The Changing Politics of European Security: European Security and Trasatlantic Relations (Palgrave studies in European Union Politics)

The Changing Politics of European Security Europe Alone?

Edited by

Stefan Gänzle and Allen G. Sens

Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics Edited by: Michelle Egan, American University USA, Neill Nugent, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK, William Paterson, University of Birmingham, UK Editorial Board: Christopher Hill, Cambridge, UK, Simon Hix, London School of Economics, UK, Mark Pollack, Temple University, USA, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Oxford UK, Morten Egeberg, University of Oslo, Norway, Amy Verdun, University of Victoria, Canada Palgrave Macmillan is delighted to announce the launch of a new book series on the European Union. Following on the sustained success of the acclaimed European Union Series, which essentially publishes research-based textbooks, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics will publish research-driven monographs. The remit of the series is broadly defined, both in terms of subject and academic discipline. All topics of significance concerning the nature and operation of the European Union potentially fall within the scope of the series. The series is multidisciplinary to reflect the growing importance of the EU as a political and social phenomenon. We will welcome submissions from the areas of political studies, international relations, political economy, public and social policy and sociology. Titles include: Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan (editors) THE EUROPEANIZATION OF BRITISH POLITICS Derek Beach and Colette Mazzucelli (editors) LEADERSHIP IN THE BIG BANGS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION Morten Egeberg (editor) MULTILEVEL UNION ADMINISTRATION The Transformation of Executive Politics in Europe Stefan Gänzle and Allen G. Sens (editors) THE CHANGING POLITICS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY Europe Alone? Isabelle Garzon REFORMING THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY History of a Paradigm Change Heather Grabbe THE EU’s TRANSFORMATIVE POWER Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (editors) THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED NATIONS Paul G. Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldová (editors) THE EUROPEAN UNION AND PARTY POLITICS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Hartmut Mayer and Henri Vogt (editors) A RESPONSIBLE EUROPE? Ethical Foundations of EU External Affairs

Lauren M. McLaren IDENTITY, INTERESTS AND ATTITUDES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION Christoph O. Meyer, Ingo Linsenmann and Wolfgang Wessels (editors) ECONOMIC GOVERNMENT OF THE EU A Balance Sheet of New Modes of Policy Coordination Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION IN EUROPE European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change Justus Schönlau DRAFTING THE EU CHARTER Rights, Legitimacy and Process

Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics Series Standing Order ISBN 1–4039–9511–7 (hardback) and ISBN 1–4039–9512–5 (paperback) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and one of the ISBNs quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

The Changing Politics of European Security Europe Alone? Edited by Stefan Gänzle Institute for European Studies Department of Political Science University of British Columbia, Canada

and

Allen G. Sens Department of Political Science University of British Columbia, Canada

Editorial matter and selection © Stefan Gänzle and Allen G. Sens 2007 All remaining chapters © respective authors 2007 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–01994–2 hardback ISBN-10: 0–230–01994–3 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The changing politics of European security : Europe alone? / edited by Stefan Gänzle and Allen G. Sens. p. cm. — (Palgrave studies in European Union politics) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN–13: 978–0–230–01994–2 (cloth) ISBN–10: 0–230–01994–3 (cloth) 1. National security—Europe. 2. Europe—Politics and government— 1945– 3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 4. Europe—Foreign relations—United States. 5. United States—Foreign relations—Europe. I. Gänzle, Stefan, 1970– II. Sens, Allen Gregory, 1964– UA646.C4785 2007 355⬘.03304—dc22 2006052025 10 16

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents List of Tables

vii

Acknowledgements

viii

Notes on Contributors

ix

List of Abbreviations

xii

1

The Changing Politics of European Security Allen G. Sens

1

Part I Changing Security Perceptions in Europe and North America 2

3

4

Internal and External Security in the EU: Is There Any Longer a Distinction? Malcolm Anderson

31

Security Perspectives in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: ‘Easternization’ and ‘Europeanization’ Lenard J. Cohen

47

Transatlantic Differences on Security Perceptions and Responses Fraser Cameron

67

Part II Ready to go Alone? Unfolding the EU’s Security and Defence Policy 5

6

7

Common Security and Defence Policy in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe Milagros Álvarez

87

The European Neighbourhood Policy: a Strategy for Security in Europe? Stefan Gänzle

110

Russia and the ESDP: Partnership Strategy versus Strategic Partnership Dmitry Danilov

135

v

vi

Contents

Part III 8

9 10

European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship

From an Alliance of Commitment to an Alliance of Choice: the Adaptation of NATO in a Time of Uncertainty Helga Haftendorn The Challenges and Limits of NATO–ESDP Synergy Alexander Moens Strategic Partners, Different Strategies: the United States and Canada in the Transatlantic Security Community Frédéric Mérand

161 180

202

Select Bibliography

220

Index

237

List of Tables 3.1 3.2

Military activity of East European EU member states and candidates Support in the EU for the accession of the South-eastern European states

vii

54 60

Acknowledgements This book is the result of our shared interest in the restructuring and adaptation of European security institutions. As with all collaborative projects, this volume would not have been possible without the assistance of many organizations and individuals. We are more than grateful to acknowledge the generous support of the UBC Institute for European Studies (IES), the UBC Centre for International Relations, the UBC Department of Political Science, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) as well as the British Council and the Consulate General of France in Vancouver. Many individuals have offered input on various drafts of the chapters. In particular, we wish to thank Eric Remacle and Frédéric Charillon for their insights. Both the Director of the Institute for European Studies, Sima Godfrey, and the Director of the Centre for International Relations, Brian Job, provided support and helped to navigate the editors through the publication process. Michael Eddy and Jason R. Young, both graduate students from the IES Masters programme, and Rob Stoddard, Assistant to the IES Director, were helpful in bringing the style into line with the publishers’ requirements. Ryan Cross assisted in preparing the bibliography. Most of all, however, we are grateful to our authors, who were always supportive in bringing this project to a successful end. STEFAN GÄNZLE AND ALLEN G. SENS VANCOUVER

viii

Notes on Contributors Milagros Álvarez is Assistant Professor of International and EU Law at the Universidad de Barcelona. She was a visiting scholar at Cornell University’s Institute of European Studies. Her research interests focus on the European integration process, the European Security and Defence Policy, transatlantic relations and international security management. Recent publications include ‘The European Security and Defence Policy within the Framework of the European Union Reform’ in Revista Jurídica Universidad de Puerto Rico (2004). Malcolm Anderson is Professor Emeritus at the University of Edinburgh and an Honorary Jean Monnet Professor. He has held teaching posts in four UK universities and temporary posts in France, Austria, Greece, Canada, Nigeria and the United States. He was Senior Fellow of the Centre of European Policy Studies until 2003 where he directed the programme on Justice and Home Affairs. He has been a consultant for the French Planning Commission, the House of Lords, the European Commission, and the Negotiation Support Unit for the Middle East Peace Process. He has published books, articles and reports on French and comparative politics, international police cooperation, the politics of frontiers, and the EU. Lenard J. Cohen is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver where he has been teaching since 1974. His main area of specialization is East European politics, with a special focus on the Balkans. His publications include Political Cohesion in a Fragile Mosaic: the Yugoslav Experience (1983), The Socialist Pyramid: Elites and Power in Yugoslavia (1989), Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (1995), ‘Serpent in the Bosom’: the Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic (2000) and Foreign Policy Realignment in the Age of Terror (2003). Fraser Cameron is Director of Studies at the European Policy Centre (EPC). A former academic and diplomat, Cameron was an adviser to the European Commission for more than ten years and was closely involved in the development of the EU’s external relations, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Cameron has been a visiting professor at ix

x

Notes on Contributors

Bruges, Florence and Edinburgh, and has lectured widely in Europe and the US. He is the author of a number of books and articles on European and international affairs. Dmitry Danilov is the Head of Department for European Security Studies in the Moscow-based Institute of Europe (Russian Academy of Sciences). He worked as a senior researcher in the analytic cell of the General Staff and is the author of about 100 scientific publications. Danilov specializes in problems of European security institutions, military-political aspects of transatlantic relationships and Russian security policy. Amongst his recent publications is ‘Russia and European Security’, in Dov Lynch (ed.), What Russia Sees, Chaillot Paper 74 (January 2005). Stefan Gänzle is Visiting Assistant Professor (DAAD) at the Institute for European Studies and the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. His research interests lie in the field of European integration and EU foreign policy. He has been a research fellow at the University of Jena, the European University Institute and a researcher-in-residence at the OSCE. His most recent publications have appeared in Cooperation and Conflict, Défense Nationale and Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Helga Haftendorn is the former Director of the Center for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy and Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Relations at the Free University of Berlin. Her main research interests are in German and American foreign policy, the Atlantic Alliance and international security. She has written several authoritative texts on German foreign policy and the theory of international relations. In addition to teaching at the University of Hamburg and the Armed Forces College (Hamburg), she has also taught in the United States (Georgetown University, 1977–78; Stanford University, 1982–83) and at the European University Institute in Florence (1989). In 1991/92 Professor Haftendorn served as President of the International Studies Association. In 1995 she received the Max-Planck Research Award for International Cooperation and in 1996 the Federal Republic of Germany’s Order of Merit. Frédéric Mérand is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Montréal in 2005. He holds a PhD in sociology from the University of California at Berkeley. The title of his dissertation was ‘Soldiers and Diplomats: the Institutionalization of the

Notes on Contributors

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European Security and Defense Policy, 1989–2003’. He has published in Acta Sociologica, European Societies, Cooperation and Conflict and Politique européenne. He is currently working on European security and transatlantic relations, German, French and British defence policies, European integration and regional organizations, and the political sociology of international relations. Alexander Moens is Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University, and a Senior Fellow in American Policy at the Fraser Institute. His most recent publications include NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the Cold War’s End to the Age of Terrorism (2003) and The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush: Values, Strategy, Loyalty (2004). Moens served in the Policy Planning Staff of Canada’s Foreign Affairs Department and he was a visiting fellow at the National Defense University in Washington DC. He is also a researcher with the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, and a Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. Allen G. Sens is a Senior Instructor in the Department of Political Science and Chair of the International Relations Programme at the University of British Columbia. He specializes in international relations, with a research and teaching focus on armed conflict and conflict management. He maintains research agendas on United Nations peacekeeping, European security and NATO, and Canadian foreign and defence policy. He is co-author of Global Politics: Origins, Currents, Directions, now in its third edition (2005).

List of Abbreviations ABC ACO ACT AFSOUTH AIDS ALTHEA AU AWACS BG C3 CARDS CBRN CEEC

CFSP CIA CJTF CMO COMECON COSAC CSCE CSDP DCI DG DGP DIA DND DRC DSACEUR EAEC EAPC EBRD EC

Atomic, Biological, Chemical Allied Command Operations Allied Command Transformation Allied Forces Southern Europe Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina African Union Airborne Warning and Control System EU Battle Groups Consultation, Command and Control Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU) Central Intelligence Agency Combined Joint Task Forces Crisis Management Operation Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Conference of European Affairs Committee Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe Common Security and Defence Policy Defense Capabilities Initiative Directorate-General High Level Defense Group against Proliferation Defense Intelligence Agency Department of National Defence (Canada) Democratic Republic of the Congo Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe European Atomic Energy Community, Euratom Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council European Bank for Reconstruction and Development European Community, European Communities xii

List of Abbreviations

ECAP ECB ECE ECHO ECJ ECSC ECU EDA EDC EEA EEC EFTA EIB EMU ENP ENPI EP EPC Erasmus ERM ERRF ESDI ESDP ESS ETA EU EUFOR EUPAT Euratom Europol GAERC GAL GATT GDP JFC JHA ICC

xiii

European Capability Action Plan European Central Bank European Command Element European Community Humanitarian Office Court of Justice of the European Communities (European Court of Justice) European Coal and Steel Community European Currency Unit European Defence Agency European Defence Community European Economic Area European Economic Community European Free Trade Association European Investment Bank European Economic and Monetary Union European Neighbourhood Policy European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument European Parliament European Political Cooperation European Community action scheme for the mobility of university students European Exchange Rate Mechanism EU Rapid Reaction Force European Security and Defence Identity European Security and Defence Policy European Security Strategy Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (terrorist Basque nationalist organization) European Union European Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina European Police Advisory team European Atomic Energy Community, EAEC European Police Office General Affairs and External Relations Council Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberación (Spanish Antiterrorist Liberation Group) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product Joint Forces Command Justice and Home Affairs International Criminal Court

xiv

List of Abbreviations

ICI IGC IFOR IPAP IMS INF IS ISAF JHA KFOR MAP MC MEDA

MEP MLF NAC NACC NATO NIS

NORAD NRF NSS NUC OAE OECD OEEC OSCE PCA PCC PfP Phare PROXIMA PRT PSC

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Intergovernmental Conference Implementation Force Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) International Military Staff Intermediate-range Nuclear Force International Staff International Security Assistance Force Justice and Home Affairs Kosovo Force Membership Action Plan Military Committee Principal financial instrument of the European Union for the implementation of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership Member of the European Parliament Multilateral Force NATO Council North Atlantic Cooperation Council North Atlantic Treaty Organization New Independent States (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) North American Aerospace Defense Command NATO Response Force National Security Strategy NATO Ukraine Commission Operation Active Endeavour Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for European Economic Cooperation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (with the NIS) Prague Capabilities Commitment Partnership for Peace Phare programme (Poland and Hungary: aid for economic restructuring) European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Provincial Reconstruction Team Political and Security Committee

List of Abbreviations

SACEUR SACT SEA SEE SFOR SHAPE Tacis TAIEX Tempus TEU UN UNSC WEU WMD WTO WU

xv

Supreme Allied Commander Europe Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Single European Act South-eastern Europe Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Technical assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office Trans-European mobility scheme for university studies Treaty on European Union United Nations United Nations Security Council Western European Union Weapons of Mass Destruction World Trade Organization Western Union

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1 The Changing Politics of European Security Allen G. Sens

In 1988 John Palmer, the European Editor at the Guardian, published a book titled Europe without America? The Crisis in Transatlantic Relations. Palmer was writing at a time of angst and conflict in American–European relations, which he argued was a reflection of a ‘systemic crisis of the Western economic and political order’ that would lead to a ‘post-Atlantic Europe’.1 This Europe, Palmer hoped, would maintain a cooperative relationship with America but would be increasingly free from the constraints of the transatlantic relationship to pursue its own path in world affairs. Palmer made no effort to hide his normative leanings. In the last sentence of the book, he argued that: ‘a Europe which broke free from the chariot wheels of nuclear militarism and helped to demonstrate new ways to master economic, political, and social problems could make an immense contribution to freedom and world peace’.2 The cover art of the paperback neatly captured Palmer’s thesis, showing a small, crowded car adorned with European flags taking a different road from a large, single-occupancy convertible decorated with the stars and stripes. The book was one among many publications in the 1980s that reflected on the consequences of a ‘widening Atlantic’ and openly contemplated the idea of Europe acting as an increasingly independent entity. Of course, much has changed in the international security environment since 1988. In addition to the end of the Cold War, major developments such as the September 11 attacks, the ‘war on terror’, the Iraq War, and increasing concerns over failed states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have fundamentally altered the global security agenda. In Europe, additional developments such as the Balkan wars of the 1990s, major terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, increasing social tensions over immigration, and political and social transition in Eastern Europe and beyond, have decisively changed the content of the dialogue on European 1

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security. Nevertheless, Palmer’s book is remarkably relevant today. The transatlantic relationship is deeply troubled. Europe is no longer a security priority for America. Security cooperation between European states has deepened. More than ever, the core component of Palmer’s normative argument – the emergence of Europe as an increasingly independent actor – is acknowledged in deliberations over the future of the European Union (EU), the fate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the fortunes of US–European relations. The central argument of this book is that European states will increasingly act alone, independent of America, on security matters. In doing so, they will prefer to operate through the institutional machinery of the EU, which is ascendant as an instrument of security coordination in Europe. The editors make this claim on the basis of five central themes that emerge from the contributions of the chapter authors. First, the change in the European security environment has raised the significance of non-military or ‘soft security’ issues such as terrorism, organized crime, immigration and social stability. On these matters, EU institutions and mechanisms are of growing relevance. Second, the divergence between the US and Europe on many security issues is symptomatic of a divide in interests and values. This divide is fuelling efforts to enhance European security collaboration. Third, the institutional development of the EU as a security actor has accelerated. The EU is already the focal point for European cooperation on a range of security issues. Fourth, the EU is establishing a record of concrete action on security matters, including engagement with neighbouring countries and the deployment of military missions beyond the borders of member states. Finally, security cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic is increasingly characterized by the formation of coalitions of states operating under a NATO or EU banner. Both NATO and the EU have facilitated such cooperation, making the EU a logical launching pad for collaborative action by European governments in the future. The volume is careful to avoid overstatement. Palmer himself hoped for the maintenance of a cooperative relationship between the US and Europe, and acknowledged the limitations of Europe’s desire or capacity to journey far from the road travelled by America. The contributors to this volume have made their assessments with the same caution. The chapters exhibit respect for the common interests, shared values and political prudence that will continue to be the basis for security cooperation between Europe and America. The development of EU machinery for security and defence cooperation has been plagued with constraints in terms of political will and concrete capacity. The missions mounted by the EU have been modest in size and scope. The rise of the EU as a security actor has led to calls for

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a new transatlantic bargain and NATO–EU cooperation. And so, when using the word ‘alone’ the editors and contributors to this volume do not mean that Europe will be insulated or isolated from America or other friends or allies. We do not mean that the transatlantic relationship, or NATO, will become extinct. We do not mean that Europe will always act as a single cohesive unit. By ‘alone’ we mean that European states will increasingly take a more independent path in response to their security concerns through the institutions and mechanisms of the EU. This introduction opens with an examination of the major themes of European security politics since 1945. Significant, and in many cases fundamental, changes have occurred that indicate a decisive thematic change is under way in the European security environment. These changes are driving European states along a more independent path in the formulation and execution of security policy. The introduction then turns to a historical overview of the politics of European security since 1945, to provide the vital context in which contemporary debates and issues must be understood. In particular, this overview tracks the troubled transatlantic relationship and the development of European security and defence mechanisms. Since the end of the Cold War, the transatlantic divide has widened and European security collaboration has deepened. The Iraq War might prove to be a watershed event in the evolution of Europe as a more independent security and defence policy actor. The introduction concludes with an overview of the volume and a presentation of the key findings of the chapter contributors, as they look to the future of European security cooperation.

The changing politics of European security What is meant by the term ‘European security’? The phrase has multiple meanings and usages. In analytical work European security can be used to describe a state or condition relative to threats. In this context, Europe is often referred to as a zone of peace, largely secure from direct and existential threats to its territorial integrity and core values. However, Europe has also been described as insecure from various threats such as terrorism or illegal immigration. In this context, the term European security is used normatively as a goal or an objective to be achieved. This volume uses the term ‘European security environment’ in reference to these threat-based aspects of security. European security can also refer to the institutional architecture, procedures, plans and policies that compose the collective effort to secure the continent and project power. NATO, the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), partnership programmes and dialogue efforts, national defence policies and force

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structure planning are all part of this subject matter. Deliberations on all of these matters are at the core of intergovernmental, institutional and public debates on security in Europe, and together constitute what we refer to as the ‘politics’ of European security. As a result, evaluations of continuity and change in European security account for changes in threat assessments, shifts in interests and values relative to those threats, the evolution of collaborative efforts and institutional arrangements, and the character of disputes and disagreements over policy and planning. Between 1945 and 1990, there was a remarkable degree of continuity in the European security environment. In fact, even after the end of the Cold War, the attacks of September 11, and the Iraq War many of these continuities remain relevant to an understanding of the politics of European security. However, a new era is unfolding and the once familiar patterns of European security no longer exert the same force over government policies, institutional arrangements and security and defence activity. This is a fundamental theme of this volume: the European security environment has changed, and with it the politics of European security. This change is evident in the five core themes that have constituted the enduring realities of European security politics. First, from 1945 to 1990, the Soviet threat presented a challenge to the territorial integrity and political independence of Western European states. In response, most of these states pursued a traditional collective defence effort through NATO. After the Cold War, the emergence of intrastate conflicts (especially in the Balkans) made the stabilization of the volatile periphery of the continent a security priority. After the September 11 and Madrid attacks, the threat of terrorism became the focus of security policy on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition, riots by Kurdish youth in Germany, the murder of Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh in November 2004, and the violent protests surrounding the publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad in 2005 raised the profile of immigration and integration policy within Europe. Energy security has also been a growing concern. As a result, the boundary between internal and external security in Europe has become less and less distinct. Responding to intrastate conflicts and threats such as terrorism has placed more focus on broader conceptions of security. These developments have diminished – perhaps even eliminated – the territorial and military defence focus of European security in the past. This in turn has driven the development of EU policies and mechanisms capable of meeting the new European security environment. Second, during the Cold War Europe was the cornerstone of US grand strategy. US leadership in NATO and the large American military presence

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on the continent was a visible expression of America’s commitment to European security. After the end of the Cold War, the US continued to maintain stationed forces in Europe and was engaged (albeit with some reluctance) in the diplomatic and military effort to pacify the Balkans. However, the US presence in Europe is declining significantly. In August 2004 the Bush Administration announced a major restructuring of the global US force posture. Base realignments and closures and troop withdrawals are a prominent component of this plan, which is designed to bring US military deployments worldwide into line with new security threats and priorities. In Europe the drawdown of US forces will be dramatic, especially in Germany. This reflects the decline in the importance of Europe in the US strategic outlook. Europe may not always be ‘alone’ or ‘without America’, but there will certainly be ‘less America’ in Europe in the future. The acceleration of efforts to develop a European defence capability are at least in part the product of a growing realization that Europe must be able to act without direct American involvement, and – if only modestly – without any American support at all. Third, the strategic relationship between Europe and America has been characterized by agreement on general goals but bitter disagreement over practice. Through the Cold War America maintained a global consciousness in its security outlook, while European states maintained a primarily continental security outlook. This led to disputes over defence strategies, nuclear weapons and relations with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, a tension always existed between two different visions of the European security architecture. An ‘Atlanticist’ vision saw European security built on a close transatlantic relationship, and manifested itself in the form of support for NATO as the pre-eminent security organization in Europe. In contrast, a European vision was built largely around the European integration process, and manifested itself in efforts to strengthen European security and defence cooperation initiatives. After the Cold War these divisions deepened. Disputes are no longer held in check by the need to maintain a common front against a clear and present danger. Transatlantic tensions over NATO enlargement, crisis response in the Balkans, the air war against Serbia, and the efforts of the EU to develop a security and defence capacity, demonstrate the consistency of the US–European divide on major security issues. The Iraq War was a crisis of major proportions. While security consultation and cooperation are still seen as important in principle, in the absence of a direct threat America and Europe are now even more distant in practice. Fourth, the politics of European security have not just been about the transatlantic relationship. European states have been divided on security and defence policy cooperation and planning, and on diplomatic

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approaches to world issues and events. While the term ‘Europe’ is often used to describe the continent, this is a deceptive (and inaccurate) use of the singular. The United States went from becoming an ‘are’ (plural) to an ‘is’ (singular) in the years following the Civil War. The states of Europe have yet to become a singular – ‘the Europe’ – especially in the area of security and defence policy. The history of European efforts to develop security and defence policy unity is one of near paralysis. The failure of the European Constitution to pass ratification in France and the Netherlands is only the latest in a series of setbacks for the larger European integration process. In the even more contentious realm of security cooperation, there is little expectation of an end to the European propensity for security policy disagreements. However, new energy from governments, the creation of new institutional machinery, and diplomatic and operational activity by the EU in the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East suggest that greater levels of EU cooperation on security matters should be expected in the future. Fifth, the politics of European security have been characterized by a high level of institutionalization. During the Cold War, the major threat to the security of Western Europe was met primarily by the collective defence efforts of NATO, which developed extensive and unequalled levels of political cooperation and military coordination. Since 1991, threats to the security of Europe have been met through the collaborative efforts of states in several institutions, especially NATO and the EU, which have been the focus of efforts to adapt the institutional architecture of Europe to new conditions. This institutional adaptation has been designed to facilitate increased flexibility and enhanced opportunities for security cooperation. This has taken two forms: the increased ability of states outside the formal membership of NATO and the EU to cooperate with member states; and the ability of groups of states within these institutions to cooperate in coalitions of the willing without requiring all member states to participate or contribute. In effect, the institutions of European security have been redesigned to facilitate the creation of coalitions, suggesting that European security efforts in the future will be characterized by à la carte arrangements rather than institutional exclusiveness or homogeneity. The dialogue and debate on European security since 1945 has been dominated by issues that are rooted in some or all of the above themes. The contemporary security dialogue and debate across the Atlantic and within Europe does of course reflect some important elements of continuity. However, the editors and contributors to this volume argue that recent developments, and evident trends, suggest a significant shift is under way in the character of the politics of European security. The changing nature of the threat environment, the US pursuit of a global security agenda that

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no longer has Europe as its focus, transatlantic tensions over security policy and military action, renewed efforts to develop European security and defence mechanisms, and a changing institutional architecture, suggest that significant elements of discontinuity are impacting on familiar patterns of policy and practice. The result of this change is an increasing trend towards Europe acting alone on security matters. This argument is addressed in more detail in the following exploration of the history of European security.

The evolution of the politics of European security from 1945 Security cooperation in Western Europe developed in the context of the Soviet threat and the dream of European integration. The first efforts came in the form of the Anglo–French Dunkirk Treaty of 1947 and the subsequent Treaty of Brussels of March 1948. However, there were few illusions about the capacity of this effort to defend its members against the emerging threat of the Soviet Union. That role would be left to NATO, established on 4 April 1949. Lord Ismay, the first Secretary-General of NATO, famously described NATO’s purpose as keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down. The Alliance would deter Soviet aggression, commit the US to the defence of Europe, and provide confidence that Germany was no longer a threat. NATO was built on the principle of collective defence, enshrined in Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance became the dominant security organization in Europe, and under this umbrella the European integration process turned toward the political and economic realm with the creation of the Council of Europe (1949), the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the European Economic Community (1957). There were renewed efforts in the 1950s to establish a European defence effort. In 1950 the Pleven Plan (proposed by the French Premier René Pleven) proposed the creation of a unified European army. This idea developed into efforts to establish a European defence organization, called the European Defence Community (EDC). While a treaty establishing the EDC was signed in 1952, it was not universally admired in Europe or across the Atlantic. The United Kingdom did not share the same federal vision of the future of Europe upon which the EDC was based, and the US did not like the plan as it could potentially undercut NATO. The EDC collapsed in 1954 when the French parliament failed to ratify the treaty. Attempts to salvage the idea of an independent European defence capacity led to efforts to revitalize the Treaty of Brussels. In 1954, West Germany and Italy joined

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the treaty and the Western European Union (WEU) was established. The WEU would survive the Cold War, but would never be more than a diplomatic and military paper plan. Efforts to develop a broader foreign policy dimension to the European integration process met with modest results. In the early 1960s, France presented the Fouchet Plan which envisioned drastic changes to the governance of European cooperation. The proposals included plans for closer European foreign and defence policies. The Fouchet Plan was rejected by the other members of the European Community and amid considerable acrimony the French proposals were shelved in 1962. In 1970 the European Political Cooperation (EPC) process was founded, consisting of informal but regular meetings of the foreign ministers of Community countries. Although the EPC system was largely unsuccessful at forging joint positions, it did establish the principle of consultation on political affairs within the Community. In 1981, stung by the inability of Europe to respond effectively to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution, the European Community adopted the London Report, requiring consultation between member states and the European Commission on foreign policy matters. The Single European Act of 1986 formalized the EPC mechanism, but with a general lack of results in forging common foreign policy positions. The only other formalized multilateral security mechanism in the Euro–Atlantic area during the Cold War was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Established in 1973 to reduce Cold War tensions and develop East–West dialogue on economic cooperation and human rights, the CSCE proved to be a large and unwieldy mechanism limited by the divisions of the Cold War. In 1994, the CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). On security matters, NATO was the pre-eminent organization in Europe. However, the Alliance was itself troubled by a series of disagreements and crises. Member states struggled to find common positions on political and military matters. The Suez Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, détente and arms control all provoked deep transatlantic and European divisions which challenged the cohesion of the Alliance. The first effort to establish the military requirements and expectations of member states was the ill-fated Lisbon Force Goals initiative of 1952. This failure was the beginning of persistent tensions between the United States and many European states on burden sharing in the Alliance. While NATO would succeed in achieving an unprecedented level of military coordination and interoperability, progress was slow and characterized by clashes over strategy and weapons procurement. The importance of the nuclear deterrent in Alliance strategy led to a series of disputes within NATO on

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nuclear strategy, which almost always pitted the US against many of its European allies. Episodes such as the Multilateral Force (MLF) controversy in the 1950s, the debate over ‘flexible response’ in the late 1960s, the neutron bomb controversy of the 1970s, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) controversy in the 1980s were symptomatic of basic disagreements within the Alliance on nuclear weapons. These diplomatic and strategic disputes led to discussions of a ‘widening Atlantic’ in the mid-1980s. It was in this context that John Palmer wrote his book Europe without America? suggesting that: ‘[t]he economic, military, and political world of the Atlantic Alliance . . . is visibly crumbling’.3 As Andrew J. Pierre observed, ‘perceptions and interests, as viewed on either side of the ocean, are pulling Europe and America apart’.4 Demographic changes in the United States, the passing of the WWII generation, a divergence in social values and trade disputes were all taken as evidence of a growing transatlantic split. Earl Ravenal argued that NATO’s crises ‘are not accidental or superficial . . . in fact, they derive from the divergent perceptions of alliance, the divergent security needs, and the divergent geopolitical situations of the United States and Europe’.5 However, there were limits to the widening Atlantic thesis. The transatlantic link remained a reflection of common security interests and shared values, democratic norms and economic interdependence. Even those who made the case for a widening Atlantic recognized the limits of the argument. Andrew J. Pierre observed that there were ‘set limits on the extent to which the two sides of the Atlantic can drift apart’.6 Even though he made the case that European society was increasingly differentiated from America, Ralf Dahrendorf observed that among Europeans, ‘the continued need for the Atlantic Alliance is unchallenged both in terms of values and interest’.7 The end of the Cold War and the politics of European security The end of the Cold War was the third geopolitical earthquake of the twentieth century. Mercifully, this earthquake came without the scale of human suffering and devastation caused by the world wars, but its impact on political and security environments was just as dramatic. The bipolar political world disappeared, the Soviet threat vanished, Germany was unified and the Iron Curtain swept away. What followed was a period of political uncertainty in which national security policies were adjusted to meet new conditions. The politics of European security after the Cold War were dominated by debates over institutional adaptation and reform, approaches to Eastern Europe and responses to the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. The adaptation of NATO to the new security environment was swift, beginning with the extension of a ‘hand of friendship’ to Central

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The Changing Politics of European Security

and Eastern Europe in the London Declaration of 6 July 1990.8 At the Rome Summit of 7–8 November 1991 the Alliance adopted a new strategic concept and a new force structure.9 The Alliance no longer spoke of threats, instead focusing on ‘risks’ originating from regional instability, ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, movement of peoples, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the environment. NATO’s new role was to project security and stability through political and military cooperation with non-member states, and the use of military force in crisis response operations. The desire to extend stability eastward and placate calls for the enlargement of NATO led to the creation of new institutional mechanisms in the Alliance. These efforts began with the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) on 10 March 1992, a forum for dialogue and consultation on a wide range of issues. At the Brussels Summit of 10–11 January 1994, the Partnerships for Peace (PfP) programme was established to deepen political and military cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries. Subsequently, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) replaced the NACC on 30 May 1997. NATO also reached out to Russia, and the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security was signed by NATO and the Russian Federation on 14 May 1997. This led to the creation of the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). A relationship with the Ukraine was developed through the NATO Ukraine Commission (NUC). In 1995, NATO began a study of enlargement, and political debates began on which countries should be admitted. At the Madrid Summit in 1997 three countries – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – were invited to begin accession negotiations, and on 12 March 1999 these countries were admitted into the Alliance. NATO’s adoption of a peacekeeping and crisis response role was prompted by the violent breakup of Yugoslavia and the failure of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Member states were motivated by a desire to prevent a wider Balkan war and to respond to large-scale human rights abuses. In January 1992 the then NATO SecretaryGeneral Manfred Wörner suggested that NATO could contribute its forces and related assets to peace missions under the auspices of the CSCE or the UN. On 4 June 1992 NATO adopted a peacekeeping role on a ‘case by case basis’.10 In response to a request by the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali for NATO support in Bosnia, on 17 December 1992 NATO members confirmed ‘the preparedness of our Alliance to support on a case by case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council’.11 Significantly, this announcement came after NATO had been involved in the region for almost six months, monitoring and then enforcing the UN sanctions

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regime imposed against Yugoslavia. NATO involvement in Bosnia would increase to include the use of airpower to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia and subsequently to conduct air strikes to protect UN ‘safe areas’. When the Dayton Accords were signed on 15 December 1995, NATO deployed an Implementation Force (IFOR) to replace the UN-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia. IFOR deployed some 58,000 troops from NATO and non-NATO countries, tasked with the creation of a secure environment in Bosnia. The politics of NATO’s new roles were divisive. There was considerable controversy over the question of enlargement. With several former Warsaw Pact countries clamoring for admission into NATO, the Alliance bickered over admission criteria, the impact of enlargement on relations with Russia, and the ability of NATO to function with more members. In the end, American insistence on Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic carried the day, but not without creating resentment. The peacekeeping and crisis response operations of the Alliance were also highly contentious. Some European countries were uncomfortable with NATO acting as an instrument of power projection. Some member states refused to contribute to IFOR, leading Joseph Lepgold to suggest that NATO faced a ‘collective action problem’ because crisis response operations ‘do not involve members’ territorial or political integrity’.12 The air strikes issue in particular was highly divisive. The Clinton Administration advocated the strikes, while other NATO countries were opposed, fearing reprisals against their UN peacekeeping contingents on the ground. NATO’s direct involvement in the Balkans would not end in Bosnia. On 24 March 1999, the Alliance launched a bombing campaign against the Republic of Yugoslavia in response to the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo. This action provoked considerable controversy, especially as NATO had failed to obtain a UN Security Council mandate authorizing the use of force. Nevertheless, the campaign was successful in compelling the Milosevic government to agree to terms. The air campaign was suspended on 10 June, and on 12 June the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) began its deployment into Kosovo. The NATO air campaign against Serbia provoked considerable public protest, particularly in Europe, and disagreement within the North Atlantic Council on the wisdom of the war and on its execution. The experience left a sour aftertaste, with the Americans frustrated over the difficulties of conducting a war through NATO while many European states were unhappy with US dominance.13 NATO engagement in the Balkans provoked a debate on whether NATO should take on a global role. In 1993, US Senator Richard Lugar argued that NATO would have to go out of area or ‘go out of business’.14 In 1997, former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and former Secretary of

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The Changing Politics of European Security

Defense William Perry suggested the Alliance become an instrument of collective action anywhere in the world.15 However, European member states were concerned that a global NATO would become an instrument for dragging European countries into America’s global security engagements. NATO’s operational experience also sparked tensions over a widening gap in military capabilities between the US and other member states. In 1999, General Klaus Naumann, a former chairman of NATO’s military committee, warned that the US and its allies ‘will not even be able to fight on the same battlefield’ in the near future.16 Dependence on US military assets was also in evidence in the air campaign against Serbia.17 The result of this asymmetry was steady US pressure on Europe to increase its usable military capacity. As the 1990s drew to a close, NATO could boast accomplishments. The Alliance had been restructured, cooperative arrangements had been established with non-member states, new members had been admitted, operations in Bosnia had been effective, and the Milosevic government in Serbia had been removed. However, transatlantic and European tensions over major strategic and operational issues had been commonplace. While NATO was adapting to new missions and roles, renewed efforts were under way to develop a European foreign and defence policy. Early exertions sought to reinvigorate the WEU. In June 1992, the WEU Council issued the Petersberg Declaration, which called for EU commonality on humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and crisis management missions, which came to be known as the ‘Petersberg Tasks’. In 1990, France and Germany established a Franco–German Brigade (later a Corps), which was made available to the WEU and the ‘European pillar’ of NATO. By the mid-1990s, additional countries joined and the name of the formation was changed to the EuroCorps. Efforts to energize the WEU were soon submerged by larger attempts to infuse the EU with a stronger external policy component. To this end, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one of the three pillars of the EU. The CFSP reflected the desire of member states to forge common strategies through joint actions and common positions. Joint actions addressed specific contingencies where operational action by the EU was deemed necessary. Common positions defined the general policy approach taken by the EU on a larger foreign policy theme or geographic region. However, in practical terms there were significant limitations to the CFSP. The framework specifically allowed for states to express their independent character, and decisions on common foreign and security policies were subject to the consensual decision-making procedures of the EU. In practice, the crisis in Yugoslavia exposed the lack of a cohesive foreign policy identity, as European states proved unable to forge a joint position

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on the recognition of the breakaway republics of the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the provisions of the CFSP were the foundation for subsequent efforts to build on the Maastricht Treaty. On 2 October 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed, and went into force on 1 May 1999. The Amsterdam Treaty created the post of High Representative for the CFSP to advise the Presidency of the Council of Ministers on CFSP matters. The High Representative could (at the request of the Presidency) represent the Council of Ministers abroad, thus enabling Europe to speak with one voice. The Amsterdam Treaty also provided for the gradual development of a common defence policy, although it did not commit member states to a common defence. The Amsterdam Treaty also integrated the WEU into the EU as its military component, and formally incorporated the Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP framework. In December 1998, French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a bilateral declaration in Saint-Malo, which called on the EU to ‘have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’.18 This began more serious discussions of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and at the Cologne European Council in 1999, the ESDP concept became part of the CFSP framework. Building on the momentum, the Headline Goals adopted by the EU at Helsinki in December 1999 called for the creation of an EU Rapid Reaction Corps of up to 60,000 personnel, deployable in 60 days and sustainable for one year. Further institutional innovations developed to strengthen ESDP included the creation of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) as an interim body in 2000. Meeting regularly to draft opinions and implement decisions for the Council, the PSC exercised political control and strategic direction over EU crisis response missions. Also created were a military advisory body, the EU Military Committee, and a planning and support element in the form of the EU Military Staff. The developments in NATO and the EU were regarded with suspicion by their respective advocates. The US and other Atlanticist countries in Europe were concerned that the development of the CFSP and ESDP could threaten the supremacy of the Alliance and therefore any European defence initiatives should be subsumed under NATO. At the same time, EU developments (driven particularly by France) were motivated by a desire to seek a more independent European capacity, not only to build a common European identity in world affairs, but to reduce what many saw as an unhealthy and politically damaging reliance on America. The two visions of European security cooperation did find points of political compromise and institutional collaboration. At the Brussels Summit of 10–11 January 1994,

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The Changing Politics of European Security

Alliance members approved the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, with a view to generating forces ‘tailored’ to respond to crisis contingencies or peacekeeping requirements.19 The CJTF concept was also a means of bridging the institutional divide between NATO and the EU, as it envisioned a situation in which a European mission could use NATO assets (with permission) in support of a mission that was not led by NATO or directly involved US forces. In effect, this would facilitate the deployment of European military operations but maintain NATO’s position as the dominant security institution on the continent. Despite this effort at political and institutional accommodation, suspicion and institutional rivalry remained a common theme in the NATO–EU relationship. In the mid-1990s, a new time of troubles emerged for the transatlantic relationship. Once again, broad differences across the Atlantic were pulling the two continents further apart. Economic tensions on issues ranging from growth hormones in food products to cultural exemptions in trade talks poisoned the atmosphere between the US and Europe. Diplomatic disputes over rogue states, policy in the Middle East, missile defence, the Kyoto protocol and China were evidence of a wide range of disagreements. Demographic shifts were once again identified as evidence for a widening Atlantic.20 From the European perspective, American society was tarnished by crime, poverty, race riots and corporate capitalism. A season of ‘America bashing’ was under way.21 As William Wallace has noted, ‘[t]he result has been a growing divergence between America’s perception of its moral leadership and European perception of the United States as a flawed superpower’.22 The situation deteriorated to the point that Owen Harries was moved to exclaim that ‘[t]he political “West” is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile “East” to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy.’23 For others, this was an overstatement. Europe and America still shared fundamental security interests. Antony Blinken argued that the notion of a transatlantic split was a ‘false crisis’ largely driven by Europe’s elite, not broader social attitudes.24 Trade flows across the Atlantic had increased. Europe and America had cooperated on a wide range of issues and despite differences had reached common ground on NATO enlargement, the Balkans and institutional adaptation. Even US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted, ‘Our greatest asset still lies in our values – freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.’25 Nevertheless, there was a general acknowledgement that the Atlantic community would be less cohesive. A powerful undercurrent of coalition thinking was evident in the willingness of the ‘great powers’ to coordinate policy in forums such

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as the Contact Group in Bosnia, the involvement of non-NATO states in NATO military operations, and the self-conscious decision under the CJTF framework to acknowledge that NATO assets might be used in European military operations in which the US was not taking part. The politics of European security from September 11 to Iraq The attacks of September 11 and the subsequent heightened awareness of terrorism had a significant impact on the European security environment. The US-led ‘war on terror’ soon dominated the security agendas of North American and European capitals. Despite the attention international terrorism received, there was continuity in the threat assessments of governments after September 11. Intrastate conflict and failed states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, autocratic regimes and dictatorships, organized crime and trafficking in people and narcotics, and immigration and integration challenges remained prominent security concerns. Nevertheless, after the attacks of September 11 terrorism became the focus of security deliberations and activity in NATO and the EU. In response to the September 11 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, pledging its support to the US. At the Prague Summit of 21–22 November 2002, NATO developed the ‘Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism’, which identified initiatives to be taken on defensive measures, ‘consequence management’, counter-terrorism abroad and military cooperation with civilian and police agencies. NATO soon became engaged in Afghanistan, one of the theatres of the ‘war on terror’. On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which quickly became the operational priority for the Alliance. Initially confined to the area around Kabul, in October of 2003 the mission expanded to a wider area of the countryside. Moving in phases, ISAF has deployed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout much of Afghanistan in an effort to improve the security situation and assist reconstruction and nation-building. The future of the ISAF mission remains in question as the security situation has fluctuated, contributing countries continue to experience casualties, and the momentum of nation-building efforts seems to have slowed. NATO agreed at the 2004 Istanbul Summit to assist in the training of Iraqi security forces. Organizationally, NATO was preoccupied by another round of enlargement and renewed efforts at internal restructuring and reform. On 29 March 2004, in a ‘biggish bang’ seven new members were admitted into the Alliance. NATO now had 26 members, ten of which came from the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. The size of the enlargement

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The Changing Politics of European Security

round was decisively influenced by a shift in policy in Washington after September 11. Initially reluctant to risk bogging down NATO decisionmaking with a large number of new members, the US was opposed to the ‘big bang’ option that would have admitted ten new states into the Alliance. After the September 11 attacks, the US reversed its policy in light of the need to gain support for the ‘war on terror’. Other organizational changes came in the form of a restructuring of NATO’s famously cumbersome command structure, and a commitment to ‘Transformation’ – a largely US-led initiative aimed at the modernization of NATO’s military capability to enhance interoperability and the incorporation of new technological developments. NATO also engaged in efforts to revitalize the political foundations of the Alliance. At the June 2004 Summit in Istanbul, the Alliance initiated a project known as ‘Comprehensive Political Guidance’ (CPG), aimed at establishing a set of political guidelines that would act as the basis for military planning, development and operations. NATO also continued to tinker with its operational capacities. Largely at the initiative of the US, at the Prague Summit in 2002 NATO announced the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF), which became operational in 2006. The NRF is a military formation designed to respond rapidly to a number of possible contingencies including evacuations, counter-terrorism and initial deployment into a crisis. The NRF is also a vehicle for the introduction of ‘Transformation’ concepts and technologies into NATO. Despite these developments, disputes within the Alliance continued in the lead-up to the Riga Summit in November 2006, primarily over a US proposal to create a ‘Global Partnership’ forum that would serve as a link between NATO and partner countries around the world. This proposal is regarded with suspicion by some European governments, who see the forum as another attempt by America to link NATO with US global strategy. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the EU responded by adopting the European Union Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. Calling the September 11 attacks ‘cowardly’, the Framework Decision document called for ‘an effective response to terrorism at the level of the European Union’.26 The EU subsequently adopted measures in the area of police and judicial cooperation which included a European arrest warrant, a common definition of terrorism and a list of terrorist organizations. Internationally, the EU adopted measures on the freezing of assets and joint law enforcement actions against terrorism abroad. Under the CFSP, the EU enhanced its dialogues with other countries on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, the EU struggled to find commonality on the role of ESDP in the fight against terrorism. The Madrid

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bombings of 11 March 2004 accelerated the counter-terrorism efforts of the EU. The European Council adopted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism on 25 March 2004. The Council created a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator post to the Council Secretariat, and developed plans to improve counterterrorism information flows between EU member states and to enhance border controls and travel document security. The ‘Hague Programme’ emerged from the Council Summit of November 2004, committing member states to the creation of an area of ‘freedom, security, and justice’ through a wide range of security enhancements in asylum, immigration and border control policies.27 Significant efforts were also under way to enhance European security and defence collaboration. In December 2003, the EU adopted a European Security Strategy (ESS). The motive for the ESS emerged out of a growing realization that the EU needed to define its diplomatic and strategic interests in the context of a wider threat assessment. European division over Iraq and increased concern over transatlantic relations prompted discussions on a common European approach to a wide range of security threats. The ESS called for a ‘holistic’ approach to European security, and the use of EU diplomatic, trade, development and military capacities to meet Europe’s security challenges. The ESS also committed EU member states to becoming more active and capable in crisis management and conflict prevention. According to the document, the member states ‘need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’.28 The document was also an effort to reach out to Washington, noting repeatedly the importance of strong US–EU–NATO relations. Following on the creation of the ESS, in June 2004 the EU endorsed a plan of action to enhance member state capacities to support the objectives of the ESS, particularly in the areas of force projection. Among other initiatives, the 2010 Headline Goals called for the creation of rapidly deployable battle groups, airlift capabilities, the availability of an aircraft carrier and advances in interoperability. This initiative was followed by the creation of the European Defence Agency by the European Council on 12 July 2004. The objectives of the EDA are the coordination of defence operations, enhancing cooperation on armaments development, encouraging the competitiveness of European defence industries, and encouraging defence research and development. In November 2004 the EU decided to develop 13 small rapidly deployable battle groups. Each battle group is to be composed of 1000–1500 personnel, deployable within ten days of a unanimous EU decision, and sustainable in the field for three months. Questions have arisen about the duplication of effort with the NRF, but the formal

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The Changing Politics of European Security

position of the EU and NATO is that the NRF and the EU Battle groups are ‘complementary’. Since 2003, the EU has become much more engaged as an international security actor by deploying numerous operational missions. On 1 January 2003 the EU established the European Union Police Mission in BosniaHerzegovina. The EU replaced a NATO mission in Macedonia with Operation Concordia, mandated to contribute to security and stability. The EU Police Mission PROXIMA, launched on 15 December 2003, was subsequently replaced by the European Police Advisory team (EUPAT) on 24 November 2005. From 12 June to 1 September 2003 the EU mounted Operation Artemis, with France as the lead nation. Backed by a UN Security Council mandate, the mission was deployed as an interim emergency multinational force in Bunia, in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The EU has also been engaged in security sector reform in the DRC. At the June 2004 NATO Summit in Istanbul NATO agreed to hand over control of the SFOR mission in Bosnia to an EU-led mission (Operation Althea). On 16 July 2004, the EU established the EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia to provide support, advice and mentoring to senior officials of the Georgian government. 2005 was a busy year, with the creation of the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and the Ukraine, the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, and the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah. The EU also provided operational and logistics assistance to the African Union (AU) AMIS II mission in Darfur. After the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 member states on 1 May 2004, the next big step in the development of the EU was to have been the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. The development of the European Constitutional Treaty was motivated by a desire for the grand unification of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Communities that formed the foundation of the EU. A document of principle as well as practice, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe attempted to define the powers of the EU relative to its member states and the roles of European institutions. A final draft of the treaty was formally approved in October 2004. The draft treaty specifies that ‘the Union shall have competence to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy’.29 The treaty called for the creation of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs responsible for all matters of EU foreign policy. It also provided for the possibility of small groups of member states taking action under the banner of the EU: ‘the Union may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary

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capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task.’30 However, French and Dutch voters failed to ratify the treaty in referendums in May and June of 2005, effectively scuttling the treaty. NATO–EU cooperation continued, but again on a limited and somewhat suspicious basis. On 16 December 2002, NATO and EU member states agreed on the ‘NATO–EU Declaration on ESDP’, in which both organizations agreed to a strategic relationship that called for mutual consultation but also respect for the decision-making autonomy of each organization. ESDP is considered to be complementary to, but independent of, NATO. This was followed by the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements of 17 March 2003. This agreement established the foundation for NATO–EU cooperation on crisis management, essentially allowing the EU to draw on NATO assets for EU-led missions, such as the EU mission in Bosnia. The Berlin Plus arrangements specify provisions for information sharing, availability of assets and consultation procedures. In 2005, the two organizations agreed to establish permanent liaison offices for the EU at SHAPE and for NATO within the European Union Military Staff, and initiated regular meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee. The transatlantic relationship after the Iraq War In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the launch of the ‘war on terror’, it was evident that differences in threat perceptions and security policy approaches existed between the United States and Europe, and within Europe itself. However, while the ‘war on terror’ and the attack on Afghanistan provoked some deliberation and disagreement across the Atlantic and within Europe, the Iraq War became the focal point of a transatlantic crisis between Europe and America, and the source of sharp disagreement between European states. European governments were divided on the war, with some (such as the United Kingdom, Italy and Poland) choosing to actively support the US while others (such as France and Germany) withheld their support or even sought to confront the US in the UN. The Iraq War had once again exposed the limitations of a common European approach to major international crisis and conflicts. Nevertheless, it was the poor state of the relationship between Europe and America that garnered the majority of the attention. Why this was the case provides an important insight into the significance of the US–European relationship in global politics. The future of the transatlantic relationship is of fundamental importance. It is difficult to argue that a world in which Europe and America

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The Changing Politics of European Security

are increasingly uncooperative or even at odds on security matters will be more stable or responsive to regional and global challenges. Increased division on security matters between states in the Euro–Atlantic area would erode the elaborate institutional architecture developed over decades, the neglect damaging not only the capacity to engage in multilateral action but also the institutional foundations of the multilateral relationship with Russia and other partner countries. Any erosion in multilateral will and capacity will leave America and Europe less able to respond to those crises around the periphery of Europe or beyond that require a coordinated and multilateral response, to the long-term detriment of the security of both. In short, a plausible storyline for the future is a slow but steady breakdown in the security cooperation that is the foundation of stability and collaborative security efforts in the post-Cold War northern hemisphere. This explains the near apocalyptic expressions of concern over the future of the transatlantic relationship. Observers have suggested that fundamental differences now divide America and Europe. Robert Kagan famously characterized the difference by arguing that Americans were from Mars, while Europeans were from Venus.31 In their book Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq, Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro argued that the transatlantic community was in such a poor state that the right issue – such as war with Iraq – would lead to a rapid deterioration in the relationship.32 In a similar argument, Bruno Tertrais suggested that Iraq was the ‘perfect storm’ that rocked transatlantic relations.33 David P. Calleo suggests that the American vision of the future is centred on a unipolarity, US hegemony and unilateralism, while the European vision of the future is centred on multipolarity, balance and multilateralism. ‘The real transatlantic issue’, argues Calleo, ‘is whether Europe and America can accommodate each other sufficiently so that Europe can continue its integration to a point where the West can come into a harmonious balance. Europe and America will then be able to play together a harmonious role in shaping the world’s future. Otherwise, the West seems likely to grow increasingly preoccupied and disabled by its own internal conflicts.’34 Thomas Risse argued that: ‘current disagreements between Europe and the United States go beyond ordinary policy conflicts and touch issues of common values’.35 Elizabeth Pond suggested that the survival of NATO itself was in doubt.36 Based on such observations, the fabric of the Atlantic community seemed to be in tatters, with a strategic divorce between Europe and America imminent. This introduction has already counselled against overstatement. Certainly, Europe and America are far apart on issues such as the use of military force, responses to threatening regimes, investment in defence capabilities, environmental degradation and trade policy. Disputes and

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disagreements between the US and European countries continue to manifest themselves on a range of diplomatic issues including trade with China, Iran and the Israeli–Palestinian dispute. And yet, the ties that bind remain. Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro acknowledge that despite their differences, Europe and America share the same ideas and beliefs.37 Mark Pollack suggests that the alleged differences between a ‘soft power’ Europe and a realpolitik America have been exaggerated.38 An opinion survey conducted in 2004 reflected mixed feelings, but hardly ones that indicated an inseparable gulf between Europe and America. According to the survey, 70 per cent of Americans and 60 per cent of Europeans believed that their countries shared enough common values to cooperate on world problems. Sixty-five per cent of Europeans believed that the US and Europe have grown closer or maintained their relationship in recent years. Fifty per cent of Europeans believed the EU should take a more independent approach in security and defence matters. Fifty-eight per cent of Europeans found strong US leadership undesirable, a sentiment that has increased steadily since 1999. On Iraq, 80 per cent of Europeans believed the war was not worth the human and monetary costs, and 73 per cent believed the war had increased the threat of terrorism. Americans were divided.39

The future of the politics of European security: Europe alone? Against the backdrop of the evolution in the politics of European security, the impact of the end of the Cold War and September 11, and the post-Iraq War transatlantic crisis, the contributors to this volume explore a number of questions concerning the future of European security. If direct American engagement is no longer necessary for the military security of Europe, and transatlantic perceptions of threats, interests and even values are at least in part diverging, are we entering an era in which Europe is largely alone in meeting the security challenges it faces? Will European states increasingly take a more independent path in the pursuit of their security objectives? Is the EU ascendant as the most important security organization in Europe? If the EU is becoming the primary institutional vehicle for European security, is NATO in decline? How will the failed ratification of the Constitution Treaty affect CFSP and ESDP? Will transatlantic and European security policies and activities increasingly be conducted in an à la carte fashion by ‘coalitions of the willing’ mustered in NATO and the EU? The chapters of this volume are organized into three parts. In the first part of the volume, three chapters evaluate the changing threat perceptions in the Euro–Atlantic area. All these chapters argue that the dominant

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threat perception across Europe and the Atlantic has changed. Terrorism and ‘soft security’ issues are now the primary focus of governments, while traditional military security issues have declined in prominence. As a result, the EU is increasingly the focal point for security deliberation and coordination by European governments. However, significant differences exist across the Atlantic and within Europe on responses and priorities. While differences across the Atlantic will encourage further development of the EU as a security actor, differences within Europe will continue to be a constraint on the ability of the EU to forge common positions and engage in multilateral actions. In the opening chapter, Malcolm Anderson argues that two ‘grand narratives’ are evident in the security debate in Europe: a traditional narrative focused on territorial and military security; and an emerging and increasingly dominant narrative focused on terrorism, organized crime and trafficking. As these threats have emerged, the distinction between internal and external security has eroded. In response, European governments have increased their efforts to develop capabilities across a wide range of security, law enforcement and regulatory issue areas. While the EU will be the lead institution on these matters, Anderson is sceptical of the ability of the EU to forge unified positions and take decisive action on the basis of this new narrative. In the following chapter, Lenard Cohen suggests that differences in threat perceptions between Western Europe and Eastern Europe (and within Eastern Europe itself) explain the divergence in the security policies across these countries. In particular, Cohen argues that Eastern European approaches toward Atlanticism, Russia and energy security demonstrate a divergence of interests within Europe. Cohen pays special attention to the impact of the infamous ‘new Europe–old Europe’ differentiation, and how developments in the western Balkan region have influenced both the evolving European security environment and transatlantic relations. Cohen argues that while the ‘Europeanization’ of security policy will continue, the unique concerns of Eastern Europe are unlikely to be erased and instead will remain part of the politics of European security. Fraser Cameron then analyses the similarities and differences in transatlantic security perceptions. The emphasis in this contribution is on the transatlantic divide, and the erosion (but not the destruction) of the Atlantic community. Cameron examines and contrasts the US National Security Strategy of September 2002 and the European Security Strategy of December 2003. Cameron argues that there are many similarities between the two documents that reflect a general consensus on changing security priorities. However, he also argues that areas of difference will continue to affect the future of EU–US relations. The chapter then considers

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the impact of the Iraq War on transatlantic relations and institutional arrangements and argues that NATO is no longer the primary forum for strategic discussions in a new security environment. The EU is the principle stabilizing regime in Europe, and hence the time is ripe to consider a new accommodation between the EU and the US. The second part of the book is devoted to an analysis of the future of the EU as a security actor. In this section, the chapters argue that the EU will continue to develop the conceptual framework and capacities to act alone on security matters. The draft of the Constitution Treaty and the ESS speak to a growing ‘Europeanization’ of security thinking, while diplomatic engagements with neighbouring countries and with Russia are reflective of a growing international presence for the EU. Milagros Álvarez opens this section of the volume with an evaluation of the significance of the Constitution Treaty and its subsequent failure. In the area of security and defence policy, the treaty contained four novel features: the formalization of ESDP, the recognition of cooperative flexibility in the areas of security and defence, the regularization of mechanisms for strengthening EU operational capabilities and the new regulations for EU international agreements, which effectively broadens the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction. Álvarez also points out that the draft treaty acknowledges the need for flexibility when smaller groups of member states wish to cooperate more deeply or take action in coalitions. Álvarez argues that the failure of the treaty will have a minimal impact on the future of ESDP or its design, because the provisions agreed to in the treaty will form the model for future developments. While the treaty was therefore a step forward for ESDP and for Europe as an international actor, Álvarez notes that it would not have solved the issue of intergovernmental unanimity in decision-making, or the tension between legitimacy and internal solidarity. Shifting the discussion to EU diplomatic activity and policy toward the periphery of Europe, Stefan Gänzle examines the role and impact of the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Gänzle argues that the ENP has the potential to provide added value in terms of ‘soft security’ to both the EU and its immediate vicinity provided that the ultimate objective of membership remains on the negotiating table. This chapter illustrates the wider impact that EU processes are having on the promotion of security and stability in the wider European space and the increased role of the EU as a mechanism for wider security cooperation in Europe. Gänzle argues that the ENP has made the EU more visible and influential as an international actor. In his chapter, Dmitry Danilov explores the EU relationship with Russia. This relationship is an important example of the EU acting alone,

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independently of America. Russia is a crucial country in the politics of European security, given its role as an energy exporter and a veto-wielding member of the Security Council. Russia is also an important actor in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and North-east Asia. At the same time, the future of Russian democracy is a source for concern in Europe and America. Danilov characterizes the EU–Russia relationship as generally positive but with uncertain prospects. Russia and the EU do have common interests in a positive relationship, and there are opportunities for direct cooperation, particularly on terrorism. Danilov argues that the EU must account for Moscow in its external policies, and recognizes Russia’s importance in the realm of security. For Russia, the growing political and security development of the EU fits with Russian conceptions of a multipolar world and cooperation with the EU furthers Russia’s aims of a closer relationship with Europe. However, Danilov argues that there are important constraints on the practical level of cooperation between the EU and Russia. There is division between European countries on approaches to Russia, and debate on the state of Russian democracy and the direction of Russian foreign policy. The Russian relationship with NATO is another complicating factor in building EU–Russia relations. The third section of the volume continues to explore the development of the EU as a security policy actor, but in the context of the transatlantic relationship in general and the EU–NATO relationship in particular. In this section, more attention is paid to ESDP and the implications of growing EU capacity on defence for the future of security cooperation in Europe. The chapters in this section agree that the EU is increasingly relevant as an independent security actor in the context of an eroding transatlantic relationship and a declining NATO. Again, there is caution in all of these arguments, and the chapters respect the limitations of the will and capacity of Europe to act alone, and the limitations of the EU as a military security institution. They do not argue that NATO will disappear, and agree that some form of NATO–EU cooperation will continue. In the opening chapter, Helga Haftendorn argues that NATO has been transformed from a common defence alliance to a collective security institution: from an alliance of commitment to an alliance of choice. Haftendorn envisions a more flexible alliance that will act as a transatlantic ‘clearing house’ for the coordination of member states and the formation of coalitions. She suggests that the US willingness to defer to allies has declined, as has the European dependence on America for its security. In the new security environment, there is no solid glue holding the Alliance together, and Haftendorn calls for an institutional linkage between NATO and the EU.

