EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
EDUCATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: ISSUES, CONCERNS AND PROSPECTS Volume 8 Series Edit...
90 downloads
1372 Views
1MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
EDUCATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: ISSUES, CONCERNS AND PROSPECTS Volume 8 Series Editors-in-Chief: Dr. Rupert Maclean, UNESCO-UNEVOC International Centre for Education, Bonn; and Ryo Watanabe, National Institute for Educational Policy Research (NIER) of Japan, Tokyo Editorial Board Robyn Baker, New Zealand Council for Educational Research, Wellington, New Zealand Dr. Boediono, National Office for Research and Development, Ministry of National Education, Indonesia Professor Yin Cheong Cheng, The Hong Kong Institute of Education, China Dr. Wendy Duncan, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines Professor John Keeves, Flinders University of South Australia, Adelaide, Australia Dr. Zhou Mansheng, National Centre for Educational Development Research, Ministry of Education, Beijing, China Professor Colin Power, Graduate School of Education, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia Professor J. S. Rajput, National Council of Educational Research and Training, New Delhi, India Professor Konai Helu Thaman, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji Advisory Board Professor Mark Bray, Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong, China; Dr. Agnes Chang, National Institute of Education, Singapore; Dr. Nguyen Huu Chau, National Institute for Educational Sciences, Vietnam; Professor John Fien, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia; Professor Leticia Ho, University of the Philippines, Manila; Dr. Inoira Lilamaniu Ginige, National Institute of Education, Sri Lanka; Professor Phillip Hughes, ANU Centre for UNESCO, Canberra, Australia; Dr. Inayatullah, Pakistan Association for Continuing and Adult Education, Karachi; Dr. Rung Kaewdang, Office of the National Education Commission, Bangkok. Thailand; Dr. Chong-Jae Lee, Korean Educational Development Institute, Seoul; Dr. Molly Lee, UNESCO, Bangkok, Thailand; Naing Yee Mar, Glocorp, The Netherlands; Mausooma Jaleel, Maldives College of Higher Education, Male; Professor Geoff Masters, Australian Council for Educational Research, Melbourne; Dr. Victor Ordonez, Senior Education Fellow, East-West Center, Honolulu; Dr. Khamphay Sisavanh, National Research Institute of Educational Sciences, Ministry of Education, Lao PDR; Dr. Max Walsh, Secondary Education Project, Manila, Philippines.
Educational Decentralization Asian Experiences and Conceptual Contributions
Edited by
CHRISTOPHER BJORK Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY, U.S.A.
University
ISBN-10 ISBN-13 ISBN-10 ISBN-13 ISBN-10 ISBN-13
1-4020-4357-0 (PB) 978-1-4020-4357-4 (PB) 1-4020-4356-2 (HB) 978-1-4020-4356-7 (HB) 1-4020-4358-9 (e-book) 978-1-4020-4358-1 (e-book) Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. www.springer.com
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved © 2006 Springer No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed in the Netherlands.
SERIES SCOPE
The purpose of this Series is to meet the needs of those interested in an in-depth analysis of current developments in education and schooling in the vast and diverse Asia-Pacific Region. The Series will be invaluable for educational researchers, policy makers and practitioners, who want to better understand the major issues, concerns and prospects regarding educational developments in the Asia-Pacific region. The Series complements the Handbook of Educational Research in the Asia-Pacific Region, with the elaboration of specific topics, themes and case studies in greater breadth and depth than is possible in the Handbook. Topics to be covered in the Series include: secondary education reform; reorientation of primary education to achieve education for all; re-engineering education for change; the arts in education; evaluation and assessment; the moral curriculum and values education; technical and vocational education for the world of work; teachers and teaching in society; organisation and management of education; education in rural and remote areas; and, education of the disadvantaged. Although specifically focusing on major educational innovations for development in the Asia-Pacific region, the Series is directed at an international audience. The Series Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects, and the Handbook of Educational Research in the Asia-Pacific Region, are both publications of the Asia-Pacific Educational Research Association. Those interested in obtaining more information about the Monograph Series, or who wish to explore the possibility of contributing a manuscript, should (in the first instance) contact the publishers. Books published to date in the series: 1. Young People and the Environment: An Asia-Pacific Perspective Editors: John Fien, David Yenken and Helen Sykes 2. Asian Migrants and Education: The Tensions of Education in Immigrant Societies and among Migrant Groups Editors: Michael W. Charney, Brenda S.A. Yeoh and Tong Chee Kiong 3. Reform of Teacher Education in the Asia-Pacific in the New Millennium: Trends and Challenges Editors: Yin C. Cheng, King W. Chow and Magdalena M. Mok 4. Rasch Measurement: A Book of Exemplars Papers in Honour of John P. Keeves Editors: Sivakumar Alagumalai, David D. Curtis, Njora Hungi 5. Reforming Learning: Issues, Concepts and Practices in the Asian-Pacific Region Editors: Chi-Hung Ng and Peter Renshaw, in press. 6. New Paradigm for Re-engineering Education: Globalization, Localization and Individualization Yin Cheong Cheng v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction by the Series Editors
ix
Contributors
xi
Introduction Christopher Bjork
1
1. Strategies of Educational Decentralization: Key Questions and Core Issues E. Mark Hanson
9
2. Walking on Three Legs: Centralization, Decentralization, and Recentralization in Chinese Education John N. Hawkins
27
3. The Effects of Local Interpretation of Decentralization Policy on School Autonomy in Guangdong Province of China Jocelyn Lai-ngok Wong
43
4. Limited Decentralization in the Singapore Education System Jason Tan
59
5. Building and Diversifying Education Systems: Evolving Patterns and Contrasting Trends in Hong Kong and Macau Mark Bray and Kwok-Chun Tang
71
6. Trends and Issues in Deregulation and Decentralization of Educational Administration in Japan Hiromitsu Muta
97
7. Educational Decentralization in Korea: Major Issues and Controversies Ee-gyeong Kim 8. Transferring Authority to Local School Communities in Indonesia: Ambitious Plans, Mixed Results Christopher Bjork 9. Centralized Decentralization in Malaysian Education Molly N. N. Lee 10. Decentralization of Educational Governance in India: Trends and Issues R. Govinda and Madhumita Bandyopadhyay 11. Does Rhetoric Always Match Reality? An Overview of Educational Decentralization in Kerala, India M. V. Mukundan
vii
115
129 149 159
177
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
12. Decentralization and Devolution in Pakistan: Educational Implications of the Praetorian Interpretation Baela Raza Jamil
191
13. Efforts Toward Decentralization: Ideology vs. Reality—The Sri Lankan Case Wilfred J. Perera
211
Conclusion: Connecting Theory and Practice in Efforts to Decentralize Education Systems in Asia Christopher Bjork
Index
223
243
INTRODUCTION BY THE SERIES EDITORS
This timely book examines the important matter of whether or not the localization of administrative authority in education systems is preferable to more centralized systems. Traditionally, the norm has been that power, authority and decision-making concerning the operation of education systems has been centralized in the hands of a few persons or vested interest groups located in the Head Office of the education system in question. However, as part of the process of innovation and of educational change, over the past four or five decades many countries in Asia have redistributed power away from ‘Head Office’, creating instead decentralised structures that seek to be more sensitive to local cultures and needs and which attempt to improve administrative efficiency. Although the move from centralization to decentralization has become an important manifestation of the education reform process in an increasing number of countries in Asia, it has not always been consistent and is not without its critics. As the editor of this volume, Professor Bjork, points out, “over the last half-century, the tide of popular opinion has shifted back and forth from pro-centralization to pro-decentralization a number of times, creating a ‘pendulum’ effect ”. The fifteen authors in this volume examine the extent, and ways, in which evidence from the Asian case studies either supports or refutes the main arguments generally presented in favour of decentralization, with particular reference to the claimed benefits of power sharing, possibilities for achieving increased efficiency, and for best accommodating diverse needs within communities. As a group, the contributors present the most common arguments advanced to advocate the value of educational decentralization initiatives, and present case study evidence that supports, refutes, or raises questions about the justifications for devolving authority over systems. This book is a very timely and helpful contribution to the ongoing debate regarding the matter of cost-benefit analysis concerning decentralisation of education systems in various countries in Asia. By providing case studies of experience (and approaches) to the decentralisation vs. centralisation of education systems in China, Hong Kong and Macau, Singapore, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the authors identify best practices and innovations, as well as stumbling blocks, associated with crucially important issues concerning most effective approaches to the organisation and management of education systems in Asia. Of particular interest is how countries can best approach decentralisation in their education systems at a time of which is, for many of them, a period of rapid change (even instability), as they seek to diversify their education systems to meet the challenges of globalisation, modernisation and (to a varying extent) the westernisation of their education systems. As the editor of this latest volume in the Springer Education in the Asia-Pacific Region Series points out: ‘Efforts to decentralize education systems in Asia have ix
x
INTRODUCTION BY THE SERIES EDITORS
yielded an array of fascinating puzzles, lessons of experience, and unanswered questions. How can we make sense of that rich but sprawling amalgamation of data?’ In answering this question, the authors in this volume considers the motives that have given rise to decentralization initiatives, to guide an in-depth analysis of those measures. Rupert Maclean Director of the UNESCO-UNEVOC International Centre, Bonn, Germany and Ryo Watanabe Director, Department for International Research and Cooperation, National Institute for Educational Policy Research (NIER) of Japan, Tokyo
CONTRIBUTORS
Madhumita Bandyopadhyay secured her Ph.D. from Centre for Studies of Regional Development, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She is presently working in the School and Non-formal Education Unit at National Institute of Educational Administration, New Delhi. She has worked earlier in different NGOs and Research Organizations in related areas of development research, with special emphasis on educational development of disadvantaged people. She has worked as consultant at Educational Consultancy India Ltd. for implementation of externally funded Government of India project District Primary Education Program (DPEP). She is engaged in research in areas of decentralization of education, planning process of primary education, women’s education, and development. Christopher Bjork, an Assistant Professor of Education at Vassar College, earned his Ph.D. from the Stanford University School of Education. He has been awarded fellowships by the Fulbright organization, the National Security Education Program, and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. He is the author of Indonesian Education: Teachers, Schools, and Central Bureaucracy (2005). He has also published articles about educational reform in Asia in the journals Comparative Education Review, Education and Society, International Review of Education, World Studies of Education, and Anthropology & Education Quarterly. He also co-edited (with Thomas Rohlen) a three-volume anthology titled Education and Training in Japan. Mark Bray is a Chair Professor and Director of the Comparative Education Research Centre at the University of Hong Kong. He previously taught in secondary schools in Kenya and Nigeria and at the Universities of Edinburgh, Papua New Guinea and London. He has written extensively in the field of comparative education, with particular focus on aspects of administration, economics and financing. In 2000 he became Secretary General of the World Council of Comparative Education Societies. He is also a former President of the Comparative Education Society of Hong Kong, and has been a member of the Boards of Directors of the Comparative Education Society of Asia and the Comparative and International Education Society. R. Govinda is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration in New Delhi. While working at the IIEP as a Research Fellow, he was in charge of the research project on decentralized management in the SouthAsian region. He is the author of a number of publications related to the quality of basic education, adult education, and literacy. Dr. Govinda also edited the book Decentralization of Educational Management: Experiences from South Asia. Mark Hanson is a Fulbright Scholar and Professor of Education and Management at the University of California, Riverside. As a researcher, he has studied educational decentralization projects in several Latin American nations as well as the Middle East. Professor Hanson has been a consultant on decentralization reforms for the xi
xii
CONTRIBUTORS
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Agency for International Development, UNESCO, the United Nations Development Program, and the Harvard Institute for International Development. John N. Hawkins is Professor of Comparative Education and Chair of the Division of Social Sciences and Comparative Education in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies at UCLA. He has written or edited more than a dozen books including Educational Theory in the People’s Republic of China: The Report of Ch’ien Chun-iu (1971); Mao Tse-tung and Education: His Thoughts and Teachings (1974); Education and Social Change in the People’s Republic of China (1983); Education and Intergroup Relations: An International Perspective (1985); Development or Deterioration? Work in Rural Asia (1994); Transnational Competence: Rethinking U.S.–Japan Educational Relations (2000); Balancing the Individual and the Collective: Educational Values in Asia (2001). He is Principal Investigator of UCLA’s Mikio Takagi Endowment Fund for Educational Reform and is the Editor of the Comparative Education Review. He has won NDEA, Japan Foundation, East West Center, Rockefeller, Spencer and many other fellowships. Hawkins was President of the Comparative and International Education Society and served as Dean of International Studies and Overseas Programs at UCLA for 13 years. Baela Raza Jamil, currently a Technical Adviser to the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan is working in areas of public policy, decentralization and institutional strengthening. She began her career in Atlanta, U.S.A. as an Assistant Coordinator in a public–private partnership for equity and excellence in the U.S. public sector. In the U.K., she conducted research in collaboration with the Institute of Education, University of London, on aspects of quality in schools located in lowincome multi-cultural areas of inner London. In early 1988 she moved to Hong Kong, set up an NGO called the Hong Kong Asia Trust, screening projects, prioritizing needs and mobilizing resources from the corporate sector and philanthropists for education and special needs programs in Asia. At the Hong Kong University she was also a Fellow of the Centre for Asian Studies. In Pakistan, her work has spanned formal and non-formal basic education sectors, community participation, human rights, equity and privatization, public policy and education reform, institutional reforms, initiating community based innovative education programs for girls and integrated literacy programs for women in rural and urban areas. Ee-gyeong Kim currently holds the position of Director of the International Cooperation Team at the Korean Educational Development Institute in Seoul. She earned her Ph.D. in Educational Administration from the University of Iowa and also holds graduate degrees from American University and Ewha Women’s University. Kim has taught in the graduate colleges of education at Konkook University and Woosuk University. Her publications include books and articles for the U.S. Department of Education, the U.K. Government, and the World Bank. In 1996 she received the Eugene McClenahan Award at the University of Iowa, and in 2000 she was named the Korean Educational Development Institute’s “Outstanding Researcher.” Molly N.N. Lee, Associate Professor in Education at Universiti Sains Malaysia, teaches sociology of education and science teaching methods. She received her Ph.D. from the Stanford University School of Education. Recent publications include: “The
CONTRIBUTORS
xiii
Corporatisation, Privatisation and Internalisation of Higher Education in Malaysia”; “Education and the State: Malaysia After NEP”; “Private Higher Education in Malaysia”; “The Politics of Educational Change in Malaysia: National Context and Global Influences”; and “The Impacts of Globalization on Education in Malaysia.” M.V. Mukundan is a Professor in the Research Institute of Educational Economics and Administration (RIEEA) at Shenyang Normal University in China. Previously, he served as Senior Lecturer in the District Institute of Education and Training (DIET) in different districts of Kerala State in India. He received his doctorate in education from the University of Hong Kong and has also undertaken assignments for UNESCO and other international organizations. His research interests include comparative education, policy analysis, the political economy of educational reform, and educational change. Hiromitsu Muta currently serves as Director of the Center for Research and Development of Educational Technology and a Professor of Human Resource Development at the Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology. His interests are macro level planning on education and educational cooperation with developing countries. Wilfred J. Perera is the Head of the Centre for Professional Development, Education Management and Assistant Director General of the National Institute of Education, Sri Lanka. His monograph, Changing Schools from Within, a management intervention for improving school functioning in Sri Lanka was published by IIEP, UNESCO in 1999. He has written several articles on educational decentralization and school autonomy, and has made numerous presentations at international conferences. Jason Tan is Associate Professor in Policy and Management Studies at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He currently serves as Executive Editor of the Asia Pacific Journal of Education. His latest publication is Challenges Facing the Singapore Education System Today (Singapore: Prentice Hall). Kwok-chun Tang is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Education Studies at the Hong Kong Baptist University. He was born in Macau and moved to Hong Kong at the age of eight. After working as a secondary mathematics teacher in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1993, he entered graduate school and wrote a Ph.D. study that focused on stability change of secondary school mathematics knowledge in Macau. His research interests include mathematics teaching and learning, curriculum stability and change, and sociology of knowledge. Jocelyn Wong is a Post-doctoral Fellow in the Faculty of Education at the University of Hong Kong. Her research interests are educational decentralization policy and teacher education in China.
INTRODUCTION Christopher Bjork
In recent years, international funding organizations have thrown their weight behind decentralization of education systems around the globe, often making decentralization a precondition for financial assistance (Conyers, 1984; Hanson, 2000; Rhoten, 2000). Interest in delegating authority to local levels of government continues to grow: between 1992 and 1997, 12% of all projects funded by the World Bank involved some aspect of decentralization (World Bank, 1998). As Hanson notes in this volume, the Bank currently supports more than 40 governments that are attempting to decentralize their education systems. The strategies relied on to transfer authority over schools to local levels are as varied as the diverse governments that have embraced the concept in attempt to enhance system management. Indeed, a multitude of definitions have been ascribed to the term “decentralization”: “the concept has remained vague and highly ambiguous, even though used extensively by policy-makers as well as intellectuals” (Govinda, 1997, p. 3). Flexible delimitation of the term has provided observers with great latitude in making claims about the goals and results of measures introduced in the name of decentralization; it has also kept the topic lodged in the discourse on educational reform. Asia is not immune to the push for localized control of education system. It is becoming increasingly difficult to find a nation-state in the region that is not experimenting with educational decentralization in some form. In countries regarded as economic leaders in the area, as well as developing nations set on discarding their third world status, decentralization is frequently offered as a recipe for improving public institutions (Mok, 2005). Governments that choose not to follow this course of action risk being marginalized in international policy circles. Although the specific strategies introduced in the name of decentralization are notable for their variation more than their likenesses, attention to the concept is ubiquitous. One might logically assume that such a cogent push for the transfer of authority to local levels would be supported by a wealth of data documenting the costs and benefits that flow from decentralization. Yet the number of case studies of educational decentralization is remarkably small. Policy makers, politicians, and international funding organizations continue to advocate localized control of schools based on theoretical arguments that often lack strong supporting empirical evidence. As Rhoten observes, as a result of the dearth of studies that focus on the implementation of educational decentralization policies, “little is known about the nation course and local outcomes of decentralization within developing countries, nor how they differ” (Rhoten, 1999, p. 9). Gaynor seconds this view: “While the view of decentralization of education continues to attract considerable interest and support, there is an increasing 1 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 1–7. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
2
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
demand to extract lessons from experience and to critically challenge assumptions about decentralization” (Gaynor, 1998, p. 4). Literature on educational decentralization is replete with taut, often reductionist descriptions of reform ventures (Rhoten, 2000). What is missing from that literature is a corpus of research that: (1) specifies the gains as well as the difficulties that have emerged in the wake of particular decentralization measures; and, (2) connects those developments to the social, political, and historical contexts in which they are embedded. Studying educational reforms using the frames constructed by government officials and relying on their assessments of the outcomes can lead to incomplete, even erroneous readings of their impacts. Research that bridges different levels of administrative hierarchies is particularly crucial in understanding the effects of decentralization. According to Sutton and Levinson, it is essential that we treat “policy as a complex social practice, an ongoing process of normative cultural production constituted by diverse actors across diverse social and institutional contexts” (Sutton & Levinson, 2000, p. 1). Accomplishing this objective requires careful study of the effects that policy initiatives have on actual schools and the people who inhabit them. This entails connecting macro and micro levels of education systems, and analyzing policies “in relation to how they are practiced on a daily basis in people’s lives” (Kendall, 2004, p. 24). The need for analyses that link educational policy and practice is especially true of educational decentralization measures implemented in Asian locations. The literature on educational decentralization is dominated by studies of reform in Latin American countries; little attention has been devoted to reforms enacted in Asian locations. The few studies of decentralization policies enacted in Asia that have been published are primarily concerned with decision-making at upper levels of government bureaucracies. The implications of those decisions for local education stakeholders are not explored in great depth. This book was designed to examine such linkages between educational policy and practice; to add layers of complexity to the official discourse on educational decentralization. Though the foci of the 12 case studies included in this volume vary, the authors’ attention to the specific conditions that support or undermine attempts to devolve authority over schools to local entities is consistent. In some cases, emphasis is placed on the socio-historical context of reform settings; in other chapters, the effects of recent changes in political agendas on educational decentralization measures are explored in detail. One salient point that emerges from the group of case studies is that the results of educational decentralization policies rarely conform to anticipated outcomes. Such policies depend on local actors to translate ideas promulgated by policy designers into practice. Those individuals are shaped by economic, political, religious, and cultural conditions specific to the settings where they live and work. As a result, policies introduced into one location may provoke a markedly different response in another. The case studies included in this volume do not represent a comprehensive view of educational decentralization in Asia. They are not offered as a representative sample of reform initiatives that have been introduced in the region. Choices about which countries to include were not scientific or systematic. I do not make any claims that the conclusions drawn in these studies can be generalized to other settings in Asia, or elsewhere. Instead, the goal for this book is to present a selection of compelling accounts of the struggles and successes that various Asian governments have
INTRODUCTION
3
experienced in their attempts to reconfigure authority hierarchies in the education sector. The case studies depict reform initiatives introduced into nations that vary in terms of geographic setting, level of economic development, political foundations, and degree of experience with educational decentralization. Authors were encouraged to detail the complexities of policy design and implementation that surfaced as a result of the unique features of the systems they studied, rather than to obscure those intricacies. Contributors to this volume were given complete freedom to focus their chapters on whatever aspects of the reform efforts most fascinated them. The only demand I made of the authors was to include pointed critical analyses, rather than simply summarize the key events that marked a decentralization initiative or process. For that reason, the scope and tone of the chapters vary noticeably. The first chapter, written by Mark Hanson, frames the case studies that follow. Hanson identifies and explains key issues and forces that shape organization and management strategies of educational decentralization in any setting. The chapter is organized around a series of questions that press readers to delve below the surface of decentralization policies and think deeply about the impetus for devolving authority over schools, the dynamics of policy formulation, and the outcomes of reform efforts. Drawing from years of experience conducting research on this topic, Hanson supports his responses to those questions with specific evidence drawn from five countries that have experimented with educational decentralization. The chapter concludes with a list of decentralization propositions extracted from those reform attempts. Although these propositions were formulated based on evidence collected in Latin America rather than Asia, they present a valuable overview of the concepts and issues that currently pervade discussions about educational decentralization. Hanson also articulates a set of important questions that readers can consider as they read the case studies that follow; with the list of “propositions for effective decentralization” in hand, they can make their own assessments about the relative effectiveness of various reform strategies. John Hawkins, in the first of the case studies, focuses on connections between economic policies recently introduced in China and the push for educational decentralization in that nation. Research on this topic often refers to possible links between economic and educational reform, but rarely explores in such rich detail the extent to which economic can generate support for educational decentralization and direct educational decentralization measures. Hawkins observes that although China’s educational leaders have long debated the advantages and disadvantages of increasing local control of the schools, authority over education remain concentrated in the center until the national government began to endorse economic decentralization and marketization. He examines several specific initiatives that emerged from that shift in government direction, and considers the effects on both school finance and instructional practice. While government officials in China appear committed to decentralization, they remain conflicted about the need to maintain control over the system while at the same time respond creatively to the needs of the new market and the global economy, Hawkins notes. Jocelyn Wong also looks at decentralization trends in China. Her focus, however, is narrower than that of Hawkins. Wong investigates the experiences of 75 educators who were involved in the implementation of decentralization policies in Guangdong
4
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Province. This description and analysis of one city’s responses to centrally-mandated policies confirms many of the conclusions drawn by Hawkins, and underscores the competing pressures that many teachers face as they attempt to translate policy directives into practice. The numerous interview excerpts highlight the specific hurdles that many Chinese educators currently face in their schools and communities. Wong’s analysis of the dilemmas experienced by teachers underscores the cogent influences of the marketization of education in China that Hawkins mentions in the previous chapter. The next chapter focuses on decentralization initiatives that have been introduced into the Singapore education system over the past two decades. These include an independent schools scheme, school clusters, and an autonomous schools scheme. The author, Jason Tan, begins by discussing the goals of the various initiatives, and proceeds to analyze their impact. The Singapore case exemplifies the tensions between the central government’s formal commitment to decentralize authority over the schools and decisions that reassert the centrality of government control. It appears that schools are being awarded the autonomy to decide how best to attain statedetermined outcomes for the education system. However, given the heavy emphasis placed on the school system’s contributions towards improving national economic competitiveness and fostering social cohesion, the Singaporean government appears far from willing to allow schools full and complete autonomy. Chapter 6 takes a comparative look at decentralization, contrasting trajectories of educational reform in China and Hong Kong during the 1980s and 1990s. During that period, administration in Hong Kong became more decentralized, while authority over education in education became more concentrated. The Macau case is a rare example of a government choosing not to follow the recent trend of transferring authority over schools to local agencies and institutions. The authors of this chapter, Mark Bray and Tang Kwok-Chun, use an analytical framework originally proposed by Margaret Archer to chart the emergence and development of the two education systems. Their analysis of educational reforms enacted in the two territories underlines the important influence that social and historical context have had on recent decisions about the provision of education. “The different reactions of the Hong Kong and Macau governments to the success of the Communist Part in mainland China,” they assert, “marked the point of bifurcation for the development of Chinese-medium schools in the two territories” (Bray & Tang, this volume, p. 91). The chapter offers a detailed description of the major developments in the evolution of the two education systems, and considers how that comparison contributes to theories about decentralization. Of all of the education systems explored in this volume, Japan’s has probably received the most attention in academia and the popular press. Accounts of Japanese education often stress the heavy influence that the Ministry of Education plays in determining educational policy and practice. Chapter 7, written by Hiromitsu Muta, offers a unique glimpse of the Japanese school system. Muta describes several programs designed to reduce the influence of the national and provincial governments over school affairs that were enacted in Japan over the past two decades. Government support for such measures raises the possibility that the Japanese school system, often noted for its resistance to change, may be undergoing some significant modifications in administrative and curricular structure. Muta highlights several of the significant advances the Japanese government has made in attempt to deregulate and
INTRODUCTION
5
decentralize the education system. He balances those reports, however, with evidence that teachers and administrators have experienced difficulty adjusting their behavior to mesh with recently enacted decentralization policy. Ee-gyeong Kim traces the history of Korea’s Local Education Self-Governing System (LESGS) in Chapter 8. LESGS, she explains, is a broadly defined concept that encompasses four principles: decentralization, resident control, independence of educational administration, and professional management. The Korean government’s commitment to decentralizing authority over the schools has been sporadic, often rising and falling in response to developments over which the Ministry of Education has little control. In her analysis of the LESGS, Kim emphasizes the important influence that social and political context can exert on decentralization policies. She notes that educational decentralization reforms promoted in Korea were largely ineffectual until societal demand for democratization and pressure for educational development accelerated in the 1990s. In her conclusion, Kim outlines the major challenges that education officials have faced in attempting to respond to calls for more local control of the schools. Like many Asian nations, Indonesia stepped up its efforts to devolve authority over schools beginning in the 1980s. The government has sometimes faced difficulties in following through on its promise to devolve authority to autonomous regions, but its support for decentralization has not waned. Although several reports have examined the process of drafting and negotiating decentralization policies, scant attention has been devoted to the implementation of those policies at local levels. In Chapter 9, Bjork takes a close look at the effects that recently adopted decentralization measures have had on actual school communities in Indonesia. This chapter details the attitudes, accomplishments, and difficulties experienced by the individuals charged with the responsibility of translating policy into practice at the school level. It underlines the challenges that stakeholders often experience as they react to decentralization policies, even when they support the goals of those measures. In analyzing such incongruities, Bjork draws attention to the critical influence that local culture, economic conditions, and historic center-local relations can exert on the devolution process. The next chapter focuses on recent efforts to decentralize the Malaysian education system, analyzing both structural and functional changes that have been implemented over the past 20 years. Molly Lee examines policies pertaining to the recruitment, posting, and transfer of teachers, as well as fiscal control and financial management at the state, district, and school level. She pays particular attention to the struggles and successes experienced by educators working at the school level. In connecting policy to practice, Lee draws attention to tensions between the central government’s vision of what can be accomplished through the devolution of authority and the actual conditions into which decentralization policies are introduced. For example, when education officials offered a significant amount of autonomy over the curriculum to classroom teachers, “most of the teachers were not able or did not want to use that autonomy” (Lee, this volume, p. 154). Lee also describes the effects of recent reforms on higher education in Malaysia, which include a dramatic increase in the number of private universities and the establishment of a variety of creative partnerships between government and non-government organizations.
6
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Govinda and Bandyopadhyay offer a history of India’s efforts to augment the authority of local educators since the nation escaped British colonial rule. The first half of the chapter meticulously describes the legislative acts enacted in support of this goal. As the authors observe, over the past 50 years the government’s commitment to decentralization has fluctuated in intensity and in focus. The 1990s marked a period of resurgence, both in terms of legislative action taken to encourage educational decentralization, and at the level of local implementation. In the second half of the piece, Govinda and Bandyopadhyay examine shifts in the discourse about decentralization that have occurred in India. Their analysis of policy talk and action underlines the variegated outcomes that a state’s endeavors to devolve authority can produce within a single nation. As they observe, any reform policy will be shaped and by the particular social and cultural features of the settings into which it is introduced. This reality limits our ability to make generalizations about the effects of decentralization legislation, especially in a country as large and diverse as India. In Chapter 13, Mukundan moves the discussion of decentralization in India to the local level, examining the effects that educational decentralization policies have had on one state in India. Kerala is widely known for the its innovative approaches to social development and education, and is often held up as a model for others to emulate. As Mukundan notes, the state has achieved almost universal access to primary schools, near-universal literacy rates, and the percentage of girls attending schools is almost equal to that for boys. If attempts to decentralize school management were to succeed in India, one might logically predict that the odds of success would be greatest in Kerala. Over a period of several years, Mukundan interviewed local education stakeholders in Kerala about their views on the People’s Campaign for Decentralized Planning, a policy introduced in 1996. The evidence he presents in this chapter highlights dissonance between official proclamations about the program and local educators’ impressions of the outcomes that have resulted from PCDP adoption. Mukundan’s analysis of implementation of the PCDP in Kerala provides a concrete example of the mismatch between policy talk and action referred to by Govinda and Bandyopadhyay in the previous chapter. The Local Government Plan of 2000 represented a significant shift in the structure of Pakistani government. In Chapter 13, Baela Raza Jamil explores the impact of that program on educational policy and practice. She observes that education initiatives put forward after the year 2000 were framed by devolution, public–private partnerships, and sector reform. Jamil’s analysis underlines the important implications of Pakistan’s unique political situation on the education sector. The latest attempt at decentralized governance and local government has ironically been implemented by a military regime that ended civilian rule in October of 1999. Jamil states that recent support for increased local control of the schools flows from the military’s desire to create legitimacy for its actions and to counteract the perception that its policies were anti-development and anti-people. What is the early evidence on the interpretations of the praetorian initiative its impact on District Education Officers and head teachers? In this chapter, Jamil addresses that question and considers a variety of strategies for improving the process of decentralizing the Pakistani school system. Chapter 14, written by Wilfred Perera, charts the development of the Sri Lankan school system from colonial times to the present. His review of educational reforms
INTRODUCTION
7
introduced over the last 500 years reveals that although the decentralization movement has gained momentum since the mid-1980s, the Republic has been experimenting with localized control of the schools for more than a half-century. Each decade has brought new strategies for empowering local actors, from the establishment of regional offices of education to curricular reform to the creation of school clusters. In recent years, government officials in Sri Lanka have turned to School Based Management in attempt to augment local autonomy. Perera explores the arguments put forward in support of the various approaches to decentralization implemented in Sri Lanka, and compares theoretical arguments to actual results of reform measures. The contrasts between those perspectives highlight both how much Sri Lanka has invested in educational decentralization thus far and the roadblocks that have undermined the devolution process. In the final chapter of the book, I review the arguments most commonly relied on to advocate for educational decentralization, and revisit the evidence presented in the case studies that supports, refutes, or raises questions about those justifications for devolving authority over school systems. I also consider additional factors that politicians and education officials rarely mention when discussing decentralization, but which serve as catalysts for reconfiguring authority frameworks in the education sector. My analysis underscores the important influence that context exerts on attempts to decentralize school systems. I do, however, identify some commonalities that connect the Asian nations included in this book, and consider the implications on reform efforts. The chapter synthesizes the evidence presented in the case studies and draws attention to how that information can enhance our understanding of educational decentralization in the region. REFERENCES Conyers, D. (1984). Decentralization and development: A review of the literature. Public Administration and Development, 4(2), 186–197. Gaynor, C. (1998). Decentralization of education: Teacher management. Washington, DC: World Bank. Govinda, R. (1997). Decentralization of educational management: Experiences from South Asia. Paris: International Institute for International Planning. Hanson, E. M. (2000). Democratization and educational decentralization in Spain: A twenty year struggle for reform. Country studies: Education reform and management publication series, 1(3), 1–62. Kendall, N. (2004). Global policy in practice: The “successful failure” of free primary education in Malwai. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University. Mok, K. H. (2005). Centralization and decentralization: Changing governance in education. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre. Rhoten, D. (1999). Global local conditions of possibility: The case of education decentralization in Argentina. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA. Rhoten, D. (2000). Education decentralization in Argentina: A global–local conditions of possibility approach to state, market, and society change. Journal of Education Policy, 15(6), 593–601. Sutton, M., & Levinson, B. (2000). Policy as practice: A comparative sociocultural analysis of educational policy. Stamford, CT: Ablex. World Bank (1998). The World Bank Annual Report 1998. Washington DC: World Bank.
This page intentionally blank
Chapter 1 STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION: KEY QUESTIONS AND CORE ISSUES E. Mark Hanson
Educational decentralization is a popular reform theme of governments around the world, but with goals, strategies and outcomes that are as different as the countries themselves.1 These decentralization initiatives can range from arbitrary exercises of coercive power (e.g., Chile and Argentina under military governments in the 1970s) to conscientiously planned interventions driven by national political will (Spain in 1978 following the death of General Franco). They can take many forms, such as revising the way a ministry of education makes decisions at the top of the system (Colombia in 1991), privatizing through the introduction of market forces (Chile in 1980), and empowering local educators and parents through school-based management (SBM) (Nicaragua in 1994). Because so many countries are attempting to decentralize their educational systems, there is a growing need to synthesize the positive and negative aspects of these national experiences for both the academic community seeking greater insight into educational change as well as decision makers seeking guidelines on effective educational policy.2 Written in the context of a conceptual analysis, the objective of this chapter is to identify and explain the key issues and forces that play major roles in shaping organization and management strategies of educational decentralization.3 The paper is organized around a series of questions that the author has found in his own research on the subject to tap issues that go to the core of decentralization strategies.4 Examples from five Hispanic countries where the author has done extensive research will be utilized to illustrate the major points: Venezuela, Colombia, Argentina, Nicaragua, and Spain. The paper concludes with a diagram and a list of decentralization propositions that attempts to summarize the significant aspects of the issues identified. Before examining the issues associated with educational decentralization, it is worthwhile exploring the potential benefits of centralization. After all, so many nations support centralized educational system that they must have some positive attributes. 1.
IS A CENTRALIZED EDUCATION SYSTEM INHERENTLY INEFFECTIVE?
Centralization or decentralization are not ends in themselves, but only means to an end. Consequently, under given conditions the rationale behind qualitatively strengthening a centralized system rather than decentralizing it can be quite 9 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 9–25. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
10
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
persuasive. The principal arguments behind educational centralization are, as Winkler (1993) and Weiler (1993) observe: r financial, to benefit through economies of scale as well as the equitable allocation of resources to reduce regional economic disparities; r policy and programmatic uniformity, to establish consistency in quality, programs and activities (e.g., curriculum, hiring, examinations, delivery of administrative services); r central placement of scarce human resources, to place strategically the scarce, skilled human resource at those points in the institution where their impact can reach across the entire educational system; r the diffusion of innovation, to spread changes more rapidly through the entire system; and r improved teaching–learning, a tightly controlled curriculum can be one policy response to the problem of poorly qualified teachers. Colombia, from 1968 to the late 1980s, provides an interesting illustration of a country where a policy of centralization dramatically improved the organization and management of the educational system (Arizmendi Posada, 1969). Prior to the beginning of a series of centralization reforms in 1968, the departments (similar to provinces or states) existed in a condition of semi-anarchy. They were highly politicized, rarely hesitant to use educational funds for other purposes, generally disorganized, very inefficient, and quite capable of routinely ignoring national educational policy whenever it proved convenient. For Colombia, the weak regional administrative infrastructures that poorly supported education called for increased centralization rather than decentralization in the 1970s and 1980s, and that strategy proved to be very effective (Hanson, 1986). If centralization involves the concentration of decision-making authority at the upper levels of the organizational hierarchy, then decentralization involves the projection of that authority down through the various levels of the organization. However, there are various forms of decentralization. 2.
WHAT IS DECENTRALIZATION?
Decentralization is defined as the transfer of decision-making authority, responsibility, and tasks from higher to lower organizational levels or between organizations. There are three major forms of decentralization. 1. Deconcentration typically involves the transfer of tasks and work, but not authority to other units in the organization. 2. Delegation involves the transfer of decision-making authority from higher to lower hierarchical units, but that authority can be withdrawn at the discretion of the delegating unit. 3. Devolution refers to the transfer of authority to an autonomous unit that can act independently, or a unit that can act without first asking permission. Privatization is a form of devolution as responsibility and resources are transferred from public to private sector institutions (Rondinelli, 1990). The author argues that in the long run, devolution is the more effective method because it provides for continuity in the change process. Delegation often brings with it the so-called “yo-yo decision-making pattern” as newly appointed (and frequently changing) educational
STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
11
leaders delegate or retract authority depending on their motivations of the moment (Hanson, 1989a,b). 3.
IS THERE REALLY SUCH A THING AS A DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM?
There is no such thing as a truly decentralized educational system. In reality, almost all decisions (e.g., finance, personnel, curriculum) retain degrees of centralization and decentralization—the issue is finding the appropriate balance. For example, the ministry of education may set the standards for teacher qualifications, but the actual hiring according to those standards is carried out in the regions. In the recent decentralization reforms in Argentina (1993) and Colombia (1991), the center is retaining authority over national educational policy; curriculum frameworks, academic evaluation, and specialized training. Within national policy guidelines, the decentralized execution of decisions will take place regionally. To be successful, the center-periphery power-sharing arrangement must avoid the classic problem often encountered in Latin America where responsibility is decentralized but without the necessary authority, training, or financing to carry out the tasks. 4.
WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS?
