Gibraltar: British or Spanish? (Routledge Advances in European Politics)

Gibraltar

It is 300 years since Britain took possession of Gibraltar, a rocky promontory at the foot of the Iberian Peninsula. Gibraltar: British or Spanish? provides a detailed study of the attempts that have been made by Spain, particularly over the last two decades, to regain the sovereignty of ‘the Rock’ – despite the wishes of the Gibraltarians. Since 1984 a framework, known as the Brussels Process, has been in place to provide a forum for formal negotiations between Britain and Spain on practical cooperation but, more significantly, on the future sovereignty of Gibraltar. The book analyses and chronicles the historical context for these negotiations, as well as the negotiations themselves and the events surrounding them. It explores whether Gibraltar should be British or Spanish, what influence the past three centuries have had in relation to that question, why the vast majority of Gibraltarians are resolutely opposed to Spanish involvement in their affairs, and what the options are for the future. The book covers issues such as decolonization, Anglo-Spanish relations within the EU and NATO, and British strategic military considerations. The first book to give a detailed and up-to-date account of the attempts by Britain and Spain to resolve their differences over Gibraltar since the 1984 agreement, this volume will interest students and scholars of British and Spanish politics. Dr Peter Gold is Principal Lecturer and Head of the School of Languages, Linguistics and Area Studies at the University of the West of England, Bristol. He is the author of A Stone in Spain’s Shoe: The Search for a Solution to the Problem of Gibraltar and Europe or Africa?: A Contemporary Study of the Spanish North African Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

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Gibraltar British or Spanish?

Peter Gold

First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2005 Peter Gold All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Gold, Peter. Gibraltar : British or Spanish? / Peter Gold. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Gibraltar–Politics and government. 2. Spain–Foreign relations– Great Britain. 3. Great Britain–Foreign relations–Spain. I. Title. DP302.G38G65 2005 946.8⬘9–dc22 2004017217 ISBN 0-203-32336-X Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-415-34795-5 (Print Edition)

To my Mother, who has always supported me, to the memory of my Father, and to Anne and all our children for their love and forbearance.

Contents

Preface Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

xiii xiv xv

1 Introduction

1

2 British Gibraltar (1704–1963)

6

3 Gibraltar incommunicado (September 1963–October 1979)

15

4 The Lisbon Agreement ( July 1979–April 1980)

25

5 Spain’s approaches to NATO (June 1980–March 1982)

30

6 ‘Different and distant’?: the Falklands/Malvinas dispute (April–June 1982)

37

7 Spain joins NATO but the border remains closed (May–October 1982)

46

8 Felipe opens the gates (October–December 1982)

51

9 Towards the Brussels Declaration (March 1983–November 1984)

54

10 The border is fully opened: negotiations get under way (January–February 1985)

63

11 Osmosis begins (February–November 1985)

68

x

Contents

12 Sovereignty and sovereigns (December 1985–April 1986)

73

13 Into Felipe’s second term: guards and gates (June 1986–January 1987)

79

14 The battle over the airport (January–December 1987)

85

15 Gibraltarians vote to resist (December 1987–March 1988)

97

16 First visits by first ladies (April–December 1988)

104

17 The Bossano strategy (January–February 1989)

112

18 A European Hong Kong? (March–December 1989)

117

19 Tackling money-laundering and smuggling (February–December 1990)

122

20 Felipe visits London (January–May 1991)

128

21 Four more years for Joe Bossano (May 1991–January 1992)

134

22 The external frontier issue remains unresolved (February 1992–March 1993)

140

23 Setbacks in moves towards economic independence (April 1993–April 1994)

147

24 The Brussels Declaration ten years on: slow progress on all fronts (June–December 1994)

151

25 Defiant Bossano finally gives way (January–July 1995)

160

26 Changing Spanish attitudes? (July 1995–April 1996)

167

27 All change, but no change: Aznar, Caruana and Blair in power (May 1996–June 1997)

170

Contents

xi

28 Spain’s full integration into NATO (May–December 1997)

185

29 The shadow of the shared sovereignty proposal (January–December 1998)

196

30 Confrontation sparked by fishing row escalates (January–March 1999)

207

31 Border events continue to predominate (April–July 1999)

214

32 A second term and a satisfying agreement for Caruana (August 1999–April 2000)

221

33 The saga of HMS Tireless (I) (May–December 2000)

228

34 The saga of HMS Tireless (II) (January–May 2001)

240

35 The Brussels Process resumed (May–October 2001)

252

36 Piqué and Straw meet in Barcelona (November 2001)

264

37 Rumours of joint sovereignty proposals (November 2001–January 2002)

271

38 Gibraltarians plan their resistance (February 2002)

280

39 Gibraltarians take to the streets (March–April 2002)

287

40 Negotiations run into difficulties (April–May 2002)

293

41 Straw announces agreed principles (June–July 2002)

303

42 Gibraltar holds its own referendum (July–November 2002)

310

43 Recognition of democratic reality (December 2002–June 2003)

319

44 Conclusion

326

xii

Contents

Appendix 1:

The Treaty of Utrecht (2–13 July 1713)

338

Appendix 2:

The Lisbon Agreement (10 April 1980)

340

Appendix 3:

The Brussels Declaration (27 November 1984)

341

Notes Bibliography Index

342 379 384

Preface

The writing of this book began in 1988, and led to the publication of A Stone in Spain’s Shoe: The Search for a Solution to the Problem of Gibraltar, which was published by Liverpool University Press in 1994. However, the dispute between Britain and Spain over Gibraltar was far from being resolved at that time, and so my research continued. Although the ‘problem’ of Gibraltar remains, the publication of an analysis of developments since the early 1990s was felt to be timely not only because in 2004 Gibraltar celebrated the tercentenary of a British presence in Gibraltar, but also because the referendum held in Gibraltar at the end of 2002 marks the end of one of the most significant chapters in the dispute. In the preparation of this text the opportunity has been taken to revise all of the previously published chapters, and to add an historical chapter to cover the period 1704 to 1963. Chapters 2 and 23–44 have therefore not previously been published. Although the present analysis ends in June 2003, reference has been made to a number of events between that date and March 2004. These events demonstrate quite clearly that the story continues. Peter Gold Bristol, March 2004

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the British Council and to the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia in Madrid for providing ‘Acciones integradas’ funding for this project in its early stages. I thank representatives of the Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores and the British Embassy in Madrid for their helpful comments and useful material. I am also indebted to several colleagues for their help and advice, both at Sheffield Hallam University but especially, in recent years, at the University of the West of England, Bristol. Regular support for research time from my Faculty Research Committee and Faculty Executive in Bristol has been much appreciated. I am most grateful to the librarians at the British Newspaper Library at Colindale and at UWE, especially to my Faculty librarian, Jill Kempshall, for all their assistance. I am also grateful to Michael Brufal, of Friends of Gibraltar Heritage Society, for including me in the regular list of recipients of newspaper articles on Gibraltar. Finally, I should like to thank my wife, Anne, and all my family for their patient tolerance and support during the long gestation of this book.

Abbreviations

AACR AFSOUTH BBC CDS CSCE CSN DPBG EC EU FCO FIFA GBA GBC GDM GIBMED GSD GSLP IBF ICJ IRA IWBP MEP MoD MP NATO OECD PCE PNV PP PSOE

Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights Allied Forces Southern Europe British Broadcasting Corporation Centro Democrático y Social (Democratic and Social Party of the Centre) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Consejo de Seguridad Nacional (Council for Nuclear Safety) Democratic Party of British Gibraltar European Community European Union Foreign & Commonwealth Office Fédération Internationale de Football Association (International Federation of Association Football) Gibraltar Badminton Association Gibraltar Broadcasting Corporation Gibraltar Democratic Movement (the naval NATO command over the Straits of Gibraltar) Gibraltar Social Democrats Gibraltar Socialist Labour Party International Badminton Federation International Court of Justice Irish Republican Army Integration With Britain Party Member of the European Parliament Ministry of Defence Member of (British) Parliament North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Partido Comunista Español (Spanish Communist Party) Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party) Partido Popular (Popular Party) Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party)

xvi

Abbreviations

QC RFEF SACEUR SAS SDGG TGWU TVE UCD UEFA UN VAT VOGG WEU WH

Queen’s Counsel Real Federación Española de Fútbol (Royal Spanish Football Federation) Supreme Allied Command Europe Special Air Service Self-Determination for Gibraltar Group Transport and General Workers’ Union Televisión Española (Spanish Television) Unión del Centro Democrático (Union of the Democratic Centre) Union Européene de Football Association (European Union of Association Football) United Nations Value-Added Tax Voice of Gibraltar Group Western European Union Westminster Hall

1

Introduction

The British Overseas Territory of Gibraltar, a rocky promontory that rises to a height of about 420 metres and is therefore often referred to as ‘the Rock’, is a little over six kilometres in length, about 1,200 metres wide and covers an area of some seven square kilometres. It is connected to the southern tip of Spain by a low-lying isthmus about 800 metres wide at the border-crossing. Eight kilometres away across the bay to the west of Gibraltar lies the Spanish port of Algeciras, while on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar lies Morocco, 32 kilometres distant. The British have occupied the Rock since 1704 and under the Treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1713, the territory was ceded to Britain in perpetuity.1 Less than 100 Spaniards remained on the Rock after it was seized, but they have since been joined by Britons, Genoese, Maltese, Moroccans, Portuguese, Minorcans, Sephardic Jews from North Africa and, more recently, migrants from the Indian subcontinent. The population currently numbers about 28,500, of whom some 23,000 are Gibraltarians, 3,500 are other British subjects (including military personnel and their families), and 2,000 are non-British. Despite their mixed origins, the way of life of the majority is essentially British but with a Mediterranean flavour. Pubs, British shops and schools, police officers in British ‘bobby’ uniforms are typical manifestations of the fundamental Britishness of the colony, although when it comes to that other quintessential cultural identifier – language – most Gibraltarians speak fluent Spanish as well as English.2 Several attempts were made by Spain to retake Gibraltar by force, the most recent and most notable between 1779 and 1783. Since 1713 Spain has retained its claims to sovereignty over the territory, and since the 1960s, in an international climate supportive of decolonization, it has had the backing of numerous UN resolutions to resolve the issue. In 1969 the Spanish dictator General Franco tried to force Britain’s negotiating hand by removing Spanish workers from Gibraltar, closing the border between the Rock and mainland Spain, and cutting off all other direct communications in the hope of irreparably damaging the Gibraltarian economy and bringing Britain to the negotiating table. Not only did the move not have

2

Introduction

the desired effect; it also stiffened the Gibraltarians’ resolve to remain tied to Britain and by isolating them it alienated them from Spaniards, with whom thereafter they could have little direct contact for 16 years. The fact is that even without the Spanish blockade the British Government would never have contemplated a transfer of sovereignty to Spain while the Franco regime was still in power. However, since the restoration of democracy in Spain following Franco’s death in 1975 and Spain’s subsequent full re-incorporation into the international community, the way has been open for Britain and Spain to seek a settlement for the future of the only remaining colony in Europe. In the late 1970s, with Spain eager to join the European Community (EC) and to become a member of NATO, many felt that it was time to resolve a situation that had come to be seen as an anachronism and an impediment to good bilateral relations. The signing of the Lisbon Agreement in 1980, which this work takes as its starting point for a detailed analysis, was the first important step in that process. Subsequently Britain and Spain agreed, through the signing of the Brussels Declaration in 1984, to attempt to solve all of their differences over Gibraltar, including the issue of sovereignty. Progress was extraordinarily slow and tortuous until 2001, but despite an apparent leap forward at that time negotiations have not yet reached a conclusion 25 years on from Lisbon. This study explores in some detail the negotiation process, the context in which it occurred and the issues related to it in order to try to answer the question – should Gibraltar be British or Spanish? In order to understand why this question has proved to be so difficult to answer we must consider the complications of Gibraltar’s history and its geography. As far as history is concerned, there are three factors at work. First, Gibraltar is one of 16 territories that remain on the UN list awaiting decolonization. However, decolonization in a conventional sense is not an option for Gibraltar, since the Treaty of Utrecht, if properly observed, says that if Britain should wish to ‘grant, sell or by any means to alienate’ ownership of Gibraltar, Spain should be given first preference to it. Hence Gibraltar is not a straightforward case of a colony choosing one of the conventional routes to decolonization: seeking independent status from a colonial power (most Gibraltarians do not wish to pursue that course, anyway); or establishing a relationship of free association with that colonial power (which many Gibraltarians find attractive); or requesting integration with it (often proposed by Gibraltarians but ruled out by Britain). Rather it is a territory whose sovereignty is disputed by two nations that have been required through numerous United Nations resolutions to find a bilateral solution to their dispute. The options, therefore, are not those normally available to colonial territories but are limited to what is acceptable to two other parties. Within a United Nations context, no-one has thus far even agreed on the principle – self-determination for the Gibraltarians, or the restoration of Spain’s territorial integrity – that should be applied.

Introduction

3

Second, Franco’s policy of isolating Gibraltar, which is seen by democratic Spain to have been a grave mistake, has had the effect of making the Gibraltarians’ attitude towards successive Spanish Governments at best mistrustful and at worst hostile. Although Spain has made it quite clear that its objective is to restore its territorial integrity and not to turn Gibraltarians into Spaniards against their wishes, the process of undoing the damage caused by the blockade is one which requires time, patience and ‘wooing’, for want of a better term. As this study will demonstrate, Spain has shown itself to be singularly inept at ‘wooing’ the Gibraltarians since the reopening of the border in 1985, and consequently the vast majority have no interest in entertaining the idea of any Spanish involvement in their affairs. It is impossible to evaluate the extent to which that would have been the case even without the blockade, but it is certainly true as a consequence of it. The third historical factor concerns the length of time that has elapsed since Britain first established its presence in Gibraltar. Although (as Chapter 2 will indicate) Britain has in the past been prepared to relinquish Gibraltar on several occasions, with the passing of the centuries not only have strategic interests evolved but also, more significantly, attitudes have changed towards the rights of people who live in colonial territories. Some citizens can trace their Gibraltarian ancestry back to the early years of the eighteenth century, while the average is about 150 years or six generations (Gold 2001: 74–5), and such a length of time, it can be argued, gives them some entitlement to choose the nature of their own future governance. Such an argument – based on the principle of acquisition by long-continued use, or ‘prescription’ – has not been recognized by all parties. The role of Gibraltar’s geography in the decolonization process is in some respects self-evident. It is indisputably part of the Iberian Peninsula, and closer to Spain than to Britain by 1,000 miles. Gibraltar controls the seaway between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean, as well as being at the crossroads between southern Europe and North Africa. Every vessel that enters or leaves the Mediterranean has to pass through the Strait of Gibraltar, from warships to oil-tankers, merchant fleets and cruise liners, making the Rock a key strategic location. As a supply resource, forward operational base and ship-repair facility it has proved invaluable in time of war or emergency, and although its location may not be as important as it once was when nations with powerful naval forces ruled the world, it operates as an important intelligence-gathering centre for NATO. It is not surprising that Gibraltar has been so important to Britain for so long, nor why Britain is reluctant to relinquish sovereignty over the military base, especially in the context of the current ‘war on terror’. The second geographical factor in Gibraltar’s case is its size. It is smaller in terms of both territory and population than most independent states, and it would be difficult, not to say impossible, for it to achieve full

4

Introduction

self-sufficiency in the area of defence.3 In addition, although Gibraltar has now achieved economic independence, its continuation could be dependent upon existing favourable tax regimes that cannot be guaranteed indefinitely. The third aspect of Gibraltar’s geography that impinges upon any change in sovereignty is the fact that it is located in Europe. Its proximity to Britain makes it a much more sensitive and immediate issue as far as domestic British politics are concerned than would be the case if it were an African or Asian colony, and therefore it is more problematic for a British Government to go against the wishes of the Gibraltarians (although some would argue that that has not prevented the present Government from trying). The former British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington is quoted as having said that ‘the problem for Spain is that Gibraltar is in Europe . . . the issue would be settled, just like Rhodesia and Hong Kong, if the Spaniards were black or Chinese’ (El País, 4 August 1987).4 The fourth geographical aspect concerns the fact that there are really two separate areas that are under negotiation: the town and the Rock on the one hand, and the isthmus that connects the Rock to the Spanish mainland on the other. The isthmus is territory that has been occupied by Britain since 1814 but it is not covered by the Treaty of Utrecht, so that whereas Britain can use de jure arguments in relation to the promontory, it has to rely on the more contentious de facto arguments of possession by prescription in relation to the isthmus and the airport that has been built upon it. As a consequence Spain has often seen the isthmus as more fruitful territory for negotiation, and at times British Governments have felt more vulnerable in relation to it, although the Gibraltarians consider it to be as much part of their territory as any other. There are two further factors that may have had a restraining influence on Spain’s pursuit of its claim to Gibraltar. The first is the question of the Spanish towns or enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. Melilla, which is less than 13 square kilometres and has a population of 69,000, has belonged to Spain since 1497, when Spain pursued some of the last Muslims to be expelled from the Peninsula across the Strait of Gibraltar. In 1912 it was declared a Spanish protectorate, which enabled it to become more than just a fortress around the castle. Ceuta, 160 kilometres to the west, is less than 20 square kilometres and has 76,000 inhabitants. The fort was established by the Portuguese in 1415 and ceded to Spain in 1668. When Morocco gained its independence in 1956, both Ceuta and Melilla were retained by Spain as garrisons or fortified towns, together with several islands, and are incorporated into metropolitan Spain. These territories are claimed by Morocco, and every time that progress is made on Gibraltar, Morocco raises them as an issue, although Spain has never acknowledged any justification for Morocco’s claim and insists that there is no parallel between the enclaves and Gibraltar.5 The second additional influencing factor, especially in recent years, is

Introduction

5

the growing interest in self-determination by Spain’s regions, or autonomous communities, in particular the Basque Country and Cataluña. The recent exploration by Britain and Spain of the possibility that Gibraltar might partly come under Spanish sovereignty with a degree of autonomy greater than that enjoyed by even the most autonomous of Spanish regions inevitably aroused both interest in those regions and also a degree of alarm in Madrid regarding the implications for the unity of the Spanish state. This and the issue of the North African enclaves help to explain why Spain has not at times applied pressure on reaching a solution on Gibraltar quite as forcefully as it otherwise might have done. These historical and geographical factors have weighed heavily on the debate about Gibraltar’s future. They provide the backdrop to the countless actions and counteractions that have been taken by one side or another in order to protect or promote its own interests in the dispute. This study explores these actions and counteractions in some detail in the attempt to answer the question posed by the book’s title. Of course many Gibraltarians would quite properly suggest that such a question is too twodimensional, and that they are an essential part of any solution. It is hoped that this study will make it quite clear that that has to be the case.

2

British Gibraltar (1704–1963)1

On 1 August 1704, as part of the Wars of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714),2 an Anglo-Dutch force under the command of Admiral Sir George Rooke began the bombardment of the fortified town of Gibraltar on the southernmost tip of the Iberian Peninsula. After three days of battle, on 4 August, Gibraltar was successfully seized. Of the 4,000 inhabitants, all but 70 fled across the isthmus into the hinterland of the Campo de Gibraltar, many settling temporarily (or so they thought) in San Roque, which two years later King Philip V of Spain dubbed ‘My city of Gibraltar resident in its Campo’ (Jackson 1987: 101). Although a FrancoSpanish siege continued from land and sea, by April 1705 Gibraltar was, to all intents and purposes, conceded to England (Harvey 1996: 73). It was garrisoned by Dutch and English regiments, but a mixture of Jews, Moroccans and other civilians from elsewhere in Europe were allowed to come back to the town (idem). Initially no interest was shown from London in accepting responsibility for the administration of Gibraltar, indicating that at this stage it had little intention of retaining the Rock (Harvey 1996: 72). However, there were those, like the MP Robert Harley, who recognized its potential, and he wrote in 1704: ‘The taking of Gibraltar may yet turn to great account, it being the greatest thorofare of trade in the world’ (quoted in Hills 1974: 204–5). However, perhaps surprisingly for a seafaring nation at the height of its imperial power, the British Admiralty saw it as of little strategic significance – its harbour was limited and its upkeep and defence could prove costly (Harvey 1996: 74). Nevertheless, in 1713 the Treaty of Utrecht (which was designed to ensure that the thrones of Spain and France would never be united) required the Dutch to remove their troops from Gibraltar and, in Article X, assigned the territory to Britain (as it had become after the Act of Union in 1707). However, the way in which the Article was drafted has led to arguments between Britain and Spain ever since. Arrticle X (see Appendix 1) has been described as ‘unusual as to its length and unique in phraseology’ (Hills 1974: 222). It may be that by using the word ‘propriety’ with reference to Gibraltar, King Philip intended to give Britain its ownership and use but not sovereignty over it,

British Gibraltar

7

and that if Britain acquired sovereignty it was through prescription rather than by treaty (Hills 1974: 224). Nor did the Article make clear whether Britain acquired Gibraltar by right of conquest, later confirmed by treaty (which is how Britain saw it), or simply by right of treaty; the text says that ‘hereby’ the King of Spain was ‘yielding’ Gibraltar, with no reference to conquest (Hills 1974: 225). These ambiguities, together with the anomalies and constraints of the Treaty – the fact that from the outset certain stipulations (such as no communication by land and sea, or the banning of Jews or Moors) were simply not observed; the absence from it of reference to the isthmus; the commitment that it shall be ‘held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right for ever’ by Britain, followed by the reversionary clause that if Britain decided to ‘grant, sell, or by any means to alienate therefrom the propriety’ of Gibraltar then ‘the preference of having the same shall always be given to the Crown of Spain before any others’ (see Appendix 1) – have all served to make the Treaty as much of a hindrance as a help in solving the dispute between Britain and Spain over Gibraltar. In spite of the fact that the Treaty conceded Gibraltar to Britain in perpetuity, there were seven occasions between 1713 and 1728 when British ministers were prepared to bargain Gibraltar away (Jackson 1987: 115). King George I even had a treaty drafted in 1720 that promised to return Gibraltar to Spain in exchange for peace, but by the time that a treaty was signed with Spain a year later the reference to Gibraltar had disappeared (Hills 1974: 256). France and Spain signed a secret treaty in 1721 in which France agreed to press Britain to return Gibraltar to Spain (Jackson 1987: 122) – a move (when it became known) that made Britain rather more determined to hold on to it. The fact that Spain laid siege to the Rock for 123 days in 1727 did nothing to encourage either the British monarch or his Parliament to entertain the possibility of handing it back (Hills 1974: 278). However, possession of it continued to be seen as a mixed blessing – useful for keeping an eye on the French (although not as useful as Minorca, which had also come Britain’s way as part of the Treaty of Utrecht), but expensive to maintain and not central to Britain’s interests in the New World and in India (Harvey 1996: 75–6). Nevertheless, with a relatively quiet half century following the 1727 siege, Britain was able to develop Gibraltar commercially and establish a sounder administrative base. The population in the mid-eighteenth century settled at around 6,000, with the garrison and their dependants constituting about three-quarters of it. The remainder consisted principally of Genoese and Jews, while only 6 per cent were British (Jackson 1987: 143). Gibraltar managed to avoid being an issue in any of the conflicts that occurred during that period, such as the Seven Years War (1756–1763), but that ceased to be the case when the so-called Great Siege (1779–1783) began as part of the Franco-Spanish hostilities against Britain that started in 1778. Thanks to the improvements to the fortifications set

8

British Gibraltar

in train by Colonel (later Major General Sir) William Green in 1769, Gibraltar had been transformed, and ‘so long as Britain retained her naval supremacy, or at least local naval supremacy, Gibraltar was impregnable’ (Hills 1974: 309). The defences, together with a competent commander from 1776 in the shape of General George Eliott, an appropriately sized garrison and support from the navy (Hills 1974: 306–44; Jackson 1987: 153–79; Harvey 1996: 89–90) enabled it to survive what turned out to be the last occasion when Gibraltar faced a direct military attack from Spain. Although the British Government considered the idea of exchanging Gibraltar for some other Spanish possession during the four-year siege, by 1782 ‘the fortress and its heroic response to the siege was now acquiring a sort of cult status amongst the population in Britain and no exchange, however attractive, was likely to be acceptable’ (Harvey 1996: 98–9). The Government now described Gibraltar as ‘one of the most valuable possessions’ of the British Crown (Harvey 1996: 99), even though King George III was quoted as saying: ‘I would wish if possible to be rid of Gibraltar . . . I shall not think peace complete if we do not get rid of Gibraltar’ (Hills 1974: 352). Nevertheless, when the Treaty of Versailles was signed in September 1783, putting an end to the wider conflict begun in 1778, Britain ceded Florida and Minorca (although not definitively until 1802) to Spain, but Gibraltar was again not mentioned (Jackson 1987: 178; Harvey 1996: 104). George III predicted that it would be the source ‘of another war, or at least of a constant lurking enmity’ (Hills 1974: 352). However, when Britain took control of Malta in 1802, confirmed by the Treaty of Paris in 1814, the idea of holding mastery over both ends of the Mediterranean seemed rather attractive, and the two possessions ‘remained the fulcrum of operations in this theatre until well after the Second World War’ (Harvey 1996: 105). Towards the end of France’s involvement in the Iberian Peninsula between 1809 and 1813 as part of the Napoleonic Wars, British troops from Gibraltar were even sent to help the Spanish out against the French army in southern Spain (Harvey 1996: 110): ‘Gradually Gibraltar changed from being the objective of the San Roque garrison into the supply base and refuge in time of trouble for the Spanish forces operating in southern Andalusia’ (Jackson 1987: 209). Thereafter Britain and Spain began a period of friendly relations during which tension over Gibraltar diminished. For most of the rest of the nineteenth century Gibraltar was able to ‘enjoy unbroken peace and modest prosperity’ (Jackson 1987: 224) as it developed as a civic entity. As a consequence, it ceased to be seen by Britain solely as a military garrison and naval base that could be bartered in exchange for more advantageous territory (Harvey 1996: 113).3 By 1815 the civilian population of Gibraltar had grown to about 10,000 – two-and-a-half times the size of the garrison – thanks partly to an influx of immigrants fleeing Genoa and conscription in Napoleon’s armies earlier in the century (Jackson 1987: 181; Harvey 1996: 105). This growth

British Gibraltar

9

was also in spite of outbreaks of yellow fever and other diseases; nearly 5,000 died in 1804 in an epidemic that was probably typhus (Jackson 1987: 196). The Genoese constituted about one-third of the civilian population, with the rest being made up of Spaniards and Portuguese who had fled from the war, Jews mainly from Morocco, while the British represented only about one-seventh of the total (Jackson 1987: 225; Harvey 1996: 113). In 1830 Britain took the significant step of changing the status of Gibraltar from ‘The town and garrison of Gibraltar in the Kingdom of Spain’ to ‘the Crown Colony of Gibraltar’, with responsibility transferred from the War Office to the Colonial Office (Jackson 1987: 229). At the same time, legal institutions were established and a police force was formed (Harvey 1996: 116). By now the population had reached 15,000,4 and it grew slowly but steadily so that by the end of the century it had reached 19,000, by which time the vast majority – nearly 17,000 – were Gibraltar-born citizens with British nationality (Jackson 1987: 246). The economy switched from war-related activities to commercial shipping and the import–export trade as Gibraltar became a centre for the distribution of goods to Spain and the Mediterranean (Harvey 1996: 114), although after 1830 some of this trade switched to Malta (Harvey 1996: 116–17). The Gibraltar economy only picked up again following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, especially through development as a coaling station for the new steam ships (Jackson 1987: 252). The standard of living was not high but it was better than that to be found in other parts of the Mediterranean, and many menial jobs in the dockyards, on the fortifications and in domestic service were done by Spaniards based in La Línea, imported English convicts (from about 1842) or immigrants from Malta (Hills 1974: 381; Harvey 1996: 118) – by 1891 there were nearly 700 of these former inhabitants of Britain’s other important Mediterranean naval base (Jackson 1987: 249). Inevitably some of the town’s commercial activity involved smuggling, especially tobacco, either across the land border or by boat into Spain (Harvey 1996: 119–20). Attempts to curtail the smuggling from Britain met with strong local opposition (Hills 1974: 383–4; Harvey 1996: 120). During most of the nineteenth century, Spain was in no position to challenge British possession of Gibraltar: ‘Torn apart by faction, the Carlist civil wars, Catalan and Basque nationalism, revolution and recurring military coups, the country was so unstable that it was quite incapable of mounting any sustained pressure on Britain to relinquish Gibraltar’ (Harvey 1996: 119). There were occasional tensions between London and Madrid, either over general issues such as smuggling or encroachment into the isthmus (Jackson 1987: 250), or due to the fact that from time to time Gibraltar gave refuge to leading Spanish opposition figures, such as General Prim in 1868 (Harvey 1996: 120). Further antagonism occurred in 1898 when Britain sided with the United States in Spain’s conflict over Cuba, and Spain began to strengthen its defences around Gibraltar in the

10

British Gibraltar

unlikely event that the Americans might try to invade via the Rock (Hills 1974: 385; Harvey 1996: 121). However, on the whole ‘Britain’s relations with Spain throughout the nineteenth century remained on a generally stable and amicable level, and this was particularly apparent in the area around Gibraltar. Spain never relinquished its heartfelt claim on the Rock, ‘but was too weak and divided to do anything about it’ (Harvey 1996: 121). Despite ‘the growth of the civilian community with a strong affiliation to Britain’ (Harvey 1996: 127), Gibraltar retained an importance as a naval staging post for the defence of the Empire both in India and the Far East as well as for the South Atlantic and the Cape. Its limitations as a harbour for sailing ships no longer applied in the days of steam, and major works were begun in 1894 (and completed in 1906) to build an artificial harbour and dry docks (Harvey 1996: 128) using labourers from Britain, Malta and Spain (Jackson 1987: 257). Despite this, during the first part of the twentieth century British military leaders still contemplated exchanging Gibraltar for an alternative territory – this time Spain’s North African enclave of Ceuta – largely because of the vulnerability of the Rock with the advent of long-range artillery (Hills 1974: 386–7; Jackson 1987: 255). Ceuta had several strategic advantages, but ‘in military terms the advantages are clearly discernible: politically, it would have been worse than jumping out of the frying pan into the fire’ (Harvey 1996: 129). In any case, by this time the British public had established an ‘emotional, albeit somewhat irrational, attachment to the place’ (Harvey 1996: 129), and its abandonment would have been highly unpopular. Gibraltar’s involvement in the First World War was minimal, largely because Spain remained neutral (Hills 1974: 400–1) and most of the action in the Mediterranean theatre occurred at the eastern end (Harvey 1996: 130–1). However, Gibraltar had to be prepared for action, and it was engaged in ship repair and the reception of casualties on hospital ships from Gallipoli (Harvey 1996: 131). Spanish workers coming into Gibraltar, together with the Governor of the town of Algeciras, helped to provide Gibraltar with vital supplies from 1916, while water was sent across the Mediterranean from Ceuta (Hills 1974: 402; Harvey 1996: 132). The only times that guns were fired in anger from Gibraltar were on two occasions in 1915 and 1917, when German U-boats had to surface (Jackson 1987: 265; Harvey 1996: 132–3). Following the Armistice in 1918 Gibraltar’s commercial life developed as a port of call for passenger liners and cruise ships for a variety of destinations (Jackson 1987: 267–8), and, in order to remain competitive, coaling procedures were mechanized and oilbunkering facilities introduced (Harvey 1996: 134–5). Also during this period the first steps towards local government were taken, with the establishment in 1921 of the Executive Council, which had local representation as well as administrative and military officials, and the City Council, which took responsibility for municipal affairs and had seven elected members

British Gibraltar

11

and four ex-officio administrative members (Jackson 1987: 268; Harvey 1996: 135). Gibraltar had little involvement in the Spanish Civil War, although some 4,000 Andalucians sought refuge on the Rock soon after the invasion by Nationalist troops from North Africa began in July 1936 (Hills 1974: 411; Harvey 1996: 133). Most Gibraltarians were anxious that the territory should not become involved in the struggle, which might have happened early on, and ‘despite the affinities of many Gibraltarians with Spain, particularly through marriage, the Civil War strengthened their identity as Gibraltarians of British nationality’ (Harvey 1996: 134). By the end of August 1936, the Nationalists were established in the Campo and the war moved northwards. It was in the greater conflict that immediately followed the Spanish Civil War that Gibraltar really came into its own. Whereas the focus of the First World War had been elsewhere, in the Second World War the Mediterranean became one of the major theatres (Harvey 1996: 137). Gibraltar’s situation was largely dependent on the attitude to the War taken by Spain, and there was initially considerable relief on the Rock when General Franco declared Spain’s neutrality. The British Government tried to establish a friendly relationship with Madrid, and the War Cabinet even hinted, in an oblique reference to Gibraltar, that Britain would be ‘prepared to discuss any question of common interest . . . after the conclusion of hostilities’, although Churchill quickly dismissed such ‘diplomatic “double-talk” ’ (Hills 1974: 428). Although the Spanish military were pro-German, the civilian community around Algeciras tended to be sympathetic to Britain, especially given that they were dependent on Gibraltar for work and food (Harvey 1996: 137). However, once Hitler turned his attention to the Mediterranean in 1940 and Franco subtly modified Spain’s position to one of ‘non-belligerence’ (Harvey 1996: 138), the capture of Gibraltar came under serious consideration by Germany. Hitler had hoped that the assault on Gibraltar could be undertaken with the cooperation of Spain. However, his meeting with Franco in October 1940, at which the Spanish leader presented a number of demands that Germany could not meet, made it clear that if Germany was going to try to capture Gibraltar it would have to be without Spain’s assistance, rendering it an extremely difficult if not impossible task (Jackson 1987: 282; Harvey 1996: 138–9). ‘Operation Felix’, as it had been dubbed, was formally cancelled in February 1941, but there is little doubt that if it had gone ahead either Gibraltar would have fallen or its military effectiveness would have been destroyed. It is ironic that it was Franco who prevented this from happening (Harvey 1996: 139), despite the fact that ‘throughout his life he had wanted Gibraltar back in Spanish hands’ (Hills 1974: 428). It was clear that Gibraltar’s strategic usefulness to the Allies could be considerably enhanced if it possessed an airfield, and the only place that this could be located was on the isthmus. The occupation of the isthmus

12

British Gibraltar

by Gibraltar began partly as a consequence of the yellow fever epidemic of 1814, when many civilians were settled there in huts in order to escape the disease (Hills 1974: 374). Following a further outbreak in 1854, barracks were constructed on the isthmus and the guard-posts, sentry boxes and wooden huts were not removed when it was over (Hills 1974: 379; Harvey 1996: 119). In Britain’s preparations for an expeditionary force during the build-up to the First World War, it was decided that savings could be made if a steel fence topped with barbed wire were to be in place of the sentries. This was completed in 1909, with Britain claiming that the line ‘has been for many years and unquestionably still is the British frontier’ (quoted in Jackson 1987: 263). Spain argued that the line was actually in neutral territory, but was in no position to do anything except protest (Hills 1974: 390–1). The isthmus was also developed with a racecourse, public gardens and sports fields in the early part of the twentieth century. Although a landing strip had been established on the racecourse during the First World War, and an emergency landing ground was available from 1934, no serious attempt to turn it into an airfield had been made prior to 1939 (Harvey 1996: 136). All that changed in October 1941, when the decision was taken to realign the runway and extend it by 550 metres into the bay, using thousands of tons of scree from the North Face of the Rock (Jackson 1987: 286). Also available was the spoil from the vast amount of tunnelling that was taking place inside the Rock – 30 miles (48 km) of it by the end of the War – in order to house most of the support facilities, such as accommodation, hospitals, storage, workshops, bakeries and laundries (Jackson 1987: 276, Harvey 1996: 141). In the early stages of the War Gibraltar served as a minor support facility on the route to the Cape, after the decision had been taken to abandon the trade route through the Mediterranean in May 1940 (Harvey 1996: 145). Gibraltarian civilians other than essential workers were evacuated in May 1940, initially to French Morocco (Jackson 1987: 276). However, after the fall of France the British Navy was forced to destroy a number of French ships at Mers-el-Kebir in July 1940, and in retaliation the French-Moroccan authorities insisted that all Gibraltarians be removed. Eventually, over 12,000 evacuees were taken to Britain and more than 3,000 went to either Madeira or Jamaica (Jackson 1987: 277–8). Once Churchill had decided to make the Mediterranean the focal point of the War it became the base for the fleet (called Force H) designed to keep a route open to Malta, Egypt and the Middle East (Harvey 1996: 145–7), as well as to disrupt German supply lines. This fleet was later joined by the 8th (Gibraltar) Submarine Flotilla (Harvey 1996: 147). Gibraltar’s dockyard ‘at last played that essential role for which its proponents had argued for two centuries’ (idem), refuelling, rearming, resupplying and repairing the ships so that they could rapidly return to the front line (Harvey 1996: 149). Following the decision in June 1942 to undertake joint British–

British Gibraltar

13

American landings in North Africa through Operation Torch, in November Gibraltar played the important role of providing the aircraft for fighter and anti-submarine cover, with more than 400 aircraft being accommodated on Gibraltar’s small airfield (Jackson 1987: 291; Harvey 1996: 151). In addition there were 160 warships and 200 other vessels in the bay, the largest number ever seen (Harvey 1996: 151). After the successful landings, over the next three months Gibraltar serviced some 50 convoys supporting the invasion force, and over the next two years continued to do the same during the Sicilian and Italian campaigns (Harvey 1996: 152), although by May 1943 convoys were able to sail unopposed through the Straits (Harvey 1996: 156). For Gibraltar the danger was virtually over by the end of 1943, and in April 1944 the first of the 16,700 evacuees began to return – a process that was not fully completed until 1951, owing initially to a shortage of shipping and then of housing (Jackson 1987: 296). The experience of evacuation ‘had bonded the Gibraltarians together as a nation’ (Harvey 1996: 160). After the Second World War, although Gibraltar’s role as a staging post was no longer as important as it had been, it continued to be a useful forward supply base, a secure and capacious storage facility and also an important surveillance post during the Cold War – particularly for the Navy but also for reconnaissance aircraft (Harvey 1996: 157). However, in other spheres more profound changes occurred. As often happens following the upheaval of war, there was a new political order and the dominant force came to be the Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights (AACR), initially a predominantly workers’ movement that became a political party and in 1945 took all seven elected seats on the reestablished City Council (Harvey 1996: 159–60). For the next five years their main objective was to obtain self-government, initially through the establishment of a Legislative Council, but they ran into strong opposition from the Colonial Office in London, which tried to ensure a majority of nominated members on whatever body was set up, together with limitations on what it could discuss (Harvey 1996: 160). Eventually in November 1950 a Legislative Council was inaugurated, with the ‘non-appointed’ members elected by proportional representation to ensure that the AACR would not win all the seats (in fact it gained three out of the five available).5 Joshua Hassan became a member, as well as being Chairman (redesignated Mayor in 1954) of the City Council (Harvey 1996: 161), and placed himself in a strong position to become, in due course, Gibraltar’s first Chief Minister. A constitutional crisis occurred in 1955 when the Financial Secretary tried to impose a 10 per cent import duty on selected goods entering Gibraltar in order to balance the budget, without first advising the Legislative Council (Harvey 1996: 161). The proposal was defeated by the Council, and the inexperienced Governor used his reserve powers to force it through. This led to the resignation of the elected members and

14

British Gibraltar

required the intervention of the Colonial Secretary in London to calm troubled waters. As a consequence, Gibraltar managed to secure an elected majority on the Council and to circumscribe the Governor’s powers. In the subsequent elections later that year the AACR, which over time moved steadily away from its links with the main trade union, retained its mass support, but little substantial change towards self-government had occurred by the time that the United Nations became involved with the future of Gibraltar in 1963. As for Spain, Franco assumed that with the conclusion of the Second World War, leaving Britain victorious but virtually bankrupt, it would not be long before Britain would feel the need to divest itself of its unsustainable Empire and would therefore no longer have need of an outpost like Gibraltar (Harvey 1996: 167). However, the Cold War put a different complexion on the value of places like Gibraltar (Jackson 1987: 296), and when Britain started to make constitutional changes in Gibraltar’s favour in 1950 Franco began to stir up anti-British and anti-Gibraltarian sentiment in Madrid (Jackson 1987: 300; Harvey 1996: 167). Although the restoration of diplomatic relations between Britain and Spain in 1951 led to preliminary talks about the territory, Franco’s argument that the inhabitants of Gibraltar were not true Gibraltarians but merely foreigners brought in to serve the garrison guaranteed that no progress would be made (Jackson 1987: 301–2; Harvey 1996: 167–8). When it was announced that Queen Elizabeth II would visit Gibraltar as part of her Commonwealth tour in 1954, Spain took measures to impose constraints on contacts with Gibraltar (Jackson 1987: 300; Harvey 1996: 168), the first steps towards the policy adopted in the late 1960s to suffocate the colony into submission.

