Educational Decentralization (Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects)

EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION

EDUCATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: ISSUES, CONCERNS AND PROSPECTS Volume 8 Series Editors-in-Chief: Dr. Rupert Maclean, UNESCO-UNEVOC International Centre for Education, Bonn; and Ryo Watanabe, National Institute for Educational Policy Research (NIER) of Japan, Tokyo Editorial Board Robyn Baker, New Zealand Council for Educational Research, Wellington, New Zealand Dr. Boediono, National Office for Research and Development, Ministry of National Education, Indonesia Professor Yin Cheong Cheng, The Hong Kong Institute of Education, China Dr. Wendy Duncan, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines Professor John Keeves, Flinders University of South Australia, Adelaide, Australia Dr. Zhou Mansheng, National Centre for Educational Development Research, Ministry of Education, Beijing, China Professor Colin Power, Graduate School of Education, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia Professor J. S. Rajput, National Council of Educational Research and Training, New Delhi, India Professor Konai Helu Thaman, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji Advisory Board Professor Mark Bray, Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong, China; Dr. Agnes Chang, National Institute of Education, Singapore; Dr. Nguyen Huu Chau, National Institute for Educational Sciences, Vietnam; Professor John Fien, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia; Professor Leticia Ho, University of the Philippines, Manila; Dr. Inoira Lilamaniu Ginige, National Institute of Education, Sri Lanka; Professor Phillip Hughes, ANU Centre for UNESCO, Canberra, Australia; Dr. Inayatullah, Pakistan Association for Continuing and Adult Education, Karachi; Dr. Rung Kaewdang, Office of the National Education Commission, Bangkok. Thailand; Dr. Chong-Jae Lee, Korean Educational Development Institute, Seoul; Dr. Molly Lee, UNESCO, Bangkok, Thailand; Naing Yee Mar, Glocorp, The Netherlands; Mausooma Jaleel, Maldives College of Higher Education, Male; Professor Geoff Masters, Australian Council for Educational Research, Melbourne; Dr. Victor Ordonez, Senior Education Fellow, East-West Center, Honolulu; Dr. Khamphay Sisavanh, National Research Institute of Educational Sciences, Ministry of Education, Lao PDR; Dr. Max Walsh, Secondary Education Project, Manila, Philippines.

Educational Decentralization Asian Experiences and Conceptual Contributions

Edited by

CHRISTOPHER BJORK Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY, U.S.A.

University

ISBN-10 ISBN-13 ISBN-10 ISBN-13 ISBN-10 ISBN-13

1-4020-4357-0 (PB) 978-1-4020-4357-4 (PB) 1-4020-4356-2 (HB) 978-1-4020-4356-7 (HB) 1-4020-4358-9 (e-book) 978-1-4020-4358-1 (e-book) Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. www.springer.com

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All Rights Reserved © 2006 Springer No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed in the Netherlands.

SERIES SCOPE

The purpose of this Series is to meet the needs of those interested in an in-depth analysis of current developments in education and schooling in the vast and diverse Asia-Pacific Region. The Series will be invaluable for educational researchers, policy makers and practitioners, who want to better understand the major issues, concerns and prospects regarding educational developments in the Asia-Pacific region. The Series complements the Handbook of Educational Research in the Asia-Pacific Region, with the elaboration of specific topics, themes and case studies in greater breadth and depth than is possible in the Handbook. Topics to be covered in the Series include: secondary education reform; reorientation of primary education to achieve education for all; re-engineering education for change; the arts in education; evaluation and assessment; the moral curriculum and values education; technical and vocational education for the world of work; teachers and teaching in society; organisation and management of education; education in rural and remote areas; and, education of the disadvantaged. Although specifically focusing on major educational innovations for development in the Asia-Pacific region, the Series is directed at an international audience. The Series Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects, and the Handbook of Educational Research in the Asia-Pacific Region, are both publications of the Asia-Pacific Educational Research Association. Those interested in obtaining more information about the Monograph Series, or who wish to explore the possibility of contributing a manuscript, should (in the first instance) contact the publishers. Books published to date in the series: 1. Young People and the Environment: An Asia-Pacific Perspective Editors: John Fien, David Yenken and Helen Sykes 2. Asian Migrants and Education: The Tensions of Education in Immigrant Societies and among Migrant Groups Editors: Michael W. Charney, Brenda S.A. Yeoh and Tong Chee Kiong 3. Reform of Teacher Education in the Asia-Pacific in the New Millennium: Trends and Challenges Editors: Yin C. Cheng, King W. Chow and Magdalena M. Mok 4. Rasch Measurement: A Book of Exemplars Papers in Honour of John P. Keeves Editors: Sivakumar Alagumalai, David D. Curtis, Njora Hungi 5. Reforming Learning: Issues, Concepts and Practices in the Asian-Pacific Region Editors: Chi-Hung Ng and Peter Renshaw, in press. 6. New Paradigm for Re-engineering Education: Globalization, Localization and Individualization Yin Cheong Cheng v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction by the Series Editors

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Contributors

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Introduction Christopher Bjork

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1. Strategies of Educational Decentralization: Key Questions and Core Issues E. Mark Hanson

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2. Walking on Three Legs: Centralization, Decentralization, and Recentralization in Chinese Education John N. Hawkins

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3. The Effects of Local Interpretation of Decentralization Policy on School Autonomy in Guangdong Province of China Jocelyn Lai-ngok Wong

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4. Limited Decentralization in the Singapore Education System Jason Tan

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5. Building and Diversifying Education Systems: Evolving Patterns and Contrasting Trends in Hong Kong and Macau Mark Bray and Kwok-Chun Tang

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6. Trends and Issues in Deregulation and Decentralization of Educational Administration in Japan Hiromitsu Muta

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7. Educational Decentralization in Korea: Major Issues and Controversies Ee-gyeong Kim 8. Transferring Authority to Local School Communities in Indonesia: Ambitious Plans, Mixed Results Christopher Bjork 9. Centralized Decentralization in Malaysian Education Molly N. N. Lee 10. Decentralization of Educational Governance in India: Trends and Issues R. Govinda and Madhumita Bandyopadhyay 11. Does Rhetoric Always Match Reality? An Overview of Educational Decentralization in Kerala, India M. V. Mukundan

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129 149 159

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12. Decentralization and Devolution in Pakistan: Educational Implications of the Praetorian Interpretation Baela Raza Jamil

191

13. Efforts Toward Decentralization: Ideology vs. Reality—The Sri Lankan Case Wilfred J. Perera

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Conclusion: Connecting Theory and Practice in Efforts to Decentralize Education Systems in Asia Christopher Bjork

Index

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INTRODUCTION BY THE SERIES EDITORS

This timely book examines the important matter of whether or not the localization of administrative authority in education systems is preferable to more centralized systems. Traditionally, the norm has been that power, authority and decision-making concerning the operation of education systems has been centralized in the hands of a few persons or vested interest groups located in the Head Office of the education system in question. However, as part of the process of innovation and of educational change, over the past four or five decades many countries in Asia have redistributed power away from ‘Head Office’, creating instead decentralised structures that seek to be more sensitive to local cultures and needs and which attempt to improve administrative efficiency. Although the move from centralization to decentralization has become an important manifestation of the education reform process in an increasing number of countries in Asia, it has not always been consistent and is not without its critics. As the editor of this volume, Professor Bjork, points out, “over the last half-century, the tide of popular opinion has shifted back and forth from pro-centralization to pro-decentralization a number of times, creating a ‘pendulum’ effect ”. The fifteen authors in this volume examine the extent, and ways, in which evidence from the Asian case studies either supports or refutes the main arguments generally presented in favour of decentralization, with particular reference to the claimed benefits of power sharing, possibilities for achieving increased efficiency, and for best accommodating diverse needs within communities. As a group, the contributors present the most common arguments advanced to advocate the value of educational decentralization initiatives, and present case study evidence that supports, refutes, or raises questions about the justifications for devolving authority over systems. This book is a very timely and helpful contribution to the ongoing debate regarding the matter of cost-benefit analysis concerning decentralisation of education systems in various countries in Asia. By providing case studies of experience (and approaches) to the decentralisation vs. centralisation of education systems in China, Hong Kong and Macau, Singapore, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the authors identify best practices and innovations, as well as stumbling blocks, associated with crucially important issues concerning most effective approaches to the organisation and management of education systems in Asia. Of particular interest is how countries can best approach decentralisation in their education systems at a time of which is, for many of them, a period of rapid change (even instability), as they seek to diversify their education systems to meet the challenges of globalisation, modernisation and (to a varying extent) the westernisation of their education systems. As the editor of this latest volume in the Springer Education in the Asia-Pacific Region Series points out: ‘Efforts to decentralize education systems in Asia have ix

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yielded an array of fascinating puzzles, lessons of experience, and unanswered questions. How can we make sense of that rich but sprawling amalgamation of data?’ In answering this question, the authors in this volume considers the motives that have given rise to decentralization initiatives, to guide an in-depth analysis of those measures. Rupert Maclean Director of the UNESCO-UNEVOC International Centre, Bonn, Germany and Ryo Watanabe Director, Department for International Research and Cooperation, National Institute for Educational Policy Research (NIER) of Japan, Tokyo

CONTRIBUTORS

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay secured her Ph.D. from Centre for Studies of Regional Development, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She is presently working in the School and Non-formal Education Unit at National Institute of Educational Administration, New Delhi. She has worked earlier in different NGOs and Research Organizations in related areas of development research, with special emphasis on educational development of disadvantaged people. She has worked as consultant at Educational Consultancy India Ltd. for implementation of externally funded Government of India project District Primary Education Program (DPEP). She is engaged in research in areas of decentralization of education, planning process of primary education, women’s education, and development. Christopher Bjork, an Assistant Professor of Education at Vassar College, earned his Ph.D. from the Stanford University School of Education. He has been awarded fellowships by the Fulbright organization, the National Security Education Program, and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. He is the author of Indonesian Education: Teachers, Schools, and Central Bureaucracy (2005). He has also published articles about educational reform in Asia in the journals Comparative Education Review, Education and Society, International Review of Education, World Studies of Education, and Anthropology & Education Quarterly. He also co-edited (with Thomas Rohlen) a three-volume anthology titled Education and Training in Japan. Mark Bray is a Chair Professor and Director of the Comparative Education Research Centre at the University of Hong Kong. He previously taught in secondary schools in Kenya and Nigeria and at the Universities of Edinburgh, Papua New Guinea and London. He has written extensively in the field of comparative education, with particular focus on aspects of administration, economics and financing. In 2000 he became Secretary General of the World Council of Comparative Education Societies. He is also a former President of the Comparative Education Society of Hong Kong, and has been a member of the Boards of Directors of the Comparative Education Society of Asia and the Comparative and International Education Society. R. Govinda is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration in New Delhi. While working at the IIEP as a Research Fellow, he was in charge of the research project on decentralized management in the SouthAsian region. He is the author of a number of publications related to the quality of basic education, adult education, and literacy. Dr. Govinda also edited the book Decentralization of Educational Management: Experiences from South Asia. Mark Hanson is a Fulbright Scholar and Professor of Education and Management at the University of California, Riverside. As a researcher, he has studied educational decentralization projects in several Latin American nations as well as the Middle East. Professor Hanson has been a consultant on decentralization reforms for the xi

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World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Agency for International Development, UNESCO, the United Nations Development Program, and the Harvard Institute for International Development. John N. Hawkins is Professor of Comparative Education and Chair of the Division of Social Sciences and Comparative Education in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies at UCLA. He has written or edited more than a dozen books including Educational Theory in the People’s Republic of China: The Report of Ch’ien Chun-iu (1971); Mao Tse-tung and Education: His Thoughts and Teachings (1974); Education and Social Change in the People’s Republic of China (1983); Education and Intergroup Relations: An International Perspective (1985); Development or Deterioration? Work in Rural Asia (1994); Transnational Competence: Rethinking U.S.–Japan Educational Relations (2000); Balancing the Individual and the Collective: Educational Values in Asia (2001). He is Principal Investigator of UCLA’s Mikio Takagi Endowment Fund for Educational Reform and is the Editor of the Comparative Education Review. He has won NDEA, Japan Foundation, East West Center, Rockefeller, Spencer and many other fellowships. Hawkins was President of the Comparative and International Education Society and served as Dean of International Studies and Overseas Programs at UCLA for 13 years. Baela Raza Jamil, currently a Technical Adviser to the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan is working in areas of public policy, decentralization and institutional strengthening. She began her career in Atlanta, U.S.A. as an Assistant Coordinator in a public–private partnership for equity and excellence in the U.S. public sector. In the U.K., she conducted research in collaboration with the Institute of Education, University of London, on aspects of quality in schools located in lowincome multi-cultural areas of inner London. In early 1988 she moved to Hong Kong, set up an NGO called the Hong Kong Asia Trust, screening projects, prioritizing needs and mobilizing resources from the corporate sector and philanthropists for education and special needs programs in Asia. At the Hong Kong University she was also a Fellow of the Centre for Asian Studies. In Pakistan, her work has spanned formal and non-formal basic education sectors, community participation, human rights, equity and privatization, public policy and education reform, institutional reforms, initiating community based innovative education programs for girls and integrated literacy programs for women in rural and urban areas. Ee-gyeong Kim currently holds the position of Director of the International Cooperation Team at the Korean Educational Development Institute in Seoul. She earned her Ph.D. in Educational Administration from the University of Iowa and also holds graduate degrees from American University and Ewha Women’s University. Kim has taught in the graduate colleges of education at Konkook University and Woosuk University. Her publications include books and articles for the U.S. Department of Education, the U.K. Government, and the World Bank. In 1996 she received the Eugene McClenahan Award at the University of Iowa, and in 2000 she was named the Korean Educational Development Institute’s “Outstanding Researcher.” Molly N.N. Lee, Associate Professor in Education at Universiti Sains Malaysia, teaches sociology of education and science teaching methods. She received her Ph.D. from the Stanford University School of Education. Recent publications include: “The

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Corporatisation, Privatisation and Internalisation of Higher Education in Malaysia”; “Education and the State: Malaysia After NEP”; “Private Higher Education in Malaysia”; “The Politics of Educational Change in Malaysia: National Context and Global Influences”; and “The Impacts of Globalization on Education in Malaysia.” M.V. Mukundan is a Professor in the Research Institute of Educational Economics and Administration (RIEEA) at Shenyang Normal University in China. Previously, he served as Senior Lecturer in the District Institute of Education and Training (DIET) in different districts of Kerala State in India. He received his doctorate in education from the University of Hong Kong and has also undertaken assignments for UNESCO and other international organizations. His research interests include comparative education, policy analysis, the political economy of educational reform, and educational change. Hiromitsu Muta currently serves as Director of the Center for Research and Development of Educational Technology and a Professor of Human Resource Development at the Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology. His interests are macro level planning on education and educational cooperation with developing countries. Wilfred J. Perera is the Head of the Centre for Professional Development, Education Management and Assistant Director General of the National Institute of Education, Sri Lanka. His monograph, Changing Schools from Within, a management intervention for improving school functioning in Sri Lanka was published by IIEP, UNESCO in 1999. He has written several articles on educational decentralization and school autonomy, and has made numerous presentations at international conferences. Jason Tan is Associate Professor in Policy and Management Studies at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He currently serves as Executive Editor of the Asia Pacific Journal of Education. His latest publication is Challenges Facing the Singapore Education System Today (Singapore: Prentice Hall). Kwok-chun Tang is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Education Studies at the Hong Kong Baptist University. He was born in Macau and moved to Hong Kong at the age of eight. After working as a secondary mathematics teacher in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1993, he entered graduate school and wrote a Ph.D. study that focused on stability change of secondary school mathematics knowledge in Macau. His research interests include mathematics teaching and learning, curriculum stability and change, and sociology of knowledge. Jocelyn Wong is a Post-doctoral Fellow in the Faculty of Education at the University of Hong Kong. Her research interests are educational decentralization policy and teacher education in China.

INTRODUCTION Christopher Bjork

In recent years, international funding organizations have thrown their weight behind decentralization of education systems around the globe, often making decentralization a precondition for financial assistance (Conyers, 1984; Hanson, 2000; Rhoten, 2000). Interest in delegating authority to local levels of government continues to grow: between 1992 and 1997, 12% of all projects funded by the World Bank involved some aspect of decentralization (World Bank, 1998). As Hanson notes in this volume, the Bank currently supports more than 40 governments that are attempting to decentralize their education systems. The strategies relied on to transfer authority over schools to local levels are as varied as the diverse governments that have embraced the concept in attempt to enhance system management. Indeed, a multitude of definitions have been ascribed to the term “decentralization”: “the concept has remained vague and highly ambiguous, even though used extensively by policy-makers as well as intellectuals” (Govinda, 1997, p. 3). Flexible delimitation of the term has provided observers with great latitude in making claims about the goals and results of measures introduced in the name of decentralization; it has also kept the topic lodged in the discourse on educational reform. Asia is not immune to the push for localized control of education system. It is becoming increasingly difficult to find a nation-state in the region that is not experimenting with educational decentralization in some form. In countries regarded as economic leaders in the area, as well as developing nations set on discarding their third world status, decentralization is frequently offered as a recipe for improving public institutions (Mok, 2005). Governments that choose not to follow this course of action risk being marginalized in international policy circles. Although the specific strategies introduced in the name of decentralization are notable for their variation more than their likenesses, attention to the concept is ubiquitous. One might logically assume that such a cogent push for the transfer of authority to local levels would be supported by a wealth of data documenting the costs and benefits that flow from decentralization. Yet the number of case studies of educational decentralization is remarkably small. Policy makers, politicians, and international funding organizations continue to advocate localized control of schools based on theoretical arguments that often lack strong supporting empirical evidence. As Rhoten observes, as a result of the dearth of studies that focus on the implementation of educational decentralization policies, “little is known about the nation course and local outcomes of decentralization within developing countries, nor how they differ” (Rhoten, 1999, p. 9). Gaynor seconds this view: “While the view of decentralization of education continues to attract considerable interest and support, there is an increasing 1 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 1–7.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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demand to extract lessons from experience and to critically challenge assumptions about decentralization” (Gaynor, 1998, p. 4). Literature on educational decentralization is replete with taut, often reductionist descriptions of reform ventures (Rhoten, 2000). What is missing from that literature is a corpus of research that: (1) specifies the gains as well as the difficulties that have emerged in the wake of particular decentralization measures; and, (2) connects those developments to the social, political, and historical contexts in which they are embedded. Studying educational reforms using the frames constructed by government officials and relying on their assessments of the outcomes can lead to incomplete, even erroneous readings of their impacts. Research that bridges different levels of administrative hierarchies is particularly crucial in understanding the effects of decentralization. According to Sutton and Levinson, it is essential that we treat “policy as a complex social practice, an ongoing process of normative cultural production constituted by diverse actors across diverse social and institutional contexts” (Sutton & Levinson, 2000, p. 1). Accomplishing this objective requires careful study of the effects that policy initiatives have on actual schools and the people who inhabit them. This entails connecting macro and micro levels of education systems, and analyzing policies “in relation to how they are practiced on a daily basis in people’s lives” (Kendall, 2004, p. 24). The need for analyses that link educational policy and practice is especially true of educational decentralization measures implemented in Asian locations. The literature on educational decentralization is dominated by studies of reform in Latin American countries; little attention has been devoted to reforms enacted in Asian locations. The few studies of decentralization policies enacted in Asia that have been published are primarily concerned with decision-making at upper levels of government bureaucracies. The implications of those decisions for local education stakeholders are not explored in great depth. This book was designed to examine such linkages between educational policy and practice; to add layers of complexity to the official discourse on educational decentralization. Though the foci of the 12 case studies included in this volume vary, the authors’ attention to the specific conditions that support or undermine attempts to devolve authority over schools to local entities is consistent. In some cases, emphasis is placed on the socio-historical context of reform settings; in other chapters, the effects of recent changes in political agendas on educational decentralization measures are explored in detail. One salient point that emerges from the group of case studies is that the results of educational decentralization policies rarely conform to anticipated outcomes. Such policies depend on local actors to translate ideas promulgated by policy designers into practice. Those individuals are shaped by economic, political, religious, and cultural conditions specific to the settings where they live and work. As a result, policies introduced into one location may provoke a markedly different response in another. The case studies included in this volume do not represent a comprehensive view of educational decentralization in Asia. They are not offered as a representative sample of reform initiatives that have been introduced in the region. Choices about which countries to include were not scientific or systematic. I do not make any claims that the conclusions drawn in these studies can be generalized to other settings in Asia, or elsewhere. Instead, the goal for this book is to present a selection of compelling accounts of the struggles and successes that various Asian governments have

INTRODUCTION

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experienced in their attempts to reconfigure authority hierarchies in the education sector. The case studies depict reform initiatives introduced into nations that vary in terms of geographic setting, level of economic development, political foundations, and degree of experience with educational decentralization. Authors were encouraged to detail the complexities of policy design and implementation that surfaced as a result of the unique features of the systems they studied, rather than to obscure those intricacies. Contributors to this volume were given complete freedom to focus their chapters on whatever aspects of the reform efforts most fascinated them. The only demand I made of the authors was to include pointed critical analyses, rather than simply summarize the key events that marked a decentralization initiative or process. For that reason, the scope and tone of the chapters vary noticeably. The first chapter, written by Mark Hanson, frames the case studies that follow. Hanson identifies and explains key issues and forces that shape organization and management strategies of educational decentralization in any setting. The chapter is organized around a series of questions that press readers to delve below the surface of decentralization policies and think deeply about the impetus for devolving authority over schools, the dynamics of policy formulation, and the outcomes of reform efforts. Drawing from years of experience conducting research on this topic, Hanson supports his responses to those questions with specific evidence drawn from five countries that have experimented with educational decentralization. The chapter concludes with a list of decentralization propositions extracted from those reform attempts. Although these propositions were formulated based on evidence collected in Latin America rather than Asia, they present a valuable overview of the concepts and issues that currently pervade discussions about educational decentralization. Hanson also articulates a set of important questions that readers can consider as they read the case studies that follow; with the list of “propositions for effective decentralization” in hand, they can make their own assessments about the relative effectiveness of various reform strategies. John Hawkins, in the first of the case studies, focuses on connections between economic policies recently introduced in China and the push for educational decentralization in that nation. Research on this topic often refers to possible links between economic and educational reform, but rarely explores in such rich detail the extent to which economic can generate support for educational decentralization and direct educational decentralization measures. Hawkins observes that although China’s educational leaders have long debated the advantages and disadvantages of increasing local control of the schools, authority over education remain concentrated in the center until the national government began to endorse economic decentralization and marketization. He examines several specific initiatives that emerged from that shift in government direction, and considers the effects on both school finance and instructional practice. While government officials in China appear committed to decentralization, they remain conflicted about the need to maintain control over the system while at the same time respond creatively to the needs of the new market and the global economy, Hawkins notes. Jocelyn Wong also looks at decentralization trends in China. Her focus, however, is narrower than that of Hawkins. Wong investigates the experiences of 75 educators who were involved in the implementation of decentralization policies in Guangdong

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Province. This description and analysis of one city’s responses to centrally-mandated policies confirms many of the conclusions drawn by Hawkins, and underscores the competing pressures that many teachers face as they attempt to translate policy directives into practice. The numerous interview excerpts highlight the specific hurdles that many Chinese educators currently face in their schools and communities. Wong’s analysis of the dilemmas experienced by teachers underscores the cogent influences of the marketization of education in China that Hawkins mentions in the previous chapter. The next chapter focuses on decentralization initiatives that have been introduced into the Singapore education system over the past two decades. These include an independent schools scheme, school clusters, and an autonomous schools scheme. The author, Jason Tan, begins by discussing the goals of the various initiatives, and proceeds to analyze their impact. The Singapore case exemplifies the tensions between the central government’s formal commitment to decentralize authority over the schools and decisions that reassert the centrality of government control. It appears that schools are being awarded the autonomy to decide how best to attain statedetermined outcomes for the education system. However, given the heavy emphasis placed on the school system’s contributions towards improving national economic competitiveness and fostering social cohesion, the Singaporean government appears far from willing to allow schools full and complete autonomy. Chapter 6 takes a comparative look at decentralization, contrasting trajectories of educational reform in China and Hong Kong during the 1980s and 1990s. During that period, administration in Hong Kong became more decentralized, while authority over education in education became more concentrated. The Macau case is a rare example of a government choosing not to follow the recent trend of transferring authority over schools to local agencies and institutions. The authors of this chapter, Mark Bray and Tang Kwok-Chun, use an analytical framework originally proposed by Margaret Archer to chart the emergence and development of the two education systems. Their analysis of educational reforms enacted in the two territories underlines the important influence that social and historical context have had on recent decisions about the provision of education. “The different reactions of the Hong Kong and Macau governments to the success of the Communist Part in mainland China,” they assert, “marked the point of bifurcation for the development of Chinese-medium schools in the two territories” (Bray & Tang, this volume, p. 91). The chapter offers a detailed description of the major developments in the evolution of the two education systems, and considers how that comparison contributes to theories about decentralization. Of all of the education systems explored in this volume, Japan’s has probably received the most attention in academia and the popular press. Accounts of Japanese education often stress the heavy influence that the Ministry of Education plays in determining educational policy and practice. Chapter 7, written by Hiromitsu Muta, offers a unique glimpse of the Japanese school system. Muta describes several programs designed to reduce the influence of the national and provincial governments over school affairs that were enacted in Japan over the past two decades. Government support for such measures raises the possibility that the Japanese school system, often noted for its resistance to change, may be undergoing some significant modifications in administrative and curricular structure. Muta highlights several of the significant advances the Japanese government has made in attempt to deregulate and

INTRODUCTION

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decentralize the education system. He balances those reports, however, with evidence that teachers and administrators have experienced difficulty adjusting their behavior to mesh with recently enacted decentralization policy. Ee-gyeong Kim traces the history of Korea’s Local Education Self-Governing System (LESGS) in Chapter 8. LESGS, she explains, is a broadly defined concept that encompasses four principles: decentralization, resident control, independence of educational administration, and professional management. The Korean government’s commitment to decentralizing authority over the schools has been sporadic, often rising and falling in response to developments over which the Ministry of Education has little control. In her analysis of the LESGS, Kim emphasizes the important influence that social and political context can exert on decentralization policies. She notes that educational decentralization reforms promoted in Korea were largely ineffectual until societal demand for democratization and pressure for educational development accelerated in the 1990s. In her conclusion, Kim outlines the major challenges that education officials have faced in attempting to respond to calls for more local control of the schools. Like many Asian nations, Indonesia stepped up its efforts to devolve authority over schools beginning in the 1980s. The government has sometimes faced difficulties in following through on its promise to devolve authority to autonomous regions, but its support for decentralization has not waned. Although several reports have examined the process of drafting and negotiating decentralization policies, scant attention has been devoted to the implementation of those policies at local levels. In Chapter 9, Bjork takes a close look at the effects that recently adopted decentralization measures have had on actual school communities in Indonesia. This chapter details the attitudes, accomplishments, and difficulties experienced by the individuals charged with the responsibility of translating policy into practice at the school level. It underlines the challenges that stakeholders often experience as they react to decentralization policies, even when they support the goals of those measures. In analyzing such incongruities, Bjork draws attention to the critical influence that local culture, economic conditions, and historic center-local relations can exert on the devolution process. The next chapter focuses on recent efforts to decentralize the Malaysian education system, analyzing both structural and functional changes that have been implemented over the past 20 years. Molly Lee examines policies pertaining to the recruitment, posting, and transfer of teachers, as well as fiscal control and financial management at the state, district, and school level. She pays particular attention to the struggles and successes experienced by educators working at the school level. In connecting policy to practice, Lee draws attention to tensions between the central government’s vision of what can be accomplished through the devolution of authority and the actual conditions into which decentralization policies are introduced. For example, when education officials offered a significant amount of autonomy over the curriculum to classroom teachers, “most of the teachers were not able or did not want to use that autonomy” (Lee, this volume, p. 154). Lee also describes the effects of recent reforms on higher education in Malaysia, which include a dramatic increase in the number of private universities and the establishment of a variety of creative partnerships between government and non-government organizations.

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Govinda and Bandyopadhyay offer a history of India’s efforts to augment the authority of local educators since the nation escaped British colonial rule. The first half of the chapter meticulously describes the legislative acts enacted in support of this goal. As the authors observe, over the past 50 years the government’s commitment to decentralization has fluctuated in intensity and in focus. The 1990s marked a period of resurgence, both in terms of legislative action taken to encourage educational decentralization, and at the level of local implementation. In the second half of the piece, Govinda and Bandyopadhyay examine shifts in the discourse about decentralization that have occurred in India. Their analysis of policy talk and action underlines the variegated outcomes that a state’s endeavors to devolve authority can produce within a single nation. As they observe, any reform policy will be shaped and by the particular social and cultural features of the settings into which it is introduced. This reality limits our ability to make generalizations about the effects of decentralization legislation, especially in a country as large and diverse as India. In Chapter 13, Mukundan moves the discussion of decentralization in India to the local level, examining the effects that educational decentralization policies have had on one state in India. Kerala is widely known for the its innovative approaches to social development and education, and is often held up as a model for others to emulate. As Mukundan notes, the state has achieved almost universal access to primary schools, near-universal literacy rates, and the percentage of girls attending schools is almost equal to that for boys. If attempts to decentralize school management were to succeed in India, one might logically predict that the odds of success would be greatest in Kerala. Over a period of several years, Mukundan interviewed local education stakeholders in Kerala about their views on the People’s Campaign for Decentralized Planning, a policy introduced in 1996. The evidence he presents in this chapter highlights dissonance between official proclamations about the program and local educators’ impressions of the outcomes that have resulted from PCDP adoption. Mukundan’s analysis of implementation of the PCDP in Kerala provides a concrete example of the mismatch between policy talk and action referred to by Govinda and Bandyopadhyay in the previous chapter. The Local Government Plan of 2000 represented a significant shift in the structure of Pakistani government. In Chapter 13, Baela Raza Jamil explores the impact of that program on educational policy and practice. She observes that education initiatives put forward after the year 2000 were framed by devolution, public–private partnerships, and sector reform. Jamil’s analysis underlines the important implications of Pakistan’s unique political situation on the education sector. The latest attempt at decentralized governance and local government has ironically been implemented by a military regime that ended civilian rule in October of 1999. Jamil states that recent support for increased local control of the schools flows from the military’s desire to create legitimacy for its actions and to counteract the perception that its policies were anti-development and anti-people. What is the early evidence on the interpretations of the praetorian initiative its impact on District Education Officers and head teachers? In this chapter, Jamil addresses that question and considers a variety of strategies for improving the process of decentralizing the Pakistani school system. Chapter 14, written by Wilfred Perera, charts the development of the Sri Lankan school system from colonial times to the present. His review of educational reforms

INTRODUCTION

7

introduced over the last 500 years reveals that although the decentralization movement has gained momentum since the mid-1980s, the Republic has been experimenting with localized control of the schools for more than a half-century. Each decade has brought new strategies for empowering local actors, from the establishment of regional offices of education to curricular reform to the creation of school clusters. In recent years, government officials in Sri Lanka have turned to School Based Management in attempt to augment local autonomy. Perera explores the arguments put forward in support of the various approaches to decentralization implemented in Sri Lanka, and compares theoretical arguments to actual results of reform measures. The contrasts between those perspectives highlight both how much Sri Lanka has invested in educational decentralization thus far and the roadblocks that have undermined the devolution process. In the final chapter of the book, I review the arguments most commonly relied on to advocate for educational decentralization, and revisit the evidence presented in the case studies that supports, refutes, or raises questions about those justifications for devolving authority over school systems. I also consider additional factors that politicians and education officials rarely mention when discussing decentralization, but which serve as catalysts for reconfiguring authority frameworks in the education sector. My analysis underscores the important influence that context exerts on attempts to decentralize school systems. I do, however, identify some commonalities that connect the Asian nations included in this book, and consider the implications on reform efforts. The chapter synthesizes the evidence presented in the case studies and draws attention to how that information can enhance our understanding of educational decentralization in the region. REFERENCES Conyers, D. (1984). Decentralization and development: A review of the literature. Public Administration and Development, 4(2), 186–197. Gaynor, C. (1998). Decentralization of education: Teacher management. Washington, DC: World Bank. Govinda, R. (1997). Decentralization of educational management: Experiences from South Asia. Paris: International Institute for International Planning. Hanson, E. M. (2000). Democratization and educational decentralization in Spain: A twenty year struggle for reform. Country studies: Education reform and management publication series, 1(3), 1–62. Kendall, N. (2004). Global policy in practice: The “successful failure” of free primary education in Malwai. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University. Mok, K. H. (2005). Centralization and decentralization: Changing governance in education. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre. Rhoten, D. (1999). Global local conditions of possibility: The case of education decentralization in Argentina. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA. Rhoten, D. (2000). Education decentralization in Argentina: A global–local conditions of possibility approach to state, market, and society change. Journal of Education Policy, 15(6), 593–601. Sutton, M., & Levinson, B. (2000). Policy as practice: A comparative sociocultural analysis of educational policy. Stamford, CT: Ablex. World Bank (1998). The World Bank Annual Report 1998. Washington DC: World Bank.

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Chapter 1 STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION: KEY QUESTIONS AND CORE ISSUES E. Mark Hanson

Educational decentralization is a popular reform theme of governments around the world, but with goals, strategies and outcomes that are as different as the countries themselves.1 These decentralization initiatives can range from arbitrary exercises of coercive power (e.g., Chile and Argentina under military governments in the 1970s) to conscientiously planned interventions driven by national political will (Spain in 1978 following the death of General Franco). They can take many forms, such as revising the way a ministry of education makes decisions at the top of the system (Colombia in 1991), privatizing through the introduction of market forces (Chile in 1980), and empowering local educators and parents through school-based management (SBM) (Nicaragua in 1994). Because so many countries are attempting to decentralize their educational systems, there is a growing need to synthesize the positive and negative aspects of these national experiences for both the academic community seeking greater insight into educational change as well as decision makers seeking guidelines on effective educational policy.2 Written in the context of a conceptual analysis, the objective of this chapter is to identify and explain the key issues and forces that play major roles in shaping organization and management strategies of educational decentralization.3 The paper is organized around a series of questions that the author has found in his own research on the subject to tap issues that go to the core of decentralization strategies.4 Examples from five Hispanic countries where the author has done extensive research will be utilized to illustrate the major points: Venezuela, Colombia, Argentina, Nicaragua, and Spain. The paper concludes with a diagram and a list of decentralization propositions that attempts to summarize the significant aspects of the issues identified. Before examining the issues associated with educational decentralization, it is worthwhile exploring the potential benefits of centralization. After all, so many nations support centralized educational system that they must have some positive attributes. 1.

IS A CENTRALIZED EDUCATION SYSTEM INHERENTLY INEFFECTIVE?

Centralization or decentralization are not ends in themselves, but only means to an end. Consequently, under given conditions the rationale behind qualitatively strengthening a centralized system rather than decentralizing it can be quite 9 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 9–25.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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persuasive. The principal arguments behind educational centralization are, as Winkler (1993) and Weiler (1993) observe: r financial, to benefit through economies of scale as well as the equitable allocation of resources to reduce regional economic disparities; r policy and programmatic uniformity, to establish consistency in quality, programs and activities (e.g., curriculum, hiring, examinations, delivery of administrative services); r central placement of scarce human resources, to place strategically the scarce, skilled human resource at those points in the institution where their impact can reach across the entire educational system; r the diffusion of innovation, to spread changes more rapidly through the entire system; and r improved teaching–learning, a tightly controlled curriculum can be one policy response to the problem of poorly qualified teachers. Colombia, from 1968 to the late 1980s, provides an interesting illustration of a country where a policy of centralization dramatically improved the organization and management of the educational system (Arizmendi Posada, 1969). Prior to the beginning of a series of centralization reforms in 1968, the departments (similar to provinces or states) existed in a condition of semi-anarchy. They were highly politicized, rarely hesitant to use educational funds for other purposes, generally disorganized, very inefficient, and quite capable of routinely ignoring national educational policy whenever it proved convenient. For Colombia, the weak regional administrative infrastructures that poorly supported education called for increased centralization rather than decentralization in the 1970s and 1980s, and that strategy proved to be very effective (Hanson, 1986). If centralization involves the concentration of decision-making authority at the upper levels of the organizational hierarchy, then decentralization involves the projection of that authority down through the various levels of the organization. However, there are various forms of decentralization. 2.

WHAT IS DECENTRALIZATION?

Decentralization is defined as the transfer of decision-making authority, responsibility, and tasks from higher to lower organizational levels or between organizations. There are three major forms of decentralization. 1. Deconcentration typically involves the transfer of tasks and work, but not authority to other units in the organization. 2. Delegation involves the transfer of decision-making authority from higher to lower hierarchical units, but that authority can be withdrawn at the discretion of the delegating unit. 3. Devolution refers to the transfer of authority to an autonomous unit that can act independently, or a unit that can act without first asking permission. Privatization is a form of devolution as responsibility and resources are transferred from public to private sector institutions (Rondinelli, 1990). The author argues that in the long run, devolution is the more effective method because it provides for continuity in the change process. Delegation often brings with it the so-called “yo-yo decision-making pattern” as newly appointed (and frequently changing) educational

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11

leaders delegate or retract authority depending on their motivations of the moment (Hanson, 1989a,b). 3.

IS THERE REALLY SUCH A THING AS A DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM?

There is no such thing as a truly decentralized educational system. In reality, almost all decisions (e.g., finance, personnel, curriculum) retain degrees of centralization and decentralization—the issue is finding the appropriate balance. For example, the ministry of education may set the standards for teacher qualifications, but the actual hiring according to those standards is carried out in the regions. In the recent decentralization reforms in Argentina (1993) and Colombia (1991), the center is retaining authority over national educational policy; curriculum frameworks, academic evaluation, and specialized training. Within national policy guidelines, the decentralized execution of decisions will take place regionally. To be successful, the center-periphery power-sharing arrangement must avoid the classic problem often encountered in Latin America where responsibility is decentralized but without the necessary authority, training, or financing to carry out the tasks. 4.

WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS?

Educational decentralization reforms typically have their roots in the political arena. For example, as nations make the transition from autocratic to democratic forms of government, an almost natural outcome is an effort to decentralize the educational system as one important mechanism of establishing citizen participation in government institutions (Hanson, 1996a). Nicaragua is a recent case in point. Within the context of democratic government, political campaign promises are more often than not the prime-moving force behind launching a reform to decentralize educational systems. The author is unaware of any such reform that was initiated by educators from within an educational institution. Successfully facilitating a decentralization effort requires knowing where the politicians and policy makers want to go with it, and why. Many different, but often interrelated, goals drive decentralization initiatives and consequently shape their strategies, such as: increased economic development through institutional modernization; increased management efficiency; redistribution of financial responsibility; democratization; the neutralization of competing centers of power; and improved quality of education (Weiler, 1993). Goals as these fit within the political economic, organizational, and educational categories (see Figure 1.1) that contribute to directing the course of a decentralization reform. Increased economic development was as the centerpiece of Venezuela’s efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s (Hanson, 1976). The plan called for the creation of nine regionally located economic growth poles, supported by decentralized regional educational systems (the outcomes to be discussed later). The goal of increased efficiency through decentralization drove another Venezuelan initiative in the early 1990s, but this time the focus was on reducing bureaucratic stagnation, centralized inefficiencies, and corruption (de la Cruz, 1992). The redistribution of financial responsibility was the rationale used in Argentina to shift the financial burden of primary education to the provinces in 1978 and the

12

EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION POSSIBLE SUCCESS NATIONAL LEVEL

POLITICAL TENSION

COLLABORATIVE SUPPORT BY NATIONAL AGENCIES JOB STABILITY IN KEY ROLES

EQUITABLE RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION FROM TOP

SHARED VISION

NATIONAL PLANNING

MINIMUM CONFLICT

POLICY GUIDELINES

INCREASED TRAINING

CHANGING ROLES

FLEXIBILITY

GOALS in

Political Economic

Political System

yes

Economic System

yes

Institutional System

yes

Technical System

yes

inlos e

Organisational Educational

REGIONAL LEVEL

POLITICAL TENSION

REGIONAL CAPACITY TO CONTRIBUTE

no

no

no

no SHARED VISION

STRONG REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEPOLITIZATION

-w

Educational win System w

REGIONAL PLANNING SKILL TRAINING READINESS TESTS

COMMUNITY ASSUMES REPONSIBILITES SCHOOL DEVELPOMENT PLAN

PROBABLE FAILURE

Figure 1.1: Decentralization: conditions of probable success or failure. Source: Author.

same shift for secondary education in 1991 (Fern´andez Lamarra, & Vitar, 1991). This initiative at time comes under pressure from a multinational lending/donor organization, such as the World Bank, requiring that a country (e.g., Argentina between 1989 and 1991) reduce its national debt before a loan or grant would be made (Novick, 1994). Increased democratization through the redistribution of power has at least two major variations. The first type look place in Spain in the late 1970s as it engineered a rapid distribution of centralized power in order to satisfy the assertive demands for political autonomy made by three important industrialized regions (Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Territory) following the death of General Franco. Only through conferring significant measures of regional self-rule, which included considerable devolution of authority in education, was relative political stability established. The second type of power redistribution is intended to counter what Hans Weiler (1993, p. 70) calls “an erosion of the state’s legitimacy.” A good example is the Colombian initiative of the early 1990s to turn significant control of its public institutions back to the municipalities. This strategy represents no less than a desperate effort to relegitimize the central government in the eyes of its citizens and save the nation from the social, political, and economic chaos generated by brutal and corrupting drug cartels and four terrorist guerrilla armies (Hanson, 1995). In short, both major forms of national political stress can, and often do, result in decentralization initiatives. The goal of neutralizing competing centers of power is usually part of a hidden agenda. Under the guise of decentralization, power can be taken from influential groups (e.g., teachers ’ unions) and transferred to other groups more supportive of ministry policies (e.g., parent councils, municipal governments) such as happened in Chile and Mexico (Cortina, 1995; McGinn & Street, 1986; N´un˜ ez, Gonzalez, & Espinoza, 1993). Improving the quality of education is often offered as a goal of decentralization, and it reflects the notion that local people can solve local educational problems better than the state (Winkler, 1993, p. 66).

STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION

5.

13

ARE THE CENTERS OF POWER IN AGREEMENT AND WILLING TO COLLABORATE?

There are at least four centers of power that can significantly facilitate an educational decentralization program if they collaborate within the context of a shared vision: political parties, national and regional government institutions, teachers’ unions, and local citizens (see Figure 1.1). The single most important force in determining the fate of a decentralization initiative is whether or not the main political parties have a shared vision about the course and content of the reform and agree to collaborate. For example, the Venezuelan reform (1968) was ruined as successive political parties, all of which professed belief in decentralization, made massive personnel and policy changes solely to capture attention and credit for the program (Hanson, 1976). In Argentina (1993), a new organic law of education was passed which supported decentralization (federalization). However, in order to get a bill past the political factions in Congress, it had to be watered down so as to be vague and general enough for all parties to declare victory for their positions. The course (and fate) of that decentralization initiative remains uncertain (Hanson, 1996b). Spain got it right in 1978 when both major political parties collaborated in crafting the decentralization reform of government and supported it as being in the best interest of the nation. “Country before party” was the watchword at that decisive moment (Tussel & Soto, 1996). A second necessary component is to have the collaboration of the major institutions of government, such as: the ministries of education and finance, the office of national planning, and the national, regional, and municipal legislatures. Any one of these institutions can do significant damage to a decentralization strategy if it chooses to pursue its own model and refuses to compromise. A third critical center of power that can significantly advance or retard the decentralization process is the national teachers’ unions. If the teachers’ union membership does not feel threatened by a fragmentation of their bargaining units or a deterioration of benefits and working conditions, the teachers can be a formidable ally (or foe) in the change process. Finally, decentralization in education can only work if community members are prepared to put in the time and energy necessary to make the reform work if the local communities distrust, do not take seriously, do not participate in, or do not want to assume the added responsibility, then the opportunity for successful change through decentralization is seriously limited. In sum, the greater the accepted vision of decentralization within and between the distinct centers of power, the greater the chance of success. 6.

HOW ARE THE REGIONS ORGANIZED TO RECEIVE THE AUTHORITY?

There are at least three basic patterns of geographical regionalization involving the decentralization of authority. The first model transfers authority to existing regions (e.g., provinces, states, departments) to be used by the existing government machinery (e.g., provincial assembly, municipal council). Decentralization reforms in Argentina (1978 and 1993) and Colombia (1991) are examples. The strength of this model is that

14

EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION

the decentralization process is normally easier to initiate using existing government machinery. Regional government officials typically find the additional revenue and power to be quite attractive. The weakness is that existing regional government machinery is sometimes administratively weak, highly politicized, or even corrupt. Also, some regions may be small and wealthy while others are large and poor, or vice versa. The second model is represented by the Venezuelan decentralization effort in 1968. The country was divided into nine administrative territories, each sharing common social, economic, and cultural characteristics. The existing 22 state governments were basically ignored. All the ministries of the national government, including the education ministry created offices in each of the nine regions. The actions of these regional offices of the central government were to be closely co-coordinated with significant delegation and deconcentration of authority taking place. The new regional offices, with their significant planning, policy formation, and budget management authority, were to be Venezuela’s new engines of socio-economic development (Hanson, 1976). The third model is represented by Spain’s 1978 decentralization reform that followed the death of General Franco. The 50 existing provinces were aggregated into 17 regions (called autonomous communities), each with its own newly created and semi-autonomous, popularly elected parliament. Like the Venezuelan (1968) reform, each region was as much as possible shaped around common historic, socioeconomic, cultural, and (in the case of Spain) linguistic characteristics. The 17 parliaments received all the government portfolios, including education, and a devolution of authority took place. The strengths of these last two models are that the newly created regional boundaries are more consistent with the needs of modernizing nations and new leadership assumes responsibility. The weaknesses are the complexity of executing such comprehensive reforms as well as the deep commitment of political support required of the major political parties (Gunther, 1993). 7.

HOW ENTHUSIASTIC ARE THE MINISTRY OFFICIALS TO DECENTRALIZE AUTHORITY?

Because decentralization initiatives tend to be launched from the political arena, passive resistance from within the ministry of education often becomes a major barrier. While the minister of education and his/her immediate lieutenants are frequently politicians themselves and typically support the decentralization initiative, the lower-level officials are often less than enthusiastic because it means a loss of personal power and the comfortable perquisites and privileges they have managed to create for themselves. A Venezuelan minister of education illustrated these points as he spoke to a gathering of educators about his frustrations at trying to decentralize the educational system in the 1970s. After speaking about the insidious nature of passive resistance from those who simply file and forget directives, he spoke about how change initiatives seem to erode at every level of the institution: Let us say that the decisions that are taken at he level of the minister are worth 100 points, but when they are implemented at the next lower level [director-general] they are reduced to 80 points, and at

STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION

15

the level of area directors, 60 points. They leave the Ministry of Education and when implemented at the regional level are worth 50 points, at the zonal level are worth 25 points, and by the time they get to the schools not enough is left of the decisions to change what has been going on for the past 15 or 20 years. (Pe˜nalver, 1976, p. 23). On numerous occasions in other counties, other ministers of education have expressed similar sentiments to the author. Even though a minister of education may be the most powerful person in the institution, that power in no way adds up to the collective power of the other officials and employees in the institution. Consequently, only through collective support and collaborative activities from all levels, particularly those three or four levels below the minister, can successful change take place. 8.

HOW ENTHUSIASTIC ARE REGIONAL OFFICES TO RECEIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EDUCATION?

Beginning with the serious national efforts to decentralize education in Colombia and Venezuela in the early 1990s, barriers to the initiative developed in the major cities of Colombia and all 22 states in Venezuela. For the first time ever, these two countries had elected (rather than appointed) governors and mayors. The critical question became, who controls the decentralization process, the central governments deciding what they want to transfer, or the elected governors and majors determining what they are willing to receive? In Venezuela, for example, the governors insisted on the right to accept responsibility for only the well maintained national schools, properly trained teachers and administrators, and those school systems that came with fully funded teacher retirement programs (de la Cruz, 1992). Only recently, after extensive negotiations, have the first three states finally accepted responsibility for schools in their territories. A best case scenario would be the transfer of education to the regional governments in Spain. Detailed negotiations took place between the center and each region detailing what was to be transferred (e.g., buildings, vehicles, machinery), and the condition of the items. Prior to transfer, efforts were made to bring everything up to minimum standards. 9.

CAN DECENTRALIZATION FRAGMENT A NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM?

A potential danger of decentralizing a national educational system is that the regional or municipal systems may go their own way to the extent that intersystem continuity and articulation are significantly compromised. For example, different regions can develop distinct salary structures, with the better educators gravitating toward the higher paying areas; algebra can be taught in the seventh grade in one region and the ninth in other; and the school calendar across the country can vary significantly. In Argentina, many educators stressed that going from one provincial educational system to another was like going from one country to another.

16

EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION

Following decentralization, each nation should retain the organizational tools that assure the educational systems the various regions and municipalities remain integrated and articulated to acceptable levels. Spain (1978) is a good example as it pursued vigorously the concept of a “one nation” educational system made up of 17 parts. The centerpiece was a core body of knowledge (called minimums) taught for a specified amount of time in every school in the country. The remaining percentage of teaching time could then be used for instructional material introduced by the regions to suit their own educational interests (e.g., regional history, economy, language). Thus, a national–regional balance was achieved and monitored by each side. Other tools to assure that the educational system in Spain did not fragment were: r only the national government could grant graduation diplomas (threatening to refuse degrees to schools that do not obey the guidelines); r teacher training and placement was centrally managed; and r the central ministry controlled the academic calendar. Interestingly enough, following decentralization both Spain and Argentina lost the capacity for several years to gather and aggregate statistics on a nationwide basis. In both countries the various regions began gathering their own statistics for their own purposes and aggregated them differently. 10.

HOW IMPORTANT ARE THE REGIONAL MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURES?

Dropping a decentralization reform into a weak regional management infrastructure is like dropping it into quick sand. Countries with weak regional management infrastructures (which includes much of Latin America) are generally driven by the informal system (e.g., personalism, informal power centers, ignored rules, politicized decision making). In contrast, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, countries with relatively strong regional infrastructures have a much better chance for success because, for example, policies and rules are normally obeyed, promotion is based on what rather than who you know, the political/technical balance is maintained, and prior planning is taken seriously (Hanson, 1989a). 11.

HOW IS FINANCIAL DECENTRALIZATION MANAGED?

A wide variety of models are used to decentralize financial responsibilities. In Argentina in 1978, the military government simply dumped financial responsibility for 6,700 national primary schools onto the provinces. In the early 1990s, financial responsibility for 3,578 national secondary schools (including technical and subsidized private schools) then under direct control of the Ministry of Education, were transferred to the provinces (Consejo Federal de Inversiones, 1992). A co-financing formula was in place in which the central government would transfer funds to the regional governments for the payment of the salaries of the teachers who were transferred to regional control. The problem was that in many of the provinces the salary scale of the secondary schools was higher than the scale of the teachers in the transferred national schools. At great expense, the provinces had to pay the costs of the decentralization (e.g., new offices, equipment employees) as well as raise the salaries

STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION

17

of the newly acquired teachers to reach parity with teachers already working in the provinces (Human Resources Operations Division, 1994, p. 72). One privatization reform with far-reaching consequences is to provide parents with government vouchers (financial grants or a specified amount of money) which they can then spend to enroll students in private schools. Chile, while under the control of a military government in the 1980s, adopted a variation of the voucher privatization strategy. The Ministry of Education transferred all public school property to the municipalities, and teachers were terminated as central government employees and transferred to the municipalities (thus breaking up the teachers’ unions). Parents could select the private or public school they wanted their children to attend (excluding private schools that charged tuition) and pay for admission with government-issued vouchers (attendance grants) thus providing a market incentive for schools to compete for students. When the reform began in 1980, the grant funding was set to equal per pupil expenditures, but a decade later the real value of the grant had decreased by 40% forcing municipalities to assume steadily a greater part of the cost (Winkler & Rounds, 1993). Another approach was used by Colombia in 1991, whereby the funds to be transferred to the regions were fixed at a certain amount. Thereafter, the growth to the educational system (e.g., new construction, teachers, students, instructional materials) would have to be funded by the region and municipalities. Rather than specifically earmarking money for educational expenditures only, Spain (1978) adopted a block grant approach. All the financial transfers for the public sectors were lumped together for the regional parliaments to spend according to their own priorities. These parliaments it could also borrow money if they chose to do so. By the early 1990s, the level of indebtedness was considered to be a serious problem in some of the regional governments. In sum, there are various models of financial decentralization ranging from Argentina’s (1978) unilaterally transferring all financial responsibility (primary education) to the provinces, to Nicaragua’s (1995) program of voluntary parent monetary contributions. However, the most effective strategy is some probably middle-ground where national, regional, and municipal co-financing formulae are negotiated, based on the capacity to generate revenues venues at the lower levels (e.g., increased taxation powers, national transfers, privatization). 12.

HOW DOES JOB STABILITY INFLUENCE DECENTRALIZATION?

Many ministries of education are constantly caught up in a vicious personnel cycle. A new minister is appointed because of the president’s unhappiness with the educational system (e.g., teacher strikes, low quality, bureaucracy). The new minister brings in new people and new programs, but without the material resources, information, planning capability, or creative work environment to significantly improve the system. At this high managerial level the learning curve is extensive, particularly because so many senior appointees are inexperienced and untrained in top management positions. When institutional change does not follow quickly, the president gets impatient and appoints points another minister. Between 1890 and 1993 there were 76 ministers of education in Argentina. In Colombia, on average the minister changes every 18 months. When ministers change,

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EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION

so do most of the senior officials in the ministry (Hanson, 1983). Long-term (e.g., at least 4 years) leadership in educational systems seems the exception rather than the rule in Latin America. In Venezuela, following an election, the author was often astounded to meet newly appointed senior ministry officials who the previous year had been teaching in a high school. Thus, because job tenure is short, management experience is limited, resources are scarce, politics are intense, and the job learning curve is long, it is no wonder that carrying out a complex reform, such as a decentralization program, can be extraordinarily difficult. Spain has been a notable exception with respect to personnel stability in the Ministry of Education. The minister can (and often does) last for years in office. The senior personnel are typically well-trained, highly professional experts in their fields, and their jobs are not particularly tied to a personal identification with the minister. The strength of the Spanish ministry infrastructure played a very important role in the success of its decentralization program. 13.

IS DECENTRALIZATION POSSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF NATIONAL STRESS OR CRISIS?

Contrary to popular conventional wisdom, social, political, and/or economic stress or even crisis (perceived or real) open the door for significant educational reform. The reason is simple. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, during periods of significant stress, particularly when it is felt at the national and regional levels, the numerous centers of power are more prepared to join forces by putting their own vested interests aside in protecting the national interest (Heywood, 1995). An example is the Spanish decentralization of government (1978) carried out in order to satisfy the demands for political autonomy by three rebellious provinces after the death of General Franco. Also, the Colombian Constitutional Convention of 1991 (which established national decentralization) was convened in the face of national social and political disintegration. A special attempt was made to involve dissident groups, and two of the major guerrilla bands won over 30% of the seats in the constitutional convention. However, too much stress (e.g., the middle of a civil war) or not enough (e.g., when there are no organized critical voices to be heard), are severe deterrents to planned reform. A balance somewhere between these extremes provides the best terrain for change. 14.

WHAT IS AN APPROPRIATE TIME FRAME FOR DECENTRALIZATION?

Decentralization clearly does not come with the passing of laws or signing decrees. Like most types of reform, it is built rather than created. It happens slowly because the organizational culture (e.g., “the way we’ve always done things around here”) must be transformed, new roles learned leadership styles altered (e.g., shifting from controlling to supporting actions), communication patterns reversed, planning procedures revised (e.g., bottom up and top down), and developing regional policies and programs developed (Hanson, 1996b). In terms of time frame, nations should think in terms of years rather than weeks or even months. Prawda (1993, p. 26) at the World Bank wrote that “the first relevant

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19

accomplishments in the Mexican and Chilean cases surfaced about five years after the decentralization process was started.” In Spain, educational competences were transferred to the last regions in January of 1998 for a decentralization program that began in 1978 (de Puelles Benitez, 1995). The longer time frame is particularly true for nations with weak regional and local administrative infrastructures. Within that time frame there needs to be a sequence of specifically defined stages, each achieved before the next is undertaken. Decentralization by stages is part of the building process. 15.

HOW CAN CONTINUITY BE PROVIDED FOR?

Unfortunately, nations rarely use program evaluation as a means of determining whether or not to continue or terminate a reform initiative. Venezuela represents the worst case example. Almost immediately following elections during the 1970s and 1980s, many creatively crafted programs which had cost millions of dollars and thousands of work-hours to mount were terminated without any evaluation conducted. The decentralization initiative, which held great promise, also died an unnatural death. The big test for any educational reform is surviving the transition of political power from one party to another. Because major educational reforms tend to live or die based on political rather than technical considerations, the best guarantee for successful implementation is if the major parties endorse and support the initiative from the beginning. In addition, longevity is more likely if the decentralization on reform is never identified with only one political party (Hanson, 1976). 16.

IS SIMULTANEOUS OR INCREMENTAL DECENTRALIZATION BEST?

The simultaneous “all regions at once” decentralization model is always popular. The potential for quick and dramatic advancement is seductive to policy makers, but extraordinarily difficult to execute successfully. In Venezuela (1968), it failed for reasons of complexity and politics. In Argentina (1978), it created a decade of financial chaos at the provincial level. With respect to Colombia (1991), the author has serious doubts about success for the next several years because the Ministry of Education itself estimated that only about 200 of the 1,024 municipalities had sufficiently strong infrastructures to manage the education systems (Hanson, 1995). In contrast, Spain the Constitution (1978, Arts. 143, 151) structured an incremental approach by adopting fast, medium, and slow tracks to devolution. Prior to the transfer (for the medium and slow tricks) specific criteria had to be met such as approval by three-fourths of the popularly elected municipal and provincial councils, a referendum by the people, and a constitutionally specified waiting period of 5 years. In Spain, regions on the slower tracks could learn from the experiences of those on the fast track. Nicaragua has adopted an interesting version of the incremental approach which the Minister of Education refers to as “learning to swim by swimming.” That is, initiate the decentralization strategy by ministry policy in selected regions, be prepared to make adjustments as experience through experimentation is gained, and produce a decentralization law only after reasonable assurance has been reached that a workable model has been identified and tested.

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As Figure 1.1 illustrates, developing a strong technical system based on serious planning and policy guidelines along with training to carry them out are essential ingredients in the reform process. In addition, it is better to transfer authority to individual regions and municipalities (or even to schools) only when they meet specific tests of readiness (e.g., community participation, trained personnel, financial participation) rather than transfer to all the areas at once regardless of their degrees of readiness. 17.

WHAT ARE THE FORMS OF LOCAL DECENTRALIZATION?

Decentralized authority transferred to regions is usually, to some degree, passed on down to the local schools. SBM is the process associated with schools operating in a decentralized manner, with authority typically residing in the hands of a school council. On these local school councils a balance is usually sought between educators and non-educators, with the membership made up of teachers (elected by fellow teachers), parents (elected by other parents), the school director, membership from the business community, student representation, and at times, someone from the city government. In terms of authority, there is a wide range between countries. In a “low authority” country, such as Colombia, the councils are principally advisory and are to be consulted on issues of budget, planning, curriculum, and so forth. Typically, low authority councils function as auxiliary units to raise funds and organize maintenance assistance in the community for the schools. They have little influence over the course of education in the school. Nicaragua has created very powerful “high authority” school councils. In the so-called “autonomous” primary and secondary schools in Nicaragua, the councils have complete authority to set school policies, supervise all educational activities, hire and fire the school director, establish the academic program, select textbooks, and manage the discipline program (Ministerio de Educaci´on, 1993). Because the school councils can discharge the school director with five of the seven council votes, in interviews the directors report that they feel very vulnerable and uncomfortable about introducing changes that may prove unpopular with parents. The Spanish SBM model provides for local authority only over those academic components of the school program beyond the “minimums” (core curriculum) required by the state, but it allows for the election of a school director by the school council. However, in this case, the director is elected based on candidate presentations of development plans for the school, and the winning candidate has the job for three years with the possibility of re-election only once (Hanson, 1990). The negative side of the Spanish model is that the teachers elected as school directors must continue to teach several classes day, they can only be re-elected once, and they must then go back to a classroom in their own schools when their time in office is over. Along with losing that valuable administrative experience, the transition that teachers must make in their own school from colleague to director and then back to colleague is difficult and stressful. In contrast, the proposed Nicaraguan model permits the school director to be elected without specific limits on the number of terms served, thus permitting the opportunity for preserving experienced leadership.

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18.

21

DOES DECENTRALIZATION INCREASE LEARNING?

Improving the quality of education is often identified as one of several goals of a decentralization reform. Typically, the assumption is made that through a redistribution of authority that brings changes in organization, management, personnel selection, finance, and curriculum control, improved educational quality will somehow follow. However, even though various studies have concluded that parents and educators seem to be more satisfied in a decentralized system, the research literature has not demonstrated a direct relationship between decentralization and increased student achievement (Brown, 1994, p. 1,410). In their review of SBM literature, Malen, Ogawa, and Kranz (1990, p. 323) identify several studies that claim such a positive relationship, “but the [research] requirements for establishing causal claims are not met in these documents.” The authors conclude, “Once again, there is little evidence that school-based management improves student achievement.” Sharpe (1996, p. 7) in his recent review of the literature draws much the same conclusion. He argues that producing conclusive evidence is hardly possible because there are simply too many intervening variables between the management device of decentralization and improved student outcomes, such as parental attitudes, peer group support, school culture of learning, different teaching and learning styles, timeon-task, teacher motivation, and so forth. Sharpe writes that “this transfer of power provide, the opportunity, but not the guarantee, for the quality of school decision making and action to benefit.” It is the performance of the key actors that determines whether or not the quality of education and student outcomes improve. 19.

WHAT WERE THE OUTCOMES?

Discussing outcomes is never easy because, like beauty, they are often as seen in the eye of the beholder. Therefore, in the author’s eyes (regarding the five countries), the Venezuelan 1968 decentralization initiative was the most elegant in design, comprehensive in coverage, noble of purpose, and complete in its failure. It was designed by academics who did not contemplate that each new political party, without any form of evaluation, would toss out the programs and individuals put into place by the party leaving power. The next Venezuelan decentralization initiative (1991) was stalemated for the first few years because the state governors (elected for the first time in the history of the nation) refused to accept responsibility for the national schools that did not meet minimum standards regarding (among other things) guarantees covering financial transfers, the qualifications of personnel, and the physical maintenance of the schools. In the mid-1990s the stalemate was finally broken with the first three states accepting decentralized responsibility for the schools. The 1968–1991 Colombian educational reform was very successful in improving the quality of educational management by centralizing control in the Ministry of Education. Now, with the 1991 constitutional reform, the nation is trying to decentralize to regional and municipal units, but most of these administrative infrastructures are extremely weak. At least for the next decade, the prognosis for an effective and efficient decentralized educational system does not look good. But then, it should

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be recalled that the underlying reason for the decentralization initiative is the relegitimization of the state in a country with major socio-political problems. Effective change in this is area may take even longer. In Argentina, the 1978 decentralization of primary education by the military government was little more than the dumping of financial and administrative burdens onto the provinces. It took a full decade to recover from the administrative and financial chaos created. The jury is out on the 1993 decentralization of national secondary education, but the strong provincial administrative infrastructures give good reason for hope (Carciofi, Cetr´angolo, & Larra˜naga, 1996). In Spain, the 1978 decentralization initiative was a success from the beginning. The regional governments, which had strong administrative infrastructures, managed the educational systems very well. However, in 1987, when 7 of the 17 regions (autonomous communities) had taken control from the central government, the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol) which controlled the national government, suspended transferring power to more regions. Various reasons, both official and unofficial, have been attributed to this “freezing” of the decentralization process. Officially, the major reasons offered were: (1) to gain additional experience with the seven existing decentralized autonomous communities; (2) national concern that the heterogeneity of the 10 remaining decentralization plans would make it difficult to retain the “one nation” concept so important to the Spanish Constitution; and (3) the urgent need to reform the entire educational system, a reform that would be unnecessarily delayed if further decentralization were to take place (de Puelles Benitez, 1995, pp. 101–102). However, political opponents argued that the real reason was that the PSOE party simply was unwilling to give up so much power, especially to those regional parliaments controlled by other political parties (Hanson, 1989b). The Nicaraguan decentralization experience at this writing is still in the experimental stage and being guided by educational policy rather than national law. The fact that the decentralization strategy called for experimenting (“you learn to swim by swimming”) and developing a model by learning from experience is encouraging. Other countries frequently lock in a model by law from the beginning and thus negate the opportunity to modify easily the reform as experience is gained. In addition, the Nicaraguan Ministry of Education is placing considerably more weight on SBM as the cornerstone of its decentralization process than are the other countries. Because of the extensive amount of decision-making authority being transferred to local school governing committees, the Nicaraguan model is pursuing a high-risk strategy but with the potential for significant advances in democratization as a potential payoff if the plan works. 20.

SUMMARY

Figure 1.1 emphasizes the notion that educational decentralization is not an event, but a process integrating the actions of numerous systems, institutions, activities, and individuals at national and regional levels. The paper posits that the success or failure of a decentralization initiative depends on how well the various political, economic,

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23

institutional, technical, and educational systems respond to specific challenges and demands. For example, as seen in Figure 1.1, is there a shared vision among the distinct centers of power (e.g., ministries of finance and education, office of the president, national, regional, and local governments, Catholic Church) that play a role in the reform. Does the central government try to equalize the educational resources between the various regions and do the regions and municipalities have their own resource generation mechanisms (e.g., taxing authority) to support the educational reform? Do the ministry and regional educational officials have sufficient training, support, and job stability to carry out the reform, or do constant personnel changes and politicized policy changes regularly disrupt the planning and execution phases of the decentralization process? Do all regions of the country begin at the same time regardless of readiness (e.g., strong or weak infrastructures), or are tests of readiness introduced to determine which regions are actually prepared to begin (e.g., training, precise policy formation, new role definitions)? In the final analysis, if the decentralization process results in a situation in which both the national and regional participants view themselves as benefiting from the reform (win–win), then the conditions of success (but not a guarantee) have been created. On the other hand, if a situation is created where the perception is that the national level benefits but the regions do not (win–lose), or vice versa, then the probability of failure exists. 21.

PROPOSITIONS OF EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZATION

The following propositions have been extracted from the studies just discussed. The intent is to contribute to the growing body of knowledge involving efforts to successfully decentralize educational systems. The more the decentralization initiative involves the center transferring positive opportunities to the regions (win–win) rather than simply unloading problems and burdens (win–lose), the greater the chances for successful change. r The greater the accepted vision of decentralization between the distinct centers of power (e.g., political parties, unions, bureaucrats, religious institution), the greater the chance for successful change. r Devolution rather than delegation of authority and responsibility has a greater chance for long-term success. r It is easier to initiate a decentralization initiative during times of political, economic, and social stress or turbulence, than it is during times of relative stability. r When decentralization initiatives die, it is usually for political rather than administrative/technical reasons. r The stronger the management infrastructure at the regional levels, the greater the opportunity for success. r It is better to transfer authority to individual regions only when they meet specific tests of readiness, rather than to all the regions at once regardless of readiness. r Decentralizing in incremental stages has a greater chance for success than an “out-with-the-old and in-with-the-new” approach. r Understanding the motivation behind a decentralization initiative is the key to understanding the specifics of the strategy.