Educational decentralization reforms typically have their roots in the political arena. For example, as nations make the transition from autocratic to democratic forms of government, an almost natural outcome is an effort to decentralize the educational system as one important mechanism of establishing citizen participation in government institutions (Hanson, 1996a). Nicaragua is a recent case in point. Within the context of democratic government, political campaign promises are more often than not the prime-moving force behind launching a reform to decentralize educational systems. The author is unaware of any such reform that was initiated by educators from within an educational institution. Successfully facilitating a decentralization effort requires knowing where the politicians and policy makers want to go with it, and why. Many different, but often interrelated, goals drive decentralization initiatives and consequently shape their strategies, such as: increased economic development through institutional modernization; increased management efficiency; redistribution of financial responsibility; democratization; the neutralization of competing centers of power; and improved quality of education (Weiler, 1993). Goals as these fit within the political economic, organizational, and educational categories (see Figure 1.1) that contribute to directing the course of a decentralization reform. Increased economic development was as the centerpiece of Venezuela’s efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s (Hanson, 1976). The plan called for the creation of nine regionally located economic growth poles, supported by decentralized regional educational systems (the outcomes to be discussed later). The goal of increased efficiency through decentralization drove another Venezuelan initiative in the early 1990s, but this time the focus was on reducing bureaucratic stagnation, centralized inefficiencies, and corruption (de la Cruz, 1992). The redistribution of financial responsibility was the rationale used in Argentina to shift the financial burden of primary education to the provinces in 1978 and the
12
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION POSSIBLE SUCCESS NATIONAL LEVEL
POLITICAL TENSION
COLLABORATIVE SUPPORT BY NATIONAL AGENCIES JOB STABILITY IN KEY ROLES
EQUITABLE RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION FROM TOP
SHARED VISION
NATIONAL PLANNING
MINIMUM CONFLICT
POLICY GUIDELINES
INCREASED TRAINING
CHANGING ROLES
FLEXIBILITY
GOALS in
Political Economic
Political System
yes
Economic System
yes
Institutional System
yes
Technical System
yes
inlos e
Organisational Educational
REGIONAL LEVEL
POLITICAL TENSION
REGIONAL CAPACITY TO CONTRIBUTE
no
no
no
no SHARED VISION
STRONG REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEPOLITIZATION
-w
Educational win System w
REGIONAL PLANNING SKILL TRAINING READINESS TESTS
COMMUNITY ASSUMES REPONSIBILITES SCHOOL DEVELPOMENT PLAN
PROBABLE FAILURE
Figure 1.1: Decentralization: conditions of probable success or failure. Source: Author.
same shift for secondary education in 1991 (Fern´andez Lamarra, & Vitar, 1991). This initiative at time comes under pressure from a multinational lending/donor organization, such as the World Bank, requiring that a country (e.g., Argentina between 1989 and 1991) reduce its national debt before a loan or grant would be made (Novick, 1994). Increased democratization through the redistribution of power has at least two major variations. The first type look place in Spain in the late 1970s as it engineered a rapid distribution of centralized power in order to satisfy the assertive demands for political autonomy made by three important industrialized regions (Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Territory) following the death of General Franco. Only through conferring significant measures of regional self-rule, which included considerable devolution of authority in education, was relative political stability established. The second type of power redistribution is intended to counter what Hans Weiler (1993, p. 70) calls “an erosion of the state’s legitimacy.” A good example is the Colombian initiative of the early 1990s to turn significant control of its public institutions back to the municipalities. This strategy represents no less than a desperate effort to relegitimize the central government in the eyes of its citizens and save the nation from the social, political, and economic chaos generated by brutal and corrupting drug cartels and four terrorist guerrilla armies (Hanson, 1995). In short, both major forms of national political stress can, and often do, result in decentralization initiatives. The goal of neutralizing competing centers of power is usually part of a hidden agenda. Under the guise of decentralization, power can be taken from influential groups (e.g., teachers ’ unions) and transferred to other groups more supportive of ministry policies (e.g., parent councils, municipal governments) such as happened in Chile and Mexico (Cortina, 1995; McGinn & Street, 1986; N´un˜ ez, Gonzalez, & Espinoza, 1993). Improving the quality of education is often offered as a goal of decentralization, and it reflects the notion that local people can solve local educational problems better than the state (Winkler, 1993, p. 66).
STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
5.
13
ARE THE CENTERS OF POWER IN AGREEMENT AND WILLING TO COLLABORATE?
There are at least four centers of power that can significantly facilitate an educational decentralization program if they collaborate within the context of a shared vision: political parties, national and regional government institutions, teachers’ unions, and local citizens (see Figure 1.1). The single most important force in determining the fate of a decentralization initiative is whether or not the main political parties have a shared vision about the course and content of the reform and agree to collaborate. For example, the Venezuelan reform (1968) was ruined as successive political parties, all of which professed belief in decentralization, made massive personnel and policy changes solely to capture attention and credit for the program (Hanson, 1976). In Argentina (1993), a new organic law of education was passed which supported decentralization (federalization). However, in order to get a bill past the political factions in Congress, it had to be watered down so as to be vague and general enough for all parties to declare victory for their positions. The course (and fate) of that decentralization initiative remains uncertain (Hanson, 1996b). Spain got it right in 1978 when both major political parties collaborated in crafting the decentralization reform of government and supported it as being in the best interest of the nation. “Country before party” was the watchword at that decisive moment (Tussel & Soto, 1996). A second necessary component is to have the collaboration of the major institutions of government, such as: the ministries of education and finance, the office of national planning, and the national, regional, and municipal legislatures. Any one of these institutions can do significant damage to a decentralization strategy if it chooses to pursue its own model and refuses to compromise. A third critical center of power that can significantly advance or retard the decentralization process is the national teachers’ unions. If the teachers’ union membership does not feel threatened by a fragmentation of their bargaining units or a deterioration of benefits and working conditions, the teachers can be a formidable ally (or foe) in the change process. Finally, decentralization in education can only work if community members are prepared to put in the time and energy necessary to make the reform work if the local communities distrust, do not take seriously, do not participate in, or do not want to assume the added responsibility, then the opportunity for successful change through decentralization is seriously limited. In sum, the greater the accepted vision of decentralization within and between the distinct centers of power, the greater the chance of success. 6.
HOW ARE THE REGIONS ORGANIZED TO RECEIVE THE AUTHORITY?
There are at least three basic patterns of geographical regionalization involving the decentralization of authority. The first model transfers authority to existing regions (e.g., provinces, states, departments) to be used by the existing government machinery (e.g., provincial assembly, municipal council). Decentralization reforms in Argentina (1978 and 1993) and Colombia (1991) are examples. The strength of this model is that
14
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
the decentralization process is normally easier to initiate using existing government machinery. Regional government officials typically find the additional revenue and power to be quite attractive. The weakness is that existing regional government machinery is sometimes administratively weak, highly politicized, or even corrupt. Also, some regions may be small and wealthy while others are large and poor, or vice versa. The second model is represented by the Venezuelan decentralization effort in 1968. The country was divided into nine administrative territories, each sharing common social, economic, and cultural characteristics. The existing 22 state governments were basically ignored. All the ministries of the national government, including the education ministry created offices in each of the nine regions. The actions of these regional offices of the central government were to be closely co-coordinated with significant delegation and deconcentration of authority taking place. The new regional offices, with their significant planning, policy formation, and budget management authority, were to be Venezuela’s new engines of socio-economic development (Hanson, 1976). The third model is represented by Spain’s 1978 decentralization reform that followed the death of General Franco. The 50 existing provinces were aggregated into 17 regions (called autonomous communities), each with its own newly created and semi-autonomous, popularly elected parliament. Like the Venezuelan (1968) reform, each region was as much as possible shaped around common historic, socioeconomic, cultural, and (in the case of Spain) linguistic characteristics. The 17 parliaments received all the government portfolios, including education, and a devolution of authority took place. The strengths of these last two models are that the newly created regional boundaries are more consistent with the needs of modernizing nations and new leadership assumes responsibility. The weaknesses are the complexity of executing such comprehensive reforms as well as the deep commitment of political support required of the major political parties (Gunther, 1993). 7.
HOW ENTHUSIASTIC ARE THE MINISTRY OFFICIALS TO DECENTRALIZE AUTHORITY?
Because decentralization initiatives tend to be launched from the political arena, passive resistance from within the ministry of education often becomes a major barrier. While the minister of education and his/her immediate lieutenants are frequently politicians themselves and typically support the decentralization initiative, the lower-level officials are often less than enthusiastic because it means a loss of personal power and the comfortable perquisites and privileges they have managed to create for themselves. A Venezuelan minister of education illustrated these points as he spoke to a gathering of educators about his frustrations at trying to decentralize the educational system in the 1970s. After speaking about the insidious nature of passive resistance from those who simply file and forget directives, he spoke about how change initiatives seem to erode at every level of the institution: Let us say that the decisions that are taken at he level of the minister are worth 100 points, but when they are implemented at the next lower level [director-general] they are reduced to 80 points, and at
STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
15
the level of area directors, 60 points. They leave the Ministry of Education and when implemented at the regional level are worth 50 points, at the zonal level are worth 25 points, and by the time they get to the schools not enough is left of the decisions to change what has been going on for the past 15 or 20 years. (Pe˜nalver, 1976, p. 23). On numerous occasions in other counties, other ministers of education have expressed similar sentiments to the author. Even though a minister of education may be the most powerful person in the institution, that power in no way adds up to the collective power of the other officials and employees in the institution. Consequently, only through collective support and collaborative activities from all levels, particularly those three or four levels below the minister, can successful change take place. 8.
HOW ENTHUSIASTIC ARE REGIONAL OFFICES TO RECEIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EDUCATION?
Beginning with the serious national efforts to decentralize education in Colombia and Venezuela in the early 1990s, barriers to the initiative developed in the major cities of Colombia and all 22 states in Venezuela. For the first time ever, these two countries had elected (rather than appointed) governors and mayors. The critical question became, who controls the decentralization process, the central governments deciding what they want to transfer, or the elected governors and majors determining what they are willing to receive? In Venezuela, for example, the governors insisted on the right to accept responsibility for only the well maintained national schools, properly trained teachers and administrators, and those school systems that came with fully funded teacher retirement programs (de la Cruz, 1992). Only recently, after extensive negotiations, have the first three states finally accepted responsibility for schools in their territories. A best case scenario would be the transfer of education to the regional governments in Spain. Detailed negotiations took place between the center and each region detailing what was to be transferred (e.g., buildings, vehicles, machinery), and the condition of the items. Prior to transfer, efforts were made to bring everything up to minimum standards. 9.
CAN DECENTRALIZATION FRAGMENT A NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM?
A potential danger of decentralizing a national educational system is that the regional or municipal systems may go their own way to the extent that intersystem continuity and articulation are significantly compromised. For example, different regions can develop distinct salary structures, with the better educators gravitating toward the higher paying areas; algebra can be taught in the seventh grade in one region and the ninth in other; and the school calendar across the country can vary significantly. In Argentina, many educators stressed that going from one provincial educational system to another was like going from one country to another.
16
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Following decentralization, each nation should retain the organizational tools that assure the educational systems the various regions and municipalities remain integrated and articulated to acceptable levels. Spain (1978) is a good example as it pursued vigorously the concept of a “one nation” educational system made up of 17 parts. The centerpiece was a core body of knowledge (called minimums) taught for a specified amount of time in every school in the country. The remaining percentage of teaching time could then be used for instructional material introduced by the regions to suit their own educational interests (e.g., regional history, economy, language). Thus, a national–regional balance was achieved and monitored by each side. Other tools to assure that the educational system in Spain did not fragment were: r only the national government could grant graduation diplomas (threatening to refuse degrees to schools that do not obey the guidelines); r teacher training and placement was centrally managed; and r the central ministry controlled the academic calendar. Interestingly enough, following decentralization both Spain and Argentina lost the capacity for several years to gather and aggregate statistics on a nationwide basis. In both countries the various regions began gathering their own statistics for their own purposes and aggregated them differently. 10.
HOW IMPORTANT ARE THE REGIONAL MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURES?
Dropping a decentralization reform into a weak regional management infrastructure is like dropping it into quick sand. Countries with weak regional management infrastructures (which includes much of Latin America) are generally driven by the informal system (e.g., personalism, informal power centers, ignored rules, politicized decision making). In contrast, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, countries with relatively strong regional infrastructures have a much better chance for success because, for example, policies and rules are normally obeyed, promotion is based on what rather than who you know, the political/technical balance is maintained, and prior planning is taken seriously (Hanson, 1989a). 11.
HOW IS FINANCIAL DECENTRALIZATION MANAGED?
A wide variety of models are used to decentralize financial responsibilities. In Argentina in 1978, the military government simply dumped financial responsibility for 6,700 national primary schools onto the provinces. In the early 1990s, financial responsibility for 3,578 national secondary schools (including technical and subsidized private schools) then under direct control of the Ministry of Education, were transferred to the provinces (Consejo Federal de Inversiones, 1992). A co-financing formula was in place in which the central government would transfer funds to the regional governments for the payment of the salaries of the teachers who were transferred to regional control. The problem was that in many of the provinces the salary scale of the secondary schools was higher than the scale of the teachers in the transferred national schools. At great expense, the provinces had to pay the costs of the decentralization (e.g., new offices, equipment employees) as well as raise the salaries
STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
17
of the newly acquired teachers to reach parity with teachers already working in the provinces (Human Resources Operations Division, 1994, p. 72). One privatization reform with far-reaching consequences is to provide parents with government vouchers (financial grants or a specified amount of money) which they can then spend to enroll students in private schools. Chile, while under the control of a military government in the 1980s, adopted a variation of the voucher privatization strategy. The Ministry of Education transferred all public school property to the municipalities, and teachers were terminated as central government employees and transferred to the municipalities (thus breaking up the teachers’ unions). Parents could select the private or public school they wanted their children to attend (excluding private schools that charged tuition) and pay for admission with government-issued vouchers (attendance grants) thus providing a market incentive for schools to compete for students. When the reform began in 1980, the grant funding was set to equal per pupil expenditures, but a decade later the real value of the grant had decreased by 40% forcing municipalities to assume steadily a greater part of the cost (Winkler & Rounds, 1993). Another approach was used by Colombia in 1991, whereby the funds to be transferred to the regions were fixed at a certain amount. Thereafter, the growth to the educational system (e.g., new construction, teachers, students, instructional materials) would have to be funded by the region and municipalities. Rather than specifically earmarking money for educational expenditures only, Spain (1978) adopted a block grant approach. All the financial transfers for the public sectors were lumped together for the regional parliaments to spend according to their own priorities. These parliaments it could also borrow money if they chose to do so. By the early 1990s, the level of indebtedness was considered to be a serious problem in some of the regional governments. In sum, there are various models of financial decentralization ranging from Argentina’s (1978) unilaterally transferring all financial responsibility (primary education) to the provinces, to Nicaragua’s (1995) program of voluntary parent monetary contributions. However, the most effective strategy is some probably middle-ground where national, regional, and municipal co-financing formulae are negotiated, based on the capacity to generate revenues venues at the lower levels (e.g., increased taxation powers, national transfers, privatization). 12.
HOW DOES JOB STABILITY INFLUENCE DECENTRALIZATION?
Many ministries of education are constantly caught up in a vicious personnel cycle. A new minister is appointed because of the president’s unhappiness with the educational system (e.g., teacher strikes, low quality, bureaucracy). The new minister brings in new people and new programs, but without the material resources, information, planning capability, or creative work environment to significantly improve the system. At this high managerial level the learning curve is extensive, particularly because so many senior appointees are inexperienced and untrained in top management positions. When institutional change does not follow quickly, the president gets impatient and appoints points another minister. Between 1890 and 1993 there were 76 ministers of education in Argentina. In Colombia, on average the minister changes every 18 months. When ministers change,
18
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
so do most of the senior officials in the ministry (Hanson, 1983). Long-term (e.g., at least 4 years) leadership in educational systems seems the exception rather than the rule in Latin America. In Venezuela, following an election, the author was often astounded to meet newly appointed senior ministry officials who the previous year had been teaching in a high school. Thus, because job tenure is short, management experience is limited, resources are scarce, politics are intense, and the job learning curve is long, it is no wonder that carrying out a complex reform, such as a decentralization program, can be extraordinarily difficult. Spain has been a notable exception with respect to personnel stability in the Ministry of Education. The minister can (and often does) last for years in office. The senior personnel are typically well-trained, highly professional experts in their fields, and their jobs are not particularly tied to a personal identification with the minister. The strength of the Spanish ministry infrastructure played a very important role in the success of its decentralization program. 13.
IS DECENTRALIZATION POSSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF NATIONAL STRESS OR CRISIS?
Contrary to popular conventional wisdom, social, political, and/or economic stress or even crisis (perceived or real) open the door for significant educational reform. The reason is simple. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, during periods of significant stress, particularly when it is felt at the national and regional levels, the numerous centers of power are more prepared to join forces by putting their own vested interests aside in protecting the national interest (Heywood, 1995). An example is the Spanish decentralization of government (1978) carried out in order to satisfy the demands for political autonomy by three rebellious provinces after the death of General Franco. Also, the Colombian Constitutional Convention of 1991 (which established national decentralization) was convened in the face of national social and political disintegration. A special attempt was made to involve dissident groups, and two of the major guerrilla bands won over 30% of the seats in the constitutional convention. However, too much stress (e.g., the middle of a civil war) or not enough (e.g., when there are no organized critical voices to be heard), are severe deterrents to planned reform. A balance somewhere between these extremes provides the best terrain for change. 14.
WHAT IS AN APPROPRIATE TIME FRAME FOR DECENTRALIZATION?
Decentralization clearly does not come with the passing of laws or signing decrees. Like most types of reform, it is built rather than created. It happens slowly because the organizational culture (e.g., “the way we’ve always done things around here”) must be transformed, new roles learned leadership styles altered (e.g., shifting from controlling to supporting actions), communication patterns reversed, planning procedures revised (e.g., bottom up and top down), and developing regional policies and programs developed (Hanson, 1996b). In terms of time frame, nations should think in terms of years rather than weeks or even months. Prawda (1993, p. 26) at the World Bank wrote that “the first relevant
STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
19
accomplishments in the Mexican and Chilean cases surfaced about five years after the decentralization process was started.” In Spain, educational competences were transferred to the last regions in January of 1998 for a decentralization program that began in 1978 (de Puelles Benitez, 1995). The longer time frame is particularly true for nations with weak regional and local administrative infrastructures. Within that time frame there needs to be a sequence of specifically defined stages, each achieved before the next is undertaken. Decentralization by stages is part of the building process. 15.
HOW CAN CONTINUITY BE PROVIDED FOR?
Unfortunately, nations rarely use program evaluation as a means of determining whether or not to continue or terminate a reform initiative. Venezuela represents the worst case example. Almost immediately following elections during the 1970s and 1980s, many creatively crafted programs which had cost millions of dollars and thousands of work-hours to mount were terminated without any evaluation conducted. The decentralization initiative, which held great promise, also died an unnatural death. The big test for any educational reform is surviving the transition of political power from one party to another. Because major educational reforms tend to live or die based on political rather than technical considerations, the best guarantee for successful implementation is if the major parties endorse and support the initiative from the beginning. In addition, longevity is more likely if the decentralization on reform is never identified with only one political party (Hanson, 1976). 16.
IS SIMULTANEOUS OR INCREMENTAL DECENTRALIZATION BEST?
The simultaneous “all regions at once” decentralization model is always popular. The potential for quick and dramatic advancement is seductive to policy makers, but extraordinarily difficult to execute successfully. In Venezuela (1968), it failed for reasons of complexity and politics. In Argentina (1978), it created a decade of financial chaos at the provincial level. With respect to Colombia (1991), the author has serious doubts about success for the next several years because the Ministry of Education itself estimated that only about 200 of the 1,024 municipalities had sufficiently strong infrastructures to manage the education systems (Hanson, 1995). In contrast, Spain the Constitution (1978, Arts. 143, 151) structured an incremental approach by adopting fast, medium, and slow tracks to devolution. Prior to the transfer (for the medium and slow tricks) specific criteria had to be met such as approval by three-fourths of the popularly elected municipal and provincial councils, a referendum by the people, and a constitutionally specified waiting period of 5 years. In Spain, regions on the slower tracks could learn from the experiences of those on the fast track. Nicaragua has adopted an interesting version of the incremental approach which the Minister of Education refers to as “learning to swim by swimming.” That is, initiate the decentralization strategy by ministry policy in selected regions, be prepared to make adjustments as experience through experimentation is gained, and produce a decentralization law only after reasonable assurance has been reached that a workable model has been identified and tested.
20
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
As Figure 1.1 illustrates, developing a strong technical system based on serious planning and policy guidelines along with training to carry them out are essential ingredients in the reform process. In addition, it is better to transfer authority to individual regions and municipalities (or even to schools) only when they meet specific tests of readiness (e.g., community participation, trained personnel, financial participation) rather than transfer to all the areas at once regardless of their degrees of readiness. 17.
WHAT ARE THE FORMS OF LOCAL DECENTRALIZATION?
Decentralized authority transferred to regions is usually, to some degree, passed on down to the local schools. SBM is the process associated with schools operating in a decentralized manner, with authority typically residing in the hands of a school council. On these local school councils a balance is usually sought between educators and non-educators, with the membership made up of teachers (elected by fellow teachers), parents (elected by other parents), the school director, membership from the business community, student representation, and at times, someone from the city government. In terms of authority, there is a wide range between countries. In a “low authority” country, such as Colombia, the councils are principally advisory and are to be consulted on issues of budget, planning, curriculum, and so forth. Typically, low authority councils function as auxiliary units to raise funds and organize maintenance assistance in the community for the schools. They have little influence over the course of education in the school. Nicaragua has created very powerful “high authority” school councils. In the so-called “autonomous” primary and secondary schools in Nicaragua, the councils have complete authority to set school policies, supervise all educational activities, hire and fire the school director, establish the academic program, select textbooks, and manage the discipline program (Ministerio de Educaci´on, 1993). Because the school councils can discharge the school director with five of the seven council votes, in interviews the directors report that they feel very vulnerable and uncomfortable about introducing changes that may prove unpopular with parents. The Spanish SBM model provides for local authority only over those academic components of the school program beyond the “minimums” (core curriculum) required by the state, but it allows for the election of a school director by the school council. However, in this case, the director is elected based on candidate presentations of development plans for the school, and the winning candidate has the job for three years with the possibility of re-election only once (Hanson, 1990). The negative side of the Spanish model is that the teachers elected as school directors must continue to teach several classes day, they can only be re-elected once, and they must then go back to a classroom in their own schools when their time in office is over. Along with losing that valuable administrative experience, the transition that teachers must make in their own school from colleague to director and then back to colleague is difficult and stressful. In contrast, the proposed Nicaraguan model permits the school director to be elected without specific limits on the number of terms served, thus permitting the opportunity for preserving experienced leadership.
STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
18.
21
DOES DECENTRALIZATION INCREASE LEARNING?
Improving the quality of education is often identified as one of several goals of a decentralization reform. Typically, the assumption is made that through a redistribution of authority that brings changes in organization, management, personnel selection, finance, and curriculum control, improved educational quality will somehow follow. However, even though various studies have concluded that parents and educators seem to be more satisfied in a decentralized system, the research literature has not demonstrated a direct relationship between decentralization and increased student achievement (Brown, 1994, p. 1,410). In their review of SBM literature, Malen, Ogawa, and Kranz (1990, p. 323) identify several studies that claim such a positive relationship, “but the [research] requirements for establishing causal claims are not met in these documents.” The authors conclude, “Once again, there is little evidence that school-based management improves student achievement.” Sharpe (1996, p. 7) in his recent review of the literature draws much the same conclusion. He argues that producing conclusive evidence is hardly possible because there are simply too many intervening variables between the management device of decentralization and improved student outcomes, such as parental attitudes, peer group support, school culture of learning, different teaching and learning styles, timeon-task, teacher motivation, and so forth. Sharpe writes that “this transfer of power provide, the opportunity, but not the guarantee, for the quality of school decision making and action to benefit.” It is the performance of the key actors that determines whether or not the quality of education and student outcomes improve. 19.
WHAT WERE THE OUTCOMES?
Discussing outcomes is never easy because, like beauty, they are often as seen in the eye of the beholder. Therefore, in the author’s eyes (regarding the five countries), the Venezuelan 1968 decentralization initiative was the most elegant in design, comprehensive in coverage, noble of purpose, and complete in its failure. It was designed by academics who did not contemplate that each new political party, without any form of evaluation, would toss out the programs and individuals put into place by the party leaving power. The next Venezuelan decentralization initiative (1991) was stalemated for the first few years because the state governors (elected for the first time in the history of the nation) refused to accept responsibility for the national schools that did not meet minimum standards regarding (among other things) guarantees covering financial transfers, the qualifications of personnel, and the physical maintenance of the schools. In the mid-1990s the stalemate was finally broken with the first three states accepting decentralized responsibility for the schools. The 1968–1991 Colombian educational reform was very successful in improving the quality of educational management by centralizing control in the Ministry of Education. Now, with the 1991 constitutional reform, the nation is trying to decentralize to regional and municipal units, but most of these administrative infrastructures are extremely weak. At least for the next decade, the prognosis for an effective and efficient decentralized educational system does not look good. But then, it should
22
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
be recalled that the underlying reason for the decentralization initiative is the relegitimization of the state in a country with major socio-political problems. Effective change in this is area may take even longer. In Argentina, the 1978 decentralization of primary education by the military government was little more than the dumping of financial and administrative burdens onto the provinces. It took a full decade to recover from the administrative and financial chaos created. The jury is out on the 1993 decentralization of national secondary education, but the strong provincial administrative infrastructures give good reason for hope (Carciofi, Cetr´angolo, & Larra˜naga, 1996). In Spain, the 1978 decentralization initiative was a success from the beginning. The regional governments, which had strong administrative infrastructures, managed the educational systems very well. However, in 1987, when 7 of the 17 regions (autonomous communities) had taken control from the central government, the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol) which controlled the national government, suspended transferring power to more regions. Various reasons, both official and unofficial, have been attributed to this “freezing” of the decentralization process. Officially, the major reasons offered were: (1) to gain additional experience with the seven existing decentralized autonomous communities; (2) national concern that the heterogeneity of the 10 remaining decentralization plans would make it difficult to retain the “one nation” concept so important to the Spanish Constitution; and (3) the urgent need to reform the entire educational system, a reform that would be unnecessarily delayed if further decentralization were to take place (de Puelles Benitez, 1995, pp. 101–102). However, political opponents argued that the real reason was that the PSOE party simply was unwilling to give up so much power, especially to those regional parliaments controlled by other political parties (Hanson, 1989b). The Nicaraguan decentralization experience at this writing is still in the experimental stage and being guided by educational policy rather than national law. The fact that the decentralization strategy called for experimenting (“you learn to swim by swimming”) and developing a model by learning from experience is encouraging. Other countries frequently lock in a model by law from the beginning and thus negate the opportunity to modify easily the reform as experience is gained. In addition, the Nicaraguan Ministry of Education is placing considerably more weight on SBM as the cornerstone of its decentralization process than are the other countries. Because of the extensive amount of decision-making authority being transferred to local school governing committees, the Nicaraguan model is pursuing a high-risk strategy but with the potential for significant advances in democratization as a potential payoff if the plan works. 20.
SUMMARY
Figure 1.1 emphasizes the notion that educational decentralization is not an event, but a process integrating the actions of numerous systems, institutions, activities, and individuals at national and regional levels. The paper posits that the success or failure of a decentralization initiative depends on how well the various political, economic,
STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
23
institutional, technical, and educational systems respond to specific challenges and demands. For example, as seen in Figure 1.1, is there a shared vision among the distinct centers of power (e.g., ministries of finance and education, office of the president, national, regional, and local governments, Catholic Church) that play a role in the reform. Does the central government try to equalize the educational resources between the various regions and do the regions and municipalities have their own resource generation mechanisms (e.g., taxing authority) to support the educational reform? Do the ministry and regional educational officials have sufficient training, support, and job stability to carry out the reform, or do constant personnel changes and politicized policy changes regularly disrupt the planning and execution phases of the decentralization process? Do all regions of the country begin at the same time regardless of readiness (e.g., strong or weak infrastructures), or are tests of readiness introduced to determine which regions are actually prepared to begin (e.g., training, precise policy formation, new role definitions)? In the final analysis, if the decentralization process results in a situation in which both the national and regional participants view themselves as benefiting from the reform (win–win), then the conditions of success (but not a guarantee) have been created. On the other hand, if a situation is created where the perception is that the national level benefits but the regions do not (win–lose), or vice versa, then the probability of failure exists. 21.
PROPOSITIONS OF EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZATION
The following propositions have been extracted from the studies just discussed. The intent is to contribute to the growing body of knowledge involving efforts to successfully decentralize educational systems. The more the decentralization initiative involves the center transferring positive opportunities to the regions (win–win) rather than simply unloading problems and burdens (win–lose), the greater the chances for successful change. r The greater the accepted vision of decentralization between the distinct centers of power (e.g., political parties, unions, bureaucrats, religious institution), the greater the chance for successful change. r Devolution rather than delegation of authority and responsibility has a greater chance for long-term success. r It is easier to initiate a decentralization initiative during times of political, economic, and social stress or turbulence, than it is during times of relative stability. r When decentralization initiatives die, it is usually for political rather than administrative/technical reasons. r The stronger the management infrastructure at the regional levels, the greater the opportunity for success. r It is better to transfer authority to individual regions only when they meet specific tests of readiness, rather than to all the regions at once regardless of readiness. r Decentralizing in incremental stages has a greater chance for success than an “out-with-the-old and in-with-the-new” approach. r Understanding the motivation behind a decentralization initiative is the key to understanding the specifics of the strategy.
24
r r r r
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
The people who have been part of an organizational culture that has managed a centralized system are not very effective in managing a decentralized system (old habits and a taste for power are difficult to cast off.) A decentralized organization should function as arts of a whole rather than simply independent parts. Once decentralization has taken place, the central ministry still must have the tools to safeguard that the regions follow national educational policy. Educational policy on decentralization should be set through debate rather than disguised manipulations of the national budget.
NOTES 1. The World Bank is currently working with more than 40 nations that are decentralizing their educational systems. 2. This paper is a substantial revision of two other papers. The first was presented at a World Bank seminar on educational decentralization, June 2, 1995, and the second was a report written for Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, DC. 3. The information, observations, and explanations reported in this article are based principally on a series of field studies on decentralization conducted by the author over a period of two decades For an examination of the specific country studies that provided the base material, see the articles listed under the author’s name in the bibliography. The data from the original field studies were obtained in each country through an analysis of hundreds of pages of published documents and extensive interviews (usually 45–60 minutes each) with educators ranging from classroom teachers to ministers of education. The author usually spent many months gathering data in each country. 4. These particular key questions and core issues were selected because they represent concerns repeatedly raised by educators in all the countries studied.
22.
REFERENCES
Arizmendi Posada, O. (1969). Transformaci´on educativa. Bogota: Ministerio de Educaci´on Nacional. Brown, D. (1994). Decentralization in educational governance and management. In T. N. Postlewaite The international encyclopedia of education (2nd ed.). London: Pergamon Press. Carciofi, R., Cetr´angolo, O., & Larra˜naga, O. (1996). Desafios de la descentralizaci´on:Educaci´on y Salud en Argentina y Chile. Santiago de Chile: Comisi´on Econ´omica para Am´erica Latina y el Caribe, Naciones Unidas. Consejo Federal de Inversiones. (1992). Servicios educativos nacionales en las provincias. Buenos Aires: Gobierno de Argentina. Cortina, R. (1995). Education and political change in Mexico. Paper presented at the CIES Conference, Boston, MA. de la Cruz, R. (Ed.). (1992). Descentralizaci´on, Gobernabilidad, Democracia. Caracas: Nueva Sociedad. de Puelles Benitez, M. (1995). La politica educativa del estado auton´omico. Politica y Educaci´on (pp. 87–108). Barcelona: Universidad Aut´onoma de Barcelona. Fern´andez Lamarra, N., & Vitar, A. (1991). Planificaci´on, Federalismo, y Descentralizaci´on en la Argentina. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Educaci´on y Justicia. Gunther, R. (1993). Politics, society, and democracy: The case of Spain. Oxford: Westview Press. Hanson, M. (1976). Decentralization and regionalization in the ministry of education: The case of Venezuela. International Review of Education, 22(2), 155–176. Hanson, M. (1983). Administrative development in the Colombian Ministry of Education: A case analysis of the 1970s. Comparative Education Review, 27(1), 89–108. Hanson, M. (1986). Educational reform and administrative development: The cases of Colombia and Venezuela. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Hanson. M. (1989a). Decentralization and regionalization in educational administration: Comparisons of Venezuela, Colombia and Spain. Comparative Education, 25(1), 41–55.
STRATEGIES OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
25
Hanson, M. (1989b). Education, administrative development and democracy in Spain. International Journal of Educational Development, 9(2), 127–138. Hanson, M. (1990). School-based management aid educational reform in the USA and Spain. Comparative Education Review, 34(4), 523–537. Hanson, M. (1995). Democratization and decentralization in Colombian education. Comparative Education Review, 39(1), 100–119. Hanson, M. (1996a). Educational administration and organizational behavior. 4th ed. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Hanson, M. (1996b). Educational change under autocratic and democratic governments: The case of Argentina. Comparative Education, 32(3), 303–317. Heywood, P. (1995). The government and politics of Spain. London: Macmillan. Human Resources Operations Division. (1994). Argentina: Decentralization and improvement of secondary education project, working paper. Washington DC: The World Bank. Malen, B., Ogawa, R., & Kranz, J. (1990). What do we know about school-based management? A case study of the literature—a call for research. In: W. Clune and J. Witte (Eds.), Choice and control in American education, Vol 2: The practice of choice, decentralization and school restructuring (pp. 289–342.). London: The Palmer Press. McGinn, N., & Street, S. (1986). Educational decentralization: Weak state or strong state? Comparative Education Review, 30(4), 471–491. Ministerio de Educaci´on. (1993). Reglamento genera de educaci´on primaria y secondaria. Managua, Nicaragua: Gobierno de Nicaragua. Novick, S. (1994). Una nueva agenda para la descentralizaci´on educativa.Revista Iberoamencana de Educaci´on, 4(1):11–27. N´un˜ ez, I., Gonzalez, L., & Espinoza, O. (1993). La Pr´actica de la Planificaci´on Educativa en el Contexto del Proceso de Decentralizaci´on en Chile. Paris: Instituto Internacional de Planeamiento de la Educaci´on. Pe˜nalver, L. (1976). La Regionalizaci´on: Principos que la Informen. Caracas: Ministerio de Educaci´on. Prawda. J. (1993). Educational decentralization in Latin America: Lessons learned. International Journal of Educational Development, 13(3), 253–264. Rondinelli, D. (1990). Decentralizing urban development programs: A framework for analyzing policy. Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development. Sharpe, F. (1996). Towards a research paradigm on devolution. Journal of Educational Administration, 34(1), 4–23. Tussel, J., & Soto A. (Eds.). (1996). Historia de la Transici´on: 1975–1986. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. Weiler, H. (1993). Control versus legitimization: The politics of ambivalence. In J. Hannaway and M. Carnoy (Eds.), Decentralization and school improvement (pp. 55–83). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Winkler, D. (1993). Fiscal decentralization and accountability in education: Experiences in four countries. In J. Hannaway and M. Carnoy (Eds.), Decentralization and school improvement (pp. 104–109). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Winkler, D., & Rounds, T. (1993). Municipal and private sector response to decentralization and school choice. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
This page intentionally blank
Chapter 2 WALKING ON THREE LEGS: CENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION, AND RECENTRALIZATION IN CHINESE EDUCATION John N. Hawkins
1.
INTRODUCTION
China has clearly set itself on a path to become not only a regional but also a world leader. But in order to do so, its leaders are convinced that China’s power is linked to producing and retaining the best and brightest students and to reforming its educational system (Lu, 2000). A major feature of the current educational reform movement to achieve these goals is the focus on decentralization. China’s educational leadership has been struggling with the issue of centralization and decentralization almost since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. Terms such as “walking on two legs” (combining both centralized and decentralized approaches to education) and minban schools (community-run schools), once again in vogue, date back several decades (Hawkins, 1973). In the latter years of the commune system, communes, and production brigades were being urged by provincial authorities to run rural primary and junior middle schools independently, raising funds through their own efforts, and hiring teachers in a competitive manner (Xin, 1984). These early efforts to shift authority from central to local levels did not represent, however, a national decentralization policy of the scope we are witnessing today. Nevertheless, there is a history of experimentation with different levels and degrees of decentralization, always against the background of a highly centralized political economy, and often followed by a recentralization as authorities retrench fearing loss of control (the paradoxes of state-led decentralization are convincingly argued in Tatto (1999)). As Hanson (1993) and Bray (1999) correctly note, in general, there are no clear examples of completely decentralized educational systems, but rather one finds mixtures of centralization and decentralization. These processes are fluid and in motion and change over time. It is also important to remember that there are differing definitions of what constitutes decentralization. In this volume, Hanson offers a useful general definition that is appropriate for the China case: “Decentralization is defined as the transfer of decision-making authority, responsibility, and tasks from higher to lower organizational levels or between organizations” (p. XX). He and Bray (1999) also note three basic kinds of decentralization: (1) Deconcentration (transfer of tasks and work but not authority); (2) Delegation (transfer of decisionmaking authority from higher to lower levels, but authority can be withdrawn by the center); (3) Devolution (transfer of authority to an autonomous unit which can act independently without permission from the center). Privatization is another form 27 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 27–41. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
28
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
which, however, is not always decentralized. As we shall see, in the case of China, several of these exist at the same time. In the remainder of this chapter we will examine the various stages of the educational reform movement begun in 1985, focus on what motivated the reforms in the context of China’s unique political culture, explore some specific features (finance, curriculum, management, etc.) of China’s efforts to decentralize the precollegiate level, and finally, comment on the strengths and weaknesses of these efforts. 2.
THE REFORM ENVIRONMENT
As the economic reforms of the 1970s began to take hold it was soon discovered that the educational system was woefully inadequate to contribute to the new economic opportunities. Thus, in May of 1985, the Communist Party of China (CPC) convened a conference to address this issue. Out of these deliberations came a series of general policy guidelines meant to begin a process of educational reform and gradually align the educational system with the newly emerging marketization of the economy (Reform, 1985). General principals focused on linking education to economic reforms, implementing the 9-year compulsory educational system, decentralizing finances and management, increasing vocational and technical education, and increasing the number and quality of teachers. More specifically, it was stated that: r Government control of schools was too rigid and management inefficient r Authority should be “devolved” to lower levels r Multiple methods of financing should be sought r Devolution of authority for the 9-year compulsory system should be gradual, based on a regional approach in the order of: coastal cities, developed interior regions and cities, and less developed interior r “The power for administration of elementary education belongs to local authorities” (Reform, 1985, p. 9) r Secondary schools will establish tracking, either toward higher education or vocational–technical education combined with some devolution of authority and financing r The central level (State Education Commission—SEC, later replaced by the Ministry of Education, MOE) will continue to monitor the process and provide basic guidelines, but “subordinate units” will have more power and bear financial costs (Reform, 1985, p. 20). These general policies began a process of decentralization but somewhat ambiguously continued to stress the “guiding” and “monitoring” role of the central authorities with respect to “major policies, principles, and general plans” (Reform, 1985, p. 9). Also, the exact degree of decentralization at the subprovincial level was to be determined by centrally administered areas (provincial, autonomous regions, municipalities). A reformed tax system was to allow for more flexibility to apply special surcharges to support the financial base for schools (Tsui, 1997). Eight years later it was necessary to restate many of these policies in a more detailed manner. In March of 1993 after 4 years of preparation, the “Program for China’s Educational Reform and Development” was issued by the State Council (Cui, 1993; State Education Commission, 1994). A six part, fifty article document,
WALKING ON THREE LEGS
29
this policy statement clearly articulated that it was necessary for China to shift its primary focus from economic development and marketization, to human resource development. Despite previous reforms, it is noted that China’s economy remains backwards, inefficient, and noncompetitive, largely because of the low educational level of China’s workers. And despite previous educational reforms, problems still remained with the institution of the 9-year compulsory educational system, the tracking of secondary students into appropriate fields, the fight against illiteracy, and the overly centralized management and financial structure of education (Cui, 1993; State Education Commission, 1994). In an effort to clarify the ambiguity of the 1985 reform document, it is stated more specifically that: “The system to run schools will also witness great changes with the government monopoly to be broken. While the focus remains on state schools, encouragement will be given to the gradual establishment of community sponsored schools. At present (1993) basic education must be achieved mainly through local government schools” (Cui, 1993, p. 16). Nonstate operation of schools by groups and individuals (along with overseas donations) is also to be allowed but only in the context of existing government laws and regulations. This reform document provides enough space for local levels to take more responsibility for basic education both in terms of management and finances but also clearly specifies that the “state” remains the arbiter of rules and regulations, and as the “state” is extended to local governments, the primary provider of basic education. Nevertheless, the architecture for a less centralized educational system begins to emerge. The different government levels from the central to the county are encouraged to work together to develop a feasible structure for the management and financing of precollegiate schooling, with a gradual deconcentration of authority. More recently, however, officials have taken steps to reassure the bureaucracy and population that the state sector still has a critical role to play. This is particularly true in the area of higher education. A refinement on the earlier reform policies stresses the merging of smaller universities into larger, more comprehensive institutions, the goal of which is to form a national system of higher education including community colleges. Very little is said in this document about privatization or the devolution of authority to university presidents (Wu, 2000). It appears that Zhu Rongji’s “fifth wave” reform package, which includes several decentralization proposals, has stalled not only as a result of foot dragging by the bureaucracy, but also because of some concerns about national security (Zweig, 2001). This is also true of overall control of the national economy; while the nonstate sector is important, the state sector “should dominate” (Jiang, 2001, p. 1). Particularly with respect to science and technology, the Minister in charge of the State Development Planning Commission has stressed that this area requires a centralized state level effort and should not be devolved to lower levels (China Minister, 2001). Another area of concern for China’s leaders is the unintended impact of decentralization that has resulted in a significant “brain drain.” As the central authorities cut budgets to higher education, one result was higher cost of higher education and lower quality, thus prompting the best and brightest individuals to go abroad for higher learning, many, not to return (Current Issues, 2001). And finally, discussion of educational decentralization has occurred somewhat in isolation from other centralization issues. For example, there has been significant rural migration to China’s cities and while this is now allowed, migrants do so without the hukou or urban residency status.
