The Eastern European Economy, 1815-1989

THE ECONOMY OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE, 1815–1989 This comprehensive survey examines the dramatic changes in the economies of Eastern Europe, set in the political context of the region. The Economy of East Central Europe, 1815–1989 reviews two centuries of modernisation in the countries on the western border of the former Soviet Union. Wide in scope and including detailed and informative chronologies, David Turnock traces the economic history of the region within the wider political and ideological context. This exhaustive and thorough review brings together the entire scope of the modernisation process, from the first phase of modern national development in the Balkans and the impact of imperial systems on the area as a whole, to the feeling of ‘unfinished business’ at the end of the Second World War, and continuing up to the end of communism, evaluating the contrasts in the region between the northern and southern states, domestic division between dynamic and backward areas, and the increasing emphasis on the opening up of frontier regions. Balanced and informative, The Economy of East Central Europe, 1815–1989 is essential reading for all those with an interest in Eastern Europe or economic history. David Turnock is Emeritus Professor at the University of Leicester. His main research interest is in post-socialist countries, especially those in Eastern Europe. He is the author of The Making of Eastern Europe: From the Earliest Times to 1815 (1988) and Privatization in Rural Eastern Europe: The Process of Restitution and Restructuring (1998).

THE ECONOMY OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE, 1815–1989 Stages of transformation in a peripheral region

David Turnock

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2006 David Turnock All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Every effort has been made to ensure that the information in this book is true and accurate at the time of going to press. However, neither the publisher nor the author can accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Turnock, David. The economy of East Central Europe 1815–1989: stages of transformation in a peripheral region/David Turnock.—1st ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-415-18053-8 (hardback: alk. paper) 1. Europe, Eastern-Economic conditions. 2. Europe, Central-Economic conditions. I. Title. HC244 .E255 2005 330.943′0009′034—dc22 2005005338 ISBN 0-203-48622-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-59843-1 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN10: 0-415-18053-8 (Print Edition) ISBN13: 9-78-0-415-18053-5 (Print Edition)

For Nicolae Muică with thanks for his companionship over some three decades of field study in rural areas across Romania

CONTENTS List of Figures

ix

List of Tables

xii

List of Abbreviations

xiv

Preface

xv

Introduction: Modernisation in East Central Europe PART I The nineteenth century

1 10

1 The region at the start of the nineteenth century

12

2 Political structures, agriculture and industry

30

3 Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

105

PART II 1914–45

153

4 The First World War, political structures, agriculture and industry

155

5 Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

208

PART III The communist era

265

6 Economy, industry and agriculture

267

7 Infrastructure, services and settlement

328

8 Regional planning and environmental change

379

9 Conclusion

419

Chronology outlining salient political, economic and social events

422

Bibliography

475

Index

503

LIST OF FIGURES 0.1 Physical geography, including major towns and state boundaries 2 for 1945–89 1.1 Political geography of the eighteenth century

13

1.2 The Reşiţa industrial region

24

2.1 The two-field system at Rogoz, Máramaros (Maramureş)

57

2.2 Settlement and ethnicity in the Apuseni Mountains

61

2.3 Industry in Poland in 1900

69

2.4 Industry on the Pürglitz (Krĭivoklát) Estate in Bohemia

72

2.5 The textile manufacturing centre of Łódź

77

2.6 The coalmining settlement of Anina

91

2.7 Industrial regions of Romania 1902

94

2.8 Forest railways in the Eastern Carpathians

100

2.9 Employment in industry in Banat and Transylvania 1910

102

3.1 Waterways in the northern part of the region

110

3.2 Railways in Germany and Poland to 1900

115

3.3 Towns in Hungary 1787–1910

129

3.4 Development of the Bârzava Valley for the Reşiţa metallurgical industry

135

3.5 Urban population 1910

141

4.1 States of East Central Europe after the First World War

158

4.2 Employment, illiteracy and natural increase in Central Europe c. 176 1930 4.3 Crop production and cereal/potato surpluses and deficits by region c.1930

181

4.4 Meat production in Central Europe c. 1930

182

4.5 Forest railways in the Covasna area of Transylvania

202

4.6 Industry in Romania in 1941

205

5.1 Railway development in Germany and Poland since the First World War

210

5.2 Railway projects in Romania since the First World War

211

5.3 Development of railways in Albania and Yugoslavia since 1918

212

5.4 Electricity generation and transmission c. 1940

223

5.5 Proposed electrification regions for Romania

224

5.6 Urban development 1910–50

233

5.7 Industrial areas of Zagreb

235

5.8 East Central Europe during the Second World War

239

5.9 Lignite working around the Brüx (Most) area of northern Bohemia

252

6.1 Communist states of East Central Europe

268

6.2 Forced labour in communist Romania

278

6.3 Industrial centres in Poland in the 1970s

294

6.4 Rural industry in Hungary

296

7.1 Regional variations in employment at the end of the communist era

329

7.2 Hydropower in the Romanian Carpathians

342

7.3 Urban growth 1950–90

357

7.4 Commuting in the Romanian Carpathians

367

7.5 Cooperatives and key villages in the Nitra area of Slovakia

371

7.6 Romania’s ‘sistematizare’ programme

373

7.7 Housing in Poiana Mărului, Braşov County, Romania

376

8.1 Urban agglomerations in Poland

388

8.2 Industrial Location Plan for Poland 1983–90

392

8.3 Decongestion in Upper Silesia

395

8.4 Yugoslavia’s central place system and electricity network

399

8.5 The environment of the Sudetes in the 1980s

414

LIST OF TABLES 2.1 Rural geography of the Habsburg Empire 1900–10

54

2.2 Employment in industry in Poland 1879–1913

70

2.3 Coal, oil, iron and steel production in Poland 1800–1920

80

3.1 Urban development in Hungary 1787–1910

130

3.2 Population of towns 1870–1990

138

3.3 Urban growth by country 1870–1990

139

3.4 Urban growth rates by population size groups 1870–1990

139

4.1 Population 1920–39

161

4.2 Population and industrial activity in relation to Europe 1938 162 4.3 Trade balances 1920–38

163

4.4 Land distribution by farm size c. 1930

177

4.5 Employment in industry in 1930

183

4.6 Changing occupational structures in industry 1920s and 1930s

184

4.7 Industrial production, consumption and trade 1934–7

184

4.8 Mineral resources and production 1928–38

191

5.1 Economic sectors: working population and national income 227 1930s 5.2 Aspects of population and agricultural dependence in the

228

1930s 5.3 Rural population 1900–90

229

5.4 Germany’s through-roads in Ostdeutschland

246

5.5 Coal, steel and electricity production 1913–43

249

6.1 Population, urban development and capital cities 1950–90

277

6.2 Growth of crude steel production under communism

297

7.1 Power stations in Yugoslavia to 1983

343

7.2 International tourism 1983–7

350

7.3 Existing towns and new towns proposed under Romania’s ‘sistematizare’ programme

373

7.4 Proposed rural centres in Vâlcea County, Romania

374

8.1 Investment in Romania 1950–89 by county groups

380

8.2 Employment in Romania 1960–89 by county groups

382

8.3

384– 85

Hungarian settlement system

8.4 Urban agglomerations in Poland 1979

389

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Comecon

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)

CSCE

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

ECE

East Central Europe

ECECs

East Central European countries

FDI

foreign direct investment

FSU

Former Soviet Union

FYP

Five Year Plan

GATT

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDR

German Democratic Republic (East Germany)

GNP

gross national product

GOP

Gornośląskię Okreg Prsemyslowy (Poland)

MFN

most favoured nation

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NEM

New Economic Mechanism

OSCE

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

ptp

per thousand of the population

SEE

Southeastern Europe

SEECs

Southeast European countries

SOE

state-owned enterprise

TEM/TER

Trans-European Motorway/Railway

UNRRA

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency

VVB

Association of Publicly Owned Enterprises (GDR)

WOG

Large Economic Association (Poland)

PREFACE

This book is a development of previous work which aimed at tracing the historical geography of the communist states bordering on the then Soviet Union and comprising a territory known at the time as ‘Eastern Europe’. The situation has now moved on and we now refer to the region as ‘East Central Europe’ thereby reserving the ‘east’ for the former Soviet states themselves. However, the historical geography of this area remains an absorbing topic, albeit with a shift in the focus from the background to communism to the reorganisation of a major component of Europe’s periphery. Since the previous book was published in 1989 scholarship has also moved on and the present work aims at an updated and in-depth study of one component: the economic geography of the modern period starting in 1815 but now extending through the communist period since this has now passed into history and can be reviewed in its entirety. For this reason the boundary of the study area remains unchanged even though it is anomalous to include the core of the German Empire in the European periphery and not the Habsburg counterpart: Vienna. The book includes a ‘stock-take’ of the situation in 1815 since the protoindustrialisation that took place in the eighteenth century in a number of German and Habsburg territories is an important part of the story even if the southeast remained relatively backward. What the book tries to demonstrate is the complexity of the struggle by a peripheral region to develop its political power from a position of economic inferiority. The state became proactive in economic development although the political geographies and the economic programmes were highly contested. Imperial and national approaches underpin the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries respectively, followed by the communist era which involved extreme state intervention while the dominance of Moscow compromised—without entirely suppressing—national integrity. The sad conclusion is that despite Herculean efforts the exercise of independent political power has incurred heavy economic costs since G.Berend’s paper of 2002 sees the region as being further behind the West now than it was in 1815. And the question for the future is whether a more integrated Europe will be more successful in achieving convergence, at least as far as East Central Europe is concerned. However, for most of today’s English readers there is the challenge of an unfamiliar historical context which is addressed not only through the contextual material in each chapter but the chronologies which offer some detail on political, economic and social events. The alternative placename spellings, replete with diacriticals, are a minefield in themselves, and—except for some ethnically stable villages—the approach here has been to use the names that were official at the time and

to quote the present one in brackets on the first occasion each name comes up in a particular chapter. Fairly complete listings appear in books by authors such as N.J.G.Pounds (1969 pp. 877–9), while R.H.Osborne (1967 pp. 325–44) helps with pronunciation. This modest work of synthesis would not have been possible without the researches carried out in historical geography and in economic and social history over recent decades and listed in the bibliography, which is however restricted to English language works apart from key statistical and cartographic sources. In addition I am grateful to countless individuals and institutions across the region for helping me in my travels around the region over the past four decades. In particular, the study of urban population trends—albeit compromised by inconsistencies over dates and boundaries—would not have been possible without help from Karl Martin Born (Berlin) who kindly supplied data for German towns from Neumann’s Orts- und Verkehrs-Lexikon (1900) and Amtliches Gemeindeverzeichnis (1939); also Branislaw Domański and Włodzimierz Kurek (Kraków) recommended Polish sources and gave me general information, particularly for Upper Silesia; while Branislav Djurdjev (Novi Sad), Dražen Njegac (Zagreb) and Caedmon Staddon (Bristol) provided some census data for the southern republics of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bulgaria, respectively. Martin Hampl (Prague) helped me with the location of rural industrial centres on the Křivoklát estate while several colleagues—Krystyna Carter (London) for Polish; Vladimir Drgona (Nitra) for Czech and Slovak; and Erika Nagy (Békéscsaba) for Hungarian—have assisted over linguistic details. Peter Jordan (Vienna) discussed the history of Pula while Dražen Njegac (Zagreb) clarified matters relating to the city’s industry. Petr Pavlínek (Omaha) commented on the history of coalmining in the Most area and Claudia Popescu (Bucharest) gave me information on the organisation of agriculture and the planning of new towns in Romania’s Vâlcea county. Field study in Romania has been important for several studies included in the book, especially those concerned with heavy industry in Reşiţa, the timber industry in the Carpathians and rural settlement projects in Poiana Mărului and Rogoz. This work has been done over a number of years and would not have been possible but for Nicolae Muică (Bucharest), to whom this book is dedicated, as well as my wife Marion and a number of local contacts. Some of the maps from the earlier work have been recycled but many are entirely new drawings expertly drafted by Ruth Pollington in the Leicester University Geography Department. Finally, Routledge have been very supportive of my efforts over the years and for this present volume I am particularly grateful to Jane Blackwell, Philippa Grand and Vicky Peters. David Turnock Leicester, August 2005

INTRODUCTION Modernisation in East Central Europe As defined for the purposes of this book, East Central Europe (ECE) has an area of 1.27 million sq.km and a population of 137.8 million (1985) with an overall density of 102 persons/sq.km (Figure 0.1). The maximum longitudinal spread is some 26 degrees (about 1,300km) between the Italian-Slovenian frontier and the Danube Delta but is reduced to only 400km between Hungary’s Austrian and Ukrainian frontiers before widening again to some 1,200km at 51 degrees north in the territory of East Germany and Poland. Northsouth distance reaches its maximum between 40 degrees north in southern Albania to 55 degrees north in northern Poland, a distance of some 1,650km. The region’s coherence arises from the adoption, by monopoly communist parties, of elements of the former Soviet system of government, including socio-economic development through a command economy guided by central planning. There was some relaxation after Stalin’s death in 1953 underpinned by Red Army withdrawals from the Balkans—though not from East Germany and other countries of particular importance for transit—but maintenance of communist power was guaranteed by the Brezhnev Doctrine which legitimised Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 on the grounds that a threat to the system in one country was a challenge to the alliance as a whole. Now there is unity through transition policies; these are also characteristic of the former Soviet republics, although the latter no longer comprise a superpower centre. However, it is usual to divide the region into two halves: a northern tier comprising the relatively welldeveloped states of Czechoslovakia, East Germany (GDR), Hungary and Poland; and a southern, Southeastern European (SEE) group taking in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. The latter area found the Soviet system particularly relevant to economic development in the second half of the twentieth century, along with Soviet technology and raw materials, while the more sophisticated northern economies with considerable democratic experience were arguably constrained by the Soviets’ extensive approach. There are significant constraints in the mountains, however. Just over a fifth of the land is higher than 500m. To an extent the mountains help to block maritime climatic influence and accentuate drought risk. Despite high sunshine levels in the south, the geopolitical base for the development of nation states is often problematic, e.g. for Albanians and Macedonians, encouraging autonomy within

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

Figure 0.1 Physical geography, including major towns and state boundaries for 1945–89

2

Introduction

3

imperial structures rather than outright independence. Remarkably large agricultural communities were supported in the past, although remoteness from marauding armies and feudalising landowners were also significant factors, as was the high incidence of disease in the lowlands in early modern times. However, the mountains are not a continuous barrier except in the case of the Dinaric ‘wall’ complicating inland penetration from the Adriatic. Instead there is often easy access through ‘corridor valleys’; making the Balkan lands a ‘commercial and cultural crossroads’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 3). There are niche situations in the intramontane depressions ‘formidable enough to preserve native particularism and to prevent widespread diffusion of the competing foreign influences’ (ibid.). Yet subsistence farmers must concentrate on the hardiest cereals, such as rye in the Carpathians. Minerals are scattered and do not offer scope for major metallurgical complexes comparable with the Ruhr. Industrial growth has been limited, though significant in contact cities drawing on complementary resources and in the depressions which are also useful for ‘hiding’ strategic industries. On the other hand, the mountains are still heavily forested and the woodlands are very important commercially, with exports of raw timber now diversified by manufactured products such as board, plywood and furniture requiring a greater degree of processing. Meanwhile, the scenic attractions of the mountains with cultural landscapes indicative of settlement continuity and pluriactivity have become important resources for tourism. Complementary lowland areas, particularly the North European Plain and the plains associated with the Danube (the Pannonian Plain—known to Hungarians as Nagyalföld— and the Lower Danube or Wallachian Plain) comprise fertile land interspersed with less tractable sands. The latter have often supported only poor grazing (like the Hungarian ‘puszta’) or woodland, although more recently the supply of irrigation water has opened the way to more intensive uses. However, conditions are very dry in the southeasternmost parts of the region: Dobrogea, Moldavia and eastern Wallachia (Bărăgan steppe) have an annual rainfall below 50cm and irrigation is therefore critical. In the past much of the land was used to rear livestock and grow cereals for export. But the growth of population and industry means that more land is needed to feed the population and generate agricultural raw materials. The trade surplus has been turned into a deficit and by the 1980s there was a considerable net import of cereals. On the farms cereal crops are complemented by sugar beet and fodder, while additional areas are devoted to textile crops, oil plants such as sunflowers, tobacco and a range of medicinal and aromatic plants. There are also vegetable gardens, orchards and vineyards with considerable export potential. Livestock rearing has become more intensive (contributing to the cereal deficit) since meat production is an important indicator of rising living standards. Fish are also more important: caught by trawlers in distant waters to supplement the traditional fisheries along the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Sea coasts, the inland rivers (the Danube Delta and floodplain lakes) and fish ponds which are particularly numerous in southern Bohemia. The whole region is within 500 kms of the sea except for the eastern parts of Hungary and Slovakia and adjacent areas of Poland and Romania. This book follows earlier work in historical geography (Turnock 1988, 1989) which provided a context for the communist revolution and the transformation of the region through central planning under which national interests were often constrained by the hegemony of the Soviet Union. Now that fifteen years of transition have occurred it is appropriate to examine the traumatic communist interlude and to ask whether it was a

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

4

perverse interruption of a ‘natural’ progression towards greater integration among the nations of Europe as a whole or a constructive stage of development which may in some way have been ‘inevitable’ in the sense that, even if Soviet influence had been eminently benign, there would have been an extension of state intervention in the economy and curbs on the deployment of private capital. For the time was ripe for industry based on old technology—limiting capital while maximising employment—since the 1930s brought home the weakness of overconcentration on agriculture. The comprehensive rejection of communism by the neoliberal ethos of transition states in the early 1990s should not totally obscure the rationale of the former system as an escape from the frustrations of backwardness on Europe’s periphery, even though the excessive overriding of the real costs of production—in the strategic interests of the Soviet Union— was on balance a burden to the region. But the post-communist phase is promoting a surge in scholarship that is assessing the pre-socialist era without the in-built ideological hostility of the recent past. The immediate pre-communist period may seem inevitably ‘bad’ for somehow failing to deliver faster growth and so ‘justifying’ the communist phase, yet it may also be seen as an alternative constructive phase confronting the same basic challenges as the communists in the transformed context of post-1918 nation states and the drive for industrialisation given the deteriorating terms of trade for farmers and the strategic imperatives arising from a vulnerable position sandwiched between Germany and the USSR. Western writers no longer plough a ‘lonely furrow’ in enquiring into the debates of the inter-war years that went way beyond class conflicts and workers’ demonstrations. It also seems appropriate to extend the discourse back into the nineteenth century to deal with the first phase of national development in SEE in the modern period and also to consider the impact of imperial systems on the area as a whole. In this way the book provides a review of two centuries of modernisation under rapidly changing political and technological conditions, with the latter underpinned by a shift from a rural to an urban emphasis. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE: CONTESTED STATE FRAMEWORKS THROUGH THE AGES A key element in the historical context is the changing position of the region from one centrally placed astride the migration routes and (in the case of the SEECs) integrated into the Roman Empire to one occupying the margins of the oceanic trading system with a major role as exporter of primary commodities. The region was certainly congenial for settlement and agriculture in prehistory, playing a part in the diffusion of crops from the Middle East to Western Europe. Prehistoric settlers found the relatively warm and dry lands of the Danube and Morava-Vardar corridors gave easy access to new farming lands as forest was cleared, especially on the light loess soils. The amber routes exemplify the region’s transit role, transmitting cultural influences from the Balkans to the coniferous and deciduous woodlands of the North European Plain, where German and Slav colonists initiated economic developments which eclipsed the Balkans in medieval and modern times. With access provided by such rivers as the Elbe, Oder and Vistula, surpluses could be marketed through the Hanseatic trading system. Yet ECE lost out when the historic trading axis from the Mediterranean to the East was eclipsed by the great discoveries

Introduction

5

which stimulated economic advance and technological innovation in Western Europe. During the Industrial Revolution, with its coal-based technology, it was impossible to escape from a largely colonial relationship with the West because few large industrial regions developed. ‘Peripherally’ provides an essential context through the perpetual economic challenge of ‘catching up’ with the advanced countries and competing for the attentions of their capitalists. It also directs interest to the trickle of ideas about development options that were not strictly in keeping with Western models which may not be entirely redundant despite the present momentum for EU enlargement, involving Western engagement with the Balkans on a scale that could not have been imagined until recently. Industrialisation lies at the root of the economic advance, although the medieval period laid some of the foundations. For example, in the Saxon Erzgebirge there was woodland clearance for agriculture in eleventh and twelfth centuries, followed by widespread clearance for mining in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries after rich finds of silver and tin were made in many places: wood was needed for smelting and was also used in mining, and wider supply areas were necessary. But progress was not sustained through time or space, although when long-distance trade was disrupted by conflagrations like the Thirty Years War, towns were needed for local marketing on landed estates, e.g. Głogów; also for defence (the Brody fortress), administration, religion and learning, not to mention the residences of magnates (e.g. Zamość) and the meetings of the gentry (indeed it was common for towns to be private, i.e. subordinate, to their owners). However, the early modern period brought a major setback through war and an accompanying agrarianisation (Bogucka 1996). While Warsaw grew tenfold from the late sixteenth to the late eighteenth century (10,000–100,000) and Gdańsk showed roughly 50% growth (40,000–58,000), other leading towns in Poland either stagnated or declined. In the context of somewhat reduced boundaries towns of 2,000 or more declined from 155 to 51, while those smaller than 2,000 fell from 1,132 to 523. A peripheral position in Europe does not explain all the complex changes in the region’s political make-up which are crucial to an understanding of the constraints imposed on the development of nations, which have been continually reconstituted. It has been the region’s fate that after Roman intervention in a complex tribal structure evolving through prehistory (incidentally providing a cultural foundation for the countries of Albania and Romania), small dynastic states have been subjected to further waves of imperialism. It is important to recognise the economic, social and political consequences of the Ottoman advance and the absorption of Balkan territory; for the problems of economic backwardness and virulent nationalism which have dominated the region’s politics in modern times can be traced back to the constraints on reform in the Ottoman Empire which first entered Balkan territory in the fourteenth century. And although the north was more closely integrated economically with Western Europe, the Polish state was undermined by a series of partitions orchestrated by the Habsburg, Prussian and Russian empires. Thus the modern era was grounded in the economic requirements of major powers whose political and industrial heartlands were to varying degrees external to the region. The book takes off at this point with a summary of modernising trends during the eighteenth century and highlights a degree of polarisation as the empires encouraged development in specific areas through new laws and the economic stimulus of wider markets through improvements in transport and the removal of internal trade

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

6

barriers. Large areas were to become marginalised as rural peripheries where the privileged elites were bolstered by neo-feudalism, and migration was virtually the only solution to the crisis of underemployment. The nineteenth century This is the starting point for the detailed narrative. The political map for the middle decades would highlight the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian empires, along with the German states, among which Prussia was gaining ascendancy. The dynamism of the north can be seen in the relatively early demise of the feudal system, for change began in the Habsburg Empire with the ‘Serfdom Patent’ of 1781—and reform occurred in Prussia in 1807—although the formal completion came only in 1848, with Russia following in 1861 and Romania in 1864. But long before the mid-nineteenth century customary obligations were being converted to cash payments in order to increase economic efficiency, whereas in the backward areas formal abolition changed little: it gave the lords freedom to exploit what were now their personal possessions, while peasants stranded on their smallholdings were obliged to enter into labour contracts to undertake estate work for low pay (or for no wages at all if the deal was tied to sharecropping) with traditional social relations perpetuated. Understanding society in much of the region has to be grounded in the logic of peasant farming and the struggle to secure basic needs from small plots of land using simple technology. The other side of the coin comprised a small urban-based middle class constrained by limited demand for local industry and delayed reform of guild systems, while the contributions of the aristocracy to modernisation were seen more through military service and administration (even the Prussian elite became a class of hereditary state servants) than through enterprise. There was hardly a yawning divide between north and south, although the latter was relatively slow to develop significant growth areas. The Habsburg-Ottoman ‘tug-of-war’ was resolved by the southward expansion of Vienna’s imperial borderlands. The Habsburg borderlands were not substantially richer than territories immediately to the south—which in some respects industrialised earlier—but they did enjoy relatively enlightened and principled government conducive to the development of civil society while the remaining Ottoman lands were being contested by the emerging nations of the Balkans and wider imperial designs. A novel situation arose whereby the Danubian principalities were subject to Ottoman suzerainty, yet remained vulnerable to Habsburg occupation before being placed under Russian protection until 1856 and subsequently the now independent state of Romania fell into the German economic orbit by the end of the century. However, the political configuration was not dictated solely by the balance of power between the major actors on the world stage, for the ethnicity of the region was such that nationalism ensured a measure of ‘locally dictated developments’ whereby the nations of ECE were able to make a difference. But the ‘state-led nationalism’ of Western Europe contrasted with ‘state-seeking nationalism’ as ‘Balkanisation’ spawned a tier of new nation states when it became evident that the Ottomans had little to offer their Christian population at a time of increasing national awareness. Meanwhile, the Habsburgs agreed on a share of power between Budapest and Vienna, and the political transformation was completed by US-sponsored self-determination at the end of the First World War which left many Germans and Hungarians stranded by the collapse of the imperial structures.

Introduction

7

Huge infrastructural overhauls were therefore needed during the decades on either side of the First World War, highlighting the very close link between economics and politics. But the economic challenge was all the greater because a ‘natural’ division into agricultural and industrial regions—based on physical and demographic resources, entrepreneurial skills and social organisation—was no longer feasible. Agricultural regions were by definition poor and overpopulated while industrial regions were strong (notwithstanding the demographic basis of much of the protoindustrialisation in the eighteenth century). How was industrial growth to be accelerated? While the UK industrial revolution was largely due to spontaneous private forces able to stimulate continuing demand (though not without some preconditions satisfied by the state), Germany and the Habsburg Empire relied on investment banks which emerged from urban banks providing credit for the nobility and large merchants—as well as governments—although there were rural banks to tide peasants over after a bad harvest (a function which otherwise fell to itinerant pedlars). Following the Austrian National Bank of 1816, commercial banks followed in the second half of the century, like the Creditanstalt which specialised in agricultural credit. Banks could stimulate pride among ethnic groups, like the Czechs, Slovenians and Ukrainians in the Habsburg Empire, and they could also fuel antiSemitism. The SEECs started setting up their national banks—as well as commercial and agricultural banks—during the second half of the century. But the more backward European economies also needed direct government investment and initiative, as Gerschenkron (1962) and Spulber (1966) have pointed out. For national security demanded that industry should expand and if entrepreneurs were not available the state would have to do the job. Indeed this book is very much concerned with the role of the state to the point where ‘too strict a dichotomy between Balkan capitalism and socialism obscures the continuity across the last century of powerful government institutions and nationalistic ideologies’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 13). The new nation states now had to temper comparative advantage and free trade (and the reality of underemployment and overpopulation) with protection through strategically significant, employment-maximising ideas of self-sufficiency to relieve rural poverty combined with strict regulation of foreign capital. Yet the resource base for selfsufficiency was by no means compelling in the south where the new nations struggled to modernise through agricultural surpluses that could be overtaken by harvest failure or tariff war (which suddenly forced the Serbs to switch from livestock exports to meat packing). Romania became one of the world’s leading cereal exporters with rail as well as sea transport available, yet all this was but a means to an end: industrialisation with a politically motivated land reform programme to give peasants greater security and independence, which unfortunately came too late to prevent the peasant revolt of 1907. Agrarian parties arose to advocate this complementary strategy although some idealists saw land reform, with village cooperatives and credit organisations, as an almost complete alternative to urban-industrial expansion, attracting the support of some socialists—though not communists, given the dichotomy of individual versus collective—and even nationalists when there were ethnic distinctions between peasants and landlords. They emerged in the half century before 1914 when world market forces upset traditional rural society and when extended suffrage boosted the potential for parliamentary success.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

8

The twentieth century The twentieth century greatly extended the modernisation project through further Kondratieff cycles linked with an ongoing and increasing radical political transformation. Despite the overwhelming moral arguement for self-determination, the Versailles system was unstable enough for the British geographer H.J.Mackinder to appreciate the strategic importance of ECE to both Germany (seeking eastward expansion into the Eurasian heartland) and Russia (looking for security on her western frontier). He advocated a security system for the new democracies, but this was only achieved to the limited extent of the Little Entente in view of major foreign policy differences between the states of the region themselves. By the late 1930s Germany was casting a shadow and substantial territorial changes were made to create a Greater Germany (‘Grossdeutschland’) and allow a larger stake in the region for Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy. Measures were taken to simplify the ethnic structure through resettlement (including population exchanges). And the need for an alliance with the Soviet Union to challenge Germany involved a nearhopeless quest for compromise between the interests of nation states like Poland and the aspirations of the Soviets to regain lost territory. Meanwhile, national industrialisation was gaining momentum with greater desperation as the setbacks in agriculture that followed the fall in world agricultural prices after 1929 ushered in a trend towards increasing state intervention going way beyond the first steps in grain marketing. Given acute capital shortage it was impossible to safeguard the traditional sectors and adopt new technology at the same time. Thus Berend (1996 p. 360) takes lessons from history to argue that in both the 1870s and 1930s the region could not accommodate changes ‘and responded by attempting to save and protect the obsolete sectors in its economy’. However, Germany took advantage of the opportunity to carve out an economic empire in ‘Fortress Europe’ and from the later 1930s until 1945 the region struggled to reconcile national industrialisation with the demands of the German war economy. The degeneration into communism in the late 1940s meant an extension of the war economy in the Soviet interest, with some additional momentum through perceived benefits in national reconstruction and cohesion. It was maintained—indeed entrenched—‘against a background of threatening hostilities: the Korean War, the NATO embargo on deliveries of strategic goods and counter-measures by Comecon members’ (Kaser and Zielinski 1970 p. 31). While the eastern territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania were lost to the Soviet Union in 1945, the region as a whole became a tier of satellite states subject to communist party monopoly power and an economic blueprint based on the Soviet FYPs of the 1930s. Yet, while there was certainly a revolution in the region during the late 1940s, it was the 1920s which required a new start in building states within revised boundaries, while the 1930s made it clear that the state would inevitably play a leading role. Subsequent decades merely perverted this trend in the Soviet interest with consensus gained through sacrificing much of the region’s social capital to Stalin’s paranoia. The latter’s death in 1953 came too late to halt a process which had already com prehensively devoured the non-communist leadership and even made inroads into the new elites through charges of nationalist deviations. Yet it was also too soon for the image of the party to be unduly tarnished and nearly four decades of unprecedentedly rapid growth—in pursuit of a perverse ‘war economy’—had to be sustained on the basis of distorted external relations and a cynical disregard for majority public opinion. Whatever benefits accrued from the strategies adopted they were

Introduction

9

fundamentally flawed because each nation’s aspirations were deliberately manipulated. Elites felt they had a vested interest in unbalanced development as they had a century earlier; what was different was the removal of an ethnic distinction between the elite and the mass of the population. The book therefore ends on a distinctly ambivalent note for the progress of the region for the last half century has been based on a false premise and the current reconstruction has not only to restore balance through recovery in the primary and tertiary sectors but comprehensively rebuild the flagship.

Part I THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

1 THE REGION AT THE START OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY In political terms the nineteenth century was based on firm reaction to a Napoleonic revolution that arose out of the Enlightenment and its increasingly liberal interpretations. Napoleon’s arrangements in Europe involved a French Empire extending way beyond ‘natural frontiers’ to include an Elbe-Baltic corridor (separating Denmark-Norway from the German ‘Rhine Confederation’), Tuscany, Illyria and northeastern Spain; with dependencies in western Germany (where the Rhine Confederation brought the Holy Roman Empire to an end), Italy, Naples, Poland (or the Grand Duchy of Warsaw) and Spain; rounded off by more or less unwilling allies in the Habsburg Empire and Prussia. The impact in ECE was most apparent in Illyria and Poland and it is fascinating to speculate on the consequences for the region had Napoleon’s intervention been durable enough to establish a Yugoslav piedmont at the head of the Adriatic and safeguard Poland’s integrity so as to establish an impetus for nation state development far ahead of the Balkan countries that emerged in the second half of the century. Following the disaster of the First Partition in 1773, Poland’s attempted recovery through a constitution grounded in Enlightenment merely provoked a Russian invasion of 1792 and a Second Partition in 1793, whereupon T.Kościuszko’s rebellion in 1794 against foreign overlords ended with the capitulation of Warsaw and the Third Partition in 1795. Under Adam Czartoryski the Poles then took advantage of Napoleonic pressure against Prussia to forge a pact with St Petersburg under the ‘Puławy Plan’ to restore Poland in union in Russia. But this ‘Slavic’ initiative was overtaken by Napoleon’s progress to the extent that the Grand Duchy of 1807 also recovered the territory taken by the Habsburg Empire and Prussia in the last two partitions (less Białystok). Following Tilsit, the arrangement was a ‘gift’ to the Poles for supporting Napoleon and there was always the hope that full independence might be restored in the future. The Poles persevered although the continental system meant they could not export for economic growth (while Britain’s embargo on the emigration of artisans slowed down attempts at adaptation). Instead they sent troops to assist Napoleon in Italy and Spain and shouldered the obligation of paying off a mortgage owed to Russia as the former partitioning power. Napoleon’s intervention was probably seen as being as radical at one pole of the political spectrum as did Stalin’s at the opposite extreme a century and a half later.

The region at the start of the nineteenth century

13

Figure 1.1 Political geography of the eighteenth century. Note the selfcontainment of the region highlighted by the marketing of cloth from Brünn.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

14

There was reaction everywhere—even in France—but within the region the liberal turn would certainly have evoked a more positive response in some areas than in others according to the north-south divide (Figure 1.1). Progressive trends were already evident in the Habsburg Empire through the enlightened absolute rule of Maria Theresa (1740– 80) followed by the Josefinian era which started with the emancipation of serfs on the royal estates. Overpopulation in the north created a force for protoindustrialisation which in turn brought increased agricultural production and gave natural resources greater value, as changing attitudes towards woodland demonstrate. After centuries of destruction, which left the forests intact only in inaccessible areas, it was time for a more sustainable approach. Protection gave a basis for reconstruction after extensive erosion through the needs of agriculture as well as mining and smelting, demonstrated graphically for the Erzgebirge by Thomasius (1994) who refers to widening supply areas for industry as well as clearance through colonisation by Bohemian exiles, especially in the west. Under the Teresian forest regulations in Carniola 1771 customary rights were retained in state forests only and there was a further shift towards personal ownership under Josefinian legislation (not to mention some temporary innovations under the French). Yet while mobilisation of human resources based on individual rights might strike a chord in the ‘European’ north where modernisation was already under way, it was unclear if similar processes could operate in the backward ‘alien’ southeast preoccupied by the challenge of repopulation in devastated areas vacated by the Ottoman withdrawal of 1699. In spite of the shortage of people in this part of the region, few would concede that feudalism and guild systems should be ended to overcome constraints on mobility for rural labour. An enlightened thinker B.Skerletz (d. 1797) sought fiscal incentives for foreign manufacturers in Hungary and proposed resettling Jews in industrial areas and Roma in rural areas (Horvath 1991 p. 184). The rationale was all to do with boosting enterprise and creating demand, from which the state would gain through taxation. An under-populated region—with the risk of famine for people on tiny holdings—could deliver little, yet the population might double in fifty years if the barriers could be set aside. In the event, the elites clung to their privileges in backward areas and liberal regimes were restricted to special cases such as the steppelands where landowners encouraged settlement by ‘slobozeni’ free from feudal obligations. THE NORTH Brandenburg-Prussia and Saxony Germany’s unification was of course a long way off but the great military successes of Friedrich der Grosse were reflected by the rapid growth of Berlin in a forward position between the Elbe and Oder rivers with a developing network of roads and canals. Its industries were but a shadow of what would follow the departure of the French, not to mention the stimuli arising from the Zollverein and the railway age, but porcelain and silk manufacture were established (the latter responsible for the appearance of a factory town) while the ‘Königliche Eisengiesserei’ (Royal Iron Foundry), established in BerlinPankow in 1803 was part of a strategic complex of powder mills and cannon foundries which also had the role of supplying steam engines to stimulate technological advance in

The region at the start of the nineteenth century

15

private industry (though the first private foundry did not emerge until 1821). Further afield lay a constellation of industrialising regions. The immediate hinterland was largely agricultural, but expansion in Silesia (annexed by Prussia in 1745) was indicated by suburban growth outside the walled towns of Schweidnitz (Świdnica) and Waldenburg (Wałbrzych). Here, Prussian mercantilism precipitated a surge of activity in textiles soon after the takeover of the province, with flax spinning schools in new villages where workers were able to make cash payments in lieu of feudal obligations. There was pressure from Irish and Scottish competition at the end of the century; and some locational shift from the deforested lowlands to the foothills of the Giant Mountains (Riesengebirge) which could better meet the fuel needs of the linen bleaching process. There was also a boost for business in Pomerania with Friedrich II’s decision to make Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) the capital of Netze (Notec) district—acquired through the partition of 1772—and completion of the Bromberg (Bydgoski) Canal in 1773–4 (linking the canalised Brahe (Brda) and Netze rivers to connect the Oder and Vistula systems). Enterprise in textiles spread to other parts of Poland that fell temporarily under Prussian administration in 1793 and 1795. A clothiers’ village was established at Dąbie on the Ner (southeast of Koło, between Konin and Kutno) in 1799—a model for later settlements. Other developments included Wizna, east of Łomża in 1799 and Pułtusk on the Narew north of Warsaw in 1803. Meanwhile, Saxony was diversifying in a big way, taking off from the ravages of the Thirty Years War when many miners began making paper, textiles, glass and toys. Saxony was the most highly industrialised part of Germany, with a medieval history of mineral and handicraft production which provided a basis for proto-industrialisation in a territory with indifferent agricultural resources. Raw materials and power supplies combined with a dynamic trading city (Leipzig) and a positive attitude in government to guild restrictions combined with peasant emancipation. While linens came from Bohemia for finishing, there was a domestic woollen industry in the Elbe and Mulde valleys which progressed through the application of water power to spinning machines in Ernstal in 1782; while Mittweida had fifty looms in 1790. The cotton industry was introduced in Chemnitz and Plauen by Dutch/Swiss immigrants using British yarn before the Napoleonic Wars. It seems that cotton was imported from Macedonia for the first spinning mill which opened in 1800 on the Würschnitz River at Harthau using British machines and instructors (though local engineers were soon engaged). There was also a transition to cotton from linen in Zittau and from worsted in Vogtland (where embroidery and lace also expanded). Cloth was initially finished in Augsburg and Hamburg but calico printing started in Plauen as a service to rural manufacturers—and the printers then linked back to cloth production and organised a putting-out system to create a steady flow of material. There were furnaces and forges in the Erzgebirge, along with a furnace (1725) and four forges on Muckenburg estate (Lauchammer), with an engine for the blast in 1803. There was particular dynamism in two mining areas. First, the deepening of the Mansfeld copper mines required cooperation in driving longer drainage adits: the 14km ‘Froschmühle’ (Unterrissdorf-Klostermansfeld) with associated shafts and ‘light holes’— providing air while allowing some ore and waste to be raised— was followed by the Glückauf tunnel (Benndorf-Wimmelburg), started in 1730, and the Zabenstadt Tunnel (Hettstedt-Zabendorf), started in 1778. Soon after, in 1783, the Boulton and Watt engine

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

16

was put to work at Mansfeld when horse-driven pumps were unable to lift water to the level of the drainage tunnels. The same trends were evident in Upper Silesia with an interest in iron mining, but an even greater greater commitment to lead and silver mining around Beuthen (Bytom) and Tarnowitz (Tarnowskie Góry) dating back to the early medieval. Surface exploitations were extended underground and—with the stimulus of rising prices and the invention of silver separation—pumping to depths of 50m, with the aid of belts, chains and ropes, was installed from the fifteenth century, given the high level of the water table which made the Silesian mines much more difficult than their Bohemian and Slovak counterparts. Adits were also driven from the late sixteenth century with investment by the local nobility and other small capitalists; draining into the Klodnitz (Kłodnica) and Malapane (Małapane). Four adits at Tarnowitz had a total length of 8.2km by 1700 (of which 5.9km were underground). With very gentle river gradients it was often necessary to combine adits with pumping (the latter involving a lift of 60– 70m). The first steam engine was installed at Tarnowitz in 1788 and there were six in Upper Silesia by the end of the century. Adits started at greater depths reached up to 14km in length: from Bobrownik (Bobrowniki), near Scharley (Piekary Śląskie), through Trockenberg (Sucha Góra) to the upper Klodnitz (Kłodnica) Basin and through Tarnowitz and Oppatowitz (Opatowice) to the Malapane. Counting main and branch adits, there were 200km in the Tarnowitz area by the early nineteenth century. And such was the demand for timber (12 million oak beams were used in the Tarnowitz mines in the sixteenth century) that whole forests disappeared. Meanwhile, water power was harnessed for iron furnaces, sawmills and fulling mills, creating many ponds in the process. Mining provided a stimulus to industry. In the case of Mansfeld there was a successful engineering enterprise established at Rothenburg a.d.Saale with the help of an English mechanic to supply engines to the both the copperfield and the Schönebeck salt works near Magdeburg; as a result of which heavy industry came to be located in this city. Meanwhile, Upper Silesia was processing ores and long before the first Prussian government initiatives of the late eighteenth century the area was deeply affected by smelting at Malapane. However, engineering began soon after Friedrich took the province from the Habsburgs, for royal ironworks were set up at Kreuzberg (Kluczbork) and Malapane as strategic industries. Under the Mining Law of 1769 the state could designate appropriate areas as crown mining concessions, as a result of which both the Malapane iron industry and the Tarnowitz lead industry were extended. Malapane had previously been endowed with new blast furnaces in 1753–4, taking advantage of local timber and water power—not to mention proximity to the navigable Oder—which made for an important role in the Prussian armaments industry. Further capacity was installed under the 1769 act and when Friedrich moved to reorganise the iron industry in 1781 F.W.von Reden—responsible for all the royal mining operations in Silesia—produced a series of innovations concerned with coke smelting, steel making and engineering. Malapane remained very much at the centre: the Scottish technician John Baildon— recruited by von Reden—was able to cast sections for bridge building, but steam pumps were also manufactured, including one for the Tarnowitz mine, and an English-made atmospheric engine was installed in a new mine at Friedrichsgrübe opened in 1786. But as demand for energy increased the coalfield exerted a stronger influence on industrial location. On the basis of Baildon’s experience at Carron in Scotland, blast furnaces were

The region at the start of the nineteenth century

17

now completed at Gleiwitz (Gliwice) in 1796—the first built outside Britain using coke—and also at Königshütte (Chorzów) in 1801. And the Tarnowitz engine was transferred to Gleiwitz 1794 with the relocation of lead smelting to Friedrichshütte in 1789 where coke was available. Calamine was extracted and used in the brass industries of Gleiwitz and Tarnowitz, as well as Breslau (Wrocław). However, in contrast to Mansfeld, this was a remote region, very close to Russian territory, and downstream activities were situated in less vulnerable places: thanks to the new Klodnitz Canal from the Oder to Gleiwitz which advanced slowly into Upper Silesia during 1788–1806 to reach the royal coalmine in Hindenburg (Zabrze) sunk in 1791. With the programme of waterway development carried out on the Oder during 1796–1836 it was possible to connect with the canals leading to Berlin and the Elbe Valley. The Habsburg Empire The Czech lands While Slovakia was still an important mining area, with Neusöhl (Banská Bystrica) and Kremnitz (Kremnica) active throughout the century, there was substantial protoindustrialisation to the northwest through an iron industry comprising 59 furnaces and 179 hammer ponds in 1798 while engineering was launched in 1814 by completion of the first steam engine on the Watt principle—destined for a Brünn (Brno) factory—by J.Baildon who was lessee of the Stiepanau (Stepanov) ironworks. However, demand was driven by a textile industry arising out of population increase in the north where, despite poor soil, density was much higher than in cereal-growing areas. Flax growing was established in the Middle Ages and cloth was exported through Bavaria from the sixteenth century through agents—representing such Nürnberg families as the Gewandschneiders and Pellers—who organised putting-out systems supported by landlords through the customary labour they controlled. Linen also moved north for finishing in Saxony because the Finke and Loose families of Zittau were putting-out in Böhmische Neustadt (Dolni Bĕlá) through agents who went round on horseback to check quality; while some cloth went to Silesia, where Greiffenberg (Gryfów) was a leading centre; and some export down the Elbe was organised by English and Dutch traders. Fourteen hundred domestic spinners were recorded in 1775 at Neugedein (Nová Kdyné) and 7,000 in 1838, and there were large numbers in the other areas of northeastern Bohemia such as Friedland (Frýdlant) and Reichenberg (Liberec). However, R. Allason—an exporter of linen to England—established bleaching and dye works for local finishing of cloth generated by his own putting-out systems (supplemented by market purchases) at Deutsch Gabel (Jeslonné), Georgenthal (Jiřetín), etín), Kreibitz (Chřibska), Rumburg (Rumburk) and Schluckenau (Šluknov). There were also some peasants who became rich enough to operate as entrepreneurs, with feudal dues commuted to cash payments. In the case of woollen cloth there was a state company in Linz with which some 17,000 Bohemians were associated in 1786. Indeed some wool was sent out as yarn when spinning was organised at Neuhaus (Jindřichův Hradec) in 1765 to supply a stocking factory in Austria. There was also interest in cotton when prohibition was removed in 1763, despite the need to import the raw material.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

18

Factories started to appear through the agency of the religious houses or feudal lords seeking rural development. A model is provided by Count Waldstein’s woollen industry at Oberleutensdorf (Horní Litvinov) where skills were first acquired through work for the nearby Ossegg (Osek) monastery in the late seventeenth century. Waldstein’s cloth gained a reputation equal to English or Flemish products, although he could not compete on price. With such developments manorial bureaucracies had to adjust to cash payments in lieu of feudal obligations, rising local demands for food and timber and the disturbance arising from the appearance of foreign workers and other strangers outside their jurisdiction. Other examples include Krzizanau (Křižanov) in 1794 and Namiest (Námĕšt) in 1795; demonstrating a link with engineering in the latter case since Count Haugwitz was an early producer of woollen spinning machinery. Unusually, Count J.von Kinsky—with his Burgstein (Sloup) estate at Kreibitz—set up a dyeworks to process the linen woven by his domestic workers but later spurned the advantage of supervision in a factory by installing cotton looms in his workers’ houses, reasoning that production could increase without the need for extra buildings and profits were greater thereby. This is a good example of an autonomous industry which arose from Kinsky’s encouragement— through a spinning school (1756) and printworks (1759)—to the point where almost every local family was tied up with the business. However, it was more usual for expertise to come in from outside, organised by the bourgeoisie. Vienna merchant J.M.Schmidt established a woollen mill at Neugedein on Count von Stadion’s estate under an agreement to employ serfs and buy local food and firewood. There were mills for combing and for fulling, dyeing and finishing (the latter rebuilt as a more modern establishment in 1845) while outworkers did the spinning and weaving: in 1838 540 worked in the factory and 7,000 outside. Meanwhile, J.J.Leitenberger, a craftsman dyer, purchased his freedom in 1750 and went abroad to complete his apprenticeship, returning to Bohemia to marry the daughter of a master dyer at Wernsdorf (Verneřice) in 1758 and inherit the factory in 1764; whereupon the business was expanded and modernised. Leitenberger then went into cotton with a mill in Prague to escape the constraints of feudalism (citizens in a royal town were free) though he later bought—and modernised—a cotton factory at Josefsthal (Josefův Důl) which may still be operating today, having been sold out of the family in 1904. He also engaged a craftsman to build English jennies, water frames and mules. While there were some failures due to bad management, disputes and neglect, there was usually success under efficient bourgeois management. Habsburg encouragement of industry Such developments would hardly have been possible without an enlightened approach to industry by the Habsburgs in a situation where smallholders and cottagers ‘have nothing except an isolated dwelling and earn a miserable living for themselves and their children by weaving, spinning and handicrafts’ (Klima 1974 p. 49). Since tradition favoured a single heir to each agricultural holding, work in textiles supported a growing landless population in the Bohemian mountains. A subsistence crisis, like that of 1770–1, was seen as potentially destabilising through unrest or emigration while intervention was also favoured by the pronatalist logic of mercantilism whereby a greater population would contribute to financial and military power. Overriding the parochial interests of the guilds

The region at the start of the nineteenth century

19

and sections of the aristocracy underpressure of falling living standards, ‘central government succeeded in creating within four decades an environment propitious for economic development’ (Komlos 1986 p. 430). A government ‘Kommerzien Direktorium’ (Commercial Board) planned industrial development in Vienna during 1746–72, while free trade was extended from Austria in 1775 to Galicia (1784), Hungary (1851; internally unified in 1784) and Dalmatia (1880). By contrast, internal barriers in Prussia were not modified until 1818. Quality ordinances sustained new spinning schools in Bohemia, while protectionist measures in 1764 blocked foreign textiles (especially Silesian wool and linen) and in 1784 there were prohibitive tariffs on all industrial goods which persisted until the mid-nineteenth century. Subsidies were advanced on woollen goods in 1768, while in the 1780s local government could help small producers (there had previously been weaving rents in 1755 to support mountainous regions) and in 1787 large factories could establish warehouses in all provincial capitals. Yet there was also a need for social reform since feudal lords extracted licence fees from the yarn collectors who were serfs ‘taking the spinners’ yarn, sorting it according to quality and carrying it to the weekly markets of nearby towns for sale to weavers’ (Klima 1974 p. 51). As early as 1766, a civil servant noted the con tradiction between feudalism and industrial development and wanted to see traders purchasing their freedom so they would have more encouragement to develop trade. Theresian policy sought to maximise freedom for trade and industry ‘to permit the peasantry to increase its income and thus stave off the Malthusian threat by participating in protoindustry’ (Stokes 1987 p. 37). Rents payable by the peasantry were lowered in 1775 to encourage agricultural intensification, while a reduction in labour services to just thirteen days (for those without land) freed up time for work in industry which was considered much more elastic than agriculture in terms of scope to increase output. At the same time, industrial work was properly regulated when contractual relations were demanded in 1775 and the peasants were free to work for whom they liked. This measure increased efficiency and broke down the huge putting-out organisations that had been bolstered by servile labour. Josef II then acted in support of labour mobility in 1781 by allowing serfs to marry—and also to move if they were not in debt (a significant development towards complete abolition). By the end of the eighteenth century there were more workers in cotton than linen, and non-noble entrepreneurs were starting to challenge the dominance of the aristocracy. Reform stopped with Josef’s death in 1790 but what was in force continued: a significant achievement ‘given the unequal distribution of privilege which prevailed’ (Komlos 1986 p. 480), although failure to institutionalise change eventually fomented revolution in 1848. Meanwhile, there were measures to reduce the power of the guilds, seen as a conservative force potentially hostile to the innovations of Flemish immigrants. Thus a survey of imperial estates was made on the presumption that ‘in a perverse way the introduction of a new technology might be easier with the untutored peasants of the Bohemian manor’ (Freudenberger 1977 p. 31), although when industry was first allowed in rural areas (1732, but 1740 for cotton spinning and weaving) the master craftsmen had to be incorporated into the guilds of the nearest town. Hence the experiment over a woollen industry at Kladrau (Kladruby) on the Pardubitz (Pardubice) estate in the 1750s, though it lost money and was relocated in Brünn the following decade, where it survived until the 1780s. The town was obviously a better location for large-scale production but

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

20

some rural areas proved to be viable. A self-reinforcing growth process set in as cheap yet competent labour attracted more orders, and in turn stimulated earlier marriages and a growth in the labour supply which kept costs low through limited opportunity. Family income rose sufficiently to justify higher rents and ensure further landowner interest in industry, though charcoal smelting limited access to firewood while land endowments to incoming key workers could limit what was available for community subsistence. Meanwhile, pressure on the guilds continued. The emperor could sanction industries by licence or privilege and these remained free of guild control (from 1776 provincial authorities could also give such approval). In 1754 industries serving distant markets were classified as ‘commercial’ and were outside the guilds; in 1760 all weaving industries were declared open professions; in 1781 pig-iron production was deregulated; and in 1818 glass factories could be set up by people without ‘special education’. Transport in the north An efficient market system needed better communications and Germany set the standard for road improvements through links from the western cultural centres passing through the central highlands to reach the ‘colonial’ lands in the east. The Hellweg led from Köln to Magdeburg and Berlin—thence to Stettin (Szczecin); to Danzig (Gdańsk) via Frankfurt a.d.Oder and Posen (Poznań); and further northeast through Bromberg and Thorn (Toruń). Another key route connected Frankfurt to Eisenach on the approach to the Thuringian passes, leading through Erfurt to Halle-Leipzig, Dresden and Breslau. And long-established routes also led from Nürnberg to Thuringia either by Coburg and Jena or Plauen and Zwickau. However, roads were still in a bad state in the eighteenth century and a shortage of vehicles also hampered the transport of heavy goods. There were coach services for passengers—one network served the lands of the Archbishop of Magdeburg from the late seventeenth century—and there was an expanding network of post offices in Brandenburg-Prussia by the beginning of the eighteenth century with specific ‘post routes’ scheduled for improvement (including some short cuts and other new projects). Otherwise there was little development in the east, although Friedrich der Grosse improved strategic roads—like the one from Schweidnitz to Glatz (Kłodzko)—in defence of Silesia. Even so, it was only in 1793 that a modern highway was built from Berlin to Potsdam. The rivers were much used for transport. But there were natural hazards as well as tolls and some towns could compel merchants to use their harbours, e.g. the staple ports on the Danube upstream of Budapest; also Magdeburg, Dresden and Pirna on the Elbe. Moreover, shipping guilds (usually at the staple ports) could monopolise traffic on certain stretches of water. The stronger states did improve their waterways. Brandenburg-Prussia had a major interest in canal building to connect the navigable rivers and the old eastwest trending glacial channels were ideal for the purpose. By the seventeenth century routes to the Oder were identified using the Havel and Spree valleys (respectively north and south of Berlin). But while the northern route was realised at the time by the Finow Canal—from the Havel near Liebenwalde to the Oder at Oderberg—and rebuilt by Friedrich der Grosse after destruction in the Thirty Years War, the southern ‘Friedrich Wilhelm Canal’ project was only realised in the eighteenth century through the ‘Neuer Graben’. However, the latter had the great merit that goods from Silesia could avoid

The region at the start of the nineteenth century

21

Frankfurt a.d.Oder which was considered a great obstacle to trade. Furthermore the completion of the Plauer Canal in 1745 from the Elbe to the Havel at Plauen near Brandenburg gave access to Hamburg although there were still many tolls levied and goods from the east had to be transshipped in Berlin. The Plauer Canal was also useful for moving salt eastwards from Schönebeck. Meanwhile, there were local navigations in Uckermark facilitating grain and timber exports: the Templin and Wehrbellin canals in 1745 and 1766, respectively. Improvements at the Oder mouth involved the Swine as an outlet from the Stettiner Haff to the Baltic in 1729 and Swinemünde (Świnoujście)—on the site of the old fishing village of Swine—secured municipal rights at this time. Further south road conditions were relatively poor though the Habsburg Empire had an effective system extended in line with military adventure such as the short-lived occupation of Oltenia (western Wallachia) during 1718–39 when a road was pushed down the Olt Valley. Some canal building was linked with the Danube. The TiszaDanube Canal followed the Treaty of Svistov (Silistra) in 1791 and aimed to link Pannonia with the Adriatic to facilitate grain export; a privileged grain company was contemplated (also salt was brought down the Tisza on rafts from Maramureş). Work started in 1793–4 from Becej on Tisza to Bezdan on Danube—with locks at Stapari, Vrbas and Gradište—in the context of a concession including estate agriculture with milling and brewing at Apatin, and distilling at Kula. The canal opened in 1802 and— with a late nineteenth-century development from Mali Stapari to Novi Sad—was not superseded until the Danube-Tisza Canal was built after the Second World War with a link between Becej and Dan Palanka just upstream of the Romanian frontier. However, the planned westward extension of the canal did not materialise: it was to comprise the Vukovar-Šamac Canal and improvement of the Sava to Karlovac to meet the road to Rijeka or a possible waterway extension (proposed in the mid-eighteenth century) towards the Gorski Kotor highlands with locks from Karlovac to Brod na Kupi. There was a concession in 1801 but geological problems were encountered and the canal could not be sealed properly. Instead, a road was started in 1803 and finished by the French after 1809. Greeks were prominent in the cereal trade between Hungary and the Adriatic—and the reverse flow of Italian manufactures—following the rise of Fiume (Rijeka) and Trieste, aided by former’s sugar refinery arising from Maria Theresa’s ban on the import of refined sugar in 1755. The northern peripheries The north was not modernising at a uniform rate, for much enterprise in Poland arose only when Catholic landowners sought to maximise the economic value of feudal privileges whereby peasants had to deliver 25–50% of their harvest to the lords—plus two or three days’ labour each week as ‘robota’. This ‘second serfdom’ was organised by Jews who managed the economy of grain growing and marketing which provided the gentry with their luxuries. They ‘may have enabled the Polish nobles to delude themselves into thinking of their sense of disorder as ultimately functional and truly viable’ without the need for bridge-building between the classes (Levine 1991 pp. 137– 8), but they were slow to see the limitations of a single-crop economy and dependence on serf labour which added up to domestic failure for which the Jews were convenient scapegoats. Industrial change was seen most clearly in the imitation of Prussian textile

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

22

villages through the 1779 plan for Ludwinów as a centre of commerce and handicrafts on the Vistula opposite Kraków’s Wawel and Kazimierz quarters. A private landowner encouraged handicrafts at Nowy Dwór in 1780 and A.Tyzenhaus, a royal treasurer for Lithuania, planned manufactures in eastern Poland at Kunsztów near Grodno. A similar approach was taken in the eastern and southern borderlands of the Habsburg Empire where the Hungarian and Polish nobility were reluctant to countenance any diminution of their privileges and used serf labour to create jewels such as the Esterhazy Palace, finished in a reclaimed swampland in 1776. These were transitional areas, exemplified by the reference to the partly German Habsburg crownland comprising the Bukowina ‘Corridor’ (acquired in 1775 and joined to Galicia between 1786 and 1849) that was seen as ‘Halb-Asien’—notwithstanding the fact that it was also the ‘gradina veselă’ (fertile garden) of Romanians. Meanwhile, Transylvania was another landlocked Habsburg province, this time under the control of Hungarian nobility. Although there was a livestock surplus which could be marketed on the hoof there was no opportunity to specialise in arable farming for ‘bad roads and the more affluent estates of Inner Hungary barred the way to the growing markets of Budapest and Vienna’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 78). Indeed there was a cereal deficit which drew in grain from the Romanian principalities, given the low tariff of 3% negotiated with the Porte in the eighteenth century. A snapshot of the Romanian majority village of laroshéviz (Topliţa) at the end of the eighteenth century shows that 227 households belonged to three proprietors and all but nineteen ‘inquilini’ (without land) worked a small subsistence holding ‘sesie’ (and access to common grazing and woodland) in return for farm and forestry work on the owner’s estate. The 208 holdings averaged 1.65jug (1.78jug equalling lha) but since some had as much as 9.25jug others must have been quite small. Settlement in Galicia and Transylvania After the setback of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century wars, Habsburg annexation of Galicia under the Polish partitions (1772) was accompanied by a measure of recolonisation. Germans from the Rhineland gave a boost to Bochnia—a centre of enhanced administrative importance close to the trade routes—through exploitation of the salt mines and fuller exploitation of the forests and the agricultural potential. The Habsburgs also presided over the growth of the iron industry in Galicia. Ustrón (first mentioned 1305 as an episcopal estate in the Silesian Beskid) acquired a foundry to work up low-grade iron ore, while Kuznica in the Zakopane area of the Tatra was engaged in mining and foundry work. There was a measure of urban and commercial growth. The small Middle Beskid town of Sucha Beskidzka in Galicia saw its seventeenth-century castle—now the local museum—redeveloped in the baroque style with a surrounding park. Merchant communities were moving into new houses while the beginnings of tourism based on the curative properties of mineral waters originated in this period, especially the ‘szcawa’ waters containing ferruginous substances. Renamed Krynica, the village of Krzenycze in the Beskid Sadęcki Mountains acquired its first spa amenities in 1793, while Żegiestów-Zdrój also emerged in the same area. Szczawnica in the Pieniny— a medieval monastic estate village that passed to the Polish crown in the fifteenth century—was another eighteenth-century spa which expanded considerably after the Hungarian Szalay family bought the estate in 1834 and built the landscape park and local

The region at the start of the nineteenth century

23

housing. Finally Ustrón also became a health resort when hot slag from the local iron industry gained a therapeutic use in the ‘gierzymowe’ baths. However, since virtually the entire mountain system was now under the control of Vienna, the greater rhythm of commercial activity and systematic resource exploitation could be seen more widely. A great transformation occurred in the Banat Mountains, at the southwestern extremity of the Carpathian system, where a major settlement programme followed the recovery of territory from the Turks in 1699 (Figure 1.2). In comparison with other regions with a ruling noble class, the emperor was the sole landowner here and a planned colonisation went ahead. Lowland Banat became a place of multi-ethnic Catholic colonisation, while a

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

24

Figure 1.2 The Reşiţa industrial region mining programme for the adjacent Carpathians was undertaken by the ‘Banater Bergwerk-Einrichtungs-Kommission’ set up in 1717. As skilled miners were brought from Bohemia, Styria, Tyrol and Zips (Spiš), a copper smelter was opened at Oravicza

The region at the start of the nineteenth century

25

(Oraviţa) in 1718 and an iron furnace at Bogsan (Bocşa) followed in 1719; the latter expanded into a large metallurgical complex on the edge of the Steyerdorf (Anina), Dognecea and Semenic Mountains with the Reschitza (Resica/Reşiţa) furnace of 1771 as the main element. Nearby in the Poiana Ruscă there were installations in the Bistra Valley (now Oţelu Roşu) in 1795; later at Ruschitza (Ruşchiţa) in 1828 and Rusca Montană (1830). Reference should also be made of the coal first discovered within the woodcutting community of Steyerdorf (Steierdorf) in 1790 and the mining industry which developed in the early nineteenth century with skilled workers from Bohemia and Slovakia. Rather special circumstances also arose where security considerations called for a military frontier against the Ottoman Empire: established in 1762 and dissolved only in 1881 after Hungarian pressure through the 1870s. Seven regiments were raised in the eastern sector extending from Banat to the eastern Carpathians and the work of the state in the frontier region was clearly a significant force for modernisation. In the extensively researched northeastern Rodna Military District—later the Naszód (Năsăud) Frontier District—twelve Companies were formed during 1762–83, each recruited from a group of villages. Under military planning there was a consolidation of the Greek-Catholic parochial structure and provision of a state education system through elementary ‘Trivialschulen’ from 1770 and a high school in Naszód in 1771. Medical and sanitary programmes provided effective barriers against the spread of plague from Moldavia in 1815 and cholera from Wallachia in 1830. Commerce expanded in a network of central places with their fairs and road systems, while the promotion of agriculture included attention to cereals, vegetables, potatoes, textile plants and fruit trees, along with stock rearing and allocation of grazings. Indeed this is the basis of landholding today apart from some ‘abusive’ transfers to non-frontier communes in the communist period. Regulation extended to hunting and fishing as well as forestry, mining and manufacturing; with the latter advanced through instruction in spinning, weaving and fulling, and a growth of water-powered cereal mills as well as the first water-powered sawmills (‘joagăre’) in Maieru and Parva in 1766. Beer and spirits were produced in Naszód from 1765, paper at Prundul Bârgăului from 1768, while a great lime furnace (‘varniţa’) was built at Parva in 1777. It is also notable that settlement was consolidated so that Nepos was transformed between 1775 and 1783 from a scattered settlement north of the River Samos (Someş to a compact linear belt along the main valley. New settlement occurred in the heavily forested Ilva Valley as colonists moved from Maieru and Rodna to establish dispersed com munities at Arşiţa, Recele and Secături before consolidating under the frontier regime as Ilva Mare, Măgura Ilvei and Poiana Ilvei. From the ‘mini-basins’ along this secondary morpho-hydrographic axis the meadows and forests on the high surfaces could be more fully utilised. Meanwhile, Habsburg modernising pressures displaced some Romanians eastwards across the Carpathians— hence the ‘Ungureni’ communities emigrating from areas of Hungarian influence—but the scale should not be exaggerated. Handicrafts in the rural areas might be compromised by the monopolies maintained by the guilds in towns like Hermannstadt (Sibiu) which were closed to Romanians. An industrial axis developed along the Cibin with ample processing water, while canals were engineered at a higher level from other streams to supply the town centre (for street cleaning, fire fighting and fishponds as well as drinking) with the surplus diverted to the

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

26

Cibin. However, since little water power was available, a separate industrial community developed at Heltau (Cisnădie) and there were opportunities for the rural Romanians of Mărgineni Sibiului. They maximised their agriculture through maize, potatoes, fruit and apiculture while their pastoralism was extended to other areas including Banat and the Gurghiu-Căliman area of north Transylvania; moving progressively further afield over the next century in response to population growth and fiscal pressures. But increased wool production arising from the expansion of the transhumance system eventually had positive implications for local industry: hence the multiplication of the fulling mills (‘piua’) especially at Saline, Sibiel and Tilişca. There was also a growth in food and wood processing: while the ‘joagar’ originated in the sixteenth century, the number increased rapidly in the eighteenth through the ‘joagăreni’ of Gura Râului, Raşinari, Sadu and Tălmaciu who produced wooden roof tiles and exported sawn timber to Wallachia. Corn and fulling mills were usually built within the village perimeters for security, whereas the sawmills were more scattered in order to economise on transport. As the forests and mountain pastures were more fully exploited the remoter villages like Jina gained ground. Elsewhere, there were high surfaces which provided scope for colonisation at a time of growing population pressure. Typically the new settlements on the higher ground were hamlets—each representing a gradually expanding kinship group—comprising individual farmsteads which often involved an enclosed courtyard appropriate for sheep rearing in exposed areas subject to the depredations of wild animals. In Transylvania the high surfaces of the Apuseni Mountains and also the platforms at Bran and Poiana Mărului near Braşov exhibit settlement at this time to very good effect. The Haţeg peasants arrived in the Petroşani Basin in the upper Jiu Valley and also the ‘Ţinutul Pădurenilor’ on the eastern flanks of the Poiana Ruscă. And beyond the Carpathians in the Mehedinţi Plateau of Oltenia people were breaking out from the village cores in the late eighteenth century in order to settle on individual farms carved out of the community demesne: perhaps initially a ‘palanca’ or shelter, developing into a more substantial temporary dwelling or ‘conac’, an outlying grazing station inhabited seasonally by some family members (a practice which still survives in many parts of the Romanian Carpathians). The pressure of a growing rural population extending its grip over the intermediate slopes and plateau lands of the Carpathians was not without its risks. Galician registers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries reveal con version of meadows and pastures to arable and much logging, driven by land settlement linked with profit and high taxation. At the same time variable weather and the poor condition of some of the land increased the risks of harvest failure with consequent instability in the ownership structure. On the Carpathian margins, oats were grown much more extensively and accounted for 80% of the land cropped at the end of the century; with the balance taken mainly by potatoes and clover. The forests were being seriously eroded (and beekeeping declined as a result), with the frequent appearance of the Polish placename element ‘poręba’, referring to the cutting of timber—often in connection with industrial settlements producing charcoal and tar within the forests. As the beech and fir receded there was some degradation as intensive run-off carried much more sediment to the rivers (Lac 2000 p. 204). The damage would have been greater had a grand conception of timber export by rafting on the regulated tributaries of the Vistula been realised. Ivanička (1999 p. 212) refers to the devastation of woodland in Slovakia by the eighteenth century

The region at the start of the nineteenth century

27

through mining, industry (bricks, glass and potash) and timber exports. However, an increase in wood prices demonstrated the need for the improved forest management regime worked out by the Forestry Faculty of Banská Štiavnica Mining College. More generally, the Theresian period saw forest management codes issued from 1769 (in parallel with stronger individual ownership rights). In Galicia fast-growing pine and larch were favoured over deciduous forest dominated by beech. All this impacted on pastoral farming since the landlords demanded higher leasing fees—and therefore forced more intensive grazing—while trying to prevent further erosion of woodlands, to which end the keeping of goats was often forbidden. In some cases shepherding associations or cooperatives retained a hold on their pastures (as in Tĕšin and Vsetín) while in Hukvald the forestry interest predominated and seasonal sheep farms were eliminated by the middle of nineteenth century. THE SOUTH Ottoman territories were devoid of modernisation through lack of a uniform administration and industrial development constrained by the tendency to specialise in the export of raw materials. But even so agriculture could hardly develop in a progressive manner. Ottoman officials—and the feudal cavalry—were supported by the ‘timar’ (estate) system although holdings were not inherited and did not carry feudal jurisdiction over the peasants. But during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these ‘spahis’ were able to convert their fiefs into ‘chiftliks’ functioning on the basis of servile labour, and demands tended to increase (or peasants might be driven off the land altogether). Finally in 1831 the ‘timar’ system was abolished but only for the rural population to be left in a state of dependence on native landowners which saw the Albanian ‘bajraktars’ presiding over rigid patriarchal societies torn by blood feuds. The extent of autonomy had already been demonstrated by Ali Pasha who was the Turkish governor in Yanya (Ioannina) during 1782–1822 and attracted the sympathy of Greek Christians before he was finally dislodged (after a two-year siege) when Sultan Mahmud II saw Ali as a threat to his reforming and centralising policy. Romanian lords operated in the same spirit since a ‘boyar’ class evolved from village leaders and claimed a share of the peasant’s grain crop as ‘dijmă’. However, until the nineteenth century labour service (‘clacă’) was rarely demanded to the full legal extent—and it was not used extensively to work demesne land—while obligations could usually be paid off by cash from livestock sales. Commerce was limited because Istanbul claimed a monopoly over wheat: European ships could not enter the Black Sea after 1592 while Turkish ships could not take goods into the Mediterranean without taxation. Surpluses were collected by traders from Dubrovnik who were initially favoured by the Ottomans, although the eighteenth century saw commercial aptitudes emerging elsewhere—particularly among the Greeks who were able to create a political bourgeoisie active in banking and administration. ‘Greek’ merchants—including Jews and Hellenised Orthodox peoples using Greek as the language of commerce—paid low prices for compulsory deliveries (‘zaharea’) of agricultural products, which diverted the peasants into maize because it yielded well (especially with vegetables between the rows) and was exempt not only from ‘zaharea’ but from all taxation.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

28

It seems that the trading system was initially efficient, with a command economy maintained through administrative and military hierarchies working in a market system of towns interconnected by trading caravans. But it failed to modernise in the era of factory industry, and growth was stifled as intermediaries intercepted the flow of wealth heading for Istanbul. Although the Danube route was open after 1718—under the Treaty of Passarowitz (Požarevac)—the river was little used below Pressburg (Bratislava) on account of the water mills, strong currents (convict labour was used on the tow paths until steam power) and the Hungarian nobility’s desire for isolation to safeguard feudalism. Even when regular steamships were provided in 1831 little was done to relieve constraints on navigation at the Iron Gates until funding by Hungarian state subsidies in 1896–7. Much of the region depended on roads of abysmal quality so that journeys were slow and expensive (not to mention security risks in the case of unstable areas of the Balkans). It was a laborious business gathering surpluses and distributing essentials such as salt which was taken inland from the Adriatic at the points where ‘old contracts’ specified that it should be produced: the Bojana Valley, Dubrovnik, Cattaro (Kotor) and the Neretva Estuary. Dubrovnik derived much profit from salt and Ston saltworks continued to supply its area, successfully competing with Slav enterprises at Budva and Sutorina (Erceg 1993). Until better roads allowed the use of carts, thousands of horses (each carrying packs of up to 100kg) would carry salt inland and provide a basis for exchange trade on the return journey. The Romanian principalities emerge as an interesting case since they lay on the margins of the empire, enjoying a degree of autonomy through Ottoman suzerainty. The use of a succession of short-term Greek ‘Phanariot’ rulers had negative results through their exploitative attitude, though Bucharest became the largest and wealthiest Balkan city by the end of the eighteenth century as the Phanariots required luxurious housing and services and consigned wheat to Istanbul (whose wheat monopoly became ever more important after the Ottomans lost their southern Russian territories in 1783). However, the Treaty of Kucuk Kainarji (1774) gave Russia a protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia and also the right to intervene if any Balkan Christians were threatened. This was promising enough for Moldavian volunteers to accept Russian objectives as their own during the 1787–92 Russo-Turkish War. But despite some Russian success with the Porte in easing the burden of rule through Greek Phanariot princes, Russian influence in Moldavia seemed rather less progressive when the eastern part of the principality (Bessarabia) was annexed in 1812 as the price for ending their occupation (Broadus 1981 p. 367). Meanwhile, the Habsburgs had occupied Oltenia during 1718–39 and had begun the ‘Partition of Moldavia’ by taking Bukowina in 1775 (by 1782 both the Habsburgs and Russians had their agents in Bucharest). There was, however, an economic stimulus because—despite the challenges of the established Habsburg borderlands—there was a mutual interest in trade and an ‘inadvertent promotion of economic ties’ between the principalities and Transylvania (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 107) sanctioned by commercial treaties, and Balkan commodity surpluses became increasingly valuable to the Habsburgs as the expansion of cereal growing in Hungary reduced the scope for livestock rearing. Romania’s boyars were certainly encouraged by a sharp increase in cattle, horse and pig prices after the start of the Napoleonic Wars. Meanwhile, these northern markets were valuable for Ottoman peripheral territories given the disorganised domestic market and the dangers of travel in bandit country. Indeed cereals were also

The region at the start of the nineteenth century

29

needed in Balkan deficit areas such as Bosnia and the Habsburg Military Frontier. Close Serb-Habsburg relations from 1699 made Belgrade a transit point for Ottoman-Habsburg trade, but when war reduced the Ottoman outposts to chaos Serb traders moved their business northwards, as did some of the peasants. This ‘new and essentially economic migration hastened the final weakening of Ottoman authority and the emergence of independent Balkan states’ (ibid. p. 49). There was also opportunity for the Serb peasants of Šumadija to increase their pig herds using acorn fodder from the oak woods. Free peasants from mountain districts—like the Vlachs of Macedonia—traded their handicraft products and surpluses of wool, cheese and skins in both the Habsburg and Russian empires. As a result they improved their homes and churches, even it the threat of brigandage caused consolidation in key towns—like Kruševo, Monastir (Bitola) and Veles—and some migration to Belgrade and Banat. And while Armenian, Greek and Jewish traders left little scope for the Bulgarians, some peasants from the Rhodope and Stara Planina went to Hungary and Russia in the late eighteenth century. CONCLUSION ECE was anything but unified. It was a highly differentiated region—even within the Habsburg or Prussian domains—and in many areas insecure, with the Balkans consigned to an alien pattern of development after a long period of continuous association with the rest of the continent. Industrial growth was occurring as technology from the West was implanted and it was clear that population growth was sustainable, even if there were still plagues of biblical proportions in the Ottoman lands that would call for quarantine regulations. As Komlos (1989, 2000) argues, the ‘Malthusian’ agenda of growth triggering subsistence crises through diminishing returns was being liberated by an alternate ‘Boserup’ thesis of population growth as the spur for protourbanisation and technological change—which could not be expected to take place in a vacuum. The nineteenth century would pauperise the less fortunate but there was no major subsistence crisis and a growing working population was possible. Yet the run-up to the nineteenth century was demonstrating polarisation between cores and peripheries. The Czech lands were developed as the main Habsburg industrial base while Saxony played a similar role in the German lands—with the great trading emporium at Leipzig and a major centre of manufacturing in Chemnitz where the textile industries of the Erzgebirge were being consolidated. There were a number of other growth points of which those in Prussia were outstanding, but regions without obvious potential were consigned to an agricultural role and their elites were then able to make a virtue out of necessity with an appropriately conservative social policy. So the Habsburgs kept Hungary in a state of feudal subjection as the empire’s breadbasket (for the warmth of the Great Plain gives Hungary an agricultural potential comparable with that of the Balkan states) and industrialisation took off only after the famous ‘Ausgleich’ (compromise) of 1867.

2 POLITICAL STRUCTURES, AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY A NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURE Following the Napoleonic upheavals it was, as Lord Castlereagh put it, the duty of politicians to ‘bring back the world to peaceful habits’ (Knapton and Deny 1965 p. 4). The Congress of Vienna (1814–15) achieved a broad measure of success over reconstruction in Germany, Italy and Poland; thanks to a spirit of cooperation among restored hereditary monarchies and new enlarged kingdoms within a ‘Concert of Europe’ which convened congresses to deal with threats to stability. A further massive conflagration was prevented for almost exactly a century (apart from the Crimean interlude). However, the three eastern powers were largely responsible for redrawing the map of Europe, with a balance of power between them. The Russians, who had contributed so much to the overthrow of Napoleon, obtained the greater part of Poland (more than had been gained under the eighteenth-century partitions) and held on to Finland and Bessarabia (gained in 1809 and 1812, respectively); Austria regained Dalmatia and Istria as well as portions of Carinthia and Carniola; Prussia made progress in Saxony as well as the Rhineland, but regained only part of her Polish territory which Napoleon had appropriated for his Grand Duchy of Warsaw. These powers were highly reactionary after 1815 and rightly saw nationalism as a threat to empire. In the Habsburg Empire the notion of balance inherent in the ‘Metternich System’—named after the empire’s highly intelligent foreign minister—was based on a frank recognition of conflicting ethnic elements (German, Italian, Magyar, Romanian and Slavic) that only an absolute power could mediate successfully, even though the grand design trampled on the aspirations of the peoples of ECE after the stimulation of the Napoleonic era. The compromise—such as it was—would clearly not be sustainable as the nineteenth century turned out to be a period of unprecedented change across Europe with the growth of urban-industrial interests, and while the basic outline proved durable there were continual struggles and adjustments and significant changes in the balance among the great powers of the region which finally erupted in the First World War. The cavalier attitude towards the nations of ECE was well exemplified by Poland which was again divided in 1815 between three parties ‘committed to make Polish lands as useless as possible to the power of the others’ (Pogonowski 1987 p. 163), although at least the mortgage imposed by Napoleon in 1807 was liquidated. Poland was still acknowledged as an entity since the Duchy of Warsaw became the Kingdom of Poland (Congress Poland): an autonomous constitutional kingdom within the Russian Empire, endowed—thanks to Prince Adam Czartoryski—with as liberal a constitution as any in Europe. Some Russians might delude themselves that Slavophilism provided a bond between the two peoples—even if the Poles never acknowledged this—and most were pragmatic enough to accept that denying cultural autonomy would be counter-productive, even if the Polish gentry had forced grain surpluses from Orthodox peasants on to the urban markets under the oppressive feudalism of the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries. At

Political structures, agriculture and industry

31

the same time, the Grand Duchy of Poznań was separated from Napoleon’s duchy of 1812 and placed under Prussia, while the free city of Kraków acted as ‘the symbolic capital of the divided Poland’. But these trappings of autonomy would not last. The kingdom was demoted to the status of Russia’s Western Region after the 1863–4 insurrection and subject to Russification, while Poznań was Germanised (as Posen) and Kraków was annexed by Austria (as Cracow) as early as 1846, although there was still Polish culture at Cracow and Lemberg (Lviv) universities and access by Polish representatives to the Vienna parliament confirmed Galicia as a Polish Piedmont in the minds of a people whose national consciousness had certainly benefited from the Napoleonic experience. Polish was given official status in 1869 (when Vienna was happy to support all cultural activities of anti-Russian character) and Poles on the Austrian side were the first to engage Russian forces in 1914. Galicia was also seen by Ukrainians—a separate nation—as a Piedmont, although the Polish schools were the better organised and education in Galicia was effectively Polonised. Meanwhile, the Ottomans also made concessions to nationalism with self-government for Serbia in 1817, while the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia—simultaneously under Ottoman suzerainty and Russian protection—were blessed with constitutions in 1829. Even so, constitutions did not guarantee liberalism and democracy, for in the great empires dominating ECE control was exerted by hereditary dynasties entrenched in power and disposed to cooperate with each other in the interest of stability. Tsar Alexander of Russia presented European leaders at Paris with his Treaty of Holy Alliance under which rulers would agree to govern their states as branches of the Christian community and render mutual service to each other. There was a somewhat ad hoc approach to crises, but the imperial governments were able to preserve the spirit of the 1815 accords and stave off a general conflagration (briefly threatened in 1848) despite peasant emancipation, significant advances in constitutionalism and the Ottoman concession over Greek independence in 1832. Yet the conservative forces ruling over modernising industrial states were eventually confronted by the more ruthless nationalism of the age of Realpolitik. The German Empire Consolidation and modernisation in Germany was carried over to a new German Confederation (a loose union of thirty-four sovereign states and four free cities—each with its own assembly) placed under the permanent presidency of the Habsburg Empire. It acted as a stabilising force, but it was a poor substitute for a genuine national state. Meanwhile, Prussia gained ascendancy through the Zollverein, a free zone arising out of the measures taken in Prussia in 1818 to abolish all internal customs barriers while constructing a tariff wall against other German states. These pressures led ultimately (in 1834) to the customs union of 18 states with a total population of some 20 million. The organisation expanded further through the adhesion of Baden, Hannover and Oldenburg by 1853 and Holstein, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Schleswig by 1866, and was a major contribution to the growth of German unity. It was not a prerequisite for political unification, but it brought fiscal benefits to member states, and free trade within Germany allowed for greater specialisation between the farmers of East Prussia and Posen and the industrialists of the Rhineland and Saxony. News of revolution in France in 1848 provoked demonstrations in Berlin—prompting the promise of a representative

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

32

constitution and subsequently a dramatic statement from Friedrich Wilhelm IV that Prussia would soon merge itself into a united Germany. Uprisings in other states including Saxony were effective in transforming the confederation into an assembly of democratically elected representatives at Frankfurt, where middle-class values crystallised in support of economic growth and concerted action against foreign competition. But there was disagreement over the issues of central versus federal government, the role of the monarchy (given a significant radical, republican element) and territorial extent: should the non-German areas of Prussia and the Habsburg Empire be included in a Grossdeutschland? The Kleindeutsch arguments of ethnic coherence were persuasive—signalling an aggressive nationalism (echoed in Hungary) combining the nation state with a pseudo-colonial ‘periphery’ where German interests would predominate despite non-German ethnic majorities. However, the Frankfurt initiative was effectively vetoed when Friedrich Wilhelm refused the imperial crown, allegedly because it was offered by ‘master bakers and butchers’ rather than brother monarchs. Bismarck and Unification Prussian strength was boosted when Wilhelm I ascended the throne in 1861 and appointed the anti-liberal Otto Karl von Bismarck (of the right-wing Junker party) as his minister-president. It is difficult to separate the process of German unification from the personality of Bismarck: an ambitious administrator who realised that conflict with the Habsburg Empire was inevitable. The balance swung decisively with the Prussian victory over Austria at Königgratz (Hradec Králové) thanks to a brilliantly efficient mobilisation that made full use of the developing railway system at a time when Habsburg troops were deployed on the southern front against what appeared a more immediate threat from Italy. Prussia now annexed several German states to create a continuous territory from the Niemen to the Rhine, with overwhelming authority over a North German Confederation of twenty-two states from which Austria was excluded. The Franco-Prussian War yielded Alsace-Lorraine and also gave an opportunity for Prussia to win over the southern German states and establish the new empire with Wilhelm I proclaimed emperor of a united Germany at Versailles in 1871: ‘the most powerful national state that continental Europe had even seen now came into being as the consequence of the most ruthless exercise of Realpolitik and military force’ (Knapton and Deny 1965 p. 157). Bismarck’s appetite was now satiated and peace was maintained throughout Europe until the First World War apart from relatively localised struggles in the Balkans. With the trial of strength now resolved, Germany and the Habsburg Empire secretly agreed in 1879 to come to each other’s aid if attacked by a third party and this Dual Alliance became a Triple Alliance through Italy’s adherence in 1882. Serbia was also associated with this defence system in 1881, followed by Romania in 1883—although this was difficult (despite Carol I’s pro-German stance) given the neo-feudal oppression of Romanians in Transylvania exposed by the National Party in Bucharest and also conceded by progressive Hungarians. Meanwhile, in the ECE context, Bismarck’s style can also be seen in his desire for good relations with Russia. ‘After 1870 as the armaments race in Europe increased in intensity year by year, the efforts of the great powers to save themselves from a fratricidal war took on an always greater sense of urgency’ (Scott 1978 p. 399). Hence Bismarck’s

Political structures, agriculture and industry

33

alliances which gave stability through an international balance of power giving imperial Germany precedence. Italy wanted security vis-à-vis both Austria and France but had to accept the status quo in Central Europe. Bismarck consolidated Germany’s position through the Dreikaiserbund (Three Emperors’ League) of 1872–3, which meant he had to overcome Habsburg-Russian tensions over Slav freedom (championed by Russia as a means of regaining a position in Europe after Crimea): note the Congress of Berlin to reverse some Balkan gains of 1877–8. After renewal in 1883, the Dreikaiserbund was replaced by a Reinsurance Treaty (1887) confirming the Balkans as a Russian sphere and agreeing to German and Russian ‘benevolent neutrality’ in a future war unless Germany attacked France or Russia attacked the Habsburg Empire. This was the pinnacle of Bismarck’s diplomacy. He resigned in 1890 (to be replaced by L.von Caprivi) in the face of the headstrong Wilhelm II. The Reinsurance Treaty lapsed and when the Russian harvest failed France offered aid, leading to a military alliance in 1894: agreeing to mobilise if either partner was attacked by Germany (or any Triple Alliance country). The UK then joined what became a Triple Entente in 1907 (after the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904). As tension increased at the turn of the century there was heavy spending on armaments which took some 5% of national income in France and Germany and 6% in the Habsburg and Russian empires. But Germany’s encirclement was arguably an inevitable consequence of her rise to great power status, rounded off by a substantial colonial programme (sparking the Morocco Crisis in 1905–6). Her response to the threat of isolation by land and sea was appropriately resolute: military planners were forced to adopt the Schlieffen Plan for quick, decisive and total victory, especially in the West, and saw in the First World War the stark choice of world power or downfall. Colonial societies and ‘Drang nach Osten’ German colonial societies were complemented by a Pan-German League formed in 1893 whose members advocated German domination over much of ECE (and the Low Countries) to achieve a Greater Germany. It was considered regrettable that the 5.5 million Germans who emigrated to the USA in the nineteenth century could not have been held on the eastern and southeastern marches to bolster German economic and political interests. There could be no doubt about the importance of trade with the Habsburg Empire and with the Balkans, to say nothing of the Middle East where German businessmen followed up Wilhelm II’s visits to the sultan in 1889 and 1898 by accumulating a collection of railway concessions—enough to open the prospect of a Berlin-Baghdad railway when a 2,300km extension to the Anatolian Railway was agreed in 1903. But while Germany reorganised the Turkish army, the French were equipping Bulgarian and Serb forces so that Ottoman failures in the Balkan War of 1912 could be seen as ‘Creuzot’s victory over Krupp’. Poland was also an area of critical importance since Palacký’s notion of German-Slav antagonism gave Berlin a sense of mission through ‘Drang nach Osten’. Initially there were good relations between Germans and Poles in the Grand Duchy of Poznań, though little manufacturing developed apart from food processing and handicrafts. However, 1848 brought a general desire for liberalism which quickly broke down over Polish desires for ‘national’ reorganisation. A Polish ‘Duchy of Gniezno’ was proposed in the eastern part of Prussian Poland whereupon the whole of Poznań became an integral part

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

34

of the Prussian monarchy (as Posen; see above). The poorer Jews supported neither party but others tended to support the Germans, especially in the north and west where Germans were in the majority. German nationalists viewed the Poles ambivalently as actual or potential internal enemies of the state (‘Reichsfeinde’) and a sense of provocation was deepened by Bismarck’s appreciation that enlightened attitudes towards the Poles would not be appreciated in St Petersburg if Russia were forced into some accommodation with its own Polish population. Polish nationalism had to be seen as a threat that might mean the loss of territory to a Polish state and Bismarck asserted that ‘Polish nationalism cannot be judged humanistically and impartially by us but only antagonistically’ (Blanke 1981 p. 9). His first strategy was the ‘Kulturkampf’ which sought to frustrate the growth of Polish nationalism through the activities of the Catholic Church by placing all schools under the supervision of state inspectors (1871) before the teaching of Polish in elementary schools was stopped altogether (1887). Nevertheless, the ethnic balance tipped in favour of the Poles because the effects of a high birth rate—and some Polonisation of German Catholics—were exaggerated by out-migration of Germans linked with the competition suffered by local small-scale industries on account of large urban-based factories in the west that now had the benefit of cheap distribution by rail. Transit trade with Russia was also hard hit by customs regulations, and the slump in farm prices depressed the agricultural sector along with related industries like timber, spirits and wool. German technicians could earn more in the west while German retailers were eliminated by Polish boycotts. Most went to Brandenburg-Berlin and Westfalen, but many went abroad in the 1870s and 1880s. Of course, ethnic Germans con stituted the bulk of the migrants since they were in a better position to adjust to life among co-nationals in the west; Poles would usually stay only briefly in alien German-speaking areas before returning home with money to buy land. Somewhat ineffectual action was taken to remove the Russian Poles employed by German landowners—exploiting cheap labour to bolster their profits—before the more positive approach of the ‘Ansiedlungsgesetz’ (Settlement Law) of 1886 which gave rise to an ‘Ansiedlungskommission’ to purchase estates so that Polish farmworkers could be replaced by independent German peasants. However, the German peasant farmers assisted by the act were also anxious to use cheap labour and so the Poles remained, albeit with a change of employer. Caprivi was personally less antagonistic towards the Poles and expulsion orders against foreign workers were revoked in 1890. There was frankly little alternative assuming that German farmworkers could not be compelled to remain in the east and employers could not be made to pay higher wages. There was also a changing international context—with strains between Germany and Russia reaching the point where Poles might become a factor in a future two-front war embroiling Germany with both Russia and France—and some softening of measures taken against Polish language teaching. These changes were hardly fundamental and the limited reconciliation arose simply because ‘both sides were more or less conscripted into a closer relationship by fear of outside forces’ (ibid. p. 147). Ethnic Germans in the east still advocated a radical policy: hence the Germanising ethos of the ‘Ostmarkenverein’ (1894)—an Association for the Advancement of the German Nationality in the Eastern Marches— followed by a new Expropriation Law in 1908 and the colonial society ‘Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Inneren Kołonisation’ in 1912.

Political structures, agriculture and industry

35

Reference should also be made to the ‘Hebungspolitik’ of 1898: a programme of public spending to increase the attractiveness of the eastern regions. There was much new building in Posen, including a Royal Academy (later university) and the Kaiser-Wilhelm Library; and improved communications by both rail and water as the Warta was regulated and Posen port developed. Clearly there was a will to act but the programme was undermined primarily by the reluctance of Germans to compensate for the continuing exodus from the eastern periphery. Although Caprivi would not repeal the Settlement Law, rising land prices and a shortage of suitable German applicants reduced its effectiveness. While Germans dominated urban industry, the civil service and the railways, the gains made by Polish landowners between 1896 and 1914 went a long way to cancel out the losses of some 245,000ha from 1861 to 1896; many of them successfully adopted capitalist farming and extended rural industrialisation. Tariff policy Broadly speaking there was a conflict of interest between industrialists who wanted high tariffs to protect themselves against more efficient foreign producers and agrarians who believed that high tariffs for manufacturers would lead to retaliatory measures harmful to cereal exports which relied on free trade. Hence a compromise position of low tariff levels in the Zollverein, incidentally reciprocated when Metternich’s policy of high tariffs was modified with the aim of joining the club. But the situation was rather different when protection was quickly reintroduced in Germany in 1879 through an alliance between ‘rye and iron’. Agrarian interests now demanded protection, especially with the onset of depression when cheap food imports from Russia and the US undermined living standards among a farming population used to high incomes. But Bismarck’s modest increase in tariffs was a signal that the great eastern landowners would not be allowed to stand in the way of industry’s growing need for access to world markets in order to boost efficiency, specialisation and income growth (although even the moderate tariff increase had an adverse effect on production and accelerated emigration to the North America). However, it was difficult to avoid a spiralling effect given the tariff increase in the Habsburg and Russian empires in the 1880s. German retaliation culminated in 1892 when the Farmers’ League, a political group representing the now-uncompetitive Junkers and their academic supporters, pressed their views in crucial tariff debates. High tariffs then brought prosperity to the land—and generated more jobs for Poles in the eastern provinces—but this recognition of the political influence of the Junkers did nothing to encourage peasant proprietorship. The case for an ‘Agrarstaat’—requiring Germans to pay a high price for food—rather than a pure ‘Industriestaat’ was argued out on the basis of a physically fit rural population with a high birth rate that was more useful for the defence of a country than the physically inferior populations crowded into industrial towns. Autarky would also remove the risk of military weakness arising from excessive dependence on imports. The attempt by Caprivi in 1894 to negotiate simultaneous tariff reductions in Germany, the Habsburg Empire and some West European states (followed by Serbia and Romania in 1893 and Russia in 1894) gave a boost to industry—with a reduction in emigration in the late 1890s and a redirection of migration flows to the German cities—but eventually generated enough opposition to remove the chancellor

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

36

from office. The controversial ‘Central European system’ lapsed in 1903 and tariffs resumed their upward trend. Compromise in the Habsburg Empire Support for German interests was clearly seen in the Habsburg Empire after 1850. The centralised system of A.Bach dispensed with local diets and concentrated a huge German-speaking bureaucracy in Vienna. This formula was drastically modified in 1867 when, in the wake of a catastrophic defeat by Prussia in the brief seven-week war of 1866, the empire was not only expelled from the German Confederation but forced to negotiate with the Magyars led by E.Deák and Count G.Andrássy to transform the state into a Dual Monarchy (Austria-Hungary). Nevertheless, concern over ‘encirclement’ (especially Russian pressure on her borderlands) made an entente appropriate and German capital flowed from 1867. When demand inflation sparked off a series of trade deficits from 1908 Germany also helped with emergency loans in 1913–14. A Central European customs union was fully established in 1891 through a series of Caprivi treaties linking Germany with the Habsburg Empire (and Italy, Switzerland and Belgium). Food from the empire moved to Germany along with oil from Galicia—following German investment by Deutsche Petrol—which helped gather support for an abortive OderDanube Canal project in the 1890s. The empire was still a major political force in the south and policy aimed resolutely at reducing Russian influence after Crimea. With German support, the Russian patronage for Bulgaria at San Stefano (1877–8) was reduced by the Berlin Congress in 1878. And after taking over the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the rebellion of 1875–8, the province was formally annexed in 1908—following the Young Turk revolution—as part of a more active policy by foreign minister Von Aehrenthal during 1906–12 which included railway development in the South Slav lands. Relations with Serbia deteriorated until a crisis was provoked in 1914 by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by a Serb nationalist, whereupon Austrian bombardment of Belgrade caused Russia to mobilise. Until then the empire had an advantage because Russia was a net importer of capital and could not afford to invest in the region. For example, she could not summon finance for the Oriental Railway through Bulgaria in the early 1880s when ‘the occupying Tsarist army and officials could surely have used such a loan to consolidate their influence in the new Balkan state’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 90). But the empire was placed under great strain in the late nineteenth century as a result of the growth of nationalism. More powerful groups like the Magyars tried to maximise their influence while the weaker nations came to see the Dual Monarchy in a more negative light as an obstruction to their own ambitions. Yet stability arising out of the long continuity of administrative practice made collapse inconceivable before 1914. The principle of federation was widely supported. However, by 1918 interest in the principle of an imperial framework to provide security for small nations in the region—very strong in Palacký’s time—had switched to the radical alternative of national independence for which there was a growing number of precedents in the Balkans at the turn of the century. Only the smaller groups still found the imperial framework congenial. In Austria the Germans remained a distinct minority, with 34.8% of the population in 1910, by which time the Magyars in Hungary had achieved a majority of 54.5%. The

Political structures, agriculture and industry

37

Germans struggled to maintain ascendancy over the Slavs (Czechs, Poles, Slovenes and Ukrainians) and a significant Italian element. Yet, despite their refusal to take these peoples into a full partnership, there was a measure of cooperation from Czechs and Poles in the Vienna Reichsrat (parliament). Indeed Count Taafe’s rule (1879–93) was based on a combination of Catholic, Czech and socialist parties against German liberals. As a nation without a state the Czechs secured an important cultural concession in 1882 with the establishment of a separate university using the Czech language; securing a measure of equality with the Poles who already had universities at Cracow and Lemberg. The Jews were also cooperative as a result of emancipation by the end of the 1850s: they could escape the restrictions of ghetto life and adopt the values and lifestyle of liberal middle-class Gentile society. As H.G.Wanklyn (1940 p. 187) put it, ‘there is no denying the contribution of the Jews to contemporary economics: whether as tax gatherers, distillers, small traders, millers, manufacturers or timber merchants they had a lively sense of the resources of the region and knew in spite of many limitations how to make use of them’. Interestingly, census questions in Prague about everyday language after 1880 revealed a split between German and Czech which gradually shifted in the latter’s favour as the poorer Jews began to identify more closely with the Czech majority in the city. Hungary The Habsburg link was applauded by progressives in the early nineteenth century as the basis for Westernisation where nations on the margins of the Ottoman Empire were often judged to be Oriental in character. It seemed desirable to associate Hungarian culture with Europe’s Franco-German core provided her nationality would be safeguarded. A national idea then arose out of a Magyar renaissance, reflecting the ideals of the liberal aristocracy for agricultural development and emancipation in the 1830s and 1840s which generated strong literary and political impulses. Hungarian became the official language of the kingdom in 1844 and while liberals advocated an inclusive society giving nonMagyars a share in a superior culture, this was not heeded in 1848 when Kossuth rejected the idea of a multi-ethnic Hungarian state and thereby ensured that non-Magyars would back the forces of reaction in Vienna to defeat the revolution. But repression under martial law gave way to cooperation with Vienna in 1854, with economic development as the overriding concern. The emperor was subsequently disposed to fulfil Hungarian aspirations that went beyond progress in industry, transport and trade: there was a boost for the Church with money for Esztergom Cathedral in 1855 and tacit approval of the goal of ‘equitable dualism’. Ultimately, the victory which eluded the Magyars in 1848 was achieved in 1867 under Andrássy’s leadership when the Ausgleich maintained a unitary state yet with the Hungarian concession of giving up the dream of full independence balanced by freedom to promote the doctrine of a culturally superior Magyar race with a historic mission to control the southeastern marchlands which were drawn into the Hungarian ‘half of empire with the boundary on the Leitha River separating Austrian ‘Cisleithania’ from Hungarian ‘Transleithania’. The economic provisions were renewed every ten years through long negotiations, but an acute constitutional crisis occurred when failure to renegotiate in 1897 led to ‘years of

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

38

obstruction’ (up to 1903) and the election of a nationalist coalition in 1905, which eventually governed until 1910. A nationality law in 1868 proclaimed all Hungarian citizens as members of the ‘Magyar’ nation irrespective of their mother tongue, yet each minority could use its own language and develop autonomy in educational and religious spheres. But in 1879 the teaching of Hungarian became obligatory even in non-Hungarian schools—a requirement reinforced by laws in 1883, 1891 and 1893. Substantial resources were put into the establishment of state schools while high standards were imposed on the religious denominations—which had run virtually all the primary schools before 1867— necessitating acceptance of state subsidies and the official interference that came with them, culminating in Count A.Apponyi’s 1907 law which secured government control over teachers by declaring them civil servants (requiring com petence in Hungarian and the right to a salary which many school managers in minority areas could not afford). The net result was the dominance of Hungarian as a language of instruction in all schools and a sharp reduction in the number of primary schools teaching in minority languages. Such actions made the minorities despair, for there was great frustration among national groups that tried to set up cultural facilities, for example reading rooms which were seen as having a political purpose against the interests of the ‘Magyar nation’. But the context lay in Vienna’s sole concession over renegotiation of the Ausgleich: in each army regiment the prevailing language (‘Umgangssprache’) would reflect that which most soldiers understood and not the mother tongue of the majority. Since the Hungarians had always wanted their own forces, an army where more regiments operated in Hungarian was a way forward. Hence the coalition government accepted Vienna’s terms in 1906 but then took measures in line with a chauvinistic policy to make ‘the language issue the crucial element of its goal to create a Hungary of thirty million Magyars’ (Sugar 1981 p. 301). The only substantial concession was made with Croatia through the ‘Nagodba’ of 1868, allowing autonomy in internal affairs with a governor (‘ban’) and parliament (‘sobor’) in Zagreb and Croatian as the official language. But even here all railway employees had to master the Hungarian language. There can be little doubt that Magyarisation was effective while resentment was not always universally felt since the educated classes saw economic and social benefits in conversion to the Magyar cause. Romanians, Slovaks and southern Slavs aired their grievances at a Congress of Nationalities in Budapest in 1895, but the group broke up due to internal divisions after only four years of opposition to government policies. The economy Meanwhile, Hungary’s economy within the Habsburg fold was based primarily on agriculture with cereal and flour exports catching up the traditional livestock sector during the first half of the nineteenth century. The aristocracy remained firmly in control: not only did differential tariffs (established in 1756 by Maria Theresa) favour exports of Hungarian farm products—as they did those of Austrian manufactures—but the ancient privileges of the aristocracy were confirmed by Leopold II, and—by 1830—they expropriated large areas of land cleared by free peasants of the previous generation. The events of 1848 changed the legal status of the nobility, who no longer held seigneurial rights, as well as the peasantry, who ceased to perform compulsory labour, but there was

Political structures, agriculture and industry

39

no redistribution of land and a middle class did not emerge. The so-called Liberal Party was controlled by the aristocracy (as was the Independence Party, perpetuating the spirit of 1848) and ruled from 1875 to 1906 with K.Tisza as premier, thanks to corrupt elections, rotten boroughs and patronage. The extent of aristocratic control was remarkable for ‘the magnates accepted the state as their own and used it for their own purposes’ (Stokes 1987 p. 73): a few prominent landowners could exercise ultimate control and they were able to mobilise the landless peasants who worked their lands. When industrialisation got under way after 1873 the political potential of the bourgeoisie remained largely dormant because Tisza saw to it that the leaders of the successful Jewish industrial and banking community were ennobled and thereby absorbed into the establishment (rather as in Prussia where the Junkers reached an understanding with industrialists that safeguarded their property and status). The Ottoman Empire and the successor states The Ottoman Empire was unable to offer the same positive response to developments in Western Europe. There was a breakdown in isolation with the arrival of diplomats and merchants but the prominence of non-Muslims in agriculture, commerce and industry encouraged the establishment to concentrate on its great vested interests of administrative and military matters. The Ottoman economy adjusted to the industrial revolution by concentrating on the export of foodstuffs and other raw materials without any commitment to modernisation. Until 1880 there were clear fiscal objectives through high tariffs for exports that generated resources for the army and palace, yet were quite inappropriate as stimuli for economic development. Since agriculture, industry and commerce were required only to satisfy existing consumption, there could be no sense of economic and technological dynamism, and ambivalence was shown towards skilful immigrant craftsmen and traders. The Anglo-Turkish commercial convention of 1838 was appreciated for its political and strategic benefits at a time of crisis in Egypt, even though free trade posed a threat to local industry. While crafts were undermined only slowly in the interior regions, the industries started around Istanbul in the 1840s by Sultan Mecid could supply only the army, while foreign capital needed ‘the institutions and the adaptability adequate to channel these resources in the direction that best served the country’s interest’ (ibid. p. 22). The infrastructure remained poor with only a sparse railway system developing late in the century, while the Islamic prohibition on usury was strong enough to delay the development of commercial banking and credit (the imperial bank established in Istanbul in 1863 served only the needs of the state). Foreign loans were largely for military use and a loan in 1870 linked with the Oriental Railway project to join the European system was essentially a political, administrative and strategic venture (railways inland from Constanţa and Varna were built by British firms taking advantage of the empire’s growing foreign trade). However, the Ottomans took a significant initiative in Midhat Pasha’s Danube Vilayet arising out of the 1864 reform seeking centralisation of provincial government and a growth in tax revenues. As an experiment in regional development—to overcome the disruption caused by a Circassian migration from the Crimea (1862–3) that gave rise to banditry—Midhat built roads and introduced both farm machinery and savings banks for agricultural credit, but on too small a scale and without efficient organisation so that

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

40

rising tribute encouraged Bulgarians to support national revival by the 1870s. Moreover, the relatively stable period 1880–1914—dominated by the reign of Sultan Adbulhamid (1878–1908)—showed concern for economic development and the Western system of free enterprise with some acceptance of the use of tax revenues for development and infrastructure. There was a leap in imports for consumption and growing investor confidence as the empire paid off old debts in an orderly manner and contracted new ones. As banks with general commercial functions became prominent in the 1890s Turkey was arguably poised for an economic upsurge at the beginning of the twentieth century, but instead the country descended into eight years of war, for the division between the Turkish bureaucracy and Christian merchant communities (as revolutionary vanguards) fermented into an antagonism that was to become the basis of Balkan nationalism. The Ottomans paid a heavy price for their failure to modernise and seek the betterment of the individual through some feeling of identity. In the absence of any sense of common citizenship the empire could not survive. Christians traditionally held an inferior position in Ottoman society, providing the tax support for the military establishment and for other functions of state. An edict of 1856—marking the beginning of the ‘Tandzimat’ (Reform) period which lasted until 1876—declared the equality of all Ottoman citizens through ‘Osmanlilik’ or Ottomanism. But reform began in the military sector and was a slow and sometimes contradictory movement to maintain the integrity of the state during a period of near constant warfare. It promised the ultimate secularisation of government but no reform was radical enough to abolish the ‘millet’ system: a well-meaning concession allowing all groups to enjoy their own local administration which actually served to institutionalise Muslim privilege. Hence the Christian interest lay in moving from a ‘millet’ to a national consciousness with protection by the great powers as an interim measure as integration became a lost cause. It was ‘to be doubted if any programme of reform could have preserved the Ottoman Empire as a multinational state whose citizens would have been content to remain within its control’ (Jelavich and Jelavich 1977 p. 326). The Young Turk movement, with a secularist conception of fatherland (‘vatan’), forced even the Muslim Arab intelligentsia to shed their loyalty to the Ottoman state. The nation states of Southeastern Europe The Vienna Congress did not address the looming Eastern Question and since there was no guarantee for the ailing Ottoman Empire the Habsburg and Russian empires competed for Balkan territory. Under the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) Russia gained unprecedented influence in the marchlands: free passage in the Balkans and free access to the Dardanelles Straits for merchants; protection over the principalities; and a guarantee for Serbian autonomy. The Habsburgs were naturally concerned about this level of influence and after the Crimean War the Treaty of Paris (1856) called for the demilitarisation of the Black Sea and territorial adjustments in the Danube Delta (thereby giving Russia no role in the new Danube Commission). Furthermore the treaty cancelled Russia’s Balkan protectorate functions (in the principalities and Serbia)—and her right to intervene in Ottoman affairs on behalf of Orthodox Christians—in favour of an international guarantee. There followed a further setback when Russia’s patronage for a ‘Big Bulgaria’—the result of a pan-Slavic front against imperialism during the Russo-Turkish

Political structures, agriculture and industry

41

War of 1877–8—was blocked by the Congress of Berlin. She did, however, have the satisfaction of the Triple Alliance and a prompt response from her allies when the Ottomans attacked her Crimean ports in 1914. Meanwhile, there was considerable progress towards the formation of nation states that were nominally independent, yet economically and politically subservient to the great powers and their sensitivities over Russian designs on the Balkans and the Straits. There was a developing sense of nationalism despite the lack of ‘enlightenment’, which seemed to evade Ottoman territories, for Balkan Slavs were ready by the 1830s to assimilate national ideologies in order to ‘jump in one gigantic leap from Ottoman medievalism to romanticism, liberalism and socialism’ (Sugar 1975 p. 507). Yet while the state institutions were modelled on the West, ‘the actual content of political activity was more consistent with traditional status societies than with the more legalistic societies from which the state forms were copied’ (Stokes 1987 p. 74). The new nations were rarely able to realise their territorial ambitions in full since they tended to become mutually antagonistic, to say nothing of claims against the imperial powers which could not be effectively advanced until the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 and the First World War. In the development of nationalism much depended on the improvements in education but it is very significant that national Churches provided cultural, moral and political leadership. Since Ottoman systems of regulation had to be transformed by building up native entrepreneurship without an adequate security framework, there had to be a disproportionate emphasis on heavy industry and armaments. The infrastructure included the building of railway systems that were purely embryonic in the Ottoman period. And while the elites initially favoured low tariffs in order to push the agricultural surpluses of their estates into more developed parts of Europe (and to maintain good relations with the powers) stagnating grain prices in the 1880s undermined the credibility of an industrial policy linked to agricultural exports and forced a general extension of tariff barriers which provided an umbrella for domestic manufacturers. However, despite the developments in the resource regions (delivering timber, fuels and minerals, cereals and livestock) and the activity at the ports, the remarkable changes in the capital cities created major spatial antagonisms which had not been adequately addressed when Balkan tensions erupted into the First World War. But the rurality of the region remained an enduring characteristic, reflected in a balance of concern in the minds of visionaries between agrarian reform, in the interests of economic and social progress in the countryside, and urban-industrial development to solve the ‘peasant problem’ by reducing population pressure on limited land resources. Serbia and Montenegro National feeling was manifest in revolt against Turkish misrule in the very early years of the nineteenth century. A Serb uprising (1804) was precipitated by rebellious Janissaries and was not crushed until Ottoman victory in 1813. Trade with the south was disrupted: the economy was crippled and isolated. In 1815 a second rebellion gave M.Obrenović the opportunity to negotiate autonomy for the ‘pashalik’ of Belgrade where selfadministration was conceded by formal Ottoman decrees in 1830 and 1833 (arising out of bribery of Ottoman officials financed by the rapid expansion of the Serbian livestock trade to the Habsburg lands, the largest slice of which Obrenović himself controlled). It

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

42

was significant that the Ottomans had eliminated the old medieval nobility, while the Serb uprisings got rid of the Turkish landowners. So it was comparatively easy for Obrenović to contain the potential challenges from churchmen and military figures and pose as the sole peasant leader. His abdication in 1838 left a peasantry that was almost totally undifferentiated (although the extended family ‘zadruga’ was beginning to collapse) apart from a small percentage of landowners with holdings of moderate size. Since shops were usually denied permits and subjected to high taxes it was only in the 1840s that rural shops began to eliminate the itinerant pedlars; while country fairs and inns (‘kafane’) also provided a commercial network. Indeed the 1838 constitution—in the mould of the Romanian ‘Organic Statutes’—established virtual free trade and a further surge in business which saw imported manufactures undermining craft workshops. Towns became Serbianised for Serbs were able to take over trade from many of the Greeks and Jews who had been in control in the early part of the century but were subjected to discrimination over documentation, citizenship and residence in the 1830s and 1840s. But urban expansion was constrained by the freeing of internal trade in 1838. Meanwhile, Montenegro was able to escape the full force of Turkish domination, given the determination of the tribesmen to exploit the excellent opportunities for guerrilla warfare in barren limestone country around Cetinje. But it was also possible for Montenegro to gain advantage from the major struggles between the empires and in 1799 the Ottomans formally recognised the country’s independence and the incorporation of Brda. These extended frontiers were successfully defended thereafter, with some gains in the Grahovo area in 1858. But efforts to obtain a footing on the Adriatic at Cattaro (1815) and Budva (1840) were resisted by the Habsburgs. Serbian independence was achieved in 1878 (with territorial expansion into the Niš triangle) and modernisation was based firmly on the West European model of national and class interests. Banking developed slowly in the early 1870s based almost entirely on domestic capital, although most traders were still forced to borrow from local money lenders and many had to get short-tern credit from the Habsburg lands. A bureaucracy emerged while the prince (king after 1882) managed the parliamentary system by switching support between the Serbian Radical Party (founded 1881) and the rival Liberal Party. The Radicals built up the infrastructure, including education, transport and the military, but did little for farming apart from the foundation of a few agricultural schools and plant breeding establishments. However, they also reduced the tax burden on the peasants (partly by lax application of the rules, including a reluctance to chase up arrears) and appeared to be championing their interests through a populist programme even though the party was controlled by intellectuals. The Liberals played a complementary role in popularising national unity and revitalising the Kosovo legend so that—with momentum contributed by the example of Italian unification—Serbia was seen as a core around which other southern Slav nations might coalesce given the inspiration of the medieval state of S.Dušan and Napoleon’s ‘Illyrian Idea’. Still more grandiose was the notion of a Balkan League that might draw Bulgarians, Greeks, Romanians and southern Slavs into a confederation with Belgrade as the appropriate capital. However, these ideas lacked realism as long as Serbia remained a small, backward state. Even in the context of the southern Slav peoples, subservience to Belgrade was controversial: indeed, it was repellent to the relatively developed and Westernised Croats especially in view of

Political structures, agriculture and industry

43

Serbia’s primitive political organisation focusing on the rival Karadjeordjević and Obrenović families. Links with the Habsburg Empire were strengthened under Milan Obrenović (1868–89) by Serbia’s request for support over boundary revisions at the Congress of Berlin, leading to a general economic agreement in 1880 that increased Serbia’s dependence. But dynastic change in favour of Peter Karadjeordjević in 1903 then produced sweeping reforms including reorganisation of commerce, bringing new trade and customs arrangements with Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire in 1905. Vienna was also dismayed when modernisation of the army led to a contract with Schneider-Creusot of France rather than Škoda of Bohemia. The border was closed to Serbian exports in 1906, and annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 was related to a desire to increase pressure on Serbia. By the time the commercial war ended in 1911 Serbia had radically diversified her trade. Territorial gains in the Balkan Wars (limited only by Habsburg support for Albania) had an electrifying effect on the southern Slavs which precipitated the crisis of 1914. These gains were, however, controversial because they defied the wishes of the Macedonian people as represented by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) founded in 1893 with a governing principle (announced in 1896) to achieve full political autonomy for Macedonia (and Adrianople) through internal revolution. After a failed revolt in the Monastir (Bitola) region in 1903, IMRO was torn between the options of complete independence or a merging into a Greater Bulgaria (1905) until Serbia was joined by Bulgaria and Greece in the partition of 1913. Of course, Serbia and Greece were totally opposed to IMRO while Sofia was ambivalent because one wing of the organisation supported Macedonian union with Bulgaria although she received only a small share of the spoils. Meanwhile, Montenegro gained a short coastline between Antivari (Bar) and Ulcinj after the Congress of Berlin, along with further interior territory around Nikšič. Further gains emerged out of the Balkan Wars as the ‘sancak’ (province) of Novipazar was partitioned between Montenegro and Serbia, thereby paving the way for a union movement that was already gaining momentum when the First World War started as a reaction to King Nikola’s alliance with Italian interests, although the ‘odbor’ (union) was not achieved until Nikola’s overthrow following civil war in 1918–19. Montenegro’s political and economic achievements were remarkable considering the meagre resources of the country and suspicions among the powers that annexation of coastal territory would result in a Russian naval presence (producing the stipulation in the 1878 treaty that Montenegrin waters should remain closed to the warships of all nations). Romania ‘From the Principalities subjected to the rule of the Phanariot princes as early as 1821, and which were destined to form the nucleus of the future modern state, to the national Romanian state forged in 1859, there was a huge leap which covered less than half a century’ (Berindei 1988 p. 23). The ‘boyar’ landowners maintained pressure for the restoration of native rule through the late eighteenth century but it was only in 1821, following the great Greek upheaval, that the Porte abandoned the system of indirect rule through Phanariot appointees and restored native princes the following year. Since the

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

44

cosmopolitan merchant class was not a political force, this was significant in opening the way for a surge of Enlightenment under the Western-educated boyar youth which included cultured individuals such as V.Alecsandri, G.Asachi, N.Bălcescu, C.Golescu and M.Kogălniceanu. Russian influence also proved very positive when the occupation of 1828–34 (‘the sixth in a series of Tsarist occupations since 1711’) brought in Count P.Kiselev—as plenipotentiary in both principalities—to ‘convert the territory into a bulwark against the Ottoman Empire’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 91). The need for better regulation resulted in constitutions in the form of the Organic Statutes (1830) driven through in the teeth of boyar objections. There was a new government machine with a council of ministers and efforts were made to improve agriculture and health services, but a progressive Russian regime in the principalities did not lessen the greater attractiveness of trade with the Habsburg Empire, undertaken by a growing number of Jewish merchants arising from immigration which the Russians could do little to control (though they were barred from holding land and—like other traders and artisans—from settling in villages). Commercial growth arose from the removal of the Ottoman monopoly under the Treaty of Adrianople, the opening up of the Black Sea and adoption of a fairer fiscal system. The cereal output could now enter the world economic circuit. The Crimean War brought to an end the Russian protectorate and the restoration of Moldavian control over the mouth of the Danube through the transfer of southern Bessarabia which had been lost to Russia (along with the rest of the province) in 1829. There was a surge of popular pressure for unity and despite Habsburg and Ottoman interference the ‘divans’ set their sights on ‘united principalities’ by electing the same prince (A.I.Cuza) in both Moldavia and Wallachia. The powers then accepted the inevitable with the Wallachian capital (Bucharest) the clear choice for the new administration as the largest town in the region. Economic and social change accelerated with attention to defence, public health, industry and transport. There was a growth of small industry (artisan workshops) especially in Bucharest, while a national coinage was introduced in 1867 and there were 1,300km of railway by the time independence was achieved in 1878. The modernisation of the country went ahead to consolidate the economic underpinnings of independence with the benefit of cereal, oil and timber exports and a more supportive fiscal regime. The growth of cereal exports was particularly impressive in the immediate hinterland of the ports. The feudal issue was settled in 1864 but the slow pace of urbanisation meant that there was an expanding rural population which had to be supported largely by sharecropping and labour contracts on estate land. Yet while more land was ploughed, yields and prices were not dynamic enough to secure significant improvements in living standards so that governments became increasingly preoccupied with economic and social crises, especially after the peasant revolt of 1907. Political power rested with the landowning Conservatives and urban entrepreneurial Liberals, but those who entered public life could not maintain a grip on power because King Carol (who as Prince Carol had replaced Cuza after the coup against the latter in 1866) switched his support between the two parties. Neither party was prepared to compromise with the Jewish middle class which became a strong force in the towns (inevitably, since they could not live in the countryside or own land). The Liberals resented the Jews as economic rivals and hounded them out of even such minor business as peddling in the villages; and while the

Political structures, agriculture and industry

45

Conservatives valued Jews as estate managers they lacked the maturity to recruit them as a political force. Meanwhile, Romanian industry was hit hard by foreign imports in the years just before independence when there was a limited market, a lack of domestic capital and skilled workers, and, crucially, no effective system of protection and national industrial growth (but extractive industries like oil and salt were doing well). However, all the domestic issues of the kingdom were overshadowed by the issue of union with Transylvania. Although official action was constrained by Romania’s secret treaty with the Habsburg Empire there was growing cultural contact, and the continuing lack of unity across the Carpathians was seen as an unnatural situation, not unlike the partitioned Poland. Bulgaria During the Ottoman period Bulgarian nationalism was constrained by the domination of the patriarchate by Greek bishops, although a history book in Bulgarian was published in 1762. But it was only in 1870 that Russian pressure produced a Bulgarian Orthodox exarchate, and a national church leader outside the authority of the Greek patriarch seems to have fomented greater political activity. Rising tribute increased Bulgarian sympathy for the national movement, but another consideration was Turkish preference for Bulgarian community leaders (the ‘chorobadzia’ who were successful traders operating within the Ottoman Empire), mayors and tax collectors in each town with the result that small councils were established to represent different interest groups, notably craftsmen and merchants. These innovations were stimulating because the chorobadzia were closely associated (as tithe collectors) with the Phanariot Greek hierarchy of the Orthodox Church and could therefore apply pressure from the business community for improved education facilities in the Bulgarian language which contributed to cultural and economic development as well as a rise of national consciousness. Then the severe Turkish response to the carefully organised rising of 1876 brought about a Russian invasion with Romanian support. But the large Bulgarian state carved out of Ottoman territory in 1877 under the Treaty of San Stefano was unacceptable to the other powers despite much sympathy for the Bulgarian cause. The Russians had to submit their treaty for ratification by the Congress of Berlin, as a result of which only a small Bulgaria was recognised as a self-governing state under Ottoman suzerainty while Macedonia and Eastern Rumelia were returned to Ottoman rule (albeit with a measure of autonomy in the latter case). This was welcomed by Serbia, with claims to some of Bulgaria’s 1877 territory, but it constituted a setback for the Russians whose influence in Balkan affairs was greatly reduced. However, although some Russians denounced the Congress, they could not afford to go to war with the other powers, and northern Bulgaria could be seen as the nucleus for a future independent and unified state. In the event Russian tutelage was resented by the Bulgarians who made surprisingly rapid progress in pursuit of a larger state by absorbing Eastern Rumelia in 1885 (despite Serbia’s violent opposition), while suzerainty was rejected by a unilateral declaration of independence in 1908. Unlike the situation in Serbia in 1878 Bulgaria had no ready-made administration, but a stable regime was established under Ferdinand Saxe-Coburg in 1887 (he became king in 1908) and Bulgaria was led into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

46

in the hope that further territorial gains would help re-establish the generous frontiers of early medieval Bulgarian empires. It was the liberal intelligentsia who dominated the Turnovo constitutional convention and controlled the government in the early years after the departure of Turkish landlords left Bulgaria a country of smallholding peasants. The role of the prince was quite decisive in a situation where there was no natural party of government supported by the peasants, who were faced with low commodity prices and heavy tax burdens. The prince established his personal power with the help of conservatives and instability linked with war with Serbia and unification with Rumelia was overcome by authoritarian methods which undermined the Turnovo constitution and gave rise to the fraudulent ‘making’ of elections typical of Romania, Serbia and even Hungary, where the magnates relied on rural support delivered by coercive methods. There was attention to infrastructure as in Serbia, but the peasants did not escape a heavy fiscal burden. Radical opposition came from the ‘Bulgarski Zemedelske Naroden Soiuz’ (Bulgarian Agricultural National Union: BANU) formed in 1899 to mount what turned out to be a successful campaign against collection of tithes in kind during a period of rising cereal prices, although it was not until after the war that their charismatic leader A.Stamboliski was able to make an impact in parliament. The union found a useful role in developing producer cooperatives (‘druzhbi’) which established stores and provided insurance funds and agricultural extension services. The latter included credit facilities—that is, mortgage loans—through the Bulgarian Agricultural Bank which emerged from the rural savings banks (organised by Midhat Pasha in the 1860s) to comprise a single organisation with headquarters in Sofia by 1903. Trade was relatively limited (Bucharest, Istanbul and Selanik) at this time, for the Bulgarians did not possess a borderline offering longdistance trading opportunities. However, an artisan-trader class developed in the upland towns, manufacturing army equipment for the Ottomans on the basis of the inherited guild system which ‘nicely served the political apprenticeship of this growing commercial class’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 152). Albania Shqiptar (Albanian) national consciousness was slow to develop, and culture was for long associated with the Catholic and Orthodox Churches (in the north and south respectively) rather than politics. It was among the Muslims of that revolutionary intellectuals first emerged in the 1840s thanks to Greek schools which helped to overcome cultural isolation. The idea of preserving Muslim Albania in the context of a reformed Ottoman Empire seems to have given way—in the face of strong Hellenisation during the 1870s— to an alternative conception of an Albanian nation securing its future in a post-Ottoman context on the basis of language and national literature. Thus ‘a generation of Albanian patriots when forced to identify either on the basis of language or religion came to the conclusion that the survival of the “komb” ultimately depended on the survival of the language’ (Kolsti 1981 p. 40). But it was only in 1908 that an All-Albania Congress in Monastir agreed to adopt a modified form of the ‘Union Alphabet’ which evolved among Ghegs in northern Albania in preference to the ‘Istanbul Alphabet’ used by Tosks in the south (and phased out only in 1915). The really critical period for Albanian nationalism began when the Young Turk revolution ushered in a new constitution removing

Political structures, agriculture and industry

47

recognition of ethnic groups (declaring all citizens to be ‘Osmanli’) which had the effect of transforming an Albanian cultural movement into a national revolt, especially among the Catholic Malissori on the Montenegrin frontier. However, while Greeks and Slavs welcomed anti-Ottoman sentiment, neither wished to facilitate an Albanian state, and with the collapse of the Ottoman army and a final Turkish withdrawal from the Western Balkans after the Balkan War in 1912 it was largely because of Austrian and Italian insistence that the growth of Serbia (and to a lesser extent Greece) should be curbed that a separate Albania was recognised; although arguably without any basis in Albanian nationalism this policy might not have been viable. In 1912 a national assembly in Vlorë declared independence, with strong support from Italy (wanting a foothold) and Austria (wishing to block Serbia’s expansion to the sea). By contrast, Montenegrins and Serbs saw the Ottoman Albanian territories as the potential spoils of a Holy War and atrocities committed against Albanians betrayed genocidal instincts at the grass roots. And while Serbia was denied direct access to the sea, Albanian territory was partitioned to allow the Serbs to regain Kosovo and Uskub (Skopje), which had been integral parts of the medieval Serb state (Rašca) that the Turks has captured through fighting at Kosovo Polje centuries earlier. AGRICULTURE Introduction on core-periphery relations and peasant emancipation At the start of the period agriculture was a labour-intensive business grounded in feudalism which gave the landowners an exalted social status. Predictably for the European periphery there were no crop yields above the European average outside Germany. The Austrian section of the Habsburg Empire came close but other territories were well behind (though for wheat Hungary was just below average and Romania just above). On the other hand the region was a significant meat supplier and stocking levels were high in relation to cropland. Agriculture became more efficient as labour was diverted to the towns and investment in infrastructure boosted output. Increasing liquidity led to a decline in barter and increased the commercialisation of agriculture, raising the probability that financial sector growth contributed to the acceleration of output at the turn of the century. In the growth areas feudalism was quickly superseded by cash payment. Peasants could not be coerced into performing transport services with their own draught animals but they could still carry out such work in return for wages. W.Długoborksi (1975 p. 129) remarks that in the transport of mining-smelting products ‘the owners of mines and ironworks used almost exclusively hired peasant draught-horse services’ and for some peasants this activity became their main source of income, relegating agriculture to a secondary role. Agricultural labourers ceased to be paid in kind and hence there was a growing demand for small shops which ‘appeared with resilient promptitude where they were needed by the population which they could then serve regardless of the weather and the time of day’ (Csato 1977 p. 418). Elsewhere, the social realities could not be taken out of the picture. If compelling industrial potential would not give the lords a new role in business, there could be a ‘rejoicing’ over backward area status because the old relations would remain in force

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

48

with a formal abolition of serfdom bringing no fundamental change: requiring merely a new form of dependence involving labour contracts for estate work (including sharecropping on peasant-cultivated land) to supplement activity on small owneroccupied farms. Even in Hungary and eastern Germany (Posen) the aristocracy retained privileges despite growth. But Dashkalov (1997) explains that in the more backward peripheral areas nineteenth-century modernisation could not overcome the town-country cleavage in view of a rural outlook rooted in small peasant agriculture: a conservative reaction rooted in peasant values with rural civilisation the base of an authentic national identity (influential regarding the fascist and communist projects). This traditional outlook was naturally strongest where the peasantry had no choice but to stay on the land. There were dangers of withdrawing from the land: what else was there but limited industrial work or emigration? The substantial landless rural population in Transylvania gained only marginally from the sale of estate land which was bought up by the banks and mortgaged to a mainly Romanian peasantry. In Russian Poland the peasantry remained isolated from the lively pace of cultural change in the towns, being ‘atomised into a number of closed independent village communities each of which independently had to undergo the slow and cumbersome process of breaking its social and cultural isolation [and] finding ways to participate in the life, values and activities of the nation’ (Obrebski 1976 p. 25). Peasant revolts might have been a protest against repression but equally a cry for rescue from a state of stagnation when the forces of modernisation seemed to be passing by; with particular sensitivity when the negligence could be blamed on an alien group. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw both anti-Habsburg and anti-Ottoman protest with particular interest attaching to the former, which in both the Apuseni Mountains and Pannonian Plain saw the peasants isolated from currents of modernisation. Indeed the 1831 ‘Cholera Uprising’ in Hungary spawned the rumour that landlords and Jews were poisoning the rural population and the upheaval generated momentum for social reform in the hands of enlightened people like I.Széchenyi, leading to the abolition of serfdom in 1848. The late nineteenth century produced the Bosnian Crisis (1875–8), which began as a peasant revolt in Herzegovina, and risings in Bulgaria (1875–6). Meanwhile, Romania experienced outbursts against speculators and absentee landlords in 1888–9, followed by the 1907 ‘jacquerie’ that began with anti-Semitic rioting in northern Moldavia. ‘The end of serfdom generally included a division of lands that favoured landlords. Peasants gained title to roughly one-third of former estates but lost access to common pastures and woodlands’ (Sowards 2000 p. 568). However, there were major differences according to the arrangements for bringing feudalism to an end, for example the contrast between Austria and Hungary. In Austria the majority of those emancipated gained security of tenure over all the lands they had previously cultivated, while former landowners were compensated for the loss of labour services and debarred from purchasing peasant-owned land. This helped preserve the peasant class because peasants could only sell land to other peasants. Nevertheless, emancipation brought change as holdings in the open fields were consolidated and more dispersed settlement forms evolved with farmhouses standing on newly enclosed holdings laid off from the roads. In some cases the original village core was reduced to just one element in a more complex structure. An alternative model awarded land to both the peasants and feudal lords while in Posen compensation payable to landowners for emancipation was a burden on the

Political structures, agriculture and industry

49

peasantry until the 1870s, forcing them to earn additional income off the farm (and often on estates). A further hazard was the subdivision of the small peasant farms arising out of emancipation. ‘Thoughout Galicia the system of bilateral inheritance, which ideally divided parental lands between all offspring, inevitably led to the diminution of peasant farms’ (Pine and Bogdanowicz 1982 p. 71) even if some sons and daughters could be ‘bought out’ when they left the land. The problems were further exaggerated in the event of disease and potato crop failure, such as occurred in the 1870s. More than a quarter of Galicia’s population had emigrated to the USA by 1914. There was virtually no new land that could be broken in: the Podhale village of Tymowa, first settled in the seventeenth century and poor even by Galician standards, developed out of necessity despite lowquality soil, a short growing season and a limited crop range. In Hungary (and in Bukowina and Galicia) the estates were kept largely intact and the majority of peasants received no land apart from their tiny plots. The peasants had little option but to accept low wages for estate work because there was often no other employment available: the old social relationships were recreated in a new form. This could involve sharecropping where owners did not have capital to provide equipment and wages: they were guaranteed a steady income without the need to take any particular interest in their land and could enjoy a leisured retreat to a comfortable townhouse with the estate management left to an agent. Thus J.Komlos (1979 p. 60) denies that the abolition of serfdom was either ‘a sufficient or necessary condition for the rapid transformation of the countryside’. Society in the Balkans A special case concerns the power of the peasantry where there was no native aristocracy, as in Bulgaria and Serbia. On the Habsburg Empire’s Military Frontier where settlers owed military service for their land, reform was accomplished slowly between 1869 and 1886. And in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Habsburgs inherited a system that obliged peasants to support the military activities of Muslim landlords and the Turkish overlord the tenures were gradually changed to freeholds after 1879. However, this change could be accomplished without affecting the local custom whereby the individual household (‘kmet’) would integrate with others—usually about ten in all—to form a kinship group (‘zadruga’) which worked all the constituent holdings on a communal basis, thereby comprising a unit of both settlement and landholding. Even when agrarian bank credits were available in 1909 to separate out the individual farms a third of the peasants chose to retain the traditional structure. In Bulgaria a rising tax burden and more efficient collection procedures weakened the Ottoman ‘chiftlik’ (estate) system so that expropriation and subdivision transferred more land to smallholders after the ‘Tanzimat’ era had produced some small/medium farms worked by Bulgarians. However, if there were no large estates to tax then fiscal burdens were likely to fall on the peasants. Thus, while small, fragmented holdings predominated after 1878 (with some success in cashcropping through the rose oil industry around Gabrovo), the peasants were discouraged by rising harvest tithes; and a switch of payment from cash to kind under the poor harvest conditions of 1899 led to the formation of BANU (as already noted) so that as a result peasant politics became a burning issue before and after the First World War.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

50

The case of Romania The situation was very different in Romania where the lords evolved from village leaders who took over the best village lands and—as a boyar class—gained great influence as the nineteenth-century elite. Demesnes were worked less thoroughly than in the north and the boyars exploited the peasants on the Ottoman model. For when Ottoman officials and feudal cavalry were supported by lands granted by the sultan for life (but without inheritance, and without feudal jurisdiction over peasants), it was common for these fiefs to be administered illegally as chiftliks where peasants were obliged out of economic necessity to work as sharecroppers under terms which might be onerous enough to foment national revolutions. Estates became more prominent in the principalities when the opportunities to supply grain as well as livestock to Istanbul (and to Western Europe after 1828) ‘encouraged boyars to attempt to secure rights to the agricultural production of villages’ (Stokes 1987 p. 52), and they controlled the plains not through landownership so much as their rights to collect tithes. While demographic setbacks and insecurity combined with transhumance to prevent tight control of a sedentary population in the eighteenth century, the nineteenth-reality was quite different thanks to more ordered government and a resumption of population growth. The boyars gained clear access to power with the Ottoman abandonment of rule through Phanariot Greeks and their replacement by native princes. Labour requirements were raised before the end of the eighteenth century while in 1815 settlement on boyar land became a privilege rather than a right, and tithes were raised from a tenth of the production to a fifth. Even when Kiselev’s Organic Statutes of 1831 legally restricted peasants’ smallholdings to a maximum of two-thirds of the estate land, production continued to focus on small-scale operations. Peasants disliked working as estate labourers and resisted surveys that might result in a loss of land; while the owners (or the merchants renting their lands) ‘were apparently more interested in maximising their short-term cash income than in organising production for long term’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 223). They would rent additional estate land (‘prisoare’) to peasants (without survey) through contracts requiring payment in cash or kind rather than feudal labour services (increased by the codification of tasks in such a way as to take far longer than the customary twelve days). This exploitative arrangement facilitated a monetisation process and was very rewarding to the owners who ‘used not only the threat of surveying but also the growing peasant demand for land to increase rents sharply’ (ibid. p. 223). Thus, capitalist farming was introduced on the basis of neo-feudal obligations which made labour extremely cheap. While there was some mechanisation on the estates the process was limited by the fact that the labour was not supplied by a rural proletariat but rather by a ‘peasantry of subjugated smallholding sharecroppers’ (Stokes 1987 p. 54). In 1848 a provisional government attempted to study agrarian problems with the idea of freeing the peasants and establishing them on adequate holdings for which the estates would be compensated. But the reaction which followed the arrival of Ottoman forces saw a revision of land rights in favour of the boyars in 1851, paving the way for greater use of peasant labour on estate reserves—though this ‘second serfdom’ also saw the peasantry encroaching on estate land so that cultivation on peasant-worked land increased faster than on estate reserve land. All this facilitated a growing grain output, though with low yields given the technology employed and the recurring drought conditions. In 1858 the boyars became landlords (‘moşierii’) while the 1864 reform formally abolished

Political structures, agriculture and industry

51

feudalism and gave the peasants two-thirds of the estate land—although the holdings were small and prohibition on the sale of holdings prevented any evolution towards viable family farms—while the landlords obtained legal title to the remainder (the best one-third!) and gained further through the secularisation of monastic lands. Both peasants and landlords could access state land but even so the average peasant holding declined from 1896. When leasing more demesne land for sharecropping a curious legal formality tied the contract to unpaid labour on another portion of the estate! As landlords leased the management to agents by competition, contracts had to bring a profit and so they became more onerous for the peasants. This was especially the case after 1895 when cereal prices stagnated in the face of North American competition, and when the flagging latifundia system was taken over by rapacious Jewish estate managers (‘arendaşi’) seeking the cheapest possible peasant labour, with adverse consequences for public health through long hours of peasant work and the virtual absence of protein in the diet. In 1904 the Liberals sanctioned peasant cooperatives which could compete for sharecropping leases but the system did not make significant progress because only rarely could the cooperatives compete with the ‘arendaşi’. Owners actually preferred wage labour by landless Romanian peasants and seasonal Bulgarian, Macedonian and Serb migrants (the latter also prominent in Bulgaria and Hungary) but most failed to create a stable basis for capitalist farming since they entered world markets not ‘as profit-seeking farmers but as tribute-seeking rentiers’ (ibid. p. 55) while German and Hungarian farms still secured greater efficiency. It was only after the First World War that the system was revised in favour of wider peasant proprietorship and heavier state taxes. Germany German agriculture contributed to the country’s economic miracle with the encouragement of a high protective cereal tariff set in 1879 and raised through the 1880s, although J.A.Perkins (1981) emphasises the desire of owner-occupiers to maintain the value of their land through higher technical inputs in the main arable areas. Progress was most evident in potatoes and sugar beet, with particularly high capital and labour inputs in the latter case: raw sugar yield per hectare in Germany was 38% higher than in the Habsburg Empire and 31% higher than in France. However, labour was required on a seasonal rather than a permanent basis and this resulted in the ‘Instleute’ system whereby cottagers were provided with a smallholding in return for the labour of the holder and one other person when needed—although further intensification eventually required the return of these holdings to the owner and the adoption of a system of wage labour for seasonal migrants. Thus peasants from the Eichsfeld district near Erfurt went to work on the sugar beet farms of Halle and Magdeburg in the 1840s and by the end of the century the habit of going to Saxony (‘Sachsengängarei’) was well established in central and eastern Germany. The system also affected Habsburg territories (especially Galicia), Italy, Russia (Poland and White Russia) and Scandinavia so that in 1914 there were some 430,000 seasonal agricultural workers migrating to Germany across international frontiers (more than a quarter of them Russian Poles). Some farms were extremely large and were integrated with processing. The Nagel farm near Halle, which started in the 1840s when two brothers gave up their craft as stonemasons and purchased land—100ha, gradually enlarged to l,414ha by the time of

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

52

their deaths in the mid-1880s—was subsequently endowed with a sugar factory, flour mill and distillery (the latter producing alcohol from potatoes and molasses). The farm continued to expand under new management to reach 2,146ha in 1900, by which time a second sugar factory was working on the estate. Given the management problems of such complex operations there seems to have been a preference for the alternative model whereby large sugar factories, enjoying scale economies, worked in conjunction with a number of separate farms. But either way it is clear that the Junkers, who were politically powerful in Germany before the First World War, were efficient managers of successful businesses rather than reactionary survivors of some bygone feudal age. Artificial fertiliser was a critical factor in the situation since the organic manure from cattle fed on sugar beet pulp would not have been sufficient to maintain high yields. The availability of potash in central Germany (initially a waste material generated in the course of salt mining) helped to make the Magdeburg area a leader in the agricultural revolution. Potash sales rose sharply after J.von Liebig discovered its value as fertiliser in 1861 to reach 0.3 million tonnes in 1870, 0.7 million in 1880 and 8 million in 1910. Nitrate came from Chile while domestic industry yielded ammonium sulphate from coke ovens and phosphate (basic slag) from metallurgical works. Fertiliser dressings per hectare in Germany rose from 3.1kg/ha in 1878–80 to 42 in 1913–14 (18.9kg of superphosphate, 16.7 of potash and 6.4 of nitrogen). The Eastern Question Here there was a slow start to intensification given the peasant stake in the land under feudalism, and uncertainty over the impact of the new farming technology on the sandy soils of East Prussia. There was little progress in the early nineteenth century as long as farmer protection (‘Bauernschütz’) safeguarded peasant land. But Dickler (1975) traces the progress of Prussian ‘regulation’ which established a free market in land (1807); individual property rights to replace privilege (1811); landlord access to a third of peasant hereditary possessions—half the non-hereditary possessions—while peasants without ownership rights got nothing (1816); and enclosure of commons (1821). As peasant pasture and subsistence arable became available, 1 million hectares of peasant land went to the estates through regulation or buy-outs of land from peasants weakened by the new regime. These changes gave a boost to the Junkers in production for export in the context of rising cereal prices: wheat and rye gained at the expense of barley—used locally for brewing—and the oats required for horse feed and gruel; justifying investment in land reclamation and drainage as well as rotation systems involving potatoes and clover. In the process the peasant middle class was weakened—to a greater extent than in Saxony where the level of ‘protection’ was greater—and more people became free labourers (‘Tagelöhner’). Output increased but the social change was also reflected in higher infant mortality linked with the relative increase in the role of potatoes in the rural diet; a consequence of the potential for cereal exports and the need for other appropriate crops in the rotation system. Smallholders and wage earners left with a bit of land after commutation of feudal dues and services and enclosure of the commons ‘may have adopted the potato as the only way to avoid starvation given the amount of land made available to them’ (Dickler 1975 p. 290). It is significant that while potato cultivation in Central Europe followed famine in

Political structures, agriculture and industry

53

1770–2, rapid growth came later with the steep rise in cereal prices: for by releasing land and labour, potatoes gave rise to improved rotation and enabled land under major crops to increase faster than male workers. It was also significant that the growth of root crops brought higher cereal yields since the latter benefited from the fertiliser applied to sugar beet at the start of the rotation cycle, the methods of cultivation and the manure supply. Tracing the progress of sugar beet on eastern Junker holdings from the 1850s, Perkins (1981) notes the dependence on cheap seasonal labour when many former farm workers went into industry. He explains how the distinction between farm servants (‘Knechte’)— who lived on the farm and worked with draught animals—and ‘Instleute’ cottagers was reduced by the latter’s evolution to ‘Deputant’ status involving a smaller plots and more regular work (though both variants became less prominent with the growth of seasonal work, much of it done by women). In particular, dependence on migrant Poles developed the capitalist ethos which broke down traditional employer-employee relations inherited from feudalism and reduced Junker control over the rural population in general. Habsburg Empire The contrast between core and periphery was very strong. Bohemia and Moravia lay adjacent to the German provinces of Saxony and Silesia with a relatively large number of 20–50ha farms to justify capital investment to raise yields. But the estates were also progressive and the cheap labour of smallholders was not exploited simply to enjoy higher living standards without any obligation to modernise and innovate. This was not so much an issue of ethics as one of demand—in an industrial area—coming from private households and food-processing factories, while rural-urban migration removed population pressure on the land and precluded a subsistence mentality (though in any case the primogenital inheritance law forbade the subdivision of peasant farms before 1869). Cultivation of hops and sugar beet was linked with breweries and sugar factories served by road and rail transport; and the introduction of the crops was often financed initially by the industries themselves. Apart from some early cultivation at the time of Napoleonic continental blockades, sugar beet growing really began with the opening of the Seelowitz (Židlochovice) factory in 1837. Tariff barriers against imported sugar were stimulative but probably more important were the compensation payments received by landowners in connection with the abolition of serfdom because these capital reserves enabled the larger estates to build sugar factories. By the 1870s production was similar to Germany but relatively low consumption in the empire made for a considerable export surplus. And the need to compete in foreign markets was a spur to increase efficiency, with profits ploughed back into research that would improve quality and reduce costs. Germany established a clear lead in output from the 1880s but the empire was still a major world producer. Of course, while industrial crops symbolised a productive agriculture, bread and fodder cereals and potatoes were far more important in areal terms. But the business environment was such that almost all sections of the farming population had an interest in removing checks to the capitalist mode of production. The situation is well summarised by Kolossa (1969) who contrasts the developed economy in the west— with modern, large-scale farming and a bourgeois outlook—first with Carniola and west/central Hungary where capitalist agriculture developed at the turn of the century, and second with the eastern and southern regions that were relatively backward and

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

54

retained the peasant character that was also characteristic of alpine areas (Table 2.1). Industry was a major influence, increasing the proportion of non-occupational agrarian landowners, reducing the scale of the peasant community and stimulating small landholders to assume a bourgeois outlook with involvement in capitalistic market situations and a more urban lifestyle. The strength of the landowners and the total population not engaged in agrarian pursuits correlates with farm size (particularly when the larger holdings are considered), with incomes and with the use of hired labour. Bohemia and Moravia can be distinguished from Austria, Carniola and Hungary, with Bukowina, Croatia, Dalmatia and Galicia in the lowest category. Nevertheless, Moravia’s median farm size remained low, while Croatia did relatively well in terms of income. Hungary Here a relatively backward agriculture was transformed in the late nineteenth century when farmers were able to bypass local markets and export to Austria,

Table 2.1 Rural geography of the Habsburg Empire 1900–10 A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Austria 15.6 51.7 2.4 5.6 5.82 13.97 28.48 6.23 Bohemia 27.8 67.9 2.3 6.1 10.11 23.25 16.76 11.53 Bukovina 9.0 29.1 1.6 3.1 2.08 3.33 56.34 3.17 Carniola 14.6 38.1 4.8 11.4 2.95 14.16 14.89 4.08 Croatia 8.4 18.0 3.4 6.3 4.17 14.05 n.a. n.a. Dalmatia 8.1 17.5 1.4 3.0 1.13 1.58 39.26 1.30 Galicia 5.6 27.1 2.3 4.3 3.22 7.41 42.61 2.66 Hungary 13.8 33.5 2.5 6.2 5.01 12.37 n.a. n.a. Moravia 25.3 38.9 1.9 5.4 11.34 21.55 23.36 9.11 Key: A Percentage of owners not engaged in agrarian pursuits (1910 but Croatia and Hungary 1900) B Ditto for the total population (1910 but Croatia and Hungary 1900) C Median farm size (ha) 1900 D Ditto: largest 25% 1900 E Average net income per hectare (guldens) 1900 F Ditto for the median farm size of holding 1900 G Percentage of operations using hired labour 1902 H Ditto industrial hired labour 1902 Note: There is a correlation between Columns A and B, with high values in developed areas where many peasants were seeking new occupations in manufacturing, trade and administration. Columns C–F show variations in farm size and income—highlighting the need for additonal income in many cases. Source: Kolossa 1969 pp. 425, 428 and 430

particularly wheat and maize that were good estate enterprises. In 1912 Austria took 99.8% of Hungary’s wheat exports compared with 97.9% for flour, 89.2% for maize and 79.9% for cattle. This achievement required a massive growth of wholesale commerce, for the grain trade was the largest branch in the commercial sector. Another key issue was

Political structures, agriculture and industry

55

the development of financial institutions. Although the first savings banks emerged in the 1830s, the number rocketed from 1,255 in 1890 to 5,014 in 1913—especially village savings and loan associations—transformed by Raiffeisen-type savings and loan cooperatives (Held 1980 p. 95). There was also an annual growth in productivity of 1.7– 2.2% (depending on the source of the calculations) during 1867–1913 compared with 4.5% and 6% respectively in industry. Since landowners were able to keep a tight political grip on the country they were able to maintain their privileges by keeping many medieval institutions alive, while promoting legislation (for agricultural export subsidies and rural credit facilities) to help create a modern commercial agriculture. Yet, although relatively extensive by Austrian standards, it was difficult for agriculture to compete against North American and Russian grain, so the tariff wall around the empire—within which high prices could not easily be undermined—was a great comfort (especially with added value through flour milling). Hence the genuine development effort by landowners exemplified by Count Széchenyi, a pioneer of stockbreeding, mechanisation, agricultural banking and rural transport. There was increased output in cereals, potatoes and sugar beet through marshland drainage, the practice of ley-farming (which replaced rigid rotations) and the use of artificial fertilisers—during the 1890s—and improved seed. Yields were broadly comparable with the best in Europe, though Germany (with Belgium and Denmark) maintained a strong lead for sugar beet. On the other hand, it could be argued that the country’s social development was constrained by the grip of the estates (landholdings exceeding 5,750ha) which increased their stake from 2.26 million hectares (8.4%) in 1867 to 5.46 (19.4%) in 1914— particularly at the expense of medium-sized farms, reduced from 12.03 million hectares (44.9%) to 8.92 million (31.6%) at a time of stagnating cereal prices (many being owned by credit institutions, the Churches and central/local government). The strength of the titled nobility was particularly marked in Transdanubia. After 1900 most medium and large farms were using machines—iron ploughs and traction engines (for ploughs, seed drills and threshing machines)—to supplement draught animals, while small farms used draught cattle, horses and manpower, and hand-operated machines that became available in the 1860s and 1870s. Note that holdings below 20ha accounted for 45.6% of land— slightly more than holdings of over 100ha (43.9%). However, this meant reduced demand for labour at harvest time and while the smaller farms (below 115ha) remained stable (and the number of viable holdings increased only slowly), there was a rapid turnover among the farming population reflecting the social costs arising from the failure of smaller farms (and landless labourers) to prosper on the basis of indifferent price levels in the last quarter of the century and the deployment of steam-driven machines across the plains. Seasonal unemployment brought harvest strikes and deeper unrest may have been avoided by diversification of agricultural exports after 1880 with more emphasis on labour-intensive sectors: animal breeding, poultry and horticulture which equalled grain and flour by 1914. Development of small-scale farming depended on rural education which was relatively poor in backward areas. It also needed a stronger cooperative system supported by Liberal politicians as a way of containing the agrarian socialist movement. The law for the organisation of the National Central ‘Orszagos Kosponti Hitelszovetkezet’ (Office of Credit Cooperatives: OCC) was passed in 1898 to secure working capital and organise village branches. The government underwrote 1 million crowns’ worth of shares matched by large credit institutions in Budapest. OCC had 712

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

56

associations in 1899 and 2,425 in 1913—covering 61.8% of all settlements in Hungary and the credits extended to borrowers rose from 25.4 to 279.6 million crowns over the period (Held 1980 p. 96). But on the whole the differences between large and small farms tended to increase. Hungary’s borderlands Agriculture was relatively backward in the borderlands (as in Bukowina and Galicia), apart from some islands of improvement like the large Croatian estates near Zagreb and the railway route to the north. Traditional farming systems persisted even after the abolition of serfdom and it was common for the peasants to operate a two-field system whereby all agreed to alternate between their allotted strips in the two parts of the village so that one of the fields would be available for grazing continuously (Figure 2.1). A three-year cycle has also been noted where maize, barley, rye and potatoes, first autumn sown then spring sown, would follow the fallow year. It was sometimes well into the twentieth century before this practice broke down in favour of individual decisionmaking and restriction of cooperative grazing arrangements to recognised common pastures where animals were tended by a member of the community working on a daily rota system. Cooperation was even more extensive (especially in remote areas) and the government was supportive, although there had to be a central organisation in Budapest, as in the case of the cattle insuring union (1898); the ‘Hungya’ food cooperative (1898) and the ‘Fructus’ distillery union (1917). Local initiative was very important, for development in western Slovakia around Skalica arose when a local doctor (L.Blaho) and the Catholic priest (L.Okánik) started a farmers’ food union in the town in 1897; followed by a farmers’ and vintners’ union in 1901 and another for dairy farmers in 1903. Congresses were held from 1906, allowing local produce like the Modra wine to be exhibited. Cattle insurance cooperatives sprung up in Nyitta (Nitra) and Trencsén (Trenčin) and development spread eastwards into central Slovakia. Voluntary sheep breeding unions were provided for in the Theresian shepherding regulations of the period; operating under orally preserved customs established in key regions like Bravacovo in the upper Hron. The union at Kochanovce (near Trencsén) generated savings on a scale that allowed it to assume a credit function, but the agricultural revolution in Hungary served ‘to choke off the borderlands from principal markets’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 287), so these overpopulated areas were left largely with an agricultural role tied to local markets that showed little expansion in view of the lack of strong industrial development. Indeed, since the railways allowed distant producers—with their economies of scale—to meet much of local demand for manufactures, the towns were unable to absorb significant numbers of rural people. Agriculture had a major subsistence function for provinces like Bucovina and Galicia which maintained the custom of early marriage (and hence large families) through an era of falling mortality rates. Rural labour was cheap and provided no incentive to mechanise, so productivity and incomes remained low. In 1902 farms of less than 5ha accounted for 80.3% of all holdings in Galicia, 85.7% in Bucovina and 87.4% in Dalmatia, and incomes were kept low by the subsistence demands of large families: the emphasis was on maize while cash crops failed to make headway (the wine industry in Dalmatia was overtaken by the eastward spread of phylloxera). Until emigration to the New World became an option at the turn of the

Political structures, agriculture and industry

57

century the best opportunities lay in seasonal work in Germany or the ‘core’ provinces of the empire. Southeastern Europe There was scope for food exports to Central and Western Europe using railways and steamships once national governments restored public order and imposed quite

Figure 2.1 The two-field system at Rogoz, Máramaros (Maramureş) high monetary taxes that obliged the peasants to produce marketable surpluses to finance the import of manufactures. The Ottoman grain monopoly was set aside in the principalities in 1829 and in Bulgaria a decade later, so Balkan grain was entering Western Europe in significant quantities from the 1840s. At the same time there was a profitable livestock trade from the principalities to the Habsburg Empire and from Bulgaria to Istanbul to meet the Ottoman army’s demand for meat and leather. However, North American competition in cereals caused a downturn in prices after 1873, while rural population growth and a finite land area subject to drought made it impossible to maintain per capita export growth in real terms. Yields advanced slowly to 11.3qu/ha in

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

58

1911–15 (the average for the three states) from 9.5 in 1862–6 (Romania and Serbia only) (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 188), but the per capita area sown declined while the per capita export was static after 1900 (indeed there was no labour productivity increase in Romania after the early 1890s). Thus peasants found their work less rewarding, even though real taxation decreased, while the terms of trade for primary producers did not worsen significantly. There were also problems for Romania when pig exports to the Habsburg Empire faced a prohibitive tariff from 1882 (which gave Serbs some respite, as noted below) but when higher German tariffs were imposed on pigs from the empire in 1885, Hungarians demanded that the domestic market should be reserved for them alone, and in 1896 Vienna used a veterinary pretext to stop all pigs entering (a move triggered by renegotiation of the 1867 customs agreement which was due every ten years). While the vulnerability of the overpopulated Balkan states made a protective regime for industry irresistible during the 1880s—even though jobs in the factories could not be created quickly enough to ease pressure—agrarians advocated tariff reductions that might (with reciprocation by the Habsburg Empire) improve the condition of the peasantry over the short term. Other proposals were put forward, like the radical agrarian programme presented in V.Kogălniceanu’s pamphlet of 1906 demanding a new regime of labour contracts and stronger banks with the means to purchase estates for subdivision. As already noted, peasant frustrations in Romania boiled over the following year but it was not until 1921 that radical land reform was achieved. Serbia Serbia is an interesting case because the national economy was based on small family farms in contrast to large estates—with a privileged aristocracy and servile peasantry— seeking economies of scale and capital-intensive production. The 1863 census revealed 93% of the population living in communities below 2,000 and ‘nearly all rural dwellers were members of settled farm-owning peasant families’ (Palairet 1995 p. 41) who could be given land by the commune (‘opština’). Within communities there was remarkable equality, especially in poorer areas: the tax burden was imposed uniformly on a capitation basis, although incomes were higher in the fertile lowlands where peasants got involved in the pig trade as prices rose through the 1830s. Support from the Habsburg Empire against the Ottomans influenced trade but exports were affected by a doubling of pig numbers in Hungary during 1870–95, by which time the empire was itself a net pig exporter. Initial closure of the Habsburg market to Serbian pig exports in 1895–6 and the five-year customs war of 1906–11 (encouraging a switch to meat packing)—and the entire ‘Pig War’ episode of 1905–11—saw the Habsburg share of Serbian imports fall from 60% to 19% (90% to 18% for exports). Interestingly it is argued that this tended to maintain the ‘zadruga’ beyond the time when its defence rationale had disappeared and land tax liability was transferred to individual families (1835). The ‘zadruga’ certainly evolved according to the constant state of flux of family arrangements as sons/brothers decided to stay or leave—with prosperity making for stability and stress leading to fragmentation. But the institution was always more prominent in ‘the comparatively commercialised rich accessible lowland district of Belica [part of the western “Šumadija”] than in the barely monetised poor remote highland area of Trnava’ (ibid. p. 104) because the ‘zadruga’ owned more real estate per capita than conventional family

Political structures, agriculture and industry

59

farms in a situation where several married couples would generate a significant workforce for swineherding (which was productive employment for women). Since livestock comprised the key cash crop there was little cereal production beyond subsistence needs (including maize for the animals) and townspeople had to pay high prices. With the meadows all important, the larger peasants did not find it worthwhile to market crops: profits were invested in shops, stables, warehouses, watermills and taverns and despite occupying ‘some of the richest potential grain-bearing land in Central Europe’ (Palairet 1995 p. 88), the cultivated area rose less sharply than the rise in population. Paradoxically, in the hills farmers had to sell cereals to get money to pay taxes and in the process they ‘tended to oversupply local grain markets and [probably] to supply grain to the lowlands’ (ibid. p. 107) so grain prices were low in remote mountain towns like Užice where ‘grain would be dumped on an ill-developed market which could scarcely absorb it’ (ibid. p. 100), while costs for exchange goods were high because of remoteness from import competition. Meanwhile, viticulture was left to small peasants who needed to sell for cash, for there was little quality production (better wines were imported from Hungary). Some diversification occurred through dried plums (prunes) from northern Serbia. When the brandy markets were closed in 1880 through revised Habsburg and Ottoman tariffs, Bosnian entrepreneurs came in with wholesaling experience and a plum-drying technique which produced an agency/credit network stimulating farmers to devote some land and labour to plums for export (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 177). At the same time, the tobacco monopoly was never so complete that it destroyed the subsistence sector in the countryside. Agricultural expansion in new lands In various ways the rural population sought new opportunities where the options of migrating to the towns or foreign parts were not available. Harvest workers competed with sharecroppers on the grain estates while other seasonal migrants found casual work in factories, forests and mines in order to maintain their homes in the countryside. Indeed, a little-explored feature of industrial development at this time was the way that it continued to integrate with a rural way of life despite the factory system. But there was still scope for colonisation, including remote rural areas where increased land might be created by terracing, as occurred widely in Transylvania. There was continuing scope in the steppelands of Bărăgan and Dobrogea. N.Todorov (1998) has described the migrations from the Balkan Mountains, Macedonia and Thrace by people wishing to take up farming in this area or to engage in commerce at the famous Bazargic Fair. And when the flow of German immigrants to the Habsburg Military Frontier on the southwestern edge of Pannonia was discouraged by a property requirement (300 florins per family) in 1829, the Hungarian authorities opened a colonisation office in Budapest and even recruited Slovaks from the Tatra because ‘acálfí’ were deemed sufficiently Magyarised to represent Hungarian interests. Recent research has also drawn attention to the Adriatic islands which were refugee centres for families escaping the Ottoman grip on the mainland. The Kornati Islands were being occupied by fugitives and by people from Murter (from the early seventeenth century) using the open pastures increasingly for cattle—and sheep which devastated the remnants of woodland—as well as olive growing, followed by viticulture in the nineteenth century (until phylloxera enabled olives to make

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

60

a comeback after 1900). It was people from Murter who eventually controlled most of the islands, such was the pressure to find new land, allied with Austria’s progressive land tax which meant that the fiscal burdens of the extra land were relatively low due to the tiny holdings on the island of domicile. Land on the Kornati Islands was secured in four purchases (‘kupovština’) from 1851 to 1896—and the islands were partitioned by drystone walls during 1896–1926 (Kulušić 2000–1), while a cannery at Sali on Dugi otok encouraged fishing. The Hungarian ‘tanyák’ and transhumance in the Romanian Carpathians The isolated farmsteads of the Great Plain of Hungary emerged after the Turkish occupation through more intensive use of land beyond the central dwelling and stable zone in the eighteenth century, whereas previously only herders had stayed out in barns on the puszta. After the Turkish withdrawal there was little settlement within 20km of Kecskemét, where population increased from 10,000 in the eighteenth century to 21,318 in 1871—when there were just 1,308 people in the plains beyond the town. The barns were now inhabited permanently and the colonisation was extended through new arable lands created by river regulation and drainage work at the end of the nineteenth century when intensification made it necessary to occupy the ‘tanyák’ permanently. Village housing was then given up in favour of a dense ‘tanya’ network based on fruit and vine growing between the Danube and Tisza; transforming the sandy Kiskunság degraded by overgrazing and resulting sand-blow (where shepherding survived until the early twentieth century) and tobacco in Nyírseg. The colonisation was facilitated by freehold tenure of parcels at a time when industrial development was lacking, though the towns remained important for commerce and family contacts. During the 1880s, when half of Hungary’s established vineyards were ravaged by phylloxera, the landless cotters showed great resolve and dedication in the way they set about pioneering to rebuild and intensify agriculture on the puszta. It is also appropriate to recall longwave transhumance which enabled some communities to grow well beyond the capacity of the local agriculture, particularly in the case of the ‘margineni’ (border) communities around the towns of Hermannstadt (Sibiu) and Kronstadt (Braşov) where early growth was based on links with German industrial and trading com munities. The Treaty of Passarowitz (1718) opened the way for journeys of twelve to fourteen days to winter sheep in the Lower Danube Valley and parts of Dobrogea such as the Batova Valley (‘la vallée sans hiver’). In March they would return home, taking advantage of the Zimnicea floodplain grazings en route. When problems arose through cultivation of steppes from 1860s and tighter border controls (some precipitated by the customs wars between Romania and the Habsburg Empire during 1886–1900), some moved on to work seasonally in Bessarabia to look after large landowners’ flocks while others reached the open spaces of Crimea and the Caucasus to enjoy a better environment that avoided the hard winters and dry summers in Bessarabia. Some also turned to peddling (‘comerţ ambulant’) along the old routes or set up as craftsmen and traders in the towns of southern Transylvania or northern Wallachia. At the same time the shift towards crop production for the market did not preclude further peasant colonisation of the high ground for stock rearing, woodcarving and subsistence farming. Statistics collected by Apolzan (1987) in the

Political structures, agriculture and industry

61

Apuseni show the contact area with the Transylvanian Plateau—west of Kolozsvár (Cluj), Torda (Turda) and Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia)—to be an ethnically mixed area with a clear Romanian majority on the higher ground, especially the upper Arieş Basin above Câmpeni, with significant amounts of pasture and woodland per capita, complementing the stronger arable element at the contact. Population figures for 1860– 1941 then show a strong upward trend in the upper Arieş compared with the lower (Figure 2.2). Significantly the upper Arieş offered a succession of surfaces particularly the Măguri-Mărişel convenient for settlement and pastoralism with woodland retained on the steep slopes pitching into the valley system. INDUSTRY Despite low per capita income and agriculture’s persistence as the leading occupation— with widespread poverty—industrial development was substantial. Since the state carried responsibility for defence and often played a prominent role in railway development (seen as having important security implications) it was logical that it should also take a lead in industrialisation, especially in Hungary and the SEECs where industry was introduced into relatively backward areas. There was

Figure 2.2 Settlement and ethnicity in the Apuseni Mountains a high level of concentration which was inevitable given that industry represented a relatively new innovation, but the tendency was reinforced by the uneven distribution of inputs and infrastructure, not to mention political and strategic considerations. There was a generally high level of technical training for the German workforce as the state

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

62

purposefully combined its industrial raw materials with the scientific skills of the universities, technical schools and commercial institutes, but elsewhere provision was less generous and the supply of managers in the Habsburg Empire was dependent on the Technische Hochschulen opened in Prague (1806), Vienna (1815), Brünn (Brno; 1849) and Budapest (1860). Gerschenkron (1962) argues that backward economies favoured a large scale of business. This was not always true for many industrial units were quite small and catered for an essentially local demand. But they were much larger when there was a reliance on export markets, as in the case of milling and capital goods in Hungary. Large companies in the Habsburg Empire like the Prague Iron Company (Pražská Železâŕska Společnost) and the leading coal companies in Brüx (Most)—Brüxer KohlenBergbau Gesellschaft and Nordböhmische Kohlenwerks-Gesellschaft—opened the way for cartelisation which began with the agreement between the Witkowitz (Vitkovice) Mining and Foundry Works and the Teplitz (Teplice) rail mill in 1877. Vertical integration during the 1870s was followed by horizontal concentration during the 1880s business upswing. Cartelisation was a particularly prominent feature of German industry and followed from a degree of ambivalence over the virtues of competition on the home front and an instinctive preference for the ethos of the pre-industrial state bureaucracy. The cartels might inhibit innovative action in the short term but ‘in the long run they could function as a further stimulus to economic development by sustaining the level of profit or by facilitating further technological innovation’ (Milward and Saul 1977 p. 53). The role of the banking system Gerschenkron also contrasted the self-generated industrial revolution in the UK with developments in ECE that required the assistance of investment banks, although textile industries were able to keep abreast of modern technology by ploughing back their profits. This can be seen in the international flow of capital, given the major German investment in the Habsburg Empire: Kr3.52 billion in 1914, compared with 0.19 billion for the UK, which was the largest export market after Germany and the second largest source of imports after Germany. Indeed, for Germany, the excess of imports over exports was more than cancelled out by earnings from shipping and foreign investments, which included chemicals and electrical engineering in the Habsburg Empire; metallurgy and oil drilling in Romania; and steel in Russian Poland. From the Habsburg Empire’s point of view, the need to acquire foreign financial resources become particularly urgent during the two decades or so before the First World War when a growing import surplus began to develop. One-eighth of Austrian industrial securities were in foreign—mainly German—hands in 1901 (Teichova and Cottrell 1983 p. 35). At the end of 1913 the Dual Monarchy’s total foreign indebtedness amounted to approximately Kr9.75 billion ‘and the debt servicing burden so imposed was only partly alleviated by investment in the Balkans’ (Cottrell 1983 p. 309). Within the empire, Austrian capital was crucial for building Hungarian heavy industry, although it meant that much of the iron ore production was exported direct to Austrian territories in a raw state, and in the early years of the Ausgleich pig-iron production grew much more slowly than iron-ore output. For the whole period 1867–1913 iron-ore production rose from 0.3 to 2.1 million tonnes while pig iron rose from 0.1 to 0.6 million tonnes.

Political structures, agriculture and industry

63

The Balkan states had their central banks which issued national currencies to displace foreign denominations but at the same time they were constrained by an overriding obligation to foreign creditors to remain tied to the gold standard. However, with their monetary systems thus tied to the French franc, some foreign banks channelled in outside capital. The German banks—Disconto-Gesellschaft and Bleichröder Bank of Berlin— invested in Romanian oil after 1895 and Deutsche Bank took over Steaua Română in 1902. Foreign banks concentrated on under-writing state loans as ‘the first large-scale infusion of European capital into the Balkan economies’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 321), but the depression of the 1870s induced some ‘reluctant imperialism’ among the great European banks which were very slow to open branches in Balkan capitals. Despite the German challenge to Habsburg exports there was little interest in Balkan economic penetration because capital was sucked into the Czech lands and Hungary. Austrian capital arriving after the 1873 depression proved to be an all-important catalyst at a time when domestic accumulation would have been insufficient, but a serious problem was always the lack of self-sufficiency in fuel. Meanwhile, few foreign firms jumped tariff barriers, though J.P.Coats had branch plants in the Czech lands and Hungary at the beginning of the twentieth century. Another example concerns Mannesmann of Düsseldorf with works in Komotau (Chomutov) in Bohemia which were registered in the Habsburg monarchy and gained a strong position in the Habsburg tube cartel along with Witkowitz and three other large tube companies. The company also became majority shareholder in Röhrenswerke of Schönebrunn (Klimkovice) on the western edge of the Mährische-Ostrau (Ostrava) industrial complex. The role of banks can be seen more significantly at the domestic level, although assessments vary from the most positive (Fremdling and Tilly 1976; Tilly 1986) to the more sceptical (Neuburger and Stokes 1974). Much investment occurred through joint stock limited liability companies with credit from development banks. The banks concentrated on the large, strong companies and were not prominent over risk-taking and innovation—though they did sponsor large vertically integrated coal-iron-steel companies and were involved with the Mannesmann seamless tube development in the 1890s. Invention of seamless rolled tubes by R. & M.Mannesmann arose from the financial backing of W. & F.von Siemens who were connected with Deutsche Bank. Even so, there are mixed feelings about the role of banks in German industry: some writers have emphasised reciprocal support and influence. Meanwhile, Habsburg banks became much more involved in medium- and long-term business from the late 1880s, especially in heavy industry. Although not highly profitable, in Carniola it was ‘decisive in creating mining and metallurgical sectors’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 312). Banks were crucial to Škoda’s expansion into armaments which was financed by Boden-creditanstalt and Böhmische Escompte-Bank; while the Bohemian sugar industry was assisted by Živnostenská Bank. Hungarian banks became cautious after the 1873 crisis, but there was some revival of interest from the mid-1890s with the growth of industrial joint stock companies, but not on the scale of Creditanstalt (Austria) and Deutsche Bank (Germany). The Hungarian banks were less specialised and while there was a rapid growth of financial institutions during the two decades before 1914 the processes of amalgamation and of branch formation were relatively slow. Some large Hungarian companies—like Rimamurány Salgótarján, Manfréd Weiss and Salgótarján coal mines—were independent of banks, while the sugar industry was closely connected with the Hungarian General

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

64

Credit Bank. Some companies might have more than one bank represented on the board, for while the First Hungarian Economic Machine Factory developed a connection with the National Banking Corporation (NBC) in 1897, the Commercial Bank was also represented on the board after acquiring the majority of NBC shares in 1916. Indeed, during inflation more than one bank was needed. Also there might be changes in banks (Pogany 1989). In SEE there was only limited involvement in industry by Bulgarian private banks compared with Bucharest’s Banca Marmorosch-Blank, established by a family of Habsburg-Jewish immigrants who switched to merchant banking from the Leipzig wholesale trade and encouraged the Vienna-based Götz timber company to extend its operations to Romania after 1873 (Lampe & Jackson 1982 p. 258). Germany Germany’s economic performance over the half century before the First World War was a truly remarkable exemplification of Gerschenkron’s thesis on latecomer countries. Assisted by a rapid growth of both population and workforce to levels exceeded in Europe only by the Russian Empire, Germany contributed 15.7% of world manufacturing (exceeding the UK share of 14%). Thanks to data supplied by F.B.Tipton (1976), it is evident that the transformation at the end of the century was particularly impressive, with 0.63 jobs in industry for each one in agriculture in 1882 rising to 1.22 in 1907. At the same time, structural change brought jobs in building materials, engineering, metallurgy and mining into parity with those in food processing, textiles and clothing compared with a ratio of only 0.6 to 1 in 1882. There was particular strength in steel, chemicals and electricity. The east-west regional split was quite striking with a more rapid growth of population and employment (and specifically employment in industry and in the tertiary sector) in the west and the faster decline of agricultural employment in the east. So as heavy industry made headway in the east the ratio was slightly more favourable than the all-German figures already quoted: 0.66 and 1.24 compared with 0.61 and 1.19 in the west. Some regions like Magdeburg and Saxony were able to develop their engineering industries based on the requirements of agriculture and food processing, but this was not generally the case for ‘the east developed no processing centres comparable to Chicago and Kansas City in the United States, nor did Berlin seem willing or able to full this role’ (ibid. p. 108). The picture in the east was highly uneven. Berlin-Potsdam dominated the picture with 2.9 times the average growth of population, 3.5 times the average growth of employment and exactly double the average growth of employment in industry. Magdeburg, Merseburg, Oppeln (Opole) and Saxony especially showed up well while all the other regions were well below average. The impression is one of powerful migration currents focusing on Berlin where migration was equivalent to 11.6% of the resident population each year (on average) from 1876 to 1890, falling to 4.2% between 1891 and 1905. Apart from Potsdam, there were negative rates throughout the east although they were naturally lower in the more industrialised areas which were able to gain some benefit from the Russian market.