24

r r r r

EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION

The people who have been part of an organizational culture that has managed a centralized system are not very effective in managing a decentralized system (old habits and a taste for power are difficult to cast off.) A decentralized organization should function as arts of a whole rather than simply independent parts. Once decentralization has taken place, the central ministry still must have the tools to safeguard that the regions follow national educational policy. Educational policy on decentralization should be set through debate rather than disguised manipulations of the national budget.

NOTES 1. The World Bank is currently working with more than 40 nations that are decentralizing their educational systems. 2. This paper is a substantial revision of two other papers. The first was presented at a World Bank seminar on educational decentralization, June 2, 1995, and the second was a report written for Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, DC. 3. The information, observations, and explanations reported in this article are based principally on a series of field studies on decentralization conducted by the author over a period of two decades For an examination of the specific country studies that provided the base material, see the articles listed under the author’s name in the bibliography. The data from the original field studies were obtained in each country through an analysis of hundreds of pages of published documents and extensive interviews (usually 45–60 minutes each) with educators ranging from classroom teachers to ministers of education. The author usually spent many months gathering data in each country. 4. These particular key questions and core issues were selected because they represent concerns repeatedly raised by educators in all the countries studied.

22.

REFERENCES

Arizmendi Posada, O. (1969). Transformaci´on educativa. Bogota: Ministerio de Educaci´on Nacional. Brown, D. (1994). Decentralization in educational governance and management. In T. N. Postlewaite The international encyclopedia of education (2nd ed.). London: Pergamon Press. Carciofi, R., Cetr´angolo, O., & Larra˜naga, O. (1996). Desafios de la descentralizaci´on:Educaci´on y Salud en Argentina y Chile. Santiago de Chile: Comisi´on Econ´omica para Am´erica Latina y el Caribe, Naciones Unidas. Consejo Federal de Inversiones. (1992). Servicios educativos nacionales en las provincias. Buenos Aires: Gobierno de Argentina. Cortina, R. (1995). Education and political change in Mexico. Paper presented at the CIES Conference, Boston, MA. de la Cruz, R. (Ed.). (1992). Descentralizaci´on, Gobernabilidad, Democracia. Caracas: Nueva Sociedad. de Puelles Benitez, M. (1995). La politica educativa del estado auton´omico. Politica y Educaci´on (pp. 87–108). Barcelona: Universidad Aut´onoma de Barcelona. Fern´andez Lamarra, N., & Vitar, A. (1991). Planificaci´on, Federalismo, y Descentralizaci´on en la Argentina. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Educaci´on y Justicia. Gunther, R. (1993). Politics, society, and democracy: The case of Spain. Oxford: Westview Press. Hanson, M. (1976). Decentralization and regionalization in the ministry of education: The case of Venezuela. International Review of Education, 22(2), 155–176. Hanson, M. (1983). Administrative development in the Colombian Ministry of Education: A case analysis of the 1970s. Comparative Education Review, 27(1), 89–108. Hanson, M. (1986). Educational reform and administrative development: The cases of Colombia and Venezuela. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Hanson. M. (1989a). Decentralization and regionalization in educational administration: Comparisons of Venezuela, Colombia and Spain. Comparative Education, 25(1), 41–55.

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Hanson, M. (1989b). Education, administrative development and democracy in Spain. International Journal of Educational Development, 9(2), 127–138. Hanson, M. (1990). School-based management aid educational reform in the USA and Spain. Comparative Education Review, 34(4), 523–537. Hanson, M. (1995). Democratization and decentralization in Colombian education. Comparative Education Review, 39(1), 100–119. Hanson, M. (1996a). Educational administration and organizational behavior. 4th ed. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Hanson, M. (1996b). Educational change under autocratic and democratic governments: The case of Argentina. Comparative Education, 32(3), 303–317. Heywood, P. (1995). The government and politics of Spain. London: Macmillan. Human Resources Operations Division. (1994). Argentina: Decentralization and improvement of secondary education project, working paper. Washington DC: The World Bank. Malen, B., Ogawa, R., & Kranz, J. (1990). What do we know about school-based management? A case study of the literature—a call for research. In: W. Clune and J. Witte (Eds.), Choice and control in American education, Vol 2: The practice of choice, decentralization and school restructuring (pp. 289–342.). London: The Palmer Press. McGinn, N., & Street, S. (1986). Educational decentralization: Weak state or strong state? Comparative Education Review, 30(4), 471–491. Ministerio de Educaci´on. (1993). Reglamento genera de educaci´on primaria y secondaria. Managua, Nicaragua: Gobierno de Nicaragua. Novick, S. (1994). Una nueva agenda para la descentralizaci´on educativa.Revista Iberoamencana de Educaci´on, 4(1):11–27. N´un˜ ez, I., Gonzalez, L., & Espinoza, O. (1993). La Pr´actica de la Planificaci´on Educativa en el Contexto del Proceso de Decentralizaci´on en Chile. Paris: Instituto Internacional de Planeamiento de la Educaci´on. Pe˜nalver, L. (1976). La Regionalizaci´on: Principos que la Informen. Caracas: Ministerio de Educaci´on. Prawda. J. (1993). Educational decentralization in Latin America: Lessons learned. International Journal of Educational Development, 13(3), 253–264. Rondinelli, D. (1990). Decentralizing urban development programs: A framework for analyzing policy. Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development. Sharpe, F. (1996). Towards a research paradigm on devolution. Journal of Educational Administration, 34(1), 4–23. Tussel, J., & Soto A. (Eds.). (1996). Historia de la Transici´on: 1975–1986. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. Weiler, H. (1993). Control versus legitimization: The politics of ambivalence. In J. Hannaway and M. Carnoy (Eds.), Decentralization and school improvement (pp. 55–83). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Winkler, D. (1993). Fiscal decentralization and accountability in education: Experiences in four countries. In J. Hannaway and M. Carnoy (Eds.), Decentralization and school improvement (pp. 104–109). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Winkler, D., & Rounds, T. (1993). Municipal and private sector response to decentralization and school choice. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

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Chapter 2 WALKING ON THREE LEGS: CENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION, AND RECENTRALIZATION IN CHINESE EDUCATION John N. Hawkins

1.

INTRODUCTION

China has clearly set itself on a path to become not only a regional but also a world leader. But in order to do so, its leaders are convinced that China’s power is linked to producing and retaining the best and brightest students and to reforming its educational system (Lu, 2000). A major feature of the current educational reform movement to achieve these goals is the focus on decentralization. China’s educational leadership has been struggling with the issue of centralization and decentralization almost since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. Terms such as “walking on two legs” (combining both centralized and decentralized approaches to education) and minban schools (community-run schools), once again in vogue, date back several decades (Hawkins, 1973). In the latter years of the commune system, communes, and production brigades were being urged by provincial authorities to run rural primary and junior middle schools independently, raising funds through their own efforts, and hiring teachers in a competitive manner (Xin, 1984). These early efforts to shift authority from central to local levels did not represent, however, a national decentralization policy of the scope we are witnessing today. Nevertheless, there is a history of experimentation with different levels and degrees of decentralization, always against the background of a highly centralized political economy, and often followed by a recentralization as authorities retrench fearing loss of control (the paradoxes of state-led decentralization are convincingly argued in Tatto (1999)). As Hanson (1993) and Bray (1999) correctly note, in general, there are no clear examples of completely decentralized educational systems, but rather one finds mixtures of centralization and decentralization. These processes are fluid and in motion and change over time. It is also important to remember that there are differing definitions of what constitutes decentralization. In this volume, Hanson offers a useful general definition that is appropriate for the China case: “Decentralization is defined as the transfer of decision-making authority, responsibility, and tasks from higher to lower organizational levels or between organizations” (p. XX). He and Bray (1999) also note three basic kinds of decentralization: (1) Deconcentration (transfer of tasks and work but not authority); (2) Delegation (transfer of decisionmaking authority from higher to lower levels, but authority can be withdrawn by the center); (3) Devolution (transfer of authority to an autonomous unit which can act independently without permission from the center). Privatization is another form 27 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 27–41.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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which, however, is not always decentralized. As we shall see, in the case of China, several of these exist at the same time. In the remainder of this chapter we will examine the various stages of the educational reform movement begun in 1985, focus on what motivated the reforms in the context of China’s unique political culture, explore some specific features (finance, curriculum, management, etc.) of China’s efforts to decentralize the precollegiate level, and finally, comment on the strengths and weaknesses of these efforts. 2.

THE REFORM ENVIRONMENT

As the economic reforms of the 1970s began to take hold it was soon discovered that the educational system was woefully inadequate to contribute to the new economic opportunities. Thus, in May of 1985, the Communist Party of China (CPC) convened a conference to address this issue. Out of these deliberations came a series of general policy guidelines meant to begin a process of educational reform and gradually align the educational system with the newly emerging marketization of the economy (Reform, 1985). General principals focused on linking education to economic reforms, implementing the 9-year compulsory educational system, decentralizing finances and management, increasing vocational and technical education, and increasing the number and quality of teachers. More specifically, it was stated that: r Government control of schools was too rigid and management inefficient r Authority should be “devolved” to lower levels r Multiple methods of financing should be sought r Devolution of authority for the 9-year compulsory system should be gradual, based on a regional approach in the order of: coastal cities, developed interior regions and cities, and less developed interior r “The power for administration of elementary education belongs to local authorities” (Reform, 1985, p. 9) r Secondary schools will establish tracking, either toward higher education or vocational–technical education combined with some devolution of authority and financing r The central level (State Education Commission—SEC, later replaced by the Ministry of Education, MOE) will continue to monitor the process and provide basic guidelines, but “subordinate units” will have more power and bear financial costs (Reform, 1985, p. 20). These general policies began a process of decentralization but somewhat ambiguously continued to stress the “guiding” and “monitoring” role of the central authorities with respect to “major policies, principles, and general plans” (Reform, 1985, p. 9). Also, the exact degree of decentralization at the subprovincial level was to be determined by centrally administered areas (provincial, autonomous regions, municipalities). A reformed tax system was to allow for more flexibility to apply special surcharges to support the financial base for schools (Tsui, 1997). Eight years later it was necessary to restate many of these policies in a more detailed manner. In March of 1993 after 4 years of preparation, the “Program for China’s Educational Reform and Development” was issued by the State Council (Cui, 1993; State Education Commission, 1994). A six part, fifty article document,

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this policy statement clearly articulated that it was necessary for China to shift its primary focus from economic development and marketization, to human resource development. Despite previous reforms, it is noted that China’s economy remains backwards, inefficient, and noncompetitive, largely because of the low educational level of China’s workers. And despite previous educational reforms, problems still remained with the institution of the 9-year compulsory educational system, the tracking of secondary students into appropriate fields, the fight against illiteracy, and the overly centralized management and financial structure of education (Cui, 1993; State Education Commission, 1994). In an effort to clarify the ambiguity of the 1985 reform document, it is stated more specifically that: “The system to run schools will also witness great changes with the government monopoly to be broken. While the focus remains on state schools, encouragement will be given to the gradual establishment of community sponsored schools. At present (1993) basic education must be achieved mainly through local government schools” (Cui, 1993, p. 16). Nonstate operation of schools by groups and individuals (along with overseas donations) is also to be allowed but only in the context of existing government laws and regulations. This reform document provides enough space for local levels to take more responsibility for basic education both in terms of management and finances but also clearly specifies that the “state” remains the arbiter of rules and regulations, and as the “state” is extended to local governments, the primary provider of basic education. Nevertheless, the architecture for a less centralized educational system begins to emerge. The different government levels from the central to the county are encouraged to work together to develop a feasible structure for the management and financing of precollegiate schooling, with a gradual deconcentration of authority. More recently, however, officials have taken steps to reassure the bureaucracy and population that the state sector still has a critical role to play. This is particularly true in the area of higher education. A refinement on the earlier reform policies stresses the merging of smaller universities into larger, more comprehensive institutions, the goal of which is to form a national system of higher education including community colleges. Very little is said in this document about privatization or the devolution of authority to university presidents (Wu, 2000). It appears that Zhu Rongji’s “fifth wave” reform package, which includes several decentralization proposals, has stalled not only as a result of foot dragging by the bureaucracy, but also because of some concerns about national security (Zweig, 2001). This is also true of overall control of the national economy; while the nonstate sector is important, the state sector “should dominate” (Jiang, 2001, p. 1). Particularly with respect to science and technology, the Minister in charge of the State Development Planning Commission has stressed that this area requires a centralized state level effort and should not be devolved to lower levels (China Minister, 2001). Another area of concern for China’s leaders is the unintended impact of decentralization that has resulted in a significant “brain drain.” As the central authorities cut budgets to higher education, one result was higher cost of higher education and lower quality, thus prompting the best and brightest individuals to go abroad for higher learning, many, not to return (Current Issues, 2001). And finally, discussion of educational decentralization has occurred somewhat in isolation from other centralization issues. For example, there has been significant rural migration to China’s cities and while this is now allowed, migrants do so without the hukou or urban residency status.

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Thus they are cut off from many social services including education. As Solinger (1999) points out, this produces the possibility of social instability. 3.

MOTIVES

Identifying motives for educational decentralization in China must be considered in the context of China’s unique political culture and broader decentralization in both political and economic realms. China’s distinct form of state-led growth, what Oi (1995, p. 1132) calls “local state corporatism,” provides the environment in which educational decentralization must be viewed. Regime change is not necessarily a prerequisite for reform and growth. Decentralization from the center to the periphery, still within “state” boundaries, has produced in China a unique form of “state” decentralization (Oi, 1999). China’s current transitional status has retained key elements of the Maoist period—elements of a Leninist state—that has decentralized control and administration to a point that it is now qualitatively different from the earlier Maoist period. While privatization is growing, it is not leading the growth and change that is occurring. Rather, government at the local level, counties, townships and village enterprises are acting as the real entrepreneurs and change agents. Decollectivization and fiscal reform were the two major incentives to encourage local governments to become entrepreneurial. The county functions somewhat as the corporate headquarters, the township as the regional headquarters, and the villages as companies within the larger corporation. Each is a profit center, fiscally independent and expected to maximize its performance. The Maoist framework has thus been adapted to account for economic liberalization and local decentralization. Unlike other Leninist states in transition, “. . . China evolved into a distinctive decentralized form that, when coupled with proper incentives, allowed its local officials quickly to play an entrepreneurial role” (Oi, 1995, p. 1147). Thus, the broader fiscal and economic reforms of the 1970s led to later efforts to decentralize education, always within the context of a state that was consciously retreating from being the sole provider of social services (Mok, 1997). In the educational system, this retreat and shifting of financial and management authority to the local level was most evident first in higher education (Hawkins, 1999; Mok, 1997). As we will see, the precollegiate level followed next but in a much more cautious manner. Motives for decentralization in education were principally fiscal (Bray, 1999), and as Cheng (1997, p. 393) notes, “. . . in the case of China, improvement of the quality of the modern school has not been a primary motive for decentralization.” Yet, while the central state might have retreated from paying all of the costs for education, there remained a belief that by empowering local authorities with responsibility for running the schools, they will better be able to serve their clients, improve educational efficiencies, and respond more rapidly to the new market forces being unleashed as a result of economic liberalization (Mok, 1997). Thus, it can be said that educational decentralization was part of a broader economic liberalization that was occurring, within a modified Maoist–Leninist system, and was motivated by a desire to disengage the state from being the sole provider of educational services. A much hoped for outcome would be an educational system that would more nimbly respond to economic needs. As the reforms unfolded, it was also realized that the state had to remain engaged particularly in the rural areas where decentralization has

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caused hardships on poorer counties and villages. As a result, public spending has been increased in the area of primary and secondary education (Fang, 2001). At the upper end of the educational system China’s leaders are clearly motivated by a desire to be both a regional and world leader. Thus, reform initiatives like Project 211 (2001) have become showcases for educational innovation that involve joint state, local, and university financing and administration.1 It is hoped that all of these reforms will result in China taking its place among the developed nations of the world as a leader in education, science and technology. It is too early to judge if this will indeed be the case. 4.

DECENTRALIZATION IN ACTION

There are diverse aspects to educational decentralization in China. It is clear that in some areas the central authorities have no intention of decentralizing responsibility to local authorities or the private sector. National exams are one such area. Recent announcements make it clear that national unified exams are necessary to choose elites and assure that the state supply of highly trained personnel will continue (Xinhua, 2001b). However, in a variety of other areas from the hosting of private college presidents from the United States to help China explore how private higher education works, to the privatization of dormitory and food services, to the formation of educational internet portals linking the mainland with Taiwan (NetBig.com), China’s authorities are experimenting with devolution of power and authority in ways they have not in the past (China & Taiwan, 2001; Minnesota, 2001; Xinhua, 2001a). Here we will focus on three broad areas that are central to the reforms occurring in China: fiscal reforms, management of schools, and the always-sensitive area of curriculum reform. 4.1.

Fiscal and Management Reforms

As has been noted, fiscal decentralization was one of the key reforms effecting educational decentralization. As the central government began to reduce subsidies for local schools, educational officials at the county, township, and village level pursued alternative sources to fund basic education. This resulted in a much more diversified funding structure for education using local taxes, tuition, overseas donations, local fund-raising, income from enterprises, and modest subsidies to fill in the gaps left by the central government (Mok, 1998). The reform documents specified six methods for funding precollegiate education: (1) Urban and rural educational surcharges levied by local governments; (2) Contributions from industry and social organizations; (3) Donated funds from community organizations and individuals; (4) Tuition fees from students; (5) Income from school-run enterprises; (6) Central authorities (State Education Commission, 1994). At this time it was estimated that roughly 40% of precollegiate funding was provided from nongovernmental sources (State Education Commission, 1994, p. 11). Similar reforms are occurring in the higher education sector. Although so-called minban or private colleges and universities are being allowed, the government has concluded, according to the President of People’s University, that “education is a public cause which should not be commercialized” (Ji, 2000, p. 1). Students are

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expected to contribute about 25% of per pupil cost, and the state should play a heavy role in subsidizing higher education. The financial structure is now much more diversified through a mixture of fees, state subsidies, interest-free loans, and a variety of other mechanisms. However, a cultural reluctance to borrow money combined with the fact that students are required to repay their loans soon after graduation, has resulted in a large number of defaults thus reducing the effectiveness of educational loans (Ji, 2000). Higher education has historically been underfunded since 1949, and it is therefore likely that the minban institutions will pick up much of the slack, especially for vocational–technical education (even though only 37 out of a total of 1,207 such institutions are authorized to grant any kind of certificate or degree) (Fu, 2001). For a period, fiscal decentralization allowed local governments great discretion to set taxes, target surcharges for education, and generally manage their financial affairs. For wealthy regions this worked quite well and the quality of schools and teachers was high. For poorer regions, the opposite was often true; disparities began to appear in the system. For a variety of reasons, including issues of equity, the central government, in 1994, began a process of recentralization, removing certain tax authority from the local governments (Bahl, 1998). This revealed how fragile China’s decentralization process remains. As Bahl notes: “The biggest difference between China and the decentralized systems of the west is the absence of popular representation. Local councils must be popularly elected and local chief officials must be locally appointed for the efficiency gains from decentralization to occur” (Bahl, 1998, p. 72). Local governments now may not set tax rates or borrow for capital projects. This, however, does not mean that the central authorities will get back into the business of completely subsidizing education. Quite the contrary, now local governments must be even more creative in finding alternative sources for funding schools, which in fact may produce a more genuinely decentralized system. While the localities are not able to set tax rates, they have been encouraged to set surcharges on top of commercial and industrial taxes, which “must” be devoted exclusively to education. But they are not required to do so, and many local villages have opted to use tax funds for purposes other than education (NPC, 2001; Xin, 2001). The situation has reached such a critical stage that the government is once again stepping in to play a more central role in funding precollegiate education, especially in the poorer rural areas. No less a figure than Zhu Rongji has joined the chorus of those lamenting the state of rural basic education now that the tax base has changed (Vice Premier, 2001). New investment mechanisms are being constructed to assure that parents do not have to pay for both textbooks and basic education for their children. Inequities in uncritical decentralization is now being reported in the press (Education reform, 2001). Central authorities continue to fund teacher salaries and certain capital projects, but these are funds that are collected at the local level, rerouted to the central government, and then reallocated back to teachers (a process called “the center hosts the banquet and the local foots the bill”) (Cheng, 1997, p. 395). This blend of central and local governmental financial support along with donations, fund-raising, enterprise support, and community participation creates an appearance of more decentralization than may actually be taking place. The State Education Commission itself has taken pains to defend its position as the primary

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financial supporter of China’s vast educational system: “It is a mistake to think that most of China’s education funding comes from donations” (Xinhua, November 25, 1997c,d, p. 1). Vice Minister Cheng Zhili states that 74% of all educational funding comes from state revenues (up from the 40% figure cited 2 years earlier), and while he encourages local levels to seek diversified sources of funding, the amount that is raised in this manner is “peanuts compared to government appropriations for education” (Xinhua, November 25, 1997c,d, p. 2). He is referring, of course, to government at all levels, China’s “state corporatism,” but in this view, government is government, whether it is at the village level or in Beijing. As was demonstrated in the 1994 tax recentralization, what has been granted to the localities can be quickly withdrawn. Nevertheless, even a 24% level of nongovernmental funding represents a significant shift for China’s educational establishment (up from 19% in 1993—Chinese Education (1994, p. 2)). And, although the bulk of the funding comes from state sources, the central government’s role has been considerably reduced. With increased fiscal responsibility has come a diversified administrative structure for China’s schools. Prior to 1991, there were virtually no laws governing education. Now laws and regulations have been drafted at both the central and local levels: r 1991: “Law of Compulsory Education” covering thirty provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities r 1993: a whole series of laws regarding teachers, the handicapped, communityrun schools, vocational and technical education, higher education, educational finance, fund-raising, and science and technology (State Education Commission, 1994). Supervision of education, once a matter solely for the central authorities, now is applied through a hierarchy whereby government agencies above the county level, supervise, evaluate, and examine authorities at lower levels. There are multiple layers of educational supervision: (1) The National Educational Supervision Agency operates centrally and is made up of a Supervisor General, 2 deputies, and 61 supervisors invited from relevant ministries, commissions, provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities; (2) Local governments have corresponding organs at different levels down to the county level. Currently about 97% of all cities and prefectures have such agencies, as do about 90% of the counties (Ma, 2005; State Education Commission, 1994). The supervisors are responsible for assuring that the various laws and regulations are followed by local authorities and educators. As for the schools themselves, village government has been given responsibility for running primary schools (60% of China’s primary school cohort resides in the over 700,000 villages throughout China), and county government has responsibility for running secondary schools (Cheng 1997; Cui 1999c, January 4). This means that they have responsibility for finding financing for the schools, for appointment and retention of teachers, and limited authority over the curriculum. Nevertheless, China’s central educational authorities, the State Education Commission and later the Ministry of Education, continues to help “guide” decentralization as in past efforts to establish pilot programs in Shanghai, Tantai, and Dalian to promote “quality based education” (China Daily, September 4, 1997a, p. 1; China Daily, September 19, 1997). Selected schools develop programs to serve as models of quality education for local decentralized schools; the central authorities thus do not order locally run schools to behave in a certain manner but

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rather demonstrates how to do so by experimental model (Ma, 2005; Xinhua, May 27, 1995). While the government or state-run primary and secondary schools (by far the largest educational sector) have been variously decentralized, a variety of nongovernmental, or semi-private, precollegiate schools have been allowed to emerge. In 1994 it was estimated that there were more than 40,000 private schools in China (Kwong, 1996). At the 1992 14th Congress of the CPC, the principal of “creating a favorable environment for the emergence of private education” was endorsed (Mok, 1998, p. 258). Initially focused on higher education, by 1993 private schools included basic primary and secondary education as well as kindergartens. And, as recently as June 1999, Premier Zhu Rongji affirmed that as long as nonstate-run schools operate in the context of relevant state laws and regulations, they should be encouraged (China Daily, June 21, 1999b). The government still avoids the use of the term “private” when discussing these schools and generally uses the term “nonstate run” or “minban” to describe what are essentially private schools. Mok (1997) notes that it is difficult to differentiate precisely between minban (run by citizens) and private. In the former, funds are provided by communities or collectives and in the latter by individuals or enterprises. The principal distinction between them and government schools, however, is that these private initiatives are basically self-supporting utilizing a variety of funding mechanisms (tuition, overseas Chinese support, enterprises, debentures, etc.) and, as we shall see, are able to deviate from the state curriculum. One outcome of the emergence of private schools is that family saving and spending habits are changing. In Guangdong province, for example, it is reported that over the past 3 years average family educational expenditures have grown by 12% annually (China Daily, July 3, 1999a). This is higher than spending patterns for entertainment and travel. Savings rates are also growing with funds earmarked for education (China Daily, July 3, 1999a). As in other areas of decentralization, much of the impetus for allowing a more flexible policy toward private education had to do with the fiscal retreat of the state from public education. At a recent conference in Beijing, it was noted that public schools are not capable of handling all of the educational needs of the city, fund cuts had caused problems of educational quality and there has been an increased public demand for educational alternatives (Tang, 1999). It was urged that private schools be accepted on the same level as public schools, present their graduates with recognized certificates, investors in such schools should be able to reap a profit, and municipal government should assist private efforts by providing buildings and facilities creating a kind of “education industry” (Tang, 1999, p. 1). Although private initiatives represent a small percentage of all precollegiate schooling in China, they are particularly important in the rural areas where government cutbacks have resulted in setbacks for the educational reform efforts initiated in 1985 and 1993. They represent an alternative to the low quality and high cost of government schools and are playing a significant role in realizing the 9-year compulsory education policy in rural areas (Lin, 1997). At the other end of the spectrum, well-endowed private schools boasting to be schools for “aristocrats” and elites and charging high fees or debentures also offer high quality alternatives for China’s new elites (Mok, 1997). While these efforts clearly represent a significant form of

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decentralization for China’s vast educational system, it is also clear that the central government is carefully watching and monitoring these developments. 4.2.

Curriculum Reforms

Control over the content of schooling is usually one of the last areas that central authorities are willing to decentralize. This is as true for centralized, democratic states such as Japan, as it is for centralized, Leninist states such as China. The central educational authorities in China keep close watch on school leaving qualifications, textbooks, and curriculum; and while there is some tolerance for diversity, it is quite limited (Bray, 1999). Much more leeway is allowed in higher education (Hawkins, 1999; Mok, 1998). Within the 9-year compulsory cycle the Ministry of Education maintains central control in core subject areas and areas where they have a particular interest (such as moral–political education) (Hawkins, 1999; Hawkins, Zhou, & Lee, 2001). A nationwide curriculum framework was drafted in 1992 and implemented in 1993. Most courses are compulsory with some options at the junior secondary level. While this effort was principally carried out by central authorities, certain components were developed jointly between central and local authorities under the policy that “local authorities will also undertake some responsibility” for curriculum development (State Education Commission, 1994). Despite efforts to engage in joint curriculum development, criticism has mounted in recent years that the overcentralization of academic programming is damaging China’s efforts to provide innovative and up-to-date courses particularly at the precollegiate level. At a recent OECD (Organization for Economic and Cultural Development) conference in Hong Kong mainland academics openly complained that the rigidity with which the Ministry of Education maintains control over course content and the curriculum in general is setting China back in the areas of science and math education. They maintain that the MOE maintains central files of all courses, and that making any sort of change in the curriculum is a long and arduous process (Yeung, 2001). Course content, class timetables and even the printing of diplomas are all controlled by the MOE. According to one scholar at the conference, “this shows the government has no confidence in our institutions” (Ready, 2001, p. 1). What decentralization has occurred has been in the context of a shift in focus for precollegiate education, away from the exam centered model, the 100 mark system of grading and toward what has variously been described as “quality education” (Xinhua, July 16, 1997a; Xinhua, November 25, 1997c,d). Flexibility to introduce new subjects at the local level appear to be limited to aesthetic education programs such as art, music, singing, sports, vocational skills, and, of course, anything to do with computers (Cui, June 2, 1999a, June 3, 1999b; Xinhua, November 23, 1997b). Even so, the central authorities sets standards and provides guidance on how these new subjects should be developed (Xinhua, July 16, 1997a).2 Partly in response to criticism that the system is too rigidly controlled by the MOE, a new national curriculum is in the works that allows for slightly more input from teachers, students, and other stakeholders (MOE maintains control over 80% of curriculum, allowing local schools to innovate on 20% of courses) and will introduce more interdisciplinary courses and flexibility for teachers to innovate (Curriculum reform, 2001; Curriculum system, 2001). At the very least, China’s educators hope that these new measures will

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result in a curriculum interesting enough to keep students awake in class (Yeung & Cheung, 2001). And finally, the newly developed private schools appear to be able to deviate further from SEC approved curricula but again, primarily in selected areas (computers and foreign languages) (Mok, 1997). The area of teacher education is another that has experienced limited decentralization. Several teacher education institutions have responded to the educational reforms by altering the methods of preparing teachers, for example by introducing the 3 + 1 approach (3 years of academic discipline oriented education and 1 year of teacher training) and by developing “hot” programs and topics such as accounting, business administration, foreign languages, tourism, and business communication (Shen, 1994). But as one insider noted, “the Commission on Education has no intention of giving up the independent teacher education system (normal universities, shifandaxue) and believes that the latter is still an effective mechanism to train teachers” (Shen, 1994, p. 68). It thus appears that while the dominant political–economic climate is moving toward marketization, and significant progress has been made in educational decentralization, the areas of teacher preparation and curriculum control remain rather highly centralized. One result is that prospective teacher applicants are moving on to other opportunities rather than entering the teaching profession (Ma, 2005; Shen, 1994). 5.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

As has been noted above, fiscal decentralization was a prime motive for educational decentralization. However as Cheng notes, “The beauties of decentralization— participation, community involvement, local sensitivity, and all that—have occurred in the Chinese reform. However, such benefits often occurred independent of intent” (Cheng, 1997, p. 396). Even the fiscal elements of decentralization have been in some cases costly. One major study concluded that, “We find that a higher degree of fiscal decentralization of government spending is associated with lower provincial economic growth over the past fifteen years. This is a significant and robust finding” (Tao & Zhou, 1998, p. 221). Variation in provincial resources has a strong effect on the benefits of fiscal decentralization. Decentralization seems to be working well if the locality is already doing well economically. Poorer areas are wishing that the state were more involved. Articles have appeared that call for the county and central authorities to pick up more of the cost and management of education, which would represent a major reversal of decentralization leading to recentralization (Cheng, 1994, p. 268). In higher education, another form of recentralization is occurring through the institutional amalgamation and national consortium efforts. Creating larger and more sophisticated institutions has required a greater degree of central control thus negating some of the earlier higher education decentralization practices. Problems include partners being put together against their will, academic drift as a result of smaller colleges being absorbed by larger institutions, narrower range of teaching and research activities to achieve economies of scale, and lower staff morale and academic quality (Fang, 1998). The Chinese state appears to be caught between a centralist, corporatist ideology (Leninism) and an economic market movement toward decentralization, which is dragging other social sectors, such as education, along.

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This contradiction has been recognized at the very highest levels and among educators. Zhu Rongji has stated that there remains a continuing problem of disengaging the huge government bureaucracy from local management decentralization reforms (Xinhua, July 23, 1999). Government cadres continue to meddle in local reforms in efforts to hang on to power. “Delegating power and conceding profits” has clearly resulted in some economic gains but also has created economic fiefdoms and regional protectionism (Inside Mainland China, 1997, p. 1). CPC cadres are being charged with attempting to “recover planned economics style power” and basically recentralizing power at the local level (Inside Mainland China, 1997, p. 2). This has resulted in the creation of redundant bureaucracies with numerous laws and regulations that in fact inhibit individuals and enterprises seeking to take advantage of the devolution of power and authority by Beijing in such areas as education. Educators have also spoken out on the lack of progress in educational decentralization. At a conference held in Beijing by the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference, it was noted that the SEC was the “most conservative of all the ministries and commissions” (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1998, p. 2). The SEC is characterized as being backward and rooted in the planned economy mode, basically maintaining a monopoly on educational matters. It was noted that “the scale of enrollment and details of specialties, teaching materials, and curricula of all schools are managed and controlled uniformly” (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1998). The Ministry of Education, which replaced the SEC has been more open to change but is also regarded as conservative (Ma, 2005). How much decentralization reforms have contributed to a decline in attainment, literacy and other educational measures is also an area of debate. Some scholars have argued that the fiscal reforms may have had a negative effect on educational attainment as measured by enrollments, rural–urban disparities, and drop-out rates (Bakken, 1988; Lo, 1994; Pepper, 1990). A more recent quantitative study, however, suggests a more complicated picture (Tsui, 1997). Regional disparities indeed exist, “In the post-Mao era of fiscal decentralization there has been a strong incentive for local governments to invest in projects which can quickly earn profits and generate tax revenues . . . with the result that investment in education has been a low priority” (Tsui, 1997, p. 108). Yet, it does not appear that there has been an overall decline in enrollments and attendance in primary and lower-secondary schools. Nor is there any strong evidence to suggest that literacy has suffered as a result of the reforms although the Chinese government seems concerned about it (State Education Commission, 1994; Tsui, 1997). Tsui’s study presents a complex picture of the effect of the fiscal and educational decentralization on educational attainment arguing that one must not deduce regional and interregional problems for national problems. Nevertheless, he concludes, “in absolute terms, there are still many children who cannot go to school for various reasons” (Tsui, 1997, p. 127). This is especially true for rural girls who are being kept out of school more than boys and who drop-out at a higher rate (China, 1999). That State Council has also demonstrated its concern that all is not well with the decentralization of basic education and has identified management, funding and teacher education as areas in need of improvement (State Council, 2001). The rising number of private schools has also been a cause for alarm among China’s educational leaders. In 1997, the State Council issued a document entitled: “Stipulations for Schools Run Through the Energies of Society” (Inside Mainland

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China, 1998). Unwilling to use the term “private” schools, these schools were known officially by the rather awkward phrase: “schools run through the energies of society, and now by translating min ban to the phrase, “ non governmental schools”.” Among the problems identified by educational officials are that many of these schools are only for the rich, they deviate excessively from the approved state curriculum, school administrators do not follow the approved regulations, there is too much emphasis on turning a profit, and they follow a “patriarchal” management style (i.e. tyrannical) (Inside Mainland China, 1998, p. 3). This has been changing as a new, younger leadership group is emerging.

6.

CONCLUSION

What can be said about China’s educational reforms and decentralization effects? Have they been successful, unsuccessful? Going back to Hanson (this volume) and Bray (1999), it seems clear at this stage that China’s decentralization fits the general definition of a transfer of authority (particularly financial) and decision-making from higher to lower levels, but it is less clear whether this is a complete devolution or more of a delegation of authority. Decentralization in China appears to have characteristics of both. The center keeps close watch on the changes that have taken place and in a corporatist political economy, with a single dominant party retaining Maoist and Leninist aspects, it is unlikely that a genuine devolution of authority can take place. And one might question whether it should at this stage in China’s development. China, unlike other socialist states in transition, has moved cautiously in all of its efforts to disengage the state from various aspects of Chinese society and as a result has avoided some of the catastrophic problems other nations have faced. Decentralization per se is not necessarily a good thing. There is a role for central government to play during a transitional period that helps maintain stability and resolve regional inequities. Yet, the reduced visibility and participation of the central state in educational matters has changed the way local citizens, particularly in the rural areas, view the state. The very term “state” is much more vague now, leading some scholars to conclude that the legitimacy of the state has eroded: “. . . the state is continuously undermining its old foundations of legitimacy. It is also continuously nurturing a new kind of legitimacy which makes decentralization irreversible” (Cheng, 1994, p. 267). In the long run, this may be true. but as was shown in the recentralization of the tax process, the state can quickly reassert itself. There is mounting concern in Beijing about the quality of schooling, particularly private schools, and the Ministry of Education is defensive about a perception that decentralized education is superior to the former state-controlled model. The central authorities just do not have the financial resources any longer to run everything. What is emerging is a complex mix of precollegiate schooling opportunities with the state providing “guidance,” rules, and regulations to the three tiered system: public–state supported schools, public–community-run schools (minban), and variations of private schools. And in higher education, so-called minban colleges and universities are increasingly playing a larger role in China’s overall effort to expand higher education opportunities (Quddis, 2000).

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Thus in a nation as large and disparate as China it is difficult to reach any specific conclusions as to what has worked and what has not worked in the current educational reform movement. Decentralization seems to be working in some selected areas and not working in others. The central authorities seem conflicted about how much authority and responsibility they want to devolve to the local level, and CPC cadres operating at the local level have created recentralized regimes of their own. What does seem clear is that there are both strengths and weaknesses to China’s approach to decentralization, and it remains to be seen what specific strategies will be used to resolve some of these contradictions. As we enter 2005 and China begins to take its place as a leading force in the world—joining WTO, hosting the Olympics, seeking to be the principal regional leader in Asia—educational decentralization seems to be driven less by a desire for real educational change and more by a desire to make the nation appear to be like other leading powers. The ambiguity seen in educational decentralization reforms thus far means that we are likely to witness more of a rather awkward balancing act of “walking on three legs.” NOTES 1. Project 211 is aimed at providing the country with a cadre of high level human resources and enhance overall international competitiveness. Hundred institutions are being targeted to focus on national strategic goals in science and technology. 2. An interesting variant of curricular decentralization is a program initiated by the SEC to encourage primary and middle school teachers to develop innovative teaching soft-ware and send it to the Textbook Department of the SEC for possible inclusion in officially approved curricula (Cui, 1999, July 15).

7.

REFERENCES

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Cui, N. (1999a, June 2). Guizhou schools try new approaches. China Daily, 1. Cui, N. (1999b, June 3). Hunan schools provide example. China Daily, 1. Cui, N. (1999c, June 11). County develops education. China Daily, 1. Cui, N. (1999d, July 15). Software to push education. China Daily, 1. Current Issues in Chinese Higher Education, 2001. Paris: OECD. Curriculum reform to open new courses in autumn semester, 2001, People’s Daily Online, August 8. Curriculum system to see changes in primary and middle schools, 2001, China Daily Online, January 9. Fang, Z. (1998, February 5). A remarkable move of restructuring: Chinese higher education. Education Policy Analysts Archives, 6(5), 13–27. Fang, S., Zhang, L., & Zhang, X. (2001, August 16). Public spending spurs growth. China Daily. Fu, Z. (2001, April 14). College kid generation comes of age. South China Morning Post, 1. Hanson, M. E. (1993). Strategies of educational decentralization: Key questions and core issues. Journal of Educational Administration, 36(2), 111–128. Hawkins, J. E. (1973, Fall 1973). Deschooling society Chinese style: Alternative forms of non-formal education. Educational studies, 1–10. Hawkins, J. N. (1999). Recent higher education reform in China: Problems and prospects. ESTP Conference Proceedings. Paris: ESTP Press. Hawkins, J. N., Zhou, N. Z., & Lee, J. (2001). Balancing the collective and the individual: Values education in China. In W. Cummings, T. Tatto, and J. Hawkins (Eds.), Values education for dynamic societies: Individualism or collectivism. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Inside Mainland China. (1997, October 1). The role of local party and government agencies after delegating power and conceding profits, pp. 1–3. Inside Mainland China. (1998, October 1). Problems for private schools, pp. 1–4. Ji, B. (2000, December 22). Education must be reformed. China Daily, 1. Jiang stresses role of non-state sector, 2001, China Daily, March 5. Kwong, J. (1996). Introduction. Chinese Education, 29(5), 3–6. Lin, J. (1997). Introduction. Chinese Education, 30(1), 3–7. Lo, L. N. (1994). The changing education system: Dilemma of disparity. In J. Cheng and F. Brosseau (Eds.), China Review 1993. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Lu, C. (2000, February 26). Brain drain fears arise over foreign study allure. China Daily, 1. Ma, W. H. (2005). Globalization and paradigm change in higher education: A case analysis of China, Unpublished paper given at the conference on new educational paradigms, East West Center, September, 2004. Minnesota private college council leads trade mission: Delegation aims to advance Chinese private education systems, 2001, PR Newswire, November 1. Mok, K. H. (1997). Retreat of the state: Marketization of education in the Pearl River Delta. Comparative Education Review, 41(3), 260–276. Mok, K. H., & Wat, K. Y. (1998). Merging of the public and private boundary: Education and the market place in China. Journal of Educational Development, 18(3), 255–267. NPC Vice Chairwoman Peng stresses basic education for rural areas, 2001, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political, March 12. Oi, J. C. (1995). The role of the local state in China’s transitional economy. The China Quarterly, 1132–1149. Oi, J. C. (1999). Rural China takes off: Institutional foundations of economic reform. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pepper, S. (1990). China’s education reform in the 1980s. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies. Premier calls for breakthrough in basic education reform, 2001, People’s Daily, June 14, p. 2. Project 211: A brief introduction, 2001, China Education and Research Network (CERNET), August 3. Quiddis, M. (2000, July). The world-wide movement in private universities. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 59(3). Reform of China’s Educational Structure—Decision of the CPC Central Committee, 1985. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Shen, A. (1994). Teacher education and national development in China. Journal of Education, 176(2), 57–71. Solinger, D. J. (1999). Contesting citizenship in urban China: Peasants, migrants, the state and the logic of the market. Berkeley: University of California Press. State council issues decision on basic education reform, 2001, Xinhua News Agency, June 14. State Education Commission. (1994). The development and reform of education in China. Beijing, China, p. 53.

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Tang, M. (1999). Public schools cannot meet people’s demands for education: Private institutions win support, June 19, p. 1. Tao, Z., & Zhou, H. F. (1998). Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic growth in China. Journal of Public Economics, 67(2), 221–240. Tatto, M. T. (1999). Education reform and state power in Mexico: The paradoxes of decentralization. Comparative Education Review, 43(3), 251–282. Tsui, K. Y. (1997). Economic reform and attainment in basic education in China. China Quarterly, 104–127. Vice Premier. (2001, June 12). Education reforms should be deepened. China Daily, 1. Wu, Y. (2000, December 29). Educational reform refined for 2001. China Daily. Xin, X. (1984, April 9). Peasants run their own schools. Beijing Review, 4–5. Xin, Z. (2001, March 7). Tax reform not to affect education. China Daily, 1. Xinhua. (1995, May 27). China to reform senior high schools, pp. 1–2. Xinhua. (1997a, July 16). China reforms elementary education. Xinhua. (1997b, November 23). New curriculum popular among pupils, pp. 1–2. Xinhua. (1997c, November 25). Government pays for education in China, pp. 1–2. Xinhua. (1997d, November 25). Vice premier discusses role of education in economic growth, pp. 1–2. Xinhua. (1999, July 23). Premier addresses meeting on local government structural reform. Xinhua. (2001a, July 7). Private food and dormitory services available. Xinhua. (2001b, July 10). National unified exams still necessary. Yeung, L. (2001, February 3). Mainland academics demand greater autonomy and funding. South China Morning Post. Yeung, L., & Cheung G. (2001, January 13). Wake up call for sleepy students: Professors want to put a stop to dozing off in class. South China Morning Post. Zweig, D. (2001, March/April). China’s stalled ‘fifth wave’—Zhu Rongji’s reform package of 1998–2000. Asian Survey, XLI(2), 231–247.

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Chapter 3 THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF DECENTRALIZATION POLICY ON SCHOOL AUTONOMY IN GUANGDONG PROVINCE OF CHINA Jocelyn Lai-ngok Wong

1.

INTRODUCTION

The decision to decentralize education systems is often predicated on the assumption that such a move will enhance the autonomy of local schools. According to this line of reasoning, in a decentralized system, schools will use their heightened authority to make curricular content more relevant to local interests and demands. Such discussions, however, have largely ignored local interpretation of decentralization policies. It is important and necessary to examine educational decentralization policies from the local perspective, for the ways in which local education stakeholders understand, interpret, and react to policy changes will have a direct impact on their implementation in the schools. China has been experimenting with educational decentralization for almost two decades. Financial considerations have provided the primary motive for decentralizing the Chinese educational system. The state, which has been struggling to provide adequate funds for the nation’s schools, has been searching for new financial and administrative models (Bray, 2003; Hawkins, 2000; Paine, 1998). To this end, transferring the fiscal burdens from the central government to the local level (which includes several levels of local government, communities, individuals, and even the private sector), was viewed as a means of remedying the nation’s financial problems. It is interesting to note that while the primary catalyst for educational decentralization in the West has been the New Right Ideology, the allure of marketization in education has driven the Chinese government’s policy shift. Interestingly, research on educational reform in China has not devoted significant attention to the voices of principals and teachers. This study, in contrast, takes a close look at how principals and teachers from seven schools in Guangdong Province viewed and interpreted decentralization policies designed to promote local school autonomy. I explore individual interpretations of educational reforms, and link the individual dimension of this process to larger issues related to state control and market principles in the education sector. In this chapter, I examine the extent to which autonomy is transferred to the school level, as well as the mechanisms the state has utilized in attempt to augment its own authority. Another factor I explore is the link between culture and educational practice. Previously published research on educational decentralization has tended to avoid consideration of the cultural dimensions of policy implementation. As I will show, China’s unique cultural heritage 43 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 43–58.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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has had an important influence on the ways that education stakeholders interpret and implement decentralization policies. 2.

THEORETICAL CONTEXT

Decentralization in education has been one of the major components of global educational policy direction since the early 1980s. It has been treated by many as a panacea that will lead to improvements in the quality of education. Such claims rest upon the assumption that the delegation of power can establish closer linkages between schools and other educational stakeholders, and curricular content will become more relevant to local demands and resources (e.g., see Elmore, 1993; Levin, 1998; Patrinos & Ariasingam, 1997; Rhoten, 2000; Tracy, 1997). A decentralized education system, therefore, respond to local markets. It is also expected that students’ performance can be improved when local institutions are granted more autonomy over their affairs (Bulkley, 2002; Sharpe, 1996). Research suggests that several beneficial effects can be achieved if autonomy of schools is increased. First, strong professional communities can be developed as teachers assume more active roles in defining their working environments and professional development plans (Briggs & Wohlstetter, 2003; Eilason, 1996). Second, school autonomy appears to provide an impetus for mobilizing local resources with the aim of resolving the financial straits of local education (Bray & Borevskaya, 2001). Third, school autonomy facilitates closer ties between schools and school districts. Schools are then prepared to respond positively and react quickly to market demands and changing local needs (Astiz et al., 2002; Murphy, 1991). As the educational content is made relevant to local conditions and schools are held accountable to clients’ needs, schools are assumed to have more power to cope with their unique problems (Levin, 1998; Patrinos & Ariasingam, 1997). Some scholars, however, believe that there is still a distance to go before accepting these conclusions (e.g., Green, 1997, 1999; Helsby, 1999; Helsby & McCulloch, 1996; Whitty & Power, 2002). Scholars such as Ball (1994, 1999), Halsey et al. (1997), Helsby (1999), and Whitty and coworkers (1997a,b, 1998, 2002) have examined the issue of educational decentralization on a macro-structural level, and view the shift in policy as a combination of state control and market driven values. They regard decentralization in education not as a means of improving system productivity; instead, decentralization is considered a “governance strategy” the state may employ to uphold its legitimacy, and to recentralize its control over the schools (e.g., Benveniste, 2002; Dale, 1997; Hawkins, 2000; Karlsen, 2000; Leung, 2003; Tracy, 1997). This research literature raises some important questions about the assumption that educational decentralization will increase local school autonomy. Several studies have cast doubts on relations between decentralization policy and school autonomy. Thus far, there is still little evidence that an expansion of the decision-making power of schools will result from delegating power from the top. Increasing school autonomy may be a symbolic response that actually functions to quiet conflict and restore confidence (Malen, Ogawa, & Kranz, 1990a,b). This perspective is particularly prevalent in studies that examine links between educational decentralization and political reform (e.g., see Bjork, 2003; Bray & Borevskaya, 2001; Hanson, 1990, 1995, 1997; Lundahl, 2002; McGinn & Street, 1986; Ornelas, 2000;

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Tatto, 1999; Tracy, 1997). Decentralization in education is not only an instrument to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of education systems, but also a mechanism for managing conflict and maintaining the legitimacy of modern states (Benveniste, 2002; Fiske, 1996; Weiler, 1989, 1990). Stated simply, decentralization in education, as Karlsen (2000) argues, can be perceived as a way to transmit conflicts and problems from the central to periphery and to reestablish legitimate authority of the state. Recently, the study of decentralization policies in education has been situated in the context of New Right Movements in the West. Devolution of authority to schools and the introduction of school-based management have been accompanied by a managerial revolution of the New Right Ideology. This body of research highlights two interesting characteristics of recent devolutions of authority. First, there has been a steady increase in the transfer of financial and managerial control over schools to local levels (either schools or parents). Second, centrally defined goals often continue to influence what schools teach and how their performance is assessed (e.g., Helsby, 1999; Whitty, Power, & Halpin, 1998). Because most governments in the West are attempting to transfer educational responsibilities, especially fiscal burdens, to local communities and parents, decentralization constitutes a way of maintaining standards of education within an affordable budget (Halsey et al., 1997). As entrepreneurial cultures to adopt market principals and business management models, education is treated as a private good rather than a social responsibility (Whitty, 1997a). Business concepts, such as “scientific management,” “client-based service,” “effectiveness,” and “efficiency” all encourage the creation of competitive cultures within schools. Perhaps more importantly, a recent trend of decentralization in the West is the pairing of transfers of power to individual schools with even stricter central controls (e.g., see studies from Apple, 2000; Ball, 1994; McCulloch, Helsby, & Knight, 2000; Whitty, Power, & Halpin, 1998). A series of performance indicators, such as “examination league tables,” “inspections,” and “appraisals” are employed to assess school performance. In other words, the state applies task-setting and goal-oriented approaches, but also devolves responsibility for goal achievement through the schoolbased management system to maintain its control on the education sector (Ball, 1998; Fergusson, 2000; Helsby, 1999; Menter & Muschamp, 1999). Educational decentralization may therefore lead to increased bureaucratic control over schools through standardization and evaluation (Apple, 2001; Majhanovich, 2003; Whitty & Power, 2002; Whitty, Power, & Halpin, 1998). Devolution of responsibility in education can lead to the “devolution of blame” (Whitty, Power, & Halpin, 1998, p. 113) and assignment of “the blame for cutbacks” to individual schools (Angus, 1994). Educational decentralization in the West can be viewed as primarily rhetorical, concealing the fact that the state is gradually retreating from its fiscal responsibility, transferring this burden to the general public through market mechanisms. Such policy changes may actually result in a reconcentration of power within the state. That is, the process of decentralization in education is accompanied by the notion of recentralization (Bulkley, 2002; Hawkins, 2000; Ornelas, 2000). Karlsen (2000) calls situations in which power remains in the hands of the central after decentralization policies have been adopted “decentralized centralism.” Given these perspectives, the notion of allowing a high level of school autonomy within the context of decentralization has been called into question. Self-management of schools can be viewed as a mechanism for delivering reforms rather than a vehicle

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for promoting initiative and innovation because the state maintains control “over the discourse of self management and over the indicators of performance rather than over practice” (Ball, 1994, p. 80). As Chitty and Lawn (1995) argued, “schools rarely have unlimited autonomy without regard to system-wide policy parameters and agreed national standards” (p. 141). Therefore, it is necessary to examine carefully what decisions are assigned to the school level before instituting decentralization in education. 3.

METHODOLOGY

This study presents principals’ views and teachers’ perceptions toward school autonomy. The data are derived from 75 interviews with educators working in seven schools located in Guangzhou, Panyu, Shenzhen, and Conghua, all of which are urban areas of Guangdong Province, China. The reasons for choosing Guangdong Province as the research locality for this study are twofold. First, Guangdong Province has been ranked as one of the most affluent provinces in China, and has experienced a significant economic boom over the last two decades. Recent economic growth has created concern among local communities and government bodies related to the schools’ ability to respond to new market demands. Second, Guangdong families’ investment in education has been increasing steadily, and the average annual income is higher than in most other provinces. This has lead to increasing marketization of education, a trend that has persisted over the last decade. The seven schools in this study included two key point (elite) grammar schools (Schools K1 and K2), one vocational school (School V), one regular grammar school (School N), and three high-fee paying private schools (Schools P1, P2, and P3). All public schools studied were recommended by local education bureaus, and the three private schools were selected based on recommendations from personal contacts. I conducted a total of 75 interviews. Most interviewees were chosen from a pool of teachers recommended by school administrators; 9 were principals or vice principals, and 28 were responsible for school administration. Sixty of the interviewees came from inland China. Semi-structured and informal interviews were used during the data collection process. All semi-structured interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded for data analysis. The coding process involved three steps: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 4.

AN INCREASE OF SCHOOL AUTONOMY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF DECENTRALIZATION

Since the state has steadily reduced its financial responsibilities for education in China over the last two decades, it is important to investigate whether this shift in policy has been accompanied by an increase in the level of autonomy delivered to schools. The discussion below will be framed using the table below (Table 3.1), which draws from Dale’s ideas (1997) about educational governance. Attention to the factors included in the table will help to clarify whether or not schools have been granted more authority as a result of the educational decentralization policies implemented in Guangdong, China.

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Table 3.1: Governance Activities in Education and Related Coordinating Institutions Coordinating Institutions Governance Activities

School Matters

Funding

School finance

Regulation

Educational goals School management Personnel and staffing

Provision/delivery

Curriculum setting Student recruitment

State

Market

Community

Note: Modified from Dale (1997, p. 275).

4.1.

Funding: School Finance

One unique feature of China’s approach to educational decentralization is that public schools have their own channels, which are named “creation of income” (chuangshou), for generating the revenue to cover approximately 20% of their expenses. Accepting extra students beyond the official quotas seems to be the most popular way of improving the financial status of the public schools I studied. Generally speaking, parents are willing to pay sponsorship fees to schools that are willing to accept their children for admission—even if they do not meet the schools’ entrance requirements. This acceptance channel is called “out of plan” (jiwaisheng). These students are not only an important financial source for schools; they also create linkages between the outside sectors and the schools. Schools have the final say about who will be accepted through the “out of plan” channel. As one teacher explained, “Even though parents are ready to pay for it, our school has the ultimate selection power to choose who will be accepted [through the ‘out of plan’ channel]” (Interview N-5). Running income-producing business provides schools with another way to increase their financial resources. Two of the public schools I studied, Schools V and N, have employed this strategy. School V has established three computer technology companies. A portion of the profits generated by these three companies is allocated to the school’s operating budget. School N rents its premises out to generate additional income. The educational funding mechanisms used by private schools are completely different from those relied on by public ones. Educational debentures were the predominant mode of private education funding in Guangdong during 1990s (Bao, 1998). School P3 was a pioneer of the debenture system. Deposits from parents were invested in the business sector, and the profits were used to improve the school’s financial situation. After 1999, the private schools studied gradually shifted from the debenture system to a fee paying system due to two factors: the economic downturn in China after the economic recession in Asia; and the Guangdong Provincial Education Department’s prohibition of school use of the debenture system. There are some other ways that private schools can secure their financial health. For example, the Director of school P3, who is also the founder of the school, established his school as a company in the stock market in Shanghai as a way to invigorate its fiscal position. All in all, schools’ autonomy over financial matters has increased significantly in both public and private institutions as a result of the government’s promotion of educational decentralization. Local communities and the market have also influenced the funding of educational institutions. Education now seems to be treated as a

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commodity (Chan, 2003). The state’s retreat from the provision of welfare services has led to the acceptance of “self-financed” and “high-priced” students, regardless of their academic performance (Lo, 1993). Allowing schools the autonomy to accept self-financed students, as Paine (1998) points out, can provide schools with additional fees or student places they can trade with nearby institutions. 4.2.

Regulation 1: Educational Goals

The ultimate educational goal in China is to improve the intellectual capabilities of school graduates so that the nation will be more competitive in the global marketplace. However, with permission from the local education departments, the public schools I studied could create their own goals. Local demand has led School F, for example, to focus on foreign language instruction. Another institutions, School V, has adopted the role of training a commercial labor force for the local business market. Given this situation, the power to make decisions related to the development plans for individual schools rests in the hands of local education departments rather than in the schools themselves. One teacher highlighted this situation: “These [educational goals] are set up by the provincial education department, and we have no power to say ‘no’ in this matter. We have to follow instructions from the education department” (Interview K2-3). Private schools have considerable autonomy in setting educational goals even though they are still regulated by education departments through the state’s promulgation of “The Provisional Regulations on Social Forces Running Schools” (1997) (hereafter “Provisional Regulations”). Private schools often have an explicit business agenda behind their educational goals. For example, School P1’s development was driven by a real estate business project. The school was created not to serve an educational need, but as a means of acquiring land from the local government that could be used for real estate development. School P1 actually used education to sell real estate. The principal of the school did not attempt to hide this situation: “We are using education for selling real estate. Then, the properties that we sell can improve our school’s developmental plan and education” (Interview P1-1). 4.3.

Regulation 2: School Management

Educational decentralization in China has led to the emergence of what is referred to as a “principal’s responsibility system” of school management. The implications of this system vary, depending on whether a school is public or private. Principals are now expected to have greater decision-making powers than in the past. In actuality, however, private school principals have limited power and authority when it comes to matters related to school operations. Unlike the public schools, where principals are perceived as the primary decision-makers in most school matters, Boards of Directors provide important input into the decision-making process at private schools. These Boards are often organized by the investment companies linked with private schools. Private schools generally experience more direct pressure to respond to the market, and their management practices reflect this. Three of the private schools I studied were actually set up by private business ventures. As I note above, School P1 was created by a real estate company for the purpose of obtaining land from the local

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government. The Board of Directs at School P1 includes only two members: the Director of that real estate company and an Education Officer from the company who is in charge of education matters at the school. The principal is not included on the Board. School P2 was founded by a real estate/entertainment company. The company used the school to acquire debentures from parents, which it then invested in its own business. The Board included only a company Chair, an Education Officer, and the Chief Principal of the school. The education officers are not actively involved in the daily operations of the school. Directors of business companies typically have the final say in all decisions made for the schools. As these examples suggest, the directors from the business companies—not the principals, teachers, or parents—have the final say over school matters. The boards of these companies operate independently from the academic departments of the schools, and are responsible for the administrative issues of the private schools they oversee. However, decisions made by the boards directly affect the daily operations of the academic departments. The directors of the boards tend to have more decisionmaking power than any school-based employees. As one teacher from School P1 observed, “Directors make all the decisions, and we have to follow their instructions” (Interview P1-6). Teachers and parents are excluded from these boards. The management style of private schools could therefore be described as “outsiders managing insiders.” 4.4.

Regulation 3: Staffing and Personnel

One positive development that has resulted from the adoption of educational decentralization policies in Guangdong, China has been increased flexibility in personnel matters. The Teacher Laws enacted in 1993 clearly state that schools and other educational institutions should gradually establish a “teachers’ employment system.” This system provides schools with the autonomy to independently recruit employees; schools are no longer solely dependent on employment arrangements established by the state. Graduates from universities or teachers colleges send their applications directly to the schools. Recruiting high quality teachers is regarded as an effective and important way to improve and sustain the academic status of schools, especially in the eyes of potential students. Both public and private schools in Guangdong, particularly in urban areas, are likely to offer financial incentives (such as salaries up to five times higher than those offered by inland schools) to recruit well-qualified teachers. Of the 12 educators I interviewed at School V, 6 also work as university lecturers; 3 of the 10 interviewees at School K1 are university lecturers from inland normal universities or teachers colleges. Highly regarded teachers also work in the private schools I studied. The principal of school P1, for example, is one of the best-known mathematics teachers in China and is known for his creative instructional methods. The principal of School P2 was ranked as one of the best performing principals in his hometown and has published several articles about Chinese language teaching. All of this supports the view that the quality of education for an entire province can be improved if schools are given more autonomy in over staffing issues. One key point school teacher highlighted the importance of recruiting well-qualified and experienced teachers from inland: “If a [non-local]

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teacher is selected, definitely the quality of that teacher should be very good. The academic standard of our school can be improved in this way” (Interview K2-6). Nevertheless, autonomy in staff recruitment of public schools is not unlimited. It is controlled by a quota system that is predetermined by local education departments. Schools use a variety of mechanisms to maximize their labor forces under the existing quota system. Firstly, schools have the flexibility to employ fewer teachers than the quotas require. Vacancies may be kept open until individuals considered to be suitable candidates apply for these positions. Secondly, public schools sometimes recruit part time staff as a way to improve the quality of teaching on their campuses. Thirdly, teachers in China are generally controlled by a “personnel record system” (renshi dangan), which requires that all teachers’ personal files (including curriculum vitae, resume, letter of release, assessment reports from leaders, personal evaluation records, etc.) be held at their original schools until principals and education departments officially approve their applications for transfers to other schools. Without these records, teachers are unlikely to obtain permanent teaching position in any state-funded institutions. Principals have the ultimate power to keep all these records, and can refuse to transfer the best performing teachers to other schools. Retaining human resources is thus perceived as a form of school autonomy. As one principal stated, “We have the autonomy to keep the teachers that we want” (Interview V-8). The implementation of the teachers’ employment system has created a great deal of stress for private school teachers. The annual teacher turnover rate at the three private schools I studied averaged 10%. This system helps some private schools to enhance the quality of their teaching force and to retain students. It also creates a great deal of pressure on private school teachers to improve their performance so as to secure their jobs. Although both public and private schools have been granted greater autonomy in the area of personnel and staffing as a result of recently adopted decentralized policies, the teachers’ employment system seems to have had a more substantial impact on private schools. 4.5.

Provision/Delivery 1: Curriculum Setting

One major feature of many of the educational decentralization policies designed in the West is the delegation of power over curricular matters to lower levels. This provides schools and teachers with more freedom to select and arrange the most appropriate curriculum to fit the needs of local communities and students. Since the mid-1980s, local curriculum planning has been permitted in China, but it consists of “one curriculum framework and multi edition textbooks” (yigangduoben) (Decisions, 1985; Outlines, 1993). Different versions of textbooks may be selected, but they must conform to a standard teaching framework, which is predetermined by central authorities. Individual schools do not enjoy ultimate power over the design of their curricula. Decisions about what is taught in schools are determined by an important underlying factor: pressure to prepare students for examinations. All of the public junior secondary schools studied have their own district examination “league tables.” Junior secondary school students are required to take district-based examinations each year. These examinations are designed by teachers from different schools in the same locality. The results are published in a format, known as a “league table,” that allows people to compare school performance by subject and grade level.

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Student performance on high school entrance examinations also has a direct impact on the status of schools. As a result, textbook selection and teaching content are driven by public examinations. This examination effect influences instruction in both public and private schools because the pursuit of academic excellence becomes an important avenue for upgrading the status of schools, particularly if they face serious market competition. In such situations, a high level of school autonomy in deciding curriculum is unlikely to occur. However, the schools I studied still have very limited autonomy over certain segments of the curriculum, such as foreign language studies (e.g., Japanese) and vocational subjects. In summary, the curriculum is mostly controlled by the state through the examination system. As the following quotation suggests, teachers continue to feel that their ability to influence curricular content is limited: “We have no right to do this [designing curriculum] because we need to follow the main stream” (Interview P16). In most schools, there is only minor input, or no input, from members of school communities. 4.6.

Provision/Delivery 2: Student Recruitment

Public schools in Guangdong now have more autonomy in the area of student recruitment than they did prior to the introduction of decentralization policies. As I mention above, although public examination results act as the most important mechanism for allocating students to different types of schools, underperforming students are sometimes accepted through the “out of plan” channel. These students, in fact, are commonly accepted to public schools, especially those designated as “key point” grammar schools. The number of “out of plan” students is regulated by a quota system set by local education departments, which limits the number of this type of student to a maximum of 10 students per class. In practice, however, schools do not always adhere to this quota system. Each class of School K2, for example, contains between 56 and 70 students, including an unknown amount of “out of plan” students. A vice principal at the school remarked that, “Our school has the autonomy to accept ‘out of plan’ students. This is our choice” (Interview K2-1). Student recruitment at private schools is almost entirely based on market competition. Private schools can recruit students from across the nation and overseas. School P3, for example, was one of the largest private schools in Guangdong, with almost 2,300 students. Students at the school came from Guangdong province, other regions of China, and Southeast Asia. Public schools do not have this luxury. In addition, they have to make decisions about student admissions based on examination results. As a result, the pool of candidates for private schools tends to be much larger than for public schools. 5.

WAYS FOR THE STATE TO UPHOLD ITS LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY AND POWER

The Chinese government believes that educational decentralization requires “a shift from the state education system to a state-community one” (Bray & Borevskaya, 2001, p. 358). It is assumed that such a shift will influence the extent of the state’s authority. This study shows that educational decentralization has increased the schools’ ability to determine certain aspects of school matters. However, the state still has

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the ultimate decision-making power over a variety of functions carried out in the schools. These include curriculum and textbook design, staffing control, and student recruitment through quota systems, all of which are a part of bureaucratic control from the state, as explained above. On the surface, it might seem that schools have more flexibility and autonomy in academic matters than in the past. However, this flexibility is quite limited. A principal observed that, “In our country, it is important for us to follow the laws and regulations set by the top” (Interview K2-3). Despite the fact that private schools now have the authority to generate funds, the state continues to use its political power and the legal system to regulate the private school system. One private school teacher summarized this situation as follows: “Most educational decisions are actions of the state. The state has the ultimate power” (Interview P2-4). Another observed that, “Everything has to depend on the top . . . the gatekeeper is the government” (Interview P2-2). Despite demonstrating public support for educational decentralization, the state also appears intent on protecting its own legitimacy. More importantly, the state has maintained the authority to assess the achievement of schools using league tables and, in turn, to provide rewards and punishments based on the schools’ performance. This tendency parallels the Western practice of combining financial devolution of the education system with “an increased control by means of measurement of output” (Bottery and Wright, 2000, p.16). Here, academic performance on examinations represents the output. The standardized examination system is a powerful device for controlling the schools I studied. For example, examination scores for all public schools are made available to the principals and teachers in district-based league tables. Examination results from each junior secondary school are disaggregated so that the academic achievement of each school can be compared. Scores are broken down by grade level. If a public school’s performance on these tests is considered unsatisfactory, the annual assessment mark of that school will be reduced, and the quota for student acceptance will be lowered. If the school does not remedy this situation, it will not be considered a progressive school (a label that can increase a school’s status). Private schools also focus on their students’ performance on exams out of an interest to sustain a competitive advantage in the market. Thus, the state now uses performance indicators to uphold, or enhance, its power over both types of schools. As Ball notes, such control over the indicators of performance and over self-management leaves the state “in the enviable position of having power without responsibility” (Ball, 1994, p. 81). As this discussion illustrates, schools do not make decisions about curricula in isolation. They must adhere to education goals set by the state, even if those objectives are not explicitly communicated to the schools. The public examinations are one tool that the state uses to control what is taught in the schools, whose public reputations depend to a great extent on the scores their students earn on the tests. In China, the examination is regarded as the most definitive measure of student, teacher, and school achievement. The state can retain its control over school practice through its manipulation of the assessments of each school, and thus restore its legitimate authority within a decentralized educational management system. This pattern is likely to be repeated in Guangdong Province, with the state maintaining its authority through bureaucratic control and oversight of public school examinations. Rather than relying on a detailed set of regulations to uphold its legitimacy, the state accomplishes

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this through the goals it sets for the schools. In the schools that I studied, the state continued to demonstrate significant authority, with the market and the community providing only limited input. This represents a process of recentralization of power, even though certain managing tasks and funding responsibilities have been delegated to the local level. More significantly, this study shows that educational decentralization in Guangdong, at this stage, is simply instrumental. The state has used education policy to transfer fiscal responsibility, and certain aspects of managing tasks, to subordinate educational stakeholders in attempt to improve system effectiveness. As Chan argues, the state does not intend to make “an ideological shift to managerialism and its practices” (Chan, 2003, p. 95). In other words, the expanded market force in the education sector does not lessen the state control due to the fact that the state has carefully ensured that ultimate control is increasingly vested at its hand. 6.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTS OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION POLICY IN CHINA

Two additional factors have influenced the ways in which the schools in this study put the educational decentralization policy into practice. 6.1.