30
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Thus they are cut off from many social services including education. As Solinger (1999) points out, this produces the possibility of social instability. 3.
MOTIVES
Identifying motives for educational decentralization in China must be considered in the context of China’s unique political culture and broader decentralization in both political and economic realms. China’s distinct form of state-led growth, what Oi (1995, p. 1132) calls “local state corporatism,” provides the environment in which educational decentralization must be viewed. Regime change is not necessarily a prerequisite for reform and growth. Decentralization from the center to the periphery, still within “state” boundaries, has produced in China a unique form of “state” decentralization (Oi, 1999). China’s current transitional status has retained key elements of the Maoist period—elements of a Leninist state—that has decentralized control and administration to a point that it is now qualitatively different from the earlier Maoist period. While privatization is growing, it is not leading the growth and change that is occurring. Rather, government at the local level, counties, townships and village enterprises are acting as the real entrepreneurs and change agents. Decollectivization and fiscal reform were the two major incentives to encourage local governments to become entrepreneurial. The county functions somewhat as the corporate headquarters, the township as the regional headquarters, and the villages as companies within the larger corporation. Each is a profit center, fiscally independent and expected to maximize its performance. The Maoist framework has thus been adapted to account for economic liberalization and local decentralization. Unlike other Leninist states in transition, “. . . China evolved into a distinctive decentralized form that, when coupled with proper incentives, allowed its local officials quickly to play an entrepreneurial role” (Oi, 1995, p. 1147). Thus, the broader fiscal and economic reforms of the 1970s led to later efforts to decentralize education, always within the context of a state that was consciously retreating from being the sole provider of social services (Mok, 1997). In the educational system, this retreat and shifting of financial and management authority to the local level was most evident first in higher education (Hawkins, 1999; Mok, 1997). As we will see, the precollegiate level followed next but in a much more cautious manner. Motives for decentralization in education were principally fiscal (Bray, 1999), and as Cheng (1997, p. 393) notes, “. . . in the case of China, improvement of the quality of the modern school has not been a primary motive for decentralization.” Yet, while the central state might have retreated from paying all of the costs for education, there remained a belief that by empowering local authorities with responsibility for running the schools, they will better be able to serve their clients, improve educational efficiencies, and respond more rapidly to the new market forces being unleashed as a result of economic liberalization (Mok, 1997). Thus, it can be said that educational decentralization was part of a broader economic liberalization that was occurring, within a modified Maoist–Leninist system, and was motivated by a desire to disengage the state from being the sole provider of educational services. A much hoped for outcome would be an educational system that would more nimbly respond to economic needs. As the reforms unfolded, it was also realized that the state had to remain engaged particularly in the rural areas where decentralization has
WALKING ON THREE LEGS
31
caused hardships on poorer counties and villages. As a result, public spending has been increased in the area of primary and secondary education (Fang, 2001). At the upper end of the educational system China’s leaders are clearly motivated by a desire to be both a regional and world leader. Thus, reform initiatives like Project 211 (2001) have become showcases for educational innovation that involve joint state, local, and university financing and administration.1 It is hoped that all of these reforms will result in China taking its place among the developed nations of the world as a leader in education, science and technology. It is too early to judge if this will indeed be the case. 4.
DECENTRALIZATION IN ACTION
There are diverse aspects to educational decentralization in China. It is clear that in some areas the central authorities have no intention of decentralizing responsibility to local authorities or the private sector. National exams are one such area. Recent announcements make it clear that national unified exams are necessary to choose elites and assure that the state supply of highly trained personnel will continue (Xinhua, 2001b). However, in a variety of other areas from the hosting of private college presidents from the United States to help China explore how private higher education works, to the privatization of dormitory and food services, to the formation of educational internet portals linking the mainland with Taiwan (NetBig.com), China’s authorities are experimenting with devolution of power and authority in ways they have not in the past (China & Taiwan, 2001; Minnesota, 2001; Xinhua, 2001a). Here we will focus on three broad areas that are central to the reforms occurring in China: fiscal reforms, management of schools, and the always-sensitive area of curriculum reform. 4.1.
Fiscal and Management Reforms
As has been noted, fiscal decentralization was one of the key reforms effecting educational decentralization. As the central government began to reduce subsidies for local schools, educational officials at the county, township, and village level pursued alternative sources to fund basic education. This resulted in a much more diversified funding structure for education using local taxes, tuition, overseas donations, local fund-raising, income from enterprises, and modest subsidies to fill in the gaps left by the central government (Mok, 1998). The reform documents specified six methods for funding precollegiate education: (1) Urban and rural educational surcharges levied by local governments; (2) Contributions from industry and social organizations; (3) Donated funds from community organizations and individuals; (4) Tuition fees from students; (5) Income from school-run enterprises; (6) Central authorities (State Education Commission, 1994). At this time it was estimated that roughly 40% of precollegiate funding was provided from nongovernmental sources (State Education Commission, 1994, p. 11). Similar reforms are occurring in the higher education sector. Although so-called minban or private colleges and universities are being allowed, the government has concluded, according to the President of People’s University, that “education is a public cause which should not be commercialized” (Ji, 2000, p. 1). Students are
32
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
expected to contribute about 25% of per pupil cost, and the state should play a heavy role in subsidizing higher education. The financial structure is now much more diversified through a mixture of fees, state subsidies, interest-free loans, and a variety of other mechanisms. However, a cultural reluctance to borrow money combined with the fact that students are required to repay their loans soon after graduation, has resulted in a large number of defaults thus reducing the effectiveness of educational loans (Ji, 2000). Higher education has historically been underfunded since 1949, and it is therefore likely that the minban institutions will pick up much of the slack, especially for vocational–technical education (even though only 37 out of a total of 1,207 such institutions are authorized to grant any kind of certificate or degree) (Fu, 2001). For a period, fiscal decentralization allowed local governments great discretion to set taxes, target surcharges for education, and generally manage their financial affairs. For wealthy regions this worked quite well and the quality of schools and teachers was high. For poorer regions, the opposite was often true; disparities began to appear in the system. For a variety of reasons, including issues of equity, the central government, in 1994, began a process of recentralization, removing certain tax authority from the local governments (Bahl, 1998). This revealed how fragile China’s decentralization process remains. As Bahl notes: “The biggest difference between China and the decentralized systems of the west is the absence of popular representation. Local councils must be popularly elected and local chief officials must be locally appointed for the efficiency gains from decentralization to occur” (Bahl, 1998, p. 72). Local governments now may not set tax rates or borrow for capital projects. This, however, does not mean that the central authorities will get back into the business of completely subsidizing education. Quite the contrary, now local governments must be even more creative in finding alternative sources for funding schools, which in fact may produce a more genuinely decentralized system. While the localities are not able to set tax rates, they have been encouraged to set surcharges on top of commercial and industrial taxes, which “must” be devoted exclusively to education. But they are not required to do so, and many local villages have opted to use tax funds for purposes other than education (NPC, 2001; Xin, 2001). The situation has reached such a critical stage that the government is once again stepping in to play a more central role in funding precollegiate education, especially in the poorer rural areas. No less a figure than Zhu Rongji has joined the chorus of those lamenting the state of rural basic education now that the tax base has changed (Vice Premier, 2001). New investment mechanisms are being constructed to assure that parents do not have to pay for both textbooks and basic education for their children. Inequities in uncritical decentralization is now being reported in the press (Education reform, 2001). Central authorities continue to fund teacher salaries and certain capital projects, but these are funds that are collected at the local level, rerouted to the central government, and then reallocated back to teachers (a process called “the center hosts the banquet and the local foots the bill”) (Cheng, 1997, p. 395). This blend of central and local governmental financial support along with donations, fund-raising, enterprise support, and community participation creates an appearance of more decentralization than may actually be taking place. The State Education Commission itself has taken pains to defend its position as the primary
WALKING ON THREE LEGS
33
financial supporter of China’s vast educational system: “It is a mistake to think that most of China’s education funding comes from donations” (Xinhua, November 25, 1997c,d, p. 1). Vice Minister Cheng Zhili states that 74% of all educational funding comes from state revenues (up from the 40% figure cited 2 years earlier), and while he encourages local levels to seek diversified sources of funding, the amount that is raised in this manner is “peanuts compared to government appropriations for education” (Xinhua, November 25, 1997c,d, p. 2). He is referring, of course, to government at all levels, China’s “state corporatism,” but in this view, government is government, whether it is at the village level or in Beijing. As was demonstrated in the 1994 tax recentralization, what has been granted to the localities can be quickly withdrawn. Nevertheless, even a 24% level of nongovernmental funding represents a significant shift for China’s educational establishment (up from 19% in 1993—Chinese Education (1994, p. 2)). And, although the bulk of the funding comes from state sources, the central government’s role has been considerably reduced. With increased fiscal responsibility has come a diversified administrative structure for China’s schools. Prior to 1991, there were virtually no laws governing education. Now laws and regulations have been drafted at both the central and local levels: r 1991: “Law of Compulsory Education” covering thirty provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities r 1993: a whole series of laws regarding teachers, the handicapped, communityrun schools, vocational and technical education, higher education, educational finance, fund-raising, and science and technology (State Education Commission, 1994). Supervision of education, once a matter solely for the central authorities, now is applied through a hierarchy whereby government agencies above the county level, supervise, evaluate, and examine authorities at lower levels. There are multiple layers of educational supervision: (1) The National Educational Supervision Agency operates centrally and is made up of a Supervisor General, 2 deputies, and 61 supervisors invited from relevant ministries, commissions, provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities; (2) Local governments have corresponding organs at different levels down to the county level. Currently about 97% of all cities and prefectures have such agencies, as do about 90% of the counties (Ma, 2005; State Education Commission, 1994). The supervisors are responsible for assuring that the various laws and regulations are followed by local authorities and educators. As for the schools themselves, village government has been given responsibility for running primary schools (60% of China’s primary school cohort resides in the over 700,000 villages throughout China), and county government has responsibility for running secondary schools (Cheng 1997; Cui 1999c, January 4). This means that they have responsibility for finding financing for the schools, for appointment and retention of teachers, and limited authority over the curriculum. Nevertheless, China’s central educational authorities, the State Education Commission and later the Ministry of Education, continues to help “guide” decentralization as in past efforts to establish pilot programs in Shanghai, Tantai, and Dalian to promote “quality based education” (China Daily, September 4, 1997a, p. 1; China Daily, September 19, 1997). Selected schools develop programs to serve as models of quality education for local decentralized schools; the central authorities thus do not order locally run schools to behave in a certain manner but
34
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
rather demonstrates how to do so by experimental model (Ma, 2005; Xinhua, May 27, 1995). While the government or state-run primary and secondary schools (by far the largest educational sector) have been variously decentralized, a variety of nongovernmental, or semi-private, precollegiate schools have been allowed to emerge. In 1994 it was estimated that there were more than 40,000 private schools in China (Kwong, 1996). At the 1992 14th Congress of the CPC, the principal of “creating a favorable environment for the emergence of private education” was endorsed (Mok, 1998, p. 258). Initially focused on higher education, by 1993 private schools included basic primary and secondary education as well as kindergartens. And, as recently as June 1999, Premier Zhu Rongji affirmed that as long as nonstate-run schools operate in the context of relevant state laws and regulations, they should be encouraged (China Daily, June 21, 1999b). The government still avoids the use of the term “private” when discussing these schools and generally uses the term “nonstate run” or “minban” to describe what are essentially private schools. Mok (1997) notes that it is difficult to differentiate precisely between minban (run by citizens) and private. In the former, funds are provided by communities or collectives and in the latter by individuals or enterprises. The principal distinction between them and government schools, however, is that these private initiatives are basically self-supporting utilizing a variety of funding mechanisms (tuition, overseas Chinese support, enterprises, debentures, etc.) and, as we shall see, are able to deviate from the state curriculum. One outcome of the emergence of private schools is that family saving and spending habits are changing. In Guangdong province, for example, it is reported that over the past 3 years average family educational expenditures have grown by 12% annually (China Daily, July 3, 1999a). This is higher than spending patterns for entertainment and travel. Savings rates are also growing with funds earmarked for education (China Daily, July 3, 1999a). As in other areas of decentralization, much of the impetus for allowing a more flexible policy toward private education had to do with the fiscal retreat of the state from public education. At a recent conference in Beijing, it was noted that public schools are not capable of handling all of the educational needs of the city, fund cuts had caused problems of educational quality and there has been an increased public demand for educational alternatives (Tang, 1999). It was urged that private schools be accepted on the same level as public schools, present their graduates with recognized certificates, investors in such schools should be able to reap a profit, and municipal government should assist private efforts by providing buildings and facilities creating a kind of “education industry” (Tang, 1999, p. 1). Although private initiatives represent a small percentage of all precollegiate schooling in China, they are particularly important in the rural areas where government cutbacks have resulted in setbacks for the educational reform efforts initiated in 1985 and 1993. They represent an alternative to the low quality and high cost of government schools and are playing a significant role in realizing the 9-year compulsory education policy in rural areas (Lin, 1997). At the other end of the spectrum, well-endowed private schools boasting to be schools for “aristocrats” and elites and charging high fees or debentures also offer high quality alternatives for China’s new elites (Mok, 1997). While these efforts clearly represent a significant form of
WALKING ON THREE LEGS
35
decentralization for China’s vast educational system, it is also clear that the central government is carefully watching and monitoring these developments. 4.2.
Curriculum Reforms
Control over the content of schooling is usually one of the last areas that central authorities are willing to decentralize. This is as true for centralized, democratic states such as Japan, as it is for centralized, Leninist states such as China. The central educational authorities in China keep close watch on school leaving qualifications, textbooks, and curriculum; and while there is some tolerance for diversity, it is quite limited (Bray, 1999). Much more leeway is allowed in higher education (Hawkins, 1999; Mok, 1998). Within the 9-year compulsory cycle the Ministry of Education maintains central control in core subject areas and areas where they have a particular interest (such as moral–political education) (Hawkins, 1999; Hawkins, Zhou, & Lee, 2001). A nationwide curriculum framework was drafted in 1992 and implemented in 1993. Most courses are compulsory with some options at the junior secondary level. While this effort was principally carried out by central authorities, certain components were developed jointly between central and local authorities under the policy that “local authorities will also undertake some responsibility” for curriculum development (State Education Commission, 1994). Despite efforts to engage in joint curriculum development, criticism has mounted in recent years that the overcentralization of academic programming is damaging China’s efforts to provide innovative and up-to-date courses particularly at the precollegiate level. At a recent OECD (Organization for Economic and Cultural Development) conference in Hong Kong mainland academics openly complained that the rigidity with which the Ministry of Education maintains control over course content and the curriculum in general is setting China back in the areas of science and math education. They maintain that the MOE maintains central files of all courses, and that making any sort of change in the curriculum is a long and arduous process (Yeung, 2001). Course content, class timetables and even the printing of diplomas are all controlled by the MOE. According to one scholar at the conference, “this shows the government has no confidence in our institutions” (Ready, 2001, p. 1). What decentralization has occurred has been in the context of a shift in focus for precollegiate education, away from the exam centered model, the 100 mark system of grading and toward what has variously been described as “quality education” (Xinhua, July 16, 1997a; Xinhua, November 25, 1997c,d). Flexibility to introduce new subjects at the local level appear to be limited to aesthetic education programs such as art, music, singing, sports, vocational skills, and, of course, anything to do with computers (Cui, June 2, 1999a, June 3, 1999b; Xinhua, November 23, 1997b). Even so, the central authorities sets standards and provides guidance on how these new subjects should be developed (Xinhua, July 16, 1997a).2 Partly in response to criticism that the system is too rigidly controlled by the MOE, a new national curriculum is in the works that allows for slightly more input from teachers, students, and other stakeholders (MOE maintains control over 80% of curriculum, allowing local schools to innovate on 20% of courses) and will introduce more interdisciplinary courses and flexibility for teachers to innovate (Curriculum reform, 2001; Curriculum system, 2001). At the very least, China’s educators hope that these new measures will
36
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
result in a curriculum interesting enough to keep students awake in class (Yeung & Cheung, 2001). And finally, the newly developed private schools appear to be able to deviate further from SEC approved curricula but again, primarily in selected areas (computers and foreign languages) (Mok, 1997). The area of teacher education is another that has experienced limited decentralization. Several teacher education institutions have responded to the educational reforms by altering the methods of preparing teachers, for example by introducing the 3 + 1 approach (3 years of academic discipline oriented education and 1 year of teacher training) and by developing “hot” programs and topics such as accounting, business administration, foreign languages, tourism, and business communication (Shen, 1994). But as one insider noted, “the Commission on Education has no intention of giving up the independent teacher education system (normal universities, shifandaxue) and believes that the latter is still an effective mechanism to train teachers” (Shen, 1994, p. 68). It thus appears that while the dominant political–economic climate is moving toward marketization, and significant progress has been made in educational decentralization, the areas of teacher preparation and curriculum control remain rather highly centralized. One result is that prospective teacher applicants are moving on to other opportunities rather than entering the teaching profession (Ma, 2005; Shen, 1994). 5.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
As has been noted above, fiscal decentralization was a prime motive for educational decentralization. However as Cheng notes, “The beauties of decentralization— participation, community involvement, local sensitivity, and all that—have occurred in the Chinese reform. However, such benefits often occurred independent of intent” (Cheng, 1997, p. 396). Even the fiscal elements of decentralization have been in some cases costly. One major study concluded that, “We find that a higher degree of fiscal decentralization of government spending is associated with lower provincial economic growth over the past fifteen years. This is a significant and robust finding” (Tao & Zhou, 1998, p. 221). Variation in provincial resources has a strong effect on the benefits of fiscal decentralization. Decentralization seems to be working well if the locality is already doing well economically. Poorer areas are wishing that the state were more involved. Articles have appeared that call for the county and central authorities to pick up more of the cost and management of education, which would represent a major reversal of decentralization leading to recentralization (Cheng, 1994, p. 268). In higher education, another form of recentralization is occurring through the institutional amalgamation and national consortium efforts. Creating larger and more sophisticated institutions has required a greater degree of central control thus negating some of the earlier higher education decentralization practices. Problems include partners being put together against their will, academic drift as a result of smaller colleges being absorbed by larger institutions, narrower range of teaching and research activities to achieve economies of scale, and lower staff morale and academic quality (Fang, 1998). The Chinese state appears to be caught between a centralist, corporatist ideology (Leninism) and an economic market movement toward decentralization, which is dragging other social sectors, such as education, along.
WALKING ON THREE LEGS
37
This contradiction has been recognized at the very highest levels and among educators. Zhu Rongji has stated that there remains a continuing problem of disengaging the huge government bureaucracy from local management decentralization reforms (Xinhua, July 23, 1999). Government cadres continue to meddle in local reforms in efforts to hang on to power. “Delegating power and conceding profits” has clearly resulted in some economic gains but also has created economic fiefdoms and regional protectionism (Inside Mainland China, 1997, p. 1). CPC cadres are being charged with attempting to “recover planned economics style power” and basically recentralizing power at the local level (Inside Mainland China, 1997, p. 2). This has resulted in the creation of redundant bureaucracies with numerous laws and regulations that in fact inhibit individuals and enterprises seeking to take advantage of the devolution of power and authority by Beijing in such areas as education. Educators have also spoken out on the lack of progress in educational decentralization. At a conference held in Beijing by the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference, it was noted that the SEC was the “most conservative of all the ministries and commissions” (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1998, p. 2). The SEC is characterized as being backward and rooted in the planned economy mode, basically maintaining a monopoly on educational matters. It was noted that “the scale of enrollment and details of specialties, teaching materials, and curricula of all schools are managed and controlled uniformly” (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1998). The Ministry of Education, which replaced the SEC has been more open to change but is also regarded as conservative (Ma, 2005). How much decentralization reforms have contributed to a decline in attainment, literacy and other educational measures is also an area of debate. Some scholars have argued that the fiscal reforms may have had a negative effect on educational attainment as measured by enrollments, rural–urban disparities, and drop-out rates (Bakken, 1988; Lo, 1994; Pepper, 1990). A more recent quantitative study, however, suggests a more complicated picture (Tsui, 1997). Regional disparities indeed exist, “In the post-Mao era of fiscal decentralization there has been a strong incentive for local governments to invest in projects which can quickly earn profits and generate tax revenues . . . with the result that investment in education has been a low priority” (Tsui, 1997, p. 108). Yet, it does not appear that there has been an overall decline in enrollments and attendance in primary and lower-secondary schools. Nor is there any strong evidence to suggest that literacy has suffered as a result of the reforms although the Chinese government seems concerned about it (State Education Commission, 1994; Tsui, 1997). Tsui’s study presents a complex picture of the effect of the fiscal and educational decentralization on educational attainment arguing that one must not deduce regional and interregional problems for national problems. Nevertheless, he concludes, “in absolute terms, there are still many children who cannot go to school for various reasons” (Tsui, 1997, p. 127). This is especially true for rural girls who are being kept out of school more than boys and who drop-out at a higher rate (China, 1999). That State Council has also demonstrated its concern that all is not well with the decentralization of basic education and has identified management, funding and teacher education as areas in need of improvement (State Council, 2001). The rising number of private schools has also been a cause for alarm among China’s educational leaders. In 1997, the State Council issued a document entitled: “Stipulations for Schools Run Through the Energies of Society” (Inside Mainland
38
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
China, 1998). Unwilling to use the term “private” schools, these schools were known officially by the rather awkward phrase: “schools run through the energies of society, and now by translating min ban to the phrase, “ non governmental schools”.” Among the problems identified by educational officials are that many of these schools are only for the rich, they deviate excessively from the approved state curriculum, school administrators do not follow the approved regulations, there is too much emphasis on turning a profit, and they follow a “patriarchal” management style (i.e. tyrannical) (Inside Mainland China, 1998, p. 3). This has been changing as a new, younger leadership group is emerging.
6.
CONCLUSION
What can be said about China’s educational reforms and decentralization effects? Have they been successful, unsuccessful? Going back to Hanson (this volume) and Bray (1999), it seems clear at this stage that China’s decentralization fits the general definition of a transfer of authority (particularly financial) and decision-making from higher to lower levels, but it is less clear whether this is a complete devolution or more of a delegation of authority. Decentralization in China appears to have characteristics of both. The center keeps close watch on the changes that have taken place and in a corporatist political economy, with a single dominant party retaining Maoist and Leninist aspects, it is unlikely that a genuine devolution of authority can take place. And one might question whether it should at this stage in China’s development. China, unlike other socialist states in transition, has moved cautiously in all of its efforts to disengage the state from various aspects of Chinese society and as a result has avoided some of the catastrophic problems other nations have faced. Decentralization per se is not necessarily a good thing. There is a role for central government to play during a transitional period that helps maintain stability and resolve regional inequities. Yet, the reduced visibility and participation of the central state in educational matters has changed the way local citizens, particularly in the rural areas, view the state. The very term “state” is much more vague now, leading some scholars to conclude that the legitimacy of the state has eroded: “. . . the state is continuously undermining its old foundations of legitimacy. It is also continuously nurturing a new kind of legitimacy which makes decentralization irreversible” (Cheng, 1994, p. 267). In the long run, this may be true. but as was shown in the recentralization of the tax process, the state can quickly reassert itself. There is mounting concern in Beijing about the quality of schooling, particularly private schools, and the Ministry of Education is defensive about a perception that decentralized education is superior to the former state-controlled model. The central authorities just do not have the financial resources any longer to run everything. What is emerging is a complex mix of precollegiate schooling opportunities with the state providing “guidance,” rules, and regulations to the three tiered system: public–state supported schools, public–community-run schools (minban), and variations of private schools. And in higher education, so-called minban colleges and universities are increasingly playing a larger role in China’s overall effort to expand higher education opportunities (Quddis, 2000).
WALKING ON THREE LEGS
39
Thus in a nation as large and disparate as China it is difficult to reach any specific conclusions as to what has worked and what has not worked in the current educational reform movement. Decentralization seems to be working in some selected areas and not working in others. The central authorities seem conflicted about how much authority and responsibility they want to devolve to the local level, and CPC cadres operating at the local level have created recentralized regimes of their own. What does seem clear is that there are both strengths and weaknesses to China’s approach to decentralization, and it remains to be seen what specific strategies will be used to resolve some of these contradictions. As we enter 2005 and China begins to take its place as a leading force in the world—joining WTO, hosting the Olympics, seeking to be the principal regional leader in Asia—educational decentralization seems to be driven less by a desire for real educational change and more by a desire to make the nation appear to be like other leading powers. The ambiguity seen in educational decentralization reforms thus far means that we are likely to witness more of a rather awkward balancing act of “walking on three legs.” NOTES 1. Project 211 is aimed at providing the country with a cadre of high level human resources and enhance overall international competitiveness. Hundred institutions are being targeted to focus on national strategic goals in science and technology. 2. An interesting variant of curricular decentralization is a program initiated by the SEC to encourage primary and middle school teachers to develop innovative teaching soft-ware and send it to the Textbook Department of the SEC for possible inclusion in officially approved curricula (Cui, 1999, July 15).
7.
REFERENCES
Bahl, R. W. (1998). China: Evaluating the impact of intergovernmental fiscal reform. In R. Bird and V. Vaillancort (Eds.), Fiscal decentralization in developing countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bakken, B. (1988). Backwards reform in chinese education. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 19(20), 127–163. Bray, M. (1999). Control of education: Issues and tensions in centralization and decentralization. In R. Arnove and C. Torres (Eds.), Comparative education: The dialectic of the global and the local (pp. 207–232). Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield. British Broadcasting Corporation. (1998, June 19). Education commission criticized as too conservative, creativity stifled. Cheng, K. M. (1994). The changing legitimacy in a decentralizing system: The state and education development in China. International Journal of Educational Development, 14(3), 265–269. Cheng, K. M. (1997). The meaning of decentralization: Looking at the case of China. In W. Cummings and N. McGinn (Eds.), International handbook of education and development: Preparing schools, students and nations for the twenty-first century. New York: Pergamon. China Daily. (1997a, September 4). China: Quality oriented education to speed up, pp. 1–3. China Daily. (1997b, September 19). Schooling goes joint venture in Shanghai, pp. 1–2. China Daily. (1999a, July 3). Chinese families spend more on child education, pp. 1–2. China Daily. (1999b, June 21). Education deserves top role, pp. 1–2. China minister on progress in science, technology, education and health care, 2001, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political, March 6. China: Rural girls left out of school, 1999, New York Times, November 1. China and Taiwan unite in the educational arena, 2001, PR Newswire, May 10. Chinese Education at a Glance, 1994. Beijing: State Education Commission. Cui, L. (1993, May 31 to June 6). New target for educational reform. Beijing Review, 13–18.
40
WALKING ON THREE LEGS
Cui, N. (1999a, June 2). Guizhou schools try new approaches. China Daily, 1. Cui, N. (1999b, June 3). Hunan schools provide example. China Daily, 1. Cui, N. (1999c, June 11). County develops education. China Daily, 1. Cui, N. (1999d, July 15). Software to push education. China Daily, 1. Current Issues in Chinese Higher Education, 2001. Paris: OECD. Curriculum reform to open new courses in autumn semester, 2001, People’s Daily Online, August 8. Curriculum system to see changes in primary and middle schools, 2001, China Daily Online, January 9. Fang, Z. (1998, February 5). A remarkable move of restructuring: Chinese higher education. Education Policy Analysts Archives, 6(5), 13–27. Fang, S., Zhang, L., & Zhang, X. (2001, August 16). Public spending spurs growth. China Daily. Fu, Z. (2001, April 14). College kid generation comes of age. South China Morning Post, 1. Hanson, M. E. (1993). Strategies of educational decentralization: Key questions and core issues. Journal of Educational Administration, 36(2), 111–128. Hawkins, J. E. (1973, Fall 1973). Deschooling society Chinese style: Alternative forms of non-formal education. Educational studies, 1–10. Hawkins, J. N. (1999). Recent higher education reform in China: Problems and prospects. ESTP Conference Proceedings. Paris: ESTP Press. Hawkins, J. N., Zhou, N. Z., & Lee, J. (2001). Balancing the collective and the individual: Values education in China. In W. Cummings, T. Tatto, and J. Hawkins (Eds.), Values education for dynamic societies: Individualism or collectivism. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Inside Mainland China. (1997, October 1). The role of local party and government agencies after delegating power and conceding profits, pp. 1–3. Inside Mainland China. (1998, October 1). Problems for private schools, pp. 1–4. Ji, B. (2000, December 22). Education must be reformed. China Daily, 1. Jiang stresses role of non-state sector, 2001, China Daily, March 5. Kwong, J. (1996). Introduction. Chinese Education, 29(5), 3–6. Lin, J. (1997). Introduction. Chinese Education, 30(1), 3–7. Lo, L. N. (1994). The changing education system: Dilemma of disparity. In J. Cheng and F. Brosseau (Eds.), China Review 1993. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Lu, C. (2000, February 26). Brain drain fears arise over foreign study allure. China Daily, 1. Ma, W. H. (2005). Globalization and paradigm change in higher education: A case analysis of China, Unpublished paper given at the conference on new educational paradigms, East West Center, September, 2004. Minnesota private college council leads trade mission: Delegation aims to advance Chinese private education systems, 2001, PR Newswire, November 1. Mok, K. H. (1997). Retreat of the state: Marketization of education in the Pearl River Delta. Comparative Education Review, 41(3), 260–276. Mok, K. H., & Wat, K. Y. (1998). Merging of the public and private boundary: Education and the market place in China. Journal of Educational Development, 18(3), 255–267. NPC Vice Chairwoman Peng stresses basic education for rural areas, 2001, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political, March 12. Oi, J. C. (1995). The role of the local state in China’s transitional economy. The China Quarterly, 1132–1149. Oi, J. C. (1999). Rural China takes off: Institutional foundations of economic reform. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pepper, S. (1990). China’s education reform in the 1980s. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies. Premier calls for breakthrough in basic education reform, 2001, People’s Daily, June 14, p. 2. Project 211: A brief introduction, 2001, China Education and Research Network (CERNET), August 3. Quiddis, M. (2000, July). The world-wide movement in private universities. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 59(3). Reform of China’s Educational Structure—Decision of the CPC Central Committee, 1985. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Shen, A. (1994). Teacher education and national development in China. Journal of Education, 176(2), 57–71. Solinger, D. J. (1999). Contesting citizenship in urban China: Peasants, migrants, the state and the logic of the market. Berkeley: University of California Press. State council issues decision on basic education reform, 2001, Xinhua News Agency, June 14. State Education Commission. (1994). The development and reform of education in China. Beijing, China, p. 53.
WALKING ON THREE LEGS
41
Tang, M. (1999). Public schools cannot meet people’s demands for education: Private institutions win support, June 19, p. 1. Tao, Z., & Zhou, H. F. (1998). Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic growth in China. Journal of Public Economics, 67(2), 221–240. Tatto, M. T. (1999). Education reform and state power in Mexico: The paradoxes of decentralization. Comparative Education Review, 43(3), 251–282. Tsui, K. Y. (1997). Economic reform and attainment in basic education in China. China Quarterly, 104–127. Vice Premier. (2001, June 12). Education reforms should be deepened. China Daily, 1. Wu, Y. (2000, December 29). Educational reform refined for 2001. China Daily. Xin, X. (1984, April 9). Peasants run their own schools. Beijing Review, 4–5. Xin, Z. (2001, March 7). Tax reform not to affect education. China Daily, 1. Xinhua. (1995, May 27). China to reform senior high schools, pp. 1–2. Xinhua. (1997a, July 16). China reforms elementary education. Xinhua. (1997b, November 23). New curriculum popular among pupils, pp. 1–2. Xinhua. (1997c, November 25). Government pays for education in China, pp. 1–2. Xinhua. (1997d, November 25). Vice premier discusses role of education in economic growth, pp. 1–2. Xinhua. (1999, July 23). Premier addresses meeting on local government structural reform. Xinhua. (2001a, July 7). Private food and dormitory services available. Xinhua. (2001b, July 10). National unified exams still necessary. Yeung, L. (2001, February 3). Mainland academics demand greater autonomy and funding. South China Morning Post. Yeung, L., & Cheung G. (2001, January 13). Wake up call for sleepy students: Professors want to put a stop to dozing off in class. South China Morning Post. Zweig, D. (2001, March/April). China’s stalled ‘fifth wave’—Zhu Rongji’s reform package of 1998–2000. Asian Survey, XLI(2), 231–247.
This page intentionally blank
Chapter 3 THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF DECENTRALIZATION POLICY ON SCHOOL AUTONOMY IN GUANGDONG PROVINCE OF CHINA Jocelyn Lai-ngok Wong
1.
INTRODUCTION
The decision to decentralize education systems is often predicated on the assumption that such a move will enhance the autonomy of local schools. According to this line of reasoning, in a decentralized system, schools will use their heightened authority to make curricular content more relevant to local interests and demands. Such discussions, however, have largely ignored local interpretation of decentralization policies. It is important and necessary to examine educational decentralization policies from the local perspective, for the ways in which local education stakeholders understand, interpret, and react to policy changes will have a direct impact on their implementation in the schools. China has been experimenting with educational decentralization for almost two decades. Financial considerations have provided the primary motive for decentralizing the Chinese educational system. The state, which has been struggling to provide adequate funds for the nation’s schools, has been searching for new financial and administrative models (Bray, 2003; Hawkins, 2000; Paine, 1998). To this end, transferring the fiscal burdens from the central government to the local level (which includes several levels of local government, communities, individuals, and even the private sector), was viewed as a means of remedying the nation’s financial problems. It is interesting to note that while the primary catalyst for educational decentralization in the West has been the New Right Ideology, the allure of marketization in education has driven the Chinese government’s policy shift. Interestingly, research on educational reform in China has not devoted significant attention to the voices of principals and teachers. This study, in contrast, takes a close look at how principals and teachers from seven schools in Guangdong Province viewed and interpreted decentralization policies designed to promote local school autonomy. I explore individual interpretations of educational reforms, and link the individual dimension of this process to larger issues related to state control and market principles in the education sector. In this chapter, I examine the extent to which autonomy is transferred to the school level, as well as the mechanisms the state has utilized in attempt to augment its own authority. Another factor I explore is the link between culture and educational practice. Previously published research on educational decentralization has tended to avoid consideration of the cultural dimensions of policy implementation. As I will show, China’s unique cultural heritage 43 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 43–58. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
44
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
has had an important influence on the ways that education stakeholders interpret and implement decentralization policies. 2.
THEORETICAL CONTEXT
Decentralization in education has been one of the major components of global educational policy direction since the early 1980s. It has been treated by many as a panacea that will lead to improvements in the quality of education. Such claims rest upon the assumption that the delegation of power can establish closer linkages between schools and other educational stakeholders, and curricular content will become more relevant to local demands and resources (e.g., see Elmore, 1993; Levin, 1998; Patrinos & Ariasingam, 1997; Rhoten, 2000; Tracy, 1997). A decentralized education system, therefore, respond to local markets. It is also expected that students’ performance can be improved when local institutions are granted more autonomy over their affairs (Bulkley, 2002; Sharpe, 1996). Research suggests that several beneficial effects can be achieved if autonomy of schools is increased. First, strong professional communities can be developed as teachers assume more active roles in defining their working environments and professional development plans (Briggs & Wohlstetter, 2003; Eilason, 1996). Second, school autonomy appears to provide an impetus for mobilizing local resources with the aim of resolving the financial straits of local education (Bray & Borevskaya, 2001). Third, school autonomy facilitates closer ties between schools and school districts. Schools are then prepared to respond positively and react quickly to market demands and changing local needs (Astiz et al., 2002; Murphy, 1991). As the educational content is made relevant to local conditions and schools are held accountable to clients’ needs, schools are assumed to have more power to cope with their unique problems (Levin, 1998; Patrinos & Ariasingam, 1997). Some scholars, however, believe that there is still a distance to go before accepting these conclusions (e.g., Green, 1997, 1999; Helsby, 1999; Helsby & McCulloch, 1996; Whitty & Power, 2002). Scholars such as Ball (1994, 1999), Halsey et al. (1997), Helsby (1999), and Whitty and coworkers (1997a,b, 1998, 2002) have examined the issue of educational decentralization on a macro-structural level, and view the shift in policy as a combination of state control and market driven values. They regard decentralization in education not as a means of improving system productivity; instead, decentralization is considered a “governance strategy” the state may employ to uphold its legitimacy, and to recentralize its control over the schools (e.g., Benveniste, 2002; Dale, 1997; Hawkins, 2000; Karlsen, 2000; Leung, 2003; Tracy, 1997). This research literature raises some important questions about the assumption that educational decentralization will increase local school autonomy. Several studies have cast doubts on relations between decentralization policy and school autonomy. Thus far, there is still little evidence that an expansion of the decision-making power of schools will result from delegating power from the top. Increasing school autonomy may be a symbolic response that actually functions to quiet conflict and restore confidence (Malen, Ogawa, & Kranz, 1990a,b). This perspective is particularly prevalent in studies that examine links between educational decentralization and political reform (e.g., see Bjork, 2003; Bray & Borevskaya, 2001; Hanson, 1990, 1995, 1997; Lundahl, 2002; McGinn & Street, 1986; Ornelas, 2000;
EFFECTS OF LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF DECENTRALIZATION POLICY
45
Tatto, 1999; Tracy, 1997). Decentralization in education is not only an instrument to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of education systems, but also a mechanism for managing conflict and maintaining the legitimacy of modern states (Benveniste, 2002; Fiske, 1996; Weiler, 1989, 1990). Stated simply, decentralization in education, as Karlsen (2000) argues, can be perceived as a way to transmit conflicts and problems from the central to periphery and to reestablish legitimate authority of the state. Recently, the study of decentralization policies in education has been situated in the context of New Right Movements in the West. Devolution of authority to schools and the introduction of school-based management have been accompanied by a managerial revolution of the New Right Ideology. This body of research highlights two interesting characteristics of recent devolutions of authority. First, there has been a steady increase in the transfer of financial and managerial control over schools to local levels (either schools or parents). Second, centrally defined goals often continue to influence what schools teach and how their performance is assessed (e.g., Helsby, 1999; Whitty, Power, & Halpin, 1998). Because most governments in the West are attempting to transfer educational responsibilities, especially fiscal burdens, to local communities and parents, decentralization constitutes a way of maintaining standards of education within an affordable budget (Halsey et al., 1997). As entrepreneurial cultures to adopt market principals and business management models, education is treated as a private good rather than a social responsibility (Whitty, 1997a). Business concepts, such as “scientific management,” “client-based service,” “effectiveness,” and “efficiency” all encourage the creation of competitive cultures within schools. Perhaps more importantly, a recent trend of decentralization in the West is the pairing of transfers of power to individual schools with even stricter central controls (e.g., see studies from Apple, 2000; Ball, 1994; McCulloch, Helsby, & Knight, 2000; Whitty, Power, & Halpin, 1998). A series of performance indicators, such as “examination league tables,” “inspections,” and “appraisals” are employed to assess school performance. In other words, the state applies task-setting and goal-oriented approaches, but also devolves responsibility for goal achievement through the schoolbased management system to maintain its control on the education sector (Ball, 1998; Fergusson, 2000; Helsby, 1999; Menter & Muschamp, 1999). Educational decentralization may therefore lead to increased bureaucratic control over schools through standardization and evaluation (Apple, 2001; Majhanovich, 2003; Whitty & Power, 2002; Whitty, Power, & Halpin, 1998). Devolution of responsibility in education can lead to the “devolution of blame” (Whitty, Power, & Halpin, 1998, p. 113) and assignment of “the blame for cutbacks” to individual schools (Angus, 1994). Educational decentralization in the West can be viewed as primarily rhetorical, concealing the fact that the state is gradually retreating from its fiscal responsibility, transferring this burden to the general public through market mechanisms. Such policy changes may actually result in a reconcentration of power within the state. That is, the process of decentralization in education is accompanied by the notion of recentralization (Bulkley, 2002; Hawkins, 2000; Ornelas, 2000). Karlsen (2000) calls situations in which power remains in the hands of the central after decentralization policies have been adopted “decentralized centralism.” Given these perspectives, the notion of allowing a high level of school autonomy within the context of decentralization has been called into question. Self-management of schools can be viewed as a mechanism for delivering reforms rather than a vehicle
46
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
for promoting initiative and innovation because the state maintains control “over the discourse of self management and over the indicators of performance rather than over practice” (Ball, 1994, p. 80). As Chitty and Lawn (1995) argued, “schools rarely have unlimited autonomy without regard to system-wide policy parameters and agreed national standards” (p. 141). Therefore, it is necessary to examine carefully what decisions are assigned to the school level before instituting decentralization in education. 3.