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In the following chapter, Alexander Moens argues that EU–NATO cooperation has peaked, and a prolonged status quo period has begun. There will be pragmatic developments in institutional cooperation between the EU and NATO in this period, but Moens is sceptical of claims that the EU–NATO relationship constitutes an emerging European security regime, because of divisions and interests within Europe and across the Atlantic. Moens argues that the fundamental contradiction in European integration since the foundation of NATO and the European Coal and Steel Community remains in place: the dominant structure of cooperation in economic policy after World War II rested with a functionalist ‘Europe Only’ forum, while security and defence cooperation continued in an intergovernmental ‘Europe plus North America’ forum. Moens concludes that the EU is acting as a more unified actor in the global arena, and suggests that ESDP will develop as the European integration process resumes some momentum in the future. However, the price of the strengthening of Europe’s capacity to act alone may be the weakening of Atlantic security. In the concluding chapter, Frédéric Mérand examines the Canadian and North American responses to the developing role of the EU as an international actor. Merand argues that the EU is defining itself in relation to American ‘imperium’. The US reaction to a changing international security environment and to increased EU engagement in the world has been one of disentanglement from Europe, while the Canadian reaction has seen a shift from transatlantic community to a transatlantic relationship. Afghanistan demonstrated the limits of NATO as a military alliance, while Iraq highlighted the myth of NATO as a transatlantic community. NATO is no longer the pre-eminent organization in Europe for political cooperation on security, but will still serve as a vehicle for European cooperation in US-led military coalitions. But when Europe acts through the EU it will act alone, as the EU will not serve as a vehicle for US participation in European missions. In the future, ESDP will grow in effectiveness, North America will become increasingly disengaged from Europe, and the transatlantic community will be obsolete.

Conclusion: Europe alone This volume argues that Europe will increasingly act alone, taking a more independent path in response to the security concerns facing the continent. The EU will increasingly become the institutional centre of gravity for security policy deliberation, coordination and action by European governments. The European security environment has changed dramatically as a result of the end of the Cold War and the September 11 attacks.

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The focus on terrorism, crime, trafficking and immigration and integration concerns has heightened the relevance of internal security and the relationship between internal and external security policy. This development will continue to privilege the competencies of the EU. The transatlantic relationship has become more distant, with America’s priorities shifting away from Europe to the hotspots of the ‘war on terror’. This will continue to open the political space for greater European security cooperation, and in fact will make increased cooperation a necessity. The EU will continue to develop the political consensus, institutional machinery and operational capacity to act alone. The EU has increasingly demonstrated this capacity in the growing number of initiatives and actions it has taken on internal security matters, but of equal significance are the growing number of activities the EU is conducting beyond the territory of member states. These activities, coming in the form of engagement with countries around the periphery of Europe and the relationship with Russia, as well as a number of observer and military missions deployed abroad, are significant developments in the evolution of the EU. The EU will continue to facilitate the formation of coalitions of the willing, making the EU increasingly relevant as an institutional forum for action by European governments. However, the EU will remain an incomplete security actor, as it has made only limited progress on large-scale defence cooperation. As a result, NATO will remain a valued instrument for transatlantic political and military coordination, although it is not well suited to meet the broad range of security issues that confront European states, and lacks the larger economic and intergovernmental machinery that anchors the security and defence policy component of the EU. Divisions between member states, both within Europe and across the Atlantic, will continue to limit both the institutional development of the EU and NATO and efforts to define a clear institutional relationship between the two. Europe does not seek to define itself in opposition to the United States, or as a counterweight to US hegemony. Europe is not willing or capable of performing such a role. It might, as John Palmer suggested, have a role in providing an alternative model of democracy and a more equitable, regulated market economy, but contesting America in the realm of political leadership and military power is beyond Europe. The future is likely to see non-military security matters handled by the EU alone or in cooperation with key partners such as the US and Russia. Military actions are likely to be conducted in an à la carte fashion, as like-minded states seek institutional approval through increasingly flexible EU or NATO mechanisms. When it comes to the use of military force, Europe

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is likely to act not in defiance of America, but in deference to America. But it will act alone, independent of America, when circumstances favour such a choice.

Notes 1. John Palmer, Europe without America? The Crisis in Transatlantic Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 1–2. 2. Ibid., 194. 3. lbid., 1. 4. Andrew J. Pierre, ‘Introduction’, in A Widening Atlantic? Domestic Change and Foreign Policy, ed. Andrew J. Pierre (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), 2. 5. Earl C. Ravenal, NATO: the Tides of Discontent, Policy Papers in International Affairs, 23 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1985), 11. 6. Pierre, ‘Introduction’, 3. 7. Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘The Europeanization of Europe’, in A Widening Atlantic? Domestic Change and Foreign Policy, ed. Pierre, 52. 8. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance (the ‘London Declaration’) (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1990). This outreach to Central and Eastern Europe was expanded to include a wider range of military and security expert contacts at the Copenhagen Ministerial, 6–7 June 1991. 9. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance Strategic Concept, NATO Press Communiqué S-1 (91) 86, Rome, 8 November 1991. 10. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Final Communiqué issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session, NATO Ministerial Press Communiqué M-NAC-1 (92) 51, 4 June 1992, 2. 11. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Final Communiqué issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session, NATO Ministerial Communiqué M-NAC-2 (92) 106, 17 December 1992, 2. 12. Joseph Lepgold, ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem’, International Security, 13 (1998): 105, 85. 13. See Peter W. Rodman, ‘The Fallout from Kosovo’, Foreign Affairs, 78 (1999): 45–51. 14. Richard G. Lugar, ‘NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business? A Call for US Leadership to Revive and Redefine the Alliance’, Remarks to the Open Forum of the US Department of State, 2 August 1993, 7. 15. Warren Christopher and William J. Perry, ‘NATO’s True Mission’, New York Times, 21 October 1997. 16. Quoted in William Drozdiak, ‘Air War Exposed Arms Gap within NATO’, Washington Post, 28 June 1999, A1. 17. Elinor Sloan, ‘DCI: Responding to the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs’, NATO Review, 48 (2000): 4. 18. Franco–British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defence, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998. 19. Anthony Cragg, ‘The Combined Joint Task Force Concept: a Key Component of the Alliance’s Adaptation’, NATO Review, 44 (July 1996): 9.

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20. See Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart’, National Interest, 54 (1998/99): 3–11. 21. Roger Cohen, ‘New Analysis: to European Eyes, It’s America the Ugly’, New York Times, 7 May 2001. 22. William Wallace, ‘Europe, the Necessary Partner’, Foreign Affairs, 80 (2001): 28. 23. Owen Harries, ‘The Collapse of “The West” ’, Foreign Affairs, 72 (1993): 41–2; and Christoph Bertram, Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995). 24. Antony J. Blinken, ‘The False Crisis over the Atlantic’, Foreign Affairs, 80 (2001): 35–48. 25. Donald H. Rumsfeld, ‘Speech at the Munich Conference on European Security Policy’, Munich, Germany, 3 February 2001. 26. European Commission, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, COM 2001 (521) Final (Brussels: European Union, 2001), 1. 27. The Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, 16054/04 (Brussels: European Union, 2004). The Hague Programme built on an earlier five-year programme agreed to at the Tampere Council Summit in 1999. 28. European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy (Brussels: 2003), 11. 29. European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Belgium, European Union, 2005), 21. 30. Ibid., 45. 31. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003). 32. Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004), 71. 33. Bruno Tertrais, ‘The Perfect Storm’, Survival, 46 (2004): 161–7. 34. David P. Calleo, ‘The Broken West’, Survival, 46 (2004): 32–3. 35. Thomas Risse, ‘The Atlantic Alliance in Crisis’, Current History, 103 (2004): 364. 36. Elizabeth Pond, Friendly Fire: the Near-death of the Transatlantic Alliance (Pittsburgh and Washington DC: European Union Studies Association and Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 37. Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War. 38. See Mark Pollack, ‘Unilateral America, Multilateral Europe’, Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty-first Century, eds John Peterson and Mark A. Pollack (London: Routledge, 2003), 115–27. 39. ‘Transatlantic Trends Overview: 2004’, Transatlantic Trends, The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia Di San Paolo, http://www.transatlantictrends.org/index.cfm?year⫽2004 (6 June 2006).

Part I Changing Security Perceptions in Europe and North America

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2 Internal and External Security in the EU: Is There Any Longer a Distinction? Malcolm Anderson

Introduction This chapter analyses some important, but often neglected, features of current European debates on security. These debates have similarities and differences with some recent American discussions.1 The American connection and influence are factors which are always present, even if not explicitly mentioned. Inevitably, European considerations differ from those close to the Bush Administration, and much has been written on those differences.2 One illustration of them is that European governments, with the exception of some members of the British Labour administration, tend to avoid the use of the term ‘war on terror’. There is nonetheless a common concern on both sides of the Atlantic about the possibility that Islamic groups will launch attacks on major cities. This common concern, together with long-standing points of friction, has resulted in a complex pattern of tension and cooperation in the European–American intelligence relationship in the counter-terrorist field. The quality of practical cooperation is usually reported to be excellent, even with the French, whose expertise on the Muslim world is appreciated in Washington. Cooperation between intelligence services has indeed been so good that it has gone beyond the bounds of political acceptability in the cases of kidnapping of Islamic extremists, secret CIA detention centres in European countries and facilities for CIA flights for transferring terrorist suspects to American detention centres.3 There is not, however, the same obsession with Middle Eastern terrorism in Europe as in the United States and there are widely divergent views on the usefulness of the Iraq intervention in combating terrorism. Policy differences with the United States form a necessary background, and sometimes intrude into the foreground, of any discussion on security. 31

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The characteristics of European security policy One difficulty is the problem of establishing the boundaries of the field of European security, both in terms of defining what Europe is and what security is. European Union institutions do not yet have real powers in this area so we are, therefore, dealing with a rather messy conglomerate of the EU and its member states. The European Union does not have a developed security policy, although it has well-rounded and comprehensive declarations on such a policy, in particular the European Security Strategy, the so-called ‘Solana doctrine’. The EU cannot have such a policy because it has extremely limited executive powers in security and the possible future development of these will cause grave tensions between the larger and the smaller EU members, as well as between the more and the less ‘Atlanticist’ states. Also, it cannot enforce compliance of member states with its very extensive declarations of security policy. All developed security policies have two necessary components: a ‘grand narrative’ about what is to be secured, how it is to be secured and why it is to be secured; and the capacity for taking decisions quickly and mobilizing the resources for their effective implementation. The EU is still some considerable distance from meeting these conditions. Member states are still pursuing their own security agendas in certain fields, and in certain regions of the world. There are sceptics who think that the EU will never reach this goal and important actors, in particular influential circles in the United States, who hope that it will not. Recent illustrations of American opposition were the attempted veto of even the most modest military planning capacity attached to the EU. Quite as significant was the determined but finally unsuccessful US opposition to Galileo, the European geographical positioning system which gives the EU the basis for an independent military strategy (although its primary purpose is civilian). At one time such US opposition would have been decisive; it no longer is. However, it should be stressed that those persons who are sceptical about whether the EU can develop an independent military strategy have the whole weight of European history on their side. Kalevi Holsti, as well as many others, has pointed out that war-making and state-making have gone hand in hand in the past and many therefore find it difficult to imagine the EU with a war-making capacity.4 At the moment, the closest the EU comes to envisaging a projection of military force outside its borders are the so-called Petersberg missions of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. The EU therefore must take a novel path to acquiring state-like characteristics in this area, which is likely to be a long process.

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Two ‘grand narratives’ about security A traditional definition of security is still serviceable – security is the ability to maintain the core values of society without war but, if war must be fought, security means having the resources and the capacity to win it. There are three difficulties with this definition in the contemporary European context – first, continent-wide agreement on the core values of society is still in the making; second, defending core values may well involve using a whole series of policy instruments which have little to do with coercion and the coercive powers of the state or with security forces as conventionally understood; and third, the definition ignores the power of nightmares, the recognition that security policy has become as much about the management of insecurities as it is about keeping enemies at bay, and insecurities are almost always manipulated by politicians. Nonetheless, a grand narrative about security has been emerging and is articulated in the policy declarations of the EU. Two specific grand narratives are influential in policy-making circles. The first is more likely to be held by people associated with ministries of defence and the constellation of institutes, think tanks, commentators and academics associated with them. This is the limited and traditional view of security as having to do with the survival and protection of the interests of the state – in this case of the EU and its member states – against external threats of the use of force. In this view, the acquisition of the resources and capacities for military defence is a basic requirement of security. The implication of this is that security is, or should be, in the hands of a limited number of professionals charged with this responsibility. A dividing line exists between ‘Security’ (with a capital ‘S’), the defence against external threats and the use of force and intimidation, and internal ‘security’ (with a small ‘s’), which can take various forms (from the safety of society from criminal acts to economic, social and environmental security) although subject to different disciplines and rules to those of ‘Security’. Non-military threats are assumed to be less serious and fall within the domains of policing, political intelligence gathering, propaganda, covert operations and the like, which may, for more or less contingent reasons, come within the ambit of the military, although normally they are the job of civilian agencies. The other general position is to be found in security services, described here as military involved in ‘low intensity operations’, gendarmeries and customs and police, particularly those involved in counter-terrorism and in the repression of drug trafficking. For many people, security in the military sense is part of a security spectrum and it has decreased in

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importance in recent years. In contemporary circumstances, there are strict limits to the usefulness of applying military force in countering the security threats we face. Also, the military is increasingly involved in roles other than war-making. In this view, connections exist between all the various types of threats to our societies from organized crime, uncontrolled immigration, fraud and money laundering, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, subversion and intimidation by foreign powers. The first definition of security has been referred to as ‘traditional’ but the second is also of venerable antiquity. The perception of guarding against a seamless web of threats, actual or potential, goes back to the beginnings of the modern state in Europe and one of its well-known manifestations was the attempt by states to impose religious uniformity on their populations – because the religious homogeneity of populations made states less vulnerable to subversion by foreign powers. This second conception of security has grown in influence in recent years, and particularly since the end of the Cold War. Until 1989, a consensus existed that the Soviet Union represented a potential threat, which had to be taken into account, even though few in Europe thought that it would launch a military attack. No other power, not even a China armed with nuclear weapons, has replaced it as a potential threat to the physical security of Europe. Drugs, organized crime, international terrorism and disorder in the neighbourhood of the EU – resulting in refugee crises and the spilling over of crime problems – then rose to the top of the security debate in Europe and direct military threats have, for the time being at least, virtually disappeared. The implication of thinking of security as a broad spectrum of issues is that there has been a redistribution of responsibilities between agencies of security. Civilian intelligence services, law enforcement, and policing in all its forms assume a more central role, and should be assisted by all other agencies of government. Military action in other regions of the world – both Britain and France have sent forces to Africa on several occasions – are still envisaged, and even thought likely, but these are conceived as limited in nature and not directly involving the home countries. Even Prime Minister Tony Blair (although his rhetorical justifications for the military intervention in Iraq became overheated) never suggested that Saddam Hussein was about to launch a conventional military attack on the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, there is a widespread belief in both policy-making circles and among the public that military conflicts in other regions of the world cause security problems in European cities. The Iraq intervention was perceived in the United Kingdom and other European states as exposing these countries to a greater risk of terrorist action. Military forces have

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been deployed to defend potential targets such as airports, although the practical effectiveness of doing this has been questioned. A different example is the intervention in Afghanistan, which was successful in terms of overthrowing the Taliban regime although it restored the position of the country as the world’s principal supplier of raw opium (in the European case supplying 90 per cent of the refined opium consumed, within the space of little more than one growing season). In the worldview of people who hold the second position on security, heroin, drug addiction, drug trafficking and related criminal acts of robbery with violence, racketeering and corruption threaten the stability of our societies and undermine the physical security of individuals and property. It is, however, terrorism by Islamic groups that may one day acquire weapons of great destructive power which has promoted belief in this second position on security. It has also demonstrated the power of nightmares because the vision of what might happen is far removed from what has taken place to date. Such terrorist action, until now, has been very low tech, including the attacks of September 11 in the United States. The loss of life, however shocking in the Madrid bombings, has been small, compared with that of conventional military action even of a limited kind. Many factors underlie the tension between the two narratives. It is partly a generational conflict, between the Cold War and the post-Cold War generation. It is also a clash between two worldviews – the neorealists who believe that international politics has enduring features, and those who consider that the world has changed with 11 September and that, in the words of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, new rules apply. It is partly a bureaucratic and political struggle for influence and resources, and partly a battle for public opinion as defined by Key in 1961 as ‘those opinions held by private persons whom public persons find prudent to heed’.5 For the moment, the second position has gained an intellectual ascendancy over the first. However, there is room for doubt as to whether this victory is complete and likely to endure.

The practical impact of the ascendancy of the broad concept of security The implications of this provisional ascendancy of the second position over the first are not the conclusions which Robert Kagan drew in his much quoted formulation, ‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus’.6 The difference, Kagan claimed, is that Americans, weighed down with the responsibilities of global domination, live in a Hobbesian world of anarchy, whereas Europeans live in a post-historical paradise of

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relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s vision of perpetual peace. Security in a broad sense is a central concern of European elites and public opinion and it is an issue, sometimes a crucial issue, in electoral campaigns. The website of the European Union is a good source for prevailing European views of security which are mentioned in many places, other than the ‘Solana doctrine’ previously referred to. The immediate impression given by a trawl of the website is that security covers a vast area; this has been particularly marked since the 1999 Tampere Presidency conclusions which were devoted to internal security.7 Security covers what Ole Wæver and many others have dubbed ‘societal’ security,8 and includes efforts to protect: • • • •

Financial and economic interests; The environment; Culture and language; Health – this classification may be regarded as surprising but it is now common. For example, the UN Security Council in January 2000 declared that AIDS was a threat to global peace and security;9 and • Physical safety. Although there are references to the defence of the specific security of the EU institutions, these are fewer than in national security policy statements. Identifiable threats come from a number of sources including: • • • •

Uncontrolled immigration; Organized crime – drug trafficking, people trafficking, and so on; Fraud involving tax havens and global networks; Disorder in the neighbourhood of the EU, and, more generally, failed states, impoverished populations and global instability; and • Terrorism. This list has been modified in the last two years. Nuclear proliferation has come back onto the European security agenda, particularly since European diplomatic efforts began to try to dissuade Iran from developing the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons. Issues in the Far East, which the United States takes seriously – whether China is likely to take military action against Taiwan, whether North Korea threatens its neighbours, and so on – do not feature on the European security agenda, although they are considered seriously in the foreign ministries of the larger European states. To summarize rather drastically European thinking, the best way to promote security in these matters, as Peter Katzenstein observed, is

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through promoting order in international society, through multilateral action either on a regional basis or through the United Nations.10

A critical assessment of the current EU security agenda Two observations can be made about this agenda. First, the security landscape which emerges from official EU policy statements is based on a weak consensus in that it does not and cannot represent the views of the governments of all of the member states, let alone the influential views within member states. For example, the threat to culture and language (core values of societies) is felt particularly strongly among the French elites where the intrusion of English has been considered a threat and Muslim customs such as the wearing of the veil by schoolgirls is thought to infringe on the concept of laïcité, a basic principle of the French Republic. The threat to culture and language is less of a concern in the UK where the use of an increasingly dominant world language gives a (perhaps false) sense of cultural security, and because of a different national and imperial past, it is thought perfectly reasonable that people should retain idiosyncratic customs and habits. To take another example, disorder in the neighbourhood of the EU is felt to be more threatening in countries where such disorder is likely to have a direct impact on their territory, as is the case of disorder in North Africa for France or in former Yugoslavia for Italy and Hungary or in Eastern Europe for Germany. Uncontrolled immigration is felt particularly in those countries which are most exposed to it – Germany was the principal target of asylum seekers in the early 1990s, replaced by the UK in the first years of this century – and in both cases tightening the rules governing asylum seekers and very clear indications that they were unwelcome was sufficient to reduce their numbers (although not to stop the flow). The EU was slow to take collective action because of basic differences of view about the content of a common policy. The most serious explicit difference of view has been, and remains, how to combat international terrorism originating from the Islamic world.11 Despite the raft of anti-terrorism measures quickly agreed to by the EU after 11 September 2001, including reinforced cooperation with the United States, the EU was deeply divided over military intervention in Iraq in 2003 and over its consequences for international terrorism.12 This difference was less at the level of public opinion (clear majorities in the member states, with the exception of Denmark, opposed the intervention) than at the governmental level where the issue was considered more in terms of the importance of the American connection for the security and defence of Europe. Although France and Germany were at

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pains to represent opposition to the Iraq intervention as the European view (which it was at the level of public opinion), a majority of governments supported the US-led invasion. This division of opinion demonstrated once again that the EU is not a state, and in major crises the member states may not agree, thus preventing a common EU position. In the area of security it remains an intergovernmental organization, gradually acquiring common services in internal security, intelligence, military coordination and planning and foreign affairs, which raises the possibility that a certain de facto supranationalism will develop. Second, the main traditional ‘internal’ threats have been reframed, and the external (particularly extra-European) origins or dimensions of each of them emphasized. Within law enforcement agencies, and frequently in political debate, a security continuum is assumed, making connections between the broad categories of activities already mentioned: terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, trans-frontier crime, illegal immigration, asylum seekers and some minority ethnic groups.13 The main aspects of that process of externalization of internal security can be summarized as follows: first, non-European or the extra-European components of terrorism are given overwhelming importance, despite the historical importance and persistence, on a small scale, of acts of political violence by indigenous groups in several European countries; second, international migration mainly from countries outside Europe, in which the irregular/undocumented/illegal component has become progressively more important, has come to be regarded as a security threat;14 third, the international character of criminal organizations and networks engaged in drug trafficking, money laundering, people smuggling, car theft and other traffics is highlighted. However, the relative importance of the transnational component in organized crime (and even of the ‘imported’ component in ‘petty’ crime) is also stressed.

The development of security policy and institutional factors This view of security threats has been at the core of the argument for strengthening European-level efforts in the security field. It has had a major impact on the structures, methods and contents of the policymaking process in Justice and Home Affairs ( JHA). The externalization of internal security issues has created an incentive for national law enforcement agencies, whose activities had been exclusively concentrated within national borders, to devote an increasing share of their institutional and operational efforts to the international arena within the framework of a European ‘internal security regime’.15 ‘The idea of a link

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between internal and external security is a logical consequence of the process of European integration.’16 It has gained wide currency, exemplified in the official statement: ‘JHA is essential given the worldwide challenges facing the Union, such as restoring the rule of law, controlling migratory movements and combating organized crime. Above and beyond the strategic importance of a particular country, a global approach is required.’17 Global, in this context means both ‘overall’ and ‘worldwide’. EU policy-makers have sought to secure an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, seeking to create a stable international environment. It is a search without end, but currently contains certain basic elements. The first is the pursuit of multilateral solutions to global problems. The EU Rapid Reaction Force is intended to support multinational initiatives, although it has yet to pass the test of deployment in a major international crisis. Second, the EU considers its foreign aid programme (it has the largest foreign aid budget in the world) as an important contribution to global stability. Third, particular attention is paid to countries adjacent to the EU. Crime and clandestine immigration are a priority for the EU in its immediate neighbourhood – particularly in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and along the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Relations with neighbours now come under the general heading of European Neighbourhood Policy and within this are the Neighbourhood Action Plans for each country (see Stefan Gänzle’s chapter in this volume), within which there is a section on JHA cooperation. There are also a number of multilateral regional programmes. Examples include the Barcelona Process and MEDA (the financial instrument of the Euro–Mediterranean Dialogue), the Stabilization and Association Process for the Western Balkans, with the associated CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) assistance – which includes immigration, and police and judicial cooperation elements. The EU also has agreements on Justice and Home Affairs issues with Ukraine and with Russia on organized crime. The practical impact of some of these initiatives is considerably less than the accompanying declarations imply. The treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam established a framework which facilitates the merging of internal and external security. This is partly through overlapping spheres of competence (the European Constitution will not change this radically if it is ratified at some future date). The details of the arrangements for security policy are complicated; these arise from the bicephalic executive – responsibilities are shared between the Council and the Commission. An institutional detail illustrates the general point.

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The Council has the sole responsibility for external security policy, although the Commissioner for External Relations has authority over the external representation of the EU (that is, the dense network of EU Commission Delegations), over the areas of exclusive community competence (trade and economic relations), and a voice in other fields of external relations. The General Affairs and External Relations Council determines policy and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, reports to it. However, the Commissioner for External Affairs also attends its meetings. A Military Committee, meetings of heads of intelligence agencies, and a strategic research unit are associated with it. This apparatus, involving both the Council and Commission, for arriving at common positions, joint actions and ad hoc initiatives, works reasonably well over most policy fields. However, it does not prevent member states from pursuing their own policies even though they are, in principle, bound to respect undertakings they have given at the Council. Progress has been much more rapid in internal security (which mainly comes under the heading of Justice and Home Affairs) than in external security, and within this field police cooperation has developed more rapidly than in other areas.18 The member states and the Commission share the right to initiate proposals – although in practice, the JHA Commissioner takes the lead because most of the proposals from member states are either proposed for domestic political reasons or are poorly prepared. A series of agencies and arrangements mainly concerned with business within the EU but also with external roles, are dependent on the Council and the Commission. The most important are Europol, Eurojust, the European Judicial Network, the Schengen system, the recently established external border management agency, the Working Group of Chiefs of Police, the Police Academy (CEPOL) and the (already mentioned) meetings of national intelligence agencies. From being an area in which few initiatives were taken painfully slowly, JHA has become the most dynamic area of EU policy-making, helped along by more efficient decision-making procedures contained in the Treaty of Amsterdam.19 The treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam therefore give authority to the EU in both external and internal security policy but its executive power is severely circumscribed. Any external action in the field of security and political relations remains subject to unanimous agreement by the member states. In terms of military operations, the EU does not have an integrated command structure like NATO and in its present form the Rapid Reaction Force cannot be regarded as an embryonic European army in the ambitious form proposed in the 1950s for the European Defence Community. In internal security, Europol has no powers of stop, search

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and arrest, and Eurojust cannot bring prosecutions. Meetings of heads of national intelligence organizations are purely consultative. In all these cases, however, a de facto supranationalism is slowly emerging – working practices, agencies of coordination, databases, research activity and the practice of joint decision-making contribute to establishing the EU, in the minds of key elites, as an instrument for major initiatives and actions.

Differing national perspectives The potential of the EU arrangements, particularly in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), is deliberately understated in those countries most keen on retaining close political and military ties with the United States. These states see their security interests as better served by retaining strong links with the US. For example, the new member states of Eastern and Central Europe consider that their major security threat is Russia and that this threat could be backed by military force. Their current position on security is based not so much on gratitude for the American role in helping to undermine communism as on a belief that contemporary Russia is an unstable power capable of acting aggressively. They lack confidence in their European partners to counter such a threat, and therefore consider an American security guarantee as the only available one. In the British, Spanish and Italian cases, the motives are more obscure and complicated. Personal convictions of the leaders play a role. Prime Minister Blair apparently shares President Bush’s view that international politics is a struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. However, this is not the crucial factor in explaining British foreign policy. Most of the foreign and defence policy community establishment has believed, since the Suez debacle of 1956, that the UK must in all circumstances stay as close as possible to Washington. The UK is heavily dependent on the US both in a strategic sense and in terms of basic weapons systems. To cite the most obvious examples of this dependence, the British nuclear deterrent, unlike that of the French, is not technologically independent of American control and the British are part of a global American intelligence network, particularly in the field of electronic surveillance (ECHELON), which is regarded as crucial to Britain’s security interests. The Spanish and Italians do not have these sorts of involvement and their position on the Iraq intervention was, at least in part, governed by internal European considerations – the desire to thwart Franco-German leadership – as well as by the belief that there were political and even economic advantages to be gained by siding with the Americans. In both cases they were confronted

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by hostile public opinion; their commitment of armed forces was token and, in the Spanish case, brief.

Conclusion: evaluating the two perspectives The broad concept of security, embodied in the security stance of the EU, has elaborate and far-reaching implications, but is it persuasive? The answer is, in practice, not altogether. Also, conceptions of security are not ethically and politically neutral and some of the implications of this vision of security may not be desirable. The most persuasive objections are prudential and practical. First, security strategies should be based as much on future possibilities as on recent experience. Inter-state armed conflicts should be regarded as probable – not between the EU and neighbouring states, but between states in the developing world, and between advanced industrial societies and less developed countries. Struggles for resources, which have been regarded as anachronistic, are likely to re-emerge; the use or the threat of the use of military force may be decisive in these cases. The projection of EU political and military power may be necessary for other reasons – to prevent countries descending into anarchy or to promote regional stability. In addition, the interests of the EU, as a major economic power with the largest share of international trade of any single actor, could be involved in future armed conflicts. If wars take place, there are always implications for internal security, but military considerations have the leading role. The second objection is connected with governmental organization. Although there is now more coordination and interaction between institutions of internal security and of military defence, they have kept their separate identities at the national level and they remain separate as new institutions are established at the European Union level. Within states, ministries and agencies responsible for internal and external security remain distinct – indeed there have been some detailed proposals to make them even more separate, for example, to civilianize gendarmeries under military discipline. Administrations responsible for internal security (primarily ministries of the interior) and external security (primarily ministries of defence) have shown no signs of losing their separate identity and in the European Union there is still a directorate general for external affairs and a directorate general for internal security. Think tanks and professional advisers still tend to specialize in one field or the other. The notable exception to this straightforward picture is counter-terrorism, where there are changes in the distribution of authority and there has been

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a coming together of internal and external policy-making. A graphic example is the responsibility of the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, who maintains responsibility for anti-terrorist policy with an anti-terrorist coordinator working directly with him. Think tanks specializing in foreign policy and strategic matters engage in specialized studies of terrorism, as do think tanks in internal security. For partisans of the seamless web school of security this exception demonstrates their point because terrorism is the key hinge issue; they can also point to examples of foreign offices and the military being involved in anti-drug initiatives. It is possible, of course, to explain this as institutional inertia, and the successful defence by corporate interests of the status quo. People resist losing their budgets, responsibilities, status and possibly jobs. However, it is more plausible to think that the instruments of internal and external security still remain sufficiently distinct to make institutional separation useful. Third, there are reasons for preserving the distinction for the effectiveness in the planning and implementation of policy. The linking of all security threats in a general security spectrum encourages an exaggeration of connections between them. There are, of course, some links between, for example, drug trafficking and terrorism, between urban disorder and illegal immigration, but they are more marginal than integrating them into a seamless web of security concerns implies. Assigning security agencies the lead role in tackling such issues risks policy failure. The ethical, legal and political objection is that internal security necessarily involves law enforcement in a context where the principles of the rule of law are generally respected, whereas in the field of external security this is exceptional and where it applies it is fragile. The difficulties of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in obtaining recognition by major powers and attempts to make soldiers legally responsible for human rights infringements when they are operating in foreign countries are graphic illustrations of this. To be sure, intelligence services involved in internal security have sometimes, even frequently, acted outside the law but they can be brought to trial if their activities become public knowledge.20 There have been attempts to break out of the constraints of the rule of law in internal security by limiting the rights of individuals involved in organized crime and abolishing them altogether in the case of suspected terrorists by introducing a quasi-permanent exceptional regime for terrorist offences. However, there are political and legal obstacles to doing this.21 In the UK, the attempt to undermine the rights embodied in habeas corpus and the principles of fair trial, which an influential elite takes very seriously, is a powerful political reason for separating internal and external security. There is a difference between armed intervention in

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conflicts, where the laws of war apply, and in the treatment of European citizens and residents where the rule of law applies. The refusal to recognize this distinction, by declaring a war on terror, runs the risk of undermining the legitimacy of state action in the field of security. It may create problems of social cohesion, because sections of the population – Muslims and immigrants more generally – may feel, with or without justification, that they are being unfairly targeted and that this supports other forms of discrimination against them. Moreover, declaring war on terror or on any other problem of internal security, such as a war on drugs, organized crime or illegal immigration does not have the powerful mobilizing effect on public opinion that it possibly still has in the United States. All major European countries have had terrorist problems. Although there have occasionally been temptations to shoot so-called terrorists, such as the alleged 1980s’ ‘shoot to kill’ policy in Northern Ireland and the Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL) sponsored by Socialist ministers in Spain to assassinate members of ETA, most policy-makers have taken the view that there are strict limits to the use of force and a wide range of policy instruments must be used if terrorism is to be eradicated. Successive US administrations, including the present one, have supported this position for Northern Ireland. Although there are good reasons for separating security issues and not making all pressing policy issues matters of security, there are practical political reasons why the idea of a broad spectrum of security is likely to persist. This is partly based on language use: first, the word security is used very widely in ordinary language – social security, economic security, environmental security and so on – which contributes to the securitization of all issues. Policy-makers habitually use security in all kinds of contexts and this creates an assumption that security problems, at least for some purposes, should be treated together. Second, in terms of political mobilization, it is much easier to gain political support and mobilize resources if you suggest that security is at risk. This is abundantly clear in the field of the environment. Clean air, clean water, uncontaminated food are widely regarded as beneficial but apart from specialized groups few people are prepared to pay the full economic costs of guaranteeing them. If it is suggested that physical survival is at risk, and the environment is therefore a security issue, then this at least captures public attention and creates pressure to produce solutions.22 Greater conceptual clarity in defining policy fields is desirable. The clear distinction between internal and external security was possible when sovereign states had genuine independence of action. It cannot be revived in its classic form because the international system has radically changed. But

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the passage of time reveals the flaws in all grand narratives of security and this will certainly be the case for the broad conception of security which has recently been the basis of European positions on security policy. It is not yet time to discard it, but it should be regarded with scepticism.

Notes 1. In a remarkable article Andreas and Price delineated the merging of the internal and the external in American security discourse – a parallel development in Europe is a central theme in this chapter. Peter Andreas and Richard Price, ‘From War-fighting to Crime-fighting: Transforming the American National Security State’, International Studies Review, 3 (2001): 31–52. 2. For a recent contribution by one of the best specialists in strategic studies, see Lawrence Freedman, ‘The Transatlantic Agenda: Vision and Counter Vision’, Survival, 47 (2005): 19–38. 3. Milan magistrates issued on 10 November 2005 arrest warrants for 22 CIA officials for the kidnapping of an Egyptian, so far without effect. Detention centres and CIA flights have attracted much press comment, expressions of concern in European and national parliaments, and careful investigation by the Council of Europe. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States, 22 January 2006, http://assembly.coe.int/ CommitteeDocs/2006/20060124_ Jdoc032006_E.pdf; Council of Europe, Secretary General, Secretary General’s Report under Article 52 ECHR on the question of secret detention and transport of detainees suspected of terrorist acts, notably by or at the instigation of foreign agencies, 28 February 2006, http://www.coe.int/T/ E/Com/Files/Events/2006-cia/SG-Inf-%282006%29.pdf (4 March 2006). 4. Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 5. Vladimir O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1961), 14. 6. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003). 7. European Union, European Council, Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15/16 October 1999, http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/ oct99_en.htm (7 December 2005). 8. See Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaître, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1998). 9. See United Nations, ‘Security Council Holds Debate on Impact of Aids on Peace and Security in Africa’, 10 January 2000, Press Release SC 67. 10. Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 11. For a discussion of why, prior to 11 September 2001, there had been so much difficulty in anti-terrorist cooperation among European states, see Malcolm Anderson, ‘Terrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation’, in European Democracies against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, ed. Fernando Reinares (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), and for future prospects, see Malcolm Anderson, ‘What Future for

46

12.

13.

14. 15.

16.

17.

18. 19.

20.

21.

22.

The Changing Politics of European Security Counter-terrorism as an Objective of European Police Co-operation?’, in Police and Justice Co-operation and the New European Borders, eds Malcolm Anderson and Joanna Apap (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002). See Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt (eds), One Year On. Lessons from Iraq, Chaillot Paper 68 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, 2004); Walter Posch (ed.), Looking into Iraq, Chaillot Paper 79 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, 2005). On the conceptual, political and operational convergence of internal and external security in Europe, since the late 1970s, see Didier Bigo, ‘When Two Become One. Internal and External Securitisations in Europe’, in International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community, eds Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams (London: Routledge, 2000). On this crucial development, see Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998). For the use of the concept of ‘security regime’ to designate the European ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, see Jörg Monar (2000), ‘Justice and Home Affairs in a Wider Europe: the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion’, Working Paper 07/00, Sussex European Institute: Economic and Social Research Council – ‘One Europe or Several’ Programme, 2000. Alessandro Politi, European Security: the New Transnational Risks, Chaillot Paper 29 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1997), 10. European Council, European Union Priorities and Policy Objectives for External Relations in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs, 7653/00 JAI 35 (Brussels: European Union, 2000), 6. For an up-to-date account see John D. Occhipinti, The Politics of EU Police Co-operation: Toward a European FBI? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003). Instead of having to negotiate conventions in internal law, the treaty authorized ‘framework decisions’ which resemble First Pillar directives, although, unlike directives, they are not legally enforceable in member states. Political obstacles often intervene as when, in 2006, President Bush ‘covered’ the CIA agents for phone tapping, within the US, American citizens and residents suspected of contacts with al-Qa’ida – an action prohibited by law. The recent UK attempt to intern foreign terrorists without trial was blocked by the House of Lords and the attempt to place all suspected terrorists under a form of house arrest without legal sanction has also encountered difficulties. For an extended discussion of this, see Daniel H. Deudney and Richard A. Mathew (eds), Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).

3 Security Perspectives in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: ‘Easternization’ and ‘Europeanization’ Lenard J. Cohen

Introduction This chapter will examine the evolving security perspectives of the East European states, particularly in the period surrounding the onset and current continuation of the Iraq War and insurgency (2003–06). Historically, one can discern quite distinct patterns of political and socio-economic development between the states of Western Europe and those of Eastern Europe. This division includes rather differentiated East–West European perspectives toward world affairs and questions of defence and security. Finding themselves typically caught between influences from the more politically and economically advanced dynamism of Western Europe and the turbulent and more stagnant evolution of regimes farther to the East, the states and peoples of East-Central Europe and South-eastern Europe have exhibited a unique, albeit not uniform, set of developmental and security imperatives. For example, throughout the twentieth century and into the early twenty-first century East European elites, when free to choose their own orientation, have more often than not been obsessed with overcoming their chronic position on the margins or periphery of West European political and economic currents, and are also anxious to benefit from the security against external threats that might be offered by full inclusion in a pan-European security framework. Even after the end of the Cold War, as pressures for the absorption of the Central and East European states into the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accelerated – with the goal of creating one ‘indivisible Europe’ – signs of Europe’s geopolitical differentiation remain quite apparent. Do such intra-European divisions – which were apparent before, during and immediately after the phase of communist rule – continue to characterize security perspectives in Europe? 47

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During a period of rapid socio-economic change and globalization, as an enlarged EU (25 members) and NATO (26 members) contemplate further enlargement, will Europe’s traditional geopolitical fault-lines remain pertinent and persistent?

Iraq and transatlantic relations: the ‘old Europe’–‘new Europe’ tempest One byproduct of the transatlantic rift that emerged between the United States and some European states during the 2003 debate surrounding the invasion of Iraq was the enhanced awareness of the substantial variation between the security perspectives of long-time EU and NATO member states, and the outlook of East European countries that were either formally scheduled to join the Euro-Atlantic alliance framework or were under serious consideration for eventual entry into the EU and NATO. At the time of the Iraqi invasion in March 2003, seven Eastern European countries (Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) were one year away from joining NATO. Together with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, which had joined the military alliance in April 1999, this new enlargement would mean that ten of 26 NATO members would be former communist states. The EU was also on the eve of adding ten new members in 2004, of which eight were former communist states. Bulgaria and Romania, who were to be part of the 2004 NATO enlargement, were also slated to become EU members in 2007. When, near the end of January 2003, the American Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, made his indelicate and now infamous distinction between ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe’, intra-European divergence regarding security issues became a more highly sensitive feature in transatlantic discourse. According to Rumsfeld, the Franco-German-led opposition to the Iraq War was a reflection of thinking in the old Europe, and he claimed that ‘if you look at the entire NATO today [2003], the center of gravity is shifting to the east’.1 Rumsfeld’s tactical dichotomy of Europe’s political orientation was quickly followed by the signing of public letters in support of the United States’ position concerning Iraq; first the ‘Letter of Eight’ (the UK, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic) on 30 January 2003, and then the ‘letter of the Vilnius 10’ group of East European states (the three Baltic countries, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania – all in the queue for NATO membership – plus, Albania, Macedonia and Croatia) on 5 February. Bruce Jackson, a former US military intelligence official and one-time arms industry lobbyist, played a key role in the preparation of both letters.2

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The letters took French and German politicians by surprise. President Chirac of France described the letter of the Vilnius 10 as ‘childish behaviour’, and threatened that the signatories had ‘missed an opportunity to keep quiet’, and had served to ‘reduce their chances of entering Europe’.3 Chirac’s rebuke provoked a strong reaction on the part of the East European countries involved, with his outburst viewed as being undiplomatic, condescending and unfair.4 Rumsfeld’s sharp distinction between the two Europes was not a carefully reasoned observation, but clearly a political gambit intended to mobilize as much support as possible for the Iraqi venture, especially among those European countries which were on the cusp of entering the Euro–Atlantic security community. Although irritating to many Europeans, Rumsfeld’s remarks were hardly an original dichotomy or fundamentally an accurate one. Indeed, the distinction between the challenges and priorities faced by the newer and older democracies of Europe was already a centrepiece in studies of post-communist transition. And, after all, some of the European states that were ‘old’ members of the NATO alliance and the EU supported the war, and most of the so-called ‘new’ states had quite old cultures and long state histories. Moreover, the Rumsfeld notion was only one facet of a much broader intellectual debate that had taken place within most European countries about the Iraq war and other matters that differentiated official US views from a strong segment of elite and citizen opinion in Europe. Still, the temporal and territorial differentiation implied by Rumsfeld hit a raw nerve during a time of sharp polemics between Washington and many European capitals. Clearly eager to get along with both the United States and the ‘old’ members of the Euro–Atlantic alliance system, the former communist states that were about to enter the EU, several of whom were also on the verge of entering NATO, found themselves in a particularly awkward position as a result of the transatlantic schism regarding Iraq. Indeed, the political elites of Eastern Europe were anxious to avoid offending European members of the alliances they were about to enter, but also determined to ensure good relations with the United States. At a minimum, the two-Europe issue raised by Rumsfeld directed attention at an interesting question, that is, whether the new democracies of Eastern Europe could accurately be described as having a distinct security outlook, or different strategic security cultures, which could be contrasted with those of the older, more consolidated democracies in Europe.5 Although the flap generated by Rumsfeld would have a relatively short shelf-life, he had correctly, albeit self-servingly, drawn attention to

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significant features of the security outlook in the Central and East European countries during their first stage of post-communist evolution. Between 2003 and 2006, several events would unfold that would provide an even more substantial basis to explore the matter of East–West intra-European contrast regarding security matters: the mid-2004 enlargement of the EU by ten members, including eight former communist states; the autumn 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which required external mediation by the EU and a number of new East European democracies; the May 2005 rejection of the European Constitution by France and the Netherlands, which partially involved dissatisfaction with the course of eastward enlargement; the controversy over the CIA’s reputed use of East European countries to confine or transport Middle East terrorists; and the construction of American/NATO military bases in selected East European countries. Indeed, during 2005, as the second Bush Administration worked to repair transatlantic relations, the notion of old Europe–new Europe was dismissed as an obsolete ‘construct’, which Rumsfeld himself would later jokingly describe as an idea connected to the ‘old Rumsfeld’.6 But the distinctiveness of security perspectives and priorities in post-communist Eastern Europe, which first came into sharp focus during the Iraq War, remained an analytically interesting issue, particularly as the European Union struggled with the challenge of developing a pan-continental membership and consciousness.

Eastern Europe’s Atlanticism When contrasted with the West European countries forming the core of early membership in the EU/EEC and NATO, most of the new democracies in Eastern Europe do exhibit some interesting and even unique features regarding security matters. Recognizing that there is substantial variation among the states within the new Europe, some generalizations can still be made about their collective outlook. For example, it is fair to say that while public opinion in the new Eastern European democracies by and large opposed the United States-led war in Iraq, most of the ruling political elites in the region believed that it was in their interest, and in the interest of their countries, to either give direct or indirect support to US foreign policy goals in the Middle East and in the ‘war on terror’. Several factors help explain the strong Atlanticist orientation of the East European elites. For one thing, many leaders and older citizens in the East European states had only recently experienced a long period of rule by communist authoritarian regimes, and tended to regard US opposition to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold

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War in a very positive light. Disappointment with earlier failures of the West European countries to obstruct expansionist authoritarian regimes before or immediately after World War II also contributed to a favourable evaluation of American power and its commitment to democratic principles. Membership in the American-led NATO alliance is also seen by many leaders in Eastern Europe as a safety-net to protect their countries against resurgent Russian authoritarianism. Such negative memories regarding the Soviet era are often compounded by traditional cultural antipathy to Russia and Russian influence in Eastern Europe. The lethargic and uneven nature of democratization in the Russian Federation and other parts of the former Soviet Union, and especially the recent pattern of authoritarian retrenchment by the Putin regime, as well as the troubled course of democratic change even in countries that have undergone so-called ‘coloured revolutions’, have reinforced East European elite and mass anxieties concerning the fragility of democratic consolidation and the need to rely on superpower guarantees with respect to stability and freedom. A willingness to give the United States the benefit of the doubt on the Iraq War can in part be traced to such sentiments. As writer Jan Ross put it in mid-2003: The east of the continent has something to tell the West, and whoever refuses to listen does so at his own peril. In this respect, it is not just opportunism that led the coalition countries in the Iraq dispute to the side of the United States . . . The status quo that core Europeans love so much and which they now defend against the revolutionary United States, is in the East still connected with the memory of a halfcentury of oppression. The legacy of 1989 [includes] the primacy of freedom and the hope for something new.7 East European publics were, in fact, hardly more enthusiastic concerning participation in the Iraq war than were the citizens of Western Europe. But East European elites, who were only in the first stage of democratic change, and were anxious to protect their countries against external and internal threats, found it easy to endorse the Bush Administration’s ‘crusade’ for regime change in the fight against terrorism. Such idealist rhetoric and policy merged comfortably with the interest of some East European states in ensuring their entry into the NATO Alliance. Indeed, during 2004, some analysts predicted that as a result of the transatlantic rift on Iraq, and intra-European divisions on the issue, European security policy was becoming ‘Easternized’. As the Slovak Brussels-based scholar

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Thomas Valasek has pointed out, many East Europeans regarded their new freedom of choice as: . . . including the choice to stay out of somebody else’s wars! . . . Even so, the new allies lean towards the assertive vision of security put forth by London and Washington. These governments in general seem to take a bleaker, more Darwinian view of international relations than their western neighbors. Strategic calculations also argue for sticking close to Washington. Military power matters and the United States has most of it . . . The glue binding new allies to Washington, in other words, is built on more than a sense of gratitude and moral obligation.8 Perhaps more aware of threats that can lead to the breakdown of democratic regimes – as occurred in this region during the interwar period, and again immediately after World War II – East European leaders were also sometimes more disposed than their Western counterparts to the utility of using force against undemocratic regimes. The high sense of threat awareness regarding the democratization process and opposition to appeasement of authoritarian states – the so-called Munich Syndrome – has also sometimes led elites in the new post-communist democracies to question the inclination or capacity of core West European states to come to the assistance of Eastern Europe, should push come to shove. Such views may have led some East European leaders to be less wary than West European elites about the Bush Administration’s commitment to the use of pre-emptive force and unilateralism, and more suspicious regarding the potential security value of multilateral solutions grounded in international law. Atlanticist or pro-American predilections in Eastern Europe, or at least the tendency to preserve close ties with the United States as a means of avoiding over-reliance on Western European states, also derives from an impulse in the new democracies to prevent any infringement on their newly acquired sovereignty. Thus, the EU emphasis on the pooling of national sovereignty in Brussels is sometimes viewed more suspiciously in Eastern Europe than in other European countries. For example, to some outspoken Eastern European leaders, such as the Czech President Vaclav Klaus and the President of Poland, Lech Kaczynski, the EU bureaucracy in Brussels is viewed as an administrative behemoth whose mania for regulatory controls can place limits on their own states’ arduously won independence. Klaus has been particularly vociferous about protecting the prerogatives of his nation against ‘unification orchestrated from above and the birth of super-nationalism’, irrespective of whether it is

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a case of over-centralization in the EU or other international actors and agencies. ‘We need a system of relations and relationships of individual countries’, he recently argued – speaking of catchwords such as ‘Europeanism’, and ‘ever closer Europe’ – ‘which must not be based on false internationalism, or super-national organizations, and on the misunderstanding of globalization . . . We must forget the slogan “less of nation-states, more of internationalism” because the state is an unsubstitutable guarantee of democracy (opposite to all kinds of “Reichs”, empires, and conglomerates of states).’9 In Klaus’s case, any excessive meddling in a country’s affairs, whether it is by Brussels or Washington, is equally irksome. He did not support the war in Iraq. But for some members of the political class in the new democracies, the Iraqi issue offered a chance to demonstrate that they could follow whichever international policy they wished, in addition to other motives they may have had. Recognizing their status as newer and weaker states within the EU, and in most cases their position as smaller states, Eastern European countries are often driven by a distinct set of security impulses and policy priorities, and their willingness to see the United States as a counterweight or balance to the power of established Western European countries. Indeed, some observers have suggested that it was the imperative of asserting their sovereignty as independent nation-states on the eve of their countries’ entry into the EU, and not vital security, Atlanticist or democratic concerns, which motivated so many East European leaders to ally themselves with the United States during the acrimonious transatlantic Iraq debate. As foreign policy concerns were not generally of critical interest to their local constituencies during electoral campaigns, East European leaders enjoyed considerable latitude in aligning themselves with Washington without fear of retaliation from their citizens. Some East European leaders have also been bothered by a certain ambivalence or condescension toward their region by West European countries, and a feeling that the United States remains critical of Eastern Europe’s overall ‘Westernization’ and democratic consolidation. In this regard, some friction between ‘old’ Europe and the United States has actually improved the opportunity for East European countries to obtain concessions and maximize their influence within the Euro–Atlantic community. Thus, in some measure, the East European balancing act between Brussels and Washington is nothing but the self-assertive political gamesmanship of newer and less powerful players within the multi-polar structure of the Euro–Atlantic system. As a result of the Atlanticist-oriented or NATO-centric security subculture that resulted from such mixed motives and sources, the East European

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Table 3.1:

Military activity of East European EU member states and candidates Armed forces (Oct. 2003) Active armed forces

Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia Bulgaria Romania

57050 5510 33400 4800 12700 163000 22000 6500 nd nd

Selected operations

Conscripts Deployed ‘Iraq Freedom’ Feb. 2004 20400 1310 22900 1600 4700 81000 3500 1200 nd nd

1266 3 1039 165 174 3956 854 85 nd nd

80 55 300 121 105 2400 105 – 470 700

ISAF 2004 17 6 13 11 2 – – 21 38 27

Source: Jean-Yves Haine (2004), Force Structures (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies).

states would ultimately find themselves making a major commitment to the initial phases of the post-invasion military occupation of Iraq (see Table 3.1). Thus, by early 2005, East European troops would constitute a substantial portion of the non-American troops in Iraq. This East European involvement was of enormous symbolic benefit to the Bush Administration, which desperately needed to broaden its base of international support for invading Iraq. The military contribution of the East European states, while not negligible during the post-invasion phase of security management in Iraq, was much less important than their role in helping to legitimate Washington’s policy. Moreover, at the end of the day, the intraEuropean tensions over Iraq had no practical effect on either NATO or EU enlargement during 2004. As planned, in March 2004, seven East European countries joined NATO, and in May, the EU alliance expanded from 15 to 25 members. Europe appeared more unified and integrated, at least on the surface.