3

Gibraltar incommunicado (September 1963–October 1979)

On 8 June 1969, Spain ordered the closure of the customs post and border gates between Spain and Gibraltar at La Línea. On 25 June the ferry service from Algeciras to Gibraltar was suspended with effect from 27 June, leaving the weekly British European Airways flight from London via Madrid as the only communication between Spain and the Rock. So began the fifteenth and longest siege of Gibraltar. The British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart commented in the House of Commons on 26 June that the interruption of the ferry service not only flouted ‘standards of international behaviour accepted by modern governments’ but also that it was in breach of the Treaty of Utrecht, which implies that there should be sea communication between Spain and Gibraltar. He accused Spain of subjecting the Gibraltarians to a policy of economic and psychological pressure (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 26 June 1969, Cols 1709–15). In an aide-mémoire handed to the Spanish Ambassador in London when he was summoned to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on 27 June, the Foreign Secretary said that the measure flouts standards of international behaviour accepted by modern governments, contradicts the concern which the Spanish Government professes to feel for the interests of the people of Gibraltar and serves only to contribute to the difficulties which lie in the way of a solution to the problem of Gibraltar. (The Times, 28 June 1969) If General Franco and, more particularly, his hard-line Foreign Minister Fernando María Castiella thought that a policy of isolating Gibraltar would bring Gibraltar to its knees economically and result in the inevitable transfer of Gibraltar to Spain as the only path to its survival, they were clearly very much mistaken on both counts. Not only did Gibraltar survive economically, largely through the support of successive British Governments, but its isolation from 1969 to 1985 had the predictable effect of making a closer relationship with Spain – even a democratic and

16

Gibraltar incommunicado

modern Spain, which became a fellow-member of NATO and the EC – significantly less attractive than would have been the case if communications had been maintained throughout those years. So what prompted Spain in 1969 to take such a drastic step? The answer can only be that it was taken out of a sense of frustration that had built up over a six-year period. During that time Spain applied fruitless diplomatic pressure to get Britain to negotiate the transfer of sovereignty, while suffering immense irritation at the measures that Britain took either to confirm its determination to defend the wishes of the Gibraltarians or to enhance the colony’s self-sufficiency. The problem was that Britain made it quite clear for most of that period that the one issue that it would refuse to discuss was the question of a transfer of sovereignty to Spain, while this appeared to be the only aspect of the problem in which the Spanish Government was interested. The harder Spain tried to exert pressure on Britain to negotiate, the more determined Britain became to resist. It was an extraordinarily short-sighted policy pursued by General Franco and his Foreign Minister, but it was fuelled by the constant encouragement offered by the United Nations throughout this period from 1960 onwards. At Spain’s request the United Nations Committee of 241 discussed the question of Gibraltar for the first time in September 1963, but no conclusions were reached. Discussions did not resume until the next session in September and October 1964, and it was then that Jaime de Pinies, on behalf of the Spanish Government, threatened for the first time to cut communications with Gibraltar. He called upon Britain to negotiate with Spain to implement UN Resolution 1514 of December 1960 on the ending of colonialism. At the end of the session on 16 October 1964, the Committee noted that there was ‘a disagreement, even a dispute, between the UK and Spain over the status and the situation of the territory of Gibraltar’ (Morris and Haigh 1992: 16), and it called upon the two sides to negotiate. However, Britain’s representative, Cecil King, did not accept that there was a dispute over the status of Gibraltar. He said that the British Government would not feel bound by the terms of any recommendations the Committee might make on questions of sovereignty, and that they were not prepared to discuss sovereignty over Gibraltar with Spain (idem). Meanwhile, in August 1964 the British Government had introduced constitutional changes in Gibraltar that gave the colony a greater degree of internal self-government, and elections to the new Legislative Council were held in September. The Spanish Government reaction to this and to British intransigence at the UN in October was to restrict the passage of people, traffic and goods across the border. The economic effects on the Rock were significant, and they prompted steps to be taken during the spring of 1965 to increase the colony’s self-sufficiency2 in case Spain carried out its threat – as it was to do four years later – to close the border completely.

Gibraltar incommunicado

17

Exchanges of diplomatic notes took place between November 1964 and March 1965, with Spain trying to get Britain to agree to talk without preconditions (although it then promptly proposed one itself), to which Britain’s reply was that it would not do so under duress. The British Government published a White Paper in April 1965 in which it set out its view of events since the autumn of 1963 (Gibraltar: Recent Differences with Spain 1965). In reply, Spain published a 550-page Red Book in December of the same year setting out the Spanish case (Documentos sobre Gibraltar 1965). Four sessions of fractious bilateral talks were held in London between May and October 1966, but without achieving any rapprochement of the views held by the two sides. On the eve of the fourth session in October, the communications issue grew worse when Spain closed the customs post at La Línea to all vehicles entering and leaving Gibraltar, and later that month closed the border except for pedestrians. As a consequence, Britain proposed that the legal issues in dispute between the two governments should be taken to the International Court of Justice at The Hague.3 From 12 November Gibraltarian passports were no longer recognized at La Línea, which effectively banned Gibraltarians from entering Spain. Following a ban on British military aircraft flying over Spanish territory from 4 August 1966, a further exchange of diplomatic notes occurred in relation to alleged violations of the ban and to the question of sovereignty over the isthmus. At the UN in December 1966, Resolution 2231 called upon Britain and Spain to continue their negotiations and Britain was called upon to expedite the decolonization of Gibraltar. Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, Sir Joshua Hassan, told the Assembly’s Trusteeship Committee that Gibraltarians already enjoyed a considerable degree of self-government, and that they had no wish to become part of Spain or to come in any way under Spanish sovereignty (Morris and Haigh 1992: 28, 158 n11). In March 1967, in compliance with the UN Resolution, Britain proposed that talks should start on 18 April. However, these were called off by Britain when, on 12 April, Spain, claiming persistent violations of its airspace, introduced a ban on all flights by foreign aircraft in an area contiguous to Gibraltar. When Britain called for negotiations on the ban, Spain responded by calling for talks on the decolonization question. Although talks did resume on 5 June, they broke down three days later when Britain, having failed to persuade Spain to discuss the particular technical issue of aerial restrictions, took the dispute to the International Civil Aviation Authority, but they were unable to resolve a problem which was essentially a political one. This was quickly followed by an announcement on 14 June in the House of Commons that a referendum would be held in September inviting Gibraltarians to choose between continued association with Britain, or Spanish sovereignty (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 14 June 1967, Cols 564–6).

18

Gibraltar incommunicado

Not surprisingly, this drew strong objections from Spain, which argued that the referendum violated UN General Assembly Resolutions by being held without consultation with Spain, and also that it contravened the Treaty of Utrecht. The UN Committee of 24 passed a resolution on 1 September in support of Spain’s objections (although it is difficult to see on what legal grounds, since the Treaty is only concerned with matters of sovereignty and not with internal administration) and called upon Britain and Spain to negotiate directly. Britain and Gibraltar denounced the UN Committee’s Resolution as a wholly partisan document, and went ahead with the referendum on 10 September. The result was about as decisive as it could be without being unanimous: 12,138 Gibraltarians voted in favour of continuing association with Britain and 44 voted for Spanish sovereignty out of 12,762 registered voters. Before the result was announced, Spain had already requested the resumption of talks on 6 September. However, when Britain agreed and proposed that they be held towards the end of November, Spain replied that Britain would first have to invalidate the referendum, which it refused to do. A dispute over the violation of Spanish territorial waters in the Bay of Algeciras blew up in early December. A second Red Book was published by the Spanish Government on 11 December 1967, in which the negotiations since May 1966 were analysed (Negociaciones sobre Gibraltar 1967). On 16 December the UN General Assembly’s Trusteeship Committee passed a resolution, endorsed on 19 December by the General Assembly, which regretted the interruption of talks on Gibraltar, described the referendum as a contravention of the 1966 Assembly Resolution and of the one passed by the Committee of 24 on 1 September 1967, and called upon Spain and Britain to resume talks with a view to ending the colonial situation in Gibraltar. The British permanent representative, Lord Caradon, described the resolution as ‘unworthy of the UN and a disgrace to the [Trusteeship] Committee’, while Gibraltar’s Chief Minister complained that ‘abuse of fact, distortion, and deliberate lies have won the day’ (Morris and Haigh 1992: 37). In January and February 1968, Spain again called for talks on the return of Gibraltar to Spanish sovereignty. On 15 March, a group of six Gibraltarian lawyers and businessmen calling themselves the ‘Doves’ published a letter calling for a negotiated settlement with Spain. Following a further letter on 4 April, rioting and violent attacks on their property took place. Talks were resumed in Madrid on 18 March 1968, but two days later broke down because Spain insisted that they be based exclusively on the UN Resolution. On 5 May, as a result of what Spain described as ‘Britain’s refusal to comply with the UN Resolution’ (Morris and Haigh 1992: 41), Spain closed the land frontier to all traffic (including pedestrians) except for permanent residents and those Spaniards with permits to work on the Rock. On 7 May an emergency debate was held in the House of

Gibraltar incommunicado

19

Commons, during which the UN Resolution was described as ‘contemptible’ and ‘disgraceful’. The Commonwealth Secretary, George Thomson, spoke of the possibility that Spain might in future prevent its nationals from continuing to work in Gibraltar (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 7 May 1968, Cols 245, 267, 271, 276–7). British reaction to Spain’s attitude hardened. Thomson visited Gibraltar later that month, and agreed that constitutional talks between Britain and the colony would take place in Gibraltar in July. These were agreed on 24 July in a joint communiqué that covered Gibraltar’s links with Britain and its internal constitution. As part of the former, it was agreed that the Preamble to the Order in Council promulgating the new Constitution would include a declaration to the effect that ‘Gibraltar would remain part of Her Majesty’s Dominions unless and until an Act of Parliament provides otherwise’ (Morris and Haigh 1992: 46). More significantly, the Preamble also included the commitment from the British Government that it will ‘never enter into arrangements under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty of another State against their freely and democratically expressed wishes’ (idem). Ever since then this commitment has given the Gibraltarians a virtual power of veto as far as the transfer of sovereignty is concerned, and has given the British Government a let-out clause over the aspect of the issue in which Spain is interested above all others. Because of the opportunity it provides for the status quo to be maintained, it has proved to be the single most significant statement made on the sovereignty of Gibraltar since the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht itself. Spain condemned the Anglo-Gibraltarian talks in a statement issued on 24 July 1968 that was sent to the UN Secretary General. It argued that the measures constituted a gratuitously unfriendly act towards Spain, a defiance of the United Nations, and a further obstacle to the solution to Gibraltar’s future (Morris and Haigh 1992: 44). Britain’s delegation to the UN responded by pointing out that UN Resolutions were recommendations, not binding decisions, and that when a Resolution conflicted with the UN Charter4 the obligation under the Charter had to take precedence. Britain’s response went on that it looked forward to a time when Spain realized that its crude pressure was misguided and when it understood the need for patient endeavour to eradicate the distrust and hostility that its policy had created (idem). Such a time was, at this juncture, a long way off. Gibraltar was back on the UN agenda in December 1968, when the most strongly worded resolution thus far proposed was adopted. It declared the colonial situation in Gibraltar to be incompatible with the UN Charter and with previous Assembly Resolutions, called upon Britain to terminate the colonial situation in Gibraltar by 1 October 1969, and called upon the British and Spanish Governments to begin negotiations without delay. Caradon, for the British Government, told the Assembly

20

Gibraltar incommunicado

that the Resolution will not and cannot be put into effect (The Times, 19 December 1968). Gibraltar’s new constitution was published on 30 May 1969 as an Order in Council and came into immediate effect, with elections scheduled for 30 July.5 It established a House of Assembly, consisting of a Speaker appointed by the Governor, 15 elected members (of whom no more than eight may come from the winning party) and two ex-officio members (the Attorney-General and the Financial and Development Secretary). The Governor, who is also the Commander-in-Chief, exercises executive authority. He is normally required to act in accordance with the advice of the Gibraltar Council, consisting of four ex-officio members (the Deputy Governor, the Deputy Fortress Commander, the Attorney-General and the Financial and Development Secretary), together with five elected members of the House of Assembly appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Chief Minister. There is a Council of Ministers presided over by the Chief Minister. Britain is responsible for external affairs, defence and internal security; other areas of responsibility are devolved to elected Ministers. The Spanish Government described the promulgation of the constitution as an open disregard by Britain of UN Resolutions and as a violation of Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht. It was at a meeting of the Spanish Cabinet on 6 June that the decision was taken to carry out the threat made over four years earlier to cut Gibraltar off from the mainland (The Times, 7 June 1969). Two days later, Gibraltar’s 16-year period of physical and psychological isolation from Spain began. The deadline of 1 October, contained in the UN Resolution of December 1968, had no sooner passed than Spain increased Gibraltar’s isolation by severing telephone links. An FCO spokesman described the act as ‘malicious’ and ‘small-minded’ (Morris and Haigh 1992: 51). But surprisingly a change in the tone of Spanish policy soon occurred with the replacement of Castiella as Foreign Minister by Gregorio López Bravo on 30 October. Spanish propaganda broadcasting to Gibraltar was stopped, and Spain decided in November not to raise the question of Gibraltar at the current session of the UN General Assembly. Telephone links were restored over Christmas for 36 hours. The most immediate effect in Gibraltar of the frontier closure was the need to find replacements for the 4,800 Spanish workers – about onethird of the labour force – who hitherto had crossed daily to work on the Rock. Replacements were largely achieved through a combination of troops, government employees taking on extra part-time jobs, and the hiring of housewives and Moroccans. Britain’s commitment to assist Gibraltar’s economy following the severance of communications was now turned into hard currency, when a visit to London in early December 1969 by the new Chief Minister, Robert Peliza, produced a commitment of £4 million ($7.2 million)6 over three years for development aid.

Gibraltar incommunicado

21

During the first half of 1970 there were rumours that behind-the-scenes negotiations were taking place, but until restrictions were lifted by Spain Britain made it clear that serious talks could not get under way. There was a change of British Government in June, and the new Conservative Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, had a brief meeting with his Spanish counterpart, López Bravo, in Luxembourg on 30 June. Little happened for nearly a year, until informal talks took place in Madrid on 3 June 1971 at the level of Permanent Under-Secretary of State on the British side with the Spanish Foreign Minister and senior officials on the other, but it was reported that ‘there was no progress on the touchy issue of Gibraltar’ (The Times, 4 June 1971). Douglas-Home went to Gibraltar for talks on 24 September, and in October López Bravo spoke of his feeling that a climate for dialogue now existed. Talks did in fact take place at Foreign Minister level in Madrid in February 1972, but no progress was made. The Spanish Foreign Minister held further discussions on Gibraltar during an official visit to London in July, and contact was renewed in November between Douglas-Home and his Spanish counterpart. Their views were sufficiently far apart for the joint communiqué to state that they had not yet reached the stage at which formal negotiations might begin (The Times, 29 November 1972). Britain formally entered the European Community on 1 January 1973. Gibraltar was accorded special status under Article 227(4) of the Treaty of Rome, through which it became a member but did not contribute VAT, nor participate in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or the Common External Tariff. By the same token, the colony had no official representation in any of the Community institutions in its own right, including the European Parliament. Britain’s Accession Treaty with the EC made it clear that this status could be safeguarded because Britain would have the right of veto over any proposal to change it. The next round of talks between the two Foreign Ministers took place in May 1973, when Spain tabled some new proposals,7 predicated upon the transfer of sovereignty, which Britain was unable to accept. The situation looked bleak at this point, with no communiqué issued and no date set for a further meeting. López Bravo, who had seven fruitless meetings with the British Foreign Secretary, was replaced as Foreign Minister by Laureano López Rodó, who informed the UN Secretary General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, on 18 July, that discussions had been suspended because of ‘the obstinate attitude of the British Government’, which in four-and-ahalf years has ‘not made the slightest effort to comply’ with UN Resolutions (The Times, 2 August 1973). On 6 August communications by small craft from Gibraltar to Algeciras, which had been permitted since November 1970, were halted. On 26 November Spain renewed its call to the UN Trusteeship Committee for a British withdrawal from Gibraltar (The Times, 27 November 1973), and the consensus recommended by this Committee was adopted by the General Assembly. It appeared that after four years of

22

Gibraltar incommunicado

a softer line from López Bravo, which had been unproductive from a Spanish point of view, a harder line was once more being taken under his successor. Britain, under the new Labour Government, responded to the UN consensus by proposing exploratory and non-committal talks in Madrid that took place at the end of May 1974. One issue that Britain raised was safe access to Gibraltar airport, but Spain refused to discuss it separately from the decolonization question. No decisions were taken, and no date was set for a subsequent meeting. At the UN General Assembly on 3 October, Spain’s Foreign Minister, Pedro Cortina Mauri, accused Britain of being ‘obstinate, rigid and selfish’ in refusing to negotiate (The Times, 4 October 1974).8 In September 1975, Roy Hattersley, Minister of State at the FCO, paid an official visit to Gibraltar and confirmed the British Government’s position but also made it clear that he ruled out any prospect of future integration with Britain. Financial commitments by the British Government to Gibraltar were by this stage taking on an air of permanence. In November 1974 capital aid of over £7.6 million ($13.7 million) was agreed for the period 1975–1978, following talks in London with Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, who called for a shift of emphasis in Gibraltar’s aid programme from short-term temporary measures towards investment designed to increase Gibraltar’s selfsufficiency. The possibility of progress being made on the Gibraltar question was improved by the end of the Franco regime on 20 November 1975 and the replacement of dictatorship by a constitutional monarchy, the introduction of democratic reforms and the potential integration of Spain into the European Community. It was clear that there would be no sudden and dramatic progress, however, when King Juan Carlos emphasized in his accession speech that Spain would continue to attempt to reclaim sovereignty over Gibraltar (Morris and Haigh 1992: 69). However, the first sign of the end of Gibraltar’s isolation occurred in December when telephone links between Spain and the Rock were restored between Christmas and the New Year, and again over Easter in April 1976. Early in 1976 an inter-party Constitution Committee in Gibraltar proposed constitutional changes involving greater integration with Britain, and in June a delegation visited London to discuss them. In a Memorandum, the British Government declared that ‘it is impossible to consider decolonization in the form of integration with Britain or independence’ (Memorandum by Her Majesty’s Government on the Report of the Constitution Committee 1976).9 The proposed reforms were rejected because they wanted to avoid taking measures that might hamper ‘the development of a more favourable Spanish attitude’ (idem). The idea of a permanent economic link with Britain was also rejected because it would ‘decrease the options which might eventually be open to the Gibraltarians’ (idem). Sir Joshua Hassan (who was shortly to be re-elected as Chief Minister)10 wrote

Gibraltar incommunicado

23

a letter to the Sunday Times (19 September 1976), in which he envisaged a time when a solution to the Gibraltar question might be achieved: Should a more humane and modern European policy be adopted in the future [by Spain], one can see possibilities of an honourable longterm solution, in a European context, which would safeguard our political freedoms, the continuation of our links with Britain and our way of life as a minute but identifiable community. Following the first post-Franco general elections in Spain on 15 June 1977, the Spanish Government’s main preoccupation was the introduction of a new constitution.11 However, it did not waste any time in reiterating at the first cabinet meeting on 12 July its claim to Gibraltar as part of Spanish territory, and in the first foreign affairs debate of the new Parliament held on 20 September all parties agreed on ‘the decolonization of Gibraltar’ (El País, 21 September 1977). On 5 September, Dr David Owen became the first British Foreign Secretary to visit Spain since Douglas-Home went there in 1971. He called for the lifting of the restrictions on communications before negotiations could begin, although he expressed Britain’s support for Spain’s application to the EC (which had been formally submitted in July) and also to NATO (which it was considering) (The Times, 8 September 1977). Henceforth, the issue of Gibraltar became closely intertwined with those of Spain’s membership of the EC and NATO. The Spanish Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez, visited London on 19 October and discussed the Gibraltar issue with his British counterpart, James Callaghan, and with the Foreign Secretary. Suárez believed that ‘the new democracy in Spain would enable a negotiated solution to be reached on Gibraltar’ (The Times, 20 October 1977), but he refused to lift the restrictions as he argued that this would have represented a partial solution to the problem rather than a global one (idem). In November 1977, following discussions in London with Gibraltarian representatives, the British Government agreed that exploratory talks to break the deadlock should be held between the British and Spanish Governments, including – for the first time – Gibraltarian representation. Accordingly, David Owen, Hassan and Maurice Xiberras (an independent deputy and former leader of the Integration with Britain Party) met Marcelino Oreja, the Spanish Foreign Minister, in Strasbourg on 24 November on the occasion of Spain’s entry into the Council of Europe. The meeting was reconvened in Paris on 15 March 1978, when it was agreed to set up Anglo-Spanish working groups on telephone and maritime communications, and also on pensions for former Spanish workers in Gibraltar. The groups met in London in July and in Madrid in December 1978. When the British general election brought the Conservatives back into

24

Gibraltar incommunicado

government in May 1979, Lord Carrington, the new Foreign Secretary, quickly confirmed that there would be no change in British policy towards Gibraltar, but indicated a desire to resolve the problem of restrictions on Spanish airspace for aircraft using Gibraltar airport (Daily Telegraph, 27 June 1979). There was no sign of any shift on the question of the reopening of the border, and developments on this front would not emerge for a further nine months. So in spite of the transition to democracy, there had been a remarkably consistent (even persistent) attitude by Spain towards Gibraltar throughout this period. All Spanish Governments had clung with tenacity to a position in which the nation’s desire to reclaim the sovereignty of Gibraltar was unquestioned and unquestionable: the remarks of King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suárez on Gibraltar could have been made by General Franco or any of his Ministers. For Spain, democracy had changed nothing as far as the issue of Gibraltar was concerned. But for Britain it was clearly going to be easier to discuss the Gibraltar issue with a democratic Spain, especially one with which Britain would be tied through joint membership of a supranational organization. Not only would it be easier, but also essential: Spain would have to put an end to the blockade, as there would have to be free movement of people and goods across borders, and Britain would have to seek a way of satisfying the territorial claims of another Community state. The problem would be to convince the Gibraltarians themselves that change was either desirable or necessary. After over a decade of isolation, and several more years of it to come, that would be an uphill task.

4

The Lisbon Agreement (July 1979–April 1980)

Sir Ian Gilmour, Minister of State at the FCO, visited Gibraltar on 17 and 18 July 1979 in order to convey the new Conservative Government’s position directly to the Gibraltarians. He said that the Government considered the Spanish restrictions to be unjustifiable, that it was inconceivable that the frontier should remain closed in an enlarged European Community, and described the restrictions as an act of hostility (El País, 19 July 1979). Thus far the British Government had maintained that Britain would fully support Spain’s application for membership of the European Community, and that the Gibraltar dispute was irrelevant to Britain’s attitude. However, when a member of the British Government linked the two, as Gilmour did, suspicions arose in the minds of Spaniards as to whether there might not be some connection being made between the two issues, especially as the EC negotiations frequently ran into opposition from Britain on the question of fishing. Nevertheless, Spain’s negotiations to join the EC continued, while those on Gibraltar did not. Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, met his Spanish counterpart, Marcelino Oreja, in New York on 24 September during the General Assembly of the UN, but nothing of substance emerged. Pressure on the Spanish Government to shift the log-jam on negotiations came from a new quarter in October 1979. A 24-hour general strike was called in La Línea for 9 October to protest against the Government’s failure to compensate the Campo region for the economic hardship it had suffered over the past ten years due to the closure of the frontier. Unemployment in La Línea currently affected some 4,000 workers, representing between 20 and 25 per cent of the active workforce. The PSOE, the main opposition party, called upon the Government to respond. Pressure from the British and the Gibraltarians to reopen the border was one thing; calls from disgruntled Spanish workers – and voters – was quite another. However, little had changed by the time that the Spanish Foreign Minister appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 6 December and took the opportunity to set out Spain’s current position on the Gibraltar issue. Spain was prepared to concede a considerable degree of autonomy, dual nationality and customs privileges in exchange

26

The Lisbon Agreement

for joint control (rather than NATO control) of the military base and a definite time-scale for the transfer of sovereignty. He defended the current restrictions by referring to Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht that prohibits communication by land between Gibraltar and Spain, arguing that Gibraltarians were free to enter Spain by any other route (El País, 7 December 1979). Technically he was correct, and the stipulations in the Treaty have often been used over the years by one side or the other to justify a course of action or inaction; in practical terms his statement was not at all helpful, least of all in improving the diplomatic climate. The heart of the matter was clearly whether Britain would be willing to agree to negotiate explicitly on sovereignty – this appeared to be the only concession Britain could make which would achieve the end of the blockade of Gibraltar by Spain. One ray of hope on the Spanish side that this might be possible was the fact that Peter Carrington was now Foreign Secretary. Having demonstrated his ability to persuade the British Government to make important concessions in the case of Rhodesia, it was felt in Spain that he might be able at least to persuade his Government to discuss the Gibraltar sovereignty issue. However, no immediate moves were forthcoming. The general election held in Gibraltar on 6 February 1980 saw Sir Joshua Hassan’s AACR party returned to power, with eight of the 15 seats. The Integration With Britain Party (now reformed as the Democratic Party of British Gibraltar) won six seats, with Joe Bossano as the sole GSLP representative. The Spanish daily El País reported the results and noted that negotiations on Gibraltar were unlikely in the near future, since the FCO would argue that the international situation prevented Gibraltar from being one of its priorities, commenting that ‘there is always an Afghanistan somewhere in the world’ (El País, 8 February 1980).1 The fact was, the paper said, that the situation in Afghanistan had once again underlined the strategic importance of Gibraltar whenever there was a confrontation between East and West. When Britain decided to send three frigates and an amphibious assault ship to the Eastern Mediterranean in January to reinforce the US Sixth Fleet, the ships came from Gibraltar (idem).2 Carrington and his counterpart Oreja were due to meet in Lisbon on 10 April 1980 at a Council of Europe meeting. It was hoped that they might take the opportunity to have informal talks about Gibraltar with a view to establishing a framework for negotiations. The Spanish Parliament tried to give its representative a strong hand at the meeting by unanimously supporting a PSOE resolution on Gibraltar on 27 March. The resolution reaffirmed the will of the Spanish people to reintegrate Gibraltar into Spain; urged the Spanish Government to invite the British Government once more to start negotiations, in accordance with UN Resolutions; invited the Government to re-establish land communications step-by-step as negotiations permit; and called for cultural, economic, scientific and other exchanges between Gibraltar and the Campo region and the imple-

The Lisbon Agreement

27

mentation of a plan to revive the Campo economy. The PSOE representative, Luis Yañez, who presented the resolution, concluded his long speech with the words of the President of the Second Spanish Republic in Exile, Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, who said: ‘There cannot be a Spaniard worthy of the name, who can write, without blushing, that Gibraltar is not part of Spain. And if there is anyone who can write that without blushing, I take the liberty of blushing for him, as a liberal Spaniard in exile’ (El País, 28 March 1980). Here at last was an opening – a proposal from the entire, democraticallyelected representative body of the Spanish people – that the Spanish Government could use in order to justify the re-establishment of communications with Gibraltar, a measure that would allow the British Government – leaving on one side the predictable call for the reintegration of Gibraltar into Spain – to agree to start negotiations. As the leader-writer in El País on 28 March pointed out, while Spain would have to be prepared for Britain to use the protection of the Gibraltarians’ interests as their main negotiating weapon, Spain could argue that ‘since the restoration of democratic freedoms in Spain there are no civil rights that the Gibraltarians can lose through reintegration into Spain’. Their rights, he argued, would be as well – if not better – protected under Spain’s autonomy statutes than they are by holding ‘mythical, obsolete and novelesque British passports’ (El País, 28 March 1980). The declaration from the Spanish Parliament was sent privately to the FCO in London as the basis for the ‘talks about talks’ in Lisbon in April. There was a great deal of secrecy about the Carrington–Oreja encounter, largely (it was suggested) at Oreja’s request, because reports to the press by the Gibraltarians following the meeting he had had in Strasbourg with David Owen in 1977 had led to friction in later talks. The two Foreign Ministers met for 45 minutes on 9 April. Although no official statement was issued, it appeared that the main achievement of this encounter was that both sides were able to make their position clear. On the British side there was determination to seek a solution, although the views of the Gibraltarian people would be decisive. The Spanish side was prepared to re-establish communication by land to coincide with the start of negotiations, while it was claimed that the new Spanish Constitution offered a suitable solution to the people of Gibraltar. Carrington and Oreja met again the following day, and it was at the end of their discussions that the declaration which came to be known as the Lisbon Agreement was made. The six points of the Agreement were that the British and Spanish Governments agreed to resolve the problem of Gibraltar, to start negotiations ‘in order to resolve all their differences’ and to re-establish direct communications in the region. They also agreed – in a phrase which was to create immediate difficulties – that future cooperation should be ‘on the basis of reciprocity and full equality of rights’. In addition the Spanish Government, while reaffirming its position

28

The Lisbon Agreement

regarding the re-establishment of Spain’s territorial integrity, agreed to ensure that the interests of the Gibraltarians would be safeguarded, while the British Government would maintain its commitment (as indicated in the Preamble to the 1969 Gibraltarian Constitution) to respect the freely and democratically expressed wishes of the Gibraltarians. It was agreed that by 1 June officials of both sides would prepare the way for the objectives of the agreement to be met, including an agenda and timetable (The Times, 11 April 1980).3 At the press conference at which the joint declaration was announced, both sides were clearly satisfied with the outcome of their two days of talks. The practical result was that what The Times of 12 April called the ‘major irritant’ of the 11-year Spanish blockade of Gibraltar could now finally be lifted. However, agreeing to discuss the Gibraltar problem – which was in itself a major step forward – was one thing; perceiving how to resolve it would be quite another. In reality, the Agreement represented a statement of the positions held on each side: Spain would pursue discussion of the issue of sovereignty (resolving ‘all their differences’ clearly implied this), while Britain would respect the wishes of the Gibraltarians. Since it was unlikely in the foreseeable future that the wishes of the Gibraltarians and of the Spanish Government would coincide, these two conflicting positions would inevitably ensure that the negotiations would be neither easy nor brief. Reaction in Gibraltar itself was generally – though by no means universally – favourable. Hassan suggested that the British Government had done Spain a favour by finding a way forward on the Gibraltar problem so that it no longer threatened to get in the way of Spain’s negotiations to join the EC. He also underlined the mistrust of Spaniards that had grown over the past 11 years in Gibraltar, and urged that that be taken into account when the border opened (El País, 13 April 1980). The importance of Hassan’s exhortation was underlined by the fact that on 13 April, 2,000 Gibraltarians demonstrated in protest at the opening of negotiations. The man heading the protest was Joe Bossano, leader of the GSLP, whose views were later to lead him to be elected as Chief Minister. He argued at a rally that if there were to be any negotiations about the future of the Rock, they should be held between Britain and the inhabitants of Gibraltar, without any participation by the Spanish Government (El País, 15 April 1980). There was also concern about the effect that the opening of the border might have on Gibraltar’s economy, given the lack of development of its infrastructure during its period of isolation.4 No doubt these matters were discussed when Hassan and Peter Isola of the Integration with Britain Party met Lord Carrington in London on 14 April, the same day that the Foreign Secretary reported to the House of Lords on his meeting in Lisbon. In his statement Carrington pointed out that the process of negotiation was likely to be a very long one, although

The Lisbon Agreement

29

Lord Gladwyn wondered what the negotiations would be about, given the Government’s commitment to do nothing against the wishes of the Gibraltarians. Carrington’s reply was that the negotiations would consist of anything anyone wanted to talk about, subject to the proviso regarding the Gibraltarians’ wishes (Hansard House of Lords Debates, 14 April 1980). In the Commons, Gilmour made a statement and in answer to a question agreed that there was nothing to prevent the discussion of sovereignty in the negotiations (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 14 April 1980, Col. 801). When Marcelino Oreja made a statement on the Lisbon Agreement to the Spanish Foreign Affairs Committee on 16 April, he argued that while Spain was prepared to safeguard and recognize the interests of the Gibraltarians, it would never recognize their right to dispose of ‘something which does not belong to them and has never belonged to them: the sovereignty of Gibraltar’ (El País, 17 April 1980). He too conceded that the negotiations would be long and difficult. Clearly, the starting points of the two sides in the negotiations were going to be some way apart. On the question of sovereignty, the British approach was that under the terms of the agreement it was a legitimate subject for discussion, but that the known position of the Gibraltarians made it extremely unlikely that any movement on the issue would be possible. For their part, the Spaniards saw discussions on sovereignty within the context of the UN Resolutions and a move towards decolonization. As for the Gibraltarians, it was their ‘wishes’ that would be paramount for Britain, whereas Spain was prepared only to respect their ‘interests’. However, at least the negotiating process could now get under way. In addition, Spain was in the process of conducting two other series of negotiations that had a bearing on the Gibraltar question: entry into the European Community and membership of NATO. It was the latter that took centre stage in the months following April 1980.