Political structures, agriculture and industry

65

Habsburg Empire Growth was persistent but modest by German standards. In 1910 just 22.1% of the working population was employed in industry compared with 55.1% for agriculture (a ratio of 0.4, compared with 1.22 in Germany in 1907). Growth was relatively rapid after 1880 with recovery from the depression of the mid-1870s and some stimulus from the dynamic German economy, but the average rate of growth of industrial production from 1880 to 1914 was only a fraction above 4% compared with 3% during 1840–80. The structure was diverse and saw considerable change. Textiles were most prominent in midcentury when the empire’s cotton industry was greater than that of the Zollverein, but the share was only a quarter by 1910. The relative decline reflected an abundance of labour and hence a leisurely pace of mechanisation (even though equipment was readily available in Saxony) and the inefficiency of locationally separate spinning and weaving branches: exports of yarn and cloth (e.g. to the Balkans) were balanced by imports of higher-quality products. Meanwhile, there was growing strength in chemicals, metallurgy and engineering that constituted a third of all industrial production at the turn of the century (thanks to the ambitious railway and public works programme during the premiership of E.von Körber and the discovery of oil in Galicia where production rose from 0.03 million tonnes in 1880 to 2 million in 1909). Even so, heavy industries were less prominent than in Germany (as well as France and the UK) and Habsburg industry in general was very dependent on a protected domestic market. Hungary In the late nineteenth century the country’s primary economic role as food supplier to Austria (in return for the latter’s industrial products) was complemented by a significant amount of manufacturing. The proportion of the working population employed in industry doubled after the Ausgleich from 8.6% in 1870 to 17.1% in 1910, and the employment generated was of the greatest social and economic importance at a time when the mechanisation of agriculture was responsible for serious rural unemployment. Some industry was associated with food production (brewing and milling) but the rest emerged from a new potential revealed by the railway system in combining individually modest resource bases. Although heavy protection was impossible because of the risk of retaliation against agricultural exports, it was considered important to stimulate heavy industry in the national interest—especially in the production and maintenance of railway equipment: 1873 saw the opening of the Hungarian State Railway Machine Works just a few years after the State Iron Works was founded at Diósgyőr (1868) to produce rails and munitions. A law for the encouragement of industry was passed in 1881 in response to growing concern over the high level of emigration and the need for more tax revenue after heavy borrowing in the 1860s and 1870s led to chronic budgetary deficits in the 1880s. The stimulus of tax exemption prompted a burst of investment by the Budapest banks and was followed by interest-free loans under the Industrial Promotion Law (1890), tax rebates (1899) and shareholding (1907) for particular sectors, especially textiles, which was to receive 57% of all subsidies (though in total they amounted to only

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

66

2% of total investment by private industry and their impact could hardly have been dramatic. Hungary had to cope with a lack of self-sufficiency in fuel, for coal consumption was always higher than production with imports rising from 12.7% on average during 1851– 73 to 32.2% during 1896–1913, even though the Tatabánya-based Hungarian General Coal Mining Company and the Salgótarján Company raised output from 4.8 million tonnes in 1860 to 102.7 million in 1913, of which 2.4 million and 89.5 million respectively consisted of lignite. On the other hand, there was much help over infrastructure such as housing and services for workers which would otherwise have placed heavy burdens on the shoulders of entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, growth rates consistently above those of Austria after 1886 enabled Hungarian industrial output to reach 30% of the Austrian level in 1914 compared with only 16% in 1841, so Hungary ‘ameliorated to a considerable extent her relative backwardness’ (Komlos 1981 p. 6). However, while trade with Austria highlighted the exchange of food for manufactures, the pattern with the rest of the world was almost the reverse. Hungary’s policy was economically irrational in the context of the empire as a whole because there was a deteriorating balance of payments situation after 1900 as the Dual Monarchy ceased to be self-sufficient in food and yet increased imports of industrial plant and raw materials. But thanks to this highly motivated regional interest within the common market Hungary was able to set off on the road to separate economic development, and despite the complication of boundary changes (which cut off many Budapest firms from their suppliers of raw materials and intermediates) there was a solid base for the fully independent state that emerged after the First World War. Agrarian interests sought to exclude industrialists from the House of Representatives in the late 1890s (reflecting the agrarian, anti-industrial sentiment of the Hungarian ruling class), but the National Association of Hungarian Industrialists was founded in 1902 to reverse this trend when industrialists felt the government was more concerned with protection against food imports than support for industrial exports. There was a strong Jewish representation so the organisation was quite liberal and without the right-wing inter-war leanings of Austrian and German equivalents. There was little fear of the working class in Hungary—which strengthened the bond between industrialists and landowners in Germany. Russia and the Balkans There were considerable opportunities in the east and southeast. The technical lead of several decades enjoyed by the Kingdom of Poland (over other parts of the Russian Empire) by virtue of its relatively early industrialisation gave its manufacturers a competitive edge especially when German entrepreneurs crossed the frontier and set up textile and iron industries in Łódz and Sosnowiec, respectively. Although Russian industrial output rose substantially in value from Rb1.12 billion to 4.58 billion during 1887–1908, Poland’s share fell only slightly from 14.7% to 12.6%. Meanwhile, as already noted, the emerging capitalists of the Ottoman Empire had to overcome the ambivalence of the Muslim elite. Great damage arose through the trade conventions signed in 1838 which prescribed very low duties for imported Western manufactures while guilds remained an obligatory form of organisation for commodity producers and

Political structures, agriculture and industry

67

even for new branches of manufacturing. Moreover, since a lack of security was ‘one of the greatest obstacles to larger and more permanent investments in industry’ (Todorov 1983 p. 306), people preferred to move their capital around and if necessary to take it out of the country: hence commerce, money lending and real estate were often preferred outlets for capital. But successor states took vigorous action over the economy, education and security. Given a lack of compelling raw materials, only native entrepreneurs—with the necessary knowledge of local conditions—could come to terms with the initially low expectations and it was usually resident Jews or ethnic Germans who sought out Central European capital rather than the reverse. Despite the lack of capital and business experience there was a record of substantial growth from the late nineteenth century which provided a basis for a more comprehensive approach to modernisation in the context of enlarged national economies after 1918. The drive came from population growth and a less rewarding cereal trade. Whereas the elites initially favoured low tariffs in order to push the agricultural surpluses of their estates into more developed parts of Europe (and to maintain good relations with the powers) stagnating grain prices in the 1880s undermined the credibility of an industrial policy linked to agricultural exports (all the more so in view of agricultural protectionism in some countries) and forced a general extension of tariff barriers. It was also essential for the state to take a lead and establish heavy strategic industries linked with defence and with state monopolies like the national railway companies, while erecting tariff barriers to encourage light industry on the basis of private enterprise or foreign investment. In 1873 tax exemptions were granted in Romania and Serbia and these first measures later grew into more comprehensive schemes to stimulate industry, including free building land, customs-exempt imported raw materials, concessionary railway freight charges and some production subsidies. Usually there were stipulations over the scale of mechanisation (to ensure a significant level of production), the number of employees (usually 20–5 minimum) and the training of native workers. Further protective legislation was passed in Romania in 1882 and 1887 (with a Mining Law in 1895 which opened up the oil industry to foreign investment) and Serbia in 1898, while Bulgaria’s initial rates of 1883 were raised in 1897. There were further laws in Bulgaria in 1904, Serbia in 1906 and Romania in 1906 and 1912 (as well as a survey in 1901–2)—all of which generated bitter conflict with the Habsburg Empire, for Romania’s tariffs on finished and semifinished imports—averaging 20% ad valorem—were certainly high enough to deter some European manufactures. Hence there was ‘a climate in which entrepreneurs could believe investment in domestic industry would yield at least long-term prospects for satisfactory profit’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 269). On the other hand, ‘overvalued exchange rates may have aided infant industries by reducing the cost of imported machinery but also helped to restrict already small domestic markets for manufactures by passing on the high price of agricultural exports to urban consumers. The resulting pressure to raise industrial wages, backed by an emerging socialist movement, discouraged local manufacturers still further’ (ibid. p. 589)—with excess capacity and cartel restrictions evident after 1900. After good progress in the 1890s (a decade blessed for the most part by high cereal prices) momentum showed signs of flagging when living standards ceased to grow, the virgin cereal lands were fully occupied and world prices stagnated. Moreover, the saturation of the home market suggested that an industrialisation policy based on

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

68

substitution had largely run its course, though perhaps not in textiles where import levels were still high. But there were significant variations between countries. In Romania, where 40% of the seats in the legislature went to urban representatives who backed protection strongly, industrial growth to 1914 averaged 6–8%—possibly going as far back as 1880 (Jackson 1986 pp. 60–1) while the country also became the world’s fourth-largest wheat exporter through ruthless exploitation of peasant workers on estate farms. Meanwhile, population pressure was lower in Serbia and the national assembly was more representative: Skupština peasant representatives did not want to pay more for domestic manufactures (normally lacking the efficiency or scale economies to generate export) supplied to a protected home market. So Serbian industry was constrained by the political strength of the peasantry which heaped more of the fiscal burden on the nonagricultural population, partly through indirect taxes on what were considered to be urban luxuries. Protection of the agrarian population may not have been a deliberate act to avoid proletarianisation by holding it in tutelage through low taxation, but it is certain that the latent strength of peasant power in opposition blunted attacks on their interests— not to mention the likelihood that squeezing the peasantry in the interest of protected state industrialisation would reduce morale, depress agricultural exports and accelerate ruralurban migration. In Bulgaria too it was the small non-farm population which supported the rising cost of government: when protective legislation arrived relatively late, as a response to the agricultural depression, it failed to target specific branches and lacked the support of a strong party like the Romanian Liberals. Industrial regions: the ECE industrial core—Jena-Łódź-Budapest It has been observed by F.E.I.Hamilton (1970) that this area comprised the ECE’s industrial core which could be seen as a major outlier of the West European industrial system with its heartland in the Ruhr. While evading precise definition—indeed ths review will include extensions to Berlin and Magdeburg—it was a region with considerable industrial experience dating back to early modern times and a great capacity for adaptation. For example, the historic glass industry of Thuringia survived through scientific glassware at Ilmenau and optical industries in Jena where the famous ‘Carl Zeiss Jena’ arose out of a partnership between the owner of a fine mechanical business and the optical specialist E.Abbe in 1876. The latter gained sole charge after buying out Zeiss’s son (following his partner’s death in 1888) and teamed up with O.Schrott who delivered glass of the required quality and enabled production to extend from microscopes into optical instruments of all kinds. In 1891 Abbe handed over his assets to a Carl Zeiss Foundation to provide pensions, medical assistance and housing loans—also to finance retooling at the factory. But the region cannot be regarded as homogeneous and cohesive: rather—as is suggested by the diverse patterns produced in the Polish territories (Figure 2.3; Table 2.2)—it was a zone comprising many separate systems (each with its own historical and structural profile) distributed across several countries and drainage basins, and unified only by relatively high levels of employment in industry and relatively well-developed urban and railway networks. There was a major divide between the German and Habsburg complexes. The Silesian coalfield, with its functional links by

Political structures, agriculture and industry

69

rail and water transport with Berlin, was complemented by traditional areas of metal and textile production in Saxony and Thuringia and the rising central German chemical complex. To the south lay the Habsburg system based in the Czech lands and functionally tied to Vienna, notwithstanding the availability of the Elbe/Labe navigation to the North Sea, with a separate—newly established—complex in Budapest. Boosted by tariff protection, the Czech lands were important for Habsburg coal and iron production; as well as beer, alcohol and flour; porcelain and glass; and textiles. In 1902 56% of Austria’s industrial workers were from the Czech lands, despite only limited Czech ownership. The region also included some Polish industry in Dąbrowa and Łódź that was bound into the Russian economy, with relatively little use made of the Vistula navigation which could have integrated the Habsburg and Russian lands. Indeed, while Western Europe developed a substantial waterway network, ECE’s industrial triangle never attracted the investment

Figure 2.3 Industry in Poland in 1900 to connect the Danube with the Elbe, Oder and Vistula (which would have provided a comparable facility) and instead was forced to rely heavily on railways for its integration, given the close coordination of construction in the border areas. The Danube was of some value for Hungary but it was again the railways that linked the resource-based industries

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

70

of Slovakia and Transylvania with Budapest and connected the capital with the Adriatic port of Fiume. The estate complex Food industries increased the demand for agricultural products and many were located in rural areas where they competed with urban-based establishments. There was a growth of sugar beet refining from the 1830s—with clear interdependence with government policy—through small refineries built on large farms in central Germany and Lower Silesia (with the most suitable soils) with the by-product pulp and molasses valued for animal fodder (as important a consideration as the sugar itself in the early days). The estates were also locations for breweries and distilleries—along with starch factories, corn mills and sawmills—all of which were absorbing bourgeois capital after 1870. For example, in Hungary agricultural distilleries were assisted by the first Industrial Promotion Law of 1881 (offering tax exemptions for

Table 2.2 Employment in industry in Poland 1879– 1913 Kingdom of Poland Prussia Galicia Upper Silesia 1879 1894 1904 1913 1882 1895 1907 1902 1875 1907 Factories 2148 2025 3413 4369 1996 3902 4986 n.a. n.a. n.a. Workers (thousands) 97.6 180.2 334.8 428.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 89.5 18.6 242.8 Mining 12.1 19.7 29.6 33.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 23.0 42.8 110.7 Metals/Metallurgy 15.7 29.6 73.0 90.4 10.2 14.8 29.1 10.5 24.0 47.3 Minerals 4.5 8.6 20.3 27.9 8.1 14.2 24.1 12.0 4.5 21.9 Wood n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.7 10.1 19.4 11.2 1.3 9.8 Textiles 29.3 81.5 138.9 175.4 2.8 7.8 8.5 8.8 2.1 16.5 Food 30.4 24.5 29.4 37.7 12.7 28.9 28.7 15.1 5.6 19.7 Others 5.6 16.3 43.6 63.5 5.0 7.4 12.1 10.1 1.3 16.9 Notes: Figures for industrial sectors are percentages of the total employed in industry Source: Jezierski 1994 pp. 105–8

new factories). They proved viable on the estates where they competed with the distilleries of industrialists. The sugar industry has been most fully researched and it appears that the first-generation factories (eliminated by the competition with cane sugar) were followed by a second generation of highly capitalistic operations that hired rural workers during agriculture’s ‘dead season’. Sugar beet refining became a major business, with the ‘diffusion’ process pioneered at Seelowitz in Moravia by J.Robert, the son of the founder of the first sugar beet factory in the Czech lands. The process spread quickly and for a time machinery was exported to France and Germany. However, technology favoured very large factories by the end of the century—because of the increasing scale of efficient diffusers (which extracted juice from beet). Thus in the early 1900s the Cukrownia enterprise for sugar and alcohol—established in 1882 at Kulmsee (Chełnża) near Thorn (Toruń) in Posen Province—processed more beet per season than the entire quantity handled by the 145 factories of 1840. Hence the many factory closures at the

Political structures, agriculture and industry

71

turn of the century when small units were marginalised by the higher costs of obsolete technology. By this time the factories were producing raw sugar which was sent to the refineries (much raw sugar from the east went to refineries in the west) whereas initially the sugar beet processors had sold white sugar in their local market area. A consequence of larger factories was the need to intensify beet production in local supply areas. Field railways were built from the 1870s while land purchase or leasing became a necessary evil, despite the strain on capital. While it is impossible to discuss all the local industries in detail, a general shift to urban locations reflected the importance of railway distribution and the need for labour in very large units like the breweries of Pilsen (Plzeň), where steam power was applied and improvements in the production of chilled lager helped the town to become one of the great European producers. Meanwhile, in Budapest the first flour mill opened in 1839 and another ten were operating by 1867—although it was only around 1900 that more than half the wheat exported from Hungary was sent out as flour. The catchment was extended over the plain and included some imports from Romania. Success was based on high-quality wheat from the south and the milling system patented by A.Mechwart— using iron rollers with a spirally cut groove—and manufactured by the Ganz engineering works (set up originally by A.Ganz, a flour mill employee of Swiss origin, to produce electrical machinery for the industry in 1878). By the 1890s Budapest was Europe’s Minneapolis—one of world’s great flour-milling centres. Pürglitz Estate Few studies of individual estates are available but Pürglitz (Krĭvoklát) in Bohemia is a case in point—a former royal hunting area of 628sq.km long managed by the Fürstenberg family (which held on to the Krušovice and Povlčin areas until 1945) and now a protected area on either side of the Berounka Valley between the towns of Beroun, Kladno, Rakovnik and Zbiroh (Figure 2.4). The valley has been threatened by dams (highlighted in a study of 1911–13 to improve Elbe navigation)

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

72

Figure 2.4 Industry on the Pürglitz (Křivoklát) Estate in Bohemia but there is also a history of small industrial projects (along with new roads and social services) which were part of Bohemia’s economic boom—especially under Karel Egon II (1803–54). There was a considerable iron industry based on the local charcoal and the

Political structures, agriculture and industry

73

ores of the Krušna Hora (60,000qu/year with a 30–45% iron content). Estate director F.Nittinger was responsible for two iron furnaces at Nový Jáchymov, built during 1810– 19 by Prague Polytechnic principal F.J. Gerstner; also a forge of 1824–6 at Roztoky near Pürglitz Castle; followed by a rolling mill and six puddling furnaces in 1842–3 at Stara Hut (Hýskov) on a former ironworking site. Another four furnaces produced iron from 1857 at Nová Hut (Nižbor) and there was further capacity at Karlova Hut after the Fürstenbergs purchased the Králův Dvůr Estate and built furnaces. The industry declined from the 1870s as the charcoal furnaces were overtaken by the coke-based industry at nearby Kladno and all had closed by 1905 whereupon the charcoal-making disappeared (having been made for centuries at the top of the Klíčava Stream near Řevničov and also near Chyňava). But the estate was primarily concerned with wood production and agriculture—the latter endowed with several new buildings (e.g. Amálie, Karlov and Požáry) during 1860–5 after massive forest damage. There were numerous breweries, distilleries, sawmills and other installations—including a spa at Merkovka and a hydropower plant at Rakovnik. And timber transport to Prague was facilitated by the Lány horse railway of 1830 which entered the forest in the northeast sector. The lower section is still used after modernisation for steam working as part of the Bustchrad (Buštĕhrad) system (1863) needed to supply the city with coal. The textile complex The geography may be tackled historically by starting with the medieval legacy arising from the continental trade routes which maintained relatively intensive commercial and industrial activity along the east-west trending ‘Hellweg’ and its linking routes south to the Danube. The highlands of Thuringia, Vogtland and Erzgebirge comprised distinct industrial and farming systems grouped around Leipzig Bay; and textiles combined with metals/metal manufactures, glass, paper, ceramics and wood (including musical instruments) across the wider Leipzig-Dresden-Plauen triangle. Restructuring of the industry involved the use of machinery in towns situated below the Erzgebirge foothills from Plauen to Zittau, including Flöha, Willisbach and Zschopau where water power first located them, with local specialisation according to different types of cloth. Leipzig was a centre for woollen/worsted manufacturing which was also based in Thuringia (e.g. Thüringer Wollgarnspinnerei); the lace industry of Vogtland was mechanised in Plauen with the assimilation of the Heilmann embroidery machine imported from Switzerland in the 1850s; while linen developed in Lobau and Zittau. Cotton spinning began during the Napoleonic Wars and transition to steam began in 1831 whereupon the factories were drawn down from the upland valleys. Chemnitz became the great centre of the cotton industry although there were also mills in Pössneck while Crimmitsschau and Werdau were noted for their yarns manufactured from Indian cotton. With the removal of internal customs barriers Saxony did well in the Zollverein from 1834 and had the distinction of destroying the cotton weaving industry in Berlin (where clothing became the main concern). As the ‘Manchester of Saxony’ Chemnitz had access to the Elbe waterway and the web of railways which was plainly taking shape from the 1850s. There were eventually lines to Berlin (via Elsterwerda and Juterbog) as well as a coal supply route from Lugau and Zwickau. And railways pushed up the Erzgebirge valleys to emphasise the city’s growth pole function. Nineteenth-century Leipzig developed as Saxony’s

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

74

commercial centre although the Prussian frontier came close on three sides. It was largely in the hope of maintaining freedom of commerce for Leipzig’s fairs that Saxony joined not only the Middle German Commercial Union in 1828 and the Zollverein in 1834, but the North German Confederation in 1867 and the empire 1871, despite reservations about a Prussian customs system spreading all over Germany. Meanwhile, the textile industry in Silesia first assumed commercial importance in the sixteenth century but did not develop like its Rhineland counterpart as a major factory-based activity. During the critical mid-nineteenth-century years both coal and iron cost considerably more at the factory gate. Because of poor transport, the lack of social overheads and industrial linkages industry, the marginal efficiency of investment in textiles was thought to be very low. Artisans working in textiles in Silesia (and in Posen) were affected by the loss of Polish markets, where new artisan settlements were promoted during 1815–30 at a time of competition from factory production in Western Europe (Ostrowski 1966). But some compensation arose from the growth of engineering, for example in Breslau with Eisenbahnwagenbau and Linke-Hofmann-Lauchhammer. Habsburg Empire Here again the roots can be traced back to eighteenth-century Bohemia where the growing and spinning of flax could be virtually a full-time occupation—complemented by other activities in weaving, finishing and marketing. The woollen industry was also prominent in the Czech lands and while much of the cotton industry was located outside the region in Lower Austria, Vienna and Vorarlberg, there was considerable capacity in the Czech lands arising initially from the stimulus of continental blockade. Based on cotton imported through Hamburg and yarn from Austria proper, handspinning was replaced by 1835 when there were still 100,000 domestic weavers in the Friedland (Frýdlant), Leitmeritz (Litomĕřice) and Reichenberg (Liberec) areas of northern Bohemia and some in the south around Tabor. The stimulating business climate also attracted initiative from merchants and artisans who moved into the finishing section and extended factory working upstream. J.G.Berger, a cotton/linen wholesaler of the 1770s, purchased a bleaching/ fulling mill at Reichenberg in 1793 and extended into spinning and weaving passing on an efficient integrated business at his death in 1810. (His manager F.Römheld took over the Wallenstein business referred to below.) The most celebrated case concerns the journeyman J.J.Leitenberger who married the daughter of a Wernstadt (Verneřice) ice) dyer and took over his father-in-law’s works in 1764 (mentioned in the previous chapter), brought the outworker system under his control and introduced factory working to all stages of production. Some elements of the aristocracy wanted slow industrial expansion (for Vienna—and the Hungarian nobility—were particularly concerned about the risk of destabilisation). But the flood of cheap textiles after the Napoleonic Wars forced Bohemian entrepreneurs to increase the productivity of their skilled workers through building modern factories with the aid of British mechanics and technicians who were no longer constrained from migrating to the continent. There was also innovation in machinery since initial use of British cylinder printing machines and French panel printing methods gave rise to Leitenberger’s own machine in 1836 which would print six to eight colours simultaneously. The family interest was maintained throughout the nineteenth century and one of the factories—the Josefsthal

Political structures, agriculture and industry

75

(Josefův-Důl) printworks—survived into the late twentieth century. It was only in the 1880s that mechanised spinning and weaving became more important than the traditional methods. Mechanised spinning began in the 1820s in Reichenberg and in mid-century reached Moravia where the craft industries at Humpolec, Iglau (Jihlava) and Neuhaus (Jindřichův Hradec)—drawing wool from Hungary or Poland—eventually succumbed, though traditional linen and wool weaving was still present in the Brünn area half a century later. It was significant that aristocratic owners who lacked the skill and technical knowledge to keep up to date with progress in Western Europe were usually able to find middle-class partners on whom complete responsibility eventually devolved. Thus F. Römheld, with long experience in cotton mill management (see above), became joint proprietor and manager of the Count Wallenstein cloth factory at Oberleutensdorf (Horní Litvinov) in 1819. Romheld modernised the factory and obtained a steam engine from Reiff & Luz located near Brünn in 1826. The stock of mechanical spindles in Bohemia rose from 18,000 in 1805 to 550,000 1850 and 4.9 million 1914. Although there was a large printworks in Leitmeritz, Prague was the great finishing centre for the Bohemian cotton industry, accounting for half the total amount of cotton printed in the region at mid-century. The origins lay in the Sánger mill on the Moldau (Vltava) in 1766 but the great expansion came after 1825 with new mills outside the walled city in Karolinenthal (Karlin) and Smichow (Smichov) by 1830 and Ovenec (Bubeneč) by 1850. Growth came to a halt with the raw cotton crisis of the 1860s followed by the collapse of the Vienna banks in the following decade. Poland There was much activity in the Congress Kingdom in the 1820s based on the encouragement of textiles in the western part of the province, with planned village settlements inspired by the artisan towns of eighteenth-century Great Poland and contemporary Prussian colonisation in Brandenburg. Fiscal incentives were available for entrepreneurs in selected areas with water power while government provided town halls, churches and houses. Thus Zgierz was launched in 1820 on a government-owned estate east of the town, followed by Gostynin (1821), Gábin (1822–3) and a complex of developments close to the decadent market town of Łódź where settlement on state land was handled efficiently by the ‘voivode’ R. Rembieliński. The programme started with a new town for clothiers (producing handmade woollens) promoted during 1821–3 with an octagonal market opposite the old town and a weavers’ village (Łódka) laid out in 1824 along Piotrkówska. There was also a spinners’ village in 1825 and the village of Ślązaki in 1827: both were situated to the east of Piotrkówska and south of the Jasien—718 plots in all. There were plots for artisans producing cotton and linen cloth (double plots for linen spinners who also grew flax) while areas along the Jasien itself were reserved for fulling and for cotton mills that would take over the corn milling sites. (Despite the watershed situation between the Oder and Vistula there was spring water for processing and power.) Figure 2.5 shows the Łódź area and the state demesne of the nineteenth century (roughly delimiting the Greater Łódź of the present day) where dispersed village settlement was transformed by planned settlement to create a new town which gradually incorporated the villages of Widzew, Wólka and Zarzew. There were also eight new textile towns promoted by private landowners who expected to make money from leases

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

76

and municipal charges: Babiak (1815–16); Ozorków (1816); Aleksandrów (1822); Krasnosielc (1822); Poddębice (1822); Zduńska Wola (1825); Konstantinów (1830); and Tomaszów Mazowiecki (1830). However, while the Congress Kingdom encouraged Western capitalists and skilled workers to settle, the uprising in 1830 brought a devastating response through the fiscal barrier that was then erected on the boundary of the empire proper, causing investors to use Białystok as the most accessible location within the empire. A Polish magnate residing in the town had introduced woollen handicrafts in the eighteenth century and a factory was built in 1824 before the ‘take-off’ occurred in 1831 when Russia extended her customs regime to the Congress Kingdom and blunted the competition of the Łódź area. However, the tariff barrier between Poland and Russia was then removed in the 1850s while the ‘gold tarrif’ of 1873 effectively priced other imports into Russia out of the market and gave Łódź even stronger FDI incentives so that it quickly became the ‘Polish Manchester’ and by 1914 was the second-largest Polish city after Warsaw. Penetration of the Russian market was now all the easier given the advantage of rail transport. While the tariff war with Germany raised duties on cotton in 1893, 1894 and 1903 so that the price of raw material was too high for Poland to compete in world markets, the availability of the Russian market proved a major incentive for Poland, which was industrialising relatively early (with the additional incentive of relatively easy raw material smuggling). Of course, Łódź was like a thorn in the flesh of Moscow’s textile manufacturers who sought a renewed customs frontier against Poland, especially in 1886 when a bad harvest reduced demand—and prices—for textiles, but her privileged position was not seriously dented by this further round in the ‘Moscow-Łódź War’ (waged in the ministries of St Petersburg) and the boom in Russian Poland continued into the 1890s. A formal customs barrier could not be erected within the empire and Polish cotton producers were penalised only by higher import duties on raw cotton. But it gave some renewed incentive to Białystok where the number of textile factories increased from 47 in 1879 rising to 113 in 1922. By the 1850s the craftsman model had been overtaken by the steam-powered factory system. Thus the small handicraft workshops and commercial units merely generated capital for the entrepreneurs of the next phase. For ‘it is a highly characteristic fact that the later proprietors of the great spinning and weaving plants

Political structures, agriculture and industry

77

Figure 2.5 The textile manufacturing centre of Łódź in Łódź were overwhelmingly recruited from among the merchant-entrepreneurs’ (Straszewicz 1959 p. 74). The skilled labour of the area was now irresistible to German industrialists who jumped the tariff barrier to produce cotton cloth for the Russian market. As the large plots of Łódź were redeveloped for factories and housing, the steampowered mills helped to cement a large industrial complex as the formerly separate handicraft villages fused together, with Piotrkówska (the traditional axis of movement linking the old market centre with the bridges over the Łódź and Jasien rivers) emerging as the main thoroughfare within a more uncompromisingly urban pattern. Machinery was installed in the 1850s and direct access to the Warsaw-Vienna railway in 1866 gave Łódź a big advantage over other towns in the area. Redevelopment meant that population ‘reached 250,000 before the built-up area had spread substantially beyond the original streets and plots’ (Dawson 1979 p. 377). Around each courtyard (in the centre of the original plots) ‘small factories, workshops and warehouses were cheek-by-jowl with tenements. Large mills occupied the plots along the small streams in the town, but the watershed site offered far fewer plots of this type than were required and some mills were built around the outside of the planned area of the town in freely but haphazardly developing suburbs and drew their water from boreholes’ (ibid.). Workers’ tenements combined with the palaces of entrepreneurs like Scheibler. In 1897 570 people were employed per cotton factory, compared with 34 in 1870. But the water supply became increasingly contaminated, while the town retained a colonial character with poor wages and living conditions for the workers and handsome profits for the owners. The woollen industry was less dynamic in view of the demise of the Polish army following the 1830 insurrection, which seriously affected Zgierz in particular. But the industry also graduated to a factory scale of operation around 1870, sustained by the

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

78

migration of workers from Saxony, and it employed about as many workers as the cotton trade by 1900 (some 50,000), with centralised spinning and finishing (partly mechanised) and a putting-out system for weaving. The foreign entrepreneurs stayed close together (on account of the variable quality of the infrastructure and also for social reasons) in an area where growth was still restricted to the state demesne until 1925, when large areas were unsuitable for development on account of poor drainage or forest cover. But the situation was logical in the context of skilled workers who came from both Germany (Chemnitz, Dresden and Zittau) and the Habsburg Empire (Böhmisch Leipa (Česka Lípa), Jungbunzlau (Mladá Boleslav) and Reichenberg). However, by the 1860s most workers were descendants of local families who had worked in industry for up to three generations. There was restrained dispersal to Pabianice and Zgierz, but it may have been restricted by lack of suitable labour outside the area affected by the early nineteenthcentury government initiative in Congress Poland. The heavy industrial complex The region contained some metallurgical industries using charcoal furnaces which were part of the estate economy and the supply of metal was a stimulus for the engineering industry: thus the Waldstein ironworks turned out steam engines while Blansko produced spare parts and Friedland made boilers. Until the end of the 1870s charcoal furnaces still accounted for more than half the production of the Czech lands, partly the result of the persistence of the estates in the ownership structure: it was only in 1880 when Böhmische Montan Gesellschaft took over the Fürstenberg interests and rationalisation was no longer constrained by local considerations outside the industry that the loss-making Křivoklát ironworks was closed in favour of coke smelting at Kladno. Meanwhile, Thuringia’s iron industry was killed off by the exhaustion of its ore in the eighteenth century but experienced a partial renaissance when rail transport supplied inputs for the engineering industry, for example machine tools at Ruhla and Saalfeld; spinning machines at Eisenach; and blast furnace accessories at Schmalkalden, which once had a large iron industry. As local raw materials were exhausted in Saxony, iron production shifted from the landlocked Lauchhammer Estate to the Elbe trading artery at Riesa—eventually with a Siemens-Martin steel furnace and new rolling mill (ultimately taken over after 1918 by a Breslau (Wrocław) locomotive firm to form Linke-Hoffman-Lauchhammer). There was also a large state-owned ironworks developed in Poland during 1820–30 based on ore and charcoal along the Kamienna River in Kielce Region: the Ostowiec-StarachowiceSkarżysko-Końskie axis, with blast furnaces in some twenty-five separate locations (including the villages of Chlewiska, Parszów, Rzuców and Samsonów); rolling mills at Mlyny, Nietulisko, Przysucha, Ruda Maleniecka and Stielpia; and metal manufacture at Baczyna, Bliżyn, Pomyków and Suchedniów. This was associated with a programme of river regulation, dams and canals to support the iron industry by creating a basis for ‘groups of cooperating factories along fast-flowing rivers’ (Ostrowski 1966 p. 40). There was some change to the use of coke with Ostrowiec and Starachowice as the principal locations (Czapliński and Łodogórski 1981 p. 35).

Political structures, agriculture and industry

79

Upper Silesia In what was Europe’s largest coalfield west of Ukraine, there were 4,500sq.km of coal measures that were easy to exploit with seams thicker than 2m available at a depth of less 1,000m over two-fifths of the workable field. Ninety per cent of seams sloped at less than 15 degrees and these included important deposits of coking coal in the west (commanding premium prices) contrasting with material of lower calorific value (with more ash and sulphur) in the east, especially to the southeast of Sosnowiec. Up folding— occurring along a 30km ‘saddle’ from Sosnowiec to Hindenburg (Zabrze)—brought seams of up to 8m of the best coal almost to the surface and mining was concentrated here until the end of the century when new technology led to six mines at Rybnik and three beyond Tychy. Lower Silesia’s output from the Waldenburg (Wałbrzych) area was overtaken in 1822 but still in the 1860s most mines were no deeper than 80–100m: 65m for the highly productive Königsgrübe. Activity was most brisk in the west around Hindenburg where coking coal was available for supply to the Donnersmarck furnaces (Table 2.3). However, the shallow mines brought subsidence problems and while the consequences were not severe on open heathland the urban fabric was seriously affected. In the late nineteenth century some attempts were made to fill the underground spaces with sand but this was not done on any scale until after the Second World War. The railways gave a fillip to coalmining: not only did they consume coal but they offered a vastly improved transport service to what the Oder could provide. For, despite the Klodnitz (Klodnice) Canal (1812) which linked the coalfield with the Oder (Odra) at Cosel (Koźle), the limited draught posed a problem for heavy coal barges and there was no access east of Hindenburg. However, Silesia had to compete with other coalproducing areas of Germany, and although ‘exports’ accounted for over 70% of output in 1901 (after 40% in 1868) growth was slower than in the Ruhr (2.5 million tonnes in 1860, 16.9 million in 1890 and 43.4 million in 1913), for the advantage in production costs— which helped to compensate for a peripheral position in Germany—had been wiped out by 1900. Ruhr competition became stronger still with the completion of the Mittelland Canal, connecting with the older Dortmund-Ems Canal and providing an efficient transport system into the heart of Silesia’s traditional marketing area. This affected the metallurgical industry because it was cheaper for Berlin engineering firms to work up Silesian pig in the capital instead of supporting integrated works in the east. Mention has already been made of F.W.von Reden’s work in Silesia and in particular the opening of the royal ironworks in Gleiwitz (Gliwice) in 1796. Von Reden’s successor, who took over in 1802, expanded the munitions industry at Malapane (Małapane) but also began producing calamine at Königshütte (Chorzów) to make Prussia the world’s leading producer thanks in part to education and housing programmes which attracted skilled miners and engineers. The Prussian state was much less active after the Napoleonic Wars, but despite capital shortage the landowners maintained momentum. At Pless (Puszczyna) the coal lay too deep but the Mikolów outcrop was more accessible and the mining company Plessische Bergamt was established. Meanwhile, Henckel von Donnersmarck—owning much of the Gleiwitz-Kattowitz (Katowice) saddle—built the furnaces of Antonien (Ruda Ślaską), Baildon at Kattowitz and Laura (Siemianowice). Puddling was adopted in the 1830s and remained the

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

80

dominant method of refining until late in the century. A Breslau merchant of Italian origin (N.Caro) established the Hermina (Labędy) steelworks 1848 and took over the Bobrek steelworks in Beuthen (Bytom) in 1883; W.Hegenscheldt from Westfalen opened a wire factory in 1853 and also bought the Baildon steelworks in 1865; and Hahn u.Huldschinsky opened a steel pipe mill 1867 (with Siemens-Martin furnaces in 1890) and manufactured additional products like railway wheels. Caro and Hegenscheldt joined forces in 1887 to form Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie für Bergbau und Eisenhüttenbetrieb (Obereisen)—opening a new rolling mill in Gleiwitz 1899 and a coal mine in 1912. They also

Table 2.3 Coal, oil, iron and steel production in Poland (thousand tonnes) 1800–1920 Coal Oil Iron Steelg f Kingdom Galicia Prussia Galicia Kingdom Prussia Kingdomf Prussiaf 1800 4a 5a 87.a . n.a. n.a. . . 1820 17 10 147 . n.a. n.a. . . 1830 69b 30b 361b . 13.1b 18.4b . 9.9b 1840 118 30 539 . 28.2 37.6 10.1 24.7 1850 108 39 975 . 15.6 71.4 10.2 47.2 1860 197 96 2447 . 22.8 89.3 17.6 85.9c 1870 321 188 5854 . 28.4 230.6 14.5 158.2 1880 1268 319 10011 32 43.9 336.1 99.5 257.8 1890 2450 610 16863 92 127.3 508.6 125.0 387.6 1900 4036 1167 24829 347 298.4 747.2 341.0 788.7 1910 5465 1346 34461 1766 249.9 901.4 404.0 1159.0 1920 4499e 1577e 39958e 773e 418.4d 994.6d 595.3d 1463.6d a b c d e f g Key: 1805; 1825; 1866; 1913; 1918; Upper Silesia only; includes puddled iron Note: the highest recorded figures during the period covered by the table were recorded for coal in 1913: Kingdom 6,834; Galicia 1,971 and Prussia 43,435 Source: Jezierski 1994 pp. 98–100

acquired Czestochowa ironworks (then in Russia) and expanded vertically through other takeovers including a local lead-zinc mine, enamelling plants in Rybnik—as well as Berlin and Breslau, coal mines in Waldenburg, iron mines in the north of Hungary (i.e. Slovakia), a tool factory in Warsaw and other assets in Germany, Russia and the UK. Then in 1905 the Huldschinskywerke was incorporated into the Ballestrem family’s Oberschlesische Eisenbahn-Bedarfs (Oberbedarf) which controlled the Friedenshütte (Pokoj) integrated iron and steel plant of Antonienhütte; also other steel plants, rolling mills and foundries, plus the iron mines in Slovakia. This group moved its headquarters to Gleiwitz and acquired the Ferrum pipeworks in Kattowitz plus ammunition and wagon works in Berlin. Local ores contained too much phosphorous and since they were hardly prolific the scale of production was too small to justify the Bessemer converter, even with the Gilchrist-Thomas solution to the phosphorous problem; while open-hearth steelmaking was largely precluded by the lack of scrap. Ore was brought in from Schmiedeberg (Kowary) in Lower Silesia and also from the Habsburg Empire, Russian Poland, Sweden and Spain. From the 1870s imports of ore from Sweden and Ukraine

Political structures, agriculture and industry

81

were regular and accounted for half the total consumed by 1900. Production in 1914 was 995,000 tonnes of pig iron and 1.4 million tonnes of steel. Regional institutions were based in Kattowitz, which first emerged as a central place when G.Winkler transferred the seat of his estate business while his manager F.W.Grundmann secured the railway link with Breslau via the Oberschlesische Bahn in 1846, providing markets for coal and a benchmark for the development of new industrial capacity. Urban status followed in 1865: until then Beuthen, Gleiwitz and Myslowitz (Mysłowice) were the only urban centres. Kattowitz enjoyed district (‘Kreis’) status and was the seat of institutions like the Union of Upper Silesian Mining and Metal Entrepreneurs (1882) and the regional headquarters of the state railways (1895). But there were also company headquarters in Gleiwitz which meant managerial and clerical jobs— also quality residential areas and good education and health services, plus parks, sporting facilities and a theatre. Subsidence problems ruled out tall buildings, and purchase of large estates by colliery companies (to avoid claims for structural damage) led to a readiness to pander to agrarian instincts and accommodate miners in two-storey houses with allotment gardens. More generally the smaller towns were content with two- or three-storey buildings (‘Burgerhauser’) accommodating six families in apartments. The coalfield was divided by the German-Russian frontier and so the eastern portion (Dąbrowa) developed a separate industry behind tariff barriers. The coal was relatively poor and some imports were needed from the German section, while Ukrainian ore was being supplied by the end of the century. Some German firms jumped the tariff barrier to refine and roll imported iron at Dąbrowa Górnicza and Sosnowiec and gain free access to the Russian market. Huldschinsky built steelworks at Sosnowiec (1881) and Zawiercie (1901)—also in Kharkov further east—after the Russians imposed tariffs against imports. But there was some tension when German capitalists moved and combined anti-Polish attitudes with loyalty to the tsar. Berlin and Magdeburg Berlin took pride of place in engineering through the concentration of firms especially in electrical engineering. Municipal lighting and transport systems opened up enormous markets, given the extent of Berlin’s electric tramways and railways, not to mention those of five provincial cities which exceeded half a million in population by 1914. As the domestic market became saturated plenty of business was found elsewhere in Europe and overseas. Industry in Berlin was dominated by two giants: Allgemeine ElectrizitätsGesellschaft (AEG) and Siemens-Schuckert. The latter originated in the cable and telegraph business started by W.von Siemens, a former Prussian army officer, which scored an impressive lead for Germany in the industrial application of electrical energy with several notable innovations, including manufacture of the first dynamos. Siemens was not so active in harnessing electrical energy for domestic and industrial consumers and this important branch of the industry was advanced by the merger with Schuckert’s firm in 1903. Work on current distribution, using the patents of Edison and others, was also pursued by E.Rathenau, whose AEG was one of the biggest electrical firms by 1890 and larger than the Siemens and Schuckert concerns prior to their merger. Both firms had branches all over Germany and employed thousands of workers abroad but their

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

82

headquarters remained in Berlin where Siemens in particular stamped an identity on a particular suburb appropriately named Siemensstadt. The building of steam engines was already established at the beginning of the period, especially in Berlin and Magdeburg. Berlin’s industry was greatly enlarged by additional firms in 1837 (Borsig), 1842 (Wöhlert) and 1844 (Hoppe). Magdeburg, meanwhile, was the centre of Prussian Saxony: a major sugar market and industrial centre on account of the availability of lignite and potash at nearby Stassfurt. Production included fertilisers, pharmaceuticals and saccharin (the latter developed by Saccharin Fabrik). Engineering developed through repair shops in 1838 (and later building facilities) by Vereinigte Hamburg-Magdeburger Dampschiffarhrts Gesellschaft at Buckau, followed in 1862 by the works of a former Hamburg-Magdeburger employee (Wolf) who gained reputation for steam engines for agricultural use. Machinery for the sugar industry was another interest. Other eastern engine manufacturers were located in Breslau in 1833, Chemnitz in 1847, and Landsberg a.d. Warthe (Gorzów) at an unknown date. Engine building linked backwards to textile machinery in the case of Hartmann in Chemnitz (mentioned below) who built his first engine for internal use. In Berlin both Borsig and Wöhlert progressed to locomotives in 1840 and 1846 respectively, with Schwartzkopft (Berliner Maschinenbau) as a later development; while AEG and Gothaer Waggonbau had aircraft departments complemented by the specialist producers in Halberstadt, Leipzig, Schwerin and Staaken (the last two being the Fokker and Zeppelin plants, respectively) which were all in business by the end of the First World War. All this development was part of a policy evident throughout German engineering to diversify and thereby seek orders from a large number of domestic and overseas customers; in contrast to the American practice of extreme specialisation and standardisation. The agricultural engineer R.Sak of Leipzig made many different types of plough, to cope with farming conditions in different parts of Europe, and although J.Zimmermann (later Chemnitzer Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik) standardised the production of machine tools the factory was still making steam engines to order in 1913. Saxony’s engineering skills were evident in a wide range of equipment, musical instruments and toys. But as a result of Napoleon’s continental blockade Chemnitz gained a dominating position in the production of textile machinery, associated with the leading engineers like R.Hartmann, C.G.Haubold and J.Zimmermann: steam engines were produced from 1822 and jacquard textile machines from 1827. A significant local customer for steam engines was the Mansfeld coppermining complex which installed its first engine in 1833 when the mining had reached a depth of 140m. Mining was consolidated (to twenty mines in 1860) to concentrate on the richer material where deeper mining would be profitable. In the 1860s the last great drainage tunnel for the Mansfeld syncline was started at Friedeburg (31km; completed in 1879). Shafts going below this level depended entirely on steam pumping: gaining a further 60m in the 1860s and 370m (total depth 560m) by 1914, while production increased from 1,510 (1860) to 21,116 tonnes (1899). Smelters were transferred from water power locations to the Mansfeld Plateau—Krughütte (1870) and Kochhütte (1880; though the valley smelter of Eckardthütte was active until 1926)—and despite maximising production of slag bricks large conical tips began to dominate the landscape. Copper company housing was provided at Augsdorf, Benndorf, Helbra and Klostermansfeld, while officials and the

Political structures, agriculture and industry

83

middle class lived in Eisleben where the population increased from 10,800 in 1860 to 25,100 in 1905. Habsburg Empire (Czech lands) The empire had a small share of the Upper Silesian coalfield that forms Polish territory today but output was only a modest 2.0 million tonnes in 1913 compared with 6.8 million for the Russian section. Nevertheless, there was a base for heavy industry in the Mahrische-Ostrau (Ostrava) area (which passed to Czechoslovakia after the First World War). A modern industry first superseded the charcoal system when in 1826 the Archbishop of Olmütz (Olomouc)—owner of Friedland ironworks—decided to build blast furnaces and puddling plant on the coalfield at Witkowitz. The first furnace (lit in 1830) used charcoal but coke was used in additional furnaces built in 1836 and 1837 (though problems in coking meant that charcoal furnaces were not closed until the 1870s). By this time the project had attracted the attention of the Rothschilds, a Viennese banking family who appreciated the value of the works in connection with their railway contract for the Nordbahn (Vienna-Bochnia). Through the support of the Rothschilds, Professor Riepl of Vienna Polytechnic was able to visit the UK in 1830 and recruit British experts who were on hand when puddling began at Witkowitz. The Rothschilds eventually bought the works outright in 1845 and increased their stake in the industry through purchase of iron mines at Marienthal (Mariánské Údoli). Between the 1830s and 1870s steam power was applied to blasting, hammering and rolling. The Bessemer converter was introduced at Witkowitz in 1866 and Kladno nine years later, encouraged by the railway demand for steel rails. However, there were problems with the local iron ores until the Gilchrist-Thomas dolomite lining was available (in 1879 at both places, revaluing the Nučice ores) and heavy reliance was placed on the non-phosphoric ores of Styria (transfer of ore being balanced by a return flow of coal, with the transport costs deemed acceptable in the context of a protected home market). A surge of railway demand in the 1880s was met by installation of Siemens-Martin open-hearth furnaces which could accept scrap as well as pig iron (though Styrian ores were still indispensable, especially at Witkowitz). There was also a shift in production to Komotau (Chomutov) where steel was made in 1872 and a tube mill installed by Mannesmann. This was an expanding coalmining area (23 million tonnes in 1914) which included opencast workings at Brüx, especially after 1900, with wide distribution including Bavaria, Prussia and Saxony, as well as Bohemia. Viennese capital also found its way into the Nučice iron mines and the blast furnaces and puddling plant at Kladno where the Prague Iron Company introduced coke smelting in 1856. Kladno was a long-established centre of ironworking but it was overtaken by the Mährische-Ostrau area with its ample coking coal and close connections with the railway industry. The contrast was underlined by the presence of a purely Czech labour force at Kladno and the retention of smallholdings whereas Mährische-Ostrau experienced immigration from Galicia and Silesia. The Bessemer converter arrived in 1875 when one of the two blast furnaces was using Styrian ore to produce pig iron for the Bessemer converters while the other used a mixture of ores (including some local phosphoric material) to turn out forge iron. However, it was only at Teplitz, where Bessemer converters were installed in 1873, that reliance on ‘imported’ ores was total.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

84

Development in northern Bohemia was linked with the expansion of coalmining, most evident at Brüx—beginning after 1740 for use in local industry (brewing/distilling and brick/lime working). Initial small-scale mining in shallow pits was transformed in scale by steam-powered industry after 1830: there were 150 mines in north Bohemia in 1847 but 1,000 in 1855 (Pavlínek and Pickles 2000 p. 91). The Aussig (Ústí)-Komotau railway of 1870 opened up markets in both the Czech lands and Saxony—hence deeper pits and larger opencast mines by Britannia from the UK (1866), Brüx of Austria and the AngloAustrian North Bohemia Company (1871), Brüx-Dux-Komotau (1874), taken over by the Austrian state after bankruptcy, and Lom (1888), all with headquarters in Brüx (ibid. p. 92), which experienced a boom in public and commercial buildings plus villas for the coal barons and working-class quarters for miners whose numbers had increased from 4,000 in 1848 to 26,000 by 1914 (30,000 in northern Bohemia in 1900) with plenty of cultural stress between German and Czech employees as the latter became relatively more prominent. A.Klima (1975) has demonstrated the close connection between textile and engineering industries because it was through small workshops set up inside textile factories to maintain machinery that some specialist engineering firms developed, although it was in Brünn (outside the main textile region) where Austria’s first steam engine was built in 1814. One workshop at Schwarzenberg (Šlapanice) near Brünn was started in 1821 by two Germans, J.Reiff and H.A.Luz. A steam engine was built for the Offermann factory in Brünn and it has already been noted that another was supplied to the Wallenstein factory in 1826. In 1836 the business was relocated in Brünn as an independent concern. In another instance a group of mechanics, including the Britons D.Evans and J.Lee and the Czech C.Danek, all with experience at the Breitfeld mill, set up their own engineering business in the Prague district of Karolinenthal (Karlin). Two brothers from the UK, E. and J.Thomas, acquired some experience in installing steam engines and started their own factory in 1829 in Reichenberg which was relocated to an old spinning mill in Karolinenthal in 1832 in order to enjoy a more central position in Bohemia and closer proximity to supplies of iron. It became the largest machine building plant in Bohemia in the first half of the century with a wide range of products including a rolling mill supplied to Křivoklát ironworks in 1842. Meanwhile, one of the Thomases’ associates, T.Bracegirdle, set up his own plant close to Reichenberg at Gablonz (Jablonec) in 1835 where a good water-power site was developed. His looms became a speciality and he moved to Brünn in 1843, perhaps encouraged by personal associations with Offermann and the prospect of cornering the Moravian market. He went on to build steam engines, installing his own foundry and rolling mill. Interestingly, these examples show links going forward to the major late nineteenth century engineering industries of the Czech lands. Consolidation occurred in Brünn in 1872 (seven years after Bracegirdle’s death), giving rise to the famous Erster Brünner Maschinenfabrikgesellschaft (Prvni brenská strojirna). Metal came from Witkowitz and it was this supply that drew more of the engineering towards the Mährische-Ostrau complex, including the coach factory at Nesselsdorf (Kopřivnice) which later built cars and lorries. The Thomas factory was eventually absorbed into the Škoda company which started in Pilsen (Plzeň) by manufacturing sugar refining plant in 1859 at what was then the Wallenstein engineering works (taken over by E.Škoda in 1869), before diversifying in armaments in 1890 using

Political structures, agriculture and industry

85

steel from plant installed within the works the previous year. Converted into a joint stock company with the aid of Kreditanstalt in 1899 it opened a motorcycle factory in Jungbunzlau in that year and started car production there in 1905; serial production followed at Nesselsdorf in 1906 and Prague in 1907. Škoda also became a major armaments supplier for the Habsburg army, subsequently serving the Czechoslovak state and its allies in the Little Entente during the inter-war years, the Axis during the Second World War and the Warsaw Pact forces during the communist period. Finally the needs of the sugar beet industry also gave rise to the Prague engineering firm of C.Danek (founded in 1854) which was merged into the massive Českomoravská-Kolben-Danek (ČKD) enterprise in 1927 along with Prvni Českomoravská (which started manufacturing mining machinery and metallurgical plant in 1871—later water turbines, refrigerators, locomotives and motor cars) and Emil Kolben’s factory of 1896 producing power station equipment. Habsburg Empire (Hungary) Here the state supported the iron industry which encountered strong demand through the upsurge of railway building after the Ausgleich. A steel mill established at Diósgyőr in 1868, equipped with Siemens-Martin open-hearth furnaces, became part of a large state metallurgical works which was Hungary’s second-largest steel producer in 1913 after Resicza in Banat. Mention should also be made of the company Rimamurány-Salgotarjan created in 1881—in an area of long-standing charcoal ironworking dating back to 1770— by the amalgamation of foundries in Borsodnadasd, Ózd and Salgótarján, leading to open-hearth furnaces at Ózd and a focus on finished products at Salgótarján. And small ironworks was later opened at Zolyombrezno (Podbrezová) near Beszterczebánya (Banská Bystrica) and other units in Banat and Transylvania including Resicza and Vajdahunyad (Hunedoara). These works made some metal at source and under the railway company Staatseisenbahngesellschaft Resicza produced both rails and locomotives. But engineering tended to develop within each market region and remote production was rather exceptional. Hence the flow of metal to Budapest, complementing the transfer from Silesia to Berlin. As the Budapest and Vienna banks promoted engineering close to the main markets ‘Transylvanian machine works remained essentially repair shops’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 314). There were also rolling mills in Budapest in 1838 long before the State Engineering Works built its first railway locomotive in 1873, and Manfréd Weiss became a significant arms producer. Reference should be made to the stimulus that came from flour milling: A.Ganz, the flour mill employee of Swiss origin who set up his own factory in Budapest to manufacture milling machinery, diversified into electrical machinery in 1878. Ganz were producing turbines (mostly for export) and milling machines in the 1880s and a patent was obtained in 1885 for AC transformers—through work by O.Bláthy, M.Déri and K.Zipernowski. Locomotives and rolling stock were another speciality: the first electrically powered locomotive was designed in 1896–8 by K.Kándo. Hungary’s first internal combustion engines were also built: a petrol-driven tricycle in 1900 was succeeded by a two-stroke automobile in 1902 and a four-cylinder vehicle in 1905 (followed by the first tractor 1912). As Ganz-Mávag (and now Ganz-Hunslet) the firm remains one of the most important in Hungary. Manfréd Weiss started producing canned

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

86

foods for the army in 1884 but moved into cartridges and magazines in 1895 (after relocating to Csepel on account of fire and explosion risks). The firm grew into a major munitions complex by 1914 as it showed a knack for anticipating the army’s requirements. The new location gave space for a foundry and rolling mill built in 1896 followed by a copper rolling mill in 1899. United Incandescent Lamps at Újpest also established a leading position. The chemical complex Germany This industry was grounded in the needs of the textile industry for bleaching and dyeing materials and the alkali required for the manufacture of glass and soap. As the key commodity, sulphuric acid was produced in the region from the seventeenth century but it was the evolution of the lead chamber process from experiments in Berlin (1768) and Breslau (1779)—burning sulphur (or sulphur-containing ores like iron pyrites) and condensing the gas—that created the basis for diffusion through the region. Several chemical works were established around Berlin in the early nineteenth century, notably Kunheim in 1826 (relocated at Kreuzberg around mid-century) and the Prussian government’s soda plant at Schönebeck. There was a rising demand for cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and photographic materials in which Berlin firms were able to specialise. But the heavy chemical industry was progressively relocated to the lignite field in Merseburg. A remarkable concentration in this part of central Germany arose first from the salt of Nordhausen used to produce sulpuric acid (‘Nordhausen acid’)—the source of bleaching powder—in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and subsequently through the discovery of salt deposits at Stassfurt near Magdeburg in 1856 in an area well endowed with lignite and with transport links available by both the Saale River and the developing railway system. Salt production was boosted by its use in explosives, glass and soap to reach 16 million tonnes in 1938 (including production from Nordhausen). It is important to add that the salt lay beneath an overburden of potassium chloride, known as ‘Abraumsalze’—also found at Aschersleben, Leopoldshall and Wintershall—which was appreciated by sugar beet growers and thereby formed the foundation of a major fertiliser industry, with output rising from 100,000 to 3 million tonnes during 1865–1900. The importance of hard coal as a fuel and raw material initially became critical in drawing sulphuric acid production (using the Leblanc and Solvay processes) to western Germany—along with the production of derivatives like soda and dyestuffs—even though the lead chamber was pioneered in the east. But a new phase of growth occurred in central Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century at a time of technological ferment in the chemical industry when major new investments were being made. At this juncture value attached to the lignite and the ‘Abraumsalze’ while the railway system (supplementing the Saale/Elbe navigation) could distribute production across Germany. Additional value accrued from what was perceived as a strategically valuable location in the heart of the country (far from the eastern and western frontiers) in the context of the First World War and the subsequent policy of economic autarky. Technological breakthroughs included the electrolysis of brine as an industrial process for the production of caustic soda and chlorine—demonstrated in the 1880s—followed by

Political structures, agriculture and industry

87

the discovery (in 1892) that the heating of lime and carbon in an electric furnace gave rise to the compound calcium carbide which could be readily converted into acetylene— useful for cutting and welding and also a source of acetic acid and alcohol—and moreover an intermediate in fertiliser production arising from the fixation of nitrogen to form calcium cyanide. Another important line of development was associated with coal tar (analine) and the use of this material as an intermediate in the production of synthetic dyestuffs. Although discovered accidentally (in the course of attempts to synthesise quinine for medical use) the bright colours of analine dyes were widely appreciated and gave rise to much research in a field where students of Germany’s advanced system of technical education were able to prosper. By 1914 the industry involved a small number of vertically integrated enterprises which were to a large extent responsible for the technology being used. The 1890s brought a cluster of installations to Bitterfeld, then a small settlement on the Mulde south of Dessau. The most important investment was made in 1895 when Chemischefabrik Griesheim, a firm operating in the west, decided to employ the electrolysis of brine process using the local salt and lignite. This was a radical location decision which ‘was unquestionably the chief force in making this area the centre of the German electro-chemical industry’ (Findlay 1948 p. 124). Within a few years the company was greatly enlarged by mergers and takeovers and—in its renamed form Griesheim-Elektron—it concentrated its entire chlorinated hydrocarbon capacity at Bitterfeld and made bleaching powder on a particularly large scale. Also, one of the larger mining and fertiliser companies at Stassfurt joined with Aussiger Verein (see below) to set up a subsidiary at Bitterfeld to operate an electrolytic caustic soda and chlorine plant. And the expanding Kunheim company in Berlin went on from an initial relocation to the edge of the city (Niederschöneweide in 1885) to set up further plant in Niederlausitz (Grosskoschen) and also in Bitterfeld. The latter arose out of a successful venture in 1867 when Kunheim combined with two other Berlin firms to create a small analine works on the eastern edge of the city at Rummelsburg which opened in 1869. This business—named Aktiengesellschaft für Analinfabrikation (Agfa)—was extremely successful with its cotton dyes and photographic materials when it resumed operations at Treptow after the Franco-Prussian War; so much so that the Bitterfeld project was undertaken in conjunction with lignite mining. A separate factory for photographic materials was opened at Wolfen near Bitterfeld in 1909. Bohemia Parallel developments occurred when D.Hirsch established his Prague factory to provide acids for calico printing in 1835 and F.X.Brosche was similarly engaged, although his product range extended to paints, printing inks and pharmaceuticals. In 1839 his chemist developed a two-chamber system for sulphuric acid using chlorinated limestone. The first major chemical producer was J.D.Starck, whose sulphuric acid plant at Davidov near Zwittau (Svitavy)—based on the vitriol schist of Komotau—dates to 1810. Over the next forty years the firm became a multi-plant enterprise with a wide product range, including superphosphate in the 1840s at Kaznau (Kaznĕjov) with a private source of coal from the Falknov (Sokolov) Basin and was exporting as far as the Rhineland at the time of his death in 1841. Other locations, which were based on local coal, included Lipnice, Silberbach (Stříbná) and Rychnov. In this way Bohemia resisted both Prussian and Saxon

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

88

competition in heavy chemicals. Further coal-based establishments at Hruschau (OstravaHrušov) in 1851 and Aussig in 1856 supplemented sulphuric acid production with the Leblanc soda process (eventually overtaken by the Solvay process involving the electrolysis of brine). Lead chambers supplanted the old Bohemian production method geared to a concentrated but expensive acid (oleum) but the traditional industry recovered through capacity at Kolín in 1871 and Pozsony (Bratislava) in 1873 when the dyestuffs industry required a more concentrated product (at least until the lead-chamber system was modernised through the ‘contact’ process, employing a platinum catalyst). Indeed the local production of oleum gave a boost to dyestuffs in Bohemia, despite strong German competition. A long-established Prague firm specialising in oleum-based intermediates entered the trade and the Hruschau factory (later taken over and expanded by Aussig) did likewise. There was some spread of soda manufacture to Bosnia, Galicia and Transylvania, while German chemical companies were attracted to the Russian Empire by high tariff protection and the coal available in Dąbrowa: a sulphuric acid and Leblanc alkali plant was built at Sosnowiec while an electrolytic plant appeared south of Łódź (though salt for the latter had to be brought from the Donbas) and a dyestuffs factory operated at Pabianice. Other industrial regions The Baltic ports The ports acquired a range of industries. Steam engines were built in Elbing (Elbląg) and Stettin (Szczecin) from 1837 and 1851 respectively, a business not unconnected with shipbuilding established in these places—which in Stettin included ocean liners, beginning with a contract in 1887 from the Hamburg-Amerika Line—and also in Danzig (Gdańsk). Food industries were prominent in Stettin after two local merchants (H.Dohrn and J.F.Veltkusen) founded a sugar refinery in 1817 that grew into the huge Baltische Rübenzuckerfabriken with commerce assisted by the Zollverein and improved transport facilities in both the port as a result of the hinterland road/railway construction and improved port facilities. As Berlin’s outport, Stettin’s industry was particularly diverse, with milling, brewing and distilling; timber, furniture, paper, pulp and cellulose; cement and refractories; phosphate fertiliser; not to mention the Kraftwerk blast furnaces linked with the Henckel-Donnersmark mines in Upper Silesia. The hinterland included Posen, which received some government aid to improve the city and reduce emigration by the German community. The firm of H.Cegielski started with farm machinery (after agricultural supply business, 1846) and then moved to larger premises to build locomotives and rolling stock. Steam engines were made in Neubrandenburg from 1840. The Adriatic ports: Trieste and Fiume (Rijeka) These comprise a further industrial region along with their hinterlands in Carniola and Croatia. Import of Egyptian cotton gave rise to the Aidussina (Ajovščina) spinning mill of 1828 (with a steam engine to supplement water power in 1843) which marks the beginning of modern industry in Carniola. An integrated spinning and weaving mill in Laibach (Ljubljana) followed in 1837, associated with the British entrepreneur

Political structures, agriculture and industry

89

W.Moline. There was also a glass industry established in 1824 and cane sugar refining began in Laibach in the 1830s—later in Fiume and Trieste—only to be eclipsed by Czech sugar beet in the last quarter of the century. The railway to Trieste opened up small coalfields on the supply line to Italy. The coal of Trifain (Trbovlje) was first developed by Laibach and Trieste businessmen to support the sugar industry, but Viennese investors bought the mines in 1873 with the help of Wienerbankverein, leading to modernisation and the quadrupling of output by 1912 (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 312). The coal was used by the glass industry (referred to above), enabling it to make the transition from potash to gas, although it was eliminated through Czech competition in the railway age. The coal was unsuitable for coking but it could be used for the puddling process introduced first at Gulenstein (Štore) in 1836, where coal displaced charcoal in 1840, and later at Ravne near Celli (Celje)—linked with the scattered iron industry of the upper Sava. Some of the former’s capacity was dismantled in 1898 and transferred to Donawitz in Styria but other units survived at both locations. The iron industry of Carniola was eventually consolidated by Krainische Industrie Gesellschaft (with German capital) through an integrated works at Assling (Jesenice) when the railway arrived in 1870, with Siemens-Martin technology added in 1891 when ownership passed to a Viennese arms firm with access to military orders. Exhaustion of local ores resulted in the transfer of pig-iron production to Trieste in 1897 (convenient for the working-up of imported ores and British coking coal), but the remaining capacities were inherited by the Yugoslav government after the First World War and diversified through electric steel making based on the hydropower potential after a successful venture at Fala on the Drava with Swiss capital during the war. Meanwhile, Fiume—a free port from 1776—saw growth accelerate after access was provided by a narrow-gauge spur from the Vienna-Trieste railway, widened in 1873. Although cut off from Vienna by the Ausgleich (interrupting the flow of timber and iron) and deprived of its sugar industry through competition from sugar beet, the port then concentrated on papermaking and shipbuilding; the latter flourishing with the introduction of iron and steel, with spread to Pola (Pula). The railway from Budapest and Zagreb arrived on the ‘Hungarian Littoral’ in 1862 and boosted flour exports. But the rail links were by no means comprehensive: the link with Zagreb allowed Croatian rough woollen cloth to develop a market (after previous failure against British and Czech production), while lack of a direct link with eastern Slavonia discouraged the textiles in Osijek where the silk industry did not survive the 1860s. On balance ‘it seems doubtful that Rijeka’s export tonnage could have multiplied tenfold from 1870 to 1910 or the building of steamships [today its major industry] gotten under way had the attraction of Trieste not been checked by Austro-Hungarian rivalry’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 300). Industrial areas in the Habsburg borderlands and Southeastern Europe Southwestern Transylvania and Banat Reference should be made to some compelling resource industries, beginning (chronologically) with the goldmining in the Western Carpathians at Vörös Patak (Roşia Montană) near the small town of Abrud which is worth examining in view of the

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

90

excellent detail provided by Paget (1850) and the contrast in technology and capitalisation offered with the coppermining at Mansfeld already addressed. The whole mass of the fortress-like hill of Csetátie (Cetate) contained gold and was being worked opencast and gradually cut away (as it still is today) in contrast to underground mining techniques used by the Romans. For ‘there are no large capitals employed in working these mines; they are entirely in the hands of poor peasants who work them either singly or in small associations of two or three persons. When the mountain was richer, government found it worthwhile to work on its own account but since it has become poorer none but the peasants—it is said—can get a good profit out of it’ (ibid. p. 298). It was explained how the peasants applied for grants of mountain space in square yards; family groups would then operate, with the father boring and blasting while one son took the horse and its panniers to the crushing mill operated by the mother and another son, with the crushed ore then carried to Abrud: ‘all these processes are carried out in the rudest possible manner [with] no less than 500 crushing mills and washing floors within the space of a couple of English miles’ (ibid. p. 299). The mills ‘consisted of a single small wheel, generally deficient in half its buckets, which moves three crushing poles— none of which go equally and one of which is generally wanting or broken’ (ibid. p. 299), yet the peasants got rich and had fine houses in the village. Some peasants collected ore lying on the pathways where it was found ‘glittering in the sun’ after some natural sorting of material on the stony surface by rain, showing that the notion of ‘streets paved with gold’ was no idle romance but ‘a serious reality’ (ibid. p. 300). The ‘little metropolis’ of Abrudbánya exhibited ‘wealth and luxury which he [the traveller] little expects to see in the midst of the wildest natural scenery’ with fine houses for government officers and people benefiting from this ‘lucky mining adventure [with] mining operations on every side’ (ibid. p. 295). Paget (ibid. p. 97) also visited the Hoffman iron furnace and casting mill at Ruskberg (Nădrag) which produced lead shot with the help of a 44m crag acting as a natural ‘shot tower’: ‘molten lead falls through a cullinder into a basin in the brook below’. Wood was cut for the factory and a system of steam drying had been perfected for treating green timber. However, he did not visit the large state-owned mining and ironworking activities in the Resicza area—founded originally in the

Political structures, agriculture and industry

91

Figure 2.6 The coalmining settlement of Anina. Note that the mines at Ciudanoviţa, David Lisava and Miniş are modern pits for uranium and clay eighteenth century using charcoal as the furnace fuel—which were privatised by STEG under the financial pressures of the Crimean War. STEG eventually com pleted the Steierdorf-Bazias coal export railway to the Danube in 1863 (Figure 2.6), eventually substituting a surface railway from Lisava to Anina for a tunnel which would have run directly from the coal seams at Kubeck. And although the coal was subsequently redirected from the Danube to the Resicza furnaces (Bessemer converters and SiemensMartin open-hearth furnaces were installed in 1868 and 1876 respectively), production continued to be taken as far as Oravicza (Oraviţa) over this mountain railway which

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

92

constitutes the most remarkable part of a sustained industrial endeavour central to the modernisation of the Krassó-Szöreny (Caraş-Severin) District. Enterprise by the Hungarian state was subsequently responsible for metallurgy at Vajdahunyad combining local ores with coal from Petroszény (Petroşani). Other emerging industrial complexes in the Carpathian areas of the Habsburg Empire did not involve such a large scale of planned settlement, but they were locally significant: especially the mining and metallurgical industries at Ózd and Salgótarján. Bosnia and Herzegovina The Habsburg occupation of 1878—a prelude to annexation in 1908—brought state involvement in the economy in order to increase provincial tax revenues, meet the costs of administration and so reduce dependence on joint occupation credits. A railway network was built on a narrow-gauge basis primarily for troop movements; and in order to maximise revenue from commercial traffic freight rates per kilometre increased with total distance whereas the reverse would have been appropriate for the stimulation of industry. However, there was a flurry of activity, for an iron industry was built at Vareš in 1891: there was coal as well as ore available but as the former was of poor quality charcoal from the extensive forests was used instead. The forests were taken into state ownership and large concessions were awarded to entrepreneurs like the Bavarian O.Steinbeis who gained control of 45,000ha of forest in the Doberlin (Dobrljin)-DrvarJajce triangle in 1892. Narrow-gauge railways collected timber in the forests and were also available for transport of sawn timber from the Doberlin and Drvar factories to the quayside at Sibenico (Šibenik) where the company built its own wharves. There was also a chemical industry featuring calcium carbide at Jajce and soda at Lukavac (the latter supplied with brine from the salt deposits of Donja and Tuzla). An oil refinery at Bosanski Brod imported its crude in order to send products to Hungarian territory on the opposite side of the Sava. The profile was completed by a range of food processing industries: brewing, canning, distilling, tanning and tobacco manufacture. There was no integrated programme but the results were impressive for a backward province that stood apart from the main lines of communication. Bulgaria Large-scale industry was almost completely absent before 1850 and even in the second half of the nineteenth century progress was extremely uneven. Bulgaria developed some food processing and leather industries—including sugar beet refining, meat packing, canning and flour milling. There were some large mills at Russe and other Bulgarian Danube ports exporting to the Ottoman Empire, but the inefficiency of shipping reduced both quality and profit. And in the hinterland small native-owned mills could not make adequate profits (and could not afford rail transport) once wheat prices rose during the last pre-war decade. Bulgaria also had an iron industry at Samokov south of Sofia, linked with the production of agricultural implements, but the prospects for competition with imported machines seem to have prevented an investment in coke smelting after 1850 when capital was switched to banking and commerce. However, it is in any case doubtful

Political structures, agriculture and industry

93

if Bulgaria had adequate coal and iron ore to sustain a profitable iron industry at this time. Romania Significant clusters of industry developed here. Attempts by the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia to introduce factory industry to their respective capitals—Iaşi and Bucharest— were frustrated by the backward war-torn environment for which monopolies and tied labour forces were inadequate compensation. However, although the landowners were not brought under political control in the 1830s to the extent that Count Kiselev would have wished, there was a growth of commerce along the Danube (reflected in the development of the river ports, especially Braila and Galati, where food industries developed) and improvement of the road from Bucharest to Brassó (Braşov) in Transylvania. The Assan milling, oil-pressing and distilling enterprise in Bucharest stood out as the most impressive mid-century development (and one of the first to use steam power). Craft skills in the rural areas were of some significance when organised on a workshop scale to cope with orders from the towns. Thus the Kogălniceanu military clothing factory at Târgu Neamţ (1858) was grounded in the reputation of the area for woollen textiles fostered by the Neamţ monastery. Despite attempts at import substitution for iron and paper (especially in Moldavia), heavy industry did not make an appearance until after the unification of the principalities. The Mehedinţeanu refinery opened near Ploieşti in 1859 while the 1860s saw progress in foundry work and engineering in Bucharest. The building material industry was encouraged by growth in all the Balkan capitals but Romania did best with the Bucharest market (with its large population including many high-income families), and the cement industry experienced technical innovation by the boyar Prince Bibescu using the family fortune to introduce the rotating oven in 1908. However, the main surge of growth occurred in response to tariff protection (first offered to the paper and sugar industries in 1881–2) which precipitated a five-year tariff war with the Habsburg Empire after 1887. Romania had a range of agricultural and mineral raw materials (outstandingly oil) and migration of Romanians from the Habsburg Empire after independence contributed to the reservoir of skilled labour. In the main industrial area, which extended from the Danube at Giurgiu to the Hungarian border at Predeal, Bucharest supported a wide range of activities (including engineering, textiles and food processing) while Ploieşti shared with Câmpina the oil refining and oilfield engineering business of the Prahova oilfields (Figure 2.7). Giurgiu had a ship repairing business and a sugar factory while Comarnic produced cement, Azuga beer and clothing with textiles and wood processing at Busteni. A second cluster in Moldavia was based in the Siret Valley from Paşcani to Adjud where the railway ran parallel to the Siret and raw material arrived from the Carpathian valleys, especially the Bistriţa and Trotuş: with wood processing at Piatra Neamţ (also paper at Letea and textiles at Buhuşi) in the former, with coal at Comăneşti and oil production at Moineşti in the latter. A third cluster covered the ports of Brăila and Galaţi with engineering and some processing of the cereals and timber drawn to the port. With over 77% of all the country’s employment in large-scale industry (the balance fell to scattered nodes like the provincial capitals, with textile industries, and Botoşani, with flour milling

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

94

Figure 2.7 Industrial regions of Romania 1902 associated with an agricultural market close to Austrian Bukowina), Romania illustrated in microcosm the core-periphery contrasts already noted in the Habsburg Empire and Germany. Serbia Some meat-packing developed when the border was closed to live exports in 1895–6 and it was consolidated in the face of the 1906–11 pig war. Apart from local crafts there was an offshoot of the Bulgarian textile industry in the Leskovac and Niš areas annexed in 1878. It involved braid, hemp rope and woollen cloth; well founded on local raw materials but constrained in its evolution to a factory system by the conservative outlook of the artisans which discouraged investment. And there were further problems when the Bulgarian market was closed by the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885–6. The few native entrepreneurs able to effect the transition tended to relocate in Belgrade. Food processing made some progress, but in modern mills turning out fine white flour there was a tendency to overcapacity as exporting proved difficult. The Belgrade ‘klanica’ (meatpacking plant) opened by the Serb engineer M.Savčič in 1897 was a success but the high prices paid for live animals in Vienna discouraged processors elsewhere in Serbia. Urban construction generated a market for building materials while state defence and railway building supported an engineering industry, nevertheless constrained by the low level of technical education and the need to import metal. However, the pace accelerated after Austria initiated a tariff war in 1906 to subordinate the economy; whereupon Serbia found other markets for livestock and boosted industry to reduce dependence on the

Political structures, agriculture and industry

95

empire still further. Over 400 manufacturing enterprises were established between 1906 and 1914. Backward areas Forceful investment policies might ideally have been applied to all backward areas, but much was left to private enterprise which failed to gain significant momentum. Industries serving local markets tended to cluster in the main towns and also along the key railway routes. Galicia saw growth along the ‘Inner Carpathian Railway’ (Żywiec-Nowy SączJasło-Krosno-Zagórz) of 1882–4 and the oilfields around Gorlice, Jasło and Krosno: exploitation began in 1851 near Krosno—the town where I.Łukasiewicz distilled oil for the first time—at a laboratory scale. But without valuable raw materials competition with the main industrial cores was almost impossible. A pattern of specialisation seems to have been encouraged by a tacit acceptance of pseudo-colonial status for the empire’s peripheral territories lacking a large urban-based middle class anxious to invest in manufacturing, except where German and Jewish communities played a significant role: for example, through the textile industry’s transition to a factory system in areas of German settlement around Hermannstadt and Kronstadt. It has also been argued that feudal traditions had a strong hold on the minds of the upper and middle classes, making them despise both manual work and commercial gain; while ‘the peasants generally lacked the skill and capital, let alone the legal freedoms, to become entrepreneurs’ (Mellor 1975 p. 185). The attachment of the peasant to the soil was so great that mines and factories in the Balkans were frequently unable to find sufficient workers willing to stay permanently and thereby acquire real skill. Most of the workers stayed for only a short time and then returned to their farms. Transylvania The issue may be taken further with respect to Transylvania where the feudal lords retained their status after 1848 because their incomes were safeguarded by the arrangements relating to the formal abolition of feudalism and the continuing oversupply of agricultural labour. This left the peasants with few escape routes, although the overpopulation of the countryside was eventually relieved by migration and 87,000 Romanians left during 1908–13, virtually a fifth of all those who left Hungary at this time. Agriculture serving the modest internal market was relatively inefficient, while the cost advantage of abundant cheap labour could easily be offset in eyes of potential industrialists by lack of skills, low productivity, raw material shortages and high transport costs to markets outside the region (given the limited local market which—in the railway age—could easily be supplied from the industrial cores with proven efficiency and economies of scale). So it was appropriate that the east should remain agrarian. AustroBohemian magnates were always concerned about the possibility of competition from Hungarian nobles who would not pay taxes: hence ‘a coalition between the Habsburg state and Bohemian industrialists that excluded manufacturing from Hungary’ (Verdery 1983 p. 176). Furthermore, the Habsburgs were happy to bypass the German business community in Transylvania ‘preferring to deal with international merchants who could assure them access to eastern raw materials and markets for Austro-Bohemian

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

96

manufactures’ (ibid. p. 177) although this prevented accumulation of merchant capital in Transylvania. Habsburg industry was not the most efficient even in its core locations and regional policies (subsidies and tax exemptions) as protection against Bohemian manufactures would hardly have paid dividends. The overriding aim was reduced dependence on foreign loans and increased self-sufficiency. There was capital from the great banks of Budapest and Vienna to support pockets of growth where potential existed, while relations with the Ottoman Empire ‘allowed Balkan traders to join German farmers and Italian bankers in carving out modernizing enclaves in the economy of the imperial borderlands’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 78). So the aim for Transylvania was integration through an agricultural bias to livestock while complementary industry made modest progress. Yet there was no export surplus since trade in timber and grain was more than balanced by imports of livestock, cotton, wool (including aba) and tobacco. The empire was also dependent on Balkan traders, faced with ‘sporadic restriction tempered by a reluctance to alienate them or the Ottoman Empire from which they came’ (ibid. p. 60). Discrimination against Transylvania (and Galicia) may have been accentuated by a cynical acceptance of backwardness by regional elites which had a political impact through the complex web of state-building, economic change and ethnicity. Romanian nationalism was already prospering in the context of the Habsburg-nobility struggle over centralisation, given the support of the Uniate Church, for the Habsburgs singularly failed to convert the Romanian peasants to Catholicism during the eighteenth century despite the clash between collective gains and the individualism of Enlightenment. Although Korea’s revolt was firmly put down—at a time of revenue crisis on feudal estates just as Habsburg tax reforms were being perfected (Verdery 1983 p. 344)—the Hungarian nobles gained little compensation for damage to their estates. Reactionary lordly attitudes in Transylvania were again apparent in 1848 for the Transylvanian Diet rejected emancipation in 1846—even with the support of the most commercialised estates producing sugar, oil and alcohol—when the opposite was being widely advocated across Hungary as a whole. With limited mining and manufacturing, this negative attitude to capitalism kept the peasants on the land and delayed improvement through a Transylvanian Agricultural Society that had been established only in 1844 (ibid. p. 357). Feudalism was soon dismantled during 1848–54 but change was too slow and the Magyars then settled for dualism which allowed for a Hungarian civil service and industrial establishment in Budapest (built up from eastward-moving capital) which imposed itself on Transylvania through a colonial relationship. There was improved access to commodity markets but the peasants had to work on the estates to pay compensation for their plots (rendered progressively less viable through partible inheritance) with further agricultural work through sharecropping. Informal methods predominated, including payment in kind to migrant ‘highlanders’ for casual labour even on the largest Romanian farms (ibid. p. 240). Meanwhile, the progressive influence of the Saxons was undermined by outside competition and intrusion into their commercial niche by Armenians, Jews and Wallachians, although with larger farms and smaller families they could modernise with machinery and cash wages for their workers (ibid. p. 346). Not surprisingly they found it hard to decide whether to ally with the Hungarians or Romanians as the latter were ‘persuaded that a viable economy could be organised only on a national basis [whereupon] they sought to create a Romanian agriculture, a

Political structures, agriculture and industry

97

Romanian industry and Romanian banks’ (ibid. p. 220). They had most success in banking and credit: starting with ‘Albina’ in 1872, 274 banks—mostly small and agricultural—were established by 1914. Hungarian assimilation tactics could never succeed because as a predominantly rural people with Orthodox and Uniate traditions, the Romanians were ‘protected from the assimilative power of the cities in the central industrial regions which served as foundries of Magyarisation’ (ibid. p. 223). Progressive Hungarian leaders like I.Tisza (premier during 1913–17) wanted to deal with Transylvania’s Romanians—as the largest minority in Hungary—to bring them into the mainstream of public life and weaken their links with Bucharest. Yet there could never be compromise over the Magyar character of Hungary which barred proportional representation for Romanians at all levels of government. The capitalist forest economy Logging was a commercial activity which became cumulatively very extensive in the mountain regions and especially the Carpathians during the late nineteenth century. The industry was not new because wood cutting to serve the mining and metallurgical industries was widespread. But the decline of mining in the traditional areas of the early modern period—like the Erzgebirge—and the introduction of coking in the iron industry encouraged the idea of sustainable forestry for a wider market. H.Cotta worked for the Grand-Duke Karl August of Saxony-Weimar-Eisenach at a private forestry school at Zillbach near Meiningen and then—as director of Saxony’s Forest Survey Office—was able to move the school to Tharandt where it became the Royal Saxon Forest Academy in 1816, extolling the virtues of sustained yield. This was also a time when species change was advocated, and Pürglitz in central Bohemia was just one of many estates affected by ‘spruce mania’ that called for artificial renewal after 1780 (with great dangers in terms of vulnerability to disease and storm damage). Meanwhile, pine was being promoted in the lowlands. The idea was to meet the new demands from the paper and building industries, soon to be followed by the need for railway sleepers and telegraph poles. A new generation of factories was created on the edge of the forests in the early part of the century: for example, the Harmanec paperworks opened by F.S.Leicht on the edge of Beszterczebánya (Banská Bystrica) in 1829 and then massively expanded by the Hüttner family during 1892–5 when railway access meant that the three paper-making machines could despatch 600 wagonloads each year. (After a serious fire in 1904 it was rebuilt by the Hazai Bank of Budapest and gained direct railway access to Beszterczebánya.) Forests were revalued and the inexorable of clearance for agriculture came to an end after a period of four to five centuries when it is calculated that sheep grazing on the flat summits of the Balkan Mountains—exploited for Muslim markets in Asia—lowered the timberline by several hundred metres from the high level of 1,800–1,950m in the Holocene. In Carniola in the railway age the local woodlands were well situated not only for local industry (including a paper industry started in 1843) but in relation to the timber deficit area of the Mediterranean with export through Trieste. A shift to management for a sustained wood yield brought resistance to agricultural pressures seeking more grazing opportunities and the lords were keen to tighten their control as the forests were seen to offer real value through logging—although some were prepared to address the issue of customary rights by turning over a portion of their forests to the community (or to

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

98

individuals in proportion to the size of their holdings) on condition that claims to the remaining areas would be relinquished. It was the same in Russian Poland after 1864, for whereas the landlords had first welcomed peasant efforts in land clearance and reclamation (against a share of the crops) they now rationalised the woodlands and saw the peasant agrarian and pastoralist as the greatest enemy of a young forest: ‘his penetration was stopped, his free access refused, his legal titles questioned, his customary rights denied and his utilization of the land ordered to comply strictly with the law’ (Obrebski 1976 p. 42). Transport systems Transport from the forests to the sawmills became an important consideration. The rivers could often be used for floating, with timber dams (‘opuşturi’ in Romania) to release an extra boost of water to cope with shallow sections (beechwood was too heavy to float but there was little demand for this before 1918). A canal built by the Schwarzenburg family to link the Svetla tributary of the Vltava with the Danube above Linz (1778–1823) opened up the Vimperk and Plakenstejn forests, while further investments made on the Vltava for the Spitzenberg Canal (1854–62) made it possible to float timber through the difficult Horni Plana section. By contrast the Morava was not so widely used, since very rapid flow in the upper reaches contrasted with extremely sluggish conditions lower down. However, apart from some rapids on the upper reaches (the Váh above Zsolna (Žilina), for example) the Slovak rivers provided a useful contact with the Danube and rafters from Kralovany (at the Orava-Váh confluence) would work through to the Black Sea until the 1870s when the railways captured the long-distance traffic. Much use was also made of the Drava and Sava to deliver timber to such places as Novi Sad, Pančevo and Zemun, while the Bistriţa and Maros (Mureş) were among those used in Romania and Transylvania, respectively. In the railway age attention shifted to more local facilities to move timber to sawmills built at strategic points on the network: localised floating might be possible but narrow-gauge railways were widely adopted by the 1890s. They could be used in valleys not suitable for floating but were in any case superior because waste was reduced while equipment and workers could be transported as well as timber—and as long as there was a gentle down-valley gradient, timber could move largely by gravity with locomotives of only modest power required (indeed some early railways worked by gravity with loaded trains controlled by brakesmen and with horses to return empty wagons). They proved to be quite adaptable with a minimum curvature of only 30m and scope for horseshoes in tributary valleys to moderate gradient. Various gauges were used but the Bosnian gauge, of 76cm became standard by the end of the century. While small sawmills were widely scattered (including peasant-owned installations based on water power) large units which included furniture- and/or papermaking as well as sawmilling used nodal points well below the main forested massifs: Pardubice and Strakonice in Bohemia; Poprad, Rózahegy, Ružomberok and Zsolna in Slovakia; Ljubljana in Slovenia (along with paper/pulp mills as Medvode, Veržej and Vevče). Some entrepreneurs gained control of extensive domains where they acted as the local development agency like Steinbeis in Bosnia, already discussed. The railways were a force for modernisation with the infrastructure a means of developing tourism and/or facilitating access for hydropower development.

Political structures, agriculture and industry

99

Transport systems in Romania Long before the nineteenth century Carpathian timber was taken into the deforested lowlands as part of an exchange economy between complementary natural regions, but commercial sawmilling in the mountains started around 1885, a decade later than in Transylvania. There was some large-scale cutting of oak in the hills of Muntenia and Oltenia as peasants sold land cheaply to the timber companies, failing to realise how efficiently these companies would provide infrastructure in remote areas. And when the state became a large landowner after the secularisation of monastic lands in 1863 and organised a forest service (with a ‘Codul Silvic’ enacted in 1881) woodland was again sold cheaply at a time when the state lacked the means to invest in transport itself. Moreover, after 1901 legislation gave a boost to wood processing and the number of sawmills increased from 45 in 1900 to over 90 in 1910; exceeding the annual timber increment. The sustainable option of felling small parcels in succession and leaving each to regenerate was often ignored in favour of rapid clearance of a large concession which caused considerable erosion and prevented long-term use of the transport infrastructure. Rafting on the Olt began in 1890 from Gura Sadului to Turnu Măgurele (300km) with processing at Râmnicu Vâlcea, Stoeneşti, Slatina and Turnu Măgurele, while localised timber floating occurred in Transylvania on the Sebeş from Bistra and Oaşa to the Petreşti mill and on the Vaser to Vişeu de Sus (after the long-distance rafting on the Tisa was stopped by the arrival of the railway in Sighet in 1872). Many railways connected with the developing mainline system and these were laid in a stable, permanent way using transverse sleepers that were suitable for locomotives. But some lines were isolated from public railways, like the Găineşti system west of Fălticeni, which nevertheless included an inclined plane (1892) to connect two levels. And in Transylvania some lines were built with wooden rails (and a very narrow gauge of 60cm) for animal traction, for example at Finiş near Belényes (Beiuş). The best conditions were on the Romanian side of the Eastern Carpathians where a mainline railway followed the contact and there were valleys drained by tributaries of the Siret offering easy conditions for construction. Indeed some of the valleys were opened up by public railways: the Bistriţa in 1885—with forest lines from Tarcău in 1899 and Piatra Neamţ (Valea Cuejdiului) after 1908—and the Trotuş in 1899. The Bistriţa was remarkable for the retention of rafting above Piatra Neamţ which gave rise to a number of isolated forest railway feeders at Borca in 1890 and Crucea in 1909. Further north in Austrian territory the Bukowiner Lokalbahn (to Varna and Moldoviţa in 1889; and Putna and Nisipitu in 1898) was the trigger for the Orthodox Church’s estate (‘Religionsfonds’) to expand logging and gradually create a system under its own control which comprised 1,200km of roads and 228km of railways (by 1910) in the Falcău, Frasin, Gura Humorului, Moldoviţa, Nisipitul, Păltinoasa, Putna and Voroneţ areas. On the Transylvanian side where the commercial impulses were stronger, several forest railways were triggered by the arrival of standard-gauge lines, for example the completion of the arc Kronstadt-Csiksereda (Miercurea Ciuc)-Gyergyószentmiklós (Gheorgheni)Szászrégen (Reghin)-Marosvásárhely (Târgu Mureş)-Torda (Turda) in 1909 set off a spate of construction from Subcetate, Marosheviz (Topliţa) and Rastoliţa—one example being the Mures Valley Wood Production Company line which reached the upper Bistricioara Valley from Maroshéviz (Figure 2.8) which highlights the Buzău,

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

100

Figure 2.8 Forest railways in the Eastern Carpathians Kovaszna (Covasna) and Vrancea areas shows the Sepsiszentgyörgy-Kezdivásárhely (Sf.Gheorghe-Târgu Secuiesc) branch of 1891 which provided the base or two lines built simultaneously to the upper Bâsca catchment around Komando (Comandău) at an altitude of 1010m: one from Brateş which required a spiralling track to gain height and another— belonging to Grödel’s Transylvanian Forest Company—from Kovaszna which used an inclined plane at the head of Valea Zânelor. The company cut timber in the Bâsca Mare

Political structures, agriculture and industry

101

Valley and then acquired land in the Bâsca Mică in 1904 (on the Romanian side of the border) which required a railway extension over the watershed at Halom. These new systems superseded an older exploitation which used carts to take timber from a sawmill built in 1878 at Gyula, several kilometres south of Komando. Meanwhile, the Nehoiaşu branch (1911) enabled the Götz empire to push forest railways up the two Bâsca valleys and eventually make contact with the Grödel system based on Komando. The Tişiţa system was built by the Austrian Count Mikes from the main line at Mărăşeşti during 1903–16, but although the system was easy to build along the Şuşiţa to Soveja, it was then necessary to cross the watershed to the Putna Valley and penetrate the narrow Tişiţa Valley which required some tunnelling. It was also notable for the use of a lubricated wooden trough (the ‘goanga’) whereby horses could pull tree trunks down short tributary valleys. Handicrafts and other peasant industries A major compensation for any lack of factory industry was the prominence of handicrafts and domestic/workshop activities of all kinds. These have rarely been surveyed in any detail but they appear to have been prominent everywhere and in some respects—through the logic of service industries and the supply of appropriate goods in areas with enhanced spending power—were more prominent in areas with factory industry than those without. Around Laibach one of the minor facets of industrialisation begun before 1900 was the production of straw hats in Domžale where the water power of the Kamniška Bistrica River was a significant resource. But in remoter areas with a labour surplus and suitable raw materials it was not difficult for local craftsmen to undercut factory-made goods, often working on a casual or seasonal basis to complement the demands of agriculture. The list of activities was often quite substantial, depending on the local materials. Food and drink was provided for each farm but local corn milling was needed and there were often surplus cheese and brandy to be marketed. Domestic wool processing and blanket weaving required the services of water-powered fulling mills. Areas with plenty of timber would be selling wooden utensils and even sawn timber and furniture, while metalworking, lime burning and potting were specialities in areas with appropriate raw materials. Rural industry was assisted by the cooperative movement which is underresearched for Slovakia, although Marluliak (1995) mentions the sack-makers’ union founded in 1868 at Myjava which reflects the importance of wool and weaving in the Carpathians. Production of spirits from potatoes and beets also made for cooperation and the first cooperative distilleries were set up in Dolná Rišňovce and Horná Rišňovce in 1904. Similar arrangements were made for wooden products from Podjavorina and Stara Tura in 1903; and for basket-making at Bardejov and other municipalities in Trenčin County and Považie-Milochov in 1913. Milk production for ‘bryndza’ cottage cheese and other dairy products developed on the same basis, especially in the Zvolen area. Reference should also be made to purchasing cooperatives for tradesmen in towns, for example drapers in Prievidza (1884); tanners in Stará Lubovňa (1906); woodcarvers at Rajec (1909); and furniture-makers in Žilina (1913), though they were mostly short-lived. In the case of Transylvania, Anastasiu (1922) quotes Hungarian statistics for 1910 to show the role of small-scale industry (Figure 2.9). Employment in industry (by

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

102

Figure 2.9 Employment in industry in Banat and Transylvania 1910 county) reached 50,000 or more in most western parts of the province (including the eastern edge of the Pannonian Plain which passed to Romania after 1918) but was clearly much weaker in the east. Agriculture always employed more and, predictably, the margin tended to be greater in the east than the west (although not by a large margin because of the greater intensification and arable bias on the edge of the plain). But it is also clear that small-scale industry, while always less important for employment, maintained a considerable stake in all counties except Caraş-Severin, Cluj and Timiş. Bulgarian rose-oil Statistical coverage of this major speciality suggests an annual output of 1,000–2,000kg during the 1840s–1880s rising to record levels of 3,430kg in the 1900s (which included some very high output years in 1904–7 and 1909, when 4,000kg was exceeded) and 2,740 in the 1910s (Palairet 1999). The oil, which was much sought after by the Western cosmetics industry, was produced by two stages of distillation (in small stills) using Rosa Damascana which found ideal conditions in the ‘Rose Valley’ of Bulgaria between the

Political structures, agriculture and industry

103

Stara Planina and Sredna Gora. The business may have spread from Persia with roses introduced to Bulgaria by the Ottomans. The earliest references come from a French traveller who observed trade at Kazanlik in 1791 when there was export to France. It seems that the business was originally dominated by Turks with distillation by merchants like Papazoglu and Hristov controlling the business. After Bulgaria’s liberation the Turks were displaced through ethnic cleansing and Bulgarians moved in; though they did not have the skills initially and growing ceased in the Koprivshtitsa area by the 1880s. The market shifted from Adrianople to the Kazanlik/Karlovo area of Bulgaria which was visited by traders arriving from Istanbul who re-exported the oil to Europe. However, the Bulgarian peasants were able to do their own distilling using stills of 1101; total numbers seem to have increased from 253). in 1859 to 7,290 in 1892 and 14,500 in 1912. Rising prices forced rose growing to the hillsides, despite lower yields, but also encouraged the search for substitutes and (inside Bulgaria) the adulteration of the oil by palmarosa. This was difficult to control—despite its import being prohibited in 1889—because the ‘congelation’ test could be neutralised by growing more white roses which could allow 5–10% adulteration because of high ‘stearoptene’ richness. Yet Bulgaria enjoyed a monopoly in the late nineteenth century and pressure from buyers over the adulteration problem led to merchant investment in industrial-scale distilling using French technology introduced during 1902–5. The Batsurov firm built a distillery at Kirnare (Karlovo) in 1903, followed by the Hristov, Papazogliu and Papazov families in 1905; although these three new distilleries were responsible for only about 5% of the total output in that year and the business was hardly profitable. This was because the premium for the merchants’ ‘own-distilled’ oil was too small to cover the investment and compensate for a lower yield. Peasants could obtain between a fifth and a third more, partly because they distilled fresher flowers—such was the deterioration in transport that portable stills would have been preferable—while distilling was limited to only one month of the year and capacity then lay idle, although attempts were made to develop other crops such as lavender and mint. Other Bulgarian peasant industry This example of a peasant industry that showed some tendency to achieve a larger scale of activity may be followed up by the case of textiles since SEE shows several attempts in the nineteenth century to use domestic skills on a workshop or small factory scale and develop an organisation capable of servicing orders for clothing from a wider area, including urban customers. For several decades before independence, Bulgaria’s Pomaks were exploiting the wool supply of the Rhodope and other areas with the aid of water power harnessed for fulling. Ottoman support for new factory ventures was very limited although the mills at Sliven (1836) were a focus for the rough woollen cloth (‘aba’) industry which dominated the Sredna Gora and Rhodope. The industry grew out of a workshop started by D.Zheliazkov on the strength of expertise gained in Ekaterinoslav during a brief exile following the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–9. Because supplies of cloth for army uniforms coming from Selanik (Thessaloniki) were inadequate and because the Sliven administrator (‘voyvoda’) was the person entrusted with the supply of aba for military needs, official financial support was given for what was the first true factory in the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

104

Another rare initiative concerns the Gumusgerdan family who built a woollen mill in the village of Dermendere in 1848: there was water power, a putting-out organisation to support domestic weavers and (as the centre of a ‘chiftlik’) a guild—which was an obligatory form of organisation for commodity producers and even for new capitalist ventures. Spinning machines were imported from the UK while weaving was carried out in domestic workshops. Karlovo had an important braid (‘gaitan’) industry using foot-powered looms introduced into domestic workshops early in the century (although no large-scale factory industry ever emerged); and Koprivshtitsa made progress in building a clothing industry based on aba brought in from Pazardzhik. There was also a clothing industry in 1848 in Plovdiv—already producing coarse cloth for Istanbul. Most small factories were undermined by a flood of cheap manufactures during the 1870s and 1880s; yet one ‘gaitan’ artisan in Gabrovo—I.Kalpazanov—opened Bulgaria’s first mechanised textile factory in 1882 by investing profits from lucrative wartime trading in machinery. So by independence there was some textile production in partly modernised factories. ‘With women’s wages less than 40% of the male average, Bulgarian textiles thus made connections with the cheap supply of rural labour that largely eluded manufacturers in Balkan capitals’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 246); yet exports faced an 8% Ottoman tariff until independence and there was competition from artisans and from Austrian and British imports. Indeed Sofia preferred to import its textiles and only in 1906 did a Bulgarian entrepreneur and Czech technician open a small woollen factory to compete with imported Central European goods. There was little advance in installed power or fixed capital per worker in this branch over the two decades before 1914 (ibid.). Cotton cloth made some advances, although the slow spread of cotton cultivation prevented any significant backward linkage into agriculture. Meanwhile, the demise of the urban craftsmen was particularly rapid after independence because the Ottoman market was lost; not to mention the emigration of the conservative Turkish population.

3 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT, TOURISM AND ENERGY TRANSPORT Navigation The idea of freedom of navigation on the major rivers—with the easing of tolls and restrictions—gained ground as a result of the Congress of Vienna, and new arrangements, including the reduction of tolls, were eventually made for the Danube in 1856 and the Elbe in 1863. Internationalisation of Elbe was of the greatest importance for the Habsburg Empire and shipping companies were founded in the 1820s. Sachsische Dampfschiffahtsgesellschaft linked Bohemia and Saxony in 1826, and 1841 saw both domestic services between Prague and Mĕlník and international services to Dresden. A chain-drive ship was tested in 1866 and in 1886 the ‘Kette Deutsche Elbeschiffahtsgesellschaft’ (owned by German and Habsburg interests) proved highly competitive with its 740km of chain from Mélník to Hamburg. However, the railway challenge produced a grouping in 1903—Vereinigte Elbeschiffahrtsgesellschaft, with headquarters in Dresden—and finally in 1907 a union of private shipping interests was established; although this monopoly was then challenged by two new companies there was a measure of cooperation between them. Meanwhile, river improvements affected the Oder in Silesia (1848–58) while new canals around Berlin modernised both routes to the Oder and culminated in the Berlin-Stettin Ship Canal of 1914. Although the Vistula was used for navigation with regular passenger sailings from 1852 (Wocławek was reported a steamship port in 1853), there were no improvements in Russian territory. But although the Habsburg and Russian empires failed to cooperate over the basin as a whole, the former implemented river regulation and drainage in Sandomierz, affecting tributaries like the San (where work began in 1907) and the Wisłoka (where work went on over sixty years). The gradient between the Wisłoka and San mouths declined during 1857–87, while stream density decreased and the width of the main rivers was reduced (the San had been 800m wide), though depth increased by up to 3m, banks were consolidated and meanders cut off. Swampland disappeared as ground water level fell from just beneath the surface by 2–4m, which affected the forests as well as large swamps and peat bogs near Nisko and Rudnik. In the case of the Oder catchment in present-day Poland statistics produced by Bielecka and Ciołisz (2002) on the land-use changes from the nineteenth century through to 1992 show a sharp decline in the area of marshland and surface water (1,140 to 830 sq.km)—as well as agricultural land (41,230 to 35,390)—to allow for the expansion of forests (17,660 to 20,770) and settlements (2,740 to 5,770).

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

106

The Danube The greatest progress was made on the Danube in the 1830s with the introduction of steamers which could make relatively easy progress upstream against the strong current. Expansion of shipping took place through the leading companies such as Erste Donau Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft (DDSG) while from a base at Sisak, the Sava-Kupa Steamship Company (‘Savsko-Kupsko Parabrodsko Dionicarsko Drustvo’) started to handle freight and passengers to Zemun in 1844 when there was still a Turkish garrison in the Belgrade fortress. Other substantial ports were at Šamac and Županija on the Sava and Vukovar on the Danube. The Ottomans accepted through-shipping from Pannonia, but problems remained through watermills as well as the ‘boat bridges’ linking Buda and Pest and the need for lightering at the Iron Gates where the Romans had previously found it necessary to build a towpath and where a new road was now provided by Count Széchenyi between Baziaş, Újmoldova (Moldova) and Orşova during 1834–7. Only after the Congress of Berlin were taxes authorised to finance a programme of six new works, the most important of which involved blasting out a 4.5km canal for 700-tonne barges to bypass the most difficult section. It was completed in 1895 but since there were no locks and upstream traffic still had to contend with the strong currents, towing was provided by a winch steamer, replaced after Allied seizure during the First World War by a locomotive running on an isolated section of railway built along the canal bank. With more powerful conventional steamers coming into service this system remained adequate until the Iron Gates hydropower and navigation complex provided a permanent solution in the communist period. A winch steamer also operated at Szvinica (Sviniţa). Short canals were built to Sarviz in 1840 (following the Temesvár drainage canal dated around 1710) while a Danube-Tisza Canal through Sombor in 1803 threw off a branch (named after Franz Josef) to Novi Sad in 1875. And, although the purpose was flood control and not specifically navigation, this is an appropriate point to mention the major works carried out during 1846–96 to shorten the course of the Tisza: Somogyi (1979) reports that from a starting point at Tokaj, the plan by the hydaulic engineer P.Vásárhelyi involved 114 separate cuts totalling 136km which replaced 589km of meandering river: a saving which reduced the river length in the regulated section from 1,211 to 758km. Meanwhile, 266 new cuts (212km) replaced 791km of meanders on the Körös/Criş rivers while 68 cut-offs on the Drava (75km) replaced 243km of winding river channels. On the Lower Danube shipping was frustrated by the Russians because after the Ottomans conceded navigation rights in the Black Sea (1744) they gained a stranglehold over the rivermouth by advancing their frontier from the Chilia Channel at the northern edge of the delta in 1812 (when the Porte ceded the territory between the Dniester and Prut, known as Bessarabia), to Sulina in 1817 and to the southernmost Sf. Gheorghe Channel in 1829—the latter sanctioned by the Treaty of Adrianople (and accepted by the Habsburg Empire in 1840) which also conferred the right to operate a quarantine station at Sulina as a Danube ‘cordon’ against plague from Bulgaria. Perversely, it seemed, Russia took few precautions at Odessa but was most diligent at placing agents at all quarantine stations in the principalities to maximise obstruction through the ‘the practice of the utmost rigour, as if the plague were actually on board every ship that arrives’ (Skene 1854 p. 367). Extreme inconvenience seemed calculated to frustrate any growth of commerce that might threaten Odessa, for only ‘protection money’ paid at the Russian Embassy in London was guaranteed to simplify the formalities. Meanwhile, traditional

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

107

techniques were neglected while Russia lacked the resources to improve the river and cut through the notorious offshore bar that required the use of Greek lighters. The system was abused by dishonesty and also disrupted by gales: on one December night in 1855 24 sailing ships and 60 lighters were forced ashore with losses of both life and cargo. A British engineer did not exaggerate when he described the area as ‘a wild open seaboard strewn with wrecks, the hulls and masts of which—sticking out of the submerged sandbanks—gave the mariners the only guide where the deepest channel was to be found’ (Hartley 1873 p. 239). The Habsburg Steam Navigation Company tried to avoid Sulina by trans-shipment from Chernevodo (Cernavodă) to Kustendje (Constanţa) but the latter’s harbour was not adequate. A portage railway opened in 1860 (and an alterative route from Silistra to Varna in 1866) did not provide an adequate solution. There was talk of an alternative quarantine system at the mouth of the Sf. Gheorghe Channel but a Turkish settlement would have been needed and the approach was difficult due to mudbanks. The Crimean War removed the stranglehold, for the Russian frontier was pushed back well clear of the delta when the settlements of Cahul, Cetatea Alba, Chilia, Ismail and Reni were returned to the principality of Moldavia. And when this decision was reversed in 1878 (in Russia’s favour) the frontier advanced no further than the Chilia Channel (to which it returned in the Soviet period). International jurisdiction over the Danube was generally desired—following the Crimean War—but a commission of riparian states would have meant Habsburg dominance so a European commission (representing the great powers and Romania) was preferred. It was originally formed in 1856 to clear the river of debris but an initial twoyear lifespan was progressively extended and eventually perpetuated for an indefinite period (1883) to ensure a major force for stability in the Balkans—although ‘the existence of an autonomous agency on Romanian soil was an affront to Romanian nationalism’ (Frucht 2000 p. 215). It became clear that major works were needed and that one of the three main channels would have to be selected for improvement. But while the southernmost Sf. Gheorghe Channel offered the shortest journey to the Dardanelles Straits, there was little settlement there at the time and provisional work carried out at Sulina (preferred by shipping in general at the time) seems to have been the determining factor. Canalisation of the channel (undertaken in 1858–61 and consolidated in 1878–81) was remarkably successful in providing a deeper channel over the bar and set in train a series of projects which progressively straightened the whole Sulina River (1868–1902) and shortened it from 84 to 63km. While the total investment was probably greater than the cost of improving the Sf. Gheorghe Channel (where the meanders were straightened out only during the communist period, but with no intention of creating a major ship canal) it was undertaken gradually and could be financed from toll revenue. Meanwhile, the territorial adjustments of 1878 were initially much resented by Romania because not only were her territorial interests being managed by the great powers but she was ‘compensated’ for the loss of the relatively urbanised southern Bessarabia territory (the counties of Cahul, Cetatea Alba and Ismail) with the backward Turkish province of Dobrogea which offered some 250km of Black Sea coastline. However, the Romanians made a virtue out of necessity and converted the old Kustendje into the modern port of Constanţa. Rail access from Bucharest was secured by the extension of the existing Constanţa-Cernavodă line across the Danube (by means of the Carol I Bridge designed by the Romanian Anghel Saligny and finished in 1895) to Feteşti

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

108

and the continuation of the railway across the heart of the Bărăgan to the Romanian capital. Other railways subsequently radiated from Feteşti to Buzău (with a branch from Faurei to Brăila and Galaţi) and Ploieşti. These railways (along with the pipelines which were eventually laid alongside the track) carried the bulk of Romania’s export staples: cereals, timber and oil. Constanţa offered a greater depth of water than the 7.3m available (by dredging) to Brăila and the combined land-sea route to the Straits was much more direct than the circuitous Danube waterway (even allowing for the straightening of the Sulina Channel). It is certain that additional interest arose from the desire for a trade route entirely under Romanian control, given the understandable ambivalence felt towards the European Danube Commission over the compromise of national sovereignty. Canal systems There were economic and strategic interests in considering the linkage of the region’s major rivers by canals, after connections between the Elbe, Oder and Vistula by the Plauer/Finow and Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) canals had been made by Prussia during 1743– 85. Further east, Russia’s Augustów Canal (1830) connected the Vistula Basin through the Narew with the Niemen—to divert Polish commerce from Danzig to Libau in Latvia—and the Bug-Pripet link followed in 1841. Elbe-Oder connections were improved by the Ihle Canal from the Elbe to the Plauer Canal 1866–71 and in order to link the Danube and Rhine-Main, Ludwigs Canal 1836–45 extended from Bamberg on the Main to Dietfurt on the Altmühl close to the Danube at Kelheim, although despite 100 locks it was narrow and shallow with capacity limited to 130-tonne vessels. The united Reich of 1871 then fixed minds on the need for bulk transport where railways couldn’t cope. From 1871 to 1905 developments included canalisation of the Saale from the Elbe confluence to Halle and the Unstrut (Halle-Breteben) during 1882–90; the upper Netze (Notec) 1879–82; and the lower Netze (1891–6). A new harbour was built on the Elbe in Dresden in 1891–3 and the Kaiserfahrt was put in hand during the 1890s (completed in 1900) from Swinemünde (Świnoujście) to Stettin. Work in the Berlin area got under way on the Havel from the Elbe to Spandau (1875– 82) while the Havel-Oder Canal (Spandau-Hohensaathen) via the Finow Canal was improved during 1874–85 (Figure 3.1). The Oder-Spree Canal from Fürstenberg was reconstructed during 1887–97 and extended by the Teltow Canal (Potsdam-Köpenick) of 1901–6 to allow 600-tonne boats to bypass Berlin. It was now easier to reach Hamburg and some trade switched from Stettin. Work on the upper Oder extended from the Neisse mouth to Cosel—including the canalised Alte Oder to bypass Breslau (1891–7)—leading to a big growth in coal traffic through the harbour of Cosel with three docks constructed in 1895–1907. In East Prussia there was access into the hinterland of Elbing for the Elbing River was navigable by small vessels to Drausen See (Drużno Lake) and thence by the Oberländischer Canal to Liebemühl (Miłomłyn) where the Deutsch-Eylau (Iława) and Osteroda (Ostróda) routes divided. Full use was made of the lakes: Roethlot See (J.Ruda Woda) to reach Liebemuhle and then Geserich See (J.Jesiorak) gave access to Deutsch-Eylau while Ostroda was reached by way of Drewenz See (J.Drwęckie). The canal even continued further northeast to Schilling See (J.Szęlag Wlk.) possibly in order to transport timber from the extensive forests of the area. The canal took sixteen years to complete (1844–60) using Dutch engineers and was unusual for the series of inclined

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

109

planes (on which boats were carried in cradles, with cable haulage powered by watermills)—rather than locks—to climb from Drausen See to the lake plateau at Małdyty. It offered summer cruises between Elbing and Osteroda (a tradition which is still alive). The Königsberg (Kaliningrad) Sea Canal was completed in 1901 to Pillau (Baltijsk) and the Pregel above Königsberg was navigable by small craft as far as Tapiau (Gwardiejsk) and by small boats to Insterburg (Chernyakovsk). At Tapiau a short cut was made to reach the Deime (Diejma)—a minor river flowing into Kurisches Haff (Zalew Wiślany)—with a minimum depth of 1.2m and often used by small coasters in ballast going to Memel (Klaipeda) for cargoes. Then an alternative route was made between Königsberg, Tilsit and Memel by linking rivers flowing into Kurisches Haff with short canals. From Labian near the mouth of the Deime small craft could proceed by the Grosse Friedrichs Graben and Seckenburger canals into the Gilge and so to Tilsit; from this town vessels went down the Russ into Kurisches Haff and finally into the Memel River at Schmelz where the König Wilhelm Canal of 1863–73 gave access to the town. Königsberg was boosted by the Russo-German Commercial Treaty of 1894 whereby Russia accorded the same railway tariffs to German Baltic ports as her own and Königsberg traffic increased three times to 1913 through Russian imports and exports (only to fall off sharply after 1919). The Prussian Waterway Law of 1905 was a milestone in the process of boosting capacity. There was a focus on the Ruhr-Elbe project previously rejected in 1883,

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

110

Figure 3.1 Waterways in the northern part of the region. Note that the map includes some canal projects and water-supply arrangements relating a later period 1893, 1899 and 1901 through opposition from Silesia (fearing the erosion of its market for coal) and also from lignite interests in Hannover and Prussian Saxony. However, the

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

111

project went ahead as far as Hannover in 1905 (balanced by money for further Oder improvement and the extension to Cosel harbour) but tolls were again levied so that coal carried on this new ‘Mittelland Canal’ would not be so competitive. The 1905 act also provided for the Berlin-Stettin Ship Canal—completed in 1914, with new harbours during 1917–19, and involving the Berlin-Spandau Canal, the Havel River, the Hohenzollern Canal (Havel-Oder)—duplicating much of the route of the old Finow Canal to the Oder at Oderberg (with a new Niederfinow lift at the entrance to the river); and the lower Oder. As part of a carefully balanced plan, Oder-Vistula links were to be improved and in 1908 the Masurian Ship Canal was authorised to connect Königsberg’s head of navigation at Królewiec with Mamry in the Masurian lake country (earlier work had connected Kisajno with Niegocin in 1765–72 and Sniardwy with Pisa in 1849): work started in 1911 and was to require ten locks to cope with a difference in altitude of 111m. But the project was interrupted by the First World War and resumed only in 1934, although it remained incomplete notwithstanding Hitler’s plan for strategic industries in the lake country during the Second World War. Elsewhere in the region the need for canals was less clear cut, so railways (which provide a more equitable transport network) tended to block waterway improvements. In the Habsburg Empire, where the Danube provided a direct outlet to the sea in the south, the problem was one of forging connections northwards to the Elbe and Oder basins so that manufactures from the Czech lands and coal from Silesia could be obtained more cheaply. Abortive initiatives culminated in the Black Sea-Baltic Sea proposal of 1901: a Danube-Oder canal along the March (Morava) Valley would throw off links to the Elbe and Vistula and a second canal from the Danube at Linz would join the Moldau near Budweis (České Budĕjovice) while the Moldau itself would be canalised to Prague to join the Elbe (Labe) navigation. This inspired a political initiative by Premier Von Körber to bring the nations of the empire together through public works, but these were not financially viable and improvement of the empire’s links with Baltic and North Sea ports threatened the new ‘Tauernbahn’ which aimed at improving Bohemia’s links with the Adriatic port of Trieste. Nevertheless, this Danube-Oder canal from Pressburg (Bratislava) to Kosel (Koźle) was sanctioned in law in 1901 and plans were drawn up in 1910, although they were never implemented. Other abortive projects included canalisation of the Vistula at Cracow (Kraków), a link with the Dniester and canals to the ports of Fiume, Trieste and Selanik (Thessaloniki): the latter involving a long canal from the Danube through the Morava-Vardar Corridor. Roads The greatest efforts were made in Germany when moves towards integration during 1815–71—under the Germanic Confederation (1815–66), the North German Confederation (1866–71) and the Zollverein (from 1834)—focused much attention on the road network. Soon after the Napoleonic Wars Prussia improved the road from Berlin to the Rhineland, and also built roads to improve north-south links through the Thuringian principalities of Gotha and Meiningen; to link Magdeburg to both Bamberg and Hamburg (partly to provide ‘free roads’ between the Prussia-Hesse-Darmstadt Customs Union and that of Bavaria-Württemberg). Meanwhile, Saxony had a motive for improving roads when she joined her neighbours in setting up a rival Middle German Commercial Union

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

112

to prevent Prussia controlling the commercial routes from Hamburg to Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig. But plans to improve these links—and also Leipzig-Frankfurt—did not materialise and after the formation of the Zollverein the roads built in the era of struggle were somewhat marginalised in favour of traditional routes. Meanwhile, most roads were narrow with sharp bends and steep gradients, with a surface that was rough and dusty in summer and muddy in winter. Journeys were slow and dangerous—for example, forty hours from Berlin to Breslau (O’Dell and Morgan 1945 p. 444)—despite Prussia’s concern to improve transport to the eastern borders. Some industrialists in Upper Silesia had to cooperate over provision of better roads to minimise the closure of furnaces (reported at Halemba) when coal and iron could not get through. There were other improvements in the middle of the nineteenth century when road and railway building went together. The capital cost came from public funds (in contrast to the British turnpike system) while maintenance was financed from toll revenue until these charges were phased out during the last third of the century (though not until 1915 in Mecklenburg Strelitz). Passengers were largely catered for by the post office and coach passengers doubled between 1840 and 1855, with decline setting in only after German unification (1873). However, in the railway age the average passenger journey and freight haul by road was indicative of an essentially feeder role. The Habsburg priority was for a Budapest-Vienna road—with links with Fiume and Trieste, respectively—and connections between major provincial towns. Otherwise good roads were rare: for example, Spalato (Split) to Sinj and Trogir (Dalmatia) which was mentioned in 1815. There was some development in the interior for trade, though local people would travel on foot or on horseback while shipping served the coastal areas. Some improvement came with the post coach (‘diligence’) while much use was made by local contractors of sprung ‘tabletop’ wagons (‘fuvaroskocsi’) on the better roads in Hungary: a big improvement on the basic cart or ‘szeker’. Meanwhile, the emerging Balkan nations were driven by strategic concerns, especially in the light of sluggish railway growth. The growth of a bureaucracy in Serbia needed tax revenue which in turn stimulated trade and the need for secure travel. Significant improvements to the primitive road system did not come until 1845, but conditions remained poor on the borders of Montenegro and Serbia with the Ottoman Empire given the absence of compelling economic potential, while the Italian economic and geopolitical thrust had relatively localised objectives. So there was business for the horse caravans operating from railheads like Mitrovica and Uvac, distributing imports from Selanik and Trieste respectively, and stimulating a limited amount of local trade as agricultural products (cattle, cheese, honey, skins and wool), timber and wax were exchanged for cereals, coffee, salt, sugar and tobacco. But the alignment of the few railways that did penetrate the ‘Dinaric Triangle’ was of course unfavourable to ports like Dubrovnik, Durrës and Vlorë, while roads that were modernised to handle wheeled traffic, and help compensate for the lack of railways, tended to be determined by administrative and strategic considerations. Thus in Montenegro, Cetinje, Nikšič and Podgorica were connected with the coast at Antivari (Bar) and Cattaro, while in the Ottoman Empire Shkodër had its link with the coast at San Giovanni di Medua, while Monastir (Bitola) and Yanya were oriented towards Santi Quaranta (Sarandë). Meanwhile, the Via Egnatia from Durrës and Monastir remained in a poor condition. In Bulgaria the Turkish military road from Khaskovo south to Komotini was improved after

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

113

the Balkan Wars and there were important road links from Sofia to the Aegean via the Struma Valley and with Uskub via Kustendil and Kumanovo (also a potential railway route from the Danube to Selanik, but one the Turks were reluctant to support for fear of Bulgarian expansion into Macedonia). The infrastructure in these areas remote from railways seems to have been particularly poor in terms of public health and living conditions generally, although the poverty of the high karst and the malarial swamps of the Albanian coast may have discouraged investment in railways as a force for modernisation among the outposts of the Balkan periphery. Railways Germany It was the railway that really made the difference: allowing for the easier assembly of raw materials and the wider distribution of manufactures; while easing barriers to export. The first lines in Germany were industrial feeders (recorded in the Harz Mountains and Upper Silesia) but in 1833 the economist F.List proposed a system of radial routes from Berlin to Stettin, Danzig, Breslau, Prague, München/Lindau, Basel/Paris, Köln/Antwerp and Hamburg/Lübeck. Curiously, however, the Prague line was to reach Dresden via Leipzig which would also have a direct link with Magdeburg. This reflected the importance of the Elbe axis which lay at the core of the Saxon state. But the programme was too radical for immediate fulfilment and developments took place piecemeal, beginning with the Leipzig-Dresden line of 1839. Lacking a satisfactory navigation, Leipzig sought a link with the Elbe at Dresden: not the nearest port on that river but one that lay in the same state of Saxony; though the line first reached the Elbe at Alten and then crossed the lowland via Reisa (instead of Meissen and the Mulde), requiring the Machern Cutting and Oberau Tunnel (500m). It was only ten years later that the much shorter link was made to the Elbe at Magdeburg. Chemnitz was linked with Elbe at Riesa in 1852, the Zwickau coalfield (1858) and the Erzgebirge valleys. Meanwhile, another visionary developer, C.J.Meyer, tried to develop local networks to generate centrality: his interest lay in the Thuringian towns of Eisenach, Gotha and Weimar (and the minerals in their hinterlands) which he tried to place at the centre of a German railway system. But plainly every town cannot be a railway hub and although Meyer founded Deutsche EisenbahnschienenCompagnie and built a rolling mill complex at Neuhaus near the Sonneberg furnaces during 1845–7 his plan was outflanked by the Hamburg-Munich and Prussian east-west concepts. Berlin, Magdeburg, Dessau and Dresden (also Braunschweig) were all linked by 1845. The following year saw Berlin connected with Bremen and Hamburg—and with Breslau via Frankfurt a.d.Oder—extended two years later to the Habsburg frontier at Oderberg (Bohumin) to meet the line from Vienna, while in 1851 another route was open between Berlin and Vienna via Dresden, Prague and Brünn. Meanwhile, the Ruhr had been reached via Oschersleben, Braunschweig, Hannover and Minden in 1847 and a major route to Plauen via Leipzig opened in 1851, including the famous Göltzschtal Viaduct (576m long and 73m high) built at Reichenbach im Vogtland from 1846 as three viaducts—with brick and granite arches—on top of each other. By 1853 there was a connection to the northeastern frontier at Königsberg, apart from the Vistula bridge—of some 500m—at Dirschau (Tczew) which was not ready for another four years: one of

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

114

several major mid-century bridges including the Bober at Bunzlau (420m) and the Neisse at Görlitz (472m) in 1844–6; to be followed by the Mulde at Göhren (425m) in 1870–1 and the Elbe at Riesa (350m) in 1877–8. The Prussian Östbahn had an important strategic role and its construction raised eyebrows in the liberal West where commercial considerations were respected over military and political interests. Later developments included links with the Baltic ports: Stralsund via Neubrandenburg in 1878 and RostockWarnemünde via Neustrelitz in 1886—the latter financed by the Norddeutscher-Lloyd Shipping Company to encourage use of its steamers to Denmark (Figure 3.2). Until German unification was achieved, the political clout of German states could influence the route of railways and the Berlin-Hamburg railway was forced to deviate northwards beyond Wittenberge in order to meet Mecklenburg’s insistence for a convenient junction for a line to the state capital of Schwerin whereas the best route would have been along the Elbe Valley: it could not use the Hannover side of the river because of that state’s insistence on the terminus being built in Harburg on the opposite side of the river from the ‘Freistadt’ of Hamburg. It was to avoid Hannover’s territory that the route to the west through Minden (already mentioned) was duplicated in 1853 by taking a longer path through Erfurt, Kassel and Altenbecken to Paderborn—somewhat shortened with the cooperation of Braunschweig by using the latter’s detached territory of Kriensen to reach Altenbecken. After unification separate state railway companies continued to exist until 1920 (whereupon it was possible to realise Bismarck’s dream of a fully united railway administration with the formation of Deutsche Reichsbahn) and so Berlin-Köln trains continued use of the Kriensen-Altenbecken route even though it was longer and slower than the Hannover alternative. And the legacy of rivalry between Prussia and Saxony lived on through the decision to improve sections of the Berlin-HalleSaalfeld-Nurnberg route and switch traffic from the Saxon route via Leipzig, Vogtland and Hof. The latter was, in turn, part of ‘the progressive building programme of the Saxon government which hoped to benefit by the geographical situation of its state at the eastern extremity of Bohemia and was therefore well placed to profit from the route way joining south Germany to Silesia and the northeast which lay through its territory’ (O’Dell and Morgan 1945 p. 207). Finally, the successful use of railways in the war with the Habsburg Empire in 1866—often referred to as the ‘Eisenbahnkrieg’—helped to ensure that a united Germany would contemplate railways for strategic reasons. The military pressed for a purely military railway from central Germany to the Rhine that would be part of a so-

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

115

Figure 3.2 Railways in Germany and Poland to 1900 called ‘Kanonenstrasse’ connecting the eastern and western frontiers: this involved some new construction from Blankenheim on the flanks of the Harz Mountains to the Lahn Valley and required a purely military railway for training purposes, developed close to the Berlin-Dresden main line between Schöneberg, Zossen and Jüterbog during 1875–97. Strategic considerations made national coordination more important than avoidance of monopoly and although a single German company was not achieved until 1920 Prussia’s railways were nationalised during 1876–86 and amalgamations with the Braunschweig and Hesse systems took place in 1885 and 1896, respectively. The growth of the German economy required the doubling and even quadrupling of track and also justified construction of cut-offs to shorten the distance to places on the radial routes from Berlin: hence the direct line to Dresden via Elsterwerda in 1875 and the link with Sühl across the Thuringian Forest via the 3km Brandleite tunnel under Thuringerwald. Königsberg trains were re-routed first from Stettin to Frankfurt a.d.Oder and Küstrin (Kostrzyn) in 1857 when major bridges over the Vistula and Nogat between Dirschau and Marienburg were completed; then to Küstrin direct in 1867 before the detour via Bromberg was avoided by a cut-off through Schneidemühl (Piła) and Dirschau in 1873—the same year that another huge cut-off enabled trains for the Russian frontier

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

116

at Eydtkuhnen to proceed directly from Bromberg and Thorn to Insterburg and avoid Königsberg which lay on the first route to Eydtkuhnen opened in 1861. Electrification was pioneered by W.von Siemens who produced a locomotive in 1879 for the Berlin Exhibition. Siemens and AEG used a test track at Zossen-Marienfelde in 1903 while the Prussian State Railway also carried out tests between Dessau and Bitterfeld before 1914. However, conversion occurred on a significant scale only after the First World War. Accelerated construction of branch lines (‘Nebenbahnen’) was a great help to agricultural areas and progress was accelerated by legalisation allowing unguarded level crossings in 1878 where the maximum speed was 30km/h (15km/h for important crossings). Other concessions included the absence of fencing and signalling and the need for only one track inspection daily (previously three). Reference may also be made to two rather unusual local railways. The Thüringerwald line from Ilmenau to Schleusingen comprised 30km of standard-gauge adhesion railway (with a maximum gradient of 1 in 40) and five rack sections (6.2km in all—ultimately converted for conventional working) with a maximum gradient of 1 in 17. The slow progress in crossing the mountains by this route precipitated the straighter low-level route through the Brandleite Tunnel. The Prussian Harz Railway opened in 1885 between Blankenburg and Tanne—running across two ridges with ten rack sections of 0.3–1.6km and a maximum gradient 1 in 17. It climbed from Halberstadt to Blankenburg (106m), Hüttenrode (477m) and Rübeland (384m) to the highest point at 503m, thence to Rottenhütte at 431m and Tanne at 460m, using tank locomotives that could work at 25km/h on the adhesion sections and 12km/h on the rack. A hydropower scheme eventually flooded the upper section (beyond Königshütte) while sufficient conventional locomotive power was available to dispense with the rack in 1926. Electrification in the interest of the heavy mineral traffic followed in the GDR era. Saxony gave strong encouragement of narrow-gauge branches to reduce costs even further: starting with Kirchberg-Wilkau, twenty-three systems were built during 1881–98 (with expansion until 1921) and made an important contribution, especially to the industries of the Erzgebirge valleys. Altogether, 541km of Germany’s 919km of narrow gauge (in 1940) were in Saxony. Particularly extensive narrow-gauge systems in Germany included the metre-gauge Harz system connecting Gernrode, Nordhausen and Wernigerode (1886–97), while lowland examples include the 225 route kilometres comprising the 600mm Mecklenburgishe Pommersche Schmalspurbahn based at Anklam. Mention should also be made of urban railways such as the Berlin Ringbahn (1867– 77), divided into north and south semicircles by the Stadtbahn (1874–82) serving Charlottenburg-Schlesischer Bahnhof, with junctions at Stralau-Rummelsburg in the east and Halensee and Westend in the west. This inner-city system meshed with a new generation of mainline stations like the Anhalter Bahnhof of 1880. As in Budapest and Bucharest, separate terminal stations persisted, in contrast to Prague (where the main through station opened in 1906 superseded the older terminus breaching the eastern walls in 1845) and Belgrade. While surface railways were extremely disruptive the option of using electrification for elevated or underground lines was highly contoversial despite a certain degree of credibility deriving from the 1893 Chicago World Fair. The Siemens Hochbahngesellschaft of the 1880s was held up by concern over noise and the devaluation of properties until 1897. Meanwhile, the U-Bahn proposed by AEG in the 1890s faced outright rejection until people were eventually convinced by engineering

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

117

solutions. It was finally on the basis of a mixture of elevated and underground railways that the 10.1km line from Warschauer-Brucke to Zoologischer Garten with a branch to Potsdamer Platz was finished 1902, providing enhanced mobility needed to access cheaper suburban housing. And it should not be overlooked that privately owned industrial railways played a crucial role within large mining and heavy industrial enterprises. Many of these systems used narrow-gauge (as has been noted for the Carpathian forestry lines). In the case of the Mansfeld copperfield over 100km of narrowgauge railway replaced the cableways that had previously connected the mines with the smelters: first from Ernst mine near Helbra to Kochhütte in 1871 and subsequently from the Hermann, Martin and Otto mines to Kraghütte by 1904. Other examples concern the Hungarian heavy industrial complexes of Miskolc and Resicza in the 1870s and Vajdahunyad in 1900. In the case of Upper Silesia over 150 mines and metallurgical/engineering works were connnected by 158km of narrow-gauge industrial railways developed from 1857 by the privately owned Oberschlesische EisenbahnGesellschaft. Habsburg Empire Some early railways were built as accessories to navigations. The first to be opened connected the Labe at Prague with the Kladno-Krĭvoklát resource area: this was the Prague-Lány horse railway of 1830. More ambitious was the 120km Budweis-Linzer Pferdebahn to connect the Danube and Elbe basins (Freudenberger 1997). It was conceived by F.A.von Gerstner who wrote ‘Über die Vortheile der Anlage einer Eisenbahn zwischen der Moldau und Donau’ (Vienna 1824). Like his father, he sought to link science and technology with economic development and had considerable drive as a young professor at Vienna Polytechnic. The dream of linking the two river systems (and more generally connecting the North Sea and Baltic with the Adriatic and Black Sea) was of particular interest in Bohemia in getting the production of the estates into Austria and it had given rise to canal projects (most recently in 1807 by Böhmisch Hydrotechnische Privetgesellschaft). Von Gerstner’s concept was supported by the Elbe riparian states meeting at Dresden in 1819 and the following year he was authorised to undertake a feasibility survey by the imperial commerce commission (though the greatest enthusiasm always came from Bohemian landowners with whom the family enjoyed close relations). He demonstrated that a canal would be very difficult—requiring a minimum of 234 locks—and would hardly be profitable when the much more straightforward Canal du Midi (in France) was only barely viable. But some thought a railway unreliable (and still did even when the line opened in 1833) and when the concession was allowed in 1824 the bureaucratic agencies in Vienna were still hankering after a Trieste-Vienna-Elbe canal (incorporating the Wiener Neustadt Canal), though it created a conflict with local Bohemian interests seeking a direct link with Upper Austria. The cost was estimated at a million gulden (i.e. 40,000 per Austrian mile, which was comparable with the costs of road building). A major factor seems to have been the lack of money in the state treasury to finance a canal whereas (illogically) a railway was seen as being within the capacities of private capital. But while the shareholders were happy for Von Gerstner to begin work on a line that could be used by locomotives (and on the most difficult section in order to demonstrate the technology) they dismissed him in 1829 and the work was completed in

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

118

1833 by M.Schönerer as a purely horse railway (reconstructed in 1854)—while Von Gerstner went on to build the first railway in Prussia. It is not clear how profitable the line was: it certainly carried passengers, salt and general merchandise and caused some initial disquiet among local traders, but the project also had trouble over land acquisition, shoddy work and fraudulent contractors. And it cost double the estimate, which was much more than the Viennese banks had agreed to. It was converted for locomotive use by 1860. Progress towards an integrated system in the Habsburg Empire came quite early through the Nordbahn which was an important interest for the Rothschild bank—already associated with the Witkowitz ironworks which produced the rails. The Vienna-Brünn line of 1838 provided a launchpad for extension through Moravia to join the German and Russian networks through Bohumin in 1848, although the aim was also to reach the saltmining area of Bochnia and throw off branches en route to Olmütz (Olomouc) and Troppau (Opava) as well as Brünn. The Olmütz branch of 1841 was then extended to Prague in 1845 and met the railways of Saxony at Tetschen (Dĕčín) in 1851. The Südbahn was opened to Trieste in 1850 by way of Marburg (Maribor) and Laibach; towns that soon afterwards gained connections respectively with Budapest (1860) and Zagreb (1862). Indeed construction was quite brisk until the stock market crash of 1873 by which time virtually all the main towns of the empire had been reached. At this point the state tended to take over from the banks as the main driving force, given the perceived strategic importance of railways and—especially from the Habsburg perspective—their value in appeasing national groups. The Berlin-Vienna link assumed great importance in view of the close economic and political ties between the two states. The original route via Bohumin (1849) was 779km long and a substantial reduction to 683km was achieved by a direct line to Dresden via Elsterwerda (1875) and thence via Tetschen, Kolín and Iglau. Other options were provided by the routes through Prague and Brünn (1851) and via Gorlitz, Reichenberg and Jungbunzlau (1872). Most lines in Bohemia were entirely conventional, but the rack system was used on the steepest sections of the Reichenberg-Gablonz-Tannvald (Tanvald) system in Bohemia (1894). F.Krisik was associated with a pioneer electrification project over 26km at Tabor in 1903. Hungary The first railway in Hungary parallelled the Danube between Budapest and Vác in 1846 while the Crimean War placed a premium on securing coal for Danube steamers which resulted in the horse railway from the port of Baziaş to Oravicza and the mines of Steierdorf in 1856 which was converted for locomotive working throughout in 1863; a Vienna-Baziaş boat train then connected with Danube steamers that offered an Istanbul service via the Cernavodă-Constanfa Railway and the Black Sea ferry. Expansion in Hungary was particularly rapid and the radial system around Budapest was a significant factor in the city’s explosive growth. Following the line to Vác (1846), the radial lines opened in 1847 to Sopron and Szolnok, in 1850 to Vienna via Pozsony (Bratislava) and Garnserndorf—with the Marchegg cut-off in 1870—in 1854 to Szeged and 1855 to Győr. An all-Hungarian route to the Adriatic started immediately after 1867 and opened to Fiume in 1873 in the mode of the earlier Südbahn to Trieste (1856)—although the line was economically disastrous until railway rates were fixed so that there was an advantage

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

119

in exporting agricultural produce this way. Meanwhile, the main line from Pozsony to Zsolna (Žilina) in 1873 developed out of an earlier horse railway—as far as Nagyszombat (Trnava)—which was not completely eliminated until the Sered branch was converted for steam working five years later. After state railways had been privatised during the Crimean War (e.g. Südostlicher Staatsbahn was sold to Staatseisenbahngesellschaft (STEG) in 1855) it was Count Tisza’s policy to create a national system (MÁV) controlling the lines to the main cities. This produced a series of takeovers continuing into the 1880s and finally the STEG network in 1891. Hungary used rack railways in Budapest (Déli-Svábhegy to Szabadsághegy in 1874 (Széchenyihegy 1890)); also at Ózd and Salgótarján in the 1880s; and the central section of the Karansebes (Caransebeş)-Subcetate line in 1908. And narrow gauge played a major role when Bosnia and Herzegovina was annexed and the Habsburgs took over a standard-gauge line built by the Ottomans from Doberlin to Banja Luka. Since narrow gauge (760mm) was deemed more appropriate in rugged terrain new construction began at Slavonski Brod (on the standard-gauge Zagreb-Belgrade railway) and reached Sarajevo in 1879, continuing southwards to reach Dubrovnik in 1906 and the naval base of Cattaro (Kotor) in 1901. But a planned link with Spalato proceeded no further than Bugojno (1894). Success with the narrow gauge led to a rapid take-up in Hungary for local railways—after the first local railway (Szeged-Kikinda-Periam in 1870) had used standard gauge—with the encouragement of legislation in 1880 providing subsidies and virtual free passage on roadside verges and dykes. Hungary was also very innovative with electrification of urban railways: the city line in Budapest (1887) was followed by other underground and surface railways in the capital (serving Csepel, Szentendre and Törökbalint) and the Budapest-Vác-Gödöllö line 1911. Given the challenging conditions on some lines like the steeply graded section from Brassó (Braşov) to the Romanian frontier at Predeal that eventually required the superior power and adhesion of the Mallet system in 1914, interest was generated more widely after the Ganz chief engineer (K.Kándo) tested a three-phase 500V locomotive in Budapest in 1899. The short Miskolc-Diósgyőr line was electrified in 1906, followed by two other short branches in 1912 (Poprad-Tatranská Lomnica and Trenčianská TeplaTrenčianske Teplice) and the Arad-Pâncota/Radna system in 1913. A commercial railcar was developed for this line by Janos Weitzer of Arad in 1906 but it did not perform satisfactorily and steam traction was used from 1907 until conversion. The final pre-war project was the Pozsony-Vienna electrification of 1914. The development of railways into the Balkans involved ‘compromises between economic rationality and the exigences created by shifting political sands, entrepreneurs of questionable ability and integrity, engineers trading on reputations acquired in Western Europe but often failing to make good on them and regional interests neglected in favour of not very well-aimed governmental power plays’ (Rosegger and Jensen 1995 p. 428). The Habsburg interest lay in a ‘Drang zum Meer’ to market manufactures largely uncompetitive in Western Europe while simultaneously improving internal links with ‘the predominantly agrarian regions of Hungary and the eastern Habsburg provinces of Galicia, Bukowina and Transylvania and especially the German towns of Transylvania’ (ibid. p. 429). In 1842 the Budapest parliament considered thirteen new railways for Hungary including the lines from Budapest to Nagyvárad (Oradea) and Kolozsvár (Cluj), extendable to Nagyszeben (Sibiu) and Brassó, and to Arad, Gyulafehérvár and

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

120

Nagyszeben. But it was only in 1847 that construction reached Szolnok and the Theissbahn did not reach Arad and Nagyvárad until 1858. As regards Transylvania, the Hungarian interest of binding the province to Budapest clashed with Vienna’s desire to develop trade, while interests in Hermannstadt and Brassó were keen on links with Bucharest and their iron industry saw markets in railway building, while the benefits of ‘Notstandsarbeiten’ (emergency works) were appreciated by those sensitive to poverty problems. Meanwhile, the Kaiser Franz Josef Orientbahn to Semlin (Zemun) was conceived in the hope of reaching Istanbul via Serbia: founded in 1856, it merged with the Südbahn in 1858 and was completed to Semlin in 1870, while the line to Istanbul took shape only in the 1880s with construction from Budapest through Subotica to Belgrade in 1883 and a link with the Ottoman system in 1888. Planning in Transylvania was somewhat in advance of this for the Budapest-Nagvárad-Brassó line (with connections for Gyulafehérvár and Nagyszeben) was approved in 1854, although such were the tensions between Austria and Hungary (and between Brassó and Nagyszeben) that construction east of Arad and Nagyvárad was delayed until the 1860s. A team sent to Transylvania in 1856 recommended a Black Sea railway via Arad, Nagyszeben and the Buzău Pass to give the easiest access to Wallachia in the direction of the Black Sea, though bypassing Ploieşti and Bucharest meant that the Wallachian government was disinclined to grant a concession to the Rothschild brothers, who had the support of Vienna. Romania primarily wanted a median route through Wallachia to connect with the Hungarian system at Orşova or Baziaş—links with Brassó and Nagyszeben were not initially high priority—while Vienna objected to this on the grounds of vulnerability to attack by Turks at Ada Kaleh. But an ‘Eisenbahnausschuss’ (railroad committee) recommended a concession for an Arad-Gyulafehérvár line— whereupon a law of 1865 authorised the government to grant the bidder an eighty-fiveyear concession—which went to Erste Siebenburger Eisenbahn in 1866. After 1867 railroad planning passed to the Budapest Ministry for Public Works and Communications which outlined a comprehensive scheme for 4,800km ‘to avoid line planning entirely by applicants for concessions’ (ibid. p. 439). Hungary was now happy with a railway to the Black Sea to provide competition for DDSG—hence the 509km Ungarische Ostbahn (Nagyvárad-Brassó—plus the Gyulafehérvár branch to meet the Siebenburger Bahn from Arad). An alternative Balkan route was suggested when the Lemberg-Czernowitzer Eisenbahn of 1866 was extended to Suceava in 1869, but it depended on an extension to the Black Sea for viability. There was first a plan to reach Iaşi, which involved a charge of bribery against the concessionaire Von Ofenheim—reflecting the hazards of building in a backward area in the context of the Habsburg state’s ‘ambivalent and ineffectual sponsorship…recklessly granting concessions without sufficient attention to the economic soundness of projects’ (ibid. p. 433). Until the all-rail route to Istanbul was available the best route was by the Habsburg Empire and Romanian railways to Giurgiu with riverboat connections to the portage railways and a Black Sea steamer for the final leg of the journey. Southeastern Europe Early railway building consisted of short railways to extend the hinterland of the Adriatic and Black Sea ports. After the Ottoman Empire had granted concessions for the portage

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

121

railways of Kustendje-Chernevodo (1860) and Varna-Russe (1866)—with British firms taking advantage of the empire’s growing foreign trade—Wallachia’s first railway ran from Bucharest to the Danube at Giurgiu (1869) while Priština in Macedonia was connected with Selanik in 1873. After showing fleeting interest in a system linking Istanbul with Belgrade and Russe in the 1850s, the Ottomans allowed long-distance railway schemes to lapse until 1869 when a line to Sofia, Priština and Sarajevo seemed to have administrative and strategic value in bypassing Belgrade to link with the Habsburg system at Doberlin (Dobrljin) where the branch from Sunja crossed the Una. It would include branches from Adrianople to Dedeagach and Yambol (a launchpad for Ruse), from Plovdiv to Burgas and from Priština to the Serbian frontier. A foreign loan was obtained and work began at both ends so that Yambol was reached in 1875 while Doberlin was linked with Banja Luka. The rest of the scheme was aborted through the death of Ali Pasha in 1871 and when building resumed the principal connection was with Belgrade via Sofia and Niš (completed in 1887), while lines in Bulgaria were decided upon in Sofia. These projects were both controversial but the political objective of isolating Serbia was not feasible given the difficulty of negotiating the mountainous terrain of the western Balkans: hence the convention of 1881 whereby the Habsburg and Ottoman empires reluctantly agreed with Serbia to use the Belgrade route. There were also ambitions for railways crossing the southern part of the region from west to east, giving Russia access to Serbia and allowing Italy to penetrate the region from the Adriatic. Montenegro’s first railway—connecting the port of Antivari (Bar) with Virpazar on Lake Scutari in 1909—was based on the concept of a grand portage railway to the Danube at Kladovo or Vidin (suggested in 1901) with an Adriatic terminus at either Virpazar or San Giovanni di Medua (Shënjini). This project may be seen in the context of Italian penetration which could have extended along a railway axis that would eventually join the Romanian system at Turnu Severin (from Kladovo) or Calafat (from Vidin). Romania would in turn give access to Russia. But this was the exact opposite of the line the Habsburgs had wanted to forge with the Ottoman Empire. Nothing happened over the 1901 initiative, although two years later the Montenegrin government set up a state tobacco monopoly to be administered for fifteen years by an Italian company: plantations were set up using skilled labour from Italy and a factory opened in Podgorica. When the Virpazar railway did proceed—on the basis of agreement between the Montenegrin government and the Antivari Company in 1906—it was in direct opposition to construction of a narrow-gauge line from Sarajevo which reached the Ottoman frontier at Uvac in the same year; a line which Count A.Aerenthal wanted to extend through a territory known as the Sancak/Sandschak of Novipazar—hence the ‘Sandschakbahn’ project—to meet the Ottoman railhead of Mitrovica where the railway had arrived in 1874. The difference in gauge might be accepted in the interest of opening up shipping routes to Egypt and the Far East, although a more local commercial goal (albeit a lower priority to the Habsburgs) would have been a link between Užice and Spalato using the branch lines to Jajce and Vardište). However, peace did not last long enough, for the Young Turk upheavals were followed by the Balkan Wars and the First World War. Despite the ‘big picture’ of great power conflict the nation states were able to persevere with their respective domestic agendas. The Ausgleich occurred before Croatia could be tied firmly to Vienna by rail—since the line from Graz which reached Laibach in 1849 proceeded only as far as Zagreb in 1862—and instead Hungary was quick to

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

122

connect Zagreb with Budapest in 1870 and then Fiume in 1873 (while a proposed OsijekFiume line was vetoed). Hungarian interests also ensured that the link with Romania would not become an embarrassment; for an embargo was placed on export of animals (with heavy duties on other exports) which made it easier for Romanians to resist Austrian manufactures which were injuring domestic industry—whereupon German manufactures took over. For her part Romania was able to ensure that the lines from the Habsburg Empire served national interests at the same time: notably the axis from Vârciorova (on the frontier near Orşova) to Bucharest and Constanţa. Bulgaria was not pleased to find herself on a Istanbul-Belgrade railway that provided no access to her own ports on the Black Sea. Yet the supporters of the Orient Railway did not want to see traffic diverted and it was only in 1889 that Bulgaria managed to raise funds for a line to the coast which advanced from Yambol and reached Burgas the following year. Lines were also built to Pernik (1893) and Varna (1897), while the journey from Plovdiv to Burgas was made more direct by the line to Stara Zagora in 1910. Another railway crossed the Balkan Mountains (Stara Zagora to Gorna Oryakhovitsa) in 1913 to complete the south-north link with the Danube the Turks had envisaged years earlier. Improved transport and its impact The railway system was a highly significant achievement. The network varied in density from 116km per 1,000sq.km in Germany to 69km in Hungary and 13km in Russia. Yet per head of population only France did better than Hungary with its extraordinary ‘Gründung’ whereby 6,353km of track were built during 1847–73 with an explosive surge after 1867 that gave priority to grain-growing areas. But there were huge distortions through uneven quality of provision, especially in the south where rail and road networks were sparse and their quality inferior. Established urban hierarchies were reinforced by their evolving railway systems and endowed with industries which reflected their labour and market potentials (with distortion in areas with particular raw materials and skills). The change in freight handling in Hungary was dramatic with the share for carts falling from four-fifths in 1850 to less than 1% in 1900 (when rail accounted for 92.3% and steamships 7.4%) while the total freight increased form 2,500 to 46,000 tonnes. In the Balkans the change was much less dramatic. By steam train from Budapest, Debrecen and Vienna were less than nine hours away compared with forty by post coach to Debrecen and twenty-eight to Vienna in 1847. Even within the shipping business there was a big change on account of steam power: in 1914 there were 338 steam-ships and 1,500 barges in Hungary whereas in 1867 there had been 135 steamers and 523 barges towed by draught animals. The journey time by steamer to Vienna was twenty hours (more than double the time by rail) but this was a tremendous improvement over the eighteen to twenty days needed for a horse-drawn barge. Transport gains were reinforced by telegraph/telephone communications and affordable/reliable mail systems. The telegraph in Hungary was introduced in 1847 when the Pozsony office opened—followed by Pest and Zagreb—and by 1867 the system extended to 17,000km (and 170,000km by 1914). The telephone started operating in Budapest in 1881 and the network extended over some 500,000km by 1914, with 20,000 subscribers in Budapest alone. Yet, despite these alternatives to letters—carried by pigeons and horseback messengers as well as post coaches—the post office handled 800 million items in 1914 compared with 51 million in

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

123

1873 and just 4 million in 1848, reflecting reduced cost and delivery time as well as greater literacy. In terms of communications the Balkan countries were quick to take advantage. Romania had a unified post-telegraph service in 1864 although post offices were classified according to importance and it was the county centres that had the best services with the rural areas relatively poorly provided for outside the administrative hierarchy of districts and communes. Trains in the region were not noted for speed, even in Germany where problems arose from numerous junctions and legislation requiring trains to stop at places of minor importance. But the impact of the railways was of course profound given their close functional links with the entire political, economic and social fabric of the region. Romania’s railways provided a direct stimulus to industry, for heavy industry correlated with railway centres, and such was the extent of the business that the CFR had ‘the largest operating expenses of any enterprise in the pre-war Balkan states’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 274). The functional links were very close with new factories typically seeking lineside sites (necessarily where private sidings were needed) and the scale of development tended towards a hierarchy reflecting greater centrality of the important junctions. In some cases railway and industry were integrated by business connections. Thus the Nordbahn arose out of desire of the Rothschilds’ Creditanstalt to link up with the Moravian metallurgical industries and the Galician salt mines. There was also a strike in the southeast when a branch from the Gulatehérvár railway of 1857 was built from Piskitilip (Simeria) to the Petroszény coal basin. This allowed linkage with the iron ores of Vajdahunyad where the charcoal-based industry was now modernised so that iron could be despatched to the steel mills and engineering works in Budapest. Indeed it was the Rothschilds’ railway enterprise STEG which acquired the state ironworks at Resicza and enlarged it into an independent centre of steel-making and engineering. Improvements in transport in general and railways in particular cannot be regarded as the cause of all the facets of modernisation that occurred at the time but it is useful to review the trends that could not have taken place without increased mobility at a sustainable cost. There was a revision of patterns of economic specialisation with enlarged supply systems and distribution networks. Great centres of manufacturing could draw in raw materials and semi-manufactures on a greater scale, as well as food, including fresh milk. And the more remotely situated ironworks like Vajdahunyad (1884) could expand through inputs that could now be economically transported over longer distances. Livestock shipments from the Habsburg borderlands doubled between 1896–9 and 1910–13 (compared with only a slight increase from independent Serbia) which compensated for grain output which was declining in per capita terms—and even in yields per hectare—by the end of the century (ibid. p. 320). Stock from Croatian estates near Zagreb posed a threat to Serbia where a switch to meat-packing occurred. This benefited the landowners and also help to strengthen the basis for industrial growth in the area (ibid. p. 295). The railway played an important role in developing internal trade, for the promoters well appreciated the scope for handling the produce of rural resource regions. The railway along the Olt Valley from Nagyszeben to Fogoras (Făgăraş) hugged the villages on the south side because they were convenient points for handling freight flows from Carpathian valleys (also an area of glass-making, distilling and sawmilling); while a major new highway (‘Reichstrasse’) on the south side of the river replaced the older route

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

124

to the north across the Hârtibaciu Plateau. Price variations between town and country became negligible whereas before the railway grain prices in distant provinces were half the Budapest level due to high transport costs (though changes in transport included better use of the Danube and tributaries like the Tisza). The railway was also significant in handling perishables like dairy produce, although much of the market gardening developed around Budapest and other large towns. But Moson farmers were supplying Vienna from the 1890s, while Budapest needed regular deliveries of milk from distant suppliers, organised through over 500 milk processing and distributing cooperatives that developed between 1895 and 1910. In turn this process was a motivating force for intensive cattle breeding. The livestock sector was particularly dynamic: against the level of 1871–5=100 (prices) and 1882–6=100 (exports), beef cattle prices scored 152.7 in 1906–10 and exports 362.3 (Held 1980 p. 93) compared with wheat 88.8 and 79.5 (though flour scored 207.5 for exports, including some wheat coming in from the Balkans under special arrangements). Hardy big-horned grey cattle—slow to fatten and low in milk yield—were replaced by Simmental crosses; yielding the Hungarian spotted cattle which met the rising urban demand for milk. Meanwhile, industrial-scale fattening of pigs focused on the Mangalica breed introduced from Serbia which replaced smoothhaired Hungarian breeds. TOURISM Tourism and recreation opportunities were of course in place well before the railway age when the leisured classes travelled by private coach. It was in the eighteenth century that visitors to the Šumava started to use the trails opened up by woodcutters (catering for a growing glass industry) to appreciate the alpine Black and Devil lakes. The spa at Pieštăny in Slovakia began in 1821 under the local lord Erdodiovcov, with a few wooden buildings needed for mud treatment baths and swimming pools. In Poland convalescence in Włocławek Province became popular through the unique climate of the Ciechocinek salt springs, ‘discovered’ in the 1820s and endowed with their famous ‘teznias’ (tall timber structures, first constructed in 1824–8) which drip salt water—for speedy evaporation—for the benefit of people with respiratory problems who can readily inhale the chloric, bromic, iodic and ferrous mineral salts. Later a spa developed under H.Marconi’s plan of 1845 and the first Vistula steamers were introduced in 1848 to connect Warsaw with Ciechocinek. Rambling and painting trips were also popular in mid-century: Varsovians patronised resorts like Kępa with cafés, dance floors and circus artists, while walkers with historical interests would visit the ruined Gothic castle of the Mazovian princes at Czersk on the Vistula south of Warsaw near Góra Kalwaria. Cycling and rowing became popular later in the century and the first summer housing estates were developing in forests near rivers and reservoirs before 1914. In the south there was a similar combination of health and cultural concerns. People staying at the Krzeszowice health resort would visit Tenczyn Castle and the Baroque ‘White Friar’s’ monastery on the Czerna; while Krynica (where a pavilion was erected over the main spring in 1808) offered not only a promenade but longer walks to Diabelski Kamień (the Devil’s Stone). Cracow people soon discovered the delights of Ojców (now a national park) where guides would lead parties into the caves with improvised ‘torches’.

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

125

But the most impressive development was the transformation of the old mining and metallurgical centre of Zakopane in the Podhale District. A small but distinguished clientele was secured from 1873 when Dr T.Chatubinski of Warsaw started his annual visits, ‘bringing many distinguished friends for rest, recreation and the simple life’ (Davies 1934 p. 43). Sanitary con ditions were not at first suitable for invalids but convalescents were recommended to make the journey and helped to establish Zakopane as a health resort (under the control of a municipal council) with excellent opportunities for artists and—later in the century—photographers, encouraged by Poland’s oldest tourist organisation: Towarzystwo Tatrzańskie. Access improved through the railhead at Chabówka (available when the Cracow-Sanok line opened in 1884)—with transfer to the highlanders’ carts for the last 35km of the journey—but it was with the opening of the branch railway in 1899 that Zakopane became a substantial resort and a curative centre for pulmonary and tubercular diseases. Services improved (with a water supply in 1906 and a hydropower plant at nearby Kuznice which began to supply current in 1920) while many buildings were raised in a style developed by S.Witkiewicz from the traditional Gorale cottage. From mid-century the highlanders were punting tourists through the Pieniny Mountains (offering views of Sokolica) and offering voyages on the Dunajec past Czorsztyn and Niedzica castles. Hiking expeditions took in Rysy or Wysoka peaks, with overnights at the refuge in the Ciężka Dolina Valley, and another popular route went from Zakopane over the Zawory Saddle to the corrie lake of Morskie Oko—with a hazardous descent from Mieguszowiecka Pass to a refuge in the ‘Valley of the Five Ponds’; also to Poprad Lake and Krywán Mountain. The locals would also oblige the visitors with their fiddling and popularised the highland jerkin and wooden axe (‘ciupaga’). Of course, the spas and climate stations in general gained much greater custom and developed a fine architectural style demonstrated by the colonnades at Karlsbad (Karlovy Vary) built in 1861 as the result of a competition. There was a massive expansion at in 1889 (projected by A.Winter) including the Dvorana and Eva baths, the Irma Spa and Thermia Palace Hotel that gained international renown for treating rheumatic and nervous disorders and children’s problems. Smaller spas lacking a direct rail service were able to attract a significant clientele prepared for a coach journey from a railhead several kilometres away. Some eventually attracted branch lines: Moneasa in 1893— thanks to the new owner (F.Enkheim) who took over in 1891 (after the first visitors had arrived in 1854 and the first pavilions were built in 1881); Szovata (Sovata) in 1906; Trenčianske Teplice in 1909; and Krynica in 1911. Borszék (Borsec) could be accessed by 41km of forest railway from the standard-gauge railhead of Maroshéviz after 1909, which was an improvement on the ‘diligence’ which had previously to be taken over progressively shorter distances as the railway network developed: Marosvásárhely (118km) after 1871, Szászrégen (86km) after 1886, Csiksereda (85km) after 1897 and Gyergószentmiklós (30km) after 1907. Meanwhile, the importance of brown coal in north Bohemia meant that the arrival of the railway in the spa town of Teplitz in 1858 brought about a major change in function. But on the other hand scenic charms were such that visitors were happy to make a coach journey of 20km from Nagyszeben to Höhe Rinne (Izvoru de Sus—now known as Păltiniş) at a height 1,452m from 1892 when the resort was established by Siebenbürgische Karpatenverein, though carriages had to be taken from the railway station in the town.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

126

Overall, by the end of the nineteenth century, the region was endowed with a fine network of inland resorts (taking advantage of the excellent endowment of mineral waters) and cumulatively there was a massive increase in capacity. More people were also visiting attractive countryside. In the Šumava momentum was increased by romantic writings on ‘Böhmerwald’ by A.Stifter (1805–86) and K.Klostermann (1848–1923) to stimulate small resorts like Eisenstein (Železná Ruda) which enjoyed rail links to Plzeň and Prague in 1877. Eisenstein could boast four hotels and a population of 1,500 by 1880. Alpine clubs were developing at this time and the Czech Tourist Club (1888) built hostels for student parties and marked out ‘Šumava hiking trails’. Hunting became more important; so much so that the Bucura summer sheep grazing station (‘stâna’) was abandoned in 1906 when Hungarian landowners preferred to keep the land intact for hunting ‘chamois’ and bears. Meanwhile, the coastal resorts offered alternative opportunities. The Baltic coast was endowed relatively early in the century but the Nordbahn brought much expansion on Rugen where the older Bad Doberan was followed by Binz, Pölitz and Sassnitz, where the Kaiserbad—replete with the large houses of wealthy Berliners, including the Dwasieden Castle by Adolf von Hanseman associated with the Lehrter Railway—was followed by the port in 1896 and train ferry services in 1909. The fishing villages of Koserow, Swinemünde, Wolgast, Wollin and Zinnowitz were also transformed. The Adriatic resorts were opened up by the Trieste-Cattaro steamship service from 1837 connecting Pola, Lussin (Losinj), Zara (Zadar), Sibenico (Šibenik), Spalato (Split), Lesina (Hvar), Curzola (Korčula) and Dubrovnik. But the first tourist association (at Lesina) did not emerge until 1868. It was the arrival of the railway in Fiume (at a particularly fine station at Mitulji) that created conditions for the growth of the winter resort of Abbazia (Opatija) where the first hotel (Kvarner) was built in 1884, followed by Crikvenica (south of Fiume) with its Therapia Hotel in 1893. The Imperial at Dubrovnik was built in 1897. The Black Sea was also being discovered by this time; notably Constanţa with its elegant casino on the waterfront and the adjacent resort of Mamaia where the first building started in 1906. Urban development Towns suffered some disruption with the arrival of the railway. At Medgyes (Mediaş) in Transylvania the line to Brassó cut through the Romanian residential area 100m south of the town wall—requiring a trench and overpass—but much new industry was attracted to the area. Indeed urban functions increased through easier contact with the rural hinterland and commerce in the form of shops, markets and fairs became much more regular whereas previously there were many travelling salesmen and pedlars. There was an increasing availability of standardised products, branded and packaged ready for sale by large factories. Since merchants were no longer involved in the production process (traditionally in finishing), traders needed relatively little experience in manufacturing and special shops therefore tended to replace small industries which had previously been in direct contact with consumers. However, there was a much better level of provision in the Czech lands than in more backward parts of the empire such as Bukowina, Galicia and especially Dalmatia. And the disparities tended to be rather greater for specialised shops than for outlets dealing in foodstuffs and miscellaneous items.

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

127

Hungary developed a relatively massive industrial core in Budapest in the late nineteenth century. S.M.Eddie (1977 p. 353) suggests that ‘the activity of the state in promoting railroads was more important to the growth of Hungarian industry in the late 1880s and the 1890s than was any direct industrialisation programme either at that time or later’. Especially when railway systems were relatively sparse the leading cities gained particular advantage over less favoured rivals. Both Budapest and Vienna sought links with the Adriatic which prevented a project for the Sava Valley from Semlin and Osijek to Fiume (to replace the less efficient river and route) from gaining a high priority. Railway development in eastern Germany was drawn to Königsberg and Posen whose production and trade functions were greatly strengthened as the east became more closely integrated into the German economy. By comparison the smaller agricultural centres (‘Ackerburgstadte’) did not have any great potential and became less dynamic as the century progressed, though junctions boosted nodality. In Bohemia where the railway network was well developed—with energy and manufacturing already dispersed—it was possible to create a complex radial system around Prague, including a local coal-carrying railway—Bustchrad (Buštĕhrad)—to Kladno via Kralup (Kralupy) as well as inter-city links, in addition to a direct line from Vienna to the industrial districts of Bohemia including Iglau, Numburg (Nymburk) and Jungbunzlau. Glancing lower down the hierarchy, ‘all the towns of the Ore Mountains [Erzgebirge] showed a rapid growth in population beginning with the year of their connection to the railway system’ (Tipton 1976 p. 132)—and again the junction towns developed most rapidly. Thus at Aue, where the line from Chemnitz cut across the earlier line from the Zwickau coalfield to the Schwarzenberg ironworkings, the successful Gessner textile machinery works was joined by other enterprises (many started by former Gessner employees) so that in 1905 there were twelve engineering firms in the town employing nearly 2,000 people. Hungary It is worth looking at the transformation in Hungary since statistics are available to show the changes in the urban system during the railway age (1857–1910) and also before it (1787–1857) (Thirring 1912), although for some towns 1869 is taken instead of 1857 and 1830 instead of 1787, while very few figures are available for Croatia before 1857 (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1). In 1857 only Budapest, Szabadca (Subotica) and Szeged were over 50,000 and there were few towns over 25,000—only Pozsony in the northwest, Debrecen in the northeast and Brassó in Transylvania—apart from a group in the southeast part of the Great Plain: Arad, Hódmezővásárhely, Kecskemét, Makó and Szentes. But a cluster of towns with populations of 10,000–25,000 distributed across the Great Plain contrasted with an outer ring of smaller towns in Croatia, Slovakia and Transylvania (many of them below 5,000, especially in Croatia and Slovakia). However, there was a historic process of settlement nucleation in parts of the plain, linked with security and the Ottoman threat, so that leading towns like Hódmezővásárhely and Kecskemét retained a strong agrarian character. By 1910 there was much more differentiation. The primacy of Budapest was very marked, for it had grown to 880,400 (7.4 times the size of Szeged with 118,300 compared with just 3 times in 1857) but the contrast between the Great Plain and the periphery was reduced through regional hierarchies emerging around centres of over 50,000, although the plain had 11 towns of

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

128

over 50,000 and 26 in the 25,000–50,000 band compared with the periphery (3 and 6, respectively). There was equality in the 10,000–25,000 band, with 24 for the plain and 25 for the periphery, while for the small towns (below 10,000) the plain had only 3 compared with 68 for the periphery. Growth tended to reflect the level in the hierarchy, but there were rapid increases for the periphery’s emerging regional centres: 4 exceeded 50,000 in 1910 (Fiume, Kołozsvár, Pola and Zagreb) and another 5 reached 25,000– 50,000. There was also fast growth among several towns in the 10,000–25,000 band: Besztercze (Bistriţa), Dées (Dej), Gyulafehérvár, Marosvásárhely, Székelyudvarhely (Odorhei) and Torda (Turda) in Transylvania; Kassa (Košice), Lozonez (Lučenec), Iglo (Spišska Nová Ves) and Rózahegy in Slovakia; Slavonski Brod and Vinkovci in Croatia. Also the group in the upper Tisza: Beregszász (Beregovo), Máramarossziget (Sighet), Munkacs (Mukačevo) and Sátoraljaújhely. Some small towns were picking up district functions: Bjelovar Djakovo, Koprivnica, Opatija and Požega in Croatia; Trencsén and Zolyom (Zvolen) in Slovakia; Cziksereda (Miercurea Ciuc), Deva and Karansebes (Caransebeş) in Transylvania. By contrast the larger towns of

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

129

Figure 3.3 Towns in Hungary 1787– 1910 the Great Plain show slower growth except for the ring on the margin: Arad, Nagyvárad and Temesvár in the east; Győr, Pécs and Szombathely in the west. While the towns of the plain grew by 2.2% per annum compared with 1.9% for the periphery, the picture is reversed if Budapest is discounted with 6.9% as against 2.4% for the 50,000–100,000

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

130

group; 1.9% against 1.6% for 25,000–50,000; and 1.8% against 0.3% for 10,000–25,000. During the earlier period faster growth occurred on the plain except for in the 25,000– 50,000 group where the 5 towns in the periphery grew marginally faster than the 41 on the plain.

Table 3.1 Urban development in Hungary 1787– 1910

Size groups (,000s)

1787– 1857 Plaina A B

Periphery Croatiab Slovakiac Transylvaniad Total C A B C A B C A B C A B C A B

C

100– 1 186.9 3.7 1 186.9 3.7 499.9 50–99.9 2 116.2 2.5 2 116.2 2.5 25–49.9 6 215.3 1.4 1 26.8 0.7 1 26.8 0.7 7 242.1 1.3 10–24.9 41 664.9 0.8 5 77.2 1.0 5 69.0 n.a. 1 16.4 1.6 4 60.8 0.9 46 742.1 0.9 5–9.9th 9 67.1 1.3 19 130.1 0.7 7 54.4 n.a. 10 70.9 0.6 9 59.2 0.8 28 197.2 0.9 Below 5 6 20.0 0.3 44 147.2 0.2 21 57.7 n.a. 24 77.4 0.0 20 69.8 0.5 50 167.2 0.2 Total 651 270.4 1.3 69 381.3 0.5 33 181.1 n.a. 351 64.7 0.3 342 16.6 0.7 134 1651.7 1.0 1857–1910 500 and 1 800.4 6.2 1 800.4 6.2 over 100– 1 118.3 1.7 1 118.3 1.7 499.9 50–99.9 10 701.3 2.4 4 249.1 6.9 3 188.3 8.2 1 60.8 3.7 14 950.4 2.6 25–49.9 26 822.1 1.6 5 178.3 1.9 1 34.0 2.0 1 44.2 3.2 3 100.1 1.5 31 1000.4 1.6 10–24.9 24 299.9 0.3 25 343.2 1.8 10 141.4 1.6 7 97.5 2.0 8 104.3 1.9 49 643.1 0.9 5–9.9 2 14.1 0.5 36 261.0 1.5 11 76.1 2.3 11 75.2 1.1 14 109.7 1.4 38 275.1 1.4 Below 5 1 1.5 0.1 32 111.1 0.3 8 28.3 1.0 16 51.7 0.0 8 31.1 0.6 33 112.6 0.3 Total 652 757.6 2.2 102 1142.7 1.9 33 468.1 3.0 35 268.6 1.2 34 406.0 1.6 167 3900.3 2.1 Key: A number of towns; B total population (,000); C average percentage growth per annum; a Includes upper Tisza Basin, Bacska and the eastern axis from Szatmárnémeti (Satu Mare) to Fehertemplon (Bela Crkva); b includes the whole of the present state territory for completeness but the map does not include the Dalmatian towns: Dubrovnik (7,700 1857, 12,700 1910), Sibenico (6,600 and 13,700), Spaleto (10,400 and 21,500), Trogir (3,000 and 3,300) and Zadar (8,300 and 18,100); c includes the present state territory apart from Pozsony; d includes all towns other than Máramarossziget (Sighet) and the Szatmárnémeti-Temesvár axis Source: Thirring 1912 pp. 52–4

Poland Data have also been found for Poland (Jelonek 1956). For the 545 towns with comparable data the overall picture was one of growth averaging 3.1% per annum during both 1810/16 to 1869/71 (1.27 to 3.44 million) and a second period extending to 1910 when

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

131

the total was 7.70 million (some context is provided by Figure 2.3 and Table 2.2, above). These figures are higher than those of 1% and 2.1% relating to Hungary, although the periods are not quite comparable. When the different-size groups are examined, 236 towns smaller than 5,000 in 1910 (totalling 700,000; 540,000 in 1869/71 and 280,000 in 1810/16) grew by 0.7% in the second period but 1.7% in the first. The same situation of lower growth rates in the later period appeared clearly in two other categories: 168 towns in the 5,000–9,000 group (1.12 million in 1910; 700,000 in 1869/71 and 310,000 in 1810/16) grew by 2.2% in the first period but by only 1.5% in the second; 87 towns in the 10,000–24,900 group (1.27 million in 1910; 620,000 in in 1869/71 and 230,000 in 1810/16) grew by 3.1% in the first period but by only 2.6% in the second. However, the 33 towns in the 25,000–49,900 group (1.10 million in 1910; 440,000 in 1869/71 and 140,000 in 1810/16) grew by 3.9% in the first period but only marginally less—3.8%—in the second. Finally, the 21 largest towns (3.52 million in 1910; 1.15 million in 1869/ 71 and 310,000 in 1810/16) grew by 4.7% in the first period but 5.2% in the second. The period is thus a highly consistent one of higher growth rates in ascending order through the size groups with a gradual shift from relatively weaker to relatively stronger growth when the second period is compared to the first. Moreover, the performance is superior to Hungary in all categories for both periods except in the case of Budapest, although the performance of Hungary’s larger provincial towns would have been closer to that of Poland but for the remarkable dynamism of Upper Silesia (including adjacent parts of Russian Poland: Częstochowa and Dąbrowa) where a group of 12 towns forming the axis from Gleiwitz to Dąbrowa Górnicza—of which 6 were larger than 40,000 in 1910: in descending order from Sosnowiec (98,700), Częstochowa (74,900), Königshütte (72,600), Beuthen (67,700), Gleiwitz (67,000), Hindenburg (63,400) and Kattowitz (43,200)—comprised a total of 610,000 in 1910 compared with 120,000 in 1869/71 and an insignificant number in 1810/16—with an average growth of 10.6% per annum in the later period. Łódź did even better with its population advancing from 514 in 1810/16 to 50,500 in 1969/71 and 423,700 in 1910 (averaging 18.5% per annum in the second period) while Białystok was also very small in 1810/16 but exploded from 16,500 in 1869/71 to 80,300 in 1910 (16.5% per annum). Some much smaller towns were also highly dynamic: Włocławek had just 2,000 in 1810/16 but after steamship services started on the Vistula in 1853, the railway arrived in 1862 and the river was bridged three years later, population rose to 11,800 in 1869/71 (8.6%) and 37,100 in 1910 (5.4%). There were fifty-three factories in the town by 1914 including the first Polish-based paper mill. As regards the regional centres, Warsaw advanced from 77,700 to 276,000 (4.6% per annum) in the first period and reached 895,400 in 1910 (5.6%) while Breslau grew from 68,100 to 208,000 and 512,100 (3.7% in both periods) and Posen also showed consistency over the two periods (4.4%) as the population advanced from 16,100 to 56,400 and 156,700. Cracow showed much greater primacy in the railway age with growth from 25, 300 to 54, 100 in the first period (averaging 2%) increasing to 174,200 in 1910 as a result of 5.6% average annual growth. The other leading towns in Austrian and German Poland (leaving aside the ports referred to below)—Bromberg Görlitz (taking both sides of the Neisse), Liegnitz (Legnica) and Przemyśl (all exceeding 50,000 in 1910)—had a total population of 28,800 in 1810/16 rising to 108,200 (4.9%) and 265,000 (3.6%). This performance was almost identical to that of the regional

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

132

administrative centres of Russian Poland: in descending order they were Lublin and Kalisz (exceeding 50,000) followed by Radom, Piotrków, Płock, Kielce, Siedlce, Suwałki, Łomża and Chełm, with only the last-named falling below 25,000. The total population rose from 37,100 to 148,500 and 368,400 to produce an annual average growth of 5.3% in the first period and 3.7% in the second. Thus the Polish experience suggests that the railway did not necessarily accelerate urban growth overall but— predictably—brought about a greater emphasis on the leading regional and industrial centres. Ports Railways contributed to the selective development of ports on the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Adriatic. On the Baltic Stettin was the leading port, growing from 21,300 in 1810/16 to 76,300 in 1869/71 and 236,100 in 1910, with a rather faster rate in the second period (5.2%) than the first (4.5%), given the improved links with Berlin. It was rapidly catching up on Königsberg which itself grew from 122,600 to 246,000 during 1870–1919 (2.5%). Commercial arrangements were such that the port was not too gravely embarrassed by the Russian frontier. The same situation applied at Danzig (Gdańsk) where growth during 1869/71–1910 (2.3%) was slightly below the 2.5% registered earlier in the century athough population nevertheless grew from 37,100 to 89,000 in 1870 and to 170,300 in 1910. On the Black Sea there was a growth of traffic at Constanţa thanks to the railway service and substantial capacity in the port itself (though the all-important breakwater was built only at the end of the century). Indeed Romania had a much better rail network for grain shipment to the ports than Serbia, while Bulgarian lines in the northern grain belt came only after 1900. Nevertheless, Varna (41,400) was considerably larger than Constanţa (27,200) in 1910, though Burgas did not exceed 20,000 until the inter-war period. On the Adriatic the strongest growth occurred in the north where Fiume and Trieste were supported by Hungary and Austria, respectively. Of course, the railways played havoc with the established patterns of trade because regions lost the isolation they had previously enjoyed from distant lower-cost producers. Thus while industries that were particularly favoured by virtue of raw materials or by labour and entrepreneurial skills prospered from widening markets, activities that were less efficient for whatever reason were likely to contract with the loss of protection previously enjoyed by high transport costs. Not that railway tariffs were necessarily hugely competitive, for it cost more to send cotton yarn to Bohemia from Vienna by rail than from Manchester by water (canal, sea and river). However, the cotton textile industry that started in Slovenia in 1828 using Egyptian raw material imported through Trieste was badly affected by competition from the Czech lands when the Südbahn opened in 1854, as was the local glass industry dating to 1824. But the boot was on the other foot when it came to production based on wood processing, given the ample raw material available, and the paper industry at Laibach became profitable enough to attract Viennese as well as local capital so that operations were modernised in the 1870s. The local coal was sufficient to resuscitate the traditional iron industry on the basis of Styrian ores and the markets in the Trieste shipyards. The Trifain coal mines, which had been left in a depressed state by the decline of sugar refining industry—hit by the growth of sugar beet—were now modernised and a large new steelworks was built at Assling in 1891. There was

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

133

considerable manipulation of freight rates: while Slavonian competition with Budapest was checked by high freight rates to the city and low rates in the opposite direction, Budapest-Fiume freight rates were reduced to the Austrian level after the Hungarian government took full control of the network in 1891, while high Austrian rates on the line from Fiume to Trieste also discouraged Hungarian use of the latter port (Lampe and Jackson 1982 pp. 299–300). There was relative decline at Dubrovnik which was endowed by a railway link only late (1906) and on a narrow-gauge basis—quite inadequate to allow the town to recapture its once extensive Balkan and Pannonian hinterland. Shipping companies transferred their allegiance, especially after Ploče was built at the mouth of the Neretva in 1937 and subsequently endowed with a railway connection (now converted to standard gauge and electrified). Railways reached Sebenico and Spalato from both Bosnia and Serbia via Prijedor (narrow gauge) and Croatia via Ogulin (standard). Military installations These needed railways for easy deployment. Thus in the area where the German, Habsburg and Russian empires came together—the so-called ‘Dreikaiserecke’ (Three Emperors’ Corner) there were great camps—Posen for Germany, Cracow for the Habsburgs and Ivangorod (Dęblin, near Radom) and Novo Georgievsk (Zakroczym, near Warsaw) for Russia—that were all railway based. However, the Russians were highly discriminating over railways that crossed their frontiers which meant that there were major tasks of rationalisation for Poland in the post-imperial period after 1918. In relation to the lengths of frontier involved there was a striking contrast in the frequency of rail links (a) between the Russian Empire and her German and Habsburg neighbours and (b) between these two neighbours themselves. Prussian army fortifications also included the fortress at Thorn (Toruń)—where the main railway to East Prussia crossed the Vistula. It was built during 1878–92 to act—along with Graudenz (Grudziądz) and Kulm (Chełmno) on the Vistula downstream—as a block to any Russian attack from the middle Vistula on East Prussia (although the Russians were to be defeated in 1914 at Tannenberg (Stebark) south of Osteroda on the southwestern edge of East Prussia while the Bolsheviks were subsequently halted at Warsaw in 1920). The military role might substantially extend the population growth linked with trade and industry. Thorn grew from 6,900 in 1810/16 to 17,700 in 1869/71 (2.8%) and 46,200 in 1910 (4%) with its fortress operational by this time, although the town was somewhat constrained in its regional role by Bromberg: 4,100 in 1810 but 27,700 in 1870 (10.2%) and 57,700 in 1910 (2.7%). For the Habsburg Empire the alignment of the Carpathian arc in relation to the northeastern frontier made for military concentrations along the contact zone that was accessed by the axial route from Cracow to Lemberg and Czernowitz (Čhernivci) while also being supported by the various trans-Carpathian railways which certainly had a strategic rationale. The Habsburg geopolitical interest in the Adriatic produced a dramatic response when it was challenged by the unified Italy; whereupon Pola was established as a major naval base—with Cattaro (Kotor) as a subsidiary—supported by the Istrian State Railway that arrived from Trieste in 1876. Pola was the second city of Croatia in 1910 (57,800, having overtaken Fiume). However, it lost its role with the empire’s demise after the First World War and transfer to Italy while the subequent shift in Yugoslavia’s favour in 1945 led to ethnic replacement which has only recently restored the population total to

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

134

its 1910 level. Meanwhile, Romania’s forces were located with an eye to railway access to the frontiers, though it is interesting to see how the railways built along the eastern (Prut) frontier with Russia between Dorohoi and Galati kept well away from the river to stay out of artillery range. The main bastion was Bucharest which lacked significant physical features which could be exploited by the military. Here the largest entrenched camp in the region was tied up with a railway ring (‘centura’) with a constellation of outer forts. The Ottoman approach was to avoid inviting invasion by placing infrastructure in frontier regions once necessary contact had been made with the European system (initially planned through Sarajevo but realised only through Belgrade after agreement in 1888) after which no Turkish railways reached the frontier of the empire. While the Habsburgs thought of closing the gap between Uvac and Mitrovica, the Ottoman logic for reaching the heart of Macedonia (just before the stock market crash of 1873) was to increase the means of quelling disorder in the province. ENERGY Industry was heavily dependent on the steam engine although water power was harnessed extensively and became the basis of Bulgaria’s localised industrial revolution in Gabrovo with installations on the Yantra River serving the wool textile industry (subsequently established in Sliven, Samokov and Karlovo). Water power was also widely used for mills, including many small installations in rural areas. Electricity did not come into general factory use until the 1880s. Both Germany and the Habsburg Empire developed important electrical engineering industries but extensive power distribution systems were slow to emerge and until after the First World War generation involved hydro or thermal plants of less than 1mW capacity supplying essentially local markets. The leading cities were of course moving well beyond this level. Berlin’s large Klingenberg station included capacity for suburban railway electrification, while Kulkwitz near Leipzig opened in 1910 with 24mW; 30mW were installed at Merseburg (Gross Kayna) in 1917. The war years also saw the opening of Zschornewitz to support the new nitrate industry at Piesteritz while the Trattendorf station of 1915 was linked with the aluminium industry at Lauta. Hungary also played a leading role in the region by virtue of the electric machine building by Ganz which began in 1878. Electric lighting was introduced in the 1880s, with Temesvár (Timişoara) claiming a ‘first’ in 1884. Meanwhile, electric trams started in Budapest in 1888 and the first Budapest power plant for electric light was built in 1893. Once again there was a proliferation of small local power plants in the early years: 120 in 1906 across Hungary’s territory. Consolidation on the basis of longer transmission distances began in 1909 and Budapest’s Kelenfold station (15mW in 1917) was outstanding, but the process was essentially one for the period post-1918 (Rath n.d.). Steam generators were sensitive to fuel costs and conferred advantage on coalfield locations, although Romania’s oil residues provided an alternative fuel. Hydropower could often be useful for isolated factories in mountainous regions and in some cases waterwheels were replaced by dynamos. But this variant also offered the possibility of substantial capacities where a succession of power stations could be integrated with public or industrial water supply and timber transport: the Bârzava catchment was

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

135

developed during 1901–16 in this way to meet the needs of the Resicza’s metallurgical complex (Figure 3.4). In the early 1900s there was planning for Sofia’s water supply which included hydropower projects near the city in 1900 and further afield in the Stara Planina in the 1910s; while a report on water resources in 1909 led to the establishment of the first regional water supply bureaux in 1912. Bulgaria’s planners were also looking at the Danube marshlands and the possibility of irrigated rice fields at Plovdiv. Historical studies of water power and supply arrangements are all too few although Haţieganu (1942) looked at the importance of the Cibin for the industries of Hermannstadt before the railway age and noticed a succession of canals which brought water from the Carpathians to the higher part of the town to provide drinking water and a reserve for fire-fighting while the surplus cascaded down to the Cibin. The nineteenth century brought the first long-distance conduit (1894) and a reorganisation of the inherited system which paved the way for some parkland and irrigated gardens. Meanwhile, in Zagreb a stream in Medveščak (adjacent to the old town) provided water power for milling until the location shift towards the railway in the steam age and the eventual culverting of the stream to make way for a new street: Tkalčičeva.