A new mood and new imperatives Because the international context is never static, and because it is constantly being re-examined by decision-makers in individual countries, security imperatives tend to be in a continual state of flux. Indeed,

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following the American presidential election in the autumn of 2004 and the advent of the second Bush Administration, the transatlantic rift waned and intra-European discourse also changed. As the insurgency worsened in Iraq and Washington increasingly found itself in a quagmire, the Bush Administration attempted to de-emphasize unilateralism and to repair its relationship with its ‘old’ European allies, who had opposed the war. As one observer put it in 2005, ‘the U.S. and the EU agreed that they need each other because they could not achieve their objectives by acting alone’.10 Chained to the Iraqi albatross, Washington began to look more respectfully on Europe’s experience in using soft power for the managed transition and state-building of post-authoritarian and post-conflict regimes. The May 2005 rejection of the European Constitution by French voters and then by Dutch voters, partially in connection with anxiety over immigration to the West by workers from the new democracies, also shook European confidence in the future of a unified Europe as an aspirant superpower, at least in the short term. In a number of complex issue areas, such as Iran, Russia and the Far East, there were still major differences of approach between Europe and the United States. But there were also significant areas of commonality of interests, and a realization on both sides of the Atlantic regarding the benefits of multilateral cooperation. One reason for the more moderate tone in transatlantic relations after 2004 was connected to the fact that the NATO alliance – which had been at the epicentre of tensions and divisions during the old Europe/new Europe debate – was no longer as critical in US–Europe discourse. US unilateralism and the formation of a ‘coalition of the willing’ for Afghanistan (at least initially) and then for Iraq – or what John Kerry called a ‘coalition of the bribed’ during the 2004 US presidential election – made NATO somewhat less significant to US security policy. NATO would eventually assume a leading role in Afghanistan, but only after the phase of militarily levered regime change had concluded. Moreover, greater EU assertiveness in peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions, as well as in the entire area of Common Foreign and Security Policy also lessened the NATO-centric concerns on both sides of the Atlantic. US–European relations were still shaky and fraught with potential difficulties, but the transatlantic climate had changed significantly. One aspect of the new mood in the transatlantic alliance was enhanced American support for European unity, and an end to overt efforts by Washington to foster intra-European division. Many East European leaders had also become displeased that they had not received what they had expected from Washington in return for their support during the first

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stage of the Iraqi venture. For example, US visa restrictions and trade laws had not been liberalized to the extent desired by some East European countries. Moreover, as time elapsed and vivid memories of the Cold War receded, East European leaders were becoming somewhat less assertive in their Atlanticist impulses.11 And as the EU became more assertive with regard to its own foreign and security policy, many East European leaders hoped they could achieve their respective security goals within a more integrated Europe. The Atlanticist outlook in Eastern European elite circles was still substantial. Indeed, the leaders of the new democracies believed they could play a special role in bridging the gap between US and Europe. But the pro-American features of the distinct security subculture in East Europe on the eve of the 2004 enlargements in NATO and the EU had clearly diminished. The continuing insurgency and sectarian violence in Iraq – with no end-game in clear sight – also made direct military participation alongside the US and the UK less and less attractive to East European leaders, not to mention costly in terms of casualties, resources and the persistent elite–mass gap it fostered. Despite the rejection of the so-called ‘EU Constitution’ there was also growing momentum towards Europeanization, especially among the eight new members of the EU from the region and candidate states such as Romania and Bulgaria which were expected to enter the EU quite soon (and also in Croatia and Macedonia, who had acquired candidacy status). Even the other countries in South-eastern Europe or the West Balkans – for example, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Albania – who were in the early stages of the pre-accession process, were becoming more integrated into the Euro–Atlantic strategic culture simply by virtue of their commitment to, and assistance from, Brussels. The EU membership conditionality paradigm was in fact designed to transform every facet of the pre-accession states (for example, institutions, values and behaviour), including the area of strategic perspectives. EU security development had not been moving ahead at the pace some in Europe hoped for, nor was it fully taking advantage of the diminished US resistance to the emergence of the EU as a security actor. But increasingly Eastern Europeans were participating directly in EU security and defence activities, either through the European Union Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF),by conducting Petersberg peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks (as in Macedonia and Bosnia) or by participating (in 2005 and 2006) in the new battle groups being developed within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) framework. In brief, Eastern Europe had become more directly engaged in European security development, although the specific nuances of the relationship between the ERRF and the battle

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groups on the one side, and the development of NATO’s own response force (which was created in 2002), on the other side, were still being worked out. East European elites, like other members of the EU, were well aware that when it came to high-intensity conflict operations, the US-led NATO was still indispensable. But in the meantime, NATO and ERRF were operating according to the principle of complementarity, and that principle had become a key element of the security subcultures in the East European states. Thus it was not necessary for the new Europe to choose between EU and NATO security structures, but rather to utilize the security capabilities of both alliances. Teodor Atanasiu, Romania’s Defence Minister, recently made the same point regarding his country’s national defence policy: ‘We want to optimize our defence capabilities, observe our commitments as a NATO member, participate in the European Security and Defence Policy, promote stability in the Balkans and the Black Sea region, and engage in the fight against terrorism.’12 While some European observers felt that the EU needed more internal unity on defence questions, and a much stronger security structure to counterbalance the United States, most East European leaders were content to benefit and extract what they could from the US–European security divide, while also strongly supporting the creation of a common defence and security policy within the EU. Thus, European public opinion was very receptive to a common security and defence policy – an average of 77 per cent of the public supported ESDP in the autumn of 2005; the average intensity of support expressed in the 15 old member states (75 per cent) was 10 points lower than the average support recorded in the 10 new member states (85 per cent), and all of Eastern Europe’s new democracies were well above the EU average.13 It may also be suggestive for the future that, while twothirds of the citizens in the EU claimed that they ‘feel attached to Europe’, the average for young people (15–22 years of age) surveyed was 62 per cent in the 15 old member states and 78 per cent for younger citizens in the new member states.14

EU enlargement and security imperatives: the Southern tier While East-Central Europe is a relatively stable zone that is highly integrated into Euro–Atlantic security structures, South-eastern Europe (SEE), in contrast, remains a region with both significant pockets of instability and considerable uncertainty with respect to its European aspirations. Indeed, SEE elites and citizens exhibit considerable insecurity about their future status in Europe. The Eastern Balkan states, Romania and Bulgaria,

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are the best positioned in this respect, as they are already in NATO, quite stable in their internal political dynamics, and close to reaching their announced entry point into the EU. Croatia, although a member of the West Balkan group of states (including Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro) is an EU candidate country that can also be regarded as being in a fortuitous position, and is widely expected to become an EU member soon after the East Balkan cases. Croatia is also likely to become a member of NATO between 2008 and 2013. But Croatia aside, anti-enlargement impulses that accompanied the rejection of the EU Constitution by France and Holland placed a question mark over the entire enlargement process in the West Balkans. West Balkan elites have consequently been anxious about their future hopes for accession, despite frequent reassurances by EU officials that the West Balkan region remains eligible for accession, that is, if the individual countries fulfil the conditions established for that process. But there is now an awareness that such conditions, or the criteria for EU entry, will now be interpreted in a more stringent manner than in earlier years. There is also awareness of a wide divergence of opinion among EU states over the propriety of further enlargement, even in the case of the East Balkans, but particularly with respect to the West Balkan cases and Turkey. The 25 EU members realize that these states present a unique security challenge, and that the West Balkan outlook on security issues collectively represents yet another distinct strategic subculture. The reverberations from socialist Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration – the wars of the Yugoslav succession in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia – followed by the turbulence in Albania in 1997, the 2001 fighting in Macedonia between Slavs and Albanians, and then the March 2004 antiSerb riots in Kosovo by disgruntled Albanians, have underlined the security challenges in the SEE region. The region is also troubled by a host of serious problems (high unemployment and poverty levels, trafficking in arms, drugs and people, corruption), and an agenda of special territorial and political issues: the separation of Serbia and Montenegro; uncertainty about what will follow the current talks on Kosovo’s future status; the continued strength of populist and extremist groups; and the inability adequately to deal with matters of postwar reconciliation and justice. As one astute Bulgarian analyst recently observed: ‘We may hope that the wars in the Balkans are over, but the smell of violence lingers heavily in the air. The region’s profile is bleak – a mixture of weak states and international protectorates where Europe now has almost half of its deployable military forces . . . the vanishing prospect of EU enlargement into the Balkans could yet mean war there.’15

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In some countries of the Balkan region, in particular Serbia, it is estimated that up to 70 per cent of the parliamentary deputies may hold anti-Western views, and are ‘sceptical about reforms in general and European integration in particular’.16 Serbia may be an unusual case owing to its recent difficulties with post-communist transition (the ‘Milosevic phenomenon’ from 1987 to 2000) and its problems in meeting basic requirements for advancement in the pre-accession process, particularly with respect to delivering war-crime suspects to the Hague Tribunal. Serbia’s predicament – which was not immediately alleviated by the death of Slobodan Milosevic in March 2006 – is also complicated by the drive for state formation in Montenegro and Kosovo. Until the matter of the status of those cases has been resolved – and the potential for spillover turbulence in the region reduced – it will also be difficult for the EU and NATO to offer neighbouring Macedonia and Albania membership. Meanwhile, Bosnia’s continued ethnic segmentation also complicates its Euro–Atlantic aspirations, and though progress on constitutional reform seemed promising in early 2006, the protectorate – now run substantially by the EU – still has a long way to go before becoming an economically self-sustaining and politically democratic state. There is no doubt that after the end of the war in Bosnia in 1995, and especially since the Kosovo war of 1999 and the formation of the Stability Pact, the role of the EU as an economic, political and security actor in the West Balkans has been critical to the region’s stability and development. But in view of ambivalence and divergence within the EU, West Balkan elites in general have serious reasons for concern regarding their country’s prospects for becoming fully integrated into Euro–Atlantic institutions. For example, in the autumn of 2005 public opinion data on attitudes towards enlargement in the EU revealed a deep divide between citizens of the old member states and the newer member states in Eastern Europe. Thus the overall average percentage of all EU citizens in favour of enlargement (49 per cent) is higher than those against the project (39 per cent). But though two-thirds to three-quarters of those surveyed in the East European member states are in favour of enlargement, support for broadening the membership of the EU is well below average in the old member states. Large portions of the public in Austria (77 per cent), Luxembourg (69 per cent), France (69 per cent), Germany (64 per cent) and the UK (57 per cent) do not indicate their support for further enlargement as a general notion.17 Rather than being viewed as a source of well-being, the idea of an ‘ever wider’ EU is now regarded as a source of insecurity and anxiety in many European countries. For example, despite

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Table 3.2: Support in the EU for the accession of the South-eastern European states (percentage in favour) Potential entrant states

EU 25

EU 15

Croatia Bulgaria Romania Macedonia Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbia and Montenegro Albania Turkey

51 48 43 41 40 39 33 31

47 45 41 39 39 36 32 29

New members 70 64 53 51 50 50 40 38

Source: European Commission (2005), Eurobarometer 64: Public Opinion in the European Union.

reports that labour mobility from Eastern Europe to Western Europe has been beneficial to Europe’s overall macroeconomic condition, the fear of losing jobs to cheaper labour from Eastern Europe is still quite marked among many citizens in the older EU member states.18 West European respondents surveyed in Eurobarometer studies express far more concern than East European citizens about potential entry of the South-east European states into the EU (see Table 3.2). Moreover, even in the new member states, support for inclusion of the SEE countries in the EU has been falling. Still, most West Balkan political leaders and citizens are generally hopeful about joining the EU, although they also have mixed emotions and anxieties about how they are being treated as potential candidates for admission, whether they will be granted EU entry soon, and how their states will fare should they eventually enter the EU. Thus, in these states, Euro-enthusiasm is mixed with Euro-scepticism, and in some cases, especially among extremist and populist parties, a good deal of Euro-antipathy. The attitudinal data regarding EU enlargement and potential new entrants strengthens the apprehension among many in South-eastern Europe (and in Central Europe as well) about the ability of transcending the old Europe–new Europe divide, the near-term unification of Europe as a whole, and the ability of the EU to act coherently as a global actor. Such perceptions encourage the ‘instinctive Atlanticism’ of East European states regarding matters of security and defence, and especially the value of maintaining close relations with both the United States and Europe.

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Conclusion Euro–Atlantic structures have played, and continue to play, a significant role in assisting the states of East-Central Europe and South-eastern Europe in their relatively recent post-communist transition. There are notable differences between the security outlook of the Northern tier new democracies, which have already entered the EU and NATO and are beginning to play an important role within those alliances, and the foreign and security perspectives of countries in South-eastern Europe. The East-Central European states have exhibited a rather distinct strategic or security subculture during the first decade of the twenty-first century, and this clearly came into focus during the period surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2004 enlargement of NATO and the EU. Meanwhile, South-eastern Europe, with its continued turbulence and socio-economic and political problems, reveals elements of yet another subculture regarding matters relating to security affairs. Still anxious to achieve their entry and full acceptance into the EU and NATO, the West Balkans is particularly vulnerable to external pressures and tensions that may derive from difficulties in transatlantic relations, and may still be negatively affected by intra-European divisions on the propriety and speed of EU and NATO enlargement. Whether the West Balkans will become a territorial ghetto surrounded by EU states, or in contrast make a smooth transition to joining the EU club of 25, remains to be seen. South-eastern European candidates for EU admission might need to be concerned by the suggestion made by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, that some kind of ‘privileged partnership’ might serve as a desirable model for further West Balkan and Turkish association with the EU.19 However, in mid-March 2006, EU Enlargement commissioner, Olli Rehn, warned EU member states that ‘it would be utterly irresponsible to disrupt a valuable process that is helping to build stable and effective partners in the most unstable parts of Europe. If we were to go wobbly about the Western Balkans perspective, our beneficial influence would be seriously eroded.’20 But until the EU has made progress on its own constitutional arrangements, and reached a consensus on enlargement issues, the accession hopes of most West Balkan states will not be realized. What has been termed EU ‘accession automatism’ is now a thing of the past, and there is now a good deal of attention devoted to the ‘functioning capacity’ of potential member states, and not just the ‘absorption capacity’ of the EU.21 Meanwhile, countries such as Croatia, Macedonia and Albania remain official candidates to join NATO (the US has also been lobbying for the entry of

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Ukraine and Georgia), but the decision on yet another wave or waves of NATO enlargement will probably not be made until late 2006 or during 2007, and the next accession process will not occur before 2008 at the earliest. The security agendas of the post-communist democracies that are queued up to enter the EU and NATO will continue to exhibit specific security issues that differentiate their perceptions and priorities from the older member states. For example, aside from the Baltic states, the political and economic development of those countries which belonged to the former Soviet Union – countries that are now only in the broader EU neighbourhood, but not slated for imminent membership in NATO – is of concern to all Europeans, but especially to elites and to citizens in Eastern Europe who equate their security as much with what happens in the East as in the West.22 The East European countries, and also the more troubled South-eastern European countries, worry a great deal about the pattern of stalled democratic transition in Belarus, Moldova and the Russian Federation, as well as the more promising but still problematic trajectory of Ukraine and Georgia. Challenges to democratic developments in the EU neighbourhood to the East therefore constitute a security matter of very high priority in the new European democracies. There has been considerable transatlantic divergence over the best method of democracy promotion, with the US generally advocating bottomup revolutionary change, and the EU focusing as a rule on the top-down export of stability and state-building in an orderly fashion.23 The leaders of the new democracies in East Europe – themselves former civil society activists or recent witnesses to their countries’ liberation from communist authoritarian rule – often tend to be more Atlanticist and aggressive in their commitment to democratic change. The East European states which experienced the civil society resistance that eventually led to the anti-communist revolutions of 1989 are now spearheading efforts to assist civil society ‘revolutionary’ change in states who have found themselves under the control of corrupted and stalled post-communist regimes. For example, an important step in asserting the ‘Eastern dimension’ on matters of democracy promotion occurred during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine when Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski and Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, worked closely together with the EU’s Javier Solana to mediate a peaceful outcome.24 Promoting ‘regime change’ is just as appealing a project to many East Europeans as the task of stabilizing countries that are already democratic. Thus at the March 2006 EU Summit in Brussels, it was Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic states, joined by Denmark and Sweden, who initiated the

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adoption of tough sanctions against the regime in Belarus because of significant fraud during the presidential election just a week earlier. Austria and other EU countries had called for milder sanctions, while France had demanded the deletion of wording in the summit declaration stipulating that Europe would work closely with the United States on the Belarus issue. Thus, on the matter of the Alexander Lukashenko regime in Belarus, many of the East European states seemed as Atlanticist as they had been on the US policy concerning the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Another specific issue of increasing priority and some controversy in Europe is the issue of energy security. For example, the vulnerability of Europe to Russian gas supplies was made very apparent in the winter of 2005–06. Eighty per cent of all Russian gas that flows to the EU transits through Ukraine. When Russia reduced its gas exports and shipments to and through Ukraine, the Balkan countries such as Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro were adversely affected, along with Central European countries such as Hungary, Poland the Czech Republic and Austria. East European countries are at a particularly critical stage of their post-communist economic transformation, and are wary regarding politically or economically motivated reductions in gas deliveries. Thus the energy-vulnerable East European states have argued for a much stronger and more unified response to the problem of energy supplies. In January 2006, the four Central European Visegrad countries – Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – met with Austria, the current EU rotating president, and agreed to act together on energy issues. The Central European states were also concerned that their energy security would be adversely influenced by the North European Gas Pipeline project between Russia and Germany. The pipeline, which is to run under the Baltic Sea, will bypass Poland and the Baltic states. For example, Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas exclaimed to a German newspaper: ‘I don’t know who is trying to play around with us – Russia, or maybe Germany.’25 Germany, which in 2004 received 52 per cent of its gas from Russia, could re-export gas back to the East European states, but that expectation appeared figuratively, if not literally, of little comfort to leaders in the new democracies. At their March 2006 summit in Brussels, EU leaders began to explore elements of a common energy policy. Poland, supported by the Baltic states, urged the EU to move quickly towards reducing energy dependence on Russia, and to adopt tougher and more unified measures towards Russia in this area. Poland also favoured adopting an energy policy that would include South-east Europe, Ukraine and Turkey. But Germany and France were more reluctant to isolate Russia, with France particularly wary about

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allowing the EU to exercise control over gas supplies through some kind of ‘energy NATO pact’. The dialectic of European unification and division is not likely to end soon. The political assertiveness and sometimes pro-American positions of East European elites may bother many in the ‘old Europe’, or in the ‘core Europe’ – just as the Anglo-American special relationship has proved irritating to some observers. But the ‘Eastern dimension’ in the EU and in NATO is not likely to succumb to the homogenizing influence of ‘Europeanization’. US–EU relations and intra-European relations will also be tested by issues such as the November 2005 allegations that US intelligence used Polish and Romanian facilities and bases in connection with the movement and incarceration of terrorists, and the US–Bulgarian agreement, signed in March 2006, for the stationing of American troops in Bulgaria. In any case, on issues such as promoting democratic development in the former communist countries, how to respond to energy vulnerability, and the various issues which will undoubtedly arise in the EU–US transatlantic discourse in the future, the historically shaped and diverse security perspective of the East European states will continue to be expressed within the evolving ‘European security culture’.

Notes 1. ‘State Department Foreign Press Centre Briefing – Subject: Department of Defense Update’, Federal News Service, 22 January 2003. 2. Michael Mihalka, ‘Conclusion: Values and Interests: European Support for the Intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq’, in Old Europe, New Europe, and the United States: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post-9/11 Era, eds Tom Lanford and Blagovest Tashe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 290, 292. 3. Robert Graham, ‘Chirac Vents Ire Over Behavior of EU Candidates’, Financial Times, 19 February 2003, 8. 4. Rory Watson, ‘Chirac’s Outburst Met with Disdain by EU Applicants’, The Times, 19 February 2003, 13. 5. Jiri Sedivy and Marcin Zaborowski, ‘Old Europe, New Europe, and Transatlantic Relations’, in Old Europe, New Europe, and the Transatlantic Security Agenda, eds Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski (London: Routledge, 2005), 11–27. 6. Donald Rumsfeld, ‘Remarks by Secretary Rumsfeld at the 41st Munich Conference on European Security Policy’, transcript, 2005 Munich Conference on European Security Policy, 12 February 2005, http://www.securityconference.de/ konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2005⫽&menu_konferenzen⫽&sprache⫽en&i d⫽144& (10 January 2006). 7. Jan Ross, ‘The Ghosts of the Chocolate Summit’, in Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraqi War, eds Daniel Levy, Max Pensky and John Torpey (London: Verso, 2005), 71; Richard Asmus and Alexandr Vondra, ‘The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18 (2005): 203–16.

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8. Tomas Valasek, ‘The “Easternization” of ESDP after EU Enlargement’, in Fresh Perspectives on European Security, ed. Real Instituto Elcano/ New Defence Agenda (Brussels: Forum Europe), 51–5. 9. Vaclav Klaus, ‘Some Doubts about the EU’s Ever-closer Future’, speech, 2006 Bridge Forum Dialogue, Luxembourg, 8 March 2006, http://www.forumdialogue.lu/pdf/discours_some_doubts.pdf (15 March 2006). 10. Marcin Zaborowski, ‘Friends Reunited? Recalibrating Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century’, in Friends Again? EU–U.S. Relations after the Crisis, ed. Marcin Zaborowski (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2006), 226. 11. At a 5 February 2005 Warsaw press conference with Condoleezza Rice, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rotfeld, remarked: ‘Our attitude towards the development in Iraq and our action in the years 2003 and 2004 did cause a response on the part of some EU member states and that was perceived as a rift in transatlantic relations. However today we have come to the common conclusion that the unfortunate concept of old and new Europe is a total misunderstanding. We are part and parcel of one Europe and we are integrated with it. In the year 2005 we are in a completely different place than we were in the years 2004 and 2003.’ ‘Remarks with Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rothfeld after Meeting’, transcript, US Department of State, 5 February 2005, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/41848.htm (10 December 2005). 12. Pericles N. Zorzovilis, interview with Teodor Atanasiu, Defense News, 23 January 2006: 22. 13. European Commission, Eurobarometer 64: Public Opinion in the European Union, December 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_ first_en.pdf (15/02/2006). 14. European Commission, ‘Youth Takes the Floor’ – Background Note Based on Relevant Findings from Eurobarometer Data, December 2005, http://ec.europa. eu/public_opinion/archives/notes/back_note_en.pdf. 15. Ivan Krastev, ‘The Balkans Explosion That Could Benefit Europe’, Europe’s World, 1 (2005): 117. 16. ‘Serbia: Spinning its Wheels’, International Crisis Group: Europe Briefing 39, 23 May 2005: 6. 17. European Commission, Eurobarometer 64: Public Opinion in the European Union, First Results, Brussels, 2005. 18. Quentin Peel, ‘Enlargement is a Great Unsung Success Story’, Financial Times, 9 February 2006, 15. 19. Mark Beunderman and Ekrem Krasniqi, ‘Merkel Moots “Privileged Partnership” for Balkans’, EUobserver, 17 March 2006. 20. Mark Beunderman, ‘Rehn and MEPs Warn against “Wobbly” Message to Balkans’, EUobserver, 15 March 2006. 21. EU Commissioner for enlargement, Rehn, recently observed: ‘We can’t wait for the next big enlargement to sort out the EU’s internal problems, because the next accessions after Bulgaria and Romania are still far off . . . Too often in the 1990s Brussels fiddled while the Balkans burned. We must not risk this happening again’; Olli Rehn, ‘Brussels Must Offer the Balkans a Credible Future’, Financial Times, 3 April 2006, 15. 22. Verena Fritz, ‘New Divisions in Europe? East-East Divergence and the Influence of European Enlargement’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 8 (2005): 192–217.

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23. Jeffrey Kopstein, ‘The Transatlantic Divide Over Democracy Promotion’, Washington Quarterly, 29 (2006): 85–98. 24. Geoffrey Edwards, ‘The New Member States and EU Foreign Policy Making’, Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM): Policy Papers, February 2006. 25. ‘The Ties That Bind’, Petroleum Economist, March 2006: 1.

4 Transatlantic Differences on Security Perceptions and Responses Fraser Cameron

Introduction ‘Americans are warmongers. Europeans are wimps.’ These widely held but erroneous perceptions of the United States and the European Union provide the background to a steady unravelling of the previous transatlantic consensus on security threats and how to respond to them. The crisis of 2002/03 in transatlantic relations was the most traumatic in post-World War II history. It centred on how to respond to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It pitted Washington, London, Warsaw (and for a time Madrid) against Berlin and Paris (and Moscow). German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder won re-election on an anti-American war ticket in October 2002. Some of the largest anti-war demonstrations in European history took place in February 2003. The crisis shook NATO and the EU to their very foundations. How did these transatlantic differences arise? What are the prospects for future US–EU agreement on security threats and the appropriate responses, in particular responses involving the use of force? To what extent has the second Bush Administration learned lessons from the Iraq War? What are the implications for the future of the EU and NATO? How will the EU advance its security ambitions after the failure to ratify the constitutional treaty? This chapter seeks to examine the nature of the transatlantic rift on security, focusing on respective security strategies, and suggests that while the gap has narrowed, there remain substantial differences in approach that will affect future EU–US relations.

The changing nature of security With the end of the Cold War it was inevitable that the EU and the US would reassess their strategic interests. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 67

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November 1989 became the defining moment for Europe as much as the terrorist attacks of September 2001 became the defining moment for the US. In the aftermath of the collapse of communism, the EU embarked on the process of integrating two halves of a continent that had been divided for almost half a century. With the attack on the twin towers, the US launched a global mission to eradicate terrorism. The US front line was no longer in Europe but in every country or region that engaged in terrorism or sheltered terrorists or was alleged to be developing WMD. There was little overlap between the two agendas. The US was pleased that the EU was finally taking greater responsibility for its own continent but expected Europe to do more in the global ‘war on terror’. But most Europeans were concerned about the American approach in tackling terrorism. Europeans had lengthy experience in dealing with terrorists and even after the Madrid bombings of March 2004 and the London bombings of July 2005 doubted the use of military power in combating terrorism.1 Significantly, Europeans spoke of ‘the fight against terrorism’ rather than a ‘war on terror’.2 According to President Bush, nations were either ‘with us or against us’ in the fight against ‘good and evil’. The main tool in the ‘war on terror’ was to be the US military machine, the most daunting fighting force in history. In a swift one-sided military encounter, the Taliban were defeated in Afghanistan.

America: the special nation US security perceptions are coloured by the fact that America has always seen itself as a special nation with a special mission to save civilization. Moral and religious fervour have always been present in presidential speeches but it reached new heights during the Bush presidency and suggests a heightened sense of crisis and a shift in the very categories of thinking about international relations. Robert Kagan, who asserted that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus, put the argument forward for an American special mission with force. A high priest of the neoconservatives, Kagan argued that ‘it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. They agree on little and understand each other less and less.’ Nor was this a superficial or transitory phenomenon: ‘[W]hen it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defence policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.’3 Kagan’s thesis struck a raw nerve in Europe and led to a plethora of counter arguments. But Bush himself was constantly promoting the idea of America

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as a special nation with a special mission and special responsibilities.4 Prior to 1989, the United States’ principal mission was the containment of communism. Now Bush was arguing, rather like Kennedy, that the US would pay any price to eradicate terrorism. As leader of the ‘civilized’ world the US is generally expected and expects to assume certain responsibilities and the range of economic and strategic interests has increasingly extended this net of commitments. Some traditional constraints still exist on American interventions but the context has changed radically since 1989 and especially after 9/11. The US is the undisputed world leader. It has no rival globally, whether one is talking about overall size of the economy, defence budgets, weapons systems, global military reach or global economic influence. Despite many social and economic problems, the basic ingredients of American power remain intact, and with the Cold War enemy removed America is apparently more free to act on the global stage than at any time since the Second World War. Hence the continuing relevance of the suggestion that America is engaged on a special mission and is ‘bound to lead’. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War complicated matters as far as American global leadership is concerned. It is not the often-remarked absence of a clearly defined enemy so much as the absence of a ready set of rules and justifications for overseas interventions. Rather than the blanket justification of containment of communism, each intervention has to be justified on its own terms or in relation to some as yet not clearly formulated programme – Bush Senior’s ‘New World Order’ or Clinton’s ‘democratic enlargement’.5 If Cold War ‘realism’ had supplied the necessary basis for policy choices in the period of East–West confrontation, in the more fluid world that followed the collapse of communism various elements of idealism came more to the fore. Crucially, a world in which terrorism was the chief threat simply did not accord with the familiar patterns of conflict and policy choices, to the extent that it was necessary to reinterpret that threat to accord more clearly with realist precepts. This led to the ‘war on terror’ and the war on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, policy choices that split the Atlantic allies.

The Iraq War The ease with which the US military imposed regime change in Afghanistan brought a frenzy of calls for further military action to oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. From leaked reports of meetings of the National Security Council and also of meetings between President George W. Bush and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, it would appear that the US took the

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decision to topple Saddam Hussein in the summer of 2002.6 American hubris and unrealistic expectations of the outcome were major factors in this momentous decision, a decision that at the time enjoyed very broad cross-party support in the US. It later emerged that American and British intelligence reports were modified to try and prove that Iraq possessed WMD. Despite failing to secure United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorization, the US, together with the UK and a handful of other smaller allies, invaded Iraq in spring 2003 and by the summer had again imposed regime change in a Muslim country. The decision to go to war led to a major crisis in transatlantic relations. Both Bush and Blair tried to pin the blame on French President Jacques Chirac for threatening to use his veto to block UNSC approval for military action. The French retorted that Hans Blix, the UN chief weapons inspector, should be given more time to complete his work. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was quoted as saying that the US ‘should punish the French, ignore Germany and forgive Russia’.7 For several months the White House refused to take any calls from the German Chancellor’s office. Relations could hardly have been worse.8 Yet it was more than a pure US–EU split. Although European public opinion was solidly against the war as manifested in all public opinion polls and in the largest-ever anti-war demonstrations that took place in cities such as London, Madrid, Rome and Warsaw in February 2003, governments were divided. Prime ministers Aznar, Blair and Berlusconi, for example, were ready to deliver official Spanish, British and Italian support for the war even in the face of widespread opposition. Blair was clearly Bush’s most important ally and it was only under the Prime Minister’s urging that the US President was prepared to seek a second (unsuccessful) UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force in February 2003. The initial euphoria over the swift military victory in Iraq soon gave way to misgivings as the US encountered a growing insurgency. There was widespread criticism of the failure to plan for the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq and American and civilian casualties continued to rise in months and years following the invasion. Yet, despite these problems, President Bush fought and won the November 2004 election as a war president.9 The neoconservatives who dominated the first Bush Administration were soon to learn that the power to act does not equate with the power to persuade. Many American strategists derided the alleged European military weakness and argued that the US could and should ‘go it alone’. Many Europeans wailed at the growing asymmetry in military power but argued that the EU was an important proponent of ‘soft power’. Few stopped to consider the possibility of complementarity in what the EU

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and US brought to the table. The first Bush Administration seemed more willing to divide and rule in Europe rather than argue the virtues of a strong, united EU as its partner of preference. An additional problem was the new generations taking power on both sides of the Atlantic. Gerhard Schröder, for example, did not have the same wartime experience as his predecessor, Helmut Kohl, and few of the closest advisers around Bush had experience of the EU.

A change of course? The early months of the second Bush Administration seemed to indicate a willingness to change tack and to reach out to erstwhile allies in Europe who had been scorned during the first Bush term. In February 2005, President Bush chose to visit Brussels, including the EU headquarters as well as NATO, and Germany. He spoke of the enduring importance of the Atlantic Alliance but also emphasized the US wish to see a strong, united Europe. He repeated this message on the occasion of the EU/US summit in Washington in June 2005, just a few weeks after the EU was plunged into crisis as a result of the two failed referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands (for the impact of the failure of the Constitutional Treaty see the chapter by Milagros Álvarez). The motives for the changed US approach can be traced back to the difficulties the US was facing in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It was becoming apparent to influential parts of the US bureaucracy, especially the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security, that the US needed EU resources, assistance and legitimacy if it was going to achieve its security goals. While the February visit was warmly welcomed by European leaders keen to heal the transatlantic rift, European public opinion remained hostile to Bush and US foreign policy. According to several polls taken after the US elections, a staggering 75 per cent of Europeans had no confidence in Bush’s foreign policy. Polls in Canada, the Middle East and elsewhere in the world showed similar popular misgivings about the style and direction of American policy. In many countries China was more trusted as a positive factor in international relations than the US.10 What upset many Europeans was the style and rhetoric of the Bush Administration, which was so different to that of President Clinton. Bush also propagated a different theory of leadership. The US should articulate clear goals and others would follow. Allies would be punished or ignored if they did not follow. Dissent was equated with disloyalty. This grated with European governments as well as public opinion.

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The European Security Strategy and the US National Security Strategy The two most important reference documents for any analysis of transatlantic security differences are the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS). The US NSS was updated in March 2006 (see below). Detailed comparison of the two documents is difficult because of their different lengths, structures and ambitions. The US paper is twice as long, providing a fairly detailed and concrete programme statement on behalf of a single sovereign entity. The ESS avoids descending into detail, not just because of the number of nations it was designed to please and the multiplicity of European instruments needed to give effect to it (including many resources still under national control), but also because it was published in the wake of a major internal disagreement on Iraq and amidst a sensitive debate on the future of the European Security and Defence Policy. Each paper was designed for a distinct demonstration effect: the US document for reassuring its citizens about their leaders’ understanding of new threats and determination to counter them, the European document aiming both to draw EU members back together after months of painful division and to show the world that they meant business. The NSS is peppered with phrases about promoting freedom and democracy. Claims are made on behalf of America’s own history and values, on behalf of American leadership and on behalf of the civilized world whose values are taken to be at one with those of the US. In his introductory statement to the NSS, Bush noted that that ‘the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization’.11 Such moral and religious rhetoric is to be found in many of President Bush’s major speeches since 9/11. The Bush rhetoric as well as the thrust of the NSS found little resonance in Europe. Europeans found it hard to accept the idea that the West was engaged in a titanic struggle to save civilization. The introduction to the ESS states that Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure and so free. It adds that this union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s GNP and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal is inevitably a global player. It should be ready, therefore, to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world. The ESS is then organized into three chapters: an analysis of the security environment, the definition of three strategic objectives and an assessment of the policy implications for the EU. With regard to the current security environment, the ESS begins by listing the negative aspects of globalization, arguing that poverty, disease, competition for

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scarce resources and global warming could have a negative impact on the security of EU member countries. Anticipating that ‘large scale aggression against any member state is now improbable’ the ESS identifies five key threats that are interconnected, namely:12 1. Terrorism, which has become global in its ‘scope and is linked to religious extremism’; Europe ‘is both a target and a base for such terrorism’. 2. Proliferation of WMD, ‘potentially the greatest threat to our security’. 3. Regional conflicts, both worldwide and in the EU’s neighbourhood, which have an impact on ‘European interests directly and indirectly and which can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure’. 4. State failure, which ‘undermines global governance and adds to regional instability’ and which ‘can be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime or terrorism’. 5. Organized crime, which can be linked to terrorism and is ‘often associated with weak or failing states’; organized crime has thus an ‘important external dimension’ such as ‘cross-border trafficking of drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons’. The ESS then identifies three strategic objectives. The first is ‘Addressing the Threats’, and the document notes progress in adopting an EU arrest warrant, in tackling proliferation and in dealing with regional conflicts. The second is ‘Building Security in our Neighbourhood’, and here the document touches on the importance of enlargement and the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy. The third objective is an international order based on effective multilateralism. Finally, in considering the policy implications for Europe, the ESS suggests that Europe should be more active, more capable and more coherent in responding to the new security threats. Although the NSS was written a year earlier and with an overall tougher approach than the ESS, there are a number of similarities in both papers. Both are optimistic about the progress made with the end of the Cold War; both seek to blend different categories and levels (military and nonmilitary, state and non-state, internal and external) in the new analysis of threat; both recognize the ubiquity of the new challenges; both couch objectives in value-related and dynamic terms and both advocate a proactive and anticipatory approach. The ESS does not, however, embrace the doctrine of pre-emption. This difference on pre-emption was without doubt the most widely noted when the ESS was published, not least because it resonated so directly with US–European differences over Iraq. Other interesting contrasts are worth noting. Solana pays tribute to the US in his introduction while Bush does not mention Europe at all, and

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NATO only in its penultimate paragraph. The NSS spends very little time on threat analysis. It states clearly what the US will do, with further elaboration of the targets added as necessary. A third of the ESS analyses the challenges and does not get to ‘countering the threats’ until near the end. Regarding multilateralism, the ESS states that ‘no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems entirely on its own’;13 the NSS accepts that ‘no nation can build a safer, better world alone’.14 However, by the time the NSS reaches this point it has already clearly laid out a vision based on US dominance and exceptionalism: ‘we seek to create a balance of power’, ‘we will defend the peace’, ‘we will extend the peace’, other countries ‘must’ do this and ‘must’ do that.15 The ESS persistently expresses a preference for cooperative methods over coercion. The NSS waits until chapter VIII to discuss ‘Developing Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power’,16 and here talks in terms of ‘coalition leadership’ with institutions reduced to an instrumental role. The language of the NSS is dominated by references to ‘enemies’ and ‘rogue states’, while the ESS avoids these terms. When it comes to instruments for execution of the strategy, the NSS places the primary emphasis on military strength while the ESS prefers a judicious combination of resources. The world according to the NSS is much more black and white, with American military power serving as the chief weapon. Unlike the US document, the ESS also pays great attention to the importance of the UN as a legitimizing authority.

Changes since the NSS and ESS appeared In the three years since the NSS was published, the American attack on Iraq has fully stretched (many would say over-stretched) the doctrine of legitimate pre-emption, but the parallel handling of the North Korean and Iranian WMD challenges has revealed a different approach. On North Korea, the US has worked within the framework of the Six Party talks while on Iran it has come round to supporting EU efforts (and since March 2006 the UNSC efforts) to defuse the nuclear issue. It has become clear that even the sole superpower is unable or unwilling to carry out more than one major military adventure at a time as the ambitions in the NSS have come up against limits inherent in the US’s own system – financial, constitutional, public-opinion constraints – and in the actual strategic environment outside. It is generally acknowledged, and increasingly so in the US itself, that the problems attending the occupation of Iraq by the US and its partners since Saddam Hussein fell have demonstrated both the limitations of military force alone for achieving transformational

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solutions and the US’s deficiency in the other skills and resources required. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called for ‘accelerated transformational changes’ in his introduction to the 2006 Pentagon Quadrennial Review which identified four priority areas for attention: (i) defeating terrorist networks (ii) defending the homeland in depth (iii) shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads and (iv) preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.17 The widely propagated view of the neoconservatives that regime change in Iraq would deal a body blow to terrorism has proved quite wrong. In their testimony to Congress on 15 February 2005 the Director of the CIA, Portman Goss, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, both highlighted the continuing threat of terrorism to the homeland and to US interests abroad. The Director of the CIA caused some consternation by stating that the war in Iraq had actually led to an increase, not a decrease, in terrorist activities. The DIA chief was also frank in asserting that US policies in the Middle East fuelled resentment in the Muslim world. President Bush himself admitted that Iraq was a magnet for terrorists in a speech to the nation on 28 June 2005. As the situation in Iraq worsened in 2006 more and more critical voices could be heard. The 2006 mid-term elections saw the Democrats win control of Congress, a result widely interpreted as a repudiation of the Administration’s Iraq policy.

The 2006 National Security Strategy In March 2006, the US published a new NSS, described by National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley as an update on the 2002 document.18 The new document was essentially a restatement of the 2002 core message albeit with slightly different language. There was no direct reference to ‘pre-emptive strikes’, but the report insisted that the US reserved the right to act unilaterally if its vital interests were threatened. The US was in the early years of a long struggle against terrorism. Promoting freedom and democracy were twin US goals in combating terrorism. Iran, described as ‘an ally of terror and an enemy of freedom’,19 was catapulted to the top of the ‘evil empire’ list (‘we face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran’20) followed by Syria, North Korea, Cuba, Belarus, Zimbabwe and Burma. There was a more sceptical attitude towards Russia (‘we must regrettably point to a diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions’21) and China (‘it must act as a responsible stakeholder that fulfils its obligations’22). There was still no enthusiasm for international organizations with the NSS stating that coalitions of the willing were often more effective at dealing with problems.

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The 2006 NSS received rather little media coverage in contrast to the 2002 document, when the media focused on ‘pre-emptive strikes’ and the obvious reference to Iraq. The singling out of Iran in the 2006 report may cause some alarm in Teheran and elsewhere. But the likelihood of a US military strike against Iran remains remote. American forces are overstretched and the Pentagon is also concerned about the consequences for US interests in Iraq and elsewhere if there were to be another military intervention in the Middle East.23

Popular views on security There were a number of surveys of popular opinion taken in the US and in the EU during the 2002–03 transatlantic crisis that revealed considerable similarities, albeit with some marked differences. The most detailed and sophisticated polls24 provide a basis for tracing some interesting elements of divergence as well as convergence. Both Europeans and Americans no longer fear any kind of direct ‘Soviet’-style attack. There are, however, nuances. The US-defined ‘new threats’ of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction fall somewhat lower down in the league of European fears. Crime (internal as well as international) is of much greater concern for Europeans. Concerns of a social and economic nature loom very high in Europe and are expressed in somewhat ‘collectivist’ terms (for example, a concern about poverty which is not limited to the poor). The US tends to place more emphasis on external threats, the EU on internal threats. There is considerable convergence in how both Americans and Europeans consider threats should be tackled. Both sides of the Atlantic would appear to wish for a non-unilateralist US, an active EU (perhaps even a European superpower), cooperative modes of action using non-military as well as military strengths, and respect for the United Nations. The events of 2002–03, however, seem to have pushed down the level of European trust in and approval for the US Administration’s policies (most sharply of all in Germany) more than it has affected US popular warmth towards Europe.25 Certainly it does not offer any political kudos for European leaders to be seen as close to George W. Bush in the White House. American actions in Guantanamo and in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq as well as claims of US rendition practices have also severely undermined previous positive images of US foreign policy. Particularly interesting in the context of active security strategies are the findings of the Transatlantic Trends Survey that US opinion is more ready to bypass the UN when vital national interests are at stake; that US citizens find it easier to justify loss of life resulting from active interventions abroad; and that the

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American public is more ready to believe in the possibility of a ‘just war’. The same explanations mentioned above are relevant here too, but perhaps the most important consequence is that US leaders can much more easily marshal (at least) a short-term public consensus for forceful action against others than European governments can.

The EU as a security actor The EU has made enormous strides in the past decade as a security actor. It is now the principal stabilizing regime for the entire continent. The enlargement process has been a powerful element in the effort to attempt peaceful regime change in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and now Turkey. As the EU has enlarged it has also deepened and as of 2005 had plans to adopt a new constitution that would further enhance its ability to act on the world stage. The new constitution provided for an EU Foreign Minister, supported by an EU diplomatic service (EU external action service), who would be able to speak on behalf of the EU in the international arena. The treaty also intended to give the EU a legal personality and thus the ability to sign international agreements. Perhaps of most significance were the steps to ensure an enhanced military capability. The new constitution provided for structured cooperation, jargon for allowing those member states ready, willing and able to act in the name of the EU to be able to do so. In her chapter, Milagros Álvarez believes much can be salvaged from the draft treaty in the wake of the French and Dutch referendums, but this is not yet certain. There would appear to be a broad consensus that the proposals to improve the EU’s foreign and security policy should somehow be salvaged. At the same time, there is concern that attempts to ‘cherry pick’ parts of the treaty could provoke a popular backlash. It is likely, therefore, that there will only be incremental improvements to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and no ‘big bang’. It may take several years to create the post of EU Foreign Minister and establish an EU diplomatic service. Leaving the treaty aside, the past decade has witnessed significant progress with regard to European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It now has a permanent bureaucracy in the form of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), a Military Committee and a Military Staff, a framework for conducting operations and securing force goals from the member states, the beginnings of an agency for defence and armaments cooperation, and a security strategy that puts forth the political mechanisms and conceptual reasons for how and when this force would be used. In short, within a decade ESDP has gone from a vague idea to a developing institution,

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one that is conducting small but significant operations in the Balkans (Bosnia), Africa (Congo), Middle East (Gaza) and Asia (Aceh). Clearly it is a difficult road and there have been many setbacks and obstacles. But even if the process is ‘two steps forward and one step back’, ESDP has made remarkable progress and it is something that the US must take into serious consideration. At the 2005 EU–US summit in Ireland, a planned joint declaration on crisis management failed because the US was unwilling to recognize the military aspects of ESDP. Although there are many commentators who confidently predict that ESDP will never lead to a truly integrated EU military organization, it is worth noting that there were those who confidently predicted in the 1980s that the single currency would never come into being either. There are, of course, differing conceptions of what ESDP should become in the future. At one end of the spectrum some see it as a major step forward in the European integration project. The creation of a European force capable of acting autonomously would give the EU some ‘hard’ power to back up the CFSP. Eventually, ESDP would lead to a more common military force. The force would not necessarily be a European army, but certainly one capable of conducting a range of missions without resorting to assistance from NATO or the US when the member states of the EU agree that military force is needed. The need for such a force is not purely theoretical. It has its roots in the inability of Europe to act in the face of successive crises in the Balkans in the 1990s without the assistance of the US. Also on this end of the spectrum is the view that the EU may eventually be responsible for the collective defence of Europe. As General Gustav Hägglund, the then Chairman of the EU Military Committee asked rhetorically in February 2004, ‘If 280 million Americans can take care of their homeland security without European involvement isn’t it fair to expect the 450 million Europeans to arrange the defence of their area without the Americans?’26 At the other end of the spectrum, however, are those critics who feel that this conception of the EU as an institution encompassing a mutual security guarantee is not appealing. In their view, ESDP is a more limited and pragmatic development. ESDP is a means to build better capabilities because it may be easier to convince European publics that they should support the development of military capabilities within an EU context than it is to do so within a NATO context. The same ships, aircraft and troops would be used for either NATO or EU missions, so for those on this end of the spectrum, ESDP is less of a radical concept and more of an adjustment to political realities after the end of the Cold War and the existential threat to Europe posed by the Warsaw Pact. In this view, ESDP

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can only be seen as a means of improving European capabilities to take on certain activities in which NATO declines to participate. Regardless, it is important to keep ESDP in perspective. There is no possibility of the EU fielding a military capability that is remotely comparable in size or capability to that of the US. Even at its full strength and assuming a massive increase in European power projection capabilities, the EU Rapid Reaction Force would be about the same size as one of the three US Marine Corps expeditionary forces. The EU is also not attempting to build a force for high intensity operations and is concentrating on stability operations, humanitarian relief and similar operations. Thus, while at one end of the continuum some see ESDP as an important part of the overall process of European integration, at the other end some are more focused on the pragmatic aspects of military cooperation to make Europe more capable of playing a larger role within or outside of the NATO alliance.

Where does this leave the EU and NATO? For forty years NATO provided a secure shield for West Europeans to engage in rebuilding their half of the continent and developing the process of European integration. When the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989 there were many who predicted the end of NATO. Rather than contracting, however, NATO expanded from 16 to 19 to 26 and conducted its first operations out-of-area in the decade following the fall of the Soviet Union. But the Kosovo experience led many in the Pentagon to doubt whether it was possible to fight a war by committee. When NATO proposed invoking its Article V guarantee in the wake of 9/11, the US declined the offer. As the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put it, the ‘mission defined the coalition’ not the other way around. The reality of Iraq and Afghanistan, however, brought a change in the US approach and in late 2003 Washington pushed for an expanded NATO role in Afghanistan in order to relieve US forces and subsequently urged a NATO role in Iraq. In terms of missions, the NATO summits at Prague and Istanbul camouflaged deep differences between member governments.27 NATO now has its hands full in Afghanistan and it is establishing a rapid reaction capability (the NATO Response Force). It has expanded its dialogues with just about every region of the world. It has tried to develop a role for itself in fighting terrorism and in delivering humanitarian aid to Pakistan and to New Orleans. It has just agreed to build a new headquarters. But it still cannot shake off the impression, as one US Senator said, of being ‘a bureaucracy in search of a pension’.28

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The US has fluctuated between regarding NATO as an opportunity to gain European support for its foreign policy and as a useful toolbox for its operations elsewhere. The short annual EU–US summits and the usually rushed and overloaded ministerial meetings have been unable to make time to address these matters.29 Consequently, in 2002/03 the two sides largely talked past each other. While there was a general common analysis of the threats, there were significant differences in how to tackle these threats. For the Bush Administration the military was the first instrument. For Europeans (and Canadians), the military was but one of several instruments and they both made the point that all military action should have UN approval. The differences in EU and US approaches also extend to political issues such as the Israel–Palestine conflict, the wider Middle East – including how to deal with Iran and autocratic regimes – so-called rogue states, climate change and the International Criminal Court (ICC). During his speech at a Munich security conference in February 2005, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany raised a number of sensitive issues. He stated that the American presence in Europe was no longer the security priority that it used to be. New threats did not require a military response and here Schröder was echoing a widespread European fear of being dragged into American wars. The Chancellor went on to note that one of the major problems in transatlantic relations was the absence of any forum to discuss strategic issues. Certainly Schröder was correct in stating the obvious fact that neither NATO nor the EU has proved an adequate forum. But devising an alternative is likely to prove highly contentious. Schröder was right to state that the EU–US dialogue in its current form does justice neither to the Union’s growing importance nor to the demands of transatlantic cooperation. The German Chancellor, however, failed to pave the way for his remarks and there was little instant support for his speech, apart from President Chirac. The French press certainly welcomed the passage in the speech that stated, ‘NATO was no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies.’30 Certainly German and French public opinion are unlikely to accept the primacy of NATO for political matters. President Bush reacted by stating that ‘the relationship between the US and Europe is a vital relationship, a necessary relationship, and our relationship within NATO is the cornerstone of that relationship’.31 Without doubt, the US will try and work through both institutions, normally showing a preference for NATO but recognizing that it brings little to the table in tackling terrorism or other new threats. At present, there is little sign that Washington would wish to change the status quo, but if and when the EU develops more coherence in foreign policy and

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brings greater military capabilities to the table then there could be a change of heart in the US that would lead to a de facto EU–US strategic relationship. But how should transatlantic security cooperation be structured in the future? There is a growing appreciation that the EU should be able to manage its own security. After all, there is no external threat from a third state. And why should the American taxpayer help provide security for rich Europeans? The EU has also a moral obligation not only to provide for its own security, and thus provide an example to the rest of the world, but also to free up resources for promoting security elsewhere. The acceptance of the solidarity clause in the draft constitutional treaty was a clear indication of the direction in which the EU was moving. Although likely to be delayed, the acceptance of a security clause will almost certainly be included in the next EU treaty amendment. It is possible, therefore, that a widened and deepened EU, in ten year’s time, may become America’s partner of first choice rather than any ad hoc coalition of the willing. But this will require the EU to consolidate its structures and develop the necessary political will; and it will require the US to accept the benefits of a genuine strategic partnership with the EU.

Conclusions This chapter has sought to examine the nature of the transatlantic rift on security, focusing on respective security strategies, and suggests that while the gap has narrowed as a result of the Iraq experience, there remain substantial differences in approach and this will colour future transatlantic institutional relations. Despite the emphasis on terrorism, it is worth noting that American and European armed forces have been involved in a mixture of interventions since the end of the Cold War. The US and its European allies have not had to fight a prolonged conventional military campaign for several decades. Rather, they have been involved in quelling insurgencies, protecting civilian populations from terror campaigns, or brief bombing campaigns to bring about regime change. Their armed forces have been used principally for peacekeeping operations, either under UN, NATO or EU auspices. NATO launched two of the last decade’s largest nation-building missions, one of which it has since been passed on to the EU (in Bosnia). It seems clear that European and American armed forces will continue to be involved in peacekeeping and nation-building activities for the foreseeable future. The EU and US have moved closer as a result of the lessons learned in Iraq and the recognition that they are far better equipped to tackle new security threats by working together than by going separate ways. There

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is an opportunity for the US and the EU to strengthen the UN, for example, by supporting the Peace Building Commission. Both the EU and the US need to develop further their non-military capabilities for nation-building; both need also to engage in a regular strategic dialogue and seek to understand each other’s motives and interests better. This should be carried out within existing structures but with additional provisions for informal contact group arrangements. The directoire that existed to discuss Berlin issues during the Cold War, involving the US, Britain and France, could usefully be revived in a discreet manner. There will not always be a meeting of minds but the more dialogue there is the less likely that we shall see a repeat of the 2003 crisis that was so damaging to transatlantic relations.

Notes 1. Mirjam Dietrich, ‘Facing the Global Terrorist Threat: a European Response’, Working Paper 14, Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2005. 2. Michael Howard, ‘What’s in a Name?’, Foreign Affairs, 81 (2002): 2–8. 3. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003), 1–2. 4. George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union Address’, transcript, 2004 State of the Union, 20 January 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/ 20040120-7.html. 5. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: the Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World, revised edn (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1999). 6. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (London: Simon and Schuster, 2004); Richard Clarke, Against all Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (London: Free Press, 2004). 7. ‘Which Way Now for French Policy?’, The Economist, 24 July 2003. 8. Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004); Fraser Cameron, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2005). 9. There is a vast literature on the foreign policy of the first Bush Administration and the decision to go to war. See, for example, Cameron, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War; Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq; Seymour Hersch, ‘Who Lied to Whom?’, New Yorker, 31 March 2003: 41; and Woodward, Plan of Attack. Clarke, Against all Enemies, is particularly scathing of the decision to attack Iraq as a diversion from the real war on terror. 10. Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Centre, US Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative, 24 June 2005, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID⫽ 801 (2 December 2005). 11. United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 20 September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (15 November 2005). 12. Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, Brussels, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms Upload/78367.pdf (15 November 2005).

Transatlantic Differences on Security Perceptions 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25.

26. 27. 28. 29.

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31.

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Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World. United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Ibid. Ibid. United States, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, introduction, 6 February 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf (10 March 2006). Peter Baker, ‘Bush to Restate Terror Strategy’, Washington Post, 17 March 2006, A01. United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 16 March 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ (20 March 2006). Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Anatol Lieven, ‘There is a Menace in America’s Policy of Prevention’, Financial Times, 20 March 2006, 11. This discussion is based on information found in ‘Key Findings 2003’, Transatlantic Trends, 15 December 2005, http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/ 2003_english_key.pdf; European Commission, ‘Eurobarometer 60: Public Opinion in the European Union, February 2004, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ archives/eb/eb60/eb60_rapport_standard_en.pdf (10 April 2006); and European Commission, Eurobarometer 59: Public Opinion in the European Union, July 2003, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb59/eb59_rapport_ final_en.pdf (15 November 2005). In Germany, 68 per cent of respondents thought strong US leadership in the world desirable in 2002, and only 45 per cent in 2003. The number of German respondents who accepted the US as the world’s sole superpower fell from 22 per cent to 8 per cent and the number wishing the EU to become a superpower rose from 48 per cent to 70 per cent over the same year; see ‘Key Findings 2003’. Gustav Hägglund, Speech at the European Policy Centre, 22 February 2004. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). Private conversation with the author. European Commission, Directorate General External Relations, ‘Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States – An Independent Study’, 26 April 2005, http://europa.eu.int/comm/ external_relations/us/revamping/final_report_260405.pdf (10 April 2006). Gerhard Schröder, Speech at the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy, transcript, 2005 Munich Conference on Security Policy, 12 February 2005, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2005⫽ &menu_konferenzen⫽&sprache⫽en&id⫽143& (15 November 2005). North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Opening Statement by President George W. Bush at the Press Conference Following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Heads of State and Government’, press release, 22 February 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050222j.htm (10 April 2006).

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Part II Ready to go Alone? Unfolding the EU’s Security and Defence Policy

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5 Common Security and Defence Policy in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe Milagros Álvarez

Introduction The European integration process has undergone significant developments in the last fifteen years, specifically in the area of security and defence. To date, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe represents the highest point of agreement among member states, particularly on the features of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).1 The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands does not alter this fact.2 It is important to remember that no EU member state government challenged the ESDP’s inclusion in the treaty and that most of the ‘no’ voters in the referendums were firmly in favour of the strengthening of the ESDP. Indeed, the inclusion of measures to strengthen the ESDP in the Constitutional Treaty did not introduce any ‘revolutionary’ changes to the legal and institutional framework for that policy, allowing for the possibility of the further development of the ESDP regardless of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005. That being said, it is important to examine the changes proposed by the treaty, as doing so provides the basis for a comparison of ‘what could have been’ and ‘what is likely to be’ with regards to the development of the ESDP in the future. With this in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to review the changes that the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe would have introduced to the development of the ESDP. The primary objective behind this examination is to identify and explain the proposed changes to European security and defence policy highlighted in the treaty, and to evaluate them in the light of two criteria: efficiency and legitimacy.3 The question of how to improve the efficiency of decision-making and the functioning of institutions in a union of some twenty-five member states 87

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was a principal question posed at the beginning of the reform process initiated by the European Council in the Laeken Declaration of 2001.4 With regard to the ESDP, efficiency refers to the capacity to implement decisions and to make an assertive European Union (EU) security presence possible.5 However, efficiency measures must be balanced so as not to negatively impact the legitimacy of the EU and as a consequence diminish the internal solidarity and the external credibility of the EU.6 This was a consideration that the drafters of the treaty were well aware of when determining the changes to the ESDP to be included in the document. In the case of intergovernmental systems, just as is the case with the ESDP, legitimacy comes from the inalienable sovereignty of the member states. This chapter covers the three main ‘innovations’ concerning the ESDP introduced in the Constitutional Treaty: first, the conventional formalization of this policy; second, the regulation of cooperative flexibility in the areas of security and defence within the EU; third, the mechanisms for strengthening the operational capabilities of the EU in dealing with crises. The conclusion of this chapter provides an overall assessment on how the Constitution balanced the chosen criteria and, consequently, how and to what extent the proposed changes introduced in the Constitutional Treaty might have improved the ESDP.