5

Spain’s approaches to NATO (June 1980–March 1982)

In a wide-ranging interview on the foreign policy of the UCD Government, Spain’s Foreign Minister, Marcelino Oreja, announced that it was the intention of the Government to apply to join NATO sometime in 1981. He made an explicit link with Gibraltar by indicating that the only conditions of Spain’s application were guarantees that negotiations on Spain’s membership of the EC would continue and that those on the transfer of the sovereignty of Gibraltar would be under way (El País, 15 June 1980). In fact negotiations on Gibraltar were not yet under way, although technical talks on practical matters such as setting up customs posts had started. The start of negotiations on the text of the Lisbon Agreement had been delayed because Spain wanted reciprocal treatment of Spaniards in Gibraltar and Gibraltarians in Spain (referred to in Paragraph 3 of the Agreement) to begin at the same time as communications were restored, whereas as far as reciprocity was concerned Britain (and Gibraltar) put that in the context of the words ‘future co-operation’ in the text. The timetable, starting with the deadline of 1 June for negotiations to get under way, had fallen at the first hurdle. The negotiations had still not started by the time that Sir Ian Gilmour went to Madrid on 7 January 1981 for two days of talks with the new Spanish Foreign Minister, José Pedro Pérez-Llorca, on bilateral and international matters, including Gibraltar. Neither side had shifted its position on the question of reciprocal treatment, and the problem had not been helped in December by a resolution passed in the Gibraltarian House of Assembly (and assumed in Spain to have the backing of Britain) which stated that Spanish nationals should not enjoy the same rights as nationals of other EC countries until Spain was a full member of the Community. The result of the meeting as far as the Gibraltar issue was concerned was disappointing. Spanish demands were now for equality for Spaniards going to Gibraltar in anticipation of Spain’s entry into the European Community (currently expected to be in January 1984), but Gilmour was not prepared to make any concessions. This was seen in Spain as a clear hardening of the British position, although Gilmour maintained that

Spain’s approaches to NATO

31

through reciprocal rights Spaniards could acquire almost the same advantages in Gibraltar as nationals of other EC countries. It was clear on the British side that Spain was held responsible for the delay in starting talks. Later in January 1981, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo took over as Prime Minister from Adolfo Suárez. Before he had had the chance fully to take over the reins of office there was an attempted coup led by Colonel Tejero on 23 February. Although it failed, it did not enhance Spain’s cause in winning the hearts and minds of Gibraltarians, although in other respects (perhaps surprisingly) it does not appear to have affected progress on negotiations on Gibraltar: it has never been suggested that the Gibraltar question would be harder to resolve as a consequence of the vulnerability of Spanish democracy to military intervention. In that respect it may have been an advantage that at the time talks on Gibraltar had ground to a halt; if they had been in full swing in February 1981, it is likely that the attempted coup would have represented a severe setback to their progress. As far as the Spanish Government was concerned, the attempted coup was a useful means of putting pressure on Britain to move negotiations forward, and thereby bolster the standing of the democratic regime. The first contact at Foreign Minister level since the signing of the Lisbon Agreement was arranged for 13 July 1981 in Brussels. The reason for the meeting concerned Spain’s application to join the European Community, but Carrington and Pérez-Llorca also briefly discussed Gibraltar. There was speculation before the meeting that Spain would indicate its readiness to open the border gates without insisting on simultaneous reciprocity of rights, but this proved to be unfounded. Instead there was a more pessimistic fear that unless one side or the other changed its position, the border would not open until 1984 at the earliest. Anglo-Spanish relations took a turn for the worse when the FCO announced that the Prince and Princess of Wales would fly to Gibraltar to start their honeymoon on the royal yacht Britannia on 1 August, following their wedding on 29 July. As a result of the announcement, the Spanish King and Queen chose not to attend the wedding ceremony. As the event more or less coincided with the 277th anniversary of the seizure of the Rock, several Spanish newspapers took the opportunity to attack Britain over the Gibraltar issue. Further speculation about a new proposal from the Spanish side appeared in the Sunday Times on 23 August and was repeated in El País two days later, to the effect that Spain would propose that Gibraltar should be converted into a full-scale military base under NATO command. The Spanish Government would hope that an agreement with London would take the wind out of the sails of left-wing opposition to Spain’s membership of the Atlantic Alliance, which the Government now planned to initiate in the autumn. Spain had several reasons to want to join NATO: to play a part in mainstream Western international activity; to reinforce its application to join

32

Spain’s approaches to NATO

the EC; to modernize the armed forces and give them a non-political focus; to change the nature of its relationship with the US as far as defence was concerned;1 and, last but not least, to provide a context in which an acceptable solution to the Gibraltar issue might be found. It is no doubt for this last reason that the speculation arose as to what Spain might propose in relation to the Gibraltar negotiations. The PSOE had chosen 3 September as the day to launch their antiNATO campaign, and they used the Gibraltar issue to stir up Spanish emotions by arguing that once in NATO, Spain would be obliged to defend a British colony if Gibraltar were attacked. The PSOE leader, Felipe González, called for recognition by the other members of the Atlantic Alliance of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar – an action that he knew full well was out of the question. The PSOE spokesman on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Fernando Morán, argued that if Gibraltar became a NATO base with a Spanish command it would make the transfer of sovereignty even more difficult, not easier as the Government was suggesting. The PSOE clearly saw Gibraltar as something of an Achilles heel for the Government’s stance on NATO; its desire to push through membership of NATO could not wait upon a solution to the Gibraltar issue, and would therefore leave Spain with this hypothetical dilemma of having to defend a British colony. Meanwhile, the Spanish position on Gibraltar had been given a boost on 28 August when the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee published a report on Gibraltar. This followed fact-finding visits by a five-member delegation of the Committee, led by Sir Anthony Kershaw, to both Gibraltar and Madrid in April. The Committee’s report recommended ‘on the lifting of restrictions, to give to Spaniards in Gibraltar the rights they would have as citizens of an EEC country’, because it would anticipate their change in status by only a short time. There was recognition that the present Spanish constitutional structure providing for regional autonomy within Spain could be an important element in resolving the dispute. The report also questioned British jurisdiction over the isthmus in the light of the Treaty of Utrecht, and there was the suggestion that the Gibraltarians should be reminded that, whilst accepting Britain’s obligations to them, the British Government’s primary responsibility is to the British Parliament (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 1981).2 Not surprisingly, the report was well-received in Spain (it was the main front-page news story in El País on 28 August), where it was viewed as supporting many of Spain’s own positions, particularly regarding the Lisbon Agreement. The Foreign Minister, José Pedro Pérez-Llorca, met Lord Carrington in New York on 23 September at the UN, where they discussed what by now were the standard three issues: the EC, NATO and Gibraltar. Pérez Llorca made it clear that he saw Spain’s membership of NATO as a means of making progress on the Gibraltar question. There was a clear division of

Spain’s approaches to NATO

33

opinion between the UCD Government and the PSOE opposition on whether membership of NATO would help or hinder Spain’s aspirations regarding the sovereignty of Gibraltar. The Spanish Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, was scheduled to visit Britain in December, and took the opportunity on 3 October to prepare the ground publicly by announcing that he would be looking for a number of concessions in return for agreeing to open the border gates. They included the hope that the British Government would (a) reject the amendment to the British Nationality Bill which would grant Gibraltarian passport-holders the right to apply for British citizenship;3 (b) support the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on Gibraltar published in August; and (c) as the current holder of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, propose at the heads of government summit in November that the date for Spain to join the EC should be 1 January 1984. In addition, Calvo Sotelo hoped to accelerate Spain’s membership of NATO by receiving an invitation for Spain to join when the Foreign Ministers of NATO members met in early December. This would enable the Spanish Government to demonstrate to the Spanish people the connection between the four areas of current external negotiations (Gibraltar, EC, NATO and the treaty with the US), and to win support for Spain’s entry into NATO. For three days between 6 and 8 October, the Spanish Foreign Affairs Committee discussed Spain’s entry into NATO. During the final day the Foreign Minister, Pérez-Llorca, argued that his Government was intending to go ahead with its application, despite the fact that the question of the sovereignty of Gibraltar had not been resolved. However, he threatened that if there were no progress on the Gibraltar issue Spain would leave NATO. The opposition parties opposed NATO membership without prior recognition of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar, on the grounds that, first, one of Spain’s fellow-members had a military base on ‘its’ territory, and second, in the event of an attack, Spain would have to go to Gibraltar’s defence with the Rock still under British control.4 The draft resolution approved by the Foreign Affairs Committee included the desire to see progress towards a solution to the Gibraltar problem. The plenary debate on NATO membership in the Spanish Parliament was held three weeks later, on 27 and 28 October. The arguments divided largely on left–right lines, with the UCD, Acción Democrática, and the Basque and Catalan Nationalist parties lining up in favour of Spanish entry. The main issue was whether Spain was prepared to commit itself to membership of the Western–Atlantic block, but the restoration of Gibraltar to Spanish sovereignty figured amongst the three subsidiary issues, together with the North African enclaves, and the maintenance of Spain’s non-nuclear policy. On all three of these issues the PSOE and other leftwing opposition parties demanded guarantees before entry, but the Government and its supporters rejected such a position.

34

Spain’s approaches to NATO

The Prime Minister, Calvo Sotelo, argued that a better solution to the Gibraltar issue could be achieved with Spain inside NATO, and that the decolonization process had been assisted by the British Parliament’s decision on 27 October to grant Gibraltarians the right to British citizenship, following the approval of an amendment in the House of Lords in July. The text authorizing the Spanish Parliament to proceed with negotiations included a recommendation to the Government that they pay special attention to the fact that ‘the restoration of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar is a top priority’ (El País, 30 October 1981). Such a statement only added to British suspicions regarding the Spanish Government’s motives for pushing ahead with NATO membership. As has been indicated there were several reasons why Spain wanted to join NATO, but if it hoped that its membership would enable it somehow to circumvent Britain’s adherence to the principle of respecting the wishes of the Gibraltarians as far as sovereignty was concerned, that would only serve to stiffen the British Government’s resolve. Whilst Britain wanted Spain to join NATO as a means of strengthening the Alliance’s southern flank, it was determined that that would have no effect on its attitude towards Gibraltarian sovereignty. The Gibraltarians were no doubt glad of that, but they must have wondered what kind of message the British Government was really trying to send to Spain when on 23 November it announced its intention to close Gibraltar’s Royal Navy dockyard in 1983, with the predicted direct loss of 950 jobs, a total of 2,000 jobs threatened (20 per cent of the labour force) and inevitable damage to the economy.5 In addition, the RAF airfield would operate for fewer hours. In Spain, the dockyard closure was taken as a further sign that Britain was trying to reconcile its interests and the defence of Gibraltar with the arguments about Gibraltar put by Spain. With the Parliamentary hurdle concerning NATO out of the way, Spanish entry into the Atlantic Alliance could now go ahead during 1982. Thus around the turn of the year the Gibraltar issue ceased to be linked with NATO, but reverted back to the bilateral talks and the implementation of the Lisbon Agreement. Since the autumn of 1981, work had proceeded between the two Foreign Offices to pave the way for a visit by the Spanish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to Downing Street on 8 January 1982. The visit was not exclusively concerned with Gibraltar, but this was high on the agenda. It was expected prior to the meeting that the start of negotiations would be announced, and these expectations were not disappointed, despite an inauspicious snowstorm that coincided with the Spanish Ministers’ arrival in London. A joint communiqué was issued to the effect that the date of 20 April 1982 had been set for the start of negotiations on the basis of the 1980 Lisbon Agreement, with the simultaneous opening of the border between Gibraltar and Spain. Although it was not stated in the

Spain’s approaches to NATO

35

communiqué, an official at the press conference added that formal written assurances had been given to Calvo Sotelo by means of an exchange of notes that Spanish workers would be able to stay overnight in Gibraltar and would also be given equality of labour rights (El País, 9 January 1982). The Spanish side had clearly been satisfied that the simultaneity of opening the border and reciprocity of rights would now occur, and it was this that had shifted the log-jam. However, Gibraltarians insisted that there had been no discrimination against Spaniards for some time, and also pointed out that in the unlikely event of more jobs in Gibraltar becoming available, workers from other EC-member countries would still have preference over Spaniards (idem). Reaction in Spain to the announcement was generally favourable. The leading article in El País on 9 January welcomed the outcome of the talks and took the opportunity to condemn the policy of Franco and his Foreign Minister Castiella. Amongst the political parties, the only cynical view came from Simón Sánchez Montero of the PCE, who saw the agreed date as part of the Government’s attempt to persuade Spaniards that the Gibraltar issue was tied in with Spain’s entry into NATO. In Andalusia, the head of the Autonomous Government, Rafael Escuredo, looked forward to the time when Gibraltar itself became autonomous and was incorporated into the Autonomous Community of Andalusia. He pointed out that the Autonomy Statute for Andalusia had been drafted to allow for such a step. Other leaders in the region welcomed the announcement, although they were concerned about the impression that the state of the infrastructure in the Campo de Gibraltar would give to people coming from the Rock. Juan Carmona, Mayor of La Línea, feared that Gibraltarians would scarcely want to become Spanish when they saw what La Línea was like (idem). In Gibraltar itself, Sir Joshua Hassan gave an interview to Spanish National Radio in which he said that the trouble with the Lisbon Agreement was that it tried to reconcile the irreconcilable, because as far as ‘this generation’ was concerned no more than half-a-dozen Gibraltarians were willing to accept Spanish sovereignty (idem). Nevertheless there were fears amongst the Gibraltarians that the opening of the border and the start of negotiations, together with the announcement about the shipyards, marked the start of a shift in the economy of the Rock and an eventual sell-out by the British Government. By an unfortunate coincidence, the first reductions in the shipyard workforce were due to occur on 20 April – the day that the negotiations were set to begin. On the positive side, Gibraltarians welcomed the fact that land communications would shortly be restored, leading to an increase in tourism and related trade, and that there was the possibility of a marina development. However, an influx of tourists’ cars would put pressure on Gibraltar’s roads, and in anticipation of the opening of the border over 1,000 old cars had been pushed over the cliff into the sea at Europa Point during 1981.

36

Spain’s approaches to NATO

There were also fears about the possible entry of troublemakers and an increase in crime. Whether such fears had any foundation would have to wait until after the opening of the border. The last official contact before the planned opening occurred on 23 March, when Carrington briefly met his Spanish counterpart in Brussels to discuss questions of procedure. What neither of them could know was that ten days later, thousands of miles from Gibraltar, General Galtieri of Argentina would set back progress on the Gibraltar issue for many a long month.

6

‘Different and distant’? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute (April–June 1982)

On 2 April 1982 in an act of unprovoked aggression against British sovereign territory and British people Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands. (The Falklands Campaign 1982a: 5)

The Spanish press showed an immediate fascination for and obsession with the Falklands/Malvinas crisis, reporting it in such detail that an observer from another planet might have been forgiven for thinking that the islands were a Spanish colony rather than a British one. In El País the news was on the front page for several days; it was the main international news story (on page 2 and following) every day for two months from 4 April to 5 June (when Israel invaded Lebanon), and it reappeared on the front page from 14 to 17 June at the time of the Argentine surrender and its aftermath. However, what was to distinguish Spanish coverage of the South Atlantic crisis from the way in which it was reported in the British press was the fact that in Spain throughout the months of April and May 1982 the connection was repeatedly made between Argentina’s dispute with Britain over the Falklands/Malvinas and Spain’s dispute with Britain over Gibraltar. In Britain, for the most part, the Gibraltar issue could not have been further from the minds of either politicians or newspaper editors. The references in Spain sometimes involved the drawing of parallels or distinctions between the two issues; at others the question was raised of the effect that the Falklands/Malvinas crisis would have on the progress of negotiations on the Gibraltar question. Whatever the context might be, these references served to reinforce the identification by Spain with the Argentine cause on an emotional level, even though (apart from the extreme right wing) it rejected the manner in which Argentina had attempted to settle the dispute. If the mandarins in the FCO had ever had time during the crisis to turn their attention from across the Atlantic to study reaction to it in Spain, they would not have been very pleased at this constant linkage of the two issues, except to note that even the right-wing

38

‘Different and distant’?

press such as El Alcázar was not advocating a Galtieri-style invasion of the Rock. On 4 April, the day following the extraordinary Saturday debate in the House of Commons, El País linked the two issues on two occasions. The first was in an editorial, entitled ‘The Falklands, between reason and force’, which seized the opportunity to draw distinctions and parallels between the two British colonies. Both the British Government and the Gibraltarians would have been relieved to read that ‘the use of force is to be deplored wherever there are diplomatic means to resolve conflicts’, although perhaps not so happy with the concluding remark that ‘what has happened (in the Falklands/Malvinas) may help the British . . . to appreciate that with colonial questions patience is not infinite’ (El País, 4 April 1982).1 Elsewhere in the same edition there was a substantial report on the Commons debate, and alongside it a report of an impromptu press conference given by the Spanish Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, who on the Saturday happened fortuitously to be campaigning for the Andalusian elections in Algeciras across the bay from Gibraltar, and was therefore able to have himself photographed giving the press conference with the Rock in the background. He, like the editorial, made the point that the two problems of the Malvinas and Gibraltar were ‘different and distant’ – but what they had in common, of course, was a centuries-old dispute over sovereignty. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that the headline of the article on the Commons debate (‘Thatcher reaffirms British sovereignty over the Islands’), was echoed by Calvo Sotelo, who is reported to have said that the opening of the gates between La Línea and the Rock, scheduled for 20 April, would start Spain upon the path towards the rapid recovery of the sovereignty of Gibraltar. Throughout the next two months the connection between the two issues was never going to be far from the minds of Spanish newspaper editors, and probably not entirely absent from those of Spanish politicians. Concern about the effect of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis upon the Gibraltar issue quickly centred upon whether it would interfere with the timetable for the opening of the frontier gates and the initiation of negotiations in the Portuguese town of Sintra over the future of the Rock. With the proposed date only two weeks away, a leading article in El País on 6 April wondered whether it would be wise for them to take place as planned, given that the Foreign Office team in Britain had just resigned over the Falklands/Malvinas invasion and was now headed not by Carrington (whose skills in the decolonization of Zimbabwe and Belize were recalled in an article elsewhere in the same edition) but by Francis Pym, whom they viewed as a hard-liner.2 Moreover, the article questioned whether it would be advisable at this juncture to attempt to discuss the question of the sovereignty of one of Britain’s colonies when it had just sent a task force to ‘liberate’ another.3 The judgement was that they ought

‘Different and distant’?

39

at least to wait and see what the British Navy would do once it reached its destination, and that under present circumstances the Gibraltar negotiations would probably lead to a failure which would benefit neither side. There were several other reasons why negotiations would have been difficult at this time. First, the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister had indicated that Portugal would respond favourably to a request from Britain to use the Azores as a supply base for the British fleet. Clearly Spain would find it diplomatically uncomfortable to be negotiating on Portuguese soil under those circumstances. Second, Spain had abstained in the UN Security Council vote on Resolution 502 condemning the act of Argentine aggression,4 a position that would almost certainly cloud Anglo-Spanish negotiations. Third, Spain found itself between a rock and a hard place on the question of the Falklands/Malvinas issue; as it explained to the Council of Europe on 7 April, while it opposed the use of force as a means of resolving international disputes, it supported the UN principle of decolonization and yet it found itself in conflict with the UK, a member of NATO (which it was about to join) and of the European Community (membership of which it was in the process of pursuing).5 Finally, the British Navy would be using as a supply base for its Falklands/Malvinas venture the very territory in dispute between Spain and Britain. Speculation regarding a possible postponement did not have to go on for very long. Indeed, it was only delayed at all by the British insistence upon agreeing a definite new date and place for the talks. On 8 April, a joint communiqué was issued simultaneously in Madrid and London to the effect that the talks and the opening of the frontier would be postponed until 25 June.6 No reason was given, but clearly none was necessary. Not only was the climate not right, but (as an editorial in El País put it on 9 April) Francis Pym’s mind would also inevitably be on other things. The two Governments were anxious for it to be known that they had both agreed to the postponement,7 that it was being accepted in a spirit of understanding, and that they were both standing by their commitment in the Lisbon Agreement to ‘solve all their differences over Gibraltar’. There was disappointment on both sides of the border at the postponement, and not a little embarrassment in La Línea, where the Council would have to change its plans to call the road running to Gibraltar ‘Avenida del 20 de Abril’. The Mayor of La Línea, Juan Carmona, accepted the logic of the decision, but lamented the fact that many businesses in the town, which had suffered at the time Franco closed the border and had received little government assistance by way of compensation, had been borrowing money in anticipation of improved trade when the border reopened and were now going to be financially overstretched. The Chairman of the local branch of the Association for Small and Medium Businesses, Jaime Martínez, estimated that the figure was between 1,000 million and 1,500 million pesetas ($7.1 million and $10.7 million). By contrast, the Gibraltarians had not made significant

40

‘Different and distant’?

investments in advance of the opening of the border, since they had learned their lesson in 1980 when there had been similar expectations that had come to nothing. Members of divided families, who had had to travel via Tangier to see each other, had also been looking forward to 20 April. More generally, the inhabitants of the Campo de Gibraltar would have to wait two more months before they could enjoy the benefits agreed by Calvo Sotelo and Margaret Thatcher in London in January – namely, the right to stay on the Rock overnight, and the same labour, union and welfare rights as Gibraltarians themselves. Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, Sir Joshua Hassan, was piqued, perhaps as much by the fact that he was not consulted about the postponement as about the postponement itself. He did not feel that a delay of two months was justified. However, the general consensus amongst Spanish politicians was that a combination of the occupation of the Falklands/Malvinas, the resignation of Carrington and the sensitivity of British public opinion regarding colonies meant that it was wise to delay the talks. The postponement also served to remind the foreign affairs spokesman of the Alianza Popular Party that the two problems of the Falklands/Malvinas and Gibraltar were not as ‘different or distant’ as the Spanish Prime Minister had tried to suggest. ‘Both’, he said, ‘are problems of decolonization’ (El País, 9 April 1982). The House of Commons held a second debate on the Falklands/ Malvinas crisis on 7 April, and an emergency debate (for which members had to be recalled during the Easter recess) on 14 April. It was during the latter that reference was made on several occasions to the Gibraltar issue, notably by John Stokes, who reminded the House that their response to Argentina would be noted in Gibraltar, and by Alexander Lyon, who, while recognizing that his was a minority view, suggested that the inhabitants of Britain’s remaining colonies could not assume that they could remain British indefinitely just because they said they wanted to (The Falklands Campaign 1982b: 90–1).8 In Madrid, the right-wing parties took to the streets on 19 April to demonstrate in favour of Argentina’s action in the Falklands/Malvinas, to call for the return of Gibraltar to Spain, and (for good measure) to denounce Spanish democracy and the monarchy. Some 5,000 demonstrators (or 15,000 according to the organizers) shouted slogans such as ‘Por un Borbón perdimos el Peñón’ (‘Thanks to a Bourbon we lost the Rock’),9 ‘Gobierno gallina, aprende de Argentina’ (‘The Government is chicken, they should learn from Argentina’), ‘Tejero aguanta, España se levanta’ (‘With people like Tejero, Spain stands tall’)10 and ‘Tejero sal y toma Gibraltar’ (‘Tejero, come and take Gibraltar’). A Spanish flag, signed by ‘Soldiers’ Wives’, was used as a banner and inscribed with slogans saying ‘Long live the Argentine Army’, ‘The Malvinas belong to Argentina’ and ‘Gibraltar belongs to Spain’. Former Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez came under

‘Different and distant’?

41

verbal fire as the demonstrators congregated outside his office to sing the Falange hymn Face to the Sun, recalling the days of Franco. While the Spanish flag and those of Fuerza Nueva and the Falange were fluttering in the breeze, two Union Jacks were ceremoniously set alight (El País, 20 April 1982). On 1 May, El País reported that at the meeting of the Council of Europe the Spanish representative, Gabriel Mañueco (deputizing for the Foreign Minister Pérez-Llorca so that the latter would not have to have any awkward contact with British representatives), had been the only one to abstain on the Council’s resolution supporting Britain’s position. Such ambivalence can scarcely have impressed the British Government. Historical ties and colonial parallels are all very well, but (they would have argued) unprovoked aggression by a ruthless military dictatorship should be condemned outright and any other sentiments should be put to one side. Even if the Falklands/Malvinas dispute were settled quickly – whether through diplomacy or by armed conflict – Spain’s attitude could not have enhanced its negotiating position when talks on Gibraltar resumed. However, there were signs that Spain was after all going to try to use its good offices to mediate in the dispute. It was reported on 4 May that the Spanish Foreign Minister, José Pedro Pérez-Llorca, had gone to New York one day earlier than had been expected in order to express to the UN Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Spain’s concern at the escalation of the conflict and possibly to offer Spain’s services. However, the reporter doubted whether London would consider Spain to be an appropriate mediator, especially as the Spanish Government had on 1 May officially expressed ‘grave concern’ at the bombing of Port Stanley by Britain and had warned Britain of the ‘serious historical error’ that it might be committing – comments which had been well received in Buenos Aires (El País, 4 May 1982). In the same issue, El País linked Spain’s position with regard to the Falklands/Malvinas crisis and its relations with the EC and NATO. The paper’s correspondent in Brussels (where the presidency of the European Community resided at that time) reported that the Belgian Foreign Minister, Leo Tindemans, had stated that as Spain was not yet a member of either the EC or NATO, its support for Buenos Aires had not caused any difficulty for those two organizations (although one conservative Belgian newspaper suggested that Spain had alienated British support for its application to the EC, and that Spain’s Latin American interests were incompatible with its European vocation). Spain was, however, clearly concerned to make sure that its prospective colleagues would understand its position, as it had been keeping the EC, NATO and Britain directly informed. There was a further delicate problem in relation to Spain and NATO, namely the question of the nationality of the commander of the NATO base in Gibraltar. Fortunately it seemed unlikely that the subject would

42

‘Different and distant’?

come up for discussion within NATO for several months, time enough for London to have ‘forgotten’ about Spain’s position during the Falklands/Malvinas crisis. However, if the issue of the Falklands/Malvinas had not been fully settled by the time that the subject was raised, it was suggested that Britain would be unlikely to accept a Spanish commander in Gibraltar since Britain clearly needed the base for naval protection of the South Atlantic. The connection between Spain’s membership of NATO and negotiations over Gibraltar was made once more by one of Spain’s smaller parties, Acción Democrática, who proposed to the Spanish Parliament on 4 May that Spain’s entry into NATO should not proceed until negotiations with Britain over the future of Gibraltar had been restarted. The party’s leader, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez (later to become Foreign Minister when the PSOE came to power), criticized the Government both for not offering to mediate sooner and for their timid support for Latin America (El País, 5 May 1982). The double criticism was a reflection of Spain’s dilemma: an offer to mediate implied a neutrality which would not go down well in Buenos Aires, whereas strong support for Argentina would offend Britain and rule Spain out as a mediator – hence the Government’s delay in doing either. Acción Democrática also considered that Britain’s use of Gibraltar in its South Atlantic campaign was an affront to Spain’s dignity, and called on the Spanish Government to protest. Spain’s offer to mediate in the Falklands/Malvinas dispute was taken a stage further on 5 May, when King Juan Carlos proposed his good offices. Whereas the Spanish Government’s offer was fraught with difficulties, the King’s personal intervention could be seen as far less contentious. Not only was the King recognized as being the key figure in Spain’s transition to democracy, but he also had the advantage of family ties with the British royal family11 and a constitutional role that enabled him to rise above political issues. However, little attention appears to have been paid to the King’s offer (El País, 7 May 1982). By this time Galtieri’s forces had been occupying the Falklands/ Malvinas for over a month. The longer the Argentinian troops remained, the more the Spanish right was encouraged to think that Spain could attempt a similar show of force and occupy Gibraltar. In an article in El País on 7 May entitled ‘How do you say Malvinas in Moroccan?’, a socialist member of the Spanish Parliament, Luis Solana, reminded those who were advocating such a move that aside from the fact that Britain would respond, the use of force by Spain could well prompt Morocco to attempt an invasion of Ceuta and Melilla. He pointed out that since thousands of Spanish troops were stationed in these North African enclaves, such an invasion would undoubtedly be bloody. The threat of military action over Gibraltar at this juncture was never a serious one, but the attempted military coup in Spain of little more than a year earlier meant that it had clearly crossed some people’s minds.

‘Different and distant’?

43

Criticism of the Government by Spanish opposition parties for the opportunities it had missed and the foreign policy it was pursuing began to grow. On 8 May, the leader of the PSOE, Felipe González, wondered why Pérez-Llorca had gone to the United States, arguing that Spain should have made use of its dual position as a Western European country and also one with links with Latin America, whilst making it clear that it adhered to the international principle of a rejection of the use of force. Fernando Morán (at the time a Socialist Senator and, like Fernández Ordóñez, later to become Foreign Minister) saw that the Falklands/ Malvinas crisis impinged upon four aspects of Spanish foreign policy: Gibraltar, NATO, the EC, and the harmonization of its relationship with Europe and with Latin America. On the Gibraltar issue, Morán claimed that the use of the Rock as a supply base for a military operation ‘underscored the unacceptability of a part of our territory remaining in foreign hands’ (El País, 9 May 1982). However, his criticism was that in its haste to make Spain acceptable to Europe and to its NATO allies, the Spanish Government ‘had been shedding its clothes like an impatient bride on the staircase’ and so shaping the country’s foreign policy exclusively in accordance with these present and future alliances (idem). The Spanish Government’s view was put by Javier Rupérez, at that time a UCD spokesman for foreign relations. He argued that ‘democratic Spain had clearly given a priority to Europe and to the West’ in its approach to foreign affairs, but that ‘this does not exclude – on the contrary – an imaginative and pragmatic relationship with Latin America’. Spain was now a participant in the system that defended Western values, he said, and it was through that system that Gibraltar would finally be recovered (El País, 12 May 1982). A connection between the conflict over the Falklands/Malvinas and Spain’s own conflict over Gibraltar was clearly unavoidable when Spain’s reaction to the situation in the South Atlantic was under discussion by politicians of every persuasion, but it was underlined by the fact that Gibraltar itself was implicated in the Falklands/Malvinas War through the use of the Rock as a base for British supply lines. This became a central point in the Spanish Foreign Affairs Committee debate that took place on 11 and 12 May. On the first day of the debate, Foreign Minister Pérez-Llorca defended the Government’s position on the Falklands/Malvinas as coherent and uncompromising, insisting that the problem was, like Gibraltar, basically a colonial one. For that reason Spain had been unable to support UN Resolution 502, which simply called for the withdrawal of Argentine troops, or the EC’s economic boycott of Argentina, or the Council of Europe’s condemnation. Amongst the opposition speakers, Ramón Tamames (formerly of the PCE and now sitting in the Grupo Mixto) recalled that Calvo Sotelo’s distinction between the Falklands/Malvinas and Gibraltar as ‘different and distant’ was invalid, while Francisco Fernández Ordóñez,

44

‘Different and distant’?

leader of Acción Democrática, pointed out that there were connections between the two issues, such as the postponement of negotiations over Gibraltar as a result of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis and the use of Gibraltar as a base. The PNV member Antoni Monforte was the only one to call the Argentines ‘aggressors’, but got no reply when he asked the Foreign Minister what Spain’s attitude would be if a similar aggression were committed against Ceuta and Melilla. The Coalición Democrática representative and former Minister of Culture, Ricardo de la Cierva, asked whether any protest had been lodged against the use of Gibraltar by the United Kingdom. Pérez-Llorca’s reply was that there had been some Spanish reaction, which had not yet received an official reply, but that since that reaction British use of Gibraltar had been reduced and was more careful (El País, 12 May 1982). When the debate was renewed on the second day, the Communist leader Santiago Carrillo criticized the Government for adopting the ‘Atlantic option’ because it went against the nation’s interests in Latin America and the Third World and had resulted in the King’s offer to mediate failing to gain support. Carrillo was concerned that if Morocco were to attempt to take Ceuta and Melilla by force, NATO would not support Spain, and he therefore supported Fernández Ordóñez’s call (as did Manuel Marín for the PSOE) for the suspension of the NATO negotiations until Spain received guarantees concerning Gibraltar and the North African enclaves. In his response Pérez-Llorca rejected the criticism, and with regard to Ceuta and Melilla he strongly rejected the comparison between the colonial situation of the Falklands/Malvinas ‘and the situation in these Spanish towns’. He added that ‘the mention of these towns at the present time is against Spanish interests’ (El País, 13 May 1982). There is a touch of irony in the fact that the Communist Carrillo was at least being consistent in seeing parallels not only between territories claimed by Spain and Argentina but also between those territories and others claimed against Spain, whereas the UCD Foreign Minister was keen to raise the issue of Gibraltar in the context of the Falklands/Malvinas but rejected the mention of territories claimed by Morocco, even though the reference was made in the context of Spain’s desire to defend them. Indeed there was a timely reminder from Joaquín Muñoz Peirats, Head of the Spanish Delegation to the Council of Europe and a UCD representative in Congress, that specifically Spanish matters should not be brought into the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. Those politicians who want to take advantage of these circumstances to discuss the conditions of our entry into NATO or who look for parallels with our dispute over Gibraltar do not understand international reality or else have other intentions which I would prefer not to go into here. (idem)

‘Different and distant’?

45

The South Atlantic crisis was reaching its climax. On 22 May, British troops began their assault on the Falkland Islands that was to result in their recapture. The Spanish press thereafter continued to report the final stages of the Falklands/Malvinas War, but it is noteworthy that the references to Gibraltar in such reporting virtually disappeared. That is not to say, however, that Gibraltar itself was relegated to a back seat amongst the concerns of the press. On the contrary, it figured just as prominently in the early days of June. The difference was that it now came to be closely linked with Spain’s membership of NATO, which was formalized on 30 May, prior to the June NATO summit. At the same time as the War drew to a close, the issues of Gibraltar, the Falklands/Malvinas and NATO became closely intertwined. The connection was, of course, evident during the conflict when Britain used Gibraltar as a supply base for its Falklands/Malvinas campaign. However, that connection was to be made explicit in an extraordinary juxtaposition of events over a period of three days in June, which saw Britain accept the surrender of the Falklands/Malvinas from one of Spain’s former colonies whilst welcoming Spain as a military ally in NATO, despite Spain’s continuing support for its vanquished cultural offspring and despite the unresolved colonial problem of Gibraltar which stood between the two NATO partners.

