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THE ECONOMY OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE, 1815–1989 This comprehensive survey examines the dramatic changes in the economies of Eastern Europe, set in the political context of the region. The Economy of East Central Europe, 1815–1989 reviews two centuries of modernisation in the countries on the western border of the former Soviet Union. Wide in scope and including detailed and informative chronologies, David Turnock traces the economic history of the region within the wider political and ideological context. This exhaustive and thorough review brings together the entire scope of the modernisation process, from the first phase of modern national development in the Balkans and the impact of imperial systems on the area as a whole, to the feeling of ‘unfinished business’ at the end of the Second World War, and continuing up to the end of communism, evaluating the contrasts in the region between the northern and southern states, domestic division between dynamic and backward areas, and the increasing emphasis on the opening up of frontier regions. Balanced and informative, The Economy of East Central Europe, 1815–1989 is essential reading for all those with an interest in Eastern Europe or economic history. David Turnock is Emeritus Professor at the University of Leicester. His main research interest is in post-socialist countries, especially those in Eastern Europe. He is the author of The Making of Eastern Europe: From the Earliest Times to 1815 (1988) and Privatization in Rural Eastern Europe: The Process of Restitution and Restructuring (1998).
THE ECONOMY OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE, 1815–1989 Stages of transformation in a peripheral region
David Turnock
LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2006 David Turnock All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Every effort has been made to ensure that the information in this book is true and accurate at the time of going to press. However, neither the publisher nor the author can accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Turnock, David. The economy of East Central Europe 1815–1989: stages of transformation in a peripheral region/David Turnock.—1st ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-415-18053-8 (hardback: alk. paper) 1. Europe, Eastern-Economic conditions. 2. Europe, Central-Economic conditions. I. Title. HC244 .E255 2005 330.943′0009′034—dc22 2005005338 ISBN 0-203-48622-6 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-59843-1 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN10: 0-415-18053-8 (Print Edition) ISBN13: 9-78-0-415-18053-5 (Print Edition)
For Nicolae Muică with thanks for his companionship over some three decades of field study in rural areas across Romania
CONTENTS List of Figures
ix
List of Tables
xii
List of Abbreviations
xiv
Preface
xv
Introduction: Modernisation in East Central Europe PART I The nineteenth century
1 10
1 The region at the start of the nineteenth century
12
2 Political structures, agriculture and industry
30
3 Infrastructure, transport, tourism and energy
105
PART II 1914–45
153
4 The First World War, political structures, agriculture and industry
155
5 Infrastructure, transport, energy and tourism
208
PART III The communist era
265
6 Economy, industry and agriculture
267
7 Infrastructure, services and settlement
328
8 Regional planning and environmental change
379
9 Conclusion
419
Chronology outlining salient political, economic and social events
422
Bibliography
475
Index
503
LIST OF FIGURES 0.1 Physical geography, including major towns and state boundaries 2 for 1945–89 1.1 Political geography of the eighteenth century
13
1.2 The Reşiţa industrial region
24
2.1 The two-field system at Rogoz, Máramaros (Maramureş)
57
2.2 Settlement and ethnicity in the Apuseni Mountains
61
2.3 Industry in Poland in 1900
69
2.4 Industry on the Pürglitz (Krĭivoklát) Estate in Bohemia
72
2.5 The textile manufacturing centre of Łódź
77
2.6 The coalmining settlement of Anina
91
2.7 Industrial regions of Romania 1902
94
2.8 Forest railways in the Eastern Carpathians
100
2.9 Employment in industry in Banat and Transylvania 1910
102
3.1 Waterways in the northern part of the region
110
3.2 Railways in Germany and Poland to 1900
115
3.3 Towns in Hungary 1787–1910
129
3.4 Development of the Bârzava Valley for the Reşiţa metallurgical industry
135
3.5 Urban population 1910
141
4.1 States of East Central Europe after the First World War
158
4.2 Employment, illiteracy and natural increase in Central Europe c. 176 1930 4.3 Crop production and cereal/potato surpluses and deficits by region c.1930
181
4.4 Meat production in Central Europe c. 1930
182
4.5 Forest railways in the Covasna area of Transylvania
202
4.6 Industry in Romania in 1941
205
5.1 Railway development in Germany and Poland since the First World War
210
5.2 Railway projects in Romania since the First World War
211
5.3 Development of railways in Albania and Yugoslavia since 1918
212
5.4 Electricity generation and transmission c. 1940
223
5.5 Proposed electrification regions for Romania
224
5.6 Urban development 1910–50
233
5.7 Industrial areas of Zagreb
235
5.8 East Central Europe during the Second World War
239
5.9 Lignite working around the Brüx (Most) area of northern Bohemia
252
6.1 Communist states of East Central Europe
268
6.2 Forced labour in communist Romania
278
6.3 Industrial centres in Poland in the 1970s
294
6.4 Rural industry in Hungary
296
7.1 Regional variations in employment at the end of the communist era
329
7.2 Hydropower in the Romanian Carpathians
342
7.3 Urban growth 1950–90
357
7.4 Commuting in the Romanian Carpathians
367
7.5 Cooperatives and key villages in the Nitra area of Slovakia
371
7.6 Romania’s ‘sistematizare’ programme
373
7.7 Housing in Poiana Mărului, Braşov County, Romania
376
8.1 Urban agglomerations in Poland
388
8.2 Industrial Location Plan for Poland 1983–90
392
8.3 Decongestion in Upper Silesia
395
8.4 Yugoslavia’s central place system and electricity network
399
8.5 The environment of the Sudetes in the 1980s
414
LIST OF TABLES 2.1 Rural geography of the Habsburg Empire 1900–10
54
2.2 Employment in industry in Poland 1879–1913
70
2.3 Coal, oil, iron and steel production in Poland 1800–1920
80
3.1 Urban development in Hungary 1787–1910
130
3.2 Population of towns 1870–1990
138
3.3 Urban growth by country 1870–1990
139
3.4 Urban growth rates by population size groups 1870–1990
139
4.1 Population 1920–39
161
4.2 Population and industrial activity in relation to Europe 1938 162 4.3 Trade balances 1920–38
163
4.4 Land distribution by farm size c. 1930
177
4.5 Employment in industry in 1930
183
4.6 Changing occupational structures in industry 1920s and 1930s
184
4.7 Industrial production, consumption and trade 1934–7
184
4.8 Mineral resources and production 1928–38
191
5.1 Economic sectors: working population and national income 227 1930s 5.2 Aspects of population and agricultural dependence in the
228
1930s 5.3 Rural population 1900–90
229
5.4 Germany’s through-roads in Ostdeutschland
246
5.5 Coal, steel and electricity production 1913–43
249
6.1 Population, urban development and capital cities 1950–90
277
6.2 Growth of crude steel production under communism
297
7.1 Power stations in Yugoslavia to 1983
343
7.2 International tourism 1983–7
350
7.3 Existing towns and new towns proposed under Romania’s ‘sistematizare’ programme
373
7.4 Proposed rural centres in Vâlcea County, Romania
374
8.1 Investment in Romania 1950–89 by county groups
380
8.2 Employment in Romania 1960–89 by county groups
382
8.3
384– 85
Hungarian settlement system
8.4 Urban agglomerations in Poland 1979
389
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Comecon
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
CSCE
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
ECE
East Central Europe
ECECs
East Central European countries
FDI
foreign direct investment
FSU
Former Soviet Union
FYP
Five Year Plan
GATT
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR
German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GNP
gross national product
GOP
Gornośląskię Okreg Prsemyslowy (Poland)
MFN
most favoured nation
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEM
New Economic Mechanism
OSCE
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
ptp
per thousand of the population
SEE
Southeastern Europe
SEECs
Southeast European countries
SOE
state-owned enterprise
TEM/TER
Trans-European Motorway/Railway
UNRRA
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
VVB
Association of Publicly Owned Enterprises (GDR)
WOG
Large Economic Association (Poland)
PREFACE
This book is a development of previous work which aimed at tracing the historical geography of the communist states bordering on the then Soviet Union and comprising a territory known at the time as ‘Eastern Europe’. The situation has now moved on and we now refer to the region as ‘East Central Europe’ thereby reserving the ‘east’ for the former Soviet states themselves. However, the historical geography of this area remains an absorbing topic, albeit with a shift in the focus from the background to communism to the reorganisation of a major component of Europe’s periphery. Since the previous book was published in 1989 scholarship has also moved on and the present work aims at an updated and in-depth study of one component: the economic geography of the modern period starting in 1815 but now extending through the communist period since this has now passed into history and can be reviewed in its entirety. For this reason the boundary of the study area remains unchanged even though it is anomalous to include the core of the German Empire in the European periphery and not the Habsburg counterpart: Vienna. The book includes a ‘stock-take’ of the situation in 1815 since the protoindustrialisation that took place in the eighteenth century in a number of German and Habsburg territories is an important part of the story even if the southeast remained relatively backward. What the book tries to demonstrate is the complexity of the struggle by a peripheral region to develop its political power from a position of economic inferiority. The state became proactive in economic development although the political geographies and the economic programmes were highly contested. Imperial and national approaches underpin the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries respectively, followed by the communist era which involved extreme state intervention while the dominance of Moscow compromised—without entirely suppressing—national integrity. The sad conclusion is that despite Herculean efforts the exercise of independent political power has incurred heavy economic costs since G.Berend’s paper of 2002 sees the region as being further behind the West now than it was in 1815. And the question for the future is whether a more integrated Europe will be more successful in achieving convergence, at least as far as East Central Europe is concerned. However, for most of today’s English readers there is the challenge of an unfamiliar historical context which is addressed not only through the contextual material in each chapter but the chronologies which offer some detail on political, economic and social events. The alternative placename spellings, replete with diacriticals, are a minefield in themselves, and—except for some ethnically stable villages—the approach here has been to use the names that were official at the time and
to quote the present one in brackets on the first occasion each name comes up in a particular chapter. Fairly complete listings appear in books by authors such as N.J.G.Pounds (1969 pp. 877–9), while R.H.Osborne (1967 pp. 325–44) helps with pronunciation. This modest work of synthesis would not have been possible without the researches carried out in historical geography and in economic and social history over recent decades and listed in the bibliography, which is however restricted to English language works apart from key statistical and cartographic sources. In addition I am grateful to countless individuals and institutions across the region for helping me in my travels around the region over the past four decades. In particular, the study of urban population trends—albeit compromised by inconsistencies over dates and boundaries—would not have been possible without help from Karl Martin Born (Berlin) who kindly supplied data for German towns from Neumann’s Orts- und Verkehrs-Lexikon (1900) and Amtliches Gemeindeverzeichnis (1939); also Branislaw Domański and Włodzimierz Kurek (Kraków) recommended Polish sources and gave me general information, particularly for Upper Silesia; while Branislav Djurdjev (Novi Sad), Dražen Njegac (Zagreb) and Caedmon Staddon (Bristol) provided some census data for the southern republics of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bulgaria, respectively. Martin Hampl (Prague) helped me with the location of rural industrial centres on the Křivoklát estate while several colleagues—Krystyna Carter (London) for Polish; Vladimir Drgona (Nitra) for Czech and Slovak; and Erika Nagy (Békéscsaba) for Hungarian—have assisted over linguistic details. Peter Jordan (Vienna) discussed the history of Pula while Dražen Njegac (Zagreb) clarified matters relating to the city’s industry. Petr Pavlínek (Omaha) commented on the history of coalmining in the Most area and Claudia Popescu (Bucharest) gave me information on the organisation of agriculture and the planning of new towns in Romania’s Vâlcea county. Field study in Romania has been important for several studies included in the book, especially those concerned with heavy industry in Reşiţa, the timber industry in the Carpathians and rural settlement projects in Poiana Mărului and Rogoz. This work has been done over a number of years and would not have been possible but for Nicolae Muică (Bucharest), to whom this book is dedicated, as well as my wife Marion and a number of local contacts. Some of the maps from the earlier work have been recycled but many are entirely new drawings expertly drafted by Ruth Pollington in the Leicester University Geography Department. Finally, Routledge have been very supportive of my efforts over the years and for this present volume I am particularly grateful to Jane Blackwell, Philippa Grand and Vicky Peters. David Turnock Leicester, August 2005
INTRODUCTION Modernisation in East Central Europe As defined for the purposes of this book, East Central Europe (ECE) has an area of 1.27 million sq.km and a population of 137.8 million (1985) with an overall density of 102 persons/sq.km (Figure 0.1). The maximum longitudinal spread is some 26 degrees (about 1,300km) between the Italian-Slovenian frontier and the Danube Delta but is reduced to only 400km between Hungary’s Austrian and Ukrainian frontiers before widening again to some 1,200km at 51 degrees north in the territory of East Germany and Poland. Northsouth distance reaches its maximum between 40 degrees north in southern Albania to 55 degrees north in northern Poland, a distance of some 1,650km. The region’s coherence arises from the adoption, by monopoly communist parties, of elements of the former Soviet system of government, including socio-economic development through a command economy guided by central planning. There was some relaxation after Stalin’s death in 1953 underpinned by Red Army withdrawals from the Balkans—though not from East Germany and other countries of particular importance for transit—but maintenance of communist power was guaranteed by the Brezhnev Doctrine which legitimised Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 on the grounds that a threat to the system in one country was a challenge to the alliance as a whole. Now there is unity through transition policies; these are also characteristic of the former Soviet republics, although the latter no longer comprise a superpower centre. However, it is usual to divide the region into two halves: a northern tier comprising the relatively welldeveloped states of Czechoslovakia, East Germany (GDR), Hungary and Poland; and a southern, Southeastern European (SEE) group taking in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. The latter area found the Soviet system particularly relevant to economic development in the second half of the twentieth century, along with Soviet technology and raw materials, while the more sophisticated northern economies with considerable democratic experience were arguably constrained by the Soviets’ extensive approach. There are significant constraints in the mountains, however. Just over a fifth of the land is higher than 500m. To an extent the mountains help to block maritime climatic influence and accentuate drought risk. Despite high sunshine levels in the south, the geopolitical base for the development of nation states is often problematic, e.g. for Albanians and Macedonians, encouraging autonomy within
The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989
Figure 0.1 Physical geography, including major towns and state boundaries for 1945–89
2
Introduction
3
imperial structures rather than outright independence. Remarkably large agricultural communities were supported in the past, although remoteness from marauding armies and feudalising landowners were also significant factors, as was the high incidence of disease in the lowlands in early modern times. However, the mountains are not a continuous barrier except in the case of the Dinaric ‘wall’ complicating inland penetration from the Adriatic. Instead there is often easy access through ‘corridor valleys’; making the Balkan lands a ‘commercial and cultural crossroads’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 3). There are niche situations in the intramontane depressions ‘formidable enough to preserve native particularism and to prevent widespread diffusion of the competing foreign influences’ (ibid.). Yet subsistence farmers must concentrate on the hardiest cereals, such as rye in the Carpathians. Minerals are scattered and do not offer scope for major metallurgical complexes comparable with the Ruhr. Industrial growth has been limited, though significant in contact cities drawing on complementary resources and in the depressions which are also useful for ‘hiding’ strategic industries. On the other hand, the mountains are still heavily forested and the woodlands are very important commercially, with exports of raw timber now diversified by manufactured products such as board, plywood and furniture requiring a greater degree of processing. Meanwhile, the scenic attractions of the mountains with cultural landscapes indicative of settlement continuity and pluriactivity have become important resources for tourism. Complementary lowland areas, particularly the North European Plain and the plains associated with the Danube (the Pannonian Plain—known to Hungarians as Nagyalföld— and the Lower Danube or Wallachian Plain) comprise fertile land interspersed with less tractable sands. The latter have often supported only poor grazing (like the Hungarian ‘puszta’) or woodland, although more recently the supply of irrigation water has opened the way to more intensive uses. However, conditions are very dry in the southeasternmost parts of the region: Dobrogea, Moldavia and eastern Wallachia (Bărăgan steppe) have an annual rainfall below 50cm and irrigation is therefore critical. In the past much of the land was used to rear livestock and grow cereals for export. But the growth of population and industry means that more land is needed to feed the population and generate agricultural raw materials. The trade surplus has been turned into a deficit and by the 1980s there was a considerable net import of cereals. On the farms cereal crops are complemented by sugar beet and fodder, while additional areas are devoted to textile crops, oil plants such as sunflowers, tobacco and a range of medicinal and aromatic plants. There are also vegetable gardens, orchards and vineyards with considerable export potential. Livestock rearing has become more intensive (contributing to the cereal deficit) since meat production is an important indicator of rising living standards. Fish are also more important: caught by trawlers in distant waters to supplement the traditional fisheries along the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Sea coasts, the inland rivers (the Danube Delta and floodplain lakes) and fish ponds which are particularly numerous in southern Bohemia. The whole region is within 500 kms of the sea except for the eastern parts of Hungary and Slovakia and adjacent areas of Poland and Romania. This book follows earlier work in historical geography (Turnock 1988, 1989) which provided a context for the communist revolution and the transformation of the region through central planning under which national interests were often constrained by the hegemony of the Soviet Union. Now that fifteen years of transition have occurred it is appropriate to examine the traumatic communist interlude and to ask whether it was a
The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989
4
perverse interruption of a ‘natural’ progression towards greater integration among the nations of Europe as a whole or a constructive stage of development which may in some way have been ‘inevitable’ in the sense that, even if Soviet influence had been eminently benign, there would have been an extension of state intervention in the economy and curbs on the deployment of private capital. For the time was ripe for industry based on old technology—limiting capital while maximising employment—since the 1930s brought home the weakness of overconcentration on agriculture. The comprehensive rejection of communism by the neoliberal ethos of transition states in the early 1990s should not totally obscure the rationale of the former system as an escape from the frustrations of backwardness on Europe’s periphery, even though the excessive overriding of the real costs of production—in the strategic interests of the Soviet Union— was on balance a burden to the region. But the post-communist phase is promoting a surge in scholarship that is assessing the pre-socialist era without the in-built ideological hostility of the recent past. The immediate pre-communist period may seem inevitably ‘bad’ for somehow failing to deliver faster growth and so ‘justifying’ the communist phase, yet it may also be seen as an alternative constructive phase confronting the same basic challenges as the communists in the transformed context of post-1918 nation states and the drive for industrialisation given the deteriorating terms of trade for farmers and the strategic imperatives arising from a vulnerable position sandwiched between Germany and the USSR. Western writers no longer plough a ‘lonely furrow’ in enquiring into the debates of the inter-war years that went way beyond class conflicts and workers’ demonstrations. It also seems appropriate to extend the discourse back into the nineteenth century to deal with the first phase of national development in SEE in the modern period and also to consider the impact of imperial systems on the area as a whole. In this way the book provides a review of two centuries of modernisation under rapidly changing political and technological conditions, with the latter underpinned by a shift from a rural to an urban emphasis. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE: CONTESTED STATE FRAMEWORKS THROUGH THE AGES A key element in the historical context is the changing position of the region from one centrally placed astride the migration routes and (in the case of the SEECs) integrated into the Roman Empire to one occupying the margins of the oceanic trading system with a major role as exporter of primary commodities. The region was certainly congenial for settlement and agriculture in prehistory, playing a part in the diffusion of crops from the Middle East to Western Europe. Prehistoric settlers found the relatively warm and dry lands of the Danube and Morava-Vardar corridors gave easy access to new farming lands as forest was cleared, especially on the light loess soils. The amber routes exemplify the region’s transit role, transmitting cultural influences from the Balkans to the coniferous and deciduous woodlands of the North European Plain, where German and Slav colonists initiated economic developments which eclipsed the Balkans in medieval and modern times. With access provided by such rivers as the Elbe, Oder and Vistula, surpluses could be marketed through the Hanseatic trading system. Yet ECE lost out when the historic trading axis from the Mediterranean to the East was eclipsed by the great discoveries
Introduction
5
which stimulated economic advance and technological innovation in Western Europe. During the Industrial Revolution, with its coal-based technology, it was impossible to escape from a largely colonial relationship with the West because few large industrial regions developed. ‘Peripherally’ provides an essential context through the perpetual economic challenge of ‘catching up’ with the advanced countries and competing for the attentions of their capitalists. It also directs interest to the trickle of ideas about development options that were not strictly in keeping with Western models which may not be entirely redundant despite the present momentum for EU enlargement, involving Western engagement with the Balkans on a scale that could not have been imagined until recently. Industrialisation lies at the root of the economic advance, although the medieval period laid some of the foundations. For example, in the Saxon Erzgebirge there was woodland clearance for agriculture in eleventh and twelfth centuries, followed by widespread clearance for mining in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries after rich finds of silver and tin were made in many places: wood was needed for smelting and was also used in mining, and wider supply areas were necessary. But progress was not sustained through time or space, although when long-distance trade was disrupted by conflagrations like the Thirty Years War, towns were needed for local marketing on landed estates, e.g. Głogów; also for defence (the Brody fortress), administration, religion and learning, not to mention the residences of magnates (e.g. Zamość) and the meetings of the gentry (indeed it was common for towns to be private, i.e. subordinate, to their owners). However, the early modern period brought a major setback through war and an accompanying agrarianisation (Bogucka 1996). While Warsaw grew tenfold from the late sixteenth to the late eighteenth century (10,000–100,000) and Gdańsk showed roughly 50% growth (40,000–58,000), other leading towns in Poland either stagnated or declined. In the context of somewhat reduced boundaries towns of 2,000 or more declined from 155 to 51, while those smaller than 2,000 fell from 1,132 to 523. A peripheral position in Europe does not explain all the complex changes in the region’s political make-up which are crucial to an understanding of the constraints imposed on the development of nations, which have been continually reconstituted. It has been the region’s fate that after Roman intervention in a complex tribal structure evolving through prehistory (incidentally providing a cultural foundation for the countries of Albania and Romania), small dynastic states have been subjected to further waves of imperialism. It is important to recognise the economic, social and political consequences of the Ottoman advance and the absorption of Balkan territory; for the problems of economic backwardness and virulent nationalism which have dominated the region’s politics in modern times can be traced back to the constraints on reform in the Ottoman Empire which first entered Balkan territory in the fourteenth century. And although the north was more closely integrated economically with Western Europe, the Polish state was undermined by a series of partitions orchestrated by the Habsburg, Prussian and Russian empires. Thus the modern era was grounded in the economic requirements of major powers whose political and industrial heartlands were to varying degrees external to the region. The book takes off at this point with a summary of modernising trends during the eighteenth century and highlights a degree of polarisation as the empires encouraged development in specific areas through new laws and the economic stimulus of wider markets through improvements in transport and the removal of internal trade
The economy of east central Europe, 1815-1989
6
barriers. Large areas were to become marginalised as rural peripheries where the privileged elites were bolstered by neo-feudalism, and migration was virtually the only solution to the crisis of underemployment. The nineteenth century This is the starting point for the detailed narrative. The political map for the middle decades would highlight the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian empires, along with the German states, among which Prussia was gaining ascendancy. The dynamism of the north can be seen in the relatively early demise of the feudal system, for change began in the Habsburg Empire with the ‘Serfdom Patent’ of 1781—and reform occurred in Prussia in 1807—although the formal completion came only in 1848, with Russia following in 1861 and Romania in 1864. But long before the mid-nineteenth century customary obligations were being converted to cash payments in order to increase economic efficiency, whereas in the backward areas formal abolition changed little: it gave the lords freedom to exploit what were now their personal possessions, while peasants stranded on their smallholdings were obliged to enter into labour contracts to undertake estate work for low pay (or for no wages at all if the deal was tied to sharecropping) with traditional social relations perpetuated. Understanding society in much of the region has to be grounded in the logic of peasant farming and the struggle to secure basic needs from small plots of land using simple technology. The other side of the coin comprised a small urban-based middle class constrained by limited demand for local industry and delayed reform of guild systems, while the contributions of the aristocracy to modernisation were seen more through military service and administration (even the Prussian elite became a class of hereditary state servants) than through enterprise. There was hardly a yawning divide between north and south, although the latter was relatively slow to develop significant growth areas. The Habsburg-Ottoman ‘tug-of-war’ was resolved by the southward expansion of Vienna’s imperial borderlands. The Habsburg borderlands were not substantially richer than territories immediately to the south—which in some respects industrialised earlier—but they did enjoy relatively enlightened and principled government conducive to the development of civil society while the remaining Ottoman lands were being contested by the emerging nations of the Balkans and wider imperial designs. A novel situation arose whereby the Danubian principalities were subject to Ottoman suzerainty, yet remained vulnerable to Habsburg occupation before being placed under Russian protection until 1856 and subsequently the now independent state of Romania fell into the German economic orbit by the end of the century. However, the political configuration was not dictated solely by the balance of power between the major actors on the world stage, for the ethnicity of the region was such that nationalism ensured a measure of ‘locally dictated developments’ whereby the nations of ECE were able to make a difference. But the ‘state-led nationalism’ of Western Europe contrasted with ‘state-seeking nationalism’ as ‘Balkanisation’ spawned a tier of new nation states when it became evident that the Ottomans had little to offer their Christian population at a time of increasing national awareness. Meanwhile, the Habsburgs agreed on a share of power between Budapest and Vienna, and the political transformation was completed by US-sponsored self-determination at the end of the First World War which left many Germans and Hungarians stranded by the collapse of the imperial structures.