Formalizing European Security and Defence Policy The formalization of the ESDP was one of the most significant outcomes of the Constitutional Treaty, keeping in mind the fact that the ESDP does not appear in the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), currently in force. The Constitutional Treaty incorporated the European Security and Defence Policy (also known as the Common Security and Defence Policy, or CSDP) as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy; under the terms of the treaty the CFSP would have remained a policy of the EU itself and not only of some of its member states (Article I-41.1). The CSDP is conceived, moreover, as the prerequisite to the EU’s common defence policy, thereby confirming its character as a phase in the progressive development of this policy. No other changes appeared in the Constitutional Treaty concerning increased levels of defence cooperation. The treaty incorporated the methodology for determining how to develop a common defence policy (based on the principle of progressiveness), as well as the regime envisaged to establish a common defence system (by unanimous decision of the European Council and recommendation to the member states).7 In addition, it

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retained the existing limits on how defence matters requiring cooperation were submitted for consideration within the EU framework (Art. I41.2). Regarding its characteristics, the conventional formalization reinforced the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP,8 although some important changes were also made concerning its content and institutional functioning. Content The Constitutional Treaty defined the CSDP in operational terms, underlining its instrumental nature. CSDP provides the EU with an operational capacity based on existing civil and military assets in order for it to fulfil a specific dimension of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): executing missions outside the borders of the EU, whose objectives are peacekeeping and conflict-prevention; and strengthening international security (Article I-41.1). The typology of these missions was set forth in Article III-309, which described the gamut of missions specified under Article 17.2 of the TEU, and added three new ones: joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, and post-conflict stabilization. It expressly stated that the EU might contribute to the fight against terrorism, including support for non-EU countries combating terrorism on their own soil. The new list described what the EU has already been doing, and then went beyond the current division between ‘Petersberg Tasks’ and the remaining civilian aspects of crisis management, delineating those tasks for which both civilian and military means would be employed. This might have been anticipated to generate tension with the European Commission, but the dual competence of the EU Foreign Minister – as we will see later – could explain the relatively easy expansion of the Petersberg list.9 Two other innovations would have had important consequences for the content of the EU cooperation on security and defence had the treaty been ratified: the clause for collective self-defence, in Article I-41(7), and the solidarity clause, in Article I-43. The ‘self-defence’ clause resulted from the consensus forged at the Intergovernmental Conference, creating a significant alteration in the mechanism primarily designed by the European Convention. Specifically, the mechanism of optional ratification (initially set in the Convention proposal)10 was substituted by a new clause under which it was declared ‘if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’.11 If the treaty entered into force, this clause would have been binding for all

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EU states. However, its effective scope would have been encircled by two limits. First, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitments would have continued to be the basis for mutual defence for the member states. Second, each EU member state would have been entitled to maintain its own traditional security and defence policy and, therefore, would have decided the type of assistance provided to states in the event of an attack.12 Both limits would have allowed for compatibility between those EU states that are members of NATO, and those that are neutral, as this self-defence commitment has no legal effects but rather reflects a political understanding. The new article endorsed an implicit consequence of the European integration process: the ‘largely common sense recognition that, in the event of attack against a Member State, the others will do what they feel they can (or wish to) do to help out’.13 While this commitment exists informally nowadays, the Constitutional Treaty would have put it in writing.14 The second significant element in the CSDP content of the Constitutional Treaty was the solidarity clause on terrorist attacks and natural as well as man-made disasters contained in Article I-43 and detailed by Article III-329.15 This clause could be labelled as the new version of the previous self-defence commitments. The treaty established that member states were required to assist a fellow EU state according to two rules: prior petition by the state’s political authorities, and coordination of the assistance within the Council of Ministers. Nonetheless, the obligations incorporated in the clause – for member states (joint action in a spirit of solidarity) and for the EU (mobilization of all the instruments at its disposal, including military resources provided by member states) – were confusing. Three questions stand out. First is the scope of applicability, which depends on how ‘terrorist attack’ and ‘natural and man-made disasters’ are defined. Second is the nature of the assistance, as it is not clear who would assess the suitability of the means utilized. Third is the scope of the member states’ commitment, as it is unclear if the article included an automatic commitment to assist.16 Finally, paragraph 3 of Article III-329 of the treaty appears to have incorporated a preventive role against terrorist attacks and disasters of natural or human origin for the European Council which must periodically evaluate the risks that threaten the Union. This provision raises at least three concerns. First, the European Council is poorly suited for this mission, as it lacks a capacity to make a technical assessment of such risks. Therefore it would have been absolutely critical that the European Council be connected to other EU institutions and organs with the necessary competence. As the provision does not guarantee that the European

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Council’s evaluation will lead to the certain identification of risk, the effectiveness of this ‘new task’ would have relied heavily on effective coordination among member states and on the exercise of existing EU powers.17 Despite these problems, on 25 March 2003, member states made the political commitment to act jointly against terrorist acts in the spirit of the solidarity clause contained in the Constitutional Treaty, and since that date the European Council has periodically reviewed the strategic objectives of the EU Action Plan against terrorism.18 Institutional functioning The institutional support that was designed in the Constitutional Treaty for the CSDP is found in the single institutional framework of the EU, even if the functions and competences of each of its integrated institutions continue being specific to this material sphere. The European Council and the Council of Ministers continue to be the only bodies deemed competent to make decisions in this area.19 The treaty retained the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP, and therefore the full sovereignty of member states to define the concrete scope of this policy, as well as the degree to which each is committed to action. In effect, under the measures that were introduced in the treaty, unanimity in the Council of Ministers is required for the adoption of any EU-wide decision relating to the exercise of the CSDP, including the decision to undertake a mission (Article I-41(4)). Such unanimity, though not expressly stated, allows for the application of constructive abstention.20 Moreover, Article III-300(4) expressly excluded qualified majorities for any decisions having military or defence implications, and blocked the European Council from modifying this situation using a mechanism contemplated by Article III-300(3). According to this provision, the European Council would have been able to decide unanimously that the Council of Ministers shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those envisaged by the treaty. Unfortunately, Article III-300(4) did not allow the European Council to modify the procedure envisaged by the treaty for decisions with military or defence implications.21 Member states lost an important opportunity to open the possibility of qualified majority voting in the CSDP. As this was regulated for the CFSP in Article III-300(2), majority voting would not have been able to proceed against the opposition of a member state, as any member state could have avoided voting if it declared that, for vital and stated reasons of its national policy, it opposed the adoption of a European-wide decision. Obviously, this regulation belonged to the general rules of intergovernmental systems. Nonetheless, it also reflected a certain degree of solidarity and trust among member

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states: majority voting decisions (improving effectiveness and flexibility in the decision-making process) would only have been avoidable in the case of existing major national concerns. Regrettably, this limited solidarity and trust does not exist among the EU member states on defence and security issues, and there is no indication it will exist in the near future. Besides these trends reflecting continuity, the treaty introduced two new institutional figures that may have impacted EU security and defence policy: the European Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and the President of the European Council. In addition, the EU Court of Justice might have had a new role in the CFSP and the CSDP under the Constitutional Treaty as the guarantor of the compatibility of EU international agreements with the Constitutional Treaty. The position of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs represents the fusion of the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, with that of the Commissioner for External Relations (Article I-28). The minister’s institutional responsibilities would have been two-fold: s/he would have presided over the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and would have been a member of the European Commission, with the rank of vice-president. Consequently, the EU minister’s functions and competences would have been of a dual nature.22 First, s/he would have played a key role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and, hence, in the CSDP. His/her institutional position would have enabled the presentation of policy proposals and would have permitted the execution of decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers or by the European Council. S/he would have also been assigned three other functions (Article III-296): representing the EU in Common Foreign and Security Policy matters, conducting political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf, and expressing EU positions in international organizations and at international conferences. Specifically, when the EU had defined its position on a United Nations Security Council agenda item, EU member states on the Security Council would have (theoretically) requested that the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs be asked to present the Union’s position (Article III-305.2).23 Some have questioned whether the vast range of responsibilities that were to be given to the EU minister would have been within the capabilities of a single individual.24 Certainly, his/her job would have required some amount of delegation.25 It is this author’s view that these problems, however, would have been less serious than the potential disadvantages of having two separate people providing leadership in the field of external relations. Unfortunately, such an improvement cannot be achieved without an amendment of the current

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TEU, according to the incompatibilities and requirements of the members of the Commission set out in Article 213 TEC. Concerning the subsidiary bodies, the EU Foreign Minister’s potential effectiveness would have also been conditional on the final form taken by the proposed European External Action Service.26 The organization and functioning of this service would have been established by a Europeanwide decision of the Council (Article III-296.3).27 The treaty specified that the service would comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission as well as staff from the national diplomatic services of member states. It further contemplated the creation of a new mixed administrative unit under the authority of the EU Foreign Minister, rather than the fusion of administrative units now dependent on the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. For this reason, there appeared to be no legal obstacle to folding the Military Staff into the External Service.28 In any case, the subsidiary nature of this External Service will make it possible to create it without having to amend the current treaties. Moreover, it appears that the EU is already taking steps in this direction.29 Nevertheless, the relationship between the External Service and the Commission services, as well as between the internal composition and functions of the External Service, will be a complicated one now that the treaty has effectively been shelved. In terms of the President of the European Council, his or her functions would have affected the internal workings of the European Council, imbuing it with continuity and facilitating the efficacy of its working groups (Article I-22). This general improvement would have likely produced salutary effects on those EU policies specifically dependent on the European Council, including the CSDP. The President would also have been charged with representing the EU in foreign affairs, specifically in relation to CFSP (without infringing upon the powers of the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs). He or she would have also been responsible for reporting on meetings of the European Council to the European Parliament.30 Comparing the role of the President of the European Council to that of the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, it is clear that the treaty would have strengthened the role of the latter more than that of the former.31 However, there would have been a clear risk of overlap in terms of representation in matters related to the CFSP, which could have been aggravated depending on the specific personalities of those holding the offices.32 Consistent with attributing an international legal personality to the EU, Chapter VI of Title V of Part III of the Constitutional Treaty set forth the procedure for the signing of international agreements between the

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EU and third countries or international organizations. This procedure included application details for agreements regarding foreign policy and common security (under Article 24 of the TEU).33 Article III-325(11) introduced a general clause allowing any member state, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission to solicit the Court of Justice’s opinion on the compatibility of the Constitution with any envisaged agreement. In the event of a negative ruling, said agreement would not enter into force unless it was amended or the Constitution was revised. This provision thus allowed the European Court of Justice a point of entry into matters concerning the CFSP, as well as into matters concerning the CSDP.34 This is despite the fact that the Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction – as Article III-376 establishes – with respect to Articles I-40 and I-41, and the provisions of Chapter II of Title V of Part III on Common Foreign and Security Policy. Article III-303 stated that the Union would be able to conclude agreements with one or more states or international organizations under the terms established by the CFSP. As it was not specific, EU international agreements with regards to the CFSP were to be negotiated and concluded in accordance with the procedure established in Article III-325 if the Constitutional Treaty were to have entered into force.35 Obviously, it could have been argued that ‘procedure’ should have been strictly understood to mean only those procedural steps specified in the article necessary for concluding international agreements and therefore it would not have included recourse to the court under paragraph 11 of Article III-325. It is the opinion of this author that the broader interpretation should have and could have prevailed had the Constitution come into effect.36 This is based primarily on two arguments. First, there is no ground to justify why the court should not have been able to ensure the conformity of EU international agreements related to the CFSP/CSDP with the procedure that was (in the restrictive meaning of procedural steps) outlined in the treaty. Secondly, with respect to content, the European Court of Justice should have had the jurisdiction to study at least the consonance of those agreements with the principles and objectives of EU foreign policy action, since these were established in Article III-292, a provision that was ‘inside’ the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction under the terms of the Constitutional Treaty – different to the current situation under the TEU. Therefore, the court could have been called to rule on, for example, an international agreement between the EU and third states or international organizations if said agreement dealt with EU assistance, support and/or cooperation with a military occupation of a country. The court could have given its opinion on the compatibility of the agreement with the principles of international law and

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the United Nations Charter (Article III-292 of the Constitutional Treaty). The case law of the court has shown that the court has been willing to apply those principles to control the legality of the Community actions and decisions, and the court has confirmed that the United Nations Charter prevails over the Community legal order.37 Under the Constitutional Treaty, the court would have been able to apply this scrutiny to any international agreement concluded by the EU, regardless of its specific content.

Cooperative flexibility for security and defence in the EU framework As distinct from the TEU, the Constitutional Treaty recognized the possibility of cooperative flexibility in security and defence issues and permitted a reduced grouping of member states to establish more intense cooperation through a new permanent structured cooperation mechanism (Article I-41(6), Article III-312 and Protocol number 23). This flexibility seemed to be a necessary condition for the effective functioning of an EU with thirty or more member states and, consequently, won the support of the Intergovernmental Conference, even though this led to important changes in the initial design of the European Convention.38 The discussion point was by ‘whom’ and ‘how’ the establishment of this specific cooperation system and its composition would be settled. The key question was how much influence the EU members (as a whole) should have on the group of member states who were willing to move forward at a faster pace on European defence-related issues. The other principal issue was whether this group would limit its activities to building military and operational capacities or whether it would be entitled to conduct military operations in the name of the Union.39 The final consensus in the Intergovernmental Conference can be understood as a desire to avoid the development of a directoire.40 However, it is also true that the Constitutional Treaty established a tactful balance between the development of permanent structured cooperation and the general evolution of the EU. The establishment and the initial composition of permanent structured cooperation is an EU issue, because the Council of Ministers (by majority vote) would adopt decisions in this area only after confirming that the participating member states had fulfilled the criteria and commitments on military capabilities set out in the protocol. Later decisions concerning the composition of the permanent structured cooperation (incorporation of a new member or suspension of a participating state) would be

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adopted following the same criteria, although in these cases the participating states would adopt the necessary decisions (by qualified majority and not by unanimity, as is its general rule of functioning). The Constitutional Treaty consecrated the right of any member state to participate in this cooperation mechanism if it met the ‘objective’ conditions set out in the protocol. Participating states in the permanent structured cooperation would have had no right of veto, although there would have likely been a minimum consensus among them regarding the ‘qualification’ of a particular candidate. Debates on the content and development of the structured cooperation would have taken place within the EU Council forum and any member state would be able to participate, not only those participating in the structured cooperation. This is probably one of the most important features of the treaty design, because it meant that political input into the decision-making process would come from throughout the EU and would take into account the opinion of all members no matter what their position in the CSDP. Finally, structured cooperation would have been more about capacity than action.41 As the protocol clearly stated, the objectives of the structured cooperation were to develop greater defence capabilities, with the ability, by no later than 2007, to deploy combat units within a period of 5 to 30 days that were to be able to sustain themselves for a period of between 30 and 120 days. To attain these objectives, five benchmarks were established: (1) cooperation in defence equipment investments; (2) harmonization of such investments between national forces; (3) enhancement of availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability; (4) cooperation in addressing any lacunae as may exist; and (5) participation in joint or European equipment programmes within the framework of the European Defence Agency. The combat units developed through this mechanism were to have been able to have the capability to carry out the tasks referred to in Article III-309, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations. Nonetheless, participating states in permanently structured cooperation would not be able to decide, on their own, to execute these tasks if they wanted to act under the EU flag. If they (or some of them) chose to act in the name of the EU, they would have had to have waited for the unanimous decision of the Council of Ministers to support them and entrust them to implement the mission (Article I-41(5)). Therefore, the permanent cooperation mechanism was designed by the Constitutional Treaty as an EU instrument, and not as a ‘way out’ for member states who wanted to move faster towards greater cooperation on European defence issues.

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Permanent structured cooperation requires the amendment of the current treaties in order to be included as such into the ESDP general design. However, nothing in the current treaties precludes the EU member states from agreeing to cooperate through the European Defence Agency in order to achieve the commitments assigned to the permanent structured cooperation mechanism. This agreement could also include the terms of reference for the relationship between the EU and this closer cooperation, endorsing it in political terms as a new ESDP instrument.

Increasing EU operational capabilities In the Constitutional Treaty, the mechanism whereby the EU identified the civilian and military capabilities required to implement crisis management operations retained its existing legal character: member states were to make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union (Article I-41(3)). Although this article has been interpreted differently by some scholars,42 in this author’s view the article did not entail a new obligation for the member states, but rather was designed to avoid the development of the Union’s own military capabilities. Further, it seemed to reflect the specific desire of some member states to prevent the possibility of the establishment of a European army and instead transferred these responsibilities to the member states themselves, thereby limiting EU capabilities in this area. The treaty incorporated three novel features that indicated a certain strengthening of EU operational capabilities: the creation of the European Defence Agency; a mandate mechanism for the execution of EU operations; and a new system to finance the preparation of CSDP missions. The European Defence Agency envisaged in Articles I-41.3 and III-311 was configured as a subsidiary organ of the Council, which was to define the agency’s statute, location and operational rules. This explains why its creation did not need the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty and, in fact, how the agency was established in light of the failure of the Constitution.43 Its establishment reflects a commitment by the member states progressively to improve their military capabilities. Nonetheless, its powers are limited to advising, assessing needs and promoting the means to fulfil the agreed upon military capability objectives. The envisaged enhancement of the industrial base and defence-technology sector remain subordinated to the judgement of member states on whether such actions are necessary. At the same time, specific agency groups may be created by members to carry out joint projects (along the lines of what now occurs at the Western European Armament Organization).44 In legal terms, it is not clear why this agency, and not others, received mention

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in the Constitutional provisions. In political terms, the underlying problem remains: the general reluctance of the member states to cooperate and harmonize their military capabilities.45 The work undertaken by the agency during its first year demonstrates some important achievements that, nonetheless, do not eliminate its legal limits.46 For instance, from 1 July 2006 onwards, member states who subscribe to the Code of Conduct for Defence Procurement (a voluntary and intergovernmental regime established by the agency) have committed to maximizing fair and equal opportunities for all suppliers based in other subscribing member states by publicizing procurement opportunities for contracts worth more than one million euros through a single online portal and setting transparent and objective criteria for selecting bidders and awarding contracts. Defence ministries should have to justify to each other a decision not to open procurement to competition. Obviously, the regime will prosper under two conditions: first, all member states find benefit in subscribing to it and, second, defence ministries do not decide to close public international procurement postings, at least not too often. The Constitutional Treaty also contemplated the possibility that the Council of Ministers could entrust a mission’s implementation to a group of member states (Article I-41.5). This precept seemed to reflect a Council of Ministers deferral to a group of willing and capable member states and, as we have already mentioned, it could have been used as the link between the permanent structured cooperation and the EU crisis management capability. Nothing in the article precluded entrusting the mission’s implementation to certain member states participating in the permanent structured cooperation or to all of them. This mechanism removed the management of such an operation from the EU. According to Article III-310, the mission’s management would have had to have been agreed upon among only executing member states, in association with the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs. The EU minister thus would have become the main communication channel between these member states and the EU, and his/her role would have paralleled the one that member states have with the Council of Ministers.47 The EU can already implement this entrusting mechanism, as there is no regulation about the implementation of ESDP missions in the current treaties. To some extent, the Framework Nation concept could be used to that purpose. Finally, Article III-313 reproduced, literally, the provisions of the TEU relating to the financing of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The article required this financing to fall under the general EU budget, except those operating expenditures stemming from military or defence operations, or whenever the Council of Ministers decided otherwise.48

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The innovation introduced in the Constitutional Treaty was the ‘start-up fund’ for financing the preparations for the CSDP crisis-management missions envisaged by Article I-41.1 that are not charged to the EU budget (operations with military or defence implications).49 The creation of the start-up fund would have been subject to the adoption of Europeanwide decisions by the Council of Ministers; such decisions would have defined the constitutional and financial norms of the initial fund, as well as the norms governing its administration and financial control. Once constituted, the fund was to be handled by the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, with advance authorization of the Council of Ministers. This authorization would have had to have been reached unanimously, given that Article III-313 did not establish any other procedure. Though this financing mechanism can be seen as a positive step, its efficacy would have been limited by the unanimity required for its implementation. Unanimity was to have been an absolute requirement, even in the preparatory phase of an operation. It is unclear what kinds of preparations were to have been defrayed by this fund, and how they would have differed from the tasks assigned to specific EU organs, such as the Military Staff and the Military Committee. In any case, it is necessary to point out that nothing under the current treaties precludes the Council from creating a fund with the same characteristics and goals.

Conclusions The failure of the Constitutional Treaty will have very little impact on the ESDP design. In the application of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, the ESDP would have retained its intergovernmental character and, therefore, its content and scope would still have depended on the support of each sovereign member state. Indeed, as we have seen before, the legal nature of some of the novelties in the CSDP realm made it possible to apply them before the entry into force of the treaty or even in the case of the current ‘ratification crisis’. This has been the case with the European Defence Agency (through a decision of the EU Council) and the solidarity clause (through the political commitment of the European Council). This could be also the case for the fund for the preparation of EU crisis-management operations (through decision of the EU Council), and even the self-defence clause could be agreed to by the European Council. Nonetheless, the institutional novelties and the permanent structured cooperation mechanism need the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty, although some alternatives exist to introduce more flexibility in this area of security and defence cooperation.

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The intergovernmental nature of the CSDP is the legal consequence of its highly sensitive nature. Security and defence issues remain core subject matters under the sovereign control of the member states. Differences in perspectives among these states are obvious, and it is unrealistic to expect that they will completely disappear in the near future. Therefore, it was unlikely that any significant changes would be adopted in terms of the legal basis of the ESDP. Nonetheless, the Constitutional Treaty regulation on CSDP would have provided EU member states with new tools that might have improved the efficiency of the CSDP if they were to have made a proper use of them. Specifically, the EU minister could have improved the consistency of the EU’s external action if the member states were to have achieved consensus on the main actions and the President of the European Council had not been used as a ‘counterbalance’ to the EU minister’s powers. Similarly, the European Defence Agency can serve as an excellent instrument to develop European defence capabilities and the industrial and technological research base, but only if the member states are willing to coordinate national military policy and able to improve the coordination of equipment procurement. As we have seen, the Constitutional Treaty introduced flexibility for the development of military capabilities (permanent structured cooperation and the European Defence Agency), but not for adopting political decisions on how best to use those capabilities in the name of the EU (this decision has to be made unanimously in the Council of Ministers). The legitimacy of the EU international visibility in security and defence matters is, and will be, intergovernmental, and this represents the limit to CSDP flexibility: member states are not willing to assign authority on these matters to any supranational structure, nor to a reduced group of member states. The development and existence of a group of member states with the capabilities necessary to carry out a crisis management operation can certainly have positive effects on the EU decision-making process. If not, the political pressure of member states willing and able to take action, but unable to act under the EU flag (because of the absence of unanimous decision in the Council of Minister) might be the precursor to serious internal crisis in the Union. Therefore, increasing solidarity and political consensus among member states is the key to the success of the EU as an international actor. Some provisions introduced in the Constitutional Treaty are proof of the improved political solidarity among the member states. No matter the limits, ambiguities and balances, the introduction of a self-defence clause is an extraordinary event in the history of the European integration process. And the same is true of the solidarity clause, especially if we take into account the new security challenges

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that Europe faces. That being said, none of the provisions introduced in the Constitutional Treaty would have facilitated the development of a coherent and well-functioning programme of external EU action – what is really needed in this regard is new political leadership that can move the whole process of European integration forward.

Notes 1. European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 2004 C 310/1, 16 December 2004 (Brussels: European Union, 2004). The EU Foreign Ministers reached the main points of agreement as regards defence and security issues during their meeting in Naples on 28 and 29 November 2003. See European Union, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, CIG 57/03, 2 December 2003 (Brussels: European Union, 2003); European Union, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, CIG 57/1/03, REV1, 5 December 2003 (Brussels: European Union, 2003); European Union, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, CIG 60/03, 9 December 2003 (Brussels: European Union, 2003); and European Union, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, CIG 60/03 ADD 1, 9 December 2003 (Brussels: European Union, 2003). In general terms, the Constitutional Treaty confirms the fundamental approach of the European Convention concerning the regulation of the ESDP, with two significant exceptions: the ‘self-defence’ commitment and the regulation of permanent structured cooperation. See European Union, Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Documents of the European Convention are available at The European Convention, 31 July 2003, http://european-convention.eu.int (15 April 2006). Documents of the EU Intergovernmental Conference are available at Intergovernmental Conference, 30 March 2006, http://ue.eu.int/cms3_applications/Applications/igc/ doc_register.asp?content⫽DOC&lang⫽EN&cmsid⫽900 (10 April 2006). 2. The people of France and the Netherlands rejected the text of the Constitution on 29 May and 1 June 2005, respectively. From the legal point of view, the Constitutional Treaty is an amendment of the existing European Communities and EU treaties. Hence, it will enter into force only if ratified by all member states (according to the revision procedure described in Article 48 of the TEU). Nonetheless, a provision exists for the European Council to consider the best course of action in circumstances where only four-fifths of member states have ratified the treaty (Declaration No. 30 on the ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference). In the light of the referendum results, the European Council, meeting on 16 and 17 June 2005, considered that ‘we do not feel that the date initially planned for a report on ratification of the Treaty, 1 November 2006, is still tenable, since those countries which have not yet ratified the Treaty will be unable to furnish a clear reply before mid-2007.’ See Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the European Union, ‘Jean-Claude Juncker States that there will be a Period for Reflection and Discussion but the Process to Ratify the Constitutional Treaty will Continue

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

The Changing Politics of European Security with no Renegotiation’, press release, 17 June 2006, http://www.eu2005. lu/en/actualites/communiques/2005/06/16jclj-ratif/index.html (10 July 2006). A period of reflection, explanation and discussion is currently under way in all countries, whether or not they have ratified the Constitution. The German EU Presidency in the first half of 2007 is expected to launch a major initiative vis-à-vis the Constitutional Treaty. Lefebvre uses these criteria (with a slightly different meaning) to evaluate the novelties of the Constitutional Treaty concerning the EU institutional system. See Maxime Lefebvre, ‘La Constitution européenne: bilan d’un accouchement (2002–2004)’, Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 482 (2004): 561–3. The Laeken Declaration has a minimum reference to security and defence issues: ‘How should a more coherent common foreign policy and defence policy be developed? Should the Petersberg Tasks be updated?’ European Council, Laeken European Council Presidency Conclusions, 14/15 December 2001. In any case, it is important to remember that the ESDP is a very specific dimension of the array of EU tools available to strengthen the European presence in international and security issues. Indeed, ‘some claims of a European super-power in military terms trivialize the specific ways in which the EU can make a difference on the international scene’. See Panos Koutrakos, ‘Constitutional Idiosyncrasies and Political Realities: the Emerging Security and Defense Policy of the European Union’, Columbia Journal of European Law, 10 (2003): 96. I use the term ‘legitimacy’ in the sense of ‘EU title’ of ESDP actions. For analysis of the democratic legitimacy of the ESDP, see Wolfgang Wagner, ‘The European Security and Defence Policy and Democratic Legitimacy’, Occasional Paper 57, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2005. Concerning the objective of a common defence, Cremona points up the change of words (‘will’ instead of ‘might’) but recognizes it is a ‘statement of political intent rather than creative of any legal obligation’. See Marise Cremona, ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action’, Common Market Law Review, 40 (2003): 1359. In this sense, although with a more positive understanding of the issue, see Loick Benoit, ‘La politique de sécurité et de défense commune dans le traité instituant une Constitution pour l’Europe’, Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, 486 (2005): 155–62. Goudappel is very critical about the regulation of the CSDP in the Constitutional Treaty and considers that the position of defence – the unique pillar in the constitutional structure – is an anomaly in the structure of the Constitution. Flora Goudappel, ‘Prospects of the European Common Defence Policy’, Revue Européenne de Droit Public, 16 (2004): 245–62. Simon Duke, ‘The Convention, the Draft Constitution and External Relations: Effects and Implications for the EU and its International Role’, Working Paper 2, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 20003, 21. The draft treaty adopted by the European Convention proposed a protocol of optional ratification to deal with the self-defence commitment, as France and Germany and also other member states of the WEU considered this necessary to express this solidarity within the reality of the EU. But this desire provoked two different reactions: the neutral member states did not want to see

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11. 12.

13. 14.

15.

16.

17.

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the EU as a military union and the pro-Atlantic countries looked at this protocol as a means to weaken the commitment to NATO. See Duke, ‘The Convention, the Draft Constitution and External Relations: Effects and Implications for the EU and its International Role’, 24–9; Jolyon Howorth, ‘The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: a Question of Flexibility’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 9 (2004): 492–6; and Philippe de Schoutheete, La cohérence par la défense. Une autre lecture de la PESD, Chaillot Paper 71 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 21–50. European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe Article I-41(7). Article I-41(7) reads as follows: ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.’ See European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Curiously, the new text originates in a proposal by Finland, Ireland, Austria and Sweden, countries without any military alliances. See European Union, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, CIG 62/03, 5 December 2003 (Brussels: European Union, 2003). Jolyon Howorth, ‘The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: a Question of Flexibility’, 496. Forsberg speaks of guarantees as ‘largely symbolic’ although he considers them in positive terms. See Tuomas Forsberg, ‘Security and Defense Policy in the New European Constitution: a Critical Assessment’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 3 (2004): 22. Article III-329 refers the arrangements for implementing this new commitment to a European decision adopted by the Council of Ministers upon the joint proposal of the Commission and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. It also establishes that the Council shall act in accordance with Article III300(1) – by unanimity – where this decision has defence implications. This confirms the relationship of the solidarity clause to European security and defence matters, although the solidarity clause is formally outside the CSDP section. See European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Declaration number 9, on Articles I-43 and III-329, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference reads as follows: ‘Without prejudice to the measures adopted by the Union to comply with its solidarity obligation towards a Member State which is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of natural or man-made disaster, none of the provisions of Articles I-43 and III-329 of the Constitution is intended to affect the right of another Member State to choose the most appropriate means to comply with its own solidarity obligation towards that Member State.’ See European Union, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, CIG 87/04, 12 October 2004 (Brussels: European Union, 2004). Duke thinks that the solidarity clause does not add any obvious value beyond political symbolism and that it is unclear why this device for inter-pillar

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20.

21.

The Changing Politics of European Security coordination deserves specific mention in the Constitution. See Duke, ‘The Convention, the Draft Constitution and External Relations: Effects and Implications for the EU and its International Role’, 34. Certainly, EU actions after the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 prove that there is no technical necessity for this provision, although they reveal too the political opportunity it provides. European Council, Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 25 March 2004 (Brussels: European Union, 2004), and European Union, EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism – Update, 5777/1/06 REV 1 (Brussels: European Union, 2006). More recently, the European Council has adopted the European Union CounterTerrorism Strategy. See, European Council, Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15/16 December 2005. As the treaty refers to the legal means of defining and fulfilling the CSDP, the changes are only superficial. In effect, the dismantling of the pillar structure of the TEU carries with it the supposed establishment of a single EU legal system, including both ‘legislative’ and ‘non-legislative’. According to this initial schema, Article I-40.6 excludes legislative acts in the Common Foreign and Security Policy sphere, and those relating to CSDP. This exclusion is complemented with specific provisions for the execution of these policies, collected under Articles I-40 to I-41, and in Articles III-293, 294, 295, 297 and 298. A legal subsystem emerges from these articles; it governs both Common Foreign and Security Policy and CSDP and reflects modest differences with the current TEU. Generally, the treaty accepts the term ‘European decisions’ to refer to acts susceptible to adoption in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and CSDP spheres. Even so, the content and legal effect of these European decisions is identical to the current common strategies, common positions and joint actions. See European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. ‘On a superficial level, this may appear simpler, but a precise indication of the action taken will require the use of cumbersome portmanteau phrases instead of the relatively simple descriptive labels we currently use.’ See Marise Cremona, ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action’, 1358. As suggested by the final report of the European Convention Defence Group, which also proposed flexibility respecting constructive-abstention norms. See European Union, Final Report of Working Group VIII, CONV 461/02, 16 December 2002 (Brussels: European Union, 2002). Wagner argues that communitarizing the CFSP does not increase its effectiveness and is unlikely to make European crisis management more effective. In contrast, the extension and application of qualified majority voting could speed up decision-making which is the key to a more effective common foreign and security policy. See Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy will Remain Intergovernmental: a Rationalist Institutional Choice Analysis of European Crisis Management Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10 (2003): 576–95. Article III-300.4 can be given a dual interpretation. One broad interpretation leads to the conclusion that the flexibility clause in Article III-300 has no applicability in all CSDP spheres; unanimity is thus consecrated as a decisionmaking procedure for the development of this policy, to the extent it does not lead to a modification of the treaties. The more restrictive interpretation of Article III-300.4 rests on its very literality, in combination with Article III-313

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22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

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(financial provisions): that combined reading allows the limitation of unanimity for only those CSDP decisions with repercussions in the military sphere, or for defence (that is, only those decisions relating to missions that imply the use of military instruments or resources). See European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. As Commission Vice-President, the Union minister is subject to the procedures that govern the Commission, as long as these are compatible with his/her functions in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This limitation did not appear in the draft presented by the European Convention, reinforcing the intergovernmental dependence of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. In other words, ‘at the definitive stage of the decision making process on both CFSP matters and the other aspects of external relations, the UMFA [Union Minister] will be wearing his/her Council hat’. See Alan Dashwood and Angus Johnston, ‘The Institutions of the Enlarged EU under the Regime of the Constitutional Treaty’, Common Market Law Review, 41 (2004): 1504. In fact, Article III-299(1) reduces the Commission’s ‘initiative power’ in the CFSP field. In this sense, see Stefan Griller, ‘External Relations’, in Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, ed. Bruno de Witte (Florence: European University Institute, 2003), 146–8; Juliane Kokott and Alexandra Ruth, ‘The European Convention and its Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: Appropriate Answers to the Laeken Question’, Common Market Law Review, 40(6) (2003): 1326–7; and John Temple, ‘The Main Issues after the Convention on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe’, Fordham International Law Journal, 27 (2004): 576. The EU Minister for Foreign Affairs ‘reflects a pace truly peculiar to the institutional evolution of the Union: for the new issues coming from the core of national sovereignty that are being placed on the community domain, there is a tendency of creating “ad hoc” institutions, as the Central Bank for the monetary union and now the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the common foreign and security policies.’ See Luis Ortega, ‘The Reform of the Community Institutions’, Revue Européenne de Droit Public, 16 (2004): 135. Duke, ‘The Convention, the Draft Constitution and External Relations: Effects and Implications for the EU and its International Role’, 16. Howorth, ‘The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: a Question of Flexibility’, 500–3. On the issue of European diplomacy, see Simon Duke, ‘Preparing for European Diplomacy?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2002): 849–70. The Council shall act, in this case, on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission. See European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Specific to the CSDP sphere, the treaty retains the existing Political and Security Committee regulation but includes no reference to the Military Staff or the Military Committee. The Military Staff is currently inserted within the structures of the Council’s General Secretariat and depends, organically speaking, on the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Military Committee is a subsidiary organ of the Council with no formal connection with the current High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.

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29. See European Council, Progress Report: European External Action Service, Brussels, 9 June 2005 (document 9956/05). 30. Alan Dashwood and Angus Johnston, clearly supporters of this new figure, think that the President of the European Council is a necessary consequence of the EU enlargement and believe it will contribute to the development of coherent Union policies. See Dashwood and Johnston, ‘The Institutions of the Enlarged EU under the Regime of the Constitutional Treaty’, 1491–2. Arguments against a long-term, full-time President of the Council are listed by Temple, ‘The Main Issues after the Convention on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe’, 575. 31. Dehousse recalls that the Constitutional Treaty prevents the President of the European Council from holding any state responsibility, but not an EU one. This would allow the same person to hold the posts of President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. See Franklin Dehousse, ‘The Convention’s Draft Constitutional Treaty: Old Wine in a New Bottle?’, Studia Diplomatica, 56 (2003): 114–15. 32. Forsberg, ‘Security and Defence Policy in the New European Constitution: a Critical Assessment’, 20. Howorth offers a more optimistic view on the potential ‘division of labour’ between the President of the European Council and the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs. See Howorth, ‘The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: a Question of Flexibility’, 500–3. 33. First, the current doubts about the legal imputation of international agreements relating to foreign policy and common security are removed (the treaty eliminates the provision under the current paragraph 5 of TEU Article 24, by virtue of which: ‘No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply with its own constitutional procedures … ’). See European Union, Treaty on European Union, OJ C 325, 24 December 2002 (Brussels: European Union, 2002). Second, the treaty clarifies, legally speaking, the competence of the EU to conclude international agreements within the CSDP ambit (Art. III-323(1)). See European Union, Treaty on European Union. Third, some changes are introduced respecting the organs and institutions competent to negotiate and conclude such agreements; these changes reflect the participation of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, but in no way do they alter the Council’s powers, as it retains the exclusive competence over authorization to open negotiations, approval of negotiation directives, signing powers, and effective conclusion of the agreement (Art. III-325). See European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. 34. This new role would reinforce the importance of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice policing the borderline between the CFSP and other Union policies. 35. The first paragraph of Article III-325 only excludes the specific provisions laid down in Article III-315, and establishes that ‘agreements between the Union and third countries or international organizations shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with the following procedure’. See European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. 36. ‘Where however an interested party, such as a Member State, has doubts about the compatibility of an agreement, referring the matter to the ECJ [European Court of Justice] is also a procedural step.’ Takis Tridimas, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: a Supreme Court for the Union?’,

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37.

38.

39. 40.

41.

42.

43.

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in European Union Law for the Twenty-first Century: Rethinking the New Legal Order, eds Takis Tridimas and Paolisa Nebbia (Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004), 129. In the framework of the European Convention, the Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice discussed the issue of whether the jurisdiction of the court to deliver opinions in relation to international agreements should be extended to cover agreements within the sphere of the CFSP. Although most members of the circle were clearly in favour, there was no consensus as a few members took the opposite view. See European Union, Supplementary Report on the Question of Judicial Control Relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, CONV 689/1/03 REV 1, 16 April 2003 (Brussels: European Union, 2003). Among the most recent case law, see European Court of Justice and Court of First Instance, Judgement of the Court of First Instance of 21 September 2005, Kadi versus Council and Commission, OJ C 218, 12 November 2005; and European Court of Justice and Court of First Instance, Judgement of the Court of First Instance of 21 September 2005, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation versus Council and Commission, 12 November 2005. The mechanism of structured cooperation is an idea specifically promoted by the states constituting the European Union of Security and Defence, an initiative signed on 29 April 2003 by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. This initiative received strong criticism, as it seemed to represent the reaction of ‘old Europe’ to the US war against Iraq. Nonetheless, and beyond its political opportunity, its goal was to achieve structured cooperation for better integration among armed forces. See André Dumoulin, ‘Comment se porte la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense?’, Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, 479 (2004): 369–71. Howorth, ‘The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: a Question of Flexibility’, 486–92. Forsberg explains how some member states and observers feared that structured cooperation could in effect mean a directoire. See Forsberg, ‘Security and Defence Policy in the New European Constitution: a Critical Assessment’, 23–5. ‘In the absence of comprehensive top-down planning of capabilities at the level of the EU-25, permanent structured cooperation could enable a quantum leap forward by offering a framework for multinational cooperation and specialization to those Member States that are willing.’ See Sven Biscop, ‘Able and Willing? Assessing the EU’s Capacity for Military Action’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 9 (2004): 526. Commenting on the draft treaty adopted by the European Convention, Cremona considers that ‘Member States will be under an obligation to make these capabilities available to the Union.’ See Cremona, ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action’, 1359–60. See European Council, Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the Establishment of the European Defence Agency, OJ L 245/17, 17 July 2004 (Brussels: European Union, 2004). Concerning the implications for procurement, research and the defence market coming from the development of the European Defence Agency, see Burkard Schmitt, The European Union and Armaments: Getting a Bigger Bang for the Euro, Chaillot Paper 63 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2003).

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44. Neither the Constitutional Treaty nor the Council Joint Action clarify whether existing arrangements for closer cooperation in the armaments area (such as the Western European Armament Organization, or the Western European Armament Group, both governed within the WEU framework) would be integrated into this agency, although the Joint Action refers to their working relations and talks about incorporation or assimilation of their relevant elements. The Defence Group of the European Convention recommended such integration in its final report. See European Union, Final Report of Working Group VIII, points 64 and 65. Article 25 of the Joint Action establishes that ‘the Agency shall develop close working relations with the relevant elements of OCCAR, the LoI [Letter of Intent] Framework Agreement, and WEAG/WEAO with a view to incorporate those elements or assimilate their principles and practices in due course, as appropriate and by mutual agreement’. See European Council, Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the Establishment of the European Defence Agency. This provision does not exclude and even seems to foresee the maintenance of the multiplicity of European cooperation forums on armaments matters. Regardless, the transfer of responsibilities from WEAG/WEAO was among the urgent agendas identified in the agency work programme for 2005. In 2005, the agency established practical working relations with the LoI/Framework Agreement nations, OCCAR and NATO. Also, the takeover of responsibilities from WEAG/WEAO is under way, including the transfer of dozens of research and technology contracts. See ‘EDA Work Programme 2005’, European Defence Agency, 22 November 2004, http://eda.eu.int/reference/ewp/ewp-2004-11-22.htm (20 May 2006) and ‘EDA Work Programme 2006’, European Defence Agency, 21 November 2005, http://eda.eu.int/reference/ewp/ewp-2005-11-21.htm (20 May 2006). 45. Duke, ‘The Convention, the Draft Constitution and External Relations: Effects and Implications for the EU and its International Role’, 35. Nonetheless, Howorth believes that this agency ‘offers the first real opportunity for the EU to bring its defence planning, military capability objectives and armaments coordination in line with the urgent tasks it is facing on the ground’. Howorth, ‘The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: a Question of Flexibility’, 499. 46. The four flagship programmes of the agency are: the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (to launch ad hoc projects by participating member states, focusing on joint technology development to increase European standardization and interoperability); the Armoured Fighting Vehicles (to turn shared interest and requirements into ad hoc projects, focusing on technologies which will assist in improving the creation of a European family of vehicles); the Command, Control and Communications initiative (to improve coordination and to set requirements for future satellite communications and to assess the scope for a joint civil–military effort regarding software-defined radio); and the Code of Conduct for Defence Procurement (to prepare for the implementation of the agreed code on 1 July 2006, including further work on related issues such as security of supply). See ‘Latest News’, European Defence Agency, 20 March 2006, http://www.eda.europa.eu/ (10 April 2006). 47. ‘Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another

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Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the European decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary European decisions’ (Art. III-310.2). See European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. 48. Whenever the costs are not accounted for by the EU budget, these shall be borne by the member states in the same terms as those set forth at present (in accordance with the gross national product scale). 49. This fund is different to the current ATHENA mechanism: ATHENA is directed to administer the financing of the common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications. See European Council, Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004 Establishing a Mechanism to Administer the Financing of the Common Costs of European Union Operations Having Military or Defence Implications, OJ L 63/68, 28 February 2004 (Brussels: European Union, 2004).

6 The European Neighbourhood Policy: a Strategy for Security in Europe? Stefan Gänzle

Introduction The 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) was heralded as ‘historic’ in terms of both its magnitude and geopolitical outreach, yielding the Central and East European countries’ ultimate ‘return to Europe’. Enlargement, however, resulted in more than the mere addition of ten new member states. It also pushed the EU much closer towards what is broadly conceived as a ‘new neighbourhood’ and into an area that the EU considers to be of paramount importance for security in Europe. The future of EU engagement in its neighbourhood will depend on two decisive factors. First, the EU is in an uncertain and difficult period of internal adjustment and consolidation after enlargement and the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Second, the EU is about to absorb the impact that new members such as Poland and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) will have on the EU’s foreign policy towards Eastern Europe (EU Eastern Policy1). It is in this context that the EU is compelled to devise a strategy for the ‘new neighbourhood’ countries, in particular Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. In 2001 and 2002, in the wake of increasingly strained relations with Russia, the European Union began to devise a ‘proximity policy’. This ultimately led to the creation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).2 As the European Commission President Romano Prodi put it at the time, the primary objective of the ENP was to create a ‘ring of friends surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbours, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea’.3 Similar to the policy of enlargement, the ENP’s main purpose since its inception has been the enhancement of the EU’s overall relationship with each of its neighbouring countries through the promotion of ‘stability, security and sustainable development both within and 110

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without the EU’.4 The EU, therefore, subscribes to a twofold objective allowing for the enhancement of the EU’s internal security by fostering security in a comprehensive manner well beyond its external borders. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has been confronted with the task of redefining its relationships with the states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). So far, the EU has pursued a policy of gradual and differentiated rapprochement prior to ultimately including CEE states into its internal structures of governance.5 While Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome asserted that ‘[a]ny European State may apply to become a member of the Community’,6 the treaty remained silent on the criteria that define the term ‘European’. Instead, it has become conventional wisdom to loosely conceptualize the borders of Europe within a set of factors encompassing geographical, geopolitical, cultural, religious, historical, economic and political considerations.7 Yet, it seems that a geographical approach to the concept of ‘Europe’ prevails as long as it is clear and simple to devise. It may be relatively easy to exclude the Southern Mediterranean from a geographical perspective, but it is increasingly difficult to operate the same definition vis-à-vis the EU’s new ‘Eastern Europe’, where borders tend to acquire the character of a moving ‘frontier’. European post-Cold War relations must be analysed within the scope of the increasing institutional supremacy, ‘presence’ and ‘actorness’8 of the European Union. On a regional level, following the collapse of communism in Europe, the CSCE/OSCE gradually lost its primacy as the institutional core of pan-European relations and concurrently its ability to offer itself as a model for the ‘New Europe’.9 By and large, it was accession to the EU and NATO – the centrepieces of the Euro–Atlantic structure of prosperity, stability and peace, with the European Union as the core institution of European political order – that became the mantra and telos of the Central and Eastern European countries’ foreign policy preferences. Karen Smith has suggested the history between the EU and its neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe can be interpreted as the ‘EU coping with the exclusion/inclusion dilemma by eventually choosing inclusion’.10 However, while this is true for the EU’s neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe, one should not overlook the fact that the EU opted for a ‘dual track policy’11 that separated the Central and East European countries (including the Baltic states) from the Newly Independent States (NIS). Ultimately, the EU has developed different models of differentiated integration, oscillating between inclusion and exclusion. Without downplaying the importance of economic considerations, EC/EU enlargement in the 1990s acquired a distinctly political feature following the southern enlargement of the 1980s (Greece in 1981, Spain

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and Portugal in 1986). Those countries had just emerged from rule by military dictatorships. Similarly, the so-called ‘northern’ enlargement of 1995 marked a distinct political tide of change with the formerly ‘neutral’, or more accurately, non-aligned states of Austria, Finland and Sweden opting into the European Union. In the case of the Southern European countries, EC/EU membership primarily boosted internal security through the EC’s provision of external incentives for domestic democratization. In contrast, the EU was perceived foremost as an (additional) provider of external security in the case of Austria, Sweden and Finland. When the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004 brought ten new member states into the EU, clearly the ‘inclusionary approach’ won out over exclusion. Even with the completion of the most recent expansion, there are still several states waiting in line for EU accession: Bulgaria and Romania may join in 2007 or 2008,12 and both Croatia and Turkey entered into negotiation talks with the EU in October 2005. Additionally, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was officially recognized as a candidate for EU membership in December 2005. The other countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro) have membership prospects provided that they meet various forms of conditionality set out by the EU. Clearly, the Union will continue to embrace new member states over the next years. Thus it is feasible to conceive of a ‘wider EU’ of up to 35 member states which will stretch well beyond Europe’s geographical borders in sensu strictu. At the same time, it is likely that in the future the EU will continue to exclude some countries that are considered to be part of Europe – at least as far as Europe is defined in terms of geography. Until recently, the EU’s approach to the countries of the former Soviet Union was shaped by the fact that the EU as well as various member states tacitly acknowledged the pivotal role played by Russia. In the wake of the ‘Orange Revolution’ in November 2004 and the energy dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2005/2006, the relationship seems to be conceptualized as triangular. In this vein, the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier declared on 21 March 2006 to the German-Russian Forum: ‘In the EU-Russia-Ukraine triangle the three sides must be as equal as possible. Disturbed relations between two of these partners destabilize the region. However, the precondition for regional stability is that all sides stop thinking in terms of traditional spheres of influence and in categories of geopolitical rivalry.’13 Whereas the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) aspiring for EU membership subscribed to extensive ‘Europe Agreements’ as the legal base of their relations with the EU in the mid-1990s, most of the Newly Independent States launched Partnership and Cooperation

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Agreements (PCAs) with the EU. The PCAs were less comprehensive than the European Agreements and reflected Russia’s role in shaping EU relations with the former Soviet Union’s closest neighbours.14 While the Europe Agreements were much more asymmetrical (the EU opened its market to the CEECs before most of the CEECs’ markets were opened to the EU) and conditional (the CEECs completely accepted EU conditionality provisions), the PCAs tended to be much less ambitious. Furthermore, in a second stage of bilateral relations, the EU established ‘Common Strategies’ towards Russia (1999), Ukraine (1999) and the Mediterranean region (2000) in an attempt to unify its approach – at both the individual member state and the EU levels – with regards to its unfolding Common Foreign and Security Policy in general.15 Most recently, in the course of the introduction of the ENP, Russia opted out of any further agreements established under the same heading as other ‘European neighbours’ and instead insisted on pursuing a strictly bilateral EU–Russia ‘strategic partnership’. As a consequence, both the EU and Russia have agreed upon the creation of the so-called ‘Common Spaces’ which basically mirror the pillar structure of the EU itself, encompassing economic cooperation as well as cooperation in the fields of external and internal security, plus education and research. As Dmitry Danilov argues in his chapter, the EU–Russia relationship will progress on some issues, but significant constraints will limit the relationship to tactical rather than strategic arrangements. While the EU was aiming at establishing a comprehensive approach in dealing with its immediate vicinity, the mere fact that the EU’s policy towards the new Eastern Europe recreated the ‘dual track policy’ in the East – the ‘Eastern Policy’ in the framework of ENP and EU–Russia relations – may spur the aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova and other countries to become members of the European Union. There is a vast body of literature available on ENP. Many studies have focused on the EU’s ability to provide for an ‘external incentive’ model – albeit below the membership line and thus without relying on the ‘membership carrot’ to induce transformative change in a partner country.16 While some have been sceptical with regards to the transformative power the EU can deploy in its neighbourhood policy,17 others who understand the EU’s oscillating policies between inclusion and exclusion as an effort to regulate Europe’s changing political order have welcomed the ENP as a ‘significant advance’.18 The central argument of this chapter is that ENP not only needs to be addressed as an offspring of enlargement policy and politics, but it must also be understood in terms of the EU’s efforts at conflict prevention and crisis management. Thus, after setting out the contents and the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy, this chapter

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will explore whether the ENP provides a new model for the European security relationship.

The European Union and models of integration in Europe From the 1950s until the late 1980s, the European Community (EC) was confronted with alternative models and modes of political and economic integration in Europe. For example, the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) was conceived of by European states such as the UK, which explicitly did not wish to subscribe to the EC’s far-reaching regional integration scheme – politically and economically – in terms of policies and decisionmaking style. While the alternative model in this particular case was set up ‘outside’ the EC, the perspective changed considerably in the wake of the Cold War’s end, marking the general recognition of the EC/EU as Europe’s central institution for bringing West and East together. In this light, the European Economic Area (EEA) created in 1989 aimed at providing an alternative and differentiated model of smooth integration into the EC/EU, which came primarily from ‘inside’ the Community itself. Without offering any sort of participation in the law-making process, the European Economic Area (EEA) extended the single market to those countries that were members of the EFTA. Yet, by this time it was already clear that a number of EFTA countries, such as Austria, Sweden and Finland, were about to apply for or had already applied for full-fledged membership in the EU, while at the same time a number of the remaining EFTA countries were considering doing the same and were closely associated with various policies of the European Union.19 The EC/EU devised three basic, sometimes interlinking models for dealing with its immediate neighbourhood throughout the 1990s: 1. Comprehensive, all-inclusive models of pan-European cooperation (such as the ‘European Confederation’ and – to a lesser extent – the Europe Conference). 2. Differentiated approaches of gradual and conditional integration of individual countries20 into the EC/EU (based on so-called Europe Agreements) or cooperation/integration with the EC/EU (based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements). 3. Geographically focused approaches of EU foreign policy, external relations and regional policy involving the EU and specific non-EU countries (particularly in the context of the Euro–Mediterranean partnership (‘Barcelona process’), the Northern Dimension initiative and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe).

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As early as January 1990, French President François Mitterrand tabled the idea of creating a European Confederation providing links between all European states, including the Soviet Union.21 Ultimately, this idea would have brought the EC very close to the institutional logic of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which at that time was preparing negotiations for the Charter of Paris (November 1990). Although Mitterrand’s proposal did not produce immediately tangible results, it resonated quite clearly in a later proposal put forward by Frans Andriessen, then European Commissioner for External Relations. In April 1991, he suggested creating the status of ‘affiliate membership’22 – in a sense the status that the Community had awarded to Germany’s Eastern länder following the reunification of Germany (until 1994, East German MEPs were granted observer status in the European Parliament). ‘Affiliate members’ were supposed to have a seat, yet no vote at the table of EC/EU decision-makers in a number of specified areas (for example, foreign policy, transport, environment, monetary affairs, research and so on). In both cases, the CEECs rejected these suggestions, fearing first the presence of the Soviet Union, and second the creation of a long-term waiting room and antechamber for EC/EU membership. This last concern came to play an increasingly key role in their foreign policies throughout the 1990s. In June 1992, the European Commission sketched out the idea of a ‘European Political Area’ that would provide a forum for regular meetings of EU member states and associated countries from Central and Eastern Europe. One year later, in June 1993, this suggestion developed into the Copenhagen European Council’s initiative to create the ‘structured dialogue’, a ‘framework for discussions on all areas of EU business’.23 However, at the very same time that the CEECs were finally awarded the prospect of joining the EU in the future, they were required to accept unconditionally the EU rules of the game regarding integration into the Community. At the Essen European Council in June 1994, the EU heads of state and governments launched the so-called pre-accession strategy, providing additional financial resources for the CEECs on their path towards market economies and democratization. In mid-1995, the Commission’s White Paper for integration into the EU internal market provided guidance and directives to the CEECs for the adoption of EC regulations and directives in this area. Last but not least, between 1998 and 2002, all the candidate countries entered into negotiations on the terms of their accession to the European Union. Concomitantly, the EU fleshed out a similar, but less ambitious policy towards Eastern European countries that were likely – for various reasons – to be left out of the enlargement process for the foreseeable future. Most

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importantly in this regard was the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements in 1994, and the launch of Common Strategies at the end of that decade. While both agreements set out a plethora of inter-institutional relations and called upon Russia and Ukraine to pursue political and economic reforms, none of them created a perspective for a relationship that might develop into the creation of a common market with the European Union. Although the PCA outlined the establishment of an eventual free trade area between Russia and the EU, this option was not pursued further. At the Luxembourg European Council meeting in December 1997, the European Union decided to launch ‘a European Conference which will bring together the Member States of the European Union and the European States aspiring to accede to it and sharing its values and internal and external objectives’.24 Initially the EU offer was addressed to Cyprus, the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey. Later, it was expanded to include closely associated countries such as Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. The European conferences involved regular meeting of heads of state and government to discuss a wide range of policy issues of mutual interest.25 The conferences were primarily offered in order to mollify Turkey in light of the decision not to consider it as a candidate country for EU enlargement at the Luxembourg EU summit; yet, for a number of years, Turkey refused to participate. At the Göteborg European Council of June 2001, the EU member states decided to invite Ukraine and Moldova to join the European Conference.26 However, as it lacked any political decision-making capacities, the European Conference largely remained an exercise in ‘symbolic politics’ that did not yield any substantial successes. Last but not least is the Northern Dimension initiative, launched by the Finnish government in 1997 in order to raise EU-wide awareness of the particular needs (especially with regards to the environment) of Northern Europe and its immediate vicinity (Russia, the Baltic states and Poland). Similar to the European Conference, albeit limited in its geographical scope, Finland and Denmark organized the Northern Dimension conferences which involved Russia in the context of a ‘partnership approach’;27 yet as holds true for all comprehensive approaches, neither the European Conference nor the Northern Dimension conferences allowed non-EU members a seat at the decision-making table.