7

Spain joins NATO but the border remains closed (May–October 1982)

When Spain became the sixteenth member of NATO on 30 May 1982, it was still unclear exactly how Spain would fit into the command structure – whether it would form part of SACEUR (with its headquarters in Belgium), or whether (as Spain itself preferred) a new Spanish command would be created, covering the whole of the Iberian peninsula (an arrangement which Portugal, currently part of the SACLANT command based in Norfolk, Virginia, would view with mixed feelings) together with the Balearic Islands and the Canaries. That was one issue. The other was the question of Gibraltar itself. Leaving aside the whole sovereignty issue, the British in particular were concerned about the Spanish Government’s opposition (in the event that command of the base were shared) to the presence of nuclear-armed warships in Gibraltar’s naval docks. A third problem was that of Ceuta and Melilla. The North Atlantic Treaty, as Secretary General Joseph Luns had made clear on more than one occasion, specifically excluded the African territories, but Spain considered them to be part of its national territory (and not colonies like Gibraltar or the Falklands/Malvinas) and was determined to include them under NATO protection. Although Spain’s membership of NATO marked one further step towards its international rehabilitation after the Franco years, it was not the most auspicious time, either on the national or international scene, for it to take such an important as well as such a controversial decision. The international backdrop was that the event took place while the Falklands/Malvinas conflict remained unresolved – a conflict that saw all of Spain’s future NATO partners in support of the British position while Spain supported Argentina. On the national stage, the sentences on those responsible for the attempted military coup of 23 February the previous year were handed down a few days after entry. The fact that both Spain and the other NATO members persevered with the process despite these factors is testimony as much to the powers of persuasion of the Spanish Government and military leaders (including the Commander-in-Chief, King Juan Carlos) as it is to the determination of the other NATO

Spain joins NATO, border remains closed

47

members not to allow Spanish democracy to slip backwards nor to lose the opportunity to embrace this strategically vital part of Western Europe. There was another national factor to consider, namely that there was by no means a consensus amongst the Spanish people that membership of NATO was the right step for the country to take. To bring the point home, the PSOE, which had made plain its opposition to that step, had just won a resounding victory in the Andalusian elections. This lent weight to the motion that the PSOE had put before the Spanish Parliament to postpone Spain’s entry into the Alliance at least until the negotiations on Gibraltar had been restarted, for the Spanish Government would now have to accept that after the bloody conflict in the South Atlantic over one of its colonies, Britain would not lightly relinquish its hold over another closer to home. Moreover, Spain’s position as a member of NATO not only left it little room for manoeuvre as a mediator over the Falklands/Malvinas, but also restricted its negotiating position over Gibraltar. From now on, negotiations would have to take into account Spain’s obligations to the North Atlantic Treaty. The official ceremony to mark Spain’s membership was held in Brussels on 5 June. In his speech to the extraordinary session of the North Atlantic Council, Spain’s Foreign Minister, José Pedro Pérez-Llorca, made no specific reference to Gibraltar, although he did explain the historical ties that led his country to adopt a different attitude towards the Falklands/ Malvinas conflict from that of other NATO members. In the press conference, however, he recognized that the question of the command of Gibraltar would not be solved in the short term, and that the solution to the sovereignty issue was more important (El País, 6 June 1982). In the same conference the Defence Minister, Alberto Oliart, denied that Spain would consider sharing the command with Britain and argued that the Spanish position was that Gibraltar should be controlled directly from Brussels and have a Spanish commander (idem). In the final ceremony connected with Spain’s entry into NATO – the summit on 10 June in Bonn – Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo did refer to Gibraltar when he called for the Alliance’s cooperation on three matters, including ‘a rapid, negotiated settlement to the Gibraltar problem’ (El País, 11 June 1982). As the leading article in El País on 11 June pointed out, until that happened Gibraltar would remain a British base that would be at NATO’s disposal and not subject to the Spanish Government’s denuclearization policy. So Spain and Britain became military allies for the first time since Britain had helped to expel Napoleon’s troops from Spanish soil 170 years earlier. It was hoped that this new alliance would be a good omen for the talks on Gibraltar that were scheduled to start two weeks later, following the postponement from 20 April. The date that had been fixed for the renewal of talks between Britain and Spain and the opening of the border between Spain and Gibraltar

48

Spain joins NATO, border remains closed

was 25 June 1982. In anticipation of the talks, Spain realized that the Falklands/Malvinas War had rather changed the atmosphere. In particular, although Britain remained committed to the Lisbon Agreement to resolve all its differences with Spain over the Rock, Britain’s attitude had changed ever since Spain had aligned itself with Panama in the UN Security Council resolution that called for a cease-fire in the Falklands/Malvinas without it being linked to an Argentine withdrawal. It was also reported in Spain that Britain was concerned about the fact that during the South Atlantic crisis the Spanish media (particularly television) had given greater credence to reports from Buenos Aires than to those emanating from London. In the climate of euphoria in London following the Falklands/Malvinas victory, it was not surprising, therefore, that there were those in Spain who suspected that the British representatives might go to Sintra ‘simply to have their photo taken’ and who, in the absence prior to the talks of any firm indication of Britain’s stance, would have preferred the talks to be cancelled (El País, 20 June 1982). There were others who felt that Britain might be more sympathetic to negotiations over Gibraltar given the contrast between Madrid’s civilized approach and the Argentinians’ use of force in the South Atlantic. Anticipation was greatest in the frontier town of La Línea. It had suffered most when the frontier was closed in 1969, both in trade and in jobs. In 1982, 38 per cent of the active population was unemployed and millions of pesetas worth of trade, especially in foodstuffs, had been lost. Once the frontier was opened, it was hoped that some 500 jobs would become available in Gibraltar to residents in La Línea, that some Gibraltarians would come and live in the growing town (given the housing waiting list of 1,600 in Gibraltar itself), and that the tourist trade would bring new life to bars, restaurants and hotels. Having made investments totalling 3,000 million pesetas ($21.4 million) – including 1,500 million pesetas ($10.7 million) in increased stocks – in anticipation of the opening both now and two months earlier, many businesses were at the limit of their credit. The Mayor, Juan Carmona, was all in favour of opening the frontier, and argued that Spain did not need to use its opening as a condition for the start of talks. Gibraltarians, too, wanted the frontier to be opened without further delay. Foreign Ministers Pym and Pérez-Llorca met in Luxembourg on 21 June as part of the negotiations relating to Spain’s membership of the EC. It had become clear by then that Spain had been pressing London to agree that the communiqué after the Sintra talks should be able to include an indication that the question of the sovereignty of Gibraltar had been discussed, and that a timetable had been set for negotiations. A Spanish note sent to the FCO about the Sintra talks had suggested a new treaty to replace that of Utrecht, which would guarantee and safeguard all the legitimate interests and the well-being of the inhabitants of Gibraltar

Spain joins NATO, border remains closed

49

but re-establish Spain’s territorial integrity (El País, 22 June 1982). Not surprisingly, given the climate of the day, Britain was unwilling to agree to this, and the Spanish Government decided to postpone the talks without setting a new date and to keep the frontier closed. In their statements in Luxembourg announcing the postponement, Francis Pym blamed Spanish domestic politics while his Spanish counterpart put the postponement down to the emotionally charged atmosphere in Britain that would prevent the talks getting off to a positive start (idem). Pérez-Llorca may have been persuaded (probably rightly) that, since the Falklands/Malvinas War, Britain was quite likely to insist that the views of the Gibraltarians would be paramount, and he hoped that the passage of time might lessen the chances of a statement to this effect being made. Reaction in La Línea was one of bitter disappointment. Representatives of the town’s political, economic and social interests agreed to send a commission to Madrid to ask for the region to be declared a disaster area, and considered other measures such as blocking the road from Algeciras to Cádiz, calling for a massive demonstration, sending thousands of telegrams to the Foreign Affairs Minister, or even hunger strikes (El País, 23 June 1982). It was in this climate that El País ran a front-page story based upon an interview given by Margaret Thatcher for Danish, Swedish and Norwegian television in which she stated that Britain was not prepared to talk about the sovereignty of Gibraltar with Spain. She did, however, consider independence for Gibraltar a possibility, despite the stipulations of the Treaty of Utrecht, provided that Spain agreed to it and the Gibraltarians wanted it (idem).1 The Spanish Foreign Office was furious at these remarks, and the British Ambassador, Richard Parsons, could hardly have been surprised to find himself summoned to the Foreign Affairs Ministry to try to explain what his Prime Minister had meant. He reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to the Lisbon Agreement, and suggested that Thatcher must have meant by her remarks that Britain could not enter talks with preconditions having been set (El País, 24 June 1982). A spokesman at the British Embassy in Madrid suggested that the interview was supposed to be about the Falklands/Malvinas, and that Thatcher was not prepared for a question about Gibraltar (idem). In order that it could hear and see exactly what she did say, the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Madrid asked for a video of the broadcast. In the House of Commons, Francis Pym expressed regret that the opening of the frontier had been postponed, and warned Spain that it could not enter the EC without a change in that situation (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 22 June 1982, Col. 157). However, he must have been acutely embarrassed by Margaret Thatcher’s remarks (not least because they made it quite clear that he was not in control of British foreign policy), and he had to reassert that Britain would honour the Lisbon accord. In Gibraltar, the GSLP, which had always been opposed to the

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Spain joins NATO, border remains closed

Lisbon Agreement, seized the opportunity to organize a rally to demonstrate that sovereignty was not negotiable. British diplomatic sources were quoted in the Spanish press as having conceded in private that Thatcher had ‘put her foot in it’ (El País, 24 June 1982). Coming as they did so soon after the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, Margaret Thatcher’s remarks were scarcely surprising. They were nonetheless damaging, and seemed to justify Spain’s fears that the Falklands/Malvinas War represented a considerable setback to the negotiation process over Gibraltar – not just because the start of talks had been indefinitely postponed, but also because the sentiments contained in the Lisbon Agreement were now clearly threatened. It would have to await the Brussels Declaration nearly two years later for those sentiments to be reaffirmed to Spain’s satisfaction.

8

Felipe opens the gates (October–December 1982)

Spain’s first post-Franco Socialist Government came to power on 28 October 1982 with a comfortable overall majority. The new Prime Minister, Felipe González, addressed the nation on television at 2.35 am from his party headquarters in the Hotel Palace. His message was brief, but such was the prominence given to the Gibraltar issue in Spanish foreign affairs that even on this occasion he made reference to it by saying that ‘we also reaffirm our unflagging aspiration to reintegrate Gibraltar into our national sovereignty’ – words that were highlighted in the reaction the next day by the British press to the PSOE’s victory (El País, 29 October 1982; 30 October 1982). On 7 December Felipe González held his first Cabinet meeting, where it was agreed that on humanitarian grounds the frontier with Gibraltar would be opened to pedestrian visitors on 15 December. Afterwards he gave a press conference and explained that although the frontier would be open 24 hours a day, people would only be allowed to make one crossing per day in each direction. The following day the British Government reacted favourably to the proposal as far as it went, although the FCO took the opportunity to point out that Britain had always kept its side of the border gates open, at least from 6 am to 1 am the next morning. Before the border was actually opened, however, Francis Pym and Fernando Morán agreed during an encounter at a NATO meeting in Brussels on 10 December that negotiations over Gibraltar would be reopened sometime during the spring of the following year, and would coincide with the full opening of the border. Morán took the opportunity to reiterate the fact that the Lisbon Agreement referred to discussion by both sides of all points of disagreement and, whilst recognizing the need to change the climate amongst the people of Gibraltar, he asserted that Spain’s objective continued to be that ‘in the near future, Gibraltar once again becomes part of Spanish sovereignty’ (El País, 11 December 1982). This agreement to negotiate under the terms set in Lisbon was the first official indication that the new Spanish Government would pursue the diplomatic procedures established by its predecessor. The historic day when the border would be officially opened

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approached. As it did so a certain amount of diplomatic sparring took place, such was the significance of the event. On the same day that the Foreign Ministers met in Brussels, the Spanish Government decided that only Spanish passport-holders and British citizens resident in Gibraltar would be allowed to cross the frontier. Both the British and Gibraltarian authorities declared this to be discriminatory, and in retaliation Gibraltar’s Council of Ministers reversed its decision of 9 December and decided in an emergency meeting two days later not to open the border gates for 24 hours a day, but to continue to close them between 1 am and 6 am, although Spaniards would still be allowed to spend the night on the Rock. The Spaniards in the Campo were annoyed, but put the change of heart about 24-hour opening down to reaction by Gibraltarian businesses against the Spanish decision to restrict passage to pedestrians, thus denying the businessmen any commercial advantages. However, that decision was once more reversed under pressure from the FCO in London on the night of 14 December, and, with just over an hour to go before the opening was due, Sir Joshua Hassan appeared on Gibraltar television to announce that the gates would remain open permanently after all (El País, 15 December 1982). When midnight struck, some 500 people were at the border gates to see them opened on the Spanish side for the first time in 13 years. There was some disagreement between the Civil Guard and the National Police as to who should perform the ceremony, and the problem was resolved by the Head of Customs, who did it himself. A 52-year-old man from La Línea but resident in Gibraltar succeeded in becoming the first person to cross (from the Gibraltar side, because those crossing from the Spanish side had to cover about 100 metres of No-Man’s-Land). The atmosphere was festive, with singing, champagne and emotional reunions. Inevitably there were some disappointments, as the initial arrangements did not allow some 200 Gibraltarians resident in La Línea to cross into Gibraltar (this ban was lifted on 10 January); nor did they allow the non-Spanish or nonGibraltarian spouses of those entitled to cross to do so. However, for most there was a sense of relief and a feeling that at last tangible progress was being made towards the normalization of communications between Gibraltar and Spain.1 Not surprisingly, there was some political fallout for Gibraltar’s Chief Minister at having been overruled by the Foreign Office. Joe Bossano, leader of the GSLP, could not resist the jibe: ‘I suspect that this is the first occasion that Hassan has done something off his own bat, and look what happens’ (El País, 16 December 1982). The Chief Minister gave a press conference the day after the opening, and said he had not considered resignation. He explained that Francis Pym had given him ‘exceptional reasons to make him take the decision [to keep the gates open], but now is not the time to go into them’ (idem). Clearly Pym did not want to give Spain the diplomatic initiative by being seen to be more restrictive

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than the Spaniards, after so many years when the boot was on the other foot. The first full day with the border gates open saw a constant stream of people crossing, more into Gibraltar than in the opposite direction. Estimates for the first 24 hours put the total number of people going across at between 7,000 and 8,000, with the queue at one time during the late morning taking 45 minutes to get through the gates. One minor problem that the Gibraltarians encountered was that there was no official exchange rate for their currency, so they could not buy pesetas when they got into Spain. One of the issues that had most concerned Spaniards from the Campo region, and from which they had suffered since the closure of the border, was the loss of employment opportunities in Gibraltar. Many of the unemployed from La Línea seized the first chance they had to find a job, and were snapped up on the first day by the numerous employers who were anxious to fill vacancies for skilled workers or to replace absentee Moroccans. One of the attractions of workers from La Línea was that they did not need accommodation, whereas Moroccan workers lived in state hostels without their families, whom they went home to visit at weekends. Meanwhile, there were some mundane matters to be dealt with; the replacement of the pre-democracy shield over the Customs shed on the Spanish side with a new up-to-date one, and the removal of the Spanish soldiers’ helmets (requested by the civil authorities) because they looked too much like German Second World War helmets. The former proved easier to secure than the latter. The reopening of the border gates was a major step forward, and marked the end of the Franco–Castiella approach to the Gibraltar issue. Yet the opening of the frontier had only been partial, and restrictions had been discriminatory. To the annoyance of Gibraltar businesses, Spaniards were not allowed to buy fresh produce in Gibraltar and take it back to Spain. The development of Gibraltar’s tourist industry was hindered by the fact that tourists were not allowed to cross into Spain from Gibraltar. Britain wanted the frontier to be fully opened. Until that happened, further progress on negotiations was bound to be painstakingly slow.

9

Towards the Brussels Declaration (March 1983–November 1984)

With the border gates between Spain and Gibraltar now open, the spring of 1983 was to be the time when a real start could be made on the negotiations heralded by the Lisbon Agreement. The first opportunity for talks presented itself on 16 March, when (on the first visit made by a member of Felipe González’s Government to Britain) Foreign Affairs Minister Fernando Morán went to London as part of a series of bilateral visits he was making to European Community countries. Gibraltar was not of course the exclusive – or even the main – item on the agenda, but it was there, and no doubt higher up on Morán’s list of topics than on that of Francis Pym or Margaret Thatcher. The day before the talks, El País noted that although Britain had been very supportive since 1975 of Spain’s desire to establish closer ties with the rest of Europe as far as defence and trade were concerned, an element of resentment at some of Spain’s remarks during the Falklands/Malvinas crisis had appeared in British comments during the previous year. This did not offer much encouragement to the Spanish visitors; the best that was hoped for was that working parties might be set up on the most contentious aspects of the Gibraltar question in order to prepare the ground for negotiations (El País, 15 March 1983). This was not the only factor that did not augur well for the talks. The correspondent of El País noted three reasons why little progress was likely. First, Francis Pym was being subjected to attacks from members of his own party (attacks, it was said, which had the support of the Prime Minister), and he was not therefore in a strong position to negotiate (especially not if such negotiations involved any concessions).1 Second, it was expected that Thatcher would call a general election by October at the latest, and little progress was likely in a pre-electoral period. Third, Thatcher had made clear her doctrine on decolonization by stating in Parliament with reference to the Falklands/Malvinas that sovereignty would not be discussed as long as the islands’ inhabitants did not wish it to be. Although it could be argued that Gibraltar was a different case, it was felt unlikely that on this particular question Britain would agree to talk about sovereignty in relation to one colony whilst refusing to do so in relation to another

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(El País, 16 March 1983). Certainly Margaret Thatcher had shown no interest in doing so. As far as progress on Gibraltar was concerned, Fernando Morán left London empty-handed. Britain was insisting that before talks could begin, the frontier between Spain and Gibraltar had to be open without restrictions. Spain at this stage refused to remove the restrictions without some concessions in return regarding the rights of Spaniards in Gibraltar and without some commitment to discuss the sovereignty issue. Consequently, no agreement was reached either on a date or on a framework for negotiations to implement the Lisbon Agreement. A statement issued at the end of the talks simply said that the two Foreign Ministers would maintain contact. As The Times put it on 19 March, ‘once again, Gibraltar has prevented AngloSpanish relations from blossoming into a fully relaxed friendship’. A few weeks later a storm blew up over a visit to the Rock by the Royal Navy, illustrating the extent of Spanish sensitivity over the issue at this time. The British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Richard Parsons, informed the Spanish Government as a matter of courtesy that longstanding annual manoeuvres, called Spring Train, were due to take place in April in the North-East Atlantic, and that these would involve some ships calling at Gibraltar.2 To the great surprise of the FCO in London and of the Government in Gibraltar, Parsons was summoned to the Spanish Foreign Ministry on 11 April (and again on the following day) to hear a statement of protest (although it was not officially described as such), and the Spanish Ambassador to NATO, Jaime de Ojeda, was instructed to protest in the same vein. Spain considered that the manoeuvres were ‘unfriendly’, and should have waited until the bilateral talks over Gibraltar had made some progress. In any case it was felt that the North-East Atlantic was sufficiently wide an area not to involve ships going anywhere near Gibraltar, and that the choice of waters had been deliberately designed to put psychological pressure on Spain. The British fleet arrived off Gibraltar in the small hours of 13 April. In addition to three support ships, it consisted of 13 vessels, with the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible as flagship, plus two destroyers, eight frigates and two submarines. The Spanish press did not fail to mention that all of the British ships had been used in the South Atlantic venture, and that on board the flagship was the Falklands/Malvinas War-veteran Prince Andrew. It was also noted that reporters from the popular British press were more interested in finding the actress Koo Stark (who at that time was associated with Prince Andrew and was said to be in Gibraltar) than in the presence of British vessels. When it learnt of the manoeuvres, the Spanish Foreign Ministry decided that it would send a Spanish naval presence to the Bay of Algeciras just outside the harbour of Gibraltar in order to demonstrate Spanish sovereignty over those waters. Apparently the Commander of the Spanish fleet initially opposed the idea, saying that not enough ships were ready,

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and that it would be more sensible to avoid any incidents. However, when the British fleet sailed into Gibraltar harbour, it did so under the watchful eyes of the Spanish frigate Cataluña, the destroyer Lángara and the corvette Infanta Elena, which had dropped anchor in the bay. The arrival of British naval vessels in Gibraltar was not an unusual event for the Gibraltarians – even the Invincible had called there twice before – and little fuss was made on the Rock. Consequently they were surprised at the attention being paid to the event on mainland Spain, which included a motion passed unanimously by the Spanish Senate regretting the presence of units of the British fleet in Gibraltar ‘which has resulted in a worsening of relations between two democratic states and has made negotiations over Gibraltar much more difficult’ (El País, 14 April 1983). Manuel Fraga, the Leader of the Opposition, former Spanish Ambassador in London and an unreconstructed supporter of Franco, made political capital out of the incident by claiming that if he were Prime Minister he would revoke the Lisbon Agreement and send the Spanish Navy to occupy what he claimed were Spanish waters. Things got worse before they got better. Exercises involving combat planes, helicopters and rescue launches were held on 14 April. The same day the Spanish Government sent a protest note to the International Civil Aviation Authority in Ottawa claiming that the British manoeuvres were disrupting civil air traffic, although the real motive behind the protest note was contained in its closing words: ‘The attitude of the British authorities shows a lack of sensitivity for Spanish feelings regarding the Gibraltar problem’ (El País, 15 April 1983). However, these Spanish protests assisted the Royal Navy in one sense; it was reported that some of the Gibraltarian dockers, who had organized a protest against the recently announced dock closures by the Ministry of Defence, decided that, as a response to the actions of the Spanish Government, they would call off their refusal to resupply the vessels.3 In Britain, Spain’s reaction, together with the fact that the border had only been partially opened, led to veiled hints that its application to join the EC might be in jeopardy, and these were duly reported in the Spanish press. In answer to a question on 13 April in the House of Commons, Douglas Hurd, Minister of State at the FCO, said that while the border restrictions remained, Spain’s entry was ‘inconceivable’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 13 April 1983, Col. 806). At 9 am on 18 April the British naval vessels departed Gibraltar, leaving behind 2,000 men to reinforce the British garrison and a number of antiaircraft Blowpipe missiles, which were among the weapons used in the Falklands/Malvinas. The FCO and the Ministry of Defence strongly denied a report in the Sunday Telegraph that had suggested that these men and weapons had been sent in case an attack were mounted to seize Gibraltar. Such a suggestion could only have been made in the sensitive atmosphere that was the legacy of the South Atlantic crisis.

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The anger of the Spaniards at these naval exercises was generated not so much by the manoeuvres themselves as by a sense of frustration at not being able to move the negotiation process along. The feeling in Spain was that Britain was being obstructive by insisting that all obstacles to negotiations be removed, while at the same time refusing to allow Spaniards the same treatment in Gibraltar as Gibraltarians.4 Whatever the motives for the protest, the outcome was that the implementation of the Lisbon Agreement suffered a further delay. Over the ensuing months, no formal sessions were arranged specifically for bilateral discussions on Gibraltar to take place. Instead, the respective Foreign Ministers used meetings at which they were both present to have informal discussions. Following Margaret Thatcher’s second general election victory in June 1983, Sir Geoffrey Howe took over the reins at the Foreign Office. Howe met his Spanish counterpart, Fernando Morán, in Madrid for the first time on 7 September on the occasion of the summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The meeting had limited objectives, namely to improve the climate so that discussions could proceed, but afterwards spokesmen on both sides suggested that some changes to the interpretation of the Lisbon Agreement might be made in order to facilitate negotiations. Later that month, the Howe–Morán dialogue was resumed at the 38th session of the United Nations in New York, where once again informal discussions took place. At a press conference given by Morán on 30 September, he said that he felt Britain was now more flexible about Gibraltar. He hoped that the British would get over the ‘trauma’ of the Falklands/ Malvinas and that a more balanced interpretation would be taken of the Lisbon Agreement, in which, he argued, the British view had so far prevailed (El País, 1 October 1983). Brussels was the scene of the third Howe–Morán encounter, at which the Spanish Foreign Minister addressed his 15 counterparts on the Atlantic Council on 8 December. Morán referred in his speech to the three issues that were at the top of Spain’s foreign affairs priorities: entry into the EC, its relationship with NATO5 and a solution to the Gibraltar problem (El País, 9 December 1983). Few details were reported of the bilateral talks that took place between Morán and Howe, but the hope seemed to be that the technical working groups that had been meeting behind the scenes would make sufficient progress to enable formal talks to get under way during 1984. Before the end of 1983, however, an extraordinary situation of confusion occurred regarding the lifting of restrictions on those entitled to cross the frontier between Spain and Gibraltar. Marking the first anniversary of the reopening of the border, on the night of 13 December the Spanish Ministry of the Interior issued an order to the police at La Línea that for the Christmas period there were to be no restrictions on the nationalities of those entitled to cross the border (El País, 15 December

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1983). Instead of permission being confined to citizens of Gibraltar, British citizens resident in Gibraltar and Spanish citizens, the order allowed citizens of any nationality to cross the border in either direction. However, on the afternoon of the following day the Civil Governor of Cádiz, Salvador Domínguez, sent a telex to La Línea’s police chief cancelling the original order, which had been signed by the Director General of Police, Rafael del Río, and explaining that the only alterations to the current restrictions were that for the period 23 December to 6 January (a) the permitted categories of citizens allowed to cross the frontier could do so without being confined to one crossing per day, and (b) journalists of any nationality would be allowed to cross for professional reasons (El País, 16 December 1983). Quite how the first telex came to be sent in the first place remains a mystery. Had its order been implemented, it could have broken the log-jam on negotiations between Britain and Spain. The reality was that the main restrictions remained in place for a further 14 months.6 Following Margaret Thatcher’s visit to Peking in September 1982, early in 1984 Britain began to move towards a settlement with the People’s Republic of China over the future of another British colony, Hong Kong. What aroused particular interest in Spain was the fact that Britain was conceding sovereignty to China over the whole of the colony, including Victoria (also known as Hong Kong) Island and the Kowloon Peninsula (both of which had been ceded to Britain in perpetuity and were not subject to the 99-year lease under the Treaty of Nanking) in addition to the New Territories (which were). In a leading article in El País on 25 January, the writer concluded that Britain was for the first time recognizing Chinese sovereignty over the whole territory, and that what must have changed Britain’s mind was the fact that it recognized that its sovereignty over Victoria and Kowloon was based upon an outmoded colonial system, which now operated only in places like Hong Kong and Gibraltar. Echoing the parallels drawn during the South Atlantic crisis between Gibraltar and the Falklands/Malvinas, the opportunity was seized to draw two similarities between Gibraltar and Hong Kong. First, the British Government had renounced its sovereignty in Hong Kong over territory to which its claim was just as solid in juridical terms as that accorded to it by the Treaty of Utrecht over Gibraltar. Second, Britain had accepted the transfer of sovereignty despite the fact that the inhabitants had shown no indication that this was their preference. These were precisely the two arguments that Britain was using to reject Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar, ‘further proof that the British attitude in the Gibraltar dispute is not only ethically unsustainable but also that it is lacking in the most basic political logic’ (El País, 25 January 1984). The writer concluded that whilst it was important for democratic Spain to move closer to the people of Gibraltar in order to repair the damage done by the policies of the Franco regime, the Spanish Government should use the example of Britain’s last colony in Asia to urge it to put an end to an unacceptable colonial situation in Europe.7

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It was scarcely surprising that the Spanish press did not miss this chance to highlight what they saw as inconsistencies in British policy. What Spain chose not to mention here was the fact that Gibraltar had its own democratically elected Assembly and, through its own constitution, a good deal of autonomy. Moreover, the people had voted in 1967 to express their wishes about their future. Neither of these applied to Hong Kong, even though, following the events in Peking in June 1989, Britain came to regret the fact that it had not established democratic procedures in Hong Kong sooner. There was the additional factor that it would not have made sense for Britain to retain the territory in Hong Kong that was not covered by the Treaty, because it was not viable on its own. The differences between the two colonies were significant, but that would not prevent Spaniards from drawing parallels again in the future (see Chapter 14). The other focus of Spanish attention early in 1984 was the general election held in Gibraltar on 26 January, for the outcome could well influence the speed with which progress could be made on the Lisbon Agreement. The main issue was the future of the Royal Navy’s dry docks, where 800 repair jobs were under threat. The British Government had offered the docks to Appledore International to manage a commercial operation. The Government was offering Appledore £28 million ($50.4 million) provided that the company obtained an agreement with the shipworkers’ union, the TGWU, but Appledore was only offering a commitment to retain about half of the 800 jobs. There was a three-way choice in the elections. Sir Joshua Hassan’s Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights (AACR) recommended that the union reach an agreement with Appledore. The right-wing Democratic Party of British Gibraltar (DPBG), led by Peter Isola, was seeking better conditions from Britain for the future viability of the shipyards. The left was represented by the Gibraltar Socialist Labour Party (GSLP), led by Joe Bossano, who had obtained wage-parity for Gibraltarian workers with those of the UK after Franco closed the border and who now rejected the British Government’s solution to the shipyard issue as blackmail, because the workers would be forced to accept Appledore’s conditions, including the loss of wage-parity. Bossano argued that if Britain wanted to keep Gibraltar as a vital NATO naval base, the British Government had a responsibility to convert the shipyard and to protect the interests of the workers, or alternatively it should give the Gibraltarians the £28 million ($50.4 million) to spend on the shipyard and on other improvements to the economy. Spain noted that the pro-Spain ‘doves’, who had been routed in the previous elections, were not standing on this occasion, so that no-one in the campaign was arguing for a future closely linked with Spain. By contrast, there were three independent nationalist candidates calling for greater autonomy for Gibraltar. The only poll taken during the campaign suggested that Bossano’s GSLP would increase its seats from one to four or five, Hassan’s ruling

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AACR would win seven or eight out of the total of 15 up for election, and the remainder would go to the DPBG. In the event, on a 74.5 per cent turn-out (up from 65 per cent in 1980) Hassan retained his eight seats (the maximum possible under Gibraltar’s election rules), with a one-seat majority over the seven gained by Joe Bossano’s party and an increased percentage of the poll. The DPBG gained no representation at all. Clearly the threat of job losses in the shipyards had accounted for the major swing to the GSLP at the expense of the fanatically pro-British DPBG. The outcome held little by way of encouragement for Spain (Bossano had said that he did not want to be colonized by Spain any more than he did by Britain), although the fact that Hassan (who declared that this was to be his last period of office) was still in power at least meant that Gibraltar’s policy in negotiations over the next four years would remain unchanged. Had Bossano’s party won that clearly would not have been the case, and Howe and Fernando Morán must have breathed a sigh of relief that Hassan was still in charge. Spain’s official response to the election result was that although everything that happens in Gibraltar is of great interest to Spain, negotiations take place with London. From April 1984 onwards work continued behind the scenes as attempts were made to prepare the ground for negotiations on the implementation of the Lisbon Agreement. However, throughout the summer and autumn there were still no official bilateral meetings to discuss the Gibraltar issue, although as had been the case 12 months earlier it was discussed when Howe and Morán met at the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September. Any substantive public pronouncements were awaiting progress in the technical talks, including those that were being held in relation to Spain’s entry into the European Community. Hassan went to Brussels in early October in order to plead Gibraltar’s case for special treatment to soften the impact when Spain joined the EC, but these pleas were rejected by the European Commission. It was reported in Brussels, however, that encouraging results were emerging from the technical talks on such issues as communications between the Peninsula and the Rock, and the use of Gibraltar’s airport.8 The eagerly awaited meeting of Howe and Morán took place in Brussels on 27 November 1984. The negotiations which had been going on behind the scenes finally bore fruit in the agreement that they issued on that day and which has come to be known as the Brussels Declaration. Designed as a statement that committed both sides to apply the Lisbon Agreement of 1980, the two most significant aspects of the Brussels accord were that Spain would lift restrictions on Gibraltar by 15 February 1985 and that Britain would discuss the question of sovereignty. At the same time that restrictions were lifted, Spaniards and Gibraltarians would enjoy reciprocity and equality of rights in their respective territories following the introduction of the necessary legislation on both sides. ‘Lifting of restrictions’ meant the free movement of people, vehicles

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and goods (although a customs post would remain, since Gibraltar did not belong to the customs union). It was made clear that in all other respects the rights of Spaniards and Gibraltarians in each other’s territory anticipated Spain’s membership of the EC. It was disagreement over the interpretation of the phrase ‘the reciprocity and full equality of rights’ in the Lisbon Agreement which had delayed the full opening of the border, and clarification of that issue now made it possible for Spain to remove the remaining border restrictions. Spaniards and Gibraltarians would also enjoy an advantage in each other’s labour markets over nationals from non-EC countries, although there would be a transition period of seven years before full freedom of movement of labour came into effect. A negotiating process would be set up on the basis of working groups to resolve all differences between Spain and Britain over Gibraltar, and to promote cooperation in economic, cultural, touristic, aviation, military and environmental matters.9 The Declaration stated that ‘both sides accept that the issues of sovereignty will be discussed in that process’.10 The fact that Britain was prepared explicitly to discuss the issues of sovereignty (of the territory ceded under the Treaty of Utrecht and, separately, of the isthmus) must have come as something of a surprise in Spain, given that barely two years earlier, in the wake of the Falklands/ Malvinas conflict, Margaret Thatcher had explicitly said the opposite. Not surprisingly, Morán was anxious to underscore the importance of the inclusion of such an explicit statement in the Declaration, for it represented a considerable diplomatic success. ‘No Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs can leave any ambiguity about the fact that the solution to the problem of Gibraltar lies in the return of its sovereignty to Spain,’ he said at a press conference (El País, 28 November 1984). In return for the inclusion of the reference to sovereignty, the Spanish negotiators had conceded the omission of two statements originally included in the Lisbon Agreement. One referred to the commitment to solve the problem in accordance with the UN Resolutions, which Spain said it was prepared to exclude in order to preserve the climate of cooperation that had been established. The significance of this from the British point of view was – at least in theory – that it took the negotiations outside the context of decolonization and bilateral talks, which is how the UN Resolutions had viewed the problem. The other phrase omitted was the reference to the ‘re-establishment of the territorial integrity of Spain’, but in order to distinguish between the land and the inhabitants Morán spoke now of integrating the territory but not its people, and envisaged a special status for Gibraltarians so that they could preserve their British nationality and their way of life. This would, however, be easier said than done, for the Declaration stated that ‘the British Government will fully maintain its commitment to honour the wishes of the people of Gibraltar as set out in the Preamble to the 1969 Constitution’ (see Appendix 3). The inclusion of this statement was brought to the attention of the

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House of Commons when the Foreign Secretary spoke on the issue on 28 November (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 28 November 1984, Col. 927). It also enabled Hassan to express his satisfaction with the Declaration, despite the well-known reservations of the Gibraltarians on any discussion of sovereignty, although the leader of the opposition, Joe Bossano, saw it as a clear victory for Spanish diplomacy. He was also critical of the privileges given to Spaniards over workers from other countries, especially Moroccans, and of the fact that Britain was now going behind the backs of Gibraltarians to talk to Spain about their future (El País, 29 November 1984). One of the problems which was clearly accepted by both sides as requiring urgent solution was that of communications by air, for the Declaration made specific mention of the fact that ‘the Spanish Government undertakes to take the early actions necessary to allow safe and effective air communications’ (see Appendix 3). The problem was one both of allowing planes to fly over Spanish air space (Morán described it as an issue of Spanish sovereignty) and of adjusting fare prices, since flights from Britain to Gibraltar were treated as internal and were thus cheaper than flights from Britain to nearby Spanish airports such as Málaga. The issue of air communications was to prove contentious and difficult to resolve. It became a substitute for discussions about territorial sovereignty which, although theoretically on the agenda, did not fit into the overall negotiating framework – there was no working group set up to study sovereignty issues – and which was studiously avoided by Britain when the Foreign Ministers had their annual meeting to review the progress of talks. It was clear that at the time the inclusion of the issue of sovereignty in the Declaration signified more a recognition of Spain’s change of status than a change of attitude on Britain’s part. Since 1980 that change of status had included substantial progress on negotiations for entry into the European Community and – even more significantly as far as Gibraltar was concerned – membership of NATO. However, there was no clear indication as to how these new realities could be translated into a change from the status quo as far as sovereignty was concerned – not even when, many years later, a Labour Government in Britain, with its own European agenda, attempted to do so. However, the more immediate concerns were preparation for the full opening of the border between Spain and Gibraltar and the establishment of the working groups on all the other issues to which the Brussels Declaration referred.