Introduction
7
Huge infrastructural overhauls were therefore needed during the decades on either side of the First World War, highlighting the very close link between economics and politics. But the economic challenge was all the greater because a ‘natural’ division into agricultural and industrial regions—based on physical and demographic resources, entrepreneurial skills and social organisation—was no longer feasible. Agricultural regions were by definition poor and overpopulated while industrial regions were strong (notwithstanding the demographic basis of much of the protoindustrialisation in the eighteenth century). How was industrial growth to be accelerated? While the UK industrial revolution was largely due to spontaneous private forces able to stimulate continuing demand (though not without some preconditions satisfied by the state), Germany and the Habsburg Empire relied on investment banks which emerged from urban banks providing credit for the nobility and large merchants—as well as governments—although there were rural banks to tide peasants over after a bad harvest (a function which otherwise fell to itinerant pedlars). Following the Austrian National Bank of 1816, commercial banks followed in the second half of the century, like the Creditanstalt which specialised in agricultural credit. Banks could stimulate pride among ethnic groups, like the Czechs, Slovenians and Ukrainians in the Habsburg Empire, and they could also fuel antiSemitism. The SEECs started setting up their national banks—as well as commercial and agricultural banks—during the second half of the century. But the more backward European economies also needed direct government investment and initiative, as Gerschenkron (1962) and Spulber (1966) have pointed out. For national security demanded that industry should expand and if entrepreneurs were not available the state would have to do the job. Indeed this book is very much concerned with the role of the state to the point where ‘too strict a dichotomy between Balkan capitalism and socialism obscures the continuity across the last century of powerful government institutions and nationalistic ideologies’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 13). The new nation states now had to temper comparative advantage and free trade (and the reality of underemployment and overpopulation) with protection through strategically significant, employment-maximising ideas of self-sufficiency to relieve rural poverty combined with strict regulation of foreign capital. Yet the resource base for selfsufficiency was by no means compelling in the south where the new nations struggled to modernise through agricultural surpluses that could be overtaken by harvest failure or tariff war (which suddenly forced the Serbs to switch from livestock exports to meat packing). Romania became one of the world’s leading cereal exporters with rail as well as sea transport available, yet all this was but a means to an end: industrialisation with a politically motivated land reform programme to give peasants greater security and independence, which unfortunately came too late to prevent the peasant revolt of 1907. Agrarian parties arose to advocate this complementary strategy although some idealists saw land reform, with village cooperatives and credit organisations, as an almost complete alternative to urban-industrial expansion, attracting the support of some socialists—though not communists, given the dichotomy of individual versus collective—and even nationalists when there were ethnic distinctions between peasants and landlords. They emerged in the half century before 1914 when world market forces upset traditional rural society and when extended suffrage boosted the potential for parliamentary success.
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The twentieth century The twentieth century greatly extended the modernisation project through further Kondratieff cycles linked with an ongoing and increasing radical political transformation. Despite the overwhelming moral arguement for self-determination, the Versailles system was unstable enough for the British geographer H.J.Mackinder to appreciate the strategic importance of ECE to both Germany (seeking eastward expansion into the Eurasian heartland) and Russia (looking for security on her western frontier). He advocated a security system for the new democracies, but this was only achieved to the limited extent of the Little Entente in view of major foreign policy differences between the states of the region themselves. By the late 1930s Germany was casting a shadow and substantial territorial changes were made to create a Greater Germany (‘Grossdeutschland’) and allow a larger stake in the region for Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy. Measures were taken to simplify the ethnic structure through resettlement (including population exchanges). And the need for an alliance with the Soviet Union to challenge Germany involved a nearhopeless quest for compromise between the interests of nation states like Poland and the aspirations of the Soviets to regain lost territory. Meanwhile, national industrialisation was gaining momentum with greater desperation as the setbacks in agriculture that followed the fall in world agricultural prices after 1929 ushered in a trend towards increasing state intervention going way beyond the first steps in grain marketing. Given acute capital shortage it was impossible to safeguard the traditional sectors and adopt new technology at the same time. Thus Berend (1996 p. 360) takes lessons from history to argue that in both the 1870s and 1930s the region could not accommodate changes ‘and responded by attempting to save and protect the obsolete sectors in its economy’. However, Germany took advantage of the opportunity to carve out an economic empire in ‘Fortress Europe’ and from the later 1930s until 1945 the region struggled to reconcile national industrialisation with the demands of the German war economy. The degeneration into communism in the late 1940s meant an extension of the war economy in the Soviet interest, with some additional momentum through perceived benefits in national reconstruction and cohesion. It was maintained—indeed entrenched—‘against a background of threatening hostilities: the Korean War, the NATO embargo on deliveries of strategic goods and counter-measures by Comecon members’ (Kaser and Zielinski 1970 p. 31). While the eastern territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania were lost to the Soviet Union in 1945, the region as a whole became a tier of satellite states subject to communist party monopoly power and an economic blueprint based on the Soviet FYPs of the 1930s. Yet, while there was certainly a revolution in the region during the late 1940s, it was the 1920s which required a new start in building states within revised boundaries, while the 1930s made it clear that the state would inevitably play a leading role. Subsequent decades merely perverted this trend in the Soviet interest with consensus gained through sacrificing much of the region’s social capital to Stalin’s paranoia. The latter’s death in 1953 came too late to halt a process which had already com prehensively devoured the non-communist leadership and even made inroads into the new elites through charges of nationalist deviations. Yet it was also too soon for the image of the party to be unduly tarnished and nearly four decades of unprecedentedly rapid growth—in pursuit of a perverse ‘war economy’—had to be sustained on the basis of distorted external relations and a cynical disregard for majority public opinion. Whatever benefits accrued from the strategies adopted they were
Introduction
9
fundamentally flawed because each nation’s aspirations were deliberately manipulated. Elites felt they had a vested interest in unbalanced development as they had a century earlier; what was different was the removal of an ethnic distinction between the elite and the mass of the population. The book therefore ends on a distinctly ambivalent note for the progress of the region for the last half century has been based on a false premise and the current reconstruction has not only to restore balance through recovery in the primary and tertiary sectors but comprehensively rebuild the flagship.
Part I THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
1 THE REGION AT THE START OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY In political terms the nineteenth century was based on firm reaction to a Napoleonic revolution that arose out of the Enlightenment and its increasingly liberal interpretations. Napoleon’s arrangements in Europe involved a French Empire extending way beyond ‘natural frontiers’ to include an Elbe-Baltic corridor (separating Denmark-Norway from the German ‘Rhine Confederation’), Tuscany, Illyria and northeastern Spain; with dependencies in western Germany (where the Rhine Confederation brought the Holy Roman Empire to an end), Italy, Naples, Poland (or the Grand Duchy of Warsaw) and Spain; rounded off by more or less unwilling allies in the Habsburg Empire and Prussia. The impact in ECE was most apparent in Illyria and Poland and it is fascinating to speculate on the consequences for the region had Napoleon’s intervention been durable enough to establish a Yugoslav piedmont at the head of the Adriatic and safeguard Poland’s integrity so as to establish an impetus for nation state development far ahead of the Balkan countries that emerged in the second half of the century. Following the disaster of the First Partition in 1773, Poland’s attempted recovery through a constitution grounded in Enlightenment merely provoked a Russian invasion of 1792 and a Second Partition in 1793, whereupon T.Kościuszko’s rebellion in 1794 against foreign overlords ended with the capitulation of Warsaw and the Third Partition in 1795. Under Adam Czartoryski the Poles then took advantage of Napoleonic pressure against Prussia to forge a pact with St Petersburg under the ‘Puławy Plan’ to restore Poland in union in Russia. But this ‘Slavic’ initiative was overtaken by Napoleon’s progress to the extent that the Grand Duchy of 1807 also recovered the territory taken by the Habsburg Empire and Prussia in the last two partitions (less Białystok). Following Tilsit, the arrangement was a ‘gift’ to the Poles for supporting Napoleon and there was always the hope that full independence might be restored in the future. The Poles persevered although the continental system meant they could not export for economic growth (while Britain’s embargo on the emigration of artisans slowed down attempts at adaptation). Instead they sent troops to assist Napoleon in Italy and Spain and shouldered the obligation of paying off a mortgage owed to Russia as the former partitioning power. Napoleon’s intervention was probably seen as being as radical at one pole of the political spectrum as did Stalin’s at the opposite extreme a century and a half later.
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Figure 1.1 Political geography of the eighteenth century. Note the selfcontainment of the region highlighted by the marketing of cloth from Brünn.
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There was reaction everywhere—even in France—but within the region the liberal turn would certainly have evoked a more positive response in some areas than in others according to the north-south divide (Figure 1.1). Progressive trends were already evident in the Habsburg Empire through the enlightened absolute rule of Maria Theresa (1740– 80) followed by the Josefinian era which started with the emancipation of serfs on the royal estates. Overpopulation in the north created a force for protoindustrialisation which in turn brought increased agricultural production and gave natural resources greater value, as changing attitudes towards woodland demonstrate. After centuries of destruction, which left the forests intact only in inaccessible areas, it was time for a more sustainable approach. Protection gave a basis for reconstruction after extensive erosion through the needs of agriculture as well as mining and smelting, demonstrated graphically for the Erzgebirge by Thomasius (1994) who refers to widening supply areas for industry as well as clearance through colonisation by Bohemian exiles, especially in the west. Under the Teresian forest regulations in Carniola 1771 customary rights were retained in state forests only and there was a further shift towards personal ownership under Josefinian legislation (not to mention some temporary innovations under the French). Yet while mobilisation of human resources based on individual rights might strike a chord in the ‘European’ north where modernisation was already under way, it was unclear if similar processes could operate in the backward ‘alien’ southeast preoccupied by the challenge of repopulation in devastated areas vacated by the Ottoman withdrawal of 1699. In spite of the shortage of people in this part of the region, few would concede that feudalism and guild systems should be ended to overcome constraints on mobility for rural labour. An enlightened thinker B.Skerletz (d. 1797) sought fiscal incentives for foreign manufacturers in Hungary and proposed resettling Jews in industrial areas and Roma in rural areas (Horvath 1991 p. 184). The rationale was all to do with boosting enterprise and creating demand, from which the state would gain through taxation. An under-populated region—with the risk of famine for people on tiny holdings—could deliver little, yet the population might double in fifty years if the barriers could be set aside. In the event, the elites clung to their privileges in backward areas and liberal regimes were restricted to special cases such as the steppelands where landowners encouraged settlement by ‘slobozeni’ free from feudal obligations. THE NORTH Brandenburg-Prussia and Saxony Germany’s unification was of course a long way off but the great military successes of Friedrich der Grosse were reflected by the rapid growth of Berlin in a forward position between the Elbe and Oder rivers with a developing network of roads and canals. Its industries were but a shadow of what would follow the departure of the French, not to mention the stimuli arising from the Zollverein and the railway age, but porcelain and silk manufacture were established (the latter responsible for the appearance of a factory town) while the ‘Königliche Eisengiesserei’ (Royal Iron Foundry), established in BerlinPankow in 1803 was part of a strategic complex of powder mills and cannon foundries which also had the role of supplying steam engines to stimulate technological advance in
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private industry (though the first private foundry did not emerge until 1821). Further afield lay a constellation of industrialising regions. The immediate hinterland was largely agricultural, but expansion in Silesia (annexed by Prussia in 1745) was indicated by suburban growth outside the walled towns of Schweidnitz (Świdnica) and Waldenburg (Wałbrzych). Here, Prussian mercantilism precipitated a surge of activity in textiles soon after the takeover of the province, with flax spinning schools in new villages where workers were able to make cash payments in lieu of feudal obligations. There was pressure from Irish and Scottish competition at the end of the century; and some locational shift from the deforested lowlands to the foothills of the Giant Mountains (Riesengebirge) which could better meet the fuel needs of the linen bleaching process. There was also a boost for business in Pomerania with Friedrich II’s decision to make Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) the capital of Netze (Notec) district—acquired through the partition of 1772—and completion of the Bromberg (Bydgoski) Canal in 1773–4 (linking the canalised Brahe (Brda) and Netze rivers to connect the Oder and Vistula systems). Enterprise in textiles spread to other parts of Poland that fell temporarily under Prussian administration in 1793 and 1795. A clothiers’ village was established at Dąbie on the Ner (southeast of Koło, between Konin and Kutno) in 1799—a model for later settlements. Other developments included Wizna, east of Łomża in 1799 and Pułtusk on the Narew north of Warsaw in 1803. Meanwhile, Saxony was diversifying in a big way, taking off from the ravages of the Thirty Years War when many miners began making paper, textiles, glass and toys. Saxony was the most highly industrialised part of Germany, with a medieval history of mineral and handicraft production which provided a basis for proto-industrialisation in a territory with indifferent agricultural resources. Raw materials and power supplies combined with a dynamic trading city (Leipzig) and a positive attitude in government to guild restrictions combined with peasant emancipation. While linens came from Bohemia for finishing, there was a domestic woollen industry in the Elbe and Mulde valleys which progressed through the application of water power to spinning machines in Ernstal in 1782; while Mittweida had fifty looms in 1790. The cotton industry was introduced in Chemnitz and Plauen by Dutch/Swiss immigrants using British yarn before the Napoleonic Wars. It seems that cotton was imported from Macedonia for the first spinning mill which opened in 1800 on the Würschnitz River at Harthau using British machines and instructors (though local engineers were soon engaged). There was also a transition to cotton from linen in Zittau and from worsted in Vogtland (where embroidery and lace also expanded). Cloth was initially finished in Augsburg and Hamburg but calico printing started in Plauen as a service to rural manufacturers—and the printers then linked back to cloth production and organised a putting-out system to create a steady flow of material. There were furnaces and forges in the Erzgebirge, along with a furnace (1725) and four forges on Muckenburg estate (Lauchammer), with an engine for the blast in 1803. There was particular dynamism in two mining areas. First, the deepening of the Mansfeld copper mines required cooperation in driving longer drainage adits: the 14km ‘Froschmühle’ (Unterrissdorf-Klostermansfeld) with associated shafts and ‘light holes’— providing air while allowing some ore and waste to be raised— was followed by the Glückauf tunnel (Benndorf-Wimmelburg), started in 1730, and the Zabenstadt Tunnel (Hettstedt-Zabendorf), started in 1778. Soon after, in 1783, the Boulton and Watt engine
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was put to work at Mansfeld when horse-driven pumps were unable to lift water to the level of the drainage tunnels. The same trends were evident in Upper Silesia with an interest in iron mining, but an even greater greater commitment to lead and silver mining around Beuthen (Bytom) and Tarnowitz (Tarnowskie Góry) dating back to the early medieval. Surface exploitations were extended underground and—with the stimulus of rising prices and the invention of silver separation—pumping to depths of 50m, with the aid of belts, chains and ropes, was installed from the fifteenth century, given the high level of the water table which made the Silesian mines much more difficult than their Bohemian and Slovak counterparts. Adits were also driven from the late sixteenth century with investment by the local nobility and other small capitalists; draining into the Klodnitz (Kłodnica) and Malapane (Małapane). Four adits at Tarnowitz had a total length of 8.2km by 1700 (of which 5.9km were underground). With very gentle river gradients it was often necessary to combine adits with pumping (the latter involving a lift of 60– 70m). The first steam engine was installed at Tarnowitz in 1788 and there were six in Upper Silesia by the end of the century. Adits started at greater depths reached up to 14km in length: from Bobrownik (Bobrowniki), near Scharley (Piekary Śląskie), through Trockenberg (Sucha Góra) to the upper Klodnitz (Kłodnica) Basin and through Tarnowitz and Oppatowitz (Opatowice) to the Malapane. Counting main and branch adits, there were 200km in the Tarnowitz area by the early nineteenth century. And such was the demand for timber (12 million oak beams were used in the Tarnowitz mines in the sixteenth century) that whole forests disappeared. Meanwhile, water power was harnessed for iron furnaces, sawmills and fulling mills, creating many ponds in the process. Mining provided a stimulus to industry. In the case of Mansfeld there was a successful engineering enterprise established at Rothenburg a.d.Saale with the help of an English mechanic to supply engines to the both the copperfield and the Schönebeck salt works near Magdeburg; as a result of which heavy industry came to be located in this city. Meanwhile, Upper Silesia was processing ores and long before the first Prussian government initiatives of the late eighteenth century the area was deeply affected by smelting at Malapane. However, engineering began soon after Friedrich took the province from the Habsburgs, for royal ironworks were set up at Kreuzberg (Kluczbork) and Malapane as strategic industries. Under the Mining Law of 1769 the state could designate appropriate areas as crown mining concessions, as a result of which both the Malapane iron industry and the Tarnowitz lead industry were extended. Malapane had previously been endowed with new blast furnaces in 1753–4, taking advantage of local timber and water power—not to mention proximity to the navigable Oder—which made for an important role in the Prussian armaments industry. Further capacity was installed under the 1769 act and when Friedrich moved to reorganise the iron industry in 1781 F.W.von Reden—responsible for all the royal mining operations in Silesia—produced a series of innovations concerned with coke smelting, steel making and engineering. Malapane remained very much at the centre: the Scottish technician John Baildon— recruited by von Reden—was able to cast sections for bridge building, but steam pumps were also manufactured, including one for the Tarnowitz mine, and an English-made atmospheric engine was installed in a new mine at Friedrichsgrübe opened in 1786. But as demand for energy increased the coalfield exerted a stronger influence on industrial location. On the basis of Baildon’s experience at Carron in Scotland, blast furnaces were
The region at the start of the nineteenth century
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now completed at Gleiwitz (Gliwice) in 1796—the first built outside Britain using coke—and also at Königshütte (Chorzów) in 1801. And the Tarnowitz engine was transferred to Gleiwitz 1794 with the relocation of lead smelting to Friedrichshütte in 1789 where coke was available. Calamine was extracted and used in the brass industries of Gleiwitz and Tarnowitz, as well as Breslau (Wrocław). However, in contrast to Mansfeld, this was a remote region, very close to Russian territory, and downstream activities were situated in less vulnerable places: thanks to the new Klodnitz Canal from the Oder to Gleiwitz which advanced slowly into Upper Silesia during 1788–1806 to reach the royal coalmine in Hindenburg (Zabrze) sunk in 1791. With the programme of waterway development carried out on the Oder during 1796–1836 it was possible to connect with the canals leading to Berlin and the Elbe Valley. The Habsburg Empire The Czech lands While Slovakia was still an important mining area, with Neusöhl (Banská Bystrica) and Kremnitz (Kremnica) active throughout the century, there was substantial protoindustrialisation to the northwest through an iron industry comprising 59 furnaces and 179 hammer ponds in 1798 while engineering was launched in 1814 by completion of the first steam engine on the Watt principle—destined for a Brünn (Brno) factory—by J.Baildon who was lessee of the Stiepanau (Stepanov) ironworks. However, demand was driven by a textile industry arising out of population increase in the north where, despite poor soil, density was much higher than in cereal-growing areas. Flax growing was established in the Middle Ages and cloth was exported through Bavaria from the sixteenth century through agents—representing such Nürnberg families as the Gewandschneiders and Pellers—who organised putting-out systems supported by landlords through the customary labour they controlled. Linen also moved north for finishing in Saxony because the Finke and Loose families of Zittau were putting-out in Böhmische Neustadt (Dolni Bĕlá) through agents who went round on horseback to check quality; while some cloth went to Silesia, where Greiffenberg (Gryfów) was a leading centre; and some export down the Elbe was organised by English and Dutch traders. Fourteen hundred domestic spinners were recorded in 1775 at Neugedein (Nová Kdyné) and 7,000 in 1838, and there were large numbers in the other areas of northeastern Bohemia such as Friedland (Frýdlant) and Reichenberg (Liberec). However, R. Allason—an exporter of linen to England—established bleaching and dye works for local finishing of cloth generated by his own putting-out systems (supplemented by market purchases) at Deutsch Gabel (Jeslonné), Georgenthal (Jiřetín), etín), Kreibitz (Chřibska), Rumburg (Rumburk) and Schluckenau (Šluknov). There were also some peasants who became rich enough to operate as entrepreneurs, with feudal dues commuted to cash payments. In the case of woollen cloth there was a state company in Linz with which some 17,000 Bohemians were associated in 1786. Indeed some wool was sent out as yarn when spinning was organised at Neuhaus (Jindřichův Hradec) in 1765 to supply a stocking factory in Austria. There was also interest in cotton when prohibition was removed in 1763, despite the need to import the raw material.