METHODOLOGY
This study presents principals’ views and teachers’ perceptions toward school autonomy. The data are derived from 75 interviews with educators working in seven schools located in Guangzhou, Panyu, Shenzhen, and Conghua, all of which are urban areas of Guangdong Province, China. The reasons for choosing Guangdong Province as the research locality for this study are twofold. First, Guangdong Province has been ranked as one of the most affluent provinces in China, and has experienced a significant economic boom over the last two decades. Recent economic growth has created concern among local communities and government bodies related to the schools’ ability to respond to new market demands. Second, Guangdong families’ investment in education has been increasing steadily, and the average annual income is higher than in most other provinces. This has lead to increasing marketization of education, a trend that has persisted over the last decade. The seven schools in this study included two key point (elite) grammar schools (Schools K1 and K2), one vocational school (School V), one regular grammar school (School N), and three high-fee paying private schools (Schools P1, P2, and P3). All public schools studied were recommended by local education bureaus, and the three private schools were selected based on recommendations from personal contacts. I conducted a total of 75 interviews. Most interviewees were chosen from a pool of teachers recommended by school administrators; 9 were principals or vice principals, and 28 were responsible for school administration. Sixty of the interviewees came from inland China. Semi-structured and informal interviews were used during the data collection process. All semi-structured interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded for data analysis. The coding process involved three steps: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 4.
AN INCREASE OF SCHOOL AUTONOMY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF DECENTRALIZATION
Since the state has steadily reduced its financial responsibilities for education in China over the last two decades, it is important to investigate whether this shift in policy has been accompanied by an increase in the level of autonomy delivered to schools. The discussion below will be framed using the table below (Table 3.1), which draws from Dale’s ideas (1997) about educational governance. Attention to the factors included in the table will help to clarify whether or not schools have been granted more authority as a result of the educational decentralization policies implemented in Guangdong, China.
EFFECTS OF LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF DECENTRALIZATION POLICY
47
Table 3.1: Governance Activities in Education and Related Coordinating Institutions Coordinating Institutions Governance Activities
School Matters
Funding
School finance
Regulation
Educational goals School management Personnel and staffing
Provision/delivery
Curriculum setting Student recruitment
State
Market
Community
Note: Modified from Dale (1997, p. 275).
4.1.
Funding: School Finance
One unique feature of China’s approach to educational decentralization is that public schools have their own channels, which are named “creation of income” (chuangshou), for generating the revenue to cover approximately 20% of their expenses. Accepting extra students beyond the official quotas seems to be the most popular way of improving the financial status of the public schools I studied. Generally speaking, parents are willing to pay sponsorship fees to schools that are willing to accept their children for admission—even if they do not meet the schools’ entrance requirements. This acceptance channel is called “out of plan” (jiwaisheng). These students are not only an important financial source for schools; they also create linkages between the outside sectors and the schools. Schools have the final say about who will be accepted through the “out of plan” channel. As one teacher explained, “Even though parents are ready to pay for it, our school has the ultimate selection power to choose who will be accepted [through the ‘out of plan’ channel]” (Interview N-5). Running income-producing business provides schools with another way to increase their financial resources. Two of the public schools I studied, Schools V and N, have employed this strategy. School V has established three computer technology companies. A portion of the profits generated by these three companies is allocated to the school’s operating budget. School N rents its premises out to generate additional income. The educational funding mechanisms used by private schools are completely different from those relied on by public ones. Educational debentures were the predominant mode of private education funding in Guangdong during 1990s (Bao, 1998). School P3 was a pioneer of the debenture system. Deposits from parents were invested in the business sector, and the profits were used to improve the school’s financial situation. After 1999, the private schools studied gradually shifted from the debenture system to a fee paying system due to two factors: the economic downturn in China after the economic recession in Asia; and the Guangdong Provincial Education Department’s prohibition of school use of the debenture system. There are some other ways that private schools can secure their financial health. For example, the Director of school P3, who is also the founder of the school, established his school as a company in the stock market in Shanghai as a way to invigorate its fiscal position. All in all, schools’ autonomy over financial matters has increased significantly in both public and private institutions as a result of the government’s promotion of educational decentralization. Local communities and the market have also influenced the funding of educational institutions. Education now seems to be treated as a
48
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
commodity (Chan, 2003). The state’s retreat from the provision of welfare services has led to the acceptance of “self-financed” and “high-priced” students, regardless of their academic performance (Lo, 1993). Allowing schools the autonomy to accept self-financed students, as Paine (1998) points out, can provide schools with additional fees or student places they can trade with nearby institutions. 4.2.
Regulation 1: Educational Goals
The ultimate educational goal in China is to improve the intellectual capabilities of school graduates so that the nation will be more competitive in the global marketplace. However, with permission from the local education departments, the public schools I studied could create their own goals. Local demand has led School F, for example, to focus on foreign language instruction. Another institutions, School V, has adopted the role of training a commercial labor force for the local business market. Given this situation, the power to make decisions related to the development plans for individual schools rests in the hands of local education departments rather than in the schools themselves. One teacher highlighted this situation: “These [educational goals] are set up by the provincial education department, and we have no power to say ‘no’ in this matter. We have to follow instructions from the education department” (Interview K2-3). Private schools have considerable autonomy in setting educational goals even though they are still regulated by education departments through the state’s promulgation of “The Provisional Regulations on Social Forces Running Schools” (1997) (hereafter “Provisional Regulations”). Private schools often have an explicit business agenda behind their educational goals. For example, School P1’s development was driven by a real estate business project. The school was created not to serve an educational need, but as a means of acquiring land from the local government that could be used for real estate development. School P1 actually used education to sell real estate. The principal of the school did not attempt to hide this situation: “We are using education for selling real estate. Then, the properties that we sell can improve our school’s developmental plan and education” (Interview P1-1). 4.3.
Regulation 2: School Management
Educational decentralization in China has led to the emergence of what is referred to as a “principal’s responsibility system” of school management. The implications of this system vary, depending on whether a school is public or private. Principals are now expected to have greater decision-making powers than in the past. In actuality, however, private school principals have limited power and authority when it comes to matters related to school operations. Unlike the public schools, where principals are perceived as the primary decision-makers in most school matters, Boards of Directors provide important input into the decision-making process at private schools. These Boards are often organized by the investment companies linked with private schools. Private schools generally experience more direct pressure to respond to the market, and their management practices reflect this. Three of the private schools I studied were actually set up by private business ventures. As I note above, School P1 was created by a real estate company for the purpose of obtaining land from the local
EFFECTS OF LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF DECENTRALIZATION POLICY
49
government. The Board of Directs at School P1 includes only two members: the Director of that real estate company and an Education Officer from the company who is in charge of education matters at the school. The principal is not included on the Board. School P2 was founded by a real estate/entertainment company. The company used the school to acquire debentures from parents, which it then invested in its own business. The Board included only a company Chair, an Education Officer, and the Chief Principal of the school. The education officers are not actively involved in the daily operations of the school. Directors of business companies typically have the final say in all decisions made for the schools. As these examples suggest, the directors from the business companies—not the principals, teachers, or parents—have the final say over school matters. The boards of these companies operate independently from the academic departments of the schools, and are responsible for the administrative issues of the private schools they oversee. However, decisions made by the boards directly affect the daily operations of the academic departments. The directors of the boards tend to have more decisionmaking power than any school-based employees. As one teacher from School P1 observed, “Directors make all the decisions, and we have to follow their instructions” (Interview P1-6). Teachers and parents are excluded from these boards. The management style of private schools could therefore be described as “outsiders managing insiders.” 4.4.
Regulation 3: Staffing and Personnel
One positive development that has resulted from the adoption of educational decentralization policies in Guangdong, China has been increased flexibility in personnel matters. The Teacher Laws enacted in 1993 clearly state that schools and other educational institutions should gradually establish a “teachers’ employment system.” This system provides schools with the autonomy to independently recruit employees; schools are no longer solely dependent on employment arrangements established by the state. Graduates from universities or teachers colleges send their applications directly to the schools. Recruiting high quality teachers is regarded as an effective and important way to improve and sustain the academic status of schools, especially in the eyes of potential students. Both public and private schools in Guangdong, particularly in urban areas, are likely to offer financial incentives (such as salaries up to five times higher than those offered by inland schools) to recruit well-qualified teachers. Of the 12 educators I interviewed at School V, 6 also work as university lecturers; 3 of the 10 interviewees at School K1 are university lecturers from inland normal universities or teachers colleges. Highly regarded teachers also work in the private schools I studied. The principal of school P1, for example, is one of the best-known mathematics teachers in China and is known for his creative instructional methods. The principal of School P2 was ranked as one of the best performing principals in his hometown and has published several articles about Chinese language teaching. All of this supports the view that the quality of education for an entire province can be improved if schools are given more autonomy in over staffing issues. One key point school teacher highlighted the importance of recruiting well-qualified and experienced teachers from inland: “If a [non-local]
50
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
teacher is selected, definitely the quality of that teacher should be very good. The academic standard of our school can be improved in this way” (Interview K2-6). Nevertheless, autonomy in staff recruitment of public schools is not unlimited. It is controlled by a quota system that is predetermined by local education departments. Schools use a variety of mechanisms to maximize their labor forces under the existing quota system. Firstly, schools have the flexibility to employ fewer teachers than the quotas require. Vacancies may be kept open until individuals considered to be suitable candidates apply for these positions. Secondly, public schools sometimes recruit part time staff as a way to improve the quality of teaching on their campuses. Thirdly, teachers in China are generally controlled by a “personnel record system” (renshi dangan), which requires that all teachers’ personal files (including curriculum vitae, resume, letter of release, assessment reports from leaders, personal evaluation records, etc.) be held at their original schools until principals and education departments officially approve their applications for transfers to other schools. Without these records, teachers are unlikely to obtain permanent teaching position in any state-funded institutions. Principals have the ultimate power to keep all these records, and can refuse to transfer the best performing teachers to other schools. Retaining human resources is thus perceived as a form of school autonomy. As one principal stated, “We have the autonomy to keep the teachers that we want” (Interview V-8). The implementation of the teachers’ employment system has created a great deal of stress for private school teachers. The annual teacher turnover rate at the three private schools I studied averaged 10%. This system helps some private schools to enhance the quality of their teaching force and to retain students. It also creates a great deal of pressure on private school teachers to improve their performance so as to secure their jobs. Although both public and private schools have been granted greater autonomy in the area of personnel and staffing as a result of recently adopted decentralized policies, the teachers’ employment system seems to have had a more substantial impact on private schools. 4.5.
Provision/Delivery 1: Curriculum Setting
One major feature of many of the educational decentralization policies designed in the West is the delegation of power over curricular matters to lower levels. This provides schools and teachers with more freedom to select and arrange the most appropriate curriculum to fit the needs of local communities and students. Since the mid-1980s, local curriculum planning has been permitted in China, but it consists of “one curriculum framework and multi edition textbooks” (yigangduoben) (Decisions, 1985; Outlines, 1993). Different versions of textbooks may be selected, but they must conform to a standard teaching framework, which is predetermined by central authorities. Individual schools do not enjoy ultimate power over the design of their curricula. Decisions about what is taught in schools are determined by an important underlying factor: pressure to prepare students for examinations. All of the public junior secondary schools studied have their own district examination “league tables.” Junior secondary school students are required to take district-based examinations each year. These examinations are designed by teachers from different schools in the same locality. The results are published in a format, known as a “league table,” that allows people to compare school performance by subject and grade level.
EFFECTS OF LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF DECENTRALIZATION POLICY
51
Student performance on high school entrance examinations also has a direct impact on the status of schools. As a result, textbook selection and teaching content are driven by public examinations. This examination effect influences instruction in both public and private schools because the pursuit of academic excellence becomes an important avenue for upgrading the status of schools, particularly if they face serious market competition. In such situations, a high level of school autonomy in deciding curriculum is unlikely to occur. However, the schools I studied still have very limited autonomy over certain segments of the curriculum, such as foreign language studies (e.g., Japanese) and vocational subjects. In summary, the curriculum is mostly controlled by the state through the examination system. As the following quotation suggests, teachers continue to feel that their ability to influence curricular content is limited: “We have no right to do this [designing curriculum] because we need to follow the main stream” (Interview P16). In most schools, there is only minor input, or no input, from members of school communities. 4.6.
Provision/Delivery 2: Student Recruitment
Public schools in Guangdong now have more autonomy in the area of student recruitment than they did prior to the introduction of decentralization policies. As I mention above, although public examination results act as the most important mechanism for allocating students to different types of schools, underperforming students are sometimes accepted through the “out of plan” channel. These students, in fact, are commonly accepted to public schools, especially those designated as “key point” grammar schools. The number of “out of plan” students is regulated by a quota system set by local education departments, which limits the number of this type of student to a maximum of 10 students per class. In practice, however, schools do not always adhere to this quota system. Each class of School K2, for example, contains between 56 and 70 students, including an unknown amount of “out of plan” students. A vice principal at the school remarked that, “Our school has the autonomy to accept ‘out of plan’ students. This is our choice” (Interview K2-1). Student recruitment at private schools is almost entirely based on market competition. Private schools can recruit students from across the nation and overseas. School P3, for example, was one of the largest private schools in Guangdong, with almost 2,300 students. Students at the school came from Guangdong province, other regions of China, and Southeast Asia. Public schools do not have this luxury. In addition, they have to make decisions about student admissions based on examination results. As a result, the pool of candidates for private schools tends to be much larger than for public schools. 5.
WAYS FOR THE STATE TO UPHOLD ITS LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY AND POWER
The Chinese government believes that educational decentralization requires “a shift from the state education system to a state-community one” (Bray & Borevskaya, 2001, p. 358). It is assumed that such a shift will influence the extent of the state’s authority. This study shows that educational decentralization has increased the schools’ ability to determine certain aspects of school matters. However, the state still has
52
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
the ultimate decision-making power over a variety of functions carried out in the schools. These include curriculum and textbook design, staffing control, and student recruitment through quota systems, all of which are a part of bureaucratic control from the state, as explained above. On the surface, it might seem that schools have more flexibility and autonomy in academic matters than in the past. However, this flexibility is quite limited. A principal observed that, “In our country, it is important for us to follow the laws and regulations set by the top” (Interview K2-3). Despite the fact that private schools now have the authority to generate funds, the state continues to use its political power and the legal system to regulate the private school system. One private school teacher summarized this situation as follows: “Most educational decisions are actions of the state. The state has the ultimate power” (Interview P2-4). Another observed that, “Everything has to depend on the top . . . the gatekeeper is the government” (Interview P2-2). Despite demonstrating public support for educational decentralization, the state also appears intent on protecting its own legitimacy. More importantly, the state has maintained the authority to assess the achievement of schools using league tables and, in turn, to provide rewards and punishments based on the schools’ performance. This tendency parallels the Western practice of combining financial devolution of the education system with “an increased control by means of measurement of output” (Bottery and Wright, 2000, p.16). Here, academic performance on examinations represents the output. The standardized examination system is a powerful device for controlling the schools I studied. For example, examination scores for all public schools are made available to the principals and teachers in district-based league tables. Examination results from each junior secondary school are disaggregated so that the academic achievement of each school can be compared. Scores are broken down by grade level. If a public school’s performance on these tests is considered unsatisfactory, the annual assessment mark of that school will be reduced, and the quota for student acceptance will be lowered. If the school does not remedy this situation, it will not be considered a progressive school (a label that can increase a school’s status). Private schools also focus on their students’ performance on exams out of an interest to sustain a competitive advantage in the market. Thus, the state now uses performance indicators to uphold, or enhance, its power over both types of schools. As Ball notes, such control over the indicators of performance and over self-management leaves the state “in the enviable position of having power without responsibility” (Ball, 1994, p. 81). As this discussion illustrates, schools do not make decisions about curricula in isolation. They must adhere to education goals set by the state, even if those objectives are not explicitly communicated to the schools. The public examinations are one tool that the state uses to control what is taught in the schools, whose public reputations depend to a great extent on the scores their students earn on the tests. In China, the examination is regarded as the most definitive measure of student, teacher, and school achievement. The state can retain its control over school practice through its manipulation of the assessments of each school, and thus restore its legitimate authority within a decentralized educational management system. This pattern is likely to be repeated in Guangdong Province, with the state maintaining its authority through bureaucratic control and oversight of public school examinations. Rather than relying on a detailed set of regulations to uphold its legitimacy, the state accomplishes
EFFECTS OF LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF DECENTRALIZATION POLICY
53
this through the goals it sets for the schools. In the schools that I studied, the state continued to demonstrate significant authority, with the market and the community providing only limited input. This represents a process of recentralization of power, even though certain managing tasks and funding responsibilities have been delegated to the local level. More significantly, this study shows that educational decentralization in Guangdong, at this stage, is simply instrumental. The state has used education policy to transfer fiscal responsibility, and certain aspects of managing tasks, to subordinate educational stakeholders in attempt to improve system effectiveness. As Chan argues, the state does not intend to make “an ideological shift to managerialism and its practices” (Chan, 2003, p. 95). In other words, the expanded market force in the education sector does not lessen the state control due to the fact that the state has carefully ensured that ultimate control is increasingly vested at its hand. 6.
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTS OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION POLICY IN CHINA
Two additional factors have influenced the ways in which the schools in this study put the educational decentralization policy into practice. 6.1.
Cultural Factors: Interpersonal Relationship (guanxi)
Discussions of educational decentralization in the West generally exclude the cultural dimension and its implications for policy change. This study indicates that culture extends an important influence over the content and outcomes of educational decentralization policies in China. Chinese respect for guanxi (interpersonal relationship) seems to be particularly significant. Principals now need to find a number of ways for generating revenue to compensate for inadequate funding from the state. From the principals’ perspective, having good relationships with other education stakeholders, such as the government, parents, and tertiary institutions, is necessary and important. Accepting “out of plan” students can help principals expand their social networks. Accordingly, principals’ personal ties and relationships with other educational stakeholders, rather than their management skills, have become a decisive factor that significantly influences the ways principals in China oversee their schools. Schools now use guanxi to resolve a wide-range school issues. As Delany and Paine (1991) observe, guanxi reinforces connections between principals and other parties that participate in educational matters. Indeed, guanxi has been a crucial factor as autonomy is reshaped at the school level. Moreover, leaders in China commonly act as clan leaders, offering comprehensive support to the employees they oversee. Walder (1983, 1986) observed factory workers in China and concluded that they are highly dependent on their supervisors for satisfaction of their personal needs. In return, workers rely on the leaders of their organizations to fulfill wide-ranging needs, and a dependency culture has been institutionalized. This kind of patron–client organizational climate also exists in schools. Approaches to the staffing of public schools provide one example of this. The Teacher Laws of 1993 clearly state that schools and other educational institutions are permitted
54
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
to dismiss incompetent staff. Three public school principals I interviewed, however, believed that this policy is still far from binding. It is unlikely for a principal to lay off an underperforming employee because, as clan leaders, they need to take teachers’ family financial issues into consideration. This patron–client relationship, thus, is perceived as a stumbling block toward accomplishing a new staffing policy because the concept of organizational dependency is still rooted deeply in public schools. Perhaps more importantly, this also helps to explain why teachers in China generally accept a top-down model of management, as the relationship between principals and teachers is based on patron–client dependency. As Pye (1995) argues, guanxi plays a “fundamental but concealed role” in shaping Chinese society. Therefore, any further examination of educational decentralization in China needs to take into consideration the effects of this on policy implementation. 6.2.
Teachers’ Views Toward Decentralization in Education
This study shows that an educational decentralization policy has not provided a supportive climate for teachers in China, who are on the front line of educational reforms, to develop strategies for responding to the current policy environment. In other words, educational decentralization has not brought a new vision of educational management. Teachers appear not to derive substantial benefits from the recent policy shift. In fact, the instructors I interviewed experienced fear, anxiety, and nervousness as a result of their increased workload. This, in turn, augmented teachers’ reluctance to accept the new power offered to them as a result of the policy shift. As yet, such a change has not stimulated teachers to become more involved in school matters. As one teacher related, “If you want teachers to have more power, they may not accept such an offer. Most of us believe that the ‘less trouble the better.’ Then, we do just enough work to get by. If I have power to make decisions, I will spend more time doing this” (Interview V11). Educational decentralization policy in China has not encouraged teachers to have more say in matters related to school operation. The working environment for teachers continues to follow a top-down bureaucratic approach that limits the growth of democratization in the schools. For the majority of teachers who took part in this study, participation is just a formality. They believe that decisions are carefully regulated by the state. The teachers I spoke with often communicated a sense of powerlessness, as the following comments suggest: “Teachers are only responsible for teaching. We have no voice in administrative work” (Interview N3). “I have no power to make any change. We have no power to make decisions” (Interview P1-2). “Frankly speaking, we don’t have much power . . . though we have a Teachers’ Representative Committee in our school, it doesn’t change a lot” (Interview K2-4). “The teachers’ union only has a symbolic function and cannot reflect the real ideas of teachers. It is really sad” (Interview V6).
EFFECTS OF LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF DECENTRALIZATION POLICY
55
At the same time, teachers have been required to adjust to new roles and duties that have emerged in conjunction with the introduction of decentralization policies and the increased influence of the market. They are generally inclined to follow bureaucratic instruction from the top instead of following their own professional judgment. 7.
CONCLUSION
As is true in many Western countries, education in China is gravitating toward decentralization through features such as strong state apparatus and market mechanism. Due to cutbacks in funding for education, the state has gradually delegated fiscal responsibility in education to local communities and individuals. The education system is shifting from a state monopoly to a mixed economy (Mok, 2000). In reviewing the issue of school autonomy in Guangdong, China, it becomes clear that the educational decentralization policy in China represents “controlled decentralization” (Hadden, 1980); the education system remains under the administrative control of the state. The introduction of decentralization policies has not completely eroded the state’s decision-making power. Despite emerging marketization and privatization in the education system, it retains a top-down, state-determined approach to the delivery of educational services. The promotion of educational decentralization policy has not caused any dramatic changes in the authority of the central government. On the contrary, the state has utilized decentralization policy to recentralize its power and authority through indirect control. In other words, educational decentralization represents a mixture of strong state control and minor input from the market and from local communities. Educational decentralization has made it possible for the state to transfer fiscal responsibility and management tasks to subordinate educational stakeholders without granting them any real power. The state has not introduced any new visions of education in conjunction with its educational decentralization project. In this sense, the autonomy of schools only exists to a limited degree, with schools controlled by quota systems, standardized curricula, and assessment systems. At this stage, an increase of school autonomy within the context of decentralization is a myth rather than a reality. More importantly, the state has introduced decentralization policies without lessening its control. It shows no signs of implementing ideological changes in the management of schools. Last but not least, this study shows that teachers’ interpersonal relationships and views on the policy shift have shaped the implementation and effects of the educational decentralization policy in the Guangdong context. 8.
REFERENCES
Angues, L. (1994). Sociological analysis and education management: The social context of the self-managing school. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 15(1), 79–91. Apple, M. W. (2000). Between neoliberalism and neoconservatism: Education and conservation in a global context. In N. C. Burbules and C. A. Torres (Eds.), Globalization and education: Critical perspectives (pp. 57–78). London: Falmer. Apple, M. W. (2001). Market, standard, teaching, and teacher education. Journal of Teacher Education, 52(3), 182–196. Astiz, M., Fernanda, W., Alexander, W., & Baker, D. P. (2002). Slouching towards decentralization: Consequences of globalization for curricular control in national education systems. Comparative Education Review, 46(1): 66–88.
56
EFFECTS OF LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF DECENTRALIZATION POLICY
Ball, S. J. (1994). Education reform: A critical and post-structural approach. Buckingham: Open University Press. Ball, S. J. (1998). Performativity and fragmentation in ‘postmodern schooling’. In J. Carter (Ed.), Postmodernity and the fragmentation of welfare (pp. 186–203). New York: Routledge. Ball, S. J. (1999). Educational reform and the struggle for the soul of the teacher. Education Policy Studies Series No. 17. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Education and Hong Kong Institute of Educational Research. Bao, Q. (Ed.) (1998). Shijie jiaoyu fazhan qushi yu zhong guo jiao yu gai ge [World education development and Chinese educational reforms]. Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu. Benveniste, L. (2002). The political structuration of assessment: Negotiating state power and legitimacy. Comparative Education Review, 46(1), 89–118. Bjork, C. (2003). Local responses to decentralization policy in Indonesia. Comparative Education Review, 47(2), 184–216. Bottery, M., & Wright, N. (2000). Teachers and the state: Towards a directed profession. New York: Routledge. Bray, M. (2003). Control of education: Issues and tensions in centralization and decentralization. In R. F. Arnove and C. A. Torres (Eds.), Comparative education: The dialectic of the global and the local (pp. 204–228). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Bray, M., & Borevskaya, N. (2001). Financing education in transitional societies: Lessons from Russia and China. Comparative Education, 37(3), 345–365. Briggs, K. L., & Wohlstetter, P. (2003). Key elements of a successful school-based management strategy. School Effectiveness and School Improvement, 14(3), 351–372. Bulkley, K. E. (2002). Recentralizing decentralization? Educational management organizations and charters schools’ educational programs. Occasional paper of National Center for the study of privatization in education of Columbia University, New York (Eric Document Reproduction No. 477185). Chan, D. K. K. (2003). Education reform policy of one country, two systems: A comparison of Mainland China and Hong Kong. World Studies in Education, 4(1), 79–101. Chitty, C., & Lawn, M. (1995). Redefining the teacher and the curriculum. Educational Review, 47(2), 139–142. Dale, R. (1997). The state and the governance of education: An analysis of the restructuring of the state–education relationship. In A. H. Halsey, Hugh Launder, Phillip Brown, and A. S. Wells (Eds.), Education: Culture, economy and society (pp. 273–282). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Delany, B., & Paine, L. (1991). Shifting patterns of authority in Chinese schools. Comparative Education Review, 35(1), 23–43. Eilason, L. C. (1996). Educational decentralization as a policy strategy in an era of fiscal stress. In J. D. Chapman, W. L. Boyd, R. Lauder, and D. Reynolds (Eds.), The reconstruction of education: Quality, equality and control (pp. 82–102). London: Cassell. Elmore, R. F. (1993). School decentralization: Who gains? Who loses? In J. Hannaway and M. Carnoy (Eds.), Decentralization and school improvement: Can we fulfill the promise (pp. 33–54). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Fergusson, R. (2000). Modernizing managerialism in education. In J. Clark, S. Gewirtz, and E. McLaughlin (Eds.), New managerialism, new welfare? (pp. 202–221). London: SAGE. Fiske, E. B. (1996). Decentralization of education: Politics and consensus. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Green, A. (1997). Educational achievement in centralized and decentralized systems. In A. H. Halsey, H. Launder, P. Brown, and A. S. Wells (Eds.), Education: Culture, economy and society (pp. 283–298). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Green, A. (1999). Education and globalization in Europe and East Asia: Convergent and divergent trends. Journal of Education Policy, 14(1), 55–71. Hadden, S. G. (1980). Controlled decentralization and policy implementation: The case of rural electrification in Rajasthan. In M. S. Grindle (Ed.), Politics and policy implementation in the Third World (pp. 190–211). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Halsey, A. H., Lauder, H., Brown, P., & Wells A. S. (Eds.) (1997). Education: Culture, economy and society. Oxford: Oxford University. Hanson, E. M. (1990). School-based management and educational reform in the United States and Spain. Comparative Education Review, 34(4), 523–537.
EFFECTS OF LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF DECENTRALIZATION POLICY
57
Hanson, E. M. (1995). Democratization and decentralization in Colombian education. Comparative Education Review, 39(1), 101–119. Hanson, E. M. (1997). Strategies of educational decentralization: Key questions and core issues. Journal of Educational Administration, 36(2), 111–128. Hawkins, J. N. (2000). Centralization, decentralization, recentralization: Educational reform in China. Journal of Educational Administration, 38(5), 443–455. Helsby, G. (1999). Changing teachers’ work: The reform of secondary schooling. Buckingham: Open University Press. Helsby, G., & McCulloch, G. (1996). Teacher professionalism and curriculum control. In I. F. Goodson and A. Hargreaves (Eds.), Teachers’ professional lives (pp. 56–73). London: Falmer. Karlsen, G. E. (2000). Decentralized centralism? Framework for a better understanding of governance in the field of education. Journal of Education Policy, 15(5), 525–538. Leung, Y. H. J. (2003). The politics of decentralization: A case study of school management reform in Hong Kong. In K. H. Mok (Ed.), Centralization and decentralization: Educational reforms and changing governance in Chinese societies (pp. 21–38). Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre of the University of Hong Kong and Kluwer Academic Publishers. Levin, B. (1998). An epidemic of education policy: (What) can we learn from each other? Comparative Education, 34(2), 131–141. Lo, L. N. K. (1993). The changing educational system: Dilemma of disparity. In J. Cheng and M. Brosseau (Eds.), China Review 1993 (pp. 22.2–22.42). Hong Kong: CUHK. Lundahl, L. (2002). Sweden: Decentralization, deregulation, quasi-markets—and then what? Journal of Education Policy, 17(6), 687–697. Majhanovich, S. (2003). Making sense of decentralization in education using a comparativist lens. Canadian and International Education, 32(1), 1–19. Malen, B., Ogawa, R. T., & Kranz, J. (1990a). Site-based management: Unfulfilled promises. The School Administrator, 47(2), 30–59. Malen, B., Ogawa, R. T., & Kranz, J. (1990b). What do we know about school-based management? A case study of the literature—A call for research. In W. H. Clune and J. F. Witte (Eds.), Choice and control in American education Vol. 2: The practice of choice: Decentralization and school improvement (pp. 289–342). London: Falmer. McCulloch, G., Helsby, G., & Knight, P. (2000). The politics of professionalism: Teachers and the curriculum. London: Continuum. McGinn, N., & Street, S. (1986). Educational decentralization: Weak state or strong state? Comparative Education Review, 30(4), 471–490. Menter, I., & Muschamp, Y. (1999). Markets and management: The case of primary schools. In M. Exworthy and S. Halford (Eds.), Professionals and new managerialism in the public sector (pp. 66–82). Buckingham: Open University Press. Mok, K. H. (2000). Social and political development in post-reform China. London: Macmillan Press. Murphy, J. (1991). Restructuring schools: Capturing and assessing the phenomena. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University.Ornelas, C. (2000). The politics of the educational decentralization in Mexico. Journal of Educational Administration, 39(5), 426–441. Paine, L. (1998). Making school modern: Paradoxes of educational reform. In A. Walder (Ed.), Zouping in transition: The process of reform in rural North China (pp. 205–273). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Patrinos, H. A., & Ariasingam, D. L. (1997). Decentralization of education: Demand-size financing. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Pye, L. W. (1995). Factions and the politics of guanxi: Paradoxes in Chinese administrative and political behaviour. The China Journal, 34, 35–53. Rhoten, D. (2000). Educational decentralization in Argentina: A ‘global–local conditions of possibility’ approach to state, market and society change. Journal of Education Policy, 15(6), 593–619. Sharpe, F. G. (1996). Towards a research paradigm on devolution. Journal of Educational Administration, 34(1), 4–23. Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory and procedures and techniques. Newbury Park: SAGE. Tatto, M. T. (1999). Education reform and state power in Mexico: The paradoxes of decentralization. Comparative Education Review, 43(3), 251–282. Tracy, M. (1997). To transfer power to transfer responsibility: Educational decentralization in Venezuela. International Journal of Educational Development, 17(2), 145–162.
58
EFFECTS OF LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF DECENTRALIZATION POLICY
Walder, A. G. (1983). Organized dependency and cultures of authority in Chinese industry. Journal of Asian Study, 43(1), 51–76. Walder, A. G. (1986). Communist neo-traditionalism: Work and authority in Chinese industry. Berkeley: University of California Press. Weiler, H. (1989). Education and power: The politics of educational decentralization in comparative perspective. Education Policy, 3(1), 31–43. Weiler, H. (1990). Comparative perspectives on educational decentralization: An exercise in contradiction? Education Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 12(4), 433–448. Whitty, G. (1997a). Creating quasi-markets in education: A review of recent research on parental choice and school autonomy in three countries. Review of Research in Education, 22, 3–47. Whitty, G. (1997b). Marketization, the state and the re-formation of the teaching profession. In A. H. Halsey, H. Lauder, P. Brown, and A. S. Wells (Eds.), Education: Culture, economy and society (pp. 299–310). Oxford: Oxford University. Whitty, G., & Power, S. (2002). Devolution and choice in three countries. In G. Whitty (Ed.), Making sense of education policy: Studies in the sociology and politics of education (pp. 46–63). London: Paul Chapman Publishing. Whitty, G., Power, S., & Halpin, D. (1998). Devolution and choice in education: The school, the state and the market. Melbourne: ACER Press. Zhonggong Zhongyang. (1985). Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaoyu tizhi gaige de jueding [Decisions on the reform of the educational system] (Official document). Zhonggong Zhongyang & Guowuyuan. (1993). Zhongguo jiaoyu gaige he fazhan gangyao [Outlines for reform and development of education in China] (Official document). Zhonggong Zhongyang & Guowuyuan. (1997). Guanyu shehui liliang bianxue guiding [The provision regulations on social forces running schools] (Official document). Zhongguo Renmin Daibiao Dehui. (1993). Zhonghua renmin guongheguo jiaoshifa [Teacher laws in China] (Official document).
Chapter 4 LIMITED DECENTRALIZATION IN THE SINGAPORE EDUCATION SYSTEM Jason Tan
1.
INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on decentralization initiatives that have taken place in the Singapore education system over the past two decades. These include the encouragement of greater school autonomy through the independent schools scheme, the autonomous schools scheme, and school clusters. Another initiative has been the promotion of aggressive inter-school competition through the annual publication of school ranking league tables and the institution of school quality awards. This sort of competition is supposed to promote diversity and choice and to improve overall educational standards. The chapter begins by discussing the goals of the various initiatives and proceeds to analyze their impact. The Singapore case exemplifies the tensions between moves to decentralize authority and control to schools, on the one hand, and government decisions that reassert the centrality of government authority and control. It appears that schools are being awarded autonomy to decide how best to attain state-determined outcomes for the entire education system. Given the heavy emphasis placed on the school system’s contributions toward improving national economic competitiveness and fostering social cohesion, the Singapore government is far from willing to allow schools full and complete autonomy. 2.
INCREASED AUTONOMY FOR SCHOOLS
During the British colonial administration of Singapore from 1819 to 1959, educational provision was left predominantly in the hands of enterprising individuals, missionary bodies, or private organizations, with occasional government grants. Schools operated in one of four languages—English, Malay, Chinese, or Tamil—and differed in terms of curricula, management, and overall goals. Interest in educational matters among the various colonial governors varied according to individual temperament and according to the strength of beliefs held by the incumbent Director of Education. Political considerations also influenced official policy. For example, in the wake of anti-Japanese activities by students from Chinese-medium schools, the Registration of Schools Ordinance of 1920 called for the registration of schools, teachers, and managers, and attempted to regulate the conduct of schools. It also outlawed all schools that promoted ideas considered to conflict with the interests of the government. The government began offering financial aid to community-run 59 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 59–70. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
60
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Chinese-medium schools in 1923. In return, the schools had to submit themselves to official inspections. The first attempt to design educational policies that related to clearly defined goals came in the form of the Ten Years Program, which was adopted in 1947. Two of the general principles underlying the policy were the need for education to foster the capacity for self-government and for education to inculcate civic loyalty and responsibility. The Program also outlined plans to provide universal free primary education and a common curriculum for all ethnic groups. This policy was promulgated against the backdrop of increasing recognition by the colonial government that self-government for the colony was on the horizon. In the wake of growing politicization of students in Chinese-medium schools and their involvement in labor unrest, the newly-installed Legislative Assembly commissioned an All-Party Committee in 1955 to study Chinese-medium education. The government responded to the Committee Report by issuing a White Paper on Education the following year that endorsed many of the Committee’s recommendations. One of these was that all four language streams of education—English, Malay, Chinese, and Tamil—were to receive equal treatment. Another recommendation was that all government and government-aided schools were to be treated equally in terms of financial grants, conditions of service, and salaries. In addition, common curricula and syllabuses were to be established for all schools. Following on the heels of the White Paper, the 1957 Education Ordinance included provisions for the registration of schools, managers, and teachers, and provisions governing the role and responsibilities of school management committees. The Ordinance was followed by regulations that gave government and governmentaided schools equal funding, and stated that staff qualifications and salaries and fees should be the same in both types of school. Government-aided schools were to adhere to standards comparable to those in government schools in terms of physical facilities, student attainment, and student discipline and behavior. In addition, the Director of Education was given control over staff recruitment and dismissal in all schools. This marked the beginning of the move toward a highly centralized system of education. Upon coming to power as the first fully elected government in 1959, the People’s Action Party stated its view of education as a key means of providing skilled manpower for industrialization. Over the next decade, subject syllabuses and educational structures were standardized across the various language streams of schooling, and common terminal examinations at both primary and secondary levels were instituted. At the same time, various attempts were made to promote a sense of national identity in all schools. These included the institution of daily flag-raising and lowering ceremonies, the singing of the national anthem, the recitation of the loyalty pledge, and civics curricula. By the early 1980s, the tide of centralization had begun to turn. In 1982 the then Director of Schools, John Yip, announced that the Education Ministry wanted to decentralize educational management from the Ministry headquarters to the schools. He listed several benefits of decentralization. First, it would encourage greater efficiency. Principals and teachers would be stimulated to become innovative and creative. Students would be the ultimate beneficiaries of principals’ strong educational leadership. Secondly, decisions on how to meet students’ diverse needs were best
DECENTRALIZATION IN THE SINGAPORE EDUCATION SYSTEM
61
made by individual schools rather than by the Ministry. Yip noted, however, that the Ministry would continue to maintain sufficient centralized control and supervision in order to ensure uniform standards. Furthermore, principals would continue to be accountable to the Ministry through regular inspections. A major boost to the idea of freeing schools from centralized control was given by the then Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1985. He spoke of the need to allow more autonomy within schools (including the right to appoint staff, devise school curricula, and choose textbooks), while conforming to national education policies such as bilingualism and common examinations. Goh asserted that prestigious schools had lost some of their individuality and special character through centralized control. He thought that principals and teachers should now be allowed greater flexibility and independence to experiment with new ideas. Goh’s sentiment was echoed the following year by the then Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, who felt that government domination of educational provision meant a lack of competition and diversity. At the end of 1986, 12 school principals were invited to accompany the then Education Minister to study the management of 25 “acknowledged successful schools” in the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and see what lessons could be learned for Singapore. The principals’ report recommended greater autonomy for selected schools in order to “stimulate educational innovation” and to allow schools “to respond more promptly to the needs and aspirations of pupils and parents” (Ministry of Education, 1987, p. ix). Accepting the recommendations, Education Minister Tony Tan stated that several well-established schools would be allowed to become independent schools. They would be given autonomy and flexibility in staff deployment and salaries, finance, management, and the curriculum. These schools were to serve as role models for other schools in improving the quality of education. They would also help to set the market value for good principals and teachers by recruiting staff in a competitive market. Parents, teachers, and students would enjoy a wider variety of schools to choose from. In 1987, three well-established boys’ secondary schools announced their intention to go independent in 1988. Their applications for independent status were approved by the Education Ministry. They were followed a year later by two prestigious government-aided girls’ secondary schools. To date, a total of eight secondary schools, all of which are well-established and prestigious, have become independent. All of the independent schools are academically selective. This setting aside of high-performing students in a few selected schools is consistent with the Singapore government’s well-entrenched elitist philosophy (Milne & Mauzy, 1990). The independent schools scheme may be viewed as part of an attempt by the government to foster creativity and innovation in the citizenry, a theme lent special urgency ever since the 1985–1986 economic recession. It is also part of an attempt to pass a greater proportion of the costs of operating social services such as education and health to the public (Low, 1994). The policy aims to lessen government subsidies and to make Singaporeans more self-reliant. The government has been careful to avoid using the term “privatization” with its connotations of “profit-making.” Its position is that the government will continue to subsidize basic education, but that the public will have to help bear the cost of high quality education.