10 The border is fully opened Negotiations get under way (January–February 1985)

In anticipation of the full opening of the border scheduled for early February 1985, 36 Spanish and Gibraltarian officials met on 10 and 11 January for preparatory talks to discuss practical matters relating to the reestablishment of communications, such as police control, customs, work permits and telecommunications. The Gibraltar delegation was led by the Deputy Governor while the Spanish group was headed by Francisco José Mayans, special adviser to the Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister, and both sides included representatives of several ministries involved. The first day’s meetings were held in La Línea, while on the second day they were held in Gibraltar itself, the first time that Spanish officials had come to the Rock since 1969. Tact was very much in evidence in order to avoid any friction. The participants spoke in their own language and their contribution was then translated into the language of their interlocutors, despite the fact that practically all of the participants could speak both languages. For the first day’s talks the Gibraltarians actually replaced one of their translators, a British subject who technically was not yet allowed to cross the border. The atmosphere in the talks was friendly, no doubt due to the fact that they were dealing with practical matters rather than political issues. The outcome was the publication in Madrid on 18 January of detailed regulations about the movement of people, goods and vehicles across the border. This augured well for the full opening of the border and for the Geneva meeting between the two Foreign Ministers to implement the Brussels Declaration, both of which had been set for 5 February. Before that, however, on 16 January the Gibraltar House of Assembly gave approval to the law, proposed by the Brussels Declaration, which gave Spaniards and Gibraltarians reciprocal rights in each other’s territory, in anticipation of Spain’s membership of the European Community. The opposition GSLP members, who opposed the signing of the Brussels Declaration, objected to the proposal, arguing that Gibraltar should have used the intervening period to protect Gibraltarians’ rights in EC countries. In a dramatic gesture, the seven GSLP representatives walked out of the Assembly when the vote was being taken. One feature of the new situation

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was the fact that some 3,000 Spaniards who had worked in Gibraltar prior to the closure of the border were now eligible to receive a weekly pension which would cost Gibraltar’s Exchequer a total of about £6 million ($10.8 million) per year. Conscious of the criticism from many Gibraltarians that the Brussels Declaration represented a sell-out, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, Sir Joshua Hassan, took the opportunity at a press conference following talks with Sir Geoffrey Howe in London on 30 January to reiterate the desire of the people of Gibraltar to remain British. One of Hassan’s main objectives in the talks was no doubt to seek assurances from Howe that a firm position would be taken on the sovereignty issue in Geneva. The following day, 31 January, the Spanish Cabinet took similar measures to those taken by the Gibraltarian Assembly in order to accord reciprocal rights. They also agreed to rescind Franco’s decree of 11 July 1969 and to re-establish communications by land and sea. Meanwhile, the opposition in Gibraltar organized a demonstration of 2,500 people (The Times reported a figure of 1,300) against the Brussels Declaration and handed a 10,000-signature petition to the Governor. These gestures against the process of negotiation and the numbers involved in them – surprisingly small compared to demonstrations in later years – serve as a reminder of the challenge for the Gibraltarians in the face of the internal and external pressures on Spain and the UK to resolve the differences between them. So, on the stroke of midnight between 4 and 5 February 1985, the border gates, which had been in place for 76 years and had been closed on the Spanish side for the last 16, were finally fully opened. The ceremony to open the gate on the Spanish side was carried out by the Civil Governor of the Province of Cádiz, Mariano Baquedano. Fortunately a rehearsal had been carried out earlier in the day, which involved unlocking the padlock (in order to avoid any hitch during the real performance) and also, more significantly, the removal of a vertical bar which required the use of a pneumatic drill and which would otherwise have caused some embarrassment. Reports differed as to how the opening of the gates was received. El País reported that some 4,000 people had gathered on the Spanish side to witness the event, with somewhat fewer on the Gibraltar side, including about 40 rowdy youths shouting anti-Spanish slogans. Several cars were set alight, about 600 Gibraltarians waved Union Jacks, and there was cheering on both sides. The first people across from the Spanish side were Jesús Malado, from Algeciras, on a Vespa scooter, and his pillion passenger María José Escarcena; in the opposite direction the claim to fame went to three young women who, although resident on the Rock, were not Gibraltarian but (perhaps significantly) French, Swiss and American. During the day, some 300 vehicles crossed from Spain into Gibraltar, causing traffic problems late in the afternoon, while about half that

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number went in the opposite direction.1 Passport controls were still in force, thus slowing down the passage of visitors. The first commercial traffic into Gibraltar consisted of two car transporters bringing in Fiat vehicles that had previously had to depend on infrequent sea transport from Italy. The only problem was that the transporter drivers had not thought to bring passports with them, and had to be given temporary 24-hour entry permits. Meanwhile, that same day British and Spanish delegations, led by their respective Foreign Ministers, met at the International Conference Centre in Geneva to discuss the implementation of the Brussels Declaration. It was the first occasion on which the two Foreign Ministers had arranged a formal encounter specifically to talk about Gibraltar. While the British delegation included, as usual, Hassan and two other representatives from Gibraltar, the Spanish delegation included local government representatives from the Campo de Gibraltar for the first time. The clear intention on the Spanish side was to lay the foundations for closer cooperation between the population of the Rock and the inhabitants of the Campo, in order to rebuild confidence lost during the years when the border was closed. One project designed to achieve this, at a cost of 4 billion pesetas ($28.5 million), was the building of a commercial and leisure centre on the Spanish side to attract Gibraltarians. However, the principal business of the Geneva meeting was to establish the working groups that would have the task of tackling the separate aspects of cooperation. Clearly one of the most contentious was going to be the operation of the airport situated on the isthmus between Gibraltar and the mainland. Before the signing of the agreement in Brussels, Britain had suggested joint operation of the airport, a proposal which caused Spain some difficulties because it maintained that the isthmus was neutral territory.2 Whatever the problems over practical issues like air communications, however, these would pale into insignificance when compared with the thorny issue of sovereignty. Spain entered the negotiations with viewpoints that were markedly different from those of the British Government in two respects. The first was that ‘history, international law and geopolitical realities allow no room for doubt that territorially Gibraltar belongs to Spanish sovereignty’ (El País, 5 February 1985). Britain accepted very little of that; its position was rather that geopolitical realities alone required it to find some means of resolving the Gibraltar question. The second difference was that whereas Spain was prepared to protect the interests of the Gibraltarians, as required by the UN Resolutions on the matter, the British Government interpreted these as being synonymous with their wishes. Clearly this semantic distinction would be a far more difficult area to resolve. In the plenary sessions in Geneva there were few surprises; Fernando Morán went through the well-rehearsed reasons for Spain’s claim to the

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sovereignty of the Rock that it had been giving for the previous 25 years. The surprises (although there had been some speculation along these lines prior to the talks) came in the private discussions between Morán and Howe before the plenary sessions, when the Spanish Foreign Minister proposed a range of ideas on the return of Gibraltar to Spanish sovereignty. Although they were not made public at the time, the proposals involved a new Treaty through which Spain would regain sovereignty over the Rock, with a condominium or leaseback arrangement over a 15- to 20-year period.3 For an indefinite period the inhabitants would retain their nationality, political and labour rights, self-government and institutions (Morán 1988: 17). The military base could also be the subject of a separate agreement. In accordance with standard diplomatic procedure, Howe asked for these proposals to be sent to him in writing for detailed study, but Morán was encouraged by his British counterpart’s response; the mere experience of discussing the sovereignty of Gibraltar must of itself have given any Spanish Foreign Minister some encouragement. Yet he was aware that the British Government was trying to play for time and consolidate the status quo (idem). On practical matters, it was agreed that the working group on air traffic would get started later in February, with the groups on economic cooperation, culture, tourism, the environment and transport to follow. Military cooperation would be discussed at some future date. As far as sovereignty was concerned, this would not be dealt with by a special working group but through diplomatic channels. It was also agreed that the two Foreign Ministers would meet annually to discuss progress being made, in addition to any other encounters they might have in the normal course of events. As for the Gibraltarians themselves, Hassan managed to avoid giving a hostage to fortune when he refused to accede to a request at the press conference to answer a question in Spanish (which of course he was quite able to do, but which would no doubt have led many Spanish commentators to observe that most Gibraltarians were really as Spanish as they were). Hassan had to be content with playing third string, in the talks, to Howe and the British Ambassador in Madrid, although he made it clear that he would have preferred to be there as a third party, representing Gibraltar as an equal with Britain and Spain. Sixteen years later, another Chief Minister was to take a very firm stand on this same issue. Meanwhile, Hassan’s leading political opponent, Joe Bossano, was making waves by calling for independence for Gibraltar, citing in support the UN declaration on decolonization. Such statements no doubt fuelled Spanish speculation that Britain’s readiness to discuss sovereignty really meant that Britain might be using the opportunity to encourage Gibraltarians to become more independent without actually granting them independence. However, at least the process of negotiation was at last under way. On 5 February 1985 two important steps along the road towards a solution

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were taken, although the distance to be travelled remained unknown. The obstacles along the way were highlighted by the results of a survey published in the Gibraltar magazine Panorama, which showed that 94 per cent of Gibraltarians were opposed to any discussion of the question of sovereignty.4 Little progress could be expected on that aspect of the issue for some considerable time.

11 Osmosis begins (February–November 1985)

In the weeks and months after 5 February 1985, business boomed from the new tourist trade to Gibraltar. Within the first week there were 45,000 visitors to the Rock, while during Easter week some 10,000 visitors per day followed the same path. After six months the number reached the one million mark, with 250,000 of them crossing the border in July alone. Vehicles were entering at the rate of 1,000 per day in July, and parking became a nightmare. By the summer, daily flights into Gibraltar from London had doubled, with tour operators offering packages combining the Costa del Sol and the Rock. Retail sales of food and clothing boomed, banks were busy, hotel bookings increased and pubs were overcrowded. Initially the fears of the GSLP that Gibraltar would be inundated by Spanish workers were unfounded. A fortnight after the gates had been opened, no work permits had been issued to Spaniards (even by June the figure was only 84), and newly created jobs had gone to unemployed Moroccans and Gibraltarian or EC nationals. Traffic between the Rock and Spain was not, of course, all one-way and many Gibraltarians crossed into the Campo, either at weekends to shop at the hypermarket Continente, or on Wednesdays for the market in La Línea.1 One significant Gibraltarian who on 18 April made his first visit to the Campo after a 20-year interval was the Chief Minister, Sir Joshua Hassan. He was returning the official visit of the Chairman of the Councils of the Campo Region, Rafael Palomino, who went to Gibraltar on 22 March. For the Spaniards of the Campo, Hassan’s visit was an important step in re-establishing direct personal contacts, which they saw as an essential part of the process of ‘osmosis’ (as they called it) that would help to normalize relations between the Rock and the Campo. Topics discussed during the formal sessions covered the environment, protection of the Bay, and cultural, tourist and commercial exchanges. Predictably the visit drew criticism from the main Gibraltar opposition party, who saw it as part of the decolonization process. However, it was not long before the GSLP leader, Joe Bossano, was himself setting foot on Spanish soil, in his case after a 21-year gap. The purpose of his trip to Madrid on 10 May was to clarify his party’s position regarding Spain’s

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entry into the EC. He wanted to make it clear that they were not antiSpanish but anti-big-neighbour. As he put it, Gibraltar’s membership of the EC since 1973 had only been theoretical, but once Spain joined and Gibraltar shared a border with a Community member then Gibraltar’s relations with the EC would become a practical issue, and he wanted the PSOE Government to understand the threat that posed to Gibraltar. Another long interval between visits came to an end when the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, arrived in Gibraltar on 7 June, the first visit by a British Foreign Secretary for 13 years. Despite the economic upturn on the Rock since February, which had resulted in the creation of 650 new jobs, local politicians were anxious to seek economic assistance from Britain. Specifically, they were asking for £18 million ($32.4 million) – half the total cost – for the development of the port area and other infrastructure projects, and also for Britain to foot the annual bill of £6 million ($10.8 million) for the pensions of former Spanish workers on the Rock.2 Opposition politicians were also anxious to know what Morán had proposed in February in Geneva regarding Gibraltar’s future sovereignty, since they felt they were being kept in the dark. Howe said that Morán’s proposals would be considered in detail at their first annual meeting in November. Joe Bossano took the opportunity in a meeting he had with Howe to push the idea of limited independence for Gibraltar (an idea that Howe rejected because of what the Treaty of Utrecht had to say on the matter), while the former Chief Minister Robert Peliza called for a referendum in Gibraltar on the sovereignty issue (which at the time Howe thought was unlikely) (El País, 8 June 1985). The British Foreign Secretary’s reaction to these proposals was well received in Madrid. Howe had gone on to Gibraltar from the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Estoril. While in Portugal he had had bilateral talks with his Spanish counterpart on the Gibraltar issue. Fernando Morán reported that they had discussed the progress of the Brussels Declaration. He also indicated that, as far as the resolution of the problem of Gibraltar was concerned, this was a long-term issue; when asked if ‘long-term’ meant the year 2050, he replied: ‘Much less than that; less than half’ (idem) – from which it can be deduced that the Spanish Foreign Minister was not expecting the Gibraltar question to be resolved definitively for about 25 years. Howe was not to be drawn on time-scales. Meanwhile, negotiations had begun in Madrid on the business of air communications between Gibraltar and the Spanish mainland. The group dealing with the airport issue first met on 4 March. Clearly progress was not going to be easy; while Spain was seeking joint control of the airport, Britain wanted it to be opened up for use as a ‘feeder’ to Costa del Sol resorts, but this would mean Spain lifting restrictions on flights over the Bay of Algeciras. As a first step, and in the spirit of the Brussels Declaration to ensure safe and effective air communications, on 1 April Madrid issued new regulations allowing pilots more room to manoeuvre over the

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Bay when taking off and landing, but this applied to civil aircraft only. The question of overflying rights for British military planes was to remain a contentious issue for some time. The main problem, however, was the use of the airport itself. As the isthmus is not covered by the Treaty of Utrecht, Spain claimed that the airport lay on Spanish territory. However, very sensibly neither side wanted to get bogged down on the aspect of territorial claims, so Britain did not ask Spain to renounce its claim to the isthmus, while Spain formally reserved its position on the matter. By mid-June 1985, the proposal on joint use of the airport had taken broad shape. The idea was to model it on Basle, where passengers could disembark either into France or Switzerland. Passengers flying from Madrid would either enter the Campo de Gibraltar, or go through customs and passport control and enter Gibraltar. The Gibraltarians first learnt of this proposal, which was eventually discussed by the technical group on air traffic in London on 28 August, from a report in El País on 17 June, provoking an angry response from the GSLP both for the manner in which they learnt of the proposal and for the fact that it would mean recognition of Spain’s superior rights to use the airport over those of any other country. They called for a debate in the House of Assembly preventing any agreement on the airport without prior discussion (El País, 24 June 1985), but in the debate Hassan did not accept that the press report was accurate, and his amendment was passed to the effect that Spain had no jurisdiction over the airport, and that any proposal for practical cooperation would have to be for the benefit of both sides (El País, 29 June 1985). It was also reported in late June that the six-month-old shipyard company, Gibraltar Shiprepair (known as Gibrepair), which had received £28 million ($50.4 million) from the British Government, was in financial difficulties, having used half of this assistance in the first three months. The company wanted to employ Spanish workers, but had run into union opposition. In early July, it was announced that Britain was to spend £1.5 million ($2.7 million) on improvements to the naval base in an area known as Coaling Island. Two other instances in June and July showed that collaboration between Spain and Gibraltar was increasing. It was revealed that the Gibraltar garrison had imported 3,000 tons of water from Spain because of a shortfall owing to leakage from underground reserves, while closer links of a different kind were agreed in July when the GBC decided to transmit some TV programmes in Spanish for the first time. The idea was driven more by financial considerations than cultural ones, since such programmes would also attract advertising in Spanish and help to offset a heavy Government subsidy. On the diplomatic front, the Gibraltar question re-emerged in the context of the final agreement on Spain’s entry into the EC. The signing

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of the Treaty of Accession in Madrid on 12 June had provoked an exchange of notes between the British and Spanish Foreign Secretaries. Morán’s note sent on 13 June insisted that Spain’s membership of the Community would in no way affect its claim to Gibraltar, while Howe confirmed in his reply that Britain’s position would not be affected either. Both agreed that they would continue to implement the Brussels Declaration. The question of Gibraltar was raised by the Spanish Opposition when the Treaty was ratified by the Congress on 26 June. They argued that the Government had given no guarantee in the Organic Law by which the Treaty was being ratified that the Gibraltar dispute would not be put on the back burner, but Morán was able to point to the exchange of notes in his defence. This was Fernando Morán’s last act on Gibraltar as Foreign Minister; on 5 July he was replaced by Francisco Fernández Ordóñez. Two months after leaving office, Morán felt at liberty to reveal that in 1983 it had been suggested within the European Community that Spain should agree to withdraw its claims to Gibraltar in exchange for entry. Morán said that he had taken the position that in that event Spain would have sacrificed joining the Community. He said that for over a year ‘secret negotiations’ had taken place with Britain before that particular threat was dropped (El País, 15 September 1985). Surprisingly little was made of this revelation, no doubt because Spain was anxious for the other member countries to ratify the Treaty agreeing to Spain’s membership in time for the entry date of 1 January 1986 to be met.3 The first encounter between Morán’s successor and his British counterpart took place in Helsinki on 31 July 1985. Although much of their discussion was taken up with other matters, including the official visit of the King and Queen of Spain to Britain planned for April 1986, the issue of Gibraltar was raised in their talks. It was confirmed that Howe would visit Madrid in December, when it was hoped that Britain would respond to the ‘ideas’ (details of which had still not been officially released) put forward by Morán in February. Naturally there was continuing speculation as to what these ‘ideas’ might be, with a period of transition involving leaseback or shared sovereignty being seen as the most likely. As far as the time-scale was concerned, Morán had earlier said that the beginning of the period of transition could be two or three years away and could last for two decades (El País, 1 August 1985). He has been shown by events to have been over-optimistic with regard to the start of such a process, although had he suggested that the time-scale might be longer it would scarcely have given the impression that the Spanish Government was pushing as hard as it could for a resolution to the dispute. In the autumn of 1985 there were two brief reminders of the strong links made three-and-a-half years earlier between Gibraltar and the Falklands/Malvinas. The first came during a visit to Madrid by President

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Alfonsín of Argentina, who was attending a meeting of Liberal International, and who commented that ‘long-lasting anachronisms in Gibraltar and the Malvinas which cause so much heartache for Spaniards and Argentinians will soon have to give way to rational solutions’ (El País, 4 October 1985). The other reminder came with the announcement on 12 October that the British naval base in Gibraltar had been reinforced by the installation of the French-made Exocet missile system, which had been used to such devastating effect on the British Navy in the Falklands/ Malvinas conflict. In early November Hassan went to London for talks with the British Foreign Secretary. One of the subjects discussed was the question of the payment of pensions to Spanish workers, as it required a solution before Spain’s entry into the Community the following January. However, the main purpose was to agree their positions in the talks with Madrid due in December – the first occasion following the Brussels Declaration at which the subject of sovereignty would be formally under discussion.

12 Sovereignty and sovereigns (December 1985–April 1986)

Expectations were muted as the date approached of the first meeting between Sir Geoffrey Howe and Francisco Fernández Ordóñez to discuss the question of the future sovereignty of Gibraltar. Madrid’s hopes were no doubt higher than those of London; whereas the former wanted a clear statement of the British position, the latter wanted to create a climate of confidence for the future. It was seen as a difficult time for both governments. Madrid was under pressure because it had yet to hold the promised referendum on Spain’s continuing membership of NATO. Britain’s refusal to hold talks on the Falklands/Malvinas had been opposed at the UN (through a resolution supported by Spain), and the British Government was also coping with the aftermath of the signing of the Anglo-Irish agreement. It was not the time for the British Government to be seen to be making any concessions to Spain over Gibraltar. For this reason, rather than spending the talks exclusively exploring the question of sovereignty it was expected that Britain would prefer to discuss three areas in relation to the Gibraltar issue: first, to review the situation since the full opening of the border; second, to examine progress in the technical talks on air and sea communications and other areas of cooperation; and third, the question of sovereignty. In addition, the issue of pensions for former Spanish workers would have to be aired. Howe arrived in Madrid on 5 December 1985 for two days of talks. Following the meetings, Fernández Ordóñez informed journalists at a press conference that the question of the sovereignty of Gibraltar had occupied three-quarters of their time. However, in the joint written communiqué issued on 6 December the sovereignty issue constituted only part of the second half of the one-page document, an indication that little progress of substance had been made. Both sides, said the communiqué, agreed to remit the question of sovereignty to normal diplomatic channels, and the text added that Howe emphasized that the British Government would fully maintain its commitment to respect the wishes of the Gibraltarians, as set out in the Preamble to the 1969 Constitution. The two Ministers said that they would continue to discuss the issue of Gibraltar in their regular

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encounters at meetings of the EC and NATO (El País, 7 December 1985). The question of the joint use of the airport was also to be resolved through continuing discussions by the technical groups; the stumbling block seemed to be that the Gibraltarians were opposed to passengers embarking from Spanish airports being allowed to arrive in Gibraltar but not go through police controls. On the question of payment of pensions to Spaniards, agreement had been reached that they would be paid at the same level as Gibraltarians from 1 January 1986, although it was yet to be agreed whether Britain or Gibraltar would foot the bill.1 Sir Joshua Hassan, as a member of the British delegation to the talks, was also at the press conference. In answer to a question on the issue of sovereignty he said (in English): ‘I accept the Spanish position’, although the British interpreter translated this into Spanish as ‘I understand the Spanish position’ (idem). Spanish reporters tried to make something out of this distinction, for that was all they had to clutch at. So the moment had come and gone. There must have been some disappointment on the Spanish side, although this was the first occasion when the British had not rejected outright a proposal that implied a Spanish future for Gibraltar. There must also have been some relief among Gibraltarians that the issue of sovereignty had remained unchanged. All the signs were that it was accepted that this was not a propitious moment to start discussing the issue of sovereignty in any depth, although cynics might have been forgiven for asking if there would ever be a good time to discuss it. It was clear that it was going to be a long haul. Spain duly entered the European Community on 1 January 1986. Spaniards entering Gibraltar and Gibraltarians entering Spain had to continue to present their passports to police, whereas members of other EC countries entering Gibraltar only had to show their identity card. This was an arrangement agreed before the full opening of the frontier in February 1985 in order (it was said) to keep out petty Spanish criminals, and the Gibraltarian authorities showed no sign of changing their position. There were no early tangible signs for Spaniards that EC membership had had any effect on their relations with the inhabitants of the Rock. The next landmark was the first anniversary of the full opening of the border on 5 February. During that first year there had been two million visitors to the Rock, compared with an annual average of 150,000 over the previous ten years. The economic benefits were substantial, not only for Gibraltarians but also for the neighbouring Spanish regions. Spanish exports to Gibraltar were worth £20–30 million ($36–$54 million), while it was estimated that Gibraltarians had spent about £15 million ($27 million) in Spain. Income from tourism in Gibraltar had doubled from £10 million to £20 million ($18 million to $36 million), and 400 jobs had been created. This would undoubtedly increase if the Spanish airline Iberia were allowed to use the airport. However, not all Gibraltarians saw the issue exclusively – or even primarily – in economic terms.

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Negotiators had a further meeting to discuss the airport question on 4 and 5 March in La Línea and Gibraltar. The Spanish delegation was headed by Fermín Prieto Castro, of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, while the British delegation was led by David Moss, of the UK Department of Transport – their departmental attachments reflecting an interesting difference in the perception of the issue from the two sides. On previous occasions the British delegation had included a Gibraltarian, Joe Pitaluga, but this time he was absent because the Gibraltarian Administration did not want to be party to any agreement that gave concessions to Spain. Spain proposed the construction of a Spanish terminal on the north side of the airport in Spanish military territory, and the two delegations visited the site to consider the best location. Another thorny issue discussed was that of passenger and baggage handling, which Iberia wanted to undertake for its own services but which were so far exclusively operated by the Gibraltarian company Bland. The main point of difference, however, continued to be the issue of customs and immigration control. On 23 March at the first meeting of the Gibraltarian House of Assembly to be held following the technical talks, the Opposition called for the Spanish proposals to be rejected (El País, 22 March 1986). Clearly the concern was that if any plane landing in Gibraltar were allowed to be treated as if it were a domestic flight, this would constitute a de facto breach of Gibraltar’s territorial integrity and a threat to its sovereignty. The details might have seemed petty; the underlying issue was fundamental. Meanwhile, on 12 March, Spaniards took another step along the road of international responsibility by voting to stay in NATO (but to remain outside the military structure) in the long-awaited referendum. It was an unexpectedly comfortable margin of 51 per cent to 41 per cent on a 60 per cent turn-out, given that only a week before opinion polls were still forecasting a ‘no’ majority of 52–46. Clearly Gibraltar was not a factor that weighed heavily in voters’ minds; when asked if they thought that by staying in NATO Spain would be more likely to regain Gibraltar, only 26 per cent said that they did (El País, 6 March 1986). A much more decisive influence was the effect on Spain’s political stability if the vote went against the Government. Despite the about-turn of the PSOE on the issue (they had campaigned in the 1982 elections to take Spain out of NATO), the referendum became as much a vote of confidence in Felipe González as a vote to stay in the Atlantic Alliance. The importance of the result as far as the Gibraltar issue was concerned was that a ‘no’ vote could have given Britain justification for maintaining the status quo on sovereignty because of Gibraltar’s continuing military importance to NATO. This was one of many reasons for the Spanish Government to breathe a sigh of relief on the night of 12 March. In April there occurred another of those incidents leading to a diplomatic protest that indicated the sensitivity of the Gibraltar issue. The

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problem arose this time from the British claim that the Spanish aircraft carrier Dédalo had entered British territorial waters in the Bay of Algeciras for some 20 minutes on the night of 20 March. The elapse of 11 days between the incident and the formal lodging of the protest on 2 April (a delay partly caused, it was explained, by Easter) suggested that the protest was undertaken rather as a matter of routine. Not everyone in Britain treated the event with such equanimity, however. It was alleged that two Tory MPs, John Stokes and Albert McQuarrie (who was also Chairman of the Gibraltar Parliamentary Group), called for the cancellation of the royal visit to the UK (due to start in only three weeks) unless there was a formal apology from the Spanish Government.2 This call was seen in Spanish diplomatic circles as a reflection of pressure exerted from Gibraltar itself, where many people were concerned about the significance of the rapprochement between the heads of state. The Daily Express claimed that the incident was an attempt by rebel Spanish naval officers to torpedo the royal visit, although the FCO dismissed this as absurd (El País, 3 April 1986). That they tried to play down the incident is indicated by the fact that the protest, in the form of an aide-mémoire sent to the Spanish Foreign Ministry in Madrid, was delivered by a British Embassy official and not by the Ambassador himself. In the reply delivered on 3 April, Spain claimed that it was not possible for its ships to transgress British waters as accused because it did not recognize British jurisdiction over any waters outside the port of Gibraltar, in accordance with the Treaty of Utrecht (El País, 4 April 1986).3 And there the matter was allowed to rest. The British Government had made its point, and neither government wanted to cloud the atmosphere so close to the royal visit. In fact, on the same day as the protest was answered the details of the royal visit were published (idem). Before that visit took place, however, the strategic importance of Gibraltar was thrown into relief once again when US planes went into action over Libya on 15 April. Anti-terrorist and other security measures on the Rock were stepped up immediately, and over the following weekend surface-to-air Rapier missile batteries were installed in order to strengthen the air defences. Although there was no reason to suppose that Gibraltar might come under attack, the activity to prepare for such an eventuality was a sign of how important Gibraltar would be in circumstances involving a threat to NATO. For now, however, such activity proved to be something of a tourist attraction, and hundreds of Spaniards drove up the roads on the Rock itself to view the naval presence through their binoculars. Fortunately, the situation in the Mediterranean was not sufficiently serious to threaten the royal visit of King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofía to Britain from 22 to 24 April. It was the first visit by a reigning Spanish monarch to the UK since Juan Carlos’ grandfather, Alfonso XIII, visited in 1905. Queen Elizabeth took whatever steps she could to indicate the close

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ties between herself and her guests – inviting them to stay at Windsor Castle, for example, and sending Prince Charles to meet them at the airport. Gibraltar was seen as the one ‘issue’ of the visit. Juan Carlos had, after all, made reference to Gibraltar in the very first speech he made as King in November 1975, and he and Queen Sofía had declined the invitation to attend the wedding of the Prince and Princess of Wales in 1981 because the honeymoon started from Gibraltar. Inevitably, therefore, there were references to Gibraltar that were made publicly by both Spanish and British monarchs. In a speech at the end of the banquet at Windsor Castle on the first evening of the visit, King Juan Carlos referred to some differences remaining between their nations, and expressed the hope that our two Governments will find by means of a negotiating process already begun, appropriate formulae for reaching a solution satisfactory to all, so that, resolved, what have been matters of conflict become elements of understanding and cooperation between our two countries to the direct benefit of the populations involved. (The Times, 23 April 1986) Queen Elizabeth had earlier struck a similar note. ‘There are of course still differences between us,’ she said, ‘it would be surprising if there were not. But these are being handled in a friendly and cooperative spirit as befits close allies and partners, for we have so much in common that friendship between our two countries is assured’ (idem). On the following day, 23 April, the Spanish King became the first foreign monarch to address a joint gathering of the two Houses of Parliament. Twice during the speech he made explicit reference to Gibraltar. He called for ‘the early disappearance of the only problem that separates us’ (The Times, 24 April 1986), and later used a passage similar to that which he had used at the previous night’s banquet. Close observers of the King’s words noted that reference to an early resolution to the problem went against his known view that it could not be rushed, but no doubt Spanish Government advisers, mindful of the fact that a general election was due later in the year, inserted the word ‘early’ to indicate that the Government was not going to let the problem slide. The royal visit was by all accounts a great success. On a personal level, the two royal families clearly got on well (the Prince and Princess of Wales and their children were invited to spend several days as guests of the Spanish royals in Mallorca in August). The visit cemented longstanding and recently reinforced ties between the two countries, and enabled the problem of Gibraltar to be put in perspective. The future of Spain and Britain was shown to be inextricably linked through membership of the EC and NATO, while the likeable personality of the Spanish monarch and

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his personal contribution to the restoration of democracy in Spain commended him to even the most ardent defender of the ‘Britishness’ of Gibraltar. At the same time the problem was not swept under the carpet, and reference to it by the Spanish head of state within the Palace of Westminster – unthinkable a decade earlier – ensured that efforts to find a solution would be continued.

13 Into Felipe’s second term Guards and gates (June 1986–January 1987)

Having won the referendum vote on NATO in March, Felipe González decided to call a general election in June 1986 rather than run the full four-year term and wait until the autumn. An evaluation of the first PSOE government’s foreign policy achievements would leave a question mark as far as NATO was concerned (largely because it was not clear what the Government’s aims had been). However, there could be no doubt that entry into the EC and the unblocking of the negotiations on Gibraltar had been the Government’s two major successes. González comfortably won a second term and, just as he had done after his first victory, he included reference to Gibraltar when presenting his new Government’s programme in the Congress on 22 July. He expressed the hope that an agreement could be reached between Britain and Spain by 1990 on the decolonization of Gibraltar. Setting a target date – at least for an agreement on procedures and a timetable, however long-term – at least gave the impression that the Government was determined not to let up the pressure on Britain. It would also give Felipe González the whole of his second term in which to achieve this objective and earn himself a place in the history books; he may perhaps have envisaged that a third successive term with himself at the helm could not be guaranteed. If that was the case, he was being over-optimistic about Gibraltar although unduly pessimistic about his chances of continuing as Prime Minister into the following decade. A sign of British concession soon came – though hardly enough to encourage González that his target was likely to be met. It was decided to remove permanently the British military guard at the frontier post from 31 July. Britain argued that it was no longer appropriate to maintain such a military presence, given that Britain and Spain were now both members of the EC and NATO. Although it was only a ceremonial presence and had become something of a tourist attraction since the opening of the gates, the Gibraltarians inevitably viewed the withdrawal of the guard after some 250 years with some concern. Sir Joshua Hassan, who had been informed in advance of the withdrawal, returned from his holiday on the Costa del Sol.

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Two weeks later, in an attempt to make clear his opposition to the British move, Hassan revealed that the British and Spanish Governments had been discussing the removal not just of the guard but also of the gates themselves. He said that on 8 May he was informed that the Spanish Government had proposed that the gates be dismantled as a condition for the withdrawal of the Spanish military guard. Hassan opposed this; the British Government expressed its disappointment at his reaction, agreed to put the issue of dismantling the gates aside for the time being and decided on the withdrawal of the British military guard without Spanish reciprocity. Despite this revelation, Hassan gained little sympathy from the Gibraltarian opposition parties for the way in which the British Government had apparently treated him. They were united in condemning the unilateral withdrawal of the British guard, but whereas Hassan would have been satisfied with a reciprocal Spanish withdrawal, the opposition parties would not.1 The problem for many Gibraltarians was the fact that the territory in which the British guard had been mounted was part of the isthmus, territory not covered by the Treaty of Utrecht and which also includes the airport. Withdrawal of a British military presence from this sensitive area could therefore be seen as sending political messages that were encouraging to Spain and worrying for Gibraltarians. Eventually on 10 September, some six weeks after the British guard had been withdrawn, leading Gibraltarian politicians and community leaders from across the political spectrum sent a communiqué to Sir Geoffrey Howe on the issue. They protested at the withdrawal of the guard and asked the British Government not to remove the gates. They also rejected the Spanish policy of ‘osmosis’ because its ultimate objective was to drive them towards Spain, and requested that this be conveyed to Madrid (El País, 17 September 1986). Meanwhile, the technical talks progressed at a snail’s pace. Those scheduled for early June were called off at Spain’s request because it was felt that no progress had been made since the previous talks. David Radford, Head of the Southern Europe Department at the FCO, met his Spanish counterpart Jesús Ezquerra, Head of European Foreign Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 18 July, and Radford paid a lightning visit to Gibraltar at the end of August. The Civil Aviation Group met for talks on 10 September, prior to meetings on 18–19 September between Radford and Ezquerra, but continuing opposition in Gibraltar to the proposals on the joint use of the airport meant that little progress was made. Perhaps prompted by the strongly worded communiqué to which Hassan had been the leading signatory, El País published an interview with the Chief Minister of Gibraltar in which he made clear his concern to retain Gibraltar’s own identity. When asked why Gibraltarians were so afraid of the question of sovereignty, Hassan replied: ‘Because we are an established community who have come from many parts of Europe but

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who today have an identity as a people; we are neither British nor Andalusian, but Gibraltarian. Let’s say that we are British out of convenience . . . [We are] a combination of Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon cultures, which equals Gibraltarian’ (El País, 21 September 1986). He asserted that if Gibraltar were not so small, it would already be independent: ‘We are victims of geography, not history . . . Let’s not talk of sovereignty; time and future generations will decide that . . . When there is European political union and frontiers have lost their present meaning, then there will be no problem . . .’ (idem).2 Here was a clear indication that Hassan and likeminded Gibraltarians saw their best hope in going along with negotiations between Britain and Spain, but delaying their progress wherever possible, in the expectation that political change within Europe would eventually allow Gibraltar a satisfactory degree of autonomy. Although the British Government would never have admitted it – and under Margaret Thatcher would certainly have rejected the objective of European political union – it is likely that they would have supported such a strategy. Five months after his intervention on the Gibraltar issue in Britain, King Juan Carlos was again making a public statement about the need for an early solution and the re-incorporation of Gibraltar into Spanish territory. This time his forum was the opening of the general debate on 22 September 1986 of the 41st Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, where he was making his first official visit. He spoke on a range of issues, including making a reference to Gibraltar as an ‘anachronism’ and an ‘unjust situation’ (El País, 23 September 1986). In Gibraltar, the Government rejected the validity of the terms used by the King; in the absence of Hassan in London, his deputy, Adolfo Canepa, said that what was anachronistic was that a member of the EC was claiming territory which legally belonged to another member state, and that what would be unjust would be for Gibraltar and its people to have their sovereignty transferred against their wishes. Joe Bossano, the opposition leader, said that the King’s speech marked a return to the Spanish position under Franco (El País, 24 September 1986). However, the fact that the King of Spain (widely respected for his role in the restoration of Spanish democracy and of Spain’s full participation in international affairs) was making reference to Gibraltar before the United Nations (a forum whose principal success over the previous three decades had been to oversee the decolonization process) was unlikely to have been lost on the British delegation at the UN, which included the Foreign Secretary. On his return to London, Howe drafted a reply to the communiqué sent to him on 10 September by leading Gibraltarians. In a letter sent on 26 September he reaffirmed the British position that sovereignty extends over the whole territory of the Rock, and confirmed that the decision on the dismantling of the border gates would depend on the outcome of consultations going on in Gibraltar. He said that Britain was continuing to press the Spanish Government to remove the guard from its side of the

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border, and stated that ‘Spain is entitled to raise issues relating to sovereignty . . . but that these would be considered by Britain in the context of its commitments to the Gibraltarians’ (El País, 27 September 1986). Gibraltarians could take some comfort from Howe’s reply, although there is no indication that he was prepared to dissuade Madrid from following its ‘osmosis’ policy as requested – if for no other reason than that ‘osmosis’ helped the Gibraltarian economy, which in turn eased Britain’s financial obligations to the colony. As the end of the year approached, preparations were stepped up for the second annual encounter between the British and Spanish Foreign Ministers. Hassan, together with the Governor, Sir Peter Terry, went to London for this purpose on 1 October. On his return to Gibraltar, Hassan expressed doubts about whether the meeting would actually take place because no date had yet been set, but the Foreign Office said that this was due to Howe’s busy diary (El País, 8 October 1986). Britain currently held the Presidency of the European Community, and the biannual summit was due to be held in London on 5 and 6 December. It came as no surprise, therefore, when in mid-November it was announced that the meeting would not be held until 13 and 14 January. In the interim, Gibraltar’s role in NATO produced further discord over the visit to the Rock from 7 to 9 October by General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe. The Spanish Government expressed its profound displeasure and submitted a formal protest to the Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, at the visit to GIBMED (the NATO naval command over the Straits situated in Gibraltar), especially since Madrid had made it clear in February that it did not recognize the jurisdiction of GIBMED.3 The visit came at a sensitive time, since the US and Spain were in the process of negotiating in Washington a reduction of the US military presence in Spain, which had been part of the Government’s commitment in the NATO referendum campaign. General Rogers said that he understood Spain’s objection to NATO bases in Gibraltar, but that he lived in the real world and his visit to observe resources was essential (El País, 16 October 1986). Spain’s Ambassador to NATO, Jaime de Ojeda, said the visit was badly timed and ill advised, and added that for Spain the main reality was Gibraltar’s colonial status (El País, 17 October 1986). Another factor that had made the timing of General Rogers’ visit so sensitive was that Spain was due to start discussions on 30 and 31 October in Brussels on its role within NATO – discussions that would inevitably be linked with those on reductions of US forces in Spain. The main difficulty envisaged for the Brussels talks (which were expected to take many months) was the implementation of coordination between Spain and NATO in Gibraltar through GIBMED, the command that Spain did not recognize but through which it would have to liaise. One solution would be on the basis of some diplomatic agreement between London and

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Madrid; another would involve Spain bypassing GIBMED (and the air command GIBAIR) and coordinating directly with AFSOUTH in Naples. Spain’s concern, of course, was to ensure that any agreement that might be reached should not cast any doubts upon its claim for sovereignty over the Rock. Spanish reaction to General Rogers’ visit probably had something to do with the cancellation of the visit by Admiral Cesare Pellini, Chief of NATO naval forces in Southern Europe, which had been scheduled for 20 October. The official reason given by the British Navy in Gibraltar for the cancellation was ‘operational reasons’, whereas the reason given by a spokesman for the HQ of the Allied Forces in Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples was ‘scheduling’ (El País, 21 October 1986). The Spanish Government interpreted the cancellation as being due to NATO not wishing to create further political turmoil in Spain, although his visit eventually took place on 6 January 1987 without any formal protest. Felipe González made his first public comments on Gibraltar since starting his second term in an interview for BBC Radio on 10 October. He described the effect of Gibraltar on Anglo-Spanish relations as ‘a stone in Spain’s shoe’, and felt that there was a pressing need to reach an agreement that would lead to an eventual resolution of the problem (El País, 11 October 1986). His interviewer pressed him for a time-scale, and González concurred that an agreement during his term of office would be ‘reasonable’. However, what annoyed Gibraltarians was his statement that they have ‘no right to self-determination’ (idem). Hassan said that the Spanish Prime Minister’s remarks ‘went totally against the spirit of greater understanding in Anglo-Spanish contacts in recent years, and could contribute to a hardening of attitudes on all sides’ (idem). Joe Bossano’s reaction was that Felipe González’s rejection of self-determination was totally unacceptable, and that an agreement on the problem was out of the question as long as he remained in power (idem). The Gibraltarian governing party’s response to the Spanish Prime Minister was to consider, in early November, the possibility of changing the status of Gibraltar from colony to a state in free association, like the Cook Islands in their relationship with New Zealand or Puerto Rico with the United States, with complete internal self-government excluding foreign relations and defence. However, the British Government’s response was that such an idea was a non-starter, because it contravened Article 10 of the Treaty of Utrecht, although Hassan’s party argued that such an arrangement would not involve a change of sovereignty (El País, 2 November 1986).4 These Gibraltarian reactions to the Spanish Prime Minister clearly indicated the continuing existence of a sizeable gulf in the perceptions of how negotiations should develop. The Foreign Office was not pleased with González’s utterances, particularly the pressure which a specific timescale implied, especially given the fact that the British guard had been

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withdrawn in what was intended as something more than just a symbolic gesture. The British Government reacted to Prime Minister González’s remarks by including reference to the maintenance of Britain’s commitment to the people of Gibraltar in the Queen’s Speech at the opening of the Parliamentary session (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 12 November 1986, Col. 3). Although Gibraltar had been mentioned in the speech at the opening of the 1984 session, there had been no such reference in 1985 because of the visit of the King and Queen of Spain. Clearly Margaret Thatcher was not at all pleased with her Spanish counterpart, especially given the fact that he had recently said that Spain would not recognize the 150-mile exclusion zone for fishing boats off the Falklands/ Malvinas. In preparation for the talks between the two Foreign Ministers scheduled for January 1987, meetings were as usual held beforehand between officials, this time in London on 19 December. Beforehand, the leader of the Spanish delegation, Jesús Ezquerra, reported a sense of frustration over what they saw as British intransigence in refusing to discuss the sovereignty issue, as evidenced by the fact that nearly two years had elapsed since Spain put forward the leaseback or condominium proposals and Britain had yet to reply (El País, 18 December 1986). There was further frustration at the lack of progress on the proposal for joint use of the airport, and the Gibraltarians themselves provided a timely reminder of their hostility to the idea by passing unanimously a motion in their House of Assembly on 17 December calling for the airport to remain under British and Gibraltarian control (The Times, 18 December 1986). Further indications that the talks would not alleviate Spain’s frustration occurred on 8 January when John Grant, a British Foreign Office spokesman, said in an interview for Spanish radio that ‘our commitment to the people of Gibraltar is something which cannot be altered and we are not prepared to make any concession or any change on the question of sovereignty, nor to discuss proposals which may lead to changes in our position on sovereignty’ (El País, 9 January 1987). The Director of the Spanish Office for Diplomatic Information, Inocencio Arias, described the statement as ‘unwonted and contradictory’, and confirmed that ‘Spain will broach the subject of the sovereignty of Gibraltar at all levels at the meeting in London on the 13th and 14th’ (idem). The British position seemed to be that Spain was free to discuss sovereignty, but it should not expect anything to change as a consequence of such discussion. Spain would have to wait a good many years before that position altered.

