European Union Council Presidencies: A Comparative Analysis (Routledge Advances in European Politics, 13)

European Union Council Presidencies

Why do European Union Council Presidencies vary so enormously? This comparative volume investigates how and why member states choose to play the Presidency role in such dissimilar ways, differing in both strategies and priorities. It analyses, explains and compares seven European Union Council Presidencies and describes the functions of the Presidency. It also provides a concluding section containing summaries of member state characteristics and behaviour. This is a truly comparative, theoretically informed study of EU Council Presidencies at the turn of the millennium. Based on rationalist and sociological theoretical perspectives, it contains new empirical data and indepth case studies looking at the Presidencies of the Netherlands, Britain, Finland, France, Sweden, Belgium and Spain. Ole Elgström is Professor in the Department of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden.

Routledge Advances in European Politics

1 Russian Messianism Third Rome, revolution, Communism and after Peter J.S. Duncan 2 European Integration and the Postmodern Condition Governance, democracy, identity Peter van Ham 3 Nationalism in Italian Politics The stories of the Northern League, 1980–2000 Damian Tambini 4 International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995 Edited by Peter Siani-Davies 5 Widening the European Union The politics of institutional change and reform Edited by Bernard Steunenberg

9 Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe The democratisation of the general public in fifteen Central and Eastern European countries, 1991–1998 Christian W. Haerpfer 10 Private Sector Involvement in the Euro The power of ideas Stefan Collignon and Daniela Schwarzer 11 Europe A Nietzschean perspective Stefan Elbe 12 Europe, Globalisation and Sustainable Development Edited by Brian Baxter, John Barry and Richard Dunphy

6 Institutional Challenges in the European Union Edited by Madeleine Hosli, Adrian van Deemen and Mika Widgrén

13 European Union Council Presidencies A comparative perspective Edited by Ole Elgström

7 Europe Unbound Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union Edited by Jan Zielonka

14 European Governance and Supranational Institutions Making states comply Jonas Tallberg

8 Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans Nationalism and the destruction of tradition Cathie Carmichael

15 European Union, NATO and Russia Martin Smith and Graham Timmins

European Union Council Presidencies A comparative perspective

Edited by Ole Elgström

First published 2003 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. © 2003 Ole Elgström for selection and editorial matter; individual contributors, their contributions All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data European Union council presidencies : a comparative perspective / edited by Ole Elgström. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Council of the European Union—Presidents. 2. European Union countries—Politics and government. I. Elgström, Ole, 1950– JN34.E97 2003 341.242'2—dc21 2003001095 ISBN 0-203-40096-8 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-33896-0 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–30990–5 (Print Edition)

Contents

Notes on contributors Preface and acknowledgements 1 Introduction

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OLE ELGSTRÖM

2 The agenda-shaping powers of the Council Presidency

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JONAS TALLBERG

3 ‘The honest broker’? The Council Presidency as a mediator

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4 The Council Presidency and external representation

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RIKARD BENGTSSON

5 The Netherlands’ Presidency of 1997: between ambition and modesty

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MENDELTJE VAN KEULEN AND JAN Q. TH. ROOD

6 The British Presidency of 1998: New Labour, new tone?

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IAN MANNERS

7 The Finnish Presidency of 1999: pragmatism and the promotion of Finland’s position in Europe

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TEIJA TIILIKAINEN

8 The French Presidency of 2000: an arrogant leader? OLIVIER COSTA, ANNE COUVIDAT AND JEAN-PASCAL DALOZ

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9 The Swedish Presidency of 2001: a reflection of Swedish identity

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BO BJURULF

10 The Belgian Presidency of 2001: cautious leadership as trademark

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BART KERREMANS AND EDITH DRIESKENS

11 The Spanish Presidencies of 1989, 1995 and 2002: from commitment to reluctance towards European integration

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FRANCESC MORATA AND ANA-MAR FERNÁNDEZ

12 Conclusion: rationalist and sociological perspectives on the Council Presidency

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OLE ELGSTRÖM AND JONAS TALLBERG

Index

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Contributors

Rikard Bengtsson is Research Fellow at the Department of Political Science, Lund University. His main research interests concern security politics and international relations theory. His publications include Trust, Threat and Stable Peace (Lund University 2000) and articles in the journals Cooperation and Conflict, Diplomacy and Statecraft, and Central European Political Science Review. Bo Bjurulf is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Lund University. His initial area of research was a simulation study of the effects of different voting rules when applied to the same system of preferences. He has published articles on formal modelling, electoral behaviour and the transparency process in the European Union. Olivier Costa is Research Fellow at the CNRS (Bordeaux Institute of Political Science (CERVL)) and Professor at the College of Europe (Bruges). His publications deal with European institutions and policymaking in the EU. He is currently working on European and national MPs’ behaviour as well as on interest representation in the EU. Anne Couvidat is a graduate assistant and a Ph.D. student at the Bordeaux Institute of Political Science (CERVL). She specializes in the study of political leadership. Jean-Pascal Daloz is Research Fellow at the CNRS (Bordeaux Institute of Political Science (CERVL)). He is Executive Secretary of the Research Committee on Political Elites (IPSA) and of the Research Committee on Comparative Sociology (AIS). Edith Drieskens works as an assistant at the Institute of International and European Policy at the Catholic University of Leuven. She has recently published on the 2001 Belgian EU Presidency in Res Publica and the Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review 2001/2002 (with Bart Kerremans). Her Ph.D. research focuses on the transatlantic dimension of economic sanctions.

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Ole Elgström is Professor of Political Science at Lund University. He has published articles on negotiation and mediation in the EU in the Journal of European Public Policy, International Negotiation, Scandinavian Political Studies and the European Foreign Affairs Review. He is a board member of the ECPR Standing Group on the European Union. Ana-Mar Fernández is a Ph.D. candidate and Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Autonomous University of Barcelona. Her current research deals with European institutions and especially with the Council of Ministers. Bart Kerremans conducts research on the external trade policies of the European Union and the United States, and decision-making in this field in general, and on the WTO-related trade relations between the EU and the USA in particular. Mendeltje van Keulen works at the EU office of the training department of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, and is a Ph.D. student at Twente University in the Netherlands. Ian Manners is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, Canterbury. His recent publications include Substance and Symbolism: An Anatomy of Cooperation in the New Europe (Ashgate 2000), and with Richard Whitman (eds) The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States (Manchester University Press 2000). Francesc Morata is Professor at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He gained his Ph.D. from the European University Institute of Florence. He has been in charge of several research projects on European integration, regional governance and environmental policy. He has recently published and edited a series of volumes in Spanish and Italian on EU governance and EU policies. Jan Q. Th. Rood is Director of Studies of the Clingendael Institute (the Netherlands Institute of International Relations) and Professor in International Relations Theory at Utrecht University, the Netherlands. Jonas Tallberg is Research Fellow at Lund University and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. He has published numerous articles on European governance in international journals, and is the author of European Governance and Supranational Institutions: Making States Comply (Routledge 2003). Teija Tiilikainen is Director of Research in the Centre for European Studies at the University of Helsinki. She is also the representative of the Finnish Government in the European Convention. In her research, she has focused on European integration and Finnish foreign and security policy.

Preface and acknowledgements

The idea to write this volume was initiated by the members of the Swedish research project Comparing Council Presidencies. Early on we decided to create a network of international scholars with an interest in EU Council Presidencies, and we soon realized that we together constituted a body of scholarship that was particularly well suited to writing a volume on Presidency performance and developments in the office of the Presidency during the past decade. Network meetings were held in Lund in March 2000, in La Laguna, Tenerife (in connection with the Spanish Political Science Association’s annual meeting) in September 2001, and at Örenäs castle in June 2002. At these meetings, preliminary chapter drafts were presented and thoroughly discussed. As well as the authors of chapters in this volume, the following scholars participated in one or more of these meetings: Federiga Bindi, Matilda Broman, Kenneth Hanf, Karl-Magnus Johansson, Thomas Pedersen and Rebecca Ulfgaard. We sincerely thank all of them for their valuable comments, and Francesc Morata and Kenneth Hanf for arranging the Presidency panel in Tenerife. We would also like to express our gratitude to The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation for generous economic support, both for the Swedish research project as such and for making participation in the abovementioned meetings and conferences possible. Thanks also to the Swedish Political Science Network on European Studies for a grant that made it possible to arrange the final meeting at Örenäs castle. Sir David Ratford has performed an excellent job in reviewing our use of the English language. The editor and publisher would also like to thank Taylor & Francis (www.tandf.co.uk) for granting permission to reprint a slightly revised version of ‘The Agenda Shaping Powers of the EU Council Presidency’ by Jonas Tallberg, Journal of European Public Policy, 10:1 (2003). Ole Elgström Lund

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Introduction Ole Elgström

The Presidency: a multi-faceted institution ‘The Presidency has always had a role of attempting to lead the Council, but the role has expanded.’ ‘The Presidency has a lot of room to push things . . . he who proposes is in the driving seat.’ ‘The Presidencies that are stubborn and opinionated are those that make an impact.’ ‘By definition, a Presidency has to suppress its national interests.’ ‘It is important for a Presidency to work democratically and to show consideration: to strive for consensus and compromise and to listen to all member states.’ ‘The Presidency was very successful: good management and impartial.’ (Quotes from interviews with Brussels officials) The Presidency of the European Union (EU) Council of Ministers is one of the key institutional players in the EU negotiation game. The Presidency is regarded by other actors as a leader, providing visions of the future and guiding the integration process towards these new goals. When deadlocks occur in lengthy decision-making processes, eyes are turned towards the Presidency: it is supposed to come up with creative proposals and to broker compromises that are ‘yesable’ to all member states. At the same time, the Presidency period is seen by many actors in the domestic arena as the opportunity to advance particular national interests; this is the time, they hope, when due attention will be given to the specific national needs and concerns of the country at the helm. The Presidency is furthermore expected to provide an organizational environment that is conducive

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to agreement. Meetings are to be well prepared and to be run smoothly, documents to be distributed on time and in all languages, and logistics to function properly. Expectations of the Presidency are thus many and diverse. It is a complex role, but also potentially an important one. It gives all member states a chance to be centre stage and to be the leading star for six months. It gives their leaders a chance to demonstrate their political acumen, to gain additional support and perhaps to influence their own national opinions in their attitudes towards the EU. It is important for the Union as such at times when other actors are unable or unwilling to provide leadership. On the other hand, the role is played for only six months, the agenda is already set to a large degree and external events may anyway destroy what chances there may have been to shape the political landscape. The ways in which member states approach their Presidency periods are as diverse as the expectations they encounter. Presidency performance varies enormously. The puzzle that this volume seeks to address is why this is the case. How can we explain that member states choose to play the Presidency role in different ways, that they differ in what Presidency functions they prioritize and in what strategies they use to realize their aspirations? The purpose is to describe, analyse and explain the role performance of different Presidencies. In this book, scholars from seven different member states focus their analytical skills on the Council Presidency. We aim to develop theoretical instruments for researching the office of the Presidency and EU decisionmaking in general, to sharpen and deepen the analysis of the functions and the role performance of the Presidency, and to make a comparative assessment of the performance of seven member states, using the same theoretical concepts and tools. In contrast to most previous studies of the Presidency, this volume is explicitly theoretical and comparative in its focus. It compares a large number of cases instead of focusing on just one and is guided by a conscious effort to use one and the same analytical framework. It provides novel empirical grounds for comparison and covers the experiences and developments of the past five years. Many of the contributions build on empirical data, interviews and documentary evidence that were collected especially for this enterprise. The volume comprises an effort to explain systematically differences in the role performances of different member states. In this Introduction, we start by placing the institution of the Presidency in its context, at the apex of the EU political process. Thereafter, existing research on the Presidency is briefly reviewed and characterized. The following section describes the functions of the office and accentuates a number of analytical distinctions that are to guide the empirical chapters. The subject of the next section is to discuss ways to explain differences in role performance. We start by presenting the intuitively appealing notion

Introduction 3 that member state characteristics determine role performance. We then introduce two contrasting approaches, emphasizing a logic of expected consequences and a logic of appropriateness respectively. The subsequent sections, on Presidency goals and strategies and on Presidency roles and role performance, serve to illustrate main propositions in these two approaches and to highlight some dilemmas confronting each country at the helm. The country reports of the book will reflect how different states have responded to these hard choices. Finally, an outline of the remainder of the volume is presented.

In the midst of the decision-making system Taking over the chair of the Presidency means assuming responsibility for the work of the EU Council of Ministers and the European Council. It brings with it the administrative burden of arranging thousands of meetings, in Brussels and at home. The country in charge chairs meetings at all levels of intergovernmental negotiation, from working parties with member state and Commission officials, and Coreper with their ambassadors, to Council ministerial meetings and summits, involving heads of governments and states. Holding the chair entails the theoretical possibility of influencing the agenda, shaping the bargaining process and proposing specific solutions to the problems at hand. The Council of Ministers (the Council) is the foremost site of intergovernmental activism in the EU, in contrast to the supranational Commission and the directly elected European Parliament. These three institutions together constitute the main actors of the lawmaking process within the first pillar. According to the ‘Community method’, the Commission initiates proposals and the Council decides, increasingly jointly with the Parliament. Within the second and third pillars the position of the Council is even more dominant, since the powers of the other institutions are heavily circumscribed in the areas of foreign and security policy and police and legal co-operation. Thus, holding the Presidency automatically places a country at the centre of EU negotiation processes. The Presidency is one of the major EU institutions. Institutions affect outcomes. This is in brief the message of the neoinstitutionalist approach (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 4). Both formal structures and informal norms influence, from this perspective, the negotiation strategies and behaviour of actors. The functions, rules and norms associated with and surrounding the Presidency are therefore independent variables that may affect EU decision-making and Presidency role performance. This is a basic theoretical assumption informing this volume. In arguing that institutions matter, we believe that the processes as well as the results of EU decision-making would have been quite different had the Presidency not had the characteristics it features today.

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Existing research The Council Presidency has so far attracted relatively little scholarly interest. The existing literature may be divided into three major categories. First, there is a limited number of studies that are devoted directly to the Presidency (Edwards and Wallace 1977; de Bassompierre 1988; Kirchner 1992; Svensson 2000). Second, there are chapters on the Presidency in books describing and analysing the Council of Ministers (Westlake 1995; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Sherrington 2000). Third, there is a rather voluminous body of articles, books and conference reports on the experiences of particular holders of the Presidency (e.g. Kirchner and Tsagkari 1993; Ludlow 1993, 1998; Wurzel 2000; Tallberg 2001). Characteristic of the literature is its mainly descriptive focus. Theoretical insights are presented, but not in any structured format. A few exceptions exist, however. David Metcalfe (1998) presents an incisive analysis of the Presidency from a leadership perspective. Adrian Schout has confronted the manifold roles of the office (Schout 1998; Schout and Vanhoonacker 2001). Anna-Carin Svensson (2000) portrays and problematizes the influence of Presidencies during Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs). The empirical literature is typically void of broader, comparative analyses, with the exception of Kirchner (1992), Wurzel (1996) and Svensson (2000). In general, the literature puts great emphasis on assessing, in empirical terms, the degree of influence and the effectiveness of individual Presidencies and of the institution as such. The possible differences between larger and smaller member states are often noted, but no thorough analysis has been carried out. There are very few studies that have attempted to wed general political science concepts and theories to the Presidency institution.

The functions of the Presidency The task of the Presidency today comprises four main functions (Tallberg 2001: 11–14; cf. Wallace 1985; Kirchner 1992; Schout 1998). These are factual functions rather than formal, in the sense that they are anchored in legal obligations to only a limited degree, instead being based on established praxis. The functions of the Presidency have been in continous evolution since the birth of the EU. Its areas of responsibility and the tasks it performs have developed gradually through the creation of informal practices, which over the years have become increasingly institutionalized. The Treaty of the European Economic Community (1957) prescribed a rotating Presidency, with a change of guard every six months, but did not indicate any specific functions to be carried out. The relatively limited role given to the Presidency mirrored the federalist ideas behind the institutional construction that was decided in Rome. The Treaty awarded a

Introduction 5 leading position to the Commission, which had the main responsibility for pushing the integration process forward. As will be demonstrated below, the Presidency has thereafter gained in importance and expanded its tasks, often at the expense of the Commission. From a comparative perspective, it should be noted that the EU model differs from Presidency constructions in other organizations, such as the UN or NATO, in two major ways. First, the management task is distributed among several actors instead of being concentrated in the hands of a permanent Secretary-General. Second, all member states, regardless of size or power, are given this responsibility in an equal way (Tallberg 2001: 13). Administration and co-ordination The Presidency is responsible for preparing and co-ordinating the work of the Council by compiling and distributing documents, drawing up agendas and convening all meetings. In concrete terms, this means planning for around 2000 meetings at all levels and arranging about eighty formal and informal ministerial meetings. These administrative tasks constitute the core, traditional function of any Presidency. In the EU context, the demand for co-ordination has increased in tandem with the broadening and intensification of Council responsibilities. The number of Council constellations has increased steadily as the acquis communautaire has developed. The biggest change of all was, however, the introduction of informal ministerial meetings, often taking place in the home country of the Presidency, that require extensive administrative, logistic and economic preparations. The increasing importance of European Council meetings, and the enormous attention paid by the media and public to these summits, necessitate meticulous preparations. After all, the final verdict on a Presidency may hinge upon the perceived effectiveness of the two summits. Co-ordination is also necessary in connection with the Council’s relations with Commission and Parliament. To ensure a smooth and wellfunctioning decision-making process, the Presidency bureaucrats have to be in constant contact with their counterparts in Brussels. This is necessary not least in the preparatory phase, before the actual Presidency period starts, to increase the probability that the incoming Presidency will receive the documents and proposals from the Commission that are needed to obtain results during its stint in office in the dossiers that it has prioritized. Some Presidencies are ‘capital driven’ while others are ‘run by the perm rep’. Commission officials normally prefer Presidencies to be managed by their permanent representations in Brussels, as this is claimed to increase the chance that decisions are well informed and permeated with a concern for European interests. Member states that centralize decision-making to its capital are, according to Commission officials, more prone to be attentive to their own national interests. Incidentally, such Presidencies also

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seem less likely to co-operate closely with the Commission. In the country reports of this volume, both these aspects of organizational design (the degree of Presidency–Commission co-ordination and the degree of centralization) will be highlighted. Setting political priorities One of the tasks of the Presidency is to prepare and present a list of prioritized areas. The Presidency programme expresses the political priorities of the country in charge and indicates to what issues it will give extra attention and where political results are expected. This is a relatively new function that has grown in importance in concordance with developments within the EU. The sheer number of potential issues on the agenda makes tough priorities necessary. The image of a weak Commission, increasingly unable to provide leadership, combined with the perception that the Commission is more and more becoming a ‘sixteenth player’ in EU negotiations, with its own interests and agenda, have also persuaded the Council to allow the Presidency increased freedom of action. This political function has become even more pronounced with the Presidency’s responsibility for the agenda of the European Council meetings. Jonas Tallberg (Chapter 2, this volume) proposes that agenda-shaping is the most appropriate label for this phenomenon. Despite the severe limitations on Presidency influence in this field (an agenda that is to a large extent inherited and vulnerable to external, unpredicted events), there are, claims Tallberg, possibilities for the Council leader to influence EU policy. Arguing that existing literature operates with a too narrow definition of agenda-shaping, he introduces a distinction between agendasetting (the introduction of new issues on the agenda), agenda-structuring (putting varying emphases on issues already on the agenda) and agendaexclusion (keeping issues away from the agenda). This analytical distinction will be used in the empirical scrutiny of Presidential agendashaping in this volume. Mediation The Presidency is supposed to steer negotiations in the Council towards decisions and agreement. By means of consensus-building, mediation and brokering, the chair is searching for compromises that are acceptable to all parties, or at least to a majority of the actors. This is a function shared by chairs in all types of context, and it has grown in importance in the EU system. The increase in the number of member states and the gradual transition to qualified majority voting as the main decision-making rule have strengthened the demand for active mediation efforts. The Presidency is also often seen to be the most appropriate and natural compromise-maker, as it is considered to be more impartial than its

Introduction 7 potential competitor as mediator, the Commission. Since being ‘an honest broker’ is supposed to enhance the chances for successful conflict resolution, the demand for Presidency mediation initiatives has grown. Presidencies may, however, vary in their degree of impartiality. As noted by Ole Elgström (Chapter 3, this volume), partiality under certain circumstances is permitted, or even expected, despite the impact of the very strong impartiality norm. The effectiveness norm, which states that it is a Presidency’s duty to steer the Council to take decisions and to achieve tangible results, sometimes competes with the impartiality norm as it encourages the Presidency to put pressure on reluctant member states. It is also the case that some Presidencies are more inclined to follow the impartiality norm than others. Some countries have provided dramatic evidence that ‘neutrality’ is not always seen as an overriding priority. The empirical country chapters will reveal to what extent being an evenhanded compromise-maker has been the aspiration of the Presidencies we analyse. Representation The Presidency has been alloted the task of representing the Council both externally, in international negotiations, and internally, in its relations with other EU institutions. The Council needs someone to speak on its behalf. In international organizations and in EU discussions with state actors outside its boundaries, the Council has to be able to speak with one voice. Growing international contacts and developments within foreign and security policy have dramatically changed the demands for an international presence. Within the EU, the development of the European Parliament as a decisive actor in lawmaking and budget processes has increased the need for interinstitutional contacts. The most prominent expression of this is the informal trialogue within the frames of the codecision procedure, where the Presidency negotiates on behalf of the Council with representatives of the Parliament and the Commission. Rikard Bengtsson (Chapter 4, this volume) suggests that the role as foreign policy spokesperson is heavily contested and under development. Several actors compete with the Presidency in this field and the actions of the Presidency itself may help to shape how the representative function is institutionalized. Developments in this area are reported and analysed in the country chapters.

Explaining variations in role performance Presidencies are faced with functional requirements. However, there is within these confines a wide margin for Presidency discretion. We know from experience that some Presidencies keep a low profile, focusing on a flawless administrative performance. Others emphasize the political role

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of the office and make active efforts to shape the agenda and to steer the Union forward. What we try to illuminate and explain in this volume are the variations in role performance of different Presidencies: how they have chosen to carry out the Presidency role, what functions and role ideals they have prioritized and how they have combined strategies to reach their objectives. We do not aim to evaluate Presidency effectiveness, the degree to which various Presidencies have ‘reached their goals’ or been ‘successful’. Neither do we compare the ‘importance’ of the office with the weight of other institutions. In this Introduction, our intention is to acquaint the reader with three explanatory approaches. We proceed in two steps. First, we present the country characteristics approach. This perspective, favoured by practitioners and journalists, claims that it is the individual qualities, material and immaterial, of member states that drive their behaviour. In our view, such factors should be treated as background variables that may in diverse ways influence actor interests and/or identities. In a second step, we introduce two explanatory approaches from general political science theory. According to a logic of expected consequences, Presidency behaviour is best explained as rational, goal-oriented action; a logic of appropriateness highlights the expectations and norms that surround the office. The authors of the country chapters in this volume have been asked to relate to these explanatory models. We will return to them in the concluding chapter. Explaining Presidency behaviour in terms of country characteristics One common foundation for many existing explanations of Presidency behaviour has been references to broad member state characteristics and to the particular qualities of individual actors. In the Presidency literature it is not unusual to find narratives that stress major EU cleavages, such as the distinction between powerful and small, old-timers and debutantes, supranationalists and intergovernmentalists or politically stable versus politically fragmented member states in trying to account for the various strategies member states have chosen. This explanatory approach carries both high face validity and a closeness to practitioners’ views. It highlights Presidency capabilities – administrative as well as material – and the particular interests and preferences of member states with different characteristics and in different situations. The focus on context and external events that may impinge upon Presidency performance is thus another forte of this approach. The big power–small state distinction focuses on power and resources. The European great powers are claimed to be advantaged by their access to plentiful administrative and economic resources and by the multi-area expertise they have at their disposal. Their status and political power create preconditions for exerting the pressure that is sometimes needed

Introduction 9 to break political impasses. On the other hand, the Presidency is only one of several foreign policy undertakings great powers may have, while the Presidency is usually a top priority for any smaller member state. Small states are believed to have fewer decisive self-interests to defend, a fact that is supposed to facilitate effective brokering. A small, streamlined administration is easier to co-ordinate than the big state’s bureaucratic collossus, and the scarcity of administrative resources necessitates close contacts with the Commission and the Council secretariat. Both of these circumstances are believed to result in increased effectiveness. The small state Presidency will probably focus on entrepreneurial leadership while the big state will tend to favour coercive or unilateral leadership (Underdal 1994). A Presidency with supranational attitudes is, at least in Brussels, seen as more reliable and as more prone to shoulder a European leadership role than an intergovernmentalist chair. ‘Reluctant Europeans’ are regarded with suspicion as they are not expected to sacrifice their self-interests in the Presidency role to the same extent as the integrationist leader. Member states with experiences from previous Presidencies are supposed to have learned from their mistakes. Old members have had the chance to develop intricate networks, which facilitate their handling of sensitive dossiers. On the other hand, the debutante will probably devote substantial energy and resources to make its first stint in office a success. Finally, domestic factors are often claimed to determine Presidency behaviour. Countries with unstable coalition governments or fragile government majorities are hypothesized to defend self-interests stubbornly in order to remain in power, and to prioritize issues that are sensitive to domestic constituencies. Considerations of up-coming elections put a mark on Presidency strategies by preventing policy initiatives that are expected to evoke negative popular response. In general, Presidencies are presumed to protect particularistic interests if the population concerned is politically strong enough to affect the government’s chance of being re-elected. The notion of two-level games (Putnam 1988) nicely captures the relevance of domestic politics for EU negotiations, and also alerts us to the possibility that governments may use their domestic situation strategically. On another track, national administrative peculiarities are also assumed to impact upon Presidency performance. A divided or fragmented national leadership is predicted to result in uncoordinated policy-making, with devastating consequences for Presidency effectiveness. Federal systems where substantial power is given to regional entities may create obstacles for unified leadership. Competition between foreign ministries, line departments and the Prime Minister’s, or President’s, office is supposed to complicate the performance of Presidency functions.

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Two explanatory logics In this book, we have chosen to approach the explanatory puzzle primarily from another perspective. We understand the country characteristics described above mainly as antecedent conditions that shape member states’ interests and identities. Power, culture, historical experiences and domestic political factors may thus be claimed either to influence the way rational actors perceive the state’s policy interests or to shape the role conceptions and the expectations of appropriate behaviour by member states. Our approach to explaining Presidency performance builds on the general political science debate on explanatory logics. Actions may, from this perspective, be driven either by anticipated consequences or by perceptions of appropriate behaviour. According to the logic of expected consequences, actors ‘choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are doing likewise’ (March and Olsen 1998: 949). Political outcomes are seen as results of negotiations, or ‘strategic interaction’ (Risse 2000: 3), between rational actors, who are guided by given preferences or interests. Individual actions are ‘explained’ by identifying consequential reasons for them, and foreign policy by providing an interpretation of what outcomes were expected from it (March and Olsen 1998: 950). This is the realm of instrumental rationality, where strategic choices are guided by the outcome of actions. According to the logic of appropriateness, human actors are ‘imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations’ (March and Olsen 1998: 951). The pursuit of objectives is linked to identities rather than to fixed interests. An actor selects the alternative that he or she believes is appropriate or virtuous in the type of situation he or she faces; that is, the actor tries to do ‘the right thing’ within the given context (Risse 2000: 4). Behaviour is ‘explained’ by referring to the identities that are evoked and to the meaning given to the situation (March and Olsen 1998: 951–2). Presidency behaviour may be correspondingly described in two different ways. A rationalist approach conceives of the Presidency as a strategic actor, seeking to satisfy exogenously given national preferences within the confines of its formally designated institutional role. In general, EU actors (be they states or institutional actors) are interpreted as rational agents who are constrained, or enabled, by existing rules, procedures and norms (be they formal or informal). Presidencies, as well as other EU actors, calculate the benefits and costs of different options, taking into account the legal and normative arrangements that surround them. Constitutionally given prerogatives form and shape the moves of the negotiation game. A sociological approach views the Presidency as an identity-driven actor,

Introduction 11 who tries to determine what is the appropriate response to a given situation. National, historically formed identities provide one foundation for decisions; role conceptions based on experiences from previous Presidencies another. Learning and path-dependence are thus essential elements of such an explanation. Norm-based expectations of other actors, domestic and external, also set boundaries for permissible behaviour. The activities of EU actors are steered by notions of ‘how a Presidency should behave’, and of how other actor-types should act, rather than by cost–benefit calculations. In the following two sections, we provide the reader with a number of analytical tools to facilitate an understanding of how the rationalist and sociological approaches may try to explain Presidency behaviour. We try to categorize the choices confronting decision-makers according to the two logics. In the final chapter of this volume, Tallberg and Elgström will return to these themes and analyse the findings of the country chapters with the help of rationalist and sociological explanatory frameworks. They will also use the experiences gained for a discussion about the relationship between the approaches: are they competing or complementary? In this way, they wish to bridge the divide between EU-specific research and general political science theory and to bring the isolated study of EU Presidencies into a broader political science perspective. Selecting goals and strategies: a rationalist approach Any Presidency starts its stint at the helm with goals and priorities. Its government has to consider also the preferences of other actors in analysing what strategy to select, taking into account the formal rules and procedural norms that constitute its institutional context. Substantially, national preferences are distributed along three key dimensions of EU politics (Tallberg, Chapter 2, this volume). First, Presidencies may differ in their socio-economic priorities. Traditional ideologies do play a role here; some observers claim that increasingly more disputes within the Union are characterized by a right–left cleavage (Hix 1999). Member states also vary in their efforts to promote broad sectoral concerns. Some states emphasize environmental problems, some gender equality, others regional concerns. Second, Presidencies vary as regards constitutional priorities. The debate on the future of Europe, including visions of a federal European state as well as basically intergovernmental solutions, illustrates fully the existing variations. Third, regional priorities may be different. Depending on a country’s geographical position, its stand on, for example, enlargement and on regional aid may differ dramatically. Often, member states prioritize their own neighbouring areas. Another way of penetrating the interplay between preferences and strategies is to focus on how actors evaluate their own outcome from ongoing negotiations compared with that of other parties. Most typologies

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of negotiation strategies differentiate between distributive and integrative modes of negotiation (Raiffa 1982; Walton and McKersie 1991). The essential difference between these modes seems to lie in their respective focus on self-interest versus common interests (Elgström and Jönsson 2000: 685). Distributive bargaining is characterized by every participant’s insistence on getting as much as possible for him- or herself, ‘claiming value’ in the parlance of Lax and Sebenius (1986). Integrative negotiations focus on reaching Pareto-optimal solutions, where none of the participants is worse off because of the deal: ‘creating value’ (Lax and Sebenius 1986). When this basic distinction is combined with a social comparison process, including concerns about absolute versus relative advantages, the result is a five-fold typology of negotiator strategies (Tinsley and Pillutla 1998), that may be applied to Presidency negotiation behaviour. A forcing strategy is aimed at maximizing one’s own gains without any concern for other parties. Such a strategy is connected to manipulation and the insistence on one’s own ambitious demands. In the EU context, forcing has been claimed to be a prominent feature of IGC horse-trading. An accommodating strategy is pursued to maximize other parties’ gains, while protecting only the minimum of one’s own interests. A Presidency may wish to do this in order to reach a deal that it desperately needs and/or to increase its ‘European credentials’. A problem-solving strategy aims to maximize joint gains and realize common interests. Sharing information, creative thinking and brainstorming are tactics associated with problem-solving. The trust-permeated climate of many EU negotiations may encourage such behaviour (Elgström and Jönsson 2000). The goal of a competitive strategy is to beat the other party, irrespective of what effects this may have on one’s own absolute gains. This strategy, that typically includes bluffing and threats, seems unlikely to occur often in an institutional setting such as the EU. Finally, a compromise strategy emphasizes the equality of both parties’ outcomes. Concessionconvergence bargaining, leading to a fifty-fifty solution, epitomizes this approach, which may be evident in EU negotiations that distribute divisible resources. Presidency strategies are dependent on institutional constraints. Voting rules obviously influence the choice of an integrative or a distributive approach, but in complex ways (Elgström and Jönsson 2000: 690). Under unanimity, no actor has an incentive to agree to a policy which is below his or her BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement; see Fisher and Ury 1981). In this sense, a veto seems to encourage the promotion of self-interests. However, it may also be argued that unanimity produces a need for creativity, as the players have to design a solution which everyone can accept. When majority voting is at hand you do not have to look for jointly ‘yesable’ solutions, since you can rely on the possibility of defeating the minority by voting. The threat of a vote may be explicitly or implicitly used to press for concessions. At the same time, majority voting

Introduction 13 encourages coalition-building, which may require substantial creativity and problem-solving (cf. Elgström et al. 2001). Institutional rules also have an impact upon what strategies a Presidency might select in its relations to other institutional actors. Co-decision-making thus necessitates a relationship with the European Parliament (EP), which may be approached differently by particular Presidencies. The position of the EP has to be taken into account when Presidency proposals are put forward. The sole right of initiative of the Commission (although weakened in recent years) and the rules regarding changes in Commission proposals create a context for Presidency initiatives vis-à-vis this institutional actor. Presidency dilemmas: a sociological approach How any particular member state performs its Presidency role is, from a sociological perspective, determined partly by the expectations it encounters. Some of these expectations pertain to the office of the Presidency as such: any country in this position is expected to demonstrate certain qualities and behave in a certain way. One example is the impartiality norm, another the expectation that the Presidency should provide much needed leadership. Other expectations are country specific: they are directed specifically to the country at the helm and are anchored in previous experiences and country characteristics. Small members may thus meet other expectations than big members, and countries that have performed well in the past are supposed to do so again. Expectations are powerful determinants of what is considered to be appropriate Presidency behaviour. In spite of these constraints, which are primarily normative but may still result in severe reactions if they are perceived to be violated, member states have a certain degree of freedom in their role performance. Their identities and previous experiences help to shape what is for them the appropriate interpretation of the Presidency role. They may prioritize one function at the expense of others. They may also determine to play the Presidency role in a certain way, selecting a particular approach to the role and a dominant style of performance. Some governments may give more attention to their own, national interests than to European concerns while others may set out doggedly to provide European leadership. Furthermore, the Presidency role is only one out of many possible roles that state leaders are expected to perform. For some actors, holding the Presidency may be less important than playing, let us say, a great power role. Others may have regional concerns that overshadow Presidency expectations. Role competition is to be expected. State leaders must be prepared to face dilemmas: prioritizing one role or one approach may have negative as well as positive effects and difficult decisions therefore have to be made.

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In very simplified and black-or-white terms, governments may, in their Presidency role, choose to act as leaders, bargainers, brokers or bureaucrats. The leadership role entails an emphasis on steering the Union forward. A leader Presidency is supposed to have visions that guide its behaviour. It may use its formal position to initiate moves that further its version of the future of Europe. Leadership necessitates activism, but may include more or less pressure on followers. Some leaders put considerable pressure on other actors and even use mild coercion. Others prefer to act as an entrepreneur, leading the Union by innovative ideas and well-timed initiatives (Malnes 1995; Metcalfe 1998; cf. Underdal 1994). The bargainer role accentuates the domestic responsibilities of the member states. The Presidency period lasts for only six months and it is difficult for any country totally to abnegate its self-interested preferences during this time. The bargainer Presidency makes its national interests its priority and continues to act as it usually does, despite holding the Presidency. The broker Presidency sees its main interest as being to foster compromises and to ‘get results’ in the form of directives, regulations and other EU laws. In order to reach this goal, it may be necessary to make unilateral concessions and to downplay national preferences. Being a good team-player becomes a major concern. The bureaucrat Presidency tries to avoid mistakes and scandals and focuses on ‘running the show’ as efficiently as possible. It lacks ambitious goals and is content with helping others to lead the Union forward. Obviously, these strategies are to be seen as role ideals. In reality countries try to play many of these roles simultaneously and to combine them in such a way as to reap the benefits from all of them without also incurring the possible costs. This is easier said than done. It requires a very delicate balancing act to optimize gains and minimize losses – and mistakes are often made. If national self-interests are defended too vigorously, a country may diminish its chance to be an effective cobbler of compromise and also its pretensions of being a European leader. A broker or a bureaucrat Presidency that has to ‘pay the price of the Presidency’ to reach a compromise agreement may face political risks in its domestic arena. Mediators often put a stress on broad consensus solutions and listen patiently to all parties to foster such an agreement. Since such a strategy often ends up with least common denominator solutions, the leadership potential may be reduced. Leaders that put pressure on other actors may on the other hand be accused of arrogance and self-centredness, thereby rendering it more difficult for them to act as brokers. It is of course theoretically possible to combine the role of the good administrator with leadership, but the bureaucrat’s emphasis on caution and voluntary restraint tends in reality to rule out at least some forms of leadership.

Introduction 15

Chapter outline The following three chapters analyse the three political functions (agenda-shaping, mediation, external representation) of the Presidency. The aim of this theoretically inclined and conceptual section is to provide basic distinctions, and to distil and clarify major components of and perspectives on the functions which Presidencies fulfil within the EU political system. Chapters 5 to 11 include country reports from seven Presidency experiences, covering Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The selection of countries is motivated analytically, but has no pretence of being a ‘representative sample’ of member states. We have collected chapters on southern and northern, big and small, old and new and supranational- and sovereignty-oriented member states to facilitate comparisons from these perspectives. Before writing their contributions, the authors of the country chapters were asked to include references to the analytical framework provided by this Introduction and the functional chapters. They were encouraged to use the conceptual distinctions introduced in these chapters and to discuss how each individual country performed its Presidency role, combining elements of leadership, bargainer, bureaucrat and broker ambitions. The authors were asked to relate to the explanatory frameworks summarized above, and were thus free to introduce aspects of these models in their reasoning and arguments. However, each contributor had – within these frames – full freedom in selecting what theoretical approach and instruments to prioritize. The Conclusion, in Chapter 12, summarizes, structures and analyses the experiences and insights gained from the country reports. The empirical findings are explained by first applying a rationalist, then a sociological approach. The results of these analyses are compared to see whether the two theoretical perspectives are best seen as competing or complementary explanations. This exercise will enrich our understanding of the Presidency institution and further the theoretical debate on the role of EU institutions in general.

References Aspinwall, M.D. and Schneider, G. (2000) ‘Same menu, separate tables: The institutionalist turn in political science and the study of European integration’, European Journal of Political Research, 38: 1–36. Bassompierre, G. de (1988) Changing the Guard in Brussels: An Insider’s View of the Presidency, New York: Praeger. Edwards, G. and Wallace, H. (1977) The Council of Ministers of the European Community and the President-in-Office, London: Federal Trust. Elgström, O. and Jönsson, C. (2000) ‘Negotiation in the European Union: Bargaining or problem-solving?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7 (5): 684–704.

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Elgström, O., Bjurulf, B., Johansson, J. and Sannerstedt, A. (2001) ‘Coalitions in European Union negotiations’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 24 (2): 111–28. Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1981) Getting to Yes, London: Hutchinson Business. Hayes-Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. (1997) The Council of Ministers, London: Macmillan. Hix, S. (1999) The Political System of the European Union, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan. Kirchner, E. (1992) Decision-making in the European Community: The Council Presidency and European Integration, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Kirchner, E. and Tsagkari, A. (eds) (1993) The EC Council Presidency. The Dutch and Luxembourg Presidencies, London: UACES. Lax, D.A. and Sebenius, J.K. (1986) The Manager as Negotiator, New York: The Free Press. Ludlow, P. (1993) ‘The U.K. Presidency: A view from Brussels’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (2): 246–68. Ludlow, P. (1998) ‘The 1998 UK Presidency: A view from Brussels’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 36 (4): 573–83. Malnes, R. (1995) ‘ “Leader” and “entrepreneur” in international negotiations: A conceptual analysis’, European Journal of International Relations, 1: 87–112. March, J. and Olsen, J.P. (1998) ‘The institutional dynamics of international political orders’, International Organization, 52 (4): 943–69. Metcalfe, D. (1998) ‘Leadership in European Union negotiations: The Presidency of the Council’, International Negotiation, 3: 413–34. Putnam, R. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games’, International Organization, 37: 281–316. Raiffa, H. (1982) The Art & Science of Negotiation, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. Risse, T. (2000) ‘Let’s argue!: Communicative action in world politics’, International Organization, 54 (1): 1–39. Schout, A. (1998) ‘The Presidency as a juggler’, Eipascope, 2, Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration. Schout, A. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2001) ‘The Presidency as broker? Lessons from Nice’, paper delivered at the Fourth Pan-European IR Conference, Canterbury, 8–10 September 2001. Sherrington, P. (2000) The Council of Ministers. Political Authority in the European Union, London: Pinter. Svensson, A-C. (2000) In the Service of the European Union. The Role of the Presidency in Negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty 1995–97, Uppsala: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Uppsala universitet. Tallberg, J. (ed.) (2001) När Europa kom till Sverige. Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS förlag. Tinsley, C.H. and Pillutla, M. (1998) ‘Negotiating in the United States and Hong Kong’, Journal of International Business Studies, 29 (4): 711–28. Underdal, A. (1994) ‘Leadership theory: Rediscovering the arts of management’, in I.W. Zartmann (ed.), International Multilateral Negotiation. Approaches to the Management of Complexity, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Wallace, H. (1985) ‘The Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Community: Tasks and evolution’, in C.O. O’Nuallain (ed.), The Presidency of the European Council of Ministers, London: Croom Helm.

Introduction 17 Walton, R.E. and McKersie, R.B. (1991) A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press (1st edn 1965). Westlake, M. (1995) The Council of the European Union, London: Cartermill. Wurzel, R. (1996) ‘The role of the EU Presidency in the environmental field: Does it make a difference which member state runs the Presidency?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 3 (2): 272–91. Wurzel, R. (2000) ‘Flying into unexpected turbulence: The German EU Presidency in the environmental field’, German Politics, 9 (3): 23–42.

2

The agenda-shaping powers of the Council Presidency Jonas Tallberg

Existing literature on the Council Presidency of the EU pays scant attention to the agenda-shaping powers of this office and, to the extent that it does, the assessments are overwhelmingly pessimistic, depicting the Presidency as an office without power. In this chapter, I challenge this established wisdom on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, I develop a conceptual framework capable of capturing alternative forms of agenda influence. In this exercise, I draw on theories of bargaining, agenda-setting and decision-making, as developed in international relations and American politics. Empirically, I demonstrate that Presidencies engage regularly in alternative forms of agenda-shaping, and influence outcomes in EU policy-making. Illustrative cases are drawn primarily from the six consecutive Presidencies in the period 1999 to 2001: Germany, Finland, Portugal, France, Sweden and Belgium. Additional examples of agenda-shaping are offered in the empirical chapters in this volume on individual Presidencies. The central contention of this chapter is that existing literature operates with a narrow understanding of agenda-shaping, which causes it to underestimate the Presidency’s means to influence EU policy. Typically, influence is equated with the introduction of new issues on the agenda (agenda-setting). This definition precludes perhaps the most common forms of influence. In this chapter, I suggest that the Council Presidency engages in agenda-shaping also through the varying emphasis put on issues already on the agenda (agenda-structuring) and the deliberate barring of issues from the agenda (agenda-exclusion). The argument is informed by a rationalist understanding of EU decision-making in general, and the scope for Presidency influence in particular. The chapter is structured in three substantive sections. Following a review of existing literature in the first section, the second section introduces the threefold conception of agenda-shaping. For each form, I isolate the primary means at the Presidency’s disposal and exemplify with cases from EU policy-making. The third section addresses the puzzle of why national governments, highly sensitive to challenges to their decisionmaking authority, would agree to a system that grants privileged

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opportunities of agenda influence to the chair. I advance a functional interpretation in two steps, where I outline first the theoretical rationale of privileged agenda control, and then explain the merits of a rotating office. The conclusion of the chapter sets out the implications for contemporary debates in EU studies, stressing, in particular, the need for intergovernmental bargaining models to recognize the privileged position of the Presidency.

The conventional wisdom: ‘responsabilité sans pouvoir’ In recent years, the Council Presidency has received increasing attention in the literature on EU politics (e.g. Bassompierre 1988; Kirchner 1992; Wurzel 1996; Heyes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Metcalfe 1998; Schout 1998; Westlake 1999; Sherrington 2000; Svensson 2000). In this growing body of research, the Presidency is analysed predominantly in its capacity as broker, external representative, administrative manager, or leader in a general sense. By contrast, few works have addressed the Presidency’s agenda-shaping capacity and, to the extent that they have, the conclusions tend to be overwhelmingly pessimistic. Fiona Heyes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace submit that ‘the real opportunity to promote initiatives or to deliver to domestic expectations is heavily constrained’ (1997: 146). Richard Corbett observes that ‘Presidencies come and go . . . and the individual impact of each one on the European Union, provided they avoid disaster, is limited’ (1998: 1). David Coombes concludes that ‘ “the presidency” lacks most vital attributes and possesses most of the worst defects typically pertaining to executive power’ (1998: 7). The dominating perception of the Presidency’s agenda-shaping powers is summarized best in the frequently quoted phrase by Jean-Louis Dewost, describing the office as a ‘responsabilité sans pouvoir’ (1984: 31). Disaggregating this influential position into substantive claims about influence and agenda-shaping, three lines of reasoning are particularly prominent. According to the first argument, the office of the Presidency has not been conferred any formal powers of initiative, and therefore cannot set the EU policy agenda. The Commission enjoys a monopoly on policy initiation in the first pillar of EU co-operation, whereas the power of proposal is shared between the Commission and the member states in the second and third pillars, without according specific privileges to the Presidency. The Presidency, therefore, should not be misinterpreted as an executive position, offering the possibility of privileged influence over the agenda. In this vein, Corbett stresses that ‘taking on the Presidency does not mean acceding to an executive office but is merely the chairmanship of one of the EU institutions for a short period’ (1998: 1). This reading of the Presidency is echoed in statements such as ‘the Presidency is a chairman, not a president’ and ‘the Presidency has no power, but lots of decisions to take’ (interviews, Commission official, 6 December 2000; French government representative, 9 February 2001).

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The second line of reasoning stresses a set of factors that are considered constraints on the Presidency’s capacity to set priorities in EU policymaking. The most prominent constraint is the degree to which Presidencies inherit the agenda of their predecessors. In an early assessment that has become highly influential among both researchers and practitioners, Guy de Bassompierre asserts that ‘any Presidency, however worthy and able, can only influence, at best, 5–10 per cent of the issues’ (1988: 103). Substantiating this claim, David Neligan (1998: 7) notes: [T]he fact is that the great bulk of a Presidency’s programme will at all times consist of inherited and wholly foreseeable material. The ‘spin’ often put out, that a new departure is being marked when a different Government takes over the helm, is never more than very partially true. The agendas and the accompanying files simply land on the new Presidency’s table, many of them with a dispiritingly dull thud. Forced to attend to those issues that are already on the agenda, the Presidency enjoys few opportunities, if any, to advance its own priorities. The Presidency’s capacity to promote its pet priorities is further seen as reduced by external events beyond its control – whether at national, European or international level – that require immediate attention. HeyesRenshaw and Wallace (1997: 146) note that: No presidency can cater for the vicissitudes of events: a sudden currency crisis, a major international crisis, an unexpected domestic crisis. Many presidencies have come into office with conscientiously and well-prepared agendas, only to find that the six months disappear in a haze of meetings on quite unexpected topics. In this context, frequently mentioned events during the past ten to fifteen years include the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EMS currency crisis, the wars in former Yugoslavia, the resignation of the Commission and the outbreak of mad-cow disease. Additional constraints on the Presidency’s agendashaping potential are often the short time-span, the built-in inertia of the EU political system, the dependence on an often ineffective Commission and the segmentation of the Council. The third line of argument stresses the constraining effect of the norm of ‘the neutral Presidency’ (see also Chapter 3 by Elgström on the Presidency as broker). This principle, which has been written into the Presidency handbook issued by the Council Secretariat, states that ‘[t]he Presidency must, by definition, be neutral and impartial’ (1996: 5). Even if the holder of the Presidency may enjoy the means to prioritize issues of specific national importance, member states refrain from such behaviour, either because they have been socialized to behave neutrally, or for fear of being ostracized. Richard Whitman (1998: 15) observes that:

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States which appear to engage in the ‘aberrant’ behaviour of nakedly pursuing national foreign policy objectives ahead of those of the EU face heavy criticism and a difficult Presidency. Thus, paradoxically, the Presidency may not provide a good opportunity for advancing national foreign policy objectives. Indeed, there are few accounts that do not point to the need for the Presidency to be both disinterested with regard to its own preferences and impartial in relation to other states. The most notable shortcoming in these pessimistic accounts is the tendency to equate influence over the EU agenda with the launch of new political initiatives, generally termed agenda-setting in the literature on decision-making. Agenda-setting is an appropriate focus if the driving research question is one of determining the origin of issues on a policy agenda at any given point in time. However, if the research challenge instead consists of isolating the influence of a specific political organ over this agenda, then agenda-setting is a narrow and unsatisfactory measure. Typically, institutions affect policy agendas not only through the introduction of new issues, but also through their blocking powers and their capacity to structure ongoing debates. The negative assessments reported above therefore tend to be based on an unnecessarily restricted conception of agenda influence.

The Presidency as agenda-shaper In this section, I suggest that the Council Presidency enjoys a wide repertoire of means for influencing the EU policy agenda. Whereas much of existing research, because of its narrow focus on agenda-setting, regards inherited and unexpected issues as constraints on the Presidency’s power, I consider them to be additional sources of influence through means of manipulation. Subjects already on the agenda are not immune to the agenda-shaping efforts of a new Presidency, nor do national or international crises translate automatically into items of deliberation and decision at the European level. I adopt the term agenda-shaping as the conceptual umbrella for three alternative forms of agenda influence: agenda-setting, agenda-structuring and agenda-exclusion. The three forms of influence are distinct and mutually exclusive in logical and conceptual terms. As in the standard accounts, agenda-setting refers to the introduction of new issues on the policy agenda. Agenda-structuring refers to the emphasizing or de-emphasizing of issues already on the agenda. Agenda-exclusion, finally, refers to the active barring of issues from the policy agenda. At the heart of these distinctions is the notion that an actor exerts influence just as much when de-emphasizing or withholding subjects from collective consideration as when emphasizing existing or planting new issues on the agenda. This

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conceptualization of agenda influence is consonant with general political science theories, from which the study of the Presidency so far has remained curiously isolated. In the study of European integration, the capacity of alternative institutions to shape EU policy has been analysed in both formal and informal terms (e.g. Pollack 1997; Moravcsik 1999; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). Expressed in this terminology, agenda-shaping by the Council Presidency consists of an intertwining of formal and informal elements. Nowhere in the treaties has the Presidency been delegated specific formal powers to initiate proposals for new EU policy, to structure the agenda according to its own liking, or to exclude issues it does not consider worthy of consideration. As correctly noted by the observers cited above, the Council Presidency is but a chairman in formal terms. Yet, as a chairman, the state holding the Presidency possesses a position and an arsenal of means, both formally anchored and developed through informal institutional practices, that enable forms of agenda-shaping. In this account, member states holding the Presidency are conceived of as strategic actors, seeking to satisfy national preferences within the confines of their formally delegated role. Whereas all member states engage in agenda-shaping, they vary in the issues they introduce, emphasize, deemphasize or neglect as a result of exogenously defined variation in national preferences. As Wallace notes, it is ‘unrealistic to expect governments to act out of character for the six month’s duration of the Presidency. Rather, the framework of their general attitude to the EC and the particular interests which concern them will influence their behaviour’ (1985: 272). Below, I identify the Presidency’s repertoire of means within each of the three forms of agenda-shaping, and illustrate with cases drawn from recent Presidencies.

Agenda-setting Agenda-setting is the characteristic activity of a ‘policy entrepreneur’. In the literature on American politics, the notion of policy entrepreneurs as agenda-setters is articulated most forcefully by John Kingdon (1984). In Kingdon’s account, policy entrepreneurs are necessary for the coupling of three streams: the recognition of a problem, the development of policy proposals, and a receptive political climate. By engaging in activities that contribute to the coupling of these streams, policy entrepreneurs facilitate the emergence of new issues on the agenda. Typically, policy entrepreneurs raise the awareness of a problem by providing information and pushing for specific problem definitions. Once the time is ripe, and a ‘policy window’ appears, they then press for their pre-prepared pet proposals. The agenda-setting function of policy entrepreneurs is recognized

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further in research on international relations and European integration. In the study of international negotiations, Oran Young (1991) emphasizes the role of ‘entrepreneurial leaders’, who shape the form in which issues are presented for consideration at the international level, and devise innovative policy options to overcome bargaining impediments. In the rationalist analysis of international negotiation more generally, agenda-setting tends to be conceived of as the manipulation of ideas and information for private purposes, or the provision of ‘focal points’ around which bargaining can converge (Garrett and Weingast 1993; Moravcsik 1999). Entrepreneurs may be found in many locations in a political system, and in the EU the Presidency is but one of several potential entrepreneurs. So far, the debate on agenda-setting in the EU has been formulated mainly in terms of supranational or governmental entrepreneurship. Agenda-setting by the Council Presidency is best considered a special variant of governmental entrepreneurship. Despite the fact that no explicit powers of initiative have been delegated to the Presidency, this rotating office provides each occupant with certain agenda-setting instruments, beyond what is available to ‘normal’ member states. As one high-level official in the Commission emphasized: ‘It may be true that about 80–90 per cent of what Presidencies do is predetermined, but note that 10–20 per cent is quite a lot’ (interview, 9 February 2001). Agenda-setting by the Council Presidency primarily takes three forms. First, the Presidency can shape the policy agenda by raising the awareness of problems hitherto neglected in European co-operation and initiating a debate on how these may be addressed. As noted by Anna-Carin Svensson (2000: 24), the Presidency enjoys a ‘problem formulation prerogative’, which allows it to frame and define concerns that deserve collective attention. The Presidency can call attention to an issue by including it in the programme that each Presidency presents for its six-month period at the helm. The Presidency can exploit its right to set the theme of the informal meetings that take place in the home country, whether at primeministerial level, ministerial level or working-group level. The Presidency’s position as EU representative in external relations allows the holder of the office to pay particular attention to regions, countries or problems neglected previously. Finally, through its control of the agenda of individual meetings, the Presidency can act as gatekeeper in relation to external and unexpected events, allowing some to be subject to collective deliberation, while excluding others. The recent Finnish and Swedish Presidencies offer illustrative examples of awareness-raising efforts in previously uncharted areas. Much as Spain promoted the Mediterranean region during its 1995 Presidency, Finland sought to develop the EU’s ‘Northern Dimension’ during its 1999 Presidency. The purpose of the initiative was to increase the general awareness of specific northern concerns, make the EU’s policies in the area more coherent and efficient, and promote the integration of Russia into the

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European co-operative framework. The Swedes used their Presidency in 2001 to put the subject of conflict prevention on the expanding security agenda of the EU. The purpose of the Swedish campaign, which followed up on similar efforts within the UN, was to add conflict prevention as a third leg of EU security policy, next to military and civilian crisis management. In both cases, the awareness-raising efforts began before the actual Presidency periods, and the time at the helm was then used to anchor these concerns firmly in the EU. Both Finland and Sweden scheduled informal meetings devoted to these themes and, in the case of conflict prevention, the Swedes made the topic the subject of the public debate of the General Affairs Council. Both initiatives eventually resulted in the adoption of policy programmes, thus institutionalizing these concerns in EU policy-making. Second, the Presidency can develop concrete proposals for action in response to recognized problems. Depending on the formal position of the Presidency, it can either act on its own, or must act through and in agreement with the Commission. In the broad range of issues that fall within the first pillar of EU co-operation, the Commission’s monopoly on policy initiation entails that the Presidency is dependent on the close co-operation of the Commission for its agenda-setting activities. In the second and third pillars – common foreign and security policy, and police and justice cooperation – agenda-setting by the Presidency is facilitated by the right of member states to initiate proposals. The same goes for intergovernmental conferences (IGCs), where member governments function as contracting parties engaged in constitutional revision. Whereas, formally, all member states enjoy the same right to lobby the Commission or present proposals, the Presidency is essentially acknowledged as ‘first among equals’ in governmental agenda-setting. As one Commission official and former French diplomat notes: ‘All member states try to influence the Commission, not just the Presidency. But there is a special relation with the Presidency’ (interview, 6 December 2000). EU officials and government representatives invariably stress the importance of harmonious co-operation with the Commission if a Presidency wants to succeed in agenda-setting, especially in the first pillar. One Commission official involved regularly in pre-Presidency consultations in the area of trade provides the following description of the interaction: ‘A clever Presidency has six key priorities of its own and expects to get four through. The Commission accepts three and adds one of its own’ (interview, 6 December 2000). Agenda-setting efforts by the Netherlands and France at the end stages of the last two IGCs illustrate the slightly greater leeway enjoyed by the Presidency in this decision-making context. The Dutch succeeded in putting the integration into the treaty of the Schengen agreement on to the agenda of the 1996 to 1997 IGC, whereas the French introduced and secured acceptance of a last-minute proposal on the venue of future European Council meetings at the 2000 IGC.