62
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
What is interesting is that existing education subsides are not straining the government’s budget, as it continues to enjoy healthy budgetary surpluses and to invest heavily in education. These subsidies amount to 98% of recurrent expenditures in non-independent secondary schools. In fact, the independent schools are by no means financially independent of the government. On the contrary, they remain heavily dependent financially on government subsidies. For instance, the government provides these schools with annual per capita grants equivalent to the average cost of educating secondary students. The Singapore case thus presents a contrast with other countries where decentralization has resulted from financial stringency on the part of governments. Right from the introduction of the independent schools scheme, there was intense public criticism over its elitist nature and the high fees charged by the schools. In the wake of the 1991 general elections, which saw the governing party returned to power with a reduced parliamentary majority, the government took steps to defuse public criticism of the scheme. First, it limited the number of independent schools, thus reversing its earlier announcement that it wanted to see more schools turn independent. Another step was the establishment in 1994 of a new category of schools called autonomous schools. In the first 3 years, 18 existing non-independent secondary schools, all of which had outstanding academic results, were designated as autonomous schools. These schools receive 10% more in annual per capita government grants than non-autonomous schools. They are supposed to provide a high quality education while charging more affordable fees than independent schools. Parents and students will thus have a wider range of choices. The Ministry of Education announced in early 2000 its intention to allow about 25% of all secondary schools to become autonomous schools. These schools must have a track record of outstanding academic results, well-rounded education programs, and strong community ties. The principals of autonomous schools will be allowed discretion to admit up to 5% of their students on the basis of demonstrated talent in specific niche areas, such as sports or the arts (Teo, 2000). Between the years 2001 and 2005, another seven schools joined the autonomous schools scheme. In a departure from previous practice, these seven autonomous schools have applied to the Education Ministry for autonomous status instead of having autonomous school status thrust upon them. To date, both the independent schools scheme and autonomous schools scheme have been confined to the secondary sector. A further move to extend autonomy to primary schools, secondary schools, and junior colleges (offering 2 years of preuniversity schooling) has been the introduction of school clusters. The first clusters were piloted on an experimental basis in 1997. Every single school is now a member of a cluster. There are now a total of 28 clusters, each of which contains between 10 and 14 schools. Some clusters consist entirely of primary schools, while the others contain a mix. Each cluster is headed by a superintendent, whom the Education Ministry provides with an annual budget for teacher development and the purchase of teaching resources. The superintendents are supposed to lead school principals in pooling resources and discussing strategies to address common concerns. The results of increased school autonomy have been mixed. The principals of independent schools have enjoyed greater flexibility in decision-making in a
DECENTRALIZATION IN THE SINGAPORE EDUCATION SYSTEM
63
few respects. First, a few independent schools have recruited additional full-time administrators, such as public relations officers, estate managers, and bursars. In the mid-1990s each non-independent school was allowed to hire one school administrator and operations manager to assist the principal in carrying out administrative duties. Beginning in the year 2000, each non-independent school principal was permitted to hire an additional school administrator or operations manager, and apply for a monthly grant of around S$2,000 to purchase administrative services from privately run agencies. Second, unlike non-independent schools, the independent schools are run by school governing boards that may determine admission policies, school fees, and major financial policies and budgets. Third, all the eight independent schools have raised their fees to levels far above those charged by non-independent schools. Finally, they are able to determine their own student admission figures, a privilege denied to non-independent schools. However, it is still clear that the Ministry of Education continues to wield considerable control over the independent schools. The School Boards (Incorporation) Act of 1990 provided for the establishment of governing boards in independent schools. All appointments to governorship have to be approved by the Education Minister. The Minister may also vary or revoke individual governing board constitutions, or appoint the Director of Education to take over the running of schools. The latter provision has been invoked twice in the case of an independent school, The Chinese High School, once in 1997 and again in 1999. On both occasions, factional squabbles among governing board members resulted in the Minister appointing new governing board members. The independent schools have also exercised greater control in curriculum. For instance, several independent schools have scrapped subjects that are compulsory in non-independent schools or have made certain other subjects non-examinable. Teacher recruitment is another area in which the independent schools have taken advantage of their increased autonomy by recruiting as many teachers as their finances will allow. The schools have thus improved their teacher–student ratios vis-`a-vis their non-independent counterparts. In some other respects, however, the degree of choice and diversity is still rather limited. The government still exerts a great deal of influence over all secondary schools. In particular, the imposition of national curricular requirements and the pressures imposed by common national examinations restrict the scope for curricular innovation. None of the independent schools or autonomous schools have moved away from a subject-based curriculum. In addition, the range of subjects offered in these schools is largely identical to that in non-independent, non-autonomous schools. As long as principals are held accountable for their schools’ performance in national examinations, they cannot afford to stray too far from the mainstream curriculum. None of the independent schools or autonomous schools are allowed to stray from key national policy initiatives, such as Thinking Schools Learning Nation (which is aimed at promoting critical and creative thinking skills), the Information Technology Masterplan, and National Education (which is aimed at fostering a sense of national identity). A second major factor inhibiting innovation is conservatism and resistance to change among some Education Ministry officials. Such attitudes often prove
64
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
frustrating for school principals who desire greater autonomy from Ministry control, as manifested in this statement by the principal of an independent school: So the system on the one hand allows it [autonomy], on the other hand chokes it. . . . There’s a gap here. You’ve got the rules in the middle, on one side. You’ve got the people interpreting them. . . . You’ve got the school principal, who’s got to abide by the rules and be inspected by the inspector who works for the rules, because he’s accountable to his bosses. So if this principal doesn’t observe that rule fully, the inspector’s got to account for that principal and give the answer up here. . . . And yet the Director on top is saying, “But if you read the rules, they’ve [referring to school principals] got a lot of freedom. (Tan, 1996, p. 218) There are thus tensions between centralizing tendencies in the Ministry, on the one hand, and the desire by some principals to exercise their professional judgment on the other hand. Two boys’ independent schools, The Chinese High School and the Anglo-Chinese School (Independent), had in the early 1990s expressed their desire to break away from the national General Certificate of Education (Ordinary) Level examinations conducted jointly by the Education Ministry and the University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate. Their attempts were repeatedly blocked by Ministry of Education officials (Tan, 1996). At the end of the year 2001, both schools finally found support for their proposals when the Education Minister said that his Ministry would consider allowing top-performing students a greater range of assessment options. At about the same time, the Prime Minister announced that the government might allow the establishment of private schools to encourage diversity and innovation in teaching methods (Goh, 2001). Although they could be totally independent of the Education Ministry, they would still be required to teach core subjects. The principal of The Chinese High School promptly expressed interest in turning his school private, and hoped that the school could continue to receive financial subsidies from the government. A prominent Ministry of Education report on the reform of the upper secondary and junior college education was published in 2002. Subsequently, a number of prominent secondary schools (including five of the eight independent schools) and junior colleges have been allowed to offer “integrated programs” (that is, programs that allow top-performing students to bypass the national General Certificate of Education “Ordinary” Level examinations). One of these secondary schools, the Anglo-Chinese School (Independent), has finally been allowed to break new ground, becoming the first mainstream school to offer an alternative qualification, the International Baccalaureate, to its students. These efforts have been officially applauded as lending greater diversity to the local education landscape. This report also endorsed the establishment of specialized independent schools. Since then, the Singapore Sports School and the National University of Singapore Mathematics and Science High School have begun admitting secondary students. The latter school has promised its students a wider range of qualifications beyond the conventional General Certificate of Education examinations. Both these schools have been made associate members of existing school clusters.
DECENTRALIZATION IN THE SINGAPORE EDUCATION SYSTEM
65
Another recommendation in the 2002 report was to establish a few privatelyfunded secondary schools to add choice and diversity for students and parents. Two such schools began classes in 2005. However, they have to adhere to Ministry of Education guidelines on National Education, daily flag-raising and national anthem rituals, a minimum 50% Singaporean student enrolment, and the study of ethnic languages. These measures are to ensure that “all Singapore students continue to learn and interact with one another in an environment that nurtures a Singaporean spirit and character” (Ministry of Education, 2002, p. 61). 3.
INCREASED COMPETITION AMONG SCHOOLS
A major feature of Singapore education over the past decade, and one that has gone hand in hand with the granting of increased autonomy to schools, has been the intensification of competition between schools. Besides improving the quality of education, competition is supposed to provide parents and students with a wider range of choices and to improve accountability by forcing schools to improve their programs (Goh, 1992). This competition has been fostered in various ways. For instance, all secondary schools and junior colleges have been publicly ranked on an annual basis since 1992 and the results have been published in the various local newspapers. The official justification is that parents and students must be provided with better information in order to make intelligent and informed choices (Goh, 1992; Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 64, March 1, 1995, Col. 27). Secondary schools have been ranked on three main criteria. The first of these is a composite measure of students’ overall results in the annual General Certificate of Education (Ordinary) Level examinations. The second measure evaluates schools’ value-addedness by comparing students’ examination performance with their examination scores upon entry to their respective schools. The third criterion is a weighted index that measures a school’s performance in the National Physical Fitness Test as well as the percentage of overweight students in the school. The promotion of inter-school competition and the pressures on schools that result from the ranking of schools have led many principals to engage in marketing activities. These include recruitment talks, the design and distribution of brochures, the screening of promotional videos, and the courting of the press in order to highlight school achievements. Even primary schools are engaging in these activities, with principals reaching out to parents of kindergarten students. The introduction of explicit measures to promote competition among schools has aroused a great deal of controversy and criticism, both within and outside the governing party. For instance, in 1992 the then Senior Minister of State for Education told Parliament that public ranking of schools in terms of their academic results was “undesirable.” It was “absurd” and “nonsense” to say that one school was ahead of another because of minuscule differences in their overall academic results. It would also increase tension and stress among parents while not improving education for children at all (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 59, March 13, 1992, Cols. 991–992). However, the results of the first annual ranking exercise were still published 5 months later. It is highly contestable whether fostering competition does improve the quality of education for all students and promote greater choice and diversity for parents
66
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
and students. First of all, the competition among schools does not take place on a level playing field. The terms of competition are to a large extent dictated by the government. For instance, the number of independent schools and autonomous schools is determined by the government. Next, non-independent schools enjoy less flexibility than independent schools in determining their own enrolment figures or the number of teachers that they wish to employ. Furthermore, not all secondary schools may offer certain prestigious programs such as the Gifted Education Program or the Art Elective Program. The government only conducts such programs in selected schools, all of which are either independent or autonomous. In other words, non-prestigious, non-academically selective schools are simply unable to compete effectively with well-established, academically selective schools. The former are caught in a vicious cycle: because they are unable to attract high academic achievers, their academic results fall far below those of the well-established schools. This in turn means that they remain unable to attract high academic achievers. Analysis of the ranking results for secondary schools over the last 12 years reveals that the majority of the top 30 secondary schools have remained in this category throughout the 12 years. It is therefore questionable to what extent increased competition actually helps to improve standards in all schools. The government has claimed that the independent schools and autonomous schools will serve as role models for other schools in improving educational standards. This of course raises the question of whether what proves effective in these well-established schools can in fact be transplanted into other schools. The government’s reasoning also ignores the part played by a selective student intake in schools’ academic success (see for instance, Thrupp, 1998). It is therefore not clear to what extent the experience of independent schools and autonomous schools can be valid lessons for the bulk of Singapore secondary schools, struggling with less-than-ideal student ability and motivational levels. Another criticism is that competition leads some schools to focus narrowly on those outcomes that are relevant for public ranking and that may be useful for attracting students and parents (see for instance, Reay, 1998, for a discussion of the situation in England). Such a criticism is especially relevant in a situation such as Singapore where performance in competitive examinations is still a major determinant of educational and social mobility. There has been press coverage of how several reputable secondary schools have decided to make the study of English literature optional rather than compulsory for their graduating students. This is because English literature is perceived to be a subject in which it is difficult to do well during national examinations. These schools have been wary of the potential consequences that students’ less-than-ideal performance in English literature might have on their positions in the annual ranking exercises (Nirmala, 1997; Nirmala & Mathi, 1995). It is particularly ironic, then, that these strategies were being employed even as the Minister for Information and the Arts was extolling the virtues of the subject to students (De Souza, 1998). Even physical education has not been exempt from the adverse effects of ranking exercises. Some schools have over-emphasized preparation for the National Physical Fitness Test at the expense of the acquisition of skills in sports and games. The growing stress on school accountability and the use of narrowly defined, easily quantifiable performance indicators has clearly had a detrimental impact on
DECENTRALIZATION IN THE SINGAPORE EDUCATION SYSTEM
67
some schools. Far from promoting choice and diversity, heightened inter-school competition and rivalry may in fact work against these goals. Cluster superintendents will find it difficult to foster intra-cluster cooperation and discussion of strategies to improve academic performance while the various school principals are vying with one another to boost their schools’ positions in the school ranking league tables. In this regard, the attempts by two independent schools in the 1990s to break away from the General Certificate of Education (Ordinary) Level examinations may be seen as attempts to also break free from the tyranny imposed by the school ranking league tables. With the advent of the integrated programs in 2004, the schools offering these programs have been left out of the school ranking league tables since their students no longer need to sit for these national examinations. Somewhat oddly enough, what might be viewed as new-found freedom from tyranny of the school ranking league tables has not always been seen in that light by some parents, who have publicly demanded to know how these schools stand vis-`a-vis other schools in terms of tangible student outcomes. Even though an external review team commissioned by the Education Ministry heavily criticized the detrimental aspects of the practice of school ranking exercises in a report published in 1997 (External Review Team, 1997), the Education Ministry refused to consider scrapping the exercises altogether. Subsequently, however, in recognition of the growing public criticism of the practice, the Ministry of Education announced in 2004 that the secondary school ranking league tables would be modified to consist of bands of achievement instead of raw numerical ranks. Furthermore, junior colleges would no longer be publicly ranked. Another Ministry response to criticism of the narrowness of the ranking exercise has been instead to broaden the range of indicators upon which schools are to be assessed, through the use of the School Excellence Model (SEM). This model, which was implemented in all schools in 2000, is meant to help schools appraise their own performance in various areas, such as leadership, staff management, staff competence and morale, and student outcomes (Ministry of Education, 1999). Beginning in the year 2001, each school was supposed to subject its own internal assessment to external validation by a team headed by staff from the School Appraisal Branch of the Ministry of Education. These validations are to be carried out at least once every 5 years. Part of the SEM involves the awarding of Achievement Awards, Development Awards, Sustained Achievement Awards, Outstanding Development Awards, Best Practice Awards, School Distinction Awards, and School Excellence Awards to individual schools. Schools that score at least 400 points out of a total of 1,000 during the external validation exercise are encouraged by the Education Ministry to apply for Singapore Quality Class certification by the Productivity and Standards Board. It is arguable that the use of the SEM may result in some schools using more of the same covert strategies that they have been using thus far, this time in a wider spectrum of school processes and activities in order to boost their schools’ performance in as many of the aspects that are being assessed as possible. For example, principals may narrow the range of available co-curricular activities in order to focus the schools’ resources on those activities that are considered more fruitful in terms of winning awards in inter-school competitions. The use of the SEM continues to ensure that independent schools and autonomous schools, even those offering integrated programs, will not stray too far from official policy dictates and priorities.
68
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Amid this climate of risk-averse behavior, what then are the prospects of wideranging and sustained change triggered by wide-ranging policy initiatives, such as the teaching of critical and creative thinking skills, are concerned? Government leaders are united in lamenting the apparent lack of creativity and thinking skills among students and members of the workforce (see for instance, Goh, 1997; Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 53, March 20, 1989, Cols. 550–551; Vol. 55, March 15, 1990, Cols. 310– 311). Improving examination scores in the national examinations are beginning to sound less impressive. In this regard, it is ironic that a few months after the Prime Minister had stressed the need to move toward critical thinking skills, a departmental head in a secondary school, when asked by a newspaper journalist about the secret behind her students’ examination success, replied that it had taken months of repeated mock examination practice. As a result of at least 12 rounds of practice per subject, students were familiar not only with the examination format but, more importantly, with the examination content as well (Pan, 1997). There is a clear tension between the use of decentralization as a means of freeing schools to be creative and innovative on the one hand, and the concurrent narrowing of diversity that is encouraged by the ever-tightening grip of intense inter-school competition on the other hand. Another serious consequence of all of this intense competition is a growing hierarchy of schools and social stratification. Schools that were already academically selective have remained so. School principals who wish to maintain or improve their schools’ ranking positions need to keep a constant watch on their student intake. The trend of academic selectiveness on the part of top schools will inevitably lead to a further stratification of schools, with the independent schools and autonomous schools at the top and the rest below. Equally worrying is evidence that students from wealthier family backgrounds are over-represented in independent schools (Tan, 1993). The government is well aware of the potential impact of social stratification on social cohesion as well as on its own political legitimacy. However, it claims that it is only right to nurture the more able students as the whole country will ultimately benefit (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 59, January 20, 1992, Col. 365). 4.
CONCLUSION
Terms such as choice, competition, innovation, and diversity have now become commonplace in the Singapore education system over the past two decades. The government has attempted to delegate some decision-making authority to school principals through such means as the independent schools scheme, autonomous schools scheme, school clusters, and the Edusave scheme. This chapter has demonstrated that the government continues to exert considerable influence over schools. Not only does it impose national curricular requirements and examinations on all schools, it retains ultimate control over independent schools’ governing boards. Intense inter-school competition over the past decade has worked as a powerful centralizing influence on all schools, and has worked against the promotion of diversity and innovation. Schools appear to have been granted greater autonomy so that they might better achieve government-dictated macro-policy objectives and goals. The recent attempts to allow greater curricular diversity through the integrated programs represent limited efforts to break out of the standard mold imposed by the national examinations. Because all the schools offering integrated programs are still subject to the SEM and
DECENTRALIZATION IN THE SINGAPORE EDUCATION SYSTEM
69
to other Ministry of Education policy priorities and dictates, it is likely that their various programs will end up converging to a large degree rather than being genuinely distinctive from one another. In view of the central roles which the government has assigned to the education system in supporting economic development and fostering social cohesion, it is highly unlikely that centralized control will ever be relaxed. The regulations governing the approval of privately-funded schools bear testimony to this. It may also be argued that there are benefits to having a certain amount of centralized control of schools. One of these is the need to ensure that all children enjoy similar access to a basic general education. Another detrimental consequence of decentralization and inter-school competition has been their impact on social stratification. However, the government shows no signs of reversing its policies. If anything, it is likely to further encourage competition among schools. This is part of its urging all Singaporeans to constantly “stay ahead of the pack” in terms of global economic competitiveness (Lee, 1994). At the same time, it has urged Singaporeans not to allow “our children to be softened” by the alleged denigration of academic excellence and the promotion of a “soft approach to life” by “liberals in the West” (Goh, 1992). Its response to criticisms of the elitist nature of independent schools has been confused at times. For instance, it has tried to dispel the notion that non-independent schools are inferior to independent schools (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 63, August 25, 1994, Col. 398). At the same time, though, it has stated that the independent schools are to be developed into “outstanding institutions, to give the most promising and able students an education matching their promise” (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 59, January 6, 1992, Col. 18). The Singapore experience with decentralization differs substantially from that in most other countries in one important respect. While financial stringency is a key motivating factor in many cases, the developments in Singapore are taking place against the backdrop of healthy budgetary surpluses and increased government expenditure on education. These spending trends are likely to continue for some time, especially since education is viewed as playing a key role in enhancing national economic competitiveness in the global economy. It remains to be seen how central policy dilemmas will play out in future. These include the tension between aggressive competition and inter-school collaboration. Another is the balance between conservatism brought about by the yoke of central control, and the quest for genuine diversity and innovation. There is the question of whether major policy initiatives such as the one promoting critical and creative thinking skills will really take off in schools, or whether they will simply fall victim to the intense inter-school competition and fail to take root. Finally, an uneasy coexistence will persist between the government’s elitist philosophy and its claims to provide equal educational opportunity to all Singaporeans.
5.
REFERENCES
De Souza, A. (1998, July 5). Literature key to past, says BG Yeo. The Sunday Times, 36. External Review Team. (1997). Learning, creating, and communicating: A curriculum review. Singapore: Ministry of Education. Goh, C. T. (1992). National Day Rally 1992, Ministry of Information and the Arts, Singapore.
70
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Goh, C. T. (1997). Prepare our children for the new century: Teach them well. In J. Tan, S. Gopinathan, and W. K. Ho (Eds.), Education in Singapore: A book of readings (pp. 417–425). Singapore: Prentice Hall. Goh, C. T. (2001). Shaping lives, moulding nation. Speeches, 25(4), 11–24. Lee, H. L. (1994). The government, the people and the future. Speeches, 18(4), 15–19. Low, L. (1994). A market system with Singapore characteristics. MPP Working Paper Series No. 4. Centre for Advanced Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore. Milne, R. S., & Mauzy, D. K. (1990). Singapore: The legacy of Lee Kuan Yew. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Ministry of Education. (1987). Towards excellence for all. Singapore: Ministry of Education. Ministry of Education. (1999). The school excellence model (http://intranet.moe.edu.sg/schdiv/ semhome.htm). Ministry of Education. (2002). Report of the Junior College/Upper Secondary Education Review Committee. Singapore: Ministry of Education. Nirmala, M. (1997, August 16). Big drop in students studying O-level Literature. The Straits Times, 3. Nirmala, M., & Mathi, B. (1995). Schools making literature optional. The Straits Times, 3. Pan, X. H. (1997, August 8). Shixing moni kaoshi xue sheng shuxi zhanchang [Implementing mock examinations to familiarise students with the “battlefield”]. Lianhe Wanbao, Singapore, 6 (in Chinese). Reay, D. (1998). Setting the agenda: The growing impact of market forces on pupil grouping in British secondary schooling. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 30, 545–558. Tan, J. (1993). Independent schools in Singapore: Implications for social and educational inequalities. International Journal of Educational Development, 13, 239–251. Tan, J. (1996). Independent schools and autonomous schools in Singapore: A study of two school privatization initiatives, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo. Teo, C. H. (2000). More autonomous schools on the way. Speeches, 24(1), 50–55. Thrupp, M. (1998). The art of the possible: Organizing and managing high and low socioeconomic schools. Journal of Education Policy, 13, 197–219.
Chapter 5 BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS: EVOLVING PATTERNS AND CONTRASTING TRENDS IN HONG KONG AND MACAU Mark Bray and Tang Kwok-Chun
In the field of comparative education, contrasts are often as illuminating as similarities. However, comparative studies usually need sufficient basis of commonality in order to make meaningful contrasts. The present chapter has these necessary ingredients. It primarily focuses on two territories that are geographically close, culturally related, and have economic similarities as well as comparable political histories. However, it also shows some striking contrasts. Concerning control of education, the chapter shows contrasting trends. During the 1980s and 1990s, administration in one territory became more decentralized, while administration in the other became more centralized. The chapter also highlights ambiguities and inconsistencies. The chapter focuses on two former colonies on the south coast of China. Hong Kong was a British colony until 1997, and Macau was under Portuguese administration until 1999. Now, both have again become part of China but are administered with a high degree of autonomy in economic, political, and educational affairs. As such, in the domain of education they continue to differ from each other as well as from Mainland China. Much of the chapter has a historical focus. Indeed it is concerned with major developments over a period of decades and even centuries. The chapter identifies ways in which analysis and comparison of Hong Kong and Macau contributes to theories concerning the formation and development of education systems, which in turn requires consideration of centralization and decentralization. The chapter begins by outlining some key concepts from the literature which provide an analytical framework. It then presents some background information on each territory before turning to evolution in their education systems. 1.
THEORETICAL MODELS AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS
The chief starting point for this chapter is the work of Margaret Archer. Her 1979 book, entitled Social Origins of Educational Systems, is widely considered a seminal contribution to understanding of the nature and evolution of education systems. It is a long book, and was republished in abbreviated version in 1984. Archer’s overall concern, as highlighted in the title of the books, was with educational systems. While many analysts now take the existence of systems for granted, Archer (1984, p. 3) 71 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 71–95. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
72 Structural conditioning
Educational interaction
Structural elaboration
Structural conditioning
CYCLE 1 General changes
Comparative changes
Private enterprise
Ownership Monointegration Subordination
Competitive conflict
Substitution
Educational interaction
Structual elaboration
CYCLE 2 Emergence of educational systems
Multiply integrated state systems
State system
Processes of negotiation
Decentralized systems
External transactions Internal initiation Political manipulation
Centralized
Political
Patterns change
Incremental pattern
Restriction Stop-go
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS
Theoretical phases
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Figure 5.1: Summary Diagram of Archer’s Study. Source: Archer (1984, p. 10).
pointed out that educational systems were rare before the 18th century. Archer identified two cycles of evolution in education systems in which the starting point of the first cycle was a collection of privately owned schools which were gradually brought together into a relatively unified system. The second cycle commenced with the existence of state systems, and showed a range of patterns in which some systems moved toward centralization while others moved toward decentralization (Figure 5.1). At the beginning of the first cycle, Archer suggested, one common feature of education preceding the development of state systems was mono-integration: those who controlled education also owned it and monopolized the formal instruction. This feature embodied an emergent property that conditioned subsequent processes of educational interaction and change. In order to challenge the dominant groups, the assertive groups overcame the domination by either substitution or restriction. Substitution consisted of devaluing the monopoly of the dominant group through competition—building new schools, and recruiting, training and paying new teachers to staff them. Restriction consisted of eliminating the monopoly by coercive power—appropriating buildings, confiscating educational funds, and excluding personnel from teaching and administration. The final phase of the first cycle dealt with educational changes resulting from the social interaction. Decentralized and centralized education systems emerged, respectively, from substitution and restriction. Furthermore, unification and systematization were the predominant pair of characteristics of the newly emerged centralized systems with differentiation and specialization gradually accommodated to them. Newly emerged decentralized systems which had no leading-part retained specialization and differentiation as their dominant pair of characteristics, and these characteristics constantly created strains and problems for unification and systematization. According to this analysis, at the beginning of the second cycle the emergent centralized and decentralized systems exerted dissimilar influences upon interaction. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the structural conditioning of educational interaction in the centralized system and decentralized system, respectively. Finally, Archer suggested that in centralized systems, the polity-directed changes which are routinely negotiated through political manipulation have similar features in terms of their initiation,
BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
73
Figure 5.2: The Structural Conditioning of Educational Interaction in the Centralized System. Source: Archer (1984, p. 117).
legislation, and execution, and display a distinctive “stop–go” pattern. There is no stop–go pattern in decentralized systems because polity-directed changes are usually modified by internal initiation and external transactions which maintain a ceaseless flow of small localized changes. Despite the fact that few countries had education systems before the 18th century, by the early and mid-20th century few countries and even colonial territories did not have them. One exception, as will be shown by this chapter, was Macau. The territory is idiosyncratic, and also small; and for these reasons it is commonly considered undeserving of scholarly attention. However, an alternative perspective is that the idiosyncratic nature of Macau makes it an illuminating focus for study. Particularly worthwhile, as the chapter will show, are comparisons with Hong Kong. Also significant is that the chapter focuses on colonial territories. Archer (1984, p. 14) stressed that her analysis applied only to countries in which macroscopic change emerged autonomously, and not to settings where it could be attributed to external intervention via conquest, colonization, or territorial redistribution. During the period since the publication of Archer’s books, few scholars have endeavored to extend her
74
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Figure 5.3: The Structural Conditioning of Educational Interaction in the Decentralized System. Source: Archer (1984, p. 118).
work to colonial territories. This chapter demonstrates that her conceptual tools are also useful for comparing education development in colonial settings including Hong Kong and Macau. 2. 2.1.
AN INTRODUCTION TO HONG KONG AND MACAU
Hong Kong
The territory of Hong Kong comprises the island of Hong Kong, a number of other islands, and part of the Chinese Mainland. The island of Hong Kong was ceded to the British in 1842. A section of the Kowloon Peninsula was ceded in 1860; and the New Territories were acquired on a 99-year lease in 1898. The total land area is 1,070 km2 . Colonial policies passed through many phases during the 155 years of British administration, but one consistent feature was that Hong Kong, like Macau, was seen primarily as a trading port rather than a territory for economic exploitation in its own right. In this respect it differed from many other British colonies. Hong Kong had a largely transient population, and most aspects of social policy in the early years
BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
75
were low key. There was no early intention to raise an intermediary class of Englishtrained natives as “go-betweens” in the way that Raffles envisioned for Singapore and Macaulay championed for India (Jones, 1990, p. 142). Nevertheless, early education policy differed from other aspects of social policy in being more active and interventionist. One aspect was in the provision of school grants, a policy which paralleled measures in Britain itself. As observed by Sweeting (1990, 1993, 1995), much of the history of education in Hong Kong has been a pattern of increasing government commitment and intervention. The 99-year lease on the New Territories expired in 1997, when the whole of Hong Kong (i.e., including Hong Kong Island, which had been ceded “in perpetuity”) was returned to China. The terms under which Chinese sovereignty resumed were established between the British and Chinese governments in 1984. Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR), with its own government and laws. Since 1997, Hong Kong has been governed under the formula of “One Country, Two Systems,” which permits Hong Kong to have a high degree of autonomy. In particular, while the rest of China remains officially socialist, Hong Kong remains officially capitalist. The SAR system, which has been put in place for at least 50 years, also permits Hong Kong to have its own currency, laws, and education system. With reference to education, the Basic Law (People’s Republic of China, 1990, Article 146) states that: On the basis of the previous educational system, the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on the development and improvement of education, including policies regarding the educational system and its administration, the language of instruction, the allocation of funds, the examination system, the system of academic awards and the recognition of educational qualifications. The population of Hong Kong is approximately 7 million. Almost 98% are Chinese, for the majority of whom Cantonese is the mother tongue. Among the remainder, the largest groups are from Philippines, Indonesia, the USA, Canada, and the UK. Economically, Hong Kong is well known for its recent achievement of high rates of growth. In 2004, Hong Kong was estimated to have a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$23,900 (Government of Hong Kong, 2005). Economic growth has greatly facilitated expansion of education. 2.2.
Macau
As a distinct political entity, Macau is nearly 300 years older than Hong Kong. Portuguese traders secured from the Chinese authorities rights of settlement in 1557 (Afonso & Pereira, 1986, p. 34). Although the Portuguese were primarily interested in Macau for economic reasons, the territory also played a major religious and cultural role. The church established many schools, one of which was given university status in 1594. It operated until 1762, and taught theology, humanities, Greek, Latin, rhetoric, and philosophy (Gomes dos Santos, 1968). Macau was a major conduit through which Western education and science entered China, Japan, and Korea.
76
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
After the mid-17th century, Macau’s fortunes declined (Gunn, 1996). Portugal proved unable to hold her empire together, and competition for East Asian trade intensifed. The foundation of Hong Kong in 1842 was a particularly serious blow, for its far superior port took over the strategic significance that Macau had previously enjoyed. After World War II the Chinese government wished to repossess the territory, but was unable to force the issue. For a time, policies were left at the level of official pronouncements. However, China’s Cultural Revolution in 1966 led to violent riots in Macau and to strident anti-Portuguese propaganda. Unexpectedly, when the Portuguese announced that they intended to leave, the Communists altered their stance. The Chinese authorities were conscious of Macau’s role as an outlet for external trade, and found it more useful to retain Macau as a foreign port than to repossess it (Chang, 1988). Eight years later, Portugal itself experienced a revolution. The new government had a very different view of world affairs, and immediately set about decolonizing its African territories. In Asia, East Timor was unilaterally seized by Indonesia. However, the Chinese maintained their refusal to reassert sovereignty. Subsequently, in 1987, the Portuguese and Chinese governments agreed that Macau would revert to China in 1999. Like Hong Kong, Macau was designated a Special Administrative Region for at least 50 years after the transition. Concerning education, the wording of the 1993 Basic Law (People’s Republic of China, 1993, Article 121) is similar to the provision for Hong Kong. The total land area of Macau is just 24 km2 . A population of approximately 440,000 gives a density of 18,300 persons per km2 . This far exceeds Hong Kong’s 6,500 persons per km2 . As in Hong Kong, over 95% of the population is Chinese. Two significant minority groups are a small cadre of Portuguese and a mixed-race group known as the Macanese. Official figures placed the 2003 GDP per capita at US$17,800 (Governo de Macau, 2005). Manufacturing employed about 20% of the labor force, with restaurants, hotels, and other services employing over half. Within the service sector, tourism, and gambling were particularly significant. 3. 3.1.
EMERGING AND EVOLVING EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN HONG KONG AND MACAU
Hong Kong: Communist Threat and Unified Centralized System
The structure of the Hong Kong education system in 1990 is shown in Figure 5.4. At that time, only the primary schools had a standard duration for all pupils. At the secondary and post-secondary levels, the system became extremely complex. Despite the complexities, there was something which could be described as the Hong Kong system. As will be noted below, the same could not be said of Macau. Table 5.1 shows figures on the ownership of primary and secondary schools in Hong Kong in 2000/2001. Fewer than 6% of institutions were operated by the government. Aided schools form the largest group at both levels. This contrasted with the situation in Macau, where private schools formed the largest group. The history of the aided sector dates back to the 19th century (Sweeting, 1990). Grants have always been closely linked to controls, and have provided a way through which the government has influenced the orientation of the curriculum and quality
BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
Notes (1) Apart from Lingnan College, an Assisted Approved Post Secondary College, there is the Hong Kong Shue Yan College which offers 4 year courses, the minimum entry requirement of which, in terms of the Post Secondary Colleges Regulations, is successful completion of Form V. (2) 1st degree in medicine requires 5 years of study. (3) B. A. (Bldg.) requires 4 years of study while B. A. (Arch.) and M. B. B. S. require 5 years of study. (4) Student with craft certificate may enrol in the Technician Course after the completion of a bridging course which lasts for a minimun of one year.
Figure 5.4: Structure of the Hong Kong Education System. Source: Education Department of Hong Kong (1990, p. 79).
Table 5.1: Providers of Primary and Secondary Schooling in Hong Kong, 2000/2001 Level
Sector
Primary
Government Aided Private
41 687 88
All
816
Government Aided Private
37 368 81
All
486
Secondary
Schools
Source: Education Department of Hong Kong, (2001) (http://project2.ed.gov.hk).