Cultural Factors: Interpersonal Relationship (guanxi)

Discussions of educational decentralization in the West generally exclude the cultural dimension and its implications for policy change. This study indicates that culture extends an important influence over the content and outcomes of educational decentralization policies in China. Chinese respect for guanxi (interpersonal relationship) seems to be particularly significant. Principals now need to find a number of ways for generating revenue to compensate for inadequate funding from the state. From the principals’ perspective, having good relationships with other education stakeholders, such as the government, parents, and tertiary institutions, is necessary and important. Accepting “out of plan” students can help principals expand their social networks. Accordingly, principals’ personal ties and relationships with other educational stakeholders, rather than their management skills, have become a decisive factor that significantly influences the ways principals in China oversee their schools. Schools now use guanxi to resolve a wide-range school issues. As Delany and Paine (1991) observe, guanxi reinforces connections between principals and other parties that participate in educational matters. Indeed, guanxi has been a crucial factor as autonomy is reshaped at the school level. Moreover, leaders in China commonly act as clan leaders, offering comprehensive support to the employees they oversee. Walder (1983, 1986) observed factory workers in China and concluded that they are highly dependent on their supervisors for satisfaction of their personal needs. In return, workers rely on the leaders of their organizations to fulfill wide-ranging needs, and a dependency culture has been institutionalized. This kind of patron–client organizational climate also exists in schools. Approaches to the staffing of public schools provide one example of this. The Teacher Laws of 1993 clearly state that schools and other educational institutions are permitted

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to dismiss incompetent staff. Three public school principals I interviewed, however, believed that this policy is still far from binding. It is unlikely for a principal to lay off an underperforming employee because, as clan leaders, they need to take teachers’ family financial issues into consideration. This patron–client relationship, thus, is perceived as a stumbling block toward accomplishing a new staffing policy because the concept of organizational dependency is still rooted deeply in public schools. Perhaps more importantly, this also helps to explain why teachers in China generally accept a top-down model of management, as the relationship between principals and teachers is based on patron–client dependency. As Pye (1995) argues, guanxi plays a “fundamental but concealed role” in shaping Chinese society. Therefore, any further examination of educational decentralization in China needs to take into consideration the effects of this on policy implementation. 6.2.

Teachers’ Views Toward Decentralization in Education

This study shows that an educational decentralization policy has not provided a supportive climate for teachers in China, who are on the front line of educational reforms, to develop strategies for responding to the current policy environment. In other words, educational decentralization has not brought a new vision of educational management. Teachers appear not to derive substantial benefits from the recent policy shift. In fact, the instructors I interviewed experienced fear, anxiety, and nervousness as a result of their increased workload. This, in turn, augmented teachers’ reluctance to accept the new power offered to them as a result of the policy shift. As yet, such a change has not stimulated teachers to become more involved in school matters. As one teacher related, “If you want teachers to have more power, they may not accept such an offer. Most of us believe that the ‘less trouble the better.’ Then, we do just enough work to get by. If I have power to make decisions, I will spend more time doing this” (Interview V11). Educational decentralization policy in China has not encouraged teachers to have more say in matters related to school operation. The working environment for teachers continues to follow a top-down bureaucratic approach that limits the growth of democratization in the schools. For the majority of teachers who took part in this study, participation is just a formality. They believe that decisions are carefully regulated by the state. The teachers I spoke with often communicated a sense of powerlessness, as the following comments suggest: “Teachers are only responsible for teaching. We have no voice in administrative work” (Interview N3). “I have no power to make any change. We have no power to make decisions” (Interview P1-2). “Frankly speaking, we don’t have much power . . . though we have a Teachers’ Representative Committee in our school, it doesn’t change a lot” (Interview K2-4). “The teachers’ union only has a symbolic function and cannot reflect the real ideas of teachers. It is really sad” (Interview V6).

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At the same time, teachers have been required to adjust to new roles and duties that have emerged in conjunction with the introduction of decentralization policies and the increased influence of the market. They are generally inclined to follow bureaucratic instruction from the top instead of following their own professional judgment. 7.

CONCLUSION

As is true in many Western countries, education in China is gravitating toward decentralization through features such as strong state apparatus and market mechanism. Due to cutbacks in funding for education, the state has gradually delegated fiscal responsibility in education to local communities and individuals. The education system is shifting from a state monopoly to a mixed economy (Mok, 2000). In reviewing the issue of school autonomy in Guangdong, China, it becomes clear that the educational decentralization policy in China represents “controlled decentralization” (Hadden, 1980); the education system remains under the administrative control of the state. The introduction of decentralization policies has not completely eroded the state’s decision-making power. Despite emerging marketization and privatization in the education system, it retains a top-down, state-determined approach to the delivery of educational services. The promotion of educational decentralization policy has not caused any dramatic changes in the authority of the central government. On the contrary, the state has utilized decentralization policy to recentralize its power and authority through indirect control. In other words, educational decentralization represents a mixture of strong state control and minor input from the market and from local communities. Educational decentralization has made it possible for the state to transfer fiscal responsibility and management tasks to subordinate educational stakeholders without granting them any real power. The state has not introduced any new visions of education in conjunction with its educational decentralization project. In this sense, the autonomy of schools only exists to a limited degree, with schools controlled by quota systems, standardized curricula, and assessment systems. At this stage, an increase of school autonomy within the context of decentralization is a myth rather than a reality. More importantly, the state has introduced decentralization policies without lessening its control. It shows no signs of implementing ideological changes in the management of schools. Last but not least, this study shows that teachers’ interpersonal relationships and views on the policy shift have shaped the implementation and effects of the educational decentralization policy in the Guangdong context. 8.

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Chapter 4 LIMITED DECENTRALIZATION IN THE SINGAPORE EDUCATION SYSTEM Jason Tan

1.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on decentralization initiatives that have taken place in the Singapore education system over the past two decades. These include the encouragement of greater school autonomy through the independent schools scheme, the autonomous schools scheme, and school clusters. Another initiative has been the promotion of aggressive inter-school competition through the annual publication of school ranking league tables and the institution of school quality awards. This sort of competition is supposed to promote diversity and choice and to improve overall educational standards. The chapter begins by discussing the goals of the various initiatives and proceeds to analyze their impact. The Singapore case exemplifies the tensions between moves to decentralize authority and control to schools, on the one hand, and government decisions that reassert the centrality of government authority and control. It appears that schools are being awarded autonomy to decide how best to attain state-determined outcomes for the entire education system. Given the heavy emphasis placed on the school system’s contributions toward improving national economic competitiveness and fostering social cohesion, the Singapore government is far from willing to allow schools full and complete autonomy. 2.

INCREASED AUTONOMY FOR SCHOOLS

During the British colonial administration of Singapore from 1819 to 1959, educational provision was left predominantly in the hands of enterprising individuals, missionary bodies, or private organizations, with occasional government grants. Schools operated in one of four languages—English, Malay, Chinese, or Tamil—and differed in terms of curricula, management, and overall goals. Interest in educational matters among the various colonial governors varied according to individual temperament and according to the strength of beliefs held by the incumbent Director of Education. Political considerations also influenced official policy. For example, in the wake of anti-Japanese activities by students from Chinese-medium schools, the Registration of Schools Ordinance of 1920 called for the registration of schools, teachers, and managers, and attempted to regulate the conduct of schools. It also outlawed all schools that promoted ideas considered to conflict with the interests of the government. The government began offering financial aid to community-run 59 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 59–70.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Chinese-medium schools in 1923. In return, the schools had to submit themselves to official inspections. The first attempt to design educational policies that related to clearly defined goals came in the form of the Ten Years Program, which was adopted in 1947. Two of the general principles underlying the policy were the need for education to foster the capacity for self-government and for education to inculcate civic loyalty and responsibility. The Program also outlined plans to provide universal free primary education and a common curriculum for all ethnic groups. This policy was promulgated against the backdrop of increasing recognition by the colonial government that self-government for the colony was on the horizon. In the wake of growing politicization of students in Chinese-medium schools and their involvement in labor unrest, the newly-installed Legislative Assembly commissioned an All-Party Committee in 1955 to study Chinese-medium education. The government responded to the Committee Report by issuing a White Paper on Education the following year that endorsed many of the Committee’s recommendations. One of these was that all four language streams of education—English, Malay, Chinese, and Tamil—were to receive equal treatment. Another recommendation was that all government and government-aided schools were to be treated equally in terms of financial grants, conditions of service, and salaries. In addition, common curricula and syllabuses were to be established for all schools. Following on the heels of the White Paper, the 1957 Education Ordinance included provisions for the registration of schools, managers, and teachers, and provisions governing the role and responsibilities of school management committees. The Ordinance was followed by regulations that gave government and governmentaided schools equal funding, and stated that staff qualifications and salaries and fees should be the same in both types of school. Government-aided schools were to adhere to standards comparable to those in government schools in terms of physical facilities, student attainment, and student discipline and behavior. In addition, the Director of Education was given control over staff recruitment and dismissal in all schools. This marked the beginning of the move toward a highly centralized system of education. Upon coming to power as the first fully elected government in 1959, the People’s Action Party stated its view of education as a key means of providing skilled manpower for industrialization. Over the next decade, subject syllabuses and educational structures were standardized across the various language streams of schooling, and common terminal examinations at both primary and secondary levels were instituted. At the same time, various attempts were made to promote a sense of national identity in all schools. These included the institution of daily flag-raising and lowering ceremonies, the singing of the national anthem, the recitation of the loyalty pledge, and civics curricula. By the early 1980s, the tide of centralization had begun to turn. In 1982 the then Director of Schools, John Yip, announced that the Education Ministry wanted to decentralize educational management from the Ministry headquarters to the schools. He listed several benefits of decentralization. First, it would encourage greater efficiency. Principals and teachers would be stimulated to become innovative and creative. Students would be the ultimate beneficiaries of principals’ strong educational leadership. Secondly, decisions on how to meet students’ diverse needs were best

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made by individual schools rather than by the Ministry. Yip noted, however, that the Ministry would continue to maintain sufficient centralized control and supervision in order to ensure uniform standards. Furthermore, principals would continue to be accountable to the Ministry through regular inspections. A major boost to the idea of freeing schools from centralized control was given by the then Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1985. He spoke of the need to allow more autonomy within schools (including the right to appoint staff, devise school curricula, and choose textbooks), while conforming to national education policies such as bilingualism and common examinations. Goh asserted that prestigious schools had lost some of their individuality and special character through centralized control. He thought that principals and teachers should now be allowed greater flexibility and independence to experiment with new ideas. Goh’s sentiment was echoed the following year by the then Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, who felt that government domination of educational provision meant a lack of competition and diversity. At the end of 1986, 12 school principals were invited to accompany the then Education Minister to study the management of 25 “acknowledged successful schools” in the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and see what lessons could be learned for Singapore. The principals’ report recommended greater autonomy for selected schools in order to “stimulate educational innovation” and to allow schools “to respond more promptly to the needs and aspirations of pupils and parents” (Ministry of Education, 1987, p. ix). Accepting the recommendations, Education Minister Tony Tan stated that several well-established schools would be allowed to become independent schools. They would be given autonomy and flexibility in staff deployment and salaries, finance, management, and the curriculum. These schools were to serve as role models for other schools in improving the quality of education. They would also help to set the market value for good principals and teachers by recruiting staff in a competitive market. Parents, teachers, and students would enjoy a wider variety of schools to choose from. In 1987, three well-established boys’ secondary schools announced their intention to go independent in 1988. Their applications for independent status were approved by the Education Ministry. They were followed a year later by two prestigious government-aided girls’ secondary schools. To date, a total of eight secondary schools, all of which are well-established and prestigious, have become independent. All of the independent schools are academically selective. This setting aside of high-performing students in a few selected schools is consistent with the Singapore government’s well-entrenched elitist philosophy (Milne & Mauzy, 1990). The independent schools scheme may be viewed as part of an attempt by the government to foster creativity and innovation in the citizenry, a theme lent special urgency ever since the 1985–1986 economic recession. It is also part of an attempt to pass a greater proportion of the costs of operating social services such as education and health to the public (Low, 1994). The policy aims to lessen government subsidies and to make Singaporeans more self-reliant. The government has been careful to avoid using the term “privatization” with its connotations of “profit-making.” Its position is that the government will continue to subsidize basic education, but that the public will have to help bear the cost of high quality education.

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What is interesting is that existing education subsides are not straining the government’s budget, as it continues to enjoy healthy budgetary surpluses and to invest heavily in education. These subsidies amount to 98% of recurrent expenditures in non-independent secondary schools. In fact, the independent schools are by no means financially independent of the government. On the contrary, they remain heavily dependent financially on government subsidies. For instance, the government provides these schools with annual per capita grants equivalent to the average cost of educating secondary students. The Singapore case thus presents a contrast with other countries where decentralization has resulted from financial stringency on the part of governments. Right from the introduction of the independent schools scheme, there was intense public criticism over its elitist nature and the high fees charged by the schools. In the wake of the 1991 general elections, which saw the governing party returned to power with a reduced parliamentary majority, the government took steps to defuse public criticism of the scheme. First, it limited the number of independent schools, thus reversing its earlier announcement that it wanted to see more schools turn independent. Another step was the establishment in 1994 of a new category of schools called autonomous schools. In the first 3 years, 18 existing non-independent secondary schools, all of which had outstanding academic results, were designated as autonomous schools. These schools receive 10% more in annual per capita government grants than non-autonomous schools. They are supposed to provide a high quality education while charging more affordable fees than independent schools. Parents and students will thus have a wider range of choices. The Ministry of Education announced in early 2000 its intention to allow about 25% of all secondary schools to become autonomous schools. These schools must have a track record of outstanding academic results, well-rounded education programs, and strong community ties. The principals of autonomous schools will be allowed discretion to admit up to 5% of their students on the basis of demonstrated talent in specific niche areas, such as sports or the arts (Teo, 2000). Between the years 2001 and 2005, another seven schools joined the autonomous schools scheme. In a departure from previous practice, these seven autonomous schools have applied to the Education Ministry for autonomous status instead of having autonomous school status thrust upon them. To date, both the independent schools scheme and autonomous schools scheme have been confined to the secondary sector. A further move to extend autonomy to primary schools, secondary schools, and junior colleges (offering 2 years of preuniversity schooling) has been the introduction of school clusters. The first clusters were piloted on an experimental basis in 1997. Every single school is now a member of a cluster. There are now a total of 28 clusters, each of which contains between 10 and 14 schools. Some clusters consist entirely of primary schools, while the others contain a mix. Each cluster is headed by a superintendent, whom the Education Ministry provides with an annual budget for teacher development and the purchase of teaching resources. The superintendents are supposed to lead school principals in pooling resources and discussing strategies to address common concerns. The results of increased school autonomy have been mixed. The principals of independent schools have enjoyed greater flexibility in decision-making in a

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few respects. First, a few independent schools have recruited additional full-time administrators, such as public relations officers, estate managers, and bursars. In the mid-1990s each non-independent school was allowed to hire one school administrator and operations manager to assist the principal in carrying out administrative duties. Beginning in the year 2000, each non-independent school principal was permitted to hire an additional school administrator or operations manager, and apply for a monthly grant of around S$2,000 to purchase administrative services from privately run agencies. Second, unlike non-independent schools, the independent schools are run by school governing boards that may determine admission policies, school fees, and major financial policies and budgets. Third, all the eight independent schools have raised their fees to levels far above those charged by non-independent schools. Finally, they are able to determine their own student admission figures, a privilege denied to non-independent schools. However, it is still clear that the Ministry of Education continues to wield considerable control over the independent schools. The School Boards (Incorporation) Act of 1990 provided for the establishment of governing boards in independent schools. All appointments to governorship have to be approved by the Education Minister. The Minister may also vary or revoke individual governing board constitutions, or appoint the Director of Education to take over the running of schools. The latter provision has been invoked twice in the case of an independent school, The Chinese High School, once in 1997 and again in 1999. On both occasions, factional squabbles among governing board members resulted in the Minister appointing new governing board members. The independent schools have also exercised greater control in curriculum. For instance, several independent schools have scrapped subjects that are compulsory in non-independent schools or have made certain other subjects non-examinable. Teacher recruitment is another area in which the independent schools have taken advantage of their increased autonomy by recruiting as many teachers as their finances will allow. The schools have thus improved their teacher–student ratios vis-`a-vis their non-independent counterparts. In some other respects, however, the degree of choice and diversity is still rather limited. The government still exerts a great deal of influence over all secondary schools. In particular, the imposition of national curricular requirements and the pressures imposed by common national examinations restrict the scope for curricular innovation. None of the independent schools or autonomous schools have moved away from a subject-based curriculum. In addition, the range of subjects offered in these schools is largely identical to that in non-independent, non-autonomous schools. As long as principals are held accountable for their schools’ performance in national examinations, they cannot afford to stray too far from the mainstream curriculum. None of the independent schools or autonomous schools are allowed to stray from key national policy initiatives, such as Thinking Schools Learning Nation (which is aimed at promoting critical and creative thinking skills), the Information Technology Masterplan, and National Education (which is aimed at fostering a sense of national identity). A second major factor inhibiting innovation is conservatism and resistance to change among some Education Ministry officials. Such attitudes often prove

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frustrating for school principals who desire greater autonomy from Ministry control, as manifested in this statement by the principal of an independent school: So the system on the one hand allows it [autonomy], on the other hand chokes it. . . . There’s a gap here. You’ve got the rules in the middle, on one side. You’ve got the people interpreting them. . . . You’ve got the school principal, who’s got to abide by the rules and be inspected by the inspector who works for the rules, because he’s accountable to his bosses. So if this principal doesn’t observe that rule fully, the inspector’s got to account for that principal and give the answer up here. . . . And yet the Director on top is saying, “But if you read the rules, they’ve [referring to school principals] got a lot of freedom. (Tan, 1996, p. 218) There are thus tensions between centralizing tendencies in the Ministry, on the one hand, and the desire by some principals to exercise their professional judgment on the other hand. Two boys’ independent schools, The Chinese High School and the Anglo-Chinese School (Independent), had in the early 1990s expressed their desire to break away from the national General Certificate of Education (Ordinary) Level examinations conducted jointly by the Education Ministry and the University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate. Their attempts were repeatedly blocked by Ministry of Education officials (Tan, 1996). At the end of the year 2001, both schools finally found support for their proposals when the Education Minister said that his Ministry would consider allowing top-performing students a greater range of assessment options. At about the same time, the Prime Minister announced that the government might allow the establishment of private schools to encourage diversity and innovation in teaching methods (Goh, 2001). Although they could be totally independent of the Education Ministry, they would still be required to teach core subjects. The principal of The Chinese High School promptly expressed interest in turning his school private, and hoped that the school could continue to receive financial subsidies from the government. A prominent Ministry of Education report on the reform of the upper secondary and junior college education was published in 2002. Subsequently, a number of prominent secondary schools (including five of the eight independent schools) and junior colleges have been allowed to offer “integrated programs” (that is, programs that allow top-performing students to bypass the national General Certificate of Education “Ordinary” Level examinations). One of these secondary schools, the Anglo-Chinese School (Independent), has finally been allowed to break new ground, becoming the first mainstream school to offer an alternative qualification, the International Baccalaureate, to its students. These efforts have been officially applauded as lending greater diversity to the local education landscape. This report also endorsed the establishment of specialized independent schools. Since then, the Singapore Sports School and the National University of Singapore Mathematics and Science High School have begun admitting secondary students. The latter school has promised its students a wider range of qualifications beyond the conventional General Certificate of Education examinations. Both these schools have been made associate members of existing school clusters.

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Another recommendation in the 2002 report was to establish a few privatelyfunded secondary schools to add choice and diversity for students and parents. Two such schools began classes in 2005. However, they have to adhere to Ministry of Education guidelines on National Education, daily flag-raising and national anthem rituals, a minimum 50% Singaporean student enrolment, and the study of ethnic languages. These measures are to ensure that “all Singapore students continue to learn and interact with one another in an environment that nurtures a Singaporean spirit and character” (Ministry of Education, 2002, p. 61). 3.

INCREASED COMPETITION AMONG SCHOOLS

A major feature of Singapore education over the past decade, and one that has gone hand in hand with the granting of increased autonomy to schools, has been the intensification of competition between schools. Besides improving the quality of education, competition is supposed to provide parents and students with a wider range of choices and to improve accountability by forcing schools to improve their programs (Goh, 1992). This competition has been fostered in various ways. For instance, all secondary schools and junior colleges have been publicly ranked on an annual basis since 1992 and the results have been published in the various local newspapers. The official justification is that parents and students must be provided with better information in order to make intelligent and informed choices (Goh, 1992; Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 64, March 1, 1995, Col. 27). Secondary schools have been ranked on three main criteria. The first of these is a composite measure of students’ overall results in the annual General Certificate of Education (Ordinary) Level examinations. The second measure evaluates schools’ value-addedness by comparing students’ examination performance with their examination scores upon entry to their respective schools. The third criterion is a weighted index that measures a school’s performance in the National Physical Fitness Test as well as the percentage of overweight students in the school. The promotion of inter-school competition and the pressures on schools that result from the ranking of schools have led many principals to engage in marketing activities. These include recruitment talks, the design and distribution of brochures, the screening of promotional videos, and the courting of the press in order to highlight school achievements. Even primary schools are engaging in these activities, with principals reaching out to parents of kindergarten students. The introduction of explicit measures to promote competition among schools has aroused a great deal of controversy and criticism, both within and outside the governing party. For instance, in 1992 the then Senior Minister of State for Education told Parliament that public ranking of schools in terms of their academic results was “undesirable.” It was “absurd” and “nonsense” to say that one school was ahead of another because of minuscule differences in their overall academic results. It would also increase tension and stress among parents while not improving education for children at all (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 59, March 13, 1992, Cols. 991–992). However, the results of the first annual ranking exercise were still published 5 months later. It is highly contestable whether fostering competition does improve the quality of education for all students and promote greater choice and diversity for parents

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and students. First of all, the competition among schools does not take place on a level playing field. The terms of competition are to a large extent dictated by the government. For instance, the number of independent schools and autonomous schools is determined by the government. Next, non-independent schools enjoy less flexibility than independent schools in determining their own enrolment figures or the number of teachers that they wish to employ. Furthermore, not all secondary schools may offer certain prestigious programs such as the Gifted Education Program or the Art Elective Program. The government only conducts such programs in selected schools, all of which are either independent or autonomous. In other words, non-prestigious, non-academically selective schools are simply unable to compete effectively with well-established, academically selective schools. The former are caught in a vicious cycle: because they are unable to attract high academic achievers, their academic results fall far below those of the well-established schools. This in turn means that they remain unable to attract high academic achievers. Analysis of the ranking results for secondary schools over the last 12 years reveals that the majority of the top 30 secondary schools have remained in this category throughout the 12 years. It is therefore questionable to what extent increased competition actually helps to improve standards in all schools. The government has claimed that the independent schools and autonomous schools will serve as role models for other schools in improving educational standards. This of course raises the question of whether what proves effective in these well-established schools can in fact be transplanted into other schools. The government’s reasoning also ignores the part played by a selective student intake in schools’ academic success (see for instance, Thrupp, 1998). It is therefore not clear to what extent the experience of independent schools and autonomous schools can be valid lessons for the bulk of Singapore secondary schools, struggling with less-than-ideal student ability and motivational levels. Another criticism is that competition leads some schools to focus narrowly on those outcomes that are relevant for public ranking and that may be useful for attracting students and parents (see for instance, Reay, 1998, for a discussion of the situation in England). Such a criticism is especially relevant in a situation such as Singapore where performance in competitive examinations is still a major determinant of educational and social mobility. There has been press coverage of how several reputable secondary schools have decided to make the study of English literature optional rather than compulsory for their graduating students. This is because English literature is perceived to be a subject in which it is difficult to do well during national examinations. These schools have been wary of the potential consequences that students’ less-than-ideal performance in English literature might have on their positions in the annual ranking exercises (Nirmala, 1997; Nirmala & Mathi, 1995). It is particularly ironic, then, that these strategies were being employed even as the Minister for Information and the Arts was extolling the virtues of the subject to students (De Souza, 1998). Even physical education has not been exempt from the adverse effects of ranking exercises. Some schools have over-emphasized preparation for the National Physical Fitness Test at the expense of the acquisition of skills in sports and games. The growing stress on school accountability and the use of narrowly defined, easily quantifiable performance indicators has clearly had a detrimental impact on

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some schools. Far from promoting choice and diversity, heightened inter-school competition and rivalry may in fact work against these goals. Cluster superintendents will find it difficult to foster intra-cluster cooperation and discussion of strategies to improve academic performance while the various school principals are vying with one another to boost their schools’ positions in the school ranking league tables. In this regard, the attempts by two independent schools in the 1990s to break away from the General Certificate of Education (Ordinary) Level examinations may be seen as attempts to also break free from the tyranny imposed by the school ranking league tables. With the advent of the integrated programs in 2004, the schools offering these programs have been left out of the school ranking league tables since their students no longer need to sit for these national examinations. Somewhat oddly enough, what might be viewed as new-found freedom from tyranny of the school ranking league tables has not always been seen in that light by some parents, who have publicly demanded to know how these schools stand vis-`a-vis other schools in terms of tangible student outcomes. Even though an external review team commissioned by the Education Ministry heavily criticized the detrimental aspects of the practice of school ranking exercises in a report published in 1997 (External Review Team, 1997), the Education Ministry refused to consider scrapping the exercises altogether. Subsequently, however, in recognition of the growing public criticism of the practice, the Ministry of Education announced in 2004 that the secondary school ranking league tables would be modified to consist of bands of achievement instead of raw numerical ranks. Furthermore, junior colleges would no longer be publicly ranked. Another Ministry response to criticism of the narrowness of the ranking exercise has been instead to broaden the range of indicators upon which schools are to be assessed, through the use of the School Excellence Model (SEM). This model, which was implemented in all schools in 2000, is meant to help schools appraise their own performance in various areas, such as leadership, staff management, staff competence and morale, and student outcomes (Ministry of Education, 1999). Beginning in the year 2001, each school was supposed to subject its own internal assessment to external validation by a team headed by staff from the School Appraisal Branch of the Ministry of Education. These validations are to be carried out at least once every 5 years. Part of the SEM involves the awarding of Achievement Awards, Development Awards, Sustained Achievement Awards, Outstanding Development Awards, Best Practice Awards, School Distinction Awards, and School Excellence Awards to individual schools. Schools that score at least 400 points out of a total of 1,000 during the external validation exercise are encouraged by the Education Ministry to apply for Singapore Quality Class certification by the Productivity and Standards Board. It is arguable that the use of the SEM may result in some schools using more of the same covert strategies that they have been using thus far, this time in a wider spectrum of school processes and activities in order to boost their schools’ performance in as many of the aspects that are being assessed as possible. For example, principals may narrow the range of available co-curricular activities in order to focus the schools’ resources on those activities that are considered more fruitful in terms of winning awards in inter-school competitions. The use of the SEM continues to ensure that independent schools and autonomous schools, even those offering integrated programs, will not stray too far from official policy dictates and priorities.

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Amid this climate of risk-averse behavior, what then are the prospects of wideranging and sustained change triggered by wide-ranging policy initiatives, such as the teaching of critical and creative thinking skills, are concerned? Government leaders are united in lamenting the apparent lack of creativity and thinking skills among students and members of the workforce (see for instance, Goh, 1997; Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 53, March 20, 1989, Cols. 550–551; Vol. 55, March 15, 1990, Cols. 310– 311). Improving examination scores in the national examinations are beginning to sound less impressive. In this regard, it is ironic that a few months after the Prime Minister had stressed the need to move toward critical thinking skills, a departmental head in a secondary school, when asked by a newspaper journalist about the secret behind her students’ examination success, replied that it had taken months of repeated mock examination practice. As a result of at least 12 rounds of practice per subject, students were familiar not only with the examination format but, more importantly, with the examination content as well (Pan, 1997). There is a clear tension between the use of decentralization as a means of freeing schools to be creative and innovative on the one hand, and the concurrent narrowing of diversity that is encouraged by the ever-tightening grip of intense inter-school competition on the other hand. Another serious consequence of all of this intense competition is a growing hierarchy of schools and social stratification. Schools that were already academically selective have remained so. School principals who wish to maintain or improve their schools’ ranking positions need to keep a constant watch on their student intake. The trend of academic selectiveness on the part of top schools will inevitably lead to a further stratification of schools, with the independent schools and autonomous schools at the top and the rest below. Equally worrying is evidence that students from wealthier family backgrounds are over-represented in independent schools (Tan, 1993). The government is well aware of the potential impact of social stratification on social cohesion as well as on its own political legitimacy. However, it claims that it is only right to nurture the more able students as the whole country will ultimately benefit (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 59, January 20, 1992, Col. 365). 4.

CONCLUSION

Terms such as choice, competition, innovation, and diversity have now become commonplace in the Singapore education system over the past two decades. The government has attempted to delegate some decision-making authority to school principals through such means as the independent schools scheme, autonomous schools scheme, school clusters, and the Edusave scheme. This chapter has demonstrated that the government continues to exert considerable influence over schools. Not only does it impose national curricular requirements and examinations on all schools, it retains ultimate control over independent schools’ governing boards. Intense inter-school competition over the past decade has worked as a powerful centralizing influence on all schools, and has worked against the promotion of diversity and innovation. Schools appear to have been granted greater autonomy so that they might better achieve government-dictated macro-policy objectives and goals. The recent attempts to allow greater curricular diversity through the integrated programs represent limited efforts to break out of the standard mold imposed by the national examinations. Because all the schools offering integrated programs are still subject to the SEM and

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to other Ministry of Education policy priorities and dictates, it is likely that their various programs will end up converging to a large degree rather than being genuinely distinctive from one another. In view of the central roles which the government has assigned to the education system in supporting economic development and fostering social cohesion, it is highly unlikely that centralized control will ever be relaxed. The regulations governing the approval of privately-funded schools bear testimony to this. It may also be argued that there are benefits to having a certain amount of centralized control of schools. One of these is the need to ensure that all children enjoy similar access to a basic general education. Another detrimental consequence of decentralization and inter-school competition has been their impact on social stratification. However, the government shows no signs of reversing its policies. If anything, it is likely to further encourage competition among schools. This is part of its urging all Singaporeans to constantly “stay ahead of the pack” in terms of global economic competitiveness (Lee, 1994). At the same time, it has urged Singaporeans not to allow “our children to be softened” by the alleged denigration of academic excellence and the promotion of a “soft approach to life” by “liberals in the West” (Goh, 1992). Its response to criticisms of the elitist nature of independent schools has been confused at times. For instance, it has tried to dispel the notion that non-independent schools are inferior to independent schools (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 63, August 25, 1994, Col. 398). At the same time, though, it has stated that the independent schools are to be developed into “outstanding institutions, to give the most promising and able students an education matching their promise” (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 59, January 6, 1992, Col. 18). The Singapore experience with decentralization differs substantially from that in most other countries in one important respect. While financial stringency is a key motivating factor in many cases, the developments in Singapore are taking place against the backdrop of healthy budgetary surpluses and increased government expenditure on education. These spending trends are likely to continue for some time, especially since education is viewed as playing a key role in enhancing national economic competitiveness in the global economy. It remains to be seen how central policy dilemmas will play out in future. These include the tension between aggressive competition and inter-school collaboration. Another is the balance between conservatism brought about by the yoke of central control, and the quest for genuine diversity and innovation. There is the question of whether major policy initiatives such as the one promoting critical and creative thinking skills will really take off in schools, or whether they will simply fall victim to the intense inter-school competition and fail to take root. Finally, an uneasy coexistence will persist between the government’s elitist philosophy and its claims to provide equal educational opportunity to all Singaporeans.

5.

REFERENCES

De Souza, A. (1998, July 5). Literature key to past, says BG Yeo. The Sunday Times, 36. External Review Team. (1997). Learning, creating, and communicating: A curriculum review. Singapore: Ministry of Education. Goh, C. T. (1992). National Day Rally 1992, Ministry of Information and the Arts, Singapore.

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Goh, C. T. (1997). Prepare our children for the new century: Teach them well. In J. Tan, S. Gopinathan, and W. K. Ho (Eds.), Education in Singapore: A book of readings (pp. 417–425). Singapore: Prentice Hall. Goh, C. T. (2001). Shaping lives, moulding nation. Speeches, 25(4), 11–24. Lee, H. L. (1994). The government, the people and the future. Speeches, 18(4), 15–19. Low, L. (1994). A market system with Singapore characteristics. MPP Working Paper Series No. 4. Centre for Advanced Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore. Milne, R. S., & Mauzy, D. K. (1990). Singapore: The legacy of Lee Kuan Yew. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Ministry of Education. (1987). Towards excellence for all. Singapore: Ministry of Education. Ministry of Education. (1999). The school excellence model (http://intranet.moe.edu.sg/schdiv/ semhome.htm). Ministry of Education. (2002). Report of the Junior College/Upper Secondary Education Review Committee. Singapore: Ministry of Education. Nirmala, M. (1997, August 16). Big drop in students studying O-level Literature. The Straits Times, 3. Nirmala, M., & Mathi, B. (1995). Schools making literature optional. The Straits Times, 3. Pan, X. H. (1997, August 8). Shixing moni kaoshi xue sheng shuxi zhanchang [Implementing mock examinations to familiarise students with the “battlefield”]. Lianhe Wanbao, Singapore, 6 (in Chinese). Reay, D. (1998). Setting the agenda: The growing impact of market forces on pupil grouping in British secondary schooling. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 30, 545–558. Tan, J. (1993). Independent schools in Singapore: Implications for social and educational inequalities. International Journal of Educational Development, 13, 239–251. Tan, J. (1996). Independent schools and autonomous schools in Singapore: A study of two school privatization initiatives, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo. Teo, C. H. (2000). More autonomous schools on the way. Speeches, 24(1), 50–55. Thrupp, M. (1998). The art of the possible: Organizing and managing high and low socioeconomic schools. Journal of Education Policy, 13, 197–219.

Chapter 5 BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS: EVOLVING PATTERNS AND CONTRASTING TRENDS IN HONG KONG AND MACAU Mark Bray and Tang Kwok-Chun

In the field of comparative education, contrasts are often as illuminating as similarities. However, comparative studies usually need sufficient basis of commonality in order to make meaningful contrasts. The present chapter has these necessary ingredients. It primarily focuses on two territories that are geographically close, culturally related, and have economic similarities as well as comparable political histories. However, it also shows some striking contrasts. Concerning control of education, the chapter shows contrasting trends. During the 1980s and 1990s, administration in one territory became more decentralized, while administration in the other became more centralized. The chapter also highlights ambiguities and inconsistencies. The chapter focuses on two former colonies on the south coast of China. Hong Kong was a British colony until 1997, and Macau was under Portuguese administration until 1999. Now, both have again become part of China but are administered with a high degree of autonomy in economic, political, and educational affairs. As such, in the domain of education they continue to differ from each other as well as from Mainland China. Much of the chapter has a historical focus. Indeed it is concerned with major developments over a period of decades and even centuries. The chapter identifies ways in which analysis and comparison of Hong Kong and Macau contributes to theories concerning the formation and development of education systems, which in turn requires consideration of centralization and decentralization. The chapter begins by outlining some key concepts from the literature which provide an analytical framework. It then presents some background information on each territory before turning to evolution in their education systems. 1.

THEORETICAL MODELS AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

The chief starting point for this chapter is the work of Margaret Archer. Her 1979 book, entitled Social Origins of Educational Systems, is widely considered a seminal contribution to understanding of the nature and evolution of education systems. It is a long book, and was republished in abbreviated version in 1984. Archer’s overall concern, as highlighted in the title of the books, was with educational systems. While many analysts now take the existence of systems for granted, Archer (1984, p. 3) 71 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 71–95.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

72 Structural conditioning

Educational interaction

Structural elaboration

Structural conditioning

CYCLE 1 General changes

Comparative changes

Private enterprise

Ownership Monointegration Subordination

Competitive conflict

Substitution

Educational interaction

Structual elaboration

CYCLE 2 Emergence of educational systems

Multiply integrated state systems

State system

Processes of negotiation

Decentralized systems

External transactions Internal initiation Political manipulation

Centralized

Political

Patterns change

Incremental pattern

Restriction Stop-go

SOCIAL ORIGINS OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

Theoretical phases

EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION

Figure 5.1: Summary Diagram of Archer’s Study. Source: Archer (1984, p. 10).

pointed out that educational systems were rare before the 18th century. Archer identified two cycles of evolution in education systems in which the starting point of the first cycle was a collection of privately owned schools which were gradually brought together into a relatively unified system. The second cycle commenced with the existence of state systems, and showed a range of patterns in which some systems moved toward centralization while others moved toward decentralization (Figure 5.1). At the beginning of the first cycle, Archer suggested, one common feature of education preceding the development of state systems was mono-integration: those who controlled education also owned it and monopolized the formal instruction. This feature embodied an emergent property that conditioned subsequent processes of educational interaction and change. In order to challenge the dominant groups, the assertive groups overcame the domination by either substitution or restriction. Substitution consisted of devaluing the monopoly of the dominant group through competition—building new schools, and recruiting, training and paying new teachers to staff them. Restriction consisted of eliminating the monopoly by coercive power—appropriating buildings, confiscating educational funds, and excluding personnel from teaching and administration. The final phase of the first cycle dealt with educational changes resulting from the social interaction. Decentralized and centralized education systems emerged, respectively, from substitution and restriction. Furthermore, unification and systematization were the predominant pair of characteristics of the newly emerged centralized systems with differentiation and specialization gradually accommodated to them. Newly emerged decentralized systems which had no leading-part retained specialization and differentiation as their dominant pair of characteristics, and these characteristics constantly created strains and problems for unification and systematization. According to this analysis, at the beginning of the second cycle the emergent centralized and decentralized systems exerted dissimilar influences upon interaction. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the structural conditioning of educational interaction in the centralized system and decentralized system, respectively. Finally, Archer suggested that in centralized systems, the polity-directed changes which are routinely negotiated through political manipulation have similar features in terms of their initiation,

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Figure 5.2: The Structural Conditioning of Educational Interaction in the Centralized System. Source: Archer (1984, p. 117).

legislation, and execution, and display a distinctive “stop–go” pattern. There is no stop–go pattern in decentralized systems because polity-directed changes are usually modified by internal initiation and external transactions which maintain a ceaseless flow of small localized changes. Despite the fact that few countries had education systems before the 18th century, by the early and mid-20th century few countries and even colonial territories did not have them. One exception, as will be shown by this chapter, was Macau. The territory is idiosyncratic, and also small; and for these reasons it is commonly considered undeserving of scholarly attention. However, an alternative perspective is that the idiosyncratic nature of Macau makes it an illuminating focus for study. Particularly worthwhile, as the chapter will show, are comparisons with Hong Kong. Also significant is that the chapter focuses on colonial territories. Archer (1984, p. 14) stressed that her analysis applied only to countries in which macroscopic change emerged autonomously, and not to settings where it could be attributed to external intervention via conquest, colonization, or territorial redistribution. During the period since the publication of Archer’s books, few scholars have endeavored to extend her

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Figure 5.3: The Structural Conditioning of Educational Interaction in the Decentralized System. Source: Archer (1984, p. 118).

work to colonial territories. This chapter demonstrates that her conceptual tools are also useful for comparing education development in colonial settings including Hong Kong and Macau. 2. 2.1.

AN INTRODUCTION TO HONG KONG AND MACAU

Hong Kong

The territory of Hong Kong comprises the island of Hong Kong, a number of other islands, and part of the Chinese Mainland. The island of Hong Kong was ceded to the British in 1842. A section of the Kowloon Peninsula was ceded in 1860; and the New Territories were acquired on a 99-year lease in 1898. The total land area is 1,070 km2 . Colonial policies passed through many phases during the 155 years of British administration, but one consistent feature was that Hong Kong, like Macau, was seen primarily as a trading port rather than a territory for economic exploitation in its own right. In this respect it differed from many other British colonies. Hong Kong had a largely transient population, and most aspects of social policy in the early years

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were low key. There was no early intention to raise an intermediary class of Englishtrained natives as “go-betweens” in the way that Raffles envisioned for Singapore and Macaulay championed for India (Jones, 1990, p. 142). Nevertheless, early education policy differed from other aspects of social policy in being more active and interventionist. One aspect was in the provision of school grants, a policy which paralleled measures in Britain itself. As observed by Sweeting (1990, 1993, 1995), much of the history of education in Hong Kong has been a pattern of increasing government commitment and intervention. The 99-year lease on the New Territories expired in 1997, when the whole of Hong Kong (i.e., including Hong Kong Island, which had been ceded “in perpetuity”) was returned to China. The terms under which Chinese sovereignty resumed were established between the British and Chinese governments in 1984. Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR), with its own government and laws. Since 1997, Hong Kong has been governed under the formula of “One Country, Two Systems,” which permits Hong Kong to have a high degree of autonomy. In particular, while the rest of China remains officially socialist, Hong Kong remains officially capitalist. The SAR system, which has been put in place for at least 50 years, also permits Hong Kong to have its own currency, laws, and education system. With reference to education, the Basic Law (People’s Republic of China, 1990, Article 146) states that: On the basis of the previous educational system, the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on the development and improvement of education, including policies regarding the educational system and its administration, the language of instruction, the allocation of funds, the examination system, the system of academic awards and the recognition of educational qualifications. The population of Hong Kong is approximately 7 million. Almost 98% are Chinese, for the majority of whom Cantonese is the mother tongue. Among the remainder, the largest groups are from Philippines, Indonesia, the USA, Canada, and the UK. Economically, Hong Kong is well known for its recent achievement of high rates of growth. In 2004, Hong Kong was estimated to have a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$23,900 (Government of Hong Kong, 2005). Economic growth has greatly facilitated expansion of education. 2.2.

Macau

As a distinct political entity, Macau is nearly 300 years older than Hong Kong. Portuguese traders secured from the Chinese authorities rights of settlement in 1557 (Afonso & Pereira, 1986, p. 34). Although the Portuguese were primarily interested in Macau for economic reasons, the territory also played a major religious and cultural role. The church established many schools, one of which was given university status in 1594. It operated until 1762, and taught theology, humanities, Greek, Latin, rhetoric, and philosophy (Gomes dos Santos, 1968). Macau was a major conduit through which Western education and science entered China, Japan, and Korea.

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After the mid-17th century, Macau’s fortunes declined (Gunn, 1996). Portugal proved unable to hold her empire together, and competition for East Asian trade intensifed. The foundation of Hong Kong in 1842 was a particularly serious blow, for its far superior port took over the strategic significance that Macau had previously enjoyed. After World War II the Chinese government wished to repossess the territory, but was unable to force the issue. For a time, policies were left at the level of official pronouncements. However, China’s Cultural Revolution in 1966 led to violent riots in Macau and to strident anti-Portuguese propaganda. Unexpectedly, when the Portuguese announced that they intended to leave, the Communists altered their stance. The Chinese authorities were conscious of Macau’s role as an outlet for external trade, and found it more useful to retain Macau as a foreign port than to repossess it (Chang, 1988). Eight years later, Portugal itself experienced a revolution. The new government had a very different view of world affairs, and immediately set about decolonizing its African territories. In Asia, East Timor was unilaterally seized by Indonesia. However, the Chinese maintained their refusal to reassert sovereignty. Subsequently, in 1987, the Portuguese and Chinese governments agreed that Macau would revert to China in 1999. Like Hong Kong, Macau was designated a Special Administrative Region for at least 50 years after the transition. Concerning education, the wording of the 1993 Basic Law (People’s Republic of China, 1993, Article 121) is similar to the provision for Hong Kong. The total land area of Macau is just 24 km2 . A population of approximately 440,000 gives a density of 18,300 persons per km2 . This far exceeds Hong Kong’s 6,500 persons per km2 . As in Hong Kong, over 95% of the population is Chinese. Two significant minority groups are a small cadre of Portuguese and a mixed-race group known as the Macanese. Official figures placed the 2003 GDP per capita at US$17,800 (Governo de Macau, 2005). Manufacturing employed about 20% of the labor force, with restaurants, hotels, and other services employing over half. Within the service sector, tourism, and gambling were particularly significant. 3. 3.1.

EMERGING AND EVOLVING EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN HONG KONG AND MACAU

Hong Kong: Communist Threat and Unified Centralized System

The structure of the Hong Kong education system in 1990 is shown in Figure 5.4. At that time, only the primary schools had a standard duration for all pupils. At the secondary and post-secondary levels, the system became extremely complex. Despite the complexities, there was something which could be described as the Hong Kong system. As will be noted below, the same could not be said of Macau. Table 5.1 shows figures on the ownership of primary and secondary schools in Hong Kong in 2000/2001. Fewer than 6% of institutions were operated by the government. Aided schools form the largest group at both levels. This contrasted with the situation in Macau, where private schools formed the largest group. The history of the aided sector dates back to the 19th century (Sweeting, 1990). Grants have always been closely linked to controls, and have provided a way through which the government has influenced the orientation of the curriculum and quality

BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS

Notes (1) Apart from Lingnan College, an Assisted Approved Post Secondary College, there is the Hong Kong Shue Yan College which offers 4 year courses, the minimum entry requirement of which, in terms of the Post Secondary Colleges Regulations, is successful completion of Form V. (2) 1st degree in medicine requires 5 years of study. (3) B. A. (Bldg.) requires 4 years of study while B. A. (Arch.) and M. B. B. S. require 5 years of study. (4) Student with craft certificate may enrol in the Technician Course after the completion of a bridging course which lasts for a minimun of one year.

Figure 5.4: Structure of the Hong Kong Education System. Source: Education Department of Hong Kong (1990, p. 79).

Table 5.1: Providers of Primary and Secondary Schooling in Hong Kong, 2000/2001 Level

Sector

Primary

Government Aided Private

41 687 88

All

816

Government Aided Private

37 368 81

All

486

Secondary

Schools

Source: Education Department of Hong Kong, (2001) (http://project2.ed.gov.hk).

77

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EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION

of teaching. This feature underlay the 1873 Grant-in-Aid for schools and the 1913 Education Ordinance, and has also characterized subsequent laws and regulations. The Codes of Aid governing primary and secondary schools (Government of Hong Kong, 1984a,b) set out requirements on such matters as accounts, admission of pupils, and appointment and dismissal of staff. The accompanying Education Regulations (Government of Hong Kong, 1986) set out in considerable detail requirements on such matters as furnishings, safety precautions, toilets, cleaning, the size of print in text books, teachers’ qualifications, class size, and school holidays. In order to understand the development of the control in education and the unification and systematization of the centralized system, the long struggle by the Hong Kong government to counteract the influences from Mainland China should be noted. In addition to government and church endeavors, before 1911 individuals and private organizations with traditional Chinese religious backgrounds, philanthropic purposes, or socio-political motives were also active in the education sector. Chia-shu (family schools), ssu-shu (private schools), and i-hsueh (charitable schools) were the most popular forms of educational organizations among local Chinese, and used traditional Chinese curricula and textbooks (Sweeting, 1990). After the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, an education system adapted from Japan and Germany was introduced in Mainland China. In 1922, this system was replaced by a 6+3+3 system which was adapted from the USA. In 1928, shortly after the establishment of the Nanjing government in China, the Overseas Chinese Education Committee was established under the Ministry of Education. Regulations were issued, and overseas Chinese schools were asked to register with the Overseas Chinese Education Bureau. Details of curriculum and textbooks were required for the registration process (Chan, 1992; Cheng, 1949). One purpose was to control the structure and curriculum of overseas Chinese schools in order to exclude Communist influence. The strategic consideration behind such policy can best be understood by considering historical circumstances. Since 1928, the Chinese government had been trying to control the overseas Chinese schools through its consuls and Kuomintang agents abroad. As there were no Chinese Consuls in Hong Kong and Kuomintang activities were banned, the Chinese government influenced the colony indirectly. One reason why most of the larger schools felt it necessary to register with the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee was that a growing number of Hong Kong students were going back to China for higher studies, and they could only enter Mainland institutions if they had graduated from registered secondary schools. As registration with the Chinese authorities carried with it an obligation to observe certain regulations, whether openly or secretly, the Chinese authorities were able to exert indirect control over these schools (Wong Leung, 1969, p. 53). From the perspective of the authorities in Mainland China, the above strategy was quite successful. In 1928, some schools in Hong Kong started to adopt the American 6 + 3 + 3 system, like the middle schools in China (Sweeting, 1990, p. 352). Furthermore, as observed by Luk (1991, p. 661), in the early 1930s an increasing number of schools were able to operate with branches on both sides of the border and registered with both governments. In Hong Kong, such schools followed the curriculum prescribed by

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the Nanjing government, used textbooks published in China, mostly at Shanghai, and presented their senior middle graduates for university entrance examinations in China. They engaged teachers trained either in China or in Hong Kong. The colonial government and missionary schools also generally used the Nanjing syllabi and the Shanghai textbooks for the Chinese culture subjects, although they probably followed them less closely. For other subjects, they used textbooks from England or from Shanghai. They also employed teachers educated either in Hong Kong or in China. Hong Kong never developed an autochthonous school system before World War II. In 1929, in order to counteract the Kuomintang’s influence, a committee was appointed in Hong Kong to draw up a syllabus for private schools. However, the strategy of the Hong Kong government was not successful. In the early 1930s, vernacular schools tried, as far as the Education Department allowed, to follow the curriculum of the schools in China, using the same textbooks and having the same subjects (Wong Leung, 1969, p. 53). In 1931, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was established in Nanjing. It signified the need of the Nanjing-based government for a more comprehensive and effective policy toward the overseas Chinese because their support was found to be increasingly necessary with the rise of the Japanese militarism and their attack from the north. A survey was conducted in 1935 by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission to estimate the number of overseas Chinese schools throughout the entire world. About 550 overseas Chinese schools were found in Hong Kong and Macau (Chan, 1992, p. 256). In 1938, when Guangzhou was taken by Japan, the number of schools in Hong Kong and Macau increased dramatically because schools moved from Guangzhou and further north. The teachers and students carried with them the curricula and textbooks which had already been adopted by some schools in Hong Kong and Macau in the early 1930s. In short, the above historical account explained the social origin of the Chinese-medium schools in both places. The influence of the Chinese government on Chinese-medium schools did not diminish until the early 1950s when the colonial government wanted to exercise its own and exclusive influence on local education due to the political tensions in China built shortly after World War II. The nationalistic program for overseas Chinese education of Kuomintang resumed in 1945, and included the publishing of textbooks and educational materials (Chan, 1992, p. 309). In Hong Kong the Kuomintang started to infiltrate and direct the Chinese press. Running schools was another activity of the Kuomintang. In 1946, an estimated 35 private schools were under the influence of the Kuomintang (Sweeting, 1993, p. 194). The government’s concern about who was in control of education was reflected in and increased by several incidents. For instance, in 1948 the Education Department proclaimed that amendments should “be made to the ultra-nationalistic segments of Kuomintang-sponsored history, geography, and civics textbooks, and urged that a civics textbook especially prepared in and for Hong Kong should be published” (Sweeting, 1993, p. 196). In the late 1940s, the Hong Kong government’s wariness about the activities of the Kuomintang was overwhelmed by anxiety about the success of the Chinese

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EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION Table 5.2: The Percentage of Day Pupils in Two Types of Secondary School in Hong Kong, 1960–1990

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

Chinese-medium

English-medium

42.1 29.0 23.3 21.3 12.3 9.5 8.3

57.9 71.0 76.7 78.7 87.7 90.5 91.7

Source: Lee (1997, p. 166).

Communist Party in the context of the Cold War. In order to limit Communist influence, the Education Ordinance was amended in 1948. This empowered the Director of Education to refuse to register any school teacher, deregister a registered teacher, close any school, and control the curricula and textbooks of all schools (Sweeting, 1993, p. 199). In 1949, a Special Bureau in the Education Department was set up to fight Communism in the schools. In 1952, as recommended by the Special Bureau, the first Hong Kong Chinese School Certificate Examination was instituted. At the same time, the separate committees on textbooks and syllabuses were replaced by the Syllabuses and Textbooks Committee, and mandated to perform wider and more positive functions. Supported by the socio-economic value of English in Hong Kong society, the above strategies were found to be extremely useful. Table 5.2 shows the decline of Chinese-medium secondary schools in Hong Kong as the English-medium schools grew in popularity. 3.2. Macau: Non-Interventionist Attitude and Poly-centered, Decentralized System Reflecting the Macau government’s unwillingness to devote many resources to the territory, together with its non-interventionist attitude toward education before 1987, Macau has never had a single, unique educational system but an uncoordinated poly-centered collection of systems (Alves Pinto, 1987; Bray & Koo, 2004; Rosa, 1990). Its separate systems were imported, with or without adaptation, from Portugal, the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. The number of years in the primary, junior secondary, and senior secondary cycles varied according to the model. In the mid-1980s, the Portuguese model had a 4+2+3+2+1 pattern, and the China and Taiwan ones were 6+3+3. The principal model modified from Hong Kong’s Anglo-Chinese schools had a 6+5+1 structure. One way to simplify classification of Macau’s diverse schools is to group them by language of instruction. Some schools operate in Portuguese, others in Chinese, and yet others in English. Figure 5.5 shows the typical structures of education in each language group in the early 1990s. It also shows a fourth category labeled Luso-Chinese. These schools, which were run by the government, used Chinese as the main medium of instruction but taught Portuguese as a compulsory subject. Although Figure 5.5 was officially used from 1989/1990 (Governo de Macau, 1990) to 1992/1993 (Governo de Macau, 1994a), it was still a good representation of Macau’s

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Figure 5.5: Systems of Education in Macau by Language of Instruction in 1992/1993. Source: Macau (1994a), p. 205.

situation at the end of the decade. Among the Macau schools in 1999/2000, 83.1% operated in Chinese, 4.4% were Luso-Chinese, 8.1% operated in English, and 4.4% operated in Portuguese (Governo de Macau, 2001b, p. 9). Another notable aspect of education in Macau is the distinction between official and private schools. In 2000/2001, the former comprised only 15.0% of the total number of schools (Table 5.3). Many schools were privately owned by religious bodies, social service organizations, commercial enterprises, and individuals. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Macau was the most important single contributor, running about a quarter of the schools. Macau has a long history of Western-style education. The first European style university in the Far East was established by the Jesuits in Macau in 1594 (Pires, 1991, p. 16), and the Protestant Church established a small college in Macau in 1839 Table 5.3: Number of Schools by Level and Ownership, Macau, 2000/2001 Level Pre-primary and preparatory Primary Secondary Pre-primary and primary Primary and secondary Pre-primary, primary, and secondary Special Total

Government

Private

Total

6 7 2 1 0 0 1

11 4 11 36 12 17 5

17 11 13 37 12 17 6

17

96

113

Source: Department of Education and Youth (2001), Macau (www2.dsej.gov.mo/ ∼webdsej/www/statisti/edu).

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(Cheng & Wong, 1994, p. 73). In parallel with this Western influence, rich Chinese families operated small schools, chia-shu, from the early 1800s (Pires, 1991, p. 18). In 1893, the Portuguese government set up its official secondary school in Macau, which was also the first Portuguese official school in the Far East (Governo de Macau, 1994d, p. 55). The first official primary school was established in 1894, and the first official kindergarten in 1923. These schools were effectively Portuguese schools operated in Macau. They followed the Portuguese system with Portuguese teachers adopting Portuguese curricula and textbooks. In 1998/1999, the government-run Portuguese schools were combined and turned into a private Portuguese-medium school which secured support from the government in Portugal for future operational costs (MCEA, 1998, Vol. 1; Wong, 1998). Government documents showed that Luso-Chinese primary education commenced at the end of the 19th century, but the origins were informal and the scale was very small compared with the Portuguese schools (Governo de Macau, 1994d, p. 42). All students in these small primary schools were Chinese, who were taught by Chinese and Portuguese teachers. The schools were intended for poor Chinese, and no fees were charged (Pires, 1991, p. 18). Although the Macau government provided education for students in official schools, it was reluctant to devote the resources necessary to extend its influence on education for most of the local Chinese. As in Hong Kong, before 1911 chia-shu (family schools), ssu-shu (private schools), and i-hsueh (charitable schools) were the most common forms of educational organizations among local Chinese. In the early 1920s, facing a tide of refugees, the Macau government remained reluctant to provide education for local Chinese. Its non-interventionist attitude, neither controlling nor supporting the private sector (Alves Pinto, 1987; Rosa, 1990), allowed the growth of private Chinese schools. During this period of turmoil, the growth and development of private educational organizations exceeded those with government support (Pires, 1991, p. 18). However, this non-interventionist attitude also provided much room for the influence of the Nationalist ferment from China. For instance, in 1922, 1 year after Sun Yat-sen established a revolutionary government in Guangzhou, a Nationalist Movement was initiated in China and promoted civic education. Most of the private schools in Macau supported this movement by introducing civic education and adopting the same curriculum and textbooks (Lau, 1992, p. 49; Ng, 1992, p. 90). In 1929, physical education was introduced into the Macau school curriculum in accordance with recommendations by the Nationalist government (Chan, 1994). In addition to the influence from China, the local Chinese borrowed Hong Kong’s model as early as 1914, 1 year after the enactment of Hong Kong’s Education Ordinance. The Macau English College was established in 1914, and followed the Hong Kong system. Most of the graduates of this secondary school went to Hong Kong to sit for the University of Hong Kong examination. The school was closed in the early 1930s due to the lack of resources (MCEA, 1966, Vol. 23, p. 19). During the period up to the mid-1930s, there was still only a small government section within the police force responsible for the regulations and licenses for the schools. The control was minimal and not focused on matters of pedagogy (MCEA, 1988, Vol. 137, p. 15; Wong, 1991, p. 62). By the early 1930s, as in Hong Kong, most of the private schools, both Christian and non-Christian, had registered with

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the Education Department in Guangdong. They followed the 6+3+3 system that had been established by the Nanjing government in 1922. Private schools also adopted the curriculum and textbooks used in China, and presented their senior middle graduates for university entrance examinations in Guangzhou (Cheung, 1991, p. 116). As mentioned above, in the early 1950s the Hong Kong government sought to influence local education due to the political tensions in China. In Macau, the apathy of the colonial government toward these political tensions marked the point of bifurcation for the development of Chinese-medium schools in the two places. In 1945, following the end of World War II most schools, teachers, and students which had migrated to Macau moved back to China. The establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 attracted some people back to their motherland, but forced others to seek refuge in Hong Kong and Macau. Chinese private schools struggled to survive in the early 1950s after the sudden drop in the number of students. The non-Christian schools suffered most because the Catholic schools received support from the Diocese of Macau, and Protestant schools were supported by local or foreign churches. This challenge, together with the non-interventionist attitude of the Macau government, attracted competition between the Communists and Nationalists to exert influence on these schools. At the beginning of this competition, the pro-Nationalist force was in a stronger position. The long-established relationship between the Nationalist Party and Christianity, especially the Catholic Church, enabled the Taiwan government to resume its linkage with the Christian schools in Macau after the civil war. Furthermore, the diplomatic relations between the Taiwan government, Kuomintang and the Portuguese government, and the establishment of a Chinese consul of the Taiwan government in Macau, gave a more favorable condition for the pro-Nationalist force to compete for the non-Christian schools. This dominance of the Nationalist Party was overturned in 1966, as an unintended consequence of the riots stimulated by the China’s Cultural Revolution. Overt conflict was ignited between the Catholic Church and the Communists in Macau. Red-guard attacks were launched against the Macau government, and the Diocese and proNationalist Catholic schools were besieged by the pro-Communist masses (MCEA, 1967, 1968). Anti-colonial, anti-foreign, and anti-Christian feelings were mixed with nationalistic and ethnic zeal. In contrast to the pattern in Hong Kong, the incident did not change the Macau government’s non-interventionist attitude toward social services and education. Some Catholic leaders who were frightened by the incident moved to Hong Kong and left a chance for the pro-Communist associations to develop their influence further. In addition to the Diocese and Catholic schools, pro-Nationalist organizations including schools were attacked. Most of these organizations and their leaders were expelled from Macau. For instance, in the early 1960s there were around 10 Nationalistaffiliated schools in Macau known as the Chinese Oversea Schools (Macau Chinese Oversea Schools Association, 1962). However, the success of the Communists in the conflict led to the extinction of these schools a few years after the riot, due to the lack of support and resources. The influence of this political incident is still discernible. In the 1990s the private schools could still be divided into two groups. Christian schools were run by the Catholic or Protestant churches, while non-Christian schools were supported by

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welfare associations or philanthropic individuals. Among the non-Christian schools, some were patriotic and affiliated to the pro-Communist Macau Chinese Education Association (Lai, 1992, p. 35). These two groups of schools were balanced in power, with approximately equal numbers (Leung, 1993; Rosa, 1990). 3.3.

Analysis

In order to understand the social origins of the education systems in the colonial history of Hong Kong and Macau, the combined influence of the voluntary missionary and government efforts together with their competition with the Chinese influences should be addressed. At the very beginning, both governments were reluctant to play a major role in educational provision for local Chinese. The reason has been summarized precisely by Tam (1995, p. 91): When the two places came under colonial rule, the native population was submissive and the size of intellectual body able to mobilize the mass was almost non-existent. The need to sustain power through knowledge was not urgent. Thus, education, an important institution to spread knowledge, was entrusted to church bodies so as to reduce colonial expenditure. Before World War II, the two colonies displayed similar patterns in education development. In Hong Kong, although the 1873 Code of Grant-in-Aid for schools and the 1913 Education Ordinance signified the birth of the local education system which was an importation of an external model, the unification and systematization processes suggested by Archer did not lead to the birth of the system because of the influences from Mainland China on local Chinese education. The education system was developed after World War II through different restrictive strategies employed by the government (Luk, 1991; Sweeting, 1993). In Macau, due to the apathy of the government toward the Kuomintang’s enthusiasm and the later Communist threat, educational provision remained fragmented and uncoordinated. The non-interventionist attitude of the Macau government was the major reason for it not being able to employ the restrictive strategy to build up the Macau system. 4. 4.1.

DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROVISION AFTER THE 1970s Hong Kong: Improving Quality for Compulsory Free Education

In Hong Kong, free education was introduced by the government, and aided primary schools, in 1971. It was extended to junior secondary schooling in 1978, and the following year 9 years of schooling were made compulsory. Few countries could boast such an achievement in so short a time. In the early 1980s, by mode of financing, there were three main types of schools: government, government-aided, and private. Private schools were subdivided into private non-profit-making schools and private independent schools. In government and government-aided schools, no fees were charged at the primary and junior secondary levels. Private schools charged fees at all levels, but their fees were subject to the approval of the Director of Education. This expansion of the public sector

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Table 5.4: Distribution of School Enrollment in Hong Kong by Mode of Financing, 1980

Primary Junior secondary Senior secondary

Government

Aided

Private bought places

Private

5.9 5.9 5.7

81.6 39.2 33.0

– 51.2 0.3

12.5 3.7 61.0

Source: Government of Hong Kong (1981, p. 20).

of secondary education during the late 1970s and 1980s could only be achieved by buying places from private schools, which was known as the Bought Place Scheme. Table 5.4 shows the distribution of school enrollment by mode of financing in 1980. The fact that large numbers of places in sub-standard private schools had to be bought by the government was widely considered problematic. One way to improve the quality of basic education was replacement of bought places with purpose-built and well-equipped aided schools. By the early 1990s, most of the bought places in private schools had already been phased out. In due course, however, the public sector, which embraced both government and aided schools, was considered too uniform. In order to increase diversity and also further improve quality, the government launched two major schemes in the early 1990s. One was the School Management Initiative (SMI), which was described as a form of decentralization though some schools found it insufficiently flexible to meet their needs (Wong, 1997). The other innovation was the Direct Subsidy Scheme (DSS), which aimed “to encourage the growth of a strong private sector as an alternative to public sector education for parental choice” (Government of Hong Kong, 1999). The DSS subsidized some existing private schools and encouraged aided schools to transfer to the private sector. By 2000, 34 DSS schools existed: 32 at the secondary level, and 2 at the primary level. They received an annual subsidy calculated in terms of the average cost of an aided school place for each student enrolled. They also had freedom to set their own curricula, fees, and entrance requirements.

4.2.

Macau: Building up the System with Compulsory Free Education

Portugal’s 1974 revolution and the subsequent partial decolonization of Macau brought a slight change in the non-interventionist attitude of the Macau government. In 1977, a law for subsidizing the private schools was passed (Governo de Macau, 1977). Direct subsidies, relaxation of tax burdens, and provision of studentships were the main governments strategies to support the private schools. In 1985, a law for subsidizing private school teachers was passed (Governo de Macau, 1985), and in the same year a government Luso-Chinese Secondary School was established. Another indicator of this gradual change of the government attitude was the public expenditure on education. In 1975, education was allocated just 2.2% of the total public expenditure. Over the next decade this percentage increased markedly, reaching 5.3% in 1986—though the percentage was still low in international terms (Bray, 1991, p. 87). Major stimulus to rectify the government’s neglect of education in Macau came from the 1987 Sino-Portuguese declaration. Concerning education, the declaration

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(People’s Republic of China/Republic of Portugal, 1987, Annex section VII) stated that: The Macau Special Administrative Region shall on its own decide policies in the field of culture, education, science and technology, such as policies regarding the languages of instruction (including Portuguese) and the system of academic qualifications and the recognition of degrees. From the government viewpoint, education reform was important for future economic and political development. From the local viewpoint, citizens of Macau could consider their future with more confidence if education development was accelerated (Lai, 1991, p. 64). In 1988, a Committee of Educational Reform was set up and embarked on a survey of education. A major seminar on education was organized for public discussion in 1989, and a draft policy document was released in 1990. The proposals included a unified Macau educational system, a public school leaving examination system, and an unambiguous relationship between the government and the private schools (Bray & Tang, 1993, p. 163). In 1991, the framework for a Macau educational system was set out in a pair of laws for basic and higher education (Governo de Macau, 1991a,b). The law for basic education was later supplemented by regulations for private education organizations (Governo de Macau, 1993), a law on curriculum organization in pre-primary and primary schools (Governo de Macau, 1994b), and a law for secondary schools (Governo de Macau, 1994c). The year 1995/1996 was a further historic moment in Macau’s educational development. A law on fee-free basic education was approved (Governo de Macau, 1995a), under which all private schools could choose to become members of a conjoint system to provide 7 years of fee-free education for Macau pre-primary and primary students. By 1997/1998, a further target of providing 10 years of fee-free education for the conjoint schools had been met; and by 1998/1999, around 80% of the private schools were conjoint schools (MCEA, 1999, Vol. 5, p. 4). 4.3.