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Factories started to appear through the agency of the religious houses or feudal lords seeking rural development. A model is provided by Count Waldstein’s woollen industry at Oberleutensdorf (Horní Litvinov) where skills were first acquired through work for the nearby Ossegg (Osek) monastery in the late seventeenth century. Waldstein’s cloth gained a reputation equal to English or Flemish products, although he could not compete on price. With such developments manorial bureaucracies had to adjust to cash payments in lieu of feudal obligations, rising local demands for food and timber and the disturbance arising from the appearance of foreign workers and other strangers outside their jurisdiction. Other examples include Krzizanau (Křižanov) in 1794 and Namiest (Námĕšt) in 1795; demonstrating a link with engineering in the latter case since Count Haugwitz was an early producer of woollen spinning machinery. Unusually, Count J.von Kinsky—with his Burgstein (Sloup) estate at Kreibitz—set up a dyeworks to process the linen woven by his domestic workers but later spurned the advantage of supervision in a factory by installing cotton looms in his workers’ houses, reasoning that production could increase without the need for extra buildings and profits were greater thereby. This is a good example of an autonomous industry which arose from Kinsky’s encouragement— through a spinning school (1756) and printworks (1759)—to the point where almost every local family was tied up with the business. However, it was more usual for expertise to come in from outside, organised by the bourgeoisie. Vienna merchant J.M.Schmidt established a woollen mill at Neugedein on Count von Stadion’s estate under an agreement to employ serfs and buy local food and firewood. There were mills for combing and for fulling, dyeing and finishing (the latter rebuilt as a more modern establishment in 1845) while outworkers did the spinning and weaving: in 1838 540 worked in the factory and 7,000 outside. Meanwhile, J.J.Leitenberger, a craftsman dyer, purchased his freedom in 1750 and went abroad to complete his apprenticeship, returning to Bohemia to marry the daughter of a master dyer at Wernsdorf (Verneřice) in 1758 and inherit the factory in 1764; whereupon the business was expanded and modernised. Leitenberger then went into cotton with a mill in Prague to escape the constraints of feudalism (citizens in a royal town were free) though he later bought—and modernised—a cotton factory at Josefsthal (Josefův Důl) which may still be operating today, having been sold out of the family in 1904. He also engaged a craftsman to build English jennies, water frames and mules. While there were some failures due to bad management, disputes and neglect, there was usually success under efficient bourgeois management. Habsburg encouragement of industry Such developments would hardly have been possible without an enlightened approach to industry by the Habsburgs in a situation where smallholders and cottagers ‘have nothing except an isolated dwelling and earn a miserable living for themselves and their children by weaving, spinning and handicrafts’ (Klima 1974 p. 49). Since tradition favoured a single heir to each agricultural holding, work in textiles supported a growing landless population in the Bohemian mountains. A subsistence crisis, like that of 1770–1, was seen as potentially destabilising through unrest or emigration while intervention was also favoured by the pronatalist logic of mercantilism whereby a greater population would contribute to financial and military power. Overriding the parochial interests of the guilds
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and sections of the aristocracy underpressure of falling living standards, ‘central government succeeded in creating within four decades an environment propitious for economic development’ (Komlos 1986 p. 430). A government ‘Kommerzien Direktorium’ (Commercial Board) planned industrial development in Vienna during 1746–72, while free trade was extended from Austria in 1775 to Galicia (1784), Hungary (1851; internally unified in 1784) and Dalmatia (1880). By contrast, internal barriers in Prussia were not modified until 1818. Quality ordinances sustained new spinning schools in Bohemia, while protectionist measures in 1764 blocked foreign textiles (especially Silesian wool and linen) and in 1784 there were prohibitive tariffs on all industrial goods which persisted until the mid-nineteenth century. Subsidies were advanced on woollen goods in 1768, while in the 1780s local government could help small producers (there had previously been weaving rents in 1755 to support mountainous regions) and in 1787 large factories could establish warehouses in all provincial capitals. Yet there was also a need for social reform since feudal lords extracted licence fees from the yarn collectors who were serfs ‘taking the spinners’ yarn, sorting it according to quality and carrying it to the weekly markets of nearby towns for sale to weavers’ (Klima 1974 p. 51). As early as 1766, a civil servant noted the con tradiction between feudalism and industrial development and wanted to see traders purchasing their freedom so they would have more encouragement to develop trade. Theresian policy sought to maximise freedom for trade and industry ‘to permit the peasantry to increase its income and thus stave off the Malthusian threat by participating in protoindustry’ (Stokes 1987 p. 37). Rents payable by the peasantry were lowered in 1775 to encourage agricultural intensification, while a reduction in labour services to just thirteen days (for those without land) freed up time for work in industry which was considered much more elastic than agriculture in terms of scope to increase output. At the same time, industrial work was properly regulated when contractual relations were demanded in 1775 and the peasants were free to work for whom they liked. This measure increased efficiency and broke down the huge putting-out organisations that had been bolstered by servile labour. Josef II then acted in support of labour mobility in 1781 by allowing serfs to marry—and also to move if they were not in debt (a significant development towards complete abolition). By the end of the eighteenth century there were more workers in cotton than linen, and non-noble entrepreneurs were starting to challenge the dominance of the aristocracy. Reform stopped with Josef’s death in 1790 but what was in force continued: a significant achievement ‘given the unequal distribution of privilege which prevailed’ (Komlos 1986 p. 480), although failure to institutionalise change eventually fomented revolution in 1848. Meanwhile, there were measures to reduce the power of the guilds, seen as a conservative force potentially hostile to the innovations of Flemish immigrants. Thus a survey of imperial estates was made on the presumption that ‘in a perverse way the introduction of a new technology might be easier with the untutored peasants of the Bohemian manor’ (Freudenberger 1977 p. 31), although when industry was first allowed in rural areas (1732, but 1740 for cotton spinning and weaving) the master craftsmen had to be incorporated into the guilds of the nearest town. Hence the experiment over a woollen industry at Kladrau (Kladruby) on the Pardubitz (Pardubice) estate in the 1750s, though it lost money and was relocated in Brünn the following decade, where it survived until the 1780s. The town was obviously a better location for large-scale production but
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some rural areas proved to be viable. A self-reinforcing growth process set in as cheap yet competent labour attracted more orders, and in turn stimulated earlier marriages and a growth in the labour supply which kept costs low through limited opportunity. Family income rose sufficiently to justify higher rents and ensure further landowner interest in industry, though charcoal smelting limited access to firewood while land endowments to incoming key workers could limit what was available for community subsistence. Meanwhile, pressure on the guilds continued. The emperor could sanction industries by licence or privilege and these remained free of guild control (from 1776 provincial authorities could also give such approval). In 1754 industries serving distant markets were classified as ‘commercial’ and were outside the guilds; in 1760 all weaving industries were declared open professions; in 1781 pig-iron production was deregulated; and in 1818 glass factories could be set up by people without ‘special education’. Transport in the north An efficient market system needed better communications and Germany set the standard for road improvements through links from the western cultural centres passing through the central highlands to reach the ‘colonial’ lands in the east. The Hellweg led from Köln to Magdeburg and Berlin—thence to Stettin (Szczecin); to Danzig (Gdańsk) via Frankfurt a.d.Oder and Posen (Poznań); and further northeast through Bromberg and Thorn (Toruń). Another key route connected Frankfurt to Eisenach on the approach to the Thuringian passes, leading through Erfurt to Halle-Leipzig, Dresden and Breslau. And long-established routes also led from Nürnberg to Thuringia either by Coburg and Jena or Plauen and Zwickau. However, roads were still in a bad state in the eighteenth century and a shortage of vehicles also hampered the transport of heavy goods. There were coach services for passengers—one network served the lands of the Archbishop of Magdeburg from the late seventeenth century—and there was an expanding network of post offices in Brandenburg-Prussia by the beginning of the eighteenth century with specific ‘post routes’ scheduled for improvement (including some short cuts and other new projects). Otherwise there was little development in the east, although Friedrich der Grosse improved strategic roads—like the one from Schweidnitz to Glatz (Kłodzko)—in defence of Silesia. Even so, it was only in 1793 that a modern highway was built from Berlin to Potsdam. The rivers were much used for transport. But there were natural hazards as well as tolls and some towns could compel merchants to use their harbours, e.g. the staple ports on the Danube upstream of Budapest; also Magdeburg, Dresden and Pirna on the Elbe. Moreover, shipping guilds (usually at the staple ports) could monopolise traffic on certain stretches of water. The stronger states did improve their waterways. Brandenburg-Prussia had a major interest in canal building to connect the navigable rivers and the old eastwest trending glacial channels were ideal for the purpose. By the seventeenth century routes to the Oder were identified using the Havel and Spree valleys (respectively north and south of Berlin). But while the northern route was realised at the time by the Finow Canal—from the Havel near Liebenwalde to the Oder at Oderberg—and rebuilt by Friedrich der Grosse after destruction in the Thirty Years War, the southern ‘Friedrich Wilhelm Canal’ project was only realised in the eighteenth century through the ‘Neuer Graben’. However, the latter had the great merit that goods from Silesia could avoid
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Frankfurt a.d.Oder which was considered a great obstacle to trade. Furthermore the completion of the Plauer Canal in 1745 from the Elbe to the Havel at Plauen near Brandenburg gave access to Hamburg although there were still many tolls levied and goods from the east had to be transshipped in Berlin. The Plauer Canal was also useful for moving salt eastwards from Schönebeck. Meanwhile, there were local navigations in Uckermark facilitating grain and timber exports: the Templin and Wehrbellin canals in 1745 and 1766, respectively. Improvements at the Oder mouth involved the Swine as an outlet from the Stettiner Haff to the Baltic in 1729 and Swinemünde (Świnoujście)—on the site of the old fishing village of Swine—secured municipal rights at this time. Further south road conditions were relatively poor though the Habsburg Empire had an effective system extended in line with military adventure such as the short-lived occupation of Oltenia (western Wallachia) during 1718–39 when a road was pushed down the Olt Valley. Some canal building was linked with the Danube. The TiszaDanube Canal followed the Treaty of Svistov (Silistra) in 1791 and aimed to link Pannonia with the Adriatic to facilitate grain export; a privileged grain company was contemplated (also salt was brought down the Tisza on rafts from Maramureş). Work started in 1793–4 from Becej on Tisza to Bezdan on Danube—with locks at Stapari, Vrbas and Gradište—in the context of a concession including estate agriculture with milling and brewing at Apatin, and distilling at Kula. The canal opened in 1802 and— with a late nineteenth-century development from Mali Stapari to Novi Sad—was not superseded until the Danube-Tisza Canal was built after the Second World War with a link between Becej and Dan Palanka just upstream of the Romanian frontier. However, the planned westward extension of the canal did not materialise: it was to comprise the Vukovar-Šamac Canal and improvement of the Sava to Karlovac to meet the road to Rijeka or a possible waterway extension (proposed in the mid-eighteenth century) towards the Gorski Kotor highlands with locks from Karlovac to Brod na Kupi. There was a concession in 1801 but geological problems were encountered and the canal could not be sealed properly. Instead, a road was started in 1803 and finished by the French after 1809. Greeks were prominent in the cereal trade between Hungary and the Adriatic—and the reverse flow of Italian manufactures—following the rise of Fiume (Rijeka) and Trieste, aided by former’s sugar refinery arising from Maria Theresa’s ban on the import of refined sugar in 1755. The northern peripheries The north was not modernising at a uniform rate, for much enterprise in Poland arose only when Catholic landowners sought to maximise the economic value of feudal privileges whereby peasants had to deliver 25–50% of their harvest to the lords—plus two or three days’ labour each week as ‘robota’. This ‘second serfdom’ was organised by Jews who managed the economy of grain growing and marketing which provided the gentry with their luxuries. They ‘may have enabled the Polish nobles to delude themselves into thinking of their sense of disorder as ultimately functional and truly viable’ without the need for bridge-building between the classes (Levine 1991 pp. 137– 8), but they were slow to see the limitations of a single-crop economy and dependence on serf labour which added up to domestic failure for which the Jews were convenient scapegoats. Industrial change was seen most clearly in the imitation of Prussian textile
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villages through the 1779 plan for Ludwinów as a centre of commerce and handicrafts on the Vistula opposite Kraków’s Wawel and Kazimierz quarters. A private landowner encouraged handicrafts at Nowy Dwór in 1780 and A.Tyzenhaus, a royal treasurer for Lithuania, planned manufactures in eastern Poland at Kunsztów near Grodno. A similar approach was taken in the eastern and southern borderlands of the Habsburg Empire where the Hungarian and Polish nobility were reluctant to countenance any diminution of their privileges and used serf labour to create jewels such as the Esterhazy Palace, finished in a reclaimed swampland in 1776. These were transitional areas, exemplified by the reference to the partly German Habsburg crownland comprising the Bukowina ‘Corridor’ (acquired in 1775 and joined to Galicia between 1786 and 1849) that was seen as ‘Halb-Asien’—notwithstanding the fact that it was also the ‘gradina veselă’ (fertile garden) of Romanians. Meanwhile, Transylvania was another landlocked Habsburg province, this time under the control of Hungarian nobility. Although there was a livestock surplus which could be marketed on the hoof there was no opportunity to specialise in arable farming for ‘bad roads and the more affluent estates of Inner Hungary barred the way to the growing markets of Budapest and Vienna’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 78). Indeed there was a cereal deficit which drew in grain from the Romanian principalities, given the low tariff of 3% negotiated with the Porte in the eighteenth century. A snapshot of the Romanian majority village of laroshéviz (Topliţa) at the end of the eighteenth century shows that 227 households belonged to three proprietors and all but nineteen ‘inquilini’ (without land) worked a small subsistence holding ‘sesie’ (and access to common grazing and woodland) in return for farm and forestry work on the owner’s estate. The 208 holdings averaged 1.65jug (1.78jug equalling lha) but since some had as much as 9.25jug others must have been quite small. Settlement in Galicia and Transylvania After the setback of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century wars, Habsburg annexation of Galicia under the Polish partitions (1772) was accompanied by a measure of recolonisation. Germans from the Rhineland gave a boost to Bochnia—a centre of enhanced administrative importance close to the trade routes—through exploitation of the salt mines and fuller exploitation of the forests and the agricultural potential. The Habsburgs also presided over the growth of the iron industry in Galicia. Ustrón (first mentioned 1305 as an episcopal estate in the Silesian Beskid) acquired a foundry to work up low-grade iron ore, while Kuznica in the Zakopane area of the Tatra was engaged in mining and foundry work. There was a measure of urban and commercial growth. The small Middle Beskid town of Sucha Beskidzka in Galicia saw its seventeenth-century castle—now the local museum—redeveloped in the baroque style with a surrounding park. Merchant communities were moving into new houses while the beginnings of tourism based on the curative properties of mineral waters originated in this period, especially the ‘szcawa’ waters containing ferruginous substances. Renamed Krynica, the village of Krzenycze in the Beskid Sadęcki Mountains acquired its first spa amenities in 1793, while Żegiestów-Zdrój also emerged in the same area. Szczawnica in the Pieniny— a medieval monastic estate village that passed to the Polish crown in the fifteenth century—was another eighteenth-century spa which expanded considerably after the Hungarian Szalay family bought the estate in 1834 and built the landscape park and local
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housing. Finally Ustrón also became a health resort when hot slag from the local iron industry gained a therapeutic use in the ‘gierzymowe’ baths. However, since virtually the entire mountain system was now under the control of Vienna, the greater rhythm of commercial activity and systematic resource exploitation could be seen more widely. A great transformation occurred in the Banat Mountains, at the southwestern extremity of the Carpathian system, where a major settlement programme followed the recovery of territory from the Turks in 1699 (Figure 1.2). In comparison with other regions with a ruling noble class, the emperor was the sole landowner here and a planned colonisation went ahead. Lowland Banat became a place of multi-ethnic Catholic colonisation, while a
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Figure 1.2 The Reşiţa industrial region mining programme for the adjacent Carpathians was undertaken by the ‘Banater Bergwerk-Einrichtungs-Kommission’ set up in 1717. As skilled miners were brought from Bohemia, Styria, Tyrol and Zips (Spiš), a copper smelter was opened at Oravicza
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(Oraviţa) in 1718 and an iron furnace at Bogsan (Bocşa) followed in 1719; the latter expanded into a large metallurgical complex on the edge of the Steyerdorf (Anina), Dognecea and Semenic Mountains with the Reschitza (Resica/Reşiţa) furnace of 1771 as the main element. Nearby in the Poiana Ruscă there were installations in the Bistra Valley (now Oţelu Roşu) in 1795; later at Ruschitza (Ruşchiţa) in 1828 and Rusca Montană (1830). Reference should also be made of the coal first discovered within the woodcutting community of Steyerdorf (Steierdorf) in 1790 and the mining industry which developed in the early nineteenth century with skilled workers from Bohemia and Slovakia. Rather special circumstances also arose where security considerations called for a military frontier against the Ottoman Empire: established in 1762 and dissolved only in 1881 after Hungarian pressure through the 1870s. Seven regiments were raised in the eastern sector extending from Banat to the eastern Carpathians and the work of the state in the frontier region was clearly a significant force for modernisation. In the extensively researched northeastern Rodna Military District—later the Naszód (Năsăud) Frontier District—twelve Companies were formed during 1762–83, each recruited from a group of villages. Under military planning there was a consolidation of the Greek-Catholic parochial structure and provision of a state education system through elementary ‘Trivialschulen’ from 1770 and a high school in Naszód in 1771. Medical and sanitary programmes provided effective barriers against the spread of plague from Moldavia in 1815 and cholera from Wallachia in 1830. Commerce expanded in a network of central places with their fairs and road systems, while the promotion of agriculture included attention to cereals, vegetables, potatoes, textile plants and fruit trees, along with stock rearing and allocation of grazings. Indeed this is the basis of landholding today apart from some ‘abusive’ transfers to non-frontier communes in the communist period. Regulation extended to hunting and fishing as well as forestry, mining and manufacturing; with the latter advanced through instruction in spinning, weaving and fulling, and a growth of water-powered cereal mills as well as the first water-powered sawmills (‘joagăre’) in Maieru and Parva in 1766. Beer and spirits were produced in Naszód from 1765, paper at Prundul Bârgăului from 1768, while a great lime furnace (‘varniţa’) was built at Parva in 1777. It is also notable that settlement was consolidated so that Nepos was transformed between 1775 and 1783 from a scattered settlement north of the River Samos (Someş to a compact linear belt along the main valley. New settlement occurred in the heavily forested Ilva Valley as colonists moved from Maieru and Rodna to establish dispersed com munities at Arşiţa, Recele and Secături before consolidating under the frontier regime as Ilva Mare, Măgura Ilvei and Poiana Ilvei. From the ‘mini-basins’ along this secondary morpho-hydrographic axis the meadows and forests on the high surfaces could be more fully utilised. Meanwhile, Habsburg modernising pressures displaced some Romanians eastwards across the Carpathians— hence the ‘Ungureni’ communities emigrating from areas of Hungarian influence—but the scale should not be exaggerated. Handicrafts in the rural areas might be compromised by the monopolies maintained by the guilds in towns like Hermannstadt (Sibiu) which were closed to Romanians. An industrial axis developed along the Cibin with ample processing water, while canals were engineered at a higher level from other streams to supply the town centre (for street cleaning, fire fighting and fishponds as well as drinking) with the surplus diverted to the
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Cibin. However, since little water power was available, a separate industrial community developed at Heltau (Cisnădie) and there were opportunities for the rural Romanians of Mărgineni Sibiului. They maximised their agriculture through maize, potatoes, fruit and apiculture while their pastoralism was extended to other areas including Banat and the Gurghiu-Căliman area of north Transylvania; moving progressively further afield over the next century in response to population growth and fiscal pressures. But increased wool production arising from the expansion of the transhumance system eventually had positive implications for local industry: hence the multiplication of the fulling mills (‘piua’) especially at Saline, Sibiel and Tilişca. There was also a growth in food and wood processing: while the ‘joagar’ originated in the sixteenth century, the number increased rapidly in the eighteenth through the ‘joagăreni’ of Gura Râului, Raşinari, Sadu and Tălmaciu who produced wooden roof tiles and exported sawn timber to Wallachia. Corn and fulling mills were usually built within the village perimeters for security, whereas the sawmills were more scattered in order to economise on transport. As the forests and mountain pastures were more fully exploited the remoter villages like Jina gained ground. Elsewhere, there were high surfaces which provided scope for colonisation at a time of growing population pressure. Typically the new settlements on the higher ground were hamlets—each representing a gradually expanding kinship group—comprising individual farmsteads which often involved an enclosed courtyard appropriate for sheep rearing in exposed areas subject to the depredations of wild animals. In Transylvania the high surfaces of the Apuseni Mountains and also the platforms at Bran and Poiana Mărului near Braşov exhibit settlement at this time to very good effect. The Haţeg peasants arrived in the Petroşani Basin in the upper Jiu Valley and also the ‘Ţinutul Pădurenilor’ on the eastern flanks of the Poiana Ruscă. And beyond the Carpathians in the Mehedinţi Plateau of Oltenia people were breaking out from the village cores in the late eighteenth century in order to settle on individual farms carved out of the community demesne: perhaps initially a ‘palanca’ or shelter, developing into a more substantial temporary dwelling or ‘conac’, an outlying grazing station inhabited seasonally by some family members (a practice which still survives in many parts of the Romanian Carpathians). The pressure of a growing rural population extending its grip over the intermediate slopes and plateau lands of the Carpathians was not without its risks. Galician registers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries reveal con version of meadows and pastures to arable and much logging, driven by land settlement linked with profit and high taxation. At the same time variable weather and the poor condition of some of the land increased the risks of harvest failure with consequent instability in the ownership structure. On the Carpathian margins, oats were grown much more extensively and accounted for 80% of the land cropped at the end of the century; with the balance taken mainly by potatoes and clover. The forests were being seriously eroded (and beekeeping declined as a result), with the frequent appearance of the Polish placename element ‘poręba’, referring to the cutting of timber—often in connection with industrial settlements producing charcoal and tar within the forests. As the beech and fir receded there was some degradation as intensive run-off carried much more sediment to the rivers (Lac 2000 p. 204). The damage would have been greater had a grand conception of timber export by rafting on the regulated tributaries of the Vistula been realised. Ivanička (1999 p. 212) refers to the devastation of woodland in Slovakia by the eighteenth century
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through mining, industry (bricks, glass and potash) and timber exports. However, an increase in wood prices demonstrated the need for the improved forest management regime worked out by the Forestry Faculty of Banská Štiavnica Mining College. More generally, the Theresian period saw forest management codes issued from 1769 (in parallel with stronger individual ownership rights). In Galicia fast-growing pine and larch were favoured over deciduous forest dominated by beech. All this impacted on pastoral farming since the landlords demanded higher leasing fees—and therefore forced more intensive grazing—while trying to prevent further erosion of woodlands, to which end the keeping of goats was often forbidden. In some cases shepherding associations or cooperatives retained a hold on their pastures (as in Tĕšin and Vsetín) while in Hukvald the forestry interest predominated and seasonal sheep farms were eliminated by the middle of nineteenth century. THE SOUTH Ottoman territories were devoid of modernisation through lack of a uniform administration and industrial development constrained by the tendency to specialise in the export of raw materials. But even so agriculture could hardly develop in a progressive manner. Ottoman officials—and the feudal cavalry—were supported by the ‘timar’ (estate) system although holdings were not inherited and did not carry feudal jurisdiction over the peasants. But during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these ‘spahis’ were able to convert their fiefs into ‘chiftliks’ functioning on the basis of servile labour, and demands tended to increase (or peasants might be driven off the land altogether). Finally in 1831 the ‘timar’ system was abolished but only for the rural population to be left in a state of dependence on native landowners which saw the Albanian ‘bajraktars’ presiding over rigid patriarchal societies torn by blood feuds. The extent of autonomy had already been demonstrated by Ali Pasha who was the Turkish governor in Yanya (Ioannina) during 1782–1822 and attracted the sympathy of Greek Christians before he was finally dislodged (after a two-year siege) when Sultan Mahmud II saw Ali as a threat to his reforming and centralising policy. Romanian lords operated in the same spirit since a ‘boyar’ class evolved from village leaders and claimed a share of the peasant’s grain crop as ‘dijmă’. However, until the nineteenth century labour service (‘clacă’) was rarely demanded to the full legal extent—and it was not used extensively to work demesne land—while obligations could usually be paid off by cash from livestock sales. Commerce was limited because Istanbul claimed a monopoly over wheat: European ships could not enter the Black Sea after 1592 while Turkish ships could not take goods into the Mediterranean without taxation. Surpluses were collected by traders from Dubrovnik who were initially favoured by the Ottomans, although the eighteenth century saw commercial aptitudes emerging elsewhere—particularly among the Greeks who were able to create a political bourgeoisie active in banking and administration. ‘Greek’ merchants—including Jews and Hellenised Orthodox peoples using Greek as the language of commerce—paid low prices for compulsory deliveries (‘zaharea’) of agricultural products, which diverted the peasants into maize because it yielded well (especially with vegetables between the rows) and was exempt not only from ‘zaharea’ but from all taxation.