77
78
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
of teaching. This feature underlay the 1873 Grant-in-Aid for schools and the 1913 Education Ordinance, and has also characterized subsequent laws and regulations. The Codes of Aid governing primary and secondary schools (Government of Hong Kong, 1984a,b) set out requirements on such matters as accounts, admission of pupils, and appointment and dismissal of staff. The accompanying Education Regulations (Government of Hong Kong, 1986) set out in considerable detail requirements on such matters as furnishings, safety precautions, toilets, cleaning, the size of print in text books, teachers’ qualifications, class size, and school holidays. In order to understand the development of the control in education and the unification and systematization of the centralized system, the long struggle by the Hong Kong government to counteract the influences from Mainland China should be noted. In addition to government and church endeavors, before 1911 individuals and private organizations with traditional Chinese religious backgrounds, philanthropic purposes, or socio-political motives were also active in the education sector. Chia-shu (family schools), ssu-shu (private schools), and i-hsueh (charitable schools) were the most popular forms of educational organizations among local Chinese, and used traditional Chinese curricula and textbooks (Sweeting, 1990). After the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, an education system adapted from Japan and Germany was introduced in Mainland China. In 1922, this system was replaced by a 6+3+3 system which was adapted from the USA. In 1928, shortly after the establishment of the Nanjing government in China, the Overseas Chinese Education Committee was established under the Ministry of Education. Regulations were issued, and overseas Chinese schools were asked to register with the Overseas Chinese Education Bureau. Details of curriculum and textbooks were required for the registration process (Chan, 1992; Cheng, 1949). One purpose was to control the structure and curriculum of overseas Chinese schools in order to exclude Communist influence. The strategic consideration behind such policy can best be understood by considering historical circumstances. Since 1928, the Chinese government had been trying to control the overseas Chinese schools through its consuls and Kuomintang agents abroad. As there were no Chinese Consuls in Hong Kong and Kuomintang activities were banned, the Chinese government influenced the colony indirectly. One reason why most of the larger schools felt it necessary to register with the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee was that a growing number of Hong Kong students were going back to China for higher studies, and they could only enter Mainland institutions if they had graduated from registered secondary schools. As registration with the Chinese authorities carried with it an obligation to observe certain regulations, whether openly or secretly, the Chinese authorities were able to exert indirect control over these schools (Wong Leung, 1969, p. 53). From the perspective of the authorities in Mainland China, the above strategy was quite successful. In 1928, some schools in Hong Kong started to adopt the American 6 + 3 + 3 system, like the middle schools in China (Sweeting, 1990, p. 352). Furthermore, as observed by Luk (1991, p. 661), in the early 1930s an increasing number of schools were able to operate with branches on both sides of the border and registered with both governments. In Hong Kong, such schools followed the curriculum prescribed by
BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
79
the Nanjing government, used textbooks published in China, mostly at Shanghai, and presented their senior middle graduates for university entrance examinations in China. They engaged teachers trained either in China or in Hong Kong. The colonial government and missionary schools also generally used the Nanjing syllabi and the Shanghai textbooks for the Chinese culture subjects, although they probably followed them less closely. For other subjects, they used textbooks from England or from Shanghai. They also employed teachers educated either in Hong Kong or in China. Hong Kong never developed an autochthonous school system before World War II. In 1929, in order to counteract the Kuomintang’s influence, a committee was appointed in Hong Kong to draw up a syllabus for private schools. However, the strategy of the Hong Kong government was not successful. In the early 1930s, vernacular schools tried, as far as the Education Department allowed, to follow the curriculum of the schools in China, using the same textbooks and having the same subjects (Wong Leung, 1969, p. 53). In 1931, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was established in Nanjing. It signified the need of the Nanjing-based government for a more comprehensive and effective policy toward the overseas Chinese because their support was found to be increasingly necessary with the rise of the Japanese militarism and their attack from the north. A survey was conducted in 1935 by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission to estimate the number of overseas Chinese schools throughout the entire world. About 550 overseas Chinese schools were found in Hong Kong and Macau (Chan, 1992, p. 256). In 1938, when Guangzhou was taken by Japan, the number of schools in Hong Kong and Macau increased dramatically because schools moved from Guangzhou and further north. The teachers and students carried with them the curricula and textbooks which had already been adopted by some schools in Hong Kong and Macau in the early 1930s. In short, the above historical account explained the social origin of the Chinese-medium schools in both places. The influence of the Chinese government on Chinese-medium schools did not diminish until the early 1950s when the colonial government wanted to exercise its own and exclusive influence on local education due to the political tensions in China built shortly after World War II. The nationalistic program for overseas Chinese education of Kuomintang resumed in 1945, and included the publishing of textbooks and educational materials (Chan, 1992, p. 309). In Hong Kong the Kuomintang started to infiltrate and direct the Chinese press. Running schools was another activity of the Kuomintang. In 1946, an estimated 35 private schools were under the influence of the Kuomintang (Sweeting, 1993, p. 194). The government’s concern about who was in control of education was reflected in and increased by several incidents. For instance, in 1948 the Education Department proclaimed that amendments should “be made to the ultra-nationalistic segments of Kuomintang-sponsored history, geography, and civics textbooks, and urged that a civics textbook especially prepared in and for Hong Kong should be published” (Sweeting, 1993, p. 196). In the late 1940s, the Hong Kong government’s wariness about the activities of the Kuomintang was overwhelmed by anxiety about the success of the Chinese
80
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION Table 5.2: The Percentage of Day Pupils in Two Types of Secondary School in Hong Kong, 1960–1990
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Chinese-medium
English-medium
42.1 29.0 23.3 21.3 12.3 9.5 8.3
57.9 71.0 76.7 78.7 87.7 90.5 91.7
Source: Lee (1997, p. 166).
Communist Party in the context of the Cold War. In order to limit Communist influence, the Education Ordinance was amended in 1948. This empowered the Director of Education to refuse to register any school teacher, deregister a registered teacher, close any school, and control the curricula and textbooks of all schools (Sweeting, 1993, p. 199). In 1949, a Special Bureau in the Education Department was set up to fight Communism in the schools. In 1952, as recommended by the Special Bureau, the first Hong Kong Chinese School Certificate Examination was instituted. At the same time, the separate committees on textbooks and syllabuses were replaced by the Syllabuses and Textbooks Committee, and mandated to perform wider and more positive functions. Supported by the socio-economic value of English in Hong Kong society, the above strategies were found to be extremely useful. Table 5.2 shows the decline of Chinese-medium secondary schools in Hong Kong as the English-medium schools grew in popularity. 3.2. Macau: Non-Interventionist Attitude and Poly-centered, Decentralized System Reflecting the Macau government’s unwillingness to devote many resources to the territory, together with its non-interventionist attitude toward education before 1987, Macau has never had a single, unique educational system but an uncoordinated poly-centered collection of systems (Alves Pinto, 1987; Bray & Koo, 2004; Rosa, 1990). Its separate systems were imported, with or without adaptation, from Portugal, the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. The number of years in the primary, junior secondary, and senior secondary cycles varied according to the model. In the mid-1980s, the Portuguese model had a 4+2+3+2+1 pattern, and the China and Taiwan ones were 6+3+3. The principal model modified from Hong Kong’s Anglo-Chinese schools had a 6+5+1 structure. One way to simplify classification of Macau’s diverse schools is to group them by language of instruction. Some schools operate in Portuguese, others in Chinese, and yet others in English. Figure 5.5 shows the typical structures of education in each language group in the early 1990s. It also shows a fourth category labeled Luso-Chinese. These schools, which were run by the government, used Chinese as the main medium of instruction but taught Portuguese as a compulsory subject. Although Figure 5.5 was officially used from 1989/1990 (Governo de Macau, 1990) to 1992/1993 (Governo de Macau, 1994a), it was still a good representation of Macau’s
BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
81
Figure 5.5: Systems of Education in Macau by Language of Instruction in 1992/1993. Source: Macau (1994a), p. 205.
situation at the end of the decade. Among the Macau schools in 1999/2000, 83.1% operated in Chinese, 4.4% were Luso-Chinese, 8.1% operated in English, and 4.4% operated in Portuguese (Governo de Macau, 2001b, p. 9). Another notable aspect of education in Macau is the distinction between official and private schools. In 2000/2001, the former comprised only 15.0% of the total number of schools (Table 5.3). Many schools were privately owned by religious bodies, social service organizations, commercial enterprises, and individuals. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Macau was the most important single contributor, running about a quarter of the schools. Macau has a long history of Western-style education. The first European style university in the Far East was established by the Jesuits in Macau in 1594 (Pires, 1991, p. 16), and the Protestant Church established a small college in Macau in 1839 Table 5.3: Number of Schools by Level and Ownership, Macau, 2000/2001 Level Pre-primary and preparatory Primary Secondary Pre-primary and primary Primary and secondary Pre-primary, primary, and secondary Special Total
Government
Private
Total
6 7 2 1 0 0 1
11 4 11 36 12 17 5
17 11 13 37 12 17 6
17
96
113
Source: Department of Education and Youth (2001), Macau (www2.dsej.gov.mo/ ∼webdsej/www/statisti/edu).
82
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
(Cheng & Wong, 1994, p. 73). In parallel with this Western influence, rich Chinese families operated small schools, chia-shu, from the early 1800s (Pires, 1991, p. 18). In 1893, the Portuguese government set up its official secondary school in Macau, which was also the first Portuguese official school in the Far East (Governo de Macau, 1994d, p. 55). The first official primary school was established in 1894, and the first official kindergarten in 1923. These schools were effectively Portuguese schools operated in Macau. They followed the Portuguese system with Portuguese teachers adopting Portuguese curricula and textbooks. In 1998/1999, the government-run Portuguese schools were combined and turned into a private Portuguese-medium school which secured support from the government in Portugal for future operational costs (MCEA, 1998, Vol. 1; Wong, 1998). Government documents showed that Luso-Chinese primary education commenced at the end of the 19th century, but the origins were informal and the scale was very small compared with the Portuguese schools (Governo de Macau, 1994d, p. 42). All students in these small primary schools were Chinese, who were taught by Chinese and Portuguese teachers. The schools were intended for poor Chinese, and no fees were charged (Pires, 1991, p. 18). Although the Macau government provided education for students in official schools, it was reluctant to devote the resources necessary to extend its influence on education for most of the local Chinese. As in Hong Kong, before 1911 chia-shu (family schools), ssu-shu (private schools), and i-hsueh (charitable schools) were the most common forms of educational organizations among local Chinese. In the early 1920s, facing a tide of refugees, the Macau government remained reluctant to provide education for local Chinese. Its non-interventionist attitude, neither controlling nor supporting the private sector (Alves Pinto, 1987; Rosa, 1990), allowed the growth of private Chinese schools. During this period of turmoil, the growth and development of private educational organizations exceeded those with government support (Pires, 1991, p. 18). However, this non-interventionist attitude also provided much room for the influence of the Nationalist ferment from China. For instance, in 1922, 1 year after Sun Yat-sen established a revolutionary government in Guangzhou, a Nationalist Movement was initiated in China and promoted civic education. Most of the private schools in Macau supported this movement by introducing civic education and adopting the same curriculum and textbooks (Lau, 1992, p. 49; Ng, 1992, p. 90). In 1929, physical education was introduced into the Macau school curriculum in accordance with recommendations by the Nationalist government (Chan, 1994). In addition to the influence from China, the local Chinese borrowed Hong Kong’s model as early as 1914, 1 year after the enactment of Hong Kong’s Education Ordinance. The Macau English College was established in 1914, and followed the Hong Kong system. Most of the graduates of this secondary school went to Hong Kong to sit for the University of Hong Kong examination. The school was closed in the early 1930s due to the lack of resources (MCEA, 1966, Vol. 23, p. 19). During the period up to the mid-1930s, there was still only a small government section within the police force responsible for the regulations and licenses for the schools. The control was minimal and not focused on matters of pedagogy (MCEA, 1988, Vol. 137, p. 15; Wong, 1991, p. 62). By the early 1930s, as in Hong Kong, most of the private schools, both Christian and non-Christian, had registered with
BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
83
the Education Department in Guangdong. They followed the 6+3+3 system that had been established by the Nanjing government in 1922. Private schools also adopted the curriculum and textbooks used in China, and presented their senior middle graduates for university entrance examinations in Guangzhou (Cheung, 1991, p. 116). As mentioned above, in the early 1950s the Hong Kong government sought to influence local education due to the political tensions in China. In Macau, the apathy of the colonial government toward these political tensions marked the point of bifurcation for the development of Chinese-medium schools in the two places. In 1945, following the end of World War II most schools, teachers, and students which had migrated to Macau moved back to China. The establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 attracted some people back to their motherland, but forced others to seek refuge in Hong Kong and Macau. Chinese private schools struggled to survive in the early 1950s after the sudden drop in the number of students. The non-Christian schools suffered most because the Catholic schools received support from the Diocese of Macau, and Protestant schools were supported by local or foreign churches. This challenge, together with the non-interventionist attitude of the Macau government, attracted competition between the Communists and Nationalists to exert influence on these schools. At the beginning of this competition, the pro-Nationalist force was in a stronger position. The long-established relationship between the Nationalist Party and Christianity, especially the Catholic Church, enabled the Taiwan government to resume its linkage with the Christian schools in Macau after the civil war. Furthermore, the diplomatic relations between the Taiwan government, Kuomintang and the Portuguese government, and the establishment of a Chinese consul of the Taiwan government in Macau, gave a more favorable condition for the pro-Nationalist force to compete for the non-Christian schools. This dominance of the Nationalist Party was overturned in 1966, as an unintended consequence of the riots stimulated by the China’s Cultural Revolution. Overt conflict was ignited between the Catholic Church and the Communists in Macau. Red-guard attacks were launched against the Macau government, and the Diocese and proNationalist Catholic schools were besieged by the pro-Communist masses (MCEA, 1967, 1968). Anti-colonial, anti-foreign, and anti-Christian feelings were mixed with nationalistic and ethnic zeal. In contrast to the pattern in Hong Kong, the incident did not change the Macau government’s non-interventionist attitude toward social services and education. Some Catholic leaders who were frightened by the incident moved to Hong Kong and left a chance for the pro-Communist associations to develop their influence further. In addition to the Diocese and Catholic schools, pro-Nationalist organizations including schools were attacked. Most of these organizations and their leaders were expelled from Macau. For instance, in the early 1960s there were around 10 Nationalistaffiliated schools in Macau known as the Chinese Oversea Schools (Macau Chinese Oversea Schools Association, 1962). However, the success of the Communists in the conflict led to the extinction of these schools a few years after the riot, due to the lack of support and resources. The influence of this political incident is still discernible. In the 1990s the private schools could still be divided into two groups. Christian schools were run by the Catholic or Protestant churches, while non-Christian schools were supported by
84
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
welfare associations or philanthropic individuals. Among the non-Christian schools, some were patriotic and affiliated to the pro-Communist Macau Chinese Education Association (Lai, 1992, p. 35). These two groups of schools were balanced in power, with approximately equal numbers (Leung, 1993; Rosa, 1990). 3.3.
Analysis
In order to understand the social origins of the education systems in the colonial history of Hong Kong and Macau, the combined influence of the voluntary missionary and government efforts together with their competition with the Chinese influences should be addressed. At the very beginning, both governments were reluctant to play a major role in educational provision for local Chinese. The reason has been summarized precisely by Tam (1995, p. 91): When the two places came under colonial rule, the native population was submissive and the size of intellectual body able to mobilize the mass was almost non-existent. The need to sustain power through knowledge was not urgent. Thus, education, an important institution to spread knowledge, was entrusted to church bodies so as to reduce colonial expenditure. Before World War II, the two colonies displayed similar patterns in education development. In Hong Kong, although the 1873 Code of Grant-in-Aid for schools and the 1913 Education Ordinance signified the birth of the local education system which was an importation of an external model, the unification and systematization processes suggested by Archer did not lead to the birth of the system because of the influences from Mainland China on local Chinese education. The education system was developed after World War II through different restrictive strategies employed by the government (Luk, 1991; Sweeting, 1993). In Macau, due to the apathy of the government toward the Kuomintang’s enthusiasm and the later Communist threat, educational provision remained fragmented and uncoordinated. The non-interventionist attitude of the Macau government was the major reason for it not being able to employ the restrictive strategy to build up the Macau system. 4. 4.1.
DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROVISION AFTER THE 1970s Hong Kong: Improving Quality for Compulsory Free Education
In Hong Kong, free education was introduced by the government, and aided primary schools, in 1971. It was extended to junior secondary schooling in 1978, and the following year 9 years of schooling were made compulsory. Few countries could boast such an achievement in so short a time. In the early 1980s, by mode of financing, there were three main types of schools: government, government-aided, and private. Private schools were subdivided into private non-profit-making schools and private independent schools. In government and government-aided schools, no fees were charged at the primary and junior secondary levels. Private schools charged fees at all levels, but their fees were subject to the approval of the Director of Education. This expansion of the public sector
BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
85
Table 5.4: Distribution of School Enrollment in Hong Kong by Mode of Financing, 1980
Primary Junior secondary Senior secondary
Government
Aided
Private bought places
Private
5.9 5.9 5.7
81.6 39.2 33.0
– 51.2 0.3
12.5 3.7 61.0
Source: Government of Hong Kong (1981, p. 20).
of secondary education during the late 1970s and 1980s could only be achieved by buying places from private schools, which was known as the Bought Place Scheme. Table 5.4 shows the distribution of school enrollment by mode of financing in 1980. The fact that large numbers of places in sub-standard private schools had to be bought by the government was widely considered problematic. One way to improve the quality of basic education was replacement of bought places with purpose-built and well-equipped aided schools. By the early 1990s, most of the bought places in private schools had already been phased out. In due course, however, the public sector, which embraced both government and aided schools, was considered too uniform. In order to increase diversity and also further improve quality, the government launched two major schemes in the early 1990s. One was the School Management Initiative (SMI), which was described as a form of decentralization though some schools found it insufficiently flexible to meet their needs (Wong, 1997). The other innovation was the Direct Subsidy Scheme (DSS), which aimed “to encourage the growth of a strong private sector as an alternative to public sector education for parental choice” (Government of Hong Kong, 1999). The DSS subsidized some existing private schools and encouraged aided schools to transfer to the private sector. By 2000, 34 DSS schools existed: 32 at the secondary level, and 2 at the primary level. They received an annual subsidy calculated in terms of the average cost of an aided school place for each student enrolled. They also had freedom to set their own curricula, fees, and entrance requirements.
4.2.
Macau: Building up the System with Compulsory Free Education
Portugal’s 1974 revolution and the subsequent partial decolonization of Macau brought a slight change in the non-interventionist attitude of the Macau government. In 1977, a law for subsidizing the private schools was passed (Governo de Macau, 1977). Direct subsidies, relaxation of tax burdens, and provision of studentships were the main governments strategies to support the private schools. In 1985, a law for subsidizing private school teachers was passed (Governo de Macau, 1985), and in the same year a government Luso-Chinese Secondary School was established. Another indicator of this gradual change of the government attitude was the public expenditure on education. In 1975, education was allocated just 2.2% of the total public expenditure. Over the next decade this percentage increased markedly, reaching 5.3% in 1986—though the percentage was still low in international terms (Bray, 1991, p. 87). Major stimulus to rectify the government’s neglect of education in Macau came from the 1987 Sino-Portuguese declaration. Concerning education, the declaration
86
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
(People’s Republic of China/Republic of Portugal, 1987, Annex section VII) stated that: The Macau Special Administrative Region shall on its own decide policies in the field of culture, education, science and technology, such as policies regarding the languages of instruction (including Portuguese) and the system of academic qualifications and the recognition of degrees. From the government viewpoint, education reform was important for future economic and political development. From the local viewpoint, citizens of Macau could consider their future with more confidence if education development was accelerated (Lai, 1991, p. 64). In 1988, a Committee of Educational Reform was set up and embarked on a survey of education. A major seminar on education was organized for public discussion in 1989, and a draft policy document was released in 1990. The proposals included a unified Macau educational system, a public school leaving examination system, and an unambiguous relationship between the government and the private schools (Bray & Tang, 1993, p. 163). In 1991, the framework for a Macau educational system was set out in a pair of laws for basic and higher education (Governo de Macau, 1991a,b). The law for basic education was later supplemented by regulations for private education organizations (Governo de Macau, 1993), a law on curriculum organization in pre-primary and primary schools (Governo de Macau, 1994b), and a law for secondary schools (Governo de Macau, 1994c). The year 1995/1996 was a further historic moment in Macau’s educational development. A law on fee-free basic education was approved (Governo de Macau, 1995a), under which all private schools could choose to become members of a conjoint system to provide 7 years of fee-free education for Macau pre-primary and primary students. By 1997/1998, a further target of providing 10 years of fee-free education for the conjoint schools had been met; and by 1998/1999, around 80% of the private schools were conjoint schools (MCEA, 1999, Vol. 5, p. 4). 4.3.
Analysis
Two features of Hong Kong’s educational development are important to note here. On the one hand, unification and systematization of the Hong Kong education system proceeded by phasing out the private schools from the early 1970s to the early 1990s. On the other hand, the degree of differentiation and specialization was limited within that period because aided schools were heavily influenced by the government. In other words, the government became the dominant ownership group, and educational provision was standardized. In the early 1990s, the SMI was implemented in order to improve school management quality and encourage school diversity, especially in the aided sector. Implementation of the DSS showed a change in the government’s attitude toward private schools. Good quality independent private schools, it was felt, could contribute to the differentiation and specialization of the centralized education system. With this in mind, the government was willing not only to recognize their contributions but also to provide financial support.
BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
87
Macau started to build a unified education system with fee-free education in the 1990s. It was impossible for the Macau government to employ restrictive strategies to eliminate the well-established Leftist schools along the lines that the Hong Kong government had followed. The structure of the poly-centered collection of systems together with the power of the sponsoring groups behind each center forced the Macau government to employ substitutive strategies. The adoption of the substitutive approach was not easy, though was easier than a restrictive approach. Lack of resources was one challenge. Without government support in the past, most private schools could only survive with small campuses and large numbers of students. In the early 1990s, the average class size for private kindergartens, primary schools, and secondary schools was 52, 50, and 45, respectively, and it was not uncommon to have classrooms with over 60 students (Rosa, 1991; Wong, 1994). If the government had wanted to compete with the private schools, it would either have had to build many schools of its own or to gain control through financial assistance. The continuous influx of illegal immigrants exacerbated the problems. The second challenge facing the Macau government during the early 1990s was the place of the Portuguese language as a subject in the curriculum (MCEA, 1996, Vol. 3, p. 2; Yue, 1994). From the Portuguese perspective, Luso-Chinese schools, in which the Portuguese language was a compulsory subject, served as the model for the future. From the local perspective, Portuguese was not an international language and should have only been an elective. Thus, in contrast to the replacement in Hong Kong of Chinese-medium schools by Anglo-Chinese schools, the Luso-Chinese schools would have difficulties competing with the Chinese-medium schools or even AngloChinese schools in Macau. After the return to Chinese administration in 1999, the Macau SAR government had much less concern about the place of the Portuguese language in the curriculum and the use of substitutive strategies. More resources, both materials and administrative, were devoted to unification and systematization of the emerging system. Standardization of the structure of school management boards and systematization of financial auditing procedures for school expenditures were among the tasks embarked upon. Some government officials considered modification of the 1991 education law an inevitable step to secure a more unified system (MCEA, 2001). However, although the Macau SAR government had strong goals of unification and systematization, the task was hampered by a deteriorating economic situation. Policies had to be scaled back in the systematization of teachers’ salary scales and qualifications and in the standardization of class sizes. 5. 5.1.
SCHOOL LEAVING EXAMINATIONS AND TERTIARY EDUCATION Hong Kong: Centralized Systems
Tertiary education has existed in Hong Kong for over a century. A College of Medicine was established in 1887 and was later incorporated into the University of Hong Kong, which was founded in 1911. The University of Hong Kong Matriculation Examination was introduced in 1913. In 1954, the University introduced two levels of examination: the Advanced and the Ordinary Levels, following what was then a dominant UK model. In 1937, in order to select students for matriculation classes, the
88
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Hong Kong Certificate Examination was introduced for Anglo-Chinese secondary school graduates. In 1952, this examination was complemented by the Hong Kong Chinese School Certificate Examination for graduates of Chinese-medium middle schools. In 1963 the Chinese University of Hong Kong was formed, mainly to serve such students, by the amalgamation of three post-secondary colleges. In order to unify the two Ordinary Level examinations for graduates of AngloChinese and Chinese-medium middle schools, in 1974 the two examinations were merged to form the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination (HKCEE). Examination papers with same content were set in both Chinese and English. In 1977, the Hong Kong Examinations Authority (HKEA) was established as an independent, self-funding, and non-profit-making statutory body. Its main role was to operate two local public examinations: the HKCEE and the Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination (HKALE). The HKCEE results were used by secondary schools to select Secondary six students, whereas the HKALE results were used by the tertiary institutions to select students. By the late 1990s, eight tertiary institutions were funded by the University Grants Committee (UGC). They were the City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong Institute of Education, Lingnan University, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and University of Hong Kong. The UGC had been established in 1965 with principles and practices based on its counterpart in the United Kingdom to advise the Hong Kong government on the facilities, development, and financial needs of the university sector. 5.2.
Macau: External Versus Internal Examinations
Another feature of the Macau poly-centered collection of systems has been diversity of school leaving and university entrance examinations. Only in a few proCommunist schools were university entrance examinations a major concern until the late 1970s. Before the success of Macau’s economic development, tertiary education was an impossible dream for most of their working class students. However, the extraordinarily gifted students obtained support from pro-Communist organizations to pursue their tertiary education in China. In 1977, the Mainland National Unified College Entrance Examinations were restored after the Cultural Revolution, while at the same time the Mainland door was opened for Chinese students from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. An informal examination center was set up in Macau for the secondary graduates of pro-Communist schools. In 1984, this center was transformed into an official Macau examination center for the entrance examination of the universities in China. The number of candidates increased steadily during the 1980s and 1990s, and secondary graduates from all types of schools sat for this Chinese examination (Lau, 1993, p. 61). Other systems had different approaches. The Portuguese schools followed the Portuguese system, and their graduates sat for the Portuguese University Entrance Examination in a local examination center. Most Chinese sections of the Catholic and Protestant schools had had links with the Republic of China government since the early 1930s. An entrance examination to Taiwan universities for Overseas Chinese was established in 1954 by the Overseas Chinese Education Committee (Chan, 1992, p. 391). Prior to 1966, candidates could sit for their examination in an informal
BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
89
center in Macau. The success of the pro-Communist organizations in expelling proNationalists from Macau in 1966 forced religious schools to sever their link with the pro-Nationalists (MCEA, 1967, Vols. 27–28). Macau students, therefore, had to travel to Hong Kong, where the pro-Communist forces were curbed by the Hong Kong government, to sit for the Taiwan examination. Dramatically, the steady improvement of relationships between the China and Taiwan governments after 1979 paved the path for the establishment of a Macau center for the Taiwan examination in 1993/1994, 5 years before the reversion of Macau’s sovereignty to China. The Catholic schools took turns to run this examination center, and the popularity of the Taiwan examination was comparable with that of the Chinese examination. In addition to this Taiwan examination, the Hong Kong Higher Level Examination, before its abolition in 1991, had been an alternative for Macau secondary graduates. This examination was very popular among the secondary graduates from one Protestant school, Pui Cheng, which had a strong link with its sister school in Hong Kong and with the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The Hong Kong examination also attracted graduates from many Catholic schools in Macau, even though they had to travel to Hong Kong to sit for the examination. Hong Kong’s influence on the English sections of the Catholic schools was even more significant. Students in these sections could sit for the General Certificate of Education (GCE) (London) examination as early as 1954 (Governo de Macau, 1994d, p. 111), and many traveled to Hong Kong to do so. The first Macau examination center was set up in 1974, and by 1976 there were four GCE examination centers in Macau, all located at the Catholic schools (Governo de Macau, 1994d). This Hong Kong influence, which originated from the UK, was also substantial for commercial subjects. The first Pitman examination center was set up in 1965, and the first London Chamber of Commerce examination center was established in 1975. These centers were located at a Catholic girls’ school (Governo de Macau, 1994d, p. 96). This entire dependence on the external provision of school leaving examinations and tertiary education did not change until 1990, 2 years after the launch of Macau’s education reform. In that year the University of East Asia, which had been established in 1981, operated its first entrance examination for Macau’s secondary graduates. A brief historical review of the university, the territory’s principal tertiary institution, may explain this late development of local entrance examinations for Macau students. What is now called the University of Macau evolved from the University of East Asia, which was founded as a private, commercial enterprise. Its courses were designed to follow the Hong Kong system for students with 7 years of secondary education, and its language of instruction was English. In the early years, most students were from Hong Kong and other parts of East Asia rather than from Macau (Mellor, 1988). The government purchased the main campus of the university from the private owners in 1988, and in 1991 the institution was renamed the University of Macau. This signified the government’s determination to remodel the institution. By the mid-1990s the majority of the university’s 3,000 students came from Macau secondary schools (Bray, 2001, pp. 146–149). The 1990s also brought the establishment of other institutions of higher education. In 1991, the Macau Polytechnic Institute was created from a section that had split off from the University of East Asia. The United Nations University, which was
90
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Table 5.5: Number of Macau Students Receiving Assistance for Higher Education Study Through the Department of Education and Youth, by Place of Study, 1989/1990–2001/2002 1993/1994
1995/1996
1997/1998
1999/2000
2001/2002
Macau Mainland China Portugal Hong Kong Taiwan USA Canada Australia Others
1989/1990 4,694 202 73 31 322 27 12 9 3
1991/1992 897 202 125 23 342 20 5 7 2
1,092 313 68 17 432 17 0 0 6
1,014 595 69 2 568 17 4 1 17
1,060 888 54 6 562 21 3 4 13
1,208 1,130 36 8 475 26 4 9 9
1,524 1,020 18 8 452 18 6 7 7
Total
1,148
1,623
1,945
2,287
2,611
2,905
3,060
Source: Department of Education and Youth, Macau.
headquartered in Japan, set up an International Institute for Software Technology in Macau which commenced operations in 1992. Three years later, the Institute for Tourism Studies was founded by the Macau government; between 1995 and 2000 five institutions were established by the private sector. These institutions were the Institute of European Studies of Macau, the Inter-University Institute of Macau, the Kiang Wu Nursing College of Macau, the Macau Institute of Management, and the Macau University of Science and Technology (Bray et al., 2002). The increasing support of the Macau government can also be seen in the figures on the scholarships provided to Macau students by the government’s Department of Education and Youth (Table 5.5). Although different types of grants and loans for tertiary students studying in Macau or abroad had been offered by the government since 1981, a major shift from supporting students of official schools to supporting students from private schools only materialized in the late 1980s. Table 5.5 indicates that the most popular destinations were Macau itself, followed by Mainland China and Taiwan. In summary, the 1980s and 1990s brought about rapid expansion of tertiary education in Macau. By 1995/1996, over 80% of senior secondary graduates proceeded to tertiary education (MCEA, 1996, Vol. 4, p. 38). Among these students, over half were attracted by the two major local tertiary institutions. The preferences of students who pursued their tertiary education abroad were still linked strongly to the nature of their school sponsoring bodies, a practice with political–religious roots in history. 5.3.
Analysis
Due to the early effort by the Hong Kong government to control education through examinations and the establishment of the UGC in the 1960s, the tertiary education sector has been unified and systematized, and has expanded significantly as well. Although the number of Hong Kong secondary graduates pursuing tertiary education overseas has always been high (Postiglione, 1997), there is a unified and well-established tertiary sector within the Hong Kong education system for most of the secondary school graduates who would like to study locally. Before 1991, the Chinese University of Hong Kong offered 4-year undergraduate courses in contrast to the 3-year courses offered in all other UGC-funded institutions, and enrolled Form
BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
91
6 instead of Form 7 graduates through the administration of the Hong Kong Higher Level Examination. After considerable debate, the examination was abolished and the Chinese University of Hong Kong moved to a credit-unit system in which 3 years of study was the norm. This showed that both physical and political resources could be deployed by the Hong Kong government to achieve its education policy objectives. While the Hong Kong government could adopt restrictive strategies to eliminate the influences of Mainland China and replaced many of the Chinese-medium schools by Anglo-Chinese institutions, the Macau government could only deploy limited substitutive strategies. The decentralized pattern is likely to persist in Macau, for at least one major reason. Before 1989, Portuguese was the only official language in Macau, despite of its unpopularity among the majority of local Chinese. This regulation, on one hand, restrained the participation of local Chinese in the civil service, especially at the top; and it also rendered the educational qualifications of most local Chinese unrecognized. This situation was not altered until the government resolved to localize its civil service, making Chinese an official language alongside Portuguese. In 1993, a consultative committee for educational qualification recognition was set up. Representatives from the pro-Communist Macau Chinese Education Association and the Macau Catholic Schools Association were invited to become members of this committee, which also included principals from Catholic and Protestant schools (Governo de Macau, 1995b). By 1994, the government had officially recognized 2,649 primary certificates and 6,759 secondary certificates. Among these academic credentials, 83.6% were attained in local private schools whereas 15.4% were from schools in China (Governo de Macau, 1995b, p. 64). Furthermore, by 1993, the government had officially recognized 1,811 university degrees and 96 special degrees. Among these tertiary qualifications, 50% were attained in China whereas 20% were from Taiwan (Governo de Macau, 1995b, p. 64). The orientation of the official system for recognizing educational qualifications was maintained in the postcolonial period. Although the development of tertiary education in Macau in the 1980s and 1990s was of considerable significance, the Macau government had only limited substitutive strategies when facing the challenge of Mainland Chinese influence in terms of school leaving examinations and provision of tertiary education. In 2000, a team of Hong Kong scholars was invited by the newly established Macau SAR government to conduct a consultancy study on the strategic development of higher education (Bray et al., 2002). This was an important effort by the new Macau SAR government to systematize the tertiary sector. The comprehensive study made recommendations in many areas, including the machinery for policy-making and coordination, costs and financing, strategies for quality assurance, and institutional identity. Nevertheless, Mainland Chinese influence and decentralized patterns will probably continue for the foreseeable future. Specialization and differentiation will continue to dominate and to obstruct efforts to unify and systematize. 6.
CONCLUSION
This chapter focuses on the social origins of the education systems in Hong Kong and Macau. The chapter argues that before World War II the two colonies were very similar in terms of competition between colonial governments and Mainland Chinese
92
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
governments for educational provision. The different reactions of the Hong Kong and Macau governments to the success of the Communist Party in Mainland China marked the point of bifurcation for the development of Chinese-medium schools in the two territories. In Hong Kong, restrictive strategies supported by the legislative power of the Hong Kong government and the socio-economic value of English achieved exclusion of Chinese influences, and the degree of unification and systematization was strong within the centralized system. In Macau, due to the non-interventionist attitude of the government, educational provision remained fragmented and uncoordinated in the late 1980s. The Macau government only started to think about its own education system after the 1987 Sino-Portuguese declaration. This chapter argues that the structure of the poly-centered collection of systems together with the power of the sponsoring groups behind each center forced the Macau government to employ substitutive strategies. Furthermore, the chapter argues that even the adoption of the substitutive approach was not easy because of the lack of physical resources, the weak legislative power of the Macau government, and the low socio-economic value of the Portuguese language. While during the 1990s the Macau government was busy constructing its education system, the Hong Kong government became more aware of the problems of government dominance and of educational uniformity. In order to promote differentiation and specialization within a centralized system to cater for different needs in the Hong Kong society, the SMI and DSS were launched in the early 1990s. Analysis of school tertiary education shows similar patterns. The Hong Kong government had sufficient physical and political resources to use when dealing with educational conflicts within the centralized system, whereas the Macau government had limited resources when adopting substitutive strategies to minimize external influences. The Hong Kong government considered the development of a more differentiated and specialized tertiary sector within its centralized system, and during the early years of the new century moved toward that goal. In contrast, the Macau government worked hard to create a more systematized tertiary sector. In addition to comparing Hong Kong and Macau in terms of their development and centralization and decentralization processes, this chapter contributes to the conceptual literature by examining the possibilities and limitations of Archer’s tools for comparing education development in colonial settings. First, Archer’s sociohistorical and comparative approach is found to be valuable even for the colonial setting. Second, although her ideas about the mono-integrated characteristics of education provision at the beginning of the first cycle did not fit patterns in the two colonies because educational provisions had always been the concern of Christians, colonialists, Chinese nationalists, and Communists since the early 20th century, the chapter has shown the value of her advice to pay attention to conflicts among the dominant and assertive groups within the society. This approach is especially useful for the examination of the substitutive and restrictive strategies adopted by different interest groups and their relation with the emergence and elaboration of the decentralized and centralized education systems respectively. Third, her suggestion about the four universal new characteristics of newly emerged education systems: unification, systematization, differentiation, and specialization, together with their variations during the elaboration of the centralized and decentralized education systems, is found to be a useful conceptual tool for comparing educational development in the two colonial settings.
BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
93
The application of Archer’s conceptual tools in the above analysis does have problems, the greatest of which is the unambiguous identification of the dominant group and the assertive group. In Hong Kong, the government could be considered the dominant group, whereas the Chinese nationalists (or communists) could be described as the assertive group for educational provisions; but such usage of these two terms has already shifted away from the original usage, which excluded external influences. Therefore, the use of the restrictive and substitutive strategies in relation to the conflicts between the assertive groups and dominant group in this chapter is quite different from the original use. Nevertheless, Archer’s ideas about the deployment of physical and legislative resources in relation to the restrictive and substitutive strategies are found to be useful. NOTE This chapter is a revised version of the article by Tang Kwok-Chun and Mark Bray (2000) ‘Colonical Models and the Evolution of Education Systems: Centralization and Decentralization in Hong Kong and Macau’, Journal of Educational Administration, Vol. 38, No. 5. The authors express appreciation to the publishers for permission to use the material. The publishers’ website is: www.emeraldinsight.com/jea.htm.
7.
REFERENCES
Afonso, R., & Pereira, F. G. (1986). The political status and government institutions of Macao’. Hong Kong Law Journal, 16(1), 28–57. Alves, P., & Concei¸ca˜ o, M. (1987). Ensino em Macau: Umas Abordagem Sist´emica da Realidade Educativa. Macau: Gabinete do Secret´ario-Adjunto para Educa¸ca˜ o e Cultura. Archer, M. S. (1979). Social origins of educational systems. London: Sage. Archer, M. S. (1984). Social origins of educational systems (University edition). London: Sage. Bray, M. (1991). Education planning and financing: A comparative perspective. In H. K. Wong (Ed.), Proceedings of the Symposium on Education Reform in Macau, Centre of Macau Studies, University of East Asia, Macau. Bray, M. (2001). Higher education and colonial transition in Macau: Market forces and state intervention in a small society. In M. Bray and W. O. Lee (Eds.), Education and political transition: Themes and experiences in East Asia (pp. 139–161). Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong. Bray, M., & Koo, R. (Eds.) (2004). Education and society in Hong Kong and Macao: Comparative perspectives on continuity and change (2nd ed.). Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Bray, M., & Tang, K. C. (1993). Three plus two equals xix? Imported curricula and the search for a Macau education system. In C. C. Lam, H. W. Wong, and Y. W. Fung (Eds.), Curriculum changes for Chinese communities in Southeast Asia: Challenges of the 21st century (pp. 159–164). Hong Kong: Faculty of Education, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Bray, M., with Butler, R., Philip Hui, K. F., Kwo, O., & Mang, E. (2002). Higher education in Macau: Growth and strategic development. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong. Chan, K. W. (1992). Footprints of the Trailblazers: 300 Years of Chinese education overseas. Toronto: Royal Kingsway Inc. (in Chinese). Chan, S. W. (1994). Macau education during the war period: Newspaper clippings. Macau Daily News, Macau (in Chinese). Chang, J. L. J. (1988). Settlement of the Macao issue: Distinctive features of Beijing’s negotiating behavior (with text of 1887 protocol and 1987 declaration). Maryland: School of Law, University of Maryland. Cheng, T. C. (1949). The education of overseas Chinese: A comparative study of Hong Kong, Singapore and the East Indies, MA thesis, University of London. Cheng, W. M., & Wong, K. S. (1994). Religion in Macau. Macau Foundation, Macau (in Chinese). Cheung, B. L. (1991). The relation between school autonomy and government control. In H. K. Wong (Ed.), Proceedings of the Symposium on Education Reform in Macau, Centre of Macau Studies, University of East Asia, Macau (in Chinese).