Analysis

Two features of Hong Kong’s educational development are important to note here. On the one hand, unification and systematization of the Hong Kong education system proceeded by phasing out the private schools from the early 1970s to the early 1990s. On the other hand, the degree of differentiation and specialization was limited within that period because aided schools were heavily influenced by the government. In other words, the government became the dominant ownership group, and educational provision was standardized. In the early 1990s, the SMI was implemented in order to improve school management quality and encourage school diversity, especially in the aided sector. Implementation of the DSS showed a change in the government’s attitude toward private schools. Good quality independent private schools, it was felt, could contribute to the differentiation and specialization of the centralized education system. With this in mind, the government was willing not only to recognize their contributions but also to provide financial support.

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Macau started to build a unified education system with fee-free education in the 1990s. It was impossible for the Macau government to employ restrictive strategies to eliminate the well-established Leftist schools along the lines that the Hong Kong government had followed. The structure of the poly-centered collection of systems together with the power of the sponsoring groups behind each center forced the Macau government to employ substitutive strategies. The adoption of the substitutive approach was not easy, though was easier than a restrictive approach. Lack of resources was one challenge. Without government support in the past, most private schools could only survive with small campuses and large numbers of students. In the early 1990s, the average class size for private kindergartens, primary schools, and secondary schools was 52, 50, and 45, respectively, and it was not uncommon to have classrooms with over 60 students (Rosa, 1991; Wong, 1994). If the government had wanted to compete with the private schools, it would either have had to build many schools of its own or to gain control through financial assistance. The continuous influx of illegal immigrants exacerbated the problems. The second challenge facing the Macau government during the early 1990s was the place of the Portuguese language as a subject in the curriculum (MCEA, 1996, Vol. 3, p. 2; Yue, 1994). From the Portuguese perspective, Luso-Chinese schools, in which the Portuguese language was a compulsory subject, served as the model for the future. From the local perspective, Portuguese was not an international language and should have only been an elective. Thus, in contrast to the replacement in Hong Kong of Chinese-medium schools by Anglo-Chinese schools, the Luso-Chinese schools would have difficulties competing with the Chinese-medium schools or even AngloChinese schools in Macau. After the return to Chinese administration in 1999, the Macau SAR government had much less concern about the place of the Portuguese language in the curriculum and the use of substitutive strategies. More resources, both materials and administrative, were devoted to unification and systematization of the emerging system. Standardization of the structure of school management boards and systematization of financial auditing procedures for school expenditures were among the tasks embarked upon. Some government officials considered modification of the 1991 education law an inevitable step to secure a more unified system (MCEA, 2001). However, although the Macau SAR government had strong goals of unification and systematization, the task was hampered by a deteriorating economic situation. Policies had to be scaled back in the systematization of teachers’ salary scales and qualifications and in the standardization of class sizes. 5. 5.1.

SCHOOL LEAVING EXAMINATIONS AND TERTIARY EDUCATION Hong Kong: Centralized Systems

Tertiary education has existed in Hong Kong for over a century. A College of Medicine was established in 1887 and was later incorporated into the University of Hong Kong, which was founded in 1911. The University of Hong Kong Matriculation Examination was introduced in 1913. In 1954, the University introduced two levels of examination: the Advanced and the Ordinary Levels, following what was then a dominant UK model. In 1937, in order to select students for matriculation classes, the

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Hong Kong Certificate Examination was introduced for Anglo-Chinese secondary school graduates. In 1952, this examination was complemented by the Hong Kong Chinese School Certificate Examination for graduates of Chinese-medium middle schools. In 1963 the Chinese University of Hong Kong was formed, mainly to serve such students, by the amalgamation of three post-secondary colleges. In order to unify the two Ordinary Level examinations for graduates of AngloChinese and Chinese-medium middle schools, in 1974 the two examinations were merged to form the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination (HKCEE). Examination papers with same content were set in both Chinese and English. In 1977, the Hong Kong Examinations Authority (HKEA) was established as an independent, self-funding, and non-profit-making statutory body. Its main role was to operate two local public examinations: the HKCEE and the Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination (HKALE). The HKCEE results were used by secondary schools to select Secondary six students, whereas the HKALE results were used by the tertiary institutions to select students. By the late 1990s, eight tertiary institutions were funded by the University Grants Committee (UGC). They were the City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong Institute of Education, Lingnan University, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and University of Hong Kong. The UGC had been established in 1965 with principles and practices based on its counterpart in the United Kingdom to advise the Hong Kong government on the facilities, development, and financial needs of the university sector. 5.2.

Macau: External Versus Internal Examinations

Another feature of the Macau poly-centered collection of systems has been diversity of school leaving and university entrance examinations. Only in a few proCommunist schools were university entrance examinations a major concern until the late 1970s. Before the success of Macau’s economic development, tertiary education was an impossible dream for most of their working class students. However, the extraordinarily gifted students obtained support from pro-Communist organizations to pursue their tertiary education in China. In 1977, the Mainland National Unified College Entrance Examinations were restored after the Cultural Revolution, while at the same time the Mainland door was opened for Chinese students from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. An informal examination center was set up in Macau for the secondary graduates of pro-Communist schools. In 1984, this center was transformed into an official Macau examination center for the entrance examination of the universities in China. The number of candidates increased steadily during the 1980s and 1990s, and secondary graduates from all types of schools sat for this Chinese examination (Lau, 1993, p. 61). Other systems had different approaches. The Portuguese schools followed the Portuguese system, and their graduates sat for the Portuguese University Entrance Examination in a local examination center. Most Chinese sections of the Catholic and Protestant schools had had links with the Republic of China government since the early 1930s. An entrance examination to Taiwan universities for Overseas Chinese was established in 1954 by the Overseas Chinese Education Committee (Chan, 1992, p. 391). Prior to 1966, candidates could sit for their examination in an informal

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89

center in Macau. The success of the pro-Communist organizations in expelling proNationalists from Macau in 1966 forced religious schools to sever their link with the pro-Nationalists (MCEA, 1967, Vols. 27–28). Macau students, therefore, had to travel to Hong Kong, where the pro-Communist forces were curbed by the Hong Kong government, to sit for the Taiwan examination. Dramatically, the steady improvement of relationships between the China and Taiwan governments after 1979 paved the path for the establishment of a Macau center for the Taiwan examination in 1993/1994, 5 years before the reversion of Macau’s sovereignty to China. The Catholic schools took turns to run this examination center, and the popularity of the Taiwan examination was comparable with that of the Chinese examination. In addition to this Taiwan examination, the Hong Kong Higher Level Examination, before its abolition in 1991, had been an alternative for Macau secondary graduates. This examination was very popular among the secondary graduates from one Protestant school, Pui Cheng, which had a strong link with its sister school in Hong Kong and with the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The Hong Kong examination also attracted graduates from many Catholic schools in Macau, even though they had to travel to Hong Kong to sit for the examination. Hong Kong’s influence on the English sections of the Catholic schools was even more significant. Students in these sections could sit for the General Certificate of Education (GCE) (London) examination as early as 1954 (Governo de Macau, 1994d, p. 111), and many traveled to Hong Kong to do so. The first Macau examination center was set up in 1974, and by 1976 there were four GCE examination centers in Macau, all located at the Catholic schools (Governo de Macau, 1994d). This Hong Kong influence, which originated from the UK, was also substantial for commercial subjects. The first Pitman examination center was set up in 1965, and the first London Chamber of Commerce examination center was established in 1975. These centers were located at a Catholic girls’ school (Governo de Macau, 1994d, p. 96). This entire dependence on the external provision of school leaving examinations and tertiary education did not change until 1990, 2 years after the launch of Macau’s education reform. In that year the University of East Asia, which had been established in 1981, operated its first entrance examination for Macau’s secondary graduates. A brief historical review of the university, the territory’s principal tertiary institution, may explain this late development of local entrance examinations for Macau students. What is now called the University of Macau evolved from the University of East Asia, which was founded as a private, commercial enterprise. Its courses were designed to follow the Hong Kong system for students with 7 years of secondary education, and its language of instruction was English. In the early years, most students were from Hong Kong and other parts of East Asia rather than from Macau (Mellor, 1988). The government purchased the main campus of the university from the private owners in 1988, and in 1991 the institution was renamed the University of Macau. This signified the government’s determination to remodel the institution. By the mid-1990s the majority of the university’s 3,000 students came from Macau secondary schools (Bray, 2001, pp. 146–149). The 1990s also brought the establishment of other institutions of higher education. In 1991, the Macau Polytechnic Institute was created from a section that had split off from the University of East Asia. The United Nations University, which was

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Table 5.5: Number of Macau Students Receiving Assistance for Higher Education Study Through the Department of Education and Youth, by Place of Study, 1989/1990–2001/2002 1993/1994

1995/1996

1997/1998

1999/2000

2001/2002

Macau Mainland China Portugal Hong Kong Taiwan USA Canada Australia Others

1989/1990 4,694 202 73 31 322 27 12 9 3

1991/1992 897 202 125 23 342 20 5 7 2

1,092 313 68 17 432 17 0 0 6

1,014 595 69 2 568 17 4 1 17

1,060 888 54 6 562 21 3 4 13

1,208 1,130 36 8 475 26 4 9 9

1,524 1,020 18 8 452 18 6 7 7

Total

1,148

1,623

1,945

2,287

2,611

2,905

3,060

Source: Department of Education and Youth, Macau.

headquartered in Japan, set up an International Institute for Software Technology in Macau which commenced operations in 1992. Three years later, the Institute for Tourism Studies was founded by the Macau government; between 1995 and 2000 five institutions were established by the private sector. These institutions were the Institute of European Studies of Macau, the Inter-University Institute of Macau, the Kiang Wu Nursing College of Macau, the Macau Institute of Management, and the Macau University of Science and Technology (Bray et al., 2002). The increasing support of the Macau government can also be seen in the figures on the scholarships provided to Macau students by the government’s Department of Education and Youth (Table 5.5). Although different types of grants and loans for tertiary students studying in Macau or abroad had been offered by the government since 1981, a major shift from supporting students of official schools to supporting students from private schools only materialized in the late 1980s. Table 5.5 indicates that the most popular destinations were Macau itself, followed by Mainland China and Taiwan. In summary, the 1980s and 1990s brought about rapid expansion of tertiary education in Macau. By 1995/1996, over 80% of senior secondary graduates proceeded to tertiary education (MCEA, 1996, Vol. 4, p. 38). Among these students, over half were attracted by the two major local tertiary institutions. The preferences of students who pursued their tertiary education abroad were still linked strongly to the nature of their school sponsoring bodies, a practice with political–religious roots in history. 5.3.

Analysis

Due to the early effort by the Hong Kong government to control education through examinations and the establishment of the UGC in the 1960s, the tertiary education sector has been unified and systematized, and has expanded significantly as well. Although the number of Hong Kong secondary graduates pursuing tertiary education overseas has always been high (Postiglione, 1997), there is a unified and well-established tertiary sector within the Hong Kong education system for most of the secondary school graduates who would like to study locally. Before 1991, the Chinese University of Hong Kong offered 4-year undergraduate courses in contrast to the 3-year courses offered in all other UGC-funded institutions, and enrolled Form

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91

6 instead of Form 7 graduates through the administration of the Hong Kong Higher Level Examination. After considerable debate, the examination was abolished and the Chinese University of Hong Kong moved to a credit-unit system in which 3 years of study was the norm. This showed that both physical and political resources could be deployed by the Hong Kong government to achieve its education policy objectives. While the Hong Kong government could adopt restrictive strategies to eliminate the influences of Mainland China and replaced many of the Chinese-medium schools by Anglo-Chinese institutions, the Macau government could only deploy limited substitutive strategies. The decentralized pattern is likely to persist in Macau, for at least one major reason. Before 1989, Portuguese was the only official language in Macau, despite of its unpopularity among the majority of local Chinese. This regulation, on one hand, restrained the participation of local Chinese in the civil service, especially at the top; and it also rendered the educational qualifications of most local Chinese unrecognized. This situation was not altered until the government resolved to localize its civil service, making Chinese an official language alongside Portuguese. In 1993, a consultative committee for educational qualification recognition was set up. Representatives from the pro-Communist Macau Chinese Education Association and the Macau Catholic Schools Association were invited to become members of this committee, which also included principals from Catholic and Protestant schools (Governo de Macau, 1995b). By 1994, the government had officially recognized 2,649 primary certificates and 6,759 secondary certificates. Among these academic credentials, 83.6% were attained in local private schools whereas 15.4% were from schools in China (Governo de Macau, 1995b, p. 64). Furthermore, by 1993, the government had officially recognized 1,811 university degrees and 96 special degrees. Among these tertiary qualifications, 50% were attained in China whereas 20% were from Taiwan (Governo de Macau, 1995b, p. 64). The orientation of the official system for recognizing educational qualifications was maintained in the postcolonial period. Although the development of tertiary education in Macau in the 1980s and 1990s was of considerable significance, the Macau government had only limited substitutive strategies when facing the challenge of Mainland Chinese influence in terms of school leaving examinations and provision of tertiary education. In 2000, a team of Hong Kong scholars was invited by the newly established Macau SAR government to conduct a consultancy study on the strategic development of higher education (Bray et al., 2002). This was an important effort by the new Macau SAR government to systematize the tertiary sector. The comprehensive study made recommendations in many areas, including the machinery for policy-making and coordination, costs and financing, strategies for quality assurance, and institutional identity. Nevertheless, Mainland Chinese influence and decentralized patterns will probably continue for the foreseeable future. Specialization and differentiation will continue to dominate and to obstruct efforts to unify and systematize. 6.

CONCLUSION

This chapter focuses on the social origins of the education systems in Hong Kong and Macau. The chapter argues that before World War II the two colonies were very similar in terms of competition between colonial governments and Mainland Chinese

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governments for educational provision. The different reactions of the Hong Kong and Macau governments to the success of the Communist Party in Mainland China marked the point of bifurcation for the development of Chinese-medium schools in the two territories. In Hong Kong, restrictive strategies supported by the legislative power of the Hong Kong government and the socio-economic value of English achieved exclusion of Chinese influences, and the degree of unification and systematization was strong within the centralized system. In Macau, due to the non-interventionist attitude of the government, educational provision remained fragmented and uncoordinated in the late 1980s. The Macau government only started to think about its own education system after the 1987 Sino-Portuguese declaration. This chapter argues that the structure of the poly-centered collection of systems together with the power of the sponsoring groups behind each center forced the Macau government to employ substitutive strategies. Furthermore, the chapter argues that even the adoption of the substitutive approach was not easy because of the lack of physical resources, the weak legislative power of the Macau government, and the low socio-economic value of the Portuguese language. While during the 1990s the Macau government was busy constructing its education system, the Hong Kong government became more aware of the problems of government dominance and of educational uniformity. In order to promote differentiation and specialization within a centralized system to cater for different needs in the Hong Kong society, the SMI and DSS were launched in the early 1990s. Analysis of school tertiary education shows similar patterns. The Hong Kong government had sufficient physical and political resources to use when dealing with educational conflicts within the centralized system, whereas the Macau government had limited resources when adopting substitutive strategies to minimize external influences. The Hong Kong government considered the development of a more differentiated and specialized tertiary sector within its centralized system, and during the early years of the new century moved toward that goal. In contrast, the Macau government worked hard to create a more systematized tertiary sector. In addition to comparing Hong Kong and Macau in terms of their development and centralization and decentralization processes, this chapter contributes to the conceptual literature by examining the possibilities and limitations of Archer’s tools for comparing education development in colonial settings. First, Archer’s sociohistorical and comparative approach is found to be valuable even for the colonial setting. Second, although her ideas about the mono-integrated characteristics of education provision at the beginning of the first cycle did not fit patterns in the two colonies because educational provisions had always been the concern of Christians, colonialists, Chinese nationalists, and Communists since the early 20th century, the chapter has shown the value of her advice to pay attention to conflicts among the dominant and assertive groups within the society. This approach is especially useful for the examination of the substitutive and restrictive strategies adopted by different interest groups and their relation with the emergence and elaboration of the decentralized and centralized education systems respectively. Third, her suggestion about the four universal new characteristics of newly emerged education systems: unification, systematization, differentiation, and specialization, together with their variations during the elaboration of the centralized and decentralized education systems, is found to be a useful conceptual tool for comparing educational development in the two colonial settings.

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The application of Archer’s conceptual tools in the above analysis does have problems, the greatest of which is the unambiguous identification of the dominant group and the assertive group. In Hong Kong, the government could be considered the dominant group, whereas the Chinese nationalists (or communists) could be described as the assertive group for educational provisions; but such usage of these two terms has already shifted away from the original usage, which excluded external influences. Therefore, the use of the restrictive and substitutive strategies in relation to the conflicts between the assertive groups and dominant group in this chapter is quite different from the original use. Nevertheless, Archer’s ideas about the deployment of physical and legislative resources in relation to the restrictive and substitutive strategies are found to be useful. NOTE This chapter is a revised version of the article by Tang Kwok-Chun and Mark Bray (2000) ‘Colonical Models and the Evolution of Education Systems: Centralization and Decentralization in Hong Kong and Macau’, Journal of Educational Administration, Vol. 38, No. 5. The authors express appreciation to the publishers for permission to use the material. The publishers’ website is: www.emeraldinsight.com/jea.htm.

7.

REFERENCES

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Chapter 6 TRENDS AND ISSUES IN DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN∗ Hiromitsu Muta

1.

INTRODUCTION

In the late 19th century, Japan centralized its institutions, including education, in attempt to catch up with the Western industrialized nations. However, in order to maintain its competitive edge as a world leader in the economic globalization process, a century later the national leadership instituted a series of reforms designed to deregulate and decentralize the educational system. The objective was to provide sufficient flexibility and local control at the school level so that creativity, individual initiative, and the spirit of entrepreneurship would become part of the teaching learning process for each new generation of Japanese students. Recently, deregulation and decentralization have been underway in all aspects of education. At the same time, several evaluation systems were introduced to assure the quality of education remains high. Although the several new schemes have been put into practice, the impact of those changes is still not clear. This study aims at introducing the present status of these movements, problems, and prospects for the future. 2.

PAST AND PRESENT SYSTEM OF JAPANESE EDUCATION

In order to build a strong and unified country that could first catch up with and then cope and compete with the advanced Western nations, toward the end of the 19th century, the Japanese state centralized all its institutions, including the military, police, and education. In 1872, when the first modern education law was enacted, the state made decisions concerning the goals and subject matter of education, textbooks, and the status of teachers and students. Responsibility for the provision of facilities, school equipment, and financial support was delegated to municipalities, but under the supervision of the national government. Following the end of World War II, a report prepared by the First American Mission on Education guided educational reform in Japan. This report criticized the centralized system of education in Japan and recommended a decentralized school system based on the American system. According to the plan, schools and school districts would be given considerable independence, and members of the community ∗ The

initial version of this paper was appeared in the Journal of Educational Administration, 38(5), 2000.

97 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 97–113.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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would have opportunities to participate in the management of schools. Consistent with new constitutional guarantees for local self-government, the Board of Education Law of 1948 provided local governments with authority over education matters. Centralized control of educational administration by the national government was no longer considered legitimate. Local educational administration was distinguished from other branches of local public administration. Local boards of education were designated as independent administrative councils. The Minister of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture (hereafter referred to as the Minister of Education) and local boards of education were to function as equals rather than in a master–servant relationship. It is important to note that these reforms ran counter to the Japanese tradition of centralized organization and management. In addition, they were implemented according to the dictates of an occupying force rather than in response to the will of the Japanese nation. The changes therefore violated the principles of democracy and liberty (Sugihara, 1998). The system imposed by the occupation failed for various political reasons, such conflict between conservative and radical factions in Japan, cold war struggles, and the underdevelopment of democracy as a form of governance at all levels. As the occupation came to an end, the new system was continually modified. Revision of the Board of Education Law in 1956 represented a major change introduced during that period: decentralization became nominal and the national government reestablished control over schools throughout the prefectures and municipalities. Also, a national curriculum, known as the “Course of Study,” was instituted and followed strictly throughout the country. A rigid hierarchy, with the national government located at the top, was reestablished (Wakai, 1996). 3.

PRESENT STATE OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

In order to establish a frame of reference, some basic facts about the educational management structure in Japan might be useful. The popularly elected National Diet designates the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, in turn, appoints the Minister of Education. In each of Japan’s prefectures there is a board of education made up of five members who are appointed by the governor. The board, with the approval of the Minister of Education, appoints the Prefectural Superintendent of Education. Boards of education also exist at the local level, in the cities, towns, and villages. Mayors appoint members of those boards. In contrast to the practice of prefectural boards of education, the superintendent of a municipal board of education is elected by the board members, with the approval of the prefectural board of education. Most national educational and cultural activities fall under the authority of the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education supervises and allocates financial support to local boards of education and may require them to report on their educational activities. As occasion demands, the Ministry of Education makes inquiries and gives orders for necessary improvements, or corrections, to local boards of education. The prefectural and municipal boards of education oversee local public educational and cultural institutions. Private schools, however, are supervised by the prefectural governors rather than the municipal authorities. Prefectural governors have the power to approve the establishment or closing of private schools and to collect necessary information.

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National, prefectural, and municipal educational agencies are formally independent of each other. However, the Minister of Education offers guidance, advice and assistance to local boards of education; prefectural boards of education carry out similar functions in relation to municipal boards of education. Lower level agencies tend to view such advice as orders that must be followed. Consequently, through informal advice from the top, the administrative structure tends to operate as a centralized system. 4.

DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION

In the 1980s, powerful economic networks in Japan began to press for a series of educational reforms. The issue most frequently highlighted by critics was that the education system designed after World War II was effective in helping Japan catch up to more advanced countries, but it was not capable of developing citizens with the intellectual creativity necessary to make the nation a world leader. Educational institutions were viewed as closed, overly standardized, and lacking a spirit of internationalism. In response to growing pressures for reform, a National Council on Educational Reform that reported directly to the Prime Minister was organized in 1984. Not unlike theNation at Risk report published in the United States in 1983, the Council created a sensation by issuing a report that forcefully called for the liberalization of education. However, education networks, comfortable with the old style, were slow to respond. Nevertheless, changes that fell in line with the recommendations presented in the report were gradually introduced. Although it was eventually dissolved in 1987, the Council managed to launch a series of reforms designed to deregulate and decentralize the Japanese education system (NIER, 1988). Among the plans it set in motion were a reconsideration of the roles of national and local governments, the revitalization of boards of education, and a reexamination of the function of the school districts. The trend toward increased deregulation and administrative reform continued into the 1990s. According to a report submitted by the National Committee for the Promotion of Decentralization in 1996, local governments were advised to stop acting as subcontractors to the national government. Instead, the relationship between the two levels of government should be based on mutual cooperation, with ministries exerting minimal influence on local government. In addition, the report recommended that the national government reconsider the policy on providing educational subsidies that supported the promotion of decentralization. In January of 1997, the Ministry of Education introduced an Education Reform Program that responded to the issues raised in the First National Committee for the Promotion of Decentralization. This document raised the possibility of providing increased flexibility to school districts, increasing the level of community participation in school activities, and abolishing the appointment-approval system for selecting school superintendents. The Ministry of Education also issued an official relaxation of the school district system. The school district system used to be rigid, with few exceptions to established regulations and procedures permitted. Thanks to the Ministry’s official statement, some boards of education initiated broader selection of schools beyond the school districts at the level of compulsory education. A series of

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reforms, including the Promotion of Decentralization Plan and the Basic Law Concerning the Reform of Ministries and Agencies promoted further decentralization of school administration. Why did recent educational reforms in Japan promote the relaxation of central control over schools? Ichikawa (1995) lists neo-conservatism, changes in the power system (from a conflict driven to a consumer oriented system), a drop in the school age population (increasing competition among schools to attract students), and increasingly diversified needs in industrial circles (a diversified school system for responding to diversified needs) as the primary causes. 5.

IMPACT OF THE REPORT BY THE CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR EDUCATION

In the 1990s, a series of reports moved the education system into an era of new liberalization. Many of the issues raised in those reports were referred to in a “Promotion and Decentralization Plan.” One of these reports, produced in 1998 by the Central Council for Education, was titled “Policies on the Educational Administration of Local Governments.” The report redefined the roles of the government and the boards of education, enhanced school autonomy, and encouraged increased community participation in educational activities. This report clarified the role of the national government, and recommended that the Ministry of Education limit its practice of giving detailed advice to lower levels. In addition, it called for reduced participation by the national and prefectural governments in municipal and school activities. The following are the major proposals intended to improve the current system based on the Educational Program and most of them are realizing. Underlying all of these recommended changes is the desire for administrative reform and increased deregulation. r Abolish the appointment-approval system of superintendents: Currently, local government offices consult with upper level officials about candidates for school superintendent before making any appointments. If the informal feedback they receive from above is negative, no appointment is made. This course of action is taken to avoid any political conflict. New proposals emphasize the need to eliminate this “informal centralized approach” and call for a new system in which local assemblies select superintendents. r Reconsider requirements for school principals and vice-principals: The leadership and the management skills of school principals and vice-principals are indispensable, but the current requirements for those positions are very strict. As a result, it is often difficult to find qualified administrators to staff the schools. These requirements need to be modified. Previously, a principal was required to hold a teaching certificate and have at least 5 years experience working in schools. According to the report prepared by the Central Council for Education, the requirements for certification should be relaxed so that boards of education can appoint administrators as they deem appropriate. r Clarify the function of staff meetings: In some schools, due to the historically strong influence of teachers’ unions, most decisions are made during staff meetings. Under the new liberalization plans, a school principal can make decisions

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independent of the teaching faculty. The objective of staff meetings should be to enhance communication, mutual understanding, and the exchange of ideas among teachers—not to make decisions. If staff meetings are organized with these goals in mind, the school principal will be able to perform his professional responsibilities more smoothly because the decision by the school principal will be formally authorized. r Encourage community participation in school boards: In order for public schools to gain the trust of parents and other members of the surrounding community, schools must become more accessible. Before making important decisions, the principal needs to confer with members of the community. To achieve this goal, school boards composed of members of the community should be created. A school board system is a new practice and the board has the power of influence. A principal may use that power to oppose the teachers’ unions. r Establish local standards for class size: In Japan, the government previously set the standard class size at 40 students per elementary and lower secondary school classroom. However, because the number of students is declining, and because some areas of the country are more thinly populated than others, greater flexibility in establishing class size according to local circumstances should occur. r Create a special system for part-time teachers: The requirements for obtaining a teaching certificate are rather severe. For example, to obtain a first class Elementary School Teacher Certificate, students are required, in addition to the completion of a bachelor’s degree course, to acquire the following: 41 credits for specialized subjects (such as teaching methods), 8 credits for teaching subjects, 10 credits for specialized or teaching subjects, and 7 days experience working as care givers in special education schools and/or social welfare facilities. However, the new curriculum requires many temporary (special part-time) teachers to implement the Integrated Study Program. According to the liberalization policy, schools should be given the authority to create teaching opportunities for individuals with special knowledge and skills who may not hold teaching certificates. r Distinguish instructions and orders from guidance and advice: As I note above, schools tend to treat all government communications as direct orders. Local educators usually believe that it is safer to follow orders than to ask questions. Failing to do so might result in unfavorable treatment in the future. Under the plans for the new liberalization, instructions and orders must be distinguished from guidance. As the above examples illustrate, the report from the Central Council for Education promoted concepts such as decentralization of educational administration, the enhancement of individual initiative, school independence, and community participation in school management. The CCE also recommended the introduction of a system of school choice. 6.

THE NEW FLEXIBLE SCHOOL CURRICULUM

In Japan, it is compulsory for all schools, including private ones, to follow the national Course of Study. In the past, this document clearly defined curricular content

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and instructional hours, leaving little room for schools to design the curriculum to fit the needs of their communities. The new Course of Study, in contrast with its older version, allows schools to design more than 10% of all instructional hours. This change provides much needed academic flexibility at the local level. The new Course of Study was introduced at the kindergarten, elementary, and lower secondary levels in 1998, and in upper secondary schools in 1999. By 2003, this curricular reform was fully implemented at all levels of the system. One important component of this new approach is a new course titled Integrated Study (sogotekina gakushu). Schools have great flexibility in determining the length of Integrated Study lessons, the number of hours that should be devoted to creative teaching/learning activities, the arrangement of instructional content at each grade level, and the locally-determined subjects that are introduced at the upper secondary level. Thus, this new course provides schools with opportunities to introduce new instructional methods and content. The Ministry of Education has not offered any curricular outlines for the new Integrated Study courses. Instead, educators are expected to develop everything by themselves at the local level. However, convincing teachers to incorporate creative thinking, which had not previously been stressed, into their lesson is proving to be no easy task. In response to a barrage of requests from local schools and boards of education for guidebooks with sample lessons, the Ministry of Education developed and distributed those materials in 2000. The guidebooks quickly became best sellers. As the Ministry of Education feared, many schools have used the guidebooks as courses of study, essentially defeating the primary goals of the reform. 7.

DEREGULATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Following World War II, an increase in the number of students applying to institutions of higher education allowed most colleges and universities in Japan to recruit new students without making any special effort. Students typically selected colleges and universities based on their national reputations rather than on the curriculum they offered. The greatest challenge for high school students became passing the entrance examinations at high status universities. In order to pass the tests, high schools students must often spend long hours preparing for university entrance examinations at cram schools that offer evening and weekend classes, in addition to the time they spend in their regular schools. Once admitted to institutions of higher education, students tend not to spend a great deal of time studying. Until the 1990s, the economic situation in Japan was quite good and graduates had little difficulty finding jobs. Unlike most industrialized nations, Japanese companies relied on their own in-house programs to train new hires and were not particularly concerned with what students learned at their colleges and universities. Graduation was almost automatic at many institutions of higher education, especially in the humanities and the social sciences. However, dramatic changes began to take place in the 1990s, prompting calls for reform of the higher education system. Three of the reasons most often used to justify those demands follow: r Globalization in the information age: In the 1990s, there was a fear that students were losing interest in science and engineering. As a result, greater emphasis was placed on producing graduates who could compete in those fields at

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the international level. Universities are now expected to promote academic excellence and the development of professional workers in order to maintain a competitive edge and to lead the world in this age of globalization. r Diversification of academic interests: The ratio of secondary school graduates who go on to pursue higher education has been on the increase. In the near future it will be possible for anyone to study at a university if she is not overly selective. The declining birthrate will force all universities to attract students by featuring unique courses. They will also have to promote student flexibility to cope with changes in society. As early as the 1980s various organizations recommended the points listed above. In response to a report completed by the National Council on Educational Reform, a University Council was established in 1987. The Minister of Education directed the Council to examine “concrete measures for the improvement, individualization and activation of education and studies at institutions such as universities” (Ministry of Education, 1996). Since then, the Council has prepared numerous reports that prompted the introduction of several higher education reform initiatives. 8.

HIGHER EDUCATION CURRICULUM REFORM

The Standard for the Establishment of Universities sets out the general standards for the subject matters of university education. Before the revisions of 1991, students were required to earn: 36 general education credits for courses in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences; 8 credits in a foreign language; 4 credits in health and physical education; and 76 credits in courses in a specialized field. To meet those standards, universities had to secure teaching staff based upon the number of students who signed up for each course. Most universities divided courses and instructors into distinct general and specialized education streams. Instructors also tended to be placed in separate faculties or departments. For example, instructors on general education belong to a Faculty or a Department of General Education. Thus, the general education and specialized education curriculums were disconnected. Furthermore, general education programs were often criticized because students, who had already been taught some of the material in high school, often lost interest in these subjects. General education tended to be regarded as preparation for specialized education, and professors in the two areas were not provided equal levels of research funding. These factors often caused conflict between professors in the department of general education and those in specialized studies departments. The revisions to the Standard for the Establishment of Universities that were implemented in 1991 required major modifications in university curricula. Although the total number of credits necessary to graduate remained the same, the distinction between general education and specialized education was abolished. Universities were given the autonomy to design their own curricula. They are now free to create academic programs to fit the abilities, aptitudes, and needs of their students. Similar freedom was granted to junior colleges and institutes of technology. Capitalizing on their new freedom, some universities abolished their departments of general education and created new departments. These more recently established departments tend to offer interdisciplinary approaches to education, and to pay close attention to economic and social change. Many of these new departments include in their names words like

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the following: human, information, environmental, international, development, or Integrated. Another trend is for universities to emphasize practical education, such as information technology and foreign language, that will help their students secure employment after graduation. Universities that emphasize general education have become rare. Another major change that occurred after 1991 is that the credits earned at universities and other schools have become convertible. In the past, specialized schools, junior colleges, and universities all had different types of curriculum. However, as the rules regarding the curriculum were relaxed, differences in curricula became less pronounced. Even junior colleges and technical colleges began to offer specialized courses of study. Some now offer 4-year instructional programs. Variations in the terms used to describe different educational programs are becoming insignificant. The revisions to the standards also made it possible, in some instances, to transfer credits between universities and from specialized courses. For example, credit may be awarded to students who pass the English Proficiency Test. Such changes lower the walls separating academic institutions from other types of learning establishments. Additional measures designed to promote mutual recognition of credits have been implemented. Since 1997, students who earn credits at national universities no longer have to pay to have those credits transferred in from other institutions. The 1999 University Council Report recommended that it should be permissible to earn up to 60 credits—about half the total number of credits necessary for graduation—at institutions other than the university from which a student plans to graduate. Deregulation breeds competition. A report prepared by the University Council in October of 1998 is subtitled “To Be Distinctive: Universities in a Competitive Environment.” The report recommended the establishment of an independent body that would evaluate reforms to the system of higher education. It also called for a redefinition of national universities as independent administrative entities. The issue of turning national universities into independent agencies has been discussed by the National Council on Educational Reform (Ichikawa, 1988). The national universities have started to prepare for this new idea; however, there is still much confusion because of the absence of clear model. 9. 9.1.

CURRENT PRACTICES ON DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

School Choice Program

Students enroll in public elementary and junior secondary schools according to their place of residence. However, the percentage of students who are permitted to attend schools located in zones other than their own has been increasing across the country. A report prepared by the Central Education Council in 1998 called for a relaxation of national and local regulations so as to provide principals with greater freedom to manage schools according to their ideals about education, and to make the school zone system more flexible. Following the issuance of that report, the Ministry of Education ordered boards of education throughout the country to loosen their policies regarding school boundaries. The Ministry’s intent was to provide schools

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with more freedom and to give students more latitude in choosing where they will be educated. Several school districts followed that advice and revised their policies regarding school admissions. In 1998, Kiho Town in Mie Prefecture started offering a free choice system for seven elementary schools. Hozumi Town in Gifu Prefecture introduced a free choice system involving four elementary and two lower secondary schools in 2000. That same year, the Shinagawa Board of Education in Tokyo introduced its own free choice system. In all of these districts, new frameworks have been created, giving parents the freedom to choose which public schools their children will attend. In the Shinagawa system, the public elementary schools are divided into 4 blocks, each with between 8 and 12 schools. Parents may choose to send their children to any school in the block that has been allocated to their children. In 2001, the Shinagawa Board of Education expanded its free choice system to include lower secondary schools as well. In Shinagawa, 16% of all elementary school enrollees chose to attend schools other than their neighborhood institutions. That represented a slight increase over the previous year, when only 13% of all students attended schools out of their residential zones. The factors that parents tend to consider most seriously when making choices about schools include transportation issues, a school’s relationship with the local community, the choices of friends, and experiences of siblings. Interestingly, they do not usually consider the unique educational programs offered by individual schools (Sadahiro, 1999; Shinagawa Board of Education, 2001). Government leaders have supplied several reasons for introducing the free choice system: 1. The free choice system enhances parental awareness of school programs. It contributes to the development of cooperative relationships between school, community, and home. It is believed that because the system respects the opinions of children and their parents, they will become more involved in school activities. 2. The free choice system supports the diversification and improvement of the education provided in public schools, which have been criticized as being overly standardized. Previously, 4.4% of all elementary school students and 26.7% of all lower secondary school students chose to attend national or private schools rather than public schools located in their neighborhoods. Because they will have to compete for students, the public schools will find ways to attract new students. 3. Schools that parents do not select will be forced to close. The resulting consolidation of schools will lead to more efficient administrative practices. Kiho Town, the first municipality to introduce a choice system, closed one school in 1999 and another in 2001, eliminating its smallest, least-efficient schools. Opinions about the school zone system have swung between the egalitarian ideal of minimizing differences among schools by maintaining small school zones, and the principle of competition and the provision of a wider range of options to parents. The current tendency is to sacrifice equality in exchange for better schools. Traditionally, upper secondary school students have had the freedom to apply for admission to public schools grouped into medium or large size school zones. Recently, however,

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schools have been opting to enlarge or abolish school zones. For example, in 2000 the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education eliminated the school zone system. Students may now apply to any public high school located in the city. In 2001, the Council on Integrated Regulatory Reform submitted a report to the Prime Minister that recommended promoting the school choice system for more elementary and lower secondary schools in Japan. In 2001, the Council on Comprehensive Regulatory Reform submitted a report to the Prime Minister that recommended promoting a school choice system for more elementary and junior high schools in Japan. This has prompted the expansion of school choice systems, especially in urban areas with well-developed public transportation systems. According to a survey of 98 Boards of Education in Tokyo and surrounding cities in Chiba, Kanagawa, and Saitama Prefectures that I conducted in 2004/2005, a quarter of the boards have adopted some sort of school system at the junior high school level. As a result, in central Tokyo, 12.3% of all students are currently enrolled in public junior high schools outside of their regular school zones. These students, combined with students enrolled in private and national schools (in other words, students who are not attending public junior high schools in their designated school zones) constitute 38.5% of all junior high schools in central Tokyo. 9.2.

New Course of Study and Integrated Study

As I mention above, a new Course of Study was recently introduced at the elementary and junior secondary levels. Distinguishing features of this new curricular framework include a decrease in the total number of instructional hours (due to the implementation of a 5-day school week) and the administration of the Integrated Study curriculum. Integrated Study is designed to promote integrated learning through activities rather than lectures. However, some critics assert that the Integrated Study program is being used to absorb instructional hours trimmed from the schedule as a result of the shorter school week. That is to say, there are not enough hours to accommodate all of the subjects in the national curriculum, even with a new timetable. Specific subjects could not be eliminated because that would create political problems. So a new course that could serve as an umbrella for multiple subjects was created: Integrated Study. Schools have the freedom to adjust the hours allocated to Integrated Study to fit their own objectives. While the Ministry of Education has promoted the introduction of unconventional subjects in a flexible manner since 1977, “unconventional, flexibility-oriented education” has been under constant criticism from individuals who fear that such reform will lead to the deterioration of student achievement. The Ministry previously suggested that the Course of Study represented the highest level of education and should therefore be respected. However, the government later stated that the Course of Study only set the minimum standards for learning, and schools were free to supplement it with other instructional activities. The Ministry’s attitude, combined with the circumstances surrounding the creation of Integrated Study, led some schools to teach conventional subjects during the hours allocated to Integrated Study. For example, they might use an instructional period designed to allow for creative and

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integrated learning under the Integrated Study program to offer an extra hour of mathematics. Furthermore, 45% of all private elementary and secondary schools continue to hold classes on Saturdays (Ministry of Education, 2002). On the other hand, some local governments have proposed a number of interesting programs in response to the new Course of Study: offering optional supplementary courses before and after school or on Saturdays; developing supplemental materials to cover advanced matters that extend beyond the scope of textbooks; keeping class sizes lower than those specified in the national standards; organizing classes based on the achievement levels of students; and, conducting surveys of student achievement (Yomiuri Shinbun, 2002). Educational reform has produced a decrease in the contents of the Course of Study and the implementation of Integrated Study. Schools now have greater opportunities to display their own creativity. It can be said that the free choice system is a logical consequence of these reforms. Now that schools are no longer uniform, it would be unfair not to give freedom of choice to the students. 9.3.

Experimental Schools

The Ministry of Education felt that it was necessary to implement new curricula on a trial basis before revising the Course of Study. Beginning in 1976, the Ministry recruited schools to implement experimental curricula based on themes determined by central education officials. Such schools, designed as R & D (Research and Development) schools, were not required to follow the Course of Study. The system was later modified. In the year 2000, 102 schools were designated as R & D schools, the budget for these schools increased, and participating schools were given the freedom to choose their own themes, rather than those set by the Ministry. This framework represented a significant departure from previous Ministry of Education practice. Furthermore, the Ministry created additional models for experimenting with curricula. The most notable examples were the Super Science and the Super English Language high schools. Schools chosen to become Super Science high schools receive up to 25 million yen per year to supplement their regular budgets. In 2002, 77 schools applied for 26 Super Science high school spots, and 16 of 56 applicants were selected to become Super English Language high schools. This seems to suggest that more and more schools, free from pressure to conform to the practices of other schools, are now trying to highlight their unique qualities. 9.4.

Introduction of Evaluation System

There is an argument that the introduction of deregulation and decentralization will cause an imbalance between schools and a decline the quality of instruction. An evaluation system is expected to solve that problem somehow. The Policy Evaluation Law of 2001 required all government policies, programs, and projects to be evaluated, starting in fiscal 2002. The purpose of these evaluations is to introduce a system of accountability to governmental organizations. Each Ministry or government office will evaluate its own practices and incorporate the results of those evaluations into

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policymaking activities. It is also believed that publicizing the results of those evaluations will stimulate public interest in the policymaking process (Study Group on Policy Evaluation Methods, 2000). In the area of education, the primary focus of the evaluations will be student achievement. Traditionally, norm-referenced assessments were used to evaluate student achievement. Although such tests identified student rank within a class, they did not compare schools. Recently, there has been a shift toward criterion-referenced evaluations. A similar system of evaluation had been employed before: Beginning in 1956, the Ministry of Education conducted criterion-referenced evaluation to measure student achievement. However, the system was discontinued 10 years later because the teachers’ union, fearing that instructors would be judged based on their students’ test scores, fiercely protested such testing. As a result, when debates about the effects of revisions to the Course of Study on student achievement, there was no data to consider. For that reason, in 2000, the National Curriculum Committee asserted that the Ministry should conduct continuous criterion-based achievement evaluations in whole Japan. Some local governments also began to conduct achievement evaluations on their own. 9.5.

Evaluation of Teachers

When selecting schools, parents pay attention to the educational objectives set by schools as well as the qualities of teachers. However, when a national teacher evaluation system was proposed in 1958, resistance from the teachers’ union was fierce. Although the system was eventually implemented, results of the evaluations were rarely shared with teachers and had no influence on their salaries (Bjork, 2000). However, the Tokyo Board of Education began to appraise the professional performance of teachers in 2000, followed by some other municipalities. In Tokyo, schools and sub-groups within schools set educational objectives. Teachers are then appraised in terms of their ability, motivation, and performance concerning each objective. In other words, the evaluations have become a systematized management tool. The Tokyo Board of Education intends to reflect on the evaluations when making decisions about teaching assignments and wages in the future. 9.6.

External Evaluation and National Institute for Academic Degrees

Based on recommendations from the Universities Committee, the National Institute for Academic degrees was reformed in 1998. The Institute is now responsible for evaluating the quality of education provided and research conducted by Japanese universities, and disseminating the results. In 2001, 112 universities and other institutes of higher education were evaluated and the results were made public the following year. All of the universities were rated “satisfactory” or “adequate” in terms of their “contributions to society,” and 96% were rated “satisfactory” or “adequate” in the area of “achievement.”1 Some of the universities complained that the evaluation standards were not clear. Nevertheless, disclosing the results of the evaluations, the objections expressed by universities, and the responses to those objections were unprecedented events.

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According to the revised Standards for the Establishment of Universities of 1991, Article 2, an institution of higher education “must endeavor to examine and evaluate itself.” However, this provision was modified in 1999. According to the revised version of the document, an institution “must examine and evaluate itself” and publish the results of such assessment. Furthermore, it provided that an institution should have outside experts evaluate the results of the self-examination. Though the methods, contents, and mode of utilizing the results of the outside evaluation have not been firmly established yet, it has been decided that budget allocations will be tied to those results. This illustrates the Ministry of Education’s clear tendency to provide unequal funding to universities, depending on their demonstrated ability to improve in quality (Amano, 2002). 9.7.

Independent Administrative Agencies

Many government agencies, including research institutes and museums, became independent administrative institutions under the Independent Agency Act of 1999. Reestablishing those agencies as independent administrative units, it was believed, would increase incentives for improvement in terms of finance, structure, personnel management, and evaluation. The Research Committee on Reforming National Universities as Independent Administrative Agencies (2002) under the Higher Education Bureau of the Ministry of Education had been discussing the reform of national universities as well. In March 2002, it published a report titled “Image on New National University Foundation” that offered a framework for reorganizing national universities as independent administrative agencies, beginning in 2004. This report was approved by the Association of National Universities after heated arguments in April. That report lists several specific objectives for such change: (1) create universities that operate independently, and are internationally competitive in both research and instruction; (2) emphasize that universities are accountable to society and the nation; (3) introduce the principle of competition between institutions of higher education; (4) clarify management responsibilities so that universities can be run in a more flexible and strategic manner. According to the framework, each university should develop medium-term plans to meet these objectives. They should also develop strategies for crystallizing those plans on an annual basis. The Committee on the Evaluation of National Universities (tentative title) will evaluate the universities’ ability to meet those objectives, and will publish the results. Decisions about government subsidies for higher education will reflect the information included in the evaluations. Although discussion on this topic is still in progress, the Ministry of Education did adopt a related program, which it calls the “Top 30 Concept,” in 2001. The idea behind this program is that university funding should be tied to performance, with extra funding being awarded to the 30 best universities in their respective areas. After a number of universities raced to develop materials to improve their chances of being named a “Top 30” institution, the Ministry modified its plans and adopted a new scheme, titled the “COE Program for the 21st Century.” With the new program, 100–500 million yen will be awarded to each of 10–30 universities (with an average of 20) in 10 research subject areas.

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10. 10.1.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE AND KEY PROBLEMS TO BE RESOLVED

Initiative

Reports by the Central Council for Education and the University Council indicate that after decades of intense centralization of both educational management and the curriculum, Japan is finally moving towards a decentralized and deregulated education system. These changes are now being codified into legislation. The Integrated Decentralization Law of 1999 has already abolished the appointment-approval system for superintendents and relaxed requirements concerning the number of representatives serving on boards of education. The idea that schools should be directed by local government initiatives and that members of communities should be active participants in the management of schools (both recommended in the report by the Central Council for Education), represent significant changes in Japanese tradition (Kumagai, 1999). An important issue articulated in those reports concerns responsibility for educational reform: Which administrative units should take the initiative to drive the various reforms now taking place in Japan? In elementary and secondary education, the national government is now taking that initiative. Schools and boards of education are doing their best to understand reports and expectations communicated by the government and councils. It is odd that deregulation and decentralization, which call for initiative at the grass roots level, have been implemented in a uniform manner from the top; central authorities have conveyed orders to local educators. While decentralization has provided schools with greater discretion, they are also subject to sanctions if they fail to follow the guidelines set forth by the national government. Consequently, there are many cases where deregulation simply breeds new regulations intended to direct the process of deregulation (Kubota, 1994). Through mechanisms such as an enforced evaluation system, the center can actually continue to steer the education system from a distance (Whitty, Power & Halpin, 1998). 10.2.

Board of Education

Boards of education are designed to represent communities and to act independently. This structure aims to maintain the neutral nature of educational administration. Efforts to enrich the functions assigned to boards of education are currently underway. The goal of these efforts is to allow the municipalities and prefectures to implement policies that reflect their unique social and economic characteristics. The quality of superintendents is another important issue. Even though superintendents no longer must hold licenses, as was the case under the previous law, they must be provided with training and education that will allow them to improve their administrative skills. 10.3.

Community Participation

In order for the boards of education, which are in charge of administrative activities in their communities, to positively respond to the needs of those communities,

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the boards must make efforts to understand the will of the community, reflect on the views expressed, and encourage members of the community to participate in educational administration. How to more effectively facilitate community participation in education remains an unresolved issue. While parents of students can participate in school administration through the school board system, whether or not a particular even has a school board is up to the discretion of the principal. Thus, finding the appropriate mechanism for transferring some measure of authority to parents has not yet been identified in a satisfactory manner. 10.4.

Capacity Building

Many of the education reforms currently being promoted in Japan are intended to provide considerable independence to schools and school administrators by increasing the authority allocated to school principals and vice-principals. However, it is unclear whether or not principals are prepared to carry out such non-traditional tasks. In order to improve the administrative capacity of school leaders, training must be offered to principals, vice-principals, and members of boards of education. Also, because Japanese principals usually serve for only a short time, it is often difficult for them to demonstrate strong leadership in the schools. If the changes that are presently be considered are to succeed, it may be necessary to lengthen the time that principals spend at each school, and to choose younger teachers to serve as administrators. 10.5.

Quality Assurance

Educational opportunity, as well as the substance of the education provided, has become diversified in Japan in recent years. At the same time, evaluation systems are being implemented to secure high standards for students’ achievement at all school level and to improve financial efficiency. The national government is promoting decentralization and deregulation, and a variety of comprehensive educational reforms have been introduced. However, initiatives related to school evaluations and the widening of the school selection process are not likely to be supported in the future. This is because the idea that the small-school zone system will provide the same quality of education in schools across the nation is an illusion. Also, the Ministry of Education has repeatedly stated that the Course of Study represents minimum academic standards and that each school and region is responsible for student achievement. Therefore, parents and communities are ultimately responsible for the success or failure of attempts to improve the quality of public education. Difficulties will emerge as governments try to resolve the challenge of harmonizing traditional organization, structure, and content of education with new and emerging forms of diversified education that grant local actors more control. As the deregulation process continues, gaps in achievement between schools are likely to widen. The national government is not providing subsidies to support national standards regarding class size. Therefore, the municipalities bear the financial burden of lowering class sizes in their schools. Also, if school choice becomes widely accepted throughout the nation, maintaining equal opportunities for all students will be a challenge.

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11.

POSSIBLE PARADOX

It is necessary to expand the discretion of schools on personnel matters, budgets, and the design of educational programs. Such a redistribution of authority will encourage teachers and administrators to be independent and creative in offering education that reflects the unique characteristics of each school. Additionally, it is necessary to strengthen school administration and to clarify school responsibilities and also to strengthen the responsibilities each person in a school has. In sum, numerous educational reforms have been introduced in Japan and recent years. Among those are efforts to promote creativity, diversity, and flexibility through decentralization and deregulation. It is believed that such changes will give Japan a competitive edge in an era of globalization. Nevertheless, the tradition of a standardized education system with centralized control is proving difficult to change. In Japan, changing the mindset of those who deal with reform is difficult. There is a strong tendency to wait for instructions from upper officials. Even though the government is now offering authority to individuals, they may or may not choose to exercise that autonomy. Many educators criticize their superiors for being authoritative, but use the prevalence of instructions from higher levels of the organization as an excuse for not assuming responsibility themselves. There are also people who would like to capitalize on the authority they have been given, but lack the training necessary to act independently. Interestingly enough, the Japanese education system may face the paradox of becoming more uniform than ever as the level of central control decreases. NOTE 1. Universities were rated according to the following scale: dissatisfactory, fair, adequate, or satisfactory.

12.

REFERENCES

Amano, I. (2002). Structural changes in Japanese higher education in the 1990s. The Journal of Educational Sociology, 70(May), 39–57. Bjork, C. (2000). Responsibility for improving the quality of teaching in Japanese schools: The role of the principal in professional development efforts. Education and Society, 3(3), 21–43. Central Council for Education. (1998). Policies and educational administration of local governments. Tokyo: Ministry of Education. Ichikawa, S. (1988). Educational reform and restructuring of the administrative systems. Bulletin of the Japan Educational Administration Society, 14, 9–23. Ichikawa, S. (1995). Educational policies after the ad-hoc education council. Tokyo: Institute for Educational Development. Kubota, S. (1994). From a viewpoint of comparative education. Bulletin of the Japan Educational Administration Society, 20, 90–100. Kumagai, I. (1999). Decentralization of education and school management. Annual Bulletin of JASEP, 6, 52–69. Ministry of Education. (1996). Japanese government policies in education, science, sports and culture 1995: Remaking universities: Continuing reform of higher education. Tokyo: Government Printing Bureau. Ministry of Education. (2002). Report on current status of 5-school-days-a-week program at private schools. Tokyo: Ministry of Education. NIER (National Institute for Educational Research), Office of Overall Planning and Cooperation. (1988). The recommendations of the national council on educational reform: A summary. Tokyo: NIER.

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Research Committee on Reforming National Universities as Independent Administrative Agencies. (2002). New image of national university foundation, Tokyo: Ministry of Education. Sadahiro, S. (1999). A quantitative analysis of parental school choice preference using the rank-logit model. Bulletin of the Japan Educational Administration Society, 25, 103–116. Shinagawa Board of Education. (2001). School choice system, Tokyo. Study Group on Policy Evaluation Methods. (2000). Final report on the policy evaluation system, Tokyo. Sugihara, S. (1998). The promotion of deregulation and the role of educational administration in it around public education. Bulletin of the Japan Educational Administration Society, 24, 179–182. University Council. (1998). A vision of universities in the 21st century and reform measures, Tokyo. Wakai, Y. (1996). Decentralization of educational administration. Bulletin of the Japan Educational Administration Society, 22, 31–44. Whitty, G., Power, S. & Halpin, D. (1998). Devolution and Choice in Education: the School, the State and the Market, Melbourne, Australia: Australian Council for Educational Research. Yomiuri Shinbun. (2002). Issues on school achievement, Newspaper article on March 9.

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Chapter 7 EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION IN KOREA: MAJOR ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES Ee-gyeong Kim

1.

INTRODUCTION

In Korea, educational decentralization is one of the subjects that has continually resurfaced whenever education reform is seriously discussed. Although previous regimes eagerly tackled the issue of educational decentralization in their formulation and implementation of education reform policies, there is little evidence showing that educational decentralization has been accomplished to a satisfactory extent in Korea. Educational decentralization is not merely confined to the realm of education in Korea; it is entangled with interests of local governing bodies in a complex way, and possible alternatives to the current practice touch on sensitive political issues. Hence, it is indeed a complicated issue that cannot be examined exclusively from an educational point of view. Before discussing educational decentralization itself, it should be noted that the meaning, content, and scope of the term “educational decentralization” are subject to many different interpretations. The discussion is further complicated by the reality that educational decentralization does not just imply autonomous administration of local educational authorities; the process also requires the distribution of powers and responsibilities among local governing bodies of differing levels, and consequently encompasses the issue of autonomous administration at the level of individual schools. Literature on this subject describes a variety of phenomena that are all considered examples of decentralization. Decentralization might be perceived as a mere process of adding a number of deconcentrated bodies to the existing political and administrative structure. Sometimes, it is understood as “delegation,” which includes transferring some of the central government’s decision-making powers to bodies outside the government bureaucracy. “Devolution” refers to such cases in which specified powers are transferred to sub-national units through appropriate legal reform processes (Govinda, 1997). In Korea’s case, educational decentralization has proceeded beyond the level of either establishing local sub-organs or merely delegating the controlling authority to the local governing bodies. Current discussions primarily center on issues of how the existing system should be improved so that local educational administrations can meet demands that arise in each respective region. However, it is undeniable that a wide gap separates such discussions and reality. Up to the present, substantial authority has been officially transferred to local governing bodies. Yet in Korea, which has a long history of central authority, local governing bodies have experienced great difficulty in acting autonomously, particularly in such core areas as finance, personnel 115 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 115–128.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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management, and organizational supervision. Weak systemic support has exacerbated these problems. Therefore, educational decentralization can be regarded as one of the most difficult tasks that can be undertaken to assist educational administrators in coping with the various changes that occur both inside and beyond a nation’s borders. In this chapter, I begin with a brief overview as to what educational decentralization means in the Korean setting and how educational decentralization has historically developed to produce the current situation. Next, I provide an analysis that highlights external and domestic factors and demands unique to the Korean case. Although the educational challenges faced by countries around the world are often similar in nature largely due to the impact of globalization, each region’s unique background and circumstances can lead to variations in the actual strategies used to tackle those issues. Thus, any attempt to examine the factors and demands unique to Korea must consider the Korean context for educational decentralization. Finally, I examine current controversies, focusing on the most urgent problems related to educational decentralization in Korea. 2.

CONCEPT OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION: LOCAL EDUCATION SELF-GOVERNING SYSTEM

Discussion of educational decentralization in Korea has been carried out in general under the title of “Local Education Self-Governing System” (LESGS). Decentralizing authority over the system, a matter of nation-wide attention, implies not only that central and local administrators share power but also that local offices commit to self-governance and accountability measures. It therefore seems natural that the discussion of educational decentralization in Korea has narrowed to the notion of self-governance. The concept of the LESGS is a combination of the phrases “local autonomy,” which refers to the separation of local educational management from central administrative control, and “educational autonomy,” which means separation of educational administration from the general administration (Yun et al., 1992). The two concepts of self-governance entail distinct issues and problems since they are based on different principles. But they coincide in their shared focus on the issue of what method of allocating authority and responsibility between central and local educational administrations is more likely to guarantee autonomy, professionalism, and political neutrality. Educational decentralization alone cannot adequately address all of the issues surrounding historical development of local educational self-governance in Korea. Comprehending the Korean situation requires examination of not only the issue of decentralization of the government’s power over educational matters, but also other issues, such as resident control, separation of educational administration from general administration, and professional management of education. Therefore, in this paper I will use the acronym LESGS, which covers wide-reaching principles as well as systemic elements, rather than “educational decentralization,” as the main conceptual base for discussing the authority structure of the Korean education system. The LESGS is grounded in the Constitution and laws of Korea. According to the Constitution, education should include the following three dimensions: (1) highly intellectual activity depending essentially upon creativity and diversity; (2) professional activity that requires cooperative performance of mature professionals; and

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(3) public activity that should serve the interests of the whole society. In order to realize this conception of education, the Constitution (Item 4, Article 31) asserts that “autonomy, professionalism, and political neutrality of education . . . are guaranteed by law.” In addition, the Law for Local Educational Self-Governance specifies that the local education self-governing system should be implemented to promote autonomy and professionalism of education, and to encourage localized control of schools. In sum, the local education self-governing system defined by the Constitution and laws of Korea aims to increase local residents’ participation in the management of pubic education, thereby securing the educational autonomy, professionalism, and political neutrality called for in the Constitution. 3.

PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL EDUCATION SELF-GOVERNING SYSTEM

Although opinions of Korean scholars of educational administration vary slightly, it is generally accepted that there are four principles of the LESGS: decentralization, resident control, independence of educational administration, and professional management. These principles are sometimes used as the criteria to evaluate education self-governing systems in operation (Kim, 2001). What follows is a more detailed account of these principles. The principle of decentralization professes that the central government’s uniform command and control be avoided in planning, managing, and evaluating educational activities. Instead, education policies that address the unique conditions in different regions should be implemented. By promoting regional uniqueness and avoiding national-level uniformity, local residents can raise their capacity for autonomy and self-governance. The principle of resident control means that the local residents should determine local educational policies through their representatives, and it coincides ultimately with the principle of representative democracy. Opposed to unilateral bureaucratic control, resident control is an essential element of local self-governance. This concept is premised on the idea that educational policies should reflect broad public desires regarding the provision of schooling. To this end, there should be a systemic mechanism that allows local residents of diverse backgrounds to participate in the process of reviewing, determining, and implementing education policy. Often referred to as the principle of educational self-governance, independence of educational administration requires that educational administration be autonomous and separate from general administration. The rationale grounding this notion stresses that educational administration must be politically neutral and have independent authority if educational excellence is to be achieved. The importance of separating educational administration from general administration is also based on the notion that education should not be provided uniformly; education is viewed as an activity that touches upon human personality and ethics over long periods of time. At the same time, supervision of schools by general administration is not considered desirable because such an arrangement can impede politically neutral management of education. The principle of professional management calls for educational administration that seriously considers both the essence and uniqueness of education. Teachers, a driving force in education, are regarded as professionals trained in their field.

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Administrators should also value students and pay close attention to their continuous growth and development. At the same time, educational administrations possess their own unique attributes that set them apart from general governmental administration. Therefore, schools should be managed by individuals with professional knowledge of both the essence and uniqueness of education. 4.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

In Korea, the LESGS is currently being practiced in limited fashion. Because of the strong tendency toward centralized authority in both educational and general administration, efforts at transferring power to local governing bodies have been largely unsuccessful ever since the Korean government was established in 1948. Despite a relatively long history of promoting decentralization, the central government has continued to exert great power. Such an arrangement has been defended on the grounds that tight central control was necessary to ensure that public services were delivered as efficiently as possible. The Korean education system followed this pattern so as to achieve educational development in a very short period of time. One cannot deny, however, that this top–down approach is one of the primary causes of the various drawbacks and problems that plague Korean education. Thus, a careful examination of how the LESGS developed and shaped the present form of Korean education will help us understand the problems it is facing today. The LESGS was initially discussed during the period of U.S. military occupation that immediately followed Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule. But actual implementation of the system was delayed until after the Korean War in 1952, when the Enforcement Act for Education Law went into effect. Since then, numerous changes in the LESGS took place. These changes are usually divided into three phrases. The Fifty-Year History of Korea’s Education, published by the Ministry of Education in 1998, describes the three phases as follows: first, the “phase of birth and implementation,” which spanned from 1948 to the military coup of 1961; second, the “phase of interruption and ordeal,” beginning with the revision of Education Law in 1962 and ending with the promulgation of the Law for Local Educational Self-Governance in 1991; third, the “phase of resurrection and revitalization,” which began in 1991 and continues to the present.1 In the following section I describe the characteristics of the each phase in greater detail. 4.1.

The First Phase (from Liberation to 1961)

The birth of the LESGS dates back to Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule. After liberation, a new system similar to the U.S. model was formulated and plans were made to implement it in September of 1948. This plan was not realized, however, due to the end of U.S. military administration. Still, elements of the original plan were included in the “Regulation for School District and Board of Education” section of the Education Law adopted on December 31st, 1949. But the LESGS was not implemented because the Education Law presupposed implementation of localself governance, which was postponed owing to the Korean War. Further progress in promoting educational self-governance did not occur until April 1953, when the Enforcement Act for Education Law was adopted. This progress was limited. Poor

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management of the LESGS, combined with friction between bureaucrats stationed in the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Home Affairs, triggered harsh criticism of the system. The little progress that had been made came to a halt in 1961, with the outbreak of a military coup. At that point, the Board of Education ceased to function. Previously, 17 locally managed boards of education had been operating in big and small cities and in 123 school districts.2 In 1961, however, educational administration was absorbed by the general administration and support for the LESGS was withdrawn. 4.2.

The Second Phase (1962–1991)

The LESGS was reconceptualized during the second phase and underwent a series of changes driven by revisions to the Education Law approved in 1962, 1968, and 1972. Yet its implementation was still not undertaken because most of the revisions to the Education Law presupposed local-self governance, which had yet to be achieved. Hence, during this phase introduction of the LESGS was again delayed, and the educational administration continued to be a responsibility of the general administration. Until the system of local self-governance was finally implemented in 1991, functions related to educational administration had been the responsibility of the general administration. During this period, the LESGS experienced numerous turns and twists. At one point it was temporarily abolished, but thanks to strong protests from the education sector, led by the teachers’ associations, it was quickly resurrected. The form of the LESGS that emerged granted only limited authority to the Board of Education. Although the system appeared to delegate power to local levels, in actuality local offices were expected to carry out centrally conceptualized policies and administrative orders; the Minister of Education retained authority to appoint members of the Board of Education. Therefore, during this period the term LESGS was actually a misnomer—authority continued to be concentrated at the center. The LESGS practiced until 1991 should be regarded as an example of decentralization in name only. 4.3.

The Third Phase (from 1991 to the Present)

A critical change in the status of the LESGS finally occurred in 1991. At that point, increasing demand for local autonomy and political support for the idea finally yielded policies that gave local education authorities some meaningful power. In March of the same year, the Regulation for Education Self-Governance, which had previously been included in the Education Law, became a separate piece of legislation—the Law for Local Education Self-Governance (Law 4347). The law specified that the primary goal of local education self-governance was to “activate autonomy of education, professionalism, and uniqueness of local education.” Authority to supervise education, science, technology, arts, and other forms of learning was transferred to the offices of education, which were located in metropolitan cities or provinces and were headed by superintendents of education. The basic jurisdiction that the LESGS was applied to was metropolitan city and province levels, which included seven metropolitan cities and nine provinces. As the LESGS was not carried

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out at primary local self-governing units, it was called a “great-sphere level” LESGS. Therefore, boards of education, which assumed the role of a decision-making organ, were created at each of the 16 metropolitan or provincial levels, excluding primary local self-governing units. Since the promulgation of the Law for Local Education Self-Governance in 1991, the manner of forming and managing the boards of education has also changed. These revisions mainly targeted the methods used to select board members and superintendents, placing restrictions on their qualifications. Although the boards of education were officially responsible for making and reviewing educational decisions within their jurisdictions, they did not actually enjoy full power in making decisions. Their authority was incomplete and limited. The metropolitan and provincial assemblies were granted the power to make important decisions related to budgeting, balancing accounts, and taxing residents; the boards of education only reviewed these decisions. Thus, decision-making power for local education was split between boards of education and local assemblies. 5.

CURRENT CONDITIONS OF LOCAL EDUCATION SELF-GOVERNING SYSTEM

In order to better understand the current LESGS in Korea, it is necessary to briefly examine the structure and function of the central and local organs in charge of educational administration. The education system in Korea is divided into three levels of authority: central, intermediate, and primary. The Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development (MOEHRD) is located at the center, 16 metropolitan and provincial offices of education constitute the intermediate level, and 180 local offices of education operate at the primary (or local) level. The MOEHRD, under the leadership of the Deputy Prime Minister, is in charge of wide-ranging affairs related to school education, lifelong education, and academic learning. Among its major functions are: planning for the overall education system, establishing mid- and long-term plans for educational development, implementing education reform, and developing indices for education and producing and managing education statistics. Although the scope of the MOEHRD’s authority was significantly reduced in the 1990s when many of its functions were transferred to metropolitan and provincial offices of education, the traditional centralizing tendency still remains strong. The 16 metropolitan and provincial offices of education support the superintendents of education. Their major functions are limited to daily administrative affairs, such as supervising the opening and closing of schools, overseeing the curriculum, promoting social education, producing accounting reports, and maintaining school campuses. They do not perform functions related to self-governance in its truest sense, such as developing education policy or establishing plans for local educational development. One hundred and eighty local education offices can be found at the city, county, and district levels. These offices are primarily responsible for guiding and inspecting supervision of all public and private schools. Whereas in general administration local self-governance has been implemented down to the primary level, in educational administration self-governance has not yet occurred at the primary level. First of

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all, boards of education have not been created at this level. As I mention earlier, the LESGS has been implemented at the great-sphere level, which includes seven metropolitan cities and nine provinces. The local offices of education at city, county, and district levels merely carry out routine educational functions determined by central or intermediate authorities. Thus, local education offices are just deconcentrated administrative organs that lack independent authority (Yun, 2000). Based on the Law for Local Education Self-Governance, boards of education were established in 16 metropolitan cities and provinces. Members of the boards of education (which vary in size from 7 to 15 members) are elected by electoral colleges composed of parents and teachers. For the purpose of securing professionalism in education, half of the board members must have more than 10 years of experience in education or educational administration. The boards are in charge of reviewing and legislating important affairs in education, science, technology, sports, arts, and learning in their respective regions. But with respect to some of the important matters, current regulations grant the boards authority to review but not create new legislation. The boards therefore remain incomplete legislative bodies. The superintendents of education are the executives in charge of affairs related to education, arts, and learning in each metropolitan city or province. While the superintendents mostly carry out educational matters determined by boards of education, they sometimes execute policies delegated by the central government. Superintendents are elected every 4 years by secret voting and must receive the vote of more than half of the votes cast by members of the electoral colleges. Their primary responsibilities include: producing drafts of ordinances and budgets, balancing accounts, making educational regulations, overseeing the curriculum, and making decisions regarding the opening and closing of schools. Before making any decisions that involve financial burdens placed on residents or general accounting, the superintendents must consult with mayors or governors. 6.