The making of the European Neighbourhood Policy The first steps towards the making of the ENP were taken following a letter from the UK Foreign Minister to the then Spanish Presidency of the European Union in January 2002. In this document British Foreign Minister

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Jack Straw suggested offering Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova ‘clear and practical incentives’ for proceeding with political and economic reform. Furthermore, his proposal included granting these countries the status of ‘special neighbour’ based on a firm commitment to democratic governance and free market principles.28 At this stage, the countries of the Southern Mediterranean area were not addressed as potential candidates for such an inclusive approach. More interestingly, it was Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh and Trade Minister Leif Pagrotsky who suggested extending the geographical scope of the new policy to include Russia as well as the Southern Mediterranean countries, according to the notorious formula ‘from Russia to Morocco’. Clearly, this step anticipated the southern EU member states’ dislike of distinctive sets of policies geared towards non-EU countries East and South of Europe. In December 2002, the Copenhagen European Council approved the idea in principle: The enlargement will strengthen relations with Russia. The European Union also wishes to enhance its relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the southern Mediterranean countries, based on a longterm approach promoting democratic and economic reforms, sustainable developments and trade and is developing new initiatives for this purpose. The European Council welcomes the intention of the Commission and the Secretary-General/High Representative to bring forward proposals to that end.29 It is against this backdrop that the European Security Strategy, presented by Javier Solana in December 2003, declared that ‘building security in our neighbourhood’30 is one of the three strategic objectives31 of the EU. With regard to Eastern Europe, the strategy upholds that ‘[i]t is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.’32 Four months later, in March 2003, the European Commission released its Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours document. The Commission made it clear from the beginning that its objective was to tie the neighbouring countries ‘into the Union’s security policies, including conflict prevention and crisis management’.33 The Commission stated that: [s]hared values, strong democratic institutions and a common understanding of the need to institutionalise respect for human rights will

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open the way for closer and more open dialogue on the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). A shared neighbourhood implies burden-sharing and joint responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity.34 At that time – following pressure from the Southern Mediterranean member states – it became clear that the envisaged ‘proximity policy’ had to encompass both the non-EU countries of the Mediterranean rim and the Western NIS, thus establishing a ‘ring of friends’ as Romano Prodi put it. Furthermore, the Commission was still confident of also including Russia in this new policy. The Commission encouraged the EU to ‘take a more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes over Palestine, the Western Sahara and Transnistria (in support of the efforts of the OSCE and other mediators)’.35 Interestingly, the subsequent ENP Action Plan with Morocco does not contain any reference to the Western Sahara. Whereas Spain, followed by most of the EU member states, would have liked to put this issue on the EU’s agenda, France, in opposition, adopts a proMoroccan stance and opposes giving ENP any particular role in solving this conflict.36 This not only highlights divisions between member states and the Commission in the development of ESDP-related facets of the European Neighbourhood Policy, but also divisions between individual member states. The relatively small ESDP mission to Georgia and the EU border mission in Ukraine and Moldova in the context of the Transnistria conflict illustrate concerns among some of the member states, in particular Germany, that the EU-Russia relationship is imperilled. In July 2003, the Commission suggested launching a number of immediate measures based on existing financial instruments and initiating a new and comprehensive neighbourhood instrument, substantially increased in terms of its budget. It should be noted that at the very beginning of ENP, the operational focus of EU funding focused on the neighbouring side of the external border: ‘Such an Instrument, capable of operating on an identical footing on both sides of the EU’s external border, would provide a more complete approach, allowing for a mix of cross-border and regional co-operation activity to be developed around the external border.’37 It was only with the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper that the Commission subscribed to a more far-reaching policy approach and moved the initiative into ‘higher gear’, as a Commission press release termed it.38 One month after the Commission decided to make this initiative a top priority, the General Affairs Council decided to extend ENP to the Caucasian countries of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.39 This decision clearly

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adds to the political weight of the initiative. In the meantime, Russia declared it did not wish to be included in this policy; instead, it opted for a ‘strategic partnership’ approach in its own right. As Dmitry Danilov points out in his chapter, the Russian decision needs to be interpreted in light of a rather general foreign policy change undertaken by Moscow in the wake of EU enlargement. Russia is increasingly uneasy with the status of its relationship with the European Union. The ‘self-exclusion of Russia’40 in terms of the ENP membership may, indeed, have helped the Caucasian republics accept entering the orbit of the ENP; yet, in turn, it has given the ‘neighbourhood’ approach an additional enlargement ‘twist’, as practically all countries of the ‘new East’ are likely to consider pursuing future EU membership. It is likely that the ENP will not fully develop its potential as a policy for stabilizing the Western NIS and Russia, unless EU membership or some form of comparable relationship is offered.41

Principles, objectives and instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy In May 2004, the European Commission published its Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy. In this document, the Commission laid out the principles and objectives that would govern all future ENP partnerships. The ENP aims at ‘sharing the benefits of the EU’s enlargement in 2004 with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned’ in order to ‘prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe’.42 Clearly, at the time of enlargement some East European leaders had qualified the establishment of Schengen-borders as ‘future paper curtains’. Throughout the process of drafting the European Neighbourhood Policy, a normative tone was added: The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of the new Member States, but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism. The EU must act to promote the regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration that are preconditions for political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social divisions in our shared environment.43 ENP aims at addressing these concerns and hopes, and ultimately at contributing towards greater regional security. In December 2002, Commission President Romano Prodi declared: ‘We have to be prepared to offer more

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than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter.’44 ENP offers its partner countries the chance to participate in various EU activities through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation – albeit below the membership level. Prodi emphasized that the ‘aim is to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union’.45 In March 2003, the European Commission asserted that the EU’s neighbours should be offered the prospect of ‘a stake in the EU’s Internal Market’.46 The European Neighbourhood Policy rests upon several key principles: first, the ENP subscribes to a conservative institutional approach as it is built into the existing framework of the EU’s bilateral relations with a respective ENP partner country. This prevents the ENP from duplicating existing institutional structures. In terms of the EU’s associational outreach beyond its boundaries, this means that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or PCAs (which were developed in the first half of the 1990s to serve the NIS), as well as the more classical Association Agreements with the Mediterranean countries, provide the platform on which ENP may develop. Ultimately, this is also a commitment to a strict and differentiated bilateralism in terms of inter-institutional relations despite the fact that ENP also encourages its neighbouring countries to engage in subregional cooperation.47 Second, the Commission has declared that ENP constitutes a case for ‘joint ownership’ of the institutions and of the process in general – albeit this ownership is ‘based on the awareness of shared values and common interests’.48 Although the European Union does not explicitly state that the normative model is to be taken from the EU itself, it is clear that ENP countries are expected to converge towards the normative model of the Union. This is clearly due to the internal constraints of EU governance, which make it extremely difficult to unpack agreements that have been painstakingly developed for the 15 member states that made up the EU prior to the 2004 enlargement. Furthermore, the EU reiterates what is already part of the PCAs. For example, in the case of Ukraine, the PCA affirms that Ukraine needs to approximate its ‘existing and future legislation to that of the Community’.49 The PCAs that entered into force in 1998 were only agreed to for an initial period of ten years. Therefore the strong focus on these legal documents make more likely that the PCAs will be renewed in order to avoid another lengthy discussion and ratification process for new treaties.50 Third, the ENP sets up a procedure for monitoring the success as well as shortcomings of agreements made under ENP. Following this comprehensive step towards achieving the overarching policy goals of ENP, the European Commission refined its existing country strategies. The ENP is being reshaped in order to be compatible with the

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existing framework of relationships between the EU and its neighbours. Each country strategy paper subsequently supplies a strategic framework for the period 2002–06. Furthermore, these strategy papers set out EU cooperation goals and policy responses as well as identifying areas for cooperation which are defined as key priorities. In addition, the country strategy papers provide an assessment of the partner countries’ policy agendas and political and socio-economic situations. Attached to the strategy is information about ‘the EU response in more detail, highlighting programme objectives, expected results and conditionality in the priority fields of co-operation for the period 2002–2004’.51 The primary objective of the strategy papers was to define the scope and modes of cooperation, underpinned by financial aspects. Concomitantly, the European Commission drew up its first set of country reports. In May 2004, country reports were published on the first seven of the ENP countries which have Association or Partnership Agreements with the EU in force. A further five country reports were published in March 2005 on the next set of countries to be included in the policy (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia), as well as with those countries whose agreements had already come into force (Egypt and Lebanon). These reports provide an outline of the political, economic and social situation in the ENP countries. They also provide the space for future assessments on the achievements of each of the EU’s partner countries. The Commission announced that the first assessment would be released in 2006, to be followed by another round of country reports in 2007. The next stage in the development of ENP saw the conclusion of ENP Action Plans with each of the countries. In June 2004, the Council of the EU endorsed the Commission’s proposal: ‘Action Plans should be comprehensive but at the same time identify clearly a limited number of key priorities and offer real incentives for reform. Action plans should also contribute, where possible, to regional cooperation.’52 Subsequently, a wide range of other areas have been emphasized. They jointly define an agenda of political and economic reform by means of short and mediumterm priorities (between 3 and 5 years). They cover political dialogue and reform, economic and social cooperation and development, trade-related issues and market and regulatory reform, cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, cooperation in sectors (such as transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development) as well as a human dimension (people-to-people contacts, civil society, education, public health). The incentives the EU offers in return for progress on relevant reforms are greater integration into European programmes and networks, increased assistance and enhanced market access.

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Finally, the implementation of mutual commitments and objectives agreed upon in the Action Plans are subject to regular monitoring by the European Commission and the partner country. In addition, the European Commission is expected to issue periodic reports commenting on progress as well as shortcomings. This procedure clearly reinforces elements of conditionality by offering reviews of the relationship in exchange for compliance with jointly agreed commitments. According to the Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Mission to the EU, his country aims at ‘under-promising, but over-delivering’53 on the terms of its objectives set in the Action Plan. Currently, EU assistance to the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy is channelled through various geographical programmes.54 In October 2004, the European Commission proposed an increase in funding for the ENP to almost €15 billion. This is conceived as a part of the reform of EU assistance instruments that will be replaced by a simplified structure and a single instrument – the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). This will be a much more flexible and ‘policy-driven instrument’55 designed to target sustainable development and approximation of EU policies and standards, as well as supporting the agreed-to priorities in the ENP Action Plans. One of its most innovative features is that it entails ‘a radical simplification to the current situation where cross-border cooperation at the external EU border is hampered by interfaces between internal and external funding instruments operating through different rules’.56 This means that cross-border cooperation with non-EU countries will be considerably eased along the EU’s external land and sea borders in the east and in the south, putting partners under the same funding regime and instruments. The EU hopes to substantiate its goal of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe as a result of these changes. ENPI also envisages extending forms of technical assistance to partner countries that had previously been used in the process of the CEECs’ rapprochement towards the EU, such as Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX), long-term twinning arrangements with EU member states’ administrations (national, regional or local), as well as participation in Community programmes and agencies. Moreover, the Commission expects that the priorities identified in the action plans, which are agreed to with the authorities of the country, will have a ‘lighthouse effect’ in terms of guiding the programming of other assistance programmes from other donor countries and institutions. After painstakingly difficult negotiations on the financial perspectives for the years 2007–13, a compromise was reached at the European Council in December 2005. The Council determined that the EU’s external action – including pre-accession, stability,

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development cooperation and economic cooperation, ENP, humanitarian aid and macro-financial assistance – would receive approximately €50 billion from 2007–13.57 Out of this budget, only €10.5 billion were assigned to ENP.

The security dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy The EU’s Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Ferrero-Waldner, has argued that through its capability to draw transformative power from a system of mutually defined incentives, ENP presents a ‘modern, smart policy’ embracing ‘security, stability and prosperity’.58 This statement gives evidence of the Commission’s broad conception of security, which takes stock of measures aiming at the enhancement of non-military, ‘soft security’ issues in the targeted countries. Throughout the development of the ENP, the EU became increasingly aware of the fact that this policy may potentially yield results in reinforcing state capabilities in the neighbourhood as well as contributing to conflict prevention. Thus, it is possible to discern three major factors which ultimately have an impact on the security dimension of the ENP. First, ENP offers inclusive forms of cooperation and integration focusing, amongst others, on areas of ‘soft security’. Second, albeit not designed as fullyfledged conflict-prevention tool, ENP has been viewed and used as a tool for conflict prevention. Third, ENP offers participating countries an additional foreign policy orientation. The policy fosters a framework that may assist those countries in devising their individual foreign policy strategies. In the case of the Ukraine and Moldova, it made clear that there is a ‘European option’ at hand as opposed to a ‘Russian option’ that may require further reintegration into the CIS. Yet the Russian Federation, along with other actors in the region (such as NATO and the US), is playing an important role. Although Russia has expressed concerns vis-à-vis the scope of EU enlargement, it has not been as outspokenly opposed to this process as it was in the case of NATO enlargement. It is very important for the EU to devise strategies that ultimately will not alienate Russia from both the processes of EU enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Fostering ‘soft security’ and state-building via policy transfer, policy learning and flexible inclusion Clearly, the main focus of the ENP is the promotion of internal stability in the countries of the ‘European’ borderland. The EU would ideally like to see its neighbours adopt values such as the rule of law, democracy and

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respect for human rights and minority rights in accordance with the norms and standards – for example, political pluralism, freedom of speech and media, respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, non-discrimination on grounds of gender, political, religious and ethnic grounds – set forth by institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe. In a nutshell, the EU aspires to make these countries similar to ‘the Union itself’ in order to ease mutual interaction – based on its in-depth knowledge and experience in dealing with transition countries. Furthermore, the ENP Action Plans encourage a wide range of initiatives in interregional and cross-border cooperation arrangements involving the sub-national level(s), targeting public health, fostering local democracy and civil society, as well as building strong national education programmes. Through this approach, the EU attempts to foster ‘confidence-building’ measures between the EU and the ENP countries as well as between the ENP countries themselves. Combating organized crime and corruption are high on the agenda of the EU’s relationships with most of the ENP countries. Yet, it remains to be seen just how successful the EU will be when it comes to enhancing third countries’ state functions as well as ‘statebuilding’. Furthermore, the Action Plans are eager to set up closer cooperation based on people-to-people contacts. With regards to education, training and youth, the EU–Ukraine Action Plan for instance strives to enhance ‘a policy dialogue between EU and Ukrainian authorities in the field of education and training’.59 Furthermore, it sets out to incorporate Ukraine in a number of higher education and university programmes such as Tempus III, the Erasmus Mundus and the youth programmes. It also encourages Ukraine to subscribe fully to the objectives of the ‘Bologna process’ in Higher Education, thus ensuring the compatibility of the Ukrainian university system with that of EU member states. Together with the other Eastern ENP countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, Ukraine joined the ‘Bologna process’ in May 2005.60 Furthermore, the Ukraine–EU partnership has been extended to cover Europe’s satellite radio navigation system (Galileo), which sets the framework for cooperation in satellite navigation in a wider range of sectors, particularly in science and technology, industrial manufacturing, service and market development, as well as standardization, frequency and certification. According to Ferrero-Waldner, Ukraine has become an ‘avant-garde country’,61 yielding further progress on the market economy status necessary for Ukraine’s bid for WTO membership, as well as on visa facilitation and energy issues. Ultimately, the key mechanism for driving EU-inspired external reform resides with the ‘perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration, including through a stake in the EU’s Internal Market

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and the possibility for Ukraine to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programs’.62 Yet it is not only the ENP country which will benefit from closer forms of inclusion into EU programmes and policies – in the case of Ukraine, the EU aims at getting access to the country’s Antonov fleet in order to cope with its weak capabilities vis-à-vis its airlift capabilities and to boost its credibility in terms of ESDP. Thus, the success of the ENP ultimately will depend on the stakes both partners hold in this process. Addressing the issue of conflict prevention Although conflict prevention has played a major part in the politics of the EU’s Eastern enlargement, it was not highly prioritized at the launch of the ENP. This was mainly because the European Commission was reluctant to engage with Pillar II issues, such as conflict management and resolution issues, due to constraints set by the treaty obligations. In short ‘ENP is a Commission-driven policy, and crisis management is the prerogative of the Council’.63 Yet, with the explicit reference to neighbourhood policies in the European Security Strategy, it was made clear that the ENP would also be framed in terms of conflict prevention policy. In addition, the potential as ‘a conflict prevention tool’ is highly demand-driven or, in other words, dependent on the policy-takers’ perception and expectations vis-à-vis ENP itself. Both Georgia and Moldova have expressed hopes that the European Union and ENP would play a pivotal role in resolving some of the conflicts in their territories.64 The ENP Action Plans agreed to in 2005 make clear reference to conflict prevention. Likewise, the ENP Country Strategy Papers feature references to territorial disputes and call for a ‘shared responsibility’ for conflict settlement. Similarly, the Action Plans with Israel, Jordon, Morocco, Moldova and Ukraine, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia all mention a ‘shared responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution’; conflict resolution also figures high in Action Plans that were in the process of negotiation at the beginning of 2006. Clearly, there is a long history of this approach in the efforts of the EU to play a (significant) role in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. So far, the ‘ENP approach’ to conflict resolution has not yielded tangible results. When the Council of the EU decided to include the Caucasian republics in the ENP, it was obvious from the start that conflict prevention needed to be at the top of the agenda. Armenia, Azerbaijan and the issue of NagornoKarabakh represent symbols of Europe’s ‘frozen conflicts’. As the EU is currently preparing the Action Plans for these countries, it remains to be seen what kind of results the ENP will be capable of generating in this particular region.

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After a controversial debate among the member states, the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine was set up in November 2005 under the lead of the European Commission. Although it is an advisory, small-scale, technical body with no executive powers, it provides training and advice to Moldovan and Ukrainian officials, reinforcing their capacity to carry out effective customs controls and border surveillance.65 Ultimately, it is designed to contribute to building confidence and strengthening crossborder cooperation, particularly with a view to resolving the ‘frozen conflict’ in Transnistria. ENP targets a number of security areas: the Action Plans explicitly mention proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, reform of the police and judicial system in order to fight corruption, measures against organized crime and the countering of international terrorism. Offering a foreign policy orientation In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Russia and Ukraine searched for a ‘European option’ or some form of integration into the European Union – the ‘Common House of Europe’ as it was framed at the end of the Gorbachev era. While Boris Yeltsin was supportive of the idea of having a close relationship with the EU, he later changed his tone. Shortly after Putin’s rise to power in 2000, it became clear that Russia no longer intended to pursue this option further. Moreover, for the very first time, the Russian government explicitly declared that EU membership was not on its political agenda. There were several reasons for this development: first, the Russian political elite took a nationalistic turn under the presidency of Putin and became increasingly dismissive of the commitments at stake in European integration in terms of sovereignty; second, Russia feels that Europe and the EU in particular are highly dependent on Russian energy supplies and it therefore serves Russia’s interests to remain outside the EU in order to be able to benefit economically from this situation; third, EU inclusion of the Baltic states and Poland increased scepticism and to some extent Russo-phobia in the realm of the EU. For the ‘in-betweens’, such as Ukraine and Moldova, this political development meant that they were increasingly forced into taking a stand on their position vis-à-vis EU membership. This created an entirely new regional context for Ukraine and Moldova, who were left in limbo throughout the 1990s. At best, both countries aimed at walking a fine line between the European and Slavic options. Ultimately, however, both Ukraine and Moldova remained fairly close to Russia and its interests when it came to the development of their foreign policy orientations. With the Orange Revolution and the involvement of Poland and Lithuania in resolving the dispute surrounding the 2004 Ukrainian

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election, two EU member states proved to have a pivotal role in the Ukraine’s embrace of the ‘European option’. Thus the framework of the ENP offers an opportunity for further exploration of a closer relationship with the European Union. In his speech at the European Parliament, Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine, was very explicit: Ukraine still has much to do to become a full member of the European family, but we are all now united by values, history and aspirations . . . Like making bread, you need the right ingredients and a lot of work. European integration is the only path open for Ukraine. It is time to move beyond words and take action to develop democracy, the rule of law, freedom of the media and to tackle corruption. We must not lose this unique opportunity to bring the EU and Ukraine closer.66 The ENP opens a discursive as well as a policy space for mutual interaction that ultimately will generate an additional foreign policy orientation. It is evident that a foreign policy orientation does not create a more secure environment per se, yet it may provide the means ultimately to achieve the goal of establishing a more secure international environment instead of being lost in a regional limbo.

Conclusion The ENP does not provide an entirely new approach in the field of EU foreign and security policy. Given its reliance on the European Commission as a primary driving force, and the fact that it is strongly path-dependent and modelled after the ‘enlargement policies’, it may even be accurate to argue that it somehow presents ‘new wine in old wineskins’.67 Yet, one should not ignore the fact that the ENP does not render obsolete those EU Treaty provisions which allow ‘European states to apply for membership’. Against this backdrop, two factors have added a considerable ‘integrationist twist’ to the European Neighbourhood Policy: first, Ukraine and Moldova are indisputably ‘European countries’ in terms of Art. 49 TEU – unlike Russia and the Southern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the Russian decision to reject ENP partner status indirectly contributes to anchoring the ‘Eastern European bloc’ of ENP countries in a pro-EUmembership ‘camp’. Second, the accession of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and – in 2007/8 – Romania to the European Union has and will further increase the number of member states willing to support Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova on their path towards European integration and potential EU membership. In early 2005, the then Foreign

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Minister of Lithuania, Antanas Valionis, argued that ‘Lithuania . . . was the most vigorous supporter of the extension of the European Neighborhood Policy to South Caucasus, [and] considers this EU decision as completing the geographic boundaries of the EU strategic interests in Eastern Europe.’68 In July 2006, the German Foreign Minister aired his suggestions for improving the regional approach within ENP by singling out Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasian republics for a modernization partnership.69 For the Western NIS, this may imply the creation of a model similar to the ‘Euro-Mediterranean partnership’ that currently exists between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean. Although some aspects of ENP seem to be transitional in character, it is safe to assume that the primary focus of any ENP-like policy in the near future will be the provision of advice, assistance, and developing opportunities for social learning with a particular emphasis on areas of ‘soft security’. Here, the European Union and its member states can rely on a tremendous body of knowledge and experience when it comes to transferring stability and support to neighbouring countries transitioning from totalitarian regimes towards democracies. Ever since the G-24 entrusted the European Commission with the pivotal role in coordinating Western assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, the EU (and the Commission) have been thrust into a leadership role in the region.70 It is only fairly recently that the EU has started to seek a role for the ENP in conflict prevention and management. Here, any EU effort needs to be matched by the ENP countries and their readiness to accept the EU as an actor in conflict prevention and resolution. Again, there seems to be a ‘cross-pillar problem’ when it comes to backing up the objective of conflict prevention with measures ultimately designed to ensure conflict settlement. In the end, success in these areas is by and large dependent on a number of domestic factors and, ultimately, it is a function of the ENP countries’ interest and willingness to further their relationships with the European Union. The EU may run into some difficulties in expecting an ENP country to comply with these rules unless it backs up its external incentives with a credible membership option. Whether this ‘membership option’ implies full-fledged membership or not, or whether it may be addressed based on patterns of differentiated integration, is open for discussion. Without projecting a blueprint on how to solve various ‘frozen conflicts’ in Europe, the approach undertaken by the EU through ENP has succeeded in putting some of these conflicts back on the agenda of European security politics.71 Yet, ENP has not managed to impose itself as a source of conflict prevention in the Middle East, as the outbreak of violence between Israel and Lebanon, both ENP countries, in

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July 2006 demonstrates. Again, at this stage of the EU’s development in terms of ESDP, the ultimate threshold between the failure or success of EU conflict prevention in Europe and its immediate vicinity seems to be the question of whether the Union can match conditionality with a credible membership perspective. The European Union and ENP do not operate in a political vacuum. It is extremely important that other major actors such as NATO, the US and Russia remain involved and are able to subscribe to ENP objectives when it comes to conflict prevention and resolution. In sharp contrast to the expansion of NATO, Russia has been more supportive of EU enlargement. Up to now the expansion of NATO has preceded EU enlargement. However, with the stalemate in Ukraine following the election of pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych to become prime minister in August 2006, this could change for the very first time. The EU will have to assume political leadership in order to foster comprehensive relations with its Southern and – in particular – East European neighbours. Hence, the relationship with the new neighbours in Eastern Europe – in particular Ukraine – will ultimately provide the test ground on which the EU will have to forge its Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy and ultimately demonstrate that it is able to provide security in the wider Europe.

Notes The author wishes to acknowledge the useful help and input on this chapter by Fraser Cameron, Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, Holger Moroff, Allen G. Sens and Jason R. Young. 1. From a normative perspective, one may compare the EU’s Eastern Policy with West Germany’s ‘Ostpolitik’ starting in the late 1960s. Similar to the EU’s approach vis-à-vis Russia and Eastern Europe, the concept of ‘Ostpolitik’ implies ‘change through rapprochement’ (‘Wandel durch Annäherung’). See Holger Moroff, ‘Russia, the CIS and the EU – Secondary Integration by Association’, in The European Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Compatibility of Integration Processes, eds Katlijn Malfliet, Lien Verpoest and Evgeny Vinokurov (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming). 2. ENP partner countries are: Algeria, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Armenia, Jordan, Syria, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Belarus, Libya, Ukraine, Egypt, Moldova, Georgia and Morocco. 3. Romano Prodi, ‘A Wider Europe – a Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability’, Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU, Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Brussels, 5–6 December 2002. 4. European Commission, Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, COM (2003) 393 final (Brussels, The European Union, 2003), 4. 5. On the external dimension of EU governance, see Michael Smith, ‘The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of

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6.

7.

8.

9. 10.

11. 12.

13. 14.

The Changing Politics of European Security Order’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (1996): 5–28; Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, ‘The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (1999): 211–32; Stefan Gänzle, ‘The EU’s Presence and Actorness in the Baltic Sea Area: Multilevel Governance Beyond its External Borders’, in EU Enlargement and Beyond: the Baltic States and Russia, ed. Helmut Hubel (Berlin: Spitz, 2002), 73–103; Mette Sicard Filtenborg, Stefan Gänzle and Elisabeth Johansson, ‘An Alternative Theoretical Approach to EU Foreign Policy: “Network Governance” and the Case of the Northern Dimension’, Journal of Cooperation and Conflict, 37 (2002): 387–407; Sandra Lavenex, ‘EU External Governance in “Wider Europe” ’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11 (2004): 680–700. Today, Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that ‘[a]ny European state may apply to become a member of the European Union. Prospective candidates must meet the so-called “Copenhagen Criteria” for membership defined at the European Council meeting in June 1993: democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for minorities, a functioning market economy, and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures as well as the ability to take on the obligations of membership (acquis communautaire) and to apply effectively the EU’s rules and policies.’ As early as in the treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the founding states agreed in Article 98 ECSC that ‘[a]ny European State may request to accede to the present Treaty’. See European Union, Treaty on European Union (Brussels: European Union, 1992). It was only in the case of Morocco in 1987 that the European Commission rejected this country’s bid for membership on grounds of its not being ‘European’. On the concepts of ‘presence’ and ‘actorness’, see David Allen and Michael Smith, ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena’, Review of International Studies, 16 (1990): 19–37. Pál Dunay, The OSCE in Crisis, Chaillot Paper 88 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006). Karen E. Smith, ‘The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy’, International Affairs, 81 (2005): 757. One should not downplay, though, the challenge of EU enlargement. As Judy Batts put it: ‘EU enlargement threatens to widen the economic gap between the “ins” and the “outs”. It could reignite old political and cultural resentments between the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.’ See Judy Batt, ‘The EU’s New Borderlands’, CER Working Paper, Centre for European Reform, London, 2003, 57. See Heinz Timmermann, ‘Die Europäische Union und Russland – Dimensionen und Perspektiven der Partnerschaft’, Integration, 19(4) (1996): 195–207. Romania and Bulgaria will have to wait until early October 2006 to hear from the Commission when they will join the EU. See Mark Beunderman, ‘Romania and Bulgaria Must Wait Until Autumn for EU Entry Date’, EUobserver, 16 May 2006. Derek Fraser, ‘Taking Ukraine Seriously: the Western and Russian Responses to the Orange Revolution’ (unpublished manuscript), 10. Christophe Hillion, ‘Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between the European Union and the New Independent States of the Ex-Soviet Union’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 3 (1998): 399–420.

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15. European Council, Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia, 1999/414/CFSP (Brussels: European Union, 1999), 1–9; European Council, Common Strategy of the European Union of 11 December 1999 Ukraine, 1999/887/CFSP (Brussels: European Union, 1999), 1–9. 16. For the EU’s transformative impact on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, see Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11 (2004): 661–79; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe’, in The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, eds Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 1–28. 17. Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘European Neighborhood Policy: Political Conditionality and its Impact on Democracy in Non-candidate Neighboring Countries’, paper prepared for the EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference, Austin, 31 March–2 April 2005. 18. Roland Dannreuther, ‘Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: the European Neighbourhood Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 11 (2006): 185. 19. In the case of Switzerland, there are a number of bilateral agreements in place covering Switzerland’s relations with the EU. 20. This country approach encouraged at the same time various forms of subregional cooperation (Visegrad states of Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak Republics; Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS); Black Sea cooperation and so on). 21. ‘Mitterrand Holds Meetings with Hungarian Politicians’, New York Times, 20 January 1990. 22. Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, ‘The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (1999): 211–32. 23. Karen E. Smith, ‘The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy’, International Affairs, 81 (2005): 761. 24. European Council, Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions, 12–13 December 1997. 25. The European Council Presidency Conclusions state: ‘The members of the Conference must share a common commitment to peace, security and good neighbourliness, respect for other countries’ sovereignty, the principles upon which the European Union is founded, the integrity and inviolability of external borders and the principles of international law and a commitment to the settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Countries which endorse these principles and respect the right of any European country fulfilling the required criteria to accede to the European Union and sharing the Union’s commitment to building a Europe free of the divisions and difficulties of the past will be invited to take part in the Conference.’ 26. European Council, Göteborg European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15–16 June 2001. 27. Northern Dimension, The Second Foreign Ministers’ Conference on the Northern Dimension, Conclusions, Luxembourg, 9 April 2001; Northern Dimension, Foreign Ministers’ Conference on the Northern Dimension, Helsinki, 11–12

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28.

29. 30. 31.

32. 33.

34.

35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

The Changing Politics of European Security November 1999; Marja Nissinen (ed.), A Compilation of Speeches (Helsinki: Unit for the Northern Dimension in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2000). Michele Comelli, ‘The Approach of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): Distinctive Features and Differences with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, paper presented at the IGC Net Conference in Brussels, 17 November 2005, 13. European Council, Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions, 12–13 December 2002. European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World – a European Security Strategy (Brussels: European Union, 2003), 7. The other objectives are (1) to address the new threats to security, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism and organized crime and (2) to help create ‘an international order based on effective multilateralism’. In this regard see European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World – a European Security Strategy, 9. Ibid., 7. Marise Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: Partnership, Security and the Rule of Law’, in European Neighbourhood Policy and Ukraine, eds Alan Mayhew and Nathaniel Copsey (Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2005), 53. European Commission, Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2003) 104 final, 12. Ibid. Compare Francesco Cavatorta, Raj Chari and Sylvia Kritzinger, ‘The European Union and Morocco. Security through Authoritarianism?’, Political Science Series, 110 (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, 2006), 13. Ibid., 11. Michael Emerson, ‘Two Cheers for the European Neighbourhood Policy’, CEPS Commentary (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2004). European Council, General Affairs and External Relations, 2590th Council Meeting, 10189/04 (Presse 195) (Luxembourg: European Union, 2004). Smith, ‘The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy’, 759. It is worth noting that the failed ‘European Constitution’ attempted to codify special categories of relationship with EU neighbours: ‘1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specific agreements with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their implementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation’ (Art. I-57). European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper (Brussels: European Union, 2004), 4. European Commission, Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, COM (2003) 393 final (Brussels: European Union, 2003), 3. Prodi, ‘A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability’. Ibid. European Commission, Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, COM (2003) 393 final (Brussels: European Union, 2003), 4.

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47. European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy, 21: ‘The European Union is not seeking to establish new bodies or organisations, but rather to support existing entities and encourage their further development; the importance of local ownership is one of the most pertinent lessons that can be drawn from the Northern Dimension.’ 48. Ibid., 8. 49. European Union, Partnership and Cooperation of the European Communities and their Member States and Ukraine, OJ 1998 L49/3 (Brussels: European Union, 1998), 41: ‘The Parties recognize that an important condition for strengthening the economic links between Ukraine and the Community is the approximation of Ukraine’s existing and future legislation to that of the Community. Ukraine shall endeavour to ensure that its legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community.’ 50. See Article 101 of the PCA with Ukraine, which stipulates: ‘This Agreement is concluded for an initial period of ten years. The Agreement shall be automatically renewed year by year provided that neither Party gives the other Party written notice of denunciation of the Agreement six months before it expires.’ Ibid. 51. Commission of the European Union (2002), Euro-Med Partnership – Jordan – Country Strategy Paper 2002–2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002–2004, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/jordan/csp/ 02-06_en.pdf (25 June 2006). 52. Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations, 2590th Council Meeting, 10189/04 (Presse 195). 53. Author’s interview with Kostiantyn Yelisieiev, Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Mission to the EU, Brussels, 30 May 2005. 54. These programmes include TACIS (for its eastern neighbours and Russia) and MEDA (for its southern Mediterranean neighbours), as well as thematic programmes such as European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The budgetary period (covering 2000–06) releases funds of approximately €5.3 billion for MEDA and €3.1 billion for TACIS; in addition the European Investment Bank lends approximately €2 billion to MEDA beneficiary countries and €500 million to TACIS beneficiary countries. 55. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down General Provisions Establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, COM(2004) 628 final, 2004/0219 (COD) (Brussels: European Union 2004), 3. 56. Ibid., 3. 57. This is based on European Council, Financial Perspective 2007–2013, CADREFIN 15915/05 (Brussels: European Union, 2005), as well as my calculation (in 2006 prices). 58. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘Quo vadis Europa?’ European People’s Party ‘Paneuropa’ Group, Strasbourg, 14 December 2005, http://europa.eu.int/ rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference⫽SPEECH/05/797&format⫽HTML& aged⫽0&language⫽EN&guiLanguage⫽en (07 June 2006). 59. European Commission, ‘EU/Ukraine Action Plan’ (Brussels: European Union, 2004), 39. 60. ‘The European Higher Education Area: Achieving the Goals’, Communiqué of the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education,

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61.

62. 63.

64.

65.

66. 67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

The Changing Politics of European Security Bergen, 19–20 May 2005, http://www.bologna-bergen2005.no/Docs/00Main_doc/050520_Bergen_Communique.pdf (7 June 2006). Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘Die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik als Wohlstandsund Sicherheitsanker [The European Neighbourhood Policy as an Anchor for Prosperity and Security]’, Meeting of COSAC (Conférence des Organes Spécialisés en Affaires Communautaires), Vienna, 22 May 2006, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference⫽SPEECH/06/325& format⫽HTML&aged⫽0&language⫽DE&guiLanguage⫽en (7 June 2006). European Commission, ‘EU/Ukraine Action Plan’, 2. Nicu Popescu, ‘The EU in Moldova – Settling Conflicts in the Neighbourhood’, Occasional Paper 60, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2005, 10; Judith Kelley, ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(1) (2006): 29–55. Compare Fraser Cameron (in collaboration with Rosa Balfour), ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Conflict Prevention Tool’, EPC Issue Paper No. 47, European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2006, 5. According to a report in the New York Times, Ukrainian border patrols have increased ‘as Europe keeps close eye’; see Steven Lee Myers, ‘Ukraine Battles Smugglers as Europe Keeps Close Eye’, New York Times, 28 May 2006, 4. Viktor Yushchenko, ‘Ukraine’s Future is in the EU’, address by the President of Ukraine to the European Parliament, Brussels, 23 February 2005. Judith Kelley, ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(1) (2006): 29–55. Address by Antanas Valionis at the international conference ‘The Baltic Region and the South Caucasus: Strategies for Cooperation and Patterns of Reform’, Vilnius, February 8, 2005, http://www.urm.lt/index.php?-385741097. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, ‘Berlin entwickelt neue Nachbarschaft-spolitik für die EU’, 2 July 2006, http://www.faz.net/s/Rub99C3EECA60D84C08A D6B3E60C4EA807F/Doc⬃E2FDB15D2F5084C19B6D27D5C1C72DDA1⬃AT pl⬃Ecommon⬃Scontent.html (3 August 2006). See Jacques Pelkmans and Anna Murphy, ‘ “Catapulted into Leadership”: the Community’s Aid and Trade Policies vis-à-vis Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Integration, 14 (1991): 125. This may also be a clear sign of the substantial weakness of the OSCE, which has so far been entrusted with designing solutions to various post-Soviet conflicts, such as the one in Transnistria.

7 Russia and the ESDP: Partnership Strategy versus Strategic Partnership Dmitry Danilov

Introduction: Russia’s general attitude and motives toward cooperation Russia’s attitude towards the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has never been disapproving or apprehensive. As early as the year 2000, Moscow signalled its ‘positive interest’ in the ESDP and its willingness to cooperate with the EU’s new policy instrument.1 During the post-Kosovo period, when Russian relations with NATO were strained, the development of an EU–Russia political dialogue compensated for the relative vacuum in security relations between Russia and the West.2 But the opposite side of the coin was that this dialogue and cooperation were perceived by Moscow not only as compensation, but rather as an emerging alternative to the promotion of traditional European security interests centred on the transatlantic relationship. Maintaining a positive and mutually beneficial relationship is important for both Europe and Russia and for the European security environment more generally. Russia is a crucial country in the politics of European security. Russia is an important actor in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and North-east Asia. Given its status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia’s position on most major international issues is of direct importance to Europe. Russia is an increasingly prominent energy provider, and therefore plays a pivotal role in energy security in Europe. Moreover, the future of Russian democracy is a source for concern in both Europe and America. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that Russia and Europe have both taken steps to strengthen their relationship. The Russian Federation’s Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union (2000–10) emphasizes the need to strengthen the EU–Russia 135

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strategic partnership and to ‘promote practical cooperation in the area of security (peacemaking, crisis settlement, various aspects of arms limitation and reduction, and so on), which could counterbalance the NATOcentrism in Europe’. In this document Moscow urges the EU to emphasize the ‘supremacy of international law and non-use of force’, ‘to preserve and strengthen the OSCE as a key basis of the European security’ in order to establish ‘the reliable pan-European system of collective security’, and to cooperate on the basis of equality. At the same time, this strategy paper also emphasizes that ‘the development of a partnership with the EU should contribute to the consolidation of Russia’s role as a leading power in the process of reshaping a new system of interstate political and economic relations in the CIS area’.3 Following this instrumentalist logic, Moscow called on the EU to define clearly the geographical area of the ESDP, ignoring the fact that as a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), ESDP could not be limited territorially. It is obvious that such a stance could not meet with anything other than failure. Moreover, this suggestion by Moscow proved to be counterproductive as it restrained the EU from moving closer towards Russia. The Russian perception of the ESDP as discussed above changed substantially after the attacks of 11 September 2001. On the one hand, a rapprochement with the US and the West initiated by President Putin’s ‘new course’ and the reactivation of Russian relations with NATO relieved some of the fundamental limitations that existed in the realm of Russia–EU security cooperation. On the other hand, since 9/11 the ESDP has been losing some of its instrumental significance for Russia, especially as a ‘compensatory’ channel in the dialogue between Russia and the West. Previous Russian attempts to generate a ‘special relationship’ with the EU in the field of crisis management (and through this to influence Western approaches towards European security) appeared to be politically untenable, considering the limited autonomous potential of the ESDP, its minor role in Euro–Atlantic security, and, in particular, its reliance on NATO’s support and its capabilities. Moreover, the opportunities for practical security cooperation between Russia and the EU also appear to be rather limited. At the same time, new motivations for the development of Russia–EU security relations have arisen. First, the European Union, intent on strengthening its role in international affairs and faced with the necessity of addressing the threat posed by international terrorism, had not only to declare its support for the US, but also its partnership capacity within the antiterrorist coalition, of which Russia was an integral part. So it was not surprising that when the Brussels EU–Russia summit in October 2001

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envisaged additional steps be taken in the field of security cooperation, the two sides concluded their summit by issuing a special joint statement on their commitment to fighting terrorism. Second, Russia’s rapprochement with the US, including its recognition of the importance of the Russia–US relationship, demonstrated to many in the EU that its own relevance for both the US and Russia could decrease if it did not establish stronger ties with Russia. Third, the initial ESDP emphasis on the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’ can hardly be seen as a success. The fundamental changes and challenges that have taken place in the international system over the past few years have induced the EU to rethink its security strategy and specifically the functional role of its ESDP. In responding to the various challenges and security threats which have arisen since the turn of the millennium, the EU has had to focus its foreign and security policy towards combining efforts with its main partners and the partnership with Russia has been of special importance in this regard. Consequently, the EU, which before was more interested in Russia’s casual support for the ESDP, agreed to further strengthen its security cooperation with Russia, both in the institutional and operational fields. At the 2001 October Summit it was decided that the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) would consult with Russia, most specifically by conducting monthly meetings between the PSC Troika and Russia. Since that time, Russia has remained the only EU partner country to be granted such a permanent mechanism of consultation. At the EU–Russia summit on 29 May 2002, Russia and the EU ‘agreed to deepen significantly [their] political dialogue and cooperation on crisis management and security matters’.4 A number of further developments have taken place in recent years that demonstrate Russia’s willingness to work with the West in general and the EU in particular in defence-related areas. Most notable among these are the Russian president’s course of rapprochement with the West in the security sphere and his affirmation that Europe continues to be a focal point for Russian foreign policy. By strengthening relations with the West in this area and emphasizing the important role that Europe plays in Russia’s foreign policy, Putin induced Moscow to move away from its instrumental and rather tactical perception of the ESDP and instead forced it to examine the ESDP from the perspective of its own interests and expectations. Generally speaking, Russia’s attitude towards the ESDP is defined by three basic motivations. First, strengthening the EU’s political role fits with Russia’s sense of multipolarity in international relations. Second, advancing a strategic partnership with the European Union is important

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to Russia because it enables Moscow to advance one of its key foreign policy objectives, that being its integration into a wider Europe. Third, the EU must have a strategic relationship with Russia in order to be recognized as a capable actor on the international scene. Consequently, cooperation with the EU provides Russia with opportunities to strengthen its voice in Europe and to establish a dialogue with the West, while also serving the EU’s interests. Additionally, Russia can be seen as the EU’s co-equal in the security sphere (as opposed to other areas where the relationship is less balanced), and as such, security cooperation is critical to both parties since it has the potential to provide this relationship with a much-needed strategic character. The combination of these three general motives – strengthening the EU’s political role in the international system, furthering Russia’s integration into Europe and addressing some of Moscow’s key security interests – reflects the fact that it is in Russia’s best interests to support the strategic and operational development of the ESDP. Furthermore, if Russia hopes to maintain a significant role in international politics and European security in particular, it is imperative that it supports and encourages the development of the ESDP. Although there has been some scepticism in Russia5 (as well as in the US and in Europe itself) with regard to the slow development of both the CFSP and the ESDP, the progress that has taken place in both of these areas is quite significant. A number of European experts agree that there has been ‘an explosion of constructive developments in security and defence’ in the EU, ‘all together resulting in a more effective European “toolbox” for dealing with a wide spectrum of security challenges and much-increased US respect and support for European defence’.6 This point is supported by leading Russian analysts.7 The EU will continue to strengthen and expand CFSP and ESDP in the years to come. Russia, wishing to develop a comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU, should work towards formulating a constructive policy towards the ESDP. The EU’s operational capabilities do not pose a threat to Russia (especially as they are primarily suited for ‘Petersberg’ type missions), and so Moscow should not be concerned that the evolution of the European Union’s defence policy will raise security concerns in the Kremlin. Moreover, by increasing the political role of the EU and strengthening its military capabilities the EU will, paradoxically, be contributing to the overall demilitarization of European politics. As the EU develops a more coherent and comprehensive defence policy (with particular emphasis on its crisis management capabilities), the existing military focus will shift from NATO (with its strong traditional military

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capabilities) to the EU, with its more benign and strategically limited forces. For this reason, Russia strongly supports the development of the ESDP over the strengthening of NATO in Europe.8

Towards result-oriented cooperation In spite of the EU and Russia’s common defence and security interests, as well as their declared intentions to further cooperation in these areas, there has been precious little collaboration between these two major European players over the past few years.9 The only example of practical cooperation in these areas took place in 2002 when the Russian government pledged to send five officers to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This gesture, however, was more a symbolic one than a sign of increased political or operational cooperation. In fact, when opportunities have arisen for cooperation, the EU has often ignored them. Indeed, the EU has never resorted to military-technical cooperation with Russia. In December 2002, Russia proposed to the EU that it use Russia’s long-range air transport for EU-led operations, but the EU rejected the Kremlin’s offer. Moreover, even though the EU has invited Russia to take part in EU military exercises, it has only ever been invited as an observer rather than as a participant. The lack of cooperation between Russia and the EU in the defence sphere can be interpreted largely as the result of different goals and objectives. ‘The basic differences largely preclude the European Union and Russia from reaching agreement on what the actual results should be in the first place.’10 Further, the lack of practical results in the area of EU–Russia cooperation is quite understandable, owing to the specific character of the ESDP. In many respects, the ESDP is an internally focused ‘domestic project’ that is concentrated on the development of specific crisis management capabilities. Consequently, in this respect the EU considers Russia to be a third party that can be invited to contribute to EU-led operations, but not as a full partner.11 Yet, a ‘credibility gap is emerging between the EU’s strategic expectations, on the one hand, and its actual crisis management capability, on the other’.12 The emergence of this credibility gap constrains practical cooperation between Russia and the EU, as there is a significant disparity between the EU’s capacity to deal with crises and Russia’s crisis management capabilities. Furthermore, the fact that the two are not oriented to a wider joint agenda makes cooperation in defence-related areas difficult. Moscow, for its part, points out that ‘rapprochement between Russia and the EU . . . ought to be part and parcel of a common project for the

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creation of a truly Greater Europe without dividing lines’.13 It is exactly this approach that it considers essential to the establishment of a common space of external security between Russia and the EU. The European Union’s position on this matter is, however, quite different. Despite the enlarging geographic scope and increasing potential of the ESDP, its aims remain fairly limited. Some European experts suggest that this is the result of clashing visions and the limitations of the EU partnership. ‘For Brussels, ESDP is not a motor for the creation of a common European security space. It is a limited instrument of EU foreign policy: ESDP serves the EU and not “Greater Europe.” Future EU operations have similarly limited scope and objectives. The aim is not to create a common “space,” or to accommodate the interests of all part of Europe; it is solely that of crisis management.’14 Moreover, when the EU is able to act in defence-related matters, it aims to demonstrate to the member states and to its foreign partners its own efficiency and its increasing political and operational autonomy. The ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements, under which the NATO members (read: the United States) agreed to ‘lend’ the EU member states NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations, amplifying the ESDP’s capacity. At the same time, however, the arrangements set forth under the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements make operational partnership with Russia more difficult, both because of the ESDP’s transatlantic focus and because of the United States’ sensitivity to the EU establishing closer military ties with Russia. Russia, for its part, cannot but consider the ESDP’s limitations. Declaring its willingness to cooperate with the EU in practical areas, Moscow nonetheless prefers to cooperate with NATO as its main Western partner on military-political issues and in matters related to crisis management. One reason why the Kremlin prefers to work with NATO as opposed to the EU through the ESDP forum is because of the institutional role that Russia maintains in NATO. Relations between Russia and NATO are institutionally strong as a result of the establishment of the NATO–Russia Council, which provides Moscow with a more significant partnership role than it maintains with the EU. Moreover, the NATO–Russia Council provides Russia (or so it believes) with the opportunity to build a co-equal partnership with NATO, something that does not currently exist within the EU’s institutional framework. Moreover, the Russia–NATO Joint Peacekeeping Mission in the Balkans has been for the most part very positive, a point which bodes well for further joint operations and even greater future cooperation between NATO and Russia. From Europe’s perspective, NATO is seen as the most appropriate Western institution

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for military and political cooperation with Russia. Moreover the EU itself does not want (and does not have the capacity) to compete with NATO in this respect. So far, Russia’s desire to strengthen its cooperative relationship with NATO and to a lesser extent with the EU has not met with much support from the Union. The European Union’s attitude remained much the same even when it agreed to create a common space of external security with Russia: ‘A further involvement in ESDP would be complementary to Russia’s cooperation with the US and within the Partnership for Peace.’15 The limited scope of the ESDP, as well as the lack of interest on behalf of the EU in developing joint mechanisms and actions with Russia (against a background of increasing cooperation with NATO), has resulted in Russia maintaining only a passing interest in cooperation with the EU through the ESDP. On the whole, when examining the extent of EU–Russia cooperation, it is hard to see anything substantial beyond the political declarations, which leads to the conclusion that strategic cooperation between the EU and Moscow is still a long way off. Both the EU and Russia have made efforts to emphasize the importance of the successful development of their political dialogue and their consultations on international issues of high importance, most notably the Israel–Palestinian conflict and the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Their cooperation in these areas, however, is due more to coincidence than convergent values and objectives. When the EU and Russia disagree on international issues they steadfastly stick to their own positions and are reluctant to compromise. This is especially evident in the postSoviet neighbourhood, where in recent years Moscow and Brussels have openly clashed over plans for peace and reconciliation in Moldova, the 2004 Ukrainian elections and developments in Belarus and Uzbekistan, to name just a few. These substantial disagreements (notwithstanding the various statements from both sides claiming that there are no major differences of opinion)16 call into question the establishment of a strategic partnership. The fact that the institutionalization of the relationship has not been accompanied by any substantial progress in matters of practical security cooperation provides further evidence for the argument that neither the EU nor Russia has been serious about cooperating in defence-related matters. The widening of the gap between the two has become more and more obvious over the past several years, and both sides have recently made attempts to work sincerely towards establishing a genuine strategic partnership. ‘After several years of Russian skepticism and apathy towards the ESDP, Moscow has finally manifested its intent to cooperate.’17 In response

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to increasing tension between Russia and the EU, Brussels has also admitted: ‘The EU and Russia have agreed on ambitious political declarations (e.g. on the “common spaces”, Energy Dialogue, environmental cooperation and political and security cooperation) . . . But, despite common interests, growing economic interdependence and certain steps forward, there has been insufficient overall progress on substance.’ The EU aspires ‘to engage with Russia to build a genuine strategic partnership, moving away from grand political declarations and establishing an issue-based strategy and agenda’.18

A new window of opportunity The recent attempts to improve EU–Russia relations have been based on the agenda agreed at the 2003 EU–Russia Summit in St Petersburg. At this summit the two parties identified four areas in which they would strengthen their cooperation: in the economic sphere; in matters concerning internal security; in matters pertaining to external security; and in matters relating to education and culture. In many respects it is quite logical that these four areas were selected as they are areas in which the EU and Russia already share many of the same ideas, objectives and challenges. In May 2005, Russia and the EU agreed on a series of ‘road maps’ outlining goals and objectives for an EU–Russia partnership in these four areas. However, while this development represents an important step in the move towards stronger relations between the two parties, the road maps identify more clearly the limits of this cooperative effort than its potential to affect change. While the EU and Russia have announced their aspiration to create a common space of external security, they have provided little information regarding the future characteristics of this ‘space’ and they have not outlined their goals for this area. Consequently, the road maps represent the framework of a cooperative agreement between Moscow and Brussels, but they lack concrete information on how this cooperation is to progress. ‘Judging by the text [of the road maps], the parties tried to content themselves with smooth phrases, which make their responsibility for progress in building these spaces vague as much as possible.’19 The road map on external security is particularly vague and lacking in detail. Moreover, the road map on external security is apparently disconnected from the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA),20 the basic juridical framework for EU-Russia relations. However, despite the uncertainty surrounding EU-Russia security cooperation, there are some signs that the relationship will grow stronger in

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this area in the years to come. First, although the recently conceived road map for external security is vague and rather weak, it nevertheless represents an important step towards greater EU–Russia cooperation in this field. It is the first document in which the partners have defined their common aims and objectives for security cooperation. It therefore represents the necessary political platform for the continued management of security partnership between the EU and Russia. In these important ways the external security road map overcomes the limitations for cooperation that exist in the framework established by the PCA. The road map on external security cooperation is also important because it increases the prospect of the development of a more comprehensive security arrangement between the EU and Russia. The road map increases the possibility that cooperation in this area will move beyond dialogue and into practical operational cooperation. It extends cooperation to such important spheres as the fight against international terrorism, efforts to address the proliferation of WMD and disarmament activities. In fact, the road map corresponds to priorities set forth by the EU in its Security Strategy. Emergency preparedness and civil protection, two areas that have gained prominence over the past few years due to increasing global threats, also come under the external security road map and could be another area where the EU and Russia strengthen their cooperation. Emergency preparedness and civil protection are less politicized than many other aspects of the external security road map, and as such they provide a likely platform for increased cooperation. Moreover, the European Union could learn a great deal about civil protection from Russia’s Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergencies and the Elimination of the Consequences of Natural Disasters, which has a significant amount of experience in dealing with emergencies. There are some indications in the road map on external security that the EU and Russia may move towards establishing a strategic partnership by introducing joint mechanisms and actions.21 The joint mechanisms and actions envisioned by the road map would occur in the areas of conflict prevention and resolution, as well as in crisis management. They would apply not only to observation but also to ‘participation in exercises organized by either the EU or Russia and participation in training courses’.22 The European Security Strategy notes that ‘conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early’.23 Therefore, in terms of security cooperation with Russia, special attention has to be paid to strengthening preventive diplomacy capabilities. The EU would be wise to establish a framework for consultation with Russia in this area. The road map on external security provides the basis for cooperation in this area

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as it calls for regular consultations on early warnings and conflict prevention, consultations on the eve of major antiterrorist meetings, the exchange of contact information between corresponding ministries and departments in both the EU and Russia in order to facilitate greater communication between the two parties, as well as a number of other measures aimed at strengthening early warning coordination in the EU and Russia. The parties also agreed to ‘exchange views on new initiatives and on the possible use of instruments related to security and stability’.24 This could promote the coordination of approaches and the establishment of cooperative measures during the preliminary stages of a dispute thereby avoiding the emergence of competing initiatives, such as was the case during the Transnistria conflict. As the level of cooperation between the EU and Russia increases, so too does the number of participating government departments and agencies. Indeed, the road map on external security encourages greater coordination between various EU and Russian government bodies, and it also anticipates that the PPC will grow in the coming years. Along with Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the EU is establishing cooperative arrangements with Russia’s Ministry of Defence as well as its Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergencies and the Elimination of the Consequences of Natural Disasters. The EU also plans to establish some other ‘contacts between the EU and Russian military structures, including the European Defence Agency’.25 These developments are important, as they may be an indication that cooperation between Brussels and Russia is moving into the crisis management sphere. Russia and the EU have recently made the decision to increase the number of experts taking part in the negotiations surrounding the road maps. Up to this point the lack of competent experts taking part in EU–Russia foreign policy and security negotiations has weakened the effectiveness of these negotiations. Moreover, cooperation has been limited by the fact that experts have been removed from the decision-making process, especially in Russia. As a result of this, decisions regarding cooperation have largely been made by politicians with limited knowledge and understanding of the importance of closer Russia–EU ties in external security matters. Therefore, the road map on external security is especially significant because it contains provisions within it for the strengthening of academic ties, the conducting of joint research and the exchange of experts, most notably in areas where there is greater potential for EU–Russia cooperation. It is envisioned that these provisions will promote greater mutual understanding and the establishment of joint

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guidelines and parameters for the creation of a genuine common security space between Russia and the EU. To ensure that the ambitious programme for cooperation outlined in the road map is realized, the two parties should establish benchmarks for practical goals to be achieved within a specific period of time. In the past, most notably at the Paris Summit in October 2000 and again at the Moscow Summit in May 2002, the EU and Russia agreed on a series of cooperative measures in the field of external security yet they failed to meet their own commitments. For the past five years Brussels and Moscow have been discussing the possibility of cooperating in the area of long-haul troop transport; however they still have not settled on a practical solution to this issue. Moreover the road maps, which were initially to be signed at the 2004 Summit, were delayed for a year because of a disagreement over the wording of the texts. This is why it is so important to establish a monitoring mechanism for the road map on external security to ensure that both parties are meeting their commitments. The road map addresses this issue by calling for the permanent monitoring of the agreed external security objectives ‘within existing formats at the meetings with the PSC Troika at Ambassadors’ level and at Political Directors’ consultations’. Therefore, the road map has an accountability mechanism because it requires the parties to report on their progress in the implementation of the road map objectives at the PPC Ministerial meetings and/or at the Ministerial EU Troika–Russia meetings.26 The accountability mechanisms established under the external security road map move EU–Russia security relations to a qualitatively higher level. At the same time, however, the vagueness of the agreement, the lack of concrete obligations, and the remaining differences and obstacles for greater cooperation weaken the overall effectiveness of the external security road map. Consequently, in order for the road map to provide the basis for greater security cooperation between the EU and Russia, the two parties are going to have to interpret the agreement in such a way that facilitates the development of a stronger partnership. The success of the road map is therefore completely dependent on the political will of the two parties. However, it is unlikely that political will alone will be enough to facilitate the development of a Russia–EU strategic partnership. A partnership needs more than a common agenda and some shared objectives. The road map provides the framework for the development of increased dialogue and the exchange of ideas and views, but it does not provide the basis for a meaningful partnership.