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It seems that the trading system was initially efficient, with a command economy maintained through administrative and military hierarchies working in a market system of towns interconnected by trading caravans. But it failed to modernise in the era of factory industry, and growth was stifled as intermediaries intercepted the flow of wealth heading for Istanbul. Although the Danube route was open after 1718—under the Treaty of Passarowitz (Požarevac)—the river was little used below Pressburg (Bratislava) on account of the water mills, strong currents (convict labour was used on the tow paths until steam power) and the Hungarian nobility’s desire for isolation to safeguard feudalism. Even when regular steamships were provided in 1831 little was done to relieve constraints on navigation at the Iron Gates until funding by Hungarian state subsidies in 1896–7. Much of the region depended on roads of abysmal quality so that journeys were slow and expensive (not to mention security risks in the case of unstable areas of the Balkans). It was a laborious business gathering surpluses and distributing essentials such as salt which was taken inland from the Adriatic at the points where ‘old contracts’ specified that it should be produced: the Bojana Valley, Dubrovnik, Cattaro (Kotor) and the Neretva Estuary. Dubrovnik derived much profit from salt and Ston saltworks continued to supply its area, successfully competing with Slav enterprises at Budva and Sutorina (Erceg 1993). Until better roads allowed the use of carts, thousands of horses (each carrying packs of up to 100kg) would carry salt inland and provide a basis for exchange trade on the return journey. The Romanian principalities emerge as an interesting case since they lay on the margins of the empire, enjoying a degree of autonomy through Ottoman suzerainty. The use of a succession of short-term Greek ‘Phanariot’ rulers had negative results through their exploitative attitude, though Bucharest became the largest and wealthiest Balkan city by the end of the eighteenth century as the Phanariots required luxurious housing and services and consigned wheat to Istanbul (whose wheat monopoly became ever more important after the Ottomans lost their southern Russian territories in 1783). However, the Treaty of Kucuk Kainarji (1774) gave Russia a protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia and also the right to intervene if any Balkan Christians were threatened. This was promising enough for Moldavian volunteers to accept Russian objectives as their own during the 1787–92 Russo-Turkish War. But despite some Russian success with the Porte in easing the burden of rule through Greek Phanariot princes, Russian influence in Moldavia seemed rather less progressive when the eastern part of the principality (Bessarabia) was annexed in 1812 as the price for ending their occupation (Broadus 1981 p. 367). Meanwhile, the Habsburgs had occupied Oltenia during 1718–39 and had begun the ‘Partition of Moldavia’ by taking Bukowina in 1775 (by 1782 both the Habsburgs and Russians had their agents in Bucharest). There was, however, an economic stimulus because—despite the challenges of the established Habsburg borderlands—there was a mutual interest in trade and an ‘inadvertent promotion of economic ties’ between the principalities and Transylvania (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 107) sanctioned by commercial treaties, and Balkan commodity surpluses became increasingly valuable to the Habsburgs as the expansion of cereal growing in Hungary reduced the scope for livestock rearing. Romania’s boyars were certainly encouraged by a sharp increase in cattle, horse and pig prices after the start of the Napoleonic Wars. Meanwhile, these northern markets were valuable for Ottoman peripheral territories given the disorganised domestic market and the dangers of travel in bandit country. Indeed cereals were also
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needed in Balkan deficit areas such as Bosnia and the Habsburg Military Frontier. Close Serb-Habsburg relations from 1699 made Belgrade a transit point for Ottoman-Habsburg trade, but when war reduced the Ottoman outposts to chaos Serb traders moved their business northwards, as did some of the peasants. This ‘new and essentially economic migration hastened the final weakening of Ottoman authority and the emergence of independent Balkan states’ (ibid. p. 49). There was also opportunity for the Serb peasants of Šumadija to increase their pig herds using acorn fodder from the oak woods. Free peasants from mountain districts—like the Vlachs of Macedonia—traded their handicraft products and surpluses of wool, cheese and skins in both the Habsburg and Russian empires. As a result they improved their homes and churches, even it the threat of brigandage caused consolidation in key towns—like Kruševo, Monastir (Bitola) and Veles—and some migration to Belgrade and Banat. And while Armenian, Greek and Jewish traders left little scope for the Bulgarians, some peasants from the Rhodope and Stara Planina went to Hungary and Russia in the late eighteenth century. CONCLUSION ECE was anything but unified. It was a highly differentiated region—even within the Habsburg or Prussian domains—and in many areas insecure, with the Balkans consigned to an alien pattern of development after a long period of continuous association with the rest of the continent. Industrial growth was occurring as technology from the West was implanted and it was clear that population growth was sustainable, even if there were still plagues of biblical proportions in the Ottoman lands that would call for quarantine regulations. As Komlos (1989, 2000) argues, the ‘Malthusian’ agenda of growth triggering subsistence crises through diminishing returns was being liberated by an alternate ‘Boserup’ thesis of population growth as the spur for protourbanisation and technological change—which could not be expected to take place in a vacuum. The nineteenth century would pauperise the less fortunate but there was no major subsistence crisis and a growing working population was possible. Yet the run-up to the nineteenth century was demonstrating polarisation between cores and peripheries. The Czech lands were developed as the main Habsburg industrial base while Saxony played a similar role in the German lands—with the great trading emporium at Leipzig and a major centre of manufacturing in Chemnitz where the textile industries of the Erzgebirge were being consolidated. There were a number of other growth points of which those in Prussia were outstanding, but regions without obvious potential were consigned to an agricultural role and their elites were then able to make a virtue out of necessity with an appropriately conservative social policy. So the Habsburgs kept Hungary in a state of feudal subjection as the empire’s breadbasket (for the warmth of the Great Plain gives Hungary an agricultural potential comparable with that of the Balkan states) and industrialisation took off only after the famous ‘Ausgleich’ (compromise) of 1867.
2 POLITICAL STRUCTURES, AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY A NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURE Following the Napoleonic upheavals it was, as Lord Castlereagh put it, the duty of politicians to ‘bring back the world to peaceful habits’ (Knapton and Deny 1965 p. 4). The Congress of Vienna (1814–15) achieved a broad measure of success over reconstruction in Germany, Italy and Poland; thanks to a spirit of cooperation among restored hereditary monarchies and new enlarged kingdoms within a ‘Concert of Europe’ which convened congresses to deal with threats to stability. A further massive conflagration was prevented for almost exactly a century (apart from the Crimean interlude). However, the three eastern powers were largely responsible for redrawing the map of Europe, with a balance of power between them. The Russians, who had contributed so much to the overthrow of Napoleon, obtained the greater part of Poland (more than had been gained under the eighteenth-century partitions) and held on to Finland and Bessarabia (gained in 1809 and 1812, respectively); Austria regained Dalmatia and Istria as well as portions of Carinthia and Carniola; Prussia made progress in Saxony as well as the Rhineland, but regained only part of her Polish territory which Napoleon had appropriated for his Grand Duchy of Warsaw. These powers were highly reactionary after 1815 and rightly saw nationalism as a threat to empire. In the Habsburg Empire the notion of balance inherent in the ‘Metternich System’—named after the empire’s highly intelligent foreign minister—was based on a frank recognition of conflicting ethnic elements (German, Italian, Magyar, Romanian and Slavic) that only an absolute power could mediate successfully, even though the grand design trampled on the aspirations of the peoples of ECE after the stimulation of the Napoleonic era. The compromise—such as it was—would clearly not be sustainable as the nineteenth century turned out to be a period of unprecedented change across Europe with the growth of urban-industrial interests, and while the basic outline proved durable there were continual struggles and adjustments and significant changes in the balance among the great powers of the region which finally erupted in the First World War. The cavalier attitude towards the nations of ECE was well exemplified by Poland which was again divided in 1815 between three parties ‘committed to make Polish lands as useless as possible to the power of the others’ (Pogonowski 1987 p. 163), although at least the mortgage imposed by Napoleon in 1807 was liquidated. Poland was still acknowledged as an entity since the Duchy of Warsaw became the Kingdom of Poland (Congress Poland): an autonomous constitutional kingdom within the Russian Empire, endowed—thanks to Prince Adam Czartoryski—with as liberal a constitution as any in Europe. Some Russians might delude themselves that Slavophilism provided a bond between the two peoples—even if the Poles never acknowledged this—and most were pragmatic enough to accept that denying cultural autonomy would be counter-productive, even if the Polish gentry had forced grain surpluses from Orthodox peasants on to the urban markets under the oppressive feudalism of the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries. At
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the same time, the Grand Duchy of Poznań was separated from Napoleon’s duchy of 1812 and placed under Prussia, while the free city of Kraków acted as ‘the symbolic capital of the divided Poland’. But these trappings of autonomy would not last. The kingdom was demoted to the status of Russia’s Western Region after the 1863–4 insurrection and subject to Russification, while Poznań was Germanised (as Posen) and Kraków was annexed by Austria (as Cracow) as early as 1846, although there was still Polish culture at Cracow and Lemberg (Lviv) universities and access by Polish representatives to the Vienna parliament confirmed Galicia as a Polish Piedmont in the minds of a people whose national consciousness had certainly benefited from the Napoleonic experience. Polish was given official status in 1869 (when Vienna was happy to support all cultural activities of anti-Russian character) and Poles on the Austrian side were the first to engage Russian forces in 1914. Galicia was also seen by Ukrainians—a separate nation—as a Piedmont, although the Polish schools were the better organised and education in Galicia was effectively Polonised. Meanwhile, the Ottomans also made concessions to nationalism with self-government for Serbia in 1817, while the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia—simultaneously under Ottoman suzerainty and Russian protection—were blessed with constitutions in 1829. Even so, constitutions did not guarantee liberalism and democracy, for in the great empires dominating ECE control was exerted by hereditary dynasties entrenched in power and disposed to cooperate with each other in the interest of stability. Tsar Alexander of Russia presented European leaders at Paris with his Treaty of Holy Alliance under which rulers would agree to govern their states as branches of the Christian community and render mutual service to each other. There was a somewhat ad hoc approach to crises, but the imperial governments were able to preserve the spirit of the 1815 accords and stave off a general conflagration (briefly threatened in 1848) despite peasant emancipation, significant advances in constitutionalism and the Ottoman concession over Greek independence in 1832. Yet the conservative forces ruling over modernising industrial states were eventually confronted by the more ruthless nationalism of the age of Realpolitik. The German Empire Consolidation and modernisation in Germany was carried over to a new German Confederation (a loose union of thirty-four sovereign states and four free cities—each with its own assembly) placed under the permanent presidency of the Habsburg Empire. It acted as a stabilising force, but it was a poor substitute for a genuine national state. Meanwhile, Prussia gained ascendancy through the Zollverein, a free zone arising out of the measures taken in Prussia in 1818 to abolish all internal customs barriers while constructing a tariff wall against other German states. These pressures led ultimately (in 1834) to the customs union of 18 states with a total population of some 20 million. The organisation expanded further through the adhesion of Baden, Hannover and Oldenburg by 1853 and Holstein, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Schleswig by 1866, and was a major contribution to the growth of German unity. It was not a prerequisite for political unification, but it brought fiscal benefits to member states, and free trade within Germany allowed for greater specialisation between the farmers of East Prussia and Posen and the industrialists of the Rhineland and Saxony. News of revolution in France in 1848 provoked demonstrations in Berlin—prompting the promise of a representative
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constitution and subsequently a dramatic statement from Friedrich Wilhelm IV that Prussia would soon merge itself into a united Germany. Uprisings in other states including Saxony were effective in transforming the confederation into an assembly of democratically elected representatives at Frankfurt, where middle-class values crystallised in support of economic growth and concerted action against foreign competition. But there was disagreement over the issues of central versus federal government, the role of the monarchy (given a significant radical, republican element) and territorial extent: should the non-German areas of Prussia and the Habsburg Empire be included in a Grossdeutschland? The Kleindeutsch arguments of ethnic coherence were persuasive—signalling an aggressive nationalism (echoed in Hungary) combining the nation state with a pseudo-colonial ‘periphery’ where German interests would predominate despite non-German ethnic majorities. However, the Frankfurt initiative was effectively vetoed when Friedrich Wilhelm refused the imperial crown, allegedly because it was offered by ‘master bakers and butchers’ rather than brother monarchs. Bismarck and Unification Prussian strength was boosted when Wilhelm I ascended the throne in 1861 and appointed the anti-liberal Otto Karl von Bismarck (of the right-wing Junker party) as his minister-president. It is difficult to separate the process of German unification from the personality of Bismarck: an ambitious administrator who realised that conflict with the Habsburg Empire was inevitable. The balance swung decisively with the Prussian victory over Austria at Königgratz (Hradec Králové) thanks to a brilliantly efficient mobilisation that made full use of the developing railway system at a time when Habsburg troops were deployed on the southern front against what appeared a more immediate threat from Italy. Prussia now annexed several German states to create a continuous territory from the Niemen to the Rhine, with overwhelming authority over a North German Confederation of twenty-two states from which Austria was excluded. The Franco-Prussian War yielded Alsace-Lorraine and also gave an opportunity for Prussia to win over the southern German states and establish the new empire with Wilhelm I proclaimed emperor of a united Germany at Versailles in 1871: ‘the most powerful national state that continental Europe had even seen now came into being as the consequence of the most ruthless exercise of Realpolitik and military force’ (Knapton and Deny 1965 p. 157). Bismarck’s appetite was now satiated and peace was maintained throughout Europe until the First World War apart from relatively localised struggles in the Balkans. With the trial of strength now resolved, Germany and the Habsburg Empire secretly agreed in 1879 to come to each other’s aid if attacked by a third party and this Dual Alliance became a Triple Alliance through Italy’s adherence in 1882. Serbia was also associated with this defence system in 1881, followed by Romania in 1883—although this was difficult (despite Carol I’s pro-German stance) given the neo-feudal oppression of Romanians in Transylvania exposed by the National Party in Bucharest and also conceded by progressive Hungarians. Meanwhile, in the ECE context, Bismarck’s style can also be seen in his desire for good relations with Russia. ‘After 1870 as the armaments race in Europe increased in intensity year by year, the efforts of the great powers to save themselves from a fratricidal war took on an always greater sense of urgency’ (Scott 1978 p. 399). Hence Bismarck’s
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alliances which gave stability through an international balance of power giving imperial Germany precedence. Italy wanted security vis-à-vis both Austria and France but had to accept the status quo in Central Europe. Bismarck consolidated Germany’s position through the Dreikaiserbund (Three Emperors’ League) of 1872–3, which meant he had to overcome Habsburg-Russian tensions over Slav freedom (championed by Russia as a means of regaining a position in Europe after Crimea): note the Congress of Berlin to reverse some Balkan gains of 1877–8. After renewal in 1883, the Dreikaiserbund was replaced by a Reinsurance Treaty (1887) confirming the Balkans as a Russian sphere and agreeing to German and Russian ‘benevolent neutrality’ in a future war unless Germany attacked France or Russia attacked the Habsburg Empire. This was the pinnacle of Bismarck’s diplomacy. He resigned in 1890 (to be replaced by L.von Caprivi) in the face of the headstrong Wilhelm II. The Reinsurance Treaty lapsed and when the Russian harvest failed France offered aid, leading to a military alliance in 1894: agreeing to mobilise if either partner was attacked by Germany (or any Triple Alliance country). The UK then joined what became a Triple Entente in 1907 (after the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904). As tension increased at the turn of the century there was heavy spending on armaments which took some 5% of national income in France and Germany and 6% in the Habsburg and Russian empires. But Germany’s encirclement was arguably an inevitable consequence of her rise to great power status, rounded off by a substantial colonial programme (sparking the Morocco Crisis in 1905–6). Her response to the threat of isolation by land and sea was appropriately resolute: military planners were forced to adopt the Schlieffen Plan for quick, decisive and total victory, especially in the West, and saw in the First World War the stark choice of world power or downfall. Colonial societies and ‘Drang nach Osten’ German colonial societies were complemented by a Pan-German League formed in 1893 whose members advocated German domination over much of ECE (and the Low Countries) to achieve a Greater Germany. It was considered regrettable that the 5.5 million Germans who emigrated to the USA in the nineteenth century could not have been held on the eastern and southeastern marches to bolster German economic and political interests. There could be no doubt about the importance of trade with the Habsburg Empire and with the Balkans, to say nothing of the Middle East where German businessmen followed up Wilhelm II’s visits to the sultan in 1889 and 1898 by accumulating a collection of railway concessions—enough to open the prospect of a Berlin-Baghdad railway when a 2,300km extension to the Anatolian Railway was agreed in 1903. But while Germany reorganised the Turkish army, the French were equipping Bulgarian and Serb forces so that Ottoman failures in the Balkan War of 1912 could be seen as ‘Creuzot’s victory over Krupp’. Poland was also an area of critical importance since Palacký’s notion of German-Slav antagonism gave Berlin a sense of mission through ‘Drang nach Osten’. Initially there were good relations between Germans and Poles in the Grand Duchy of Poznań, though little manufacturing developed apart from food processing and handicrafts. However, 1848 brought a general desire for liberalism which quickly broke down over Polish desires for ‘national’ reorganisation. A Polish ‘Duchy of Gniezno’ was proposed in the eastern part of Prussian Poland whereupon the whole of Poznań became an integral part
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of the Prussian monarchy (as Posen; see above). The poorer Jews supported neither party but others tended to support the Germans, especially in the north and west where Germans were in the majority. German nationalists viewed the Poles ambivalently as actual or potential internal enemies of the state (‘Reichsfeinde’) and a sense of provocation was deepened by Bismarck’s appreciation that enlightened attitudes towards the Poles would not be appreciated in St Petersburg if Russia were forced into some accommodation with its own Polish population. Polish nationalism had to be seen as a threat that might mean the loss of territory to a Polish state and Bismarck asserted that ‘Polish nationalism cannot be judged humanistically and impartially by us but only antagonistically’ (Blanke 1981 p. 9). His first strategy was the ‘Kulturkampf’ which sought to frustrate the growth of Polish nationalism through the activities of the Catholic Church by placing all schools under the supervision of state inspectors (1871) before the teaching of Polish in elementary schools was stopped altogether (1887). Nevertheless, the ethnic balance tipped in favour of the Poles because the effects of a high birth rate—and some Polonisation of German Catholics—were exaggerated by out-migration of Germans linked with the competition suffered by local small-scale industries on account of large urban-based factories in the west that now had the benefit of cheap distribution by rail. Transit trade with Russia was also hard hit by customs regulations, and the slump in farm prices depressed the agricultural sector along with related industries like timber, spirits and wool. German technicians could earn more in the west while German retailers were eliminated by Polish boycotts. Most went to Brandenburg-Berlin and Westfalen, but many went abroad in the 1870s and 1880s. Of course, ethnic Germans con stituted the bulk of the migrants since they were in a better position to adjust to life among co-nationals in the west; Poles would usually stay only briefly in alien German-speaking areas before returning home with money to buy land. Somewhat ineffectual action was taken to remove the Russian Poles employed by German landowners—exploiting cheap labour to bolster their profits—before the more positive approach of the ‘Ansiedlungsgesetz’ (Settlement Law) of 1886 which gave rise to an ‘Ansiedlungskommission’ to purchase estates so that Polish farmworkers could be replaced by independent German peasants. However, the German peasant farmers assisted by the act were also anxious to use cheap labour and so the Poles remained, albeit with a change of employer. Caprivi was personally less antagonistic towards the Poles and expulsion orders against foreign workers were revoked in 1890. There was frankly little alternative assuming that German farmworkers could not be compelled to remain in the east and employers could not be made to pay higher wages. There was also a changing international context—with strains between Germany and Russia reaching the point where Poles might become a factor in a future two-front war embroiling Germany with both Russia and France—and some softening of measures taken against Polish language teaching. These changes were hardly fundamental and the limited reconciliation arose simply because ‘both sides were more or less conscripted into a closer relationship by fear of outside forces’ (ibid. p. 147). Ethnic Germans in the east still advocated a radical policy: hence the Germanising ethos of the ‘Ostmarkenverein’ (1894)—an Association for the Advancement of the German Nationality in the Eastern Marches— followed by a new Expropriation Law in 1908 and the colonial society ‘Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Inneren Kołonisation’ in 1912.