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Third, the Council Presidency can engage in a specific form of institutional entrepreneurship, by developing new institutional practices that structure future co-operation and decision-making. Despite a growing formalization of the Presidency’s responsibilities, the office still remains institutionally underdeveloped and open to interpretation. This room for manoeuvre has been exploited historically on a number of occasions by states holding the Presidency, which have either developed the office as such, or introduced new practices to the Council. Philippa Sherrington (2000: 39) notes, for instance, that Presidencies anxious to promote policy development in a neglected area have sought to do so by introducing new Council configurations. Sherrington mentions the Tourism Council, which met for the first time on the initiative of the Greek Presidency in 1988. Similarly, defence ministers met for the first time in a new informal Council configuration on the initiative of the Austrian Presidency in 1998. Both the Finnish and the French Presidencies made it one of their key priorities in the economic field to strengthen the standing of the Eurogroup – the informal gathering of economics and finance ministers from the Euro countries. In addition, the Finnish Presidency was innovative in introducing new transparency practices for the posting of documents on the Internet, and in streamlining institutional procedures in the EU’s common foreign and security policy (interview, Finnish government representative, 15 May 2000). Agenda-structuring The capacity to structure decision-making by emphasizing or deemphasizing items on a political agenda is seldom recognized as an independent category of agenda-shaping in existing literature. Sometimes agenda-structuring is subsumed under agenda-setting; at other times it is largely ignored as a form of influence. Agenda-structuring is the true ‘power of the chair’, anchored firmly in the discretion enjoyed by the Presidency – indeed, by any chairman managing the agenda of a decision-making organ. Agenda-structuring becomes particularly relevant as a form of influence in political systems where the time elapsing from an issue’s inclusion on the agenda to actual decisions is extensive. The EU, with its intricate institutional structure and cumbersome legislative processes, constitutes such a system. It remains true as well that issues seldom ‘disappear’ from the agenda of collective deliberation once a policy decision has been taken. Adopted programmes have to be implemented and frequently come up for revision on an ongoing basis. Few issues on a policy agenda are therefore entirely new. The Presidency’s emphasizing and de-emphasizing of alternative issues and domains sets the pace in the handling of individual dossiers, and thereby shapes relative policy progress during a six-month period. Influence is not prevented by the pre-existing agenda; rather, influence is

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possible for the very reason that Presidencies tend to inherit substantial parts of their six-month agenda. In the literature on the Council Presidency, this systematic form of influence is commonly reduced to a ‘flavour’ that Presidencies may add to the EU agenda, in the absence of a true capacity to pursue national interests. In fact, it may be this ‘flavour’ that embodies most clearly the effect of a particular Presidency on the EU’s agenda. The Presidency’s structuring of the agenda in accordance with national preferences occurs along three key dimensions of EU politics. Variation in emphasis along these dimensions may be exemplified by the political priorities of the German, Finnish, Portuguese, French, Swedish and Belgian Presidencies from 1999 to 2001. First, Presidencies tend to vary in their regional priorities. Depending on geographical and historical affinities, Presidencies prioritize alternative parts of the EU’s near abroad, thus contributing to the regionalization of member state concerns in the EU. Slightly simplified, southern European member states are most engaged in the Mediterranean region (Portugal, France), northern European member states in the Baltic region (Finland, Sweden), and former empires in their former colonial regions in Africa and Latin America (Portugal, France, Belgium). Second, Presidencies tend to vary in their socio-economic priorities, used here as a collective term for economic, social and environmental policy. Presidencies vary in the relative importance they attach to broad issue domains, such as internal market policy, social policy and environmental policy, but also in their positions on individual dossiers on the agenda. For instance, traditional environmental leaders are more prone to promote the evolution of EU environmental policy (Germany, Sweden), and socialist governments the development of the EU’s social dimension. Even within a field such as social affairs, Presidencies embrace alternative visions of what should be promoted – social policy in the form of efforts to reduce social exclusion and poverty (France and Belgium), or employment policy in the form of efforts to stimulate job creation and the retraining of labour (Germany and Sweden). Third, Presidencies tend to vary in their constitutional priorities, used here as a collective term for institutional reform and enlargement. The degree of progress in the enlargement negotiations between 1999 and 2001 was influenced by the relative concern of the respective Presidencies with an early expansion of the EU (Bengtsson 2001; interview, Swedish government representative, 2 July 2001). The divergence is even more notable with regard to the EU’s future institutional architecture. Despite the same mandate in preparing the debate for the IGC in 2004, sovereigntyconscious Sweden took an exceedingly low position, as opposed to federalist Belgium, which made the future of the EU its lead theme. Similarly, the negotiations on new transparency rules for the EU institutions moved forward at different speeds depending on the particular Presidency: slowly

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under Portuguese and French leadership, and swiftly during the Swedish Presidency (interviews, Portuguese government representative, 7 February 2001; Council Secretariat official, 8 February 2001). The Presidency’s source of power in structuring the agenda is its procedural control. Whereas the incoming Presidency’s programme for the next six months is the best general indicator of the relative emphasis attached to issues along the three dimensions, its tools are technical and procedural in character. Sherrington (2000) stresses the Presidency’s capacity to determine the frequency of meetings within a policy area as a prominent source of agenda influence. Some of the more rare Council configurations are convened only when states with specific interests in this area hold the chair, and the frequency of the more prominent Council configurations has also been known to vary depending on the Presidency’s relative involvement. But ministerial meetings constitute hard cases in this regard, since the meeting schedule at this level is more institutionalized than at the level of working groups, where we can expect greater variation across Presidencies. As emphasized by a Finnish government official, the allocation of meeting rooms functions as a procedural instrument influencing the pace in negotiations. Since there were only seventeen meeting rooms available in the Council each day, the Finnish Presidency had to make a very specific selection of what working groups to prioritize (interview, 30 November 2000). A second procedural instrument is the informal meetings the Presidency may convene at all levels of the Council machinery, and for which it is at liberty to determine the theme. These meetings are used regularly to push for progress in the prioritized regional, socio-economic and constitutional domains. The one informal meeting for which this discretion is becoming increasingly reduced is that of the European Council, whose agenda nowadays is often predefined by earlier summits. That said, the informal Lisbon summit on competitiveness, employment and innovation in March 2000 constitutes an excellent illustration of how a Presidency can succeed in setting the theme even for a European Council meeting. A third kind of procedural instrument is the Presidency’s authority in the structuring of actual meeting agendas. As in all decision-making organs, this involves a set of strategic decisions: Which issues should be included on the agenda? Which items should be at the top of the agenda? Which issues require further debate and which may be put forward for decision? This form of influence is understandable not only from a commonsensical point of view, but is also well anchored in rational-choice analysis. As demonstrated by Richard McKelvey (1976), actors in control of the agenda can produce their preferred outcomes in situations of competing alternatives, by manipulating what is being voted on and in what order. Concrete examples of this procedural power include the German Presidency’s structuring of the agenda of agricultural talks so as to avoid decisions with negative ramifications for East German farms, and the

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French Presidency’s sudden placing of maritime safety, illegal trafficking of migrants and fuel prices at the top of Council agendas, in response to domestic incidents and concerns (European Voice, 4–10 March 1999, 20–26 July 2000, 28 September to 4 October 2000). A fourth instrument was added to the Presidency’s arsenal with the changes to the co-decision procedure in the Amsterdam Treaty. It is now possible for the Council and the Parliament already to reach agreement on new legislation at the first reading. As Michael Shackleton (2001: 7) explains: [Previously], each Presidency was confronted with a legislative agenda determined by the progress of proposals through each institution and would be unable to modify that agenda significantly. Now the rate of progress can be varied and a Presidency can devote its efforts to accelerate proposals that it would like to see enacted during its six months in office. Both the French and the Swedish Presidencies made active use of this opportunity in the policy domains prioritized (Shackleton 2001; interview, European Parliament official, 2 July 2001). Agenda-exclusion The tendency to equate power and influence with positive political action is a bias which today’s research on the Council Presidency shares with the early political science literature on power and decision-making. In the general literature, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962, 1963) were the first systematically to challenge this bias. What was missing, according to Bachrach and Baratz (1963: 632), was a recognition of the ‘second face of power’ – the power of non-decision-making: Many investigators have . . . mistakenly assumed that power and its correlatives are activated and can be observed only in decision-making situations. They have overlooked the equally, if not more important area of what might be called ‘nondecision-making,’ i.e., the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making to ‘safe’ issues by manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and political institutions and procedures. To pass over this is to neglect one whole ‘face’ of power. Mirroring Bachrach and Baratz’s attempt to balance the concept of power through the addition of a second face, I suggest that we pay as much attention to the Presidency’s exclusion of issues from the EU’s policy agenda as we do to its introduction of new concerns. Interviews with officials in the Commission, the Council Secretariat and member governments testify to

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the use of agenda exclusion as a means of Presidency influence. Some issues are conveniently ‘forgotten’, with dossiers not being picked up until the next government assumes the office, whereas others are blocked openly by the Presidency, often to the dismay of other member states. Unlike positive forms of agenda-influence, agenda-exclusion involves a particular methodological problem. Since a non-decision, by definition, is a non-event, it might not be observable. As Bachrach and Baratz note, however, the ‘non-decision-making process’ – or the mobilization of bias upon a latent issue – tends to be observable. Experience from the EU context suggests that a further indicator of non-decision-making is the reaction of other member states to the exclusion of issues whose inclusion on the agenda they strongly favour. Presidencies may engage in three forms of agenda-exclusion. First, they can remain silent on a subject that is considered a problem by others and potentially could have been placed on the broader policy agenda. The Presidency thus exploits its problem-formulation prerogative by not recognizing an issue as a problem worthy of collective deliberation. For instance, the Presidency may refuse to admit the implications of external and unexpected events for the EU, thereby muting debate on the subject and permitting a sustained focus on the Presidency’s policy priorities. The Swedish Presidency’s handling of foot-and-mouth disease constitutes a case in point. The rise and spread of this disease in Europe during the early months of 2001 seriously threatened to derail the European Council’s March summit in Stockholm. Both the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and the Dutch Prime Minister, Wim Kok, declared that the summit ought to be devoted to foot-and-mouth disease. As Wim Kok stated: ‘If there is one question that must be discussed, we all know it would have to be foot-and-mouth disease. I am ready to stay for more than two days if necessary’ (Dagens Nyheter, 23 March 2001). Domestically, the host of the summit, the Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Persson, faced further pressure from interests perceiving this crisis as an opportunity to put agricultural reform on the agenda. These demands notwithstanding, the Swedish Presidency insisted on keeping to the original agenda, centred on the Swedish priority of employment. In Persson’s words: ‘That this disease is spreading is not a sufficient reason to restructure the agenda of the summit’ (ibid.). Second, the Presidency may exploit its procedural control to exclude items from the decision agenda of the Council, whether at working group, Coreper or ministerial level. To refuse to pick up a dossier during a sixmonth period is a sure way of stalling progress in this area. Although such overt manipulation is an invitation to criticism, complaints are typically dismissed by emphasizing the great number of items that deserve prime attention, as well as time and resource constraints. Sometimes the Commission plays an associated role in such agenda-exclusion. All Presidencies

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signal their preferences to the Commission by comments on its working programme, indicating what they like and dislike. Since this is a relationship of mutual dependence, the reactions of the Presidency typically influence the efforts of the Commission. As Rüdiger Wurzel notes: ‘The Commission is unlikely to spend scarce resources on a proposal if forthcoming Presidencies indicate that they will attribute only a low priority to particular dossiers’ (1996: 277). The German and French Presidencies in 1999 and 2000 offer a number of examples of dossiers that were never picked up. In the area of social affairs, Germany quietly shelved a fully prepared Commission proposal aimed at strengthening worker consultation rights, stating that it was not a priority and would not even be discussed during its six months at the helm, unless other important issues had been dealt with first (European Voice, 11–17 March 1999). Great uproar was caused by the German Presidency’s unilateral decision to postpone the adoption of the end-of-life vehicles directive, on which governments had already reached preliminary agreement during the Austrian Presidency, in response to domestic economic interests (Wurzel 2000). The French Presidency, for its part, refused to pick up a dossier in the third pillar, leaving it up to the Swedes to continue where the Portuguese left off (interview, Commission official, 9 February 2001). Third, the Presidency can postpone decisions on subjects it dislikes by deliberately presenting impossible compromise proposals. The Presidency government may be anxious to defer the decision to the next Presidency for domestic political reasons (not wanting to be associated with the likely outcome) or for strategic reasons (more legitimate to block decisions when not acting as chairman). The presentation of a proposal that clearly cannot gather the necessary support among member governments does not exclude an issue from consideration, but effectively stalls progress towards a decision. The end-game of the negotiations on the EU’s new transparency code during the Swedish Presidency involved strategic calculations of this sort (Bjurulf 2001). As part of a minority of transparency-oriented governments, Sweden faced the choice of either sacrificing its own interests for the purpose of getting an agreement during its Presidency or presenting unattainable compromise proposals, thereby deferring the decision to the next Presidency, when Sweden would be in a position to defend its interests with greater force, than when acting under the neutrality constraints of the chair. In the end it was possible to secure a manageable compromise without the decision having to be postponed.

Privileged agenda control: a functional interpretation In the preceding sections, I have demonstrated how the office of the Council Presidency offers its holder a privileged opportunity to shape the

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EU policy agenda in accordance with national interests. This challenge to the established wisdom raises new questions about the political rationale of this arrangement. Why would member governments, highly sensitive to challenges of their decision-making authority, agree to a system that allows for such agenda manipulation by the chair? In this section I offer a rational institutionalist interpretation. As opposed to sociological and historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism subscribes to a functional understanding of institutional design, in which institutions are explained in terms of the effects they are expected to produce (Keohane 1984). The central argument in this section is that member states accept the Presidency’s privileged position because of the need for concentrated agenda-shaping powers in a political system, and the distribution of such privileged opportunities between governments over time through the rotating design of the office. I lay out the theoretical logic of this interpretation in two steps. I first describe the rationale of institutionalizing agenda control in specific actors, and then suggest that a rotating office constitutes a particularly effective solution to problems that arise from the concentration of agenda-shaping powers. The rationale of institutionalized agenda control Rational institutionalist contributions suggest that the rationale of privileged agenda-shaping is the need to ensure a stable and sufficient provision of policy initiatives in a political system. As discovered already by the Marquis de Condorcet (1785), and later developed by Richard McKelvey (1976), William Riker (1980) and others, majority-rule systems that grant equal agenda-setting opportunities to all actors are liable to issue cycling and will be unable to secure stable majorities for the proposals advanced. [A]ny majoritarian system in which each and every legislator had the right to initiate proposals would encourage an endless series of proposals from disgruntled legislators who had been in the minority in the previous vote. In such a system, no decision would be an equilibrium, and the result would be endless cycling among alternative policy proposals. Thus any legislature would have a rational incentive to develop rules regarding which actors can initiate proposals, and when. (Pollack 1997: 104) Institutionalizing agenda control in specific actors constitutes a functional solution to this problem (Fiorina and Shepsle 1989). With a monopoly on the introduction of new policy proposals, and with a capacity to structure majority-rule contests, the agenda-shaper can secure a steady ‘supply’ of new and stable initiatives in the political system.

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In the rational choice literature on the EU’s supranational institutions, member governments’ delegation of an exclusive right of initiative to the Commission has been explained as a functional response to the agendasetting problem (Pollack 1997). Neutral in standing, but with a requirement of member state support, the Commission provides the Council with relatively unbiased and well-informed policy proposals. By contrast, proposals presented by member governments will always be labelled as biased, and are therefore more likely to be dismissed. In this perspective, agenda-shaping by the Council Presidency may be interpreted as a response to the Commission’s decline as a credible and impartial policy initiator. Decades of activism in the name of Europe have rendered the Commission less neutral in the eyes of member governments. Fear of unwanted shirking by the Commission has not only translated into the appointment of weak Commission presidents after Jacques Delors, and institutional arrangements that deprive the Commission of its traditional position in new policy areas, but also a more pronounced role for the Council Presidency (Tallberg 2002a). Member governments have become increasingly prepared to supplement the Presidency’s formal control over the meeting agenda with an informal capacity to influence the substantive agenda. For the same reasons, the Presidency has come to complement the Commission in its function as mediator between the member states in the Council (see also Chapter 3 by Elgström on the Presidency as broker). The merits of rotating agenda-shaping opportunities While alleviating the problem of unstable proposals, the institutionalization of agenda control simultaneously gives rise to new concerns. The supply of stable policy proposals comes at a cost, namely the concentration of agenda power. Moreover, as principal-agent theory tells us, the delegation of authority invariably involves an autonomy problem, since agents have interests too, which will influence the way they perform their functions (Pollack 1997; Tallberg 2000). Once equipped with means to shape the agenda, the Presidency is likely to use this power to further its own interests. Morris Fiorina and Kenneth Shepsle (1989) point to two potential solutions to the problem of power concentration: procedural constraints on agenda-shaping, and competition for the agenda-shaper position. The institutionalization of rotating agenda-shaping opportunities constitutes a third and novel solution. The rotating responsibility for the Council Presidency avoids the concentration of agenda control in one member state or supranational institution, by granting each government, in turn, a privileged opportunity to influence the EU’s policy agenda. This system rests on a long shadow of the future, where the gains that accrue from the agenda-shaping position are temporally structured and

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distributed between the member states. Governments accept exploitation of the Presidency by the member state currently in office, because their own opportunity will come in the future. As Sherrington observes: ‘[M]ember states seem to use the Council Presidency to promote their own domestic policy priorities, but this is not necessarily negative and is probably a recognized and accepted practice by all member states’ (2000: 166). The point is made even more forcefully by a top-level Commission official: When you are not the Presidency, you are swallowing bitter pills every day, only because you know that you will have the Presidency one day and the others will have to swallow their bitter pills. You suffer for six years and in the seventh you get to bash the others. The Presidencies are always overstepping the limits [of neutral behaviour]. What you want is a Presidency that is skilfully violating you so that it is not publicly visible. (Interview, 9 February 2001) The limits on acceptable exploitation are defined by the consequences of the agenda-shaping efforts. As a Commission official testifies: ‘There is an invisible red line that you cannot cross when pushing your own issues’ (interview, 9 February 2001). Preliminary observations suggest the contours of such a line. Substantive policy issues where agenda manoeuvring favours the interests of the Presidency, but the long-term distributional consequences are insignificant or uncertain, tend to be met by acquiescence. The majority of illustrative cases offered in this chapter belong in this category. For instance, neither the Finnish initiative on the Northern Dimension, nor the Swedish promotion of conflict prevention, provoked dissent among the other member states. In both cases, the lack of opposition has been attributed to the limited distributional impact of these initiatives, which did not require significant new funds or changes in established institutional mandates, but sought to co-ordinate existing policy tools in the EU (Arter 2000; interview, Commission official, 3 July 2001). By contrast, agenda-shaping by the Presidency tends to be met by adverse reactions when involving issues of power distribution, which threaten to change the fundamental rules of the game and the future allocation of co-operative gains from European integration. Manipulation in the institutional domain predominates heavily in cases where Presidencies have provoked disapproval from other member states. Prominent examples include the Dutch attempt at the 1991 IGC to table a draft treaty conformant with national perspectives on European integration, the Dutch attempt at the 1996–97 IGC to table a proposal on the reweighting of votes that favoured itself in relation to Belgium, and the French attempt at the 2000 IGC to structure the deliberations in

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favour of French institutional interests (Svensson 2000; Schout and Vanhoonacker 2001).

Conclusion This chapter has challenged the dominating perspective on the Council Presidency’s agenda-shaping opportunities. Rather than as an office hamstrung by its weak formal position, its exposure to disruptive external events, its required attention to an inherited agenda and its obligation to remain neutral, I conceive of the Presidency as an actor with the potential to shape policy outcomes through agenda-setting, agenda-structuring and agenda-exclusion. The pessimistic assertions in much of the existing literature are based on a narrow conception of agenda influence, which is foreign to influential strands of theory in general political science, and at odds with available empirical evidence. The chapter carries two primary implications for ongoing debates in EU studies. First, it provides a necessary corrective to misconceptions in existing literature. As such, however, it is but a first step towards a more informed understanding of the agenda influence of the Presidency. While pointing to the wide repertoire of means available to the Presidency, the chapter does not offer a theory to explain variation in agenda influence. The isolation of factors capable of explaining variation across decisionmaking contexts constitutes a challenge for future research (for a first attempt, see Tallberg 2002b). Second, this chapter suggests that existing research on leadership and bargaining in the EU should pay greater attention to the governmental entrepreneurship exercised by the Presidency. As one observer notes: ‘Most studies of EU leadership focus on France, Germany and the European Commission as political leaders. These studies have skated over the Presidency because it is neither a member state nor is it a permanent institution and has no discernible medium-term policies’ (Metcalfe 1998: 414). Intergovernmental bargaining models typically do not problematize the variation in formal standing among member states, or recognize the privileged agenda-shaping position of the Presidency. Likewise, few accounts of supranational entrepreneurship acknowledge the influence of the Presidency on the proposals formally advanced by the Commission. These are domains where future research could contribute to a more advanced understanding of EU policy-making and the role of the Council Presidency.

Acknowledgements This chapter is a slightly revised version of the article ‘The agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency’, which appeared in the Journal of European Public Policy 10 (1), 2003, published by Taylor & Francis

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(http://www.tandf.co.uk). In earlier versions, this chapter was presented at the Fourth Pan-European International Relations Conference (Canterbury 2001), the Annual Meeting of the Spanish Political Science Association (Santa Cruz de Tenerife 2001), the Annual Meeting of the Swedish Political Science Association (Göteborg 2001), and an internal book project seminar at Örenäs Castle (Örenäs 2002). For penetrating and valuable comments, I thank the participants in this book project, as well as Madeleine Hosli, Kenneth Hanf, and Gunnel Gustafsson.

References Arter, D. (2000) ‘Small state influence: the case of Finland’s “Northern Dimension Initiative” ’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (5): 677–97. Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M.S. (1962) ‘Two faces of power’, American Political Science Review, 56: 947–52. Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M.S. (1963) ‘Decisions and nondecisions: an analytical framework’, American Political Science Review, 57: 632–42. Bassompierre, G. de (1988) Changing the Guard in Brussels. An Insider’s View of the EC Presidency, New York: Praeger. Bengtsson, R. (2001) ‘Utvidgningen – höga förväntningar infriade’, in J. Tallberg (ed.), När Europa kom till Sverige: Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS Förlag. Bjurulf, B. (2001) ‘Öppenheten – framgång bakom lyckta dörrar’, in J. Tallberg (ed.), När Europa kom till Sverige: Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS Förlag. Condorcet, Marquis de (1785) Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix, Paris. Coombes, D. (1998) ‘The Commission’s relationship with the Presidency’, paper presented at conference ‘The Presidency of the European Union’, Belfast, 15–16 October 1998. Corbett, R. (1998) ‘The Council Presidency as seen from the European Parliament’, paper presented at conference ‘The Presidency of the European Union’, Belfast, 15–16 October 1998. Council Secretariat (1996) Council Guide: I. Presidency Handbook, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Dewost, J-L. (1984) ‘La Présidence dans le cadre institutionnel des Communautés Europénnes’, Revue du Marché Commun, 273: 31–4. Fiorina, M.P. and Shepsle, K.A. (1989) ‘Formal theories of leadership: agents, agenda setters, and entrepreneurs’, in B.D. Jones (ed.), Leadership and Politics, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Garrett, G. and Weingast, B.R. (1993) ‘Ideas, interests, and institutions: constructing the European Community’s internal market’, in J. Goldstein and R.O. Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Heyes-Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. (1997) The Council of Ministers, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Keohane, R.O. (1984) After Hegemony. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Kingdon, J.W. (1984) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Kirchner, E.J. (1992) Decision-Making in the European Community. The Council Presidency and European Integration, Manchester: Manchester University Press. McKelvey, R. (1976) ‘Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control’, Journal of Economic Theory, 12: 472–82. Metcalfe, D. (1998) ‘Leadership in European Union negotiations: the Presidency of the Council’, International Negotiation, 3 (3): 413–34. Moravcsik, A. (1999) ‘A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation’, International Organization, 53 (2): 267–306. Neligan, D. (1998) ‘Organising the Presidency: the Council perspective’, paper presented at the conference ‘The Presidency of the European Union’, Belfast, 15–16 October 1998. Pollack, M. (1997) ‘Delegation, agency, and agenda-setting in the European Community’, International Organization, 51 (1): 99–134. Riker, W. (1980) ‘Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for the study of institutions’, American Political Science Review, 74: 432–47. Schout, A. (1998) ‘The Presidency as juggler: managing conflicting expectations’, Eipascope, 2: 2–10. Schout, A. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2001) ‘The Presidency as broker? Lessons from Nice’, paper presented at the Fourth Pan-European International Relations Conference, Canterbury, 8–10 September 2001. Shackleton, M. (2001) ‘Codecision since Amsterdam: a laboratory for institutional innovation and change’, paper presented at ECSA Seventh Biennial International Conference, 31 May to 2 June 2001. Sherrington, P. (2000) The Council of Ministers. Political Authority in the European Union, London: Pinter. Svensson, A-C. (2000) ‘In the Service of the European Union. The Role of the Presidency in Negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty 1995–1997’, Ph.D. dissertation, Uppsala University. Tallberg, J. (2000) ‘The anatomy of autonomy: an institutional account of variation in supranational influence’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (5): 843–64. Tallberg, J. (2002a) ‘Delegation to supranational institutions: why, how, and with what consequences?’, West European Politics, 25 (1): 23–46. Tallberg, J. (2002b) ‘The power of the chair in international bargaining’, paper presented at the ISA Annual Convention, New Orleans, 24–27 March 2002. Tsebelis, G. and Garrett, G. (2001) ‘The institutional foundations of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in the European Union’, International Organization, 55 (2): 357–90. Wallace, H. (1985) ‘EC membership and the Presidency: a comparative perspective’, in C.O’Nuallain (ed.), The Presidency of the European Council of Ministers. Impacts and Implications for National Governments, London: Croom Helm. Westlake, M. (1999) The Council of the European Union (revised 2nd edn), London: John Harper. Whitman, R. (1998) ‘The role of the Presidency in promoting a CFSP’, paper presented at the conference ‘The Presidency of the European Union’, Belfast, 15–16 October 1998. Wurzel, R.K.W. (1996) ‘The role of the EU Presidency in the environmental field:

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does it make a difference which member state runs the Presidency?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 3 (2): 272–91. Wurzel, R.K.W. (2000) ‘Flying into unexpected turbulence: The German EU Presidency in the environmental field’, German Politics, 9 (3): 23–44. Young, O.R. (1991) ‘Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in international society’, International Organization, 45 (3): 281–308.

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‘The honest broker’? The Council Presidency as a mediator Ole Elgström

Introduction Mediation is a vital ingredient in EU decision-making. Different preferences normally exist over what policy to adopt. Someone is needed to act as broker to create and formulate a compromise around which member states and the Commission can rally. The two actors which might prima facie be expected to engage in such a role are the Commission and the Council Presidency. This chapter focuses on the Presidency, which over the past ten years has acquired an increasingly important role as a mediator. The Council Presidency is characterized almost unanimously as a neutral mediator, an ‘honest broker’. Scholars and practitioners alike stress the impartiality norm. The Council secretariat Presidency handbook asserts that ‘[t]he Presidency must, by definition, be neutral and impartial’. Most scholars unreflectedly repeat this assumption. In this chapter, the EU literature on Presidency mediation is confronted with insights from negotiation and mediation theory. My ambition is to problematize the Presidency mediator role and to pinpoint what actually characterizes the Presidency as a broker. Negotiation theory today questions the received wisdom that a mediator has to be neutral or impartial. Neutrality is impossible, it is claimed, and impartiality is not always recommendable. Under certain circumstances, a biased mediator can be more effective than an impartial one. This leaves us with a puzzle. If mediation theory is correct, the expected pattern of mediator behaviour involves partiality as well as impartiality – but this first ingredient seems to be missing in EU negotiations. Are Council Presidencies really as neutral as they are claimed to be? If not, what in the EU context renders partial or impartial behaviour more likely? I argue that EU Presidencies are seldom neutral and not always impartial. Even-handed treatment of all member states seems indeed to be a necessary condition for effective EU mediation but ‘disinterest’ as regards one’s own preferences is both extremely difficult to uphold and not always

Council Presidency as mediator 39 useful. As the Presidency is always an ‘insider’ in the negotiations, any particular chair brings with it its specific relationships and biases towards fellow actors. Therefore, relational impartiality is impossible. In negotiation processes, a slight bias in favour of a solid majority position is often the best way to proceed for an EU mediator. A blatant advocacy of obvious self-interests is, however, not tolerated. The strong inclination to uphold the honest broker role that nevertheless exists in EU negotiations is due primarily to the impact of the uncontested impartiality norm as such. The likelihood of partiality varies with the distribution of preferences and with the distribution of power. I thus conclude that different Presidencies vary as regards what role they play: big member states in general seem more prone to partiality, promoting their own interests, than small members. My argument starts with an overview of the literature on the EU Presidency, with a focus on its role as a mediator. In the following section, results and discussions from negotiation and mediation theory are summarized and applied to EU decision-making. I transfer insights from the ‘neutrality debate’ within the mediation field to the EU arena and argue, from this perspective, for an understanding of the Presidency as an ‘insider’ mediator who is sometimes impartial, at other times not. In the final section this general finding is contextualized: Under what circumstances will Presidencies choose to act as honest brokers? Are some categories of member states more prone to act partially?

The Presidency: a neutral mediator Mediation is usually included among the key functions of the Presidency (Kirchner 1992: 5; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). ‘The ability to offer successful compromises has become the touchstone of a Presidency’s effectiveness’ (Nicoll 1998: 6; cf. Spence 1995: 383). It is also submitted that the importance of the role has increased, in part because of a corresponding decline in the brokerage role for the Commission (Schout 1998: 2; Kirchner and Tsagkari 1993: 19; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 146–7). This is because the Commission does not always have a clear political mandate in guiding the Council towards a certain solution. Furthermore, the Commission is seen as a defender of its own proposal and as having its own political agenda which is not always in the interest of the Council. The norm that the Presidency should be neutral and impartial is almost uncontested, among practitioners as well as among academic writers. Interviews with both Commission and Council secretariat officials reveal a unanimous advocacy of the neutrality norm. ‘A Presidency can only be an important player if it is seen as fair and even-handed’ is a typical quote. The norm is highly institutionalized, in the sense of being unquestioned and taken for granted. The scholarly literature mirrors this

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view, with a few exceptions. In the words of Peter Ludlow (1993: 249): ‘A Presidency is, or ought to be, an honest broker, a cobbler of agreement and an architect of coalition.’ Other authors choose terms such as ‘neutral arbitrator’ (Wallace 1985: 16) or ‘neutral broker’ (Schout 1998: 3) to describe the Presidency role. Emil Kirchner and Anastassia Tsagkari (1993: 20) emphasize the efforts of the Presidency to look for ‘objective compromises’. David Metcalfe (1998: 420–2) agrees on the general need for a Presidency to be unbiased but offers a valuable distinction between what he labels ‘impartiality’ (implying even-handedness as regards all member states, listening patiently to the views of everyone) and ‘disinterest’ (with respect to actions affecting the Presidency’s own interests). Both components increase the legitimacy of the Presidency cua mediator. Metcalfe is also one of the few scholars to question, albeit in passing, the need for impartiality as regards the desired outcome of the negotiations. He proposes that it is legitimate for a chair to promote a certain solution as long as there is a clear majority behind this proposal (Metcalfe 1998: 421): ‘the overriding concern of delegates is not to insist on impartial mediation, but to achieve efficient and favourable outcomes.’ I will return to this important insight below. The arguments behind the unquestioned (except by Metcalfe) neutrality norm are seldom explicitly detailed. A perusal of the literature makes it possible, however, to construct two main arguments. The most common way of thinking is to put forward a trust argument (although often implicitly). Efforts to hear everyone’s opinions, to give all a fair chance to speak and not to isolate any delegation are obviously meant to build trust in the impartiality of the chair. This is meant to facilitate later efforts to foster a compromise, as all representatives would trust that they are treated equally and fairly also as regards the solution of the conflict. Disinterest, in Metcalfe’s use of the word, may increase efficiency, first, by diminishing uncertainty (all delegations trust the Presidency not to put forward a proposal that would favour the proposer or his coalition), and second, by promoting openness and the readiness to reveal information to the chair in confessionals, thereby increasing the chance for integrative (win-win) solutions. The second way of reasoning can be called a consensus argument. This refers to a quality of the mediator himself. Disinterest, it might be argued, makes it easier for a negotiator to be consensus-oriented and detached. Thus a disinterested Presidency can wholeheartedly look for ‘objectively optimal solutions’, while a chair with strong vested interests is ‘obviously ill-placed to assume the mantle of a neutral arbitrator’ (Wallace 1985: 16). To ‘be disinterested’ is arguably easier for small member states than for big ones, as their catalogue of interests is more limited (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 147–8). The EU Presidency literature thus presents a strong and united

Council Presidency as mediator 41 argument in favour of mediator neutrality. What, then, is the view of scholars studying mediation in international relations?

Mediation theory, neutrality and impartiality Mediation theory problematizes the idea that mediators are always neutral and impartial. In some situations partiality is to be expected – and even recommended. My argument, based on the findings from mediation research, is that the EU is no exception: the Presidency-as-broker is seldom neutral and not always impartial. The EU literature, I venture, utilizes a far too narrow concept of mediation and entertains a simplistic notion of what constitutes neutrality and impartiality. My argument in this section proceeds in three steps: I first give a brief account of mediation theory’s view of neutrality and impartiality in international negotiation. Second, I present a typology of biases, elaborating the key concepts. Third, these insights are applied to the mediator role of the Council Presidency. Mediators: neutral outsiders or partial insiders? Mediation, defined as ‘a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution which they cannot find by themselves’ (Zartman and Touval 1996: 446), is usually seen as a prominent instrument of conflict resolution. Scholars in the field seem to agree that mediation outcomes are the result of the interaction of contextual and process variables (Jönsson 2002). The characteristics of potential mediators and their previous relations with the parties become of immediate concern when parties are looking for an acceptable mediator. The answer to the question ‘Who should be selected as a third party?’ was traditionally that the mediator should be a neutral outsider (Hopmann 1996: 223; Wehr and Lederach 1996). According to this view, neutrality and impartiality are seen as necessary ingredients in the armoury of the successful mediator (Young 1967: 309; Carnevale and Arad 1996: 40–1). The third party should preferably have no ties to any of the parties and no stake whatsoever in the conflict outcome; he is ideally ‘not connected to either disputant, is not biased towards either side, has no investment in any outcome . . . and does not expect any special reward’ (Wehr and Lederach 1996: 57). These traits were (and are, to a certain extent) supposed to increase the credibility of the mediator and make him acceptable to all parties, but also to enhance his possibilities of obtaining information from the actors and increase the legitimacy of his proposals (Stenelo 1972: 33–5; Carnevale and Arad 1996: 41; Kleiboer 1997: 29). The image of the mediator as a neutral outsider has been increasingly questioned. Today, scholars tend to claim that mediators usually have a stake in the conflict they try to resolve and that complete altruism is rare.1

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Moreover, ‘there seems to be consensus that it is the mediators’ resources and ability to effect change, rather than their perceived impartiality, that determine their acceptability and effectiveness’ (Jönsson 2002: 222). In general, mediation analysts maintain that neutrality is impossible and that the usefulness of impartiality is contingent: under some circumstances and for some actors, impartiality results in efficiency, but this is not the case in other contexts. In a world characterized by interdependence, neutrality (in the sense of total disinterest in the outcome) becomes problematic. ‘[C]ompletely objective, dispassionate third parties are seldom or never available’ (Hopmann 1996: 225; cf. Stenelo 1972: 38). Jacob Bercovitch argues that the idea of mediator neutrality is puzzling, as ‘any intervention that turns a dyad into a triad simply cannot be neutral’ (Bercovitch 1992: 6). Active mediator interventions affect the substance as well as the likelihood of agreements (Gibson et al. 1996: 70–1). If mediation is seen as an extension of negotiation, as ‘three-cornered bargaining’ where the mediator is one of the players (Carnevale and Arad 1996: 41; cf. Princen 1992: 23), it is difficult to link mediation closely to neutrality. In the words of Terrence Hopmann (1996: 225), ‘Often the best that one can hope for is a third party that is not biased in the sense that she or he will not be willing to sacrifice the interests of one of the parties in favour of those of the other.’ Powerful mediators are often assumed to have at least indirect interest in conflicts they try to resolve. The great power mediator uses its resources to reach a solution that favours its own interests. Such mediation cannot be considered neutral. The contextual nature of impartiality is clearly witnessed by the ideas of Paul Wehr and John Lederach (1996). They contrast the traditional ‘outsider-neutral’ model described above with an ‘insider-partial’ mediator model, based on their observations of peace negotiations in Central America. To be successful in this environment, a mediator has to have a trusted relationship with the parties. Confianza (confidence) is a key word. The mediator is an insider in the sense that he or she is part of the regional context and has to live with and be affected by the outcome of the negotiations. In Central America, personal relations, close connections and intimate knowledge of the conflict are vital ingredients in mediation attempts. A typology of biases The EU literature on mediation and (im)partiality suffers from a serious confusion concerning the key variables. Neutrality, impartiality and bias are seldom defined and are thus underspecified. I have already indicated what I mean by neutrality (‘no stake in the outcome of the conflict’). With the help of the mediation literature, I propose three different basic types of partiality/bias (these two concepts are treated as synonyms): relational, process and outcome partiality.

Council Presidency as mediator 43 Relational partiality refers to expectations that stem from a belief, based on the previous experience of the actors, that a mediator has closer ties to one or some of the disputants (cf. Carnevale and Arad 1996: 45). Although such asymmetric ties are often claimed to make the non-favoured party unwilling to accept this mediator’s intervention, it is also argued that it is possible for negotiating parties to ignore this sort of bias, especially if the mediator actively tries to show impartiality in his or her actual behaviour. Furthermore, partisan feelings are believed by some authors to be beneficial for reaching an agreement if this adds to the motivation of the third party (Jönsson 2002; Hopmann 1996: 225). A mediator has, it is argued, a higher chance to persuade a reluctant actor to ‘deliver’, to agree to and implement significant concessions, if that actor has a special relationship with the mediator and high trust in his or her will and ability to protect the actor’s vital interests. Process partiality pertains to the behaviour of the mediator (cf. Carnevale and Arad 1996: 45). A third party that is perceived to side with one of the other parties by openly favouring that party at the negotiation table – procedural bias – is ordinarily seen as unfair. The mediator may give the floor to this actor before he lets anyone else speak, he may have more confidential, informal talks with the favoured party and he may accept suggestions from this actor more readily than from anyone else. Such behaviour results in distrust, also as regards the mediator’s own subsequent proposals. Therefore, even-handedness is ordinarily maintained to be a virtue. Another type of process bias – strategic bias – is when the mediator actively intervenes on behalf of one or more of the parties to help the process. Mediator assertiveness is usually not perceived to be a problem; on the contrary, it is often associated with successful settlement (Cobb and Rifkin 1991). If the ability to achieve results is the measurement of mediator success, strategic bias is seen as appropriate and even recommendable. This means that process impartiality is often portrayed as less important than outcome impartiality. If the final result, as proposed by the mediator, is deemed to be fair, the nature of the process is of less concern. Quoting Jacob Bercovitch, ‘It is . . . the ability to effect a change, not the appearance of impartiality, that [is] the sine qua non of effective mediation’ (1996: 5). On the other hand, an acceptable solution is not always equally favourable to all parties. Sometimes, it is the low quality of the alternatives that presses a negotiator to say yes, not the inherent value of the proffered agreement. Outcome impartiality thus does not necessarily imply fairness in any ‘objective’ sense (whatever that may be), only that the basic interests of all parties are respected by the mediator: the important thing is to obtain an agreement, not the exact nature of the settlement. To summarize, this chapter argues for a diversified apprehension of the key concepts and presents a rather complex picture of the relationship between impartiality and acceptability/effectiveness. First, it is clear that

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third parties are not always outsiders, and that being an insider may entail certain advantages. Trust may result both from being an outsider-neutral and an insider-partial. Second, relational partiality is a problem that is possible to overcome if the mediator demonstrates procedural impartiality. In certain situations, a relational bias is effective in fostering settlement. Third, while procedural impartiality seems to be crucial, process impartiality in general is considered less vital than outcome impartiality. In brief, the absolute need for impartiality is questioned and contextualized. The Presidency as a mediator: a partial or impartial insider? Two bodies of literature have now been reviewed. The studies of the Council Presidency reveal an almost unchallenged support for the ‘impartiality norm’; the Presidency is expected to act as an honest broker. The scholarly works on mediation have left the traditional view of the third party as an outsider-neutral and argue that neutrality is unrealistic and that partiality is, under certain circumstances, both accepted and recommendable. We thus face a puzzle. Is EU reality so different from international mediation in general? My answer is no. To begin with, the Presidency is clearly an insider mediator. It never comes to a conflict as an outsider, distanced from the negotiators. As one of the member states, the Presidency cannot escape its previous alignments, its reputation and image. It has closer ties to and better connections with some fellow member states than others. Therefore, relational impartiality is impossible to achieve. Second, the Presidency is by definition one of the negotiating actors. It has a history as a participant in previous negotiations and cannot avoid taking a stance in final decision-making. Therefore, neutrality (‘no stake in the outcome’) is seldom an option. Of course, the degrees of interest in, and the priority given to, any specific issue are variable. At times, a Presidency may actually be ‘disinterested’ in a particular dossier and this would facilitate impartiality. Ordinarily, however, a country holding the Presidency cannot abandon totally its previous policy positions and its standpoints on various issues. Political commitments and domestic constraints render any sharp breaks impossible. Powerful forces often pressure a Presidency towards process or outcome partiality. A strong temptation exists, also for countries with a sincere desire to follow the impartiality norm, to act in favour of its own national position on particular occasions. Sometimes, such pressures may make a Presidency act as a bargainer rather than a mediator, choosing policy instruments that clearly lie outside a mediator role (i.e. making threats or spreading one-sided propaganda). A pervasive norm that informs Presidency action is the effectiveness norm. The foremost duty of any Presidency is to get results. Every Presidency should do its best to be a driving force, to reach agreement on as many dossiers as possible. It is strongly believed to be in the European

Council Presidency as mediator 45 interest to steer the Union forward. This is true whether or not the Presidency is a believer in supranational ideals. The effectiveness norm is a powerful promoter of Presidency intervention and partial behaviour. To reach a decision, pressure and persuasion are often needed. The Presidency may use its power as a chair, including its privileges of steering the debate and of formulating proposals, to get reluctant member states on ‘its side’. In the words of one of our informants: ‘He who proposes is in the driver’s seat. Member states only say no if they totally cannot buy it, which grants the Presidency quite some room to shape deals to its own liking.’ Mediation efforts – in the broad sense of activities aimed at creating a compromise agreement – will therefore in practice entail a bias in favour of majority positions or even of minority proposals that the Presidency believes it will be able to persuade the others to accept. On the other hand, the impartiality norm must be considered a substantial force working against biased behaviour. The Presidency is expected not only to act as a mediator, but also to be impartial. This norm is so imbued in the organizational culture of the EU that contradictory actions are seen as immoral and aberrant. When a new Presidency initiates activities that can be construed as self-serving and against a ‘European interest’, the criticism is harsh and immediate (witness the outcry against French behaviour in the autumn of 2000). However, when Presidency actions may be claimed to favour European interests, process partiality may be pardoned or even blessed. In the EU milieu, where the shadow of the future is extremely long and diffuse reciprocity can be expected, a strong spirit of consensus has emerged: member states are loath to ride roughshod over minorities, even when majority voting is possible (Elgström and Jönsson 2000). This characteristic has a major impact on mediation behaviour. Very often, the main goal is to reach an acceptable solution which is ‘yesable’ to everyone. The usefulness of building ‘winning coalitions’ as a Presidency strategy is restricted by the hesitancy actually to use the vote to ‘defeat the enemy’. Thus the consensus norm also inhibits biased Presidency intervention. In brief, the argument is that biases and partiality exist also in the EU context. As an insider, the Presidency has problems in acting as a neutral broker. The member state holding the office cannot get away from its relational biases. We have also found, however, that the impartiality norm strongly encourages process and outcome impartiality and that such behaviour is not uncommon. The next step is therefore to further contextualize the incidence of partiality and impartiality. Under what circumstances are we likely to find, or not find, biased Presidency behaviour?

(Im)partiality: when and by whom? The institutionalized role of the office of the Presidency clearly includes being a mediator. Although an insider, the Presidency is expected to fulfil

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this function and it would not be beneficial to the reputation of a member state if it tried to abstain from playing this role. Furthermore, the Presidency’s mediator role is claimed to have increased in weight over time. Every Presidency has to face a dilemma: should it cling to absolute neutrality, following the spirit of the impartiality norm, or should it sometimes act partially in order to further national or European interests? In this section, the question of what factors determine this choice will be investigated. When, under what circumstances, will some Presidencies choose not to act as honest brokers? Are some types of member states more prone to act partially? Interviews with Brussel-based officials from the Commission, the Council secretariat and national delegations and a close reading of the EU literature reveal that Presidencies in reality do differ in their approach to mediation. While Presidencies often behave as impartial helpers, they also at times act as biased intervenors, as expected by negotiation and mediation theory. In my view, it is possible to isolate two main dimensions, determining the prevalence of impartiality and bias. The first dimension refers to the distribution of interest in the Council; the difference rests with how the Presidency relates to minorities and majorities in the Council. The second mirrors the distribution of power in Europe; the difference lies between big and small member states. Impartiality and the distribution of interest One major predictor of when biased Presidency intervention is to be expected is, I argue, what situation, in terms of the distribution of member state preferences, the Presidency is confronted with. Sometimes, the chair is faced by clear majorities, sometimes with ambiguous and unpredictable voting situations. Four main kinds of situation can be distinguished, each of which is linked to a certain mode of interventionist behaviour, depicting various degrees and nuances of neutrality and (im)partiality. First, in situations with majority voting, a Presidency mediator may sometimes think that building a winning coalition is the most efficient way to move forward. If a compromise, acceptable to all, seems unlikely or time-consuming to reach, the Presidency can strive actively to construct a proposal which is agreeable to the majority, and then call a vote in the Council. Such behaviour is expected and normally considered proper, although the minority may complain. In these situations, the mediator is usually non-neutral – having a stake in the advocated outcome – as he would otherwise probably continue to seek a compromise. The mediator is also partial in behaviour, and to the suggested outcome. Firm pressure from the side of the Presidency is not excluded; for example, to persuade members of a blocking minority to change sides. ‘As long as they trust the honesty of the broker, you may in fact act rather tough’ (interview). A conviction that it is indeed possible to find a majority, prepared to outvote

Council Presidency as mediator 47 the minority, is a necessary precondition for such behaviour. It is more likely to occur if the minority stubbornly refuses to concede and/or if there is a perceived sense of urgency; for example, when a deadline looms. Second, and much more commonly, there are situations where all actors diagnose the existence of a clear majority, and where the minority realizes that it can never win and therefore engages in a hunt for an ‘as good as possible’ compromise and then accepts this without voting. The Presidency’s role in such situations is to broker a compromise that majority and minority can agree to. ‘You try to get everybody on board: you note that there is a qualified majority in favour of the Presidency proposal, you invite the remaining states to join and you propose minor modifications in order to increase acceptance, and then you make it clear that it is time to take a decision. Usually, the minority then accepts the proposal without a vote’ (interview). The result is ‘yesable’ to all, but not optimal to anyone, although the majority standpoint is essentially favoured. In these cases, it does not really matter if the Presidency has a stake in the outcome or not; it is usually procedurally impartial but might well have a bias for the majority position. Third, the Presidency may find itself siding with the minority. In such cases, the pressure on the country at the helm is very strong to follow the majority and therefore to make the necessary concessions. A Presidency with a clear and firmly embedded national interest in the disputed matter may nevertheless choose to stick to its position and to try to pressure members of the majority to change theirs. Although member states generally have a tendency to humour a Presidency in matters of great concern to its government, this is a dangerous strategy. The risk is high that the Presidency will be accused of not being impartial. Behaviour that is perceived as clearly aimed at furthering national interests is seen as ‘surprising’ and ‘inappropriate’ (interviews). Fourth, under unanimity voting rule and in complex situations where coalitions are overlapping and no obvious majority position is readily discernible, the role of the Presidency-as-mediator is to find a solution that is acceptable to all parties. The objective must be to create a compromise proposal to which all can ascribe and to give something to everyone. Considerable skill is required to hammer out a settlement in which all parties score points on their specific sensitive issues; tie-ins and package deals may be useful instruments. Under these circumstances, it helps if the Presidency is neutral and impartial. A special case is when the mediator faces deadlock and finds that something extraordinary is needed to initiate a chain reaction of concessions. In such a situation, there is great pressure on the Presidency to break the deadlock by unilateral sacrifices; by giving in on some vital point or by offering side-payments (‘to pay the price of the Presidency’). Quite often, the main task for the mediator is to save someone’s face. When painful concessions have been made, the suffering party should

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ideally be offered a ‘sweetener’, a ‘small victory’ that can be interpreted as a major one, especially to home opinion. The Presidency can also help by revealing publicly what determined resistance it met from the government that had to give in. Mediator neutrality is not necessarily helpful: the argument that ‘you had to give in’ might be more credible if the Presidency that pushed for concessions is perceived to have a vested interest in the solution. Finally, a Presidency mediator may want to engage in inventive problem-solving. Deadlocks may require creative, pattern-breaking thinking. The goal is then to find ‘win-win’ solutions that everyone feels is better than the status quo. Perceived neutrality and process impartiality are absolutely vital ingredients in such activities to make the suggested solution credible. Non-neutrality would mean that the mediator’s proposal would be met by distrust; hidden agendas and ‘dead rats’ would be suspected. In conclusion, the degree of neutrality and impartiality varies according to the situation. Bias can be expected under certain circumstances, particularly when it is a bias in favour of a majority position. If it might be argued that the Presidency somehow acts in the ‘European interest’ – as is often the case when it promotes a majority-based proposal – this is a permissive environment for biased Presidency intervention. The effectiveness norm contributes by sanctioning Presidency strategies that ‘get results’. Nevertheless, impartiality is in principle the expected behaviour. The impartiality norm itself is a major explanatory factor. It makes procedural impartiality almost sacred, and creates a strong impetus for any Presidency to claim, at least, that its behaviour is free of self-interest. Furthermore, the rules governing decision-making influence behaviour and strategies. Although the consensus culture pressures mediators towards finding ‘yesable’ propositions, majority voting tends to weaken this tendency; after all, it does happen that majorities utilize their position. ‘The shadow of the vote’ exerts considerable pressure on minorities to accept Presidency compromise proposals. Unanimity, on the other hand, forces a mediator to seek common grounds (although prevailing norms normally make a minority of one or two give in to peer pressure). Impartiality and the distribution of power The various types of mediator behaviour that mediation literature predicts are found also in the EU. Can these differences in how Presidencies approach mediation be attributed to the power and size of the member states in charge? Thomas Princen’s rough typology, distinguishing between principal and neutral mediators, provides a useful starting point (Princen 1992). The principal is a party that has an interest in the outcome of the dispute at hand, and that possesses bargaining capability, in the sense that it can offer inducements (negative or positive) which render an agreement more attractive than non-agreement. The neutral has no

Council Presidency as mediator 49 interests in the settlement and little traditional power. Instead, it has to make use of its skills and good ideas. Its main ambition is to try to improve communication between the disputants and possibly to act as a formulator and provider of ideas. In the EU, the great powers – France, Germany and the UK – would be expected to act more as principals, while smaller member states, such as Sweden and Finland, are expected to act more as neutrals. ‘An impartial chair is also an efficient chair’, argues one of my interviewees, ‘but the great power instinct is hard to get away from’ and therefore the major powers are more prone to intervene actively in favour of their own interests. This is valid for all three great powers although France has been the most outspoken proponent of national positions, not only in the autumn of 2000 (when France was denounced by an almost united choir of Brussels officials and small state representatives for its power approach to the intergovernmental conference) but also during previous Presidency periods (interviews). In particular, great power attitudes are expected in issueareas connected to the power balance within the Union. Furthermore, it is well known that major states sometimes use the ‘power of the purse’ to encourage negotiated agreements. In the 1988 and 2000 budget negotiations, Germany was prepared to act as paymaster in order to get agreement (Laffan 2000: 733). Such examples imply that while all member states are expected to ‘pay the price of the Presidency’, larger states are even more likely to encounter such pressures. On the other hand, the fact that a great power is supposedly more prone to be flexible when it holds the Presidency than when it is an ordinary member may lead other member states to reciprocate concessions: ‘Others [in the Agenda 2000 negotiations] compromised in the end because they knew that it would be more difficult to get the package through when Germany was not the Presidency and could protect its interests just like any other member state. The French paid a lot in the end’ (interview). Big states, it is argued, have interests in most policy areas and are therefore seldom neutral. They tend to handle their Presidencies from the capital, which also tends to strengthen nationalistic tendencies (while smaller states rely more on the permanent representations in Brussels, which are perceived to have an interest in moving dossiers forward as their main objective). The result is that the major member states are more often found to demonstrate bias in their Presidency behaviour. At times, this even leads to arrogance and procedural bias (interviews). It is worth stressing, however, that the big Presidency states are also usually trying to function as honest brokers. It is even argued that it is easier to see the effect of holding the Presidency when you watch great powers, as they are clearly – although marginally – more inclined to make concessions when they hold the chair than when they do not. Smaller states are more uniform in their behaviour. In the context of history-making decisions – outcomes of European

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Councils, major budgetary decisions and so on – debated issues are often of a constitutive nature. Negotiations circle around the future balance of power between the member states and between states and EU institutions. Bargaining during the Nice summit in December 2000 is a good example. France, holding the Presidency, intervened forcefully – and clumsily, according to some sources – in order to get an agreement that mirrored great power interests, for example, regarding the distribution of Council votes in an enlarged Union. This case illustrates well that great power intermediaries ordinarily have strong vested interests in the outcome of constitutive disputes, as ‘institutional questions concern mere and cold power’ (interview). Presidency actions under such circumstances tend to be interventionist, non-neutral and partial both as regards process and outcome. EU officials comment with pleasure on the small state tendency to be impartial in their Presidency role behaviour. ‘The best Presidencies have very few topics of their own’, suggested one interviewee, and continued to argue that smaller states have a more select menu of national interests than great powers. The Presidency ‘is a chairman, not a president’, another maintained, and it should concentrate on ‘moving things forward’ – and this is ordinarily what small member states do. They also, according to a third official, usually let the Presidency be ‘run from Brussels’ and this results in neutrality and efficiency. These arguments notwithstanding, small state Presidencies are not always snow-white defenders of impartiality. In many cases, these countries too have a keen interest in the outcome of the decision-making process and consequently their impartiality is put to the test. The Dutch handling of the 1991 intergovernmental conference demonstrates that not only the ‘big three’ act out of self-interest. Two months before deadline, the Dutch Presidency decided to side-step the proposal for treaty text that Luxemburg had put on the table in favour of its own, more far-reaching proposal, which was perceived to be clearly beneficial to Dutch interests. All delegations but the Belgian and the Commission refused to accept it, and the proposal had to be ingloriously withdrawn. Smaller Presidency states are also known to favour majority positions they agree with. This is accepted behaviour. Much more problematic are situations where the Presidency happens to end up in a clear-cut minority position. The government then faces a dilemma: the impartiality norm would pressure a small state Presidency to give up its resistance; national interests that it should refuse to do so. One solution is to try to postpone a decision until the country’s Presidency period is over. Another is to use the Presidency’s mediator position to reach a deal that is somewhat better than could have been expected had it not held the office. Sweden’s handling of the proposed regulation on transparency in the spring of 2001 is a case in point. Sweden, traditionally a warm proponent of increased openness, skilfully used its Presidency position to

Council Presidency as mediator 51 manoeuvre between the conservative Council majority and the more radically inclined European Parliament, and finally won acceptance of a compromise proposal that satisfied the main Swedish concerns. In general, Presidencies try to act strategically to influence the agenda in order not to end up in a situation during its Presidency where it has to take responsibility for an issue in which it has strong national interests and is in a minority position. Spain’s efforts to avoid having to handle the question of regional funds and enlargement during its stint in office is a good example. In brief, it seems that Presidency behaviour is linked to power and, more specifically, to state identities. The ‘great power past’ of some member states has arguably left an imprint on their approach to the office. Many interviewees point to a French preoccupation with its ‘glorious history’ and ‘mission’, and claim that such ideational concerns are mirrored in French Presidency behaviour. Others explain occasional Dutch unilateral, grandiose initiatives with reference to its colonial past. Conversely, member states such as Ireland and Finland are suggested to occupy clear-cut small state roles, based on their national experiences. When identity-based orientations are confronted with the impartiality norm we may expect divergent reactions. For Swedes and Portugese, neutrality and an active mediator role are natural elements of national identity; for France, it is equally natural to act out its notions of ‘grandeur et gloire’ and for Germany, aspirations to play a leading role in Europe are still tempered by its Second World War inheritance.