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Uncertain paces through the road map The antagonisms created by the developing EU–Russia relationship demonstrate the fact that not all EU member states support the EU’s position on active partnership with Russia. When the road maps were being negotiated, many of the new EU member states and some of the neutral EU states were opposed to establishing closer ties with Moscow and criticized Brussels for doing so. The foreign ministers of some of the Central and Eastern European member states as well as the Foreign Minister of Denmark argued against the road maps at their ministerial meeting in October of 2004. Further, the European Parliament was very critical of Russia in a report released in May 2005, just days before the road maps were publicly introduced at the 2005 Russia–EU Summit. The adoption of the road map for external security by no means makes these member states more comfortable with increased cooperation with Russia. Many of the new members of the EU still harbour bitter memories from the Cold War period and do not want to re-establish ties with Moscow. Other member states (such as Denmark) are concerned with Russia’s questionable human rights record and its struggle with democratic governance. The matter is further complicated by the fact that ‘the majority of the new members do not have the diplomatic experience gained by the old members in the past negotiations; many do not subscribe to the supranational tradition of European integration, and quite a few seem uncomfortable with the EU power structure and its core coalitions’.27 Moreover, the EU still faces serious and far from settled problems surrounding the Euro–Atlantic security alliance and the various global security dilemmas that have arisen over the past few years.28 Consequently, there is very little emphasis inside the EU for resolving the differences of opinion that exist over the EU’s relations with Russia. The EU’s efforts to consolidate its internal space and concentrate on its domestic agenda, as well as its attempts to strengthen relations with the members of its ‘new’ neighbourhood (Ukraine, the Caucasus, and so on), has raised doubts as to the significance of Russia on the EU’s agenda. Furthermore, the ongoing process of institutional reorganization makes it difficult for the EU to develop a coherent strategy towards Russia and makes negotiations with Moscow difficult. Russia, for its part, is becoming increasingly frustrated with what it sees as the EU’s unwillingness to address some of its key interests and concerns in security-related matters. Another factor creating instability in EU–Russia relations is the changing political culture in some leading EU states. Traditionally, the political elites and authorities in countries such as Germany have supported

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closer relations with Russia. As political fortunes have shifted, so, too, have perceptions of the importance of EU–Russia relations. For example, the new German government under Chancellor Angela Merkel does not question the need to establish and maintain strong EU–Russia relations. It does, however, note that the partnership should be one that is based on shared values and ideals. The divergent opinions regarding Russia that exist within the EU have created some problems, including the collapse of intergovernmental dialogue between France, Germany and Russia (and Spain, as of 2005). Up until the collapse of this forum, the intergovernmental dialogue was seen as an effective vehicle for increased cooperation between Russia and the West. Consequently, Brussels’s intention of building a genuine strategic partnership with Russia in the field of security policy is not an objective that is unconditionally supported by all 25 member states. As Stefan Gänzle has noted in the previous chapter, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is the main framework for cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean and East European neighbours, excluding Russia. Although there are a number of reasons why the ENP has not been extended to Russia, it is Russia’s uniqueness – its vast size and large population, along with its economic and military potential – that sets it apart from the countries covered by the ENP. Although many have questioned the EU’s decision to treat Russia differently from the other countries of the former Soviet bloc, there is no denying that Russia is a key global player and should be dealt with as such. Moreover, the ENP framework is inappropriate for EU–Russia relations as it does not contain within it provisions for deep institutional cooperation, an element that is critical to furthering the objective of establishing a strategic partnership between the two parties. However, while the ENP is inappropriate for EU–Russia relations, in many ways the road maps established in 2005 are as well. In the opinion of many Russian and European experts, the road maps ‘are indeed a “weaker and fuzzier” derivative of the ENP Action Plans’.29 The fact that the road maps were established by Russia and the EU in joint consultation does not change the fact that both parties have fundamentally different understandings of what this partnership means. Brussels sees the relationship from an integrationist perspective, and so its approach to Russia is in many ways quite similar to its approach towards its ENP partners. Russia, for its part, acknowledges the road maps as the framework for a partnership on an equal footing with the EU. Unlike the Union’s other partners who either have associate agreements or aspire to join the EU, Russia ostensibly has no interest in becoming a

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member of the elite European club. That being said, Russia remains unclear as to what its objectives are with regard to its relationship with Brussels. The root cause of this uncertainty is that the establishment of a strategic goal with regards to the EU depends on Russia’s own foreign policy objectives and domestic agenda for modernization, which meanwhile remain unclear. In sum, the differences and uncertainties that exist for the long-term objectives of the partnership have not been resolved by the introduction of the EU–Russia Common Spaces agreement. Instead, they have been concealed and smoothed over by the vague wording of the road maps. Moreover, the ambiguous nature of the accord makes it likely that disagreements will arise between the two parties in the future. In practice, the agreement leaves it to each party to determine its own course of action concerning external security cooperation. The unclear nature of the road map on external security has been displayed in a number of different policy areas since the agreement came into force in 2005. One of the main arrangements called for in the road map is the ‘promotion of conflict prevention and settlement [mechanisms] through mutual result-oriented cooperation, including through [the] elaboration of possible joint initiatives’.30 However, just weeks after the signing of the agreement Russia and the EU were at odds over the thorny issue of Transnistria. As a result, the arrangements set forth in the agreement were watered down so that the objective instead became the strengthening of ‘dialogue and cooperation on the international scene, in particular in the regions adjacent to EU and Russian borders’.31 With regard to cooperation with Russia on the issues of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, on the eve of the May 2005 Summit the European Commission had to exert significant pressure on Moscow in order to ‘to engage Russia in concrete actions as well as political dialogue, in order to reinforce the efforts that the EU already undertakes in these regions’.32 While the EC does not support Russia’s involvement in any of these conflicts, neither does it openly criticize Moscow’s approach to the disputes that are taking place within the boundaries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). That being said, it is important to note that both parties have pledged to work together to promote lasting peace and stability in these regions. It appears that both parties are content with this arrangement. The differences that exist between these two partners are also reflected in their divergent approaches to the issue of joint peacekeeping missions. The EU continues to favour the ‘Seville Formula’, whereby Russian peacekeepers would participate in EU-led peacekeeping missions in third

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countries. In order for Russian forces to participate in such missions they would be required to ‘demonstrate their capacity to adapt to EU standards and operational procedures’.33 An important distinction between this type of peacekeeping mission and Russia–NATO operational cooperation is that Russia–NATO cooperation calls only for interoperability. The Seville Formula, therefore, places a heavy operational and political burden on Russia. Moscow, for its part, rejects the EU approach. Instead, it favours joint peacekeeping missions that would reflect the cooperative nature of the strategic partnership which is envisioned. The notion of Russian troops serving in EU-led peacekeeping missions under EU command is simply unrealistic. It is, however, by no means the only option. It would be possible to develop joint peacekeeping missions under joint command, or even missions combining EU, NATO and Russian forces in which each force would have responsibility for certain aspects of the mission. Brussels argues that the EU decision-making process would make it extremely complicated to operate joint peacekeeping missions with Russia. Further, it has been said that a number of EU states would reject outright any form of military cooperation with Moscow. While such arguments may indeed have some truth to them, they reflect the general difficulties that exist within the EU on a wide range of issues. If there is a genuine desire in the EU to develop a strong strategic partnership with Russia in the field of crisis management, then the 25 member states need to consolidate their political will and work together to overcome the obstacles that currently stand in the way of such cooperation. In reality, achieving coherence in ESDP remains an especially difficult and delicate matter as Brussels does not want to overburden its second pillar agenda with the ‘Russia problem’. Moreover, joint crisis management with Russia is rather inappropriate and pointless for the EU. In many ways, it is this reality more than anything else which is preventing the EU from establishing a stronger partnership with Russia. Consequently, if Russia desires to develop further its strategic partnership with the EU it needs to do more to convince Brussels of the value and mutual benefit of such cooperation. One way to do so would be to demonstrate a willingness to work with the EU to negotiate fair and conclusive settlements to the ‘frozen conflicts’ taking place within the CIS area. On the one hand, the road map on external security aims at strengthening dialogue and cooperation in the regions bordering both Russia and the European Union, and the fact that Moscow is even willing to cooperate in these areas reflects the tremendous policy shift that has taken place in Russia over the past fifteen years. During a Russian Security Council session in 2004, President Vladimir Putin pointed out that Russia does not

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possess a monopoly on action in the CIS area.34 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has since stressed the importance of international cooperation in providing stability and in settling international conflicts, and he has made it clear that Russia does not want ‘to turn CIS into a field of rivalry with third parties’.35 This was followed by the establishment of an agreement between Brussels and Moscow whereby both parties agreed to provide development assistance to North Caucasus regions.36 Furthermore, in 2005 Moscow finally agreed to grant to the EU (and the US) observer status (from October 2005) in negotiations on the Transnistria conflict. In these ways, therefore, the road map on external security ‘has started to create a proper basis for cooperation on the conflicts in the former Soviet Union’.37 On the other hand, however, the EU has still not been able to get Russia to agree to establish a ‘common neighbourhood’ and to work cooperatively to resolve the conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Consequently, because there have been setbacks as well as progress, it remains unclear whether the positive developments that have taken place were the result of the process of furthering the strategic partnership or whether they were the result of the pragmatic realization that Russia no longer has the power to control events in the CIS and in its wider neighbourhood that it once did. Russia is still resistant to some forms of EU involvement in the CIS area, however. For example, Moscow is opposed to discussing the possibility of establishing joint peacekeeping missions with the EU in the CIS area. Moscow claims that it can successfully cope with crisis management in the CIS area and further suggests that if the EU were to get involved matters would only get worse. Russia argues that the addition of any new ‘players’ to the frozen conflicts would only lead to greater destabilization. While there may be some truth to these arguments, it is also clear that hidden behind Russia’s arguments is the fear that greater EU involvement in the CIS area would significantly weaken Russia’s regional power. Recent disputes between Russia and the EU about reconciliation in Moldova and the disputed presidential elections in Ukraine demonstrate that there still exists a significant gulf between Brussels’s and Russia’s security policy objectives. The two parties need to work together to ensure that these differences do not develop into a fullblown rivalry. The differences that exist between Russia and the EU may not only be the result of increasing geopolitical competition, but also of the fact that the basic values on which Russian and EU foreign and security policy objectives rest do not coincide. The road map on external security does

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not address this problem, as it only calls for the establishment of a common goal of creating ‘a greater Europe without dividing lines and based on common values’.38 The CFSP and the ESDP are both aimed at promoting democracy, in particular in the areas that constitute the EU’s ‘new neighbourhood’, primarily through the process of ‘Europeanization’. Russia, on the other hand, strives to achieve its foreign policy objectives in its neighbourhood through a more classical approach. ‘The EU really is, and will remain for the foreseeable future . . . a post-modern actor, but neither a great power nor a quasi-state in the making.’ ‘As a postmodern “force,” rather than a modern power, the EU exercises influence and shapes its environment through what it is, rather than through what it does’, in contrast with ‘modern great powers of America, China and India, and perhaps Russia’.39 Common values continue to be the main criteria for the EU policy regarding Russia, while in Russia the ‘value gap’ has never been seen as a serious problem. It is considered a European mania, a departure from reality, or as a quite natural consequence of cultural and historic differences. Such contradictory perceptions of a ‘values gap’ in Russia and in the EU’s Europe are indicative of a fundamental discrepancy in values. Consequently, there appears to be a struggle between the European Union’s desire on the one hand ‘to cooperate with Russia more closely on promoting stability and democracy in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and in the South Caucasus region’,40 and its growing ‘concern about the weakening of Russia’s commitment to democracy, market economy and protection of human rights on the other’.41 The EU acknowledges the importance of pragmatic cooperation with Russia in the international arena, but only on the condition that such cooperation will not contravene the European Union’s common values. As the events surrounding the 2004 Ukraine presidential election have demonstrated, the European Union is no longer prepared to sit idly by and watch events unfold in its new neighbourhood. Additionally, the EU’s involvement in the Ukraine highlights the fact that the EU’s primary objective is to promote democracy and advance democratic values in its borderlands. Therefore, the EU’s growing external political activity tends to bring it into conflict with Russia, as the 2004 Ukrainian election so clearly demonstrated. As a result, there has been speculation in Russia that the EU is flexing its muscles in the near abroad in order to challenge Russia and precipitate the emergence of a new geopolitical dynamic in Europe.42 ‘Many European states, in particular the new EU members, have expressed concern over Russia’s interference in Ukraine leading up to and during the Orange Revolution. These concerns have prompted calls

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for a reassessment of the EU’s strategic partnership and closer integration with Russia.’ Therefore, it has been suggested that the ‘Cold War generated a zero-sum perception of Russia and the West’s interests that has been strengthened by the Orange Revolution.’43 As the events surrounding the Ukrainian election demonstrate, the EU is embracing a more robust approach to foreign policy, particularly in its new neighbourhood. As it takes on this greater role, it inevitably clashes with Russia as their values and objectives for the region sometimes differ sharply. Meanwhile, the EU itself is still struggling with its foreign policy objectives. Brussels considers that ‘genuine strategic partnership must be based on shared values and common interests’.44 At the same time, however, the ‘values–interests’ balance proposed by the Commission is not clearly reflected in the EU’s foreign policy. Consequently, the struggle to find the appropriate balance between values and interests in the strategic relationship with Russia rages on. While the older member states by and large support a more pragmatic approach that calls for constructive engagement in order to facilitate further Russia’s democratization, many of the new members of the EU insist that Russia must first embrace democratic values before cooperation moves forward. This internal debate was one of the main stumbling blocks behind the delay surrounding the adoption of the road maps, and it is a debate that continues in the EU today. These differences within the EU make it unclear what effect the values–interest debate will have on EU–Russia security cooperation as manifested in the road map on external security. On the one hand, both sides are interested in developing practical interaction and in strengthening their strategic partnership. On the other hand, the differences in their approaches to essential questions of foreign policy and the objectives of their partnership, particularly in regard to their shared neighbourhood, restrain the development of cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy. The EU’s increasing emphasis on the ‘values gap’ could lead to strained EU–Russia relations and impede progress on the objectives outlined in the road map for external security. If Brussels continues to employ a critical attitude towards Russia’s values it is likely that Russia will respond by resisting change rather than by working with the EU to embrace further democratization. Russia is already suspicious of the EU’s motives and if Brussels continues to tell Moscow that it needs to work harder to adopt democratic values it is probable that such an approach will backfire. Consequently, the EU needs to employ a more subtle approach in its efforts to facilitate change in Russia.

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Thus progress on the development of a common space of external security mainly depends on whether both Russia and the EU will be able to establish appropriate and effective ‘values–interests’ accommodation. In order to achieve this, the two parties must embrace the ‘common values criterion’ as a guiding principle and not as a critical element of successful cooperation. Consequently, the EU needs to employ a constructive approach towards its strategic cooperation with Russia. Furthermore, the EU needs to tread softly when discussing with Russia its record on human rights and democratic reform. Russia needs to work on strengthening its human rights record and on embracing further democratic reform, but it needs to do so at its own pace and on its own terms.

EU–Russia security partnership: strategic limbo The compromises achieved by the EU and Russia on a common external security space and formalized in the ‘road map’ have not touched on conflicts of interest. Despite the evident rapprochement between Russia and the West, the ‘containment-cooperation’45 dichotomy remains and will be inevitable in the future. In this respect, the document has merely to preserve the status quo, where pragmatic cooperation in the fields of mutual interest will be accompanied by collision of interests and positions in other areas. Yet, the lack of a strategic vision of future EU–Russia relations and the ‘values–interests’ dilemma, which may become thereby more acute, will inevitably limit development of a practical partnership. The current contradictory character of EU–Russia relations does not bode well for the future of the relationship. Many experts believe that Brussels and Moscow need to do better to accept the current geopolitical dynamic that exists in the wider Europe in order to build a strong cooperative partnership. ‘Taking into account the risk to play in front of an empty hall, the EU and Russia should apparently go down the stage to see that the scenery has changed.’46 Therefore, ‘maintaining of the status quo in EU–Russia relations, preserving the present model of cooperation, and trying to overcome the latent crisis by letting things run their natural course would be unacceptable’,47 as was stressed by the overwhelming majority of the participants attending a workshop on EU–Russia relations which involved prominent Russian experts and representatives of Russian ministries, government agencies and companies. Russia and the EU need to work together to foster greater cooperation. One way to do so would be to establish a common EU–Russia partnership strategy aimed at creating joint long-term goals and parameters for cooperation.

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In spite of the adoption of the road map on external security, the problem of creating a healthy strategic partnership and establishing a common security space will increasingly press on the two parties. Along with the objective of defining a long-term relationship strategy, Russia and the EU face a series of potential problems affecting their mutual policies, the most challenging of which is ‘factor 2007’. In 2007 the PCA, which was concluded for ten years, is likely to be amended or replaced. This is liable to present a headache for both parties as they will have to decide if they should stick to the PCA framework as the legal basis of their partnership and cooperation, or if they should adopt a new model entirely. With this in mind, in October 2005 British Prime Minister Tony Blair (representing the European Council) and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to establish a working group comprised of leading experts and political consultants from Russia and the EU to exchange views and prepare a background report for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement negotiations in 2007. The first session of this working group took place in Moscow on 14 December 2005.48 Most Russian experts believe that the PCA does not reflect the realities of the current EU–Russia relationship. The option of Russia joining the EU is not realistic (even if the possibility is sometimes entertained by some politicians and bureaucrats).49 Two other viable options remain for the EU–Russia relationship. The first involves some sort of ‘permanent association agreement’ with the European Union, and the second involves a strategic union between the two parties. While these two ideas are in their infancy, they do represent the first attempt by Russia to outline its future relationship with the EU. In order for the relationship to move beyond the 2007 agreement, Russia and the EU need to agree on a legal basis for their continuing cooperation. For this to happen either Russia and the EU embrace common values or the bureaucrats in both governments establish common plans – an unlikely development.50 It is likely that under the framework of the road map on external security the EU and Russia will address some of their strategic differences and consolidate their partnership. ‘Under the new banner of “strategic partnership,” the parties will, most likely, continue to develop the relations of a different nature, consisting of selective and pragmatic partnership in areas of mutual interest.’51 In all probability, Brussels will continue to move in the same direction it has been moving in over the past few years since it will be extremely difficult for the EU to elaborate a coherent new ‘Russia’ strategy in the near future, keeping in mind the different priorities on its political and

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strategic agenda (the European Constitution, Turkish accession, management of the new neighbourhood, and so on). Moreover, the difficulty in achieving consensus on highly charged issues (such as EU cooperation with Russia) will make it difficult for the EU to articulate a new Russia strategy anytime soon, also bearing in mind the usual problems associated with reaching a consensus in the EU. The relative stabilization that has been achieved under President Putin increases the confidence of Russia’s political elites and authorities in Russia’s strength and power, and consequently allows them to question the necessity of establishing stronger ties with the EU.52 Moreover, Russian officials do not have clear ideas about how to further integrate Russia into the EU, which makes it likely that Russia will be content to maintain the status quo in its relationship with the EU. That being said, Russia and the EU may realize the importance of strengthening their strategic relationship and working together to establish common spaces as envisioned by the road maps. The political and diplomatic resources for this opportunity still exist, for in light of the ongoing negotiation of a new framework agreement replacing the PCA, Russia and the European Union have agreed to promote a new form of close relationship. Summing up, the partnership alternatives became clearer and the principal choices became more urgent with the adoption of the road maps in 2005 and with the pressing challenge of the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on the near horizon. Either the parties can maintain the status quo and continue minimally cooperation with each other, or they can put their differences aside and work together to establish a strong strategic partnership based on joint longterm goals and objectives and shared values. Whether this will happen, however, very much remains to be seen.

Notes 1. The Russian attitude towards ESDP was first documented and confirmed in the joint statement after the Russia–EU summit on 29 May 2000: ‘President V.V. Putin expressed a positive interest in the EU’s evolving European Security and Defence Policy. He noted that there are possibilities for co-operation in accordance with the UN Charter principles and in recognition of the main responsibilities of the UN Security Council, in particular on the issues of strengthening international peace, security and stability, notably early warning, conflict prevention, crisis.’ The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, EU-Russia Summit, 29 May 2000: Joint Statement, http://www. delrus.cec.eu.int/en/images/pText_pict/241/sum11.doc (29 May 2006). 2. Dmitry Danilov, ‘Russian Security Policy and Developing EU–Russia Relationship in the Political and Security Field’, in Russia and Europe in a Changing International

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

The Changing Politics of European Security Environment, eds Katlijn Malfliet and Lien Verpoest (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001), 105–6. The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, ‘Russia’s Middle Term Strategy Towards the EU’, http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/p_245.htm (29 May 2006). The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Joint Declaration on Further Practical Steps in Developing Political Dialogue and Cooperation on Crisis Management and Security Matters, http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/images/ pText_pict/237/sum52.doc (29 May 2006). For an example of such a sceptical view, see Michail Nosov, ‘Zachem Evrope sobstrennaya armiya?’ [Why does Europe need its Own Army?], Sovremennaya Evropa, 1 (2005): 82–95. Klaus Becher, ‘Has-been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World after the 2003 European Security Strategy’, European Security, 13 (2004): 349. Vitaly Zhurkin, ‘Voennye Struktury EC: Tsel’- 2010’ [Military Structures of the EU: Headline Goal – 2010], Sovremennaya Evropa, 3 (2005): 5–12. For more details about Russia’s motives, see Dmitry Danilov, ‘The EU’s Rapid Reaction Capability’, in Readings in European Security, vol. 1, eds Mark Houben, Klaus Becher and Michael Emerson (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2002), 98–106. Oksana Antonenko, ‘Russia and the West: the End of the Honeymoon’, Strategic Survey (2003): 119: ‘In 2002–03, Russian relations with the EU in the area of security and defence progressed, although, as with NATO, they remain largely symbolic and tangential to both sides’ security priorities and have not yielded many practical dividends.’ Hiski Haukkala, ‘A Problematic “Strategic Partnership” ’, EU–Russian Security Dimensions, occasional papers 46, ed. Dov Lynch (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 18. European Union, Seville European Council Presidency Conclusions, 21/22 June 2002, http://www.ecre.org/seville/sevconc.pdf (29 May 2006). Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘The Strategic Culture of the European Union: a Progress Report’, International Affairs, 81 (2005): 806. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: Information and Press Department, The Foreign Policy Outcomes of 2005: Reflections and Conclusions, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/itogi/4E2913A74A69ADF7C32570E6004D151A (29 May 2006). Dov Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, Chaillot Paper 60 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2003). European Parliament, Report on EU–Russia Relations, final A6-0135/2005 (Brussels: European Union, 2005). According to Serguey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, ‘There is no issue in the relations between the EU and Russia, on which the parties sharply disagree.’ See Steve Rosenberg, interview with Sergey Lavrov, Europe Today, BBC, Moscow, 9 November 2005. Antonenko, ‘Russia and the West: the End of the Honeymoon’, 119. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Relations with Russia, COM (2004) 106 (Brussels: European Union, 2004), 3, 6.

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19. Ekaterina Kuznetsova, ‘“Dorozhnye Karty” privedut Rossiyu v Evropu?’ [Will the ‘Road Maps’ bring Russia into Europe?], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, 6 (2005): 103. 20. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Russia and the EU was signed in June 1994 and entered into force in December 1997. 21. For the essence and the main features of the ‘strategic partnership’, see Dmitry Danilov, ‘Russia–EU Cooperation in the Security Field: Trends and Conceptual Framework’, in Russia and its Foreign Policy, ed. Hanna Smith (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, Aleksanteri Institute, 2005), 111–23. 22. ‘Road Map on the Common Space of External Security’, President of Russia Official Web Portal, 10 May 2005, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/ 88029.shtml (29 May 2006). 23. European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (29 May 2006). 24. ‘Road Map on the Common Space of External Security’. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Josef Janning, ‘Leadership Coalitions and Change: the Role of States in the European Union’, International Affairs, 81 (2005): 823. 28. Jolyon Howorth, ‘European Security in the Coming Decade: Transatlantic and Global Perspectives’, Romanian Journal of International Affairs, X (2005): 175–86; Yuri Fedorov, ‘“Old” and “New” Europe: a Russian View’, in Readings in European Security, vol. 2, eds Dana H. Allin, Michael Emerson and Marius Vahl (Brussels: CEPS, IISS, 2004), 154–64. 29. Michael Emerson and Marius Vahl, Readings in European Neighbourhood Policy, (Brussels: CEPS, 2005). 30. ‘Road Map on the Common Space of External Security’. 31. Ibid. 32. The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, EU–Russia Summit in Moscow, 10 May 2005, Recent Press Releases and Speeches, http://www. delrus.cec.eu.int/en/news_709.htm (2 June 2006). 33. European Parliament, Report on EU–Russia Relations. 34. See http:/www.eepnews.ru/14.08.2004/digest/m2194[0]. 35. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 9 July 2004. 36. The first EU Commission mission for the evaluation of the situation visited some North Caucasus’ republics, including Chechnya on 11–16 April 2005. 37. Nicu Popescu, ‘The EU in Moldova – Settling Conflicts in the Neighbourhood’, Occasional Paper 60 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2005). 38. ‘Road Map on the Common Space of External Security’. 39. Hanns W. Maull, ‘Europe and the New Balance of Global Order’, International Affairs, 81 (2005): 776–8. For more details about a ‘post-modern’ EU and Russia as a modern power, and EU and Russian differences in their respective near abroads, see also Michael Emerson, The Elephant and the Bear: the European Union, Russia and their Near Abroads (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2001). 40. Interview with Javier Solana, Pravda, 13 May 2004. 41. European Parliament, Report on EU–Russia Relations.

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42. See Eugeny Primakov, ‘Rossiya vstupila v 2005 god’ [Russia Enters the Year 2005], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn 3–4 (2005): 61. Primakov is convinced that the ‘zealous support by the European Union of the Ukrainian opposition forces, which recently came into power, was mostly predetermined by aspiration to make use of Ukraine as ground for rapprochement with the Bush Administration’. 43. Antonenko, ‘Russia and the West: the End of the Honeymoon’, 157. 44. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Relations with Russia. 45. Dmitry Danilov, ‘Russlands Interessen. Pragmatismus und Suche nach Balancen’, Internationale Politik, 59 (2004): 15. 46. Thomas Gomart, ‘UE et Russie: deux actrices en quête de rôle’, Libération, 10 May 2005. 47. Sergei Karaganov, ‘Russia’s European Strategy: a New Start’, Russia in Global Affairs, 3 (2005): 75. 48. The meeting was co-chaired by British Ambassador Toni Brenton (on behalf of EU Presidency) and Sergei Yastrzhembsky, Assistant to President of Russian Federation for Relations with the EU. 49. See Konstantin Kosatchev, Head of the Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs, who considers that it is right to table a question about prospects of Russian membership in the EU. Paradoxically, some experts exploring this option do not proceed from current Russia–EU rapprochement, but argue, on the contrary, that only Russia aspiring for EU membership would allow removing an immanent asymmetry in partnership. See, for example Dmitry Suslov, ‘Koloniya Evropy ili eyo chast’ [A Colony of Europe or its Part], Nezavisimaya Gazeta – Dipkurier, 8 (2005): 15. 50. This opinion was sharply defined at the seminar on future EU–Russia relations on 14 December 2005 by Igor Yurgens, Vice-Chairman of the Russian Union of manufacturers and entrepreneurs. 51. Dmitry Danilov, ‘Russia and European Security’, in What Russia Sees, ed. Dov Lynch, Chaillot Paper 74 (Paris: the European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 90. 52. Dmitry Danilov, ‘Russia–EU Cooperation in the Security Field: Trends and Conceptual Framework’, in Russia and its Foreign Policy, ed. Hanna Smith (Aleksanteri Institute, Kikimora Publications B 33, 2005), 115.

Part III European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship

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8 From an Alliance of Commitment to an Alliance of Choice: the Adaptation of NATO in a Time of Uncertainty Helga Haftendorn

Introduction In 2005, then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder observed that ‘NATO is no more the primary venue where the transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies.’1 Indeed, the Atlantic Alliance presents a very ambiguous picture. Members do not agree on NATO’s missions, methods and means, and its military capabilities are inadequate. Nevertheless, the alliance continues to undertake operations in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and in the Persian Gulf. As a result of the dramatic changes that have taken place in the international strategic environment since the Cold War, most notably the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Iraq War and the accession of new members, the alliance has changed fundamentally. NATO is still very much in the midst of an adjustment in relation to the developments that have taken place over the past fifteen years. Moreover, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the common threat that served as the glue of the alliance has vanished, and NATO has developed from an ‘alliance of commitment’ into an ‘alliance of choice’.2 In this chapter I will explain how NATO is changing and how it has responded to the new challenges it faces, amidst this current climate of uncertainty. NATO’s role as a geographically defined alliance for common defence has been transformed into that of a collective security institution competing and cooperating with other security institutions, mainly the EU/ESDP. After discussing the changes that NATO has undergone since the early 1990s and the new challenges that it faces, I will close with a vision of a more flexible alliance which sees itself primarily as a transatlantic clearinghouse to coordinate its members’ interests in crisis management, peacekeeping, projection of power and international stabilization. 161

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A changed international environment The discrepancy between NATO’s military strength and its political weakness results from the dramatic changes that occurred after the end of the East–West conflict. Chief among these changes were the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 and the unification of Germany and of Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the alliance lost its traditional enemy; instead, Russia became a strategic partner. But terrorism struck before the alliance could adjust to this new reality. With the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’, NATO’s focus changed from addressing traditional security issues in Europe to fighting international terrorism. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 fundamentally transformed the security environment and the challenges NATO faces. The end of the East–West conflict and the 9/11 attacks also had a profound impact on the United States, specifically on its citizens’ psyche and its role in the world. The US now enjoys a position of unrivalled global power. Far on the horizon China looms as a rival, but at present the challenge is more potential than actual. America’s position as the pre-eminent actor in the world has bolstered its self-confidence and its sense of purpose in bringing freedom and democracy to the rest of the world. But it has also enhanced its preference for unilateral action. When, following 9/11, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter, Washington declined to make its ‘war on terror’ an alliance operation; instead, it responded to the 9/11 terrorist attacks as an exclusive act of national self-defence. While the US tries to preserve its position as a global hegemon, it can no longer shape transatlantic policies according to its own interests. Its partners’ dependence on the US security umbrella has sharply declined since the collapse of the Soviet Union. America’s allies now demand that they be consulted and that their concerns be taken seriously before they agree to join the US in undertaking international action. Before doing so they carefully weigh their own interests. In addition, America, in spite of its superior military capabilities, was neither able to deter the 9/11 terrorist attacks nor to win the ‘war on terror’ or, for that matter, to succeed in bringing peace to Iraq (at least in the three years since hostilities in Iraq were declared at an end by President Bush). The continuing turmoil in the Middle East and the slipping domestic support for America’s engagement in Iraq have brought home an important message to the Bush Administration: that even a superpower such as the US cannot carry the world’s burdens all by itself but needs the assistance of allies and partners.

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New challenges and risks Today the transatlantic alliance is faced with a whole gamut of new risks: besides terrorism, the major threats facing NATO come from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the instabilities caused by failing and failed states. But none of these risks, not even the threat posed by global terrorism, provide as solid a glue for the NATO alliance as did anticommunism or the ‘clear and present danger’3 of a Soviet attack during the Cold War. Further, alliance institutions have changed very little since the time of the Cold War. As a result, NATO lacks the methods and means to cope adequately with the new challenges it now faces. At the top of the NATO agenda is the fight against international terrorism.4 NATO members are faced with an asymmetrical threat originating not from a single, geographically-defined entity, but from a diverse network of independently operating groups. But is the alliance even suited for addressing the threat posed by international terrorism?5 Can small, concealed bands of non-state terrorists be defeated by armed forces? The problems that NATO encounters in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that military means alone are not sufficient to stabilize wartorn countries and to build civil societies. NATO can only be effective as a peacekeeper if its military operations are complemented by political action. The alliance needs to cooperate closely with other institutions. NATO itself can only project stability and provide security for peacekeeping operations: NATO members still have difficulties providing the types of capabilities that are suitable for fighting a war. NATO is also ill-equipped effectively to combat the acquisition of WMD by rogue states and terrorist groups. It has formed a High Level Defence Group against Proliferation (DGP) and supports both the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the corresponding Interdiction Principles which were initiated by the US administration.6 So far, however, it has not reached consensus on the methods to use for preventing the proliferation of WMD. Many members of the alliance doubt that this threat can be addressed through military means. The EU Three (Britain, France and Germany) tried to induce Iran to renounce the enrichment of nuclear fuel, and applied tremendous diplomatic pressure on the Iranian government. In contrast, the US argued for transferring the issue to the UN Security Council and refused to rule out the future use of military action. The alliance is also faced with small wars that are caused by ethnic strife, civil unrest and the breakdown of government authority. In these kinds of scenarios, when fighting has ended, and peacekeeping and political

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stabilization is called for, NATO is most effective. But the alliance will always look to cooperate with other institutions – the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the African Union (AU). Currently, NATO operates peacekeeping missions in Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF), a training mission in Iraq, and a sea-patrol mission in the Gulf and in the Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavour, OAE) – the only mission operating under Article 5 – in which various Mediterranean countries and, since 2004, Russia and the Ukraine participate.7 An evaluation of NATO’s record as a peacekeeper, however, offers a mixed picture. Half-successes exist alongside the extension of existing missions and the assumption of new responsibilities. The alliance has been successful when it has been deployed in a preventive mode or early on, often enabling it to deter the outbreak of civil war solely through its military presence. In Macedonia and in Bosnia, NATO could terminate its missions and transfer responsibility to an EU force, although without having achieved a lasting stabilization. In Kosovo no solution for the final political status of the province is in sight. In Afghanistan, although NATO deployed an estimated 31,700 ISAF troops from 37 nations in late 2006, the rebuilding of Afghan society is still painfully slow. Major problems include opposition from provincial warlords who have their own militias and profit from the flourishing opium trade, as well as remnant Taliban groups which are hunted down by US and allied special forces. The country is a good example of the argument that the effectiveness of NATO missions depends on parallel political and economic measures. Military stabilization can prepare and safeguard political solutions but cannot replace them. NATO’s effectiveness as a peacemaker is thus limited and depends on the specific political environment.

The road toward adaptation The Atlantic Alliance started its reform process as early as 1990. At a meeting in London in July 1990, the NATO heads of state and of government announced that the alliance would adapt to the changed realities of the international system and at the same time they also declared that they would strive to build new partnerships with all the European nations. They wished to ‘reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship’.8 They also emphasized the defensive nature of the alliance and announced that nuclear arms would be relegated to weapons of last resort. This reorientation made it possible for President Mikhail Gorbachev to acquiesce in NATO membership for a united Germany.

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The following year at its Rome Summit, NATO adopted a new strategic concept (which was further revised in 1999).9 In it, the alliance reiterated its role as an alliance for common defence, but at the same time accepted the additional tasks of peacekeeping and of crisis management. It also called attention to the problem of preventing rogue states from acquiring WMD. Further, NATO accepted the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as new members, thus starting on the road of enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe. Major turning points in NATO’s post-Cold War metamorphosis were the war in Kosovo and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. As a direct result of these developments, NATO once again redefined its role, this time at its 2002 summit in Prague.10 Turning away from its previous primary function of defending collectively the territorial security of its members, the NATO heads of state and government adopted the new tasks of fighting terrorism, conflict management both inside and outside of Europe, and projection of power worldwide, thus abandoning previous geographical restrictions. However, these new tasks required more usable military forces, greater capabilities to meet the increasing WMD threat, and the reorganization of alliance structures. To this end, the allies adopted the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), in which they pledged to eliminate as soon as possible certain particularly egregious deficiencies. They resolved: • to transform NATO forces to increase their combat effectiveness and interoperability. The Europeans would not need the same level of sophistication but should be able to plug in with US forces (for example, instead of aspiring to the US standard of ‘network-centric warfare’ they should be aiming at ‘network-enabled warfare’);11 • to create a NATO Response Force (NRF) in order to give the alliance an effective rapid deployment capability, increase interoperability and set a benchmark for other NATO forces. The new NRF as a rapid reaction element will allow the alliance to respond quickly with ready, welltrained and interoperable forces suited for high-end warfare;12 • to bolster defence against chemical, radiological, biological and nuclear weapons by creating a multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Battalion (CBRN), a mobile ABC Lab, and a unit to care for ABC casualties;13 • to reform and streamline NATO command structures stemming from the Cold War set-up. In the future, all NATO missions will be led operationally by one unified supreme command, Allied Command Operations (ACO), while a new Allied Command Transformation (ACT) will draft new strategic concepts and define force planning, capability requirements and training.14

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In Prague, NATO also resolved to continue with the process of enlargement. In the spring of 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia became members of the alliance. Albania, Croatia and Macedonia hope to accede soon, and in preparing for membership have signed Membership Action Plans (MAP).15 The 2004 Istanbul summit had to overcome the conflict resulting from disagreement on the Iraq War and at the same time lead the alliance toward a new level of cohesiveness. This goal, though, could only be partially attained. On Iraq, the heads of state and of government for the first time took notice of the allied efforts to stabilize the country and declared their support for UN Resolution SC 1546, which called for the democratization of the country.16 Those members that had opposed the war from the start continued to refuse to send troops to Iraq. However they did contribute to the post-conflict rehabilitation project by agreeing to train Iraqi security forces in third countries. Initial European schadenfreude has given way to deep concern on how the civil war raging in Iraq can be ended and a break-up of the country avoided. Washington also had to scale down its much publicized Greater Middle East Initiative aimed at leading the states of the region toward democratization.17 Instead, NATO members passed the more modest Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), in which they invited the states of the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Caucasus and Central Asia to cooperate with the alliance on issues of security and defence.18 So far, however, only some of the Gulf States have shown interest in this new initiative. Disagreement in Istanbul also extended to the methods and the means that the alliance should employ. NATO continues to lack a new strategic concept. Though the US National Security Strategy and the EU Strategy do not differ greatly,19 it has been impossible to adjust the outdated NATO concept of 1999. Major disagreements revolve around the question of when and under what circumstances military force should be used. The US strategy is more interventionist and allows for the possibility of preemptive actions while the Europeans are more guarded and wish to retain the defensive character of the alliance. Though few deny the need for a new strategy, many are concerned that a new debate on strategy will bring the existing disagreements to the foreground and exacerbate current tensions. Instead, many observers suggest that NATO members adopt a more pragmatic course of action. To reach a new consensus on the future tasks of the alliance, a number of political figures and analysts have called for a new ‘Harmel Exercise’ or another ‘Wise Men Group’.20 If one carefully reviews the history of this undertaking, one doubts whether the necessary preconditions for another Harmel Report exist. The differences on

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core issues are too deep, and an unbiased facilitator who would work for a compromise among the dissenting parties is not at hand. Since taking office in 2004, NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer has called for a reform of the alliance.21 This goal received added urgency when US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, threatened that the United States would withdraw from the alliance if it was not able to shape up.22 The priority in this regard has been to strengthen the effectiveness of the NATO Council (NAC). The controversy surrounding the Iraq War paralysed the NAC and made it the battleground for the confrontation between the representatives of France and the US. De Hoop Scheffer not only wants to give the NAC back its function as NATO’s central consultation and decision-making body, but also wants to streamline the alliance’s organizational structure by undertaking a number of institutional reforms, including reducing the number of active NATO committees. NATO’s future structure should be both lean and flexible. To achieve this, the Secretary General has nominated the Danish diplomat Jasper Vahr as his chargé on reform. He has also formed a small expert group made up of members of the International Staff (IS) and the International Military Staff (IMS), and has nominated a high-level senior panel comprised of eight NATO experts from both within and outside the alliance (among them four former NATO Ambassadors) as a sort of ‘sounding board’ on institutional reform.23 He has thus combined elements of expert counsel from within the institution with a ‘Wise Men Group’ from outside of the organization. He wants to control this process personally to prevent the NAC or individual member countries from trying to micromanage it. Although this initiative has come to naught, one hopes that the secretary-general’s initiatives will lead to a less bureaucratic and more political alliance.24 NATO requires the development of further informal structures which will allow consensus-building prior to official deliberations in the NAC and the Military Committee (MC). The old ‘quad’25 may have outlived its usefulness, but a reinvigoration of informal contacts in a variable geometry might be useful to overcome some of the current blockages.

Need for usable military capabilities All NATO missions suffer from a lack of usable military forces. The problem is less capabilities as such than members’ resolve to assign usable forces to NATO. The Europeans maintain larger armed forces than the US (1.7 million compared to 1.4 million), but NATO is short of interoperable military capabilities that can be transferred over great distances and can be deployed in a timely fashion. With the exception of the British and

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the French, the vast majority of alliance forces still mirror the conditions of the East–West conflict in their deployment, training and arming; only a few NATO countries have the capability to send their forces to distant places quickly. In nearly all countries, defence budgets have been cut to a degree that forces defence ministers to choose between using available funds for force modernization or overseas missions. The problem is amplified by NATO’s golden rule that costs lie where they fall, under which each nation pays all expenses for its own forces in a NATO mission. This rule applies to all costs associated with NATO missions except for costs associated with infrastructure, HQ and AWACS, which are covered by the alliance itself. If a contingency arises, the Secretary General is forced to go to the members ‘cap in hand’ to solicit contributions to pay for it. In response, De Hoop Scheffer has started to reorganize the force planning and gestation process. Instead of asking for troops for a specific mission and for a specific period of time, he wants to establish a common, comprehensive framework for the full spectrum of NATO contingencies. To be successful, the funding system also has to be revised and a larger common fund created. There is no consensus yet, however, on a new system because major contributors (such as Germany, which pays a share of about 22 per cent into the common funds) make their consent conditional on a new allotment. The Secretary General has thus appealed to member states not to embark on new tasks and missions unless the allocation of costs has been solved. Further, he has called on them to speed up the transformation of their forces and to allocate more financial resources to their armed forces.26 Of all the commitments NATO members entered into at their November 2002 Prague Summit, their pledge to improve the combat effectiveness and interoperability of their forces in key categories is still lagging behind. The Europeans’ forces might not need the same level of sophistication as do the US forces, but they should be interoperable with those of the United States. Some progress has been made to improve air and sea transport, air-to-air refuelling and ABC defence. Because of the long lead times in development and acquisition, however, the strengthening of capabilities is slow. In some cases, transformation has been hindered by the United States’ refusal to provide its NATO allies with critical technologies. The NRF, however, is on schedule, although there is not yet full agreement on its mission. The new command structure also is functioning. The co-location of the NATO transformation command (ACT) with the US Joint Forces Command at Norfolk, Virginia, and the sharing of the commander (SACT), gives the United States a great influence on the alliance transformation process.

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Shortcomings in the reform process NATO has embarked on an ambitious programme of reform. Though it makes sense in military and organizational terms, this process also entails a number of problems. First, the alliance lacks the additional budgetary resources to implement speedily the necessary reforms, even more so as existing forces are stretched to the limit in current NATO peacekeeping missions. To European budgeters, the need to cut national budgets regularly obscures the truth that reforms need initial seed money which will pay off in later savings. A shortcoming is the emphasis on the need to transform military capabilities and outputs. This emphasis on armed forces reform tends to overshadow the need for political reform inside NATO. High-end military forces can defeat an enemy within a very short time but – as current events vividly demonstrate – cannot stabilize the resulting political situation and pacify a country. NATO therefore needs to improve its political instruments and methods. One option would be the further refinement of NATO’s means for political stabilization and reconstruction and its ability for early deployment. Binnendijk and Kugler have suggested the establishment of a NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force alongside the NRF.27 But would such a force not undermine the raison d’être of the European Union’s rapid reaction force as planned under the Headline Goals, which is basically targeted for so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’, or nonArticle Five operations?28 Another possibility would be to establish a network of interlocking institutions in which the alliance closely cooperates with other organizations that have the capabilities NATO lacks – specifically the EU, the UN and the OSCE. The existing modes of cooperation should be strengthened to ensure that each institution and or organization acts in areas where it is best suited to do so, and each reaches out for another institution if it is ill-equipped to take action in a particular area. Such cooperation would require only minor changes in NATO’s structures. The best option, though, is a constructive linkage between NATO and the EU. Under the Berlin Plus agreement29 the EU may use NATO assets for crisis management operations, with NATO thus serving as a ‘tool box’ for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). But ESDP can also serve as a tool box for NATO, helping out in areas where NATO’s instruments are too limited, for example with construction units, political advisers or even police forces. A prerequisite would be the ability of the EU to provide NATO with what it needs, when it needs it.

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The EU’s emerging defence structure should be built in such a way that it enhances NATO’s military strength and does not duplicate it. It is not yet clear, however, whether the EU will try to acquire all of the types of forces which NATO has, or whether it will build complementary capabilities instead. Both institutions need to develop methods of structured cooperation that are more differentiated than the unwieldy joint meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) with NAC. In order to strengthen collaboration, the EU and NATO should rely on joint working groups, such as the joint capabilities group, and on informal bodies. The overall goal should be functional cooperation and burden sharing. However, as Alex Moens notes in the following chapter, there are political obstacles in the path of such cooperation.

NATO and ESDP: partners instead of rivals As seen from Germany – or any other European country, for that matter – both NATO and the EU are essential for its well-being and security. Why doesn’t NATO alone suffice? After the end of the East–West conflict EU members increasingly wished to have military instruments at their own disposal. The Balkan wars demonstrated the ineffectiveness of European forces, while during the Kosovo war the Europeans were frustrated about not being adequately consulted on operational planning and targeting by the US. At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 the EU heads of state and of government thus decided to accelerate the build-up of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and of the ESDP as its military arm. In the European Headline Goals (EHG), adopted at the same meeting, they committed themselves to being able to deploy a sustainable European Reaction Force (ERF) of 60,000 men by 2006.30 This force was first deployed independently from NATO during the 2004 Operation Artemis in Congo. The question of whether the ESDP should compete with or complement NATO efforts has not yet been settled for good. Initially, France supported European defence initiatives in an effort to balance American influence in Europe. Most Europeans instead see ESDP as complementary to NATO but feel that a show of strength will increase their influence in Washington. The US position toward ESDP, however, has been quite ambivalent. Washington regularly admonishes its European allies for their lack of military capability and for their inability to carry a larger share of the common defence burden, while at the same time it watches with suspicion European ambitions lest they weaken NATO or undermine US influence in Europe.31 The US has always reacted with sharp criticism

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when it has felt that the Europeans were challenging NATO, such as when four European countries proposed establishing a European headquarters at the so-called ‘Chocolate Summit’ at Tervuren in 2003. The Iraq War has not just led to a conflict with the US but it has also resulted in deep fissures between the European nations who were evenly split between supporters and opponents of the war. When France and Germany tried to enlist the cooperation of Russian president Vladimir Putin to form a coalition against the Anglo-Saxon proponents of military intervention, many EU members reacted with sharp criticism. The situation reached a climax with the ‘Letter of Eight’, which was signed by the British, Czech, Danish, Hungarian, Italian, Polish, Portuguese and Spanish leaders in 2003.32 It was matched by French President Jacques Chirac’s angry reaction that the East Europeans had missed a good chance to keep their mouths shut. Though some observers feared that this conflict would be the end of ESDP, the opposite happened. This situation strengthened European resolve to develop a common defence policy. American unilateral action brought home the need for a European ability to act independently. After the war, Britain also decided to invigorate relations with its allies on the European continent.33 At the 1996 Berlin Summit, NATO accepted in principle the concept of Combined Joint Tasks Forces (CJTF), which, under certain circumstances, allowed groups of alliance members to operate independently from SACEUR.34 After a series of long and cumbersome negotiations – which were additionally burdened by divergences between Greece and Turkey – NATO established specific rules under which alliance assets could be used for EU-led missions.35 After a special ‘security of information’ agreement between NATO and EU members had been signed, cooperation between the two institutions was finalized in the Berlin Plus agreement in March 2003. In it NATO assured the EU that it could rely on: • ‘assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations (CMO); • availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMO; • procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities; • terms of reference for DSACEUR and European command options for NATO; • EU–NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities; and • arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability requirements.’36

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But the reliance on NATO assets is not automatic; in each case the NAC has to approve an EU-led mission. This gives the US – but also other countries such as Turkey – a veto right. Supported by London, Washington has barred independent EU operative planning and command capabilities. Though the EU can nevertheless lead independent missions (such as Artemis and EUFOR in the Congo) by relying on the resources of a framework nation, the EU in most cases will draw on the NATO command system. The Deputy Supreme NATO Commander Europe (DSACEUR) will act as EU Operation Commander; SHAPE will serve as EU Operation Headquarters to which a European liaison staff and an international coordination centre for cooperation with participating non-EU or non-NATO members will be attached. After the CJTF model, the relevant NATO regional command serves as EU operative command (European Command Element, ECE). In the case of the EU missions in the Balkans the Joint Forces Command Naples (JFC, formerly AFSOUTH) serves this purpose.37 In Bosnia, Berlin Plus has stood the test, although it still needs further refinement. However, the process of consultation has proven to be very cumbersome. It is further burdened by Turkish opposition to discussing matters in the presence of Cypriot delegates, arguing that Cyprus has not signed the security agreement. Further, the EU’s inadequate military capabilities still serve as a major handicap. The European Headline Goals 2006 have not been fully implemented, and despite the establishment of the 2010 Headline Goals and the adoption of a new European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), the gap will not soon be filled. To give a show of resolve, however, the EU Defence Ministers have decided to field a number of mobile EU Battle Groups (BG), which will have 1500 soldiers each and be available for ‘Petersberg Tasks’,38 mainly crisis management missions and UN-mandated emergency operations. The planning for the battle groups – the capabilities have to come from the same set of forces as do those for the NRF – highlights the basic tension between the EU and NATO. To solve this predicament, the US has suggested a division of labour between both institutions. NATO would be the leading military institution used when both high-end military capabilities and the projection of superior military force are needed. The ESDP should instead concentrate on stabilization and other nonArticle Five missions. A number of recent events, however, have overtaken this idea. Both in Kosovo and in Afghanistan, fighting was followed by stabilization and peacekeeping missions in which NATO, KFOR and ISAF forces proved their usefulness. The final solution to this dilemma will be contingent on both a European resolve to strengthen its ambitions with capabilities, and a recognition by Washington that an alliance based on two strong pillars will be in its best interest.

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As Milagros Álvarez argues in Chapter 5, the failure of the French and the Dutch to approve the EU Constitutional Treaty will not have a big impact on ESDP. Most decisions regarding ESDP are securely anchored in existing agreements, such as the Amsterdam Treaty and later joint ministerial decisions.39 The provisions for solidarity among EU members and for structured cooperation which are so far codified in the convention could easily be put into effect by joint government decision. There is no indication yet that any of the EU member states are losing interest in the ESDP, or that they are backing down from strengthening their military capabilities in this regard. With transatlantic divergences subsiding, however, the EU member states might be more ready to look for maximum compatibility between EU and NATO institutions.

Reaching out to new members, partners and neighbours To many countries in Europe, the Caucasus and in Central Asia, the alliance continues to be very attractive. They trust that NATO provides security and assistance to its members and protects them from outside threats. It also offers a close link to the US, which the new NATO member states in particular view as the true guarantor of their security. Rather than fielding large military capabilities, the seven states that joined the alliance in 2004 have put their territory, their air space and their infrastructure at NATO’s disposal. Only Bulgaria and Romania met the MAP criteria of defence outlays amounting to 2 per cent of GDP, but their forces need to undergo major reforms. All of the other new members have to rebuild their forces from scratch because during the Cold War they lacked national armies. A special drain on their scarce resources has been the acquisition of modern armaments. To make the best of this situation, some have decided to concentrate on niche capabilities, such as ABC defence or mountain troops. Land-locked Slovakia will not acquire a navy, and Slovenia and the Baltic states will forgo raising air forces. Instead, other NATO countries guard the Baltic air space on a rotating basis. But practically all of the new members – though often in small numbers – participate in NATO operations or support allied forces in Iraq. More states continue to knock at NATO’s door. Georgian President Saakashvili has called NATO membership his government’s most important foreign policy goal and has concluded an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPMAP) with NATO.40 After the successful Orange Revolution, Ukraine is also turning to the West. President Yushchenko wants to intensify his country’s relations with Brussels. But Ukrainian admission to NATO would harshly impact alliance relations with Russia and therefore has to be weighed carefully. Meanwhile, the opportunities offered by an

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IMAP should be fully exploited or an agreement on privileged partnership concluded. Already the country is closely cooperating with NATO missions in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and in the Mediterranean. Without the hire of Ukrainian large body aircraft, many NATO members could not deploy their forces over long distances. The alliance has a strategic interest in cooperating closely with many Caucasian and Central Asian states without encouraging them to apply for membership. NATO and the US maintain logistics bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, all of which are very helpful for operations in Afghanistan. But an extension of the alliance into this volatile region would entail enormous problems: the onus of cooperating with autocratic rulers, a series of potential border conflicts as well as a number of ethnic rivalries which could transform into conflicts that would draw in NATO forces. It would also invite strong Russian opposition. Washington has nevertheless recommended admission, hoping to speed up these countries’ democratization and to secure their territory and capabilities for the fight against terrorism. Before accepting new members, NATO should assess how much more to enlarge without further straining internal cohesion. Each new member introduces its interests and problems into the alliance and makes consensus-building more difficult. If NATO’s effectiveness as a military organization is to be maintained it should instead opt for close cooperation with its neighbours and with the countries along its periphery. The projection of stability into neighbouring regions is more important than the extension of membership. In the 1990s, the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) was created as an alternative to membership and as a ‘waiting room’ for potential candidates while their applications were examined and while they prepared themselves for admission. Later they stepped into this ‘room’ with the certain expectation that the door to membership would soon be open. This will not be so in the future.41 Today, a very heterogeneous group of countries are PfP members: besides the EU countries of Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and neutral Switzerland, the Balkan states, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, the four East European countries, Belarus, Moldavia, Russia and Ukraine, the three Caucasus states, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and finally the five Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are all associated with the PfP. Partnership for Peace offers its members various programmes on the reform and training of their forces and prepares them for cooperation with NATO missions. In the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), they participate in political discussions and consultations on various issues, such as on fighting terrorism.

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The alliance also wishes to intensify relations with those states along its periphery that cannot become members of PfP (which is only open to members of the OSCE). NATO has revitalized the Mediterranean dialogue and instituted a new forum for talks with Middle Eastern states. But the distinction between PfP and dialogue partners is somewhat artificial and should be eliminated. The EAPC could eventually become a joint forum for transatlantic deliberations. The alliance is also in the process of institutionalizing cooperation with those countries desiring it. At its Riga Summit in November 2006 NATO offered close cooperation with a number of states outside of the PfP and dialogue frameworks.

The future of the alliance A future NATO will probably be a much more flexible organization than the one which emerged during the Cold War. From an ‘alliance of commitment’, NATO will likely transform into an ‘alliance of choice’. We are currently living in a time of change in which ‘floating coalitions’42 are best suited to addressing present challenges. Because of the increasing diversity of members’ interests, ‘coalitions of the willing’ – operations in which not all member states participate or in which non-members take part – will be much more common. Opting-out will also happen more often, and will no longer be criticized as it has been in the past. NATO will also need to take account of a higher EU profile and prepare for increased cooperation with EU members, PfP and dialogue partners, as well as with the states along the Euro–Atlantic periphery. If fully developed, NATO will, in a crisis, have three operating modes: 1. NATO, as in the good old days, will respond with common action, ordered by NAC and carried out by the SACEUR or another integrated command. 2. NATO will operate as resolved and directed by NAC, but not involve all members, just a few. 3. The EU or an ad hoc coalition will carry out actions, using NATO assets if NATO as a whole does not want to involve itself. This is not an à la carte approach in the sense that each member state chooses what it does entirely on its own without consultation. Flexibility requires rules and structures in order to function so as not to result in disarray. In most cases NAC will operate as a transatlantic ‘clearing house’ or as a joint steering committee bound by certain rules of operation. It

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will also draw on small, informal groups to prepare decisions and oversee actions. Furthermore, it will closely cooperate with the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). How strong are common interests in NATO’s future? The glue for a looser NATO is its common structure and its pool of forces, available for different kinds of contingencies. But will such a more loosely knit institution last? And can it survive as the central transatlantic ‘umbilical cord’? From a European point of view, the alliance should definitely be maintained. Its future will, however, very much depend on the US position, particularly on Washington’s interest in NATO, and on the United States’ contribution to it. America can do without NATO, but NATO cannot do without the US, for political more than for military reasons. NATO will last as long as European and North American member states share a broad common perception of risks and threats, and they find it useful to combine their forces to increase their effectiveness. Common values and interests, if they continue to exist, will guide them.

Notes 1. Gerhard Schröder, ‘Speech at the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy’, transcript, 2005 Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2 December, 2005, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2005⫽&me nu_konferenzen⫽&sprache⫽en&id⫽143& (15 January 2006). This chapter was written in the fall of 2005. The more supportive approach of the German government under Chancellor Merkel toward NATO was not taken into account. 2. Richard Kugler, Hans Binnendijk and David Gompert, ‘A New Capabilities Framework for NATO’, unpublished paper, NDU/CINSP (2005), 2. 3. This was Ronald Reagan’s habitual warning. 4. ‘Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus: Anpassung der Verteidigungsfähigkeiten des Bündnisses’, The German Delegation to NATO, 18 December 2001, http://www.nato.int/germany/docu/k011218d.html (15 January 2006); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Statement on Combating Terrorism: Adapting the Alliance’s Defense Capabilities’, press release 2001 (173), 18 December 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-173e.htm (15 January 2006); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘NATO’s Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism’, press release, October 2003, http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/ terrorism.htm (15 January 2006). 5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘The Alliance Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council’, NATO Handbook 1999 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999), 281–99; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘The Alliance’s Strategic Concept’, Press release NAC-S(99) 65, Washington DC, NATO Summit Meeting 23–24 April 1999, 24 April 1999,http://www.nato. int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm (15 January 2006).

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6. United States, Congressional Research Service, The Proliferation Security Initiative, Sharon Squassoni, 28 July 2005, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/ RS21881.pdf (17 October 2005). Under PSI, 15 states have agreed to consult closely and to practise measures interdicting the sea and air transport of WMD and their parts. Because of different legal foundations, NATO as an institution does not participate in the PSI, but has extended the tasks of Operation Active Endeavour to include the interdiction of any sea transport of WMD. 7. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Combating Terrorism at Sea’, NATO Briefing, April 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/terrorism_at_sea-e.pdf (15 January 2006). 8. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance (The “London Declaration”)’, NATO Handbook 1990 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1990), 271–6. 9. NATO Handbook 1999, 281–99, 406–29. 10. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Prague Summit Declaration’, press release (2002) 127, Prague NATO Summit Meeting, 21–22 November 2002, 21 November 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm (15 January 2006). 11. Daniel S. Hamilton (ed.), Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2004). 12. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘The NATO Response Force – NRF’, NATO Briefing, January 2005, 25 October 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/nrf-e.pdf; ‘The NATO Response Force – NRF’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Allied Command Operations – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm (15 January 2006). 13. Miroslav Kostelka, ‘Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion – Progress Report’, Contribution of the Czech Republic’s Minister of Defence Miroslav Kostelka to the NATO Defence Ministerial Meeting, 1 December 2003, http://www.nato. int/docu/speech/2003/s031201c.htm (15 January 2006). 14. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Prague Summit Declaration’. 15. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Membership Action Plan (MAP)’, press release NAC-S(99) 66, 24 April 1999, 05 November 2005, http://www.nato. int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm. 16. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Declaration on Iraq’, press release 2004(098), Istanbul NATO Summit Meeting, 28–29 June 2004, http://www.nato. int/docu/pr/2004/p04-098d.htm (5 November 2005); United Nations, Security Council, United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1546 (2004) The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait, 8 June 2004, http://daccessdds. un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement (15 January 2006). 17. Jürgen Rogalski (ed.), Die ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ (GMEI) der USA, SWPMaterialien E-67 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2004). 18. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’, 9 July 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-cooperation. htm (15 January 2006). 19. United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 20 September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (15 January 2006); European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World – A European Security

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20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

25.

26.

27. 28. 29.

30. 31.

32. 33. 34.