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Reference should also be made to the ‘Hebungspolitik’ of 1898: a programme of public spending to increase the attractiveness of the eastern regions. There was much new building in Posen, including a Royal Academy (later university) and the Kaiser-Wilhelm Library; and improved communications by both rail and water as the Warta was regulated and Posen port developed. Clearly there was a will to act but the programme was undermined primarily by the reluctance of Germans to compensate for the continuing exodus from the eastern periphery. Although Caprivi would not repeal the Settlement Law, rising land prices and a shortage of suitable German applicants reduced its effectiveness. While Germans dominated urban industry, the civil service and the railways, the gains made by Polish landowners between 1896 and 1914 went a long way to cancel out the losses of some 245,000ha from 1861 to 1896; many of them successfully adopted capitalist farming and extended rural industrialisation. Tariff policy Broadly speaking there was a conflict of interest between industrialists who wanted high tariffs to protect themselves against more efficient foreign producers and agrarians who believed that high tariffs for manufacturers would lead to retaliatory measures harmful to cereal exports which relied on free trade. Hence a compromise position of low tariff levels in the Zollverein, incidentally reciprocated when Metternich’s policy of high tariffs was modified with the aim of joining the club. But the situation was rather different when protection was quickly reintroduced in Germany in 1879 through an alliance between ‘rye and iron’. Agrarian interests now demanded protection, especially with the onset of depression when cheap food imports from Russia and the US undermined living standards among a farming population used to high incomes. But Bismarck’s modest increase in tariffs was a signal that the great eastern landowners would not be allowed to stand in the way of industry’s growing need for access to world markets in order to boost efficiency, specialisation and income growth (although even the moderate tariff increase had an adverse effect on production and accelerated emigration to the North America). However, it was difficult to avoid a spiralling effect given the tariff increase in the Habsburg and Russian empires in the 1880s. German retaliation culminated in 1892 when the Farmers’ League, a political group representing the now-uncompetitive Junkers and their academic supporters, pressed their views in crucial tariff debates. High tariffs then brought prosperity to the land—and generated more jobs for Poles in the eastern provinces—but this recognition of the political influence of the Junkers did nothing to encourage peasant proprietorship. The case for an ‘Agrarstaat’—requiring Germans to pay a high price for food—rather than a pure ‘Industriestaat’ was argued out on the basis of a physically fit rural population with a high birth rate that was more useful for the defence of a country than the physically inferior populations crowded into industrial towns. Autarky would also remove the risk of military weakness arising from excessive dependence on imports. The attempt by Caprivi in 1894 to negotiate simultaneous tariff reductions in Germany, the Habsburg Empire and some West European states (followed by Serbia and Romania in 1893 and Russia in 1894) gave a boost to industry—with a reduction in emigration in the late 1890s and a redirection of migration flows to the German cities—but eventually generated enough opposition to remove the chancellor
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from office. The controversial ‘Central European system’ lapsed in 1903 and tariffs resumed their upward trend. Compromise in the Habsburg Empire Support for German interests was clearly seen in the Habsburg Empire after 1850. The centralised system of A.Bach dispensed with local diets and concentrated a huge German-speaking bureaucracy in Vienna. This formula was drastically modified in 1867 when, in the wake of a catastrophic defeat by Prussia in the brief seven-week war of 1866, the empire was not only expelled from the German Confederation but forced to negotiate with the Magyars led by E.Deák and Count G.Andrássy to transform the state into a Dual Monarchy (Austria-Hungary). Nevertheless, concern over ‘encirclement’ (especially Russian pressure on her borderlands) made an entente appropriate and German capital flowed from 1867. When demand inflation sparked off a series of trade deficits from 1908 Germany also helped with emergency loans in 1913–14. A Central European customs union was fully established in 1891 through a series of Caprivi treaties linking Germany with the Habsburg Empire (and Italy, Switzerland and Belgium). Food from the empire moved to Germany along with oil from Galicia—following German investment by Deutsche Petrol—which helped gather support for an abortive OderDanube Canal project in the 1890s. The empire was still a major political force in the south and policy aimed resolutely at reducing Russian influence after Crimea. With German support, the Russian patronage for Bulgaria at San Stefano (1877–8) was reduced by the Berlin Congress in 1878. And after taking over the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the rebellion of 1875–8, the province was formally annexed in 1908—following the Young Turk revolution—as part of a more active policy by foreign minister Von Aehrenthal during 1906–12 which included railway development in the South Slav lands. Relations with Serbia deteriorated until a crisis was provoked in 1914 by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by a Serb nationalist, whereupon Austrian bombardment of Belgrade caused Russia to mobilise. Until then the empire had an advantage because Russia was a net importer of capital and could not afford to invest in the region. For example, she could not summon finance for the Oriental Railway through Bulgaria in the early 1880s when ‘the occupying Tsarist army and officials could surely have used such a loan to consolidate their influence in the new Balkan state’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 90). But the empire was placed under great strain in the late nineteenth century as a result of the growth of nationalism. More powerful groups like the Magyars tried to maximise their influence while the weaker nations came to see the Dual Monarchy in a more negative light as an obstruction to their own ambitions. Yet stability arising out of the long continuity of administrative practice made collapse inconceivable before 1914. The principle of federation was widely supported. However, by 1918 interest in the principle of an imperial framework to provide security for small nations in the region—very strong in Palacký’s time—had switched to the radical alternative of national independence for which there was a growing number of precedents in the Balkans at the turn of the century. Only the smaller groups still found the imperial framework congenial. In Austria the Germans remained a distinct minority, with 34.8% of the population in 1910, by which time the Magyars in Hungary had achieved a majority of 54.5%. The
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Germans struggled to maintain ascendancy over the Slavs (Czechs, Poles, Slovenes and Ukrainians) and a significant Italian element. Yet, despite their refusal to take these peoples into a full partnership, there was a measure of cooperation from Czechs and Poles in the Vienna Reichsrat (parliament). Indeed Count Taafe’s rule (1879–93) was based on a combination of Catholic, Czech and socialist parties against German liberals. As a nation without a state the Czechs secured an important cultural concession in 1882 with the establishment of a separate university using the Czech language; securing a measure of equality with the Poles who already had universities at Cracow and Lemberg. The Jews were also cooperative as a result of emancipation by the end of the 1850s: they could escape the restrictions of ghetto life and adopt the values and lifestyle of liberal middle-class Gentile society. As H.G.Wanklyn (1940 p. 187) put it, ‘there is no denying the contribution of the Jews to contemporary economics: whether as tax gatherers, distillers, small traders, millers, manufacturers or timber merchants they had a lively sense of the resources of the region and knew in spite of many limitations how to make use of them’. Interestingly, census questions in Prague about everyday language after 1880 revealed a split between German and Czech which gradually shifted in the latter’s favour as the poorer Jews began to identify more closely with the Czech majority in the city. Hungary The Habsburg link was applauded by progressives in the early nineteenth century as the basis for Westernisation where nations on the margins of the Ottoman Empire were often judged to be Oriental in character. It seemed desirable to associate Hungarian culture with Europe’s Franco-German core provided her nationality would be safeguarded. A national idea then arose out of a Magyar renaissance, reflecting the ideals of the liberal aristocracy for agricultural development and emancipation in the 1830s and 1840s which generated strong literary and political impulses. Hungarian became the official language of the kingdom in 1844 and while liberals advocated an inclusive society giving nonMagyars a share in a superior culture, this was not heeded in 1848 when Kossuth rejected the idea of a multi-ethnic Hungarian state and thereby ensured that non-Magyars would back the forces of reaction in Vienna to defeat the revolution. But repression under martial law gave way to cooperation with Vienna in 1854, with economic development as the overriding concern. The emperor was subsequently disposed to fulfil Hungarian aspirations that went beyond progress in industry, transport and trade: there was a boost for the Church with money for Esztergom Cathedral in 1855 and tacit approval of the goal of ‘equitable dualism’. Ultimately, the victory which eluded the Magyars in 1848 was achieved in 1867 under Andrássy’s leadership when the Ausgleich maintained a unitary state yet with the Hungarian concession of giving up the dream of full independence balanced by freedom to promote the doctrine of a culturally superior Magyar race with a historic mission to control the southeastern marchlands which were drawn into the Hungarian ‘half of empire with the boundary on the Leitha River separating Austrian ‘Cisleithania’ from Hungarian ‘Transleithania’. The economic provisions were renewed every ten years through long negotiations, but an acute constitutional crisis occurred when failure to renegotiate in 1897 led to ‘years of
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obstruction’ (up to 1903) and the election of a nationalist coalition in 1905, which eventually governed until 1910. A nationality law in 1868 proclaimed all Hungarian citizens as members of the ‘Magyar’ nation irrespective of their mother tongue, yet each minority could use its own language and develop autonomy in educational and religious spheres. But in 1879 the teaching of Hungarian became obligatory even in non-Hungarian schools—a requirement reinforced by laws in 1883, 1891 and 1893. Substantial resources were put into the establishment of state schools while high standards were imposed on the religious denominations—which had run virtually all the primary schools before 1867— necessitating acceptance of state subsidies and the official interference that came with them, culminating in Count A.Apponyi’s 1907 law which secured government control over teachers by declaring them civil servants (requiring com petence in Hungarian and the right to a salary which many school managers in minority areas could not afford). The net result was the dominance of Hungarian as a language of instruction in all schools and a sharp reduction in the number of primary schools teaching in minority languages. Such actions made the minorities despair, for there was great frustration among national groups that tried to set up cultural facilities, for example reading rooms which were seen as having a political purpose against the interests of the ‘Magyar nation’. But the context lay in Vienna’s sole concession over renegotiation of the Ausgleich: in each army regiment the prevailing language (‘Umgangssprache’) would reflect that which most soldiers understood and not the mother tongue of the majority. Since the Hungarians had always wanted their own forces, an army where more regiments operated in Hungarian was a way forward. Hence the coalition government accepted Vienna’s terms in 1906 but then took measures in line with a chauvinistic policy to make ‘the language issue the crucial element of its goal to create a Hungary of thirty million Magyars’ (Sugar 1981 p. 301). The only substantial concession was made with Croatia through the ‘Nagodba’ of 1868, allowing autonomy in internal affairs with a governor (‘ban’) and parliament (‘sobor’) in Zagreb and Croatian as the official language. But even here all railway employees had to master the Hungarian language. There can be little doubt that Magyarisation was effective while resentment was not always universally felt since the educated classes saw economic and social benefits in conversion to the Magyar cause. Romanians, Slovaks and southern Slavs aired their grievances at a Congress of Nationalities in Budapest in 1895, but the group broke up due to internal divisions after only four years of opposition to government policies. The economy Meanwhile, Hungary’s economy within the Habsburg fold was based primarily on agriculture with cereal and flour exports catching up the traditional livestock sector during the first half of the nineteenth century. The aristocracy remained firmly in control: not only did differential tariffs (established in 1756 by Maria Theresa) favour exports of Hungarian farm products—as they did those of Austrian manufactures—but the ancient privileges of the aristocracy were confirmed by Leopold II, and—by 1830—they expropriated large areas of land cleared by free peasants of the previous generation. The events of 1848 changed the legal status of the nobility, who no longer held seigneurial rights, as well as the peasantry, who ceased to perform compulsory labour, but there was
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no redistribution of land and a middle class did not emerge. The so-called Liberal Party was controlled by the aristocracy (as was the Independence Party, perpetuating the spirit of 1848) and ruled from 1875 to 1906 with K.Tisza as premier, thanks to corrupt elections, rotten boroughs and patronage. The extent of aristocratic control was remarkable for ‘the magnates accepted the state as their own and used it for their own purposes’ (Stokes 1987 p. 73): a few prominent landowners could exercise ultimate control and they were able to mobilise the landless peasants who worked their lands. When industrialisation got under way after 1873 the political potential of the bourgeoisie remained largely dormant because Tisza saw to it that the leaders of the successful Jewish industrial and banking community were ennobled and thereby absorbed into the establishment (rather as in Prussia where the Junkers reached an understanding with industrialists that safeguarded their property and status). The Ottoman Empire and the successor states The Ottoman Empire was unable to offer the same positive response to developments in Western Europe. There was a breakdown in isolation with the arrival of diplomats and merchants but the prominence of non-Muslims in agriculture, commerce and industry encouraged the establishment to concentrate on its great vested interests of administrative and military matters. The Ottoman economy adjusted to the industrial revolution by concentrating on the export of foodstuffs and other raw materials without any commitment to modernisation. Until 1880 there were clear fiscal objectives through high tariffs for exports that generated resources for the army and palace, yet were quite inappropriate as stimuli for economic development. Since agriculture, industry and commerce were required only to satisfy existing consumption, there could be no sense of economic and technological dynamism, and ambivalence was shown towards skilful immigrant craftsmen and traders. The Anglo-Turkish commercial convention of 1838 was appreciated for its political and strategic benefits at a time of crisis in Egypt, even though free trade posed a threat to local industry. While crafts were undermined only slowly in the interior regions, the industries started around Istanbul in the 1840s by Sultan Mecid could supply only the army, while foreign capital needed ‘the institutions and the adaptability adequate to channel these resources in the direction that best served the country’s interest’ (ibid. p. 22). The infrastructure remained poor with only a sparse railway system developing late in the century, while the Islamic prohibition on usury was strong enough to delay the development of commercial banking and credit (the imperial bank established in Istanbul in 1863 served only the needs of the state). Foreign loans were largely for military use and a loan in 1870 linked with the Oriental Railway project to join the European system was essentially a political, administrative and strategic venture (railways inland from Constanţa and Varna were built by British firms taking advantage of the empire’s growing foreign trade). However, the Ottomans took a significant initiative in Midhat Pasha’s Danube Vilayet arising out of the 1864 reform seeking centralisation of provincial government and a growth in tax revenues. As an experiment in regional development—to overcome the disruption caused by a Circassian migration from the Crimea (1862–3) that gave rise to banditry—Midhat built roads and introduced both farm machinery and savings banks for agricultural credit, but on too small a scale and without efficient organisation so that
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rising tribute encouraged Bulgarians to support national revival by the 1870s. Moreover, the relatively stable period 1880–1914—dominated by the reign of Sultan Adbulhamid (1878–1908)—showed concern for economic development and the Western system of free enterprise with some acceptance of the use of tax revenues for development and infrastructure. There was a leap in imports for consumption and growing investor confidence as the empire paid off old debts in an orderly manner and contracted new ones. As banks with general commercial functions became prominent in the 1890s Turkey was arguably poised for an economic upsurge at the beginning of the twentieth century, but instead the country descended into eight years of war, for the division between the Turkish bureaucracy and Christian merchant communities (as revolutionary vanguards) fermented into an antagonism that was to become the basis of Balkan nationalism. The Ottomans paid a heavy price for their failure to modernise and seek the betterment of the individual through some feeling of identity. In the absence of any sense of common citizenship the empire could not survive. Christians traditionally held an inferior position in Ottoman society, providing the tax support for the military establishment and for other functions of state. An edict of 1856—marking the beginning of the ‘Tandzimat’ (Reform) period which lasted until 1876—declared the equality of all Ottoman citizens through ‘Osmanlilik’ or Ottomanism. But reform began in the military sector and was a slow and sometimes contradictory movement to maintain the integrity of the state during a period of near constant warfare. It promised the ultimate secularisation of government but no reform was radical enough to abolish the ‘millet’ system: a well-meaning concession allowing all groups to enjoy their own local administration which actually served to institutionalise Muslim privilege. Hence the Christian interest lay in moving from a ‘millet’ to a national consciousness with protection by the great powers as an interim measure as integration became a lost cause. It was ‘to be doubted if any programme of reform could have preserved the Ottoman Empire as a multinational state whose citizens would have been content to remain within its control’ (Jelavich and Jelavich 1977 p. 326). The Young Turk movement, with a secularist conception of fatherland (‘vatan’), forced even the Muslim Arab intelligentsia to shed their loyalty to the Ottoman state. The nation states of Southeastern Europe The Vienna Congress did not address the looming Eastern Question and since there was no guarantee for the ailing Ottoman Empire the Habsburg and Russian empires competed for Balkan territory. Under the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) Russia gained unprecedented influence in the marchlands: free passage in the Balkans and free access to the Dardanelles Straits for merchants; protection over the principalities; and a guarantee for Serbian autonomy. The Habsburgs were naturally concerned about this level of influence and after the Crimean War the Treaty of Paris (1856) called for the demilitarisation of the Black Sea and territorial adjustments in the Danube Delta (thereby giving Russia no role in the new Danube Commission). Furthermore the treaty cancelled Russia’s Balkan protectorate functions (in the principalities and Serbia)—and her right to intervene in Ottoman affairs on behalf of Orthodox Christians—in favour of an international guarantee. There followed a further setback when Russia’s patronage for a ‘Big Bulgaria’—the result of a pan-Slavic front against imperialism during the Russo-Turkish
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War of 1877–8—was blocked by the Congress of Berlin. She did, however, have the satisfaction of the Triple Alliance and a prompt response from her allies when the Ottomans attacked her Crimean ports in 1914. Meanwhile, there was considerable progress towards the formation of nation states that were nominally independent, yet economically and politically subservient to the great powers and their sensitivities over Russian designs on the Balkans and the Straits. There was a developing sense of nationalism despite the lack of ‘enlightenment’, which seemed to evade Ottoman territories, for Balkan Slavs were ready by the 1830s to assimilate national ideologies in order to ‘jump in one gigantic leap from Ottoman medievalism to romanticism, liberalism and socialism’ (Sugar 1975 p. 507). Yet while the state institutions were modelled on the West, ‘the actual content of political activity was more consistent with traditional status societies than with the more legalistic societies from which the state forms were copied’ (Stokes 1987 p. 74). The new nations were rarely able to realise their territorial ambitions in full since they tended to become mutually antagonistic, to say nothing of claims against the imperial powers which could not be effectively advanced until the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 and the First World War. In the development of nationalism much depended on the improvements in education but it is very significant that national Churches provided cultural, moral and political leadership. Since Ottoman systems of regulation had to be transformed by building up native entrepreneurship without an adequate security framework, there had to be a disproportionate emphasis on heavy industry and armaments. The infrastructure included the building of railway systems that were purely embryonic in the Ottoman period. And while the elites initially favoured low tariffs in order to push the agricultural surpluses of their estates into more developed parts of Europe (and to maintain good relations with the powers) stagnating grain prices in the 1880s undermined the credibility of an industrial policy linked to agricultural exports and forced a general extension of tariff barriers which provided an umbrella for domestic manufacturers. However, despite the developments in the resource regions (delivering timber, fuels and minerals, cereals and livestock) and the activity at the ports, the remarkable changes in the capital cities created major spatial antagonisms which had not been adequately addressed when Balkan tensions erupted into the First World War. But the rurality of the region remained an enduring characteristic, reflected in a balance of concern in the minds of visionaries between agrarian reform, in the interests of economic and social progress in the countryside, and urban-industrial development to solve the ‘peasant problem’ by reducing population pressure on limited land resources. Serbia and Montenegro National feeling was manifest in revolt against Turkish misrule in the very early years of the nineteenth century. A Serb uprising (1804) was precipitated by rebellious Janissaries and was not crushed until Ottoman victory in 1813. Trade with the south was disrupted: the economy was crippled and isolated. In 1815 a second rebellion gave M.Obrenović the opportunity to negotiate autonomy for the ‘pashalik’ of Belgrade where selfadministration was conceded by formal Ottoman decrees in 1830 and 1833 (arising out of bribery of Ottoman officials financed by the rapid expansion of the Serbian livestock trade to the Habsburg lands, the largest slice of which Obrenović himself controlled). It
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was significant that the Ottomans had eliminated the old medieval nobility, while the Serb uprisings got rid of the Turkish landowners. So it was comparatively easy for Obrenović to contain the potential challenges from churchmen and military figures and pose as the sole peasant leader. His abdication in 1838 left a peasantry that was almost totally undifferentiated (although the extended family ‘zadruga’ was beginning to collapse) apart from a small percentage of landowners with holdings of moderate size. Since shops were usually denied permits and subjected to high taxes it was only in the 1840s that rural shops began to eliminate the itinerant pedlars; while country fairs and inns (‘kafane’) also provided a commercial network. Indeed the 1838 constitution—in the mould of the Romanian ‘Organic Statutes’—established virtual free trade and a further surge in business which saw imported manufactures undermining craft workshops. Towns became Serbianised for Serbs were able to take over trade from many of the Greeks and Jews who had been in control in the early part of the century but were subjected to discrimination over documentation, citizenship and residence in the 1830s and 1840s. But urban expansion was constrained by the freeing of internal trade in 1838. Meanwhile, Montenegro was able to escape the full force of Turkish domination, given the determination of the tribesmen to exploit the excellent opportunities for guerrilla warfare in barren limestone country around Cetinje. But it was also possible for Montenegro to gain advantage from the major struggles between the empires and in 1799 the Ottomans formally recognised the country’s independence and the incorporation of Brda. These extended frontiers were successfully defended thereafter, with some gains in the Grahovo area in 1858. But efforts to obtain a footing on the Adriatic at Cattaro (1815) and Budva (1840) were resisted by the Habsburgs. Serbian independence was achieved in 1878 (with territorial expansion into the Niš triangle) and modernisation was based firmly on the West European model of national and class interests. Banking developed slowly in the early 1870s based almost entirely on domestic capital, although most traders were still forced to borrow from local money lenders and many had to get short-tern credit from the Habsburg lands. A bureaucracy emerged while the prince (king after 1882) managed the parliamentary system by switching support between the Serbian Radical Party (founded 1881) and the rival Liberal Party. The Radicals built up the infrastructure, including education, transport and the military, but did little for farming apart from the foundation of a few agricultural schools and plant breeding establishments. However, they also reduced the tax burden on the peasants (partly by lax application of the rules, including a reluctance to chase up arrears) and appeared to be championing their interests through a populist programme even though the party was controlled by intellectuals. The Liberals played a complementary role in popularising national unity and revitalising the Kosovo legend so that—with momentum contributed by the example of Italian unification—Serbia was seen as a core around which other southern Slav nations might coalesce given the inspiration of the medieval state of S.Dušan and Napoleon’s ‘Illyrian Idea’. Still more grandiose was the notion of a Balkan League that might draw Bulgarians, Greeks, Romanians and southern Slavs into a confederation with Belgrade as the appropriate capital. However, these ideas lacked realism as long as Serbia remained a small, backward state. Even in the context of the southern Slav peoples, subservience to Belgrade was controversial: indeed, it was repellent to the relatively developed and Westernised Croats especially in view of
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Serbia’s primitive political organisation focusing on the rival Karadjeordjević and Obrenović families. Links with the Habsburg Empire were strengthened under Milan Obrenović (1868–89) by Serbia’s request for support over boundary revisions at the Congress of Berlin, leading to a general economic agreement in 1880 that increased Serbia’s dependence. But dynastic change in favour of Peter Karadjeordjević in 1903 then produced sweeping reforms including reorganisation of commerce, bringing new trade and customs arrangements with Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire in 1905. Vienna was also dismayed when modernisation of the army led to a contract with Schneider-Creusot of France rather than Škoda of Bohemia. The border was closed to Serbian exports in 1906, and annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 was related to a desire to increase pressure on Serbia. By the time the commercial war ended in 1911 Serbia had radically diversified her trade. Territorial gains in the Balkan Wars (limited only by Habsburg support for Albania) had an electrifying effect on the southern Slavs which precipitated the crisis of 1914. These gains were, however, controversial because they defied the wishes of the Macedonian people as represented by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) founded in 1893 with a governing principle (announced in 1896) to achieve full political autonomy for Macedonia (and Adrianople) through internal revolution. After a failed revolt in the Monastir (Bitola) region in 1903, IMRO was torn between the options of complete independence or a merging into a Greater Bulgaria (1905) until Serbia was joined by Bulgaria and Greece in the partition of 1913. Of course, Serbia and Greece were totally opposed to IMRO while Sofia was ambivalent because one wing of the organisation supported Macedonian union with Bulgaria although she received only a small share of the spoils. Meanwhile, Montenegro gained a short coastline between Antivari (Bar) and Ulcinj after the Congress of Berlin, along with further interior territory around Nikšič. Further gains emerged out of the Balkan Wars as the ‘sancak’ (province) of Novipazar was partitioned between Montenegro and Serbia, thereby paving the way for a union movement that was already gaining momentum when the First World War started as a reaction to King Nikola’s alliance with Italian interests, although the ‘odbor’ (union) was not achieved until Nikola’s overthrow following civil war in 1918–19. Montenegro’s political and economic achievements were remarkable considering the meagre resources of the country and suspicions among the powers that annexation of coastal territory would result in a Russian naval presence (producing the stipulation in the 1878 treaty that Montenegrin waters should remain closed to the warships of all nations). Romania ‘From the Principalities subjected to the rule of the Phanariot princes as early as 1821, and which were destined to form the nucleus of the future modern state, to the national Romanian state forged in 1859, there was a huge leap which covered less than half a century’ (Berindei 1988 p. 23). The ‘boyar’ landowners maintained pressure for the restoration of native rule through the late eighteenth century but it was only in 1821, following the great Greek upheaval, that the Porte abandoned the system of indirect rule through Phanariot appointees and restored native princes the following year. Since the
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cosmopolitan merchant class was not a political force, this was significant in opening the way for a surge of Enlightenment under the Western-educated boyar youth which included cultured individuals such as V.Alecsandri, G.Asachi, N.Bălcescu, C.Golescu and M.Kogălniceanu. Russian influence also proved very positive when the occupation of 1828–34 (‘the sixth in a series of Tsarist occupations since 1711’) brought in Count P.Kiselev—as plenipotentiary in both principalities—to ‘convert the territory into a bulwark against the Ottoman Empire’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 91). The need for better regulation resulted in constitutions in the form of the Organic Statutes (1830) driven through in the teeth of boyar objections. There was a new government machine with a council of ministers and efforts were made to improve agriculture and health services, but a progressive Russian regime in the principalities did not lessen the greater attractiveness of trade with the Habsburg Empire, undertaken by a growing number of Jewish merchants arising from immigration which the Russians could do little to control (though they were barred from holding land and—like other traders and artisans—from settling in villages). Commercial growth arose from the removal of the Ottoman monopoly under the Treaty of Adrianople, the opening up of the Black Sea and adoption of a fairer fiscal system. The cereal output could now enter the world economic circuit. The Crimean War brought to an end the Russian protectorate and the restoration of Moldavian control over the mouth of the Danube through the transfer of southern Bessarabia which had been lost to Russia (along with the rest of the province) in 1829. There was a surge of popular pressure for unity and despite Habsburg and Ottoman interference the ‘divans’ set their sights on ‘united principalities’ by electing the same prince (A.I.Cuza) in both Moldavia and Wallachia. The powers then accepted the inevitable with the Wallachian capital (Bucharest) the clear choice for the new administration as the largest town in the region. Economic and social change accelerated with attention to defence, public health, industry and transport. There was a growth of small industry (artisan workshops) especially in Bucharest, while a national coinage was introduced in 1867 and there were 1,300km of railway by the time independence was achieved in 1878. The modernisation of the country went ahead to consolidate the economic underpinnings of independence with the benefit of cereal, oil and timber exports and a more supportive fiscal regime. The growth of cereal exports was particularly impressive in the immediate hinterland of the ports. The feudal issue was settled in 1864 but the slow pace of urbanisation meant that there was an expanding rural population which had to be supported largely by sharecropping and labour contracts on estate land. Yet while more land was ploughed, yields and prices were not dynamic enough to secure significant improvements in living standards so that governments became increasingly preoccupied with economic and social crises, especially after the peasant revolt of 1907. Political power rested with the landowning Conservatives and urban entrepreneurial Liberals, but those who entered public life could not maintain a grip on power because King Carol (who as Prince Carol had replaced Cuza after the coup against the latter in 1866) switched his support between the two parties. Neither party was prepared to compromise with the Jewish middle class which became a strong force in the towns (inevitably, since they could not live in the countryside or own land). The Liberals resented the Jews as economic rivals and hounded them out of even such minor business as peddling in the villages; and while the