Conclusion Drawing on arguments found in mediation theory literature, I propose in this chapter that EU mediators are at times both partial and non-neutral. The traditional view, heralded in the EU Presidency discourse, that the Presidency is – and should be – a neutral and impartial broker is incomplete and partly misleading. The Presidency is an insider mediator, and cannot therefore exhibit relational impartiality. It often demonstrates procedural impartiality, acting as an even-handed chair, but sometimes intervenes in order to reach a favoured decisional solution. I also argue that any Presidency’s degree of (im)partiality is determined mainly by two dimensions: the distribution of interest in the Council and the distribution of power in the Union. It has been shown that some majority/minority distributions tend to trigger biased Presidency initiatives and interventions. It is also pointed out that great power member states are much more prone to engage in biased activities than small member states which adopt and fulfil the role of honest broker more easily. To conclude, the conventional wisdom of the Presidency as always neutral and impartial has been questioned. Much work remains to be done, however. Scattered evidence from actual decision-making processes

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needs to be brought together and more empirical material collected to demonstrate the actual proclivity of states to engage in partial behaviour.

Note 1

This position had its advocates already in the 1970s. For example, Lars-Göran Stenelo in his monograph on ‘Mediation in international negotiations’ from 1972 observed that ‘a third party with mediation ambitions can be a party with an obvious self-centred interest in both the achievement of a solution and the specific substantice content of the solution’ (Stenelo 1972: 39).

References Books Bercovitch, J. (1992) ‘The structure and diversity of mediation in international relations’, in J. Bercovitch and J.Z. Rubin (eds), Mediation in International Relations, New York: St Martin’s Press, pp. 1–29. Bercovitch, J. (1996) ‘Introduction: Thinking about mediation’, in J. Bercovitch (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts. The Theory and Practice of Mediation, Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 1–9. Carnevale, P.J. and Arad, S. (1996) ‘Bias and impartiality in international mediation’, in J. Bercovitch (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts. The Theory and Practice of Mediation, Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 39–53. Cobb, S. and Rifkin, J. (1991) ‘Practice and paradox: Deconstructing neutrality in mediation’, Law and Social Inquiry, 16. Elgström, O. and Jönsson, C. (2000) ‘Negotiation in the European Union: Bargaining or problem-solving?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7 (5): 684–704. Gibson, K., Thompson, L. and Bazerman, M.H. (1996) ‘Shortcomings of neutrality in mediation: Solutions based on rationality’, Negotiation Journal, 12 (1): 69–80. Hayes-Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. (1997) The Council of Ministers, London: Macmillan. Hopmann, P.T. (1996) The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Jönsson, C. (2002) ‘Bargaining, negotiation and diplomacy’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations, New York: Sage, pp. 212–34. Kirchner, E. (1992) Decision-making in the European Community: The Council Presidency and European Integration, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Kirchner, E. and Tsagkari, A. (eds) (1993) The EC Council Presidency. The Dutch and Luxembourg Presidencies, London: UACES. Kleiboer, M.A. (1997) International Mediation: The Multiple Realities of ThirdParty Intervention, Leiden, dissertation. Laffan, B. (2000) ‘The big budgetary bargains: From negotiation to authority’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7 (5): 725–43. Ludlow, P. (1993) ‘The U.K. Presidency: A view from Brussels’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (2): 246–68. Metcalfe, D. (1998) ‘Leadership in European Union negotiations: The Presidency of the Council’, International Negotiation, 3: 413–34.

Council Presidency as mediator 53 Nicoll, W. (1998) ‘The evolution of the Office of the Presidency’, paper presented at the conference on the Presidency of the European Union, Belfast, 15–16 October 1998. Princen, T. (1992) Intermediaries in International Conflict, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schout, A. (1998) ‘The Presidency as a juggler’, Eipascope, 2, Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration. Spence, D. (1995) ‘Negotiations, coalitions, and the resolution of inter-state conflicts’, in M. Westlake, The Council of the European Union, London: Cartermill, pp. 373–89. Stenelo, L.-G. (1972) Mediation in International Negotiations, Lund: Studentlitteratur. Wallace, H. (1985) ‘The Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Community: Tasks and evolution’, in C.O. O’Nuallain (ed.), The Presidency of the European Coucil of Ministers, London: Croom Helm. Wehr, P. and Lederach, J.P. (1996) ‘Mediating conflict in Central America’, in J. Bercovitch (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts. The Theory and Practice of Mediation, Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 55–74 (first published in Journal of Peace Research, 28 (1), 1991). Young, O.R. (1967) The Intermediaries. Third Parties in International Crises, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zartman, I.W. and Touval, S. (1996) ‘International mediation in the post-Cold War era’, in C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson with P. Aall (eds), Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, pp. 445–61.

Interviews Luisa Bastos de Almeida, Portugese perm. rep., 2000–12–07 Frank Belfrage, Swedish Foreign Ministry, 2000–10–03 Anders Bjurner, Swedish perm. rep., 2001–07–03 Gilles Briatta, French perm. rep., 2001–02–09 Hans Brunmayr, Council secretariat, 2001–02–08 Gustaaf Burschardt, Commission, 2000–12–06 Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Danish perm. rep., 2001–02–09 Christian Danielsson, Swedish perm. rep., 2001–07–02 David Galloway, Council secretariat, 2001–02–08 Pascal Hector, German perm. rep., 2001–07–03 Ingrid Hjelt af Trolle, Swedish Prime Minister’s Office, 2000–10–03 Claes Knoop, German perm. rep., 2001–07–03 Joost Korte, Commission secretariat, 2001–02–08 Christian Leffler, Commission, 2001–07–03 Pedro Lourtie, Portugese perm. rep., 2001–02–07 Gunnar Lund, Swedish perm. rep., 2001–07–04 Lars-Erik Lundin, Commission, 2001–07–03 Robert Madelin, Commission, 2000–12–06 Jan R. Olsson, Swedish perm. rep., 2001–07–02

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Alain Scriban, Olaf, 2000–12–06 Michael Shackleton, EP, 2001–07–02 Niels Henrik Sliben, Council secretariat, 2000–12–07 Agneta Söderman, Swedish Foreign Ministry, 2000–10–04 Martin Westlake, Commission, 2001–07–03 Bernard Zepter, Commission secretariat, 2001–02–09

4

The Council Presidency and external representation Rikard Bengtsson

Introduction The European Union is nowadays an active major player on the international scene. Whether discussing United Nations co-operation, Afghanistan, the Middle East, or security relations within the Euro Atlantic – Russia security complex, the EU acts increasingly as a coherent actor. This external engagement in general, and the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in particular, also points to an increasingly important function for the Council Presidency to fulfil: that of representing the EU in external affairs. As explained by Elgström in the Introduction to this volume, the Presidency nowadays fulfils functions as manager, mediator, initiator of policy proposals and representative. This latter function – ‘[a]cting as the collective point of contact for third parties’, as the Council’s Rules of Procedure puts it (Wallace 1985: 4) – is actually twofold; as Nugent notes, the function is one of ‘[r]epresenting the Council in dealings with outside bodies. This task is exercised most frequently with regard to other EU institutions (such as regular appearances before the European Parliament), and with non-member countries in connection with certain EU policies, especially the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)’ (Nugent 1999: 154–5; see also Kirchner 1992: 81). This chapter focuses solely on the external part of the representation and the (EU) inter-institutional linkages connected with external representation. External representation is indeed a Presidential function of increasing importance and recognition as the EU attempts to play a greater role in world affairs. Increasing amounts of Presidential attention are given to external events and international affairs, evident not least in the cases of the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East, where consecutive Presidencies in recent years have performed substantive activities. This observation actually presages one of the main conclusions of this chapter – that the institutionalization of the external relations of the EU and the representational function of the Presidency have to be conceived of as two interactive dimensions, which have developed in tandem. As Wallace notes, the

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Presidency as an institution developed gradually during the 1970s not least as a result of increasing Community action on the broader international stage, ‘notably, but not solely, through European Political Co-operation (EPC)’ (Wallace 1985: 3). As we will see, this ongoing process, with institutional developments through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, continues to change, indeed enhance, the character of the Presidency as an institution. After a short specification of the subject matter and a brief historical background, this chapter addresses three main dimensions along which any individual Presidency may vary in performing the function of external representation. First, each Presidency faces (although to varying degrees) structural constraints, such as uncertainty and complexity, while displaying unique characteristics in terms of, for example, size, experience and foreign policy orientation. This set-up of variables hence leaves each Presidency with particular preconditions and prerequisites for fulfilling the function during its half-year at the helm. Second, Presidencies vary in their approach to and co-operation with other major actors within the area of interest here, namely the Commission and the High Representative, resulting in different patterns of collaborative and/or conflictual relations. Third, Presidencies may vary in their approach to performing the function of external representative in terms of attempting to forcefully lead the EU in external affairs versus solidly anchoring each step with the other member states in a consensus-oriented manner. The extent to which this is a real dilemma depends on the actual leadership approach chosen and the kinds of resources that are utilized by the different Presidencies.

External relations: a complex field This chapter has as its primary focus the Presidency in connection to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), not least because it is within this area that the Presidential impact on EU external relations may be expected to be the greatest. It ought to be made clear, however, that the label external relations covers a broad range of issue-areas, with varying inter-institutional balances between the Commission and the Council (and hence the Presidency). This also poses a methodological problem about generalizing observations concerning representation across different sectors, since the room for Presidential influence generally varies among the areas along the dimension of degree of community (or conversely member state) competence. The literature proposes a number of distinctions in terms of external relations, the most common ones pointing to foreign and security policy, trade policy, and aid and development issues respectively as distinct sectors of EU external affairs. Moreover, environment and enlargement are other prominent concerns. What is analytically more important, however, is the legal format for decision-making – whether a policy area falls under exclusive community

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competence, mixed competence (in which both community and member state competences apply) or national jurisdiction (member state competence). In representational terms this means that under community competence the Commission represents the EU, whereas the Presidency on behalf of the Council represents the EU in issue-areas under national jurisdiction. Mixed competence, not surprisingly, implies that the Union is represented sometimes by the Commission, sometimes by the Presidency. To complicate matters further, dynamic processes of so-called crosspillarization imply changes in competences over time, through dynamic linkages and movements across the three pillars of the EU system. The distribution of competences is a complex matter – not least for outside parties, but obviously also one of great importance for the purposes of our present discussion, since the balance between the Commission and the Council differs between the competence spheres, in turn addressing the issue of Presidential influence. Among the sectors of external affairs, the CFSP is primarily (although not exclusively, as we shall see) intergovernmental in character. The labelling of the policy is interesting due to the expectations it may lead to in terms of coherent and unitary action. Many observers have commented on the fact that in terms of a common EU policy the Common Foreign and Security Policy is considerably weaker and less stable than, for example, the Common Commercial Policy (trade). Dinan argues that ‘the nomenclature is misleading and generates unrealistic expectations inside and outside the EU about the CFSP’s capabilities’ (Dinan 1999: 483, 508). Environmental matters, on the other hand, is an area where the EU increasingly performs as an autonomous international negotiator (see Elgström and Strömvik, forthcoming), but where mixed competence characterizes the complicated legal framework (see Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 12, 85). Trade policy, again, is often given as an example of exclusive community competence. As shown by Meunier and Nicolaidis, however, this traditional supranational field of external relations is not entirely under exclusive community competence, but also encompasses mixed competence (when it comes to non-goods trade, so called ‘new trade issues’: see Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999; Meunier 2000). In conclusion, this means that for any discussion of Presidential action and influence in the external relations sphere to be worthwhile, we need to specify with which part of EU external relations we are dealing. In general terms, the CFSP is the issue area where the position of the Presidency may be expected to be most pronounced, hence an area providing us with excellent opportunities to explore how the Presidency functions in EU external relations.

From EPC to CFSP: the Presidency under development The European Political Co-operation (EPC) was established in 1970 and became the way for EC foreign ministers to meet and discuss the

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co-ordination of foreign policy, outside of the regular European Community framework. Being an intergovernmental construction, the Commission was sidelined, and the responsibility for leadership fell on the Presidency. Since there were no legislative or regulatory means, or ambitions, the policy was oriented towards policy-making (statements and so on), which made it, in Kirchner’s words, ‘totally dependent on the Presidency’ (Kirchner 1992: 73). Turning the issue around, we find that the development of EPC contributed fundamentally to the scope of the presidential tasks. On EPC, Wallace has noted that ‘the prime task of the Presidency is to maintain the now intense dialogue on foreign policy issues’ (Wallace 1985: 8). Given that no organizational framework for this function existed, it fell to the Presidency to provide the infrastructure as well as promoting the development of policy. It has to be underlined that this took place in an environment characterized by events-driven policy development (as foreign policy in general). The implication of this arrangement was primarily twofold: on the one hand, policy inconsistency reflecting the national interests of the member states generally and the six-month rotating Presidency in particular; on the other, realization of the need for further institutionalization of the policy area for it to be worthwhile. Hayes-Renshaw makes the connection between Presidential development and policy development in arguing that the importance of the Presidency has increased in line with ‘the growing global power and influence of the EU’ (Hayes-Renshaw 1999: 34). Wallace argues in the same vein that since ‘the establishment of political co-operation, the representational role of the Presidency has taken a quantum leap forward’ (Wallace 1985: 19; also see Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 175). In terms of formal foundations for the EPC, it was recognized with an own section (Title III) in the Single European Act (SEA). It was not, however, incorporated into the treaties because member states wanted the EPC to remain outside of regular decision-making procedures. Approaching the 1990s, a number of fundamental changes pointed in the direction of further co-operation. The collapse of the Soviet Union and German reunification changed the geopolitical conditions and called for a clearer EU-level policy, whereas the failures and shortcomings of EC/EU policy in the Gulf War and in Yugoslavia underlined the inadequacy of the responses (Nugent 1999: 449; see also Allen and Smith 2000: 103, who note that although the EU displayed remarkable internal solidarity during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the US military dominance added to the feelings of inferiority on the part of the EU and induced a resolve to improve future capacity). Substantial criticism hence focused primarily on the policy being too declaratory and essentially reactive. The establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) and further the Amsterdam Treaty provided for fundamental advances in foreign and security policy co-operation, albeit under essentially the same intergovernmental conditions as before. The

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Maastricht Treaty added to the Presidential responsibilities the role of representing the EU in the CFSP. These developments have made the Presidency become more proactive than before, and, argues HayesRenshaw, also increasingly important (Hayes-Renshaw 1999: 34). There are a number of tasks involved for the Presidency under the broad heading of external representation. In legal terms, within the CFSP the Presidency represents ‘the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy’ and is ‘responsible for the implementation’ of CFSP decisions (Article 18 TEU). Dinan elaborates that the main functions and responsibilities may be summarized as: ‘co-ordinating member states’ positions at international conferences and negotiations in which the EU participates; representing the EU internationally, acting as an EU spokesperson; leading the EU side in enlargement negotiations’ (Dinan 1999: 240). Svensson argues along the same lines that as a result of the incremental process of establishing the Single European Act and the Treaty of the European Union, within the common foreign and security policy, the Presidency has become charged with representing the Union, implementing decisions, speaking in international forums, recommending conclusions of international agreements, requesting the High Representative (see below) to conduct dialogue with third parties and informing and consulting the European Parliament when so required (Svensson 2000: 18). The function of external representation, it may be concluded, is thus a quite extensive one. This in turn creates great expectations from various actors about forceful policy action; expectations that the Presidency is not always able to meet. Practice and institutional development has thus resulted in what Hill calls a ‘capability–expectations gap’ (Hill 1993, 1998).

Presidential constraints and preconditions In general terms, performing the role of external representative for the CFSP is attractive for the country holding the Presidency, allowing it to work from a prestigious platform and make an input not only to EU decision-making but also to international relations in broad terms. This observation holds irrespective of the size of the member state holding the Presidency, but applies especially to the smaller member states, which may then be in a more influential position than they are normally. Recent examples include the Nordic EU members as Presidential incumbents. Finland, which held the office for the first time in the autumn of 1999, found itself at the centre of attention in part due to events outside its own control (the war in Chechnya; see further below), but also because it saw opportunities for policy influence in relation to enlargement issues (both in terms of advancing the process in general and in terms of formal recognition of Turkey as a candidate country) and in developing the CFSP (Stubb 2000). Sweden, likewise a newcomer, experienced much the same in the spring of 2001, when it found it possible, as the term went on, to

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influence both the enlargement area (the Swedish top priority) and, perhaps more unexpectedly to some observers, the CFSP area proper, not least in relation to developments in Macedonia (see Bengtsson 2002a, 2002b). Denmark, finally, held the Presidency in the autumn of 2002 and was heavily engaged in concluding enlargement negotiations with a large circle of applicant countries. At the same time, however, it also had a role to play in representing the EU in the Middle East and in crafting EU policy towards Iraq. Taken together, this placed Denmark in a position in international affairs in which it would not otherwise have been (see e.g. European Voice, 3–9 October 2002). In addition, larger member states generally appreciate the opportunity of being at the centre, since it can be combined with their power status into making an even more pronounced impact than normally, both on EU developments and in international affairs. It can be expected, however, that they generally place less emphasis on the opportunities created by the Presidential office than do small states. As an exogenous condition, any Presidency faces great uncertainty in being responsible for EU foreign and security policy. In short, the Presidency is vulnerable to external developments. Rapidly unfolding events, such as a sudden conflict or threat, may require swift action, in turn challenging the potential for coherent policy reaction and making the advancement of predetermined national agendas/priorities impossible. In recent years, outstanding examples in this area are the German Presidency (spring 1999) facing the Kosovo crisis, the Finnish Presidency (autumn of the same year) having to deal with the war in Chechnya, and the Belgian Presidency (autumn 2001) facing the World Trade Center catastrophe and the subsequent war on terrorism. But uncertainty need not be that dramatic – it is actually a common trait to all Presidencies in the sense of dependence on external developments and uncertainty as to what kinds of situations and events will erupt. In short, the Presidency is on the receiving end as international events unfold, yet responsible for EU reaction, along with other actors (see below). Another structural condition is the complexity of international negotiations, given that any Presidency will have to engage in multi-level diplomacy, externally with third parties and internally in the EU circle of states, but also domestically in the political environment of the home country. This multi-level diplomacy (following the logic of Putnam’s (1988) twolevel games) is perhaps most difficult when the element of uncertainty is most pronounced, as in various unexpected circumstances triggered by the external environment. But it is also a central feature in enlargement negotiations, where the Presidency first has to craft a common position among the EU member states, and then sell this compromise to each of the candidate countries. The same obviously goes for other forms of international negotiations as well. Practitioners often argue that it is in fact the EU internal negotiations (among fellow member states, and the Commission,

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if applicable) – establishing the common position of the EU – that are the hardest negotiations. These structural dimensions – uncertainty and complexity – affect all Presidencies, albeit to varying degrees. It is commonplace to explain this variation by referring to the size of the country holding the Presidency, hence relating to the discussion on country-specific characteristics outlined in the introductory chapter to this volume. Generally speaking, larger member states would be expected to be able to deal with uncertainty as well as complexity in a better way than would smaller member states holding the Presidency. The basis for such an expectation is twofold, grounded in material conditions and international leverage. Smaller states generally have fewer organizational/administrative resources to apply when necessary, and generally carry less weight in international relations, implying that external actors may not see a small Presidency as the natural foremost EU partner. By side-stepping the Presidency and going directly to any of the larger powers of the union, external actors simultaneously question and risk the credibility and legitimacy of the CFSP (see e.g. Hayes-Renshaw 1999: 34; Holland 1999: 232). Likewise, EU member states themselves can influence the level of credibility, legitimacy and coherence by their own actions. Not least are the activities of the larger member states in focus here. The officially announced meeting between Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder in connection with the Ghent European Council meeting certainly made life more difficult for the Belgian Presidency at the time (autumn 2001), and was criticized by the Belgians as well as by the Commission for undermining the work towards a common foreign policy with the incumbent Presidency in a primary position. Commission President Romano Prodi’s remark that ‘The morale of the small states is really down’ was another way of pointing to the detrimental effects on Presidential action resulting from great power-related activity in the EU context (see further European Voice, 25–31 October 2001). During the Danish Presidency (autumn 2002), the various responses to the American plans and proposals about the Iraq–UN conflict by the EU member states displayed not only differences in policy preferences, but also the inherent difficulties involved in achieving a common stand on foreign policy issues and the challenges facing a small state Presidency (European Voice, 3–9 October 2002). This characterization along the size/resource dimension can be complemented, however, by including other forms of resources than organizational/administrative capacity. Diplomatic skill/experience of international diplomacy is such another form of resource, which may alter the big/small divide discussed above. True, there is to a certain extent a size dimension as well, since larger member states usually have a history of participation in international affairs to an extent that some (but not all) smaller states do not. On the other hand, relationships of interdependence (e.g. in security and economic matters) may have necessitated intense

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international relations and an active and skilful foreign policy also for small states. Connected to this is the issue of national foreign policy orientation. In short, it may be of some importance specifically in the CFSP area whether the holder of the Presidency is a non-aligned state or a NATO member. The linkages between the EU and NATO have been increasingly obvious in recent times, especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, but also in light of the discussions about the use of NATO resources for EU activities and competition between the two institutions (see Robertson 2001; European Voice, 10–16 October 2002). The 1995 round of enlargement is interesting in this regard since the three newcomers – Austria, Finland and Sweden – were all non-aligned, small states. Their efforts in their respective first terms in the Presidency (more pronounced in the Finnish and Swedish cases than in the Austrian) point to non-alignment not being the expected obstacle in security-political affairs generally and in dealings with NATO specifically; rather, those dimensions worked out rather well, as many observers have noted (see further Bengtsson and Strömvik 2001; Bengtsson 2002a, and Bjurulf’s and Tiilikainen’s contributions to this volume, Chapters 9 and 7 respectively). It may even at times be an advantage to have a different sort of historical luggage when entering into various forms of negotiations, both in inter-institutional dealings with NATO and in other settings. Different Presidencies are obviously unequally well equipped to face the constraints outlined above. As Bretherton and Vogler argue, given the ‘variation in size and diplomatic capability among the 15 presidents there are bound to be disparities in performance’ (1999: 251). Again referring to the capability–expectations gap (see above), we may conceive of the function of external representation as varying among Presidencies in terms of expectations (by fellow EU members as well as external actors) on a Presidency about what sort of impact/position the Presidency will have/take (based on, for example, size, experience and foreign policy orientation), on the one hand, and what sort/amount of capabilities a certain Presidency possesses (resources of various sorts) and what constraints it faces (in terms of complexity and uncertainty), on the other.

The institutional division of labour As in all areas of EU policy-making, the Presidency does not operate in a vacuum or run the whole show itself; rather, there are a number of other actors involved in the policy-making process. In our area of interest, two other main actors deserve to be discussed: the Commission, in particular the Commissioner for External Relations, and the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (also the Secretary-General of the Council Secretariat). The division of labour among these three institutions is not clear, primarily because the CFSP is of incrementally changing

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nature due to its being very much an events-driven policy in the making. As a consequence, uncertainty and complexity in terms of international developments may actually lead to parallel balances of competences at the same point in time, corresponding to the different character of different issue areas. To take two recent examples, the balance of competences is not the same in the two cases of EU action towards the Middle East and the Balkans respectively. The relationship between the Presidency and the Commission is a rather complicated one in the field of external relations. As Dinan puts it: ‘Dual representation is particularly prominent and perplexing in the EU’s external relations’ (Dinan 1999: 242). As noted above, it depends heavily on which part of external relations we are discussing, with the Commission role in the CFSP obviously being narrower than in the cases of trade and development, for example. But also in the CFSP, the Commission is definitively part of the process. Looking back, this divisional problem is not a new one – also during the EPC era the Commission and the Presidency shared the function of collective representation (Wallace 1985: 19; Kirchner 1992: 5; Edwards 1999: 140). Through the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission has a shared right of initiative in the CFSP (this was not the case during the EPC era), which implies that the formal intergovernmental character of the CFSP is only part of the picture. Having said that, it ought to be underlined that the right to initiate matters does not imply any straightforward right to negotiate on behalf of the union (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 176, 181). Moreover, the Commission is, through the EC delegations in third countries, actually part of the diplomatic and operational aspects of the CFSP. Also of fundamental importance is the fact that certain CFSP instruments, sanctions in particular, require community-level authority. In these cases, the Commission’s role, both in terms of implementation and providing legal basis, is fundamental (Holland 1999: 232; Nugent 1999: 460). Hence, as Holland concludes, Commission participation in the CFSP underlines ‘both the implausibility and impossibility of confining CFSP to an exclusively intergovernmental process. . . . Paradoxically, although the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties specify CFSP as an intergovernmental, second pillar, process, both contain procedures that have extended Commission involvement’ (Holland 1999: 232). Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 12) note in the same vein: Although the Commission and Member State governments may make policy proposals, policy initiation tends to fall to the Presidency. However policy implementation almost invariably involves major input from the Commission. Since the Commission does not regard itself as the servant of the Council, this arrangement is a source of considerable cross-Pillar tension, which causes numerous difficulties, some of them resulting in extreme pettiness.

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It may be added that the Council (the Presidency) may at times depend heavily on the Commission for information and advice. Again, the role of EC delegations in third countries is a case in point, along with ‘general’ Commission work. This is the case in enlargement negotiations, which are formally bilateral intergovernmental conferences between the EU and each candidate country, with the EU side being led by the Presidency, but in which the Commission role of going between the EU side and the candidate countries in the actual negotiations puts it in a central position (as a ‘key strategic actor’, to use Friis’ (1999: 33) terminology) despite the intergovernmental character of the process. In conclusion, as Kirchner notes, the ‘roles of the Presidency and the Commission are both collaborative and conflictual’ (Kirchner 1992: 5). In order to strengthen the CFSP, a new institutional feature was created through the Amsterdam Treaty (Article 18(3)) – the High Representative for the CFSP – and a new policy-planning and early warning unit connected to that office. The rationale for taking this step was to ensure ‘permanence and “institutional memory” in Union foreign policy’ (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 193), hence acknowledging one of the shortcomings of the six-month rotating Presidential format. The role of the High Representative is to ‘assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of Presidency, through conducting dialogue with third countries’ (Article 26 TEU; see Nugent 1999: 459). This means that there is legally no independent mandate for the High Representative; rather, the office is to work at the request of the Presidency. At the same time, however, the High Representative may under certain circumstances perform much the same tasks as the Presidency does. As a result, there is continued debate as to the status and autonomy of the High Representative. In part, the status may depend on the structural condition of the size of the country holding the Presidency discussed above. Dinan states: ‘Clearly, the Presidency remains central to CFSP representation and to other aspects of the CFSP’s operation. There could be a tendency on the part of large member states with greater resources at their disposal to make less use than smaller states of the High Representative’ (Dinan 1999: 524). The back-to-back French and Swedish Presidencies (autumn 2000 to spring 2001) illustrate this point rather well. As with the relationship between the Presidency and the Commission in the sphere of the CFSP, the balance between the institutions may change over time. In the case of the High Representative, it is still too soon to draw any rigorous conclusions, but as early as during the Finnish Presidency – the first full one with the new institution at work – there were contributions from the High Representative. Stubb notes, for example, that for a number of the important decisions taken at the Helsinki European

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Council (military capabilities and decision-making mechanisms), ‘[m]uch of the push in this field came from the new High Representative/Secretary General of the Council, Javier Solana’ (Stubb 2000: 51). To complete this picture of the triangular drama, there is also an inherent potential for rivalry, but also mutually beneficial co-operation, between the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations. The Presidency thus finds itself in a leadership game in which the balance among the three actors varies over time and across issue-areas, which in turn implies an unrealized potential for the CFSP (for debates on this matter, see European Voice, 29 November to 5 December 2001, 24–30 January 2002, 4–10 July 2002). As argued by Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh: ‘a truly Common Foreign and Security Policy means the coherence . . . between the different voices of the Union on foreign policy – the Presidency, the Commission, the High Representative and the Member States’ (Lindh 2001). Anna Lindh herself reportedly experienced the lack of coherence quite concretely during the Swedish Presidency when she ‘wanted to talk to US Secretary of State Colin Powell, only to be told that he was already on the line with Solana. She offered to hold the line, only to learn that Commissioner Chris Patten was already holding’ (European Voice, 24–30 January 2002). From a principal perspective, this (lack of) order means that there is a certain room for Presidential activity and Presidencies typically vary to what extent they (attempt to) utilize this opportunity. EU activity in relation to the Middle East peace process is a good case in point, since in recent years consecutive Presidencies have dealt with the Middle East issues, but with various approaches; for example, when it comes to collaboration with the Commission and the High Representative. Drawing together these different dimensions, there is an obvious open and complex question relating to the institutional division of labour within the CFSP. As has been hinted at above, the various balances may shift over time according to external developments and the qualities of the holders of the Presidency and the positions of High Representative and External Relations Commissioner. Presidencies will generally vary in their approach to these other actors. We may, for instance, expect that small member states holding the Presidency will be more inclined to work closely with the other institutional actors than will larger member states. Along a different dimension, we may expect supranationalists to be more interested in such institutional co-operation than intergovernmentalists.

The primus inter pares dilemma As with the other functions fulfilled by the Presidency, the function of external representation involves a dilemma between providing strong and energetic leadership on behalf of the EU, in this case in external relations, and consensus-building in developing common responses within the EU

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circle to these outside events. We find here a potential role conflict among the Presidential roles elaborated on in the introductory chapter to this volume. In short, there seems to be a built-in tension between efficiency in the external game and legitimacy in the internal game. This is obviously a potentially increasing problem as the EU seeks to play a greater role in international affairs. Schmuck notes in relation to the function of representing the EU to the outside world that there is more and more of a leadership dimension involved, in that the ambition is increasingly not only to respond to outside events, but also to take action. ‘As the [Union] increasingly becomes the focal point from the outside world during international conflicts, the Presidency will be required to take the lead’, Schmuck argues (1993: 9). This can then be described as a primus inter pares problem, to use Holland’s term, where on the one hand the leader is expected to lead, but simultaneously runs the risk of losing the trust of the fellow members. Holland writes: ‘Indeed any presidencies that have tried to be more than primus inter pares have found the authority of their presidencies seriously compromised’ (Holland 1999: 231). This dilemma also ties in with the discussion about the discrepancy between expectations and capabilities referred to above, in that different Presidencies will try to resolve the dilemma in different ways by striking various balances between providing leadership (meeting external as well as internal expectations) and establishing well-founded political responses within the EU circle (meeting internal expectations). Metcalfe notes that any Presidency draws on one or more of several resources – coercion, reward, legitimacy, socialization, expertise and information – in its leadership in the Council (Metcalfe 1998: 416–26). Depending on the chosen mix of resources utilized, that is, what strategy is chosen, the primus inter pares dilemma may be more or less acute for any given Presidency. This is another way of arguing that although all incumbents are aware of what is generally perceived as appropriate behaviour, their specific national behaviour (interest-based and goal-oriented) may be more or less in conflict with the norm of appropriateness.

Conclusion As we have seen, external representation is a complex function for the Presidency to fulfil. At the outset there is the formal variation of distribution of competences implying that no matter the holder of the Presidency, Presidential behaviour will be different in, for example, security and trade matters. Within each sector, furthermore, there are three main dimensions along which the conditions for and the actual performance of Presidential external representation vary. First, there is variation in the set-up of constitutive factors (constraining factors such as uncertainty and complexity in combination with characteristics such as size, organizational resource bases, diplomatic skill and experience). Second, there is the issue of

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division of labour, in this context, then, not between different competence spheres, but rather how the individual Presidencies work with the Commission and the High Representative within the sphere of the CFSP. Third, there is the potential variation in how Presidencies deal with what we have labelled the primus inter pares dilemma between leadership and consensus-building. A major problem in the history of the external relations of the EU, in general and in the foreign policy sphere in particular, concerns the lack of policy co-ordination. To take but one example, as Allen and Smith note, ‘developments in the western Balkans . . . tended to highlight the continuing need for the EU to be aware of the dangers of incoherence and lack of co-ordination in its external activities’ (Allen and Smith 2000: 104). Already under the EPC era, and especially through formalization in the form of the SEA, the Presidency and the Commission shared the responsibility of ensuring consistency (see e.g. Edwards (1999: 140) about such ‘mixed’ agreements ‘straddling the EPC divide’). Recent treaty developments have increasingly placed this task with the Presidency, at the same time, as we have seen, as the institutional set-up has become more complicated. Hence, it remains a major challenge for the EU to sort out the institutional division of labour in its external relations in general and within the CFSP in particular, in order to ensure co-ordinated policy and a credible political role globally. Bretherton and Vogler note: ‘inadequate coordination between and within policy issue areas, is the most fundamental [problem]. It reflects both low levels of Member State commitment and tensions between Member States and the Commission’ (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 172, also p. 188). As we have noted, a related problem for the external representation is the rotating six-month Presidential format, potentially hampering continuity and hence making it harder for the EU to speak with one voice externally. Dinan (1999: 518) describes the problem after recent years’ reforms: ‘Lack of continuity due to the biannual presidential rotation inevitably affected the implementation of the CFSP and weakened the EU’s external representation.’ Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson argued along similar lines after the Swedish Presidency: ‘when it comes to representing the Union externally a particular problem occurs: countries outside the EU complain about having to deal with new sets of priorities and personnel every six months’ (Persson 2002). Along with a host of others, this is yet a further reason for underlining that national foreign policies are still important in the EU. Holland argues that ‘[d]espite the appeal of simplicity, an analysis based on the foreign policy preferences of member states may provide a better explanation of the EU’s common approach than an analysis focused purely on the Presidency’ (Holland 1999: 232). In brief, the main arguments of this chapter may be summarized as follows. The political institution of the Presidency in general and the

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representational function in particular have developed incrementally, much more in response to political developments than to formal regulations. The development of the representational function is thus part of an ongoing process of political institutionalization of the EU, a process in turn contested from various corners as it touches upon fundamental issues concerning the very nature and character of the EU as a political entity. The role of external representation, specifically, has developed in tandem with the advancement of a common external policy. This is not unproblematic since it unquestionably opens up for potential disparities between expectations of action that various parties inside and outside the European Union hold, and the actual political capacity endowed on the EU and potentially mobilized by the Presidency. The characterization of the function of external representation obviously falls within a more general characterization of Presidential functions and how the Presidency works. This means that although the holder of the Presidency is granted certain possibilities for influence (varying according to size, administrative and other material resources and diplomatic skill), the possibility for assuming a leadership role is, in fact, rather constrained. Two main reasons for this may be given. One concerns what in this chapter is labelled the primus inter pares dilemma (between efficiency in external relations and legitimacy in internal relations), the other the inherent but varying competition from a number of other actors (EU institutions and, potentially, member states). Against this background any Presidency is faced with the challenge of delivering co-ordinated and effective policy. The external relations sphere is no exception in this regard, in fact quite the contrary, it may be argued. The future of the Presidential function of external representation will probably prove to be a very intense and interesting one. A number of processes continue to underline the transient character of the Presidency in general terms and of external representation in more pronounced terms. First, the already ongoing process of institutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the central issue of the institutional division of labour, will obviously be of great importance also in the coming years. Second, the current constitutional debate about the future shape of the EU under the umbrella of the Convention on the Future of Europe will in all likelihood contribute to a redefinition and specification of the office of the Presidency as well as of the handling of external affairs. Third, a large-scale round of enlargement will certainly change the character of the European Union in many fundamental regards, one of which will probably be the set-up and functioning of the Presidency, in turn affecting the intricate balance in external affairs between effective leadership and internal legitimacy.

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References Allen, D. and Smith, M. (2000) ‘External policy developments’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (Annual Review): 101–20. Bengtsson, R. (2002a) ‘Soft security and the Presidency: Swedish policy towards the Northern Dimension’, Cooperation and Conflict, 37 (2): 212–18. Bengtsson, R. (2002b) ‘Securing Europe: The Swedish Presidency and EU enlargement’, Central European Political Science Review, 3 (7): 64–74. Bengtsson, R. and Strömvik, M. (2001) ‘Den gemensamma utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken – Sverige i världspolitikens strålkastarljus’, in J. Tallberg (ed.), När Europa kom till Sverige: Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS Förlag. Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (1999) The European Union as a Global Actor, London and New York: Routledge. Dinan, D. (1999) Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (2nd edn), Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner. Edwards, G. (1999) ‘National sovereignty vs. integration: The Council of Ministers’, in J. Richardson (ed.), European Union: Power and Policy-making, London and New York: Routledge. Elgström, O. and Strömvik, M. (forthcoming) ‘The EU as an international negotiator’, paper to be presented at the EUSA Conference, Nashville, 2003. European Voice, 25–31 October 2001: 2, ‘Big boys prove it’s a two-tier EU’. European Voice, 29 November to 5 December 2001: 2, ‘Germany and France push for end to Patten–Solana confusion’. European Voice, 24–30 January 2002: 13, ‘Closing time may be near for the presidency merry-go-round’. European Voice, 4–10 July 2002: 3, ‘Bildt demands reality-check for institutions to boost CFSP’. European Voice, 3–9 October 2002: 6, ‘Danes struggle to present united front over Baghdad policy’. European Voice, 10–16 October 2002: 9, ‘Robertson: NATO force won’t rival EU’. Friis, L. (1999) An Ever Larger Union? EU Enlargement and European integration, Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs. Hayes-Renshaw, F. (1999) ‘The European Council and the Council of Ministers’ in L. Cram, D. Dinan and N. Nugent (eds), Developments in the European Union, New York: St Martin’s Press. Hill, C. (1993) ‘The capability–expectations gap, or conceptualising Europe’s international role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (3): 305–28. Hill, C. (1998) ‘Closing the capabilities–expectations gap?’, in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, London: Routledge. Holland, M. (1999) ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy’, in L. Cram, D. Dinan and N. Nugent (eds), Developments in the European Union, New York: St Martin’s Press. Kirchner, E.J. (1992) Decision-making in the European Community. The Council Presidency and European integration, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. Lindh, A. (2001) ‘Coherence, commitment and co-operation – EU external relations in an era of globalisation’, speech 4 December, http://www.regeringen.se/ lindh.

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Metcalfe, D. (1998) ‘Leadership in European Union negotiations: The Presidency of the Council’, International Negotiation, 3 (3): 413–33. Meunier, S. (2000) ‘What single voice? European institutions and EU–U.S. trade negotiations’, International Organization, 54 (1): 103–35. Meunier, S. and Nicolaidis, K. (1999) ‘Who speaks for Europe? The delegation of trade authority in the EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (3): 477–501. Nugent, N. (1999) The Government and Politics of the European Union (4th edn), Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Persson, G. (2002) Speech by Prime Minister Göran Persson at the seminar ‘The Future of the European Union and the Role of the Council’, 25 April, http://www.regeringen.se/persson. Putnam, R.D. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games’, International Organization, 42 (3): 427–60. Robertson, Lord (2001) ‘In an uncertain world it’s crucial that NATO and the EU stand together’, European Voice, 18–24 October: 17. Schmuck, O. (1993) ‘The setting of the Luxembourg and Dutch Presidencies’, in E.J. Kirchner and A. Tsagkari (eds), The EC Council Presidency. A Comparison of the Dutch and Luxembourg Presidency and Reform Considerations, UACES Proceedings 9, London: King’s College. Stubb, A. (2000) ‘The Finnish Presidency’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (Annual Review): 49–53. Svensson, A-C. (2000) In the Service of the European Union. The Role of the Presidency in Negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty 1995–97, Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Wallace, H. (1985) ‘The Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Community: Tasks and evolution’, in C. O’Nuallain (ed.), The Presidency of the European Council of Ministers. Impacts and Implications for National Governments, London: Croom Helm.

5

The Netherlands’ Presidency of 1997 Between ambition and modesty Mendeltje van Keulen and Jan Q. Th. Rood

Introduction During the first half of 1997, the Netherlands occupied the office of Council President of the European Union for the tenth time since the introduction of this rotating system of EU Presidencies. This particular Presidency was a special event, as it coincided with the concluding stage of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the objective of which was the revision of the Treaty of Maastricht. To the Dutch it was of primary importance to bring these negotiations to a successful end at the European Council summit of Amsterdam in June 1997. In this respect, the 1997 Presidency could be considered a review of the Presidency the Netherlands exercised in the latter half of 1991, when the European Community was in the final stage of an IGC, to be concluded with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union. In this chapter a critical assessment will be made of the performance of the Netherlands’ Presidency of the EU Council, in particular that of the first half of 1997, based on an input–output analysis of priorities, strategy and the outcome of the negotiations. In an attempt to explain the results of the 1997 Presidency, it is important to determine to what extent the preceding 1991 Dutch Presidency cast its shadow on the events of 1997. We therefore start with a brief review of the events that marked the 1991 Presidency. We then turn to the internal track in the preparations for the 1997 Presidency and analyse the engagement of all domestic actors involved, the definition and setting of priorities and the design of a negotiating strategy for the IGC process as well as for the day-to-day management of the more ‘technical’ legislative dossiers. We conclude with an evaluation of the results and the final outcome of the Presidency. In this evaluation, use has been made of a written and oral survey, conducted in 1998, among Dutch government diplomats and civil servants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as from those line ministries that were closely involved in the Presidency. In the final section of this chapter, we present a number of tentative explanations with regard to the Dutch performance as EU Council

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President. Among Dutch civil servants, the prevailing view as to what the Presidency means, in terms of opportunities and pitfalls, is undoubtedly influenced by the wider context of Dutch EU policy-making and by the European identity of the Netherlands. Although in the Netherlands the permissive consensus on European integration remains relatively high, a decline in the almost dogmatic belief in the benefits of further integration can be observed. In the past few years, political concerns have been voiced regarding the financial implications of European co-operation – the Netherlands being a net contributor to the EU budget – the establishment of areas of common policy close to the realm of national sovereignty, as well as the decrease in relative Dutch influence on EU decision-making as a result of four successive enlargements and the forthcoming accession of states from Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. It is our particular aim to discuss the issues raised in this chapter not only from the perspective of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague – a lead actor during the Presidency – but to take into account also the activities of a number of line ministries that were deeply involved in the (preparations for) the Presidency. This latter dimension is important as it reflects the growing ‘Europeanization’ of domestic affairs.

The shadow of the 1991 Presidency In order to put the 1997 Presidency in a broader perspective (i.e. of Dutch EU policy), it is deemed relevant to examine whether the experience of the 1991 Presidency has induced the Netherlands to adopt a different approach and strategy in 1997. This question is all the more relevant since the Dutch 1991 Presidency is considered – at least by Dutch observers – to have been a rather traumatic experience for all actors involved. Essentially, this trauma is related to the way the Dutch Presidency positioned itself in the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Maastricht. In September 1991, the Netherlands’ Presidency tabled a draft treaty, which differed substantially from the draft presented by the preceding Luxembourg Presidency. The Luxembourg draft had introduced the notorious three-pillar structure, which implied that the common foreign and security policy and co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs were to be pursued on an intergovernmental basis, outside the Community framework (the first pillar) as established in the Treaty of Rome. This proposal met fierce opposition from a number of member states, among them the Netherlands, who feared an increase of intergovernmentalism in European integration and an erosion of the Community method of decision-making. In response, the draft presented by the Dutch Presidency in September 1997 proposed to retain the so-called unitary structure, i.e. bringing the common foreign and security policy and co-operation in justice and home affairs inside the Community structure, albeit subject to a different, more intergovernmental way of decision-making.

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In view of the opposition to the Luxembourg draft, the Netherlands expected wide support for its proposal. Yet the Dutch draft treaty was rejected on Monday, 30 September 1991 (since then commonly known in the Netherlands as ‘Black Monday’) by nine of the twelve member states, with only Belgium and the European Commission fully endorsing the Dutch proposal, and Spain giving qualified support. The Netherlands was thus forced publicly to return to the Luxembourg draft, which it opposed, and to finalize negotiations on the basis of that proposal. This experience overshadowed the 1991 Dutch Presidency to such an extent that the many positive results this Presidency brought about, such as the agreement on the Economic and Monetary Union and the many results on more specific non-IGC related issues, have been neglected. The reasons for this failure – as suggested over the years – are many and diverse (Wester 1992; van Hulten 1997). According to some observers, the Dutch draft was too supranational, even aiming at a European federation. It thus clearly reflected the Dutch supranational preference with regard to the integration process. Although a close reading of both the Luxembourg and Dutch drafts does not substantiate this claim (Rozemond 1991), some member states seem to have perceived that the Dutch went off on their own hobby-horses, thus openly violating the impartiality norm. Nevertheless, the most important factor contributing to the failure is probably to be found in frictions within the Netherlands bureaucracy involving a range of domestic actors in European policy-making. In this respect, the first difference of opinion, causing a crucial delay in the presentation of the Dutch draft, concerned the question of whether it was necessary to present a new draft treaty. Whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specifically its European branch, strongly favoured the presentation of a ‘Dutch’ draft, the Ministry of Justice in particular contested the need to do so, and favoured the Luxembourg three-pillar structure, because of the intergovernmental set-up for co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs. This conflict complicated the already rather cumbersome domestic EU co-ordination process between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the line ministries. The second problem arose as a result of contradicting views on the level of support for the Dutch draft among the other member states. Although some member states (such as the United Kingdom) were highly critical of, or even outright opposed to, the Dutch draft, the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs was convinced it could gain the support of a majority of member states (including Germany), a view not shared by the Netherlands’ Permanent Representative to the EU. He specifically warned about French opposition, and argued that in case of a French non the Germans would follow the French rather than the Dutch, as the Federal Republic would be inclined to let the Franco–German relationship prevail over its ties with the Netherlands. And, indeed, that was what happened on 30 September 1991.

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These internal frictions resulted in a lack of time for consultations with the other member states. These bilateral consultations were considered pivotal, as the Netherlands were to come up with a new treaty proposal. Insofar as bilateral meetings were held, the Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers took no part in them, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs played a rather remote role in the exploration of the different positions taken by the EU partners. This aloofness reflected, on the one hand, the Foreign Office’s optimistic assessment of the support among the member states. On the other hand, this aloofness is rather striking in view of the fact that the first occasion for discussing the Dutch Treaty proposal was during the General Council meeting of 30 September, i.e. at a high political level. The experience of ‘Black Monday’ induced the Netherlands to adopt a more pragmatic approach towards the European Union (cf. Pijpers and Vanhoonacker 1997; Langendoen and Pijpers 2002). For the next Dutch Presidency, six years later, it implied a more modest strategy and a less ambitious list of priorities. Yet even more important were the conclusions drawn with regard to the preparation and conduct of the next Presidency. First, it was agreed that the preparations should start earlier and should be co-ordinated more effectively at the domestic level, in order to eliminate internal frictions at an early stage and to provide room for consultations with the other member states. Second, the consultation process should be intensified, including proactive consultations during the stage preceding the actual Presidency. In this process not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also, in particular in view of the IGC, the Prime Minister would have to be involved.

Priorities and role conceptions Hence the Netherlands’ EU Presidency of 1997 got off to an early start. In 1994, the Dutch government issued the first of four discussion papers in preparation for the IGC which was due to start in 1996. Even at this early stage it was already highly likely that the IGC would be concluded under the Dutch Presidency. Therefore, given the Dutch government’s keenness to bring this round of negotiations to a successful conclusion, this topic would dominate the Dutch Presidency. The discussion papers dealt with the process of enlargement and its implications, the Union’s foreign and security policy, co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs, and reform of the EU institutions in the context of the forthcoming enlargement with Eastern European countries. They were discussed thoroughly in the Dutch Parliament, and the main considerations and views expressed in Parliament were incorporated in the 1996 Priority Paper on the IGC. In this paper the Dutch position was set out, including the programme for the Dutch Presidency. Priority papers were published, not only by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also by various line ministries. In addition, within the framework of the BENELUX co-operation, the Netherlands,

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together with Belgium and Luxembourg, issued a joint memorandum on the IGC. For a better understanding of the Dutch Presidency’s priorities, two papers are of relevance: first, the Presidency Programme as it was presented at the start of the 1997 Dutch Presidency; second, the paper on the Dutch Presidency presented to Parliament in November 1996. In particular the latter paper provides an overview of Dutch priorities, specifically the number and range of its ambitions and objectives. The paper starts by emphasizing that these priorities originate mainly from the Union’s current political agenda. From this, the following main priorities were set. First, it was the Dutch objective to bring the ongoing IGC to a conclusion on the basis of the draft text prepared by the Irish Presidency. Apart from the ambition to conclude negotiations in June 1997, no further priorities as to the contents of the Treaty are formulated in the Dutch Presidency paper. The final paper outlining the position of the Netherlands (in its capacity as member state, and not as EU Council President) on the different topics of the IGC was equally vague as to substance. Preparing the final stage of the EMU process constituted a second priority for the Dutch Presidency, which meant that agreement had to be reached among the member states about the need for, and the modalities of, stronger fiscal discipline in order to guarantee the member states’ continued budgetary restraint (the ‘Stability Pact’). Third, as far as the enlargement was concerned, Dutch priorities concentrated on strengthening the structural (political) dialogue between the Union and the candidate member states and on the pre-accession process (the adoption of the internal market acquis by the candidates). Apart from these three rather obvious dossiers, the Dutch Presidency presented a list of other issues, such as: the Middle East peace process; the follow-up of the Barcelona process (i.e. further strengthening co-operation with the Mediterranean countries); the elaboration of the Dayton Agreements concerning the former Yugoslavia; relations with the United States and Canada; the combat of international crime, in particular drugs trafficking; and the fight against racism. The involvement of the different line ministries was reflected by the listing of yet further priorities, such as: the common European employment programmes; the Union’s social dimension, in particular equal treatment of men and women; the strengthening of the internal market; further liberalization in the transport, communication and energy sectors; protection of the environment (specifically the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions); initiatives in healthcare; reform of the agricultural and fisheries sectors; animal welfare, culture (the audio-visual sector), and, finally, efforts in the field of trade relations and development co-operation. In this respect it is interesting to note that the ambitions of the line ministries concerning some dossiers exceeded those of the Ministry of Foreign

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Affairs, resulting in some awkward domestic quarrels on the national priorities and on negotiating positions. In view of this rather long list of priorities, it should come as no surprise that at the presentation of the Presidency programme, the Dutch government met strong opposition from both its own national Parliament and the European Parliament, which criticized it for having no (clear) priorities at all and for its lack of vision. This criticism was even enhanced by statements from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van Mierlo, and his State Secretary for European Affairs, Michiel Patijn. In response to critical remarks by a number of MEPs, van Mierlo replied that there was neither time nor room for any national priorities: ‘There is a European agenda and only that, and for the moment I cannot imagine a greater ambition than to get the results that are in the interest of Europe’, while Patijn emphasized that the Dutch Presidency’s main task was to take proper care of the Union’s ‘going concerns’. These statements summarize in an eloquent way the 1997 Dutch Presidency’s conception of tasks. In the view of these national politicians, the Dutch Presidency’s main task was to bring about progress in the European agenda, which had been set by preceding Presidencies and which was complicated and overloaded enough. If there was room for national priorities at all, their number should be restricted. Hence the Presidency’s catchwords were: modesty, no hobby-horses and subservience to the wider goal of European integration, or, as was reflected in the Dutch Presidency’s logo: the Netherlands as ‘bridge-builder’. This approach triggered a debate in the media and among academics on the Dutch position, which was considered too modest. The question was even raised whether the Dutch Presidency actually had a ‘bottom line’.

Preparations and organization1 Apart from the complex task of managing the Intergovernmental Conference, the Dutch Presidency had to prepare the day-to-day EU legislative programme. In the autumn of 1995, domestic organizational preparations started in an interdepartmental working group of a broad composition, including officials from the Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU in Brussels and from the Cabinet of European Commissioner Hans van den Broek. Apart from trying to get a grip on the wide range of legislative dossiers to be finalized in the European Council during the Dutch Presidency, which was – after all – still two years ahead, this working group formulated a number of guidelines for the line ministries involved in departmental preparations for the Presidency. The main advice was to avoid hobby-horses and to focus instead on managing the Union’s rolling agenda. In some instances, dossiers which were important to the Netherlands had to be left out. Such was the case for the Agriculture Council, where a number of dossiers were deliberately omitted from the agenda in

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view of Agenda 2000, the reform proposal from the European Commission which was scheduled to be published in the final months of the Dutch Presidency. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed final responsibility for all departmental priority papers, the line ministries were allowed to take their own position and to prepare their own negotiating briefs, as is usual practice in Dutch EU policy co-ordination. However, the line ministries were specifically instructed to be open about the priorities to be scheduled in the sectoral Council meetings, in order to facilitate coordination and package deals in the negotiating phases. In the course of 1996, the internal co-ordination process resulted in the listing of priorities for each ministry, which were subsequently sent to and debated in the Dutch Parliament. At this stage it became clear – as was indicated above – that the Dutch would go for a restricted national agenda. Most ministries opted for tabling a select number of dossiers, which were mostly part of the rolling legislative agenda. Often, the numbers of dossiers to be treated during the Dutch Presidency were consciously limited. As from 1995, Presidency task forces were set up, bringing together officials who were to be involved in Council working groups, and priorities were selected. Gradually, the outlines of a negotiating strategy emerged. All line ministries made the necessary investments in their internal organization in order to be well prepared in the run-up to the EU Presidency. In many cases, additional personnel and financial means were made available. Moreover, both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the line ministries organized special training courses for the civil servants who were to be involved in EU dossiers, in order to increase their knowledge of the European Union and to improve their negotiating and mediating skills. Dutch officials and politicians were sent out regularly on ‘European tours’ to Brussels and the capitals of all member states to fine-tune Presidency priorities. Before and during the Presidency, special attention was paid to regular contacts with relevant Directorates General of the European Commission. These relations were often established and maintained well in advance of the actual Dutch Presidency. Apart from a small number of ‘national initiatives’, any EU Presidency is ultimately dependent on the actual tabling of a proposal by the European Commission. This meant that relevant Commission officials had to be contacted at an early stage – ‘to test the water’ so to speak – and to keep an eye on (the timing of) the legislative process. But even this is no guarantee for success. During the 1997 Presidency some priorities could not be met, simply because there was no Commission proposal on the particular subject. A case in point is the Framework Directive on Water Management, a dossier of specific interest to the Netherlands, for which the Commission proposal came too late for the Dutch Presidency to have any effect. As regards the other EU institutions, the Netherlands – as is the case for most smaller member states – relied heavily on the services of the

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Council Secretariat, in particular for legal advice and administrative support. As far as relations with the European Parliament were concerned, the Dutch Presidency faced a number of tough decisions to be taken according to the new co-decision procedure (e.g. in the Telecom Council). The introduction of this procedure had significantly increased the influence of the Council Presidency, as it represents the Council in all formal and informal meetings with representatives of the European Commission and the European Parliament, where much of the final bargaining on European legislation takes place. Since relations in the Hague are organized along the principle of the separation of powers between the Legislative and the Executive, this close co-operation with parliamentarians proved a new experience for Dutch government officials, for whom particular expertise was required. In 1997, the Council Presidency and the Intergovernmental Conference were organized along separate tracks, both in the preparation and the execution stage. This implied a heavy workload and posed an organizational challenge. In general, this double challenge did not result in serious internal differences between the various ministries involved. Only in a small number of particular cases did opinions differ between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and individual line ministries. One case in point concerned the complex dossier on bovine identification and registration to be treated in the Agriculture Council. Following the BSE crisis that had shocked European consumers, the presiding Dutch Ministry of Agriculture stressed the political momentum to bring about early EU legislation on this particular dossier. However, the Foreign Ministry, with an eye on the IGC debate on democratic legitimacy, stressed the importance of involving the European Parliament ex Article 100A, which implied timeconsuming negotiations with MEPs. This battle was won by the Agro lobby: the final directive delegated the technical details to a comitology committee and Article 43a was applied – without any binding competences for the European Parliament. In the field of environmental policy, the Dutch Presidency, in particular the Ministry of the Environment, did its utmost to include in the IGC negotiations the objectives of environmental protection, such as laying down in the treaty text the principle of sustainable development and rendering environmental policy-making subject to qualified majority voting. This led to occasional clashes with the State Secretary for European Affairs, who proved less environment-minded than some officials in The Hague had hoped. When we look at the conduct of the Netherlands as IGC President, important differences may be noted between the Presidencies of 1991 and 1997. First of all, the latter was better prepared. Apart from the presentation of discussion papers on the various aspects of the IGC process, relations with the other member states, specifically the neighbouring countries, were intensified. Consultations with Belgium and Luxembourg resulted in the issuance of a joint BENELUX memorandum on the IGC in

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1996, while two special working groups were established with the task of exchanging and co-ordinating views and positions with Germany and France. A special IGC Task Force within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was set up to co-ordinate all activities surrounding the Presidency. And at the highest political level, not only the Minister of Foreign Affairs but also the Prime Minister were involved in the preparation of the IGC’s final stages. A second difference between the 1991 and 1997 Presidencies may be found in that in 1997 the Netherlands did not present its own treaty proposal but started to work on the basis of the draft treaty text it inherited from the Irish Presidency of the latter half of 1996. The Irish draft was no more than a sketch containing a substantial number of blank spots. Although, with elections in the United Kingdom and France, its task was far from easy, on 12 June 1997 the Dutch Presidency was able to present a final draft treaty text, which had come about by adopting a piecemeal approach of a series of new treaty proposals. Moreover, the presentation of this draft was accompanied by a diplomatic offensive. On 23 May 1997, the Dutch Presidency had hosted an informal European Council meeting in which the Dutch treaty proposal was discussed, among others, with the new British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, while in June both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited all member states’ capitals with the same purpose. In the end, the litmus test for the Dutch would be the successful conclusion of the IGC, which implied agreement on a new treaty text with a limited number of modifications, in particular on the issue of flexibility (coopération renforcée), the ‘communitarization’ of parts of the third pillar and institutional reform. Apart from this latter issue, which in the end was postponed (and which would be treated in the next IGC leading up to the Treaty of Nice), the goals of the Dutch Presidency were mostly achieved.