NEW DEMANDS REQUIRING CHANGES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM

As previously noted, Korea has traditionally been a centralized nation and the central government’s role in determining, implementing, and evaluating educational policies remains very strong. Such an approach worked well in the past, when the government was forced to reconstruct the nation’s economy after the end of the Korean War. The concentration of power in the capital allowed the government to facilitate rapid expansion of education by providing a majority of the Korean people with educational opportunities. Since the 1990s, however, when access to elementary and secondary education became universal and opportunities for higher education dramatically improved, the Korean government initiated a variety of reforms designed to shift the focus from quantitative growth to that of qualitative development. In contrast to the growthoriented policies of the post-war period, this round of reforms promoted a consumeroriented education system. The concepts of localization, decentralization, and autonomy guided these reforms. In the past, critics of Korean education frequently pointed out that the system did not provide enough autonomy to local levels. During the 1990s, demands for decentralizing the structure of educational administrative authority gained currency.

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The recent surge in attention to local education self-governance is related to broader changes in the educational environment and changing societal demands for schooling. The development of a knowledge-based society interested in lifelong learning is significantly changing the concept, role, place, timing, and method of education provided in Korea. The governance structure has been transformed to cope with the overarching changes that have taken place. A number of notable changes designed to encourage local self-governance of education have been introduced. First, a large-scale transfer of education-related functions from central to local governing bodies has been called for. In its continuing effort to create a smaller and more efficient government, the Korean government amended the Law for the Government Organization in February of 1998. Based on this amendment, the size of the Ministry of Education was reduced and functions were adjusted. A second restructuring of the Ministry took place in May of 1999. These actions were prompted by the government’s desire to reduce the size of the central Ministry and to redistribute authority from central to local administrations. This power transfer has been requested, but the transfer itself has not yet been accomplished. Second, societal demands for education became stronger and more complex. For example, Korean education had historically been uniform and highly standardized, with middle-level students receiving the most attention. This “mass production” system, which had proved successful in the past, no longer pleased Korean citizens. Because education is perceived of as a key to upward mobility and an important determinant of one’s future social status, consumers’ expectations regarding education continued to rise. These consumers are demanding increased choices for schooling, more diversified and specialized educational programs, and curricula that reflect contemporary realities and needs. It has become apparent that the uniform and centralized system of educational administration can no longer satisfy these demands. In order to cope with new demands for education, many argue that it is necessary to transform educational administration from a rigid, top–down structure into an “intelligent organization” based on professionalism, accountability, and information (Kim, 1998b). Third, with increased awareness that educational development is a critical precondition for national development, education reform, and development strategies have become subjects of foremost interest to the Korean government. However, it has also been recognized that reform efforts that fail to generate cooperation and support from local school communities are doomed to fail. There is a belief that educational administrators should abandon the practice of commanding and directing their subordinates. If central authorities transfer some of their powers to local administrative organs, these bodies will make more realistic assessments of the needs of local communities and individual school sites. Local education administrators can also do a better job cultivating the necessary material, human, and financial resources. Consequently, reform measures will have a more positive impact on actual settings for learning. Fourth, Korean people’s demands for democratization have accelerated since the 1990s. Development of democratic politics has been relatively slow, compared with the economic advancement that has taken place in Korea. Unequal distribution of political power among different regions of the country has produced great friction. Conflicts between different socioeconomic strata that arose in tandem with industrial development driven by large corporations have produced another obstacle to political development. But after the first civilian government was created in the 1990s,

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democratization at the central government level began to accelerate and expectations for local self-governance strengthened. Also, citizens who had previously felt alienated from politics began to demand an increased role in political decision-making and more responsive government administration. As local residents showed increased interest in educational policymaking (along with other matters such as health care, housing, and social services), the call for local governance of schools also rose. Fifth, citizens became more vocal in their demands for administrative accountability. In the past, parents, citizens, local communities, and non-governmental organizations were quite accepting of educational administrators. The outcomes of education policies were rarely evaluated in detail. However, as diverse educational consumers began to recognize the importance of the quality of instruction provided in schools, educational administrators, schools, and teachers were increasingly held accountable for the outcomes of their actions. School evaluations became more and more important, and new attempts were made to understand why and how the quality of education differed from school to school. This development provided yet another argument for transferring authority from the center to local administrative organizations. The educational institutions and personnel in charge of local schools, it was believed, should be held accountable for the outcomes produced by those schools. The extent to which Korea will succeed in developing its local education selfgovernance system in the future will be closely related to how actively it responds to the changes described above. 7.

MAJOR CONTROVERSIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM

Korea’s education experts and educational administrators offer a variety of viewpoints in diagnosing the current local education self-governance system. Some argue that the current system is incomplete in that it betrays the fundamental principles such as decentralization, resident control, independence from general administration, and professional management. Others criticize various problematic aspects including the lack of autonomy, the bifurcated system of legislative power, and a flawed procedure for electing the superintendent and members of boards of education. While it is possible from a macro perspective to distinguish those problems caused by flaws in the system from those caused by problematic management of the system, in the section that follows major issues will be discussed without dwelling on such distinctions. 7.1.

Local Education Self-Governance System Excluding the Primary Level

Korea’s local education self-governance is limited to the intermediate level (metropolitan cities and provinces) and excludes the levels in lower administrative hierarchy. Therefore, complete decentralization of the system has not yet been achieved. One critic argues that despite the government’s public support for local selfgovernance, the failure to extend authority to lower levels of the system indicates that the system is unfair (Kim et al., 1999a). Kim (1999c) asserts that the spirit of local education self-governance cannot be realized in a system that is not decentralized to the primary level. The problems experienced by local communities or individual schools should be tackled through self-governance and until authority is extended

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below the intermediate level, critics argue, teachers, parents, and local residents will not feel that the LESGS is truly operational. 7.2.

Lack of Autonomy

The issue of autonomy is one of the core elements of the LESGS. Autonomy means having the power to execute authority in one’s own work without being directed or impeded by external parties, and being responsible for the outcomes of one’s own performance. The current form of the LESGS, however, does not grant enough power to local authorities to make decisions in areas of educational importance such as education planning, teacher policies, and curricula. The Law for Local Education Self-Governance and its supporting acts regulate the current LESGS in a uniform manner. For example, the election procedure and qualifications of superintendents and board members are precisely prescribed in the law, and applied to each and every locality without exception. This prevents local authorities from effectively responding to the unique attributes and environmental factors of a region (Kim, 1999c). Also, the fact that the deputy superintendent is appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Ministry of Education generates criticism that the central government’s control over local administration still lingers (Kim et al., 1999a). 7.3.

Bifurcated Legislative Authority

The authority of the board of education is greatly weakened by the bifurcated system of legislative authority. Local education self-governance bodies and general local self-governance bodies are often in conflict. Critics have asserted that the board of education has lost its independence as a legislative organ and does little more than review the actions of the local assembly. In most cases, a board’s decisions must be approved by the local assembly. Especially these matters related to educational finance are subject to the decisions made by the local assembly. Due to this bifurcation, friction between boards of education and local assemblies is increasing, and the authority of the boards authority is being undermined (Kim, 2002). Currently, a board of education meets 60 days each year while metropolitan and provincial assemblies convene 120 days per year. Issues related to budgets, accounting, and drafts of ordinances are reviewed by both boards of education and local assemblies. This duplication of effort represents a waste of time and energy. An uncooperative relationship between boards of education and local assemblies can also make it difficult to gain support from other local governing bodies. Moreover, the superintendents of education have ultimate authority over affairs pertaining to education, learning, and arts. Therefore, local heads of governing bodies (such as mayors and governors) have no direct incentive to provide financial support for improving conditions in the schools. 7.4.

Issue of Separation of Educational Administration

This concept refers to the separation of educational administration from general government administration. The issue has provoked continued debate among scholars, particularly between those in the field of general administration and those in

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education, and even among scholars of education. Major controversies include the following: Is educational self-governance really necessary? Should boards of education remain separate from offices of education? For what and by whom should education self-governance work? To what extent should local assembly and the head of local governing bodies be involved in local educational administration and finance? Within the education sector, there is a tendency to advocate complete local education self-governance, with educational administration that is distinct from general administration. Officials in the general administration, on the other hand, generally push for the integration of local education administration into the general administration so as to improve operational effectiveness and efficiency. Others feel that educational administration should focus on development rather than self-governance, and call for more accurate assessments of decentralization efforts that have been implemented thus far (Song, 1997). In the midst of these controversies, the Korean government recently considered the idea of incorporating educational administration into the local self-governance system and discussed the possibility of integrating legislative organs and finance into the general administration. This has triggered severe debates among scholars and practitioners. A satisfactory resolution that can be agreed to by many parties involved in the issue of self-governance has yet to be made. 7.5.

Method of Electing the Superintendent and Education Board Members

After the education self-governance system was put into motion in the 1990s, members of education boards were elected in the local assembly and those board members, in their turn, elected superintendents of education. This doubly indirect method proved to be unsatisfactory. Through a series of changes, during the 2002 election, electoral colleges comprised of all school council members elected superintendents and school board members. Previously, the electoral colleges awarded each school council only a single vote. The general public criticized this practice for many reasons, including its failure consider the size of schools. The present system of electing board members and superintendents allows a larger number of voters to express their views about the candidates. However, many observers still wonder whether or not the electoral college truly represents the will of local residents (Kim, 2001). Such critics claim that the current election system cannot be considered democratic because the electoral college does not take into consideration the opinions of the entire resident population. They point out that limiting number of the members of electoral college makes it difficult for that body to respond to the opinions of the whole resident population regarding educational provisions. 7.6.

Accountability of Local Self-Governing Authorities

Some critics feel that the current LESGS does not encourage authorities to take responsibility for local educational issues (Kim, 1998a). Despite the fact that local residents’ interest in local education is becoming stronger day by day, superintendents tend to blame lack of support from local governments for the problems in schools, rather than accepting personal responsibility for these troubles themselves. The heads of local governments tend to behave in a similarly irresponsible manner arguing that they are granted little authority over education. Despite claims that decentralization

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will lead to greater accountability of elected heads of local governments, some have ignored their responsibilities. Another question concerns the task of evaluating local education self-governing bodies by the central government to reform the education system. The Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development has been conducting an annual evaluation of the metropolitan and provincial offices of education since 1996 in an effort to make them more effective and accountable. Some critics argued that local residents—not the central authority—should assume responsibility for making the LESGS truly functional (Kim, 1999b). They also claimed that determining the amount of financial support provided to local education self-governing bodies based on the results of these evaluations represents a betrayal of the principle of self-governance. 7.7.

Management and Structure of Local Educational Finance

Observers have suggested that although the autonomy of metropolitan and provincial has dramatically increased as a result of decentralization policies, improvements in the efficiency of financial management have not kept pace with the changes in the authority structure (Kim et al., 1999a). This issue began to attract public attention when the rate of public investment in education increased rapidly after the government set the education budget at 5% of the GNP in 1996. With the goal of improving educational equity, the central government began to estimate the financial needs of each metropolitan and provincial region. The level of central funds provided to each education office used to be determined by calculating the difference between standardized financial expenditure from standardized financial revenues, and making up the differences. This practice reduced local motivation to efficiently managing educational finances. There is little incentive for local education offices to adopt innovative management techniques or to secure independent sources of revenue. In addition, local dependence on the central government is especially strong in the area of educational finance. The central government, via national taxes, continues to supply over 80% of all education funds in Korea. This situation tends to decrease the participation of local residents in supplying and managing local educational finances, and therefore undermines the goal of local self-governance. It is doubtful that problems related to local educational financing can be solved without restructuring the entire taxation system. 8.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

No one can deny that the education in the 21st century must meet newly emerging demands that have surfaced in connection with globalization and the development of a knowledge-based society. Education authorities in Korea believe that decentralization can help the nation meet this goal. However, the system of local education self-governance currently practiced in Korea hardly guarantees autonomy and professionalism in educational management. The Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development applies unnecessarily specific standards and regulations to local education offices. The uniform nature of the guidance provided by the Ministry makes it difficult for local authorities to tailor education to the unique aspects of the communities they serve. Central officials also fear that local educational administrations

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will become overly concerned with the minute details of school management and fail to provide satisfactory support to the schools, thus lowering the quality of education offered at the local level. With a variety of interest groups attempting to express their opinions in public arenas, frictions, and controversies related to educational matters have become increasingly detrimental. It is becoming more and more difficult to provide consumers with high quality education that meshes with the distinct realities of each region. In Korea, autonomy and self-governance in education are no longer matters of choice or possible alternatives, but imperatives that must be followed. The government is challenged to come up with a form of educational decentralization that reflects the traditions, culture, and social structure of Korean society. Developments in the political arena would appear to support educational decentralization. The political system has become more democratic, with citizens enjoying rights and responsibilities previously denied to them. A system of local self-governance builds on these developments. The LESGS aims at encouraging local residents to express their own desires for local education and to take responsibility for realizing those goals. Such a system is rooted in a conception of education that views local residents as the leaders of their school communities. At the same time, such a model presupposes high degrees of cooperation and mutual support not only between central and local education authorities, but also among a variety of higher administrative authorities and subordinate administrative organs. The strong tradition of centralized educational administration in Korea makes the process of transferring authority from the central Ministry to local educational bodies particularly challenging. Errors are bound to occur as people at different levels of the system adapt to new procedures and expectations. However, such a transfer of authority is necessary if Korean education is to continue to progress. If the LESGS is not realized, the education system will pay a high price. Therefore, the central government should continue to promote educational decentralization. It must help local administrators build capacity in areas such as finance, personnel, and organizational management. As local administrative capacity grows, the transfer of authority to local self-governing bodies should become more substantial and more consequential. NOTES 1. A study conducted by the Korean Educational Development Institute identifies the same chronological periods, but labels them using different phrases: “adoption and testing,” “reservation,” and “implementation’ phases” (Kim et al., 1999a). 2. The functions carried out by the two different level BODs were different. For example, the city level BOD was an executive organ, while the school district level BOD was a decision-making body. The decision-making authority of BODs at school districts was also limited, as they were allowed to make decisions pertaining to only elementary education.

9.

REFERENCES

Choi, H. S. (1996). Evaluative study on the local autonomy system of education. Journal of Educational Administration, 14(3), 149–169. Govinda, R. (1997). Decentralization of educational management: Experiences from South Asia. Paris: IIEP.

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Kim, N. S. (1996). A study on the development of local educational governance system in Korea. Journal of Educational Administration, 14(3), 170–231. Kim, J. W. (1998a). Meaning of education self-governance and the future prospect—with a focus on local education self-governance system. The Study of Educational Principles [Kyoyuk Wonli Yon’gu], 3(1), 23–28. Kim, S. B. (1998b). Changes in the environment of local educational administration and the directions for reform. Journal of Educational Administration, 16(3), 4–13. Kim, H. et al. (1999a). Restructuring of local administration system in education. RR99-9. Seoul: Korean Educational Development Institute. Kim, N. S. (1999b). Recollection of education self-governance in the 1990s and education self-governance for the 2000s. Paper presented at the 1999 symposium organized by the Korean Society for the Study of Education. Kim, Y. (1999c). What are the problems in the current local education self-governance system? Educational Development [Kyoyuk Kaebal], 117 (January), 22–25. Kim, S. B. (2001). Prospects of local education self-governance system in the twenty-first century and new strategies. Paper presented at the 121st symposium organized by the Korean Society for the Study of Educational Administration. Ministry of Education. (1998). Fifty-year history of Korea’s education. Seoul: Ministry of Education. Song, K. C. (1997). An alternative model of the relationship between educational autonomy and local autonomy. Study of Social and Educational Science [Sahoe Kyoyuk Kwahak Yon’gu], 2, 45–72. Yun, C. (2000). Redistribution of roles and functions between central and local education authorities. Journal of Educational Administration, 18(4), 159–172. Yun, C. et al. (1992). Education policy in Korea. Seoul: Kwahak Kyoyuksa.

Chapter 8 TRANSFERRING AUTHORITY TO LOCAL SCHOOL COMMUNITIES IN INDONESIA: AMBITIOUS PLANS, MIXED RESULTS Christopher Bjork

Indonesia, like many developing nations in Asia, is currently riding a decentralization wave. Over the past decade, the government has pushed for decentralization in all sectors of government, from health to agriculture. In the 1980s, the Ministry of National Education (MONE)1 began exploring the possibility of decentralizing authority over the schools. In the years that followed, a multitude of programs and policies tied to that goal were enacted. Although the government sometimes had trouble following through on its promise to devolve authority to autonomous regions, its support for decentralization projects did not wane. The culmination of its efforts to reconfigure authority frameworks was the passage of two laws in 1999 that granted sweeping powers to Indonesia’s districts and municipalities, beginning in 2001 (Ferrazzi, 1998; Malo, 1995; Usman, 2001). This legislation indicated that the education system, like all sectors of government, would be managed by local authorities and educators, and the MONE’s primary responsibility would shift from direction to coordination. Considering the highly centralized, top-down nature of Indonesian government, the decision to redistribute authority to local levels represented significant departure from previous practice. An administration that had “embodied centripetal power” (Malley, 1999) indicated that it would transfer key powers to local actors and institutions. This shift had important implications for the way that education would be organized and delivered in Indonesia. A system that had previously concentrated authority firmly at the top was signaling that the MONE’s monopoly over the education field would be broken. After a long history of being denied opportunities to participate in the direction of schooling, local educators were given unprecedented authority over the curriculum, budgets, and school practice. Members of school communities were also encouraged to take part in school decision-making. The government indicated its intention to lower the walls dividing schools from their surrounding communities and collaborate with school personnel in bottom-up planning. Ideally, those reconfigurations would increase community commitment to education, transform curricula, and enliven instruction. Although government officials were unclear about how local actors would respond to those challenges, they continued to promote the benefits of educational decentralization. Policy reports and guidebooks explore in great detail theoretical arguments for devolving authority over school systems. Surprisingly little attention has been devoted to local responses to the decentralization policies that have been 129 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 129–147.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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adopted. In this chapter I offer a preliminary account of the effects that decentralization policies have had in the schools. The chapter is divided into four sections: legal foundations for decentralization, teachers’ responses to proposed changes, the roles assigned to parents in the reconfigured education system, and curricular reform. Focusing on the translation and implementation of decentralization measures at the school level, I draw attention to the critical influence that local culture, economic conditions, and historical center-local relations can exert on the devolution process. 1.

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS AND HISTORICAL PRECEDENT

Indonesia’s remarkable cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious diversity has long challenged the individuals charged with governing the archipelago. Created in 1945, the country is composed of more than 13,000 islands, 200 million people, 50 ethnic groups, and 200 regional languages. Since that time, the Indonesian government has flirted with the idea of transferring authority to local levels on a number of occasions. Initially, government officials indicated that they would entrust local representatives with a considerable degree of autonomy. Adoption of Indonesia’s first decentralization law in 1948, the Basic Law on Regional Government, suggested that power would indeed be dispersed across the islands. The Constitution of 1950 went so far as to specify that, “The division of Indonesia into large and small regions with the right to govern their own affairs . . . . These divisions shall be given the largest possible measure of autonomy to manage their own affairs” (Indonesian Constitution of 1950, Article 131).2 Although politicians expressed support for decentralization, the absence of effective supporting legislation undermined plans for the devolution of authority to local levels (Ford, 2000). By 1949, a unitary state had replaced the federalist model and elites with centralist proclivities reasserted their authority (Ferrazzi, 2000). After the first president, Sukarno, was forced out of office in 1965, the New Order leadership that replaced him revived plans for decentralizing the bureaucracy. Intent on increasing administrative effectiveness, the government passed Law No. 5 of 1974, which called for the delegation of authority to the regencies and municipalities. The law, however, was never translated into action. According to Buising (2000), there are several factors that interfered with policy implementation. First, Law No. 5 did not provide detailed plans for transferring power to local levels. Second, many bureaucrats resisted pressure to share their power with sub-national offices. Finally, the oil boom that enriched Indonesia soon after Law No. 5 was adopted allowed New Order leaders to co-opt the regions by offering them much needed development funds in exchange for their support of a strong central government (Buising, 2000, p. 2). As a result, Law No. 5 had little effect on the distribution of power in Indonesian government offices. Although the law remained in effect, it was largely ignored. During the New Order era (1966–1998), authority became steadily more concentrated in the capital. Concerned about potential threats to his power and to national unity, President Suharto gradually tightened the leash that connected local levels of government to the center. Javanese stress on harmony and unity, combined with Indonesia’s rapid economic development, fed into Suharto’s plans for minimizing threats to his own authority (Schwarz, 2000). Improvements in transportation and communication networks enhanced communication across levels of government, but

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the bulk of information flowed in one direction. Under Suharto, local government officials became “transmitters” of directives from Jakarta rather than community representatives (Emmerson, 1978). Presidential Regulation No. 6 of 1970 required all civil servants to demonstrate “monoloyalty” to the government, and forbade them from engaging in political activity (Emmerson, 1978). Interestingly, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, just as the New Order administration was clamping down on individual and group freedoms (Schwarz, 2000), it introduced an extensive slate of decentralization programs in various sectors of government, from agriculture to health care. The impetus to decentralize, however, did not emerge solely within the borders of the nation; Indonesia’s embracement of decentralization paralleled an international groundswell of support for the concept (Govinda, 1997). This sheds light on the tension between the concomitant push for greater local autonomy and Suharto’s assertion of central authority and limitation of individual expression. The President’s instincts might have led him to guard the power accorded to central authorities, but global trends made that a risky strategy. As an official at the MONE that I interviewed observed, Indonesia has “entered what is called globalization, the free market. So we need to have every level of society active . . . . Because Indonesia will be joining the AFTA, APEC, and WTO. Decentralization is part of the process of preparing for membership in these organization” (Interview conducted at the MONE in Jakarta, October 22, 1997). Just months prior to the turn of the century, the newly appointed president, B. J. Habibie unexpectedly propelled the nation forward in its devolution project. At the time, Habibie was under great pressure to respond to political reforms proposed by the opposition forces that had driven his predecessor, Suharto, from office. Decentralization was perceived as a means of maintaining national cohesion in a precarious and volatile political environment. Only a year after being sworn in as president, Habibie signed two laws that required the country to step up its efforts to delegate authority to sub-national levels of government—and without delay. Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government and Law No. 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance Between the Central Government and the Regions decreed that all sectors of government begin the process of decentralization “big bang style” on January 1, 2001. Law No. 22 called for the elimination of the hierarchical relationship between provincial and local governments within 2 years. For the first time, the localities became responsible for managing most public services, such as education, health, and city planning. City and district offices no longer reported to the provincial governors. Instead, they were made accountable to locally elected assemblies (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah). This represented a major reconfiguration of the government– community relationship. Although community participation pilot projects had occasionally been introduced in various sectors of government over the previous 20 years, most Indonesian citizens enjoyed few, if any, opportunities to influence government decision-making. It appeared that this situation was about to undergo significant changes. Another notable aspect of Law No. 22 was a call for the decoupling of most deconcentrated offices3 from central ministries. As a result, local governments were granted the authority to hire, fire, pay, and train civil servants stationed outside of the capital. Law No. 25 stated that “the regions have the authority and responsibility to carry out the people’s interests in accordance with principles that are transparent, involve

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community participation, and are accountable” (Article 3.1.3.1). It also required the national government to share 20% of all revenues with sub-national governments.4 So, although city and district governments received larger shares of taxes and fees collected in Jakarta, their financial burdens also increased.5 Law No. 25 outlined a system of revenue sharing that required provincial and district governments to redistribute many of the taxes they collected. Taken together, the two laws signaled a notable shift in the government’s approach to decentralization. It appeared that after years of discussing and experimenting with the idea of transferring power from the capital to the localities, Indonesia would finally follow through on those inclinations. The president underscored his commitment to decentralization by creating a Ministry of Regional Autonomy and appointing Ryaas Rasjid as its head. If laws 22 and 25 were implemented in accordance with the spirit that spurred their creation, districts and cities would be given unprecedented degrees of autonomy. Although the central government would continue to draft national policy and coordinate the provision of public services, those services would be managed primarily at the district level. According to government documents, this redistribution of power was expected to “improve the delivery of public services, to make the public sector more responsive to the needs and priorities of local communities, and to increase civil participation in the policy making and oversight process” (Handisumarto, 2000, p. 1). Reports from the field, however, indicate that the process of decentralization is not progressing as smoothly as officials in Jakarta would have liked. Alm, Aten, and Bahl (2000) posit that the Indonesian government should be commended for making a firm commitment to decentralization and setting that process in motion; however, local actors have experienced much confusion in attempting to enact the legislation. This confusion is primarily the result of two factors: (1) politicians in Jakarta appear to have adopted the decentralization reforms without formulating a clear statement of the objectives of those reforms; (2) Laws 22 and 25 are not supported by a set of regulations that provide the individuals and agencies responsible for implementing those laws with clear instructions on how to proceed. Not surprisingly, the reforms driven by Laws 22 and 25 faced difficulties even before the legislation went into effect. Claiming that differences between his own views and those of President Abdurraham, Habibie’s successor, prevented him from effectively carrying out his duties, Ryaas Rasjdid, resigned his post only 2 days after the laws were enacted. The President was unwilling to support Ryaas’ proposal for establishing an Autonomy Supervisory Board to oversee implementation of the laws, preferring instead to create a directorate general within the Ministry of Home Affairs. Soon after Ryaas stepped down, the Ministry of Regional Autonomy was eliminated and responsibility for overseeing decentralization was transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Undeterred, the government forged ahead with its plans for devolving the system. It is still too early to draw any definitive conclusions about the effects of decentralization in Indonesia. The government has emphasized that decentralization is a long-term project, and it will take years before sub-national offices develop an understanding of exactly what is expected of them and how they can best serve their surrounding communities. A report published by the Ministry of Home Affairs emphasizes that regional autonomy will not begin to “stabilize” until at least 2007

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(Soedirja, 2001, p. 15). Nevertheless, the government appears committed to moving forward with its plans to decentralize the government, regardless of the trajectory of the transition: “We have reached the point of no return” (Soedirja, 2001, p. 15). Will Indonesia succeed in creating an efficient system of localized government, as the report above suggests? Are civil servants working in the localities prepared to take on the new responsibilities being assigned to them? Will members of communities take advantage of opportunities to influence local government? In this chapter, I explore these questions in the context of the education system. Drawing from several years of experience studying the Indonesian education system, I describe the factors likely to influence the way parents, teachers, and administrators respond to the challenge of managing the schools, with limited guidance from the MONE. 2.

TEACHERS’ RESPONSES TO THE PROPOSED CHANGES

One of the salient goals of educational decentralization is to create more democratic authority structures and to expand the circle of actors involved in decisionmaking. Teachers, in particular, are pressed to take a more active role in school management and curricular design. Yet studies of educational decentralization rarely focus on the actions of instructors. Research on this topic tends to come in the form of macro-evaluations of decentralization efforts, with analyses that highlight economic efficiency issues or political wrangling between government officials or ministries. Notably absent from such accounts is consideration of the role that teachers play in translating decentralization policy into practice. In the section that follows, I take a close look at the ways in which the culture of teaching in Indonesia supports or undermines the goals of educational decentralization. As I will illustrate, Indonesian teachers attach themselves to the education system according to a set of values and expectations that contrast in some key respects with those common to school systems in developed nations. Indonesian teachers’ unique conceptions of their professional responsibilities have important implications for the MONE’s plans to decentralize the education system. A review of educational literature published in the West reveals certain assumptions about teacher motivation. We tend to take for granted that a primary motivation for most teachers is the opportunity to make a difference in the lives of children. Teachers often endure unpleasant work conditions, low pay, and feelings of isolation in exchange for the “psychic rewards” they derive from their interactions with children (Lortie, 1975). For example, in a survey distributed to 1,100 educators in Canada, the most common reason respondents provided for becoming teachers was “to make a difference in the lives of students” (Fullan, 1993b). For many, this entails acting as a “student advocate” or an “agent of change” (Fullan, 1993a,b; Yee, 1990). Individuals who view themselves in this manner are likely to welcome opportunities to influence school policy and practice. Indonesian teachers do follow many of the same routines as instructors in other countries: they present lessons from textbooks, give homework assignments, test students’ mastery of the curriculum, and send report cards home to parents. However, these surface similarities belie some fundamental differences in views about what it means to work as a guru in a public school. Indonesia has developed a definition of “teacher” that fits the unique contours of the nation’s social, historical, and political

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landscape. The nation’s system of government has exerted a powerful influence on the work of teachers, rewarding educators for behaviors not typically stressed in schools located in Western nations with solid democratic foundations. As civil servants, Indonesian teachers have traditionally answered to the government, not students, parents, or local school boards. A number of recent studies on identity formation of individuals working in large organizations depict this experience as a complex process over which the individual often has little conscious control (Burns & Flam, 1987; Kramer, 1993; March, 1994; Turner, 1987). This literature suggests that individuals possess multiple, cooccurring identities and that responses to institutional pressures will depend on the relative salience of those identities. According to Kramer (1993), all members of an organization share a common “superordinate” identity. In addition, they form multiple organizational selves tied to job titles, work responsibilities, subgroup memberships, and so forth. When faced with an unfamiliar situation, employees tend to rely on the superordinate identity to guide their actions. In Indonesia, teachers are classified both as educators and civil servants. The civil servant identity, however, has usually been emphasized over that of the educator. During the second half of the 20th century, the state depended on all sectors of government to promote national cohesion. The education system was organized around this purpose, and educators learned to pay careful attention to programs designed to support the national cause (Thomas, 1981). The state emphasized teachers’ loyalty to the nation above that to their profession. Schools were decorated with pictures of national heroes, ceremonies designed to honor the state were institutionalized across the archipelago, and the national curriculum stressed the schools’ duty to produce patriotic citizens. Instruction, in contrast, was not established as a high priority. Teachers were rarely observed in class, and their instructional abilities were not evaluated.6 As long as educators did not threaten the state, their jobs were secure. During the New Order period, discussing politics on campus could endanger an educator’s career, but failing to show up for scheduled classes was condoned. Teachers learned to follow the rules established by the government and organize their behavior accordingly. In other words, the civil servant identity became “superordinate” for public school employees. One effect of this emphasis on teachers’ obligations to the state is that they have not established a set of professional standards distinct from that applied to other types of civil servants. The civil service system is structured to reward individuals who display loyalty and obedience, and these are the qualities most readily embraced by the instructors I observed. Teachers, like other government employees, rarely question the party line communicated from Jakarta or seek to increase their degree of influence in the workplace. They have learned that the most dependable response is to follow directions and avoid drawing attention to oneself. This helps to explain teachers’ unenthusiastic response to a series of reforms designed to augment their authority. The MONE is attempting to locate members of the education system in new places, but is failing to recognize tensions between the new organizational grid it is promoting and the traditional hierarchical order. The meager compensation teachers receive for their work can also weaken their commitment to the schools. A survey conducted by the World Bank found that 39% of Indonesian junior secondary school teachers supplement their income through

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additional part-time work (World Bank, 1989). Several of the educators I interviewed noted that their supplemental income actually exceeded the money they earned from the government. Most commonly, they taught part-time at private schools or worked as private tutors. Employment was not, however, limited to education-related ventures. In the schools I visited, educators also ran small-scale trading businesses, refereed soccer matches, and sold animals to generate extra income; in rural areas, teachers often combined careers in education and agriculture. In many cases, teachers’ secondary work took priority over their responsibilities in the schools. This is not surprising, given the requirements of the civil servant and those of the private entrepreneur. Teachers interested in moonlighting as tutors must compete with a large pool of instructors, college students, and private institutes. Those who deliver the best results attract the largest numbers of students and can charge the highest fees. Instructors that engage in other side businesses also tend to be subject to the pressures of a market economy. Public employees, in contrasts, are guaranteed a basic salary regardless of performance on the job. As long as they do not upset their principals or employees in the provincial office of education, teachers can expect to receive regular pay increases every 4 years, regardless of their efforts in the classroom (World Bank, 1989). Teachers also balance their professional obligations with social and religious affiliations. Attachments to groups not associated with the schools often play a key role in organizing their lives. Informants frequently talked about the rewards they derived from holding leadership positions in community and religious organizations. One man, for example, served as the assistant head of his village; another formed a cooperative to assist farmers in his neighborhood in devising strategies for using their land more efficiently. In their neighborhoods and mosques, teachers find spaces to participate in activities that resonate with their individual interests, values, and beliefs. These opportunities are more likely to elicit their commitment than events organized in schools. Communities outside of the school provide teachers with more immediate and fulfilling rewards for their efforts. Guinness notes that in Indonesia the “neighborhood is particularly significant . . . because it does not represent an official unit of administration” (Guinness, 1989, p. 61). Neighborhood organizations gain legitimacy precisely because they are disconnected from the state apparatus. The combination of these pressures weighing down on school employees has created a system in which “teaching is perceived not as a full-time responsibility but as a part-time occupation often secondary to farming, business or homekeeping” (World Bank, 1989). Instructors tend to concentrate on the tasks with the greatest potential to increase their income or status in the community—those based beyond the borders of the schools. Administrators, sympathetic to teachers’ financial burdens, generally overlook staff absenteeism, tardiness, or lack of preparation. For many educators, the economic realities of life prevent them from making teaching a high priority. Most public school employees I interviewed seemed content with their narrowly defined job descriptions. Although they did not enjoy high degrees of influence over school policy and practice, teachers often highlighted the advantages of that situation. The restricted scope of the responsibilities delegated to Indonesian teachers reduces the possibility that they will derive substantial rewards from their work, but it also minimizes the demands placed upon them and the job-related stress they experience.

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With relatively few obligations when their classes are not in session, teachers have more time to devote to activities not related to school. This conception of teaching does not mesh with the behaviors that MONE officials are currently hoping that educators will display as they respond to decentralization policy. The Indonesian government is depending on classroom teachers to take a leading role in the process of educational decentralization. As numerous education officials told me, efforts to devolve authority to the schools hinge on the efforts of classroom teachers. According to MONE plans, instructors should now design original curricula, experiment with instructional strategies, and meet with members of the community. These modifications are all designed to promote teacher autonomy and make them more active agents in their school communities. Yet teachers are still defined as civil servants, their salaries continue to be paid by the national government, and they are evaluated using the same behavioral checklist used to rate all government employees. Not surprisingly, instructors are clinging to behaviors that brought them security in the past rather than following the precarious, unproven plans the government has developed in its move to devolve control over the school schools. Socialized to respect the verticality of the system’s hierarchy, they are rejecting opportunities to increase their levels of responsibility. Instead, they continue to wait for direction from central officials, who assume that local actors have accepted the baton that has been passed to them. The product of this situation is a leadership vacuum that no one seems eager to fill. 3.

PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

Teachers are not the only actors expected to modify their relationships to the recently reconfigured Indonesian schools. Reports prepared both by the MONE and international funding organizations call for parents and community leaders to take more active roles in the management of public schools (UNDP/UNESCO/ILO, 1994; van der Werf et al., 2000). Echoing theory about educational decentralization that highlights the potential to improve system efficiency, education officials maintain that expanding parental participation will bolster local support for the schools and generate additional resources. One report published by the MONE posits that the government needs to make an effort to “actualize a conception of the responsibilities of education which is jointly shared by parents, the community, and the government” (Ministry of Education and Culture, 1994b, p. 1). Another document states that, “It is expected that school personnel honor the participation and support of the parents and communities. That kind of mutual respect and mutual responsibilities can be cultivated in the management of education” (Ministry of Education and Culture, 1994c, p. 12). Educational decentralization plans echo those reports, advising schools to consult parents as they make decisions concerning a variety of matters previously handled by provincial and national authorities (UNDP, 1998; Vicencio, 1995). In the decentralized education system envisioned by government officials, parents, community leaders, teachers, and administrators will work in partnership to improve the quality of teaching and learning delivered in the schools. The conception of schools as extensions of their surrounding communities is consonant with ideas about educational reform currently in favor in international circles (Ministry of Education and Culture, 1994a; National Institution for Educational Research, 1996;

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Moyle & Pongtuluran, 1992). It is not clear, however, if Indonesian educators are prepared to work in collaboration with members of the community. Indonesian schools have not traditionally invited or responded to the input of everyday citizens (Cohen, 2000; Mandolang, 1996). Like most public institutions in Indonesia, schools have operated with a sense of independence from their surrounding communities. Institutional practice, as well as the tacit signals communicated to parents, has underlined the idea that education of Indonesia’s youth should be entrusted to teachers, and that parents should not interfere in that process. Parent– teacher conference days are not written into school calendars, school festivals are usually closed to the community, and teachers do not invite parents on campus to observe classes. The division between schools and communities solidified over time, and is now an accepted feature of a majority of the schools I visited. As a result, parents have minimal influence over what transpires in their children’s classrooms: At the moment most state schools appear to be isolated institutions in the community, answerable more to the district and provincial offices than to their local communities whose children and parents are their clients. Information passing from the school to the community and back is at the moment small in its extent. Parents are given a mark on their child’s report card each term, but often no explanation is given of how this was arrived at and what it means in terms of the needs of the child. There is a real need to embed the school as part of the local community so that the community can feed in its ideas and opinions of how to make the school relevant to the social, cultural and economic needs of the community. (UNDP/UNESCO/ILO, 1994, p. 33) This framing of the school–community relationship pervades, and extends beyond, the education system. Since Indonesia gained independence, the government has carefully assessed the consequences of an active populace and intervened when freedom of expression was perceived of as a threat to the central government’s agenda. In the early years of the New Order era, the need for economic development and political stability was used to justify the curtailment of civil liberties (Emmerson, 1978; Schwarz, 2000). The impressive economic growth that followed augmented the central government’s influence and reinforced the idea that the state knew what was best for the people (Rahardjo, 1985). Careful monitoring of the activities of community organizations and regular appointment of individuals with records of loyalty to the central government further extended the central government’s reach into local affairs. In addition, community organizations often relied on government funds to operate. Not surprisingly, most citizens refrained from participating in organizations with links to the government (Guinness, 1994). Beginning in the 1980s, state technocrats began devising strategies for closing the gap that separated schools from their surrounding communities. Over the next 20 years a number of polices and programs designed to spur community involvement in education were enacted. Education Act No. 2 of 1989 provided a legal foundation for expanding the circle of actors involved in educational decision-making. The law defined the polity and the government as partners in the provision of education, and required that society be “given ample opportunity to participate in the conduct of

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national education” (Education Act of the Republic of Indonesia No. 2/1989). Several government-sponsored projects were initiated to support this objective.7 In addition, during the 1980s and 1990s, curriculum planners in Jakarta developed several instruments (such as community surveys and guidelines for parent roundtables) for school personnel to utilize as they followed MONE plans for reform (Bjork, 2003). Analyses of the impact of reforms introduced in attempt to boost parental participation in education offer ambiguous evidence regarding their effectiveness. Evaluations of community participation projects include evidence of progress toward MONE objectives, but also identify impediments that have prevented parents from playing a more active part in school management. It appears that efforts to improve school–home links have had some effect, but not to the extent that government officials had hoped. For example, in the sub-districts where the Coplaner program was piloted, “local investment interest and motivation in education” increased (UNDP/UNESCO/ILO, 1994, p. 33). A series of reports prepared by an international consultant identify several activities initiated in conjunction with the Coplaner program that fall in line with MONE goals: partnerships between schools and local businesses, community meetings focused on improving the teaching and learning process, and home visits by teachers. The same reports, however, describe troubling developments as well. For example, in some districts parent–teacher conferences were initiated only with “selected”—mostly poor—adults whose children were experiencing academic difficulties at school. In other locations, school personnel experienced difficulty in translating ideas about community participation into actual practice: “They limit themselves to traditional, formal management activities and don’t undertake real community participation efforts” (Mandolang, 1996, p. 4). Another report found that encouraging community participation in education did bolster student achievement. However, the types of participation observed8 were limited to support provided by families at home—they were not invited to collaborate with or advise school personnel. When I visited schools on the island of Java and studied local responses to decentralization policy, I was initially perplexed by apparent contradictions in the interview and observation data that I collected. Parents, teachers, and administrators all told me that the parents in their communities regularly participated in school activities. On a survey that I distributed to 191 teachers, 51% of all respondents indicated that parents were actively involved in the Local Content Curriculum (LCC) programs (see below for more details on this program) at their schools. Yet when I spent time on school campuses, I rarely saw a parent venture beyond the entrance gates. I struggled to find examples of parental participation in the schools. Not once did I glimpse a parent visit a classroom or meet with a teacher about a school’s academic program. In follow-up interviews conducted with survey respondents, I began to make sense of the apparent incongruity between the survey data and my observation notes. It gradually became clear to me that the mismatch stemmed from divergent interpretations of the word “participation.” For me, parental participation connoted active involvement in school meetings, planning activities, special events, and so forth. But the parents and teachers I interviewed seemed to attach a different definition to the term. When asked to provide examples of parental involvement, these informants did not describe activities in which parents shared their knowledge, opinions, or skills;

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instead, without exception, they referred to parents’ financial contributions. For instance, when I asked a principal to describe the role of the parents at his school, he replied, “To give support for the materials we need.” In response to the same query, a home economics teacher explained that parents “can prepare materials, donate materials to the school. Maybe you have observed a cooking lesson. Students cook lots of food. This was possible because the parents donated the materials.” Informants at all of the schools I visited echoed the comments made by these educators. There was a clear consensus that parents were valued for the financial and material contributions they made, but such donations did not earn them any influence over school management, practice, or curricula. Although parents seemed quite accepting of this framing of parental participation, their attitudes about school accessibility and responsiveness varied significantly. More specifically, parents’ views about their rights and responsibilities in an evolving educational sphere were closely linked to their income level. In communities with relatively low average incomes, parents generally avoided interacting with school employees. Instead, they left their children’s education in the hands of teachers, communicating with the schools only when summoned by members of the staff. In interviews, many such parents expressed unease about approaching teachers or administrators. They did not feel that their opinions were welcomed or respected by school employees. Economically disadvantaged parents assumed, based on previous patterns of interaction and information secured from relatives and friends, that their children would benefit from their own silence. Parents of higher socio-economic status, in contrast, described more relaxed and open relationships with their children’s teachers. Although interactions between parents and teachers were rare even on the campuses of highly regarded institutions, parents did not seem to have erected the sturdy psychological barriers dividing them from the schools that prevented less affluent men and women from interacting with school employees. The opinions of school personnel reinforced patterns of behavior. Teachers working at more elite schools (both public and private) frequently spoke about the parents of their students with a sense of respect. Most were appreciative of the contributions those parents made to their children’s education, and pointed to that support as a key to the school’s success. According to the employees of highly regarded educational institutions, parental support made it possible for teachers to undertake activities that might otherwise have been impossible. Teachers employed by schools that served families with lower average incomes did not speak as respectfully or appreciatively of their students’ families. Current efforts to decentralize the Indonesian education system build on a series of reforms initiated by the MONE in attempt to encourage greater participation by parents. The government is depending on parents to become more actively involved in school management. Although some of the pilot programs9 (most notably Coplaner) have stimulated changes in the ways that teachers interact with parents in certain locations, the public schools have proven remarkably resistant to pressure to democratize decision-making procedures. After decades of separation from the outside, teachers and administrators appear hesitant to open the doors of the schools to surrounding communities. Local educators and parents appear to have developed a definition of “parental participation” that does not match the MONE’s interpretation of that phrase. Individuals outside of the Ministry continue to regard parental

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participation as a process of extraction—of securing financial and material support for school programs from parents, without soliciting their ideas or opinions about their children’s education. This situation reveals another challenge facing Indonesian education officials as they attempt to devolve authority over the schools to local levels. Facilitating community partnerships requires people not only to behave differently, but also to redefine concepts formed and solidified over decades in response to the realities of community life. As Cohen observes, government officials have approached the task of altering the links between schools and parents “through training rather than through the establishment of a formal system to institute behavior change among all interested audience” (Cohen, 2000, p. 2). As long as the government approaches this project as a technical process, with the view that a short workshop will provide the impetus for educators and parents to alter their behavior, decentralization reforms are likely to fall short of expectations. 4.

CURRICULAR REFORM

It is still unclear, at this point, what effect laws 22 and 25 will have on the curriculum. Up to this point, implementation has focused on organizational rather than curricular issues. This legislation, however, does not represent the government’s first attempt to expand the responsibilities and influence of classroom teachers. The Local Content Curriculum (LCC) reform, instituted in 1994, set in motion the process of devolving authority over the curriculum to local educators. The reform was regarded as the MONE’s flagship educational decentralization project prior to the adoption of laws 22 and 25 (Bjork, 2003). In the area of curriculum and instruction, the LCC continues to represent the most noteworthy decentralization measure enacted in Indonesia thus far. In this section, I examine the strategies the MONE employed in support of the LCC, and the effects these efforts have had on the subject matter that is taught in actual classrooms. As I will show, teachers and administrators may not be eager to take the active role in reshaping curriculum and practice that decentralization policies such as the LCC demand of them. After years of informal discussion about the prospect of decentralizing control over the curriculum, in 1994 the MONE required all elementary and junior high schools in the country to allocate 20% of total instructional hours to locally designed subject matter. Concerned that previous national curricula did not adequately consider Indonesia’s extraordinary diversity, education officials instructed teachers and administrators to develop locally relevant course that would “provide students with an understanding of . . . their local culture, basic life skills and an introduction to income producing skills” (UNDP, 1998, p. 6). A school in Bali might decide to provide instruction in tourism, while an institution located in a rural area of Java could offer an LCC course in agriculture. A schedule was established for phasing the LCC into junior secondary schools 1 year at a time, beginning with first year students in 1994. By 1996, all grade levels in all Indonesian junior secondary schools were required to follow a curriculum that included locally determined, designed, and implemented subject matter. In each of Indonesia’s provinces, a 35-person “Curriculum Coordinating Group” (CCG) was formed and conferred the authority to direct implementation of the LCC.

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These handpicked committees of teachers, administrators, and bureaucrats were responsible for coordinating the LCC curriculum, devising assessment tools, and training teachers in their districts. Prior to the introduction of the LCC, the MONE held two intensive training sessions for every CCG. After the reform was launched nationally, the Ministry gradually reduced its level of support to the these groups. As an official involved in LCC policy explained, “We are moving from development to stabilization” of local LCC management. MONE representatives continue to meet with the CCGs approximately once a year to check on the group’s progress and offer advice. The expectation in Jakarta was that the CCGs will eventually assume complete responsibility for overseeing LCC programs. Authority over the actual design and implementation of the new curriculum, however, was concentrated at the school level. As a result, classroom teachers were delegated powers previously unheard of in Indonesia. For the first time, local educators were asked to take an active part in designing curricula. In the past, curriculum specialists in Jakarta wrote the curriculum followed in all schools; the instructor’s primary responsibility was to transmit information included in textbooks. The MONE hoped that introduction of the LCC would spur a change in that model. In contrast with their previous role as information conduits, teachers were encouraged “to act as educational leaders and decision makers in the selection and shaping of LCC activities and programs” (UNDP, 1998, p. 26). Individuals located at all levels of the system seem to have absorbed the notion that the curriculum should more closely mesh with local conditions. When asked their opinions about the goals of the LCC, the teachers and principals I interviewed all highlighted the importance of matching the curriculum to local conditions. Most of these people believed that their schools had succeeded in meeting that goal. MONE officials as well as classroom teachers observed that, in response to LCC policy guidelines, schools had revised their course offerings to better meet the needs of the communities they serve. Individuals often differed in their interpretations of how curricula could best match local contexts, but there was a consensus that LCC course offerings had been designed to fit local realities, both economic and cultural, and that such linkages would make learning more stimulating for Indonesian students. Based on the statements expressed by teachers and education officials, one might assume that efforts to devolve authority to local levels had produced a transformation of the Indonesian curriculum. My observations of actual lessons, however, contradicted this supposition. In the vast majority of the schools I visited, the pre- and post-1994 skills curriculum showed remarkable consistency. In most cases, course titles had been changed or classes moved to different sections of the curriculum, but the core subject matter remained essentially the same. Schools reorganized or relabeled the courses they offered to comply with LCC policy directives, but the substance of what students studied remained constant. The most significant changes existed in print only. That strategy allowed schools to demonstrate compliance with LCC policy while investing minimal effort in restructuring instructional programs, as the comments below illustrate: Remarks made by a principal at a faculty meeting: A problem with LCC is that before last year this material was labeled PKK. The current subjects are actually the same as PKK. The only difference

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is now you have to teach with “packets.” One packet should be covered each term. There are many more packets than are needed, so you should pick the packets that are appropriate to your particular conditions. Q: How did the introduction of the 1994 Curriculum affect the subject you teach? Auto mechanics Teacher: The implementation is the same but the materials have changed. The new materials are more thoroughly developed. There used to be two semesters in a year but now there are three quarters (cawu). Before, we finished one kit per semester but now we finish one kit per quarter. That means six kits in two years rather than four. Also, I used to teach only third year students but now I also teach second year students. Q: How have your teaching methods changed? Auto-mechanics Teacher: They are almost the same. The teaching methods I use vary according to the kits. I can arrange the kits into any order I want. None of the schools I visited had made a concerted effort to shape the LCC curriculum to fit the unique needs or interests of its students. School employees did not survey parents or students or study employment conditions in the community, as policy guidelines advised them to do. When course topics and students’ needs did match, those connections appeared to occur fortuitously rather than due to careful planning. As a result, in some instances there was a good fit between curriculum and need, while in other cases it was hard to justify the slate of LCC courses offered at a particular school. For example, at Junior High School B, an institution serving an elite student population, the LCC curriculum included cooking, sewing, photography, electronics, and Javanese language courses. A veteran sewing teacher offered the following rationale for this slate of classes: Q: What is your opinion of the LCC curriculum? Sewing teacher: It’s good because we can adapt it to the situation at this school. For example, at this school the students are very smart and the level of learning is very high. So we can adjust the lessons to their abilities. Students will be able to use these skills when they get jobs. Q: Do you think many of your students will get jobs that require sewing? Sewing teacher: Students at this school are well off, so they rarely work as seamstresses. They become doctors or businessmen. But they can make their own clothes or sew part time when they are university students. This teacher’s explanation typified those supplied by LCC instructors. School employees could usually point out some benefits of offering the subjects they taught,

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but did not provide evidence that LCC courses were selected based on the particular interests and career plans of their students, as MONE documents recommended. Students at Junior High School B were no more likely to work as seamstresses, electricians, or cooks than they were as glassblowers. One might make the case that such courses might heighten students’ interest in school. But even if they did have that effect, the introduction of LCC should not be considered a causal factor, given that the slate of courses offered prior to 1994 did change. As a result of LCC policy, schools reorganized curricula into a new set of boxes. Some teachers did pay increased attention to connections between the subject matter they disseminated to students, but the basic curricular foundation anchoring instruction in Indonesian junior high schools remained constant. I did not find any evidence of schools revising their instructional programs in response to community needs. As a result, what was billed as a major reconfiguration of the education system did not induce any significant change in the education delivered to Indonesian junior high school students. Educators are often quite adept at demonstrating compliance to guidelines for curricular reform without actually modifying the content of their lessons to any significant extent. 5.

CONCLUSION

At the end of the 20th century, after decades of entertaining the idea of decentralization, the Indonesian government made an unprecedented commitment to devolve power to local levels. Encouraged by organizations such as the World Bank and the UNDP, it enacted a series of laws and programs that created a framework for autonomous action in Indonesia’s villages and municipalities. It appeared that those attempts to redistribute authority would have more extensive and long-lasting effects than any others initiated since Indonesia gained independence. In the education sector, community leaders, parents, teachers, and school administrators were offered powers previously reserved for MONE officials in Jakarta. For the first time, local actors were encouraged to shape policy and practice in the schools. According to Western literature on educational reform members of school communities would embrace such opportunities to exert their influence (Fullan, 1993b; McLaughlin, 1990; Sirianni, 1987; Sykes, 1990). MONE officials expected them to do just that. However, response to educational decentralization reforms introduced in Indonesia was less than overwhelming. Local stakeholders seemed hesitant to alter their values and behaviors to conform to government plans (Bjork, 2004). The Indonesian government implemented decentralization reforms at a speed and to an extent that seemed unthinkable only a few years ago. These changes challenged members of school communities to take on responsibilities previously reserved for MONE employees working in Jakarta. Not surprisingly, financial constraints and insufficient local capacity make the challenge of devolution even more daunting (Cohen, 2000). As the literature on educational decentralization would suggest, these realities have interfered with the transfer of authority to the local level. Yet the schools I visited that had the most abundant resources, the healthiest budgets, and the most well trained teachers were no more likely to embrace decentralization than less prosperous peer institutions. The wealthiest schools as well as the poorest modified practice little if at all in response to decentralization policies. Even individuals who

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spoke with enthusiasm about the idea of delegating increased authority over education to local communities and schools continued to wait for direction from their superiors. Reform rarely extended beyond a rhetorical level. The words informants used to describe the ways that schools should be run may have been altered to mesh with MONE reform plans, but their actions were not (Bjork, 2005). This disjuncture between words and behavior underscores the depth of change necessary before a highly centralized system can devolve authority to lower levels of an administrative hierarchy. Reconfiguring the Indonesian education system so that decisions will flow from the bottom up rather than the top down requires more extensive modifications of thought and action than policy documents acknowledge. Decentralizing the schools is essentially a move to democratize them, and this type of reform goes against the norms that ordered most Indonesian public institutions for decades. During the New Order era, loyally following orders was more likely to bring one rewards than acting with a sense of independence. Indonesian educators are not likely to have significant experience with democratically managed institutions; nor can they be expected to be familiar with schools that regularly include teachers or parents in making important decisions. Shifting to a locally managed education system does not merely entail refining existing practices; it requires the construction of new foundations (Bjork, 2005). The individuals who must assume authority in a decentralized system interpret reforms in reference to the institutional and societal norms that frame their lives. The notions of democratic participation and independent thought that ground the concept of decentralization have not been emphasized in Indonesian public institutions in the past. As local actors negotiate the decentralization policies that have been handed down to them, they attach meaning to the phrases that pervade policy talk, in terms that make sense in their immediate surroundings. As a result of that process of localized interpretation, decentralization policies enacted in Indonesia have been reshaped to look quite distinct from the plans conceived of by MONE officials, whose actions are more closely tied to transnational flows of information than to the realities of Indonesian classrooms. Consequently, individuals located at all levels of the education system can give positive reports about the effects of educational decentralization while practices in the schools remain constant. The data I collected suggest that Indonesian citizens are generally enthused about the prospects of devolving authority of schools and other public institutions. They are not likely, however, to have a thorough understanding of the implications of this process for their own behavior. Although informants often spoke with optimism about the idea of locally managed schools, I rarely met parents, teachers, administrators, or government officials who had given serious thought to how they would need to modify their own behavior so as to fall in line the objectives of educational decentralization. In their comments, interviewees sometimes used phrases (such as “local autonomy” or “school-based management”) that pervade the literature on educational decentralization. However, they came up with definitions for those terms in reference to the norms and values of their own lives. Their interpretations of such terms often clashed with those used by education officials or international consultants: parental participation was construed as making financial contributions

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to schools; autonomous activity by teachers required renaming courses and curricula, but not any significant modification of behavior. For many, decentralization was a laudable goal, as long as it did not necessitate changes in their own responsibilities. In summary, the individuals expected to assume new roles and responsibilities in a decentralized education system are clinging to behaviors that have served them well in the past rather than following precarious, unproven recommendations outlined in policy documents. NOTES 1. The organization was previously referred to as the Ministry of Education and Culture. 2. In 1959 the Constitution of 1945, which accorded much greater power to central authorities was re-enacted, replacing the 1950 version. 3. Matters related to defense, foreign policy, judicial affairs, and religion were exempted from this provision. 4. Ten percent of this amount was allocated to provincial offices and 90% to the district level. 5. According to one report, the share of sub-national government spending would more than double, but regional revenues were projected to increase to only 10% of overall revenues (ISFDC). 6. All civil servants, regardless of position, are rated using a single standardized performance evaluation form. None of the criteria used to evaluate teachers is directly tied to instructional competence. Principals rate the members of a teaching faculty on a scale of 1–100 in the following areas: loyalty (kesetian), work performance (prestasi kerja), responsibility (tanggung jawab), obedience (ketautan), honesty (kejujuran), cooperation (kerjasama), and initiate (prakarsa). A score of 75 or above is considered satisfactory. There is one important exceptin to this rule—an employee must receive a rating of at least 90 in the “loyalty” category to pass the evaluation and continue working in a school. 7. For example, under the STEPPES program, between 1986 and 1990 approximately 1,700 people were trained in “bottom-up planning.” Another large scale pilot project, Community Participation in Planning and Management of Educational Resources (Coplaner), was initiated to “[b]ring together important policy initiatives in an innovative fashion to explore lower level administrative frameworks which enhance community involvement in education” (Coplaner, 1994, p. 3). Though not specifically created to promote parental involvement in education, the Primary Educational Quality Improvement Project (PEQIP) included a component that sought to cultivate broader participation by parents community leaders (van der Werf et al., 2000). 8. Homework regulations, voluntary work of parents, educational involvement of parents, help with homework, signing homework, financial contributions. 9. It is important to note that before the LCC was introduced in 1994, all of the MONE programs focused on parental participation were pilot programs that were never implemented nation-wide.

6.

REFERENCES

Alm, J., Aten, R., & Bahl, R. (2000). Can Indonesia decentralize? Plans, problems, and prospects. Working Paper No. 00–10, Georgia State University, International Studies Program. Bjork, C. (2003). Local Responses to decentralization policy in Indonesia. Comparative Education Review, 47(2), 184–216. Bjork, C. (2004). Decentralization in education: Institutional culture and teacher autonomy in Indonesia. International Review of Education, 50(3), 245–262. Bjork, C. (2005). Indonesian education: Teachers, schools, and central authority. New York: Routledge. Buising, T. (2000). Decentralize. Easy to say. Difficult to do. Inside Indonesia, 63(July–September). The article was retrieved from the website: www.insideindonesia.org. Burns, T. R., & Flam, H. (1987). The shaping of social organization. London: Sage Publications. Cohen, J. (2000). Educational decentralization and behavior needs in Indonesia, Unpublished manuscript, Jakarta. Emmerson, D. K. (1978). The bureaucracy in political context: Weakness in strength. In K. D. Jackson and L. W. Pye (Eds.), Political power and communications in Indonesia (pp. 82–136). Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Ferrazzi, G. (1998). Criteria for transferring functions to sub-national governments: Selection and application in Indonesian decentralization initiatives, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The University of Guelph. Ferrazzi, G. (2000). Using the “F” word: Federalism in Indonesia’s decentralization discourse. Publius, 30(2) (Spring), 63–85. Ford, J. F. G. (2000). Inter-governmental fiscal relations and state building: The case of Indonesia. Washington, DC: Mimeograph. Fullan, M. (1993a). Innovation, reform, and restructuring strategies. In G. Cawelti (Ed.), Changes and achievements of American education (pp. 116–133). Alexandria, VA: ASCD. Fullan, M. G. (1993b). Why teachers must become change agents. Educational Leadership, 50(6), 12–17. Govinda, R. (1997). Decentralization of educational management: Experiences from South Asia. Paris: International Institute for International Planning. Guinness, P. (1989). ‘Social harmony’ as ideology and practice in a Javanese city. In P. Alexander (Ed.), Creating Indonesian cultures. Sydney: Oceana Publications. Guinness, P. (1994). Local society and culture. In H. Hill (Ed.), Indonesia’s new order. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Handisumarto, D. (2000). Re-designing programs and providing capacity building support for good local governance. Jakarta: National Development Planning Agency. Kramer, R. M. (1993). Cooperation and organizational identification. In J. K. Murninghan (Ed.), Social psychology in organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Lortie, D. (1975). Schoolteacher. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Malley, M. (1999). Regions: Centralization and resistance. In D. Emmerson (Ed.), Indonesia beyond Suharto (pp. 71–108). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Malo, M. (1995). Social sector decentralization: The case of Indonesia. Ottowa, Canada: International Development Research Center. Mandolang, N. H. (1996). Community participation specialist consultant’s report. Jakarta: Ministry of Education and Culture. March, J. G. (1994). A primer on decision making. New York: The Free Press. McLaughlin, M. (1990). The change agent revisited. Educational Researcher, 19, 11–16. Ministry of Education and Culture. (1994a). Community participation in planning and management of educational resources. Jakarta: Ministry of Education and Culture. Ministry of Education and Culture. (1994b). Flexible framework for the development of coplaner at the sub-district level. Jakarta: Ministry of Education and Culture. Ministry of Education and Culture (1994c). The role of communication, motivation and exploration of the quality of community participation improvement in the sector of education. Jakarta: Ministry of Education and Culture. Moyle, C., & Pongtuluran, A. (1992). Involving the community in the local school. In, J. Chapman, ed., Institutional management: school decision making and management in the Asia/Pacific Region. Paris: UNESCO. National Institution for Educational Research (NIER). (1996). Partnerships in education: Home, school and community links in the Asia-Pacific region. Report of a Regional Seminar, National Institution for Educational Research, Tokyo. Rahardjo, M. D. (1985). The role of the community in modernization. Prisma, 36, 3–7. Schwarz, A. (2000). A nation in waiting: Indonesia’s search for stability (2nd ed.) Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Sirianni, C. (1987). Worker participation in the late twentieth century: Some critical issues. In C. Sirianni (Ed.), Worker participation and the politics of reform (pp. 3–33). Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Soedirja, S. (2001). Regional autonomy: Main policies toward a democratic and prosperous Indonesia. Jakarta: Minister of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy. Sykes, G. (1990). Fostering teacher professionalism in schools. In R. F. Elmore (Ed.), The next generation of school reform (pp. 59–96). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Thomas, R. M. (1981). Indonesia’s cultural pluralism and education. Educational Research Quarterly, 6(3), 75–85. Turner, J. C. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. UNDP. (1998). Managing the delivery of local content curriculum final report. Jakarta: United Nations Development Program.

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UNDP/UNESCO/ILO. (1994). The management and delivery of the 1994 junior secondary local content curriculum. Author: Jakarta. Usman, S. (2001). Indonesia’s decentralization policy: Initial experiences and emerging problems. London: The SMERU Research Institute. van der Werf, G., Creemers, B., de Jong, R., & Klaver, E. (2000). Evaluation of school improvement through an educational effectiveness model: The case of Indonesia’s PEQIP project. Comparative Education Review, 44(3), 329–355. Vicencio, E. M. (1995). Muatan Lokal: Innovation and creativity in curriculum development. Jakarta: Ministry of Education and Culture. World Bank. (1989). Indonesia basic education study. Jakarta: The World Bank. Yee, S. (1990). Careers in the classroom: When teaching is more than a job. New York and London: Teachers College Press.

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Chapter 9 CENTRALIZED DECENTRALIZATION IN MALAYSIAN EDUCATION Molly N. N. Lee

1.

INTRODUCTION

One current global trend in educational reform is the decentralization of national education systems. Decentralization has been promoted by UNESCO, the World Bank, and other multilateral and bilateral assistance agencies for a number of years (McGinn, 1997). The growing interest in decentralization arises from the realization that many education systems, particularly those in the Third World, have expanded rapidly, making it increasingly difficult to plan and administer all education activities effectively and efficiently from the center. Support for decentralization has become so widespread that even highly centralized countries like Malaysia and Singapore have endorsed initiatives that aim to decentralize aspects of their education systems. This chapter analyzes the most prominent decentralization measures that have been undertaken in Malaysia over the past two decades. These initiatives include the establishment of District Education Offices, reforms calling for the decentralization of the national curriculum, and the privatization of higher education. Malaysia provides an interesting case because although the central government has publicly supported numerous decentralization programs, it has been reluctant to relinquish its authority over the schools. In short, the form is there but not the substance. Advocates of decentralization have offered a long list of reasons for the redistribution of authority in the planning and administration of education. In general, there are three main motives for decentralization, namely, (i) to maintain a politically legitimate dispersal of authority, (ii) to render good quality of services, and (iii) to optimize efficient use of resources (Lauglo, 1995). Under the political legitimacy rationalization, decentralization is aimed at widening the participation in decision-making on educational matters to different agencies, groups, and stakeholders. Decentralization policies may be used to diffuse political dissent or to seek alternative resources in providing finance for education. Under the quality and efficiency rationales, decentralization can be a means of increasing effectiveness by moving control over the schools closer to the parents and communities and making education more responsive to local problems and needs. Debate on centralization and decentralization usually revolves around the issue of who controls and who ought to control education. Education is a contested terrain and it is often a site of struggle among different groups, particularly in a multiethnic country like Malaysia. Decentralization can take the forms of political decentralization or administrative decentralization. Political decentralization is driven by questions about who has the right to make decisions about educational matters, 149 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 149–158.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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including issues related to the funding of schools. Administrative decentralization, in contrast, involves the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the allocation of resources from higher levels in an official hierarchy to lower ones. According to Rondinelli (1990), there are three major forms of administrative decentralization, namely, deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. Privatization is another form of decentralization although privatization may centralize control, albeit in non-governmental bodies (Bray, 1999). It is important to note that these forms of decentralization are not mutually exclusive, and that many government structures do consist some combination of these various forms. Furthermore, it is also possible for an education system to be structurally centralized and decentralized at the same time. The aim of this chapter is to examine how the highly centralized education system in Malaysia has taken steps to decentralize and to consider how the above theory applies to the Malaysian case. The chapter examines some of the structural and functional changes that have occurred as a result of both political and administrative decentralization. It discusses: r How deconcentration from the State Education Department (SED) occurred by analyzing the roles and functions of the District Education Officer (DEO) r How delegation took place between the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the State Education Department (SED) in the implementation of a recent national curriculum reform r How power to provide and responsibility to finance higher education has been devolved to the private sector through legislation The discussion focuses on what kinds of decision have been relocated at which level, the readiness of the people concerned to make these decisions, and what actually happened in reality despite the rhetoric. 2.