Figure 3.4 Development of the Bârzava Valley for the Reşiţa metallurgical industry

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

136

URBAN AND RURAL SETTLEMENT The towns As already noted, the region was transformed as a result of unprecedented improvements in transport and communications. Large towns of over 20,000 population, capable of generating extensive central place functions and attracting major industries, increased considerably in number, although there were far more in the north than in SEE, given the pronounced lag in urban development in this area. In addition to in-migration the urban areas showed higher rates of fertility and natural increase than the rural districts, and the growth in the labour supply encouraged further industrial development. In the key cities there was immense building activity which included new public buildings and street widening, for example in Warsaw during 1817–19 when Bankowy (now Dzierzynski) Square was created; combined with a consolidated administration and a surge in banking, trade and industry up to the abortive uprising in 1830–1. Efficient services were essential: the problem of high food prices in Buda and Pest in 1852 was solved by providing new market places and by removing restrictions which limited trading to two days per week. Public transport developed through electric trams which meant that the catchment area for workers around each factory widened accordingly, as F.W.Carter (1975) has demonstrated for ČKD employees in Prague. Sensitive to any pressure on their incomes, industrial workers became a new social force, affected by change more than other social groups since farmworkers stayed rural and the middle class was already urban. An attempt has been made to examine urban population change, building up a picture by recording the populations of individual towns of over 20,000 citizens for 1870, 1910, 1930, 1950, 1970 and 1990. Problems arise in the sense that even the official figures are based on estimates and in some cases the data have to be taken from the nearest available year. As far as possible the figures relate to the urban boundaries at the time but occasionally it has been necessary to use figures that have been taken from a sequence that uses present boundaries only. The results are presented in several forms. First, Table 3.2 provides a broad picture using a range of size categories and the state boundaries of the communist period. A second exercise looks at growth rates for individual states (again based on the states of the communist era) built up from individual towns with populations exceeding 20,000 at the start of each period (Table 3.3). A further table examines growth rates for five population size categories with separate calculations for the northern and southern groups (Table 3.4). Finally, Figure 3.5 (and comparable figures in chapters 5 and 7) maps the distributions using the same size categories—for 1910, 1930 and 1990—with the annual rates of change (over 1870–1910, 1910–50 and 1950– 90) calculated for all but the 20,000–50,000 band. For 1870–1910 the picture is grounded in the Universal Geography of E.Reclus (1875). While there was rapid growth— averaging 2.9% per annum—the survey relates to only 99 towns. In 1910 there were 144 additional towns with populations exceeding 20,000 but comparable data for an earlier year is not available. Towns in the SEECs grew much more slowly (1.1%) than their northern counterparts (2.9%)—an inferiority evident in all size groups—and their share fell from 24.2% to 16.1%. Although the data are not presented in a way that conforms to

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

137

fit the prevailing territorial units, a recalculation indicates the towns in the German and Austrian territories both grew by 3%; Hungary by 2.8%; Bulgaria by 1.4%; Yugoslavia by 1.3%; and Romania by 0.8%. However, the Yugoslavia figure is based on the larger Serbia, arising out of the Balkan Wars, and the Montenegro figure on the eve of the First World War: in 1910 Belgrade was the only Serb town to qualify and the situation on the northern border made for the development of strategic industries in Kragujevac (which did not exceed 20,000 until the 1930s). Meanwhile, not even the Montenegrin capital of Cetinje exceeded 20,000. Finally, Poland achieved a remarkably high figure of 6.9% but this relates to only four towns, two of which were Łódź and Warsaw. Germany and Berlin The greatest progress was made in Germany where a planning system was put in place based on the Enteignungsgesetz (1874) and Fluchtliniengesetz (1875). New main streets could be laid out on the desired alignment with building, draining and lighting costs falling to the owners of the frontage sites, but the requirements for the side streets were less specific and private developers were free to line them with tenement blocks (‘Mietskasernen’) rising to the maximum height permitted under the building regulations and extending well back through a succession of courtyards. Eventually concern over public health curbed the worst excesses although stipulation of minimum densities prevented the idea of the single family house from being realised until lower densities were allowed in the outer zones in the 1890s. Furthermore there was no general acceptance of the need to ensure minimum provision of open spaces and public buildings like churches and schools: the progressive Urban Development Law (allgemeine Baugesetz) passed in Saxony was not copied in Prussia, so ‘by 1914 a great gulf had opened up between the more enlightened towns and those which remained in the grip of property-owning interests’ (Breitling 1980 p. 43). However, a new community movement, ‘Neue Gemeinschaft’, was started in 1902, exactly half a century after V.A.Huber had failed with Germany’s first cooperative housing reform association. In Dresden craft workshops were provided by K.Schmidt in 1898; an initiative extended along garden city lines through relocation of housing and workshops in Hellerau (1907) where four districts were laid out with industry, housing and community facilities. Berlin was Germany’s greatest city—the political and financial centre, with a large industrial base—where a population of 172,000 in 1800 rose to 1,559,000 by the end of the century after boundary extension and the dismantling of fortifications. An inspired design for the town hall (1858) arose out of a competition but J. Hobrecht was commissioned by the Prussian government to produce the Bebauungsplan in 1862 with streets 25m and 30m in width delimiting very large blocks of 200×300m (sometimes 400m) to reduce building costs. The workers’

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

138

Table 3.2 Population of towns 1870–1990 (in thousands) 20,000– 50,000 Albania 1870 1 35.0 1910 2 47.2 1930 3 71.6 1950 4 119.6 1970 4 137.7 1990 4 140.0 Bulgaria 1870 5 160.0 1910 7 218.0 1930 9 259.4 1950 19 594.1 1970 28 904.6 1990 23 639.8 Czecho 1870 9 247.3 slovakia 1910 23 733.9 1930 27 775.6 1950 31 890.1 1970 43 1257.4 1990 76 2221.2 GDR 1870 10 312.7 1910 41 1243.8 1930 59 1900.4 1950 73 2413.9 1970 77 2490.0 1990 78 2437.3 Hung 1870 16 429.8 ary 1910 29 912.1 1930 27 837.4 1950 32 973.4 1970 38 1187.4 1990 45 1376.0 Poland 1870 6 154.1 1910 42 1329.1 1930 46 1445.7 1950 48 1468.3 1970 92 2802.1 1990 128 3962.2 Roma 1870 12 339.8

50,000– 100,000

100,000– 500,000

500,000 1 −1 million+ million

3 5

159.1 378.6

1 1 1

108.2 171.3 232.1

3 5 10 18 2

223.1 332.6 733.4 1257.2 115.0

1 1 2 5 10 2

102.8 344.8 282.1 1 885.5 1 1839.8 375.1

8 12 10 17 23 3 7 13 12 17 21 1

560.7 782.9 622.4 1209.2 1640.5 196.3 457.2 903.8 886.6 1213.9 1340.6 71.0

3 5 4 5 10 3 5 8 9 8 12 1

568.4 930.0 896.9 1362.0 2225.3 529.2 1518.8 1548.2 2015.8 1573.8 2183.0 320.0

267.4 416.5 289.5 613.5 754.2 326.3 880.9 898.9 732.3 2037.2 3230.2 170.0

1 2 5 8 2 5 12 16 20 38 1

111.8 220.1 753.8 1271.3 484.0 1161.0 1967.9 2905.0 4218.0 7338.5 222.0

4 6 4 9 11 5 13 14 11 29 48 2

1 1

639.9 885.7 1

667.6 949.2 1 1 1

1

846.3

2 1 2 2

1337.5 617.6 1086.3 1063.4

1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 2 1407.5 2 1230.7 1 2 1433.9 3 1870.6 1 4 2832.0 1

Total

1 35.0 2 47.2 3 71.6 5 227.8 8 468.1 10 750.7 5 160.0 8 320.8 13 827.3 27 1848.7 44 3409.2 1140.8 52 4877.6 13 737.4 35 2530.6 45 3437.7 1057.4 46 3466.8 1140.7 66 4969.3 1214.8 110 7301.8 17 1884.5 1888.8 54 5108.6 4338.7 83 10028.6 1189.7 96 7123.6 1096.4 105 7460.4 1284.5 114 8308.8 19 820.8 1110.4 1441.6 1590.3 2001.1 2113.6

34 2289.9 35 2807.3 39 3073.3 53 4555.8 65 5515.1 13 964.4 62 4778.5 1178.9 75 6721.7 77 6539.5 1339.2 145 12267.1 1655.7 219 19018.6 15 731.8

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

139

nia 1910 13 363.3 9 581.0 1 341.3 1930 16 470.0 9 632.0 3 304.3 1 639.0 1950 20 583.9 10 842.0 2 229.9 1970 48 1430.4 11 794.3 12 1997.9 1990 63 1955.3 21 1565.8 25 5275.7 Yugoslavia 1870 15 409.2 2 106.3 1910 18 499.8 7 485.3 1930 20 601.6 6 382.9 4 653.8 1950 50 1420.9 4 288.6 7 1446.6 1970 62 2008.8 15 1104.9 11 1941.8 2 1501.3 1990 61 1895.0 31 2016.2 18 3012.8 2 1288.3 Total 1870 74 2087.9 15 984.9 9 1930.3 1 846.3 1910 175 5347.2 48 3232.5 15 3692.3 3 2075.1 1930 207 6361.3 63 4240.1 34 5860.8 6 4156.4 1950 277 8464.2 56 3994.0 43 8104.6 4 2691.4 1970 3921 2218.4 111 7859.5 67 12904.1 8 5343.9 1990 4781 4626.8 179 12383.3 122 23378.5 8 5183.7 Note: Berlin figures pre-1950 are for the whole city Sources: Gazeteers, statistical yearbooks and personal communications

1 1 1

1 2 3 4 5 7

23 1285.6 29 2045.3 1041.8 33 2697.6 1475.1 72 5697.7 2127.2 110 10924.0 17 515.5 25 985.1 30 1638.3 61 3156.1 90 6556.8 1168.5 113 9380.8 99 5849.4 2999.2 243 17346.3 6959.2 312 28577.8 4879.2 384 28133.4 7052.5 583 45384.4 10705.1 793 66077.4

Table 3.3 Urban growth by country 1870–1990 Population (,000) Population (,000) Population (,000) 1870 1910 (a)% 1910 1950 (b)% 1950 1970 1990 (c)% (d)% (e)% Albania 47 70 1.5 228 369 5390 4.1 3.9 2.4 Bulgaria 160 251 1.4 321 1210 6.0 18487 2964 40793 3.0 3.0 1.9 Czechoslovakia 737 1756 3.5 2531 3172 0.6 34668 4366 53752 1.3 1.4 1.3 Germany 1884 4032 2.8 5109 8028 1.4 71236 7014 74766 <0.1 0.2 0.4 Hungary 821 1869 3.2 2290 2955 0.7 30733 4160 46983 1.8 1.3 0.7 Poland 964 2893 5.0 4778 5813 0.5 65395 10374 13837 2.9 2.8 1.9 Romania 732 1069 1.2 1286 2460 2.3 26976 4593 7849 3.5 4.8 3.7 Yugoslavia 515 702 0.9 985 208 2.8 31561 5497 7371 3.7 3.3 1.7 Total 5814 12571 2.9 17346 25795 1.2 28133 39388 51225 2.0 2.1 1.7 Notes: Annual average growth rates relate to: 1870–1910 (a); 1910–1950 (b); 1950–1970 (c); 1950–1990 (d); and 1970–1990 (e). The 1970–90 rate is based on a larger number of towns than the calculations for 1950–90: a total of 45.44 million in 1970 rising to 60.70 million in 1990 Sources: Gazeteers, statistical yearbooks and personal communications

Table 3.4 Urban growth rates by population size groups 1870–1990 20,000– 50,000 1970– A B 90 ECE

50,000– 100,000 C A B

100,000– 250,000–1 1 Total 250,000 million million+ C A B C A B C A B C A B

392 13.44 1.6 111 7.93 2.6 53 8.18

2.1 22

C

8.78 1.2 5 7.05 0.8 583 45.38 1.7

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

140

North 250 8.97 1.0 72 5.14 2.6 27 4.10 1.5 16 5.47 0.9 4 5.58 0.6 369 29.25 1.2 South 142 4.48 2.9 39 2.79 2.6 26 4.08 2.6 6 3.31 1.6 1 1.47 2.2 214 16.13 2.5 1950–70 ECE 277 9.35 2.8 56 4.00 2.7 32 4.57 2.5 14 5.33 2.1 4 4.88 0.9 384 28.13 2.0 North 184 6.63 2.5 37 2.54 2.5 22 3.31 2.0 12 3.88 1.7 3 3.84 0.5 258 20.20 1.5 South 93 2.72 3.6 19 1.46 4.2 10 1.26 3.7 2 1.45 3.2 1 1.04 2.1 126 7.93 3.5 1950–90 ECE 277 9.35 2.3 56 4.00 3.0 32 4.57 2.3 14 5.33 1.7 4 4.88 1.0 384 28.13 2.1 North 184 6.63 1.5 37 2.54 0.9 22 3.31 1.7 12 3.88 1.4 3 3.84 0.5 258 20.20 1.4 South 93 2.72 4.1 19 1.46 4.8 10 1.26 3.8 2 1.45 2.7 1 1.04 2.1 126 7.93 3.7 1910–50 ECE 175 5.25 0.9 48 3.32 1.6 12 2.10 1.4 7 3.77 0.8 2 3.00 1.6 243 17.44 1.2 North 135 4.03 0.7 32 2.25 1.1 11 2.00 0.8 6 3.42 0.4 2 3.00 1.6 186 14.71 0.9 South 40 1.23 1.5 16 1.07 2.5 1 0.10 13.0 1 0.34 5.1 58 2.74 2.9 1870–1910 ECE 73 2.05 1.7 15 0.99 3.4 6 1.06 2.7 4 1.71 4.2 98 5.81 2.9 North 41 1.14 2.0 11 0.71 4.6 5 0.84 3.1 4 1.71 4.2 61 4.41 3.5 South 32 0.91 1.3 4 0.28 0.2 1 0.22 1.3 37 1.41 1.1 Key: A=number of towns; B=population (million) at the start of the period; C=average annual growth. Note: Albania not included for 1870–1910, hence the total of 98 towns instead of the 99 listed in Table 3.2 Sources: Gazeteers, statistical yearbooks and personal communications

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

141

Figure 3.5 Urban population 1910 ‘Mietskasernen’ comprised four- or five-storey tenements, with high density and poor sanitation responsible for deteriorating living conditions in the inner city. Public open spaces were restricted to squares at the intersections of wide avenues. Shops and services were provided on the ground floor of buildings in the central area. The main east-west trending boulevard of Unter den Linden was intersected in 1873 by Siegesallee (Victory

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

142

Alley) leading to Humboldt Hafen and endowed with the Siegessaule (Victory Column) and heroic statues celebrating victories against Denmark, Austria and France. Urban transport improved with horse-drawn omnibuses in the 1840s to break a restrictive monopoly over carriage services. Even so ‘the size of the city seems to have been pressing against the limits of technologies of local transportation’ (Tipton 1976 p. 105). As already noted, railways made a crucial contribution through the Berlin Ringbahn of 1867–77. By this time the Dresdener and Nordbahn companies were beginning to encourage commuter traffic by building suburban stations (following the example of Lichterfelde station by the promoter of the surrounding suburb) before a separate system—partly elevated and partly underground—developed from 1903. Transport improvements ensured that the working-class suburbs of the Wilhelminian settlement ring (correlating with the Ringbahn), which made Berlin the world’s largest tenement city, would be complemented by the villa colonies (‘Villenkolonien’) for the wealthy in suburbs like Lichterfelde, Grunewald and the more distant Wannsee. Berlin also had a profitable horse tram system from 1865; and the first electric tram was introduced 1881 with the system then converted almost in its entirety, thanks to the support of the Halske and Siemens firms. But while Berlin had the Nordbahn to bring in cheap labour and raw materials to achieve an almost tenfold growth (from 340,000 in 1859 to 3 million in 1910) it could not achieve the goal of railway visionaries like E.Rathenow and W.von Siemens who saw the east feeding people into a 12 million city with radial suburban lines extending for 40km. For the birth rate was declining and 3 million people emigrated to America during 1873–93. Another weakness lay in planning and administration because although a further town plan was formulated by R.Eberstadt and others (arising out of a competition) there was no unified local government until 1920, and Berlin found itself in the grip of land speculators and blighted by a number of failed construction projects. Hungary and Budapest Budapest was a great achievement of the bourgeoisie who transformed the city into a bustling centre from obscure beginnings in two generations. There was very rapid growth from a low base level while provincial centres grew much more slowly with small commercial cores and wide rural belts. Széchenyi was a committed moderniser, forging a suspension bridge across the Danube in 1849: Adam Clark’s ‘Chain Bridge’ was a symbolic and practical link between Buda and Pest which were joined into one administration in 1873. This gave Hungary a capital in the very heart of the country replacing Pozsony which was much too close to Vienna; it also established a toll regime for all persons (including the nobility) which helped sustain the principle of general taxation. Arguably Budapest was a great asset and was not in any way a parasitic city. Landowners took houses in Pest and invested in industry and banking. For Pest was a great market for wool and tobacco—later agricultural marketing (including fruit from Kecskemét)—and a centre for the brewing, milling and engineering industries. Employment in industry increased from 35,000 to 110,600 between 1890 and 1910. Metallurgy, engineering and chemicals dominated (48.6% in 1890 and 48.9% in 1910) but food processing slipped relatively from 22.9% to 15.5% in favour of leather, textiles, clothing, wood processing, building materials and paper/printing, which increased from 27.9% to 33.9%: still quite low, although the textile, clothing and leather industries were

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

143

particularly open to competition from more established centres in the empire. With 5% of Hungary’s population, Budapest had 23% of the factories, 25% of energy consumed in manufacturing and 28% of the factory workers (Bencze and Tajti 1972 p. 17). Industrial locations highlighted the route to the north (Váci ut.) and the zone between the Danube and the Vác railway including Angyaföld on the horse/electric tram route where old-fashioned factories survived into the communist era. Also Kobánya on the railway line to Cegled (1848) and Ferencváros on the Hatvan/ Szabadka lines (1867–82). Then came a shift from core to the suburbs: engineering at Angyaföld; mills and meatpacking at Ferencváros; railway industries, textiles, building materials and breweries in Kőbánya; Manfréd Weiss in Csepel; textiles and food in South Buda. While Kispest/Kőbánya clearly benefited from the railway, which gave rise to engineering and textile industries, the area was already a major source of clay and limestone: underground caverns subsequently proved valuable for the brewing and canning industries by providing refrigerated warehouses. The food industry was able to obtain its water from artesian sources. Ferencváros profited from the Danube, bringing grain to the mills, but there were also the land routes from the Great Plain used by animals consigned to the packing stations. Particular importance attached to railway crossings of the Danube at Újpest-Óbuda and Ferencváros-Kelenfold which provided riverside wharfs with railway sidings. There was shipbuilding (originating before 1848) in Óbuda along with bricks and textiles; while tanneries and woodyards appeared at Újpest (New Pest) which was readily accessible to the city centre by tram along Váci ut. (and rail and ferry services, too) while delayed incorporation into the city (1950) made for lower rents and taxes attractive to industrialists. From 700 in 1850, the population had exploded to 50,000 by 1909. Southeastern Europe The urban system was rooted in Ottoman administrative arrangements, with Uskub the military and administrative centre for Kosovo vilayet. Caravan traffic was busy and it enjoyed a position on the Selanik-Mitrovica railway of 1874 (linked with Belgrade in 1888). Small provincial centres acquired industries; like Pleven with post-1900 industrial growth covering mills for grain and oil, processing of tobacco and textile plants—and later engineering, chemicals and oil processing. Much attention was lavished on the new capitals because of the rapid growth of each national bureaucracy: national pride required the construction of modern public buildings along spacious boulevards. The capitals were agents of modernisation and national revival, with employment structures tilting progressively towards secondary and tertiary sectors. Between 1887 and 1910 the share of the active population in Bulgarian towns working in agriculture and forestry decreased from 46.3% to 26.6%. There were variations because Bucharest was far larger (310,000 in 1910) than Belgrade (90,000) and Sofia (103,000). Bucharest had a relatively early start as the capital of Wallachia and then the united Romania, whereas Bulgaria’s preference for Sofia over Turnovo was by no means assured. And while Belgrade was situated on the Danube and was perhaps best equipped to be a notional capital of the Balkans, it lay at the northern extremity of Serbia: ‘this precarious location pushed the main railway yards south to Niš and kept the military arsenal with its equally great demand for metal manufacture in Kragujevac’ (Lampe 1979 p. 23).

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

144

Social change There were distinct variations in the rural-urban transfer, for opportunities were greater in the north and the labour market was not entirely cohesive, with ethnicity a significant influence. In 1867 Banat passed to the Hungarian Kingdom under Austro-Hungarian Empire’s dualist regime. Divided into ‘commitates’, it lost its administrative unity and was influenced by an active process of Magyarisation as most positions in the administration during 1867–1918 were filled by Hungarians appointed by Budapest. The Romanian community was neutralised by Hungarian schoolmasters and policemen, Jewish-Hungarian publicans (profiting from debts) and priests who were under the Hungarian or Serb religious authorities. For ‘Illyric privileges’—in ecclesiastical and political matters—were enjoyed by the Serbs through the Diploma of 1690 which had brought in new waves of Serb immigrants (e.g. during 1716–37) while the bishops of Ipek (Peč) and Karlowitz (Srem. Karlovci) gained the official right of political-church leaders for the Orthodox subjects of the Habsburg Empire. Hence the Orthodox Church in Banat was under their control and the Romanians could escape only by building their own places of worship, for example in the Cetate and Fabric districts of Temesvár. However, the political atmosphere in Temesvár was not highly contested by the standards of most provincial cities; perhaps due to the relatively early development of capitalism— showing respect for individual rights—before the emergence of strong nationalist sentiments as an overriding political issue. Cultural convergence enabled Banat to continue assimilating potentially incompatible peoples, for the identities of each ethnic group were preserved and good inter-cultural relations could be maintained through functional complementarity. Magyarisation found particular success in the Jewish communities, which merged with the dominant Hungarians and thereby gained ‘rights of cetate’ in Temesvár after 1870, leading to synagogues in the town’s Cetate quarter as well as the other privileged inner suburbs of Fabric and Josefin. But the movement was checked by the cultural prestige and economic power of the Germans (or Swabians) and by the large number of illiterate Romanians and Serbs. Relationships changed through time. The growth of nationalism in the Balkans strengthened the majority Christian dislike of those in power when there were conspicuous differences in language and religion. The new nationals (and the poor) benefited from the demise of former elite elements, for example Jews and Muslims, when their property was redistributed; so nationalism provided an irresistible path of power blessed by the European powers—with the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian revolts setting the standard. There was also a power struggle in the Czech lands which was most highly contested in Prague where the Germans fought for ethnic survival. In 1892 the Czech nationalist majority on Prague’s Board of Aldermen decided that purely Czech street signs should replace the bilingual nameplates previously in use—a indication of the extent to which the former German city (where, as Cohen (1981 p. 3) recalled, ‘only the lowest classes of population dared express themselves in Czech’) had been culturally transformed by the end of the century, to the point where the Austrian imperial authorities had no option but to uphold the decision. As a minority both here and in other cities, German speakers had ‘to define a group identity and to establish a separate group life if they were to survive as a distinct segment of the population’ (ibid. p. 9). The Polish Kingdom benefited for centuries from the economic role of the Jewish population—as had much of western Russia (especially the Pale, where Jews were

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

145

confined under Catherine the Great). There were good conditions under Alexander II (1855–81)—following the onerous training and military service demands of former times when male children were taken from families at the age of twelve. Around 1880 there were 5.2 million Jews in Russia, of whom 4.9 million were in the Pale of 1825— including 1.32 million in Poland. But after Alexander’s assassination there was a ban on new settlement with pogroms and expulsions from towns outside the Pale which started an exodus westwards to Western Europe and North America. There were also settlement restrictions and expulsions from rural areas within the Pale (which in practice included Russian Poland after 1868) to reduce tension with the indigenous population. Conditions in the Habsburg Empire were more congenial but difficulties were reported from Bukowina. Jews had full equality in 1857; they knew the languages and facilitated trade between Hutsuls/Ruthenians and Hungarians—indeed they could monopolise all the buying and selling. But after the 1860s ‘the economic situation of the Jews in Galicia became untenable as the agrarian feudal system there was being destroyed and the socioeconomic role of Jews as middlemen between the Polish gentry and their peasants drastically diminished’ (Moskovich 2001 p. 245): there were few openings in industry and pauperisation led to emigration. However, Jews had a good position in Czernowitz (comprising half the population of a town known as ‘Jerusalem am Pruth’ or ‘Klein Wien’) where they controlled trade and owned food processing and oil refining installations, while Poles worked in administration, transport and pig farming, and Germans occupied official and professional positions (ibid. p. 236). The more affluent German-speaking Jews lived in the hills while the poorer Yiddish speakers stayed close to the river. Rural areas At the turn of the century, Hungarian industry produced contrasting rural population responses with decline around Budapest, Győr and Miskolc compared with slow growth elsewhere—or occasionally rapid on the periphery—due to established rural industries (like Bohemian textiles) and the scope for commuting on a regular or seasonal basis to work in factories, forests and mines which could be combined with a home and a small farm in the countryside. Indeed, a little-explored feature of industrial development at this time was the way that it continued to integrate with a rural way of life despite the factory system. Thus the Carso area on the edge of Trieste experienced a transition from farming to industry. The former lifestyle involved much walking to graze cattle and cut hay; not to mention longer expeditions to help relatives, wash clothes in the Timovo River or visit the local fairs and markets—usually Sesana (Sežana)—where mulberry leaves were sold to Friuli silkworm farmers during June-September and limestone slabs were traded with Friuli stonecutters. Now the labourers started walking beside the railway to work in Trieste or the Monfalcone shipyards (saving the train fare) while women carried milk to the city. With industrial jobs there were smaller families and a rise in apartment housing: rubbish thrown into ‘dolinas’ was a sign of village life overcome by suburbanisation. As more open space was consumed children’s games like long-range ‘hide and seek’ were constrained while society became more informal as the discipline of family, church and school was relaxed.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

146

Around Mährische-Ostrau there was much continuity. While many people took advantage of work in industry, peasants in villages near to mines and factories could remain in agriculture—even after the railway had reduced the need for their carting services—by renting rooms to factory workers and by supplying goods to expanding local markets. For as the population of the industrial centres increased there were stronger local food markets for the farmers to supply: the peasant economy could compete with landowners as well as with traders who brought in rural products over greater distances. However, the scope for agriculture near the industrial settlements was reduced by pollution and by opportunities for a change in land use. Where the land contained limestone, fireclay or gravel the peasant could open a quarry or sell the land to another operator. More generally the growth of factories and their infrastructure increased land prices in the immediate vicinity, thus making sale of land for urban development difficult to resist. So the peasantry became a proletariat, though still not a homogeneous class, for whereas landless peasants became industrial workers ‘rich peasants found their place in new society as independent craftsmen, lower middle-class merchants and tenement-house and restaurant owners’ (Długoborski 1975 p. 131). The peasant producer might survive further from the settlement if he could compete with imported food by turning to dairying or vegetable growing. Throughout the region there are cases of ‘industrial-agricultural regions where farming could still profit [from] being very close to industrial works of small to medium size which would not become a threat to farm existence and where slow progress in [the growth of the] railway system helped to establish the local products’ market’ (ibid. pp. 131–2). Industry expanded in Posen from 31,450 workers in 1875 to 162,000 in 1907. The large factories included farm machinery (H.Ciegelski) and fertiliser production, but there were many rural industries and agriculture was not altogether undermined. Families on smallholdings below 5ha generated most of the labour for industry. Some came from families on larger holdings when not all children stayed on the land. There was little movement before 1870, but mobility increased with elementary schools, societies and press, better roads and railways. ‘It can be assumed that those remaining on the soil who had extra income from without the farm eventually severed their ties with the land’ (Rusinski 1969 p. 518). However, there was return migration: ‘characteristic for an area in which a relatively high standard of agriculture was competitive with the developing non-agricultural industry and the city’ (ibid. pp. 518–20). Large Prussian landowners were against industry because they feared it would reduce agricultural labour and increase wages—so Colonisation Commission funds went on social projects to resist the Polish way of life. But there was hardly a rural shortage because the labour market was overrun by rural migrants, so wages remained low. Cheap labour came from Russian Poland and Galicia for the sugar campaign—as many as 20,000 during 1890–1912— contributing to the growth in farm production. Remoter rural areas These found opportunities through seasonal migration and long-distance peddling. Poor, illiterate, unskilled migrants (‘highlanders’ speaking only Polish dialects) came to Silesia from the east and had to accept the most disadvantageous working conditions, including illegal employment and strike-breaking, for the stringent police regulations of 1890

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

147

meant they could be removed at any time. In 1848 76.5% of workers in the MährischeOstrau coalfield came from an area within 50km, compared with 17% for adjacent regions and 6.5% for other regions of Austria. In 1879 the comparable figures were 38%, 28.5% and 33.5%, respectively. With these greater average distances there would have been migration (weekly, seasonal but also permanent) to the place of work. The longestablished ‘pecalbarstvo’ (seasonal migration to work in the building trade) in Bulgaria and Macedonia helped supplement agricultural incomes compromised by stagnating commodity prices and natural disasters like the phylloxera epidemic. Cserepfalu in northern Hungary was much affected by the ‘summazas’ (traditional seasonal agrarian migration), while some people were moving abroad to North America and Sweden. Slovaks found seasonal work on the Great Plain of Hungary; and they would market linen cloth from their home villages right across the central and southern parts of Hungary and in some cases cross the frontiers to the empire to trade in Romania and Russia. Itinerant Bulgarian market gardeners from the Stara Planina were active in Romania and Serbia while Bulgarian pedlars had good opportunities in the principalities after the Treaty of Adrianople and many crossed the Danube at this time. But it was different in Transylvania, which experienced emigration from 1870 due to lack of good arable land and poor prospects for work outside agriculture. There was some movement to the cities by those who lost their holdings through poverty and reclamatory processes; while others went seasonally to the Banat/Crisana plains to work on the estates. In the east and north holdings were particularly inadequate to support families (at a time of high birth rates). Nevertheless, Aluas (1969) calculates that only during the 1870s did the rural population decline absolutely by 4.1% (compared with increases of 7.8% in the 1880s; 7.7% in the 1890s; and 6.9% in the 1900s). In the 1900s natural increase in rural areas was 378,700, of which 229,100 migrated. Employment in mining, industry and trade increased from 142,500 to 200,800 while work in agriculture and forestry declined from 945,900 to 834,900 because even fewer active family members were available at a time when 40,400 emigrated. Life no doubt improved in various ways. Greater mobility reduced isolation and the barrier to integration that serfdom had imposed was now removed. While money came into the villages through the earnings of migratory workers, agricultural labourers ceased to be paid in kind and hence there was a growing demand for small shops which ‘appeared with resilient promptitude where they were needed by the population which they could then serve regardless of the weather and the time of day’ (Csato 1977 p. 418). Yet integration of the remoter villagers into the mainstream was by no means complete and the glimpses of a wider world enjoyed by the young people rested uneasily on the home base tinged with conservative domestic values and neofeudalism arising from a combination of estate work and the cultivation of smallholdings. The process of change was hardly painless and elderly people perceived an open revolt by the young against old traditions and despaired at their disappearance: particularly traumatic was the breakdown in authority of parents and elders and erosion of the extended household that had previously been the hallmark of the traditional patriarchal family. The father was no longer a symbol of the family group’s economic potential and social importance for seasonal migration for wage labour gave independence to individual members and inevitably introduced new social values. In such a situation government policy wavered between support for the peasantry (through improvement of their smallholdings and

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

148

recognition of their culture as the essence of national identity) and incitement to migrate on an even larger scale in the face of urban-based industrialisation. The dilemma was to become more acute in the inter-war years. Population change and emigration The region sustained a substantial population increase overall: population more than doubled between 1800 and 1910 (after 1860 alone in the Balkans), and more than trebled in the Polish territories. With a little more accuracy it may be claimed that the population of the region increased by 18.2% between 1870 and 1890 and by 26.6% over the following twenty years (Turnock 1989 p. 168). But partly because of the persistence of high birth rates beyond the time for which there was an economic justification, the region was unable to hold its population. While political reasons triggered migrations after Poland’s abortive revolution in 1830 and the subsequent upheavals of 1848, the bulk of the movement in the later half of the century was economically inspired. For both periods the rates of growth in the Balkans were higher than in Germany and the Habsburg Empire, though not by large margins. The fall in mortality resulted in rising rates of natural increase which reached 18.3 per 1,000 in Bulgaria and 15.8 per 1,000 in Serbia between 1900 and 1909. In all countries except Bulgaria the birth rate fell from 1880–9 to 1900–9, but not rapidly enough to match the falling death rate. The faster growth in SEE was unfortunate since this area was less successful in creating new jobs. In much of the north rural-urban migration obviated any need for fertility controls: indeed migration from the Silesian countryside was great enough to induce a rise in agricultural wages until 1900. Yet the growth in SEE could have been higher, for Palairet (1995) refers to high infant mortality in Serbia, to the point where even a slight improvement in public health could have triggered a population explosion, as there was no celibacy to impose restraint and young widows usually remarried—albeit to men older than their deceased first husbands would have been. Ways were found to enhance social security, for example through the Habsburg tradition of municipal, church and union granaries: encouraged by Josef II’s regulations from 1789 that required owners to deposit a third of their crops wherever a union granary was established so that grain could then be supplied on credit to those without enough for sowing. The first granaries in Slovakia were established at Lazy pod Makytou and Lysá near Puchov in 1824 (an area of poverty after the Šaštin cloth factory closed). And in 1835 there was one at Lučivná in the High Tatras arranged with the help of landowner D.Varády-Szatmáry who built the granary at his own expense following a cholera outbreak. Another nobleman built the Zemianske Podhradie granary at his own expense 1847. It was only in 1864 that the Royal Offices asked all local county authorities in Hungary to support the founding of municipal granaries, with cash contributions to help inhabitants in bad years. Church granaries were prominent in Spiš: there was a central granary in Batizov with branches in Gerlachov, Lučisná and Štol. There were complex migration currents even within the periphery as the subdivision of holdings in Galicia pushed some people into the adjacent province of Bukovina. But the principal safety valve was emigration, although knowledge of New World opportunities was quite limited until late in the century. In Hungary J.Puskas (1982) identified a period of ‘full-fledged mass migration’ from 1899 to 1913 developing out of

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

149

preparations made over previous decades. In view of the failure of industrialisation to keep pace with the demographic boom, emigration helped to reduce poverty and the money sent home was of great economic importance. However, emigration rates did not correlate closely with variations in the population-resource balance and even in 1914 some countries in the region were not as ‘emigration saturated’ as some Western countries had been decades earlier. Many people did not go permanently: some twothirds of all Bulgarians, Montenegrins and Serbs in the USA were temporary sojourners (compared with a half for Austria, a third for Hungary and a fifth for Germany). The situation arose partly because of difficulties over cultural identification combined with limited opportunities for seasonal work in Europe which made an Atlantic crossing acceptable. In Hungary emigration fever developed most strongly in peripheral parts of the country, especially Slovakia, followed by Croatia and southern Transylvania. These were areas far removed from the industrial pull of Budapest where there was a desire to retain a country home on the basis of money earned through a temporary stay in the USA with its relatively high wages. There may also have been contact across the frontier with Czechs, Germans and Poles who had been keen to emigrate at an earlier date. However, the peripheral bias could have been strengthened by the greater difficulty in obtaining passports in lowland regions where the estates wanted to hang on to their cheap labour. In fact it was largely because of the fears of the industrialists and landowners over labour supply that politicians were inclined to talk emotively about ‘ghost villages’ and the progressive feminisation of rural communities. However, there was a genuine sense of failure over the volume of emigration (not least for reasons of national security) and more thought was given by political leaders to the problems of the landless proletariat. And, after allowing for return migration (with high overseas wages financing land purchase commensurate with a middle-class farming lifestyle), emigration accounted for a quarter of the natural increase in Hungary and rather more in Austria (Kopanic 2000 p. 256). CONCLUSION There were great achievements yet inequality was perpetuated. The region achieved a remarkable unity with Germany and the Habsburg Empire together extending their economic links and giving some credibility to the notion of ECE as a zone of German influence. The railway contributed greatly since overland transport of raw materials and manufactures increased many times over the level achieved by the ‘Greek’ traders in the course of their weary treks across the Balkans. The Berlin-Baghdad concept reflected a reality which attracted tacit acceptance from the great powers, all of which could find adequate opportunities for colonial expansion in different parts of the world. However, the Balkans were always a sensitive area. Both the Western powers and Russia had strategic interests in the Ottoman Empire, while the cause of nationalism in the region attracted attention from both Western liberalism and Russian pan-Slavism. However, Bairoch’s (1976) GNP estimates for 1860–1913 suggest a rising European share for ECE (excluding the Ottoman Empire and Russian Poland) from 26.9% to 31.5%, although this was entirely due to growth in Germany (14% to 19.4%) which cancelled out the relative decline in the Habsburg Empire, Bulgaria and Serbia—although Romania experienced a slight improvement. The three Balkan states together declined from 1.92% to 1.72%

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

150

despite a surge in exports which demonstrated the role of FDI, although there was a tendency for foreign capital to create enclaves linked more closely with foreign markets than with other components of the Balkan economy. It is also evident that Germany’s success was linked primarily with the strong private sector economy in Westfalen, closely associated with the Belgian-Dutch economy in a situation where the more backward Prussia was not as much of a’drag’ on the whole of Germany as were the Croatian-Hungarian-Galician territories in the Habsburg context. It may be that ‘human capital in entrepreneurship, technology and workmanship in the Habsburg Monarchy was not yet sufficiently seasoned for a serious forward thrust in the economy’ (Freudenberger 1997 p. 268). On the periphery modernisation seemed to be taking place in a ‘defective’ way because it proceeded on the basis of some archaic social and political practices. The SEECs needed education to assert national culture against powerful foreign/imperial Greek and Turkish influences yet literacy levels were obstinately low at 24% in Bulgaria, 17% in Serbia and 15% in Romania (compared with 62% in Austria and 50% in Hungary), with only a tiny fraction of young people proceeding to secondary schools and universities. In Albania education was almost nonexistent before 1908 because instruction in Albanian was prohibited by the Turkish authorities (McCarthy 2000 p. 252). Neo-feudalism on the periphery contrasted with a core that enjoyed a high level of integration with efficient agricultural markets (though with some emigration and decline in local industry) and was experiencing a social revolution with the growth of organised labour and the concept of a welfare state. In 1914 some parts of the region were still protected by relatively poor communications and subsistence agriculture. The post-1815 rebuff for liberal ideas produced a temporary stability but only at the cost of a widening class divide as the elite was required to share power merely with a modest middle-class element which prospered under capitalism. Relatively scant rewards for labour meant deprivation for the millions who comprised the rural peasantry whose bargaining position was for long constrained by overpopulation and reactionary social policies. Even the more successful peasant families in the Balkans found basic agricultural equipment a heavy drain on their resources and were not immune from falling living standards and from diseases like pellagra caused by malnutrition. Handicrafts emerged as ancillary activities to agriculture (as in Bohemia and Saxony) but with little sign of progressing to a factory system: in some branches of textiles it is possible to see a spontaneous transition from the domestic scale to workshops and factories yet with little experience of mechanisation and grave difficulties over power supply it was an uphill task to compete with imported cloth even with the help of tariff protection. The home markets of Balkan countries were not very stimulating because of the small populations and low incomes. Yet there was some progress to be made through import substitution, even if the change was only a shift from imported cotton cloth to imported yarn. There was a lack of resources for regional policies at a time when regional specialisation seemed the natural order of things. But while empire might tolerate peripheries, the Balkan states were finding that strategic considerations necessitated rapid modernisation while commodity price trends offered no guarantee of rising income from exports to buy the manufactures needed. While land hunger was eased by the emigration of Turks from Bulgaria and the movement from Galicia to the New World, governments could not be sanguine about agriculture’s capacity to generate higher incomes. There were few programmes to stimulate the periphery, for example in Posen to make it a more

Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy

151

attractive city for German settlement. Millward and Saul (1977 p. 456) acknowledge that ‘in the last resort the responsibility for the failure of economic development in the Balkan countries rested not only with their heritage of economic backwardness but with the failure of the major European economies to create in their own interests an international economic system which would have helped such small economies towards economic growth and development’.

Part II 1914–45

4 THE FIRST WORLD WAR, POLITICAL STRUCTURES, AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY The second century covered by this book is divided in two because, although both periods are concerned with nation states and their struggles to maintain growth in a challenging global situation, there are fundamental differences in the methods adopted and the international relations forged. The first period covers the two world wars of the twentieth century and the short interlude of two decades between them. This period is being widely re-evaluated as the immediate forerunner to the communist era. While shortcomings and contradictions were overemphasised retrospectively through the ideologically motivated critiques of the communist period, more objective examination of the evidence points to balanced programmes to expand factory industry while seeking a measure of rural diversification. But security was always a great problem which diverted capital into the armed services and defence industries: not only was there a danger of a German and/or Russian resurgence, but the smaller nations of the regions were themselves divided through the opposed interests of the ‘winners’ of 1918 (Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia) and ‘losers’ like Germany, Hungary and—to a lesser extent—Bulgaria. This chapter will therefore deal with these various contextual issues as well as the changing economic geography. It will also be appropriate to consider alternative development models in the context of growing German influence: the urge for accelerated growth after the depression years through imitation of German methods requiring greater cooperation and cartelisation, underpinned by greater state investment and planning. Tariff systems were very much the order of the day: it was assumed that any reduction in protection would be damaging—given the importance of industry based on import substitution that would not be competitive on a free trade basis—so only bilateral or multilateral reductions could be contemplated. But industrial countries whose exporters were barricaded out of the markets of agrarian countries naturally took measures against the latter’s food exports, thereby keeping food prices low in the region with returns to farmers that were wholly inadequate to sustain peasant proprietorship and moderate rural-urban migration pressure. THE FIRST WORLD WAR The period begins with the First World War: a power struggle between the Central Powers and their neighbours in the east and the west, although the critical issue arose through a deteriorating relationship between the Habsburg Empire and Serbia leading to the assassination of an Austrian archduke in Sarajevo, a Habsburg provincial capital

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

156

exposed to Serb nationalist activity. But this local affair was symptomatic of a wider and deepening tension between imperial and nation systems of territorial organisation. The ensuing war would therefore decide whether imperialism in Central Europe would be confirmed and consolidated or superseded by national states grounded in the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. The outbreak of hostilities saw a hint of compromise when Germany and the Habsburg Empire proclaimed a kingdom of Poland in 1916 in their respective occupation zones in Russian Poland. However, Poles did not believe that any eastward extension would meet their expectations and an offer of limited selfgovernment came too late to prevent the Russian revolutionary government gaining the initiative. This brought recognition of Polish independence, followed by recruitment of Poles in a Polish army corps in 1917–18; but only for Piłsudski and his corps to be taken into internment after a clash with the Central Powers. In the face of the growing crisis facing the Habsburg Empire, Emperor Karl offered autonomy to all Austria’s minorities but—significantly—not for those in Hungary, where the situation has to be seen in the context of implacable nationalist forces in the old empire radicalised by a brutal Magyarisation policy inspired by a notion of racial supremacy, allied with the crown of St Stephen so that ‘territorial integrity was to be sacrosanct and not subject to any kind of bargain or negotiation’ (Vermes 1972 p. 487). Yet the non-Magyar leadership was equally determined and—after backing the antiLiberal coalition in the elections of 1907 to no apparent advantage—they soon realised they had no future in Hungary. For the coalition’s extended ethnic policies of 1907–10 did irreparable damage and were even condemned by I. Tisza’s Liberals. They can be ascribed only to a massive miscalculation of the Magyars’ political strength (Sugar 1981). As premier in 1914, Tisza hardly welcomed the war yet there was a certain inevitability arising from Russian support (since the beginning of the century) for enlargement of Romania and Serbia at Habsburg/Hungarian expense, while Ruthenian Uniates were encouraged to convert to Orthodoxy and so win the tsar’s protection. The key element in the war was a somewhat futile British-German struggle, the outcome of which was by no means clear until the final phase. Germany was convinced of her economic strength, having maintained strong competition from the 1880s, with Britain perceived as a prisoner of her industrial structure and empire trade. But there was much more at stake, since German support for the Habsburg Empire against Russia was a major factor leading to war in the East: a theatre in which the Central Powers were almost totally successful. Here the effort could be seen as a bid to counteract high American protective tariffs through economic associations that would prepare the ground for an economic unification of ECE: a ‘Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftsverein’ would extend from the German-Habsburg core to a resource periphery covering the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East—as well as extensive colonial territories around the world. However, the Central Powers had to fight on two fronts—and cope with a severe food supply crisis—precipitated by Allied blockades—from the winter of 1916–17 (though difficulties within the Habsburg Empire were compounded by hoarding in Hungary and transport problems over imports from Romania). This caused a costly diversion of effort into Ukraine although there were no vast surpluses to be requisitioned and the country was ill prepared for any intensification of its agriculture given the lack of machinery and fertiliser. Although it sustained Austria’s cities until the 1918 harvest could be delivered, the venture could only secure a granary for future years on the presumption that the war

The First World War, political structures

157

situation in the West would not deteriorate and hostilities would continue into 1919 and beyond. Through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) Germany was able to coerce the Bolsheviks into a humiliating territorial surrender when Lenin accepted independence for the Baltic States and Ukraine. A separate peace with Ukraine at Brest-Litovsk recognised the state’s great importance as a supplier of food and iron, while the Treaty of Bucharest with Romania reflected Berlin’s interest in oil and transport routes by river and railway. It was fortunate for Lenin and the Bolsheviks that although worldwide revolution did not reverse the settlement, Germany’s defeat on the Western Front led to the abrogation of the treaties by both Russia and Ukraine later in 1918 and paved the way for Ukrainian territory to be recovered by the Bolsheviks during civil war in 1919. Meanwhile, it became clear to the USA, already disappointed by German rejection of President Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ (1918), that there was no effective opposition in the German Reich to a policy based purely on power and self-interest. Impending American mobilisation forced Germany to attempt a breakthrough in the West, exploiting the modest advantage arising from the release of troops from the Eastern Front before the American build-up became decisive. But despite mobilisation for total war, Germany lacked the resources to consolidate infantry gains, for the ‘over-extension of the Central Powers was less diminished by the fall of Russia than has been generally assumed’ (Cromwell 1973 p. 278) and Allied containment of General Ludendorff’s final offensive—thanks to an advantage in equipment and transport—was sufficient to bring about the enemy’s exhaustion and ensure that the settlement in the East would be overturned. Threatened by revolution, Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated and a Social Democratic provisional government signed an armistice. Of course, there is no guarantee that with military victory Germany could have succeeded in her political and economic plans. Even with the assumption that the imperialist enterprise would have had majority support within a democratic Germany, there was great potential for conflict with the Habsburg and Ottoman empires over Poland and the Caucasus, respectively (indeed the Ukrainians were already using grain exports as a lever for territorial gain at Austria’s expense in the Chełm district of eastern Galicia). Equally unrealistic was the expectation that an aggressive economic programme could be reconciled with stable relations with a greatly reduced Russian Empire (or her Soviet successor).

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

158

Figure 4.1 States of East Central Europe after the First World War While Germans could unite against the threat of encirclement they could hardly presume on the acquiescence of others, and progressive interpretations of Mittel-europa resting on

The First World War, political structures

159

cultural values were hardly vindicated by the expansionist policies of Ludendorff’s and his fellow annexationists. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 faced a mammoth task in redrawing the map of ECE while resolving the tension between the French desire to prevent German resurgence and the British view that sought eventual German reintegration (Figure 4.1). The latter view prevailed through accommodations—such as the status of Danzig (Gdansk) as a free city (separate from Poland) along with the plebiscites in Allenstein (Olsztyn) and Marienwerder (Kwidzyn), which Germany won, and the one in Upper Silesia, where there was a compromise. Significantly Hungary was refused plebiscites (except in the Sopron area of Burgenland destined for transfer to Austria), although there were regions where the case for them was just as strong as in Germany. The best that could be said for the Hungarian interest was that the most extreme territorial demands of the Romanians, Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs were rejected. Clearly, self-determination lay at the heart of the treaties of 1919–20 signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine (with Bulgaria); St Germain (with Austria); and Trianon (with Hungary). But while Western leaders sympathised broadly with ‘nation state’ aspirations—and strategic arguments (like Romania’s claim to the lowland corridor along the eastern edge of the Pannonian Plain) were broadly settled in favour of the new states—a number of issues were determined by local military efforts, for the powers had no direct military presence in the region. Some decisions were quite arbitrary: Tĕšín/Cieszyn—a small area retained by the Habsburg Empire in 1742 when Silesia was lost to Prussia—was initially included in Czechoslovakia but Poland objected and the territory was divided without plebiscite by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1920, with the town passing to Poland while the western coal/industrial areas became part of Czechoslovakia. Banat could not be retained as a unit in the face of grossly overlapping claims between Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia, but despite inevitable minority problems the compromise proved to be sustainable in a region with a history of peaceful coexistence THE NEW POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM The immediate post-war years were challenging in the extreme. There were enormous problems arising out of war damage and the need for territorial integration, on top of population growth and rising expectations as democratic nation states replaced ‘oppressive’ imperial systems. Grave shortages of food and fuel aroused fears of epidemic and revolutionary upheaval (as in Hungary in 1919). Inflation was rampant not least because of government spending to limit unemployment. Financial stability was needed and adjustments were required to assimilate new industrial installations or compensate for plant and raw materials in lost areas, not to mention a host of infrastructural and administrative measures to integrate new provinces and regulate new frontiers. The entire infrastructure had to be standardised within new frontiers: while wardamaged railways needed repairs (including the rebuilding of many bridges), many new lines were needed to integrate each national territory. Education required standardisation and better performance according to the national culture, as well as the provision of many new school buildings (and improvement to those already existing) and more, betterqualified teachers. For example, the Yugoslav education system had somehow to merge

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

160

with the Serbian system the extremes of Austrian provision in Slovenia and the Turkish legacy in Macedonia (generating literacy levels of 91.8% and 16.2%, respectively). In Albania the entire system had to be built almost from scratch: it was only in 1933 that all schools were nationalised and the Italian schools closed (McCarthy 2000 p. 253). German reparations were another source of instability since Germany could not afford to meet her obligations while the beneficiaries could not accept the goods and services without creating unemployment. Under the Dawes Plan Germany’s payments were financed by American loans which allowed a margin that Germany could use to modernise her own industries and thereby become more competitive than countries to which the reparations were due. Western-style industrialisation seemed the only way forward when pre-1914 grain surpluses returned only occasionally and emigration as an antidote to mass poverty was no longer available. High tariffs were the order of the day—over 40% on textiles in Bulgaria, Poland and Romania; and on metal goods in Hungary. But even so it was necessary to restrict imports—driven by the need for domestic stability, although protection resulted in more expensive inputs and final products. Yet there were alternative ‘agrarian’ ideas of progress drawing reassurance from the past, with the village at the heart of authentic national identity. A.Stamboliski (leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union) disliked privileged tariff protection for industry and sought more rural development and welfare through reduced military spending and avoidance of aggressive foreign policies. It was a more realistic approach than a nostalgic ‘populism’ idealising peasant life and a timeless ‘autochtonism’, although it grounded modernisation on a backward and inefficient agricultural system of small farms. Foreign investment and economic growth The region sought foreign investment to meet balance of payments deficits because it could not rely on a trade surplus: primary produce had to be held back to support a large and rapidly expanding population (Table 4.1)—and in any case agricultural exports were hardly competitive—while structural weakness was acute and the state did not have sufficient fiscal resources to develop both agriculture and industry. At the same time, ECE’s needs were reciprocated because even before the war ‘Balkan-Danubian Europe was for most industrialised European countries the ideal region where they could exchange their industrial products with raw materials and foodstuffs’ (Di Quirico 2001 p. 291). Moreover, economic-financial penetration was necessary to guarantee political influence in a situation where Britain, France and Italy did not want to surrender the region to a German monopoly—while the war had revealed the problems of depending on distant foreign territories for raw materials. Western Europe sought influence through shareholdings in companies and also through control of banking, for example AngloOsterreichische Bank (UK) and Landerbank (France); and also in transport where there were specific regional interests. Italy could not compete with Britain and France but did undertake some projects, for example ‘Foresta’ spawned ‘Polka Foresta’ in Poland in 1921—a vertically integrated timber business from logging to furniture. And Götz was

The First World War, political structures

161

Table 4.1 Population 1920–39 A

B

C

D

E

F

Albania 804 1064 32.3 16.9 27.5 38.7 Bulgaria 4847 6305 30.0 13.9 103.0 61.2 Czechoslovakia 13612 15513 7.8 14.0 140.5 110.4 Hungary 7990 9129 8.5 14.2 93.1 98.0 Poland 26829 34848 16.0 29.9 388.6 89.7 Romania 15635 20045 14.1 28.2 295.0 67.9 Yugoslavia 11985 15703 15.2 31.0 247.5 63.4 Total 81702 102607 25.6 75.6 Key: A population 1920; B population 1939; C natural increase c. 1930 (estimated for Albania); D percentage growth 1920–39; E area (,000 sq.km); F population density/sq.km 1939 Source: Hauner 1985 pp. 75–7

acquired in Romania in 1923, with capital from Banca Comerciale Italiana. However, poor trade prospects always tended to restrict borrowing and ‘this limit was well below the amount necessary to provide the less-developed countries of the area with sufficient funds for ensuring the degree of industrialization necessary for sustained economic growth called for by the expansion of the population’ (Radice 1985a p. 39). Furthermore, war disrupted investment channels. After 1918 there was still funding from Paris, but although London and New York became more prominent in what was a rather unfamiliar area, the capital flow was limited in the early years and money came from loans rather than direct investment and participation. The Danubian economies were increasingly bypassing Vienna, with Prague bankers searching for capital in Paris almost before the end of the war: note the Czech ‘promotion spree’ of 1919–21, halted by deflation policies which caused a crisis in 1923 when several banks failed; while Hungary was embarrassed during 1920–2 by radical internal political events (Cottrell 1983 p. 329). Stabilisation during the early 1920s and ‘the spectre of hyper-inflation had been banished from the Danubian region by 1925’ (ibid. p. 321)—thanks to the inflow of foreign funds, including the flotation of foreign loans (e.g. by Hungary with the assistance of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, which included supervision of the domestic economy by a commissioner-general). Czechoslovakia moved forward most rapidly: 15% of the total capital of all joint stock banks was foreignowned at the end of 1937 (ibid. p. 329). Meanwhile, trading profiles revealed a 70:30 ratio (primary products: manufactures) in Hungary and Poland (but the opposite in Czechoslovakia), while manufactures made up less than 5% in Bulgaria and Romania and 0% in Albania (Table 4.2). Economic growth was grounded in industrialisation and therefore ‘the import demand of all countries except Czechoslovkia exceeded export capacities’ (Drabek 1985 p. 389). Moreover, while the four SEECs were low trading countries, Poland and Romania saw a fall in per capita trade over 1913 with the emergence of large home markets. Rates of per capita GNP growth through the inter-war years

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

162

Table 4.2 Population and industrial activity in relation to Europe (excluding Russia) 1938 A

B

C

D

E

F

Bulgaria 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 Czechoslovakia 3.7 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.5 Germany 16.8 32.1 29.2 42.8 42.0 27.5 Hungary 2.2 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.2 Poland 8.5 2.5 3.7 2.8 2.4 3.9 Romania 4.8 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.6 n.a. Key: A population; B industrial output; C energy consumption; D iron and steel production; E steel consumption; F basic textiles Source: Teichova 1985 p. 229

—0.78% in Hungary, 0.72% in Yugoslavia and 0.18% in Czechoslovakia—were well below the average for Europe (0.92% per annum during 1913–38) except for Germany (1.6%), though by no means the worst. Polish and Romanian figures—0.67% and 0.42%, respectively—relate to 1929–38 only, when the European average was 1.81 %. Figures quoted by Roszkowski (1986 pp. 287–8) set total output for Europe at 138.2 (if the 1913 level=100) during 1936–8. Above-average scores were registered by Romania (178.5), Czechoslovakia (149.6) and Hungary (143.1), with Germany slightly above (138.3) and Poland well below (95.4) since the collapse between 1913 and 1920 was not fully made good. However, growth was not uniform throughout the period. Much of the growth in the 1920s—exceeding 10% in the late 1920s—was all about restoring production to 1913 levels, and to an extent inter-war growth rates were exaggerated (Lampe and Jackson 1982 pp. 401–3). After stability and growth in the 1920s, there was severe disruption through the depression years from 1929 and while European production (excluding USSR) fell by 22%, Poland declined by 41.8% and Czechoslovakia by 37%. Agricultural prices were crucially important for imports of capital, yet by 1933 grain products had sunk to well below half their pre-1929 value; moreover, Western investment came to a halt as credit markets collapsed. The depression started relatively early in some ECECs and the impact was relatively great. Czechoslovakia was most seriously affected because of her dependence on exports. When recovery began there was a rapid rise in imports and it was highly significant that Nazi Germany was poised to play a leading role (Table 4.3). Of course, the depressed state of world markets in the early 1930s made it even less realistic to contemplate rural prosperity sustaining demand for manufactures that would hasten structural change. The state therefore took an even stronger lead that was justified in the context of rearmament, although the ECECs failed to combine against Germany since some relied on German support as a means of satisfying territorial claims. Growth in the 1930s was very much dependent on internal accumulation since foreign lenders were becoming less enthusiastic and there was a concern to maximise earnings in convertible currencies. But Germany guaranteed an export market at relatively satisfactory prices (despite some short-term outflow

The First World War, political structures

163

Table 4.3 Trade balances 1920–1938 ($ million) Balance of trade with ECE (excl. Germany) Albania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia 1920 n.a. 4.4 58.6 −19.1 n.a. −1.6 −19.3 1923 −0.6 −6.4 43.6 −30.2 48.0 4.0 −13.8 1926 −0.5 −2.8 5.4 −42.2 40.0 −5.3 −2.5 1929 −1.8 −10.1 55.2 −40.0 25.2 −6.0 0.2 1932 −1.2 −2.9 −5.8 −18.6 12.7 13.0 −3.4 1935 −0.7 −1.0 5.0 −12.8 3.0 3.0 1.6 1938 −2.2 −2.6 15.7 −7.8 −1.3 4.6 −2.3 Balance of trade with other states Albania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia 1920 −5.3 −15.9 59.4 −87.3 n.a. −117.7 −107.2 1923 −5.0 −23.6 110.1 −29.3 25.8 42.0 −4.7 1926 −4.2 0.4 123.5 −54.2 134.8 8.8 5.6 1929 −7.8 −23.5 25.6 −7.4 −56.4 −6.9 9.7 1932 −6.0 −1.1 −3.6 1.8 42.1 48.2 4.5 1935 −2.5 3.0 27.3 14.5 12.2 49.8 7.6 1938 −4.3 7.9 63.9 33.1 −21.9 20.7 1.5 Source: Drabek 1985 pp. 488–529 Note: Positive figures indicate net export and negative figures net import.

of capital where suitable imports from Germany were lacking). Nevertheless, much of the German penetration occurred quite late as a result of events in Austria and Czechoslovakia. It is therefore valid to argue for a divide between the 1920s, dominated by pre-war politicians, and the 1930s when the old parties splintered in the face of growing royal/military influences and increasing German influence. Such was the growth of government intervention in the economy that post-1945 central planning was in many respects anticipated—even the ideological clash between democratic ideals and totalitarian systems, for despite the liberal-mindedness of the bourgeoisie the necessity to modernise under pressure made for strong central government under monopoly parties. And the disillusionment among peasant parties, as land reform was compromised by the rural poverty of the depression years, meant that the Agrarians went into decline and the remnants were assimilated by the communist movement after 1945. In the meantime, however, the fascist brand of totalitarianism came to the forefront, emphasising national over sectional interests but with avoidance of wholesale coercion and expropriation. It has been considered an irrational response to problems of modernisation, attractive only to socially marginal people and some teachers, clerics, civil servants and soldiers. It also required enemies (such as the Jews) and collapsed not only through war but as a result of economic inefficiency and political corruption.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

164

National profiles: the losers Germany Germany lost considerable territory but largely in its colonies. In the east a Polish ‘Corridor’ was interposed between Pomerania and a greatly reduced West Prussia on one side and East Prussia on the other, while her share of the Silesian coalfield was reduced from almost half to no more than a tenth, and Danzig became a free city under the League of Nations. But these changes were not economically crucial and since the war was fought beyond her borders, her industrial establishment and transport system remained largely intact. The imperial system could not be saved, however, and unrest in Berlin led to a provisional assembly at Weimar in 1919 before elections led to promulgation of a democratic republic and the return of the administration to Berlin later in the year. Yet despite more representative government, there was great resentment that Germany had been constrained in its quest for self-determination and particular outrage over certain ‘honour clauses’ which implied German responsibility for starting the war and causing all the damage. Hence, perception of the treaty as a ‘Diktat’ nourished a ‘Revisionspolitik’ for the recovery of lost territory—even though development in the east was a challenge, since the extension of settlement was undermined by poor soil and a continuing migration of Germans westwards. Despite the ‘Weimar renaissance’, most effectively expressed through W. Gropius and the Bauhaus school of design—seen as a modernist attack on tradition —hyperinflation followed by restabilisation in 1923 fuelled radicalism and undermined the middle class. The Dawes Plan provided foreign loans which enabled Germany to regain its 1913 production level by 1927, while the Young Committee reduced the burden of reparations. But then the stock market crash of 1929 prompted a withdrawal of loans and increased indebtedness, leading to a fall in production and many business failures. As the elections in 1930 brought both Hitler’s Nazis and the Communists into parliament, these parties could mobilise the enormous resentment arising from depression. When Hitler became chancellor in 1933 and the Nazis could start to implement their programme, it was not difficult to convince Germans that they were victims of a world controlled by Jews and needed to support the ideal of a racially pure ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ from which Jews would be excluded. There was a regional problem in the east where cheap Polish labour was cut off by the new frontier and as manufacturers lost their eastern markets the Posen (Poznań) area became ‘economically unsafe’ through a high level of dependence on agriculture and poorly developed industry. However, activists saw German settlement as a matter of defence, even a struggle for existence (‘Daseinkamf’); hence an obsession over demography and a fear of Polonisation. A high level of cultural and political activism among the Polish minority in the Grenzmark was countered by aggressive, nationalistic ‘Ostforschung’ scholarship in the 1930s with Hitler as the guard against Polish competition. Hence the German efforts to hamper the growth of Polish economic power, for example by preventing subdivision of farmland obtained through inheritance.

The First World War, political structures

165

Hungary The war proved an almost unmitigated disaster for Hungary. During hostilities there could be no hint of compromise when ‘the Magyar tradition of independence clashed at the most basic level with the absolute necessity of developing a coordinated approach to the subsistence crisis overtaking Austria’ (Wargelin 2000 p. 281). And peace brought little sign of flexibility. There were some reform-minded intellectuals like O.Jaszi and Wilsonian principles were approached through the idea of a Danubian federation which could be more advantageous for the various minorities than separate homogeneous states. M.Károlyi emphasised the ‘fraternal interdependence’ linking Hungarians with Romanians and Slovaks in his manifesto of 1918, warning that ‘if Hungary is dismembered you will lose all your old markets because all the rivers and railways—the vehicles of your trade—converge in the centre of Hungary. Often high and barren mountains or wide rivers separate you from your co-nationals and to cross them is exhausting, difficult and expensive’ (Vermes 1972 p. 494). However, there was no support for this view except in Ruthenia which proclaimed itself an autonomous region in 1918 (outright secession being hardly an option). So the complete collapse of the empire was driven in no small measure by Magyar extremism: not only were all Hungary’s peripheral territories lost but a third of all Hungarians were shut out of the new Hungarian state and stranded as minorities in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. Burgenland was lost to Austria but at least Hungary did not suffer the indignity of seeing the territory transferred to Czechoslovakia to provide a corridor to Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, there was a catastrophic loss of raw materials and markets which guaranteed both a revisionist foreign policy and a ‘Little Entente’ among Hungary’s neighbours (other than Austria) dedicated to defence of their substantial gains. Meanwhile, at home, Károlyi’s failure to establish a government based on a liberal consensus led to the radical extreme of Bela Kun’s ‘Soviet Republic’. Soon, however, conservatives returned and steered the country through the depression and the Second World War years—with a gradual tilt towards fascism that even some peasants supported after leftist rural reform was discredited by Kun’s collapse. The start was anything but encouraging, given the new Hungary’s responsibility for part of the pre-war Habsburg debt and her reparation obligations; whereupon the country slumped into the ‘the most gigantic inflation in modern history’ (Grossman and Horvath 2000 p. 405) which had to be accommodated as a means of getting the economy restarted. In a situation where Hungary was devastated (after avoiding much damage early in the war), with low opportunity costs for labour and lack of a functioning capital market, the government could pledge eventual stability by printing more money which was passed on to business because—in an inflationary situation—there was no point in anybody holding on to it. Of course, wages did not keep pace, but the workers had no option but keep working despite a transfer of wealth to the entrepreneurs. The banks played their part in this strategy (instead of using new money to buy food and make profits) because of central bank control of money supply and a sense of ‘pulling together’. Thus we have an example ‘of how even the most unlikely economic forces might be turned to benefit a nation at a time and place where few “normal” options seem to exist’ (ibid. p. 427). Prices increased 23,000 times until the currency was stabilised in 1924 with loans supervised by the

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

166

League of Nations. Hungary was heavily dependent on agriculture and bauxite exports and made slow progress in breaking down a semi-feudal character. She suffered a devastating depression with declining demand for industrial products and the recall of foreign loans which started a bank run. Eventually the 1938 the Győr Programme sought long-term investment for armaments and supporting utilities, though it was less of a concerted drive than the Polish counterpart. Bulgaria Bulgaria suffered moderate loss through the transfer of Thracian territory to Greece and some small border areas to Yugoslavia, plus confirmation of the loss of Southern Dobrogea to Romania after the Balkan Wars. But although she was not blinded by quest for territory, resentment over failure to create a ‘Greater Bulgaria’ was strong enough to nourish an interest in upsetting the territorial status quo. Initially, Stamboliski’s strong anti-war stance brought him to power in 1919. He trod a middle path, seeking a more prosperous peasantry through land reform. With their opposition to war vindicated, the Agrarians were able to impose a 30ha maximum landholding in support of family farming (with exceptions where holdings were concerned with fruit and vegetables). The industrialisation programme was retained and there was introduction of both compulsory education and progressive income tax; the Treaty of Niš was negotiated with Yugoslavia to control cross-border provocations by radical Macedonians. Yet being both authoritarian and anti-urban—with his own party divided—Stamboliski’s bid to secure the best of both worlds failed to gain the confidence of the prince and the state class. He was deposed in 1923 and assassinated with the help of IMRO elements. His land reform had been achieved by this time and his foreign policy aspirations—including support for a Balkan federation—were later reflected in a mood for entente in the late 1920s, strengthened by the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1930 and realised in Ankara in 1935 (followed by a pact of perpetual friendship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in 1937). Bulgaria then followed a policy of import restriction to accumulate domestic savings and encourage foreign capital for domestic industry that would stand to benefit from higher prices in a protected market. There was an element of concentration through United Tobacco Factories but, like Albania, Bulgaria maintained an ‘overwhelmingly agrarian character’ (Radice 1985ap. 63). National profiles: the winners Poland The Poles always maintained their claim to independent statehood and it was a foregone conclusion that the Polish state would re-emerge at Versailles. But fixing the boundaries was problematic in the extreme and it was highly significant for the Poles that while their territories suffered much damage in the war—with half a million losses as they fought each other in the armies of the partitioning powers—the armistice left them as a formidable military power. Accordingly they pressed home their advantage by advancing far to the east of the ‘Curzon Line’ (suggested by the UK as a reasonable frontier between Poland and Russia) in a Polish-Soviet War which raged until 1920. Piłsudski’s victory on

The First World War, political structures

167

the Niemen gave Poland control of ‘Middle Lithuania’, including Wilno (Vilnius), and from March 1919 he launched an advance eastwards (between the Dvina and Zbrucz rivers in north-south extent) to Kiev in June 1920. But Soviet resurgence in Belorussia and a push ‘to the west over the corpse of Poland on the road to worldwide conflagration’ (Pogonowski 1987 p. 184) led to the compromise of the October 1920 armistice line confirmed by the Treaty of Riga in 1921. This meant that while ambitions in the west were largely satisfied apart from the western part of Upper Silesia and land north of the Noteć in Pomerania, the eastern objective of the ‘Dmówski Line’—extending north to include all East Prussia, Memel and Lithuania except for a small territory around Königsberg (Kaliningrad)—was ultimately unattainable. When compared with the final agreed frontier this objective failed by a substantial margin involving East Prussian territory around Allenstein, Lithuanian territory between Kaunas and the coast and a strip along the eastern frontier, including Minsk. Nevertheless, pursuit of statehood in the context of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth—rejecting the legitimacy of a purely Lithuanian state—meant the seizure and retention of the Lithuanian city of Wilno. Even though the Poles considered that ‘Middle Lithuania’—including Wilno—opted for incorporation into Poland in 1922, the action soured relations between the two states throughout the inter-war years. But it is important to understand that Poland’s motives in seeking more territory in the east and north were linked with a programme—proposed by Piłsudski’s Democratic Union in 1919–20—for a defensive anti-Bolshevik marchland federation that would combine Poland with Finland, the Baltic, Ukraine and the Caucasus (recycled by the British geographer H.J. Mackinder as a Finland-Bulgaria axis after the Bolsheviks had regained the Caucasus and Ukraine). At the time, however, the Petlura government in Ukraine did not have wide support while the UK was unhappy about a project that seemed destined to boost French influence in the region. Meanwhile, Poland felt herself thwarted over her quest for unified control of the Vistula Valley through the German majority in the city of Danzig. Although the compromise of free city status was meant to ensure unfettered Polish use of the harbour as well as an interest in its development and control of the railway links—hence the city was included in the Polish customs area—there was a primary aim of protecting German heritage, and the lack of effective cooperation forced Poland to develop a separate settlement at Gdynia to the north. Yet Poles behaved with restraint over Danzig, even when the Nazis took over in the city, and the system of German ‘privileged trains’ crossing Polish territory to reach East Prussia worked satisfactorily. Of course Germany always resented the Danzig settlement—along with the Polish Corridor rail project which supported it—and separate administration for the fragmentary territory of Grenzmark Posen-Westpreussen was a subtle challenge to Poland’s western frontier. Finally, the division of Tĕšín/Cieszyn clouded Czech-Polish relations, especially since the Czechs were known to sympathise with the Soviets over Poland’s eastern border, which placed many Ukrainians in Poland. Economic problems Poland had the great problem of integrating the former German, Habsburg and Russian territories. The Prussian section had a relatively modern industry and a capitalist agriculture with a market orientation, but while Russian Poland had an industrial system

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

168

there was also an extensive backward east (‘Kresy Wschodnie’); and while former Habsburg Galicia had some industry in Krakow and also oil in the east, the region ‘suffered from the total lack of foreign markets and local incentives for development’ (Roszkowski 1989 p. 106). As a result of the war and the subsequent Ukrainian and Soviet operations, industrial output fell to 35% of the 1913 level in 1920–1. The loss of eastern markets applied not only to textiles, clothing and fancy goods but to railway rolling stock which was a well-developed industry in Warsaw. Greater emphasis on selfsufficiency can be seen from trade figures drawn up by A.Jezierski: foreign trade per capita fell from $81.6 in 1910 to $14 in 1938, while the share of trade with Russia fell from $67 to $0.4, reflecting Soviet autarky and displeasure over Poland’s refusal to accept the Curzon Line as her eastern frontier. Poland did not get substantial economic aid after 1918 despite reduced export possibilities (when markets in partition states were lost) and a need to readjust production to meet the needs of a new national market. She suffered from hyperinflation as prices increased 2.4 million times (though this was much below the factor of 4 billion in Russia). Fiscal weakness in 1923, exacerbated by the range of inherited systems and excessive printing of new money, was overcome by the government of W.Grabski through a balanced budget for 1924, the imposition of a special property tax and introduction of a new currency. Party politics Poland had weak governments under Christian Democrat and National Democratic leadership until 1926 (when the political landscape was transformed by the Piłsudski coup) due to friction between urban, landowner and peasant interests. There was a wide range of opinion, including support for the ideology of laissez-faire (free competition and non-intervention) championed by A.Krzyżanowski and the Kraków liberal school, and although supporters of the cooperative movement criticised free competition they opposed reconstruction through the state bureaucracy. There was then strong leadership by J.Piłsudski who was in complete control of Poland during 1926–35 with a ‘Sanacja’ government that sought to cleanse the state of partisan politics. This was followed by a switch to state intervention in the 1930s under E.Kwiatkowski in the context of a new security triangle comprising a Central Industrial Region (‘Centralny Okręg Przemysłowy’). The Polish economy maintained a ‘desperate fight to overcome some of the immense checks on progress’ (Roszkowski 1986 p. 295) given low productivity, capital formation and external market opportunities, as well as overpopulation and geopolitical problems. Poland improved agricultural production and launched ambitious development plans which gave the promise of greater economic independence, but it was the only European country that had failed to regain 1913 production levels by the end of the inter-war period. The agricultural bias made for a poverty-stricken rural population while the deteriorating geopolitical situation led foreign investors to withdraw capital. Socialists advocated intervention and there was indeed considerable state involvement during 1918–26, arising through necessity (rather than ideology) on account of the inheritance from the partitioning powers requiring compulsory government administration of plants that were not in the hands of legal owners. Poland inherited damaged industrial regions in Łódź and Warsaw but Upper Silesia and Poznań were largely unaffected by the war apart from capacity increases. She set about developing her

The First World War, political structures

169

light industry while consolidating the mining and heavy industry of the Silesian coalfield. But there was a strategic necessity arising from the lack of armaments plants in 1918: since the new state inherited just five small repair shops, a central administration for military installations (formed in 1922) built a gunpowder/explosives factory at Pionki (1924); a munitions factory at Skarżysko Kamienna (1925); with further units for instruments in Warsaw (1926) and cannon at Radom (1927). There was also direct government participation in mining and metallurgy, as well as chemicals, transport and forests—for example, Wieliczka salt mine and the Drohobycz (‘Polmin’) oil refinery— while state ownership was extended to estates and forests (including experimental farms and studs) as well as railways, waterways and postal services. Furthermore, the need for budget revenues gave rise to state monopolies for tobacco, liquor and lotteries—and also for salt, when the former Austrian monopoly was extended to the whole country in 1924 when only Wapno was operated privately. State banks provided credits for reconstruction, public works and government orders: ‘generally the government sector more or less satisfied the widely understood social, economic or military requirements but was costly, inflexible and inefficient’ (Roszkowski 1989 p. 125). Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia is an impressive example of a state created through determined and inspired leadership after long adherence to the concept of a wider federation to avoid incorporation into a greater Germany. The Czechs were well primed for democracy because in addition to the historic legacy of Jan Hus they ‘achieved national consciousness in the 19th century at a time when industrialisation and social differentiation were already relatively advanced’ (Stokes 1987 p. 33). Austro-Slavism was inspired ideologically by F.Palacký in the early nineteenth century and promoted as a basis for reform to create a democratic Habsburg Empire but there were setbacks in 1848 and 1867; while a neo-Slav congress in Prague in 1908 was too late for a consensus since tensions were already growing in the run-up to the First World War. Nationalism was further strengthened when food supplies within Austria became desperate during the winter of 1917–18 (due to declining wartime harvests and the bad state of the Hungarian railways, which delayed the arrival of Balkan surpluses). And the Allies began to recognise exiled nationalist governments. It is also significant that Franz Josef had set up a system of local government in Bohemia separate from the central bureaucracy in which the Bohemian nobility might participate. Thus progressive middle-class elements were left to administer health and education as well as local transport and social security. So when a nation state became available there were influential personalities like T.Masaryk who could thrive on the basis of middle-class norms of democratic behaviour grounded in local and regional politics. Czechoslovakia inherited strong and largely undamaged industrial areas, and production increased to meet export orders. Apart from Germany she was the one state in the region where food exports were not a major foreign-exchange earner. Under Finance Minister A.Rašin wild currency fluctuations were avoided. Restrained intervention encouraged further private sector growth, though there was competition for markets with the collapse of the Habsburg free trade area and high export dependence meant that the country was hit hard by the depression, when Czechoslovakia suffered a massive setback

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

170

in her consumer industries like glass and textiles. However, with modest foreign borrowings, she continued to service her debts and slowly recovered after 1936. There was, though, the formidable challenge of combining the Czech lands and Slovakia in view of contrasting experiences, albeit within the same imperial system. However, although Slovakia was much poorer than the Czech lands and was slow to catch up, the Slovaks were far less critical of the Czechs than the Croats were of the Serbs in Yugoslavia. Although there were gains through land reform and improved education facilities, many Slovak industries has difficulty in competing with the more efficient Czech businesses. Slovakia accounted for 36% of the land and 23% of the population but only a twelfth of the industrial output—indeed there was a measure of deindustrialisation, and what remained often fell under Czech financial control (like the Harmanec paper works, which became a major cellulose exporter under the Moravia Bank of Brno)— while agricultural productivity was also substantially lower. Slovakia was a supplier of raw materials and cheap labour; yet even so there was high unemployment relieved by emigration by some 200,000 people over a twenty-year period. Division between the two nations may have caused ‘an excessive agrarian protectionism’ while inhibiting ‘a more consciously national policy of industrial planning’ (Radice 1985a p. 63). There was also tension on religious grounds which made the Catholic Church a focal point for Slovak nationalism. Ethnic issues Meanwhile, some instability arose from the large German stake in Bohemia, for Vienna belatedly recognised separate Czech and German areas; and after the collapse of the empire in 1918 the Germans not only declared ‘Deutschösterreich’ (i.e. the present Austria) but ‘Deutschbohmen’ and ‘Sudetenland’ with provisional governments in Reichenberg (Liberec) and Troppau (Opava), respectively. Czech forces had to occupy these areas in order to secure the historic frontiers accepted by Western leaders in the interest of security and economic rationality. The Slovaks did not have to demonstrate the same military capacity and enjoyed strong French support for incorporation in a Czechoslovak state, but they brought with them a population of 700,000 recalcitrant Hungarians. Czechoslovakia gained the Hlučinsko area from Germany, while success was rounded off by the acquisition of Ruthenia and a share of Tĕšín. The Ukrainians of Ruthenia saw union with Czechoslovakia as their best option (avoiding the radicalism of the communists in both Hungary—under Béla Kun’s brief regime—and Russia), although they were disappointed when the promised autonomy failed to materialise until 1938 (prompted by the Munich Crisis) and they faced heavy-handed officialdom when the censor at Ungvár (Uzhgorod) confiscated autonomist newspapers for criticising the government. There was also an ethic tension within the region because the Lemko/Rusyn minority was frustrated by Ukrainianisation. But Czechoslovakia ‘took seriously her new responsibilities, developed the region’s timber industry, built roads, schools and hospitals and generally brought the region into the 20th century’ (Karparek 1989 p. 365). Tĕšín, secured in 1920, was the last piece of the puzzle, conferring important coal reserves and railway connections between the Czech lands and Slovakia. But the population was Polish and control was secured only by taking advantage of Poland’s preoccupation with

The First World War, political structures

171

Russian forces at the time. There were wrangles over individual villages and Czechoslovakia’s claim to Javorina (Jaworzyna) was conceded only in 1924. This stored up trouble for the future because Poland was primed to regain the territory when the Munich Agreement of 1938 provided the opportunity. Romania Romania experienced rapidly changing fortunes. After belatedly entering the war on the Allied side in 1916 she was forced to make peace with the Central Powers under the Treaty of Bucharest which involved some loss of Carpathian territory. Major German requisitioning followed, with pressure to cultivate oil and other industrial plants and to preserve food at factories in Bucharest, Piteşti and Craiova. The oil industry fell under German control and the Cernavodă pipeline was relaid to Giurgiu. But the Allied victory reversed the process and, with remarkably little dissension from other states or local opinion, the old kingdom (‘Regat’) was more than doubled in size by the addition of Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transylvania and additional territory in Banat and Crişana, including the Timişoara-Oradea-Satu Mare axis along the eastern edge of the Pannonian Plain. However, she did not get all that was sought since the Tisza/Tisa River was proposed as the western frontier, along with the whole of Banat. But Serbs were not disposed to respect the unity of Banat (even though Bucharest was agreeable to the Timok Romanians remaining in Yugoslavia) on the grounds of ethnicity and the need for land in order to organise the defence of Belgrade (Boia 1994 p. 56). Indeed, the Serbs coveted the whole of Banat, and their claim on the Orşova-Caransebeş, railway brought the two countries close to a military confrontation. France then occupied the whole ‘quadrilateral’ (as far east as Lipova, Lugoj and Orşova) until a compromise was agreed, which meant dividing the old Hungarian county (‘comitat’) of Timiş-Torontal. In domestic politics, a massive and long-awaited land reform in 1921 eliminated the landlords as a class and ensured that the peasants would not join the proletariat. Steps were taken to construct a democratic system in which the Liberal Party was dominant. There were heavy financial burdens in administering the enlarged territories (with less revenue in real per capita terms than before the war) yet the Liberals chose an autarkic policy of ‘prin noi înşine’ (by ourselves alone) which brought growth in agriculture, mining and manufacturing in the 1920s. There was no shortage of intellectual effort for political opinion advocated industrialisation, either on a laissez-faire or interventionist basis (with nationalisation in the case of Marxists and socialists), while the peasants wanted full use of natural resources. Romania ‘showed a remarkable will to stand on its own economically assisted by very substantial non-agricultural resources, notably oil and timber’ (Radice 1985a p. 64). She was keen to use domestic resources rather than rely heavily on foreign investment (at the expense of low living standards) but didn’t coordinate effective plans, ‘perhaps mainly because of the weaknesses of the administrative and fiscal systems’ (ibid. p. 64). However, some capital was needed and it was unfortunate that ‘efforts to squeeze the money supply again in order to re-establish overvalued exchange rates had just begun to yield British and French loans when the depression struck in 1929. The subsequent collapse of the gold exchange standard in the early 1930s prevented any further influx of significant Western capital, public or private’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

172

p. 589). The merging of the Peasant Party of Transylvania with the National Party of the Regat in 1928 provided an alternative political force, but while this new National Peasant Party under I.Maniu sought a truly constitutional regime and protection of peasant interests, the stresses of the depression and Carol II’s determination to secure total power effectively sidelined this moderating influence. When autarky was revised in favour of foreign investment and some improvements in agriculture, Romania had the advantage of substantial oil exports which actually rose during the depression years, so industrial decline was quite limited (11% of the 1929 level compared with 52% in Hungary). However, due to insufficient exploration, oil production peaked in 1936, and while annual industrial growth before 1914 averaged 6–8%—possibly going back to 1880 (thanks to laws for the encouragement of industry)—the most optimistic estimate for 1913–30 was just 2%, rising to 3% in the 1930s (Jackson 1986 pp. 60–1). Rapid growth seemed to fade, perhaps due to problems in artisan/household manufacturing, and any spurt in the 1920s was largely recovery from wartime decline. Yugoslavia In 1918 the problem of adjustment to the new political framework was perhaps greatest in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the official name for the country until 1929). Given the heroic wartime resistance of the Serbs and Montenegrins and the collapse of the Central Powers, Bosnians, Croats and Slovenes were panicked into seeking the protection of Serbia on the blind assumption that any relationship with their southern neighbour (which had just joined Montenegro to form a de facto Yugoslav Piedmont) would be an improvement on the limited autonomy previously enjoyed— though Croatia was always sensitive to the danger of partition by Hungary and Italy. The Slovene minority in the Klagenfurt area of Austria was not an issue but Rijeka (Fiume) was contested with Italy, and only the southern suburb of Sušak passed to Croatia until the whole city was transferred—with the province of Istria—after 1945. Yet Belgrade saw the union in pan-Serb terms—as the culmination of a movement for a ‘Greater Serbia’ begun in 1804 (when the first anti-Ottoman assault was mounted)—and great insensitivity was shown towards the sophisticated Croats who possessed considerable administrative experience of their own as well as a sense of separate nationhood. Although the Croats were the ‘provincial’ group, they were advanced culturally and economically; and although Croatia (like Slovenia) had developed a national economy, experience in the Habsburg Empire ran counter to protectionism and state intervention. There was also discontent when estates were broken up under the land reform programme and used to provide family farms for Serbs from the south, where estates did not exist. Royal dictatorship in 1929 forced the opposed factions underground and nine new regions transcended national boundaries, but the Slovenes had a majority in one and the Croats in two while the Serbs had the edge in the rest. It was only after the fall of Prague in 1939 that the Croats were offered a large ‘banovina’ comprising their two majority areas, along with parts of Drina, Dunav, Vrbas and Zeta (Bosnia and Herzegovina), comprising 30% of Yugoslav territory and 4.4 million inhabitants. Yugoslavia also suffered from serious economic divisions for there was only limited industrial potential outside Slovenia, and the main non-agricultural resources were exploited by foreigners which made it difficult to accumulate capital. The trade deficit in 1920 was twice as big

The First World War, political structures

173

as the value of all exports—so the trade gap had to be closed by decreasing imports. The regional problem could not be solved quickly but efforts were made to expand the railway network in backward areas. Albania After a rush for independence in 1912 with sights modestly set on autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, Albania was far from secure during the war years, despite the support of the powers in 1913, with an international control commission to settle boundaries which were still disputed a year later. However, the state gained only half the lands occupied by Albanians in the region and even this arrangement seemed in doubt, given her covetous neighbours on all sides and the wartime occupation by Austria in the north and by Italy and France in the south. The Pact of London (1915) offered Vlorë and a strategic hinterland to Italy on the understanding that she would not oppose the partition of the rest of the state between Greece (Gjirokastër), Montenegro and Serbia (the north). The area was of the greatest strategic importance since it gave Italy the key to the Adriatic—with the sea only 75km wide at the Strait of Otranto. But when the Allies decided to champion a powerful Yugoslavia, Rome moved in favour of Albanian unity and independence under Italian protection in 1917. With the threat of partition still all too evident in 1919, the Albanians rejected all foreign entanglements and forced the Italians to withdraw. Claiming the right to decide their own destiny at the Congress of Lushnjë (1920), they dissolved the Durrës government (formed in 1918 under Italian control) and provided for a national parliament when French occupation ended in 1920. Leadership continued to come from elements connected with the former Ottoman imperial service and the government was headed by the northern Gheg leader (A.Zogu) who had liberated the country after the war. A more Westernised party under the revolutionary intellectual F.S.Noli (comprising elements from the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia) cooperated with the League of Nations (1923–5), but lost support by failing to introduce land reform. Its call for Soviet assistance caused Yugoslavia to declare support from the then-exiled Zog, who was able to return (with the backing of conservative landowners) and establish himself first as president (1925) and then in 1928 as ‘King of the Albanians’ (an oblique reference to Kosovo), combining the style of tribal chief, Ottoman pasha and modernising despot. Zog’s success amounted to a victory for the northern Ghegs over the southern Tosks, but despite partiality towards the north, he led the country effectively through the interwar years with a pragmatic compromise of the traditional and the modern. The new state had never existed as a compact administrative area because the ‘vilayet’ of Shkodër— with its capital the largest Albanian town at the time, albeit situated perilously close to the Yugoslav frontier—was amalgamated with parts of the adjacent provinces of Monastir (Bitola) and Yanya (Ioannina). This meant that the Albanians had to find a capital in the centre of the new state that comprised a borderland between the three provinces, with Tirana preferred to Durrës and Elbasan (as well as Vlorë, further south, where independence was proclaimed in 1912 and where the government was established until 1914). Durrës had been chosen for the provisional government in 1919 but after this authority had caved in to Italian demands, the final choice settled on the inland town of Tirana. With a population of 10,000 in 1910 and 17,000 when selected, it advanced to

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

174

30,800 in 1930 when it was just ahead of Shkodër, with 29,200, and with 22,800. Frontier demarcation was also a problem because only in the north—where the provincial boundary between Scutari and Skopje provided a convenient marker—was the alignment not entirely new. Some Albanian territory was cut off from market centres (Dibra and Prizren) while access to Sarandë (formerly Santi Quaranta) was complicated because the and Ioannina roads lay in Greek hands. divergence point for the Economic problems Albania faced severe economic problems. Little capital could be accumulated because her ‘economy remained so locked in primitive patterns of agriculture and handicrafts that it barely achieved any economic progress during the interwar years’ (Radice 1985a p. 63). There was slow progress with land reform and 60% of the land was divided into 129,000 small farms averaging just 1.8ha, while 23% comprised larger family farms averaging 20ha, and 3.7% consisted of estates averaging 2,000ha (much of it leased to landless peasants) while the rest was state owned. Population increased rapidly with a natural increase of 20.5 per thousand in 1937–8 (births 34 and deaths 13.5) which took the total from 740,000 in 1876 to 1.06 million in 1938. Despite a stable, national, convertible currency—and a trade deficit sustained by capital imports and emigrant remittances— there was low productivity and illiteracy was widespread (Hočevar 1987). Education was fully nationalised as a gesture against Italian and Greek paternalism. Traditional institutions were circumscribed by modern civil, penal and commercial codes (1929–31) to stimulate business, but this was by no means easy because highland tribal society was patriarchal: dating back to the Illyrian tribes and strengthened in the Ottoman period to provide de facto autonomy (Fischer 1999). But the northerners were brought round to thinking in national terms through taxation, a military establishment and confiscation of locally held weapons. Nevertheless, the churches remained powerful and the fundamental cultural split between northern Ghegs and southern Tosks lingered. Mineral prospecting during the war was followed by a mining law in 1923 which provided for licences and concessions and led to an ‘oil boom’ in the Vlorë area in 1925– 6. However, promising initial signs were not followed by major oil strikes and workings were gradually abandoned. Foreign assistance was essential despite the risks of occupation. A friendship treaty with Yugoslavia ruled out foreign interference in Albanian affairs, but when the Yugoslavs showed partiality for Zog and facilitated the aforementioned change in regime, the way opened for the Italians to sign treaties covering military and economic aid in 1926 and 1927, and capital went into infrastructure and industry. Exports went mainly to Italy: 60% in 1928 rising to 68% by 1938, while imports declined from 46% to 36% as Bulgaria and Romania became relatively more important. The Italians produced oil at Devoli (48,000 tonnes in 1936; rising to 130,000 tonnes in 1939) and sent it to Vlorë by pipeline for export to a refinery at Bari. Hard coal was also sent to Italy as output increased from 2,000 to 13,000 tonnes during 1923–38, while chrome was worked for export at Kukës. The Albanian National Bank was set up with Italian help and an Italian was put in charge of the agricultural school of Lushnjë. There was some capital from Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (with British Petroleum drilling for oil at Ardenitza in 1925 and Patos in 1926) but Italy was always the key partner. Albanian national pride was offended by excessive tutelage and the

The First World War, political structures

175

tangible risks in terms of both occupation and the destabilisation of the social order that might follow from rapid modernisation. A customs union was rejected in 1932 and a move against Catholic schools the following year was seen as an anti-Italian gesture. The Albanians would have liked Italian help over a national iron and steel industry at Durrës, based on the ores of Pogradec, but although a railway was started it did not even reach Tirana until after the Second World War. AGRICULTURE Land reform There was a trend from high population density (139/sq.km in Germany, 105 in Czechoslovakia, 93 in Hungary and 82 in Poland), with low birth and death rates and low infant mortality in the northwest of Central Europe to the opposite extremes in the southeast (61 per sq.km in Romania, 59 in Bulgaria and 56 in Yugoslavia). On the other hand, illiteracy was also high in the southeast, rooted, according to Ronai (1993 p. 185), in the emphasis given to schooling by the Western churches compared with their Orthodox counterpart, and there was also a heavy dependence on agriculture (generally 60–90% but even higher in much of Yugoslavia) (Figure 4.2). Hence, after the war the successor states carried out radical land reform primarily for political reasons, but there was also a social imperative (especially in the SEECs), given the rapid population growth (which the manufacturing and service sectors could not wholly absorb) and restrictions placed on emigration to the United States, while Bulgaria faced additional urgency through the need to settle refugees from Macedonia and Thrace. However, there was considerable delay in Albania—for it was not until a land cadaster was introduced in 1928 that a land reform law could be passed (1930)—and in Germany, Hungary and Poland landowners were strong enough to block radical change. In Hungary only a tenth of the land held by estates was taken to give 400,000 families (including 250,000 previously landless ‘zellérek’) small parcels averaging lha. And Poland’s land reform of 1919 was limited to 2.65 million hectares (only a tenth of the land in the country) despite a rural overpopulation of 2.5–5 million (Roszkowski 1987 pp. 87–8). However, nowhere could land hunger be substantially overcome: there was never enough land to provide all families with viable farms even before population growth necessitated subdivision (Table 4.4). It would have needed 7.7 million hectares in the late 1930s to make Polish peasants self-sufficient while the maximum estate land for parcelling was only 4.6 million. Put another way, Poland’s cropland was 11.5 million hectares, yet 19 million were needed to make the peasantry secure (ibid. p. 292). Small farms produced more because they used more labour and more buildings, animals, machines and inventories (i.e. reproducible assets) per hectare. Although they may have used their resources more efficiently (Lampe and Jackson 1982 pp. 443–5), they could not generate enough income to support the population. The relative merits of large estates and small farms were much discussed in Poland, where land reform was modest. According to W.Grabski (the prime minister responsible for monetary reform in 1924, a former rector of Warsaw’s Central School of Rural Economy and a critic of the country’s ‘noble tradition’), small farms absorbed intensive labour and operated

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

176

efficiently in livestock production, though they also consumed much of their output, with negative implications for urban food supply and the maintenance of agricultural exports if the estates were superseded. Meanwhile, many conservatives, like T.Brzeski and J.Stecki—and even radicals like J.Marchlewski—deplored the inefficiency of subdivision and argued that without estates there would be lower industrial demand, lower tax revenue (since estates clearly paid more tax per hectare) and higher prices. (Note also the role of the estates in social and national activities (e.g. food for the unemployed and collections for national defence) while estate owners were often involved in manufacturing, mining, banking and transport.) Yet industrialisation could not develop fast enough to prevent a trend towards minifundia. Landholdings over 50ha covered 11.5 million hectares in 1921:30.4% of the total area (while 2.1 million holdings below 5ha covered 4.5 million hectares), but only 9.2 million hectares in 1938 (24.3%)—a decline of 20.1%.

Figure 4.2 Employment, illiteracy and natural increase in Central Europe c. 1930

The First World War, political structures

177

Table 4.4 Land distribution by farm size c. 1930 Below 5ha A B

5–50ha 50–100ha A B A B

Over 100ha A B

Total A

B

Bulgaria 1313 30.0 2986 68.4 69 1.6 0 0.0 4368 100 Czechoslovakia 2082 15.5 5535 41.2 505 3.7 5334 39.6 13456 100 Hungary 1846 20.1 3070 33.5 502 5.5 3751 40.9 9169 100 Poland 6200 16.3 15616 41.3 9780 25.8 6301 16.6 37897 100 Romania 5535 28.0 7850 39.8 895 4.5 5470 27.7 19750 100 Yugoslavia 2982 28.0 6642 62.4 338 3.2 1224 6.4 10646 100 Key: A area (,000 ha); B percentage of the total agricultural area Note: The figures for Poland do not sum and the total in the penultimate column has been adjusted accordingly. Source: Berend 1985 p. 154

Trends in farm production and income With inadequate finance, agriculture was not dynamic, and the peak in 1928 was only slightly ahead of the pre-war level: ‘neither the islands of advanced and more rapid development nor the relatively prosperous period of the second half of the twenties included more than rather moderate progress in agricultural production overall’ (Berend 1985 p. 170). Then the collapse of world prices for agricultural exports in the early 1930s reduced agriculture’s contribution to national income, though it remained over half in Romania and Yugoslavia and almost two-thirds in Bulgaria; and in the process the export volume needed for debt servicing was doubled or tripled. Depression caused many bankruptcies and slowed the pace of mechanisation (prominent only in Hungary and the north) and fertiliser use (practically unknown south of the Sava-Danube line) as well as in land improvement (swamp drainage in Bulgaria) research and plant breeding and the sowing of industrial crops. Production and marketing cooperatives were in a bad state as a result of inflation in Czechoslovakia in 1921–2, slowing down through to 1923 (Marluliak 1995) though credit cooperatives were operating in 1924 and a Colonising Cooperative in Bratislava helped to settle the southern fringes of the country. But there was a resurgence in the 1930s. In 1934 ‘Centrokooperativ’ (Czechoslovakia) joined with other bodies in forming the Czechoslovak Corn Corporation which set grain prices in collaboration with the state. And ‘Gospodarska Sloga’ was founded by the Croatian Peasant Party in 1935: the result was effective minimum prices for cattle the following year. Moreover, in view of the difficult trading con ditions for farmers, purchasing agencies were set up (e.g. in 1930 in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; and in 1932 in Romania) to buy cereals at prices above international levels; marking the start of ‘étatism’, defined as ‘policies that go beyond the passive fiscal measures and the actual ownership of certain enterprises’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 435). There was widening government intervention as state-owned banks in Poland assumed part of the debt burden: for example Państwowy Bank Rolny (1934) was linked with a mortgage moratorium postponing repayments. And Hungary’s ‘Hungya’ cooperative—formed in 1934 with 70% state ownership—organised foreign trade and guaranteed minimum prices. Yugoslavia set up the ‘Privileged Joint-Stock Export Company’ (PRIZAD),

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

178

complemented by Bulgaria’s Cereal Export Agency ‘Hranoiznos’ and the Romanian State Cereal Commission. Under the latter Romanian wheat acreage doubled during 1930–7, though funding transfers to new crops were less accessible. However, while the agencies supported prices they did ‘not address the fundamental problems facing Balkan agriculture, particularly the freeing of smallholders’ money income from the overpowering claims of taxation, transport costs and existing debt’ (ibid. p. 449). Romania The situation has been carefully examined for Romania with respect to a Transylvanian village where small farms absorbed much of what they produced, so the surplus available for export fell. But in any case the lurch towards autarky and import substitution—in order to maximise the growth of industry—reacted on agriculture which encountered more barriers in its search for exports. It was not just a case of the state neglecting agriculture but ‘actively underdeveloping it’ (Verdery 1983 p. 356) in preference for industrial growth because of ‘nationalistic designs to diversify the economy using protectionist methods in order to avoid what were considered the detrimental effects of monocrop export dependency’ (ibid. p. 356) evident before 1914. Despite the stimulus of urban markets which provided money for limited modernisation (e.g. iron ploughs), peasants couldn’t consolidate and modernise due to ‘their inability to earn enough in an agriculture whose prices that state depressed to support industry’ (ibid. p. 330). They faced high taxes and discouraging prices and, as proprietors, could no longer cut corners by ‘covering weeds with dirt’ as they had done when labouring on Hungarian estates before the war. The depression served to deepen the malaise since the Romanian peasantry incurred the largest personal debt among the SEECs given the lack of government credit. Indeed, ‘the cycle of land circulation, low credit and high debt was on its way to proletarianising many peasants when the depression struck’ (ibid. p. 331). A moratorium then checked bankruptcy but at huge cost to the banks and also to the state which had to retreat from a policy of more viable farms. Money owed could not easily be recovered since the Popular Banks reduced their loans at a time when Bulgarian cooperative credit associations were increasing their assets by a quarter during 1932–4. But a large destitute population unable to find work in industry would have been a greater risk and so the peasantry was not proletarianised on this occasion. Of course, factory work was a great boon where it was available while the cattle exports to Czechoslovakia were relatively buoyant and so enabled peasants to ‘utilise every corner of their ecological niche and survive on it’ (ibid. p. 314). But the counterproductive nature of reform—whereby proprietorship was compromised by peasant indebtedness—was not without historical precedent. In the 1930s Romanian peasants were hard pressed through taxation imposed by ‘a Romanian state in partial collusion with merchants’ (ibid. p. 341), just as they had been in the nineteenth century by the Magyar state, the nobility and the merchants and even earlier by landlords and Habsburg tax collectors. While the southeast shows a high dependence on agriculture the density of the agricultural population was not so variable with 51 per sq.km in Saxony (346 for the total population) and in Silesia (139), and 50 (72) in southern Romania and 53 (65) in Bessarabia (Ronai 1993 p. 89). This reflects the level of intensfication, admittedly with some overpopulation on subsistence holdings. The greatest problems are indicated by the

The First World War, political structures

179

areas of the Yugoslav mountains with more than three people per hectare of arable land (Figure 4.2). Some resettlement was taking place in addition to rural-urban migration. Romanian peasants from Bucovina and the Apuseni Mountains moved to the adjacent lowlands while some politically reliable Serb and Montenegrin war veterans were accommodated in Vojvodina (where the Yugoslavs were in a minority) but this hardly satisfied expectations and there was some further pioneer settlement as revealed by Lebon’s (1935) study of the Jezera region of Montenegro. Although the ‘zadruga’ was not perpetuated in its traditional form—with communal agriculture and concentration of power in the hands of the elderly—interrelated groups of families would still go out from time to time to establish a new settlement when all the arable land in the mother village had been broken in and the rough grazing fully used. Thirteen families set out to found a new settlement in the Tara Valley where a hamlet had previously been founded by men fleeing Turkish oppression in the Peč area around 1860. ‘As their sons grew up farms were created for them by breaking up new land and when—on the decease of the original founders—questions of inheritance arose, land was divided into strips so that the best land should not come to one individual’ (ibid. pp. 277–8). There was even some new rural settlement in Hungary when the partition of common land (‘hatar’) prompted a shift from the ‘kültelek’ (inner settlements) to ‘tanyák’ (isolated farmsteads). This process had begun in the late nineteenth century in favour of the wealthier villagers who were then constrained from leaving the village. But now it gathered momentum, with a considerable amount of illegal squatting, and the isolated farmsteads which had previously been inhabited on a purely temporary basis became permanent homes. Production in the 1930s Nevertheless, in 1938 agriculture still contributed a third to a half of total exports except in Czechoslovakia and Germany (admittedly less than in 1914). And agriculture’s role in employment was even more fundamental to the point where it continued to grow absolutely in parts of SEE, for example Bulgaria, where 75% of the increment went into agriculture (Teichova 1985 p. 238). Hence the number of small farms (below 5ha) and their share of the land continued to increase (Berend 1985 p. 161). ECE grain exports had contributed 13% of world wheat exports during 1909–13 but reached only 8% in the late 1930s—and before that no more than 4% (ibid. p. 208). But there were still substantial grain surpluses in the south with some improvements in infrastructure to handle them. Bulgaria built more railways, although grain exports through Varna dropped with the loss of South Dobrogea, and ‘a total lack of provincial elevators meant that some lots began to spoil while waiting for enough others to fill a freight car’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 367). Land reform in Romania made for more variable quality, while full freight-car shipments became more difficult to secure. While Austrian and Hungarian pre-war buyers in Serbia would assemble lots for rail/river shipment, West European agents were concerned only with ships and would not deal with the situation inland. Agriculture was fundamentally unstable because of the huge world oversupply of grain. Given that Western Europe’s import requirements (reduced through advances in farming stimulated by subsidised production) were only a fraction of the ECE output, ‘the new phenomenon of price instability was especially damaging to the farm sector and created a latent agricultural depression characterising the interwar period as a whole’ (Berend 1985 p.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

180

183). Price fluctuations affected the poorer peasants especially because they had to sell after the harvest. Stock numbers (cattle and pigs) did not increase except in Poland (and Romania for pigs) but there was development in poultry and also a qualitative change through breeding, though the constraint over winter feed meant that progress depended on the arable sector—where there was increased output through better yields and more land. Across Central Europe as a whole there was a complex mosaic of cereal surplus and deficit areas—revealed by Ronai (1993)—with implications for sub-regional trade (Figure 4.3). And some interesting details on the distribution of livestock in relation to local food demands are also examined with regard to 1935 data (Figure 4.4). While areas like Lower Silesia and Macedonia maintained a high meat surplus, there was generally some deficiency in meat in rich grain-growing areas (like the Kielce region of Poland, and much of Ukraine) that needed supplies from complementary livestock regions with rich natural pastures. Thus beef was taken into the Pannonian Basin and Bohemia from the Balkans, the Carpathians and Transylvania; also Kraków and Upper Silesia. Beef production was low in Hungary compared with Romania and Yugoslavia but she made up for this with double the number of pigs compared with Romania and Yugoslavia (numbers in the Carpathian Basin increased from 4.5 million in 1857 to 8.8 million in 1935). Pigs were also prominent in Saxony and Silesia. Annual per capita pork consumption was much lower in Romania (9.2kg) and Yugoslavia (8.6kg) compared with Hungary (21.9kg) but there were clear deficiencies in the Dinaric Highlands as well as the Bohemian Erzgebirge, north Carpathians and Sudetes (though near areas of abundance in Austria, Bavaria and Prussia). And there was enough pork fat in Hungary (con sumption 26.8kg) to meet the more modest demand in Romania (5.7kg) and Yugoslavia (13.4kg). Sheep were most numerous in mountain areas, especially parts of the Balkans without winter snow; though numbers were falling (11.3 million in 1857 to 6 million in 1935), albeit in the context of a change in breeds to emphasise wool (hence the merino) rather than meat. Consumption of mutton was again low in Hungary (1.5kg) compared with Romania (3.3kg) and Yugoslavia (3.4kg).

The First World War, political structures

181

Figure 4.3 Crop production (quintals per capital) and cereal/potato surpluses and deficits by region c. 1930

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

182

Figure 4.4 Meat production (kg per capita) in Central Europe c. 1930 INDUSTRY Industrial growth was impressive where it took off from a low base level: Bulgaria, where annual growth averaged 6.3% per annum during 1909–37 (Lampe & Jackson 1982 p. 394), not simply through import tariffs (because the most highly protected branches did not grow most rapidly) but due to ‘a sharp increase in the number of manufacturing enterprises late in the First World War, supported by the post-war influx of short-term credit from several European banks’ (ibid. p. 590) at a time when these banks dominated the commercial sector with assets greater than those of the central bank (Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7). Romania did rather less well because after maintaining a remarkably high rhythm of 6–8% annual growth during 1880–1914, the most optimistic estimate for 1913–30 was 2% before rising to 3% in the 1930s (Jackson 1986 pp. 60–1). But industrialisation was the goal everywhere, on the grounds of both jobs and security. The only way of drawing people out of agriculture was to provide more rewarding work, so import substitution to meet rural demand would be unavoidable and the danger of bankruptcy among peasant farmers would force the pace. Some industrial growth was needed to compensate for capacity lost by boundary changes. In the paper industry

The First World War, political structures

183

Hungary’s loss of plant in the former border territories was balanced by a large new Nemenyi factory in Csepel (Budapest) which was the largest in the country. There was also a strategic argument in favour of heavy industry (chemicals, engineering and metallurgy) where the state would create much of the demand (despite sniping from experts about the importance of ‘military orders’ rather than ‘genuine demand’). New locations might evolve through spatial dispersal within central areas commensurate with the availability of rail transport; also through the exploitation of new fuels such as lignite in Germany and natural gas in Romania; not to mention the opportunities available when frontier changes revealed new combinations of raw materials and skills. Resources were quite inadequate for total substitution, as the trade picture shows (Table 4.3); yet high tariffs were maintained irrationally as small countries duplicated production and protected high-cost industries from consumer choice through potentially corrupting relations between industrialists and government officials. It was assumed that any reduction in protection would be damaging, although industrial countries took measures against ECE food exports which meant low returns to farmers and brought further state intervention through the purchasing agencies already mentioned. In general there was an inflationary boom in the early 1920s with expanding production; then hiatus with stabilisation so that growth ‘resumed during the second half of the decade as a result of foreign stimuli’—expanded export markets or further financial inflows—while ‘the contraction in international economic intercourse at the end of the decade was one factor responsible for domestic stagnation and financial stringency’ (Cottrell 1983 p. 330). Foreign loans were not always fully subscribed, while inflowing funds ‘were often employed with complete disregard for their maturity for the medium- and long-term support of industrial firms’ (ibid. p. 330). But although industrial growth rates slowed after 1929 they were still high by international standards.

Table 4.5 Employment in industry in 1930* Czechoslovakia Hungary Romania Yugoslavia Total** A B A B A B A B A B Mining/Metal/Engineering

406† 37.9 126 40.1 63 23.9 68 33.7 746 35.8 619‡ 9.6 236 5.9 183 1.7 160 2.4 1459 4.7 Textiles/Clothing 319† 29.7 87 27.6 75 28.5 58 28.8 605 29.0 731‡ 11.1 273 6.8 241 2.3 211 3.1 1836 6.0 Quarries/Timber 219† 20.5 42 13.3 59 22.7 40 19.8 377 18.1 796‡ 12.2 203 5.1 174 1.7 176 2.6 1647 5.3 Food Processing 33† 3.1 33 10.4 29 11.0 18 8.7 135 6.7 231‡ 3.5 97 2.4 97 0.9 79 1.2 636 2.1 Chemicals/Paper 97† 8.8 27 8.6 36 13.4 18 9.0 213 10.3 104‡ 1.6 41 1.1 48 0.5 16 0.4 308 1.0 Total 1072† 100.0 315 100.0 263 100.0 202 100.0 2082 100.0 2500‡ 38.2 908 22.7 755 7.2 708 10.6 6031 19.6 Key: A number of workers (,000); B percentage of the total national workforce in mining and manufacturing (but for line two the total gainfully employed population throughout the economy); † miners and factory workers; ‡ total gainfully employed; * Yugoslavia 1931; ** includes Austria (1934) Source: Ronai 1993 pp. 345–6

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

184

Table 4.6 Changing occupational structures in industry 1920s and 1930s Bulgaria Czechoslovakia A B A B

Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia A B A B A B A B

Mining 10 10 116 90 37 44 144 105 79 62 27 12 Metallurgy 5 7 208 215 77 92 215 228 41 51 46 58 Chemicals 13 30 39 13 20 39 48 20 28 11 16 Wood 2 3 62 49 16 15 57 53 40 44 87 42 Building 4 5 144 104 37 32 106 97 19 24 20 17 materials Food 28 37 139 42 45 43 63 63 30 35 79 43 Textiles 5 32 324 272 61 98 197 176 46 82 46 89 Paper 2 2 46 49 14 15 25 29 11 15 15 11 Key: Bulgaria, A 1921, B 1938; Czechoslovakia A 1926, B 1935; Hungary A 1928, B 1937; Poland A 1928, B 1938; Romania A 1928, B 1937; Yugoslavia A 1931, B 1938 Note: Textiles includes Clothing and Leather; Paper includes Publishing Source: Teichova 1985 p. 245

Table 4.7 Industrial production, consumption and trade 1934–7 Production A B

Trade C

D

Consumption E F

Czechoslovakia 1657.2 108.5 186.1 330.0 1513.3 99.1 Iron, Metals and Machinery 725.9 47.5 97.6 108.1 715.4 46.8 Textiles, Clothing and Leather 584.8 38.3 52.6 153.9 483.4 31.6 Chemicals and Paper 248.7 16.3 33.0 30.1 251.6 16.5 Hungary 374.0 41.4 73.1 38.9 408.2 45.2 Iron, Metals and Machinery 117.1 12.9 21.7 19.6 119.2 13.2 Textiles, Clothing and Leather 167.6 18.5 35.3 16.1 186.9 20.7 Chemicals and Paper 69.7 7.7 15.2 2.2 322.8 9.1 Romania 355.7 18.2 128.4 5.8 478.2 24.5 Iron, Metals and Machinery 80.6 4.1 72.8 0.6 152.7 7.8 Textiles, Clothing and Leather 127.1 6.5 39.1 3.4 162.8 8.3 Chemicals and Paper 127.2 6.5 12,9 1.3 138.7 7.1 Yugoslavia 190.3 12.4 108.1 21.1 277.3 18.1 Iron, Metals and Machinery 45.8 3.0 49.0 11.8 82.9 5.4 Textiles, Clothing and Leather 99.2 6.5 42.8 3.6 138.5 9.1 Chemicals and Paper 33.4 2.2 11.7 5.4 39.7 2.6 Key: A $ million; B $ per capita; C imports $ million; D exports $ million; E $ million; F $ per capita Source: Ronai 1993 p. 348

In this way the SEECs ‘overcame the general world tendency towards stagnation or decline during the 1930s’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 482) because a growing native

The First World War, political structures

185

industry limited reliance on agricultural exports. Moreover, a high share of total Romanian oil and timber production was being exported. All Balkan governments passed protective tariffs in the 1930s and unused capacity was put back into production; while modernisation is suggested by the fact that in Romania installed power increased faster than labour (ibid. p. 483). The Romanian state was making significant contributions through higher education and technical training, but M.Manoilescu wanted the state to assume direction for industrial development overall. However, Lampe and Jackson (1982 p. 415) draw attention to the classic dilemma when the encouragement of manufacturing creates the need for semi-finished inputs that the domestic economy cannot easily provide yet disturbs the balance of payments: increasing the domestic production of inputs meant importing more finished goods in the interim—or restricting consumption. There were also problems in Yugoslavia where ‘regional impulses to create a series of separate economies formed a barrier to the integration of the Yugoslav market’ (ibid. p. 414). Dalmatia might import more flour than Vojvodina and Croatia exported, while the rapid growth of industry in the north (helped by low tariffs for inputs) eliminated the artisan production in Macedonia where there were no special regional measures to encourage restructuring. And Yugoslavia could not make rapid progress in the production of heavy machinery since there was a lack of home demand comparable with what was provided by the Romanian oil industry. Reorganisation: concentration for efficiency Since industrialisation traditionally involved substantial state intervention ECE’s post1918 producer-goods industries often began as relatively large-scale units—and despite territorial changes the old industrial-financial groups often re-emerged in new forms. Siemens in Berlin manufactured ‘the full range of electrical goods from generators, transformers, switchgear and cables, through telephone and telegraph apparatus and radio sets to valves, lamps, fuses and switches’ (Findlay 1948 p. 124). They had factories elsewhere in Germany: Plauen (cables and wire) and Sornewitz near Meissen (heating apparatus) as well as numerous foreign associations. In Hungary Ganz merged with Schlick-Nicholson (owners of the Hungarian Motor and Machine Industry Company) and other important companies were absorbed the end of the 1920s. In Czechoslovakia there was the famous A. and T.Bat’a Shoe Company of 1924 established in Zlín in the White Carpathians—the Czech example of welfare capitalism, modelled on the Ford Motor Company and a world leader by 1928. After starting with a few machinists the firm employed 65,000 by 1938 (including 23,000 abroad) and produced 50 million pairs of shoes. Using the most modern American practice the works was a model in vertical integration with a range of associated companies in coalmining, wood processing, oil refining, tanning and machine building. There was a workshop autonomy system and profit sharing, while the company established an enviable record in welfare as well as efficiency which elevated ‘Bat’aism’ almost to an ideology which communist propaganda failed to obscure completely. When the post-war boom halted in 1922, excess capacity provided an opportunity for concentration, realised as ‘the major banks became more than ever in effect industrial holding companies’ (Teichova and Cottrell 1983 p. 52). Škoda merged with the car manufacturer Laurin and Klement of Mladá Boleslav in 1925. With its branches—and

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

186

purchases of existing companies across the region—it employed 37,000 in 1930 before falling in the depression. The Prague engineering company ČKD was formed by a merger in 1927. However, the large firm was very much the exception rather than the rule in ECE and this particular innovation worked its way most unevenly through the central place system. By the Second World War it had largely failed to reach those regions of ECE which lacked a good water supply. In contrast to a few large concerns, ‘on the low technology side of the dual economy a great number of diminutive and dispersed production units survived and performed an important economic function’ (Teichova 1985 p. 273). But there were few medium-sized concerns except in Czechoslovakia. Cartelisation Reference should be made to vertical integration through cartelisation. In 1921 the Czechoslovak steel industry was consolidated by a selling agency (‘prodejna sdružených’)—dominated by Vitkovice and two other large firms—which was influential internationally because ‘Zentraleuropäische Gruppe’ (ZEG) reserved the Czechoslovak market for domestic producers who also secured stakes in Hungary and the SEECs. Romania—with its own ‘Socomet’ cartel which initially comprised Hunedoara and Reşiţa in 1926 but was reconstituted in 1931 to control virtually all the country’s iron and steel capacity—relinquished claims to export and granted ZEG a third of its home market for iron and steel and rolled products, while Yugoslavia, with units at Jesenice, Sisak and Zenica, also agreed to restrict output of rolled goods (Teichova 1985 p. 320). In Poland there was a merger of Silesian foundries into Wspolnóta Interesów GórniczoHutnicznych—with Huta Pokój the only significant other (ibid. p. 303). And Hungarian steel comprised merely the threesome of Rimamurány-Salgótarján, Diósgyőr and Manfréd Weiss with their commercial banks. Germany experienced cartelisation in the chemical industry when the seventeen leading companies of 1907 were consolidated to six in 1913. These comprised two groups of three which had formed cartels in 1904: Hoechst, Cassella and Kalle; Bayer, Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik (BASF) and Aktiengesellschaft für Anilinfabrikation (Agfa)—the last-named being a Berlin firm while all the others were based in western parts of Germany. In 1918—with government support—the whole six came together with Weiler de Meer and Griesheim Chemical Works. Cartels helped recovery and were a force for standardisation and scientific management with specialisation at particular sites. German cartels were also effective internationally: in chemicals through superior technological development and control of the best chemical patents (Steckel 1990 p. 346). The eight firms merged into Interessen Gemeinschaft Farbenindustrie (IGF) in 1924–5—spurred by the ‘authoritarianism’ of Carl Bosch (BASF) and Karl Duisberg (Bayer). It was the largest corporation in Europe and the largest chemical company in the world: for in 1928 IGF had 52.7% of world chemical supply by volume (22.5% for USA firms) and 63.8% by value (ibid. p. 348). In the inter-war period cartelisation of German industry was encouraged by government as a means of boosting organisation, investment and research to regain world markets: ‘the scientific and technical advantage of the Germans was probably the single most important factor in the recovery of their chemical industry’ (ibid p. 349).

The First World War, political structures

187

Another case of rationalisation concerned sugar beet processing when the loss of beet growing areas to Poland led to overcapacity in refining, especially in the West. There was a tendency for combines to emerge to gain the capacity that would allow group ownership of a refinery which in turn would ensure access to privileged finance available only to refiners through the operation of a state-regulated sugar economy— Reichszuckerstelle. A good example discussed by Perkins (1990) was the formation in 1921 of the Union of Central German Raw Sugar Factories (‘Vereinigung mitteldeutscher Rohzuckerfabriken’) in the Halle area, with thirty-one factories plus the Halle refinery (forced to sell out when the union threatened to build its own). By 1923 there were more raw sugar factories joining the combine and it was possible to acquire additional refineries at Rositz and Alten, the latter with a chocolate factory included. The union even set up its own bank. However, all this meant a separation from beet growing and pressure on farmers to take lower prices: this led to the establishment of a growers’ organisation and political action which converted them to the Nazi cause. Foreign investment Much finance for industry came from domestic sources (as before 1914). But despite the logic of autarky (supported by the Liberals in Romania) there was considerable foreign participation. Vienna’s financial role was eclipsed—and there was much instability in banking in general, combined with some specialisation into specific operational areas— yet many old links were able to survive. But given the persistent scarcity of capital there was a substantial inflow of funds. Some capital was only nominally foreign, for example emigrant investment to identify with the homeland or development in Łódź by immigrant Germans who became fully assimilated, but ‘by the mid-1920s nearly all the major banks of ECE had substantial proportions of their equity capital held by foreigners, primarily Americans, Belgians, Dutch, English, French and Germans. This was almost a complete reversal of the situation in 1914 when most of the great Viennese banks had been largely domestically owned and controlled’ (Cottrell 1983 p. 309). But the experience was not altogether satisfactory since the banking sector tended to be too large (arising from the inflationary boom of the early 1920s and—in Hungary’s case—the additional factor of territorial downsizing). Moreover, ‘the largest companies in the mostly highly concentrated industries of ECE were generally wholly or partially owned subsidiaries of Western European multi-national enterprises’ (Teichova and Cottrell 1983 p. 45), especially in mining and metallurgy, chemicals and engineering. The situation arose through the actions of many different companies and governments, but—apart from the speculative inflow of funds in anticipation of quick capital gains in the run-up to the economic stabilisation achieved by 1925—the expansion of Western interests was ‘a way of earmarking the ECE market and forestalling any German export drive to the region which would have come about with a recovery of the German economy’ (Cottrell 1983 p. 312). Moreover, after the October Revolution ‘many Western diplomats and politicians now considered that it was necessary to construct a bulwark against any Bolshevik contagion. Further, the removal of Russia from the capitalist world economy left a vacuum which could be filled in part at least by the substitute markets of the Danube Basin and the Balkans’ (ibid. p. 312). But Allied policy was not monolithic because ‘political aims varied and there was intense rivalry between the various allied powers for

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

188

assets in the area. The degree of concerted action between private companies and state departments also varied’ (ibid. p. 312). Motives for acquiring ECE securities varied over time: ‘the post-war depreciation of local currencies did lead to a speculative inflow of funds in the expectation of a capital gain arising when stabilization was achieved at or near pre-war parities’ (ibid. p. 314). Company profiles Mannesmann Foreign owners were usually keen to present a low profile. Mannesmann’s seamless tube business—located at Chomutov and Klimkovice (formerly Schönbrunn) near Ostrava— prospered in Czechoslovakia after 1918 but with registration as a Czechoslovak firm: the company left their Vienna headquarters and joined the Association of Czechoslovak Industrialists (significantly not the Association of German Industrialists in Czechoslovakia!) to gain shelter from reparation liabilities. Moreover, ‘the national solution of the Czechs’ political claim to independent state-hood had taken the edge off the social struggle and the Czechoslovak government’s social legislation before the end of 1918 had contributed towards reducing strife in industrial relations particularly by the introduction of the eight-hour working day and the promise of works councils’ (Teichova 1983 p. 109). Thus the factories continued production with little disruption and they were able to use advantageous profit transfer mechanisms to forward money to Düsseldorf in such a way that ‘the foreign subsidiary facilitated the transition from war to peace production for the Mannesmann combine as a whole’ (ibid. p. 109). Chomutov had two local coal mines and metal was drawn from Kladno while Klimkovice used Vitkovice. Additionally, Mannesmann was able to buy into the Prague Iron Company and get metal at concessionary prices; though the situation was not so good for Klimkovice because, despite buying into the Frýštat (Freistadt) iron and steel company, the power of Vitkovice was such that Frýštat shares had to be sold to the cartel in 1923 and the works was shut down. Chomutov produced a range of tubes and related products while Klimkovice (with a third of Chomutov’s output) concentrated on gas pipes. In 1925 Chomutov took a majority holding in the water/heating/sewer-pipe maker Rumpel of Teplice-Šanov; and in 1931 full control of Čapek and Reichel (Prague) who went into aircraft tubes. The Chomutov management did their own sales drive in SEE (acting for Mannesmann in this area), thereby gaining a share in the Romanian market. Altogether ‘Mannesmannröhren Werke Komotau’ participated in seven manufacturing companies (including Klimkovice) and eight trading companies, and Mannesmann’s investments across the region were financed out of the Czechoslovak subsidiary’s earnings. The situation became more difficult with the advent of Hitler’s government in Germany for the Czechoslovak authorities kept a more stringent watch on profit transfers—until the two factories were included in the Sudeten territories ceded to Germany in 1939 and the company’s multinational fagade was eliminated.

The First World War, political structures

189

Siemens-Schuckert-Werke Yet German companies could still establish extensive networks: for example, a major German manufacturer of high- and low-voltage electrical equipment with exports to ECE managed from Vienna by the Austrian subsidiary ‘Österreichische Siemens-SchuckertWerke’ (ÖSSW). There were sales companies in Czechoslovakia in 1920, Romania and Yugoslavia in 1922 and Bulgaria in 1923, in addition to subsidiary plants in Budapest and Prague inherited from the pre-war era. In 1937 there was representation of some kind (if only an agency or technical consultancy) in every ECE capital and in eleven provincial centres in Czechoslovakia, four in Yugoslavia and two each in Poland and Romania (H.Schroter 1983 p. 177). Meanwhile, ‘the explicit policy of IGF was that of camouflaging its foreign participation as “national enterprises” in overseas countries in view of growing nationalism’ (V.Schroter 1983 p. 139). The company was always helpful to the German state administration and also maintained ‘cordial support’ for ECE governments to ensure that their interests were safeguarded in Germany’s trade negotiations in the region, as in 1935. Its main Austrian agency, ‘Anilinchemie’ of Vienna, was not simply a sales agency but a means of cooperating with all of Austria’s major chemical companies over cartel agreements and sales operations in Hungary and the Balkans, reserved for IGF under international agreements (though not Czechoslovakia, whose market was restricted by high tariffs and competition from ‘Spolek’ of Ústí nad Labem). ‘Thus IGF and its sales organisation played an important role in the marketing of chemical products in Austria and via Austria in SEE… Further Anilinchemie was also the organizational centre from which IGF’s South-East European export remittances were transferred to Germany to evade exchange controls’ (ibid. pp. 146–7). Germany was in a strong position to withstand competition within ECE and when Ronania wished to produce her own dyestuffs a good deal was offered that would allow IGF to supply in bulk with Romanian packaging applied at the Colorom factory in Codlea, which did not actually produce materials until after 1945. Swedish Match Company Western firms also wanted to exploit the raw materials (like the foreign oil companies in Romania or mining companies in Yugoslavia) or establish branch plants for assembling consumer goods from imported components. The Swedish Match Company (SMC) made progress in the region through taking over national match monopolies with the provision of loans to governments; waiting for ‘good opportunities’ at times when credit was in short supply. SMC—and its Austro-Hungarian rival Solo—were large, horizontally integrated companies operating pre-1914 and the region was traditionally Solo country, although Polish territories were also supplied by German and Russian producers. There was keen competition in the early 1920s, prior to a global agreement in 1925 (when the Baltic States were starting to export strongly) which restricted Solo—now divided into Prague- and Vienna-based national companies. SMC held Solo shares (including a majority in the Vienna company—known only to top directors) but could not fully control the companies given struggles between domestic and foreign shareholders. (Of course, SMC wanted to control Solo’s exports to increase SMC market share.) However,

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

190

SMC was also penetrating the region directly because in 1925 the Polish government gave an exclusive concession for match manufacture through ‘Monzap’—a Polish company controlled by SMC and its American subsidiary (Wikander 1983). When monopoly contracts were also signed with Hungary and Yugoslavia in 1928—in Hungary’s case for fifty years in return for an annual tax lease and a $36 million loan— SMC bought factories in both countries and collaborated with others in which Solo had shares, though no longer overall control. There was a breakthrough in Romania in 1929 through a large stabilisation and development loan of $101 million issued by an international group of banking houses—mainly French and American. These studies raise an interesting general question as to whether foreign subsidiaries give rise to economic independence or ‘new dependencies’—and did the situation vary between Czechoslovakia and the SEECs? Since IGF’s investments in ECE were seen as complementary to German needs and not substitutive, it is unclear if this self-interest helped or hampered autonomous industrial development. ECE plants often mirrored German production and, as with Chomutov, profits went back to Germany; while Siemens avoided foreign investments in order to maintain exports from Germany and only went ahead—very quickly—if important markets like Czechoslovakia were in danger of being lost to competitors. There was a tension between firms’ interests in maximising profits around the world—to facilitate the global supply of raw materials— and the Hitlerite interest in ‘Grosswirtschaft Südosteuropa’ with ‘Reichsmarkbloc’ exchange controls. ‘Siemens always acted loyally in concert with the foreign policy of the German government and industry as a whole during both the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich’, although the company hesitated to act like other German enterprises and ‘was very reluctant to become involved in the trend of backward integration of raw material supplies’ (H.Schroter 1983 p. 188). Mining in Yugoslavia The region retained substantial resources (Table 4.8)—including some that would not be discovered for some decades—but only occasionally were they compelling for foreign capital. Yugoslavia was an exception, so much so that foreign capital accounted for some 75% of total investment in this sector compared with 42% in industry as a whole. There were closures during the depression years followed by rapid expansion stimulated by German capital from 1935. French capitalists started operations at Bor in Serbia in 1919 and when output approached 1 million tonnes of copper in 1939 (plus some gold and silver) it was Europe’s largest and most profitable mine west of the USSR. Yet Yugoslavia’s domestic copper needs had to be imported until 1936 when the Stojadinović government opened a refinery for electrolytic copper large enough (12,000-tonne capacity in 1938) to export to her Little Entente partners: Czechoslovakia and Romania. The lead-zinc workings started at Mežica in Slovenia by an Austrian company before 1914 fell into British hands after the war but the operation was overtaken by a new venture at Trepča in southern Serbia where UK capital was again involved. The 1939 output of 700,000 tonnes from the single Stari Trg mine accounted for four-fifths of national lead-zinc output (and there were small quantities of pyrites and silver too). As smelting developed in the 1930s Zvečan (on the Belgrade-Skopje railway) and Sabac, close to the capital, became the largest of six units that supplemented the inherited

The First World War, political structures

191

Mežica plant. Finished metal could now be exported which gave Yugoslavia greater advantage from what was reputed to be the cheapest lead ore in the world, frequently sold four or five years ahead of production. Much of the country’s chrome came from Orašje in Macedonia through the British company Allantini Mines, though Germany’s JugoChrome became the major purchaser. However, by the late 1930s much of the chrome was being diverted to the domestic steel industry and ferrochrome plants were located on the Adriatic coast near Šibenik and near Maribor in Slovenia. Antimony was mined and smelted at Krupanj in Serbia while pyrites was worked on a modest scale mainly at Majdanpek and Trepča. Finally, Yugoslavia produced a tenth of the world’s bauxite in 1939, initially at Sinj with rail transport to the coast provided for export to Germany from Šibenik or Split. In 1937 the first aluminium smelter came on stream at Lozovac near Šibenik but with peak production of 2,800 tonnes in 1940 this accounted for only a fraction of the bauxite output of 400,000 tonnes. Although German capital backed a second smelter at Mostar in Herzegovina no further capacity was opened until after the war. Industrial sectors: some salient features Heavy industry Hungary’s steel industry was disrupted by the loss of capacity in mining and iron production to the successor states, and until the dynamism of heavy industry was reasserted during the war years Hungary fell back on lighter manufactures. Although

Table 4.8 Mineral resources and production 1928– 1938 COAL (brown coal/lignite unless* denoting hard coal) (reserves million metric quintals; production in thousand tonnes)

Reserves Production

Bulgaria: Burgas, Lom, Maritsa, Pernik Czechoslovakia*: Kladno, Ostrava Czechoslovakia: Eger, Karlovy Vary, Most, Nitra Germany: Borna, Görlitz, Naumburg Hungary*: Komló, Pécs Hungary: Dorog, Miskolc, Ózd, Salgórarján, Tatabánya Poland*: Upper Silesia Romania: Petroşani, Oltenia, Doiceşti Yugoslavia: Tuzla, Kraljevo, Trbovlje OIL (thousand tonnes) and GAS (million km3) Hungary: Debrecen, Hajdúszoboszló, Karcag Poland: Boryslav, Drohobycz, Jaslo Romania: Dâmboviţa, Prahova, Transylvania Yugoslavia: Bujavica IRON ORE (including chrome/manganese iron ore) (reserves million tonnes; production thousand tonnes) Czechoslovakia: Krušna Hóra, Nučice, Dobšiná, Spiš

920 8,657 1119,883 n.a. 160 1,431 58,800 2,675 3,440 Oil 0.0 504.0 6475.0 0.0

n.a. 12,674 a 16,007 b 31,519 a 1,023 a 6,033 a n.a. 1,711 b 4,134 b Gas 4.2 i 584.5 i 1809.2 i 2.4 i

637.0 1528.4 ch

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

192

Germany: Silesia; Thüringischer-Frankischer Wald 120.0 526.1 f Hungary: Rudabánya 79.5 290.0 h Poland: Kromolów, Szczecno 134.0 469.0 Romania: Hunedoara, lacobeni, Plavişeviţa, Reşiţa 33.4 77.3 e Yugoslavia: Ljubija, Stari Majdan, Vareš 494.0 569.0 h BAUXITE (reserves million tonnes; production thousand tonnes) Hungary: Gánt, Sümeg, Iszkaszentgyörgy 157 529.5 h Romania: Bihor 3 n.a. Yugoslavia: Bosnia, Istria, Montenegro 48 527.1 h COPPER, GOLD and SILVER, LEAD and ZINC (reserves million tonnes’ production thousand tonnes) Bulgaria: Pavel, Plakalnica n.a. 32.5 d Czechoslovakia: Pribřam, Spiš n.a. 197.3 gh Germany: Upper Silesia (Beuthen) n.a. 423.5 c Poland: Bolesław, Olkusz n.a. 64.5 g Romania: Alba, Baia Mare, Bihor 14 661.5 e Yugoslavia: Bor, Golubac, Majdanpek 33 1365.1 h Key: a 1930–8 average; b 1934–7 average; c 1928; d 1930; e 1934; f 1935; g 1936; h 1937; i 1938 Source: Ronai 1993 pp. 320–40

some new blast furnace capacity was built in Trianon Hungary, for example, Diósgyőr in the 1920s (a location with a good water supply where the necessary inputs could be assembled), there was a greater emphasis on steel produced from scrap or from imported pig iron (the loss of hard coal could be made good only through greater dependence on low-grade lignite). There was some compensation through bauxite which was initially exported unprocessed. Quarrying at Ajka started in 1932, production from scattered fields was brought in by the Halimba railway and a start was made in processing, although it was some time before Hungary created its own aluminium industry. Elsewhere, iron ore was a major constraint, for only Yugoslavia had enough to meet national requirements, but a limited home market meant that Poland could not increase steel output over the 1913 level because the engineering industry was not large or diverse enough to absorb former German capacity, and the ambitious plan for a Central Industrial Region was not realised by 1939. Indeed, the engineering industry had to cut back, despite diversification into electrical equipment and export orders for railway rolling stock and agricultural machinery. Overall production in engineering and metal goods did well, with impressive growth of metal and machine production in Romania and Yugoslavia. While small producers were dispersed through Bohemia and eastern Germany, there were major innovative companies in the leading cities, like H.Cegielski in Poznań, and Ganz-Mávag and Malaxa in Budapest. In the case of Carl Zeiss Jena there was great progress in aerial photography, so much so that in 1931 the Aerotopographic Company of Dresden amalgamated with Zeiss and moved to Jena. Hungary demonstrated the importance of export to break out of a limited home market. From 1928 Ganz were successful in foreign markets with their diesel trains; followed by river- and ocean-going motor vessels from 1933; while their range of massproduced electrical goods was complemented by the wireless valves of the United Incandescent Lamp Company. Mávag and Manfréd Weiss experimented with small runs

The First World War, political structures

193

for tractors, threshing machines, lorries, buses and machine tools. Although there was some specialisation—for electrical engineering was most competitive for exports, while much machinery for light industry and machine tools was imported—it may be that the range of goods was too wide and there was insufficient consolidation into large organisations geared to specialised production. Chemicals The region was not entirely lacking in plant to produce inorganic chemicals—yielding alkalis, ammonia, chlorine, sulphuric acid and superphosphate—and mineral chemicals such as phosphates, potassium fertilisers and sodium salts. Locations emphasised the coalfields of Czechoslovakia and Poland and the oilfields of Romania; while Yugoslavia made do with low-grade coal and non-ferrous metallurgy (as did Romania in the case of Baia Mare and Zlatna)—although carbide factories were based on hydropower at Dugirat near Omiš (also an ammonia and fertiliser producer), Ruše near Maribor, and Šibenik. Hungary’s industry was small but new plant was installed to take power from the Budapest generators, including the nitrogen and explosives works at Pét (1928). However, Romania’s situation was most interesting on account of the methane gas that came on stream. Discovered accidentally in 1908 (when prospectors were seeking potassium salts) and harnessed for use as a fuel during and after the First World War, thought turned to the use of this very pure gas as a raw material for chemistry in the 1930s. Production of carbon black for the tyre industry began at Copşa Mică in 1936 and an ammonia plant opened at Târnaveni in the same year: it ‘must be considered the first plant in the world producing hydrogen out of methane gas in the field of ammonia industry’ (Florescu 1973 p. 32). Not only was ammonia basic to the production of fertiliser, plastics and synthetic fibres (through such intermediates as urea, hydrogen cyanide and acrylonitrile) but the dissociation of methane to produce ammonia also yields acetylene—an intermediate needed to produce plastics, synthetic rubber and Pharmaceuticals and hence the pivot for an expanding methane-based chemical industry. Textiles The textile industry retained some high levels of concentration, for the town of Łódź accounted for 80% of Polish cotton production and 40% of the woollen goods output with much of the balance in Białystok, Pabianice and Zgierz. However, trade barriers were now formidable and the factories in Białystok fell from 113 in 1922 to 68 in 1937 through depression and the loss of the Russian market. Czechoslovakia had to make a similar adjustment and since textiles grew fast in Hungary—even during the depression—some firms relocated in Hungary to retain their markets or used surplus equipment to start branch plants. Hungarian firms purchased second-hand, technically obsolete equipment from both Austria and Czechoslovakia to serve a now-protected market endowed with more cotton cloth in 1929 than Imperial Hungary had registered in 1913. The transformation of the Goldberger concern in Budapest from a purely finishing enterprise to an integrated concern with large new factories in Kelenföld and Óbuda was characteristic of the transformation. Meanwhile, textiles (and building materials) were in great demand in Romania and the thorough reorganisation of the sector must rank as a

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

194

major achievement of the period. Textiles were also a success in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia with substitution by more domestic production thanks to tariff protection even though rates in Yugoslavia were relatively low. Indeed, SEE saw some relocation of plant from Czechoslovakia and Poland. There was a trend towards artificial fibres, based on the naturally occurring polymer cellulose. They were being produced before the First World War (especially the ‘silk-like’ materials derived from acetate rayon and celanese) but there was a big expansion in the inter-war period, requiring in turn larger quantities of caustic soda and soda ash. A large plant for the latter emerged at Bernburg near the Stassfurt salt field, linked with Deutsche Celluloid Fabrik at Eilenburg. There were also factories in Czechoslovakia (Svit) and Poland (Łódź), while Romania opened small factories for cellulose fibres in Bucharest (‘Viscofil’) and at Lupeni near Petroşani (‘Viscoza’) in 1935 and 1937, respectively. Meanwhile, entirely synthetic material could be produced following the discovery of nylon by the IGF laboratories at Wolfen in 1932 in the course of research on PVC. While Wolfen concentrated on artificial silk, the technological breakthrough was applied through production of caprolactam at Leuna to produce perlon (nylon) fibre at Landsberg (Gorzów) in 1938. By the Second World War rayon textiles were being produced at Glauchau, Pirna and Plauen. Finally, it should not be overlooked that the factories did not immediately eliminate domestic production since marketing organisations like ‘Albina’ and ‘Furnica’ in Romania gave work to peasant women as well as carpet weavers based in the convents so that traditional use of vegetable dyes continued. Food The general pattern was one of growth, but there was decline in Hungary despite the growth of new branches such as canning, chocolate and meat/milk processing. Milling output fell and the technological lead was lost as plant slumped into obsolescence because high tariffs meant a loss of foreign markets (though the industry was still exporting on balance). Preference for cane sugar was damaging to the Hungarian sugar beet industry and a declining market for beer, partly caused by cheap wine, brought some conversion of Budapest breweries to other activities in the food, chemical and textile sectors. There was also a problem of raw material to supply all the Budapest flour and sugar factories. Romania’s performance in food processing was also poor—as in wood processing and leather—due to dependence on agriculture and forest production as well as exports and the need for more import substitution (Jackson 1986 p. 241). Industrial regions It is not the intention to examine this topic in depth since much of the detail given in Chapter 2 may be carried over. But it should be emphasised that spatial variations remained outstanding—with contrasts between manufacturing complexes drawing in raw materials and areas of primary production with limited local processing—despite the obligations of the new states to promote locations on both social and strategic grounds. Thus the Czechoslovak state secured a measure of economic development for the easternmost province of Ruthenia, even if the obligation to grant autonomy was not activated until 1937. The northern part of the region remained the more dynamic with

The First World War, political structures

195

both expansion and diversification. Chemnitz was active in the familiar industrial progression from bicycles to motorcycles and cars, emerging as capital of the German Auto Union in 1932. There was much subcontracting throughout the area. Urbanisation levels increased and growing prosperity led to an expansion of leisure interests. There were also variations within countries and these are broadly evident from figures for Romania presented by Jackson (1986 p. 243) showing the trend from 1913 (=100) which for the country has a whole was downwards to 1919 (60.8) with partial recovery to 1929 (89.9). The former kingdom (Regat) scored 65 and 79.6, while the new territories generally did better: especially Transylvania, with 56.7 and 109.6 and Banat with 67.4 and 111.7. Bucovina lost heavily during the war and sank to 31.6 in 1919 before recovering strongly to 88.1 in 1929, but Bessaraia (with 52.4 and 32.6) was clearly unable to compete. Significant in these variations was the great variation in energy supply, for industrialists could hardly lose sight of the Prahova-Dâmboviţa oilfields, the Transylvanian natural gas and the coalfields of Anina and Petroşani. Individual cities were outstanding in various ways. Budapest (with 65.3% of Hungary’s industrial workers in 1920) made progress in the chemical, glass, footwear and paper industries but most of all in textiles. With the capital comprising so much of the home market, assembly plants set up by foreign firms tended to gravitate to the city. The role of fringes was reinforced especially in Kispest and Újpest with glass, paper and chemicals; and there was much expansion in Csepel and Óbuda. Ports were also dynamic places: none more so than Gdynia—a fishing village of 1,000 people that was transformed into Poland’s largest Baltic port. A plan of 1922 envisaged a population of 60,000 but 125,000 was reached in 1939. While part of the former housing area was rezoned for the port, new tenements produced ‘typical corridor streets, monotonous and dull [while] the main trading centre came into being spontaneously in the busiest street where the ground floors were occupied by shops and the upper stories by dwellings’ (Ostrowski 1966 p. 43); shanty towns appeared on the outskirts. It will be explained later how the success of Gdynia opened up the idea of a strategic waterway link between the Baltic and Black seas, making use of the Dniester Valley. This plan was not activated but Gdynia gained from the diversion of much traffic—cement and fertiliser imports and sugar beet exports—that had previously gone to Stettin (Szczecin) whose hinterland was now restricted by the new border. But Stettin did gain from a new grain-store (1935–6) and synthetic oil manufacture at nearby Pölitz (Police) while shipbuilding, timber/cellulose, milling and brewing/alcohol industries continued. On the Adriatic shipbuilding started at Kraljevica and Split in the inter-war period, while in the Black Sea theatre Galaţi expanded its engineering and metallurgical industries. Regional planning There was little formal regional planning but there are two significant examples. In 1929 plans were drawn up by J.Piłsudski for a rapid expansion of state industry (armaments, chemicals and steel), combined with a growth of coal exports. The programme got under way in the 1930s. And after the Association of Polish Town Planners highlighted the poor environmental conditions in Upper Silesia and the inadequacies in the infrastructure of the capital city—along with rural problems of overpopulation, fragmented smallholdings and soil erosion—a state investment plan was launched for 1936–40 to

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

196

focus on backward areas east of Vistula (‘Poland B’ as distinct from the more developed western territories comprising ‘Poland A’). Building on the planning offices recently established in three Carpathian areas seeking a development in tourism, a total of eleven regional planning commissions set up in 1937 involved 40% of Polish territory: the main urban areas in the west—Gdynia and the ‘corridor’ region, Kraków, Kielce, Łódź, Poznań and Upper Silesia; four regions in the east—Białystok, Carpathians, Lwów and Wolyn; and a central industrial region between Kraków and Lwów (centred in the Sandomierz Depression with the water resources of the Vistula-San confluence) where the Ministry of Defence was in control with the aim of developing strategic industries in a secure location (Hamilton 1982). There was an aircraft complex at Mielec started in 1938 (with aircraft engine production planned for Rzeszów) and Poland’s first synthetic rubber plant was built at Dębica—both locations in the Wisłoka Valley. But Kuliś (2000) explains that the main project was located at what became known as Stalowa Wola (1948) where Zakłady Południowe was founded in 1937 with the intention of installing electric steel and aluminium foundries. Elsewhere the greatest progress was made in Warsaw with a unified approach for development linked with work, residence and recreation developed by J.Chmielewski and S.Syrkus to relieve congestion. Work stopped with invasion in 1939 and so it was impossible for the planning to ‘exert any specific influence on investment trends and spatial change’ (Zaremba 1966 p. 274) although the experience was useful in documenting disparities, resources and developing planning methods. It is interesting to speculate on what might have been possible. Certainly regional planning would have gone much further in areas like Łódź and Upper Silesia but industries were another matter for budget limits restricted growth and state enterprises were less efficient than their privately owned counterparts. Yugoslavia also tried to create an industrial heartland in the 1930s after the government decided to order new plant from Krupp in Germany for steelmaking at Zenica in Bosnia on the basis of iron ore of Vareš (first worked in 1917 and smelted at Krepuli with imported coke or charcoal obtained from the Teslić wood distillation plant). ‘Jugočelik’ was incorporated as a state enterprise in 1938 to modernise Zenica with its iron ore and lignite mines. Nazi representatives subsequently arranged for the credits and equipment needed to put several Siemens-Martin furnaces into operation by 1939 (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 517). Meanwhile, Yugoslavia’s inherited steelworks were concentrated on the northern edge of the country at Jesenice, Ravne and Štore in Slovenia and they were now cut off from iron ore in Styria and dependent on ore from Ljubija in Croatia (some of which was smelted locally). However, lack of coking coal restricted pig-iron output in Yugoslavia to 84,000 tonnes in 1939, and the much higher steel output of 235,000 tonnes was achieved through the use of scrap and imported pig iron, which was particularly fundamental to the working of a new steel mill built on the Danube at Smederevo. But while ECE industry necessarily tended to concentrate in regions and business centres with an infrastructure, including a skilled workforce and a market, growth in the smaller towns was limited by the poverty of agriculture (though some craftsmen survived mass production). Only in Bohemia and Germany did industry extend significantly from large to medium and small towns. By contrast ‘many small rural settlements in Balkan countries were, because of the closed economy, almost out of the direct scope of industrialisation’ (Mihailović 1972 p. 6). Inherited small-scale manufacturing lacked growth potential. Thus Macedonia suffered further pauperisation

The First World War, political structures

197

through overpopulation and the low prices for tobacco and opium by the state monopoly, while industry was ‘steered’ towards Serbia proper and development of a quality labour force was hardly assisted by the closure of most secondary schools closed after 1927. In Romania, Bessarabia was distinctly marginalised and northern Moldavia stagnated as some of the towns went into decline—notably Botoşani which had previously maintained trade links with the Habsburg Empire. The main industrial triangle: capital-intensive production—chemicals in central Germany Previous reference has been made to manufacturers in Bitterfeld: Agfa (manufacturer of cotton dyes and photographic materials) and Griesheim-Elektron (producer of bleaching powder). In 1925 both were brought into the massive Frankfurt-based dyeing syndicate IGF which (as already noted) began as a cartel in 1916, with the eight member firms subsequently merging into a single corporation. IGF was very much at the centre of a spate of innovations which boosted chemical production in the area on a massive scale, particularly at Leunawerke near Merseburg. First, a new chemical route into fertiliser production was found through synthetic ammonia obtained by combining the nitrogen of the atmosphere with the hydrogenation of water—very significant when Chilean nitrate was cut off during the war and nitrogen compounds were needed for explosives and fertilisers. The process was devised electrolytically by K.Birkeland and S.Eyde and subsequently (under pressure) by F.Haber in 1909, a great success for his company BASF which went on to apply the technique on an industrial scale at Oppau near Ludwigshafen in 1913 under C.Bosch. Central Germany also became involved in the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen, first applied at Westregeln near Magdeburg in 1905, but on a much greater scale at Leuna in 1916 with capacities for sulphuric acid and synthetic ammonia production. A munitions crisis in 1915 resulted in Bosch’s perfection of a technique whereby ammonia could be converted into nitric acid (essential for the production of gunpowder). This resulted in the decision to establish a huge Haber-Bosch high-pressure plant at Leuna in 1917. The importance of this plant was then increased immediately after the war when Oppau was threatened by French occupation of the Rhineland; whereupon the plant was transferred to Leuna which subsequently became known as Ammoniakwerke Merseburg—a major fertiliser producer, along with another plant established at Piesteritz near Wittenberg in 1915 to produce nitrogen compounds for explosives and fertilisers. Also at Leuna hydrogenation came on stream in 1927 to derive motor spirit from coal, using a process perfected in 1925 by F.Fischer and H.Tropsch. First revealed by F.Bergius in 1909, it involved a production route through ethylene to acetylene and the hydrogenation of the latter to yield high-grade fuel and lubricants. IGF were interested because they believed that loss of their Haber-Bosch monopoly would soon lead to a glut in the supply of synthetic nitrates. A new enterprise was needed and oil production from coal seemed an attractive prospect, especially with the announcement in 1926 (when work started adjacent to Leuna’s Haber-Bosch installation) that American oilfields could sustain current production levels for only another six years. IGF then cooperated with Standard Oil over the synthetic option which was unfortunately overtaken by both the depression and the discovery of new American oilfields in Texas. On the other hand Hitler appreciated the strategic advantages of self-sufficiency in oil

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

198

and in 1933 he approved expansion at Leuna that would raise capacity to over 300,000 tonnes by 1937. Even more important was the discovery of synthetic solid materials known as plastics. Bakelite had been known since the beginning of the century but this ‘thermosetting plastic’ could not be remoulded after the initial application of heat. By contrast, research into uses of acetylene revealed processes for the preparation of ‘electric plastics masses’ (thermoplastics)—which could be reprocessed—through the synthesis of vinyl chloride. Given the dangerous flammability of first-generation plastics like celluloid—and the opportunity to derive ‘Buna’ synthetic rubber from the polymerisation of vinyl chloride—this work proved momentous, and great progress was made in Germany in the 1930s in connection with polyvinyl chloride (PVC) using acids and alcohols derived from the Fischer-Tropsch process. The desire for a high level of self-sufficiency in the event of war also had a considerable bearing on the development of synthetic rubber production. Bayer claimed some success in 1915 and during the First World War hard rubber was made available for batteries, magnetos and other electrical equipment, though such material was not suitable for tyres. After an initial lapse after the war, Bayer and IGF together undertook research which resulted in the production of styrenebutadiene rubber (‘Buna S’) in the early 1930s at Bunawerke in Schkopau near Merseburg. And when depression undermined the initiative it was Hitler’s overriding concern for selfsufficiency that restored interest in this rather rudimentary substitute, for the military interest in Buna tyres resulted in a growth of production from 200 to 1,000 tonnes per month. The growth of the chemical complex called for more electricity and hence the lignite-burning power station at nearby Golpa-Zschornewitz (1915) and subsequently the Lauta-Trattendorf complex in the Cottbus area. The main industrial triangle: Upper Silesia There was unrest in the Silesian coalfield during 1919–21—a heavily contested area where a new boundary was drawn across ‘a great complexity of intimate associations’ (Hartshorne 1933 p. 222)—prior to the Geneva Agreement and partition by League of Nations in 1922 whereby the Poles got 30% of the area, 46% of the population, twothirds of the steel capacity and three-quarters of the coal mines. The settlement left 625,000 Poles in Germany and 260,000 Germans in Poland. The agreement was the last for fifteen years and ensured a measure of economic and social integration (utilities like electricity and water) in an area where a complete severance of the infrastructure would have caused great hardship. Nevertheless, there was some disruption after 1937 followed by renewed integration: first within Grossdeutschland during the Second World War; and second within the Polish state from 1945. However, there was no general agreement for the free exchange of goods between the two parts of the region, despite the fact that some ironworks were cut off from their coal supplies and zinc mines from galvanising works. In 1921 Germany agreed to take 6 million tonnes of Polish coal annually for three years but this was followed by a complete embargo in 1925 through an ‘economic war’ which harmed east Silesian mines when Germans preferred to invest in their own territory rather than take risks in a ‘Saisonstaat’ next door. Poland then had to rail the surplus coal to Gdynia by an indirect route (and at nil cost to the producer) in order to seek export markets—a procedure which laid the basis for a direct ‘coal railway’ in later years.

The First World War, political structures

199

Integration in the German part included a merger in 1926 of the Obereisen, Oberbedarf and Donnersmarckhütte companies of Hindenburg (Zabrze) to create one of the greatest German companies—Vereinigte Oberschlesische Huttenswerke AG (‘Oberhütten’)—though it did not control the former Russian-based works that were sold after the war. The group had an ironworks and cokery at Hindenburg, iron mines in the Sudeten Mountains and Austria, foundries in Gleiwitz (Gliwice) and Ozimek (Małapane)—a former royal ironworks—a mining equipment factory in Waldenburg (Wałbrzych) and a new armaments factory in the Gleiwitz suburb of Laband (Labędy). In the 1930s the conglomerate owned ten iron and steel plants, seven large collieries, coking plants, power plants and more than a dozen engineering works in Germany and Poland. Gleiwitz had a major role since the Bellestrem family moved the seat of their entire industrial and agricultural businesses to the town in 1922; as did the Schaffgotsch group who relocated the headquarters of their business—including coal mines, Beuthen (Bytom) power station and coking plant near Ruda (Ruda Śląska) as well as the large, new plant at Derschnitz (Zdzieszowice)—from Beuthen to Gleiwitz. While Beuthen was close to the border and away from the Breslau (Wrocław) railway and Hindenburg only gained municipal status in 1922, Gleiwitz was the principal town: a high-ranking shopping and service centre for German Upper Silesia with institutions and utility/health insurance companies, air services (from 1925) and a regional radio station, not to mention the seat of the High Command of the Allied Force (a peace-keeping force supervising the plebiscite in Upper Silesia until 1922). Katowice had a similar role in the Polish part, and was a district (voivodship) capital, although Chorzów was larger. The main Polish companies moved to Katowice in the 1920s but the town always has its roots primarily in non-industrial functions, whereas Gleiwitz had its own industrial base. Germany pushed ahead to maximise coal output from her remaining bridgehead: rising from 8 million tonnes in 1920 to 28 million in the 1930s, with investment by the Bellestrem, Donnersmarck, Giesches and Thiele-Winckler estates. Coking coal was now practically exhausted and alternative supplies were obtained from Waldenburg to smelt ore that now came from Sweden. But rising costs limited enthusiasm for modernisation and several old smelters were closed and dismantled (Borsig, Donnersmarck and Gleiwitz) leaving Bobrek and Julien as the principal units. Coastal locations seemed more profitable: hence new investment at Stettin. However, steelmaking was more persistent given the demand in Upper Silesia itself and in eastern Germany generally. Open-hearth furnaces could supply this market using locally generated scrap (plus some imported material). Much of the output was from Laband but an integrated works at Julien was anticipated just before the Second World War. Reference should also be made to a large zinc refinery by the Breslau firm Georg von Giesche’s Erben in 1932–3. Meanwhile, in the east the situation changed dramatically as an independent Polish state took over Dabrowa and the former German towns now known as Katowice, Nowy Bytom, Siemianowice and Świętochłowice. To increase cohesion in the new Polish state, Upper Silesia was portrayed as a distinct industrial region—albeit with forested landscapes on the margins—with a hardworking population, but there were serious problems of integration through inheriting German and Russian territory, including a coal industry far in excess of domestic requirements: hence the search for export markets was a constant preoccupation. Despite a tariff war with Germany, the UK general strike of 1926 gave access to a significant part of the European coal market, and in view of the difficult

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

200

relations with Danzig the Gdynia port project that had started in 1922 accelerated during 1926–30. A new agreement with Germany in 1930 provided one outlet while the Danubian countries took small quantities but a breakthrough occurred with the completion of the railway to Gdynia in 1931 which opened the way for export by sea. Meanwhile, the metallurgical industry faced the same problem as in Germany: coking coal was imported from Czechoslovakia and Germany while the low-grade domestic iron ores of Częstochowa were worked under the stimulus of a high tariff barrier—even though the high phosphorous content limited their use. The main units were in and around Katowice, including Baildon to the west and Ferrun to the east (supplying the engineering industry in Kraków) but imports of scrap were needed to produce the steel required. In the late 1930s further growth in Upper Silesia was rejected in favour of a central industrial region at the Vistula-San confluence where a new steel works was planned for Stalowa Wola. Backward areas The timber industry in Romania As noted in the previous chapter, the Carpathians—containing vast quantities of oakbeech and spruce-fir timber—have great value for wood processing, not to mention the security function of extensive forests and the importance of sheep grazing, hunting and the harvesting of accessory products such as berries and medicinal plants. With the construction of a mainline railway system, sawmills could be installed at strategic points where raw timber could be supplied from the upper reaches of each drainage basin— initially by floating logs down the river but subsequently by using railways and roads which avoided loss and quality deterioration. The weight of beechwood was also a consideration since this made floating difficult and exploitation tended to concentrate on catchments with large stands of resinous timber—particularly the Eastern Carpathians— which the market desired. In this area Reghin, Topliţa and Gheorgheni were sawmilling centres on the semi-circular Transylvanian line from Braşov to Târgu Mureş while Nehoiu and Piatra Neamţ were situated on branch lines and Comandău lay in the heart of a remote forested area that required a narrow-gauge railway to get both raw material to the mill and finished production to the standard-gauge railhead. Narrow-gauge railways (760mm became popular) were quite inexpensive to build and operate for wood could be used as a locomotive fuel and logs could be strapped to bogies without the need for container wagons. The feasibility of the railway was enhanced by the generally downstream flow of timber which meant that, apart from stores and equipment, trains working against the gradient consisted only of empty rolling stock. Some forest roads were built before the Second World War but usually as accessories to railway systems: they have become the primary means of transport only since the 1960s with the development of road vehicles. The commercial companies employed steam power to produce large quantities of sawn timber (‘cherestea’) for export. Until suitable processing methods became available demand tended to focus on resinous timber (fir and spruce) which was found above the beech layer. Enterprise groupings in the timber industry highlight five arbitrary statistical areas in the Eastern Carpathians: Gheorgheni-Miercurea Ciuc with 5,420 workers and

The First World War, political structures

201

6,070hp of installed power; followed by Pojorita-Vatra Dornei with 2,740 and 3,480, respectively; Covasna-Nehoiu with 2,610 and 3,800; Comăneşti-Dărmăneşti with 2,530 and 4,630; and Târgu Mureş-Topliţa with 2,090 and 3,020. Figures for 1931–5 suggest that 18 million cubic metres of timber were being exploited annually: 10 million for processing and 8 million for firewood. Not all factories were concerned with sawmilling, however. The production of furniture was well established and some towns enjoyed particularly high reputations, notably Pâncota near Arad. Wood distillation was undertaken at Reşiţa as part of the expansion of the works during the Second World War. A complex network of narrow-gauge railways developed south of Anina immediately before and after the First World War and wood distillation at Carşa in the Miniş Valley was efficient in the context of a gravity flow of timber (and limiting to haulage of raw timber over the ridge between Anina and Steierdorf). However, the cutting of much of Carşa’s catchment brought about a switch to Reşiţa by means of a new narrow-gauge railway to Secu to join the established timber transport canal system in the Bârzava Valley (integrated with hydropower production). Romania also inherited a chain of paper mills including Letea (Bacău) and Piatra Neamţ in Moldavia, Buşteni in Wallachia, and Petreşti and Prundul Bârgăului in Transylvania. The commercial companies operated side by side with small-scale industry in the hands of peasants working small private forests to serve a more local market. Allocation of woodlands to peasant families under the land reform strengthened this smaller scale of operation which typically gave rise to small water-powered sawmills (‘joagăre de apă’) along Carpathian streams. In some cases the sawmill was one element in a complex of mills covering corn milling and fulling as well. There were about 1,400 water-powered sawmills in Romania in 1940 and the industry was sufficiently buoyant for some entrepreneurs to graduate to larger premises, as in the case of the Dinculescu mill built at Baia de Fier in 1930. Timber was floated a distance of some 20km down the Galben and Olteţ rivers in spring (when the water level was at its highest), while the finished planks (‘scânduri’) were taken on by cart to the nearest railhead at Târgu Carbuneşti. New transport systems with particular reference to the Eastern Carpathians Following the previous review of this area (Figure 2.8), many new forest railways were built in the inter-war period: Caşin (1920), Oituz (1929)—using a former ‘Deutsche Heeresfeldbahn’—and Comănesţi in Moldavia (1936); Reghin (1916) by ‘Górgenyi Erdei Iparvasut’ (Gurghiu Forest Railway)—when the area was still under Hungarian administration—and Rastoliţa by Waldindustrie (1928) in Transylvania; and Vişeu de Sus in Maramureş (1932) where localised floating of timber finally came to an end. The early 1920s also saw construction in Banat at Berzasca—on the Danube at the Iron Gates—and at Margina in the east. There were two interesting developments in the Eastern Carpathian case-study area highlighted in the previous chapter. Although the connections between the Götz and Grödel systems in the Bâsca valleys led to some timber trains crossing the frontier, the creation of Greater Romania increased the coordination across the main Carpathian watershed so that from the Transylvanian side railways could be extended to access valuable timber on the upper surfaces on the Moldavian side, rather than have separate feeders working down to mills on the eastern

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

202

side (Figure 4.5). This was a reflection of distance but also of height because the firspruce forests lay at 1,000–1,600m. So from the forests of the Bâsca Mare and the logging centre of Comandău—with its narrow-gauge railway contact with Covasna which included an inclined plane (‘siclău’) to reach the standard-gauge railhead—the railway was extended over watershed into Vrancea—with further inclines at Goru and Verdele— to work 4,000ha in the Năruja Valley from 1928. This large commercial bloc, dominated by the Grödel and Fraţia/Năruja companies, was presumably undermined only by Romania’s loss of southern Transylvania in 1940 which restored the frontier close to the main watershed. However, because the Nehoiu-based Götz empire had expanded northwards and a funicular connected the upper Bâsca Mică and the Zăbala Valley in Vrancea there was the possibility of an all-Romanian route from the Vrancea forests to the sawmill at Nehoiu. Furthermore, funiculars were used much more extensively. Although the Tişiţa system had extended from Mărăseşti, to the Vrancea Mountains, the crossing of the Şuşiţa-Putna watershed between Soveja and Tulnici reduced the efficiency of rail transport. The system was therefore closed at the lower end while the Putna section operated in isolation with funicular links of up to 10km with Colonia Zernea on the

Figure 4.5 Forest railways in the Covasna area of Transylvania Ghelinta system near Bretcu (from where another funicular accessed timber on the high ground north of Lăcăuţ), Lepşa on the Oituz system (not to be confused with Lepşa in Vrancea) and Scutaru on the Caşin system. Available dates include 1932 for Lepşa—also the date for the forest railway to the Oituz sawmill—and 1936 for Scutaru. In the latter case there was also a funicular into tributary valleys—especially the Cremeneţ—of the Şuşiţa (above Câmpuri) which had originally accessed by the lower section of the Tişiţa railway through wooden skidways (‘goanga’). The infrastructure was installed primarily

The First World War, political structures

203

by commercial companies that systematically exploited the more valuable timber. However, in 1928 when there were 1.89 million hectares of state woodland, only 620,000 were exploited while 230,000 had transport but no exploitation and the rest was protection woodland or was inaccessible. At this juncture a significant initiative arose through the formation of a ‘Casa Autonomă a Pădurilor Statului’ (CAPS) to seek more rational exploitation and greater use of beechwood by railway building in areas like Stâlpeni north of Piteşti (1935) and the Bistriţa Valley west of Râmnicu Vâlcea where an initially isolated railway in the upper valley was being extended to the mainline Băbeni during the Second World War. CAPS also took over the Giurghiu Valley line from Reghin and the Leordina-Socolău line in Maramureş—built as an Austrian Feldbahn to contain the Brussilow Offensive: both operated passenger services and were listed in the national railway timetable as ‘calea ferata particulară’. More beechwood was used for furniture and cellulose, although much still went for charcoal and firewood—and 91.6% of the 2.24 million cubic metres of timber produced in 1938 was still resinous compared with only 4.1% for beech and 4.3% for other species. CAPS also represented a belated compromise in the ideological struggle over the issue of private and state enterprise, and it was this organisation that dealt with the Germans in 1939 to establish a joint company with Deutsche Forstung Holzwirtschaftsgesellschaft which covered 34,000ha in the Pipirig-Râsca-Târgu Neamţ area of the Eastern Carpathians (taken over by the USSR after the war as the basis of a new SovietRomanian joint company: Sovromlemn). CAPS used the 76cm gauge and their standard locomotive developed in 1929 was the forerunner of the type used countrywide after nationalisation. However, in 1928 only 2,780km out of a total of 4,350km used the 76cm gauge (there were also 1,400km at 600mm and 110km at 1,000mm plus 60km of standard-gauge track). Evidently there was some rationalisation by 1938 when the total network was down to 3,500km (with sixteen fixed funiculars) and presumably many 600mm lines, using horse traction, had been eliminated. However, it was still possible for local initiatives to take place and a new railway at Estelnic in Covasna was built around 1933 as a collaborative venture to bring in timber to four separate Jewish-owned sawmills which then used lorries to take the finished planks to the standard-gauge railhead at Breţcu. Part-time industries Despite the spread of factory industry there was still a great deal of small-scale industrial activity distributed across the region. Labour-intensive industry frequently assumed a peasant character, including some parts of the timber industry. Indeed, for thousands of workers across the region, but especially in the south, industry was predominantly small scale and based on part-time work in rural areas. While some of these industries did complete the transition to regular factory working it was often not possible since the operations complemented the seasonal rhythm of agricultural work and there was a lack of capital and managerial competence to increase quality and marketing in order to penetrate urban markets. Unfortunately this has not been studied in detail except where specific rural industries attracted attention (see below), and statistical coverage is also poor. However, for Romania it is possible to compare the distribution of large-scale industry—with its focus on an east-west Carpathian axis, reflecting the major cities and

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

204

mineral resources—with the workshop component because the latter was covered quite thoroughly by the 1941 census (although this did not include northern Transylvania, which was then under Hungarian administration; Figure 4.6). Very small centres, involving 26–100 people, were essentially rural and featured both Carpathian and lowland areas, with strong clusters in the Banat Plain, the Danube axis and the Carpathian areas around Braşov, Cluj and Sibiu; while larger centres were predominantly urban and showed some correlation with centres of large-scale industry. Thus it is quite clear that manufacturing was a significant part of village life, although virtually all the participants played some role in agriculture as well. The distribution is also rather uneven since there were activities dependent on local skills and raw materials. Wherever there were fruit surpluses brandy was distilled and widely sold on urban markets. Indeed, it is possible that urban producers of spirits did some blending to combine rural production with a fine bouquet, with neutral spirit distilled on a large scale. Rose-oil in Bulgaria In this case Palairet (1999) refers to stockpiling of oil during the war combined with the deterioration of rose gardens without adequate pruning and replacement of diseased bushes. After the war the government flooded the market by taking over stocks and trading rose-oil for relief grain, whereupon some growers switched to tobacco. Substitutes did not create problems at first since there was a strong demand from the leading perfume houses for the genuine article, but the threat became greater when the remaining buyers were able to insist absolutely on a pure product distilled by the merchants themselves. In this situation merchants were most reluctant to take peasant oil and boycotted villages where adulteration was suspected. Thus the number of peasant stills fell from 4,000 in 1921 to 2,300 in 1927 and only 1,215 in 1932—a process encouraged by high prices for scrap copper in view of the demands of the munitions industry after the war and the growing use

The First World War, political structures

205

Figure 4.6 Industry in Romania in 1941 showing (centre) large-scale industry and (top and bottom) smallscale industry Note: The state boundary is for 1945, but three locations of large-scale industry in Bessarabia and North Bucovina are included

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

206

of lorries and vans which increased the area within range of the central distilleries: 12 in 1922 (accounting for 38.7% of rose-oil production) but 38 in 1927 (70.3%). Only 25 were working in 1931, although 32 were still registered. Synthetics consolidated demand for oil at the top of the market in the 1920s but by the 1930s there was little perceived advantage in using the natural product at all and there would only ‘remain a small (and conservative) market for high price perfumes which did require use of the natural product’ (ibid. p. 590). Even this would not necessarily require the Bulgarian product since Turkey entered the industry and was able to undercut; precipitating a particularly devastating slump. Government then intervened by building on the cooperative system in the Stamboliski era (1922–3) with cheap credit from the state agrarian bank: legislation brought the whole industry under this umbrella given its monopoly on rose buying— linked with market demand so as to avoid overproduction and attempts to prevent the peasants distilling their own flowers (for the bank maintained supervision to stop adulteration). However, in view of the slump—which proved permanent—production stayed above the export level despite money for uprooting the surplus roses and stocks reached 8,000kg in 1936. But by paying a fixed price of 25,000 leva per kilo for oil it was possible for the government to regain a steady market and distillers began to take back their equipment after being rescued from bankruptcy—so the bank was responsible for 78% of production in 1936, falling to 66% in 1937 when there were exports of 2,200kg (mainly to France, the UK, Germany, the USA and Switzerland) out of a total production if 2,850kg (up from 1,812kg in 1936). Government also helped through an experimental farm at Kazanlik where a higher-yielding damask rose (Rosa damascena) was developed—allowing peasants to use less land for roses (with lower picking costs) and more for other crops. The damask rose was preferred because while the musk rose (Rosa moschata) had more flowers it did not provide the same quantity or quality of oil. A useful description of the industry (Cash 1939) stresses the importance of picking roses every morning—from dawn to midday—before hot sunshine extracted the scent. Women would work communally as each farmer’s wife would invite her friends and provide food (sometimes using paid labour). Rose bushes were never allowed to reach their full splendour but showers followed by hot sun would bring out the roses each day. Bushes were maintained at a height of 0.9–1.2m in the fields with space between for picking. Baskets were emptied into sacks and the sacks carted to the distillery for handling within eighteen hours of picking (because heat caused a progressive loss of perfume). There were 6,230ha under roses at the time, each yielding 15–17kg of oil, on which 140 villages were dependent. At each distillery a government inspector would weigh the roses and give a receipt for encashment at the bank at the end of the season at a rate of 4 leva per kilo (1937 rate), compared with the bank’s charge to the distillery of 4.4 leva. Roses were boiled for two to three hours in a copper retort or ‘alembic’ (like an oldfashioned washing boiler) over an open fire, but modern stills were steam heated to reduce boiling time, while a modified still created a partial vacuum and reduced the boiling point so that a better-quality rose-oil was produced in the shorter time of ninety minutes. Still capacity varied from 150 to l,000kgs of roses. When liquid emerged from cold-water condensers it was collected in metal containers with a glass tops. The oil would float to the surface in a thick band, maintained at a constant level by siphoning-off rosewater beneath. Since the water contained a small quantity of oil it would go back into the retorts to be distilled again. However, the water was considered to have excellent

The First World War, political structures

207

medicinal qualities (good for stomach ailments) and distillers would frequently take sips! The inspector would draw off the oil each day into large bottles, which—when placed in the sun—caused the oil to melt so that impurities sank to the bottom. The liquid was then poured off, filtered and placed in metal containers for storage in the bank’s vaults pending export. Betwen 3,500 and 4,000kg of damask roses would generally yield 1kg of oil priced at £50, and the average daily output at the Botu Papazoglu distillery in Karlovo was 4.5kg (from some 5 million roses). The distillery then stood idle out of season apart from some mint distillation.