Evaluating the output of the 1997 Presidency It is obvious that a sound ex-post-evaluation of the role performance of any member state’s EU Council Presidency is an extremely difficult exercise. One reason is that it is nearly impossible to discern what specific result can be attributed to a country’s Presidency. Moreover, in the assessment of the success of a Presidency, the level of ambition and the expectations beforehand have to be taken into account. Finally, each Presidency is confronted with a rolling European agenda, and will be faced with unexpected circumstances along the way, which all considerably complicate a proper comparison between Presidencies and their performances. The determination of to what extent a Presidency achieved its goals is obscured further by the fact that most dossiers have been thoroughly prepared by the preceding Presidencies. In other words, the line between the preparation phase and the phase of actual negotiations is hard to draw.

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Moreover, when we evaluate the progress made in particular legislative dossiers that were tabled during the 1997 Dutch Presidency, we may conclude that in many cases the expected progress was made thanks to political pressure, international obligations or easy agreement between all parties concerned. If no progress was made it was often due to unexpected problems with the Commission proposal. Although it is thus hard to make a methodologically valid evaluation of the way the Netherlands performed as EU Council President, an input–output analysis seems to indicate that the thorough preparation of the 1997 Presidency certainly paid off. The sound bilateral preparatory track enabled the Dutch, on most dossiers, to be sufficiently aware of the different national positions and issue linkages. The Presidency was thus able to formulate package deals and compromises. Member state characteristics may well be a crucial explanatory variable here: precisely because the Netherlands held a middle position as a small(er) member state, this made compromise acceptable to the others. In some instances political involvement was crucial, while in other cases dossiers were sufficiently prepared at the administrative level to be decided in the Council as a so-called ‘B-point’. It may be concluded that, in general, collaboration between the Dutch delegation and the chair, supported by the Council Secretariat, was efficient. Yet, some officials admitted to have been somewhat disappointed in the challenge presented by the Presidency, as a ‘head with two faces’. Although, at first glance, a Presidency seems an excellent opportunity for national ministries to ‘push things through’, in some instances national priorities had to be held back for the sake of a broader strategy or a package deal. As for the output during the Dutch Presidency, two results from the 1998 survey (mentioned in our Introduction) may be particularly noted: first, the supposed role of the Dutch Presidency as honest broker, and second, the input of the co-ordinating authority. To the member state in office the Presidency obviously offers a unique opportunity to table national concerns and priorities. The national government is thus confronted with a large number of domestic stakeholders, all regarding the Presidency as a unique chance to achieve their own preferences. Yet it appears that the Dutch government was not very responsive to all these various demands. When asked, the Dutch civil servants involved in the Presidency considered ‘the realization of national priorities’ as hardly relevant to the Council chair. Instead, mediation, the proper management of the EU’s rolling agenda and the forging of compromises were viewed as the most relevant tasks of the Presidency; in short the Presidency was seen as a facilitator and honest broker. The biannual informal General Council meeting, which provides a unique opportunity to ‘set the scene’, was mentioned as being one of the few opportunities for a Presidency to table national concerns. The officials involved in the 1997 Dutch Presidency thus subscribed en masse to a

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minimal definition of Presidency role: the chair as bureaucrat and as facilitator of compromises. In answer to the question as to how such a complex issue as Presidency performance should be evaluated, nearly one-third of the officials responding to the survey indicated that in this evaluation the degree of efficiency in the management and presiding over the different meetings, rather than the initiation of EU legislation, should be the main criterion. Hence the credo of the Netherlands was that the Presidency demands a fundamentally different attitude from the ‘common’ representation of national interests. Performance as President depends not so much on ‘scoring results’ but rather on proper co-operation with the other member states and with the EU institutions. The Dutch, therefore, deliberately presented their small number of national preferences (e.g. in the field of environmental policy) as ‘European’ rather than ‘national’ priorities. Behind the Dutch adoption of this role concept was the assumption of the existence within the EU of a so-called ‘institutional memory’ (i.e. the idea that a modest role perception would pay off in the future). For this reason, the Dutch Presidency deliberately opted for a pragmatic approach; for instance, during the regular meetings of the Agriculture Council on the annual package deal of market prices. The role perception of all officials involved (and ultimately that of the Agriculture Minister) was that of a neutral chair, assisting the Commission in forging coalitions between the member states. However, in EU negotiations there has never been proof of the existence of an institutional memory. The idea is highly contested because in the ever-changing EU network system one is never sure to meet the actual negotiator eye to eye again. A second result of the 1998 survey worth mentioning here is related to the co-ordinating role of the Foreign Ministry. The Dutch way of interdepartmental co-ordination of EU affairs is characterized by accommodating and embedding different interests through a policy of consensus and compromise among stakeholders; the notorious ‘Polder Model’. Since in public administration ministerial autonomy is a key value, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a modest role in the sense that, although formally the co-ordinating authority for Dutch EU policy, it does not possess instruments to enforce co-ordination or compliance with a broader strategy. Similar to most member states, the ministry most involved is in charge of the preparation and representation of the national position with regard to the dossier at hand. It may therefore come as no surprise that in the 1998 survey more than one-third of respondents said that regular contact with the Foreign Ministry did not play a decisive role in the 1997 Presidency. A lack of staff and of expertise concerning the relatively technical dossiers overloading the Presidency agenda may be one of the reasons for this apparent perception of the line ministries that it is perfectly possible to act on their own.

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The Netherlands’ 1997 Presidency explained The general impression of the 1997 Dutch Presidency is that of a wellorganized and well-prepared Presidency but, as regards ambitions, also as a modest, subservient if not subdued Presidency. From a historical perspective this is rather striking. As one of the EU’s ‘founding fathers’, the Netherlands has always been reputed for its supranational preference, with regard to the course and set-up of the European integration process. This explains why during the IGC leading up to the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991 the Dutch used their Presidency to present more radical proposals for revision of the treaty. From this perspective, the Dutch Presidency of 1997, too – and certainly the ongoing IGC – seemed to present the Netherlands with an excellent opportunity to leave a mark on the integration process. So, what explains this rather subdued approach? A possible explanation may be that the Dutch had concluded that it would be in their own interest to take a more modest approach towards the 1997 Presidency. Consistent with rationalist thinking, they may have considered reputational concerns. As noted above, the government also believed that a modest approach would pay off in the long run. An interpretation in sociological terms is, however, also credible. As may be inferred from statements made by Dutch officials in the months following the Presidency, a subdued and modest role conception is considered ‘inherent’ in the position and function of the EU Presidency. In this sense, the Netherlands to a large extent adhered to what may be called a traditional role conception of the Council Presidency, i.e. taking care of the going concerns, and acting as an honest broker between the conflicting interests of the other member states. Needless to say, this leaves little or no room to pursue national interests. It recalls the image of the Netherlands as a broker and a bridge-builder, a role that seemed even more pivotal in view of the successful conclusion of the IGC. This may also explain why the Dutch Presidency of 1997 concentrated on the administrative and organizational roles of the Chair and on its role as mediator, rather than on initiating new policies or on agenda-setting. Even more important, in the Dutch perception there seemed no inherent contradiction between an impartial Presidency and the Dutch national interest. A subdued and modest Presidency was regarded as a prerequisite for developing further the integration process, which, in the end, is in the Dutch interest. Or, as Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo put it: ‘We are restrained because we are ambitious.’ The difference with the 1991 Presidency is striking. In 1991 the Netherlands actively tried to set the IGC agenda, and in 1997 the Dutch government refrained from such efforts. But the experience of ‘Black Monday’ is said to have traumatized Dutch EU policy and may explain this difference in approach towards the 1991 and 1997 Presidencies. Whatever the actual effects of this event, circumstances of a more structural nature must also

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be taken into consideration in an attempt to explain the Dutch role conception. The assumption is here that a member state’s positioning as President of the EU Council is influenced by at least three variables: the European agenda and its complexities; a member state’s attitude towards the integration process (in terms of both capacity to influence and preferences); and, finally, domestic factors and international developments. From this perspective, a number of circumstances and considerations deserve further attention. First, the Netherlands had to cope with a European agenda, which was not only extensive but also contained a number of controversial and sensitive issues within the IGC framework, in particular on the topic of institutional reform. According to some observers, the Netherlands was even facing ‘a mission impossible’. It was imperative to the Dutch Presidency to prevent a stalemate in negotiations and to come up with a treaty text. Hence it was not in the Dutch Presidency’s interest to raise high expectations about the possible outcome of the IGC or to introduce ambitious proposals of its own making. The Dutch Presidency faced further complications following political developments in a number of key member states. To the Dutch it was quite clear that it would be impossible to make any progress with the proposed EU treaty reforms as long as the Conservative government remained in 10 Downing Street. How much room the Presidency would have for political manoeuvre in the IGC’s final stages therefore depended to a large extent on the outcome of the British elections. The EU’s political landscape was complicated even further when President Chirac lost the French parliamentary elections he had called for in April 1997. This election led to a period of co-habitation with a socialist Prime Minister, Jospin, who immediately began to press for improved European efforts in the sensitive field of European employment policy. This development complicated the final stage of negotiations on the Treaty of Amsterdam. To be fair, the Dutch approach itself did not always prove very helpful either. At the European summit in Amsterdam, the conflict which arose between the Netherlands and Belgium about the allocation of voting weights in the Council did not contribute to a successful conclusion of the negotiations on the urgently required institutional reforms. This may explain to some extent why the Protocol on institutional reform as agreed upon in Amsterdam has been labelled a ‘Protocol of failure’. The demand for a greater voting weight than the other small(er) member states may in its turn be illustrative of a shift in the Dutch attitude towards the European integration process, particularly with regard to the issue of how to pursue the Dutch interests. The traditional supranational position of the Netherlands was challenged as a result of (the prospect of) enlargement, of German reunification and of the fact that in the course of the 1990s the Netherlands had become a net contributor to the Union’s budget. The traditional transatlantic inclination of the Dutch in security

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matters became untenable as a result of the end of the Cold War and of the changing position of the United States. Or, to put it differently, the pillars of Dutch post-Second World War foreign policy were under pressure, resulting in the emergence of a feeling of unease and uncertainty about a renewed Dutch orientation towards EU co-operation. It may therefore be argued that the 1997 Presidency coincided with a period of reflection on the basic assumptions underlying the Dutch EU policy, a reflection that led eventually to what has been called a much more pragmatic approach towards the European Union. The formulation of a clear and ambitious EU policy as regards the Council Presidency may also have been hindered by the growing involvement of a large number of actors in EU affairs, in particular the line ministries. This engagement of different stakeholders in the domestic co-ordination of any national EU policy is the direct result of the wellknown Europeanization of domestic policy and politics in the member states. Rather paradoxically, the new European engagement of a wide range of domestic actors may thus obstruct rather than facilitate the performance of the EU Presidency. This development has had at least some complicating effects as far as the preparation of national positions for the Dutch Presidency is concerned. First, the sheer number of actors participating in the co-ordination process and the number of interests to be taken into account has increased substantially. Second, as regards Dutch ambitions and preferences, a number of line ministries did not support the Dutch traditional supranational view of European integration unconditionally. These new players in the EU arena have been shown to be in favour of a more intergovernmental approach towards European integration, resulting in the Dutch view on European integration becoming more diverse and differentiated. A third reason for the more pragmatic Dutch position in Europe may be the fact that the European integration process can no longer be considered a ‘free lunch’. As illustrated by the conflict between the Netherlands and France about the former’s liberal drugs policy, basic societal values and traditions are often at stake which considerably complicate member state co-operation as well as domestic policy preparation processes. Finally, the lack of consensus about the European Union’s further development within the Purple coalition (left- and right-wing liberals and social democrats) which made up the government at the time of the 1997 Dutch Presidency should be mentioned here. Until the early 1990s, European policy in the Netherlands may be said to have been an elite-driven process, based firmly on the principles of permissive consensus and widely supported by all main political parties. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Maastricht, slight fractures started to appear in this political constellation. The right-wing liberals, in particular their political leader at the time, Frits Bolkestein, took the lead in an upsurge of what may even be called ‘Euro-scepticism’. They began to question the wisdom of further

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(political) integration within the EU framework. In view of this lack of support and lack of consensus within the ruling coalition, it became increasingly difficult for the Dutch government to present a clear and ambitious programme for its EU Presidency. This particular political landscape may well have hampered domestic co-ordination processes and may have influenced the Netherlands’ modest perception of the opportunities presented by the 1997 EU Council Presidency.

Conclusion How can the 1997 Dutch EU Council Presidency be characterized in terms of the analytical scheme as discussed in the Introduction to this volume? First, as far as the leading role concept is concerned, some clear differences between the Presidencies of 1991 and 1997 may be observed. Due to a number of factors, as analysed in the preceding paragraph, the Dutch approach towards the EU Presidency gradually shifted away from the opportunities of the Presidency for agenda-setting to an approach in which more emphasis was placed upon efficient organization and mediation. Being one of the smaller member states, the EU Presidency constituted for the Netherlands the main foreign policy priority during the latter half of 1996 and the first half of 1997. This intensified further when it became clear that the Intergovernmental Conference was to be concluded under the Dutch Presidency. The dual challenge imposed an additional burden on administrative skills. It may be concluded that the Netherlands dealt rather efficiently and smoothly with the organizational tasks of the 1997 Presidency, mainly thanks to timely and effective preparation. Leadership was exerted in an entrepreneurial style, constantly aiming for compromises between the member states – except, perhaps, during the final stage of the IGC. As far as such behaviour is regarded as characteristic of the smaller member states, country features did indeed play a role. In addition, the Dutch role conception of the 1997 Presidency was determined strongly by what is called the ‘logic of appropriateness’, in particular the expectations and normative arrangements that surround the institution of the EU Presidency in general. In evaluating the 1997 Presidency, Dutch observers, as they did in 1991, have been rather harsh in their judgement of the public administration in general and certain politicians in particular. However, it is remarkable that this time their criticism has concentrated on the Dutch negotiating stance, which was judged as having been too modest and subdued. Since at the time of writing the political situation in the Netherlands has changed, one may only guess what the Dutch position will be in 2004, when the Netherlands will again be at the helm of the European Union Council.

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Note 1

This and the following sections is based upon an ex-post evaluation survey of the Dutch Presidency conducted by the Clingendael Institute. The study aimed at an analysis of the management and goal attainment on a number of 1997 Presidency dossiers. A written survey was conducted among 200 Dutch officials involved in the EU Presidency and a select number of them were interviewed (Instituut Clingendael (1998) ‘Het Nederlandse Raadsvoorzitterschap geëvalueerd’).

References Langendoen, M. and Pijpers, A. (2002) ‘The Netherlands: The mixed fruits of pragmatism’, in F. Laursen (ed.), The Amsterdam Treaty: National Preference Formation, Interstate Bargaining and Outcome, Odense: Odense Unversity Press, pp. 267–89. Pijpers, A. and Vanhoonacker, S. (1997) ‘The position of the Benelux countries’, in G. Edwards and A. Pijpers (eds), The Politics of the European Treaty Reform; The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond, London and Washington, DC: Pinter, pp. 119–41. Rozemond, S. (1991) De gang naar Maastricht, The Hague: Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen Clingendael. van Hulten, M. (1997) ‘Zwarte maandag – Kroniek van een gemiste kans’, in H.H.J. Labohm (ed.), De waterdragers van het Nederlandse Europabeleid; terugblik op 40 jaar DGES, The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, pp. 193–210. Wester, R. (1992) ‘The Netherlands’, in F. Laursen and S. Vanhoonacker (eds), The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, Maastricht: EIPA, pp. 172–5.

6

The British Presidency of 1998 New Labour, new tone? Ian Manners

Introduction In this chapter I will offer some critical reflections on the British Presidency of the EU in a way which promotes comparison with other Presidencies in the period 1997 to 2002. In particular I will try to develop ways of thinking about the evaluation and comparison of Presidencies which takes into account both formal and informal factors. In order to achieve this I will use the framework adopted in this book to examine four functions of the Presidency: administration, agenda-shaping, mediation and representation. In addition, I will argue that the means by which we attempt to evaluate and compare Presidencies is the determining factor in our assessments – efficiency, ambition, expectation and impression are all important in our reading of Presidencies. The British Presidency during the first half of 1998 was the fifth since joining in 1973 – in this respect it might be comparable with those of the third Spanish Presidency of 2002 in terms of administrative experience. As a ‘larger’ member state with an extensive pattern and experience of global relations (Manners and Whitman 2000: 262), Britain’s Presidency might be compared with the French Presidency of 1999 in terms of representational roles. However, I would argue that an important feature of the British Presidency, in terms of comparison, was not experience or size, but the way in which it was led by a new labour government which had been in office for only eight months and was committed to changing the tone of its relations with the rest of the EU: Our Presidency is an opportunity to demonstrate that Britain now has a strong voice in Europe. That the indecision, vacillation and antiEuropeanism of the past have gone. (Blair 1997) Following the arrival in office of the new government led by Tony Blair in May 1997, the British Presidency provides an interesting insight into how a new idealistic government came to terms with one of the most difficult,

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strenuous and brief periods of political office in the EU. Prime Minister Blair, Foreign Minister Robin Cook, European Minister Douglas Henderson and the rest of the Cabinet had practically no experience of administering, agenda-shaping, mediating or representing the EU. Worse still, the ‘bad odour’ left by the previous Conservative administration meant that expectations in Brussels and other member states for New Labour were high; expectations which were heightened further by Labour inexperience (Ludlow 1998: 574; Koutrakou 2000: 73). By this, I mean that the New Labour media machine that had been so successful during the general election vastly exaggerated Britain’s ambitions and achievements – indeed to an incredible extent. However, Presidencies are not shaped by political experience and high expectations alone – Blair had ridden a bicycle of good EU will from Amsterdam to Luxembourg but was presented with an agenda preordained to be largely uneventful. Most importantly of all, the New Labour government was just one part of a British government machine which is often referred to as ‘one of the best in the Union’ (Ludlow 1998: 575; Forster 2000: 51). The question for this government, and for the British Presidency, was whether the ambitions of New Labour and the expectations of its EU partners could be fulfilled in just six short months in 1998. To answer this question I will now turn to look at the way in which the British Presidency fulfilled its four functions by examining a series of examples in each role.

The functioning of the British Presidency In trying to assess the British Presidency it is worth reflecting on the usual method of comparing the priorities or themes set out at the beginning of the Presidency with the outcomes or results in these areas. As we will see below, this approach is problematic because it confuses aspirations and realizations, as well as overlooking the extent to which any Presidency is really in command of its agenda. What we can say about the themes of the British Presidency is that they were undoubtedly ambitious, as the list from Blair’s launch speech (Blair 1997; see also British Government 1998) makes clear: 1 2 3 4 5 6

Economic Reform and Employment Economic and Monetary Union Enlargement and Agenda 2000 Crime, Drugs and the Environment External Relations Involving the British People.

In each of the following sections I will try to analyse these themes, as well as the administration of the whole breadth of EU policies, and the

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handling of externally induced problems and policies. Clearly I cannot hope to provide anything more than a snapshot of the ways in which the British Presidency managed a huge expanse of thousands of meetings, sessions, dossiers and policies. Before going on to analyse the British Presidency it is worth pointing out that it was undoubtedly a ‘long’ Presidency – the keenness for New Labour to take a lead in Europe, together with the advantages of a firsthalf Presidency and the large number of set-piece summits, all meant that Labour’s Presidency consumed far more time, effort and political will than most. Having been out of power for eighteen years and having watched the Conservative government turn Britain into the apparent ‘awkward partner’ of Europe, the new government was incredibly keen to ‘show the British people what the Union really does, instead of the usual absurd stereotypes, and the possibilities it offers, rather than the hackneyed horror stories’ (Henderson 1998: 564). Unlike second-half Presidencies, the Labour government was able to make full use of all six months in office. The British government arranged several summit-level meetings: the EU–Japan meeting in January, the European Conference in March, the Brussels European Council, EU–Russia and EU–US summits in May, and the Cardiff European Council in June. Thus, from Blair’s Presidency launch on 5 December 1997 to his critical reflections on 1 July 1998, Britain’s Presidency of the EU was both long and arduous for New Labour (Cook 1998). Administration The Presidency is an unusual institution, requiring a mix of patience, leadership and an ability to chase progress. (Henderson 1998: 564) As European Minister Henderson was to acknowledge, running the EU Council Presidency required a mixture of skills to be brought to every political occasion, but it is in the area of administering and co-ordinating the Presidency that these skills were most important. First and foremost, the EU Presidency is about administering and co-ordinating the Council of Ministers with the help and support of the Council General Secretariat (Westlake 1999: 50). The recognition of this role is an important determinant of the success of Presidencies and goes some way to explain why smaller member states, such as Luxembourg and Ireland, who have historically worked closely with the Secretariat have often achieved more than larger states, such as France and Britain. What became obvious during the British Presidency was that the General Affairs Council (GAC) might play a more active role in the definition of the general management of Union work. As a result of these reflections the Council was to make some small changes to the rules of

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procedure in 2000, but nothing like those needed or recommended (Agence Europe 1998h; Council of Ministers 2000; Wallace 2002). It was these structural challenges of administration and co-ordination which set the context for the British Presidency – in particular the tendency for difficult and complex issues to drift up the Council hierarchy towards the European Council. In addition, the expansion of tasks over the previous four years (in particular Justice and Home Affairs) had led to the GAC being accused of failing in its role of co-ordination: ‘[t]here is no-one in charge of co-ordination anymore between the too numerous formations of the Council, unless it is the European Council itself, which cannot do everything’ (Jacques Santer, quoted in Agence Europe 1998b). In particular, the problem of organizing and co-ordinating external relations, foreign affairs and meetings with third countries by the Presidency was seen as uneven. The British Presidency took some practical steps towards dealing with these issues. First, the British Presidency is credited by Ludlow with deescalating the ‘drift’ tendency mentioned above, as it succeeded in ensuring that power was returned ‘to where it really belonged’, namely Coreper 1 (Ludlow 1998: 575). Second, under the British Presidency attempts were made to deal with EC business during the morning of the first day of the GAC followed immediately by foreign policy issues. Meetings with third countries were then scheduled during the evening of the first day and the second day of the GAC (Agence Europe 1998h). Third, the British Presidency attempted to reduce the number of Council formations to seventeen and the number of council meetings to forty-five. This compares with the growing average of thirty-five to fortyfive meetings and the growth in formations from fifteen to twenty Councils between 1982 and 1994 (Sherrington 2000: 39). As part of this minimizing of formations, the British Presidency also managed to restrict itself to just eight informal council sessions (including two joint meetings) – a rare feat for a first half Presidency. Interestingly, the British Presidency did revive one formation in the shape of an informal meeting on regional policy and spatial planning held, not surprisingly, in Glasgow. Finally, in addition to enhancing the running of the GAC, the British Presidency took some steps towards improving the administration and management of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In particular the Presidency worked hard to try to finalize the details of the role and size of the Policy Planning and Early-Warning Unit of the CFSP, as well as reaching agreement at Cardiff to appoint the High Representative for CFSP at the Vienna European Council in December 1998 (Agence Europe 1998a, 1998c). Overall, the British Presidency was generally acknowledged to be efficiently run, although there were contrasting appraisals of the performances of the various Council chairs (Ludlow 1998: 575; Shukman 1998; Koutrakou 2000: 73). In comparison to the previous British Presidency,

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the administration of the 1998 Presidency was as good, if not better, as Ludlow suggests: The successes of 1992 . . . were first and foremost a tribute to the way in which skilful officials can compensate for the inadequacies of their temporary masters or mistresses. The class of 1998 were the equals of their predecessors. (Ludlow 1998: 575) Agenda-shaping We did not expect carte blanche to pursue our own priorities, although there were issues on the EU’s agenda to which we attach particular importance. But it remained the EU’s agenda, not a national one. We could raise the profile of some issues, give an extra push to others, but we could not and did not set out to rewrite the agenda. (Henderson 1998: 564) As Henderson reflected, the ability of any Presidency to shape its own agenda is largely conditional on what the chair-holder inherits. The new Labour government developed its own agenda for the Presidency swiftly after the June 1997 Amsterdam European Council. By November 1997, Robin Cook was outlining the Labour priorities including making Europe ‘work for people’, ‘employability’, and tackling ‘crime, drugs and the environment’ (Cook 1997b). In addition, as we will see below, the British government was keen to improve external relations and foreign policy coordination, particularly in light of Labour’s ‘foreign policy with an ethical dimension’ (Cook 1997a). The British Presidency’s attempt at agenda-shaping was thus focused on the ‘third way’ themes of economic reform and employment, as well as crime, drugs and the environment: ‘we must build support for what we call the third way in Europe. The focus for economic reform should be a social model based on improving the employability of the European workforce’ (Blair 1997). Although Blair acknowledged the fact that much of this third way theme was actually determined by the Luxembourg summit, JHA initiatives and the Kyoto summit, he was keen ‘to bring home to people in Europe what Europe can do’ in these areas (Blair 1998). The British government went further by drawing up an ambitious programme and timetable listing sixty-three goals it intended to achieve during its sixmonth Presidency (British Government 1998). Instead of trying to cover all sixty-three goals superficially, I will focus on the major third way themes mentioned above as it will provide us with some measure of the comparative performance of the British Presidency. The first of these was economic reform and employability through the production of ‘national employment action plans’ and the implementation of

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the Commission’s ‘Action Plan for the Single Market’ (both agreed at Luxembourg). The Luxembourg Special European Council on Jobs had agreed that the member states would produce employment action plans in order to compare and contrast ‘best practice’, with particular emphasis on employability, adaptability, entrepreneurship and equal opportunities (British Government 1998). And so they did – by April all member states had submitted their plans for consideration by the Commission and Council, and discussion in Council before taking to the Cardiff summit (Council of Ministers 1998: 6–8; Henderson 1998: 567). At Cardiff it was also agreed that the action plans put the emphasis on education, training and encouragement of SMEs in order to tackle young and long-term unemployed as well as discrimination in the labour market. In the area of the Single Market, the British Presidency was particularly keen to make progress on the Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market (SLIM) initiative, as well as the more intractable problems such as mutual recognition and standards (British Government 1998). Although the Presidency did make some headway in these areas, in particular through simplification rather than harmonization, it was in the area of implementation where most was achieved. As Santer recognized at Cardiff, there had been a 50 per cent increase in the implementation rate of internal market directives, as well as the development of the Commission’s single market scoreboard for monitoring the integration of the internal market and its directives during the first half of 1998 (Agence Europe 1998b; Council of Ministers 1998: 8). Although the European Company Statue was not agreed, the British Presidency was generally acknowledged to have handled the single market implementation problems well. In the areas of employment and economic reform, the British Presidency continued the work of the previous Presidencies, and set the shortterm and medium-term agendas for the subsequent Presidencies. The problems of high and structural unemployment have been prominent on the agenda of the EU for the past fifteen years and will continue to be so for at least the next fifteen years. In short, no EU Presidency in the postSEA era can claim these themes as uniquely their ‘own’, and none will solve the long-term structural problems of the European economy in just six months. However, the British Presidency did achieve its limited strategic objectives of encouraging the exchange of information and best practice, together with simplification, as the means to achieve these longer term goals, as it said it would at the beginning of its term (British Government 1998). It was in the third area of action on crime and drugs that the British Presidency was probably most successful – largely because it was precisely in the area of Justice and Home Affairs that the previous British government had some of its greatest reservations. The turn-around in the British government attitude in May 1997 allowed the Presidency to proceed with a whole range of issues in the third pillar, despite problems with Spain

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over Gibraltar and continued non-participation in the Schengen arrangements. Progress was made in implementing the Action Plan on Organized Crime, including creating a European Judicial Network, among other achievements. More remarkably, the Presidency was able to lean on recalcitrant states to ratify the Europol Convention, as well as finally signing the seven-year-old Convention on Driving Disqualifications (Council of Ministers 1998: 14–15; Henderson 1998: 568; Ludlow 1998: 577). The final area of priority was that of the environment. The Commission began the long-term goal of mainstreaming sustainable development (as required by the Treaty of Amsterdam) by submitting a draft strategy at Cardiff. The Presidency was successful in tough negotiations in the Environment Council over achieving the EU’s commitment of 8 per cent emissions reduction negotiated at Kyoto. In addition, the Presidency was able to achieve agreements on protecting biodiversity including directives on standards in zoos and the use of drift nets in fishing. Finally, the continued challenge of tackling poor air quality, particularly in cities, was met partially through the auto-oil package. Although the difficulty of coordinating environmental policy in all the formations of the Council was still apparent, the British Presidency was congratulated for its leadership in the environment and throwing off the ‘dirty man of Europe’ title (Lean 1998). Overall, the British Presidency may be seen to have achieved many of those priorities which were attainable. In contrast, most of those priorities, which it obviously did not achieve, in particular those involving employment and economic reform, were simply not attainable in such a short time-scale. The search for practical results and an ability to chase progress were characteristic of the British Presidency. In comparison to the previous British Presidency, the agenda-shaping ability of the 1998 Presidency was undoubtedly better because its agenda was not shaped by ‘domestic dissatisfaction with European issues’ and it was not seen to use its Presidency to primarily ‘block the passage’ of European legislation as was the case in 1992 (Sherrington 2000: 44). Mediation [I]t is hardly shocking that some decisions [choosing the President of the ECB] of such long-term significance proved contentious. The fact is that we avoided deadlock and achieved a positive result . . . the Prime Minister was right to keep partners at the negotiating table until a solution was found, and showed the advantages of having a genuinely neutral umpire in the chair. (Henderson 1998: 566) Although important, the third way agenda was actually secondary to the themes of Economic and Monetary Union, and Enlargement and Agenda

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2000 during the British Presidency. Because Britain was not going to be an early member of the single currency, and had lesser vested interests in enlargement than many member states, it might have been thought that it would have been able to mediate successfully in these two areas. In many respects it was, but it was the inexperience of New Labour in Europe which was to be the most memorable feature of the British Presidency’s attempts at mediation. As Henderson commented later, Britain did have the advantage of being a ‘genuinely neutral umpire’ – but no one else in Europe plays cricket. Similar to the two previous sections, I will try to derive some insight into the British Presidency’s attempts at mediation by focusing on a series of examples, rather than trying a more encompassing approach. First, and notoriously, the British Presidency was to suffer at the hands of French nationalism over the decision to allow Wim Duisenberg, President of the European Monetary Institute, to continue his role as President of the institute’s successor, the European Central Bank (ECB). Exactly a year and a day after sweeping to power in Britain, Tony Blair found himself chairing a special May Day weekend EMU Council in Brussels to finalize membership and confirm the President of the ECB. Blair wound up looking ‘unprepared and ill at ease’ as he found himself having to negotiate a compromise between the Dutch Duisenberg and his French challenger Trichet (The Economist 1998b). Worse still, the ‘mess’ was compounded by the way in which Blair tried to resolve the issue without using the plenary weight of the other twelve member states to shame the French (The Economist 1998c). Second, the British Presidency also needed to mediate the beginnings of the six-year crawl towards enlargement and budgetary reform launched at the European Conference meeting in London and the Commission’s Agenda 2000 proposals during March. Although no particular skills were needed for the European Conference, continued mediation and diplomacy were necessary to deal with the fall-out from not inviting Turkey to begin accession negotiations (Gower 2000: 131–2). Unfortunately, despite much effort from the British Presidency, Turkey declined an invitation to attend the European Conference. The far more difficult mediation was that surrounding the Agenda 2000 reform proposals based on the Commission’s estimation that it was possible to enlarge the EU as early as 2003 without breaking a budgetary ceiling of own resources of 1.27 per cent of EU GNP (Gower 2000: 128). Not surprisingly, the Agenda 2000 negotiations were to continue until their resolution at a special European Council in March 1999 under the German Presidency. Given that the Germans are the biggest contributors to the budget, and that the European Parliament was to be re-elected in June 1999, it is highly unlikely that the British (or the Austrian) Presidency could have mediated any solutions in this area. Also within the context of budgetary reforms was the question of reorganizing regional boundaries and regional aid, which the British Presidency was to mediate. Although the necessity for reforming regional aid

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ahead of enlargement was huge, Britain appears to have benefited from the Commission’s review of EU regional boundaries on one of the very last days of the Presidency. Despite advocating reductions in agricultural and regional support throughout its Presidency, the government also lobbied hard to keep Objective 1 regional funding for as much of Britain as possible – an exception from the otherwise impartial British approach. At the end of its Presidency this strategy appears to have paid off as the ‘Celtic regions’ in general, with Cornwall and West Wales in particular, benefiting from the redrawing of boundaries in order to retain regional aid (Parker and Jowit 1998). Finally, the British Presidency also had to mediate over the Broad Economic Guidelines (BEG) which were submitted for their first consultation at Cardiff. The status of the BEG and the degree of criticism they received are at the heart of an ongoing struggle over the control of economic policy within the Union. On the one hand, Santer and the French Prime Minster Lionel Jospin were keen to see the BEG developed as a tool for macroeconomic co-ordination within the Union (Agence Europe 1998d). On the other hand, a number of less integration-inclined member states were far less keen to allow any form of EU macro-economic government to develop, particularly within the Euro-12 group. Despite Santer’s protestations, the Cardiff summit decided to accept the ‘sweetened’ and ‘disappointing’ BEG of the June Ecofin, rather than the tougher criticisms demanded by Jospin (Agence Europe 1998e; Council of Ministers 1998: 5; Ludlow 1998: 579). Overall, the British Presidency was on an incredibly steep learning curve during its six months of office. While it is generally acknowledged that the British were able to play an honest broker role in several important areas of Council business (such as enlargement, EMU and CAP), it is undoubtedly true that Blair and his Cabinet colleagues underestimated the strength of feelings held by several member states in areas such as EMU and CAP (Agence Europe 1998g; Hughes and Smith 1998: 99; Koutrakou 2000: 46, 56). In comparison to the previous British Presidency, however, the mediation of the 1998 Presidency was clearly exempt from ‘the main criticism made of the 1992 British Presidency . . . that the Government too often chaired meetings in a way that advanced its own narrow interest at the expense of the general good’ (George and Sowemimo 1998: 19). Representation In a sense, external affairs is the area least under the control of an individual Presidency. On many dossiers the Presidency inherits wellestablished negotiating positions. In other areas, new crises flare up beyond the Union’s boundaries. In contrast to the largely predictable progress of most first pillar business, Member States face unexpected problems that demand rapid action. (Henderson 1998: 569–70)

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Although Henderson is correct in his assessment of the unpredictability of the Presidency’s role in representing the EU externally, in many respects the British tour of duty was not as unexpected as others. The British Presidency was largely in command of the task of representing the EU, with much of its agenda internally rather than externally driven, with the exception, for example, of crises in Algeria, Iraq and Kosovo. I will focus on three indicative elements of the British Presidency’s task of representing the EU: international initiatives, procedural relations and crisis management. A key element of New Labour government policy in 1997 had been the commitment to an ethical dimension in foreign policy which promoted ‘good international citizenship’ (Wheeler and Dunne 1998). What is interesting in the analysis of the British Presidency is the way in which this commitment developed into EU international initiatives: ‘Europe must play a major role on the world stage – a role that is open and outward looking, strong in its advocacy of free trade, human rights and democratic values’ (Blair 1997). This advocacy was to lead to a number of initiatives in human rights and arms exports, as well as progress on international treaties. In particular, the British Presidency was able to oversee the agreement on guidelines for EU policy towards third countries on the death penalty as part of its commitment to internationalize human rights (Manners 2002). Similarly, the Presidency was also able to encourage agreement on an EU code of conduct on arms exports which proposed to regulate a common approach to arms sales by EU states. Of equal significance was the slow progress made in maintaining the EU line on establishing the International Criminal Court during 1998 (Council of Ministers 1998: 33). While the British Presidency was relatively successful in its international initiatives, it is inevitably the huge number of procedural relations constituting the EU’s network of global relations which presented the greatest challenge. In addition to the three big set-piece summits with Japan, Russia and the USA mentioned above, the Presidency had to coordinate and/or represent the EU in meetings with the San José and Rio groups (in Costa Rica and Panama during February); the ACP group (in Barbados during May); and with the Euro-Med group (in Palermo during June). Furthermore, Cook’s ground-breaking tour of the Middle East during March (followed by Blair during April) went some way towards developing a more open common policy by the EU in its support for the Palestinian state (Council of Ministers 1998: 28). Inevitably it is crisis management which tests the Presidency the most, and in this area the British Presidency, like most EU Presidencies, was found wanting. The combination of structural factors such as institutional and operational weakness, with more actor-oriented factors such as lack of political will and commitment, ensures that EU Presidencies have great difficulty in representing the Union in times of crisis (The Economist

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1998a; Wright 2000: 171). However, the British Presidency was compromised further by its desire to please the USA in most issues of foreign policy – in particular in the former Yugoslavia and over Iraq. The British Presidency made seventy-seven declarations and statements on behalf of the EU – with the greatest number regarding events in Nigeria, Algeria, Kosovo, Israel/Palestine, Iraq and Indonesia/East Timor. These declarations reflect the extent to which the British Presidency found itself having to respond to ongoing crises, three of which were problematic for the Presidency. First, in Algeria the Presidency tried to implement a new EU initiative on humanitarian aid and political dialogue during early January, although unwillingness to confront the Algerian government rendered the initiative unproductive (Wheeler and Dunne 1998: 866–7). Second, in Iraq British support for the US position on weapons inspection, rather than attempting to achieve EU consensus, ensured that the CFSP was rendered ‘worthless’ and that Blair was accused of being Clinton’s ‘poodle’ by France (The Economist 1998c: 41; Anderson 1999: 64). Similarly, in Kosovo the EU and its Presidency was forced to follow the USA and NATO’s lead against Yugoslavia, although the Cardiff summit did agree on a declaration on Kosovo (Council of Ministers 1998: 35–7). Overall, the British Presidency had its successes and failures in representing the EU in the world. Its successes in human rights activities, agreeing a mandate for negotiating the future Lomé Convention, and in overcoming EU–US problems of extraterritoriality and trade were all broadly overlooked. Instead, much blame was put on the British Presidency for its handling of crises such as Algeria, Iraq and Kosovo (Shukman 1998). It may be argued that Britain’s extensive network of global relations was to prove as much a hindrance as a help, in particular the baggage of its so-called ‘special relationship’. In comparison to the previous British Presidency, the representation of the 1998 Presidency was probably better, although this is almost impossible to judge due to the different international contexts. What may be said is that the same issues, which weakened the 1992 British Presidency in terms of representation (relations with the USA and NATO, Iraq and the former Yugoslavia), were still to be important during the 1998 Presidency. However, the 1998 British Presidency was one that was informed, if not defined, by principles of good international citizenship. This was not something that could have been said of the 1992 Presidency.

Explaining variations in role performance Having now considered the functioning of the British Presidency, I will try briefly to account for variation in role performance in terms of commonsensical rationalist explanations and belief-driven constructivist explanations for Presidency performance.

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Rationalist explanations for Presidency performance In fairness, Europe is too big and the powers of the Presidency too small for six months’ possession of them to mean very much. Mr Blair would have to have been a magician to have achieved all of his ambitious goals. But if the Presidency really was a test of Britain’s ability to lead in Europe, it has failed. (The Economist 1998c: 41) As I have discussed in this chapter, the British Presidency set itself six major themes and sixty-three goals it wanted to achieve by the end of its Presidency. To the eight-month-old New Labour government this did not seem remarkable or unattainable – it had waited eighteen years to demonstrate that it was willing and able to undertake ‘a test for Britain to show that we can and do offer strong leadership in Europe’ (Blair 1997). From the perspective of those outside government such ambitions were as remarkable as they were unachievable – many of the dossiers which fell under the broad British theme of third way reform had very, very long shelf lives. From a rationalist perspective the British ambition may be seen as a fairly logical attempt to change the attitudes of Europeans towards Britain, and Britain’s towards the EU, as part of the ‘rebranding’ of New Labour and new Britain. Such an approach had yielded rich dividends for the Labour party in the preceding five years as it had ditched its old Labour image and climbed aboard the ‘cool Britannia’ media bandwagon. Similarly, the spreading of the third way doctrine beyond the British shoreline was also a logical extension of both successful domestic political strategy and a continuation of British national interests by other means. To many outside Britain, the 1998 Presidency’s pursuit of employability, single market and CAP reform did not sound so very different from the 1992 Presidency’s demands for flexible labour, product and capital markets, as well as CAP reform. The major difference between previous naked pursuit of British national interest, and that practised by the 1998 British Presidency was the desire to ‘involve the British people’ and the use of excessive media spin in explaining the successes of the Presidency. Again, this may seem like the fairly logical desire of the British government to play to a domestic audience, in particular the Murdoch media empire, and thus ensure continued political success. If true, this explanation leaves us wondering why the media management of the Presidency was so bad that it was universally condemned for its ignorance and arrogance by the EU partners (Bates 1998: 32; Ludlow 1998: 580; Anderson 1999: 64; Koutrakou 2000: 73). The answer to this logical inconsistency in explaining the British Presidency can only be found by resorting to ‘beliefs’ – the Blair government believed it was acting perfectly rationally. Blair and his government believed they

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could involve the British people, believed they could make Europe work for the people of Europe, and believed they could lead in Europe. To understand these beliefs we have to escape the analytical strait-jacket of rational explanations and turn instead to constructivist explanations. Constructivist explanations for Presidency performance It is difficult to define the ‘tone’ of a Presidency. It is however relatively easy to canvass the judgements of those who saw the Presidency at close quarters. On that basis, the 1998 UK Presidency emerges with flying colours. (Ludlow 1998: 578) Ludlow’s evaluation of the British Presidency could not be more different from that of The Economist cited above. From this perspective the Presidency did not fail, but passed with flying colours. We are thus presented with an analytical problem that is difficult to overcome from within the rationalist perspective – colour (or beauty) is in the eye of the beholder, by which I mean our evidence, evaluation and explanation of the British Presidency is subjective. From this subjective or constructed perspective the Presidency was a success (Ludlow, Laffan and Gower’s view), a mixture of success and failure (Anderson, Shukman and Koutrakou’s view), or a failure (Bates’ and The Economist view). By taking a constructivist approach to analysing the Presidency we are forced to reflect not only on the empirical evidence we use to substantiate our analyses, but also the beliefs and normative positions of those we analyse, those who analyse, and ourselves. In sum, constructivist explanations for the British Presidency performance are as contested as they are difficult to derive clearly. Rather than trying to deconstruct the social motivations and context of those involved in running the British Presidency, I would suggest that it might be more productive to focus on the discourses used by, and surrounding, those involved in both conducting and analysing the British Presidency. Although this methodology provides no concrete explanations for the Presidency performance, and, as I have suggested, neither do rationalist approaches, it does allow us to make some informed and reflective judgements regarding the Presidency. The first element of discourse I would identify is that surrounding the term ‘tone’, as used by Ludlow to encapsulate the achievement of the Presidency. What is clear in this particular discourse is that the tone of the Presidency is the most important factor determining the success or otherwise of future British relations with the rest of the EU. Thus the tone of the relationship, and therefore the nature and quality of social relations, are considered to be as important as the material components of Britain’s relations with the EU. Laffan also uses this type of discourse, but goes further:

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In many respects Laffan is reflecting the discourse of the British government which Blair and Cook used repeatedly throughout the Presidency, as did many other observers. In this type of discourse we can see an attempt to emphasize the difference between the 1998 and previous Presidencies: ‘[i]t will allow the government to claim that it was their constructive approach to Europe, in contrast to the Tories’ confrontational stance, that made the move [lifting the British beef ban] possible’ (Assinder 1998). The final element of discourse is located in the notions of ‘tone’ and ‘constructive engagement’, but goes much further – it invokes possibly the most sought-after prize of Britain’s relations with Europe: ‘normality’. In this discourse, Ludlow and Gijs de Vries claim that the British Presidency had normalized relations between Britain and the EU (Agence Europe 1998f; Ludlow 1998: 583). From an analytical perspective it has to be said that if these claims are even fractionally true then the 1998 Presidency was undoubtedly the most important and successful of the past twenty-five years. Constructivist explanations help us to come to terms with much of the ‘irrational’ elements of the British Presidency – in particular the extent to which it should not be explained in terms of political outcomes such as policy reforms, but in more important terms of social relations such as the normalization of Britain’s relations with the rest of the EU. As mentioned above, the British Presidency saw its primary role as providing leadership in the EU. Blair, Cook and Henderson all referred to the desire for Britain to fulfil a leader role, with particular reference to championing the third way agenda of free trade, human rights and democratic values ‘on the world stage’ (Blair 1997; Cook 1998; Henderson 1998: 572). This role proved increasingly unsustainable as the Presidency progressed, as the British leader role was undermined by the USA in foreign policy and by France and Germany in internal policy. The aspiration to lead was most symbolically ended by the exclusion of the chair of the Ecofin Council, Gordon Brown, from the inaugural meeting of the Austrian-led Euro-11 group meeting in Luxembourg in June. The secondary role for the British Presidency was to act as ‘honest broker’ in the launch of the EMU and the negotiation of other controversial dossiers such as enlargement, CAP and regional policy (Blair 1998; Koutrakou 2000: 46). Britain was far more successful in its broker role than in its leader role, largely because of the nature of the dossiers, but also because of the keenness for British ministers and officials to be seen as ‘neutral umpires’. Although the British Presidency did not specifically set out to play a bureaucrat role during its six months it is probably this role which was played the best. Almost all involved in, or witnessing, the British Presidency commented

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that its role was characterized by general efficiency in the administration and co-ordination of the Council. Finally, the British Presidency tried to shape the agenda of the EU in a third way direction. However, as we have already seen, this attempt by the British Presidency to play a bargainer role was largely unattainable because of the long-term nature of many third way aims and the problems which they seek to overcome.

Conclusion: from six months to ten years On the day after the British Presidency of the EU Council of Ministers ended, Tony Blair made possibly the most important decision of the sixmonth period when he ordered a complete review of Britain’s approach to the EU (Peston 1998). Although it had taken six months, the New Labour leader had learned more from the Presidency than his predecessors had in as many years: that it would take ten more years before Britain could completely normalize its relations with the rest of the EU and play a more influential role. The British Presidency had not succeeded in involving the British people, as public opinion polling conducted by the Commission seemed to suggest that only 36 per cent of the British people were even aware that Britain held the Presidency (Commission 2001: 99). This figure was significantly lower than the 52 per cent level of awareness during the 1992 British Presidency and the lowest recorded since the 22 per cent level of awareness during the 1986 British Presidency. Finally, despite doing everything possible to smooth relations with the Murdoch media empire, at the end of the Presidency the Sun, a Murdoch-run xenophobic English newspaper, described Blair as ‘the most dangerous man in Europe’. Overall the 1998 British Presidency must be regarded as one of the most important, for, besides its administration being good, its agendashaping reasonable, its mediation uneven and its representation sometimes difficult, it did mark an important step in New Labour understanding. This understanding is now that ten years, rather than six months, would be needed for Britain and Europe to transform their views of each other, and for Britain to become a ‘normal’ member state of the European Union: At the Cardiff summit, the last great event of the British Presidency there is one widely-held conclusion: that the Presidency was strong on efficiency and the search for practical results, but weak on achieving its own ambitious target of transforming in just six months the way Britain and the rest of Europe view each other. (Shukman 1998)

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References Agence Europe (1998a) ‘EU/CFSP’, Europe Daily Bulletin, No. 7193, 2 April 1998. Agence Europe (1998b) ‘EU/European Council’, Europe Daily Bulletin, No. 7241, 15 June 1998. Agence Europe (1998c) ‘EU/Cardiff Summit’, Europe Daily Bulletin, No. 7243, 17 June 1998. Agence Europe (1998d) ‘EU/European Council’, Europe Daily Bulletin, No. 7242, 15 June 1998. Agence Europe (1998e) ‘PE/European Council’, Europe Daily Bulletin, No. 7245, 19 June 1998. Agence Europe (1998f) ‘EP/Cardiff Summit’, Europe Daily Bulletin, No. 7246, 20 June 1998. Agence Europe (1998g) ‘EU/Agriculture’, Europe Daily Bulletins, No. 7251, 27 June 1998. Agence Europe (1998h) ‘EU/Council Functioning’, Europe Daily Bulletin, No. 7297, 10 September 1998. Anderson, P. (1999) ‘The British Presidency of 1998’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (Annual Review): 63–4. Assinder, N. (1998) ‘Blair to reject attacks on EU Presidency’, 15 June 1998, http://news.bbc.ac.uk Bates, S. (1998) ‘Europe falls out of love with Tony’, New Statesman, 31 July 1998, pp. 31–2. Blair, T. (1997) ‘Europe working for people’, speech by the Prime Minster at the EU Presidency Launch, Waterloo Station, London, 5 December 1997. Blair, T. (1998) ‘Opening statements from a press conference given by the Prime Minister and Mr Jacques Santer’, London, 8 January 1998. British Government (1998) ‘British Council Presidency’s programme and timetable for the half-year in progress’, in Agence Europe, Europe Documents, No. 2070, 28 January 1998. Commission (2001) Standard Eurobarometer, 55, Fieldwork April–May 2001, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/ Cook, R. (1997a) ‘British foreign policy’, speech by the Foreign Minister at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 12 May 1997. Cook, R. (1997b) ‘The British Presidency – giving Europe back to the people’, speech to the Institute for European Affairs, Dublin, 2 November 1997. Cook, R. (1998) ‘British Presidency of the EU, Jan–Jun 1998’, speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 25 June 1998. Council of Ministers (1998) ‘Presidencies Conclusions – Cardiff, 15 and 16 June 1998’, Brussels: Council of Ministers, SN 150/98. Council of Ministers (2000) ‘Council Decision of 5 June 2000 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure’, Official Journal, 23 June 2000. Economist, The (1998a) ‘Cook’s lumpy foreign broth’, The Economist, 29 January 1998. Economist, The (1998b) ‘Enter the euro’, The Economist, 7 May 1998. Economist, The (1998c) ‘Tony Blair’s Waterloo’, The Economist, 13 June 1998, p. 41. Forster, A. (2000) ‘Britain’, in Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (eds), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 44–63.

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George, S. and Sowemimo, M. (1998) ‘Europe looks to London’, The World Today, January, pp. 18–20. Gower, J. (2000) ‘EU enlargement: The current agenda’, in V. Koutrakou with L. Emerson (eds), The European Union and Britain: Debating the Challenges Ahead, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 126–40. Henderson, D. (1998) ‘The UK Presidency: An insider’s view’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 36 (4): 563–72. Hughes, K. and Smith, E. (1998) ‘New Labour – New Europe?’, International Affairs, 74 (1): 93–104. Koutrakou, V. (2000) ‘The British Presidency’, in V. Koutrakou with L. Emerson (eds), The European Union and Britain: Debating the Challenges Ahead, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 44–77. Laffan, B. (1999) ‘Developments in the Member States’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (Annual Review): 169–85. Lean, G. (1998) ‘How Britain came clean’, Independent on Sunday, 5 July 1998. Ludlow, P. (1998) ‘The 1998 UK Presidency: A view from Brussels’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 36 (4): 573–83. Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2): 235–58. Manners, I. and Whitman, R. (2000) ‘Conclusions’, in I. Manners and R. Whitman (eds), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 243–73. Parker, G. and Jowit, J. (1998) ‘Cornwall and West Wales set for big boost in EU regional aid’, Financial Times, 30 June, p. 22. Peston, R. (1998) ‘Blair orders review of UK role in Europe’, Financial Times, 1 July, p. 1. Sherrington, P. (2000) The Council of Ministers: Political Authority in the European Union, London: Pinter. Shukman, D. (1998) ‘Six months of success?’, Special Report on the Cardiff Summit, 15 June 1998, http://news.bbc.ac.uk Wallace, H. (2002) ‘The Council: An institutional chameleon?’, Governance, 15 (3): 325–44. Westlake, M. (1999) The Council of the European Union (revised edn), London: John Harper. Wheeler, N. and Dunne, T. (1998) ‘Good international citizenship: A third way for British foreign policy’, International Affairs, 74 (4): 847–70. Wright, K. (2000) ‘Comprehensive European security: Integrating the military and civil dimensions’, in V. Koutrakou with L. Emerson (eds), The European Union and Britain: Debating the Challenges Ahead, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 155–72.

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The Finnish Presidency of 1999 Pragmatism and the promotion of Finland’s position in Europe Teija Tiilikainen

Finland’s Presidency of the EU, occurring in the second half of 1999, was regarded as the greatest international challenge since Finland’s independence. Finland had to cope with the task only four and a half years after it had joined the EU, which increased the Presidency period’s role as the first real showcase for national EU policy. The Finnish state administration took the task very seriously – preparations for the Presidency began years before the term of office. While the domestic preconditions for a successful Presidency seemed excellent, the external conditions were extremely challenging, with an overburdened agenda and an inexperienced Commission. This chapter provides an analysis of the first Finnish Presidency in the EU with an emphasis on the national identities and interests that affected Presidency behaviour. First, the conditions that shaped Finnish Presidency role performance are discussed. Finnish cultural and historical experiences that help us understand Finnish Presidency behaviour are scrutinized, as are the immediate national and international conditions surrounding the Finnish Presidency. Second, the role performance of the Finnish Presidency is analysed with the help of rationalist and sociological theoretical approaches (cf. the Introduction to this volume). In explaining concrete action, these models cannot, however, be treated separately, as definitions of an actor’s interests are based upon a political identity. What one can do is to point out the order of importance between these types of explanation in the context of individual, concrete processes.