14 The battle over the airport ( January–December 1987)

As if to prepare for the likelihood that the talks in London on 13 and 14 January 1987 at Foreign Minister level would produce little progress, the Spanish press noted that, once again, this was not an auspicious time for negotiations to take place. Elections were likely in Britain during the year, and were also scheduled in Gibraltar itself, and elections and concessions on sensitive issues to foreign powers do not make good bedfellows. Britain’s position on the sovereignty question was seen to have hardened in the light of the comments of the FCO spokesman, John Grant, together with the fact that no response to Spain’s specific proposals had been forthcoming. The ongoing talks on the reduction of the US military presence in Spain (a reduction to which the US was opposed) and the discussions on establishing Spain’s role in NATO (two of whose military commands were established in Gibraltar) were other factors that clouded the issue. It was assumed in Madrid that no progress could be expected on the Gibraltar question until Spain’s position on these matters had been clarified. Whilst that was probably true it was also over-optimistic, for the fundamental difference between Britain and Spain was one of priorities, and these became quite clear when the talks got under way. The meeting on the afternoon of 14 January was described as tough and tense. There was even disagreement as to the nature of the meeting; the Spanish side saw it as a summit meeting on Gibraltar, whereas Britain viewed it as one of a series of meetings to discuss matters of mutual interest, including Gibraltar. Fernández Ordóñez accused Britain of blocking the negotiating process by not responding to Spain’s proposals on sovereignty. Sir Geoffrey Howe’s position was that Spain had a lot more work to do in improving Spanish–Gibraltar relations before the question of sovereignty could be considered. On the following day the two Foreign Ministers and their delegations met again, before Fernández Ordóñez and Howe had a meeting with Margaret Thatcher. Fernández Ordóñez argued that as long as the colonial anachronism of Gibraltar continued, the Rock would cast its shadow over bilateral relations between Spain and Britain. However, the British

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position remained that the priority was to respect the wishes of the Gibraltarians, although they did affirm that they had rejected the idea that Gibraltar might become a state in free association, and that any change in Gibraltar’s status (if that should ever occur) would involve its transfer to Spain. That appeared a long way off, however, and satisfaction was expressed in Gibraltar at the outcome of the talks. In Britain it was suggested that one positive sign from the meetings was a determination to find an acceptable compromise on the use of the airport. In Spain they were not at the moment concerned with airports, and the talks were described as a failure (El País, 15 January 1987). The Times on 16 January blamed Madrid for being too impatient, but also ascribed some of the fault to London for allowing Spain to expect too much from the Brussels Declaration, which suffered from the weakness that it would always place the British Government in difficulty whenever the sovereignty issue was raised. However, any hope in London that Madrid’s approach might change as a result of this round of talks had to be quickly abandoned. Felipe González, returning from an official visit to Egypt while the talks had been going on in London, said that Spain’s line of negotiation on Gibraltar would not change at all (El País, 16 January 1987). Like it or not, Spain had to be satisfied with talks on the use of the airport as the next step, and further discussions at the Ezquerra–Radford coordinator level were held in Madrid on 26 March. However, there was no announcement afterwards of any progress having been made. While the talks were proceeding the Gibraltar Government announced a proposal to expand the air terminal at a cost of £2.5 million ($4.5 million), as part of a total development package costing £20 million ($36 million) over four years up to 1990. In January, Howe had put his weight behind progress on joint use of the airport – or ‘allowing Spain to use the airport facilities’, as he preferred to see it – because there would be mutual economic benefit from such an arrangement (idem). The problem with the airport issue, of course, was that it too could be seen (and was seen by the Gibraltarians and the Spaniards) as a question of sovereignty because of its location on the disputed isthmus. Although they were prepared for Spanish civil airlines to use Gibraltar airport, Gibraltarians saw any concession to Spain with regard to the establishment of their own terminal as the thin end of the wedge; Sir Joshua Hassan said as much on a visit to Seville a few months later (El País, 7 May 1987). However, progress on a different front was made earlier that month, when Spain agreed to eliminate restrictions on the use of air space by British military aircraft over Gibraltar in exchange for Britain lifting its veto on Spanish membership of Eurocontrol, the European air traffic control body. Meanwhile, there was general agreement that the Gibraltar economy was booming. Prior to the opening of the border in February 1985 there were just under 2,000 companies established on the Rock, but by the end

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of 1986 there were 3,800. Part of the attraction was that, for companies registered in Gibraltar but not trading there, profits were largely exempt from tax. Financial services institutions had grown from four in 1980 to 15, including the Spanish banks Bilbao and Central, and many of their clients were resident in Spain. Bank deposits had increased by 68 per cent during 1986.1 Income tax and taxes on cars and car-parts had been reduced to make them more competitive with Spain. Goods were free from VAT, and therefore a shopping visit remained an attractive proposition. Imports from Spain had increased by 60 per cent over the previous year, and now constituted 15 per cent of total imports. Import duty revenue had increased from £4.4 million ($7.9 million) in 1984 to nearly £10 million ($18 million) in 1986. The tourism sector was still booming, and now provided nearly a quarter of Gibraltar’s income. Since the beginning of 1985 more than five million visitors had arrived, and the rate had reached about 60,000 per week. The number of air passengers from London to Gibraltar in 1986 was 90,000, the highest level since 1968. Of these, 22,000 were heading for the Costa del Sol. Ambitious plans were in the pipeline for the development of Queensway Quay, a hotel, apartment and marina complex on the west side of the peninsula. Talks were held in March 1987 on tourism marketing that would involve the use of facilities on both sides of the border. Such collaborative ventures were essential if the Campo was to avoid feeling that all the advantages of the opening of the border had gone to Gibraltar. Of course there had been economic benefits to the Spanish side, but they were not as visible as they were on the seven square kilometres of the Rock because they were not confined to the Campo region but spread throughout Spain. The Gibraltar issue affected a new element in Spain’s relations with its EC partners on 25 May, when Spain refused to sign two agreements during the first meeting of European Community Justice Ministers. The first agreement prevented the same person from being tried and found guilty of the same crime in two EC member states. The second agreement concerned abolishing the legalization of commercial transactions. Spain’s Justice Minister, Fernando Ledesma, said that he could not sign them because of the problem of applying them to Gibraltar (El País, 26 May 1987). However, it was the issue of Gibraltar airport which took on a much more significant European dimension on 24 June at a meeting of EC Ministers of Transport in Luxembourg, when Spain threatened to refuse to agree to the deregulation of commercial air traffic. Agreement had been reached on the reduction of fare schedules (albeit hedged with an inordinate number of conditions) and the removal of the 50–50 agreement on the distribution of seat capacity between airlines, but there was also a ‘market access’ proposal to allow regular flights to major regional airports (so-called ‘third category airports’) from any member country using

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planes with a maximum seating capacity of 70 passengers. Spain argued that if Gibraltar were included in the agreement it would constitute implicit recognition of the airport as British, and therefore recognition of British sovereignty over the isthmus (El País, 25 June 1987). The issue was to dominate the rest of the year in Anglo-Spanish relations. The negotiations on the deregulation of civil air traffic in the Community had been going on for almost a year, but it was not until 9 June that Spain decided to pose Gibraltar as an obstacle to its signing of the agreement.2 The question was raised in the form of a letter from the Spanish Transport Minister, Abel Caballero, to the European Commissioner for Transport, Stanley Clinton-Davis, asking whether Gibraltar airport was included on the list of regional airports to benefit from deregulation (El País, 24 June 1987). The letter was not formally answered; instead bilateral discussions between Caballero and his British counterpart, Paul Channon, took place on 24 June. Spain hoped to persuade Britain to agree to exclude Gibraltar airport from the agreement, which had to be accepted by all member states to be implemented. However, Britain (which had included Gibraltar on a list of airports submitted to the Commission in 1984) was unwilling to change its position. Further negotiations on 25 June proved fruitless when a compromise, formulated by Spain but proposed by the Commission, failed to find acceptance. The Commission proposed that the directive be adopted, excluding its application to Gibraltar, while Spain and Britain would meet subsequently to find a solution to the Gibraltar airport issue, which they would then put to the Commission. Channon said Britain would agree on condition that an agreement was reached within three months in order (so he said) not to delay work on the airport on which it wished to embark. The Spanish delegation declined to accept this condition, however, because they feared that an agreement would not be reached within such a time-scale. Gibraltar airport would then be included in the directive and Britain would thereby establish through an EC directive what it had so far failed to establish in two years of bilateral talks. It was suggested (though not confirmed) that the British and Spanish Prime Ministers had communicated by telephone on the subject, but without altering their respective positions (El País, 26 June 1987). The Belgian President of the Council of Transport Ministers, Hermann de Croo, decided to reconvene the meeting on 30 June (to coincide with the meeting of Heads of Government in Brussels), in the hope that a compromise might be worked out in the interim. If this was not forthcoming, it was argued that the whole agreement (including reductions in fares) would be set back for months, possibly years, because under the Single European Act (due to come into force on 1 July) there would have to be a report from the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee which would take some time to produce. Britain no doubt hoped that Spain (which stood to gain from deregulation more than most other

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EC countries) would not be able to withstand the pressure that the remaining ten Community members would exert in order to produce an agreement on 30 June. If neither side gave way, they would have to hope that the other would be blamed for the failure. Possible areas of compromise were explored during the weekend of 27 and 28 June, when Jesús Ezquerra (Head of Western Europe policy at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and David Hannay (permanent British representative to the EC) were seen separately by an official of the Belgian Foreign Affairs Ministry. Spain requested (so Britain claimed) that these meetings be indirect (i.e. conducted through an intermediary) rather than bilateral, in the hope that such a formula would be more successful. It did not prove to be the case. On 29 June, Belgium suggested a 12-month postponement before the agreement would apply to Gibraltar airport, but Spain rejected any time limit while Britain said the time limit was too long and the implementation of the agreement would not thereafter be automatic. A face-to-face meeting between Ezquerra and Hannay only confirmed the distance between the two sides.3 It came as no surprise, therefore, that at the reconvened meeting of European Transport Ministers on 30 June in Luxembourg, no agreement was reached and deregulation was not adopted. Spain rejected the final proposal put forward by France – a verbal commitment by the ten other member states not to use Gibraltar while Britain and Spain resolved their differences – because it had no legal validity, although Spain’s Transport Minister saw this move as a sign of support for his country’s position. Britain saw Spain’s position as inconsistent with having accepted the statute on Gibraltar when signing the Accession Treaty, and did not see that Spain’s claim to Gibraltar or the bilateral talks were in any way threatened by acceptance of the air transport directive. The meeting broke up in the small hours of the morning of 1 July, by which time the Single European Act had come into force. Since one of the consequences of that was that certain proposals no longer needed unanimous agreement, Spain felt obliged to threaten to use a power of veto, still available to member states when they consider that vital national interests are at stake – the so-called ‘Luxembourg compromise’.4 This, Spain hoped, would be enough to deter the Commission from an early return to the proposal, although the Commissioner responsible for competition policy, Peter Sutherland, soon made it clear that they were unlikely to be deterred for long. Meanwhile, in Brussels, Margaret Thatcher, fresh from her third election victory three weeks earlier, had been undertaking her usual lone battle against the other member states – this time over the proposals for economic and social union in the so-called Delors Plan. Spain was able to use the British Prime Minister’s stubbornness there to gain some sympathy for the difficulties that Spain had to face on the airport issue, as well as to minimize the impact of the failure to reach an agreement on it.

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The Times on 2 July took a much more cynical view of the whole process. Spain was accused of thinking up the Gibraltar issue as a last minute trick to protect the Iberia airline from competition, with the other governments feeling privately grateful that Spain had thought of a good way of scuppering the agreement so that they too could protect their national airlines. Whilst the extent of progress achieved since then goes some way to support this thesis, the fact is that in view of the stalemate in the bilateral talks on the joint use of Gibraltar airport because of what it might imply regarding sovereignty, Spain was hardly likely to agree to a European measure which had similar – if not greater – implications. It was inevitable that sooner or later the Gibraltar question would become a European issue, but the fact that in this instance it prevented the acceptance of a European directive which would have resulted in greater market freedom – the main raison d’être of the Community in Thatcher’s view – would not have advanced Spain’s cause on the Gibraltar issue in the eyes of the British Government. The whole incident left Anglo-Spanish relations – at least at governmental level – at a low ebb. Felipe González was as much irritated by the Luxembourg fracas as he was by Margaret Thatcher’s intransigence in Brussels when he criticized Britain in a Spanish TV interview a week after the summit for ‘believing least in European unity’, and for being interested only in a free market by 1992, rather than a Europe ‘of solidarity concerned with the needs of citizens as a whole’. He added: ‘I will oppose all steps to advance the internal market which are not accompanied directly by measures for solidarity’ (The Times, 13 July 1987). Given the tenor of such remarks, it was scarcely surprising that neither leader had visited the other during the five years they had both been in power. Even with interpreters, they were unlikely to understand each other’s language. Things went from bad to worse after an interview that Howe gave to El País. His insistence that Britain was obliged to respect the wishes of the Gibraltarians would have come as no surprise to Spain. His reiteration of the British position on the deregulation of air traffic was equally predictable, as was his conviction that moves on sovereignty would take a long time. However, the Spanish Government would have been disturbed by the implication that Spain should not expect much in answer to the alternatives on sovereignty that it proposed in February 1985 because they did not make any provision for the Gibraltarians to have a say on the decisions affecting their future. Nor would they have liked the statement that the isthmus had been under exclusive British jurisdiction since at least 1838, and that Britain had no doubts about the legitimacy of its title (El País, 31 July 1987).5 The response from the Spanish Foreign Ministry to these remarks was swift. The following day, 1 August, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez stated that Spain did not recognize Britain’s ‘occupation’ of the isthmus. He went on to say that the issue was not just a legal one but also a political

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problem relating to the decolonization of the whole area, including the isthmus and the Rock. He reiterated Spain’s position on the airport issue, claiming that Spain was prepared to accept the whole package as long as Gibraltar was excluded from the agreement, whereas Britain was prepared to scupper the whole proposal for the sake of including Gibraltar (El País, 1 August 1987). Clearly the airport issue had soured the negotiating climate considerably. In his response Fernández Ordóñez also took up the point that Howe had made about the wishes of the Gibraltarians being paramount, saying that Spain was willing for them to keep their British nationality, their economic and taxation system, their cultural and linguistic identity and local self-government (idem). Here was a clear attempt by the Spanish Government to make plain that their interest was in the territory and not the people. The irony was that Britain could probably have accepted all that if the Gibraltarians themselves were prepared to do so too. An opinion poll published in Panorama in Gibraltar showed how unlikely that was. It indicated that Joe Bossano’s GSLP, which had opposed the Brussels Declaration, had gained 7 per cent since the elections of 1984 and was now in the lead – the first time in ten years of opinion polls that Sir Joshua Hassan’s AACR was not ahead (quoted in El País, 4 August 1987). Gibraltar became an issue at the European level for the third time in the year in mid-September, though in a very different way from the first two occasions. This time it involved a question of protocol during a visit by Hassan and other leading Gibraltarians on 16 September to the European Parliament in Strasbourg at the invitation of Lord Bethell, a British Conservative MEP and Chairman of the Gibraltar in Europe Representation Group. The objective of the visit, to which Spanish representatives objected but which they could not prevent, was to provide the Gibraltarians with the opportunity to lobby MEPs on their right to determine their own future. Fernando Morán, former Foreign Minister and now a Euro MP, expressed the concern of Spanish MEPs that Hassan’s visit should not be seen as official in any way, and in particular that he should not be received by the President of the Parliament, Lord Plumb (El País, 16 September 1987). When Plumb switched a meeting with Hassan and other Gibraltarians, including Joe Bossano, at the last minute from his Parliamentary office to the residence of the British Ambassador to the Council of Europe, Hassan went to the meeting only to stay long enough to say to Plumb: ‘I am very sorry you have submitted to Spanish pressure in this way. Thank you very much. Goodbye.’ Bethell, Hassan and Bossano gave a press conference the following morning, in which they denounced ‘the dreadful manipulation by the Spaniards’ (The Times, 18 September 1987).6 Plumb later explained to the press that he had not wanted to put the interests of the Parliament at risk, nor to harm the European Democrats Group

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(the Euro-Parliament group which consisted mainly of British Conservatives and Spanish members of Alianza Popular and whose views on the subject of Gibraltar were, therefore, far from unanimous). He also argued that there was more room at the Ambassador’s residence for such a large delegation (El País, 18 September 1987). It is highly unlikely that the Gibraltarians will have found Plumb’s last explanation very convincing. Meanwhile, bilateral negotiations on the airport, which should have taken place at the end of June, finally got under way again in London on 8 September. At the meeting Spain put forward a number of technical proposals, but there was otherwise no sign of progress. Pressure from the EC to work towards some agreement on the airport so that the directive on the deregulation of air traffic could be implemented resulted in an additional meeting on 5 October. The Spanish delegation was now headed by Fermín Zelada, who had replaced Jesús Ezquerra as Head of Western Europe policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The meeting was continued on the following day, but neither side showed any sign of willingness to shift its position. The two sides agreed to meet again in London on 29 and 30 October. The six areas on which the discussions had centred involved access by Spaniards to the airport without having to go through border controls (which Britain and Gibraltar opposed); the building of another terminal (from which arriving passengers, whatever their point of departure, would directly enter Spain and which Britain accepted); Spanish involvement in the control of Gibraltarian airspace and the presence of Spanish air-traffic controllers in the control tower (both of which Britain rejected on miltary grounds since the airport was still strictly an RAF base); the use by Iberia of airport facilities, and their involvement in the running of the airport (which Britain was prepared to concede). However, true to expectations, neither side announced any progress. The chances of any agreement being reached before the next meeting at Foreign Minister level on 30 November were looking more and more remote. David Radford, the Under-Secretary at the FCO heading the British delegation on the airport negotiations, went to Gibraltar on 10 November in an attempt to sound out local opinion on new proposals. However, even before he went, Gibraltarian opinion was hardening. At the AGM of the Gibraltar Trades Council, a resolution was passed that vigorously opposed any agreement on the airport that might adversely affect any aspect of Gibraltarian sovereignty or any trade unionist. Other representative groups issued similar statements of opposition (El País, 4 November 1987). On 10 November, 12,000 Gibraltarians, led by Hassan and Bossano, marched through the streets in what was one of the largest demonstrations ever held in the territory. A 15,000-signature petition was presented to Radford, calling on the British Government not to make any concessions to Spain over the airport. The following day Joe Bossano announced

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a motion to be debated by the Gibraltarian House of Assembly on 17 November endorsing the ‘no concessions’ demonstration (El País, 12 November 1987). Despite this show of opposition, Radford went ahead and put the British Government’s new proposals to the colony’s political leaders. They involved the offer of the use of airport facilities to Spain in exchange for the lifting of Spain’s veto on the deregulation of European air transport. It was argued that the facilities would not affect the question of sovereignty because they would only be take-off and landing facilities for air traffic generated by Spain for Spain. When the Spanish and British negotiating teams had yet another presummit meeting on 16 November in Madrid, it was reported that some slight progress had been made, although no details were given. Howe issued a statement in London indicating his desire to see an agreement reached, but once again Gibraltarian opposition was swift and unanimous. On 17 November, the House of Assembly unanimously passed the motion calling on the British Government not to reach any agreement with Spain that would give them joint control of the airport (El País, 18 November 1987). The Trades Council, representing 80 per cent of the Gibraltarian workforce, announced their intention to block the implementation of any agreement (El País, 19 November 1987). The response from the Spanish authorities was to tighten border controls, which caused long delays at the frontier. On 26 November, Hassan travelled to London to discuss Britain’s negotiating position with Howe before going on to Madrid as part of the British delegation. On arrival in Madrid Hassan made it quite clear that while flights from Spain to Gibraltar would be welcomed, he was totally opposed to any Spanish involvement in the control of the airport and any symbolic agreement that might appear to advance Spain’s position regarding sovereignty over the isthmus (El País, 28 November 1987). The prospects that an agreement might be reached were in the balance as other negotiators gathered in Madrid for the meetings on 27 and 28 November. Accusations by Spanish Government officials that Britain appeared to make important concessions but in reality only made proposals that were not acceptable to Spain did not augur well, but in London it was felt that Britain’s offer would be enough to persuade Spain to accept. In detail, Britain was prepared to treat Spanish passengers flying to a Spanish airport (but not those with other destinations) as transit passengers, who would not therefore have to go through British passport and customs control. Britain was also prepared to allow the construction of an air terminal on the Spanish side of the airport for Spanish use, and the presence of a Spanish air-traffic controller provided that he was acting only as a link with Seville on account of the military functions of Gibraltar airport. For Britain, the only danger was, as The Times put it on 26 November, that Gibraltarian demonstrations against such an agreement ‘might

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awaken post-colonial sentries in the dustier corridors of Westminster’. The real question, however, was whether Spain would be prepared to accept the concessions that would allow it to use the airport facilities but not to exercise any control over them. On his arrival in Madrid, Howe had a brief meeting with King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister González before getting down to talks with his Spanish counterpart in the afternoon and evening of 27 November. The four hours of talks were frequently interrupted while consultations were held with Downing Street and the Moncloa Palace. A further six hours of talks the following day with the full delegations involved still proved insufficient for any agreement to be reached. The Gordian knot, it appeared, was whether Britain was willing to accept Spain’s demand for a clause stating that the inclusion of Gibraltar airport in the deregulation of European air traffic did not indicate recognition of Britain’s sovereignty over the isthmus or in any way prejudice Spain’s sovereignty claims. With the pressure still on to try and reach an agreement before the EC Transport Ministers’ meeting on 7 December, the two sides decided to have further discussions in London on 2 December – the eleventh occasion since June that talks on the airport had been held. With the threat of opprobrium by the rest of the EC hovering over the meeting, agreement was finally reached at 9.30 pm after a further nine hours of hard bargaining between the negotiating teams, which included the respective Transport Ministers. The joint statement issued in the small hours of 3 December provided the details of the agreement, the main points of which were: • • •

•

• •

Spain would decide which airlines would operate Spanish air services between Spain and Gibraltar; a new terminal would be built on the Spanish side of the airport, with direct access to and from Spain; the new terminal would be used for the arrival by air of any passengers of any nationality not intending to enter Gibraltar, or for passengers intending to depart from Spain to another country; passengers would be subject to customs and passport control in the appropriate terminal; a committee would be set up under the supervision of the civil aviation working group to coordinate activities in the two civil transport terminals and their relationship with other airport services; there would be close collaboration on security measures; there would be continuing discussions on strengthening air safety and air traffic control in the region. (El País, 4 December 1987)

The declaration included a statement that the agreement was without prejudice to the respective legal positions of Spain and Britain in their

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dispute regarding sovereignty over the territory where the airport is situated. This was heralded by Spain as the first time since 1966 that Britain had conceded that Spain disputed British sovereignty over the isthmus. As an indication that the bilateral talks did extend to matters other than the airport, in an annexe to the declaration there were also agreements to reestablish the ferry service between Algeciras and Gibraltar as soon as possible and to improve the flow of traffic through customs (idem). Predictable satisfaction was expressed by the European Commissioners for Transport and for Competition Policy on the agreement (idem). Spain secured its ‘without prejudice’ statement regarding the directive on the deregulation of air traffic, and both sides would jointly inform the Commission that Gibraltar airport would be excluded from the directive until such time as the agreement was ready to be implemented. Both the local governments in the Campo de Gibraltar and the Government in Madrid expressed satisfaction with the outcome (idem). Spain had successfully prevented what would have been (as it saw things) the international legitimization of a situation in which the sovereignty of the territory was in dispute. It was the first tangible gain for Spain arising from the Brussels Declaration made three years before. The British Government also seemed reasonably satisfied with the deal. Thatcher congratulated her Foreign Secretary during Prime Minister’s Question Time on 3 December because the agreement, which she claimed would bring great benefits for the whole of Europe, was reached ‘without any derogation from the sovereignty of Gibraltar, and gives the Gibraltarians the possibility of joining that agreement if they wish to do so’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 3 December 1987, Col. 1102). Howe tried to sell the package to Gibraltar by a reminder of the economic advantages that wider use of the airport would bring. However, Gibraltarian leaders did not see it that way. The exclusion of Gibraltar airport from the deregulation package, together with the fact that once the Spanish terminal was built there would be an increase in the number of passengers entering Spain rather than Gibraltar, meant that there was very little in the agreement which was of advantage to Gibraltar. Since the agreement was also seen as the thin end of the wedge as far as Spanish encroachment was concerned, it was not surprising that the initial reaction from Gibraltar was less than enthusiastic (El País, 4 December 1987) – although, somewhat surprisingly, Hassan then admitted that the agreement was the best that could be obtained (El País, 5 December 1987). Both he and Bossano welcomed the fact that Britain had given Gibraltarians the right to approve the necessary legislation in order to implement it. They interpreted this as a power of veto, although this interpretation was explicitly rejected by Spain and no doubt implicitly so by Britain. However, there was no denying the fact that if they chose to do so the Gibraltarians could delay the effect of the deregulation directive on their airport for some time.

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Clearly the saga of Gibraltar airport was far from over, but at least the agreement reached marked the end of the beginning. Both sides had carefully reserved their positions as far as sovereignty over the Rock was concerned, so no progress could be claimed in that direction.7 However, the principal gain was not so much the specific outcome relating to the use of the airport or the knock-on effect it would have on air-traffic deregulation; rather was it the fact that progress had been made within a European Community context. It had only happened because there was pressure for it to happen from the EC; the first step had taken 283 years because hitherto there had been no framework (pace the UN) outside the bilateral one to make it happen. It was that fact which should have given encouragement to Britain and Spain for progress in the long term. In the short term, there remained the problem of persuading the Gibraltarians themselves to accept the airport agreement.

15 Gibraltarians vote to resist (December 1987–March 1988)

No sooner was the airport agreement reached than Sir Joshua Hassan dropped a political bombshell on the inhabitants of the Rock by announcing on 9 December 1987 that he would stand down as Chief Minister with immediate effect, and that he would not stand for re-election at the House of Assembly elections scheduled for February. Hassan had been leader of the Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights (AACR) party since 1947, and a member of the Gibraltarian legislature since 1950. He became Gibraltar’s first Chief Minister following legislative changes in 1964 and, apart from the years 1969–1972 (when Robert Peliza, leader of the Integration With Britain Party held the post), he had acted in that capacity ever since. He had become almost a permanent fixture of Gibraltarian politics, but now, at the age of 72, he had decided (to use the popular phrase of the late 1980s in British politics) to spend more time with his family. Given the timing of his announcement, it was natural to assume that there was some connection between his decision and the outcome of the airport negotiations. However, Hassan stressed that the decision had been taken some months before, and that he had waited until the airport negotiations had been concluded before making his decision public, although he conceded that if an agreement had not been reached he would have stayed on until it was. In a resignation statement, he called upon Gibraltarians to decide on the airport agreement with their heads and not with their hearts (El País, 12 December 1987). His successor as Chief Minister was Adolfo Canepa, aged 46 and former Deputy to Hassan. A supporter of free association as the ultimate constitutional solution for Gibraltar, he was more hard-line than his predecessor towards Spain, although less so than the leader of the opposition, Joe Bossano, who saw the airport agreement as an unprecedented concession. Canepa’s first public pronouncement following Hassan’s announcement, to the effect that Gibraltar would not be Spanish even in 100 years’ time (El País, 11 December 1987), would not have won him any friends in Spain. The new scenario brought about by Hassan’s resignation also produced

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a new political entity, the Independent Democratic Party, whose formation was announced on 10 December, and which was to be led by a close adviser to Hassan, Joe Pitaluga. His intention was to stop a socialist election victory that he saw as likely in the vacuum caused by Hassan’s retirement, especially as three other ministers were expected to retire with him. All the predictions, however, were that in view of the uncertain stance of the centre-right on the airport agreement, Bossano was likely to win the elections. El País clearly thought so; on 21 December, ten days after the resignation of Hassan, the Spanish paper chose to interview the leader of the opposition rather than the new Chief Minister, Canepa. Joe Bossano was evidently unhappier about the airport agreement than had previously been reported in Spain or Britain. As a member of the EC since Britain joined in 1973, Gibraltar and its airport should, he argued in the interview, have been treated in the same way as any other EC airport included in the agreement. Instead, Gibraltar had been excluded, and when included it would be Spain who would decide which airlines could fly there, whereas if Spain wanted to fly to any other British airport it had to ask Britain. He did not accept that there had been any real agreement on the airport, because the Gibraltarians had not accepted it all along. He did not envisage any particular relationship with Spain in the future, but simply a normal relationship between two neighbouring states within the European Community. In the forthcoming elections, he promised that if he won he would dissociate Gibraltar from the Brussels Declaration (El País, 21 December 1987). Whatever they thought of Canepa, therefore, the Spanish Foreign Office must have wondered what they could do to assist him in order to prevent Bossano from coming to office. The Foreign Minister, Fernández Ordóñez, took the unprecedented step on 9 January 1988 of going to Algeciras to meet all the mayors of the Campo de Gibraltar region with a view to appointing a regional coordinator with the people of the Rock. The British FCO saw this as a positive step, and Lynda Chalker, Minister of State, congratulated him on his visit when she was in Spain some ten days later (El País, 20 January 1988). Gibraltar and NATO came back on the agenda at this time when Spain informed Lord Carrington, the Secretary General, of its decision regarding its contribution to NATO’s military and operational activities. The letter that Spain’s Ambassador to NATO, Jaime de Ojeda, handed to Carrington on 18 January made clear that Spain would not participate in manoeuvres or operations that were under the command or control of military authorities in Gibraltar (idem). Spain’s objective was to highlight to its NATO allies the problem that would arise, as long as the Gibraltar issue remained unresolved, if, as Spain proposed, one of Spain’s six contributions to NATO included a permanent naval presence under Spanish operational control stationed in and around the Straits.