CENTRAL CONTROL OF EDUCATION

Malaysia is a multiethnic society with a population of 22.2 million, of which 58% are Bumiputra,1 35% Chinese, and 7% Indians. A former British colony, the nation gained political independence in 1957. During the colonial period, the provision of education was highly decentralized. The education system was divided into four streams: (1) vernacular Malay schools, most of which were primary schools established to serve rural Malay children; (2) Chinese and Tamil vernacular schools, which were set up by the Chinese and Indian communities; (3) English schools maintained by the British government; (4) Christian missionaries that served the mixed urban population. When Malaysia was incorporated in 1963, it became a federation comprised of the peninsular states as well as the former British colonies of Singapore,2 Sabah and Sarawak. The government of Malaysia consisted of the central or federal government at the top tier, the state governments at the middle tier, and the local authorities at the bottom tier. The Malaysian constitution delineated functions between the federal and state governments. Education, along with other public services like health, defense, and finance, fell under the jurisdiction of the Federal government (Wee, 1996). Adoption of the 1961 Education Act led to the establishment of a national education system characterized by a common language,3 common school curriculum, common public examinations, common teaching service scheme, and central funding

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for all schools in the public system. Through centralized bureaucratization, the ruling coalition government gained tight control over the education system by integrating the Chinese and Tamil schools into the national system, phasing out the use of English language as a medium of instruction, and establishing an administrative structure that was directly controlled by the Ministry of Education. The overriding aim of the national education policy was to integrate its multiethnic population and to bring about social cohesion and national unity. To achieve this aim, a highly centralized education system was established based on the rationale that the “centralized management system ensures optimal use of physical resources and available expertise in the education sector as well as prevents wasteful duplication of duties” (Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1980, p. 141). During the early years of independence, the centralized administrative structure was divided into three levels in Peninsular Malaysia and four levels in Sabah and Sarawak. There were the national, state, and school levels in the peninsular states and an additional division level (which is higher than the district level) in the Bornean states because of their larger sizes. However, an extra administrative layer was added at the district level in all the states in 1982. I discuss this initial move toward decentralization by deconcentration to the district level in greater detail in the following section. This centralized administrative structure is used to manage all the schools and other institutions in the national education system.4 The administrative structure of the national system is characterized by its standardization and bureaucratization. Central control and provision of education is deemed desirable in making an education of reasonable quality available to all children in the country. 3.

DECONCENTRATION TO THE DISTRICT LEVEL

A brief review of the administrative structure shows that at the national level the Ministry of Education is responsible for the formulation of education policies, overall planning, the control of all matters related to finance and expenditure, planning and implementing physical development, developing school curriculum, recruitment, training, and posting of teachers. The ultimate aim of the Ministry of Education is to ensure that the national education system, in accordance with the 1961 Education Act (and later 1995 Education Act), supports the government’s primary objective of national unity. The State Education Department (SED) in each state answers directly to the Ministry of Education. The SED functions as a regional agency, regularly receiving directives from the center. It implements all the educational programs in schools within the state. In addition, the SED manages, monitors, and supervises all matters concerning curriculum, schools, teachers, students, as well as public funds received from the center. Each school is headed by a principal or head teacher, whose role is to implement all the educational programs stipulated by the Ministry of Education, supervise, and guide teachers to ensure the quality of teaching and learning in schools, monitor and supervise students’ welfare with respect to their education, and establish good and effective relations with parents and the community (Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1980). However, as the number of schools, students, and teachers grew, the volume of work at the state level also increased and became more complex. There was an

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obvious need to provide an intermediary between the state level and the school level of administration. Therefore, in 1982, district education offices were established so as to facilitate administration and to liase between the schools and the SEDs. The number of district education offices in each state varied according to the size of the state. For example, there are only three district education offices in Penang but nine in Perak. In general, fewer schools are located in the rural districts than in the urban areas, but the rural schools tend to be further apart, and the communication infrastructure is less developed in the rural districts. The roles and functions of the District Education Officers (DEOs) are mainly supervisory, managing information, and carrying out routine tasks. The DEOs supervise the schools, teachers, and pupils at the ground level; they also establish good relations with parents and communities. They collect data on schools, teachers, and students (such as the number of teachers who request transfer) and pass that information to the SEDs, which use the information to make decisions. The DEOs also disseminate information concerning rules and regulations from the SED to schools. In addition, they carry out routine tasks, such as maintaining school facilities and monitoring public examinations. How effective are the DEOs in carrying out their duties? Research on this question indicates that that the DEOs tend to spend more time handling administrative matters than professional matters (Mohamad Kombali, 2000). More often than not they lack the professional skills and know-how that is required in data analysis, educational supervision, and professional development of teachers. The DEOs are not usually involved in decisions made at the SED. They are not provided with an overview of the development of education at the state or even the district level. It is, therefore, very difficult for them to make plans for schools or teachers. For example, it has been reported that the DEOs have been asked to organize in-service courses for the teachers in their districts at the end of the year only because there was some money left over in the state budget at the end of the year (from interview with a DEO on September 25, 2001). The establishment of District Education Offices is a structural change whereby routine tasks have been deconcentrated from the state level so as to cut down red tape, to facilitate better exchange of information, and to relieve officers at the SEDs of routine tasks so that they can plan, supervise, and strategize more effectively. In restructuring the administrative system, it is quite easy to create education offices in all the districts, transfer personnel to these offices, and assign them certain roles and functions. In actuality, most of the appointed DEOs are drawn from a pool of schoolteachers who have limited experience in administration and supervision. For these DEOs to be effective in their new roles and functions, they need to receive proper training in professional skills like managing information system, educational supervision, managing the curriculum, personnel management, and staff development. It is hoped that deconcentration will prompt the DEOs to use their professional judgment in carrying out directives from the center at the local level. Therefore, increased attention needs to be given to the professional training of these DEOs. It is interesting to note that the establishment of District Education Offices throughout the country has not led to increased popular participation in local decisionmaking in educational matters such as curriculum, hiring and firing of teachers, and examinations. In the Malaysian context, the local district authority is very weak when

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compared to the power of the state government. Ever since the 1960s, the election of local government has been suspended. All members of the municipal/district councils are now appointed by their respective state governments. Community participation in decision-making in school matters is mostly limited to fund-raising activities of parent–teacher associations and alumni associations, although in some very remote areas rural communities help with the construction of school buildings and teachers’ quarters. The establishment of education offices at the district level has increased the level of central authority in outlying areas. As noted by Bray (1999), deconcentration can be used as a mechanism by the central ministry to exert tighter control on the periphery. 4.

DELEGATION TO THE STATE LEVEL

The deconcentration of routine tasks from the SEDs to the district level took place a year before the Ministry of Education launched a major curriculum reform in the national school system. The New Primary School Curriculum (KBSR)5 was implemented progressively starting from Year 1 to Year 6, and the full cycle took 6 years (from 1983 to 1988) to complete. As a continuation of this major reform, the Integrated Secondary School Curriculum (KBSM)6 was also implemented progressively, from 1989 until 1993. Both the KBSR and KBSM were centrally developed by the Curriculum Development Center under the Ministry of Education. These are national curricula, which do not allow for any locally designed subject matter. However, the Ministry of Education decided to delegate authority and responsibility over implementation of these programs to the SEDs. The SEDs, together with other divisions in the Ministry of Education, were asked to coordinate and manage curricular revisions. Both the KBSM and the KBSR were implemented based on “the principle of decentralization whereby various sections will be given specific tasks and responsibilities. The aim is to encourage involvement and full participation by the states, districts, and schools” (Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1983, p. 6). The SEDs, which had previously followed policy directives from central authorities, were suddenly asked to take on a more active role in implementing curricular reform. New responsibilities assigned to the SEDs included financial management, deployment of staff, preparation of school facilities, in-service preparation for new teachers, and sustenance of new curricula in schools (Azizah, 1987). The SEDs devised their own plans and strategies for disseminating, implementing, and sustaining the curriculum innovations. As there is a wide range of differences among the schools in terms of facilities, resources, leadership, and teachers’ qualities, the SEDs were expected to use discretion in decision-making (Noor Azmi, 1988). Each state, district, and school was encouraged to develop its own instructional materials to complement those developed by the center. A “cascade strategy” was employed to orient and familiarize teachers with the new curriculum and teaching methods advocated by the curriculum developers. Experienced and competent teachers designated as Key Personnel (KP)7 were selected from each state to attend in-service training at the national level. During these inservice programs, the KPs attended lectures, workshops, and demonstrations, and were provided hands-on experience in preparing instructional materials. On completion of these programs, the KPs returned to their respective states and districts where

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they, with the help of the respective SEDs, conducted similar courses for practicing teachers. In theory, the cascade strategy should have had a multiplier effect, with information being disseminated in the quickest possible time. However, this strategy was found to be quite ineffective because information and key ideas in KBSR were not properly disseminated to schoolteachers and head teachers. This was partly due to the limited time allocated for the in-service programs, both at the national and state levels. There was a tendency for “message dilution and distortion” as the information was filtered down to the schoolteachers (Siti Hawa, 1986). To overcome these weaknesses, a different strategy was adopted for the implementation of KBSM. The in-house training model was used to orientate teachers to changes in the KSBM curriculum. For example, selected teachers, designated as resource persons (KS),8 were trained at the national level and then sent back to their respective states to disseminate the information. The KSs were furnished with training packages that included syllabi documents, guidebooks, sample lesson plans, and video recordings of sample lessons. Similar packages were also distributed to each and every school. School principals were directed to organize in-house training sessions for the teachers, with the help of the KS, based in their schools using the training packages developed at the center. It was hoped that the in-house training model would help to overcome the problem of “message dilution and distortion.” These training packages also served as self-access modules, which teachers could use at their own pace. However, problems still arose. The self-access module did not address the theoretical underpinnings of the syllabi or suggested pedagogy. Teachers were exposed to a variety of tools they could use in their classrooms, but did not develop an understanding of the philosophy that grounded them. Furthermore, these training packages were standardized and did not take into account varying competencies among teachers or contextual differences that exist among schools (Nalliah & Thiyagarajah, 2000). Many of the SEDs adopted a centralized approach for preparing school facilities to implement the curricular reforms. Suppliers contracted at the state level provided schools with teaching materials and equipments necessary to implement new curricula. Education officials believed that this strategy would ensure that schools located in rural and remote areas would receive adequate supplies and support materials. However, very often the support materials supplied to schools were either irrelevant or inadequate. In some cases, there was insufficient supply of some items and oversupply of other items. For example, some schools received a glut of manila cards and physical education equipment but lacked other essential items, such as cyclostyling paper and stencils (Noor Azmi, 1988). These problems could be traced to the actions of state level officers, who rarely knew exactly what supplies different schools needed at different points in time. On the whole, implementation of the national curriculum reform through delegation of authority and responsibilities to the state level had its own share of problems. Even though the implementation was decentralized, teachers and officers at the periphery did not respond to this strategy positively. They seemed to be shackled by the traditional practice of waiting for directives from the center rather than willing to make independent decision (Azizah, 1987). A significant amount of autonomy over the delivery of the curriculum was given to the teachers. However, most of the teachers were not able to or did not want to use that autonomy. They preferred to

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rely on specific instructions from the top so as to avoid the risk of being accused of doing something wrong. On the other hand, some officers at the top were reluctant to relinquish their authority to their staff at the lower levels because they lacked confidence in their subordinates. Thus, the highly centralized system in Malaysia resulted in “dysfunctional consequences” among the staff because those at the regional and local levels became unresourceful and overdependent on directives and guidelines from the center (Noor Azmi, 1988). Although much of the decision-making pertaining to the implementation of the national curriculum reform has been delegated to the state level, there is no point in moving decisions to the site of action if the local actors are not competent in making those decisions. 5.

DEVOLUTION TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Another recent education reform involved the privatization of higher education: the Ministry of Education decentralized financial responsibilities for higher education to the private sector. This was a political move on the part of the Malaysian government to meet excess demands for higher education. In 1991, the extension of free basic education from 9 years to 11 years resulted in a rapid expansion of upper secondary education. Consequently, demand for higher education also increased, but could not be met by the public sector due to fiscal constraints. The problem was further exacerbated by an ethnic quota policy whereby admission to public institutions of higher learning was based on a ratio of 55:45 for Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra students. As a result of this ethnic quota policy, many qualified non-Bumiputra students were denied admission to public universities and polytechnics; large numbers of such students decided to seek further education overseas. But escalating overseas tuition fees limited access to overseas education to students from wealthy families. Hence, political pressure was brought to bear on the Malaysian government to liberalize policies on private education, especially at the post-secondary level. To meet the increasing demand for higher education and in light of the government fiscal conditions, the Ministry of Education devolved part of its financial responsibility to provide higher education to the private sector. In the years that followed, the number of private institutions increased dramatically, from 156 in 1992 to about 707 in 2002. The upsurge in private universities was even more dramatic, from 0 in 1995 to 12 in 2001 (Lee, 2001). In 1999, 43% of the total number of students enrolled at the tertiary level attended private institutions. Various kinds of private institutions of higher learning, both for-profit and non-profit, emerged. The key players in private higher education included government corporations, private companies, public listed companies, and individual proprietors. Foundations, philanthropic organizations, and communities also set up non-profit educational institutions. To mobilize and optimize resources for higher education, various forms of partnerships were established between government, non-government organizations, private enterprises, local communities, and religious groups. In addition, a number of foreign universities like Monash University and Curtin University from Australia opened branch campuses in Malaysia. To date, a host of programs, ranging from pre-university level to post-graduate level, have been offered by these private higher education institutions (PHEIs). The PHEIs are well known for their ability to experiment and innovate with different

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kinds of programs so as to offer more choices to their customers; they are also very fast in responding to market demands.9 It is interesting to note that most of the PHEIs offer programs in disciplines such as accounting, law, business studies, and computer studies, all of which are very popular with both local and foreign students. Unlike the public institutions of higher learning, most instruction at the PHEIs is provided in English, which has attracted a substantial number of foreign students from neighboring countries like Indonesia, China, and Thailand. As for local students, the PHEIs attract mostly non-Bumiputra students who cannot gain admission into the public institutions because of the ethnic quota policy. In 1996, the Private Higher Educational Institutions Act, which defined the government’s regulatory control over all the private educational institutions in the country, was passed. Under the Act, establishment of all private institutions and special educational programs requires prior approval from the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, all instruction must be conducted in the national language, although with prior approval from the Ministry of Education some courses can be taught in English or Arabic. All private educational institutions were required to offer a number of compulsory subjects, such as Bahasa Malaysia, Malaysian studies, Islamic studies (for Muslims), and Moral studies (for non-Muslims). This legislation gave the Ministry of Education greater control over the kinds of private educational institutions that could be established and the kinds of educational programs that could be offered. To formalize the government’s supervisory role, the National Accreditation Board Act was also passed in 1996. This act called for the establishment of a national accreditation board that would formulate policies related to the standard and quality of courses of study, certificates, diplomas, and degrees conferred by the private educational institutions. In privatizing higher education, the Malaysian government managed to transfer some of its financial burden to the private sector. Although the Ministry of Education devolved a portion of its financial responsibilities to non-government organizations, the Ministry of Education did not relinquish total control over the provision of higher education. Instead, the Ministry retained supervisory powers over private educational institutions, and maintained joint responsibility for the financing higher education with the private sector. By allowing private educational institutions to be set up in the country, the Malaysian government gained political legitimacy through the widening of access to higher education. 6.

CONCLUSION

Despite the adoption of several decentralization initiatives, the Malaysian education system remains centralized, with authority heavily concentrated at the Ministry of Education. The establishment of district education offices resulted in a shift of workloads, but not a meaningful transfer of authority from the state level to the district level. In the case of implementing national curriculum reform, the Ministry of Education initially delegated authority to the state level but later reclaimed that authority. As for private higher education, financial responsibility and authority was redistributed to the private sector, but the Ministry of Education retained control over licensing and accreditation of private institutions of higher education. All of these decentralization initiatives were aimed at improving the efficiency and quality

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of education as well as gaining political legitimacy by widening access to higher education. Yet these measures did not always produce their intended results. My analysis of efforts to decentralize education in Malaysia raises a series of important questions about the effectiveness of decentralization reforms: Are upper level officials willing to relinquish power to lower levels of the system? Are officers and teachers working at the lower levels prepared to exercise their newly acquired authority or to carry out their new roles and functions? How enthusiastic is the private sector when it comes to collaborating with the government in the provision of higher education? The outcomes of these decentralization policies show that, despite some initial difficulties, the DEOs are assisting the SEDs in supervising and monitoring the schools and teachers; in other words, spreading the power and influence of the central authority to the peripheral regions. The SEDs have completed the implementation of the national curriculum reforms and are sustaining the new curricula in schools, but most of the authority pertaining to school curriculum has been reclaimed by the center. The private sector is playing a very active part in the provision of higher education, but the central government exerts a great deal of control over the PHEIs. As a result, the PHEIs lack the authority to make decisions related to medium of instruction, subjects to be taught, types of programs, and kinds of certification offered in the schools. Contrary to common belief, the decentralization initiatives in Malaysia have not relaxed the tight control of the Malaysian government over the provision and delivery of education at all levels in the country. NOTES 1. “Bumiputra” means “native of the soil” and this term is used to include the Malays and other indigenous people in Sabah and Sarawak. 2. Singapore broke away from the federation in 1965. 3. The national language, Malay language, is the sole medium of instruction in schools. 4. Private schools like the Chinese Independent schools, religious schools, and expatriate schools are outside the national education system. 5. The New Primary School Curriculum is commonly known as Kurikulum Baru Sekolah Rendah (KBSR) in Malaysia. 6. The Integrated Secondary School Curriculum is known as Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah (KBSM) in Malaysia. 7. The key personnel are known as Kakitangan Penting (KP) in Malaysia. 8. Resource persons are referred to as Kakitangan Sumber (KS) in Malaysia. 9. Some of the innovative programs include the twinning programs and the credit–transfer programs where students are able to do part or the whole of a foreign degree program in one of the local PHEIs.

7.

REFERENCES

Azizah A. R. (1987). Curriculum innovation in Malaysia: The case of the KBSR, PhD thesis, University of London Institute of Education, United Kingdom. Bray, M. (1999). Control of education: Issues and tensions in centralization and decentralization. In R. F. Arnove and C. A. Torres (Eds.), Comparative education: The dialectic of the global and the local (pp. 207–232). Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield. Cheema, G. S., & Rondinelli, D. A. (Eds.) (1983). Decentralization and development: Policy implementation in developing countries. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia. (1980). Laporan Jawatankuasa Kabinet Mengkaji Pelaksanaan Dasar Pelajaran, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur.

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Lauglo, J. (1995). Forms of decentralisation and their implications for education. Comparative Education, 31(1), 5–29. Lee, M. N. N. (2001). Private higher education in Malaysia: Expansion, diversification and consolidation. Paper presented at the Second Regional Seminar on Private Higher Education: Its Role in Human Resource Development in a Globalised Knowledge Society, organized by UNESCO PROAP and SEAMEO RIHED on June 20–22, 2001, Bangkok, Thailand. McGinn, N. F. (1997). The impact of globalization on national education systems. Prospects, XXVII(1), 41–54. Mohamad Kombali, B. H. (2000). Peranan dan tanggungjawab pegawai pendidikan daerah: Satu kajian kes di pejabat pendidikan daerah Klang, Unpublished MEd thesis, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang. Nalliah, M., & Thiyagarajah, R. (2000). Teacher education for TESOL in Malaysia: The pursuance of conformity in the context of cultural diversity. Asia-Pacific Journal of Teacher Education and Development, 3(2), 17–34. Noor Azmi, I. (1988). In-service courses and teachers’ professionality: The implementation of KBSR in Malaysia, PhD thesis, University of Sussex, United Kingdom. Rondinelli, D. (1990). Decentralizing urban development programs: A framework for analyzing policy. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development. Siti Hawa, B. A. (1986). Implementing a new curriculum for primary schools: A case study from Malaysia, PhD thesis, University of London Institute of Education, United Kingdom. Wee, C. H. (1996). Fiscal federalism. In K. S. Jomo and S. K. Ng (Eds.), Malaysia’s economic development: Policy and reform (pp. 227–316). Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications.

Chapter 10 DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN INDIA: TRENDS AND ISSUES R. Govinda and Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

1.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, decentralization has become a global trend and it is on the political agenda in many countries. Education is being decentralized in numerous countries as part of a larger move to reform public management systems (Govinda, 2003a). The policies largely aim to reduce government size, reorganize delivery, expand private initiatives, and create new partnerships. Decentralization is having a significant impact on policy, planning, and management of elementary education. With the increasing impact of globalization, the challenges faced by the nations of the world are substantial; hence, the importance of localization through decentralization has intensified. At the same time, decentralization is seen as a means of improving the efficiency of education systems and the quality of educational services. In India, education is the joint responsibility of state and union governments. Ever since decentralization has been promoted in the field of education, different states in India have undergone various decentralization processes with distinct outcomes. The actual manifestation of the process of decentralization, in terms of the rationale put forth as well as operational features adopted, varies widely across the states. The socio-political context and the degree of popular participation in the decision-making process directly influence the outcomes of decentralization measures. Generally speaking, in India decentralization is treated as a means of politically restructuring the system. Capacity building is also held up as one of the benefits of effective implementation. However, the decision to decentralize often translates into intense social activity at the local level. Many researchers suggest that educational decentralization essentially becomes a political decision that requires strong political will, both at the central and state levels. It also becomes imperative to carefully plan the process of decentralization to ensure effective implementation. The challenge of balancing several different aims can be enormous: first, making education more relevant to local needs; second, democratically promoting people’s participation by empowering local authorities; and third, improving performance accountability (Govinda, 2003a). In general, it appears that, decentralization seems to mean different things to different people, depending on the political and administrative context in which the term is used. The concept has remained vague and highly ambiguous, when used by policy makers as well as intellectuals. Public discussion of decentralization is often confusing, characterized by sweeping, cross-disciplinary claims about the positive effects of decentralization measures on the quality and efficiency of both government and social interaction (Faguet, 2001). It is within this ambiguously defined 159 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 159–176.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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framework of decentralization that one has to carefully study the actions initiated in the education sector to transfer power and authority to local level actors. Needless to say, over the 50 years of post-independent period, contours of decentralization in education have also undergone significant transformations. This chapter examines how decentralization is being integrated into the system of educational governance in India. The focus is on primary education, where decentralized management is perceived as the only means for achieving efficient management. The chapter begins with a description of policy initiatives that have been introduced for democratic as well as administrative decentralization in India, and describes how they have affected primary education. We also consider whether India is favoring a market oriented efficiency model or is emphasizing political and ideological reform. Finally, the chapter addresses some of the issues that inform contemporary debates and discourses on the subject in India, and across the world as well. 2. 2.1.

DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE: CHANGING FACETS

The Early Years After Independence

Decentralization of educational governance has been a prominent element of educational discourse in recent years. In India, however, debates and policy initiatives related to decentralization emerged immediately after the country was liberated from British colonial control. At that time, a federal arrangement was relied on to bring together the various politico-administrative units with diverse culture, language, and ethnic affiliations. However, the notion that federating units should enjoy some freedom and autonomy was also ingrained in the concept of the nation. Accordingly, primary responsibility for several areas of policy and action, including governance of education, was delegated to the state governments. It is in this context that the concepts of panchayati raj and a community development framework were adopted in the early years after independence. The political system consisted of three tiers: district, block (sub-district), and village levels. While political decentralization followed this framework, it was deemed appropriate to designate the block level as the main unit for development administration. Thus came the establishment of the Block Development Offices, with each block consisting of 100–150 villages. The districts created during the British period remained more or less intact. Interestingly, education governance remained generally delinked from the development administration framework adopted for all other sectors. The district education offices remained the main organ for school governance. Nearly 25 years after this arrangement was established, separate offices of education were created at the block level in many states. This was partially due to the enormous expansion of the primary education system that took place during the preceding two decades. In fact, the block education offices currently oversee primary education in many states, while the district education office directly governs secondary education. After an initial flurry of interest in “democratic decentralization,” attention to the process waned. Most of the states showed little interest in involving local citizens in the management of public institutions. At the village level, the relative inexperience of the people, lack of knowledge, dearth of resources, and tightening of bureaucratic

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controls rendered panchayat samitis and zilla parishads ineffective (Dhar, 1997). Reflecting on this issue, Myrdal writes, Another hope inspired and initiated from the centre is that a system of locally elected bodies, the panchayati raj, better known under the label “democratic decentralization” or “democratic planning,” will encourage the masses to participate in the management of local affairs and thereby weaken the power of the local political bosses . . . the most conspicuous immediate effect of such efforts has been to strengthen the grip of the rural elite, the self-elected boss class, over the masses. Whenever locally elected bodies are given powers worth scrambling for, they are almost invariably run in the interests of the dominant caste in land and wealth. The system of panchayati raj, like the basic democracies in Pakistan, has not, in general, thrown up any new leadership in rural areas. (Myrdal, 1968, p. 299) Correspondingly, educational decentralization rarely secured a place on the political agenda in most states in India. 2.2.

The Recentralization Phase

The Education Commission of 1964–1966 reiterated the national government’s commitment to decentralization through its endorsement of the National Policy on Education, which was adopted in 1968. But at the state level, interest in decentralization waned during the 1970s. In fact, a counter-movement began to take shape. The most significant example of this shift was the large-scale nationalization of schools, particularly at the primary level of education. As a result, state governments became the main providers and managers of elementary education throughout the country. This paved the way for the deconcentration of power, although considerable authority (especially in terms of the recruitment, posting, and transfer of personnel) continued to be vested at the district level. Interestingly, as deconcentration was being promoted at the district level, decision-making became more centralized at the state level. This led to the erosion of authority at the district level. The state secretariats, which within in the original framework dealt only with policy matters, assumed greater responsibility for running the education system. This was especially true in terms of teacher appointments and the creation of new schools. In fact, by the early 1970s, few state governments were willing to take up the task of political decentralization through panchayati raj elections and the transfer of power to decentralized units at district and sub-district levels. This disinterest on the part of state-level leadership paralleled broader trends in the larger sphere concerning political reform and public administration. 2.3.

Revival of Interest in the 1980s

The 1980s saw a revival of interest in panchayati raj in some of the states. For example, in Karnataka local elections and the distribution of block grants provided local bodies with increased autonomy. This prompted many local bodies to allocate

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District Education Office

School Complexes

Block Education Office

Village Education Committee

School, AE Center, NFE Center

Figure 10.1: NPE—1986 Proposal.

funds for education development activities at the district and sub-district levels. Of course, some of the decisions were reversed when the state-level political leadership changed. Such developments highlight the vulnerability of such measures to political vicissitudes. Interestingly, Andhra Pradesh moved away from the national pattern of a threetier local governance system; instead the state adopted a two-tier system, by and large following the recommendations of the Asoka Mehta Committee (Mehta, 1978). However, unlike the Karnataka system, the reforms in Andhra Pradesh did not include any major move to decentralize governance of education. West Bengal also took up the task of strengthening the three-tier system for local governance. Meanwhile, the western Indian states of Gujarat and Maharashtra had decentralized educational management at the district levels, though minimal progress could be observed with regard to decentralization of authority to sub-district levels. The National Policy on Education (NPE) of 1986 was a landmark measure, as it not only encouraged decentralization but also articulated a concrete implementation plan. Interestingly, the NPE recommendations essentially entailed a process of deconcentration (see Figure 10.1). The policy did not include any plans for devolving power to local self-government bodies, instead focusing on decongesting upper level education offices and creating district boards of education. Though many states initially showed enthusiasm for the NPE recommendations, very little reform of educational governance actually occurred. 2.4.

Reemergence of Decentralization and Panchayati Raj in the 1990s

During the 1990s India made significant moves toward decentralization, both in terms of policy reorientation and practical actions in the field. Corresponding to the efforts in reforming public administration, fairly vigorous attention was paid to the problem of management and control of education and the need to involve communities in the oversight of schools. At the policy level, the somewhat aborted attempt of the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI’s) during the early period after independence was revived through the 73rd and 74th Amendments of the Constitution in 1992. These amendments mandated the establishment of local bodies at the village, block,

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district, and municipal levels, through democratic elections. This is arguably the most significant policy initiative for decentralized governance that India has formulated since independence. The mandatory reservation of one third of the elected posts for women, in particular, was a major step in the direction of creating a gender balance in the country’s governance system. 2.5.

Innovative Efforts for Decentralization

In recent years, the national as well as state governments have promoted experimentation with various approaches to decentralizing the primary education system. In many cases, these innovations have paved the way for the implementation of decentralized management frameworks. They have encouraged the delegation of power to schools, lower level government offices, and elected bodies, thus providing opportunities for local citizens to participate in the management of schools. Different states in the country have relied on different reform strategies. Many have followed a technical administration approach, which promotes top down transformation through change of rules and regulations (with or without corresponding legislation); stakeholders at various levels of the hierarchy are expected to adopt new roles and functions. Other states have employed a socio-political approach, which involves building institutional structures from below through direct and active participation of people at the grassroots level. Most of the states have followed the former approach, although it is possible to find examples of the latter method; the most ambitious example of this approach is the massive project initiated by government of India under the banner of District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) (Govinda, 2003b).1 2.6.

District Planning Under DPEP—A Case of Controlled Decentralization

In an expanding education system, decisions about planning and investment can generate debate and controversy. Opening new schools, making decisions about financial allocations, teacher appointments, and other related matters invariably become areas of contention. In a large country with a number of federated units, decisions tied to the flow of finances between the central and state governments, on the one hand, and between state governments and lower level governance structures, on the other, may take on further significance. One such initiative that provoked heated debate in India during the 1990s was the District Primary Education Project (DPEP). This project attempted to put in place a new framework for managing primary education at the district level. The framework granted considerable autonomy to local stakeholders and sought to actively involve members of the community in decisions about schools. The DPEP framework, however, raised critical questions about the long-term sustenance of decentralized decision-making in the Indian context. The plan for granting autonomy to the district level was not altogether new. Similar bodies, such as the Small Farmers Development Agency (SDFA), had been created in other sectors. However, in that case, the management body established at the district level was not fully incorporated in to the administrative bureaucracy. For this reason, some analysts viewed the SFDA project as an example of “controlled decentralization” (Mathur, 1985).

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Facilitation through legal and executive measures

Decentralized management structures Processes

Pro-active participation

Community Figure 10.2: Model of Convergent Legitimization. Source: Govinda (2003a,b).

As an initiative sponsored by India’s central government, the DPEP maintains an identity distinct from the general education administrative structure. This situation raises the question, “Can a management structure promoted by the state really bring about system-wide transformation of educational management?” (Govinda & Varghese, 1994) Some observers have expressed doubts about the functional utility of adopting the district as the unit of planning, given the large size of most districts in India (which average of more than 2,000 primary schools). Experience indicates that institutional structures created through executive orders from the state, such as village education committees and school complexes, have not taken root. Convergence between state officials and local stakeholders appears to be a necessary condition for such reforms to succeed (see Figure 10.2). 3.

SOME QUESTIONS ON THE RATIONALE FOR DECENTRALIZATION

In the early years after gaining independence from colonial control, Indian leadership initiated reforms with an ideology driven agenda of giving power to the people by creating local self-governments through democratic elections. Empowering the people through democratic institutions was seen as a value in itself. While, panchayati raj and community development gave the operational framework for decentralization, the contours of the subject of discourse were largely defined by the liberation rhetoric that characterized most countries in the immediate aftermath of freedom from external rule. Thus, “power to the people” at the grassroots formed the core rationale for decentralization in India. In the report of Education Commission (1964– 1966), decentralization of educational governance was recommended with the goal

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of ensuring deeper involvement of community in school education. It was envisaged that, “At the primary stage, it is required to organize program to bring the school closer to the community with an accent on serving the community in suitable ways” (NCERT, 1972, p. 12). It was further argued that, “School education is predominantly a local–state partnership and higher education is a Center-State partnership. It is this basic principle that should guide the evolution of delicate balance between centralization and decentralization which our planning needs” (Government of India, 1972, p. 667). The rationale for decentralization seems to have gradually changed over the years. The National Policy on Education 1986 and the accompanying Program of Action called for an integrated and decentralized approach to developing school education systems with a focus on building the capacity of districts in planning and management of school education, particularly at elementary level. Decentralization has been regarded as a fundamental requirement for improving the entire education system and creating an appropriate framework for accountability at each level of administration. However, when the issue was revisited in the 1990s, a decade characterized by the government’s eagerness to introduce market reforms, the emphasis appeared to have changed dramatically. The language used in articulating the rationale for decentralization underwent significant transformation. Phrases such as “empowering the people” or “grassroots level democracy” almost disappeared from the discourse. For instance, the Moily Committee set up by the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE), argued that: It is increasingly becoming evident that the bureaucratic systems are not able to manage the challenges in the field of educational development and people’s participation is seen the world over as an essential pre-requisite for achieving the goal of education for all. It is in this context that the Committee perceives the entrustment of educational programmes to institutions of local self-government as a step in the right direction. (MOHRD, 1995, p. 14) The move to decentralize appears to have been motivated by the utilitarian value of involving the community, which could possibly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the school system. India may not be alone in changing the contents of the discourse on decentralization. In fact, in line with increased open market reforms, a predominant view is emerging at the international level that centralized state control is responsible for the poor state of affairs and it is essential to bring in decentralization and local community participation to improve the situation. This view is often promoted, at least implicitly, by the conditionalities placed by international agencies involved in educational development. According to Maclure, three arguments underscore this line of thinking: (a) since central governments are increasingly unable to direct and administer all aspects of mass education, decentralization of planning and programming will result in improved service delivery by enabling local authorities to perform tasks they are better equipped; (b) since mass education has placed an inordinate strain on state resources, decentralization will improve economies of scale and will lead to more appropriate responsiveness to the particular needs and situations of different regions

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and groups; and (c) by engaging active involvement of community and private sector groups in local schooling, decentralization will generate more representativeness and equity in educational decision-making, and thus foster greater local commitment to public education (Maclure, 1993). It may seem unimportant to read too much into this transformation in the language or the increased emphasis on utilitarianism in reforming educational governance. Yet, it raises some critical questions in the Indian context: Are we moving from a fundamental commitment for empowering the community for self-determination to a limited rationale of technical and economic efficiency? Is it a fundamental value to be internalized or just a technocratic means of solving some of the management problems? Is a particular meaning and rationale of decentralization getting universalized? 4.

UNRESOLVED DILEMMAS AND EMERGING ISSUES

The process of transforming the educational governance system that got moving after the 73rd and 74th amendments to the constitution is undoubtedly much wider in coverage and more consistently pursued as compared to what happened in the early years after independence. However, the situation is still in a flux in most states. Further, though most of the states have opted to employ a technical administrative transformation of the system through top down measures, as the reforms unfold and take shape, the process is not likely to remain a technical one. The nature and degree of power transferred within such a reform process are dependent upon political will and the power struggles that underlie all efforts to achieve decentralization (Adamolekun et al., 1990). What pattern of power sharing arrangement between the central and peripheral actors will prevail in the final analysis is difficult to predict at this stage. This will depend on the socio-cultural characteristics as well as historical and geographical background factors separate from the emerging political dynamics. In fact, leadership at the national as well state levels are confronted with a number of difficult issues and dilemmas, which have to be tackled if a stable system of decentralized governance in the education sector is to emerge. Some of these critical ones are discussed in the following section. 4.1.

Desirability of Exclusive Dependence on Politics of Panchayati Raj Bodies

Though there is a broad move toward empowering the local bodies for governing school education, not all state governments have moved decisively in this direction. There is obviously no consensus concerning the issue of whether such a move would have a significantly positive impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the education system, which has been the main motive for decentralization in recent years. It is argued that, in political systems with empowered local self-government bodies, political upheavals at the national and provincial/state levels echo at the grassroots level. In such circumstances, the devolution of power to elected representatives can threaten stability of organizational arrangements in the field and thereby strengthen the hands of the bureaucracy, instead of giving more power to the community. It is also argued that that elected local bodies are susceptible to political upheaval and intra-party power dynamics and may therefore lead to parochial considerations in

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decision-making. The basic question raised is whether education receives due attention under these bodies—or will it only result in decentralizing existing problems of the system? While elected local bodies have the legitimacy in democratic representational sense, the issues raised above cannot be ignored. In fact, in many countries, school governing boards are created through independent election processes distinct from the local self-government bodies created for public administration. A hidden tension underlying these debates on devolution to local bodies is that of “who will decide at the local level—the political leader or the bureaucrat.” In a centralized system, the bureaucracy tends to have an upper hand, notwithstanding the complaints of political interference in decision-making. With decentralization, whenever local bodies are created with delegated or devolved powers, this is likely to call into question the well-established authority of the local education office of administration, often leading to unresolved tensions. The issue requires careful consideration. When a multilevel hierarchical system has several tiers of offices, from the center to the school, which is the case in all the states of India, the situation becomes even more complex. Each level is eager to assume authority for decision-making but to pass on the responsibility for implementation to others. Again, it is impossible to make any a priori assessment of the number of layers that would make the system more efficient as in the final analysis it is the rational distribution of functional areas and the internal efficiency of each layer that determine the overall system efficiency (Govinda, 1997). A contentious issue facing most state governments in this regard is that of teacher recruitment and posting. In general, teacher unions have been quite apprehensive of the move to establish local governance systems. Consequently, considering the high political stakes involved, most of the state governments continue to treat teachers as state employees, even though they serve under local bodies. However, there is a distinct trend to transfer the power to appoint personnel to local units, as in case of Madhya Pradesh, but this move is also accompanied by delegation of the responsibility to find finances (at least partially). The reservations among the teachers need careful consideration. It is necessary to create proper service rules so that the local bodies do not create increased labor litigation and political chaos. Giving freedom for the local units to recruit teachers can have far-reaching implications for the quality of the teaching if unchecked in terms of the norms of educational and training qualifications and the salary structure of the teachers. The issue of who controls such critical functions cannot be taken lightly. If unresolved amicably with the involvement of all stakeholders, it may prove counter-productive to the decentralization process. As Weiler points out, the imperative of control is likely to outweigh the state’s need for legitimacy. Consequently, decentralization and participation become political ploys, useful symbolically for purposes of discussion, but entailing minimal political cost, as little is done in the form of implementation (Weiler, 1983). 4.2.

Community Empowerment and Civil Society Participation

The democracy rationale for decentralization is built on the core premise that people have the right to decide for themselves and therefore their participation is

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critical for decentralization measures to succeed. Even if the motive is utilitarian, involvement of the community members is seen as a basic prerequisite to instill a sense of ownership and thereby improve the efficiency of the system. Is this evident from the Indian experience? More specifically, have decentralization measures really ensured community empowerment and civil society participation? What model of decentralization is most likely to promote community participation? Will transfer of education governance to local bodies really usher more effective community involvement in decision-making? Evidence from different states is mixed. At the formal level, most of the states have initiated concrete measures to bring the school and the community closer. Strengthening of parent teacher associations in Kerala and creation of empowered village education committees and school management committees in several other states are a clear illustration of this move. It is generally argued that what neighbors who know one another can do relatively easily would be very difficult to do from a distance through a centralized bureaucracy. In particular, democratic decentralization that utilizes local information, initiative, and ingenuity is extremely important for the poor and the excluded. Changing the political culture in the village gives more voice to the poor and induces them to get involved in local self-governing institutions and management of the local commons—this makes the poor themselves stakeholders in the system, so that they take an interest in a system they were formerly excluded from (Bardhan, 2001). However, not everyone is convinced that devolution of education governance functions to local bodies will ensure the participation of local community members, particularly the marginalized. For instance, reflecting on the developments in West Bengal, Webster comments that decentralization does not always result in the empowerment of the people and reduction in state control: Far from it, the extension of the state outward and downwards can just as well serve the objective of consolidating the power of the central state as it can serve the objective of devolving power away from the centre. It can extend the state’s control over the people just as it can aid the people’s control over the state and its activities. Decentralization is very much a double-edged sword. (Webster, 1992, pp. 129–130) It is obvious that decentralization becoming a genuine means of community participation requires much deeper changes in the mind set of the people—those who govern as well as those who are governed—than simply creating local units and transferring some powers to them. There is also considerable naivety accompanying policy pronouncements associated with community participation in education. It should be recognized that communities in a village or a small geographical unit carry multiple identities—depending on the stake they have. Accordingly, they become active members of different groups and serve community interests. Can we assume that education decision-making is such an area of activity that it cuts across interests of the whole village or the city? It is found that sometimes they serve the interests of only the “narrowly defined groups” they belong to jeopardizing the interests of many children. Generally, community participation is best served when people join hands on a voluntary basis.

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But will there be provision for such voluntary associations in the framework of decentralization? Kantha and Narain, in analyzing the situation in Bihar, consider that the idea of a community is based on a sense of identity, which implies also a difference: Pre-modern communities or primary communities have set social forms, very intense, by which people are classified as similar or different. More importantly these are communities which are not formed on account of the ‘convergence of interest’ which underscores the identity of the other form of community. In contemporary discourse the interest bonded communities are those that are being structured and encouraged to participate in the development process. However because the bonds are weak and uncertain, the picture of the primary community is sought to be evoked so as to bring up the imagery of the traditional community. Because of the newness of its form the pretension involves taking these to be immemorial ancient communities. The earlier communities do not have a territorial identity; these are for example religious or caste communities. Larger collectives are now being constructed by creating linkages of common interest, which could be health or education in which the concept of the village as a community, which while fixing it with a territorial identity, is created above the traditional identities of communities that are existing in village and that transcend territorial boundaries (for example linkages with castes or religious groups residing in other villages). Somewhere along the line, intrinsic to the concept in the formation of the interest-based community is the concept of community advantage, in participation and of individual advantage. So long as this advantage, is apparent, the cohesiveness remains, but has to be continuously perceived. (Kantha & Narain, forthcoming) The central question to be addressed in the context of the highly stratified Indian rural society is, “Will education development programs in general and primary schools in particular being together rural populace on a common platform?” What has been pointed out regarding the Bihar setting needs careful examination in the context of decentralization as a whole. A related issue regards the extent to which decentralization facilitates the involvement of non-governmental organizations. As of now there is no model of local governance that can best facilitate the involvement of non-governmental organizations in decision-making. However, some Education for All projects, such as lok jumbish in Rajasthan and the Bihar Education Project, have created meaningful strategies for involving NGOs in a number of areas of implementing education development programs in a participatory framework. Making matters worse, civil society in India, as anywhere else, is also often somewhat disorganized and conflict ridden. And civil society organizations are less than fully accountable to their members and to the people whom they claim to serve (Crook & Manor, 2000). The crucial question is about the appropriate balance between centralized control and decentralized decision-making;

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that is, “What is the optimum balance for a nation-state between state control and citizen participation?” 4.3.

Capacity Building for Decision-Making at the Local Level

Changed institutional arrangements and empowered local bodies naturally usher new actors into various positions and demand new knowledge and skill orientation from the incumbents. Traditionally, such requirements have been highlighted for local level actors. In fact, capacity building for local governance has attracted tremendous attention from all quarters in recent years. It is not unusual to find top-level leaders arguing for withholding powers from local functionaries on the pretext that they do not possess the capacity required. A pertinent question very rarely raised in this context is: “Who needs capacity building for local governance?” Traditional strategies and programs for capacity building focus almost exclusively on launching training programs, especially for community leaders and grassroots level functionaries. It is necessary to look beyond this narrow framework. Involvement of the local community in educational governance demands a radical transformation of the organizational culture of the public education management system as a whole. Greater involvement of the local community requires that the higher authorities agree to give up certain powers hitherto enjoyed. Also, school control by local stakeholders brings greater pressure on the school authorities to promote transparency and shared perspective with parents. The school authorities cannot merely meet the demands of remotely placed of higher authorities and get away even with low efficiency in school functioning. Accountability to local masters is not something many school authorities are familiar with. A related issue is the institutional arrangement for capacity building. It is important to recognize that capacity building is not just a one-time activity. It is essential to make more stable arrangements for orienting new as well as old occupants of decision-making positions on a continuous manner. However, evidence from the field shows that the education departments in most states are not equipped to deal with the situation. In fact, most of the efforts in recent years have taken place under special education development projects that are time bound. How do we sustain the capacity building activities beyond such projects? Further, the task has invariably been seen as delivering standard training packages. Such an approach is not likely to suffice. Developing new habits of self-determination among all concerned is a slow process and requires adequate provisions for direct practice with technical support and professional guidance. Capacity building should, therefore, be viewed as a comprehensive process of facilitating the change over from centralized management to a system of local governance. A final issue to be addressed is: “Should Practice of Local governance wait for Capacity Building?” It is ironic that the argument for decentralization often begins by highlighting how it would help bring more people into the fold of education and thereby improve the overall educational status of the community. However, when actual empowerment of the local community is to happen, the very same argument is turned around, as low education development among the local population is pointed out as the main obstacle for decentralization. The real challenge is how to break this vicious cycle. It is true that the field level personnel in many countries seriously

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Lack of Scope for Self - determination

Lack of Basic Capabilities

Externally Designed and Monitored Development Strategies

Perpetuate Central Control Figure 10.3: Vicious Cycle Leading to Central Control

lack planning and management capabilities. But it is difficult to decide whether refusal to change the governance framework is fully explained by the apparent lack of management capacity in the field level. How could they acquire capabilities if they have no opportunity to practice them? It is important to recognize that decentralization represents a way of living not just a technical strategy (see Figure 10.3; Govinda, 2001). Are we making too much of the need for capacity building for self-governance? Is the real problem one of lack of technical capacity or the absence of adequate financial resources? A closer examination of past experiences on what is really debilitating the functioning of local self-governments in India reveals that the lack of attention paid to the problem of resources has significantly jeopardized even the learning process for the local leadership and community to acquire the skills of self-management and decision-making. Thus, without a serious debate on resource provisioning, it sounds hollow to go ahead and transfer powers and responsibilities to the local bodies with respect to educational governance. In fact, such a move may result in increased control of the education sector by market forces and, in turn, even more seriously affect equity and create a backlash of demand from the poor to recentralize. 4.4.

Financing Local Governance of Education

Transforming the pattern of governance from a top down centralized framework to one that is decentralized, empowering local actors for decision-making, demands a new approach for financing the education system. Where will the funds come from in the new system? How will the existing flow of funds be channelized for implementing locally made decisions? As most of the state governments in the country are undergoing severe financial constraints, the governments have been compelled to explore alternative avenues for financing education programs. Some view decentralization as a means of mobilizing additional resources from the community and economizing state-level investments. Such efforts have come in for severe criticism from a number of quarters, particularly as they would lead to further inequity in education access and quality. This becomes doubly complicated, as the education system will continue to expand with more and more children joining the schools. Recognizing

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the likely emergence of such issues and the ensuing tensions at the state level, recent constitutional amendments recommended setting up a State Finance Commission under Article 243-I to review the financial position of the panchayats. It has been authorized to determine the taxes, duties, tolls, and feels leviable by the state, and to make recommendations to the governor of the state regarding the distribution of funds (Article 243-I, 73rd Amendment Act, 1992). Several state governments have acted upon this recommendation and set up statelevel finance commissions for determining the framework for allocation of finances to different districts. States have also initiated actions to raise resources through alternate sources to finance education at decentralized levels. For instance, in Maharashtra, a District Fund managed by district authorities has been created; also, the village education committees have been given specified amounts of annual grants, which can be utilized by the committee for developmental purposes. The situation is not only still fluid but also raises serious concerns in many states: Earmarked funds and locally-raised resources which, in the economic situation of many rural areas would be difficult to find, would not provide to the local bodies enough funds to deal with expansion and quality improvement of elementary education. The financial constraints, as the history of local body institutions has shown for years, will adversely affect their ability to manage elementary education, much less enhance its quality. There is need for a system of differential grants which take care of the economic capacity of different villages and localities. (Dhar, 1997, p. 113) Innovative experiments, such as the Shikshak Samakhya (Teacher Empowerment) program in Madhya Pradesh and the proposal to provide specified amount of untied funds to each primary school under the District Primary Education Program, represent moves to inject a new sense of freedom and financial autonomy into individual schools. A similar move to allocate specified sums of money to all schools is being envisaged in Karnataka, to be utilized through the newly constituted School Development and Monitoring Committees. But will such short-term efforts, often based on availability of funds through time bound projects, be sustainable? In this context it is worthwhile to take note of experiences from other parts of the world. Where resources are especially constrained, the risk of failing to fulfill some particular function may easily neutralize the potential gains from fulfilling it more efficiently and effectively with a new approach. The arguments also rest on the assumption that local cadre will be independent enough and motivated enough to take responsibility for risky undertakings. It could also be argued that small, relatively weak organizations will more likely be swamped by the need to respond to unexpected problems. It may also be that, even if decentralized units are better able to generate innovations, the institutionalization, diffusion and adaptation of successful innovations requires the resources and capabilities of the center (Cohen et al., 1981). Many critics fear that under the pretext of decentralization, the state governments will abandon even the current minimal levels of financial commitment and begin to

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expect community members to pay for the services provided. In other words, decentralization may raise the specter of privatization on large-scale further aggravating inequities in the society: The idea of decentralization is attractive; . . . . However it can also be a less than overt step on the way to increased privatization, deregulation and a rolling-back of many of the economic and particularly social functions of the state . . . . The term ‘decentralization’ can be articulated into a monetarist discourse, but alternatively it can be linked into a discourse that combines ideas of collective empowerment, democracy and socialism. (Slater, 1989, p. 516) This is a matter that needs closer examination in India. Until recently, private schooling, which is expensive, could be found expanding only in urban localities. But now this trend is observed in rural areas as well. Private financing of education can be considered a positive move to relieve pressure on the governments. However, if this trend is allowed to grow unchecked, and if the government reduces its investment in education proportionately, it will seriously affect the interests of the poor. Many question whether some of the state governments are taking these means of privatization and community financing as escape routes from the commitment of providing free and compulsory education. 5.

CONCLUSION

India has undoubtedly witnessed a wide range of reforms leading to decentralization of educational governance during the last 10–15 years. Amendments to the Constitution made during the beginning of 1990s gave further fillip to the move. However, it should be realized that the situation has become politically much more complicated than it was five decades ago and one has therefore to reckon with unevenness across the country both in terms of the extent of reform and its nature. A closer review of the discourse on educational decentralization shows an element of inadequacy in the analysis, both with respect to policy and practice. It appears that the top down reforms being initiated essentially through the bureaucratic machinery treat the task only as a technical administrative one. It is necessary to realize that all decentralization measures are located in specific social and cultural contexts and in the final analysis one seeks to transform the norms of social transaction. Particularly, transformation of micro-level power equations, which is at the core of local governance reform, is highly contingent upon caste, linguistic, and communal considerations. It is necessary to begin with a realistic understanding of the community characteristics in the country. This is essential because, “ideologies of educational decentralization frequently assume a dichotomy between a socially organic local community and the nation state and the local community tends to be defined in ideal terms corresponding, for instance, to an Athenian conception of participatory democracy” (Lauglo & McClean, 1985, p. 3).

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Such assumptions may lead to highly dangerous decisions on management responsibilities. As Dhar emphasizes this point in the Indian context, The contention that rural communities are composite and cohesive is not valid. Studies of villages have indicated group formations, not only on the basis of economic and political interests, but more often, on the basis of caste, religion and ethnic composition. One should therefore not approach panchayat raj institutions from a romantic view of communities, but from the point of view of endemic and continuous conflicts of group and individual interests and constant shifting of alignments and loyalties. Educational policy makers and administrators are generally ill-equipped to live and deal with a situation of conflict. (Dhar, 1997, pp. 113–114) Apart from addressing this sociological complexity, unionization of teachers and other stakeholders also needs more careful consideration. Unilaterally passing legislation and imposing new rules and regulations by the government unilaterally will not suffice. Careful analysis in a disaggregated manner, with sensitivity to local contexts and formulation of innovative and accommodative policies and programs, is necessary. The typical reform approach dealing with sharing of responsibilities between the state government and the panchayati raj bodies does not seem to take into cognizance developments in the larger social and economic scene. Having embraced an open market economy in recent years, the country cannot ignore the market forces in the education sector. Fast growing private self-financing sector in education illustrates this point well. With the emergence of the market, not just the state and the civil society, as a powerful arbiter for provision of education, questions of equity and quality have been further compounded. Policy makers have to recognize the downstream and intergenerational costs of seriously unequal learning opportunities, which are likely to emerge with unchecked marketization of the education sector. Markets do not solve fairness problems. These problems are the natural responsibility of the public sector and have to be integrated into public education debate and policy (World Bank, 2000). As reiterated by the International Commission on Education for the Twentyfirst Century, improvement of education requires policy makers to face up squarely to their responsibilities. They cannot leave it to market forces or to some kind of self-regulation to put things right when they go wrong (Delors, 1996). Therefore, governance reform frameworks have to treat the issue in a triangular fashion, as between the state, the community (represented by the local governance system) and the market. Such an approach cannot be done in a top down bureaucratic fashion. There are no standard solutions to the questions involved. It is highly contextual to each state demanding continuous dialogue with stakeholders and a careful rearticulating of the policies and programs in an evolutionary perspective. Finally, it should be noted that though a utilitarian rationale for decentralization appears to fit the current developmental scene, one cannot anchor governance reforms on such fleeting phenomena. In order to sustainable and internally consistent, they have to be based on the long-term goal of empowering the people for

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self-determination. Education has a critical role to play in this process, both as a subject of reform and, more importantly, as a promoter of the reform process in the larger socio-political relational dynamics. But such transformations cannot be achieved through short-term project initiatives or with foolproof blue prints, however strong the capacity building efforts are. If establishing a democratic life style in educational governance is the final goal, people learn through practice and experience; training alone will not do. Mistakes are a part of the learning process and one cannot have a perfect launch and implementation of decentralization.

NOTE 1. For detailed discussion on different approaches to decentralization, also see Govinda, R. and Madhumita Bandyopadhyay, “Approaches to Decentralised Management of Basic Education in India,” in a forthcoming publication of IRMA, India.

6.

REFERENCES

Adamolekun, L., Robert, R., & Laleye, M., (1990). Decentralisation policies and socio-economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: Economic Development Institute of the World Bank and Pan African Institute for Development. Bardhan, P. (2001). Social justice in the global economy. Economic and Political Weekly Special Articles (February 3–10), 2001. Cohen, S. S., Dyckman, J. W., Schoenberger, E., & Downs, C. R. (1981). Decentralization: A framework for policy analysis (pp. 46–48). Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, University of California. Crook, R., & Manor, J. (2000). Democratic decentralization, operations evaluation department. Washington, DC: World Bank. Delors, J. (1996). Education: The necessary utopia. In Learning: The treasure within (pp. 13–35). Paris: Report of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, UNESCO. Dhar, T. N. (1997). Decentralized management of elementary education: The Indian experience. In R. Govinda (Ed.), Decentralization of Educational Management: Experiences from South Asia (pp. 95–121). Paris: UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning. Faguet, J. P. (2001). Does decentralization increase responsiveness to local needs? Evidence from Bolivia. Washington, DC: World Bank. Govinda, R. (1997). Decentralized management of primary education in South Asia: Policy and Practice. In R. Govinda (Ed.), Decentralization of Educational Management: Experiences from South Asia (pp. 15–72). Paris: UNESCO International Institute of Educational Planning. Govinda, R. (2001). Capacity building for educational governance at local levels. Paper presented at the International Consultation on Educational Governance at Local Levels, held at UNESCO, Paris, 27–28 February 2001. Govinda, R. (2003a). Decentralising education: Trends and issues. IIEP Newsletter, XXI(2), 5. Govinda, R. (2003b). Dynamics of decentralized management and community empowerment in primary education: A comparative analysis of policy and practice in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. In R. Govinda & R. Diwan (Eds.), Community participation and empowerment in primary education: Indian experience. New Delhi: Sage. Govinda, R., & Varghese, N. V. (1994). District level plan implementation strategy with particular reference to school improvement. Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning. Kantha, V. K., & Narain, D. (2003). Dynamics of community mobilization in a fragmented and turbulent state. In R. Govinda & R. Diwan (Eds.), Community participation and empowerment in primary education. New Delhi: Sage Publishers. Lauglo, J., & McClean, M. (1985). The control of education: International perspectives on the centralization–decentralization debate. London: Heinamann. Maclure, R. (1993). School reform in Burkina Faso: The limited prospects of decentralization and local participation. Canadian and International Education, 22(2), 69–85.

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Mathur, K. (1985). Small farmers development agency in India: An experiment in controlled decentralization. In G. Shabbir Cheema (Ed.), Rural Development in Asia. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers. Mehta, A. (1978). Report of the Committee of Panchayati Raj Institutions. New Delhi: Department of Rural Development. Ministry of Human Resource Development. (1995). Report of the CABE Committee on decentralization in education. New Delhi: Government of India. Myrdal, G. (1968). Asian drama: An inquiry into the poverty of nations. New York: Pantheon. NCERT. (1972). Report of the Education Commission 1964–66 (p. 12). New Delhi: NCERT. Slater, D. (1989). Territorial power and the peripheral state: The issue of decentralization. Development and Change, 20(3), 501–531. Webster, N. (1992). Panchayati raj in West Bengal: Popular participation for the people or the party? Development and Change, 23(4), 129–163. Weiler, H. N. (1983). Legalization, expertise, and participation: Strategies of compensatory legitimation in educational policy. Comparative Education Review, 27(2): 259–277. World Bank. (2000). Hidden challenges to education systems in transition economies: A world free of poverty. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Chapter 11 DOES RHETORIC ALWAYS MATCH REALITY? AN OVERVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION IN KERALA, INDIA M. V. Mukundan

1.

INTRODUCTION

Kerala State, which lies on the most southwestern tip of India, is widely known for its innovative approaches to social development and education, and is regarded internationally as a model for development. This tiny state with a most advanced civil society has been described as “a sort of Scandinavia of the Third World” (Tornquist, 2000, p. 118). The state has achieved universal primary education, near-universal literacy, and near gender equality in access to education. Kerala has received recognition for its history of social mobilization of education, health care, public distribution of food both at home and abroad, and for the many fundamental structural changes it has adopted, including land reforms. Yet paradoxically, Kerala has also been referred to as “a mystery inside a riddle inside an enigma” (Wallich, 1995, p. 37) because it has never succeeded in translating its human development indicators into economic ones (Mukundan & Bray, 2004). Kerala claims to have implemented far-reaching decentralized planning in numerous sectors, including education, through the 1996 introduction of the People’s Campaign for Decentralized Planning (PCDP). This decentralization policy was much heralded by its political proponents as one of the most unique reform approaches ever introduced in the country (Isaac & Franke, 2000). One academic went so far as to describe it as “one of the most important recent experiments in generating alternatives to corporate dominated globalization” (Franke, 2002, p. 47). Under this decentralization project, local level self-governing bodies were delegated with powers to control basic education and were authorized to formulate and implement local level plans. In this chapter, I closely examine the impact of decentralization on the primary education sector of Kerala. Analyzing the particular socio-political, cultural, and economic contexts of Kerala, I explore the paradoxes and jeopardizing factors behind the decentralized reform process, focusing on the relationship between the creation of official legislation and the actual effects of implementation on governance. I commence with a brief description of the 1996 PCDP along with its perceived impacts in the field of education, and subsequently provide an analysis of the accountability and effectiveness of democratic decentralization. Noting the conceptual implications of the politics of democratic decentralization in Kerala, I conclude with insights related

177 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 177–190.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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to the need for redefinition of the process of initiating and sustaining educational changes in a decentralized fashion in Kerala. 2.

THE PCDP AND EDUCATION SECTOR

In this section, I will describe the structure and philosophy of the PCDP, which has undergone a series of significant modifications since it was introduced. The Left Democratic Front (LDF) government that was in power in 1996 promoted the PCDP as a mechanism for supporting decentralized planning. The reform was a key component of the group’s political agenda. The elements and principles adopted by the LDF government for the decentralization campaign were largely drawn from the legacy of voluntary activities of the Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishat (KSSP), a proleftist non-governmental organization that has operated in the state for the last three decades (Krishnakumar, 2003). Literature about the PCDP highlighted autonomy, subsidiarity,1 role clarity, complementarity, uniformity, people’s participation, and transparency as basic principles for the devolution of authority and resources to local bodies (Isaac & Harilal, 1997). The state government also devolved 35–40% of its total annual budgetary allocation to the three-tier Local Self Government Institutions (LSGIs). As a result, the State Planning Board, a semi-autonomous government department, was reconstituted with pro-government nominees placed in positions with important decision-making powers. So as to empower the LSGIs, the planning Board asked the local panchayat governing bodies to draw up 5-year development plans. The PCDP was carried out in a series of phases. The first phase started with each village panchayat identifying local needs and gaps in development at the “Grama Sabha,” or village assembly, level (Isaac & Heller, 2001; Mukundan, 2004; Nair & George, 2002; Powis, 1999). Development Seminars were then held at each village panchayat level in which people’s representatives, officials, and experts discussed a “Panchayat Development Report” that detailed development issues and challenges they faced. They also provided basic data, appraisals, and sector surveys which in turn helped the different sector-wise task forces that were set up to “projectize” development approaches, and finally formulated a “Panchayat Plan.” The panchayatlevel plans were later integrated at the block and district levels. Responsibility for the 12,306 schools (government, government aided private, and private-unaided primary, secondary, and higher education schools) was transferred from the direct control of state government to different tiers of LSGIs. The State Planning Board (SPB) published a handbook for the education sector, proposed a Comprehensive Education Program, and provided training for the members of the task force (State Planning Board, 1998). Though these activities were intended to accelerate the process of decentralization, they produced only limited understanding of the form and process of planning. The ventures undertaken included educational quality improvement projects, educational background improvement projects, as well as other integrated projects. In 2003, I conducted a comprehensive comparative study based on continuity and change. My focus was on PCDP activities carried out from 1996 to 2002 in the primary education sector and aspects related to the primary sector in Kerala. The continuities and changes I observed in the primary education sector were connected

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with the following: standard setting, curriculum design and teaching methods, student evaluation, textbook/handbook production and distribution, teacher recruitment, salary and promotion, and aspects related to financing, construction, and maintenance (Mukundan, 2003a,b, 2004). In December of 2004, I returned to Kerala and spent 3 months examining developments in the implementation of PCDP since my last visit to the area. The data I collected indicated that the policy had not produced significant changes, even if decentralization is viewed as a means to an end in a particular setting (Hanson, 2000). What was most striking to me was the continuation of old patterns. The decentralization experiences of Kerala thus raise the question of whether decentralization policies have the inherent capacity to empower institutions and stakeholders in more transparent and accountable modes to cope with the changing demands of systems and agencies from within and outside. 3. ANALYSIS ON THE PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY IN DECENTRALIZING THE CONTROL OF PRIMARY EDUCATION 3.1.

Finance

When considering the effects of decentralization on finance, four factors should be considered: revenue authority, expenditure authority, grants-in-aid, and intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Regarding the decentralization initiative introduced in 1996 in Kerala, the authority of the central and state governments over financial matters did not greatly change. No change was observable on the revenue side and very little change was brought about on the expenditure side. The federal government continued to make decisions about financial transfers to the state level. The state government devolved 35–40% of its total annual budgetary allocation to the three-tier LSGIs. The funds allocated to local bodies based on population size were inadequate for their developmental requirements (Nazeer, 1997b). According to the available official figures, the total outlay for the entire state of Kerala, which consists of 14 districts and nearly 1,000 Village Panchayats, for education projects was approximately 599 million Indian Rupees (IRs) in 1997–1998, the first PCDP project year. During the second project year, 1998–1999, this figure dropped to approximately 503 million IRs. The State Planning Board reported that 6.9% of the total budget for social services was allocated to education in 1997–1998 (State Planning Board, 1998). Yet the LSGIs had only slightly more control over how to spend funds than was the case prior to 1996, since they were required to adhere to State Planning Board instructions and regulations when they made plans. The entire education sector (consisting of pre-primary to higher secondary sub sectors) received only a fraction of the total amount officially earmarked for social services. In addition, the actual funds disbursed for education often varied according to the whims of political administrators who control LSGI decision-making about education projects. This had a direct impact on the LSGIs at the block and village levels. The lower tiers of the administrative hierarchy are required to obtain approval from their superiors for all projects implemented within a stipulated period (Nazeer, 1997a). In a contradictory way, this acts as an impediment to the process of decentralization at the LSGI level in Kerala.

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Moreover, official statements2 made by state level officials highlight the important role that the state government continued to play in financial matters, even after decentralization policies had been adopted (Mathrubhumi, 2001). This situation raises important questions about financial equity in Kerala schools. In a state like Kerala, which regularly experiences financial shortfalls due to the lack of proper intergovernmental transfers (largely in the form of grants-in-aid), the LSGIs constantly face fiscal mismatches and vertical imbalances. Local governments continue to depend on the state government for funding, and are often unwilling to raise funds for education on their own. As a consequence, local institutions have yet to play an active role in managing educational finances. 3.2.

Auditing and Evaluation

The auditing and evaluation issues in the social service sector have an impact on the delivery of public services as well the government’s accountability to taxpayers. Governments typically design budgets and audit the use of the funds they allocate so as to ensure that public monies are well spent. They also oversee and evaluate the performance of agencies and institutions involved with service provisions. Normally four types of audits are carried out: financial, operations, program, and performance audits (Miksell, 1991). In Kerala, LSGIs are democratically elected institutions that are treated in principle as self-governing or independent organs. This means that they are not considered agencies that merely handle powers and rights delegated to them by the state government (Balan, 2002). They are supposed to possess functional, financial, and administrative autonomy. Yet audits of various projects carried out by village panchayats in Kerala identified numerous instances of malpractice and mismanagement of funds (Mathrubhumi, 2002a–c, 2005a,b). Furthermore, audits and evaluations are not carried out in a consistent and systematic way covering entire LSGI institutions in the state. The Malayala Manorama, a leading national daily newspaper published in Malayalam, highlighted this situation in its edition of June 3, 2002. The newspaper discovered that within 4 years of the introduction of PCDP, the state government, as a matter of its decentralization policy, transferred 38,000 million IRs to the LSGIs. However, 75% of this amount was not audited. According to the report, 60% of the village panchayats were reluctant to submit their actual fund utilization reports. Another report published by the Malayala Manorama (November 8, 2002), accused the government of purposely exempting many local self-governing institutions ruled by the LDF from formal audits. Auditing reports prepared by the UDF ministry only accounted for 15,000 million IRs out of the total 50,000 IRs earmarked for distribution to local government bodies. Although the LDF government spent 110 million IRs to publicize the PCDP, a “popular revolution” in its own terms, it made little effort to ensure effective use of the funds distributed to the various tiers of government. Though these kinds of administrative anomalies are well known to the higher level political and bureaucratic authorities, no correctional measures have been undertaken so far. This sort of ambivalent attitude discourages decentralization efforts (Basheer, 2004). Inconsistent and ineffective auditing practices also allow political administrators at the local level to employ nepotistic and partisan practices

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in making decisions (Also see Neelakantan, 2004; Malayala Manorama, February 4, 2005). 3.3.

Regulation and Policy Development

According to the Constitution, national and state governments are both responsible for the provision and management of education in India; they should set educational goals and minimum levels of service in the schools. However, after the introduction of PCDP in 1996, the General Education Department of Kerala issued an order mandating that authority over certain institutions and projects be transferred to the LSGIs. Though this order specified the powers that should be delegated to the village and district panchayats, local authorities seem reluctant to assume control over the primary education sector (Vijayanand, 2001). For instance, even though they have the power to inspect and evaluate the prescribed responsibilities of teachers and non-teaching staff, they seldom carry out this task. One of the reasons is political resistance from teachers’ unions, who often challenge the local authorities’ professional expertise. None of the official documents I collected from my sample of 29 village panchayats mentioned official monitoring work carried out among schools (Mukundan, 2003b). The great majority of teachers I interviewed for this study were not aware of any such monitoring by LSGI authorities. Moreover, state level government officials and bureaucrats continue to exercise excessive control over local stakeholders. Since some of the de jure powers delegated to local government bodies include overlapping powers and policy frameworks, duplication of similar projects is quite common at the local government level. For example, training programs for teachers designed to improve the quality of instruction and lunch programs for children were simultaneously carried out in an overlapping and duplicating fashion by the education department and LSGIs. 3.4.