Foundations of Finnish EU policy: Finnish national identities Finland’s integration policy cannot be explained without paying attention to past experiences and the way these are interpreted. By this I refer to the bases of national identity. Finnish political culture is by tradition highly state-centric (Tiilikainen 1998; cf. Jakobson 1998). This culture has its roots in the way ‘Finland’ as a political entity, and later as a nation, came into being. Finland started to appear as a political entity for the first time

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when certain areas of the present Finnish territories were part of the Swedish monarchy between the twelfth century and the year 1809 (Jussila 1987). During the Swedish era the structures of a centralized state took root in Finland. These structures, including autonomous Finnish state organs and a Finnish constitution, separate from the Swedish one, became highly relevant as the political basis of an independent Finnish state, when Finland was transferred from Sweden and became an autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian empire in 1809. When nationalism and a nationalist conception of Finland spread into Finland in the mid-nineteenth century, it had two targets. The first was the cultivation of the Finnish nation, which under nineteenth-century conditions meant primarily the abolition in Finland of Swedish cultural and linguistic elements (Paasivirta 1978). The second – and the target that finally united both the Swedish and Finnish groups in Finland – was Russian political dominance of Finland, from which Finland had to be liberated. The struggle for independence was based largely upon the existing political institutions, including the constitution from the Swedish time, which were used as expressions of Finnish statehood legitimizing independence (Jussila 1987). The process was successful, as Finland managed to take advantage of the 1917 revolution in Russia to declare itself independent. The early history of Finland thus gave cause for a state-centric tradition in Finnish political culture. Nationalism, and the wars with the Soviet Union in 1939 to 1940 and 1941 to 1944, reinforced this tradition further. In the Finnish case state-centrism means that values connected with the state, such as sovereignty and territoriality, have traditionally been strongly emphasized. This has led to a very limited position being given to alternative political communities, such as that of a united Europe or the development of a strong regional level, in Finnish political thinking. Finnish political culture stems from Lutheran political concepts, which means that the connection to the cultural origins of European unification – linked to Catholic political traditions – is very weak. Consequently, Finland has lacked any visible or politically influential federalist political movements or forces that have worked strongly in favour of European political unification. In the Cold War era, the state-centric identity was emphasized further due to the international situation and also to two further attributes of Finnish identity. These were a small state tradition and the role of Finland as a borderland. Both of these traditions underlined Finland’s position as an endangered territory. They have had farreaching consequences for Finnish policy even after the Cold War era. The role of Finland as a borderland became very accentuated in the tense international situation of the Cold War, where the borderline between the two political blocs went along Finland’s border with the Soviet Union. Finland took a strange position between the blocs by being militarily neutral, with a Finnish–Soviet treaty providing for the possibility of wartime military co-operation with the Soviet Union, but belonging to

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the West as far as the political and economic basis of its society was concerned. Finland was thus very concretely faced with the challenge of balancing between the two blocs in a difficult international situation, which, in the worst case scenario, could have turned Finnish territory into a battlefield. Another tenet that grew out of post-war political thinking in Finland was that of a small state. As a small actor – at least when assessed in terms of the qualities decisive in international politics – Finland was seen to be continuously in danger. By the early 1990s the Finns had become used to living – at least for five decades – in a world where state sovereignty and security formed the uncontested starting point for political life. When participation in European integration started to be discussed in Finland, it first took place very much in these state-centric terms (Tiilikainen 1992). The impact that EU membership would have on state sovereignty in several policy fields formed the key perspective of this debate. The lack of a cultural connection to the values inherent in the European integration project was reflected even in the reasons for Finnish membership, with state security being one of the key motives behind the national decision to apply for membership. In the mid-1990s Finnish political identity was still very much the identity of a small state situated on the periphery of Europe and looking for protection for its territory and people. The security policy motivations of Finnish EU membership were expressed in various ways. First, they formed the basis for the strong national consensus existing on the major decisions related to Finland’s participation in European integration. Irrespective of controversies prevailing about the consequences of integration in various sectoral policies, Finnish EU membership per se rested on solid political ground. Second, a firm commitment to integration is found even in those policy fields, where a conflict of values could have been assumed to exist. As anticipated by several foreign scholars, the state-centric political culture could have been expected to bring about a reluctant attitude vis-à-vis supranational decision-making. However, such expectations proved very wrong indeed. For the Finnish elite, a strong European Union was a guarantee of Finnish security. The commitment to integration, which prevails among the political, administrative and business elites, and which to a great extent can be traced back to security policy motivations, is, however, not shared to the same extent by the Finnish people. The Finns are sceptical about the benefits and desirability of EU membership. In part, this scepticism is a reaction to the EU’s deficient legitimacy. However, in Finland’s case, it could also indicate that an era of dogmatism and respect for authorities has reached its end in Finnish political culture. It is no exaggeration to state that EU membership has ‘normalized’ foreign policy culture in Finland. Gradually, it has politicized foreign policy, which used to be the prerogative of the President and beyond the reach of political controversies. In

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Finland, scepticism towards the EU can consequently be treated also as an indication of an improved preparedness of the people to formulate their own opinion on political issues and question the axioms of the political elite.

Internal and external preconditions for the Finnish Presidency Smaller member states are often claimed to have insufficient resources to carry out the administrative and co-ordinating tasks of the Presidency in the same, allegedly efficient, way larger member states do. Small size and new membership were, however, in the Finnish case compensated for through an effective national system for decision-making in EU issues. On the basis of this machinery, national preparations for EU Presidency had begun as early as 1996.1 A particular unit (Unit for EU Affairs) had been established in the Prime Minister’s Office for the national leadership and co-ordination of EU Presidency. A corresponding ad hoc unit had been established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the leadership and coordination of practical arrangements – such as meetings and interpreter services – related to the Presidency. An extensive training programme for civil servants had taken place with the objective of reinforcing the language proficiencies and administrative skills of those functioning in key positions during the Presidency.2 Finland was administratively well prepared for the Presidency. The internal political preconditions for a successful Presidency appeared perfect in the case of Finland. Throughout its membership history, governmental commitment to integration had been firm. In the general elections just a few months before the Presidency, the government had renewed its mandate, which made its political position solid during the Presidency. Even at the EU level, the Lipponen government had achieved recognition due to its flexible and pro-European policy. The external preconditions, on the other hand, were not that favourable for Finland. As the last Presidency of the millennium the Finnish agenda appeared to become overloaded. In general, it seemed as if almost all key projects related to integration – everything from enlargement and the defence dimension to the constitutional development and the new IGC on institutional issues – were to reach an important stage during the Finnish Presidency.3 At the same time the political machinery of the EU appeared to have serious malfunctions. Due to the resignation of the Santer Commission in March 1999, the EU would lack an effective Commission until the new Commission took office in the middle of the Finnish period. Another element of instability was caused by the EP elections only a few weeks before the start of the Finnish Presidency and the change they would bring about in the political constellations governing the EU. In addition to all this, the stabilization of the situation in Kosovo after the

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crisis there became one of those extra issues on the EU agenda that may come almost to dominate the agenda.

The formulation of Finnish priorities The Presidency can be analysed as a Finnish effort to assess its own identity in the unification project. Identity, consequently, formed the essential basis for the formulation of Finnish interests for its Presidency. The conception of Finland as a small and northern member state seemed to constitute the basis for Finnish action. There appeared to be a slight discrepancy between the way this identity was expressed in external and internal policies. While European unity and strength were emphasized in the presentation of the EU’s external role, diversity and openness to different influences were ideals that were promoted internally. This discrepancy even made itself evident in the title of the programme for the Finnish Presidency: ‘A Strong and Open Europe into the New Millennium’.4 One of the main tasks of the Finnish Presidency was to contribute to the creation of a globally active and influential EU. Even if this part of the agenda was to a large extent determined by factors outside Finnish control, it suited Finnish priorities. The Finnish government had frequently emphasized the value of a strong EU to a small member state – a reflection of the country’s perceived security interests.5 The EU’s international position was first promoted by rapidly developing the common crisis management capacity, as had been agreed by the European Council in Cologne. The crisis management project was, even in the new form it had taken since Saint Malo, a pleasant task for Finland, which regards itself as one of the originators of the whole project.6 Another task that Finland adopted concerning the institutional setting of the Common Foreign and Security Policy was the promotion of coherence in the EU’s external action. Efficiency and coherence of decision-making belonged to those Nordic principles of administration that formed the basis for the Finnish recommendations as regards general institutional reform in the EU. Finland clearly prioritized, and tried to promote, the northern geographical dimension of the EU’s external relations, even if it was selfevident that this was not the only dimension that would need the Presidency’s attention during the Finnish term. The implementation of the newly adopted Common Strategy on Russia was included, appropriately, on the Finnish agenda. The EU’s relations with Russia were emphasized further through the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) (see below). In the enlargement process, the Helsinki European Council was supposed to examine, on the basis of the Commission’s progress reports, the scope for opening accession talks with new applicant countries. Finland emphasized the principle according to which all applicant countries would participate in the process on an equal footing and be able to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria.

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As far as the internal policies of the EU were concerned, the identity of a small northern state was reflected in the emphasis put on the reform of the EU political machinery, in accordance with the administrative principles of the northern member countries. Finland stressed the openness and transparency of EU decision-making, the necessity of enhancing the efficiency and coherence of the Council of Ministers and of improving action to combat fraud in the Commission. The preparations for an IGC on institutional reform, a task assigned to Finland by the Cologne European Council, was a more problematic project from the Finnish point of view. Basically, it corresponded to the Finnish demands for enhanced efficiency in the operation of the EU. The whole agenda, however, seemed to be based on the interests of the big member states, which had led to the original Finnish aim of keeping the agenda as limited as possible. A society based on information and knowledge and social and ecological responsibility were other major objectives in the programme for the Finnish Presidency that expressed northern values. Even the central theme of the Tampere European Council, the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice, assigned for the Finnish Presidency by the Vienna summit, fitted well the Finnish aspirations concerning integration.

Finnish Presidency role performance as rational action Even if identity and interests intermingle, fields of action can still be distinguished from each other on the basis of whether they can best be explained by a sociological or a rationalist approach. As far as the Finnish EU Presidency was concerned, the Northern Dimension project and that of the rationalization of the Union’s decision-making practices can be treated as good examples of the rational action logic. The Northern Dimension Initiative was originally launched by Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen in Rovaniemi on 15 September 1997 at an international conference on the Barents region, with a clear intention of including the project on the EU’s agenda prior to the Finnish Presidency in 1999. This is a clear example of agenda-setting ambitions (cf. Tallberg, Chapter 2, this volume). The content of the initiative has been characterized as highly indefinite with its general goal, however, being found in the reinforcement of co-operation across the EU’s northern borders (Arter 2000: 678). NDI was adopted as an official EU policy at the end of 1998. The Commission then stated that: within the framework of existing contractual relationships, financial instruments and regional organizations, the Northern Dimension is a concept that can provide added value. It can contribute to the strengthening of the Union’s external policies and the reinforcement of the positive interdependence between Russia, the Baltic region and

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Finland clearly had its own interests at stake even if these interests were related to its general position and membership profile as much as to more concrete interests regarding its eastern border. The strategy that Finland had planned for the advancement of the NDI project covered the whole decision-making process from the launch of the initiative through its acceptance as an official policy to the ministerial conference arranged during the Finnish Presidency. This conference between the EU member states and partners in the Northern Dimension – Iceland, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Estonia – was planned to speed up the project (Arter 2000). It was also supposed to support the Commission’s work to make the NDI concept more concrete. The goals of the NDI project were not achieved in all aspects, which does not, of course, contradict the logic of rational action. The conflict in Chechnya affected the EU’s relations with Russia and resulted, among other things, in a watering down of the outcome of the ministerial conference on the Northern Dimension.7 The entire programme did not, however, become stranded, as the Helsinki European Council invited the Commission to prepare an action plan on the policy area. The Council also welcomed the Swedish intention to organize a follow-up conference on the Northern Dimension. Another issue, where a rational action model could be treated as the dominant explanation for Finland’s action, deals with reform of the Union’s political and administrative structures. Finnish priorities in this field were promoted in a comprehensive manner, in the context of a number of detailed issues related to it. This was by and large made in the spirit of the Nordic principles of administration: openness, efficacy and rationality. The Finnish Presidency was the first to publish agendas for meetings on the web, on its home pages. Finland even started to apply some points of the Trumpf-Piris report on Council reform before it was adopted by the Helsinki summit.8 A clear tendency to simplify the EU’s practices could be perceived even in the framework of the CFSP and Euro-11. One question linked to the reform of the Union’s political and administrative structures – and dealing with Finland’s key interests – where the objectives could not be reached concerned the implementation of Article 255 of the TEU (Treaty on European Union) on transparency.9 According to this article, the Council was to approve jointly with the Parliament general principles for, and restrictions on, such transparency, which take account of public and individual interests, following a proposal from the Commission. It was Finland’s aim to create the political preconditions and efficient procedures for preparation of the transparency legislation and to

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reach agreement on its main elements. This aim could not, however, be fulfilled due to the postponement of the Commission’s proposal.

Finnish Presidency role performance as identity-based behaviour The sociological approach is clearly the one of the two theoretical perspectives referred to in the Introduction to this volume that in most cases can provide the best understanding of Finland’s action. Instead of using its EU Presidency as an instrument for national interests Finland followed the norms and expectations that seemed to prevail for a good Presidency. As noted in the Introduction, all Presidencies are expected to operate the EU’s intergovernmental machinery acting as even-handed brokers following the impartiality norm. There is also, however, a pressure on Presidencies to propel the European project forward and to act as leaders.10 Finland’s small size and short membership history could, it may be argued, have resulted in a vague and unambitious approach to EU leadership. On the other hand, other aspects of the country’s historical experiences spoke in favour of a more active role. Finland had achieved international recognition as a mediator in other diplomatic contexts both during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era.11 It had hosted the meetings between the superpower leaders and its credibility had been confirmed recently by the former President Martti Ahtisaari being nominated as mediator in the Kosovo crisis on the very eve of the Finnish Presidency. In the role of mediator, small size connected with the history of a neutral country could be assumed to develop into an advantage, too. Therefore, both national characteristics and prevailing Presidency norms converged to encourage a Finnish focus on the roles of broker and bureaucrat. At a very general level this meant that Finland tried to ensure that the administrative tasks linked with Council Presidency were properly carried out. As far as the management of Council business was concerned, Finland seemed to be able to cope well with the huge agenda it had inherited. The Helsinki European Council was able to take decisions on almost all the big issues put before it. In some of the issues the decision was still more farreaching than the original goal.12 The management of the Council’s agenda lies close to the co-ordinating function of Council Presidency. Expectations concerning Finland’s ability to take this role were high both inside and outside Finland. It is a common conception that the co-ordinating function between differing interests can best be managed by an actor whose own position and interests in the issue are not very firm and inflexible. Therefore, small member states are arguably often better arbitrators in Union politics than big ones (Kirchner 1992). The smooth management of the EU agenda is itself an indication that Finland did well in the co-ordinating function. Its own interests at stake in the Presidency were moderate – aspirations for general progress

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rather than for the realization of its national interest. Relations with the Commission and the Parliament were handled smoothly, irrespective of the fact that both of them had been set up only recently and that new decision-making rules entered into force along with the Amsterdam Treaty. Two cases may serve as examples of the way the Finnish Presidency functioned primarily on the basis of established norms and expectations for a good Presidency. The first is the decision concerning the approval of Turkey’s candidate status in the European Union.13 In the preparation of this historical decision Finland took advantage of the momentum created for the rapprochement during the German Presidency. In fact, Germany had tried to solve the problem concerning Turkey’s status at the Cologne summit, but the project had been unsuccessful due to Greek and Swedish opposition (Peltonen 2000). It was the task of the Finnish Presidency to try to avoid losing this momentum and to overcome the remaining opposition in the issue. The Finnish strategy, which finally proved successful, was to keep a low profile in the Turkish issue and to try to prevent it from becoming politicized. The neutrality of the Finnish Presidency was emphasized in the sense that Finland was not perceived as having any strong interest of its own in the issue, which was not even included in the programme for the Presidency. Confirmation of Turkey’s status as a candidate for membership in the EU was a result of many different factors.14 However, it fell to the Finnish Presidency to co-ordinate these factors so that the very concrete end result was achieved. The creation of the crisis management capacity is another example of a case where Finland took the position as an arbitrator – a role which it believed the Presidency should fulfil. In this issue Finland had no major interests of its own, even if it could refer to the fact that it – together with Sweden – had taken the key initiative for the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks in the Union’s treaties. The Finnish Presidency was given this task by the Cologne European Council. Finland thus tried to cope with this responsibility to start developing the EU’s capacity and instruments to act independently in conflict prevention and crisis management in accordance with those guidelines.15 Having formed one of the most controversial dimensions of integration, there are still many differences of opinion between the member states concerning the details and formulations of the defence dimension. The results must consequently please both those who have more ambitious expectations concerning the EU’s defence policy, like France, and those who are highly sceptical of the entire military dimension, like Sweden and Ireland. During the Finnish Presidency, the big member states reached an agreement on the main forms of the crisis management system and it fell to the Presidency to win the support of the rest of EU for this policy line. Flexibility was needed from Finland itself, as was shown by the fact that the first drafts produced by the Finnish Presidency were more moderate than

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what was to become the decision of the Helsinki European Council.16 Due to the firm position of the government, the new guidelines of the crisis management system were accepted in the Eduskunta (the Finnish Parliament) without difficulty. The compromise created by the Presidency was a rapid advancement of the defence dimension upholstered in the guise of crisis management capacity. Binding the military resources firmly to crisis management activities was a precondition for the incorporation of the defence dimension in the EU, from the point of view of the sceptical member states. Finland, with its own position of non-alignment, functioned as a credible leader in this respect. On the other hand, the achievements pleased even the opposite camp which saw the results of the Finnish Presidency – the creation of EU military resources and institutions – as an important step in the process of establishing a European defence.17

Managing the role as the union’s external representative During its EU Presidency Finland had to respond to several challenges arising externally, many of which lay outside the country’s key national concerns. Even in this role Finland functioned mainly on the basis of the norms and expectations related to the leadership role of the Council Presidency in the CFSP. During the Finnish Presidency the focus of the EU’s external relations was in the western Balkans and Russia. Promotion of the stability and reconstruction of Kosovo with different instruments became one of the key tasks of the Finnish Presidency. The Presidency’s role with respect to the entire western Balkans was in many ways difficult and demanding. The implementation of the stability pact for South-Eastern Europe was launched during the Finnish Presidency. The Cologne European Council had assigned to the Council and the Commission a duty to maintain the leading role of the EU in the promotion of stability in the region. The implementation of the stability pact was launched by establishing three socalled working tables involving the countries in the region.18 External pressures were directed at the Presidency, as the members of the stability pact were expecting faster advancement from the EU in the stabilizing acts (Tiilikainen 2000). Another challenge dealt with relations between the EU institutions in connection with the stability pact. Co-operation between the Council and the Commission in safeguarding the external unity of the EU was less than optimal and Finland tried to solve the problem by asking the institutions to make a common report on the issue to the Helsinki European Council. The report summed up the guidelines for the EU’s action in the implementation of the pact and the roles of both institutions in this connection. Internal conflicts within the Union – between member states as well as between EU institutions – came to the fore in the context of many other projects in the Balkans. Two important decisions concerning the

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reconstruction of Kosovo may be taken as examples. On the eve of the Finnish Presidency the Commission had taken the initiative to establish a new reconstruction agency for the Balkans. The new office was to be responsible for channelling reconstruction aid to Kosovo after the damage caused by the air-strikes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Serbian military action. The Commission suggested that the new agency should be sited in Pristina, the Kosovan capital, or, in case this was not possible, in Skopje in Macedonia. The European Parliament supported Pristina. Greece opposed the Commission’s proposal and threatened to veto the advancement of the whole project if parts of the agency were not sited in Tirana and Montenegro, in addition to Pristina. The Finnish Presidency led the conciliation of this process on the basis of a compromise found in informal meetings (Tiilikainen 2000: 174). On the basis of this compromise the administrative headquarters of the Agency were located in the Greek city of Salonika and its operational headquarters in Pristina.19 Another dispute concerning Kosovo arose between the EU institutions concerning the position of the EU’s aid to Kosovo in the Union budget. The Parliament refused to accept the Commission’s proposal, according to which the 500 million euro aid envisaged would have been taken from other budget headings and argued, instead, that new funds should be granted for Kosovo. The Parliament’s counter-proposal would have necessitated amendments to the financial agreements made by the European Council in Berlin, so the Council refused consent to it. It became the task of the Finnish Presidency to mediate between the three institutions. In this case, the prestige of the institutions formed the core of the issue (Peltonen 2000: 151). Finally, a compromise was reached in which, by lowering the sum to 360 million euro the institutions were able to fund the cost of rebuilding without undermining the other items in the external relations budget.20 Relations with Russia were one field on the Presidency’s agenda where Finland had more direct self-interests at stake. With the exception of the Northern Dimension programme, these issues derived from earlier decisions made at Union level and not from Finland’s own planning. The implementation of the Common Strategy on Russia was the general framework within which Finland had planned to draft a work programme in order to strengthen the basis for democracy and a market economy in Russia. Another aim was to advance the implementation of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the parties. A third goal was the promotion of the Northern Dimension programme. The advancement of all projects was, however, seriously delayed due to the new course that relations between the EU and Russia took after Russian military action in Chechnya. The General Affairs Council of the EU expressed several times during the Finnish Presidency its concern over Russia’s military campaign in Chechnya, and the EU–Russian summit arranged in Finland in October reflected a stasis in relations. Pressures for tougher EU action against

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Russia grew towards the end of the Finnish Presidency until the summit in Helsinki finally made a decision on concrete sanctions.21 These belonged to the ‘reviewing’ of the Common Strategy and the transfer of some funds from Tacis to humanitarian assistance.22

Conclusion In general, the role performance of the Finnish Presidency seems to have been built on expectations based upon the role of Finland as a small, new and northern member state. To keep the EU machinery functioning became the guiding principle of Finnish leadership. Consequently, Finland tried to persuade the EU to take the decisions that were assigned to its term of office. The fulfilment of this goal presupposed the effective preparation of issues and systematic planning.23 It even presupposed standing back from immediate national interests in the issues concerned. In a study conducted on the Finnish Presidency (Martikainen and Tiilikainen 2000), a number of issues could be pointed out where Finland – either before the actual negotiation process started or during such a process – distanced itself from its national objectives. At the level of the very large-scale political projects, the Lomé Treaty and the enlargement process may be mentioned as examples of the first case and the creation of the crisis management capacity and the agenda of the IGC as examples of the second.24 There were, however, two specific fields where systematic efforts were made in order to leave the Presidency’s own imprint on EU structures. Finland tried, in various forms, to influence the structures and practices of decision-making in the EU, and, in particular, in the Council. Finland also tried to promote the role of its immediate neighbourhood on the Union’s agenda in the form of the Northern Dimension programme. When it comes to the Presidency’s working methods, Finland was praised for the professional way in which issues pertaining to its term of office were prepared. The Finnish achievements as broker and mediator were equally deemed to be successful. The image of being a small member state with moderate national interests and no hidden agenda evidently increased Finland’s credibility as compromise-builder. Success, however, has its reverse, and in the case of the Finnish Presidency, what was from one perspective pragmatic and well planned appeared to many as a lack of imagination and of political vision. The Finnish effectiveness in planning turned into inflexibility in some cases and an unnecessary rigidity as regards the planned agenda. In general, Finland was not – despite its nonaligned status – accused for the lack of credibility in representing the CFSP. Some difficulties could still be perceived when it came to Finland’s capacity and willingness to adopt the harsh rhetoric of big powers, which many large members of the EU expect of the nation speaking on behalf of the Union.

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The Finnish expectations concerning its first EU Presidency were realistic. The nearer the Presidency approached, the more the aspirations concentrated simply on decent management of the overwhelming agenda. Yet in the end the Finns succeeded in leaving some imprints on the integration process. The results could be interpreted as a cautious introduction of ‘northern’ values into European integration. Principles such as openness, efficiency and coherence reinforced their grip on the EU administration. The EU’s attention was drawn towards the territories and problems around its northern borders. The successful period as leader of the common European project hopefully helped Finland to rid itself of its old feelings of inferiority stemming from its Cold War identity as an outsider – a peripheral small state all on its own. At the same time, it forced the country to identify its place – its own goals and values – in the common European house. In these ways, the Finnish Presidency may have challenged the predominant state-centric political culture of Finland.

Notes 1 Concerning national preparations, see Simula 2000. Stubb refers to the fact that decisions on the calendar for informal and formal Council meetings were taken as early as 1997 when preparations for the Presidency programme began (see Stubb 1999/2000: 50). 2 All in all 1500 people participated in these training programmes, the costs of which (1996 to 1999) amounted to 88 million Finnish marks (15 million euro). 3 At its meeting in Cologne the European Council paid attention to the fact that the Commission was supposed to give its progress reports on the applicant countries in autumn 1999 and that these reports formed the basis for any decisions to be taken by the Helsinki European Council. The Cologne summit even invited the Finnish Presidency to draw up, related to the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional questions, a comprehensive report explaining and taking stock of options for resolving the issues to be settled. In the framework of the Common European Security and Defence Policy the Cologne Council invited the Finnish Presidency to continue work on the creation of a crisis management system in accordance with the outlines approved by it (Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999). 4 See Programme for the Finnish Presidency of the European Union, SN 2940/2/99 REV 2. 5 See e.g. ‘Finland’s points of departure and objectives at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference’, Report to the Parliament by the Council of State, 27 February 1996. 6 The crisis management capacity of the EU that was agreed upon in the IGC held in 1996 to 1997 was to a large extent based upon a Finnish–Swedish initiative. According to an official Finnish interpretation, the creation of a military crisis management system to the EU will not hamper the Finnish policy of nonalignment. 7 The EU foreign ministers did not attend the ministerial conference in protest against the Russian policy in Chechnya. 8 The guidelines for reform and operational recommendations are based upon the so-called Trumpf-Piris report published in March 1999. The report was

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drawn up by a working party chaired by the Secretary-General of the Council Mr Trumpf, with Mr Piris as its deputy chairman. According to Article 255, ‘Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3.’ Schout specifies the elements of success as mediation skills, technical expertise, networks, luck, careful preparation, good people and neutrality (Schout 1998: 2–10). Verbeke and van de Voorde define the key skills as neutrality, credibility, skill and tact, in-depth knowledge of the dossiers, good collaboration with other institutions, attentiveness to the full implication of all member countries in decision-making and internal cohesion (Verbeke and van de Voorde 1994: 29–40). Finland was in a key position in the Security and Co-operation in Europe process (currently Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)), whose first conference it hosted in Helsinki in 1975. In the 1980s Finland hosted several meetings of the US and Soviet leaders. The agreement on Turkey’s status as an official membership candidate was not a part of the original Finnish programme for Presidency. The progress report presented on the common crisis management capacity is much more farreaching than what is referred to in the programme for the Finnish Presidency or in the Cologne declaration. See Cologne European Council (3–4 June 1999): Presidency Conclusions, Annex III: European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence. The analysis concerning Finland’s role is based upon Peltonen (2000). For her study, Peltonen conducted extensive interviews both during the Finnish Presidency and afterwards. One of these factors was the Commission’s positive stance in the issue, adopted during the Finnish Presidency. Another was the US contribution through its contacts with Greece and Turkey (Peltonen 2000: 116). The exact formulation at the Cologne summit being ‘In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives and the progressive framing of a common defence policy, we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crises management tasks defined in the Treaty of European Union, the “Petersberg tasks”. To this end the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so without prejudice to actions by NATO.’ See Cologne European Council (3–4 June 1999): Presidency Conclusions, Annex III. The Finnish drafts departed from the idea that the size and form of EU troop contributions (the headline goals) would not be confirmed in Helsinki. The Finnish drafts relied more upon co-operation between EU and NATO than the final decision. Even the level of EU military organization became higher than the one presented in the original drafts. See The Finnish Presidency, NonPaper, ‘Elements for the Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on strengthening of the common European policy on security and defence’. The French newspaper Le Monde, for instance, interpreted the results of the Helsinki summit as an important step in the creation of a European identity due to the strengthening of the defence dimension. The other daily newspaper Le Figaro announced in its headline ‘A 60 000 men army to Europe’. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Media Report, HELD 103-1, 7 January 2000.

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18 The working table on economic reconstruction, development and co-operation started its activities first. The working tables on democratization and human rights and defence and security affairs held their inaugural meetings during the Finnish Presidency; see General Affairs Council, 11 October 1999, 11651/99. 19 Greece had insisted that the headquarters should be based in Salonika whereas the Commission, supported by a majority of member states, preferred Pristina. See European Report, No. 2426 (V): 10. 20 See European Report, No. 2460 (I): 4. 21 Criticism came from the EP, which demanded that the EU should freeze Tacis aid to Russia if it did not halt the military campaign in Chechnya. See Bulletin EU, 10 (1999). 22 See Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, Annex II. 23 The preparation of issues has been regarded as one of the great virtues of the Finnish Presidency (Stubb 1999/2000: 49). 24 The Finnish government had been critical of the structure of the Lomé system, and in the enlargement process it had been in favour of a more restricted second round. In the creation of the crisis management system Finland had originally supported a more cautious approach and concerning the IGC it had worked for the confirmation of a closed agenda (Peltonen 2000: 110; Tiilikainen 2000: 171 and 196).

References Arter, D. (2000) ‘Small state influence within the EU: The case of Finland’s “Northern Dimension” initiative’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (5): 677–97. Jakobson, M. (1998) Finland in the New Europe, Westport: Praeger, The Washington Papers/175. Jussila, O. (1987) Maakunnasta valtioksi, Helsinki: WSOY. Kirchner, E. (1992) Decision-making in the European Communities, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Martikainen, T. and Tiilikainen, T. (eds) (2000) Suomi EU: n johdossa: Tutkimus Suomen puheenjohtajuudesta 1999, Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Yleisen valtioopin laitos, Acta Politica 13. Paasivirta, J. (1978) Suomi ja Eurooppa: Autonomia ja kansainväliset kriisit 1808–1914, Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä. Peltonen, P. (2000) ‘Päätöksenteko Euroopan unionissa – kahdeksan esimerkkitapausta puheenjohtajan näkökulmasta’, in T. Martikainen and T. Tiilikainen (eds), Suomi EU: n johdossa: Tutkimus Suomen puheenjohtajuudesta 1999, Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Yleisen valtio-opin laitos, Acta Politica 13: 107–62. Schout, A. (1998) ‘The Presidency as a juggler: Managing conflicting expectations’, Eipascope 2. Simula, A. (2000) ‘Suomen EU-puheenjohtajuus hallinnollisten järjestelyjen näkökulmasta’, in T. Martikainen and T. Tiilikainen (eds), Suomi EU: n johdossa: Tutkimus Suomen puheenjohtajuudesta 1999, Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Yleisen valtio-opin laitos, Acta Politica 13: 21–50. Stubb, A. (1999/2000) ‘The Finnish Presidency’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Annual Review of the EU, 49–53. Tiilikainen, T. (1992) ‘Suomen doktriini murtuu – suomalaisen politiikan kulku

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Paasikiven-Kekkonen realismista kohti yhteisöllisyyden Eurooppa’, Ulkopolitiikka, 29 (4): 15–22. Tiilikainen, T. (1998) Europe and Finland: Defining the Political Identity of Finland in Western Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate. Tiilikainen, T. (2000) ‘Suomi johtajana EU: n ulkosuhteissa’, in T. Martikainen and T. Tiilikainen (eds), Suomi EU: n johdossa: Tutkimus Suomen puheenjohtajuudesta 1999, Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Yleisen valtio-opin laitos, Acta Politica 13: 163–85. Verbeke, J. and van de Voorde, W. (1994) ‘The Presidency of the European Union; Some reflections on current practice and recent evolutions’, Studia Diplomatica, 47 (3): 29–40.

8

The French Presidency of 2000 An arrogant leader? Olivier Costa, Anne Couvidat and Jean-Pascal Daloz

Introduction Being influential is not about imposing one’s views, it is about putting forward a real plan and leading others.1 France’s most recent Presidency of the Council – held during the second half of 2000 – is a perfect illustration of both the specificity which lies behind the unique ‘style’ of every Presidency and the difficulties faced by any member state in charge of it. The study of the French Presidency is also relevant on another point: it shows how much the fears and expectations linked to the running of the Union can vary from one member state to another. As for the ‘performance’ of the French Presidency, it has been criticized widely by both the media and representatives of the other European institutions. Most of the criticism was actually directed at the mixed results obtained during the European summit of Nice – the other achievements of the French Presidency being consequently overshadowed.2 This chapter is devoted to a thorough review of both what was expected from the Presidency and how French officials ran it. Our aim is thus to point out the characteristics of the French way of running the Presidency, in order ultimately to identify the elements that account for a French ‘style’.

Running the EU Presidency – the French way The task of reviewing how a country such as France has run the Presidency is not easy. In the words of the Aide mémoire (2000: point I.9):3 ‘Theorising about how the Presidency should be handled is difficult since the running of the Presidency is above all a matter of common sense and human relations.’ Such a task also requires us to pay full attention to the French officials’ actual experience of the Presidency. We assess to what extent their experience actually differs from what was perceived by their European counterparts, analysts and national public opinion. Thus it is commonly acknowledged that the process leading to institutional reform

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perverted both the progress, image and outcomes of the French Presidency. According to the people we interviewed – among whom were not only top advisers of the French President, the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of European Affairs, but also officials from the Office for Interministerial Co-ordination (SGCI) and diplomats working in the Office of the French Permanent Representation in Brussels – there is no ground for France to be ashamed of what it achieved during its Presidency mandate. On the whole, the Presidency achieved much but its communication was admittedly ‘disastrous’.4 The Presidency’s four main duties (see the Introduction to this volume) will serve as a framework for our review. Administration and co-ordination Since France enjoys such an impressive machinery of state, its task is comparatively easy when it comes to running the Presidency. The special secretariat created for the Presidency was composed of no more than ten people. Neither was there any such thing as a specific budget for it. The strategy adopted by France was instead to mobilize personnel in charge of a single issue on an ad hoc basis. Besides, most ministries have a specialized unit for European affairs. Mobility being part of the officials’ career, one hardly finds any top civil servant unfamiliar with European affairs. What is more, contrary to new EU members, France has a long experience in terms of running the Presidency. Yet it should not be considered as a routine matter for French officials. With fifteen members, the Presidencies nowadays come around less frequently than before and they become increasingly more complex to run. Thus the growing importance of the European Parliament and the appearance of new actors in EU politics – for example, the officials in charge of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – created changes in the way of running the Presidency, the need for dialogue being greater than in the past. According to the officials whom we met, it is important to prepare for the task well in advance. Instructions were given one year ahead of the Presidency that any government member and adviser who was to collaborate on the Presidency’s work should regard it as a priority on his or her agenda. However, the officials acknowledged that there was some room left for improvisation and bricolage.5 The word ‘amateurishness’ was even used to describe the French bureaucratic set-up in comparison with the utmost rigour of the machinery deployed by Finland in 1999.6 Actually the people whom we interviewed for this chapter were rather self-critical on that point. Yet the general feeling was that there was no reason for France to be excessive in its mobilization – unlike the smaller member states or the new ones, who feared they might not be up to the task. Each member state obviously pays close attention to how its counterparts run their Presidencies. As for France, it meant to do it in a somehow

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distinct way, regardless of trends or fashions. Thus although the Internet was granted an important role in terms of communication strategy – which had not been the case during the 1995 French Presidency – it was not accorded as much importance as it had been under some other member states’ Presidencies (see Chapters 7 and 9 on Finland and Sweden, respectively, this volume). France was critical of the trend to organize a large number of informal summits. In fact, it was originally planned to hold no more than seven of them. Eventually there were nine. There is no doubt that top officials insisted on having their own mini-summit in their respective place, as did the Minister of European Affairs, Serge Moscovici, in his city of Montbéliard. However, the situation in France is quite different from that of member states where scepticism towards the EU is marked. For those, efforts have to be made in every part of the country to heighten public awareness of the salience of European integration. As for the achievements of the French Presidency, energy and attention were admittedly focused mainly on the summits at Biarritz and Nice. Setting political priorities Some member states set only two or three priorities at the beginning of their mandate – whether due to modesty, pragmatism or obsessional concerns.7 Making such a selection always seems difficult for France. On many occasions, the country displayed its ambition to deal with every issue at the same time without any intention of setting priorities. It is not our aim to discuss in detail the priorities declared by the French Presidency.8 For various reasons, French decision-makers seem to have been guided first of all by their intention to give a positive image of their action at the top of the European Union and to make sure that a treaty would be signed in Nice. This goal, which was to become a kind of obsession, led France to neglect other issues or at least to refrain from exercising much influence on the multiple negotiations in progress. The only exception was defence. As far as this sector was concerned, the French seized the opportunity offered to them to present their geopolitical and geo-economical vision of European integration. They have been all the more willing to do so because, according to them, if results were not reached through their initiative, no headway would be made for a long time. Considering the absence of real priorities, the task was consequently all the harder for the French office in charge of interdepartmental coordination (SGCI), as underlined by senior officials working for this structure. What is more, the agenda of the French Presidency was announced rather late and by both President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin. Besides, the content of the agenda evolved, going through many a review in the course of the half-year of the Presidency. There are obviously issues for which France has always shown a very special concern. Its overall mistrust of globalization and its commitment to

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preserve the French model of public services could be mentioned here. However, thanks to its network of experts, France is quite able to take a stand on nearly every matter of importance. As seems to be the rule for the founders and key members of the European Union, France had to meet particularly high expectations in terms of impetus and achievements. France has sometimes been accused of showing a certain arrogance, of imposing its views – and this point will be developed below. However, according to some of the French officials whom we interviewed, smaller countries are actually quite happy with the idea that leading member states handle the more difficult questions. The officials whom we spoke with acknowledged that control over the agenda was obviously fundamental. Like its fellow member states, France had the opportunity to hinder the negotiation process on certain issues (see Tallberg, Chapter 2, this volume).9 Leaving the sensitive issues to its successors can be part of a country’s strategy – as was admitted in the interviews. On the other hand, it can be interesting for a country like France to achieve the resolution of a matter that former Presidencies have failed to settle. On some issues, however, it simply made announcements without any intention of taking further action. Mediation Like their counterparts, the French top officials were reportedly well aware of the difficulty of their task: to appear as an impartial arbiter without allowing key national interests to be jeopardized. In the Aide mémoire (2000: point I.3), it is stated that ‘the duties of a President differ from those of a spokesperson’ and ‘it is appropriate to make efforts in order not to give the impression that there is “connivance” between the Presidency and the French delegation, which does not exclude ad hoc contacts before meetings when necessary’. According to one of the Foreign Affairs Minister’s advisers, there is actually no such thing as self-sacrifice in policy matters, yet it is essential not to defend national interests too openly. Being accused of partiality is the supreme insult. On the other hand, it is considered quite acceptable for the state in charge of the Presidency to air a tricky issue or to make a compromise favourable to its own interests (cf. Elgström, Chapter 1, this volume). However, French negotiators are fully aware that it is their duty both to consider the participants’ different viewpoints and to find a middle way to which a majority of them can rally. The European Affairs Minister’s chief adviser set out the strategy adopted by the French negotiators. The country’s core interests are the first element to take into account. Then comes the necessity to be recognized as a good arbiter, while the French interests of less importance are passed over in silence. This latter point is confirmed by the French President’s European affairs adviser. He admits: ‘it would be hypocritical to

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pretend that we can put our national priority concerns in brackets, but we can drop secondary preoccupations.’ As a result, ministers were sometimes asked not to try to push through certain measures even though they regarded them as a priority in their field. In that respect the importance of solid preparatory work is crucial. Within the framework of the recommendations they had received, ministers actually enjoyed a certain freedom during the negotiation process. In fact, France proved to be an ambitious negotiator. The country truly intended to achieve a great deal with no fear of incurring unpopularity – a good Presidency being a completely active one according to the French viewpoint. There are indeed only a few months for the work to be done. One could sum up the French Presidency’s attitude as follows: no time should be lost in procrastination and it can be useful to rush things. As concerns COREPER it was thus recommended to ‘have the discussion talks speeded up and “dramatised” by confronting each delegation with its duties’ (Aide mémoire 2000: point I.3a). Such methods are actually the opposite extreme of those favoured by ‘overcautious’ member states, whose main concern, as they run the Presidency, is to avoid ‘making waves’ and which seek consensus at any cost.10 By contrast, the French Presidency resorted to formal voting11 on several occasions, which some states would not do, attached as they are to consensual practice. France also organized marathon meetings.12 Another French method was that of the ‘confessional’ which was much in use at the European summit of Nice. It was so called because French officials met with each of the different delegations so as to convince them individually. At the Nice summit, the final negotiation round concerning the reform of the treaties also offered an illustration of the French Presidency’s strategy. France took its own proposal as a basis for discussion and assumed that any point to which objections were not raised had been accepted. Contrary to other Presidencies that would consider the different delegations’ stands on a particular point, France contented itself with stating its views and asking opponents to stand up. As a result, France’s image as an arbiter was sometimes tarnished. It was especially the case when its stands could be regarded as contradictory, even cynical. An example of this is to be found in its conduct of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). France supported the idea that the Council voting system should take greater account of the member states’ demography, but without accepting that France should have a different weight from Germany. Such an attitude was not well received by other member states. In fact, whenever France’s core interests were at stake, its role of arbiter was unquestionably relegated to a position of secondary importance – all its energy being devoted to the defence of its own interests.

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Representation The Presidency’s representation duty is two-dimensional. Not only does it represent the Council in dealings with the other institutions, it also represents the EU vis-à-vis the rest of the world. As regards interinstitutional relations, the French Presidency was well aware that working in coordination with the Commission was essential. ‘Before every meeting, the chairman should define the negotiation tactics with both the SecretaryGeneral of the Council and the Commission. The latter is not to be presented with a fait accompli – its agreement being necessary to modify any of its proposals, except in the case of a unanimous vote by the Council’ – as it is put in the French Aide mémoire for the Presidency (2000: point I.9). In addition to the Council’s sessions, most ministers organized symposiums, conferences and seminars in partnership with the Commission – the aim being to heighten the awareness of their action among the French people concerned in the field. Yet in the end the French Presidency did not rely on the Commission’s support as much as smaller countries do. According to some of the French officials interviewed, the Commission was even treated badly on several occasions. The Commission was admittedly not involved directly in the signature of the Treaty, but it was made to understand so in a heavy-handed way. Furthermore, Romano Prodi resented the fact that the Commission was not, according to him, adequately associated with the preparation for the Treaty. On the other hand, the French officials interviewed noticed a change in the Presidency–Parliament relations since France’s previous mandate. We need to recall that these relations had been very tense at the end of the 1995 French Presidency. Jacques Chirac, who was freshly elected as the new President, had then announced his decision to resume nuclear tests. The European Parliament at that time reacted very negatively by adopting no less than five resolutions to condemn it and by giving Jacques Chirac a rather hostile reception when he came to present the result of the French Presidency. The speech delivered by the French President at the European Parliament on 4 July 2000 reveals a very different attitude towards the EP from the French side. The purpose of the speech was to present France’s plans for its Presidency and President Chirac clearly sought to please every single one of the political groups. The new consideration given to the EP became obvious. French ministers spent more time within its doors than in the past. What is more, on some occasions the French Presidency relied on the Parliament’s support to influence the Council’s negotiation talks.13 The fact that the French Presidency made a statement of its achievements to the MEPs is also noteworthy. As they ran the Presidency, French officials were indeed encouraged to be more diplomatic towards an institution that for many remained ‘an assembly of foreigners’ as De Gaulle once put it. During its mandate, France was faced with a most sensitive issue for the

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EU – taking action against Austria on the basis of Article VI of the European Union Treaty. When the extreme-right party came to power in Austria, France was among the states that most virulently voiced their disapproval. Yet, as the Council’s president, the country had to negotiate with the Austrians, who were threatening to block the EU’s enlargement process. Sanctions eventually had to be lifted. This example proves, if proof is necessary, that when in charge of the Council’s Presidency, member states have to adopt a more realistic attitude however clear-cut their former standpoints may have been. In terms of external representation, the Presidency can hardly be regarded as a significant opportunity for a country such as France – contrary to smaller states hoping to gain weight on the international stage. The French tend to have views on all world issues, and they believe that Europe should be built according to their vision. Besides, it is sometimes difficult for France to speak in the name of the EU as regards issues related to foreign affairs. Foreign affairs was the only field that did not fall into the overall competence of the French intergovernmental committee – the SGCI – under the Prime Minister’s authority. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs is the one in charge of dealing with the European Common and Foreign Policy. But France’s foreign policy is somehow the pride and preserve of its diplomats, who, however committed to consensus they may have been, actually manage to enforce the French diplomatic lines within the Council. The consideration given to such issues as the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories or Yugoslavia’s reconstruction process was thus very much in the French diplomatic tradition. The situation is very different in the case of lower-profile countries for which representing the Council is regarded as a great opportunity. France thinks of itself as a major power, as one of the two leaders of the EU. Having at its disposal a wider diplomatic network than its counterparts, it is reportedly better informed. As a result, it is hard for the country to behave like any other state when it is in charge of the Council’s external representation.

Accounting for the French performance and style After having thus explored the way in which France performed the Presidency’s four main duties, we will now devote our attention to the factors that account for its performance and style. To do so, different factors will be considered. They relate to France’s characteristics as a member state, to the French officials’ strategies and to the decision-making context. Relevant French features Four criteria will be taken into account. The first criterion we would like to stress is size. The cleavage existing between so-called ‘small’, ‘medium-

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sized’ and ‘big’ member states actually has a strong impact on the countries’ discourse. It is a most salient criterion to account for how the EU works, both in a formal and informal way. Thus the status of being a ‘big’ state is not without effect on how the Presidency is conducted, to say the least. Things are admittedly easier for a ‘big’ state: it has at its disposal a well-developed bureaucracy as well as important human and financial resources. In terms of a power game, it also enjoys relative superiority over its counterparts. More than any other member state, France was regarded as ‘big among the biggest’ for two reasons. First, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the French–German ‘axis’ appeared as the EU driving force, especially as far as treaty reform was concerned. More recently, the French President committed himself strongly in favour of a European constitution, which was to create high expectations among his partners. Yet in a ‘big’ state senior civil servants and politicians are likely to become less involved in the everyday work of the Presidency. Contrary to smaller states for which the Presidency is seen as a top priority, bigger states such as France may have other priorities. In comparison with smaller states, the big states sometimes also prove to be less efficient. In fact, they tend to neglect the help that could be provided by the Commission and the Council’s General Secretariat, which is often reduced to clerical work. Small countries have less ambitious plans, but they use all their resources to achieve them. Thus, except for the two European summits, the French Presidency was not perceived as very professional in handling the practical aspects linked to its task (such as the languages in which interpretation should be officially provided, the logos to be used, accommodation arrangements and refunds). This neglect of details was sometimes regarded as a form of arrogance. France is actually a good illustration of what has just been claimed to characterize the ‘big’ member states’ conduct of the Presidency – that is, a certain lack of involvement. Thus within the Council of Ministers or in official speeches, the two heads of the French executive barely ever referred to the European issues that were at stake during France’s mandate. It was as if the Presidency’s duties had in fact been left entirely in the hands of the French senior civil servants appointed to the task. Such a lack of interest was all the more striking, since it contrasted with the French officials’ initial statements that were quite ambitious. According to a member of the French Permanent Representation in Brussels, barely had the Presidency begun than French officials had but one dream: to see it over.14 France’s attitude is often described as arrogant; it is part of the nation’s stereotyped image. However, the French Presidency gave grounds for it: there was indeed an obvious gap between France’s display of ambition and what was eventually achieved during its mandate. The second criterion we would like to put forward is experience. Having already run the Presidency a number of times – eleven in the case of France – the founding member states enjoy an unquestionable advantage

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over the countries for which it is a new experience. Senior French officials and civil servants are thus particularly used to running the Presidency. What is more, France has at its disposal negotiation networks and resources – such as the French–German ‘axis’. As a result, the country has played a crucial role in key decisions concerning European integration. Yet, because of the ‘routine’ phenomenon already mentioned, the ‘big’ states’ involvement in the Presidency tends to fade. In contrast, new member states prove to be more dedicated. They seek to convey a good image of themselves to their counterparts at all costs. For France, the Presidency is no big event. Consequently France did not prepare for it seriously and the lack of preparation was not compensated for by an ability to build consensus either. The member states’ overall attitude towards European integration is also a criterion that should be taken into account. In the French case, the situation is altogether ambiguous. A priori, France is in favour of further European integration. President Chirac thus launched the idea of a European constitution while Lionel Jospin expressed French commitment to strengthen the main Community policies. Yet their tradition of centralism makes it hard for the French to accept that political decisions affecting the country should be taken in Brussels. As a result, the conduct of the Presidency was mainly ‘Parisian’. Contrary to other states, which leave considerable freedom of manoeuvre to their Permanent Representation in Brussels, the French one was obviously under the orders of both the Committee for Interministerial Co-ordination (SGCI) and the President’s office.15 Furthermore, there were tensions in the relations between the French Presidency and the Council’s General Secretariat. The latter had its own agenda and would refuse to be treated as a mere tool in the conduct of the Presidency.16 It is also noteworthy that France has always been reluctant to back the liberal views and policies enforced by the Commission. France’s distrust of a European market lies in its very conception of the EU. The EU is seen as a potential challenger to the power of the United States and, moreover, not only in the economic field. This is why President Chirac was so devoted to speeding up the prospect of a European common defence – an issue that barely mobilized other member states. The last criterion to be examined is that of domestic politics. As the Council’s history reveals, it has actually had a strong impact on the way in which the Presidency is run. Thus impending elections in the country running the Presidency inevitably result in a certain timidity. France’s conduct of the Presidency was affected by two phenomena. The first was co-habitation, which created both competition and co-ordination problems between the two heads of the French executive. It was also blamed for France’s overall wait-and-see policy. The second of those phenomena was the prospect of the electoral battle (in May and June 2002). Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin were both expected to run for the French

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Presidency. For them, the EU consequently became a ground for confrontation – we shall come back to this below. As for the impact of co-habitation on the daily conduct of the Presidency, opinions differ. The French officials working in Brussels are far more critical than their Parisian counterparts. According to a member of the Permanent Representation, the French politicians’ interest in the Council’s Presidency has been ‘strikingly weak’ – coming in at ‘26th position’ on their scale of interests.17 He added that the French Presidency had grown in importance only when it could be exploited in the domestic arena. Other French officials have a more balanced viewpoint and consider that the implicit division of work has contributed to reduce tensions.18 The technical matters were under the ministries’ competence, while the President’s domaine réservé – that is, Foreign Affairs – would be respected. Nevertheless, President Chirac had to act in concert with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, both of whom he met regularly in conseils restreints. As regards the relations between the two heads of the French executive, observers have not noticed any major incidents – in particular because the left–right cleavage is not relevant in European issues. On the contrary, tensions have actually proved to be a good thing, for they have encouraged both sides to become more involved. Any initiative has gone through constant arbitration. This co-operation took the form of regular meetings between the senior officials in charge of the Presidency and the two heads of the executive. At the end of those meetings the Presidency’s priorities would be established in writing. These so-called notes blanches would be sent to the officials of the French Permanent Representation, who were thus provided with clear instructions. Co-habitation in fact proved to be more harmonious during the Presidency than it is usually. On such an occasion, the French interest overcame those related to domestic politics. On the whole, co-habitation is not as sensitive an issue as it might seem. Nevertheless, it can be blamed for having opened the way for some moments of discord, loss of time and communication difficulties. Competition between the President and the Prime Minister sometimes placed obstacles in the way of solutions to problems, but the President’s interventions were generally limited to media announcements. At the end of the French Presidency, Jacques Chirac attempted to claim credit for the French initiatives, notably those taken at the summits or on some particular issues which were clearly outside his domaine réservé (such as maritime safety, the banning of meat-and-bone meal, citizens’ Europe). The Prime Minister, for his part, has also encroached upon the President’s long-time pet issue as he dealt with agricultural matters. Yet the Prime Minister has been obviously concerned to avoid too direct confrontations with Jacques Chirac in order to protect France’s image as Council President. Within the ministries, co-habitation admittedly engendered a climate of mutual surveillance and suspicion, which greatly damaged the conduct of the

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Presidency. Both sides thus had to be cautious not to display their initiatives in advance for fear that the opposing one should take it over and claim paternity.19 The consequences of this situation were a certain selfcensorship on the government’s part, together with a lack of in-house transparency. All things considered, the co-habitation context, despite the opposite effects it inevitably created, has proved to be less of a handicap than the situation faced by numerous European governments that have to rely on fragile parliamentary coalitions. In the latter case, the ministers, since they belong to different political families, sometimes make statements that lack coherence. On the contrary, French officials have managed to speak with one voice. For the heads of the executive, the co-habitation context had the advantage of neutralizing any criticism on the part of the MPs – the opposition being, like the majority, associated with the Presidency’s initiatives and achievements. That is why French MPs have been so discreet regarding the results of the Nice summit. The situation would have been quite different in countries forced to adopt a wait-and-see policy through fear of the opposition’s reactions. The logic of expected consequences: a rational approach Another approach that can help us understand France’s conduct of the Presidency is the rational perspective. A number of factors are worthy of consideration. The first relates to France’s economic and social situation. Its impact on the Presidency’s agenda was obvious: the battle against unemployment and the defence of the French model of social protection and public services were set as top priorities. It is quite relevant to note that the three issues occupied an important place in France’s domestic politics and political debates. What is more, they were also among the French government’s national priority issues. The second factor is constitutional. France made it clear that it would oppose any prospect of federalism, but adopted a more pragmatic profile concerning the reform of the treaties and also gave greater impetus to various policies linked to the overall reform of the EU’s institutional structure. By the same token, the French Presidency’s distant attitude towards both the Commission and the Parliament may be explained by France’s own conception of European integration. The Commission was regarded as an excessively centralizing institution and the legitimacy of the EP failed to be acknowledged by French officials. A salient third element to account for the Presidency’s decisions is regional interests. In this respect, France was faithful to its leadership ideals and refused to interfere in the defence of local interests. It happened that the country actually took initiatives called for by important domestic events – for instance, enhancing security in sea transportation following the wreck of the tanker Erika and of the Levoli Sun on the

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coasts of France – but such initiatives remained exceptional. That France could stay neutral when regional interests were at stake is understandable – the North–South cleavage being of little relevance in the French case, both on geographical and socio-economic grounds. In the field of external relations, France showed much more ambition. For instance, at the European summit of Biarritz – held in October 2000 – the French Presidency invited Emil Kostunica, newly elected at the head of Yugoslavia’s government. What is more, defence was set as a top priority by the French Presidency. France was thus accused of modifying the European agenda according to its national priorities and preferences. Actually, France’s conduct was less guided by its own short-term interests than by its idea both of its own international role and that of the EU. The defence of France’s interests was also obvious in the stand taken by its Presidency as regards institutional reform – a stand inspired very much by France’s singular vision of the institutions. France has always had a noticeable claim to ‘re-invent’ Europe – or, in the case of the Presidency, to conduct it in accordance with its aspirations. As for the institutional field, some French officials are of the opinion that France displayed too much self-confidence. It supposedly overestimated the resources at its disposal to drive the EU in the direction it favoured.20 France was dedicated to defending its views concerning the institutional reforms and consequently appeared as quite arrogant. At the end of its mandate, disappointment was thus inevitable – the French stands being evidently unacceptable to other member states. Moreover, they distracted the French Presidency from more standard issues. As it was put by a senior civil servant working at the Ministry of the Environment: One has to stop pretending that it is possible to preside over everything all the time. There are actually no grounds either for displaying national pride to the external world. The Council Presidency is a great lever, but it is no more than that. One does not rule the Parliament or the Commission. The Presidency does not confer any droit d’initiative.21 In terms of strategies (see the Introduction to this volume), we may conclude that the French included elements of a forcing strategy in its overall approach. When constitutional and security interests were perceived to be at stake, France did not hesitate to insist on its own preferred solution. In less politicized areas, accommodating and problem-solving strategies were more prevalent. The logic of appropriateness: a sociological and contextual approach To analyse the French Presidency’s style and performance, the country’s features and preferences are not the only elements to take into account.