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The longstanding issue of pensions payable to the 6,000 retired Spaniards who worked in Gibraltar arose once again in the Gibraltarian House of Assembly on 22 January. The reason it came up again was because the original agreement between London and Gibraltar – that the UK Government would pay £16.5 million ($29.7 million) and the Gibraltarians would pay £4.5 million ($8.1 million) over three years – was due to expire at the end of 1988,1 and the Gibraltarians felt that, since they had actually paid out the equivalent of all of the pensioners’ contributions plus interest, Britain and Spain should now work out a solution between them. The Chief Minister, however, felt that there was a moral obligation to continue to pay the pensions of those 500 Spaniards who had worked in Gibraltar but retired before 1969, at an annual cost of about £1 million ($1.8 million). Joe Bossano did not agree that there was any such moral obligation. Here was yet more evidence that the Leader of the Opposition in Gibraltar took an even more uncompromising line towards Spain than the Chief Minister. Cooperation with Spain was taking place, however, on a more mundane level. It was announced towards the end of January that the Gibraltarian authorities had reached agreement on the disposal of solid waste in a sewage plant on the Campo de Gibraltar side of the border; previously, solid waste had been dumped in the sea, to the annoyance of Spaniards in the region who complained at the effects on the environment and on public health. A consequence of the agreement made in Brussels in 1984, the plant was a further indication that on practical matters progress was possible. In mid-February the date of the forthcoming elections in Gibraltar was set for 24 March, some weeks later than had been expected. Electioneering immediately gathered pace. On 1 February, Joe Bossano had shaken the banking community by announcing that as part of his economic strategy he would set up a commercial bank with capital of £5 million ($9 million), with half the amount raised by the Government and half from the private sector (El País, 2 February 1988). While Bossano was tackling the banks, Adolfo Canepa was trying to take on the unions by threatening to introduce restrictive legislation if he were re-elected, as a response to the 25 strikes that Gibraltar had had over the previous two years (El País, 13 February 1988). It quickly became clear that the main issues of the election would be the unions, the shipyards, housing and, above all, Gibraltar’s relationship with Spain. As far as the last-mentioned was concerned, the most immediate context in which it had arisen concerned the airport. The airport issue reappeared at the end of February when Adolfo Canepa and Joe Bossano both had to go to Basle, where they took the opportunity to visit the airport, as it had been cited as offering the kind of arrangement that was being proposed for Gibraltar (see Chapter 11). They shared the view that the principal difference between the two cases was that in Basle there was

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no dispute over the sovereignty of the territory on which the airport had been constructed, whereas this was clearly not the case with Gibraltar. They both therefore indicated that Spanish acceptance of British sovereignty over the isthmus was essential before the Gibraltar House of Assembly would approve the agreement reached in December 1987 between London and Madrid (El País, 27 February 1988). That inevitably meant an indefinite postponement of the implementation of the airport agreement. On 6 March 1988, a good deal of unwanted publicity hit Gibraltar for reasons that were only indirectly connected with the dispute between Britain and Spain. Having entered Gibraltar from Spain, three unarmed IRA activists who were suspected of aiming to plant a car-bomb were shot by British troops and members of the British anti-terrorist squad. On 16 March, the Foreign Minister stated the official Spanish Government position on the incident to the Congress. He was speaking in reply to a representative from the Basque Community, who asked whether the Government was intending to make any formal diplomatic protest ‘at the summary execution of three unarmed members of the IRA in territory which Spain claims as its own’ (El País, 17 March 1988). Fernández Ordóñez answered that as the shootings occurred ‘on territory whose jurisdiction is exercised by the United Kingdom’, he had no intention of issuing a protest (idem). Fernández Ordóñez’s suggestion that what happened in Gibraltar had nothing to do with Spain was rejected by El País on 23 March, which claimed that since the Spanish authorities had not detained and extradited the three terrorists but allowed them to proceed to Gibraltar, ‘Spanish intervention in the incident was decisive’. Gibraltar’s Chief Minister clearly agreed; he took the opportunity to thank the Spanish security forces for their role in ensuring that the terrorists did not carry out their planned operation (El País, 12 March 1988). It could well be that the Spanish Government, anxious not to jeopardize progress on the talks on Gibraltar, decided to collaborate with the British Government in helping them to track the IRA terrorists’ movements. In any event, it is unlikely that the Spanish security forces would have known how the British forces intended to handle the situation once the terrorists reached Gibraltar; nor could they have made their collaboration contingent upon a ‘no-shoot-to-kill’ policy. The Spanish Government therefore played its hand carefully; it supported the British authorities and disclaimed any responsibility for what ultimately happened. The political fall-out from the shootings was difficult to establish. The event does not appear to have had any effect on the ongoing bilateral talks on the implementation of the Brussels Declaration because the British Government would have been quite satisfied with the cooperation it received from Spain.2 As far as the Gibraltar elections were concerned, the polls were already indicating that the GSLP was likely to win three

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weeks later. However, one Gibraltarian journalist believed that the incident did have an effect on the people of the Rock because it broke the warmth and closeness that had existed between the military personnel of the colonizing power and the people of the colony itself. After 1988, the MoD had to make new arrangements. Officers’ quarters could no longer be in the town, and the troops could no longer go to the local pubs. Army and civilians became oil and water. (Guardian, 9 November 1991) As the Gibraltar election drew closer and the two main parties published their manifestos, the differences between them on the central issue of sovereignty became more apparent. The position of Canepa’s AACR party was that it was fully committed to turning Gibraltar into a state in free association with Britain, and would continue to support the Brussels Declaration on the understanding that Gibraltar would have the last word on any agreement affecting sovereignty. On the airport issue, the AACR said it wanted to study the agreement further before making a decision on it. By contrast, Bossano’s GSLP called for self-determination; the party stated that it was firmly opposed to the people’s future and the sovereignty of their land being subject to negotiation between Britain and Spain, and would resist the absorption of Gibraltar by Spain. It would withdraw from participation in the negotiations on the Brussels Declaration, although it would cooperate with Spanish neighbours in the Campo. It was firmly opposed to accepting the agreement on the airport. Three days before polling day, a survey gave Bossano’s party 63 per cent. Not surprisingly, it was unofficially reported that the Spanish Government was seriously worried about the possible victory of the GSLP. In any event, they expected that as a consequence of the election campaign the agreement on the airport, as well as other projects involving local cooperation, would remain blocked for some time. All of the parties participating in the election had rejected the proposal made by the Spanish Foreign Minister during a visit to the Campo in January to offer grants and welfare benefits to inhabitants of the Rock. ‘Offer them to people in La Línea; that’s where they’re needed,’ Joe Bossano is reported to have said (El País, 26 March 1988). The outcome of the election was clear. On a turn-out of 76 per cent, Joe Bossano’s GSLP put an end to 40 years of Conservative domination in Gibraltar by winning the maximum possible eight of the 15 seats and 58 per cent of the popular vote. Perhaps more significantly, Joe Bossano’s personal vote of 8,128 was more than 4,000 votes higher than that of Adolfo Canepa, the leader of the AACR, which won the other seven seats. The candidates for Joe Pitaluga’s Independent Democratic Party all came at the foot of the poll. Although some observers saw Bossano’s victory as a consequence of the

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absence of Sir Joshua Hassan and the comparatively weak opposition offered in personality terms by Canepa and Pitaluga, there was no doubt that the strength of the vote for the GSLP candidates, all of whom outpolled the opposition, was a reflection of the popularity, as well as the clarity, of the stance Bossano had taken on relations with Spain. Few people interpreted the outcome as a swing by the voters of Gibraltar from right to left, although some felt that the attraction of Joe Bossano was his blend of Gibraltarian identity and socialism.3 El País on 26 March recognized the forces at work in Gibraltar that had led to Joe Bossano’s election as Chief Minister, but the paper reminded him that he was in no position to reject the Brussels Declaration or the airport agreement, not only because it was not in the Gibraltarians’ interests to do so, but also because Britain would if necessary remind Gibraltar of its colonial status. Bossano’s more constructive awareness of the need to develop good working relations with his Spanish neighbours in the Campo region was welcomed, and the paper concluded that ‘Spain should talk to London about decolonization and to Bossano about friendship and economic development’. The EC context was, however, once again seen as the way in which a solution to the problem would be found. The inexorable move towards political union in Europe ‘would make abolition of the colony a simple administrative act appropriate to civilized nations’, and, by implication, Gibraltar would become part of Spain. Wisely, the paper did not mention a time-scale – for, even supposing that the future of Gibraltar might one day be determined at a European level, the inhabitants of the Rock still had to be persuaded that being part of Spain was a good idea, and by electing Joe Bossano as Chief Minister they had just indicated the exact opposite. He summed up his policy towards Spain by asserting that ‘the Gibraltarian people do not want to integrate with Spain, but they do not feel any hostility towards Spain (El País, 27 March 1988) – hence his willingness to assist in the development of the economy of La Línea and the Campo region. More significant was his strategy to exploit the impotence of Britain and Spain in implementing agreements reached over Gibraltar because of the Gibraltarians’ intransigence, which led the Sunday Times to remark accurately on 27 March that ‘unless Spain and Britain make extravagant assurances to Bossano, any further talks on the territory’s future are likely to stagnate over the next four years’. For the British Government the Gibraltarians’ attitude provided a ready justification for the slow pace of negotiations, but there were frustrations, too, as with the airport agreement, where the Gibraltarians’ inflexibility threatened to impede the one aspect of European Community activity which Thatcher’s Government unreservedly supported, namely the liberalization of markets. The Spanish Government – and the Spanish media – were steadfastly opposed to the notion that the Gibraltarians had any right to interfere with the negotiating process, although they accepted their influence upon

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it. However, Joe Bossano’s intention was to give himself greater status than Sir Joshua Hassan had ever had vis-à-vis Spain by talking on a bilateral basis with the Spanish Prime Minister, Felipe González. If that were accepted, it would fit well with his plan to enhance Gibraltar’s position as a genuine third party in discussing the future of the Rock. There was no doubt that the Gibraltar over which Joe Bossano now presided was very different from in the pre-open border days. In 1987, the inhabitants of the Rock imported goods from Spain worth £15 million ($27 million). To dispense the cash required for these purposes (and to provide the loans for the apartments for sale in Marbella which were advertised on Gibraltar TV) there were now 20 banks, including three Spanish ones. In the shops, pesetas and the Spanish language were as much in evidence as pounds and English. There were now over a thousand Spanish workers on the Rock, although this was still far below the 4,666 at the time the border was closed in 1969. So in practical terms there was a creeping ‘hispanicization’ about dayto-day activity in Gibraltar. Osmosis was definitely at work. However, the Gibraltarian voters had made it clear that they were seeking their own path for the future. The election of Joe Bossano as Chief Minister meant a clear change of attitude by the political leadership in Gibraltar towards the Anglo-Spanish negotiation process. As a consequence, the resolution of the dispute over Gibraltar was one step further away.

16 First visits by first ladies (April–December 1988)

In the autumn of 1988, Spain was due to receive first-time visits from both Queen Elizabeth and Margaret Thatcher. The visits were a sign that Britain felt comfortable about the way in which negotiations on Gibraltar were proceeding, and an indication that Spain accepted rapprochement at all levels as a necessary concomitant to those negotiations. The visits also served to demonstrate the determination on the part of the British Government that the message conveyed by the Gibraltarians through the election of Joe Bossano would not affect good relations between Britain and Spain and would not impede the continuation of the negotiation process. Before these visits took place, however, there was earlier in the year another first visit, this time by General John Galvin, Supreme Commander of NATO in Europe and the first holder of that office to visit Spain, where he arrived on 6 April ‘to listen and to learn’ (El País, 7 April 1988). Inevitably the question of Spain’s contribution to NATO arose in connection with the visit, and as usual this involved consideration of the role of Gibraltar in NATO. Britain’s informal reaction to Spain’s position, which Spain had made clear in January (see Chapter 15) and which rejected any Spanish coordination with the GIBMED Command, was that any activities in Gibraltar involving Spanish forces would need to be coordinated from the Allied Forces Southern Europe Command (AFSOUTH) in Naples.1 General Galvin let it be known that if Spain found this solution acceptable, NATO would support it. Here, too, there was a clear attempt on all sides to try to ensure that the Gibraltar issue did not impede the progress of good relations between Spain and its partners. More tricky than General Galvin’s position, however, was that of the Governor of Gibraltar, Air Marshall Peter Terry, who also tried to please all sides at the inauguration of the new Gibraltarian Assembly on 14 April. He reiterated the British Government’s position of support for the Brussels Declaration, but also reaffirmed the pledge that ‘the sovereignty of Gibraltar would never pass to another country against the freely and democratically expressed wishes of the people of Gibraltar’ (El País, 15 April 1988). To please the Spanish Government, he called the airport agreement ‘sensi-

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ble and acceptable’, but he also reassured the Gibraltarians that it in no way affected the sovereignty of any part of the territory, and conceded that it was for the Assembly to decide whether to accept the agreement or not (idem). His address well demonstrated the balancing act that the British Government was trying to perform in order to satisfy all parties. Margaret Thatcher got caught up in it, too. A major concern of the Spanish Government following the victory of the GSLP in the Gibraltar elections was the British Government’s position with regard to Joe Bossano’s preferred option of self-determination for Gibraltar. This was put to the test when Antonio Hernández Mancha, leader of Spain’s main opposition party, the Alianza Popular, visited London on 25 April for talks with Thatcher, who made it quite clear that autonomy or independence for Gibraltar was out of the question. This would clearly not have pleased Bossano, who had already declared his intention to boycott the annual bilateral meetings of the two Foreign Ministers. However, the Spanish Government would have been gratified to learn that Britain would not be influenced by Joe Bossano’s stance, even though Britain’s commitment to respect the Gibraltarians’ wishes was, as far as Spain was concerned, a significant impediment to progress. Joe Bossano soon demonstrated his intention to carve out a more independent path as Gibraltarian leader than his predecessor by making a visit to the Canary Islands on 5 and 6 May without reference to the British Foreign Office. Although technically there was no need for him to do so as it was a private visit, there was no doubt that the visit had a political motive, and Bossano had talks with the CDS leader of the Government of the islands, Fernando Fernández Martín, which included discussion of a plan to link the Canaries and the Rock by sea. The visit did not pass without criticism, however, from the coalition partners of the CDS in the islands, the Alianza Popular, who described Fernández Martín’s meeting with the Gibraltarian Chief Minister as ‘a serious diplomatic error’ because ‘it legitimized the international contacts which Bossano might make in the future, to the detriment of Spanish interests’ and because it ‘threatened the unity of Spain’ (El País, 16 May 1993). The supposed threat to Spain posed at this time by Joe Bossano was not confined to the Canaries, however, for the Government decided to ban the broadcast of a debate on Spanish television on 20 May between the Chief Minister and the former Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando Morán, for the same reasons. Not surprisingly (for when free speech is at issue one medium of communication always springs to the defence of another), El País that morning was scathing in its criticism of the Government for reverting to the Franco-ist ways of suppressing views which the Government did not want the Spanish people to hear. In the column entitled ‘The policy of the ostrich’, the paper contrasted the attitude of TVE in Spain with the BBC, which had resisted government pressure not to show the programme Death on the Rock on the killing of the IRA activists.

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El País warned the Spanish Government that their attitude would only reinforce the views of Gibraltarians who were mistrustful of Spain’s declared good intentions towards them. Clearly Spanish politicians had not fully worked out how to handle the new Chief Minister’s approach to relations with Spain, and they fell back on old instincts from pre-democracy days. Hassan was ‘a devil they knew’; by contrast Joe Bossano was treated rather like a terrorist who had to be declared persona non grata if he tried to visit Spanish territory, or be denied the oxygen of publicity when it came to expressing his views over the airwaves. One of Bossano’s declared intentions in his election platform was to make Gibraltar as economically self-sufficient as he could. A major step was taken in this direction when it was announced at the end of July 1988 that a land reclamation programme would begin in October in the port area. The objective, which had the support of the British Ministry of Defence, was to increase the Rock’s land area by some 4 per cent in order to provide building land for civil projects. When completed, the programme would no doubt delight the Gibraltarians who had voted for Bossano, just as it would provide the Spanish authorities with further cause for concern about the future of the Rock. It would also provide a counter to the view expressed in a United Nations Decolonization Committee working paper due for discussion by the Committee on 12 August, which indicated that industrial, commercial and service activity on the Rock was virtually limited to the needs of the civilian population and the remaining military garrison. If the development succeeded, it could make Gibraltar into an attractive offshore centre for investors from all over the world. Bossano also started to undertake visits abroad in order to promote Gibraltar and to attract foreign investors. In early September he went to Washington and New York to try to secure US investments in the colony, as well as to persuade the US navy and merchant shipping companies to use Gibraltar’s shipyards for repairs. Later the same month he went to the Commonwealth Conference in Cyprus, and to a conference organized by the International Monetary Fund in Berlin. It was scarcely surprising, in view of the reaction to his visit to the Canaries, that he had still not been invited to visit Madrid. The issue of the IRA terrorists came back into the frame on 6 September, when the coroner’s inquest into the killings began in Gibraltar. Security measures were stepped up several days beforehand, with armed soldiers in combat gear posted outside military installations and the electronic screening of everyone entering the court. The Spanish press followed the event with interest, and on the day that the inquest began El País took some pleasure in describing the fact that an inquest was being held at all as ‘an important defeat for Margaret Thatcher’s Government’ (El País, 6 September 1988).

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Spain was largely a bystander in the month-long process. A report from the Spanish police concerning the location of the cars to be used in the attack was submitted as written evidence but was not used. Neither was a statement from a Spanish police officer from Málaga that provided crucial evidence about the tracking of the terrorists by the police in Spain. The officer was willing to appear in person at the inquest, but this offer was withdrawn under orders from his superiors without any clear explanation. Since they would be unable to question him, the lawyers in the case apparently agreed not to use the statement. The main issue involving Spain concerned the fact that the SAS officer in command of the operation maintained to the inquest that the Spanish police did not inform the British security forces that the suspected terrorists had left Málaga for Gibraltar. Hence, the officer claimed, the SAS were taken by surprise when the terrorists appeared on the Rock and had to take impromptu action without clear information as to whether or not the suspects were armed (El País, 20 September 1988). His evidence – delivered from behind a curtain that protected his and his fellow officers’ identity from the public and the press – went against claims made by the Spanish police and by the Ulster lawyer, Patrick McGrory, representing the families of the three victims. However, it was decisive in influencing the jury to bring in a verdict of lawful killing, which they did on 30 September.2 As a consequence, the SAS officers involved did not have to stand trial. Given the evidence as reported by the media, there were many who were surprised by the verdict. In Spain though, they were impressed by the legal process by which it was achieved: a coroner’s inquest before a jury with the identity of witnesses protected from public view was a complete novelty. The inquest served as a reminder of the different legal system in Gibraltar that would need to be respected if any future change in sovereignty were to occur. By the time the inquest came to an end, Margaret Thatcher had paid her first visit to Spain. On the eve of the visit on 22 September, she gave a press conference for Spanish correspondents in London. On the specific question of Gibraltar, she reminded Spain that it could not impose a solution against the wishes of the Gibraltarians, and she rejected parallels with Hong Kong because of the difference in the treaty arrangements governing the two colonies (idem). She was determined to give the clear impression that Britain does not dictate to Gibraltar what it must do, either in matters of foreign policy or on issues such as the airport agreement. Thatcher had put similar points in an interview broadcast on Spanish TV on 18 September. However, the Spanish Foreign Ministry did not accept these arguments. In an annoyed response, they pointed out that the reason Britain was committed to respect the wishes of the Gibraltarians was because Britain had written such a statement into the Preamble to the 1969 Gibraltar Constitution. They argued that the difference

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between Gibraltar and Hong Kong was that Britain had chosen not to support Hong Kong in the same constitutional way (idem). The visit itself was described as both historic and difficult. It was historic because, surprisingly, this was the first ever official visit by a serving British Prime Minister to Spain.3 It was seen as difficult for a number of reasons: Spain’s role in NATO was not yet clear and it had not yet reached agreement on entry into the Western European Union (partly because it would have to accept the involvement of nuclear weapons); and Britain and Spain (the latter due to take over the Presidency of the European Community for the first time in January 1989) did not agree on the right pace of progress towards closer EC union (Thatcher that week made her famous anti-EC Bruges speech). There was also the question of Spain’s contribution to the development of the European Fighter Aircraft; the Spanish Government was considering reducing it from 13 per cent, while Britain wanted it to keep to that figure. Then there was the ‘classic’ problem of Gibraltar. On 22 September, El País, which paid tribute to Thatcher’s support for Spain at the time of Tejero’s attempted coup in 1981 and which played down the differences between the two countries, described ‘the intractable Gibraltar problem’ as the one that weighed down Anglo-Spanish relations. It was Gibraltar that made the front-page headline in the following day’s issue: ‘González tells Thatcher that talks on Gibraltar must produce results’ (El País, 23 September 1988). In fact European union was the main topic of discussion on the first day of Thatcher’s visit, but at a dinner at the Moncloa Palace Felipe González took the opportunity to say that on the Gibraltar question ‘dialogue must not become an end in itself’ and that they must work towards a ‘concrete solution’. In reply, Thatcher said that it was not realistic to expect a rapid solution to their differences over Gibraltar, but gave assurances that ‘Gibraltar will never be independent’ (idem). The main conclusion to emerge on the Gibraltar issue from the second and final day of Thatcher’s visit, as reported on 24 September, was that she would endeavour to put pressure on Gibraltar’s Chief Minister to accept the airport agreement of December 1987 on the grounds that it would be good for Gibraltar and for Spain.4 At a joint press conference she insisted that the negotiations within the framework of the Brussels Declaration must go ahead, but admitted that ‘we do not have a formula to resolve the differences between us’ (El País, 24 September 1988). As far as the other differences were concerned, greatest progress seems to have been made on the entry of Spain into the Western European Union (WEU). On the idea of a ‘social European space’ that Felipe González wanted to introduce during his presidency of the European Community, Margaret Thatcher was quite dismissive, calling it ‘the new jargon’. The Spanish Prime Minister did not rise to the bait, aware that within a month Spain would be welcoming Queen Elizabeth.

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In terms of moving the Gibraltar issue forward the British Prime Minister’s visit could scarcely be described as a great success, although only the diplomatically naive could have expected anything of substance to emerge. However, as a step in the post-Franco – and post-Falklands/ Malvinas – process of rapprochement, it was not only successful but also essential. Britain and Spain, as EC and NATO partners, had to demonstrate that, despite the stumbling block of Gibraltar, they could conduct themselves properly in normal diplomatic relations. Restraint had to be shown on both sides, and that would have been no easy matter when one of the protagonists was Margaret Thatcher. With two visits from Britain’s leading female figureheads following in quick succession, Spanish diplomats had a very taxing autumn in 1988. However, there can be no doubt that the first of the two would have caused them to lose more sleep than the second, and they would have felt relieved to have it behind them. Queen Elizabeth’s visit to Spain in October was a reciprocation of the one that King Juan Carlos made to Britain in 1986, and the first ever official visit by a British monarch. Now that Spain was comfortably settled as a constitutional monarchy, from within Spain there was much admiration for nations with similar constitutional structures – and, as one of the longest established and most stable, Britain came in for its share. Certainly that was the tone of the leading article in El País on 16 October on the eve of the Queen’s arrival. There was no direct reference in the article to the Gibraltar problem, but the inference in the last sentence was clear when the writer said that the visit ‘represents a victory for both countries, which today are rising above that which has separated them and continues to separate them’. Gibraltar was never far from the forefront when AngloSpanish relations were under consideration. The Gibraltarian Government took the opportunity for some selfpublicity and announced at the beginning of the royal visit that later in the year Gibraltar would issue its own currency, partly to bring income for its Treasury and partly ‘to project Gibraltar’s image in the world’, in the words of the Gibraltarian Trade and Industry Minister, Michael Feetham (El País, 17 October 1988). Gibraltar’s Chief Minister also arranged another of his visits (this time to the Far East, including Japan and Singapore) during the royal visit, to promote trade with Gibraltar. Such acts will have been seen in Spanish diplomatic circles as provocative, and part of Gibraltar’s new strategy to promote its semi-independence from Britain. It is unthinkable that Sir Joshua Hassan would have done the same. The royal visit – part official, part private – lasted seven days. In an endeavour to ensure that the subject of Gibraltar could not sour the visit in any way, it was reported that Spanish diplomatic sources had said not only that it would not be proper to broach specific political matters on a royal visit, but also that the subject would not even be discussed when the two Foreign Ministers met on 17 October; their talks would concentrate on Spain’s entry into the WEU (idem).

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However, for the first two days the reality was very different. In his speech at the dinner offered to the British royal visitors on 17 October, King Juan Carlos warned that Gibraltar ‘could make full cooperation difficult’ between Spain and Britain (El País, 18 October 1988), although he acknowledged that the dispute ‘has now found an appropriate forum for discussion’. ‘Our Governments began a process of talks four years ago,’ he said. ‘They have been able to achieve some agreements which, when implemented, will come to benefit the people most directly affected’ (idem). He looked forward to a positive outcome: ‘the overcoming of the dispute through friendship in accordance with the logic of history’. In reply Queen Elizabeth was more indirect, saying that ‘we are sure that our growing mutual understanding will enable us to deal with the only remaining problem between us’ (idem).5 So, despite reports prior to the visit, not only did the royals bring the subject of Gibraltar into their speeches but the two Foreign Ministers also discussed it when they met for 90 minutes earlier in the day. The implementation of the airport agreement – or rather the failure to implement it – was the main topic of discussion, although no progress was reported. The second day of the visit, 18 October, involved two official visits of a political nature – one to Parliament and the other to Madrid City Hall – which offered further opportunities for reference to the Gibraltar problem to be made, although there was clearly much resistance against uttering the ‘G’ word itself. The President of the Spanish Parliament, Félix Pons, made an oblique reference to ‘a page to be finished and a chapter to be closed’, while the Mayor of Madrid, Juan Barranco, spoke of the ‘rivalries and disagreements of the past’ (El País, 19 October 1988). In reply, the Queen referred to the need ‘to tackle areas of historical misunderstanding’ and to the recognition that ‘often our paths have not always been the same’ (idem). Thereafter the royal visit followed a more conventional course, and the Gibraltar issue moved off the agenda. However, the important thing was that the visit of the British Head of State had taken place, immediately following that of the British Head of Government. The acknowledgement during both visits that negotiations were under way and would have to produce concrete solutions was interpreted in Spain as a sign that something might emerge at the next annual meeting between the two Foreign Ministers, scheduled for the turn of the year for the express purpose of discussing the Gibraltar issue. The same interpretation was not, however, made in Britain. As the year closed Joe Bossano was once more ploughing his own furrow, this time by making his first official visit to the Campo region on 13 December for talks with José Carracao, the Chairman of the Councils of the region. Gibraltar’s Chief Minister proposed the establishment of industries in the region using capital from international companies based on the Rock, while Carracao put forward proposals for cheaper drinking

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water for Gibraltar, a solid waste disposal system, and the sale of land in the Campo for industrial development. Cooperation was taking place on the ground as well as at head of government and head of state level. The question was whether this encouraging situation would carry over into the New Year.

17 The Bossano strategy ( January–February 1989)

There was certainly a positive note in the statements that emerged from the Spanish Foreign Ministry on 1 January 1989, and some good reasons for such a note to be struck. First, Joe Bossano – his reputation already established in Spain as more hard-line than his predecessor – had proposed a second visit to the Campo region on 10 January to continue discussing areas of cooperation, a move which was seen as both ‘possible and desirable’ by the Foreign Affairs Ministry (El País, 2 January 1989). Second, it was felt that following the visits of Prime Minister Thatcher and Queen Elizabeth there was a new climate which would lead to the British Government putting pressure on Gibraltar regarding joint use of the airport.1 Third from the Spanish Foreign Ministry was to present a ‘softer image’; an example was the Spanish Government’s willingness not to create difficulties over land reclamation developments in the port area of Gibraltar Bay, on which it was planned to build some 1,200 dwellings.2 Finally, Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, who was due to meet his counterpart on 6 February in their annual round of talks, had a new adviser on Gibraltar in the form of Richard Gozney, until recently a member of the British diplomatic mission in Madrid and therefore seen in Spain as someone who understood the Spanish approach to the Gibraltar problem. However, before the glow became too rosy, on 4 January the Municipal Council in Algeciras accused Gibraltar of contributing to dangerous pollution in the Bay through the disposal of solid waste in the sea. The major contributors to the pollution were in fact Spanish industries in the region, which produced high levels of metals and toxic waste; followed by local sewage; and third by ships and oil-tankers cleaning out their tanks in the Bay. However, Gibraltarians came in for a good deal of criticism, largely due to the fact that some untreated waste identifiable as coming from Gibraltar had appeared while the main incinerator was out of service. This appeared to be a case of the pot calling the kettle black while finding a scapegoat, and the sensitivities in the region made the Gibraltarians an easy target.3 Relations between Gibraltar and the neighbouring Campo region were

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not enhanced by the publication of an interview given by Joe Bossano to the Gibraltar weekly Panorama on the eve of his visit to La Línea. This was reported in the Spanish press, and quoted him as saying that ‘there was not the slightest possibility that we would accept the Anglo-Spanish agreement on the joint use of Gibraltar airport’ (El País, 10 January 1989).4 He also said that he believed there was a new generation of Spaniards who were European, less insular and less sensitive about the Gibraltar issue. ‘The day will come,’ he believed, ‘when Gibraltar will not be an affront to the dignity and the virility of Spain which they have to avenge’ (idem). Despite these hiccoughs, the process of osmosis initiated several years earlier took a major step forward when Joe Bossano made his first official visit to La Línea on 10 and 11 January. The Chief Minister’s strategy to maintain an annual growth rate for the Gibraltarian economy of 12 per cent included the establishment of an industrial sector in the neighbouring Campo region. Consequently one of the main subjects under discussion during his four hours of talks with the Mayor, Salvador Pagán, was the plan to set up a prefabrication factory in La Línea with Danish finance that would create 50 jobs. Some 60 per cent of the finished products would be used in Gibraltar, the remainder would be exported from the Rock, and the company would be registered there for tax purposes. The main disadvantage for Gibraltar was the danger that Spanish customs might not give special treatment to the finished products when they were being transported to the Rock, and Bossano was anxious to ensure that the Council in La Línea should negotiate such treatment with the Madrid authorities. Although Spain recognized that the motives for this collaboration were expediency on Gibraltar’s part because of its limited room for industrial expansion, it was at least a move that was of benefit to both sides. On 30 January, Howe visited Gibraltar for the first time since Bossano’s election victory on 24 March the previous year. He had been due to visit the Rock shortly after that date, but the official reason for the delay was due to the coroner’s inquest into the shooting of the IRA suspects earlier that month. The day before the Foreign Secretary’s arrival, news was leaked that he would announce that Britain would withdraw its army presence from Gibraltar after the Royal Green Jackets (due to replace the Royal Anglian Regiment within a few months) had finished their two-year tour of duty, with their gradual replacement by a Gibraltar Regiment. Unlike the navy and the air force, the British army in Gibraltar had no NATO role, but was there only to protect Gibraltar from its neighbour. With Spain itself now in NATO, Britain felt that there was no longer any such role for the army to play. As expected, Howe announced the withdrawal in his talks with Bossano. The three existing units – an infantry battalion, an artillery battery and a unit of Royal Engineers, totalling some 1,915 men – would be cut by half by March 1991. The news was greeted with concern in Gibraltar itself, not

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only because of what withdrawal represented politically, but also because the removal of over 1,000 servicemen and their families could mean job losses and damaging economic consequences for Gibraltarians. Publicly, however, Bossano minimized the significance of the proposed withdrawal, and drew attention to the benefits for Gibraltar of being able to exploit land currently dedicated to military use. With almost half of the usable land in the territory belonging to the Ministry of Defence, it was clear that some of it could be used to reduce the estimated shortfall of 2,000 dwellings. While acknowledging that ‘the defence of Gibraltar in 1990 did not require the same resources as in 1890’, he reminded the Foreign Secretary of the commitments of the British Government to defend Gibraltar and of their ‘political commitment to defend the right of the Gibraltarians to self-determination’ (El País, 31 January 1989). The Secretary of State for Defence, George Younger, was quick to restate the first commitment, even if he avoided making reference to the second: Our commitment towards them is absolute and very clear. As long as the people of Gibraltar wish it, they will remain under the British flag, as the Prime Minister has said many times. The reduction of the military presence does not alter that, but if I have a limited number of battalions to deploy in the many tasks that we have, it is a luxury to have one of them stationed where it is not needed. (idem) In general, the logic of this argument was accepted in Britain; some even wondered why it had taken the British Government so long to make a decision on withdrawal. In Spain the decision was seen to have potentially more political than strategic significance, since it was recognized that the land army had little to do with the defence of the territory and even less to do with the control of the Strait, which could count on Rapier, Exocet and Harpoon missiles, as well as two permanently stationed warships and six Jaguar aircraft. However, the Spanish Foreign Office decided not to exploit the subject in order not to undermine the ‘softer image’ that they were trying to cultivate. The topic of the military withdrawal somewhat eclipsed the other main subject on the agenda for the Howe–Bossano meetings, namely the question of the joint use of Gibraltar airport. There were signs – both in a statement he made after the meeting on 30 January and in remarks made by the Gibraltarian Minister responsible for civil aviation, John Pilcher – that Bossano was prepared to soften his opposition to joint use, although there was no indication as to when he might agree to do so. The agreement signed on 2 December 1987 was, as far as Gibraltar’s Chief Minister was concerned, ‘non-viable’, but he said he was prepared to explore

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alternatives, including the possibility of negotiating a new agreement (idem).5 Whatever these alternatives might be, they would not involve sharing control of the airport: ‘We are not prepared to buy peace at the expense of going back on the commitments for which we were elected’ (El País, 1 February 1989). He viewed joint use of the airport as a part of Gibraltar’s long-term strategy for economic development, which focused on cooperation with the Campo region.6 However, he saw this collaboration developing in a European context: ‘The economic future of Gibraltar depends on its potential within the European Community, and this must logically include Spain’ (idem). The idea that it must include Spain was pursued in El País on 1 February. The fact that there seemed to be a shift in Bossano’s stance on the airport issue was welcomed as a sign of successful pressure having been exerted by the British Government. Even more significant, the article said, was Bossano’s recognition that Gibraltar has to cooperate with the neighbouring territory: ‘His aspiration to modern development – which breaks with the “mono-industry” of the military base – is unsustainable without integration with Spain as a whole’. The paper chided the Spanish Government for not being sufficiently active in trying to awaken in Gibraltarians the idea that they would have a future in a democratic and decentralized Spain. That was clearly not the future that Bossano and the majority of Gibraltarians saw. Far from admitting defeat in pursuit of his objective, the strategy of Gibraltar’s Chief Minister was to seek economic independence for Gibraltar as a means of maintaining political independence, and the removal of all trade barriers within the Community from 1993 would provide Gibraltar with the opportunity to use its financial resources as a means to this end. To conceive of any other interpretation was to misunderstand Bossano’s game plan. Another sign of the different strategy adopted by Bossano from that of his predecessor, Sir Joshua Hassan, was the fact that, whereas Hassan had insisted on participating in the annual round of talks between the British and Spanish Foreign Ministers, Bossano refused to do so in order to indicate his rejection of the Brussels Declaration. So it was that when Howe and Fernández Ordóñez met in London on 6 and 7 February7 Bossano was absent, whereas the Mayor of La Línea and the Chairman of the Local Councils of the Campo accompanied the Spanish Foreign Minister in order to demonstrate their desire to increase collaboration on either side of the border. The two Foreign Ministers met on the evening of 6 February, and again the following day, when Fernández Ordóñez also met Margaret Thatcher for 45 minutes. The British Prime Minister and her Foreign Secretary both stressed their desire and determination to persuade the Gibraltarians to implement the airport agreement. At a press conference Fernández Ordóñez indicated that Thatcher had some ideas on how this might be

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achieved, although he declined to reveal what those ideas might be (El País, 8 February 1989). The question of sovereignty received its annual airing, with each side making predictable utterances; the British indicated their concern to respect the wishes of the Gibraltarian people, while the Spanish delegation repeated its wish to achieve territorial integrity, ‘without in any way affecting the judicial, political, economic or any other aspect of the status of the population’ (idem). Fernández Ordóñez again reminded the press that ‘the UN voted overwhelmingly in favour of considering Gibraltar as a case for decolonization’ (idem). The fact that the Spanish Foreign Minister could still wheel out such a statement nearly a quarter of a century after the first UN vote was taken was, in one sense, an indication of what little progress had been made and what a gulf still remained to be bridged. Interested parties on all sides were no doubt weary of hearing such wellworn arguments. However, reaction to the current impasse took a different turn on this occasion, for most of the serious British press rounded on the Gibraltarians for their ‘obstructionism’, their ‘artificial semi-isolation’, and their ‘siege mentality that limits their vision and impedes progress’ (quoted in idem). One paper, however, suggested that with the EC discussing how all border controls might be dropped (except measures against terrorism and drugs-smuggling), ‘the Gibraltar issue could “fade away” ’ and ‘create a climate of opinion in which few will care whether the Rock belongs to Gibraltar or Spain’ (The Times, 7 February 1989). It is hard to imagine that anyone in Gibraltar would have agreed that this was a possibility in the near future.

18 A European Hong Kong? (March–December 1989)

One year after the incident involving the shooting of three IRA suspects in Gibraltar, and six months after the ending of the inquest, the issue suddenly re-emerged in a blaze of controversy. On 15 March 1989, following a ceremony at which 22 Spanish policemen were given awards for their part in tracking the IRA activists, the Spanish police confirmed that they had in fact informed the British security forces on 6 March 1988 that the three suspects had left Torremolinos and were heading for Gibraltar, but without arms or explosives. At the inquest the official British version had been that the Spanish police had failed to pass on this information, and that the SAS had not therefore known exactly when the terrorists would arrive on the Rock or whether they were armed. This version had been used to absolve the members of the SAS of unlawful killing at the inquest held during September 1988, although it was strongly contested by the solicitor representing the families of the victims (see Chapter 16). A report in the Sunday Times on 2 April 1989, which was highlighted in the Spanish press the following day, also suggested that two British army bomb-disposal experts had known that the car which was to have been used in the terrorist attack did not in fact contain a car-bomb, but they were over-ruled by a military adviser who was designated to testify at the inquest. A further revelation of the report was that the British authorities had asked the Spanish police not to pursue the terrorists in order not to arouse suspicions. The British position at the inquest had been that the Spanish police had lost track of their Irish quarry; Spain said that they only lost track of them temporarily on 4 March for a few hours after their arrival at Málaga airport, and regained it long before the ambush in Gibraltar took place on 6 March. A report drawn up shortly after the events of March 1988 by the Spanish Interior Ministry’s Information Office, details of which were published in El País on 22 April 1989, indicates that the Spanish police knew the movements of the three suspects between Málaga, Fuengirola and Torremolinos on 4 March, and that the police informed the British authorities in Gibraltar. It was also confirmed that a representative of the Spanish Foreign

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Information Service was prevented by the Spanish Interior Ministry from giving evidence at the inquest, and it was noted that Margaret Thatcher paid a visit to Spain during September in between the time that the Spanish police were called to appear at the inquest and the decision not to allow them to do so. At the time there were strong denials that the British Prime Minister had discussed the issue of the IRA killings during her visit. There were now suspicions that she had asked the Spanish Government to intervene and prevent the Spanish official from appearing at the inquest. However, a Spanish Government spokesman stated that the reason why the official was prevented from appearing was that Madrid had decided that his appearance would imply recognition of British sovereignty over Gibraltar. If the latter was the real reason, then the Gibraltar dispute had even been allowed to interfere in the proper pursuit of justice. The way in which the whole terrorist incident had been handled by the British Government was put into question on 6 April in a report published by the National Council of Civil Liberties and the International League of Human Rights. In one part of the report concern was expressed at the contradictions between the Spanish and British versions of the pursuit of the terrorists, and the fact that these discrepancies had not been revealed at the inquest (The Times, 7 April 1989). A further report on the incident issued later that month by Amnesty International referred to the absence of testimony at the inquest from Spanish police as one of its weaknesses (El País, 18 April 1989). Whether the reason for their non-appearance was due to pressure from the British or the Spanish authorities may never be known, but, given the discrepancy in the account of the information which was passed to Gibraltar, it does suggest that there was some degree of collusion between Britain and Spain regarding the inquest, unless credence is given to the argument mentioned above that the issue of sovereignty was involved. The re-emergence of issues relating to the terrorist incident had its effect on the Rock in a way that Britain and Northern Ireland in particular had long since become accustomed to. On 3 April, it was reported that British security forces in Gibraltar had received a telephone warning of a bomb threat on military installations. There was also a report that Spanish police had notified their British counterparts of the presence of two members of the IRA in Spain. Security precautions in Gibraltar were stepped up, especially since the Royal Green Jackets Regiment – the last British regiment to do so – had just arrived to take up duties. By mid-April 1989 the IRA terrorist issue had receded, but as the year wore on there was little sign of progress on any of the major areas of disagreement. The British Government’s desire to let sleeping dogs lie by not upsetting Madrid led to an angry statement by Chief Minister Bossano when military manoeuvres scheduled to take place off Gibraltar on 13 May were cancelled in case the Spanish Government interpreted them as a provocation. The official reason given for their cancellation was that it was

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decided that the manoeuvres, involving commandos parachuting into waters close to Spain, were not militarily necessary. However, the decision to cancel came following Foreign Office advice to the Ministry of Defence. The British military involved were clearly none too pleased at having their activities interfered with for what they saw as political reasons, and their displeasure was matched by that of Joe Bossano, who issued an official communiqué stating that the Government of Gibraltar did not share London’s opinion about Madrid’s possible reaction, and that in any case such considerations should not interfere with matters involving the defence of Gibraltar (El País, 17 May 1989). For its part, the Spanish Government refused to comment. At the beginning of June 1989 comparisons between Gibraltar and Hong Kong re-emerged, although this time they were prompted by the Gibraltarians themselves rather than by Spain looking for parallels. The cause was the Tiananmen Square massacre in Peking, when the authorities crushed the embryonic pro-democracy movement in China in brutal fashion. The future of Hong Kong after 1997 was uncertain in any case, and was now further threatened by the events in Peking. However, on the Rock they were seen as extremely helpful to Gibraltar’s aim of making itself economically self-sufficient. Earlier in the year Bossano had undertaken a promotional visit to the Far East, and had opened a Gibraltar information office in Hong Kong. With Hong Kong financial capital now urgently looking for an alternative home, Gibraltar was anxious to offer it one, and a further trip was planned by businessmen, bankers and politicians for September. Capital deposited in Gibraltar banks was already growing at an annual rate of 70 per cent, and the very Britishness of Gibraltar made it an attractive alternative to Hong Kong for investments. Although Bossano was anxious to stress the differences between the two British colonies in political terms, there were attractions for Gibraltar in trying to emulate some of the attributes of its Far-Eastern sister, and there were plans to build a Hong Kong-style financial centre on land in the port area. If there was to be a mass exodus from Hong Kong over the ensuing eight years before handover to China, it mattered little that Gibraltar was only seven square kilometres in size and that accommodation was at a premium; there were already more companies in Gibraltar than there were inhabitants (more than 26,000 new post-office box companies had been established on the Rock during the previous two years), and many more would be attracted by Gibraltar’s tax advantages to establish themselves as Gibraltarian companies without anyone having to set foot on the Rock. Spanish banks had not been slow to seize opportunities to benefit from Gibraltar’s business boom by establishing a presence there. Indeed, one of the ironies of the situation was that the attractiveness of Gibraltar for investments, some of which were lodged with Spanish banks, would not have applied if Gibraltar had been part of Spain.