The Changing Politics of European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, Brussels, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/ 78367.pdf (15 January 2006). North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘The Future of the Atlantic Alliance (“The Harmel Report”)’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Basic Texts, 14 December 1967, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b671213a.htm (15 January 2006); ‘Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Basic Texts, 13 December 1956, http:// www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/bt-a3.htm (15 January 2006). Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, ‘New Missions, New Means’, RUSI, 149 (2004): 42–4. Gerry Gilmore, ‘Rumsfeld: NATO, Like U.S., Needs to Transform its Military’, American Forces Information Service, 22 September 2002. Personal Information. See also Horst Bacia, ‘So gut wie vergessen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 April 2005, 5. Michael Rühle, ‘Toward a More Political NATO: the Imperative of Military and Political Transformation’, Internationale Politik – Transatlantic Edition, Special Edition (2005): 26–9. Helga Haftendorn, ‘The “Quad”: Dynamics of Institutional Change’, in Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space, eds Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 162–94. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, ‘NATO’s Istanbul Summit: New Missions, New Means’, transcript, speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Royal Services Institute, 18 June 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/ 2004/s040618a.htm (15 January 2006). Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, ‘Needed – A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force’, Defence Horizons, 45 (2004): 1–8. Ministerial Council of the Western European Union, ‘Petersberg Declaration’, Europa-Archiv, 47 (1992): D479–85. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘NATO-EU: a Strategic Partnership’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Topics, http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/ (15 January 2006); ‘Berlin-Plus Agreement’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Allied Command Operations – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm (15 January 2006). Nicole Gnesetto (ed.), EU Security and Defense Policy: the First Five Years (1999– 2004) (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004). See former Foreign Secretary Madeleine Albright’s admonition: ‘no decoupling, no duplication, no discrimination’, cited by Kristin Archik and Paul Gallis, ‘NATO and the European Union’, CRD Report for Congress (Washington, DC: United States Government, 2004), 13; also Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion – or Competitor? (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002). ‘Europe and America Must Stand United’, The Times, 30 January 2003, 24. The letter had been inspired by Washington. Charles Grant, ‘Europe Can Sell its Defense Plan to Washington’, Financial Times, 2 December 2003, 23. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including the Berlin Decision on

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35.

36. 37. 38. 39.

40.

41.

42.

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Building a European Security and Defense Identity Within the Alliance)’, NATO Handbook 1966 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1990), 370–85. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘EU–NATO Declaration on ESDP’, press release 2002 (142), 16 December 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/ p02-142e.htm (15 January 2006). ‘Berlin-Plus Agreement’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Allied Command Operations – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Rainer Feist, ‘NATO–EU und “Berlin-Plus” ’, Sicherheit und Stabilität, 2 (2004): 53–9. Ministerial Council of the Western European Union, ‘Petersberg Declaration’. ‘Vertrag von Amsterdam zur Änderung des Vertrags über die Europäische Union’, Internationale Politik, 52 (1997): 99–127; see also Gnesetto (ed.), EU Security and Defense Policy. An Individual Partnership Action Plan encourages countries to cooperate with NATO in reforming their armed forces without, however, promising eventual NATO membership. See ‘NATO-Beitritt wichtigstes außenpolitisches Ziel Georgiens – Präsident Saakaschwili kündigt Reformen in der Armee an’, Osteuropa Monitor, 16 February 2004. ‘Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Basic Texts, http://www.nato.int/issues/eap/index.html (15 January 2006). Christopher Coker, ‘NATO’s Unbearable Lightness of Being’, RUSI, 149 (June 2004): 18–23.

9 The Challenges and Limits of NATO–ESDP Synergy Alexander Moens

Introduction The complicated relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is not due to the fact that two affiliated organizations are both trying to provide security policies in the same Euro–Atlantic area. Rather, the most revealing difficulties in their relationship derive from the fact that ESDP is part of a larger quest by European elites to create a more unified and single political identity for Europe. This chapter will examine three areas of ESDP’s development, with special emphasis on how the dynamics of European identity play a key role. In the first place, we will look at European political unification as a sub-theme of the development of the European Union (EU). After World War II, Europe was divided into three identities. Ever since, elites have tried to narrow these gaps over time by bringing the Eastern half of the continent into the European Union and by reducing the North Atlantic influence in Europe’s security and defence. A second perspective examines ESDP as a single case of common policy development that began very incrementally in the 1970s and developed into defence policy only recently. The third vantage point in explaining ESDP focuses mainly on the EU’s attempts to form a geopolitical dimension by combining its external economic, political and security identity outside of Europe. Of course, as ESDP developed, so did NATO. The most dynamic growth spurts in each organization’s lifespan have taken place in roughly the same time frame. As Helga Haftendorn notes in the previous chapter, for NATO the growth spurt began after the 1991 Rome Summit, where it added its first new strategic rationale after the fall of the Soviet Empire. In addition to defence, deterrence and allied consultation, NATO now also provided 180

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the foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. For the European Union, the decisive point was the Maastricht Presidency Conclusions in which foreign and security policy were brought formally into a new pillar of EU competence. These were confirmed in the Maastricht Treaty that took effect in 1993. The conclusion of this analysis will point to the need for caution in calling the NATO–ESDP relationship a security regime for the Euro–Atlantic area. There are factors that point towards a working arrangement between the two, but other factors suggest a good deal of instability is still present. Fundamentally, Europe is still divided between a political dynamic centred on the EU as a common economic and political ambition, and a security and defence dynamic centred on maintaining the North Atlantic link as part of the new Europe. As a result, there is a good deal of pragmatic cooperation and institutional rivalry going on at the same time. It is the latter that prevents the creation of joint decision-making and more integrated military arrangements. Most likely, EU and NATO cooperation has peaked. Rather than looking for closer cooperation between the two, we can expect a prolonged status quo until the momentum for more EU integration returns in Europe. At that point, European elites will try to mould ESDP more closely into the community method and further weaken Atlantic security ties.

The challenge of Europe’s evolving political identity Europe emerged after World War II in three dimensions: Communist Europe, Community Europe and Atlantic Security Europe. Communist Europe refers to the states of Central and Eastern Europe that came under the Soviet sphere of influence and were thus cut off economically and politically from their historical interaction with Western Europe. Community Europe stands for the unique experiment undertaken by the founding states of the European Community whereby elements of functional, supranational and intergovernmental cooperation were mixed into a new form of international integration. The start point is the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded in Paris in 1951, in which the original six states that would later form the European Community put to work the functional, intergovernmental and supranational processes in the coal and steel sector. The European Economic Community as formed by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 expanded this method to other areas of cooperation. The community method, as explained by Youri Devuyst, developed from this point on and is characterized by a limited transfer of national sovereignty, community institutions that are empowered to

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generate, implement and enforce community law, and a growing body of legal competence (acquis communautaire) that increasingly supersedes national law and is enforced by the European Court of Justice.1 Atlantic Security Europe actually began as a classical European mutual defence treaty, the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947, in which France and England pledged mutual assistance in case of renewed aggression. In the 1948 Brussels Treaty, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg joined a mutual defence pledge which was directed primarily against possible German rearmament. In 1954 Germany and Italy joined the Brussels Treaty and the Western European Union (WEU) was created. But in 1949 the Washington Treaty and the subsequent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) overtook these efforts, the new threat being not Germany but Soviet Russia. The invasion of South Korea by its northern counterpart in 1950 brought stationed American forces to Europe and a military structure with an American general as Supreme Allied Commander. For the first time in its history, the United States committed to a permanent military alliance and in so doing ‘transatlanticized’ European security and defence. For the first time in history, Europe had an outside power participating as an insider, removing by its mere presence any possible recurrence of European rivalry and at the same time supplanting a native European defence identity. There has been an emphasis in the historical accounts of the rise of the European Union to contrast between the identity of pre-war Europe as defined by its nation-states and the newly emerging Europe after the war as defined by the community method. In this general view, the European Community is usually credited with ‘Putting an end to the recurring cycle of wars between France and Germany.’2 Or as Mary Fulbrook summarizes: The age of nationalism, a force which had dominated the previous era and ignited two world wars, thus appeared to have been superseded by an age, if not of uncontested European integration, than at least of remarkable convergence of socio-economic, cultural and political profiles of individual European states.3 While there is much credible evidence for this sweep of European history from a period dominated by the nation-state to a new community mindset that made war unthinkable, it overlooks the fact that Europe after the war emerged in three dimensions and it belittles the role of Atlantic Security Europe in contributing to the ensuing peace in Europe. Communist Europe included most of the Central and East European countries, some of which had been part of democratic, commercial and

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cultural Europe until Soviet forces directly or through puppet regimes lowered an iron curtain of separation between them and the rest of Europe. The curtain cut these European countries off from the community method of integration in the West and pitched them as adversaries vis-à-vis Atlantic Security Europe. What followed were decades of a widening economic gap and a deepening political stand-off. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact were Communist Europe’s attempts (as induced by Moscow) to mirror Community Europe and Atlantic Security Europe and so make believe that the two halves were equal and permanent. While Western Europe developed rapidly, Eastern Europe fell behind. A sharp divide in prosperity became part of Europe’s identity. The Cold War added a second, ideological layer of division between the two halves of Europe. A divided Europe became part of the lexicon. Ironically, it was Germany’s desire to unite the two parts of its old nation-state that put pressure on Franco–German cooperation and the European Community (EC) agenda in the 1970s during Willy Brandt’s so-called Ostpolitik. Again, it was Germany’s quest for unification in 1989 that speeded up the changes in Eastern Europe facilitated by Mikhail Gorbachev. But until the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, Communist Europe was only part of Europe because of its old common roots and its enduring identity. After the ideological divide was taken away, Community Europe worked hard to prepare these states to join the West and in so doing to strengthen Europe’s identity. The formal decision to admit most of these states as well as a few Mediterranean applicants took place in 2002. Identity politics arises from the phenomenon of national or ethnic groups seeking self-determination. Social belonging is one of the strongest and most enduring concepts in explaining political behaviour. Though Europe is a much more complex entity than a social, sub-national or national group, European politics contain elements of belonging, selfidentification and self-determination. European identity politics are arguably still weak among most of the publics of Europe and are increasingly questioned by European elites as well, especially in the wake of the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. The key point about European identity politics is not that they seek to supplant the powerful and historical national identities of its members, but that they seek either to supplement them or to transform them into a higher postnational form of identity.4 Identity politics play a key role in understanding European integration as an elite-driven process, including in defence policy in the historical context. In this chapter, identity politics

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will refer mainly to European elites, especially those directly engaged in Community Europe and those supporting its goals in national power circles, including in academia and in the think tank community. I realize there are considerable differences among Europeanist elites on what type of European identity might eventually emerge, ranging all the way from strictly federalist to loosely cosmopolitan.5 Rather than explore these, I assume here a lowest common denominator, namely a greater collective political identity for Europe with the EU at its centre of governance. The key point about identity politics in this chapter comes down to the quest to reduce non-EU political loyalties and non-EU institutional dependencies among existing or new member states. It is reflected in policies that articulate common ideals and aspire to channel national or sub-national aspirations into a common EU future. Thus, when Communist Europe ended, Community Europe sought not only to bring it into the economic integration process that had begun in 1952, but also to fast-track the Eastern half into a newly emerging foreign, security and defence policy which Community Europe launched in 1991, as we will see below. The quest to bring not just the economic sphere but also the security and defence sector of Eastern Europe into the EU has given rise to unexpected tension between the EU and NATO. At NATO’s London Summit in the summer of 1990, the members agreed to extend the hand of friendship to the Warsaw Pact nations. NATO set up a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) in 1994, to bring Central and East European nations as close as possible to the dynamics of consultation in the alliance and to set ready and willing countries on a path to NATO membership. In 1997 the NACC was replaced by the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council. It is simplistic to speak of competition between the EU and NATO as stemming from these organizations’ courtship of the Central and East European countries. Yet, there was substantive concern among certain EU member states, notably France, as well as among European elites, that Atlantic Security Europe would redefine itself and revitalize its mission by bringing in the old Communist Europe and in so doing would delay and complicate Community Europe’s attempt to bolster its newly minted foreign and security dimension. There was a great deal of diplomatic manoeuvring behind the scenes to limit NATO’s liaison with these new states. For example, France delayed their participation in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. There was also some effort made to damage the prospect of new NATO membership before the United States somewhat abruptly decided to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1996.

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There was a flurry of activity on the part of the newly formed European Common Foreign and Security Policy in its new relationship with a revitalized WEU, copying the links NATO was making with the East. The WEU created associate partnerships for the Central and Eastern European countries. The EU also formed a stronger bloc inside the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which changed in 1994 into the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). The EU launched the Barcelona Conference to form a common strategy with the 12 countries of the Mediterranean basin the same year that NATO set up a Mediterranean Dialogue with roughly the same members. A few years later, both NATO and the EU set up overlapping South-east European initiatives. Of course there are complementary tasks for the EU and NATO in all areas of Europe, and it is obvious that the two organizations will end up strengthening the common endeavour of their member states of bringing stability and prosperity to the outlying regions. Still, for Europe, NATO’s new activities remain a sensitive point not because they are unhelpful but because they compete with the ultimate goal of merging former Communist Europe into a stronger European identity.

The challenge of Europe’s emerging defence policy The common aspiration in European defence took its first substantial form in 1952 when plans for the establishment of the European Defence Community (EDC) were formed. As spearheaded by the French Premier, René Pleven, the plan was to copy in defence and military policy what was envisaged for the coal and steel sector in the ECSC. West German troops would be brought under a common European command. The European Political Community was added so that a pan-European Army would be led by a council of foreign and defence ministers. The community method would not merely lead ad hoc coalitions of European forces, including Germany’s, but would integrate military forces under a common European authority. When the French parliament failed to adopt the plans in 1954, West Germany and Italy joined the Brussels Treaty and the WEU was formed. Britain, which had opposed the EDC, joined the WEU and West Germany became a member of NATO. Because it operated entirely on intergovernmental procedures and thus missed the supranationalist element envisioned in EDC and because the WEU was essentially subsumed by NATO, the movement that sought to establish a greater European identity in security and defence policy-making had made no progress.

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The plans under then President Charles de Gaulle to create a separate West European defence policy were a frontal challenge to NATO. The socalled Fouchet Plan of 1960 would exclude Great Britain and would clearly diminish American influence over European defence policies. It had no supranationalist component but was blocked by the smaller members not for that reason but because they feared French hegemony or a Franco-German condominium in the new organization. The FrancoGerman cooperation agreement signed in its wake (the Elysée Treaty) envisaged more bilateral coordination, but did not diminish German commitments in NATO. The quest for a European-only voice in security and defence affairs had now suffered two defeats; one in an overreach of the community method (EDC) and another in a geopolitical overreach (Fouchet). The European Community was able to get a foothold in foreign policy only by taking the most cautious and incremental route possible, which it did in 1970 through European Political Cooperation (EPC). So strong was the identity of Atlantic Security Europe that many member states of the EC only agreed to a foreign policy discussion and subsequent coordination if they specifically refrained from security and defence policies and did not include any formal institutions. Even the name ‘Political Cooperation’ was a euphemism for the intent to find a common voice on international problems. Often the assembled foreign ministers changed venue after a formal EC meeting to continue EPC discussions elsewhere. From the outset, EPC represented a parallel dynamic to the European Community. By concentrating on non-European defence issues, it became an early forum for policy coordination. It allowed the EC members to have a voice in relations with Soviet Russia that Europe could not have in NATO. It did so by offering coordination among EC members in the negotiations that followed the 1975 Helsinki Accords and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). EPC also became a rallying point for European statements about the Middle East peace process and showed the early beginnings of the geopolitical role Europe sought to play in that region. Interestingly, EPC manifested itself foremost as a European voice distinct from American foreign policy. As Steve Marsh and Hans Mackenstein pointed out: Indeed, EPC revealed the Community’s growing willingness to assert itself collectively vis-à-vis US policies, such as its declaration in June 1980 against US Middle Eastern policy and in favor of a Palestinian homeland and of Palestinian participation in Arab-Israeli peace talks.6

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The tensions inside NATO in the 1980s over deploying the Pershing II Missile clearly spilled over into new momentum for European coordination of policy. Public disagreement with American policy gave French President François Mitterrand the opportunity to call for a greater role for the dormant Western European Union. Without attracting much attention – given the eye-catching agreements on the Single European Market – the 1986 Single European Act incorporated the EPC formally into Community Europe and gave it its first modest institutional form by means of a permanent secretariat. This incorporation laid the groundwork for the EC to add a pillar on foreign policy in 1991. The massive changes to the EC undertaken at Maastricht included the first formal identity for Community Europe in security policy. It reflected both the revitalization of the WEU and its subordinate place in the new Europe, but now not only to NATO but also to the new European Union. The Maastricht Treaty made it clear that the EU had the competence to call upon the WEU to implement its Common Foreign and Security Policy. Realizing that a new vital link was being put in place, the first Bush Administration launched what then Secretary of the WEU Willem van Eekelen described as ‘a pre-emptive strike’ in the form of the Bartholomew Telegram.7 Washington, worried that NATO’s monopoly over Atlantic Security Europe would soon evolve into a shared NATO–European Union mandate, wanted to water down the direct EC–WEU link and keep NATO as the only forum for defence consultations among all members of Community and Atlantic Security Europe. What emerged from the Bartholomew initiative was the first of an elaborate and prolonged set of compromises in institutional (not operational) power-sharing between NATO and the new European Union. Usually Britain would lead these compromises, but they were always parked on a declining slope that tilted towards more European influence. At Maastricht, the language agreed to was that the new security and foreign policy ‘shall include . . . the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence’.8 While European elites had sought a European locus in foreign and security policy-making in the decades prior to 1991, the new challenge – having established a de facto entity in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU – was to form a common policy that would bind Europe’s security future into the structures, processes and laws of Community Europe. This proved very difficult as the vast majority of members were not willing to pool foreign and security policy into a common authority. Thus, Community Europe’s first real steps in acquiring a security identity

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required an intergovernmental framework, commonly known after Maastricht as Pillar Two. Of course the drive for a new EU common policy in security was not a monolithic movement or a simple anti-NATO sentiment. Its success was never inevitable. Many European elites, especially in traditionally Atlanticist states such as Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands, were most reluctant to transfer security and defence to a European identity. Still, the momentum toward more European integration that resulted from the agreements on monetary union and the market harmonization agenda called ‘Europe 1992’, as well as the need to address security challenges in South-eastern Europe inched even the most Atlanticist Europeans towards more competence for Community Europe. These states could ill afford to make CFSP a blocking point in European integration given the benefits derived from the EU’s other common policies. Their publics, even in Britain, agreed to a greater role for Europe. The prevalent idea in the mid-1990s that Europe symbolized a contradiction in that it had become an economic giant but remained a political dwarf and that this gap should be closed also played a role in persuading publics and governments that more European competence or identity in this area was needed. What followed was an EU attempt to do all these things at once: create common positions and joint actions, improvise with new procedures to bring these typically intergovernmental actions closer to the community method, and generate a politico-military capacity to act in the Balkans. The EU failed to persuade the various parties in the former Republic of Yugoslavia that the rewards of speedy EU membership were worth renouncing violence for. The new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) also could not get EU members to agree on putting a WEU interposition force between Serbs and Croats as proposed by the French in 1991. While many commentators have concluded that the Balkans was a bridge too far for the CFSP, it is also true that NATO did nothing to help the new entity to succeed. France and others would not agree to a formal role for NATO in the early 1990s, arguing simply that the conflict was out of the area of competence of the Washington Treaty. While the French government sought to keep NATO out of the management of the conflict in order to allow the CFSP new jurisdiction, the effect was actually counterproductive. European states were more, not less cautious about entering the fray without NATO involvement. At the same time, the first Bush Administration miscalculated in the early phase of the Balkan conflict, thinking that the Yugoslav federation could stay together and that the Europeans could manage the conflict.

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Crisis management in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina turned to the United Nations (UN), then to a joint UN–NATO effort, and finally to a series of NATO stabilization forces that maintained the peace negotiated under American leadership at Dayton, Ohio. The operational momentum at the EU level switched to monitoring and police forces, first in the city of Mostar and then in all of Bosnia. Of course, the EU remained the key diplomatic player in the region, the main financial donor, and the lead agent under a UN mandate on peace stabilization and reconstruction efforts. While CFSP operational efforts remained modest, the policy and institution-building of a greater European identity in security policy continued both inside the EU and in the relationship between the EU and NATO. In 1994, NATO for the first time officially acknowledged a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). It was the Clinton Administration’s signal that American policy would not look at the NATO–EU relationship as a zero-sum game. In recognizing ESDI, NATO gave legitimacy to the European aspiration to co-manage security in Europe. In 1992, the WEU had agreed to a set of new tasks, the so-called Petersberg Tasks, including humanitarian, peacekeeping and crisis management operations. NATO’s recognition of ESDI opened the way for practical military cooperation between the EU, the WEU and NATO. This momentum produced the so-called Berlin Agreement of 1996. Borrowing from American military doctrine, the idea was to construct flexible military task forces among member states in which land, naval and air forces could operate jointly and in which different member states’ forces could be combined. Thus the model of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) would open military contributions to flexible missions (NATO or WEU) as well as flexible command (NATO alone, or NATO in support of a WEU member state’s command). The buzzwords in those days were ‘interlocking’ and ‘mutually reinforcing institutions’.9 At the very time this was agreed, a NATO CJTF was operating in Bosnia under NATO command (IFOR). The 1996 Berlin Agreement has proven to have been both a breakthrough in NATO–EU relations and a bottleneck. The idea that European members could undertake Petersberg missions in Europe with the help of NATO clearly marked the beginning of a practical European security identity. This was the first time in which Atlantic Security Europe could be divided into missions with or without direct American participation. It led the way to future missions such as Operation Althea, the European Union Force (EUFOR), currently under way in Bosnia in which European forces run an entire military mission with hardly any transatlantic connections. When Althea took over from NATO’s stabilization force in

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Bosnia in 2004, the Americans reduced their participation essentially to helping find war criminals. Canada also scaled back its forces in Bosnia from some 700 personnel to fewer than 50. We can expect that eventually the NATO-led force in Kosovo will also transfer from a NATO force to an EU force based on the fundamental agreements reached at Berlin. But Berlin also brought into the open an enduring bottleneck. America and several other member states wanted to keep a single planning and command structure for all these operations and keep that structure inside NATO. Thus the forces would be separable in terms of operations but they would not really be separate in terms of planning and command structures. The plan was that the EU would have certain access to NATO’s command and control assets and that it would have presumed access to other assets. In other words, the price the European Union would pay for having NATO support for its operations was that the EU would not construct a second integrated military planning and command structure inside the EU. Community Europe could undertake military missions, but in its planning and command it would have to remain dependent on Atlantic Security Europe. It was for this reason that France stopped short of reintegrating into NATO’s military command. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 made important improvements to Community Europe’s attempt to construct a common policy. It was agreed that the European Council could set the speed for the progressive framing of a defence policy. Also, the new WEU tasks were incorporated into the EU Treaty. The Commission obtained a right of joint initiative. Qualified majority voting was applied to joint actions, although a right of constructive abstention was also granted, allowing members to stay out of a particular operation. The CFSP was given a policy planning and early warning unit. EU members agreed on a new High Representative to be the EU’s chief diplomat and spokesperson on the common policy. However, the CFSP did not achieve a fully-funded common budget; participating member states would still pay a large share of the costs of any joint action undertaken. None of these improvements gave the EU or WEU the institutional momentum or military capacity to respond to the Kosovo crisis as it unfolded in 1999 if NATO had said ‘no’. Not wanting to wait as long as it had in the Croatian and Bosnian crises, the Clinton Administration was willing to take the lead task and organize NATO to conduct both the air war and the peace enforcement operations in Kosovo afterward. When in 1998 Britain’s government agreed with France on a new initiative to bolster military capacity for autonomous EU action, some believed that Tony Blair had changed British policy from putting the brakes on Community Europe to actively joining Community Europe.

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The British rationale was likely more complicated and less revolutionary. As Jolyon Howorth has argued, Britain calculated that the challenge was not too much European defence, but too little. By building a genuine European military capacity, Britain believed Washington would have incentive to stay engaged. The radical notion that NATO was in trouble not because Europe was getting too strong but because it was getting too weak propelled Blair into action.10 Put another way, if Community Europe did not step up to the plate, Atlantic Security Europe – a vital British interest – would fall by the wayside. The British motive was weakened in the eyes of the American government by the fact that France shared Britain’s desire for autonomous EU capacity but obviously not for the reason of preserving Atlantic Security Europe. The Franco-British initiative was incorporated into the EU’s 1999 Helsinki Presidency Conclusions. The EU now added a Common European Security and Defence Policy and set a ‘Headline Goal’ to build an intervention force of some 60,000 troops with the modern requirements of command and control, air and sea-lift, and precision-guided weaponry. NATO and the EU then agreed that the operational agreements reached between NATO and the WEU would be transferred to the EU. Thus in the Berlin Plus Agreement the EU obtained assured access to NATO command and presumed access to its other assets. What was not resolved was how and where these decisions would be made. Most problematic was the exact political relationship between NATO and the EU. It took until 2003 to hammer out a political agreement between the two which still did not resolve the most sensitive question, namely whether these were entirely equal organizations, or whether NATO had a certain primacy in security and defence. In the EU Treaty Amendments agreed to in Nice in 2001, members added a Political and Security Committee (PSC), a Military Committee composed of representatives of the chiefs of the various national defence staffs, and a Military Staff to give decision-making competence to the new Security and Defence Policy and to provide it with early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. The PSC is the equivalent of NATO’s North Atlantic Council and is the forum in which the EU officially consults with NATO. The EU’s military planning staff added a contingency planning capacity in 2003 and is obviously moving incrementally towards assuming some of the functions of operational planning and command undertaken at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). It is remarkable to see how close the EU has come to the goals envisioned by the European Defence Community in 1952. It now has a strong treaty mandate in defence, a plan to combine modern military forces under EU

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auspices, and a foothold in planning and commanding these forces under a European general. Still, Community Europe has not yet replaced Atlantic Security Europe. NATO showed its vibrancy in the Balkans twice. Any new conflagration on Europe’s flank will likely end up on NATO’s plate. NATO maintains a naval task force in the Mediterranean to act as an anti-terrorism patrol and WMD interception capability. When NATO moved the centre of its operations to Afghanistan in 2003 and took over the International Security Assistance Force, it greatly enhanced its importance to Europeans, Americans and Canadians alike in terms of a centralized planning and command structure. Former Communist Europe, which has joined both the EU and NATO, keeps reminding Europeans and Americans that the traditional Article V mandate for common defence is still a NATO priority.

The challenge of Europe’s geopolitical role Community Europe has also used its economic integration and its foreign and security policy to give the EU a greater voice outside the Euro–Atlantic area. The EU’s considerable powers in international trade negotiations and in development assistance have been combined with its political ambition on most issues dominating the international agenda. Thus, Community Europe has become a distinct voice and a strong player in international affairs. This international or geopolitical role is increasingly linked to the ESDP functions that the EU defines for itself. International power politics is certainly not an explicit goal of the EU or a formal common policy. Most analysts are cautious about what type of international actor the EU will ultimately become and what type of power it will wield. The idea that the EU would form a unique type of ‘civilian power’ as was discussed in the 1980s is less in vogue now.11 Still, there is a strong notion that the EU is creating a whole new form of governance that mixes domestic and international policies and that concentrates on the use of soft power. The EU already possesses some of the traditional characteristics of a great power as defined in classical realism.12 As the EU forms stronger internal policies and more integrated forms of decision-making, outside powers are less able to influence the outcome of EU processes. The EU also increasingly defines its interests in global terms, rather than in narrowly defined national needs as small powers do. The ESDP’s new Political and Security Committee not only coordinates EU member state policies toward NATO issues, but also, for example, tries to improve coherence among EU member states’ policies on issues before the United Nations Security Council.13

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The EU is acting more and more as a unified power in the global arena. Even when major powers inside the EU such as Britain, France and Germany unite their diplomacy outside CFSP and ESDP structures – as the ‘EU Three’ have done vis-à-vis Iran, they still unify the EU’s common security identity. Some argue that such great power leadership inside the EU actually speeds up a common security and defence policy. In this scenario, Britain, France and Germany take control of the European defence identity, and ‘kick-start a process of breaking the log-jam’ of internal EU contradictions and exceptions in defence policy, speed up the development of military capacity, and become the interlocutor with Washington on behalf of Europe.14 One inescapable element of this geopolitical drive for a European security identity is that the EU becomes in part a unilateral power which challenges America’s preponderance inside NATO and even in the global arena. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s call for a transatlantic dialogue between the United States and the EU in February 2005 embodies this new EU awareness.15 Whether it was meant to strengthen or undermine NATO, Schröder tried to switch defence and security consultations out of Security Atlantic Europe’s North Atlantic Council into a new dialogue between superpowers. John van Oudenaren argues that EU actions in unifying its member states’ external policies have had a drying up effect on other multilateral fora.16 For example, when the European Court of Justice in 1963 ruled on the doctrine of ‘direct effect’, it ipso facto limited the body of GATT law that applied to all GATT members. The European Union is also taking over other European multilateral projects such as the European Space Agency. As the EU caucuses in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and in various UN organs have shown, it squeezes out the influence of other states on its policy formation. Combining interests and policy-making in external relations has become another way in which the EU has created a political and international security identity. An example of this momentum is the EU’s policy toward China. With minimal prior consultation, Brussels announced the imminent lifting of its arms embargo on China in early 2005. This policy change could have had a significant impact on American interests in the Asia Pacific region. Washington was less consulted than presented with a near fait accompli. It took maximum American pressure to stop the unilateral EU action. The net effect of Europe’s geopolitical identity is a type of unilateralism usually associated with American policies. European Union hegemony becomes a counterweight to American hegemony.

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Most of what today is called ‘multilateralism’ is in fact American or EU attempts at internationalizing their increasingly unilateral policies. Both the United States and the European Union seek international partners to implement their ‘domestic’ policies. The difference is that for the United States, in recent years the key parameter has been external results (hence the idea of ‘the mission determines the coalition’), while the European Union has two key parameters: external results and internal ‘state’ or identity-building. The EU needs external partners more than the United States and has worked harder to gain non-European legitimacy, for example with Canada, for its foreign policy. It has cast its approach to international issues in a wide global net, essentially by getting a global forum to adopt the EU goals as its own. It has externalized its internal approach to carbon dioxide reduction through the Kyoto Protocol. Policies on banning landmines and prosecuting war criminals even when they were generated abroad have become internationalized only because the EU threw its concerted weight behind them. In some ways, the European Union is aspiring to do what the United States did after World War II. Back then, Washington successfully ‘internationalized’ its national interests by means of Bretton Woods, the United Nations and the North Atlantic Alliance. The European Union has been in serious competition with the United States since the early 1990s to internationalize its agenda as the more legitimate representation of global interests. While Europe’s geopolitical identity formed gradually in the 1990s, European–American disagreements during the George W. Bush era have made the quest far more visible. In some ways, the tension has played into the hand of those EU elites that seek to boost identity as a spin-off from substantial disagreements with the United States. After 9/11, Bush shifted the United States to the pursuit of a new set of security interests dominated by cutting off the vanguard of militant Islamic terrorism and inducing democratic development in the Middle East. From 2003 onwards, Bush offered an alternative set of political and security tasks to those that the European Union has offered to the international community. Bush, as it were, put America back into competition for international legitimacy for its goals; destroying terror networks and spreading freedom. Bush also pushed alternative means such as ad hoc coalitions and less institutionalized forms of cooperation, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States wants to embed likeminded allies in Americanled operations and uses diplomacy to reshape old institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Bush Administration calls

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this ‘effective multilateralism’. By emphasizing the old order, the European Union has become the counter-revolutionary power, trying to replace the United States as the guardian of the conventional international order. It uses primarily treaty-based security and forms of so-called soft power, especially economic development and support for various nongovernmental organizations. On the basis of its geopolitical identity, the EU calls for specific security and defence actions such as its peacekeeping and peace stabilization missions in Africa. In 2003, several European states wanted to convert ISAF into an ESDP mission as it was Europe (and Canada) that had expended the greatest amount of aid and personnel in the peace-building tasks around Kabul. Likewise, the EU sought to take the lead role in the crisis in Darfur. In the end, Darfur became a mixture of operations, some national (such as Canada’s provision of armed personnel carriers to the African Union peacekeepers), some NATO (especially military intelligence and airlift) and some European (especially the aid coordination function from EU states). The EU’s geopolitical dimension showed itself during the diplomatic stand-off surrounding the Iraq War by a concerted Franco-German effort to frustrate any American effort to obtain a second UN Security Council Resolution that would explicitly permit the use of force. Franco-German cooperation also spilled over into the Euro–Atlantic arena. Germany and France united in the North Atlantic Council to block the American–Turkish request for NATO assets to be transferred to Turkey in anticipation of possible Iraqi retaliation. After the invasion, the EU’s biggest powers blocked any NATO function in Iraq beyond giving planning and command assistance to the Polish Brigade. At the height of the tensions, France and Germany, under the cover of a Belgian initiative, proposed a complete break from the Berlin Plus Agreement by setting up a separate military command structure for the European Union in the Brussels’s suburb of Tervuren. Britain was able to stave off a confrontation among the major allies in NATO by proposing more planning competence for the EU Military Staff.

The limit of NATO–ESDP synergy The political unification of Europe, the search for a common European policy in security and defence, as well as the geopolitical ambition of the EU, all show the strong presence of identity politics in Europe’s drive for more security and defence competence. Still, identity politics should not be seen as evidence that there is no practical and pragmatic cooperation between the EU and NATO. There is plenty of it. First of all, the commonality of

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democratic principles, the shared quest for international stability, and the pursuit of free commercial exchange provide a bedrock of unity between the twenty-six NATO and twenty-five EU member states, nineteen of which are members in both organizations. An argument can be made that some of the EU’s actions in security and defence are simply a response in areas where NATO has no background, no capacity, no political will, and perhaps no future. This includes the setting up of a 5000-strong EU police force for policing missions alongside or following peacekeeping or military operations. In this category, European security and defence is not about shadow boxing with NATO but about filling gaps and holes that NATO does not cover. When NATO committed to enforce the Dayton Accords with robust troops, there was just as much need for police functions and juridical and development assistance to come alongside. Whether under UN or EU auspices, EU member states and budgets generally filled this role. Similarly, when NATO’s ‘trip wire’ function to stave off Serbian intervention in Macedonia had come to an end and American troop commitments were sparse, it was only the EU who could fill the ensuing monitoring mission, first military and then civilian. The EU actions became a type of force multipliers for what NATO was trying to achieve. Given America’s enormous military commitment in Iraq and the relative calm in Bosnia, it was only a matter of time before NATO handed over its operation to the European Union. As the environment changed from ‘medium-threat’ to ‘low-threat’, the operation in Bosnia moved from NATO to the EU, setting a precedent for Kosovo. Because the EU operation in Bosnia is a formal ‘Berlin Plus’ operation, SHAPE is assisting EUFOR in its planning and command. A liaison team of EU military advisers is housed at SHAPE and the general conclusion is that the two organizations are working smoothly on day to day issues. To many security analysts, it would seem that there are more opportunities for NATO–EU synergy.17 In the previous chapter, Helga Haftendorn makes an argument for ‘constructive linkage’ between the EU and NATO. Given how NATO and the EU can supplement each other’s activities and strengths, that so many members overlap, and that there are so many interconnected institutions between the two large organizations, the question has frequently been posed, why cannot these two organizations blend into a single Euro–Atlantic security organization or at least form a single coherent security regime? Stanley Sloan has challenged the members of both NATO and the EU to revisit the individual institutions’ mandates and provide a greater umbrella framework organization.18

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The closest thing to such a new transatlantic bargain was offered in October 2000 by then US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen. He wanted to create a ‘European Security and Defense Planning System’, that would put NATO and EU initiatives into a single multilateral alliance. His plans included a ‘collaborative, unitary defense planning system for all scenarios other than defending the NATO territory’ (that is, Article V of the Washington Treaty was not included). He wanted all EU and NATO members (then 23 in number) to participate.19 It is critical to understand why these proposals floundered and what it teaches us about the limits of EU–NATO cooperation. First of all, a single military command and defence planning function would effectively give the United States a chair around the EU table of common defence policymaking. Since the EU would not be invited to join America’s defence planning in Washington, it is truly a non-starter. Second, the United States has always enjoyed primus inter pares status at SHAPE and rightly so given its military might. As recent years have shown, the US is reducing the amount of multilateral input into its military decisions given the enormous and persisting disparity in capabilities between it and NATO and EU members. A single NATO–EU command structure would widen the circle even more. Again, it looks like a non-starter. Third, there is a certain amount of specialization of labour between NATO and the EU. Almost all members resent this trend. The US and the UK do not feel they should shoulder the burden of peacemaking alone; the other members resent the idea of cleaning up behind US war-fighting. Still, this pattern is now in place as it was in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. The specialization of tasks allows NATO and the EU to have separate mandates and thus make separate decisions. It also takes some of the pressure away from forming a single defence planning and command process. According to most classical definitions of international regimes, NATO and the EU already form a loose type of security regime. Using Stephen Krasner’s key concepts, there is a clear convergence of norms and principles among the member states – although the recent use of pre-emptive war has driven a wedge between America and its allies. There certainly are decision-making procedures around which actor expectations can converge though some of these remain in play, depending on the severity of the crisis or threat.20 For example, in the case of any attack using weapons of mass destruction in or near Europe, it is more likely that NATO’s Response Force (NRF) will be deployed than the EU’s new Battle Groups. But the presence of a loose security regime between NATO and the EU does not mean that there are good prospects for a single governing arrangement to come about. In fact, it is more likely that synergy and

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coordination between the two has peaked. Some EU members keep discussions between the North Atlantic Council and the Political Security Committee strictly to those missions where the Berlin Plus mandate applies, which today is only the case in Bosnia. The exchange of information between the two organizations is still minimal, and common procedures are limited to narrow areas of cooperation. Both organizations are conducting military modernizing programmes (for NATO, the Prague Capabilities Initiative, for the EU, the European Capabilities Action Plan) but there is no horizontal dialogue or exchange of information between the two initiatives. Synergy in operations is usually achieved by ad hoc diplomacy rather than through stable procedures. In Africa, NATO and the EU have at times, as in the Congo and Darfur, openly competed for a role in crisis management. The specialization of labour referred to above between NATO’s war-fighting and the EU’s post-conflict reconstruction may be compounded by a geographic division of labour in which the EU looks after Europe (and possibly Africa) while NATO operates in Asia and the Middle East. The best explanation of why two broadly overlapping and functionally complementary institutions are kept at arms’ length goes back to identity politics. Those among the European elite who seek the unification of a single European identity in politics, economics and defence profit from NATO’s security functions in the short to medium term but will lose their objective if Atlantic Security Europe remains a permanent feature of Europe. These elites are intent on building a European military command, planning and headquarters capacity. For them, it is only a matter of time before the EU accomplishes this task. It makes no sense for these advocates of the European project to vest political power back into a single transatlantic forum. Paul Cornish put it this way: ‘In time – say, ten or fifteen years – it might be reasonable to talk meaningfully of a choice between NATO and the EU as providers of security and defence in Europe.’21 The challenge Community Europe faces is not to find closer relations with NATO, but to claw back on ESDP’s intergovernmental features to make it eventually fit into the acquis communautaire. This requires radical measures that obviously do not have much political momentum in Europe at the moment as member state governments and EU institutions are still reeling from the defeat of the European Constitution Treaty. Still, the path is not obscure and might be illustrated by how the common policy on economic and monetary union (EMU) came about. When first outlined in the Pierre Werner Report in 1971, EMU looked hugely ambitious and long term. During the tumultuous years of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), or the European currency

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snake, it looked as though the whole plan would fail. Werner’s target date of 1980 turned out to be more than twenty years too early. Yet, Werner’s three stages were more or less followed and even beyond his expectation, the Community method was expanded to include a central bank to manage the common currency. More than thirty years after Werner’s starting point the euro went into circulation. A truly common European defence policy would begin to train, equip and command a common European soldier.22 Member states would pool their defence budgets and agree to a single procurement process. A single European chain of command would be set up, taking its direction from a European general and a single forum for civilian decision-making within the community method. Some member states may choose at first only to pool a part of their forces and gradually expand participation as the new common policy showed results. If Helsinki 1999 was the launch point of the idea of autonomous European action, it may, as was the case with EMU, take another thirty years to arrive at a single European defence policy and force. While it is now more difficult to achieve because ESDP has limped ahead with a mixture of mainly intergovernmental structures, we can still see pieces of a community method being set up. The European Defence Agency is a case in point. While its mandate and budget are still tiny, it could become the core from which to develop common procurement plans and budgets. The European Security Strategy agreed to in December 2003 could be the blueprint from which to identify specific tasks. While most EU member state governments have serious problems with taking such an integrationist approach to a common defence policy, independent opinion polls clearly indicate a trend of strong public support for an EU defence capacity. A 2005 survey by the Marshall Fund found that 70 per cent of Europeans want the EU to become ‘a superpower like the United States’, though they differ on what type of power that should be.23 A recent Eurobarometer survey put European support for the common foreign and defence policy project at 78 per cent.24 I do not want to downplay the enormous challenge of grafting a community method defence policy onto the existing EU process. Many have pointed out the numerous complications of such an approach.25 My key point is that EU–NATO cooperation is not likely to grow beyond another Berlin Plus arrangement in Kosovo. Sooner or later, the momentum for more EU-based security and defence competence will resume because the drive for European identity still motivates key elites in the EU. Based on the history of Community Europe’s progress in security and defence, the pace of change will remain slow, but its direction steady.

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Notes 1. Youri Devuyst, The European Union Transformed: Community Method and Institutional Evolution from the Schuman Plan to the Constitution for Europe, Second Edition (Brussels: P.I.E-Peter Lang, 2005), 12. 2. Ibid., 11. 3. Mary Fulbrook, ‘Introduction’, Europe since 1945, ed. Mary Fulbrook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 5. 4. John Erik Fossum, ‘Identity Politics in the European Union’, Arena Working Paper 01/17, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp01_17.htm#_ftnref4 (20 May 2006). 5. Gary Marks et al., Governance in the European Union (London: Sage, 1996). 6. Steve Marsh and Hans Mackenstein, The International Relations of the European Union (Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2005), 11. 7. Willem van Eekelen, Debating European Security, 1948–1998 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 1998), 78. 8. European Union, Treaty on European Union, OJC 191, 29 July 1992 (Brussels: European Union, 1992), Article J 4.1. 9. For a discussion see John Borawski and Thomas-Durell Young, NATO after 2000: the Future of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 99. 10. This argument is made best by Jolyon Howorth, ‘Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance’, in Defending Europe: the EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy, eds Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 11. The term ‘civilian power’, here used comes from the discussion in Christopher Hill, ‘European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Bloc, of Flop?’ in The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe’s New Assertiveness, ed. Reinhardt Rummel (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 31–55. See also Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the Beginnings of the European Strategic Culture’, International Affairs, 77 (2001): 597. 12. Martin Wight, ‘Chapter Two’, in Power Politics, eds Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978). 13. Sven Biscop, ‘Security and Development: a Positive Agenda for Global EU-UN Partnership’, in The European Union and the United Nations, ed. Martin Ortega, Chaillot Paper 78 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies), 27. 14. Anand Menon, ‘From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq’, International Affairs, 80 (2004): 632. 15. ‘Schröder Slammed over NATO Reform Idea’, Deutsche Welle, 14 February 2005, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0, 1488890,00.html?maca⫽en-english_current_affairs-96-rdf (20 May 2006). 16. John van Oudenaren, ‘Transatlantic Bipolarity and the End of Multilateralism’, Political Science Quarterly, 120 (2005): 1–32. 17. For example, see Michelle Flournoy and Julianne Smith, European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005).

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18. Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: the Transatlantic Bargain Challenged (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005). 19. For development of this idea see: Alexander Moens, ‘Thinking Outside the Box: NATO-ESDP Cooperation at Twenty Three’, in NATO and European Security, eds Alexander Moens et al. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003). 20. Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International Organization, 36 (1982), 185. See also Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983). 21. Paul Cornish, ‘NATO: the Practice and Politics of Transformation’, International Affairs, 80 (2004): 74. 22. For a speculative road towards such a policy see Alexander Moens, ‘The Road towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy’, Journal of European Integration, XIX (1996): 165–80. 23. ‘Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2005’ (German Marshall Fund and the Campagnia di San Paolo), 4. 24. Marta Dassu and Roberto Menotti, ‘Europe and America in the Age of Bush’, Survival, 47 (2005): 108. 25. For example see Gilles Andréani et al., Europe’s Military Revolution (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001). See also, ‘Chapter Four’, in European Defence: a Proposal for a White Paper (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004).

10 Strategic Partners, Different Strategies: the United States and Canada in the Transatlantic Security Community Frédéric Mérand

Introduction On 30 August 1954, the French National Assembly dealt a final blow to the project of a European Defence Community. The EDC, agreed upon by the six founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community in Paris two years before, would have been composed of multinational military forces overseen by a supranational authority. The French rejection of the EDC meant that the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took on European security issues alone, while the European Community focused on economic matters. When, in December 1998, at the Saint-Malo Summit, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair launched the European Defence Initiative, many thought it would meet the same fate as the EDC. It did not. Between 1998 and 2005, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as it was called in the Treaty of Nice, made remarkable progress. In less time than it took to forge the Economic and Monetary Union, the European Union established a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee, a Military Staff, a Defence Agency and EU Battle Groups. Military operations were undertaken in Macedonia, the Congo and, more recently, Bosnia. In the illfated Constitutional Treaty, EU leaders agreed to a ‘solidarity clause’ that is only one step from NATO’s mutual defence clause, Article 5. To a large extent, the success of ESDP can be attributed to its bottom-up approach: modest forms of cooperation, small organizational structures and relatively safe military operations that were put in place without spending too much time discussing grand architectural designs à la common European defence. Whatever happens to ESDP as a political project, this stock of institutional links and cooperation habits will not be lost. This contrasts with the EDC’s top-down approach, which had created detailed 202

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plans for a single European Army before ensuring that its main protagonists – diplomats, military officers, politicians, citizens – would buy it.1 In other words, rather than focusing of its finalité politique, the architects of ESDP built an infrastructure to serve whatever finalité politique may subsequently be chosen. As this volume argues, there is no turning back. The EU is ascendant in the politics of European security, while NATO is in decline. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP are here to stay. The vast majority of European countries are members of both the EU and NATO. Now occupying the same institutional terrain, NATO is bound to focus on technical military issues while the EU assumes overarching political responsibilities in the area of broad or ‘soft security’ issues, and increasingly enhances its defence capacities and its engagement in operational missions. Already, as former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder observed, the North Atlantic Council is ‘no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and co-ordinate strategies’.2 So far as European governments are concerned, the EU Council is where real security management discussions are taking place. Borrowing from Peter Katzenstein’s recent argument about the emergence of a ‘world of regions’, in this concluding chapter I suggest that the shifting dynamics of the transatlantic relationship are occurring in a regionalization context, whereby an assertive Europe is increasingly defining itself in relation to the American ‘imperium’.3 This has important consequences for countries that are members of NATO but not of the EU. To understand the changing shape of the transatlantic security community, this chapter looks at how the two North American countries, the United States and Canada, one big and the other small, are responding to the emergence of ESDP. The purpose of this comparison is not only methodological: while the importance of the US in European security affairs is obvious, it is also useful to consider the Canadian example as an illustration of the predicament of so-called third countries, such as Norway or Turkey, which have played an important role in the transatlantic community but now find themselves sidelined by an exclusive EU–US relationship.4 The US and Canada were both praised as ‘strategic partners’ in the 2003 European Security Strategy. Yet towards ESDP, they have adopted very different strategies. While the US first opposed European autonomy in defence matters, it now accommodates European demands in so far as they allow it to disengage from Europe. Much as the EU treats NATO as one military tool in pursuit of its common foreign policy, the US has instrumentalized an organization that can neither entangle its foreign policy nor its

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military strategy. Canada, by contrast, remains committed to the Alliance and has chosen a milder rhetoric vis-à-vis European defence. But the smaller North American country now finds itself isolated in transatlantic relations and unable (or unwilling) to find in ESDP the place it lost with the relative demise of NATO. The Canadian example, I will argue, provides evidence of the displacement of the transatlantic community by a transatlantic relationship operating along a Washington–Brussels axis.

What is European defence? Enshrined in the Treaty of Nice, ESDP is a multifaceted project. It refers to at least three different objectives. First, ESDP strengthens the military dimension of the European Union’s crisis management capacity. Already the EU has become a major player in the deployment of expeditionary forces for peace support operations.5 Between 1997 and 2005, a decision-making structure was established in Brussels whose job it is to deal with ‘hard security’ crises, specifically those having to do with humanitarian intervention and peacemaking: the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’, named after the German castle where European governments met in 1992 to elaborate a strategic concept for the now defunct Western European Union (WEU). The EU does not possess its own military capabilities. When it decides to launch a mission, it has to mandate SHAPE or a national operations HQ to carry out the operation. But the chain of command, instead of leading up to the North Atlantic Council or a member state’s government, is placed under the authority of the EU Council. The EU-led military operations so far include Operation Concordia in Macedonia, Operation Althea in Bosnia, and Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. SHAPE and the French Joint Planning Staff, respectively, carried them out. The political-military bodies of the EU are located in the EU Council and not in the European Commission. This ensures that decision-making remains intergovernmental. At the top of the hierarchy is the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of the EU Council, where each foreign minister is represented. The Secretary General of the Council, Javier Solana, is also the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). A Political and Security Committee (PSC) is responsible for the political control and strategic direction of ESDP. The PSC is composed of ambassador-level delegates from the member states with political-military expertise. A representative from the Commission also sits on the PSC, which may be chaired in times of crisis by the High Representative. The PSC relies on the military advice and coordination function of the Military Committee, which consists of military

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representatives from the member states’ chiefs of defence staff. An international Military Staff provides early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning, supervises force planning procedures, and implements the decisions of the Military Committee. Until the planning cell envisaged after the French-German-British agreement of December 2003 is fully developed, the Military Staff is not an operations headquarters but it liaises with national and multinational HQs.6 The second objective of ESDP is to rationalize the military tools of EU member states. This is primarily done through the development of common procurement programmes, the establishment of joint bodies to oversee these programmes, and the pooling of command structures to utilize the final products.7 The demand side is accompanied by an industrial policy that specifically aims at Europeanizing the defence sector.8 Much of the momentum behind ESDP lies in the pursuit of the so-called Headline Goals, a catalogue of capabilities specifically earmarked for EU operations that, it is believed, will in the long run help member states fill ‘capability gaps’ – that is, military assets that European states do not currently possess in sufficient quantities – and avoid unnecessary duplication. To this effect, defence ministries have established a European Defence Agency that will help procurement officials and defence staffs share information and network around common projects.9 This process, however, is still in its infancy: much remains to be done in a Europe that boasts of maintaining more than a million enlisted personnel, 15 separate armies, 14 air forces, and 13 navies, and yet can hardly transport 60,000 troops to a distant theatre in less than a month.10 Finally, ESDP furthers European integration and, through enhanced military clout, gives Europe a voice in the world. By no means do all those involved agree on this last objective of ESDP; yet it has long been an essential subtext of the project.11 In its milder form, the proponents of European defence argue that it must help member states coordinate their defence policies in view of supporting the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. This objective is part of an old debate about how to reorganize the command structures of NATO better to reflect European interests and priorities. In a more ambitious vein, many believe that ESDP is the first step towards creating a truly European military organization, eventually a European army, fulfilling the EU founding fathers’ vision of a state-like federation.12 A number of multinational forces have been established since the late 1980s, notably the Franco-German Brigade, the Dutch-German Corps, the Eurocorps and now the EU Battle Groups. These joint military forces do not necessarily answer operational needs, but they demonstrate the political commitment of member states to European integration.

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Throughout the 1990s, Canada and the United States insisted that EU efforts in the defence sphere remain tightly coupled with NATO. The military alliance was thought to embody a community of fate that bound Euro–Atlantic states together.13 Politically and organizationally, North American countries tried to cast the European desire for autonomy in a NATO frame, allowing it to have an ‘identity’ rather than a policy.

Salvaging NATO: the European Security and Defence Identity For most of the 1990s, the issue of European defence was approached as a matter of making NATO assets available for European use through the Western European Union (WEU), NATO’s European pillar. After Jacques Chirac came to power in 1995, he announced that France would rejoin the Allied Military Committee, which it had left in 1966, and promised that full reintegration would be given consideration if NATO agreed to Europeanize its structures, most notably the SACEUR system which had been at the heart of French complaints since its creation because it is de facto headed by an American general. Resonating with European concerns aired at the 1994 NATO Summit, this paralleled a series of initiatives labelled as the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The idea was to grant European officers a greater number of command posts, enhance the role of SACEUR’s deputy (a European general), elaborate cooperation arrangements between the Western European Union and NATO and specify the rules whereby NATO assets and command structures could be called on by the WEU. These developments were celebrated at the Berlin Summit in 1996.14 The WEU was to have assured access to NATO planning capabilities and ‘presumed’ access to a handful of pre-designated NATO assets. In the event of a situation in which the WEU would draw on NATO capabilities, the WEU would assume the strategic direction and political control of a European operation involving Allied assets. Eventually, at the Berlin NATO Summit the Americans also agreed to allow the WEU access to US airlift and satellite intelligence capabilities. With France reintegrating into a Europeanized NATO a new security architecture was to have emerged with the agreement of all parties, including the United States.15 For a while, it seemed to be the ‘victory of the Anglo-American idea’, giving pride of place to NATO.16 However, this hope collapsed when political declarations were put to the test of real concessions. Tensions arose when it came to implementing ESDI. France insisted that, to make ESDI a reality, Europe had to have its fair share of command appointments in NATO, which is what the Berlin talks seemed

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to imply.17 When its demand that a European general be placed at the head of the Mediterranean forces in Naples (AFSOUTH) was rejected by the US on the grounds that its fleet could not be placed under European command, France halted its rapprochement. As Phil Gordon wrote, ‘[h]aving announced that France would re-join the integrated Alliance bodies only if the United States genuinely agreed to give the Europeans a greater role, President Jacques Chirac felt obliged to “deliver” that greater role, lest he be accused of getting nothing in return for France’s reintegration’.18 If the US was unwilling to make such a small concession, the French thought, how could Europeans trust that it would lend NATO assets to the WEU in the event of a crisis? The Alliance again faced an impasse as France returned to a ‘politics of ambivalence’ towards it.19 The failure of the French–NATO rapprochement highlighted the untenable assumptions of ESDI.20 To keep the NATO framework that they preferred in place US and British diplomats agreed to enhance its European profile through the WEU, the so-called European pillar. But a genuine transfer of authority to Europeans, either to the WEU or inside the Alliance structure, did not follow this symbolic move. The Berlin agreement was more attractive for its rhetoric of openness than for its actual implications. Indeed, presumed WEU access to NATO assets, upon which the US–British conception rested, was highly problematic since NATO itself held very few of these assets. NATO owns no military forces, intelligence capabilities, satellites or means of projection. An air defence system, some fixed C3 assets, oil pipelines, bunkers and shelters were not very useful for the force projection that the WEU was supposed to undertake. True, Europeans could use the 18 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes and SHAPE planning capabilities, but even then the question remained as to how US officers could be pulled out.21 Europeans were told that they had to use NATO assets, rely on NATO planning and ask for NATO’s permission (the so-called ‘right of first refusal’), but those assets alone did not allow them to carry out the ambitious tasks they were thinking of undertaking. Lacking in symbolic strength and real buy-in from important actors such as France or the EU, ESDI did not help Europe address its capability gaps. A bigger concern was that of political authority. Unknown to the public and dormant for many decades, the WEU could not become a real partner, let alone a competitor, for NATO. With ESDI, the question of strategic direction and political guidance – that is, of decision-making autonomy – remained elusive despite formal concessions to putatively European operational control. Put differently, NATO could supply its services, but the demand side remained plagued by the lack of a credible European

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decision-making body. The focus had been on giving the military organization a greater European profile; in so doing the political autonomy of Europeans was sacrificed in exchange for uncertain access to modest assets. No one really believed that, as Berlin agreements implied, Europeans would obtain the critical US-owned capabilities that it possibly had access to, such as strategic airlift or satellite intelligence.22 The Pentagon insisted that it keep firm control of any American piece of equipment or staff. ESDP was hammered out by British and French officials as a way out of this dilemma. First discussed informally in London after Tony Blair lifted Britain’s opposition to European defence, it was hastily launched in December 1998 at Saint-Malo.23 Speaking of the EU, the Franco-British declaration used the words ‘autonomous capacity for action using credible military forces’. Made possible by Britain’s about-face, the declaration was an ambiguously-worded compromise. The term ‘autonomous’ in particular was understood differently in Paris and in London: did it refer to enhanced capabilities, as the British insisted, or to autonomous decision-making, as the French hoped for? Through an opinion piece in the Financial Times, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright gave her support to Tony Blair’s European move but insisted that a European defence initiative should not ‘decouple’ Europe from NATO, ‘duplicate’ NATO structures or ‘discriminate’ against nonEU members.24 This was a success for Britain, which had managed to please both the Americans and the French.25 The Washington Communiqué of the 50th North Atlantic Council, in April 1999, ‘welcome[d] the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defense’ and ‘acknowledge[d] the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action’. But the communiqué went on to add: ‘where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged’. This reiterated the taboo of NATO’s ‘right of first refusal’. Even if NATO allowed the EU to conduct a military operation, this would have to take place within the limits set by the Berlin Summit, which made provision for the use of pre-identified NATO assets and planning capabilities by the WEU with Deputy SACEUR as Commander and ultimate Allied control over them.26 In sum, the Atlantic Alliance stuck to ESDI, as it had since 1994, but was willing to substitute the EU for the WEU as its European partner. Now, under the impression that despite its reservations the US government had rubberstamped Blair’s initiative, all of NATO (except Denmark and Turkey) seemed to share the British option.27 The French were more reserved, but they were not willing to grind the British-agreed European defence initiative to a halt.