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An approach of a more sociological kind also proves to be of relevance in understanding what determined the Presidency’s conduct. To do so, four sets of factors will be examined – namely path dependency, expectations and stereotypes, institutional constraints and the national political context. First, historical institutionalism leads us to consider the various logics of institutional inertia and path dependency that affected the French Presidency. From one country’s mandate to the next, the member state’s features remain the same, as does their political and administrative culture. In this respect, French officials underline the salience of the cleavage between Latin and Anglo-Saxon countries. On such concepts as public services and general interest, or on such matters as the role of the state, that of the EU and public action in a wide sense, the cultures cannot be but contrasted. However, it would admittedly be an exaggeration to speak of a strong continuity of action from one French Presidency to the next. Furthermore, the context in which the Presidency takes place is not similar either. In fact, it makes sense to refer to path dependency as regards the agenda-setting and the work in progress as decided largely by the country previously in charge of the Presidency. The Presidency’s action is also influenced by another set of elements related to expectations and perceptions – the expectations it has aroused and the way in which its conduct is perceived. In the case of France, taking into account how it has previously run the Presidency and French officials’ usual behaviour within the EU’s institutions, its conduct was expected to feature the three next qualities: arrogance, leadership and inventiveness. The French Presidency was expected to behave in an arrogant way, which it was eventually accused of – for a number of reasons. The first was France’s well-known voluntarism. France does not hesitate to be ‘pushy’ to obtain what it wants and even to put some delegations in difficulty. The second is the French negotiators’ specific state of mind, which is not always well appreciated by their counterparts. Hubert Védrine, Laurent Fabius and Pierre Moscovici, to mention but a few names, have all been trained at the ENA – the French National School of Administration. Claiming to be French intellectuals, they have a liking for paradoxical spirit, which leads them to reject a too formal diplomatic language. Such an attitude may be very irritating for negotiators from other countries.22 The French Presidency was reproached for its arrogant behaviour in the IGC, notably for the way in which it conducted negotiations in Nice. Other countries’ officials resented the stand taken by France as regards the weighting of votes – all the more since the issue of an (un)equal treatment between France and Germany had never been openly mentioned or discussed. Yet it was admittedly France’s duty, as chairman, to maintain a good climate during the negotiations. Moreover, France was blamed for applying pressure on other member states, for instance, favouring the Netherlands at the expense of Belgian interests. The French Presidency’s strategy was to take advantage of the fact that Belgian officials were

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supposedly pro-European and more likely to make further concessions. The ‘small’ countries eventually resented this cynical attitude. We wish to underline the vital importance of stereotypes. They are worth studying, as they have a two-way impact. National stereotypes can help to explain how each country’s Presidency is perceived by the other member states. They also figure prominently in accounting for its priorities and ‘style’. For these reasons, there is no doubt that stereotypes play an essential role within EU politics. Our purpose here is not to put forward easy cultural explanations or clichés. Nevertheless, it is relevant to keep in mind that national peculiarities have an effect on both the way in which the Presidency is run and the way it is perceived. Knowing that stereotyped attitudes would be expected from them, French officials did not bother to distinguish themselves from the national stereotypes. They felt no shame in behaving in accordance with them, so they behaved openly in that way. French officials first did their best to appear as consensusbuilders, but they soon adopted conduct that was more likely to sustain France’s reputation for arrogance and ‘autism’ – the word is used here with reference to France’s lack of ability to listen to the others, notably the negotiators from the ‘small’ countries. Yet French officials failed to live up to their country’s reputation of ‘visionary’ ability. As it was put by a member of the French Permanent Representation: ‘France did not meet the standards in keeping with its stereotype, though it did illustrate the darker sides of it’ (cf. Costa and Daloz, forthcoming).23 There are also institutional grounds for the French Presidency’s lack of clear priorities and involvement. According to several French officials, the conduct of the Presidency could have been improved had the role of the Minister of European Affairs been better defined. His involvement was focused on institutional reform and was regarded as insufficient on other issues, when there was any involvement at all. Some French officials suggested that he should enjoy a more prominent position under the Prime Minister in order to be able to co-ordinate properly other ministers’ actions. This low-profile position may account for the lack of co-ordination between the different units of the Council. During the French Presidency, the Council did not entirely fulfil its duties as regards general matters. It happened that the different Councils dealt with the same issue in rather contrasted terms. The weaknesses of the French Presidency, and the way it played its Presidency role, have also been explained by the role implications of the national political context, and especially co-habitation. The modesty of the French Presidency’s achievements regarding reform of the treaties has been attributed to the lack of involvement on the part of the two heads of the French executive, whose main concern was domestic politics. The Presidency role was for both actors a less vital concern than their roles as domestic actors. There was indeed a gap between Jacques Chirac’s enthusiastic declarations concerning the adoption of a European constitution

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and the mixed results of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) – for which France has been held mainly responsible. The Presidency failed to give the right impetus to further reform. Besides, the prospect of being treated differently from Germany was unacceptable to France. The country’s lack of achievements on the institutional issue stemmed mainly from the fact that Chirac and Jospin disagreed on the scale of the reform – the latter having opposed the use of the word ‘constitution’. They both wished to appear as the protectors of French interests and therefore emphasized the bargainer role in the conduct of the Presidency. This meant that France eventually fell short of its European ambitions.

Conclusion France’s initial claim to appear both as a broker – and thus belie its reputation for arrogance – and as a leader was not borne out in practice. As he presented the French Presidency’s plan of action, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin kept a very low profile. Appearing before the French MPs he stated: ‘it is not the proper time for ambitious announcements or declarations of intent.’ But in reality things went differently. France’s great expectations for the EU contrasted with its lack of actual priorities. According to many experts, the Presidency failed to fulfil its duty as ‘political filter’.24 In fact, issues of various kinds were discussed without any order or logic – notably during the European summits. As a result, the European Council did not function as a political forum, but was used merely as a place for negotiations. Obviously, France did not meet the (high) standards set by those who regarded it as a potential leader. Its leadership style was ‘pushy’ and provoked resentment among, especially, the smaller states. Small countries, however critical they may be of the arrogant attitude of the big states – France in particular – are still well aware that they have played a key role in the European integration process. On the whole, the image left by the French Presidency is admittedly a two-faceted one: bureaucrat and bargainer. That France should be described as a bureaucrat is unremarkable: its senior officials have displayed a relative lack of interest regarding European issues, and this resulted in an often very passive attitude. Co-habitation – and the dysfunctions it brought – also gave grounds for this ‘bureaucrat’ image. As for the ‘bargainer’ image, it stems from the attitude of the French Presidency on the occasion of the European summit in Nice, where France indeed had a very expeditious way of dealing with some issues, resorting to formal voting and marathon councils. The French President also pushed through the common defence policy issue. Four main items had been put on the agenda of the Nice summit, relating to such issues as strengthened cooperation, the reweighting of the Council voting system, the formation of the Commission and the extension of qualified majority voting. All those issues were run in a zero-sum game context. In this respect, President

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Chirac’s voluntarism (‘the Treaty has to be done’) contrasted with his unwillingness to make any concession.

Notes 1 ‘L’influence, ce n’est pas d’imposer des idées, mais de proposer un vrai projet et d’entraîner les autres.’ Declaration by a member of the French Permanent Representation Office in Brussels, at a Conference on the Nice summit, College of Europe, Bruges (January 2001). 2 The French Presidency’s main achievements concern European defence on the one hand and ‘citizens’ Europe’ on the other. Special forces with 60,000 soldiers were created in case of urgent interventions and military-politico institutions were organized at the European Union level. With regard to measures intended to reassure European citizens that the EU is really looking after them, one should mention the proclamation of the EU fundamental rights charter. Some progress was also made in the field of food safety (increase in ESB tests, banning the use of animal meal to feed all cattle, creation of a European food agency in the year 2002) and transport safety (reinforcement of regulations on ship control, programming the withdrawal of single-hull tankers, establishing a freight trans-European railway network, adoption of a directive on the truck drivers’ work hours). Finally, social measures (a five-year action plan to speed up the harmonization of social legislation, an agreement on the status of European firms) were adopted. 3 The French handbook for the conduct of the Presidency, edited in 2000, which was sent to all the French officials involved. All quotes from this source are our translations. 4 As it was put by one of the Prime Minister’s advisers on European Affairs. 5 A senior official working at the French Committee for Interministerial Cooperation (SGCI: Secrétariat Général pour la Coordination Interministérielle) whom we interviewed in February 2001 thus spoke of ‘the necessity to make ends meet’ (‘faire des économies de bouts de ficelle’). 6 As was reported by the adviser for European Affairs within the Ministry of Environment. 7 Prime Minister Kostas Simitis thus stated that the two main objectives for the EU Greek Presidency (second half of 2003) would be to achieve the negotiation procedures for the accession of Cyprus and to put the economic policy in conformity with the EU social policy. http://www.primeminister.gr. 8 The French programme headlines were advertised in the main French daily newspapers such as Le Monde, on 19 July 2000: ‘Let’s draw Europe together. Since July, the 1st France runs the Council’s Presidency and will do so until the 31st of December. How to help economic growth, innovation and full employment. How to strengthen social cohesion? How to answer citizens’ everyday and down to earth preoccupations? How to consolidate peace? How to make the EU institutions more efficient and understandable? How to make the enlargement work? These are some among the questions the French Presidency has to face and will try to deal with to make Europe go ahead.’ 9 For instance, France was accused of hindering the directive regarding the cleaning out of tanks offshore. At the occasion of a press conference, on 11 September, the Dutch MEP Theodorus Bouwman stated: ‘France, represented on that matter by Minister Jean-Claude Gayssot, was against the text proposed by the Parliament until June. On the eve of taking over the Presidency, France adopted a new position. The country could not maintain this hostility after the Erika’s shipwreck.’ Previously, the French attitude was related to the aim of

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defending the competitiveness of French harbours in comparison to those of Northern European countries, according to some French officials. ‘Le président de groupe doit veiller, lorsqu’il traite une proposition qui peut être adoptée à la majorité qualifiée, à orienter les travaux non pas vers la recherche du consensus mais vers le ralliement d’une majorité suffisante. Il ne pourra évidemment agir ainsi qu’avec le doigté nécessaire et ne devra pas donner à une délégation qui à un problème particulier l’impression qu’on ne tient pas compte de ses difficultés, sans pour autant lui conférer un pouvoir de blocage. Il veillera dans ce cas à renvoyer le dossier – sur ce point précis – au niveau du COREPER’ (ibid). That is, the aim is not consensus-building but to rally a sufficient number of participants to reach a qualified majority vote in favour. The French Presidency resorted to formal voting on two key issues – that of legal working time for road transportation (the UK being in the minority) and that of the ‘Erika I package’ relating to maritime safety (several member states being put in a minority). As in Councils on agriculture (November–December 2000) and transportation (December 2000). The French Presidency intended to strengthen its position as regards maritime safety following the Levoli Sun shipwreck. However, it was to face opponents within the Council and sought Parliament’s support (the latter being in favour of stricter measures) in order to find a way out. Interview at the French Permanent Representation. The senior French civil servants prove to be more and more ‘Europeanized’. As indicated above, the officials involved in the Presidency either within the various ministries or working for the two heads of the executive were all familiar with EU negotiations and Brussels habits, often having worked at the Permanent Representation. Their socialization process together with their interpersonal networks contributed to their better recognition of Community interests. According to a member of the Finnish Permanent Representation in Brussels. Conference on the Nice summit, College of Europe, Bruges (January 2001). Interview in Brussels. Interview with an official working at the French Committee for Interministerial Co-operation (SGCI). Interview with an official adviser on European Affairs within a French ministry. Interview with an official adviser on European Affairs within a French ministry. Interview with an official adviser on European Affairs within a French ministry. Due to their counterparts’ outspokenness, the officials from Luxembourg had the feeling of being looked down on as regards the fiscal issue. As it was put by a member of the French Permanent Representation. Conference on the Nice summit, College of Europe, Bruges, January 2001.

References Books Aide mémoire (2000) French Handbook for Conduct of the Presidency, Paris: Secrétariat Général pour la Coordination Interministérielle.

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Costa, O. and Daloz, J-P. (forthcoming) ‘How French policy-makers see themselves’, in H. Drake (ed.), France and Europe: Agents of Change and Resistance to Change, London: Routledge.

Interviews M. Pascal FONTAINE, Secrétaire général adjoint, Groupe du Parti populaire européen, Parlement européen, 12 December 2000. M. Jean-Marc LAFOREST, Secrétaire général adjoint, Groupe du Parti des socialistes européens, Parlement européen, Bruxelles, 21 September 2000. M. Jean-Louis BOURLANGES, Membre du Parlement européen, Bruxelles, 22 February 2001. M. Jean-Paul ALBERTINI, Chef de Cabinet, Ministère de l’environnement (responsable des questions européennes lors de la présidence 2000), Paris, 22 March 2001. M. Gilles BRIATTA, Membre de la Représentation permanente de la France à Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2001. M. Michel GUILBAUD, Directeur-adjoint du SGCI, Paris, 6 February 2001. M. Jacques LAPOUGE, Conseiller du Président de la République pour les Affaires européennes, Paris, 14 March 2001. M. Philippe LEGLISE-COSTA, Membre du Cabinet du Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Paris, 1 March 2001. M. Patrick MAISONNAVE, Membre du Cabinet du Ministre délégué aux Affaires européennes, Paris, 1 March 2001. M. Michael SHACKLETON, Administrateur, Parlement européen, Bruxelles, 24 January 2001. M. Jean VIDAL, Conseiller du Premier ministre pour les Affaires européennes, Directeur du SGCI, Paris, 14 March 2001.

9

The Swedish Presidency of 2001 A reflection of Swedish identity Bo Bjurulf

Introduction From a Swedish perspective, the Swedish Presidency during the spring of 2001 was the single most important European event since accession to the European Union in 1995. It has even been argued that, for the first time since the Vienna Conference 1814 to 1815, Sweden could now act on equal terms with the more powerful nations in determining European policy development (cf. Wahlbäck 2000: 1). The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how a small and new member state with a well-functioning administration chose to play the Presidency role during the spring of 2001. What were the forces driving the Swedish government? According to the logic of expected consequences (see the Introduction to this volume), actors ‘choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are doing likewise’ (March and Olsen 1998: 949). Thus, according to this logic, actors are guided by a cost–benefit calculation of their interest. This calculation can, however, turn out differently if it is based on national interests, on the interests of the government per se or on the interests of individual governmental leaders. According to the logic of appropriateness the pursuit of objectives is linked to identities rather than cost-benefit calculated interests. An actor selects the alternative that he or she believes is appropriate or virtuous in the type of situation he or she faces; that is, the actor tries to do ‘the right thing’ within the given context (Risse 2000: 4). It seems reasonable to assume that ‘the right thing’ might be driven by different identities. In this chapter, this latter approach is used to enhance our understanding of the Swedish Presidency.

Swedish national identity and notions of appropriateness I make the assumption that the Swedish Presidency was steered in different contexts by alternative notions of ‘how a Swedish EU Presidency should behave’, ‘how a European Union Presidency should behave’, ‘how an EU Presidency should behave’. A Swedish Presidency is guided by

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historically grounded perspectives, or frames of reference, of issue-areas in which what is the right thing to do is governed by traditional identities. As regards framing, Petersson and Carlberg (1990: 14) argue that power in modern society is about determining and defining what the problem is. Tversky and Kahneman (1981, quoted in Nylander 2000: 73) state ‘that an individual’s choice of action is highly dependent on the particular frame of reference in which it was cast’. A path-dependent framing is when a nation views a problem in a customary way, which may even be formalized in constitutions or treaties. The ‘Swedish model’ is an example of such a historically rooted frame, albeit only partly formalized. It seems reasonable to argue that path-dependent, national ways of framing different issueareas might contribute to the construction of a national identity. What then constitutes the Swedish national identity? That the welfare state is important is beyond doubt. Trägårdh writes: ‘Thus, in so far as Swedish national identity is tightly linked to the welfare state, the emphasis should be equally on “welfare” and the “state”. A decoupling of nation and state would appear to be wholly foreign to the Swedish political tradition . . . the terms nation, state and society are in Swedish virtually synonymous’ (Trägårdh 2002: 144). This fusion has created a socialengineering state based on centralized power and uniformity in which concepts such as subsidiarity and federalism are foreign to the Swedish identity (cf. Trägårdh 2002: 142, 144). Moreover, Swedish political culture is democratic rather than liberal. It is characterized by an ancient tradition of a broadly defined access to the democratic process even as it places rather narrow limits on the possibility of diverging from the communal consensus (cf. Trägårdh 2002: 142). On the external dimension, Trägårdh (2002: 152) notes that: While others – especially the Great Powers – conducted themselves in a manner more befitting a Bismarck or a Metternich, the Swedes ostentatiously rejected the amoralism of Realpolitik. From Dag Hammarskjöld and Folke Bernadotte to Olof Palme, and indeed including even Carl Bildt, the Swedish way has been one of wholehearted support of binding international law, expressed in a language steeped in a deeply moralist vision of a new world order, one fashioned in the image of Swedish rationality, democratic values and social engineering. In brief, the Swedish identity is, in my view, based on a fusion of nation, state and society that has created a social-engineering state based on centralized power and widespread access to the democratic process. This identity may have a strong bearing on national decisions, according to the logic of appropriateness. A European Union Presidency is steered by notions among Swedish decision-makers about how a ‘good European’ should behave and on their

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visions of European governance. Sweden is well known for its emphasis on an intergovernmental European Union. At the same time, Swedish politicians have not been averse to European solutions, even of a supranational character, in issue-areas of traditional concern to Sweden. In Swedish conceptions of Europe, the EU is perceived as a democratic peace project that can have a future influence on the wider Europe. Social solidarity, democracy, the rule of law and peace are core values that are seen as essential elements of European identity. Finally, a European Union Presidency is steered by how the country’s leaders believe a ‘Presidency’ should behave. The widespread EU norms of efficiency and impartiality are also seen as ideals by Swedish decisionmakers. The impartiality norm fits well with traditional Swedish role conceptions that highlight the country’s role as mediator in the international arena but also its history as a consensual, compromise-prone state. Highly efficient decision-making is associated with bureaucratic ideals and virtues, and is also linked to Sweden’s tradition of a strong, centralized state authority. Using this slightly modified theory of the logic of appropriateness, what Swedish policies would we expect in the different issue-areas facing the Swedish Presidency, and what strategies would seem to be most likely? Lee Miles (2000: 232) has proposed that Sweden has some ‘[c]hampioned policy priorities’ in which ‘Swedish governments are driven by the “priority” of making a “positive” impact on the EU’s future development.’ Miles distinguishes between: ‘(i) Swedish desires to improve the democratic credentials of the Union, such as greater EU openness and transparency; (ii) those policy areas where the Swedes are usually perceived to be “market leaders” such as the environmental and social policy spheres’ (Miles 2000: 232). The assumption here is that Sweden in the championed priority areas believes that it knows what is ‘the right thing to do’ even if the outcome is not necessarily positive according to a national cost–benefit calculation. In this type of issues I assume that the Swedish Presidency is driven by its notion of ‘how a Swedish EU Presidency should behave’. Since Swedish decision-makers believe that they know what is ‘the right thing to do’ they will want to spread the values inherent in the Swedish model. Thus they will be on the offensive, using forcing or problem-solving strategies. Miles’ second category is normative policy priorities. According to Miles, ‘the major priority here is that Sweden is viewed by others to be a “mainstream” member state and a “good European” ’ (Miles 2000: 232). His main examples are CFSP and the Schengen co-operation. Thus we assume that in these areas Sweden is driven by ‘how a European Presidency should behave’ and an accommodating strategy from the Presidency should be high on the strategic agenda since that is part of being a ‘good European’. The enlargement area seems to fit into both the championed and the normative categories. Miles’ third and final category is policy dilemmas. Miles’ assumption here is that ‘[t]he priority of the Swedish

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government in these policy areas is to “defend” overtly and usually “protect” national interests, even if this requires Sweden to be placed on the periphery of EU development’ (Miles 2000: 232–3). Miles mentions the EMU and the Swedish alcohol monopoly (Miles 2000: 233). I suggest that tax and budget issues are even better examples. In my opinion, policy dilemmas are areas driven by Swedish interests, and are therefore not ideally analysed with the aid of a logic of appropriateness. In constitutional issues, however, there might exist deep-rooted identities based on the state’s national constitutional heritage. In the largely cost–benefit driven issue-areas I would argue that Sweden will be on the defensive, protecting national values and national interests and the strategic choice is between a forcing and a compromise strategy.

What drove the Swedish government in different issue-areas? The Swedish Presidency was focusing on the three Es: Enlargement, Employment and Environment. These were areas with high domestic Swedish expectations that Sweden would make a difference, fitting, as it were, quite well into the frames of the Swedish model and the socialengineering state. The same applies to the question of public access to EU documents which fits with Sweden’s tradition of a high level of political and social rights but a comparatively low emphasis on civil and individual rights (cf. Trägårdh 2002: 143). Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) also became a major item on the Swedish agenda, more popular in Europe than at home. How did the Swedish Presidency choose to enact the role of the Presidency in these issue-areas? Can the management styles be explained by the logic of appropriateness as stated above or is the logic of expected consequences a more useful explanation? Which strategies were used? Enlargement: a Presidency caught in a three-level game How did Sweden choose to enact the Presidency role in a ‘history-making area’ such as enlargement? It could be argued that the context for management was not favourable since, from the perspective of the Presidency, Sweden was in a three-level game. The first level was the relation to Swedish public opinion. Here, curiously enough, the EU-sceptical Swedes were positive (see e.g. the Eurobarometer 54 (April 2001), according to which 56 per cent of Swedes were in favour of enlargement and 32 per cent were against). The second level was the meetings and discussions with the candidate countries. Without the huge efforts by the candidate countries facing an enthusiastic Presidency it would not have been possible to open sixty-four chapters and close sixty-six (Commission representative interview, 3 July 2001).

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According to interviews with Commission officials, Sweden found creative solutions in the environmental field, in the field of movement of capital and the variable time frame for the free movement of labour. Moreover, more chapters were closed than expected. The problematic third level was the EU one. Internal EU discussions framed by a North–South division were complicated. Another problem was a Commission wavering between a Swedish ‘regatta’ position, that each applicant should be judged on its merits, and a ‘political grouping’ of the applicant countries. A division into political groupings would have slowed down the process, according to Swedish representatives. Another problem was demands by Spanish leaders that Spain should be guaranteed the same level of regional support after enlargement. Finally, Germany and France were against the dates in the Göteborg European Council conclusions. The end result was summarized by the Swedish Presidency in the following way: At the meeting of the European Council in Göteborg it was established that a significant breakthrough had taken place and that the enlargement procedure is now irreversible. Heads of government agreed on two deadlines: • •

Conclusion of the negotiations before the end of 2002 for the bestprepared candidate countries; Accession to the EU for these countries in time to be able to participate in the European Parliament elections in 2004 as members. (Results of the Swedish Presidency 2001: 1)

External events helped the Swedish Presidency to have its way. The negative result of the Irish referendum made dates more important and the flaring up of the conflict in Macedonia heightened the European security perspective. Schröder, the German Chancellor, in defence of his concessions, argued that from a symbolic point of view the dates were more important for Sweden than for Germany – but that a goal is not a commitment (The Economist, 6 June 2001). A close look at what was agreed upon tends to support Schröder’s view that no unconditional promises of membership were given. The most important creative solution pushed by the Swedish Presidency was a shift in framing. Enlargement should not, according to this frame, be about regional support, the invasion of labour or budgetary problems; it should be about security, welfare and democratization (for this section, cf. Bengtsson 2001). This was thoroughly consistent with the Swedish view of the EU as a promoter of peace, a ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002). I suggest that the Swedish government in this issue-area was driven by Sweden’s tradition of internationalism (cf. Ruth 1984: 71, in Trägårdh 2002: 112). Enlargement was framed as a project for democracy and peace.

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A problem-solving strategy was used. Creative solutions were found. The framing advocated by Sweden was of a strategic, but possibly also temporary, character. The Swedish government did not touch the closely related budget implications, which are loaded with national interests. Thus Sweden was in the enlargement issue-area driven by a convergence of global concerns and a Swedish internationalist identity. Employment: a Presidency confronting conflicting pathdependent identities If enlargement was driven by global interest, the employment issue-area was definitely a path-dependent issue. The question was whether Sweden would be able to follow up the employment process from Luxembourg 1997, with employment guidelines and national programmes, via the Cardiff process to improve structural reforms of goods, service and capital markets to the Cologne process, which implies a co-ordination of macroeconomic policies (cf. Jacobsson 2001). In the employment area, the Swedish Presidency had problems on several levels: 1

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It was wedged in between the French and the Belgian Presidencies whose framing of the issue-area was to focus on a European social agenda and social cohesion. The Belgian Employment Minister, Laurette Onkelinx, talked about a ‘European social model’ to replace different national models and had specific proposals concerning joint pension, equality and labour market regulations. Here the Swedish government was not enthusiastic, since there was a conflict between a continental family-based welfare system and joint taxation and a Swedish individually based system with daycare centres, individual taxation and so on (cf. Jacobsson 2001: 92). In Sweden the social contract on which the welfare state was built is one between the individual and the state at the expense of the intermediary institutions of civil society, such as the family, and private and voluntary organizations (cf. Trägårdh 2002: 142). Another conflict stemmed from the Swedish position, not supported by all its fellow member states, that full employment is the best instrument against social deprivation. Denmark, which shared the same perspective, was, in the autumn of 2002, expected to follow up this perspective, lost during the Belgian and Spanish Presidencies (cf. Jacobsson 2001: 91–2). Here we find an interesting conflict between European governments’ attitudes towards ‘employment engineering’. There was also a conflict between the free market enthusiasts Great Britain and Spain on one hand and France and Germany on the other; the latter being of the opinion that liberalization is a means not a goal (cf. Jacobsson 2001).

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The Swedish Presidency was in a situation where, to start with, it wanted to reframe the issue. This proved to be extremely difficult, however. The Portuguese, the French, the Belgian and the Spanish Presidencies all followed their path, based on a competing frame. Thus despite the fact that this was a ‘championed policy priority’, completely in line with Sweden and the Swedish social democratic government’s identity, where we might have expected a forcing and problem-solving strategy, path-dependent conflicts produced an accommodating strategy. Sweden, acutely aware of the Presidency efficiency norm, felt a need to compromise to produce some kind of progress in the area. It should also be noted that the Swedish goal of full employment would necessitate more federal solutions, which produces an internal Swedish conflict of identity. The anti-federal identity is in conflict with the full-employment identity inherent in the Swedish model (for this section cf. Jacobsson 2001). Environment: a Presidency driven by Swedish identity Environment, a true Nordic priority, was an excellent issue to elicit a positive response from Swedish domestic opinion. In this area, the Swedes often try to assume a leadership role, thinking they can lead Europe by example. The Swedes argue that they are at the forefront, having concrete, clear and long-term policies for ecologically sustainable development. The Swedish Prime Minister has also stressed the importance of the environment issue area. The Swedish Presidency achieved, at the meeting of the European Council in Göteborg, an EU strategy for sustainable development. The starting point was that EU citizens shall be guaranteed economic stability, social security and a clean, healthy and secure environment, and that sustainable development called for global solutions (Results of the Swedish Presidency 2001). In the environmental field the EU is going through another framing process. In the words of Annika Kronsell (1997: 194), environmental problems have been defined first as costly impediments to economic practices; later as a possible source of income and new markets; and finally as the basis of economic activities. It is in reflective problem-framing that most changes toward greening have taken place. This has been done in declarations, programmes and reports but perhaps less so in practical politics. It is quite obvious that different countries within the EU are at different levels in this framing process. The Swedish Presidency was not in a position to authorize a major breakthrough in the environmental field. The fact that the proposal from the Commission came late was one major problem. The fact that harmonization of taxes is against Swedish principles was a

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problem as regards a tax on the emission of carbon dioxides which, from a green perspective, is much needed (cf. Kronsell 2001: 112, 117). In the environment issue-area the Swedish Presidency believed it had the correct solutions and that other countries should adopt the Swedish policies (Kronsell 2001: 109), so again we would expect a forcing and a problem-solving strategy. Such strategies may be found in the agendashaping activities. The Swedish Presidency was able to put acid rain, the chemical strategy and the sixth environmental action programme on the agenda and some results were accomplished (Kronsell 2001: 113). Unforeseen actions outside of Presidential control such as the Kyoto conflict and late Commission proposals as well as conflicts about framing, however, had the effect that the time was not right for a substantial breakthrough. In the European Parliament, the Swedish Presidency was applauded more for its ambitions than for its results (Malmström 2001: 197). Thus, in this issue area, the Swedish government, which thought it had the solutions including an important role for an active ‘environmental engineering’ state, ran into European frames of reference which, according to interviews, were to a large extent based on environmental problems as costly impediments to economic practices as well as a more reluctant attitude to state activities. Public access to EU documents: a Presidency driven by a pathdependent Swedish identity? Sweden has a long and venerable tradition of openness as regards access to documents. Already in 1766, Sweden got its first Freedom of Information Act, ‘Tryckfrihetsförordningen’. This act forms part of the Swedish constitution, and in this way openness was institutionalized and became a part of the country’s cultural heritage. Sweden, which since 1995 had pushed for greater openness in the EU, found itself in quite a complicated situation. It was first obliged to chair the process in the Council to reach a common position on public access to EU documents and then to argue that position in a co-decision process with the Parliament. In the Council, Sweden’s position was backed fully only by Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands, and, to some extent, by Great Britain and Ireland. The formidable opposition to greater access was led by France, Spain, Germany and Austria. However, the European Parliament’s position (at least that of its active minority) was, especially when it came to parliamentary access, even more openness-friendly than the Swedish view. Thus Sweden faced the unpleasant situation of having to argue for a common position far from its own preferences against a Parliament with some very radical views on openness. At the end of January 2001, trialogue negotiations between the Commission, the Parliament and the Council were in full swing and by the end of April an agreement was reached.

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Bo Bjurulf A decision was taken on a regulation that signifies a major step forward as regards openness in EU institutions and citizens’ access to EU documents. Both documents drawn up and documents received are covered by the regulation, including the sensitive documents (cf. the Solana decision), albeit with certain special rules. Public records must be established. These records will be available through the Internet. Swedish regulations on public access will not be affected negatively. The Council also adopted a decision to make Council documents available on the Internet. (Results of the Swedish Presidency 2001: 30–1)

In my analysis of this issue I will first present the widely different framing backgrounds that were present in the process and, second, try to unravel the puzzle: How did two minorities in Parliament and in Council succeed in changing fundamentally the Commission proposal? The first framing conflict is between the diplomatic secrecy framing in the Council versus the process-democratic position of the EU Parliament. The diplomatic secrecy culture is based on an intergovernmental perspective: ‘We represent our country in complicated negotiations with other countries. Our negotiation positions must be secret in order to reach the best result possible for our country. Furthermore if we divulge the positions of the other countries this will affect the negotiation confidence in a negative way.’ Against this we have the Parliament’s position that this is a joint problem-solving process and that Parliament must be as well informed as the Council in order to be able to participate in an efficient way. A second conflict is between politicians looking for legitimacy, and bureaucrats looking for efficiency. The Swedish framing is that openness/ accountability is an efficiency-producing instrument (e.g. in bringing down the level of corruption). It has been said that openness promotes the best bureaucrats and weeds out the worst. An important factor in the process was the British process towards a Freedom of Information Act. The British internal discussion clearly changed the British view. In Parliament the British MEPs Michael Cashman and Graham Watson played decisive roles. It should also be noted that actors with other frames were involved – such as the Ombudsman and the Court – on the basis of complaints from agents of change, for example, the Guardian, Statewatch and the Journalist. These agents of change influence public opinion perceptions and no Parliament is insensitive to public pressure. It might be noted that these actors were very critical when the final solution was reached. Statewatch’s Tony Bunyan was quoted in the Guardian: ‘[t]he Parliament has rolled over and given in to the Council. It’s been a wholly undemocratic process’ (Guardian, 26 April 2001). It is also important to remember that the Swedish Presidency influenced the openness process before being part of the negotiation process as

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President. The first instrument was to use the shadow of the incoming Presidency. In my opinion the Swedish position and expectations of the incoming Swedish Presidency influenced several of the Commission’s access proposals. The second instrument was to influence by example. The order went out to all the Swedish chairpersons that this was going to be the most transparent Presidency ever. Denmark (1993) and the UK (1992 and 1998) introduced some transparency activities into the European Union. Finland (1999) was leading by example when it put documents and calendars on the web for the first time (‘lex Kemppinen’). After some passivity by the Portuguese and French Presidencies, the Swedish Presidency carried the Finnish example forward. Our puzzle, to be unravelled, is how two minorities in Parliament and in Council could change the Commission proposal in fundamental ways. First of all, the Commission produced a proposal that did not satisfy anyone. The necessity to protect sensitive documents was not anticipated, the list of exceptions was a step backwards, even according to Council lawyers, the process towards a more transparent and service-minded administrative culture was not codified, civil society was not consulted and so on. Furthermore, if the Commission had produced a proposal less adapted to its own administrative structure and to Swedish demands and more adapted to a secrecy-related majority view, the Swedish negotiation position would have been much worse. The problem for the Commission, however, was that there was no active majority position. The majority was diffident until the problem with sensitive NATO documents appeared. The second factor was the relations between the Parliament, the Council, the Presidency and the Commission. The transparency activists in Parliament had confidence in the Swedish Presidency and distrusted the French and even more the Spanish one on the horizon. The Council trusted the Swedish chief negotiator Gunnar Lund. His instruments against the most secrecy-minded members of the Council were the Parliament and a commitment to protect the sensitive security-related documents. A third factor was the form of the co-decision process, which produced Commission passivity all the way up to the last days of the negotiations. In the informal trilogues, the Commission refused to be treated like a member state, expected to produce positions during the trilogue process. A fourth factor was Sweden’s technical competence. Being from a country that had dealt, legally, with the issue since 1766, the Swedish experts had the upper hand against lawyers from the Council and from countries with little experience in Freedom Of Information Acts. Related to this was the negotiating skill of Gunnar Lund: ‘He stepped on a number of toes but his use of the Parliament and refusal to allow certain proposals on the table was very clever’ (high-ranking Commission representative, 18 June 2001).

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A fifth factor was the deadline – 1 May 2001 – in the Amsterdam Treaty, which was heavily used as an instrument in Sweden’s pushing activities (for this section cf. Bjurulf 2001). The openness and transparency issue-area alongside enlargement, was probably the Swedish policy priority most actively championed by the Presidency. This was due to the fact that the Swedish constitution was at stake but also to a desire to improve the democratic credentials of the Union in line with old Swedish constitutional traditions. Gunnar Lund used a heavily forcing strategy, combined with elements of problemsolving, entirely in line with what has happened in other negotiations on constitutional issues. Sweden engaged in classical negotiation behaviour, playing off different actors against each other and trading concessions in different areas. The common foreign and security policy: a Presidency driven by a European identity? Brussels’ expectations of Swedish performance in the foreign and security policy areas were rather low-key. With the reputation of being a ‘reluctant European’, and with its long tradition of neutrality and non-alignment, high hopes were not placed on Sweden as a leader, or even an active player, in this field. At the same time, domestic expectation stressed Sweden’s tradition of foreign policy activism. The Swedes solved what might be regarded as a dilemma by framing the CSFP on the basis of traditional Swedish identities such as intensified co-operation with the UN, development of the EU’s civil crisis management and conflict prevention, and playing down NATO relations and the development of military capacity. Sweden, being a small state, had intensive co-operation with the High Representative Solana and Commissioner Patten. Sweden relied on Solana and may even have bolstered his position. Relations between Solana and the Swedish Foreign Minister Lindh seem to have been excellent. The Swedish Presidency thus intentionally fostered close relations with other institutional actors to be able to make an imprint. Sweden showed in several issues – above all in policy towards Macedonia – a capacity and an intention to produce a united EU strategy. The EU also, during the Swedish Presidency, took a number of initiatives in the Middle East. Thus Sweden, despite being a small state, managed to be an active player in the CFSP issue-area. Sweden as a new member did surprisingly well, relying on a good relationship with Solana, Patten, Blair and Schröder. Co-operation with other institutions and a whole-hearted effort to increase EU visibility in international affairs created a positive atmosphere in Brussels. Simultaneously, Sweden promoted its hobby-horses, for example, conflict prevention that it has likewise advocated in the UN. The picture of Sweden as a reluctant European, especially in the CFSP

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area, was challenged – and this was probably an intentional effect (for this section, cf. Bengtsson and Strömvik 2001). Had we expected Sweden as a new, reluctant, small and non-aligned nation to enact the Presidential role in the CFSP in this way? Clearly an accommodating strategy was used to maximize, not necessarily other nations’ gains, but European and global gains. In my opinion, the Swedish Presidency did this in order to increase its ‘European credentials’. Sweden, I believe, passed the initiation rite that any new Presidency must confront mainly through its handling of the CFSP. After the Swedish CFSP efforts I would be very surprised if Sweden is not regarded as a ‘real member’, even if several high-ranking officials in Brussels were amazed at how neutral Sweden could act the way it did in the CFSP area. This, however, only shows that they are not aware of the Swedish international activist identity.

How did the Swedish Presidency manage the parliaments and home opinion? The Swedish and the EU Parliaments In the Swedish Parliament there was a distinct party truce in line with a Swedish foreign policy tradition. The two largest political parties in Parliament, the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, usually find common ground in the foreign policy area. In a comparative perspective this bipartisanship is not unusual, especially during EU Presidencies. The only clear exception in recent times was the conflict between the President and the Prime Minister during the French Presidency in the autumn of 2000 (cf. Costa, Couvidat and Daloz, Chapter 8, this volume). The only conflict that can be found in the Swedish Parliament on the handling of the Presidency is the question of how power should be distributed within the EU and between EU institutions, i.e. the constitutional issue. This question is a complicated issue for the Swedish Social Democrats and it is not surprising that it was deferred to the Belgian Presidency. In fact, the Swedish Social Democrats, and not least the Social Democratic government, are in favour of extending EU power to new areas provided that it is done through the intergovernmental co-ordination method. Swedish conservatives and liberals are sceptical about extending EU power (e.g. in the employment area). They want a limited but strong EU. The social democrats may be in some trouble here since their electorate is not in favour of extending power to the EU (cf. Hegeland and Johansson 2001). In the European Parliament, the Swedish Presidency could not fall back on a Swedish identity. Interestingly enough it could fall back on a partypolitical identity. The Socialists liked what the Swedes did and the Conservatives were more critical. It came as no surprise that the Swedish Prime Minister’s preference for the intergovernmental model and a strong

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Council was generally criticized by a Parliament with a strong federal interest. EU parliamentary criticism was in the same vein, claiming that the Swedish Presidency had no ideas on the future of the EU. The Swedish Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister both emphasized the importance of a discussion of this future but they had few ideas about how it should be shaped. Pat Cox characterized Sweden’s position as ‘extremely cautious’. Management-wise, Parliament felt somewhat marginalized during the first half of the Swedish Presidency. During the second half there was nothing but praise. The trialogue method was an efficient, albeit non-transparent, tool in the hands of the Swedish Presidency (Malmström 2001: 198). In relation to the European Parliament I have the distinct impression that the Swedish government had expected to be able to treat that Parliament in the same way as the Swedish one. Experiences in numerous codecision negotiations, (cf. Beckman 2001: 64), however, forced the Swedish government into a more accommodating strategy, which seems to have been successful. Thus as an institution the European Parliament experienced no shared identity with the Swedish Presidency. Sweden was in a two-level game in which, due to different identities, the two levels had to be handled differently. The domestic arena It is a common view that the picture supplied by the mass media determines the success of a Presidency. Thus the Swedish Presidency in its management of mass media was concerned primarily with creating a more positive Swedish opinion and producing ‘the most transparent Presidency ever’. That strong transparency is consistent with Swedish identity has been pointed out above. That the Swedish government should try to turn Swedish opinion is not equally obvious from a European perspective. An important factor is the gap between the attitudes of an overwhelming majority of the Swedish national elite on the one side (positive to the EU) and a significant part of the electorate on the other (negative to the EU) (Hix 1999: 159). This gap would indicate a difference in the level of European identity between the elite and the electorate. The attempts to turn Swedish opinion were criticized in Le Monde and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung with the argument that they drew resources from Presidential substance. In general the Swedish newspapers had an abundance of material on the EU and the Swedish Presidency, even if the reports in general had a sceptical touch, with Swedish enlargement activities the exception. The European newspapers wrote much less but were more positive, seeing the regulation of public access to EU documents and Swedish activities in the CFSP as Sweden’s greatest achievements (for this section cf. Broman and Rosén 2001). In line with the effect of other Presidencies, the Eurobarometer, with

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fieldwork in October to November 2001, shows greater satisfaction among the Swedes with EU democracy (an increase of 9 per cent) and an increase in the feeling that Sweden on balance has benefited from being a member of the EU. Whether these changes can be attributed to the Swedish Presidency or whether they are due mainly to a general trend is an open question.

Swedish identities and Presidency roles At the beginning of the Swedish Presidency, the government was anxious to underline that a Presidency is aimed primarily at ‘managing Europe’. Therefore, no major advances in issue-areas that were close to the hearts of domestic special interest groups were to be expected. The government thus emphasized the roles of bureaucrat and broker (see the Introduction to this volume). Both of these roles were close to the Swedish ideal image of the EU Presidency as an active consensus-maker and an efficient manager. Furthermore, playing the role of an honest broker in the EU fitted well with the Swedish self-image, and perceived history, of being a first-class, skilful international mediator. Swedish identity in this case tallied with its Presidency role expectations. In general, Sweden succeeded in enacting the impartial mediator role. The Presidency was credited with bringing a number of difficult dossiers to a conclusion, both in the Council and in conciliation negotiations with the EP. In the transparency case, however, Sweden was accused of having stepped over the limits in openly advocating its own national interests. This was, of course, denied by Swedish officials, who claimed they acted solely in the general European interest. Being proud of its self-image as a good administrator, the Swedish administration made a concerted effort to be well prepared and to handle day-to-day business in an efficient way. The fact that Sweden held the office for the first time contributed to the massive attention given to the Presidency. As stated in my introduction, this period at the helm of the EU was seen as a very serious and important task for Sweden. Sweden did not play any prominent leadership role during its stint in office, except in the enlargement area. Sweden was accused of lack of leadership in the debate on the future of Europe. Furthermore, Swedish officials generally preferred an accommodative style, trying to find broad consensus solutions. This was both consistent with Swedish domestic tradition and was perceived to be an efficient way of producing lasting compromises. On the other hand, Sweden was criticized at times for being too prone to compromise. In the eyes of some observers, this diminished the room for Presidency leadership: pushing a certain position is considered necessary to achieve results. The Swedish approach in this context can fruitfully be compared to the French leadership style (cf. Costa, Couvidat and Daloz, Chapter 8, this volume), which put a premium on applying

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pressure – but which did not really encourage listening to smaller member states.

Conclusions: what drove the Swedish Government? In this chapter, I have interpreted the performance of the Swedish Presidency in terms of identity-based behaviour. The Swedish Presidency tried to stay as far away as possible from national interest issues, such as the budgetary consequences of enlargement or the horizontal and vertical future distribution of power within the EU. The CSFP might be regarded as an exception where the Swedish government clearly found an active policy to be an ‘investment that would generate national dividends during many years to come’ (Finnish diplomat, 5 May 2000). However, the framing of the issue-area was clearly consistent with a path-dependent Swedish identity. A huge Swedish management effort within the security issue-area may furthermore have modified Sweden’s reputation as a ‘reluctant’ European. The regulation of public access to EU documents was also in many nations regarded as being driven by Swedish interests. I argue, however, that the Swedish Presidency was driven primarily by a deep-rooted Swedish identity and what was, by the Swedes, regarded as a shared European interest. The Swedes tried to push their own model or frame based on the national identity in areas where they could show ‘how it can be done from a different perspective’. This produced problems in the employment and environment areas. The time was not right and there were too many competing path-dependent frames to produce any substantial change. In this situation, the Swedish Presidency fell back on a compromise strategy. In the enlargement field, Sweden used a problem-solving strategy while we find a pushing strategy in the transparency issue-area. There the time was ripe and a forcing strategy could be used. I think we may conclude that the Swedes were, in the prioritized areas I have investigated, driven mainly by the logic of appropriateness. A convergence of Swedish identity and a global interest drove the problem-solving strategy in the enlargement area. Swedish identity guided the Swedish Presidency in the employment, environmental and transparency fields. A convergence of a European identity and a Swedish traditional activist role inspired the government in the CFSP area. Shared identities, as stressed by the logic of appropriateness, helped the government when dealing with the Swedish Parliament. The Swedish identity was in the Swedish Parliament a stronger force than strategies based on strict cost–benefit calculations.

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References Books and articles Beckman, B. (2001) ‘Den administrative utmaningen – svensk effektivitet i EU:s tjänst’, in J. Tallberg (ed.), När Europa kom till Sverige. Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS förlag. Bengtsson, R. (2001) ‘Utvidgningen – höga förväntningar infriade’, in J. Tallberg (ed.), När Europa kom till Sverige. Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS förlag. Bengtsson, R. and Strömvik, M. (2001) ‘Den gemensamma utrikes och säkerhetspolitiken – Sverige i världspolitikens strålkastarljus’, in J. Tallberg (ed.), När Europa kom till Sverige. Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS förlag. Bjurulf, B. (2001) ‘Öppenheten – framgång bakom lyckta dörrar’, in J. Tallberg (ed.), När Europa kom till Sverige. Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS förlag. Broman, M. and Rosén, M. (2001) ‘Ordförandeskapet och pressen- en mediabild blir till’, in J. Tallberg (ed.), När Europa kom till Sverige. Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS förlag. Hegeland, H. and Johansson, K.M. (2001) ‘Ordförandeskapet och riksdagen – borgfreden som höll’, in J. Tallberg (ed.), När Europa kom till Sverige. Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS förlag. Hix, S. (1999) The Political System of the European Union, London: Macmillan. Jacobsson, K. (2001) ‘Sysselsättningspolitiken – att förvalta ett arv’, in J. Tallberg (ed.), När Europa kom till Sverige. Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS förlag. Kronsell, A. (1997) Greening the EU, Lund: Lund University Press Kronsell, A. (2001) ‘Miljöpolitiken – föregångslandets dilemma’, in J. Tallberg (ed.), När Europa kom till Sverige. Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS förlag. Malmström, C. (2001) ‘Ordförandeskapet och Europaparlamentet – nationalstaten i federalismens högborg’, in J. Tallberg (ed.), När Europa kom till Sverige. Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS förlag. Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2): 235–58. March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1998) ‘The institutional dynamics of international political orders’, International Organization, 52 (4): 943–69. Miles, L. (ed.) (2000) Sweden and the European Union Evaluated, London: Continuum. Nylander, J. (2000) The Power of Framing. A New-Institutional Approach to Interest Group Participation in the European Union, Uppsala: University Printers. Petersson, O. and Carlberg, I. (1990) Makten över tanken, Stockholm: Carlsson. Risse, T. (2000) ‘Let’s argue!: Communicative action in world politics’, International Organization, 54 (1): 1–39. Tallberg, J. (ed.) (2001) När Europa kom till Sverige: Ordförandeskapet i EU 2001, Stockholm: SNS förlag. Trägårdh, L. (2002) ‘Sweden and the EU: Welfare state nationalism and the spectre of Europe’, in O. Waever and L. Hansen (eds), European Integration and National Identity. The Challenge of the Nordic States, London: Routledge.

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Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1990) ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, in K. Schweers Cook and M. Levi (eds), The Limits of Rationality, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Wahlbäck, K. (2000) ‘Svenska rollskiften 1156–2001’, paper presented at the SEB Council for Socioeconomic Issues, November.

Official documents and reports Eurobarometer Reports, nos 54 and 56, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion. Report by the Presidency and the General Secretariat of the Council to the European Council on making the co-decision procedure more effective, 28 November 2000, 13316/1/00. Results of the Swedish Presidency, Promemoria, Prime Minister’s Office, 01/07/2001 FINAL, http://www.eu2001.se, accessed in July 2001.

Newspapers Guardian, 26 April 2001. The Economist, 23 June 2001. Interviews Interviews with Finnish diplomats, 5 May and 15 June 2000, and with Commission, Council and European Parliament representatives, 18 June and 3 July 2001.

10 The Belgian Presidency of 2001 Cautious leadership as trademark Bart Kerremans and Edith Drieskens

Ambition and cautiousness As early as 2 May 2001, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, Foreign Minister Louis Michel and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Annemie Neyts presented a list of sixteen priorities for the Belgian Presidency of the second half of 2001. Describing a Presidency as ‘a mission carried out in the interest of the European Union’ (Work Programme: 1), it was the federal government’s ambition to take ‘a further step . . . towards a balanced unification process’ (Priorities Note: 9) achieving ‘tangible results’ (Priorities Note: 1) for each of the sixteen fields identified. By way of its Presidency, the Belgian government clearly intended to demonstrate once and for all that even a ‘small’ country like Belgium can be ‘big’ in the European arena: During its Presidency Belgium wishes to make progress over a wide range of policy domains of the Union. In this way the Union should become more transparent, more efficient, more coherent and more powerful and should have a greater democratic legitimacy. Therefore, the Belgian Presidency will, at its start, present an ambitious and detailed program with clear goals for every policy domain and for every European Ministerial Council. (Priorities Note: 1) The zenith of the Belgian Presidency would be the Laeken Declaration, a declaration ‘in which the starting shot is given for the debate on the jump we intend the enlarged union to make’ (Verhofstadt 2000), which would ask ‘the right questions and in this way opens the necessary doors for a wide, profound debate in the years to come’ (Priorities Note: 8). As for the latter, in December 2000, the Nice European Council approved the ‘Declaration on the Future of the Union’.1 The Belgian Presidency, like the Swedish Presidency, was given the task of drawing the parameters of the future debate encouraging wide-ranging discussions with all interested parties. To this end, the ‘Declaration on the Future of the Union’ sketched

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the lines of the future debate specifying four questions. Yet, convinced that enlargement to a European Union with twenty-five or twenty-seven member states could be equated with a ‘mutation’ (Priorities Note: 7), the Belgian government decided to widen the initial agenda into ‘a global project for Europe’ (Priorities Note: 1), a project providing the answer to the question of ‘how to structure political life in an enlarged Union’ (Priorities Note: 8). For this purpose the Laeken Declaration would include the agenda, the methods and the timetable for the debate on the future of the European Union. To interpret these statements as indicating simply that the Belgian government was eager to use its Presidency to push forward its agenda in the European Union would give an incorrect picture of Belgian attitudes. In the Priorities Note, the Belgian government equally declared that a Presidency not only has to engage itself in an evolutionary process, but also that a Presidency depends on others to realize its ambitions, and that circumstances beyond its control may affect its success(es). In other words, right from the start, the Belgian government was conscious of the fact that although a Presidency can be meticulously prepared, it can never be completely planned. Together with its priorities and its self-qualification as a Presidency presenting an ‘ambitious and detailed programme’ (Priorities Note: 1), these references to ‘current affairs and continuity’ (Priorities Note: 8), to the fact that ‘a Presidency does not stand on its own’ (Priorities Note: 9) and to the Presidency as ‘not a job that can be done in isolation’ (Work Programme: 1) indicate that the Belgian government realized that, although it would not be a completely neutral broker, it had at least to be a cautious one. This paradoxical combination of ambition and caution was reflected both in the Priorities Note and the way in which most Belgian officials directly involved in the Presidency approached these priorities. At first sight, priorities such as the realization of Galileo and the Community Patent reflected the Belgian government’s ambition, and especially the voluntarism of both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, of leaving a footprint on the European integration path. This ambition was reflected most clearly in the government’s approach to the establishment of the ‘Convention on the Future of Europe’ (further: Convention). In order to counter the negative connotation the convention formula had in some member states following the drafting of the ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights’ the Belgian government amended the original format in two ways.2 First, the Convention would be presided over by a strong leadership to be appointed by the European leaders at their meeting in Laeken. Second, the Convention’s final text would be a flexible document and the privilege of taking final decisions would remain with the European leaders at the Intergovernmental Conference. Although the Belgian Presidency did not succeed in persuading all member states to support its candidate for the position of President of the Convention,3 by surrounding Valéry Giscard

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d’Estaing with two members of the so-called ‘Laeken Group’4 the Belgian government did succeed in setting a stamp on the preparatory process for the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference. The convention formula was formalized at the General Affairs Council meeting of 8 October 2001 and included in the Laeken Declaration. Although Belgium’s approach to the Laeken Declaration may have suggested ambition, a closer look at the priority list reveals that caution prevailed over ambition, if ambition stands for pushing EU policies in a direction preferred by the Belgian government. After all, the sixteen priorities fit to a very large extent into the rolling agenda of the EU. This indicates that the most important motive for the Belgian Presidency seems to have been pragmatism. Although pragmatism does not make a Presidency necessarily less ambitious, it does indicate that, as for the Belgian Presidency of 2001, procedural ambitions rather than substantive ambitions prevailed. Here, the notion ‘procedural ambitions’ refers to the ambition of using one’s Presidency to achieve a positive effect on the likelihood of reaching agreement, especially on difficult and highly politicized issues, irrespective of the substance of such agreements. Turned around, ‘substantive ambition’ refers to the ambition of reaching specific substantive agreements even at the expense of diminishing the likelihood of concluding agreements at all. By definition, procedural ambition does not exclude substantive ambition, but it moderates and confines the latter. Moreover, following the twin processes of widening and deepening, the EU setting provides unique opportunities for combining the two. As we will see, the option for procedural ambitions affected Belgium’s role as mediator among the member states’ representatives in the Council of Ministers’ different configurations as well as between the Council and the European Parliament.