Expression of Demand

As I visited schools in Kerala and interviewed local education stakeholders, I attempted to determine the mechanisms that allowed them to express their demands related to schooling. My primary interest was in cost recovery and citizen participation. The data I collected provide a troubling picture of local input into education at the village panchayat level of LSGIs in Kerala. The cost recovery of education is not easily assessable in quantitative measures over a short period or based on immediate results. Educational processes are mainly dependent on qualitative aspects related to educational standards such as learning achievement of students and teacher efficiency. In addition, political administrators interested in generating immediate results are often reluctant to take up educational projects. The village panchayats establish demand-driven elements at the local level based on a legal framework. The legal framework here refers to the Gramasabhas or Ward Councils, where local demands can be raised. The primary stakeholders are the teachers, students and parents, and members of the community. Participation in Gramasabhas is limited to eligible voters belonging to a particular ward (the geographical unit within one village panchayat; they consist of an average of 1,500 adult voters). This structure prevents a majority of the teachers situated in a particular

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ward from taking part in the ward council forums, where most important decisions related to education are made. Only parents who have been selected, or are expected to be chosen as beneficiaries of financial assistance from local governments, can take part in decision-making processes. This prevents most stakeholders from formally expressing their opinions about minimum standards for service or outcome goals for the schools. As a result, a mechanism designed to promote local participation in education deteriorated into a site for political bargaining, rather than a forum for expressing demands about education. 3.5.

Democratic Mechanisms

As various scholars have pointed out, Indian government officials often link the terms “democracy” and “decentralization” in policy discussions. The use of the compound term “democratic decentralization” is regularly used in references to matters such as voting rights, citizen participation, and the involvement of local grassroots organizations and NGOs. The democratic decentralization process in India, and particularly in Kerala, emerged as “an important political response to the development crisis” based on the assumption that it would accelerate economic growth and create a new model of equitable growth (Isaac & Franke, 2000). It was also supposed to contribute to improvements in the efficiency of policy implementation, and to make the development process more participatory and transparent. This supposition corresponds with the argument made by Putnam (1993) and the Inter-American Development Bank (1997) that decentralization is most effective when local communities have active civic and political participation, which in turn is associated with the tradition of self-government; democratic decentralization can help to mobilize social capital. Two specific questions are particularly relevant to this discussion of democratization, decentralization, and implementation of PCDP. First, does a sufficiently democratic institutional framework that encourages citizens to express their preferences exist in Kerala? Second, do decentralization reforms increase the reliance on these mechanisms for actual decision-making? The institutional framework of LSGIs seems to be democratic in the sense that representatives are elected every 5 years. However, these representatives are elected on a “first-past-the-post” basis through elections that are heavily influenced by party politics.3 Representatives are bound to act according to the instructions and interests of political party elites. This creates an impediment to conflict resolution procedures, and sometimes creates additional conflict (Radhakrishnan, 1997). This situation appears to contradict the notion that representatives should be accountable to their electorate. Interestingly, the major political parties and their elites also patronize local and grassroots organizations. Hence these organizations’ participation apparently depends on the political leadership that controls the LSGIs. For instance, when the LDF becomes the ruling party, pro-LDF activists (such as its NGO wings, cultural, and trade union wings) tend to become quite active, and withdraw when the opposition party, the UDF, comes to power (Mukherjee, 2001). The same is true with the pro UDF activists (Venugopal, 1997). The politicization and partisanship that emerges when policy initiatives are introduced have produced a kind of stagnation in Kerala development activities.

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In Kerala, the three-tier LSGIs operating at the district level replicate the state and national level political administrative set up, which has been labeled a “representativetechno-bureaucratic democracy” (Basheer, 2004). These institutions have evolved into centers of corruption and political nepotism that advance the interests of politicians eager to augment their own power. According to ordinary citizens, what is most needed in Kerala is a non-partisan, impartial approach to governance and increased opportunities for civic participation in decision-making. Unfortunately, for most ordinary citizens and education stakeholders, PTAs and MPTAs in the primary education sector do not usually have the power to bypass the nexus of local political elites and bureaucrats. For example, one primary school headmaster I interviewed explained that due to his own lack of connections to the ruling party of the local LSGI, an urgently needed water supply project in his school was never initiated. In a questionnaire I distributed to 128 teachers, 90% of all respondents identified this conflation of politics and education as a problematic aspect of the education system. This helps to explain the comparatively low level of participation by ordinary citizens, especially males, in the local assemblies. In most of the village panchayats I observed, these forums now function ritualistically; they do not carry out the wishes of local citizens. These realities raise questions about the democratic decision-making powers and practices that political administrators claim have resulted from the introduction of PCDP. 3.6.

Service Provider Arrangements

Within decentralized political administrative systems that prevail in Indian federation and states like Kerala, education, particularly basic or primary education, is a public provision. Though a number of private schools (both aided and un-aided) exist in Kerala, they function according to the same provisions as public schools. Hence the choice between public, private, and non-profit schools is not as significant as one might expect. In India, basic education has become a fundamental right for all children between the ages of 6 and 14. Although free public education is available to all students, the state government in Kerala has been experimenting with privatization since 1958. At present, it allows privately owned schools run by individuals as well as corporations to receive financial subsidies. There are also unaided but government-recognized schools run by religious establishments and private organizations, as well as a number of private English-medium schools. This liberal approach provides parents with numerous schooling options from which to choose. Following a global trend, the government in Kerala is encouraging members of communities to more actively participate in the schools (Mukundan, 2001). The most common vehicles utilized to promote participation are PTAs and Mother PTAs (MPTAs). Schools are increasingly dependent on these parent groups to donate money, equipment, and services that the schools need to remain in operation. Some NGOs in Kerala are also involved in educational matters, especially those related to science and non-formal education, but they do not operate schools of their own. The implementation of PCDP, however, has not generated any fundamental changes in the roles or structures of civic organizations involved in primary education in Kerala. Furthermore, education department bureaucrats in the state often

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use guidelines issued by the General Education Department to control the activities of local managed groups, such as PTAs and MPTAs. 3.7.

Civil Service Management Systems

According to Dillinger (1995), management information systems and other technological aspects of administration are critical for any local government to provide services efficiently. Has educational decentralization led to the restructuring or strengthening of educational management in Kerala? The data I collected suggest that no substantial improvements in capacity building have taken place since the PCDP was instituted in 1996. The bureaucratic administrative system has not been altered. At the LSGI level, some minor administrative restructuring has taken place. As part of the state government’s practice of redistributing excess employees, a small number of clerical workers have been transferred to the education units of district panchayats to carry out jobs related to education. In 1996–1997, an education sector core committee was constituted to prepare a comprehensive education report in each village panchayat. Another noticeable change occurred at the village panchayat level, where the headmaster of a government lower primary school was appointed as the Implementing Officer for educational and cultural projects. However, this does not directly relate to the capacity building of civil servants employed in the education department. Headmasters are often absent from their schools so that they can attend meetings related to school management and project formulation. This has raised concerns about the quality of instruction in the lower primary schools, where headmasters are also assigned homeroom responsibilities and are required to teach full-time (Mathrubhumi, 2002a–c). The Standing Committees for Education constituted at each tier of LSGIs function as a formal body to fulfill the prescribed norms in the Kerala Panchayati Raj Act. However, none of the LSGIs I studied could provide any evidence of activity designed to build the capacities of civil servants (including teachers). The Standing Committees have also been assigned responsibility for coordinating and organizing the activities of PTAs, MPTAs, and NGOS. According to Comprehensive Education Program guidelines issued by the State Planning Board, school-level education committees would also be created to participate in local decision-making. However, in all 29 of the village panchayats I visited, these committees existed on paper only. My interviews with education stakeholders, as well as survey data I collected, revealed that no formal organizational structures or communication channels designed to facilitate coordination among LSGI-level administrators and education department bureaucrats had been established. Clearly, the control of primary education did not undergo any substantial changes after the implementation of the PCDP. The accountability of different aspects related to the decentralized reform reveals that the rhetoric of the political administrators did not match actual conditions (Bray & Mukundan, 2003; Mukundan, 2005). 4.

THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION IN KERALA

In the following section, I explore the politics of decentralization in Kerala. The experiments with decentralization in Kerala are enmeshed with politics and

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state–society relations in rural areas, which are the locus of existence of the LSGIs. After a change in state level political administration brought the UDF-led government to power in May of 2001, the PCDP program was renamed “Decentralization of Powers.” In December of 2002, the same government gave it yet another title: the “Kerala Development Program.” Task forces were dissolved and replaced by “Working Councils.” These are examples of contradictory political strategies that resulted from the ideological confrontation between the two main ruling powers blocks. Nevertheless, according to government publications (Government of Kerala, 2002a–c; Ravi, 2002) the post-2001 political environment in Kerala does provide evidence of advancement in the democratic decentralization process from its “experimental phase” to the “institutionalization phase” by present power holders. The leaders of numerous political parties in Kerala, even those that compete for votes, have united in stating that decentralization can promote democratic participation in government. The leaders of these parties promote decentralization with slogans such as, “the power is in the hands of the people,” “governments should decentralize and people should participate in democratic governance,” “power to the people,” and so on. Though they sound like innocuous, even laudable goals, the realities do not usually match the rhetoric. The decentralization process that the PCDP was created to usher in represents a kind of dismantling or restructuring of the state bureaucratic system within a more democratic framework. Interestingly, the reform was proposed by political administrators belonging to the Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPIM) in Kerala (which leads the LDF). The CPIM is actually organized in an orthodox way, with its leaders following the principles of democratic centralism. Outside observers were concerned that the inherent contradictions between the actualization of ideas about decentralization policies being implemented by a centralized party would eventually bring the whole process under the control of cadres inside the party network (Narayan, 1997. Also see Venu, 2003). The CPIM party leaders, however, countered this concern with the sweeping statement that “principles of party organization should be distinguished from principles for organizing society in general or government administration” (Isaac & Franke, 2000, p. 34). In practice, however, critics’ fears proved to be valid in most cases. For example, one scholar observes that in the Pathanamthitta District of Kerala, petty politics of people’s representatives and parties caste a shadow over the campaign for the People’s Planning process in the district. With the CPI(M) cadres going all the hog out to project it as an LDF baby, the rival UDF, which has a major say in the district’s elected civic bodies, failed to give the seriousness that is due to the project. (Radhakrishnan, 1997, p. 5) On a more positive note, the LSGIs in Kerala have acquired structural uniformity, tenurial periodicity, and regularity of elections. These developments have added stability to Kerala’s politico-administrative system. However, the net gains that have emerged since the decentralization policies were introduced are neither clear nor comprehensive. Conceptually speaking, decentralization legislation made the LSGIs institutions for executing developmental policies, programs, and projects.

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Nevertheless, they largely depend on the mercy of the state legislature and the political administrative system. It is not yet clear the extent of their autonomy because the constitution of India itself is silent as to what constitutes self-government. In Kerala, the Panchayati Raj Act, enacted as a constitutional obligation in 1994, underwent 10 amendments within 8 years of its adoption (Suhritkumar, 2002). Various powers and responsibilities of the state government were transferred to the local self-governments, beginning on October 2, 1995 (Department of Panchayat, 2002). Subsequently, nearly 38 rules that addressed decentralized powers were reformulated. Furthermore, the regulations related to these rules have not been framed or implemented, which paradoxically reflects that they have not yet become part of the state legislature statutes (Ramachandran & Vijayanand, 2002). This indicates that administrative barriers are still present within the decentralized political administrative system in Kerala. My research suggests that there exists a lack of serious commitment to the devolution of power in Kerala among political elites, irrespective of their political ideologies. 5.

IMPACTS OF DECENTRALIZATION IN THE CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ASPECTS

The above analysis of the politicization of the decentralization process in Kerala, when viewed in relation to the control, continuity, and change in primary education sector, supports ideas put forth by Archer (1984). As she asserts, the political administrative leadership often utilizes the field of education as a laboratory for testing its power and authority. However, in the case of Kerala, the control of primary education still continues to rest in the hands of the state government. Very few educational projects are carried out by the LSGIs. Thus, the rhetoric of the political administrators appears to be unrealistic when it comes to devolving authority to local governments in Kerala, at least in the case of primary education. Decentralized participation is limited to political bargains made by political representatives in forums such as Grama Sabhas at the LSGIs. The authorities who designed the PCDP do not appear to have given adequate attention to problems related to micro level project management and the challenges associated with making political or administrative institutions more democratic. White’s observation that “sharing through participation does not necessarily mean sharing power” (White, 1996, p. 6) also applies to educational administration in Kerala. The PCDP has resulted in the devolution of power to carry out certain projects in the education field. However, taken together, these changes do not represent a substantial change in the way that education is managed in Kerala. At the primary education level, the changes induced by decentralization policies have been peripheral, both at the institutional and societal levels. These changes have not produced significant benefits. Most education-related processes, such as teaching and learning in schools, continued to follow established patterns without undergoing any fundamental alterations. In some instances, decentralization policies have created problems in schools. For example, in each village panchayat, a government school headmaster has been appointed as the Implementing Officer for education projects. This change created difficulties in the daily functioning of schools (especially in terms

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of instructional matters) to which those headmasters were assigned (Mathrubhumi, October 11, 2002a–c). Another negative development occurred when local government bodies did not disburse the funds schools needed to run their lunch programs. This created a financial crisis for several schools. 6.

CONCLUSION

This study of decentralized reforms in the field of primary education in Kerala highlights the need for a redefinition of the process of initiating and sustaining educational change. If new changes are to endure and foster local participation in school management, they will require a deeper understanding of the internal and external environments of each village panchayat. At the political level, policymakers and implementers need to define the opportunities and limitations of a particular locality in relation to the general objectives of primary education as envisioned by state and local governments. This will help to integrate local level educational changes into the flow of state and national activities. In addition, policy designers at the local level have to think more carefully about how they can encourage different categories of stakeholders including teachers, administrators, students, and community members to support the general objectives of primary education. Such harmonization between different stakeholders must be maintained through constant critique, evaluation, analysis, and feedback from each locality. Political elites in Kerala described decentralization as a tool that be used to regulate and control the direction of future change. They also advocated it as a legitimization strategy intended to foster local democracy. The ubiquitous as well as malleable nature of the construct allows politicians to manipulate the idea of decentralization to serve their own interests, and to recast the state–society relationship. Decentralization was proposed as a means of creating local power structures that would encourage stakeholder empowerment. In reality, decentralization policies enacted after 1996 in Kerala, especially in the primary sector, resulted in contradictions and disjunctures that clashed with their theoretical claims. The results of decentralization reforms introduced in Kerala confirm the assertion that decentralization is “an ideologically marked narrative which purports to give a true account of a set of past, present, or predicted political events and which is accepted as valid in its essentials by a social group” (Flood, 1996, p. 44), but may not extend far beyond that. My research in Kerala shows that while proclamations about the benefits of devolving authority are easy to issue, real change is more difficult to achieve. Nine years after the introduction of the PCDP, examples of continuity are more abundant than those of change. State level regulations continue to dominate, and bottom up initiatives in the field of primary education sector are rare. Some isolated cases that emerged in response to specific socio-political conditions reveal that the rhetoric of decentralization does have some basis in reality. However, the positive examples were few in number, and the overall picture is largely one of continuity of old patterns. This study clearly shows that even within favorable political conditions, there are real limits to what decentralization policies can achieve in India.

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NOTES 1. This term refers to a political policy that delegates the power to make decisions to a smaller group. 2. See e.g.: The Malayalam daily news paper, Mathrubhumi on 29 November 2001, reported the statement made by Revenue Minister K. M. Mani in the Kerala Legislative Assembly which read as: “The rural Panchayats have got the power to select projects. But the power to allocate funds for them still exists with the State Government.” The same daily reported on the same day Dr. M. A. Kuttappan’s (the then Minister in charge of the portfolio for the Welfare of Backward Communities, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes) statement that “the delegated power to utilize the Tribal Supply Fund by the three-tier Panchayats had been taken back from them because, the funds never reaches properly to the tribes through these Panchayats.” 3. According to this approach, the individual who receives the most votes among all candidates is judged the winner of the election.

7.

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Chapter 12 DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN: EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRAETORIAN INTERPRETATION Baela Raza Jamil

1.

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan has a diverse ethnic population of 142 million people, with 32.2% living below the poverty line (I-PRSP, 2001). It is a federation with four provinces and four federally administered territories.1 For three decades the country experienced a process of increasing centralization in decision-making, resource management, and service delivery. During that period, governments were set-up under Islamic Socialism, martial law, experiments with democracy by eight governments, and another military take over. Democratic institutions and service delivery eroded at each reconstruction of the state. To offset poor governance, a process of devolution has been initiated through the establishment of local governments across Pakistan. The principle of inclusion through political decentralization was meant to provide institutional entitlements for voice and action. Direct elections were held at the union council level (encompassing a population of 25,000, covering 5–7 villages or more settlements) in 2000 for 21 representatives. As the result of a countrywide mobilization drive, 33% seats were reserved for women, an unprecedented accomplishment in Pakistan’s history. In addition, six seats were set-aside for workers and peasants and one for a representative of a minority group. The latest attempt at decentralized governance and local government has ironically been implemented under the supervision of the military, which abruptly ended civilian rule on October 12, 1999. In the enterprise of state survival, the military and bureaucracy have taken turns as major and minor partners (Siddiqui, 2001). Seeking legitimation through local government has been a recurrent pattern adopted by the military, as evidenced in Pakistan’s history. In 1959, Field Marshall Ayub Khan passed the Basic Democracies Order for Local Government reforms, devolving representation to the village level to serve as an electoral college. In 1979, the local Government Ordinance was promulgated by General Zia ul Haq to activate local government. That move followed Bhutto’s experiment with Islamic Socialism in which nationalization led to centralization and dilution of local councils. In 1999, the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) was set-up as a central authority to formulate and implement devolution under the Local Government Plan (LGP). The NRB devised the Devolution Plan in 2000 and by August 2001 all district governments were in place, mediated by sub-district and union council teams and headed by district, sub-district, and union council nazims (mayors). The LGP adhered to the 191 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 191–209.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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principle of moving comprehensive authority to autonomous units as conceived by the NRB. It is within the framework of political decentralization that education decentralization is located. All modes of decentralization (deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and privatization) currently operate within the devolution design under implementation. The praetorian initiative is not coincidental. The martial guardians have intervened four times since 1947 for prolonged periods, taking over civil society’s management and restructuring in the Republic of Pakistan for protection of its best interests. The praetorian imperative to bring civil order and reform logically flows from the military’s urgent need to seek legitimacy for intervention in dysfunctional democratic processes, where accountability had been severely undermined and policies had become anti-development and anti-people. The recent drive toward decentralization through a comprehensive devolution design has implications for efficient and equitable service delivery. The decentralization story in Pakistan in its recent carnation is a complex one. It merits a narrative that locates the problem in a wider evolving political context. This chapter has five major sections. Section I covers the context for decentralization in Pakistan. Sections II and III highlight the key features of the Education Sector Reforms Action Plan 2001–2005 and responses to devolution. Section IV, focuses on the emergent public–private partnerships and the new policy environment to address equity. Finally, emerging mechanisms for financing decentralization are addressed in Section V. 2.

BACKGROUND: CONTEXTUALIZING DECENTRALIZATION IN PAKISTAN

The need for decentralization in education was initially discussed as a strategy for meeting Education For All goals after the government of Pakistan sought recommendations from the UN Inter-Agency experts in 1995 (Department of Education, Punjab, 2000; PMSP, 1997; UN Inter-Agency Mission, 1995). The UN Inter-Agency mission statement articulated the need for education reforms in this area and suggested the following: Moving the organization and management structure of basic education from one of a highly centralized and government—managed operation to one that supports a true partnership of the government, communities, non-governmental organizations and private sector and brings more of the decision making to the schools/villages and the districts. (UN Inter-Agency Mission, 1995, p. 2) However, an institutional approach to administrative decentralization, as suggested by the UN Mission, was bypassed. Instead, the focus was on the creation of School Management Committees/PTAs for local governance in education at the school level. In some provinces, elaborate analyses of comprehensive decentralization were undertaken (NWFP and Punjab, 1997 1998). In Punjab, active measures for creating “district education authorities” were taken, but implementation was ad hoc (Department of Education, Government of Punjab, 1997 and 1999). The piecemeal

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interpretation of decentralization was clearly not sufficient to produce tangible results. Responsibility and authority were not always aligned and decision rights remained centralized at the provincial level. Public sector shortfalls in education, in spite of 160,000 government institutions (ESR, 2002), led to the emergence of a robust private sector. It is estimated that the private sector provides 28% of all education in Pakistan, with this number rising to more than 40% in urban areas (FBS, 2001; World Bank, 2001). From a completely nationalized and closed system of 1970s, the government incrementally adopted a laissez faire approach toward private sector, NGO, and community initiatives. This provided multiple spaces to multiple partners. The stage was set for various individuals and groups in Pakistan with a vested interest in education to form partnerships that address the delivery gap in education. The policy environment, emerging institutional arrangements, financing, and partnerships in education present a unique and comprehensive opportunity for education. Improving education service delivery is therefore one of the core objectives of this comprehensive exercise. In Pakistan, the devolution exercise is underway against such a complex backdrop. The country has been engulfed in prolonged legitimacy and fiscal crises. These are embedded in the history of the state, which has in turn triggered the crises of democracy, participation, and distribution (Ahmed, 1998). The current praetorian set-up aims to put in place “good governance” and in turn create legitimacy for its actions. There have been four broad responses to the multiple crises of the state which were initiated simultaneously soon after October 12, 1999. The four concurrent strands are: 1. Economic revival through debt rescheduling, macro-economic reform, and accountability. 2. Poverty alleviation as set-out in the Interim Poverty Reduction Paper (I-PRSP). The strategies for achieving this include governance reforms, revival of the economy, asset creation, social safety nets, and improved human development. 3. Good governance through social sector reforms, including the Education Sector Reforms (ESR) Action Plan 2001–2004. 4. Political reform through devolution, as outlined in the Local Government Plan 2000, which calls for the devolution of decision-making powers to local levels. The above initiatives were designed by handpicked task forces. These comprised of a cross-section of experts drawn from civil society and government in the last quarter of 1999. By 2001, these programs were fully integrated in the I-PRSP,2 which has become the macro-policy, program performance, and resource mobilization document for the Government of Pakistan. 3.

EDUCATION SECTOR REFORMS—ACTION PLAN 2001–2004

The state of the provision of education in Pakistan has frequently been critiqued in studies, surveys, and site reports. Those assessments emphasize that a lack of demand is not at issue; instead, problems relate to the sub-optimal quality and quantity of the education supplied (Gazdar, 1999; Kardar, 1996; Khan et al., 1999; MSU, 2001a,b). In December 1999, a National Education Advisory Board was created and given

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the responsibility of outlining measures for improving education at all levels. In July 2000, the Board presented a list of proposed education sector reforms to the President (then Chief Executive) as an action plan. The Education Sector Reforms Action Plan 2001–2005 was designed through an inclusive strategy of mobilizing private sector and civil society partners, reinforcing the idea that the government should not serve as the sole provider of education. Contributions from these partners included innovative approaches and resources for meeting demands for public goods, such as education, health, sanitation, and security. The ESR is an action plan rather than a new education policy.3 It focuses on universal primary education, literacy, technical education at the secondary and post-secondary levels, madrasahs (religious schools), higher education, and quality across all sectors. The plan is anchored in sector-wide framework, public–private partnerships (PPP), and poverty reduction through education entitlements. The Education Sector Reforms (ESR) highlight the state’s responsibility to reach out when private sector options are inaccessible to the poor. There is also an implicit acceptance that “quality education for all” must be regarded as a fundamental human right. All institutional and financial arrangements for implementation of the ESR must be negotiated within the recently installed devolution plan. The district governments, which have been in operation since August 14, 2001, are currently undergoing a transition phase, adjusting to new rules of business within district-based realities. The ESR programs pertaining to all sub-sectors up to the secondary and college levels must now be implemented through district government mechanisms. This is a radical shift from previous arrangements whereby all decision-making was settled at provincial headquarters. Devolution thus carries major implications for education with new arrangements at national and sub-national levels. Key institutional characteristics of devolution are outlined in the Local Government Plan 2000, with the legal operational framework. The four provinces also follow their own governance documents, called the Local Government Ordinances 2001, approved by their respective cabinets, which detail roles and responsibilities at all tiers. The devolution plan is a comprehensive attempt to restore legitimacy to the state through a bottom up system of governance by mobilizing civil society through direct elections at the union council level, the tier closest to the beneficiaries. It is conceived as a counterpoint to the colonial structures where bureaucracy and local governments were juxtaposed in an adversarial hierarchy. The Local Government design is based on five fundamentals: Devolution of power, decentralization of administrative authority, deconcentration of management functions, diffusion of power-authority nexus, and distribution of resources to the district level. It is designed to ensure that the genuine interests of the people are served and their rights safeguarded. A coherent integration of these principles and application in various sectors is a major challenge. (NRB, 2000, p. 1) Elections for local governments were undertaken from December 2000 and the process was completed in July 2001 in 97 districts. Councilors, nazims (mayors), and naib nazims (deputy mayors) were elected. In all districts, governments are now

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organized around political and administrative teams. According to the devolution manual, the Local Government Ordinance and the District Rules of Business, each district is composed of 11 departments that function as separate entities. Each of these departments (including education, literacy, and information technology) is managed by an Executive District Officer (EDO). Like all EDOs, the EDO-education’s line managers are||, the District Coordination Office (DCO) (the direct administrative head) and the district mayor, or nazim (the political head). The federally administered areas are awaiting devolution transformations. The EDO must also respond to the demands of his/her provincial line department manager, or the Secretary of Education. 4.

STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS

Education decentralization in Pakistan is evolving as a negotiated and iterative process, aligned with new national directions. Decentralization, as stated earlier, is not merely confined to the education departments of the provinces and district governments but is part of macro-level efforts for civil service and fiscal reform. Both personnel and resources have been devolved to the local level to improve decisionmaking. This exercise may be seen as a gigantic “architectural effort” of decentralization, whereby form must follow the function of people-centered development. On January 24, 2002, the President of Pakistan, addressing the Pakistan Human Development Forum, expressed his political will for good governance and the role of education in national reconstruction. The President enunciated three gradations of change: improvement, reform, and restructuring. Pakistan, he stated, has opted for the latter. He was categorical in his view that Pakistan’s future lies in its ability to restructure for human development, stating, “Human development is the anchor of my economic revival policy, which will focus on education, health, and poverty alleviation” (President of Pakistan, January 19, 2002). The colonial administrative pyramid, guided by the paradigm of bureaucratic control for managing dissent and mobilizing resources, consisted of well-structured geographical tiers. The colonial arrangements persisted for 54 years in Pakistan. As Figure 12.1 illustrates, the Local Government Plan 2000 for devolution eliminated “Division” and “Markaz” from the administrative hierarchy, mediating the tiers within the district by Village/Neighborhood Councils, Citizen Community Boards, and PTAs/SMCs. In 2000, the Ministry of Education (MOE) approached the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) with a list of concerns to be addressed in the devolution plan (MOE, 2000). That list included the following issues: protecting the budgets for education in district government; establishing mechanisms for implementing the Compulsory Primary Education Acts; integrating special needs within education departments; rethinking the separation of the education and literacy departments; and, declaring the SMCs/PTAs as legal identities (MOE, 2000). Although not all of the proposals advocated by the MOE were adopted, some significant changes were made. For example, matters related to special needs were placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education and the NRB agreed in principal to legally designate the SMCs/PTAs as Citizen Community Boards (CCBs). Some of the key contrasts between pre- and post-devolution structures are outlined below (Figure 12.2):

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Post–Devolution Flattening

Federal Government Federal Provincial Government

Province “Division” District

District Sub-district/Tehsil Union Council Village/Neighborhood Councils Citizen Community Boards PTAs/SMCs/School Councils

Tehsil/sub-district “Markaz” Union Council PTAs/SMCs Figure 12.1:

The traditional offices of the education departments remained more or less intact at the tiers that have survived devolution, such as district, sub-district, and union council. However, as a result of the formation of district governments, many new officers have been added to the district government level for the subjects that have been devolved. In urban areas the departments of education under municipal authorities have been merged as one under district governments. Administrative decentralization followed political decentralization. New organizational structures have been designed. The functions and responsibilities at different levels have been articulated. Assets and facilities were reassigned and put in place. Staff assignments are also in process. New functions and responsibilities for different levels have been developed. In terms of implementation, there are provincial differences, administrative issues, and personnel matters that will need attention in due course. For example, there has been a lack of uniformity across provinces with respect to the implementation of certain provisions. Due to a lack of skilled personnel, many provinces are having difficulty finding enough skilled staff members to carry out the functions and responsibilities recently assigned to them. These problems need to be revisited by the provincial governments soon after completion of the transition phase of devolution. In the workshops held in 2001, field practitioners expressed numerous concerns about problems they felt were inevitable. Those concerns are outlined in Table 12.1 below. Government authorities have acknowledged that skills need urgent attention if decentralization is to prove worthwhile for education development in Pakistan. This requires: (1) massive capacity building of all stakeholders; (2) proper orientation of communities; and (3) a reorientation of elected representatives (MSU, 2001a,b). Pakistan is not following a single standardized decentralization plan. There are variations from province to province based on differences in history, education trends, topography, and local culture. For example, in Sindh and Punjab, the decision has been to devolve colleges to the district level but in the other two provinces that devolution

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Fiscal, Planning, Administrative and Personnel Arrangements in Pre & Post-Devolution Periods Pre-devolution

Post-devolution

Fiscal centralization, federal level

Fiscal decentralization to provincial and district levels in a phased manner over 3 years.

Planning centralized to federal level

Planning decentralized at district level

Administrative centralization at provincial level

Administrative powers devolved to district level

Administrative powers with Commissioners and Elected Representative, Nazim (Mayor) as head, District Commissioners at Divisional and District assisted by a bureaucrat, DCO & 11 Departments. Levels.

Planning, posts & transfers with line departments & Planning decisions/targets at district & Union Secretaries at provincial headquarters. Council levels. Positings up to scale 15/18.

Provincial cadres – District level up to

District based cadres emerging for local transfers Scale 9 ( Primary level Teachers) & postings up to Scale 20. Current responsibility for postings & transfer up to Scale 15.

Training or Human Resource Development

Training is still centrally managed by at the provincial level, but efforts under ESR to revive district level training institutions to serve HRD and capacity building needs.

Figure 12.2: Fiscal, Planning, Administrative, and Personnel Arrangements in Pre- and Post-Devolution Periods.

Table 12.1: Issues Highlighted by Provinces There is need of proper orientation and capacity building of all stakeholders about their particular roles and responsibilities toward the system as well as toward each other A number of managerial staff are former teachers. They should be provided with necessary managerial training Inter-district transfers to be made with the consent of the concerned EDOs Public representatives should refrain from creating unnecessary interference with education officials Clear job descriptions be laid down to ensure better and focused performance Administrative and financial powers are too limited The Rules of Business are not clear enough, especially the financial aspects need more clarity A solid physical infrastructure is not yet in place The staff strength does not match the responsibilities assigned to the district educational set-up The communities have to be provided proper orientation as to how they can play their role in enhancement of education levels and standards

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has not progressed beyond the secondary level. In the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), district-based cadres are adhering to their ancient tribal practices of more egalitarian approaches to social organization. Whilst Punjab and Sindh have accepted the division of education and literacy as separate departments, NWFP has actively resisted that move. These variations are a healthy sign that structures and functions are being organized to suit the needs of provinces. The process toward devolution and comprehensive decentralization has been uneven. That is primarily due a pervasive mood amongst the elite bureaucracy that this phenomenon is “illegitimate,” “transitionary,” and “politically volatile.” The assertion of the new political bosses as district heads (in the form of nazims/mayors) was resisted through organized protests at the federal level by senior bureaucrats, who felt subordinated to elected representatives. Ironically, it was these senior elite bureaucrat cadres who were given the responsibility of initiating administrative reorganization to fit the devolution design. They were not willing leaders in an exercise which they felt was bound to fail. However, civil servant recruits at the district level have expressed other views. The Pakistani situation illustrates how messy decentralization can be, especially when it involves pockets of resistance within institutions. 5.

RESPONSES TO DECENTRALIZATION

Responses to decentralization initiatives in Pakistan have varied in response to time thresholds, attitudes, and practices. I organize the evolution of those responses into three groups: resistance to devolution, compliance, and accommodation/adjustment. In this section, I will review each of the three periods and describe the major events that occurred during each phase. 5.1.

Phase I: Resistance

From December 1999 to January 2001, all provinces resisted the onset of devolution. Primarily the bureaucrats, who had the most to lose in terms of status and authority, led the resistance. Since the bureaucrats had to lead the pre-devolution transition process, they themselves became the primary blockers of the idea. The most concrete example occurred in the province of Punjab, which on the one hand was perceived to move faster than the emerging NRB blueprint on devolution, whilst on the other ruffled the bureaucrats by making them identify the shortfalls of their system and remedies which would significantly undermine an edifice with solid colonial foundations. In December of 1999, the governor of the province, assisted by his Minister for Information, formed a Task Force on Social Empowerment and Institutional Reform. The group comprised of ministers, senior civil servants, and civil society experts and activists. The scope of work on rethinking government was comprehensive, engaging all departments. An energetic Minister galvanized reluctant bureaucrats to pre-empt devolution and feed into the Local Government Plan at the center being prepared by the NRB.4 The professional civil society groups worked voluntarily in the sprit of national reconstruction and redesign, producing a thoroughly researched and well-debated document entitled “Devolving the State: A Model for Empowering the People” (2001).5 An intensive exercise was undertaken on “Functional Devolution— Education” with implications for political and administrative decentralization. The

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Governor delayed action on the recommendations of the report. For all practical purposes, the report was shelved, both by the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) and the provincial government, including the Department of Education. Disappointed and frustrated, the Governor resigned in protest. Whilst the effort mobilized a wide cross-section of bureaucrats and civil society groups to become proactive on issues of governance and its remedies, the fact that the recommendations were not carried through reinforced the bureaucrats’ thinking that devolution was premature—just a whim of the current praetorian regime designed to justify the take over by the military watchdogs. Many bureaucrats felt that the Devolution Plan 2000 undermined the traditional authority of the bureaucracy. There was an implicit belief that devolution would not be implemented and the local elections scheduled for December 2000 would not be held. Release and utilization of budgets was slowed, a trend that continued for years. Little proactive work was undertaken to rationally determine the key features of a decentralized set-up for education. In the provinces of NWFP and Punjab, a minister mobilized bureaucrats and civil society members to create a base for implementing decentralization reforms. In Punjab, valuable efforts for mapping out preparations for devolution were abandoned, disappointing numerous civil society professionals. The government was labeled as opportunistic, and criticized for undertaking a serious activity with lukewarm efforts at implementability of recommendations only to pacify public opinion vis-a-vis army rule.6 Although the report by the Punjab Government in March 2000, Devolving the State (a precursor to the Devolution Plan 2000) was shelved, many of its recommendations from the education chapter were incorporated into education sector reforms and the new decentralized structure in an attempt to provide “Quality Education For All.” Some of the representatives engaged in the Punjab exercise were co-opted as members of the National Education Advisory Board, which had a strong influence on the policy and structures of governance and social reforms. Although there is no evidence of “dumping” governance on local organizations, the resistance phase certainly interfered with detailed planning. The resistance was squarely led by the bureaucrats in charge of executing decisions, backed by financial resources. 5.2.

Phase II: Compliance

This phase occurred between December 2000 and August 2001, triggered by preparations for the first local government elections. The MOE acted as a catalyst for expediting the process toward decentralization. In February 2001, the MOE initiated a series of national and provincial workshops on “Devolution and Implications for Decentralization in Education.” The Education Department of NWFP, influenced by the provincial health department’s early measures in health sector reforms, was the first province to begin the devolution process. In January of 2001, NWFP initiated an exercise to bring the education department in alignment with the emergent principles of devolution. Other provinces formally initiated the decentralization process in February 2001, using some principles from the Decentralization and School-Based Management Guide Resource Kit, published by the World Bank, as a guide. In June 2001, the first blueprints for administrative and functional decentralization were prepared (MSU, 2001a,b).

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However, some difficulties did surface. Some of the arrangements regarding the role of the provincial headquarters and the federal ministry were unclear; new job descriptions for the decentralized system were not well defined. Also, education facilities that had previously existed under departments of education and local governments had to be merged to form district governments. Many of the people involved did not find this integrated approach acceptable. There was considerable resistance toward devolving power to the districts. Provincial Vision Statements Punjab: Principal goal is to devolve decision-making for quality education through decentralization of powers from Provincial Education Department to district and union council levels closest to end users . . . where stakeholders can have a productive collaborative partnership among themselves||.. to recreate the missing link between teachers and students (Task Force on Social Empowerment: Punjab 2000 & Special Secretary Schools, Government of Punjab, 2001). NWFP: Building on the opportunity provided by and in accord with the spirit of Devolution of Power to the District Government, the Education Department is proposed to be restructured by decentralizing its implementation functions and introduction of procedures to ensure work efficiency, performance, accountability, and development of professionalism in the Education service for improving the Literacy, Access/Enrolment, Quality of Learning, and outcomes at the Schools, Colleges and technical & Vocational Institutions levels by involving parents and Community in the service delivery (Education Department, Government of NWFP, 2001). Sindh: Our Mission is Quality, Retention and Access (Education Department, Government of Sindh, 2001). Balochistan: Devolution is aimed at shifting the decision making process from provincial headquarter down to the district government for promotion of education, quantitatively and qualitatively through an effective, efficient and accountable mode of governance (Education Department, Government of Balochistan, 2001). Nevertheless, the blueprints were put into effect on August 14, 2001, when new district governments were established in all 97 districts of Pakistan. In all provincial capitals, the large divisions and districts around urban metropolitan areas were

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amalgamated as “city districts.” In the case of Karachi, five districts, including a rural district, were merged into one decentralized mega-city district. Each provincial education department articulated a vision statement about decentralization (reproduced above), suggesting some internalization of the plans for change. 5.3.

Phase III: Accommodation and Adjustment

The most vibrant phase is the current one, which began after August 14, 2001. At the time of this writing, many changes regarding roles, responsibilities and authority regimes, at the district, provincial, and federal levels are underway. Whilst most education managers at the district level believe that district-based planning and decision-making is ideal, there is concern that the EDO-education has very little autonomy. With respect to new programs and decisions, the Mayor and the District Coordination Officer (DCO) reign supreme as decision makers. The tension is apparent in all districts. One EDO remarked, “I am not of any use, simply engaged in posting and transfers rather than real work on education planning and quality. . . . This is not decentralization, we are re-centralizing. . . . I would like to go back to my college where I had done wonders as a manager” (EDO||—Sheikhupura, April 15, 2002). District education functionaries believe that the “bureaucrats will not give devolution a chance,” as they have the administrative skills for executing decisions but do not have the will to do so. In most of the districts there is evidence of adjustments in posts, roles, and responsibilities, indicating that the organization charts will undergo many changes. The district mayors are filled with enthusiasm about education, wanting to change many arrangements. Many would like to see authority over the elementary schools devolve to the union council level, where they would be managed by the mayors and their teams (District Mayor Lahore District April, 2002). When informed that such action could lead to the politicization of education, one mayor admitted that this issue merits “due consideration.” At a meeting on “Improving Education Through Civil Society Participation,” it was decided that a District Education Board should be formed. Although all admit that there is a need for administrative presence at the union council level, there is inertia about taking the measures necessary to make it happen. The President, as the chief praetorian guard of Pakistan, obtained the mandate through a controversial national referendum in May 2002 for remaining in power for five additional years so as to implement the proposed national reforms. The Constitution, which stands abrogated since 1999, will have to be changed. It is now undergoing rapid changes with a semblance of consensus to accommodate the centrality of local government and ascendancy of a praetorian-civilian President. This political arrangement presents a challenge to continuity and sustainability of the reform processes. It is possible that another cycle of change, resistance, compliance, and accommodation could set in motion after the elections, undermining the much needed decentralization process for improved service delivery. The Pakistan case study certainly demonstrates that decentralization is a complex process, not just administratively, but politically and legally as well. Diverging from the blueprints for devolution, educational decentralization has been led by provincial authorities, with some assistance from the federal government. The implementation of educational decentralization hinges on public, private,

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and NGO delivery options. There have been uneven opportunities for civil society stakeholders to participate in the process, both on account of old habits of selective consultation for managing “dissent and noise” as well as poorly defined protocols for collaboration between the public sector and civil society partners. The cabinet approved an incentive package for promoting public–private partnerships. Each district government has to contend with these multiple players in education in creating opportunities for education development. As described above, the decentralization process is fully at play in Pakistan. Its variations may be seen in the form of deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and privatization including public–private partnerships. 6.

PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: GOVERNMENT SHIFTS FROM PROVIDER TO FACILITATOR Education in Pakistan, over the past thirty years has moved from the domain of state provision to one of multiple delivery system. Increasingly, public and private are not separate entities but are seen to lie on a continuum to meet national targets of non-formal, elementary, technical, and higher education in terms of quality and access. (Jamil, 1999, p. 6)

The terms privatization and decentralization7 are commonly conflated, used interchangeably within the “good governance” discourse. Privatization is often subsumed under decentralization (Bray, 1996a,b, 1994; Woodhall, 1997). Woodhall argues that conceptual slippages between decentralization and privatization occur with particular frequency in the areas of finance, delivery, and control (Woodhall, 1997, p. 4). Decentralization has often been conceptually and practically deconstructed along a continuum, spanning from deconcentration to privatization. The political economy of education has been the main determinant of these new arrangements. It is therefore essential to locate movements toward public–private partnerships within a framework that illustrates the evolving linkages as well as tensions. There are three broad periods with respect to the mobilization of private sector education in Pakistan. These trends coincide with shifts in political arrangements. 6.1.

1979–1989

During this decade, the military government reclaimed authority over the education sector after the debacle of mass nationalization in 1972–1973. Government officials decided that it was in the best interest of state and society to release control over schools and allow private sector to participate in education delivery. That strategy was designed to provide legitimacy to the military rulers who were allowing not only options and choice for schooling, but also helping the government in times of fiscal stress. In addition to re-injecting the private sector into the process of educational outreach, the 1979 National Education Policy mobilized other partners in attempt to increase non-secular education options. During this decade, the number of madrasahs also mushroomed, and their diplomas were made equivalent to those from public institutions.

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6.2.

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1989–1999

Influenced by the call for “Education for All” made at Jomtien in 1990, multiple democratic governments in Pakistan attempted to broaden participation in education through mobilization of NGOs and communities. The focus was on issues of access (particularly for girls) and quality. Numerous pilot programs were initiated in hopes that model programs would be created and implemented on a larger scale. Although community support often depended on government and donor financing, the private sector began to play a more active part at all levels of the education spectrum. Public policy in education began to consider the possibility of utilizing decentralization, privatization, and equity to “correct” the runaway state (sometimes also referred to as the “failed state”). 6.3.

Post-1999

After the military take over in 1999, there were two broad responses to the multiple crises of the state: (1) devolving power to local levels through the initiative of the Local Government Plan 2000; (2) mobilizing private sector and civil society partners for additional resources and improved management arrangements. The private sector expanded rapidly from the early 1980s through the 1990s. There are now almost 30,000 primary and middle schools, 41% of which are located in rural areas (FBS, 2001). The recent wave in soliciting partnerships for education seeks to legitimize and formalize institutional arrangements that were successfully implemented between 1989 and 1999.8 The state has assumed the role of the facilitator, negotiating partnerships with the private (profit and non-profit) sector. Education Sector Reforms (ESR) have set targets of 3% increases in private sector enrollments at the secondary level, and 5% at the higher education level. The “new” state as a facilitator is emerging with many options for public–private partnerships. This has created the potential for increased resources, better service delivery, and more choices in the kinds of goods and services available to consumers from non-elite groups. The possibility of using vouchers to expand schooling options available to poor families is also being explored (MOE, 2002; World Bank, 2002). 7.

PRIVATE SECTOR OPTIONS AND EQUITY

The ESR has thus put on the map a key role for the private sector and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Many experiments for bringing in private sector into public sites are currently underway to address equity and quality. Partnerships for education have emerged along the multiple spaces in a loosely layered environment of laissez faire management. If the government focuses on access without making entitlements and quality its key objectives, public policy may suffer. The government has taken its role as a facilitator and an arranger seriously, providing incentives to the private sector and encouraging civil society organizations to promote education. It is actively seeking capacity building opportunities for itself and its partners in private and civil society sectors through donor and local government support. Efforts are currently being made to mobilize for capacity building initiatives in governance, planning, democracy, and participation, as well as civil society mobilization. However, there

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are concerns that the public sector may continue to operate sub-optimally, drifting toward privatization without challenging its own personnel and systems to extend quality education to disadvantaged groups. Although the ESR expanded the resources available to improve public sector facilities, several institutional and administrative decisions have not yet been taken. For example, many of the rules that teachers and administrators are required to follow are in need of revision; the roles and responsibilities assigned to district level managers (at EDO-education) are not clearly defined. Lack of attention to these matters continues to pull down performance by public sector facilities. The vision for reform and decentralization needs to be accompanied by both systemic and attitudinal changes, which have to be acknowledged and acted upon. Both take time, as is the evidence with decentralization processes in any other part of the developed or the developing world. District-based governments must contend with private sector and public–private partnerships as they attempt to meet the goals and targets established in the ESR and the EFA. The challenge for the district governments is to increase their level of understanding and skill in implementing the policy reforms. They are attempting to create opportunities for engaging with communities, public–private partnerships, and the private sector, so as to meet the goals of equity and the ultimate national objective of people-centered government. What type of progress has been made? At this early stage, the evidence is just beginning to emerge. There are several concrete examples of progress: r Creation of District Education Plans through stakeholder exercises and facilitation by NGOs in the districts of Kasur, Sheikhupura, and Chakwal in Punjab; r Designation of PTAs/SMCs as Citizen Community Boards (CCB); r A formalized “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoA) calling for civil society organizations to adopt local schools for improvement and work with district governments; r Calls for the private sector to run afternoon classes in public school buildings. It appears that the center is making up for deficits in the skill level and “beliefattitudes” among district level authorities by expanding the scope of “clients” and “service providers,” with whom they may legitimately work. Almost 4,000 public secondary schools have been equipped with IT facilities and more than 6,000 primary, middle, and secondary schools have been upgraded to middle, secondary, and higher secondary levels in the provinces of Punjab and NWFP, thereby creating substantial savings for the government in brick and mortar expenses. The central government is cognizant that expanding delivery options under decentralization must be supported by increased financial support through decentralized financing instruments that are accessible to public sector, civil society, and private partners alike. 8.

FINANCING DECENTRALIZATION: FISCAL SPACE AND FISCAL OPPORTUNITIES

A major challenge for effective decentralization is that of fiscal devolution to the district level. Over the past three decades, financing became completely centralized in Pakistan. However, plans are currently under way to create a partnership between the

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Ministries of Finance, Planning, and Education for rethinking how resources for education can be generated and disbursed. The goal was to create new fiscal opportunities at the district level. Financing was reconceptualized in the ESR from a conventional deficit oriented approach to a more robust, multi-dimensional one. Four dimensions were involved in the modified approach: multiple level resourcing, poverty reduction strategies, institutional mechanisms of additionality and disbursement, and new budgetary mechanisms for financing education. Convinced that devolution required alternative options, an innovative instrument called the Letter of Agreement was designed by the Ministry of Education (2001). The Letter of Agreement is a performance-based funding mechanism that provides all providences with generous subsidies9 determined using a performance-based formula set by the National Economic Council (NEC). According to the stipulations of the Agreement, civil service organizations must be involved in those projects and 50% of all funds must be allocated to girls/women and disadvantaged groups. The Letters of Agreement were signed in January and February of 2002. That was almost 7 months into the financial year. Many districts had trouble switching to a performance-based expenditure system so quickly. Some district level arrangements remain in a state of flux. The districts are attempting to take on new responsibilities but must rely on personnel who may lack necessary skills. In addition, the EDO-education does not have direct access to these funds, which are currently under the control of the District Coordination Officers (DCOs). In many cases, the DCOs perceive of the EDOs as officers with little capability or imagination. Many district governments are apprehensive about sharing their resources with the CSOs. They are worried about being held liable for ineligible expenditures. Although the Letters of Agreement were enacted in the spirit of financial devolution, they clearly provoked anxiety and confusion at all levels of the government in the initial phase, but have been since acknowledged as the lever for direct resource injection to the district level without being subjected to complex controls and approvals at higher provincial and federal levels. The NRB has facilitated “bottom up” financial planning through Citizen Communities Boards (CCBs), which operate at the village and union council levels. The CCBs are composed of non-elected citizen volunteers who come together as an organized body (see Appendix III). Access to funds is through a matching grant scheme, whereby the CCBs must provide 20% of total funds in cash to receive 80% of approved budget. The praetorian managers require all registered civil society organizations, including PTAs/SMCs, to re-register as CCBS if they want access to district funds (NRB, 2002). In addition, CCB projects must go through a complicated nine-step process to receive grants.10 The NRB has resisted providing alternate funds to the CSOs (such as conditional grants from provincial and federal sources) for fear that doing so will undermine the new praetorian diktats for mainstream democracy. The Ministry of Education initiated work on guidelines for CSO participation and private sector access to ESR funds. It also successfully oversaw the completion of a complex agreement between the Ministries of Finance, Planning, Comptroller General of Accounts, and the NRB. This financing instrument will support decentralization through local civil society organizations by providing sufficient fiscal space, not only to mobilize resources but also flexibility to utilize this as per priorities of

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local needs and opportunity, thereby aligning policy with implementable systems and procedures. 9.

CONCLUSION

This case study of decentralization is situated within the larger framework of national reconstruction and the political economy of education in Pakistan. Recently, the government has been led by a praetorian regime, undertaking broad-based political, social, and economic reforms. In implementing decentralization reforms, the military government adopted an eclectic mix of persuasion, consultation, and coercion. The public is not yet sure if the reforms have been undertaken for the public good, or to add legitimacy to the military government so that it may remain in power. During the resistance phase of the devolution, the bureaucrats, who were rivals to the praetorian guards, allowed only minimal release of funds. However, just 6 months prior to the formation of the district governments, the NRB flexed its muscles and ensured the implementation of the Local Government Ordinances, which specified the powers that would be transferred to local administrative levels. It is important to note that drafts of the Local Government Ordinances were not made public by the praetorian pragmatists, who feared that the process would become complicated with too many opinions. When this scribe requested a copy of the Ordinance in December 2000 from a senior local government officer in Punjab, the response was: “This is a document with restricted circulation . . . under instruction from NRB . . . . We have deadlines to meet!” (Local Government & Rural Development Department, Punjab, 2000). Although one general blueprint guides the devolution of the education system that is being overseen by the NRB, there are variations on how each province is organizing its decentralized education structures and functions. These depend upon the availability of human resources, the educational infrastructure, and, to a critical extent, the “vision” of the champion(s) of reform. Federal authorities recognize that such variations should be addressed in a flexible manner. Only if such an approach is taken can underdeveloped provinces, such as Balochistan and rural Sindh, address equity issues. Funding formulas must factor in need, population, and poverty levels. This issue is currently under debate. In Pakistan, several challenges must be met if educational decentralization is to produce positive outcomes. The most critical of those challenges are: r Linking district realities with national restructuring efforts r Continuing to advance the decentralization agenda after the election of October 2002 r Devolving powers and authority to district managers and local governance partners in the communities r Providing the union councils with administrative and financial powers so that recentralization trends will be resisted and decision can be made in a timely way r Designing an efficient indigenous capacity model that will promote good governance r Ensuring the participation of private and civil society sectors in meeting district targets for education It will take time before decentralization structures that are suited to the emerging and shifting political and administrative landscape of Pakistan can be put in place.

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The public and private sectors are now working together to support good governance of education, with the government playing the role of facilitator. This is necessary for equity reasons. However, the cultures of the two sectors remain distinct. The public sector mindset offers the toughest challenge to continued decentralization. Bureaucrats often resist the move from the traditional adversarial relationship to one of collaboration and trust with civil society organizations. On the other hand, there are asymmetries in the schooling options offered in the private sector, especially in terms of equity. Objectives related to equity require fundamental shifts in ownership, distribution, and capacities of various groups in society. There is an underlying tension, however, between the goal of pursuing equity and those associated with privatization. Privatization requires the state to display advanced technical capacities, and to show continuous vigilance as it manages a demanding reform agenda. Initially, the role of the state will be increased rather than reduced. Governance for quality in education depends upon the capabilities of stakeholders and managers. Currently, that quality is uneven at all levels and across provinces. Community participation may appear as a proxy for ensuring equity through collective action, but groups such as CBOs and NGOs currently have minimal negotiating power with the government and little control over their destinies. The convergence of administrative and financial devolution through the ESR Action Plan created a vibrant setting for reform in Pakistan. Only if institutional and fiscal issues are addressed simultaneously, however, can recently adopted reforms meet their goals. If decentralization reforms are successful, they will lead to the improved delivery of public services—the only options available to the average citizens of Pakistan, 33% of whom who live below the poverty level. Thus, the cornerstone of educational democracy remains the primary challenge for the Pakistan government. The private sector, local communities, and school management committees on their own can only be seen as proxies to effective decentralization in education. There is a thin, but powerful dividing line between governance and participation. The deciding factor must surely be if current decentralization reform efforts are for the people or for the state. The martial, administrative, and political groups who have traditionally wielded the state in Pakistan need to clarify their role vis-a-vis civil society, and to modify governance structures and practices accordingly. In the education sector, such a transformation needs to create opportunities for everyday citizens to become involved in school governance and decision-making. If those plans are translated into action, we should see evidence of reform at the level of learning sites (the schools and colleges). NOTES 1. Provinces: Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab, and NWFP. Federal Areas: Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Northern Areas (NA), Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK), and Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT). 2. I-PRSP, although homegrown, is a pre-requisite to qualify for IMF’s Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF), the replacement to Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). 3. The latest Education Policy in operation is that of 1998–2010. 4. It is only pertinent to note that both the Governor and the focal person for the Devolution Plan (both retired generals) at the National Reconstruction Bureau(NRB), marginalized the provincial efforts.

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5. The exercise covered comprehensively, a Conceptual Framework, District Government, Elections, Local Dispute Resolution, Police, Land Revenue Administration, Education, Health, Financing and Residuary functions of the State (ibid.). 6. On September 19 yet another Think Tank was formed for Education with four groups to address issues of quality and relevance across four sub-sectors. The civil society participants at this national meeting openly shared their reservations about such initiatives which are not translated into actions but to address some other objectives (September 19, 2002). 7. Decentralization has been explored vigorously since 1983 as a public policy option for education, examining the role of the state and the locus of “control.” The debate has been growing in face of poor performance of the state to deliver basic services (see Lauglo & McLean, 1985). 8. The “Adopt A School Programme” used under-utilized public sector sites for Fellowship and Community Supported Schools (community managed), opening low cost private sector options in rural areas on government sites and with support from Education Foundations. 9. A total of 3.4 billion rupees (approximately 55 million dollars) were allocated to the provinces to fund Education Sector Reform development projects at the district level. 10. The nine steps of that process are: need identification, project preparation, submission, clearance by the council of proposals, approval, deposit of share, release of first installment, implementation, monitoring and project progress reports.

10.

REFERENCES

Bashir, S., & Viadyanatha A. R. V. (2001). District primary education programme. Submitted to the Encyclopaedia of Indian Education, NCERT, New Delhi. Bray, M. (1994). Centralization/decentralization and privatization/publicization: Conceptual issues and the need for more research. International Journal of Education Research, 21(8), 817–824. Bray, M. (1996a). Privatisation of secondary education: Issues and policy implications. International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, UNESCO, Paris. Bray, M. (1996b). Decentralization of education: Community financing. World Bank, Washington, DC. Burnett, N. (2002). Pakistan: Working with the private sector in primary and middle school education, towards a policy framework (DRAFT). The World Bank, SASHID. Federal Bureau of Statistics. (2001). Census of Private Educational Institutions in Pakistan 1000–2000. Islamabad. Fiske, E. B. (1996). Decentralization of education: Politics and consensus. Directions in Development, The World Bank, Washington, DC. Gazdar, H. (1999). Universal basic education in Pakistan: A commentary on strategy and results of a survey. SDPI Working Papers, Islamabad. Government of Pakistan. (2000). Local government plan 2000. National Reconstruction Bureau, Islamabad. Government of Pakistan. (2001). Finance division—Interim poverty reduction strategy paper (I-PRSP), Islamabad. Government of Pakistan. (2002). Planning division—Poverty reduction and human development. Strategy for Pakistan Human Development Forum, Islamabad. Government of the Punjab. (2000). Devolving the state: A model for empowering the people. Task Force on Social Empowerment, Lahore. Hanson, E. M. (2000). Democratization and education decentralization in Spain: A twenty year struggle for reform. Country Studies, Education Reform and Management Publication Series. Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi. (2001). Policy note to the district, provincial and federal education and NRB authorities. Jamil, B. (1999). Privatization and equity: The case of Pakistani urban secondary schools, Unpublished Mphil/PhD thesis, University of London, London. Kardar, S. (1996). Survey of schools in five districts of Punjab. British Council: Systems Private Limited, Lahore. Khan, S. et al. (1999). The state of basic education in Pakistan: A qualitative, comparative institutional analysis. Islamabad, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Working Papers Series. Lauglo, J. & McLean, M. (1985). The control of education: International perspectives on the centralization-decentralization debate. Heineman, London. Ministry of Education. (1998). National education policy 1998–2010. Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. Ministry of Education. (2002). Education sector reforms action plan 2001—2005. Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

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Multi-Donor Support Unit (MSU). (2001a). Elementary education in Pakistan: Current status, issues and future strategies. MSU, Islamabad. Multi-Donor Support Unit (MSU). (2001b). Report of the technical group meeting on devolution and decentralization: Implications for the education sector (February 26–27, 2001). Islamabad. Najam, M. J. (2001). Up-gradation of schools through community public partnerships—CPP (afternoon school system). Education Department, Government of Punjab, Punjab. Rondinelli, D. (1990). Decentralizing urban development programs: A framework for analyzing policy. U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC. Siddiqui, T. A. (2001). Towards good governance. Oxford University Press, Karachi. The Punjab Local Government Ordinance. (2001). Irfan Law Book House, Lahore. Verghese, N. V. (1996). Decentralization of educational planning in India: The case of the district primary education programme. International Journal of Education Development, 16(4), 355–365. Woodhall, M. (1997). Public versus private education: Changing perceptions of boundaries and roles. The World Bank, Washington, DC.

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Chapter 13 EFFORTS TOWARD DECENTRALIZATION: IDEOLOGY VS. REALITY—THE SRI LANKAN CASE Wilfred J. Perera

1.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last four decades, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has shown a keen interest in decentralizing its educational administration. On a number of occasions the government restructured and reorganized its educational administrative machinery. Through the creation of intermediate layers between the central ministry and the schools, the country attempted to maximize efficiency, but the effects were marginal. The government’s stated intention to improve the education system through greater participation by local communities has rarely been met. The multiplication of bureaucratic layers resulted in more complex procedures and confusion about administrative responsibilities. The lack of a strong “work ethic” in newly established layers hindered rather than supported school improvement. Though administrative authority was transferred from the center to the periphery, practice in schools remained almost largely unchanged. The Sri Lankan government made some key moves in attempt to decentralize authority over the schools: establishing regional and provincial offices of education; diversifying the curriculum by adding pre-vocational subjects; introducing cluster schools; and introducing school development boards. These efforts were noteworthy, but they did not produce their desired outcomes. Ambiguity in objectives, frequent changes in policies and programs, cultural and social constraints, and a lack of resources have all impeded reform. The present period marks a new era in the Sri Lankan education system, as a comprehensive package of both organizational and curricular reforms are being implemented. The concept currently attracting the most attention from advocates of educational decentralization is how more autonomy can be transferred to the schools. Although attempts to decentralize the school system have not been impressive thus far, if the government can learn from its past failures and take steps to address the issues that have hindered the shift toward local autonomy, Sri Lanka may eventually succeed in implementing functional decentralization. 2.

THE BEGINNINGS

Sri Lanka has a recorded history that stretches from 600 B.C. to the present day. Archeological evidence suggests that there were large centers of learning associated with the Buddhist monasteries from 3rd century B.C. (Harris, 1983, p. 70). The political structures in early Sri Lanka were not highly centralized. The school system 211 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 211–222.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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was more or less “consumer oriented” during that period. Education was primarily imparted in village or temple schools. The teachers (or “guru”), guided by the needs of the community, determined the curriculum. External support for education came only through royal patronage. A succession of outside powers ruled Sri Lanka, beginning in the 16th century. The Portuguese arrived in 1505, and were replaced by the Dutch in 1656. The British conquered the island in 1796 and ruled until the country gained independence in 1948. With the commencement of western rule in 1505 until independence, education policies were geared to meet the political, economic, and social needs of the colonial rulers. During the Portuguese era the church controlled the education system, with the state playing an indirect role. Centralizing trends in administration began during the Dutch period. The “Scholrachal Commission” specified that schools should be governed centrally, with teachers and pupils strictly following curricula determined by central authorities. When the British took over from the Dutch, they were initially hesitant to get involved in educational pursuits, as their primary concerns were economic. But they played a more active role in educational affairs after seeing the advantages of controlling the schools. Under the British, educational administration became highly centralized, with the colonial rulers making all decisions regarding the schools. Legislation adopted in 1906 and 1907 discouraged local citizens from participating in government; local authorities were prevented from actively participating in educational affairs. The introduction of Educational Ordinance No. 1 of 1920, which gave legal status to the Department of Education (Jayasuriya, 1971, p. 417), heightened the central government’s influence over the school system. The most revolutionary educational reforms in Sri Lanka’s history were introduced in 1945. That year a system of free education (from kindergarten through university) was introduced, and the mother tongue was established as the medium of instruction in all primary classrooms. Dr. C. W. W. Kannangara, Sri Lanka’s first Minister of Education, was the driving force behind those policies. Kannangara wanted to remove the privileges and prejudices of education through equalization of educational opportunities for all children. This resulted in a large expansion of the school-going population. The local elite, who took over power from the British in 1948, did not introduce radical changes that would encourage local participation. Thus, the centralized tradition continued for some time. 3.

FURTHER MOVES TOWARD DECENTRALIZATION

As the volume of work increased and the problems facing education officials became more complex, the administrative machinery that was in place proved inadequate. In the late 1950s, several attempts were made to formulate a decentralized administrative structure that better suited society at the time, but these efforts were not very successful. The first significant recommendation for decentralization occurred in April 1961, when the following recommendation was delivered at a national education conference: Decentralization is one of the important means of securing efficiency and speed in handling the day-to-day work of administration. Decentralization connotes delegation of authority to Regional

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office and lessening of concentration of power at the Head Office . . . Inadequate delegation of authority and its unnecessary concentration in the Head office have been mainly responsible for administrative decisions being considerably delayed and work unnecessarily duplicated. Technically qualified personnel have been tied down to routine work in the head office and to some extent in the provincial offices. (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, 1961: Report of the Education Conference held at Bandarawela, 1961: 1–2) This report provoked a swift response. In October 1961, the government created 10 educational regions and 13 educational districts. The head office retained the power to deal with questions of policy in all administrative matters. The district and regional offices were made responsible for accounting, finance, and administration. As a result of those changes, the education system did a better job of satisfying local needs than had been the case in the past. However, these reforms represented a delegation of tasks rather than a genuine effort to devolve power. In 1966, when educational planners realized that the impact of the above decentralization was limited, a deliberate effort was made to implement a more comprehensive decentralization scheme: “A strong and well-organized administrative set-up, with well-defined lines of authorities as well as checks and balances among different authorities, reinforced by adequate provision of the consultation of public opinion, is of vital importance to an efficient system of administration” (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, 1966: The Proposal for Reforms in General and Technical Education, 1966, p. 5). The number of education regions was increased to 15, and each region was placed under a regional director of education with full autonomy. This individual was responsible for training and promoting teachers, and for the general administration of the region—without input from the center. Changes were made at the national level as well. The Director of Education, who headed the Department of Education, was designated Director-General of Education, and his post was combined with that of the permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Education (Ariyadasa, 1976, p. 4). The decentralization of the administration carried out in 1961 and in 1966, and the changes that followed, gave the ministry a new organizational infrastructure.

4.

THE 1972 CURRICULUM REFORMS

In 1972 curriculum reforms that capitalized on local expertise were enacted. Subjects such as cultural heritage and pre-vocational studies were introduced to encourage schools to become more closely connected to local communities. Education officials believed that subjects such as these would transform both the structure of learning and the attitude of teachers. This provided an opportunity to diversify the curriculum in a predominantly rural country with great geographical variation. Though these changes represented landmarks in curricular reform, they eventually had to be abandoned due to resource constraints, environmental constrains, and public opinion (Diyasena, 1976; Jayaweera, 1988). The public believed that pre-vocational courses reinforced existing socio-economic disparities.

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5.

REFORMS OF 1981 AND SCHOOL CLUSTERS

Another set of ambitious reforms was adopted in 1981. At that time, the regional departments of education and the district offices were reorganized and restructured to reduce “system overload” at the regional level. These changes allowed the regional director to concentrate on development orientation. Another initiative proposed that the existing circuit system be replaced by the cluster system. A group of schools within a defined geographical area would be grouped into a “cluster” for the purpose of better organization, management, and development. Policy planners believed that creating such clusters would reduce disparities between schools and achieve greater efficiency; local management would enable better utilization of both community and state resources. The leader of each cluster, the principal of the core-school, was given the power to set goals for and manage the unit. School clusters were vested with great authority regarding the management of local education activities: Each cluster will function as an administrative entity to meet the educational needs of the area it serves. Pupil admissions, requisitions of supplies, capital expenditure, and allocation of teachers will be on the basis that each cluster is one organizational unit. Thus, the smallest unit for planning the development and organization of the school system will henceforth be the school cluster. (Ministry of Education, 1981) It was envisioned that a school cluster would be comprised of a number of primary and secondary schools. The total enrollment of a cluster would total between 3,000 and 5,000 students (Samaranayake, 1985, p. 26). The objectives of the cluster system can be summarized as follows: r To achieve qualitative development in education through intensive and systematic supervision, evaluation, and follow-up action of the school within the cluster; r To up-grade the neglected, underdeveloped, and remote schools by making them participate in cluster activities; r To enable schools to be managed by a body of more competent personnel; r To minimize/eliminate duplication in the provision and use of facilities and to achieve optimum utilization of scarce resources, both human and physical, within school clusters; r To obtain the maximum participation of the community and ensure the maximum contribution of the public to the upgrading of the educational facilities of their school complex area. Though there were several clusters that achieved the expected objectives, most did not. Many administrative problems arose when the circuits were replaced by the clusters. The core-school heads were often unable to fulfill their responsibilities, which were previously carried out by the Circuit Education Officers. Some core schools lacked adequate facilities. The basic aim of the cluster—sharing resources and supporting weaker schools—was not often realized. Studies of the cluster system pointed out several other weaknesses: r Unqualified or inexperienced personnel working as cluster principals r A decrease in the frequency of school supervision visits r Lack of improvement in supervising techniques

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Table 13.1: Variation in the Number of Schools Among Clusters Number of schools in the cluster

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Number of clusters with that number of schools

2

1

5

3

5

4

8

9

9

4

1

2

1

r r r r

Distances between schools in a single cluster were often so great that they could not be administered as a single unit Concentration of resources in the core schools An imbalance in the distribution of schools among clusters (i.e., some clusters had more than 12 or even 16 schools whereas some had less than 4 schools; see Table 13.1) Great disparities in the number of pupils assigned to different clusters (i.e., the number of pupils per cluster was expected to be between 3,000 to 5,000, but some clusters had more than 7,000 or even 8,000 while some others had less than 1,000) (see Table 13.2). 6.