94
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Education Department of Hong Kong. (1990). Annual summary 1989–1990. Hong Kong: Education Department. Gomes dos Santos, D. M. (1968). Macau: Primeria Universidade Occidental do Extremo Oriente. Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da Hist´oria. Government of Hong Kong. (1981). The Hong Kong education system. Hong Kong: Education Department. Government of Hong Kong. (1984a). Code of aid for primary schools. Hong Kong: Government Printer. Government of Hong Kong. (1984b). Code of aid for secondary schools. Hong Kong: Government Printer. Government of Hong Kong. (1986). Education regulations. Hong Kong: Government Printer. Government of Hong Kong. (1999). Direct subsidy scheme. Hong Kong: Education Department (http://www.info.gov.hk/ed/school/dss/dsg e.htm). Government of Hong Kong. (2005). Basic statistics. Hong Kong: Census & Statistics Department (http://www.info.gov.hk/censtatd/eng/hkstat/fas/nat account/gdp/gdp1 index.html). Governo de Macau. (1977). Decreto-Lei No. 11/77/M. Macau: Imprensa Oficial. Governo de Macau. (1985). Decreto-Lei No. 199/85/M. Macau: Imprensa Oficial. Governo de Macau. (1990). Inqu´erito ao Ensino 1989/90. Macau: Servi¸cos de Estat´ıstica e Censos. Governo de Macau. (1991a). Ensino Superior em Macau, Decreto-Lei No. 11/91/M. Macau: Imprensa Oficial. Governo de Macau. (1991b). Sistema Educativo de Macau, Decreto-Lei No. 11/91/M. Macau: Imprensa Oficial. Governo de Macau. (1993). Estatuto das Institui¸co˜ es Educativas Particulares, Decreto-Lei No. 38/93/M. Macau: Imprensa Oficial. Governo de Macau. (1994a). Caracter´ısticas do Sistema de Ensino de Macau: Curr´ıculo 1993/94. Macau: Direc¸ca˜ o dos Servi¸cos de Educa¸ca˜ o e Juventude. Governo de Macau. (1994b). Decreto-Lei No. 38/91/M. Macau: Imprensa Oficial. Governo de Macau. (1994c). Decreto-Lei No. 39/91/M. Macau: Imprensa Oficial. Governo de Macau. (1994d). Estabelecimentos de Ensino de Macau: Sua Caracteriza¸ca˜ o 1992/93. Macau: Direc¸ca˜ o dos Servi¸cos de Educa¸ca˜ o e Juventude. Governo de Macau. (1995a). Decreto-Lei No. 29/95/M. Macau: Imprensa Oficial. Governo de Macau. (1995b). Reconhecimento de Habilita¸co˜ es Acad´emicas em Macau. Macau: Gabinete de Apoio ao Ensino Superior. Governo de Macau. (2001b). Inqu´erito ao Ensino 1999/2000. Macau: Servi¸cos de Estat´ıstica e Censos. Governo de Macau. (2005). Macau em N´umeros. Macau: Servi¸cos de Estat´ıstica e Censos (http://www.dsec.gov.mo/index.asp?src=/english/indicator/e mn indicator.html). Gunn, G. C. (1996). Encountering Macau: A Portuguese city-state on the periphery of China, 1557–1999. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Jones, C. (1990). Promoting prosperity: The Hong Kong way of social policy. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Lai, I. M. (1991). The aims of education reform. In H. K. Wong (Ed.), Proceedings of the Symposium on Education Reform in Macau, Centre of Macau Studies, University of East Asia, Macau (in Chinese). Lai, I. M. (1992). Fundamental problems of reorganizing civic education in schools. In H. K. Wong (Ed.), Proceedings of the Symposium on Civic Education in Macau, Macau Research Centre of University of Macau, Macau (in Chinese). Lau, S. B. (1992). Civic education in Macau. In H. K. Wong (Ed.), Proceedings of the Symposium on Civic Education in Macau, Macau Research Centre of University of Macau, Macau (in Chinese). Lau, S. B. (1993). The future cooperation between Macau and Guangzhou on education development. Journal of The Macau Society of Social Sciences, 12, 60–61 (in Chinese). Lee, W. O. (1997). Social class, language and achievement. In: G. A. Postiglione and W. O. Lee (Eds.), Schooling in Hong Kong: Organization, teaching and social context. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Leung, B. K. F. (1993). The political-religion (Catholic) relationship during the transition period. In C. Yue (Ed.), Macau: Transition Over 1999. Hong Kong: Wide Angle Press Ltd (in Chinese). Luk, B. H. K. (1991). Chinese culture in the Hong Kong curriculum: Heritage and colonialism. Comparative Education Review, 35(4), 650–668. Macau Chinese Education Association (MCEA). (2001). Newspaper Clippings for Education, 3, 11–13 (in Chinese). Macau Chinese Education Association (MCEA). (various years). Macau Education. Macau: Information Service Centre of Macau Chinese Education Association (in Chinese).
BUILDING AND DIVERSIFYING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
95
Macau Chinese Oversea Schools Association. (1962). The special publication for the establishment of the Macau Chinese Oversea School Association. Macau: Chinese Oversea School Association (in Chinese). Mellor, B. (1988). The university of East Asia: Origin and outlook. Hong Kong: UEA Press. Ng, K. C. (1992). Democratic politics and civic education in schools. In H. K. Wong (Ed.), Proceedings of the symposium on civic education in Macau, Macau Research Centre of University of Macau, Macau (in Chinese). People’s Republic of China. (1990). The basic law of the Hong Kong special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China. Hong Kong: Consultative Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. People’s Republic of China. (1993). Lei B´asica da Regi˜ao Administrativa Especial de Macau de Rep´ublica Popular da China. Macau: Conselho Consultivo da Lei B´asica da Regi˜ao Administrativa Especial de Macau de Rep´ublica Popular da China. People’s Republic of China/Republic of Portugal. (1987). Declarac˜ao Conjunta Sino-Portuguesa sobre a Quest˜ao de Macau. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Pires, B. V. (1991). Origins and early history of Macau. In R. D. Cremer (Ed.), Macau: City of commerce and culture—continuity and change (2nd ed., pp. 7–21). Hong Kong: API Press. Postiglione, G. A. (1997). Schooling and social stratification. In G. A. Postiglione and W. O. Lee (Eds.), Schooling in Hong Kong: Organization, teaching and social context. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Rosa, A. (1990). Macau education in the period of transition: An overview and prospects. Paper presented at the UNESCO International Congress of Planning and Management of Educational Development, Mexico City. Rosa, A. (1991). A situa¸ca˜ o da educa¸ca˜ o em Macau e a necessidade da reforma. In H. K. Wong (Ed.), Education reform in Macau (pp. 31–36). Macau: Centre of Macau Studies, University of East Asia. Sweeting, A. (1990). Education in Hong Kong Pre-1841 to 1941: Fact and opinion. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Sweeting, A. (1993). A phoenix transformed: The reconstruction of education in post-war Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Sweeting, A. (1995). Hong Kong. In P. Morris and A. Sweeting (Eds.), Education and development in East Asia (pp. 41–77). New York: Garland. Tam, E. T. W. (1995). A comparative study on the contributions of missionaries to the formative years of colonial education in Hong Kong and Macau, unpublished MA dissertation, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. Wong, W. M. (1991). Reforming the education system and improving school management. In H. K. Wong (Ed.), Proceedings of the symposium on education reform in Macau, Centre of Macau Studies, University of East Asia, Macau (in Chinese). Wong, C. S. (1994). Education. In C. L. Ng and H. K. Wong (Eds.), Macau: An overview. Macau: Macau Foundation (in Chinese). Wong, K. C. (1997). Organizing and managing schools. In G. A. Postiglione and W. O. Lee (Eds.), Schooling in Hong Kong: Organization, teaching and social context. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Wong, K. C. (1998, March 16). Portuguese-medium education beyond 1999 in Macau. Yazhou Zhoukan (pp. 33–34). Hong Kong: Yazhou Zhoukan Limited (in Chinese). Wong Leung, S. N. C. (1969). A comparative study of some of the salient features of the curricula of ordinary middle schools in mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong between 1949–1966, MA dissertation, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. Yue, K. L. (1994, 28 August). The controversy on language of instruction in Macau. Yazhou Zhoukan, 64–65 (in Chinese).
This page intentionally blank
Chapter 6 TRENDS AND ISSUES IN DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN∗ Hiromitsu Muta
1.
INTRODUCTION
In the late 19th century, Japan centralized its institutions, including education, in attempt to catch up with the Western industrialized nations. However, in order to maintain its competitive edge as a world leader in the economic globalization process, a century later the national leadership instituted a series of reforms designed to deregulate and decentralize the educational system. The objective was to provide sufficient flexibility and local control at the school level so that creativity, individual initiative, and the spirit of entrepreneurship would become part of the teaching learning process for each new generation of Japanese students. Recently, deregulation and decentralization have been underway in all aspects of education. At the same time, several evaluation systems were introduced to assure the quality of education remains high. Although the several new schemes have been put into practice, the impact of those changes is still not clear. This study aims at introducing the present status of these movements, problems, and prospects for the future. 2.
PAST AND PRESENT SYSTEM OF JAPANESE EDUCATION
In order to build a strong and unified country that could first catch up with and then cope and compete with the advanced Western nations, toward the end of the 19th century, the Japanese state centralized all its institutions, including the military, police, and education. In 1872, when the first modern education law was enacted, the state made decisions concerning the goals and subject matter of education, textbooks, and the status of teachers and students. Responsibility for the provision of facilities, school equipment, and financial support was delegated to municipalities, but under the supervision of the national government. Following the end of World War II, a report prepared by the First American Mission on Education guided educational reform in Japan. This report criticized the centralized system of education in Japan and recommended a decentralized school system based on the American system. According to the plan, schools and school districts would be given considerable independence, and members of the community ∗ The
initial version of this paper was appeared in the Journal of Educational Administration, 38(5), 2000.
97 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 97–113. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
98
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
would have opportunities to participate in the management of schools. Consistent with new constitutional guarantees for local self-government, the Board of Education Law of 1948 provided local governments with authority over education matters. Centralized control of educational administration by the national government was no longer considered legitimate. Local educational administration was distinguished from other branches of local public administration. Local boards of education were designated as independent administrative councils. The Minister of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture (hereafter referred to as the Minister of Education) and local boards of education were to function as equals rather than in a master–servant relationship. It is important to note that these reforms ran counter to the Japanese tradition of centralized organization and management. In addition, they were implemented according to the dictates of an occupying force rather than in response to the will of the Japanese nation. The changes therefore violated the principles of democracy and liberty (Sugihara, 1998). The system imposed by the occupation failed for various political reasons, such conflict between conservative and radical factions in Japan, cold war struggles, and the underdevelopment of democracy as a form of governance at all levels. As the occupation came to an end, the new system was continually modified. Revision of the Board of Education Law in 1956 represented a major change introduced during that period: decentralization became nominal and the national government reestablished control over schools throughout the prefectures and municipalities. Also, a national curriculum, known as the “Course of Study,” was instituted and followed strictly throughout the country. A rigid hierarchy, with the national government located at the top, was reestablished (Wakai, 1996). 3.
PRESENT STATE OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
In order to establish a frame of reference, some basic facts about the educational management structure in Japan might be useful. The popularly elected National Diet designates the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, in turn, appoints the Minister of Education. In each of Japan’s prefectures there is a board of education made up of five members who are appointed by the governor. The board, with the approval of the Minister of Education, appoints the Prefectural Superintendent of Education. Boards of education also exist at the local level, in the cities, towns, and villages. Mayors appoint members of those boards. In contrast to the practice of prefectural boards of education, the superintendent of a municipal board of education is elected by the board members, with the approval of the prefectural board of education. Most national educational and cultural activities fall under the authority of the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education supervises and allocates financial support to local boards of education and may require them to report on their educational activities. As occasion demands, the Ministry of Education makes inquiries and gives orders for necessary improvements, or corrections, to local boards of education. The prefectural and municipal boards of education oversee local public educational and cultural institutions. Private schools, however, are supervised by the prefectural governors rather than the municipal authorities. Prefectural governors have the power to approve the establishment or closing of private schools and to collect necessary information.
DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN
99
National, prefectural, and municipal educational agencies are formally independent of each other. However, the Minister of Education offers guidance, advice and assistance to local boards of education; prefectural boards of education carry out similar functions in relation to municipal boards of education. Lower level agencies tend to view such advice as orders that must be followed. Consequently, through informal advice from the top, the administrative structure tends to operate as a centralized system. 4.
DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION
In the 1980s, powerful economic networks in Japan began to press for a series of educational reforms. The issue most frequently highlighted by critics was that the education system designed after World War II was effective in helping Japan catch up to more advanced countries, but it was not capable of developing citizens with the intellectual creativity necessary to make the nation a world leader. Educational institutions were viewed as closed, overly standardized, and lacking a spirit of internationalism. In response to growing pressures for reform, a National Council on Educational Reform that reported directly to the Prime Minister was organized in 1984. Not unlike theNation at Risk report published in the United States in 1983, the Council created a sensation by issuing a report that forcefully called for the liberalization of education. However, education networks, comfortable with the old style, were slow to respond. Nevertheless, changes that fell in line with the recommendations presented in the report were gradually introduced. Although it was eventually dissolved in 1987, the Council managed to launch a series of reforms designed to deregulate and decentralize the Japanese education system (NIER, 1988). Among the plans it set in motion were a reconsideration of the roles of national and local governments, the revitalization of boards of education, and a reexamination of the function of the school districts. The trend toward increased deregulation and administrative reform continued into the 1990s. According to a report submitted by the National Committee for the Promotion of Decentralization in 1996, local governments were advised to stop acting as subcontractors to the national government. Instead, the relationship between the two levels of government should be based on mutual cooperation, with ministries exerting minimal influence on local government. In addition, the report recommended that the national government reconsider the policy on providing educational subsidies that supported the promotion of decentralization. In January of 1997, the Ministry of Education introduced an Education Reform Program that responded to the issues raised in the First National Committee for the Promotion of Decentralization. This document raised the possibility of providing increased flexibility to school districts, increasing the level of community participation in school activities, and abolishing the appointment-approval system for selecting school superintendents. The Ministry of Education also issued an official relaxation of the school district system. The school district system used to be rigid, with few exceptions to established regulations and procedures permitted. Thanks to the Ministry’s official statement, some boards of education initiated broader selection of schools beyond the school districts at the level of compulsory education. A series of
100
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
reforms, including the Promotion of Decentralization Plan and the Basic Law Concerning the Reform of Ministries and Agencies promoted further decentralization of school administration. Why did recent educational reforms in Japan promote the relaxation of central control over schools? Ichikawa (1995) lists neo-conservatism, changes in the power system (from a conflict driven to a consumer oriented system), a drop in the school age population (increasing competition among schools to attract students), and increasingly diversified needs in industrial circles (a diversified school system for responding to diversified needs) as the primary causes. 5.
IMPACT OF THE REPORT BY THE CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR EDUCATION
In the 1990s, a series of reports moved the education system into an era of new liberalization. Many of the issues raised in those reports were referred to in a “Promotion and Decentralization Plan.” One of these reports, produced in 1998 by the Central Council for Education, was titled “Policies on the Educational Administration of Local Governments.” The report redefined the roles of the government and the boards of education, enhanced school autonomy, and encouraged increased community participation in educational activities. This report clarified the role of the national government, and recommended that the Ministry of Education limit its practice of giving detailed advice to lower levels. In addition, it called for reduced participation by the national and prefectural governments in municipal and school activities. The following are the major proposals intended to improve the current system based on the Educational Program and most of them are realizing. Underlying all of these recommended changes is the desire for administrative reform and increased deregulation. r Abolish the appointment-approval system of superintendents: Currently, local government offices consult with upper level officials about candidates for school superintendent before making any appointments. If the informal feedback they receive from above is negative, no appointment is made. This course of action is taken to avoid any political conflict. New proposals emphasize the need to eliminate this “informal centralized approach” and call for a new system in which local assemblies select superintendents. r Reconsider requirements for school principals and vice-principals: The leadership and the management skills of school principals and vice-principals are indispensable, but the current requirements for those positions are very strict. As a result, it is often difficult to find qualified administrators to staff the schools. These requirements need to be modified. Previously, a principal was required to hold a teaching certificate and have at least 5 years experience working in schools. According to the report prepared by the Central Council for Education, the requirements for certification should be relaxed so that boards of education can appoint administrators as they deem appropriate. r Clarify the function of staff meetings: In some schools, due to the historically strong influence of teachers’ unions, most decisions are made during staff meetings. Under the new liberalization plans, a school principal can make decisions
DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN
101
independent of the teaching faculty. The objective of staff meetings should be to enhance communication, mutual understanding, and the exchange of ideas among teachers—not to make decisions. If staff meetings are organized with these goals in mind, the school principal will be able to perform his professional responsibilities more smoothly because the decision by the school principal will be formally authorized. r Encourage community participation in school boards: In order for public schools to gain the trust of parents and other members of the surrounding community, schools must become more accessible. Before making important decisions, the principal needs to confer with members of the community. To achieve this goal, school boards composed of members of the community should be created. A school board system is a new practice and the board has the power of influence. A principal may use that power to oppose the teachers’ unions. r Establish local standards for class size: In Japan, the government previously set the standard class size at 40 students per elementary and lower secondary school classroom. However, because the number of students is declining, and because some areas of the country are more thinly populated than others, greater flexibility in establishing class size according to local circumstances should occur. r Create a special system for part-time teachers: The requirements for obtaining a teaching certificate are rather severe. For example, to obtain a first class Elementary School Teacher Certificate, students are required, in addition to the completion of a bachelor’s degree course, to acquire the following: 41 credits for specialized subjects (such as teaching methods), 8 credits for teaching subjects, 10 credits for specialized or teaching subjects, and 7 days experience working as care givers in special education schools and/or social welfare facilities. However, the new curriculum requires many temporary (special part-time) teachers to implement the Integrated Study Program. According to the liberalization policy, schools should be given the authority to create teaching opportunities for individuals with special knowledge and skills who may not hold teaching certificates. r Distinguish instructions and orders from guidance and advice: As I note above, schools tend to treat all government communications as direct orders. Local educators usually believe that it is safer to follow orders than to ask questions. Failing to do so might result in unfavorable treatment in the future. Under the plans for the new liberalization, instructions and orders must be distinguished from guidance. As the above examples illustrate, the report from the Central Council for Education promoted concepts such as decentralization of educational administration, the enhancement of individual initiative, school independence, and community participation in school management. The CCE also recommended the introduction of a system of school choice. 6.
THE NEW FLEXIBLE SCHOOL CURRICULUM
In Japan, it is compulsory for all schools, including private ones, to follow the national Course of Study. In the past, this document clearly defined curricular content
102
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
and instructional hours, leaving little room for schools to design the curriculum to fit the needs of their communities. The new Course of Study, in contrast with its older version, allows schools to design more than 10% of all instructional hours. This change provides much needed academic flexibility at the local level. The new Course of Study was introduced at the kindergarten, elementary, and lower secondary levels in 1998, and in upper secondary schools in 1999. By 2003, this curricular reform was fully implemented at all levels of the system. One important component of this new approach is a new course titled Integrated Study (sogotekina gakushu). Schools have great flexibility in determining the length of Integrated Study lessons, the number of hours that should be devoted to creative teaching/learning activities, the arrangement of instructional content at each grade level, and the locally-determined subjects that are introduced at the upper secondary level. Thus, this new course provides schools with opportunities to introduce new instructional methods and content. The Ministry of Education has not offered any curricular outlines for the new Integrated Study courses. Instead, educators are expected to develop everything by themselves at the local level. However, convincing teachers to incorporate creative thinking, which had not previously been stressed, into their lesson is proving to be no easy task. In response to a barrage of requests from local schools and boards of education for guidebooks with sample lessons, the Ministry of Education developed and distributed those materials in 2000. The guidebooks quickly became best sellers. As the Ministry of Education feared, many schools have used the guidebooks as courses of study, essentially defeating the primary goals of the reform. 7.
DEREGULATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Following World War II, an increase in the number of students applying to institutions of higher education allowed most colleges and universities in Japan to recruit new students without making any special effort. Students typically selected colleges and universities based on their national reputations rather than on the curriculum they offered. The greatest challenge for high school students became passing the entrance examinations at high status universities. In order to pass the tests, high schools students must often spend long hours preparing for university entrance examinations at cram schools that offer evening and weekend classes, in addition to the time they spend in their regular schools. Once admitted to institutions of higher education, students tend not to spend a great deal of time studying. Until the 1990s, the economic situation in Japan was quite good and graduates had little difficulty finding jobs. Unlike most industrialized nations, Japanese companies relied on their own in-house programs to train new hires and were not particularly concerned with what students learned at their colleges and universities. Graduation was almost automatic at many institutions of higher education, especially in the humanities and the social sciences. However, dramatic changes began to take place in the 1990s, prompting calls for reform of the higher education system. Three of the reasons most often used to justify those demands follow: r Globalization in the information age: In the 1990s, there was a fear that students were losing interest in science and engineering. As a result, greater emphasis was placed on producing graduates who could compete in those fields at
DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN
103
the international level. Universities are now expected to promote academic excellence and the development of professional workers in order to maintain a competitive edge and to lead the world in this age of globalization. r Diversification of academic interests: The ratio of secondary school graduates who go on to pursue higher education has been on the increase. In the near future it will be possible for anyone to study at a university if she is not overly selective. The declining birthrate will force all universities to attract students by featuring unique courses. They will also have to promote student flexibility to cope with changes in society. As early as the 1980s various organizations recommended the points listed above. In response to a report completed by the National Council on Educational Reform, a University Council was established in 1987. The Minister of Education directed the Council to examine “concrete measures for the improvement, individualization and activation of education and studies at institutions such as universities” (Ministry of Education, 1996). Since then, the Council has prepared numerous reports that prompted the introduction of several higher education reform initiatives. 8.
HIGHER EDUCATION CURRICULUM REFORM
The Standard for the Establishment of Universities sets out the general standards for the subject matters of university education. Before the revisions of 1991, students were required to earn: 36 general education credits for courses in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences; 8 credits in a foreign language; 4 credits in health and physical education; and 76 credits in courses in a specialized field. To meet those standards, universities had to secure teaching staff based upon the number of students who signed up for each course. Most universities divided courses and instructors into distinct general and specialized education streams. Instructors also tended to be placed in separate faculties or departments. For example, instructors on general education belong to a Faculty or a Department of General Education. Thus, the general education and specialized education curriculums were disconnected. Furthermore, general education programs were often criticized because students, who had already been taught some of the material in high school, often lost interest in these subjects. General education tended to be regarded as preparation for specialized education, and professors in the two areas were not provided equal levels of research funding. These factors often caused conflict between professors in the department of general education and those in specialized studies departments. The revisions to the Standard for the Establishment of Universities that were implemented in 1991 required major modifications in university curricula. Although the total number of credits necessary to graduate remained the same, the distinction between general education and specialized education was abolished. Universities were given the autonomy to design their own curricula. They are now free to create academic programs to fit the abilities, aptitudes, and needs of their students. Similar freedom was granted to junior colleges and institutes of technology. Capitalizing on their new freedom, some universities abolished their departments of general education and created new departments. These more recently established departments tend to offer interdisciplinary approaches to education, and to pay close attention to economic and social change. Many of these new departments include in their names words like
104
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
the following: human, information, environmental, international, development, or Integrated. Another trend is for universities to emphasize practical education, such as information technology and foreign language, that will help their students secure employment after graduation. Universities that emphasize general education have become rare. Another major change that occurred after 1991 is that the credits earned at universities and other schools have become convertible. In the past, specialized schools, junior colleges, and universities all had different types of curriculum. However, as the rules regarding the curriculum were relaxed, differences in curricula became less pronounced. Even junior colleges and technical colleges began to offer specialized courses of study. Some now offer 4-year instructional programs. Variations in the terms used to describe different educational programs are becoming insignificant. The revisions to the standards also made it possible, in some instances, to transfer credits between universities and from specialized courses. For example, credit may be awarded to students who pass the English Proficiency Test. Such changes lower the walls separating academic institutions from other types of learning establishments. Additional measures designed to promote mutual recognition of credits have been implemented. Since 1997, students who earn credits at national universities no longer have to pay to have those credits transferred in from other institutions. The 1999 University Council Report recommended that it should be permissible to earn up to 60 credits—about half the total number of credits necessary for graduation—at institutions other than the university from which a student plans to graduate. Deregulation breeds competition. A report prepared by the University Council in October of 1998 is subtitled “To Be Distinctive: Universities in a Competitive Environment.” The report recommended the establishment of an independent body that would evaluate reforms to the system of higher education. It also called for a redefinition of national universities as independent administrative entities. The issue of turning national universities into independent agencies has been discussed by the National Council on Educational Reform (Ichikawa, 1988). The national universities have started to prepare for this new idea; however, there is still much confusion because of the absence of clear model. 9. 9.1.
CURRENT PRACTICES ON DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION
School Choice Program
Students enroll in public elementary and junior secondary schools according to their place of residence. However, the percentage of students who are permitted to attend schools located in zones other than their own has been increasing across the country. A report prepared by the Central Education Council in 1998 called for a relaxation of national and local regulations so as to provide principals with greater freedom to manage schools according to their ideals about education, and to make the school zone system more flexible. Following the issuance of that report, the Ministry of Education ordered boards of education throughout the country to loosen their policies regarding school boundaries. The Ministry’s intent was to provide schools
DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN
105
with more freedom and to give students more latitude in choosing where they will be educated. Several school districts followed that advice and revised their policies regarding school admissions. In 1998, Kiho Town in Mie Prefecture started offering a free choice system for seven elementary schools. Hozumi Town in Gifu Prefecture introduced a free choice system involving four elementary and two lower secondary schools in 2000. That same year, the Shinagawa Board of Education in Tokyo introduced its own free choice system. In all of these districts, new frameworks have been created, giving parents the freedom to choose which public schools their children will attend. In the Shinagawa system, the public elementary schools are divided into 4 blocks, each with between 8 and 12 schools. Parents may choose to send their children to any school in the block that has been allocated to their children. In 2001, the Shinagawa Board of Education expanded its free choice system to include lower secondary schools as well. In Shinagawa, 16% of all elementary school enrollees chose to attend schools other than their neighborhood institutions. That represented a slight increase over the previous year, when only 13% of all students attended schools out of their residential zones. The factors that parents tend to consider most seriously when making choices about schools include transportation issues, a school’s relationship with the local community, the choices of friends, and experiences of siblings. Interestingly, they do not usually consider the unique educational programs offered by individual schools (Sadahiro, 1999; Shinagawa Board of Education, 2001). Government leaders have supplied several reasons for introducing the free choice system: 1. The free choice system enhances parental awareness of school programs. It contributes to the development of cooperative relationships between school, community, and home. It is believed that because the system respects the opinions of children and their parents, they will become more involved in school activities. 2. The free choice system supports the diversification and improvement of the education provided in public schools, which have been criticized as being overly standardized. Previously, 4.4% of all elementary school students and 26.7% of all lower secondary school students chose to attend national or private schools rather than public schools located in their neighborhoods. Because they will have to compete for students, the public schools will find ways to attract new students. 3. Schools that parents do not select will be forced to close. The resulting consolidation of schools will lead to more efficient administrative practices. Kiho Town, the first municipality to introduce a choice system, closed one school in 1999 and another in 2001, eliminating its smallest, least-efficient schools. Opinions about the school zone system have swung between the egalitarian ideal of minimizing differences among schools by maintaining small school zones, and the principle of competition and the provision of a wider range of options to parents. The current tendency is to sacrifice equality in exchange for better schools. Traditionally, upper secondary school students have had the freedom to apply for admission to public schools grouped into medium or large size school zones. Recently, however,
106
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
schools have been opting to enlarge or abolish school zones. For example, in 2000 the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education eliminated the school zone system. Students may now apply to any public high school located in the city. In 2001, the Council on Integrated Regulatory Reform submitted a report to the Prime Minister that recommended promoting the school choice system for more elementary and lower secondary schools in Japan. In 2001, the Council on Comprehensive Regulatory Reform submitted a report to the Prime Minister that recommended promoting a school choice system for more elementary and junior high schools in Japan. This has prompted the expansion of school choice systems, especially in urban areas with well-developed public transportation systems. According to a survey of 98 Boards of Education in Tokyo and surrounding cities in Chiba, Kanagawa, and Saitama Prefectures that I conducted in 2004/2005, a quarter of the boards have adopted some sort of school system at the junior high school level. As a result, in central Tokyo, 12.3% of all students are currently enrolled in public junior high schools outside of their regular school zones. These students, combined with students enrolled in private and national schools (in other words, students who are not attending public junior high schools in their designated school zones) constitute 38.5% of all junior high schools in central Tokyo. 9.2.
New Course of Study and Integrated Study
As I mention above, a new Course of Study was recently introduced at the elementary and junior secondary levels. Distinguishing features of this new curricular framework include a decrease in the total number of instructional hours (due to the implementation of a 5-day school week) and the administration of the Integrated Study curriculum. Integrated Study is designed to promote integrated learning through activities rather than lectures. However, some critics assert that the Integrated Study program is being used to absorb instructional hours trimmed from the schedule as a result of the shorter school week. That is to say, there are not enough hours to accommodate all of the subjects in the national curriculum, even with a new timetable. Specific subjects could not be eliminated because that would create political problems. So a new course that could serve as an umbrella for multiple subjects was created: Integrated Study. Schools have the freedom to adjust the hours allocated to Integrated Study to fit their own objectives. While the Ministry of Education has promoted the introduction of unconventional subjects in a flexible manner since 1977, “unconventional, flexibility-oriented education” has been under constant criticism from individuals who fear that such reform will lead to the deterioration of student achievement. The Ministry previously suggested that the Course of Study represented the highest level of education and should therefore be respected. However, the government later stated that the Course of Study only set the minimum standards for learning, and schools were free to supplement it with other instructional activities. The Ministry’s attitude, combined with the circumstances surrounding the creation of Integrated Study, led some schools to teach conventional subjects during the hours allocated to Integrated Study. For example, they might use an instructional period designed to allow for creative and
DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN
107
integrated learning under the Integrated Study program to offer an extra hour of mathematics. Furthermore, 45% of all private elementary and secondary schools continue to hold classes on Saturdays (Ministry of Education, 2002). On the other hand, some local governments have proposed a number of interesting programs in response to the new Course of Study: offering optional supplementary courses before and after school or on Saturdays; developing supplemental materials to cover advanced matters that extend beyond the scope of textbooks; keeping class sizes lower than those specified in the national standards; organizing classes based on the achievement levels of students; and, conducting surveys of student achievement (Yomiuri Shinbun, 2002). Educational reform has produced a decrease in the contents of the Course of Study and the implementation of Integrated Study. Schools now have greater opportunities to display their own creativity. It can be said that the free choice system is a logical consequence of these reforms. Now that schools are no longer uniform, it would be unfair not to give freedom of choice to the students. 9.3.
Experimental Schools
The Ministry of Education felt that it was necessary to implement new curricula on a trial basis before revising the Course of Study. Beginning in 1976, the Ministry recruited schools to implement experimental curricula based on themes determined by central education officials. Such schools, designed as R & D (Research and Development) schools, were not required to follow the Course of Study. The system was later modified. In the year 2000, 102 schools were designated as R & D schools, the budget for these schools increased, and participating schools were given the freedom to choose their own themes, rather than those set by the Ministry. This framework represented a significant departure from previous Ministry of Education practice. Furthermore, the Ministry created additional models for experimenting with curricula. The most notable examples were the Super Science and the Super English Language high schools. Schools chosen to become Super Science high schools receive up to 25 million yen per year to supplement their regular budgets. In 2002, 77 schools applied for 26 Super Science high school spots, and 16 of 56 applicants were selected to become Super English Language high schools. This seems to suggest that more and more schools, free from pressure to conform to the practices of other schools, are now trying to highlight their unique qualities. 9.4.
Introduction of Evaluation System
There is an argument that the introduction of deregulation and decentralization will cause an imbalance between schools and a decline the quality of instruction. An evaluation system is expected to solve that problem somehow. The Policy Evaluation Law of 2001 required all government policies, programs, and projects to be evaluated, starting in fiscal 2002. The purpose of these evaluations is to introduce a system of accountability to governmental organizations. Each Ministry or government office will evaluate its own practices and incorporate the results of those evaluations into
108
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
policymaking activities. It is also believed that publicizing the results of those evaluations will stimulate public interest in the policymaking process (Study Group on Policy Evaluation Methods, 2000). In the area of education, the primary focus of the evaluations will be student achievement. Traditionally, norm-referenced assessments were used to evaluate student achievement. Although such tests identified student rank within a class, they did not compare schools. Recently, there has been a shift toward criterion-referenced evaluations. A similar system of evaluation had been employed before: Beginning in 1956, the Ministry of Education conducted criterion-referenced evaluation to measure student achievement. However, the system was discontinued 10 years later because the teachers’ union, fearing that instructors would be judged based on their students’ test scores, fiercely protested such testing. As a result, when debates about the effects of revisions to the Course of Study on student achievement, there was no data to consider. For that reason, in 2000, the National Curriculum Committee asserted that the Ministry should conduct continuous criterion-based achievement evaluations in whole Japan. Some local governments also began to conduct achievement evaluations on their own. 9.5.
Evaluation of Teachers
When selecting schools, parents pay attention to the educational objectives set by schools as well as the qualities of teachers. However, when a national teacher evaluation system was proposed in 1958, resistance from the teachers’ union was fierce. Although the system was eventually implemented, results of the evaluations were rarely shared with teachers and had no influence on their salaries (Bjork, 2000). However, the Tokyo Board of Education began to appraise the professional performance of teachers in 2000, followed by some other municipalities. In Tokyo, schools and sub-groups within schools set educational objectives. Teachers are then appraised in terms of their ability, motivation, and performance concerning each objective. In other words, the evaluations have become a systematized management tool. The Tokyo Board of Education intends to reflect on the evaluations when making decisions about teaching assignments and wages in the future. 9.6.
External Evaluation and National Institute for Academic Degrees
Based on recommendations from the Universities Committee, the National Institute for Academic degrees was reformed in 1998. The Institute is now responsible for evaluating the quality of education provided and research conducted by Japanese universities, and disseminating the results. In 2001, 112 universities and other institutes of higher education were evaluated and the results were made public the following year. All of the universities were rated “satisfactory” or “adequate” in terms of their “contributions to society,” and 96% were rated “satisfactory” or “adequate” in the area of “achievement.”1 Some of the universities complained that the evaluation standards were not clear. Nevertheless, disclosing the results of the evaluations, the objections expressed by universities, and the responses to those objections were unprecedented events.
DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN
109
According to the revised Standards for the Establishment of Universities of 1991, Article 2, an institution of higher education “must endeavor to examine and evaluate itself.” However, this provision was modified in 1999. According to the revised version of the document, an institution “must examine and evaluate itself” and publish the results of such assessment. Furthermore, it provided that an institution should have outside experts evaluate the results of the self-examination. Though the methods, contents, and mode of utilizing the results of the outside evaluation have not been firmly established yet, it has been decided that budget allocations will be tied to those results. This illustrates the Ministry of Education’s clear tendency to provide unequal funding to universities, depending on their demonstrated ability to improve in quality (Amano, 2002). 9.7.
Independent Administrative Agencies
Many government agencies, including research institutes and museums, became independent administrative institutions under the Independent Agency Act of 1999. Reestablishing those agencies as independent administrative units, it was believed, would increase incentives for improvement in terms of finance, structure, personnel management, and evaluation. The Research Committee on Reforming National Universities as Independent Administrative Agencies (2002) under the Higher Education Bureau of the Ministry of Education had been discussing the reform of national universities as well. In March 2002, it published a report titled “Image on New National University Foundation” that offered a framework for reorganizing national universities as independent administrative agencies, beginning in 2004. This report was approved by the Association of National Universities after heated arguments in April. That report lists several specific objectives for such change: (1) create universities that operate independently, and are internationally competitive in both research and instruction; (2) emphasize that universities are accountable to society and the nation; (3) introduce the principle of competition between institutions of higher education; (4) clarify management responsibilities so that universities can be run in a more flexible and strategic manner. According to the framework, each university should develop medium-term plans to meet these objectives. They should also develop strategies for crystallizing those plans on an annual basis. The Committee on the Evaluation of National Universities (tentative title) will evaluate the universities’ ability to meet those objectives, and will publish the results. Decisions about government subsidies for higher education will reflect the information included in the evaluations. Although discussion on this topic is still in progress, the Ministry of Education did adopt a related program, which it calls the “Top 30 Concept,” in 2001. The idea behind this program is that university funding should be tied to performance, with extra funding being awarded to the 30 best universities in their respective areas. After a number of universities raced to develop materials to improve their chances of being named a “Top 30” institution, the Ministry modified its plans and adopted a new scheme, titled the “COE Program for the 21st Century.” With the new program, 100–500 million yen will be awarded to each of 10–30 universities (with an average of 20) in 10 research subject areas.
110
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
10. 10.1.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE AND KEY PROBLEMS TO BE RESOLVED
Initiative
Reports by the Central Council for Education and the University Council indicate that after decades of intense centralization of both educational management and the curriculum, Japan is finally moving towards a decentralized and deregulated education system. These changes are now being codified into legislation. The Integrated Decentralization Law of 1999 has already abolished the appointment-approval system for superintendents and relaxed requirements concerning the number of representatives serving on boards of education. The idea that schools should be directed by local government initiatives and that members of communities should be active participants in the management of schools (both recommended in the report by the Central Council for Education), represent significant changes in Japanese tradition (Kumagai, 1999). An important issue articulated in those reports concerns responsibility for educational reform: Which administrative units should take the initiative to drive the various reforms now taking place in Japan? In elementary and secondary education, the national government is now taking that initiative. Schools and boards of education are doing their best to understand reports and expectations communicated by the government and councils. It is odd that deregulation and decentralization, which call for initiative at the grass roots level, have been implemented in a uniform manner from the top; central authorities have conveyed orders to local educators. While decentralization has provided schools with greater discretion, they are also subject to sanctions if they fail to follow the guidelines set forth by the national government. Consequently, there are many cases where deregulation simply breeds new regulations intended to direct the process of deregulation (Kubota, 1994). Through mechanisms such as an enforced evaluation system, the center can actually continue to steer the education system from a distance (Whitty, Power & Halpin, 1998). 10.2.
Board of Education
Boards of education are designed to represent communities and to act independently. This structure aims to maintain the neutral nature of educational administration. Efforts to enrich the functions assigned to boards of education are currently underway. The goal of these efforts is to allow the municipalities and prefectures to implement policies that reflect their unique social and economic characteristics. The quality of superintendents is another important issue. Even though superintendents no longer must hold licenses, as was the case under the previous law, they must be provided with training and education that will allow them to improve their administrative skills. 10.3.
Community Participation
In order for the boards of education, which are in charge of administrative activities in their communities, to positively respond to the needs of those communities,
DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN
111
the boards must make efforts to understand the will of the community, reflect on the views expressed, and encourage members of the community to participate in educational administration. How to more effectively facilitate community participation in education remains an unresolved issue. While parents of students can participate in school administration through the school board system, whether or not a particular even has a school board is up to the discretion of the principal. Thus, finding the appropriate mechanism for transferring some measure of authority to parents has not yet been identified in a satisfactory manner. 10.4.
Capacity Building
Many of the education reforms currently being promoted in Japan are intended to provide considerable independence to schools and school administrators by increasing the authority allocated to school principals and vice-principals. However, it is unclear whether or not principals are prepared to carry out such non-traditional tasks. In order to improve the administrative capacity of school leaders, training must be offered to principals, vice-principals, and members of boards of education. Also, because Japanese principals usually serve for only a short time, it is often difficult for them to demonstrate strong leadership in the schools. If the changes that are presently be considered are to succeed, it may be necessary to lengthen the time that principals spend at each school, and to choose younger teachers to serve as administrators. 10.5.
Quality Assurance
Educational opportunity, as well as the substance of the education provided, has become diversified in Japan in recent years. At the same time, evaluation systems are being implemented to secure high standards for students’ achievement at all school level and to improve financial efficiency. The national government is promoting decentralization and deregulation, and a variety of comprehensive educational reforms have been introduced. However, initiatives related to school evaluations and the widening of the school selection process are not likely to be supported in the future. This is because the idea that the small-school zone system will provide the same quality of education in schools across the nation is an illusion. Also, the Ministry of Education has repeatedly stated that the Course of Study represents minimum academic standards and that each school and region is responsible for student achievement. Therefore, parents and communities are ultimately responsible for the success or failure of attempts to improve the quality of public education. Difficulties will emerge as governments try to resolve the challenge of harmonizing traditional organization, structure, and content of education with new and emerging forms of diversified education that grant local actors more control. As the deregulation process continues, gaps in achievement between schools are likely to widen. The national government is not providing subsidies to support national standards regarding class size. Therefore, the municipalities bear the financial burden of lowering class sizes in their schools. Also, if school choice becomes widely accepted throughout the nation, maintaining equal opportunities for all students will be a challenge.
112
DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN
11.