Setting priorities: agenda-structuring and agenda-setting Our respondents5 revealed that the Belgian government struggled with these different rationales when setting the priorities for its Presidency. There were many individual substantive ambitions to satisfy, since several members of the federal government looked upon the Presidency as an opportunity to affect EU policies substantively by giving an impetus to issues in a number of policy fields. Examples include social policy (poverty and public pension systems), labour policy (an EU-wide ‘Renaultdirective’, i.e. an EU-wide obligation for employers to inform employees about the company’s financial situation), fiscal harmonization (including the Tobin Tax) and sustainable development (with inter alia renewable energy sources). The same was true for Belgium’s subnational governments which, for the first time, would be involved as presidents of formal EU Councils,6 and for several interest groups and NGOs which mobilized their members, keeping the role they expected Belgium to play as EU

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President at the back of their minds. The task was not made easier by the fact that almost all governments were ‘rainbow coalition’ governments. For instance, in the second half of 2001, the federal government was a sixparty coalition with Flemish- and French-speaking liberals, socialists and greens. The leading ministers of each of these parties wanted their (parties’, regions’) substantive concerns included in the Presidency priority list. Some ministers showed such zeal that – to quote one of our respondents – ‘it became almost tantamount to renegotiating the government coalition agreement itself’. The early disclosure of the Priorities Note turned out to be an ideal means of diverting (media) attention from ticklish domestic issues such as the impending bankruptcy of the national airline SABENA. However, as one of our respondents indicated, ‘going public’ was also ‘the only way to stop the internal bidding on the – ever expanding – priorities list’.7 In other words, in order to avoid ‘that sixteen priorities would grow to thirty’ the list had to be made public even if some coalition partners were not happy with this way of ending the internal debate, and even if, to say the least, this way of working was less than courteous to the Swedish Presidency. For the national and international media, this early announcement appeared to justify their suspicions that the Belgian Presidency under the direction of ‘Mr Nice Guy’8 would be ambitious, if not over-ambitious. However, as indicated above, those journalists who took a closer look at the Priorities Note noticed immediately that the Belgian government had been cautious rather than ambitious. This caution is a direct consequence of a second concern that played a role in the internal preparatory debate. The Belgian ministers at both the federal and subnational level may have been ambitious from a substantive point of view; yet they were equally concerned about the fact that their performance would be measured against the background of the widely recognized and applauded success of the Belgian Presidency of 1993.9 As press coverage indicates, the standard used for qualifying the 1993 Presidency had been procedural rather than substantive (Beyers and Kerremans 1994; Kerremans 1994). Because the Belgian government had succeeded in reaching agreements on difficult and often highly politicized issues it had been adjudged a successful president. In consequence, as for the 2001 Presidency, substantive ambitions had to be moderated in order to make procedural success more likely, or rather, to allow the Belgian government to be as successful in its procedural ambitions as the one that assumed the 1993 Presidency. As a result, the Belgian government decided to make an effort to achieve progress on the EU’s rolling agenda (‘agenda-structuring’, cf. Tallberg, Chapter 2, this volume) rather than to table new issues (‘agenda-setting’, cf. Tallberg, Chapter 2, this volume). Yet the Belgian government equally decided to exploit the opportunities provided by this agenda. In so doing, the Belgian Presidency did take risks, but only calculated and limited ones. A typical example of this risk-taking is the way in which the Presidency

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phrased its approach to the EU’s social policy agenda, under the – suggestive – title ‘The European Social Model’: The [Belgian] Presidency of the European Union will be characterized by a strong social dimension. In this connection, the social agenda approved at the European Council in Nice will be the common theme running through all the actions taken. Indeed, the social agenda offers a dynamic perspective for defining and consolidating the European social model. . . . The Presidency will ensure that the emphasis is placed on high-quality work, equal opportunities, greater involvement by workers in economic change, the modernization of social protection, the fight against social exclusion and poverty, sustainability, refinancing pensions and engaging in dialogue with the social partners. (Work Programme: 2) In the same vein, but even more direct in its phrasing, the Presidency’s approach to sustainable development was defined: If . . . [the] new model of [sustainable] development is to be put in place in Europe and throughout the world, then some non-sustainable modes of production and consumption will have to be changed so that we can successfully unhitch economic growth from the use of resources and pollution. This shift in modes of production and consumption in Europe . . . is one of the Presidency’s key objectives. The Presidency will endeavor to implement the Sustainable Development Strategy adopted at the Göteborg Summit. . . . [It] will monitor the implementation of this strategy on an ongoing basis by fixing hardand-fast objectives and establishing real indicators that will enable an annual assessment to be made by the respective Spring summits. (Work Programme: 7) Although a close look at the Belgian Priorities Note shows that the agenda-shaping activity of the Belgian Presidency amounted mainly to ‘agenda-structuring’, the Belgian government also included a number of new policy issues in its agenda, raising awareness for the problems on the African continent being a significant example (‘agenda-setting’, cf. Tallberg, Chapter 2, this volume). For Verhofstadt, the Belgian Presidency started in Kisingani, Democratic Republic Congo (DRC). Together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Development, the Belgian Prime Minister visited the former Belgian colony on the occasion of the fortyfirst independence anniversary. Condemning the European lack of interest in the region, upon his return Verhofstadt added Africa to the list of issues on which he sought support of the European Commission. In doing so, Verhofstadt, who developed a special interest in the African continent as a

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member of the ‘Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Events in Rwanda’ made it clear that, as far as he was concerned, the European Union foreign policy would have a Belgian touch in the second half of 2001.10 The Foreign Minister, Louis Michel, also holds the Great Lakes region dear. Ever since his appointment as Foreign Minister in 1999, Michel has stood for an active Belgian involvement in Central Africa, an involvement he has been trying to translate on the European and international level whenever possible. As for the Belgian Presidency, achievements are Verhofstadt putting Africa on the agenda of the G8meeting in Genoa (20–22 July 2001), the organization of the Euro–African summit in Brussels (10 October 2001), the meeting with the envoy for the Burundi peace process, Nelson Mandela, in Brussels (15 October 2001) and the EU high-level visit to Burundi, Rwanda, Congo and Zimbabwe at the end of November. With the support of the French delegation, the Belgian government also succeeded in putting Africa on the agenda of the European Council of Laeken. What is more, in Laeken, the Belgian government succeeded in talking the European Commission into signing a ‘Programme Indicatif National’ (PIN) for the DRC, facilitating development assistance by the European Union.11 Although the list of priorities is only the starting point of a Presidency, it also plays a role during the actual chairmanship. A priority list may be a helpful benchmark for surveying the work within the different Council configurations as well as the aims set. In other words, a priority list provides a Presidency to a certain extent with a sound basis for keeping a tally of its performance. That is exactly what the Belgian Presidency did. If only for the tenor of the Priorities Note’s presentation, the document was binding as to the aims to be achieved and would result in a final tally at the end of the ride. During the Presidency, every Saturday morning, the Prime Minister’s office organized a meeting between the personal advisers of the different ministers involved in the Council meetings and a task force of senior diplomats from the Prime Minister’s office, the Foreign Ministry and the Belgian permanent representation to the EU. During these meetings a tally was kept of the progress in each of the Council configurations, and conclusions were drawn about the political impulses required for dossiers posing problems. This way of working permitted problems to be put directly on the table of the weekly Monday morning inner Cabinet meeting. In consequence, the concentric circle way of working was also an answer to the domestic political context. After all, whereas in 1993 the domestic political sensitivities were channelled by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Finance Minister, in 2001, six political parties had to run the Presidency show.

11 September: a catalyst for leadership At first sight, a priority list diminishes in value as a Presidency faces unforeseen circumstances. Nevertheless, a priority list may become helpful

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in managing exactly such situations. For the Belgian Presidency, the attacks of 11 September 2001 created – to say the least – such circumstances. As anti-terrorism became the area of attention in many Councils configurations, the events of 11 September immediately thwarted the implementation of the Belgian Presidency agenda. As the Belgian government would soon find out, the ‘war on terrorism’ added ‘a new dimension’ to its Presidency (Press Release by the Belgian Presidency) – for Council configurations such as general affairs, justice and home affairs and transport even ‘a second Presidency.’12 The international context emerging from the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon not only required a redefinition of the Belgian Presidency, but also created windows of opportunity for pushing a number of issues through. What is more, the shock following the terrorist attacks not only created the opportunity for the Belgian Presidency to seize the initiative but also the expectation on the part of the other member states that it would do so. Especially for the initiation of EU decision-making, the attacks elevated the Presidency into a leading role – a role that probably would not have fallen to the (Belgian) Presidency under normal circumstances. The Belgian Presidency accepted the challenge of taking on this role without neglecting its initial programme, despite pressure – as some respondents have indicated – from other member states to drop its priorities and to focus on anti-terrorism only. As for the sense and nonsense of a Presidency’s neutrality and impartiality in the context of the Belgian Presidency of 2001, it is important to notice that the emergency situation created by the events of 11 September almost immediately made it clear that the notion of impartiality would become hard to adhere to in subsequent months. Due to both extreme time pressure and the member states’ expectations of the Presidency taking appropriate measures, the Belgian Presidency not only had to fill the traditional role of mediator, it also had to serve as an initiator. In other words, the attacks of 11 September forced the Belgian government to combine its role of ‘broker’ with that of ‘leader’, characterized by additional agenda-setting opportunities (cf. the Introduction to this volume). Under strong German and French pressure, the extraordinary European Council of Brussels-Schuman was organized on 21 September 2001. The heads of state and government approved a ‘Plan of Action’ identifying a catalogue of measures to be taken in the fight against terrorism. In Brussels, the European leaders directed the Justice and Home Affairs Council ‘to flesh out’ their agreements on the introduction of a European arrest warrant and the adoption of a common definition of terrorism and ‘to determine the relevant arrangements’ as ‘a matter of urgency’, and at the latest at its meeting of 6 and 7 December 2001 (Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001: 1–2). However, as one senior official indicated, the Belgian officials themselves decided almost immediately to exploit the situation as ‘a

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momentum’ for taking an important step forward bringing the Tampere goal of a single European judicial area closer.13 Following the events of 11 September, especially for the fields of justice and home affairs, the Belgian Presidency had to come up with proposals guiding the EU by defining a certain direction. This is clearly different from jumping into an ongoing decision-making process, sensing the preferences of each of the participants, and drafting a compromise, which can be agreed either by a majority or by a consensus. Yet the Belgian efforts paid off. On 11 December 2001 – three days before the start of the European Council of Laeken and exactly three months after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington – Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, the last one to block the issue, gave the green light for the European arrest warrant. The closer co-operation and Schengen scenarios, which had been used by the Belgian Presidency as deterrent rather than real options, could be filed away. The Belgian government succeeded in keeping the other member states aligned until the ‘War on Terrorism’ entered a military stage.14 The ‘minisummits’ of Ghent (19 October 2001) and London (4 November 2001) made it clear that, in the current stage of political integration, especially regarding military affairs, the foreign policy of the European Union remains the privilege of the (big) member states. At best, a supporting role is reserved for the Presidency (held by a small member state). In London, the three-way consultation between Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder was extended to Silvio Berlusconi and José Maria Aznar. Only at the very last minute was President-in-office Guy Verhofstadt invited, together with Wim Kok and Javier Solana. Although they may have influenced the decision to declare the European Security and Defence Policy (partially) operational in Laeken, in contrast to previous major international crises, the attacks of 11 September did not give a new impulse to the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. As Duke indicates, in the past year, individual efforts of the larger member states as well as burgeoning directories led to a re-nationalization of European security, breaking the Saint-Malo dynamic. In other words, whereas the attacks on 11 September accelerated the integration processes in the first and third pillars, and even across the different pillars, they seem to have decelerated it in the second pillar, especially as regards the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (Duke 2002: 160–7). At the Laeken European Council, the ‘rapid reaction force’ was declared partially operational, yet the European leaders did not succeed in reaching an agreement on its funding. What is more, in Laeken the whistle was publicly blown on Foreign Minister Louis Michel after he announced that ‘the EU would unanimously create a multinational force’ for Afghanistan. In particular, the pronouncements made by the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and the British Minister for Europe Peter Hain indicated that, as for military integration, the EU was still far from ‘the turning point

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in European history’ Louis Michel declared it to be (Washington Post, 21 December 2001: A45).

Broker and leader in foreign policy That a member state may compensate for its lack of size through its diplomatic skills and expertise was shown by the role the Belgian government played at the ‘World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance’ in Durban, South Africa (31 August to 7 September 2001). Since it was overshadowed by the crisis in the Middle East, the conference seemed to be foredoomed to failure. Yet, thanks to the constant efforts of the Belgian government, after a week of difficult deliberations the participants agreed upon a declaration and action programme, calling slavery and slave-trade crimes against humanity. Although the Durban conclusions are not legally binding, at the conference the Belgian government succeeded in presenting the EU as a unitary international actor, being not only successful as a ‘broker’, but also as a ‘leader’. The Belgian government also tried to use its negotiating skills to overcome the deadlock in the Middle East peace process. At the informal European Council of Ghent (19 October 2001), the Belgian Presidency even received an EU mandate to tour the region with the aim of relaunching the peace process. Yet the Belgian government came home empty-handed. As the EU has been politically and economically subscribing to the idea of Palestinian statehood, Israel does not consider the EU to be a neutral mediator. For the Belgian Presidency, the case was made even more difficult by the charges of genocide against Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon pending before a Belgian court. As den Boer and Monar note, High Representative Javier Solana adopted a low profile in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks allowing the Belgian Presidency and the Commission to take the lead as regards the EU external representation. Solana none the less played an important indirect role in preventing the escalation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In doing so, he made a valuable contribution to preventing the international coalition that was established after 11 September from falling apart (den Boer and Monar 2002: 15–16). It was also thanks to the continuous – but often offstage – efforts of Solana and special representatives François Léotard and Alain Le Roy that the EU succeeded in making the difference in the western Balkans in 2001. Especially as regards the Former Republic of Macedonia, they succeeded in presenting the EU as a coherent international political actor. The Belgian Presidency tried to present the EU as an independent foreign actor by seeking rapprochement with ‘states of concern’ such as Iran and Cuba. Yet the limits of this independence from the United States were demonstrated in early October when Russian President Putin persuaded the Belgian Presidency to drop a human rights clause regarding Chechnya

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in a common declaration – Russia being an indispensable ally of the USA in the ‘War on Terrorism’ at the time. It seems to be that the EU is increasingly allowed to play a political role in international relations, but only on condition that it does not run counter to the leading US role.

An honest broker? As some policy issues were selected and others not, the Belgian priorities list indicated that a Presidency is rarely a neutral institution. Yet the list equally reflected a concern to push the EU decision-making forward, implying at least an effort to give the other member states – and to a certain extent also the European Parliament – the impression that one is going to be neutral, an ‘honest broker’. As indicated, the predominant approach of the Belgian Presidency was to increase the likelihood of EU agreements on a selected number of issues that were in the pipeline of EU decision-making and of exploiting the opportunities created by EU decisions taken previously on some of these issues. This approach has affected the way in which most Belgian officials perceived not only their own role, but also that of Belgium as a president within the Councils and in the interactions between the Councils and the European Parliament. In our interviews, officials involved directly in the last Belgian Presidency stressed the double role they had to play. As a ‘broker’, they had to persuade the member state delegations to agree to a feasible outcome or they had to work in this direction (e.g. by reducing the number of options among which a final decision would be taken). As a ‘drafter’ (and ‘leader’), they had to draw up compromise and discussion texts with a view to directing the debate. The first role, the role of ‘mediator’ or ‘gobetween’, suggests neutrality in which at least an impression of disinterest has to be maintained. Many officials stressed that other member states would never allow a Presidency to behave otherwise. A president is not supposed to promote its own interest – it was stressed – but to promote the EU interest, in the sense of an agreement acceptable to all. As for the drafting function, the functionality of neutrality, even impartiality, turned out to be less clear-cut. It is quite reasonable to assume that a president drafting a compromise text acts neutrally if only one solution can be the logical outcome of a deliberation among many. In cases where there is no such ‘silver bullet’ – in other words, in most cases – a compromise text reflects a selection from a limited number of potential compromises. Because a president has a choice, he or she has a limited capacity to steer and guide decision-making in one direction rather than another. A compromise proposal, as one senior official indicated, must reflect ‘the sense of the meeting’. And, as a mediator, the Presidency can influence the direction in which ‘the sense of the meeting’ is going. Some respondents stressed that this is especially the case because not all member states have an outspoken interest on a particular issue. Nevertheless, it is precisely

The Belgian Presidency of 2001 165 these member states that may become crucial in achieving a majority in favour of a proposal, either because one works towards a qualified majority or because one wants to create a situation in which the minority decides to jump on board, which is important taking into account the consensus culture in EU decision-making. A compromise proposal is always the result of a subtle balancing exercise. The conclusion that a compromise proposal has to reflect ‘the sense of the meeting’ is important. The text has to come across as a logical step in an ongoing deliberative process in the Council. This severely restricts the alternatives available to a drafting president and requires – as many of our respondents have emphasized – that a president is extremely well informed about the bargaining process(es) at the different levels – working groups and COREPER – and the winnowing of proposals and alternatives that have taken place. In consequence, presidents at these levels are encouraged to work towards such winnowing processes. This means that Presidencies with an ambition of being honest brokers tend to favour a problem-solving strategy. It equally requires a president to be well informed about what is acceptable and unacceptable for the different member state delegations, especially for those crucial to achieving the qualified majority or the consensus. Just as there is not one optimal solution for all the member states together, most member state delegations bring with them a range of acceptable solutions rather than just one ‘silver bullet’. For a Presidency it comes down to knowing these ranges. As one of our senior respondents indicated, one way of pulling the more reluctant ministers over the bridge was simply asking ‘Tell me what you can live with’. Yet this question can be asked only if a Presidency already largely knows the answer through networking in concentric circles (ministerial, ambassadorial, medium-level officials), through the discussions that took place at the different stages of the decision-making process, and through a sense of empathy which implies recognition of the domestic problems that may emerge for member state representatives that accept certain outcomes. Assessing the role of neutrality and impartiality in this context is a difficult task. Among the Belgian officials involved in Belgium’s Presidency of 2001, no consensus existed on this matter. Some officials stressed that neutrality was necessary, whereas others claimed that it was impossible. However, the gap between these opinions is not as wide as it seems at first sight. On the one hand, those who stress that neutrality is necessary equally stress that neutrality is impossible because the member states expect the Presidency to come up with the solutions. On the other hand, those who stress that neutrality is impossible equally stress that policy solutions cannot be formulated out of the blue but have to be based on what has been suggested by previous meetings and by networks developed by the Presidency. What these contacts suggest is not all that is acceptable, but rather all that is not unacceptable. All that is not unacceptable – or, as

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Elgström puts it, solutions that are ‘yesable’ to everyone – can be presented by the Presidency and have a real chance of being accepted. In consequence, our findings seem to confirm that as long as a president respects the principle of ‘outcome impartiality’ the assumption that he acts neutrally holds (cf. Elgström, Chapter 1, this volume). By proposing something obviously unacceptable, a president jeopardizes this assumption and the perception that he is a broker who is honest. Our research on the Belgian Presidency indicates that the assumption of neutrality (‘appearance of neutrality’) rather than neutrality itself (‘reality of neutrality’) provides the bridge between the Presidency’s institutional potential to steer the decision-making process in a certain direction, and the EU’s traditional norm of a neutral and impartial Council president.15 There is leeway to steer and to direct, but this leeway is severely restricted by the acceptability norm, which underlies the assumption of neutrality and impartiality. All Presidency actions can be fitted in with and assessed from this perspective. What it boils down to is sounding out what other member states will accept and then trying to persuade them to accept. In other words, as one of our senior respondents indicated, a Presidency’s influence on EU decision-making is a ‘consensual’ one. This implies that what Elgström calls a ‘strategic bias’ is at times permitted. Indeed, by definition, a Presidency does not contact all member states on all issues. Most Belgian officials indicated that they focused most of their networking efforts on a limited number of (problematic) member states.

Respecting the margins of acceptability Many of our respondents also indicated that the difference between being the President-in-office and being ‘an ordinary member state’ is that as President you are at the centre of the EU decision-making networks. For the Belgian officials, this difference was experienced intensively because, representing a small member state, their importance in these networks is normally rather limited. This sense of being at the centre of EU decisionmaking provides an indication that a president can have an impact. As a majority of the respondents indicated, the opinions of a member state presiding over the EU do matter. Moreover, the President-in-office is consulted intensively by member states with (large) stakes in the issues on the negotiation table. In addition, in cases where the EU has entered into negotiations with third countries, there is a potential for a member state holding the Presidency to become an attractive contact point for them as well. However, this impact is like a golden cage. Being President provides a member state with tools it otherwise does not possess. Yet the way in which these tools can be employed is severely restricted by the institutionalized norms of neutrality and impartiality. This indicates that, to a considerable extent, a Presidency’s prerogatives may be used for procedural

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rather than substantive purposes. Within certain limits, presidents can determine the speed of the European integration process, either accelerating EU decision-making or slowing it down. This is not only the case for decision-making inside the Council of Ministers, but also for the interaction between the Council and the European Parliament. During the Belgian Presidency, some of the Council presidents succeeded in making a serious difference here (The Financial Times, 13 December 2001: 6). For example, the Belgian Presidency, like the French Presidency of 2000, succeeded in guiding the Council’s second reading of the draft budget for the financial year 2002, taking decisions on all the proposed modifications and all the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on its first reading. The Telecom case is another example. As for the latter, the Belgian Presidency made every effort to reach a compromise between the European Parliament and the Council on the second reading, rather than risking an extended procedure through conciliation. According to one of the senior officials involved in the informal negotiations between the Presidency and European Parliament leaders, a president can only have an impact if he or she knows the range of possible compromises that neither the Council nor the European Parliament leadership will reject. Within these confines a president can steer the decision-making process. In the specific case of Telecom regulation, time pressure – a consequence of the deadline set by the Lisbon European Council (2000) – played a role as well. A third example concerns the directive on the organization of working time for mobile workers performing road-transport activities, where the Presidency was actively involved in the conciliation procedure itself and where an agreement was reached in December 2001. Once more, senior officials involved pointed out the role time pressure played on the one hand, and the empathy towards both the Council members and the European Parliament on the other. In other words, if a Presidency wants to have an impact on EU decision-making, it has to respect the margins of acceptability of the member states and, in the case of the co-decision procedure, of the European Parliament as well. This means that even if a Presidency is not neutral, it should at least uphold the assumption of its neutrality, i.e. ‘apparent neutrality’, and, even if it is not impartial, it has to broker honestly. Consequently, the Belgian Presidency of 2001 has confronted Belgian officials directly involved with the fact that, especially for an ambitious Presidency, finding the right balance between ambition and honest brokering is essential in achieving a lasting impact.

Conclusion As our discussion of the Belgian Priorities Note reveals, the Belgian government had a clear political project in mind for its 2001 EU Presidency. As interests and anticipated consequences seem to have been the

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most important motive for the Belgian performance, the logic of expected consequences would be the most appropriate explanatory framework. Yet, the Belgian Presidency acted as a strategic actor because it was driven by perceptions of appropriate behaviour – perceptions that can be partially traced to a number of country characteristics. In other words, the Belgian performance of 2001 leaves room for a three-dimensional explanatory approach, combining the logic of expected consequences, the logic of appropriateness and the country characteristics approach. Although it would be more appropriate to distinguish between strategies used in different functions, policy issues and decision-making stages, for the Belgian Presidency of 2001 the predominant negotiating strategy was a ‘problemsolving’ one. For the reasons enumerated in this chapter, the Belgian Presidency decided to assume the role of ‘broker’. Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks of 11 September forced the Belgian government into a ‘leader’ role – a role the Belgian federal government had considered to be written for it even before the start of the Presidency.

Notes 1 Declaration 23 to the Treaty of Nice. 2 The convention formula was applied for the first time to the drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Charter was drafted by a Convention of sixty-two members following a decision by the European Council of Cologne (3–4 June 1999). 3 In Laeken, only France did not support the Belgian proposal of appointing former Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok as President of the Convention. 4 In June 2001, Verhofstadt established the ‘Laeken Group’ as a consultative group on the Laeken Declaration. The group compromised experts on European affairs. Apart from Amato and Dehaene, Bonsilaw Geremek, David Miliband, Jacques Delors and Louis Michel formed part of the group. 5 This contribution is based on thirty-three interviews with Belgian policy officials who were involved in the 2001 Presidency as President of one or more Council configurations, as member of COREPER or as member of one of the Council working groups. All interviews took place between February and April 2002. A detailed list of those interviewed is included at the end of this chapter. 6 The Belgian Presidency of 2001 is considered to be the first Presidency in European history in which autonomous subnational entities played an active role on behalf of a member state. Ministers from the Belgian Communities and Regions not only presided over a number of formal and informal Councils of Ministers, but also occupied the Belgian seat at several Council meetings. During the Belgian Presidency of 1993, the Communities and Regions already presided over a number of informal Council meetings (Kerremans and Drieskens 2002a: 52, 2002b). 7 On the eve of the Belgian Presidency, in an interview with the Belgian newspaper De Standaard, Foreign Minister Louis Michel put it as follows: ‘Yes. But you have to take into account the Belgian reality: every concern has to be transformed into a priority. If there would be only one party in government, there would be only two priorities’ (De Standaard, 25 May 2002, www.standaard.be; authors’ translation). 8 In the context of the European Council of Nice, The Financial Times named

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Guy Verhofstadt ‘Mr Nice Guy’ because of his persistence during the marathon meeting on the reweighting of the votes in the Council of Ministers. In this context, De Winter and Türsan (2001) see the promotion of an ‘unedited governmental team’ as a latent function of the 2001 Belgian Presidency. According to De Winter and Türsan, for the current ‘purple-green’ or ‘rainbow’ coalition the Presidency was a matter of prestige to prove that European matters could be coped with even better then by a coalition with Christian Democrats. Since most key positions in the Belgian Presidency were held by Liberal excellencies, the Presidency was also a unique opportunity for the Liberal parties (VLD, PRL) to acquire a prominent and competent profile in European Affairs. Guy Verhofstadt is the first nonChristian Democrat Belgian Prime Minister since 1974 (De Winter and Türsan 2001: 38–9). Verhofstadt participated as reporter in the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Events in Rwanda. This Commission, known as the ‘Rwanda Committee’, was set up in 1996 by the Belgian Senate to investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda focusing on the policy implemented by the Belgian and international authorities. At the start of the Belgian Presidency, the European Commission had linked the signing of such a framework agreement to the start of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue as provided for in the 1999 Lusaka Agreements. From a quantitative point of view, the number of Council configurations, which have not been affected in one way or another by the terrorist attacks of 11 September, is limited. From a qualitative point of view, the effect of the attacks was most perceptible within Council configurations on matters relating exclusively to federal competence. Following a Co-operation Agreement between the Federal State, the Regions and Communities on the representation of Belgium with the Council of Ministers (1994), such ‘category I’ competences include: General Affairs, Economy and Finance, Budget, Telecommunications, Fisheries, Justice and Home Affairs, Civil Protection, Consumer Protection, and Development Co-operation. For the Councils Budget (Telecommunications, Fisheries, Civil Protection and Consumer Protection), the impact of 11 September was less explicit than for the Councils General Affairs, ECOFIN, Justice and Home Affairs, and, to a lesser degree, Development Co-operation. As a mixed competence with predominant competence of the Federal government, Transport is part of the ‘category II’ competences. In October 1999, the extraordinary Council of Tampere (15–16 October 1999) was dedicated to the establishment of an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, the latter being provided for in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Initially, the greatest obstacle for the EU speaking with a single voice turned out to be the relationship between the Belgian Presidency and the Commission; witness the visit Verhofstadt and Prodi paid to US President George W. Bush in the aftermath of the attacks and the press conference after the Ghent European Council. As for a mediator’s fairness, Carnevale and Arad note that mediators are more concerned about the appearance of fairness than about the reality of fairness (Carnevale and Arad 1996: 45).

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References Articles Beyers, J. and Kerremans, B. (1994) ‘Relativiteit en succes van een Europees voorzitterschap: het Belgisch voorzitterschap van naderbij bekeken’, Res Publica, 36 (2): 129–42. Carnevale, P.J. and Arad, S. (1996) ‘Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation’, in J. Bercovitch (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 39–53. den Boer, M. and Monar, J. (2002) ‘Keynote Article: 11 September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism’, Annual Review of the EU 2001/2002, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40: 11–28. De Winter, L. and Türsan, H. (2001) The Belgian Presidency 2001, Paris: Notre Europe (Research and Policy Paper No. 13). Duke, S. (2002) ‘CESDP and the EU Response to 11 September: Identifying the Weakest Link’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 7 (2): 153–69. Kerremans, B. (1994) ‘België als voorzitter van de Europese Unie: over de relativiteit van een succesvol voorzitterschap’, Internationale Spectator, 48 (4): 178–83. Kerremans, B. and Drieskens, E. (2002a) ‘The Belgian Presidencies of 2001’, Annual Review of the EU 2001/2002, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40: 49–52. Kerremans, B. and Drieskens, E. (2002b) ‘Tussen schok en overgang: de Europese Unie in 2001’, Res Publica, 44 (2–3): 279–305. Verhofstadt, G. (2000) ‘Een visie op Europa’, Speech at the European Policy Center, Brussels, 21 September (authors’ translation).

Documents Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001. The Belgian Presidency of the European Union, 1 July to 31 December 2001, Priorities Note (referred to as: Priorities Note). The Belgian Presidency of the European Union, 1 July to 31 December 2001, Work Program (referred to as: Work Program). ‘The Belgian Presidency of the European Union (1 July to 31 December 2001): general overview of results’, Press release by the Belgian EU Presidency, 20 December 2001 (referred to as: Press release by the Belgian Presidency). 14157/01 (Presse 424–G) 2388th Council Meeting, Budget, Brussels, 21 November 2000. 1998/0319 (COD) Directive on the organization of the working time of those whose occupation is the performance of mobile road-transport activities.

Interviews François-Xavier de Donnea, Minister-President of the Brussels-Captial Region, Brussels, 2002-02-12. Johan Verbeke, Chef de Cabinet, Cabinet of the Minister attached to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, charged with Agriculture, Brussels, 2002-02-15.

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Jozef De Laporte, Deputy Chef de Cabinet, Cabinet of the Minister attached to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, charged with Agriculture, Brussels, 2002-0215. Annik Bogaert, Adviser, Cabinet of the Flemish Minister for Employment and Tourism, Brussels, 2002-02-19. Patrick Zanders, Diplomatic Expert, Cabinet of the Minister for the Home Department, Brussels, 2002-02-20. Rik Daems, Minister for Telecommunications, Public Enterprises and Participations, charged with the self-employed, Brussels, 2002-02-25. Henri Autrique, Adviser, Cabinet of the Secretary for Energy and Sustainable Development, attached to the Minister for Mobility and Transport, Brussels, 2002-02-26. Marc Pallemaerts, Deputy Chef de Cabinet, Cabinet of the Secretary for Energy and Sustainable Development, attached to the Minister for Mobility and Transport, Brussels, 2002-02-26. Marc Marechal, Deputy Chef de Cabinet, Cabinet of the Minister of Finance, Brussels, 2002-02-26. Rudy Arnoudt, Deputy Chef de Cabinet, Cabinet of the Vice-Minister-President and Minister for Economic Affairs, SMEs, Research and New Technologies of the Walloon Region, Namur, 2002-02-28. Philippe Kridelka, Deputy Chef de Cabinet, Cabinet of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Employment, Brussels, 2002-03-05. Alain Jeunehomme, Chef de Cabinet, Cabinet of the Minister for the Arts and the Audiovisual Sector of the French Community, Brussels, 2002-03-05. Antoine Drzymala, Adviser, Cabinet of the Minister for the Arts and the Audiovisual Sector of the French Community, Brussels, 2002-03-05. Nathalie Steyns, Adviser, Cabinet of the Minister for Budget, Culture and Sport of the French Community, Brussels, 2002-03-06. Marie Demelenne, Adviser, Cabinet of the Minister for Budget, Culture and Sport of the French Community, Brussels, 2002-03-06. Sam Biesemans, Expert on EU Development Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and International Cooperation Directorate-General for Development Co-operation, Brussels, 2002-03-07. Myriam Bacquelaine, Adviser, Cabinet of the State Secretary for Development Co-operation, attached to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 2002-03-07. Françoise Renier, Civil Servant, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and International Co-operation, Directorate-General for Development Co-operation (DGCI), EU Unit, Brussels, 2002-03-07. Isabelle Durant, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Mobility and Transport, Brussels, 2002-03-07. Nadia Debeule, Spokesperson, Cabinet of the Minister-President of the BrusselsCaptial Region, e-mail, 2002-03-08. Annelies Storms, Adviser, Cabinet of the Flemish Minister for Culture, Youth, Sports, Brussels Affairs and Development Co-operation, Brussels, 2002-03-12. Hilde Billiet, Civil Servant, Culture Administration Ministry of Flanders, Brussels, 2002-03-12. Hugo Brauwers, Deputy Chef de Cabinet, Cabinet of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Budget, Social Integration and Social Economy, Brussels, 2002-03-12.

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Anne Deltour, Attaché, Permanent Representation of Belgium to the European Union, Brussels, 2002-03-14. Jan Vanhee, Civil Servant, Youth and Sports Division Ministry of Flanders, Brussels, 2002-03-26. Anne Van Lancker, Member of the European Parliament and the European Convention, 2002-03-28. Ulrik Lenaerts, Adviser, Cabinet of the Minister for Consumer Interests, Health and Environment, Brussels, 2002-04-09. Frans Van Daele, Ambassador, Permanent Representation of Belgium to the European Union, Brussels, 2002-04-17. Dirk Wouters, Deputy Director-General of the European Integration and Coordination Department (P11), Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and International Co-operation, Brussels, 2002-04-17. Nick Vandermarliere, Spokesperson, Cabinet of the Flemish Minister for Education and Training, Brussels, 2002-04-18. Philippe de Koster, Deputy Chef de Cabinet, Cabinet of the Minister of Justice, Brussels, 2002-04-19. Daniel Nolin, Adviser, Comité de l’Article Trente Six (CATS), Brussels, 2002-0419. Peter Moors, Diplomatic Adviser, Director of the Strategic Cell, Services of the Prime Minister, Brussels, 2002-04-23.

11 The Spanish Presidencies of 1989, 1995 and 2002 From commitment to reluctance towards European integration Francesc Morata and Ana-Mar Fernández Introduction Spain joined the European Community in 1986 and since then it has held the European Presidency on three different occasions. The first took place in the first half of 1989, only three years after it had become an EC member. The second was held during the second half of 1995, after the accession to EC membership of Austria, Finland and Sweden. The third began in January 2002, in the aftermath of the terrorist attack against the United States. A comparative analysis of the Spanish Presidencies reveals continuity in some basic priorities as well as significant changes of strategies and goals. The latter are essentially due to three interacting factors: the evolution of the process of European integration, the progressive Europeanization of Spanish politics and policies, and, since 1996, the shift from a proactive approach, combining commitment to European integration with an increasingly clear-cut definition of national interests, to reactive attitudes based on self-interests together with emphasis on single issues such as market liberalization or terrorism. This chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first, the domestic foundations for changes in Spanish policies and attitudes towards the EU are laid down. We first review the evolving domestic context of Spanish membership, paying particular attention to the preferences and attitudes of Spanish political elites, to regional concerns and to public opinion attitudes. We then identify elements of shift and continuity in Spain’s European strategies and interests. This provides an assessment on the extent to which Aznar’s government has represented a departure compared to the González term. In the second part, the three Spanish Presidency periods are described and analysed. We briefly outline the main characteristics and outcomes of the 1989 and 1995 Spanish Presidencies are then given an indepth account of the 2002 Presidency, stressing the different types of strategies deployed to cope with the issues on the agenda.

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The domestic foundations of Spanish EU policy The domestic context A disappearing consensus on the EU Until the Maastricht Treaty, Spanish European politics were based on a nationwide consensus rather than on partisan preferences (Closa 2001: 10). Spain’s entrance into the EC was supported almost unanimously by political parties, including Catalan and Basque nationalists, interest groups, the media and public opinion. For Spain, European integration meant above all economic, social and political modernization (Morata 1997). It was also supposed to allow the country to recover its lost place in Europe. In addition, EC membership was perceived by many political actors as a way to face traditional problems of identity in a pluri-national state. Belonging to Europe would provide the opportunity to share a ‘common’ identity based on non-nationalist values. The EC was also immediately equated to a source of benefits in terms of political stability, economic growth, regional development and foreign investments. As an economic and social laggard country, since 1986 Spain has largely been relying on EU subsidies to develop its regions and to modernize the infrastructures. Its GDP per capita has increased from 69 per cent to 85 per cent of the Community average.1 Its hard bargaining strategy in the European Council of Berlin (March 1999) allowed it to be the main beneficiary of Community funds until 2006. However, it will be difficult for Spain to keep its position after the next enlargement. Furthermore, the Spanish administration, at all levels, has adapted quite satisfactorily to EC requirements and is, in general, among the good implementors of EC policies. The initial consensus among political elites, and especially between the two main parties (PSOE and PP), began to break down in the early 1990s when Aznar took over the PP leadership. As early as 1992, the conservative leader criticized governmental efforts to obtain additional financing at the Edinburgh summit, stigmatizing Felipe González as a ‘beggar’.2 However, European issues dealing with institutional architecture, social policies and the free market have only recently become matters of political contention in dayto-day politics, especially between the ruling conservative PP and the socialist party. The latter has been trying to exploit political scandals associated with European policies, such as the linseed oil affaire3 or the huge ‘compensations’ granted to electric power companies to cushion the costs of market liberalization. As we will see below, the debate on the future of Europe and the 2002 Spanish Presidency have ultimately deepened these differences. Regional exclusion from EU decision-making Regional participation in the EU has been a matter of permanent concern for the regions and a source of intergovernmental tensions since 1986.

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Since Spain is a decentralized member state, the EU relies largely on the regions (Autonomous Communities) for the implementation of policies and the management of funds. At the same time, however, the expansion of the integration process has resulted in a loss of regional decisionmaking powers to the national government. The ‘political agreement for governance’ signed by the conservative Popular Party and the Catalan nationalists of CiU in 1996, as the basis for the CiU’s parliamentary support to the national government, provided for enhanced regional participation in Community decisions. The agreement was aimed at improving regional participation in internal procedures for preparing national positions on EU matters. More importantly, it provided for future participation by regional ministers in those Council meetings dealing with issues that fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the regions. However, the agreement has never been fully implemented. The Autonomous Communities have continually expressed their frustration with regard to their involvement in EU decision-making both at the internal and European level. In 1998, Aznar ignored a parliamentary resolution urging the government to strengthen the regional presence in the EU Councils on the basis that ‘representation of national interests in the EU is an exclusive competence of the central government’ (El País, 18 October 1998). The Spanish Prime Minister began Spain’s 2002 Presidency reaffirming his firm opposition to regional involvement in EU decisions. As we will see below, Aznar’s attitude regarding the regions is consistent with his role as a zealous gatekeeper for national sovereignty at the EU level. Public opinion attitudes Since 1986, Eurobarometers have consistently reflected two main characteristics of Spanish perceptions concerning European integration. On the one hand, European integration has more supporters in Spain than the Community average. Citizens are generally favourable towards the idea of a strong European Union, with the purpose of bringing together Europe’s nations and states (European Commission 2001). Most of them do not consider it to be a real threat to Spain in terms of language, national identities or culture. Significantly, according to opinion polls, most Spaniards feel comfortable with a multi-level identity (Szmolka 1999) and the subsidiarity principle has more supporters in Spain than in most member states. In general, trust in European institutions is much higher in Spain than the European average, sometimes even higher than trust in domestic institutions (June 1996), and a large majority supports continued participation in the EU. On the other hand, however, the perception of material benefits provided by EU membership is below the European average. Since this is the case in many member states, such an apparent contradiction between

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material and immaterial values might reflect a lack of awareness among Spanish citizens about the complex and sometimes incomprehensible implications of EU membership (Barreiro and Sánchez-Cuenca 2001: 34). Consequently, the decreasing support for European integration from 1991 to 1995 may not only be the expression of a widespread feeling of Europessimism in a context of economic crisis, but also a concrete reaction to growing conflicts related to highly sensitive domestic interests (agriculture, fisheries, regional funds and public aids) (Morata 1999: 420). In other words, since accession Spaniards have tended to frame Community membership more in terms of rights–benefits than in terms of obligations–costs. González and Aznar: continuity despite deep changes In institutional and political terms, since its entry into the EC, Spain has tended to see itself as one of the large member states (Powell 2002). At present, it enjoys eight votes in the Council of Ministers (twenty-seven when the Nice Treaty enters into force) and two members of the Commission. In 1999, Javier Solana was appointed Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for the CFSP. In order to play a major role in the EU, Spain has been seeking also to take advantage of its historical relations with Latin America and the Arab countries. However, some of the problems faced by Spain as an EU partner may be better explained by ‘its very peculiar position that does not fit into any of the categories into which all others may be grouped: the very prosperous and large; the very prosperous and small; the less prosperous and small’ (Powell 2002; see also Areilza 1999). Notwithstanding similarities in a number of fundamental issues (i.e. preserving Spain’s institutional weight; rejecting a ‘two-speed’ Europe to avoid being peripheralized; demanding more cohesion; strengthening EU relations with Latin America; supporting South Mediterranean partnership), González’ and Aznar’s strategies towards European integration have been rather different with regard to both form and content. González’ European activism The socialist premier attached high priority to building a strong alliance with Mitterrand and Kohl that allowed Spain to participate in the Community’s hardcore while promoting initiatives such as subsidiarity, European citizenship and closer economic relations with Latin America. A personal good understanding with Jacques Delors led also to important outcomes related to cohesion policy and the integration of Spanish agriculture and fisheries into the common policies sooner than expected. By framing European priorities in terms compatible with national aspirations and vice versa, the latecomer Spain was able to gain a reputation as a quasi founder member state.

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Felipe González displayed a twofold entrepreneurial and bargaining strategy which combined a commitment to far-reaching European integration and the claim for Community funds to enable the country to close the gap with the big member states. In 1989, Spain vetoed the EC budget in order to force agreement on doubling the Structural Funds as a compensation for accepting the Single European Market. Again, in 1991 Spain threatened to block the agreement on Political Union if the new Cohesion Fund was not included in the Maastricht Treaty. While the Spanish negotiators did not succeeded in imposing their views on the need to create a federal compensatory fund to reduce economic differences among the member states, they were able to build a winning coalition including three small member states – Portugal, Greece and Ireland – to get additional resources to improve transport and environmental infrastructure. In exchange, the Spanish government was ready to accept majority voting in a number of policies, and especially for environmental decisions, a very sensitive issue for the government and domestic economic interests. However, at the Maastricht summit, Spain also played the federal card for all it was worth. Its original proposal for European citizenship was included in the treaty. Furthermore, Spain was one of the main supporters of the principle of subsidiarity to be applied as a guide to decide how best to achieve Community objectives instead of a limit to Community competencies. At the Ioannina summit of 1994 the Spanish government, together with the UK, opposed increasing from twenty-three to twenty-six the votes needed to form a blocking minority in Council decisions following the entry of Austria, Finland and Sweden into the EU. Spain clearly feared that the centre of gravity would shift northward, so that the country would find it difficult to grab the lion’s share of the EU regional funds. Finally, as already mentioned, the Spanish government took the opportunity to bring about the integration of domestic fisheries four years earlier than had been stipulated in the accession treaty. In short, the new context of European integration resulting from German reunification, Maastricht and the Northern enlargement led to ‘a more careful consideration of exactly what degree and kind of co-operation were required to maximize perceived national interest’ (Gillespie and Youngs 2000: 5). Aznar: a stubborn nation-state’s gatekeeper Aznar’s European policy since 1996 has been characterized by a combination of change and continuity (Barbé 1999; Powell 2002). The latter is evident in the efforts of the government to ensure that Spain would join the EMU, to promote relations with Latin America and the Southern Mediterranean countries (excepting Morocco) and to defend cohesion policies.4 Changes have related mainly to the stronger emphasis on market policies and the increasing alignment with the Blair and Berlusconi governments in contrast to Spain’s traditional commitment to the

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Franco–German axis. In many respects, Aznar’s European strategy has been more influenced by domestic considerations than by a clear commitment to the European project. This has resulted in a mix of nationalist attitudes, reactive pragmatism and a lack of flexibility. When he came to power in 1996, Aznar was almost the only conservative prime minister in an EU club dominated by socialist and social democrat members. However, the series of electoral defeats of right-wing (UK, Italy and France) and Christian Democrat (Germany) parties in the large member states gave him the opportunity to gain influence in the European People’s Party (PPE). It is worth remembering that Aznar’s strategy included the entry of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia into the party and the exclusion of the Basque Christian Democrats (PNB). A further step was his election as the new President of the Christian Democrat International (CDI) in November 2001. A main departure from the former period has been Aznar’s fascination with Blair’s neoliberal policy, irrespective of substantial economic and labour market differences between Spain and the UK. Both leaders were main promoters of the Lisbon process to strengthen European competitiveness. They also took common initiatives against terrorism and illegal immigration. At the domestic level, Aznar has also profited somewhat from the new entente with the British government as it allowed for the opening of bilateral negotiations on a new statute for Gibraltar during the Spanish Presidency. Together with Blair and Berlusconi, Aznar has been one of the most fervent European supporters of US global strategy after 11 September. With regard to institutional issues, the PP government adopted a rather obstructionist attitude during the negotiations of the Amsterdam Treaty. Initially it threatened to block the agreement on the overall reform if the other partners would not accept its claims regarding the reweighting of votes in the Council. This demand led to the inclusion in the treaty of a Declaration stating that ‘there is a Spanish problem which ought to be solved before the first enlargement’. In other words, Spain would only accept the loss of one of ‘its’ two commissioners in exchange for a substantial increase in its votes in the Council. With respect to the other issues at stake, Spain’s main objective was to prevent any decision that would harm Spanish financial advantages or bring about any increase in domestic expenditure. Thus Spanish negotiators fiercely opposed the extension of qualified majority voting to Structural and Cohesion Funds as well as, together with Britain and Denmark, to social security decisions. On other issues, Spain moderated its positions in order to achieve its main domestic priorities: a special fiscal status, as an ‘ultra-peripheral region’, for the Canary Islands, and the limitation of asylum rights for EU nationals suspected of terrorism. Unlike the 1991 IGC, Spain did not pay special attention to the CFSP since it was satisfied with the existing arrangements (Barbé 1999). Regarding the Stability Pact, Aznar sided with Helmut Kohl against the French proposal on EU co-financing of national employment policies to counteract eventual disruptive effects on the labour market.

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Frequent disputes with Germany, the main net contributor to the EU budget, on financial issues has been another characteristic of Spanish European policy since 1998. During the negotiations on the Financial Perspective 2000 to 2006, with the amount that was to be allocated to cohesion policies at stake, Aznar succeeded in keeping for Spain almost the same share of Structural and Cohesion Funds as it had enjoyed during the previous period. However, the strategy followed was rather confusing. Instead of taking a clear position throughout the process, Aznar combined forcing strategies with unexpected concessions, especially to Germany, which upset the other partners and embarrassed Spanish negotiators. Moreover, his last-minute bargaining on the Cohesion Fund did not enable him to avoid a small cut-back on the Structural Funds, what was precisely supposed to be the first Spanish priority. Tensions with Germany reappeared during the 2000 IGC (Closa 2001). Notwithstanding its final agreement on enhanced co-operation, Spain was very reluctant to accept the German proposal on the simplification of the procedure, fearing the negative externalities of any eventual exclusion in terms of decision-making influence (Gstöhl 2000: 56). However, Madrid’s top priorities were concentrated on keeping its privileged position among the largest member states and its veto powers on the Structural and Cohesion Funds. The two self-interest-oriented roles of being a European great power and a bargainer for national interests are clearly visible in the Nice process. Spain exerted great pressure to defend its position as a medium to large country having two commissioners. In the negotiations leading to Nice, the Spanish government also argued that it would only accept having fewer votes than France, Italy and the UK if the Germans were to have more (Best 2001). This bargaining strategy was successful. As expected, Spain did not succeed in obtaining the same influence in blocking decisions as the four larger member states. However, it managed to win the largest proportional increase in votes – from eight to twenty-seven – and ended up having only two votes fewer than the larger members. As regards the extension of qualified majority voting, Spain retained its veto power on the Structural and Cohesion Funds until 2007. Even then it will relinquish this veto only on condition that the Financial Perspective for the period after 2007 will already have been adopted.

Three Spanish Presidencies: changes in strategies and roles The first two Spanish Presidencies January to June 1989: ‘The challenge of the debutante’ Spain’s accession to EC membership was the final result of hard and long negotiations. The apprehension of some member states vis-à-vis the entry into the Community of the young Spanish democracy prolonged the phase

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of preparatory negotiations for more than ten years. Yet this European scepticism contrasted sharply with both the enthusiasm and the proEuropeanist consensus of Spanish elites and society. Being part of an integrated Europe was synonymous with economic modernization and political rehabilitation. It is important to highlight such a fact since it allows a better understanding of the Spanish strategy once its turn in the Presidency of the Council arrived in January 1989. The first Spanish Presidency was dominated by one overarching goal: to show its reliability and efficiency as a Community partner and to confute the sceptical expectations of some member states about Spain’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. To achieve such a goal the Spanish executive invested heavily in preparing for and organizing it. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs characterized these preparatory activities as the ‘largest task ever undertaken by the Spanish Government and its administration’ (Informe 1989: 1). On this occasion, as well as on subsequent ones, the Spanish government took particular pride in its organizing capacity and made a big point out of it. The programme of the Spanish Presidency was an important means for demonstrating that Spain was a reliable European partner with a clear pro-Europeanist stance.5 With such goals in mind, the Presidency developed two parallel strategies. On the one hand, working in close contact with the European Commission, it focused on pending issues dealing with economic integration. On the other hand, it tried to carry out initiatives in the sphere of European political co-operation. In a context marked by the renewal of the European Commission in January and by European elections in June, the first priority of the Spanish Presidency was to comply with the Single Market programme to be achieved by the end of 1992. To do this it had to clear the way to the construction of the internal market by providing solutions to pending issues, in particular fiscal harmonization and freedom of circulation. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the social dimension of the internal market were issues that received preferential attention. In fact, they monopolized the negotiations that took place during the European Council of Madrid in June. On these issues the results of the Council were uneven. The Council freed the way to move forward regarding the EMU, by approving the Delors Plan and by setting 1 July as the beginning of a new phase. Yet British opposition to the draft of the European Social Charter overshadowed the progress made regarding the EMU, the greatest political achievement of the first Spanish Presidency (González Sánchez 1989: 720). Thus the first Spanish Presidency adopted a strategy which, while tending to minimize risk, also aimed at dealing resolutely with pending Community issues. Finally, the Spanish Presidency carefully avoided making a major issue of the British rejection of the European Social Charter. However, such a ‘low’ profile was not to be found regarding

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matters that were managed on an intergovernmental basis. Since its first Presidency, Spain has paid particular attention to European political cooperation and resorted to the intergovernmental mechanism as a way to Europeanize its priorities on matters of foreign policy and to try to achieve a new international stature after decades of ostracism. The Southern Mediterranean as well as Latin American traditional priorities of the Spanish diplomacy received preferential attention during the first Spanish term. Regarding Latin America, two initiatives stand out: the creation of a guarantee fund to resolve the problem of foreign debt and the increasing involvement of the European Community in the peace process in Central America. To summarize, Spain used its first Presidency to achieve three major goals: to convey to the other member states its seriousness and efficacy as European partner, to reaffirm its pro-Europeanist stance and its commitment to serve the Community interest, and to strengthen European political co-operation as a framework to achieve a new international projection. It thus emphasized the role of the ‘good European’, trying to act as a well-meaning broker with the ambition of moving the Union forward. In doing so, it relied primarily on accommodating and problem-solving strategies (see the Introduction to this volume). July to December 1995: ‘Less naïve with regard to Europe’ Spain regained the European Presidency in the second half of 1995 in the midst of a complex context. The Spanish Presidency was, for various reasons, viewed with scepticism by its European partners. The Presidency took place in the aftermath of a difficult negotiation that settled a major distributional conflict between the least developed member states (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy) and the rest regarding the EMU. Spain, which acted as the leader of the coalition of the least developed, had demanded a doubling of Structural Funds for the period 1993 to 1999 as well as the creation of a new Cohesion Fund in exchange for the financial efforts that were necessary to meet the demands of the EMU. As negotiations leading to the treaty on the European Union made clear, through time Spanish society and elites had become more critical regarding the cost–benefit ratio generated in the process of European integration. Even the traditionally pro-integrationist Spanish government moderated its public stance (Closa 2001: 39).6 Furthermore, the Spanish Presidency came after a difficult political time in Spain, dominated by multiple political and financial scandals that badly affected the socialist government. In such a context, the Presidency was seen as an opportunity to try to polish the tarnished image of the government in the eyes of the public. The context in which the second Spanish Presidency unfolded predisposed the government towards a programme of action more focused on

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pursuing national interests.7 Unlike 1989, the main goal of the second Presidency was not so much to show its reliability as a European partner as to demonstrate how ‘central’ Spain was for Europe (Moreno Juste 2001). In other words, Spain abandoned the role of the ‘good European’ and instead started to promote a stance that emphasized Spain’s position as an important European power. Spain reaffirmed its commitment to the process of economic integration and set as a priority the attempt to devise solutions for pending matters such as the definition of the criteria that qualified candidates to enter the third stage of EMU as well as the definition of a European employment policy. The 1995 Presidency was also a new opportunity to strengthen EU relationships with a set of regional countries, especially the Mediterranean and the Latin American ones, in which Spain had a particular interest. The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Barcelona, the Inter-regional Framework Agreement with Mercosur, the signature of a new Trans-Atlantic Agenda and a Plan for Concerted Action during the European Council of Madrid were some of the major achievements of the Presidency. Furthermore, the new Presidential term was a favourable occasion to promote another traditional priority of the Spanish government, namely the strengthening of European co-operation in matters of justice and home affairs, in particular the prevention of and fight against terrorist activities. The Spanish initiative led to the European Statement of Gomera (Westendorp 1995: 22). In summary, the second Spanish Presidency made clear that a turning point had been passed in Spain’s attitude towards European integration since the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty. Once the reliability of Spain as a Community partner had been established and its international prestige consolidated, the priority of Spanish European policy was to keep the country in the centre of European politics. It did so through two different means: on the one hand, by qualifying as a candidate to enter the third phase of EMU, hence becoming part of the European hardcore; on the other hand, by shifting the priorities of its domestic agenda to the European sphere to Europeanize traditional goals of Spanish foreign policy as a way to offset the progressive shift of Europe’s centre of gravity eastward. In terms of Presidency roles, Spain became more of a bargainer for national, regional as well as socio-economic interests. This included the role as defender of the interests of the ‘southern periphery’. Accommodating strategies were now accompanied by strategies that served Spanish self-interests. The 2002 Presidency: great ambitions, modest outcomes The 2002 Presidency entailed the organization of two European Councils, one summit with Latin American countries, the fifth Mediterranean Conference, forty-one Council meetings, forty-one informal Councils and 151

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working meetings, not to mention the mobilization of almost 50,000 policemen and 12,000 journalists. In addition, the hosting cities of Barcelona and Seville were subjected to strict security measures adopted to ‘protect’ the European leaders. This gives a broad idea of the logistic complexity and the amount of organizational resources needed to fulfil such a responsibility. The Spanish agenda consisted largely of European and international issues such as global terrorism, the worsening Middle East conflict, the setting up of the European Convention on institutional reforms, the negotiations on the next enlargement and the Lisbon process. Mr. Aznar devoted great efforts, not only to fostering economic issues related with competitiveness in the global market, but also to building a coalition, especially with Italy and the UK and some other small member states on very sensitive issues such as terrorism and immigration. The terrorist challenge For obvious domestic reasons, terrorism was the first priority on the Spanish agenda, a concern that was not shared initially by most European governments. However, after 11 September 2001 global security issues were at stake and the Spanish authorities took the opportunity to Europeanize as much as possible the struggle against ETA. Indeed, we have here a good example of agenda-shaping, in which Spain succeeded in structuring and framing the agenda to its own advantage (cf. Tallberg, Chapter 2, this volume). Spain concentrated on strengthening legislative and judicial means towards a European Space of Freedom, Security and Justice. The most relevant achievement was the agreement on the effective enforcement of a Euro-arrest order. Spain did not succeed in reaching an agreement either on the final location of Eurojust or on the European School of Police, for which Madrid was one of the candidate cities. In addition, the Spanish government put pressure on its reluctant EU partners to start negotiations on judicial co-operation with the USA, which would have made the extradition of terrorists easier. The proposal was strongly opposed by some member states and by the European Parliament, which pointed to the persistence of the death penalty in the US judicial system and the serious legal doubts aroused by the Patriot Act adopted in the aftermath of 11 September. The Lisbon process Economic liberalization (the Lisbon process) was also at the top of the Spanish agenda during the European Council of Barcelona of March 2002. It is worth noting that, a few weeks before the meeting, the Spanish Prime Minister criticized the European left as being ‘an obstacle to the progress of the market’ (Ortega 2002: 32). The EU summit was contested by the

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largest demonstration against globalization ever held in Europe, involving 300,000 people. Due to the strong resistance of France and Germany, the Spanish government, supported again by the UK and Italy, did not succeed in its attempt to complete fully the liberalization of the energy market. The compromise agreement will affect industries and, only partially, consumers by 2004. However, Spain overcame the strong opposition of the Netherlands and Germany (and indirectly the USA) against the Galileo project, which will compete with the American GPS. The Lisbon process not only deals with increasing European competitiveness; it includes social cohesion concerns as well and, as agreed at the Göteborg summit, a strong commitment to environmental issues as part of the European strategy towards sustainable development.8 However, despite the proximity of the World Summit of Johannesburg, sustainable development was not a priority on the Spanish agenda, any more than it is at the domestic level. The European Council of Barcelona ‘took note’ of some Commission proposals on the issue and decided to postpone the definition of the Union’s position on Johannesburg until the Seville European Council. At Seville, the European leaders simply stressed the Union’s desire to adopt ‘clear and concrete commitments with a precise time frame, relying for their achievement on effective partnership’.9 In fact, the preparatory work to Johannesburg was carried out mainly by the Commission. Enlargement Regarding the Eastern Europe candidate countries, officially ‘Spain gives resolute and unreserved backing to the enlargement process, which is considered both an historic challenge and a priority’ (COPE 2002). The Spanish stance is a matter of national interest. For Spain, the entry of the candidate countries into the EU will probably stimulate a real development of economic, trading and cultural relations, which for historical reasons have always been very narrow. However, it is worth noting that in 1999 Spain blocked the reform of the cohesion funds until the next reform in 2006. In 2001 it claimed further financial compensation for its less developed regions to counteract the ‘statistical effects’ of the enlargement on the European GDP per capita average. In this context, Spain fully took on the role of a bargainer for national interests, and did not refrain from manipulative and forcing strategies (cf. the Introduction to this volume). Officially, Spain has given full backing to the objective proposed by the Commission in its ‘road map’ for improving the progress of the accession negotiations. Spain supported the ‘regatta’ approach, the principle of differentiation and the possibility for each candidate to ‘catch up’ in terms of its actual state of readiness. Regarding the proposal for a schedule of items to be dealt with during the Presidency, Spain declared its willingness

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to achieve common positions on the assigned chapters in accordance with the road map, ‘but always respecting the present framework and the current financial perspective’. The aim was to conclude the negotiations with the best-prepared candidates during 2002. However, little room for an agreement on the financial costs of accession was left before the Seville Council, and Aznar did not manage to reach a common agreement on that issue during the meeting. For electoral (Germany and Sweden) and other domestic (the Netherlands and UK) reasons some member states were blocking the negotiations, claiming that the final decision should be taken only after the reform of the CAP during the Danish Presidency. Thus the real outcome on the enlargement negotiations, officially one of the main issues on the Spanish agenda, was a non-decision. Immigration While the Spanish Presidency agenda did not include a single word on immigration, the issue became the ‘most relevant European priority’ immediately prior to the Seville summit. With some quick tactical moves, Mr Aznar manoeuvred to achieve two main objectives. On the one hand, he imposed his agenda on the rest of the European leaders, some of whom had been blocking the Commission proposals on immigration for years. This is a prominent example of Presidential agenda-setting (see Tallberg, Chapter 2, this volume). On the other hand, backed by the new European conservative governments and the UK, he reacted to the increasing xenophobia and racist attitudes in some member states, which were paving the way for the rise of extreme-right and populist parties in France and in the Netherlands. The Seville European Council was expected to set up a common framework to cope with illegal immigration and criminality.10 The Presidency proposal, which was rejected firmly by France and Sweden, included financial sanctions against less developed countries unable to control migration flows. Instead, the Council conclusions stressed that ‘closer economic co-operation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention are all means of promoting economic prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby reducing the underlying causes of migration flaws’ (Seville Council 2002). Moreover, any future cooperation or association agreement concluded with third countries should foresee the joint management of migration flows and the readmission of eventual illegal immigrants. Relations with Mediterranean and Latin American partners Once again, the strengthening of Euro–Mediterranean and Euro–Latin America relations were two important priorities of the Spanish Presidency, demonstrating the strong regional priorities of Spain. Spain

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continued its efforts to play the role of a bridge-builder between the EU and regions of Spanish interest. While seeking formulas to define operational measures for promoting political partnerships and security, Spain also made an effort to open the door to a new phase of the Barcelona process, emphasizing the need to stimulate the business integration of Mediterranean partners with a view to the future establishment of a Euro–Mediterranean free trade area. The fifth Euro–Mediterranean Conference was supposed to provide new impetus to Euro–Mediterranean partnership. However, the results were very disappointing. Spain was unable to reach agreement with its partners on the creation of a Euro–Mediterranean Development Bank while some Arab leaders decided to boycott the conference as a protest against Israel. The Spanish Presidency intended to renew and strengthen the strategic association between the EU and Latin America, which to a large extent crystallized in Rio de Janeiro in 1999. In the margins of the Madrid summit, specific meetings were held at the highest level with Mercosur, the Andean Community and the countries of Central America. Following the Association and Free Trade Agreement concluded with Mexico, a new agreement based on the same goals was concluded with Chile. At the same time, efforts were pursued to advance the European Union’s negotiations with Mercosur. In addition to raising the profile of political relations, these agreements were intended to bring an increase in economic and commercial exchanges with the Latin American region. However, the Argentina crisis, which seriously affected Spanish economic interests, and Brazil’s economic difficulties made it impossible to conclude any specific agreement with those countries. Institutional reforms The final point deals with the Spanish attitude towards institutional reforms, and especially the European Convention. It is no secret that, in spite of the Presidency slogan (‘More Europe’), Aznar is not only against a federal Europe, but he is also reluctant to make any attempt to strengthen supranational institutions. As he has stated on several occasions, ‘all those debates [on institutional reforms] are only nominal issues; what is really relevant is policy effectiveness and the preservation of national sovereignties’. Aznar has been profiting from his strong domestic position and from his close relationships with Blair, Berlusconi and, more recently, Chirac, to create a coalition aiming to foster the intergovernmental pillar. Following the guidelines adopted by the Helsinki summit (December 1999), the European Council of Seville endorsed the report on simplifying the structure and functioning of the Council, which was prepared by SecretaryGeneral Javier Solana. Notwithstanding the European Convention, the European leaders examined a Blair–Chirac–Aznar proposal for the reform

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of the European Presidency, which foresees the appointment of a ‘former President or Prime Minister’ as a permanent ‘President of the European Council’ for the next legislative period. A rotating Presidential team consisting of five or six current heads of government would in turn assist the President. Should the right continue to increase its electoral support in Europe, Aznar would probably be among the front runners. Nevertheless, the small member states did not back the project, which would give more influence to the larger ones.