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Leaving the field: the United States and ESDP under the Bush Administration Despite its misgivings about European defence, the Clinton Administration had, throughout the 1990s, backed up British proposals in a fairly consistent, if guarded, manner.28 The military hierarchy had its doubts about ESDI; but the State Department was trying to find a way to accommodate European demands in spite of Congress’s less understanding position, so long as it remained under NATO’s purview.29 The US thoroughly supported NATO but, at Britain’s insistence, it was willing to accept a non-threatening form of ESDP as well, especially if it could lead to a better sharing of the European defence burden. On taking over the Oval Office, it seemed to ESDP proponents that the second Bush Administration would prove an inadvertently easier partner. They felt that the new government, which had expressed its reluctance to undertake peacemaking missions, would give Europeans greater room to manoeuvre than the Clinton staff had. Because, it was believed, the new administration cared less about Europe than the previous one had, it would also grant the EU more autonomy in defence and security-related matters.30 In a way, the optimists were right. Bush’s indifference to NATO allowed the EU Council to carve out its role in security affairs. This was reinforced by the September 11 events. In the hours that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO Secretary General George Robertson – Tony Blair’s former defence minister – convinced the organization’s members to invoke, for the first time since its inception, the Alliance’s Article 5, whereby an attack against one of the Alliance’s members is considered as an attack against all of them, and at the same time offer a European military contribution. In so doing, officials thought they would, aside from expressing unfailing solidarity with the American people, demonstrate NATO’s relevance in a changing world. It came as a shock to many when this offer was met with polite disdain in Washington. For many commentators, the highly symbolic gesture of invoking Article 5 to no avail threatened to precipitate the fall of NATO into strategic irrelevance.31 In subsequent months, two things became clear. First, US interest in European affairs dissolved spectacularly. The impression that the US would sooner rather than later pull out from Europe (already strong during the Balkan wars despite Clinton’s fairly active policy) became a conviction. According to Gordon, 9/11 would hasten the withdrawal of US troops from the Balkans, making the EU’s military involvement in this region more than just a theoretical possibility.32 Indeed, some in Washington

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came to see ESDP as a way for the Europeans to bolster their military capabilities and manage crises in regions of low strategic interest to the US. Second, NATO would never look the same again. What was left of it would no longer serve to underwrite Europe’s security concerns but America’s, and according to America’s wishes. Atlanticists found some comfort in the creation of an International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Another reason for comfort was the fact that Germany took over the command of the ISAF and deployed thousands of soldiers overseas, which augured well for NATO as well as for ESDP. But Atlanticists could not fail to notice that US officials saw this merely as back-up support for its own military policy. In the beginning, European governments did little to dispel the new notion that the US could ‘pick and choose’ its allies on an ad hoc basis. Indeed, they did not activate ESDP structures and chose instead to offer military support in Afghanistan on a bilateral and national basis.33 The most optimistic analysts argued that ‘NATO was becoming more of a European security organization, less of an alliance’.34 But it was moving in that direction on American terms, and in a way that, ironically, seemed to duplicate the EU’s common foreign policy. In spite of declaratory hubris, 9/11 shattered the transatlantic myth. British leaders continued to argue that NATO was simply modernizing its doctrine, and remained the best way to entangle the US in a multilateral security relationship, but it sounded more like an incantation than an accurate description of American behaviour. The Pentagon, which had grown wary of European militaries in the past decade, had taken over the State Department in terms of US security policy. The staunchly conservative Congress, which was no longer counterbalanced by a more Europe-friendly executive, reinforced the defiance toward Europe.35 As Julian Lindley-French writes: ‘Contrary to what much of the hype has suggested, 11 September did not in itself create change in the transatlantic security relationship, but it has certainly accelerated existing dynamics.’36 By and large, the transatlantic relationship remained intact. No one really opposed US intervention in Afghanistan. Yet the US response to the crisis further highlighted the American military’s diminished trust in NATO and the Europeans. For many experts, the war in Kosovo should have heralded the renewed relevance of the military alliance. Its intervention had been successful overall, and it had allowed the partners to pinpoint the organization’s main drawbacks – notably Europe’s capability gaps – with a view to solving them through NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative and ESDP. The war in Afghanistan, however, was a blow to these hopes. Instead of being rejuvenated, NATO as a military alliance was further delegitimized by the US’s unwillingness to grant it more than a functional role as the

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centre for the logistical support for European troops. Though important technically, NATO’s involvement cannot conceal a distinct lack of enthusiasm on the part of European partners.37 The 2002 Prague Summit did little to dispel this perception. At the summit, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld pushed forward his idea of a NATO Response Force that many Europeans saw as a less than subtle means of undercutting their own defence initiative, the EU Rapid Reaction Force agreed upon in Helsinki.38 These tensions were exacerbated by the US decision to topple the Iraqi regime. This time, two major European allies decided to question Washington’s strategy. As is well known, most of the diplomatic row took place in the United Nations but NATO and the EU felt the side effects. France and Germany made it clear from the outset that they disapproved of Bush’s approach to the Iraqi problem. They objected to the US using international institutions to impose its views. While many diplomatic and military actors all over Europe, including France and Germany, were willing to accept an assertive but negotiated solution for Iraq, their uneasiness with Washington’s ‘with us or against us’ rhetoric reached a boiling point. Like others (for example, Cox, 2005), I believe the causes of this crisis to be structural rather than contingent. Afghanistan demonstrated the limits of NATO as a military alliance. Iraq highlighted the mythical dimension of NATO as a transatlantic community. All that remained was a military organization: basically SHAPE’s formidable planning capacity and interoperability standards. Since the political dimension of NATO was in disrepair, there was at this point a risk that European states would revert to strictly national defence policies. The foundation of Blair’s position since 1998 – that is, that it was possible to create a European foreign and defence policy that would be both autonomous and harmonious with the United States’ own views – was put to the test. The French felt increasingly uncomfortable with NATO and, for the first time since its creation, so did German diplomats. But there was nothing to replace it: none of the problems that had given rise to the Saint-Malo process were solved. Then the US became stuck in Iraq, which made a withdrawal from Bosnia all the more pressing. At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO agreed to transfer most of its military operation in Bosnia (SFOR) to the EU. The EU took over on 2 December 2004, with Operation Althea, which is conducted by an EU Military Force (EUFOR) of about 7000 troops. NATO continues to provide operational support to the EU force under the Berlin Plus arrangements, which provide for the lending of NATO’s planning and operational capabilities to the EU. The Operations HQ is in fact NATO’s SHAPE, in Mons. The Operations Commander is Deputy SACEUR, a European general.

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The EU Command Element is located in NATO’s Joint Force Command, in Naples. The EU force is composed of task forces that were already on the ground with SFOR but now work under the strategic direction and political control of the EU. This shows the technical importance of the Atlantic Alliance, but also its political limits. The difference with SFOR is that US troops have left EUFOR. This is both an act of openness and a sign that the US is disengaging militarily from Europe. As Barry Posen suggests on the basis of a ‘weak balance-of-power’ argument, the United States’ relative weakening on the global security front has allowed ESDP to flourish.39 In Washington, ESDP has become a non-issue, a way for the Europeans to take on missions that are considered of low strategic relevance to the US. This opens a window of opportunity for ESDP to proceed unencumbered with the politically divisive rhetoric that hitherto prevailed. But it poses a challenge for countries like Canada that are neither close enough to the EU to hope to have a say in ESDP nor big enough to afford being on their own.

Canada: an awkward partner Canadian diplomacy has been broadly supportive of ESDP, in so far as it poses no challenge to NATO. There were no harsh reactions to the European Defence Initiative in 1998. That being said, Canadian diplomats have missed no opportunities to remind Europeans of the importance of transatlantic ties and of NATO–EU transparency, while at the same time remaining fairly constructive. In essence, Ottawa has long held on to Madeleine Albright’s ‘three D’s’, minus the abrupt rhetoric. As far as the Canadian government is concerned, the EU may enhance its military capabilities and sometimes act on its own, so long as NATO remains the ultimate security organization and any Allied third-party is welcome to participate in EU operations. For a long time, the question on the Canadian side was ‘What’s in it for Canada?’ 40 The answer was, not much.41 As a result, the Canadian government has remained fixated on the issue of NATO’s prominence, exemplified by its ‘right of first refusal’, behaving as if NATO would remain the primary forum for transatlantic discussions. As late as 2000, when it had become clear that an autonomous but NATO-friendly ESDP would proceed, Defence Minister Art Eggleton still emphasized that NATO and the EU should integrate their planning processes in a transatlantic system.42 By that time, however, the EU was clearly beyond that stage. For geopolitical and organizational reasons, Canada has always been adamant vis-à-vis the transatlantic community: NATO is the only

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organization that allows Ottawa to reconcile the European affinities of some with the American allegiance of others. The Atlantic Alliance enables this small North American country to do credible military crisis management in a combined context while remaining engaged in Europe. Since the Treaty of Washington, signed in 1949, Canada has seen NATO as more than a military alliance: it was, for the Canadian drafters of the treaty, a transatlantic political community.43 For obvious reasons, the idea of a two-pillar Alliance was never popular in Ottawa. Canada would then be isolated between a European caucus, which countries like Norway and Turkey would naturally feel closer to, and a large neighbour that has clearly shifted its priorities. Today, Ottawa advocates the elevation of NATO to a broad political forum as a way out of this conundrum.44 Yet there does not seem to be much appetite for this project in other capitals: NATO is not necessarily the first place European and US officials go to discuss important challenges, witness the Contact Group in Bosnia, the Quartet in the Middle East, and the diplomatic discussions over Iran’s nuclear programme. To a large extent, the Canadian ambivalence towards ESDP also reflects a bureaucratic divide between the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Department of Foreign Affairs. On the one hand, the Canadian military is highly integrated with the US in the context of continental defence, of which NORAD is a prime illustration. Canada–US cooperation is held in high regard in the Canadian defence establishment. Hundreds of Canadian soldiers are stationed in the US and there exist several mechanisms, such as the Planning Group, the Military Cooperation Committee and the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, that have institutionalized Canada–US relations.45 On the other hand, Canada’s strategic identity, which is focused on peacekeeping, conflict prevention, low-intensity warfare and human security, is much closer to that of the Europeans.46 The EU’s security motto, ‘effective multilateralism’, resonates in Canadian foreign policy circles in a way that it does not in, say, Washington. Ottawa trusts the EU more than the US does. Thanks to a series of political declarations, ranging from the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration to the 2004 Partnership Agenda, there is a relatively dense system of contacts between Canada and the EU at the political-diplomatic level. The Canadian Ambassador to the EU meets with the PSC Troika at least once a year. Political directors meet twice a year. These meetings and others prepare the way for biannual summits with the Canadian Prime Minister, the President of the European Commission, the head of government of the country that holds the EU Presidency, and the High Representative. By contrast, US and EU leaders meet only once a year.

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But Canada’s security and defence engagement with the EU has been weak, institutionally speaking. This reflects, in part, the Department of Defence’s lack of enthusiasm towards ESDP. While the diplomacy section of the 2005 International Policy Statement hails the EU as a ‘strategic partner’ and a ‘natural ally’, the defence section devotes six short, factual sentences to the EU. There is no formal consultative mechanism between DND and Brussels’s military structures. To some extent, Canada’s military cooperation with Europe is bilateral. Liaison officers are posted in the capitals of traditional allies, such as France, Germany and especially Great Britain, but not in the EU Military Staff proper. To a much greater extent, institutional focus remains directed at NATO, where dozens of Canadians work. Defence officials remain of the view that the only way to conceive Canada–EU cooperation in the area of defence is through NATO–EU cooperation. Key initiatives to enhance the Canada–EU relationship have come from the Department of Foreign Affairs. The 2000 Joint Declaration on Defence and Security, prepared with the French Presidency, had provisions for an important Canadian role, through Political and Security Consultations, in the Committee of Contributors and through the posting of a liaison officer in the EU Military Staff. While Political and Security Consultations were institutionalized, the Committee of Contributors has failed so far to play an important operational role. This is in large part due to some EU governments being wary of third-party infringement on EU autonomy. But DND has also chosen not to enhance its role in EU structures, which it could have done with the posting of a liaison officer or a military attaché in the Canadian Mission to the EU or through direct contacts and cooperative efforts, for example in the area of procurement with the new European Defence Agency.47 Canadian industrialists and defence officials are definitely outside the ESDP network. Political impetus may force National Defence to catch up. Canadian Forces have participated in two EU operations so far: they provided airlift to the EU’s autonomous military operation in the Congo and have made a short-lived but considerable contribution of 70-odd troops to the EU’s Military Force in Bosnia. In November 2005, Ottawa and Brussels signed a ‘Canada-EU Agreement establishing a framework for the participation of Canada in EU crisis management operations’. This means that Canada is willing to put its troops under the political and operational control of an international organization of which it is not a member.48 It remains to be seen whether the Canadian contribution to EUFOR will be the beginning of a pattern of military cooperation, much like the Norwegian strategy of ‘troops for influence’,49 or prove to be a one-off initiative.

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Conclusion The EU and the US are increasingly treating NATO as an instrument of their respective foreign policies, not as a political forum, let alone a security community. As the editors of this book argue, the EU has become the institutional centre of gravity for security policy deliberation, coordination and action by European governments. The EU is building a security and defence policy that, most of the time, will rely on NATO’s military capabilities. But while the EU has not yet developed the same CFSP instruments it uses in the UN and other international organizations – partly because some EU countries are not members of the Atlantic Alliance, which prevents foreign policy decisions unanimously arrived at (‘common decisions’) from being pursued in the North Atlantic Council – one can expect that its members will increasingly caucus among themselves before going to NATO meetings, at least at the strategic level. Formal NATO–EU meetings are already almost devoid of content, since most delegates discuss substantive issues in an EU context before meeting with their equals again in the NATO–EU context. The US, for its part, is clearly disengaging from NATO, both as a military alliance and as a meaningful political community. In Afghanistan, for example, NATO is involved through ISAF but American forces operate separately. The US may convince the Allies to renew the Afghan experience, for example around the Mediterranean or in the Sudan, and develop the NATO Response Force. If that is the case, NATO will serve as a vehicle for a European contribution. But the converse will not be true. The Europeans will not be able to convince the US to back their own priorities with appeals to transatlantic solidarity. As I have suggested in this chapter, NATO remains an important tool of interoperability and cross-national socialization for European militaries,50 but its political importance, as a transatlantic security organization, will likely continue to decrease. Washington’s recent proposal to boost NATO ties with countries like Australia, New Zealand and Japan, in what would become a ‘global partnership’, only serves to underscore the shifting contours of security cooperation from the US perspective.51 In security as in trade, transatlantic relations are now EU–US relations. The few European states that are not members of the EU are either candidates (Bulgaria, Romania) or closely associated to it (Switzerland, Norway). This leaves Canada in the rather uncomfortable position of being the odd one out. While a great deal of effort has been expended to enhance the political dimension of the Canada–EU relationship, the strategy of sticking to NATO–EU relations in security and defence matters may become

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untenable. The option of transforming the Atlantic Alliance into a transatlantic political forum finds little appeal in Washington or in Brussels. Canadian officials will have to get used to being debriefed after EU–US meetings. This volume opened with a reference to John Palmer’s book Europe without America? and his argument that a transatlantic divide would see Europe increasingly taking its own path. In closing, it is useful to consider the implications of this volume’s argument for transatlantic relations. Fifty years ago, Karl Deutsch and his colleagues thought they were witnessing the emergence of a political community across the Atlantic. In the 1950s and 1960s, despite their size, European governments and small countries like Canada were able to exert considerable influence on US foreign policy thanks to a densely institutionalized transatlantic community.52 But the regionalization of the world system since the end of the Cold War, which Katzenstein analyses as the rise of two regional orders, Asia and Europe, constituted by their relationship to the American ‘imperium’, renders the concept of a transatlantic community less relevant than ever.53 This does not mean that North America and Europe are bound to become rivals or strangers. Yet the concept of a security community implied something more than a strong relationship between the US and a regional grouping. It meant that smaller entities, such as Canada and Norway, could sit at the table and, by virtue of a perceived common identity make their voices heard. This, at least so far as security and defence issues are concerned, will become more difficult. Of course, as Katzenstein indicates, regional orders are porous, and there are all sorts of institutional links that can be established between different geometries of countries in flexible and à la carte arrangements. However, transatlantic relations will now be characterized by more power and less identity, and by a Europe more willing and able to act alone as a security actor in world affairs.

Notes 1. Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003). 2. Radio Canada International, 7 March 2005. 3. Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 4. Nina Græger, ‘Norway and the EU Security and Defence Dimension: a “Troopsfor-Influence” Strategy’, in The ESDP and the Nordic Countries: Four Variations on a Theme, eds Nina Græger, Henrik Larsen and Hanna Ojanen (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003); Mark Webber, Terry Terriff, Jolyon Howorth and Stuart Croft, ‘The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the “Third-Country” Issue’, European Security, 11 (2002): 75–100.

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5. Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace, ‘Not Such a Soft Power: the External Deployments of European Forces’, Survival, 46 (2004): 163–82. 6. André Dumoulin, R. Mathieu and G. Sarlet, La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense: de l’opératoire à l’identitaire (Brussels: Bruylant, 2003); Trevor C. Salmon and Alistair J.K. Shepherd, Toward a European Army: a Military Power in the Making? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 7. Anthony King, ‘Towards a Transnational Europe: the Case of the Armed Forces’, European Journal of Social Theory, 8 (2005): 321–40. 8. Kori Schake, Constructive Duplication (London: Centre for European Reform, 2002); Burkard Schmitt, From Cooperation to Integration: Defence and Aerospace Industries in Europe, Chaillot Paper 40 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2000). 9. Ulrika Mörth and Malena Britz, ‘European Integration as Organizing: the Case of Armaments’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42 (2004): 957–73. 10. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (eds), Defending Europe: the EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy (London: Palgrave, 2003). 11. Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe; Adrian Treacher, ‘From Civilian Power to Military Power: the EU’s Resistible Transformation’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 9 (2004): 49–66. 12. Salmon and Shepherd, Toward a European Army: a Military Power in the Making? 13. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: the European Influence on US Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 14. Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Transatlantic Community: the Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002). 15. Michael Quinlan, European Defence Cooperation: Asset or Threat to NATO? (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001): 22. 16. Stuart Croft, ‘The EU, NATO, and Europeanisation: the Return of Architectural Debate’, European Security, 9 (2000): 8. 17. France has long objected to the virtual US monopoly on NATO commands: the two supreme commands, SACEUR and SACLANT (Atlantic) were held by US generals; among the regional commands, none had been given to a Frenchman since the early 1950s: CINCHAN (deleted in 1994) was held by a British admiral with strong connections with the US Navy; CINCENT and CINCNORTH were held by a German general; and CINCSOUTH was kept for Americans. 18. Philip Gordon, ‘Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy’, International Security, 11 (1998): 35. 19. Anand Menon, France, NATO, and the Limits of Independence: the Politics of Ambivalence (London: Macmillan, 2000). 20. Michael Brenner, Europe’s New Security Vocation (Washington: National Defense University, 2002); Robert Hunter and Donna Farley, The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO’s Companion or Competitor? (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002); Howorth and Keeler (eds), Defending Europe: the EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy. 21. Schake, Constructive Duplication; Terry Terriff, ‘The CJTF Concept and the Limits of European Autonomy’, in Howorth and Keeler (eds), Defending Europe: the EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy. 22. Schake, Constructive Duplication; Terry Terriff, ‘The CJTF Concept and the Limits of European Autonomy’.

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23. Frédéric Mérand, ‘Social Representations in the European Security and Defence Policy’, Cooperation and Conflict, 41 (2006): 131–52; Robert Dover, ‘The Prime Minister and the Core Executive: a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Reading of UK Defence Policy Formulation’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7 (2005): 508–25; Charles Cogan, The Third Option: the Emancipation of European Defence, 1989–2000 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). 24. Madeleine Albright, ‘The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future: the Alliance in the 21st Century Will Require New Cooperation in Defending Enlarged Borders against a Variety of Threats’, Financial Times, 7 December 1998, 22. To these 3 D’s Lord Robertson responded with his three I’s: indivisibility of the Alliance, improved European capabilities, inclusiveness of all partners. 25. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Transatlantic Community: the Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered. 26. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Transatlantic Community: the Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered; Hunter and Farley, The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO’s Companion or Competitor? 27. Brenner, Europe’s New Security Vocation. 28. Ronald Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade itself for a New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 29. Brenner, Europe’s New Security Vocation; Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Transatlantic Community: the Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered. 30. Schake, Constructive Duplication. 31. Philip Gordon, ‘NATO after 11 September’, Survival, 43 (2002): 89–106; Jolyon Howorth, ‘France, Britain, and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis’, Survival, 45 (2003): 173–92. 32. Gordon, ‘NATO after 11 September’. 33. Howorth, ‘France, Britain, and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis’. 34. Anthony Forster and William Wallace, ‘What is NATO For?’, Survival, 43 (2004): 107. 35. Tod Lindberg (ed.), Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America, and the Future of a Troubled Partnership (London: Routledge, 2004); Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Transatlantic Community: the Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered. 36. Julian Lindley-French, Terms of Engagement: the Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma Post-11 September, Chaillot Papers 52 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2002), 41. 37. Michael Cox, ‘Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia’, European Journal of International Relations, 11 (2005): 203–33; Julian Lindley-French, Terms of Engagement: the Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma post11 September. 38. Michael Clarke and Paul Cornish, ‘The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit’, International Affairs, 78 (2002): 777–88. 39. Barry Posen, ‘ESDP and the Structure of World Power’, The International Spectator, XXXIX (2004): 5–17. 40. John Bryson, ‘European Security and Defence Policy: What’s In It for Canada?’, in NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, eds Alex Moens et al. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 83–107. 41. Alex Moens, ‘Thinking Outside the Box: NATO–ESDP Cooperation at 23’, in NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, eds Alex Moens et al., 67–82.

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42. Neil Macfarlane, ‘Canada and the European Pillar of Defence’, in What NATO for Canada?, ed. David Haglund (Kingston: Queen’s Centre for International Relations, 2000), 53–70; Michel Fortmann and Hélène Viau, ‘Le Canada et la PESD: une politique à la croisées des chemins’, La revue internationale et stratégique, 44 (2002): 41–52. 43. David G. Haglund, The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End (Toronto: Irwin, 2000). 44. Conference by H. E. Jean-Pierre Juneau, Ambassador of Canada to NATO, Montréal, 24 March 2006. 45. Stéphane Roussel, The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Security Institution-building in Canada–US Relations, 1867–1958 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004). 46. David B. Dewitt and Jeffrey P. Plante, ‘National Defence vs Foreign Affairs: Culture Clash in Canada’s International Security Policy?’, International Journal, 59 (2004): 579–97. 47. Frédéric Mérand, ‘Les nouvelles relations transatlantiques en matière de défense: quel rôle pour le Canada?’, Canadian Foreign Policy, 12 (2005): 33–47. 48. Ibid. 49. Nina Græger, ‘Norway and the EU Security and Defence Dimension: a “Troops-for-Influence” Strategy’, in The ESDP and the Nordic Countries: Four Variations on a Theme, eds Nina Græger, Henrik Larsen and Hanna Ojanen. 50. Alexandra Gheciu, ‘Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the New Europe’, International Organization, 59 (2005): 973–1012. 51. Daniel Dombey, ‘NATO Looks to Create a Global Partnership’, Financial Times, 3 April 2006, 5. 52. Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: the European Influence on US Foreign Policy; Roussel, The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Security Institution-building in Canada–US Relations, 1867–1958. 53. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium.

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222 Select Bibliography Ferrero-Waldner, Benita (2006), Die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik als Wohlstandsund Sicherheitsanker, SPEECH/06/325, Meeting of COSAC (Conférence des Organes Spécialisés en Affaires Communautaires), Vienna, May 22, 2006, http:// europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference⫽SPEECH/06/325&format⫽ HTML&aged⫽0&language⫽DE&guiLanguage⫽en (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (2005), Quo vadis Europa? EPP ‘Paneuropa’ Group, SPEECH05/797, Strasbourg, 16 December, 2005, Luxembourg: OOPEC, http://europa.eu.int/rapid/press ReleasesAction.do?reference⫽SPEECH/05/797&format⫽HTML&aged⫽0&lan guage⫽EN&guiLanguage⫽en (accessed 25 June 2006). Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defence, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998, http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/1998/stmalo.asp (accessed 25 June 2006). German Delegation to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2001), Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus: Anpassung der Verteidigungsf ähigkeiten des Bündnisses, Brussels, 18 December 2001, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/ germany/docu/k011218d.html (accessed 25 June 2006). Gilmorel, Gerry (2002), ‘Rumsfeld: NATO, like U.S., Needs to Transform its Military’, in United States Department of Defence: American Forces Information Service, Warsaw, 22 September 2002, Washington: United States Department of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2002/n09222002_200209221.html (accessed 25 June 2006). International Crisis Group (2005), Serbia: Spinning its Wheels, Europe Briefing 39, Brussels/Belgrade: International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/ library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia_spinning_its_wheels.pdf (accessed 25 June 2006). Klaus, Vaclav (2006), Speech by the President of the Czech Republic, The BridgeForum Dialogue, 8 March 2006, http://www.forum-dialogue.lu/pdf/discours_ mersch_08_03_06.pdf. Kostelka, Miroslav (2003), Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion – Progress Report, Contribution of the Czech Republic’s Minister of Defence Miroslav Kostelka to the NATO Defence Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 1 December 2003, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/ s031201c.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). Lugar, Richard G. (1993), NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business? A Call for US Leadership to Revive and Redefine the Alliance Remarks to the Open Forum of the US Department of State, Press Release, 2 August 1993, Washington: United States Department of State. Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (1992), ‘Petersberg Declaration’, in Europa-Archiv 47, D479–485. Nissinen, Marja (ed.) (1999), A Compilation of Speeches; Foreign Ministers’ Conference on the Northern Dimension, Helsinki, 11–12 November 1999, Helsinki: Unit for the Northern Dimension in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2006), SHAPE Issues: the NATO Response Force – NRF, Mons, Belgium: NATO Integrated Data Service, Allied Command Operations; Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, http://www.nato.int/shape/ issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (2005), Briefing: Deploying Capabilities Faster and Further than Ever Before, January 2005, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/nrf-e.pdf (accessed 25 June 2006).

Select Bibliography 223 —— (2005), NATO–EU: a Strategic Partnership, Brussels, 16 November 2005, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/ (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (2005), SHAPE Information: Berlin Plus Agreement, Mons, Belgium: NATO Integrated Data Service, Allied Command Operations; Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/ se030822a.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (2004), Briefing: Combating Terrorism at Sea, April 2004, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/terrorism_at_ sea-e.pdf (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (2004), Statement on Iraq Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul on 28 June 2004, Press Release 2004(098), Istanbul, 28 June 2004, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-098d.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (2004), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Istanbul, 28 June 2004, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06istanbul/docu-cooperation.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (2003), NATO’s Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism, Brussels, October 2003, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/ ims/docu/terrorism.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (2002), Prague Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002, Press Release (2002) 127, Prague, 21 November 2002, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (2002), Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, Prague, 21 November 2002, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021121a.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (2002), EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, Press Release (2002) 142, Brussels, 16 December 2002, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/ docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (2001), Statement on Combating Terrorism: Adapting the Alliance’s Defence Capabilities, Press Release (2001) 173, Brussels, 18 December 2001, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-173e.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (1999), Membership Action Plan (MAP), Press Release NAC-S(99)66, Washington, 24 April 1999, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/ docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (1999), The Alliance’s Strategic Concept: Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington DC on 23 and 24 April 1999, Press Release NAC-S(99)65, Washington, 24 April 1999, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/ pr/1999/p99-065e.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (1996), Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including the Berlin Decision on Building a European Security and Defense Identity Within the Alliance), Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)63, Berlin, 3 June 1996, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/ 1996/p96-063e.htm (accessed 25 June 2006).

224 Select Bibliography —— (1992), Final Communiqué Issued by the North Atlantic Council, NATO Ministerial Communiqué M-NAC-1 (92) 51, Oslo, 4 June 1992, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-5/c920604a.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (1992), Final Communiqué Issued by the North Atlantic Council, NATO Ministerial Communiqué M-NAC-2(92)106, Brussels, 17 December 1992, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/4995/c921217a.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (1991), The Alliance Strategic Concept: Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 8 November 1991, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/ basictxt/b911108a.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (1991), Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, NATO Press Communiqué S-1(91)86, Rome, 8 November 1991, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (1990), Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (‘The London Declaration’), London, 6 July 1990, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b900706a.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (1967), The Future Tasks of the Alliance (‘The Harmel Report’), Brussels, 14 December 1967, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/ docu/basictxt/b671213a.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (1956), Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, Brussels, 13 December 1956, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/bt-a3.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). Prodi, Romano (2002), A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Brussels, 5–6 December 2002. Rumsfeld, Donald H. (2001), Speech of Secretary of Defence, United States of America, at the 27th Munich Conference on Security Policy, transcript 2001 Munich Conference on Security Policy, 3 February 2001, Munich: Munich Conference on Security Policy, ttp://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php? id⫽31&sprache⫽en& (accessed 25 June 2006). Russian Federation (2005), Road Map on the Common Space of External Security, Moscow, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/88029.shtml (accessed 25 June 2006). —— (2000), The Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union (2000–2010), Moscow, http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/p_245.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop (2004), NATO’s Istanbul Summit: New Missions, New Means, Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Royal United Services Institute, London, 18 June 2004, Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040618a.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). Schröder, Gerhard (2005), Speech of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany at the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy, transcript 2005 Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2 December 2005, Munich Conference on Security Policy, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php? menu_2005⫽&menu_konferenzen⫽&sprache⫽en&id⫽143& (accessed 25 June 2006).

Select Bibliography 225 Solana, Javier (2004), Interview on Russia–EU relations 13.05.2004, RIA Novosty, Brussels, 13 May 2004, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/ docs/pressdata/EN/sghr_int/80565.pdf (accessed 25 June 2006). United Nations (2000), Security Council Holds Debate on Impact of Aids on Peace and Security in Africa, January 10, 2000, Press Release SC 67. United Nations Security Council (2004), The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait, S/Res/1546 (2004), New York, 8 June 2004, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/ 381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 25 June 2006). United States (2006), The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (accessed 25 June 2006). United States Department of State (2005), Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Remarks with Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rotfeld after Meeting, Warsaw, 5 February 2005, Washington: United States Department of State, http:// www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/41848.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). Yushchenko, Viktor (2005), Ukraine’s Future is in the EU, address by the President of Ukraine to the European Parliament, Brussels, 23 February 2005, New York: OOPEC, http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_4382_en.htm (accessed 25 June 2006).

References and further reading Allen, David and Michel Smith (1990), ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena’, Review of International Studies, 16 (1): 19–37. Allin, Dana, Michael Emerson and Marius Vahl (eds) (2004), Readings in European Security, vol. 2, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. Anderson, Malcolm (2000), ‘Terrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation’, in Fernando Reinares (ed.), European Democracies against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, Aldershot: Ashgate, 227–43. Anderson, Malcolm (2002), ‘What Future for Counter-Terrorism as an Objective of European Police Co-operation?’, in Malcolm Anderson and Joanna Apap (eds), Police and Justice Co-operation and the New European Borders, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 219–26. Andréani, Gilles, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant (2001), Europe’s Military Revolution, London: Centre for European Reform. Andreas, Peter and Richard Price (2001), ‘From War-fighting to Crime-fighting: Transforming the American National Security State’, International Studies Review, 3 (3): 31–52. Archik, Kristin and Paul Gallis (2004), ‘NATO and the European Union’, Washington: United States of America Congressional Research Service, http://fpc.state.gov/ documents/organization/31988.pdf (accessed 25 June 2006). Asmus, Richard and Alexandr Vondra (2005), ‘The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18 (2): 203–16. Asmus, Ronald (2002), Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era, New York: Columbia University Press. Bacia, Horst (2005), ‘So gut wie vergessen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 April 2005.

226 Select Bibliography Batt, Judy (2003), ‘The EU’s New Borderlands’, CER Working Paper, London: Centre for European Reform. Becher, Klaus (2004), ‘Has-been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World after the 2003 European Security Strategy’, European Security, 13-II (4): 345–59. Benoit, Loick (2005), ‘La politique de sécurité et de défense commune dans le traité instituant une Constitution pour l’Europe’, Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, 486: 155–62. Bertram, Christoph (1995), Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Beunderman, Mark (2006), ‘Romania and Bulgaria Must Wait until Autumn for EU Entry Date’, EUobserver, 16 May 2006, http://euobserver.com/9/21610 (accessed 16 May 2006). Bigo, Didier (1998), ‘L’immigration à la croisée des chemins sécuritaires’, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 14 (1): 25–46. —— (2000), ‘When Two Become One. Internal and External Securitisations in Europe’, in Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams (eds), International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community, London: Routledge, 175–205. Binnendijk, Hans and Richard Kugler (2004), ‘Needed – A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force’, Defence Horizons, 45: 1–8, http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/ defense_horizons/DH_45.pdf (accessed 25 June 2006). Biscop, Sven (2005a), The European Security Strategy. A Global Agenda for Positive Power, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. —— (2005b), ‘Security and Development: a Positive Agenda for Global EU–UN Partnership’, in Martin Ortega (ed.), The European Union and the United Nations, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 17–30. —— (2004), ‘Able and Willing? Assessing the EU’s Capacity for Military Action’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 9: 509–27. Blinken, Antony J. (2001), ‘The False Crisis over the Atlantic’, Foreign Affairs, 80 (3): 35–48. Borawski, John and Thomas-Durell Young (2001), NATO after 2000: the Future of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Brenner, Michael (2002), Europe’s New Security Vocation, Washington: National Defense University. Bryson, John (2003), ‘European Security and Defence Policy: What’s In It for Canada?’, in Alex Moens, Len Cohen and Allen Sens (eds), NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, Westport, CT: Praeger, 83–107. Bugajski, Janusz and Ilona Teleki (2005), ‘Washington’s New European Allies: Durable or Conditional Partners?’, Washington Quarterly, 28 (2): 95–107. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998), Security: a New Framework for Analysis, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Calleo, David P. (2004), ‘The Broken West’, Survival, 46 (3): 29–38. Cameron, Fraser (in collaboration with Rosa Balfour) (2006), ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Conflict Prevention Tool’, EPC Issue Paper No. 47, Brussels: European Policy Centre. —— (2005), US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, London: Routledge. —— (2004), The Future of Europe, Integration and Enlargement, London: Routledge.

Select Bibliography 227 Cameron, Fraser and Gerrard Quille (2004), ‘ESDP – the State of the Play’, EPC Working Paper 11, Brussels: European Policy Centre. Cavatorta, Francesco, Raj Chari and Sylvia Kritzinger (2006), ‘The European Union and Morocco. Security through Authoritarianism?’, Political Science Series 110, Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies. Ceyhan, Ayse (1999), ‘Migrants as a Threat: a Comparative Analysis of Securitarian Discourse: France and the United States’, in Victoria Gray (ed.), A European Dilemma. Immigration, Citizenship and Identity in Western Europe, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1999. Christopher, Warren and William J. Perry (1997), ‘NATO’s True Mission’, New York Times, 21 October 1997. Clarke, Michael and Paul Cornish (2002), ‘The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit’, International Affairs, 78 (4): 777–88. Clarke, Richard (2004), Against all Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, London: Free Press. Cogan, Charles (2001), The Third Option: the Emancipation of European Defence, 1989–2000, Westport, CT: Praeger. Cohen, Roger (2001), ‘New Analysis: to European Eyes, it’s America the Ugly’, New York Times, 7 May 2001. Coker, Christopher (2004), ‘NATO’s Unbearable Lightness of Being’, RUSI Journal, 149 (3): 18–23. Comelli, Michele (2005), ‘ The Approach of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): Distinctive Features and Differences with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, paper presented at the IGC Net-conference in Brussels, 17 November 2005, http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/moschella.pdf (accessed 25 June 2006). Cornish, Paul (2004), ‘NATO: the Practice and Politics of Transformation’, International Affairs, 80 (1): 63–74. Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards (2005), ‘The Strategic Culture of the European Union: a Progress Report’, International Affairs, 81 (4): 801–20. ––— (2001), ‘Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the Beginnings of the European Strategic Culture’, International Affairs, 77 (3): 587–603. Cox, Michael (2005), ‘Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia’, European Journal of International Relations, 11 (2): 203–33. Cragg, Anthony (1996), ‘The Combined Joint Task Force Concept: A Key Component of the Alliance’s Adaptation’, NATO Review, 44 (4): 7–10, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1996/9604-2.htm (accessed 25 June 2006). Cremona, Marise (2005), ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: Partnership, Security and the Rule of Law’, in Alan Mayhew and Nathaniel Copsey (eds), European Neighbourhood Policy and Ukraine, Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 25–54. —— (2003), ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action’, Common Market Law Review, 40: 1347–66. Croft, Stuart (2000), ‘The EU, NATO, and Europeanisation: the Return of Architectural Debate’, European Security, 9 (3): 1–20. Daalder, Ivo H. and James M. Lindsay (2003), America Unbound: the Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, Washington: Brookings Institution Press. Dahrendorf, Ralf (1986), ‘The Europeanization of Europe’, in Ralf Dahrendorf and Theodore C. Sorensen (eds), A Widening Atlantic? Domestic Change and Foreign Policy, New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

228 Select Bibliography Danilov, Dmitry (2005), ‘Russia and European Security’, in Dov Lynch (ed.), What Russia Sees, Chaillot Paper 74, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 79–97. —— (2005), ‘Russia–EU Cooperation in the Security Field: Trends and Conceptual Framework’, in Hanna Smith (ed.), Russia and its Foreign Policy, Saarijarvi: Kikimora Publications. —— (2004), ‘Russlands Interessen. Pragmatismus und Suche nach Balancen’, Internationale Politik, 59 (3): 11–17. —— (2001), ‘Russian Security Policy and Developing EU–Russia Relationship in the Political and Security Field’, in Katlijn Malfliet and Lien Verpoest (eds), Russia and Europe in a Changing International Environment, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 101–15. —— (2002), ‘The EU’s Rapid Reaction Capability’, in Mark Houben, Klaus Becher and Michael Emerson (eds), Readings in European Security, vol. 1, Brussels: CEPS, IISS, 98–106. Dannreuther, Roland (2006), ‘Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: the European Neighbourhood Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 11: 183–201. Dashwood, Alan and Angus Johnston (2004), ‘The Institutions of the Enlarged EU under the Regime of the Constitutional Treaty’, Common Market Law Review, 41 (6): 1481–518. Dassu, Marta and Roberto Menotti (2005), ‘Europe and America in the Age of Bush’, Survival, 47 (1): 105–22. Dehousse, Franklin, Wouter Coussens, Jordi Garcia and Pierre van den Brule (eds) (2003), ‘The Convention’s Draft Constitutional Treaty: Old Wine in a New Bottle?’, Studia Diplomatica, 56 (1–2): 1–189. Dempsey, Judy (2005), ‘For EU and NATO, a Race for Influence’, International Herald Tribune, 18 February 2005. Deudney, Daniel H. and Richard A. Mathew (eds) (1999), Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics, New York: State University of New York. Deutsche Welle (2005), ‘Schröder Slammed over NATO Reform Idea’, 14 February 2005, Bonn: Deutsche Welle, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564, 1488890,00.html (accessed 25 June 2006). Devuyst, Youri (2005), The European Union Transformed: Community Method and Institutional Evolution from the Schuman Plan to the Constitution for Europe, Brussels: P.I.E-Peter Lang. Dewitt, David B. and Jeffrey P. Plante (2004), ‘National Defence vs. Foreign Affairs: Culture Clash in Canada’s International Security Policy?’, International Journal, 59 (3): 579–97. Dietrich, Mirjam (2005), ‘Facing the Global Terrorist Threat: a European Response’, EPC Working Paper 14, Brussels: European Policy Centre. Dombey, Daniel (2005), ‘Return of Realpolitik’, Financial Times, 10 May 2005. Dover, Robert (2005), ‘The Prime Minister and the Core Executive: a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Reading of UK Defence Policy Formulation’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7 (4): 508–25. Drozdiak, William (1999), ‘Air War Exposed Arms Gap within NATO’, Washington Post, 28 June 1999. Duke, Simon (2003), ‘The Convention, the Draft Constitution and External Relations: Effects and Implications for the EU and its International Role’, EIPA

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Index Adamkus, Valdas, 62 Afghanistan, 8, 15, 19, 25, 35, 55, 64, 68, 69, 71, 79, 141, 161, 163, 164, 166, 172, 174, 192, 197, 210, 211, 215 Africa, 6, 18, 34, 37, 78, 164, 195, 198 Congo, 18, 78, 170, 198, 202, 204, 214 AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome), 36 Albania, 48, 56, 58 Albanians, 11 ALTHEA (EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina), 18, 189, 204 Amsterdam Treaty, 13, 173, 190 Andriessen, Frans, 115 Armenia, 118, 121, 124, 125, 129, 174 Asia, 24, 78, 135, 166, 173, 193, 198, 216, 219 Aceh, 78 Atanasiu, Teodor, 57, 65 Atlantic Alliance, 9, 27, 28, 48, 49, 55, 71, 161, 162, 164, 177, 194, 200, 208, 212, 213, 215, 216 see also NATO Atlanticism, 22, 50, 60, 64 Atlanticist, 62, 63, 188, 210 Austria, 59, 63, 103, 112, 114, 174 Azerbaijan, 118, 121, 124, 125, 129, 174 Aznar, José Maria, 70 Balkans, 77, 78, 112, 140, 161, 163, 172, 174, 184, 188, 192, 209 see also under individual countries’ names Baltic countries or states, 48, 62, 63, 110, 111, 116, 126, 130, 131, 134, 173 see also under individual countries’ names Barcelona process, 39, 114

Belarus, 117, 129, 141, 151, 174 Berlin Plus, 178, 191, 195, 196, 198, 199, 211 Berlusconi, Silvio, 70 Blair, Tony, 70, 154, 190, 191, 202, 208, 209, 211 Blix, Hans, 70 Bosnia, 10–12, 15, 18, 19, 56, 58–60, 63, 78, 81, 112, 139, 164, 189, 190, 196–8, 202, 204, 211, 213, 214 Brazauskas, Algirdas, 63 Bulgaria, 64, 112, 166, 173, 215 Bush, George W., 5, 28, 31, 41, 46, 50–2, 54, 55, 67–9, 71–3, 75, 76, 80, 162, 187, 188, 194, 209, 211 Bush Administration, 5, 31, 50–2, 54, 55, 67, 70, 71, 80, 82, 158, 187, 188, 194, 209 Canada, 71, 190, 194, 195, 202, 204, 206, 212–16 CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization), 39 Caucasian Republics, 119, 125, 128 see also under individual countries’ names Caucasus, 117, 128, 134, 146, 150, 151, 157, 166, 173, 174 see also under individual countries’ names Central and Eastern Europe, 77, 111, 112, 115, 116, 128, 146, 165, 181, 185 see also under individual countries’ names China, 14, 21, 34, 36, 71, 75, 151, 162, 193 Chirac, Jacques, 13, 49, 70, 80, 171, 202, 206, 207 Clinton, William (Bill), 11, 69, 71, 189, 190, 209

237

238

Index

Code of Conduct for Defence Procurement, 98, 108 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 12, 18, 40, 55, 56, 77, 88, 89, 92–4, 98, 104, 105, 107, 109, 113, 118, 136, 138, 151, 185, 187–90, 193, 201, 203–5, 215 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 88–97, 99, 100, 193 see also European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Communism, 48, 68, 69, 111, 163 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 8, 10, 111, 115, 185, 186 conflict prevention, 17, 89, 113, 117, 123, 125, 128, 129, 134, 143, 144, 148, 213 Contact Group, 15, 82, 213 Croatia, 48, 56, 58, 60, 61, 112, 116, 174, 189, 190 Czech Republic, 10, 11, 48, 54, 62, 63, 165, 177, 184 democracy promotion, 62 Denmark, 37, 48, 62, 116, 146, 188, 208 Department of Homeland Security, 71 Directoire, 82, 95 drug-trafficking, 33, 35, 36, 38, 43 Eastern dimension, 62, 64 Egypt, 121 enlargement (EU and NATO), 5, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18, 48, 50, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60–2, 69, 73, 77, 106, 110, 111–13, 115–17, 119, 120, 123, 125, 127, 129, 130, 131, 165, 166 affiliate membership, 115 external incentive, 112, 113, 128 membership carrot, 113 ENP Action Plan, 118, 121, 122, 124, 125, 147 Estonia, 48, 54, 110, 127, 166 EU Constitution, 56, 58, 173 see also Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe

Euro-Mediterranean partnership 114, 128 see also Barcelona process Eurobarometer, 60, 199 Europe Agreements, 112–14 Europe Conference, 114 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 7, 25, 181, 202 European Commission, 8, 89, 92, 106, 110, 115, 117, 119, 120–2, 125–30, 148, 204, 213 Commissioner for External Relations, 40, 92, 93, 115, 123 European Community, European Communities, 8, 18, 101, 114, 133, 181–3, 186, 202 European Confederation, 115, 114 European Convention, 89, 95 European Council, 13, 17, 88, 90–3, 99, 100, 115–17, 122, 154, 190 European Court of Justice, 23, 94, 182, 193 European Defence Agency (EDA), 17, 96, 97, 99, 100, 144, 199, 205, 214 European Defence Community (EDC), 7, 40, 185, 186, 191, 202 European Economic Area (EEA), 114 European External Action Service, 93 European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), 114 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 23, 39, 110, 113, 114, 116, 118–20, 122–9, 147 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), 122 inclusionary approach, 112 proximity policy, 110, 118 see also ENP Action Plan European Parliament, 93, 94, 115, 127, 146 European Political Area, 115 European Political Cooperation (EPC), 8, 134, 186, 187 European security culture, 64 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 13, 16, 19, 21, 23–5, 56, 57, 65, 72, 77–9, 87, 88, 97–100,

Index 118, 125, 129, 135–41, 149, 151, 161, 169–73, 180, 181, 191–3, 195, 199, 202–5, 208–10, 212–14 European Security Strategy (ESS), 17, 22, 23, 32, 72–4, 117, 125, 127, 143, 199, 203 see also Solana doctrine European Union (EU), 2–6, 8, 12–19, 21–6, 31–43, 45–50, 52–64, 67, 68, 70–4, 76–82, 87, 92–101, 110–29, 135–55, 161, 163, 164, 166, 169–75, 180–2, 184, 185, 187–99, 202–9, 211–16 actorness, 111 EU Action Plan against terrorism, 91 EU Battle Groups, 18, 172, 202, 205 EU Commission Delegations, 40 EU Foreign Minister, 77, 89, 93 EU Presidency, 213 EU Rapid Reaction Force, 39, 79, 211 High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 40 Military Committee (MC), 13, 40, 77, 78, 99, 167, 191, 202, 204, 205 Military Staff, 13, 19, 77, 93, 99, 191, 195, 202, 205, 214 Political and Security Committee (PSC), 13, 19, 77, 137, 170, 191, 192, 202, 204 presence, 111 see also enlargement; EU Constitution; European Commission; European Council; European Court of Justice; European Parliament Europeanization, 22, 23, 56, 64, 151 EU-US, 22, 64, 67, 78, 80, 81, 203, 215, 216 transatlantic discourse, 48, 64 Ferrero-Waldner, Benita, 123, 124 Finland, 112, 114, 116, 174 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 112 see also Macedonia

239

France, 6, 8, 12, 13, 18, 19, 34, 37, 49, 50, 58, 59, 63, 71, 82, 87, 110, 118, 147, 163, 167, 170, 171, 182, 184, 188, 190, 191, 193, 195, 206, 207, 211 frozen conflict, 125, 126, 128, 149, 150 Galileo, 32, 124 Georgia, 18, 62, 118, 121, 124, 125, 127, 173, 174 Germany, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12, 19, 37, 59, 63, 70, 71, 76, 80, 115, 118, 146, 147, 162, 164, 170, 171, 182, 183, 185, 193, 195, 210, 211, 214 Great Britain, 186, 214 Hägglund, Gustav, 78 Headline Goals, 13, 17, 169, 170, 172, 205 health, 36, 121, 124 see also AIDS Holsti, Kalevi, 32 Hungary, 10, 11, 37, 48, 63, 165, 184 Hussein, Saddam, 34, 63, 67, 69, 70, 74 illegal immigration, 3, 38, 43, 44 intelligence, 31, 33, 34, 38, 40, 41, 43, 48, 64, 70, 75, 195, 206, 207, 208 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), 89, 95 International Criminal Court (ICC), 43, 80 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 15, 192, 210 Iran, 8, 21, 36, 55, 74–6, 80, 163, 193, 213 Iraq, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 31, 34, 37, 38, 41, 48, 49, 51, 53–6, 61, 69–76, 79, 81, 141, 162–4, 166, 173, 195, 211 Iraq War 1, 3–5, 19, 21, 23, 47–51, 67, 69, 161, 165, 167, 171, 195 Islamic, 31, 35, 37, 194 Italy, 7, 19, 37, 48, 182, 185

240

Index

Jackson, Bruce, 48 Jacoby, Lowell E., 75 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), 38–40, 121 Kaczynski, Lech, 52 Kagan, Robert, 20, 35, 68 Katzenstein, Peter, 36, 203, 216 Klaus, Vaclav, 52, 53 Kohl, Helmut, 71 Kosovo, 11, 58, 59, 79, 135, 164, 165, 170, 172, 190, 196, 197, 199, 210 Kwasniewski, Alexander, 62 Laeken Declaration, 88 Latvia, 48, 110, 127, 166 Lebanon, 121, 128 Lindh, Anna, 117 Lithuania, 48, 62, 63, 110, 126, 127, 128, 166 London, 52, 67, 70, 164, 172, 208 London bombings, 1, 68 London Declaration, 10 London Report, 8 Lukashenko, Alexander, 63 Luxembourg, 59, 116, 182 Maastricht Treaty, 12, 13, 181, 187 Macedonia, 18, 48, 56, 58, 59, 61, 112, 164, 166, 174, 196, 202, 204 Madrid 10, 67, 70 Madrid attacks, Madrid bombings, 1, 4, 16, 35, 68 Merkel, Angela, 61, 65, 174 Middle East, 6, 14, 24, 31, 50, 71, 75, 76, 78, 80, 128, 135, 166, 175, 186, 194, 198, 213 Gaza, 78 Mitterrand, François, 115, 187 models of integration, 114 Moldova, 18, 62, 110, 113, 116–18, 123–8, 141, 150, 151 Montenegro, 56, 58, 59, 63, 112 Morocco, 110, 117, 118, 125 multilateralism, 20, 73, 74, 194, 195, 213 effective multilateralism, 73, 195, 213

Nagorno-Karabakh, 125, 148, 150 neorealist, 35 Netherlands, 6, 50, 75, 87, 101, 110, 182, 188 Newly Independent States (NIS), 111, 112, 118–20, 128 see also under individual countries’ names North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2–21, 23–6, 40, 47–51, 53–9, 61, 62, 64, 67, 71, 74, 78–81, 90, 111, 123, 129, 135, 136, 138–41, 149, 156, 161–76, 180–93, 195–9, 202–17 Article V, 79, 192, 197 Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), 14, 15, 171, 172, 189 enlargement, 5, 14, 48, 61, 62, 128 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), 10, 174, 175, 184 Istanbul Summit, 15, 166, 211 Letter of Eight, 48, 171 London Summit, 184 Riga Summit, 16 Rome Summit, 10, 164, 184 Partnership for Peace (PfP), 10, 141, 174, 175, 179, 184 Prague Summit, 15, 16, 168, 211 Prague Capabilities Commitment, 165 Rapid Reaction Force, 40 Response Force, 16, 57, 79, 165, 197, 211, 215 North Korea, 36, 74, 75 Northern Dimension (initiative), 114, 116 nuclear proliferation, 10, 36 Orange Revolution, 50, 62, 112, 126, 151, 152, 173 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 3, 8, 111, 118, 124, 136, 164, 169, 175, 185 organized crime, 2, 15, 22, 34, 36, 38, 39, 43, 44, 73, 124, 126 drug trafficking, 33, 35, 36, 38, 43 people trafficking, 36

Index Pagrotsky, Leif, 117 Palestine, 80, 118 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), 116, 120, 142, 143, 154, 155 peacekeeping, 10–12, 14, 32, 55, 56, 81, 89, 140, 148–50, 161, 163–5, 169, 172, 184, 189, 195, 196, 213 Pentagon, 71, 75, 76, 79, 208, 210 Petersberg Tasks, 12, 13, 89, 102, 137, 169, 172, 189, 204 physical safety, 36 Poland, 10, 11, 19, 48, 52, 54, 62, 63, 110, 116, 126, 127, 165, 184 Portugal, 48, 112 Prodi, Romano, 110, 118–20 Putin, Vladimir, 51, 126, 137, 149, 154, 155, 171 Regional conflicts, 73 Rice, Condoleezza, 70 Romania, 48, 56, 57, 112, 127, 166, 173, 215 Rome, 70, 111 Ross, Jan, 51 Rumsfeld, Donald, 48–50, 75, 79, 167, 211 Russia, 10, 11, 20, 22–4, 26, 39, 41, 51, 55, 63, 70, 75, 110, 112, 113, 116–19, 123, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 135–55, 162, 164, 173, 174, 182, 186 Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop, 167, 168 Schröder, Gerhard, 67, 71, 80, 161, 193, 203 security, 1–26, 31–45, 47–64, 67–81, 110–14, 117, 119, 120, 123, 126, 128, 129, 135–50, 152–4, 161–6, 171–5, 180, 181, 184, 187–9, 193–9, 203, 204, 206, 209, 210, 212–16 Atlantic security, 25, 181 collective security, 24, 136, 161 debates on security, 4, 31 Euro-Atlantic security, 49, 57, 136, 146, 196 European security, 2–7, 9, 13, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24–6, 32, 36, 47, 51,

241

56, 57, 64, 114, 128, 135, 136, 138, 140, 202, 203, 210 European security identity, 189, 193 externalization of internal security, 38 human security, 213 internal security, 26, 36, 38, 40, 42–4, 111–13, 142 narratives about security, 22, 32, 33 ‘soft security’, 2, 22, 23, 123, 128, 203 traditional security, 90, 162 see also European Security Strategy (ESS) September 11 (11 September 2001, ‘9/11’), 1, 4, 15, 16, 19, 21, 25, 35, 37, 69, 72, 79, 136, 161, 162, 165, 194, 209, 210 Serbia, 5, 11, 12, 56, 58, 59, 63 Slovakia, 48, 62, 63, 166, 173 Slovenia, 48, 58, 166, 173 Solana doctrine, 32, 36 see also European Security Strategy (ESS) Solana, Javier, 40, 43, 62, 73, 117, 204 South-eastern Europe, 39, 47, 56, 57, 60, 61, 114, 188 Soviet Union, 5, 7, 15, 34, 50, 51, 62, 79, 112, 115, 130, 150, 161, 162 Spain, 44, 48, 111, 118, 147 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 114 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 112 Straw, Jack, 117 Supranationalism, 38, 41 Sweden, 62, 112, 114, 174 Taliban, 35, 68, 164 terrorism, 1–4, 10, 14–17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 31 34–8, 42–4, 50, 51, 57, 68, 69, 73, 75, 76, 79, 80, 89, 91, 126, 136, 137, 143, 162, 163, 165, 174, 192, 194 counter-terrorism, 15–17, 33, 42 fight against terrorism, 15, 51, 57, 68, 89, 174

242

Index

terrorism – (Continued) terrorist attacks, 1, 19, 68, 90, 104, 161, 162, 165, 209 see also ‘war on terror’ The Hague Tribunal, 59 transatlantic relations, 1, 17, 20, 22, 23, 48, 50, 55, 61, 67, 70, 80, 204, 215, 216 transatlantic rift, 48, 51, 55, 67, 71, 81 Transnistria, 118, 126, 144, 148, 150 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 18, 87, 99, 110 Ukraine, 10, 18, 39, 50, 62, 63, 110, 112, 113, 116–18, 120, 123, 124–9, 146, 150, 151, 164, 173, 174 United Kingdom, 7, 19, 34 United Nations, 10, 37, 70, 76, 89, 92, 95, 96, 135, 163, 189, 192, 211 Security Council, 10, 11, 18, 24, 36, 69, 70, 92, 135, 192, 195 United Nations Charter, 89, 95 United States (of America), 2–9, 11–17, 19–26, 31, 32, 35–8, 41, 44, 48–53, 55–7, 61–4, 67–82,

123, 129, 136–8, 140, 141, 150, 162–8, 170–4, 176, 182, 184, 186, 192–5, 197, 199, 202, 203, 205–7, 209–13, 215, 216 dominance, 11, 74 exceptionalism, 74 National Security Strategy 2002, 2006, 22, 72, 75, 166 Valionis, Antanas, 128 ‘war on terror’, 1, 15, 16, 19, 26, 31, 44, 50, 68, 69, 162 Warsaw, 67, 70 Warsaw Pact, 11, 15, 50, 78, 183, 184 weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 1, 15, 16, 34, 67, 76, 126, 162, 197 West Balkans, 55, 58, 59, 61 Western European Union (WEU), 8, 12, 13, 182, 185, 187–91, 204, 206–8 Western Sahara, 118 Yanukovych, Viktor, 129 Yugoslavia, 9–13, 37, 188 Yushchenko, Viktor, 127, 173