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Conservatives valued Jews as estate managers they lacked the maturity to recruit them as a political force. Meanwhile, Romanian industry was hit hard by foreign imports in the years just before independence when there was a limited market, a lack of domestic capital and skilled workers, and, crucially, no effective system of protection and national industrial growth (but extractive industries like oil and salt were doing well). However, all the domestic issues of the kingdom were overshadowed by the issue of union with Transylvania. Although official action was constrained by Romania’s secret treaty with the Habsburg Empire there was growing cultural contact, and the continuing lack of unity across the Carpathians was seen as an unnatural situation, not unlike the partitioned Poland. Bulgaria During the Ottoman period Bulgarian nationalism was constrained by the domination of the patriarchate by Greek bishops, although a history book in Bulgarian was published in 1762. But it was only in 1870 that Russian pressure produced a Bulgarian Orthodox exarchate, and a national church leader outside the authority of the Greek patriarch seems to have fomented greater political activity. Rising tribute increased Bulgarian sympathy for the national movement, but another consideration was Turkish preference for Bulgarian community leaders (the ‘chorobadzia’ who were successful traders operating within the Ottoman Empire), mayors and tax collectors in each town with the result that small councils were established to represent different interest groups, notably craftsmen and merchants. These innovations were stimulating because the chorobadzia were closely associated (as tithe collectors) with the Phanariot Greek hierarchy of the Orthodox Church and could therefore apply pressure from the business community for improved education facilities in the Bulgarian language which contributed to cultural and economic development as well as a rise of national consciousness. Then the severe Turkish response to the carefully organised rising of 1876 brought about a Russian invasion with Romanian support. But the large Bulgarian state carved out of Ottoman territory in 1877 under the Treaty of San Stefano was unacceptable to the other powers despite much sympathy for the Bulgarian cause. The Russians had to submit their treaty for ratification by the Congress of Berlin, as a result of which only a small Bulgaria was recognised as a self-governing state under Ottoman suzerainty while Macedonia and Eastern Rumelia were returned to Ottoman rule (albeit with a measure of autonomy in the latter case). This was welcomed by Serbia, with claims to some of Bulgaria’s 1877 territory, but it constituted a setback for the Russians whose influence in Balkan affairs was greatly reduced. However, although some Russians denounced the Congress, they could not afford to go to war with the other powers, and northern Bulgaria could be seen as the nucleus for a future independent and unified state. In the event Russian tutelage was resented by the Bulgarians who made surprisingly rapid progress in pursuit of a larger state by absorbing Eastern Rumelia in 1885 (despite Serbia’s violent opposition), while suzerainty was rejected by a unilateral declaration of independence in 1908. Unlike the situation in Serbia in 1878 Bulgaria had no ready-made administration, but a stable regime was established under Ferdinand Saxe-Coburg in 1887 (he became king in 1908) and Bulgaria was led into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers
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in the hope that further territorial gains would help re-establish the generous frontiers of early medieval Bulgarian empires. It was the liberal intelligentsia who dominated the Turnovo constitutional convention and controlled the government in the early years after the departure of Turkish landlords left Bulgaria a country of smallholding peasants. The role of the prince was quite decisive in a situation where there was no natural party of government supported by the peasants, who were faced with low commodity prices and heavy tax burdens. The prince established his personal power with the help of conservatives and instability linked with war with Serbia and unification with Rumelia was overcome by authoritarian methods which undermined the Turnovo constitution and gave rise to the fraudulent ‘making’ of elections typical of Romania, Serbia and even Hungary, where the magnates relied on rural support delivered by coercive methods. There was attention to infrastructure as in Serbia, but the peasants did not escape a heavy fiscal burden. Radical opposition came from the ‘Bulgarski Zemedelske Naroden Soiuz’ (Bulgarian Agricultural National Union: BANU) formed in 1899 to mount what turned out to be a successful campaign against collection of tithes in kind during a period of rising cereal prices, although it was not until after the war that their charismatic leader A.Stamboliski was able to make an impact in parliament. The union found a useful role in developing producer cooperatives (‘druzhbi’) which established stores and provided insurance funds and agricultural extension services. The latter included credit facilities—that is, mortgage loans—through the Bulgarian Agricultural Bank which emerged from the rural savings banks (organised by Midhat Pasha in the 1860s) to comprise a single organisation with headquarters in Sofia by 1903. Trade was relatively limited (Bucharest, Istanbul and Selanik) at this time, for the Bulgarians did not possess a borderline offering longdistance trading opportunities. However, an artisan-trader class developed in the upland towns, manufacturing army equipment for the Ottomans on the basis of the inherited guild system which ‘nicely served the political apprenticeship of this growing commercial class’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 152). Albania Shqiptar (Albanian) national consciousness was slow to develop, and culture was for long associated with the Catholic and Orthodox Churches (in the north and south respectively) rather than politics. It was among the Muslims of that revolutionary intellectuals first emerged in the 1840s thanks to Greek schools which helped to overcome cultural isolation. The idea of preserving Muslim Albania in the context of a reformed Ottoman Empire seems to have given way—in the face of strong Hellenisation during the 1870s— to an alternative conception of an Albanian nation securing its future in a post-Ottoman context on the basis of language and national literature. Thus ‘a generation of Albanian patriots when forced to identify either on the basis of language or religion came to the conclusion that the survival of the “komb” ultimately depended on the survival of the language’ (Kolsti 1981 p. 40). But it was only in 1908 that an All-Albania Congress in Monastir agreed to adopt a modified form of the ‘Union Alphabet’ which evolved among Ghegs in northern Albania in preference to the ‘Istanbul Alphabet’ used by Tosks in the south (and phased out only in 1915). The really critical period for Albanian nationalism began when the Young Turk revolution ushered in a new constitution removing
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recognition of ethnic groups (declaring all citizens to be ‘Osmanli’) which had the effect of transforming an Albanian cultural movement into a national revolt, especially among the Catholic Malissori on the Montenegrin frontier. However, while Greeks and Slavs welcomed anti-Ottoman sentiment, neither wished to facilitate an Albanian state, and with the collapse of the Ottoman army and a final Turkish withdrawal from the Western Balkans after the Balkan War in 1912 it was largely because of Austrian and Italian insistence that the growth of Serbia (and to a lesser extent Greece) should be curbed that a separate Albania was recognised; although arguably without any basis in Albanian nationalism this policy might not have been viable. In 1912 a national assembly in Vlorë declared independence, with strong support from Italy (wanting a foothold) and Austria (wishing to block Serbia’s expansion to the sea). By contrast, Montenegrins and Serbs saw the Ottoman Albanian territories as the potential spoils of a Holy War and atrocities committed against Albanians betrayed genocidal instincts at the grass roots. And while Serbia was denied direct access to the sea, Albanian territory was partitioned to allow the Serbs to regain Kosovo and Uskub (Skopje), which had been integral parts of the medieval Serb state (Rašca) that the Turks has captured through fighting at Kosovo Polje centuries earlier. AGRICULTURE Introduction on core-periphery relations and peasant emancipation At the start of the period agriculture was a labour-intensive business grounded in feudalism which gave the landowners an exalted social status. Predictably for the European periphery there were no crop yields above the European average outside Germany. The Austrian section of the Habsburg Empire came close but other territories were well behind (though for wheat Hungary was just below average and Romania just above). On the other hand the region was a significant meat supplier and stocking levels were high in relation to cropland. Agriculture became more efficient as labour was diverted to the towns and investment in infrastructure boosted output. Increasing liquidity led to a decline in barter and increased the commercialisation of agriculture, raising the probability that financial sector growth contributed to the acceleration of output at the turn of the century. In the growth areas feudalism was quickly superseded by cash payment. Peasants could not be coerced into performing transport services with their own draught animals but they could still carry out such work in return for wages. W.Długoborksi (1975 p. 129) remarks that in the transport of mining-smelting products ‘the owners of mines and ironworks used almost exclusively hired peasant draught-horse services’ and for some peasants this activity became their main source of income, relegating agriculture to a secondary role. Agricultural labourers ceased to be paid in kind and hence there was a growing demand for small shops which ‘appeared with resilient promptitude where they were needed by the population which they could then serve regardless of the weather and the time of day’ (Csato 1977 p. 418). Elsewhere, the social realities could not be taken out of the picture. If compelling industrial potential would not give the lords a new role in business, there could be a ‘rejoicing’ over backward area status because the old relations would remain in force
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with a formal abolition of serfdom bringing no fundamental change: requiring merely a new form of dependence involving labour contracts for estate work (including sharecropping on peasant-cultivated land) to supplement activity on small owneroccupied farms. Even in Hungary and eastern Germany (Posen) the aristocracy retained privileges despite growth. But Dashkalov (1997) explains that in the more backward peripheral areas nineteenth-century modernisation could not overcome the town-country cleavage in view of a rural outlook rooted in small peasant agriculture: a conservative reaction rooted in peasant values with rural civilisation the base of an authentic national identity (influential regarding the fascist and communist projects). This traditional outlook was naturally strongest where the peasantry had no choice but to stay on the land. There were dangers of withdrawing from the land: what else was there but limited industrial work or emigration? The substantial landless rural population in Transylvania gained only marginally from the sale of estate land which was bought up by the banks and mortgaged to a mainly Romanian peasantry. In Russian Poland the peasantry remained isolated from the lively pace of cultural change in the towns, being ‘atomised into a number of closed independent village communities each of which independently had to undergo the slow and cumbersome process of breaking its social and cultural isolation [and] finding ways to participate in the life, values and activities of the nation’ (Obrebski 1976 p. 25). Peasant revolts might have been a protest against repression but equally a cry for rescue from a state of stagnation when the forces of modernisation seemed to be passing by; with particular sensitivity when the negligence could be blamed on an alien group. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw both anti-Habsburg and anti-Ottoman protest with particular interest attaching to the former, which in both the Apuseni Mountains and Pannonian Plain saw the peasants isolated from currents of modernisation. Indeed the 1831 ‘Cholera Uprising’ in Hungary spawned the rumour that landlords and Jews were poisoning the rural population and the upheaval generated momentum for social reform in the hands of enlightened people like I.Széchenyi, leading to the abolition of serfdom in 1848. The late nineteenth century produced the Bosnian Crisis (1875–8), which began as a peasant revolt in Herzegovina, and risings in Bulgaria (1875–6). Meanwhile, Romania experienced outbursts against speculators and absentee landlords in 1888–9, followed by the 1907 ‘jacquerie’ that began with anti-Semitic rioting in northern Moldavia. ‘The end of serfdom generally included a division of lands that favoured landlords. Peasants gained title to roughly one-third of former estates but lost access to common pastures and woodlands’ (Sowards 2000 p. 568). However, there were major differences according to the arrangements for bringing feudalism to an end, for example the contrast between Austria and Hungary. In Austria the majority of those emancipated gained security of tenure over all the lands they had previously cultivated, while former landowners were compensated for the loss of labour services and debarred from purchasing peasant-owned land. This helped preserve the peasant class because peasants could only sell land to other peasants. Nevertheless, emancipation brought change as holdings in the open fields were consolidated and more dispersed settlement forms evolved with farmhouses standing on newly enclosed holdings laid off from the roads. In some cases the original village core was reduced to just one element in a more complex structure. An alternative model awarded land to both the peasants and feudal lords while in Posen compensation payable to landowners for emancipation was a burden on the
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peasantry until the 1870s, forcing them to earn additional income off the farm (and often on estates). A further hazard was the subdivision of the small peasant farms arising out of emancipation. ‘Thoughout Galicia the system of bilateral inheritance, which ideally divided parental lands between all offspring, inevitably led to the diminution of peasant farms’ (Pine and Bogdanowicz 1982 p. 71) even if some sons and daughters could be ‘bought out’ when they left the land. The problems were further exaggerated in the event of disease and potato crop failure, such as occurred in the 1870s. More than a quarter of Galicia’s population had emigrated to the USA by 1914. There was virtually no new land that could be broken in: the Podhale village of Tymowa, first settled in the seventeenth century and poor even by Galician standards, developed out of necessity despite lowquality soil, a short growing season and a limited crop range. In Hungary (and in Bukowina and Galicia) the estates were kept largely intact and the majority of peasants received no land apart from their tiny plots. The peasants had little option but to accept low wages for estate work because there was often no other employment available: the old social relationships were recreated in a new form. This could involve sharecropping where owners did not have capital to provide equipment and wages: they were guaranteed a steady income without the need to take any particular interest in their land and could enjoy a leisured retreat to a comfortable townhouse with the estate management left to an agent. Thus J.Komlos (1979 p. 60) denies that the abolition of serfdom was either ‘a sufficient or necessary condition for the rapid transformation of the countryside’. Society in the Balkans A special case concerns the power of the peasantry where there was no native aristocracy, as in Bulgaria and Serbia. On the Habsburg Empire’s Military Frontier where settlers owed military service for their land, reform was accomplished slowly between 1869 and 1886. And in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Habsburgs inherited a system that obliged peasants to support the military activities of Muslim landlords and the Turkish overlord the tenures were gradually changed to freeholds after 1879. However, this change could be accomplished without affecting the local custom whereby the individual household (‘kmet’) would integrate with others—usually about ten in all—to form a kinship group (‘zadruga’) which worked all the constituent holdings on a communal basis, thereby comprising a unit of both settlement and landholding. Even when agrarian bank credits were available in 1909 to separate out the individual farms a third of the peasants chose to retain the traditional structure. In Bulgaria a rising tax burden and more efficient collection procedures weakened the Ottoman ‘chiftlik’ (estate) system so that expropriation and subdivision transferred more land to smallholders after the ‘Tanzimat’ era had produced some small/medium farms worked by Bulgarians. However, if there were no large estates to tax then fiscal burdens were likely to fall on the peasants. Thus, while small, fragmented holdings predominated after 1878 (with some success in cashcropping through the rose oil industry around Gabrovo), the peasants were discouraged by rising harvest tithes; and a switch of payment from cash to kind under the poor harvest conditions of 1899 led to the formation of BANU (as already noted) so that as a result peasant politics became a burning issue before and after the First World War.
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The case of Romania The situation was very different in Romania where the lords evolved from village leaders who took over the best village lands and—as a boyar class—gained great influence as the nineteenth-century elite. Demesnes were worked less thoroughly than in the north and the boyars exploited the peasants on the Ottoman model. For when Ottoman officials and feudal cavalry were supported by lands granted by the sultan for life (but without inheritance, and without feudal jurisdiction over peasants), it was common for these fiefs to be administered illegally as chiftliks where peasants were obliged out of economic necessity to work as sharecroppers under terms which might be onerous enough to foment national revolutions. Estates became more prominent in the principalities when the opportunities to supply grain as well as livestock to Istanbul (and to Western Europe after 1828) ‘encouraged boyars to attempt to secure rights to the agricultural production of villages’ (Stokes 1987 p. 52), and they controlled the plains not through landownership so much as their rights to collect tithes. While demographic setbacks and insecurity combined with transhumance to prevent tight control of a sedentary population in the eighteenth century, the nineteenth-reality was quite different thanks to more ordered government and a resumption of population growth. The boyars gained clear access to power with the Ottoman abandonment of rule through Phanariot Greeks and their replacement by native princes. Labour requirements were raised before the end of the eighteenth century while in 1815 settlement on boyar land became a privilege rather than a right, and tithes were raised from a tenth of the production to a fifth. Even when Kiselev’s Organic Statutes of 1831 legally restricted peasants’ smallholdings to a maximum of two-thirds of the estate land, production continued to focus on small-scale operations. Peasants disliked working as estate labourers and resisted surveys that might result in a loss of land; while the owners (or the merchants renting their lands) ‘were apparently more interested in maximising their short-term cash income than in organising production for long term’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 223). They would rent additional estate land (‘prisoare’) to peasants (without survey) through contracts requiring payment in cash or kind rather than feudal labour services (increased by the codification of tasks in such a way as to take far longer than the customary twelve days). This exploitative arrangement facilitated a monetisation process and was very rewarding to the owners who ‘used not only the threat of surveying but also the growing peasant demand for land to increase rents sharply’ (ibid. p. 223). Thus, capitalist farming was introduced on the basis of neo-feudal obligations which made labour extremely cheap. While there was some mechanisation on the estates the process was limited by the fact that the labour was not supplied by a rural proletariat but rather by a ‘peasantry of subjugated smallholding sharecroppers’ (Stokes 1987 p. 54). In 1848 a provisional government attempted to study agrarian problems with the idea of freeing the peasants and establishing them on adequate holdings for which the estates would be compensated. But the reaction which followed the arrival of Ottoman forces saw a revision of land rights in favour of the boyars in 1851, paving the way for greater use of peasant labour on estate reserves—though this ‘second serfdom’ also saw the peasantry encroaching on estate land so that cultivation on peasant-worked land increased faster than on estate reserve land. All this facilitated a growing grain output, though with low yields given the technology employed and the recurring drought conditions. In 1858 the boyars became landlords (‘moşierii’) while the 1864 reform formally abolished
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feudalism and gave the peasants two-thirds of the estate land—although the holdings were small and prohibition on the sale of holdings prevented any evolution towards viable family farms—while the landlords obtained legal title to the remainder (the best one-third!) and gained further through the secularisation of monastic lands. Both peasants and landlords could access state land but even so the average peasant holding declined from 1896. When leasing more demesne land for sharecropping a curious legal formality tied the contract to unpaid labour on another portion of the estate! As landlords leased the management to agents by competition, contracts had to bring a profit and so they became more onerous for the peasants. This was especially the case after 1895 when cereal prices stagnated in the face of North American competition, and when the flagging latifundia system was taken over by rapacious Jewish estate managers (‘arendaşi’) seeking the cheapest possible peasant labour, with adverse consequences for public health through long hours of peasant work and the virtual absence of protein in the diet. In 1904 the Liberals sanctioned peasant cooperatives which could compete for sharecropping leases but the system did not make significant progress because only rarely could the cooperatives compete with the ‘arendaşi’. Owners actually preferred wage labour by landless Romanian peasants and seasonal Bulgarian, Macedonian and Serb migrants (the latter also prominent in Bulgaria and Hungary) but most failed to create a stable basis for capitalist farming since they entered world markets not ‘as profit-seeking farmers but as tribute-seeking rentiers’ (ibid. p. 55) while German and Hungarian farms still secured greater efficiency. It was only after the First World War that the system was revised in favour of wider peasant proprietorship and heavier state taxes. Germany German agriculture contributed to the country’s economic miracle with the encouragement of a high protective cereal tariff set in 1879 and raised through the 1880s, although J.A.Perkins (1981) emphasises the desire of owner-occupiers to maintain the value of their land through higher technical inputs in the main arable areas. Progress was most evident in potatoes and sugar beet, with particularly high capital and labour inputs in the latter case: raw sugar yield per hectare in Germany was 38% higher than in the Habsburg Empire and 31% higher than in France. However, labour was required on a seasonal rather than a permanent basis and this resulted in the ‘Instleute’ system whereby cottagers were provided with a smallholding in return for the labour of the holder and one other person when needed—although further intensification eventually required the return of these holdings to the owner and the adoption of a system of wage labour for seasonal migrants. Thus peasants from the Eichsfeld district near Erfurt went to work on the sugar beet farms of Halle and Magdeburg in the 1840s and by the end of the century the habit of going to Saxony (‘Sachsengängarei’) was well established in central and eastern Germany. The system also affected Habsburg territories (especially Galicia), Italy, Russia (Poland and White Russia) and Scandinavia so that in 1914 there were some 430,000 seasonal agricultural workers migrating to Germany across international frontiers (more than a quarter of them Russian Poles). Some farms were extremely large and were integrated with processing. The Nagel farm near Halle, which started in the 1840s when two brothers gave up their craft as stonemasons and purchased land—100ha, gradually enlarged to l,414ha by the time of
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their deaths in the mid-1880s—was subsequently endowed with a sugar factory, flour mill and distillery (the latter producing alcohol from potatoes and molasses). The farm continued to expand under new management to reach 2,146ha in 1900, by which time a second sugar factory was working on the estate. Given the management problems of such complex operations there seems to have been a preference for the alternative model whereby large sugar factories, enjoying scale economies, worked in conjunction with a number of separate farms. But either way it is clear that the Junkers, who were politically powerful in Germany before the First World War, were efficient managers of successful businesses rather than reactionary survivors of some bygone feudal age. Artificial fertiliser was a critical factor in the situation since the organic manure from cattle fed on sugar beet pulp would not have been sufficient to maintain high yields. The availability of potash in central Germany (initially a waste material generated in the course of salt mining) helped to make the Magdeburg area a leader in the agricultural revolution. Potash sales rose sharply after J.von Liebig discovered its value as fertiliser in 1861 to reach 0.3 million tonnes in 1870, 0.7 million in 1880 and 8 million in 1910. Nitrate came from Chile while domestic industry yielded ammonium sulphate from coke ovens and phosphate (basic slag) from metallurgical works. Fertiliser dressings per hectare in Germany rose from 3.1kg/ha in 1878–80 to 42 in 1913–14 (18.9kg of superphosphate, 16.7 of potash and 6.4 of nitrogen). The Eastern Question Here there was a slow start to intensification given the peasant stake in the land under feudalism, and uncertainty over the impact of the new farming technology on the sandy soils of East Prussia. There was little progress in the early nineteenth century as long as farmer protection (‘Bauernschütz’) safeguarded peasant land. But Dickler (1975) traces the progress of Prussian ‘regulation’ which established a free market in land (1807); individual property rights to replace privilege (1811); landlord access to a third of peasant hereditary possessions—half the non-hereditary possessions—while peasants without ownership rights got nothing (1816); and enclosure of commons (1821). As peasant pasture and subsistence arable became available, 1 million hectares of peasant land went to the estates through regulation or buy-outs of land from peasants weakened by the new regime. These changes gave a boost to the Junkers in production for export in the context of rising cereal prices: wheat and rye gained at the expense of barley—used locally for brewing—and the oats required for horse feed and gruel; justifying investment in land reclamation and drainage as well as rotation systems involving potatoes and clover. In the process the peasant middle class was weakened—to a greater extent than in Saxony where the level of ‘protection’ was greater—and more people became free labourers (‘Tagelöhner’). Output increased but the social change was also reflected in higher infant mortality linked with the relative increase in the role of potatoes in the rural diet; a consequence of the potential for cereal exports and the need for other appropriate crops in the rotation system. Smallholders and wage earners left with a bit of land after commutation of feudal dues and services and enclosure of the commons ‘may have adopted the potato as the only way to avoid starvation given the amount of land made available to them’ (Dickler 1975 p. 290). It is significant that while potato cultivation in Central Europe followed famine in
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1770–2, rapid growth came later with the steep rise in cereal prices: for by releasing land and labour, potatoes gave rise to improved rotation and enabled land under major crops to increase faster than male workers. It was also significant that the growth of root crops brought higher cereal yields since the latter benefited from the fertiliser applied to sugar beet at the start of the rotation cycle, the methods of cultivation and the manure supply. Tracing the progress of sugar beet on eastern Junker holdings from the 1850s, Perkins (1981) notes the dependence on cheap seasonal labour when many former farm workers went into industry. He explains how the distinction between farm servants (‘Knechte’)— who lived on the farm and worked with draught animals—and ‘Instleute’ cottagers was reduced by the latter’s evolution to ‘Deputant’ status involving a smaller plots and more regular work (though both variants became less prominent with the growth of seasonal work, much of it done by women). In particular, dependence on migrant Poles developed the capitalist ethos which broke down traditional employer-employee relations inherited from feudalism and reduced Junker control over the rural population in general. Habsburg Empire The contrast between core and periphery was very strong. Bohemia and Moravia lay adjacent to the German provinces of Saxony and Silesia with a relatively large number of 20–50ha farms to justify capital investment to raise yields. But the estates were also progressive and the cheap labour of smallholders was not exploited simply to enjoy higher living standards without any obligation to modernise and innovate. This was not so much an issue of ethics as one of demand—in an industrial area—coming from private households and food-processing factories, while rural-urban migration removed population pressure on the land and precluded a subsistence mentality (though in any case the primogenital inheritance law forbade the subdivision of peasant farms before 1869). Cultivation of hops and sugar beet was linked with breweries and sugar factories served by road and rail transport; and the introduction of the crops was often financed initially by the industries themselves. Apart from some early cultivation at the time of Napoleonic continental blockades, sugar beet growing really began with the opening of the Seelowitz (Židlochovice) factory in 1837. Tariff barriers against imported sugar were stimulative but probably more important were the compensation payments received by landowners in connection with the abolition of serfdom because these capital reserves enabled the larger estates to build sugar factories. By the 1870s production was similar to Germany but relatively low consumption in the empire made for a considerable export surplus. And the need to compete in foreign markets was a spur to increase efficiency, with profits ploughed back into research that would improve quality and reduce costs. Germany established a clear lead in output from the 1880s but the empire was still a major world producer. Of course, while industrial crops symbolised a productive agriculture, bread and fodder cereals and potatoes were far more important in areal terms. But the business environment was such that almost all sections of the farming population had an interest in removing checks to the capitalist mode of production. The situation is well summarised by Kolossa (1969) who contrasts the developed economy in the west— with modern, large-scale farming and a bourgeois outlook—first with Carniola and west/central Hungary where capitalist agriculture developed at the turn of the century, and second with the eastern and southern regions that were relatively backward and