Conclusions Recalling Spain’s ‘peripheral syndrome’ (Barbé 1999), periodic claims for financial compensation and a continuous determination to attain ‘big power status’ (Powell 2002), the recent literature has stressed continuities between González’s and Aznar’s European Presidencies. Continuities are based on historically shaped specificities of the country, on past Presidencies and on rooted expectations among the other partners (see Introduction to this volume), while changes are related to evolving ideological values and preferences regarding national interests within the context of European integration. As Tallberg points out (Chapter 2, this volume), ‘whereas all member states engage in forms of agenda-shaping, they vary in the issues they introduce, emphasize, de-emphasize, or neglect as a result of exogenously defined variation in national preferences’. The same rationale may be applied to Presidencies conducted at different times by the same member state. From this point of view, the Spanish case shows substantial variations both in socio-economic or constitutional priorities and, to a certain extent, also in regional priorities. The former Prime Minister, Felipe González, was seeking to create an interdependent link between Spanish modernization and European integration which brought about credibility as a reliable partner, active involvement in European institutional building and leadership capacity as a quasi large member state. In 1989, the latecomer and somewhat still naive Spain put to work its organizational capacities to overcome the Community’s sceptical expectations. In the second half of 1995, in the midst of domestic political difficulties and continuing Euro-scepticism, the Spanish Presidency reached the main targets that had been set, most of which were of a wider European interest. In terms of Presidency roles, the role of ‘good European’ was at the forefront. Spain tried hard to be an effective broker and bureaucrat in order to gain credentials as a reliable European partner. Apart from supporting free market policies, a strong euro and closer co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs, Aznar has lacked a vision for a European project, as the debate on the Europe of the future has made evident. This also implies that Spain has not been able to play any significant leadership role under his premiership. His approach to European

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integration is twofold. On the one hand, it relies largely on traditional Spanish nationalism rooted in firm convictions about the need to preserve sovereignty above all. On the other hand, the EU is viewed as a provider of additional financial and legal means to expand free market policies and to close the gap with the large member states. At the same time it can also offer additional resources to face domestic problems such as terrorism. To be effective, such a strategy should be consistent with the priorities of other partners, especially UK and Italy, in order to build a blocking coalition. The 2002 Spanish Presidency case fits with the rational model ‘which conceives the Presidency as a strategic actor, seeking to satisfy national preferences within the confines of its formally designated institutional role’ (Introduction to this volume). Madrid structured the EU agenda according to its main priorities: economic, institutional and regional. Preferences were clear from the beginning: European solidarity against the terrorist challenge – including closer co-operation with the US – market liberalization, and improving trade relations with Latin American and South Mediterranean countries. Enlargement was expected to be the star issue at the European meeting of Seville. Indeed, Spain was willing to reach an agreement on the entry date of the candidates. However, it failed to mediate among member states’ positions on the post-enlargement share of CAP subsidies, an issue in which Spanish interests were at stake. Repeated Spanish efforts to protect its interests in undiminished regional and agricultural support have made any Spanish attempt to act as an honest broker difficult, especially in these and related issue-areas. Immigration overtook the enlargement. The issue jumped to the top of the Spanish agenda in reaction to the electoral gains of xenophobic parties in some member states. However, the Presidency framed the problem in terms of fighting illegal immigration and sanctioning countries of origin, which was unacceptable to the other member states. As regards the regional priorities of Spain, little room for a satisfactory agreement was left to enhance the Euro–Mediterranean partnership due to the Middle East conflict, the Spanish dispute with Morocco, and the German reluctance about any additional expenditure. At the same time, a trade agreement with Chile was the most significant outcome of the EU–Latin America summit. Finally, apart from rejecting the federalist project, the Spanish Presidency did not make any explicit contribution to the institutional debate on the future of Europe. However, it took advantage of the term to back a proposal aiming at strengthening the Presidency powers.

Notes 1 By 2000, the Spanish economy was the eleventh largest in the world. 2 In 1999, at the Berlin European Council on Agenda 2000, Aznar blocked the

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final agreement until 5.30 a.m. to increase the Spanish share of the Cohesion Fund. An important fraud in the use of Community subsidies to flax crops was discovered in 1999. During the 1999 Berlin Council, Spain was able to keep its share of the Cohesion funds as a condition for not blocking Eastern enlargement; furthermore, in the Nice summit (December 2000) Spain succeeded in retaining unanimity on structural policies until the next reform in 2006. See the interview with Felipe González: ‘L’avenir de l’Espagne dépend de son intégration à l’Europe’, Le Figaro, 8 June 1989. See also the interview with Felipe González: ‘Il n’y a pas que l’Allemagne qui compte’, Le Nouvel Observateur, 12–18 June 1992. At least at a symbolic level, as became apparent in the choice of the logo (a ‘ñ’ with the colours of the Spanish flag, a reference to the conflict with the European Commission that rejected the Spanish decision to ban the selling of keyboards that did not have that letter (cf. Closa 2001: 40). COM (2001): 264 final. Out of the forty-two pages of the Presidency Conclusions only one deals with the EU strategy towards Johannesburg. However, some European leaders, such as President Chirac and the Swedish Prime Minister Persson, warned of the danger of linking immigration and criminality.

References Books and articles Areilza, J.M. de (1999) ‘Las transformaciones del poder europeo: reforma institucional, principio de subsidiariedad y cooperaciones reforzadas’, in J.M. de Areilza (ed.), España y las Transformaciones de la Unión Europea, Madrid: FAES, p. 45. Barbé, E. (1999) La política europea de España, Barcelona: Ariel. Barreiro, B. and Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2001) ‘La europeización de la opinión pública española’, in C. Closa (ed.), La europeización del sistema político español, Madrid: Istmo, pp. 29–51. Best, E. (2001) ‘The Treaty of Nice: Not beautiful but it’ll do’, Eipascope, 1: 2–9. Closa, C. (2001) ‘Las raíces domésticas de la política europea de España y la Presidencia de 2002’, Etudes et Recherches, 16, Paris: Fondation Nôtre Europe. European Commission (2001) ‘Perceptions of the European Union. A qualitative study of the public’s attitudes to and expectations of the European Union in the 15 member states and in 9 candidate countries’, available at www.europa.eu.int. Gillespie, R. and Youngs, R. (2000) ‘Spain’s international challenges at the turn of the century’, Mediterranean Politics, 2: 1–17. González Sánchez, E. (1989) ‘La Presidencia española de la Comunidad Europea’, Revista de Instituciones Europeas, 3: 691–723. Gstöhl, S. (2000) ‘The European Union after Amsterdam: Towards a theoretical approach to (differentiated) integration’, in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith (eds), The State of the European Union, Vol. 5, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 42–63. Montes, J. (1999) ‘L’Espagne et l’Union européenne à l’aube du XXIème siècle’, Défense nationale, December: 45–70.

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Morata, F. (1997) ‘Modernization through integration’, in K. Hanf and B. Soetendorp (eds), Adapting to European Integration, London: Longman, pp. 100–15. Morata, F. (1999) La Unión Europea: procesos, actores y políticas (2nd edn), Barcelona: Ariel, pp. 410–43. Moreno Juste, A. (2001) ‘España en el proceso de integración europea’, in Historia de la integración europea, Barcelona: Ariel. Ortega, A. (2002) ‘A mitad de la Presidencia española’, Política Exterior, 87: 44–9. Powell, C. (2002) ‘Spanish membership of the European Union revisited’, Working Paper 2002/2, Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 15 June. Szmolka, I. (1999) ‘Opiniones y actitudes de los españoles ante el proceso de integración europea’, Opiniones y Actitudes, 21, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Westendorp, C. (1995) ‘Balance de la Presidencia española de la Unión Europea’, Presupuesto y Gasto Público, 17: 15–28.

Official documents Comité Organizador (1996) Prioridades de la Presidencia española del Consejo de la Unión Europea, Chile: CELARE. COPE (Comité Organizador de la Presidencia Española) (2000) Más Europa. Programa de la Presidencia Española de la Unión Europea (1 de enero-30 de junio 2002), Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores. CES (Comité Económico y Social) (1996) Informe sobre las Prioridades de la Presidencia Española del Consejo de la Unión Europea-junio de 1995, Chile: CELARE. Congreso de los Diputados (2001) Comparecencia del Presidente del Gobierno en el Congreso para explicar las prioridades de la Presidencia Española de la UE, 10 December, www.ue2002.es. Council of Europe (2002) Conclusions de la Presidencia (21–22 June), available at www.ue2002.es. Informe (Informe sobre la Presidencia española de la Comunidad Europea) (1989) Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, July.) OID (Oficina de Información Diplomática) (1989) Balance de la Presidencia española de la CE, Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores. OID (Oficina de Información Diplomática) (1995) Balance de la Presidencia Española del Consejo de la Unión Europea julio-diciembre de 1995, Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores. Patronat Català Pro Europa (2002) VI Informe semestral sobre l’estat de la Unió Europea-primer semestre de 2002, Barcelona, 15 January.

12 Conclusion Rationalist and sociological perspectives on the Council Presidency Ole Elgström and Jonas Tallberg This volume adds new insights to the existing literature on EU politics in two major ways. First, it provides novel empirical knowledge on the performance of EU Presidencies. The book describes and analyses experiences from seven Presidencies in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Whereas most existing studies of Council Presidencies date from the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, this volume offers new and unique information on Presidency behaviour, as shaped by the formal and informal evolution of Presidency functions in the 1990s. The empirical contribution of this volume helps us to better understand the evolving and dynamic interplay between member states and institutional actors in the EU. Second, we link the study of the Presidency to ongoing theoretical debates in general political science. Many studies of EU politics conceive of European governance as a sui generis phenomenon, which can only be analysed in EU-specific terms, using EU-specific theories. This is also the dominating approach in existing literature on the EU Presidency. We have instead chosen to frame this volume in terms of two alternative perspectives, drawn from mainstream political science. The rationalist approach concentrates on actors’ conscious efforts to reach their objectives, whereas the sociological approach gives prominence to the roles and self-images of the actors. These perspectives inform the analysis in the thematic and country chapters, and help structure the observations generated in the volume. The result is a fascinating account of how rational and ideational factors interact to produce EU policy. In this concluding chapter, we structure the main observations of the volume in accordance with the two perspectives. We first explain Presidency behaviour in strategic terms, and then develop an alternative understanding based on roles and identities. The two accounts may be perceived as either competing or complementary. This problematique is discussed in the final part of this conclusion, where we distinguish between areas of theoretical competition and complementarity in explaining Presidency behaviour. In existing literature and among practitioners, explanations of

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Presidency behaviour are often related to various country characteristics, such as whether the state holding the Presidency is large or small, northern or southern, experienced or debutante. We conceive of such characteristics as antecedent factors that shape member state interests and constrain or form expectations and role interpretation. These factors are thus integral to both of our two alternative theoretical perspectives. This approach provides a more principled type of explanation, which also creates opportunities for comparing EU Presidency behaviour with the performance of chairs in other international contexts. EU experiences can thereby be used to enrich our understanding of general international relations phenomena.

The Presidency: a rationalist account The rationalist perspective conceives of EU decision-making as a strategic context where rational governments and institutions interact in the pursuit of exogenously given interests. For the government holding the Presidency, the office constitutes an additional vehicle for securing national interests. Formal and informal institutions – such as decision rules, legislative procedures and norms – enable and constrain the Presidency in its behavioural choices and in its interaction with EU governments and institutions. The country chapters in this volume generate observations on primarily three components of the rationalist perspective on the EU Presidency: (1) the formation of preferences and Presidency priorities through interest aggregation at the national level; (2) the enabling and constraining impact of domestic politics on Presidency behaviour; and (3) the Presidency’s strategic interaction with other EU actors, as shaped by formal and informal European level constraints. In this rationalist account, patterns of variation between Presidencies are explained by variations in these key components of the strategic environment. EU governments enter the office of the Presidency with varying sets of preferences, face different domestic political contexts, and are confronted with shifting constraints at the European level. Interest aggregation and Presidency priorities All country chapters testify that Presidency priorities are the product of a long and careful process of interest aggregation at the national level. Whereas interest aggregation is an everyday element of the national political process in EU member states, involving competing domestic interest coalitions, the prospect of the Presidency presents governments with an additional incentive and opportunity to canvass domestic interests. The government’s primary instrument for isolating and prioritizing between interests is the Presidency programme. The initial work on this programme often starts years before the government takes over the

Conclusion 193 Presidency. This work is generally co-ordinated by either the Prime Minister’s office or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but the process of identifying national key interests involves all line ministries and many government agencies. Action plans are developed for ongoing policy processes, and priority papers are issued. Simultaneously, societal actors lobby the government in order to convince politicians and civil servants that their particular concerns should be among the priorities for the Presidency. Step by step, the list of key concerns and Presidency priorities is narrowed down. This process of aggregation and prioritization continues until the presentation of the programme shortly before the beginning of the Presidency, which marks the end of the political process of interest aggregation. The number of priorities eventually presented by incoming Presidencies varies considerably. For instance, the Swedish Presidency focused on three key concerns – enlargement, employment, environment – whereas the Belgian Presidency outlined as many as sixteen priorities. This variation is partly a question of labelling; the narrow Swedish focus on the three Es was a marketing trick and the actual list of priorities was considerably longer, but differences in the number of priorities also reflect the domestic political situation. In the Belgian case, the long list of priorities was partly an effect of the six-party government coalition at the federal level, where each party fought to have its interests represented among the priorities. Presidency priorities typically satisfy three requirements. First, as products of the process of domestic preferences aggregation, they constitute national interests. This is the core property of Presidency priorities. Second, they are issues that can be framed as European concerns. Given the norm of the neutral Presidency, governments strategically frame national interests in terms of their European dimensions. Third, the prioritized areas are issues which have a reasonable likelihood of progress during the Presidency period. Governments want to use their privileged period at the helm for maximum impact, and demonstrable progress carries positive reputational effects and the epithet of a ‘successful Presidency’. This volume demonstrates that Presidency agendas vary in predictable ways across three dimensions: regional, socio-economic and constitutional priorities. For economic, political, cultural and ideological reasons anchored in domestic politics, EU member states prioritize different areas of EU policy-making. Regional priorities are affected by geographical and historical affinities. Over three consecutive Presidencies, Spain consistently promoted EU co-operation with Latin America and in the Mediterranean region. Belgium paid special attention to the African continent in general, and Central Africa in particular. Finland sought to add a northern dimension to the EU’s policy towards its neighbouring regions. Sweden continued the work on this initiative, but also promoted a more coherent EU policy towards Russia. In the socio-economic area, the political orientation of the government

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in office often leaves a noticeable imprint. The shift from a socialist to a conservative government in Spain brought predictable changes in the state’s priorities from one Presidency to the other, towards a greater emphasis on economic liberalization. The 1998 UK Presidency continued the British tradition of emphasis on the internal market, but now within the ‘third way’ framework of Tony Blair’s Labour government. By contrast, socialist governments or coalition partners in Sweden, Belgium and France all sought to strengthen the EU’s social dimension through the promotion of either employment policy or efforts to reduce social exclusion. Constitutional priorities tend to be linked to alternative perspectives on the future of Europe. Almost all Presidencies covered in this volume were engaged in some form of enlargement or IGC negotiations. Yet, despite similar mandates, they took on these tasks with varying enthusiasm. Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland were keen to promote a further deepening of the EU, whereas Sweden, France, the UK and Spain in 2002 were reluctant to encourage a development towards a federal Europe. Sweden prioritized the enlargement negotiations over all other issues, whereas France, Belgium and Spain worked constructively for progress, but without the same political dedication. Presidency behaviour and domestic politics The domestic political landscape shapes the government’s behaviour as Presidency, by facilitating or rendering more difficult certain courses of action. Presidency representatives are engaged in two-level diplomacy, where they simultaneously try to take account of and influence the reactions of actors both at home and at the EU level. Domestic politics is often enabling rather than constraining for debutante Presidencies. In new member states, the Presidency is perceived as something of an entrance exam and the degree of national mobilization behind the government tends to be extensive. The general political support for the government expands the Presidency’s room for manoeuvre at the EU level, and permits certain flexibility in balancing national and European interests. The Spanish Presidency of 1989 was conducted on the basis of a pro-European consensus in society, which enabled the government to work for EU decisions without inflexible national restrictions. Similarly, the Finnish Presidency in 1999 rested on broad public support for the government’s ambition to acquire the reputation of a successful and constructive Presidency, thus granting the government significant room for manoeuvre. Although confronted with an otherwise relatively Euro-sceptic population, the Swedish government was not particularly constrained in its approach to the Presidency. The Presidency was seen as a national concern, and the opposition parties chose to unite behind the government rather than challenge it for domestic political advantage.

Conclusion 195 Yet domestic public opinion can also limit the Presidency’s ability to take initiatives and construct compromises. Certain issues are sufficiently sensitive in domestic politics that any compromise on the national interest would be politically hazardous for the government. While restricting the Presidency in its function as mediator, this may simultaneously strengthen its negotiating hand in relation to other governments. The Swedish Presidency offers two excellent examples. In the negotiations on new EU rules for public access to EU documents, the Swedish Presidency was heavily restricted in its actions by massive domestic support for existing, constitutionally protected, transparency rules. Negotiators were instructed to avoid compromises at any cost, which certainly did not facilitate agreement among the member states, even if it strengthened the Swedish representatives’ bargaining position. The sovereignty-consciousness of Swedish public opinion also explains the extremely low profile taken by the Swedish Presidency on the future of Europe, despite a European Council mandate to initiate a debate on this theme. The prospect of elections tends to reinforce already existing domestic constraints. The government in office is anxious to avoid decisions and compromises that can be exploited by its national party competitors. Simultaneously, it is eager to claim credit for EU initiatives and decisions that can reflect positively upon it at the domestic level. The Finnish and French Presidencies constitute two contrasting cases. Finland had held a national election shortly before the Presidency, and the new coalition government entered the Presidency office with a very strong electoral mandate and few domestic competitors. The government’s sacrifice of certain substantive national interests, as part of its strategy for gaining a favourable reputation among its European partners, carried no real domestic political costs. In France, by contrast, the Presidency period preceded the elections to the national assembly and the post as President. As a consequence, national politicians were heavily preoccupied with domestic political considerations during the Presidency period. The Presidency became important only when it could be used to domestic political advantage, or when failure at the European level risked imposing domestic political costs. Co-habitation between a conservative President and a socialist government reinforced the degree of partisan conflict over the conduct of the Presidency, and enhanced the constraining effect of domestic politics. For governments whose actions at the European level are uncomfortably circumscribed by domestic political attitudes, the Presidency may be used strategically as a means of affecting the evolution of public opinion, thus expanding the government’s room for manoeuvre in the future. This phenomenon is prominent in Euro-sceptic states, where the political elite in government is often prepared to engage in more extensive European co-operation than the general public. In the UK, the new Labour government made special efforts to involve people in the Presidency, and to

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demonstrate the importance of the EU’s activities. The goal was to shed the epithet of ‘awkward European’. In Sweden, the government launched an ambitious public relations strategy aimed at creating a more favourable domestic political climate as regards European affairs. Easy access to officials and documents, informal meetings in all parts of the country and attempts to achieve favourable media coverage were components of this strategy. Presidency behaviour and strategic interaction The Presidency acts strategically at the European level in relation to other member states and the EU institutions. The Presidency’s choices and actions are conditioned by formal and informal constraints, such as norms, decision rules and institutional mandates. All Presidencies relate to the norms of the neutral and effective Presidency. Even in the rationalist account Presidencies are anxious to be remembered as successful. Rational Presidencies care about norms because violation can result in costs in the present if it provokes political sanctions, and in the future if the actor’s reputation as a co-operative partner is damaged. Yet Presidencies may still choose to disregard these norms if the gains they accrue from such behaviour exceed the expected costs of being labelled a norm violator. In such cases, however, Presidencies still pay lip-service to these norms as a way of shielding criticism and minimizing negative reputational effects. Presidencies are especially anxious to conform to Presidency norms under two general circumstances. First, new member states without established reputations in EU co-operation are particularly eager to create positive reputations as reliable co-operative partners. The primary goal of the Spanish Presidency in 1989 was to show its trustworthiness as a Community partner, and to counteract the negative expectations of some member states. The Finnish Presidency developed an explicit strategy of sacrificing substantive national interests whenever the defence of these interests conflicted with its responsibility as Presidency. Norm conformance in the present was believed to generate concessions and offers in the future. The Swedish Presidency did not go to the same extreme, but made it one of its key objectives to generate an image of Sweden as a true European partner. Second, for member states with tainted reputations, conformance to heralded Presidency norms offers a means of changing the established picture. The British Labour government tried actively to change the ingrained image of the UK as an awkward European partner; if rebranding Labour had succeeded, then rebranding the UK should also be possible. Through modesty and norm conformance, the Dutch 1997 Presidency sought to restore the good reputation it had tarnished through the ‘Black Monday’ of its 1991 Presidency. Similarly, Sweden fought

Conclusion 197 against the widespread description of the country as a ‘reluctant European’, with a historically problematic attitude towards European integration. Beyond these general trends, it is the strategic situation in every individual case that shapes governments’ attention to Presidency norms. Whereas most country chapters provide examples of this phenomenon, the French Presidency is the most illuminating, since the political leadership in this case made an attempt at formalizing its approach. If fundamental national interests were involved, French representatives were supposed to prioritize these interests over the responsibilities as Presidency, but if the issue involved interests of only secondary importance, then the Presidency obligations were to be given due attention. Formal legislative procedures affect the behaviour of the Presidency by enabling or encouraging certain courses of action, while closing off or discouraging others. The Commission is given varying attention, depending on the formal involvement of, and the Presidency’s need for, the European executive. Presidencies are anxious to seek the co-operation of the Commission on first-pillar issues, where the Commission has the sole right of initiative and Presidencies few independent means for launching proposals. In the second and third pillars, the Commission has gone from little to greater formal involvement over the past decade. Yet it is notable in Presidencies’ approach towards the Commission that it does not possess powers in these areas that equal those in the first pillar. Nor is it a coincidence that the French Presidency chose to disregard the Commission during the IGC 2000; the Commission was excluded because its support was not formally required. The Presidency’s approach towards the European Parliament is similarly affected by the evolution of the formal provisions for co-operation with the EP. As the Parliament’s powers have grown, so has the attention paid to this institution by the Presidency. French officials, for instance, testify that the EP was given considerably more consideration during the 2000 Presidency than during the 1995 Presidency. Presidencies have discovered not only that the Parliament is a tough counterpart for the Council, but also that the Parliament can be used tactically, to strengthen the Presidency’s influence in internal Council negotiations. An illustrative example is the Swedish handling of the transparency dossier, where the Presidency promoted its own preferred position by threatening the secrecy-oriented Council with the transparency-oriented Parliament. As opposed to other institutional EU contexts, European Council summits are distinguished by a virtual lack of formal agenda-setting rules. This is exploited by the Presidencies in charge of preparing these summits, even if the tendency for the European Council to predefine its future meeting agendas means that Presidencies increasingly must seek early support for their proposals. The Swedish government engineered support for enlargement and sustainable development as the dominating themes of

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the Göteborg European Council, as did the Belgian government for the Laeken declaration as the high point of its concluding summit. The Spanish Presidency used an even more forthright approach, by simply imposing its agenda of immigration on other member governments immediately before the Seville summit. From a rationalist perspective, the Presidencies’ choice of negotiation strategies is a product of the combined strategic setting: reputational concerns, preference distribution, decision rules and legislative procedures. In this volume, primarily three types of strategies have come to the fore. No Presidency solely adopts one or the other strategy, depending on what is expected of it, but instead tailors its negotiating strategy to the particular situation at hand. The ideal-typical situation when a forcing strategy is used is one where key national interests are at stake, where reputational concerns are of secondary importance, and where the distribution of preferences is such that the formally required support can only be achieved by exploiting all the weapons at the Presidency’s disposal. The ideal-typical situation when an accommodating strategy is used is one where the Presidency only has secondary interests at stake, where reputational concerns are of major importance, and agreement can be reached only if the Presidency sacrifices its own substantive concerns. Yet it is the problem-solving strategy, where the Presidency seeks to maximize joint gains, that is the most common strategy, if judged by the cases presented in this volume.

The Presidency: a sociological account According to a sociological approach, Presidency behaviour is guided by a logic of appropriateness. Presidencies act as they believe they should behave. Self-images (or, in another parlance, identities), often based on national culture and historical traditions, identify what roles Presidencies prefer to play and how they prefer to fulfil these roles. Presidency performance is also, however, influenced by expectations from other member states and from EU institutions, which may constrain what is considered appropriate behaviour. Expectations are directed both towards the particular member state that assumes the office and towards the office of the Presidency in general. Presidency performance may therefore mirror a delicate balancing act between various expectations and conflicting norms. In this section, a sociological interpretation of Presidency performance is presented. We give a structured account of the different role priorities and role expectations that have been portrayed in the country chapters and try to highlight patterns of similarities and dissimilarities that appear in the empirical cases. First, we detail the impact of national self-images, relating these to the various Presidency roles described in the Introduction to this volume. We then describe how external expectations, reputations and national stereotypes are reflected in our cases and analyse how member states have tried actively to change ingrained expectations. Next,

Conclusion 199 the norms surrounding the office of the Presidency and their impact as constraining elements are discussed. We end with an overview of role conflicts and how these have been handled by various Presidencies. Self-images and role selection Historical national experiences play substantial roles in forming Presidency behaviour. Traditional roles tend to reappear, although sometimes in new shapes and varieties. A particularly good example is the way in which France perceives itself as a natural European (and global) leader. A glorious political and cultural heritage provides the impetus for playing a great power role also today. French leaders do not hesitate to share their firm convictions about the future of Europe with other member states and feel that they, as representatives of a major nation, have a responsibility for Europe. The Presidency gives just another opportunity for France to play its leadership role, not least in the realm of foreign and security policy. During its latest Presidencies, Spain has also demonstrated great power aspirations, although limited to the European arena. History and population size combine to make Spanish leaders acutely aware of status considerations, leading them to advocate a prominent role for Spain in EU affairs. Both the French and the Spanish cases indicate that the great power image also seems to make it more legitimate to defend national interests, not least in questions of political power, and thus to pursue a bargainer role. Leaders who are convinced that their own national approach to policy is superior and could serve as a good example for the rest of Europe tend to exploit the Presidency period to export their national model. In the case of Sweden, considerable pride is taken in ‘the Swedish model’, which historically provided the Swedes with unprecedented welfare. In several issue-areas, Sweden actively promoted a national approach – often to the annoyance of sceptical fellow countries with other traditions. Similarly, the Blair government made attempts to export its ‘third way agenda’, once again without much success. Traditional self-perception is reflected also in other types of role prioritization. British officials have a self-image of being ‘efficient and neutral umpires’, prompting them to focus on impartial brokerage and efficiency. Likewise, Spain takes pride in its self-professed bureaucratic efficiency, while Sweden has a national oft-cited tradition of both efficiency and neutral mediation. All these perceived traits were clearly mirrored in actual Presidency behaviour and priorities. Geographical and historical circumstances create emotional ties that push some member states to take on a bridge-building role, trying to strengthen EU relations with certain countries or regions. Finland introduced the northern dimension on the EU agenda. Spain and Portugal have prioritized Latin America and Mediterranean co-operation. Geographical concerns, stemming from

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historical ties, can also be discerned in the ways eastern enlargement is handled by different Presidencies. Our cases also illustrate how previous Presidencies may create precedents and how governments use earlier experiences as yardsticks and standards of comparison. The Dutch 1991 Presidency disaster, the ‘Black Monday’, is referred to by all governments as an example to avoid, and Dutch performance in 1997 was structured deliberately to refute the image created six years before. Belgium set its perceived 1993 success as a benchmark for performance, while the Blair government wanted to distance its approach from the conservative UK Presidencies of the past. Sweden compared its achievements to the Finnish success and had a clear ambition to ‘beat’, or at least not perform worse than its neighbouring country. Explicit or implicit comparisons seem to function as fuel for increased ambitions. The impact of reputation and external expectations Previous Presidency experiences contribute to create country-based expectations. Often, these seem to strengthen already existing images (sometimes stereotypes) of fellow member states. Again, France serves as an effective illustration. The widespread conception of France as an arrogant but visionary great power, which does not take advice and highhandedly promotes its national interests, was certainly consolidated by the 2000 French Presidency, despite the many results reached. These external expectations were well known to French policy-makers and served to bolster, rather than restrain, such French behaviour. In the cases of Finland and Sweden, and not least the UK, external expectations of exemplary bureaucratic efficiency coincided with self-images and strengthened the resolve to live up to this positive reputation. In general, existing attitudes, based on images, tend to form other member states’ actions towards particular Presidencies. Germany is often, as President, expected to act as a paymaster when a solution depends on side-payments. Spain is expected to promote self-interests in questions of regional policy and agriculture, and other members adapt their strategies to counter such efforts. General country characteristics sometimes influence expectations; thus smaller member states are expected to keep a low profile and adopt a cautious approach. The Belgian approach to its 2001 Presidency reflects such concerns. In that case, external expectations served to shape Belgium’s own preferences (emphasizing procedural ambitions), but also constrained its substantial ambitions. In the field of foreign policy, where expectations on small state restraint are perhaps most outspoken, this can even lead to clashes. Ambitious governments that see the Presidency as an opportunity to make an imprint on the international stage try to advance their own agenda, only to encounter great power scepticism and resistance. Sweden, driven by its self-image as an activist norm promoter, had to limit its

Conclusion 201 ambitions and pursue a more restricted foreign policy agenda, but succeeded in advancing some of its key ideas and also received external praise for its actions. Efforts to change expectations Debutantes in the office tend to invest a lot of energy (and money) in their first Presidency. Making a good first impression seems to be a common goal. More specifically, the newcomers that we have investigated (Spain, Finland, Sweden) also have in common their deliberate efforts to use the Presidency period to improve their EU images. They all sought to convince existing members that they were also ‘good Europeans’, worthy to be counted as equals. For Spain, it was a way of consolidating its democratic credentials; for Finland, it was important because of its past with a ‘special relationship’ to the Soviet Union; for Sweden, it was a chance to get rid of the notion of Sweden as a ‘reluctant European’. Attempts to change expectations and attitudes among fellow members were also visible in the British case. Here, the change came with a newly elected government, eager to prove that it held a much more responsible European approach to the EU than its Conservative predecessors. New Labour tried to strike a ‘new tone’ in its relations with the EU – while still stubbornly defending the British budget rebate. In the Dutch case, a major objective of its 1997 Presidency was to re-create an image of the Netherlands as a European-minded, responsible member state, and to obliterate the shadow of its previous Presidency. This led to a cautious and modest approach, where the government was anxious not to leave the impression of being a selfish bargainer. Presidency norms as constraints The twin norms of impartiality and effectiveness exert considerable influence over Presidency behaviour. The semi-official impartiality norm strongly links being a ‘good’ president with the need to act as a neutral compromise-maker. All Presidencies try to avoid open criticism for partiality, ‘the supreme insult’. The impartiality norm contributed to the conscious efforts of inter alia the Belgian and Swedish governments to orient their Presidencies towards brokerage and efficient administration. Even the French administration sought to live up to the norm. However, the role of promoter of self-interests under some circumstances trumps the impartiality norm, not only for France. Perceived vital national interests – of a constitutional nature, or linked to values of security or welfare – have led repeatedly to instances of openly self-interested behaviour. Yet the end conclusion must be that the impartiality norm sets clear limits as to what Presidencies can do under ‘normal’ circumstances. As shown in Chapter 10 on Belgium, it is at least vital in the final evaluation to be

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perceived as impartial, regardless of biased actions on the road to a fair compromise. The effectiveness norm prescribes that Presidencies should actively push the European agenda forward, and try to finalize as many outstanding issues as possible. A good Presidency is equated with lawmaking success, often measured by the number of decisions taken. The smaller member states in our selection, consistent with this norm, all emphasized procedural leadership (moving negotiation processes towards decisions) and brokerage (to find acceptable compromises). Britain – in line with its traditional role as a versatile broker and administrator – also prioritized getting results in the end. If a state has the chance of staging a major history-making decision during its term in office, this often becomes the overarching concern. This held true for France, with its number one priority to have a breakthrough in the constitutional arena, but also for Denmark in 2002, with its concentration on producing a final decision on eastern enlargement (with the slogan of ‘from Copenhagen to Copenhagen’). The impartiality and effectiveness norms taken together tend to pressure the integration process forward. Brokering deals and producing tangible results are seen as appropriate behaviour – and therefore Presidencies constantly act to produce European solutions. That these norms predominate also when otherwise Euro-sceptical member states hold the office is a sign of the power of normative influences. Role conflicts Member states choose different strategies when it comes to striking a balance between the bargainer role (defending national self-interests) and the role of the broker (often sacrificing self-interest for the sake of broader European interests). At the one extreme, France had a clear order of priority, where fundamental, constitutional French interests were always supreme. The responsibilities of the Presidency came only in second place, followed by issue-based sectoral interests. Finland occupies the other extreme. Finnish representatives systematically chose to retreat and abstain from tough protection of national interests when they perceived that the EU majority was of a different opinion. The middle-of-the-road position may be exemplified by Portugal, whose Foreign Minister is claimed to have defined the Portuguese position as being an ‘honest broker, but without being masochistic’. The border between leadership and brokerage is unclear. Prioritizing one of the roles may negatively affect the other. Thus France pressed very hard to provide leadership and to produce an agreement – consistent with French interests – at the Nice summit, but thereby provoked small state criticism. Its alleged tendency not to listen to small state delegations was interpreted as contrary to the honest broker norm. Sweden, on the other

Conclusion 203 hand, was criticized for a far too consensual approach, lacking in leadership. Swedish officials were inclined to listen to all parties and to try to anchor their suggestions in all camps before they produced a compromise proposal. Such procedures were often time-consuming and involved the risk that no decisions would be made. In this sense, the role of the neutral umpire may negatively affect leadership aspirations.

Competing or complementary perspectives? We have now presented two interpretations of why Presidencies behave as they do. Each seems to provide a credible and persuasive account of Presidency performance, but how do the rationalist and sociological approaches relate to each other? Are the explanations given by the approaches to the variation in Presidency performance that we have found competing or complementary? Do they give alternative, competing explanations for the same phenomena or does each add its specific contribution to a compatible and consistent overall explanation? The perspectives may be perceived of as complementary, in the sense that the sociological approach underlines antecedent factors which shape what rationalists later conceptualize as exogenously derived interests. In the words of Katzenstein and colleagues (1998: 680), a sociological perspective ‘focuses on the sources of actors’ identities – in game-theoretic terms, their preferences. . . . Rationalist accounts make very limited claims about the insights they can offer into the origins of . . . common knowledge.’ The insistence of sociologists that actor performance is pathdependent is one such background mechanism. Traditional self-images and role conceptions (e.g. Swedish neutrality) may preclude certain policy choices from consideration (working for a common military security policy). Furthermore, the sociological perspective emphasizes the impact of constitutional practices and of long-standing roles, shaped by geographical location and historical experiences. All these factors, based in tradition and culture, may be claimed to help us understand why different member states vary in their goal priorities. In this sense, the sociological approach may be interpreted as complementing rationalist explanations. A sociological approach has its main strength in explaining consistency and long-term trends. By referring to persistent, change-resistant images and roles, it provides a persuasive interpretation of continuity in state behaviour. Among our cases, the British and Spanish experiences, covering several Presidencies, demonstrate how key ingredients in state policy remain the same, despite changes in government. In the case of the UK, Tory and Labour governments both conceived of the internal market as the heart of the British engagement with Europe. In Spain, concerns about the country’s position in Europe, about peripheral European regions and about Europe’s relationships with Latin America persist despite regime change. The chapters on these two countries also describe how such

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continuity may credibly be attributed to basic self-images and traditional roles. At the same time, the same cases also illustrate the advantages and strengths of a rationalist perspective. The rationalist can easily explain short-term shifts and variation in state behaviour by pointing to changes in domestic power relations. Oscillations in interest group prominence interact with the coming to power of new political regimes with different ideologies. Short-term variation in Presidency performance may also reflect changes in the European level strategic context, including institutional changes as well as transformations in member state preference distributions. In the UK, New Labour gave more emphasis to traditional labour concerns, such as economic reform and employment. In Spain, Aznar’s European agenda differed from his socialist predecessor’s, through a distinct emphasis on economic liberalization and immigration policy. We thus propose that the sociological and rationalist perspectives differ in their relative strengths: while the first is well suited to help us understand long-term continuity and persistence in Presidency performance, the second better explains fluctuation in Presidency strategic behaviour. While the preceding paragraphs have indicated basic complementarity, the chapters and the Conclusion also give evidence of instances where the two approaches present competing explanations of the very same empirical observation. As regards reputational concerns, the rationalist argument points to the strategic value of a positive reputation, while the sociological argument underlines the aspirations to live up to expectations and do what is considered appropriate. As regards norm adherence, Presidencies, according to the sociological perspective, follow norms (e.g. the impartiality norm) because they have internalized the values expressed by the norm and take them for granted. The rationalist perspective, on the contrary, predicts that Presidencies conduct cost–benefit analyses and follow norms when the gains prevail over the costs. In both cases, the result could be the same. Empirically, it is exceedingly difficult to prove whether one approach is ‘correct’ while the other is ‘wrong’. When the Belgian government tries to implement an even-handed policy of brokerage, is this the effect of norm adherence or of a rational calculus? When the Netherlands tries to reestablish itself as a reliable European, is this out of a logic of appropriateness or a logic of consequences? We cannot, with our material, make any such assessments. This would require quite another type of research involving detailed process-tracing. Furthermore, elements of both theoretical mechanisms may well be present. In brief, we find evidence of both theoretical complementarity and competition when trying to explain our empirical findings on Presidency behaviour. We agree with the general observation that ‘the differences and complementarities between constructivism and rationalism promise to make the interaction between these two theoretical orientations a productive

Conclusion 205 point of contestation’ (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 678). In this volume, we have brought this debate to the study of the EU Presidency in European governance.

Reference Katzenstein, P.J., Keohane, R.O. and Krasner, S.D. (1998) ‘International Organization and the Study of World Politics’, International Organization, 52 (4): 645–85.

Index

accommodating strategies 12, 144, 198 acquis communautaire 5 Agenda 2000 76–7, 94 agenda-exclusion 21, 28–30, 34 agenda-setting 21–5, 34, 85, 109, 158–9, 185 agenda-shaping 6, 8, 18–22, 30–4, 91–3, 145, 159, 183, 187; reactions to 33 agenda-structuring 21, 25–8, 34, 158–9 Ahtisaari, Martti 111 Algeria 97 Allen, D. 58, 67 Amsterdam Treaty 58, 63–4, 83, 112, 148, 178 arrest warrant, European 161–2, 183 arrogant behaviour 132, 134 Arter, D. 109–10 Article 255 (of the TEU) 110 Austria 25, 62, 125–6 awareness-raising 23–4 Aznar, José Maria 162, 173–9, 183–8, 204 Bachrach, Peter 28–9 Baratz, Morton 28–9 Barcelona process 75, 186 bargaining role for the Presidency 14, 134, 202 Bassompierre, Guy de 20 BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) 12 Belgium 26, 60–1, 73–5, 78, 83, 132–3, 193, 197–200, 204; Presidency in second half of 2001 155–68 Bercovitch, Jacob 42–3 Berlusconi, Silvio 162, 177–8, 186 Bernadotte, Folke 139 bias 42–5, 48 Bildt, Carl 139 ‘Black Monday’ (30 September 1991)

73–4, 82, 196, 200 Blair, Tony 29, 61, 79, 87–8, 91–101, 148, 162, 177–8, 186, 194, 199–200 Bolkestein, Frits 84 Bretherton, C. 62–3, 67 Broad Economic Guidelines (BEG) 95 brokerage role for the Presidency 14, 115, 134, 151, 161–4, 168, 201–2; see also ‘honest broker’ role Brown, Gordon 100 Bunyan, Tony 146 bureaucrat-type Presidency 14, 134, 151, 187 ‘capability-expectations gap’ 59, 62, 66 Carlberg, I. 139 Cashman, Michael 146 Chechnya 114, 163–4 Chirac, Jacques 61, 83, 122, 125, 128–9, 133–5, 162, 186 Clinton, Bill 97 coalitions 12–13, 47, 183, 188 co-decision procedure 7, 13, 28, 78, 145, 147, 167 co-habitation (in French government) 128–30, 133–4, 195 Cohesion Fund 177–81, 184 Commissioner for External Relations 62, 65 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 55–68, 90, 97, 108, 100, 113, 115, 121, 140–1, 148–9, 152, 162; Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit 90; see also European Political Co-operation competence, national, community and mixed 56–7 competitive strategies 12 compromise strategies 12, 164–5 Condorcet, Marquis de 31

Index 207 conflict prevention 24, 33, 112, 148 conflict resolution 41 consensual solutions 14, 40, 65–6, 124, 151, 165–6 Convention on the Future of Europe 68, 156, 186 Cook, Robin 88, 91, 96, 100 Coombes, David 19 Corbett, Richard 19 COREPER 3, 29, 90, 124, 165 country characteristics explanation of Presidency behaviour 8–10, 13, 168, 192, 200 Cox, Pat 150 crisis management 112–15, 148 cross-pillarization 57 Dayton Agreements 75 de Vries, Gijs 100 deadlock situations 1 Delors, Jacques 32, 176 Democratic Republic of Congo 159–60 den Boer, M. 163 Denmark 60–1, 143, 202 Dewost, Jean-Louis 19 Dinan, D. 57, 59, 63–4, 67 disinterest 40, 42, 44, 164 distributive bargaining 12 documents, access to 145–7, 150–2, 195–6 Driving Disqualification, Convention on 93 Duisenberg, Wim 94 Duke, S. 162 Durban conference on racism (2001) 163 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 75, 100, 141, 177, 180–2 The Economist 98–9 employment action plans 91–2 enlargement of the EU 26, 59–60, 62, 64, 68, 72, 75, 94, 115, 126, 141–3, 148, 152, 155–6, 184–5, 188, 194, 202 environmental issues 57, 78, 93, 142–5, 152, 177, 184 ETA 183 Euro-11 group 100, 110 Eurobarometer surveys 150–1, 175 Eurogroup 25 European Central Bank 94 European Commission 3–7, 13, 19, 24, 32, 39, 56–7, 61–4, 73, 77–8, 113, 125, 128, 130–1, 147, 180, 197

European Council 3, 5–7, 27, 39, 56–7, 64, 90, 115, 155, 197; General Secretariat 89, 127–8 European Council meetings: Amsterdam (1997) 71, 83; Barcelona (2002) 183–4; Berlin (1999) 174; Biarritz (2000) 131; BrusselsSchuman (2001) 161; Cardiff (1998) 92, 97, 101, 143; Cologne (1999) 108–9, 112–13, 143; Edinburgh (1992) 174; Ghent (2001) 61, 162–3; Göteborg (2001) 142, 144, 184, 197–8; Helsinki (1999) 64–5, 108–15 passim, 186; Ioannina (1994) 177; Laeken (2001) 160, 162, 198; Lisbon (2000) 27, 167; London (2001) 162; Madrid (1989) 180, 186, 188; Nice (2000) 50, 120, 122, 124, 130, 132, 134, 155, 202; Seville (2002) 184–6, 188, 198; Stockholm (2001) 29; Vienna (1998) 90 European Parliament 3, 5, 7, 13, 28, 51, 55, 59, 76, 78, 114, 121, 125, 130–1, 145–6, 149–51, 164, 167, 183, 197 European Political Co-operation (EPC) 56–8, 63, 180–1 European Presidency: explanations of variations in performance 7–14; functions of 4–7; research on 4; see also more specific headings European Social Charter 180 Europol Convention 93 Fabius, Laurent 132 Finland 23–5, 33, 51, 59–60, 62, 147, 193–6, 199–202; Presidency in second half of 1999 104–16 Fiorina, Morris 32 Fischer, Joschka 162 foot-and-mouth disease 29 forcing strategies 12, 131, 144–5, 148, 152, 179, 184, 198 France 24–30 passim, 33–4, 45, 49–51, 64, 73, 84, 94, 97, 100, 112, 142–3, 151–2, 185, 195–202 passim; Presidency in second half of 2000 120–35 French-German ‘axis’ 127–8, 177–8 frequency of meetings 27 Friis, L. 64 Galileo project 184 De Gaulle, Charles 125 General Affairs Council 24, 89–90, 157

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Germany 27, 30, 49, 60, 73, 94, 100, 112, 179, 184, 188, 200 Gibraltar 178 Gillespie, R. 177 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry 156–7 González, Felipe 173–7, 187 Greece 25 Hain, Peter 162 Hammarskjöld, Dag 139 Hayes-Renshaw, F. 19–20, 58–9 Henderson, Douglas 88–96 passim, 100 High Representative for the CFSP 56, 59, 62–7 passim, 148 ‘honest broker’ role 38–40, 46–51 passim, 80, 82, 95, 100, 151, 164–7, 188, 202, see also brokerage role Hopmann, Terrence 42 immigration policy 185, 188 impartiality of the Presidency 7, 13, 38–51, 73, 111, 123, 140, 161, 164–6, 201–2; and the distribution of interest 46–8; and the distribution of power 48–51; see also neutrality of the Presidency informal meetings 5, 27, 114, 122 initiation of policy 19, 24, 32 ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ 25 ‘institutional memory’ 64, 81 institutional reform 131 institutionalism see neoinstitutionalism; rational-choice institutionalism institutions, significance of 3 integrative negotiations 12 Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) 4, 12, 24, 50, 71–5, 78–9, 83–5, 115, 124, 132–4, 140, 146, 149–50, 156–7, 179–81, 197 International Criminal Court 96 Internet, the 122, 146 Iraq 97 Ireland 51, 89, 112 Italy 183, 188

Kok, Wim 29, 162 Kosovo 58, 60, 97, 107–8, 111–14 Kostunica, Emil 131 Kronsell, Annika 144 Laeken Declaration 155–7 Laeken Group 156–7 Laffan, B. 99–100 Lax, D.A. 12 Le Roy, Alain 163 leadership role for the Presidency 14, 134, 151, 161–4, 168, 202–3 Lederach, John 42 Léotard, François 163 Lindh, Anna 65, 148 Lipponen, Paavo 107, 109 Lisbon process 178, 183–4 logic of appropriateness 8, 10, 85, 138–41, 152, 168, 198 logic of expected consequences 8, 10, 138, 167–8 Lomé Convention 97, 115 Lubbers, Ruud 74 Ludlow, Peter 40, 90–1, 99 Lund, Gunnar 147–8 Luxembourg 74–5, 78, 89

Jönsson, C. 42 Jospin, Lionel 83, 95, 122, 128–9, 134

Maastricht Treaty 58–9, 63, 177 McKelvey, Richard 27, 31 majority voting 12–13, 48 Mandela, Nelson 160 Martikainen, T. 115 mediation 6–7, 38–42, 45–8, 93–5, 115, 123–4, 151, 164; definition of 41; by outsiders and insiders 41–2; theory of 46, 51 Mercosur 182, 186 Metcalfe, David 4, 34, 40, 66 Meunier, S. 57 Michel, Louis 155, 160, 162–3 Middle East peace process 65, 75, 163 Miles, Lee 140–1 Mitterrand, François 176 Monar, J. 163 Moscovici, Pierre 132 Moscovici, Serge 122 multi-level diplomacy 9, 60, 194 Murdoch, Rupert 98, 101

Kahneman, D. 139 Katzenstein, P.J. 203–5 Kingdon, John 22 Kirchner, E.J. 40, 58, 64 Kohl, Helmut 176, 178

national identity 104–6, 139, 152 national interests and priorities 1, 9, 11, 14, 21–2, 50–1, 76, 80–2, 111–12, 115, 122–4, 138, 151–2, 173, 175, 181–4, 187, 192–202 passim

Index 209 national jurisdiction 57 negotiation strategies 11–12, 198 Neligan, David 20 neo-institutionalism 3 Netherlands 24, 33, 50–1, 63, 66–7, 132, 184, 196, 200–1, 204; Presidency in first half of 1997 71–86 neutrality of the Presidency 20, 33, 38–42, 48–51, 112, 161, 164–7, 201, 203 Neyts, Annemie 155 Nicolaidis, K. 57 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 157–8 norms, adherence to and violation of 196, 204 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 62, 97, 114, 147–8 Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) 108–9, 114–15 notes blanches 129 Nugent, N. 55 Onkelinx, Laurette 143 Organized Crime, Action Plan on 93 Ortega, Manuel 183 Palme, Olof 139 path dependency 132, 139, 143–4, 152, 203 Patijn, Michiel 76 Patten, Chris 65, 148 Persson, Göran 29, 67 Petersberg tasks 112 Petersson, O. 139 ‘polder model’ 81 policy dilemmas 140–1 policy entrepreneurs 22–3 Pollack, M. 31 Portugal 27, 51, 199, 202 Powell, Colin 65 pragmatism 157 primus inter pares dilemma 65–8 Princen, Thomas 48 principal-agent theory 32 priorities, political 6, 11 problem-solving strategies 12, 144–5, 148, 152, 165, 168, 198 process partiality and impartiality 43–4, 48 Prodi, Romano 61, 125 public opinion 150, 175–6, 194–6 Putin, Vladimir 163 qualified majority voting 6, 165, 178–9

rational-choice institutionalism 31–2, 130 rationalist approach to Presidency behaviour 10, 109–10, 191–2, 203–4 regatta approach to accession 142, 184 regional aid 94–5 relational partiality and impartiality 42–4 representational functions of the Presidency 7, 23, 55–68, 95–7, 113–15, 125–6 reputational concerns 204 Riker, William 31 role conflicts 202–3 Rome Treaty 4 rotation of Council Presidency 32, 67, 187 Russia 23–4, 108, 110, 113–15, 164 SABENA 158 Santer, Jacques 90, 92, 95 scepticism towards the EU 84, 106–7, 122, 141, 179–80, 195 Schengen agreement 24, 140 Schmuck, O. 66 Schout, Adrian 4 Schröder, Gerhard 61, 142, 148, 162 Sebenius, J.K. 12 security policy 24, 106 ‘sense of a meeting’ 164–5 September 11th 2001, terrorist attacks of 161–2, 168 Shackleton, Michael 28 Sharon, Ariel 163 Shepsle, Kenneth 32 Sherrington, Philippa 25, 27, 33 Shukman, D. 101 Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market (SLIM) initiative 92 Single European Act 58–9 Smith, M. 58, 67 sociological approach to Presidency behaviour 10–11, 13–14, 109, 111, 132, 191, 198, 203–4 Solana, Javier 65, 148, 162–3, 176, 186 sovereignty of states 106, 188 Spain 23, 51, 73, 92–3, 143, 173–9, 194–204; Presidencies in 1989 and 1995 179–82; Presidency in first half of 2002 182–8 Stability Pact: for EMU 75, 178; for South-Eastern Europe 113 state-centrism 104–6, 116, 128

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stereotypes in EU politics 133 Structural Funds 177–81 Stubb, A. 64–5 subsidiarity 175–7 The Sun 101 supranationalism 9, 140, 186 sustainable development 144, 157, 184 Svensson, Anna-Carin 4, 23, 59 Sweden 24–30 passim, 33, 50–1, 59–60, 62, 64, 112, 185, 193–203; Presidency in first half of 2001 138–52 ‘sweeteners’ 47–8 terrorism 161–2, 164, 182, 188 Tiilikainen, T. 115 ‘tone’ of a Presidency 99–100 Touval, S. 41 trade policy 57 Trägårdh, L. 139 transparency 110, 147–52, 155, 195, 197 Tsagkari, Anastassia 40 Turkey 59, 94, 112 Tversky, A. 139 ‘two-level games’ 9, 60, 194

United Kingdom 49, 73, 143, 146, 178, 183, 188, 194–6, 199–204; Presidency in first half of 1998 87–101 United Nations 148 United States 97, 100, 128, 163–4, 183–4 van den Broek, Hans 76 van Mierlo, Hans 76, 82 Védrine, Hubert 132 Verhofstadt, Guy 155, 159–60, 162 veto power 12 Vogler, J. 62–3, 67 voluntarism 134–5, 156 Wallace, Helen 19–20, 22, 40, 55–6, 58 Watson, Graham 146 Wehr, Paul 42 Whitman, Richard 20–1 worker consultation rights 30 Wurzel, Rüdiger 30 Young, Oran 23 Youngs, R. 177 Zartman, I.W. 41

unanimity requirements 12