5 INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT, ENERGY AND TOURISM Although there is only limited information on this potentially vast topic, it is self-evident that Romania and Yugoslavia benefited from annexing relatively advanced territories to the north while Poland had to cope with the east-west extremes. Relatively large efforts were made in education and health. Education needed great improvement at the more basic level although the new nations also sought better provision for higher education in leading provincial towns like Timiş oara, which gained its polytechnic in 1920 to complement the existing university catering for the humanities. But development in education ‘did not suffice to generate a major economic improvement’ (Hauner 1985 p. 93) owing to conflict between consumer service and long-term investment which meant there was no planning of graduate output until after 1945. Regarding the challenge of peasant illiteracy, compulsory education was enacted before the war (except in Albania and parts of Yugoslavia) but full school attendance was still not achieved because ‘most countries were in a vicious circle of low public outlay, inadequate availability of teachers, school buildings, textbooks and adequate communications, and above all, demand for skilled labour’ (ibid. p. 94). Public health improved through progress in hospitals and the provision of doctors (with Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia finding themselves with fewer doctors than in 1914) while epidemic diseases were tackled through vaccination and better hygiene and water. Bulgaria and Poland were unusual in seeking comprehensive provision against sickness, old age and unemployment. Progress was not even because Hungary and Romania did well over literacy but less so with health while Yugoslavia did better on health. There was limited intervention in housing except in the northern cities and the new capitals, although there were major regional and urban-rural differences. In the northern countries and even more in the Balkans ‘the low capital accumulating capacity of the economies disfavoured projects of high capital intensity and infrastructural components giving slow returns. However, the further growth at Gdynia during 1930–6 was supported by state through subsidised building costs and tax concessions. It was labour-intensive types of infrastructure which developed relatively rapidly’ (Ehrlich 1985 p. 366). In transport and communications there is a detailed review below, but it should be noted that national airlines were coming into existence, while telephones lagged with only 8.3 phones per 1,000 people in 1937 compared with 70.6 in Western Europe. There were also great variations within the region: 11.5 in the three northern states; 3.9 in Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia; and 1.9 in Albania. This was the most backward infrastructure, with transport the next weakest, despite all the progress that was made everywhere.

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

209

TRANSPORT Railways Qualitative improvements in the north contrasted with system development in the south (with the added challenge where domestic industry could not supply equipment). In Germany work on a ring railway for Berlin started in 1918 and was eventually completed in 1957 (partly on a revised alignment to avoid entry into West Berlin). But other rationalisation measures were not taken, such as the 10km gap between Rossach and Untermersbach that would have provided a more direct route between Erfurt and Nürnberg, in preference to the heavily graded route through Lichtenfels: a legacy of the old frontier between Bavaria and Saxony-Coburg-Gotha. However, for Poland there was a tremendous task to convert the inherited Russian broad-gauge lines (east of Warsaw) and integrate the three inherited systems with a new network in what was now the heart of the country to link Warsaw with Poznań, Radom and Toruń; not to mention the standardisation of locomotives and rolling stock (Figure 5.1). In 1921 construction of the new Warsaw-Berlin trunk was complete from Kutno through Konin to Strzałkowo near Wrneśia in the direction of Poznań; while the line from Warsaw to Radom in 1934 provided a new link with Krakow via Kielce that was shorter than the Częstochowa route, one year after the coal railway from Silesia to Gdynia was completed with French capital. A ring railway for Warsaw was planned but not realised, but the line from Zyradów to Otwock gave a link between the city’s Głowna and Wschodnia stations. A four-year transport plan launched in 1938 envisaged an improved coal railway and a new line from Warsaw to Lublin but it was halted by the invasion in 1940. In Czechoslovakia two new links were built between the Czech lands and Slovakia connecting the two northeastsouthwest axial routes Břeclav-Přerov-Ostrava and Bratislava-Trenčin-Žilina through Veselí n. Moravou-Nové Mesto n. Váhom in 1929 and Vsetín-Puchov in 1937; while a number of existing lines were connected so as to complete a line through central Slovakia from Trenčin to Banská Bystrica and Košice during 1936–41, especially the Banská Bystrica-Horna Štubná section. The SEECs Romania also had major problems of standardisation, including the gauge conversion in Bessarabia by 1924. She had the benefit of several lines built during the war, including narrow-gauge lines in central Transylvania in 1915 and a strategic link between Roman and Vaslui in Moldavia that was finished only after 1918

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

210

Figure 5.1 Railway development in Germany and Poland since the First World War (1 on Figure 5.2). Most remarkable was a novel petrol-electric system over the pass (at 948m)—between Vatra Dornei and Prundul Bârgăului—to evacuate equipment cut off by Russia’s Brussilow Offensive of 1916. Locomotives were powered by 150hp petrol engines driving 300v/90w dynamos which allowed the power wagon to handle trains of four or five trailer wagons. Although the line was built to standard gauge, the equipment salvaged from Galicia had to be dismantled prior to transfer. In the opposite direction there was some transfer of stores, including horse fodder. The line was restored in 1923 and used by the Romanians as a useful link between Transylvania and Moldavia until the Ilva Mică-Vatra Dornei line was finished in 1938 (11 on Figure 5.2), when elaborate transit arrangements through Poland and Czechoslovakia became largely unnecessary. However, a vast amount of new construction was needed to integrate the new provinces yet much of it involved difficult terrain, and resources were limited. Hence there were many exercises in prioritisation and achievements were relatively limited. Early attention was given to the gap in the direct line between Arad and Oradea at Chişineu Criş in 1923 (2 on Figure 5.2). This was of great strategic importance in providing a link between the three countries of the Little Entente—from Stamora Moraviţa on the Romanian-Yugoslav frontier to Halmeu on the Romanian-Czechoslovak border. Extensions along the Black Sea coast to Mangalia (3 and 10) and Tulcea (4 and 12) were also achieved without great difficulty; likewise a number of small projects on the border in Banat (26: some after 1945) and in the Bucharest area (7 and 19) and the standardising of the narrow-gauge line to Huşi (8). But a major disappointment was the failure to connect Braşov with Nehoiaşu. This would have given Transylvania a direct link with the Black Sea and reduced

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

211

pressure on the Bucharest-Braşov line with its high summit at Predeal. Despite the construction of the longest tunnel in Romania at Teliu to reach Întorsura Buzăului in 1931 (6) the unstable terrain of the Buzău Subcarpathians prevented further progress apart from the narrow-gauge extension to Crasna in 1947. Apart from the aforementioned East Carpathian line the main acheievements were the linkage of the Reşiţa metallurgical and engineering complex with the main line from Timişoara to Bucharest (9), the more direct access with Galaţi and Bucharest provided for Chişinău (in Bessarabia) (5) and the rail link for the Danube port of Ismail (14). Some other projects were started but not completed until the late 1940s. In Yugoslavia the Veles-Prilep-Bitola narrow-gauge line of 1920 overcame the situation where Bitola had rail connections only with Thessaloniki (and boosted the role of Veles as a route centre instead of Gradsko) while wartime ‘Feldbahnen’ were extended to connect Skopje with Tetovo and Ohrid in 1921, and the Ottoman line to Mitrovica was integrated into the Yugoslav system by the extension to Kragujevac in 1931 (involving major works between Kragujevać and Kraljevo) (Figure 5.3). The narrow-gauge line from Čuprija to Zaječar (1911) was now replaced by a standard-gauge line taking advantage of Serbia’s extended frontiers running from Niš to the Danube at Prahovo (1922). In the north Zagreb was connected with Split via Karlovac, Oštarije and Knin in 1925 (including the widening of the Knin-Split line of 1877) and this standard-gauge line supplemented the

Figure 5.2 Railway projects in Romania since the First World War (note that the numbers refer to individual projects mentioned in the text and placename spellings are those used in the communist era.)

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

212

narrow-gauge lines from Bosnia which had reached the port in 1914 from Prijedor and 1916 from Sarajevo and Jajce. Bihać was reached in 1924 while modifications were needed in Fiume (Rijeka) which passed to Italy (apart from the southern suburb of Sušak) so the line from Zagreb was modified by a branch reaching the coast in Yugoslav territory at Bakar in 1931. Problems arose in Bosnia which was seen as the bridge between Belgrade and the Adriatic ports. The immediate priority was a narrow-gauge through service between Belgrade and Zelenika on the Bay of Kotor. This required the filling of gaps at Čačak-Lajkovac (1922), Vardište-Užice (1925) and ObrenovaćBelgrade (1928): the 1925 project providing a mixed-gauge line between the Bosnian and Serbian systems which included the horseshoe curve and tunnel at Šargan when work started in 1921. There were several options for further expansion, one of which was the Habsburg concept of a line from Karlovac through Bihać, Banja Luka, Doboj and Tuzla to Valjevo and Čačak which could connect Belgrade with Split by an extension along the Una Valley from Bihać which was reached in 1924 by a line from Bosanski Novi on the long branch from Sunja and Dobrljin to Banja Luka dating back to 1872. Alternatively the Zelenika line could be used with new construction from Mostar. Meanwhile, a more direct route from

Figure 5.3 Development of railways in Albania and Yugoslavia since 1918 (Please note that the first section of the new line west of Rijeka was never completed.)

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

213

Užice to Dubrovnik could be achieved through Foča and there was potential for harbour development at Bar (where the railway inland reached Podgorica in 1927) with access from the interior from Mostar via Nikšić, Priboj via the Lim Valley or from Kosovo via Peč. All these concepts gained some development because the railway reached Peč in 1936, Nikšić in 1938 and Foča in 1939. Meanwhile, in Bulgaria work began on a new trans-Balkan line to give Sofia direct access to Burgas via Karlovo and Sliven although this was not complete until 1952. Construction also affected the Arda Valley (Rakovski-Momchilgrad) and the Struma Valley where the wartime narrow-gauge line heading south from Radomir to the Greek frontier (reached in 1929) was converted. Lengthy branch lines reached the Danube at Vidin (1923) and Orjahovo (1931), while a short link connecting Karnobat with Kolarovgrad provided a direct link between Plovdiv and Varna (1941). Serbia had been poised to reach the Adriatic coast at Shëngjini port when Albania achieved independence; whereupon the Albanians conceived their own ambitious plans for railways to connect the coastal settlements and penetrate inland to forge international connections through to Fiorina (for Thessaloniki) and from Shkodër to Prizren and Skopje. The obvious priority was to connect Durrës with Tirana and Elbasan but the government also wanted to connect Durrës with Vlorë. Preparatory work was done in 1925 but although the Italians started construction of the Elbasan line after finishing the harbour in 1933, no railway was completed until Durrës and Tirana were connected in 1949. Improving the system However, there were operational matters to consider as well as network development. Much of the track was worn out after minimal maintenance during the war years which left some lines capable of speeds of only 20–30km/h (indeed, some could not operate at all due to the destruction of bridges). Investment was needed to rebuild track and overhaul trains in addition to the aforementioned network development. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia inherited a ‘mixed bag’ of locomotives and rolling stock from the imperial powers, although Poland had particular problems because of the broad-gauge conversion during 1921–5. So urgent consideration was given to new standard locomotive classes for mixed traffic like Hungary’s ‘328’ and ‘424’ classes of 1919 and 1924, respectively. There were problems over coal, for Hungary was left only with lignite and had to import hard coal. In the meantime trains came to a standstill for hours because of poor coal (twenty hours were needed for the Budapest-Vienna journey in March 1919) and it was only in the summer of 1920 that passenger trains restarted on all lines. International trains in the mid-1930s only rarely offered times faster than 1914. However, there was still a good choice of routes: for example, Vienna-Prague via Grmünd provided the best time but there were also through services via Brečlav and Znojmo. Vienna-Berlin services went through Prague, and the routes through Bohumin and Mladá Boleslav were also available (though Liberec was given up). Improvements were made selectively through better track. There were also more powerful engines for express passenger duties, for example Hungary’s streamlined lightweight tank locomotives introduced in 1936–9 for the Budapest-Miskolc service. Larger stations were needed in the cities, notably the enlarged central station in Prague named after US President Wilson (1928).

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

214

Innovations were also sought through petrol and diesel engines. There were railcar conversions in Hungary from 1926 using the Ganz petrol engine, superseded by the Ganz-Jendrássik diesel engine in 1933 which achieved more substantial savings in working costs. Higher speeds were needed to fight road competition while the decline in rail freight meant that mixed trains were no longer needed. By 1933 railcars handled twofifths of local passengers compared with barely one-fifth for passenger traffic as a whole. However, diesel engines were used for the Budapest-Vienna ‘Arpad’ railcar service of 1934 (which did not even stop at the frontier). Ganz-built railcars were used in Yugoslavia on the Brod-Sarajevo and Belgrade-Dubrovnik lines where they overcame the problem of smoke in tunnels. And Hungarian practice was copied in Romania where Malaxa built railcars for both mainline and branchline use. Although the level of use was low by Hungarian standards some units remain in service today and are currently being re-engined. In Czechoslovakia railcars built by Ringhoffer in Prague (Smichow) started running between Prague and Bratislava in 1933 while ČKD later provided cars for the ‘Slovak Arrow’ service. Diesel locomotives were not used on any scale but Romania introduced 4,000hp Sulzer diesels in 1938 for use on the climb from Braşov to Predeal to avoid banking assistance. Another solution was electrification but only Germany made progress on a large scale with conversion in Berlin and also on the ‘Saxon Ring’ through Halle and Leipzig and connections with Görlitz and Breslau. A long-distance electrified connection ran from Leipzig to München via Weissenfels and Nürnberg. This was complete from Weissenfels in 1939 with the outstanding Berlin-Leipzig conversion then well advanced. The 303km central system started with Dessau-Bitterfeld in 1911 (with power from the ligniteburning power stations of Apolda and Muldenstein near Bitterfeld) and also included Zerbst-Bitterfeld-Leipzig-Halle in 1922; Magdeburg-Zerbst in 1923; and Halle-KothenMagdeburg in 1934. The 270km of Berlin lines (electrified at 15,000V AC) comprised Berlin-Lichterfelde Ost in 1903; Berlin-Bernau, Potsdam-Erkner, Wannsee-Stahnsdorf and Charlottenberg-Kaulsdorf in 1924; the Berlin Ringbahn in 1929; and the Wannsee Line in 1933. Finally, the Silesian system (387km) was a response to severe gradients encountered on the lower ridges of the Riesengebirge: 1 in 70 out of Niedersalzbrünn near Waldenburg (Wałbrzych) while 1 in 51 was the maximum between Görlitz and Breslau and the line running southeast of Hirschberg (Jelenia Góra) to Strockern (Sedzislav) near Kamienna Góra had 24km of 1 in 40. Electrification began in 1916–17 with the line from Gottesberg (Boguszów-Gorce) through Waldenburg to Freiburg (Swiebodzice) and Königszelt (Jaworzyna), extended to Breslau in 1928. Then the branch south from Kohlfurt (Węgliniec) to Lauban (Lubań) and Marklissa (Leśna) was electrified during 1924–8, before the network was completed by the Görlitz-LaubanGreiffenberg (Gryfów)-Hirschberg-Waldenburg line plus the loop between Hirschberg and Waldenburg via Schmiedeberg (Kowary); also Hirschberg-Schweiberau (Sklarska Poręba) and other local lines. Power was supplied by the Mittelsteine station burning low-grade coal. Hungary began electrification with Budapest-Komárom in 1932, extended to the Austrian border at Hegyeshalom in 1934, using the 16,000V Kando system with power supply from the Banhida station. Poland’s 1938 plan included electrification to Zakopane but this was not implemented.

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

215

Train workings Germany operated an extensive network of express trains with many through-coach options (requiring constant remarshalling) by D trains (Schnellzüge) achieving speeds of up to 100km/h. In the eastern part of the country the network consisted almost exclusively of radial routes from Berlin (though some ran through Berlin, e.g. StralsundDresden): exceptions were Stettin-Küstrin and Wismar-Magdeburg-Halle; and the eastwest axes Stettin-Hamburg and Breslau-Dresden-Köln/Würzburg. Germany also offered long-distance trains—mainly in radial routes from Berlin—which stopped only at infrequent intervals (‘Ferndurchgangszüge’). And she led Europe with high-speed dieselelectric trains (‘Fernschnelltriebwagen’) introduced in 1933 on the Berlin-Hamburg service (‘Fliegende Hamburger’)—followed by Berlin-Breslau-Beuthen and BerlinLeipzig-Naumburg (thence Erfurt-Frankfurt and Nürnberg-München/Stuttgart); BerlinHannover-Köln, with average speeds over 110km/h non-stop over the following runs of over 160km from Berlin—Breslau, Hamburg, Hannover, Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig (O’Dell and Morgan 1945 p. 247). As already noted, express diesel trains were copied by Hungary and other states, while diesel traction was also used for local services and express light freights (although Germany stopped all diesel railcar services with the onset of war to conserve fuel). Finally reference may be made to luxurious L trains using stock belonging to the International Sleeper Car Company, for example the Orient Express which after the war also operated as the Simplon-Orient—while the ‘classic’ route through Germany via Stuttgart included a rake of coaches providing a Paris-Karlsbad (Karlovy Vary)-Prague service (augmented at Nürnberg by coaches running through from Ostend). There was also the Mitteleuropäische Schlafwagen und Speiswagen Gesellschaft (Mitropa) with the Nord Express running eastwards through Germany to Warsaw and Riga. However, by 1939 this service was reduced to two sleeping cars running as part of a D train (although there was also a through service from Ostend to Bucharest via Breslau associated with the Nord Express). It should be noted that there was a big reduction in Berlin-Warsaw timings after the direct line through Kutno replaced the circuitous Ostrówo route. Berlin also offered services to Western Europe and Scandinavia as well as the Mediterranean (including connections with Norddeutscher Lloyd sailings from Naples to Alexandria) and the Balkans and Middle East via ECE. There was also a Berlin section of the Orient Express via Breslau and Budapest. At the other extreme from the main lines (‘Hauptbahnen’), the secondary lines (‘Nebenbahnen’) had an enduring function, including narrow-gauge lines (‘Nebenbähnliche Kleinbahnen’) with low building and operating costs and needing only four passengers/km for viability compared with sixteen on normal stopping trains. Despite comprehensive nationalisation under Deutsche Reichsbahn, there were still some privately owned lines like the Niederlausitzer Eisenbahn and Brandenburgische Stadtbahn. The greatest freight tonnage in 1937 was handled by the Halle district (Reichsbahndirektion) which forwarded 40.9 million tonnes and received 25 million, reflecting the wide distribution of Merseburg lignite: of 184.7 million tonnes of lignite produced in Germany, the railway carried 55 million tonnes of which 35 million was briquetted to economise on wagon space. Oppeln—Silesian coal heading for Berlin and Stettin; also Bavaria via Hof—accounts for 21.5 million tonnes of shipment while only

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

216

10.1 million was received. Berlin had a massive inward surplus (5.8 million and 16.1 million), as did Stettin (6.2 million and 12 million), while Breslau was exactly in balance (13.1 million in and out) and the amounts in the other eastern districts were small: Frankfurt a.d.Oder 3.1 million and 5.1 million; Königsberg 5.5 million and 6.8 million; and Schwerin 1.4 million and 2.7 million (ibid. p. 291). There was an interest in Western Europe-Central Europe links avoiding Germany— with particular value attaching to the Simplon Tunnel (1906) which offered routes via Switzerland and Italy—and also a Paris-Belgrade route 121km shorter than the existing one through Germany. A change was blocked at the time by Austria and Germany but accepted in 1919 when a Paris-Bucharest service used the new route which initially took ninety-six hours (the Simplon-Orient Express came later). Also a Paris-Prague/Warsaw service started in 1920 (also to Berlin and Vienna) while delays on more direct routes help to account for a Vienna-Bucharest service via Krakow! Big changes occurred in the Balkans where the links with Western Europe were consolidated by the Simplon-Orient Express running through Yugoslavia to Romania via Zagreb, Belgrade and Timişoara (and requiring bridges over the Tisza at Senta (1923) and later over the Danube at Pančevo (1935). There was an opportunity of thinking about new concepts such as a French idea for a rail-sea route to Turkey via Brindisi, Vlorë, Thessaloniki, Athens and Izmir (while Greece was interested in loannina-Vlorë). The new frontiers created problems for railways built when different territorial arrangements were in force. Under the Treaty of Versailles Germany could run ‘privileged trains’ across the Polish Corridor but it was only after protracted negotiations in 1933 that the system worked smoothly with minimal formalities. Many routes were closed to through running and the principal routes were reduced to Konitz (Chojnice) and Marienburg (Malbork) on the Königsburg line and from Bentschen (Zbąszyń) to Deutsch Eylau (Iława) on the line to Tilsit. Nevertheless, increasing use was made of the shipping service between Stettin (Szczecin) and Königsberg. German trains also ran in transit through Czechoslovak territory in the Asch (Aš) and Warnsdorf (Vamsdorf) areas. Romania had arrangements whereby the Anina-Baziaş trains could run through Yugoslavia while, pending completion of an allRomanian route to Sighetul Marmaţiei in the northern Maramureş region (1949—but with a temporary narrow-gauge link of 40km from Telciu to Moisei in 1940), transitional arrangements were needed through Czechoslovak territory from Satu Mare or through Polish territory from Cernăuţi. In the former case there was a joint state railway solution and when Ruthenia was ceded to Hungary during the war years Romania unsuccessfully sought control of the railway corridor running almost parallel to the frontier. BudapestVienna trains started to use the south bank of the Danube (via Győr) after the traditional northern route through Bratislava now involved a transit of Czechoslovakia (only one train continued to take this route which had been the more important pre-1914). For the same reason some Berlin-Vienna trains were routed through Passau (whereas the older routes were via Bohumin or Prague). Meanwhile, in the Baltic international traffic was affected when Lithuania cut four railways from Poland (including Wilno-Kaunas)— which meant that contact could be made only through Daugavpils (Latvia) or East Prussia.

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

217

Road transport The growth of motor cars and lorries on German roads after the First World War brought some improvements under the Weimar regime, but there were no uniform specifications for road construction until 1934 when a network of ‘Reichstrassen’ was designated, and all but 7% of the total length had a dust-free surface in 1938. Traditionally this involved heavy stone with small stone and finer material com prising the upper layers and water for binding: granite was available in the Harz and in Lausitz but while the Northern Plain had plenty of sand and gravel, basic materials had to be taken in and so coarse stone was widely used as a base. But by the late 1930s it was usual for the Reichstrassen to offer a smooth surface of asphalt and tar (though rarely in East and West Prussia or Upper Silesia). A great deal of widening was also carried out, though the system was still unsuitable for high-speed or heavy traffic (with sharp curves inhibiting visibility). Meanwhile, the ‘Landestrassen’ retained the old waterbound macadam construction, with a camber for drainage and cobbling in villages with stones collected from the fields. After Hitler came to power a network of new arterial roads was provided: 2,000km were available after just three years from the first opening in May 1935; giving notice that the primacy of railways was not by any means assured. Indeed, the ‘Reichsautobahnen’ constituted one of the outstanding works of National Socialism in Germany. Roads with separate traffic lanes had been laid before 1933 but no comprehensive system—to link all areas of economic and cultural importance—had previously been contemplated. It was a major unemployment relief project and one that did not require any imported raw materials. Work was directed by ‘Reichsautobahnen Gesellschaft’ (a subsidiary of the state railway company) with construction offices (in the east) at Berlin, Breslau, Dresden, Halle, Königsberg and Stettin. Across Germany an estimated 100,000 workers were employed directly and 250,000 indirectly. There were east-west routes from the Polish frontier west of Posen (Poznań) to Frankfurt a.d.Oder, Berlin, Magdeburg and Hannover; and from the frontier in Upper Silesia to Breslau, Dresden, Chemnitz, Erfurt and Frankfurt am Main. There were also transverse routes: Stettin-Berlin-Leipzig-Nürnberg (revised in 1939 to start 105km east of Stettin, though still short of the Polish border) and Hamburg-Berlin-Breslau. Berlin was the key intersection in the east and a complete motorway ring was planned. While traffic levels were a fraction of those to be experienced at the end of the century there was increased movement due to the growth in the number of lorries (encouraged by the abolition of heavy taxes) and technical advances through the introduction of the diesel engine. Private motoring was becoming more affordable through the Volkswagen family car scheme. During the war the autobahn system was projected to extend further east to Königsberg/Insterburg, Posen (Poznań) and Upper Silesia, while after the fall of Czechoslovakia it was possible to plan a north-south connection from Stettin to Frankfurt a.d.Oder (joined by a branch from the projected Danzig (Gdańsk) autobahn at Falkenburg (Zlochieniec) Cottbus, Reichenberg (Libenec) and across northern Bohemia heading for Würzburg; while another autobahn was to link Breslau with Vienna via Glatz (Kłodzko) and Brünn (Brno). Good roads were generally available on the principal routes in the northern countries (especially in Czechslovakia) but they were relatively poor in the SEECs. In 1935–6 only

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

218

43% of Bulgarian roads could allow car speeds of 50–65km/h—rarely 30km/h otherwise (and many not suitable for motor vehicles). Yet roads had a particular importance in Balkan areas lacking railways: opening up the countryside and increasing the cohesion of functional regions around market towns and key villages. The Habsburg army built 650km of motorable roads in Albania during the war and the scope was such that foreign investment went into bus and road haulage firms in Durrës and Kruje. The opening of a Shkodër-Kukës highway in 1939 was important in enabling Albanian chrome exports to Italy to begin in that year. Yugoslavia gave Dalmatian roads a priority and a law of 1923 allowed forced labour—while all citizens had to work for two weeks (periods of seven days) each year in spring and autumn—but the scheme was administratively unworkable and little capital was available. There were disputes over responsibility for roads between the state and local authorities—both the county (‘banovina’) and commune—where the attitude was generally one of indifference. Little happened until the 1930s when there was reconstruction from Split to Sinj and Trogir as part of a future Zagreb-Split motorway and a ‘coastal tourist road’ from Split to Šibenik. Before the Second World War few roads climbed the Dinaric ‘Wall’ and local roads were only suitable for animals (with some spring renovation after winter snow blockage). Some new roads were provided in remote rural areas, for example Jezera in Montenegro to serve the principal village of Žabljak in 1934: at the time two new buildings were raised in stone with slate roofs, one for a school and the other for a town hall and police station. New houses were built by local officials and the growth of a tourist industry was anticipated (Lebon 1935). Meanwhile, most local roads remained in a poor condition and Boyd (193 7 p. 12) makes the interesting point that the Polish government deliberately avoided a higher priority so as ‘not to disturb too radically the existing peasant economy’ by accelerating the transfer to motors that would use more petrol (and reduce exports) while eliminating horses and thereby removing a significant demand for fodder; thus creating the need for alternative cash crops for which there was no market. Canals Once again the major actions were largely confined to Germany (where there were difficult choices to be made), although some interesting projects were discussed elsewhere. The main focus lay on the Mittelland project which made Magdeburg an important centre. This eastern extension was considered essential in the light of the war and it was completed in 1938 with a 59m lift from the Elbe at Rothensee (though a second at Hohenwarthe—which would have separated upstream and downstream river flows—was not realised) as well as a branch to Hermann Göring Werke Salzgitter. The reservoir programme for the Elbe system included a large new installation at Bleiloch (Upper Saale) in 1932 (215 million cubic metres) and also at Hohenwarte; and a dam at Pirna. The Oder was made accessible to 500-tonne barges on a more regular basis through the creation of artificial water storages on tributary streams to overcome the seasonal problem of low water and maintain a minimum depth of 1.4m: a new 11 million cubic metres reservoir was built at Goldentraum near Grieiffenberg on the Queis (Kwisa) during 1912–24 and another of 143 million cubic metres at Ottmachau (Otmuchow) on the Glatzer Neisse (Nysa Kłodzka) during 1933–9 followed earlier storages at Mauer (J.Sudęcki) on the Bober (Bobr) in 1912 (50 million cubic metres), Marklissa on the

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

219

Queis (15 million cubic metres) in 1905 and the Stauwerder (Dzierżno) lakes on the Klodnitz (Kłodnica) Canal (Crone 1939). Finally, the Adolf Hitler Canal was opened in 1940 between Beuthen and Cosel (Koźle) to supersede the Klodnitz Canal and serve a new coal port at Gleiwitz. It should not be overlooked that Czechoslovakia collaborated over the improvement of the Elbe: a shipping union was formed in 1926 leading to a mandatory state-regulated cartel in 1932. Reservoir projects included a possible dam near Pürglitz (Křivoklát) on the Berounka. To help open up the hinterland of Königsberg (depressed by the closure of Russian trade which used to involve an exchange of herring, coal, manure and groceries for timber and grain) the Masurian Canal was planned for completion in 1940 through the Mauer (Mamry) Lake and Allenburg (Druzba) (50km) on the Pregel (Ława)—with a capacity for 400-tonne barges. This waterway could connect southwards through the Mauer and Spirding (Śniardwy) lakes and the Pissa (Pisa) and Narew rivers to provide access to Warsaw. However, although the channel was excavated the very large locks were never completed. It is thought that Hitler had in mind the overhaul of U-boats in the security of the lake country, which lay close to his bunker situated between Rastenburg (Kętrzyn) and Angerburg (Węgorzewo). Meanwhile, Königsberg was connected through the Deime (Diejma)—a tributary of the Pregel—to Kurisches Haff and the Inner Coastal Waterway provided by the Deime-Gilga Canal for Tilsit and the König Wilhelm Canal to Memel (available for 400–600-tonne vessels); also along the western arm of the Inner Coastal Waterway to Elbing (Elblag) and the Nogat arm of the Vistula (Wisła), including access to the Oberländischer Canal (Kanal Elblaski) to Deutsch Eylau and Osterode (Ostróda), though the through link to West Prussia was little used. On an even wider scale the new canal would have completed a ‘figure of eight’ with one loop provided by the Narew, Biebrza and the Augustów Canal link with Niemen which then flowed to the Baltic coast to connect with the Inner Coastal Waterway; and the other consisting of the Narew and Vistula. The Danube-Black Sea theatre In 1920 a Danube conference created an international commission for the upper river but left the European Commission to look after maritime commerce although it continued to be seen as a symbol of imperialism and attracted diplomatic challenges throughout the post-war period. In 1938 the Danube fell into the Nazi orbit with the admission of Germany. Improvements were made in Germany (also on the Main, although the Ludwig Canal connecting the two rivers was not replaced). Further downstream, work began in 1926 to stabilise the river bed along the Czechoslovak-Hungarian frontier; while Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia began to build dykes in connection with floodplain drainage that would increase agricultural land and reduce the danger of malaria—copying what the Hungarians has already done along the Tisza, although work then extended well into the post-war period. There was continuing discussion over the delta problem where the Sulina Canal was continually menaced by the southward drift of sediment from the Chilia distributary: perpetual extension of the dykes into the sea seemed inevitable unless the more southerly Sf. Gheorghe Channel could be developed for international shipping—an option resisted (as it still is today) given the capital already invested in the Sulina route. However, the Romanians remained sensitive over the compromise of its

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

220

sovereignty by the Danube Commission and contemplated a Danube-Black Sea canal (Cernovodă-Constanţa) as a solution (eventually realised in 1984 under communism). This was just one of several projects considered in the 1930s: along with the DanubeMorava-Oder and Danube-Morava-Vardar (Belgrade-Thessaloniki). But no work was done, except for a start on the Danube-Oder Canal near Vienna in 1940. Such a canal would have followed the March (Morava) Valley to Prerau (Přerov) and then crossed at watershed at 1,295m to reach the Oder system at Cosel. There was some improvement of the Bega Canal to complete a scheme started in 1901 to accommodate larger ships: locks were built in 1916 at Timişoara and Sânmihai. There is reference to cereal traffic for Galaţi and some movement of iron from Călan and Nădrag, but rail and road provided stiff competition in the 1930s and traffic stagnated during the war. Planning included a strategic waterway connection that would have provided a link between the Baltic and Black seas independent of Germany. Immediately after the First World War A.Konopka in the Polish Ministry of Public Works suggested two main alternatives: the Vistula-San-Dniester/Nistru route (with the Prut as a variant) or a more easterly alignment using the Vistula-Bug-Pripet-Dneiper/Nipru. There was a positive growth mentality in Poland after 1926 involving Gdynia port and the railway from Silesia; plus industrial activity in engineering, metallurgy and textiles. The Malakiewicz canal plan of 1927 would enable Polish exports to transit Romania and Romanian exports to reach the Baltics, Germany and Scandinavia. It would use the Nistru variant mentioned above: the Vistula and San (canalised to the Wisznia confluence with a canal thence to Nistru); the Nistru for 270km (and a canal from Zaleszczyk to the Prut); and canalisation of the Prut through Cernăuţi and Siculeni to join the navigable section to Galaţi and Sulina. Five locks would be needed at Horodenca-Cernăuţi-Ripiceni and six over the Ripiceni-Galaţi section. There would be a shipping lane for 600–700-tonne barges and proposed double-track railway from the Romanian frontier (Grigore Ghica Vodă) to Mărăşeşti and Galaţi. A modification involved a canal from the Sf. Gheorghe Channel via Razelm-Goloviţa-Taşaul/Midia where a free zone would be created (there was also British interest in a naval base at Tasaul in 1930 with a Cernavodă-Taşaul canal). It is important to stress that Constanţa was a major focus of attention for the Romanians. The port expanded and the Romanian authorities began to think about an enlarged transit traffic for East European neighbours whose territories had previously formed part of an imperial framework with its major shipping interests on the Adriatic and Baltic seas. Such considerations stimulated interest not only in the Polish project but in a DanubeBlack Sea canal across the narrow Cernavodă-Constanţa ‘portage’, avoiding the need for trans-shipment to the railway for a short journey of some 60km. Once again the scope for action independent of the ECD was an incentive, although little was done prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. Meanwhile, Romanian interest in the Black Sea increased through the acquisition of Southern Dobrogea (the counties of Caliacra and Durostor) after the Balkan War of 1913, though this had little maritime significance apart from the coastal resort of Balcic. Rather the additional territory offered scope for peasant colonisation of the kind that was already going on in Bărăgan and Dobrogea. However, the prefect of Caliacra (one of two administrative counties covering Southern Dobrogea) proposed a Danube-Black Sea canal from Popina to Balcic (as well as a branch railway from Bazargic to Balcic) that would shorten the distance for shipping to the Dardanelles. The Polish canal project was

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

221

modified in line with this proposal in 1937 but it may be assumed that it made no further progress as Romania’s links with Germany became closer, even if the Bucharest government was in any case prepared to compromise the position of Constanţa. Meanwhile, the Poles were also thinking of a ‘Central Canal’ from Opole to Konin and Toruń as a cost-effective way of moving Silesian coal northwards given the Fifteen Year Investment Plan (referred to below and endorsed during the war by the government in exile: indeed, it was embraced under communism but never implemented). And Czechoslovakia raised the issue of an Oder-Danube canal which could export coal and import iron ore, and the Bat’a empire even proposed a canal link between Ruthenia and Moravia to transport timber: a regional development initiative going well beyond its Slovak branch factory at Bat’avany (Partizánske) and retailing network. POWER AND ELECTRICITY It was highly significant at this stage that ECE had an energy surplus, for in addition to self-sufficiency in electricity there were exports of Polish coal (5.7 million tonnes in 1922; 17 million in 1937). There was much more attention paid to low-grade coal worked open cast; not only in Czechoslovakia and Germany (where villages were relocated, beginning in the Leipzig-Altenburg area in 1928), but in the Balkans, where mining started in Kosovo in 1925 (6,400 tonnes in the first year). Hydrocarbon fuels focused primarily on Romanian oil production: falling from 1.84 million tonnes in 1913 to 1.37 million in 1922 before peaking at 8.39 million in 1935, which included a large margin for export. Poland’s oil production fell from 1.05 million tonnes in 1913 to 710,000 in 1922 and 500,000 in 1937 (though there was gas available along the axis from Gorlice/Krosno to Drohobycz/Stryj, exending northwards to Kielce and Lwów) while Albania’s output was exported to Italy. Both Poland and Romania had natural gas: 531 million m3 and 2,007 million m3, respectively, in 1937 (Radice 1985b pp. 212–13). Increasingly domestic fuels were being consumed in power stations and Germany’s lignite-burning capacity was already substantial in the 1920s with new stations like Finkenherd (1920) and Böhlen (1921). The conventional arrangement across ECE was for small individual power stations to serve local or district markets with minimal interconnection of distribution systems (which would in any case have been constrained by the low voltages used). In SEE practically all power stations were smaller than 25mW. Yugoslavia had a total capacity of 600mW in 1939—one-third comprising hydro plants, the largest of which was the 70mW station at Kralyeva on the Cetina east of Split. Hence it was usual for electricity costs to vary significantly between generating companies and for each system to have limited scope in coping with large additional demands, with obvious implications for industrial location. However, by the 1930s it was the practice in Germany to build large power stations with distribution systems of appropriate capacity. Berlin was supported by a cluster of stations with a total capacity exceeding 1000mW (including Klingenberg, 270mW; West, 228mW; Charlottenburg, 109mW; and Moabit 81mW), while another group served the Halle-Leipzig chemical region (with some supply to Berlin; enabling more lignite to be used at source). The main stations were at Golpa-Zschornewitz, north of Bitterfeld: 434mW (serving Berlin as well as the Piesteritz complex and Bitterfeld’s aluminium

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

222

industry); Böhlen (393mW) and Espenhain-Mölbis (297mW)—respectively south and southwest of Leipzig—along with Zeitz-Tröglitz (175mW) for synthetic oil production as well as public supply; also Bitterfeld/Wolfen (238mW), Leuna and Schkopau (both 150mW) for local complexes, including the synthetic rubber industry. Elbekraftwerk north of Leipzig (175mW) also burnt lignite or briquettes. The Cottbus lignite field was relatively undeveloped but Lauta near Senftenberg (222mW) served the aluminium industry and there were further units of over 200mW at Finkenheerd near Frankfurt/ Oder, Hirschfelde near Zittau and Trattendorf (Spremberg). In German Upper Silesia the main stations were at Blechhammer (Blachownia) (550mW) and Hindenburg (Zabrze) (146mW). The Energiewirtschaftsgesetz placed the power industry directly under the minister of economy and after 1935 a relatively comprehensive grid system developed in central Germany with voltages of 220kV (some with the potential to operate at 380kV) compared with a maximum of 100kV elsewhere. The grid extended from Berlin to the Ruhr and there were plans (probably completed during the war) to connect Bitterfeld eastwards through Trattendorf with Upper Silesia and southwestwards with Bavaria (Figure 5.4).

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

223

Figure 5.4 Electricity generation and transmission c. 1940 Planning regional systems in Romania and Hungary Romania had elaborate plans for hydropower as a key element in a pattern of regional generating systems (Figure 5.5) but the cheapness of oil residue for use in thermal power

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

224

stations discouraged this while natural gas offered a further option. There was little longdistance transmission of power until after 1945. Rath (n.d.) shows that Hungary was rather more successful with early coordination to limit dwarf thermal plants (for in 1925 capacity of 257mW was split between 211 separate power stations). Opened in 1917 as a 15mW station Budapest-Kelenföld extended to some 30mW in 1925 plus 144mW by 1932—the main station in a cluster in and around Budapest. Other stations operated at Csepel and Újpest, with a further 66mW available at Banhida (1931)—all supplied with hard coal from Dorog. Banhida’s capacity was initially planned for Esztergom, very close to Dorog, but the state-owned Transdanubian Electricity Corporation preferred closer proximity to the Budapest market (though the small station at Dorog was extended to 32mW by 1945 and Tatabánya—with local coal and a position astride the 100kV Budapest-Győr transmission line—reached 90mW by the same time). Altogether capacity in the Budapest area reached some 400mW. The inferior value of lignite presented a compelling argument for use at source: hence capacity at Ajka, Fűzfő

Figure 5.5 Proposed electrification regions for Romania and Varpalota (where much of the power was needed by the expanding aluminium industry) exceeded 80mW by the end of the war, and work was advanced on the ‘Matra’ station at Lörinci near Hatvan, burning Gyöngyös lignite (with its 100kV link to Budapest) and started after an earlier proposal to use the Tisza at Szolnok was rejected.

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

225

State investment was also geared to key industries at Ajka, Diósgyőr, Győr, Komló and Mosonmagyaróvár. In 1942 Ajka formed a group with Varpalota, Fűzfő and Pét totalling some 70mW. There was a contribution from hydropower despite the low theoretical potential of just 132mW, of which 57mW fell to the Danube above Budapest. Development was restricted to small projects for local demand: hence the projects on the Rába near Győr (Szentgotthárd 270kW and Csikvand 174kW) and on the Hernád near Miskolc where Felsődobsza (500kW) and Gibart (600kW) were followed by Kesnyete, started in 1940 on the lower river by Mávag (Hungarian State Metallurgical and Engineering Works) and completed in 1942: a 7.5km channel from Belsóbecs Dam and eventually discharged into the Sajó and supplied power by a 100kV link with Diósgyőr. Although large regional thermal stations were not achieved in the Borsod and Pécs areas, expansion with the onset of war raised capacity from 246mW in 1935 to 645mW (at 133 stations) in 1943— not including stations with a purely industrial function, supplying a factory or mine. There was also increased interconnection not only in the Budapest area (extending to Dorog, Tatabánya and Győr) but in Borsod through the 60kV link with Salgótarján which raised the total capacity of the area to some 80mW. Power lines extended into rural areas, for example from the Borsod area to Hatvan and Szolnok by 1932. By the next year only 278 of 1,697 settlements below 1,000 population had electricity against 490 out of 1,421 for settlements with 1,000–5,000 inhabitants (compared with 131 outof 1,394 in 1925); and 231 out of 272 for the over-5,000 category (155 out of 215 in 1925). Of course, by no means all households in each settlement were connected. It is worth adding that Hungary’s territorial enlargement during the war prompted greater interest in hydro projects and although nothing was achieved at the time, the hydro lobby was influential in the early years of communist central planning. TOURISM The established resorts were acquiring more hotels as well as private rooms. More entertainments were being provided, often with respect to national traditions. The Czechoslovak state helped in the revamping of its spa resorts like Trenčianske Teplice while Germany’s Baltic coast spawned a new resort in Binz on Rügen with a through train daily from Berlin (1939)—a spin-off from the opening of the Rügendamm bridge built in 1936 in support of the Sassnitz-Trelleborg ferry. There was growth on the Adriatic and Black Sea coasts, for example in Romania at Eforie (Carmen Sylva) and Techirghiol to the south of Constanţa—with the emphasis on medical treatment, associated with the therapeutic mud of Techirghiol—as well as Mamaia to the north. Letea Forest was protected in 1938 and Roşca-Buhaiova was included in a list of proposed reserves in 1940. There was further development of second homes in the Warsaw area up to a distance of 60km, including Podkowa Leśna and Wilga (on the Bug) where there was some planning along the lines of the Howard ‘garden city’. And with car ownership there was some permanent living in these suburban zones, for example in the Otwock belt. In Bucharest there was recreational development associated with a suite of lakes constructed along the Colentina: an idea originating in 1860 out of a flood disaster and supported financially by the royal family. Work undertaken by the local authority

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

226

during 1932–7 included Herăstrău and Floreasca lakes; the open-air Village Museum was part of the programme. Since mountain beauty spots were greatly appreciated—like Croatia’s Plitvicka jezera—mountain cabins were very popular and such basic accommodation to cater for ramblers of modest means grew up alongside the more traditional and elitist forms, including large country houses. In Germany heavy tourist traffic called for conversion of the Heidenau-Altenberg railway to standard-gauge (previously standard gauge wagons circulated on transporter flats). The benefits of tourist services in terms of accommodation and handicrafts were frequently associated with new railway projects like Slovakia’s strategic central line. And the growth of such domestic tourism evidently stimulated measures for the protection of nature. In 1919 the Polish minister of education set up a committee which grew into the State Council for the Protection of Wild Nature in 1925. In 1934 a law gave practical effect to their activities particularly with national parks in mind. Six parks were laid out by the end of the 1930s: Bialowieza Forest (4,630ha) in 1921; followed by Żeromski Fir Forest near Kielce (l,160ha) in the Holy Cross Mountains (1925); Ludwików, which provided rural recreation near Poznań; while Pieniny covered 740ha of the Dunajec Gorge on the Polish-Czechoslovak frontier; and there were two Beskid parks—Babia Góra and Czarnohóra. Planning eventually focused on the Tatra Mountains, covering fine mountain scenery on the Polish-Czechoslovak border and the distinctive cultural landscape of the Gorale region although the national park was not set up until 1954. Action in Bulgaria was driven by serious drought during 1914–21 which led the Agrarian Party to pass the 1920 Law on Water Syndicates (concerned with pipes and canals in small catchments over areas of 150–300ha). The first syndicates were set up in the Struma Basin for irrigating apple orchards near Kustendil, spreading to the Maritsa Basin and beyond despite tension with water-mill owners. Also in 1920 the General State Water Programme encouraged dams and afforestation to develop river basins for multiple use. Activity followed in the 1930s in Luodgorie, a deforested region northeast of Shumen. POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT Ethnic divisions, still pronounced within the new nation states, detracted from wellintegrated labour markets. Economic development and nationalism reinforced each other, complicating the position of ethnic minorities stranded by the demise of imperialism. Population exchanges were sometimes possible, anticipating more coercive consolidation exercises such as the Nazi Warthegau resettlement programme for German minorities and draconian solutions to the ‘storage’ problems over Jewish and Roma elements. But there was much spontaneous movement by peoples who now found themselves minorities in foreign lands—Germans, Hungarians and Turks especially, as well as Bulgarians and Macedonians from areas ceded to Greece. There were also organised population exchanges, such as those between Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania in 1940; also between Bulgarians and Romanians in Dobrogea at the same time. However, most minorities chose to remain, unaware of the dangers that would arise through xenophobia associated with the depression years of the 1930s and the rise of Germany as a focus for revisionism. Ethnic issues became highly politicised and some groups were readily perceived as fifth columnists (even though they might harbour no subversive intentions of

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

227

their own) if the mother country sought to protect them. Although there was no threat from a Jewish state, the Jews in ECE were particularly vulnerable given their historic roles as estate stewards and businessmen. They also maintained striking group identification through language, religion, dress and diet at a time when these manifestations were not as provocative because there was no dominant national force to perceive a challenge. For example, the situation for Jews in Bukowina deteriorated when the Austrian connection was severed and a comparatively liberal regime was replaced by pogroms precipitated by Soviet invaders in 1914 and by Romanians in 1918: the latter convinced that they had been disadvantaged under the Habsburgs in favour of the Ukrainians and other groups despite access to their own national schools. Rural overpopulation There was much rural-urban migration but with variations according to a gradient from northwest to southeast across the central part of the region which also applied in terms of employment and demographic structures (Table 5.1). With its heritage of Dual Monarchy, Hungary found 11.6% of her entire population living in one city (Budapest, with 1.01 million inhabitants in 1930); while virtually a third (32.5%) lived in towns of over 20,000, compared with 16.6% in Czechoslovakia and 11% in Yugoslavia. The towns were important centres of trade, becoming progressively more important (taking the majority share of employment in the tertiary sector) with growth in population size. The hierarchical structure was clear in Hungary, where Budapest had 40.3% of the country’s employment in trade (including finance) and 26.5% of employment in industry— compared with the aforementioned 11.6% for population. For the other towns the shares of employment for trade and industry (30.7% and 31%, respectively) were not so far in advance of the population share of 21.6%, while the two rural categories boasted very little employment outside of agriculture (Csato 1977 p. 405). It is interesting to see that there were slight gains in percentage employment in trade and industry in the rural

Table 5.1 Economic sectors: working population and national income (percentages) Active Working Population 1930 A B C D E

National Income 1937 A B C D

E

Bulgaria 74.2 9.5 2.4 6.0 7.9 45.6 17.2 4.3 15.2 17.5 Czechoslovakia 29.8 44.6 5.1 8.3 11.4 17.4 42.3 8.6 11.9 19.5 Hungary 54.3 21.8 2.9 5.9 13.4 32.1 32.1 7.1 7.1 21.4 Poland 67.0 18.5 2.3 5.4 6.9 32.4 27.9 4.9 15.3 20.2 Romania 73.0 11.2 2.6 5.1 8.1 32.1 30.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. Yugoslavia 77.0 11.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 48.4 20.5 7.2 6.2 17.4 Key: A agriculture; B mining industry, handicrafts and construction; C transport; D trade; E private and public services Source: Lethbridge 1985 pp. 533–4

areas when 1930 is compared with 1910—though the territorial changes make a direct comparison hazardous—while the share of national employment in these sectors fell (though not for industry in the larger villages). Even small villages retained a significant

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

228

number of craftsmen in 1930, for almost all those enumerated as industrial workers would have been employed in village workshops bearing in mind the limited level of commuting to factory jobs in the towns at the time. Reduced self-sufficiency in the villages provided great opportunity for small-scale food and clothing industries. The overriding consideration outside Czechoslovakia and Germany was ‘the vicious circle of population pressure, excessive reliance on under-productive agriculture and low income’ (Radice 1985a p. 31) arising from the fact that nearly a third of the total agrarian population of these counties was ‘surplus’ and could be withdrawn without production being affected. The situation was aggravated by restrictions on immigration into the USA imposed in 1922. Although, despite quotas, some 400,000 people moved from ECE to the USA (half of them from Yugoslavia), for, while migration to the towns was a possibility—and for the women especially emancipation was sufficient to justify the phrase ‘Stadtluft macht frei’—there was never enough opportunity to relieve land hunger. Some rural areas were experiencing declining fertility, but not yet Albania (including Albanian majority areas in Yugoslavia) and the Romanian province of Moldavia. The independent smallholding provided a measure of security but it was always a mixed blessing in the sense that ‘round the clock’ work on a smallholding could deliver only a basic subsistence given the low prices for agricultural commodities (with a tendency towards a ‘price scissors’ as inputs and other manufactured goods became progressively more expensive). Although yields were relatively high, output per person was low (Table 5.2). Although absolute increases in the rural population to 1940 were general, there was also a relative increase in Bulgaria. There were even absolute increases in Hungary and the SEECs until after 1961, and the rural population still accounted for more than 50% in Romania and Yugoslavia in 1980 (Table 5.3)

Table 5.2 Aspects of population and agricultural dependence A

B

C

D

E

F

G H

I

J

K

L

M

N

Albania 27.5 0.80 1.06 32.3 16.9 38.7 n.a. 80 121 80 22 77.7 n.a. n.a. Bulgaria 103.0 4.85 6.30 30.0 13.9 61.2 1 31 144 75 47 53.0 0.2 0.2 Czechoslovakia 140.5 13.61 15.13 14.0 7.8 110.4 7 4 128 33 105 -4.7 3.1 3.4 Hungary 93.1 7.99 9.13 14.2 8.5 98.0 n.a. 9 156 51 78 22.4 0.9 0.7 Poland 388.6 26.83 34.85 29.9 16.0 89.7 13 23 140 60 49 51.3 2.5 3.7 Romania 295.0 15.63 20.04 28.2 14.1 67.9 2 42 164 72 48 51.4 0.8 0.8 Yugoslavia 247.5 11.98 15.70 31.0 15.2 63.4 4 45 155 76 38 61.5 n.a. n.a. Key: A area (,000 sq.km); B population 1920 (million); C ditto 1939; D percentage change 1920– 39; E natural increase (per 1,000) c. 1930 (Albania estimate); F density (per sq.km) 1939; G average annual out-migration (,000) 1930s; H illiteracy (excluding those below eleven years) percentage (Germany 1%); I infant mortality 1930–4 (deaths under one year/1,000 live births); J dependency on agriculture c. 1920 percentage (Germany 20%); K productivity in agriculture c. 1930 (Europe =100; Germany=195); L surplus agricultural population 1930 percentage, based on current output and European productivity levels (Moore 1945 pp. 63–4); M industrial production 1938 (share of Europe percentage; Germany 32.1%) (Teichova 1985 p. 229); N energy consumption (ditto; Germany 29.2%) (ibid). Source: (except where otherwise stated) Hauner 1985 pp. 75–7, 87

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

229

Table 5.3 Rural population 1900–1990 c. 1990 c. 1940 1961 1980 c. 1990 A B A B A B A B A B Bulgaria 3.00 80.9 4.08 83.3 4.95 62.6 3.35 37.7 3.06 34.1 Czechoslovakia 7.05 58.0 7.15 49.5 5.84 42.8 4.18 27.3 3.81 24.4 Hungary 4.25 62.0 5.00 53.6 5.23 52.5 4.66 43.5 4.33 40.8 Poland 17.21 73.5 20.25 63.2 15.25 51.3 14.76 41.3 14.62 38.4 Romania 9.18 82.0 13.06 78.0 12.49 67.9 11.19 50.4 10.48 45.7 Yugoslavia 9.12 86.0 12.67 79.2 13.30 71.7 12.09 53.9 11.24 48.0 Key: A rural population (million); B percentage of the total Source: Eberhardt 1994

Before the war long-wave commuting had been commonplace, with Hungarians travelling well beyond the Carpathian Basin. Slovak pedlars operated along the Danube and some 12,000 Bulgarian vegetable gardeners travelled all over Europe at the turn of the century. But now the new boundaries imposed restrictions and there were shorter seasonal movements by agricultural labourers (‘summasok’) operating as cohesive kin/neighbourhood work teams (‘bandák’) including surrogate mothers for the girls so ‘the eyes of the village are always still upon us’ (Huseby-Darvas 1989 p. 489). Compared with those who escaped to the towns or developed a rewarding business supplying the towns from rural areas in close proximity, there were extensive areas where the population was marginalised. The 45 ‘giant villages’ of eastern Hungary—each exceeding 10,000 population—were frequently dominated by landed estates that did not support a healthy independent peasant population but gave rise to communities of migrant agricultural labourers supplementing the subsistence value of smallholdings (with limited commuting to factory jobs elsewhere by the late 1930s, as at Mezőkövesd). Held (1980 pp. 255–65) also refers to the poor rural services for the marginalised population in backward areas like Szabolcs-Szatmár (with high infant mortality and pockets of illiteracy) and the neo-feudal conditions affecting farm servants in the estate village or ‘puszta’. Most deplorable were the tanya systems which involved thirty-six of the aforementioned ‘giant villages’. The late nineteenth-century explosion of tanya settlement (particularly strong around Kecskemét and Szeged) involved temporary shelters for use in spring and autumn to save travel time, while farmers returned to town at weekends—and stayed there through the winter so children could attend school. But the families of poor peasants lived on the tanyák longer—perhaps all year (with the likelihood of urban living only in old age). From late autumn to early spring they were cut off by impassable roads; for taxes brought few services such as shops, markets, schools and churches (bizarre sects flourished in the absence of the clergy), and there was a lack of healthcare and veterinary services. ‘About 700,000 people were excluded from all contact with the outside world for a good part of each year’ (Held 1980 p. 269). They rented from municipalities, churches or individuals and were forced into grain growing despite being unable to market during the winter (which meant they had to sell after the harvest when prices were lowest). With little grazing land available, animal husbandry was backward and without access to woodland dried manure and straw were needed for heating. The introverted mentalities of these

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

230

communities would even perceive modernisation as a threat leading to dispersal of families. Although this example may relate to a specific social system where reform was long delayed, the marginality of the rural population was not exceptional and it attracted the attention of those seeking a feasible reform and development strategy. The eugenics movement in Romania The conventional response was limited security for peasant farmers and an acceleration of industrial growth and improvements in rural services. Romania developed such a strategy through eugenics, which gave a central role to the health of the nation and its development subject to laws of heredity and evolution (with biology the fundamental academic discipline: hence ‘biopolitica’ for the total eugenic state). It emphasised preventive health policies with a focus on hygiene and improved medical services, but it might also imply a coercive/authoritarian approach through restricting marriage. As a result of such anti-democratic leanings young people were drawn into accepting a rightwing ideology. Hence the advocates of eugenics opposed liberal politics in the 1920s before drawing a positive response through the National Peasant Party’s Public Health and Welfare Law in 1930: the most com prehensive piece of public health legislation of the inter-war period. The movement also challenged the Orthodox and Uniate Churches in Transylvania and threatened to remove them from a central role in the community. There was a ‘natural hierarchy’ of classes reflected through intelligence which suggested that there should be a rigorous selection process for students entering higher education. I.Moldovan—the intellectual force behind the 1930 law—made progress in Transylvania with his Institute of Hygiene in Cluj and advocacy of mobile dispensaries. He sought central direction through doctors as elite technocrats but with a decentralised system of implementation since his Gilău station was highlighted by the 1930 law as a model district health centre or ‘plasa sanitară’. From this beginning eugenics then moved towards obligatory counselling for married couples (for example, to inculcate a sense of eugenic responsibility among urban dwellers to avoid large families) and limitation of the right to marry (especially in Transylvanian towns). Advocates sought to influence Carol II, the Iron Guard and Antonescu, though the right-wing agenda ran way ahead of them. In 1936 the Penal Code criminalised marriage to a healthy person by a sufferer of VD or another epidemic disease. Carol’s dictatorship produced the Social Service Programme (masterminded by D.Gusti) which included public health (with an expanded role for doctors) as a preoccupation of 3,000 ‘Culture Hearths’ founded in 1939 to operate with local funds (emphasising decentralisation and self-reliance). Under the Anti-Jewish Law of 1940 mixed Jewish-Romanian marriages were forbidden. Through the ‘Astra’ organisation—over which Moldovan presided in 1932—there was a shift to wider cultural and development issues with conferences in market towns dealing with public health issues (through the Biopolitical Section started in 1926). V.Ilea’s idea for peasant schools was implemented in Reghin to educate men (nominated by local teachers, priests and doctors) to be village leaders and agents for cultural betterment. But significantly there was an ‘unspoken but assumed exclusionary attitude towards ethnic non-Romanians [and the schools] reinforced ethnic segregation and sought to instill nationalism among their students’ (Bucur 2002 p. 170). There was also attention to schools for women as the founding of a Feminine Biopolitical Subsection in

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

231

the late 1920s sought to enhance biological vitality and counter ‘alluring images of the city’ (ibid. p. 173) which drew young unmarried women to the towns in search of romance and adventure. While it was desirable to discourage prostitution, rural-urban migration was a function of economic change and so education on social diseases and the importance of individual hygiene was important (though education was potentially a double-edged sword). Subsequent research during the war years was linked with ‘undesirable minorities’ (Jews and Roma) and anthropometric measurements of Transnistrian Romanians in 1942 in the hope of demonstrating ‘authenticity’ and deriving ‘scientific’ criteria for weeding out undesirable ‘others’ (ibid. p. 224). In 1942 Astra (transferred to Sibiu in 1940) founded a Biopolitical Section (separate from the Medical Section) out of concern for the welfare of poor rural Romanians. This reflects the perceived value of rural stock—notwithstanding the superior status of the urban middle class—since eugenicists hoped to avoid the social costs of industrialisation in the senses of alcoholism, malnutrition and syphilis. It was important to influence the rural professionals to help ‘turn this massive population into a well-integrated functioning part of the national community and the modern Romanian state’ (ibid. p. 73). Priests were expected to approach their work in sympathy with eugenic principles, while the presence of more doctors was expected to provide a secular alternative. Thus Moldovan got young doctors to research in rural areas and to undertake post-natal care and marital counselling at the same time. Knowledge of rural conditions in inter-war Romania was greatly enhanced by ethnographers and geographers, but most of all by the sociologists because study of the cultural history became a patriotic duty—justifying the newly established frontiers of ‘Greater Romania’, and D.Gusti’s ‘Bucharest School’ attracted committed researchers on the basis of generous state support. The nationalist project sought spiritual as well as political and military unification: the regions were to be homogenised through culture. Urban culture was thought to have a foreign origin, hence ‘the unification strategy viewed the culture of the Romanian village as the only true authentic one, so providing the right model to follow’ (Rostas 2000 p. 13). The Carpathian areas tended to be most prominent for summer ‘campaigns’ which began at Fundul Moldovei (in Bucovina, near Vatra Dornei) in 1928 and then switched to Drăguş (near Braşov) in 1929 where over 100 people attended (ibid. p. 8). Later in the 1930s two summers were spent at Şanţ near Rodna, while foreign groups were also employing methods of regional survey, notably the British Le Play Society. The political overtones were particularly strong under the royal dictatorship (1938–40) when all college and university students had to perform voluntary cultural work under a Social Service Act drafted with Gusti’s assistance. Predictably, Gusti encouraged detailed research while the politicians wanted to move quickly towards integration, despite the danger of superficial results. But detailed monographs of each village profile gave way—under the influence of A.Golopentia—to a focus on change highlighting the dynamics and tensions. Work was largely halted under communism but the record is now being positively evaluated and perpetuated in a modern form.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

232

Urban centres The years 1910–50 added 8.4 million to the urban population (in respect of towns larger than 20,000 in 1910) compared with 6.8 million for 1870–1910 (a much more restricted network), but the growth rate was much slower, reflecting war losses and the displacement of large refugee populations from some large cities. (Post-Second World War recovery was just beginning when the period ended (Figure 5.6).) The SEECs were now growing much more rapidly—2.9% per annum on average—than the north (0.9%) and region as a whole (1.2%). The contrast applied in all relevant size groups, although in two cases the picture for the SEECs is based on one city only. But even in the smaller towns the growth rate was double that of the northern group. Unfortunately data was not collected in such a way as to comform with the prevailing state boundaries. But discounting the eastern territories lost after the war and taking the prevailing western boundary for Yugoslavia produces the following profile. The northern group had an urban population of 14.71 million, of which Germany had 6.83 million (and an annual average growth of 1.1%) while Poland 3.06 million (0.8%), Czechoslovakia 2.53 million (0.7%) and Hungary 2.29 million (0.7%). The southern group had a total urban population of 2.57 million: 1.29 million for Romania (growing at 2.3% per annum), Yugoslavia 840,000 (3.2%), Bulgaria 390,000 (5.2%) and Albania 50,000 (1.5%). The large centres were still very unevenly distributed and the classic backward areas of the time such as Slovakia and the southern parts of Romania and Yugoslavia are clearly revealed. However, the main centres in these areas are starting to appear, such as Bratislava and Kosice for Slovakia, as well as Craiova and Iaşi in southern and eastern Romania respectively, and Sarajevo and Skopje in Yugoslavia. Most of Poland’s adminisitrative centres now exceeded 50,000: Białystok, Katowice, Kraków, Łódź, Lublin, Poznań, Toruń and Warsaw. In terms of rates of change the most striking feature of the map is the decline evident—through the expulsion of Germans after the war—not only in northern Bohemia but in Breslau, Elbing and Liegnitz. Major disturbance also occurred in Białystok, Prsemyśl and above all Warsaw. Decline took place in Frankfurt a.d.Oder and Plauen in central Germany, Hódmezővásárhely in Hungary and in Pula and Subotica in Yugoslavia. Moderate growth occurred in central Poland (including Upper Silesia), a few towns in central Germany (notably the axis from Eisenach to Zwickau) and several

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

233

Figure 5.6 Urban development 1910– 50

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

234

leading towns in the south, including the Romanian capital and the three most dynamic provincial towns (Braşov, Cluj and Constanţa). Apart from Katowice, the areas of rapid urban growth (over 5% per annum) are confined to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (where the highest rates were recorded by Skopje, Sofia and Zagreb). Zagreb’s industrial growth was impressive with a cluster of major manufacturing concerns in 1945 (Figure 5.7). The industrial zone at that time was heavily influenced by the railway, although some older locations further northeast were still efficient because of private sidings. By this time the original industrial zone of Medveščak (adjacent to Gornji Grad)—formerly endowed with both process water and water power for milling—had disappeared with the culverting of the stream and the shift into Donji Grad and the axis from Črnomerec in the northwest to Maksimir in the southeast but increasingly drawn to the railway axis Trešnjevka in the northwest through Trnje to Peščenica in the southeast. After 1945 there was a shift to the Sava and also to suburbs, though some firms (like Končar and the power generating company) retained older sites while also setting up new premises. But railway access continued in the new Zitnjek area, with some closure and rationalisation in the pre-1945 areas. This was not a period for substantial works in urban development although there was some appreciation of the need to reorganise densely populated and poorly serviced innercity areas such the Tabán area of the Buda riverside; while suburbs were laid out on the ‘garden city’ principle as seen at Szentimre in the Pestszentlorinc area of Budapest and the Hellerau suburb of Dresden. This reflected a sense that cities needed to be loosened to achieve a better balance between work, home and recreation, and, as mentioned, the Warsaw planners were moving in this direction. The development of the Colentina in northern Bucharest to provide a series of lakes was primarily triggered by the need for a better water supply but the implications for suburban development and recreation were soon apparent. However, it was in Berlin where the greatest transformation was envisaged. Under the Weimar Republic the ‘Gross-Berlin Gesetz’ of 1920 brought in adjacent areas including Charlottenburg, Neukölln, Wilmersdorf and Spandau, providing space for new building projects. But the 1925 zoning plan sought to abolish ‘Mietskasernen’ and provide land for new industrial and residential areas inspired by the Bauhaus philosophy: a modern ‘socially conscious’ architectural movement with ‘garden city’ approaches led by W.Gropius, B.Taut and M.van der Rohe. A massive federal government-subsidised housing programme associated with left-wing municipalities, while land beyond the Ringbahn was reserved for recreation. Further suburban railway electrification was carried out after the 1924 economic stabilisation and public transport was better integrated in 1928 when the elevated and underground railways joined with the bus and tramway companies to form Berliner Verkehrsgesellschaft (BVG) that combined rail, tram and bus transport. The railway served to reinforce neighbourhood identity as ‘people politicised the physical structures around them’ in sympathy with the tensions that led to the collapse of the Weimar Republic (Swett 2003 p. 235). Given a strong sense of neighbourhood ‘Kiez’ autonomy at a time of growing political conflict and radical activism, ‘train stations were at the centre of this violent political culture’ (ibid. p. 233).

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

235

Figure 5.7 Industrial areas of Zagreb (inset: Donji Grad)

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

236

All this was destined to be taken over by Hitler’s attempt at replanning on the grand scale, although there was no real implementation due to the war which eventually interrupted building in 1942. Hitler’s Berlin was to accommodate the monumental structures of the Third Reich and ‘stand for eternity’ as the embodiment of moral values, virtues and ideological messages. As Hitler’s young protégé, A.Speer ‘engaged in a monumental, cool, unadorned style, meant to impress at first sight. This was accepted as the official Nazi building style and no modernist experiments were allowed’ (van der Wusten 2000 p. 343). Responsible only to Hitler—a status recalling the authority given to Haussman by Napoleon III—Speer was appointed ‘Generalbauinspector (GBI) für die Reichshauptstadt’ in 1937 with decision-making powers that undermined both the municipality and the national town planning office. There was an efficient institutional framework to provide for replanning, including expropriation. For a vast amount of demolition was envisaged—52,100 apartments (‘Wohnugen’) would have been needed for the great avenue and the central proposals in general—affecting up to 200,000 people. The Spree was to be widened, while Humboldt Hafen would be partially covered by the Volkshalle and many buildings around the Reichstag would be demolished. The skyline would be disrupted by a totally new urban scenery—oppressive and incompatible with human scale. The Berlin local authority was unimpressed with large-scale schemes and opposed the north-south avenue—an idea taken from Mächler’s plan for Berlin in 1917– 19. Indeed, the two plans were very similar apart from the immense scale of Hitler’s and its emphasis on aesthetics and politics rather than urban function. The plans were kept virtually secret. Speer admitted that Hitler had moved into a realm of self-idolatry and his buildings were ‘the very expression of tyranny’: he was reportedly indifferent to social dimensions (the Bauhaus people were seen as ‘inclined to communism’). A modern railway system would replace local stations by two large terminals at Wedding (Nord-Bahn) and Papestrasse (Süd-Bahn)—partly anticipated by the Nordsüdbahn which opened as a surface railway in 1939 between Stettiner and Anhalter stations, with tunnelling under the Spree and an exchange with the Stadtbahn at Friedrichstrasse. There would also be artificial lakes for sport and central parks without financial limits. The framework consisted of a radial concentric structure with five ring boulevards linked by seventeen radial local roads (but with a major right-angle intersection of the north-south and east-west axes at the Brandenburg Gate). Prime concern was given to the 5km north-south axis: 140m wide lined with neoclassical public buildings, in contrast to the 90m recommended by local planners in order to accommodate the immense crowds anticipated. The ‘gigantic classicism’ of this great avenue—with its Arc de Triomphe and other buildings of excessive ornamentation—was inspired by the Champs-Elysées, which Hitler was determined to surpass in the interest of prestige as well as accommodation for the bureaucracy. So Berlin’s equivalent would be 1.5 times wider and 2.5 times longer, with a succession of buildings: Nord-Bahn; Volkshalle (partly covering Humboldt Hafen); the Unter den Linden/Tiergarten intersection; Arc de Triomphe and Süd-Bahn. The architecture—posing as propaganda to reflect political power and authoritarian will (‘autoritäre Wille’)—would focus on an area in the vicinity of the Brandenburg Gate and the Reichstag: the Königsplatz with the Volkshalle (where Hitler could meet the public in a great domed hall, to accommodate 150,000 people standing—symbolising the community of the German people), essentially a place of worship to acquire the same importance as St Peter’s in Rome for Catholic

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

237

Christendom; representing the apex of a new world era based on a German Empire to last a thousand years. Süd-Bahn, with a 34ha square, would terminate the axis in the south and from this point there would be an awe-inspiring view of the Arc de Triomphe. THE SECOND WORLD WAR As Germany regained her strength and unilaterally overcame some of the worst injustices of the peace settlement, ‘the very existence of the newly independent but highly vulnerable states of ECE, legitimated by the victorious allies, proved on balance a political and diplomatic asset to Germany’ (Pollard 1981 p. 291). The British political geographer H.J.Mackinder clearly pointed out that the integrity of the tier of independent states established after the war, along with their democratic institutions, required an ongoing Western commitment. While the Western powers sought to maintain the status quo they were at a disadvantage in two major respects when it came to challenging Germany’s programme of penetration. First the region was fundamentally divided by commitments to maintain the new territorial arrangements or to set them aside. And second, having sponsored the new order which left each of the defeated powers with a revisionist agenda, ideological tensions ruled out concessions for the Soviet Union that might have cemented an alliance against the German threat; thereby leaving open the option of a German-Soviet alliance to partition the region once again. Despite the risk of renewed war, it was not expected that the considerable understanding over Germany’s grievances would be exploited so massively by Hitler that territorial adjustments on the ethnic principle would merely be the first stage of a crusade to annex a vast eastern territory (‘Ostraum’) and annihilate Jews. Although anticipated in Hitler’s Mein Kampf 1925, the German electorate assumed a degree of moderation commensurate with responsible government. However, continued ‘identification’ by Jews caused resentment among the mainstream groups harbouring right-wing perceptions of privileged minorities. The Second World War was, of course, a disaster for ethnic harmony generally through widespread nationalist excesses although it is the Holocaust (which accounted for 3 million Jews in Poland alone—98% of the country’s Jewish population) that stands as the most appalling outrage. While an ideological gulf separated the Soviet Union from the West, it was despair after the 1938 Munich Agreement that finally convinced Moscow of the West’s inability to mount an effective challenge in the face of Germany’s rapid move over Czechoslovakia following strident demands for autonomy by K.Henlein’s Sudeten German Nazi Party. Substantial territory relinquished in 1938 under the Munich Agreement and the subsequent Bohemia and Moravia Protectorate (established over the remainder of the Czech lands) had dramatic implications for the rest of the region in view of the considerable investments held in the SEECs by the former state. Paradoxically there was, eventually, a declaration of war against Germany in defence of Poland, whose independence was destroyed in the joint invasion by Germany and the Soviet Union. Hitler’s attack on Poland—an immediate response to the Franco-British guarantee— provided a staging post for a subsequent Russian campaign. But what at first seemed an empty gesture did gain substance when Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa against the Soviets in 1941 cemented an alliance that forced the Axis to fight on two fronts; and again when

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

238

the USA joined the struggle against ‘Fortress Europe’ (Figure 5.8). But how could Poland’s full independence be salvaged in a war that now saw Germany and the Soviet Union on opposite sides, notwithstanding the Allied agreement to pursue hostilities until Germany offered an unconditional surrender? In such a situation any territorial settlement in ECE would have to serve the Soviet interest. Planning for war in Germany The war effort was backed by a major economic programme that substantially modified the geography of production. Rearming began secretly in 1933 but this became selfevident in 1935. And since defeat in 1918 was seen as the result of blockade, the Four Year Plan (1936–40)—placed under the control of H.Göring, with a leading role for IGF board member C.Krauch—was needed to build up reserves for a war in the East forecasted by 1942–3 (a timetable that was brought forward after the Munich Agreement). Hitler appreciated the strategic advantages of self-sufficiency in oil and in 1933 he approved expansion at Leuna that would raise oil capacity to over 300,000 tonnes by 1937 and 1.4 million in 1941, with a further 2.1 million from nineteen other plants, including four in central Germany: Magdeburg (1934), Bohlen (1937), Zeitz (1938) and Lutzendorf near Merseburg (1938). Iron production of 8.60 million tonnes in 1934 (from 5.22 million domestic ore and 14.06 million imported) rose to 18.20 million in 1938 (using 15 million domestic ore—thanks to the Salzgitter project—plus 22.93 million imported, mainly from Sweden, France and Luxembourg). The Harz mines were again exploited for iron as well as for non-ferrous metals, after previous withdrawal had left a legacy in engineering industries in the towns at the foot of the mountains (Mansfeld copper ore was smelted at Eisleben while Magdeburg produced nickel and zinc). There was also a reintroduction of ironworking in Thuringia with the building of new furnaces during the war at Unterwellenborn near Saalfeld (by the Müller Company of Kattowitz during 1942–4). These were retained by the GDR after the war and not blown out until the 1990s when the privatised plant became a steel maker based on scrap. But other materials were needed to toughen steel for armour, guns and shells: manganese, chromium, tungsten, nickel, molybdenum, cobalt and vanadium. Manganese came from Czechoslovakia (more could come from the USSR—also chromium) but nickel (from Canada), tungsten (China), cobalt (Africa), molybdenum (USA) and vanadium (Africa and the Americas) were all

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

239

Figure 5.8 East Central Europe during the Second World War subject to blockade (except for Chinese tungsten, which could conceivably have been transported across the USSR with appropriate railway overhaul and conversion).

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

240

Germany located a bomber project in the caves of Niedersachswerfen in the Harz Mountains during 1944–5 and the nuclear project also involved locations in central Germany. Work on ‘uranium machines’ (which were to use enriched uranium to drive ships) was transferred for security reasons from Berlin-Dahlem to Bavaria. But Auer (Oranienburg) played a key role by supplying uranium oxide and subsequently uranium plates from 1942–3 at a time of sustained research activity using universities throughout the German sphere. There were important developments in the chemical industry, facilitated in no small measure by IGF’s strong links with the Nazis. According to Todd (1981), war demands took annual output of synthetic rubber to 40,500 tonnes in 1940 and 117,600 in 1943, including 67,700 from Shkopau and 45,600 from the three western plants at Hüls, Leverkusen and Ludwigshafen. Another large plant, with over 100,000-tonne annual output, was planned for Auschwitz (Oswięcim) but this did not fully materialise. Germany’s synthetic rubber (‘Buna S’) was a rather rudimentary substitute in the early 1930s and needed refining when the drive for self-sufficiency started in 1934 as a result of controls/duties on natural rubber with the establishment of the Schkopau plant (followed by Hüls and Ludwigshafen, with a small research unit at Leverkusen). However, the synthetic product was much more expensive than natural rubber ($0.35/lb compared with $0.22–0.30) and gave poorer results since tyre life was relatively low and repairs were unsatisfactory (nevertheless, all but the heaviest vehicles could operate with Buna tyres). Such was the pressure on German industry that Hitler agreed to Himmler’s proposal to expand the Schützstaffel (SS) economic empire by cultivating plants that contained 1.5% rubber over 20,000ha in Ukraine and the Generalgovernment and when the Red Army advance threatened the project in 1944 even dandelions were considered as an alternative. A very important advance was made in 1938 with the construction of a plant near Merseburg for the extrusion of PVC with 7,000 tonnes per annum capacity since various grades of material could be used widely for insulation, filmmaking and in leather/rubber substitution. One consequence was that Bunawerke diversified from rubber into plastics. And these developments intertwined in the field of man-made fibres for the textile industry. There was a great increase in artificial silk-like materials (known collectively as rayon) first developed at the turn of the century. Production rested on cellulose which in turn required caustic soda and soda ash. A large plant was built at Bernburg close to the Stassfurt salts to supply intermediates to Deutsche Celluloid Fabrik at Eilenburg. As has been said, the first fully synthetic fibre (nylon) was produced in the IGF laboratories at Wolfen in 1932 in the course of research into PVC. The result was an artificial silk industry at Wolfen and the production of caprolactam at Leuna for use in producing nylon fibre at Landsberg (Gorzów) in 1938. This was another strand in the Four Year Plan (1936–40) to make Germany independent of foreign countries for all materials ‘which can in any way be produced through German capability through our chemistry, engineering and mining industries’ (Turner 1970 p. 70). Never before had an industrial concern (IGF) been so involved in preparation for a great war. Supported by protective tariffs on oil imports, investment in synthetics extended not only to plastics, rubber and synthetic fibres but even to substitutes for explosives, metals, pharmaceuticals and food. The limits were reached with the aforementioned dandelions as a possible source of rubber, fir-tree roots as a source of fuel and exhaust fumes as a source of alcohol. It was a

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

241

tribute to the scale and importance of the IGF complex—built on the brilliance of German research efforts—that it was systematically wrecked by Allied bombing in 1944. The ‘Battle of Leuna’ was one of the crucial episodes of the war. Other installations in the area that were serving the war effort—the aircraft factories of Aschersleben, Bernburg and Halberstadt—were also damaged. Much was subsequently rebuilt to a modified profile to serve the post-war GDR regime as a new generation of oil- and gasbased chemical plants grew up across the region with Soviet hydrocarbons, distributed by pipeline, the crucial input. Leuna, with its workforce of 30,000, continued to be exceptional for its vertical integration but other installations of the Nazi wartime era like Auschwitz (Oswięcim) and Malteuern (Záluží)—see below—were again prominent under the new order. These units might have become involved in the nuclear programme since there were expectations of heavy-water production not only in Norway but through IGF production at Auschwitz and Leuna. The workforce Surprisingly, Germany did not plan for a lengthy war and was unprepared for a long struggle when 1941 saw the failure of ‘Blitzkrieg’ tactics to take Moscow, and a formidable challenge through US entry into the war. Early in 1942 A.Speer was appointed minister of armament production and a plan for ‘in-depth’ armament was launched. This placed a premium on labour recruitment, although it is again surprising that the increase secured during 1939–44 was less than the natural growth of the workingage population, and fewer women were mobilised than in the UK. In July 1942 the total number of foreign workers reached 5.12 million—including 1.3 million POWs (and other workers from newly occupied Eastern regions) and 340,000 from other Allied and occupied territories (150,000 million from ECE, including Warthegau). But further recruitment drives from late 1942 until 1944 brought only a further 3.74 million against a quota of 6.7 million, mainly because the 1944 programme brought only 1.21 million new workers compared with a planned 4.05 million. Nevertheless, in 1944 there were 8.1 million foreign workers in the Reich—a fifth of the total workforce. They made a crucial contribution: ‘indeed the ability of the Nazi state to recruit and assimilate millions of foreigners into a sophisticated and complex economy is an ominous portent of the efficiency and productive capacities of a ruthless totalitarian regime’ (Homze 1967 p. 308). Despite ambivalence towards the foreigners, especially those from the East, economic necessity brought about a subtle change by 1944 from an ‘Untermensch’ attitude of racial superiority (reflected in the mistreatment of Slavs in the course of resettlement plans through the Warthegau programme) to acceptance of equality inherent in ‘Gastarbeiter’ status, as a result of which some 750,000 foreign workers, mostly from the East, refused repatriation after the war. At the same time, the large prison population was also used for industrial labour. This opportunity arose from the establishment of ‘Konzentrationslagen’ for opponents of the Nazis imprisoned without trial. By 1939 there were 25,000 incarcerated at Buchenwald near Weimar and Sachsenhausen near Oranienburg (as well as Dachau near München). At first the emphasis was on brickmaking and quarry work, but as the prison population soared (reaching 225,000 in 1943) and new camps were opened in the Generalgovernment, Himmler saw the possibility of increasing armaments production

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

242

which would enhance the economic power of the SS and make the organisation independent of the state budget. Five camps/districts were identified—Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Ravensbruck and Sachsenhausen in the East, and Neuengamme near Hamburg, where a total of 25,000 prisoners would be put to work. From 1942 camp prisoners were officially exploited as labourers—coordinated by the Economic Administration Main Office (‘Wirtschafts Verwaltungshauptamt’ or WVHA) to include many sub-camps established next to factories—with a consequent blurring of the distinction between concentration camp and forced labour camp. Auschwitz is dealt with below, but here it may be noted that Buchenwald (first set up in 1937) sprouted a number of weapons factories in 1943, including an underground complex for carbine production in the Jonastal military area near Ohrdruf—where 1,000 prisoners were employed in mid1943—connected with Weimar by a 13km railway. At Ravensbruck, where a women’s camp was first established in 1939, a military factory made uniforms and SachsenhausenOranienburg north of Berlin (dating to 1933) included a satellite at Gross Rosen (Rogożnica) near Jauer (Jawor) in Lower Silesia—established in 1940, but made independent in 1941—with a granite quarry owned by Deutsche Erd- u. Steinwerke. However, people were found to be less productive in a prison environment, with security as an additional cost. So, while Hitler agreed to Himmler’s plan the task proved too complex for the SS (not least because of the persecution of Jews and the lack of machine tools); hence the aforementioned Speer armaments programme. The wider region The idea of a ‘Grossraumwirtschaft’ had its origins in J.G.Fichte’s concept of 1800 and was revised in F.Naumann’s work on Mitteleuropa in 1918. However, the Nazis had in mind a vast ‘pan region’ covering Europe and Africa (separate from the Americas and East Asia) with Germany as the ‘Kernland’ or directing centre. The German strategy was launched in 1934 but it found its greatest opportunity during the war years when much of the ECE economy came under direct Nazi control. Germany had earlier taken a substantial initiative by offering what was in effect a guaranteed market with stimulative prices provided the proceeds were spent on German goods; gradually seeking to ‘create enough vested interests so as to take over those countries without war’ (Botsas 1978 p. 265). Yet ‘the German advance into the economies of SEE during the 1930s was too sporadic to permit the conclusion that it was the decade’s decisive event in the evolution of the state sector’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 519). Economic penetration followed an inconsistent course until ‘the combination of Balkan rearmament and the Nazi absorption of the Czech Lands finally brought sizeable German investment’ (ibid. p. 589) although, even so, oil sales to the West allowed Romania to avoid this new leverage until 1940. It was a considerable help for the Nazis that they could count on the support of a German ethnic population dispersed across the region. There were quite varied attitudes in the 1920s when Transylvanian Germans celebrated the prospect of a multi-ethnic kingdom (along Swiss confederate lines), while the urbanised Zipsers in Slovakia were opposed and either moved to Hungary or sought assimilation into Hungarian culture. Meanwhile, the rural Schwabians in the new Hungary were supporters of integration into the Reich. The momentum gathered by pan-Germanism between the wars was ‘the single most impressive harvesting of outside nationals by a state in history, and arguably an

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

243

example of how policy makers working with academics can transform ethnic-national identity formation’ (Szelenyi 2002 p. 4). The action certainly altered the outlook in Transylvania where radical elements were elected to the leadership of the Lutheran Church: by the 1940s the Transylvanian Saxons’ National Socialist Party was in control. But although the states of the region had little option but to buy Germany’s protection they were not ready to surrender all their economic interests, while overall control was in any case complicated by state boundaries and differences in currencies and fiscal systems. However, despite the widespread nature of manufacturing capacities under German control, the bulk of new investment was concentrated in the Reich where the infrastructure was good and security and supervision posed relatively few problems— although massive transfers of labour were needed. Significantly, A.Speer (1981) wrote of the difficulties in developing armaments production in Poland where chaotic conditions made costly investments largely ineffective. Workers were found to be in poor health and coal distribution was often inefficient. Industry in Poland was left short of labour and in general ‘no rational choice was made as to where the labour could most effectively be employed for the German war effort’ (Radice 1986a p. 327). SS control of a number of industries in Poland—textiles, glass and building materials—gave rise to conflicts between economic and racial policies when production was affected by workers being withdrawn for liquidation. Transport was always a problem and the ambition of a 3mgauge electrified system capable of moving 10,000-tonne freights at 100km/h could not be implemented under war conditions (indeed, even the Soviets never contemplated reconstruction on such a scale). However, arising out of the Russian campaign there was an element of standardisation in the building of war locomotives (‘Kriegslokomotiven’)—saving both steel and non-ferrous metals while achieving a low axle weight (15 tonnes) appropriate for rough track plus the versatility to cope with sharp curves. After the prototype emerged from the Borsig works in Berlin in September 1942, a total of over 6,700 locomotives were built by seventeen different manufacturers. This also provided a solution to transit problems through Hungary arising in the early days of the war when motive power shortages and ‘Horthy trains’ (each consisting of a locomotive and brake van) had to be despatched to repatriate German wagons. The route between Kraków, Lwów and Cernăuţi was the obvious alternative once it had been converted back from broad gauge: after the joint German-Soviet assault on Poland the line was changed to the Soviet gauge and in this condition was offered to the Germans for transit fees payable in gold, notwithstanding the double trans-shipment needed for Romanian grain and risks of looting along the way. Little new railway building is reported apart the Ljubljana bypass of 1942—subsequently closed in 1968—although national interests secured a number of extensions, referred to below (small, however, in relation to the grandiose extensions envisaged in some states). Partly because of transport problems, Germany’s colonial instinct was tempered by ECE’s war materials and labour reserves. So while some industry was closed down where it was inappropriate for Germany’s needs—and racial policies sometimes got in the way of economic rationality—existing capacities were used and some new projects were implemented where there were fuels available (like Romanian natural gas) and locational advantages in relation to the Eastern Front, not to mention security from Allied bombing later in the war. However, it is doubtful if there was a net gain in investment when funding from Germany is balanced against deterioration: the best-case scenarios most

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

244

likely applied to Hungary and Sudetenland. Even so large quantities of food were obtained for Germany. Average annual acquisitions by the Wehrmacht for local consumption and transfer to Greater Germany from 1939–40 to 1943–4 (in descending order, and masking great fluctuations due to the weather) amounted to 480,200 tonnes from the Polish incorporated territories, 283,500 from Romania (not counting 1942–3), 239,800 from the Generalgovernment, 220,600 from Hungary, 141,800 from Yugoslavia and 114,800 from the Protectorate (the former Czech Lands; see below), but only 49,000 from Bulgaria and 36,700 from Slovakia (excluding 1943–4) (Radice 1986b p. 375). In the incorporated lands and the Protectorate there were appropriate administrative arrangements so that ‘farmers whose economic interests did not coincide with this policy had to be compelled to cooperate’ (ibid. p. 391). But in other areas hostile producers were able to use the black market—though there was good cooperation from Volksdeutsche in Banat and Ukrainians in Galicia. In the case of timber, poor planning resulted in overexploitation in the Generalgovernment, Protectorate and Romania, with underuse in some other areas, like Slovakia. The role of Reichswerke Hermann Göring (RHG) and IG Farbenindustrie (IGF) Founded in 1937, RHG was closely identified with Germany’s economic and political aims. The company tackled the Salzgitter iron ores—which private companies were reluctant to take on—in the interest of the war effort that required economic autarky and armament readiness. There was also investment in the Steyr-Daimler-Puch Works in Austria. As a result RHG was greatly favoured in the competition for assets in ECE arising out of Germany’s territorial expansion. Czech firms like Škoda were valuable for the army, not to mention the export potential before war broke out. However, there was no rationalisation or transfer of resources: all units kept going on the basis of ‘expansion at all costs’ (Overy 1983 p. 283)—which meant that labour, management expertise and machinery were spread too thinly to get the best results. RHG included railway industries, armaments and shipping in order to make use of all the iron and steel, and thereby generate materials and products for transfer to Germany. Yet ‘when the period of expansion virtually came to an end in 1941 an unwieldy and untidy industrial colossus had been carved from the spoils of Central Europe’ (ibid. p. 283), so at this stage three major blocks were formed on the basis of iron, steel and mining (‘Montanblock’), armaments (‘Waffen und Maschinenbau’), and shipping—although all were controlled by a central holding company in Berlin (until ‘Waffen’ had to be removed from RHG control in 1942, notwithstanding Göring’s attempts to maintain personal contact). A strong link was intended between engineering and the oil industry, but the chance to utilise Soviet oil did not materialise. IGF negotiated special deals to expand markets by buying agricultural products and contributed to the German autarkic economy (from 1933) by securing vegetable oils in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. After consolidating through the 1920s, IGF then adjusted to the crisis in world markets by establishing final production abroad—also compensation agreements and increasing political activity. ‘After 1938, IGF reinforced its penetration [into the region] by either direct participation in local chemical industries or the foundation of new companies’ (V.Schroter 1983 p. 161), though FDI played only a

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

245

minor role through the inter-war period as a whole. IGF interest in the Nobel explosives factory in Bratislava made this a suitable base for storage of intermediates relevant to IGF’s planned manufacture of dyestuffs in Czechoslovakia for it was registered as a Czechoslovak joint stock company possessing a concession for the production of chemicals. In these additional areas the capacity of the IGF-controlled chemical industry was enlarged by control of Aussiger Verein at Aussig (Ústí nad Labem) in the Sudetenland and several dyestuffs companies in Poland. Finally, the labour demands from all this industrial activity were considerable and so prison labour was widely used throughout the region from 1941. Apart from Poland (described in detail below) there were large installations at Theresienstadt (Terezín) in the Protectorate, Nováky and Sered in Slovakia, Győr, Novi Sad and Szolnok in Hungary, Jasenovac in Croatia, and Pleven in Bulgaria; while Romania’s camps included Caracal, Călărasj, Moineşti and Târgu Jiu, and with others in Bessarabia and Transnistria. Grossdeutschland: incorporated territories and Generalgovernment There was a change of direction in Polish politics with the death of Piłsudski in 1935 since proper priority could now be given to defence (previously thought inappropriate). A Six Year Defence Expansion Plan was drawn up for 1936–42, to include air force modernisation. There was also a Four Year Investment Plan for 1936–40 and in 1938 a set of three Five Year Plans were expected to follow— all based on domestic finance. Although doomed to early revision with the outbreak of hostilities, the whole exercise represented a powerful reaction to the Kraków school of liberal economists. There was also an important spatial component to the plan, as noted earlier. Poland already had a network of armament/ammunition factories in Warsaw and provincial locations such as Dębica, Lublin, Móscice, Pionki, Pustków, Radom, Skarżysko and Starachowice (which had exported equipment while Poland’s own forces went short). Like Romania, Poland tried to avoid growing dependence on Germany but had difficulty disposing of agricultural surpluses. And her policies were overtaken by events arising out of the Munich Agreement, the Nazi-Soviet Pact—leading to invasion by Germany and the USSR—and Germany’s war against the Soviets. Former aircraft manufacturing premises at Warsaw-Okęcie were now used by German repair companies: Brandenburgische Werke and Flugzeugwerke. Further afield the Mielitz (Mielec) factory turned to Messerschmitt components with further capacity at Malbork. Explosives were made at Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) and other armaments factories started from 1942, including tanks and small arms in Warsaw. The Peenemünde rocket project had to be relocated after the Griefswald site was destroyed by Allied bombing in 1943 and while part was transferred to Hammerfeld near Nordhausen in the Harz Mountains—where 10,000 labourers worked in a vast underground factory developed in old mine workings—use was also made of a site at Blizna (near the Kraków-Lwów railway close to Rzesów) which had been developed for a Polish ordnance establishment and subsequently converted into a health camp and training ground (‘Heidelager’). Reference should be made to some wartime farm consolidation, although some estates in Galicia (first occupied by the Soviets) were split into small farms and old estate buildings demolished. And while there were no significant railway projects the road system was reorganised to create a network of north-south and west-east through-roads or

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

246

‘Durchgangstrassen’ (DGSTR; Table 5.4) which provided a coherent network across Grossdeutschland) and extended at a greatly reduced density into Allied and occupied territories. Although no new construction was involved it would appear that the DGSTR network had priority where maintenance was concerned. The selected roads did not comprise a regular grid: four north-south routes crossed in quick succession on route IV at Neisse (A), Cosel (U), Gleiwitz (Z) and Sosnowitz (S); while north-south route W crossed west-east routes in rapid succession in East Prussia at Tilset (XII), Königsberg (XII), Bertenstein (XI), Lautern (X), Bischofsburg (IX) and Ortelsburg (IX/IXa). Two west-east routes touched at Görlitz while north-south and west-east routes coincided over short distances, and over quite lengthy stretches in the case of a section starting just east of Miskolc to Nagyvárad (Oradea) (W and I); also Budapest-Arad (S and XIII). Town centres were avoided where possible: route U passed just west of Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) and Kalisch (Kalisz) while VII passed south of Cottbus; route S avoided large settlements altogether all the way from Thorn (Toruń) to Gleiwitz. It is noticeable that several branches ended on the frontier of the General government, presumably as part of an initial defence strategy for the German conquests

Table 5.4 Germany’s through-roads in Ostdeutschland North-south routes E Hof-Passau-Simbach* D Sassnitz-Neubrandenburg*-Berlin*-Dresden*-Teplitz (Teplice)*-Prag (Prague)*-Tabor*Krems-St. Pölten* D1 Tabor*-Budweis (České Budĕjovice)-Linz* C Swinemünde (Świnouście)-Stettin (Szczecin)*-Frankfurt a.d. Oder*-Cottbus-Görlitz*-ZittauKolin (Kolin)*-Iglau (Jihlava)*-Vienna* B Landsberg (Gorzów)*-Grunberg (Zielona Góra)-Parchwitz (Prochowice)* A Kolberg (Kołobrzeg)-Scheidemühl* (Piła)-Posen (Poznań)*-Breslau (Wrocław)*-Neisse (Nysa)*-Olmütz (Olomouc)-Brünn (Brno)*-Vienna*-Leoben*-Klagenfurt-Villach U Gotenhaen (Gdynia)-Konitz (Chojnice)*-Oppeln (Opole)*-Cosel (Koźle)*-Mähr. Ostrau* (Ostrava)-Trentschin (Trenčin)*-Tyrnau (Trnava)* Z Danzig (Gdańsk)*-Dirschau (Tczew)*-Graudenz (Grudziądz)*-Thorn (Toruń)*-Gleiwitz (Gliwice)*-Sillein (Žilina)*-Prievidza-Budapest*-Arad*-Belgrade* S Elbing (Elbląg)*-Osteroda (Ostróda)*-Schröttersburg (Płock)-Litzmannstadt (Łódź)-Petrikau (Piotrków)*-Tschentockau (Częstochowa)-Sosnowitz (Sosnowiec)*-Rosenburg (Ružomberok)*-Losone (Lučenec)*-Budapest*-Esseg (Osijek)-Belgrade* W Tilsit (Sovetsk)*-Königsberg (Kaliningrad) *-Bertenstein (Bartoszyce)*-Bischofsburg (Biskupiec)*-Warshau (Warsaw)*-Radom*-Sandomir (Sandomierz)*-Prešov*-Kassa (Košice)*-Nagyvárad (Oradea)*-Arad*-Belgrade* W1 Memel (Klaipeda)-Tilsit*-Insterburg (Chernyakovsk)*-Angerburg (Węgorzewo)*Bischofsburg* W2 Warshau*-Lublin*-Zamość-Lemberg (Lviv)*-Munkács* (Mukačevo)-Szatmarnémeti (Satu Mare)-Dej-Kołozsvár (Cluj)-Sebeş* West-east routes XII Hamburg-Neubrandenburg*-Stettin*-Danzig*-Königsberg*-Tilsit*-Leningrad XI Celle-Eberswalde-Stargard-Dirschau*-Marienburg (Malbork)-Bertenstein*-Insterburg*Gumbinnen (Gusiew)

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

247

X Eberswalde-Konitz*-Graudenz*-Osteroda*-Allenstein (Olsztyn)-Angerburg*-Gumbinnen IX Hannover-Berlin-Landsberg*-Schneidemühl*-Bromberg (Bydgoszcz)-Bischofsburg*-WilnaWitebsk—also IXA Ortelsburg (Szczytno)-Prostken (Prostk)# VIII Frankfurt a.d.Oder*-Posen*-Warshau*-Międzyrzec*-Brest-Roslawi VI Kassel-Wittenberg-Glogau (Glógów)-Kalisch (Kalisz)-Petrikau*-Radom* -Międzyrzec VI Eisenach-Görlitz*-Liegnitz (Legnica)-Parchwitz*-Breslau*-Radomsko*-Lublin*-Chełm# V Frankfurt am Main-Chemnitz-Dresden*-Görlitz*-Oppeln*-Sandomir*-Zamość-HrubieszówKijew (Kiev) IV Würzburg-Teplitz*-Jungbunzlau (Mladá Boleslav)-Königgratz (Hradec Králové)-Neisse*Cosel*-Gleiwitz*-Katowice-Sosnowitz*-Krakau (Kraków)-Tarnów-Przemyśl-LembergUman-also branch IVa Reichshof (Rzeszów)-Ciesanów# III Nürnberg-Pilsen (Plzeň)-Prag*-Kolín*-Mähr. Schönberg (Šumperk)-Mähr. Ostrau*-Bielitz (Bielsko Biała)-Sanok II Stuttgart-Tabor*-Iglau*-Brünn*-Trentschin*-Sillein*-Rosenberg*-Prešov*-Kassa*Munkács*-Máramarossziget (Sighet)-Botoşani I Strassburg-Simbach*-Linz*-St Pölten*-Vienna-Pressburg (Bratislava) -Tyrnau*-Losone*Miskolc-Debrecen-Nagyvárad*-Kolozsvár*-Huşi Ib Vienna-Pressburg (Bratislava)-Budapest-Szolnok-Nagyvárad* XIII Innsbruck-Leoben*-Graz-Veszprém-Budapest*-Arad*-Sebeş*-Ploeşti XIV Graz-Marburg (Maribor)-Varasdin (Varaždin)-Agram (Zagreb)-Belgrade* Key: * towns where north-south and west-east routes intersect; # routes ending at the eastern frontier of the general government Source: Durchgangsstrassen: Blatt Ostdeutschland 1941

in Poland. No information has been accessed dealing with the traffic levels, roadside services and maintenance. Upper Silesia With the fall of Poland, attention shifted to the reunification of Upper Silesia where the Poles had previously attempted to maintain coal production in their territory through a cartel which involved taking over companies with German capital—weakened by depression and insolvency, aggravated by the outflow of capital. Dealing now with the entire conurbation, the Germans scored a major planning success through the integration of coalmining (largely in the hands of HGW subsidiary ‘Bergwerksverwaltung’) so that production reached the record level of 86.7 million tonnes in 1943 (after 64.1 million in 1938 and 52.3 million in 1913) (Table 5.5). There was also rationalisation of steelmaking—including capacity in Teschen (Tĕšín)—which was placed in the hands of experienced managers and integrated with Sudetenland and the Protectorate on the basis of a customs union in 1940. Considerable returns to the German war economy were limited only by labour and capital (Radice 1986d p. 415). O.Fitzner proved an effective chief of the civilian administration of the enlarged Gau (administrative region) but the industrial organisation fell to Vereinigte Stahlwerke of Düsseldorf, resulting in some consolidation of individual businesses. In this ‘Ruhrgebiet des Ostens’ or ‘Hüttenkombinat Ost’, assets of the Polish state and British/French capitalists—along with the Teschen installations—were allocated primarily to new state-monopoly concerns: Berghütte and RHW. There was a rapid increase in steel output through better

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

248

use of Polish capacities in which German firms had previously underinvested: the 1938 output of 4.3 million tonnes rose to 5.1 million in 1943 (ibid. p. 420). Tanks were made in converted steel mills like Bankowa, Batory and Königshütte (the former Huta Piłsudski). There was also some new development using locations on the edge of the conurbation. Auschwitz featured in plans to increase output of synthetic rubber, as well as explosives and oil (through a massive complex for hydrogenation and nitrogen-ethylene production). IGF wished to support the war against the Soviet Union and also envisaged a huge postwar market in the East. The project started in 1941 at a site with good rail links, local water and coal (the latter secured from Fürstengrübe and Janina mines) and with the prospect of labour from an adjacent concentration camp, before IGF established its own camp—Auschwitz III—at Monowitz in 1942. Nevertheless, camp inmates accounted for only 26.6% of the worforce, while 55.1% were ‘free’ foreign workers and 18.3% regular German workers. Despite the horrific regime whereby IGF used slave labour as a consumable raw material, no rubber was ever produced and the oil output was well below capacity. Meanwhile, factories to produce explosives were not only attached to major plants in central Germany (like Bunawerke) but were dispersed in locations elsewhere, including Upper Silesia. A chemical plan in 1940 envisaged the Auschwitz complex on the eastern side in the Vistula Valley and other units on the western side, developed in the Oder Valley at Blechhammer (Blachownia) and Heydebreck (Kędzierzyn), while Dyhernfurth (Brzeg Dolny) handled poison gas. Population movements: resettlement and the concentration camps Movements among the civilian population arose through the concentration camp system (referred to below) and migration for work in Germany. But a decree in the Protectorate in 1940 required Roma to settle within two months or face internment in camps at Hodonin and Lety near Písek; other labour centres were designated later and there were eventual transfers to death camps. Reference should also be made to resettlement where efforts were concentrated in one of the Polish incorporated territories: Warthegau (Warta region). This should be seen in the context of the 1941 ‘General Plan East’ which sought to eliminate 30 million Slavs to create space for resettlement of Germans in plantations organised by overlords: it was at this time that Himmler’s SS refitted the Auschwitz camp with gas chambers. Volksdeutsche were settled in Zamość but much more substantial was the Warthe project which was aimed at Germans from the East and was driven by ‘atrocity propaganda’—the spectre of Bolshevik invasion and intimidation—which meant that the towns as well as the land had to be Germanised, leading to an industrial policy embracing lignite mining and the production of agricultural machinery and textiles. Posen had a major administrative role but great importance also attached to Łódź (renamed Litzmannstadt) where the original idea was to dismantle Polish-owned industry and transfer plant to other parts of the Reich—although this policy could not be implemented quickly and in 1942 there were still 400,000 Poles in the

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

249

Table 5.5 Coal, steel and electricity production 1913–43 Coal (million tonnes) Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia A B A B A B A B A B A B 1913 0.0 0.3 14.3 n.a. 0.8 5.5 41.0 0.0 0.5 2.6 na na 1922 0.0 1.0 10.5 19.2 0.9 6.2 34.6 0.0 0.3 1.9 0.1 3.6 1927 0.1 1.2 14.0 19.6 0.8 6.2 38.0 0.0 0.4 2.9 0.3 4.5 1929 0.1 1.6 16.5 22.5 0.8 7.0 46.2 0.0 0.4 2.7 0.4 4.2 1932 0.1 1.7 11.0 15.8 0.9 6.0 28.8 0.0 0.2 1.5 0.4 4.1 1935 0.1 1.5 10.9 15.1 0.8 6.7 28.5 0.0 0.3 1.7 0.4 4.0 1937 0.1 1.7 17.0 18.0 0.9 8.0 36.2 0.0 0.1 1.7 0.4 4.6 1939 0.2 2.1 18.8 19.4 1.1 9.5 38.1 0.0 0.3 2.2 0.4 5.6 1941 0.2 4.3 21.0 22.4 1.3 12.6 48.9 0.0 0.2 2.2 n.a. n.a. 1943 0.2 3.8 24.6 27.6 1.4 10.8 57.5 0.0 0.3 2.6 n.a. n.a. Steel (million tonnes) Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia 1913 1.23 0.44 1.66 0.04 0.00 1922 0.72 0.26 1.00 0.07 0.04 1927 1.69 0.47 1.24 0.13 0.07 1929 2.19 0.51 1.38 0.16 0.98 1932 0.67 0.18 0.56 0.10 0.07 1937 2.32 0.67 1.47 0.24 0.17 1939 2.29 0.73 1.90 0.26 0.24 1941 2.42 0.78 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1943 2.56 0.78 2.49 0.35 n.a. Electricity (million kWh)† Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia 1922 21 1759 358 1297 243 n.a. 1927 45 2381 602 1742 415 n.a. 1929 86 3336 703 2355 500 460 1932 121 2621 687 2257 544 777 1937 202† 4115‡ 1061 3628 1077 913† 1939 266 4559 1232 2083* 1212 1100 1941 304 5344 1450 n.a. 1171 n.a. 1943 340 6660 1806 n.a. 1440 n.a. Key: A hard coal; B lignite; * first six months; † includes hydropower (Bulgaria 134; Czechoslovakia 557; Yugoslavia 450) Source: Radice 1985b pp. 211–15; 1986c pp. 400–3; 1986d p. 417

city, with many mills running purely on Polish labour (while spare textile capacity was used to produce ammunition). Meanwhile, several smaller towns were idenified as Kreis (district) centres, including Gostingen (Gostyń), Jaroyshin (Jarocin) and Lissa (Leszno), each with a group of subordinate market towns, for example Görchen (Miejska Górka),

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

250

Kröben (Krobia), Pogorschella (Pogorzela), Pünitz (Pobiec), Rawitsch (Rowicz) and Schmückert (Bojanowo) in the case of Gostingen (Freeman 1987 p. 160). Polish and Jewish artisans were to be replaced by Germans, for barely 5,000 of the 65,000 handicraft establishments in the Warthegau belonged to local Volksdeutsche at the time of incorporation. Many units under Polish or Jewish management were closed because a total of 33,000 was considered sufficient, but skilled Germans could not be found immediately and officials had to entice settlers from other parts of the Reich rather than recruit artisans from the ranks of migrants from the East. The number of Germans resettled has been estimated at some 630,000 by late 1944, including some transfers from bombed areas of the Altreich (Radice 1986a pp. 316–19). The Ostland (later Reichland) organisation competently managed land earmarked for German settlement and generated surpluses—in Danzig-Westpreussen as well as Warthegau—despite hostility shown to the incomers and difficulties that arose in dealing with the SS who were responsible for resettlement (and indeed poised to make the occupied East their ‘massive trial ground [where] racial and ideological schemes could be tested and refined’ (Freeman 1987 p. 152), with security in the hands of their commando forces or ‘Einsatzgruppen’). Meanwhile, Poles were expelled from Warthegau into the Generalgovernment and also to the Altreich where they could meet the labour shortage in agriculture. But to the end of 1943 only 365,000 had gone to the Generalgovernment from the incorporated territories as a whole, plus 170,000 to the Altreich, showing how plans could be upset by economic as well as military considerations (i.e. a concern over a falling workforce in the incorporated territories). Plans to settle Germans in the Lublin area of the Generalgovernment did not succeed and only a few Germans from Bucovina and Bessarabia were settled in central Moravia. Concentration camp districts in Poland were based at Auschwitz, Majdanek near Lublin—the location for ‘Ostindustrie’, a group of enterprises relocated from Warsaw— Gross Rosen with its granite quarry, Plaszów south of Kraków and Stutthof (Sztutowo) in the Danzig territory. But a further camp was built at Auschwitz-Monowitz in 1941 in connection with the IGF synthetic rubber and gasoline projects, and other significant installations were located at Janówske west of Lwów, Rava Ruska on the Tanew by the main road from Warsaw to Lwów, and Trawniki on the Wieprz between Lublin and Chełm where several Warsaw factories were relocated. Mass extermination camps (‘Vernichtungslagen’) were set up, mainly under ‘Aktion Reinhard’, and operated in 1942–3 at Auschwitz-Birkenau (Oszwięcim-Brzeziny) where 3.5 million people perished; Belżec south of Tomaszów Lubelski (600,000); Chełmno on a tributary of the Warthe southeast of Koło (no figure available); and Treblinka, on the Bug near Ostrów Mazowiecki northeast of Warsaw (750,000). In addition there were operations during 1941–5 at Culmhof near Bromberg (360,000); and during 1942–4 at Majdanek (200,000) and Sobibór on the Bug northeast of Chełm (250,000). These were all in the Generalgovernment except for Auschwitz and Chełmno which were in the incorporated territories. The result was loss of some 3 million people from Poland (mainly Jews) and smaller numbers from other countries, in addition to the substantial military losses.

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

251

Grossdeutschland: Sudetenland and the Bohemia and Moravia Protectorate After the Munich Agreement the Germans were invited to set up a protectorate over what was left of the Czech lands. A generally mild regime acknowledged the importance of the economy for the war effort, and as part of RHG’s Waffen section Škoda’s workforce of 32,000 in 1938 had grown to 78,000 by 1945 (with a name change to V.I.Lenin under communism). However, there was no upsurge in production in the Protectorate—only in 1943 was there an increase in output over 1939—with a growth in heavy industry balancing a decline in light industry because on average 265,000 Czechs were working in Germany at any one time (Krejči 1986 p. 453). The production of armaments came not only from Škoda at Plzeň and Mladá Boleslav (plus a new ammunition factory at Nýrăny) but from Böhmische-Mährische Kolben Danek in Prague; and from Československá Zbrojovka Brno (CZB), also with a factory in Moravia at Uherský Brod. All these units were brought together under RHG’s Škoda-Brünn complex which could draw on the Vitkovice armour-plate steelworks and the high-quality steels from Kladno. Production peaked in 1944 as work was transferred from vulnerable western areas of Germany. Aircraft—as well as engines and components—were produced at Prague-Letnany and in many smaller centres. North of Brüx (Most) a very large oil plant was started at Malteuern in 1938, staffed with 32,600 workers (including POWs) by mid-1942 when it was endowed with it own power station (supplied by the surrouning lignite field). The hydrogenation plant operating by the end of 1942 produced 40,000–50,000 tonnes of motor fuels each month until it was 70% destroyed by bombing in 1944–5 (Figure 5.9). Oil and explosives were produced at Pardubitz (Pardubice) while dyestuffs came from an enlarged plant at Aussig (Ústí). There were agricultural programmes that sought to cross the native Valašska sheep with the Merino, to modernise dairying, expand potato growing with elite seed from Pomerania and grow vegetables for the Vienna market. But the positive work done by German technical assistance was undermined by racial persecution and secret police power. The plan to colonise Moravia as a German corridor connecting Austria and Silesia did not get very far while ambitious plans to overhaul the transport system in what was a critical area for integration of Grossdeutschland could obviously not be achieved under war conditions. However, some thought was given to new lines of communication that would be aligned along the Sudetenland northeastern axis to complement all the routes that were crossing it from Silesia to central Bohemia. After the Munich Agreement a new strategic road was planned to follow the line

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

252

Figure 5.9 Lignite working around the Brüx (Most) area of northern Bohemia of the mountains from Bad Flinsberg (Swieradow Zdrój) east of Zittau across the Riesengebirge passing just north of Jungbach (Trutnov) to reach Schomberg (Mezimĕsti) before following existing roads to Branau (Broumov), Wünschelberg (Radków) and Kudowa (Kudowa Zdrój). Then new construction was to follow the western slopes of the Glatz depression to Mittelwalde (Międzylesie) and continue eastwards between Altstadt (Staré Mesto pod Snĕžníkem) and Hannsdorf (Hanušovice) and over the Allvatergebirge to Freudenthal (Bruntál) and Troppau. The road was never finished but several sections exist, including the Glatz portion which provides a fine touring route today between Międzylesie and Kudowa Zdrój. Sudetenland was also integrated into the aforementioned system of Durch-gangstrassen. Various sections of secondary route would have eventually been upgraded to international standard—for example, the route through northeastern Bohemia for the road from Prague through Kolín, Chrudim, Zwittau

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

253

(Svitavy), Mähr. Schönberg (Šumperk), Troppau, Mähr.Ostrau (Ostrava), Salzberg (Bochnia), Przemyśl and Lemberg (Lwów). The Oder-Danube Canal concept was taken over as well as a number of railway projects to connect Chemnitz with Karlsbad, improve Reichenberg’s links with Saxony and Silesia and link Mähr. Schönberg with Troppau. Hungary Politics in Hungary followed a predictable course whereby support for the Axis was necessary in order to regain territory from her neighbours. In this she was partially successful—Felvidék (southern Slovakia) in 1938, northern Transylvania in 1940 and Délvidék (Bačka/Baranya Triangle) in 1941—but all the gains were cancelled out at the end of the war, despite Hungary’s attempt at unilateral withdrawal which led to a short German occupation. Hungary’s farming was the subject of a Ten Year Agricultural Plan announced in 1941 for 1942–51, but a new turn in the economy came in 1937 with the Győr Programme which developed into a Five Year Rearmament Programme the following year, including the state Mávag ammunition plant at Diósgyőr (also a producer of locomotives). Two hundred million pengö a year were to be invested over five years from 1938 as investment subsidies for agriculture, heavy industry and transport. War work was very evident at Manfréd Weiss after 1937 through production of army lorries and military aircraft as well as guns, tanks and ammunition. Lorries were also built by Mávag; and there was investment at the state ironworks of Diósgyor where the iron-ore supply was increased—linked with armaments from Győr Wagon Factory and the Budapest enterprises of Ganz (also a builder of ships and electrical machinery) and Lang in addition to Mávag and Manfréd Weiss. Ammunition and explosives were also secured from the chemical complex at Pét near Veszprém; while there was German support for the aircraft industry which expanded from 1941 so that over 500 Messerschmitt aircraft were serially produced for Germany in 1944 alone from factories at Budapest (where Manfréd Weiss opened a new ‘Danube’ factory at Szigetszentmiklós) and Győr which produced Daimler-Benz aero engines and components. The aluminium industry was boosted by German demand: aluminium production in Hungary was prevented by the Versailles Treaty and hence alumina initially went to Germany via Mosonmagyaróvár to produce metal. But the restriction was ignored under the Hitler-Horthy relationship with the needs of German aviation uppermost. Investments were made at the mines near Ajka that had begun production in 1932 (a new power station was started in 1942) while alumina was made from bauxite at Almásfüzitö near Komarom for transfer to the Manfréd Weiss smelter in Budapest-Csepel (in addition to the Mosonmagyaróvár installation for export to Germany). Further capacity was planned for Felsögalla (Tatabánya) but was not achieved until after the war. The Transdanubian oil industry at Lispe, southwest of Lake Balaton, grew quickly from comparative insignificance in 1938 to 800,000 tonnes towards the end of the war with an oil refinery installed at Soroksár (though the planned Budapest pipeline was not achieved). Pharmaceuticals were supplied from the enlarged Chinoin factory and there was a wartime drive towards artificial fibres at the rayon factory in Mosonmagyaróvár. All this made Hungary a target for heavy bombing especially in Budapest, Győr and Pét. A new power plant in the Matra was unfinished. Territorial changes left Hungary with the need to improve access to southeastern Transylvania which led to the opening of a through-route from

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

254

Szatmarnéméti (Satu Mare) to Brassó (Braşov) by new link to the north of Marosvásárhely (Târgu Mureş) (16 on Figure 5.2). A secondary narrow-gauge line immediately to the south was also extended at this time. Slovakia When Hitler set out to destroy Czechoslovakia there was a measure of support in Slovakia for a separate state. And if the Slovaks acquiesced in Hitler’s plan of 1939 for a protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and a nominally independent Slovakia then at least the country (which still included the capital Bratislava and the historic town of Nitra) was saved from the possibility of total absorption into Hungary. However, Ruthenia was detached, and despite the internal divisions which could have linked its future with Hungary, Poland or Ukraine, the whole territory was taken over by Hungary and at the end of the war by the USSR. Poland had sought to destabilise the local administration and precipitate a change of government in her favour, but it was significant for the Poles that Hungary would not allow Germany to use Ruthenia as a launchpad for their subsequent invasion of Poland; thereby allowing elements of the Polish forces to escape into Hungary and Romania and then regroup in the Middle East and Western Europe. Meanwhile, despite their limited territory, Slovaks were also able to enjoy a brief economic boom before self-preservation (in the face of a weakening Germany) sparked an uprising in 1944 and secured the admission from the Czechoslovak government in exile that the Slovaks were a nation. However, the autonomy that should have been secured by this declaration was not forthcoming until 1969 when Soviet suppression of the ‘Prague Spring’ was followed by federalisation of party and state. Slovakia benefited from strong growth in the Nazi era which greatly reduced the regional differences. There were plans for the expansion of armaments under the Four Year Plan using steel from Vitkovice, but in the event Czech steel, from both Vitkovice and Poldi-Kladno was used for tank production by Škoda and Linz. Synthetic oil using the Fischer-Tropsch process was produced at Bratislava; while Škoda and ČZB had branch plants at Dubnica and Považská Bystrica, respectively. Finally, it should be noted that the war gave Slovakia an opportunity to push ahead with its railway development since national interests in east-west axial routes coincided with the German interest in better transit capacity between Vienna and Ukraine via Bratislava and Kosice, but little was actually achieved. Although, following the Handlová-Harmanec line of 1939 and the completion of the central trunk from Trenčin to Košice the line was continued eastwards between Prešov and Humenné through the Kapušany-Strážske line of 1943—a route considered to be of great importance to Slovakia and Germany. Along the southern border it was intended to link Brezno with Košice through Slavošovce and thence through connections with other branch lines (Revúca-Tisovec, Štitnic-Nižna Staná and Rožňava-Turňa). But none of this work was implemented and the Rožňiava-Turňa section was completed only in 1955 to supply minerals to Košice. In the north it was planned to link Breszo with Králová Lehota, to connect the end of the Podolínec branch with Bardejov and continue parallel to the Polish frontier but only the Podolínec-Plaveć link was built (and not until 1966). Another abortive proposal aimed at connecting branch lines to provide a direct link from Bratislava through Jáblonica to Myjava (on the SlovakMoravian link of 1929 between Nové Mesto n.Vahom and Veselí n.Morava).

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

255

Romania Carol II’s royal dictatorship was well established by 1933 (though military officers replaced civilian prefects under the 1938 constitution) and the the native fascist movement—the Legion of Archangel Michael—has been dismissed as ‘a mystical movement of regeneration that concentrated in its early phases on mobilizing the neglected peasants rather than on maintaining control over them through a decaying landed elite’ (Stokes 1987 p. 60). Carol strengthened his defences with a programme for strategic industries which included state support for rearmament through the ‘Socomet’ cartel after 1936 (including the Concordia munitions plant located between Bucharest and Braşov). But in the aftermath of depression the German embrace proved irresistible and his attempts to maintain independence through his style of ‘monarcho-fascism’ was gravely weakened by events in Czechoslovakia in 1939 because of Československá Zbrojovka’s one-fifth interest in the Romanian munitions company Uzinele Copşa Mică şi Cugir (UCMC) plus a tenth of the Reşiţa metallurgical and engineering company. Hence the German takeover of Czech interests ‘dealt a death blow to Romanian efforts at maintaining its military forces outside the German orbit’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 518). Then Carol’s position collapsed disastrously in 1940 when Romania was obliged to cede northern Transylvania to Hungary under Hitler’s Vienna ‘Diktat’ while the Soviets demanded northern Bukowina and Bessarabia (plus the Herta district of Moldavia) and Bulgaria regained the Dobrogea territory lost in 1913. Carol was forced to abdicate in favour of his son Mihai and went into exile. The new government headed by Marshal Antonescu operated in such close liaison with the Central Powers that he has been seen as ‘the third man of the Axis’. Romania participated in the campaign against the Soviet Union and in addition to regaining the lost northeastern territories in 1941 occupied a slice of Ukraine known as ‘Transnistria’. There was RHG involvement in Romania where ‘much was promised in the way of investment and little given’ (Overy 1983 p. 289). The technical agreement signed with HGW provided for German investment and technical assistance to Malaxa, and this set the pattern for Hunedoara and Reşiţa where HGW took over commercial and technical management through the Rogifer organisation combining the three units. In this way the Romanian metallurgical industry gained a new rolling mill and Siemens-Martin furnaces. Industria Aeronautică Română Braşov was controlled by a HGW subsidiary and retooled to produce Messerschmitt fighters in 1943. The Germans were not keen on developing armaments in Romania although UCMC (controlled in the 1920s by Vickers) produced artillery and small arms while Avrig near Sibiu was concerned with shell filling and transport equipment. But when Romania began to use methane gas as a raw material for the chemical industry, the Germans eventually supported the trend as a useful contribution to the war effort, and the advantage of having a source of explosives close to the southeastern front was strong enough to overrule arguments against dispersal of German technology. Production of formaldehyde (needed for synthetic resins and explosives) began at Copşa, a Mică in 1940 and the Nitramonia plant was opened at Făgăraş in 1942 to produce ammonia and explosives. A further plant was started at nearby Ucea de Sus (in a somewhat remoter, forested area to the southwest) but supplies of German equipment were cut off by the coup in Romania in 1944. The works was then built to serve peacetime needs, and opened in the 1950s with the name ‘Victoria’. More

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

256

widespread use of gas was envisaged through a pipeline to Braşov and Bucharest which, again, was not achieved until after the war. The oil industry There was also great German interest in the Romanian oilfields where the most substantial defences were erected to protect ‘Fortress Ploieşti’ from enemy bombers operating out of North Africa. Following the economic agreement of 1939, Germany sought a modification to the 1937 Mining Law, which was eventually secured in 1942 to allow foreign exploration/exploitation of entire structures; although there was still effective state control, not to mention state control of pipelines and insistence on refining in Romania of all oil produced. Indeed, by placing the wartime management of refining, transport and export in state hands—and leaving foreign interests little leeway for peacetime investment or expansion—West European and American oil companies were brought directly under Romanian government management. The results were not substantial because despite much new drilling during 1942–3, no new reserves were discovered and the production level was hardly maintained. Nevertheless, Romanian oil supplies played a crucial role for the Axis, with export via Giurgiu and the Danube route or by rail through Moldavia and Galicia. ‘The Romanians were very successful in keeping essential control in their own hands and in this respect German economic policy in Romania failed to attain its most important objective’ (Radice 1986b p. 444). But the virtual nationalisation of Romanian oil operations from 1942 made it easy for the Soviets to create Sovrompetrol in May 1945, controlling 36% of oil output in 1947 (exporting two-thirds to the USSR). After all units in German or Hungarian ownership passed into Soviet hands under the armistice agreement in 1945, a programme was agreed later in the year for five years of economic collaboration whereby joint companies would enjoy preferential status, including lower tax rates. The Soviets contributed eleven confiscated German firms while Romanians surrendered a similar number of their own. By 1949 the Sovroms (Soviet-Roman joint stock companies) controlled all key industries and there were additional Sovroms for naval/maritime traffic and uranium exploration by 1952. In 1954 the system was brought to an end: fourteen companies were discontinued in that year and the remaining two closed in 1956. However, any large-scale enterprise in which the state had participated came under the new government’s complete control in June 1945. With Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej as minister of national economy, state industrial bureaux (‘oficii industriale’) were declared in 1946—linked with the delivery of reparations—and realised early the following year when the existing managers shared responsibility with the workforce and the regime. Nevertheless, the statistics point to a growth of small units in manufacturing after 1945 which might have related to Soviet reparations from large factories. Agriculture and transport By the end of 1940 the Antonescu government agreed to broaden the 1939 agreement with Germany so that all Romanian agricultural exports would be geared to the German market, with a ten-year plan delivering set amounts at fixed prices. By 1942 the Ministry of Agriculture had begun to organise associations of peasants for joint production

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

257

(without infringing private ownership rights) but success was compromised by the need to substitute eastern territories for what had been lost in Transylvania. Some 200 associations were formed by 1944, producing according to a plan and benefiting from imported German farm machinery distributed through ‘Institut Naţional de Cooperaţiei’ which also had a monopoly over the purchase and distribution of cereals. Not surprisingly the system continued to operate after the war in the context of communist-controlled central planning. Meanwhile, German technical aid to Romanian agriculture had been going east through officially sponsored German-Romanian corporations pioneered by IGF in 1934: for example, the Soya Corporation which trained farmers and guaranteed purchase at fixed prices. A purely German ‘Südostropa’ organisation promoted flax cultivation at fixed prices. However, operations in Bessarabia suffered from the fact that it was impossible to replace the marketing network of small Jewish traders after it had been abruptly abolished. In the interests of defence the railway network was given renewed emphasis through the new construction to Reşiţa and in the Eastern Carpathians (projects 9 and 11 on Figure 5.2) while projects to reach the Petroşani coalfield from the south through the Jiu Defile (15) and also to serve Maramureş without transit through Czechoslovakia (13) were not completed until after the war. A start was made on a new main line to Iaşi (18) and a new branch reached the Danube (19) to provide a potential springboard for an alternative route to Constanţa (since the existing bridge at Cernavodă was single track only). Doubling of track between Bucharest and Braşov was put in hand (with diesel traction for the steep climb from Braşov to Predeal). And with routes through Transylvania compromised by the loss of territory to Hungary the line to Sibiu was improved on both sides of Braşov, including a tunnel to avoid a sharply winding route through the Perşani Mountains (29). Bulgaria The Zveno group of military reformers took power in 1934–5 and reorganised government before King Boris—backed by army officers—assumed personal control and adopted a relatively enlightened economic policy. He sought Germany’s protection but did not bind wartime agricultural policies too closely: Bulgaria was involved in the IGF soya project but her cereal agency did not fall under tight German control. There was a heavy industrial drive which provided the basis of the metallurgical industry (with two blast furnaces at Pernik in 1939), while aircraft were built at Bozhurishte near Sofia and guns assembled at Kazanlik. There was a German link with shipbuilding at the Varna naval dockyard which gave rise to a Soviet-Bulgarian joint company after the war, while RHG participated in road projects. Bulgaria also featured in the long-term project to bring in oil from Batumi in the Caucasus by Black Sea shipping and she undertook limited railway development in the Danube area in 1941: the branch from Razgrad to Silistra and the Karnobat-Shumen line between the northeast and the Sofia-Burgas railway. Wartime agriculture was disappointing because the surpluses of the depression years (arising out of low consumption) were not sustained. There were limited efforts elsewhere in agriculture following German pre-war initiatives over soya beans and improved sheep stocks based on Merino imports. Flax was promoted by the Sudostropa company in

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

258

Dobrogea (started by the Romanians in territory returned to Bulgaria in 1940) but progress was difficult in the steppe climate. Yugoslavia Retreat from democracy began early with Alexander’s dictatorship in 1928. His assassination in 1934 inaugurated a period of regency government but Premier M. Stojadinović made little headway despite a ‘halfhearted resort to fascist trappings’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 328). Ambitious railway plans were formulated during the years of increasing insecurity prior to the Second World War. Work began in 193 8 at Čačak to reach Banj a Luka while a complementary north-south line was envisaged from Osijek to reach Sarajevo via Tuzla and continue over a modernised line to Mostar associated with a hydropower project at Jablanica. This might have provided a route to Split but all that was achieved was a short extension in 1942 to a new port at Ploče at the mouth of the Neretva. This was after the German invasion in 1941—following a coup against Prince Paul’s acceptance of Hitler’s invitation to Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact—had driven a wedge across the country by treating Croats as allies (with their own ‘Independent State of Croatia’), while the Serbs, as defeated enemies, lost territory to Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy. Separate administrations looked after the remaining territories of Banat, Montenegro and Serbia while Slovene territory passed to Germany and Italy. Serbian firms were amalgamated into twenty-nine enterprises—all required to produce for the war effort. There was much dismantling and shipment to Germany (including metallurgy, armaments and a modern footwear factory set up in Borovo by Bat’a). But there was little German investment except electric generators to save coal: plans for investment at the Bor copper mine and provision of railway transport to the Danube did not materialise, while a 500mW power station in Belgrade burning Kolubara’s brown coal in the interest of aluminum production was also abandoned. As the Kragujevac and Sarajevo arsenals were dismantled, there was some relocation from border areas, for example transfer from Jesenice and Kranj to Smederevska Palanca and Užice, while aircraft were built at Kraljevo and the Ikarus works in Belgrade-Zemun. There were also good results in the mining of non-ferrous ores. Slovenian industry was taken over by German firms and the building of aero engines started at Marburg (Maribor) in 1942; likewise by the government in the case of Croatia; with some Italian acquisitions elsewhere. The Nazis used the Prizad organisation to obtain cereals, while the separate occupation regime for Banat proved significant since food surpluses could be transferred to Germany instead of being diverted to relieve shortages in Belgrade. On this basis, technical assistance—related to irrigation, animal breeding and silo construction— was given to Banat farmers through the German minority’s cooperative network. A considerable area was devoted to sunflowers. All this provided a good foundation for rapid post-war nationalisation since so much capacity could be claimed as booty seized from the country’s enemies and or inherited from the a fascist regime; not to mention cases of confiscation for war profiteering and collaboration. Private commercial banks were heavily compromised by German influence and shareholders; while major foreign interests like the Bor and Trepča mines (with French and British capital, respectively) had been taken over: for example, Bor was sold to Germany after the fall of France.

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

259

Population shifts involved some resettlement of ethnic Germans in the Posen area of Poland, while Croatia’s boundaries were a recipe for Serb-Croat tension, duly inflamed by the power of the Ustaša (originating in the insurgency movement against the royal dictatorship) which destroyed all hope of collaboration on the Slovak model. But in addition to the struggles between Serb ‘Četnik’ resistance groups and the Croat ‘Ustaša’, there was conflict between rival Serb resistance groups—one led by D.Mihailović, a Serb loyal to the monarchy, and the other with a broader Yugoslav inspiration and a more flamboyant leadership under J.Broz (nicknamed Tito) who was able to draw on Western support when the government in exile was bogged down by Serb-Croat disagreements. Tito’s focus on ‘Yugoslavia’ seemed conducive to regional stability while Mihailović— with a pan-Serb outlook—seemed less active and was tainted by suspicions of collaboration. London hoped to influence Tito to build a democratic coalition, but he sought unity in a programme grounded in ‘Anti-Fascist Councils for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia’ held in Bihać in 1942 and Jajce in 1943 during a period when he enhanced his charisma by repeatedly evading capture by German forces. On this basis an independently minded radical regime came to power after the war—supported by the oppressive tactics of a politically motivated police and judiciary—rather different from the democratic coalition that London had tried to encourage. Albania The country was buffeted massively during the Second World War after Italian preoccupation over Abyssinia and Spain had provided Zog with a peaceful interlude. When Mussolini acted decisively in 1939 in demanding a formal Italian protectorate (including Italian garrisons), lack of immediate compliance brought an invasion which forced Zog into exile; whereupon Albania joined the Italian kingdom through a customs and royal union (Emmanuel III became King of Albania) working on the model of Germany’s unions with Austria and the Czech borderlands. Italy may also have moved quickly to forestall any Yugoslav rejection of Italian hegemony. The Italians planned to resettle about a million of their people on reclaimed malarial swamplands and to exploit Albania’s minerals to boost Italian self-sufficiency. The programme included roads and bridges as well as an iron and steel industry and a boost to electrification (generating capacity rose from 2.5 to 3.6mW during 1939–41). And further Balkan penetration was envisaged from this ‘fifth coastline of Italy’. However, when the Italians failed to dislodge the Greeks from ‘Albanian’ territory in Epirus and provoked a Greek claim to southern Albania (dubbed ‘Northern Epirus’), Germany had to enter directly into the picture and Albanian territory was doubled by the transfer of occupied Greek and Yugoslav lands in 1941. Even so the Germans faced opposition from Albanians. When they became the occupying power in 1943 they were able to manipulate resistance sponsored by Tosk landowners through the Balli Kombëtar (BK), but failed to eliminate the Yugoslavbacked national movement which had been formed at Peza in 1942. Hence a complexity in the Albanian resistance movement ‘leading directly to vacillation and indecision on the part of British policy makers’ and the Special Operations Executive (Fischer 1991 p. 43). At the end of the war Yugoslavia regained her lost territories and showed little restraint in settling scores with Albanian separatists. However, within Albania proper it was the Tosk

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

260

communists and intellectuals who prevailed over the non-communist Ghegs—disarmed by M.Shehu—and E.Hoxha was able to come to the fore, eliminate threats from surviving Zogist and BK elements and build his isolationist communist regime on the back of a 1945 election victory. He had taken power initially in the previous year when the Germans left and a provisional government was established at a congress convened at Berat by Albania’s own ‘Anti-Fascist Committee of National Liberation’. TRANSITION TO COMMUNISM After the Second World War there was no return to the status quo which the Axis had undermined—except with regard to the state frontiers including the 1920 boundary in Tĕšín/Cieszyn. Notwithstanding the Franco-British guarantee for Poland, Soviet claims over territory and future security—to dispel the German threat totally—could not be contested. Hence Poland suffered a major setback with the loss of her eastern territories, including the cities of Wilno and Lwów, although there was compensation through the ‘Recovered Territories’ acquired at Germany’s expense in the west (Pomerania and Silesia) and northeast (part of East Prussia). But while the shift in boundaries provided better land it generated many refugees as well. Soviet westward expansion also meant that Czechoslovakia had to abandon Ruthenia (which now passed from Hungary to the USSR) while Romania again lost Bessarabia and North Bucovina, while regaining northern Transylvania once a regime acceptable to the Soviets had gained power in Bucharest. Albania, Bulgaria and Hungary were largely unchanged (against the situation in 1920) since Albania and Hungary had to relinquish their wartime gains, although Bulgaria retained the territory in Dobrogea that had been awarded in 1940 (against its earlier loss after the First World War). Yugoslavia gained territory along the Dalmatian coast (the Zadar enclave) and in Istria where an Italian majority in the towns was complemented by Slav dominance in the countryside. The Italians quickly abandoned the smaller towns of Istria—Abbazia (Opatija), Albona (Labin), Parenzo (Poreč) and Pola (Pula)—and concentrated their defence of ‘Italianita’ (which had stimulated Mussolini’s wartime attempts to revive the traditions of Venice) on the port city of Trieste. Eventually a compromise allocated the southern suburbs to Yugoslavia—incidentally providing Slovenia with a significant port at Koper—while the core of the city was returned to Italy: a severe setback for the Yugoslavs who anticipated more substantial territorial gains in the years of euphoria under Tito between the end of the war and his expulsion from the Cominform in 1948. The Slovene peasantry were thus cut off from their market centre while the city’s links with Italy were tenuously maintained along a narrow coastal corridor. However, the small Slovene minority in Austria’s Carinthia Province was not a major issue at a time when the main ambitions lay to the south where Yugoslavia was much involved (with Albania and Bulgaria) with the communist insurgency in northern Greece (again with disappointing results). The most critical aspect of the new political arrangement was the USSR’s withdrawal from its declaration to respect existing social systems. Stalin certainly did not make clear his intention to use the Red Army presence as a means of creating a buffer in the region under his own control. There were immediate efforts to undermine the administration by encouraging Serbs to enter Romanian Banat, attack government offices and intimidate

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

261

ethnic minorities to default over taxes. Despite Western concern over the development of closer relations with ECE during the war (e.g. the 1943 Soviet Friendship Pact with Czechoslovakia’s exiled government), the systematic destruction of the institutions of pluralism was in no way anticipated and the progress of radical totalitarian movements in Albania and Yugoslavia would not have been matched elsewhere in the region without Soviet intervention. No doubt the Western Allies did not appreciate that the Soviet Union’s ‘openly organised right to have friendly regimes “free of fascist and reactionary elements” on its borders was tantamount to affording something like a “sphere of influence”’ (Brus 1986a p. 565). Yet by subverting democratic forces Stalin was able to insist on the primacy of Soviet links with each individual state while frustrating significant collaboration within the region which might well have created some effective institutions to moderate Soviet penetration. General Sikorski’s 1942 Confederation Plan for a tier of states from Finland to Greece—based on the Atlantic Charter and geared to the containment of Soviet westward advance—was compromised immediately through Czech reluctance to discount Soviet opposition that was very clearly communicated in 1943. And in the late 1940s the concept of a Balkan federation was similarly undermined. It was also a surprise when the Soviets minimised Western influence through neartotal self-containment of their zone of influence via communist party networks and more formal institutions like the Warsaw Pact. France and the UK could not pose any real threat (despite their commitment to democracy) but the US produced the European Recovery Programme (or ‘Marshall Plan’) in which Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland all initially expressed interest. But Moscow signalled its unease by boycotting discussion at a Paris conference, leading some commentators to suggest that a masterplan for the division of Europe was already in existence. However, although the Soviets did not extend the system of Soviet Socialist Republics—even though Bulgaria and Yugoslavia may have aspired to such status in 1945–6—the western border of Sovietcontrolled territory was massively fortified. This ‘Iron Curtain’ (as Churchill saw it) could be penetrated through just a few tightly controlled border crossings (as was also the case on the frontiers between member states) and international trade was internalised within the bloc as far as possible. The effects were most striking in Germany which—in the light of the Potsdam Conference of 1945—was shorn of its eastern territories beyond the Oder-Neisse frontier: accepted by the German administration in the Soviet Occupation Zone in 1950 and subsequently by West Germany and the Western Allies, even though it involved heavier losses than had been anticipated in the West on account of confusion between two Neisse rivers. (Even so, Polish territory was reduced by about a fifth from 388,600 to 312,700 sq.km). The Western Allies anticipated close cooperation between all four occupation zones carved out of ‘Potsdam Germany’ but as this became impossible the system was transformed to create two German states (not reunified until 1990) with separate economies and a highly fortified inner boundary. Of course, Stalin would have welcomed German unification on communist lines but he could not secure this; nor could he or his successors frustrate Western efforts to establish the Federal Republic of Germany as a sovereign state in the West. The city of Berlin became a microcosm of the divided German problem with the complete separation of the Soviet Zone (East Berlin) from the combined American, British and French zones (West Berlin) by the wall which stood from 1961 until 1989, and major revamping of the infrastructure to isolate West Berlin as far as possible from the GDR. The situation of West Berlin

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

262

within East Germany created serious supply problems. However, through resolute action, including the Berlin airlift to break a Soviet blockade, it was possible to sustain West Berlin until such time as stable arrangements could be worked out through the Four Power Agreement of 1971 and the Transit Agreement of 1972. Separation was very much the byword across the whole region. Until 1946 there was an international element in post-war relief through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA)—the very first UN agency—created in 1943 by agreement among forty-four countries including Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. Reconstruction aid was concentrated on agriculture and raw materials, as well as food, clothing and medical aid. But the USSR was in the driving seat when it came to reparations imposed on ex-enemy states (equivalent to some 15% of national income in Romania and 10% in Hungary in 1947–8) as well as restitution obligations. German/Austrian assets in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were transferred to Soviet ownership under the 1947 peace treaty and then contributed to mixed companies along with compulsory national contributions. The 1945 Potsdam Agreement authorised dismantling in the Soviet Zone of Germany, though much remained in situ to be operated as Soviet enterprises (‘sowjetische Aktiengesellschaften’). International trade was rapidly reoriented since the Soviet Union was almost the only country able to supply raw materials, and—reflecting the German position in 1940—the Soviets demanded that subordinate/satellite states deal directly with Moscow and not between themselves. However, state control was virtually inevitable irrespective of political orientation. Lampe and Jackson (1982) see the region profiled for state involvement given that wartime arrangements—as in Romania through the state authority to regulate the petroleum industry under the 1942 law—left private interests with no basis to resume operations after the war. Land reform assumed central importance in Hungary and Poland especially—as well as in Albania through the colonisation of reclaimed marshlands by Italians and in other countries through ownership of landholdings by Germans, collaborators, churches and other institutions. Over this issue communists did not necessarily make the running: indeed, it was necessary to disown post-1918 communist propaganda against land reform as a ‘sectarian mistake’. But in other respects communists dictated the course of events and progress reflected their evolving stranglehold on power. Initial coalitions formed by 1946—excluding right-wing elements—had their non-socialist parties eliminated the following year, and the communist monopolies were completed by total absorption of social democratic parties by 1949. Left-wing dominance was a precondition for central planning and complete nationalisation. Planning for industrial recovery was generally achieved by 1948 (the following year in Romania) and it was a substantial achievement—in view of the disruption arising from system change—that recovery was in general faster than it had been after 1918, notwithstanding a disastrous harvest in 1947 due to drought. Indeed, performance across the region was comparable to that in other groups of countries (Brus 1986a p. 641).

Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism

263

CONCLUSION For many people across the region the inter-war years brought little in the way of prosperity and instead presented a dramatic mismatch between expectations and realities. The initial experience of system change—notwithstanding a morale boost for mainstream populations—would have been soul-destroying given the war damage and the need to integrate the new national territories. Land reform was politically unavoidable but could not provide a sound economic base given the persistent land hunger reinforced by rural population growth that outstripped capacity to create new jobs. Labour-intensive methods reflected the limited employment opportunities outside agriculture where the peasant character of farming was enhanced by sharecropping arrangements to supplement the produce from the peasants’ own land; some of it arising out of land reforms implemented after the First World War. Thus the agricultural emphasis persisted amid acute problems of rural overpopulation. The industrial project was hardly a success, starting as it did with post-war reconstruction complicated by hyperinflation. As J.Rothschild reasonably argues (1974 p. 268) the restrained development of industry was not due to any reluctance on the part of the native elite or constraints imposed by foreign powers. There was no really solid basis for rapid progress, especially in the Balkans. In the case of Yugoslavia, for example, her ‘internal market, capital resources, transportation network, skilled labour supply and entrepreneurial experience were all too weak to render her a likely candidate for general industrialisation’ (ibid. p. 268). Despite Gerschenkron’s thesis on the benefits of a late start, there was only very low absorptive capacity in industries like metallurgy, engineering and chemicals (Teichova 1985 p. 253). Lighter industries that could serve the domestic market and find some scope in world markets ran the risk of undermining the handicrafts that had evolved—with remarkable environmental adjustment—among largely self-sufficient agricultural communities; not to mention the ethnic dimension in a situation where commerce and industry were traditionally monopolised by Germans, Greeks and Jews. Yet, given the strength of feeling in favour of nation states it is hardly possible to see the inter-war arrangements as anything other than legitimate and progressive. As Verdery (1983 p. 349) points out for Romania, there was a yearning for inclusion through ‘autarkic efforts to become the economic equal of the world’s more privileged nations’. Where there had previously been the oppression of Magyarisation there was now a sense of national identity over economic growth even though it placed the farming population at a disadvantage. For the rapid growth required for the state’s security and maximum job creation could not be achieved on the basis of demand generated by a prosperous middle peasantry. Instead the farming population had to submit to a heavy tax burden to avoid heavy dependence on foreign capital that would distort the industrial structure. But in a democratic system only the ethnic minorities with minimal vested interests in the system would have sensed any discrimination or oppression. There was clearly much more government involvement and a growing consensus that this was the way forward, to the point where post-1945 central planning was in many respects anticipated with all its ideological dilemmas over democratic ideals and totalitarian systems. For despite the liberal-mindedness of the bourgeoisie the necessity to modernise under pressure made for

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

264

strong central government under monopoly parties. Perhaps the war made certain what was already inevitable: central planning and the erosion of independent financial institutions.

Part III THE COMMUNIST ERA

6 ECONOMY, INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE COMMUNIST POWER Although the details of the region’s politics are only of contextual relevance it is important to emphasise the Soviet interest in the emerging communist states (Figure 6.1) which led Stalin to impose his authority in order to gain security as well as access to resources like oil, timber and uranium—even though this latter consideration was to rebound to the embarrassment of the Soviets who soon had to start delivering their own raw materials at concessionary prices to maintain cohesion within the bloc. Stalin had initially adapted the tenets of Marxism to the needs of ‘socialism in one country’ when the USSR was ideologically isolated during the inter-war years and she felt obliged to build a stronger industrial economy in secure ‘heartland’ locations which would not be immediately accessible to any future German invasion force. The Communist Party (CPSU) gave itself the right to invest all the nation’s wealth in this exercise and to demand the full compliance of the people using the most draconian methods, including collectivisation of agriculture and deployment of a huge army of forced labourers through the notorious ‘gulag’ system. The system was vindicated by the survival of the state during the Second World War, but such were the vested interests of Bolshevism—and in particular the prestige enjoyed by the CPSU—that the war economy was not only perpetuated but brutally imposed on the ECECs even though there was no compelling case for revolutionary upheaval in the ownership and location of production across the board. Indeed, Stalin’s initial actions were inconsistent for he initially sought very substantial reparations from ex-enemy states and even ordered the dismantling of railways in Poland which the Poles subsequently had to re-lay. Romania’s reparations to the Soviets were valued at $1.8 billion during 1944–8 (Smulta 1972 p. 525) and in addition the economy was dominated by Sovroms, liquidated, as has been said, only during 1954–6 after Stalin’s death. It was not surprising that industrial recovery was faster in Bulgaria than in Romania—given the lighter Soviet requisitioning and the authority of a large communist party (indeed, Bulgarian industry produced more in 1944 than in 1939). Yet neither Romania nor the other ECECs were incorporated into the USSR and it continues to be an open question how far Stalin was belatedly propelled into closer integration (involving monopoly

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

268

Figure 6.1 Communist states of East Central Europe communist party government) as a response to the American offer of Marshall Aid in 1948. An alternative interpretation would highlight the essential importance of the region (as a buffer) for Soviet great power status and cite the consistent use of ‘salami tactics’ to isolate and neutralise opposition forces. Stalin destroyed social elites who took refuge in

Economy, industry and agriculture

269

1940 and demanded a significant zone of influence, yet he promised free elections at Yalta 1945 in exchange for recognition of Moscow-sponsored communist regimes in territories liberated by the Red Army. Gradual control was extended during 1945–9 through endorsement of land reform (1945–6), creation of the Cominform (1947), intervention in Czechoslovakia (1948), the blockade of Berlin (1948–9) and the formation of Comecon (1949); with Yugoslav dissent in 1948 as the only significant setback. Initial interest in the Marshall Plan and Western involvement in early post-war planning through Keynesian influence in Poland and Kaldor’s contribution in Hungary represent the last flickerings of Western intellectual input, blocked in favour of the Stalinist mode of monopoly power geared to overstrained industrialisation programmes. It remains unclear if there was pragmatism at work, as opposed to a ‘grand scheme’ with the concessions at Yalta a ‘calculated deception’. Stalin’s uncompromising demand for Soviet control (limited only by the trappings of independent statehood) was confirmed, with limited concessions, by all his successors until M.Gorbachev assumed power in 1985. Khrushchev denounced Stalin for unlimited personal dictatorship but reaffirmed Soviet authority, albeit on a more regulated and negotiated basis (with an increased role for Comecon). He also called for ‘different roads to socialism’: a green light that strengthened nationalism provided the authority of the local communist party was not questioned. It was even possible for Stalinist uniformity to be followed by growing national diversity and limited reform provided the communist monopoly was not imperilled (Stokes 1991). Thus, for example, Romania was able to embark on an ‘independent economic course’ in 1958 after Soviet forces were quietly withdrawn, and there was a political amnesty 1964. But the communist era created much tension since it has tended to be a feature of Russia’s geopolitical position that a higher profile in world affairs—albeit motivated by an instinct for self-defence—is easily interpreted as a prelude to offensive action. The alien ideology was itself portrayed as a threat, given its proven capacity for crude coercion and abuse of human rights, eventually exposed by the Western powers (through the Helsinki process of 1975) in order to limit Soviet influence and induce a more defensive posture in the 1980s. Nevertheless, it remained difficult for the ECE satellite states to take any real initiatives in foreign policy since they did not have effective independence of action. When A.Rapacki was Polish foreign minister—at a time when W.Gomulka’s Poland was seeking a more independent foreign policy—he proposed a disarmament plan, involving a nuclear-free zone for Czechoslovakia, Germany and Poland—but this was not taken seriously in the West. Meanwhile, post-war Balkan unity was undermined by the division between Soviet and Western spheres (not to mention wartime memories including Bulgarian occupation of northern Greece). National boundaries were set in concrete and there was no question of adopting Yugoslavia’s experiment on a wider scale. However, trade was not cut off and in the late 1960s/ early 1970s inter-Balkan commerce increased faster than exchanges with the rest of the world. At the national level the establishment of communist regimes demonstrated ‘the readiness of a determined minority of communists in each country to use coercion, deception and manipulation of their fellow countrymen in order to secure a monopoly of power’; taking advantage of ‘the physical exhaustion and political disorientation of the war-ravaged population’ (Batt 1991 p. 3). Elite penetration of all facets of government and international coordination made legitimation difficult, but power was effectively

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

270

consolidated and the propaganda war created an image of purposeful progress. For the Stalinists ‘actually succeeded in con structing a political system that was superbly efficient at concentrating power and at ensuring that this [was] never seriously diluted’ (Schopflin 1988 p. 147) since the unions remained essentially one-way transmission belts. However, there was a common basic interest in a radical drive for modernisation— copying Stalin’s plans of the 1930s—after earlier ‘false starts’. Building the proletariat was a major social priority at first (though by the 1980s the social background of the party membership was largely non-proletarian) with the promise that the food demands of a growing urban workforce and gradual improvement in rural infrastructure would allow factory industry to spread through the central hierarchy and eventually take root in the more backward regions. Communists also embraced long-standing national interests in modernisation so that Soviet manoeuvrings were not always clearly recognisable. Thus in Hungary there was strong support for radical change in 1945, with communists and the National Peasant Party advocating industrial and agrarian socialism, respectively. While it was inevitable that the former would prevail, it could be seen to have done so primarily because of its ‘professional leadership, the inadequacy of populist socialism as a model of development at this particular juncture, the eclecticism of populist ideology and the divided agrarian movement’ (Gati 1971 p. 358). Again, Romania’s yearning for inclusion in the developed world prompted ‘autarkic efforts to become the economic equal of the world’s more privileged nations’ (Verdery 1983 p. 349) and hence the socialist state could naturally become ‘the primary accumulator and manufacturer in its own right’ (ibid. p. 356). And just as one must applaud firm government for rooting out any lingering tendencies towards infanticide in the Romanian countryside, so merit might well be seen in the ruthlessness of Hoxha in stopping the blood feud in Albania and modernising through forced collectivisation/industrialisation with military and labour service, even though change was not sufficiently rooted to withstand chaos after the revolution. Indeed, it must always be insisted that notwithstanding a remarkable capacity for ‘marching in step’—initially to Stalin’s tune—countries could always ‘do their own thing’, albeit within limits. As a small country, Albania was subject to a relatively informal administration and Hoxha ‘argued against an excessive bureaucracy and in favour of the participation of the masses’ (Matejka 1986 p. 255). Thus there was no serious planning of foreign trade in favour of heavy reliance on foreign aid, first from Yugoslavia and the USSR (1948) then China (1961) with a ‘shopping list’ of import requirements distributed through party channels. But despite idealism over improvement that was manifest at all levels from the local and regional to the national and international, the ruthlessness of Stalinism worked its way through the system to perpetrate terror and intimidation on a scale that easily obscured any sense of economic and social benefit, even in Albania and Yugoslavia where the emphasis was always on national security and wellbeing. The communists were not by any means bereft of ideas when it came to countering Western charges of imposing dictatorship, confiscating private property and liquidating opponents. It was all about mobilising capital in a situation where the Soviets were initially a drain on resources and all Western input was rejected. There was much grassroots idealism for a new order that would boost employment and promise a better future for the poorer people generally, based on the raw materials available to each state and the orders of the military-industrial establishment free from the constraints of world market

Economy, industry and agriculture

271

prices and rewards for capital investment. There was great enthusiasm in Yugoslavia which possessed pride over the war record and initial satisfaction with the new federal system that sponsored many reconstruction projects including the ‘youth railways’. Cooperatives were set up in Bulgaria with the help of weekend migrations by urban dwellers to educate the villagers: ‘in these bands there is perhaps the compulsion of a social conscience but for the most part the work is done enthusiastically and voluntarily’ (Edwards 1947 p. 547). While intolerance was manifest in the treatment of Germans (and in the disturbance of certain other ethnic groups—like the Ukrainians in Poland— associated with wartime atrocities) ethnic tension was reduced, partly perhaps through Jewish influence in the communist parties in the early days. Federalism could provide some encouragement for minorities coupled with the stability provided by the safeguard of discipline within a monopoly party. Yet objective appraisal of communist-inspired change was always complicated by the tension between the heroic voluntarism of traditional societies working flat-out for modernisation and the coercive state apparatus working to a ‘secret agenda’ that had much more to do with Soviet great power pretensions than the cause of prosperity for the masses. It was possible to herald a ‘new’ and unique way forward as long as the environmental costs were minimal and forced labour could be explained away in terms of ‘re-education’ for criminals and wartime collaborators. Some authors continued to applaud the social objectives and the spatial policies of equalisation well into the 1980s. But the realities of coercion could be seen at the international level by the threat to Yugoslavia after Tito’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 when it seemed that vulnerable centres of population might be exposed to a tank assault from Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria (perhaps even from Albania) and there was talk of another retreat to the mountains and a consequent dispersal of development projects. The ‘forced march’ to modernisation involved heavy social costs through long hours of factory work and persistent shortages in housing, transport and consumer goods. Although agriculture was mechanised and intensified through the use of irrigation and fertilisers, the farming population remained relatively poor and in this sense an anti-agrarian bias evident in the 1930s was deliberately extended to ensure a flood of migrants for the towns. Moreover, the demands of the military-industrial complex left a legacy through an ‘outdated distorted economic structure that was too intimately bound up with the equally distorted political structure’ (Schopflin 1988 p. 146). THE ECONOMY The Soviet ‘command economy’ required central planning which eventually produced a pattern of Five Year Plans (FYPs), to ensure that industrial projects would be supported by the necessary building materials, machinery, raw materials and labour. The rest of the economy was reprofiled to provide a supporting role and the tertiary sector was heavily restricted, for example with a massive consolidation of financial services to produce a few state-run banks. Industrial projects initially depended largely on domestic raw materials, while surplus labour could be released from agriculture. Lampe and Jackson (1982 pp. 520–75) highlight massive injections of planned investment assisted by some agricultural exports—and some timber and minerals for export unprocessed—to allow the

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

272

import of machinery (though on a much smaller scale than before 1914), with coordination of international trade through the Comecon organisation. Growth rates were high in the 1950s and 1960s, and the region accounted for 12.3% of European production in 1950 but 14.4% in 1970, excluding Albania, while total production increased three times (Bairoch 1976). All individual ECECs increased their GNP more rapidly than Europe as a whole although the margin was small in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, while the three southern countries increased GNP 3.9 times compared with 3.3 for the four northern countries. On a per capita basis the ECECs registered increases between 2.6 times (Poland) and 4.5 times (Czechoslovakia) compared with 2.4 times for Europe as a whole. Industry’s contribution to national income (in relation to agriculture reckoned at 1) rose sharply in Bulgaria from 1.3 to 3.4 during 1965–83, though less dramatically in the more advanced northern countries: 5.5 to 7.3 in Czechoslovakia and 5.0 to 8.8 in the GDR. Values for employment were much lower (because of the great differences in productivity and the artificial pricing which discriminated in favour of manufacturing): Bulgaria 0.5 and 2.2; Czechoslovakia 1.9 and 2.8; GDR 3.1 and 4.1. It is not clear how far the communist system of state ownership and central planning was a precondition for this progress, for potential efficiency gains were potentially compromised by the price controls and trade restrictions that protected industries from the discipline of market forces. Indeed, planning was a rather crude exercise and until Stalin’s death medium-term plans were bundles of directives drawn up largely on the strength of Soviet orders conveyed through meetings of party leaders. Plans for the early 1950s were then altered to increase output of consumer goods under the ‘new course’ of 1953. Comecon coordination brought plans into phase by 1965, but there were still upsets through political upheavals in Hungary and Poland and the first moves towards reform were apparent during this decade. Industrial growth was not steady, for productivity could not keep up with the pace of structural change in contrast to earlier experience. Performance declined during the 1970s as the scope for extensive growth was exhausted and industry’s inputs became more costly as searches for more domestic raw material and energy sources were insufficient to halt the growth of imports. With rural labour reserves largely exhausted (except in Albania), Western loans for technology transfer failed to boost productivity in SOEs used to hoarding labour, and failure to modernise the structure of economic growth continued to restrict progress. Despite an ‘unfailing intensive saturation of industry with capital resources’ (Minassian 1992 p. 710) output in Bulgaria stagnated in the 1980s and gave rise to gloomy predictions for the 1990s as tight planning built around industry’s special status perpetuated large, inefficient firms hampered by monopolistic practices and relatively small internal markets. Instead there was a need for intensive industry with increasing productivity per unit of resources, and a better quality of production to ‘service both an impatient domestic demand for better consumer goods and an international debt that the desire for Western export-oriented technology has pushed toward pre-1914 proportions during the past decade’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 599). There was considerable technological backwardness, and some Siemens-Martin steel furnaces (installed in the nineteenth century) were still working into the 1980s, for old factories were rarely closed even when new capacities came on stream elsewhere. Moreover, large enterprises were often inefficiently located, incurring high transport costs, while poor factory organisation could mean production hold-ups, with knock-on effects in other

Economy, industry and agriculture

273

industries dependent on what might well be the monopoly supplier of intermediates. High costs passed down the line boosted the ‘value’ of production on which wage increases might be based, but made exports less com petitive. Major sectors of industry were found to be operating at a loss, with limited world market penetration (due to poor quality) giving rise to some exports at prices below the real value of the raw materials. Large injections of budgetary funds to support inefficient enterprises justified the view that Stalin’s communism was a’highly contradictory even counterproductive modernising revolution’ (Schopflin 1988 p. 126). Economic reform Yugoslavia initially set the pace for reform in the region where change was generally slow and tentative. The country got off to a good start thanks to significant external aid through UNRRA assistance and reparations from Germany, Italy and Hungary. The 1948 rift with Stalin brought rapid change towards a model of market socialism with autonomy and democracy for each enterprise assured through the principle of self-management by elected workers’ councils. The system—devised by B. Kidrić and E.Kardelj and introduced in 1950—allowed free associations of workers to manage their own affairs through the concept of ‘social property’ (which actually involved only limited property rights). A significant amount of private enterprise was also tolerated and the affluence of a small minority of successful operators created public disquiet over the ethics of personal enrichment in a socialist society. However, while prosecuting those who traded illegally or evaded taxation, the state defended the legitimacy of private property earned through honest labour. There was also a retreat from central planning through the 1950s in favour of a system of ‘publicly owned but essentially commercial banks’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 598) to mobilise domestic capital and emigrants’ remittances. An outstanding success for the Yugoslav approach was scored by the Slovenian company Gorenje, which produced household appliances. With a country-wide sales network, the Velenje-based enterprise grew from a small workshop with a dozen engineers and technicians in 1953 to become a national leader with a dozen factories responding effectively to market opportunities. Cooperation with electronics companies in Austria and West Germany (including the acquisition of Körting Radio Werke) brought in Western technology as well as some guaranteed export outlets which helped to build a global network. A factory was opened in Thessaloniki to provide household appliances as well as radio and television sets. But decentralisation through self-management was a formula that could not protect the country from the problems of rising prices, falling production and foreign indebtedness during the 1980s when two-digit inflation turned into annual hyperinflation of 1,000% until a stabilisation package was designed by the IMF in 1989, with a drastic cut in government spending, currency depreciation and liberalisation of prices and trade. And while the ‘voluntarism associated with local self-government directly led to growing autarky in the Yugoslav economy, the increasing economic and political isolationism of the Yugoslav republics from one another in part resulted [at the same time] in the demise of Yugoslavia as constituted under Tito’ (Şuster 2000 p. 717).

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

274

Hungary’s New Economic Mechanism Elsewhere there was a search for more balanced development in the late 1950s and early 1960s which was extended by growth of consumption later in that decade when new institutions comprised a ‘second wave’ of reform in search of faster growth targets. The greatest progress was made in Hungary. Reforms in 1953 provided incentives with bonuses tied directly to maximising production (though companies tended to use cheaper inputs). It was very significant that J.Kádár’s reform movement grew out of the failed revolution of 1956 for Brus (1986b p. 147) thinks it plausible to argue that ‘that the avoidance of bloody suppression left the Czechoslovak “normalisers” politically weaker to implement a “Kádárist” solution compared with their counterparts in Hungary in the mid-1960s’. The control maintained by the party was not so stifling as to inhibit genuine discussion. There was also a readiness to provide more stimulation through incentives rather than ideologically motivated propaganda, while decision-making was approached on a more scientific basis through modern data-processing to ensure an adequate supply of information—implying that a professional approach was needed rather than crude decision-making by politically reliable functionaries. The New Economic Mechanism (NEM) of 1968 was remarkable for its com prehensive nature and a genuine interest in decentralisation. While state ownership continued, factory managers set their targets with regard to both short- and long-term profit motives. Companies could take their own investment decisions, could trade on their own account and set wages. There was a premium for skilled workers and professional managers while international trade was encouraged by simplified procedures and more realistic pricing; and the drive for incentives was underpinned by efforts to increase the food supply by encouraging cooperation between socialist agricultural units and individual gardeners and smallholders—thus ensuring that higher wages were translated into better living standards. Removal of restrictions on second-home ownership and on private enterprise in the building trade and other tertiary activities also contributed to this objective. Despite vested interests, compromise was the order of the day and while managers as well as ministers and party activists sat less comfortably than before, sensitivity over inflation and unemployment instilled a fear of full-blown market pressure: price stabilisation (to control inflation) meant that pricing could not reflect world market conditions exactly. In 1973 there was recentralisation but, despite the oil crisis and an increasing balance of payments deficit, the Hungarian reform movement gained momentum and it was universally accepted that the highly centralised system could no longer cope with Hungary’s needs. In 1978 ministries ceased to set production targets and became policymaking entities, while price setting became the function of the National Board for Materials and Prices. To increase competition, large ‘horizontal’ industrial and mining trusts were broken up into smaller firms, while private enterprise could qualify for state loans: indeed, a small stock market catered for buying and selling by institutions. As the service sector was exposed to more foreign competition through joint ventures, Marks & Spencer appeared in the border town of Sopron, and McDonald’s opened a chain of fastfood outlets in Budapest in cooperation with the state farm of Babolna. Hungarians exiled abroad after 1956 started to return home and foreigners (especially Austrians and

Economy, industry and agriculture

275

Scandinavians) were able to secure holiday and retirement homes. Hungary also appreciated the need for improved technology with in-house research and development linked with imported technology, while radical treatment of inefficient SOEs lacking local resource advantages was meted out in 1986–7 when the Ózd steelworks closed the oldest furnaces and rolling mills and precipitated the greatest job losses ever to occur within one of the country’s socialist establishments and the payroll was reduced from 14,000 to 11,500. The ‘Ózd Model’ was to become a blueprint for the other problem areas, though it exposed the difficulty of attracting new light industry where diversification had previously been discouraged to avoid competition for labour. Meanwhile, Enterprise Economic Work Partnerships (EEWPs) introduced in 1982 made a significant contribution to manufacturing. Some of them merely involved groups of SOE elite workers brought together to cope with various delegated tasks, but others avoided such a satellite relationship by finding work with other enterprises. A third category consisted of ‘wholly independent full-time participants in the second economy whose only link with the socialist sector is via the market’ (Swain 1990 p. 104). Overall, Jerome (1988) concludes that productivity increases were highest in the NEM period which avoided the extremes of the Soviet and Yugoslav systems. ‘Until 1974 Hungary was remarkable in combining stable growth at a respectable rate with a much greater degree of macroeconomic equilibrium and consumer satisfaction than elsewhere’ (Brus 1986b p. 248). And the NEM was maintained through subsequent FYPs despite worsening terms of trade from 1973 and the need to protect the public from the negative effects of competition. Other reform initiatives Reforms in the other Comecon states made some progress through enterprise restructuring and more efficient information-gathering, while leaving the centralised command structure intact. Limited autonomy was granted to enterprises reorganised as large organisations which greatly reduced the number of producers entering into the calculations of the various ministries. Czechoslovakia set up ‘industrial associations’ while the GDR came up with its ‘associations of nationalised enterprises’ and Romania consolidated through ‘centrals’. The basic units could now achieve economies of scale and link production with research and development. An extensive investment policy was pursued for too long, with a disproportionate amount of capital tied up in uncompleted projects, but greater selectivity emerged in the context of higher raw material prices, and more competitive exporting was eventually necessary, with provision for self-finance enabling enterprises to assimilate new technology and modify their production quickly in line with progress in world market penetration. The north Bohemian enterprise Crystalex of Nový Bor was one of a number of successful firms maintaining their own foreign currency account (retaining almost one-sixth of the proceeds of foreign trade for raw materials and development costs). Workers’ councils were formed spontaneously in Poland in 1956–7 but, though legalised, their powers were curtailed in 1958 and ‘associations’ then served only as administrative links between enterprises and ministries. Before the Solidarity crisis of 1981 Poland was contemplating radical reforms but, despite caution, the options of drastic cut-backs of cereal and machinery imports (which would have hit meat production and reduced efficiency in industry) were rejected and the

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

276

private sector registered some growth. When a combination of low prices and propaganda against private enterprise succeeded in reducing meat production from small farms in Poland, farmers responded to market incentives offered in the mid-1970s. In the south where the economic challenges were less severe there was a contrast between Bulgaria’s reliance on Soviet assistance over technology, fuel and raw materials and Romania’s priority for restoration of Western links—although the party retained firm control of the economy in a situation where competition in the world economy called for greater efficiency and flexibility. Romania’s approach was unbending so that dissatisfaction over wages and working conditions was hardly relieved by a new selffinancing mechanism providing for compulsory contributions from employees to boost capital investment. It therefore seems anomalous that Romania chose to ‘experiment’ with a decisive transfer to trade to the West after 1960. This is often seen as politically motivated although Lampe and Jackson (1982 p. 593) argue that ‘an economic rationale also existed’ in the availability of primary surpluses than could buy better-quality machinery for the industrialisation programme. Albania maintained ultra-rigid orthodoxy after the break with Comecon and the Warsaw Pact in 1961. So there was much hesitation over reform during 1965–75 when the leadership ‘presented successive violently changing economic policies in lurid ideological colours’ (Brus 1986b p. 229). On the whole initiatives were being taken and there was ‘better adjustment of production to domestic and external market demand’ (Csaba 1989 p. 25), though clearly not enough was done to raise efficiency in the face of rising input costs. Generally, few additional reforms were made after 1972, although recentralisation did not go all the way back and there was increasing adoption of computing and cybernetics in the planning process. Indeed, Klaus (1989) sees the first steps to reform in Czechoslovakia coming as late as 1987, but even then changes were carried out with little input from economists and there was great reluctance to accept market forces despite interest in a mixed system. Meanwhile, the Hungarian record was significant but reforms were always constrained by the communist monopoly on power which prevented significant decentralisation. Little was done to stimulate competition and enterprises continued to take advantage of their monopoly position in a seller’s market by setting prices as they chose. It was still difficult to make rapid technical progress and achieve product innovation. Overseas trade failed to respond adequately to foreign loans and international technology transfers, so indebtedness increased. A market system could have been introduced in the context of authoritarian rule but the vested interests in the central planning/command prevented this until 1989. Vested interests may have formed the major barrier, rather than ideology (which had in some respects become trivialised by the 1980s). For it is remarkable that in the limited field of housing reforms change was relatively far reaching with an expanding private sector. But it also remained a crucial issue whether a reformed system could accelerate economic growth grounded in state ownership and SOEs that were used to hoarding labour. The problem can be linked with the 1975 paradox in Poland when the country needed to live within its means, yet it also needed capacity to make better use of resources. Thus ‘the economic mechanism found itself in a state of confusion in which the worst of both possible worlds probably prevailed’ (Brus 1986b p. 206). ‘Something’ had to be done and indeed there were more changes after the workers’ revolt of 1976; yet it might have been better not to have begun reform at all.