POSSIBLE PARADOX
It is necessary to expand the discretion of schools on personnel matters, budgets, and the design of educational programs. Such a redistribution of authority will encourage teachers and administrators to be independent and creative in offering education that reflects the unique characteristics of each school. Additionally, it is necessary to strengthen school administration and to clarify school responsibilities and also to strengthen the responsibilities each person in a school has. In sum, numerous educational reforms have been introduced in Japan and recent years. Among those are efforts to promote creativity, diversity, and flexibility through decentralization and deregulation. It is believed that such changes will give Japan a competitive edge in an era of globalization. Nevertheless, the tradition of a standardized education system with centralized control is proving difficult to change. In Japan, changing the mindset of those who deal with reform is difficult. There is a strong tendency to wait for instructions from upper officials. Even though the government is now offering authority to individuals, they may or may not choose to exercise that autonomy. Many educators criticize their superiors for being authoritative, but use the prevalence of instructions from higher levels of the organization as an excuse for not assuming responsibility themselves. There are also people who would like to capitalize on the authority they have been given, but lack the training necessary to act independently. Interestingly enough, the Japanese education system may face the paradox of becoming more uniform than ever as the level of central control decreases. NOTE 1. Universities were rated according to the following scale: dissatisfactory, fair, adequate, or satisfactory.
12.
REFERENCES
Amano, I. (2002). Structural changes in Japanese higher education in the 1990s. The Journal of Educational Sociology, 70(May), 39–57. Bjork, C. (2000). Responsibility for improving the quality of teaching in Japanese schools: The role of the principal in professional development efforts. Education and Society, 3(3), 21–43. Central Council for Education. (1998). Policies and educational administration of local governments. Tokyo: Ministry of Education. Ichikawa, S. (1988). Educational reform and restructuring of the administrative systems. Bulletin of the Japan Educational Administration Society, 14, 9–23. Ichikawa, S. (1995). Educational policies after the ad-hoc education council. Tokyo: Institute for Educational Development. Kubota, S. (1994). From a viewpoint of comparative education. Bulletin of the Japan Educational Administration Society, 20, 90–100. Kumagai, I. (1999). Decentralization of education and school management. Annual Bulletin of JASEP, 6, 52–69. Ministry of Education. (1996). Japanese government policies in education, science, sports and culture 1995: Remaking universities: Continuing reform of higher education. Tokyo: Government Printing Bureau. Ministry of Education. (2002). Report on current status of 5-school-days-a-week program at private schools. Tokyo: Ministry of Education. NIER (National Institute for Educational Research), Office of Overall Planning and Cooperation. (1988). The recommendations of the national council on educational reform: A summary. Tokyo: NIER.
DEREGULATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN
113
Research Committee on Reforming National Universities as Independent Administrative Agencies. (2002). New image of national university foundation, Tokyo: Ministry of Education. Sadahiro, S. (1999). A quantitative analysis of parental school choice preference using the rank-logit model. Bulletin of the Japan Educational Administration Society, 25, 103–116. Shinagawa Board of Education. (2001). School choice system, Tokyo. Study Group on Policy Evaluation Methods. (2000). Final report on the policy evaluation system, Tokyo. Sugihara, S. (1998). The promotion of deregulation and the role of educational administration in it around public education. Bulletin of the Japan Educational Administration Society, 24, 179–182. University Council. (1998). A vision of universities in the 21st century and reform measures, Tokyo. Wakai, Y. (1996). Decentralization of educational administration. Bulletin of the Japan Educational Administration Society, 22, 31–44. Whitty, G., Power, S. & Halpin, D. (1998). Devolution and Choice in Education: the School, the State and the Market, Melbourne, Australia: Australian Council for Educational Research. Yomiuri Shinbun. (2002). Issues on school achievement, Newspaper article on March 9.
This page intentionally blank
Chapter 7 EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION IN KOREA: MAJOR ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES Ee-gyeong Kim
1.
INTRODUCTION
In Korea, educational decentralization is one of the subjects that has continually resurfaced whenever education reform is seriously discussed. Although previous regimes eagerly tackled the issue of educational decentralization in their formulation and implementation of education reform policies, there is little evidence showing that educational decentralization has been accomplished to a satisfactory extent in Korea. Educational decentralization is not merely confined to the realm of education in Korea; it is entangled with interests of local governing bodies in a complex way, and possible alternatives to the current practice touch on sensitive political issues. Hence, it is indeed a complicated issue that cannot be examined exclusively from an educational point of view. Before discussing educational decentralization itself, it should be noted that the meaning, content, and scope of the term “educational decentralization” are subject to many different interpretations. The discussion is further complicated by the reality that educational decentralization does not just imply autonomous administration of local educational authorities; the process also requires the distribution of powers and responsibilities among local governing bodies of differing levels, and consequently encompasses the issue of autonomous administration at the level of individual schools. Literature on this subject describes a variety of phenomena that are all considered examples of decentralization. Decentralization might be perceived as a mere process of adding a number of deconcentrated bodies to the existing political and administrative structure. Sometimes, it is understood as “delegation,” which includes transferring some of the central government’s decision-making powers to bodies outside the government bureaucracy. “Devolution” refers to such cases in which specified powers are transferred to sub-national units through appropriate legal reform processes (Govinda, 1997). In Korea’s case, educational decentralization has proceeded beyond the level of either establishing local sub-organs or merely delegating the controlling authority to the local governing bodies. Current discussions primarily center on issues of how the existing system should be improved so that local educational administrations can meet demands that arise in each respective region. However, it is undeniable that a wide gap separates such discussions and reality. Up to the present, substantial authority has been officially transferred to local governing bodies. Yet in Korea, which has a long history of central authority, local governing bodies have experienced great difficulty in acting autonomously, particularly in such core areas as finance, personnel 115 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 115–128. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
116
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
management, and organizational supervision. Weak systemic support has exacerbated these problems. Therefore, educational decentralization can be regarded as one of the most difficult tasks that can be undertaken to assist educational administrators in coping with the various changes that occur both inside and beyond a nation’s borders. In this chapter, I begin with a brief overview as to what educational decentralization means in the Korean setting and how educational decentralization has historically developed to produce the current situation. Next, I provide an analysis that highlights external and domestic factors and demands unique to the Korean case. Although the educational challenges faced by countries around the world are often similar in nature largely due to the impact of globalization, each region’s unique background and circumstances can lead to variations in the actual strategies used to tackle those issues. Thus, any attempt to examine the factors and demands unique to Korea must consider the Korean context for educational decentralization. Finally, I examine current controversies, focusing on the most urgent problems related to educational decentralization in Korea. 2.
CONCEPT OF EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION: LOCAL EDUCATION SELF-GOVERNING SYSTEM
Discussion of educational decentralization in Korea has been carried out in general under the title of “Local Education Self-Governing System” (LESGS). Decentralizing authority over the system, a matter of nation-wide attention, implies not only that central and local administrators share power but also that local offices commit to self-governance and accountability measures. It therefore seems natural that the discussion of educational decentralization in Korea has narrowed to the notion of self-governance. The concept of the LESGS is a combination of the phrases “local autonomy,” which refers to the separation of local educational management from central administrative control, and “educational autonomy,” which means separation of educational administration from the general administration (Yun et al., 1992). The two concepts of self-governance entail distinct issues and problems since they are based on different principles. But they coincide in their shared focus on the issue of what method of allocating authority and responsibility between central and local educational administrations is more likely to guarantee autonomy, professionalism, and political neutrality. Educational decentralization alone cannot adequately address all of the issues surrounding historical development of local educational self-governance in Korea. Comprehending the Korean situation requires examination of not only the issue of decentralization of the government’s power over educational matters, but also other issues, such as resident control, separation of educational administration from general administration, and professional management of education. Therefore, in this paper I will use the acronym LESGS, which covers wide-reaching principles as well as systemic elements, rather than “educational decentralization,” as the main conceptual base for discussing the authority structure of the Korean education system. The LESGS is grounded in the Constitution and laws of Korea. According to the Constitution, education should include the following three dimensions: (1) highly intellectual activity depending essentially upon creativity and diversity; (2) professional activity that requires cooperative performance of mature professionals; and
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION IN KOREA
117
(3) public activity that should serve the interests of the whole society. In order to realize this conception of education, the Constitution (Item 4, Article 31) asserts that “autonomy, professionalism, and political neutrality of education . . . are guaranteed by law.” In addition, the Law for Local Educational Self-Governance specifies that the local education self-governing system should be implemented to promote autonomy and professionalism of education, and to encourage localized control of schools. In sum, the local education self-governing system defined by the Constitution and laws of Korea aims to increase local residents’ participation in the management of pubic education, thereby securing the educational autonomy, professionalism, and political neutrality called for in the Constitution. 3.
PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL EDUCATION SELF-GOVERNING SYSTEM
Although opinions of Korean scholars of educational administration vary slightly, it is generally accepted that there are four principles of the LESGS: decentralization, resident control, independence of educational administration, and professional management. These principles are sometimes used as the criteria to evaluate education self-governing systems in operation (Kim, 2001). What follows is a more detailed account of these principles. The principle of decentralization professes that the central government’s uniform command and control be avoided in planning, managing, and evaluating educational activities. Instead, education policies that address the unique conditions in different regions should be implemented. By promoting regional uniqueness and avoiding national-level uniformity, local residents can raise their capacity for autonomy and self-governance. The principle of resident control means that the local residents should determine local educational policies through their representatives, and it coincides ultimately with the principle of representative democracy. Opposed to unilateral bureaucratic control, resident control is an essential element of local self-governance. This concept is premised on the idea that educational policies should reflect broad public desires regarding the provision of schooling. To this end, there should be a systemic mechanism that allows local residents of diverse backgrounds to participate in the process of reviewing, determining, and implementing education policy. Often referred to as the principle of educational self-governance, independence of educational administration requires that educational administration be autonomous and separate from general administration. The rationale grounding this notion stresses that educational administration must be politically neutral and have independent authority if educational excellence is to be achieved. The importance of separating educational administration from general administration is also based on the notion that education should not be provided uniformly; education is viewed as an activity that touches upon human personality and ethics over long periods of time. At the same time, supervision of schools by general administration is not considered desirable because such an arrangement can impede politically neutral management of education. The principle of professional management calls for educational administration that seriously considers both the essence and uniqueness of education. Teachers, a driving force in education, are regarded as professionals trained in their field.
118
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Administrators should also value students and pay close attention to their continuous growth and development. At the same time, educational administrations possess their own unique attributes that set them apart from general governmental administration. Therefore, schools should be managed by individuals with professional knowledge of both the essence and uniqueness of education. 4.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
In Korea, the LESGS is currently being practiced in limited fashion. Because of the strong tendency toward centralized authority in both educational and general administration, efforts at transferring power to local governing bodies have been largely unsuccessful ever since the Korean government was established in 1948. Despite a relatively long history of promoting decentralization, the central government has continued to exert great power. Such an arrangement has been defended on the grounds that tight central control was necessary to ensure that public services were delivered as efficiently as possible. The Korean education system followed this pattern so as to achieve educational development in a very short period of time. One cannot deny, however, that this top–down approach is one of the primary causes of the various drawbacks and problems that plague Korean education. Thus, a careful examination of how the LESGS developed and shaped the present form of Korean education will help us understand the problems it is facing today. The LESGS was initially discussed during the period of U.S. military occupation that immediately followed Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule. But actual implementation of the system was delayed until after the Korean War in 1952, when the Enforcement Act for Education Law went into effect. Since then, numerous changes in the LESGS took place. These changes are usually divided into three phrases. The Fifty-Year History of Korea’s Education, published by the Ministry of Education in 1998, describes the three phases as follows: first, the “phase of birth and implementation,” which spanned from 1948 to the military coup of 1961; second, the “phase of interruption and ordeal,” beginning with the revision of Education Law in 1962 and ending with the promulgation of the Law for Local Educational Self-Governance in 1991; third, the “phase of resurrection and revitalization,” which began in 1991 and continues to the present.1 In the following section I describe the characteristics of the each phase in greater detail. 4.1.
The First Phase (from Liberation to 1961)
The birth of the LESGS dates back to Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule. After liberation, a new system similar to the U.S. model was formulated and plans were made to implement it in September of 1948. This plan was not realized, however, due to the end of U.S. military administration. Still, elements of the original plan were included in the “Regulation for School District and Board of Education” section of the Education Law adopted on December 31st, 1949. But the LESGS was not implemented because the Education Law presupposed implementation of localself governance, which was postponed owing to the Korean War. Further progress in promoting educational self-governance did not occur until April 1953, when the Enforcement Act for Education Law was adopted. This progress was limited. Poor
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION IN KOREA
119
management of the LESGS, combined with friction between bureaucrats stationed in the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Home Affairs, triggered harsh criticism of the system. The little progress that had been made came to a halt in 1961, with the outbreak of a military coup. At that point, the Board of Education ceased to function. Previously, 17 locally managed boards of education had been operating in big and small cities and in 123 school districts.2 In 1961, however, educational administration was absorbed by the general administration and support for the LESGS was withdrawn. 4.2.
The Second Phase (1962–1991)
The LESGS was reconceptualized during the second phase and underwent a series of changes driven by revisions to the Education Law approved in 1962, 1968, and 1972. Yet its implementation was still not undertaken because most of the revisions to the Education Law presupposed local-self governance, which had yet to be achieved. Hence, during this phase introduction of the LESGS was again delayed, and the educational administration continued to be a responsibility of the general administration. Until the system of local self-governance was finally implemented in 1991, functions related to educational administration had been the responsibility of the general administration. During this period, the LESGS experienced numerous turns and twists. At one point it was temporarily abolished, but thanks to strong protests from the education sector, led by the teachers’ associations, it was quickly resurrected. The form of the LESGS that emerged granted only limited authority to the Board of Education. Although the system appeared to delegate power to local levels, in actuality local offices were expected to carry out centrally conceptualized policies and administrative orders; the Minister of Education retained authority to appoint members of the Board of Education. Therefore, during this period the term LESGS was actually a misnomer—authority continued to be concentrated at the center. The LESGS practiced until 1991 should be regarded as an example of decentralization in name only. 4.3.
The Third Phase (from 1991 to the Present)
A critical change in the status of the LESGS finally occurred in 1991. At that point, increasing demand for local autonomy and political support for the idea finally yielded policies that gave local education authorities some meaningful power. In March of the same year, the Regulation for Education Self-Governance, which had previously been included in the Education Law, became a separate piece of legislation—the Law for Local Education Self-Governance (Law 4347). The law specified that the primary goal of local education self-governance was to “activate autonomy of education, professionalism, and uniqueness of local education.” Authority to supervise education, science, technology, arts, and other forms of learning was transferred to the offices of education, which were located in metropolitan cities or provinces and were headed by superintendents of education. The basic jurisdiction that the LESGS was applied to was metropolitan city and province levels, which included seven metropolitan cities and nine provinces. As the LESGS was not carried
120
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
out at primary local self-governing units, it was called a “great-sphere level” LESGS. Therefore, boards of education, which assumed the role of a decision-making organ, were created at each of the 16 metropolitan or provincial levels, excluding primary local self-governing units. Since the promulgation of the Law for Local Education Self-Governance in 1991, the manner of forming and managing the boards of education has also changed. These revisions mainly targeted the methods used to select board members and superintendents, placing restrictions on their qualifications. Although the boards of education were officially responsible for making and reviewing educational decisions within their jurisdictions, they did not actually enjoy full power in making decisions. Their authority was incomplete and limited. The metropolitan and provincial assemblies were granted the power to make important decisions related to budgeting, balancing accounts, and taxing residents; the boards of education only reviewed these decisions. Thus, decision-making power for local education was split between boards of education and local assemblies. 5.
CURRENT CONDITIONS OF LOCAL EDUCATION SELF-GOVERNING SYSTEM
In order to better understand the current LESGS in Korea, it is necessary to briefly examine the structure and function of the central and local organs in charge of educational administration. The education system in Korea is divided into three levels of authority: central, intermediate, and primary. The Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development (MOEHRD) is located at the center, 16 metropolitan and provincial offices of education constitute the intermediate level, and 180 local offices of education operate at the primary (or local) level. The MOEHRD, under the leadership of the Deputy Prime Minister, is in charge of wide-ranging affairs related to school education, lifelong education, and academic learning. Among its major functions are: planning for the overall education system, establishing mid- and long-term plans for educational development, implementing education reform, and developing indices for education and producing and managing education statistics. Although the scope of the MOEHRD’s authority was significantly reduced in the 1990s when many of its functions were transferred to metropolitan and provincial offices of education, the traditional centralizing tendency still remains strong. The 16 metropolitan and provincial offices of education support the superintendents of education. Their major functions are limited to daily administrative affairs, such as supervising the opening and closing of schools, overseeing the curriculum, promoting social education, producing accounting reports, and maintaining school campuses. They do not perform functions related to self-governance in its truest sense, such as developing education policy or establishing plans for local educational development. One hundred and eighty local education offices can be found at the city, county, and district levels. These offices are primarily responsible for guiding and inspecting supervision of all public and private schools. Whereas in general administration local self-governance has been implemented down to the primary level, in educational administration self-governance has not yet occurred at the primary level. First of
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION IN KOREA
121
all, boards of education have not been created at this level. As I mention earlier, the LESGS has been implemented at the great-sphere level, which includes seven metropolitan cities and nine provinces. The local offices of education at city, county, and district levels merely carry out routine educational functions determined by central or intermediate authorities. Thus, local education offices are just deconcentrated administrative organs that lack independent authority (Yun, 2000). Based on the Law for Local Education Self-Governance, boards of education were established in 16 metropolitan cities and provinces. Members of the boards of education (which vary in size from 7 to 15 members) are elected by electoral colleges composed of parents and teachers. For the purpose of securing professionalism in education, half of the board members must have more than 10 years of experience in education or educational administration. The boards are in charge of reviewing and legislating important affairs in education, science, technology, sports, arts, and learning in their respective regions. But with respect to some of the important matters, current regulations grant the boards authority to review but not create new legislation. The boards therefore remain incomplete legislative bodies. The superintendents of education are the executives in charge of affairs related to education, arts, and learning in each metropolitan city or province. While the superintendents mostly carry out educational matters determined by boards of education, they sometimes execute policies delegated by the central government. Superintendents are elected every 4 years by secret voting and must receive the vote of more than half of the votes cast by members of the electoral colleges. Their primary responsibilities include: producing drafts of ordinances and budgets, balancing accounts, making educational regulations, overseeing the curriculum, and making decisions regarding the opening and closing of schools. Before making any decisions that involve financial burdens placed on residents or general accounting, the superintendents must consult with mayors or governors. 6.
NEW DEMANDS REQUIRING CHANGES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM
As previously noted, Korea has traditionally been a centralized nation and the central government’s role in determining, implementing, and evaluating educational policies remains very strong. Such an approach worked well in the past, when the government was forced to reconstruct the nation’s economy after the end of the Korean War. The concentration of power in the capital allowed the government to facilitate rapid expansion of education by providing a majority of the Korean people with educational opportunities. Since the 1990s, however, when access to elementary and secondary education became universal and opportunities for higher education dramatically improved, the Korean government initiated a variety of reforms designed to shift the focus from quantitative growth to that of qualitative development. In contrast to the growthoriented policies of the post-war period, this round of reforms promoted a consumeroriented education system. The concepts of localization, decentralization, and autonomy guided these reforms. In the past, critics of Korean education frequently pointed out that the system did not provide enough autonomy to local levels. During the 1990s, demands for decentralizing the structure of educational administrative authority gained currency.
122
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
The recent surge in attention to local education self-governance is related to broader changes in the educational environment and changing societal demands for schooling. The development of a knowledge-based society interested in lifelong learning is significantly changing the concept, role, place, timing, and method of education provided in Korea. The governance structure has been transformed to cope with the overarching changes that have taken place. A number of notable changes designed to encourage local self-governance of education have been introduced. First, a large-scale transfer of education-related functions from central to local governing bodies has been called for. In its continuing effort to create a smaller and more efficient government, the Korean government amended the Law for the Government Organization in February of 1998. Based on this amendment, the size of the Ministry of Education was reduced and functions were adjusted. A second restructuring of the Ministry took place in May of 1999. These actions were prompted by the government’s desire to reduce the size of the central Ministry and to redistribute authority from central to local administrations. This power transfer has been requested, but the transfer itself has not yet been accomplished. Second, societal demands for education became stronger and more complex. For example, Korean education had historically been uniform and highly standardized, with middle-level students receiving the most attention. This “mass production” system, which had proved successful in the past, no longer pleased Korean citizens. Because education is perceived of as a key to upward mobility and an important determinant of one’s future social status, consumers’ expectations regarding education continued to rise. These consumers are demanding increased choices for schooling, more diversified and specialized educational programs, and curricula that reflect contemporary realities and needs. It has become apparent that the uniform and centralized system of educational administration can no longer satisfy these demands. In order to cope with new demands for education, many argue that it is necessary to transform educational administration from a rigid, top–down structure into an “intelligent organization” based on professionalism, accountability, and information (Kim, 1998b). Third, with increased awareness that educational development is a critical precondition for national development, education reform, and development strategies have become subjects of foremost interest to the Korean government. However, it has also been recognized that reform efforts that fail to generate cooperation and support from local school communities are doomed to fail. There is a belief that educational administrators should abandon the practice of commanding and directing their subordinates. If central authorities transfer some of their powers to local administrative organs, these bodies will make more realistic assessments of the needs of local communities and individual school sites. Local education administrators can also do a better job cultivating the necessary material, human, and financial resources. Consequently, reform measures will have a more positive impact on actual settings for learning. Fourth, Korean people’s demands for democratization have accelerated since the 1990s. Development of democratic politics has been relatively slow, compared with the economic advancement that has taken place in Korea. Unequal distribution of political power among different regions of the country has produced great friction. Conflicts between different socioeconomic strata that arose in tandem with industrial development driven by large corporations have produced another obstacle to political development. But after the first civilian government was created in the 1990s,
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION IN KOREA
123
democratization at the central government level began to accelerate and expectations for local self-governance strengthened. Also, citizens who had previously felt alienated from politics began to demand an increased role in political decision-making and more responsive government administration. As local residents showed increased interest in educational policymaking (along with other matters such as health care, housing, and social services), the call for local governance of schools also rose. Fifth, citizens became more vocal in their demands for administrative accountability. In the past, parents, citizens, local communities, and non-governmental organizations were quite accepting of educational administrators. The outcomes of education policies were rarely evaluated in detail. However, as diverse educational consumers began to recognize the importance of the quality of instruction provided in schools, educational administrators, schools, and teachers were increasingly held accountable for the outcomes of their actions. School evaluations became more and more important, and new attempts were made to understand why and how the quality of education differed from school to school. This development provided yet another argument for transferring authority from the center to local administrative organizations. The educational institutions and personnel in charge of local schools, it was believed, should be held accountable for the outcomes produced by those schools. The extent to which Korea will succeed in developing its local education selfgovernance system in the future will be closely related to how actively it responds to the changes described above. 7.
MAJOR CONTROVERSIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Korea’s education experts and educational administrators offer a variety of viewpoints in diagnosing the current local education self-governance system. Some argue that the current system is incomplete in that it betrays the fundamental principles such as decentralization, resident control, independence from general administration, and professional management. Others criticize various problematic aspects including the lack of autonomy, the bifurcated system of legislative power, and a flawed procedure for electing the superintendent and members of boards of education. While it is possible from a macro perspective to distinguish those problems caused by flaws in the system from those caused by problematic management of the system, in the section that follows major issues will be discussed without dwelling on such distinctions. 7.1.
Local Education Self-Governance System Excluding the Primary Level
Korea’s local education self-governance is limited to the intermediate level (metropolitan cities and provinces) and excludes the levels in lower administrative hierarchy. Therefore, complete decentralization of the system has not yet been achieved. One critic argues that despite the government’s public support for local selfgovernance, the failure to extend authority to lower levels of the system indicates that the system is unfair (Kim et al., 1999a). Kim (1999c) asserts that the spirit of local education self-governance cannot be realized in a system that is not decentralized to the primary level. The problems experienced by local communities or individual schools should be tackled through self-governance and until authority is extended
124
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
below the intermediate level, critics argue, teachers, parents, and local residents will not feel that the LESGS is truly operational. 7.2.
Lack of Autonomy
The issue of autonomy is one of the core elements of the LESGS. Autonomy means having the power to execute authority in one’s own work without being directed or impeded by external parties, and being responsible for the outcomes of one’s own performance. The current form of the LESGS, however, does not grant enough power to local authorities to make decisions in areas of educational importance such as education planning, teacher policies, and curricula. The Law for Local Education Self-Governance and its supporting acts regulate the current LESGS in a uniform manner. For example, the election procedure and qualifications of superintendents and board members are precisely prescribed in the law, and applied to each and every locality without exception. This prevents local authorities from effectively responding to the unique attributes and environmental factors of a region (Kim, 1999c). Also, the fact that the deputy superintendent is appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Ministry of Education generates criticism that the central government’s control over local administration still lingers (Kim et al., 1999a). 7.3.
Bifurcated Legislative Authority
The authority of the board of education is greatly weakened by the bifurcated system of legislative authority. Local education self-governance bodies and general local self-governance bodies are often in conflict. Critics have asserted that the board of education has lost its independence as a legislative organ and does little more than review the actions of the local assembly. In most cases, a board’s decisions must be approved by the local assembly. Especially these matters related to educational finance are subject to the decisions made by the local assembly. Due to this bifurcation, friction between boards of education and local assemblies is increasing, and the authority of the boards authority is being undermined (Kim, 2002). Currently, a board of education meets 60 days each year while metropolitan and provincial assemblies convene 120 days per year. Issues related to budgets, accounting, and drafts of ordinances are reviewed by both boards of education and local assemblies. This duplication of effort represents a waste of time and energy. An uncooperative relationship between boards of education and local assemblies can also make it difficult to gain support from other local governing bodies. Moreover, the superintendents of education have ultimate authority over affairs pertaining to education, learning, and arts. Therefore, local heads of governing bodies (such as mayors and governors) have no direct incentive to provide financial support for improving conditions in the schools. 7.4.
Issue of Separation of Educational Administration
This concept refers to the separation of educational administration from general government administration. The issue has provoked continued debate among scholars, particularly between those in the field of general administration and those in
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION IN KOREA
125
education, and even among scholars of education. Major controversies include the following: Is educational self-governance really necessary? Should boards of education remain separate from offices of education? For what and by whom should education self-governance work? To what extent should local assembly and the head of local governing bodies be involved in local educational administration and finance? Within the education sector, there is a tendency to advocate complete local education self-governance, with educational administration that is distinct from general administration. Officials in the general administration, on the other hand, generally push for the integration of local education administration into the general administration so as to improve operational effectiveness and efficiency. Others feel that educational administration should focus on development rather than self-governance, and call for more accurate assessments of decentralization efforts that have been implemented thus far (Song, 1997). In the midst of these controversies, the Korean government recently considered the idea of incorporating educational administration into the local self-governance system and discussed the possibility of integrating legislative organs and finance into the general administration. This has triggered severe debates among scholars and practitioners. A satisfactory resolution that can be agreed to by many parties involved in the issue of self-governance has yet to be made. 7.5.
Method of Electing the Superintendent and Education Board Members
After the education self-governance system was put into motion in the 1990s, members of education boards were elected in the local assembly and those board members, in their turn, elected superintendents of education. This doubly indirect method proved to be unsatisfactory. Through a series of changes, during the 2002 election, electoral colleges comprised of all school council members elected superintendents and school board members. Previously, the electoral colleges awarded each school council only a single vote. The general public criticized this practice for many reasons, including its failure consider the size of schools. The present system of electing board members and superintendents allows a larger number of voters to express their views about the candidates. However, many observers still wonder whether or not the electoral college truly represents the will of local residents (Kim, 2001). Such critics claim that the current election system cannot be considered democratic because the electoral college does not take into consideration the opinions of the entire resident population. They point out that limiting number of the members of electoral college makes it difficult for that body to respond to the opinions of the whole resident population regarding educational provisions. 7.6.
Accountability of Local Self-Governing Authorities
Some critics feel that the current LESGS does not encourage authorities to take responsibility for local educational issues (Kim, 1998a). Despite the fact that local residents’ interest in local education is becoming stronger day by day, superintendents tend to blame lack of support from local governments for the problems in schools, rather than accepting personal responsibility for these troubles themselves. The heads of local governments tend to behave in a similarly irresponsible manner arguing that they are granted little authority over education. Despite claims that decentralization
126
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
will lead to greater accountability of elected heads of local governments, some have ignored their responsibilities. Another question concerns the task of evaluating local education self-governing bodies by the central government to reform the education system. The Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development has been conducting an annual evaluation of the metropolitan and provincial offices of education since 1996 in an effort to make them more effective and accountable. Some critics argued that local residents—not the central authority—should assume responsibility for making the LESGS truly functional (Kim, 1999b). They also claimed that determining the amount of financial support provided to local education self-governing bodies based on the results of these evaluations represents a betrayal of the principle of self-governance. 7.7.
Management and Structure of Local Educational Finance
Observers have suggested that although the autonomy of metropolitan and provincial has dramatically increased as a result of decentralization policies, improvements in the efficiency of financial management have not kept pace with the changes in the authority structure (Kim et al., 1999a). This issue began to attract public attention when the rate of public investment in education increased rapidly after the government set the education budget at 5% of the GNP in 1996. With the goal of improving educational equity, the central government began to estimate the financial needs of each metropolitan and provincial region. The level of central funds provided to each education office used to be determined by calculating the difference between standardized financial expenditure from standardized financial revenues, and making up the differences. This practice reduced local motivation to efficiently managing educational finances. There is little incentive for local education offices to adopt innovative management techniques or to secure independent sources of revenue. In addition, local dependence on the central government is especially strong in the area of educational finance. The central government, via national taxes, continues to supply over 80% of all education funds in Korea. This situation tends to decrease the participation of local residents in supplying and managing local educational finances, and therefore undermines the goal of local self-governance. It is doubtful that problems related to local educational financing can be solved without restructuring the entire taxation system. 8.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
No one can deny that the education in the 21st century must meet newly emerging demands that have surfaced in connection with globalization and the development of a knowledge-based society. Education authorities in Korea believe that decentralization can help the nation meet this goal. However, the system of local education self-governance currently practiced in Korea hardly guarantees autonomy and professionalism in educational management. The Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development applies unnecessarily specific standards and regulations to local education offices. The uniform nature of the guidance provided by the Ministry makes it difficult for local authorities to tailor education to the unique aspects of the communities they serve. Central officials also fear that local educational administrations
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION IN KOREA
127
will become overly concerned with the minute details of school management and fail to provide satisfactory support to the schools, thus lowering the quality of education offered at the local level. With a variety of interest groups attempting to express their opinions in public arenas, frictions, and controversies related to educational matters have become increasingly detrimental. It is becoming more and more difficult to provide consumers with high quality education that meshes with the distinct realities of each region. In Korea, autonomy and self-governance in education are no longer matters of choice or possible alternatives, but imperatives that must be followed. The government is challenged to come up with a form of educational decentralization that reflects the traditions, culture, and social structure of Korean society. Developments in the political arena would appear to support educational decentralization. The political system has become more democratic, with citizens enjoying rights and responsibilities previously denied to them. A system of local self-governance builds on these developments. The LESGS aims at encouraging local residents to express their own desires for local education and to take responsibility for realizing those goals. Such a system is rooted in a conception of education that views local residents as the leaders of their school communities. At the same time, such a model presupposes high degrees of cooperation and mutual support not only between central and local education authorities, but also among a variety of higher administrative authorities and subordinate administrative organs. The strong tradition of centralized educational administration in Korea makes the process of transferring authority from the central Ministry to local educational bodies particularly challenging. Errors are bound to occur as people at different levels of the system adapt to new procedures and expectations. However, such a transfer of authority is necessary if Korean education is to continue to progress. If the LESGS is not realized, the education system will pay a high price. Therefore, the central government should continue to promote educational decentralization. It must help local administrators build capacity in areas such as finance, personnel, and organizational management. As local administrative capacity grows, the transfer of authority to local self-governing bodies should become more substantial and more consequential. NOTES 1. A study conducted by the Korean Educational Development Institute identifies the same chronological periods, but labels them using different phrases: “adoption and testing,” “reservation,” and “implementation’ phases” (Kim et al., 1999a). 2. The functions carried out by the two different level BODs were different. For example, the city level BOD was an executive organ, while the school district level BOD was a decision-making body. The decision-making authority of BODs at school districts was also limited, as they were allowed to make decisions pertaining to only elementary education.
9.
REFERENCES
Choi, H. S. (1996). Evaluative study on the local autonomy system of education. Journal of Educational Administration, 14(3), 149–169. Govinda, R. (1997). Decentralization of educational management: Experiences from South Asia. Paris: IIEP.
128
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
Kim, N. S. (1996). A study on the development of local educational governance system in Korea. Journal of Educational Administration, 14(3), 170–231. Kim, J. W. (1998a). Meaning of education self-governance and the future prospect—with a focus on local education self-governance system. The Study of Educational Principles [Kyoyuk Wonli Yon’gu], 3(1), 23–28. Kim, S. B. (1998b). Changes in the environment of local educational administration and the directions for reform. Journal of Educational Administration, 16(3), 4–13. Kim, H. et al. (1999a). Restructuring of local administration system in education. RR99-9. Seoul: Korean Educational Development Institute. Kim, N. S. (1999b). Recollection of education self-governance in the 1990s and education self-governance for the 2000s. Paper presented at the 1999 symposium organized by the Korean Society for the Study of Education. Kim, Y. (1999c). What are the problems in the current local education self-governance system? Educational Development [Kyoyuk Kaebal], 117 (January), 22–25. Kim, S. B. (2001). Prospects of local education self-governance system in the twenty-first century and new strategies. Paper presented at the 121st symposium organized by the Korean Society for the Study of Educational Administration. Ministry of Education. (1998). Fifty-year history of Korea’s education. Seoul: Ministry of Education. Song, K. C. (1997). An alternative model of the relationship between educational autonomy and local autonomy. Study of Social and Educational Science [Sahoe Kyoyuk Kwahak Yon’gu], 2, 45–72. Yun, C. (2000). Redistribution of roles and functions between central and local education authorities. Journal of Educational Administration, 18(4), 159–172. Yun, C. et al. (1992). Education policy in Korea. Seoul: Kwahak Kyoyuksa.
Chapter 8 TRANSFERRING AUTHORITY TO LOCAL SCHOOL COMMUNITIES IN INDONESIA: AMBITIOUS PLANS, MIXED RESULTS Christopher Bjork
Indonesia, like many developing nations in Asia, is currently riding a decentralization wave. Over the past decade, the government has pushed for decentralization in all sectors of government, from health to agriculture. In the 1980s, the Ministry of National Education (MONE)1 began exploring the possibility of decentralizing authority over the schools. In the years that followed, a multitude of programs and policies tied to that goal were enacted. Although the government sometimes had trouble following through on its promise to devolve authority to autonomous regions, its support for decentralization projects did not wane. The culmination of its efforts to reconfigure authority frameworks was the passage of two laws in 1999 that granted sweeping powers to Indonesia’s districts and municipalities, beginning in 2001 (Ferrazzi, 1998; Malo, 1995; Usman, 2001). This legislation indicated that the education system, like all sectors of government, would be managed by local authorities and educators, and the MONE’s primary responsibility would shift from direction to coordination. Considering the highly centralized, top-down nature of Indonesian government, the decision to redistribute authority to local levels represented significant departure from previous practice. An administration that had “embodied centripetal power” (Malley, 1999) indicated that it would transfer key powers to local actors and institutions. This shift had important implications for the way that education would be organized and delivered in Indonesia. A system that had previously concentrated authority firmly at the top was signaling that the MONE’s monopoly over the education field would be broken. After a long history of being denied opportunities to participate in the direction of schooling, local educators were given unprecedented authority over the curriculum, budgets, and school practice. Members of school communities were also encouraged to take part in school decision-making. The government indicated its intention to lower the walls dividing schools from their surrounding communities and collaborate with school personnel in bottom-up planning. Ideally, those reconfigurations would increase community commitment to education, transform curricula, and enliven instruction. Although government officials were unclear about how local actors would respond to those challenges, they continued to promote the benefits of educational decentralization. Policy reports and guidebooks explore in great detail theoretical arguments for devolving authority over school systems. Surprisingly little attention has been devoted to local responses to the decentralization policies that have been 129 Christopher Bjork (ed.), Educational Decentralization, 129–147. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
130
EDUCATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
adopted. In this chapter I offer a preliminary account of the effects that decentralization policies have had in the schools. The chapter is divided into four sections: legal foundations for decentralization, teachers’ responses to proposed changes, the roles assigned to parents in the reconfigured education system, and curricular reform. Focusing on the translation and implementation of decentralization measures at the school level, I draw attention to the critical influence that local culture, economic conditions, and historical center-local relations can exert on the devolution process. 1.
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS AND HISTORICAL PRECEDENT
Indonesia’s remarkable cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious diversity has long challenged the individuals charged with governing the archipelago. Created in 1945, the country is composed of more than 13,000 islands, 200 million people, 50 ethnic groups, and 200 regional languages. Since that time, the Indonesian government has flirted with the idea of transferring authority to local levels on a number of occasions. Initially, government officials indicated that they would entrust local representatives with a considerable degree of autonomy. Adoption of Indonesia’s first decentralization law in 1948, the Basic Law on Regional Government, suggested that power would indeed be dispersed across the islands. The Constitution of 1950 went so far as to specify that, “The division of Indonesia into large and small regions with the right to govern their own affairs . . . . These divisions shall be given the largest possible measure of autonomy to manage their own affairs” (Indonesian Constitution of 1950, Article 131).2 Although politicians expressed support for decentralization, the absence of effective supporting legislation undermined plans for the devolution of authority to local levels (Ford, 2000). By 1949, a unitary state had replaced the federalist model and elites with centralist proclivities reasserted their authority (Ferrazzi, 2000). After the first president, Sukarno, was forced out of office in 1965, the New Order leadership that replaced him revived plans for decentralizing the bureaucracy. Intent on increasing administrative effectiveness, the government passed Law No. 5 of 1974, which called for the delegation of authority to the regencies and municipalities. The law, however, was never translated into action. According to Buising (2000), there are several factors that interfered with policy implementation. First, Law No. 5 did not provide detailed plans for transferring power to local levels. Second, many bureaucrats resisted pressure to share their power with sub-national offices. Finally, the oil boom that enriched Indonesia soon after Law No. 5 was adopted allowed New Order leaders to co-opt the regions by offering them much needed development funds in exchange for their support of a strong central government (Buising, 2000, p. 2). As a result, Law No. 5 had little effect on the distribution of power in Indonesian government offices. Although the law remained in effect, it was largely ignored. During the New Order era (1966–1998), authority became steadily more concentrated in the capital. Concerned about potential threats to his power and to national unity, President Suharto gradually tightened the leash that connected local levels of government to the center. Javanese stress on harmony and unity, combined with Indonesia’s rapid economic development, fed into Suharto’s plans for minimizing threats to his own authority (Schwarz, 2000). Improvements in transportation and communication networks enhanced communication across levels of government, but
TRANSFERRING AUTHORITY TO LOCAL SCHOOL COMMUNITIES IN INDONESIA
131
the bulk of information flowed in one direction. Under Suharto, local government officials became “transmitters” of directives from Jakarta rather than community representatives (Emmerson, 1978). Presidential Regulation No. 6 of 1970 required all civil servants to demonstrate “monoloyalty” to the government, and forbade them from engaging in political activity (Emmerson, 1978). Interestingly, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, just as the New Order administration was clamping down on individual and group freedoms (Schwarz, 2000), it introduced an extensive slate of decentralization programs in various sectors of government, from agriculture to health care. The impetus to decentralize, however, did not emerge solely within the borders of the nation; Indonesia’s embracement of decentralization paralleled an international groundswell of support for the concept (Govinda, 1997). This sheds light on the tension between the concomitant push for greater local autonomy and Suharto’s assertion of central authority and limitation of individual expression. The President’s instincts might have led him to guard the power accorded to central authorities, but global trends made that a risky strategy. As an official at the MONE that I interviewed observed, Indonesia has “entered what is called globalization, the free market. So we need to have every level of society active . . . . Because