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retained the peasant character that was also characteristic of alpine areas (Table 2.1). Industry was a major influence, increasing the proportion of non-occupational agrarian landowners, reducing the scale of the peasant community and stimulating small landholders to assume a bourgeois outlook with involvement in capitalistic market situations and a more urban lifestyle. The strength of the landowners and the total population not engaged in agrarian pursuits correlates with farm size (particularly when the larger holdings are considered), with incomes and with the use of hired labour. Bohemia and Moravia can be distinguished from Austria, Carniola and Hungary, with Bukowina, Croatia, Dalmatia and Galicia in the lowest category. Nevertheless, Moravia’s median farm size remained low, while Croatia did relatively well in terms of income. Hungary Here a relatively backward agriculture was transformed in the late nineteenth century when farmers were able to bypass local markets and export to Austria,
Table 2.1 Rural geography of the Habsburg Empire 1900–10 A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Austria 15.6 51.7 2.4 5.6 5.82 13.97 28.48 6.23 Bohemia 27.8 67.9 2.3 6.1 10.11 23.25 16.76 11.53 Bukovina 9.0 29.1 1.6 3.1 2.08 3.33 56.34 3.17 Carniola 14.6 38.1 4.8 11.4 2.95 14.16 14.89 4.08 Croatia 8.4 18.0 3.4 6.3 4.17 14.05 n.a. n.a. Dalmatia 8.1 17.5 1.4 3.0 1.13 1.58 39.26 1.30 Galicia 5.6 27.1 2.3 4.3 3.22 7.41 42.61 2.66 Hungary 13.8 33.5 2.5 6.2 5.01 12.37 n.a. n.a. Moravia 25.3 38.9 1.9 5.4 11.34 21.55 23.36 9.11 Key: A Percentage of owners not engaged in agrarian pursuits (1910 but Croatia and Hungary 1900) B Ditto for the total population (1910 but Croatia and Hungary 1900) C Median farm size (ha) 1900 D Ditto: largest 25% 1900 E Average net income per hectare (guldens) 1900 F Ditto for the median farm size of holding 1900 G Percentage of operations using hired labour 1902 H Ditto industrial hired labour 1902 Note: There is a correlation between Columns A and B, with high values in developed areas where many peasants were seeking new occupations in manufacturing, trade and administration. Columns C–F show variations in farm size and income—highlighting the need for additonal income in many cases. Source: Kolossa 1969 pp. 425, 428 and 430
particularly wheat and maize that were good estate enterprises. In 1912 Austria took 99.8% of Hungary’s wheat exports compared with 97.9% for flour, 89.2% for maize and 79.9% for cattle. This achievement required a massive growth of wholesale commerce, for the grain trade was the largest branch in the commercial sector. Another key issue was
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the development of financial institutions. Although the first savings banks emerged in the 1830s, the number rocketed from 1,255 in 1890 to 5,014 in 1913—especially village savings and loan associations—transformed by Raiffeisen-type savings and loan cooperatives (Held 1980 p. 95). There was also an annual growth in productivity of 1.7– 2.2% (depending on the source of the calculations) during 1867–1913 compared with 4.5% and 6% respectively in industry. Since landowners were able to keep a tight political grip on the country they were able to maintain their privileges by keeping many medieval institutions alive, while promoting legislation (for agricultural export subsidies and rural credit facilities) to help create a modern commercial agriculture. Yet, although relatively extensive by Austrian standards, it was difficult for agriculture to compete against North American and Russian grain, so the tariff wall around the empire—within which high prices could not easily be undermined—was a great comfort (especially with added value through flour milling). Hence the genuine development effort by landowners exemplified by Count Széchenyi, a pioneer of stockbreeding, mechanisation, agricultural banking and rural transport. There was increased output in cereals, potatoes and sugar beet through marshland drainage, the practice of ley-farming (which replaced rigid rotations) and the use of artificial fertilisers—during the 1890s—and improved seed. Yields were broadly comparable with the best in Europe, though Germany (with Belgium and Denmark) maintained a strong lead for sugar beet. On the other hand, it could be argued that the country’s social development was constrained by the grip of the estates (landholdings exceeding 5,750ha) which increased their stake from 2.26 million hectares (8.4%) in 1867 to 5.46 (19.4%) in 1914— particularly at the expense of medium-sized farms, reduced from 12.03 million hectares (44.9%) to 8.92 million (31.6%) at a time of stagnating cereal prices (many being owned by credit institutions, the Churches and central/local government). The strength of the titled nobility was particularly marked in Transdanubia. After 1900 most medium and large farms were using machines—iron ploughs and traction engines (for ploughs, seed drills and threshing machines)—to supplement draught animals, while small farms used draught cattle, horses and manpower, and hand-operated machines that became available in the 1860s and 1870s. Note that holdings below 20ha accounted for 45.6% of land— slightly more than holdings of over 100ha (43.9%). However, this meant reduced demand for labour at harvest time and while the smaller farms (below 115ha) remained stable (and the number of viable holdings increased only slowly), there was a rapid turnover among the farming population reflecting the social costs arising from the failure of smaller farms (and landless labourers) to prosper on the basis of indifferent price levels in the last quarter of the century and the deployment of steam-driven machines across the plains. Seasonal unemployment brought harvest strikes and deeper unrest may have been avoided by diversification of agricultural exports after 1880 with more emphasis on labour-intensive sectors: animal breeding, poultry and horticulture which equalled grain and flour by 1914. Development of small-scale farming depended on rural education which was relatively poor in backward areas. It also needed a stronger cooperative system supported by Liberal politicians as a way of containing the agrarian socialist movement. The law for the organisation of the National Central ‘Orszagos Kosponti Hitelszovetkezet’ (Office of Credit Cooperatives: OCC) was passed in 1898 to secure working capital and organise village branches. The government underwrote 1 million crowns’ worth of shares matched by large credit institutions in Budapest. OCC had 712
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associations in 1899 and 2,425 in 1913—covering 61.8% of all settlements in Hungary and the credits extended to borrowers rose from 25.4 to 279.6 million crowns over the period (Held 1980 p. 96). But on the whole the differences between large and small farms tended to increase. Hungary’s borderlands Agriculture was relatively backward in the borderlands (as in Bukowina and Galicia), apart from some islands of improvement like the large Croatian estates near Zagreb and the railway route to the north. Traditional farming systems persisted even after the abolition of serfdom and it was common for the peasants to operate a two-field system whereby all agreed to alternate between their allotted strips in the two parts of the village so that one of the fields would be available for grazing continuously (Figure 2.1). A three-year cycle has also been noted where maize, barley, rye and potatoes, first autumn sown then spring sown, would follow the fallow year. It was sometimes well into the twentieth century before this practice broke down in favour of individual decisionmaking and restriction of cooperative grazing arrangements to recognised common pastures where animals were tended by a member of the community working on a daily rota system. Cooperation was even more extensive (especially in remote areas) and the government was supportive, although there had to be a central organisation in Budapest, as in the case of the cattle insuring union (1898); the ‘Hungya’ food cooperative (1898) and the ‘Fructus’ distillery union (1917). Local initiative was very important, for development in western Slovakia around Skalica arose when a local doctor (L.Blaho) and the Catholic priest (L.Okánik) started a farmers’ food union in the town in 1897; followed by a farmers’ and vintners’ union in 1901 and another for dairy farmers in 1903. Congresses were held from 1906, allowing local produce like the Modra wine to be exhibited. Cattle insurance cooperatives sprung up in Nyitta (Nitra) and Trencsén (Trenčin) and development spread eastwards into central Slovakia. Voluntary sheep breeding unions were provided for in the Theresian shepherding regulations of the period; operating under orally preserved customs established in key regions like Bravacovo in the upper Hron. The union at Kochanovce (near Trencsén) generated savings on a scale that allowed it to assume a credit function, but the agricultural revolution in Hungary served ‘to choke off the borderlands from principal markets’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 287), so these overpopulated areas were left largely with an agricultural role tied to local markets that showed little expansion in view of the lack of strong industrial development. Indeed, since the railways allowed distant producers—with their economies of scale—to meet much of local demand for manufactures, the towns were unable to absorb significant numbers of rural people. Agriculture had a major subsistence function for provinces like Bucovina and Galicia which maintained the custom of early marriage (and hence large families) through an era of falling mortality rates. Rural labour was cheap and provided no incentive to mechanise, so productivity and incomes remained low. In 1902 farms of less than 5ha accounted for 80.3% of all holdings in Galicia, 85.7% in Bucovina and 87.4% in Dalmatia, and incomes were kept low by the subsistence demands of large families: the emphasis was on maize while cash crops failed to make headway (the wine industry in Dalmatia was overtaken by the eastward spread of phylloxera). Until emigration to the New World became an option at the turn of the
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century the best opportunities lay in seasonal work in Germany or the ‘core’ provinces of the empire. Southeastern Europe There was scope for food exports to Central and Western Europe using railways and steamships once national governments restored public order and imposed quite
Figure 2.1 The two-field system at Rogoz, Máramaros (Maramureş) high monetary taxes that obliged the peasants to produce marketable surpluses to finance the import of manufactures. The Ottoman grain monopoly was set aside in the principalities in 1829 and in Bulgaria a decade later, so Balkan grain was entering Western Europe in significant quantities from the 1840s. At the same time there was a profitable livestock trade from the principalities to the Habsburg Empire and from Bulgaria to Istanbul to meet the Ottoman army’s demand for meat and leather. However, North American competition in cereals caused a downturn in prices after 1873, while rural population growth and a finite land area subject to drought made it impossible to maintain per capita export growth in real terms. Yields advanced slowly to 11.3qu/ha in
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1911–15 (the average for the three states) from 9.5 in 1862–6 (Romania and Serbia only) (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 188), but the per capita area sown declined while the per capita export was static after 1900 (indeed there was no labour productivity increase in Romania after the early 1890s). Thus peasants found their work less rewarding, even though real taxation decreased, while the terms of trade for primary producers did not worsen significantly. There were also problems for Romania when pig exports to the Habsburg Empire faced a prohibitive tariff from 1882 (which gave Serbs some respite, as noted below) but when higher German tariffs were imposed on pigs from the empire in 1885, Hungarians demanded that the domestic market should be reserved for them alone, and in 1896 Vienna used a veterinary pretext to stop all pigs entering (a move triggered by renegotiation of the 1867 customs agreement which was due every ten years). While the vulnerability of the overpopulated Balkan states made a protective regime for industry irresistible during the 1880s—even though jobs in the factories could not be created quickly enough to ease pressure—agrarians advocated tariff reductions that might (with reciprocation by the Habsburg Empire) improve the condition of the peasantry over the short term. Other proposals were put forward, like the radical agrarian programme presented in V.Kogălniceanu’s pamphlet of 1906 demanding a new regime of labour contracts and stronger banks with the means to purchase estates for subdivision. As already noted, peasant frustrations in Romania boiled over the following year but it was not until 1921 that radical land reform was achieved. Serbia Serbia is an interesting case because the national economy was based on small family farms in contrast to large estates—with a privileged aristocracy and servile peasantry— seeking economies of scale and capital-intensive production. The 1863 census revealed 93% of the population living in communities below 2,000 and ‘nearly all rural dwellers were members of settled farm-owning peasant families’ (Palairet 1995 p. 41) who could be given land by the commune (‘opština’). Within communities there was remarkable equality, especially in poorer areas: the tax burden was imposed uniformly on a capitation basis, although incomes were higher in the fertile lowlands where peasants got involved in the pig trade as prices rose through the 1830s. Support from the Habsburg Empire against the Ottomans influenced trade but exports were affected by a doubling of pig numbers in Hungary during 1870–95, by which time the empire was itself a net pig exporter. Initial closure of the Habsburg market to Serbian pig exports in 1895–6 and the five-year customs war of 1906–11 (encouraging a switch to meat packing)—and the entire ‘Pig War’ episode of 1905–11—saw the Habsburg share of Serbian imports fall from 60% to 19% (90% to 18% for exports). Interestingly it is argued that this tended to maintain the ‘zadruga’ beyond the time when its defence rationale had disappeared and land tax liability was transferred to individual families (1835). The ‘zadruga’ certainly evolved according to the constant state of flux of family arrangements as sons/brothers decided to stay or leave—with prosperity making for stability and stress leading to fragmentation. But the institution was always more prominent in ‘the comparatively commercialised rich accessible lowland district of Belica [part of the western “Šumadija”] than in the barely monetised poor remote highland area of Trnava’ (ibid. p. 104) because the ‘zadruga’ owned more real estate per capita than conventional family
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farms in a situation where several married couples would generate a significant workforce for swineherding (which was productive employment for women). Since livestock comprised the key cash crop there was little cereal production beyond subsistence needs (including maize for the animals) and townspeople had to pay high prices. With the meadows all important, the larger peasants did not find it worthwhile to market crops: profits were invested in shops, stables, warehouses, watermills and taverns and despite occupying ‘some of the richest potential grain-bearing land in Central Europe’ (Palairet 1995 p. 88), the cultivated area rose less sharply than the rise in population. Paradoxically, in the hills farmers had to sell cereals to get money to pay taxes and in the process they ‘tended to oversupply local grain markets and [probably] to supply grain to the lowlands’ (ibid. p. 107) so grain prices were low in remote mountain towns like Užice where ‘grain would be dumped on an ill-developed market which could scarcely absorb it’ (ibid. p. 100), while costs for exchange goods were high because of remoteness from import competition. Meanwhile, viticulture was left to small peasants who needed to sell for cash, for there was little quality production (better wines were imported from Hungary). Some diversification occurred through dried plums (prunes) from northern Serbia. When the brandy markets were closed in 1880 through revised Habsburg and Ottoman tariffs, Bosnian entrepreneurs came in with wholesaling experience and a plum-drying technique which produced an agency/credit network stimulating farmers to devote some land and labour to plums for export (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 177). At the same time, the tobacco monopoly was never so complete that it destroyed the subsistence sector in the countryside. Agricultural expansion in new lands In various ways the rural population sought new opportunities where the options of migrating to the towns or foreign parts were not available. Harvest workers competed with sharecroppers on the grain estates while other seasonal migrants found casual work in factories, forests and mines in order to maintain their homes in the countryside. Indeed, a little-explored feature of industrial development at this time was the way that it continued to integrate with a rural way of life despite the factory system. But there was still scope for colonisation, including remote rural areas where increased land might be created by terracing, as occurred widely in Transylvania. There was continuing scope in the steppelands of Bărăgan and Dobrogea. N.Todorov (1998) has described the migrations from the Balkan Mountains, Macedonia and Thrace by people wishing to take up farming in this area or to engage in commerce at the famous Bazargic Fair. And when the flow of German immigrants to the Habsburg Military Frontier on the southwestern edge of Pannonia was discouraged by a property requirement (300 florins per family) in 1829, the Hungarian authorities opened a colonisation office in Budapest and even recruited Slovaks from the Tatra because ‘acálfí’ were deemed sufficiently Magyarised to represent Hungarian interests. Recent research has also drawn attention to the Adriatic islands which were refugee centres for families escaping the Ottoman grip on the mainland. The Kornati Islands were being occupied by fugitives and by people from Murter (from the early seventeenth century) using the open pastures increasingly for cattle—and sheep which devastated the remnants of woodland—as well as olive growing, followed by viticulture in the nineteenth century (until phylloxera enabled olives to make
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a comeback after 1900). It was people from Murter who eventually controlled most of the islands, such was the pressure to find new land, allied with Austria’s progressive land tax which meant that the fiscal burdens of the extra land were relatively low due to the tiny holdings on the island of domicile. Land on the Kornati Islands was secured in four purchases (‘kupovština’) from 1851 to 1896—and the islands were partitioned by drystone walls during 1896–1926 (Kulušić 2000–1), while a cannery at Sali on Dugi otok encouraged fishing. The Hungarian ‘tanyák’ and transhumance in the Romanian Carpathians The isolated farmsteads of the Great Plain of Hungary emerged after the Turkish occupation through more intensive use of land beyond the central dwelling and stable zone in the eighteenth century, whereas previously only herders had stayed out in barns on the puszta. After the Turkish withdrawal there was little settlement within 20km of Kecskemét, where population increased from 10,000 in the eighteenth century to 21,318 in 1871—when there were just 1,308 people in the plains beyond the town. The barns were now inhabited permanently and the colonisation was extended through new arable lands created by river regulation and drainage work at the end of the nineteenth century when intensification made it necessary to occupy the ‘tanyák’ permanently. Village housing was then given up in favour of a dense ‘tanya’ network based on fruit and vine growing between the Danube and Tisza; transforming the sandy Kiskunság degraded by overgrazing and resulting sand-blow (where shepherding survived until the early twentieth century) and tobacco in Nyírseg. The colonisation was facilitated by freehold tenure of parcels at a time when industrial development was lacking, though the towns remained important for commerce and family contacts. During the 1880s, when half of Hungary’s established vineyards were ravaged by phylloxera, the landless cotters showed great resolve and dedication in the way they set about pioneering to rebuild and intensify agriculture on the puszta. It is also appropriate to recall longwave transhumance which enabled some communities to grow well beyond the capacity of the local agriculture, particularly in the case of the ‘margineni’ (border) communities around the towns of Hermannstadt (Sibiu) and Kronstadt (Braşov) where early growth was based on links with German industrial and trading com munities. The Treaty of Passarowitz (1718) opened the way for journeys of twelve to fourteen days to winter sheep in the Lower Danube Valley and parts of Dobrogea such as the Batova Valley (‘la vallée sans hiver’). In March they would return home, taking advantage of the Zimnicea floodplain grazings en route. When problems arose through cultivation of steppes from 1860s and tighter border controls (some precipitated by the customs wars between Romania and the Habsburg Empire during 1886–1900), some moved on to work seasonally in Bessarabia to look after large landowners’ flocks while others reached the open spaces of Crimea and the Caucasus to enjoy a better environment that avoided the hard winters and dry summers in Bessarabia. Some also turned to peddling (‘comerţ ambulant’) along the old routes or set up as craftsmen and traders in the towns of southern Transylvania or northern Wallachia. At the same time the shift towards crop production for the market did not preclude further peasant colonisation of the high ground for stock rearing, woodcarving and subsistence farming. Statistics collected by Apolzan (1987) in the
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Apuseni show the contact area with the Transylvanian Plateau—west of Kolozsvár (Cluj), Torda (Turda) and Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia)—to be an ethnically mixed area with a clear Romanian majority on the higher ground, especially the upper Arieş Basin above Câmpeni, with significant amounts of pasture and woodland per capita, complementing the stronger arable element at the contact. Population figures for 1860– 1941 then show a strong upward trend in the upper Arieş compared with the lower (Figure 2.2). Significantly the upper Arieş offered a succession of surfaces particularly the Măguri-Mărişel convenient for settlement and pastoralism with woodland retained on the steep slopes pitching into the valley system. INDUSTRY Despite low per capita income and agriculture’s persistence as the leading occupation— with widespread poverty—industrial development was substantial. Since the state carried responsibility for defence and often played a prominent role in railway development (seen as having important security implications) it was logical that it should also take a lead in industrialisation, especially in Hungary and the SEECs where industry was introduced into relatively backward areas. There was
Figure 2.2 Settlement and ethnicity in the Apuseni Mountains a high level of concentration which was inevitable given that industry represented a relatively new innovation, but the tendency was reinforced by the uneven distribution of inputs and infrastructure, not to mention political and strategic considerations. There was a generally high level of technical training for the German workforce as the state
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purposefully combined its industrial raw materials with the scientific skills of the universities, technical schools and commercial institutes, but elsewhere provision was less generous and the supply of managers in the Habsburg Empire was dependent on the Technische Hochschulen opened in Prague (1806), Vienna (1815), Brünn (Brno; 1849) and Budapest (1860). Gerschenkron (1962) argues that backward economies favoured a large scale of business. This was not always true for many industrial units were quite small and catered for an essentially local demand. But they were much larger when there was a reliance on export markets, as in the case of milling and capital goods in Hungary. Large companies in the Habsburg Empire like the Prague Iron Company (Pražská Železâŕska Společnost) and the leading coal companies in Brüx (Most)—Brüxer KohlenBergbau Gesellschaft and Nordböhmische Kohlenwerks-Gesellschaft—opened the way for cartelisation which began with the agreement between the Witkowitz (Vitkovice) Mining and Foundry Works and the Teplitz (Teplice) rail mill in 1877. Vertical integration during the 1870s was followed by horizontal concentration during the 1880s business upswing. Cartelisation was a particularly prominent feature of German industry and followed from a degree of ambivalence over the virtues of competition on the home front and an instinctive preference for the ethos of the pre-industrial state bureaucracy. The cartels might inhibit innovative action in the short term but ‘in the long run they could function as a further stimulus to economic development by sustaining the level of profit or by facilitating further technological innovation’ (Milward and Saul 1977 p. 53). The role of the banking system Gerschenkron also contrasted the self-generated industrial revolution in the UK with developments in ECE that required the assistance of investment banks, although textile industries were able to keep abreast of modern technology by ploughing back their profits. This can be seen in the international flow of capital, given the major German investment in the Habsburg Empire: Kr3.52 billion in 1914, compared with 0.19 billion for the UK, which was the largest export market after Germany and the second largest source of imports after Germany. Indeed, for Germany, the excess of imports over exports was more than cancelled out by earnings from shipping and foreign investments, which included chemicals and electrical engineering in the Habsburg Empire; metallurgy and oil drilling in Romania; and steel in Russian Poland. From the Habsburg Empire’s point of view, the need to acquire foreign financial resources become particularly urgent during the two decades or so before the First World War when a growing import surplus began to develop. One-eighth of Austrian industrial securities were in foreign—mainly German—hands in 1901 (Teichova and Cottrell 1983 p. 35). At the end of 1913 the Dual Monarchy’s total foreign indebtedness amounted to approximately Kr9.75 billion ‘and the debt servicing burden so imposed was only partly alleviated by investment in the Balkans’ (Cottrell 1983 p. 309). Within the empire, Austrian capital was crucial for building Hungarian heavy industry, although it meant that much of the iron ore production was exported direct to Austrian territories in a raw state, and in the early years of the Ausgleich pig-iron production grew much more slowly than iron-ore output. For the whole period 1867–1913 iron-ore production rose from 0.3 to 2.1 million tonnes while pig iron rose from 0.1 to 0.6 million tonnes.
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The Balkan states had their central banks which issued national currencies to displace foreign denominations but at the same time they were constrained by an overriding obligation to foreign creditors to remain tied to the gold standard. However, with their monetary systems thus tied to the French franc, some foreign banks channelled in outside capital. The German banks—Disconto-Gesellschaft and Bleichröder Bank of Berlin— invested in Romanian oil after 1895 and Deutsche Bank took over Steaua Română in 1902. Foreign banks concentrated on under-writing state loans as ‘the first large-scale infusion of European capital into the Balkan economies’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 321), but the depression of the 1870s induced some ‘reluctant imperialism’ among the great European banks which were very slow to open branches in Balkan capitals. Despite the German challenge to Habsburg exports there was little interest in Balkan economic penetration because capital was sucked into the Czech lands and Hungary. Austrian capital arriving after the 1873 depression proved to be an all-important catalyst at a time when domestic accumulation would have been insufficient, but a serious problem was always the lack of self-sufficiency in fuel. Meanwhile, few foreign firms jumped tariff barriers, though J.P.Coats had branch plants in the Czech lands and Hungary at the beginning of the twentieth century. Another example concerns Mannesmann of Düsseldorf with works in Komotau (Chomutov) in Bohemia which were registered in the Habsburg monarchy and gained a strong position in the Habsburg tube cartel along with Witkowitz and three other large tube companies. The company also became majority shareholder in Röhrenswerke of Schönebrunn (Klimkovice) on the western edge of the Mährische-Ostrau (Ostrava) industrial complex. The role of banks can be seen more significantly at the domestic level, although assessments vary from the most positive (Fremdling and Tilly 1976; Tilly 1986) to the more sceptical (Neuburger and Stokes 1974). Much investment occurred through joint stock limited liability companies with credit from development banks. The banks concentrated on the large, strong companies and were not prominent over risk-taking and innovation—though they did sponsor large vertically integrated coal-iron-steel companies and were involved with the Mannesmann seamless tube development in the 1890s. Invention of seamless rolled tubes by R. & M.Mannesmann arose from the financial backing of W. & F.von Siemens who were connected with Deutsche Bank. Even so, there are mixed feelings about the role of banks in German industry: some writers have emphasised reciprocal support and influence. Meanwhile, Habsburg banks became much more involved in medium- and long-term business from the late 1880s, especially in heavy industry. Although not highly profitable, in Carniola it was ‘decisive in creating mining and metallurgical sectors’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 312). Banks were crucial to Škoda’s expansion into armaments which was financed by Boden-creditanstalt and Böhmische Escompte-Bank; while the Bohemian sugar industry was assisted by Živnostenská Bank. Hungarian banks became cautious after the 1873 crisis, but there was some revival of interest from the mid-1890s with the growth of industrial joint stock companies, but not on the scale of Creditanstalt (Austria) and Deutsche Bank (Germany). The Hungarian banks were less specialised and while there was a rapid growth of financial institutions during the two decades before 1914 the processes of amalgamation and of branch formation were relatively slow. Some large Hungarian companies—like Rimamurány Salgótarján, Manfréd Weiss and Salgótarján coal mines—were independent of banks, while the sugar industry was closely connected with the Hungarian General
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Credit Bank. Some companies might have more than one bank represented on the board, for while the First Hungarian Economic Machine Factory developed a connection with the National Banking Corporation (NBC) in 1897, the Commercial Bank was also represented on the board after acquiring the majority of NBC shares in 1916. Indeed, during inflation more than one bank was needed. Also there might be changes in banks (Pogany 1989). In SEE there was only limited involvement in industry by Bulgarian private banks compared with Bucharest’s Banca Marmorosch-Blank, established by a family of Habsburg-Jewish immigrants who switched to merchant banking from the Leipzig wholesale trade and encouraged the Vienna-based Götz timber company to extend its operations to Romania after 1873 (Lampe & Jackson 1982 p. 258). Germany Germany’s economic performance over the half century before the First World War was a truly remarkable exemplification of Gerschenkron’s thesis on latecomer countries. Assisted by a rapid growth of both population and workforce to levels exceeded in Europe only by the Russian Empire, Germany contributed 15.7% of world manufacturing (exceeding the UK share of 14%). Thanks to data supplied by F.B.Tipton (1976), it is evident that the transformation at the end of the century was particularly impressive, with 0.63 jobs in industry for each one in agriculture in 1882 rising to 1.22 in 1907. At the same time, structural change brought jobs in building materials, engineering, metallurgy and mining into parity with those in food processing, textiles and clothing compared with a ratio of only 0.6 to 1 in 1882. There was particular strength in steel, chemicals and electricity. The east-west regional split was quite striking with a more rapid growth of population and employment (and specifically employment in industry and in the tertiary sector) in the west and the faster decline of agricultural employment in the east. So as heavy industry made headway in the east the ratio was slightly more favourable than the all-German figures already quoted: 0.66 and 1.24 compared with 0.61 and 1.19 in the west. Some regions like Magdeburg and Saxony were able to develop their engineering industries based on the requirements of agriculture and food processing, but this was not generally the case for ‘the east developed no processing centres comparable to Chicago and Kansas City in the United States, nor did Berlin seem willing or able to full this role’ (ibid. p. 108). The picture in the east was highly uneven. Berlin-Potsdam dominated the picture with 2.9 times the average growth of population, 3.5 times the average growth of employment and exactly double the average growth of employment in industry. Magdeburg, Merseburg, Oppeln (Opole) and Saxony especially showed up well while all the other regions were well below average. The impression is one of powerful migration currents focusing on Berlin where migration was equivalent to 11.6% of the resident population each year (on average) from 1876 to 1890, falling to 4.2% between 1891 and 1905. Apart from Potsdam, there were negative rates throughout the east although they were naturally lower in the more industrialised areas which were able to gain some benefit from the Russian market.