Economy, industry and agriculture

277

Population and the labour market Population was of central importance to the governments of communist ECE in connection with both the military and economic expansion. Maximum growth would be achieved by substituting labour for capital as far as possible (Table 6.1). With an eye to greater homogeneity and a proletarian ethos, they also purged the teaching profession and eliminated private education (with a state monopoly imposed in Poland in 1946). Communists continued on the path towards universal literacy and in 1949 Albania decreed compulsory schooling for all illiterate men under forty to combat an illiteracy rate of 50% (a literacy rate of 98% was claimed

Table 6.1 Population, urban development and capital cities 1950–90 1950 A

B

1970 A

B

1990 A

B

Capital city 1950 1990 A C D A C

D

Albania 1230 250 2138 679 3289 1176 40 3.3 1.4 251 7.6 2.9 Bulgaria 7251 1856 8490 4397 8718 5796 437 6.1 3.4 1141 12.7 3.0 Czechoslovakia 12389 4687 14336 6944 15562 9661 933 7.5 3.3 1215 7.8 2.8 GDR 18390 13030 17060 14010 16210 12670 1090 5.9 1.8 1285 7.9 2.4 Hungary 9338 3667 10338 5016 10365 6432 1600 17.2 12.5 2016 20.4 9.1 Poland 24824 12673 32536 16958 38119 23570 804 3.2 1.3 1653 4.3 2.0 Romania 16311 4160 20253 8472 23207 12442 1042 6.6 8.8 2068 9.1 5.9 Yugoslavia 16345 3154 19663 7422 22808 11608 389 2.5 1.3 1168 4.9 1.6 Key: A total population; B urban population; C percentage of total population; D multiple of the population of the largest provincial city Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation database, www.apps.fao.org (GDR from UN sources)

in 1965). Education and health services were priorities. Technical skills were needed: hence the emphasis on science and technology in the secondary schools, polytechnics and universities. There was also a stronger vocational emphasis and in 1960 the curriculum in Albanian schools was altered to integrate with work in farms and factories. Trade unions were required to act as ‘transmission-belts’: advancing the party agenda to secure the required productivity and discipline through ‘socialist emulation’, even when falling living standards were imposed in order to maximise investment. Nevertheless, forced labour was exacted through an expanding prison population and communist ‘terror tactics’ were common in the 1950s. Figure 6.2 shows the network of prisons and camps in Romania where forced labour was directed to mining and projects concerned with canal building (the notorious Danube-Black Sea Canal), dyking and reed harvesting. However, strikes could not be prevented altogether. There was open rebellion in East Germany (1953), Poland and Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), leading to acceptance of the need for gradual emancipation through liberalisation—spearheaded by Poland and Czechoslovakia. It was not until the 1960s that any independence in union leadership was possible, along with increased popular participation at the local level through the inclusion of experts and intellectuals in decision-making, which—along with the expansion of welfare—began to undermine ‘the premises of the totalitarian analytical

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

278

framework’ (Iankova 2002 p. 32). Even so, there were further strikes and disturbances in Poland in 1970–1, 1976, 1980–1 and 1988, underscoring the political weakness of the Polish United Workers Party. Solidarity was established in 1980 and—although forced underground by martial law in 1981—it was a major participant in the ‘Round Table’ of 1989 when the Jaruzelski regime failed to normalise society. Employment surged, yet it was contradictory that labour was inefficiently used through excess absorption of workers in Poland to the extent of 15–30% (Seplaki 1976 p. 495) as the transfer of underemployment from the fields to the factory floor prevented the region from matching the enormous productivity gains achieved by the West. There was more efficient use of labour by the 1970s (compared with the late 1960s) due to falling natural increase and a shorter working week, but mechanisation did not seem to produce labour savings judging by the 60,000 job openings on file at regional employment offices in Hungary in the late 1960s—leading to crises for unskilled labour as the differential between skilled and unskilled was reduced in contrast to North America and Western Europe. In 1973 there were wage incentives to boost productivity (but with national wage scales to stop socially wasteful labour mobility arising from wage differentials between enterprises in the same sector). And rehabilitation of the handicapped brought 25,000 extra workers into the economy in 1975. Homogeneity and ethnicity There was an implicit need for greater homogeneity to maximise support for the ideology of communist modernisation, although this was never fully achieved. In Poland’s Podhale region it was difficult for the peasants to come to terms with

Figure 6.2 Forced labour in communist Romania

Economy, industry and agriculture

279

factory work at Novy Targ and there was heavy turnover of workers in the footwear factory. The Muslims in Yugoslavia were prominent in most of the country’s poorest districts: many of those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo had only menial jobs and they tended to extend their kinship networks in a situation where intermarriage was complicated by Croat, Serb and Slovene discouragement. The concerm over homogeneity also created problems for ethnic minorities that were not adequately represented within the ranks of each national communist party. In the past different ethnic groups had coexisted more or less harmoniously within multinational empires; often carrying out specific functions. But now nationalism was used as a motivating factor to create the ‘new socialist man’ (albeit in the context of fraternal association with the rest of the Soviet Bloc). Net losses of population could be avoided by coercive population ‘exchanges’—Slovaks for Hungarians and Poles for Belorussians and Ukrainians—but there was a clear contradiction between the importance of a large workforce and the removal of substantial elements within the population at the end of the war. Although there was some movement into the region—for example, Greeks in the 1950s following the civil war—emigration significantly affected population growth overall. Jews were often allowed to emigrate from the 1950s and there were widespread expulsions of Germans from Poland (linked with boundary changes and resettlement) and Czechoslovakia as a punitive action against Sudetenlanders. Germans in Hungary and Yugoslavia were forced to emigrate while those in Romania—after facing forced labour demands in the Soviet Union and also expropriation—remained for a time but found themselves drawn towards West Germany (and to the united Germany when the education tax was discontinued after the 1989 revolution). Elsewhere there was inconsistency. In Bulgaria, the remaining Turkish schools were nationalised in 1946 (Koranic instruction ended in 1952) and by 1960 when they were closed—or merged with Bulgarian-language schools—the number of Turks leaving Bulgaria for Turkey since the 1920s had reached half a million. Then in 1984 ‘the project of creating socialist citizens served as an excuse for suppressing Turkish language and culture even to the point of attempting to coerce ethnic Turks into accepting Bulgarian names’ (McCarthy 2000 p. 253). Such was the rapid deterioration in relations between the Turkish minority and the Bulgarian authorities that the Kardzhali area was kept in ‘enforced isolation’ for long periods. Romania was more careful in its dealings with a former ruling group: the Hungarians. Soviet-inspired experimentation with a ‘Magyar Autonomous Region’ reflected the prominence of Hungarians in the Romanian Communist Party at the time. However, restrictions after 1956 (both in extent and degree of autonomy) were followed by the abandonment of the experiment in 1968. The separate Babeş (Romanian) and Bolyai (Hungarian) universities in Cluj were merged and the ‘mini-cultural revolution’ of 1971 increased the emphasis on Romanian culture, while the 1974 law for confiscation of privately owned artefacts of cultural value—along with the embargo on foreign tourist use of private accommodation—was thought discriminatory. Nevertheless, it was argued that while ‘all ethnic groups [in Romania] are undergoing rapid socio-economic mobilisation as the regime modernises and industrialises…the masses of Hungarians and Germans have remained staunchly true to their ethnic heritage’ (Gilberg 1973 p. 454) and the regime will need to cope with ‘ethnic particularism’ at regional and local level. Particular groups might be treated differently in one country compared with another. In

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

280

addition to the aforementioned case of the Germans there were the Rusyns; while the Czechoslovak and Polish government both adopted a Ukrainophile orientation which denied the existence of a distinct Rusyn nationality (though at least a Russophile orientation was effectively eliminated), Yugoslavia provided Rusyn-language schools for the minority in Voj vodina. In the case of the Roma efforts were made to assimilate them through the offer of employment and accommodation, though most were extremely reluctant to give up their independence for regular work in the socialist economy. However, while assimilationist policies were generally weak, Czechoslovakia went to the extreme of sterilisation for over a decade. Maintaining population growth Demographic profiles varied considerably, as shown by the ‘Lorenz Curve’ methodology adopted by Kosinski and Wojciechowska (1967). Growth rates declined and moved into the negative in the GDR and Hungary—Transdanubia’s ‘one child system’ became deeply embedded—while high rates of natural increase were restricted to Albania and the Muslim-dominated areas of Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia). But in Albania especially, traditional patriarchal society persisted as a result of internal migration controls and a lack of foreign influence (in 1989 the year’s quota of foreigners allowed to enter the country was just 14,000), which was very different from the present situation in which Italian television has brought a significant loss of relative isolation. Although international migration was strictly controlled various means were available whereby people could ‘escape’ illegally, such as the high-profile attempts to cross the Berlin Wall; and in the later post-Helsinki years governments found emigration was a way of removing dissidents without attracting protests from the international community. Temporary migration was allowed in connection with education in various parts of the Comecon Bloc—sometimes to Western Europe. Yugoslavs were allowed to work abroad under their own individual arrangements (see below). Otherwise, apart from some leading celebrities, it was only possible for groups to operate under state contracts involving joint projects in the USSR and programmes of military and economic assistance in the Third World, particularly Africa and the Middle East. Comparison of statistics on natural increase and overall population growth suggests an annual net emigration from the region of 250,000 during 1950–85 (some 7.0 million in all) with the highest outflow occurring from the GDR, especially before the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The GDR was always prone to the loss of population given the limited culture shock between the two Germanics (minimised by the availability of West German TV in all parts of the GDR except the so-called ‘Valley of the Innocents’) and the big differences in per capita incomes. $8,900 against $5,400. But West Germany was also a popular destination for migrants from the other ECECs, with annual rates varying between 20,000 and 40,000, in addition to the average of over 50,000 ‘Übersiedler’ from the GDR. Albania suffered minimal emigration while Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland generated many departures after repression in 1956,1968 and 1981, respectively. However, Poland was able to maintain a surplus of labour evident through underemployment on family farms and the capacity to meet deficits in neighbouring countries. In 1972 some 10,000 Poles were commuting daily to the GDR and they were also the largest foreign group in Czechoslovakia, prominent in the north Bohemian textile

Economy, industry and agriculture

281

industry, the Nový Bor glassworks and various building sites concerned with dams, power stations and housing (at least until Vietnamese arrived in 1979 to work on fouryear apprenticeship programmes). There were Hungarian ‘Gastarbeiters’ in the GDR while ECE supplied some 50,000 workers for the USSR (including up to 40,000 from Bulgaria). Yugoslavia was unique in allowing its citizens to work in the West: there were 1.04 million there in 1972 (half in West Germany) while another 500,000 remained underemployed at home. Much attention was given to maintaining a high birth rate (characteristic of the East European demographic model) in the context of the massive, age-selective rural-urban transfer that threatened the traditionally high level of rural fertility. As women became very effective in the workplace, including in leadership roles, how could the balance best be struck between child-bearing and direct participation in the economy? In the early years the immediate needs of the labour market were paramount and hence women were given easy access to abortion, beginning in Bulgaria in 1956. Only Albania found it unnecessary to introduce this facility. This has to be seen in the context of high levels of rural fertility, boosted by the forceful introduction of doctors into all rural areas. Yet when abortion depressed the birth rate and forced a shift to pronatalist policies by the late 1960s, there was considerable sympathy for the eugenic measures that had been debated in Romania during the 1930s (although hereditary determinism was of course rejected). Severe checks on abortion were now combined with the positive encouragement of childbearing through various welfare benefits (maternity leave, family allowances and housing concessions), propaganda exhortation and the criminalisation of unauthorised abortions. After the ‘heroine mother’ distinction was bestowed on Romanian women bearing ten or more children (Berelson 1974 p. 376), extremes were reached when I.Moldovan’s disciple Râmneanţu had influence within the Ministry of Health and Communist Party Central Committee, depicting birth-rate decline as a degenerative phenomenon and proposing control of women’s access to birth control. This led to the infamous ‘Decree 770’ of October 1966: ‘one of the most intrusive forms of government control over individual privacy under the communist regime’ (Bucur 2002 p. 228). Women were turned into reproductive machines and subjected to regular gynaecological checks in the workplace to minimise illegal abortions (for which doctors were imprisoned). Hence specialists of eugenics who were regime sympathisers could argue that only a socialist state could help bring about a public health system closely connected to the needs of the nation. But despite these coercive policies the birth rate continued to fall because ‘family planning was carried out in its most rudimentary form: unskilled induced abortion’ (Puia and Hirtopeanu 1990 p. 5). This produced many complications and in such cases the women concerned sought help from specialised clinics too late because they feared legal punishment. Those who survived ‘remained infirm for the whole of their life, crippled both physically and psychologically’ (ibid.). Living standards Real wages lagged way behind West European levels and initially planners did not look far beyond propaganda when it came to mobilising and inspiring workers. Housing and working conditions could be quite demoralising with a lack of concern for the ‘human being’. Thus the new steel-making community of Nowa Huta on the edge of Krakow

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

282

failed to ‘become the expected example of the uplifting and positive potential of communism’ (Janus 1999 p. 468) given the housing problems and poor services of a ‘frontier town’ and the hazardous nature of much of the work in the metallurgical complex. Yet, although rewards were limited, except for the leading figures, the authorities were able to depend on a largely cooperative workforce, based on large-scale recruitment of young peasants for whom the move to urban employment signalled upward social mobility. Thus ‘the inundation of working class ranks by these poorly educated and organisationally inexperienced urban migrants helps to account for the success of communist regimes in maintaining conformism despite disorientating change and often severe material deprivations’ (Triska and Gati 1981 p. xli). It has to be said, though, that workers often enjoyed relatively good access to medical and recreational facilities: for example, the employees at the Žiar nad Hronom aluminium works had the benefit of the Sklené Teplice sanatorium close to the factory and excellent leisure opportunities in the Donovaly District. There was much investment in sport which gave opportunities to many young people—thanks to the training and coaching system built in the 1960s—despite the drug abuse which was later exposed and the global propaganda overtones. And amid exploitation through reliance on conscript and volunteer labour for construction and harvest work, there was much serious industrial training offering scope for rapid promotion. There were also some material incentives for special projects, such as the Bulgarian drive for settlement of the depopulated Strandja-Sakar area in the southeast, modernised in the context of a ‘Republic of Youth’. Yet the ‘magic’ of the Communist Party never really shone in ECE as it did in the USSR, where great prestige was enjoyed through defence of the state in the Second World War. Relatively few people in ECE accepted the system as authentic because whatever its benefits, it was always a product of Soviet coercion and a means of constraining national self-expression. Workers became more assertive as protest could no longer be blunted by upward social mobility, given the switch towards more intensive development while the economic slow-down of the 1980s meant a stagnation of living standards. Finding rewarding work for all young people was a growing problem in the 1980s. Higher wages called for a commensurate increase in the supply of consumer goods, yet the ‘economy of shortages’ decreed long waiting periods for certain goods, including an estimated fifty-seven years for an apartment in Warsaw! Hence dollars were bought to get access to the black market, and some dollar shops operated legally. Generally communist governments discouraged the use of Western currencies, because they wanted to buy any such currency at low prices, but the use of dollars helped to prevent inflation of the kind that raised the value of the highest banknote in Poland from Zł1,000 in 1967 to Zł1 million in 1991. The system helped to compensate for neglect of the tertiary sector due to the priority for industry. The motor car became a central political issue, especially in the GDR, where the party knew that people linked the supply of consumer goods with political legitimacy: hence the ‘automobile problem’ because the ‘longer people were forced to wait for whatever item they desired, the more likely their grievances were to become programmatic censures of the regime’ (Zatlin 1997 p. 359). At the end of the 1980s there was 1 car per 2 Germans in the West—with 70% of households owning a car—but 1 car per 4.5 Germans in the East (where barely 40% of families owned their own vehicle). Car production in the West was 3.98 million per annum but only 220,000 per annum in the East, of which only 150,000 were available for

Economy, industry and agriculture

283

the home market. Yet even this level of supply was high by the general standards of the region where production costs were high on account of the ageing fixed capital and a predilection for labour-intensive manufacturing methods. But cars soaked up cash (helping to recoup expenditure on subsidies for basic needs like bread), bestowed prestige within the Comecon Bloc and offered some competition with the West. The second economy Pressure was eased in part by a substantial growth of a ‘second economy’—partly geared to a crisis in the provision of services—which was openly encouraged in some countries, like Hungary, and tolerated in others as a field of economic activity where income was gained legally or illegally outside the socialist sector. After presiding over a reduction in the number of private artisans and craftsmen from 860,000 million in 1950 to 430,000 in 1960 and 350,000 in 1970, the GDR leadership reversed its policy in 1976 at a time when the purchase of consumer durables was reaching record levels. Many new businesses were set up—300 in East Berlin alone—within a year of the new regulations coming into force. There was also a boom in private business in Hungary where it was possible to employ three non-family workers in addition to a maximum family group of six. By 1981 there were 100,000 artisans in the country, each employing 1.5 workers: they were prominent in building and transport work, but especially in rural service provision (hairdressing, tailoring and repair work). They were one element of what was known in Hungary as ‘maszek’: a second economy developing alongside the ‘first’ centrally controlled and cooperative sector. It reflected the inability of the first economy to cater effectively for all requirements and the need for a host of small servicing enterprises to support the leading firms. However, increasing dependence on such support opened the way to certain abuses whereby moonlighting became rife in some quarters where fulltime work in the first economy—carrying tax liabilities but also welfare benefits—was combined with secondary employment generating additional untaxed income, sometimes through the use of materials pilfered from the primary workplace. But the second economy syndrome was much more than a few illegal moonlighting operations: as a salient characteristic of the 1980s, it was an embarrassing reminder of the state’s inability to control the entire economy since—to the orthodox communist—independent private sector involvement undermined the government’s legitimation as a truly socialist regime. The trading system Comecon Nationalisation of trade—importing only what was required by domestic production and exporting as efficiently as possible—was plainly essential to block out all undesirable foreign influences on the economy (including protection from foreign capital) and this led to foreign trade ministries and state foreign trade corporations. Foreign trade was marginalised and even the joint planning commissions set up from 1946— Czechoslovakia with Hungary and Poland; Hungary with Yugoslavia; Albania with Yugoslavia; Bulgaria with Romania and Yugoslavia—were all stopped in 1948. But there were a number of essential exchanges—dominated by Soviet needs in the early years—

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

284

and these were sensitive matters in view of the fundamental principle of a ‘Preisausgleich’ whereby the insulation of domestic prices from the outside world called for a separation of foreign trade from home enterprises. Yet it was anomalous that the Soviets could demand cohesion within the bloc according to their requirements for specialisation while insisting that individual ECECs drastically modify the international division of ownership in favour of maximum self-sufficiency. Of course, Soviet experience encouraged a nationalist approach to development but it was excessively dogmatic to impose the same model on ECE after 1945 once Stalin had decided not to incorporate his new allies within the USSR. Although the ECECs might best judge their own preferences, their small size meant that there was always potential for greater specialisation and so it may be that production and welfare potential would have been superior within an enlarged USSR. However, foreign trade enterprises (including manufacturers with foreign trade rights) increased, especially after 1975, and more formal coordination of intra-bloc trade emerged in 1949 with the creation of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA—or Comecon) as a reaction to the Marshall Plan’s perceived incompatibility with Soviet security requirements. Comecon was the brainchild of the Gosplan chairman N.A.Voznesenskiy (subsequently removed from the office of chief Soviet planner in 1949) and has been regarded as a powerful instrument of Soviet expansionism; providing for a solid economic bloc (or ‘Grossraumwirtschaft’) parallelled by the Cominform which ensured unity in ideological and political matters. However, Stalin preferred direct links with other party chiefs, and the organisation seems to have played no significant role in the planning of economic development in individual countries throughout the 1950s. Efficient economic linkages through plan coordination to produce an international division of labour were evidently ruled out; along with the possibility of supranational organisations. It seems clear that Stalin was unwilling to countenance any transfer of power to Comecon, given the Cold War and the ‘hot war’ in Korea. Yet van Brabant (1989 p. 24) considers that ‘a regional planning institute would have constituted the element that, in retrospect, has been missing from CMEA cooperation ever since the organisation was created’. When Khrushchev wanted such an authority in 1962 it was too late. Nationalism led to parallel industries: Czechoslovakia was the main supplier of machinery, yet there were some competing firms in the other states which Prague did not anticipate on the basis of trends in 1950–2, for Stalin’s death had an unforeseen impact in boosting economic nationalism which generated the ‘psychic income’ evident in Czechoslovakia before the 1968 invasion when workers started to take an interest in reform. But even before this Romania had rejected Comecon integration plans in 1962 and issued a ‘declaration of independence’ in 1964, having acted passively like a Soviet satellite for the previous two decades. There were plans for greater coordination, for example in machinery and transport equipment (Montias 1969), with the international division of labour envisaged for 1991–2005. However, the balance changed to one of net Soviet subsidy to ECE amounting to $20–80 billion by the late 1970s with low-cost raw materials and fuels delivered in return for shoddy manufactures (Volgyes 1989 p. 235). By the mid-1980s several economists were emphasising the shift in the region’s economic value from asset to liability and several authorities (Desai 1986; Brada 1985) offered their calculations on the extent of the subsidy.

Economy, industry and agriculture

285

Because of its exclusive approach which denied ECE the opportunity of exploiting its comparative advantages in world markets, Comecon has been seen as an organisation that ‘destroyed’ trade or at least diverted it into the Soviet sphere. However, links with a wider world were never broken off completely, although trade in essential items was handled by state companies which effectively maintained bureaucratic control. Yet while the Comecon umbrella provided security, failure to reform the system radically constrained efficiency and competitiveness on the global scale and Comecon’s share of world trade edged downwards from 10.7% in 1965 to 9.1% in 1975. Joint enterprises Progress in the formation of joint enterprises was not outstanding given the complicated accounting procedures and reservations over the concept of international property. Usually just two countries were involved in each project. Thus a joint investment was made at Zawiercie in Poland where 2,000 Polish workers spun Soviet cotton (obtained through normal trade) to produce yarn needed for high-quality clothing in Poland and the GDR, with the latter contributing most of the equipment. In 1976 Bulgaria and Romania established a joint industrial complex on the Danube at Giurgiu-Russe to produce a variety of complete installations for the chemical, metallurgical and mining industries in these two countries and also for export. However, several ventures in the Soviet Union were genuinely multilateral. Thus investments were made by various countries in the Ust Ilimsk cellulose factory during 1974–82, part of the territorial production complex based on the Bratsk hydroelectric scheme. Workers were sent from ECE and a range of materials was delivered. Five countries worked on an extraction and processing complex to handle low-quality iron ore at Dolinskaya near Krivoi Rog with the aim of producing high-quality ore pellets for more economical transport by rail. And energy projects in the 1980s centred on the Khmelniskiy and Konstantinovo nuclear power stations and related transmission lines to Poland and the GDR, and Romania and Bulgaria, respectively (after earlier projects for the Adria and Orenburg pipelines and the Vinnitsa-Albertirsa 750kW power line). Arguably Comecon accelerated structural change through increased exports of machinery which, for example, enabled Czechoslovakia to achieve economies of scale in the production of equipment for breweries, oil refineries and textile mills. Comecon agreements also recognised that country’s interest in clothing with huge Soviet orders for Prostĕjov (the ‘town of tailors’) and also for the glass industry which extends into leadcrystal products and the incomparable ‘Bijoux de Bohémé’. While plate glass using the British float method was installed at Retenice to meet domestic demand—and supply the GDR, Hungary and Poland as well—specialised products come from a range of factories distributed through Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. It is also arguable that Comecon contributed to the strengthening of the economies of the poorer member countries for there was a trend towards greater equality when output is related to population. The chemical industry The chemical industry was transformed everywhere through the switch from a coal to a hydrocarbon base (involving Soviet oil and gas supplies for the most part). Inherited coalbased complexes were rebuilt when oil pipelines reached Leuna in the GDR and Záluži in

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

286

Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s. And the ease with which intermediates like ethylene and propylene could be transported by pipeline or railway meant that downstream processing to produce fertiliser, fibre or rubber could be locationally dispersed and excessive vertical integration thereby avoided. Hence a number of new locations came into the picture in addition to the existing group in the Halle-Leipzig area of the GDR and the key locations of Záluži and Ústí nad Labem in Bohemia. Indeed, complex links developed between the two complexes since intermediates were initially transferred by pipeline between Böhlen and Záluží: at first Böhlen supplied ethylene and propylene (by pipeline and railway, respectively) to the polyethylene and polypropylene units at Záluži, but the commissioning of new capacities at Záluži subsequently allowed the flow to be reversed. Hungary’s Tiszaújváros (formerly Leninváros) complex—including an oil refinery and power station—developed as a new installation on the Tisza River, fed with Soviet oil (plus a modest initial quota of natural gas from Romania). It came to occupy a focal position in the Hungarian chemical industry, supplying intermediates to the Borsod factory at Kazincbarcika (near Miskolc) and others at Pét and Szolnok. A 335km pipeline to Kallus in the Soviet Union opened in 1975 so that ethylene (along with propylene moving by rail) could supply the Soviet vinyl chloride factory; enabling the Hungarian producer to gain economies of scale. Another advantage for Hungary was a regular supply of products for which demand was too small to justify capacity in Hungary: acrylonitrile, ethylene glycol and polystyrene. Meanwhile, Poland’s petrochemistry focused on the two complexes of Płock—linked with downstream processing in the north of the country at Bydgoszcz, Olsztyn, Poznań, Puławy and Toruń—and Blachownia Słąska with a complementary role covering Brzeg Dolny, Jelenia Góra, Kędzierzyn and Oswięcim. In SEE, Bulgaria’s chemical industry rested very heavily on Soviet assistance. The communist government inherited a small oil refinery on the Danube at Russe and initially went ahead with a coal-based complex at Dimitrovgrad in 1951 (spawning a superphosphate factory in 1957) and a soda factory using Soviet raw materials at VarnaDevnya in 1954. Attempts were made to use domestic hydrocarbon reserves—Chiren gas and oil from the Dolni Dabnik refinery near Pleven—for fertiliser production at the Vratsa factory built during 1964–8. But scale economies were not forthcoming and the chemical industry was rebuilt on the basis of Soviet resources. Crude oil was shipped to the Burgas refinery, where petrochemical production began in 1963 and extended to polystyrene and synthetic rubber by 1970; with an ethylene pipeline to Devnya (Varna) which was able to produce chlorine in 1964, mineral fertilisers and calcinated soda by 1974 and PVC in 1980. Meanwhile, gas was piped across Romania to supply a distribution ring in the north of the country (1974) which included existing factories like Vratsa as well as new projects. Intermediates from Burgas and Devnya supplied a chain of downstream processors—like Vidin which produced polyamides using polyethylene from Burgas and PVC from Devnya; while specialised plastic goods were made at Russe, synthetic fibres at Svishtov and Yambol, pharmaceuticals at Razgrad and Troyan (making maximum use of Bulgarian medicinal herbs) and flbreglass at Knezha. In this way a heavy concentration of production was avoided and Bulgaria was able to manufacture a limited range of commodities while trading with the Soviet Union to obtain products for which demand was too limited to justify home-based production.

Economy, industry and agriculture

287

By contrast Albania and Romania exploited their own hydrocarbon resources at complexes at Fier and at Ploieşti and Piteşti, respectively (with the Romanian refineries also supporting downstream processing at Craiova and Râmnicu Vâlcea—the latter bringing the local salt into the production pattern). Yugoslavia had to import the bulk of its oil but independently of Comecon. The Industrya Nafte complex on the island of Krk near Rijeka was built with American assistance using Middle East crude. Western trade Recovery of Western links was first evident in Yugoslavia to overcome blockade by integrating with Western structures and enable the now-isolated regime to consolidate popular collaboration with the six republics because of waste and achieve political devolution without the loss of communist power. And although self-reliance ‘almost completely removed Albania from the world economy’ (Austin 2000 p. 238) and left the agricultural sector predominant, good relations with Italy were maintained after the war so that after the breakdown with China in 1978 Italy featured in Albania’s strategy of ‘balance’, taking Albanian textiles from 1978 and minerals—including oil from Ballsh— from 1980. There was a Trieste-Durrës sealink for trucks from 1983, initially financed from Italy. When Western credits were made available to import goods relevant to the technology of the ‘Fourth Kondratieff of Fordist mass production, Fiat was remarkable for its multilateral cooperation during 1971–5 when deals were negotiated not only with Poland, which also concerned Hungary and the USSR, but with Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Although undermined somewhat by rising raw material and energy costs, east-west trade was valuable to the ECECs, and the Soviets took a reasonably relaxed attitude to the reduced level of dependence on their own economy in the context of improved Comecon penetration of global markets overall. Comecon states were able to become members of the IMF and thereby gain favourable credits to compensate for temporary balance of payments deficits (Romania joined both the IMF and the World Bank in 1972 to increase hard-currency borrowings). Western firms were not always keen to get involved with ECE’s monopolistic state trading companies, but trade fairs in the region (Brno and Leipzig especially, but also Bucharest, Budapest, Plovdiv and Poznań) provided attractive fora for exports by making it easier to contact customers. Certainly the growth of trade was welcomed by Western financial institutions because covering deficits was good business given the region’s good repayment record (backed by the belief that there was ultimate security in Soviet gold). Furthermore Western governments could use trade contacts to press for modest internal reform in the region. The USA certainly used trade as a lever, given the desirability of ‘Most-Favoured Nation’ (MFN) status which Romania secured in 1975 with annual renewals thereafter. Although this ‘short-termism’ complicated ongoing trade agreements it brought concessions from Romania over human rights and emigration in particular: thus the 1983 negotiations for MFN renewal brought concessions over the taxes previously imposed by the Romanian government on prospective emigrants to cover the cost of their education. Romania gave high priority to equipping its new factories with Western machinery and gained the possibility of generating competitive exports at a later time (though there was also scope for the export of raw materials and some promotion of tourism). Hungary probably gained most from

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

288

east-west trade because the reforms embodied in the NEM were conducive to the maximising of export opportunities. Although trade levels did not return to those of the 1930s, ECE’s dependence on the West for investment goods was high since the technology gap continued to place limits on import substitution. Technology transfer accelerated during the 1960s and 1970s, initially through the sale of machinery and licences. But much depended on the capacity of the ECECs to assimilate technology and use it to produce goods capable of penetrating Western markets. Performance tended to be disappointing, partly because some credits negotiated during the 1970s were wasted by mismanagement and by investment in economically unviable projects linked with overambitious growth targets. Hard-currency shortages brought preferences for industrial cooperation that tied payment for Western technology to goods then produced by the ECE partner (with allowance for risk involved in the forward commitment to buy at an agreed price). There was also a modest but significant reverse flow of ideas and some Western partners were able to work up research results from the East; so that the former might produce commercially viable products more rapidly than the latter working alone. However, joint venture agreements proved to be most popular (being provided for in legislation approved in Romania in 1971 and subsequently in Hungary and Poland): with equity contributions enabling the Western partner to transfer technology and benefit from lower-cost products using relatively cheap labour (and with a considerable measure of control over the use of the equipment or expertise). Joint ventures not only resulted in large-scale injections of capital but enabled foreign credit to be used efficiently with the support of skilled management and guaranteed markets. The Hungarian Ganz electric works was able to manufacture gas turbines and assemble them in Iraq in the context of an agreement between the Hungarian foreign trade company Transelekto and Italian firms supplying whole power units. One agreement between a frozen-food firm in the West and a Hungarian state farm secured the latter’s access to quick-freezing and packaging technology, while a liaison between two textile firms allowed the Hungarian partner to gain production and management expertise yielding productivity gains. In one unusual agreement Tatabánya Collieries made arrangements with a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum so that the Hungarian Haldex process could be used to reclaim useful materials from rock-piles of mines in the USA. American withdrawal of MFN in 1952 and subsequent restoration only to Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia raises the question of trade as a political tool. As a stick it seems not to have been successful for unrest in ECE was not the result of regimes being unable to satisfy consumer demand but their choice not to do so. By contrast, trade as a carrot seemed a realistic strategy in helping Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia to steer an independent course and limit Comecon integration. The US 1974 Trade Act barred MFN status, credits and commercial agreements to any ‘non-market’ economy that denied its citizens the right/ opportunity to emigrate or imposed more than a nominal tax or charge on those wanting to leave (arising from Congressional anger at the difficulty for Jews leaving the USSR). But waivers were granted and despite its repressive regime Romania gained MFN status ahead of Hungary. States that did not get waivers were often disinclined to modify their policies and so the 1974 act became a barrier to the development of trade, in a situation where some trade could have been in the US interest—though without letting the Soviets ‘off the hook’ in the sense of evading their

Economy, industry and agriculture

289

obligations to their bloc after decades of coercion as the ECE tended to become an economic liability. The encouragement of more trade with the West could have brought about renewed decentralisation and the loosening of Comecon links, although Hungary’s decentralisation in the late 1960s did not correlate with growing Western trade (Garvett 1982 p. 503). The Third World The Warsaw Pact states of ECE made a substantial contribution to Moscow’s successful penetration of the Third World. During the Khrushchev years orthodox states concentrated their efforts on South/Southeast Asia and the Middle East—especially Egypt, India, Indonesia and Syria—supporting grievances generally and assisting in national liberation movements with military support and propaganda offensives against Western colonialism and neo-colonialism. However, there were upsets through panAfricanism and pan-Arabism, while many Third World governments rejected any thought of ideological alignment with Moscow and its allies; indeed, communists were vigorously persecuted in Egypt and Iraq. This was followed by flexible diplomacy under Brezhnev with military aid for Marxist-Leninist governments, and particular interest in the oil-rich countries and in states offering the prospect of long-term cooperation in mining and rawmaterial processing. ECE personnel in Third World countries grew considerably and while it was economically most rewarding to get involved in oil-rich countries like Iraq, Libya and Kuwait (thereby limiting Soviet dependence), closer attention was also given to the Caribbean. Much Third World trade involved prospecting. Thus Czechoslovakia followed up its successes in locating ferro-nickel reserves in Albania (1956–9) with work in Asian Comecon countries (Mongolia and Vietnam) while Libya’s oil industry also benefited. Mention should also be made of construction work in the Third World: irrigation schemes for agriculture; industrial buildings, complete with equipment; power projects (oil refineries and power stations); transport facilities (including roads—like the TransSaharan Highway—and airports); as well as hospitals, schools, sports arenas and theatres. Bulgarian building companies worked in the Middle East and North Africa. However, Yugoslavia showed a genuine commitment to non-alignment in sharp contrast to the Soviet Bloc’s concentration on positive allies. Despite the constraint of Warsaw Pact membership, Romania also came to share this commit ment through joint ventures and capital investment in primary industry, thanks to a degree of autonomy not available to most other Warsaw Pact states. It gained considerable regard for its generous contributions to resource surveys; also through education since some 4,000 young Africans studied in Romania at any one time and over 12,000 specialists were deployed across the continent. Romania’s capacity for independent action was underlined by the decision to retain diplomatic links with Chile following the replacement of the Marxist Allende regime in 1973. (Such was her interest in Chilean copper!)

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

290

INDUSTRY Manufacturing was overwhelmingly the priority sector under the communist command economy, greatly extending state involvement from the level reached during the war. There was a meeting of minds between the USSR, driven by the arms race, and ECE communists wanting faster all-round industrialisation in their own countries (following experience of highly unbalanced investments by foreign companies in sectors where the best profits could be made). The Rosenstein-Rodan model of light industry developing in the context of a common market for large-scale production was set aside in preference for autarky based on heavy industry concentrated in capital cities and large provincial centres, though with some compromise of maximum investment efficiency in favour of poorer regions. The result was a dramatic expansion in output and employment and also rapid structural change, particularly in the more backward SEECs. Heavy industry had priority because of its importance for the military-industrial establishment and for the engineering sector which produced the machinery for use in consumer industries. Particularly rapid growth occurred in the iron and steel industry and in non-ferrous metallurgy, including aluminium. Moreover, as the totalitarian approach adopted or imposed during the war years was maintained into peacetime, the private sector virtually disappeared through nationalisation and a combination of inflation and fiscal measures which eliminated all private wealth. Stalin dictated that the central planning system should be introduced, for he depended quite heavily on deliveries of certain manufactured goods and raw materials that were needed not only for the domestic market but to enhance Soviet influence in the wider world. Hence the demand for increased steel output at the time of the Korean War. But curiously, once key Soviet demands had been taken into account, his satellites were encouraged to plan their economies on the basis of self-sufficiency. This made sense in the context of limited transport capacities and was a further stimulus to multilateral industrialisation in the more backward states. Furthermore, the plundering of the region’s resources through Soviet hegemony—including the operation of joint companies— obliged ECECs to take full advantage of the ideology of autarky as a modest defensive measure providing some scope for planning in the national interest. Development occurred through many new projects but also in two other ways. There was rationalisation, as in Łódź where small-scale industry was removed from Piotrkówska, the main thoroughfare running southwards from the old town through the nineteenth-century allotments. And there was consolidation and relocation of rural industry, for example from Vrancea in southeastern Romania to the regional centre of Bârlad. Industry came to account for more than half the net material product in all countries except Hungary (and more than three-quarters in the GDR). Such structural change could hardly have been imagined a generation earlier. Yet while the ‘fetishising’ of industry solved the problem of high agricultural dependence, it did not help efficiency when production lost all contact with the capitalist ethos of competition and was forced ahead by politically reliable management on the basis of low-grade raw materials which made for very high real production costs. Self-sufficiency and lack of competition made for economies of scale, maximum use of scarce resources and the prestige value of very

Economy, industry and agriculture

291

large enterprises, but at the expense of enterprise flexibility. Factories were often too large in terms of commuting distances necessary and the environmental impact in terms of pollution could be highly damaging. This is not to say that action to enhance efficiency was singularly lacking, as several examples from Czechoslovakia will show. The Sbĕřne Šuroviny enterprise employed some 1,500 people to collect waste paper, scrap metal and textile waste throughout the country through a network of some 150 workshops and 1,650 collection points. And in manufacturing there were notable advances such as the use of micro-electronics by firms like Tesla, famous throughout the bloc for a range of sophisticated products such as the central nervous system simulator produced at the Valašské Mezeříčí factory in Moravia. A programme for the development and production of robots and electronic devices was launched in 1976, two years after the first equipment of this kind had been imported. Coordinated by a research centre for industrial metallurgy in Prešov (a Czechoslovak-Soviet scientific association), the initiative resulted in the production of nearly 5,000 robots and manipulators by the end of 1985—the year in which the Comecon Interrobot organisation was set up. Other countries became involved in the use of robots in key industrial branches: especially the GDR where one party functionary referred to high technology as ‘our revolutionary barricade for the 1980s’— in the way that Lenin prioritised electricity in the 1920s. The less developed economies also participated in the innovation, including Bulgaria with a new hi-tech factory in Stara Zagora. Instrument-making became a promising new industry in 1965, leading to a network of factories—Blagoevgrad, Knezha, Mihailovgrad and Petrich—in addition to the Sofia Research Institute of 1966 producing for Comecon. Industrial location As Dawson (1970) has shown for Poland, disparities in levels of production between countries and between regions narrowed but did not disappear. Industrial location decisions were usually made at the national level according to the system of administrative regions which provided a set of ‘pigeon-holes’ for the allocation of investment in specific projects. Little is known of the decision-making processes which must have involved meetings and discussions within the various ministries with considerable input through the party hierarchy. It may be assumed that there was a good deal of lobbying within party circles to promote each ‘regional interest’, drawing attention to unused potentials (raw materials, labour, linkages) to attract prestigious new projects awaiting allocation while resisting more problematic assignments. Much would depend on the ‘clout’ that each individual could exploit. It would appear that Weberian (‘least cost’) location principles retained their relevance, because the central planners gave priority to the ‘big picture’ and sought the highest possible growth rate in each country overall. No doubt the criteria taken into account were similar to those relevant in a Western situation although a different set of transport costs and commodity prices applied. Hence, although planners would not knowingly select locations that would be grossly inefficient, they might approve of high energy and transport absorption because these inputs were not realistically costed. Planners were working in an environment which favoured very high levels of concentration through powerful arguments in favour of large projects that were relatively easy to supervise and effective in terms of propaganda. Such projects would naturally tend to gravitate towards the national capitals

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

292

and the centres of administrative regions with the best infrastructure (including the party hierarchy—for the regional leaders with the greatest influence tended to be those with appointments in the strongest regions). Concentration was increased by the expropriation of private businesses accompanied by some consolidation and relocation. Nationalisation and early rationalisation of state-owned industry was often highly damaging to rural industry as bakeries, dairies, distilleries, mills and workshops of various kinds—even brickworks, mines and timber yards—were first confiscated and then closed down in favour of larger urban-based enterprises in the interests of economies of scale (often related to the scarcity of managers who were both efficient and politically reliable). Equity versus efficiency There has been widespread articulation of an ‘equity’ principle to prevent con centration and achieve greater decentralisation than was normal under capitalism. This has led some writers in the West to emphasise a distinct ideological component in location decisionmaking to produce a spatial pattern fundamentally different from the capitalist counterpart (Hamilton 1970). But the argument is complex and the strength of the ideological factor remains obscure. Factory distributions certainly became more dispersed compared with the pre-war situation, but this was inevitable given the growth of production and the simple logic of spread from the established cores, though it should not be overlooked that there was a good deal of mining, food processing and saw milling in rural areas before 1945. But the technological environment was transformed in the sense that energy cost variations disappeared and electricity became widely available through the development of grid systems (while railways became more extensive in the SEECs). In the north, where the infrastructure was in a relatively good state before the war, factories were already quite widely distributed, as in the Czech lands. Naturally, ideologists sought propaganda points by highlighting apparent contradictions of capitalism that communism was seeking to overcome through development in backward areas. But political pressure for ‘equity’ might also be anticipated as a counterweight to the bureaucratic momentum in favour of concentration accelerated by the destruction of small-scale industry through nationalisation and discriminatory fiscal policies. However, some confusion may arise over an assumed contradiction between ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’ decisions. For it does not follow that the equity principle produced development inconceivable under private capitalism. Long-distance transfers of fuels and raw materials from the USSR logically highlighted new locations in the eastern regions of ECE. Dispersal might also go hand in hand with efficiency in the context of newly discovered domestic mineral resources. Furthermore, the strategic imperative applied in Yugoslavia in the early 1950s, so that all republics were seen to be achieving industrial expansion. Finally, the decongestion of conurbations like Upper Silesia was necessary to find more factory space and draw in rural labour. Local labour reserves were another incentive, especially in view of low productivity and a hoarding mentality, with an economic logic to limit migration and avoid the heavy housing costs of redeployment, although by the 1960s it was evident that the urban population would have to increase and large-scale construction of apartment blocks began. And despite unrealistically low transport costs there was a logic in favour of regional production and supply systems to reduce transport ‘absorptiveness’, for example

Economy, industry and agriculture

293

for cement and other building materials. Thus, apart from the Gdansk, Lublin, Radom, Szczecin and Warsaw areas, Poland’s early post-war cement industry was concentrated in Silesia with particular emphasis on Upper Silesia and the town of Opole. A number of new locations were proposed during the 1950s in the centre and southeast and new mills were built at Nowa Huta and Chełm in order to shift more production to backward areas while retaining the link with the metallurgical industry (Kuklinski 1961). The same argument may apply for perishable goods such as bread and milk products (supplied from modernised urban bakeries and dairies). In brewing, large units like Kobánya in Budapest sustained by domestic malt, Czech hops and the local limestone cellars were relieved by provincial units like Miskolc which also produced for export. Thus it is very difficult to demonstrate clear indulgence in favour of equity to the detriment of classical economic logic. Despite some excess of voluntarism, dispersal seems to have been limited in Yugoslavia by the cost of infrastructure and management problems, exemplified in Yugoslavia by the Kragujevac car producer Crvena Zastava which was set up in 1954 and manufactured Fiat cars from components that were produced both at home and abroad. When a branch plant was opened in Peč (Kosovo) in 1968, there was mismanagement and negligence on a grand scale: poor organisation, low-quality production and absenteeism (Palairet 1992). The politicians never attempted to present statements of comparative costs to show how a ‘least cost’ location was rejected in favour of an economically less attractive choice that would carry greater social benefit. Some dramatic claims were made in terms of industrial decentralisation, for example blast furnaces at Calbe on the Saale north of Bernburg as a boon to rural employment—but this would appear to be something of a red herring since the installation stood on the urban-rural fringe and the planners were simply claiming a social advantage from an economically logical decision in terms of the flow of commodities and the transport facilities available on the edge of Magdeburg which was the logical place to combine ore from the Harz and coke from Lauchhammer. The Calbe furnaces closed in the 1960s and the premises were then used for aluminium structural components drawing metal from Bitterfeld and Lauta. When Poland’s many new industrial centres are considered (Figure 6.3), Szelenyi (1996 p. 299) is clearly right to conclude that ‘all socialist societies industrialised with less spatial concentration of population than market capitalist economies’, but they were operating in a different technological environment where labour, transport and power were more widely available. Faced with the proverbial multiplicity of equal choices, party leaders seem to have been influential in projecting their own brand of political expediency by steering investments to their home areas. In Romania the two principal leaders of the socialist era (Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej and N.Ceauşescu) were well known for their support of Moldavia and Oltenia, respectively, with particular interest in their home areas (Bârlad and Olt) and even their home towns (Bârlad City and Scorniceşti). Ceauşescu was notorious for his interference in decisions at all levels, and each working visit (‘visita de lucru’) would include a good deal of instruction to local officials— dutifully in attendance with notebooks at the ready—as to how developments should be carried out. Such directions were fuelled by an acknowledged fascination with the building of socialism, usually conceived in terms of rather pretentious public buildings

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

294

Figure 6.3 Industrial centres in Poland in the 1970s or integrated industrial complexes as pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that would create a ‘socialist landscape’ (such were his references to the literal ‘construction’ of communism). In the case of burning of bituminous schist in a 900mW power station at Anina in the Banat Mountains, he multiplied the inefficiency of working an ultra-lowgrade energy source (that required a gas pipeline to guarantee combustion) by countermanding plans to site the power station in a river valley, with cooling water readily available, in favour of the quarry and processing site at the top of a mountain in limestone country, thus requiring cooling water to be pumped from lakes on the low ground. The reason lay simply in the neatness of a single complex embracing the quarries, stockyard, power station and new town despite the dust pollution which carried risks of cancer. Rural industry Eventually the rural areas regained an industrial role as the cooperative farms began to expand into vehicle engineering and food processing. In many cases the older industries continued to operate, for example in mining, sugar beet processing, ceramics and glass,

Economy, industry and agriculture

295

as well as distilling, tanning and viticulture: eleven of Hungary’s sugar refineries were located in rural areas, including a new factory at Kaba and a considerable number of other new factories (in chemicals and metallurgy as well as footwear and food processing) were also built in the countryside—often to support central places established to consolidate scattered populations with poor services. Tatai (1976 p. 83) mentions that after Hungary’s largest chocolate factory was built in the small town of at Szerencs, another was destined to follow in a village in Hajdu County, while several old village mills were converted into fodder-mixing units. And while many relocated Budapest industries remained close to the city, others were transferred to distant places: engineering to Berettyóújfalu, furniture to Jánosháza and silk to Szentgotthárd. Figure 6.4 shows the distribution of 106 industrial settlements, including 63 ‘minor industrial places’ (with 1,000–3,000 workers engaged mainly in mining and industries concerned with building materials, food processing and leather) of which many were rural, while those which were not attracted many rural commuters (Bencze 1964). Furthermore, since rural crafts generated interest from tourists and city dwellers, cooperatives were encouraged by tax concessions to established workshops and collaborate with homebased master craftsmen. In 1973 exactly a third of Hungary’s 10,160 industrial enterprises were situated in rural areas, though—with an average of 112 employees compared with 171 for urban-based industries—the share of employment was lower at 21.8%; while the share of electricity consumption was only 18%. In Bulgaria—where the dispersal of manufacturing ‘became a sort of ideology’ (Mihailović 1972 p. 90)—the stimulus came more directly from the state through the system of agro-industrial complexes. Thus, Korten in the foothills of Bulgaria’s Sredna Góra (lying at the centre of a complex comprising 4,200ha devoted to cereals, vineyards, orchards and stock-raising) not only developed a substantial export business in vine seedlings which were sent all over Europe but sustained a

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

296

Figure 6.4 Rural industry in Hungary vinification plant, an engineering factory producing parts for tractor-driven farm machinery and repair facilities. Agricultural machine stations, with teams of skilled workers, could develop into engineering workshops and some redundant mine installations were taken over for textile manufacture (particularly useful in providing jobs for women in areas of predominantly male employment). Country homes seized from the former aristocracy and some old military premises were also taken over for industrial use, along with redundant hostels and office blocks. The agricultural machine stations of the 1950s—made redundant by enlargement of cooperatives—were suitable for textiles, clothing and footwear, though there were some drawbacks through inferior premises and the lack of management skills. Some local initiative in economic planning was possible through self-financing. Such reforms in Romania allowed commune leaders the initiative to secure small local developments—perhaps in tourism (a small motel) or in manufacturing through subcontracting (using cast-off machinery secured from a factory). But regional planning remained weak because the local authorities had little real power to promote desirable projects and resist what was considered harmful.

Economy, industry and agriculture

297

Industrial sectors Iron and steel This was a key industry—for the ‘metal eaters’ (‘metalożercy’) mentality saw steel as the foundation of the communist system—and it gave rise to complex decision-making in view of the rising demand for metal and the importance attached to self-sufficiency with exploitation of virtually all known reserves, augmented by further mineral prospecting. A metallurgical complex would trigger an enormous growth of employment in the enterprise itself and indirectly through the impact ‘upstream’ in mining and ‘downstream’ in engineering and other metal-using industries (Table 6.2). Such projects therefore dominated the medium-term planning process through FYPs. Two countries built up steel industries virtually from scratch and selected coalfield locations close to the capital city: Bulgaria opened the ‘Lenin’ iron and steel works at Pernik in 1953 and followed it with another project close to the iron-ore mine of Kremikovtsi in 1965; while Albania operated a steel works at Elbasan during the 1980s. The other countries inherited significant capacities, although all went in for new complexes for bulk steel production that were located for the most part with imported iron ore in mind. And these new bulk producers tended to bring about restructuring at the older plants so that the emphasis shifted to special steels produced from pig iron supplied by the new integrated units. While the Gottwald complex in Ostrava in Czechoslovakia, along with those of Hunedoara and Reşiţa in Romania, survived as integrated units, Unterwellenborn near Saalfeld (GDR) eventually shut down its blast furnaces (currently preserved) and became purely a steel producer drawing pig iron from Eisenhüttenstadt, a new complex located on the Oder River. Czechoslovakia’s Podbrezová steelworks was originally built to supply special steels to Hungary but was modernised as the Sverma tube

Table 6.2 Growth of crude steel production under communism Production (million tonnes) 1948 1960 1970 1980 1985 1989 1990 Albania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.65 0.20 0.14 Bulgaria 0.00 0.25 1.80 2.56 2.94 2.90 2.18 Czechoslovakia 2.62 6.77 11.48 15.22 15.04 15.46 14.88 East Germany 0.30 3.34 5.05 7.31 7.85 7.83 n.a. Hungary 0.77 1.89 3.11 3.77 3.54 3.26 2.92 Poland 1.95 6.68 11.75 18.65 15.36 12.47 11.50 Romania 0.35 1.81 6.52 13.18 13.79 14.41 9.76 Yugoslavia 0.37 1.44 2.23 3.63 4.52 4.54 3.58 Sources: United Nations Yearbooks

mill, with metal supplied by the new East Slovakian Ironworks at Košice, while the Třinec inec steelworks near Bohumin was modernised as a component of the wider Ostrava complex. The Košice complex was a major exercise in regional development,

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

298

conceived in rational economic terms as a supplier of Slovakia’s engineering industry using local ore combined with coking coal from Ostrava in Moravia. And although the domestic ore proved unacceptable the revision of the project on the basis of imported ore from the USSR sustained this emerging growth pole; given further economic rationality through the consistently westerly flow of ore to Košice, steel to armaments industries in the Hron and Váh valleys and munitions to Warsaw Pact forces in the Czech ‘salient’. Due to dependence on iron ore shipped from overseas, Romania built a new bulk steel works at Galaţi which was able to supply the Siderca rail mill at Călărasi and another new mill at Târgovişte for special steels. Hungary selected a riverside site on the Danube below Budapest (Dunaújváros) for steel production and integration with older plant in the north in the Miskolc and Salgótarján areas. It also supplied pig iron by river to Budapest’s Csepel Iron and Metal Works (formerly Manfréd Weiss) which employed 40,000 workers in 1969, producing steel in Siemens-Martin and electric furnaces (with some use of scrap) as well as tubes and pipes. The works continued to use the river to obtain coal from Dorog as well as iron and steel from Dunaújváros. Poland Poland illustrates very well the distinction between an early post-war phase of development when domestic raw materials were used to the maximum and a subsequent phase when it was evident that much of the ore required would have to be imported. Yet there was no radical location shift away from Upper Silesia even though the USSR became the main iron-ore supplier. Bierut at Częstochowa illustrates the first strategy— focusing on a domestic orefield and simultaneously contributing further to the decongestion of the Upper Silesian industrial region; while Lenin Steelworks (LSW) at Nowa Huta on the eastern edge of Kraków was selected for a second complex that was to be supplied from the USSR since Silesian coke could meet Ukrainian ore at a place offering flood-free land, labour, transport, water and other services, plus the opportunity to build a workers’ city next to a bourgeois citadel and so ‘dilute the influence of Jagellonian University on the politics of the nation’s third largest city’ (Zikmund 1982 p. 228). The project made Kraków a symbol of communist, proletarian, atheist Poland to complement its historic role in government. Nowa Huta was originally conceived (during 1947–9) as an independent town at Mogiła village but as steel capacity was pushed up massively from 1 million to 12 million tonnes the planned limits were extended progressively to 23 villages (114sq.km); while the whole new town was added to Krakow in 1950 and the combined area expanded from 165sq.km in 1949 to 230sq. km in 1986. Additional housing has encroached on the green belt separating the new settlement from the rest of Kraków (which has itself expanded on to land originally earmarked for open space). Inputs continued to depend on the railway since the projected Vistula-BugDneiper Canal project was never implemented. Labour was provided by the rural surplus of 250,000 available in this part of Poland. Ultimately LSW employed almost a third of the city’s employees and produced over half of its total industrial output. There was an annual population increase of just 14,000 during the first phase (1950–4) but a total of 211,000 during the decade. Over 3,000 commuters travelled from an area extending to Bochnia (where an LSW branch plant opened in 1968): Nowa Huta’s population was

Economy, industry and agriculture

299

quite distinct in terms of youth, male dominance and orientation to industrial work, requiring limited higher-educational qualifications. Katowice steelworks was projected to take over the pig-iron-producing roles of small works within the conurbation so that the latter ‘will either be gradually liquidated or adapted to steel processing and the manufacturing of metal products’ (Kortus 1980 p. 57). For this reason it was built on the eastern edge of the Upper Silesian conurbation at Dąbrowa Górnicza, although the minister who took the decision was personally associated with the town (the very site was allegedly his childhood playground) and the risk of pollution to the nearby Ojców national park was disregarded, as was the logic of a more easterly location that could have generated a shuttle rail link with Upper Silesia exchanging ore for coal. As it was, the new mill required a broad-gauge rail connection with the Soviet Union. With additional employment in a partly decentralised non-ferrous metallurgical sector, the region was now portrayed as a heroic industrial zone despite the pollution problem that was largely ignored until after 1989. Kraków was also embarrassed because although Nova Huta’s pollution would normally drift eastwards— away from the historic city—in terms of both the atmosphere and Vistula flow, the city was already plagued with pollution from Upper Silesia and the new project meant that any temporary reversal of wind direction would bring irritation and discomfort from another source. Not surprisingly, people in Krakow came to show highly negative attitudes to industry, due to health problems, damage to buildings and loss of high-grade agricultural land. Yugoslavia In contrast to Poland, Yugoslavia decided on dispersal of metallurgy in the interests of regional development given the very serious inherited inequalities between the constituent republics. Apart from a small ironworks at Vareš in Bosnia and Herzegovina dating to 1891, Yugoslavia’s iron and steel capacity was restricted to Slovenia (Jesenice, Ravne and Štore) until steel-making and rolling capacity was installed at Smederevo on the Danube near Belgrade in 1937 with the aim of supplying the engineering industries at Kragujevac, Kruševac and Smederevska Palanca. Then, in 1938, with growing instability in the region and the need for iron and steel from a secure location to supply munitions industries, steel-making and rolling capacity was built at Zenica in Bosnia with blast furnaces at Majdanpek in Serbia and at Sisak and Topusko Bešlinac in Croatia. Electric steel furnaces (based on hydropower) were built in Slovenia and also at Šibenik in 1947. The communist government then decided that a new integrated works should be built at Doboj in Bosnia and—using the new railway from Banja Luka to Doboj and Tuzla— supplied with inputs from a wide area including iron ore from Vareš as well as Ljubija in Croatia; fuel would come from Zenica and the Kreka-Tuzla coalfield. However, when Tito’s independent stance provoked Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform, Soviet assistance was withdrawn and less costly ways of increasing production had to be found. Furthermore, the threat of destabilisation in the face of Soviet pressure suggested a dispersal strategy to enhance each republic’s stake in the federation. Zenica became an integrated plant for Bosnia and Herzegovina while the supply of fuel from the adjacent oil refinery sustained growth at Sisak in Croatia using coke from Lukavac (also some

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

300

imported) and ore from Ljubija and Vareš. A steelworks and tube mill also appeared at this location, given the demand for pipes in the Croatian natural gas field. Meanwhile, hydropower provided a basis for steel-making at Nikšić in Montenegro (1956) converting pig and scrap railed in from Bosnia; and although the transport and production costs were high the mill contributed to the growth of engineering in the area at Bileća, Cetinje and Trebinje as well as in the republic’s capital, Titograd (as Podgorica was renamed). Electric steel-making was also envisaged at Smederevo (Serbia), Ilijaš (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Skopje (Macedonia). Further proposed developments at Skopje were related to low-grade Macedonian ore (relieving pressure on Bosnian ore and reducing transport costs considerably) and coke manufactured in Kosovo. Finally Smederevo was to become an integrated unit with natural gas from the Banat region to supplement the coke supply. Such was the Fifteen Year Plan launched in 1958, although six years later the terminal year was brought forward to 1969. Dispersal had strategic advantages and helped spread the engineering industry, but there were too many units in relation to a total steel output of some 2 million tonnes (which might ideally have been produced at a single plant, thereby generating scale economies). Pig-iron and steel production were brought into line but great difficulty was experienced in producing enough coke given the poor quality of domestic coal (requiring some imports) and the long rail hauls required in some cases to reach coking plants and subsequently the furnaces. Non-ferrous metallurgy This sector developed largely according to the availability of ores—mainly in the southern countries (as indicated by the example of Yugoslavia in the previous chapter) with many new low-quality ore bodies exploited to enhance self-sufficiency in copper, lead and zinc. The GDR completed the exploitation of the historically important copper ores of the Mansfeld region as the existing mines were driven to greater depths and additional employment was secured initially. Mine closures occurred in the 1960s, for example Borsowski (previously Paul), Fortschritt, and Thalmann (formerly Vitzthum), when the latter had reached 830m. The Karl Liebknecht smelter (formerly Krughütte) closed in 1972 while August Babel (formerly Kochhütte) in Eisleben continued to process ore from Sangerhausen—to which some miners were transferred. In the early post-war years the Eisleben industry had required additional housing estates in the town (Wilhelm Pieck was built during 1952–4 and Ernst Thalmann in 1954–7 and 1969–73). However, closure led to a shift into electrical engineering, with which technical education in the area became associated. Meanwhile, Poland opened up entirely new sources of copper in Lower Silesia and sulphur in Tarnobrzeg. And uranium from Czechoslovakia, GDR and Romania was of the greatest importance for the Soviets who developed a nuclear programme after 1945. Chemnitz was the seat of a Soviet mining administration to exploit uranium in Erzgebirge and eastern Thuringia through the Soviet-German joint company Wismut, and in 1953 the city was honoured with the new name Karl Marx Stadt. Uranium ‘by far the most important…[raw material] from their entire sphere of influence. Had these resources not been almost completely exploited by 1989 Germany’s reunification might not have taken place at the time it did’ (Bochmann 1995 p. 543). As in the other two countries the

Economy, industry and agriculture

301

industry was highly damaging and elaborate works of ‘ecologisation’ are now under way. The Soviets also drove the production at Jáchymov and Pribřam from 1949—using forced labour—complemented by the Liberec cluster at end of the 1960s: an obvious consideration when the country embarked on its initially ‘national’ nuclear programme. Aluminium This was a very important sector. Hungary was the producer with the greatest experience, going back to the bauxite mines opened at Ajka in the 1920s. A limited power supply restricted the output of metal but even so the reduction and rolling processes were handled at Csepel in Budapest (while alumina was produced at Ajka and also at Mosonmagyaróvár on the Danube, the latter for export). After the war a further smelter was built at Inota (eventually enlarged to 100,000 tonnes) using power from the local lignite field (Varpalota). Even so, during the 1970s only 120,000–150,000 tonnes out of a total alumina output of 800,000–840,000 tonnes (obtained from 2.4 million tonnes of bauxite—the entire domestic output apart from export of 600,000 tonnes—coming mainly from the Deák mine) was smelted in Hungary. The rest was exported, with half going to the USSR under an agreement (first worked out in 1960) whereby Hungary received the appropriate amount of metal after allowing for the smelting cost using relatively cheap Soviet power at Volgograd. During the early 1980s the USSR processed 330,000 tonnes of Hungarian alumina into 165,000 tonnes of aluminium (300,000 tonnes in the late 1970s). The agreement started operating even before Inota was complete and it gave rise to new rolling capacity at Székesfehérvár and a significant export business. In 1986 the Hungarian economy acquired 180,000 tonnes of aluminium, of which some 40% was smelted within the country. The Soviets again filled the gap between the smelting capacity (some 70,000 tonnes) and the fabricating capacity that was almost double at 134,000 tonnes, although even so Hungary imported much Soviet power through a 750kV power line built for the purpose. There was a proposal for a new 100,000 tonnes per annum foundry to follow the end of the Soviet agreement in 1985, but the depression in world aluminium made speculation in ‘Hungarian silver’ somewhat problematic and when the world price of the metal fell from $2,000 a tonne in the mid1980s to $1,100–1,200 the idea was abandoned. Semi-manufactures and finished products came from the Székesfehérvár light metal works and the Kőbánya (Budapest) sheet rolling mills using ingots from Inota and Tatabánya as well as those produced in the USSR. Romania and Yugoslavia tried to build an aluminium export business on the strength of their bauxite reserves with the advantage of having sufficient power of their own. In Romania, Pădurea Craiului bauxite from the Dobreşti area was processed in Oradea while imported bauxite was processed in Tulcea, with smelting in Slatina. In Yugoslavia the significance of the federal system for industrial location was again evident because works were located at Mostar (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Kidričevo (Slovenia), Šibenik (Croatia) and Titograd (Montenegro). Šibenik was already functioning when the communist regime was established; drawing bauxite from Drniš and hydropower from the Krka River. However, immediate post-war planning identified the village of Strnišce (later renamed Kidričevo) near Ptuj in Slovenia as a second location—with rail access and premises available at a German factory built during the war—while Hungary could

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

302

supply bauxite and power could be drawn from the Drava Valley hydropower stations. The aim was to increase the supply of aluminium delivered to the Šibenik rolling mill (where capacity was double the local smelter output, which could not be increased because of a power shortage which was only overcome when the grid arrived in 1955). The plan was upset by the 1948 blockade, requiring the use of bauxite from Istria 270km away, while completion of a national power system made the Slovenian project still more marginal economically. With an original capacity of 15,000 tonnes (1954), rising to 44,000 tonnes in 1964, the works then grew to 155,000 tonnes with a progressive diversification of the bauxite supply. However, aluminium can be profitable even where the raw material is not present because bauxite is relatively easy to transport in bulk, especially if converted to alumina, while the heavy electricity demands for the reduction of alumina to aluminium normally make it unattractive to produce metal substantially beyond home market requirements (unless power happens to be very cheap). While the GDR inherited the Bitterfeld and Lauta smelters, Czechoslovakia built capacity at Žiar nad Hronom in Slovakia while Poland chose Konin and Skawina. All alumina was imported—much of it from Hungary’s two old plants and a newer one at Almásfuzitö. Locations show a concern for backward areas but also for power generated near by: Poland’s Konin plant (like Romania’s smelter at Slatina) was close to a lignite-based power station while Žiar nad Hronom was near the Hron Valley hydropower stations and the Zemianske Kostalany thermal power station in the Nitra Valley. Engineering This developed rapidly to meet home demand previously supplied through foreign penetration. Growth was encouraged in part by the availability of factories built for war industries that could now be turned over to other production, while the assembly plants of some Western companies were available and former textile mills could also be used: a mill at Orava in Czechoslovakia closed in the mid-1950s was taken over by the Tesla electrical engineering firm for the manufacture of television sets. But Soviet demands— and designs—were also influential in Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Poland, and while the more backward economies experienced less Soviet patronage they boosted exports by selling at competitive prices in Third World markets. In Hungary tractor production was concentrated at the Red Star factory (formerly Hofherr), with combine harvesters from Emag, steam engines and compressors from Mávag and lorries from Csepel Motor Works—established in 1949 in the premises of the former Danube Aircraft Works with an Austrian Steyer licence. The engineering branch of the Csepel Iron and Metal Works specialised in electrical engineering, particularly transformers. It was significant that the Hungarians were able to persuade the Soviets not to dismantle their factories but instead to take reparations in the form of production: hence the serial production of machine tools at the inherited Manfréd Weiss and Budapest-Salgótarján plant. Locomotives Czechoslovakia had a major stake through Škoda Plzeň’s development of dual-voltage locomotives and a large locomotive for handling heavy trains at high speeds (650 tonnes

Economy, industry and agriculture

303

at 200km/h) in the USSR: a two-section 8,400kW locomotive which can operate at temperatures between −50 and +40. As a result the GDR stopped producing large locomotives and the Hans Beimler factory (formerly Borsig) at Hennigsdorf near Berlin concentrated on the intermediate range, apart from highly successful heavy freight electric locomotives of up to 5,400kW. The GDR did, however, retain a reputation for rolling stock through the Waggonbau factories at Bautzen (sleeping cars), Dessau (refrigerated wagons) and Halle-Ammendorf (standard passenger coaches). Pafawag in Wrocław supplied the Polish railways. Romania meanwhile retained its own capacities for both diesel and electric mainline locomotives with Western designs (Asea and BrownBoveri) assimilated under licence; with cooperation between Electroputere (Craiova)— where a large electrical engineering complex developed out of steam locomotive repair shops after the Second World War—and Rade Končar of Zagreb so that the two factories concentrated on electric locomotives with six- and four-wheel bogies, respectively. There was also a successful diesel hydraulic mixed traffic class and a fleet of heavy freight locomotives using the American Alcoa engine. In Hungary, Ganz-Mávag—much affected by rail dieselisation—developed a railbus: a reliable vehicle using a simple technology which won orders in the Third World. Railcars were also used extensively in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Motor vehicles: trucks, buses and trams Lorry building enjoyed a high priority after 1945. The industry was already strong in Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Hungary. Comecon specialisation gave a boost to the GDR, whose factories at Zittau and Zwickau were the main producers of medium and light lorries. Meanwhile, the Tatra works at Kopřivnice near Ostrava (Czechoslovakia) was the sole Comecon producer of lorries of 12 tonnes and over from 1971—exported in large numbers to the Soviet Union where they were invaluable in coping with rigorous Siberian conditions in areas (like Magadan) where motor lorries were the only form of freight transport. The specialisation agreement meant a doubling of production by Tatra during the 1970s which was a benefit to the main plant at Kopř ivnice and the branch plants in both the Czech lands (Nový Jičín and Příbor) and Slovakia (Bánovce and Čadca). Tatra lorries were also sent to China and gained a still higher international profile following successful participation in the Paris-Dakar rally from 1985. Poland built up a truck industry quickly with capacity at Starachowice in 1949 and then at Lublin under the 1950–5 Six Year Plan. Bulgaria’s motor industry began with repair shops set up immediately after the war in Plovdiv and Sofia. A larger works at Shumen began to produce spare parts which were exported to the USSR in 1960 and also used in the assembly of a Russian-designed lorry in 1967. Thanks to Czech assistance, the Shumen factory became a producer of axles for Comecon, while Lovech assimilated Czechoslovak technology for its Škoda-Madara truck—and cooperation with LIAZ resulted in production of LIAZ-Madara trucks beginning at Shumen in 1983. A feature of the cooperation was the development of an improved back axle supplied to the LIAZ factory in Czechoslovakia. Polmot of Poland produced heavy-duty lorries at Jelcz under licence from the Austrian firm Steyr, while cooperation with MAN in West Germany underpinned production by both Rába at Győr in Hungary and Roman at Braşov in Romania.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

304

Hungary’s forte has proved to be bus building with production by Ikarus expanding from 2,700 units in 1965 to 11,400 in 1976 (with 2,100 and 9,400, respectively, for export). Indeed, Ikarus was the outstanding bus producer in Comecon and assimilated Western technology as a means of increasing its market penetration, including the supply of various components (engines, starters and gear-changing mechanisms). Other national producers have served their respective home markets: Autobuzul in Romania and Karosa in Czechoslovakia, while Jelcz in Poland cooperated with the French firm Berliet. The Tatra works in Prague-Smichov was a major builder of trams. The old Franz Ringhoffer plant was an important producer before the war but the firm rose to greater prominence in 1948 when it acquired a licence for the manufacture of tramcars to an American design. Exports increased immediately but progress was maintained with new designs: including a three-link tram—incorporating hinges and stretch covers—30m long, accommodating 350 people and resembling a metro car with its interior design and maximum speed of 65km/h. Meanwhile, Poland continued to produce trams in Chorzów. The other side of the coin was the problem for enterprises giving up certain types of production. Thus Hungary’s factory at Csepel in Budapest had to cease production of lorries and tractors on account of the Comecon specialisation agreements. Indeed, the business was further compromised when one of Hungary’s own enterprises—the Ikarus bus factory—chose to use engines manufactured at Győr under licence from the MAN company in West Germany. In the end the Csepel firm had to retool to produce a modern type of bus chassis as well as steering units for lorries; though it succeeded in establishing a joint company with Volvo of Sweden for the production of the Volvo Lapplander cross-country four-wheel-drive truck. The GDR tram factory in Gotha switched to domestic appliances when the main tramway systems standardised on the Czech product. Motor vehicles: passenger cars In contrast to the vehicles so far discussed, car production was not an immediate priority. Apart from some production at Sühl in the GDR, motorcycles were virtually a monopoly of Czechoslovakia with factories in Prague (Jawa) and Strakonice (Česká Zbrojovca) established in 1929 and 1932, respectively—coming together as one unit in the 1950s— with high demand until the 1960s. There was a big increase in production between 1965 and 1976 (250,000 to 760,000 vehicles per annum), characterised (in contrast to output for transport generally) by cooperation deals and licensing arrangements with Western companies, especially Citroën, Fiat and Renault. Škoda cars developed their own designs—producing 44,500 cars in 1960 and 126,000 in 1970. Production by Trabant and Wartburg in East Germany rose massively from 1,400 in 1948 to 106,500 in 1966 and 217,900 in 1986. However, Comecon integration favoured the relatively strong Soviet enterprises, though car headlights were manufactured at Nový Jičín in Czechoslovakia— by one of Škoda’s many subsidiary companies—and exported to other socialist countries, especially the USSR’s Togliatti works. There was some useful collaboration with Bulgaria since the Moskvich 408 car was first assembled at the Balkan works in Lovech in 1966—as a diversification project by a motorcycle works—and some components were produced, for example batteries at Tolbukhin. The Zhiguli was also assembled in Bulgaria along with the appropriate air filters, dynamos and starter motors. Most of the

Economy, industry and agriculture

305

parts were made at Sliven which opened in 1970 and eventually supplied some two-thirds of all the dynamos and starter motors required by Togliatti. But overall there was a slowdown in the region’s car production during the 1980s despite some attempts to penetrate the Western market (especially by Škoda’s Favorit). Factories were small by Western standards yet all the ECECs except Albania and Hungary—which concentrated on buses under Comecon specialisation agreements—were active, and the domestic markets across the region showed some dynamism with 266 cars ptp in the GDR and 242 in Czechoslovakia in 1989 (doubling the figures of 131 and 121, respectively, for 1977). Even so, long delays in getting new cars created a black market in registration slips and ensured that second-hand cars were more expensive than new ones (in 1989 old Trabants could be twice the price of new ones). There was a ten-year wait for Trabants distributed in Berlin in 1987 and up to fifteen years for a Lada or Škoda. Design, engines and pricing were given low priority: ‘high prices reflected the high production costs of an economy hobbled by ageing fixed capital and a predilection for labour intensive manufacturing methods’ (Zatlin 1997 p. 367). Most car production tended to involve collaboration with Western firms, given the demand from the more affluent and well-connected families. Both Czechoslovakia and the GDR showed interest in Volkswagen cars (especially the Golf/Rabbit and Passat models) and both states seemed set to become Volkswagen subcontractors. Poland made arrangements with Fiat in 1979 for the production of a range of cars at Bielsko-Biała using some Italian parts and other components manufactured in Poland. Romania linked with Renault in respect of Dacia cars from Colibaşi near Piteşti, but for Bulgaria an arrangement with Renault in 1966 proved abortive. The most complex and long-standing Western association concerned Yugoslavia’s Crvena Zastava factory in Kragujevac, started in 1954 on the strength of the town’s engineering tradition which enabled Fabrika Motora 21 Maj to make the engines for the new factory. Assembly of the Fiat 1400 began immediately under licence in 1954, following detailed study often possible candidates drawn from France, Italy, the UK and the USA. But the Yugoslav builders did not collaborate among themselves until the 1980s when Zastava, Industrija Motornih Vozila (IMV) at Novo Mesto in Slovenia and Tvornica Automobila Sarajevo (TAS) sought better utilisation of capacity. Zastava also expanded in other locations as the Fabrica Aotomobila and Komponente organisations in Kragujevac were complemented by Heroj Toza Dragović in Ohrid and Ramiz Sadiku in Peč; to say nothing of 280 subcontractors— over 100 supplying car parts—from 130 factories all over Yugoslavia (and some abroad). The subcontractors became responsible for all the components apart from transmission, suspension elements and car bodies which were produced at the Zastava plant. Zastava also diversified its foreign contacts during 1966–84 to involve two Polish firms in mutual deliveries of parts and finished cars; while a Hungarian firm supplied parts in return for finished cars; and Transportmaschinen in the GDR supplied tools and parts. Zastava also went into production of Lada cars under a cooperation agreement with the Soviet enterprise VAZ. During the years 1981–4 Zastava produced almost three-quarters of the cars built around the country (800,000 million out of a total of 1.1 million). As regards other Yugoslav builders, IMV—initially as the Moto Montaza factory—began assembling (German) DKW delivery vans in 1955 and cars in 1962. But the agreement was terminated, while subsequent cooperation with British Leyland of the UK in respect of the assembly of 1100 and 1300 cars finished in 1973. However, in 1972 IMV took

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

306

over the assembly of Renault cars from Litostroj of Ljubljana and developed on the basis of modern technology with a new factory at Novo Mesto in 1975 (with capacity for 100,000 cars in 1978). The mainstay of the plant proved to be the Renault Four using imported engines, gearboxes and other components. Meanwhile, TAS developed out of cooperation in 1957 between the local Pretis enterprise and the German NSU factory for motor-scooters and motorcycles. The first contract with Volkswagen was negotiated in 1969 and this led to the new company (TAS) producing cars only in 1972. The deal covered the assembly of Volkswagen cars and the supply of certain components to Germany. Out of the 299,500 cars assembled by manufacturers other than Zastava between 1981 and 1984 182,900 (61.1%) were produced by IMV and 84,900 (28.3%) by TAS. Small numbers of vehicles were produced by Cimos (originally Tormos) at Koper, Slovenia, Industry a Delova Automobila at Kikinda in Serbia and Udruzena Metalna Industry a at Priština in Kosovo—on the basis of links with Citroën, Opel and Peugeot, respectively. Shipbuilding Here there was a leading role in Poland where investment went into the modernisation of yards in Gdańsk/Gdynia and Szczecin. In 1974 the Comuna Paryska yard in Gdynia launched a 105,000-tonne oil and ore-carrying vessel for the USSR and ships of 200,000– 400,000 tonnes were envisaged for the future. There were also inter-regional links involving a wide range of component suppliers extending across the whole country as the share of imported items was reduced from 45% at the beginning of communism to 11% in 1965. Specialisation in fishing boats resulted in goods from Białystok (appliances for fish processing). But much came from the south—especially Katowice—due to the tradition in steel-making and engineering, but also Rzeszów due to cooling aggregates from Dębica. Efforts were made by the shipbuilding management to get more goods from areas close to Gdańsk/Gdynia with a big growth in chemicals and machinery, including transport equipment and metal from Koszalin, through more could have been done to avoid the need to bring wooden tool handles from Przemyśl and paints/varnishes from Jedlicze (both in the far southeast). Soviet orders were again crucial for the shipbuilding industry on the Danube at Komarno in Slovakia where Amur-type ships were built—suitable for bulk trade (coal, grain and timber) or containers on Soviet inland waterways. In Budapest the Ganz Shipyards and Crane factory built sea-going vessels while the Óbuda produced river craft, including l,200hp tugs designed to push barges from the rear. A Bulgarian-Soviet joint company (Korbso) was set up in Varna in 1950 for building and repairing (a dry dock opened in 1955). After the Soviet interest was withdrawn in 1954 the yard continued to function as a purely Bulgarian shipbuilding enterprise, reconstructed in 1962 to cope with oil tankers of 100,000 tonnes and ore/bulk carriers of up to 38,000 tonnes. The Ivan Dimitrov yard at Russe (opened in 1959) specialised in 1,700hp vessels for pushing barges on inland waterways and 1,500 tonnes liquid fuel bunker vessels for use at major ports. Russe also built oil tankers which can be used on both seaways and navigable rivers. Yugoslavia, meanwhile, built up an important shipbuilding industry (mainly at Rijeka) geared to the needs of her own fleet as well as Western and Third World orders. There

Economy, industry and agriculture

307

was a rapid expansion of shipbuilding and repair work—including engines and equipment—particularly at Pula, Rijeka and Split. Other yards were at Kraljevica and Trogir; with smaller units at Korčula, Murter and Vela Luka. Romania followed a similar strategy in developing her own industry which covered river boats at Drobeta-Turnu Severin and Orşova and sea-going ships at Constanţa, Galaţi and Mangalia. Aircraft The Soviets discouraged further development of an industry which had shown much promise during the decade 1935–45. However, Prague-Letňany worked on automatic control equipment and flight simulators for the Prague-based Aero trust whose main installation was at Vodochody where MiG aircraft were assembled under Soviet licence. The industry went on to gain widespread recognition for its small aircraft, used widely by the Warsaw Pact air forces and a number of Third World countries; executive-type aircraft for small numbers of passengers; and aircraft for such special purposes as aerobatics and crop-spraying. Production was coordinated between factories at Vodochody and Kunowice (the latter in Moravia) and engines were made at Motorlet in Janovice with a tradition in engineering dating back to 1911. By contrast Romania favoured Western collaboration following the decision of 1968 to rebuild the small infant industry of the 1930s. A cooperation agreement with British Aerospace led to the purchase of 1–11 aircraft and—in 1979—a contract covered assembly of the aircraft in Romania initially using British equipment with independent operation thereafter. The resulting ROMBAC 1–11 was used for passenger and freight transport in Romania. Deals were also made for a Romanian contribution to the BrittenNorman ‘Islander’ aircraft which provided experience in the production of commuter transport aircraft and the military versions. Chemicals Production of basic chemicals had long been established across the region, for example, soda and chlorine through the Solvay electrolysis of brine method at locations such as Budapest (Hungary) and Târnaveni (Romania). Hungary had strength in Pharmaceuticals through the former Chinoin, Richter and Wander factories in Budapest and two other units in Debrecen which amalgamated 1963. Germany had achieved a historic lead overall, but this was not so impressive by the 1950s because many wartime developments were taken over by Grossdeutschland’s successor states while the Halle-Leipzig heartland was heavily war-damaged. When the dust had settled, GDR nitrogen fertiliser production was complemented by the Lovosice plant in Czechoslovakia and by Kędzierzyn and Tarnów in Poland (which followed experiments at Chorzów using coke-oven gas inputs). The GDR retained its position in photographic materials at Wolfen, but synthetic rubber production by the carbide-acetylene route used at Bunawerke (Schkopau) was taken up in Czechoslovakia (and the Soviet Union) and the German PVC technology was adopted in Poland at Oswięcim in 1957. However, the growth of organic chemistry (products containing and derived from coal or hydrocarbons—analine dyes, detergents, fibres, insecticides, plastics, rubber and solvents) was held back through the Soviet priority for iron, steel and engineering. German ingenuity went into the valorisation of low-grade fuel

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

308

through briquetting plants, gasification and further power stations—using such locations as Lauchhammer and Schwarze Pumpe. This effort extended to the production of a metallurgical coke (Braunkohlen Hochtemperaturkoks: HTK) for use in the specially constructed Calbe blast furnaces, charged with low-grade ore from the Harz. Only in the 1960s did growth in the chemical industry accelerate but by then it was grounded more efficiently in (predominantly) Soviet hydrocarbons rather than domestic coal resources of indifferent quality. The use of pipelines for crude oil and gas as well as intermediates and finished products gave the planners many opportunities for developing downstream activities at convenient points in the system. Thus the theoretical extreme whereby a full range of activities from oil refining to the production of fertiliser, household plastic goods and other derivatives coming from a single combine was never achieved, despite the 30,000 workforce at Leuna. Ethylene marked a convenient break point because it integrated well with oil refining and could easily be transported by pipeline or railway tank wagons to other factories for downstream processing: hence the transfers from Burgas to Varna-Devnya (Bulgaria) and from Piteşti to Râmnicu Vâlcea (Romania)—two recipients that were initially concerned with soda based on local salt. International transfers (referred to on pp. 312–13) involved Leninváros (now Tisaújváros) in Hungary and Kallus in the USSR. For a time, oil from Zeitz was converted into ethylene at Bohlen (GDR) and than piped to Záluží and Neratovice in Czechoslovakia (propylene by rail) until Czechoslovakia produced enough polyethylene and polypropylene for both countries’ needs; and in 1978 Czechoslovakia was able to manage without GDR intermediates and the ethylene flow was reversed. In the process Záluží was almost totally reprofiled, although the site remained unchanged despite the substantial coal reserves beneath it. In 1953 the plant was producing ammonia, methanol and phenol, as well as coke, coal gas and electricity, but it was rebuilt to use crude oil during 1954–72: the processing of crude began in 1956 and ethanol was produced 1964. The ‘Friendship’ pipeline arrived the following year, while the hydrogen and urea plants followed in 1971 and 1972, respectively. Construction of the adjacent Litvínov petrochemical plant started in 1972, while the use of coal as the basis for oil production came to an end in 1973 although coal continued to be used in the local power station and for the production of town gas. Further new products were achieved: polypropylene in 1975, polyethylene in 1976 and ethylene in 1980, followed by a new refinery complex in 1981 and a hydrocracker (feedstock preparation for pyrolysis) in 1988 (Pavlínek and Pickles 2000 p. 103). The transition at Záluží was mirrored by other large factories. Soviet gas brought a change in the raw-material base at the Tarnów fertiliser factory and led to a new unit at Puławy linked with the Tarnobrzeg sulphur deposits. Meanwhile, oil processing was based at Płock and Blachownia with intermediates from the latter transforming the production process at Kędzierzyn and Oswięcim (for fertilisers, synthetic rubber and other derivatives). In Hungary the Borsod chemical combine—started in 1952 at Kazincbarcika—began to receive natural gas in 1963, thanks to discoveries in the Great Plain, ahead of supplies from the USSR. The latter triggered investments at Százhalombatta near Budapest and also at Tiszapalkonya (later Leninváros) where a small factory was initially supplied with natural gas from Romania—with a wider spatial spread for derivatives, for example rubber at Nyíregyháza, Szeged and Vác. Economies of scale for ethylene and propylene production at Leninváros then required despatch of

Economy, industry and agriculture

309

the surplus to Kallus. Meanwhile, Slovakia built up a chemical industry from scratch using Soviet raw materials: the small Bratislava refinery, dating back to 1895 was boosted by the arrival of Soviet oil in 1962 whereupon petrochemical facilities were installed under the 1966–70 FYP and from 1975 ethylene and propylene were despatched to installations at Šala and Nováky producing polyvinyl acetate and PVC, respectively. Bulgaria built the Burgas-Varna complex; while Yugoslavia established refineries at Novi Sad and Pančevo (Naftagas) as well as Rijeka and Sisak (by Industrija Nafte which also controlled petrochemical plants at Krk and Kutina). The hydrocarbon base was not seriously questioned although the Soviet Union’s failure to increase oil production in the 1980s did lead to some further thought about coal processing through gasification and the production of liquid fuels through hydrogenation. Romania turned to chemicals in a big way from the end of the 1950s in view of her oil and gas resources. Although the first FYP increased sulphuric acid and fertiliser output— and reprofiled the wartime projects at Făgăraş and Victoria—no new locations were developed until the Năvodari fertiliser factory was started in 1958; followed by a network of factories including Craiova, Roznov near Piatra Neamţ, Slobozia, Târgu Mureş, Tecuci and Turnu Măgurele. Further processing of natural gas was achieved through the PVC unit opened at Turda in 1958 and followed on a larger scale at Borzeşti (in the Trotuş Valley of Moldavia) where PVC, polystyrene and synthetic rubber units were functioning in 1964. This location—offering local oil and salt—was served by the extended system of gas pipelines. Meanwhile, reorganisation of oil refining—following the early post-war era of reparations and metallurgical dominance—paved the way for petrochemicals in the 1960s. Ploieşti’s Brazi refinery contributed to another synthetic rubber industry—serving a new tyre factory in Bucharest—and also inaugurated two ethylene units during the 1960s: one consequence being the production of PVC for use in plastics manufactured in Bucharest and Buzău. A new refinery in Piteşti supplied ethylene (from 1975) to Râmnicu Vâlcea, where production of PVC was added to the soda and chlorine industries located on the Govora saltfleld in 1952; with further quantities to Craiova where the chemical industry was diversified by the addition of polyvinyl acetate, urea and fertiliser. Meanwhile, Albania also used her domestic resources to create a modern chemical industry at Cerrick and Fier (the latter a fertiliser factory based on local hydropower) after the non-ferrous metallurgical industry at Laci provided a base for sulphuric acid and superphosphate production. Textiles Except for Albania (where the factories of Berat, and Tirana were post-war developments) each country inherited a number of textile-producing areas as well as capacity in capital cities: Gabrovo, Kazanlik, Plovdiv and Sliven (Bulgaria); Brno, Liberec, Trutnov and Varnsdorf (Czechoslovakia); Leipzig, Mühlhausen, Plauen and Zwickau (GDR); Győr, Sopron, Szeged and Szombathely (Hungary); Białystok, BielskoBiała, Łódź, Zgierz and Wrocław (Poland); Braşov, Iaşi, Sibiu and Timişoara (Romania); and Ljubljana, Maribor, Osijek and Zagreb (Yugoslavia). The industry faced major restructuring as technological change provided an opportunity to reduce concentration in the interest of regional development and improve links between textile-finishing branches and the clothing industry. Closures in traditional centres in Poland reduced the number of

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

310

units to two-fifths of the pre-war total by eliminating the smaller ones. But this still left the cotton industry with much inherited equipment dating to pre-1918 and even pre-1880. The woollen industry was in an even worse technical condition. Białystok saw a substantial overhaul of its industry through consolidation and modernisation after wartime destruction. Diversification occurred through the use of synthetic fabrics—as well as chemicals (dyestuffs and Pharmaceuticals) and engineering—to ease the structural imbalance in the Łódź textile area. Meanwhile, new enterprises were started in towns with little existing employment but with a good water supply and perhaps adaptable old buildings: hence the wool-washing and combing mill at Żagań, south of Zielona Góra, and the washing, combing and worsted spinning mill at Toruń (linked with a terylene fibre factory referred to below). Meanwhile, the Bohemian textile industry was rationalised following the expulsion of the German population and capacity transferred to four locations in Slovakia: Lučenec, Trenčin, Svit and Žilina. Dispersal was assisted by the development of a ready-made clothing industry in several new locations. In addition to the long-established industry in Prostĕjov —which received huge orders from the Soviet Union—development occurred in the Šumava Hills (Domažlice, Klatovy, Trĕboň and Vimperk) and at Puchov and Trenčin in Slovakia. Romania set up a chain of factories starting with Bucharest in 1949 and extending to six provincial locations: Cluj-Napoca, Focşani, Târgu Mureş, Satu Mare, Sighişoara, oara and Timişoara; while Hungary and Yugoslavia built new factories in the Pannonian Plain and the southern republics, respectively. Meanwhile, some backward areas gained new factories based on flax and hemp. Synthetic fibres now played a major role in the industry. After post-war dismantling of Germany’s Landsberg plant and its transfer to the USSR, the industry was restarted in what was now the Polish town of Gorzów—and spread to Jelenia Góra and Oława—with oil rather than coal as the source of caprolactam. Romania first produced caprolactam at Săvineşti in 1959, using intermediates from the country’s oil refineries, and this was used to produce ‘relon’ (nylon) at the same factory (enlarged in the 1970s). Cord was also produced for the Bucharest tyre industry—and at the cellulose fibre factory at Brăila which used reed from the Danube Delta as the raw material. From 1962 Săvineşti also processed methane gas to obtain ‘melana’ (woollen-type) fibre used in the Moldavian textile industry. However, when it was found that the intermediate acrylonitrile could be produced more cheaply using propylene rather than acetylene, the Piteşti refinery began to supply the bulk of the material and the ethylene glycol needed for ‘terom’ (polyester) fibre (i.e. terylene) first produced in 1964 in Iaşi. The output of synthetics rose in sympathy with the boom in oil refining and petrochemistry. Leuna, which had first produced caprolactam before the war, switched from coal to oil to supply the ‘dederon’ factories at Guben, Premnitz and Schwarza; also acrylonitrile for the ‘wolpryla’ fibre produced at Wolfen and ethylene glycol for the ‘grisuten’ (polyester) fibre made at Guben. Czechoslovakia built a factory at Humenné in eastern Slovakia (benefiting from links with the local Chemistry College) to make ‘chemlon’, presumably using caprolactam manufactured at Lovosice. But not every country supported an independent production route. So Poland’s polyester fibre factory at Toruń (receiving ethylene glycol from the nearby Płock refinery) supplied Hungary in exchange for acrylic fibres from its Viscosa factory. And Czechoslovakia had a surplus for export to other Comecon

Economy, industry and agriculture

311

countries arising from the large caprolactam factory at Neratovice which used propylene from both Bratislava and Záluží. At Iaşi in Romania, which may be taken as an example of local reorganisation in the industry, the inherited Moldova, Tesătura and Textila factories comprised a cluster at the western extremity of the Bahlui industrial axis, far removed from the pre-war pattern of some fifty small units. Tesătura produced cotton-type material using raw cotton imported from the USSR, Egypt and Sudan as well as man-made fibres from a variety of Romanian sources: polyester fibres were produced in Iaşi from ethylene glycol and other intermediates supplied by the petrochemical complex at Brazi, near Ploieşti, while acrylic and nylon fibres were supplied from Šavineşti in the Bistriţa Valley and cellulose fibre (artificial silk) came from Brăila. Some of the yarn from Iaşi went to factories across Romania, but most was woven in Iaşi to supply the local clothing industry and others in Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca, Sibiu and Timişoara. The local industry developed from the old Moldova hosiery factory using cotton-type cloth from Tesătura (and some from elsewhere) and woollen-type material from Buhusi near Bacău. To improve the industrial prospects of small towns in Iaşi County a branch plant was built at Hârlău and a larger unit at Paşcani. Finally, Textila specialised in flax and hemp, drawing some of the raw material from the dressing plant at Vaslui and the rest from the Western Plain (Berveni and Palota) and Transylvania (Luduş). Numbers employed in textiles and clothing in laşi County increased from 6,200 in 1960 to 17,600 in 1975. Wood processing, with particular reference to Romanian forests This industry remained very important with considerable scope for the exports to the West to pay for high-technology goods. An important innovation was the use of sawmill waste to manufacture boards which could then be covered in melamine and used to make furniture. One such unit was Smrecina at Polomka in central Slovakia but all the timberrich countries eventually had their own networks. Efforts were made to increase valueadded and avoid excessive trade in unprocessed timber. Also there was an increase in scale as new state-owned units replaced many of the smaller units once in private hands. However, in order to complement coverage in earlier chapters the review of forest work is brought up to date, with particular reference to Romania. Communism led to nationalisation in 1948 and a surge of planting which covered 600,000ha to 1955. However, annual harvesting at a rate of 5m3/ha was far in excess of annual growth averaging 3.8 (4.8 for spruce, 3.6 for beech and 2.9 for oak) so the forests became gradually younger and thinner. Organised across whole basins—‘unităţi forestiere mari’ (UFM)—80% were exploited by railways, roads or funiculars against 10% by water and animals (‘atelaje’), while another 10% remained inaccessible. Romania was obliged to deliver war reparations to the USSR after heavy wartime pressure on forests for the benefit of the Axis. So it was necessary to open up new stands of timber and there was an unprecedented expansion of forest railways during the 1950s, undertaken by the Romanian state and the joint Romanian-Soviet timber company Sovromlemn. It was considered more feasible to extend the railway network, despite challenging conditions in areas of unstable terrain. Romania did not have capacity for the production of motor vehicles at the time and since oil was also earmarked for reparations, a railway system operating largely on wood fuel was doubly appropriate. However, roads

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

312

increased their share of investment in new forest transport capacity from 10% to 26% during 1949–55 compared with 44% and 53% for rail, while animal, water and funicular systems declined (Mocanu 1970 p. 26). With the CFF system now unified under the Ministry of Timber, Paper and Cellulose, some 1,550km of new railway lines were built between 1948 and 1960, making much use of local ‘patriotic’ labour which was easily mobilised under the terror tactics of the time. Among the new railway systems were: Teregova (1955) in Banat; Fălticeni (1952) and Roznov (1952) in Moldavia (the former incorporating the isolated Găineşti railway); Tismana (1955) in Oltenia, replacing the narrow-gauge railway to Turnu Severin (1934), with another to Târgu Jiu, on account of problems in coping with unstable terrain on the steep slope of the escarpment leading into the Danube Valley at Malovăt. Also, the systems at Orăştie (1949, with additions to 1958) and Câmpu Cetaţi near Sovata (1954) were new projects in Transylvania, along with a narrow-gauge extension by the CFR from Întorsura Buzăului to the Crasna Valley which was subsequently transferred to the forestry sector in 1951. Many new branches and extensions appeared on existing lines, for example the Gurghiu branch on the Comandău system. And Moldavia had the distinction of two new railways which did not connect with the CFR network: Criştişoru (1948) linked with floating on the Bistriţa while Pipirig (1952) served a sawmill at Târgu Neamţ where the production was taken away by road. Meanwhile, there was much rationalisation, for example by diverting Zăbala timber by funicular from Manicica to Căldari-Secuiu, therefore reducing the distance to the Nehoiu sawmill while timber from Lopătari was taken out over a new funicular to Brebu. In Vrancea the Motnău-Radurii funicular allowed timber from the Râmnicu Sărat Valley to be taken to the sawmill at Gugeşti (and also permitted the closure of the railway in the lower part of the Râmnicu Sărat Valley); while the long rail haul from Oituz to Oneşti was replaced by a funicular to the Breţcu railhead in 1957 (which survived until 1975). Some 4,000 new wagons were built by the Topleţ factory near Orşova, while a new fleet of standard 0–8-0T locomotives was built for the now-unified railway system, Căile Ferate Forestiere (CFF), by the Reşiţa engineering works, and the inherited fleet of locomotives (originating mainly in Austria, Germany and Hungary) was gradually replaced, though a small number survived: although they were less powerful, they were sometimes easier to handle on light, poorly maintained track. Indeed, no standard locomotive arrived at Berzasca until 1987! Finally central repair shops were provided at Reghin in 1953. Until that time each system maintained its own workshops which meant that much equipment was built on the basis of local possibilities: for example, trolleys for gravity working and simple railcars produced by converting cars or lorries. The total extent of the CFF was some 6,000km in 1960 by which time virtually all plans had been achieved. The most significant shortfall lay on the system based in Băbeni in the Olt Valley where the original line from the (Oltenian) Bistriţa Valley—under construction during the war—was proposed for development to take in the Cerna, Olteţ and Plopi valleys as well, although the branch to the Luncăvaţ Valley was the only extension actually achieved. Road versus rail in the Romanian forests From a high-water mark in the late 1950s/early 1960s the system was overtaken by the road transport for which the necessary manufacturing capacity was now available. The

Economy, industry and agriculture

313

CFF system was down to 3,000km in 1967. Forest roads were emphasised by the Eighth RCP Congress in 1957 and the ‘colonial’ nature of funiculars was later underlined on account of their low technical standard and lack of durability where wooden pylons were used. The transition was accelerated by some instances of devastating flood damage, for example in the Nehoiu system in 1969 when only the Siriu section survived as an isolated entity for some years. Another factor was the introduction of a new network of processing units involving the production of furniture, chipboard/hardboard, plywood and veneer. This allowed more balanced forest exploitation through greater use of beechwood compared with the selective felling of fir and spruce: the proportion of beechwood in the total timber harvest rose to 15.6% in 1955 and 26.3% in 1966 with the expansion of furniture and board production. This completed the transition from small sawmills (many privately owned) in operation before 1948, for only a few units were retained under the management of a cooperative or a state logging company—Intreprinderea Forestieră de Exploatare şi Transport (IFET)—usually in remote areas to meet a specific market, for example for packing fruit. These survivors sometimes used water power but most worked by electricity. Fortunately a number of the old mills were preserved in local museums or in the large technology museum (Muzeul de Technice Populare) at Sibiu-Dumbrava. The new complex units required larger supply systems going beyond the capacity of individual railway systems and rationalisation swept away much of the CFF network, especially lines that were difficult to operate and maintain on account of severe adverse gradients and unstable terrain in the Subcarpathian terrain. Thus the rail-road balance in new construction swung from 67:33 in 1948 to 83:17 in 1955 and 9:91 in 1959 (Mocanu 1970 p. 27). It was intended that road density should increase from 6.2m/ha in 1965 to 16.6 in 1990 (ibid. p. 29) with 20 considered the optimum. In the eastern Carpathians this change had particular significance because Galaţi Region (and subsequently Vrancea County) planned for the processing of its raw material within its own borders and therefore a comprehensive forest road programme was implemented to eliminate the funicular systems and supply a new manufacturing complex in Focşani. Forest railways in the Milcov, Râmna and Râmnicu Sărat valleys were already supplying local processors, such as Gugeşti, but the problem lay with the adverse gradients in linking the upper Putna with Mărăşeşti. The Vrancea plan was drawn up by the wood industry planning institute, Institutul de Studii şi Proiectari ín Industria Lemnului (ISPIL), for forest roads to be built during 1962–70—when Vrancea forests had potential for 540,000m3 annual output—for sawmilling, other industrial processes and firewood—with a 38:62 balance between resinous timber and beechwood. Although there had been 32,700ha of planting in Vrancea during 1948–69 (including degraded land), the age structure of the resinous timber was unsatisfactory as a result of selective felling (though some old trees remained in the more inaccessible parts of the Milcov and Năruja basins. Referring to the project, Mocanu (1970 p. 44) emphasised the purely temporary character of the local transport systems and the need for a permanent resolution of the accessibility problem for Vrancea’s thirty-one production units. Development based on CFF and funicular was considered less efficient than a new unitary system based on roads that would also be useful for mining (including oil) and tourism. Some existing railways would have fitted into the new concept and thought was given to extending the networks based on Gugeşti and Odobeşti (including the CFR line to Burca) but physical conditions were considered too difficult. So the 1962 plan

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

314

proposed an extension of the forest road network from 98 to 533km, covering the Milcov, Năruja, Putna, Şuşiţa and Zăbala valleys. Within a year of the opening of the Focşani processing complex in 1960 the Căldari-Secuiu funicular was closed. The Lepşa-Scutaru funicular closed at the same time, although the funicular link from Greşu to Lepşa (in Covasna) remained until 1972. Meanwhile, local sawmills in Vrancea—for example, at Greşu and Vidra—were closed and relocated by the regional administration, although the Năruja factory (damaged by fire in 1958) was restarted in 1970 to produce doors, window frames and boxes as well as sawn timber (plus some processing of pine needles for pharmaceutical and fodder purposes from 1977). Closures were drastic during the late 1960s, although in one case (Topliţa-CorbuBorsec) a forest railway was retained for the transport of mineral water. A further twist to the saga arose out of the oil price increases of the early 1970s, by which time Romania had become a net oil importer. To economise on hydrocarbon fuels it was decided by the state logging industry ‘Centrul Exploatari Lemnului: CEL) that the remaining forest railways should be retained. A number of new ‘Reşiţa’ steam locomotives were built by the engineering enterprise UPS at Reghin. Indeed, some individual logging enterprises repaired flood damage and reconstructed abandoned lines. Entirely new extensions were built on the Moldoviţa and Râsca systems as late as 1986–7 while the state logging company at Caransebeş had serious intentions about reopening railways at Cruşovăţ and Zăvoi. Several systems—Anieş, Râsca, Scutaru and Tazlaǔ—were cut back to the forested areas while the final hauls to the sawmills (Orăştie, Fălticeni, Oneşti and Roznov, respectively) used the roads, a switch sometimes precipitated by damage to the railway or by the disruption of hydropower schemes at Rastoliţa: a and Teregova. However, around 1,000km of the CFF still existed in 1989, spread across twenty-one systems, including Covasna-Comandău, although it extended no further down the Bâsca valleys than lancău and Manicica. Under new accounting systems these railways have all since disappeared apart from Moldoviţa and Vişeu de Sus. But the 1999 decision by Brafor to close the Comandău sawmill (bringing operations to an end on the Covasna system) did lead to its preservation by the Siclău Association in 2002. Conclusion Brzeski (1969 p. 12) sees industry for ECE as ‘on the cards’ in any event and considers the progress made during the first post-war decades as being ‘within the range of magnitude one could expect under any plausible alternatives’. In other words, communism led the industrial process—the only answer to rural poverty and the development of an efficient and productive agriculture—without being ‘a necessary ingredient of this process’ (ibid.). ECE was ready for change, given the inter-war tensions between right and left radical movements and consequent worker-peasant unrest; while the region also had natural resources, financial institutions and entrepreneurship. The communist response was hardly a brilliant success given the rigid planning and the barriers that were long erected against both Western involvement (capital and technology) and a second economy—after Rosenstein-Rodan (1943 p. 1) had called for a ‘consortium of public and private interests’ to finance industrialisation and avoid unnecessary sacrifices of the Soviet system. Simultaneous development on a broad front was envisaged, but with a bias to light industry to generate an export surplus and pay off

Economy, industry and agriculture

315

foreign debt (on the assumption of global capacity excess in post-war heavy industry). In the event there was a bias towards heavy industry, while the benefits in terms of living standards were limited thanks to a seller’s market: ‘endemic shortages of goods, their maladjusted assortment and on the whole their shabby quality’ (Brzeski 1969 p. 10). Factories would have been generally smaller (certainly in terms of employment through higher productivity, and less hoarding of labour) while the structure would have been more biased towards consumer industries. Industry would have been more efficient with better quality, while the absence of inputs from the USSR at concessionary prices would have reduced wastage and boosted technology, with quicker introduction of the fourth and fifth ‘Kondratieff Cycles’ (mass production and microelectronics). While Soviet linkages would have been weaker (with less emphasis on eastern locations) it is not clear that the overall location would have been different: some forces making for dispersal would have operated under a capitalist system, for example regional policies in favour of backward regions, and decentralisation to the fringes of conurbations. And rural industry would not have been subjected to nationalisation and rationalisation while private enterprise could have provided the stimulus that eventually came from the cooperative farms. AGRICULTURE Communist industrialisation rested on an assured supply of cheap food and agricultural raw materials. The region possessed productive agricultural regions, like the great plains of Hungary and Poland, but the basis for socialist development was somewhat uneven in view of wartime and immediate post-war experiences. For example, Bulgaria received UNRRA aid, but Romania was subjected to Soviet requisitioning. There was also some structural change through further land reform: for example, in 1945 in Romania, which eliminated the larger farms and ‘once again saved the poorest peasants from being eliminated from agriculture and provided the basis for expanded commodity production among them’ (Verdery 1983 p. 334). The weather was often extreme in the late 1940s: drought in Romania in 1945 cut the harvest to a third of the 1944 level (and 59% in 1946) and there was famine in Moldavia during the severe winter of 1946–7 which attracted some US shipments. The communists needed to proletarianise the peasantry and control production at prices determined by the state. Pressure was first evident through forced deliveries on a quota basis, often with crude manipulation to penalise the larger farmers excessively (demanding commodities that farmers did not themselves produce and which could be obtained only through cash or barter). For the longer term the state needed to take over production more directly. But while nationalisation and central planning affected agriculture as it did industry there was a reluctance to assume central control for the whole business. The best land was taken over by state farms, sometimes formed out of former royal domains or experimental farms, while others were created de novo from private properties: indeed, when cooperatives were formed in Romania the state farms simply took the best land wherever the authorities desired. State farms developed intensively in Poland during 1950–8 and the average size increased as the smaller units were amalgamated. Central establishments were often enlarged as State Centres for

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

316

Agricultural Machines (from 1950). Agricultural schools (and their residential buildings) operated at the primary, secondary and extra-mural levels with coverage of various agricultural specialisms. In this way the state farms and agricultural schools exerted an important influence on the expansion of villages. However, the scale of planning required to control agriculture in its entirety surpassed the state’s administrative capacity and a decentralised system was adopted as a ‘second string’ whereby communities of peasant farmers were organised into a cooperative system under the Communist Party’s political control. Cooperative farms In a situation where central government had its hands full in directing the state farms— with insufficient capital to invest in the modernisation of agriculture universally— cooperative farms working on a relatively labour-intensive basis provided a compromise between the bureaucratic complexities of direct state control in the context of undisguised land nationalisation and the ideologically untenable position of investing in private property. The cooperatives thus provided a cover of ideological respectability, even when private ownership rights were maintained—as in Czechoslovakia where only usage rights were surrendered, along with livestock, equipment and traction power. Under the Soviet ‘kolkhoz’ model the owners received no rent and had no influence over decisions. Rewards were based almost entirely on the work contributed. Even so, the approach to collectivisation was cautious since substantial political capacity was needed to impose crude coercive measures and produce the activists required for the propaganda effort and the administration of the farms once they had been established. Progress often proved difficult and there was some dissolution in Czechoslovakia and Hungary during 1953–4 before pressure was resumed in 1955–6 (sustained in Czechoslovakia though doomed to further collapse in Hungary in 1956). In the SEECs there was also some relaxation— including the ‘anti-kulak’ bias in taxation and procurement—with Romania settling for modest progress through associations until 1955 after suspending ‘administrative violence’ in 1951. Then there was renewed pressure for cooperatives in Bulgaria in 1956 and Albania in 1957; followed by Romania at the end of the decade, with the programme driven through to completion in 1962. To sugar the pill there was general support for the retention of private plots—strongly evident by 1962, especially in Hungary (while Albania was the only country that tried to impose restrictions, in 1967). The new system could be grafted on to established traditions of community solidarity and—in a situation where country people continued to produce their own food—there could be a clear distinction between land farmed by the cooperative, mainly for transfer to state warehouses, food processors (with some local distribution for direct consumption) and the plots which individual families would cultivate mainly for their own use. Each cooperative would organise its operations to make use of whatever labour was available (taking responsibility to act as the residual employer)—with less intensive methods or greater use of machinery where labour was scarce—while the private plots (conditional on minimum involvement with the cooperative effort) were an incentive, first, to work for the cooperative despite the modest returns and, second, to use all available family labour to produce food for the household with the possibility of surpluses that could legitimately find their way on to the private markets. Thus there was

Economy, industry and agriculture

317

a new stratification arising from economic success and consequent financial rewards. Cooperatives created in areas with a history of large-scale farming (e.g. the Junker estates in East Germany) might already have suitable buildings at their disposal, but those that emerged in areas of peasant farming would need a new central complex of buildings for livestock, storage and vehicles; while the individual peasant courtyards would see reduced activity linked only with a private plot. With state control over the capital investment available (including the supply of farm machinery through special depots) and also over prices, an element of stability could be achieved: for the more successful cooperatives would make only modest profits (easily kept in check by input costs) while weaker cooperatives could be assured some income for their members through the periodic writing-off of debts. At the same time the strong links with the land through private ownership were broken and the majority of young people were encouraged to seek a career in industry. The highly formalised cooperative system (going far beyond traditional forms of mutual assistance) also sustained a small corps of salaried officials who, as party members as well as farm managers, became part of the village elite. And with scope for security police activity among this group (and other sections of rural leadership concerned with commerce, education and even the Church) the villages were politically neutralised. How was it possible to bring the peasants into line? As Verdery (1983 p. 342) explains for Romania, with particular reference to Aurel Vlaicu near Orăştie, collectivisation prevailed over strong resistance because the large landowners had already been expropriated along with the efficient German farmers, while the more prosperous peasants suffered discrimination; so there was a ‘simplification of the social field in which both parties operate’. After relaxation in 1956 through the ending of quotas (except for meat), possibly as a response to the turmoil in Hungary, pressure to collectivise was reasserted at the end of the decade through threats over access to education—while the children of pliant cooperative farm members might all go to university and become ‘gentlefolk’. Moreover the survival—however nominally—of nation states limited the sense of oppression that would have known no bounds had there been an ethnic barrier between government and peasant, as was often the case under imperialism (for a nationally minded Romanian peasant would hesitate to see the naked threats of a Romanian party activist as being as coercive as those of a Hungarian functionary pre1918). By the late 1950s the Romanians were happy to include the German minority in the cooperative workforce with the private plot used as the incentive: that is, those with sizeable gardens could keep them if they enrolled, although by this time most of the Germans were employed as skilled workers in the towns. It has been noted that in the poorer countries the relatively low level of mechanisation and continued dependence on carts (driven by the ‘conducted’ of Romanian villages, in contrast to the ‘maistri’ or working peasants) gave the remnants of the kulaks a grip on the cooperatives’ affairs. However, a considerable number of people held on to their entire farms in areas where cooperation was logistically difficult, for example in mountain districts with highly dispersed settlement patterns and field systems. Despite compulsory state contracts which might secure additional fodder from the state, such individual farms offered a degree of freedom of choice of enterprise and secured a supply of food for the household (where compulsory state contracts were not involved), but the holdings were usually too small for viability and ancillary employments were therefore necessary. There were usually

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

318

restrictions on amalgamation and the use of non-family labour. Also the state control of distribution and prices gave little encouragement to private enterprise. The system had its advantages, especially for families that could work for a cooperative while also benefiting from salaries earned through commuting to jobs in industry or through working in such rural services as administration, education and health. Work for the cooperative usually fell far short of the equivalent of full-time employment but the private plots could soak up the surplus, while improved services provided some compensation for the trauma of collectivism and the ‘second serfdom’ that arrived in its wake. In Romania in 1972 the plots averaged 0.15ha per member (0.3ha when both spouses were active). In 1975, according to Tsantis and Pepper (1979 pp. 250– 1), plots produced cereals in proportion to the land involved (10%) but a third of the meat, 36% of potatoes and other vegetables, 38% of the milk, 40% of the fruit and almost half the eggs. Government would try to control some of this production—for example, bartering lamp oil for eggs, or contracting for pigs (1973)—with groups of families keen to maintain good relations with the authorities. Many people were involved in working family plots: for example, 79% of rural households and 51% of urban families in CaraşSeverin County in the 1980s. However, the situation was less satisfying when young people left home and the parents were tied to farm work which gave poor returns, with the stimulus of the private plots limited by delivery quotas and animal registration procedures that restricted the scope for private commerce. A major drawback was that agriculture could not easily compete with industry as a career prospect for the young. Given the gulf in living standards between town and country, the experience of schoolchildren over ‘patriotic work’ to secure the harvest and poor salaries for farm work (even on the state farms which were run essentially as agribusinesses), there was a preference for work in industry: it was usually the least able among the rural youth who were left to work in agriculture as parents and teachers together recommended qualifications for salaried employment. Exceptions in Poland and Yugoslavia The main exceptions were Poland and Yugoslavia where there was no political will to persist with coercive policies. Poland departed from the model after 1956, when the state decided that the standard of farming was the key consideration rather than the ideological distinction between socialist and private sectors. Cooperatives were disbanded as a liberal gesture, confirmed by Gomulka’s return to power in 1956. Family farms were seen to make more effective use of inputs than state farms, particularly in the case of improved yields through the use of fertiliser. The Polish government increased commodity prices as an incentive to farmers and average farm size increased slowly. In 1985 farms larger than 10ha accounted for 16% of all farms and 44% of the land—although 30% of all farms were smaller than 2ha. There was a measure of coordination through ‘circles’: ‘a system devised by planners who could not enforce collectivisation but who have desperately and persistently sought to modernise the work of the private farms and to increase the nation’s productivity in agriculture’ (Adams 1974 p. 464). During 1957–71 there were inducements to set up circles with help over the purchase of machinery and provision of storage facilities or water supplies through refund of most of the difference between the procurement price for grain (payable on quotas) and the open-market price. Thus the

Economy, industry and agriculture

319

Polish system posed as an effective command system using economic inducements. And while most private farmers occupied their own land it was possible for some rent holdings from the state, for example Mysiadlo Horticultural Holdings Combine at Piaseczno. But it was difficult to expand farms and increase their efficiency: most were seen as important for income and subsistence by families with salary income from off-farm employment. Where there were good commuting prospects there was much fragmentation of farming areas, for example on the edge of the Kraków and Upper Silesian regions, as more people commuted to industry (e.g. from Krzeszowice to Dąbrowa Górnicza—Katowice steelworks—Jaworzno and Kraków). Two-hectare farms were commonly divided between six to eight plots (and sometimes more than fifteen) and farming was financed from wages in industry. Workers liked to relax on small farms and allotments but undertook ‘only the least labour-consuming agricultural activities’ (Guzik 1989 p. 172) on small plots close to the house while distant fields were leased or abandoned. Nevertheless, there was still demand for smallholdings and a 40ha complex at Tenczynek was provided for Krzeszowice and Krakow people. The state encouraged cooperation, through ‘teams’ in Krzeszowice in the 1970s, though they were generally failures, apart from some development of poultry farming. The most successful private farms went in for horticulture using greenhouses and plastic tunnels. Around Warsaw the area of plastic sheet tunnels increased from 453,000sq.m in 1977 to 1,141,000 in 1983— of which 90% was used for fruit and vegetables—and there were 15,600sq.m of glass in 1983–60% for tomatoes and cucumbers (Kulikowski et al. 1990 p. 139). Agriculture was commercialised and bound up with the urban market in other ways. There was a massive output of carnations in the immediate surroundings of Warsaw and especially Jabłonna where many families successfully changed from mixed farming to the production of flowers under glass (benefiting from a pure water supply underground and carefully prepared manures). A good local organisation was created for an industry that could support one person full time for every 250sq.m of glass. An individual farmer could employ four or five workers in addition to members of his family. This must have been quite an extreme case of specialisation with ten times as much glass per unit of area in Jabłonna as the average for the Warsaw area, which itself exceeded the national average by the same margin. Yugoslavia Collectivisation was abolished in 1952 along with compulsory deliveries, despite the continued aim of developing state farms as well as cooperation in marketing and processing. The socialist sector comprised many farms larger than 50,000ha (covering 1.5 million hectares). By comparison 10 million hectares were taken up by private farms, virtually three-quarters of which were smaller than 5ha (indeed, the average area for a private farm in 1981 was 3.5ha—and a legal maximum of 10ha was stipulated in 1953). With the additional constraint of a ban on the hiring of non-family labour—in the interest of suppressing ‘capitalist relationships’—this offered little incentive to young people to train as skilled farmers and hindered the introduction of new agricultural technologies. As the flight from the land continued and rural population decline became almost universal, much land was abandoned, especially on the Adriatic coast where terraces deteriorated

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

320

and fields reverted to juniper scrub. However, in 1975 Slovenia allowed private farmers to work as much as 20ha in areas higher than 200m (provided that two-thirds was used for wheat), and 45ha in mountain regions specialising in livestock. Aid to Slovenia’s mountain farmers through subsidies and tax concessions could be justified by ideologists as a defence strategy. Agricultural production Growth averaged some 3% per annum across the region during the communist years. This was significantly below the level achieved by industry, although the level of investment was also lower—indeed too low to meet the expanding needs of the economy for food and agricultural raw materials. Whereas the region was a net exporter during the inter-war years (during 1934–8 the surplus was equivalent to the production from 6.4% of the total area) a negative trade balance set in under communism and the deficit was equivalent to 5.9% of the total farmland available during 1962–6 (Borgstrom and Annegers 1971). Given variable harvests (greatly affected by weather conditions) it was much more difficult to meet production targets in agriculture than in industry. Yet any deficit caused problems given the generally ‘tight’ central planning that was in force. Only in Hungary could agriculture be claimed as a success under communism— generating a quarter of all exports (and one-third in the case of convertible currency trade). The domestic food situation frequently astonished visitors from other socialist countries because it was not necessary to queue for meat, and shops would normally be able to serve customers right up to closing time. Hungary, however, had good physical conditions for farming and maintained a substantial level of investment, while showing remarkable flexibility in the way that labour was used. The mountain districts certainly specialised most heavily on stock rearing (cattle, sheep and pigs) and much of the remaining cereal production (especially rye and maize) was undertaken in the interest of local self-sufficiency. But the main arable zones in the lowlands also expanded their herds on feeding farms conveniently situated in relation to the domestic food market and the international trading system. There was, however, a danger that such a strategy pursued by the state farms and cooperatives would ignore the full potential of the natural grazings. Investment was sometimes seen as illogical, notably the bias in favour of livestock that could most easily be reared through intensive methods. In Hungary, cattle lost ground to intensive pig rearing although this meant that feed was sustained by artificial fertilisers and further protein was imported while meadow land and pasture were underused and the slurry from the pig farms might be overlooked. In Romania, mountain farmers lacked strong incentives to maximise output, although state farms showed more interest in the high grazings during the 1980s and some deforestation followed as a result. Meanwhile, industrial crops (flax, hemp, sugar beet and sunflowers) appeared in the most suitable areas; as did orchards, vegetable gardens and vineyards. Intense specialisation was discouraged by the inefficiency of inter-regional trade that perpetuated traditional emphasis on self-sufficiency. But there were some outstanding specialities (some of long standing). Bulgaria retained its reputation for oleaginous roses yielding rose-oil or attar of roses for the manufacture of perfumes (the latter specialism prominent in the Kazanlik Valley). With its cooperative system already in existence, the industry was maintained under communism with a balance of Soviet and French markets

Economy, industry and agriculture

321

although in the latter case big inroads were made by Turkish producers—who exported 2,778kg on average during 1972–3 compared with Bulgaria’s 1,190kg (Palairet 1999 p. 593)—despite Chanel’s loyalty to Bulgarian oil. The trend in Bulgaria continued downwards, but with the possibility of a revival in Kazanlik. Bulgaria also specialised in tobacco in the 1970s, producing the Stuardesa brand with high tar and nicotine. Wines and ‘feta’ cheese (from sheep’s milk) also made an impact in the 1980s. Elsewhere, specialisation was noticeable in connection with local market demand, sometimes providing a base from which successful entry into longer-distance commerce was achieved. Horticulturalists at Turany near Brno in Czechoslovakia enjoyed a strong local market for flowers and started trading with Western Europe. The problem of dependence Quite early on the Soviet Union assumed responsibility for feeding its allies in the event of crisis. In 1947 when the Gottwald government in Czechoslovakia tried to ease the grain shortage (caused by a poor harvest badly affected by drought) by soliciting US aid under the Marshall Plan, Stalin intervened and—seeking to keep the country firmly in the Soviet camp—promised ‘selfless fraternal aid’. Over the years, the USSR was regarded as ‘the Canada of the socialist bloc’ and exports to ECE increased until their surpluses were exhausted by rising domestic demand and harvest failures. In the case of the GDR the level of cereal consumption met by imports rose from 25.1% to 28.2% during the 1960s and 1970s, while the percentage of imports furnished by the USSR fell from 94% to 11%. Grain terminals, like the one built at Rostock, became a more prominent feature of ECE port installations. However, the cost of importing from the West (Canada especially) became a burden that called for drastic measures to increase self-sufficiency during the 1980s. The problem was not just about maintaining the bread supply, because much of the cereal consumption fell to livestock herds necessary for an improvement in the meat supply. Without imports livestock numbers would fall and sudden crises through poor harvests in certain years would mean a setback for the breeding and rearing process. Hungary’s successful export business would also be undermined. Alternatively, the area sown to cereals would have to increase—after a period of conversion to industrial crops like sunflowers and sugar beet—or there would have to be a drive to increase yields further by using improved varieties: adopting a more scientific approach to the use of fertilisers, pesticides and irrigation systems; and improving machinery and storage facilities so as to reduce harvest losses—all of which called for higher investment. Fishing also played a part by providing a surrogate protein supply. Traditionally fish were reared in ponds, of which there are some 7,500 in Czechoslovakia—many of medieval origin and some individually as large as 500ha—covering 32,000ha in all: the upland Bohemian landscape is often compared with the scenery of Canada or Finland. Under communism the business was primarily in the hands of the Trĕboň and Vodnany branches of the national fishery enterprise—with 500 managed by Trĕboň alone. But much more production came from home waters in the Adriatic, Baltic and Black seas and from rivers like the Danube (the delta region especially): Poland’s Baltic fishing yielded just 2,500 tonnes in 1938 but 67,300 even by 1953. However, ocean fishing also increased in the communist period with vessels operating out of Gdynia (Poland), Rostock and Sassnitz (GDR) and Tulcea (Romania). Deep sea fishing was launched in

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

322

Bulgaria in 1964 through an agreement with the USSR which provided for the delivery of Soviet trawlers and refrigerating vessels. Operations extended world-wide and some cases of illegal fishing were reported from Argentina and the USA. In 1972 it was agreed that Polish factory trawlers would operate in Peruvian waters under a cooperation agreement whereby Poland would train Peruvian fishermen and help with the processing and sale of fish. Intensification and land improvement Urbanisation was slowing by the late 1970s as governments gave more attention to solving rural problems. Investment increased both absolutely and relatively. Greater attention was given to fertilisers and pest control as well as animal and plant breeding. Each country behaved as an autonomous unit but there was some cooperation. Bulgarian sheep were crossed with the Soviet Romanov breed, and Soviet Bezostaya 1 was widely used in Bulgaria as a basis for new low-stalk varieties of wheat like Ogosta, Trakia and Vratsa. In order to intensify, fertiliser applications were increased in step with output from the chemical industry but some heavy dressings proved counter-productive. More effort went into the improvement of farm machinery (including machines suitable for use on small farms) and storage facilities since heavy losses were incurred through inefficient harvesting and losses in both storage and transit. Over the development of new land there was inconsistency since the expansion of woodland was also desired, especially in the north. There was a decrease in agricultural land in Sudetenland (especially arable land) and an increase in woodland after Germans were expelled; likewise in the Bieszczady area of southeastern Poland after the Ukrainians were forced to leave. And on the Yugoslav coast some land was abandoned after early post-war peasant pressure: vineyards were made near Primosten by clearing small ‘boxes’ surrounded dry walls adapted for walking, but transport was difficult and the vineyards were abandoned in an era of machine cultivation. On the other hand, much effort went into ‘complex melioration’ of low moorland (‘Schraden’) in the GDR in the 1960s and 1970s to intensify production for self-sufficiency and generate some export. Elimination of obstacles included an end to flooding and waterlogging with grassland converted into arable land through open-ditch and underdrainage systems, plus weirs and pumping stations: altogether 300km of ditches and channels for 10,400ha of agricultural land. The water table was lowered drastically but cropping caused irreversible soil degradation and bog subsidence as the soils dried and fertile material was lost by wind erosion; while compaction (through use of heavy machinery) reduced water retention, and caused high run-off which was particularly unfortunate in view of Brandenburg’s negative water balance. Extensive use of fertilisers and pesticides caused groundwater pollution; there was also a very low self-cleaning ability of the running waters regulated through weirs and channels. Meanwhile, Albania continued earlier work on reclaiming malarial coastal marshes and also launched a major project to terrace hillsides and boost the viability of rural settlements on the high ground, despite some damage through the clearance of woodland on unstable slopes (a problem in other SEECs as well). Irrigation was quite successful despite some cases of salination through poor water management. In Romania much of the Lower Danube floodplain was protected by dykes so that former permanent

Economy, industry and agriculture

323

grasslands could be drained and converted for arable farming, while flood risks were reduced by water storages in the mountains (geared perhaps to hydroelectricity generation or navigation facilities) which could prevent any sudden rise in river levels downstream following heavy rain or snow melt. Romania transformed the steppelands of Bărăgan and Dobrogea when the Danube-Black Sea Canal (1984) assured irrigation water for 200,000ha in the Carasu Depression alone (at the same time some of the spoil from the project was used to reclaim waste land and provide an additional 2,800ha of agricultural land for fruit trees, vines and vegetables). However, the economics of irrigation remained problematic. Costs were very high when all the artificial water storages and distribution systems were taken into account (with high water losses from open canals) and two harvests each year were necessary to justify capital investment and compensate for the loss of land arising from the installation of the system, yet output rarely met this target despite cooperation (e.g. between Bulgaria and the USSR) to establish optimum watering rates for different crops and to establish computerised control systems. And progress fell behind schedule because Bulgaria’s irrigated area was only 1.2 million hectares in 1990—way below the target of 2.90 million set for 1980 by a party congress in 1962! The Danube Delta Great pressure was exerted on this sensitive area, initially through the exploitation of reed beds to supply a new cellulose factory at Brăila. But the use of heavy machinery damaged the root systems and production fell sharply; some of the reed beds were reprofiled for fish production to help compensate for the losses arising from the drainage of the Danube floodplain. A total of twenty-nine large basins (covering 50,000ha) were marked out for development during the 1970s with new species of fish to be introduced and a controlled water regime secured. But results were disappointingly low in relation to the high management costs: the new fish introduced reacted negatively on the native species and further problems arose through inadequate water circulation particularly in areas with a substratum of peat. Then during the 1980s a further shock was experienced through the drive to increase food production and permit greater exports of food, essential for the paying-off of foreign debts. The agricultural area of 11,000ha (in small ‘gulfs’ within the delta which had naturally silted up) was to increase to 90,000ha through drainage work at Pardina (27,000ha), Sireasa (7,500), Caraşuhat (2,800) and Murighiol-Dunăvat (2,500) that comprised the first phase. Within the polders the land was levelled and an artificial drainage system installed. Concrete roads were built, with access focusing on the village of Chilia Veche which was developed as one of the future agro-industrial towns under Ceauşescu’s strategy of ‘sistematizare’ with new housing and services and a large pig farm. However, despite the high development costs the results were disappointing since—unlike the alluvial ground—the peaty soil was found to be unsuitable. The loss of the natural habitat was particularly unfortunate at Sireasa where development resulted in the loss of small lakes surrounded by reeds and hydrophitic plant associations and meadows interspersed with willow trees (very different from the landscapes associated with the large lacustrine complexes further east). There was an irreversible desiccation of peatland followed by luxuriant weed growth. There was also ecological damage through over-grazing and the discharge of fertiliser into the drainage system, encouraging the

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

324

accumulation of algae and the wider problem of eutophication. Although 40,000ha of nature reserves were established by 1961 at Periteaşca-Gura Portiţei, Popina Island, Roşca-Buhaiova and Sf. Gheorghe-Perisor-Zătoane they suffered from the change to the environment in their immediate vicinity (e.g. the Pardina project was immediately adjacent to the Rosca-Buhaiova reserve). The agricultural programme was also complemented by plantations of Canadian poplar that displaced willow trees from the river banks and replaced the natural oakwoods of Caraorman and Letea. This meant considerable losses of natural vegetation and faunal associations in the interest of economic efficiency. Further dramatic change occurred through the quarrying of sand (for its mineral content) at Caraorman and the construction of an access canal from the main Sulina Channel. Administrative actions Further consolidation by gigantism Planning shortfalls that affected consumption were embarrassing to the authorities since a better food supply was one of the critical indicators of rising living standards. So various bureaucratic strategies were adopted to boost efficiency. Regular wages and improved welfare benefits were introduced and the importance of economic rather than ideological incentives led to the allocation of specific tasks to individuals and groups in return for payment by results. In Romania people were paid according to yield—under the contract payment system (‘acord global’) from 1970, instead of days worked (‘zi-munca’). But a pervasive trend was the increase in farm size through ‘gigantism’—a characteristic of the 1970s, seeking economies of scale, easier supervision from the centre (given the smaller number of units) and economic viability (combining stronger and weaker cooperatives). In Czechoslovakia, while state farms emerged from expropriation of large farms, church estates and land abandoned by Germans in border regions, the United Agricultural Cooperatives were established in the 1950s under the slogan ‘One village, one UAC’ and hence farms comprised only 200–3 OOha. But then the UACs were amalgamated in the second phase and the average size of a collective farm rose from 310ha in 1950 to 2,500ha in 1980 (490ha to 10,500ha in the case of state farms). Larger socialist farms also emerged in Hungary: in 1975 state farms averaged 6,602ha and cooperatives 3,161ha—embracing several villages in each case. Tiszaföldvár cooperative was formed in 1975 by merging five older farms and adding small industries, including a shoe factory (with a box-making unit) and an oil plant. This could make smaller villages irrelevant, while endorsing those that served as the base for a cooperative and attracted a range of services, including some industrialisation (denied to outlying communities which were then perceived as non-viable and left to a slow process of depopulation). The larger farms became very powerful since they might subsidise local councils and recruit the people with most expertise and local knowledge. So ‘it has been exceptional for local councils to seek to limit the activities of large scale farms and their associated industries even if they are environmentally hazardous’ (Persanyi 1990 p. 42). A further stage in the process brought together combinations of these larger farms. In the Nitra area of Czechoslovakia an ‘Agrokomplex’ was set up, comprising eight large enterprises operating over 45,000ha. It had an important research function developing

Economy, industry and agriculture

325

new technology, combating crop diseases and looking at ways of using manure to replace chemical fertilisers. Practical training was also provided for students from the Third World who enrolled at the agricultural college in the town (now a university). Poland produced some very large organisations involving groups of state farms. One experiment in the Masurian lakeland provided a model for a similar approach to the development of agriculture in the Sudeten Mountains (‘Agrocompleks Sudety’), though the results of this over-centralised stockrearing venture were disappointing, and frustrated local managers were forced to ‘borrow’ animals from private farms to impress visitors from Warsaw. Bulgaria pressed ahead with such organisations nationwide. Known as ‘Agro-Promishleni Kompleksi’ (Agricultural-Industrial Complexes: AIC), they achieved horizontal integration and brought together farms with specific terrain, soil and climatic conditions, followed by the consolidation of cooperatives from 3,290 in 1958 (almost one for each town and village in the country) to 795 in 1969, with an average area of 5,118ha each (compared with almost exactly 6,000ha for the 156 state farms). Official recommendation for large combines came in 1968, on the model provided by Ivaylovgrad where five state farms together provided 18,425ha of arable land, and after the party approved the AIC concept in 1970 there were 170 such organisations operating by the end of that year. Industrial-Agricultural Complexes (IACs) involved particularly close links between farming and processing. The first was formed in 1973 and combined the Russe sugar refinery (annual capacity 400,000 tonnes) with two AICs working 40,000ha of land. Some amalgamations were quite remarkable. Thus the Silistra project of 1974 combined six AICs into one AIC for grain and livestock and one IAC for fruit and vegetables. Two years later the two units merged into a single AIC which brought almost the entire territory of one administrative region into a single farm, more than six times larger than the average AIC. Irrigation systems were installed (from 1977) and Western firms were approached to help modernise the complex in other ways. However, excessive amalgamation could create problems through lack of supervision and underuse of buildings at outlying locations that were once separate farm centres. Hence the reduction in average size to 13,200ha of arable land and 2,850 workers in 1981 (when there were 280 AICs across Bulgaria). Other countries brought together groups of cooperative and state farms to achieve coordination within specific areas. In Romania, the Consiliul Unic Agroindustrial de Stat şi Cooperatist (CUASC) allowed for some specialisation, and coordinated use of irrigation systems and supply to local industry. The system also fitted in with the overhaul of settlement patterns to eliminate marginal villages and focus each system on a small town through a programme of ‘sistematizare’ that would develop the urban network and improve access to central services. But despite its modernising aspects the scheme was widely condemned for its authoritarian approach, seeking to destroy small villages and drive peasants into apartment blocks in key villages where they could be more easily intimidated by authorities through their power to control water and heating. In the GDR, Freeman (1979) described the situation around Berlstedt where close cooperation was established among three cooperatives (LPGs) and the Neumark state farm (VEG) so that each unit took responsibility for one specific branch: sugar beet and vegetable production on irrigated land; dairying; poultry; and pigs. Machinery was used more efficiently and the most appropriate buildings were provided. While the Berlstedt case involved an interenterprise institution (‘Zwischenbetriebliche Einrichtung’: ZBE), there were also

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

326

groupings of LPGs (enabling small cooperatives to be absorbed into stronger units) only to create the ‘inter-collective institution’ (‘Zwischengenossenschaftliche Einrichtung’: ZGE); and there were also farming-processing links through a cooperative association (‘Kooperationsverband’: verband’: KOV). Thus milk from the Berlstedt ZBE supplied the dairy in Erfurt and by-products went to a fodder plant which then supplied the pig farm. Berlstedt also had links with the state breeding station at Nordhausen through receipt of heifers in calf and supply of calves in return. Excessive specialisation was found to create some diseconomies through ecological problems and seasonal labour scarcities (with less scope than before for workers to be transferred between enterprises). Therefore more prominence was given to mixed arable and pastoral farming. Encouraging the peasantry: Hungary There was much flexibility on Hungarian cooperatives which even had the power to oppose state agencies: local farmers’ organisations could override what central agency officials might consider to be in the interests of the state. The cooperative at Ócsa south of Budapest allocated plots according to the number of cows each member was prepared to look after, allowing 0.75ha for each animal. While at Paszto in Nógrad County vineyards were leased to individuals in units of 1,500sq.m as part of a scheme to extend vineyards over the steep slopes of Badacsony and Tokaj. On the Nagyrede cooperative in the Eger District more than 200ha of private plot vineyards were placed in the care of 1,000 members. Meanwhile, some cooperatives in the northeast (Szabolcs-SzatmárBereg) planted orchards and arranged for routine spraying, while contracting out the routine work on the trees and the picking of the fruit to private farmers working in the knowledge of a guaranteed market for the produce. And a cooperative near Sopron arranged for several hundred gardeners and smallholders (with their main employment in the secondary and tertiary sectors) to supply grapes, vegetables and poultry—with the added stimulus of cross-border trade with Austria. There was also a bold use of incentives to stimulate production—pioneered at Red Star Farm, Nádudvar, where land was allocated to families on the basis of sharecropping. Moreover, there was a much improved supply of machinery suitable for use on small farms and equipment could be borrowed from the state farms where there was spare capacity. Families could also expand output from their gardens and plots through various forms of collaboration with the state sector. Indeed, under the NEM, the vast majority of private businesses were in agriculture where ‘competing paradigms’ (Vasary 1990) arose from the stark contrast between the collective stereotype and the new business ethic which bred ‘embourgoisement’ as a significant social movement. Private plots were hardly ‘gold mines’ and while there might have been a case for directing affluence along socially acceptable channels, higher taxes (like those imposed in 1974) risked sapping incentive and reducing output of pig meat, fruit and vegetables. On the whole, agricultural management showed communism at its pragmatic extreme with various ‘shades of red’ that reflected the process of muddling through towards 1989. The formidable energies of a free peasantry remained to a certain extent untapped,

Economy, industry and agriculture

327

although where peasant labour was relatively scarce there were attempts to make the best use of it and intensification exceeded what has—so far—proved rational under free market conditions. Unsurprisingly, however, on the whole the socialist agricultural system never managed to break away from the ideological forces that moulded it in the early days.

7 INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES AND SETTLEMENT With priority given to industry, the tertiary sector was generally neglected. Furthermore, the elimination of private wealth reduced banking and financial services to insignificance and also eliminated virtually all the demand for quality shopping. Even certain services of great strategic importance, like telecommunications, were poorly developed and many rural areas were almost totally isolated apart from basic provision to serve the network of local government offices, police stations and socialist farms. Even the more advanced economies failed to appreciate the constraint on efficiency arising from a backward telecoms sector (though Bulgaria did well in this respect thanks to the industrial profile that evolved under Comecom specialisation). Of course, the provision of even basic services requires substantial numbers to be employed in health and education, not to mention trade and transport; so the 25.6% of the workforce scored by Romania in 1989 represents the bare minimum with substantially more in Bulgaria (34.4%), Poland (35.5%) and Hungary (42.6%)—but with lower percentages all round for contribution to national income. Construction was naturally accorded greater status, almost as a branch of industry, since it was crucial for the achievement of the development plans (and became significent for foreign trade through many projects that were undertaken abroad, often as part of international aid programmes): this would account for another 7–10% of the workforce and slightly more in terms of national income. Regional distribution does not show great variations since planning aimed at reasonable equality of provision but the more highly urbanised regions stand out—and likewise the more developed republics in Yugoslavia (with Montenegro’s good showing a reflection of the coastal tourist trade). However, the concentration of East Germany’s industry in the south tends to give services greater relative importance in the north (Figure 7.1). As with earlier periods, this study will now focus on transport, energy and tourism. TRANSPORT Transport was crucial for communist industrial development but, with ‘tight’ central planning, capacity increased only slowly in the wake of increased demands

Infrastructure, services and settlement

329

Figure 7.1 Regional variations in employment at the end of the communist era Key: a—industry and construction; b—agriculture, forestry and fishing; c—services exaggerated by a high level of transport absorptiveness caused by a policy of industrial specialisation and by long hauls for many raw materials and intermediates that were not realistically costed. Traffic increased greatly through the increased tempo of economic activity, involving a great deal of long-distance movement handled by shipping around the world and by overland transfers from the Soviet Union. In 1975 oil and oil products amounted to 67.7 million tonnes (52% of all Soviet exports of these commodities). There were also 38.1 million tonnes of iron ore (87.2%), 16.4 million tonnes of coal (62.7%), 5.8 million tonnes of rolled iron/steel (89.6%), 4.3 million tonnes of pig iron (90.8%), 4.1 million tonnes of apatites (70.0%), 3.9 million tonnes of potassium salts (65.8%) and 3.1 million tonnes of coke (73.6%). Reverse flows were dominated by Polish coal (10 million tonnes). The growth in capacity affected the balance between the different modes, with railways losing ground despite their fundamental strategic importance. The railway share of all Comecon freight handling declined sharply from 89.3% in 1950 to 66.1% in 1970 and an estimated 47.4% in 1990 (when pipelines accounted for 27.4%; sea/river transport 24.8%; and roads only 0.4%—although considerably more in the context of ECE alone). But the diversification among transport modes was complemented by coordination to avoid excessive duplication in economies that did not seek competition between different operators. There was further cooperation between states to ensure that certain major routes of international importance were properly developed throughout, and to allow for specialisation—with appropriate economies of scale—in the production of locomotives and motor vehicles (though in the latter case Western involvement became more important in the 1970s and 1980s). However, Comecon planning was hardly a dominant influence and ambitious plans for trans-European motorways (TEMs) and fully modernised electrified railways (TERs) crossing the region from north to south were hardly achieved by the end of communism, although the principal east-west routes were better developed on account of their strategic importance to the Soviet Union.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

330

Meanwhile, there was enhanced passenger mobility, especially in urban areas and their commuter zones. But personal mobility was constrained by low levels of car ownership and overcrowded public transport. However, mobility constraints did not arise solely from the inadequacy of the transport system; they were exacerbated by bureaucratic measures. Throughout the communist era there were internal movement controls throughout Albania (and in other countries they were sometimes imposed during the early communist years). Special ‘local border traffic regimes’ might operate in some frontier districts, but frontiers were generally closed and tightly guarded, with the most elaborate precautions along East Germany’s fortified border with the West. In Hungary there was also a ‘closed zone’ extending up to 30km from the Austrian frontier: it was reduced to no more than 3km in 1970 (when relations with Austria were normalised) but was not completely abolished until 1989. International travel was complicated by stringent controls on the issue of passports, visas and foreign currency which continued to impede foreign travel, even between socialist countries. But transport flows in general caused environmental problems which were in any case considerable on account of poorly maintained vehicles and the production of cars with two-stroke engines. The region also depended on fuel-inefficient Soviet aircraft and obsolete motor vehicles and telecommunications systems, with little of the ‘creative destruction’ so characteristic of market economies. Railways Partly for military and strategic reasons, railways were accorded top priority in an integrated transport concept, and although other modes gradually increased their relative importance the railways were far more prominent than in the West. There was much reconstruction needed after the war, not least to restore damaged bridges: work proceeded very quickly on the Tisza at Szeged and Szolnok and the Danube at Budapest (the latter doubled in 1948) but more slowly through the 1950s over the Danube at Baja and Újpest and the Tisza at Kisköre and Tokaj. East-west links with the Soviet Union gained prime importance, so capacities increased and were later supplemented by pipelines and ferries. Military considerations gave greatly increased importance to the railway through the southern parts of Poland and the GDR via Tarnów, Kraków, Wrocław, Görlitz, Dresden and Leipzig; complementing the more northerly route through Warsaw, Poznań, Frankfurt a.d. Oder, Berlin and Magdeburg. Further south there were routes into Czechoslovakia at Čierna n.Tisou, Hungary at Záhony and Romania (primarily) at Vicşani south of Černivci and Ungheni, east of Iaşi. Use of these lines was complicated by the change in gauge at the Soviet frontier since the broad-gauge system was extended into ECE in only a few special cases: to Miskolc and Iaşi, and on the Carpathian route from Przemyśl to Košice via the Łupków Pass. There were later broad-gauge mineral supply lines to Košice and Upper Silesia: the latter was the largest transport investment in Polish history (1979): a 410km ‘Linja Hutniczo-Siarkowa’ (LHS) or Steel-Sulphur Railway from Vladimir Volynski to Sławków near Dąbrowa Górnicza where the iron-ore stockpile for the Katowice iron and steel works was located. The Soviet frontier was thus a place for major trans-shipment, although bogie changes were possible for certain categories of rolling stock (refrigerated wagons and sleeping cars) thanks to GDR technology. The Polish-Soviet border boasted the largest rail trans-shipment stations in

Infrastructure, services and settlement

331

the world (at Terespol/Brest and Medyka/Mostiska) where traffic was boosted by the growing overland traffic between Japan and Western Europe. There was also much use made of north-south routes through the region to link the capitals in the sequence BerlinPrague-Budapest and thence to either Belgrade or Bucharest and Sofia, with Warsaw connected with the southeast via Lvov in the USSR. Baltic and Black Sea ferries extended this axis northwards to Scandinavia and southwards to Turkey and the Middle East. The axis gained great seasonal importance for tourist movements from Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland to the Black Sea resorts of Bulgaria and Romania. Integration and modernisation Comecon coordination was needed to cope with anomalies where railways made short transits through neighbouring countries. Bucharest-Warsaw trains ran through the Soviet Union between Vicşani and Medyka (using the route through Lvov with mixed gauge available). Likewise there was just a short mixed-gauge (third-rail) facility between Câmpulung pe Tisa and Valea Vişeului where the trans-Carpathian line from Khust to Stanislav looped into Romanian territory (a legacy of the period when the whole of the upper Tisza was under Hungarian administration). Meanwhile, Poland’s new eastern border was aligned in such a way that the railway from Krosno to Przemyśl looped into Soviet territory: transit was allowed but the carriage windows were painted over and Soviet guards accompanied each train. Train speeds increased although not to the extent achieved in the West since the emphasis was primarily on increasing capacity and minimising new construction. The scarcity of hydrocarbon fuels in 1945 forced increased dependence on coal and gave pride of place to steam traction. A number of new locomotive classes appeared: for example, a 4–8–0 class for Czechoslovakia by Škoda, a 2–10–0 mixed-traffic locomotive for Romania by Reşiţa (based on a German design) and a Polish adaptable general purpose 2–8–2 tank locomotive—in addition to the transfer of German 2–10–0 war locomotives (e.g. from the USSR to Hungary) and US Army ‘Consolidation’ 2–8–0s to Hungary and Poland in 1945–6 (also 0–6–0 tanks to Yugoslavia). However, Hungary and Romania continued to use their diesel railcars, with the new Rába-Balaton type in Hungary in 1962. Romania never expanded her fleet— despite plans for a ‘Blue Arrow’ prestige tourist service from Vienna to Constanţa—but kept the inherited fleet at work (and has to this day, with new engines!). Meanwhile, light railcars for branch lines were introduced extensively in Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the later communist years and mainline dieselisation became widespread in the 1960s. Electrified railways were dismantled in Silesia in 1945—as in East Germany, although the latter system was gradually reinstated beginning with Halle-Kothen in 1955 and there was even some new conversion, for example on the steeply graded line to Königshütte in the Harz where iron ore and limestone were worked. Conversion started in Czechoslovakia in 1953 and Hungary in 1960 with the Budapest-Hatvan line (after temporary dismantling, and the abandonment of new projects envisaged in the Three Year Plan). By the 1970s electrification was developing quite rapidly in all countries except Albania (though the Silesian system was never restored). Despite Comecon transport integration during the 1970s, coordination of electrification was limited for there were often breaks at the frontiers, and variations of

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

332

voltage further detracted from the ideal of a unified Comecon rail system. However, a modernisation programme was agreed in principle in 1979 for three main lines from the Soviet Union to Poland and the GDR; to Hungary; and to Romania and Bulgaria (also the north-south lines from Gdynia to Bucharest and Rostock to Budapest) with 3,000–4,800tonne trains travelling at speeds of 100–140km/h. There was increased use of containers and interchangeable bogies were envisaged along the lines of the ‘Siberian Land Bridge’ pioneered by Soviet and Swiss forwarding agents for traffic between Japan and Western Europe, halving the time of the alternative sea voyage and achieving savings on insurance and packaging. However, this dream was not realised before 1989 and the concept is now being reworked in the context of an enlarged EU. Containerisation made progress, for Czechoslovakia began operations with the GDR in 1971 (when ECE’s first regular train was inaugurated between Dĕčín and Rostock), USSR in 1973 and Poland in 1974. Meanwhile, local railways were generally retained, although bus services were more flexible in delivering commuters to the factories and road transport was widely used for freight over journeys of less than 50km, though the 30–75km band could be regarded as a substitution zone, with rail infinitely preferable beyond this. Policies varied, for Hungary took the unusual step of eliminating some 1,500km of lightly used rural lines (many narrow gauge), comprising 15% of the total network, between 1965 and 1985. Poland closed a number of lines in Pomerania and the Soviet border area in East Prussia and there were a number of closures in Yugoslavia in the 1960s, particularly in Slovenia, including several lines to the frontier that were no longer needed (while the Trieste-Poreč line of 1902 was never rebuilt after wartime destruction). The GDR maximised use of its railways by developing container transport to simplify transfers between rail and road through terminals that were installed at relatively short intervals. In the SEECs many new local railways were built to serve towns that lacked a direct connection. This pro-railway policy was still evident in eastern Romania in the 1980s (see below). The use of narrow gauge is an interesting theme in this regard since economies are generated in order to increase viability in areas of limited traffic or difficult terrain. Some long-distance routes were also involved: notably, Belgrade’s only link with the Adriatic south of Rijeka was the narrow-gauge line to Zelenika via Titovo Užice and Sarajevo. Unsurprisingly, this route was converted in the 1960s and redirected to Ploče while new standard-gauge lines opened to Split in 1948 and Bar in 1976 (see below). There was also a journey of over 100km by a narrow-gauge line from Gostivar to Ohrid in Macedonia, built as a German ‘Feldbahn’ and still operated in the 1950s with the original 1917 locomotives. Poland envisaged new narrow gauge-lines under the 1950–5 Six Year Plan and although they do not appear to have been built this still left an extensive network (using 60, 75 or 100cm) including one line of 137km. New narrowgauge motive power was provided through development of the Chrzanów locomotive of the 1930s although the systems—once extensive in areas like Stargard in Pomerania— were gradually replaced by bus services. East Germany retained a number of narrowgauge lines, most notably in the Harz Mountains where dismantling in 1945 broke the link between the two systems (Harzquerbahn and Selketalbahn) and there were further losses in the border area in 1963 and on Brocken Mountain (closed to tourists in the 1960s) the railway became superfluous in 1968 when fortifications were completed. However, the rest of the system (especially Nordhausen-Wernigerode and GernrodeHarzgerode) provided an essential public service, and Europe’s most powerful narrow-

Infrastructure, services and settlement

333

gauge steam locomotives—2–10–2 tank engines of 700hp were built in the 1960s—were only partially superseded by diesels in the 1980s. Even under GDR auspices the line was promoted for tourism in the 1980s and the dismantled section was reinstated in 1983— followed by the Brocken line after unification. Romania retained most of its limited narrow-gauge system but converted the Bixad and Zlatna lines to standard gauge. As already noted much new construction took place for timber transport and this provided opportunities for passengers as well. The northern states and Albania There was little network development in the north. In the GDR the Berliner Aussenring (BAR) ensured that through traffic could bypass West Berlin. Meanwhile, a number of suburban lines were closed (in a few cases underground—U-Bahn—lines in West Berlin were allowed to transit short sections of East Berlin territory) and also on the West German frontier all lines were closed apart from a small number retained for inter-zonal traffic. Denial of transit through the GDR to reach Tettau in Bavaria necessitated special road vehicles to carry railway wagons from the nearest railhead. And while the EisenachBebra link was retained for transit the old alignment that was now cut in three places by the new frontier was realigned at considerable cost to allow a single crossing. In 1954 Poland opened a 160km transit route running to the south of Warsaw (Skiernewice-Luków) while new mineral lines included one in Upper Silesia to bring in sand needed to stop subsidence in old mine workings. And the Turów area on the German border was connected with the Polish system in 1953 although most of the lignite continued to go to East Germany’s Hirschfelde power station until a Polish power station was built in the area. Poland also envisaged a new central trunk line (‘Centrala Magistrala Kolejowa’) in the 1950s to run north from Zawierce on the edge of the Upper Silesia conurbation and handle heavy coal trains of 5,000 tonnes. This was eventually built in the 1970s with passenger services now the main beneficiary. Meanwhile, a new east-west line to serve the energy complex at Betchatów proved useful for Lublin-Wrocław connections. The spectacular LHS has already been noted. Czechoslovakia and Hungary built few new lines except for the broad-gauge access to Košice and to support the steel project at Stalinváros (now Dunaújváros) which called for the Mezőfalva branch in 1952 and the new Danube bridge at Dunaföldvár. However, it is worth noting that in the lignite producing areas of Czechoslovakia, such as the Most area (see Figure 5.9 above), and the Bitterfeld area of GDR many railways were diverted to allow for the expansion of the quarries. But in the SEECs there was a greater element of new construction, especially in Albania where all the country’s present railways originated in the post-1945 period. By 1950 lines from Durrës had reached Tirana and Elbasan and extensions from this core system reached Pogradec (1980), Shkodër (1981) and Vlorë (1983). Brigades of ‘volunteers’ brought together in the immediate post-war era from all parts of each country made new railways symbols of national unity transcending local and regional loyalties. However, the network in the south still remained limited by comparison with the north and it is unlikely that the disparity will even be overcome.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

334

Romania and Bulgaria A number of Romanian lines which previously involved transit through the territory of neighbouring states were replaced after the Second World War—for example, Nădlac (26 in Figure 5.2, above) and Sighet, where earlier work (13) was now completed (31)— although Baziaş was cut off altogether when the breakdown of relations with Yugoslavia in 1948 brought the transit arrangement to an end. The project to link the Jiu Valley coalfield more directly with Bucharest was now completed (25) after earlier work (15) had been interrupted by the war. And duplication of the routes to Craiova (23) and Iaşi (30) was now completed after the earlier start between Bucharest and Uriziceni (18). Realignment occurred at Cluj (22), the Iron Gates (40) and at the approach to Suceava (38), while the Brad-Deva connection was completed (51) after initial work at each end. New branches were laid in oilfields (27 and 28) and coalfields (36, 37, 39, 45, 49 and 50) and to facilitate other industrial projects at Bicaz (33), Constanţa (34), Galati (41) and Campulung (44); there were also the gauge conversion for Alba lulia-Zlatna (42), tourist projects (24 and 40) and extensions to small towns in Moldavia (47 and 48) which maintained construction into the 1980s. Indeed, when the revolution occurred there was work in progress to reach the Prut from Dângeni and give Botoşani a link southwards with Iaşi via the Hârlău branch: these projects have now been abandoned. Most remarkably the old problem of congestion between Bucharest and Braşov reappeared, despite double-tracking and electrification, and a new main line to Jiblea via the Curtea de Arges branch was almost complete by the end of 1989: this may well be used in the future as a freight line to free the Braşov route for high-speed passenger traffic. As was the case in other SEECs there was considerable widening of the main lines by adding a second track, while electrification began virtually from scratch everywhere (except for a small inheritance from Italy in the case of Yugoslavia). Finally, reference may be made to the Daunbe bridge at Giurgiu (35), and the one at Calafat (32) which is now being built on a major European route. Meanwhile, in Bulgaria a new, more direct ‘sub-Balkan’ link was provided from Sofia to Burgas and Varna (1952) while a new line across the Turkish border was opened in 1970 and several important branches gave access to Novipazar and Pabega (1966), and Elena and Silistra (1972). Yugoslavia We have previously examined Yugoslavia’s many railway options with choice complicated by the narrow—and standard-gauge alternatives. Narrow gauge was rejected after the war and the Belgrade-Split connection was completed through new standardgauge construction: Brčko to Tuzla (1946), where a line to Doboj was already available (1886); Doboj-Banja Luka (1953), giving access towards the coast through the 1872 line to Bosanski Novi and the 1924 branch to Bihác, from where the line to Split was completed in 1948. Bosnian narrow-gauge conversion was also put in hand beginning in 1948 when the interchange at Brod on the Sava was replaced by a new standard-gauge line of 177km from Šamac (also lying on the Sava, but downstream from Brod) which gave direct access to Doboj. This involved five major bridges (including one of 1km construction across the Sava) and four tunnels, built with the help of the National Youth

Infrastructure, services and settlement

335

Movement and other young people from the ECECs. With the infrastructure thus improved it was possible for Doboj (an intermediate station on the line with additional access from Croatia via Banja Luka) to be identified as the location of a new iron and steel plant. Later, in 1966, the conversion extended southwards (with a number of shortcuts) through Mostar to the port of Ploče, which was now preferred to Dubrovnik. Railway access to Zadar was achieved in 1967 while the Lim Valley route from Priboj to Titograd (Podgorica) and Bar opened in 1976. Narrow-gauge conversions took place elsewhere, for example from Skopje to Kičevo (with some diversions) in 1968, while the rest of the narrow-gauge line to Ohrid was closed. A direct line from Belgrade to Zaječar in the Timok Valley which reached Kučevo in 1939 was extended to Zaječar via Majdanpek in 1972 and the first leg of the Niš-Priština line built in 1930 was finished in 1948. There was also a case for modernising the Rijeka-Zagreb route through a new double-track railway running at a lower level along the Kupa Valley to a long tunnel through the Gorski Kotor that would replace the existing line with its climb to 836m at Lokva Tunnel and save 80km in the process. Such a line might also continue through Istria by a tunnel at Čičarija. Roads Meanwhile, road transport gained ground throughout ECE with the surfacing of the main roads (by the 1970s) and a substantial increase in freight and passenger services, particularly in areas with poor railway facilities, although in most towns bus, trolley-bus or tram services were of first importance. Only the largest cities had extensive suburban railways and Bucharest was the only capital in the SEECs to start a metro system. Private car ownership remained low by Western standards, although car traffic from the West was significant during the summer months. There was little dual carriageway or motorway available: in the GDR the autobahn from Berlin to Rostock and the Berlin Ring (avoiding West Berlin) were the only additions to the inherited system. Likewise there were few purpose-built urban ring roads and bypasses. Poland was forced to postpone a motorway programme with only the Warsaw-Katowice dual carriageway complete (1973–6) and no prospect of any international motorway connections. However, Czechoslovakia embarked on a Prague-Brno-Bratislava superhighway in 1967 and 85km had been built when the programme was accelerated in 1975 with an eye towards Comecon integration. Further south motorways emerged on key domestic routes: Bucharest-Piteşti—also from Sofia to Varna and the Turkish frontier—while Yugoslavia constructed its spinal motorway to connect Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade and Skopje. Yugoslavia also considered a new Zagreb-Rijeka road that would run at a lower level than the existing road (880m at Gornje Jelenje) but it is only recently that this project has moved forward (now incomplete only between Delnice and Karlovac). Such a road could extend to Trieste through the mountains of Istria where the 5km Učko Tunnel is already available. International road traffic was slight though there were regular services from Moscow to Berlin and Sofia and plans to upgrade these routes as well as Gdánsk-Vidin, and Rostock-Constanţa suggested the expectation of growth. A number of ECE haulage concerns operated into Western Europe: for example, Hungarocamion with 800 trucks— carrying conventional and refrigerated loads to all parts of Europe and the Middle East—

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

336

handled Hungarian foreign trade and also some foreign goods, especially in parts of the Middle East where railway and port facilities were overstretched. The company’s operations were enlarged by the formation of affiliated firms in Austria, Italy and Kuwait. Czechoslovakia’s road transport enterprise (ČSAD) also operated across the continent. Once again Albania’s troubled relations with its neighbours reinforced isolation: when Albanian lorries lost their MFN status on Yugoslav roads a thrice-monthly ferry service was introduced between Durrës and Trieste in 1983 to avoid hostile territory (and a Durrës-Otranto ferry was planned). Waterways There was much discussion about the scope for greater use of the waterways, which were grossly neglected in some countries. The Danube was the principal water highway and several attempts were made to improve facilities on an international basis, following the Belgrade Conference of 1948 which created a single agency for the entire river: a new international commission under the riverine powers, inevitably dominated by the Soviet Union. But the concept of a waterway ring with Baltic Sea-Black Sea waterways extending through both Soviet and ECE territory was never seriously embarked upon in the latter case. There was a limited achievement in the context of Romania’s DanubeBlack Sea Canal which was started during 1949–53 but had to resume on a new alignment in 1978 before opening in 1984 between Cernavodă and Constanţa (with a branch to Navodari). The project was somewhat anomalous because there was already a shipping lane through the Danube Delta with more capacity than any artificial canal could provide. And although currents in the Black Sea were depositing silt it was possible to maintain the shipping channel at Sulina by dredging and by extending the dyked channel further into the Black Sea. So, while Moscow did not block the project it is difficult to see it as part of a Soviet grand design that would include a Danube-Vistula canal to access an ‘eastern Ruhr’ in Upper Silesia and facilitate the deployment of naval vessels to attack Yugoslavia (Deletant 1995 pp. 24–5). It seems more likely that at a time when the Soviets had taken over Romania’s interest in delta navigation (and the powers of the international commission) the canal was a way of providing the country with an independent route to the Black Sea. The project attracted the largest concentration of forced labourers in the country (and probably in ECE) but was abandoned— significantly—after Stalin’s death when the Romanian interest at Sulina was reasserted. The second initiative was better endowed technically, but given the high cost in relation to traffic levels, it can be ascribed only to the meglomania and irrationality characteristic of the Ceauşescu era when ‘building socialism’ was not so much a national interest as a private hobby. Navigation along the river was also improved when Romania and Yugoslavia collaborated over hydropower and navigation facilities at the Iron Gates (between Orşova and Drobeta Turnu-Severin) and later at Iron Gates II (some 80km downstream near Gruia). But a similar project planned for Gabčikovo-Nagymaros upstream remained incomplete in 1989 and became a bone of contention between Hungary (whose conservationists were strongly opposed to implementation) and Slovakia (where demand for the hydropower resulted eventually in unilateral completion of the Gabčikovo station which lay on its own territory).

Infrastructure, services and settlement

337

Despite the advantages of inland navigations over rail and road haulage in terms of operating expenses, water transport remained relatively unimportant. New canals were considered but apart from Ceauşescu’s aberration the record is one of dreams unfulfilled. A Polish navigation project linked with the water plan of the 1950s (addressing the huge water deficit anticipated at Łódź and Upper Silesia by the 1970s) envisaged 1,000 tonne capacity on the Vistula above Nova Huta and below Warsaw, as well as a connecting ‘Central Canal’ from a point between Płock and Włocławek, with pumping at 100m3/sec to Łódź, Czeştochowa and Myslowice in Upper Silesia; while 600-tonne capacity would apply on the middle Vistula and the Oder (Racibórz-Szczecin) as well as canals connecting Racibórz with Ostrava—‘with the prospect of an outlet into the Danube’ (Tuszko 1966 p. 359)—and the Vistula with both the Oder via Bydgoszcz and the Bug to the Soviet border at Brzesc (Brest). Following the shelving of major projects in the Six Year Plan (1950–5) including the Vistula programme, there seems to have been considerable speculation over canals in the 1970s as part of the Comecon transport integration process (also a UNDP comprehensive strategy worked out during 1968–72), and Poland was in a key position in view of potential international links, not to mention a complex domestic agenda with options to develop the Oder and Vistula valleys—each with relevance to Upper Silesia. The Poles seem to have set their sights on the Vistula through a programme for 1981–2000 to install twenty-two hydropower stations on the model of the first—and still the only—station at Włocławek (160mW). In addition to some 2,000mW of installed power the project would have carried water supply and flood control benefits plus a navigation channel for 6,000-tonne barges (providing 100 million tonnes per annum minimum carrying capacity). It is no surprise that the Poles were looking more kindly at Gdańsk’s potential at this time, not to mention the possible canal link with Upper Silesia via the Przemsza and other connections with Czechoslovakia and Ukraine via the Vistula, Bug, Pripet and Dneiper. But there were enormous financial implications and mounting environmental objections in terms of floodplain biodiversity. Earlier, in the mid-1970s, Czechoslovakia was looking at links from the Danube to both the Labe and Oder/Vistula and hoping to achieve them during the 1980s (with the expectation of sending north Bohemian coal to a new power station at Chvaletice, subsequently earmarked as a nuclear site). But again the huge technical and financial implications could not be seriously contemplated. Finally, reference should be made to Bulgaria’s Russe-Varna plan and Yugoslavia’s contemplations regarding links from the Danube to either Rijeka via the Sava or Thessaloniki via the Morava-Vardar. A relatively modest scheme would have shortened the distance from the Sava to Central European ports by cutting off the detour through Belgrade: a 60km canal from Šamac to Vukovar would save some 400km, but it was not seriously proposed as a means of undercutting rail and road transport charges. There is also potential for joint transport between the Danube and the Adriatic with river transport to Karlovac integrating with the railway to Rijeka. Ports and shipping Shipping increased in sympathy with international trade so that imported fuels and raw materials would not involve transport costs in convertible currencies. In Poland, for example, there was a sudden increase in transport absorptiveness in 1965–8 with the

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

338

extension of exports of coal and iron to Asia (Korea, Japan, Pakistan and Vietnam) and the Americas (Brazil and USA); and again during 1973–8 with a further growth of trade in these theatres, as well as Canada, China and those Middle Eastern countries (Iran and Iraq) important for oil imports. For maximum utilisation, ships were designed to carry both dry and liquid cargoes and triangular routes were developed. Ports on the Adriatic, Baltic and Black seas gained through the growth in trade by the maritime states involved and also through competition for traffic from the landlocked countries (Czechoslovakia based its merchant fleet at Szczecin). Ports were endowed with new large capacity terminal facilities for commodities like grain and oil (e.g. the Bakar bulk cargo facility and the Omišalj oil terminal appeared in the Rijeka area). And there was an element of specialisation between ports, with Poland’s iron ore and coal handled by Szczecin, while grain and oil were imported through Gdynia and Gdańsk, respectively (the latter endowed with a pipeline to Płock). Szczecin (formerly the German Stettin) was a bone of contention since the East Germans hoped that the port might be returned to them or at least a joint administration agreed. The Poles were always hostile to such suggestions (and went no further than an ‘Interport’ organisation to coordinate the Baltic ports of the two countries). They signalled their stake in Szczecin by expanding at Świnoujście through four ‘Świnoport’ development phases from the 1960s to the 1980s and the Police industrial complex. There was some speculation that delayed links by motorway, electrified railway and a Silesian canal might be politically significant but there was a general slow-down as well as some new commitments towards Gdańsk. Meanwhile, the GDR decided to develop Rostock in 1957 to minimise dependence on West Germany. Black Sea shipping integrated with inland navigation on the Danube with the possibility of interchange at Galaţi and—following completion of the Danube-Black Sea Canal in 1984—at Constanţa. However, the Ukrainian port of Ust-Dunajsk (Vilkovo) on the northernmost of the Danube’s three delta distributaries (the Chilia or Kilia Channel) was the base for transfer of container barges to and from sea-going vessels which provided links with a number of Asian ports included in this ‘Interlighter’ system. On a more local scale reference should be made to the river-sea vessels introduced in the USSR in 1962. The system proved useful for exchanges of foodstuffs and metals with Bulgaria, as well as regular consignments of timber originating in a Bulgarian-managed logging enterprise in the Komi Region of the USSR. Also, ferry services operated between Ilichevsk (Odessa) and Varna (1979) to overcome rail transit problems in Romania. As a result Varna especially became functionally an enclave of Soviet heavy industry: broad-gauge wagons could get direct to Bulgaria, bypassing Romania’s standard-gauge railways. A similar arrangement developed in the Baltic from the end of the 1960s when the ‘Deutfracht’ organisation moved bulk freights between Klaipeda and Rostock to avoid rail congestion in Poland. This operation was then complemented by a train ferry from Klaipeda to Mukran (Sassnitz), partly a precaution against mounting political instability in Poland in the Solidarity era. Ports and regional development in Romania Since the Second World War Black Sea commerce has increased by virtue of a massive industrialisation drive so that the import of raw materials and fuels now dwarfs the oncedominant export staples (which are perpetuated in the form of manufactures like furniture

Infrastructure, services and settlement

339

and petrochemicals). The Danube ports have increased their industrial role since engineering and food-processing industries and been enlarged and diversified. This can be seen most dramatically through the iron and steel complex at Galaţi and the shipyards of Constanţa, Galaţi and Mangalia (with smaller capacities at Sulina and Tulcea). The import of crude oil has resulted in petrochemical industries at Năvodari, north of Constanţa. The Constanţa harbour complex was extended southwards to Agigea and the connections inland have improved through the electrification of the railway and widening of the railways to Bucharest and Buzău. The widening of the Bucharest railway was completed by the duplication of the Saligny Bridge in 1987; all the more significant in view of the provision for road traffic between Cernavodă and Feteşti for the first time (the first road bridge was at Giurgeni-Vadu Oii near Hârşova in 1970). However, interest in both the maritime routes continued, especially after the local government reforms of 1968 which split the Dobrogea ‘region’ into two ‘counties’ based at Constanţa and Tulcea. While Constanţa gained an enormous amount of investment for the shipbuilding and petrochemical industries, as well as for port expansion and the tourist industry, Tulcea eventually moved into metallurgy and the creation of a development company for the delta. Ceauşescu backed both the local centres of power, for while Constanţa got its Danube-Black Sea Canal in 1984 (with the Poarta Albă-Năvodari branch following in 1987), Tulcea was responsible for the massive programme for agriculture and forestry in the delta (described above) coupled with sand quarrying at Caraorman and the regularisation of the sinuous Sf. Gheorghe Channel which was shortened from 109 to 70km during 1985–90 by cutting through the meanders. Moreover, at Sulina (given freeport status in 1978), the dykes on either side of the navigation channel were pushed further into the Black Sea in order to protect the dredged channel from the southward drift of sediment from the Stambul Veche section of the Chilia Delta. The dykes now reach some 10km into the sea and are extended by some 200m each year, while dredging involves the removal of 600,000–800,000 tonnes of material each year in order to maintain the movement of some 85 million tonnes of shipping. Work has also started on an elaborate dyke and trench system along the coast between Sulina and Sf. Gheorghe in a bid to stop the marine erosion of the coastline. ENERGY The region had plenty of coal, although much of it was poor-quality lignite with low calorific value and a high ash content. The main exceptions were the Upper Silesian field—which sustained Poland as the world’s second-largest coal exporter (after the USA) until 1979—and the Czechoslovak counterpart in the heavy industrial complex of Ostrava in Moravia. On the other hand, except for Romania—historically the region’s leading hydrocarbon producer with 9.17 million tonnes of oil and 32.9 billion cubic metres of gas in 1989 (somewhat below the highest recorded figures of 11.17 million and 39.2 billion in 1982–3)—hydrocarbon reserves remained very limited. Albania and Poland continued as modest producers but elsewhere extensive prospecting—to depths of 7,000m in Czechoslovakia—yielded only small finds. So much energy had to be imported, overwhelmingly from the Soviet Union, and there was a particularly rapid increase in dependence through substitution of hydrocarbons during the 1970s. At

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

340

Bulgaria’s Burgas refinery, started in 1958, the capacity rose to 12 million tonnes and a pipeline was built to Sofia to carry refined products. Much of the energy was needed for electricity generation as well as transport and the chemical industry. Post-war power stations were planned within each state on a regional basis. Hungary’s Ten Year Electrification Plan added capacity in the various industrial areas: 150mW at Ajka/Varpalota and 112mW—later 260mW—at the Matra station in Lőrinci (after the original plant was seized by the Soviets) as well as 112mW— eventually 300mW—at the Borsod complex at Kazincbarcika and 60mW at Stalinváros (now Dunaújváros; város; a revision of the earlier project for the Pécs coalfield which sent its waste coal to supply power to Hungary’s new metallurgical centre). Inota station (120mW) also supplied Stalinváros while Ajka forged a link with Szombathely by 1948, enabling the latter’s inefficient local plant to close. The northeastern system integrated thermal and hydro stations with distribution extending to Debrecen and Nyíregyháza, while Szeged was able to supply towns in the southeast, including Hódmezővásárhely. The significance for industrial location was very great: not only the development of heavy industry at Tiszapalkonya (now Tiszaújváros) and Stalinváros but relocation of an aluminium plant from Csepel to Tatabánya. National grid systems During the 1960s these provided power supplies for domestic and industrial consumers almost everywhere at a standard cost. This was a major factor in changing the distribution of industry. Transmission systems now operated at higher voltages: initially at 110kV but progressively working up to 220kV; opening the way for large power stations located on the main fuel bases which now distributed power nationwide. The GDR assembled capacity of some 5,000mW on the Cottbus lignite field, comprising Boxberg (3,580mW) as well as Lübbenau, Vetschau and others. Poland built a large lignite-based power station at Turoszów (2,000mW) to supply the grid and in particular the deficits in Poznań and Silesia. At Konin lignite was also known before the Second World War, but only very small quantities were exploited until large seams were opened at Goslawice (1958), Patnów (1962), Adamów (1964) and Kazimierz (1966)—linked with a cluster of power stations with a total capacity of 2,825mW. In the central area the recently discovered brown coalfields of Bełchatów and Szczerców have reserves of 2.12 billion tonnes. The two-stage power station programme for Bełchatów, south of Lłódź, achieved a capacity of 4,300mW by the end of communism (below the target of 5,040mW for 1985 and 8,640mW ultimately) with power directed to both Silesia and Warsaw. A start was made on the development of the Lublin coalfield with the Bogdanka mine in 1982, although no power stations have been built there. Opole power station (to burn hard coal from Upper Silesia) was also planned, and although suspended in favour of Bełchatów (shifting demand from hard coal to lignite) it has been built since 1989 to compensate for the abandonment of the Zarnowiec nuclear project. Similar trends can be seen elsewhere. In Czechoslovakia, where the main fuel bases were in northern Bohemia and the Ostrava area of Moravia, very large generating groups were set up from the 1960s: Mĕlník-Dolni Beřkovice, Počerady-Záluží and OstravaDĕtmarovice groups each exceeded 1,000mW capacity. In Hungary the lignite-burning power station of Gyöngyös (800mW) was followed by larger groups burning gas and oil

Infrastructure, services and settlement

341

waste at Százhalombatta and Tiszaújváros. Romania concentrated on the Oltenian lignite field (comprising strip mines in the Alunu-Berbeşti, Motru and Rovinari areas, served by a new railway from Craiova to Târgu Jiu and three branch lines): with Işalniţa, Rovinari and Turceni stations (3,000mW). Bulgaria expected Maritsa Iztok to grow from some 5,000mW capacity in the 1980s to 8,400mW ultimately. An important earlier development was the interconnection of national grids to create the wide ‘Mir’ (Peace) grid in 1962 linking the four northern countries of ECE with western regions of the USSR (although a connection between Czechoslovakia and Hungary started in 1953). Romania was connected in 1963 and Bulgaria in 1967 when a unified power system and control centre came into existence. Bulgaria’s first link with Romania at Craiova (1967) used 220kV, but this was supplemented by a 400kV line crossing Romanian territory from the USSR (contributing to a concentration of industry in the northeast of the country). A similar link was made across the Oder between Poland and the GDR before capacity was raised to 750kV to handle large transfers of power from (mainly) nuclear power stations in the western parts of the USSR. The first such link was completed in 1978 between Vinnitsa and Albertirsa (Hungary)—extending a line already in existence between the Donbas and Vinnitsa—and after 1980 power from Chernobyl nuclear station was exported along this route. Meanwhile, minor transfers of power took place between Bulgaria and two of her neighbours: Turkey (in 1975) and, more importantly, Yugoslavia (from 1961) by means of three 11 OkV links and the 220kV line between Stolnik and Niš. Yugoslavia provided a link for surplus Albanian power to reach Italy and for Italy to export to Austria. However, most countries were reluctant to get into a state of heavy dependence on imported power and all possible efforts were made to boost output from domestic fuels. Hydropower This was given much emphasis in the SEECs in the early post-war years given the high potential of the mountain country, the multi-purpose aspect of projects that provided flood control, water supply and irrigation, better navigation facilities and a tourist industry geared to water-based recreation—not to mention the high-profile nature of some public works for which a significant prison population soon became available. Some river valleys were harnessed comprehensively through a chain of power stations. Sixteen dams were built on the Váh in Slovakia from 1950 onwards, culminating in Liptovská Mara with its 210mW power station. Thirteen villages were flooded and people had to be rehoused in Liptovský Mikuláš and Ružomberok. Romania constructed a chain of power stations on the Bistriţa between Bicaz and Bacău; another on the Râul Mare on the northern flank of the Retezat; and most impressively on the Olt and its Lotru tributary (Figure 7.2). In Bulgaria hydropower contributed to irrigated farming in the Maritsa Valley thanks to the construction of some major mountain storages (behind the Batak, Pjasatchnik and Topolnitsa barrages) and some 300 small reservoirs scattered across the Sredna Gora and Rhodope. Irrigation boosted crops of cereals, rice, sunflowers, lucerne and tobacco as well as orchard and vineyard crops, although the Maritsa became polluted throughout its length whereas before 1960 there were no problems upstream of Pazardjik. The potential is lower in the north but the energy of rivers in the Polish Carpathians is used in six power stations (two each on the Soła,

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

342

Dunajec and San) with a total capacity of 700mW—with small power stations also on the Dunajec at Dobczyce (1993) and Sromowce (1994). Pumped storage (delivering much power for short peak periods while consuming surplus off-peak energy to fill high-level reservoirs ready for the next surge) comprises a modest component of the programme: the GDR installed such a system in the Harz Mountains (Rübeland) and at Saalfeld, following an earlier project in the Dresden area in the 1930s.