REFORMS OF 1984

After the 1981 reforms were not matched by appropriate organizational structures and management implementation strategies, government officials indicated that further decentralization was necessary. The center was expected to establish an effective and efficient management system that would provide the necessary support for implementing a meaningful program for educational development by the year 1984. A report published by the Ministry of Education offered a long list of improvements in education management that needed to be implemented (Ministry of Education, 1984).1 An intermediate, multicluster layer operating between the office of the Regional Director of Education (RDE) and school clusters was established. The name of the new layer was the Division Education Office (DEO). The DEO was established to deconcentrate development work that had been taxing the RDE office, coordinate and supervise work in the RDE office, and improve the services provided to schools located outside the clusters, and reduce financial and time demands placed on school supervisors. The 1984 reforms encouraged a shift in the role of the principal from a first line manager of the ministry to an educational manager accountable for educational development activities in the school. Principals were given authority over school finances, and held responsible for the preparation, implementation, and management of the annual school plan. In addition, they were expected to oversee the curriculum, supervise and evaluate teachers, and serve as liaisons to parents and students. Newly Table 13.2: Variation in the Number of Pupils Among Clusters Number of pupils

Above 8,000

7,000– 8,000

6,000– 7,000

5,000– 6,000

4,000– 5,000

3,000– 4,000

2,000– 3,000

1,000– 2,000

0–1,000

Number of clusters with that number of pupils

01

01

03

05

03

12

12

11

03

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adopted policy went so far as to specify that principals should spend a minimum of 12 hours each week supervising teachers (Ministry of Education, 1984, p. 8–9). The management reforms of 1984 attempted to build a planning and management culture at the school level. However, due to multifarious factors, the proposed structural changes did not always improve administrative efficiency. In many instances, work efforts were duplicated at different levels of the hierarchy; schools were sometimes provided inconsistent direction by the layers above (Cabral, 1989; Manoharan, 1988; Perera, 1987). The new decentralization package required additional administrators with expertise in management areas such as planning, finance, and curriculum supervision. Extra supporting staff, buildings, furniture, and vehicles were also needed (Kulasena, 1989; Perera, 1989). If the reforms were to meet their goals, relevant documents needed to reach personnel at different administrative levels on time and in an easily comprehensible form (Staff College, 1986; Perera, 1989). The boundaries between the ministry, districts, and divisions had to be defined more explicitly. Conflict and confusion could have been minimized if the government had more clearly articulated what responsibilities needed to be decentralized, to what degree, and how. Most reforms remained at the suggestion level, as the proposals were not followed up with relevant circulars: Though the reforms proposed a fair amount of responsibilities to be handed over to the principal, it did not happen (Perera, 1989, p. 9). Even in the case of teacher transfers, they were consulted only in some cases. The authority and responsibility that the management reforms proposed were not vested with the principals. On the one level the ministry had not followed up its policy by amending the necessary circulars, regulations etc., while on the other, principals have not risen to the occasion to exercise power and authority that should be their due. (Perera and Palihakkara, 1997, p. 267) Principals often failed to adequately delegate functions and responsibilities to their deputies. Individuals holding middle management positions, who were not formally appointed to those posts, lacked authority; many felt they were being called to perform additional tasks without additional remuneration. This scenario indicates that it is essential under a scheme of decentralization to promote teachers based on a proper scheme of evaluation. 7.

DEVOLUTION OF POWER TO THE PROVINCIAL COUNCILS IN 1987

In 1987, provincial councils and ministries were established to give more autonomy to the provinces in managing their affairs. The positions of Provincial Director of Education and Provincial Secretary of Education were created. The Provincial Directors were given the responsibility of planning, implementing, managing, and directing the education programs in the provinces. Oversight of school facilities became a provincial function. The national ministry managed most affairs in the national schools, including the construction and maintenance of education buildings, libraries, playgrounds, furniture, teaching aids, and audio–visual materials; in other schools, the same functions were handled by the provincial ministries. Divisional

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Education Offices were created to facilitate the process of devolving authority to the periphery (Perera, 1997, p. 12). The authorities realized that the divisional offices were located too far from the provincial offices. They were also of the view that the divisional offices could not cope with the multiplicity of their functions. Hence, a number of divisions were groups together to create a “zone.” The Zonal Director became responsible for the implementation of quality improvement programs. The above moves created several difficulties for education administrators. The Zonal Director was subject to dual control by the provincial education ministry and the provincial education department. Failure to clearly define the roles of key administrators, such as the provincial secretary and the provincial director (National Education Commission Reprots, 1992, p. 108), also caused complications. Silva et al. (1993) note that the provincial ministry and provincial department simultaneously initiated transfers of the some of the same teachers. Power struggles between the central ministry and provincial ministries also occurred. For example, central officials began to give many of the larger schools “national school” status to bring them under control. “In fact one province filed a case against the central ministry for establishing national schools in their province . . . The provincial ministries sometimes complained that the national minister/ministry interfered in their work.” (Perera and Palihakkara, 1997, p. 270) 8.

SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT BOARDS

School Development Boards were established in February 1992 by Gazette extraordinary. The main purpose of the boards was to enlist community and parental support so as to improve the operational efficiency of schools. According to official guidelines, the boards were supposed to carry out the following tasks: r Assess the current needs of the school and recommend relevant improvements to the academic curricula and modes of teaching r Promote cultural, religious, and moral activities in the school r Assist in the development and maintenance of school infrastructure r Foster and strengthen the welfare activities of the school community and preserve its identity and traditions r Interact productively with the media so as to engender a cohesive relationship between the school, the community, and religious institutions r Assist in the development of the personalities of the pupils in the school In actuality, most school boards focused their efforts on generating resources— in most cases they acted as fund raising bodies. The boards were criticized for using undemocratic methods to select members, being dominated by elites who did not represent the communities they were supposed to serve, failing to facilitate a shift in power to the local people, and failing to provide information to stakeholders. As a result of such harsh criticism, the School Development Boards were abolished in 1995, only 3 years after they were created. 9.

DRAWBACKS AND LIMITATIONS IN DECENTRALIZATION EFFORTS FROM 1960 TO 2000

Though the government of Sri Lanka took several noteworthy steps toward the decentralization of educational administration with a view of upgrading operational

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efficiency, the effects were marginal. The process of decentralization was mainly concerned with establishing layers between the central ministry and the school with the view of bringing management closer to the schools. Though the geographical units of administration shifted from central to middle levels, practices in the schools remained virtually unchanged. One major drawback was that ambiguities in objectives existed at different levels, such as the recommendation level, policy level, and the operational level. This seems to have occurred due to misconceptions about the goals of decentralization. Educational decentralization can succeed only if there is systematic and careful preparation. “Decentralization is not a decision. It is a process over years” (Dalin et al., 1994, p. 260). In Sri Lanka, stakeholders were not adequately prepared for the programs introduced to encourage local control of the schools. Another impediment to change was that the objectives behind decentralization policies also changed from time to time. One could argue that some reforms were based on the concepts of devolution, participatory democracy, and the empowerment of local levels. Other reforms arose from the liberal democratic notion that the education system should function as a market economy, with the government and the local people sharing the costs of schooling. The latter vision of decentralization was supported by two arguments. First, expansion of the education system resulted in increased demand for resources. The government, already relying on an inadequate pool of resources, could not meet that demand on its own. Second, because the private sector also benefits from the provision of public education, it should help cover the costs of schooling. During the reigns of Sri Lankan kings the ordinary people were merely doers and not decision-makers. This tradition was strengthened by colonialism, and continued even after independence. Even when the government attempts to delegate power to the people, they often reject those opportunities. This social and cultural phenomenon has slowed the process of decentralization in Sri Lanka. Another factor that hindered reform efforts was lack of resources. Though new roles and functions were introduced, personnel were not prepared to take on new responsibilities. Physical resources— buildings, furniture, materials, and vehicles—were also scarce. Frequent changes in decentralization programs may also have prevented them from evolving and standing the test of time. The decentralization process carried out in the last four decades has not increased participation in the decision-making process by principals, teachers, parents, or members of the community. Decentralization has been viewed from a structural perspective rather than a functional one. Government officials need to ensure that people working at all levels of the system are prepared more thoroughly before schools can accept more autonomy. Only under those conditions could more of the functions carried out at upper levels of the bureaucracy be transferred to the school level. 10.

THE PRESENT MOVE TOWARD SCHOOL AUTONOMY: PROGRAM ON SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT

One can see many arguments for a decentralized form of educational government. Sri Lanka’s rigid bureaucracy has often led to frustration, hostility, lack of enthusiasm, and suppression of creativity. Overseeing an education system is not a mechanical activity. The Sri Lankan government recently acknowledged the value

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of providing schools with greater autonomy. In 1996, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) stated that the “process of decentralization must go right down to the level of the school.” (MEHE, 1996, p. 14). It stressed the need to give greater responsibility to the schools and communities. A key mechanism the Sri Lankan government has been relying on to achieve this goal has been a new initiative called the Program on School Improvement (PSI). The following excerpt from a report published by the National Education Commission outlines the government’s vision of the way in which schools be given more autonomy: School Based Management has been accepted as an effective tool in the management of schools. It should specifically state the power, authority and responsibilities of the principal and the Senior Management group of the school. There shall be a Council of Management for each school comprising the Principal, representatives of the staff, parents, past pupils and well-wishers and a departmental nominee to assist the Principal in the formulation of policy and preparation of development plans and monitoring the implementation thereof. (National Education Commission Report 1997, p. 25) The emergence of this initiative in Sri Lanka has to be viewed: firstly, within the overall package of reforms that have been introduced into the Sri Lankan education system; secondly, within the broader context of socio-economic and political changes that are taking place in the country: and thirdly, within the context of the international SBM movement. As I mention above, efficiency and productivity have become overriding priorities for many Sri Lankan institutions, and schools are no exception. Restructuring the education system to improve public spending by monitoring outputs against inputs has become vital. Government officials believe that the authority to make decisions has to be devolved so that services can be made more responsive to those who use them. Until recently, the centralized national curriculum and national assessment system prevented the education system from responding to individual and local needs. Government leaders are convinced that planning needs to take place at the organizational level will improve the quality of instruction. Several arguments have been used to promote school autonomy in Sri Lanka. First, the schools are submerged in a sea of macro programs and tend to blindly follow the script sent from the center. Although housed on school campuses, principals remain representatives of upper layers of the hierarchy. Secondly, the majority of schools have not identified the reservoir of potential energy, both human and physical, and hence these resources go underutilized. They hardly attempt to develop their infrastructure or generate new resources. Thirdly, only a handful of schools attempt to link themselves with outside institutions to improve the quality of curricula. Schools need to take the initiative to provide more interesting and relevant curricula. Fourthly, there is a need to involve the school in school planning and resource management. Lastly, teacher development programs currently focus on the skills of individual teachers rather than school-wide programs and practices. Through school-based staff development programs, congruence between staff development and school needs can be achieved.

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The main objective of PSI is to improve the performance of schools. The underlying assumption is that autonomous schools can offer a clear vision for the future and release the energies of their employees by empowering them to take professional responsibility for raising educational standards. Characteristics of this initiative include the following: r Allowing schools to determine their own approach to the teaching/learning process. r Allocating schools the resources and capacities to plan, in partnership with their local communities, for the future. r Creating representative school councils that work with the principal to establish school development plans that reflect local priorities. r Formally including the members of a school staff in the management process. r Recognizing that schools have the capacity to effectively deliver the curriculum according to local needs, within the national curriculum framework. r Linking school-based performance appraisal systems with school-based staff development programs. One aspect of PSI that has raised questions in Sri Lanka concerns the expanded authority of the principal. “SBM has presented principals and senior management teams with enormous challenges” (Evans and Hood, 1997, p. 14). Individuals appointed to these positions may be either unfit for the new role or may misuse their increased powers. Such doubts have been raised even two decades ago. The Report Towards Relevance in Education acknowledged that, “It will no doubt be pointed out that some principals do not have the professional or personal qualities for the exercise of such liberty. If so, we are entitled to ask how they came to be appointed to their posts. The obvious [solution] is to replace such Heads, to give them appropriate training, and in the future to appoint as principals only those who are qualified for the job” (Ministry of Education, 1982, p. 40). Because PSI provides principals with greater responsibility and authority, the selection of principals is crucial. The continuity of school administrators also needs to be guaranteed. A principal must be given at least 5–8 years to facilitate a school’s long-term development. With more power devolved to the school, the principal’s capacity to handle the newly acquired authority and to prudently achieve the objectives of the school through PSI, becomes critical. Procedures relied on to recruit principals need to be improved. The guidelines currently used to select new principals require revision. Some administrators accustomed to top–down management feel more comfortable when they do not bear responsibility for decisions made at their schools. In order to successfully implement PSI in Sri Lanka, significant changes need to be instituted in other locations as well. The mass media needs to effectively disseminate information about the benefits of PSI so that stakeholders will respond positively to proposed changes. Parents have to be made aware that under PSI schools will make decisions based on the preferences of students and parents. 11.

CONCLUSION

After committing to decentralize the education system, the Sri Lankan government decided to introduce the Program on School Improvement. Efficiency and productivity became overriding priorities for Sri Lankan institutions, and schools

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were no exception. Restructuring the education system to improve public spending by monitoring inputs and outputs has become vital. Devolving decision-making authority was regarded as a means of improving the quality of services provided in the schools. The centralized system that was in place in Sri Lanka for decades prevented the education system from responding to individual and local needs. Only if authority is delegated to the school/organization level, will the quality of decisions related to curriculum development, in-school supervision, student counseling, staff development, and assessment improve. Though several noteworthy steps toward the decentralization of educational administration with a view of upgrading operational efficiency were taken, the effects have been marginal. The geographic units of administration may have shifted from central to middle levels, but patterns of activity in the schools have remained virtually unchanged. The decentralization process has not increased the participation of principals, teachers, parents, or members of the community in decision-making processes. The rigid government bureaucracy has often led to frustration, hostility, decline in enthusiasm, and suppression of creativity. The provision and administration of education are not mechanical activities. Genuine renewal cannot be achieved unless those in the school make a conscious effort to diagnose their organization and initiate essential organizational changes. In the past, the Sri Lankan public has often vehemently opposed educational reforms upon introduction, but later come to appreciate these same programs. Much work needs to be done to gain public acceptance of the new paradigm shift in school management currently being promoted, and to ensure that educational reforms lead to a devolution of authority, rather than mere deconcentration or delegation.

NOTE 1. Among the changes recommended in that report were the following: improved management capabilities at school, regional, and ministry levels; more effective supervision systems; career development programs that focused on the improvement of individuals and organizations; the development of a clear strategy for improving management; and the participation of client groups in educational programs at the operational level (Ministry of Education, 1984, p. 7).

12.

REFERENCES

Ariyadasa, K. D. (1976). Management of educational reforms in Sri Lanka. Paris: UNESCO. Cabral, L. M. C. (1989). Kegalle after management reforms in education. Unpublished paper. Dalin, P., Anyono, T., Biazen, A., Dibaba, B., Jahan, M., Miles, M. B., & Rojas, C. (1994). How schools improve: An international report. Wiltshire: Cassell. Diyasena, W. (1976). Pre Vocational Education in Sri Lanka, IBE Paris: UNESCO. Ekanayake, S. B., & Sedere, M. U. (1989). Disparity in achievement: A case study of Sri Lanka. Maharagama, Sri Lanka: NIE. Evans, D., & Hood, P. (1997). School based management: Challenge and opportunity. United Kingdom: Anglia Business School. Fernando, N. (Ed.) (1984). Management of educational development in Sri Lanka. Maharagama, Sri Lanka: NIE. Harris, H. T. B. (1983). The administrative structure of education: Case studies of sixteen countries. Paris: UNESCO. Jayasuriya, J. E. (1969). Education in Ceylon: Before and after independence. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Associated Educational Publishers.

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Jayasuriya, J. E. (1971). Educational policies and progress during British rule in Ceylon. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Wesley Press. Jayaweera, S. (1987). Educational policies and change from the mid-twentieth century to 1977. Maharagama, Sri Lanka: NIE. Kulasena, K. G. (1989). A Study of introducing educational innovation through management practices: A preliminary draft presentation of the Ratnapura District. Maharagama, Sri Lanka: NIE. Manoharan, S. S. (1988). Decentralization in the Baticaloa District. Unpublished paper. Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs. (1961). Report of the education conference held at Bandarawela, April 17 & 25th 1961. Colombo, Sri Lanka: The Examination Department Press. Ministry of Education & Cultural Affairs. (1966). Proposals for Reforms in General and Technical Education. Ceylon: Government Press. Ministry of Education. (1969). Education in Ceylon, a centenary volume: Administrative changes in education (ch. 58). Colombo, Sri Lanka: Government Press. Ministry of Education. (1981). Education proposals for reform 1981. Colombo, Sri Lanka: MOE. Ministry of Education. (1982). Towards relevance in education: Report of the Education Reforms Committee—1979. Colombo, Sri Lanka: MOE. Ministry of Education. (1984). Report on management reforms 1984. Colombo, Sri Lanka: MOE. Ministry of Education and Higher Education. (1996). National education policy: A frame work for action on general education. Colombo, Sri Lanka: MEHE. National Education Commission. (1992). The first report of the National Education Commission. Colombo, Sri Lanka: The Government Press. National Education Commission. (1997). Reforms in general education. Colombo, Sri Lanka: NEC. Perera, W. J. (1987). Move towards decentralization: The Sri Lankan experience in educational administration. Unpublished paper. Perera, W. J. (1997). Changing schools from within: A management intervention for improving school functioning in Sri Lanka. Paris: UNESCO, IIEP. Perera, W. J. (2000). School autonomy through school-based management: The case of Sri Lanka in improving school efficiency. In The Asian Experience, An ANTRIEP Report. Paris: UNESCO, IIEP. Perera, W. J., & Palihakkara, H. (1997). Decentralization in education: The Sri Lankan experience. In R. Govinda (Ed.), Decentralization of educational management: Experiences from South Asia. Paris: UNESCO, IIEP. Samaranayake, R. S. (1985). Introduction of school clusters in Sri Lanka. Paris: UNESCO, IIEP. Silva, G. N., Ginige, L., Gunasekara, S., Perera, W. J., Ranasinghe, R. H. H., & Balasooriya, A. S. (1993). Decentralisation in education: A study of problems rising out of a new provincial set-up. Maharagama, Sri Lanka: NIE. Staff College for Educational Administration. (1986). An impact evaluation of the pilot project on the decentralization of regional administration of 1984 in Kegalle, Chilaw and Matara Sistricts in Sri Lanka: A case study. Maharagama, Sri Lanka: NIE. Yannakapulos, P. Z. (1983). Experiences in innovations in decentralization of education administration and management of local resources. Maharagma, Sri Lanka: UNESCO.

CONCLUSION: CONNECTING THEORY AND PRACTICE IN EFFORTS TO DECENTRALIZE EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN ASIA Christopher Bjork

As I state in the introduction, the scholars who contributed case studies to this volume were provided great leeway in structuring their work to highlight the most compelling aspects of the reforms they studied. The diversity of descriptions and analyses offered in the case studies presents a challenge in terms of synthesizing the material presented by the 15 authors. Efforts to decentralize education systems in Asia have yielded an array of fascinating puzzles, lessons of experience, and unanswered questions. How can we make sense of that rich but sprawling amalgamation of data? In attempt to create some order out of that material, I return to the observation expressed by Hanson in the first chapter that consideration of the motives that gave rise to decentralization initiatives should guide analyses of those measures. I will review the most common arguments used to advocate for educational decentralization, and consider the evidence presented in the case studies that supports, refutes, or raises questions about those justifications for devolving authority over school systems. Three arguments are commonly employed to explain why the localization of administrative authority is preferable to more centralized systems: redistributing power, improving administrative efficiency, and creating government structures that are more sensitive to local cultures and needs (see Figure 1 below). Given the increasing isomorphism of international rhetoric about educational reform (Boli, Ramirez, & Meyer, 1986; Ginsburg et al., 1992) and the weighty influence that international donor agencies currently play in educational development around the world (Rondinelli, 1981), it is not surprising that the governments studied in this collection of case studies have frequently relied on these three points to justify decentralization reforms. In the sections that follow, I will discuss the motives for reform identified in the case studies and consider evidence that reveals the extent to which policy goals have been met. Each section will begin with a summary of the points most often used to support that argument for decentralization. Next, evidence from the Asian case studies that either supports or undermines the argument will be presented. 1.

POWER SHARING

Decentralization efforts vary in scope and ideological thrust. Reforms may be driven by philosophical considerations or can focus on more technical problems confronting school systems (Govinda, 1997, p. 8). All discussions of decentralization, 223 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 223–242.  C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Administrative Efficiency

Sensitivity to Local Culture

Figure 1: Common Arguments for Educational Decentralization.

however, are embedded in broader issues related to democratization, individual voice, and the dispersal of power (Govinda, 1997). Support for decentralization is often premised on the idea that central authority must be redistributed to provide greater representation to political, religious, ethnic, and tribal groups who may have limited input into management of public institutions. Decentralization, it is believed, is a necessary mechanism for institutionalizing the participation of local citizens (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983). Only if groups situated outside of a nation’s capital are given regular opportunities to participate in decision-making can social equity be achieved. In exchange for its willingness to incorporate local levels in decision-making processes, the government will enjoy increased political stability and a heightened degree of national unity. The decentralization reforms explored in this book make frequent reference to the power sharing rationale for educational decentralization. As Hanson notes, “Because decentralization initiatives tend to be launched from the political arena, passive resistance from within the ministry of education often becomes a major barrier” (p. 7) to reform efforts. The case studies provide ample evidence that supports this statement. Every chapter in this book offers examples of government officials undermining the very reforms they advocate. The degree of opposition to the redistribution of power varies from case to case, but the central government’s reluctance to relinquish authority is ubiquitous across all settings. Jamil’s analysis of educational reform in Pakistan includes the most overt examples of government resistance to decentralization. She describes opposition to new authority structures at every level, noting that “resistance was led primarily by the bureaucrats, who had the most to lose in terms of status and authority. Since the bureaucrats had to lead the pre-devolution transition process, they themselves became the primary blockers of the idea” (p. 243). Tan also refers to overt resistance to decentralization, noting that the Singapore government “is far from willing to allow schools full and complete autonomy” (p. 69). Although the Ministry of Education has delegated some responsibilities to the school level, it has protected key matters, such as curricula and testing, and “continues to wield considerable control” (p. 73).

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One interesting feature of the Asian case studies is the subtlety with which resistance has been displayed in some locations. Accounts of decentralization tend to depict governments as complex systems composed of competing factions that act in their own self-interests (Bjork, 2003). According to this perspective, governments officials’ responses to a proposed policy are modulated by the perceived effects a reform will have on other actors as well as the access to resources it will provide to or block from various political players (McGinn & Street, 1986). Much of the political resistance described in this collection of studies, however, is not as overt or contentious as the contestations for power highlighted in the literature on decentralization. Politicians and central bureaucrats have undermined reform efforts in Asia, but their tactics are rarely combative. An approach they have employed frequently is to endorse decentralization policies that transferred some autonomy to lower levels of the system, but leave key responsibilities, such as testing or school inspections, in the hands of central authorities. A “competing factions” reading of such situations would suggest that individuals in high places strategically attempted to deny local actors the widespread authority they desire. My own interviews with officials at the Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture offered a different, less politically charged scenario. The central authorities I spoke with seemed to genuinely believe that they have provided new opportunities to sub-national actors to influence educational policy and practice. When they impeded the transfer of authority, those officials were often unaware of the effects of their actions on subordinates. Scenarios such as this press us to analyze resistance to devolution from multiple perspectives, and to avoid assessing the commitment of government officials in dichotomous terms. There is no disputing the reality that redistributing authority from the center to the periphery will upset existing power configurations within and across levels of a hierarchy. As numerous scholars have previously noted, central officials may actively work to prevent authority from flowing out of the capital. However, if we assume, without taking a close look at the evidence collected, that upper level authorities will choose to block decentralization initiatives, we run the risk of oversimplifying an extremely complex process, one that may arouse a variety of opinions and emotions in the actors affected by reform. In some cases, policies may provoke jostling for power, but we also need to consider the possibility that authorities conditioned to respect vertical authority hierarchies may unknowingly undermine the polices they promote. They might resist change not out of a desire to maximize their own influence, but due to a belief that schools can best be managed by an authority structure that balances central and local control. It is conceivable that Asian government officials support partial decentralization after carefully assessing the benefits and disadvantages of devolution. The enormity of the task of reconstructing power frameworks is most evident when we look at efforts to increase community participation that several Asian nations have identified as a key component of educational decentralization initiatives. Encouraging local actors to take a more active role in the direction of schools gets to the heart of the ideology driving the concept of decentralization. The “power sharing” argument is founded on the notion that groups situated outside a nation’s capital must have regular opportunities to participate in government decision-making. In other words, every citizen—not just a small cadre of elites—deserves to have a say in the management of public services. Policies that promote increased community

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involvement in school management essentially aim to institutionalize participatory democracy in the education sector. This is a noble goal that few would criticize. Breaking down the barriers that separate schools from their surrounding communities has the potential to lead to improvements in school management, curricula, and communication. But in the Asian countries examined in this book, this task has proven to be one of the most difficult goals to realize. Although most of the governments have advocated the creation of school boards or school-based management councils that include parent representatives, support for such organs has rarely led to the level of community participation originally envisioned. Some ministries have declared their intention to augment levels of parental influence in the schools, but have yet to follow through on those plans. Other governments have created formal structures for incorporating parents and community leaders into school management procedures, but have also struggled to define the specific functions and responsibilities assigned to those entities. In Japan, for example, although the government endorsed the establishment of school boards composed of community members, “finding the appropriate mechanism for transferring some measure of authority to parents has not yet been identified in a satisfactory manner” (p. 133). Similarly, Korean government officially granted boards of education the power to make and review educational decisions, yet those bodies still “did not actually enjoy full power in making decisions. Their authority was incomplete and limited” (p. 142). In certain areas of policymaking, the Korean school boards only reviewed decisions made by metropolitan and provincial assemblies. Another strategy utilized in the name of community participation has been to offer parents increased input into the management of schools, but require them to cover a larger percentage of education expenses in exchange for that influence. Several authors note that the enactment of decentralization measures has been followed by an increase in the school fees charged to parents. For example, the independent schools scheme introduced in Singapore “may be viewed as part of an attempt by the government to foster creativity and innovation in the citizenry,” but it was also “part of an attempt to pass a greater proportion of the costs of operating social services such as education and health to the public” (p. 72). According to Lee, community participation in Malaysian schools has been limited to fund-raising. Hawkins explores this issue in the greatest detail. In China, he observes, family educational expenditures have increased substantially as the state has reduced its fiscal contributions to public education. In one province, such costs grew at an annual rate of 12%. This evidence underlines the fact that although recent policies have tended to emphasize the ideological aspects of educational decentralization, the concept originally sprung from the minds of economists. Support for localized control of government agencies was based on financial considerations, driven by the spread of economic neoliberalism (Rhoten, 2000). When the World Bank began promoting educational decentralization in the late 1980s, it used “a purely fiscal and administrative argument” (Rhoten, 2000, p. 602). Discourse about decentralization did not stress links between devolution and political democratization until years later. But redistributing the authority to make decisions about school management, staffing, and curricula is quite a different undertaking than revising a system of taxation/finance. The two

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approaches demand distinct strategies for effecting change. The data presented in these case studies suggest that altering power configurations is a more formidable challenge than reforming economic policy. A society’s values about authority, status, and hierarchy are more deeply entrenched than its views on taxation schemes, which tend to be revised periodically. In most locations, citizens have come to expect that the fees they must pay the government every year will rise and fall. They are not as likely to anticipate fluctuations in the configuration of government, or in the relationship between state and society. Inducing a citizenry to regard public institutions as extensions of the people—and to alter their behavior and values to fit that vision of government—is a markedly different task than gaining their support for a new funding plan. The unique contexts into which decentralization reforms are introduced exert a critical influence on translation of those measures at the school level. Bray and Tang’s point that examining the social and historical roots of reform efforts is essential merits reiteration here. As their analysis of the contrasting trajectories of educational development in Hong Kong and Macau underscore, a nation’s political history, in particular, plays a crucial role in the implementation of reform initiatives. Macro level policy studies and government reports tend to downplay the factors that distinguish one setting from another. In emphasizing technical considerations, such analyses often leave readers with the impression that transferring authority over education to sub-national units will lead to improvements in any school system. But decentralization measures depend on local actors to put ideas promoted by policy planners into practice. Such individuals are shaped by economic conditions, political climate, religious traditions, and cultural values specific to their local communities, as well as by personal experience. In many settings, these influences can present barriers to the devolution of authority over schools. As the case studies underscore, few Asian states have traditionally expected local educators or community members to actively participate in the management of public institutions. In settings where central government officials have dictated educational policy and practice at all levels of the system for decades, local actors may be unprepared to respond to the changes introduced in the name of decentralization. Evidence presented in this book indicates that the individuals expected to implement decentralization measures at the ground level often fail to adhere to reform plans. It is unlikely that plans to devolve authority over school systems will succeed unless teachers, administrators, and community members accept the autonomy offered to them. 2.

INCREASED EFFICIENCY

More pragmatic concerns are also on the minds of many Asian ministries of education currently experimenting with decentralization. The term “efficiency” is used to justify decentralization in all of the reform efforts described in the case studies. The vision of exactly how transferring authority to local levels will improve system efficiency, however, varies from location to location. In some settings efficiency is defined as improvements in the generation of resources. In exchange for increased input in decision-making and management of schools, it is maintained, local actors will develop greater commitment to government projects in the education sector. Citizens whose opinions are taken into consideration will more eagerly contribute to

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education projects than would be the case under a centralized system. By granting local organizations more say in the direction of schools, the government can therefore decrease its overhead and reduce financial pressure on the center. Evidence from the case studies suggests that decentralization measures enacted in Asian nations can indeed improve the level of financial support for schools. In China, for example, overall levels of funding for primary and secondary public schools grew after local actors assumed more control over financial management of education. Hawkins also observes that newly established private schools “represent an alternative to the low quality and high cost of government schools” (p. 34). The Pakistani government has also experimented with innovative matching grant schemes, although the results of those efforts are not yet clear. In other locations, however, mining previously unexploited sources of financial support has not raised overall levels of funding for education. Neither have citizens willingly donated to public education programs nor has their influence over school affairs expanded. Instead, financial burdens were simply transferred from central to local levels, sometimes resulting in reductions in school budgets. Another by-product of the transfer of financial powers to local levels has been the exacerbation of disparities among school districts. Although scholars have warned of the possibility of increased inequality resulting from decentralization (Prud’homme, 1995), policy planners have generally avoided addressing the issue. Drawing on both analytical and empirical research, Prud’homme concluded that centralized governments have demonstrated greater capacity to reduce regional income disparities than local government organs (Prud’homme, 1995). The research presented in this volume offers strong confirmation for this observation. Since educational decentralization initiatives were introduced in Japan, for instance, there has been a tendency “to sacrifice equality in exchange for better schools” (p. 127). In Japan, Singapore, India, China, Indonesia, and Malaysia, disparities between funding levels and the quality of instruction offered in different schools and districts became more pronounced after the introduction of decentralization initiatives. Mukundan notes that in the Indian state of Kerala, the move to decentralize “raises important questions about financial equity . . . In a state like Kerala, which regularly experiences financial shortfalls due to the lack of proper intergovernmental transfers (largely in the form of grants-in-aid), the LSGIs constantly face fiscal mismatches and vertical imbalances” (p. 217). It appears that financial authority may challenge the resources and capacities of institutions not previously required to procure funds for operating expenses, and schools located in less economically advantaged areas tend to suffer most acutely. As Hawkins observes, “Decentralization seems to [work] well if the locality is already doing well economically” (p. 36). The goal of increasing efficiency is not limited to funding issues. Several Asian governments have promoted decentralization on the grounds that devolving authority away from the center will improve the quality of management and services provided to the public. According to this line of reasoning, sub-national actors have a better understanding of local conditions and practices than individuals based in central ministries. Therefore, granting local government organizations and employees the authority to make decisions about the schools in close proximity to them will cut down on red tape and lead to increased productivity (Bray, 1996). Local actors, capitalizing on their familiarity with their immediate communities, will do a better

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job than central officials in linking supply and demand and monitoring practice in the schools. Data from the Asian case studies do not offer resounding support for this hypothesis. Although in many locations school leaders have been granted more autonomy than in the past, the devolution of authority has rarely enhanced administrative efficiency. Most of the case studies offer mixed results in this area or describe deterioration in the efficiency of decentralized administrative systems. Reforms that were supposed to result in more effective administrative administration of education in Sri Lanka have fallen short of that goal. As Perera comments, “the proposed structural changes did not always improve administrative efficiency. Several operational difficulties arose after the 1984 reforms were introduced: duplication of work by different layers, dual control of the school by the layers above, lengthy and lethargic procedures, lack of qualified and trained personnel, and lack of physical resources” (p. 265). In Korea, local administrators have also had trouble living up to the performance standards established by central officials. After state officials assumed management responsibilities previously assigned to bureaucrats in Seoul, schools were often provided insufficient or excessive supplies. The overlap of responsibilities assigned to school boards and metropolitan assemblies in Korea “represents a waste of time and energy” (p. 148). Educational decentralization measures introduced in Malaysia “aimed at improving the efficiency and quality of education . . . . Yet these measures did not always produce their intended results” (p. 188). District Education Officers in Malaysia often struggled to shoulder the increased levels of authority delegated to them. Most lacked “the professional skills and know-how that is required in data analysis, educational supervision and professional development of teachers” (p. 182–183). Hanson warns that, “Dropping a decentralization reform into a weak regional management infrastructure is like dropping it into quicksand” (p. 9). Yet many Asian government officials appear not to have heeded this admonition, investing scant resources in the training, support, and supervision of locally based managers. As a result, the workforce depended on to implement decentralization measures at the ground level often lacks the skills, training, or attitudes necessary to improve system efficiency. Embedded in institutional cultures that have not traditionally encouraged independence of thought or activity, local actors may resist opportunities to act autonomously. Wong observes that teachers in China “experienced fear, anxiety, and nervousness as a result of their increased workload. This, in turn, augmented teachers’ reluctance to accept the new power offered to them as a result of the policy shift” (p. 60). Malaysian educators, socialized to respect authority hierarchies, continued to wait for guidance from above before reacting to decentralization policies while upper level officials assumed that their subordinates had embraced newly created opportunities to increase their influence in the schools. Teachers and education officers “seemed to be shackled by the traditional practice of waiting for directives from the center rather than be able to make independent decisions” (p. 185). The above examples of inactivity by local educators operating in decentralized school systems underline the degree of cultural change necessary to achieve a meaningful devolution of authority. Although this factor is often mentioned in literature on decentralization, it tends to be glossed over without explication of the types of change required, or the repercussions of choosing not to respond to those conditions.

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3.

SENSITIVITY TO DIVERSE NEEDS

The case studies offer the most ample evidence in support of the argument that educational decentralization will foster greater sensitivity to local conditions. This justification for reform rests on the idea that local institutions are best prepared to facilitate instructional programs that meld with the unique characteristics of those communities. Central offices, on the other hand, may lack the specific knowledge necessary to make informed policy and management decisions affecting citizens in the localities (Bray, 1984). For these reasons, it is argued, authority over curriculum design, the licensing and monitoring of teachers, the language of instruction, and/or in-service training should be devolved to local agencies and institutions. Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Indonesia have all relied on the “Sensitivity to Diverse Needs” rationale to promote decentralization. The most common strategy utilized by Asian governments in response to local variance has been to modify curricula. In Indonesia and Japan, a portion of the national curriculum has been set aside for locally determined content; schools have been granted the authority to decide which topics would be covered and how that material should be delivered. The Korean Ministry of Education called for “more diversified and specialized education programs, and for curricula that reflect contemporary realities and needs” (p. 145). Other governments have articulated strategies for dealing with this issue in broader terms. The Singaporean plan for responding to local diversity, for example, announced that: “decisions on how to meet students’ diverse needs were best made by individual schools rather than by the Ministry” (p. 71). The degree of change accompanying decentralization measures emphasizing local variation has varied. Muta details significant modifications to the structures and procedures used to determine curricula in Japan. Introduction of the “Integrated Studies” portion of the curriculum has provided schools with great flexibility to determine the topic, objectives, and length of IS lessons. These changes are particularly significant when we consider the high degree of influence that the Ministry of Education has traditionally exerted over the curriculum in Japan. Muta notes, however, that convincing K-12 educators to design lessons promoting creative thinking has been challenging. In response to pressure from local educators, the Ministry of Education felt compelled to publish a series of guidebooks containing sample lessons, “essentially defeating the primary goals of the reform” (p. 123). Similarly, in Indonesia, instructors did not respond to newly created opportunities to shape the curriculum to fit local needs and interests as planning documents predicted they would. Curricular changes instituted in the name of decentralization proved to be cosmetic—courses were given new titles and content reorganized into different configurations, but the substance of what was taught in classrooms changed very little. As a result, a reform designed to make teachers key players in curriculum development actually reinforced the status quo. As both of these cases illustrate, if classroom teachers are reluctant to modify their roles or responsibilities in the schools, initiatives that aim to align curricula with local conditions may have limited effect on the lessons delivered in classrooms. Another strategy governments have utilized in response to demands for greater attention to local diversity is privatization of education. The Hong Kong government, for example, has relied on schools to “contribute to the differentiation and

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specialization of the centralized education system” (p. 103). In Malaysia, the devolution of responsibility for higher education prompted a surge in the number of private institutions and the quantity of places reserved for students who, due to ethic quotas, lacked access to public universities. Jamil notes that “Public sector shortfalls in education led to the emergence of a robust private sector” (p. 235) in Pakistan. Before the government began devolving authority over education, the school system was “completely nationalized and closed” (p. 235). Now approximately 28% of all Pakistani schools are private, with even higher numbers in urban settings. Data from the case studies suggest that converting public schools into private institutions tends to result in more substantial alterations in the types of courses and lessons offered to students than attempting to revise practice in public institutions. Loosely coupled to the central government, private schools have greater latitude to adjust their programs to fit their own needs and goals. The privatization route would also appeal to central authorities for some obvious reasons: the changes required of government institutions are less burdensome; the demands placed on public officials decrease when the government is removed from the direct management of private schools; and financial pressure on the central government is reduced. However, as Lee observes, monitoring the quality of teaching and learning at private institutions can be problematic. 4. 4.1.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

Compensatory Legitimation

The idea that transferring authority to local education offices and actors will result in more democratic, efficient, and culturally sensitive school systems is likely to appeal to a wide range of stakeholders interested in educational development. It is therefore not surprising that all of the governments examined in this volume use at least one of the above arguments to support their calls for decentralization. The three arguments explored above offer logical rationales for enacting the policies described in the case studies. But do the factors most frequently cited in policy reports alone generate enough energy to fuel the decentralization that is currently traveling across Asia (and the rest of the globe)? Are there any additional factors that governments may not publicly discuss that have generated support for educational decentralization? Weiler (1989, 1990) contends that although the three arguments described above are theoretically tenable, when applied to actual political systems, they fail to fully account for the prevalence of decentralization efforts around the world. According to Weiler, the idea that governments will freely chose to give up a portion of their power in order to improve system efficiency is “largely incompatible with the interests of the modern state in maintaining effective control (Weiler, 1989, p. 37). He maintains that it is essential to consider the political utility of promoting decentralization measures, in addition to the publicly advertised reasons for devolving authority to local levels. Policy planners are concerned not only with the outcomes of the programs they sponsor, but also with their ability to enhance state legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. The Asian case studies provide support for this notion, which Weiler terms “compensatory legitimation.” Jamil’s analysis of educational decentralization in Pakistan

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leaves no doubt regarding the central governments motivation for redistributing authority over public institutions: The devolution plan is a comprehensive attempt to restore legitimacy to the state through a bottom up system of governance by mobilizing civil society through direct elections at the union council level, the tier closest to civil society. It is conceived as a counterpoint to the colonial structures where the bureaucracy and the governments were juxtaposed in an adversarial hierarchy. (p. 237) She also writes about “the military’s urgent need to seek legitimacy for intervention in dysfunctional democratic processes” (p. 234). None of the other authors explicitly identify compensatory legitimation as an impetus for reform. Woven through the case studies, however, are numerous statements that highlight the power that international discourse exerts on educational policymaking in Asia. Clearly, all of the governments studied in this volume feel pressure to enhance their reputation on the international stage, and endorsing decentralization supports that aim. The following excerpts from the case studies underline this reality: [I]n order to maintain its competitive edge as a world leader in the economic globalization process, the national leadership instituted a series of reforms to deregulate and decentralize the education system. (p. 117) At the upper end of the educational system China’s leaders are clearly motivated by desire to be a regional and world leader. . . . It is hoped that all of these reforms will result in China taking its place among the developed nations of the world as a leader in education, science and technology. (p. 29–30) As an official at the Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC) observed, Indonesia has ‘entered what is called globalization, the free market. So we need to have every level of society active . . . . Because Indonesia will be joining the AFTA, APEC, and WTO. Decentralization is part of the process of preparing for membership in these organization.’ (p. 157) These statements suggest that concern for improving their standing in the eyes of the international community may indeed provide a strong, though often unstated, impetus for decentralizing education systems. Politicians, policy-makers, and upper level bureaucrats do not construct policy agendas in a vacuum. They are situated within multiple spheres of activity, all of which are distinguished by unique power dynamics and agendas for change. An official employed at a ministry of education may feel pressure to respond to the demands of parent organizations, local education offices, teachers’ unions, co-workers, authorities from other ministries, politicians, and international donor organizations. Ministry officials may visit school campuses,

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but they tend to spend far more time interacting with government leaders, international consultants, and bank representatives. Organizations such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, UNESCO, and USAID provide the financial backing required to launch many education projects. Funding organizations typically attach detailed guidelines to the projects they support. In addition, outside consultants are brought in to assist with the preparation of budgets, offer technical assistance, and monitor the implementation of projects. This client–provider relationship places pressure on central officials to adhere to the ideas and plans endorsed by external entities. Governments that opt not to promote decentralization might be perceived as failing to keep up with trends in educational reform. Such a perception could undermine their status in international circles. A more concrete consequence would be the loss of critical financial support for education. All of these consequences would be regarded as unwelcome developments by Asian nations, many of which are determined to discard the “developing country” label. It is important to note, though, that concern for acquiring compensatory legitimation is not limited to the poorest Asian nations. Japan, despite its comparatively strong economy and a reputation for educational excellence, has also opted to decentralize its education system. International trends in educational reform are prodding nations of all sizes, locations, and levels of development to disperse authority over education. One salient theme that emerges from the case studies is that central officials are often quite adept at voicing convincing support for decentralization measures, but that support may fail to extend beyond a rhetorical level. Kim’s observation that in Korea “a wide gap separates . . . . discussions and reality” (pp. 137–138) would apply to most of the nations studied in this volume. As several authors point out, official accounts of reform efforts rarely capture the realities of actual implementation efforts. Authorities may publicly voice support for the notion of local autonomy but fail to follow through with the support necessary for decentralization to take root. Considerations related to compensatory legitimation may be partially responsible for contradictions between official accounts of decentralization policies and the translations of those policies in the field. If Weiler’s theory is accurate, the effects of a decentralization initiative may be subordinated to the accounts of that program conveyed to the outside. As Elmore and Sykes have noted, policy planning tends to produce more attention and high status than policy implementation (Elmore & Sykes, 1992). Promoting the delegation of power to local levels boosts the status of central authorities, whether or not they actually execute the policies they endorse. The reputation of ministry of education officials is not likely to be damaged in international circles if the goals decentralization policies they support are not met. 4.2.

Multiple Influences, Multiple Goals

Providing a succinct summary of the goals of any of the decentralization projects analyzed in this book is challenging. Government reports may stress one facet of decentralization, but, as the analyses in the case studies make clear, the objectives of reform initiatives often become broader and more amorphous with age. In addition, different actors within a single ministry of education may have contradictory views of what a particular initiative is designed to accomplish. Finally, a host of unstated

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goals are likely to accompany the stated objectives of a policy. Those aims may complement or contradict one another. Hanson comments that “The greater the accepted vision of decentralization between distinct centers of power (e.g., political parties, unions, bureaucrats, religious institutions), the greater the chance for successful change” (p. 18). Yet the case studies indicate that decentralization initiatives are rarely guided by a unified team of players. Instead, plans for devolving authority over education systems tend to be shaped by a plethora of stakeholders who often do not share a common vision for change. The constellation of forces acting upon the individuals and agencies responsible for directing decentralization measures may contribute a degree of confusion to many such efforts. Decentralization measures often incorporate ideas generated by numerous stakeholders, both within and beyond a nation’s borders. As a result, the goals for a particular initiative are often multiple, lacking in definition, and/or discordant. All of the case studies include examples of difficulties that have surfaced as a result of inconsistencies in policy goals. Education officials in Singapore, for example, have promoted decentralization in hopes that localized control will result in: greater efficiency, increased attention to students’ diverse needs, improved accountability, and a wider choice of curricular options. Complicating this situation is Govinda and Bandyopadhyay’s observation that, “decentralization seems to mean different things to different people, depending on the political and administrative context in which the term is used. The concept has remained vague and highly ambiguous, when used by policy-makers as well as intellectuals” (p. 192). In Hong Kong, the list of goals put forth by proponents of decentralization is equally ambitious. In the 1990s, two major decentralization programs were enacted in hopes of increasing diversity, improving quality, expanding parental choice, enhancing financial support, and contributing to differentiation and specialization of the education system (Bray & Tang, pp. 16–17). Government documents prepared by the Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture mention the following goals for the Local Content Curriculum program: empowering local authorities, reducing the percentage of students prematurely exiting the education system, linking the curriculum to local conditions, increasing community involvement, and improving instructional practice. These potential benefits of decentralizing education systems might impress funding organizations, but the quantity and breadth of objectives suggest that the governments embracing decentralization have not been guided by coherent visions of change. Another reality of policy formulation and implementation is that the goals of decentralization reforms often shift over time. When the principal actors assigned to manage a particular initiative change or policy planners feel compelled to modify a program, its objectives may be adjusted. As the case studies illustrate, a policy originally exclusively focused on improving financial efficiency may be reshaped to tackle the challenge of increasing community participation in educational management as well. The objectives of a decentralization initiative tend to expand as the number of actors involved in its oversight grows. This is especially likely to occur if education authorities feel pressure to please multiple constituencies. And as the scope of a program develops from the pilot stage to a phase of widespread implementation, the demands expressed by various stakeholders are bound to increase. In many cases,

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when policy planners attempt to respond to those stakeholders, decentralization measures become unwieldy and difficult to implement as originally envisioned. 5.

LONG TERM PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

Decentralizing an education system can be a monumental task, especially in settings with long histories of centralized authority, which is true of most of the countries described in this book. Although some Asian governments have experimented with educational decentralization for decades, most of the initiatives analyzed in the case studies were introduced in the 1980s and 1990s. As Hanson posits, “Like most types of reform, [decentralization] is built rather than created. It happens slowly because the organizational culture . . . must be transformed” (p. 12). Few of the scholars who contributed chapters to this volume had the luxury of watching decentralization programs unfold over long periods of time. Instead, they were forced to draw preliminary conclusions based on data collected during relatively early stages of policy implementation. What is the likelihood that the programs described in the case studies will produce their desired outcomes if they are given time to develop? Do the analyses provide evidence suggesting that recent accomplishments will breed success, or are Asian governments due for continued struggles in the future? China offers a glimmer of hope: local government officials and communities there have capitalized on opportunities to act as change agents, molding decentralization policies to fit their needs and goals. In addition, public spending for primary and secondary education increased and innovative collaborations across different levels of the Chinese education system have been initiated. However, Hawkins also observes that the “blend of central and local governmental financial support along with donations, fund-raising, enterprise support, and community participation creates an appearance of more decentralization than may actually be taking place” (p. 32). The central government has not relinquished authority over key areas such as testing, curriculum, or teacher training. Hawkins describes China’s decentralization project as “fragile” and raises the possibility that recentralization may be on the way. Legislative action in Korea and Indonesia suggests that government officials in those countries are serious about devolving authority to sub-national levels. Both nations have enacted wide-reaching laws requiring the central government to hand over specific powers to local agencies. In Korea, local boards of education and autonomous local councils are now required by law. Two Indonesian laws mandated that sweeping powers be granted to local government organs in 2001. Yet both governments have struggled to implement legislation according to plan. Kim maintains that although the Korean government has made progress toward its goals for decentralizing the education system, the authority entrusted to local stakeholders is still “incomplete and limited.” Government officials in Indonesia have provided local administrators and educators with opportunities to act autonomously, yet those people have resisted chances to increase their influence in the schools. Although Indonesia is attempting to shift to a more democratic system of governance, the socio-political situation remains quite precarious and the future for decentralized management of public services unclear. These cases, like others in this book, present an uncertain future for educational decentralization in Asia. Each study mentions some benefits that have flowed from the

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drive for a redistribution of power, but those examples are balanced—and sometimes eclipsed—by descriptions of struggles and setbacks. Hanson’s list of “Propositions for Effective Decentralization” concisely identifies specific approaches to decentralizing education systems that increase the likelihood that a meaningful redistribution of authority will occur. Evidence from the case studies provides strong support for these propositions. Unfortunately, the bulk of that conformation comes in the form of negative examples—the pitfalls that governments experience when they do not adhere to Hanson’s list of recommendations. For example, Hanson observes that, “The stronger the management infrastructure at the regional levels, the greater the opportunity for success” (p. 18). This book is laden with examples of difficulties that surfaced when decentralization initiatives transferred authority to government agencies with weak infrastructures. Another proposition states that, “The more the decentralization involves the center transferring positive opportunities to the regions (win–win) rather than simply unloading the problems and burdens (win–lose), the greater the chances of successful change” (p. 18). Yet the policies analyzed here often placed unwelcome demands on local government agencies without offering sufficient rewards for accepting new responsibilities. 6.

COMMON THREADS

One salient point that emerges from the collection of case studies is that the formulation, translation, and implementation of educational decentralization policies will vary according to the specific contexts in which they are embedded. As Table 1 below indicates, the distinct features of the education systems examined in the case studies are as notable as the commonalities they share. Although they are all located in the same geographical region of the world, the 13 Asian nations do not share a common dominant language, religion, or political structure. The list of countries includes “Asian Tigers” whose economic success during the 1980s was celebrated around the world, as well as governments that continue to battle unwieldy poverty rates. With a population of over a billion, China qualifies as the world’s most populous nation, while Macau is inhabited by fewer than a halfmillion citizens. I hesitate to offer generalizations about conditions or responses to educational reform that might obscure the incredible diversity that exists among and within the nations studied in this book. Furthermore, all of the governments experimenting with educational decentralization have experienced numerous impediments in attempting to devolve authority over the schools. No single approach can be held up as a model for others to follow. The great variety in settings for reform combined with the mixed results of policies implemented thus far make it difficult to produce a list of observations that capture the “Asian decentralization experience” with accuracy. A policy or strategy introduced in one Asian setting might trigger a contrasting response in another. Yet concluding our analysis of reform in Asia with that observation is also limiting. Although we should take care not to downplay the unique facets of each Asian nation, looking across settings for patterns in approaches to decentralization and responses to reform efforts can be instructive. Are there any events, conditions, or experiences shared by the countries explored in this volume that might help us better understand the challenge of decentralizing Asian education systems? Do any

b

a

1,261,832,482 7,116,302 1,014,003,817 224,784,210 126,549,976 47,470,969 445,594 21,793,293 141,553,775 4,151,264 19,238,575

81.5 92.2 52 83.5 99 98 90 83.5 37.8 91.1 90.2

9 9 8 9 9 9 6 9 6 6 9

Compulsory Educationa (years) 123 94 100 113 101 94 – 101 – 94 109

Gross Elem.a (%) 70 73 49 51 103 102 – 64 – 74 75

Grss Sec. Enrolla (%) 2.3 2.9 3.2 1.4 3.6 3.7 – 4.9 2.7 3.0 3.4

Public Expend.a (%)

Source: Drake Group. (2002). World education encyclopedia. Farmington Hills, MI: Rebecca Marlow-Ferguson ed. Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook. (2001). New York: United Nations.

China Hong Kong India Indonesia Japan South Korea Macau Malaysia Pakistan Singapore Sri Lanka

Populationa

Literacy Ratea (%)

Table 1: Comparison of Asian Nations

– British (1997) British (1947) Dutch (1945) – Japanese (1945) Portuguese British (1963) British (1947) British (1965) British (1948)

Last Col. Rulera

9,596,961 1,075 3,287,263 1,904,569 377,829 120,538 18 329,758 796,095 618 65,610

Surface Areab (km2 )

131 6,221 295 107 335 194 23,556 67 165 6,255 286

Densityb (per km2 )

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distinctive features set these countries apart from other settings that have attracted more attention in the literature on decentralization? One factor that clearly shaped the context for reform in most Asian locations is the legacy of colonialism. All but two of the nations examined in the case studies were governed by exogenous rulers until midway through the 20th century; most have far less experience governing their own polities than they do following the directives of colonial administrators. Those histories of domination created conditions that have impeded the project of decentralizing education systems. Most notably, representatives of foreign governments tended to concentrate authority in the center so as to augment their own levels of influence and control over indigenous citizens. Developing the capabilities of indigenous workers was rarely a priority for colonial authorities. Native citizens who obtained positions working in support of colonial administrations were trained to support the missions of their foreign rulers, not to independently manage public offices or agencies. Decades of colonialism institutionalized structures and mindsets that are interfering with current attempts to devolve authority over schools in Asia. The civil servants who staff ministries of education, sub-national offices of education, and schools often lack the attitudes and/or the skills government officials are depending on them to exhibit as power is devolved to local levels. One result of that mismatch of expectations and capabilities is a stasis that is interfering with decentralization measures at all sub-national levels of Asian education systems. A related issue is conflict between the goal of empowering local actors and the respect for hierarchy that pervades many Asian cultures. All of the decentralization policies referred to in the case studies propose that balances of power be altered so that individuals previously excluded from the decision-making process can take a more active role in school management. But the analyses of efforts to implement those policies indicate that shifting from the role of faithful disseminator of ideas to that of independent decision maker is no easy task for individuals who have been socialized to defer to rather than question their superiors. Due to an array of factors (including religious beliefs, colonial histories, government practices, and geographical features), Asian cultures have tended to more readily reward individuals for their loyalty and obedience than for their eagerness to act independently. There are obviously exceptions to this statement, but not enough to call into question its accuracy. Fulfilling the role of loyal employee demands behaviors quite distinct from those required of the autonomous educator. The case studies suggest that many of the local actors government officials in Asia are depending on to take a more active role in school management and decision-making are not altering their behavior to fall in line with reform plans. Even when teachers, administrators, or community members express support for educational decentralization, they often adhere to practices that brought them success in the past. Another attribute of many Asian nations that clearly has had some bearing on the implementation of educational decentralization policies is limited experience with participatory democracy. The plans for reform described in the case studies include an assortment of strategies for transferring authority to the periphery, but all expect local actors and organizations to play a more active role in the administration of education. Nations that have historically limited citizens’ input into the political process are bound to experience great difficulty in shifting to a model that depends on

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lower level actors to act autonomously. That statement applies to the great majority of the Asian nations explored in this book, most of which achieved independence after the conclusion of World War II and have yet to establish strong democratic foundations. Legal frameworks, voting procedures, and government machinery may not be aligned with the objectives of decentralization measures. In addition, the relationship between school and state that many Asian educators have come to know may clash with revised prescriptions for practice in a decentralized system. For example, a teacher in Malaysia or Sri Lanka is likely to have far less experience expressing her views about school management than an instructor in a country like Mexico, where the teachers’ union has traditionally played a key role in educational policymaking. An educator working in the Indonesian education system, which has historically relied on the schools to promote patriotism and national cohesion, may have difficulty making sense of decentralization measures that encourage teachers to act autonomously. Does this mean that attempts to empower local citizens living in Asian countries that lack strong democratic foundations are destined to fail? No, I do not think that is the case. Data from these case studies suggest that decentralization can expand levels of local participation. But educational decentralization rarely drives the democratization engine. Instead, local stakeholders are likely to partake in school decision-making when trends beyond the education sector support such behavior. Throughout the book, links between political context and the results of educational decentralization initiatives are salient. As Jamil observes, “It is within the framework of political decentralization that education decentralization is located” (p. 234). She then illustrates how in Pakistan trends in educational reform tend to correspond with shifts in political arrangements. Kim also focuses on links between education and politics, examining responses to education reform initiatives at various periods in Korea’s recent history. Efforts to decentralization education in Korea, she notes, repeatedly stalled until a series of political reforms that altered the society’s expectations about public institutions were instituted: “Developments in the political arena would appear to support educational decentralization. The political system has become more democratic, with citizens enjoying rights and responsibilities previously denied to them. A system of local-governance builds on those developments” (p. 151). The case studies underscore the enormity of the challenge of redistributing authority over a school system to local levels—particularly in settings that have not previously promoted civic participation in government or encouraged citizens to freely express their views about public institutions. Educational decentralization efforts are unlikely to succeed unless preceded by fundamental changes in the political system. Though many of the governments examined in this volume describe themselves as democracies, most are still attempting to make sense of that label. The majority did not achieve independence until the middle of the 20th century and have since been attempting to strike the right balance between state control and individual/local autonomy. Economically, Asian nations may have become more liberal and open during the last 20 years, but politically, most are moving at a slower pace. Authors of the case studies offer abundant examples of the difficulties that can arise when reform programs are launched before supporting legal frameworks, institutional procedures, and human capacities have been developed.

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China provides a fascinating exception to this pattern. Based on what I have just written, one might expect efforts to devolve control over the Chinese education system to fail. The nation’s strong socialist underpinnings and tradition of silencing individuals and groups that refuse to toe the government line appear to clash with the goal of empowering local stakeholders in the education enterprise. In addition, Chinese citizens do not enjoy popular representation. Yet participation by local actors in the management of Chinese schools has increased markedly in recent years, a goal that few Asian nations have managed to meet. Hawkins observes that in China “government at the local levels, counties, townships and village enterprises are acting as the real entrepreneurs and change agents” (p. 29). How can we explain such surprising success? Why is it that the push for decentralization has led to such reconfigurations of authority in China, a nation notorious for its resistance to democratic reform, while in other Asian settings attempts to transfer authority to the periphery have stalled? Is it due to China’s size, unique cultural landscape, economic conditions, or some other factor(s)? This fascinating puzzle could generate rich follow-up research projects. Another notable case is that of Macau, a nation that is bucking current trends and attempting to reduce local discretion and autonomy over education. As Bray and Tang state, “the idiosyncratic nature of Macau makes it an illuminating focus for study” (p. 89). Macau’s goals for its school system are similar to those expressed by neighboring countries: to better meet the needs of a diverse population of students, raise instructional standards, create schools that would support economic development, and so forth. Yet the strategy for achieving these goals that government leaders in Macau formulated runs counter two international trends. After decades of a noninterventionist, decentralized approach did not yield the desired results, officials in Macau opted to centralize administration of the education system. The island’s small size and minimal reliance on external funding organizations have allowed the government to take this approach without seeking approval from the international community. It is interesting that of all the governments studied in this book, the one that appears most able to independently shape its educational policies is moving to centralize authority over its education system. 7.

CONCLUSION

Over the last half-century, the tide of popular opinion has shifted back and forth from pro-centralization to pro-decentralization a number times. Mawhood (1983) calls this phenomenon the “pendulum” effect. The Macau case is noteworthy because it indicates that more than one pendulum may be concurrently swinging in different directions. What is common to the various shifts between centralized and decentralized administration is the impetus for reform. In all instances, proponents of a particular position build their arguments on the failure of previous policies to meet stated goals. Again and again, nations attempt to reinvent themselves as centralized (or decentralized) systems, struggle through the process of policy implementation, become frustrated when conditions do not improve, and finally abandon the approach in search of an alternative with seemingly greater promise. Politicians and policy-makers are eager to remedy the problems that plague their school systems and societies, but the depth of their commitment to the project of devolving authority of public institutions such as education remains unclear.

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The Asian governments studied in this volume appear to have embraced decentralization out of sense of hopefulness rather than a careful study of the concept and the way it has played out in other settings. Politicians and bureaucrats frequently express great optimism about the potential benefits of decentralizing school systems. Jamil notes, for example, that in Pakistan “district mayors are filled with enthusiasm about education, wanting to change many arrangements. Many would like to see authority over the elementary schools devolve to the union council level” (p. 247). However, in Pakistan, as in most of the Asian settings, such high levels of enthusiasm rarely translate into well-articulated, carefully implemented plans for reforming education systems. This reality should not surprise us, given the inability of most governments to make fundamental changes in the way that education is organized and delivered (Cuban, 1990). Nations that have traditionally concentrated in the center are bound to face serious challenges as they attempt to redistribute authority over schools. Enthusiasm alone is not likely to bring success. That is especially true in settings characterized by political instability, economic uncertainty, or deeply rooted problems in the education sector. It is conceivable that Asian education systems will continue to make steady progress over time in their attempts to decentralize school systems, but there is no pattern of evidence indicating that is likely to occur. Based on the analyses presented in this volume, a more likely scenario would involve continued experimentation with authority structures, resulting in education systems that combine elements of both centralized and localized power. As Bray has noted, “The future, like the past, is likely to bring continued shifts in forms of governance in all parts of the world. Some of these shifts will be centralizing, others will be decentralizing, and yet others will be both centralizing and decentralizing at the same time” (Bray, 1999, p. 228). The chapters in this volume offer numerous examples of such hybrid arrangements. Lee terms this approach “centralized decentralization”; Hawkins states that China is “walking on three legs”; and Bray and Tang describe Hong Kong’s “differentiated and specialized tertiary system within its centralized system” (Bray & Tang, p. 23). All of the Asian governments attempting to devolve authority over education left certain key responsibilities in the hands of central officials. Protecting the power that you enjoy is a natural political reflex. But a maintaining a centripetal system of government also makes sense if we step back and consider the effects that various management structures may have on the provision of education. Tan notes that “it is highly unlikely that centralized control will ever be relaxed. It may also be argued that there are benefits to having a certain amount of centralized control of school” (p. 80). Several contributors to this book support Tan’s point, observing that central ministries often play an important role in maintaining standards (in areas such as curriculum and teacher training), ensuring cohesion throughout national education systems, and attending to equity issues. Despite the rhetoric driving many decentralization measures, preserving some degree of central authority appears to make sense. Partial decentralization should not necessarily be considered a failure. It is unclear how long decentralization initiatives such as those described in this book will persist, or what forms they will eventually take. The evidence analyzed by authors of the case studies suggests that education officials will face constant struggles as they continue in their efforts to transfer authority over schooling to local levels. The majority of the nations explored in this volume were freed from colonial

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rule less than a century ago and relied on centralized authority frameworks to oversee their development. Over the past century, the concept of decentralization has occupied center stage, fallen out of favor, and reasserted itself into international discourse in a series of waves, never completely disappearing from view (Conyers, 1984). When the current push for decentralization wanes, support for many of the reforms analyzed in this book will most likely dwindle. If historical trends in decentralization policy repeat themselves, Asian education systems will shift back and forth between the two extremes, never completely embracing or rejecting either. 8.

REFERENCES

Bjork, C. (2003). Local responses to decentralization policy in Indonesia. Comparative Education Review, 47(2), 184–216. Boli, F., Ramirez, F., & Meyer, J. (1986). Explaining the origins and expansion of mass education. In: P. Altbach and G. Kelly (Eds.), New approaches to comparative education. New York: Routledge. Bray, M. (1984). Educational planning in a decentralised system: The Papua New Guinea experience. Papua New Guinea: University of Papua New Guinea Press. Bray, M. (1996). Decentralization of education: Community financing. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Bray, M. (1999). Control of education: Issues and tensions in centralization and decentralization. In R. F. Arnove and C. A. Torres (Eds.), Comparative education: The dialectic of the global and the local. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Cheema, G. S., & Rondinelli, D. A. (Eds.). (1983). Decentralization and development: Policy implementation in developing countries. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Conyers, D. (1984). Decentralisation and development: A review of the literature. Public Administration and Development, 4,186–197. Cuban, L. (1990). Reform again, again, and again. Educational Researcher, 1(January 1990), 2–13. Elmore, R., & Rykes, G. (1992). “Curriculum Policy.” In P. Jackson, ed., Handbook of Research on Curriculum. New York: Macmillan. Ginsburg, M., Cooper, S., Raghu, R., & Zegarra, H. (1990). National and world systems explanations of educational reform. Comparative Education Review, 34(4), 474–499. Govinda, R. (1997). Decentralization of educational management: Experiences from South Asia. Paris: International Institute for International Planning. Mawhood, P. (1983). Local Government in the Third World. Chichester: John Wiley. McGinn, N., & Street, S. (1986). Educational decentralization: Weak state or strong state? Comparative Education Review, 30(4), 471–491. Prud’homme, R. (1995). The dangers of decentralization. The World Bank Research Observer, 10(2), 201–220. Rhoten, D. (2000). Education decentralization in Argentina: A global–local conditions of possibility approach to state, market, and society change. Journal of Education Policy, 15(6), 593–601. Rondinelli, D. A. (1981). Government decentralization in comparative perspective: Theory and practice in developing countries. International Review of Administrative Sciences, XLVII(2), 133–145. Weiler, H. (1989). Education and power: The politics of educational decentralization in comparative perspective. Educational Policy, 3(1), 31–43. Weiler, H. (1990). Comparative perspectives on educational decentralization in comparative perspective. Educational Policy, 3(1), 31–43.

Education in the Asia-Pacific Region

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J. Fien, D. Yencken and H. Sykes (eds.): Young People and the Environment. An Asia-Pacific Perspective. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-0944-5 M.W. Charney, B.S.A. Yeoh and T.C. Kiong (eds.): Asian Migrants and Education. The Tensions of Education in Immigrant Societies and among Migrant Groups. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-1336-1 Y.C. Cheng, K.W. Chow and M. Mok (eds.): Reform of Teacher Education in the Pacific in the New Millennium. Trends and Challenges. 2004 ISBN 1-4020-2701-X S. Alagumalai, D.D. Curtis and N. Hungi (eds.): Applied Rasch Measurement. A Book of Examplars Papers in Honour of John P. Keeves. 2004 ISBN 1-4020-3072-X C.-H. Ng and P. Renshaw (eds.): Reforming Learning. Issues, Concepts and Practices in the Asian-Pacific Region. 2005 ISBN 1-4020-3002-9 Y.C. Cheng (ed.): New Paradigm for Re-engineering Education. Globalization, Localization and Individualization. 2005 ISBN 1-4020-3619-1 W.J. Campbell, N. Baikaloff and C. Power (eds.): Towards a Global Community. Educating for Tomorrow’s World. 2006 ISBN 1-4020-3960-3 C. Bjork (ed.): Educational Decentralization. Asian Experiences and Conceptual Contributions. 2006 ISBN 1-4020-4356-2

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