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Habsburg Empire Growth was persistent but modest by German standards. In 1910 just 22.1% of the working population was employed in industry compared with 55.1% for agriculture (a ratio of 0.4, compared with 1.22 in Germany in 1907). Growth was relatively rapid after 1880 with recovery from the depression of the mid-1870s and some stimulus from the dynamic German economy, but the average rate of growth of industrial production from 1880 to 1914 was only a fraction above 4% compared with 3% during 1840–80. The structure was diverse and saw considerable change. Textiles were most prominent in midcentury when the empire’s cotton industry was greater than that of the Zollverein, but the share was only a quarter by 1910. The relative decline reflected an abundance of labour and hence a leisurely pace of mechanisation (even though equipment was readily available in Saxony) and the inefficiency of locationally separate spinning and weaving branches: exports of yarn and cloth (e.g. to the Balkans) were balanced by imports of higher-quality products. Meanwhile, there was growing strength in chemicals, metallurgy and engineering that constituted a third of all industrial production at the turn of the century (thanks to the ambitious railway and public works programme during the premiership of E.von Körber and the discovery of oil in Galicia where production rose from 0.03 million tonnes in 1880 to 2 million in 1909). Even so, heavy industries were less prominent than in Germany (as well as France and the UK) and Habsburg industry in general was very dependent on a protected domestic market. Hungary In the late nineteenth century the country’s primary economic role as food supplier to Austria (in return for the latter’s industrial products) was complemented by a significant amount of manufacturing. The proportion of the working population employed in industry doubled after the Ausgleich from 8.6% in 1870 to 17.1% in 1910, and the employment generated was of the greatest social and economic importance at a time when the mechanisation of agriculture was responsible for serious rural unemployment. Some industry was associated with food production (brewing and milling) but the rest emerged from a new potential revealed by the railway system in combining individually modest resource bases. Although heavy protection was impossible because of the risk of retaliation against agricultural exports, it was considered important to stimulate heavy industry in the national interest—especially in the production and maintenance of railway equipment: 1873 saw the opening of the Hungarian State Railway Machine Works just a few years after the State Iron Works was founded at Diósgyőr (1868) to produce rails and munitions. A law for the encouragement of industry was passed in 1881 in response to growing concern over the high level of emigration and the need for more tax revenue after heavy borrowing in the 1860s and 1870s led to chronic budgetary deficits in the 1880s. The stimulus of tax exemption prompted a burst of investment by the Budapest banks and was followed by interest-free loans under the Industrial Promotion Law (1890), tax rebates (1899) and shareholding (1907) for particular sectors, especially textiles, which was to receive 57% of all subsidies (though in total they amounted to only
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2% of total investment by private industry and their impact could hardly have been dramatic. Hungary had to cope with a lack of self-sufficiency in fuel, for coal consumption was always higher than production with imports rising from 12.7% on average during 1851– 73 to 32.2% during 1896–1913, even though the Tatabánya-based Hungarian General Coal Mining Company and the Salgótarján Company raised output from 4.8 million tonnes in 1860 to 102.7 million in 1913, of which 2.4 million and 89.5 million respectively consisted of lignite. On the other hand, there was much help over infrastructure such as housing and services for workers which would otherwise have placed heavy burdens on the shoulders of entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, growth rates consistently above those of Austria after 1886 enabled Hungarian industrial output to reach 30% of the Austrian level in 1914 compared with only 16% in 1841, so Hungary ‘ameliorated to a considerable extent her relative backwardness’ (Komlos 1981 p. 6). However, while trade with Austria highlighted the exchange of food for manufactures, the pattern with the rest of the world was almost the reverse. Hungary’s policy was economically irrational in the context of the empire as a whole because there was a deteriorating balance of payments situation after 1900 as the Dual Monarchy ceased to be self-sufficient in food and yet increased imports of industrial plant and raw materials. But thanks to this highly motivated regional interest within the common market Hungary was able to set off on the road to separate economic development, and despite the complication of boundary changes (which cut off many Budapest firms from their suppliers of raw materials and intermediates) there was a solid base for the fully independent state that emerged after the First World War. Agrarian interests sought to exclude industrialists from the House of Representatives in the late 1890s (reflecting the agrarian, anti-industrial sentiment of the Hungarian ruling class), but the National Association of Hungarian Industrialists was founded in 1902 to reverse this trend when industrialists felt the government was more concerned with protection against food imports than support for industrial exports. There was a strong Jewish representation so the organisation was quite liberal and without the right-wing inter-war leanings of Austrian and German equivalents. There was little fear of the working class in Hungary—which strengthened the bond between industrialists and landowners in Germany. Russia and the Balkans There were considerable opportunities in the east and southeast. The technical lead of several decades enjoyed by the Kingdom of Poland (over other parts of the Russian Empire) by virtue of its relatively early industrialisation gave its manufacturers a competitive edge especially when German entrepreneurs crossed the frontier and set up textile and iron industries in Łódz and Sosnowiec, respectively. Although Russian industrial output rose substantially in value from Rb1.12 billion to 4.58 billion during 1887–1908, Poland’s share fell only slightly from 14.7% to 12.6%. Meanwhile, as already noted, the emerging capitalists of the Ottoman Empire had to overcome the ambivalence of the Muslim elite. Great damage arose through the trade conventions signed in 1838 which prescribed very low duties for imported Western manufactures while guilds remained an obligatory form of organisation for commodity producers and
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even for new branches of manufacturing. Moreover, since a lack of security was ‘one of the greatest obstacles to larger and more permanent investments in industry’ (Todorov 1983 p. 306), people preferred to move their capital around and if necessary to take it out of the country: hence commerce, money lending and real estate were often preferred outlets for capital. But successor states took vigorous action over the economy, education and security. Given a lack of compelling raw materials, only native entrepreneurs—with the necessary knowledge of local conditions—could come to terms with the initially low expectations and it was usually resident Jews or ethnic Germans who sought out Central European capital rather than the reverse. Despite the lack of capital and business experience there was a record of substantial growth from the late nineteenth century which provided a basis for a more comprehensive approach to modernisation in the context of enlarged national economies after 1918. The drive came from population growth and a less rewarding cereal trade. Whereas the elites initially favoured low tariffs in order to push the agricultural surpluses of their estates into more developed parts of Europe (and to maintain good relations with the powers) stagnating grain prices in the 1880s undermined the credibility of an industrial policy linked to agricultural exports (all the more so in view of agricultural protectionism in some countries) and forced a general extension of tariff barriers. It was also essential for the state to take a lead and establish heavy strategic industries linked with defence and with state monopolies like the national railway companies, while erecting tariff barriers to encourage light industry on the basis of private enterprise or foreign investment. In 1873 tax exemptions were granted in Romania and Serbia and these first measures later grew into more comprehensive schemes to stimulate industry, including free building land, customs-exempt imported raw materials, concessionary railway freight charges and some production subsidies. Usually there were stipulations over the scale of mechanisation (to ensure a significant level of production), the number of employees (usually 20–5 minimum) and the training of native workers. Further protective legislation was passed in Romania in 1882 and 1887 (with a Mining Law in 1895 which opened up the oil industry to foreign investment) and Serbia in 1898, while Bulgaria’s initial rates of 1883 were raised in 1897. There were further laws in Bulgaria in 1904, Serbia in 1906 and Romania in 1906 and 1912 (as well as a survey in 1901–2)—all of which generated bitter conflict with the Habsburg Empire, for Romania’s tariffs on finished and semifinished imports—averaging 20% ad valorem—were certainly high enough to deter some European manufactures. Hence there was ‘a climate in which entrepreneurs could believe investment in domestic industry would yield at least long-term prospects for satisfactory profit’ (Lampe and Jackson 1982 p. 269). On the other hand, ‘overvalued exchange rates may have aided infant industries by reducing the cost of imported machinery but also helped to restrict already small domestic markets for manufactures by passing on the high price of agricultural exports to urban consumers. The resulting pressure to raise industrial wages, backed by an emerging socialist movement, discouraged local manufacturers still further’ (ibid. p. 589)—with excess capacity and cartel restrictions evident after 1900. After good progress in the 1890s (a decade blessed for the most part by high cereal prices) momentum showed signs of flagging when living standards ceased to grow, the virgin cereal lands were fully occupied and world prices stagnated. Moreover, the saturation of the home market suggested that an industrialisation policy based on
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substitution had largely run its course, though perhaps not in textiles where import levels were still high. But there were significant variations between countries. In Romania, where 40% of the seats in the legislature went to urban representatives who backed protection strongly, industrial growth to 1914 averaged 6–8%—possibly going as far back as 1880 (Jackson 1986 pp. 60–1) while the country also became the world’s fourth-largest wheat exporter through ruthless exploitation of peasant workers on estate farms. Meanwhile, population pressure was lower in Serbia and the national assembly was more representative: Skupština peasant representatives did not want to pay more for domestic manufactures (normally lacking the efficiency or scale economies to generate export) supplied to a protected home market. So Serbian industry was constrained by the political strength of the peasantry which heaped more of the fiscal burden on the nonagricultural population, partly through indirect taxes on what were considered to be urban luxuries. Protection of the agrarian population may not have been a deliberate act to avoid proletarianisation by holding it in tutelage through low taxation, but it is certain that the latent strength of peasant power in opposition blunted attacks on their interests— not to mention the likelihood that squeezing the peasantry in the interest of protected state industrialisation would reduce morale, depress agricultural exports and accelerate ruralurban migration. In Bulgaria too it was the small non-farm population which supported the rising cost of government: when protective legislation arrived relatively late, as a response to the agricultural depression, it failed to target specific branches and lacked the support of a strong party like the Romanian Liberals. Industrial regions: the ECE industrial core—Jena-Łódź-Budapest It has been observed by F.E.I.Hamilton (1970) that this area comprised the ECE’s industrial core which could be seen as a major outlier of the West European industrial system with its heartland in the Ruhr. While evading precise definition—indeed ths review will include extensions to Berlin and Magdeburg—it was a region with considerable industrial experience dating back to early modern times and a great capacity for adaptation. For example, the historic glass industry of Thuringia survived through scientific glassware at Ilmenau and optical industries in Jena where the famous ‘Carl Zeiss Jena’ arose out of a partnership between the owner of a fine mechanical business and the optical specialist E.Abbe in 1876. The latter gained sole charge after buying out Zeiss’s son (following his partner’s death in 1888) and teamed up with O.Schrott who delivered glass of the required quality and enabled production to extend from microscopes into optical instruments of all kinds. In 1891 Abbe handed over his assets to a Carl Zeiss Foundation to provide pensions, medical assistance and housing loans—also to finance retooling at the factory. But the region cannot be regarded as homogeneous and cohesive: rather—as is suggested by the diverse patterns produced in the Polish territories (Figure 2.3; Table 2.2)—it was a zone comprising many separate systems (each with its own historical and structural profile) distributed across several countries and drainage basins, and unified only by relatively high levels of employment in industry and relatively well-developed urban and railway networks. There was a major divide between the German and Habsburg complexes. The Silesian coalfield, with its functional links by
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rail and water transport with Berlin, was complemented by traditional areas of metal and textile production in Saxony and Thuringia and the rising central German chemical complex. To the south lay the Habsburg system based in the Czech lands and functionally tied to Vienna, notwithstanding the availability of the Elbe/Labe navigation to the North Sea, with a separate—newly established—complex in Budapest. Boosted by tariff protection, the Czech lands were important for Habsburg coal and iron production; as well as beer, alcohol and flour; porcelain and glass; and textiles. In 1902 56% of Austria’s industrial workers were from the Czech lands, despite only limited Czech ownership. The region also included some Polish industry in Dąbrowa and Łódź that was bound into the Russian economy, with relatively little use made of the Vistula navigation which could have integrated the Habsburg and Russian lands. Indeed, while Western Europe developed a substantial waterway network, ECE’s industrial triangle never attracted the investment
Figure 2.3 Industry in Poland in 1900 to connect the Danube with the Elbe, Oder and Vistula (which would have provided a comparable facility) and instead was forced to rely heavily on railways for its integration, given the close coordination of construction in the border areas. The Danube was of some value for Hungary but it was again the railways that linked the resource-based industries
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of Slovakia and Transylvania with Budapest and connected the capital with the Adriatic port of Fiume. The estate complex Food industries increased the demand for agricultural products and many were located in rural areas where they competed with urban-based establishments. There was a growth of sugar beet refining from the 1830s—with clear interdependence with government policy—through small refineries built on large farms in central Germany and Lower Silesia (with the most suitable soils) with the by-product pulp and molasses valued for animal fodder (as important a consideration as the sugar itself in the early days). The estates were also locations for breweries and distilleries—along with starch factories, corn mills and sawmills—all of which were absorbing bourgeois capital after 1870. For example, in Hungary agricultural distilleries were assisted by the first Industrial Promotion Law of 1881 (offering tax exemptions for
Table 2.2 Employment in industry in Poland 1879– 1913 Kingdom of Poland Prussia Galicia Upper Silesia 1879 1894 1904 1913 1882 1895 1907 1902 1875 1907 Factories 2148 2025 3413 4369 1996 3902 4986 n.a. n.a. n.a. Workers (thousands) 97.6 180.2 334.8 428.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 89.5 18.6 242.8 Mining 12.1 19.7 29.6 33.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 23.0 42.8 110.7 Metals/Metallurgy 15.7 29.6 73.0 90.4 10.2 14.8 29.1 10.5 24.0 47.3 Minerals 4.5 8.6 20.3 27.9 8.1 14.2 24.1 12.0 4.5 21.9 Wood n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.7 10.1 19.4 11.2 1.3 9.8 Textiles 29.3 81.5 138.9 175.4 2.8 7.8 8.5 8.8 2.1 16.5 Food 30.4 24.5 29.4 37.7 12.7 28.9 28.7 15.1 5.6 19.7 Others 5.6 16.3 43.6 63.5 5.0 7.4 12.1 10.1 1.3 16.9 Notes: Figures for industrial sectors are percentages of the total employed in industry Source: Jezierski 1994 pp. 105–8
new factories). They proved viable on the estates where they competed with the distilleries of industrialists. The sugar industry has been most fully researched and it appears that the first-generation factories (eliminated by the competition with cane sugar) were followed by a second generation of highly capitalistic operations that hired rural workers during agriculture’s ‘dead season’. Sugar beet refining became a major business, with the ‘diffusion’ process pioneered at Seelowitz in Moravia by J.Robert, the son of the founder of the first sugar beet factory in the Czech lands. The process spread quickly and for a time machinery was exported to France and Germany. However, technology favoured very large factories by the end of the century—because of the increasing scale of efficient diffusers (which extracted juice from beet). Thus in the early 1900s the Cukrownia enterprise for sugar and alcohol—established in 1882 at Kulmsee (Chełnża) near Thorn (Toruń) in Posen Province—processed more beet per season than the entire quantity handled by the 145 factories of 1840. Hence the many factory closures at the
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turn of the century when small units were marginalised by the higher costs of obsolete technology. By this time the factories were producing raw sugar which was sent to the refineries (much raw sugar from the east went to refineries in the west) whereas initially the sugar beet processors had sold white sugar in their local market area. A consequence of larger factories was the need to intensify beet production in local supply areas. Field railways were built from the 1870s while land purchase or leasing became a necessary evil, despite the strain on capital. While it is impossible to discuss all the local industries in detail, a general shift to urban locations reflected the importance of railway distribution and the need for labour in very large units like the breweries of Pilsen (Plzeň), where steam power was applied and improvements in the production of chilled lager helped the town to become one of the great European producers. Meanwhile, in Budapest the first flour mill opened in 1839 and another ten were operating by 1867—although it was only around 1900 that more than half the wheat exported from Hungary was sent out as flour. The catchment was extended over the plain and included some imports from Romania. Success was based on high-quality wheat from the south and the milling system patented by A.Mechwart— using iron rollers with a spirally cut groove—and manufactured by the Ganz engineering works (set up originally by A.Ganz, a flour mill employee of Swiss origin, to produce electrical machinery for the industry in 1878). By the 1890s Budapest was Europe’s Minneapolis—one of world’s great flour-milling centres. Pürglitz Estate Few studies of individual estates are available but Pürglitz (Krĭvoklát) in Bohemia is a case in point—a former royal hunting area of 628sq.km long managed by the Fürstenberg family (which held on to the Krušovice and Povlčin areas until 1945) and now a protected area on either side of the Berounka Valley between the towns of Beroun, Kladno, Rakovnik and Zbiroh (Figure 2.4). The valley has been threatened by dams (highlighted in a study of 1911–13 to improve Elbe navigation)
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Figure 2.4 Industry on the Pürglitz (Křivoklát) Estate in Bohemia but there is also a history of small industrial projects (along with new roads and social services) which were part of Bohemia’s economic boom—especially under Karel Egon II (1803–54). There was a considerable iron industry based on the local charcoal and the
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ores of the Krušna Hora (60,000qu/year with a 30–45% iron content). Estate director F.Nittinger was responsible for two iron furnaces at Nový Jáchymov, built during 1810– 19 by Prague Polytechnic principal F.J. Gerstner; also a forge of 1824–6 at Roztoky near Pürglitz Castle; followed by a rolling mill and six puddling furnaces in 1842–3 at Stara Hut (Hýskov) on a former ironworking site. Another four furnaces produced iron from 1857 at Nová Hut (Nižbor) and there was further capacity at Karlova Hut after the Fürstenbergs purchased the Králův Dvůr Estate and built furnaces. The industry declined from the 1870s as the charcoal furnaces were overtaken by the coke-based industry at nearby Kladno and all had closed by 1905 whereupon the charcoal-making disappeared (having been made for centuries at the top of the Klíčava Stream near Řevničov and also near Chyňava). But the estate was primarily concerned with wood production and agriculture—the latter endowed with several new buildings (e.g. Amálie, Karlov and Požáry) during 1860–5 after massive forest damage. There were numerous breweries, distilleries, sawmills and other installations—including a spa at Merkovka and a hydropower plant at Rakovnik. And timber transport to Prague was facilitated by the Lány horse railway of 1830 which entered the forest in the northeast sector. The lower section is still used after modernisation for steam working as part of the Bustchrad (Buštĕhrad) system (1863) needed to supply the city with coal. The textile complex The geography may be tackled historically by starting with the medieval legacy arising from the continental trade routes which maintained relatively intensive commercial and industrial activity along the east-west trending ‘Hellweg’ and its linking routes south to the Danube. The highlands of Thuringia, Vogtland and Erzgebirge comprised distinct industrial and farming systems grouped around Leipzig Bay; and textiles combined with metals/metal manufactures, glass, paper, ceramics and wood (including musical instruments) across the wider Leipzig-Dresden-Plauen triangle. Restructuring of the industry involved the use of machinery in towns situated below the Erzgebirge foothills from Plauen to Zittau, including Flöha, Willisbach and Zschopau where water power first located them, with local specialisation according to different types of cloth. Leipzig was a centre for woollen/worsted manufacturing which was also based in Thuringia (e.g. Thüringer Wollgarnspinnerei); the lace industry of Vogtland was mechanised in Plauen with the assimilation of the Heilmann embroidery machine imported from Switzerland in the 1850s; while linen developed in Lobau and Zittau. Cotton spinning began during the Napoleonic Wars and transition to steam began in 1831 whereupon the factories were drawn down from the upland valleys. Chemnitz became the great centre of the cotton industry although there were also mills in Pössneck while Crimmitsschau and Werdau were noted for their yarns manufactured from Indian cotton. With the removal of internal customs barriers Saxony did well in the Zollverein from 1834 and had the distinction of destroying the cotton weaving industry in Berlin (where clothing became the main concern). As the ‘Manchester of Saxony’ Chemnitz had access to the Elbe waterway and the web of railways which was plainly taking shape from the 1850s. There were eventually lines to Berlin (via Elsterwerda and Juterbog) as well as a coal supply route from Lugau and Zwickau. And railways pushed up the Erzgebirge valleys to emphasise the city’s growth pole function. Nineteenth-century Leipzig developed as Saxony’s
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commercial centre although the Prussian frontier came close on three sides. It was largely in the hope of maintaining freedom of commerce for Leipzig’s fairs that Saxony joined not only the Middle German Commercial Union in 1828 and the Zollverein in 1834, but the North German Confederation in 1867 and the empire 1871, despite reservations about a Prussian customs system spreading all over Germany. Meanwhile, the textile industry in Silesia first assumed commercial importance in the sixteenth century but did not develop like its Rhineland counterpart as a major factory-based activity. During the critical mid-nineteenth-century years both coal and iron cost considerably more at the factory gate. Because of poor transport, the lack of social overheads and industrial linkages industry, the marginal efficiency of investment in textiles was thought to be very low. Artisans working in textiles in Silesia (and in Posen) were affected by the loss of Polish markets, where new artisan settlements were promoted during 1815–30 at a time of competition from factory production in Western Europe (Ostrowski 1966). But some compensation arose from the growth of engineering, for example in Breslau with Eisenbahnwagenbau and Linke-Hofmann-Lauchhammer. Habsburg Empire Here again the roots can be traced back to eighteenth-century Bohemia where the growing and spinning of flax could be virtually a full-time occupation—complemented by other activities in weaving, finishing and marketing. The woollen industry was also prominent in the Czech lands and while much of the cotton industry was located outside the region in Lower Austria, Vienna and Vorarlberg, there was considerable capacity in the Czech lands arising initially from the stimulus of continental blockade. Based on cotton imported through Hamburg and yarn from Austria proper, handspinning was replaced by 1835 when there were still 100,000 domestic weavers in the Friedland (Frýdlant), Leitmeritz (Litomĕřice) and Reichenberg (Liberec) areas of northern Bohemia and some in the south around Tabor. The stimulating business climate also attracted initiative from merchants and artisans who moved into the finishing section and