Figure 7.2 Hydropower in the Romanian Carpathians Dalešice (410mW) in the Czech Republic was closely linked with the Dukovany nuclear station. It not only consumes surplus power but delivers ample cooling water from the Jihlava River. There is also a pumping component at the Lotru project in Romania, while Yugoslavia provided two such stations on the edge of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Bajina Bašta and Capljina. On the whole hydropower made an important contribution, and although it involved development in remote mountain locations this was an advantage in Yugoslavia, where distribution of investment among the republics was politically essential (Table 7.1). During the four periods covered by the table there was a progressive increase in new capacity (200mW pre-1950 to 12,200mW during 1970–83) and the average power station size (7.2mW to 156.3mW) with the share of hydropower falling only slowly from 77.5% before 1950 to 76.8% during the 1950s and 65.1% during the 1960s, but then more sharply during 1970–83, by which time the best sites had been

Infrastructure, services and settlement

343

developed. However, there were some disappointing results through dry seasons and silt accumulation in reservoirs. Hungary Hungary initially showed much interest in hydropower, not least because the planners who had been working during the war (in the context of larger frontiers) were keen to keep their jobs! New capacity of 423mW was thought feasible within the now-restored Trianon limits (though this rose to 826mW in 1971 with 660mW on the Danube and the rest from the Tisza and Drava, along with the Hernád, Rába, Sajó and Sió). Microprojects were also worthwhile in the years before the grid system operated nationwide: fourteen corn-mill conversions were undertaken in 1952. There was joint work with Yugoslavia on the Drava and Mura (with the prospect of 41mW from the Barcs-Zákony section of the Drava alone) although this project stopped with Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the camp. With a potential 60mW from the Tisza, work that began at Tiszalök (realising 11.5mW of capacity in 1953 plus an irrigation system the following year) was seen as the start of a chain that would extend upstream to Záhony and downstream to Kisköre (developed in 1973), Szolnok and Szeged. There was also scope for a Danube chain often to twelve units (each of 10mW) from Mosonmagyaróvár downstream to Nagymaros (with a potential of 80mW). However, although a Hungarian-Czechoslovak commission started work in 1959 there was no agreement until 1977 (involving two large dams at Gabčikovo and Nagymaros), by which time Hungary was more interested in hydrocarbon and nuclear options. There were also growing concerns over conservation which were to bring the countries to loggerheads after 1989 when Slovakia eventually went ahead unilaterally at Gabčikovo. Dependence on Soviet energy Between 1962 and 1967 the net energy gap in ECE widened from 3.4 million tonnes (standard fuel equivalent) to 24.2 million, revealing a high level of Soviet

Table 7.1 Power stations in Yugoslavia Pre-1950 1950s A B A

B

1960s A

B

1970–83 A

B

Bosnia 7 228 3 96 2 268 6 338 8 845 5 1025 Montenegro 3 7 3 532 2 12 1 210 Croatia 5 20 11 166 3 39 7 726 2 64 8 696 11 1136 Macedonia 26 8 114 4 169 3 127 3 540 Serbia 18 136 3 50 11 164 3 80 5 210 5 278 3 137 8 1974 Slovenia 3 10 17 178 2 64 6 519 11 621 11 1784 15 3705 Total 28 172 3 50 57 857 11 259 27 2424 24 1301 35 3601 43 8590 Key: A hydro (number of stations and total capacity mW); B thermal stations (ditto) Note: All thermal stations were coal-lignite based until 64mW of hydrocarbon-based capacity was installed in the 1960s and l,323mW in the 1970s (also 665mW of nuclear capacity in the 1970s) Source: Bertć 1987 pp. 209–11

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

344

dependency (Joyner 1976 p. 501). This coincided with the completion of the first pipeline from the USSR, providing a cheaper and more reliable transport mode than the railway. The Druzhba (Friendship) oil pipeline was started in 1958 and became operational in 1962: a cooperative venture to harmonise economic policies. The pipeline originated in the Volga Region and bifurcated at Mozyr in Belorussia: one branch ran to the oil refineries of Płock (Poland) and Schwedt (GDR) and the Halle-Leipzig chemical complexes; while a southern branch reached the Bratislava and Százhalombatta (Budapest) refineries and the chemical complexes of north Bohemia. Oil was also sent from Odessa and Novorossisk to Burgas in Bulgaria and Omišalj (Krk) in Yugoslavia, although the latter country was also supplied by the Druzhba pipeline and the connecting Adria pipeline when adequate capacity was available. A gas pipeline from Ukraine reached Warsaw in 1966 and Upper Silesia in 1967 but the much longer Brastvo (Brotherhood/Fraternity) gas pipeline was opened in 1973 following the negotiation of contracts in 1968 for the supply of Soviet gas to Austria, Italy and West Germany in addition to ECECs and in 1970 for transport of gas in transit through Czechoslovakia from the Dashava and Shebelinka fields in Ukraine. The pipeline bifurcated at Bratislava with a southern branch to supply Austria (1973), Italy (1974) and France (1976) while the northern branch was laid to Zlonice north of Prague from where separate pipes were laid to East and West Germany. At the same time another pipeline was built across Romanian territory to take Soviet gas to Sofia (1973) and Leninváros in Hungary. In the case of Sofia, the new conduit meshed with the existing Chiren-Vratsa distribution system (1966) and completed a circuit connecting Pleven, Sofia, Stara Zagora, Karnobat (with a branch to Burgas) and Devnya which thereby served the country’s chemical and metallurgical industry. Romania subsequently ‘plugged into’ this pipeline in order to augment the substantial supply of gas from domestic sources. Then capacity increased as new and more distant sources were exploited: 1978 saw the opening of the Soyuz (Union) pipeline, taking Orenburg (later Tyumen) gas along a virtually identical route through Czechoslovakia. It arose out of the Comecon integration programme agreed in outline in 1971 and elaborated in detail by 1974. Finally, in 1984–5 a third (Transit) pipeline brought gas from Urengoy in northwestern Siberia. Coal and hydropower versus hydrocarbon fuels However, the situation began to change following the Arab oil embargo (1973–4) when the Soviets saw the opportunity of selling oil and gas to the West in return for the advanced machinery needed by Soviet industry, although there was some sense of obligation since failure to meet the region’s needs might have carried dangerous political consequences. The price of Soviet oil supplied to ECE rose dramatically from $28 a tonne in 1975 to $161 in 1982, reflecting the rise in world prices, but also the increase in the proportion of the world price that the Soviet Union charged its allies. Thus, while the volume of imports to Czechoslovakia doubled during the 1970s from 9.4 million to 18.8 million tonnes, the value increased 9.6 times to Kr11.09 billion. The situation worsened through revision in 1986 of the so-called ‘Bucharest Principle’, whereby the price was related to the average world market price over the previous five years (very attractive during periods of rapid world price increase). Moreover, the Soviet Union reduced oil exports in the early 1980s. Another burden to ECE was Soviet insistence on capital

Infrastructure, services and settlement

345

contributions towards the cost of oil and gas developments because at early 1970s prices it was necessary to invest three times as much capital in oil and gas field development as was needed for the manufacturing capacity in ECE to pay for fuel deliveries. There were reductions in oil supply to ECE in the early 1980s and so the reliability of future supplies became an issue: could oil be found elsewhere, perhaps through barter trade with Arab states to feed the Adria pipeline, with 30 million tonne annual capacity? This supplied Yugoslavia from the port of Omišalj near Rijeka and also served Hungary and Czechoslovakia from 1979 (under an agreement reached five years earlier). Coal could also have been more widely used by gasification, along the lines of the Schwarze Pumpe project in the GDR. Gas seemed the best hope of limiting trade dependence for hydrocarbons since total ECE gas output rose from 21 billion cubic metres 1965 to 48 billion in 1973, but the failure to maintain this rate of growth meant a renewed emphasis on lignite to supply a new generation of large thermal power stations. In the GDR mining was set to reach 450 million tonnes eventually (West German figures say 660 million), since ‘brown coal had to be mined for survival without attention to environmental impact’ (BöhmerChristiansen 1998 p. 93). Between 1980 and 1985 the weight of overburden per unit of coal extracted increased from 3.9 to 4.5 (as much as 7.1 in some pits); deeper mines also gave rise to greater drainage problems, yielding fuel with a higher moisture content; while the country became one of the worst trans-frontier polluters. The main GDR complex was Senftenberg, producing 184 million tonnes in 1984. Villages were frequently relocated to make way for the quarries (around fifty since 1928) while roads and railways had to be realigned. In Czechoslovakia the proportion of coal obtained from open pits rose from 77.8% in 1965 to 95.2% in 1990 as total output in the lignite fields of north Bohemia soared from 20 million tonnes in 1950 to 72.8 million in 1984— concentrated into eight huge mining operations, four of which were located in the Most area alone where coal employed almost 19,000 people in 1984. Working conditions in strip-mining areas could be very difficult in severe winter through waterlogging and freezing while wagon loads sometimes required heating at power stations so that coal could be discharged from frozen wagons. In Romania, the Anina project envisaged a 900mW power station burning low-grade bituminous schist extracted from a huge quarry and enriched by natural gas. The first 300mW generating set was started in 1989 only for a generator to breakdown and insoluble problems in coping with ash to force the abandonment of the whole scheme soon after the revolution. Meanwhile, as the best sites were developed the hydro option was largely overtaken by the scale economies forthcoming from large thermal power stations. However, smaller hydropower stations were more acceptable in avoiding the disruption associated with large projects (flooding villages and destroying agricultural land), and they also reduced pressure on the grid system and supplied rural industries. Hydropower best represented the interest in renewable energy but some use was made of solar heating, windmill generators, agricultural by-products and geothermal energy. The nuclear option While the region played host to Soviet missiles, deployed in 1983 in response to US Pershings and cruise missiles, the USSR had been impressed since the 1940s by ECE’s

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

346

potential as a uranium producer linked with their own nuclear technology. The Soviets supported nuclear research in Czechoslovakia at Rez, the GDR at Rossendorf near Dresden and Yugoslavia at Vinča near Belgrade, but only the first of these sought an independent nuclear policy based on natural uranium, through two 50mW gas-cooled heavy-water reactors (GCHWR) started at Jaslovské Bohunice (near Trnava, Slovakia) in 1958 and completed belatedly in 1972. The results were disappointing and the reactors were scrapped in 1979 while the seven other reactors included in the original plan were abandoned. Meanwhile, the Soviets developed a pressurised light-water reactor (PWR) which was used for the 80mW Rheinsberg power station in the GDR—built during 1961– 6, again taking much longer than was expected—and moved ahead swiftly with their 440mW PWR which achieved a big reduction in investment per unit of capacity. It became the basis of most ECE nuclear programmes and the region was able to make a contribution; notably Czechoslovakia through assembly work at Škoda, while Klement Gottwald (Vitkovice) produced high-pressure vessels and steam generators in collaboration with the Soviet boiler works in Taganrog, Valcovny Trub of Chomutov supplied piping and turbines, and Sigma of Olomouc produced pumps. Czechoslovakia’s new nuclear programme began with an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1970 for 440mW PWRs to be installed in pairs at Jaslovské Bohunice (adding to the capacity currently under construction at the time) and Dukovany (near Brno) although groups of four were subsequently preferred and the full capacity was ready in 1986 and 1987, respectively. Work started on another group of four 440mW reactors at Mochovce near Levice in Slovakia and on two 1,000mW reactors at Temelín near České Budĕjovice in 1984, but in both cases the first reactors were not completed until after 1989. The larger capacity planned for Temelín arose from the Soviet fast-breeder reactor which went on stream in 1980 and subsequently influenced planning in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Four other sites were identified: Chvaletice and Mélník (4,000mW each) and Vojany and Zvolen (2,000mW) with the expectation of some 10,000mW of nuclear power by 1990 (accounting for up to 40% of total power consumption) but no construction ever took place. Meanwhile, Bulgaria never had any plans for an independent nuclear power sector and took advantage of the Soviet 440mW reactor as soon as possible—in 1966. Two units were installed on the Danube at Kozloduy by 1975 and two more by 1982. And with the 1,000mW reactor under development there were also plans to use this design as quickly as possible—with as much as 8,000 mW of additional capacity by 1990 (when half the country’s electricity would be coming from nuclear sources), although only 2,000mW W was achieved at Kozloduy and a new site at Belene was abandoned. Hungary also made an early decision (1966) and went in for two 440mW reactors to be built at Paks on the Danube south of Budapest. But there was a pause for safety reasons and the project restarted under stricter standards in 1972 with the capacity doubled for a total of four reactors. However, only one reactor was completed (1983), although two 1,000mW reactors were contemplated in the 1980s to supersede the earlier plan. Meanwhile, the GDR adopted the new 440mW reactor for its Greifswald project where four units were ready in 1979. Poland envisaged a similar project at Zarnowiec near Gdańsk for completion in 1988, although work on the first reactor was still far from complete in 1989 (by which time a cluster of four 1,000mW reactors was planned for Kujawy).

Infrastructure, services and settlement

347

In the meantime Yugoslavia opened its first nuclear station (664mW) at Krsko on the Croatian-Slovenian border in 1981 and imported uranium until the following year when a domestic source—the Žirovski Vrh mine at Škofja Loka in Slovenia—came on stream (although it has to be sent to the USA for enrichment). Yugoslavia took a fully independent stand from the start and signed nuclear contracts with Westinghouse who built the station. The safety of the CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) plant was not a major issue, although in the aftermath of Chernobyl the green movement in Slovenia advocated closure and there was concern over security in the fighting that accompanied Slovenian independence in 1991. The Romanian scenario was complicated in the extreme. It started in the 1960s with Soviet assistance but switched to Canadian technology following approaches to the Canadian Atomic Energy Agency concerning an entire nuclear power system including several plants and a grid. The CANDU reactor was considered safe for an earthquake zone and (conveniently) required natural uranium and heavy water that could be produced within the country. The first unit was to be built at Cernavodă during 1980–5, while heavy water would come from a new plant operating at Halinga near DrobetaTurnu Severin (two modules were ready by 1989) and the fuel would be supplied by a natural uranium facility at Feldioara near Braşov (drawing ore from several domestic sources), with further processing in Piteşti. But the whole project came to a standstill in 1982 when American and Canadian credits for Romania’s nuclear programme were suspended and there was little further activity until the CANDU project was revived after the revolution. Throughout the region the nuclear option threw up financial difficulties and unforeseen problems over safety which had to be taken more seriously after the earthquake threat to Kozloduy in 1977 (which thankfully did not materialise). But highly publicised accidents in the USA, followed by Chernobyl in 1986—with a direct impact on Poland and Romania in terms of fallout—caused the greatest concern. The swing in public opinion was decisive in Poland where opposition from the Freedom and Peace Movement to the Zarnowiec project eventually led to cancellation. But even before Chernobyl there was controversy in respect of non-Soviet technology to be used in Yugoslavia. The energy deficit in Dalmatia prompted a decision in favour of a reactor at Zadar (Vir Island), only for this to be dropped due to opposition from tourism interests in favour of Prevlaka on the Sava in 1979, although no development took place here either. Once again the region was not in step, for the late 1980s saw Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia pressing ahead with new capacity, while the GDR and Poland preferred to burn coal and Hungary combined domestic coal and hydropower strategies with imports from Soviet nuclear stations. TOURISM The service sector was generally neglected under communism, but tourism was rather different because earning hard currency through accommodating Western visitors became an important business in the 1960s and 1970s when much new capacity was installed. At the same time, the climatic advantages of the Balkans meant that families from the north were able to visit the SEECs for affordable holidays abroad, given the relatively early

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

348

lifting of international travel restrictions where communist states were concerned. Except for people in Yugoslavia, travel to the West was much more difficult in view of restrictions on the availability of passports and exit visas, not to mention the hard currency required. So the state tourist offices would offer relatively few opportunities (only affordable in any case by the wealthiest families). Outside of a family crisis, it became virtually impossible for citizens of the GDR below retirement age to travel to the West—such was the likelihood that the visitors would stay on in West Germany. Hence East Germans taking holidays in the Balkans might try their luck in crossing the Bulgarian or Romanian frontiers and working their way through Yugoslavia in order to reach Austria undetected. On the other hand, around half a million Hungarians were visiting Western countries (especially Austria, Italy and West Germany) annually during the 1980s—double the number visiting the Soviet Union. In 1982 the Hungarian government conceded that every citizen had the right to travel to a non-communist state every year and they could could buy hard currency for such a visit once every three years (working on the assumption that family visits supported by the Western hosts would account for the majority of such travels). Meanwhile, the ECECs made modest efforts to provide basic recreation for the urban population. By 1945 most hotels were in a run-down state and many of those that were not converted for other uses under the central planning process were maintained largely for domestic use. State companies were set up to arrange travel and accommodation: for example, Balkantourist (Bulgaria’s state enterprise for travel and tourism) in 1948. The provision of holidays for working people in Poland was tackled by a Central Commission of Trade Unions and a tourist office which managed a chain of boarding houses. From the mid-1950s enterprises began to make their own provision and by the 1960s it was common for the SOEs across the region to provide recreation centres for their employees in the coastal, lakeland or mountain areas. Poland’s capacity for domestic tourism in 1971 amounted to 350,000 beds, of which 292,000 were provided by enterprises. New reservoirs commonly assumed recreational and residential functions (aggravated by a continued housing shortage), as in the case of Dobczyce in the Polish Carpathians. However, inadequate sewerage facilities meant that there were risks of polluting these public water supplies. The larger towns provided facilities for sports and recreation in their immediate vicinities, while from the 1960s it was possible to secure simple second homes on the urban fringes and in major recreation areas like Poland’s Tatra Mountains and lake country. Purpose-built ‘dachas’ were built in tightly packed groups on isolated sites, thanks to a planning system with insufficient powers of control where low-grade agricultural land was concerned. In the Warsaw area Magdalenka and Zalesie Górne (second-home colonies started during the inter-war years) expanded further through good public transport access and attracted both permanent residences and some multifunctional centres, while new growth started from scratch at the Zegrze artificial lake (Kowalczyk 1990). Although some second homes were situated in rural settlement cores, most were isolated from existing built-up areas because—despite provisions for protection of agricultural land and forest—reclassifying agricultural land as a recreational area was usually a less complicated bureaucratic procedure than the purchase of a plot for a second home in a village nucleus by someone without agricultural rights. Such trends were evident across the northern part of ECE and in Yugoslavia.

Infrastructure, services and settlement

349

Foreign travel to ECE Tourism attracted some major investments in order to build up the international side of the business to handle organised parties from other Comecon states and—in the case of the SEECs—to accommodate the demand for summer holidays by their northern comrades. But initially the region had relatively little to offer when the package-holiday business gathered momentum in Western Europe later in the decade. At this juncture, the economic motive for encouraging tourism became the overriding consideration because of the need for foreign currency to pay for the import of Western goods and technology, increasingly sought by the 1970s. There was a trend towards improved facilities in selected areas and state travel companies began to open offices in Western capitals and provide a network of accommodation and information centres within each country: Albtourist (Albania); Balkantourist (Bulgaria); Čedok (Czechoslovakia); Interhotel (GDR); Ibusz (Hungary); Orbis (Poland); Carpaţi (Romania); and Progress (Yugoslavia). Usually there were separate organisations for student and youth travel that did not deal with foreign visitors. The greatest growth occurred in Yugoslavia where many hotels were built along the Dalmatian coast, opened up by the new coast road of 1964–5. The number of foreign tourists increased from 2.6 million in 1965 to 8.4 million in 1985 (with particularly rapid growth in the late 1960s and early 1970s); and foreign exchange from tourism grew from $81.1 million to just over $1 billion during the same period. Yugoslavia accounted for 4% of Europe’s tourist arrivals but only 2% of foreign exchange earnings in 1985. Elsewhere in the Balkans there was development in the coastal areas, although it was relatively modest in scale by the standards of Yugoslavia (and Greece). There was also a rapid growth of international tourism in Hungary during the 1960s and 1970s—after the post-1956 ‘ice age’—to become ‘one of Europe’s numerically most tourist-saturated countries’ (Borocz 1990 p. 21). Business with Austria was particularly brisk and a ‘mini-city’ opened on the Austrian border at Hegyeshalom in 1988 to attract further spending (Table 7.2). Hotel building became an important matter for the planners. In Hungary some hotels were owned by trade unions and local government, but there was also a state-owned National Hotel and Catering Company (later HungarHotels) formed in 1953 to operate the leading hotels and restaurants, with modernisation and new construction in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s Austrian loans were negotiated—part of a $300 million credit from an Austrian banking consortium—to build Hotel Forum in Budapest (and refurbish four others in the capital). And foreign direct investment—from American, Finnish, French and Swiss sources—produced the Budapest Hilton (1977) and other projects in the capital, while the Club Tihany holiday village on Lake Balaton was built with the help of Austrian and Dutch capital. In Poland ten new hotels in the major cities and some coastal and mountain resorts were built for Orbis by the Austrian company Warimpex. Meanwhile, Yugoslav Gastarbeiters returning from work in Western Europe started to invest in home improvements that would provide rooms for visitors or other touristrelated projects concerned with catering and excursions. Relatively upmarket hotels helped maintain an element of segregation (although the nationals of each country were free to use surplus accommodation at greatly reduced rates). Spending opportunities were also provided by special shops selling Western goods for hard currency only: Corecom (Bulgaria), Tuzex (Czechoslovakia), Intershop (GDR), Intertourist (Hungary), Pewex (Poland) and Comturist (Romania). Like the exclusive hotels, they were criticised for

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

350

ideological subversion: emphasising the desirability of Western goods and fostering a ‘petit-bourgeois’ fetishism—all the more so because the shops might well be used by favoured members of the party and government. Coping with Western visitors Despite provision of quality hotels through joint ventures with Western equity participation—particularly in Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia—it was always difficult to cope with Western tourism under the socialist system with its lack of currency convertibility and controls on the small private businesses best suited to provide a high standard of service. However, governments became confident enough to accept the modest security risks, and in the case of Hungary an agreement with Austria in 1978 abolished visas and resulted in 900,000 million Austrians visiting Hungary the following year. While visas and compulsory currency exchanges (usually a minimum of ten dollars for each day covered by the visa) were normally in force across the region—for individual travellers at any rate—there were few restrictions on the areas that could be visited or the accommodation that

Table 7.2 International tourism 1983–7 1983 A B

C

D

E

F

1987 A B

C

D

E

F

Bulgaria 16.9 20.6 105.6 271 1.1 0.5 19.1 24.3 113.4 n.a. n.a. 0.5 Czechoslovakia 9.2 28.6 95.2 299 0.8 6.0 11.0 27.8 118.7 n.a. n.a. 7.5 GDR n.a. n.a. 67.8 n.a. n.a. 0.9 n.a. n.a. 67.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. Hungary 14.1 13.9 34.7 426 2.0 4.8 17.5 12.8 42.7 827 3.2 7.2 Poland 1.9 79.9 91.0 85 0.1 n.a. 3.3 n.a. 91.5 136* 0.2* n.a. Romania 5.0 n.a. 164.7 202 0.4 1.7 4.7 n.a. 169.8 178* 0.3* 1.0* Yugoslavia 35.4 55.3 302.6 1054 1.6 9.3 52.3 57.7 351.4 1668 n.a. 20.0* Key: A international tourist nights (,000); B ditto domestic; C beds in hotels and similar establishments (,000); D international tourism receipts ($ million); E D as a percentage of national product; F departures abroad (,000); * figures for 1986 Source: Buckley and Witt 1990 pp. 11–13

could be used. However, Albania’s Stalinist government was always concerned about the subversive effect of the tourist industry and there was strict segregation in order to ‘preserve ideological discipline and to minimise the demonstration effect of the presence of numbers of (usually richer) foreigners’ (Allcock and Przeclawski 1990 p. 5). Sandwiched between Greece and Yugoslavia, the country had good potential for tourism with attractive coastal and mountain scenery, historic towns (especially the ‘museum towns’ of Berat, Gjirokastër and Krujë) and archaeological sites. However, as Hall (1984 p. 547) points out, the Albanian leadership was ‘obsessed with the xenophobic fear of contagion from foreigners pursuing very different lifestyles under markedly contrasting ideological conditions to those obtaining in fortress Albania’. The business was restricted to 6,000 visitors a year, in organised tour groups only, while foreigners not only had to meet the regime’s sartorial standards (a barber and tailor were always in attendance at the international airport), but were banned from using public transport and obliged to follow

Infrastructure, services and settlement

351

itineraries using prescribed routes arranged by the Albturist organisation. In addition, the citizens of four countries—Israel, South Africa (with its apartheid regime at the time), the USA and the USSR—were excluded altogether. Insistence on the use of state hotels, where foreigners were strictly segregated, meant that contact with Albanians (other than tour company representatives) was virtually nil. Since visitors had to carry their own luggage in an egalitarian socialist society there was not even an opportunity for conversation with the hotel porter! In addition, much of the country was closed to foreigners and until routes were opened to Peshkëpi and Kukës in 1982 the whole of the northeast was forbidden territory. The leading centre was Durrës, with its hotel built in the Soviet period, while five other places offered hotels of 1970s vintage: Elbasan, Korcë, Sarandë, Shkodër and Tirana. Hall (1990 p. 51) saw Stalinist tourism in Albania as a transient phenomenon: either tourism would contribute to the breakdown of conservative forces or else the latter would ‘eventually react against the wide range of social, psychological and ideological impacts that tourism brings in its wake’. International arrivals from outside the communist bloc were insignificant in Albania and reached only 7% of all foreign tourists in Czechoslovakia. Here the number of West European arrivals increased absolutely from 730 in 1970 to 1,990 in 1988, although the ratio fell against East European visitor numbers of 2,810 and 17,590, respectively (Mariot et al. 1992 pp. 28–9). Germans reflected these trends in microcosm with West German visitors numbering 260 and 720, compared with 550 and 7,540 from the GDR. Visitors showed a strong preference for Prague and the spas of Františkovy-Láznĕ, Karlovy Vary and Mariánské-Láznĕ, despite forty years of poor maintenance. Meanwhile, international arrivals from outside the bloc reached 20–5% in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania and over 80% in former Yugoslavia (over 90% in Croatia and Slovenia). Large coastal complexes were built. In Bulgaria, Slunchev Briag (Sunny Beach) with 60,000 beds (25,000 in hotels)—along with Sveti Constantin and Zlatni Piassatsi (Golden Sands)— emerged from the early 1960s and were partially in need of renovation and upgrading by the late 1980s, all the more so since the rooms tended to be rather cramped. Pressure was eased by a number of smaller ‘holiday centres’—with 2,000–3,000 beds each— incorporating groups of hotels and villas: Beli Briag, Duni, Eleni, Kiten, Lozenets, Primorsko and Roussalka. Momentum flagged somewhat in the 1980s in the absence of long-term strategies to ensure ‘improvements in the environment for tourists including freedom of movement and exchange problems and upgrading the quality of tourist products’ (Buckley and Witt 1990 pp. 17–18). Bulgaria tried to remain competitive by abandoning compulsory currency exchange (in force between 1974 and 1977) and providing premium exchange rates. But the bulk of the foreign visitors were always from socialist countries. Even in the major complexes there were problems of seasonally and the recruitment of skilled man-power. Also, poor and unreliable equipment affected the quality of catering and black market activity was liable to take off when home-produced goods were inferior to the stocks in the foreign-currency shops. Black Sea tourism Romania’s Black Sea resorts were also greatly enlarged under communism (beginning at Mamaia in 1959) to produce a total of fifteen ‘statiuni’ over the 70km from Capul Midia to Vama Veche: Năvodari and Mamaia to the north of Constanţa; Eforie Nord, Eforie

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

352

Sud, Techirghiol, Costinesţi, Olimp, Neptun, Jupiter, Venus, Saturn and Aurora between Constanţa and Mangalia; Mangalia itself (with a sanatorium based on local mineral waters); and 2 Mai and Vama Veche between Mangalia and the Bulgarian frontier. There is also a bathing station at Nuntaşi to the north of Capul Midia (associated with the Razelm-Sinoe lake complex). By the early 1980s there were more than 200 hotels (as well as sanatoria at Eforie and Techirghiol) and places for over 155,000 visitors (including 35,000 at Mamaia; 18,500 at Eforie Nord; 13,100 at Saturn; 11,900 at Eforie Sud; and 11,400 at Venus), both Romanian nationals and travellers from abroad organised by the package-tour companies (which could fly in their clients to the Mihail Kogălniceanu Airport near Constanţa). However, the tourist industry lost ground in the late 1980s with poor levels of service and increasing conflict between the needs of foreign visitors and the Romanian government’s austerity programme. In both Bulgaria and Romania there were many customer complaints (with the limited availability of evening entertainment a particular issue in the latter case), although the winter sports resorts fared better. But even at the height of the investment boom comparatively little was done to promote the archaeological monuments (e.g. the old Greek trading centre of Histria) or the wildlife, landscape and flora of the Danube Delta. In the past the preference for large-scale development, the urge to bring the delta into the mainstream of the economy and the lack of scope for private enterprise in tourism all prevented exploitation of the potential. Yugoslavia Foreign tourists to Yugoslavia increased from 2.6 million in 1965 to 8.4 million in 1985, equivalent to 4% of Europe’s tourist arrivals. However, the country’s estimated 1988 income was only $2,024 million (in the same year Czechoslovakia made $436 million and Hungary $759 million) compared with $8,520 million for Austria, equivalent to 18.6% of total exports in Yugoslavia (6.5% in Hungary), compared with 20.1% in Austria, 20.8% in Greece and 25.8% in Spain. But the distribution was very uneven. The Adriatic was the key attraction, with access improved by the coast road (1964–5) and seven local airports. The area offered historic settlements and the national parks of Brijuni, Kornati and Mljet, but the business was dominated by large complexes: a fifth of all Yugoslavia’s tourist bednights accrued to the Dubrovnik area during 1978–88; with another fifth for the Makarska area and a tenth for Šibenik and Zadar. Large organisations ran much of the industry: Union Dalmacija employed 4,000 in Split alone. These centres had the best facilities and they were also where further growth could most easily be accommodated; so tourism made a significant contribution to urban development. Encouragement of small businesses should have allowed for a greater spread of tourist activity away from the coast, but although some investment did come from private funds (generated by migrants who spent time working in Germany), most capital came from within the industry and other sectors of the Yugoslav economy. Some spread was facilitated by the growth of nautical tourism from 1983 with a special Adriatic Croatia Association to coordinate and finance marinas, which were of course used overwhelmingly (over 90%) by foreigners. The impact of tourism in the village of Lopar (Rab) was signalled through the benefits of roads, electricity and television, piped water and better shops, as people arrived from Rijeka and a new hotel was integrated into the

Infrastructure, services and settlement

353

life of the village. This helped to moderate the drudgery of agriculture without the need to ‘escape from the mud’ (Halpern and Halpern 1973), although rural tradition continued as the women carried the burdens of domestic and agricultural work with only limited empowerment in what continued to be a patriarchal (‘zadruga’) society. Meanwhile, the outlying Kornati Islands were transformed by tourism from desert to gold mine; enabling people to live temporarily on the islands with their time divided between picking olives and accommodating tourists. Shopping tourism International car travel was boosted by shopping tourism, although this became an embarrassment when facilities were exploited in such a way as to export shortages. Border shopping ‘raids’ by Poles crossing into the GDR in large numbers brought about the collapse of the open-frontier regime dating back to 1972. Arbitrary values for currencies and commodities combined with easy access to foreign currency (facilitated by a black market in Poland) enabled Poles—often working for friends and colleagues— to empty stores of foodstuffs and consumer goods in GDR border towns—much to the chagrin of local inhabitants whose criticisms of ‘Einkaufstourismus’ soon began to appear in local newspapers. However, the East Germans could profit from highly attractive black market exchange rates for their Ostmarks in Poland and thereby extend their vacations. But the crisis in Poland in 1980 (over the free trade union Solidarity) increased pressure on Czechoslovakia as well as the GDR; leading to the imposition of strict currency and customs controls and the need for an ‘invitation’ as the precondition for the issue of a visa. In 1981 similar action was taken by Bulgaria and Hungary since Yugoslavs developed some enthusiasm for shopping tourism among their socialist—as well as their capitalist—neighbours. Pécs in Hungary was a popular destination, while Graz was attractive to discriminating Yugoslavs seeking the caffeine-free Franck coffee produced in Yugoslavia for export to Austria as a means of earning foreign currency! However, the Yugoslav government had to clamp down in 1981 when spending abroad was seen to be aggravating the problem of currency devaluation. Meanwhile, Hungary was happy to play host to Austrian shoppers and a branch of Marks & Spencer operated seven days a week in Sopron to soak up their hard currency. Conclusion Catering for foreign visitors and domestic ‘social tourism’ involved very different standards of provision and the relatively high-quality infrastructure in complexes receiving Western tourists was inevitably concentrated even though a more even distribution would have been desirable in terms of regional development (despite the security implications). But if each national tourist network was based in the cities and the principal resorts, tour itineraries were able to take a range of objectives of architectural, cultural, ethnographical, historical and sporting interest in order to offset the strong urban bias evident in the geography of accommodation. And even if quality accommodation was not always widely available, it was only in Albania where foreigners were required to use designated routes and hotels. With a smattering of the language it became easy to travel (by car or public transport) to remote places and enjoy the same opportunities as

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

354

the nationals as new roads—often built with forestry work or hydropower in mind— opened up the remoter mountain regions; basic accommodation at campsites, forestry chalets or trade union establishments became available. The popular impression that ECE was only ‘open’ for tourism after 1989 is a great distortion. The environmental issues are also worthy of comment. The Black Sea coastal resorts fitted in somewhat uneasily beside the industrial complexes of Burgas, Constanţa and Varna; while the development interest usually prevailed inland so that Bulgaria’s mountain resort at Borovets complex was criticised for the scale of forest cutting required to accommodate ski runs. But tourists visiting ecologically endangered areas helped to ‘make the problem of environmental degradation a nationwide issue and, with respect to foreign tourism, an international concern’ (Kruczala 1990 p. 77). At least it could be said that tourism served to place a monetary value on scenery and other natural resources and thereby confronted the planners and the politicians with a new set of problems. URBAN AND RURAL SETTLEMENT Urban centres The post-war period saw a massive redistribution of population in favour of the towns. Urban growth created a network of cities which were able to accommodate large numbers of socialist enterprises, while smaller units could be accommodated progressively further down the hierarchy. However, the exercise is fraught with difficulty for despite the publication of statistical yearbooks with coverage of urban areas, several countries list only towns above a certain size (with a 50,000 cut-off in the case of Bulgaria), while Yugoslavia, in the later years, listed only municipalities comprising urban and rural areas, hence requiring access to census volumes. Further problems arise through boundary changes because it is difficult to achieve consistency either way: taking contemporary boundaries for each year or seeking to apply present boundaries retrospectively. The former method has been preferred, although it means that during any period an unknown proportion of any urban growth arises from boundary extensions. However, from Tables 3.1–3.4 it is evident that there were 384 towns of over 20,000 in 1950, 583 in 1970 and 793 in 1990. The urban population in towns smaller than 20,000 can be calculated roughly by subtracting the totals from data on the overall urban population in Table 6.1: this produces a figure of 15.35 million in 1950, rising to 18.52 million in 1970 before falling slightly to 17.27 million in 1990. A gradual fall would be expected unless there was a constant increase through newly created towns (e.g. on the scale of Romania’s planned ‘sistematizare’) but this matter has not been investigated in detail. Urban growth during 1950–90 averaged 2.1% compared with 1.2% and 2.9% for the two previous periods but given the much higher starting figure for settlements of 20,000 or larger, the increase amounted to 23.1 million compared with 8.4 million and 6.8 million for the earlier periods (Table 3.2). The SEECs grew by 11.9 million with a much faster average growth rate (3.7% as against 1.4%) and their share of the total in 1990 rose to 38.7% compared with 28.3% in 1950 and still below the share of total population. If the period is split into two twenty-year sub-periods then it is apparent that the growth rate was faster in the first period (2%) than the second (1.7%) although the fall was more

Infrastructure, services and settlement

355

pronounced in the south (3.5% to 2.5%) than in the north (1.5% to 1.2%). But with the higher base level in 1970 than 1950 (partly the result of many more towns crossing the 20,000 population threshold) the growth in absolute terms was greater in the second period (15.3 million) than the first (11.4 million), with the two figures exceeding the 23.2 million already mentioned as the 1950–90 growth because of the additional towns considered in the 1970–90 calculations. When the size categories are considered there is a clear reversal of fortunes because the lower categories show the fastest percentage growth: 2.3% for the 20,000–50,000 group and 3% for the 50,000–100,000 band. Thereafter the rates declined: 2.3% for 100,000–250,000; 1.7% for 250,000–1 million and 1% for the million-plus cities. However, while the latter grew relatively slowly they experienced only a slight slackening of growth between the two sub-periods from 0.9% to 0.8%, for the national capitals maintained their dynamism albeit with great variations in the degree of primacy depending on the territorial changes and the salient features of the economic history (Table 6.1). In all other categories there was a significant slackening of the growth rate—most evident in the large provincial cities in the 250,000–1 million group (2.1% to 1.2%) but less so with the 100,000–250,000 group (2.5% to 2.1%) and only slightly with the 50,000–100,000 group (2.7% to 2.6%), which reflects the growth of regional centres—particularly clear in the case of Romania’s county towns. Thus it would seem that the towns of intermediate size (50,000–250,000) were preferred for new projects, as in the case of Poland’s restrained decentralisation through agglomerations (discussed below; Figure 7.3). In the south the lowest three categories all grew by roughly the same rate (albeit with a greater emphasis on the 50,000–100,000 band during 1950–70) and the lowest group grew faster than the average rate throughout. Most impressive is the way in which the ‘normal’ pattern of growth rates rising through the hierarchy was reversed in the communist period except for a slight falling off in the lowest category (evident in the north during 1970–90). Indeed, when the new smaller towns crossing the threshold during 1950–70 are brought into the picture, the 1970–90 rate increases: for Romania there is faster growth during this period than for 1950–70 (3.7% compared with 3.5%) while the rate for Czechoslovakia is the same (1.3%) (Table 3.3). Taking the same set of towns for comparison between 1950–70 and 1970–90, only Romania shows equality between the two periods though Czechoslovakia is only slightly lower in the later years. However, this strong performance by the smaller towns did not prevent some migration loss (albeit balanced by the arrival of country people) and of course the larger groups increased their share of the total urban population because their number increased as the initially smaller centres saw their dynamic populations crossing the threshold into higher-size groups. Thus the spatial pattern of these larger centres became more regular as regional centres at roughly 75km intervals. In the case of some backward areas this meant the sudden growth of small towns that had previously lacked an industrial economy and an intellectual society (and even strong traditional town-country relations). Thus GDR planners gave the highest priority to the capital and the regional cities and improved transport systems so that a quarter of the country’s population was within twenty minutes’ travelling time of these cities, while a further fifth lay within one hour’s travel. Migration into the cities and their commuting zones was encouraged by the provision of jobs and houses. Berentsen (1981) noted a +0.92 correlation between net migration and change in housing availability in the Dresden area between 1963 and 1967. But this was done at the expense of regional

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

356

equality in the quantity and quality of housing since priority was given to fifteen regional (‘bezirk’) cities, including Halle (with Halle-Neustadt), Rostock and Stralsund, backed up by 140 district (‘kreis’) towns to which so much of everyday life in the GDR was related. Only a fifth of the population was more than forty minutes’ travel from a district or regional town (and only 4% needed more than an hour). But the regional centres were not equal

Infrastructure, services and settlement

357

Figure 7.3 Urban growth 1950–90

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

358

since two-thirds of the GDR’s SOE associations had their head offices in the five largest cities: Berlin, Leipzig, Karl Marx Stadt (Chemnitz), Dresden and Halle. However, their growth was relatively slow. Planning urban development Growth was based on a combination of economic and physical planning with threshold analysis to see how far new functions could be accommodated without further growth of housing and infrastructure. Yet urban expansion was also a highly centralised political activity, involving only limited local input. When Poland decentralised by increasing the number of voivodships from seventeen to forty-nine in 1975, this did not enhance the scope for autonomy in urban planning because the bureaucrats were now less experienced than before, and planning was handled by eight regional departments which were institutionally part of national government; only physical planning was handled at the voivodship level. However, the regional/provincial centres enjoyed significant advantages. Bydgoszcz was traditionally the economic centre of Pomerania, while Toruń (somewhat shaded by its larger neighbour) was nevertheless home to Nicolaus Copernicus University (founded in 1945), and both Gdańsk and Wrocław saw some imaginative post-war reconstruction involving whole urban quarters. In the GDR the cathedral city of Magdeburg gained further embellishment through post-war reconstruction in the Zuckerbäcker architectural style, while the decision to rename Chemnitz as Karl Marx Stadt (even though Marx had no connection with the city) secured some favours from the GDR government in cultural life. Skopje in Yugoslavia was redeveloped in 1963 after a devastating earthquake (while retaining the Turkish bazaar and the mosques). However, not all large towns were favoured by the planners. The Czech city of Brno failed to attract the vigorous town-planning measures needed to cope with run-down mixed urban areas (especially the polluted eastern district of mixed uses dominated by old textile and engineering factories) even though it blocked the expansion of the central area—as the railway station did on the southern side, notwithstanding its socially deprived population stranded in poor housing with very limited green space in what was another industrial zone. In the early years there was particular concern to identify all available sources of raw materials while towns accommodated a new population partly through the expulsion of some of the existing inhabitants. Thus, immediate post-war Hungary ‘focused all her financial resources mainly on the development of the basic raw material industry in accordance with the economic policy of the time’ (Krajko et al. 1991 p. 5). The great provincial city of Szeged was untouched by this first phase since it could offer no basic mineral raw materials and operated only as a centre of light and food industries (indeed, there was an element of depression through the cessation of transit traffic given the breakdown of relations with Yugoslavia). But by 1960 there was more attention to labour-intensive branches, as well as ‘intensive development of rural areas in accordance with the rational arrangement of industry’ (ibid. p. 6), while new industries concerned with cables, rubber and dairy products appeared during the 1960s when there was also a big growth in commuting. Such diversification was quite typical across the region. Industry in laşi (Romania) was bound up with textiles and food processing, but engineering also developed to support local agriculture and light industry: the Nicolina

Infrastructure, services and settlement

359

railway repair shops—rebuilt to produce heavy machinery for the construction industry— formed the basis of an expanding sector which included the Tehnoton plant of 1975 (producing radio and television sets for the home market and for export) and the heavy equipment factory (CUG) situated beside the Vaslui railway on the southern edge. A relatively early venture in diversification was the pharmaceutical factory Antibiotice on the western edge of the city: still one of the country’s leading producers. Of course, industries did not grow as an organic process, but essentially in relation to the capital invested by the state. So there was always an element of uncertainty over capacity increases, although central planners would be aware of the efficiency of a factory and its ability to service export orders (particularly regular orders from the USSR, like the 600 wagon loads of clothing despatched annually from the Czech town of Prostĕjov), along with the availability of land for factory expansion and additional housing. On the other hand, a factory of major national importance might develop by expanding its core business while the more peripheral and less sophisticated activities were hived off to new locations. In this way Romania’s massive engineering complex in Reşiţa acted as ‘mama uzina’ (mother factory), spawning ‘daughters’ in various parts of the country: oil-field engineering to Ploieşti, locomotive assembly in Craiova and metal fabrication in Bocşa. An alternative strategy produced branch plants to mop up small pockets of rural labour, but this did not prevent several cases of ‘gigantomania’. In the area of Ostrava the Vitkovice and Klement Gottwald enterprises employed more than 75,000 workers in metallurgy and engineering, while the main engineering works in Brno (Zbrojovka, ZKL and Kralovopolska Strojirna) together employed more than 30,000. And there were more than 12,000 jobs in oil refining, chemistry and petrochemistry at Slovnaft and Juraj Dimitrov in Bratislava. National capitals These were clearly dominant, though to varying degrees (Table 6.1), with the greatest encouragement and the best architecture normally reserved for them, while the provincial towns might experience population loss through a creeping ‘brain drain’ (reported at Karl Marx Stadt). The capital cities experienced major growth that was sometimes difficult to accommodate. In Sofia the planners had to build beyond the ‘natural limits’: the Vitosha and Lyulin mountains to the south and the railway junction and Balkan Mountains to the north. Some extensive central development was needed. Tirana retained its Ottoman bazaar and narrow streets until the plan for a modern centre (formulated under Italian supervision) was eventually implemented during 1952–6 with a succession of major components: Skanderbeg Square, followed by the Palace of Culture (1966), the Tirana Hotel (1979) and the Hoxha Memorial (1988). Berlin was a unique case in view of the division arising from the joint occupation system which made the city a microcosm of the country as a whole; both in terms of the initial arrangements and the subsequent isolation of the combined American, British and French zones (West Berlin) from the Sovietcontrolled East Berlin which alone became the ‘Haupstadt der DDR’. Despite the wall there was a measure of cooperation over water pollution and garbage disposal, while stable arrangements were made for access to West Berlin’s Steinstücken exclave. Berlin’s population growth ceased. In 1946 the total population was 3.13 million (4.9% of the total population of Germany), with 1.17 million in the East and 1.97 million in the West.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

360

In 1984 the figure was 3.04 million (3.9%): 1.19 million in the East (a slight increase) and 1.85 million in the West, where the heavy natural decrease was balanced by some net inward migration by Germans from the West (benefiting from incentives), refugees from the East and, especially, large numbers of Turkish Gastarbeiters. ‘Socialist cities’ While the cities of the region could be deemed ‘socialist’ merely as a result of the new ideology there was much discussion in the West that they might also evolve a distinct structure to distinguish themselves clearly from their capitalist counterparts. Certainly there was greater uniformity in appearance since government control of urban rebuilding produced a land-use pattern simpler and more regular than that of a typical capitalist city. However, with the abolition of a market in land and the introduction of fixed land prices, ‘location within the city space became, from the point of view of the user, an almost irrelevant economic variable’ (Musil 1992 p. 73), whereas capitalist cities were influenced by ‘market competition, private property, real-estate profitability, local decision making and physical planning on a city to city basis’ (Enyedi 1996 p. 101). However, with industrialisation the primary goal, resources were channelled away from housing and infrastructure, despite rapid growth in population and household formation. House-building rates were initially low and did not even cover replacement—hence a massive shortage persisted. At the same time, there was a redistribution of existing space through subdivision of upper/middle-class housing units as legal norms over living space allowed local authorities to regulate the entire housing system, including control of apartment exchanges, purchase of houses and subletting. There was nationalisation of retail business, trade and services; and concentration of small premises into larger ones which were—in turn—grouped in planned centres and sub-centres to secure economies of scale. There was also a priority for public/community goals: there were small apartments but large parks; while low private-car ownership and a lack of garage space combined with a fairly comprehensive system of public transport charging low fares. Socialist cities also had a relative lack of ‘marginality’ (linked with free expression, dynamism and innovation). It was illegal not to have an address or employment, so police surveillance ensured that there was virtually no homelessness. However, there were signs of greater convergence by the 1980s through prostitution, homelessness and ‘bohemian’ marginality, for example street musicians, partly the result of tourism. Pressure on the central areas was moderated since there was no overwhelming incentive for business to locate there, although the restrained development of the tertiary sector ensured that central business districts would not be as exclusive as their Western counterparts. Hence most of the old buildings were preserved, albeit in an often decrepit condition. There was also a continuing residential function, although when suburban housing estates were built in the 1960s for new families (‘cheap housing’ based on state subsidies, with elements of a market system through favours and the operation of a black market) older people, low-income households and Roma became confined and trapped within deteriorating city centres and the older residential areas (Musil 1992 pp. 74–5). However, there were major variations in the extent of central area redevelopment. In the GDR, the perceived cost advantages of large apartment blocks on openfield sites and the strict control on rents meant that not even the traditional town houses—sometimes

Infrastructure, services and settlement

361

‘gifted’ to local authorities by private owners lacking the resources to continue maintaining them given the low rents in force—were refurbished and offered to tenants. But it was slightly different in East Berlin where the semi-derelict central core (‘Mitte’) with its war-damaged public buildings was a shabby advertisement for the GDR given the many Western visitors who could cross from West to East Berlin (as citizens of the occupying powers). After concentrating on the Alexanderplatz and Stalinallee (later Karl Marx Allee), the Mitte was refurbished (with some financial support from West Germany for the cathedral) and endowed with apartment blocks for diplomats. Redevelopment was also undertaken in Bucharest in the 1980s through comprehensive redevelopment of the Uranus/Piąta Unirii district (occupying part of the Dâmboviţa floodplain) to make way for the ‘Victory of Socialism Boulevard’. High-density housing was justified by a policy of minimising the loss of agricultural land but the Ceauşescu epoch’s obsession with ‘national Stalinism’ should also be noted: seeking enhanced security combined with social engineering to create the ‘new socialist man’ in a mode irreconcilable with private property. Another consideration was the former president’s personal fascination with the built form of socialism arising from the earthquake of 1977 and the economic crisis of the 1980s which restricted alternative forms of development. Inner areas and suburbs Moving away from the historic city cores, the inherited inner area was subject to radical change where the centre was relocated or enlarged by taking in an adjacent zone of partial redevelopment (e.g. in Katowice) which retained some of its former differentiated structure and physical appearance. Otherwise the zone projected a somewhat drab image through the legacy of capitalist urban development from the 1850s to the 1930s, associated with industry, commerce and transport: ‘congested commercial streets lined with continuous rows of shops and offices convey the image of the former capitalist CBD, especially in cities which experienced industrial or commercial boom in the 19th century’ (Hamilton 1979 p. 230). But there were also some spacious apartments of the former business and professional elite, including villas indicating the start of a ‘flight to the suburbs’. Much growth took place in this area in the 1950s as a result of ‘nests of socialist building through opportunistic infilling by individual blocks’ (ibid. p. 231) while expanding industrial areas removed any surviving features of a rural past. In Warsaw badly damaged factories in the centre were swept away and the land redeveloped for housing: although factories and tenements still intermingled in Praga and Wola, the visual impact of industry was much reduced as new factories were located on the edge of the built-up area—more clearly segregated from other land uses than before—where they more easily attracted rural workers. In Budapest much industry was displaced from the inner suburbs of Óbuda and Jozsefváros in parallel with slum clearance and redevelopment, leaving only small labour-intensive workshops in the central area. Meanwhile, there was a switch to Western-style industrial estates in all parts of the city, including green-belt land in Budaörs and Százhalombatta, as residential development intruded into the southeast. However, in towns where industries were not damaged in the war it was common to see an expansion of the existing factories requiring only minimal investment, despite the conflict between the aims of economic growth and regional development.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

362

The suburbs comprised greenfield areas taken up for the aforementioned large housing estates from the 1960s and also for industrial zones—all made possible by factories fabricating concrete components and the avoidance of the rehousing problems arising from inner-city redevelopment. But the prominence of apartment blocks (with minimal provision for car parking) gave little evidence of any decline in population density. These new districts, employing the ‘mikrorayon’ model of integrated residential and industrial functions, formed constellations around the large cities and eventually generated heavy cross-city commuter flows (contrasting with Milyutin’s linear model of 1930 for Stalingrad). There was an absence of classical forms of segregation in housing (that is, by income): ‘no part of the city is barred to any inhabitant or migrant on the grounds of cost, income, status or race’ (Smith 1989 p. 68). But there was discrimination by politically distributed privileges and by age. The new complexes attracted young, incoming families, though many lost some of their appeal with the arrival of more working-class elements, ethnic minorities and Roma. Demographic segregation in East Berlin was high during the 1970s and 1980s with apartments on new estates allocated to young couples and families (at the time) whereupon low mobility made for homogeneity. Many towns incorporated adjacent villages as they expanded (e.g. Miskolc assimilated Diósgyőr and Hejocsaba). In the process some massive planned extensions might arise which appeared almost as new towns in themselves—the Neustadt at Halle, Havířov ov and Poruba in Ostrava, Nowa Huta at Kraków and Belgrade’s Novi Beograd—instead of a balanced constellation of suburban developments. However, in Romania it became an administrative ploy to combine villages with towns simply to give the impression of a growing population. There were also special arrangements for a time at Constanţa, where the town was combined with resort developments along the coastal strip, and at Petroşani while the whole coalmining district was brought together in one unit. In such cases the villages remained morphologically separate despite their socioeconomic transformation, projecting the same physical pattern as that of administratively separate satellite settlements geared to commuting: Dugo Selo, Samobor, Sesvete, Velika Gorica and Zaprešić on the edge of Zagreb, where many were nourished by the overpopulated agrarian Hrvatsko Zagorje region to the northwest. Some of these satellites became industrialised, achieving a welcome decentralisation of employment from the city into the urban field. Urban size: should cities keep getting bigger? There was official concern that excessive growth and congestion might complicate food supply and aggravate already inadequate shopping facilities (when even normal provision was well below Western standards: 25.5sq.m per thousand of the population in Prague’s department stores compared with over 150 in Frankfurt am Main). Hence the possible containment of large cities in order to minimise congestion and simultaneously enhance the growth prospects of smaller towns and backward regions. The GDR decided in the 1960s to concentrate new apartments in larger urban-industrial centres, while Hungary was sympathetic towards the lower-order centres. Hoffman (1973) suggested that Yugoslavia could strike an ideal balance in order to create a network of strong dynamic industrial centres with the capacity to modernise an entire countryside. But Slovenia did not emulate this model because of the highly decentralised character of urban

Infrastructure, services and settlement

363

development: some two-thirds of her population lived in settlements with a population below 2,000, with no single enterprise to serve as ‘a development pole of sufficient strength to leave its mark on the structure of the republic as a whole’ (ibid. p. 24). On the other hand, 70% of post-war investment in Montenegro was concentrated in three large enterprises located in two cities, with relatively weak spread effects. However, excluding the capital cities, the consensus over optimum size appeared to shift during the communist years from 100,000 to 300,000, though planners found it difficult to generalise and there was little dogma on the issue after the 1970s. Instead development costs were examined in individual cases and judgements made as to the desirability of growth in the various agglomerations and their constituent towns. Migration controls The Bulgarian government controlled migration into Burgas, Plovdiv, Russe, Sofia and Varna from 1955 onwards (and Pleven from 1956) through the issue of residence permits on the Soviet ‘propiska’ model. Restrictions were extended to all but 32 of the country’s 174 towns in 1974 (the exceptions being small towns with a declining population or new towns where large industries were built up from scratch). However, it was common for marriages to be arranged between residents and non-residents to facilitate movement into the ‘closed’ cities, and evasion of the law was in any case widespread with 120,000 illegal residents reported in Sofia alone. It seems that the inexorable growth of the economy called for continuing migration because grave shortages of construction workers led to the issue of permits on numerous occasions. Workers were also welcome in Sofia in 1961 when the Kremikovtsi metallurgical works was under construction and further recruitment was necessary in 1967 and 1973 when migrants were required to pledge their commitment to the construction industry for five and ten years, respectively. While it was appropriate to ensure that population did not race ahead of job opportunities, excessive control risked sacrificing economies of scale to a stagnant population. Meanwhile, containment through migration controls began in Warsaw in 1954 (along with some steering of development outside the city) but new housing construction was stopped only in 1982 (apart from estates already started); with the decision reversed in 1983 as congestion increased when nobody would leave the city through fear that they might never be allowed back. And although there was more commuting—from the Siedlce (eastern) and Skierniewice (southwestern) directions especially—inadequate public transport and delay in building a metro system made long journeys to work difficult. Industrial relocation The share of the capital cities in national manufacturing in 1961 ranged from 43.3% in Budapest to 18.8% in Sofia, 18.3% in Bucharest, 9.6% in Prague, 6.7% in Belgrade, 6% in East Berlin and 5.8% in Warsaw, so clearly there was a more pressing case for decongestion in some cities than in others, although no relocation would make sense if productivity fell. It was therefore thought most desirable to decentralise labour-intensive industries while expanding high-technology industries in urban environments with an industrial tradition and good infrastructures. Decentralisation in Budapest was proposed

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

364

in 1960, supported by an Industrial Relocation Fund. Thirty-seven enterprises (employing 6,600) left in 1961–5 followed by 106 (employing 16,500) during 1966–70—with a bias to those with inadequate buildings and plant (meaning that backward technology was imposed on the provinces) and units that were labour intensive and lacked close linkages with other enterprises in the city. However, relocation could not be a panacea since enterprises claimed a genuine need for close links with the capital, and access to cheaper (though less well qualified) labour in the provinces was not always adequate compensation—reflecting the poorer training facilities outside Budapest (almost half the students in higher education were studying in the capital). Industries that did move out tended to be those generating pollution or requiring a great deal of space. While the city’s share of Hungarian industry fell to less than a third, its superior productivity was something the government could not ignore. There was, for example, close cooperation among the engineering industries of Budapest and while this precluded some relocation (Csepel Motor Works cooperated with 200 other plants, including many outside the city) in the interest of efficiency care was needed to avoid major efficiency losses. But production could be transferred to the Budapest region and managed along branch factory lines, although only 20,000 jobs were transferred out of a planned 70,000 during 1968– 71. The programme was not helped by the 1968 reform allowing workers to choose their place of work, for a fifth of all employees changed jobs in 1968–9 (Friedrichs 1988 p. 141). Attempts to move enterprises out of Sofia during the early 1980s met with only limited success, despite grave housing and labour shortages. In 1981, only ten of the twenty-three organisations slated for relocation actually moved out and some institutes even changed their functions in order to evade movement orders. New towns The new-town model could have helped to decongest large cities but it was remarkably little used apart from in Upper Silesia. Additional towns generally arose through promotion of key villages to urban status with a gradual growth of population. However, some new assembly points for manufacturing involved massive expansion where a large development was planned and where continuity with a former rural settlement was lost: for example, Dunaújváros, Kazincbarcika, Komló, Oroszlány and Varpalota in Hungary. In Romania the single village of Oneşti grew into the new town of Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej (named after the country’s early post-war communist leader). Three villages coalesced to form Dimitrovgrad in Bulgaria, while Akja in Hungary comprised not only the village of that name but Bode, Tosok and Tosokberend. Occasionally towns grew up where there was no existing village, for example Eisenhüttenstadt in the GDR (though it was close enough to Fürstenberg to incorporate this town eventually) and Tiszaújváros. In the latter case (previously known as Tiszapalkonya and Leninváros) urban status was gained in 1966 after work had started in 1958 and the first factories (for synthetic resins and nitrogen fertilisers) were ready in 1960, using Romanian gas. Synthetic fibres were made from 1967 and PVC from 1970. The issue is further discussed below in connection with promoted rural centres.

Infrastructure, services and settlement

365

bnRural settlement Rural areas contained the majority of the region’s population in 1945 and were thus a major consideration for the central planners and ideologists. Isolation was overcome by electrification (opening the way for television) and the provision of buses in areas lacking immediate access to rail services. There were also transfers among farm and forestry workers which widened perspectives considerably. Yet conservatism won out in remote areas where ideas were slow to change and where traditional clothing survived for much longer. W.G.Lockwood (1975) deals with social status and cultural change in the remote Bosnian-Muslim village of Planinica: a largely self-sufficient community—concerned with cereal farming and sheep rearing pre-1945—where some workers were hired by large Bosnian landowners and local full-time waged labour arrived with woodcutting in 1938 (while cabinet-making followed after the war). As logging moved further away the village workers stayed on the job and went home at weekends. In this way they brought a measure of modernisation through the purchase of radio sets and use of tiles for roofing. From 1966 there was some migration to work in Austria. However, innovation was by no means straightforward and there was an important role for the richer influential families in the transition from clay (‘majstor’) to metal stoves and in such agricultural practices as the use of metal ploughs, adoption of new barley seed, and the dipping of lambs in disinfectant. Some initiatives were quite unsuccessful, like the attempt to introduce a new sheep breed with wool unsuitable for traditional rugs and carpets; but it was possible to overcome the traditional limits of winter fodder by establishing permanent hayfields to secure more nutritious fodder that would allow herds to increase. It was also possible to winter sheep 200km away in Vojvodina: an area with a good hay supply where some villagers cultivated links through casual harvesting work. Yet in relative terms the rural areas continued to be marginalised, although modern nationalist rhetoric drew heavily on folk-life for its sense of unity, and communist work practices made full use of the traditions of informal rural cooperation. There was always food (except under conditions of extreme requisitioning) but the diet was heavily biased towards pork fat, poultry meat and eggs ‘which does not correspond to the principles of rational nutrition’ (Slepicka et al. 1989 p. 100). Education was poor and relatively few village students proceeded through the secondary- and higher-education systems: where there were secondary agricultural schools and agricultural universities applications far exceeded capacity at the latter (in which over half the students come from towns). There was poorer access to medical care with relatively long distances for patients to travel, and care of the aged became a problem with the disintegration of three-generation households. There was better access to jobs and services for villages close to the towns, though few facilities in the villages themselves—and rural people had to put up with the various inconveniences of the urban-rural fringe: confiscation of land for construction; and air pollution, aggravated by the storage of solid municipal and industrial waste. On the other hand, peripheral submontane areas enjoyed high ecological/aesthetic quality as some compensation for their relative isolation while small settlements in general had a good microclimate, plus architectural and landscape quality. Consumption habits in rural and urban areas became more similar, but the employment structure changed faster than the infrastructure, though all Hungarian villages had electricity by 1963 and all were

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

366

linked with the national road and bus network by 1974. Some villages gained status through the amalgamation of cooperatives. One cooperative in south Moravia (between Brĕclav and Hodonin) emerged from the Prusánky estate where smallholdings allocated under the initial land reform were subsequently amalgamated for mechanised working. The cooperative then joined with Josefov in 1962 and there were further mergers with Dolní Bojanovice and Mikulčice—placing 3,700ha of land under a single management. However, the cooperative headquarters would not always be in the most central position and it was not unusual for villages to share the installations: silo, warehouse, slaughterhouse and other processing units. Cooperatives also provided rural welfare services through a diverse range of economic activities linked with agriculture. Local industry that was not consolidated into units of republican subordination was typically administered by reliable local officials as part of a collective farm. In Albania, where strict migration controls were in force, mountain villages were very heavily supported by flour deliveries which allowed population to rise far beyond the local agricultural potential (and incidentally made the local baker a key political figure). Meanwhile, state farms could be particularly influential as a surrogate local authority and confer advantages not available to villages comprising fragmented peasant holdings. Migration and commuting Rural areas continued to lose ground demographically and in many cases absolute decline was evident by the 1960s, with losses to the towns accounting for more than just the natural increase (which in itself tended to fall as the average age advanced through selective emigration). Losses tended to be highest in areas ‘screened’ from towns to the extent that daily commuting was not feasible. Under such conditions, women in particular tended to abandon the countryside, and in parts of northeast Poland there was extreme gender imbalance with the male to female ratio reaching seven to one. Rural retention was necessary in the interest of agricultural production, along with some secondary activity—processing and maintenance—and services. In any case, comprehensive resettlement would have been costly financially (through new housing needs) and also politically in view of sentimental attachments and home ownership, even where land ownership was lost through expropriation. So commuting was greatly encouraged as the urban housing shortages (and some administrative barriers to migration) combined with the provision of affordable public transport and a home in the countryside which included either a small farm (especially in Poland and Yugoslavia) or a private plot linked with membership of a cooperative farm. (Note the prominence of supplementary ‘auxiliary’ farmwork since most household plots were worked by non-agricultural wage earners (Figure 7.4).) The employment/skill structure in rural areas became almost as diverse as in the towns when the non-agricultural population could not easily find accommodation in the towns. In 1950, 53% of Poland’s population was non-agricultural while the urban population was only 37%, but the corresponding figures in 1975 were 75% and 56%; meaning that the non-agricultural population in rural areas had doubled from 3.1 million (22% of rural population) to 6.7 million (46%) (Stasiak 1977). Rural areas of Hungary acquired a similar ratio of industrial workers to the towns due to both commuting and rural industrialisation that accounted for a fifth of the national total (i.e. 400,000 jobs, not including those provided by agricultural cooperatives in

Infrastructure, services and settlement

367

processing and repairs). But Hungarians who commuted became noticeably more ambitious as agricultural workers switched to industry and their children went in for vocational education. ‘New smallholders’ who gained land in 1945 were more conservative, while (by contrast) farmers who had owned small family farms of 5–15ha tended to remain on the land as active members of the

Figure 7.4 Commuting in the Romanian Carpathians cooperatives, while their children often did well in higher education. This clearly raised questions of self-esteem among farm workers and the need for greater job satisfaction, perhaps through greater specialisation and better working conditions. Albania adopted

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

368

strong policies of rural retention by controlling migration (especially in the north) and encouraging counter-urbanisation through mining and forest work, while the social security scheme was extended to cooperatives during 1972–6. Cooperative and state farms in the mountains were paid more for their output and charged less for their inputs in comparison with productive lowland farms. Through an artificially low level of urbanisation, the rural population increased absolutely in all altitudinal zones. Fuchs and Demko (1978 p. 177) would see such a scenario as a distinctive feature of communism with much involuntary commuting as a substitute for migration. Given the shortage of accommodation, a large number of people—predominantly young, male, manual/low-skilled workers—had to make weekly or monthly journeys to work, with an almost total dependence on public/enterprise transport and hostel accommodation. To have done otherwise would have meant an unacceptable diversion of capital to housing in the cities or excessive dispersal of industry that would have sacrificed technical linkages and/or agglomeration economies. Yet this did not prevent the anomaly whereby the few professionals in cooperative agriculture—the agronomists, for example—commuted from the town to the countryside; thus revealing ‘biases in urban housing allocation in favour of more skilled and advantageous members of socialist societies’ (ibid. p. 180). However, as with other debates on the uniqueness of the communist system, a specific ordering of priorities by totalitarian governments in ECE over the short or medium term does not really prove the ‘determination of socialist planners to develop urban forms distinctive to socialism’ (ibid.) to the extent that the region might not follow Western experience. After all, far more people did move permanently to the town than were stranded as commuters, and not all the latter cases should be seen as involuntary. The debate on ECE’s mobility transition was joined by Peet (1980), who suggested that commuting might be a transitory phenomenon relieved by more housing in the towns, or perhaps by the evolution of ‘unified settlement networks’ with interdependent clusters of specialised nodes and satellites. In this context commuting would still take place—for work as well as shopping and entertainment—but the movements would be rationalised and excessively long journeys avoided. Peet also raised the possibility that the situation in ECE might reflect the transitional problem in overcoming the ‘evils of capitalism’, but Fuchs and Demko linked their observations not only with inherited inequalities but with others that were newly created. Excessive use of commuting locked workers in a state of permanent travel weariness—deprived of the benefits of urbanisation (culture, education and housing) that were enjoyed by earlier migrants—while women were left in charge of the home, with a major role in agriculture. In three-generation households grandparents ‘provided their pensions and labour for childcare and gardening, while the younger couple went to work at state jobs, bringing home salaries and helping on subsistence plots or other profitable sidelines after work and on weekends’ (Creed 2000 p. 271). Rural restructuring There was little comprehensive reconstruction of rural settlements—though Lidice was rebuilt after destruction by the Nazi administration in Bohemia and Moravia in retaliation for assassination of the governor, and a small village in the Góra Puławska area of Poland after war damage. Most families managed to build new houses using more durable materials, and a number of public buildings were renewed. Villages near the towns

Infrastructure, services and settlement

369

generally grew as a result of housing shortages in the cities. Non-farming housing was evident in Slovenia on the edge of Ljubljana even before the Second World War: typically ‘a rather uniform Central European type of suburban house in the surrounding areas of the cities’ (Pelc 1993 p. 159) with one or two storeys, a square ground plan and a moderately inclined roof. Now, with commuting there is much more work outside agriculture to be combined with a rural environment and villages like Domžale reflected this. There were higher standards but the traditional houses were lost among new buildings constructed in the gardens of old farmhouses primarily ‘by those children of the farmers who did not inherit the farms’ (ibid. p. 160). But there were also new houses (with separate garages, wood sheds and workshops) on the margins or along the roads. Meanwhile, the old houses were modernised and the classic Slovene hay racks were replaced by silos, while storage sheds and barns served as carports or garages for farm machinery. While this was quite a typical situation involving families moving into villages from the towns, poor rural services placed limits on Western-style counterurbanisation: people who ‘made it’ to the towns were rarely minded to leave. But some people might certainly move to the countryside when the cooperatives had jobs for skilled workers—whereupon the local authority might provide a plot of land for a house or alternatively facilitate a barn conversion or the takeover of a property left vacant by the emigration of a German family. Small apartment blocks also appeared in the villages to accommodate small groups of incoming professionals. In Poland young families would move considerable distances to set up home in a village offering an apartment and a job. However, such movement was discouraged by the way that the better off could secure good housing in the towns. ‘Whereas under socialism housing is supposed to have a special significance as an equalising element of state provision—received as a right not as a reflection of income—it was found to be a source of inequality compounding other inequalities arising from occupational status’ (Smith 1989 p. 39). Indeed, the highestincome groups moved to the highest-level housing classes for ‘on average the richer classes get better housing for less money and effort, while the poorer classes get worse housing at the cost of more money or effort or both’ (Szelenyi 1983 p. 63). Capitalist inequalities were perpetuated as the best housing went to the new intelligentsia and leading figures in the party, the government and the armed forces. People on low incomes with poor housing in poor districts were paying more than richer people who occupied better housing in better districts; the workers seeking new accommodation might well be forced out of the city to look after themselves. On socialist estates, Dangschat (1987 pp. 56–7) found surprisingly high segregation in Warsaw among social groups according to education, age and household size, which contradicted the conventional wisdom. Thus there was continuing inequality despite egalitarian ideals. And the Gorbachev era seemed to suggest more scope for individual creativity. Meanwhile, there was a boost for the private sector in some countries. In 1966 a law was passed in Czechoslovakia facilitating the purchase of apartments in a state building provided there was a buyer (who could only be the sitting tenant) for every apartment in the house. However, given the inadequate rate of state house building, this law was changed in 1978 to enable one-off sales (and also to provide help for cooperative construction of multi-unit dwellings) after help was first given to secure plots in 1972. In 1983 Hungary conceded that the monolithic construction industry was inefficient and there was also a dearth of funding: in future the private sector would provide 80% of housing stock, while existing tenants

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

370

would have the ‘right to buy’. And the previous year architects had been allowed to set up private offices to do business with the more affluent members of the public. The formation of elite housing cooperatives was very noticeable in Budapest with respect to ‘niche’ sites in the hills where gentrification occurred. However, not all countries made such concessions. In Romania there was private ownership of apartments but due to the fetish for economical use of land it was virtually impossible to build conventional town houses in urban areas. A measure of consolidation of the rural population in key villages and small market towns was desirable in terms of more accessible labour markets and improved rural services. Elementary schools in Czechoslovakia fell from 15,395 in 1950 to 6,445 in 1983, with handicaps for small settlements of below 500 (Slepicka et al. 1989 p. 96). Comprehensive rural schools in Poland started in 1974, mainly in the west. They offered better facilities but children had to make longer journeys. Hungary’s ‘National Settlement System Development Conception’ (1971) recognised new rural centres (some dating back to the 1950s) while leaving the outlying settlements to their own devices (see below). Presumably these were considered to have no future: houses were poorly constructed— using adobe with earth floors dating to the inter-war period—though some were thought suitable for resort functions. Shopping became more centralised, with better facilities in the larger settlements. The selection process was influenced by conventional planning considerations, including the organisation of cooperative farms. In the Nitra District of Slovakia two phases of consolidation highlighted ‘temporary main rural settlements’ (Stage 1) and then the smaller number of ‘settlements of local importance’ (Stage 2), which not only induced some population migration but, in the latter case especially, a change in employment with the growth of non-agricultural functions in the key villages (Figure 7.5). However, the key villages did not necessarily harmonise totally with the territorial organisation of cooperatives. In 1989 four cooperative centres were only Stage 1 key villages while three Stage 2 key villages—Lapáš, Lefantovce and Zbehy—were without cooperatives. Special situations arose around the towns of Nitra and Zlate Moravce, where the university and high school, respectively, had specialised agricultural profiles.) Since 1989 villages have been able to opt for administrative independence and by 1994 the cooperative centres had taken this decision, along with a number of others. Tourism was a factor in rural consolidation in Yugoslavia since the resort village concept was applied more widely during the 1980s, with many houses sold for vacation use while larger buildings were acquired by companies wishing to provide facilities for their employees. Also, improvements to farmhouses were made to provide tourist accommodation using money earned by Gastarbeiters in Western Europe, though local authority grants were available in the mountains of Slovenia, backed by government spending on electrification, water supply and road improvements. Such enterprise contributed to the revival of spas like Rogaška Slatina. Moreover,

Infrastructure, services and settlement

371

Figure 7.5 Cooperatives and key villages in the Nitra area of Slovakia with pollution from Jesenice and other industrial centres making only a slight impact, craft workshops became prominent in the Slovenian Alps and rural retention in the 1980s meant increasing use of the mountain pastures compared with the situation in the 1960s and 1970s so that livestock numbers grew again. These changes were linked with improved accessibility and the better prospects for non-agricultural activities. The number of second homes also increased.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

372

Marginal ‘non-viable’ villages Difficult questions concerned the fate of the smaller rural settlements. While towns and larger villages had substantial functions as the headquarters for agricultural enterprises with workshops, machine parks and services (including purchasing and supply organisations and computer/technology centres), middle villages might organise plant and livestock production and small villages would usually offer virtually no local employment for ‘only rarely do they host a small husbandry plant’ (Slepicka et al. 1989 p. 97). Abandoning small settlements to their own devices often resulted in steady decline, hence the Yugoslav conception of ‘demographically endangered settlements’ (DESs) with advanced ‘deagrarisation’ (aggravated by the concentration of eight-year elementary schools in central settlements over a period of two decades). This phenomenon was particularly evident along the Slovenian-Hungarian border, which experienced massive emigration: ‘there are no new-born children, the buildings are in a state of dilapidation [and] the farmland remains to a great extent uncultivated’ (Horvat 1992 p. 277). A radical solution would have done away with villages and homogenised settlements through ‘agrogorods’ where urban standards could be attained. But dogmatic concentration implied building restrictions in small settlements (e.g. no subsidies or credits for new construction or residential rehabilitation) and further neglect of their facilities. The best approximation to this approach can be seen in Romania’s ‘sistematizare’ which envisaged some 500 additional small towns to act as agro-industrial centres for areas where all the cooperative and state farms were brought together into associations (CUASCs; see above) for planned development. All these places were existing key villages, already enlarged by transfers from outlying non-viable settlements (many of which were now scheduled for total abandonment over the medium term) but now to be reconstructed—along with the commune centres—to provide a ‘civic centre’ using space made available by compulsory purchase of property with nominal compensation. Although conceived in the 1970s this draconian scheme was shelved until the 1980s and in the end was modestly implemented prior to the revolution: only a few new civic centres were built and just five villages (all in the Bucharest area) were totally destroyed before coercive resettlement was abandoned in 1989. The general scheme is outlined in Figure 7.6 and Table 7.3, but the example for Vâlcea shows the link with agricultural restructuring. Table 7.4 shows a total of eight new centres and profiles their economic weakness compared with the two districts headed by existing towns. Băbeni was the best developed with intensive pig and poultry units and significant manufactures. Rural industry was very limited and largely concerned with extractive industries and especially the lignite quarries: in the two existing towns these sectors represented 24% of the total industrial output value compared with 63.1% in the projected new centres and 86.3% in the outlying communes. But the problem of rural service provision continues, for outlying villages have often been left with a poor infrastructure and very few non-agricultural enterprises. Rural housing remained privately owned, generally comprising single-storey cottages rebuilt each generation to produce a highly varied built environment reflecting the structure and resources of each household (Figure 7.7). A ban on structural repairs was seen as the most likely way of accelerating resettlement had the ‘sistematizare’ model been ruthlessly applied, while in the surviving villages the local authorities were expected to insist on two-storey

Infrastructure, services and settlement

373

dwellings when any new building authorisation was sought. Meanwhile, major upheavals have resulted from

Figure 7.6 Romania’s ‘sistematizare’ programme Table 7.3 Existing towns and new towns proposed under Romania’s ‘sistematizare’ programme Unofficial Macroregion (Figure 7.6)

Classification of Towns Existing Proposed A B C D D E

F

G

Centre 20 22 42 13 22 18 53 95 North 18 18 36 17 29 24 70 106 North West 23 8 31 20 47 27 94 125 South East 48 17 65 46 87 51 184 249 South West 16 12 28 17 40 19 76 104 West 13 21 34 17 29 28 74 108 Total 138 98 236 130 254 167 551 787 Key: A towns created in the pre-socialist period; B towns created under socialism prior to 1980; C communes listed for promotion to urban status by 1980; D additional promotions expected by the end of the century according to plans drawn up in the 1970s; E additonal promotions arising out of revisions to the plan in 1980s; F total number of new towns (sum of the previous three columns); G total number of towns at the end of the exercise Source: Planning reports

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

374

the extension of lignite quarries in Czechoslovakia and the GDR and from relocation arising from soil contamination in the Głogów ‘Copper Basin’ of Poland. There was much more disturbance than occurred in Romania—65 villages with a combined population of 180,000 were lost in northern Bohemia, many from the Most area. Even the old town of Most (northeast of the road and railway shown in Figure 5.9) was destroyed, and displaced southwards, although the Záluži chemical complex was not disturbed even though it was built on land that had not already been worked over. Of course, there was much resistance to resettlement—largely in the new town of Most (increased from 30,000 to 70,000) and smaller towns like Jirkov, Litvínov and Osek—although more realistic compensation was paid than in Romania. Leadership and social capital A feature of settlement planning was the limited scope for community initiative in rural development. That communities were not entirely powerless is demonstrated by Pine and Bogdanowicz (1982) who point out the difficulties experienced by the Polish communists in controlling the peasants. After Gomulka’s rise to power collectivisation was halted, but the use of ‘agricultural circles’ to plan production simply led to a fall in output. A further reduction in state control enabled the peasants to dominate local-level institutions, but there was a lack of investment and the children of peasant families increasingly gained professional qualifications and took advantage of economic diversification in areas like Podhale where light industry and tourism developed. However, the study went beyond the general theme

Table 7.4 Rural centres in Vâlcea County, Romania A Băbeni Bălceşti Berbeşti Creţeni DRĂGĂŞANI Galicea Lădeşti Măciuca RÂMNICU VÂLCEA Zătreni

B Cen Dis Cen Dis Cen Dis Cen Dis Cen Dis Cen Dis Cen Dis Cen Dis Cen Dis Cen

C

D

E

3.5 21.4 9.8 25.9 5.3 28.4 2.7 24.3 4.5 27.2 5.5 26.4 4.9 13.8 4.7 11.1 8.9 80.5 10.1

8.3 16.6 5.9 11.7 4.8 20.8 2.8 17.3 22.8 26.3 4.4 18.5 2.9 8.0 2.1 6.4 110.0 42.3 4.4

4.7 0.4 1.9 0.3 2.2 0.4 1.4 0.3 5.4 <0.1 2.9 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.6 0.3 11.3 0.4 1.6 0.4 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.4 0.1 0.2 <0.1 0.4 <0.1 68.0 0.8 7.0 0.5 0.4 0.2

F

G

H

2.4 1.4 9.9 4.3 5.7 3.7 15.9 10.4 2.5 0.8 15.6 7.5 1.5 0.8 14.1 5.7 3.4 2.1 15.4 8.5 2.6 1.8 13.3 7.0 3.2 1.1 8.0 2.6 2.9 1.3 7.1 3.0 3.6 1.6 25.0 6.2 6.0 3.4

I 21.7 8.5 4.6 11.9 2.3 14.3 1.5 11.3 8.0 13.4 4.2 11.7 2.3 6.7 2.1 4.8 2.9 35.9 3.8

J 1755 76 182 1589 728 1076 17 1025 4505 102 10 188 19 349 14 17 37435 330 19

K 891 43 115 1567 705 978 <1 993 330 71 1 161 3 338 − − 9729 34 16

Infrastructure, services and settlement

375

Dis 19.7 8.7 0.6 0.3 11.6 4.8 6.1 <1 Towns 13.3 132.8 79.4 1.2 6.9 3.8 10.9 41941 10059 New centres 46.5 21.1 14.0 1.5 26.9 14.4 42.4 2744 1732 Districts 278.7 176.5 19.8 2.6 135.9 60.1 124.4 4852 4186 Total 338.5 330.4 113.2 5.4 169.7 78.3 177.7 49537 15978 Key: A district centre (existing towns in upper case); B centre/district; C area (,000ha); D population (,000); E salaries (,000); F ditto agriculture; G agricultural land (,000ha); H ditto arable; I livestock units (,000) (reckoning 0.84 per cow, 0.20 per pig, 0.14 per sheep and 0.04 per head of poultry); J industrial production (billion lei); K ditto energy, mining/extractive industries and wood processing Constitution of districts: Băbeni: Frâncesti, Ioneşti, Popeşti, Şirineasa Bălceşti: Faureşti, Ghiroiu, Lalosu, Valea Mare Bărbeşti: Alunu, Grădiştea, Mateeşti, Sineşti, Slătioara, Stroeşti Creţeni: Amărăşti, Glăvile, Guşoeni, Mădulari, Pesceana, Şuşani Drăgăşani: Lungeşti, Orleşti, Prundeni, Scundu, Suteşti, Stefăneşti, Voiceşti Gălicea: Dănicei, Drăgoeşti, N.Bălcescu, Olanu, Stoileşti Lădeşti: Copăceni, Lăpuşata, Roeşti Măciuca: Firtateşti, Stăneşti Râmnicu Vâlcea: Boişoara, Budeşti, Bujoreni, Buneşti, Câineni, Călimăneşti, Mihăeşti, Olăneşti, Păuseşti-Măglaşi, Vlădeşti Zătreni: Livezi, Roşiile, Tetoiu Note: Figure 7.6 Shows plans for twelve new towns in Vâlcea County but three of these lie in a mountain zone beyond the main area of socialist agriculture (not covered by this survey, but comprising four small towns and twenty-three communes). The discrepancy of one arises from a revision of the CUASC units (i.e. associations of state and collective farms) Source: Commune statistical files for 1990

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

376

Figure 7.7 Housing in Poiana Mărului, Braşov County, Romania Note: The numbers refer to sequences often street numbers: e.g. 1=numbers 1–9 which may involve a total number of houses greater or smaller than ten depending on vacant numbers and splitting into a, b, etc. The map shows that (e.g.) 10 (=100–109) is an area of new development while 18 (180–188) has older housing with some rebuilding. to describe events in the poor, remote Podhale farming and handicraft village of Tymowa where two-roomed huts were connected by rough dirt tracks, which during the rains of autumn and spring and the snows of winter were rendered virtually impassable. Travel to the parish village (8km over a mountain) and to the market town of Nowy Targ (12km) to sell cheese, eggs or mushrooms was possible only when the roads were clear and was in any case limited to travel on foot, by cart or by sledge. With children put into service by the age of ten—and the need for patron-client relations to secure food for labour by the poor—the government of the 1950s considered the option of resettlement for a dying village (‘wiés zanikowa’). However, most people stayed and money was found from tourism and wage migration to the USA. Moreover, the building of a church in 1942 provided a precedent for further cooperative enterprises: a railway station with access roads (1954); a better school in the 1960s (helped by funds from the mining union that was using the village for holidays); and transformation of the agricultural circle into a village cooperative in the 1970s. There was some stimulus through the footwear industry started in Nowy Targ, but a crucial point over leadership was the presence of a trusted

Infrastructure, services and settlement

377

local administrator from the pre-war period who was also acceptable to the communist government. Decentralisation in the 1980s included new powers for the ‘basic-level national committees that are closest to the citizen and are in the best position to judge the legitimacy of citizens’ needs and interests’ (Vidlakova and Zarecky 1989 p. 179). The 1978 reform in Bulgaria provided for an elected mayor (‘kmet’) with the duty to manage public services and organise social and cultural activities; though with inadequate finance and administrative power until 1988. There was probably most substance in the reforms in Hungary through an attempt to revive local democracy by providing a new administrative body (‘eloljaroszág’) in villages that did not have their own administrative functions due to the merging of councils. Their role was to defend local interests and mobilise local initiatives (Maurel 1989 p. 121). This measure was one of several important changes in the administrative reform of 1984. There was also local economic management by councils in 1986 and the responsibilities of local government were expected to increase further, even under the communist system. Finance was a crucial issue since communism broke the system whereby the authorities were financed by local taxation. Hungary allocated more resources to small towns and villages in the 1980s but the budget was tight everywhere and thinking did move towards tax-raising powers for local government. Meanwhile, in the GDR after 1980, some plan targets were handled by local authorities and resourced by lump-sum payments. This gave them ‘direct access to the financial resources derived from the economic enterprises in their localities’ (Brauniger 1989 p. 201) and, with it, the stimulus to use the money as efficiently as possible, perhaps carrying out more building work (such as dwelling units) than that to which the sum was notionally geared. Planning was made a major issue but the system was gradually extended across rural areas. Whereas only 3,500 Polish villages out of 75,000 had their local plans, a simplified planning system was worked out for all ‘communes’ with participation of representatives. Conclusion Szelenyi (1996 p. 299) claimed that socialist planners were quite powerful, being relatively unconstrained by narrow economic considerations: they could, for example, object to high-rise buildings in the Budapest CBD because they would detract from the urban vista enjoyed from the Buda Hills; high-rise buildings were only allowed around the outer boulevard to close the vista rather than disturb it. Yet, there was little cohesion within socialist settlement systems: there were no locally or regionally based economic networks because the state economy was commanded by the various centralised government agencies. Socialist society became more stratified as bias in favour of the towns (especially the large towns) created a split between ‘the modern cities and the traditional local centres, with an inability to maintain adequate linkages between the modern sector and the countryside’ (Enyedi 1996 p. 114). The high level of commuting led Musil (1992) to refer to underurbanisation, for the six main cities of Czechoslovakia (Plzeň and Prague in Bohemia, Brno and Ostrava in Moravia and Bratislava and Košice in Slovakia) accounted for 20.5% of the industrial output by value but only 15.5% of the population. There was also a degree of ‘realisation’ in the towns, ‘both because of the large numbers of people who migrated to towns from rural regions and also because of

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

378

low standards of infrastructure in these towns’, despite socialist industrialisation (Perger 1989 p. 102). Also ‘small town society’ continued to be lacking lower down the hierarchy. Nevertheless, the distinct characteristics of ECE towns should not be exaggerated, for the socialist urban system could not be planned and managed’ in every detail, and while social processes could be modified by building on a massive scale, Enyedi (1996 p. 105) believed that the average citizen set his or her goals in basically the same way as those in Western Europe: ‘in fact these choices expressed a certain perception of urban space which is a part of a shared European culture’. Meanwhile, villages remained surprisingly traditional in character, but with some differences of emphasis since Albania and Hungary used the cooperative system to boost rural enterprise. More research is needed to indicate how far private farming exacerbated rural development in Poland and Yugoslavia through the lack of effective institutions.

8 REGIONAL PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE REGIONAL PLANNING This is a theme which has received little attention in previous chapters, for little sustained thought was given to the issue in earlier periods, when cores and peripheries were tacitly accepted as facts of life and demographic shifts were made accordingly. Discovery of compelling natural resources meant readjustment, as in the case of the Upper Silesian coalfield, and ad hoc programmes were launched in the Banat region in the eighteenth century, while the Second World War encouraged exercises in wartime dispersal to evade enemy bombing. On the other hand, regional power structures sometimes operated in order to reinforce established trends so that there may even have been ‘conspiracies’ to perpetuate the ‘natural order’ of regional variations and limit assistance to backward areas. However, regional policy was launched by the USSR as a fundamental component of its revolutionary strategy since a secure future for the state required a transformed geography of industrial production based on newly discovered resources in secure locations remote from Central Europe that could now offer better opportunities for nonagricultural work. Although radical relocation of production was not an appropriate strategic objective in ECE, given the relatively small distances involved, it was understandable that regional perspectives should be part of the communist agenda since there was a very strong desire for faster development and the region was certainly replete with classic backward areas—heavily dependent on subsistence agriculture and inured to persistent emigration—which now had their potential enhanced by the alliances forged with the USSR and programmes to develop the central places and their infrastructure. However, there was a lack of a fully fledged regional policy and the administrative regions, although crucial as building blocks in the socialist economy, were clearly passive in terms of location decision-making, which was in the hands of central organisations subordinated to the Communist Party and government. Despite an ideological emphasis on decentralisation to diminish regional inequalities, ‘centralisation and concentration were [in reality] highly valued in the socialist political and decision-making system’ (Enyedi 1996 p. 113). National growth maximisation was always the key consideration and equalisation between regions was thought most likely to follow from a fast-growing economy: there was little desire (except perhaps for a time in Yugoslavia) to pay the price of slower growth for equity in the short term (Koropeckyj 1977 pp. 126–7). As already suggested in the discussion of industrial location policy, the regional equity objective was always conditional on the identification of suitable elements in the plan that could be locationally decentralised without significant loss of efficiency overall. There was no slavish drive for total equality and—apart from the mining industry, which necessarily involved exploitation of the most attractive resources wherever they were

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

380

located—decentralisation typically involved the build-up of industrial capacities in the centres of the administrative regions (decentralisation to smaller towns was much less certain), and the ‘political clout’ of the leading regions was such that Dramowicz (1985 p. 321) was moved to quote from scripture: ‘for whosoever hath, to him shall be given’. This rationale can be seen clearly in Romania where the sixteen administrative regions of 1956 were replaced by forty counties in 1968 (forty-one in 1980) in order progressively to extend the number of provincial growth centres. Development targets were spelt out in broad terms until the 1981–5 FYP set out to achieve an industrial production value of at least 10 billion lei in each county. In 1985, thirty-eight counties achieved this target: Călăraşi, Giurgiu and Mehedinţi, failed and the poorest performer (Giurgiu) had only 4.8% of the industrial production of the capital city (a county in its own right) and 9.4% of the level of the second-largest producer (Prahova at that time). In 1970 only nine counties had passed the threshold and the weakest county then (Sălaj) had shares of 1.4% and 3.7%, respectively. Thus over fifteen years there was a general upward trend in the value of production but the relative positions of the counties did not change massively. In 1975 there were twenty-one counties over the threshold and the weakest county (Bistriţa-Năsăud) scored 1.7% of the Bucharest output and 4.7% of the next-highest producer (Braşov). In 1980, with thirty-one counties over the threshold, the weakest county (now Giurgiu) had reached 3% of Bucharest’s level and 6.9% of Braşov’s. Economists highlighted the convergence by ranking the counties in terms of socioeconomic status and identifying five clusters in addition to Bucharest. It was then obvious how the poorest groups had seen their fortunes enhanced since the smaller counties were created in 1968 and Ceauşescu announced a commitment to greater equality. However, the statistics show only a partial convergence since Group Five’s share of the total investment in the 1980s was only 70% of the population share while Bucharest attracted investment 1.6 times its population; although the picture was one of near equality for the other groups (Table 8.1). When salaried employment is considered major differences emerge in 1989 with 486 jobs per thousand of the population in Bucharest and progressively lower figures through the groups to 255, implying much greater reliance on cooperative farm work (Table 8.2). Industry’s share does not vary much (between 43% and 49% apart from 55% in Group One) but light industry’s share exceeds one-third in Groups Four and Five. Finally, when twelve indicators of development (covering urbanisation, employment, investment, services and infrastructure) are combined and weighted according to population

Table 8.1 Investment in Romania 1950–89 by county groups Group

Period

Bucharest

1950s a 15.7 7.3 n.a. n.a. b 2.1 1.0 n.a. n.a. 1960s a 16.3 10.1 10.2 11.5 b 2.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1970s a 14.1 8.4 7.9 11.8 b 1.6 0.9 0.9 1.3 1980s a 16.3 7.7 7.4 9.9

A

B

C

D

E 3.5 0.5 3.4 0.4 2.5 0.3 5.9

F

G

H

35.9 4.8 34.0 4.4 28.3 3.1 31.8

29.1 3.9 36.2 4.6 27.3 3.0 18.9

58.7 7.8 36.2 4.6 34.0 3.7 61.2

I 32.9 4.4 17.4 2.3 18.5 2.0 27.1

J

K

55.6 7.1 67.9 8.7 59.2 6.5 83.2

34.1 4.5 31.5 4.1 25.7 2.8 31.2

Regional planning and environmental change

381

b 1.6 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.5 3.2 1.9 6.1 2.5 8.3 3.1 1950s a 27.3 25.3 n.a. n.a. 11.9 17.9 17.5 10.5 16.8 10.2 21.6 b 1.8 1.7 n.a. n.a. 0.8 1.2 1.2 0.7 1.1 0.7 1.4 1960s a 18.3 22.2 20.8 15.5 12.8 15.1 13.0 14.4 12.3 7.1 18.0 b 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.4 1.2 1970s a 17.0 20.2 21.1 14.6 13.2 13.6 11.8 14.9 13.9 4.5 14.7 b 1.1 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.9 1980s a 15.5 20.2 21.2 12.6 14.0 10.4 8.5 8.9 12.5 5.8 13.7 b 0.9 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.8 Group Two 1950s a 24.8 25.3 n.a. n.a. 26.7 22.7 27.8 11.0 23.4 13.7 21.5 b 1.2 1.2 n.a. n.a. 1.3 1.1 1.3 0.5 1.1 0.7 1.0 1960s a 26.6 29.0 29.9 25.8 27.1 22.4 23.0 16.7 35.6 9.5 22.4 b 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.1 0.7 1.7 0.4 1.1 1970s a 26.2 25.8 26.9 18.5 26.1 26.8 32.4 17.8 21.8 11.6 22.4 b 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.5 0.8 1.0 0.5 1.0 1980s a 24.5 22.1 22.2 21.4 23.4 28.2 43.3 11.7 15.9 3.5 21.9 b 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 2.0 0.5 0.7 0.2 1.0 Group Three 1950s a 19.8 22.1 n.a. n.a. 31.0 11.2 12.1 7.2 13.3 8.4 11.7 b 0.8 0.9 n.a. n.a. 1.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.5 1960s a 19.1 20.8 19.8 19.7 24.5 13.3 13.3 12.9 17.3 7.8 13.1 b 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.5 1970s a 20.5 23.2 23.9 18.7 24.8 14.3 13.2 13.4 20.2 7.5 14.4 b 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.6 1980s a 20.1 24.2 24.8 19.3 23.1 13.4 14.3 7.8 19.3 5.1 14.8 b 0.9 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.7 Group 1950s a 5.4 6.3 n.a. n.a. 16.6 7.8 8.3 8.2 9.3 7.9 7.0 Four b 0.5 0.4 n.a. n.a. 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 1960s a 11.7 10.6 12.8 18.5 16.7 10.5 9.6 13.0 11.0 4.9 11.1 b 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.6 1970s a 13.2 13.4 12.1 22.3 18.7 10.3 9.6 12.8 14.7 8.8 9.8 b 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.3 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.6 1980s a 14.9 17.1 16.8 19.6 17.6 10.7 12.1 6.8 15.5 1.5 11.4 b 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.7 Group 1950s a 4.7 2.7 n.a. n.a. 10.3 4.5 5.2 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.1 Five b 0.3 0.2 n.a. n.a. 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1960s a 8.0 7.3 6.5 9.0 15.5 4.6 4.8 6.7 6.4 2.8 3.9 b 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3 1970s a 9.0 9.0 8.2 14.1 14.7 6.7 5.6 7.1 10.9 8.4 6.9 b 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 1980s a 8.8 8.7 7.6 17.2 16.4 5.5 4.4 3.6 9.7 1.0 7.0 b 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.3 1.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.5 Key: a—share of investment (%); b—share related to the share of population (where the latter=1); A total; B industry; C heavy industry (including building materials; wood processing; paper and Group One

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

382

glass/porcelain); D light industry; E agriculture and silviculture; F tertiary sector: total; G transport, telecommunications and distribution; H education and science; I health; J administration; K others Constitution of groups (see Figure 7.6 for locations): Group One: Braşov, Caraş-Severin, Hunedoara, Prahova, Sibiu, Timiş Group Two: Arad, Argeş, Bacău, Brăila, Cluj, Constanţa, Galaţi, Mureş Group Three: Alba, Bihor, Călărasi, Covasna, Dâmboviţa, Dolj, Gorj, Harghita, Ialomiţa, Maramureş, Neamţ Group Four: Buzău, Giurgiu, Iaşi, Mehedinţi. Satu Mare, Suceava, Tulcea, Vâlcea Group Five: Bistriţa-Năsăud, Botoşani, Olt, Sălaj, Teleorman, Vaslui, Vrancea Source: Anuarul Statistic al RSR

Table 8.2 Salaried employment in Romania 1960– 89 by county groups Group Bucharest

1960 I

II

1970 I

II

1980 I

II

1989 I

II

A 559.4 364.6 808.7 557.0 1077.1 515.2 1127.4 486.0 B 232.3 160.0 349.6 180.6 475.9 227.7 479.8 206.9 C 100.9 69.5 174.9 120.5 275.8 142.9 297.1 128.1 D 93.2 64.2 120.4 82.9 130.4 67.5 128.0 55.2 Group One A 765.2 225.1 1065.3 325.2 1439.4 398.8 1520.1 402.1 B 380.5 126.9 543.5 201.6 780.5 216.1 831.7 219.9 C 168.0 56.0 271.6 90.5 446.7 128.7 478.4 126.5 D 84.2 28.1 84.8 28.3 170.4 49.1 173.5 45.9 Group Two A 718.4 176.0 1183.1 289.7 1671.8 345.0 1817.8 359.2 B 258.4 63.3 453.4 96.4 717.5 148.1 812.5 160.5 C 73.4 18.0 158.6 38.9 318.0 67.7 380.5 75.2 D 86.4 21.2 138.2 33.9 199.3 42.4 212.7 42.0 Group Three A 564.0 137.5 954.4 232.7 1541.0 307.1 1669.0 319.7 B 213.7 52.1 386.1 84.7 696.5 138.8 819.1 157.0 C 61.2 14.9 133.1 32.5 301.8 66.2 374.8 71.9 D 53.3 13.0 100.5 24.5 181.1 39.7 214.3 41.1 Group Four A 421.0 113.8 721.3 194.7 982.9 263.9 1107.0 290.4 B 126.8 34.2 239.3 45.6 408.5 109.7 510.3 134.0 C 26.9 7.3 65.8 17.8 173.0 42.8 212.6 55.8 D 41.4 11.2 72.5 19.6 161.1 39.9 177.7 46.7 Group Five A 221.2 80.7 376.9 136.2 658.5 226.0 755.5 255.2 B 43.3 15.7 94.7 33.3 247.8 85.0 346.0 116.7 C 6.1 2.2 8.4 6.7 98.4 34.5 145.5 49.1 D 17.6 6.5 38.8 14.0 91.7 32.2 127.3 42.9 Key: I employment in thousands; II ditto per thousand of the population; A all wage earners; B all industry; C heavy industry (metallurgy, engineering and chemicals); D light industry (textiles, clothing, leather and food processing) Source: Anuarul Statistic al RSR.

Regional planning and environmental change

383

there is a fairly steep gradient from 1.49 in Bucharest to 0.74 in Group Five for 1989, although the gap was even greater in 1970—from 2.55 in Bucharest to 0.49 in Group Five. Meanwhile, some countries clearly went beyond this simple formula of partial levelling and reference will now be made to several countries where regional policy was, to an extent, debated and even contested. Although there was an underlying trend towards decentralisation (with strong regional lobbies in some cases) it was always a constrained process and complemented by efforts to consolidate scattered settlement (reaching an extreme but impractical degree in Romania). Poland shows the greatest academic and professional input but with constant shifts in thinking to accommodate local interests and harmonise location policy with the regional administrative structure. Czechoslovakia Here, a clear commitment was maintained to the relatively backward Slovakia, which was assisted in its development by some enterprise relocation and relatively high capital allocations to change the balance fundamentally (although it was not until 1969 that the principle of autonomy enshrined in the 1945 ‘Košice Programme’ was honoured by the establishment of a federal state). In 1980 Slovakia accounted for 33% of the country’s population and 28% of the industrial production; a much smaller deficiency than in 1938 when the figures were 25% and 8%, respectively. Of course, the strategy has to be seen in the context of rapid growth in production all round—there was no question of restricting development in the Czech lands—while faster growth in Slovakia was eminently appropriate on the basis of linkages with the USSR which were demonstrated most impressively by the Košice steelworks using Ukrainian iron ore and coke from Ostrava. Indeed, there was a clear logic for the priority given to armaments industries in the Hron and Váh valleys which thereby provided an effective back-up to Warsaw Pact troop deployments facing NATO in the Bohemian diamond (and especially the western salient). Furthermore significant growth had already occurred during the Second World War when Slovakia was nominally independent, although inevitably part of the Axis war machine. Czechoslovak planners concentrated on cities with the potential to develop to population levels of 50,000, and towns were grouped into nineteen agglomerations with a minimum population of 100,000 each. With specialisation between the constituent towns each group would function as an effective urban core capable of extending influence over an extensive rural hinterland. In 1973 accelerated urbanisation began in Slovakia with the focus on large towns capable of reaching a population of 100,000 by 2000. The development of Bratislava was planned to continue through to 2000 thanks to apartment blocks constructed by building enterprises from various parts of the country. Petrszalka on the western side of the Danube was planned as a suburb of 150,000 people, justifying a fast rail link with the centre and a new bridge over the river. Then there was the leading provincial city of Košice and four others (Banská Bystrica, Nitra, Prešov and Žilina), and six potential agglomerations of 100,000 with core towns of 50,000. Realisation would require 50,000 migrants from the countryside and the natural increase of both the urban and rural areas.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

384

Hungary This was another rather special case because of the dominance of Budapest following an ‘American tempo’ of growth there after 1870 (Enyedi 1992 p. 55) compounded by the restriction of the state to its Trianon frontiers after the First World War. Radical action was needed to strike a more equitable balance between the capital and the provinces. As Compton (1979 p. 486) remarked, as ‘a monocentric city in which commerce, administration, culture and entertainment are overwhelmingly located in and around the CBD’—while suburban centres gained a lower level of provision per capita than many rural areas—further shopping space and office accommodation in Budapest could not be met without demolition and further displacement of the resident population. Further industrial growth in the capital also raised the issue of economies of scale versus the social disruption of long-wave migration and stunted growth in the provinces (particularly the industrial economies of towns in the Great Plain), condescendingly referred to as ‘vidék’ to underline the much lower living standards. So a compromise was worked out whereby Budapest continued to grow but not in a way that would unreasonably constrain the provincial towns with aspirations as cultural centres and ‘metropoles d’équilibre’ roles. Industrial relocation from the mid-1960s—often driven by pollution hazards and large space requirements—has already been mentioned, but further momentum came from the emphasis in the second FYP on the leading provincial towns. Then, as a reaction to the autonomy provided through the NEM in 1967, a National Settlement Development Strategy was elaborated in 1971 covering nine settlement levels, of which Budapest comprised the first category. While Budapest would increase its share of population from 18.8% to 19% during 1970–2000, more substantial increases were anticipated in the first-, second- and third-order regional centres: a group of five large regional cities (Debrecen, Győr, Miskolc, Pécs and Szeged) which offered the best potential as counterweights to Budapest; a group of six slightly less prominent regional centres (Békéscsaba, Kecskemét, Nyíregyháza, Székesfehérvár, Szolnok and Szombathely); and a further group of twelve centres covering the remaining county towns, along with four centres of similar population size and economic importance (Table 8.3). By the early 1980s, considerable progress had been achieved with all the main regional centres but one (Győr) having reached the minimum population target of 150,000 and with all the cities in the next group having passed their designated minimum of 80,000, apart from Békéscsaba and Szolnok. It seemed that the higher-level settlements would be a threat to the smaller towns and villages—to say nothing of the settlements with fewer than 3,000 inhabitants left out of the strategy altogether because they were ‘unable to provide the urban services desired by their own and the surrounding population’ (Dienes 1973 p. 47). However, quite a marked change

Table 8.3 The Hungarian settlement system Status and number Average population Percentage Hinterland of centres (thousand) share population 1970 2000

Employment percentage A B

Budapest

n.a.

2600–800

18.8

19.0

2.6–2.8 million

n.a.

Regional planning and environmental change agglomeration Regional centre: 150–300 1st order 5 Regional centre: 80–150 2nd order 7 Regional centre: 50–60 3rd order 11 Sub-county 20–40 centre 64 Lowest-order 5–6 Centre 1120–1350 Key: A production; B services Source: Dienes 1973 p. 37

385

6.6

8.6

1.0–1. 5 million 48–50

50–2

3.7

6.0

0.4–0.6 million

55–60

40–5

4.7

6.0

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

10.8

14.7

50,000–120,000 62–5

35–8

47.3

32.6

5,000–6,000

20–5

75–80

occurred during the 1960s: whereas 45.9% of the 191,900 (net) rural-urban migrants went to Budapest during 1960–3, the proportion fell to 30.5% for the 157,300 migrants during 1964–7 and 24.9% for the 138,800 who left the countryside in 1968–71. This reflected the diversion of industry from Budapest to other towns through new investment as well as relocation. Capacity in Budapest was complemented by new production in the provinces. In cotton spinning new mills were built in Kaposvár, Szeged and Miskolc as well as Budapest, although the capital remained important for finishing and for clothing industries which obtained grey cotton fabric from Békéscsaba, Győr, Sopron and Szombathely. In brewing a new unit in Miskolc freed up space at Kőbánya (Budapest) used to produce bottled beers for export. And increased specialisation in Budapest’s engineering plants released functions to new factories in the provinces: in the case of Ganz, electric meters went to Gödöllo, while the Red Star (former Hofherr) Tractor Works released agricultural machine-building to Makó and Törökszentmiklós. There was a case for producing more mining machines near to the main domestic markets in Miskolc and Salgótarján. Thus, while the workforce in Budapest engineering rose from 221,000 to 273,400 during the 1960s, the expansion in the rest of the country was much more rapid: from 122,400 to 236,300, reducing Budapest’s share from 64.4% to 53.6%. This trend was evident in all branches of engineering except precision engineering where growth in Budapest was more rapid (22,600 to 35,000) than elsewhere (6,800 to 8,100) and the capital’s share there increased from 76.9% to 81.2%. Meanwhile, considerable improvement was effected on the Great Plain, not only through factory relocation but by means of new branch plants (encouraged after 1968 by the NEM), agricultural-industrial enterprises and a growth of tourism linked with national parks. Poland This country gave perhaps the most careful attention to regional issues: a Central Planning Office was created in 1945 and a decree the following year gave physical planning a key role in development plans, beginning with the Three Year Reconstruction Plan (1947–9) and the Six Year Plan of 1950–5. The prime concern was with the main urban-industrial areas of Warsaw, Upper Silesia and the industrial extending northwards from the latter to Łódź and Gdańsk and westwards to Wrocław. Warsaw was in great need of reconstruction following the disaster at the end of the war, when its population

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

386

had collapsed from 1.3 million in 1939 to 160,000 at the time of liberation in 1944. After a dramatic revival, the city developed a momentum of its own, for ‘despite many restrictions the operation of economic factors of spatial selection should not be underestimated in fostering and consolidating spatial structures’ (Węcławowicz 1979 p. 422). Immigration was severely restricted after 1954 and additional jobs were provided in the small towns of the region through the transfer of firms from the capital—though the scale of movement was less than anticipated and some new investments (including a new steel works) initially allocated to small towns were restored to the city itself. Nevertheless, a balance was struck and reduced pressure from industry simplified the redevelopment of some mixed residential-industrial areas, while Praga and Wola remained industrial areas in the east and west, respectively (and new industrial estates were laid out at Młociny, Słizwiec and Żerán). In Upper Silesia, too, priority for recovery was essential (as discussed below) but there was also some priority for the proposed ‘Central Industrial Region’ in Sandomierz, even though territorial changes now made this something of a border region. Stalowa Wola was declared a town in 1945, after the initial development had stopped in 1939 (with the basic infrastructure installed) and most of the industry was destroyed during the war, and the steel mill (Huta Stalowa Wola) emerged in the 1950s under the Six Year Plan with further growth in the 1970s. In 1990 the town’s population reached 70,000 (well in excess of the target of 50,000) and settlement extended along the railway on the west side of the San south of Rozwadów, which was incorporated within the town in 1973. Planning was also concerned with emerging growth areas—with regard to both the development of natural resources and infrastructure—as well as local resource development, agricultural regions and tourist regions. Initial concentration, with constant expansion of existing enterprises, brought a reaction in the 1960s through more controlled growth in Warsaw, Łódź and Upper Silesia and greater decentralisation. The inter-war notion of large additional industrial concentrations in underdeveloped areas with an adequate water supply—the Gwda-Noteć confluence near Piła in Pomerania and the Biebrza-Narew confluence at Wizna (between Białystok and Łomża) in the northeast—was given up in preference for a wider range of new locations which was considered a better basis for regional development in view of the security provided by the Soviet alignment and the diverse industrial heritage of the ‘Recovered Territories’. Spatial spread was accomplished through new resource-based developments: copper at Legnica-Głogów; sulphur at Tarnobrzeg; and electricity generation at Bełchatów near Łódź (though the capacity has reached only 4,390mW compared with the 7,400mW initially envisaged). There was clearly some hesitation over large developments in remoter locations and the first pit in the Lublin coalfield (Bogdanka) did not open until 1982. Urban agglomerations However, the prospective spatial plan for the Polish economy until the 1990s favoured ‘moderately polycentric concentration’ which left extensive areas protected for farming, forestry, tourism and water supply away from the nodes and corridors. The aim was to control decentralisation and replicate the ‘agglomeration’ and ‘mosaic’ characteristics of Warsaw and Upper Silesia nationwide to achieve zonal regions for harmonious regional development without excessive decentralisation. There was now a much stronger network

Regional planning and environmental change

387

of regional centres reflected in the pattern of commodity links forged by rail and road shipments (examined for 1965, 1970 and 1973). The most intense links connected large provincial cities—especially in the west and northwest—with Upper Silesia (including Kraków and Opole as well as Katowice) which was recognised as ‘the main driving force of the increasing intensity of commodity links’ (Dębski 1980 p. 125), although there was also much movement within the Katowice agglomeration itself. Other provincial areas had lower-level links with Katowice through insufficient specialisation. So under a National Spatial Plan, to run from the 1970s to the 1990s, the high-level flows would provide the core of an urban network to manage spatial development. Forty-nine voivodships (replacing the seventeen in force until 1975) would endorse polycentric concentrations of urban-industrial development as an efficient basis for investment exploiting nodes and belts provided by the existing transport system. These centres would offer more diversified industrial economies with agglomeration economies and a mix of large enterprises. Hence Dawson’s (1970 p. 194) reference to a ‘plateau of medium values invaded by a higher level for major urban-industrial regions, growing steadily outwards through new growth points and agglomerations’ with their strong commodity links, especially the supply of components to the shipyards of the Baltic coast. Unfortunately there was always tension between the notion of a limited number of agglomerations (between 16 and 32) and a system of 49 voivodships which produced vested interests in support of a much greater number. The evolution of the concept deserves detailed historical review combining academic, professional and party inputs. Only an outline can be provided here of what is a complex piece of planning history. Lijewski (1976 p. 167) emphasised the advantages of agglomeration arising from the technical and social infrastructure; opportunities for many professions and vocations; cooperation with other industrial plants; and specialised research bodies such as universities and institutes. Yet some compromise was necessary to avoid perpetuating a small number of particularly powerful cities. Dziewoński (1960) highlighted the contrast between voivodships with centres too weak to unite the whole territory: such were the ‘antagonistic contradictions’ that strong centres might influence as many as three voivodships. Hence the recognition not merely of key ‘industrial regions’ but also (a) ‘industrialising areas’ like Tarnów-Rzeszów; Zgorzelec-Zielona Góra; and the Submontane (Podkarpacki) area of Krosno; and (b) isolated growth centres and rural areas organised on the basis of medium-sized towns or larger cities with a higher level of polarisation like Białystok, Lublin and Olsztyn (Dziewoński and Leszczycki 1966 p. 263). So initially sixteen urban agglomerations with a total population of 20.6 million were identified by Iwanicka-Lyra (1969) according to density and weight of non-agricultural population—plus an additional 2.35 million in four newly emergent groupings: Carpathians; Copper Basin; Kalisz-Ostrów Wlkp. and RzeszówTarnobrzeg. But the state planning organisation then took hold of the concept through an Expert Commission on Spatial Development Planning appointed in 1972. And in a report of 1974—synchronising spatial and economic planning for the 1974–90 period—there was (a) a classification of the sixteen existing agglomerations into ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ categories—the latter comprising Białystok, Bielsko-Biała, Częstochowa, Kielce, Lublin and Opole—and (b) the introduction of seven new agglomerations: adding Rzeszów to the list of developing agglomerations and listing Kalisz, Koszalin, Legnica, Olsztyn, Tarnów and Zielona Góra as potential agglomerations. Altogether this study

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

388

revealed twenty-three agglomerations—requiring 7.4 million further housing units (Figure 8.1). Some academic studies continued to focus on the ‘basic’ sixteen agglomerations (Eberhardt 1978), after Leszczycki et al. (1975) had shown them organised in a ‘nodes and belts’ pattern. These agglomerations had a population of 12.16 million in 1975, almost double the figure for 1931–3 (6.45 million) which was in turn four times the population in 1868–71 (1.51million). By contrast the total urban population was 19.03 million (slightly less than double the 1931–3 figure of 10.66 million that in turn was some 2.5 times the 1868–71 figure (4.10 million). But since a population of 15 million was excluded from the system—including Koszalin, Olsztyn and Zielona Góra—it may be surmised that there was pressure to extend to the network to include more of Poland, especially the area of high population density in the southeast where incipient agglomerations were identified over quite extensive areas that were fully integrated at the time. Thus Rzeszów included Przemyśl and Stalowa Wola-Tarnobrzeg, while Tarnów (proposed for separation from Krakow in the 1972 document) was substituted by a ‘Carpathian agglomeration’—covering Nowy Sącz and the Jaslo-Krosno-Sanok group— in the Leszczycki et al. (1975) scheme. On the basis of the spatial structure of internal migrations conditioned by concepts of gravity and intervening opportunity, Zurkowa and Księkąk (1980) recognised nine ‘developed’ and eight ‘developing’ urban agglomerations plus another twenty-eight development centres. In addition Katowice and Warsaw were agglomerations of national importance. There was thus a close correlation between urban systems and voivodships although no single scheme proposed an exact fit. Finally Potrykowska (1985) took the concept to its logical conclusion by listing fortyseven functional urban regions—with core populations fluctuating from below 50,000 at Chełm and Zamość to over a million at Katowice and Warsaw—each

Figure 8.1 Urban agglomerations in Poland

Regional planning and environmental change

389

consisting of concentric zones with decreasing commuting intensity. Supra-regional centres—usually with a core population exceeding 200,000 and a well-developed labour market—would attract commuters from weaker adjacent regions with Warsaw drawing people from Płock, Radom and Siedlce; Białystok from Łomża-Ostrolęka and Suwałki; and Gdańsk from Elbląg. Some urban regions were generated by breaking up established agglomerations: for example, Inowrocław and Toruń were separated from Bydgoszcz, Jelenia Góra from Wałbrzych, Nowy Sącz from Jaslo-Krosno-Sanok, Ostrowiec Św. and Piotrków Tryb. from Łódź, Przemyśl and Stalowa Wola-Tarnobrzeg from Rzeszów, Radom from Kielce, as well as Tarnów from Kraków. This resulted in fourteen new groupings (allowing for Elk-Suwałki, Łomża-Ostrolęka and Biala Podłaska-Siedlce as pairings). Piotrykowska’s scheme also included around twenty other smaller groupings which lay in the peripheral zone (Table 8.4).

Table 8.4 Urban agglomerations in Poland 1979 A

B

C

Developed agglomerations Warsaw 1555.4 829.8 8.90 Łódź 942.7 470.4 −6.89 Kraków 693.6 363.0 0.92 Wrocław 597.8 298.4 0.83 Poznań 537.2 273.5 2.02 Gdańsk 720.9 337.4 6.18 Szczecin 439.9 209.2 1.09 Katowice 2633.1 1377.5 −5.16 Bydgoszcz* 338.0 167.0 −1.69 Toruń* 165.3 85.6 −0.45 Wałbrzych-Kłodzko 253.6 127.5 −0.11 Developing agglomerations Lublin 290.4 145.0 −1.32 Częstochowa 228.3 112.8 −2.52 Białystok 211.2 108.5 −2.42 Radom† 183.5 94.5 −3.44 163.2 100.1 1.84 Kielce† Bielsko-Biała 156.1 106.8 −1.83 Opole 111.3 71.2 7.88 Rzeszów 112.7 87.1 7.78 Potential agglomerations Olsztyn 126.6 70.4 7.77 Tarnów 100.9 65.4 3.89 Kalisz-Ostrów 152.6 89.1 0.51 Wlkp. Zielona Góra 94.3 57.2 3.20 Legnica 189.3 79.9 0.51 Koszalin 86.4 46.7 5.36 Tarnobrzeg-Stalowa 84.0 39.1 4.80

D

E

5.01 −5.22 2.00 3.29 4.24 5.98 3.70 −0.27 −0.70 0.65 −4.34

−3.11 0.27 1.82 0.59 0.42 −1.41 0.83 −0.85 1.97 1.05 1.41

−0.37 −0.83 0.99 −4.14 0.19 1.39 5.30 4.07

1.63 0.05 1.12 3.92 0.82 −0.28 −3.49 −2.12

4.80 1.14 −0.10

−0.09 0.86 1.11

2.61 4.44 4.64 3.20

−1.10 −1.77 1.17 −2.01

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

390

Wola

A

B

C

D

E

Other centres Elbląg 105.1 46.4 −5.09 2.88 0.07 Włocławek 95.8 54.3 −4.67 −2.52 0.25 Płock 96.7 56.1 0.30 2.21 1.26 Gorzów Wlkp. 98.7 53.7 −2.39 3.43 −0.30 Grudziądz 87.4 39.2 0.14 0.78 1.23 Słupsk 82.4 42.2 0.58 1.74 1.70 Piotrków 131.2 74.6 −3.97 −7.83 1.99 Trybunalski Jelenia Góra 84.6 41.9 9.50 0.74 0.35 Inowrocław 63.5 30.3 3.90 −0.40 0.45 Przemyśl 58.8 27.8 6.43 −7.07 2.03 Ostrowiec 150.6 103.3 1.07 −1.56 0.03 Świętokrzyski Gniezno 59.2 26.4 −0.94 −1.46 0.70 Konin 62.6 32.8 2.35 1.58 −1.23 Piła 54.9 26.3 0.01 3.67 0.82 Nowy Sącz 61.1 37.8 6.85 −1.66 2.16 Chełm 49.3 27.8 0.35 −3.40 1.64 Zamość 43.7 29.9 8.42 −2.25 2.03 Krosno-Jaslo93.9 80.2 8.52 0.41 −0.68 Sanok‡ 71.6 35.0 3.22 −0.85 0.33 Suwałki-Elk‡ 69.5 40.2 4.40 0.19 −0.05 ŁomżaOstroleka‡ Key: * Bydgoszcz-Toruń originally one agglomeration; † Kielce-Radom originally one agglomeration; ‡ shown separately on map (K-J-S referred to as Carpathian Agglomeration); A population (,000; threshold c. 50,000); B employment (,000); C services: index of development 1979 based on Z-score summations of nine variables—which often reflect deterioration during 1970s (high positive scores indicate good conditions); D housing resources and conditions—based on Z-score summations of seven variables concerned with dwellings, rooms, floorspace and amenities (high positive scores indicate good conditions); E average housing conditions: indicating overcrowding and lack of amenities (high positive scores indicate poor conditions) Source: Potrykowska 1985 pp. 115–18

However, there was considerable literature cautioning against too much concentration in the face of pressures from areas excluded, despite their weaker commodity links—noted in the Carpathian area by Kortus and Adamus (1989): even the mighty shipbuilding trust cooperated with ‘patronage plants’ which were specialised enterprises linked with smaller units in the surrounding area. Further research involved the ‘tracking’ of agglomerations

Regional planning and environmental change

391

through migration and the growth of the non-agricultural population and it was noted by Herman (1977) that the non-agricultural population increased from 10.3 million in 1960 to 12.4 million in 1970 (i.e. by 20.4%) in the sixteen principal agglomerations but more substantially from 7.8 million to 10.6 million (i.e. 35.9%) elsewhere, which suggested that agglomerations could not be regarded too exclusively. Tertiary functions were too easily correlated with centralised industrial developments and the voivodship authorities were advised to correct for this by arresting the decline of ‘powiat’ (district level) towns by strengthening their sub-regional service roles to limit concentration in the voivodship capitals (Korcelli and Potrykowska 1979 p. 233). Korcelli (1990) also drew attention to labour shortages in the cities that should have sought much higher productivity, but another solution was to expand smaller towns with lower costs and land more readily available. Moreover, for country people a move to a medium-sized town would give a greater probability of advancement than a move to the city. The need for action on this front seemed to vary across the country since the western regions were relatively advanced (with a danger of competing local centres) and it was in the centre and east where backward rural conditions were most evident. Dawson (1983) expressed doubts over the viability of the programme in the light of increasing commitments to the agricultural sector. He also referred to the reforms of 1982 giving greater powers to managers of SOEs. And more fundamentally Dziewoński (1976 p. 42) drew attention to the problems of development in the east due to infrastructure and historical traditions in education that were traced back to ‘an almost total lack of communal infrastructure’ before 1918. Moreover, in the light of the Solidarity era which projected public unease over ecological problems—as well as social stress and technical obsolescence which produced an impression that industry was not keeping pace with the changing aspirations of society—the Jaruszelski regime radically altered location policy for the 1983–90 period. A map was included within the National Socio-Economic Plan for 1983 to take into account ecological preferences and barriers (Figure 8.2). With certain exceptions— covering the coastal zone and the northeast lakeland—the whole area north of a line Gubin-Poznań-Bydgoszcz-Płock-Warsaw-Lublin was designated a ‘zone of preference for industrial location’. And within this zone many small towns were highlighted as preferred locations (some specifically for clean industries). At the same time certain areas were threatened by ecological problems—Upper Silesia along with Bydgoszcz, Częstochowa, Konin, Kraków, Legnica, Łódź, Opole, Tarnów, Wałbrzych, Włocławek and Wrocław. New ‘dirty’ industry was prohibited in all these areas with outright prohibition of all new industry in Upper Silesia, Legnica and Łódź—as well as Warsaw which was not considered ecologically threatened. Some twenty voivodships in the south were subjected to safeguards on account of their good-quality soils but there was also financial support for industrial restructuring. This was a major revision of the agglomeration strategy and possibly the most specific industrial location strategy ever published in ECE throughout the communist period. It is doubtful if any plan could have worked with totalitarian government crumbling and state investment declining. With an inspiration from the Krakow industrial geographer B.Kortus it comes over as an understandable knee-jerk reaction to environmental problems but without enough provision for the restructuring in badly polluted areas which could hardly be denied new development indefinitely.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

392

Figure 8.2 Industrial Location Plan for Poland 1983–90 Upper Silesia and Kraków Poland’s planners were much exercised by the specific problems affecting this region. For long the division of the coalfield hindered a rational structure. But the end of the war brought unification under Polish administration. This radical shift in political fortunes was complemented by a major ethnic change. While the German population was largely expelled—and Silesians were allowed to emigrate to West Germany in 1957—there was an immigration of Poles from the east, including a new intelligentsia from Lwów (Soviet Lvov at the time). The pre-1918 boundaries were blurred by high migratory turnover, aggravated by poor environment and infrastructure, especially in the early years. Commuting to service industries in Katowice was all the greater because of the tradition of male employment which meant that many women travelled daily from the old Russian Dąbrowa with its history of lower living standards making for a high female economic activity rate. There was talk of a massive programme of Soviet investment to create an ‘eastern Ruhr’, backed by ambitious canalisation projects—extending what the Germans had started with enlargement of the Gleiwitz (Gliwice) Canal in 1939—to connect the

Regional planning and environmental change

393

Danube, Oder and Vistula as the basis of a new industrial axis—a perspective partly confirmed by the aforementioned Polish water plan. However, it transpired that the Soviets had no intention of making investments outside the USSR while the waterway plan could not have been achieved in the short time-span contemplated by the planners. This left the Poles free to place the region at the centre of the plan for priority to the region as the basis for national economic recovery. Coalmining was obviously fundamental and the peak wartime level was exceeded during the 1950s as an initial shortage of coking coal (requiring imports from Czechoslovakia—plus supplies from Wałbrzych exchanged for steam coal for power station use) was overcome by new mines sunk in the Rybnik Basin to produce coal for export that would finance the import of technology. According to Riley and Tkocz (1999), 22 new mines were sunk during 1945–78 and production rose from 57 million tonnes in 1947 to 197 million in 1979 before easing back to 174 million in 1989, with 150 million planned for 2000 (Kortus 1980 p. 57). Meanwhile, employment rose from 194,000 to 365,000 and per capita output rose from 292 to 521 tonnes. There was spatial change in the mining area for nine new pits appeared on the margins of the old field while four were situated close to Tychy and nine lay further to the south in the Rybnik Coal Basin around the town of Jastrzębie Zdrój. Output from the periphery exceeded the core by early 1980s, a contrast exaggerated by relatively old equipment in low-capacity mines in the core: in 1989 only four of the nineteen collieries producing more than 3 million tonnes per annum were in this area. However, more than half the sixty-one collieries operating in 1985 made a loss—the field as a whole was unprofitable—and there were no profitable mines at all in 1989. This situation was partly related to the variations in resources, for while 90% of the seams sloped at less than 15 degrees (facilitating the use of machinery, which was used for 95% of the production in 1975) the cumulative thickness of seams (individually thicker than 0.8m) down to a depth of 1,000m varied from 20–50m around Jastrzębie to 20–40m in the Katowice-Tychy zone and only 20–30m elsewhere. Some new collieries (e.g. Budryk and Żory) were sunk in the late 1970s with only 10m thickness of seams to exploit. But the communist regime accepted low productivity overall in order to boost output and made dubious decisions over new mines, not only at Budryk and Żory but in respect of the eastern area coals with a low calorific value and a high ash content: here there were a number of very large collieries with annual output of 4 million to 8 million tonnes (Jaworzno, Lenin, Piast, Staszic and Ziemowit). Other branches became less concentrated. New lead-zinc mines were sunk around Chrzanów (e.g. Olkusz and Pomorzany) and a new plant at Miasteczko Śląskie took over from the old pollution-ridden factories of Katowice and Świętochłowice. An aluminium smelter opened at Skawina near Kraków in 1960 using Hungarian bauxite and Silesian coal, while a large copper industry started outside the region altogether: at LegnicaGłogów where the first mines at Lubin, Polkowice and Rudna were followed by the Sieroszewice mine in 1977. Meanwhile, the wartime chemical plants were rebuilt to produce fertilisers and synthetic rubber, with petrochemicals at Blachownia. The expanding iron and steel industry also used locations on the margins, as already noted, with decentralisation restrained for reasons concerned with social engineering as much as economic efficiency. Engineering extended into new branches, for example the Tychy car factory based on a Fiat licence. But in structural terms there was only modest change and

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

394

the continuing importance of energy and heavy manufactures limited diversification. Relatively few new plants were built (though there was more emphasis on light engineering and consumer goods after 1970) and hence there was ‘a gap between technological progress and the existing out-of-date structure of industry’ (Kortus 1980 p. 53). Coalmining and heavy industry continued to dominate. In terms of employment fuel and power accounted for 52.1 % in 1946 and 42.4% in 1970 while metallurgy and engineering increased their share from 33.9% to 38.3% and other industries advanced from 15% to 18%. However, these figures relate to the old core area and if the whole of the Katowice voivodship is considered (including the Rybnik Coal Basin) then fuel and power would score 50.9% in 1984, metallurgy and engineering 31.7% and other industries only 17.4%. Naturally population tended to follow industry to the margins of the region and a measure of decongestion in the core was accelerated under the regional plan for ‘Gornośląski Okręg Przemyslowy’ (GOP) produced by a committee appointed in 1950 by the State Planning Commission, following inventory studies carried out during 1945–9. The plan was prepared during 1951–2 and accepted in 1953 when GOP was officially established with its thirteen towns (including four in Dąbrowa) although full administrative unity did not arise until the Katowice voivodship was reconstituted in 1975 (Figure 8.3). The congested ‘Zone A’ (700sq.km in area with a population of 1.85 million—producing a density of 2,000 persons/sq.km) was to be relieved by transfer to the surrounding ‘Zone B’ (1,700sq.km and—initially—a population of only 310,000 million: 182 persons/sq.km). New towns were proposed for Nowa Dąbrowa, Pyskowice, Radzionków, Tarnówskie Góry and Tychy with populations ranging from 40,000 to 120,000, and Kotela (1966) also referred to development at Gołonóg, Halemba, PiekaryWieczorek and Stolarzowice—also Grodziec, which was never started. Other places also expanded, such as Będzin, which was affected by the new ‘Katowice’ steelworks. Although Zone B grew by 312% during 1950–75 to 1.29 million its density was still way below that of Zone A which nevertheless experienced a net increase to reach 1.91 million. Reference should also be made to the Nowa Huta expansion in Kraków and the very fast growth in the urban population that occurred in the Rybnik Basin: from 65,000 to 359,000 during 1950–75 (discounting settlements smaller than 10,000 population). Most of the growth occurred at Jastrzębie-Zdrój, Rybnik, Żory and the Pawłowice and Mszana communities where new mines were sunk. Dziewoński (1976 p. 41) explains the continued importance of the central area of Upper Silesia through the drive for industrialisation that ‘increased the locational advantages of the largest industrial and urban agglomerations’ because many other parts of the country lacked the technical infrastructure necessary to sustain a more dispersed industrial pattern. Furthermore, the economy required more coal that meant Upper Silesia’s resources had to be used to the utmost. It was typical of the country as a whole that industrial concentration was diminished ‘more by the extension of the existing industrialised

Regional planning and environmental change

395

Figure 8.3 Decongestion in Upper Silesia areas than by the even distribution of new industrial development’ (ibid. p. 42). Also, a high level of integration was demonstrated between Upper Silesia and the adjacent industrial regions of Bielsko-Biała, Częstochowa, Kraków and Opole as well as Rybnik (Pakula 1976). Whereas the long-term deglomeration plan assumed an overall increase of employment of only 43,500 jobs during 1949–70 it was already three times this level by 1956 (Troc 1976 p. 36). The flow to the outer parts of Upper Silesia was accelerated by housing opportunities since it was much easier to find a flat in the periphery than in the core. So some people used an apartment as a commuter base (especially if there was a ‘push’ factor through

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

396

environmental difficulties in places like Chórzow, Świętochłowice and Trzebina) and subsequently moved on from Będzin, Bukowno or Jastrzębie-Zdrój if they could not adapt. There was also movement into Krzeszowice, Skawina, Słomniki and Wieliczka to take work in Kraków, with the aim of moving into the city itself eventually. Instability was partly the result of variations in living standards, for synthetic indexes for 1978–84 reveal high values in the GOP core, central districts of Kraków and some former district (‘powiat’) towns like Chrzanów, Racibórz, Rybnik and Tychy; followed by the corridors to Bielsko-Biała and Kraków and the Racibórz area. Low values occurred around Kraków because the city appeared to cast an infrastructural-social ‘shadow’ and therefore attracted people into the core despite the housing deficit. There was a continuing rotation of population as the suburban areas—instead of holding people from the remoter rural zone—experienced ‘intensive migratory turnover’ (Zborowski 1989 p. 142). It is also apparent that the Kraków ‘knot’ retained a degree of isolation while the planners sought greater integration with Bielsko-Biała, Częstochowa and Rybnik. There remained a clear perception of difference between Katowice and Kraków—and Dąbrowa—despite decades of unification. However, contrasts in living standards were reduced by 1984, weakening the relative advantage of the GOP core, where very high values persisted only at Gliwice, Katowice, Mikólow and Tarnówskie Góry—as well as the Kleparz and Śródmieście districts of Kraków. There were improvements northeast of Katowice due to the new steelworks built in the 1970s, for many commuters eventually invested in new houses in the Zawierce area; also Olkusz between Katowice and Krakow, through commuting to the steelworks as well as the local zinc mines; and areas like Bielsko-Biała, Czechowice-Dziedzice and Pszczyna affected by commuting to the mines of JastrzębieZdrój. Low levels persisted south of Kraków and there was deterioration in parts of the Rybnik Basin: Jastrzębie-Zdrój exceeded 100,000 population, lacked a city centre and enjoyed a ‘barely developed’ social infrastructure going little beyond a secondary school and a cinema: ‘the possibility of obtaining a flat quickly was the essential advantage of this city’ (ibid. p. 143), until depression affected the construction industry in the 1980s. So there was continued dynamism in the core despite replacement of population. Gliwice provides an interesting case of continuity after the Second World War because although the Germans left and nationalisation closed the offices of business administration—so the town ‘lost both its salient economic functions and a vital social component of its previous development’ (Domański 2000 p. 41)—the educational role was resumed through the new technical university (Politechnika Śląska) in 1945, with its own academic quarter and a core of academic staff from Lwów (originally planned for Katowice where Silesian University was subsequently founded in 1969). Furthermore, state-owned research and development used the old infrastructure and made the town a predominant research centre, with seven large Gliwice-based industrial research institutes, two branches of Warsaw-based research and development, three departments of the Polish Academy of Sciences and nineteen large engineering companies specialising in product design. The town also housed the Central Board of the Chemical Industry until it moved to Warsaw in 1951 as the Ministry of Chemical Industry: this was largely a new phenomenon apart from the old ‘Oberhutten’ laboratory. And it is not surprising to find that the town’s accumulated social capital has enabled it to survive the post-1989 restructuring with some success. But the core of the region was also plagued by a lack of spatial order due to the ‘unreasonable mixing of industrial and dwelling areas

Regional planning and environmental change

397

or infrastructure’ (Kortus 1980 p. 59). The aforementioned 1953 plan aimed at more systematic development with solutions to problems of water supply and the treatment of waste and pollution. Water supplies were to be augmented by reservoirs on the edge of the Carpathians and on the upper Vistula; parks were needed at Chorzów, Gliwice and Zabrze; and colliery waste material was to be used for building materials or forested over. Unfortunately, new mining projects brought new cases of degradation to the Rybnik area where mining produced 14.8 million cubic metres of waste in 1972 alone (of which 69% was placed on dumps in the form of conical mounds or plateaux), not to mention 148ha of flooded subsidence hollows (1972) mainly in the Chwałowicki and Knurówki valleys. Subsidence was reduced by the stowage of sand. This was originally to have been obtained from quarries near Jaworzno Colliery but this posed a threat to pleasant open space and woodland near the town. Instead sand came from the ‘Błędów Desert’ involving a sand railway with branches to the mines. Excavations at Borowa Wieś (76ha) and Jankowice-Boguszówice (150ha) were to be subsequently filled in with refuse. Meanwhile, many waste tips were levelled for planting or building and altogether there were plans to recover 517ha for agriculture and forestry during 1972–90. But other major improvements to the infrastructure were not achieved. While water was obtained from the Vistula and tributaries like the Skawa and Soła, the proposed transfer from the lower Dunajec (like the Central Canal) did not proceed. A 400kV power ring is available and the Bełchatów and Opole power stations exist but neither the Sobel (Nowy Sącz) 3,000mW pumped storage scheme nor the 2,780mW Radlów station at Tarnów were built. And while a ‘Great Circular Railway’ can be pieced together from existing track, the proposed expressway is still awaited (Adamus 1976). However, Kraków managed to close Czyżyny airport in 1963 and replace it with Balice and, in the case of pollution, an outstanding development was the closure of the Skawina aluminium plant due to public pressure during the Solidarity era. But not all the problems were solved and it remained for the post-communist authorities to grapple with the further amelioration of the environment and modernisation of the infrastructure. Yugoslavia This country had enormous north-south contrasts in development in 1945 and, as a federal state without overwhelming entanglements with the USSR, there was a decentralised system of government and considerable scope for innovation. Yugoslavia inherited industrial cores in northern Serbia (Belgrade-Pančevo), in northeastern Croatia (Zagreb-Sisak) and in central Slovenia (Ljubljana). The first two were especially important: indeed Yugoslavia was unique among the ECE states in having two first-order centres. It was also noticeable that the secondary centres were most numerous in Croatia, Slovenia and the northern (Vojvodina) area of Serbia—reflecting a general tendency towards a regular ‘rank-size’ progression among towns in the former Habsburg Empire (relatively highly urbanised in 1914)—contrasting with the primate tendency in the south where regional cities exerted an overwhelming dominance (Figure 8.4). However, the three cores already mentioned were nevertheless very strong and decentralised development was constrained. Moreover, the development of a national electricity grid system opened the way for remotely located power stations—mainly hydro, but also the Kosovo thermal complex—to supply the main industrial regions. Slovenia generated

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

398

local growth ‘poles’ but did not have the capacity for very large developments and there was no provincial pole strong enough to make an impression on the republic’s urban structure as a whole. However, she did well with her heavy industrial base, while factories near Maribor ‘were quickly turned into major textile, motor vehicle and aluminium plants’ (Hamilton 1968 p. 348). There was also growth in engineering and electrical industries and good prospects for trade with Europe in view of location in the north of the country and an efficient, motivated workforce. Meanwhile, the great advantages accruing to Belgrade and Zagreb for training led to neglect of the Pannonian ‘Razvoja’ region (Slavonia-Vojvodina) apart from food processing industries and fertiliser production—although it was partly strategic vulnerability that left this Danubian region with only its agriculture and small inherited industries. However, the advantages of water and transport capacity were later recognised and a Serbian growth model envisaged the transfer of 700,000 people into Belgrade, Šumadija and Voj vodina from the south (Kosovo, Sandjak and Timok) as well as the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro (ibid. p. 354). When the government set about the development of the poorer regions, the natural logic was to build up cores comparable with those already in existence: central Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo-Zenica); the Skopje-Tetovo area of Macedonia; the Nikšíć area of Montenegro; and also the Priština-Mitrovica area of Kosovo (known at the time as Kosovo-Metohija or ‘Kosmet’)—a large, backward area of Serbia which, like Vojvodina, enjoyed autonomy. Hamilton (1968 pp. 339–40) has described how metalworking industries were dispersed round these areas for strategic reasons, with attempts at selfsufficiency in each case, although duplication inhibited economies of scale. So the strategy—dating to the years of confrontation with the Warsaw Pact states after Tito’s expulsion from the Cominform—was later abandoned as impractical. Spatially, these core areas extended along the principal valleys and transport axes. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina this meant the Bosna-Neretva system (also Banja Luka-Doboj-Tuzla): accommodating food, paper and textile industries as well as the aluminium smelter at Mostar and light engineering enterprises to complement Elektro Srbija in Belgrade and Rade Končar of Zagreb. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina did not attract a fair share of ‘locationally neutral’ industries and the republic’s performance was considered poor considering the level of investment in capital-intensive heavy industry based at Zenica. Meanwhile, Montenegro acquired the loss-making Nikšić metallurgical

Regional planning and environmental change

399

Figure 8.4 Yugoslavia’s central place system (above) and electricity network (below)

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

400

industry producing special steels for armaments—incorporating some obsolete pre-war German reparations equipment—and an aluminium smelter in the same town; as well as cellulose and paper at Ivangrad and light engineering (refrigerators) at Cetinje. Power came from hydro sources but with manufacturing concentrated into three large enterprises in two cities, spread effects were weak. Macedonia’s core was more extensive, covering the Ibar-Morava-Vardar axis where development started with capital transfers for food and mineral processing as well as textiles (Skopje, as well as Štip, Tetovo and Veles) and engineering—agricultural machinery and household electrical goods—in Bitola for the local market; with hydropower from Mavrovo on the Vardar and the Skopje lignite-burning power station. As regional policy gained momentum after 1955 all the communes tried to share in federal development, at least through irrigated cotton and rice growing in the Vardar Valley, fruit growing at Tetovo and an expanding tobacco industry. Later successes included the Skopje steel mills (with 300,000 tonnes output in the late 1960s) combining Kičevo ore (110km) and Kosovo coke (100km)—albeit a controversial project in view of Zenica’s simultaneous expansion. Non-ferrous metals (lead, zinc, chrome and antimony) at Prilep, a chemical industry and the Acetilenka synthetic fibre complex extended the profile. Meanwhile, in Kosovo non-ferrous metals diversified away from the Trepča lead project (1926) to include lead and zinc at Kisnica while fertilisers were produced in Mitrovica and processing of lignite included not only coke for Macedonia (replacing earlier raw coal shipments) but gasification. In all these developing regions education, energy and transport needed support as essential elements of the infrastructure. It would be wrong to say that all this progress was the result of sophisticated planning. Although there was certainly a will to secure growth there were conflicting views on how it should be achieved. When the party’s economic chief B.Kidrić proposed ‘complex macro-economic regions’ in 1946 there was a dual pull from east and west. In the north this created tension between Zagreb and Rijeka while in the centre there was a choice between Sarajevo and the Adriatic ports of Bar, Ploče, Šibenik and Split; and in the south the choice was between Belgrade and Danube and a Skopje-Nessaloniki link. The maritime option seemed particularly persuasive in the eyes of railway experts at the time of the Cominform blockade when improved trans-Dinaric railways were conceived: the trunk lines to Bar, Ploče and Zadar with the potential to support ‘widely scattered “oases” of secondary activity’ in the karstlands (Hamilton 1968 p. 341). But there was also a school of thought favouring a regional plan that would restrict migration and support ‘under-developed regions’ with low per capita national income—appropriate for a country that sought solidarity with developing countries. Accordingly there was special funding—from the federal budget until 1954 and from the Federal Investment Bank thereafter—to support specific projects (like the Mavrovo and Zeta hydropower projects, industry at Nikšić, and mining ventures at Bor, Kičevo and Majdanpek) carried out initially during 1951–7 (i.e. between the first two FYPs). Then, with Bosnia and Herzegovina excluded from assistance because of its earlier rapid progress, the second FYP (1957–61) gave special attention to the autonomous region of Kosovo: training workers and developing infrastructure in order to expand and diversify the existing basic industries. In the process Priština University became grossly overcrowded and the supply of jobs could not keep up with the output of graduates. There was criticism of social engineering with emphasis on large projects and neglect of small business while the

Regional planning and environmental change

401

ethnic issue was a complication since the majority of Albanians had difficulty getting jobs (as first-generation workers with ‘one foot in the village’) yet there was hostility to non-Albanian specialists who made up for the shortage of local technologists. The third FYP (1961–5) saw help restored to Bosnia and Herzegovina (and also extended to parts of Croatia and Serbia—though individual programmes were not to cross republic boundaries). This was a period of progress in the Kosovo energy project with the opening of a 65mW power station in 1962—enlarged to some 800mW by the 1980s when coal output rose beyond 6 million tonnes compared with just 400,000 in 1950. Yet despite a strong backward-area policy there was little evidence of levelling and eventually Tito expressed doubts about the wisdom of building factories in remote places ‘at any price’ in view of the high costs and inefficient management. A special fund was provided in 1965 for ‘Insufficiently Developed Areas’ based on a classification into ‘developed’ and ‘less developed’ areas: the policy involved allocation of up to 2% of the economy’s gross material product to the less developed regions as well as an interregional reallocation of resources. At the same time, the percentage of profits paid to the state was halved from 60% to 30% to give more incentive to enterprises to invest in their own expansion. This was seen as a victory for Croatia and Slovenia whose profitable enterprises could not be handicapped indefinitely while other republics caught up. Indeed, this was a defining moment because although the backward areas retained their special allocations for the 1966–70 FYP (with the previously scheduled areas of Croatia and Serbia now excluded) there was much criticism of the inefficiency arising from indiscriminate growth and the developed regions insisted on reforms so that economic considerations would dominate investment decisions. Yet the opposing view argued that ‘socialism in Yugoslavia is not being built in a vacuum’ and backward areas remained sensitive over inferiority and injustice (Hoffman 1967 p. 658). The figures show very clearly the generous regional policies of the early years in contrast to the greater restraint of the 1980s. Even in 1955 investment per capita was highest in Montenegro (1.97 times the national average) followed by Slovenia (1.83), while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia were at 0.97 followed by Macedonia at 0.93 and Serbia, at 0.81. Whereas the GNP figures placed Slovenia in the lead on 1.75 followed by Croatia (1.22), Serbia (0.86), Bosnia and Herzegovina (0.83), Macedonia (0.77) and Montenegro (0.76—a fraction of the investment level which reflects the radical nature of policy at time). By contrast in 1987–8 investment levels not only showed greater polarisation but league table placings closely in line with GNP: Slovenia 2.21 and 2.03; Croatia 1.11 and 1.22; Serbia 0.95 and 0.90; Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.73 and 0.68; Montenegro 0.77 and 0.74; and Macedonia 0.68 and 0.63. There was some convergence in the proportions of workers in relation to population, but in the long run the new ventures in the southern republics did not greatly reduce the stronger position of Slovenia. The poorer regions did not achieve rapid growth and were frustrated by a revolution in rising expectation. This was particularly true of Kosovo where there was a growth of administration after the ‘Albanianisation’ of the province in 1965. Rioting there in 1981 led to a searching review of a thoroughly inadequate industrial development performance. Productivity was very low in the context of high levels of automation and studies of inefficient and badly managed enterprises testify to the scale of the problem. The Peč subsidiary of the Kragujevac car factory suffered from gross mismanagement, and a lack of local interest in improving efficiency was attributed since Kosovo still

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

402

lacked full republic status in the former Yugoslavia. In 1980 the province accounted for 7% of the country’s population but just 2.9% of GNP and 2.4% of foreign trade. It has been said that for regional development Yugoslavia was a special case because ‘extensive regional autonomy was developed for both administrative and economic organisations’ (Perger 1989 p. 105). Indeed, ‘the spheres of authority granted to the regional level made it possible for the administrative agencies in each of the republics to become the major redistributional centres’ (ibid.). This should have provided great opportunity, but there seems to have been a dilemma between polarised development and dispersal among small and medium towns: a strategy producing greater equality across each republic but without the economies of scale that concentration in key centres— including the republic capitals—could have produced. It is also evident that there was a neglect of small enterprises, for private producers were eliminated in favour of heavy capital-intensive industry and import substitution that some commentators consider was the wrong approach. Rural revitalisation was further compromised by the ambivalence shown towards private agriculture, for the abandonment of collectivisation left farms constrained in the quest for greater efficiency. Hasty deagrarisation (and feminisation) reflected the institutional insecurity of the private farm and understandable appreciation of social benefits in the socially owned sector. However, in a situation where disposal of a farm implied personal business failure, land provided some security and a base for retirement although spare-time farms with ‘no labour’ were a poor basis for modern agriculture. While the migratory ‘push’ factor was hardly constrained, the ‘pull’ factor gained momentum from entrenched attitudes on the superiority of urban life, not to mention migration to the northern republics and temporary work in Western Europe. The latter accounted for an estimated 880,000 workers in 1971—a security risk in the sense that the absentees were equivalent to ‘three full armies’. This issue went way beyond backward-area growth problems because the migrants included many qualified workers from Croatia where new jobs were also limited. Border regions and cross-border cooperation This final section examines the ‘blind spots’ of communist regional planners, for security naturally reinforced the neglect inherent in planning geared to national self-sufficiency. The ‘Iron Curtain’ itself was hardly a growth area and at the time the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, the East Germans imposed a control zone extending over several kilometers behind the frontier itself where limited economic structures were put in place to maintain closed communities. However, all borders tended to be relatively neglected areas since ‘Comecon reinforced isolationism and economic autarchy [and] introduced closed boundaries even between socialist countries. No transboundary urban attractions were allowed in the socialist system’ (Enyedi 1992 p. 57). Frontier towns were marginalised: Szeged’s growth was impeded by the proximity of the frontier, though it did eventually benefit from the aforementioned policy of counter-poles. And as has been said, because the new frontier in southeastern Poland left the Sanok-Przemyśl railway with a transit through Soviet territory from Kroscienko to Malhowice carriage windows had to be painted over and Soviet guards accompanied all trains. Most dramatically, however, the Polish government’s struggle with the remnants of the Ukrainian Liberation Army (responsible for the deaths of around 100,000 Poles during the war) resulted in the

Regional planning and environmental change

403

clearance of the entire frontier zone in the southeast Bieszczady region between the Sanok-Kroscienko and Sanok-Łupków routeways which constituted a closed military zone until 1956 when all Ukrainians were expelled (after the Poles had been previously forced out during the war by the Ukrainian insurgents Army and the Jews liquidated by the Nazis). There were also partial clearances further west. In order to give the Polish army better access through Ustrzyki Dolni the Soviet frontier was adjusted in Poland’s favour (with compensation in the Wisokie Litewskie area north of Terespol). Although some Poles returned after 1956 with transfers from the Podhale Region—and a Greek community was settled at Kroscienko—the area is still very sparsely populated with much of the former agricultural land now afforested and cherry trees the only signs of former habitation. Expulsion of the German population from Sudetenland also prompted belated resettlement efforts through encouragement of agriculture and industry during 1958–63. The Czechoslovak 1966–70 FYP saw special regional subsidies for agricultural cooperatives and industrial enterprises leading to the 1969 plan for the border territory (17,000sq.km with a population of 700,000) where ‘extremely unfavourable’, ‘difficult’ and ‘average’ living conditions were recognised. In connection with a programme of ‘regional proportionality’ launched in 1970, budget subsidies were offered in 1972 to fund higher wages and provide up to 70% of estimated construction costs for agricultural, industrial- and tertiary-sector projects. The need for greater agricultural self-sufficiency also impacted positively on border regions and reversed the trend towards afforestation. However, there was a lack of enthusiasm among the industry, tourism and trade ministries, and people continued to leave because of supply deficiences and a poor cultural life. Similar problems arose in parts of Poland although—generally speaking— the resettlement of Poles from their lost eastern territories replaced the German population expelled from the northern and western border regions during 1945–8, with continuing growth through natural increase. There was generally good social adaptation by a predominantly young population, while tourism helped maintain a satisfactory level of economic activity. Also, Poland cooperated with the GDR in creating some special cross-border institutions along the Odra-Nysa/Oder-Neisse frontier. Reference should be made to Bulgaria’s decree of 1982 which sought to halt emigration from border regions by the end of the eighth FYP (1980–5), particularly in the Strandzha-Sakar region (bordering the Black Sea) where agricultural-industrial complexes (AICs) were to expand sheep flocks and provide year-round employment in small industrial and forestry enterprises: the usual ‘brigade’ work unit was to be made more flexible to combine with small/family groups in mountain regions where individual piecework systems would be allowed. To boost the population, settlement and movement grants were offered to those prepared to stay for at least ten years and bonuses were payable to workers in the border areas from 1983. A special role was assigned to the communist Komsomol youth organisation to recruit 4,500 young workers and specialists: 2,500 for Strandzha-Sakar region (where a Komsomol ‘Republic of Youth’ was proclaimed) and 2,000 for other border areas (with free travel twice a year to their place of birth).

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

404

Hungary Hungary had the greatest interest in seeking to minimise the impact of frontiers since the Trianon boundaries created havoc with established patterns of movement and left Hungarian minorities stranded in what were now the border regions of neighbouring countries. In 1967, Hungarian officials began contacts with the Austrian Area Research and Area Planning Society in Vienna for joint frontier planning and after joint inspections of frontier areas in 1969–70, joint planning for industry, transport and the regulation of Lake Fertö started in 1971. A customs-free area was established at Sopron and there was a measure of Austrian (and Swiss) involvement in a resort village project comprising Szombathely therapeutic sanatorium. On the Slovak border, Hungarian workers were used at the frontier railway station of Agcsernyo from 1968 and Miskolc Industrial Building Enterprise constructed a 400-room workers’ hotel in the same place. In 1971, a Working Committee on Regional Development was set up in Bratislava to coordinate development in the frontier region with regard to water supply, joint use of agricultural machinery (since the period of peak demand in Slovakia came later than in Hungary), the use of Hungarian components in Slovak housing especially in Rimavská Sobota and Rožňava and cooperation between the metallurgical industries of Košice and Miskolc. Hungarian gravel from Nyekladháza was supplied to Slovakia, while Hungary’s ‘Höllöháza’ porcelain works was able to receive gas from a Slovak pipeline in 1972, and Slovak help was sought over reducing pollution of Bodrog, Hernád and Sajó. A new road crossing at Aggtelek-Domica proved useful for local tourism and the route from Budapest to the Tatra via Eger and Rožňava was given priority for improvement. Finally the AlpsAdria Association brought Hungary’s Vas County into contact with Croatia and Slovenia (as well as Austria) particularly with regard to business and culture. Murska Sobota Textile Industry Company supplied ready-mades to the Borostyán department store in Szombathely while some Hungarian agricultural products were processed in Croatia (Beli Monastir) and Slovenia. This should be seen in the context of a permanent committee for joint urban and regional planning set up in Belgrade in 1970. Inspection tours laid the basis for plans in 1972 for industrial and water projects and anticipation of new opportunities when the Adria pipeline crossed the border. ENVIRONMENT There can be no doubt about the environmental damage which occurred during the socialist era as a consequence of the rapid rate of economic growth. This was most evident in the congested industrial areas—the million cities and the regions of Upper Silesia-North Moravia and Sudetenland-Saxony-Silesia. Pollution increased rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s with industrial growth, expansion of electricity generation, urban development and the intensification of agriculture; all part of a programme of extensive development directed from the centre in order to assimilate the Third and Fourth Kondratieffs (linked with heavy engineering and Fordist mass production). The strategy was based on Soviet technology inappropriate for areas of relatively high-density settlement; especially since the region tended to sell natural resources and semi-finished products which increased environmental damage. This ‘Africanisation’ posed dangers for the whole continent through the transmission of air pollution (Nefedova 1994 p. 34).

Regional planning and environmental change

405

Pollution was reaching unacceptable levels by the 1980s, when new pressures were starting to emerge in connection with the Fifth Kondratieff, concerned with microelectronics and boosted to a considerable degree by foreign investment. However, a dismissive ideological stance (linking pollution with capitalism) delayed serious consideration of the problem and ‘sustainable development’ (first advocated at the Stockholm Conference in 1972) hardly featured on the political agenda. The difficulties were magnified through insufficient attention to the installation of air filters, water purification and sewage treatment systems and the proper planning of fertilisation and irrigation. There was very little scope for environmental protection to arise through natural resource pricing, legislative control of pollution and public information, while problems were exacerbated by the inability of local government to exert effective influence. While problems included noise, scenic damage, soil deterioration and cultural pollution, the two critical indicators were air and water pollution—arising from inadequate filtering of emissions and treatment of water and sewage. The damage was to some extent imported as ‘transboundary pollution’. Only 48% of 704,000 tonnes of pure sulphur fallout in Poland was generated domestically: the balance was blown in from the south and west, while three-quarters of the nitrogen oxide fallout was passively imported. In the notorious ‘Black Triangle’ where Poland bordered Czechoslovakia and the GDR, Poland’s Turów power station was found to be responsible for only a quarter of the pollution in the area while the rest came from the two neighbouring countries through the burning of coal with a high sulphur content (3% compared with 0.4–0.8% at Turów). Poland was also affected by the poor condition of the Baltic Sea: a reception area for polluting substances from surrounding countries which had adverse effects on her bathing beaches and fishing industry. Meanwhile, Slovakia’s problems included oil leaks from the defective Friendship pipeline which polluted rivers and drinking water supplies in the east of the country. Bulgaria picked up pollution from Romania, for the Giurgiu chlorine factory and the Târgu Măgurele fertiliser plant impacted heavily on the Bulgarian towns across the Danube: Russe and Nikopol, respectively. Hence a radical consensus emerged during the 1980s to suggest that the situation could be improved only by system change (Kabela 1993 p. 49), although the rise of the international environmental movement during the 1980s must also be seen in the context of the undermining effect of Chernobyl—not least because of ‘heightened tensions with the Soviet allies in Eastern Europe amongst whom access to nuclear power had been a symbol of trust and status’ (Tickle and Welsh 1998 p. 13). Environmental change: a continuing concern Of course, environmental damage can be investigated as a theme running throughout history. Cartographic and statistical sources have traced the deforestation process through modern times, while stability was impaired by the planting of spruce to replace deciduous forest. Heavy cutting with clear felling continued in the socialist period (as at Křivoklát in Czechoslovakia) and although there was much replanting, the strategy of spruce monoculture and restructuring to emphasise fast-growing species was only gradually revised—in the light of the ‘Waldsterben’ (forest death) of the 1970s—in favour of species which are best adapted to the environmental conditions. The environment will

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

406

always be dynamic in terms of physical processes, changing even without any intervention from humans, which creates the need for greater hazard awareness. Centuries of deforestation have made flooding more serious; culminating in the Oder Valley floods in 1997, and those of the Elbe in 2002. Soil erosion is a long-standing issue and it has been shown in the Polish Sudeten Mountains that the wind is a significant cause of soil degradation where the layer of good soil is thin. So the establishment of small plantations and the practice of ploughing across the slope may be beneficial. The sensitive Subcarpathian environment in southeastern Romania has shown a propensity for landslides and mudflows given the succession of clays, sands and shales in the context of geological uplift, downcutting by rivers and consequent steepening of slopes. Settlement is attracted to the old landslides because of the fertility of the immature soils but periodic adjustments are inevitable and logging in the late nineteenth century in the context of heavy population pressure to extend agricultural land exposed unstable slopes to erosion and caused much damage to housing and infrastructure after heavy rain. Natural change and economic development make for constant intervention as a matter of routine. The Great Plain of Hungary has been transformed over the centuries with the cutting of woodland in the face of grazing pressure and the demand for fuel and building materials. Neglect during the Turkish Wars, followed by resettlement and agricultural expansion during the eighteenth century restricted the ‘puszta’ to fragments of poorly drained and alkaline ground. But the progressive lowering of the water table made it more difficult for trees to re-establish themselves and hastened the blowing of sand in response to the desiccating powers of the wind. The decline of oak in Hungary may be linked directly with river regulation during the modern period. Meanwhile, coastal landforms, like the Hel Peninsula in Poland’s Gdańsk Bay, evolve naturally in relation to the balance between erosion and the longshore drift of material. Forest helps to protect the spit and maintain communications from Władysławowo at the base of the peninsula to the fishing villages of Jastarnia and Kuźnica, the small tourist promenade at Jurata and Hel at the far end. There has been an ongoing management problem and the trapping of material by a new fishing harbour at Kuźnica has been countered by efforts to maintain the spit by the construction of breakwaters and the bulldozing of sand dunes as defences. On the other hand, the erosion of the spit and its division into islands (which has happened at times in the past) allows more water into the bay and reduces pollution—and might even improve the local fishing if it were to happen again. Historical perspectives thus reveal environmental problems as a necessary and inevitable part of resource management and in this sense the communist era should not be exaggerated as a special case. However, it involved great environmental as well as social pressure, the consequences of which were not adequately anticipated. When problems did arise, ‘tight’ planning meant that capital was insufficient to allow major adjustments in favour of sustainable development. Indeed, the system was fundamentally at fault because of the failure to attach value to resources which made it difficult to account for environmental damage.

Regional planning and environmental change

407

Sources of pollution Air pollution This involved emissions of gas (particularly sulphur dioxide) and dust (particulates) associated with power stations and heavy industries such as coking plants, chemical combines and non-ferrous metallurgical complexes, especially in the context of obsolete plant based on lignite which was a key fuel for most of the ECECs. Pressure was intense in East Germany where, as Böhmer-Christiansen (1998) reveals, despite a rational energy policy the state could not square its commitment to deliver Western living standards with a clean environment once the second oil crisis (1978) made the 1980s a struggle for survival despite the development of nuclear power. In 1989 two-thirds of thermal electricity in Czechoslovakia came from brown coal with a low calorific value but a high sulphur and ash content: each petajoule of thermal energy was accompanied by 400 tonnes of particulates, 1,800 tonnes of sulphur dioxide, 550 tonnes of nitrogen oxide and 115,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide (Moldan 1997 p. 115). The result was the annual generation of 3.2 million tonnes of sulphur dioxide and 1.7 million tonnes of solid particles. Because of inadequate filtering, only a small proportion of this was intercepted before passing into the atmosphere. Motor vehicles were also a major source of air pollution. At the start of the transition, cars in the region were fifteen years old on average (double the USA figure) and relatively few had modern pollution control equipment. Moreover, motor vehicles in the ECECs traditionally ran on fuels with a high sulphur content in the diesel. There was also a high lead content in petrol—0.2g/l in Czechoslovakia, 0.3 in Hungary and up to 0.6 in Poland in the early 1990s—compared with just 0.15 in Western Europe. The East German Trabant car, widely exported to other socialist countries, was powered by a two-stroke engine that increased pollution. The fallout gave rise to problems of smog in Prague and northern Bohemia during the winter. In this area total suspended particulates (TSP) were more than four times the average for Czechoslovakia. Similar peaks were encountered in the Halle-Leipzig area of East Germany and in Poland’s Upper Silesian region through heavy industry and power generation. Tall chimneys might disperse pollution (though temperature inversions were always a complication) resulting in fallout over distances of up to 40km, usually in an easterly direction. Even so, the Skawina aluminium plant, near Kraków, generated sulphur dioxide emissions up to eight times the permissible safety level of 0.15mg/m3. Covered by a stationary cloud of smog on 135 days of the year, Kraków faced an annual fallout of 1.2 million tonnes of toxic gases—plus 170,000 tonnes of heavy metal dust emissions, which penetrated the soil to a depth of 24cm—on account of its large polluting industries which included the Nowa Huta metallurgical complex. Also notorious was the ‘chrome fog’ at Siechnice near Wrocław in Poland: a toxic mist created by summertime evaporation. However, these situations were fairly extreme and should be seen in the context of a core area of high pollution extending from the Black Triangle westwards through Germany—to the Benelux countries and the UK—with sulphur dioxide emissions of 500kg/ha during the decade 1981–91. A concentric zone with values exceeding 100kg would cover the northern half of the region, extending into France and Italy and western parts of Belarus and Ukraine. By contrast pollution in the SEECs was

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

408

quite low apart from small areas around the capital cities, major industrial zones and large power stations. In Sofia and Russe in Bulgaria concentrations of TSPs rose above the accepted limit of 120mg/m3 on 200 days each year. Local research by the Burgas Group established that the Neftochim petrochemical complex (based on Soviet technology of the 1950s and 1960s, with an annual throughput of 11.8 million tonnes of oil at its height) generated levels of ammonia, phenol and hydrogen sulphide far beyond the maximum levels laid down by government. Another notorious black spot was Copşa Mică in Romania, a centre for chemicals and non-ferrous metallurgy (gold and silver; lead and zinc). The area was heavily polluted by toxic gases (up to 67,000 tonnes of sulphur each year) and dust containing heavy metals. Water The greatest threat to water quality came from inadequate treatment of urban and industrial effluent. But lignite pits (excavated to depths of 150–80m) interfered with the natural drainage system and destroyed groundwater accumulations. Meanwhile, tips of waste from deep mines polluted ground waters through seepage, while dumps of toxic waste situated close to drinking water supplies had even more devastating consequences. River pollution was particularly high on tributary streams burdened by relatively high waste water discharges. At Copşa Mică effluent discharging into the Târnave in the 1980s contained around 700 tonnes of metal (lead, zinc and iron) annually. In Czechoslovakia, the Jizera River (one of three supplying Prague with fresh drinking water) was heavily polluted by domestic effluent and industrial waste. But the major rivers were also badly affected. The Labe (Elbe) River was used to dump waste and considerable amounts of ammonia, nitrates and phosphates and various other undissolved substances were recorded: 87% of the Labe’s length was in Classes I–II in 1940 but only 3% in 1980. A special problem for southern Poland arose from the 3.2 million tonnes of salt (more than the country’s total salt consumption from Inowrocław and other underground deposits) dumped into the Oder and Vistula catchments from mine workings each year. One million cubic metres of mine waters were pumped daily in the Silesian coalfield and—as well as polluting the rivers—the salt corroded municipal and industrial installations downstream and damaged agriculture. In addition to this problem, the Vistula below Krakow was threatened by heavy metals (chrome, iron, lead and especially mercury) while fly ash from Warsaw’s power stations dumped on the banks of the river caused acid pollution. Aspects of rural pollution Many individual rural water sources were permanently polluted through the infiltration of nitrates. For safety in breast-feeding babies mothers would bring water from unpolluted sources or use mineral water. Further rural problems arose from the mismatch between piped water supplies and sewerage: 88% of rural dwellings in Hungary had piped water in 1987 but only 49% had sewerage (25% and 18%, respectively, in 1945). Dwellings with running water but no sewerage (which increased fourfold between 1972 and 1987) generated almost 150 million cubic metres of sewage per annum, but only a sixth of this was collected by tank trucks, leaving the rest to seep into the soil. Nationwide, Reeves

Regional planning and environmental change

409

(1993) claimed that roughly two-thirds of Hungary’s drinking water supply had no protection from some 2 billion cubic metres of sewage that leaked into the soil each year. The situation was also bad regarding solid waste, for garbage collection was provided only in the towns and the more urbanised villages. So, ‘throughout the countryside the margins of villages and the edges of towns and watercourses are strewn with rubbish’ (Persanyi 1990 p. 46). Recycling schemes made an appearance but up to 1989 there were insufficient collection points. Air and water pollution by major industrial complexes also affected soil, as did industrial waste accumulating on the surface. Heavy metals, associated with mining activities, were often present in the soil: around Eisleben in East Germany (associated with the Mansfeld metals complex) there were concentrations of arsenic, cadmium and zinc. Bulgarian lead smelters damaged the soil in rich farming areas, while in Upper Silesia heavy metal dust penetrated the soil to a depth of 24cm and made much of the arable land unsuitable for field crops or vegetables. Acidification was widespread to the extent of about pH1, while at Soviet air bases like Ralsko near Milovice northeast of Prague (also Stara Kopernia in Poland and Tököl in Hungary) enough fuel drained into the ground for ‘oil wells’ to be dug in some cases after 1989. Land used by the Red Army also needed reclamation (285,000ha in East Germany alone). More generally landscapes were totally transformed, especially in the lignite fields where non-polluting developments—such as the huge lake impounded by the Nechranice Dam on the Ohre with a surface area of l,300ha and capacity of 284 million cubic metres, needed for cooling at power stations like Tusimice—contributed to a loss of biodiversity. Tips and landfills Mining subsidence occurred in areas like Ostrava in Czechoslovakia (affecting over 14,000ha by 1989) and the Pécs-Komló area of Hungary. Deep mining generated extensive tipping: a rash of tip heaps appeared in the expanding Rybnik coalfield of southern Poland while East German territory between Hettstedt and Gera was affected by tipping associated with a range of extractive industries, such as copper (Hettstedt/Mansfeld), potash salts (Stassfurt) and uranium (Ronneburg). In the copperfield the tips resembled pyramids through efforts to minimise the loss of farmland by installing new hoists in the 1940s and early 1950s at the Fortschritt, Paul and Vitzthum mines. This increased the height of the tips to almost 150m and the total volume to almost 10 million cubic metres while large slag tips accumulated at the Karl Liebknecht and August Babel smelters. Lignite pits also generated large amounts of waste. Of the 26,000ha taken for lignite quarrying in north Bohemia/ Sokolov, 8,000ha was needed for tips and at the onset of the transition 185 million cubic metres (400 million tonnes) of overburden had to be moved to obtain 67 million tonnes of lignite (Moldan 1997). Noting that unrestored strip mines covered a quarter of the Most district after 1989, Pavlínek and Pickles (2000 p. 126) showed how such damage was possible as communist trade unions organised ‘socialist competition’ to boost output, while high salaries and other financial incentives (including free or subsidised social services) were available; not to mention ‘a mobile population with a very high turnover exhibiting high levels of social pathology and an apparently “mechanistic mentality” and repressed relationship towards the environment’. In the Most area the local coal company operated underground mines—on the northern rim of the coalfield near the former villages of

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

410

Dolni Jiretin, Hrdlovka and Louka—and open pits (shown in Figure 5.9), complemented by others at Bilina to the east and Tusimice (Chomutov) to the west. Energy continued to be used wastefully—without any significant switch to intensive development—even after the world oil price rise of 1973—because of cheap Soviet oil and gas and a persistent ‘supply side’ energy policy. Hazardous waste became a problem: 8 million tonnes were generated annually in Poland alone. Yet many tips and landfills of the socialist period were not properly sanctioned and regulated so that two-fifths of Poland’s hazardous dumps operated without proper control. There were dangers that dams holding back toxic mine tailings might fail under flood conditions. Uranium mining caused devastation through the injection of acids and a legacy of arsenic-rich radioactive tailings, while settling ponds in the vicinity of the processing plants contained tens of millions of tonnes of sludge with a high concentration of residual uranium and other dangerous elements, showing ‘an amazing lack of respect for devastation wrought on the ecology of the countryside’ (Bochmann 1995 p. 546). There were also problems of nuclear waste connected with the energy programme. Acid rain and agricultural chemicals Acid rain damage to forests became widespread as the critical threshold for sulphur dioxide emissions was crossed in north Bohemia in the late 1970s (e.g. through the burning of coal with a high sulphur content at Tusimice) and in Czechoslovakia as a whole in the 1980s. Some of the damage arose from insect attacks and parasitic fungi (also drought, frost and strong winds), but the consequences were all the more serious because the trees were already in a poor condition: spruces being particularly susceptible. Mistakes could be traced back to the nineteenth century when Austrian spruce seed was used to reforest bare lands after wind and insect calamities. Originally spruce comprised only the upper montane forest—to 1,500m—with beech and fir comprising the lower montane forest levels of 600–1,200m. There was a significant fall in the density of woodland (wood mass per unit of area) and the amount of wood produced. Although some decrease in emissions occurred during the 1990s, it has not been sufficient to fall below the critical threshold, so there is still the potential for further damage. Land was also damaged by excessive and careless use of agricultural chemicals, leading to the degradation of soil structure and the pollution of water through nitrification (which gives rise to blue-baby syndrome). This was especially the case in Hungary where pesticides and fertilisers were very generously applied (by international standards), leading to excessive nutrient levels and large pesticide residues. Farmyard manure was less widely used but this created further pollution problems, especially in the case of the large quantities of liquid manure generated by intensive livestock-rearing units. While private farming helped maintain species diversity through small fields, open ditches, crop diversity/rotation and low reliance on machines and mineral fertilisers, large wheat or maize monocultures degraded farmland, partly because heavy tractors compacted soil and increased fertiliser run-off. Many hedges and spinneys were removed and streams canalised in order to create large fields. The destruction of 4,000km of ribbon greenery and 3,600km of dispersed greenery—with resultant erosion—was noted after 1989 in the Czech Republic alone. Waterlogging and salinisation resulted from irrigation, including 125,000 ha from Hungary’s first Tisza barrage that was poorly planned. Intensive

Regional planning and environmental change

411

farming has not made adequate use of conservation measures like ploughing across the slope and establishing small plantations. Maintaining large areas of cropping on high ground has led to wind erosion in those parts of the Sudeten Mountains with only a thin layer of good soil and the degradation has eroded some wildlife habitats. Protected areas were far too limited and where such areas were mostly cultivated—as in Hungary—there was conflict between conservationists and farm managers. The impact of pollution The waste associated with pollution impacted on the economy in many ways. Farm and timber yields were reduced while fish stocks declined: in the Black Sea there has been a decline in fishing caused by eutrophication, while a jelly fish-like creature, mnemiopsis (which became very prominent during the 1990s), now constitutes a billion tonnes of biomass devouring the plankton. Damage to biodiversity reduced the potential for tourism through undermining scenic quality while water pollution restricted bathing, for example on Lake Balaton (through the Zala River discharges and sewage from lakeside settlements) and the Baltic coast. Pollution aggravated the water distribution crisis linked with urban growth in parts of the SEECs prone to drought. Frequently water had to be distributed to the public when it was not entirely pure: Warsaw’s two main water systems drew water from the Vistula although only 8.2% was better than Class III (accounting for 75.2% of the water), while 16.6% was worse (even tap water contained teratogenic and mutagenic compounds, though at admissible levels). Pollution increased the need for more elaborate supply systems, especially in Upper Silesia where there is now heavy dependence on reservoirs and aqueducts to secure clean water from the headwaters of mountain streams with variable discharge. In parts of rural Hungary drinking water became so polluted through the seepage of sewage that over 700 villages had to be supplied by tanks, bottles and plastic bags. At the same time the cost of overcoming environmental damage was enormous: for example, it is now evident that devastation caused by uranium mining over 30sq.km at Stráž pod Ralskem between Česka Lipá and Liberec requires a thirty-year decontamination programme costing $10 billion. Impact on human health Fly ash and particulate pollution caused great irritation, but the worst health hazards arose through sulphur dioxide gas—based on the sulphur content of fossil fuels—and water pollution. Health problems were most severe among children, although adults were prone to cancers and chronic respiratory illnesses (as well as bone, muscle and skin disorders), common in areas like north Bohemia. Particular problems were associated with some individual plants in the chemical and non-ferrous metallurgical sectors; causing high infant mortality and many cases of malignant cancers and lung diseases in older people. In Bulgaria, high lead levels were found in children’s blood in areas close to lead-zinc smelters as at Plovdiv. The Burgas petrochemical plant has been held responsible for diseases such as bronchitis, emphysema and asthma, while over a fifth of the infant mortality has been linked to breathing problems, especially in the Kameno District where the plant is situated.

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

412

In Poland 13 million people were stranded in ecologically contaminated areas, including Upper Silesia where very high sulphur dioxide concentrations caused serious health problems. The links between environment and health were high-lighted in Warsaw and other large cities. Because of pollution in Kraków and Upper Silesia, people suffered from disorders of the respiratory system and eye irritation. There was a clear correlation between deaths and sulphur dioxide concentrations during October–March. Passage of a cold front—bringing the purifying influence of atmospheric precipitation—meant fewer deaths and less work for ambulances. J.Witkowski (1993) referred to the poorer demographic performance of Poland’s ‘endangered towns’ which included many of the older industrial centres. During the 1980s they registered higher mortality: 8.1ptp (compared with 7.1 for other towns); higher infant mortality (i.e. deaths within three weeks of birth—14.6 per 1,000 live births compared with 12.9); and lower net immigration (2.3ptp compared with 9.6). Life expectancy in Czech lignite mining areas (such as the Teplice Basin) was well below the national average. Human costs had financial significance not only for individuals and families but for the state through health services, disability pensions and absenteeism. The costs imposed on the economy have been estimated at one-tenth of GNP in Poland (Carter and Turnock 1993 p. 203). Air pollution damage in Czechoslovakia was assessed at Kr4.5 billion per annum. But pollution was not the sole cause of poor health, for smoking was an important contributory factor, as were poor dietary habits (high fat and salt consumption) and stress, which may be linked not only with poor health but ‘social pathologies’ including high crime and suicide rates. Impact on urban areas The urban fabric was badly affected, which was particularly regrettable in historic cities like Kraków and Prague that were eaten away, given the pollution in the main industrial regions along with the artificial-heat phenomenon. Apartment buildings needed annual sandblasting (or painting) to stop them turning black, although this was rarely possible. Uranium mining in Bohemia and East Germany has left a legacy of radon-affected homes and as a result of copper smelting at Głogów, several villages (including Biechów, Bogomice, Wroblin and Żukówice) were evacuated due to contaminated soil. Meanwhile, lignite quarries have necessitated resettlement on an even greater scale in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland where over a hundred villages have been razed. Disruption has been compounded by unsuccessful rehousing: the Tysiaclecia estate built in the Załeże area of Katowice used an unsuitable site close to the old Kosciuszko steelworks and the Jan coalmine. Infrastructure, too, was adversely affected in areas of mining subsidence such as Upper Silesia (where railway speed restrictions occur around Katowice) and the Pécs-Komló area of Hungary. Subsidence in the Mansfeld copperfield arising from the flushing of the salty Zechstein layers caused houses to be abandoned in Eisleben with 1,400 new apartments built as replacements during 1977–81. Salt caused huge environmental damage and losses for heating systems and factories that need to use river water. Ecological problems have also arisen from road and rail accidents involving hazardous materials (ammonia, chorine, hydrogen cyanide and liquid fuel). These dangers were increased on the railway network through poorly maintained track and

Regional planning and environmental change

413

rolling stock, while road accidents were linked with heavy traffic on poor roads combined with driver fatigue and lack of awareness of either potential dangers or safety procedures. Action to solve environmental problems under communism There are historic examples of environmental protection but the scheduling of specific areas as nature reserves or protected areas gathered momentum from the end of the nineteenth century with protection for sensitive mountain areas and unique landscapes like the Danube Delta. The first national parks date to the inter-war years and such arrangements were extended into the communist period when further designations were made. There were 142 protected areas in Czechoslovakia by 1939, but it was an act in 1956 that first officially sanctioned the responsibility of the state for nature protection. Large protected areas scheduled at this time include Český ráj (125sq.km; 1955) and the Krkonoše national park (285sq.km; 1963). Substantial work in urban conservation has also been noted. In Czechoslovakia, where a Trust for Reconstruction of Urban Historical Reserves and Monuments was created in 1956, protected urban areas were designated in the historic cores of thirty towns in the Czech lands and ten in Slovakia. Moreover, in Prague the entire nineteenth-century city was effectively made an urban reserve in 1971, with protection extended to some 1,400 monuments and a third of the housing stock. Meanwhile, damaged areas were first defined in 1974 as areas where economic activity was impacting on the natural environment, and the health and wellbeing of the population, calling for special measures to be taken by government (Postolka 1996 p. 143). Environmental impact assessment (EIA) in Czechoslovakia was carried out on some major projects like the motorway through the Tatra Mountains which avoided both the national park and nature reserves lying to the south of Poprad. Some environmental projects were implemented, for example the replanting of damaged woodlands to avoid spruce monocultures: in the Black Triangle spruce is coming down to 60% (using a type adapted to the mountains—not the lowland variety) with 30% larch and 10% beech. But more elaborate programmes were often shelved because of expense. The implications of Poland’s rapid growth for water supply and sewage capacity gave rise to an ambitious water plan for 1975 (referred to in connection with navigation) to clean rivers and provide adequate water for irrigated agriculture: for example, to use meadows more intensively in dry years to produce more food for a growing population demanding higher nutritional standards. At the base of the Sudetes several reservoirs were built and deforested areas were marked out for reconstruction (Figure 8.5). The Carpathian foothill area was also to play ‘a special role in improving the water economy over large regions of the country’ (Tuszko 1966 p. 361) through reservoirs on the Vistula tributaries—for example, the dam and 50mW power station at Roznów on the Dunajec—a further cascade on the upper Vistula system and canalisation of the Przemsza. However, the conduit from the Dunajec to Upper Silesia has not yet been built. The boosting of agriculture around Łódź with the use of locally generated municipal sewage and a central canal from the middle Vistula to Upper Silesia has not been achieved and water is supplied only locally from Sulejowskie reservoir (completed in 1973, with a capacity of 109 million cubic metres) on the Pilica 50km southwest of the city. Likewise the raising of the water level in the Mazurian Lakes and the transfer of water for irrigation in the Narew Basin has not been completed. Another Polish case

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

414

concerns the Kraków agglomeration that was declared an area of ecological catastrophe in 1980. It was recommended that instead of concentrated housing development there should be ‘broad ventilation corridors along the axis of the Vistula valley [with] settlements of a loose structure located on valley slopes and in the areas of watersheds’ (Hess et al. 1989 p. 43). Vegetation belts around

Figure 8.5 The environment of the Sudetes in the 1980s industrial complexes were needed and motor-traffic arteries were to be displaced from the valley bottom. But these proposals were not implemented. People remained dissatisfied with their living conditions and it was only in areas with a negative migration balance (and new jobs were desired at all costs) that industry was viewed in a positive light. Reclamation in the lignite fields was slow and only when Most’s Lezaky quarry complex (between Most and the Chemopetrol complex at Záluží) was closed in 1999 did work start to convert the devastated area into a lake. The tips in the Mansfeld copperfield were exploited in part (Helftsa and Roblingem) for aggregate to help support railways and dredger runways in new lignite workings while smelter tips could be worked over to recover the remaining metal content. A crucial issue was the prevention of further damage and here the record was significant but inadequate. A Joint Council for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in Czechoslovakia in 1974 took measures to reduce pollution from power stations through provision of ‘scrubbers’ to reduce emissions of particulates and taller chimneys to disperse pollutants (above the inversion layers in theory). Other countries acted in a similar fashion. Legislation was passed in all countries to outlaw pollution by setting maximum levels of toleration.

Regional planning and environmental change

415

Furthermore, the monitoring of pollution was strengthened during the 1970s and 1980s, but it was not always geared to checking the emissions and discharges of individual plants and hence illegalities could not always be recorded or traced to their sources. Where evidence was available the enterprises responsible were rarely prosecuted; still less were they confronted with financial penalties adequate to ensure compliance with regulations. And while some factories were reprofiled or fitted with proper pollution control equipment, the scale of such remedial action was quite inadequate. Understandably there were conflicts within governments between ministers seeking a cleaner environment and others who gave top priority to meeting plan targets. Fundamentally the state was not prepared to penalise itself for pollution caused by its own enterprises in pursuit of plan targets; nor could it afford to scrap all outdated equipment in favour of the cleanest technology available on the market. Pressure from international organisations and the public While the voluntaristic and introverted nature of the system inhibited sustainable development, there were fora in place for discussion of wider European issues and they became more important with the growth of East-West trade to exchange fuels and raw materials for technology. The UN Economic Commission for Europe sponsored a Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Pollution while even before this there had been some bilateral arrangements on environmental matters such as those linking Czechoslovakia with Austria (1967) and Germany (Bavaria) in 1970. Increased exposure by East European governments to international standards on pollution control—notably the Stockholm Conference of 1972, followed by the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE)—provided an even more effective channel for environmental diplomacy. This led to a flurry of legislation and signalled an awareness of the problem, though not necessarily a firm political will to ensure improvements. At the same time, some organisations emerged within the region to express concern over ecological matters, like the Environmental Sector of the Academy of Sciences’ Biological Section in Prague that produced Czechoslovakia’s first detailed report on the environment and showed a catastrophic situation which the government did not appreciate. And despite political pressure on the authors, an even more detailed report was compiled in 1989 (although this ‘Blue Book’ was only readily available to the public after the revolution). However, persistent air and water pollution precipitated direct action so that environmental movements gained considerable momentum during the 1980s, especially in those countries where a significant level of protest was tolerated. The Chernobyl nuclear disaster then made an important contribution, promoting environmental problems as major issues of public concern when opposition to communism increased during the 1980s. Environmental mismanagement legitimised ‘the perceived need of the public to assert a participatory notion of civil society’ (Eastwood 1996 p. 184) when communist regimes seemed incapable of an adequate response. Public opinion became more articulate through the underground press organised by opposition groups like Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia (also Children of the Earth, which was more specifically concerned with environmental awareness), while the Polish Ecological Club emerged in 1980 in the Solidarity era, the Danube Circle was prominent in Hungary and Ekoglasnost emerged in

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

416

Bulgaria. Eventually green parties emerged to highlight the polarisation between ‘ecodemocrats’ waging a political struggle—using legitimate environmental issues as a surrogate to further a fundamentally political agenda—and those who were politically neutral and merely wished to apply pressure on those in political power to resolve local problems. However, the parties made it possible for the ‘Round Table’ in Poland in 1989 to produce an environmental protocol, with a protection system set in force to realise its goals. And when the Slovenian communists called free elections in 1990, the Greens were able to make an impact on the side of the DEMOS coalition, despite being fragmented through the lack of authority to organise. As regards environmental action during the 1980s, many groups were just concerned with local issues. Urban dwellers protested about air and water pollution in specific cases. For example, in Hungary water pollution at Vác linked with the storage of hazardous wastes by the Chinoin enterprise; dust emissions from the local power station at Ajka; and the installation of an incinerator for hazardous waste at Dorog. In Bulgaria the Committee to Save Russe was created in response to pollution by the Romanian chlorine factory at Giurgiu (on the opposite side of the Danube) which was held responsible for the rising incidence of lung disease: from 9.7ptp in 1975 to 173.9 in 1985. There was also defence of scenic features in the countryside against both the threat of mining or industrial development and the ambivalence of country dwellers; while rural people protested about the large-scale dumping of hazardous wastes. The latter might not accept their own contribution to environmental degradation through intensive agriculture, but they were sensitive to the damage when additional waste was imposed on them. In some cases there was obvious success. The Polish Ecological Club scored an immediate victory with the closure of the Skawina aluminium plant near Kraków (generating 2,000 tonnes of fluorine emissions each year (Wódź and Wódź 1998) and a campaign in Hungary led to improved safety provision at the Paks power station. A sustained opposition was also maintained by the relatively affluent and articulate German community in Ófalu (Baranya County) against the dumping of nuclear waste. Indeed, such was the sensitivity over nuclear projects in the late 1980s that both Poland and Yugoslavia abandoned power station projects (at least for the time being). This had an interesting side-effect in Poland where a thermal power station had been planned for Opole in the 1970s but postponed— in order to save more hard coal for export—in favour of a lignite-fuelled station at Bełchatów. However, when the Opole project was revived in the 1980s (as a consequence of cancellation of the Zarnowiec nuclear project) environmental protesters were able to insist on sulphur dioxide abatement by flue gas desulphurisation (FGD) and a tall chimney of 300m. Water management became a highly controversial issue in several countries. In 1983 the Danube Circle emerged in Hungary as an environmental NGO dedicated to oppose the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros hydropower project agreed by the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments six years earlier. Despite pressure on the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to provide a favourable evaluation of the scheme, a ‘Danube Walk’ was staged in 1986 and a demonstration brought 100,000 people into Budapest’s Kossuth Square in 1989 demanding an end to the project. The project was abandoned the following year and although there are some differences between the political parties—and an International Court decision censuring Hungary for unilateral withdrawal—the Hungarian contribution to it remains unfulfilled. Meanwhile, great opposition arose in Yugoslavia over the

Regional planning and environmental change

417

federal government’s plan to dam the Tara River canyon, while the Bulgarian government’s desire to solve the water supply crisis in Sofia by an inter-basin (StrumaIskur) transfer in the Rila Mountains—to supplement the Iskur (Stalin) Dam of 1956— was strongly opposed by conservationists. The project had even been opposed in the 1970s but Ekoglasnost demonstrations against its revival in 1986 had a major political impact. Nevertheless, some radical measures will have to be taken given the severity of the crisis: there are precedents in the earlier diversions from the Mesta and Struma to the Iskur and Maritsa in connection with hydropower and some development in the Rila Mountains took place in 1995 in the teeth of citizen pressure. Bulgaria now plans six new dams to supply some 450,000 people who currently face rationing. How was it possible for the environmental movement to succeed? Embarrassed by Chernobyl, as well as by failings near home, formerly self-confident regimes were forced on the defensive and encouraged to seek dialogue in sympathy with the openness of the Gorbachev years: ‘nuclear power had become the symbol of what was perceived as an entrenched, uncaring and deaf bureaucracy’ (Jančar 1992 p. 169). It is also possible that the Hungarian and Polish states embraced environmental issues in a bid to avoid more devastating criticisms from the intelligentsia. In Bulgaria it was significant that at Russe it was the Romanian authorities who were under attack and so ‘to a certain extent it was possible for party members and organisations to declare their solidarity with the ecological protest’ (Baumgartl 1993 p. 162). The Ekoglasnost movement was then founded in 1989 and concerned itself with environmental damage throughout the country, including the question of nuclear energy. Once again the political consequences were remarkable, for Mitsuda and Pashev (1995) suggest that the organisation may have drawn some support from anti-Zhivkov elites within the regime as part of efforts to isolate the leader and reform the system from within. CONCLUSION Communism offered the prospect of making up for all the disappointments of the past through an appealing ideology and a capacity to make integration work through the leadership and prestige of the party. Central planning was able to mobilise people and resources to produce and modernise while the influence of the bloc in world affairs increased considerably. Yet while some leaders had undoubted charisma and attracted genuine support it is doubtful if communism could ever claim true legitimacy and there was always a feeling of coercion to the point where the system might be seen as an aberration: an unfortunate survival of world war through a cold war played out by opposing power blocs unable to resolve their differences. Central planning produced—by design—a war economy with endemic shortages, poor-quality production and restrained innovation. It could never realise its theoretical potential for growth because economic efficiency was not the key priority. Growth was initially brisk at 3.9% per annum across the region from 1950 to 1973, but once the resources had been largely exhausted and there was a greater dependence on imports and higher productivity the rate slumped to 1.2% for the remainder of the communist era (before collapsing into recession during the early transition years (Berend 2002)). Despite rising indebtedness through an unsustainable capital inflow from the West, the system continued well beyond its sell-by

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

418

date through subsidised energy from the USSR reflecting that country’s vested interest in ECE; reciprocated to an extent by party hierarchies throughout the region and by many working people (both management and shop floor) who could appreciate the security of their employment. Yet ‘full employment and the system of social safeguards were bought at the price of economic backwardness and the absence of political freedom’ (Hall 1993 p. 38). Uneven development meant that despite sophistication in electrical and nuclear engineering there was an inability to introduce modern communications technology so that the region was ‘totally unable to follow the technological revolution of the 1970s and 1980s’ (ibid. p. 21). The economic collapse of the late 1980s has still to be properly explained but a major factor must be the Soviet Union’s decisions to abandon the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ and drastically to reduce its purchases from East European industrial enterprises: the loss of huge Soviet orders necessitated a new market system! The opening up to global forces after 1989 has sent shock-waves through the region but stability is returning with prospects of a world order that will at least see the divisions in Europe healed after a century of distorted economic development.

9 CONCLUSION After examining the tortuous process of modernisation in ECE it seems inconceivable that the region should now reach any plateau of stability. Of course, as regards the mere adoption of new technology the experience has hardly been exceptional, for the development of railways—through the detailed information available on each section of what became a highly complex network—points to a classic diffusion process extending from the innovation centres in Western Europe and Germany, allowing for the sudden slump in density beyond the limits of the German and Habsburg empires. At the same time, the Iron Curtain proved to be a particularly effective technological barrier because of communist ambivalence over the adoption of new ideas as well as Western reservations over their strategic interests. The Soviets could copy the West but could not innovate on more than a narrow front. Hence Berend’s conclusion (2002 p. 21) that Central and Eastern Europe has never pioneered techological revolution with insufficient resources for research to overcome the lack of knowledge and know-how: ‘mediocrity and other cultural factors have always been obstacles to innovation and have never in modern history allowed a peripheral country to play a leading role in technology’. Nine states that scored 59% of West Europe’s per capita GDP in 1820 but only 51% in 1950 saw their performance slump further to 40% in 1989 (ibid. p. 15). So the last traumatic decade has witnessed a catching-up process to assimilate revolutions in telecommunications, information technology, retailing and financial services. And it remains to be seen how much longer it will take for civil society and economic structures to evolve to the point where there is convergence over productivity, incomes and living standards. If the region had simply been part of the West European periphery the flow of historical events might have been steady enough to maintain an ongoing catching-up process, albeit moderated by an emerging system of nation states inspired by the Napoleonic project at the turn of the eighteenth century. But this process has been contested to the utmost by the region’s ethnic complexities, placed in the context of a deadly confrontation between nationalist ideals and ingrained imperial legitimacy which was somehow glossed over by the Congress of Vienna (with staggering condescension in the case of Poland) to the point where ad hoc tinkering with the system could act as a well-regulated safety-valve until the trajectory of events ran out of control in the run-up to the First World War. It is interesting to see how the patterns of economic specialisation within the imperial systems acquired a legitimacy of their own which could be translated into different levels of identification with the status quo on the part of the various ethnic and national groups. For while the Ottoman Empire in Europe was finished by 1914, the future of the Habsburg Empire was in doubt until the last winter of the First World War, while the German Empire could reorganise itself as a nation state and Russia could also regroup as a new imperial institution—the USSR—after heavy territorial losses, with a

The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989

420

new leadership—the Communist Party—which first secured its defence (to 1945) and then provided a recipe for superpower status. The conclusion of the First World War gave the Allies unprecedented opportunity for rebuilding ECE that was used to good effect in terms of adjustment to nationalism. But while Western sponsorship was generous in dealing with client states in the region— especially the powers which came together as the Little Entente—it lacked the institutional capacity to establish good-neighbourly relations and a security system, while the forces of revisionism were grossly underestimated at both the local level (Bulgaria and Hungary) and the regional level involving Germany and the USSR. At least the national ideal stood the test of time across the region and so the economic reconstruction of the 1920s was undone to only a limited extent through territorial shift in Poland in 1945 and the failure of the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav federations after 1989. Yet both Hitler and Stalin did their best to override national interests in the region and— notwithstanding the incidental benefits to the region on both counts—there have been incalculable losses (perhaps most of all in terms of social capital) in the way that economic options were closed off so that first Berlin and then Moscow could block the forces of globalisation for their own ends. For better or worse, these belated attempts at empire-building took ECE’s resources seriously and there was a certain respect for the nation states that had previously been provinces. Growth disparities between states were reduced and industry focused on each urban complex with specialisation between the centre and its rural hinterland. However, Stalin’s exit came too late—and Khrushchev’s ‘dethronement’ exercise was too inconsistent—to reverse the totalitarian tide; though there was a window of opportunity for limited reform, just as the conformity implicit in the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty, propounded after the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968, did not inhibit some progress on human rights under the Helsinki process. But only with Gorbachev’s assumption of power in 1985 was there a radical change of approach, albeit in the forlorn expectation that the people would be prepared to vote for communists with a human face (Keep 1997); something that did not come to pass even in the USSR, where ideology and the party had once seemed invincible. Paradoxically the worst abuses in ECE arose in countries that exuded paranoia over their independence. Communist achievements in Albania were ‘offset by Hoxha’s rigid ideological conformity, extreme isolation as well as the horrific legacy of terror’ (Fischer 2003 p. 192) making for a violent rejection of everything associated with the regime in 1991. A similar indifference towards human capital by Ceauşescu’s Romania made for a contested revolution in which the reformers enjoyed the tacit support of the Soviet embassy. With the USSR now history and with Germany overwhelmingly committed to the new European agenda—which has (despite its trading anomalies) been generous enough towards ECE to secure widespread support for membership—there is now a prospect that the region can at last concentrate single-mindedly on a better future for its ethnically and culturally diverse citizens without recourse to the artificial xenophobic stimulants so often placed at the centre of politics in the past. It may well be that Poland and the other states of the ‘New Europe’—which will not take their affluence and national existence for granted to the same extent as those of the ‘Old’—will have much to say about the role of the continent in a developing world, and their cumulative experience can only be beneficial in the quest for sustainability in Europe and the wider world. Will ECE

Conclusion

421

become ‘just like the West’, with the baggage of history forgotten? This seems unlikely in the short or medium term. For communism was something coherent in its nature as well as different from the West (Hann et al. 2002). And by the same token the region’s earlier historical experiences covered in this book have left a deep impression: the early twentieth-century crisis in the peasant states and the nineteenth-century experience of ‘catching up’ in Germany and the Habsburg Empire combined with the Balkan peoples’ escape from the Ottomans. Nor can the success of the European agenda be taken for granted, for if the northern states of ECE prosper in the EU, most of the southern states could still linger on the periphery ‘with the “longue durée” of history clearly forecasting this destiny’ (Berend 1996 p. 381). Although the world community has made it clear that Balkan conflicts will not be settled ‘by a resort to military rather than economic warfare’ as Botsas (1978 p. 280) once envisaged as the price of failure to create economic independence, the goal of economic maturity—higher output and stable responses to changing world markets (Jackson 1987 p. 393)—has still to be attained. Although it is difficult to see the coercive embrace of the USSR as anything other than a disaster given the scale of destruction of human capital (measurable in both economic and social terms)—however much the Soviets were driven by the acute geopolitical instability of the twentieth century—there are nevertheless important values that the region can contribute to a reintegrated Europe, partly as a result of recent experience. While few might commend a role for the state on the scale demanded by either communist or fascist totalitarianism, it is evident that a virtual monopoly over investment by ruling parties has produced too high a level of concentration against which any ideological drive for equity can be but a mild antidote. In spatial terms this has left extensive areas in a relatively pristine condition with high biodiversity values, evident in the mountain regions and above all in the Carpathians where effective large carnivore conservation calls for extensive protected areas and a comprehensive drive to maintain sustainable development at a critical time of EU enlargement. The EU vision for ‘Europa 2000’ with its systems of protected areas has been imaginatively projected on to the Carpathian scene by the World Wide Fund for Nature to the extent that an international Carpathian Convention may now secure the required scale of political support. At the same time the sectoral imbalance manifest by central planning and a tendency to minimise the scale of ‘creative destruction’ has left the region with agrarian and industrial landscapes that can be recorded and selectively conserved as the pace of modernisation accelerates. Industrial archaeology is on the whole poorly placed to meet the challenge in terms of both funding and experience, but small, enthusiastic groups with international support are making progress on both fronts in a race against time to enlarge the museum sector before new private owners modernise the more technically obsolete state enterprises they have taken over. There are also possibilities for niche tourism linked with nature conservation in national parks and equally with old industrial systems which could include the railways, mines and furnaces unified to offer an ‘iron way’ through Banat, Upper Silesia or the Hungarian-Slovakian border region. Equally there is potential among other sectors of the mining industry, along with wood processing, textiles and brewing; not to mention the surviving water-power mills that were the basis of self-sufficient peasant communities. And given the historical legacy of tensions and distortions arising from generations of boundary fixing, this may be one way in which the European model of cross-border cooperation can be constructively operationalised.

CHRONOLOGY

Outlining salient political, economic and social events affecting the nations of East Central Europe THE PERIOD UP TO 1944 Albania 1831 Ottomans abolish the ‘timar’ (estate) system and the rural population becomes dependent on landowning ‘beys’ and northern ‘bajraktars’; the latter presiding over rigid patriarchal societies torn by blood feuds. 1878 The Albanian League is formed in Prizren (and suppressed by the Ottomans in 1881). 1902 The Albanian school in is closed as the Ottomans attempt to suppress the autonomy movement. 1905 The Committee for the Freedom of Albania (CFA) is founded by young nationalists in Monastir (Bitola) and seeks full independence. area to attack the Greek 1906 CFA armed groups spread southwards from the minority as well as the police and military. 1908 The Albanian Orthodox Church is established in the USA while a national alphabet in the Latin script is adopted in Monastir. The Young Turk movement fails to support Albanian autonomy but liberalisation extends to education and newspaper publishing in Albanian. 1909 Young Turks pursue a policy of centralisation with Turkish the language of instruction in all Albanian schools; regular taxation and compulsory military service are also imposed. 1910 Rebellion in Kosovo spreads to Shkodër and the Ottomans respond with intimidation and suspension of nationalist associations. 1911 Catholic Albanians in the north revolt with the support by Montenegro (seeking territorial gain); while the Young Turks offer some of the concessions sought by southern Albanians at a rally at Gjirokastër. Albanian deputies in the Turkish parliament seek administrative autonomy and form a Central Committee to organise insurrection for 1912. 1912 With funds and weapons collected abroad, action is prepared in Berat, Durrës, Krujë, Tirana and Vlorë as well as Kosovo to secure an autonomous Albania covering the

Chronology

423

‘vilayets’ of Bitola, Kosovo, Ioannina and Shkodër. But the onset of the Balkan War prompts a policy of independence—proclaimed at a national congress in Vlorë—to counter Greek, Montenegrin and Serb claims; while the Habsburg Empire and Italy support Albania to limit Serb expansion (as does the Conference of Ambassadors). Serbs advance to Durrës and Greeks (supported by France and Russia) to Gjirokastër. 1913 As the Treaty of London provides for an independent Albania but with some Greek and Serb gains, while the Habsburg Empire successfully demands a Serb withdrawal, separate Albanian administrations emerge in Vlorë and Durrës. 1914 Separate governments in Durrës and Vlorë hand over to the International Control Commission (ICC) while Greeks defy the Conference of Ambassadors by proclaiming the Autonomous Republic of Northern Epirus in Gjirokastër where autonomy is eventually agreed. Attempts by the ICC to establish a stable regime in Durrës under Prince William are undermined by renewed chaos marking the outbreak of the First World War as the Italians occupy Vlorë. 1915 As Italy joins the Allies a new Treaty of London sanctions Italian control with an autonomous Albanian administration in Durrës, but Serbia intervenes and installs its own nominee while Montenegro takes Shkodër. 1916 Italy controls southern Albania while the Greeks remain in Northern Epirus and (ADK) where Greek schools the French agree to an Autonomous District of become Albanian. 1917 Italy makes concessions while the ADK is eliminated as Greece prepares to enter the war on the Allied side. 1918 With total Allied control established Albania is divided into French, Greek, Italian and Serb areas: the Italians allow an Albanian Congress to convene in Durrës and a national government is elected to defend the country’s interests in Paris. 1919 To the dismay of the Durrës Congress it emerges in Paris that Albania’s best option is an Italian mandate over the entire territory (as agreed in 1913); otherwise the powers may accept Greek claims to Northern Epirus. 1920 A National Congress approves provisional laws (‘Lushnjë Statutes’) while rejecting the decision of the 1913 Conference of Ambassadors and preparing to fight all foreign powers. When the US opposes the transfer of Albanian lands to Yugoslavia and the country maintains its integrity by default, the Italians agree to leave Vlorë and a National Legislative Assembly meets in Tirana. 1921 The Conference of Ambassadors confirms the 1913 boundary in the south and Greece withdraws while in the north there are small transfers to Yugoslavia. A leadership emerges within the Popular (Reform) Party through the democratic idealist Fan Noli and the northern Muslim leader Ahmed Bey Zogolli (Zog) who gains much from his military role in defeating the Mirdite rebellion and proclaims martial law. 1922 Zog strengthens his position against rebel forces and forms a new cabinet, opposed by Noli and other democrats from the south. 1923 Zog maintains majority support in parliament. 1924 After an uprising Zog flees to Yugoslavia while Noli—as leader of liberal intellectuals—seeks a Western-style democracy and launches an ambitious reform programme to redistribute estate land among landless peasants, though he lacks international support and Yugoslavia supports an armed assault by Zog, representing conservative landowners.

Chronology

424

1925 Noli is replaced by Zog who persecutes democrats and assumes the presidency of the Albanian Republic. Oil exploitation starts after penetration is sought by the leading powers (though metalliferous ores remain largely undeveloped) while an Italian-directed National Bank of Albania sets up a Company for the Economic Development of Albania to grant loans for public works. 1926 Zog signs the ‘Tirana Pact’ with Mussolini to obtain protection; perceived in Belgrade as an anti-Yugoslav alliance. 1927 Zog signs the second ‘Tirana Pact’: a twenty-year defensive military alliance, facilitating Italy’s penetration of the Balkans. 1928 Zog proclaims himself king (he rules until 1939) and establishes a royal dictatorship while Koca Kota heads the government: Italian and Napoleonic models are adopted for the penal and civil codes, respectively, while a land cadaster is introduced. 1930 Under the agrarian reform law 4,000ha are distributed—generally to former renters who take over from the feudal owners, although the landowners (supporter of Zog) retain a key role. 1931 A nationalist opposition close to the Yugoslav government attempts to assassinate Zog. 1932 Zog moves against Vlorë intellectuals perceived as a nationalist opposition, and a customs union is rejected to limit Italian power. 1933 Nationalisation of education affects mainly Greek and Italian schools; Mussolini suspends financial assistance and a reduced money supply restricts economic activity. 1934 Mussolini applies military pressure and demands a virtual protectorate. 1935 An anti-Zogist rising in Fier brings a switch to liberal government and more investment in agriculture and roads under M.D.Frashëri’s cabinet. 1936 Under a comprehensive agreement Italian influence over army and the economy increases; a renewed Koco Kota government spells the end of liberal reform. 1937 Further Italian support is required in the face of revolt in Delvinë. 1938 Italy envisages annexation which is implemented the following year after Yugoslavia indicates the move will not be opposed. 1939 Zog abdicates and the Italians establish a puppet government under S.B. Verląci while an Albanian fascist party is established. 1940 An Italian invasion of Greece leads to Greek occupation of Gjirokastër and 1941 Germans expel the Greek forces and Italy incorporates Kosovo and Tsamouria in Greek Epirus to claim that the Axis has achieved Greater Albania. Yugoslav Partisan emissaries help organise the Albanian Communist Party (ACP) with E.Hoxha as secretary while a new Kruja government makes concessions to Albanian autonomy. 1942 The ACP joins nationalists in a National Liberation Front (NLF) while a noncommunist republican National Front (‘Balli Kombëtar’: BK) emerges under Frashëri and the USA declares support for Albanian independence. 1943 The ACP intensifies resistance to the Italians and their new government under M.Bushati (and Germany subsequently takes over the occupation) although the BK and NLF fail to cooperate because the latter’s Yugoslav supporters will not countenance the post-war retention of Kosovo. 1944 After the NLA attacks both the occupation forces and the BK, an Anti-Fascist National Liberation Congress (ANLC) in Permët deposes Zog and forbids his return,

Chronology

425

while a council is appointed to elect an Anti-Fascist National Liberation Committee (ANLC) under Hoxha. With German withdrawal and defections from the BK most of the country is liberated and a further ANLC at Berat converts the ANLC into a provisional government. Hoxha, as premier, undertakes nationalisation and central planning with external support from Yugoslavia (to 1948): an agricultural policy of ‘land for those who till it’ is followed by cooperatives. Bulgaria 1835 The first school to teach in Bulgarian is founded in Gabrovo by V.Aprilov. 1839 Start of the Tanzimat reform era attempting to remedy abuses in taxation and the treatment of national groups throughout the empire. 1856 The first ‘chitalishte’ (reading room) opened in Svishtov. 1862 The Bulgarian Legion formed on Serb territory by G.Rakovski. 1866 The Bulgarian Secret Central Committee is formed by L.Karavelov and V. Levski to prepare a national uprising among the peasantry. 1870 Ottomans establish an autocephalous Bulgarian Church. 1876 End of the Ottoman ‘Tanzimat’ reform era which produces some small/medium farms worked by Bulgarians. A premature national uprising is suppressed but the refusal of the sultan to grant reforms brings a Russian declaration of war. 1878 The Treaty of San Stefano creates a large independent Bulgaria but the subsequent Congress of Berlin sanctions a small, autonomous Bulgaria (still under Ottoman sovereignty) and a separate Eastern Rumelia subject to the sultan. 1879 A constituent assembly in Turnovo is dominated by D.Tsankov’s Liberal Party but Prince Alexander appoints a pro-Russian Conservative government under C.Erenroth. 1881 The constitution is suspended as Alexander proposes to rule for seven years with absolute powers. 1883 Difficulties with Russia lead to a restoration of the constitution and a Liberal government under P.Karavalov. 1885 A coup in Plovdiv brings a union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia though Russian displeasure leads to withdrawal of military advisers and Alexander abdicates for lack of Russian support. Serbia invades but fails to contest the change in the balance of power since unification goes ahead (Tophane Convention). 1887 Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha is crowned Prince of Bulgaria and begins his ‘personal regime’ (seen as Russophile by St Petersburg) while the government of S.Stambolov restores stability. 1891 The Bulgarian Socialist Party is formed. 1894 Ferdinand replaces Stambolov with the Conservative K.Stoilov. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) opposes the partition of Macedonia and seeks autonomy within the Ottoman Empire or South Slav Federation while the Macedonian External Organisation (‘the Supremists’) specifically seeks union with Bulgaria. 1895 Supremist activity in northern Macedonia (north of Bitola-Sandanski) clashes with Greek-affiliated groups in the south of Kastoria-Serres and with Serb interests north of Skopje.

Chronology

426

1896 Reconciliation with Russia (on the death of Alexander III) opens the way for Ferdinand to gain international recognition. 1899 The Bulgarian Agrarian Union formed as an alliance of the peasantry and rural intelligentsia. 1900 Supremists murder a Vlach opponent of IMRO in Bucharest. Major unrest over the government’s attempt to revive the Ottoman tithe on agricultural production. 1901 IMRO extorts money for arms by holding an American missionary to ransom. 1902 Supremists launch an unsuccessful foray into Macedonia from Bulgarian territory and are forced to retreat. 1903 Ottoman forces suppress the IMRO ‘Ilinden Uprising’ and bring the years of revolt (from 1895) to an end. 1904 A Bulgarian-Ottoman treaty ends incursions into Macedonia in return for concessions to Christians in the empire and the removal of restrictions on Bulgarian goods. Bulgaria and Serbia agree a military alliance. 1905 An economic treaty with Serbia envisages a customs union. A Radical Democratic Party seeks to limit Ferdinand’s authority. 1906 Urban unrest arises out of poor working and living conditions while a railway strike ends with higher wages agreed by the Agrarian government the following year. 1907 N.Petkov—leader of the Agrarian government from 1906—is assassinated in Sofia. Some IMRO elements join the Supremist cause but a ‘leftist’ wing favours autonomy. 1908 Ferdinand declares de jure independence of Bulgaria and assumes the title of ‘tsar’. After the Agrarians are replaced by the Democratic Party, Ferdinard and the Malinov government declare the full independence of Bulgaria (in the confusion of the Young Turk revolt) and his title of ‘tsar’ is enshrined in the constitution. 1910 Christian-Muslim disturbances originate in Russe. 1911 A Nationalist-Progressive Liberal government under I.Geshov negotiates an antiOttoman alliance to liberate Macedonia (but without agreement on the allocation of territory). 1912 As Serbia starts to form an Anti-Ottoman Balkan League, with support from Greece and Montenegro, Bulgaria advances rapidly and lays siege to Adrianople. 1913 Under the Treaty of London the Ottomans agree to relinquish all European territory except eastern Thrace, but Bulgaria advances in isolation as her aspirations beyond the Ohrid-Veles-Kriva Palanka line are threatened by a Serbo-Greek ‘secret alliance’ for a common frontier in Macedonia west of the Vardar (encouraged by great power acceptance of an Albanian state). Under the Treaty of Bucharest (negotiated by a new government of Liberal elements under V.Radoslavov) Bulgaria’s territorial gains are limited to Pirin Macedonia (while Silistra and southern Dobrogea are lost to Romania); however, Bulgaria gains western Thrace under the Treaty of Constantinople. 1914 Radoslavov fails to gain the support of Stamboliski’s Agrarians but wins the election. 1915 Bulgaria enters the war on the side of the Central Powers, with opposition from the imprisoned Stamboliski and subsequently from a minority of Agrarians and Socialists in the Subranie.

Chronology

427

1916 With Turkish support the Bulgarians capture southern Dobrogea; they also advance into western Macedonia (though Serbs regain Bitola) and Radoslavov claims that Bulgaria had achieved the borders of San Stefano. 1917 ‘Women’s Riots’ for food break out but fighting continues although the proGerman Radoslavov government is replaced by that of A.Malinov. 1918 Allied forces break through Bulgarian lines in Macedonia and an armistice is signed in Thessaloniki. Stamboliski is released and although one of his deputies— R.Daskalov—is unsuccessful in leading an Agrarian assault on Sofia (‘Radimir Rebellion’) Ferdinand abdicates in favour of Boris III and the new T.Todorov government gives the pardoned Stamboliski a cabinet post. 1919 Treaty of Neuilly awards south Dobrogea to Romania and Strumitsa to Yugoslavia while the Aegean territories (western Thrace) pass to Greece under the San Remo Conference. Radical elements win the election and Stamboliski now heads a coalition government (later an Agrarian majority government) and puts down a communist strike. 1920 An election success paves the way for Agrarian policies favouring a ‘model agricultural state’ of small peasant farmers represented by the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union—with modest land reform and support for cooperatives—and a muchreduced bureaucracy. 1921 Stamboliski’s land reform limits estates to 30ha (50ha in the mountains) and enables 173,000 peasants to receive a total of 133,000ha. 1923 The Treaty of Niš empowers Yugoslavia to pursue Macedonian separatists on Bulgarian territory (since Stamboliski cannot rely on the Bulgarian military). A further Agrarian election victory—gained through some repressive measures—provokes a coup against Stamboliski by the Military League and IMRO (supported by Boris III) whereupon the new right-wing government of A. Tsankov takes a strong line against communist opponents and introduces policies favourable to industry and large-scale agriculture. 1924 The communists are outlawed but continue to function underground. 1925 Communists flee abroad after the explosion at Sofia’s Sveta Nedelya Cathedral while IMRO raids provoke a brief Greek occupation in southern Bulgaria. 1926 A new coalition leader, A.Liapchev, seeks internal peace through amnesties. 1927 The communists reform as the Bulgarian Workers’ Party while IMRO remains dangerously out of control. 1929 The Liapchev government faces serious economic challenges. 1930 A Friendship and Non-Aggression Treaty is signed with Czechoslovakia. 1931 An election victory by a Democratic-led Popular Bloc coalition (with Centre Agrarians, Liberals and Radicals) under A.Malinov is undermined by factional divisions and IMRO lawlessness in Macedonia whereupon a Democrat colleague, N.Mushanov, succeeds. 1934 Bulgaria’s diplomatic isolation through the Balkan Entente and her domestic problems provoke a military coup by K.Georgiev and D.Velchev representing a Military League and the Zveno reform group. Georgiev’s ‘Nineteenth of May Government’ aims at social renewal under authoritarian rule by decree. The IMRO is defeated and peasant debts are reduced.

Chronology

428

1935 Fearing a republican plot, Boris establishes a royal dictatorship with political parties prohibited: the premiership is handed first to a general (P.Zlatev) then to the civilian A.Toshev and later in the year to G.Kioseivanov. 1936 A spending programme for arms is launched. 1937 An election for a Subranie—with banned parties excluded and seats reduced from 274 to 160—confirms the Kioseivanov government. 1938 Under the Thessaloniki Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression the Balkan Entente accept Bulgaria’s right to rearm (denied by the Neuilly Treaty) but revisionism in Sofia provides an opportunity for Germany. 1939 Kioseivanov assures Hitler that Bulgaria is a natural ally of Germany (though Bulgaria is officially neutral when war breaks out) but Boris seeks another election to strengthen the majority in the Subranie. 1940 The strongly pro-German B.Filov takes over the government and economic ties with Germany increase; Bulgaria regains southern Dobrogea but refuses to go to war. 1941 Repressive measures are taken against Jews through the Protection of the Nation Law and a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Turkey is revoked later in the year (by Turkey) on the grounds that German troops have entered Bulgaria. After Filov signs the Tripartite Pact in Vienna with the promise of Greek Macedonia and Thrace, Greater Bulgaria (including Yugoslav Macedonia) is achieved thanks to the German advance and Bulgarian colonies are established in Greek Macedonia. Communists are persecuted under the Anti-Comintern Pact. 1942 Bulgaria declines to join the war against the USSR but communists lead an underground opposition called the Fatherland Front which includes leftist Agrarians. 1943 Greek and Yugoslav Jews in Bulgarian-occupied territory are deported for extermination while those in Bulgaria proper are displaced into rural areas. Encouraged by the Soviet victory at Stalingrad and Allied bombing of Sofia, popular anti-German demonstrations occur and communist partisans operate in the mountains. Boris III dies and is succeeded by his young son Simeon II, while despite Allied bombing of Sofia the cabinet of conservative loyalists (now headed by D.Bozhilov) maintains the alliance with Germany. 1944 The Regency Council appoints an Agrarian rightist I.Bagrianov to the premiership but his strategy of neutrality combined with continued occupation of Greek territory is unacceptable to the Allies as the basis for an armistice. After another Agrarian premier (K.Muraviev) fails to change policy significantly and Russian troops enter Bulgaria, Georgiev and Velchev (1934 coup organisers) overthrow the government and install the Fatherland Front. An armistice is signed (surrendering occupied territory) and with communist domination of the Georgiev government, people’s courts prosecute the leaders of the wartime period and up to 30,000 political opponents are killed. The Fatherland Front also begins action to confiscate the wealth of ‘fascists’ and ‘speculators’. Czechoslovakia 1780 Enlightened absolute rule of Maria Theresa ends after forty years; Josef continues her policy until his death in 1790. 1781 Bohemian peasants are virtually freed from customary feudal obligations.

Chronology

429

1806 Continental blockade provides a stimulus for modernising Habsburg estates. 1843 L.Štuř creates a new standard written form for the Slovak language. 1848 A bid for Czech autonomy is made by F.Palacký and other leaders who oppose revolution in Vienna and present constitutional proposals for a federal Habsburg state to the parliament in Kremsier (Kromĕříž). Slovaks seek recognition of their claim to nationhood through a proclamation at Liptovský Mikuláš but are overtaken by the momentum for Hungarian nationalism. 1852 Deaths of J.Kollár and F.L.Čelakovsky who were among the first real creators of a new Czech literature. 1861 Franz Josef declares a constitution which gives power to the bourgeoisie and facilitates patriotic societies and publishing by the National Party with its two wings: ‘Old Czechs’ under Palacký and the more progressive ‘Young Czechs’. 1862 Matica Slovenská—the Slovak organisation for national culture—is founded. 1869 Compulsory eight-year school reduces illiteracy in the Czech lands. 1871 Franz Josef rejects proposals for Bohemian autonomy. 1873 Slovak secondary schools are abolished. 1878 Founding of the Czech-Slavonic Social Democratic Workers’ Party. 1882 Division of Charles University into independent Czech and German institutions. 1883 National Theatre rebuilt after the fire of 1881. 1888 Austria’s Social Democrats agree a political programme but side-step the national issue. 1890 Czech Academy of Arts and Sciences opens and secondary education provided in Czech, while mass demonstrations reveal the strength of the Czech labour movement. The Czech agrarian movement makes progress through dissatisfaction with the uppermiddle-class ethos of the Young Czechs. 1891 Old Czechs are eliminated from parliament after accepting the separate status for the German-speaking border regions of Deutschböhmen. 1900 The Czech Progressive Party is founded by T.G.Masaryk. 1905 The Slovak Social Democratic Party is founded in Bratislava. 1907 Universal suffrage is granted throughout the empire. 1914 Masaryk works in Allied states to gain support for independence for the Czech lands and Slovakia. 1915 The Czech Action Committee Abroad is founded in Paris (National Committee 1916). 1916 A military unit of Czech and Slovak immigrants (formed in 1914) becomes a regiment in the Russian army (and an independent army in 1917). 1918 With Allied recognition the Czech national committee (comprising deputies in the Vienna parliament) becomes a provisional government and Czechoslovak government formed in Prague. Masaryk is elected president (re-elected 1927 and 1934). 1919 Occupation of the Sudeten German region of Bohemia; also of Tĕšín, a territory subsequently shared with Poland under an armistice signed the following year. Treaties of St Germain and Versailles—also the Treaty of Trianon in 1920—recognise Czechoslovakia’s independence. A Land Expropriation Act (continuing into 1920) by the government of K.Kramář enables 4 million hectares to be redistributed by 1937. Foreignowned companies are required to establish a headquarters in the country while currency

Chronology

430

reform provides freedom from depreciated Austrian money. A short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic is declared in Prešov. 1920 Czechoslovakia is a founder member of the League of Nations. Despite a socialist victory in the first National Assembly elections, premier V.Tusar (who replaced in Kramář in 1919) maintains the coalition with the Agrarian Party. Armed forces are used to break a general strike. 1921 Creation of the Little Entente (with Romania and Yugoslavia)—renewed in 1926, 1929 and 1932. A law for unemployment benefit (effective 1926) is enacted. The Communist Party is formed. 1922 A five-year alliance is forged with Yugoslavia. A.Svehla of the Agrarian Party takes the premiership after short periods in office by V.Tusar, J.Černý and E.Beneš; he continues until 1929 apart from a brief period under Čzerný in 1926. 1923 A military treaty is signed with Romania. The finance minister A.Rašin is assassinated. 1924 Friendship treaties with France and Italy are signed. 1925 Treaty of Mutual Guarantee with France. The Locarno Conference produces a Czechoslovak-German arbitration treaty and a French guarantee in the event of German aggression. Agrarians win the elections with the Communists second. 1927 Provincial assemblies are established for Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Ruthenia. 1929 Svehla replaced due to ill health by F.Udřzal; followed by J.Malypetr in 1932 and M.Hodža in 1935. 1930 Treaty of Friendship with Bulgaria. 1932 Exports fall to two-thirds the 1929 level. T.Bat’a dies. 1933 Unemployment reaches 738,000 (38,600 in 1929). The National Assembly grants the government wider powers to manage the economy. 1934 Diplomatic relations established with the Soviet Union (after the Little Entente’s non-aggression pact the previous year) followed by a mutual assistance pact the following year. Formation of a German Home Front by K.Henlein (autonomy demanded in 1938). 1935 Beneš succeeds Masaryk (d. 1937) as president. The Sudeten German Party formed. 1938 Beneš resigns the presidency and accepts Ruthenian and Slovak autonomy. The state is renamed Czecho-Slovakia (a proposal previously rejected in 1923). At Karlsbad (Karlovy Vary) Germans seek their own totalitarian Nazi state within Czechoslovakia. The Hodža government resigns over the Sudetenland capitulation and the non-party government under J.Syrový orders mobilisation but later accepts the Munich Agreement for German occupation of Sudetenland. Tĕšin is ceded to Poland and the Little Entente is obliged to accept Hungary’s right to rearm. A.Hlinka’s fascist party seizes power in Slovakia. 1939 As Hungary takes Ruthenia and southern Slovakia, President E.Hácha agrees to German protection for Bohemia and Moravia while Slovakia becomes nominally independent with J.Tiso as premier (later president). There is Western recognition of the Czechoslovak National Committee (USA in 1941).

Chronology

431

1940 The Czechoslovak National Committee functions as a provisional government. The Czechoslovak and Polish governments in exile agree to a post-war union (also open to other states) as a defence against Germany. 1941 Beneš proposes a Czech-Polish confederation after the war; opposed by the USSR. Slovakia allows Germany to control her weapons industry on a joint basis and signs the Anti-Cominterm Pact. 1942 Destruction of Lĕžáky and Lidice villages following the assassination of Protector R.Heydrich. USSR recognises the country’s pre-Munich borders. 1943 Beneš signs Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the USSR. 1944 Britain and France revoke the Munich Agreement and the German army occupies Slovakia, leading to a Slovak national uprising which ends in failure. Germany 1815 A loose German confederation (Deutsch Bund) is created. 1818 Imposition of a new Prussian tariff gradually attracts the membership of eight small states to form a customs union. 1828 Hesse-Darmstadt joins the Prussian customs union while Bavaria and Württemberg form a customs union. 1834 Formation of the Zollverein. 1848 Prussian revolution gives rise to an ultra-conservative constitution but the Frankfurt parliament fails to unite Germany. 1851 A German confederation is re-established. 1857 A financial crash follows years of speculation. 1862 O.von Bismarck appointed Prussian Minister-President. 1866 The Seven-Week War ends with the Prussian victory at Königgrätz (Sadowa) and under the Treaty of Prague the Habsburg Empire cedes Venetia to Italy and accepts dissolution of the German Confederation and its replacement by a North German Confederation (formed in 1867) under Prussian leadership. 1867 Southern states join the Zollverein. 1870 The Franco-Prussian War breaks out and under the Treaty of Frankfurt Germany secures Alsace-Lorraine. 1871 With the German states now unified the German Empire is founded. 1873 Bismarck negotiates a Three Emperors’ League but years of rapid growth since unification (‘Gründerjahr’) end in depression. 1875 The Social Democratic Party is formed. 1877 An alliance is forged between the landed and industrial elites. 1878 Germany plays the role of honest broker at the Congress of Berlin. 1879 A dual alliance with the Habsburg Empire signed—remains until the First World War. Kaiser Wilhelm II and his naval adviser A.von Tirpitz launch Germany’s ‘Weltpolitik’ while a change in economic policy arises through tariffs on grain and iron—reflecting Bismarck’s alliance with two conservative parties at the expense of the Liberals and the Social Democrats (the latter outlawed during 1878–90). 1881 Bismarck renegotiates the Three Emperors’ League. 1882 A Triple Alliance is formed as Italy joins the Dual Alliance of Germany and the Habsburg Empire.

Chronology

432

1883 Health insurance legislation is passed. 1884 Germany begins colonial expansion. 1885 Tariffs on grain and iron are increased (again in 1887). 1886 The Settlement Law encourages German peasants to settle in the eastern provinces. 1887 A ‘Reinsurance Treaty’ with Russia is negotiated. 1889 An old-age pension scheme is introduced. 1890 Bismarck resigns and G.von Caprivi takes over. 1891 As the Social Democrats (adopting a Marxist revolutionary programme at their Erfurt Congress) become the largest single party, social welfare reform is achieved and tariff reform commences. 1893 The Agrarian League is formed. 1894 A Franco-Russian dual alliance is forged. The Junker elite forces Caprivi’s resignation for reducing the grain tariff and lowering food costs. 1897 Foreign Minister B.von Bülow launches Germany’s ‘Weltpolitik’. 1898 The Navy League is created. 1900 Von Bulöw takes the chancellorship and resurrects the alliance of agrarian and industrial elites. 1912 T.Bethmann Hollweg and his ministers judge ‘Weltpolitik’ a failure since the Triple Entente remains firm despite German attempts to create crises out of French penetration in Morocco. Social Democrats become the largest single party in the Reichstag by winning 35% of the vote. 1914 Reacting to events in the Balkans Germany starts fighting on two fronts according to the plan of A.von Schlieffen; seeking a speedy defeat of France followed by transfer of forces to regain anticipated losses in the East. But while the Russians are defeated at Tannenburg the western campaign is bogged down and becomes a war of attrition. 1915 Italy joins the Triple Entente (followed by Romania in 1916). 1917 Germany launches submarine warfare in pursuit of total victory. The Reichstag votes for peace with no annexations but the Central Powers fail to offer peace proposals. Kaiser Wilhelm II promises an end to restrictive franchise, but an elite-supported Fatherland Front is dedicated to support the status quo. 1918 Following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and transfer of eastern forces to the Western Front, General Ludendorff’s final offensive fails. Wilhelm II installs a more liberal government under M.von Baden, but mutiny breaks out in the German fleet, the Kaiser abdicates and Social Democrats take power. An armistice is signed and F.Ebert assumes the chancellorship in pursuit of a democratic constitution. 1919 After months of political struggle Ebert prevails against radical socialist opinion led by K.Liebknecht and R.Luxemburg. The ‘Weimar Constitution’ gives the vote to all men and women at the age of twenty; while a ‘Weimar renaissance’ occurs as W.Gropius forms the Bauhaus school of design in Weimar, symbolising a modernist attack on tradition. 1920 Founding of the National Socialist Party (with Hitler as leader in 1921, absorption of the German Socialist Party in 1922 and a rapidly expanding membership by 1923). The party’s programme seeks revision of the Treaty of Versailles, restoration of

Chronology

433

lost colonial territories and creation of Greater Germany. A communist uprising takes place in the Ruhr. 1922 French refusal of Germany’s request for temporary suspension of reparations— and subsequent occupation of the Ruhr, met by passive resistance—brings economic crisis and inflation with a US dollar valued at 192 marks at the start of 1922 and 4,200 billion in mid-November 1923. 1923 A grand coalition governs Germany and Chancellor G.Streseman reestablishes of the German currency after hyperinflation and ends passive resistance. An attempted coup d’état by the Nazis through the Munich putsch fails totally, leading to Hitler’s arrest and the banning of the party. 1924 The Ruhr occupation ends (France evacuates the following year) and the Dawes Plan provides foreign loans for Germany. The Nazi Party makes gains in the election, won by the Social Democrats, but a centre-right coalition governs Germany (until 1927). 1925 Germany signs the Locarno treaties, accepts post-war boundaries with Belgium and France and agrees to arbitration in the event of frontier disputes in the east. Hitler sets up his Schützstaffeln (SS) defence unit. 1926 Germany becomes a member of the League of Nations. The publication of Hitler’s Mein Kampf (My Struggle) is completed, with references to a Darwinian struggle between races, with Aryans forming the highest order as founders of culture and Jews as the lowest order as destroyers of culture. It also outlines an aggressive foreign policy, modifying the Nazi Programme of 1920. 1928 A grand coalition governs Germany while resort to an aggressive war is outlawed under the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 1929 The Allied Reparation Commission moderates demands and reschedules payments, while the Allies agree to the evacuation of Rhineland by 1930 (having reduced the occupation force to 10,000 in 1927). 1930 Deflationary economic policies fail to arrest depression, with negative social and political consequences. Hitler’s Nazi Party gains 18.3% of the national vote with an anticapitalist, anti-Marxist and anti-Semitic platform and becomes the second largest party. The Communists are also elected to parliament. 1931 H.Himmler (who in 1929 became leader of Hitler’s SS) establishes an internal security service (Sicherheitsdienst) and subsequently organises special guard troops for concentration camps and special armed duty troops (Waffen SS) who later vie with the army in controlling the occupied territories. 1932 Hitler narrowly loses to P.von Hindenburg in the presidential election in a strong campaign organised by J.Goebbels. With some 300,000 members (3 million in 1933) his stormtroopers (Sturmabteilungen) become a highly efficient party army. 1933 Hindenburg accepts a Hitler-led government after the Nazis emerge as the largest party in 1932 with 37% of the popular vote. Hitler then consolidates Nazi power, with draconian measures (withdrawing democratic rights granted by the Weimar Constitution) following the Reichstag fire of 1933. The 44% of the popular vote gained in 1933 is interpreted by Hitler as a mandate for ‘national revolution’. Göring lays the institutional base of the police state through the secret state police Geheime Staatspolizei or Gestapo. A Nazi German Labour Front (‘Deutsche Arbeitsfront’) replaces independent unions. Marriage loans are made available to couples who are eligible on economic, political and eugenic grounds. A Hereditary Health Protection Law provides for

Chronology

434

sterilisation and welfare activity through Winter Relief (‘Winterhilfe’) is launched. Agriculture is supported as vital for the future of Germany: there is economic relief for farmers with entailed farms (‘Erbhöfe’) to preserve ‘the bonds of blood and soil’. Jews are expelled from the civil service and the universities. 1934 Completion of the major phase of Nazi ‘Gleichschaltung’ (1933–4). Hitler assumes the presidency and purges his ‘Sturmabteilungen’. Rearmament begins and a ‘Battle for Production’ is launched following a poor harvest and Germany signs a tenyear non-aggression pact with Poland. 1935 The Saarland plebiscite leads to reunion with Germany, while the Anglo-German Pact allows Germany to build a navy equivalent to 55% of UK strength (with parity in submarines). A Rome-Berlin axis is forged, the air force develops and conscription starts, while the Nürnberg Laws place restrictions on Jews and deny them German citizenship while prescribing imprisonment for marriage and intercourse between Germans and Jews. 1936 Germany and Japan sign an Anti-Cominterm Pact and the Rhineland is remilitarised. Göring is placed in charge of a Four Year Plan for rearmament (including agricultural subsidies and grants), launched at the Nürnberg Rally. 1937 Escalating anti-Semitism: ‘Kristallnacht’ violence against Jews. 1938 The ‘Anschluss’ with Austria is followed by the Munich Agreement which awards Czechoslovakia’s ‘Sudetenland’ to Germany. Synthetic oil production is boosted with the appointment of C.Krauch of IG Farben as General Plenipotentiary for Chemicals under the Four Year Plan. Concentration camp labour is used for quarrying, road-building and agriculture. Jewish businesses are subjected to mass expropriation. 1939 Germany forges a ‘Pact of Steel’ with Italy and enters into a non-aggression pact with the USSR. The drive for territorial expansion continues with the Danzig and Memel occupations, the Bohemia and Moravia protectorate and the allied state of Slovakia. Launch of a lightning war (Blitzkrieg) involving surprise attack with rapid mobility and destruction of enemy supply and control lines: initially Poland is attacked (after the Franco-British guarantee) with a view to using the country as a staging post for the Russian campaign. 1940 Germany completes the occupation of France. 1941 Launch of Operation Barbarossa against the USSR which fails to secure Leningrad and Moscow. General Plan East envisages the elimination of 30 million Slavs to create space for resettlement of Germans. 15,000km of Soviet broad-gauge track are converted to standard, a special war locomotive (‘Kriegslok’) is introduced and Hitler contemplates a new super-broad-gauge railway system. Hitler decides on a policy of systemic genocide with the first extermination camp established at Chełmno. 1942 Limited gains in Ukraine extend the east-west distance of territory under German control from 950km (‘Versailles Germany’) to 3,200km. After Himmler’s SS refit the Auschwitz camp with gas chambers mass transport of Jews begins. 1943 Germany’s defeat at Stalingrad starts the erosion of Hitler’s empire. U-boats are temporarily withdrawn from Atlantic operations. 1944 Germany fails to prevent the D-Day Normandy landings leading to withdrawal from France and the Low Countries. Organised migration of foreign workers to Germany under F.Sauckel, General Plenipotentiary for Labour, reaches 5 million during 1942–4.

Chronology

435

Hungary 1785 Hungarian peasants are virtually freed from customary feudal obligations. 1841 The Hungarian Commercial Bank of Pest opens. 1848 A Hungarian revolutionary programme under S.Petöfi leads to the April Laws asserting the territorial integrity of the Hungarian crownlands. 1849 After a declaration of Hungarian independence is opposed by the minorities, Russian troops defeat the Hungarian revolution leading to the reaction of the ‘Bach regime’. 1865 Franz-Josef dismisses his centralist Hungarian ministry and reconvenes the Hungarian diet. 1866 The end of the seven-week Austro-Prussian War accelerates the movement for compromise. 1867 Compromise establishes a Hungarian government under G.Andrássy. 1868 The Eötvös elementary education act is enacted. 1870 K.Tisza and his Centre-Left Party join the pro-compromise ‘Deak’ Party to create a stable liberal majority in Hungary. 1873 Economic crisis encourages cartel formation in Hungarian industry. 1875 Liberal Party formed by K.Tisza provides stability for the compromise for almost three decades. 1881 Tax exemption is allowed for all new Hungarian factories producing goods with new technologies. 1890 Interest-free loans are offered by the Hungarian state for establishing new companies (also 1899 and 1907). 1903 The ‘army question’ becomes so contentious that the national opposition makes parliamentary government impossible. 1905 Election secures a majority in Hungary for (Hungarian) national parties that now win nationalist concessions over the army, but Franz-Josef refuses to place them in government until compromise is reached over their programme (1906), whereupon the threat of franchise reform is withdrawn. 1906 After a period of non-parliamentary government, a coalition government is appointed under S.Wekerle but is deemed a failure despite further nationalist measures. 1910 A large majority is secured for Tisza’s Liberals in Hungary—reorganised as the ‘Party of Work’—but franchise reform is abandoned. 1914 The Habsburg Empire declares war on Russia and Hungary hopes to even the score (after 1849): Premier Tisza’s war aim is maintenance of Magyar dominance in Hungary. 1916 After the death of Franz-Josef, Karl IV succeeds. Amid currency depreciation and food shortage M.Károlyi advocates a separate peace with the Allies. 1917 Tisza refuses to accept electoral reform and resigns the premiership. 1918 Amid calls for Hungarian independence, Károlyi of the Party of Independence is appointed premier by Karl (as Hungarian king) hoping for satisfactory peace terms. As Croatia and Slovakia secede there are calls for a republic and independence is declared in pursuit of a separate armistice.

Chronology

436

1919 A leftward trends ushers in B.Kun’s Soviet Republic, with unfulfilled promises of Russian support against the Romanian advance on Budapest. Industry and commerce are nationalised and large landowners expropriated. 1920 The Treaty of Trianon established new frontiers. Election of a Christian National Union-Smallholder government under S.Somonyi-Semadam and then P.Teleki leads to cancellation of the Károlyi and Kun programmes, while the 1867 ‘compromise’ framework restores the institution of monarchy. Admiral M.Horthy is elected provisional head of state. Modest agrarian reform reduces the land held by estates by only a tenth (700,000ha) to give 400,000 families (250,000 previously landless) small parcels averaging 1ha. 1921 A plebiscite in Sopron leads to the return of this part of Burgenland to Hungary. Allied pressure prevents Charles regaining the Hungarian throne and the largely ‘legitimist’ government resigns. I.Bethlen forms an ‘antilegitimist’ Party of Unity from CNU and Smallholder elements. 1922 The boundary with Czechoslovakia is agreed and Hungary joins the League of Nations. 1923 An economic reconstruction plan is presented to the League of Nations and a $50 million loan from the great powers is agreed. 1924 Currency stabilisation through foreign aid is supervised by the League of Nations—this stimulates private lending, including the return of expatriated domestic capital. 1925 Adoption of a new currency (the pengö) is authorised by parliament (introduced in 1926). 1926 The League of Nations’ loan makes it possible to fight hyperinflation. 1927 Friendship Treaty with Italy. The new health insurance scheme does not include the rural population. 1929 Fall in world wheat prices. 1930 Formation of an Independent Party of Smallholders to represent small farmers. 1931 Bethlen wins the election but depression sets in and discontent forces his resignation: he is succeeded by G.Károlyi. 1932 A fascist Hungarian Socialist Party is formed while G.Gömbös (leader of the Right Radicals) forms a government and launches a National Work Plan. He also seeks an axis of fascist states with Germany and Italy. 1934 An economic agreement is reached with Germany, while the Rome Protocols seek to increase mutual trade between Austria, Hungary and Italy as a counter-weight to France and the Little Entente. 1935 Gömbös begins to promote a one-party state. 1936 After the election returns his Right Radicals, Gömbös is succeeded on his death by K.Daranyi; leaving Hungary in the ‘Axis camp’ with support for treaty revision and the start of rearmament. 1938 Territory in southern Slovakia is returned under the First Vienna Award. As B.Inivedy succeeds as premier, a Five Year Rearmament Programme of 1 billion pengö is launched. Extreme right parties form the Arrow Cross. 1939 Hungary regains Ruthenia. A ‘Jewish Law’ is followed by a more radical one as the premiership passes to P.Teleki.

Chronology

437

1940 The Second Vienna Award enables Hungary to regain northern Transylvania. Hungary joins the Tripartite Pact but remains non-belligerent by allowing German troops to pass into southern Romania. Further anti-Semitic legislation is passed. 1941 Horthy refuses to join a German attack on Yugoslavia but allows German troops access; Teleki commits suicide when this brings a declaration of war. L.Bárdossy occupies Hungarian areas of Yugoslavia with Croatia’s declaration of independence deemed to signal the country’s disintegration. Token support is offered for Hitler’s Barbarossa campaign. 1942 Full mobilisation is combined with an attempt at balance between the Axis and Allied camps under Premier M.Kalláy, while Croatia, Romania and Slovakia proclaim anti-Magyar friendship. Jews and Serbs are massacred at Novi Sad. 1943 Defeat of the Hungarian expeditionary force at Voronezh prompts secret negotiations with the British envisaging withdrawal from the east, but the move is opposed by the Arrow Cross and German troops occupy the country. 1944 Appointment of a collaborationist government under D.Sztögay (with persecution of Jews) is followed by the government of G.Lakatos seeking a preliminary armistice with the Soviets, but Horthy is forced to abdicate and F. Szalasi takes the premiership. Soviet troops remove the Germans from Hungary, the Communist Party is reconstituted and a provisional national assembly is formed under a democratic coalition including Agrarians and Social Democrats. Poland 1733 Augustus III gains the Polish crown with Russian support: under his rule (1733–63) Poland is effectively a Russian protectorate. 1745 Frederick the Great completes the annexation of Silesia (1740–5). 1764 End of the Seven Years War. 1764 Stanislaw II gains the Polish crown. 1773 First Partition of Poland. 1792 The new Polish constitution is destroyed by a Russian invasion. 1793 The Second Partition of Poland takes place under a Russo-Prussian treaty. 1794 Polish insurrection occurs under T.Kościuszko but Russian victory leads to the capitulation of Warsaw. 1795 Stanislaw II abdicates following the Third Partition of Poland. 1815 Following the Napoleonic Wars Poland is repartitioned among the Habsburg Empire, Prussia and Russia. 1830–1 Insurrection under P.Wysoki—seeking the removal of Tsar Nicholas II for seeking a Polish army to attack France and Belgium—ends in failure. 1832 A union of the Kingdom of Poland and the Russian Empire takes place, while the Organic Statute restricts the rights enjoyed under the 1815 constitution. 1835 A Polish People’s Association is active (until 1838). 1836 The Polish Democratic Society (PDS), founded in 1832, issues its Manifesto of Poitiers seeking an independent Poland within the 1772 boundaries. 1837 Voivodships are replaced by the Russian ‘guberiyas’. 1841 The Russian monetary system introduced.

Chronology

438

1846 Insurrection by the PDS in Kraków under J.Tyssowski and E.Dembowski fails and it is also unable to spread across Galicia. 1847 The Russian criminal code is introduced. 1848 An uprising occurs in Poznań. 1849 Financed by gentlemen in Poznań, K.Marx and F.Engels write in Neue Rheinische Zeitung to proclaim national liberation in Poland as the most important task of Europe’s workers’ movement. 1863–4 An insurrection in support of autonomy for the kingdom fails. 1864 With the end of feudalism the Polish Kingdom becomes officially Russia’s Western Province. 1867 A Polish Circle is active in the Austrian parliament. 1869 Warsaw University is Russified. 1871 A Polish Circle is active in the German parliament. 1874 Russification of secondary schools in the kingdom is completed. 1875 The completion of Russification of primary schools in the kingdom maintains a high rate of illiteracy among the peasantry. 1887 A Polish League (National League in 1893) is formed under R.Dmówski. 1892 The Polish Socialist Party (PSP) is formed under B.Limanówski (and is later led by J.Piłsudski) with a radical independence programme. 1893 A movement for ‘Social Democracy in the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania’ is formed under R.Luxemburg and J.Marchlewski. 1905 National Democracy is formed by Dmówski and controls the Polish faction in the Russian Duma until 1917: it sees the German Reich as its main opponent. 1907 A Polish Peasant Party (PPP) is founded, following the introduction of universal suffrage for the Vienna parliament of 1907, and subsequently gains influence in Congress Poland. 1914 A Polish Supreme National Committee is allowed to form in Galicia to support the Habsburg aim of bringing Congress Poland into the empire, while a Polish Legion is recruited mainly from the followers of Piłsudski’s PSP. Meanwhile, following Russian support for Polish autonomy, a Polish National Committee emerges in Warsaw (mainly from the ranks of Dmówski’s National Democrats) to support the Russian war effort which involves the Brussilow Offensive in Galicia following defeat by Germany in East Prussia. 1915 As the Central Powers regain Galicia and advance into Congress Poland PSP elements take the lead in establishing a Central National Committee to create a Polish Republic with the help of the Central Powers. 1916 Austria-Hungary and Germany declare a Kingdom of Poland in their respective occupation zones (based on Lublin and Warsaw, respectively). 1917 The Russian revolution recognises Poland’s right to independence but in military alliance with Russia. Piłsudski’s Polish Legion (now the Polish Auxiliary Corps) clashes with the Central Powers and is interned. Meanwhile, Dmówski re-establishes his Polish National Council in Lausanne to seek political progress with the Western Allies. Piłsudski’s Legion now inclines towards the Allies and is interned by the Central Powers. 1918 US President Wilson demands the formation of an independent Polish state while the award of Chelm to Ukraine (under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk) further alienates the Poles from the Central Powers. With the collapse of the Central Powers a provisional

Chronology

439

Polish government is established in Lublin while Piłsudski returns from Germany to take control. The Catholic University of Lublin is established. 1919 With agreement with Piłsudski, Dmówski’s PNC is recognised as the official Polish delegation in Paris. The Treaty of Versailles awards Poland most of Poznań Province and a corridor to the Baltic coast (though Gdańsk is made a free city). I.J.Pederewski forms a government with Piłsudski as chief of state (to 1922). An elected assembly in Warsaw approves a ‘Little Constitution’ for a bourgeois democracy dominated initially by the National Democrats and the PPP. Land reform proceeds, although due to the strength of the landed class distribution is limited to 2.65 million hectares (only a tenth of the land in the country). 1920 An ill-advised Polish advance against Kiev leads to a Red Army advance westwards but its decisive defeat on the Vistula enabled the Poles to make a further westward penetration until an armistice is signed. Polish designs on East Prussia are rebuffed by pro-German majorities in the Allenstein and Marienwerder plebiscites. Cieszyn is divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia. 1921 The Treaty of Riga establishes Poland’s eastern boundary which takes in Central Lithuania, White Ruthenia, eastern Galicia and western Wolhynia. Upper Silesia is divided between Germany and Poland. Alliances are negotiated with France and Romania. A wider constitution establishes a parliament of two houses: Senate and Sejm. 1922 The splintering of political forces makes for frequent changes in government, mostly based on coalitions between Christian Democrats, National Democrats and the PPP (to 1926). 1923 Hyperinflation breaks out. The Communist Party is declared illegal. 1924 Prime Minister W.Grabski’s introduction of the Polish złoty as national currency makes for stabilisation and a unified monetary system. 1925 A tariff war with Germany threatens currency stabilisation. Suspension of Polish coal exports leads to financial crisis and high unemployment. 1926 With PSP support, Piłsudski’s military coup establishes a ‘moral dictatorship’ (to stamp out corruption) under a Non-Party Bloc of Cooperation (NPBC) opposed by the right wing under Dmówski during 1926–7. 1927 Piłsudski’s NPBC secures a quarter of the seats in a Sejm election. 1929 With the onset of depression Piłsudski asserts his leadership against a centre-left coalition of PSP and PPP elements with sweeping arrests. 1930 Piłsudski’s NPBC secures a majority against very limited organised political opposition. He continues to govern until his death in 193 5 without holding office officially, confronting economic crisis unsuccessfully through non-intervention. 1932 A non-aggression pact is negotiated with the Soviet Union. 1934 A non-aggression pact is negotiated with Germany. The fascist National Radical Camp is dissolved. 1935 Constitutional reform allows the head of state to enact legislation without parliamentary approval. 1936 Launch of a six-year Defence Expansion Plan (1936–42) and a four-year investment plan (1936–40). 1937 A Camp of National Unity is founded by the government as an authoritarian association lacking a real political programme.

Chronology

440

1938 Violent demonstrations break out (as in 1936) which precipitate an incipient popular front combining the PSP and communists with a more radical PPP under S.Mikołajczyk; provoking Stalin into dissolving the Communist Party of Poland. 1939 A British guarantee (without financial and military assistance) is followed by the Fourth Partition of Poland under the Hitler-Stalin Non-Aggression Pact and leads to a Polish government in exile in Paris (transferred to London in 1940). Hitler and Stalin subsequently agree the Fifth Partition along the Narew-Bug-San line but this is so close to the Curzon Line that Britain is able to reconcile its guarantee of Polish integrity without engaging in diplomatic conflict with the USSR. 1941 Following Operation Barbarossa Stalin annuls the Fifth Partition of Poland and seeks cooperation with the Polish government in exile to recruit a Polish army in Russia, while proposing the Curzon Line as the future Polish boundary. 1942 The Polish Communist Party is revived in German-occupied Poland under W.Gomulka and forms the nucleus of a People’s Army. 1943 Germans announce the discovery of the Katyn graves which they attribute to Soviet massacre of Polish officers (interned in 1939) in 1940. Stalin severs relations with the Polish government in London—when the latter seeks Red Cross confirmation—and creates a Polish National Home Council (under Gomulka and B.Bierut) as the government of a future Polish People’s Republic. The Teheran Conference accepts the Curzon Line as the eastern boundary of Poland. 1944 After failing to assist an unsuccessful Polish uprising in Warsaw (which might have given Poles control of the city) the Red Army ‘liberates’ what remains following Hitler’s order for total destruction. A Polish Committee of National Liberation is established in Lublin (‘Lublin Committee’) and the UK and USA sacrifice the legitimacy of the Polish government in exile. A land reform decree eventually enables the distribution of 6 million hectares among 1.07 million families (average holding: 5.7ha). Romania 1774 Russia’s right to protect the Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox population is recognised by the Treaty of Kucuk Kainarji and Russia is awarded a protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia. 1775 The Habsburg Empire annexes Bukowina. 1782 Russia appoints a consul to Bucharest, balanced by an ‘agent’ representing the Habsburg interest. 1791 Boyars appeal to the Habsburg Empire and Russia for an end to Phanariot rule. 1802 The Ottomans agree that princes will hold office for at least seven years and will not be dispossessed without Russian consent. 1812 Russia is forced to end its occupation of the principalities (started in 1806) but the Ottomans cede the territory of Bessarabia. 1821 T.Vladimirescu leads a popular national revolt against the Phanariot system. 1829 Following the Russo-Turkish War of 1828 and Russian occupation of the principalities in 1828, the Treaty of Adrianople ends the Ottoman economic monopoly and sanctions Russian protection and government under Romanian princes elected for life; enlightened Russian occupation under P.Kiselev.

Chronology

441

1832 A constitution (‘Organic Statutes’) for Moldavia and Wallachia vests administrative and legislative powers in elected, native bodies (ratified by the Ottomans in 1834). 1848 Customs taxes between Moldavia and Wallachia are eliminated. 1856 A Russian protectorate is replaced by a collective guarantee while the Russian frontier is pushed back from the Danube by the return of southern Bessarabia to Moldavia. 1858 While separate princes and assemblies are maintained in the two principalities the Ottomans accept a central commission in Focşani. 1859 De facto unification of the principalities is secured when both Moldavia and Wallachia elect A.I.Cuza as prince (ratified by the powers in 1861). 1864 Land reform abolishes feudal relations and distributes land, leading to capitalist relations in agriculture. 1866 Carol from the Hohenzollern family becomes prince following Cuza’s abdication and a liberal constitution is granted. 1876 Liberal dominance (successively under Ion Brătianu, D.Sturdza and Ionel Brătianu) is maintained through urban middle-class support (except for 1888–95). 1877 The Russian campaign in Bulgaria is supported. 1878 The Congress of Berlin declares Romania independent with Dobrogea substituted for southern Bessarabia (returned to Russia). 1881 Carol is crowned king. 1883 Romania enters a secret alliance with Germany and the Habsburg Empire (renewed in 1902 and 1913). 1887 Legislation promotes industrial development (also in 1912). 1895 A Mining Law opens the way for greater oil production. 1902 A wave of anti-Semitism causes many Jews to leave. 1904 A demonstration occurs at Aleşd in Transylvania over economic conditions. 1905 Romania’s demand for recognition of Romanian/Vlach communities in the Ottoman Empire is successful. 1906 Rioting occurs in Bucharest over economic problems. Members of a secret Greek sect seeking to expand Hellenic influence are expelled and diplomatic relations with Greece are severed until 1911. 1907 A peasant revolt is encouraged by events in Russia in 1905. 1908 A law for state purchase of estate land—for subdivision into small farms of no more than 5ha—is implemented. 1911 The Conservatives retain power. 1912 Romania remains neutral in the First Balkan War. 1913 Romania is rewarded with Silistra and surrounding territory in Dobrogea— extended as a result of the Second Balkan War in which Romania eventually participates. 1914 The Liberal government of Ionel Brătianu considers agrarian reform. Despite renewal of the secret treaty with Germany and the Habsburg Empire, popular sentiment favours the Allied cause as a means of liberating Transylvania. The government votes for neutrality (in return for which Germany offers Bessarabia) but a secret treaty with Russia—arising from Ferdinand’s visit to St. Petersburg—offers eventual support to the Allies in return for Transylvania. 1915 Neutral Romania profits from the sale of food to the Central Powers.

Chronology

442

1916 Carol is succeeded by Ferdinand who favours the Allied cause—Romania takes this side following initial Russian victories arising from the Brussilow Offensive: she contains the German army of Field Marshal A.von Mackensen until the Russian Revolution whereupon the Brătianu government retires to Iaşi (where an agrarian law is enacted) and the Germans occupy Bucharest. 1917 At an armistice signed with Germany (Truce of Focşani), Conservatives and Liberals agree on the expropriation of estates as the basis for a future land reform, while Moldavia (Bessarabia) declares independence and seeks Romanian aid. 1918 The government of A.Marghiloman signs the Treaty of Bucharest conceding the Carpathian passes and Dobrogea as well as economic concessions to the Central Powers (including a ninety-nine-year lease of the oilfields). The country faces economic ruin in the face of primary export demands but defeat of the Central Powers leads to the return of the king and government to Bucharest and the cancellation of the treaty and related legislation (under a new prime minister, C.Coandă). Ferdinand proclaims the annexation of Banat and Transylvania (after delegates meet in Alba Iulia and vote to join Romania); also Bukowina (Bucovina) which secedes from the Habsburg Empire. 1919 Romania invades Hungary to forestall an attempt by the Hungarian Soviet Republic to regain Transylvania: an occupation administered from Debrecen maintains a three-month presence in Budapest. The Allies decide on the partition of Banat but Romania is awarded the island of Ada Kaleh; while union with Bukowina is confirmed along with the 1913 frontier with Bulgaria. Romania guarantees minority rights. A.VaidaVoevod replaces Brătianu and the National and Peasant parties win an election. 1920 As social tensions culminate in a general strike, the People’s Party under A.Averescu takes power on a Liberal platform and restores order after Vaida-Voevod seeks major economic and social reform. 1921 As Averescu is replaced by the Conservative leader T.Ionescu, land reform based on the agreement of 1917 limits estates to 500ha, and 6.3 million hectares are expropriated for land reform (including Orthodox Church estates). The Little Entente is formed—following an alliance with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the previous year— and the boundary with Yugoslavia is demarcated in Banat. A defensive military alliance is entered into with Hungary and Poland (against communist Russia) but there is disappointment over a proposed Baltic-Aegean bloc. 1922 Coronation of King Ferdinand as sovereign of a united Romania. Brătianu replaces Ionescu as premier as the Liberals return to power (until 1928). 1923 Three-year defensive military treaties are agreed with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. A new centralising constitution drawn up by the Liberals provides for manhood suffrage and citizenship for Jews. 1924 Normal relations with the USSR are compromised by the dispute over Bessarabia and Moscow’s establishment of a Moldavian Autonomous Republic east of the Nistru (Dniester) River—while at home the Communist Party is outlawed. The Mining Law appropriates mining rights for the state through the nationalisation of natural resources. 1925 Romania and Hungary agree on the border (after a skirmish at Lökösháza in 1923) while the Soviets raid Tatarbunar in Bessarabia. The Mining Law restricts concessions to Romanian companies where 60% of shares are held by Romanians. Duties

Chronology

443

are reduced to stimulate grain exports. Local government is based on seventy-one counties. 1926 Alliance treaties are signed with France and Italy. The National Party of I. Maniu amalgamates with the Peasant Party of I.Mihalache to form the National Peasant Party (NPP), but Liberals regain power in a manipulated election. 1927 Mihai succeeds on the death of Ferdinand (after Carol renounced his right to succeed in 1925). Brătianu follows Averescu and B.Stirbei as premier, presides over a Liberal election victory but dies and is succeeded by his brother V. Brătianu. The League of the Archangel Michael—a fascist terrorist organisation—is set up by C.Codreanu (renamed the Iron Guard in 1930, Total pentru Ţařa in 1934 and the Legion in 1940). The agrarian reform process ends officially. 1928 Brătianu resigns after a bad harvest while I.Maniu becomes premier and gains a huge majority for the NPP. The government introduces liberal and decentralising measures (though local autonomy is revoked in 1931) and helps peasants by repeal of export duties and encouragement of cooperatives (though the free sale of land increases the rural proletariat rather than a consolidation of peasant farms). 1929 The leu is stabilised by a $100 million loan and foreign investment is encouraged, while state monopolies are placed on a profit-making basis, tariffs are reduced and the 1924 Mining Law is revised (a miners’ strike in Lupeni is firmly suppressed). 1930 Carol II returns from exile but when Maniu resigns because Carol refuses to leave his Jewish mistress M.Lupescu, he is replaced by C.Mironescu; although after Carol is proclaimed king Maniu returns for four months before resigning a second time with Mironescu again the replacement. 1931 The NPP is defeated under conditions of depression and is replaced by a coalition under N.Iorga. 1932 Further national elections return the NPP and a new government is formed under Vaida-Voevod; meanwhile, the fascist Iron Guard gains ground under Codreanu, seeking Christian and racial renewal. 1933 Vaida-Voevod deals with the communist-inspired railway strike at Griviţa (Bucharest), but due to divisions within the NPP a new government is formed under the Liberal politician I.Duca, although after winning an election Duca is assassinated by the Iron Guard. 1934 Diplomatic relations are established with the USSR (though the status of Bessarabia remains unsettled) and a Balkan Entente is forged with Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. With NPP support the Liberal G.Tătărescu becomes the new premier and agricultural debts are reduced by 50–70%. 1936 Rightist groups form the anti-Semitic Christian League favouring stronger relations with Germany. 1937 Tătărescu is replaced by O.Goga, leader of the Christian League, who foments violent anti-Semitic action and drives Jews out of business. 1938 When anti-Jewish pressures precipitate economic collapse, Carol II dissolves parliament, establishes a royal dictatorship with a monopoly party (National Resistance Front) and a new corporative constitution with policy reorientated towards Germany. Patriarch M.Cristea is appointed premier. Attacks on fascists lead to the death of Codreanu.

Chronology

444

1939 A commercial agreement gives Germany a privileged position, balanced by a ten-year Franco-British guarantee of territorial integrity. The Iron Guard murders Prime Minister A.Călinescu (appointed after the death of Cristea) as a reprisal for Codreanu’s death the previous year. Tătărescu succeeds and seeks a balance of Allied and German interests. 1940 A new trade treaty is signed with Germany, although the latter has already assigned Bessarabia to the Soviet sphere of influence). Guardists are released from prison to appease Germany and Carol abdicates following the loss of Bessarabia and the Vienna Award assigning northern Transylvania to Hungary. Romania joins the Tripartite Pact and power passes to General I.Antonescu, appointed ‘conducator’ (leader) by King Mihai. 1941 A German-Romanian army group is formed for the ‘holy war’ against the Soviet Union: Bucovina and Bessarabia are regained. Iron Guardists are drastically purged and some seek asylum in Germany. 1942 As air raids hit Bucharest and Ploieşti, Antonescu concedes that the war is lost. 1943 Secret negotiations continue with the Allies by the Liberals and NPP with a view to taking Romania out of the war (continuing into 1945). 1944 King Mihai stages a coup against Marshal Antonescu and an armistice is signed in Moscow leading to Romanian military action on the Allied side. Power is transferred successively to governments under C.Sănătescu (two) and N.Rădescu with increasing communist participation. Activity by communist-dominated People’s Tribunals commences. Yugoslavia 1791 The Treaty of Svishtov (and the 1792 Treaty of Iaşi) defends the civil rights of the Serbs. 1804 A Serb uprising in the Šumadija is led by pig trader G.Petrović (Karadj eordjević). 1805 The Assembly (‘Škupština’) convenes in a failed attempt seek autonomy from the sultan. 1808 J.Kopitar publishes the first grammar in the Slovene language. 1812 A Russian treaty with the Ottomans leaves the Serbs open to reprisals but the Porte agrees to Serbian autonomy. 1815 A second Serbian insurrection under M.Obrenović (to 1816) attracts renewed Russian support (following the fall of Napoleon). After resisting the French occupation of Dubrovnik under ‘vladika’ Peter I, Montenegro’s independence (in alliance with Russia) is confirmed by the Congress of Vienna with the country doubled in size, but excluding Kotor and the coastal strip. The Illyrian provinces revert to Habsburg control, whereupon a wave of Magyarisation commences. 1830 Confirmation of Serbia’s autonomy amounts to de facto independence. 1833 Serbia annexes territory in the south. 1842 Karadjeordjević assumes power (until 1859) after a coup against Obrenović. 1843 The first Slovene language newspaper is established in Ljubljana. 1848 J.Jelačić leads a Croat-Serb army against Hungarian nationalists.

Chronology

445

1849 Limited autonomy is granted for the Duchy of Vojvodina in recognition of Serb loyalty to the emperor (until 1867 when Hungarian colonisation and assimilation begin). 1855 The first cooperative is established in Slovenia. 1859 The Obrenović dynasty is restored. 1866 F.Racki sets up a Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts. 1868 The ‘nagodba’ recognises the Croatian nation and provides for a parliament (‘sobor’) and a governor (‘ban’). 1874 The University of Zagreb is reorganised. 1875 Revolt breaks out in Bosnia and Herzegovina after a poor harvest. 1876 Montenegro and Serbia declare war on the Ottomans. 1878 Serbia secures de jure independence while the Habsburg Empire occupies Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1881 King Milan Obrenović’s secret trade treaty secures economic support from—and dependence on—the Habsburg Empire in return for restraint over the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (also 1892). Abolition of the Military Frontier leads to Serb colonisation in Croatia. 1883 Slovene cooperatives federate. 1895 The federation of Slovene cooperatives provides an economic arm for the Slovene People’s Party. 1903 The assassination of King A.Obrenović is followed by restoration of the antiHabsburg Karadjeordjević dynasty and the start of a period of reform and economic development. A new intellectual movement calls for Serb-Croat unity. 1905 The Resolution of Fiume unsuccessfully seeks a union of Croatia, Dalmatia and Istria. The Croatian Peasant Party is formed. 1906 A tariff war (‘Pig War’) with the Habsburg Empire—lasting until 1911—reduces dependence. 1907 Serbo-Croat becomes an official language in the Habsburg Empire, ending attempts at Italian cultural dominance. Croatian nationalists are provoked by the Hungarian Railway Regulation Act requiring all officials to speak Hungarian. 1908 The Habsburg Empire annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina to frustrate Serbian expansion (a situation accepted by Serbia in 1909). 1912 After a Balkan League is created (with Russian encouragement) to drive the Turks out of Europe, the First Balkan War breaks out. 1913 The Treaty of Bucharest ends the Balkan Wars and extends Montenegrin and Serb territories to create a common frontier between them. 1914 Assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo leads to a declaration of war by the Habsburg Empire against Serbia whose army eventually retreats through Albania to Corfu (by 1916). 1915 The Treaty of London promises Italy Dalmatia and Slovenia (with the connivance of the Yugoslav government in exile) in return for support of the Allies. 1917 Slovene leader A.Korošec organises a Yugoslav National Committee to advocate Southern Slav unity within the empire while the Corfu Declaration—by the Serbian government in exile and the Yugoslav Committee—calls for a single state in the name of the three nations (without deciding between the federal and unitary models). 1918 The Zagreb ‘sobor’ declares the union with Hungary at an end and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes is proclaimed under King Peter Karadjeordjević

Chronology

446

although an independent state is opposed by some Croat parties and Habsburg Emperor Charles offers a federal state. 1919 Serfdom is abolished in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia while comprehensive land reform secures 2.48 million hectares from estates for redistribution to 650,000 families and colonisation is promoted on abandoned and undeveloped land. Centralisation is increased by the resignation of regional governments. 1920 The Treaty of Rapallo awards Zadar to Italy along with Gorizia and Istria. The constituent assembly decision in favour of a unitary rather than a federal state leads to the withdrawal of the Croat Peasant Party of S.Radić. A regulation on the ‘Settlement of Southern Slav Lands’ leads to Serb colonisation of Kosovo and Macedonia while the government of M.Vesnić prohibits Communist Party activity. 1921 Peace with Hungary is secured after Yugoslavs withdraw from Pécs and the Little Entente is formed with Czechoslovakia and Romania (following the mutual defensive alliance with Czechoslovakia against Hungary in 1920). The centralist ‘Vidovdan’ constitution is promulgated and Aleksander Karajdeordjević is crowned King of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes while the deposed King Nikola of Montenegro dies and the Communist Party is declared illegal after fomenting violence. 1922 The country is divided into thirty-three centrally controlled districts but the ‘Croatian Bloc’ seeks the status of a ‘state’ within the wider state community. 1923 Radić seeks Italian help to establish an independent Croatia but fails to attract any foreign support during 1923–4. 1924 The Pact of Rome grants Fiume (Rijeka) to Italy. S.Pribičević forms an Independent Democratic Party (acceptable to ‘prečani’ Serb opinion) to act as a Yugoslav party of national unity. 1925 Unification and de facto currency stabilisation is achieved without foreign assistance and the Belgrade-Zagreb rail link is completed. Radić’s Croatian Republican Peasant Party becomes the Croatian Peasant Party (CPP), enters the Škupština and forms a coalition with the Radicals. 1926 The dispute with Albania is concluded and the Little Entente is renewed. 1927 Following the death of N.Pasić in 1926 the Radical Party breaks up while Radić and Pribičević form an Independent-Peasant coalition. 1928 Croatian delegates withdraw to a separate assembly in Zagreb after Radić and another of their members are assassinated by a Montenegrin Škupština delegate, but they decline an offer of independence through fear of Hungarian-Italian partition. The government of A.Korosec fails. 1929 King Aleksander establishes a personal dictatorship after failing to overcome the deadlock between Croatian and Serbian insistence on the federal and unitary systems, respectively; he is proclaimed King of Yugoslavia and the country is divided into nine ‘banovine’. Meanwhile, a Croatian terrorist organisation (Ustaša) is formed in Italy with Hungarian and Italian help. 1930 The CPP and Ustaša coordinate activity in search of autonomy. 1931 A new heavily centralist constitution legitimises the royal dictatorship. 1932 The Zagreb ‘Punctuation’ demands autonomy for Croatia while a moratorium is imposed on peasant debts. 1933 A unified foreign policy is agreed by the Little Entente.

Chronology

447

1934 Following the assassination of the king by IMRO/Ustaša agents during his visit to France a three-man regency (led by Prince Pavle) takes over during Petar’s minority (until 1941). Closer relations are forged with Hungary and Italy (through an ItaloYugoslav pact) and a commercial treaty with Germany is linked with Hermann Göring’s visit to Belgrade. 1935 Yugoslavia badly affected by League of Nations’ sanctions against Italy. Elections lead to the M.Stojadinović government which fails to arrest the disintegration of political life and the growth of political violence. 1936 Stojadinović survives an assassination attempt. Peasant debts are reduced by half and are made payable over twelve years at low interest, but the CPP remains strong. 1937 The Stojadinović government assumes some fascist pretensions and forges closer links with Germany as Krupp converts the Zenica steelworks. A coalition is formed in the hope of restoring democratic government. 1938 Stojadinović withdraws his offer of a Vatican ‘Concordat’ (a move initiated in 1937 to placate the Croats but one which Orthodox Serbs found offensive) and he is also weakened by a poor election result that reduces his majority. 1939 In a bid to stiffen resistance to German diplomatic demands Stojadinović is removed by Pavle and replaced by D.Cvetković who negotiates with the Croat Peasants under V.Moček (leader from 1928): under their Sporazum Croatia gains autonomy with its own parliament (‘sabor’) and governor (‘ban’) who is I.Šubašić. 1940 Communists under J.Broz (Tito), M.Djilas, E.Kardelj and A.Ranković condemn the Sporazum as a Croat-Serb bourgeois plot and demand the right of secession for Albanian, Macedonian and Montenegrin minorities. 1941 German troops invade after national outrage follows the signing of the Tripartite Pact in Vienna; leading to the division of the country into German and Italian zones, with separate administration for the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) under Ustaša leader A.Pevelić, for Serbia under the puppet regime of M.Nedić and for Banat (while the communists establish military commands in each region). 1942 The UK establishes a military mission at the Četnik headquarters of D. Mihailović while Tito stages an Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) despite strenuous German attempts to capture him. 1943 After a Croatian AVNOJ at Otočac the second Yugoslav AVNOJ conference in Jajce declares itself the government. The Axis ‘Weiss’ and ‘Schwarz’ operations drive the Partisans southwards but the latter are now given UK support. 1944 Tito and the former Croat peasant leader Šubašić negotiate a transitional administration while Petar appoints a more moderate government in exile in the hope of fusion with AVNOJ. The Germans make an orderly withdrawal in the face of intensified Četnik-Partisan action (though the UK withdraws aid and liaison for the Četniks while Petar orders them to join the Partisans). Kosovo Albanians allied to the Balli Kombëtar stage an uprising in Drenica against the Tito-Hoxha agreement on the reversion of the province to Yugoslavia.

Chronology

448

THE COMMUNIST ERA, 1945–89 The first section includes references to Soviet bilateral treaties with its East Central European allies and also mentions Five Year Plans which were broadly in phase throughout the bloc from 1966. Earlier plans are detailed for each country individually. Communist Bloc affairs relevant to ‘Eastern Europe’ 1945 The Yalta Conference agrees that East European governments will be freely elected but pro-Soviet. After Hitler commits suicide the Potsdam Conference agrees a reparation demand of US$20 billion and a ‘Four D’ programme: denazification (hence the Nürnberg Trials), democratisation, demilitarisation and decartelisation. Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ speech is delivered at Fulton, Missouri. Soviets conclude a bilateral trade agreement with Poland. 1946 Help provided by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). 1947 The Paris Peace Treaty ends the state of war between the Allies and Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. The first Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) conference at Szklarska Poręba hears that Stalin desires more rapid transformation along Soviet lines and Belgrade becomes the headquarters of the organisation. US President Truman launches his policy containment and the Marshall Aid Programme is introduced. The Soviets sign bilateral trade agreements with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania. 1948 Soviets prevent further discussion of a Balkan Federation involving Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia while Yugoslavia is expelled from the Cominform, whose headquarters are transferred to Bucharest. The Soviets sign friendship and mutual assistance treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania (subsequently renewed after twenty years, although not until 1970 in the case of Romania). They also disband joint planning commissions set up from 1946 to involve Albania and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and Hungary and Yugoslavia. 1949 Comecon (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) is formed by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR. The Soviets sign a friendship treaty with Czechoslovakia (renewed for twenty years in 1963). 1950 A Soviet boycott of the UN Security Council prevents the exercise of a veto on the establishment of a UN military force in Korea. 1953 Following Stalin’s death the Soviets restore diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. 1954 The reallocation of resources continues in the aftermath of Stalin’s death: Soviet holdings in joint stock companies are returned to Bulgaria and Romania. 1955 Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR form the Warsaw Pact and the Soviets formally terminate the state of war with Germany. 1956 The Cominform is dissolved and East Germany joins the Warsaw Pact.

Chronology

449

1957 An international conference in Moscow rejects ‘revisionist attempts to undermine socialism’. At the UN, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland propose the Rapacki Plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe (rejected by the West in 1958). 1959 The US State Department rejects the Soviet proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. Talks among foreign ministers to deal with the German question fail. Comecon states agree a division of labour. 1960 Khrushchev states that war with the West is not inevitable. 1961 Khrushchev threatens a separate peace treaty with East Germany and builds the Berlin Wall, while his victory over the ‘anti-party group’ is followed by a second round of ‘de-Stalinisation’ from above. 1962 Superpower confrontation occurs over Cuban missiles. ‘Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour’ are accepted in diluted form. An Executive Committee of the Comecon Council is created and supranational central direction of Comecon is proposed by Khrushchev with the backing of Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Poland. 1963 Khrushchev states that the USSR will assist any communist state under attack but he also agrees a ‘hot line’ to the USA and calls for an East-West non-aggression pact and a nuclear test-ban treaty. 1964 The fall of Khrushchev diverts momentum to internal (from external) political developments. An International Bank for Economic Cooperation operates as a multilateral clearing centre. A twenty-year friendship pact with the GDR is agreed. 1965 This year marks the end of a period of decisive shift from private to collectivised farming. It is also a turning point in that ‘systemic stability seemed to have been renounced in favour of reform of the economic mechanism’ (Brus 1986b p. 139). A Comecon railway wagon pool is introduced. 1966 Soviets strike a deal with Fiat for a car factory in the USSR. FYPs begin in the USSR and all the East Central European countries for 1966–70 (except for the GDR which started a Seven Year Plan in 1964). 1967 Both the USSR and USA submit identical drafts of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty to the UN Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The Bulgarian and Polish friendship treaties are renewed. 1968 Warsaw Pact forces invade Czechoslovakia with the participation of Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and the USSR; justified by the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ on the ‘defence of socialism’ as a common cause. 1969 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) start in Vienna. 1970 The Polish workers’ revolt demonstrates the dangers of neglecting consumer pressure. The Interkhim organisation is set up for small-volume/high-value chemicals. 1971 The Comecon Comprehensive Programme introduces new institutions for closer integration. FYPs are started in the USSR and all the East Central European counties for 1971–5: they are all in phase for the first time. 1972 Soviets sign a SALT treaty with the USA. The International Association for Nuclear Instrumentation (Interatominstrument) is established; also Intersputnik for commercial use of space. 1973 World trade terms deteriorate through the rapid rise in oil prices. Some limited possibilies arise whereby ‘convertible roubles’ can be changed into convertible currency. New Comecon organisations are established: Interatomenergo (for nuclear power station

Chronology

450

construction and equipment), Interelektro (for the electro-technical industry); Interelektrotest (for high-voltage installation laboratories); Interetalonpribor (for measuring instruments) and Intertekstilmash (for textile machinery). 1974 Terms of world trade continue to deteriorate. New Comecon organisations emerge: Chermetinformstsya (for iron and steel industry information exchange) and Interkhimvolokno (for man-made fibres) while Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia agree to build the Adria Pipeline. 1975 The Helsinki Accords or ‘Final Act’ conclude the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as the culmination of East-West relaxation: accepting post-war territorial change as final and bringing gains to the East in trade and technology while enabling Western pressure to be asserted over human-rights violations through ‘Basket Three’ of the ‘Final Act’. Economic reform moves in general decline though Hungary retains its NEM. 1976 FYPs begin in the USSR and all the East Central European countries for 1976– 80. 1978 Soviet military cooperation with Afghanistan begins. 1980 In the light of the Lenin Shipyard strikes in Gdańsk, the Soviets accuse antisocialist forces of disrupting government in Poland. 1981 Brezhnev declares that the USSR will not solve Poland’s problems (thereby removing the threat of intervention). FYPs begin in the USSR and all the East Central European countries for 1981–5. 1982 The Soviet leadership supports detente while NATO foreign ministers condemn the USSR for repression in Poland. 1983 Limited economic reforms in the USSR allow factory managers greater control. 1985 M.Gorbachev is appointed general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party while the Warsaw Pact is extended for a further twenty years. 1986 Following the Chernobyl nuclear accident Gorbachev announces a policy of openness or ‘glasnost’. FYPs begin in the USSR and all the East Central European countries for 1986–90. 1987 In a speech in Prague, Gorbachev declares that Czechoslovakia and other East European countries are not expected to introduce Soviet-style reforms. 1988 Gorbachev announces unilateral military cuts in a speech at the UN. Soviet short-range nuclear missiles are removed from Czechoslovakia and East Germany and transferred to the USSR in accordance with the Soviet-American arms treaty of 1987. 1989 Gorbachev announces to the Council of Europe that the USSR will not interfere with reforms in Hungary and Poland; and speaking to Warsaw Pact nations in Bucharest he calls for independent solutions to national problems and abandons the Brezhnev Doctrine on the grounds that the USSR has no right to interfere in Eastern Europe. Albania 1945 With the Communist administration in full control, tribunals eliminate political opponents; property belonging to the German and Italian states is confiscated (following earlier measures against collaborators); the merchant class is destroyed by excessive taxation (justified by war profiteering); transport and industry are nationalised while land reform legislation stipulates limits of 7–40ha for various owner categories and total

Chronology

451

expropriation for families drawing all their income from non-agricultural sources. The Democratic Front (formerly National Liberation Front) wins the elections and although an opposition is provided for it cannot exist because of terror. 1946 Two British destroyers are damaged by mines (with the knowledge of the Albanian government) in the Corfu Channel. Treaties on economic integration (for coordination of plans and a customs union) and mutual friendship are signed with Yugoslavia—anticipating Albanian incorporation into the federation. Albania declares itself a people’s republic with a constitution on the Yugoslav model legitimising communist control. A state foreign trade monopoly is imposed and further land reform affects all land not worked personally while imposing a 5ha family limit. All movement is controlled by the security police (Sigurimi). 1947 Yugoslavia makes development aid conditional on the coordination of plans agreed in 1946 while Albania appears to be the main base and refuge of Greek communists. A nine-month plan is announced and state farms are established in former Italian colonies. 1948 The high point for Yugoslav influence is reached (supported by Inteior Minister K.Xoxë) but E.Hoxha uses deteriorating Soviet-Yugoslav relations to assert his influence and ultimately condemn the Yugoslavs (who repudiate the friendship treaty the following year) whereupon Soviet support (until 1961) replaces that of Yugoslavia. The One Year Plan is disrupted by the break with Yugoslavia. 1949 Albania joins Comecon and the start of the 1949–50 Two Year Reconstruction Plan sees the first wave of collectivisation (after the launch in 1947). As the head of the Albanian Orthodox Church is removed and imprisoned—while all religious communities are restricted—a National Committee for a Free Albania is formed in Paris. 1950 A Soviet naval complex is built at Vlorë. A new constitution is based on the Soviet model while Titoists are purged (continuing through 1951–2) and the Catholic Church is forced to sever Vatican links. 1951 The First FYP commences (for 1951–5) while overzealous collectivisation programmes in the countryside are checked. 1952 A new penal code is founded on the Soviet model. 1953 Relations with Yugoslavia are restored through pressure from Moscow (and improvements are effected reluctantly in 1955) but the Balkan Pact (between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia) is considered aggressive for seeking Albania’s dismemberment. 1954 Reduced Soviet aid leads to agreements with China for cultural and scientifictechnical cooperation. Stakhanovites increase until this time. To achieve collective leadership Hoxha passes the premiership to M.Shehu. 1955 Albania joins the United Nations while aid to Greek communists ends. 1956 Hoxha refuses to rehabilitate victims of Titoist purges (seen as a defiance of Moscow) but wins Chinese support in the ‘war of words’ with Tito. The Second FYP starts (for 1956–60) and collectivisation is completed. 1957 Albania receives a Soviet credit for US$40 million and help for a proposed ‘Fifteen Year Plan’ (1961–75). The end of rationing is combined with higher wages and lower prices. 1958 The FYP is abandoned as certain major projects are introduced (though there is concern over Soviet preference for agricultural rather than industrial development). A broader social insurance law is also introduced.

Chronology

452

1959 Adoption of the Soviet system of planning is completed but a growing rift with Moscow lays the foundations of a close Albanian link with China. 1960 Hoxha speaks against Khrushchev at a Communist Party conference in Moscow and economic talks with Moscow break down. 1961 A major foreign donor switch from USSR to China (until 1978) occurs as Beijing sends an economic mission and the Soviets dismantle their Vlorë naval installation. The Third FYP is started (for 1961–5). 1962 Membership of Comecon lapses and Albania is completely isolated from the communist world apart from China. 1963 As Albania depends on China for wheat, her advisers insist on the primacy of agricultural development along with mining, metallurgy and hydropower. 1964 Abortive moves for reconciliation with the new Soviet leadership are made. 1965 An Albanian delegation to China receives US$214 million in credits. 1966 Emulation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution affects all parts of Albanian society, notably through the emancipation of women, while Shehu’s visit to China sees the two countries portrayed as defenders of Marxist-Leninist fundamentals in the struggle against revisionism. ‘Reorganisation of the Management System’ is attempted through a reduction of planning indicators. 1967 With the expulsion of the Bulgarian ambassador Romania becomes the only East European country with which ambassadorial-level relations are maintained. The remaining private firms are collectivised while private plots are restricted to half an acre. All religious establishments are banned and churches closed. 1968 Albania resigns from the Warsaw Pact—after effective expulsion in 1961—and severs all activity in Comecon after the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. A military delegation to China receives a US$200 million interest-free loan. 1969 Albania pledges solidarity with Romania and Yugoslavia in the face of Soviet aggression. Craft cooperatives are taken over. 1970 Implicit renunciation (made explicit in 1971) of Greek territorial claims in southern Albania restarts trade relations after thirty years and Hoxha also seeks better relations with Yugoslavia on the basis of common security interests: a delegation from Tirana University discusses academic cooperation in Priština. Rural electrification is completed. 1971 Although disapproving of Chinese-American rapprochement Hoxha maintains his alliance with Beijing. Ambassadorial-level relations are resumed with Greece and Yugoslavia. 1972 China reduces economic and military aid while Albania diversifies her trade and diplomatic relations to ensure that this is not a critical matter. 1973 Hoxha purges the cultural elite and youth leadership fearing that the policy of extending relations to neighbours and selected West European states may undermine stability. 1975 The chairman of the State Planning Commission is dismissed (and later executed) for a programme of ‘revisionist self-management’. Greeks living in Albania are pressurised to change their names where they are considered inappropriate. 1976 After replacing the 1946 constitution in 1975—to reflect progress in development—Albania declares herself a ‘socialist republic’. As the first steel is produced at Elbasan, Hoxha emphasises self-reliance to imply less dependence on China.

Chronology

453

1977 Shehu denounces China’s foreign policy in the strongest terms. 1978 China ends all economic and military assistance and withdraws over 500 specialists whereupon Hoxha announces that—as the world’s only true socialist country—Albania will not join any bloc. The trade agreement with Greece is extended as international trade becomes more crucial for self-reliance; even so industrial growth has to be cut by half and the country is plunged into crisis. 1979 A railway link between Shkodër and Titograd (now Podgorica) is agreed with Yugoslavia along with the export of power to Yugoslavia and the need for cooperation over water resources of Lake Shkodër and the Bojanë River. 1981 Unrest in Kosovo is followed by the bombing of the Yugoslav embassy in Tirana though the Albanian government denies involvement. Hoxha denounces Shehu (to prepare R.Alia as his eventual successor) and starts a purge of Shehu’s allies following his death later in the year. 1982 A.Carcani becomes premier. 1983 As Hoxha goes into partial retirement Alia announces a more pragmatic foreign policy based on closer relations with Greece, Italy and Turkey. As a Durrës-Trieste shipping line opens Albania considers routing all its West European trade through Italy (reflecting delay over the Shkodër-Titograd railway). 1984 A series of agreements is signed with Greece covering technology, transport and culture while Alia confirms that foreign relations will expand especially with Western Europe. 1985 As the death of Hoxha brings Alia to power there is increased diplomatic activity (e.g. with France and UK) where it is shown to be consistent with the national interest to overcome economic problems (which now include the rationing of food and consumer goods). The Kakavija Pass between Albania and Greece is reopened after forty-five years of closure following the Italian invasion. 1986 Isolationism is further relaxed and the Shkodër-Titograd railway opens. Failure to reach FYP targets in agriculture and mineral production is blamed on poor management, worker inefficiency and inadequate transport. 1987 Diplomatic relations are established with West Germany. Continuing food shortages bring greater autonomy for agricultural brigades but there is no encouragement of private enterprise despite recognition of the importance of private plots. Major problems in chrome and oil production are highlighted. 1988 Agreement over local border trade with Greece and opening of a Sarandë-Corfu ferry service; management shake-out to reduce corruption and favouritism. 1989 West Germany provides a DM20 million loan for animal breeding and the oil and steel industries. Gorbachev’s reforms are attacked for undermining communism but as the exiled King Leka urges revolt demonstrations are reported from Shkodër, though Stalinism will not come to an end until 1990. Bulgaria 1945 Forced labour camps are opened for the victims of people’s courts (while over 2,000 executions include many of the political and military leaders in power before the 1944 coup). As G.Dimitrov returns from twenty-two years in exile, the Agrarian and Social Democrat parties splinter and an election produces a communist majority with

Chronology

454

V.Kalorov as president of the parliament (Subranie). A National Economic Council is formed and voluntary Labour Cooperative Agricultural Farms are decreed. 1946 A joint Soviet-Bulgarian enterprise (‘Gorabso’) is established for non-ferrous ore mining. Georgiev remains premier but his government now includes only Fatherland Front ministers. However, Dimitrov forms a new government after further elections later in the year. The monarchy is abolished and Simeon goes into exile whereupon Bulgaria is declared a ‘people’s republic’. A compulsory labour service decree requires all young people to work for three years in the military or the economy without pay. A One Year Industry Plan is launched while agriculture (especially) benefits from major UNRRA assistance and a land fund is created to manage 45,000ha expropriated from ‘surplus estates’ (exceeding 10–30ha according to circumstances) and 120,000ha from churches. 1947 As a peace treaty is signed the Soviets withdraw their occupation forces and agreement is reached with Yugoslavia over a customs union and a common foreign policy but a Balkan federation negotiated with Bulgaria is blocked by the Soviets. Opposition leader N.D.Petkov is arrested and executed for allegedly plotting a coup while the Agrarian Party is dissolved. The new ‘Dimitrov’ constitution is based on the 1936 Soviet model. A Two Year Reconstruction Plan is launched to deal with war damage while small agricultural processors—and other business required for state monopolies— are nationalised, followed by a general nationalisation act affecting mines, industries and banks. 1948 A friendship treaty is agreed with Romania while the Soviets deny Dimitrov’s claim of an impending federation of the USSR and East European allies. Socialists are absorbed in the Communist Party which also gains support from G.Traikov and the Agrarians while small parties are self-liquidated into the communist-controlled Fatherland Front. A state foreign trade monopoly is imposed, the Ministry of Foreign Trade is created and a bilateral trade agreement is reached with the Soviet Union. Land and housing are nationalised while land leasing is restricted. Armenians, Gypsies, Jews and Turks are encouraged to leave. The First FYP is launched for 1949–53. 1949 Bulgaria becomes a founder member of Comecon. The ‘national’ communist leader T.Kostov is executed and ‘Kostovites’ are purged, while Dimitrov dies and is succeeded by V.Kolarov. Religious orders are subjected to state supervision while Varna is renamed Stalin. The First FYP is launched (for 1949–53) but is abandoned at the end of 1951. 1950 Further joint enterprises are formed from German assets initially placed in Soviet hands. Kolarov dies and is succeeded by V.Chervenkov who is elected party leader later in the year. As ‘little Stalin’ he champions collectivisation, heavy industry and Bulgaria’s isolation from the West. A quarter of a million Turkish Muslims are ‘allowed’ to emigrate. 1951 Wartime rationing ends while monetary reforms reduce purchasing power. By the end of the year 47.5% of all farmland is collectivised. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is raised to patriarchate status and becomes completely independent. 1952 The currency is devalued to bring it in line with the Soviet rouble. Bulgaria is reported to have thirty forced-labour camps with 100,000 prisoners. 1953 Start of the Second FYP (for 1953–7) replacing the abandoned First FYP. An amnesty is extended to political prisoners but arbitrary resignation from employment is punished by ‘corrective labour’.

Chronology

455

1954 Joint Bulgarian-Soviet enterprises are dissolved. Chervenkov hands over the party leadership to T.Zhivkov. Living standards improve. 1955 Bulgaria joins the United Nations while the shooting-down of an Israeli airliner constitutes a major diplomatic incident which is not closed until compensation is agreed in 1963. 1956 Charged with promoting a personality cult, Chervenkov is removed from the premiership in favour of A.Yugov while Kostov is rehabilitated (and declared a hero of Bulgaria in 1964). Collectivisation reaches 77% of agricultural land. 1957 The Second FYP is replaced by 1957–62 Six Year Plan. 1958 A merger process for state and collective farms begins. 1959 The Six Year Plan is overtaken by an abortive ‘great leap forward’, followed by the adoption of the Khrushchevian ‘sovnarkhozy’ model. Unemployed urban youths and ‘hooligans’ are sent to work in agriculture. 1959 Diplomatic relations are restored with the USA (severed in 1950). A major reorganisation of government releases 140,000 people for work in agriculture and industry. 1960 Overhaul of the wage system begins while collectivisation is reported 95% complete. 1961 The 1961–5 FYP begins after the collapse of the ‘great leap forward’ and the abandonment of the Six Year Plan at the end of 1960. 1962 Zhivkov takes over the premiership while Chervenkov and Yugov are expelled from the Central Committee—thereby bringing their power struggle to an end. A restrictive attitude is taken towards private plots while food prices are raised sharply to discourage hoarding. 1963 Fifty autonomous ‘state economic associations’ (DSOs) are created and the Kremikovtski metallurgical complex is inaugurated. 1964 The USSR grants US$333 million in credits over five years in return for a Soviet-Bulgarian economic, technical and cooperation commission while Bulgaria settles Greek reparation claims through provision of goods and flood control work in the Arda Valley. A foreign trade bank is established. 1965 Bulgarian-Hungarian bilateral business organisations emerge: Agromash (for fruit and vegetable processing) and Intransmash (concerned with equipment for intrafactory transport). Radical reform ‘theses’ reassert the branch principle of organisation with devolution through DSOs. 1966 A dam bursts at Vratsa. 1967 Regional and national associations of collective farms are formed. 1968 Reform is critically assessed with ‘planning from above’ reasserted to check excessive market orientation. 1969 A campaign is launched against Western influence in Bulgarian culture. Bulgarian industrial, agricultural and trade banks are established to finance modernisation. Thirty thousand ethnic Turks are ‘allowed’ to emigrate. 1970 Bulgaria donates US$800,000 for flood relief in Romania. 1971 A more rational pricing system is introduced. 1972 Vertical integration is applied in industry.

Chronology

456

1973 The minimum wage is increased by 23% and the working week reduced to five days (42.5 hours). Abortions for married women are restricted to those with two or more children. 1974 A Bulgarian fishing trawler is arrested in US territorial waters (likewise by Argentina in 1977 in the case of two vessels). Foreign companies are allowed to share management and profits for joint ventures. A gas pipeline from the USSR opens while food and consumer goods are reported to be in short supply. 1975 Zhivkov meets the pope and agrees the appointment of two bishops for Bulgaria’s Catholic population. 1976 Bedford Trucks (a GM subsidiary) agree to barter trucks for forklifts. 1977 The Romanian earthquake affects parts of Bulgaria 1978 BBC broadcaster and Bulgarian exile G.Markov is murdered by a man with an umbrella firing a metal ball, but the Bulgarian government denies involvement. 1979 As petrol prices rise private car use is restricted to certain days (odd and even registration numbers alternate) to save fuel. Market forces are allowed a greater role in agriculture in order to boost efficiency. 1980 Foreign capital participation in joint companies may reach 60%. Western debt stands at US$3.8 billion at the end of the year. 1981 Premier S.Todorov is replaced by G.Filipov and then by G.Stanchev. 1982 To improve production economic reforms include linkage of wages with output and payment for goods only when they are sold. 1984 A bombing campaign affecting Plovdiv, Russe, Targoviste and Varna is blamed on the Turkish minority reacting to Slavicisation started the previous year. 1985 Zhivkov makes references to Yugoslavia implying that Macedonians there are considered Bulgarians. Assimilation of ethnic Turks is attempted through fear that a relatively high birth rate may eventually be destabilising. Penalties for terrorism are increased. 1986 ‘Helsinki Watch’ claims 1,500 deaths among Bulgarian Turks since 1984 due to the campaign to Christianise and Slavicise but Bulgaria denies oppression, while Zhivkov signals support for ‘perestroika’ by conceding the need for economic change. Agricultural exports to the EEC are banned for a time on account of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Bulgaria’s bid to host the Winter Olympics fails (and again in 1988). Poor safety leads to deaths at the Varna-Devnya chemical complex. 1987 Zhivkov calls for economic reform (with less party interference) and a restructuring of government. The Wimpy International fast-food chain is granted the right to open twenty restaurants in Bulgaria. 1988 Foreign Minister P.Mladenov wants the Balkans free of chemical and nuclear weapons. As the Communist Party decides to restrict change, Central Committee members are purged to help Zhivkov control reformist elements. 1989 Two hundred thousand ethnic Turks leave Bulgaria in February-March and a further 100,000–150,000 during May-August when Turkey closes the border. Balkan states agree to reduce trade barriers. Zhivkov announces that collective farms may be disbanded and individual farmers may lease land while the independent trade union Podkrepa is tolerated. Zhivkov resigns after stating that socialism will not be changed and increasing pressure on human rights activists, Eco-Glasnost members and other dissidents.

Chronology

457

Czechoslovakia 1945 A provisional government is formed in Košice under Beneš (with cooperation by communists under K.Gottwald) but the agreement over Slovak autonomy is not implemented. Stalin proposes the ‘negotiation’ of Ruthenia’s future. The Nationalisation Act is passed and 1.8 million hectares of enemy-owned land are confiscated (also 1.3 million hectares of woodland). 1946 Gottwald enters a coalition government after communists are placed in key positions and he becomes premier after elections are held. US credits for the purchase of surplus war equipment are granted and later suspended. The expulsion of Germans begins along with an initial exchange of population with Hungary. 1947 An agreement on economic cooperation with Poland is secured. Territory is ceded by Hungary to provide a Bratislava ‘bridgehead’. Marshall Aid is declined as the government reverses its decision to send representatives to the programme’s opening meeting in Paris (following Stalin’s intervention). The 1947–8 Two Year Reconstruction Plan is launched and some 750,000ha of land are confiscated by enforcing upper limits for land holdings of 150ha for agricultural land and 250ha for all land. 1948 The ‘February Coup’ establishes a communist monopoly after the resignation of non-communist members and reconstitution of the National Front with the approval of the president after Beneš resigns (he dies later in the year) and is replaced by Gottwald, while A.Zápotocký becomes premier. A new constitution is based on the Soviet model with the provinces of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia abolished. A state foreign trade monopoly is imposed and the Ministry of Trade created. The first FYP is announced along with the second phase of nationalisation. Seven hundred thousand hectares of land are confiscated by imposing a 50ha maximum while redistribution of all land confiscated during 1945–8 benefits 350,000 families, as well as cooperatives and the state holdings. 1949 A Two Year Plan is drafted by the Central Planning Commission, while professionals and businessmen are arrested on charges of Titoism. 1950 Following pressure against the Catholic Church in 1949 all monasteries and convents are confiscated. 1951 A purge of Communist Party members leads to the Slansky trial of 1952. Organised recruitment secures labour for priority sectors. The First FYP is launched (for 1951–5). 1952 An austerity programme provides more money for national defence and a budget provides for Soviet-style planning of the entire national economy. The failure of agricultural collectivisation is conceded (as was also the case in 1950). 1953 Gottwald dies after attending Stalin’s funeral and is replaced by Zápotochý with V.S.Široký as premier. Drastic currency and wage devaluation provokes rioting especially in Plzeň and leads to de-Stalinisation: the end of rationing and reduced food and clothing prices. 1954 The dissolution of cooperatives is tolerated (though the decision is reversed by 1956). Zápotochý admits that the purge of bourgeois personnel in the economy has been excessive. 1955 The tenth anniversary of independence is celebrated. 1956 The friendship treaty with Yugoslavia is renewed and West Germany is recognised. The Second FYP is launched (for 1956–60) and powers are granted for Slovak regional government.

Chronology

458

1957 Zápotochý dies and is succeeded by A.Novotný. The FYP is revised and integrated production with the USSR over nuclear power is agreed. 1958 Economic reforms secure changes in the wage system and a more constant price structure. Gypsy pedlars are required by law to settle and become productive citizens. 1959 Prices for food and consumer goods are reduced in order to raise living standards. 1960 A new constitution is modelled on the Soviet counterpart. Administrative reform seeks integral economic units with a balance of agriculture and industry as a basis for decentralisation (with regions reduced from 19 to 10, and districts from 270 to 108). 1961 Start of a period of economic crisis (to 1963). Streets commemorating Stalin are renamed. The Third FYP is launched (for 1961–5). 1962 Economic recentralisation is imposed and the Third FYP is abandoned due to difficulties with collectivised agriculture and food supply (provoking a restrictive attitude towards private plots) while heavy industry is found to be overextended. 1963 As major planning difficulties continue, small charges for medical prescriptions provoke protests and the blowing-up of Stalin’s statue in Prague. Široký is replaced as premier by J.Lenart. Sentences in the Slansky trial are retracted. 1964 An alternative system of economic management is considered, including private business and Western trade, while reform-minded communists appear in election lists in response to further anti-government demonstrations. 1965 A foreign trade bank is established and after economic reform is spelled out in general terms the Central Committee adopts ‘The Main Directions for the Improvement of Planned Management of the National Economy’ with improved technology, profit incentives and worker mobility. 1966 An ‘acceleration programme’ for enterprise devolution is followed by the removal of some hard-line communists from the Central Committee. After three years without a medium-term plan, the Fourth FYP is launched (for 1966–70). 1967 The Polish friendship treaty is renewed for twenty years. Enterprises are freed from binding plan-targets while a computerised recalculation of wholesale prices takes place and regional and national associations of collective farms are organised. But economic reform is curtailed and students demonstrate against poor housing. 1968 With the onset of the ‘Prague Spring’ L.Svoboda is elected president while Novotný is also replaced by A.Dubček as first secretary and Lenart by O.Černik as premier. O.Šik launches a programmatic statement on the fundamental role of economic reform while 1969 economic guidelines contain few binding targets. Workers’ councils are established. A Warsaw Pact invasion follows. 1969 A federal state is established but as the Soviets demand ‘normalisation’ Dubček is demoted and new workers’ councils are banned. Student J.Palach commits suicide as a protest against Soviet military occupation. 1970 L.Strougal replaces Černik as premier while federal government is strengthened so that the decisions of the Czech and Slovak regional governments may be overruled. 1971 Further constitutional change gives the federal government extensive control over energy, transport and telecommunications. 1972 The invitation to meet in Helsinki for preliminary talks on a Conference on European Security is accepted.

Chronology

459

1973 Relations with West Germany are normalised and the Munich Agreement is declared null and void. Svoboda is re-elected president. 1974 The Adria Pipeline (Omišalj-Bratislava) is agreed with Hungary and Yugoslavia. The first section of the Prague metro opens. 1975 Rising prices for Soviet oil create economic problems. G.Hušak replaces Svoboda as president (the latter dies in 1979). 1976 An agreement with Austria on economic cooperation and simplified travel procedures is concluded. 1977 Charter 77 is signed (accusing the government of violating the human rights safeguarded by the Helsinki Final Act) and the dissident playwright V.Havel is imprisoned. 1978 Hušak visits West Germany. The International Labour Organisation claims discrimination against Charter 77 members. Slovakia becomes a separate Catholic ecclesiastical province with an archbishop placed in Trnava. 1979 Charter 77 members (including Havel) are arrested and sentenced. 1980 Attempts are made to show sensitivity towards workers’ complaints in order to avoid strikes of the kind precipitated by Solidarity in Poland but further pressure is placed on dissidents. 1981 Travel to and from Poland is restricted, while the government moves further against the political oppositions. Energy problems are concealed including high trade dependence and wasteful use. 1982 Hušak makes a state visit to Austria. 1983 Czechoslovakia joins the Hungarian-Polish business association Haldex (for coal slack processing). Higher social security benefits are awarded to the self-employed to encourage private business. 1985 Hušak declines to countenance reform after Gorbachev’s assumption of power in Moscow. The membership of Charter 77 is estimated at 2,000. 1987 The communist leadership ignores Gorbachev’s advocacy of economic and political reform. 1988 Hušak accepts only slow economic change. 1989 Hušak rejects reform although Premier Strougal accepts the need for change to halt economic decline. Government resigns after demonstrations and Strougal is succeeded by L.Adamec. Germany 1945 US and Soviet forces meet on the Elbe at Torgau; Germany surrenders and (as in the case of the Berlin) is divided into four occupation zones—rather than the three envisaged at Teheran in 1943—under an Allied Control Commission. The head of the Soviet military administration (G.Zhukov) announces economic disarmament and abolishes Nazi laws. The Communist Party of Germany under W.Ulbricht seeks coalition parliamentary government. 1946 Operation Ossavakim transfers skilled workers to the USSR with their families and equipment. Communists and Social Democrats form the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG) and win elections in the Soviet Occupation Zone (SOZ). The expropriation of large businesses is announced.

Chronology

460

1947 Munich Conference discusses two alternative plans for the future of Germany. Regional (‘Land’) parliaments are convened but two Berlin city governments arise from Soviet objections to the mayoral elections. The Allied Reparations Committee calls for the removal of heavy industry. In the SOZ there is a purge of non-communist officials in the SOZ and estates are broken up. 1948 A separate economic administration for the SOZ is proclaimed by General Sokolovsky (Zhukov’s successor) while the Soviets withdraw from the Allied Kommandentura (completing the division of the city) and stage the Berlin blockade in an attempt to force the Western Allies to leave (the response is the Berlin airlift). The East Berlin administration under Mayor E.Ebert acknowledges the USSR as the sole authority in that part of the city. Meanwhile, the Western Allies agree to an independent, federal West Germany (following the UK-US ‘Bizonia’ economic administration). 1949 The Berlin blockade is lifted by Sokolovsky’s successor (I.Chuikov) while a People’s Council is set up as the government for East Germany and draws up a constitution for the ‘German Democratic Republic’ (GDR) based on the Soviet model. A government under O.Grotewöhl takes over all functions previously discharged by the military authorities and W.Pieck becomes president. A Two Year Plan is launched for 1949–50 and inducements offered to middle-class intellectuals to remain in the GDR. 1950 A Ministry of Foreign and Inner-German Trade is established and provincial officials are purged. The Soviets halve East Germany’s war reparations of US$6,432 billion; trade and defence pacts are negotiated with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland; and the Oder-Neisse frontier line is recognised. Meanwhile, rival East and West German unification plans are issued. 1951 A partial accord on waterway traffic emerges from UK-Soviet talks but West Berlin’s Steinstucken exclave is temporarily seized; traffic between West Germany and West Berlin is hampered and road taxes are imposed. The GDR backs unification to head off West German rearmament. The First FYP is launched (for 1951–5) with work on a new steel mill named Stalinstadt (but Eisenhüttenstadt in 1961 when it is merged with the town of Fürstenberg). The Berlin ‘Aussenring’ railway is completed and a similar canal project is proposed. Workers’ demonstrations occur in East Berlin against overtime and pay reduction. 1952 The GDR seals the border with West Germany and issues warnings in a bid to prevent West German membership of the European Defence Community (reinforced in 1953 with the threat of a further blockade). Two hundred streets linking East and West Berlin are barricaded and police controls operate along those that remain open; while phone lines between East and West Berlin are cut (though restored in 1971); trenches are dug and trees cut along the border of the Soviet sector in Berlin; and further police violations affect border communities in West Berlin (including Kleinmachnow and Steinstücken) and West Germany. The GDR replaces its ‘Lander’ with fourteen ‘Bezirken’ and completes the nationalisation of trade. 1953 A.A.Grechko becomes the new Soviet military commander (followed by M.V.Zakharov in 1957 and I.I.Yakubovsky 1960) while V.Semyonov is the first Soviet ambassador to the GDR (but G.M.Pushkin takes over in 1954). The elevated section of the ‘U-Bahn’ is closed to prevent refugees reaching West Berlin (as numbers reach record levels—aggravated by food rationing, threats against farmers and the takeover of small businesses). Chemnitz is renamed Karl Marx Stadt. After Stalin’s death an

Chronology

461

agreement reduces state restrictions on the Church for a year (when pressure recommences) while more consumer goods are promised along with support for private enterprise. But strikes occur among building workers in East Berlin (protesting against longer working hours) and most of the FYP is abandoned while funds—including some Soviet credits—are allocated to purchase food and increase living standards. 1954 The Western Allies seek German unification on the basis of all-German assembly elections; the Soviets want unarmed neutrality and the withdrawal of foreign forces (condemned by the West as subversion). The Soviets cancel their remaining reparation demands and the end of food rationing is announced (though implementation is delayed until 1958). Grotewöhl and Pieck resign as SED co-chairmen leaving Ulbricht in sole charge. 1955 As the Soviets formally end the state of war with Germany the GDR is awarded full sovereignty and East Germans replace Soviet border guards. Heavy tolls are imposed on transit traffic between West Germany and West Berlin; the West German foreign minister propounds the ‘Hallstein Doctrine’ whereby governments entering into diplomatic relations with East Germany will forfeit the same with West Germany. 1956 Stalin’s statue is removed from East Berlin and East-West travel is eased for family emergencies. Ulbricht launches a new FYP which includes a nuclear power station, though it is abandoned after two years (on account of ‘revolutionary’ events in Hungary and Poland and an alleged raw material slump in the region) and replaced by a Seven Year Plan starting in 1959. A foreign trade bank is established and workers’ district committees are introduced experimentally (abolished in 1958). 1957 Agreement is reached over the stationing of 400,000 Soviet troops in the GDR. Ulbricht agrees with the Poles that each state should develop socialism on the basis of its national characteristics. Further administrative and industrial decentralisation is sought. 1958 Khrushchev threatens a separate peace treaty with East Germany under which authority in East Berlin would be handed over (revised in 1960 as a threat to West Germany to accept ‘free city’ status for West Berlin). The Soviets supply more raw materials and technical aid to enhance industrial growth in the GDR. Industrial ministries are abolished and regional economic councils created, while associations of publicly owned enterprises (VVBs) replace the main industrial administrations of the abolished ministries. Ulbricht calls for reduced pressure on intellectuals to discourage emigration. 1959 East German payments for Soviet forces are cancelled. The Volkskammer agrees to the Seven Year Plan for 1959–65. 1960 As monthly refugee figures to West Berlin rise to the highest level since 1953, West Germany agrees a long-term trade pact with annual barter worth US$130 million in return for non-interference with transit traffic to Berlin. Ulbricht is named head of state (and chairman of the Council of State) with Grotewöhl as one of six deputy chairmen. Pieck dies and Guben is renamed Wilhelm Pieck Stadt. The turning point is reached in the shift from private to collectivised farming. 1961 More than 1,900 East Germans enter West Berlin on a single day (9 August) as East Germany stages ‘show trials’ of captured refugees. The border in Berlin is sealed four days later as work on the 155km ‘Berliner Mauer’ begins (including eventually a section under the Spree River), followed by clearance of a border strip (continuing into 1962) with anti-tank fortifications and barbed-wire barricades along the Autobahn. There is a partial reintroduction of rationing.

Chronology

462

1962 Threat to Western use of the Berlin air corridors is withdrawn although flights are harassed by ‘buzzing’. A forbidden zone is established along the Baltic coast and customs posts established along the inter-zonal border in Berlin (now an international frontier) with fortifications at Friedrichstrasse. A five-year period of erratic institutional change in the GDR ends with the abandonment of the Seven Year Plan started in 1959. 1963 Ulbricht rejects a West German US$100 million two-year trade credit in return for access to East Berlin for West Berliners (but an accord later allows visits for Christmas-New Year, 1963–4). US President Kennedy makes his ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech. ‘Guidelines to the New Economic System’ are issued. 1964 Further Christmas visits to the East by West Berliners require payment of a fee and West Germany cancels credits in retaliation for compulsory currency exchanges. A mass escape to West Berlin is effected by tunnelling (repeating a previous success in 1962). On the death of Grotewöhl, W.Stoph succeeds as Ulbricht’s Council of State deputy. Phased price reform is implemented and subsidies for food served in enterprise canteens are withdrawn. A new Seven Year Plan is started for 1964–70. 1965 The GDR closes the transit routes between West Germany and West Berlin on the occasion of a Bundestag meeting in West Berlin and Soviet planes ‘buzz’ the Congressional Hall. 1966 Ulbricht seeks West German credits to compensate for economic and diplomatic restrictions (including US$25 million as back payment for communications services) and refuses to allow further Christmas visits unless the GDR is recognised as an independent state. 1967 The GDR orders electrical equipment and rolling stock from West Berlin but insists on being treated as an independent country over post and telephone traffic. Ulbricht is confirmed as party leader with E.Honecker as his deputy. A ‘New Economic System’ is abandoned in favour of a cosmetic ideologically motivated ‘Economic System of Socialism’ indicating less radical objectives. 1968 The West German Bundestag continues to hold meetings in West Berlin (deplored by the GDR which refuses to recognise that West Berlin is part of West Germany). After the events in Czechoslovakia Ulbricht seeks new, young revolutionaries and a ‘new course’ curtails civil and political rights. A new constitution establishes the GDR as a socialist state with Berlin as ‘Hauptstadt der DDR’. The GDR is listed one of the top ten world industrial powers. 1969 Further travel restrictions are imposed on Bundestag members travelling to West Berlin. Negotiations with West Germany may follow recognition of the GDR’s independence (repeated in 1970) but unification is now ‘out of the question’. The start of the W.Brandt chancellorship in West Germany leads to an era of East-West German cooperation. 1970 Meetings between Brandt and W.Stoph take place in Erfurt and Kassel, and West Germans are allowed to visit East Berlin for Christmas. West Germany agrees with the USSR to renounce force but declines to accept GDR independence and (specifically) to unblock GDR membership of the European Commission and World Health Organisation. ‘Objektgebundene Planung’ (‘Object Planning’) is introduced with stronger enforcement. 1971 The Four Power Berlin Agreement leads to a small exchange of territory and visits by West Berliners to East Berlin for the first time since 1966. Ulbricht loses power after resisting the Soviet policy of improving relations with West Germany and is

Chronology

463

succeeded by Honecker as head of the Communist Party. Recentralisation is enforced by the decree on ‘Implementing the Economic System of Socialism in 1971’ with ‘planned proportional development of the national economy’ dependent on enlarging the role of state planning: payment of bonuses is linked with fulfilment of specific planned tasks. 1972 A treaty between East and West Germany (‘Ostpolitik’) on ‘basic relations’ provides for diplomatic missions (without full ambassadorial representation) and prepares Bonn for withdrawal of the Hallstein Doctrine—forbidding West German relations with countries recognising the GDR—leading to worldwide diplomatic recognition. Both the GDR and West Germany become UN members and a quadripartite agreement is reached over Berlin. A joint GDR-Polish spinning mill is located at Zawiercie (Poland) and travel between the GDR and Poland is de-restricted. 1973 As France and the UK recognise the GDR (USA in 1974) inter-German trade grows but the GDR seeks to control the spread of Western ideas and the remaining private enterprises are taken over. With the death of Ulbricht, Stoph succeeds as Council of State chairman. 1974 East and West Germany establish permanent diplomatic missions while the GDR negotiates with Hoechst and Krupp over eventual joint marketing in Third World countries. The GDR constitution removes references to reunification. 1975 East and West Germany agree on road and rail connections. 1976 Honecker is elected Council of State chairman. 1977 Eighty East-West German cooperation projects arise out of normalisation agreements. A twenty-five-year friendship treaty is agreed with Czechoslovakia. 1978 The 1,000km frontier fence started at the beginning of the decade is completed. 1979 New laws are enacted against ‘unapproved’ contacts with Westerners, while a police amnesty marks the GDR’s thirtieth anniversary. 1980 A memorial statue of Friedrich der Grosse is restored in East Berlin. 1981 H.Schmidt visits the GDR for talks while Honecker supports the Polish government in dealing with the Solidarity crisis. 1982 West Germany extends interest-free credit to finance trade with the GDR. 1983 West Germany guarantees US$396.8 million of private bank loans to the GDR: the largest credit underwritten by Bonn. 1984 Honecker allows Western TV programmes in the GDR. Legal emigration to West Germany is stopped and eighty East Germans request asylum in West Germany at the latter’s embassy in Prague. 1985 West German Chancellor H.Kohl meets Honecker in Berlin (the latter makes an official visit to West Germany in 1986). 1986 GDR dissidents join others from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in calling for pluralism and independence. 1987 Honecker visits West Germany but rejects ‘glasnost’. 1988 Concerned over a growing human rights movement, the GDR bans the Soviet Sputnik magazine and five Soviet films. 1989 Gorbachev encourages Honecker to embrace reform and states that ‘matters affecting East Germany are decided not in Moscow but in Berlin’. As opposition groups demonstrate, Honecker is replaced by E.Krenz who declares support for ‘perestroika’. The opposition ‘New Forum’ is legalised and the new premier H. Modrow moves away from SUPG dominance, promising sweeping economic change and relations with West

Chronology

464

Germany ‘on a new level’. Unification ‘marches’ staged in Leipzig increase enthusiasm for Kohl’s ‘Ten Point Plan’ for German reunification. Hungary 1945 Soviet-Hungarian joint companies set up under the armistice, while reparations and guarantees for repayment of pre-war debt trigger hyperinflation. Elections produce a Smallholder majority but the Soviets insist on a coalition with the less pliable Smallholder elements removed. Radical land reform is undertaken to jump-start the economy, with maximum landholdings of 115ha for peasants (up to 50% more in the case of anti-Nazi resistance fighters) and 50ha for gentry: 1.9 million hectares could be distributed among 600,000 families with an average 3ha each. 1946 A republic is declared with F.Nagy of the Smallholders Party as premier, though communists form a left-wing bloc and force the Smallholders to remove ‘reactionary’ deputies. Hyperinflation forces currency reform (the forint replaces the pengö) and Stalinist economic strategy is accepted as a guiding policy: a Supreme Economic Council nationalises coal mines (taken over 1945) and the Ganz, Manfréd Weiss and Rimamurány enterprises. 1947 A peace treaty is signed in Paris and the Marshall Plan is rejected. Agreements on collaboration and cooperation with Yugoslavia are completed. After the election is won by a Workers’ Bloc the Social Democrats are forced to amalgamate with the Communists and create a unified party with M.Rákosi as secretary. The 1947–9 Three Year Plan commences with the creation of a National Planning Office while the new. Dinnyés government places the banks under state control. 1948 I.Dobi becomes premier and Cardinal J.Mindzenty is arrested after the Catholic Church refuses to relinquish control of its schools. All firms employing more than a hundred persons are nationalised (later in the year all firms employing more than ten people are affected) and collectivisation is announced. 1949 A friendship treaty is signed with Czechoslovakia. Elections consolidate the power of the Workers’ Party and the Hungarian People’s Republic is declared with a constitution based on the Soviet model. ‘Muscovites’ marginalise the national wing (L.Rajk is executed). A state foreign trade monopoly is imposed and Ministry of Foreign Trade established (foreign and domestic trade are finally separated in 1954). The Three Year Plan is declared complete. 1950 The First FYP (1950–4) for a fully centralised economy is launched, The Catholic primate (J.Grösz) is imprisoned—following his predecessor (Mindzenty) the previous year. 1951 Catholic priests are coerced into swearing allegiance to the People’s Republic. 1952 Party general secretary Rákosi becomes prime minister. 1953 Reforms follow Stalin’s death, beginning with liquidation of joint HungarianSoviet enterprises (completed by 1956). The government of I.Nagy (who replaces Rákosi) allows resignations from agricultural cooperatives (a decision reversed in 1956) and announces the end of rationing and the forced development of heavy industry. 1955 Hungary joins the United Nations. Nagy is replaced by the hardline E.Gerö. 1956 The student discussion group (Petöfi Circle) insists on reform and revolution breaks out with the spontaneous formation of ‘Revolutionary and Workers’ Councils’ for

Chronology

465

the transfer of power from the party apparatus. Gerö fails to restore calm and is replaced by Nagy who heads a coalition of Smallholders, Social Democrats, National Peasants and a Catholic Association. There is further relaxation of collectivisation but after Nagy announces Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact Soviets crush the revolution and install J.Kádár at the head of a peasant-worker government. The Second FYP (for 1956– 60) is quickly abandoned. 1957 Despite an attempted ‘balanced’ relationship between Hungary and the USSR, totalitarian communist rule is restored and collectivisation is resumed while changes are made to the wage system. 1958 The execution of Nagy marks the extreme point of withdrawal from the political gains of 1956. A Three Year Plan (1958–60) follows emergency annual plans and coercive measures are taken against peasants resisting collectivisation. 1959 Hungary is classified as an industrialised agrarian country in Comecon and a Hungarian-Polish bilateral business association, ‘Haldex’, is formed for the purpose of coal slack processing. Price reforms are implemented to reflect production costs more accurately. 1960 The turning point is reached in the shift from private to collectivised farming. 1961 The Second Five Year Plan (for 1961–5) is launched and Rákosi victims are rehabilitated. 1962 The socialisation of agriculture is completed. 1963 A final amnesty for the prisoners of 1956 is granted. 1965 Hungarian-Bulgarian bilateral business organisations are formed: Agromash (for fruit and vegetable processing) and Intransmash (for intra-factory transport equipment). Kádár hands over the premiership to his deputy Kállai and concentrates on party affairs. Preparations are made for economic reform by the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) to raise efficiency (avoiding institutionalised workers’ self-management). 1967 Regional and national associations of collective farms are created. 1968 The friendship treaty with Czechoslovakia is renewed but Hungary later joins the Warsaw Pact invasion. Introduction of the NEM with market prices as the guiding basis for all production. The reform package includes a tariff and forint devaluation; there is a shift from central controls over enterprises to individualised financial planning. Obligatory plan targets are no longer imposed on subordinates and cooperatives are allowed to produce industrial goods. 1970 As Brezhnev approves Hungary’s economic innovations, minority shareholdings by foreign corporations are allowed. 1971 An efficiency indicator is introduced: value-added (profits plus wages) per employee. 1972 The enterprise wage-bill is linked with value-added, marking an NEM watershed. 1973 Due to Soviet unease the NEM slows down in favour of recentralisation: the link between profits and wages is severed in the fuel and power industry while workers in state industry receive a large tax-free preferential increase in wages. 1974 The dismissal of R.Nyers signals the beginning of the reversal of the NEM. 1975 Further price control (extended from 1974) reflects greater central authority and reduced scope for the regulated market mechanism.

Chronology

466

1977 The share of foreign capital in joint ventures may achieve majority status in banking and services while greater cultural freedom is declared. 1978 The Sixth FYP is drawn up and industrial ministries are merged. 1980 Subsidies to industry are cut while the domestic prices of most fuels and raw materials are equated with foreign prices. Industries other than food are to establish price levels no higher than those prevailing for convertible currency exports. 1981 A uniform commercial and tourist exchange rate (with preceding price adjustments) is set while the Sixth FYP seeks greater efficiency and profitability. 1982 Hungary joins the IMF and World Bank. 1983 Enterprises, cooperatives and local government entities are given the right to issue and purchase bonds. 1984 Kádár introduces a ‘regulated market’ to combine private enterprise and market forces with central planning. 1985 Economic problems are to be addressed by more flexible measures to strengthen exports while managerial reforms enable enterprises to recruit and dismiss staff. 1986 A bankruptcy law is passed (the first such in the region) while unemployment compensation and value-added taxation are introduced. 1987 K.Grösz takes over the premiership from Kádár and reduces consumption through price rises and an income tax law. Reform of the banking system separates central bank and commercial bank functions. 1988 N.Németh replaces Grösz as premier while Grösz replaces Kádár (who dies later in the year) as party leader; reformists (R.Nyers and I.Pozsgay) join the Central Committee. Celebrations mark the 950th anniversary of the death of Stephen I. The stock market opens for business (the first in the region). The government shows active interest in the fate of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries. 1989 With a quadrumvirate of Grösz, Németh, Nyers and Pozsgay heading the party the country is renamed the Republic of Hungary and multiparty elections are agreed for 1990. The Iron Curtain is dismantled along the Austrian border and enterprise conversions to joint stock companies begin. Poland 1945 Following the liberation of Warsaw the Yalta Conference accepts a Provisional Polish Government of National Unity based on the ‘Lublin Committee’ enlarged as a coalition of five parties. B.Bierut becomes acting president with the Peasant Party (PPP) leader S.Mikolajczyk as premier. The Curzon Line is accepted as the eastern frontier while the Potsdam Conference accepts the Odra-Nysa Line as the western frontier and authorises the transfer of Germans to the Allied occupation zones, whereupon the provisional government extends control to this limit. A Central Planning Board is established and a Special Commission for Combating Waste and Economic Sabotage gains powers to impose forced labour (abolished 1955). Temporary cooperatives are established in the Regained Territories (continuing into 1946). 1946 The transfer of Germans starts under the Potsdam Agreement. Poland receives major UNRRA assistance, especially in agriculture. A Nine Month Investment Plan is launched while a Nationalisation Act is passed.

Chronology

467

1947 Agreement is reached over economic cooperation with Czechoslovakia (according rights over Szczecin and the Odra navigation) while Marshall Aid is declined. The PPP wins the election (claiming 84%) but the returns are falsified to favour the communist bloc comprising the PSP and PWP. B.Bierut is elected president and J.Cyrankiewicz premier. A Three Year Plan starts (1947–9) but strikes take place in Łódź. A Three Year Reconstruction Plan is launched (for 1947–9). 1948 A five-year trade treaty with the USSR compensates Poland for rejecting the American Marshall Plan. The elimination of anti-communist resistance groups is completed (the process having started in 1946). Compulsory amalgamation of the PSP and PWP creates the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP). Socialist trade grows rapidly while pressure is exerted on the private sector of industry. W.Gomulka opposes collectivisation and is removed from office. 1949 PUWP leader Gomulka is expelled after deviating from the party line. The nationalisation of trade is completed and a Ministry of Foreign Trade is established. 1950 The GDR accepts the Odra-Nysa Line. The 1950–5 Six Year Plan starts and monetary reforms are introduced to reduce purchasing power. 1951 Overzealous collectivisation programmes in the countryside are checked. A territorial exchange involving Polish land near Brest for Soviet land in the southeast facilities Polish military action against Ukrainian insurgents. 1952 A new constitution is introduced on the Soviet model. 1953 Bierut resigns the premiership and is succeeded by Cyrankiewicz. Rationing ends. Cardinal Wyszyński (elevated in 1952) is interned in a monastery. 1954 The second PUWP congress discusses the crisis in agriculture caused by collectivisation. A new arbitration procedure is introduced. 1956 The first major outbreak of dissent occurs in Poznań, starting a succession of serious strikes and rebellions (1968, 1970–1, 1976, 1980–1 and 1988). Gomulka returns to power as PUWP first secretary (until 1970) and (as in the GDR) some reverse aid from the USSR provides credit and compensates for past injustices. The State Commission for Economic Planning is replaced by a Planning Commission attached to the Council of Ministers and a law on workers’ councils is passed. Compulsory collectivisation ends while liberalisation undermines the fragile base of cooperative ownership. The FYP for 1956–60 commences. Cardinal Wyszyński is released from detention. 1957 Although a government under Cyrankiewicz shows that Stalinists are still in control, the process of removing Soviet officers from key positions in the Polish army is completed. Promotion of private farming marks the heyday of the Gomulka administration, though there is also plan revision and launch of economic reform through vaguely worded ‘Theses on Certain Directions of Change in the Economic Model’. 1958 Workers’ councils are deemed by law to become one component of ‘selfmanagement’ institutions. 1959 The ‘Haldex’ Polish-Hungarian bilateral business association is set up to deal with coal slack processing. Increased investment builds up inflationary pressures which bring about recentralisation. The government proclaims ‘meatless Mondays’ to help cope with food shortages. 1960 Price reform for producer goods reduces the gap between average production costs and prices and (for foreign trade in basic raw materials) takes account of relativities on world markets. The wage system is overhauled with a statutory minimum wage.

Chronology

468

1961 The FYP for 1961–5 commences. The teaching of religion is no longer permitted in state schools. 1963 The government accepts the nomination of Karol Wojtyła as Archbishop of Krakow. 1964 New reform measures are promulgated. 1965 Three enterprises—Befama (machine tools), Cegielski (engineering) and Rafamet (textile machinery)—assume foreign trading rights. 1966 The złoty is devalued for commercial transactions. Poles celebrate a millennium of Christianity. 1968 Student/intellectual protests against the widening income differentials sought by ‘marketeers’ are suppressed. 1969 A party congress announces a ‘transition to the stage of selective and intensive development of the economy’ during the 1971–5 FYP. 1970 West German chancellor W.Brandt promises recognition of the Odra-Nysa Line (accepted by the Bundestag in 1972). Continuing reaction by Gomulka provokes a workers’ revolt in Gdansk, Łódź and elswhere against price rises for consumer goods following the wage restraint which is intended to continue through the whole of the FYP. Gomulka is replaced by E.Gierek and price rises are cancelled. ‘From then on workers’ pressure, overt or latent, became an outstanding factor in Polish political life and any attempts to discount it ended in failure’ (Brus 1986b p. 145). Cyrankiewicz is replaced by P.Jaroszewicz as premier and becomes head of state. 1971 Gierek abrogates food price rises after a continuous wave of strike action on the Baltic coast; the 1970 incentive scheme is also abandoned (unpopular because ceilings were placed on wage rises) and the złoty is further devalued. Increased autonomy for industry arises through horizontal integration (and vertical integration through WOGs: see below). He also revises the 1971–5 FYP to give more attention to consumer goods. Wyszyński and Jaroszewicz stage the first meeting between the heads of Church and government in Poland for twenty-five years. 1972 Gierek launches a modernisation programme dependent on heavy Western borrowing. A party and government commission for the ‘Modernisation of the System of Functioning of the Economy and the State’ (set up in 1971) presents a blueprint for ‘the improvement of the system of planning and management’ (i.e. economic reform)— including provision for ‘large economic organisations’ (WOGs). A joint Polish-GDR spinning mill is located at Zawiercie (Poland) and travel between Poland and the GDR is de-restricted. West Germany ratifies the Odra-Nysa Treaty. New attempts at gradual reform are made. 1973 Fifty thousand ethnic Germans are allowed to settle in West Germany. Twentyseven WOGs start to operate as pilot units and a bonus scheme for management personnel is introduced. 1974 Workers’ strikes lead to wage increases, but economic recession ends Gierek’s ‘economic manoeuvre’ based on Western credits while a basic tenet of the incentive scheme is repealed and a retreat from the integration of foreign and domestic operations arises from a renewed ‘Preisausgleich’ in chemical industry WOG pilot units. 1975 Elements of the old system of foreign trade planning are reintroduced and fortynine WOGs are set up (although important elements of WOG autonomy are withdrawn).

Chronology

469

1976 Workers revolt as Gierek’s acceleration of investment—with consequent price increases—clashes with pressure for higher personal incomes; the price increases are moderated. Agreement is reached over construction of the broad-gauge ‘Steel and Sulphur Railway’ (LHS). 1976 Enterprises with 100% foreign capital are allowed in the service sector (especially hotels and catering). 1977 The clandestine journal Nowa is launched. 1978 The Archbishop of Kraków (Cardinal Wojtyła) is elected Pope John Paul II. L.Wałesa and other members of free trade unions on the Baltic coast remember victims of the 1970 massacre at Gdańsk’s Lenin Shipyard, while an independent trade union is organised in Katowice. 1979 A period of economic turmoil (lasting until 1982) results in a 25% decline in national income, triple-digit inflation and a failure to service the international debt. Foreign capital is allowed in all sectors up to a limit of 49%. 1980 E.Babiuch replaces Jaroszewicz as premier and Poles celebrate Constitution Day (banned since 1948). Solidarity is formed as a merger of thirty-five independent unions and Poland’s borders with Czechoslovakia and East Germany are closed while strikes take place—at the Lenin Shipyard (led by Wałesa) and elsewhere—over price rises. A new premier, J.Pinkowski, appoints a deputy who negotiates the ‘Gdańsk Agreement’ with Wałesa, and self-governing trade unions are legalised in return for recognition of the PUWP’s leading role. S. Kania replaces Gierek as party secretary. 1981 Poland is unable to pay its Western creditors. The rural wing of Solidarity is recognised but pressure for a referendum over a non-communist government and the emergence of a democratic, anti-communist opposition lead to the declaration of a state of emergency and the imposition of martial law by General W.Jaruzelski, who becomes the head of a new government and subsequently replaces Kania as party secretary. Solidarity is banned. 1982 The ‘Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth’ is founded to replace the National Unity Front: a PUWP organisation to manage other parties, including the PUWP’s allies the Democratic Party (DP) and United Peasant Party (UPP). 1983 Martial law is lifted and Solidarity is legalised. 1984 The pro-Solidarity priest Father J.Popieluszko is arrested and murdered. 1985 Jaruzelski becomes head of state with Z.Messner as premier. 1986 An ammesty is declared for political prisoners while Solidarity becomes a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World Confederation of Labour (though no longer legalised in Poland). 1987 Visit to Poland by Pope John Paul II (following previous visits in 1979 and 1983). 1988 Following protests against price rises, Prime Minister Messner is replaced by M.Rakowski and the PUWP starts a reform process in the face of renewed Solidarity pressure. 1989 Solidarity is again legalised. A round table provides for free elections in which Solidarity wins all but one of the seats contested (while others are reserved for communists). Solidarity refuses to join a coalition government and after Jaruzelski’s support for C.Kiszczak fails to produce a government T.Mazowiecki becomes premier as Solidarity is joined by the DP and UPP.

Chronology

470

Romania 1945 Soviet-Romanian joint companies are set up under the armistice. The Soviets insist on the installation of P.Groza (leader of the left-wing Ploughmen’s Front) as premier while the National Peasant and Liberal parties are excluded from power. One and a half million hectares of land (from confiscated German farms and other holdings in excess of 50ha) are distributed to landless peasants and those owning less than 5ha. 1946 Many former opposition leaders are arrested and election results are manipulated to produce an overwhelming victory for the communists. The National Bank is nationalised. 1947 A Romanian peace treaty is signed in Paris, confirming the transfer of Bessarabia to the USSR and southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria. The National Peasant Party is declared illegal and I.Maniu is imprisoned. King Mihai abdicates. A Six Month Plan is launched while monetary reform brings hyper-inflation (from 1945) under control and ‘Industrial Offices’ (later absorbed into ministries) limit the power of trusts and cartels. 1948 Romania shows interest in joining Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in a Balkan federation. Social Democrats merge with the communists to form the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP)—subsequently renamed the Communist Party—which joins with the Ploughmen’s Front and Hungarian People’s Union in a Democratic Front to fight the election—and after a communist victory Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej takes over the premiership. A State Planning Commission is created, a general nationalisation act is approved (with confiscation of royal estates) while a state foreign trade monopoly is imposed and a Ministry of Foreign Trade is created. 1949 Romania and the USSR set up joint companies (continuing into 1950). A One Year Reconstruction Plan is implemented and the remaining estates and model capitalist farms are confiscated. 1950 A further One Year Plan is implemented and rental properties are nationalised. The RWP is purged. 1951 The First FYP is launched for 1951–5. 1952 Groza becomes parliamentary president and is succeeded as premier by Gheorghiu-Dej. A new constitution is based on the Soviet model. Monetary reforms reduce purchasing power. 1953 Publicity for Stakhanovite achievements ends while collectivisation is relaxed in favour of informal associations. 1954 Joint Romanian-Soviet enterprises are dissolved (a process completed in 1956) and rationing ends. 1955 Romania becomes a member of the United Nations. There is now a call for more collective farms following the previous emphasis on informal associations. 1956 In the light of the Hungarian revolution aid from the USSR is delivered to compensate for past injustices and debts are cancelled, but mild de-Stalinisation is followed by the purging of reformers. The Second FYP is launched for 1956–60. 1957 Changes are effected in the wage system. 1958 I.G.Maurer becomes parliamentary president on the death of Groza. 1959 The Second FYP is declared complete. 1960 The turning point in the shift from private to collectivised farming. The Second FYP is abandoned early and replaced by a Six Year Plan for 1960–5. 1961 Gheorghiu-Dej becomes State Council president.

Chronology

471

1962 The completion of the collectivisation programme is announced, although this leaves many private farms in mountain regions. 1963 Gheorghiu-Dej refuses to follow the Soviet lead in condemning China and he also refuses to be bound by Comecon economic policy. 1965 Gheorghiu-Dej is succeeded by N.Ceauşescu as first secretary of the Communist Party while communist leaders liquidated by the USSR are rehabilitated. 1966 Ceauşescu aligns the Communist Party with the historic struggle for complete national independence. The formation of regional and national associations of collective farms (started in 1962) is completed. Abortion is outlawed (except in life-threatening cases) as part of a programme to boost the birth rate. 1967 Diplomatic relations are established with West Germany. Ceauşescu is elected State Council president and Central Committee directives ‘On the Improvement of the Management of the National Economy’ are issued. 1968 Romania renews the 1948 friendship treaty with Czechoslovakia and subsequently declines to join the Warsaw Pact invasion. As Ceauşescu asserts his authority as national leader, A.Drăghici is dismissed for rigging trials in the 1950s (while L.Pătrăscanu and other victims are rehabilitated). Workers’ participation in management is allowed but largely as a formality (the scheme is remodelled in 1971) and a foreign trade bank is established. 1969 Ceauşescu meets with Tito in Timişoara to reassert cooperation based on full equality of rights and non-interference in internal affairs. Enterprises are grouped into ‘central offices’ (‘centrale’) anticipated by the 1967 directives. 1970 A new incentive system is introduced. 1971 Romania joins GATT, the International Investment Bank and the Committee for Collaboration in Planning Activity. A foreign aid agreement with China is reached. The 1971–5 FYP is launched and the leu is devalued for commercial transactions. 1972 Romania joins the IMF and Ceauşescu visits African countries. A law on joint equity companies—with a foreign capital share of up to 49%—is implemented. 1973 Ceauşescu becomes the first leader of a Warsaw Pact state to visit West Germany, while a treaty of economic cooperation with the USA is signed during President Nixon’s second visit to Romania. 1975 Ceauşescu is elected state president. Economic reform is confined to organisational aspects. 1976 Ceauşescu visits the Moldavian SSR (i.e. Bessarabia) but denies any territorial claims on the USSR; he also declines the Soviet proposal for a broad-gauge railway across Romania to connect the USSR with Bulgaria. The 1976–80 FYP is launched. 1977 Romania suffers a devastating earthquake. The novelist P.Goma and others draft an open letter seeking outside help to monitor human rights, while a strike breaks out in the Jiu Valley coalfield. 1978 Following the defection of a deputy minister Ceauşescu urges greater diligence by the security apparatus (Securitate). 1979 A ‘Free Union of Working People’ is banned. 1980 Romania condemns the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 1981 Harsher penalities are announced for illegal border crossings. 1982 An education tax is imposed to discourage applications for emigration. 1984 Draconian measures are introduced to stop illegal abortion.

Chronology

472

1985 An emergency occurs in the electric power industry and it is decreed that citizens will perform six days of patriotic labour each year. 1986 Territorial waters are extended to 320km in order to safeguard potential offshore oil reserves. The use of private cars is banned as an energy-saving measure. 1987 Demonstrations in Braşov lead to storming of the town hall and party headquarters. 1988 Ceauşescu rejects Gorbachev’s advice that reforms should be adopted. The Hungarian consulate in Cluj-Napoca is closed. The rural planning (‘sistematizare’) programme is revived and the destruction of 8,000 villages is envisaged. 1989 US$10 billion of foreign debts are paid off but at the end of the year spontaneous demonstrations occur in Timişoara and a pro-government assembly in Bucharest turns into a freedom rally. Ceauşescu flees Bucharest but is apprehended and executed. The Salvation Front forms an interim government. Yugoslavia 1945 An election victory for the People’s Front—later the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)—paves the way for a communist government under Tito’s premiership and the gradual removal of non-communist members of the Tito-Šubašić transitional administration. German-owned property is confiscated (beginning in 1944) and a land fund is set up to take over expropriated land for distribution to peasant landholders and Partisans. 1946 The Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) is established under the United Nations with Zone B occupied by Yugoslavia. Treaties on economic cooperation and mutual friendship are signed with Albania (after incorporation had been considered as an option). UNRRA supplies farm machinery and fertiliser. A new constitution based on the Soviet model is drawn up for a federal people’s republic. An Outline Plan for 1946 is launched. Nationalisation of the industrial property of absentee owners is followed by a general nationalisation act and a state foreign trade monopoly is established. 1947 Agreements on collaboration and cooperation with Hungary are reached. A Balkan federation is negotiated with Bulgaria (but blocked by the Soviets). The start of the 1947–51 Five Year Plan overtakes initial arrangements for a 1948–9 Two Year Plan. 1948 Yugoslavia is expelled from the Cominform and sanctions are imposed. A trade embargo forces abandonment of the FYP in favour of a Two Year Plan (1949–50) involving project schedules and workers’ self-management. 1950 The law on the ‘Management of State Business Enterprises and Economic Associations by Workers’ Collectives’ (i.e. for workers councils) is approved. 1952 Prices are freed, except for basic goods. 1953 A Balkan pact is signed with Greece and Turkey. Collectivisation and compulsory deliveries are abandoned while a process of political decentralisation gives wide powers for each commune (‘opstina’). 1954 Conflict arises within the Yugoslav leadership and M.Djilas attacks degeneration in the party and seeks greater democracy. 1955 Yugoslavia develops its relations with the non-aligned movement which convenes its Bandung Conference. Attempts by Khrushchev (on this his visit to Yugoslavia) to draw the country back into the Soviet camp are rejected.

Chronology

473

1956 Yugoslavia gains observer status in Comecon (to 1958). 1958 Yugoslavia’s intention to follow a ‘different path to socialism’ is condemned by the Soviet camp but without the excommunication meted out in 1948. Profit-sharing is replaced by income-sharing. 1959 Yugoslavia becomes an associate member of GATT. 1961 A summit conference of the non-aligned states is held in Belgrade. The ‘Federal Fund for Underdeveloped Areas’ attracts resentment from the richer regions. Trade unions and communes lose their right to control the distribution of net income between personal incomes and retained funds. But there is criticism of reforms that are poorly prepared, inconsistent and badly implemented. 1962 Attempts are made to deal with inefficiency within protected industry through the abolition of income control and liberalisation of foreign trade. 1963 For a third successive year GNP is lower than expected. A new constitution strengthens self-management. 1964 Producers are granted the right to trade, and other major reforms are predicted. 1965 Observer status in Comecon is resumed. Ambitious reforms aim at establishing ‘market socialism’ with the abolition of many price controls to stimulate competition in the international division of labour; also the abandonment of annual plans (only Five Year Social and Development Plans). The Yugoslav National Bank ceases to be a Soviettype monopoly bank but rather a commercial institution, while internal prices are restructured and new exchange rates are established. 1966 As interior minister A.Ranković is ousted from control of security forces Yugoslavia’s reputation for liberalism is enhanced. 1968 Student demonstrations reflect political conflict over the economic crisis. Kosovo’s demands for autonomy are suppressed while Croatia’s Matika Hrvatska cultural society is abolished and the Croatian party is purged. Foreign companies are allowed to establish agencies. 1970 Inflation gives rise to a price freeze. 1971 An attempt is made to tighten party discipline but there are demands for greater autonomy in Croatia and the status of the constituent republics and regions is enhanced. A constitutional amendment seeks a shift from exclusive reliance on the market to agreements among primary economic agents. 1972 An incomes policy is reintroduced. 1973 A workers’ majority is maintained on management boards (the 75% requirement was cancelled in 1968). 1974 The decentralised economic system inaugurated by a new constitution confirms the retreat from exclusive reliance on the market for economic management: each work organisation is given the right to determine its current and forward plans. 1975 Cosmetic repressive measures obscure deeper problems of economic and political coordination. 1980 The death of Tito introduces new rulers lacking the Partisan mystique. Devaluation and liberalisation are followed by rapid economic deterioration. 1981 Disturbances occur in Kosovo. 1982 The twelfth LCY congress emphasises continuity following Tito’s death. 1983 The IMF intervenes over Yugoslavia’s foreign debt. Bosnian Muslims are tried and sentenced for counter-revolution.

Chronology

474

1984 A nine-member collective presidency is installed. 1985 Renewed claims are made concerning Albanian persecution of Serbs in Kosovo. 1986 Serbian intellectuals protest against the alleged genocidal mentality of Kosovo Albanians. 1987 S.Milošević enters popular politics by supporting the Serb position in Kosovo and purging ‘Titoist’ elements in the Serbian League of Communists. 1988 Crisis continues in Kosovo (with further unrest in Montenegro and Vojvodina). The economic reform issue leads to the resignation of the B.Mikulić cabinet. 1989 Milošević dismisses the Kosovo parliament and bans the Albanian press, while the Yugoslav army (JNA) is deployed in the province.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

J.Adam 1984, ‘Regulation of labour supply in Poland Czechoslovakia and Hungary’, Soviet Studies 36, 69–86. J.Adam 1989, Economic reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the 1960s (London: Macmillan). A.E.Adams 1974, ‘The Soviet agricultural model in Eastern Europe’, East European Quarterly 8, 461–17. J.Adamus 1976, ‘The role of technical infrastructure in the spatial changes of industry in the Upper Silesian Industrial Region’, Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego Folia Geographica Series Geographica-Oeconomica 9, 41–60. J.B.Allcock and K.Przeclawski 1990, ‘Tourism in the centrally planned economies: introduction’, Annals of Tourism Research 17, 1–6. T.P.Alton 1955, Polish post-war economy (New York: Columbia University Press). I.Aluas 1969, ‘Industrialization and migration of the Transylvanian peasantry at the end of the nineteenth century’, East European Quarterly 3,499–508. J.Ambler, D.J.B.Shaw and L.Symons eds 1985, Soviet and East European transport problems (London: Croom Helm). O.A.Anastasiu 1922, Industriile săteşti, în raport cu localizarea marei industrii (Bucharest: Academia Română, Studii şi Cercetări 13). F.Anghel 1996, ‘Un model strategic romano-polon: Canalul Marea Baltică-Marea Neagra in perioada interbelică’, Revista Istorica 7, 581–90. L.Apolzan 1987, Carpaţii: tezaur de istorie—perenitatea ąsezărilor risipite pe înalţimi (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică). G.Augustinos 1991, Diverse paths to modernity in Southeastern Europe (New York: Greenwood Press). S.Ausch 1972, Theory and practice of CMEA cooperation (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences). R.C.Austin 2000, ‘Economic development: Albania’: R.Frucht ed., Encyclopaedia of Eastern Europe: from the Congress of Vienna to the fall of communism (New York: Garland Publishing) 237–9. I.Avsenek 1955, Yugoslav metallurgical industries (New York: Mid-European Studies Center). K.J.Bade ed. 1987, Population labour and migration in nineteenth and twentieth century Germany (Leamington Spa: Berg). P.Bairoch 1976, ‘Europe’s gross national product 1800–1975’, Journal of European Economic History 5, 273–340. A.A.Balassa 1982, Reform of the New Economic Mechanism in Hungary (Washington, DC: World Bank Staff Working Paper 534). A.Barbie 1983, ‘The farm worker in Yugoslavia: a bridge between the city and the country’, Sociologia Ruralis 23, 76–84.

Bibliography

476

K.D.Barkin 1970, The controversy over German industrialisation 1890–1902 (Chicago: Chicago University Press). A.Basch 1944, The Danube Basin and the German economic sphere (London: Kegan Paul & Trench). J.Batt 1988, Economic reform and political change in Eastern Europe: a comparison of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian experiences (London: Macmillan). J.Batt 1991, East Central Europe: from reform to transformation (London: RIIA/Pinter). B.Baumgartl 1993, ‘Environmental protest as a vehicle for transition: the case of Ekoglasnost in Bulgaria’: A.Vari and P.Tamas eds, Environment and democratic transition: policy and politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Dordrecht: Kluwer) 157–78. S.Beck 1976, ‘The emergence of the peasant-worker in a Transylvanian mountain community’, Dialectical Anthropology 1, 365–75. JJ.Beer 1959, The emergence of the German dye industry (Urbana: University of Illinois Press). P.D.Bell 1984, Peasants in socialist transition: life in a collectivised Hungarian village (Berkeley: University of California Press). I.Bencze 1964, ‘The distribution of the manufacturing and mining industry in Hungary’: M.Pecsi ed., Applied geography in Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences) 179–95. I.Bencze and E.V.Tajti 1972, Budapest: an industrial geographical approach (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences). R.Bentley 1984, Technological change in the GDR (Boulder, Col.: Westview). B.Berelson 1974, Population policy in developed countries (New York: McGraw-Hill). I.T.Berend 1985, ‘Agriculture’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, Economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: economic structure and performance between the wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 148–209. I.T.Berend 1996, Central and Eastern Europe 1944–1995: detour from the periphery to the periphery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). I.T.Berend 2002, ‘Changes in Central and Eastern Europe in the last quarter of the twentieth century’, Journal of European Economic History 32, 9–24. I.T.Berend and G.Ranki 1974, Economic development in East Central Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (New York: Columbia University Press). I.T.Berend and G.Ranki 1982, The European periphery and industrialisation 1780–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). I.T.Berend and G.Ranki 1985, The Hungarian economy in the twentieth century (London: Croom Helm). I.T.Berend and G.Ranki 2002, Studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the twentieth century: regional crises and the case of Hungary (Aldershot: Ashgate). W.H.Berentsen 1981, ‘Regional change in the GDR’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 71, 50–66. W.H.Berentsen 1982, ‘Changing settlement patterns in the GDR 1945–1976’, Geoforum 13, 327– 37. I.Berenyi 1986, ‘Conflicts in land use in suburbia: the example of Budapest’: G.Heinritz and E.Lichtenburger eds, The take-off of suburbia (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag) 125–34. D.Berindei 1988, ‘Economic prerequisites for the establishment of independent Romania’, East European Quarterly 22, 23–35. D.Berindei 1994, Migration in socialism: a case study of Romania (Stockholm: Stockholm University International Graduate Programme: Stockholm International Studies 94–3). I.Bertć 1987, Veliki geografski atlas Jugoslavije (Zagreb: SNL). J.F.Besemeres 1980, Socialist population policies: the political implications of demographic trends in the USSR and Eastern Europe (White Plains, NY: M.E.Sharpe). R.Bicanic 1973, Economic policy in socialist Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Bibliography

477

I.Bičik and V.Stepanek 1994, ‘Post-war changes of land-use structure in Bohemia and Moravia: case study Sudetenland’, GeoJournal 32, 253–9. E.Bielecka and C.Ciołkisz 2002, ‘Land use changes during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the case of the Odra catchment area’, Geographia Polonica 75, 67–83. N.Birnbaum and S.Vryonis eds 1972, Aspects of the Balkans: continuity and change (The Hague: Mouton). W.C.Biselle 1971, ‘The peasant worker in Poland’, Studies in European Society 1, 26–39. K.Blanke 1981, Prussian Poland and the German Empire 1871–1900 (New York: Columbia University Press). K.Blanke 1993, Orphans of Versailles: the Germans in western Poland 1918–1939 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky). J.Blum 1948, Noble landowners and agriculture in Austria 1815–1848: a study in the origins of the peasant emancipation of 1848 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press). A.Bochmann 1995, ‘The city of Chemnitz in Saxony: building its new economic profile’, GeoJournal 37, 539–56. P.Body 1985, Joseph Eötvös and the modernisation of Hungary (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs). M.Bogucka 1996, ‘The typology of Polish towns during the 16th-18th centuries’, Journal of European Economic History 25, 325–37. S.Böhmer-Christiansen 1998, ‘Environment-friendly deindustrialization: impacts of unification on East Germany’: A.Tickle and I.Welsh eds, Environment and society in Eastern Europe (London: Addison-Wesley-Longman) 67–96. E.B.Boia 1994, ‘A neglected issue in Romanian historiography: the diplomatic struggle over the Banat 1914–1920’, Revue Roumaine d’Histoire 33, 43–62. M.K.Bokovoy 1998, Peasants and communists: policies and ideology in the Yugoslav countryside 1941–1953 (Pittsburgh, Perm.: University of Pittsburgh Press). J.T.Bombelles 1991, ‘Federal aid to the less developed areas of Yugoslavia’, East European Politics and Societies 5, 439–65. P.Boot 1983, ‘Continuity and change in the planning system of the GDR’, Soviet Studies 35, 331– 42. J.B.Borchert 1975, ‘Economic development and population distribution in Albania’, Geoforum 6, 177–86. G.Borgstrom and F.Annegers 1971, ‘Eastern Europe: an appraisal of food and agriculture in the thirties compared with the sixties’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 62, 114– 25. K.D.Borkin 1970, The controversy over German industrialisation 1890–1902 (Chicago: Chicago University Press). J.Borocz 1990, ‘Hungary as a destination’, Annals of Tourism Research 17, 19–35. E.N.Botsas 1978, ‘The big powers and inter-Balkan economic relations’, East European Quarterly 12, 257–82. L.Boyd 1937, Polish countrysides: photographs and narrative (New York: American Geographical Society). J.C.Brada 1985, ‘Soviet subsidization of Eastern Europe: the primacy of economics over polities’, Journal of Comparative Economics 1, 80–92. J.C.Brada and I.Dobozi 1988, The Hungarian economy in the 1980s: reforming the system and adjusting to external shocks (London: JAI Press). J.C.Brada and K.-E.Wadekin eds 1987, Socialist agriculture in transition: organisation response and falling performance (Boulder, Col.: Westview). H.-J.Braun 1990, The German economy in the twentieth century (London: Routledge). J.Brauniger 1989, ‘The German Democratic Republic’: R.Bennett ed., Territory and administration in Europe (London: Pinter) 191–202.

Bibliography

478

P.Breitling 1980, ‘The role of competition in the genesis of urban planning: Germany and Austria in the nineteenth century’: A.Sutcliffe ed., The rise of modern urban planning 1800–1914 (London: Mansell) 31–54. H.Brezinski 1990, ‘Private agriculture in the GDR: limitations of orthodox socialist agricultural policy’, Soviet Studies 42, 535–53. J.Brine 1993, Comecon: the rise and fall of an international socialist organisation (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press). M.Britovsek 1969, ‘The process of individualization of agriculture in Camiola in the second half of the nineteeth century’, East European Quarterly 3, 469–88. J.R.Broadus 1981, ‘Soviet historians and the Eastern Question in the eighteenth century’, East European Quarterly 15, 357–75. M.Broszat 1968, ‘The concentration camps 1933–1945’: H.Krausnich et al., Anatomy of the Schutzstaffeln state (London: Collins) 397–504. S.E.Brown and C.E.Trott 1968, ‘Grouping tendencies in an economic regionalisation of Poland’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 58, 327–42. W.Brus 1986a, ‘Postwar reconstruction and socio-economic transformation’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: interwar policy, the war and reconstruction (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 564–641. W.Brus 1986b, ‘1966–1975: normalization and conflict’: M.C.Kaser ed., The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: institutional change within a planned economy (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 138–249. P.J.Bryson 1984, The consumer under socialist planning: the East German case (New York: Praeger). P.J.Bryson and M.Melzer 1991, The end of the East German economy: from Honecker to reunification (London: Macmillan). A.Brzeski 1969, ‘Two decades of East European industrialization in retrospect’, East European Quarterly 3, 1–13. P.J.Buckley and S.F.Witt 1990, ‘Tourism in the centrally planned economies of Europe’, Annals of Tourism Research 17, 7–18. M.Bucur 2002, Eugenics and modernization in interwar Romania (Pittsburg, Penn.: University of Pittsburg Press). J.Bugajski 1992, Nations in turmoil: conflict and cooperation in Eastern Europe (Boulder, Col.: Westview). M.Bukowski 1973, ‘Industrial buildings in Upper Silesia’, Industrial Archaeology 10, 357–66. V.Bunce 1985, ‘The empire strikes back: the evolution of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet asset to a Soviet liability’, International Organization 39, 1–46. R.F.Byrnes ed. 1976, Communal families in the Balkans: the zadruga (South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame Press). F.W.Carter 1972, Dubrovnik: a classic city state (London: Academic Press). F.W.Carter 1973a, ‘Public transport development on nineteenth century Prague’, Transport History 6, 219–23. F.W.Carter 1973b, ‘The industrial development in Prague 1800–1850’, Slavonic and East European Review 51, 243–75. F.W.Carter 1975, ‘ČKD employees in Prague 1871–1920: some aspects of their geographical distribution’, Journal of Historical Geography 1, 69–97. F.W.Carter ed. 1977, Historical geography of the Balkans (London: Academic Press). F.W.Carter 1980, ‘Public transport in Eastern Europe: a case study of the Prague conurbation’, Transport Policy and Decision Making 1, 209–30. F.W.Carter 1984, ‘Pollution in Prague: environmental control in a centrally planned socialist economy’, Cities 1, 258–73. F.W.Carter 1985, ‘Pollution problems in postwar Czechoslovakia’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 10, 17–44.

Bibliography

479

F.W.Carter 1986, ‘City profile: Tirana’, Cities 3, 270–81. F.W.Carter 1988, ‘Czechoslovakia: nuclear power in a socialist society’, Environment and Planning: Government and Policy 6, 269–87. F.W.Carter and D.Turnock eds 1993, Environmental problems in Eastern Europe (London: Routledge). J.A.Cash 1939, ‘Place and products: Bulgarian rose oil’, Geographical Magazine 8, 277–88. G.Chaliand and J.-P.Rageau 1995, The Penguin atlas of disaporas (London: Penguin). K.Chester 1995, ‘The Hronec forestry railway’: K.Chester ed., East European narrow gauge (Clevedon: Channel View Publications) 73–81. D.Chirot 1976, Social change in a peripheral society: the creation of a Balkan colony (New York: Academic Press). D.Chirot ed. 1989, The origins of backwardness in Eastern Europe: economics and politics from the Middle Ages until the early twentieth century (Berkeley: University of California Press). J.Chodorowski 1970, ‘J.G.Fichte: precursor of the German doctrine of large area economy’, Polish Western Affairs 11, 126–53. M.Ciechocinska 1989, ‘The level of educational achievement in Poland: a town-countryside comparison’, Geographia Polonica 56, 213–25. E.Clark 1964, ‘The Ottoman industrial revolution’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 5, 65–76. G.B.Cohen 1981, The politics of ethnic survival: Germans in Prague 1861–1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). P.A.Compton 1969, ‘Internal migration and population change in Hungary between 1959 and 1965’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 49, 111–30. P.A.Compton 1972, ‘Internal migration in Hungary between 1960 and 1968’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 63, 25–38. P.A.Compton 1979, ‘Planning and spatial change in Budapest’: R.A.French and F.E.I. Hamilton eds, The socialist city: spatial structure and urban policy (Chichester: Wiley) 461–92. P.A.Compton 1984, ‘Hungary: the National Settlement Development Strategy’, Cities 1, 374–86. P.A.Compton and M.Pecsi eds 1976, Regional development and planning (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences). E.Cook 1984, ‘Agricultural reform in Poland: background and prospects’, Soviet Studies 36, 406– 26. P.L.Cottrell 1983 ‘Aspects of Western equity investments in the banking systems of East Central Europe’: A.Teichova and P.L.Cottrell eds, International business and Central Europe 1918– 1939 (Leicester: Leicester University Press) 309–34. G.W.Creed 1998, Domesticating revolution: from socialist reform to ambivalent transition in a Bulgarian village (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press). G.W.Creed 2000, ‘Folk Life’: R.Frucht ed. 2000, Encyclopaedia of Eastern Europe: from the Congress of Vienna to the fall of communism (New York: Garland Publishing) 270–2. R.S.Cromwell 1973, ‘Russia’s collapse in World War One: the military and economic impact on the Central Powers’, East European Quarterly 7, 265–84. G.R.Crone 1939, ‘Inland waterways of Germany’, Geographical Journal 93, 333–9. W.E.Crowther 1988, The planned economy of Romanian socialism (New York: Praeger). L.Csaba 1989, ‘Some lessons from two decades of economic reform in Hungary’, Communist Economies 1, 17–29. T.Csato 1977. ‘The development of internal trade in East Central Europe and South East Europe’, Ada Historica Academiae Scientarum Hungaricae 23, 397–430. W.Czapliński and T.Łodogórski 1981, The historical atlas of Poland (Wrocław: State Cartographical Publishers). J.Czekner 1978, ‘A comparison of the agricultural systems of Austria and Hungary in the two decades before World War One’, East European Quarterly 12, 461–73.

Bibliography

480

J.Dangschat 1987, ‘Sociopolitical disparities in a socialist city: the city of Warsaw at the end of the 1970s’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 11, 37–59. D.Danta 1993, ‘Ceauşescu’s Bucharest’, Geographical Review 83, 170–82. K.Daskalov 1997, ‘Ideas about and reactions to modernization in the Balkans’, East European Quarterly 21, 141–80. A.Davies 1934, Polish studies (London: Le Play Society). E.Davies, W.O.Henderson and H.W.Singer 1944, Germany: economic geography (London: Admiralty Naval Intelligence Division, Geographical Handbooks Series). J.C.Davies 1976, ‘A Slovene labourer and his experience of industrialisation 1888–1976’, East European Quarterly 10, 3–20. A.H.Dawson 1970, ‘The changing distribution of Polish industry 1949–1965: a general picture’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 50, 177–95. A.H.Dawson 1971, ‘Warsaw: an example of city structure in free-market and planned socialist environments’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 62, 104–13. A.H.Dawson 1979, ‘Factories and cities in Poland’: R.A.French and F.E.I.Hamilton eds, The socialist city: spatial structure and urban policy (Chichester: Wiley) 349–86. A.H.Dawson 1983, ‘Poland: thirty year rural-urban transition’, Cities 1, 175–84. A.H.Dawson 1984, ‘City profile: Krakow’, Cities 1,449–56. A.H.Dawson ed. 1986, Planning in Eastern Europe (London: Croom Helm). J.Dębski 1980, The integration of Poland’s big cities through commodity links (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences Geographical Studies 135) (in Polish with an English summary). D.Deletant 1995, Ceauşescu and the Securitate: coercion and dissent in Romania 1965–1989 (London: Hurst & Company) P.Dembinski 1990, The logic of the planned economy: the seeds of collapse (Oxford: Clarendon Press). G.Demko ed. 1984, Regional development: problems and policies in Eastern and Western Europe (London: Croom Helm). P.Desai 1986, ‘Is the Soviet Union subsidizing Eastern Europe?’ European Economic Review 1, 107–16. J.Dezler 1976, ‘Recent developments in the Hungarian labour market’, East European Quarterly 10, 255–68. R.E.Dickinson 1949, ‘Rural settlement in German lands’, Annals Association of American Geographers 39, 239–63. R.A.Dickler 1975, ‘Organization and change in productivity in East Prussia’: W.N.Parker and E.L.James eds, European peasants and their markets: essays in agrarian economic history (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 269–92. L.Dienes 1973, ‘Urban growth and spatial planning in Hungary’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 64, 24–38. L.Dienes 1974, ‘Environmental disruption and its mechanism in Eastern Europe’, Professional Geographer 26, 375–81. L.Dienes 1976, ‘Energy prospects for Eastern Europe’, Energy Policy 4, 119–29. R.Di Quirico 2001, ‘Italy and the economic penetration policy in Central Eastern Europe during the early first post-war period’, Journal of European Economic History 30, 291–318 W.Długoborski 1975, ‘Peasant economy in the coal and smelting regions of Middle-East Europe before and during the early period of industrialization’, Studia Historicae Oeconomica 10, 125– 32. M.Dobrowolska 1976, ‘The growth pole concept and the socioeconomic development of regions undergoing industrialisation’, Geographia Polonica 33(2), 83–101. F.E.Dohrs 1971, ‘Nature versus ideology in Hungarian agriculture: problems of intensification’: G.W.Hoffman ed., Eastern Europe: essays in geographical problems (London: Methuen) 271– 97.

Bibliography

481

B.Domański 2000, ‘The impact of social qualities on the reproduction of local economic success: the case of path dependent development of Gliwice’: B.Domański ed., Studies in local and regional development (Krakow: Jagiellonian University Institute of Geography, Prace Geograficzne 106) 35–53. Z.Drabek 1985, ‘Foreign trade performance and policy’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: economic structure and performance between the two wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 379–531. K.Dramowicz 1985, ‘Some problems of disparities in Poland’s regional development’, Geographia Polonica 51, 313–22. W.N.Dunn and J.Obradovic 1978, Workers’ self-management and organizational power in Yugoslavia (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press). A.E.Durrant 1966, The steam locomotives of Eastern Europe (Newton Abbot: David & Charles). J.Dzieiuchowicz 1981, ‘Spatial distribution of intra-urban commuting to work: a case study of the city of Łódź’, Geographia Polonica 44, 211–23. K.Dziewoński 1960, ‘Problems of regional structure in Poland’, Przęglad Geograficzny 32 (Supp.), 115–25. K.Dziewoński 1976, ‘Changes in the process of industrialization and urbanization’, Geographia Polonica 33(2), 39–58. K.Dziewoński and S.Leszczycki 1966, ‘Postwar changes in the Polish economic and social structure’: J.C.Fisher ed., City and regional planning in Poland (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) 243–69. L.Eastwood 1996, ‘From revolution to dissolution: recent transitions of the Eastern European environmental movement’: F.W.Carter, P.Jordan and V.Rey eds, Central Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain: geopolitical perspectives spatial patterns and trends (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang) 175–86. P.Eberhardt 1978, ‘The demographic development of urban agglomerations in the past century’, Przeglad Geograficzny 50, 235–56. P.Eberhardt 1994, ‘Distribution and dynamics of rural population in Central Eastern Europe’, Geographia Polonica 63, 75–94. S.M.Eddie 1977, ‘Trends and patterns of Hungarian foreign trade 1882–1913’, Journal of Economic History 37, 329–56. L.F.Edwards 1947, ‘The new Bulgaria’, Geographical Magazine 19, 540–9. E.Ehrlich 1985, ‘Infrastructure’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: economic structure and performance between the two wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 323–78. E.Eigendorf and M.Linke 1984, ‘The effects of copper ore mining on the cultural landscape of the Mansfeld region’: Historial Geography: IGU Pre-Congress Symposium, Nancy (Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Czechoslovak and World History) 143–70. T.H.Elkins 1957, ‘The central German chemical industry’, Geography 42, 183–96. T.H.Elkins and B.Hofmeister 1988, Berlin: the spatial structure of a divided city (London: Routledge). G.Enyedi 1967, ‘The changing face of agriculture in Eastern Europe’, Geographical Review 57, 350–72. G.Enyedi 1976, Hungary: an economic geography (Boulder, Col.: Westview). G.Enyedi ed. 1976, Rural transformation in Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences). G.Enyedi 1981, ‘The effect of modern agriculture upon the development of the rural settlement network in Hungary’, Bulletin of the Research Institute for Agricultural Economics 49, 59–67. G.Enyedi 1992, ‘Budapest in the European metropolitan system’: G.Enyedi ed., Social transition and urban restructuring in Central Europe (Budapest: European Science Foundation) 53–6 G.Enyedi 1996, ‘Urbanization under socialism’: G.Andrusz, M.Harloe and I.Szelenyi eds, Cities after socialism: urban and regional conflict in post-socialist societies (Oxford: Blackwell) 100– 18.

Bibliography

482

G.Enyedi and J.Meszaros eds 1980, Development of settlement systems (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences). G.Enyedi and V.Szirmai 1992, Budapest: a Central European capital (London: Belhaven). G.Enyedi and J.Veldman eds 1986, Rural development issues in industrialized countries (Pecs: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Regional Studies). I.Erceg 1993, ‘The salt trade on the east coast of Dalmatia 17th–18th centuries’, Journal of European Economic History 23, 249–61. C.Erikson ed. 1976, Emigration from Europe 1815–1911 (London: Black). A.Evans 1916, ‘The Adriatic Slavs and the overland route to Constantinople’, Geographical Journal 47, 241–65. I.L.Evans 1924, The agrarian revolution in Romania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Z.M.Fallenbuchl 1970, ‘The communist pattern of industrialisation’, Soviet Studies 21, 458–84. L.Farago and L.Hrubi 1988, Development possibilities of backward areas in Hungary (Pecs: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Regional Studies). J.K.Fedorowicz 1986, East-West trade in the 1980s: prospects and policies (Boulder, Col.: Westview). G.R.Feiwel 1971 Industrialization and planning under Polish socialism (New York: Praeger) 2 vols. G.R.Feiwel 1977, Growth and reforms in centrally planned economies: the lessons of the Bulgarian experience (New York: Praeger). E.Fel and T.Hofer 1969, Proper peasants: traditional life in a Hungarian village (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company). D.Feletar 1994, ‘Razvojna razdoblja industrije Zagreba’, Geografski Horizont 40(2), 98–105. B.B.Ferencz 1979, Less than slaves: Jewish forced labour and the quest for concentration (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). A.Findlay 1948, A hundred years of chemistry (London: Duckworth). B.J.Fischer 1991, ‘Resistance in Albania during the Second World War: partisans, nationalists and the Special Operations Executive’, East European Quarterly 25, 21–47. B.J.Fischer 1999, ‘Albanian highland tribal society and family structure in the process of twentieth century transformation’, East European Quarterly 23, 281–301. B.J.Fischer 2003, ‘Albania as political laboratory: the development of the Albanian state during the 20th century’, Osterreichische Osthefte 45, 177–93. S.Fischer-Galati 1963, ‘The peasantry as a revolutionary force in the Balkans’, Journal of Central European Affairs 23, 12–22. J.C.Fisher ed. 1966, City and regional planning in Poland (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). D.Flaherty 1988, ‘Plan market and unequal regional development in Yugoslavia’, Soviet Studies 40,100–24. M.Florescu 1973, Twenty years of progress in socialist Romania’s chemical industry (Bucharest: Meridiane). H.Forster and B.Kortus eds 1989, Social-geographical problems of the Cracow and Upper Silesia agglomerations (Paderborn: Ferninand Schoningh). R.A.Francisco 1980, Agricultural policies in the USSR and Eastern Europe (Boulder, Col.: Westview). R.A.Francisco and R.L.Merritt eds 1985, Berlin between two worlds (Boulder, Col.: Westview). M.Freeman 1987, Atlas of Nazi Germany (London: Croom Helm). V.D.Freeman 1979, Agricultural development and rural change in the GDR (Sheffield: Sheffield City Polytechnic, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies Occasional Paper 1). V.D.Freeman 1983, ‘Agricultural reorganization in the GDR 1965–1980’, GeoJournal 7, 59–66. R.Fremdling 1977, ‘Railroads and German economic growth’, Journal of Economic History 37, 583–604. R.Fremdling and R.H.Tilly 1976, ‘German banks German growth and economic history’, Journal of Economic History 36, 416–24.

Bibliography

483

H.Freudenberger 1969, ‘Records of the Bohemian iron industry 1694–1875’, Business History Review 43, 381–4. H.Freudenberger 1977, The industrialization of a Central European city—Brno—and the fine woollen industry in the eighteenth century (Edington: Pasold Research Fund). H.Freudenberger 1997, ‘The Linz-Budweis railway: technology science and the economy’, Journal of European Economic History 26, 239–68. J.Friedrichs 1988, ‘Large cities in Eastern Europe’: M.Dogan and J.D.Kasarda eds, The metropolis era (London: Sage) 128–54. R.Frucht 2000, ‘Danube question’: R.Frucht ed., Encyclopaedia of Eastern Europe from the Congress of Vienna to the fall of communism (New York: Garland Publishing) 215. RJ.Fuchs and G.J.Demko 1977, ‘Spatial population policies in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe’, Social Science Quarterly 58, 60–73. RJ.Fuchs and G.J.Demko 1978, ‘The postwar mobility transition in Eastern Europe’, Geographical Review 68, 171–82. R.J.Fuchs and G.Demko 1979, ‘Geographic inequality under socialism’, Annals Association of American Geographers 69, 301–18. I.R.Gabor 1989, ‘Second economy and socialism: the Hungarian experience’: E.L.Feige ed., The underground economies: tax evasion and information distortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 339–59. B.Galeski 1982, ‘The solving of the agrarian question in Poland 1960–1990’, Sociologia Ruralis 22,149–66. S.A.Garvett 1982, ‘The economics and politics of American trade with Eastern Europe: the carrot or the stick?’, East European Quarterly 15, 185–510. C.Gati 1971, ‘Modernization and communist power in Hungary’, East European Quarterly 5, 325– 59. A.Gawryszewski 1981, ‘Spatial mobility of the population of Poland: an attempt at an integrated approach’, Geographia Polonica 38, 41–8. M.Gee, T.Kirk and J.Steward eds, The city in Central Europe: culture and society from 1800 to the present (Aldershot: Ashgate). L.Georgescu 1941, Localizarea şi structura industriei româneşti (Bucharest: Editura Cartea Românească). A.Gerschenkron 1962, Economic backwardness in historical perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press). A.Ghenovici 1985, ‘Seashore location of industry: a new phenomenon in the Romanian industry distribution’, Revue Roumaine: Geographic 29, 39–45. T.Gilberg 1973, ‘Ethnic minorities in Romania under communism’, East European Quarterly 7, 435–58. D.C.Giurescu 1989, The razing of Romania’s past (New York: World Monuments Fund). S.Gomulka and C.Lin 1991, Limits to reform and transition in communist countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press). D.F.Good 1973, ‘Backwardness and the role of banking in nineteenth century European industrialisation’, Journal of Economic History 33, 845–50. D.F.Good 1984, The economic rise of the Habsburg Empire 1750–1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press). G.Gorzelek and R.Szuk 1989, ‘Spatial order and Polish disorder: problems in the Polish space economy’, Geoforum 20, 175–85. A.Greenbaum ed. 1988, Minority problems in Eastern Europe between the world wars (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem). M.B.Gregory 1973, ‘Regional economic development in Yugoslavia’, Soviet Studies 25, 213–28. K.Grime and G.Weclawowicz 1981, ‘Warsaw’: M.Pacione ed., Urban problems and planning in the developed world (London: Croom Helm) 258–91.

Bibliography

484

N.T.Gross 1971, ‘Economic growth and the consumption of coal in Austria and Hungary 1813– 1913’, Journal of Economic History 31, 898–916. P.Z.Grossman and J.Horvath 2000, ‘The dynamics of Hungarian hyperinflation 1945–1946’, Journal of European Economic History 29, 405–27. C.W.Guillebaud 1939, The economic recovery of Germany from 1933 to the incorporation of Austria in 1938 (London: Macmillan). C.Gusik 1989, ‘Problems of agriculture in the urbanizing zone of Upper Silesia: Cracow agglomeration (Krzeszowice community example)’: H.Forster and B.Kortus eds, Socialgeographical problems of the Cracow and Upper Silesia agglomerations (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh) 163–73. E.Gutkind ed. 1972a, Urban development in Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Romania and the USSR (New York: Free Press). E.Gutkind ed. 1972b, Urban development in Eastern Europe: Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary (New York: Free Press). G.Gyani 1990, ‘Budapest’: M.J.Daunton ed., Housing the workers 1850–1914: a comparative perspective (Leicester: Leicester University Press) 149–81. A.Gyenes 1976, ‘Some aspects of stratification in Hungarian cooperative farms’, Sociologia Ruralis 16, 161–76. Z.Hajdu 1993, Settlement network development policy in Hungary in the period of state socialism (Pecs: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Regional Studies). D.R.Hall 1984, ‘Foreign tourism under socialism: the Albanian “Stalinist” model’, Annals of Tourism Research 11, 539–55. D.R.Hall 1990, ‘Stalinism and tourism: a study of Albania and North Korea’, Annals of Tourism Research 17, 36–54. D.R.Hall ed. 1993, Transport and economic development in the new Central and Eastern Europe (London: Belhaven Press). J.M.Halpern and F.Halpern 1973, ‘The anthropologist as tourist: an incidental ethnography of the impact of tourism in a Dalmatian village’, East European Quarterly 7, 149–57. J.M.Halpern and B.Kerensku-Halpern 1986, A Serbian village in historical perspective (London: Holt, Rinehart & Winston). F.E.I.Hamilton 1963, ‘Yugoslavia’s hydroelectric programme’, Geography 48, 70–3. F.E.I.Hamilton 1964, ‘Location factors in the Yugoslav iron and steel industry’, Economic Geography 40, 46–64. F.E.I.Hamilton 1968, Yugoslavia: patterns of economic activity (London: Bell). F.E.I.Hamilton 1970, ‘Changes in the industrial geography of Eastern Europe since 1940’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 61, 300–5. F.E.I.Hamilton 1971, ‘Decision making and industrial location in Eastern Europe’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 52, 77–84. F.E.I.Hamilton 1975, Poland’s western and northern territories (Oxford: Oxford University Press). F.E.I.Hamilton 1979, ‘Spatial structures in East European cities’: R.A.French and F.E.I. Hamilton eds, The socialist city: spatial structure and urban policy (Chichester: Wiley) 195–261. F.E.I.Hamilton 1982, ‘Regional policy in Poland: a search for equity’, Geoforum 13, 121–32. F.E.I.Hamilton ed. 1986, Industrial change in advanced economies: spatial perspectives (London: Croom Helm). C.M.Hann 1980, Tazlar: a village in Hungary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). C.M.Hann 1985, The village without Solidarity: Polish peasants in years of crisis (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press). C.M.Hann 1990, ‘Second economy and civil society’, Journal of Communist Studies 6(2), 21–44. C.Hann, C.Humphrey and K.Verdery 2002, ‘Post-socialism as a topic of anthropological investigation’: C.Hann ed., Postsocialism: ideals ideologies and practices in Eurasia (Routledge: London) 1–28. I.Harcsa 1983, ‘Social mobility in rural Hungary’, East European Quarterly 17, 493–502.

Bibliography

485

G.Hardach 1984, ‘Banking and industry in Germany in the interwar period 1919–1939’, Journal of European Economic History 13, 203–34. P.G.Hare, H.K.Radice and N.Swain eds. 1981, Hungary: a decade of reform (London: Allen & Unwin). C.A.Hartley 1873, ‘On the changes that have taken place along the sea coast of the delta of the Danube’, Minutes of Proceedings Institution of Civil Engineers 36, 201–53. R.Hartshorne 1933, ‘Geographic and political boundaries in Upper Silesia’, Annals Association of American Geographers 23, 195–224. A.Haţieganu 1942, ‘Evoluţia şi importanţa economică a reţelei hidrografice din Sibiu’, Lucrările Institutului de Geografie al Universităţii din Cluj (Timişoara) 7, 207–27. M.Hauner 1985, ‘Human resources’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: economic structure and performance between the two wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 66–147. P.Hayes 1987, Industry and ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). J.Hegedus 1988, ‘Inequalities in East European cities’, International Journal of Urban and Rural Research 12, 129–32. J.Held 1980, The modernization of agriculture: rural transformation in Hungary 1848–1975 (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs). W.O.Henderson 1958, The state and the industrial revolution in Prussia 1740–1870 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press). W.O.Henderson 1975, The rise of German industrial power 1834–1914 (London: Temple Smith). U.Herbert 1990, A history of foreign labour in Germany 1880–1980 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press). U.Herbert 1997, Hitler’s foreign workers: enforced foreign labourers in Germany under the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). S.Herman 1977, ‘Urbanization processes in Poland’: A.Kuklinski ed., Regional studies in Poland (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences, Committee for Space Economy and Regional Planning) 105–38. F.O.Hertz 1936, The economic problem of the Danube states: a study on economic nationalism (London: Gollancz). M.Hess, T.Niedzwiedz and B.Obrebska-Starklowa 1989, ‘Bioclimatic relationships in the area of the Cracow agglomeration’: H.Forster and B.Kortus eds, Social-geographical problems of the Cracow and Upper Silesia agglomerations (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh) 10–47. M.R.Hill 1983, East-West trade: industrial cooperation and technology transfer—the British experience (Aldershot: Gower). N.Hillinger, M.Olaru and D.Turnock 2001, ‘The role of industrial archaeology in conservation: the Reşiţa area of the Romanian Carpathians’, GeoJournal 55, 607–30. W.Hinsch 1977, ‘The river Elbe international: an historical perspective’, GeoJournal 1(2), 45–8. T.Hočevar 1979, ‘Economic history of Slovenia 1828–1918: a survey of the literature’, Journal of European Economic History 8, 217–32. T.Hočevar 1987, ‘The Albanian economy 1912–1944: a survey’, Journal of European Economic History 16, 561–8. G.W.Hoffman 1967, ‘The problem of Southeast Europe’, Annals Association of American Geographers 57, 639–66. G.W.Hoffman ed. 1971, Eastern Europe: essays in geographical problems (London: Methuen). G.W.Hoffman 1972, Regional development strategies in Southeast Europe (New York: Praeger). G.W.Hoffman 1973, ‘Currents in Yugoslavia: migration and social change’, Problems of Communism 22(6), 16–31. G.W.Hoffman and L.Dienes 1985, The European energy challenge: East and West (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).

Bibliography

486

W.W.Hogen 2002, Ordinary Prussians: Brandenburg Junkers and villagers 1500–1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). M.Hollos and B.C.Maday eds. 1983, New Hungarian peasants: an East Central European experience with collectivisation (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs). J.B.Holt 1936, German agricultural policy 1918–1934: the development of a national policy towards agriculture in post-war Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press). F.D.Holzman ed. 1987, The economics of Soviet Bloc trade and finance (Boulder, Col.: Westview). E.L.Homze 1967, Foreign labour in Nazi Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). U.Horvat 1992, ‘Some characteristics of demographically endangered settlements in northeastern Slovenia’, Geographica Slovenica 23, 261–78 (in Slovenian with an English summary). G.Horvath 1987, Development of the regional management of the economy in East Central Europe (Pecs: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Regional Studies). R.A.Horvath 1991, ‘Population theories in Hungary in the late eighteenth century’, Journal of European Economic History 20, 175–86. H.J.Howkins 1996, ‘Railway geography and the demarcation of Poland’s borders 1918–1930’, Journal of Transport Geography 4, 287–99. S.Hryniuk 1985, ‘Peasant agriculture in East Galicia in the late nineteenth century’, Slavonic and East European Review 63, 228–43. G.D.Hundert 1987, ‘The role of Jews in commerce in early modern Poland-Lithuania’, Journal of European Economic History 16, 245–76. G.D.Hundert 1992, The Jews and the Polish private town: the case of Opatow in the eighteenth century (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press). E.V.Huseby-Darvas 1989, ‘Migration and gender perspectives for rural Hungary’, East European Quarterly 23, 487–98. E.A.lankova 2002, Eastern European capitalism in the making (New York: Cambridge University Press). S.Ilešić 1967, ‘Problèmes de regionalisation géographique: I’exemple de la Yougoslavie’: J.A.Sporck and B.Schoumaker eds, Mélanges de géographic offerts á Omer Tulippe (Gembloux: J.Ducolot) II, 602–14. C.Issawi 1980, The economic history of Turkey 1800–1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). K.Ivanička ed. 1964, The geography of the East Slovakian Ironworks (Bratislava: Slovak Pedagogical Publishers). K.Ivanička 1999, ‘Slovakia’: F.W.Carter and D.Turnock eds, States of Eastern Europe: North Eastern Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate) 198–248. E.Iwanicka-Lyra 1969, The delimitation of large urban agglomerations in Poland (Warsaw: Institute of Geography, Polish Academy of Sciences Geographical Studies 76) (in Polish with an English summary). C.D.Jackson 1966, Comintern and peasant in Eastern Europe 1919–1930 (New York: Columbia University Press). M.R.Jackson 1980a, ‘Bulgaria’s economy in the 1970s: adjusting productivity to structure’: Joint Economic Committee of the House of Congress ed., East European country studies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office) 571–617. M.R.Jackson 1980b, ‘Romania’s economy at the end of the 1970s: turning the corner on intensive development’: Joint Economic Committee of the House of Congress ed., East European country studies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office) 231–97. M.R.Jackson 1982, ‘Agricultural output in Southeastern Europe 1910–1938’, Bulletin Association for Comparative Economic Studies 24(4), 49–87. M.R.Jackson 1985, ‘Comparing the Balkan demographic experience 1860 to 1970’, Journal of European Economic History 14, 223–72. M.R.Jackson 1986, ‘Industrial output in Romania and the historical regions’, Journal of European Economic History 15, 59–112; 231–59.

Bibliography

487

M.R.Jackson 1987, ‘Economic development in the Balkans since 1945 compared to Southern and East Central Europe’, East European Politics and Societies 1, 393–455. M.R.Jackson and J.R.Lampe 1982, ‘The evidence of industrial growth in Southeastern Europe before the Second World War’, East European Quarterly 16, 385–415. W.A.D.Jackson ed. 1971, Agrarian policies and problems in communist and non-communist countries (Seattle: University of Washington Press). B.Jančar 1992, ‘Chaos as the explanation of the role of environmental groups in East European polities’: W.Rudig ed., Green politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press) II, 156–84. A.Janos 1982, The politics of backwardness in Hungary 1825–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). B.Janus 1999, ‘Labor’s paradise: family work and home in Nowa Huta, Poland 1950–1960’, East European Quarterly 23, 453–74. I.Jeffries ed. 1981, The industrial enterprise in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger). I.Jeffries and M.Melzer eds 1987, The East German economy (London: Croom Helm). C.Jelavich and B.Jelavich 1977, The establishment of the Balkan national states 1804–1920 (Seattle: University of Washington Press). A.Jelonek 1956, Liczba ludności miast i osiedli w Polsce w latach 1810–1955 (Warsaw: Polska Akademia Nauk Instytut Geografii Dokumentacja Geograficzna 5). J.H.Jensen and G.Rosegger 1968, ‘British railway builders along the Lower Danube 1856–1869’, Slavonic and East European Review 46, 105–28. J.H.Jensen and G.Rosegger 1978, ‘Transferring technology to a peripheral economy: the case of the Lower Danube transport development 1856–1928’, Technology and Culture 19, 675–702. R.T.Jerome 1988, ‘Sources of economic growth in Hungary 1950 to 1985’, East European Quarterly 22, 107–18. A.Jezierski 1994, Economic history in Poland in numbers (Warsaw: Central Statistical Office). M.Johnson 1997, ‘Hungary’s hotel industry in transition 1960–1996’, Tourism Management 18, 441–52 P.Jordan 1973, ‘Transport III: development of the railway network’: J.Breu ed., Atlas of the Danubian countries (Vienna: Osterreichisches Ost- und Sudosteuropa-Institut). K.Jowitt 1972, Revolutionary breakthrough and national development: the case of Romania 1944– 1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press). C.C.Joyner 1976, ‘The energy situation in Eastern Europe: problems and prospects’, East European Quarterly 10, 495–516. S.K.Kabela 1993, ‘Environmental affairs and the emergence of pluralism in Poland: a case of political symbiosis?’: A.Vari and P.Tamas eds, Environment and democratic transition: policy and politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Dordrecht: Kluwer) 40–66. P.M.Kalla-Bishop 1973, Hungarian railways (Newton Abbot: David & Charles). B.Kaminski and R.W.Jomes 1988, ‘Economic rationale for Eastern Europe’s Third World policy’, Problems of Communism 37(2), 15–27. K.J.Kansky 1976, Urbanization under socialism: the case of Czechoslovakia (New York: Praeger). J.Karparek 1989, ‘Poland’s covert operations in Ruthenia’, East European Quarterly 23, 365–73. K.H.Karpat 1985, Ottoman population 1830–1914: demographic and social characteristics (Charlottesville: University of Wisconsin Press). M.C.Kaser 1967, Comecon: integration problems of the planned economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). M.C.Kaser ed. 1968, Economic development for Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan). M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice 1986, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: economic structure and performance between the wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press). M.C.Kaser and J.G.Zielinski 1970, Planning in East Europe: industrial management by the state (London: Bodley Head). J.Keep 1997, ‘The Gorbachev era in historical context’, Studies in East European Thought 49, 271– 86.

Bibliography

488

F.-J.Kemper 1998, ‘Residential segregation and housing in Berlin’, GeoJournal 46, 17–28. P.Kende and Z.Strmiska 1987, Equality and inequality in Eastern Europe (Leamington Spa: Berg). D.A.Kideckel 1976, ‘The social organization of production on a Romanian cooperative farm’, Dialectical Anthropology 1, 267–76. D.A.Kideckel 1977, ‘The dialectic of rural development: cooperative farm goals and family strategies in a Romanian commune’, Journal of Rural Cooperation 5, 43–62. D.A.Kideckel 1982, ‘The socialist transformation of agriculture in a Romanian commune 1945– 1962’, American Ethnologist 9, 320–40. M.Kielczewska-Zaleska 1961, ‘Various trends of transformation in Polish rural settlements’, Geografiska Annaler 43, 321–8. B.K.Kiraly and N.F.Dreisziger eds 1985, War and society in East Central Europe: East European society in the First World War (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs). B.K.Kiraly and G.Stokes eds 1985, War and society in East Central Europe: insurrection wars and the eastern crisis in the 1870s (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs). V.Klaus 1989, ‘Socialist economies economic reforms and economists: reflections of a Czechoslovak economist’, Communist Economies 1, 89–96. G.Kligman 1992, ‘The politics of reproduction in Ceauşescu’s Romania: a case study in political rule’, East European Politics and Societies 6, 364–418. G.Kligman 1998, The policies of duplicity: controlling reproduction in Ceauşescu’s Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press). A.Klima 1974, ‘The role of rural domestic industry in Bohemia in the eighteenth century’, Economic History Review 27, 48–56. A.Klima 1975, ‘The beginning of the machine building industry in the Czech lands’, Journal of European Economic History 4, 49–78. A.Klima 1989, ‘Domestic industry manufactory and early industrialisation in Bohemia’ Journal of European Economic History 18, 509–27. EJ.Knapton and T.K.Deny 1965, Europe 1815–1914 (London: John Murray). C.G.Knight and M.P.Staneva 1996, ‘The water resources of Bulgaria: an overview’. GeoJournal 40, 347–62. K.Kocsis 1992, ‘Changing ethnic religious and political patterns in the Carpathian-Danubian area’: A.Kertesz and Z.Kovacs eds, New perspectives in Hungarian geography (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences) 115–42. H.Kohl 1978, ‘Complex territorial change in old industrial areas of the GDR’: F.E.I. Hamilton ed., Industrial change (London: Longman) 65–72. G.Kolankiewicz 1980, ‘The new “awkward class”: the peasant worker in Poland’, Sociologia Ruralis 20, 28–43. G.Kolankiewicz and P.G.Lewis 1988, Poland: economics and society (London: Pinter). T.Kolossa 1969, ‘The social structure of the peasant class in Austria-Hungary: statistical sources and methods of research’, East European Quarterly 3, 420–37. J.Kolsti 1981, ‘Albanianism from humanists to Hoxha’: G.Klein and M.Reban eds, Politics and ethnicity in Eastern Europe (Ney York: Columbia Univrersity Press) 1817–19 A.Komjathy and R.Stockwell 1980, German minorities and the Third Reich: ethnic Germans of East Central Europe between the wars (New York: Holmes & Meier). J.Komlos 1979, ‘Austro-Hungarian agricultural development 1827–1877’, Journal of European Economic History 8, 37–60. J.Komlos 1981, ‘Economic growth and industrialization in Hungary 1830–1913’, Journal of European Economic History 10, 5–46. J.Komlos 1986, ‘Institutional change under pressure: enlightened government policy in the 18th century Habsburg monarchy’, Journal of European Economic History 15, 427–82. J.Komlos 1989, ‘Thinking about the industrial revolution’, Journal urnal of European Economic History 18, 191–206.

Bibliography

489

J.Komlos 2000, ‘Industrial revolution as an escape from the Malthusian trap’, Journal of European Economic History 29, 307–31. M.J.Kopanic 2000, ‘Emigration’: R.Frucht ed. 2000, Encyclopaedia of Eastern Europe: from the Congress of Vienna to the fall of communism (New York: Garland Publishing) 256–7. A.Korbonski 1965, The politics of socialist agriculture in Poland 1945–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press). A.Korbonski 1989, ‘The politics of economic reform in Eastern Europe: the last thirty years’, Soviet Studies 41, 1–19. A.Korbonski 1990, ‘CMEA economic integration and perestroika 1949–1989’, Studies in Comparative Communism 23, 47–72. P.Korcelli 1990, ‘Poland’: C.B.Nam ed., International handbook on internal migration (New York: Greenwood Press) 305–22. P.Korcelli and A.Potrykowska 1979, ‘The development of tertiary functions and the administrative hierarchy of places in Poland’, Przeglad Geograficzny 51, 209–33 (in Polish with an English summary). J.Kornai 1983, ‘Comments on the present state and prospects of the Hungarian economic reform’, Journal of Contemporary Economics 7, 225–52. G.Korompai 1971, ‘Changes in the structure and direction of expanding commodity transport on the Danube’, Geoforum 6, 63–74. I.S.Koropeckyj 1972, ‘Equalization of regional development in socialist countries: an empirical study’, Economic Development and Cultural Change 21, 68–86. I.S.Koropeckyj 1977, ‘Regional development in Poland’, Soviet Studies 29, 108–27. B.Kortus 1975, ‘Structure and development trends in the Cracow agglomeration’, Geographia Polonica 30, 113–24. B.Kortus 1976, ‘Changes in industrial structure: a case study of the Upper Silesian Industrial District’, Geographia Polonica 33, 183–90. B.Kortus 1980, ‘Tendencies of structural and spatial changes of industry in the Upper Silesian Industrial Region’: F.E.I.Hamilton ed., Case studies in industrial geography (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh) 53–61. B.Kortus and J.Adamus 1989, ‘Characteristic traits of industry in the Polish Carpathians’, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego Prace Geograficzne 76, 95–100. L.A.Kosiński ed. 1977, Demographic developments in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger). L.A.Kosiński and A.Wojciechowska 1967, ‘Concentration of population in European socialist countries’, Przęglad Geograficzny 39, 181–93 (in Polish with an English summary). H.L.Kostanick ed. 1977, Population and migration trends in Eastern Europe (Boulder, Col.: Westview). I.Kostrowicka 1984, ‘Changes in agricultural productivity in the Kingdom of Poland in the 19th and early 20th centuries’, Journal of European Economic History 13, 75–98. J.Kostrowicki and R.Szczesny 1972, Polish agriculture: characteristics types and regions (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences). C.Kotela 1966, ‘Main urban planning problems in the Silesian-Kraków Industrial Region’: J.C.Fisher ed., City and regional planning in Poland (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) 111–32. M.Koter 1969, Origin of the spatial pattern of industrial Łódź (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences Institute of Geography Studies in Geography 79). M.Kotor 1976, ‘Relicts of medieval settlement in the map of modern Łódź’, Przeglad Geograficzny 48, 667–87 In Polish with an English summary. A.Kowalczyk 1990, ‘Spatial structure of second home settlements in the suburban zone of Warsaw’, Geographica Slovenica 21, 153–62. A.Kowalska 1976, ‘The influence of river regulation and land drainage upon water conditions within the Sandomierz Basin’, Geographia Polonica 34, 133–8.

Bibliography

490

J.S.Kowalski 1986, ‘Regional conflicts in Poland: spatial polarisation in a centrally planned economy’, Environment and Planning 18a, 599–617. G.Krajko, R.Mészáros, J.Abonyi, J.Rudl and B.Csatári 1991, Spatial processes of urbanization in Szeged (Szeged: Jate Press). J.M.Kramer 1990, The energy gap in Eastern Europe (Lexington, Ky.: Heath). T.Kraus, E.Meynen, H.Mortensen and H.Schlenger eds 1959, Atlas ostliches Mitteleuropa (Bielefeld: Velkagen u.Klasing). J.Krejči 1986, ‘The Bohemian-Moravian war economy’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: interwar policy, the war and reconstruction (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 452–92. J.Kruczala 1990, ‘Tourism planning in Poland’, Annals of Tourism Research 17, 69–78. A.Kruszewski 1972, The Oder-Neisse boundary and Poland’s modernization (New York: Praeger). A.Krzymowska-Kostrowicka 1972, ‘The impact of the railway on the development of Polish towns from 1860 to 1910’, Geographia Polonica 21, 53–61. A.Kuklinski 1961, ‘Problems of the Polish cement industry’: N.J.G.Pounds ed., Geographical essays on Eastern Europe (Bloomington: Indiana University Press) 75–100. A.Kuklinski ed. 1977, Regional studies in Poland (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences). K.Kulcsar 1983, ‘Rural development in post-war Hungary’, Sociologia Ruralis 23, 204–10. R.Kulikowski, B.Gałczyńska and W.B.Morgan 1990, ‘Typology of individual agriculture in the suburban zone of Warsaw’, Geographica Slovenica 21, 133–48. S.Kuliś 2000, ‘The development of Stalowa Wola: the case of spatial development of the Polish industrial town’: B.Domański ed., Studies in local and regional development (Kraków: Jagiellonian University Institute of Geography, Prace Geograficzne 106) 169–96 (in Polish with an English summary). W.Kulischer 1948, Europe on the move: war and population changes 1917–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press). S.Kulušić 2000–1, ‘Settlement and evaluation of the Kornati Islands from antiquity to the present’, Hrvatski Geografski Glasnik 62, 43–65; 63, 87–120. J.Lac 2000, ‘Geomorphological results of changes in land use structure in the Beskid Niski in the twentieth century’: D.Balteanu, M.lelenicz and N.Popescu eds, The geomorphology of the Carpathian-Balkan region: proceedings of the Carpathian-Balkan Conference 1998 (Bucharest: Editura Corint) 201–10. L.Lacko 1976, ‘The hamlet and farmstead regions of Hungary: planning problems’: G.Enyedi ed., Rural transformatiion in Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences) 59–70. J.R.Lampe 1975, ‘Varieties of unsuccessful industrialisation in the Balkans before 1914’, Journal of Economic History 35, 56–85. J.R.Lampe 1979, ‘Modernisation and social structure: the case of the pre-1914 Balkan capitals’, Southeastern Europe 5(2), 11–32. J.R.Lampe 1983, ‘Interwar Bucharest and the promise of urbanism’, Urban History Yearbook 9, 267–90. J.R.Lampe 1986, The Bulgarian economy in the twentieth century (London: Croom Helm). J.R.Lampe 1989, ‘Imperial borderlands or capitalist periphery?: redefining Balkan backwardness 1520–1914’: D.Chirot ed., The origin of backwardness in Eastern Europe: economics and politics from the Middle Ages until the early 20th century (Berkeley: University of California Press) 177–209. J.R.Lampe and M.R.Jackson 1982, Balkan economic history 1550–1950: from imperial borderlands to developing nations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press). Z.Landau and J.Tomaszewski 1985, The Polish economy in the twentieth century (London: Croom Helm). P.Latawski 1991, The reconstruction of Poland 1914–1923 (Basingstoke: Macmillan). J.H.G.Lebon 1935, ‘The Juzera: a mountain community in southeastern Jugoslavia’, Geography 20, 271–82.

Bibliography

491

W.R.Lee ed. 1985, Industrialisation and industrial growth in Germany (London: Croom Helm). W.R.Lee ed. 1991, German industry and industrialisation: essays on German economic and business history in the 19th century (London: Routledge). R.F.Leslie 1955, ‘Politics and economics in Congress Poland 1815–1864’, Past and Present 8, 43– 63. S.Leszczycki, P.Eberhardt and S.Herman 1975, ‘Spatial structure of the national economy of Poland’, Geographia Polonica 30, 29–40. E.Lethbridge 1985, ‘National income and product’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: economic structure and performance between the two wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 532–97. E.Lettrich 1969, ‘The Hungarian tanya system: history and present day problems’: B. Sarfalvi ed., Research problems in Hungarian applied geography (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences) 151–68. H.Levine 1991, Economic origins of antisemitism: Poland and Jews in the early modern period (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press). T.Lijewski 1976, ‘Tendencies in the location of new industrial plants in Poland 1945–1970’, Geographia Polonica 33(2), 157–69. T.Lijewski 1985, ‘The spread of industry as a consequence of the location of new factories in Poland 1945–1982’, Geographia Polonica 51, 199–206. W.G.Lockwood 1975, ‘Social status and cultural change in an Bosnian Moslem village’, East European Quarterly 9, 123–34. M.I.Logan 1968, ‘Regional economic development in Yugoslavia 1953–1964’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 59, 42–52. J.Lukacs 1989, Budapest 1900: a historical portrait of the city and its culture (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson) J.M.McCarthy 2000, ‘Education’: R.Frucht ed. Encyclopaedia of Eastern Europe: from the Congress of Vienna to the fall of communism (New York: Garland Publishing) 251–3. R.J.Mclntyre 1975, ‘Pronatalist programmes in Eastern Europe’, Soviet Studies 27, 366–80. R.J.Mclntyre 1988, Bulgaria: politics economics society (London: Pinter). P.R.Magocsi 2002, Historical atlas of Central Europe from the early fifth century to the present (London: Thames & Hudson). P.Marer 1976, ‘Has Eastern Europe become a liability to the Soviet Union?’: C.Gati ed., The international politics of Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger) 59–80. G.Markos 1964, ‘Ajka: the bauxite and aluminium town of Hunary’: M.Pecsi ed., Applied geography in Hungary 1900–1944 (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences) 196–211. P.Mariot, E.Otrubova and J.Vystoupil 1992, ‘Conditions of the development of active foreign tourism in the CSFR with respect to present day problems’: L.Baraniecki ed., Conditions of the foreign tourism development in the Middle and Eastern Europe (Wrocław: University of Wrocław Geographical Institute) 24–36. P.Marluliak 1995, 150 years of Slovak cooperatives 1845–1995 (Nitra: Agroinstitut). H.Matejka 1986, ‘The foreign trade system: 1966–1975: normalization and conflict’: M.C. Kaser eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: institutional change within a planned economy (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 251–88. R.H.Mathieson 1980, ‘Nuclear power in the Soviet Bloc’, Annals Association of American Geographers 70, 271–9. I.M.Matley 1968, ‘Transhumance in Bosnia and north Hercegovina’, Geographical Review 58, 231–61. H.Matzerath 1980, ‘Berlin 1890–1940’: A.Sutcliffe ed., Metropolis 1890–1940 (London: Mansell) 289–318. H.Matzerath 1981, ‘The influence of industrialisation on urban growth in Prussia 1815–1914’: H.Schmal ed., Patterns of European urbanisation (London: Croom Helm) 145–79.

Bibliography

492

M.-C.Maurel 1989, ‘Administrative reforms in Eastern Europe: an overview’: R.Bennett ed., Territory and administration in Europe (London: Pinter) 111–23. A.J.May 1938, ‘The Novibazar railway project’, Journal of Modern History 10, 496–527. T.A.Meininger 1979, ‘The social stratification of the Bulgarian town in the third quarter of the nineteenth century’, Southeastern Europe 5(2), 73–104. R.E.H.Mellor 1975, Eastern Europe: a geography of the Comecon countries (London: Macmillan). R.E.H.Mellor 1979, German railways: a study of the historical geography of transport (Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, Department of Geography O’Dell Memorial Monograph 8). M.Melzer 1981, ‘Combine formation in the GDR’, Soviet Studies 33, 88–106. R.L.Merritt 1973, ‘Infrastructure change in Berlin’, Annals Association of American Geographers 63, 58–70. B.Mieczkowski 1978, Transportation in Eastern Europe: empirical findings (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs). B.Mieczkowski ed. 1980, Eastern European transportation systems and modes (The Hague: Nijhoff). K.Mihailović 1972, Regional development: experiences and prospects in Eastern Europe (The Hague: Mouton). A.A.Millwardand S.B.Saul 1977, The development of the economies of continental Europe 1850– 1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin). G.Minassian 1992, ‘Bulgaria’s industrial growth and structure 1970–1989’, Soviet Studies 44, 699– 712. D.Mitrany 1936, The effect of war in Southeastern Europe (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press). H.Mitsuda and K.Pashev 1995, ‘Environmentalism as ends or means?: the rise and political crisis of the environmental movement in Bulgaria’, Capitalism Nature Socialism 6(1), 87–111. C.G.Mocanu 1970, Drumurile forestiere in Romania (Bucharest: University of Bucharest GeologyGeography Faculty). B.Moldan 1997, ‘Czech Republic’: J.Klarer and B.Moldan eds., The environmental challenge in Central European economies in transition (Chichester: Wiley) 107–30. J.M.Montias 1962, Central planning in Poland (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press). J.M.Montias 1967, Economic development in communist Romania (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). J.M.Montias 1969, ‘Obstacles to the economic integration of Eastern Europe’, Studies in Comparative Communism 3–4, 38–60. W.E.Moore 1945, Economic demography of Eastern and Southern Europe (Geneva: League of Nations). W.B.Morgan 1985, ‘Cut flowers in Warsaw’, GeoJournal 11, 339–48. W.B.Morgan 1989, ‘Recent government policy and private agriculture in Poland’, Resource Management and Optimization 6, 291–305. W.Moskoff 1980, ‘Pronatalist policies in Romania’, Economic Development and Cultural Change 28, 597–614. W.Moskovich 2001, ‘Galicia and Bukovina under Austrian rule and after: ethnic problems and inter-ethnic relations’: W.Moskovich ed., Jews and Slavs: Festschrift Professor Jacob Allerhand (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Slavic Studies and Literatures) 222–60. W.E.Mosse 1987, Jews in the German economy: the German-Jewish economic elite 1820–1935 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). P.Murray and I.Szelenyi 1984, ‘The city in the transition to socialism’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 8, 90–107. J.Musil 1981, Urbanization in socialist countries (London: Croom Helm). J.Musil 1992, ‘Changing urban systems in post-communist societies in Central Europe: analysis and prediction’: G.Enyedi ed., Social transition and urban restructuring in Central Europe (Budapest: European Science Foundation) 69–83.

Bibliography

493

M.Myant 1989, The Czechoslovak economy 1948–1988: the battle for economic reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). J.Necas 1937, ‘Economic and social problems in German Bohemia’, Slavonic and East European Review 15, 599–611. T.Nefedova 1994, First socio-economic effects of transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (Vienna: Osterreichisches Ost- und Sudosteuropa-Institut). D.N.Nelson ed. 1983, Communism and the politics of inequalities (Lexington, Ky: Lexington Books/Heath & Co). H.Neuburger and H.H.Stokes 1974, ‘German banks and German growth: an empirical view’, Journal of Economic History 34, 711–31. M.I.Newbigin 1915, Geographical aspects of Balkan problems (London: Constable). J.Obrebski 1976, The changing peasantry of Eastern Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing). A.C.O’Dell and F.W.Morgan 1945, Germany: ports and communications (London: Royal Navy, Naval Intelligence Division, Geographical Handbook Series). N.Oren 1973, Revolution administered: agrarianism and communism in Bulgaria (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press). R.H.Osborne 1967, East-Central Europe: a geographical introduction to the seven socialist states (London: Chatto & Windus). W.Ostrowski 1966, ‘History of urban development and planning’: J.C.Fisher ed., City and planning in Poland (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) 9–55. D.Ostry 1988, ‘The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam system as a case study in conflict of interest in Czechoslovakia and Hungary’, Slovo: Journal of Contemporary Soviet-East European Affairs 1(1), 11–24. R.J.Overy 1982, The Nazi economic recovery 1932–1938 (London: Macmillan). R.J.Overy 1983, ‘Göring’s multi-national empire’: A.Teichova and P.L.Cottrell eds, International business and Central Europe 1918–1939 (Leicester: Leicester University Press) 269–98. J.Paget 1850, Hungary and Transylvania with remarks on their condition, social, political and economical (London: John Murray). L.Pakula 1976, ‘Concentration and integration tendencies of industry in the area surrounding the Upper Silesian Industrial Region’, Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego Folia Geographica Series Geographica-Oeconomica 9, 61–77. M.Palairet 1979, ‘Fiscal pressure and peasant impoverishment in Serbia before World War One’, Journal of Economic History 39, 719–40. M.Palairet 1992, ‘Ramiz Sadiku: a case study in the industrialisation of Kosovo’, Soviet Studies 44, 897–912. M.Palairet 1995, ‘Rural Serbia in the light of the census of 1863’, Journal of European Economic History 24, 41–107. M.Palairet 1999, ‘Primary production in a market for luxury: the rose-oil trade of Bulgaria 1771– 1941’, Journal of European Economic History 28, 551–97. S.Pamuk 1987, The Ottoman Empire and European capitalism 1820–1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). L.Pasvolsky 1928, Economic nationalism in the Danubian states (New York: Macmillan). P.Pavlínek and J.Pickles 2000, Environmental transitions: transformation and ecological defence in Central and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge). M.Pearton 1971, Oil and the Romanian state (Oxford: Clarendon Press). K.Pecsi 1989, ‘The extremist path of economic development in Eastern Europe’, Communist Economies 1, 97–109. R.Peet 1980, ‘Commentary on geographic inequality under socialism’, Annals Association of American Geographers 70, 280–6.

Bibliography

494

S.Pelc 1993, ‘The commune of Domžale: an example of the transformation of the suburban landscape in the urban region of Ljubljana’, Geographica Slovenica 25, 1–163 (in Slovenian with an English summary). D.S.Pensley 1995, ‘City planning and state policy: the example of Neubaugebeit Hellersdorf’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 19, 549–75. E.Perger 1989, ‘An overview of East European developments’: R.Bennett ed., Territory and administration in Europe (London: Pinter) 93–110. J.A.Perkins 1981, ‘The agricultural revolution in Germany 1850–1914’, Journal of European Economic History 10, 71–118. J.A.Perkins 1990, ‘The organisation of German industry 1850–1930: the case of beet-sugar production’, Journal of European Economic History 19, 549–74. M.Persanyi 1990. ‘The rural environment in a post-socialist economy: the case of Hungary’: P.Lowe ed., Technological change and the rural environment (London: David Fulton) 33–52. C.G.Pickvance 1988, ‘Employers, labour markets and redistribution under state socialism: an interpretation of housing policy in Hungary 1960–1983’, Sociology 22, 193–214. F.T.Pine and P.T.Bogdanowicz 1982, ‘Policy response and alternative strategy: the process of change in a Polish highland village’, Dialectical Anthropology 7(2), 67–80. A.Pogany 1989, ‘From cradle to grave?: banking and industry in Budapest in the 1910s and 1920s’, Journal of European Economic History 18, 529–49. I.C.Pogonowski 1987, Poland: a historical atlas (New York: Hippocrene Books). S.Pollard 1981, Peaceful conquest: the industrialisation of Europe 1760–1970 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). S.Pollard 1997, Marginal Europe: the contribution of marginal lands since the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press). V.Postolka 1996, ‘A new approach to the assessment and delimitation of environmentally damaged areas in the Czech Republic’, Geografie: Sborník České Geografické Společnosti 101, 143–56 (in Czech with an English summary). A.Potrykowska 1985, ‘Spatial structure of functional urban regions in Poland’, Geographia Polonica 51, 113–26. N.J.G.Pounds 1958, ‘The spread of mining in the coal basin of Upper Silesia and Northern Moravia’, Annals Association of American Geographers 48, 149–63. N.J.G.Pounds 1958, The Upper Silesian Industrial Region (Bloomington: Indiana University Press). N.J.G.Pounds 1960, ‘The industrial geography of modern Poland’, Economic Geography 36, 231– 53. N.J.G.Pounds 1969, Eastern Europe (London: Longman). N.J.G.Pounds and N.Spulber 1957, Resources and planning in Eastern Europe (Bloomington: Indiana University Press). S.Puia and C.Hirtopeanu 1990, ‘Coming out of the dark: family planning in Romania’, Planned Parenthood in Europe 19(2), 5–6. J.Puskas 1982, From Hungary to the United States 1880–1914 (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences). E.A.Radice 1985a, ‘General characteristics of the region between the wars’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: economic structure and performance between the two wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 23–65. E.A.Radice 1985b, ‘Raw materials and energy’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: economic structure and performance between the two wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 210–21. E.A.Radice 1986a, ‘Territorial changes population movements and labour supplies’: M.C. Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: interwar policy, the war and reconstruction (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 309–28.

Bibliography

495

E.A.Radice 1986b, ‘Agriculture and food’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: interwar policy, the war and reconstruction (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 366–97. E.A.Radice 1986c, ‘Energy and materials’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: interwar policy, the war and reconstruction (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 398–415. E.A.Radice 1986d, ‘The development of industry’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: interwar policy, the war and reconstruction (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 416–51. S.G.Randall 1976, ‘The family estate in an upland Carpathian village’, Dialectical Anthropology 1, 277–85. G.Ranki 1964, ‘Problem of the development of Hungarian industry 1900–1914’, Journal of Economic History 24, 204–28. S.Rath n.d., Electric power in Hungary (New York: Mid European Studies Center). E.Reclus 1875, The universal geography (London: Virtue & Co). A.D.Reeves 1993, ‘The present state of the Hungarian environment’, Area 25, 141–3. F.Redlich 1944, ‘The leaders of the German steam engine industry during the first hundred years’, Journal of Economic History 4, 121–44. J.Regulska 1987, ‘Urban development under socialism: the Polish experience’, Urban Geography 8, 321–39. J.Regulska and J.Wawrynski 1989, ‘Polish planning in transition’, Town Planning Review 60, 247– 69. P.Richardson 1908, ‘New railway projects in the Balkan peninsula’, Scottish Geographical Magazine 24, 254–8. R.Riley and M.Tkocz 1999a, ‘Coalmining in Upper Silesia under capitalism and communism’, European Urban and Regional Studies 5, 217–35. R.Riley and M.Tkocz 1999b, ‘Local responses to changed circumstances: coalmining in the market economy in Upper Silesia’, GeoJournal 48, 279–90. M.Robbins 1983, ‘Hitler’s broad gauge railways: a review article’, Journal of Transport History 4(1), 67–73. H.L.Roberts 1951, Rumania: political problems of an agrarian state (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press). M.Roe 2001, Polish shipping under communism (Aldershot: Ashgate). A.Ronai 1993, Atlas of Central Europe (Budapest: Eötvös Lorand University. Cartography Department—digital facsimile edition of the original publication by Society of St Stephen/Puski Publishing House, Budapest, in 1945). P.Ronnas 1982, ‘Centrally planned urbanization: the case of Romania’, Geografiska Annaler 64B, 143–51. P.Ronnas 1984, Urbanization in Romania: a geography of social and economic change since independence (Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics). P.Ronnas 1987, ‘Agrarian change and economic development in rural Romania: a case study of the Oas region’, Geografiska Annaler 69B, 51–63. P.Ronnas 1989, ‘Turning the Romanian peasant into a new socialist man: an assessment of rural development policy in Romania’, Soviet Studies 41, 543–59. G.Rosegger and J.H.Jensen 1995, ‘Transylvanian railways and access to the Lower Danube 1856– 1914’, East European Quarterly 29, 427–48. P.N.Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, Agricultural surplus population in eastern and southeastern Europe (n.p.). Z.Rostas 2000, ‘The Bucharest school of sociology’, East Central Europe 27(2), 1–17. W.Roszkowski 1986, ‘Poland’s economic performance between the two world wars’, East European Quarterly 20, 285–97.

Bibliography

496

W.Roszkowski 1987, ‘Large estates and small farms in the Polish agrarian economy between the wars 1918–1938’, Journal of European Economic History 16, 75–88. W.Roszkowski 1989, ‘The growth of the state sector in the Polish economy in the years 1918– 1926’, Journal of European Economic History 18, 105–26. R.Roth ‘Interactions between railways and cities in 19th century Germany: come case studies’: R.Roth and M.-N.Polino eds, The city and the railway in Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate) 3–27. J.Rothschild 1974, East Central Europe between the two world wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press). J.S.Roucek 1932, Contemporary Romania and her problems (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press). D.S.Rugg 1985, The world’s landscapes: Eastern Europe (London: Longman). W.Rusinski 1969, ‘The role of the peasantry of Poznań in the formation of the non-agricultural labour market’, East European Quarterly 3, 509–24. S.R.Sacks 1983, Self-management and efficiency: large corporations in Yugoslavia (London: George Allen & Unwin). Z.Salzmann and V.Schleufler 1914, Komarov: a Czech farming village (New York: Rinehart & Winston). S.L.Sampson 1984a, ‘Elites and mobilization in Romanian villages’, Sociologia Ruralis 24, 29–51. S.L.Sampson 1984b, National integration through socialist planning: an anthropological study of a Romanian new town (Boulder, Col.: Westview/East European Monographs). I.T.Sanders 1949, Balkan village (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press). B.Sarfalvi ed. 1967, Land utilisation in Eastern Europe (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences). B.Sarfalvi ed. 1970, Recent population movements in East European countries (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences). C.T.Saunders ed. 1983, Regional integration in East and West (London: Macmillan). H.Schissler 1986, ‘The Junkers: notes on the social and historical significance of the agrarian elite’: R.G.Moeller ed., Peasants and lords in modern Germany: recent studies in agrarian history (London: Allen & Unwin) 24–51. C.J.Schmitz 1976, ‘German non-ferrous metal production in the early nineteenth century’, Journal of European Economic History 3, 129–47. G.Schopflin 1988, ‘The Stalinist experience in Eastern Europe’, Survey: Journal of East-West Relations 30(4), 124–47. H.Schröke 1994, ‘Mining and German settlement in Slovakia: an historical summary’, GeoJournal 32, 127–35. H.Schroter 1983, ‘Siemens and Central and South-East Europe between the two world wars’: A.Teichova and P.L.Cottrell eds, International business and Central Europe 1918–1939 (Leicester: Leicester University Press) 173–92. V.Schroter 1983, ‘The IG Farbenindustrie AG in Central and South-East Europe 1926–1938’: A.Teichova and P.L.Cottrell eds, International business and Central Europe 1918–1939 (Leicester: Leicester University Press) 139–72. V.Schroter 1986, ‘Participation in market control through foreign investment: IG Farbenindustrie AG in the United States 1920–1938’: A.Teichova ed., Multinational enterprise in historical perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 171–84. I.Scott 1978, ‘The making of the Triple Alliance in 1882’, East European Quarterly 12, 399–423. L.Seplaki 1976, ‘Socialist industrialisation and planning: the Polish case’, East European Quarterly 10, 387–96. D.E.Showalter 1975, Railroads and rifles: soldiers, technology and the unification of Germany (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books). G.Siemens 1957, History of the House of Siemens (Freiburg: K.Alber) 2 vols. P.L.Siklos 1991, War, finance, reconstruction, hyperinflation and stabilization in Hungary 1938– 1943 (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

Bibliography

497

M.K.Silber ed. 1992, Jews in the Hungarian economy 1760–1945 (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Magnes Press). J.A.A.Sillince 1987, ‘Regional policy in Hungary: objectives and achievements’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 12, 451–64. D.P.Silverman 1998, Hitler’s economy: Nazi war creation programs 1933–1936 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). A.Simic 1973a, ‘Kinship reciprocity and rural-urban migration in Serbia’, Urban Anthropology 2, 205–13. A.Simic 1973b, The peasant urbanites: a study of rural-urban mobility in Serbia (New York: Seminar Press). M.Simmons 1988, Berlin: the dispossessed city (London: Hamish Hamilton). R.P.Sinclair 1979, ‘Bureaucratic agriculture: planned social change in the GDR’, Sociologia Ruralis 19, 211–26. F.B.Singleton ed. 1987, Environmental problems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (London: Lynne Rienner). F.B.Singleton and B.Carter 1982, The economy of Yugoslavia (London: Croom Helm). O.Sjoberg 1992, ‘Underurbanisation and the zero urban growth hypothesis: diverted migration in Albania’, Geografiska Annaler 74B, 3–19. O.Sjoberg 1994, ‘Rural retention in Albania: administrative restrictions on urban-bound migration’, East European Quarterly 28, 205–33. J.H.Skene 1854, The Danubian principalities: the frontier lands of the Christian and the Turk (London: Richard Bentley). A.Slepicka, E.Hoskova, P.Ronnas and O.Sjoberg 1989, Rural Czechoslovakia: patterns of change under socialism (Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics, Economic Research Institute). A.H.Smith 1983, The planned economies of Eastern Europe (London: Croom Helm). D.M.Smith 1989, Urban inequality under communism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). I.J.Smulta 1972, ‘Ideology and political community in Eastern Europe: the case of Romania’, East European Quarterly 5, 505–36. M.Soja 1989, ‘Social and spatial aspects of location and functioning of the Lenin steel works in Cracow’: H.Forster and B.Kortus eds, Social-geographical problems of the Cracow and Upper Silesia agglomerations (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh) 90–8. J.Sokolovsky 1990, Peasants and power: state autonomy and the collectivisation of agriculture in Eastern Europe (Boulder, Col.: Westview). S.Somogyi 1971, ‘Natural endowments of the Great Hungarian Plain’: B.Sarfalvi ed., The changingface of the Great Hungarian Plain (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences) 43–4. S.Somogyi 1979, ‘Regulated rivers in Hungary’, Geographia Polonica 41, 39–53. S.W.Sowards 2000, ‘Peasant revolts and peasants’: R.Frucht ed. 2000, Encyclopaedia of Eastern Europe: from the Congress of Vienna to the fall of communism (New York: Garland Publishing) 566–8. A.Speer 1981, The slave state: Heinrich Himmler ‘s masterplan for Schutzstaffeln supremacy (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson). H.Spevack 1996, ‘Borderland nationalism, westward migration and anti-Polish aggression: the case of Grenzmark Posen-Westpressen 1919–1939’, East European Quarterly 20, 301–30 T.Spira 1977, German-Hungarian relations and the Swabian problem: from Karolyi to Gombos 1919–1936 (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs). T.Spira 1990, The German-Hungarian-Swabian triangle 1936–1939: the road to discord (Boulder: East European Monographs). N.Spulber 1957, The economics of communist Eastern Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). N.Spulber 1966, The state and economic development in Eastern Europe (New York: Random House). A.Stasiak 1977, ‘Changes in the professional structure of the rural population of Poland’, Przęglad Geograficzny 49, 677–88 (in Polish with an English summary).

Bibliography

498

S.Stebel-Achenbach 1991, Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland 1943–1948 (Basingstoke: Macmillan). F.C.Steckel 1990, ‘Cartelisation of the German chemical industry 1918–1925’, Journal of European Economic History 19, 329–51. J.P.Stern 1982, East European energy and East-West trade in energy (London: Policy Studies Institute). V.Stipetic 1982, ‘The development of the peasant economy in socialist Yugoslavia’: R.Stojanovic ed., The functioning of the Yugoslav economy (New York: M.E.Sharpe) 166–99. T.Stoianovich 1960, ‘The conquering Balkan Orthodox merchant’, Journal of Economic History 20, 234–313. G.Stokes 1987, ‘The social origins of East European polities’, Eastern Europe Politics and Societies 1, 30–74 G.Stokes ed. 1991, From Stalinism to pluralism: a documentary history of Eastern Europe since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). W.Stolper 1960, The structure of the East German economy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). G.Stolpher 1940, The German economy 1870–1910 (London: Allen & Unwin). L.Straszewicz 1959, ‘The Łódź industrial district as a subject of investigations in economic geography’, Przeglad Geograficzny 31 (Supp.), 69–91. P.F.Sugar 1964, Industrialisation in Bosnia-Hercegovina 1878–1919 (Seattle: University of Washington Press). P.F.Sugar 1975, ‘Enlightenment in the Balkans: some basic considerations’, East European Quarterly 7, 499–512. P.F.Sugar 1981, ‘An underrated event: the Hungarian constitutional crisis of 1905–6’, East European Quarterly 15, 281–306. Z.E.Şuster 2000, ‘Self management in Yugoslavia’: R.Frucht ed. 2000, Encyclopaedia of Eastern Europe: from the Congress of Vienna to the fall of communism (New York: Garland Publishing) 717. N.Swain 1985, Collective farms which work? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). N.Swain 1990, ‘Small cooperatives and economic work partnerships in the computing industries: exceptions that prove the rule’, Journal of Communist Studies 6(2), 85–109. N.Swain 1992, Hungary: the rise and fall of feasible socialism (London: Verso). P.E.Swett 2003, ‘Political networks rail networks: public transportation and neighbourhood radicalism in Weimar Berlin’: R.Roth and M.-N.Polino eds, The city and the railway in Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate) 221–36. B.Szelenyi 2002, ‘The social roots of ethnic conflict in East Central Europe: a comparative study of the German diaspora in Hungary Romania and Slovakia’, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, East European Studies Newsletter March–April, 4–9. I.Szelenyi 1983, Urban inequalities under state socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press). I.Szelenyi 1987, ‘Urban inequalities, housing inequalities and occupational segregation in state socialist economies’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 11, 61–78. I.Szelenyi 1996, ‘Cities under socialism and after’: G.Andrusz, M.Harloe and I.Szelenyi eds, Cities after socialism: urban and regional conflict in post-socialist societies (Oxford: Blackwell) 286– 317. A.Tamborra 1974, ‘The rise of Italian industry and the Balkans 1900–1914’, Journal of European Economic History 3, 87–120. Z.Tatai 1976, ‘The growth of rural industry’: G.Enyedi ed., Rural transformation in Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences) 71–88. J.Taylor 1952, The economic development of Poland 1919–1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). Z.Taylor 1984, ‘Seaport development and the role of the state: the case of Poland’: B.S.Hoyle and D.Hilling eds, Seaport systems and spatial change (Chichester: Wiley) 217–38.

Bibliography

499

A.Teichova 1983, ‘The Mannesmann concern in East Central Europe in the interwar years’: A.Teichova and P.L.Cottrell eds, International business and Central Europe 1918–1939 (Leicester: Leicester University Press) 222–322. A.Teichova 1985, ‘Industry’: M.C.Kaser and E.A.Radice eds, The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919–1975: economic structure and performance between the two wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 222–322. A.Teichova 1988, The Czechoslovak economy 1918–1980 (London: Routledge). A.Teichova and P.L.Cottrell 1983, ‘Industrial structures in West and East Central Europe during the inter-war period’: A.Teichova and P.L.Cottrell eds, International business and Central Europe 1918–1939 (Leicester: Leicester University Press) 31–55. G.Thirring 1912, A magyar városok: statisztikai ëvkőnyve (Budapest: A Magyar Városok Országos Kongresszusának Iratai). C.Thomas 1979, ‘Population mobility in frontier communities: examples from the Julian March 1931–1945’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 4, 44–61. H.Thomasius 1994, ‘The influence of mining on woods and forestry in the Saxon Erzgebirge up to the beginning of the nineteenth century’, GeoJournal 32, 103–25. A.Tickle and I.Welsh eds 1998, Environment and society in Eastern Europe (London: AddisonWesley-Longman). R.H.Tilly 1986. ‘German banking 1758–1914: development assistance for the strong’, Journal of European Economic History 15, 113–52. F.B.Tipton 1976, Regional variations in the economic development of Germany during the nineteenth century (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press). J.F.Tismer, J.Ambler and L.Symons eds 1987, Transport and economic development: Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Berlin: Osteuropa Institut an der Freien Universitat Berlin/Verlag Duncker & Humblot). D.Todd 1981, ‘Synthetic rubber in the German war economy: a case of dependence’, Journal of European Economic History 10, 153–65. N.Todorov 1970, ‘The genesis of capitalism in the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century’, Explorations in Entrepreneurial History 7, 313–24. N.Todorov 1983, The Balkan city 1400–1900: its socio-economic and demographic development (Seattle: University of Washington Press). N.Todorov 1998, Society, the city and industry in the Balkans: fifteenth-nineteenth centuries (Aldershot: Ashgate). J.Tomasevich 1955, Peasants, politics and economic change in Yugoslavia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press). I.Tosics 1988, ‘Inequalities in East European cities’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 12, 133–6. J.Toth 1994, ‘Urbanization and spatial structure in Hungary’, GeoJournal 32, 343–50. J.F.Triska 1960, ‘Work redeems: concentration camp labour and the Nazi German economy’, Journal of Central European Affairs 19, 3–22. J.F.Triska and C.Gati eds 1981, Blue collar workers in Eastern Europe (London: George Allen & Unwin). M.Troc 1976, ‘Changes in the spatial structure of industry in the Upper Silesian Industrial Region’, Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego Folia Geographica Series Geographica-Oeconomica 9, 31–40. A.C.Tsantis and R.Pepper 1979, Romania: the industrialization of an agrarian economy under socialist planning (Washington, DC: World Bank). H.A.Turner 1970, ‘Big business and the rise of Hitler’, American Historical Review 75, 56–70. D.Turnock 1974, An economic geography of Romania (London: Bell). D.Turnock 1988, The making of Eastern Europe from the earliest times to 1815 (London: Routledge). D.Turnock 1989, Eastern Europe: an historical geography 1815–1945 (London: Routledge).

Bibliography

500

D.Turnock 1991, ‘The planning of rural settlement in Romania’, Geographical Journal 157, 252– 64. D.Turnock 2003, The human geography of East Central Europe (London: Routledge). A.Tuszko 1966, ‘Water economy in Poland’: J.C.Fisher ed., City and regional planning in Poland (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) 341–65. J.M.van Brabant 1980, Socialist economic integration: aspects of contemporary economic problems in Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). J.M.van Brabant 1988, ‘Production specialization in the CMEA: concepts and empirical evidence’, Journal of Common Market Studies 3, 287–315. J.M.van Brabant 1989, Economic integration in Eastern Europe: a handbook (London: Harvester/Wheatsheaf). H.van der Wusten 2000, ‘Dictators and their capital cities: Moscow and Berlin in the 1930s’, GeoJournal 52, 339–44. I.Vasary 1987, Beyond the plain: social change in a Hungarian village (Boulder, Col.: Westview). I.Vasary 1990, ‘Competing paradigms: peasant farming and collectivisation in a Balaton community’, Journal of Communist Studies 6(2), 163–82. K.Verdery 1983, Transylvanian villagers: three centuries of political, economic and ethnic change (Berkeley: University of California Press). G.Vermes 1972, ‘The agony of federalism in Hungary under the Karolyi regime 1918–1919’, East European Quarterly 6, 487–503. O.Vidlakova and P.Zarecky 1989, ‘Czechoslovakia: the development of public administration’: R.Bennett ed., Territory and administration in Europe (London: Pinter) 168–79. F.Violich 1972, ‘An urban development policy for Dalmatia’, Town Planning Review 43, 151–65; 243–53. I.Volgyes ed. 1975, Environmental deterioration in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger). I.Volgyes ed. 1979, The Eastern European peasantry (New York: Pergamon). I.Volgyes 1989, Politics in Eastern Europe (Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company). I.Volgyes, J.Held, B.Kiraly, P.Hidas and A.Voros 1980, The modernization of Hungarian agriculture (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs). B.Vukonic and D.Tkalac 1984, ‘Tourism and urban revitaliszation: a case study of Porec, Yugoslavia’, Annals of Tourism Research 11, 591–605. K.-E.Wadekin ed. 1989, Communist agriculture: farming in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge). M.Walker 1989, German National Socialism and the quest for nuclear power 1939–1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). M.Waller 1989, ‘The ecology issue in Eastern Europe: protest and movements’, Journal of Communist Studies 5, 303–28. S.Wank 1964, ‘Aehrenthal and the Sanjak of Novibazar railway project: a reappraisal’, Slavonic and East European Review 42, 353–69. H.G.Wanklyn 1940, ‘Geographical aspects of Jewish settlement east of Germany’, Geographical Journal 95, 175–90. C.F.Wargelin 2000, ‘The economic collapse of Austro-Hungarian dualism 1914–1918’, East European Quarterly 24, 261–88. D.Warriner 1938, ‘The population question in Eastern Europe’, Slavonic and East European Review 16, 629–37. D.Warriner ed. 1965, Contrasts in emerging societies (London: Athlone Press). S.B.Webb 1980, ‘Tariffs cartels technology and growth in the German steel industry 1879–1914’, Journal of Economic History 40, 309–29.

Bibliography

501

G.Węclawowicz 1979, ‘The structure of socioeconomic space: Warsaw in 1931 and 1970—a study in factorial ecology’: R.A.French and F.E.I.Hamilton eds, The socialist city: spatial structure and urban policy (Chichester: Wiley) 387–424. U.Wikander 1983, ‘The Swedish Match Company in Central Europe between the wars: “internal power struggle” between former competitors—Solo v.Swedish Match’: A. Teichova and P.L.Cottrell eds, International business and Central Europe 1918–1939 (Leicester: Leicester University Press) 209–25. C.K.Wilber and K.P.Jameson eds 1982, Socialist models of development (Oxford: Pergamon) 991– 1004. J.Wilczynski 1974a, ‘Atomic energy for peaceful purposes in the Warsaw Pact countries’, Soviet Studies 26, 368–90. J.Wilczynski 1974b, Technology in Comecon: acceleration of technological progress through economic planning (New York: Praeger). H.R.Wilkinson 1955, ‘Jugoslav Kosmet: the evolution of a frontier province and its landscape’, Transactions Institute of British Geographers 21, 171–93. O.Wilson 1971, ‘The Belgrade-Bar railroad: an essay in economic and political geography’: G.W.Hoffman ed., Eastern Europe: essays in geographical problems (London: Methuen) 365– 93. J.Winiecki 1986, ‘Are Soviet-type economies entering an era of long-term decline?’, Soviet Studies 38, 325–48. J.Winiecki 1988, The distorted world of Soviet-type economies (London: Routledge). V.H.Winston 1956, ‘The Polish bituminous coal industry’, American Slavic and East European Review 15, 38–70. J.Witkowski 1993, ‘The quality of the natural environment and demographic processes in the large towns of Poland’, Geographia Polonica 61, 367–77. J.Wódź and K.Wódź 1998, ‘Environmental sociology in Poland and the ecological consciousness of Polish people’: A.Tickle and I.Welsh eds, Environment and society in Eastern Europe (London: Addison-Wesley-Longman) 97–113. A.Wrobel 1980, ‘Industrialization as a factor of regional development in Poland’, Geographia Polonica 43, 187–97. F.Wunderlich 1961, Farm labor in Germany 1890–1945: its historical development with the framework of agriculture and social policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). A.Wyrobisz 1983, ‘Functional types of Polish towns in the 16th-18th centuries’, Journal of European Economic History 12, 69–103. S.D.Zagoroff et al. 1955, The agricultural economy of the Danubian countries 1935–1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press). J.Zaleski 1978, ‘Poland’s maritime economy in the post-World War Two period’, GeoJournal 2, 179–90. J.Zaremba 1966, ‘Regional planning in Poland: theory methods and results’: J.C.Fisher ed., City and regional planning in Poland (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) 271–97. J.R.Zatlin 1997, ‘The vehicle of desire: the Trabant and Wartburg and the end of the GDR’, German History 15, 358–80. A.Zauberman 1964, Industrial progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany 1937–1962 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A.Zborowski 1989, ‘Spatial differentiation of living standards as the effect of social urbanization processes in the Upper Silesia-Cracow agglomeration’: H.Forster and B. Kortus eds, Socialgeographical problems of the Cracow and Upper Silesia agglomerations (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh) 134–51. J.Zikmund 1982, ‘Administrative aspects of urban and regional planning in Poland 1944–1977’, East European Quarterly 16, 217–30. H.Zimon 1979, ‘Regional inequalities in Poland 1960–1975’, Economic Geography 55, 242–52.

Bibliography

502

G.Zovanyi 1986, ‘Structural change in a system of urban places: the twentieth century evolution of Hungary’s urban settlement network’, Regional Studies 20, 47–71. A.Zurkowa and J.Księkąk 1980, ‘Elements of the spatial structure of internal migrations in Poland’, Przęglad Geograficzny 51, 81–102 (in Polish with an English summary).

INDEX

academy 37, 107 administration Pre-1914: 8, 20, 29–9, 33–4, 37–46, 49, 54–5, 60–1, 68, 73, 75, 101, 106, 114, 122– 4, 128, 131–4, 143, 148, 155–8 1914–1945: 178, 183–8, 239, 254, 259, 266, 270, 282–5, 288 Post-1945: 293–4, 300, 318, 345–7, 354, 360, 369, 382–3, 392, 397, 405, 412, 420, 439 Adrianople, Treaty of 47, 132, 161 Adriatic 4, 13, 22–3, 29, 45, 65, 76, 98–9, 121, 128, 131, 137–8, 143–5, 188, 209, 214, 232–4, 242, 349–51, 369, 387 AEG 90, 126–7 Aerenthal, A. 39, 132 Agfa 204, 216 agrarian politics 47–50, 247–51, 294–5 agriculture Pre-1914: 1–3, 6, 16, 20, 23–8, 31, 34–66, 70–1, 75–6, 80, 89–91, 97, 101, 105–7, 111– 12, 116, 122, 126, 129, 138, 156–61, 164–5 1914–1945: 169–71, 174–99, 203, 215, 224–6, 240, 262–3, 266–71, 274–5, 277, 281–2, 287–8 Post-1945: 291, 295–6, 299, 303, 307, 314–18, 324–6, 343–59, 371, 382, 387–95, 400–2, 405– 7, 414, 423, 428, 435, 439, 440–9, 452–4 see also AIC and yield Agricultural-Industrial Complex 322, 355, 441–4 aircraft/airport/air transport 90, 215, 218, 228, 261, 263, 268, 275–80, 282–3, 286, 316, 330, 335, 361, 434, 447 Alba Iulia (Gyulafehérvár, Karlsburg) 66, 130–1, 139, 210, 232, 365, 374, 402, 408 Albania/Albanians Pre-1914: 1–3, 8, 28, 46, 50–1, 123, 150–2, 164 1914–1945: 169, 172–7, 181, 188–91, 229, 234, 239, 243, 249–50, 254–5, 282–7 Post-1945: 292–6, 301–3, 306–7, 310, 313–16, 324–5, 333, 338, 346, 352, 359, 362–4, 367, 371–3, 382, 385, 388, 401, 413, 439 aluminium 209–11, 215, 243, 246, 277, 283, 308, 317, 321, 328–30, 372, 434–5, 445, 455 Andrássy, G. 39–40 Antonescu, Marshall I. 252, 279, 281 Arad 2, 130–1, 139–40, 220, 225, 231–1, 245, 269–70, 304, 374, 402, 408 aristocracy see elite armaments 15–17, 35, 44, 72, 87, 93–4, 98, 169, 180, 183–4, 190, 214–18, 224, 260–71, 274–83, 325–7, 437–9 armed forces 1, 4, 7, 36, 42, 46, 50, 63, 85, 113, 169, 178, 242, 285–7, 292–3, 367, 447 see also military artisan 13, 47, 50, 81, 114, 203, 274, 309 assimilation 265, 306, 315 Aussig see Ústí nad Labem

Index

504

Austria/Austrians Pre-1914: 3, 19, 32–5, 51, 58–9, 65, 68–75, 81, 92–105, 128, 131–3, 143, 149, 155–60, 163–4 1914–1945: 171–3, 179–80, 184, 207–9, 212, 218, 223, 237, 248, 275, 284–7 Post-1945: 292, 298–9, 321, 356, 360, 367, 377, 381–3, 387–8, 400, 441, 448, 453 see also Habsburg Empire autarky see self-sufficiency autonomy 1, 28–9, 117, 203, 208, 213, 256, 259, 278, 297, 300, 305, 392, 419, 439 Axis 259–84, 340, 419 Bacău 3, 220, 232, 304, 340, 373–4, 402, 408 backward areas/backwardness 5–7, 15, 46, 51, 60–8, 72, 101, 104–14, 118, 131, 182, 214–15, 251, 254, 294, 297, 317–20, 330, 339, 344, 390, 397, 414, 428, 435–9 see also periphery Baia Mare (Nagybánya) 2–3, 210–11, 232, 374, 402 Balkans see Southeastern Europe Balkan Wars 36, 44–7, 50, 123, 132, 180, 242 Baltic Sea/Baltic States 97, 119–21, 124, 128, 137, 143, 181, 208, 214, 238, 241, 246, 351, 361, 367–70, 423, 449 Banat 99–101, 157, 161, 186, 214, 221, 224, 231, 266, 282–5, 322, 327, 414, 461 bankruptcy/banks 29, 42–5, 50–3, 59, 63, 82, 91, 94, 98, 105–7, 128–9, 134, 148, 156, 175, 180, 184–5, 193–4, 199, 204–5, 208, 26, 283, 296–7, 358 Banska Bystrica (Beszterczebanya, Neusohl) 18, 94, 107 Banja Luka 3, 130, 132, 232, 282, 327, 366, 435–6 Bar 132, 234, 363, 366, 437 Bat’a 203–4, 242, 283 Belgrade (Beograd, Belgrad) 3, 14, 30, 39, 46, 116, 127, 130–3, 145, 149, 156–7, 187, 209, 232, 237, 244, 254, 261, 269–70, 283, 292, 361, 365–9, 379, 396–8, 434–5, 441 Berlin 2, 14–15, 18, 21–2, 36–7, 69–71, 75, 80, 87–9, 94–5, 115–27, 129, 143, 146, 163, 204, 229, 234–9, 243–6, 255–6, 261–4, 267–9, 286, 292–3, 306, 309, 330, 333, 361, 364, 366–7, 392–4, 398, 440, 459 Berlin Congress 35, 39, 46–7, 49, 116 Bessarabia 30–2, 48, 66, 117, 186, 195, 214–16, 229, 267, 274, 279, 281, 285 Beuthen see Bytom Białystok (Bielostok) 2, 13, 76, 83, 142, 212, 215, 230, 254, 321, 334, 338, 422, 424–9 Bielsko-Biała (Bielitz) 321, 333, 338, 419, 424–6, 429, 432–3 Bismarck, O.K.von 34–6, 38, 124 Bitola (Monastir) 2, 30, 50, 122, 189, 231, 437 Bitterfeld 96, 216, 235, 243–4, 261, 330, 364 Black Sea 47, 108, 116–18, 121, 128–31, 138, 143, 214, 231, 241–2, 282, 303–4, 333, 351, 361, 367–71, 386–8, 441–3 Bohemia Pre-1914: 4, 15–17, 26, 46, 57–9, 69, 74, 81–2, 86, 92, 96–7, 105, 108, 121, 124, 128, 137–8, 143, 159, 164 1914–1945: 184–5, 196, 211, 215, 259, 275–7 Post-1945: 300, 307, 312, 338, 351, 369, 372, 377–8, 403, 409, 413, 419, 445, 448–50 Bosnia and Herzegovina 30, 39, 46, 53, 97, 101, 108, 130, 187–8, 209–10, 215, 232, 305–6, 327–9, 375–6, 399, 435–8 Botoşani 2–3, 102, 216, 232, 270, 304, 365, 408 Brăila 3, 102–3, 118, 225, 232, 245, 339, 353, 4–8 branch plants 208, 212, 242, 278, 326, 340, 393 Brandenburg 2, 15–18, 22, 37, 82, 258–9, 352

Index

505

Braşov (Brassó, Kronstadt) 2, 27, 66, 102, 130–1, 138–40, 220, 224–5, 231–2, 235, 253, 256, 261, 278–81, 304, 331, 338, 365, 374, 380, 402, 408, 415 Bratislava (Pozony, Pressburg) 2, 29, 121, 129–30, 139–41, 154–5, 235, 238, 259, 267, 278, 339, 366, 377, 393, 413, 419, 441 Breslau see Wrocław Brezhnev/Brezhnev Doctrine 1, 316, 456 bribery see corruption Brno (Brünn) 2, 18, 21, 68, 82, 93, 124, 128–9, 185, 239, 261, 269, 314, 338, 351, 366, 392, 413 Brod 2, 101, 130, 139, 235, 366 Bromberg see Bydgoszcz Brünn see Brno Bucharest (Bucuresti, Bukarest) Pre-1914: 3, 14, 29–30, 35, 48, 50, 102–3, 118, 127, 130–3, 145, 154, 157 1914–1945: 171, 186, 211–12, 225, 231–2, 236–7, 242, 245–7, 253–6, 261, 279–81, 285 Post-1945: 292, 304, 314, 338–40, 361–2, 365, 370, 378, 395, 398, 407, 415, 419 Bucovina (Bukowina) 23, 30, 53, 58–61, 104, 109, 130, 138, 158, 186, 195, 214, 248, 253, 274, 279, 374 Budapest (Aquincum, Ofen) Pre-1914: 3, 8, 14, 22–4, 41, 65, 68, 72, 75–8, 94, 98, 105–7, 116, 122, 127–35, 138–40, 144–8, 154–9, 163 1914–1945: 199, 207, 211–14, 234–8, 244–8, 256, 268–70, 277–8 Post-1945: 322–5, 328–32, 336, 361, 377, 380, 383, 398, 405, 413, 420–1 Budweis see České Budĕjovice building/building materials Pre-1914: 28, 37, 70, 81, 89–92, 97, 102–4, 107, 136–8, 148–9, 156, 160, 191 1914–1945: 200–1, 212–14, 231, 239, 256–8, 264–5, 274 Post-1945: 296, 299, 307–9, 316, 319–22, 326, 338, 358, 383, 392–4, 398, 400, 403–7, 412–13, 433, 440–1, 444–6 see also wood Bukowina see Bucovina Bulgaria/Bulgarians Pre-1914: 1–3, 30, 36, 39, 43–50, 53, 63, 70, 101, 104, 112–13, 117, 123, 132, 143–6, 149–52, 157, 160–3 1914–1945: 172–7, 180–1, 186–94, 201, 207, 210–12, 224–9, 234–5, 241, 248–51, 255–6, 261, 266–7, 272–3, 282, 285–6 Post-1945: 291–7, 300–2, 305–8, 310–14, 322–5, 331–6, 338, 344–6, 350–5, 359–62, 365, 370–3, 379–88, 391, 412, 441–3, 447, 450, 454–6, 459 bureaucracy see administration Burgas 3, 132–3, 143, 210, 234, 282, 313, 336–7, 365, 371, 377, 388, 445, 453 business/business community see entrepreneurs and management Buzău 2–3, 109, 131, 231, 245, 338, 370, 374, 402, 408 Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) 2, 16, 76, 114, 118–20, 126, 145, 230, 268–9, 313, 321, 368, 392, 425–9 Bytom 2, 17, 87–9, 142, 210, 218–19, 236, 240, 432 canal 15–17, 22–3, 26, 39, 48, 86, 108, 116–21, 128, 146, 220, 240–2, 247, 277, 303–4, 326, 353– 4, 367–70, 429–30, 448 capital/credit Pre-1914: 8–10, 17, 39, 43, 46, 50, 53–61, 68–9, 72–3, 78, 87, 92, 98 101, 105–6, 113–14, 118, 122, 128, 144, 157, 162 1914–1945: 169, 174–6, 180, 183–4, 188–9, 193–4, 199, 205–8, 215, 224–9, 234, 239–41, 260, 265–7, 270, 277–9, 283, 288 Post-1945: 295–300, 303, 314–17, 324, 333, 346, 349–53, 368–9, 378–80, 383, 386–7, 393–6, 403, 407, 412, 415–23, 428, 435–9, 456, 460 see also foreign investment and loans

Index

506

capital cities listed by name Caprivi, L.von 35, 37–9 Carl Zeiss 75, 211 Carniola 15, 32, 57–8, 69, 98, 107 Carol I/II 35, 48, 187, 252–4, 279 Carpathians 4, 24–7, 48, 99–104, 107–11, 127, 135, 145–6, 186, 196, 203, 215, 219–24, 253, 281, 434, 452, 460 cars see motor transport cartel 68, 74, 169, 204–7, 216, 240, 270, 279 cash see monetisation Ceauşescu, N. 321, 353, 368, 370, 395, 415 cereals 4, 9, 22–33, 38, 41, 44, 47–50, 53–61, 73–4, 78, 102, 105, 118, 133, 135, 143, 146, 171, 174–6, 193–6, 214, 221, 240–1, 266, 281–3, 287, 300, 322, 335, 347–52, 373, 399–400, 448 Černivci (Cernăuţi, Chernovtsy, Czernowitz) 131, 145, 158, 238, 242, 245, 265, 361 Ceske Budejovice (Budweis) 2, 121, 128, 269, 379 chemicals 68, 70–1, 75, 95–7, 101, 156, 184, 199–205, 211–17, 225, 243, 257, 262, 271, 276–7, 289, 312–13, 322, 334, 336–8, 371, 377, 393, 430, 437–8, 444–5, 448–50, 453 see also fertiliser, oil and plastics Chemnitz (Karl Marx Stadt) 2, 16, 31, 80, 85, 90–1, 123, 139, 213, 239, 277, 328, 392, 394 Chişinău (Kischinew, Kishinev) 245, 361 Chomutov (Komotau) 69, 92, 96, 206–8, 379, 447 Chorzów (Königshütte) 2, 18, 87, 142, 218, 271, 332, 336, 432 church see religion civil service see administration and local government civil society see social issues ČKD 93, 148 climate 1, 4, 282, 287, 344, 350–1, 355, 381, 400, 449 Cluj/Cluj-Napoca (Klausenburg, Kolozsvár) 3, 66–7, 130, 139–40, 224, 232, 252, 256, 269–70, 304–5, 339–40, 365, 374, 402, 408 coal Pre-1914: 6, 25–6, 68, 72, 75, 80–1, 86–91, 95–102, 105–7, 119–23, 129, 134, 137–9, 144–6, 160 1914–1945: 186, 190, 199, 203, 210–11, 214–19, 229, 234–7, 240–6, 265, 270–2, 275–6, 281 Post-1945: 324–30, 335–7, 360–5, 369–72, 377–9, 381, 397, 407–9, 423, 430–2, 437, 443–7, 450 coast 4, 47, 133, 137, 181, 209, 219, 232–4, 246, 283–4, 312–15, 349, 352, 358, 366, 381–4, 386– 8, 423, 449 see also Baltic Sea, Black Sea, ports, etc. collectivisation see cooperative colonisation/colony 15, 21, 24–26, 34–8, 65–7, 82, 85, 104–6, 163–5, 195, 242, 266, 275, 287, 382 see also settlement Comecon 9, 293, 296, 301, 306, 309–18, 331–3, 342, 360, 366–8, 377, 382, 440 Cominform 285, 292, 295, 310, 327, 435, 437 commerce see trade communism 1, 5, 10, 26, 52, 93, 116–18, 148, 156, 169, 178–9, 242, 246, 254, 258, 275, 281, 284– 7, 291–459 commuting 155, 159, 249–50, 307, 318, 322, 326, 335, 347–8, 363, 393, 397–8, 401–4, 413, 432–3 competition 16, 55, 58–9, 63, 68, 73, 78, 80, 86, 91–3, 114, 124, 130–1, 136, 143–4, 149, 155–6, 169–70, 174, 183–4, 207–8, 235, 266, 297, 299–301, 309–11, 314, 318, 360, 369, 386, 394, 428, 447 computers 298, 301, 353, 406 concession 22, 101, 109, 126–8, 131, 190, 208, 267, 291–3, 314 conservatives 48, 52, 161, 180, 189

Index

507

Constanţa 3, 42, 117–18, 129–33, 138, 143, 225, 232, 241–2, 245–6, 256, 281, 335, 362, 365–7, 370, 386–8, 396, 408 constitution 13, 33, 40, 45, 47, 49, 54 construction see building consumer goods/consumption 208, 295–9, 309, 315–17, 334, 346, 379, 386–7, 393, 400, 437 cooperation/cooperative 9, 40, 55, 60–1, 111, 115, 122–4, 135, 149, 169, 182, 193–4, 207, 236, 266, 281, 294, 298–9, 308, 315–16, 322–4, 330–5, 342–56, 360–2, 394, 400–6, 412, 423, 440–1 core area 51, 104–6, 156, 171, 215, 283, 285, 295, 319, 364, 414, 435, 445 see also industrial region corruption 45, 62, 131, 178 costs 87, 92, 105, 184, 194, 199, 218, 235, 243, 262, 297, 301, 309–11, 314, 318–20, 327, 346, 353, 368, 372, 381, 396–8, 428, 438–40, 449–50, 453 see also prices Cottbus 2, 217, 230, 243, 269, 372 Cracow see Kraków Crimea/Crimean War 44, 47, 66, 129 Craiova 3, 186, 225, 232, 245, 254, 304, 313, 331, 337–8, 365, 372–3, 393 Croatia 41, 46, 58–60, 98, 133–5, 139–41, 144–5, 164, 185, 187–8, 193, 203, 215, 247, 267, 282–3, 305, 326, 366, 376, 380, 385–7, 434–42 CSCE 293, 306, 453 culture 40–1, 50–2, 92, 136, 157–8, 161, 164, 173, 188–90, 247, 252–6, 265, 305, 388, 392, 412, 420, 440–2, 458–60 see also academy and university currency 180, 183–4, 187–91, 206–7, 265, 298, 300, 309, 315, 350, 360, 381–8 see also inflation and monetisation customs see taxation and tarrif Czech Lands/Czechoslovakia/Czechs Pre-1914: 1–2, 8–10, 18–21, 30, 39–40, 121, 138, 144, 150– 2, 158, 163 1914–1945: 169, 172–7, 179–86, 190–213, 219, 229–31, 234–43, 246–51, 254–5, 259–60, 265– 7, 272–3, 278–81, 284–7 Post-1945: 292–3, 296–307, 310–12, 316–20, 325, 328–33, 336–9, 345, 351, 354, 359–69, 372, 375–92, 404, 409, 419–20, 430, 442–5, 448–55, 459 Czernowitz see Černivci Częstochowa 2, 76, 89, 120, 142, 219, 229, 269, 325, 368, 424–9, 432–3 Dąbrowa/Dąbrowa Górnicza (Dombrau) 2, 75, 89, 97, 142, 219, 326, 348, 361, 429–33 dairying 135, 159, 275, 320, 347, 356, 393 Dalmatia Pre-1914: 20, 58–61, 122, 138 1914–1945: 203, 239, 285, 381–2 Danube 1–6, 22, 29, 39, 44, 47, 65–6, 76, 80, 100–2, 108, 115–18, 121–3, 128–35, 155–7, 161, 175, 193, 206, 215, 219, 231, 234, 241–2, 246–7, 251, 277, 280–3 Post-1945: 292, 303–4, 313, 325, 327–8, 334, 339, 351–4, 361, 365, 367, 369–70, 375, 379, 386, 429, 435, 443, 451, 454 Danzig see Gdańsk Debrecen 3, 133, 139–40, 210, 270, 323, 336, 371, 420 debt 179–80, 185, 193–4, 297–8, 353, 456 defence see security democracy 1, 9, 33–4, 170–3, 178, 182–6, 252, 259, 283, 285–6, 288, 297, 412 demography see population depression 69, 71, 74, 145, 169, 176–80, 184, 187, 194–6, 203–8, 212, 217, 226, 248, 279, 282, 329, 392

Index

508

Dessau 2, 96, 235, 331 dictatorship see totalitarianism diesel power 236, 239, 281, 331, 362, 364 Diósgyor 72, 94, 130, 204, 211, 246, 277, 396 diversification 90, 194, 211–13, 299, 338, 360, 393, 423, 438 Dniester (Nistru) 117, 121, 214, 241 Dobrogea 4, 65–6, 118, 196, 242, 248, 282, 285, 353, 370 drainage 16–17, 59, 65, 85, 91, 115–16, 193, 241, 284, 287, 352–4, 378 Drava 3, 329, 375 Dresden 2, 14, 21–2, 80, 85, 115, 119–20, 123–6, 128–9, 149, 154, 211, 230, 236, 238–9, 255–6, 259, 361, 373, 379, 390, 392 Drobeta-Turnu Severin see Turnu Severin Dubrovnik (Ragusa) 29, 137–8, 122, 141, 144, 234–5, 366, 387 Durazzo) 122–3, 188–90, 234, 314, 364, 367, 385 Durrës ( East Germany Pre-1914: 1–2, 127, 150–4 1914–1945: 260–2, 286 Post-1945 292, 296, 300–3, 306–9, 312, 318, 325, 328–33, 336–8, 346–7, 351, 356–66, 369, 372–3, 377–81, 387, 390–2, 395–7, 409, 412, 440–2, 445–7, 450 East Prussia 34, 56, 119, 144, 178, 181–2, 238, 285, 363 economic growth 34, 40, 43, 71–3, 163–5, 169, 174–8, 186, 199, 296–301, 319 education 21, 26, 33, 36, 41, 44–6, 49, 60, 73, 87–9, 104, 134, 149, 157–60, 164, 173–4, 181, 184– 5, 189–92, 203, 216, 228, 247–8, 251–3, 295, 301–8, 316, 326, 345–6, 355, 358, 398–407, 412, 435, 437–8 efficiency Pre-1914: 7, 20, 29, 38, 43, 51, 53, 55, 74, 78, 81–2, 87, 109, 138, 148, 164 1914–1945: 184–5, 203–5, 215, 221, 258, 263–5 Post-1945: 294–7, 300–3, 315–22, 336, 342–54, 358, 361, 371, 393, 398, 405, 431, 435, 438–9, 456 Elbasan 189, 234, 324, 364, 385 Elbe 6, 13–18, 22, 75–80, 86, 115, 118–23, 128, 243, 443, 446 Elbląg (Elbing) 2, 76, 119, 241, 254, 269, 425, 427, 429 elections 49, 178, 292 electricity Pre-1914: 80, 90, 98, 126–30 1914–1945: 207–8, 211, 217–18, 235–6, 243–6, 256–7, 265, 270–5, 278, 283–4 Post-1945: 307, 313, 316–19, 322, 327–31, 336–7, 342, 362, 365, 369–70, 400, 405, 434–5, 438, 442–6, 452, 456 see also hydro-electricity elites 6–10, 15, 20–4, 28–30, 33, 37–55, 60, 73, 81–5, 92, 102–6, 155, 158, 161, 164, 184, 247, 252, 279, 288, 292, 299, 324, 346, 396, 405 see also landowner emancipation 16, 40, 52–3, 249, 303 emigration 16, 36–8, 42, 47, 52–3, 61, 65, 72, 97, 114, 161, 163–5, 174, 185, 189, 191, 249, 297, 305, 314–15, 414, 419, 441 employment Pre-1914: 9, 53, 70–7, 111–12, 139, 156–7, 160–2 1914–1945: 174, 192, 195, 199–201, 214, 239, 248–9, 288 Post-1945: 295–6, 299, 303, 308, 317, 324, 338–40, 344, 348–9, 390, 397–400, 405, 415, 431– 2, 438–9, 441 see also unemployment energy 16–19, 44, 69, 145–7, 156, 173, 199, 203, 216, 243, 263, 296, 300, 311–14, 319–22, 369– 81, 431, 437, 444, 448, 456 see also coal and electricity

Index

509

engineering 16–19, 68–72, 75, 78–81, 86–94, 97, 102–3, 127, 134, 139, 145, 156–7, 199–203, 211, 214, 219, 225, 231, 242, 257, 260–2, 289, 315, 317–18, 322–38, 392–3, 421, 431, 435, 437 enlightenment 47, 106 entrepreneurship 44, 48, 72–4, 81–5, 105, 108, 130, 143, 164, 189, 180, 221, 288 environment 214, 318, 328, 352–5, 361, 368, 378–80, 386–8, 400, 428–9, 432–4, 442–56 see also pollution Erfurt 2, 21, 56, 124–5, 229–30, 236, 239, 356 Erzgebirge 6, 31, 80, 107, 123, 127, 138, 196, 328 estates 16, 19, 21–4, 28, 73–4, 80, 85–6, 89, 106–7, 128, 161, 184, 188–91, 194, 251, 269 ethnicity/ethnic minorities 8–9, 34, 36, 39–41, 50, 66, 106, 113, 129, 145, 157, 170, 247–8, 253, 259, 288, 293, 295, 303–6, 47, 396, 429, 438, 458 see also named groups and nations expropriation 37, 178, 258, 294 see also nationalisation fairs 45, 65, 81, 159, 257, 314 famine 15, 27, 57, 344 fascism 52, 178, 180, 279, 283–5, 460 federation 179, 181–2, 278, 286, 295, 329, 434 fertiliser 56, 60, 90, 95–6, 160, 171, 193, 295, 312–13, 336–8, 348–52, 355, 399, 435–7, 442–3, 446–8 feudalism 4, 7, 15–16, 19–20, 23–4, 28–35, 51–6, 60, 104–5, 158, 161, 164, 211–17 finance see capital, loan and taxation First World War 8, 35–6, 44, 47–9, 55–6, 68–72, 90–1, 95, 116, 121, 126, 132, 145–6, 170–2, 178, 182–91, 194, 199, 212, 216–17, 224, 228–9, 238–40, 259, 285, 288, 420 fishing 4, 22, 65, 137, 214, 240, 334, 351, 353, 359, 443–3, 449 Fiume see Rijeka Five Year Plan 10, 296, 300, 337, 415, 437–8, 440–1 food/food processing Pre-1914: 9, 19, 23, 26–7, 36–42, 56–8, 64, 70–80, 92–4, 97–8, 101–4, 111, 134–5, 138, 146, 156–8, 162 1914–1945: 169–73, 179–80, 184–6, 191, 196–201, 213–14, 249, 256, 262, 266, 283, 287 Post-1945: 294, 299–300, 319–22, 344–7, 350, 353–5, 370, 387, 392–3, 397, 400–1, 412, 435– 7, 452, 461 see also sugar and viticulture footwear 203, 214, 282, 305, 322, 324, 354, 412 forced labour 263–4, 267, 271, 274–5, 291, 303–5, 328, 373 foreign aid/investment 15, 68–9, 73–5, 83–5, 164, 174–8, 181–3, 187–90, 199, 205–9, 214, 267, 88, 94, 97, 301, 358, 383, 442 forests see woodland France 13–15, 34–6, 40, 46, 56, 69, 71, 113, 155, 172–4, 182, 185–8, 205, 208–9, 216, 226, 229, 237, 260, 270, 283–6, 333, 350, 377, 383, 394, 445 Frankfurt a.d.Oder 2, 21, 120, 123–5, 237–9, 243, 254, 269, 361 Franz Josef 130, 184 freight/freight rates 133, 135, 144, 237, 331, 360–3, 366, 369–70 frontier/frontier region Pre-1914: 1, 7, 26, 30, 39, 46, 50, 53, 60–1, 65–6, 72, 76, 83, 89, 99–102, 105, 117, 126, 130–4, 143–5, 149 1914–1945: 173, 178–82, 185–9, 199, 218, 221, 231, 238–42, 247, 265, 279, 283–6 Post-1945: 293, 305, 360–5, 381–3, 387–8, 407, 439–42, 461 see also peripheries fuel see coal, energy, etc. furniture see wood processing

Index

510

Galaţi 3, 102, 118, 145, 214, 225, 231–2, 241, 245, 304, 325, 335, 342, 365, 370, 408 Galicia 20, 23–4, 27–8, 33, 39, 53, 56, 58–61, 71, 77, 88, 92, 97, 104–6, 130, 134, 138, 158–60, 164–5, 182, 231, 266, 269, 280 Ganz/Ganz-Mávag 78, 94, 130, 146, 203, 211, 216, 235, 277, 315, 330–1, 335, 421 gas see natural gas Gdańsk (Danzig) 2, 6, 76, 97, 118–19, 123–5, 143, 154, 172, 178, 182, 230, 244, 261, 269, 274, 320–1, 334, 367–9, 380, 392, 422, 425–6, 429, 444 Gdynia 2, 182, 214–15, 218–19, 228–9, 242, 269, 324, 334, 351, 362, 369, 425 Gera 2, 447 Germany/Germans Pre-1914: 2, 5–10, 21–4, 32–40, 51–2, 55–61, 66, 68–76, 83–92, 104–5, 115, 121–30, 133–4, 138, 144–5, 149, 152–4, 158–9, 162–5 1914–1945: 169–74, 178–9, 182–5, 190–1, 195–8, 204–19, 223, 226, 236–43, 248–9, 254–5, 259–77, 282, 288 Post-1945: 292–3, 295–8, 305–6, 329, 331–2, 336–8, 341, 346–7, 352–1, 362, 377, 381, 385–7, 404, 429, 433, 437, 440, 445, 453, 458–60 see also named German states and provinces German Democratic Republic see East Germany Gheorghiu-Dej, Gh. 281, 321, 399 Giurgiu 102, 131, 186, 280, 312, 365, 408, 415, 443, 454 glass 75, 95, 98, 135, 144, 184, 214, 265, 307, 312–13, 322 Gliwice (Gleiwitz) 2, 18, 87–9, 142, 218–19, 269–70, 429, 432–3 Gomulka, W. 293, 348, 409 Gorbachev, M. 293, 455 Göring, H. 260, 266–7, 270, 275–80, 282 Görlitz 2, 124–5, 129, 143, 210, 235–6, 268–9, 361 Gorzów (Landsberg) 2, 90, 213, 262, 269, 339, 425, 427 government see administrative and state intervention Grabski, W. 183, 191 Greece 3, 19–30, 45–7, 50, 117, 158, 163–4, 172, 180–1, 188–9, 224, 237, 248, 284–8, 292–3, 305, 383–4, 387 Gropius, W. 178, 256 growth areas 7, 31, 51, 61 Grudziądz (Graudenz) 2, 144, 269, 425, 427 guilds 15–16, 20–2, 26, 50, 114 Gyor (Raab) 3, 21, 129, 140, 159, 180, 238, 245–6, 267, 277–8, 323, 331–2, 338, 420–1 Habsburg Empire 7–8, 13–14, 18–21, 30–53, 56–8, 63–8, 71–6, 81–2, 85, 91–4, 98–102, 105, 115– 17, 121–32, 144–5, 164, 170–1, 180–4, 195, 216, 232, 248, 435, 458–60 see also named provinces Halle 2, 56, 119, 124–5, 205, 230, 235–6, 238, 243–4, 261, 331, 336, 362, 377, 390–2, 396, 445 handicrafts 16, 20, 26, 30, 36, 42, 45, 66, 83–5, 104, 111–13, 149, 159, 164, 189, 215, 224–7, 247– 9, 274, 288, 309, 322, 350, 412 harbours see ports health 4, 26, 30, 52–5, 89, 117, 123, 136–7, 149, 155, 162–4, 184–6, 203, 218, 228, 241, 246, 252– 3, 287, 303, 307–10, 316, 358, 400, 449–50 heavy industry 44, 69, 71–2, 86–97, 102, 183, 275–7, 317, 344, 370, 401, 435, 439 see also chemicals, metallurgy Hermannstadt see Sibiu Himmler, H. 262, 264, 271 Hindenburg see Zabrze

Index

511

Hitler, A. 121, 179, 207–8, 217, 238–40, 258–64, 277–9, 282, 459 Horthy, M. 265, 277 horticulture see market gardening hotel 137–8, 157, 246, 324, 381–3, 385–7 housing 29–30, 72, 75, 85–92, 99, 136–8, 149, 159, 214–15, 228, 256–8, 295, 299–301, 307–8, 320, 324–8, 382, 390, 392–406, 411–12, 419, 432–4, 441, 446, 451–2 Hoxha, E. 284, 294, 394 Hradec Králové (Königgrätz) 2, 34, 270 Hunedoara (Vajdahunyad) 2–3, 94, 100, 127, 134, 204, 210, 279, 324, 402 Hungary/Hungarians Pre-1914: 1–3, 20, 23–6, 30–4, 39–42, 50–5, 58–9, 63–73, 76–8, 81, 89, 94, 101–2, 105–6, 122, 127, 129–33, 137–43, 146, 149–54, 157–9, 162–4 1914–1945: 169–80, 185–8, 191–205, 208–13, 228, 234–5, 238, 241, 245, 248–51, 254–5, 265– 7, 272–3, 277–8, 281–2, 285–8 Post-1945: 292–310, 313–17, 322–5, 328–41, 344–9, 354–64, 367–8, 371–3, 377–82, 388, 391–2, 397–401, 404, 407, 413, 420–1, 430, 441–2, 451, 454–5, 461 hydro electricity 98, 108, 116, 126, 136, 211, 243, 246, 282, 312, 327, 329–30, 343, 352, 368, 373– 9, 381, 388, 434–7, 455 Iaşi 3–4, 102, 131, 225, 232, 245, 254, 304, 338–40, 361, 365, 393, 408 ideology 259, 288, 293–4, 298, 301, 311, 316, 319, 322, 344–5, 348–9, 354–7, 383–4, 394–5, 415, 442, 456, 460 see also agrarianism, liberalism, etc. IGF 205–8, 213, 216–17, 260–3, 266–7, 271, 274, 281–2 illiteracy see education income 38, 41, 61–3, 148, 160–1, 164–5, 191–4, 249, 307–9, 346–8, 358, 396, 404, 437 independence 4, 13, 44–9, 72, 170, 179, 188, 206–8, 234, 259–6, 278, 282–3, 293, 303, 311, 316 see also named states industrial crops 57–9, 193, 197, 275, 283, 350–1, 373 see also sugar beet industrial regions 15–20, 75–104, 211, 213–19, 422–39 industry Pre-1914: 6–9, 15, 26, 28–45, 48, 51, 57–124, 133–5, 138, 142, 149, 156, 158–64 1914–1945: 169, 174–5, 180–91, 194, 199–229, 246–8, 253, 256–7, 282, 287–8 Post-1945: 291–7, 299–301, 309, 317–48, 354–5, 388, 392, 395–6, 407, 414, 422, 440–3, 446, 453, 461 see also named industrial sectors inflation 175, 179–80, 183, 193, 199, 205, 288, 298–9 infrastructure 8, 42–4, 46, 51, 72, 85, 123, 159, 173, 190, 214–15, 228, 265, 286, 294, 319–20, 366, 388, 392, 398, 400, 407, 423–5, 428, 433–4, 437, 451 see also housing, railway, etc. innovation 68, 91, 211, 216, 235, 301, 318, 340, 394, 400, 434, 456, 458 see also technology integration see restructuring intellectuals/intelligentsia 43, 49–59, 179, 186, 188, 252, 284, 293, 303, 390, 404, 429, 455 investment see capital and foreign investment Iron Curtain 286, 440 irrigation 4, 146, 283, 295, 316, 351–6, 373–5, 442, 449, 452 Istanbul (Constantinople) 3, 14, 29, 50, 63, 113–14, 129, 131, 244 Italy 3, 13–14, 23, 32, 35, 39, 46–7, 51, 56, 98, 105, 122, 132, 145, 174–5, 187–90, 234, 237–9, 243, 282–7, 292, 297, 306, 314–15, 333, 365, 367, 373, 377, 381, 393, 445 Jastrezębia Zdrój 430–3

Index

512

Jelenia Góra (Hirschberg) 235–6, 313, 339, 424, 426, 429, 452 Jena 75, 211 Jesenice (Assling) 98, 144, 204, 215, 283, 326, 406 Jews 15, 23, 29–30, 36, 40–2, 45–8, 55, 70, 73, 104–6, 157–9, 178–9, 223, 248, 252–3, 259, 264, 274–5, 281, 288, 295, 305, 440 Jihlava (Iglau) 82, 129, 269 joint company/project 280–2, 287, 291, 306, 311–12, 315, 328, 375, 383 Junkers 34, 38, 42, 65–7, 346 Kaliningrad (Königsberg) 2, 118–21, 124–6, 138, 143, 181, 230, 237–40, 244, 261, 269 Kalisz 2, 76, 143, 269, 424–6, 429 Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad) 136, 210, 277 Károlyi, M. 79–80 Katowice (Kattowitz) 2, 23, 87–9, 142–3, 218–19, 254, 265, 268–70, 274, 321, 326, 334, 348, 361, 366, 395, 423–6, 429–33, 451 Kecskemet 65, 139–40, 156, 251, 420 Khrushchev, N. 293, 311, 316, 459 Kielce 2, 86, 143, 196, 215, 229, 243, 247, 321, 424–6 Kiselev, P. 47, 54, 102 Kladno 92, 138, 206, 210 Kogălniceanu, M. 47, 63, 102, 386 Kolín 97, 269–70, 276 Koloszvár see Cluj Königsberg see Kaliningrad Königshütte see Chorzów Konin 16, 229, 242, 330, 372, 425, 427–8 Korber, E.von 71, 121 (Korcha, Koritsa) 50, 189, 234, 338, 385 Košice (Kaschau, Kassa) 2, 139, 229, 254, 269–70, 278–9, 325, 361, 413, 419, 429, 441 Kosovo 46, 51, 156, 189, 234, 243, 305–6, 327 Koszalin (Cöslin) 2, 334, 424–6, 429, 435–9 Kotor (Cattaro) 29, 45, 122, 130, 137, 145, 232 Kraków 2, 14, 33, 40, 121, 125, 136, 144–5, 182–3, 196, 215, 219, 229, 237, 308, 321, 326, 348, 361, 396, 423–34, 445–6, 450–2, 455 Kronstadt see Braşov Kragujevac 2–3, 149, 157, 231, 283, 320, 327, 333, 439 Kun, B. 180, 185 labour Pre-1914: 15, 21, 26, 29, 37, 48, 51–64, 68, 71, 83, 91–8, 111, 143, 148, 155–61, 164 1914–1945: 180, 185, 203, 216, 224, 228, 239, 247, 251, 263–7, 271, 274 Post-1945 294–308, 311, 315, 318–21, 326, 344–50, 355–8, 386, 392, 396–401, 405, 412, 421, 426–8, 435, 456 see also employment Laibach see Ljubljana landowner 4, 23, 28, 47, 53–9, 66, 73, 87, 102, 107–9, 128, 135–7, 159–63, 169, 183, 186, 189–91, 194, 284, 399 land reform 9, 55–7, 63, 178–81, 185–93, 196, 220, 287–7, 344, 400 latifundia see estate League of Nations 180, 188, 217 Legnica (Liegnitz) 2, 143, 254, 269, 423–6, 428–30

Index

513

Leipzig 2, 16, 21, 31, 70, 80–1, 91, 121–5, 146, 154–6, 230, 235–6, 239, 243–4, 255, 261, 314, 336–8, 361, 377, 392, 445 Lemberg see Lviv Leuna 213, 216–17, 243, 260–1, 262–3, 312, 336, 339 Liberal Party/liberalism 14, 36, 40, 44, 46, 48–9, 55, 60, 73–5, 124, 178, 183, 186, 205, 248, 252, 268, 288, 298, 303 Liberec (Reichenberg) 2, 18, 85, 125, 129, 185, 234, 328, 338 light industry see food processing and textiles lignite see coal Little Entente 209, 231, 459 livestock 4, 23, 27–30, 41, 44–5, 51, 60–6, 104–5, 122, 133–7, 159, 191, 193–6, 275, 282–3, 322, 345–56, 399–400, 406–7, 441 living standards 38, 48, 58, 123, 164, 187, 303, 308–9, 344, 348, 354, 420, 429, 433–4, 444, 453, 458 see also income Ljubljana (Laibach) 3, 98, 111, 128, 133, 144, 232, 266, 338, 403 loans 33, 50–2, 59, 69, 72, 75, 105, 132, 174–5, 179–80, 187, 194, 199, 208, 215, 296, 299–301, 367, 434, 436 local government 20, 60, 136, 184, 162, 239, 247, 258, 298, 358, 370, 383, 401, 404–9, 412–13, 420–1, 442 location 16, 21, 68, 71, 83, 91, 93–8, 134, 156, 199, 211–15, 243, 256, 266, 274, 283, 295, 312, 317–24, 344, 372, 394, 398–9, 403, 414–15, 435 see also named towns and industrial sectors Łodź (Litzmannstadt) 2, 73–6, 120, 142, 149, 183, 205, 212, 215, 244, 254, 261, 269–71, 317, 338, 368, 372, 422–3, 425–6, 428–9, 452 lowlands see also by name 4, 52–6, 64–5, 107, 127, 163, 195, 224, 238, 340, 344, 350, 402 Lublin 2, 76, 143, 229–30, 254, 268, 274, 320–1, 331, 364, 423–9 Lviv (Lemberg, Lwów, Lvov) 2, 14, 33, 40, 131, 145, 215, 243, 261, 265, 269–70, 274, 284, 361– 2, 429, 433 Macedonia 1, 16, 30, 46–9, 65, 132, 145, 160, 174, 181, 191, 196, 203, 209, 216, 248, 306, 327, 376, 435–7 machinery see engineering and mechanisation Magdeburg 2, 17, 22, 56, 70–1, 75, 90, 95, 121–5, 216, 230, 235–40, 260, 320, 361, 392 Mähr.Ostrau see Ostrava Malaxa 211, 235, 279 management 20, 48, 55–6, 68, 82, 89, 107, 224, 266, 270, 274, 297–9, 315, 319–20, 324, 334, 346, 353–7, 400, 438–9, 444, 449, 454–6 Manfréd Weiss 70, 94, 156, 204, 211, 277, 325, 330 Mannesmann 69, 92, 206–7 Mansfeld 16–17, 260, 328, 447, 451, 453 manufacturing see industry Marburg see Maribor Maria Theresa 14–15, 20, 23, 41, 61 Maribor (Marburg) 2, 128, 209, 211, 338, 434 market/marketing Pre-1914: 7–9, 23–4, 29–30, 48, 57–8, 61, 64, 68, 74, 81–3, 87–94, 103–6, 120, 130, 138, 143, 146, 156–60, 164 1914–1945: 179–84, 189, 199, 203, 207–8, 213–15, 218–19, 226, 239–40, 243, 247, 251, 264, 267, 274, 281, 285, 288 Post-1945: 295–301, 309–11, 315–17, 321, 330–3, 342–50, 356, 361, 394–5, 405, 412, 456

Index

514

market gardening 4, 60, 135, 159, 180, 251, 275, 299, 322, 347–53, 356–7, 373, 447 Maros (Mureş) 3, 108, 245, 374 Marshall Plan 286, 292–3, 310, 351 mechanisation 55, 60–1, 71–4, 85, 114, 160, 164, 171, 191, 194, 211, 266, 281, 295–6, 300, 303, 311–15, 324, 334, 345–8, 352–3, 356–7, 400, 421, 437 media 306, 387–8, 399–400 Mediaş (Medgyes) 138, 232, 304 mercantilism 16, 20 merchants 8, 24, 29, 42–4, 47, 54, 70, 87, 113–14, 138, 195 see also traders Merseburg 95, 116, 146, 216–17, 260, 262 metals/metallurgy Pre-1914: 4, 15–18, 24–6, 56, 68–81, 86–103, 107, 122, 134–6, 139, 144–6 1914–1945: 184, 190, 199–201, 204–6, 209–19, 225, 242, 260–2, 267, 270, 278, 282–4, 289 Post-1945: 297–9, 308, 312, 317, 320, 322–30, 334–8, 360, 366, 370, 377, 393, 398, 419, 430, 433–7, 441, 444–5, 450–1 middle class 7, 19, 29, 34, 40–2, 48, 58, 76, 82, 91, 104, 148, 155, 159, 163–4, 178, 184, 188, 253, 288, 394 Midhat Pasha 43, 50 migration 5–7, 13–16, 20–1, 30, 56–8, 64–5, 71, 85, 92, 102, 105–6, 148, 157, 160–2, 178, 195, 248–9, 251–3, 271, 274, 295, 306–8, 387, 390, 394–7, 398–407, 413, 420–1, 429, 432, 439, 453 military 26, 29–30, 34–6, 42–7, 53–4, 65, 99–102, 114, 124–5, 130, 144–5, 158–9, 173–4, 178, 183–6, 190, 218, 253, 274–5, 279, 282–4, 294–5, 303, 306, 316–17, 335, 361 milk see dairying minerals/mining Pre-1914: 4–6, 15–18, 24–8, 44, 51, 65, 69–70, 74, 77, 86–9, 92, 98–9, 102–7, 123, 127–8, 136, 144, 159–61 1914–1945: 180, 183–6, 190, 201, 206–11, 224, 239, 242, 260–1, 267, 277, 280–4 Post-1945: 296, 299, 303, 312–16, 319–24, 327–30, 343, 354, 360–2, 369–71, 402, 412, 415, 423, 437, 447, 454 Miskolc 2–3, 127, 130, 140, 159, 210, 235, 246, 268–70, 313, 320, 323, 325, 361, 396, 420–1, 441 Mitrovica 2–3, 132, 145, 231, 435, 437 Mladá Boleslav (Jungbunzlau) 85, 129, 138, 204, 234, 270, 275 mobility see migration Moldavia 4, 26, 29, 33, 47–8, 102–3, 117, 216, 221, 229, 231, 249, 279–80, 337–41, 344, 365 Monastir see Bitola money/monetisation 20–1, 37, 51, 54, 63–4, 73 monopoly 73, 102, 113–15, 126, 132, 158, 174, 178, 184, 208, 216, 226, 270, 281, 287–8, 291–7, 301, 314, 332, 460 Montenegro 45–7, 122, 132, 149, 154, 163, 187–8, 195, 210, 282, 327, 358, 376, 397, 435–6, 438 Morava-Vardar 3, 6, 241, 369, 437 Moravia 57–9, 78, 81, 92, 121, 128, 185, 242, 259, 274–7, 312, 318, 335, 372, 403, 413, 442 mortgage see loan Most (Brüx) 92, 210, 261, 275–6, 364, 378, 409, 447, 453 Mostar 2, 209, 232–4, 282, 329, 366, 435–6 motor industry/transport 93–4, 203–4, 211–13, 220, 226, 239–40, 257, 262, 277, 309, 314, 320–4, 331–4, 340, 346, 360–3, 366–7, 387–8, 394–400, 406, 431, 435, 439, 444, 453 mountains 1–4, 20–6, 30, 64–6, 132–3, 146, 160, 179, 189, 195, 247, 281, 295, 350–2, 373–5, 382– 5, 388, 393, 401–2, 406, 441 see also named mountain chains Munich Agreement 185–6, 259–60, 268, 274 munitions see armaments

Index

515

Napoleon 13, 32–3, 46, 58, 80–1, 91, 121, 128, 250, 458 nationalism 9–10, 32–6, 39–41, 44, 48, 106, 157–8, 163, 169–70, 173, 184–5, 189, 194, 207, 223, 247, 253, 259, 280, 288, 293, 305, 346, 400 nation states (listed by name) nationalisation 126, 129, 189, 283, 287, 296, 319, 340, 345, 381, 383, 394, 433 see also restructuring national park 136, 247, 387, 451 national socialism 205, 210, 238, 241, 248, 259–84, 403, 440 natural gas 199, 212, 243–5, 263, 266, 280, 312–13, 327, 337–9, 441, 444, 448 natural resources see raw materials navigation see canals and shipping Nazi Party see national socialism Neubrandenburg 2, 97, 124–5, 269 New Economic Mechanism 298–300, 314, 357, 421 Niš 3, 45, 132, 157, 181, 231, 366, 373, 436 Nitra (Nyitta) 2, 61, 210, 278, 330, 355, 405–6, 419 Novi Sad (Neusatz, Újvidék) 3, 22, 108, 116, 267, 337, 436 nuclear power 261–3, 281, 291–3, 328, 369, 372–5, 379–81, 443–4, 447–50, 454–6 Nyíregyháza 2, 337, 371, 399, 420 Oder 6, 15–18, 39, 76, 83, 87, 240–2, 277, 286, 292, 324, 368–9, 373, 429, 441–3, 446 Obrenović, M. 45–6 oil 39, 48, 158, 171, 182–7, 190, 199, 203, 208, 210–11, 214, 217, 240, 243–5, 257, 260, 263–7, 272–82, 291, 299, 312–15, 327, 336–40, 343, 360–2, 365, 369–72, 375–8, 393, 448 Olomouc (Olmütz) 2, 91, 125, 128, 269, 379 Olt 3, 22, 109, 245, 321, 341, 373–4, 408 Oltenia 22, 30, 210, 341, 372 Olsztyn (Allenstein) 2, 173, 181, 269, 313, 424–6, 429 Opatija 138–9, 285 Opole (Oppeln) 2, 71, 125, 237, 242, 269, 320, 372, 423–4, 428–9, 432, 434, 455 Oppeln see Opole Oradea (Grosswardein, Nagyvárad) 3, 130, 186, 231–2, 245, 269–70, 304, 329, 374, 402 Orşova 116, 131–3, 186, 335, 341, 368 Osijek (Eszék, Esseg) 3, 98, 269, 282.338 Ostrava (Mähr.Ostrau) 2, 69, 91–3, 159–60, 206, 210, 229, 244, 269–70, 276, 324–5, 331, 368, 372, 393, 396, 413, 419, 447 Oswięcim (Auschwitz) 262–4, 271, 274, 313, 336–7, 432 Ottoman Empire 14–15, 24–30, 33, 36, 39–55, 6–5, 71, 101, 105, 113–14, 163, 171, 187–90, 231, 393, 460 see also Turkey ownership 28, 37, 48, 55, 86, 184, 346 see also landowner Palacký 36, 184 Pančevo (Panscova) 2, 108, 237, 338, 434 Pannonian Plain (Nagyalföld) 4, 52, 65–6, 112, 116, 139–41, 144, 156, 160, 173, 186, 196, 337, 339, 420–1, 435, 443 paper 16, 102–3, 107–8, 142–4, 156, 199–202, 214, 435–7 Pardubice (Pardubitz) 2, 21, 108, 275 park 24, 146, 247, 258 see also national park

Index

516

parliament 33, 39–41, 46, 72–4, 106, 130, 188, 258–9 peasantry Pre-1914: 7–9, 19, 26–30, 33, 38, 42, 45–6, 49–57, 60, 63, 74, 99, 105–9, 113, 159–61, 164 1914–1945: 169, 174, 178–80, 183, 186–91, 194, 213, 220, 223, 226, 239, 242, 251–3, 279–81, 285, 287–8 Post-1945: 294, 303, 308, 344–6, 352, 358, 461 Peč 2–3, 157, 195, 210, 234, 320, 333, 439 Pécs (Fünfkirchen) 140, 246, 323, 388, 420, 447, 451 pedler see trader periphery 6–7, 51–2, 57, 87, 104, 123, 139–41, 159, 162–5, 179, 414, 458 Pernik 2–3, 210, 244, 282, 324 Petroşani (Petroszény) 27, 100, 134, 210, 213–14, 281, 397, 402 Phanariot 29, 47, 49, 54 Pharmaceuticals 90, 95–6, 212, 257, 262, 277, 313, 336, 338, 393 Piatra Neamţ 2, 102, 109, 220, 232, 337, 374, 402 Pilsen see Plzeň Piłsudski, J. 170, 181–3, 214, 267 Piotrków 142, 269 pipeline 263, 277, 280, 312–13, 336–8, 360–1, 369–71, 377, 441–3 Piteşti 2, 186, 232, 304, 313, 333, 336–9, 366, 380 plague see health planning 169, 185, 229, 214–15, 242, 246–7, 258–62, 267–72, 277–8, 281, 287–8, 293–7, 301, 310–11, 317, 322, 329, 336, 344–5, 348, 358–60, 375, 382, 388–99, 403, 412–13, 422–34, 441 see also Five Year Plans plastics 212, 217, 262, 336 Plauen 2, 16, 22, 80, 124, 203, 213, 254, 338 plebiscite 172–3, 218 Pleven 2, 156, 267, 313, 377 Ploče 144, 282, 363, 366, 437 Płock 2, 143, 269, 313, 337–9, 368–9, 377, 425–9 Ploieşti 2, 102, 118, 131, 232, 244, 270, 280, 304, 313, 338–9, 393, 402 Plovdiv 3, 114, 132–3, 146, 234, 314, 331, 338, 450 Plzeň (Pilsen) 2, 78, 93, 125, 137, 270, 275, 330, 413 Podgorica (Titograd) 2, 122, 132, 327, 329, 366, 436 Poland/Poles Pre-1914: 1–2, 7, 10, 13, 23–4, 32–3, 39–40, 48, 52, 73–7, 81–7, 116, 135, 142–3, 149–52, 158, 161–3 1914–1945: 169–79, 180–6, 190, 201, 204–5, 207–19, 228–31, 234–43, 247–51, 254–5, 260, 265–74, 278–9, 284–7 Post-1945: 291–6, 300–15, 321, 325–38, 344–5, 348–52, 355, 359–73, 377, 380–4, 387–92, 401, 405, 408–9, 412, 422–34, 440–1, 445–7, 450–5; general government 262, 266–7, 274–5 politics/political parties 9 see also named parties pollution 159, 318, 322, 326, 352–4, 373, 378, 382, 392–4, 400, 406, 420, 441–54 Pomerania 178, 181, 285, 363, 392, 422 population Pre-1914: 8–9, 15, 21, 48, 54, 61–3, 66, 70–4, 90, 133, 137, 142–5, 148, 155–64 1914–1945: 173–5, 179, 185, 189–92, 195, 216–19, 247–59, 271, 274–5, 283, 288 Post-1945: 295, 301–8, 322, 326, 349, 355, 389, 392–401, 407, 414, 420–4, 427, 431–3, 440–1, 446–7, 450 see also labour ports 22, 37, 44, 48, 56–7, 76, 97–102, 115–24, 133, 143–4, 137, 156, 214, 219, 242, 282, 369–71 Posen see Poznań

Index

517

post 22, 122, 133–4, 182, 184 Potsdam 2, 22, 71, 119, 235, 286–7 poverty 9, 123, 130, 158, 161–4, 178, 183–5, 194–6, 215–16, 253, 295, 392, 412, 435 Poznań (Posen) 2, 21, 33, 36–7, 52–3, 76–8, 81, 97, 120, 125, 138, 143–4, 154, 160, 165, 179, 182– 3, 211, 215, 229–30, 238, 254, 269–71, 283, 313–14, 321, 361, 372, 425–9 Pozony see Bratislava Prague (Prag, Praha) Pre-1914: 1–2, 19, 68, 82, 93, 96–7, 115, 120–9, 137–8, 148, 154, 158 1914–1945: 175, 184, 188, 206–8, 234–8, 251, 255, 269–70, 275, 278 Post-1945: 292, 311, 332, 335, 361, 366, 377, 385, 397–8, 413, 445–7, 450, 454 Pressburg see Bratislava prices Pre-1914: 5, 9, 21, 28, 37, 48–50, 55–60, 63, 74, 78, 83, 104, 113, 134–5, 143, 148, 159–60, 164 1914–1945: 169, 176, 180, 193–6, 206, 226, 249, 264, 281 Post-1945: 291, 295–300, 315, 319, 329, 333, 345–8, 377–8, 387, 394, 442, 456 Priština (Prishtinë) 3, 366, 435–6, 438 Prizren 2–3, 189, 234 productivity 303, 320, 344, 348, 398, 428–30, 439, 456 see also efficiency profits 68, 74, 85, 101, 124, 180, 203, 206–9, 283, 346, 394, 438 proletariat 55, 74, 159, 163, 186, 194, 294, 326, 345 proprietorship see landowner and land reform protected area 247, 354, 451, 460 see also national park protection 9, 20, 33, 38, 44, 47–8, 57, 63, 72–5, 92, 97, 102, 105, 143, 169–70, 174, 185, 188, 194, 199, 203, 212, 248, 265, 382 protectorate 259, 266–7, 270–1, 275–8, 284 proto-industrialisation 8, 15–20, 30 Prussia 7, 13–16, 20–2, 30–5, 39, 42, 77, 81–2, 87–92, 95–7, 118–28, 149, 160, 164, 173, 196 Prut 3, 117, 145, 158, 242, 365 Przemyśl 76, 143, 270, 277, 334, 361–2, 424–9, 440 Pula (Pola) 137–40, 145, 254, 285, 335 quality 20, 29, 101, 133, 196, 216, 227, 297, 344, 358, 386, 388 Radom 2, 143–4, 184, 229–30, 268–9, 320–1, 425–6, 429 railway Pre-1914: 15, 34–44, 48, 58–61, 68, 71–80, 83, 86–109, 115, 117–43, 155–6, 159–60, 163 1914–1945: 179, 182–90, 196, 199, 211, 219–24, 229–38, 242, 247, 256–8, 265–8, 271, 278–83 Post-1945: 291, 295, 312–13, 319, 326–8, 336, 340, 360–5, 368–9, 377–8, 392–3, 399, 412, 419, 422–3, 434, 437, 440, 451–3, 458 Râmnicu Vâlcea 2–3, 109, 223, 232, 313, 336, 338, 374, 402, 407–10 rationalisation see restructuring raw materials Pre-1914: 1, 15–16, 28, 42, 68–9, 72–4, 83, 86, 102–5, 111, 123, 133–4, 143, 155, 163 1914–1945: 174, 180, 185, 199, 208, 212–13, 224, 271, 280, 287 Post-1945: 291, 295–7, 300, 311, 313–20, 325, 328, 337, 342–4, 349, 360, 369–70, 392, 442, 453 see also cereals, wood, etc. rebellion see revolt reclamation see drainage, fertiliser and irrigation reconstruction 183, 287–8, 295, 299–300, 361, 392, 395–6, 403 see also restructuring recreation 256, 258, 308, 381–2, 388

Index

518

reform 43, 52–3, 106, 180, 282, 293, 297–301, 311, 314, 370, 399, 412, 428, 438, 456 see also land reform and NEM refugee 65, 181, 285, 292, 394 Reghin (Szászrégen) 109, 137, 220–1, 252, 341, 343, 402 regional development/policy 33, 37, 43, 89, 105, 130, 164, 183, 188, 203, 211, 214–16, 228, 242, 283, 294, 311, 318–19, 324–8, 338, 344, 350, 388, 358, 390, 414–42 see also planning religion/religious houses 8, 19, 23–6, 29–30, 33, 38, 41, 44, 47–51, 55–64, 102, 106, 109, 136, 149, 157–9, 170, 178, 185, 190, 213, 287, 306, 346, 354, 392, 412 rent 20, 54, 156, 345, 348, 395 reparations 174, 180, 281, 287, 291, 330, 338–40, 344, 437 research 217, 253, 262, 299, 315, 318, 355, 423, 433, 458 resettlement see settlement Reşiţa (Resicza) 2–3, 25–6, 94, 99–100, l24, 146–7, 204, 210, 220, 231–2, 245, 279–81, 324, 341– 3, 362, 374, 393 restructuring 203–4, 256, 266, 270, 282, 317–19, 324, 338, 342–4, 403–13, 428 retailing 45, 51, 64, 138, 155, 161, 214, 218, 242, 257, 350, 358, 383, 386–8, 393–7, 403–5, 420, 441 revolt 13, 39, 45, 48–54, 83–5, 106, 148, 158, 161, 303 revolution 10, 34, 39, 171–3, 188, 284–7, 291, 294, 439, 414 Rhodope 113, 373 Rijeka (Fiume) 3, 76, 98–9, 121–2, 129, 133, 137–9, 143–5, 187, 232, 313, 335–7, 366–9, 378, 387, 436–7 rising see revolt roads 15, 21–6, 29, 43, 52, 58, 79, 97, 109, 116, 121–3, 128–30, 133–7, 160, 185, 220, 235, 238– 40, 268–70, 276, 282, 340–3, 360, 363, 366–9, 378, 382, 387, 400, 404–5, 412, 423, 434, 451 Roma 15, 248, 253, 271, 306, 396 Romania/Romanians Pre-1914: 1, 3, 6–10, 23–9, 32, 35, 38, 44–9, 52–5, 63, 66, 69–70, 74–5, 78, 106–11, 132–4, 143–6, 149–54, 157–61, 164 1914–1945: 169–79, 186–7, 190–215, 228–31, 234–8, 241–56, 261, 265–8, 272–3, 279–82, 285–8 Post-1945: 291–5, 300–2, 305, 307–16, 321, 324–5, 328–32, 335–9, 344–6, 350–6, 359, 361–3, 365, 367–84, 389–93, 399, 405–8, 415–19, 443, 456 Rostock 2, 24–5, 230, 351, 363, 366–7, 370, 390 rubber 262–3, 271, 274, 312–13, 336–8, 393 rural areas 19, 37, 44–5, 61, 135, 138, 145, 148, 159–65, 169, 180, 183, 191, 199, 216, 224, 228, 239, 246, 248–54, 288, 294, 307–9, 317–19, 322–6, 344, 349, 352, 358, 379, 392–3, 396–413, 446– 9 see also agriculture and village Russe (Ruse, Ruščuk) 2–3, 101, 131–2, 312–13, 335, 355, 369 Russia 7–8, 13–14, 29–30, 35–9, 44, 47–9, 52, 56, 70–6, 83–5, 89–91, 97, 115–19, 123–5, 128, 132–3, 143–5, 154, 158–60, 163, 170–1, 181–3, 186, 208, 212, 218–19, 229, 306, 443–5, 454–6 see also USSR Ruthenia 158, 179, 185, 213, 238, 242, 278, 287 Rybnik 86, 430–4, 447 Rzeszów 2, 215, 334, 423, 425–6, 429 sales see marketing Salgotarjan 70–2, 94, 101, 204, 210, 246, 323–5, 330, 421 salt 22–4, 28, 56, 95, 134–6, 184, 212, 262, 336–8, 360, 446–7, 451–2 Sarajevo 3, 39, 130–2, 145, 235, 254, 282–3, 333, 363, 435–7

Index

519

Satu Mare (Sathmar, Szatmarnemeti) 2–3, 141, 186, 232, 238, 245, 251, 269, 278, 304, 339, 408 Sava 3, 108, 116, 193, 256, 366, 369, 381 Saxony 14–18, 31, 56–7, 70–1, 75, 80–1, 85–6, 90–2, 97, 107, 120, 123–5, 127–8, 149, 164, 195–6, 235, 277, 442 school see education Schutzstaffeln 262, 264–5, 274 Schwerin 2, 90, 124–5, 237 science see research and technology second economy 299, 309–10, 344 Second World War 87, 121, 180, 190, 204, 218–20, 223, 239, 242, 291, 295, 308, 336–8, 341, 344, 361, 365, 370–2, 403, 414, 419, 422, 433 security Pre-1914: 8–9, 26, 29–30, 35, 38–9, 44, 54, 66–8, 73–4, 103, 118, 121–2, 124, 126, 129, 133, 149, 163–4 1914–1945: 169, 179–88, 191, 213–15, 219, 229–31, 240–1, 246, 254, 258–82, 288 Post-1945: 291–4, 308–11, 320, 326, 346, 349, 360–1, 383–4, 388, 414, 435, 456 Selanik see Thessaloniki self-determination see democracy self-sufficiency 9, 38, 69, 72, 105, 182–3, 186–7, 194, 205, 217, 288, 310, 317–18, 324, 328, 350– 2, 399, 435, 440 Serbia/Serbs Pre-1914: 9, 30, 33–9, 44–51, 63–4, 74, 104, 122, 131–2, 135, 143–4, 149, 154, 157– 8, 161–4 1914–1945: 170, 173, 185–8, 195–6, 209, 216, 231–2, 234, 243, 249, 260, 262, 282–3, 285 Post-1945: 305, 326, 376, 435–6, 438, 461 serfdom see feudalism service sector 309–10, 322, 347, 354–88, 394–5, 400, 404, 427, 429 settlement 65–6, 82, 116–17, 139, 158, 195, 246–8, 263, 271, 274, 308, 367, 405, 412–13, 420, 441, 444 see also colonisation sharecropping 54–5, 64, 106, 287, 357 shipping/shipbuilding Pre-1914: 22, 29, 37, 61, 68, 75, 95–102, 115–19, 123–4, 131–3, 136–7, 142–4, 156, 159 1914–1945: 184, 196, 211, 214, 237, 241–2, 246, 262, 267, 282 Post-1945: 334–5, 351, 353, 360, 368–73, 423, 452 see also canals Shkodër (Scutari) 122, 189, 234, 239, 364, 385 shops see retailing Shumen (Kolarovgrad) 2, 282, 331 Sibenik (Sibenico) 137, 141, 209, 211, 244, 327, 329, 386, 437 Sibiu (Hermannstadt, Nagyszeben) 3, 26, 66, 130, 135, 137, 146, 224–5, 232, 245, 253, 280–1, 304, 338, 340, 374, 402, 408 Siemens-Schukert 69, 90, 126–7, 155, 203, 207–8 Sighetul Marmatiei (Maramarossziget) 109, 141, 237, 270, 304, 365 Silesia 16–20, 24, 57, 75, 81, 92–4, 115, 120–1, 124, 160–2, 178, 195–6, 204, 210, 229, 235, 242, 275–7, 285, 362, 442, 446 see also Upper Silesia Siret 3, 102, 109, 245 skill 82–7, 102, 105, 113, 132–3, 143, 160, 199, 215, 224, 228, 274, 288, 298, 303, 315, 324, 347, 349, 386 Škoda 46, 70, 93, 204, 330–3, 362, 379, 403–4 Skopje (Uskub) 3, 51, 123, 156, 189, 209, 231, 234, 254–6, 327, 366–7, 392, 435–7 Slavonia 144, 435 Slavs 13, 29, 32–6, 41,44–6, 50, 163, 184, 271

Index

520

Sliven 145, 333 Slovakia/Slovaks 17–18, 26–8, 41, 61, 65, 76, 89, 108, 135, 139–41, 160–2, 179, 185–6, 242, 247, 251, 254, 261, 265–7, 277–9, 284, 312, 325, 330–1, 334, 337–9, 368, 373–5, 413, 419, 441, 443, 461 Slovenia 8, 29, 173, 187–8, 209, 215, 282–5, 298, 305, 326, 329, 349, 363, 376, 380, 385–7, 403–7, 434–41, 454 see also Carniola smallholding 54–63, 92, 160–1, 191, 194–5, 249–51, 299, 400–1 Smederevo 2–3, 215, 326 social issues 8–9, 85, 157–64, 178, 184, 190–1, 199, 206, 213, 252–8, 285, 292, 294–7, 303, 306–8, 320, 346, 357, 395, 399, 409, 412, 423, 433–4, 438–40, 444, 447, 450, 454–9 see also housing and unemployment Social Democrat/Socialist Party/socialism 44, 60, 74, 171, 183, 186, 191, 287, 294 see also communism Sofia (Sofya) 3, 36, 101, 114, 123, 132, 146, 154, 157, 234, 244, 255–6, 261, 282, 292, 318, 331, 361, 365–6, 371, 377, 393, 398, 445, 455 Solidarity 300, 303, 370, 388, 428, 434, 454 Sopron (Ödenburg) 323, 338, 356, 388, 421, 441 Sosnowiec 2, 73, 86, 89, 97, 142, 269–70, 432 Southeastern Europe Pre-1914: 1–9, 29–31, 35–6, 42–55, 61–4, 69, 117, 122, 130–4, 144, 148–9, 161–5 1914–1945: 184, 191, 194–6, 203–4, 207–8, 212, 216, 228–39, 243, 254, 260, 264, 284–8 Post-1945: 293, 296, 313, 345, 363–4, 381–3, 389, 445, 460 see also named countries Soviet Union see USSR spa 24, 135–7, 246, 405 specialisation 80, 90, 97, 104, 134, 164, 211, 310, 331–4, 349–50, 356, 358–60, 369, 402–3, 419, 423, 459 Speer, A. 258, 263–5 Split (Spalato) 3, 122–4, 130–2, 137, 141, 144, 214, 231–2, 239, 243, 335, 363–6, 387, 436–7 sport see recreation stabilisation 206, 208, 256, 298–9 Stalin 1, 10, 13, 285, 317, 291–7, 310–11, 351, 385, 459 Stamboliski, A. 50, 174, 180–1, 226 Stara Zagora 3, 133 state farm 345, 350, 354–6, 401–2 state intervention 5, 8–9, 16, 19–21, 28–9, 37, 41, 66, 72, 76, 86–7, 94–5, 99–101, 124, 128–30, 138, 180, 183–6, 193, 199, 203–5, 214–15, 224, 246, 264–87, 404 state-owned enterprises 297, 299, 301, 317, 319, 381, 392, 428 see also state farm steam power see coal Stettin see Szczecin strike 219, 303 Stoyadinović, M. 211, 284 Stralsund 2, 124–5, 236, 390 Subotica (Maria-Theresiopel, Szabadka) 3, 131, 139–40, 156, 254, 436 subsidence 87, 89, 434, 451 subsidies 41, 59, 72–4, 105, 130, 228, 256, 309–11, 349, 355, 395, 407, 447, 456 subsistence 4, 20–1, 30–1, 57–8, 61, 66, 195, 251, 403, 414 substitution 206, 208, 212–13, 315, 363 suburbia 16, 90, 146, 149, 155–6, 159, 187, 247, 285, 364, 395–6, 404, 433 Suceava 2–3, 131, 232, 304, 365, 374, 402, 405, 408

Index

521

Sudeten Mountains/Sudetenland/Sudetes 196, 207, 218, 259, 305, 352, 355 sugar/sugar beet 33, 56–60, 71, 76–8, 90, 93–8, 101–2, 144, 160, 205, 213–14, 322, 350–1, 356, 440, 442–3, 449, 451–2 Szczecin (Stettin) 2, 21–2, 76, 97, 115, 119–20, 123–6, 143, 154, 214, 219, 236–9, 261, 269, 321, 334, 368–9, 425–6, 429 Széchenyi, I. 59, 116, 155 Szeged (Szegedin) 129–30, 139–40, 251, 323, 337, 361, 371, 375, 392, 420–1, 440 Székesfehérvár (Stuhlweissenburg) 2–3, 329, 420 Szolnok 2, 129, 246, 267, 323, 361, 375, 420 Szombethely (Steinamanger) 2–3, 140, 323, 338, 420–1, 441 Târgovişte 2–3, 232, 325 Târgu Jiu 2–3, 232, 267, 341, 372, 374, 402 Târgu Mureş (Neumarkt, Marosvasarhely) 2–3, 109, 137–9, 220, 232, 245, 278, 304, 337–9 tariff 9, 20, 24, 34, 37–41, 44, 55, 58–9, 63–6, 69, 73–5, 83–5, 89, 97, 102, 104, 114, 119, 133, 143, 169–70, 174, 199, 203, 207, 212, 219, 262 see also protection Tarnów 2, 273, 336–7, 361, 424–6, 428–9, 434 Tarnówskie Góry (Tarnowitz) 17–18, 431, 433 Tatabánya 2–3, 210, 245, 315–16, 372 Tatra 24, 65, 136, 162, 247, 382, 451 taxation 15, 27–9, 33, 40, 42–50, 54–5, 63–5, 72–4, 82–3, 105–6, 116, 122, 181–3, 190–1, 194–5, 208, 239, 251, 262, 265, 280, 285, 288, 297, 310, 314–19, 322, 345, 349, 357, 412 technical crops see industrial crops technology Pre-1914: 1, 5–7, 10, 15, 21, 30, 55, 58, 68, 73, 78, 81–2, 95, 99, 128, 155, 164 1914–1945: 205, 212–13, 275, 279–80, 283 Post-1945: 296–303, 313–15, 318–19, 321, 331, 338, 340–1, 344, 349, 351, 355, 361, 368–9, 382, 398, 403, 423, 428, 430–1, 438, 442, 445, 453, 456, 458 telegraph/telephone 90, 134, 203, 358, 458 Temesvar see Timisoara Teplice (Teplitz) 68, 92, 137, 207, 244, 269–70, 450 Tĕšín (Cieszyn, Teschen) 18, 173, 185–6, 270, 284 textiles Pre-1914: 16–21, 26, 31, 70–7, 80–5, 90–2, 95, 98, 102–5, 111–13, 139, 143–6, 159, 162–4 1914–1945: 174, 182–4, 200–1, 212–14, 242, 249, 257, 262, 265, 271, 274, 278, 287 Post-1945: 307, 311–15, 322–4, 330, 338–40, 392–3, 399, 421, 435–7, 461 Thessaloniki (Selanik) 3, 14, 50, 114, 121–3, 131, 156, 231, 234, 241, 244, 261, 298, 369 Third Reich see national socialism Third World 306, 316–17, 330–1, 335, 355 Thuringia 22, 75, 80, 86, 121–6, 210, 214, 260, 328 Timişoara (Temeschburg, Temesvár) 2, 116, 140–1, 146, 157, 186, 225, 228, 231–2, 237, 241, 245, 304, 338–40, 374 Tirana 2, 189–90, 234, 292, 338, 364, 385, 393 Tisza (family) 42, 106, 129, 170 Tisza (river) 22, 65, 109, 116, 130, 135, 139–41, 186, 237, 241, 246, 313, 361, 375, 449 Tito (J.Broz) 283, 285, 295, 298, 327, 435, 438 tobacco 132, 156, 181, 184, 216, 224, 350, 373 Tolbukin 2–3, 333 Torun (Thorn) 2, 21, 78, 125–6, 144–5, 229, 242, 269, 313, 321, 338–9, 392, 425–6, 429 totalitarianism 188, 254, 258, 263, 283–5, 288, 293–4, 403, 459–60 see also communism

Index

522

tourism 24, 108, 135–8, 239, 242, 246–7, 314, 322–4, 358, 365, 370, 373, 380–8, 395–7, 405, 412, 423, 440–1, 449, 461 trade/traders Pre-1914: 4, 6–9, 13, 16–31, 36–51, 58–63, 66–75, 78–80, 83, 86–9, 98–105, 114, 118–19, 122–4, 128–33, 138, 143, 148, 158–61, 164 1914–1945: 169–71, 174–7, 181–4, 187–91, 193–5, 199, 202–14, 218–20, 226, 234, 239–43, 248, 251, 268, 280–2, 286–8 Post-1945: 293–4, 296–300, 310–18, 320–5, 328, 331–2, 340, 346–53, 358–60, 369–73, 387–8, 393–5, 420–1 tramway 146, 155–6, 332, 440, 453, 456 Transnistria 267, 279 Transylvania 23, 27, 30, 35, 48, 65–6, 76, 97, 99–102, 105–12, 130, 161, 186–7, 194–6, 210, 220– 1, 224, 229–31, 248, 252, 265, 278–81, 285, 341 transhumance 26, 54, 66 transport Pre-1914: 7, 9, 21–3, 44, 51, 59, 81, 95–7, 105, 108–13, 148, 155, 158, 164 1914–1945: 171, 184, 194, 221–4, 228, 256–7, 265, 277, 280, 288 Post-1945: 295–7, 309–11, 316–21, 326–7, 352, 358–71, 382, 385, 390, 394, 398, 403, 435–7 see also road, railway, etc. Trenčin (Trencsén, Trentschin) 61, 111, 139, 229, 269, 278, 338 Trieste 3, 98–9, 121–2, 128–9, 137, 143–4, 159, 232, 285, 314, 363, 367 Turda (Torda) 66, 139, 232, 337, 402 Turkey 3, 7–8, 116–17, 123, 132–3, 164, 173, 181, 195, 216, 237, 248, 261, 292, 305, 350, 361, 366, 373, 379–80, 392, 394, 444 see also Ottoman Empire Turnu Severin (Drobeta-Turnu Severin) 2–3, 132, 232, 335, 340, 368, 374, 380, 402 Tuzla 2–3, 101, 210, 282, 327, 365, 435–6 Tychy 2, 86, 430–1 Ukraine 8, 33, 39, 86, 89, 171, 181, 185, 196, 248, 262, 266, 278–9, 295, 305–6, 326, 352, 368–70, 377, 419, 440, 445 unemployment/underemployment 7–9, 185, 191, 228, 299, 303, 307 unions 206, 294, 297, 300, 303, 383, 388, 412, 447 United Nations 286–7, 297, 344 university 37, 40, 68, 164, 228, 262, 305, 326, 355, 392, 400, 405, 423, 433, 438 Upper Silesia Pre-1914: 2, 17–18, 77, 86–91, 97, 122–3, 127, 142, 154 1914–1945: 173, 181, 183, 196, 210, 214–19, 238–9, 243–4, 254, 261 Post-1945: 320, 325–6, 348, 351, 361, 364, 367–8, 371–2, 377, 391, 399, 414, 422–3, 428–34, 442, 445–52, 461 urbanisation Pre-1914: 7–9, 24, 29, 32–3, 36–8, 44–5, 48, 51, 64–6, 74–6, 82, 85, 89, 104, 117, 127, 130, 133–5, 148–59 1914–1945: 183, 191, 194–5, 213–16, 224, 228, 239, 248, 252–9, 274, 285 Post-1945: 294–5, 302, 307–8, 317–20, 347–9, 352, 356–60, 381–2, 385, 388–99, 402, 407, 413, 419, 422–39, 442, 446, 449–51, 454, 459 see also towns by name USA 8, 38, 53, 155, 170–1, 191, 203–5, 208, 226, 249, 260, 263, 280, 286, 292, 314–16, 332–3, 351, 369, 380, 383, 385, 394, 445 USSR 1–5, 9–10, 117, 172, 181–2, 197–8, 206, 223, 248, 259–60, 263–8, 278–82, 285–7, 291–6, 299–300, 305–20, 325–36, 339, 344–5, 350–3, 360–3, 367–81, 414, 419, 429–30, 434, 442, 445, 448, 456, 459–60 see also Russia and Ukraine Ústí nad Labem (Aussig) 2, 10, 92, 97, 207, 230, 244, 261, 267, 275, 312

Index

523

Varna 3, 42, 117, 131–3, 143, 196, 234, 261, 282, 313, 335–7, 365–6, 369–70, 377, 388 Vidin 132, 234, 313 Vienna (Beč, Wien) 2–3, 7–8, 19, 24, 32–3, 38–43, 46, 63, 68, 70, 75, 81–2, 94, 98, 104–5, 122, 131–5, 138, 144, 155, 175, 185, 205–8, 234–5, 237–9, 241, 244, 261, 269, 275, 278–9, 362, 441 Vienna Congress 32–3, 43, 115, 123–4, 458 villages 16, 22–4, 26–8, 47–8, 52–4, 59–61, 65, 82–5, 135, 137, 159, 161, 174, 186, 195, 224, 243, 247–54, 295, 322, 345–7, 354–6, 378, 382, 387, 396–401, 405–7, 412–13, 438, 441, 446 Vilnius (Vilno, Wilna, Wilno) 181–2, 238, 269, 284 Vistula 6, 28, 75–6, 83, 115, 118, 120–1, 124–6, 136, 142–4, 182, 214, 219, 271, 292, 326, 429, 446, 449, 452 Vitkovice (Witkowitz) 69, 92–3, 128, 206, 275, 278, 379, 383 viticulture 61, 64–6, 213, 322–4, 350–3, 356, 373 Vlorë 188–90, 234, 237, 364 Vojvodina 195, 203, 306, 400, 435–6 wages 7, 37, 55–7, 74, 85, 114, 160–3, 180, 297–300, 303, 308–9, 348, 354, 440, 447 Wałbrzych (Waldenburg) 2, 16, 87–9, 218, 235–6, 425–6, 428–30 Wallachia 4, 14, 22, 26–9, 33, 48, 66, 102, 131, 157, 220 war 6–10, 13–16, 22–4, 30, 36–8, 44–50, 64–6, 83, 96, 102–4, 117, 124, 129, 217–18, 291, 317, 456 see also Balkan War and First/Second World War Warsaw (Warschau, Warszawa) Pre-1914: 2, 6, 13–16, 32–3, 76, 83–5, 89, 120, 125, 136, 142–4, 148–9, 154 1914–1945: 182–4, 191, 214–15, 229–30, 236–7, 240, 244, 247, 254–5, 261, 268–9, 274 Post-1945: 292, 309, 320–1, 349, 355, 361–2, 364, 366, 368, 372, 377, 382, 396, 398, 404, 422–6, 428–9, 446, 450 Warsaw Pact 1, 286, 301, 316, 325, 335, 419, 433, 435 water/water power Pre-1914: 4, 17, 24, 26–9, 82–5, 91–3, 98–9, 108, 111, 114, 136, 145–6, 156 1914–1945: 204, 211, 215–16, 220–1, 227–8, 240, 247, 256, 271 Post-1945: 322, 326, 338–43, 348–9, 352–6, 373, 381–2, 387, 394, 405, 422–3, 430, 434–5, 441–6, 449, 452, 455, 461 see also hydro electricity waterway see canal and shipping Weimar/Weimar Republic 178, 256, 264 West/Western Europe Pre-1914: 6–8, 38–45, 61–3, 75, 81–2, 112, 124, 130, 158, 162–3 1914–1945: 171–6, 188, 196, 205–7, 229, 237, 259, 265, 278, 280, 285–6 Post-1945: 293–8, 300, 303, 306–9, 314–18, 330–5, 343, 351, 355, 360–3, 366–9, 381–8, 395– 7, 403–4, 413, 435, 439, 445, 456–60 see also named countries Wilhelm II 35, 171 Wilson, President 170–1, 235 wine see viticulture Włocławek 2, 135, 142, 154, 368, 425, 427–9 Wolfen 96, 262, 336, 339 women 163, 253, 264, 307–8, 324, 387, 403, 429, 439 wood/wood processing Pre-1914: 4–6, 15–17, 22–30, 37, 40, 44, 48, 52, 65–6, 76–7, 80, 97–102, 105–11, 115–19, 135–7, 144–6, 156, 159 1914–1945: 174, 184–5, 187, 200–3, 213–14, 219–25, 240–2, 247, 257, 266 Post-1945: 291, 296, 319, 322, 335, 340–3, 350–4, 359, 364, 370–1, 382, 388, 399, 402, 423, 434, 440, 443–4, 448–9, 451, 461 work see employment and named activities

Index

524

workforce see labour workshop 48, 113, 149, 203, 249, 322, 404, 406 Wrocław (Breslau) 2, 18, 21, 76, 81, 86–9, 119, 122–5, 218–19, 230, 235–9, 254–5, 261, 269, 321, 331, 348, 361, 364, 392, 422, 425–6, 428–9, 445 Yambol 2–3, 132–3 yields 48, 57, 60, 63, 113, 135, 196, 226, 249, 348, 351–2, 449 Yugoslavia/Yugoslavs Pre-1914: 1–3, 13, 98, 145, 149–52 1914–1945: 172–6, 179–81, 185–204, 207–12, 215, 231–43, 248–51, 254–6, 266, 272–3, 282–8 Post-1945: 292–7, 299, 302, 305–6, 310, 313–16, 320, 325, 327–9, 333–9, 349, 352, 358–9, 362–9, 373–85, 387–8, 391–2, 397, 401, 405–7, 413–15, 434–9, 445, 459 Zabrze (Hindenburg) 2, 87, 142, 218, 244, 432 Zadar 2–3, 141, 232, 366, 381, 387, 437 zadruga 45, 64, 195, 387 Zagreb (Agram, Zágráb) 3, 41, 60, 98, 129–30, 133–5, 139–40, 146, 231–2, 237, 256–7, 261, 270, 331, 338, 366–7, 397, 434–7 Zakopane 24, 136,236 Záluži (Malteuern) 263, 275–6, 336–7, 339, 409, 453 Zenica 2–3, 204, 215, 326, 435–7 Zielona Góra (Grünberg) 2, 338, 424–6, 429 Žilina (Zsolna) 2, 108, 111, 129, 229, 339, 419 Zlín (Gottwaldov) 2, 203 Zog/Zogu A. 188–90 Zollverein 15, 34, 38, 71, 80–1, 97, 121–2 Zvolen (Zolyóm) 111, 139, 379 Zwickau 2, 22, 80, 123, 139, 254, 338