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The desire by the Foreign Office not to upset Madrid manifested itself again in July. The cause this time was an order by a Gibraltarian court to apprehend four Spanish customs officials accused of illegal entry into Gibraltar and of illegal possession of arms. The officials, who had been part of an anti-smuggling operation, had been arrested and released on bail but then failed to reappear at the hearing on 20 July after the Spanish Government had intervened because the arrest had taken place on the isthmus, which Spain does not recognize as British territory.1 Meanwhile, the Spanish authorities responded by causing delays of up to three hours at the frontier crossing point between Spain and the Rock. In retaliation, Gibraltar reduced the amount of assistance given to Spain in tackling smuggling.2 A meeting was arranged in London for 29 July between the acting Governor of Gibraltar, William Quantrill, and the British Ambassador in Madrid, Nicholas Gordon Lennox, to discuss the deterioration in the relations between Gibraltar and Spain, although the Foreign Office described the meeting as routine. Gibraltarian leaders had called upon the British Government to intervene, but they declined to do so, arguing that the incident must not be allowed to interfere with the ‘important work of both Governments in the fight against the activities of drug traffickers’ (El País, 1 August 1989).3 The trouble with London’s anxiety to stay on the right side of the Spanish Government was that it did not enhance relations between London and Gibraltar. The airport came back on to the agenda in October when Gibraltar presented an appeal to the European Court of Justice to repeal Article 2.2 of the directive on the liberalization of inter-regional flights which had been approved on 18 July.4 The objective was to nullify the agreement signed between Spain and Britain in December 1987, which excluded Gibraltar’s airport from the directive. The appeal was presented to the Court on 4 October, and although a response was normally delivered within a month, the issue dragged on for many more months before a decision was finally handed down. This delay – initially at least – suited the Spanish Government, which wanted to avoid the issue becoming embroiled in the general election campaign which had been called for 29 October 1989. Spain was concerned that the British Government might be backing Gibraltar’s position, thereby calling the 1987 agreement into question; alternatively, if Gibraltar had gone behind the Foreign Office’s back, it made it difficult for Spain to know precisely who was in charge of foreign policy for Gibraltar. Towards the end of December the Council of Ministers submitted its objections to the appeal on the grounds that Gibraltar was not legally in a position to undertake action against a Community decision because of its special status within the EC, which did not entitle it to make its own foreign policy.5 In January 1990 the Spanish Government also submitted an objection to the appeal on the grounds that the airport was situated on disputed territory. When Madrid sought the British Government’s support

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for its objection it was duly given, and London also gave the assurance that if the Court decided to hear Gibraltar’s appeal, a joint defence would be mounted. This was the first time – but not the last – that Britain had agreed that it would take sides with Spain against Gibraltar, and was a clear indication of its desire to keep on the right side of the Spanish Government. The other side of the coin, however, was that the Gibraltarians would only feel more isolated and therefore more determined to find other ways of increasing their economic independence. Not only was there a new Government in Spain at the end of 1989, but there was also a new Governor in Gibraltar. At the investiture ceremony in the House of Assembly on 1 December, Admiral Derek Reffell called for closer cooperation with Spain. In his reply the Chief Minister said that Gibraltarians wanted friendship with their neighbours, based on fairness and justice, but without arousing false hopes regarding Spain’s claims to the Rock. More than five years after the signing of the Brussels Declaration, there could be few Spaniards who had any hopes of an early resolution to the problem. It is true that there was internal criticism of the Gibraltar Government’s position from opposition leaders such as Adolfo Canepa of the AACR, who claimed that there was no clear Government policy on relations with Spain, and Peter Montegriffo of the newly formed Gibraltar Social Democrats, who argued that Bossano’s boycott of the Brussels Declaration talks was damaging to Gibraltar’s interests.6 There was no doubt, though, that Bossano’s determined resistance to any modification to Gibraltar’s sovereignty had overwhelming popular support, and that his stance on this issue was enough to enable him to ride any opposition for the foreseeable future.

19 Tackling money-laundering and smuggling (February–December 1990)

Early in 1990 the Chief Minister, Joe Bossano, had a meeting with one of the leaders of the Campo region, just as he had done at the beginning of the previous year. This time his interlocutor was the Chairman of the Association of Councils for the region, José Carracao, the venue was Joe Bossano’s official residence, and the main subjects of their talks (held on 9 February) were the possibility of Gibraltar’s water being supplied from southern Spain and the use by Gibraltar of the waste tip at Los Barrios when the incinerator on the Rock was out of commission. Bossano was clearly intent on continuing to pursue his plan to collaborate with the Campo region for their mutual benefit, but outside the framework of the Brussels Declaration. However, the major meeting early in the year was the fifth annual encounter between the Spanish and British Foreign Ministers, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez and (for the first time) Douglas Hurd, who had replaced Sir Geoffrey Howe following his resignation the previous autumn. Their meeting had been scheduled for December 1989, and finally took place in Madrid on 26 February 1990. The run-up to the meeting made it quite clear that there would be no progress on the current bone of contention – the implementation of the airport agreement – because the Chief Minister of Gibraltar had made it plain in an interview published in Europa Sur in January and reported in the Spanish press that he was still firmly opposed to it.1 Furthermore, he emphasized that he was still firmly opposed to the spirit of the Brussels Declaration: When we have a single currency, the same passport with the same colour and can move around freely anywhere in Europe, how on earth will Spain be able to justify its historical claim? Spain is wasting its time if it thinks that it can tell Britain to force the Gibraltarians to become Spanish. (ABC, 21 January 1990) The principal outcome of the talks had been flagged in the Spanish press during the preceding few weeks: a decision to include Gibraltar in two

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existing bilateral agreements – the 1985 extradition treaty and the 1989 anti-smuggling agreement (it was the exclusion of Gibraltar from this which had led to the diplomatic confrontation in July 1989). This was the first time that Britain had extended an agreement held with Spain to cover Gibraltar. The ministers also signed a new agreement to tackle money-laundering, and Britain agreed to include Gibraltar in the Naples Convention of 1967 on mutual customs assistance. That something needed to be done on cross-border crime was blatantly evident. Money-laundering had become one of the fastest growing industries in the region. By early 1990, border-crossings in each direction totalled over 160,000 pedestrians and nearly 110,000 cars per month. More than half the vehicles bore number plates from Málaga or Cádiz, and many of them crossed several times in one day, carrying each time the maximum currency allowed of 120,000 pesetas ($860) plus 300,000 ($2,142) in foreign exchange. Five such trips could involve the outflow of over two million pesetas ($14,300) per person per day, and those who risked taking out more than the limit on one trip stood only a 2 per cent chance of getting caught. The banks in Gibraltar asked no questions when an account was opened and money was deposited.2 The money could be used to set up an offshore company, with the owner’s name concealed from public scrutiny by use of a nominee as shareholder. The company’s assets could then be used to buy property in Spain, with the company benefiting from tax concessions available to foreign investors. Small wonder that since the opening of the border some 30,000 companies had been established on the Rock, with deposits conservatively estimated at £1.85 billion ($3.3 billion), and that much of their capital had been used to buy property on the Costa del Sol. The only consolation for Spain was that at least a good deal of it was Spanish money being reinvested in the country, but the loss to the Spanish Exchequer in tax revenue was substantial.3 The smuggling industry was equally thriving. In 1989, the Customs Control Service (Servicio de Vigilancia Aduanera) for the Province of Cádiz alone seized 1,355 crates of cigarettes arriving from Gibraltar, containing some 677,500 packets. The total number of packets smuggled into Spain on an annual basis was estimated to be in the region of 100 million. Smugglers would buy the cigarettes at 60 pesetas (40 cents) per packet on the Rock and ship them to the Campo by speedboat for resale at 225 pesetas ($1.60).4 In addition, 70 kilos of cocaine and 3,900 kilos of cannabis were seized. Clearly only the tip of the iceberg came into the authorities’ hands. Bossano saw the move to extend the anti-money-laundering agreement to Gibraltar as a means whereby Spain could restrict Gibraltar’s economic growth. This had indeed been spectacular in the last couple of years, and the last thing Spain wanted was for Gibraltar to demonstrate its ability to acquire financial independence. From the British point of view, although the agreements could be seen as a sop to Spain in lieu of progress on

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more substantive issues, it was also the case that it gave Spain a lever by which it could argue that if Britain could impose a decision on Gibraltar on these accords, then it could do the same with regard to the airport agreement. At the press conference after the meeting, Hurd claimed that there was a difference between these agreements – which were part of Gibraltar’s external relations and which the Gibraltar Government welcomed – and the airport agreement, which was partly an internal matter for Gibraltar. Fernández Ordóñez reiterated Spain’s growing impatience at the lack of progress on the airport issue by referring to the possibility of establishing a Spanish airport on the Campo side of the border. On the question of sovereignty he made the customary assertions that ‘a colonised territory has no place in a united Europe’ and that ‘there will be no progress on Gibraltar until sovereignty is returned to Spain’ (El País, 27 February 1990). Hurd gave the traditional response that Britain had ‘a constitutional commitment’ to the Gibraltarians (idem). The tone of the editorial published in El País on 1 March was more conciliatory towards Gibraltar than it was towards London. Negotiations were taking place between Madrid and London, but the writer acknowledged that the solution to the problem depends upon the Gibraltarians being persuaded that it is in their interests to become part of Spain, and this is a long-term process. Where the writer was critical was in relation to those responsibilities exercised by London in theory but not in practice, exemplified by regulations to prevent money-laundering and the implementation of the airport agreement. The writer concluded by suggesting that Joe Bossano should be invited to Madrid for civilized discussions. The problem with that suggestion was that all along the Spanish Government had wanted to avoid enhancing the status of Gibraltar’s Chief Minister. While Hassan had been accepted as a member of the British delegation during Brussels Process discussions, there was never any question of bilateral talks between him and Spanish ministers. Bossano could, of course, have participated as a member of the British negotiating team, but he was implacably opposed to the Brussels Process and had rejected any and every opportunity to take part. The British Government had hoped that he would change his mind, for as a participant he would have been giving Gibraltarian endorsement to any agreements between London and Madrid. However, after three successive refusals to do so, there was little likelihood of any change of approach or change of strategy by the Chief Minister. Following the meeting of the two Foreign Ministers, concern about Gibraltar’s connections with tobacco-smuggling, drug-running and money-laundering continued in the Spanish press. It was scarcely surprising, given the impasse on the major issue of the airport and on talks on sovereignty, that much should be made in Spain of those issues which highlighted dubious activities and criminality, for they cast both the

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British and the Gibraltarians in a bad light and threatened to undermine Gibraltar’s pretensions as an off-shore financial centre. As a consequence, the British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Robin Fearn, felt obliged to defend them both in an article published in El País on 24 March entitled ‘A Rock free from all suspicion’. Some in Spain might have felt that he protested too much.5 The agreement to tackle the smuggling – particularly of drugs and tobacco – and related money-laundering problems bore fruit later in the year with the establishment of two joint working groups: one to try to combat the money-laundering involving the 25 international banks which had by then been established in Gibraltar; the other to tackle the use of speedboats to bring cannabis across the Strait, many of which were alleged to operate out of Gibraltar (following a ban in Spain from September 1989 on the use of speedboats over a certain size and capacity). The meeting to establish the working groups was held in Madrid on 23 and 24 July, and in a joint statement issued afterwards the two sides agreed to meet regularly ‘to study measures necessary to tackle the problem of drug trafficking’ in an area of the Campo de Gibraltar extending both to the east and to the west of the Rock itself (El País, 24 July 1990). Although the problem was clearly not confined to Gibraltar, the fact that joint measures were to be taken was an indication that the lack of progress on more substantive matters did not prevent the implementation of action on practical issues that affected both sides. The latter part of the year saw dramatic international events unfold as the Cold War came to an end and profound changes began to take shape in Central Europe. One of the main diplomatic events in that process was the meeting of 34 heads of state and heads of government in Paris in November at the summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Each national representative had the opportunity to address the Conference, and when it was the turn of the Spanish Prime Minister on 20 November he could not resist such an opportunity to remind the leaders of so many governments of the fact that his country still had a problem to resolve with Britain. It was only a paragraph, it was moderate in tone, and in order not to cross swords with the British Government the Spanish delegation informed it beforehand that González intended to refer to Gibraltar. ‘We cannot’, he said, ‘allow the continued existence of anachronistic relics. I am confident that through the process of negotiation we can resolve the problem of Gibraltar’ (El País, 21 November 1990). Of the other leaders present, there was one – Margaret Thatcher – whom Felipe González hoped was listening most attentively to his remarks. However, it is highly likely that her mind was on other matters, for (leaving aside the fact that the Conference was dealing with far more momentous issues than that of Gibraltar) in her absence in Paris Conservative MPs in London were in the process of stabbing her in the

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back. Two days later Thatcher resigned. González would have to catch the ear of a new British Prime Minister. The resignation of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party on 22 November was given full coverage in the Spanish press the next day. El País made it the front-page story, and devoted five further pages to it plus an editorial. Thatcher was Prime Minister at the time the Lisbon Agreement was signed in 1980, and had been in power ever since. She had therefore been the ultimate arbiter of British policy on Gibraltar for the past decade, and the pace of progress on the implementation of the Lisbon and Brussels accords had been determined by her policies. The story of the resignation and the resumé of her career printed by the Spanish paper contained no reference to her stance on Gibraltar – there were too many other dramas and highlights with which to fill the allotted space. However, reference to the Rock was contained in a related story, for it so happened that on 27 and 28 November Felipe González was scheduled to make the first official visit to Britain since 1982 by a Spanish Prime Minister – a visit which, under the circumstances, he decided to postpone. He let it be known that – not surprisingly – he had intended to raise the issue of Gibraltar in his talks in London. González would not have bet on any change to the status quo as a consequence of his doing so, but for those who believed that diplomatic pressure at the highest level was an essential ingredient in the process of change, the timing of the British Prime Minister’s resignation could not have been more frustrating. Despite the postponement of González’s visit, the Observer went ahead with an interview with him, which it published on 25 November and which was duly reported in the Spanish press the following day. In his most outspoken statement on the Gibraltar issue since becoming Prime Minister in 1982, Felipe González was quoted as saying that he thought Britain’s claim to sovereignty over Gibraltar was ‘at least doubtful’ and that, in his view, by allowing Gibraltar to block the implementation of the airport agreement for three years ‘the United Kingdom had, de facto, forfeited sovereignty over Gibraltar’. No doubt there was a certain amount of power-play about the Spanish Prime Minister’s remarks, which were designed to remind the new British Prime Minister of the Spanish Government’s resolve not to slacken the pressure on the resolution of the Gibraltar question. The year drew to a close with a return to an issue that had been left on the shelf since May 1986. This concerned the complete removal of the border gates and railings between Gibraltar and Spain, and was raised on 27 December at a meeting with the Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernández Ordóñez, by Tristan Garel-Jones, Minister of State at the FCO, who was in Spain for Christmas with his Spanish-born wife. Their 30-minute meeting was held at Garel-Jones’ request to sound out Spanish reactions prior to the next bilateral meeting of Foreign Ministers scheduled for February 1991. The British Minister proposed the replacement of the gates and rail-

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ings by boundary stones or flower-beds, and they also discussed a Japanese plan to build a new airport in Gibraltar elsewhere on the isthmus. The Spanish response was that they would support the replacement of the border ‘in a Europe in which walls were being brought down’; on the airport question, they insisted on the implementation of the agreement on joint use (El País, 28 December 1990).6 So another year drew to a close with the position on Gibraltar much the same as it had been when the year began. However, the New Year was to reveal that events that had occurred 50 years earlier might have made things very different.

20 Felipe visits London ( January–May 1991)

As is customary, British Cabinet papers for 1960 were released to the Public Record Office on the first day of 1991 under the 30-year rule, together with other papers previously held back because of their continuing sensitivity. Amongst the latter should have been minutes of Second World War cabinet discussions from 18 and 19 June 1940, which revealed that the suggestion had been put to the British Government by its Ambassador in Madrid that ‘matters of common interest to Spain and ourselves’ (taken to be a reference to Gibraltar) might be discussed after the War in return for guarantees from General Franco that Spain would remain neutral. Because it was felt that placing these minutes in the public domain might damage Britain’s current negotiating position with Spain, it was decided by the Whitehall ‘weeders’ (presumably under instruction from the FCO) to extend the delay on their release. However, the minutes and their contents had already been released by mistake, and reference to them had been made in a book that had already been published.1 This reference was reported by the Guardian and picked up by the Spanish press. The Foreign Office was surely not amused at Whitehall’s error. The last thing that the British Government wanted Spain to think was that even during the Second World War they had viewed Gibraltar as expendable, and that they had been prepared to hand the Rock over to a dictator against the wishes of the Gibraltarian people. In fact, as indicated in Chapter 2, with the Mediterranean about to become the main theatre of the war in Europe – thus placing Gibraltar in a position of vital strategic importance – Churchill had quickly dismissed the idea. Joe Bossano was more concerned with what Britain planned to do about the colony in the future than with what it might have done in the past, and he continued to try to shape those plans through dialogue and collaboration with leaders in the Campo region. On 12 January he had further talks, this time in Algeciras, with José Carracao, the Chairman of the Association of Councils of the Campo region. He made it clear to the press that his approach to good relations was to consider their usefulness to the region, not to deal with ‘philosophical’ questions (as he put it) like

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sovereignty (El País, 13 January 1991).2 He pointed out that of the 1,000 jobs created on the Rock over the previous four years 800 had been taken up by Spaniards, and that 20 per cent of the colony’s workforce now came from the Campo region. The use of the airport was discussed in the talks, but Bossano’s position remained that ‘Gibraltar airport belongs to the people of Gibraltar and we shall decide who uses it’ (idem).3 The strategic importance of Gibraltar was highlighted once more when the UN ultimatum to Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait expired on 15 January and hostilities in the Gulf became inevitable. Gibraltar immediately suspended all air and sea communications with Morocco and Tunisia in case of a terrorist attack because of Britain’s participation in the crisis, and Gibraltarians were advised by the FCO not to travel to North Africa. On 22 January, anti-terrorist exercises were carried out by the military and civil police, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force.4 Gibraltar’s police were armed for the first time, and North Africans were subject to identity checks and detention. Military installations were sandbagged and troops were placed on a high degree of alert. Heavily armed soldiers patrolled the airport, where 18 fighter planes had recently arrived. Sniffer dogs were used at the frontier crossing point, and there were fears that it might be closed. Moroccan passport-holders required visas. Such precautionary activities, despite the distance between Gibraltar and the theatre of operations, served as a reminder not only of the sensitivity of Gibraltar’s position but also of its strategic importance whenever a military crisis arose. With the Gulf crisis still in the balance – the land offensive against Iraqi forces had yet to take place – the annual encounter on 12 February in London between British and Spanish Foreign Ministers to discuss the Gibraltar issue went almost unnoticed. The briefest of press reports since the annual meetings began indicated that Fernández Ordóñez was still calling for the return of sovereignty to Spain, but that with the Single European Market now less than two years away the argument had increasingly to be placed in a European context. Describing the position of Gibraltar as ‘an anachronism’, the Spanish Foreign Minister said that ‘since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Gibraltar is the last remnant of an absurd situation’ (El País, 13 February 1991). However, with attention focused on the Middle East, it was scarcely surprising that no progress on the Gibraltar question was made at this juncture. The following month, despite the recent heightened awareness of the strategic importance of the Rock, Britain went ahead with the withdrawal of British troops which had been announced by Sir Geoffrey Howe two years earlier. On 19 March the last English battalion to serve on the Rock, the 3rd Battalion Royal Green Jackets, lowered its flag for the last time and handed over the Lathbury Barracks to the Gibraltar Regiment. The only remaining British forces, once the Green Jackets’ withdrawal was complete, would be 530 men of the Royal Navy and 390 of the Royal Air

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Force. So ended 287 years of British infantry presence in Gibraltar. Although there were sound military reasons for such a move, the symbolism of British withdrawal could not be entirely ignored. Bossano played down the significance of the withdrawal, suggesting that Britain no longer needed to defend Gibraltar from possible Spanish invasion – ‘no-one thinks that Spain will do with Gibraltar what Iraq did with Kuwait’ (El País, 19 March 1991) – and that this was all part of a reduction in British defence spending made possible by the easing of tension between Eastern and Western Europe. Although it might have reacted differently some years earlier, Spain did not read much more than this into the withdrawal, either. It was selfevident that the British troops were no longer needed for defence purposes. Whilst it might have been possible to draw some parallels between Saddam Hussein and General Franco, no-one would have contemplated doing so between the Iraqi leader and King Juan Carlos or his Prime Minister Felipe González. What the removal of the British infantry showed was British confidence in the stability of Spanish political institutions and in Spain’s commitment to its international obligations. However, it made no difference to the impasse on the implementation of the Brussels Declaration; Britain was no closer to reaching an agreement with Spain over the Rock than before. The main effect was not a political but an economic one; about 25 per cent of Gibraltar’s income came from defence spending, representing some £40 million ($72 million) a year, and although the Gibraltar Regiment’s numbers were increased to 400 men, the withdrawal of the Green Jackets represented a loss of the spending power of 500 men and their 750 dependents. The Gibraltarian economy would have to find some way of compensating for the financial loss. Spain’s low-key reaction to the withdrawal of the British troops reflected the fact that the Spanish Government was coming to terms with the impossibility of a straight political solution to the question of sovereignty (although in diplomatic encounters they would continue to demand it), and was adjusting to the idea that a more realistic approach was indeed through the reduction of a British presence in Gibraltar as a military base. Spain was still undergoing the process of negotiating with NATO the six basic missions or general directives that it had assumed on membership. By April 1991 four of these had been concluded – air defence and operations in the Eastern Atlantic in May 1990, air and sea operations in the Western Atlantic in January 1991, and most recently the defence of Spanish territory on 12 April 1991. The two remaining agreements concerned the complicated issues of logistical support to be provided by Spain and the control of the Strait of Gibraltar. What Spain was seeking in relation to this last agreement was for the defence of the Strait to be principally under Spanish control. Spain could not get rid of GIBMED (the NATO command held in Gibraltar) because it (Spain) was not part of NATO’s military structure, but Spain’s objective

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was to reduce GIBMED’s importance substantially by assuming all of its powers. Spain based its argument on the strategic point that Gibraltar was boxed in geographically and that the Strait could be better defended from the Spanish naval base at Rota, in the Province of Cádiz. The weakness of the Spanish case (although plans were already in hand to remedy it) was that Spain’s communications system was far inferior to the British system installed in Gibraltar that acted as a link between AFSOUTH (the NATO command responsible for the Mediterranean based in Naples) and the SACLANT command covering the Atlantic (based in Norfolk, Virginia). According to a Spanish Foreign Affairs ministry source, an agreement giving Spain the responsibility for control of the Strait would offer ‘a legal process to a difficult problem, the solution to which will require that Gibraltar ceases to be a British base’ (El País, 14 April 1991). Once that was achieved, the Spanish Government would have a stronger case to argue for a political solution. Britain, however, wanted to lose neither responsibility for GIBMED nor, as a consequence, control of the coastal waters around the base. Inevitably the outcome agreed in July was a compromise whereby Spain and Britain would jointly but separately exercise control over the Strait, with each having access via the commands at Lisbon and Naples to information generated by the other. Control of operations would be exercised by whichever country contributed more troops. Thus the key question of who had the main responsibility over the Strait remained unresolved. Nevertheless, the dual thrust of Spain’s approach to the Gibraltar question continued to be that the demands of the EC and of joint membership of NATO required a solution to the dispute to be achieved sooner rather than later. That was still the case when, accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Finance Minister, Felipe González paid his first official visit to London for two days of talks on 7 and 8 May.5 This was the visit the Spanish Prime Minister would have made in November 1990 had Margaret Thatcher not resigned. He had visited the other major countries of the EC four or five times during his nine years in office. There was never any suggestion that he had preferred to avoid a meeting with Thatcher for personal reasons – clearly the Gibraltar problem was the reason why this was his first visit during that time – but there can be no doubt that he was more likely to establish a good working relationship with John Major (who was close in age, who regularly spent his summer holiday in Spain, and whose style was less abrasive) than with the new British Prime Minister’s predecessor.6 On 26 April, just before the visit took place, there was a minor diplomatic incident that resulted in a protest by the Foreign Affairs Ministry to the British Embassy in Madrid. Two super-tankers – one Liberian, the other Iranian, with a combined total of 525,000 tonnes of oil on board – had dropped anchor in the Bay of Algeciras awaiting instructions from their owners, and had refused to leave despite the request of a Spanish

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patrol vessel acting in accordance with a ministerial order of 18 April restricting the mooring in Spanish waters of vessels carrying dangerous cargoes. The problem arose from the fact that the ships claimed they were in Gibraltarian territorial waters, although the Spanish diplomatic approach – they denied it was a protest – was made on environmental rather than on juridical grounds. With the heads of government meeting so imminent, the British Embassy’s response was that they would ‘move in the direction requested by Spain’ (El País, 30 April 1991). Once again it was notable that the temperature in such an incident was kept far cooler than would have been the case in the recent past. There were several important subjects on the agenda for discussion in London; Gibraltar was inevitably one of them. There was never any likelihood of any shift by the British Government, especially since the FCO approach was, according to one diplomatic source, ‘not to resolve the problem, but to dissolve it’ (El País, 7 May 1991) through closer collaboration with the Campo de Gibraltar and, as far as possible, to place the issue within an EC framework. At the dinner held in 10 Downing Street on 7 May, Felipe González said in his speech that the Gibraltar problem was an ‘historical anachronism’ which affected bilateral, Community and multilateral relations, and he called for an imaginative response (with which Spain was willing to assist) by the British Government to find a solution which was not solely based upon the wishes of the Gibraltarians (El País, 8 May 1991). At the press conference following the talks, the Spanish Prime Minister indicated that he had made some ‘imaginative proposals’ upon which he declined to elaborate (El País, 9 May 1991). There was some confusion as to whether these proposals included joint sovereignty. According to the Spanish Foreign Minister they did not (a position which he reiterated in an interview a month later in the Gibraltar Chronicle), but a report in the Independent on 9 May indicated that González had suggested a plan that would involve the two monarchs as joint heads of state with virtual autonomy for the Gibraltarians (see El País, 10 May 1991). Neither side was prepared to comment publicly. If this was indeed a Spanish proposal it marked a concession on Spain’s part, because hitherto the demand had always been for the transfer of sovereignty. However, for Britain to accept it, it would have to make the major concession of discounting the wishes of the Gibraltarian people. Although it was reported that John Major had ‘an open mind’ on the Spanish proposal (El País, 9 May 1991), there was little likelihood that it would be taken up. With Britain seeking allies amongst its EC partners on the questions of monetary, economic and political union, it is likely that González saw this as a propitious time to press for some movement on the Gibraltar issue in return for Spanish support. That, together with the fact that he had to be seen to be reiterating Spain’s claim to Gibraltar on his first visit to Britain, is why he gave it a high profile in the talks and the press conference. He

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was realistic enough, however, to recognize that a reminder of Spain’s ability to jeopardize Gibraltar’s growing economic self-sufficiency was more likely to have an impact on the impasse in negotiations than were proposals on joint sovereignty. González reiterated, therefore, the suggestion made by his Foreign Minister 15 months earlier, that if Gibraltar persisted in refusing to allow joint use of the airport, Spain would build another one on the Spanish side of the border in order to force the issue. However, in an interview with the Financial Times on 9 May he did describe the situation as ‘absolutely irrational that while we are building a Community I am obliged to build an airport 20 kilometres away from one that already exists’. With major airports at Málaga and Jerez de la Frontera in addition to the one at Gibraltar, any decision to build an airport near La Línea would evidently be a political rather than an economic one. There was still clearly both a difference in British and Spanish attitudes towards the Gibraltar question, and a difference in the strategy each adopted to deal with it. Felipe González, in the interview with the Financial Times, neatly summed up the difference in attitudes: ‘For the British, Gibraltar is a visit to the dentist once a year when we meet to talk about it. For us, it is a stone in the shoe all day long’ (Financial Times, 9 May 1991). As far as strategy is concerned, Spain tried a combination of the carrot of different models of sovereignty, all with a high degree of autonomy for the Gibraltarians, and the stick of threatening economic warfare through a rival airport. Britain’s strategy was not to try to solve the problem, but to continue to seek to ‘dissolve it within the EC’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 15 July 1991, Col. 202). Whatever the differences in strategy, both sides had to take into account that the current Gibraltarian Chief Minister had his own strategy, which was to refuse to participate in the formal negotiations. Whether or not he was still fully in touch with popular opinion on the Rock was, however, put in some doubt when a poll conducted by the Gibraltar Chronicle and the GBC (and reported in The Times on 13 May) indicated that 60 per cent of Gibraltar’s eligible voters wanted Gibraltar to resume participation in the Brussels Declaration negotiations.7 Since elections were due in January 1992, the voters would soon have the opportunity to indicate whether this was of such significance that a change of Chief Minister was desirable.

21 Four more years for Joe Bossano (May 1991–January 1992)

Joe Bossano continued to plough his own furrow. To underline his view that the solution to the Gibraltar problem lay in self-determination in a European context, the Gibraltar Government issued a gold coin on 27 May with a face value of 70 ecus ($90). Unlike other ecu coins issued for collectors but without the status of legal tender, the Gibraltar coins were the first that were intended for circulation.1 One side showed a mounted knight in full armour, said to represent Charlemagne, the European Emperor par excellence. The obverse bore Queen Elizabeth’s head, and the edge of the coin had 12 stars, representing the EC nations, with a thirteenth star on the knight’s shield to represent Gibraltar. It may have been highly symbolic, but it sent a clear message of Gibraltar’s commitment to an independent future under both a British and a European umbrella. A new aspect of Gibraltar’s identity had come into play in April 1991 when the International Federation of Association Football (known by its French acronym, FIFA) rejected an application for membership from Gibraltar because, according to a spokesman, ‘it could create political problems between Britain and Spain’ (El País, 27 April 1991). The rejection, in which Gibraltar was described by a sports writer as ‘a Spanish territory dependent on the United Kingdom’, was reported in El País on 27 April. The Spanish Football Federation (RFEF) had indicated that it would object to the admission of the Gibraltar Federation, using Article 1 Paragraph 4 of the FIFA statutes, which requires countries to be independent states. The Government of Gibraltar accused FIFA of politicizing their application.2 Worse was to follow in the sporting arena in June when the International Olympic Committee (IOC), meeting in Britain for the first time since 1948, found on its agenda an application from Gibraltar for IOC recognition so that it could compete in the next Olympic Games in July 1992. The complicating factors were that these Games were scheduled to take place in Barcelona, and that the President of the IOC since 1980 had been a Spaniard – albeit a Catalan – Juan Antonio Samaranch. Gibraltar’s prospective National Olympic Committee feared that attempts would be made by Spain to delay or obstruct their application. They based their

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fears on a copy of a directive from Spain’s Foreign Ministry to its sports organizers, which they claimed to possess and which instructed the organizers to stop Gibraltar from participating in the Barcelona Games. The fears of Gibraltar’s Committee were not without foundation, for the IOC postponed taking a decision on their claims until after the Barcelona Olympics. The IOC President did admit that Gibraltar was a ‘delicate problem’, but gave as one reason for the decision the fact that there was no more room in the Olympic Village (El País, 13 June 1991). Gibraltar argued that Spain had being trying to deny them Olympic recognition for 30 years, although the IOC was able to exercise a degree of even-handedness on this occasion by postponing a decision on Cataluña at the same time, as well as on Lithuania and Latvia. Gibraltar was entitled to feel aggrieved because, unlike the other applicants, it had already established the minimum of five international federations required for membership. Gibraltar promised to apply again in 1993, but even if recognition were to be granted in time for the 1996 Games, the impact would clearly be much less significant in Atlanta than it would have been in Barcelona. The Spanish Olympic Association clearly contravened the Olympic Charter by observing its Government’s directive when the Charter specifically rules otherwise, but it no doubt felt that it was the lesser of two evils. The road to the Barcelona Olympics would no doubt have enough problems without the IOC granting Gibraltar’s application at a meeting held in Britain (of all places), while at the same time rejecting one from – of all places – Cataluña. However, what the two episodes of FIFA and the IOC showed was that the issue of Gibraltar’s sovereignty touched all aspects of the colony’s life. It did not just affect its constitutional and legal position, but also spheres as diverse as the judicial process (as suggested earlier in connection with the inquest on the IRA terrorists) and the activities of its sportsmen and women.3 The Gibraltar issue once more became a stumbling block to EC agreement. On 26 June the 12 Ministers of the Interior (including Britain’s Home Secretary Kenneth Baker and José Luis Corcuera from Spain), were in Luxembourg to prepare an agreement on the crossing of external EC frontiers, in anticipation of the free movement of goods and people within the Community from 1 January 1993. Britain had certain reservations about non-EC citizens legally living in an EC country being able to move freely around the Community, because Britain’s borders are simultaneously internal and external borders. Britain therefore succeeded in having words added to the agreement indicating that the recognition of external frontiers had no implications for the recognition of internal frontiers. It was thought that this formula would also satisfy Spain. Initially Spain was concerned that if it signed the document it could compromise its claim to Gibraltar on the grounds that unless its frontier with Gibraltar were officially recognized in the agreement as an external boundary, with

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mention made of Gibraltar’s special status within the EC, Spain would be deemed to have ceded its claim to sovereignty. Felipe González therefore made it clear on 29 June that Spain would not add its signature to the document while the Gibraltar question remained unresolved. The date scheduled for the signing of the document was put back to 19 July to allow for agreement between Britain and Spain to be reached, but was eventually postponed indefinitely. Although the problem of the sovereignty issue had been dealt with by Britain agreeing to the inclusion in the document of Spanish concerns in this regard, the real difficulty lay in Spain’s insistence that there should be joint control at Gibraltar’s external entry points (the port and airport) for foreign visitors before Spain would agree to the removal of the gates at the internal border with Spain. Spain had tried to persuade Britain to accept, by the inclusion in Article 30, that the agreement would only apply to Gibraltar when there had been a bilateral agreement between Britain and Spain. In addition, Spain proposed that in Article 1 the definition of external frontiers should exclude ‘foreign territories whose international relations are in the hands of another member State’. Britain would not accept joint control of external entry points; hence the impasse. Once again the Gibraltar dispute was obstructing the process of harmonizing EC policies. The patience of other members of the EC was being sorely tested. Whether as a result of this latest delay in EC negotiations, or whether simply because August is the political silly season, the notion emerged that a solution to the issue of Gibraltarian sovereignty might be to transfer it to the EC. On 29 July The Times reported briefly that the Minister of State at the FCO, Tristan Garel-Jones, had rejected such an idea and urged Gibraltarians to come up with realistic proposals. Despite his reaction, the idea reappeared two weeks later when the Observer of 11 August reported that Spanish ministers had welcomed the imaginative idea in principle, and that the two Prime Ministers would discuss it in the autumn. However, the Independent the following day reported that both the Spanish Foreign Ministry and the FCO insisted that the idea of Gibraltarian independence, with the EC holding responsibility for defence and foreign affairs, had not been discussed. The most likely origin of such a proposal was Gibraltar itself; a survey published on 5 August showed that 52 per cent of Gibraltarians favoured independence, the first time that a majority had called for an end to the link with Britain. It is possible that the British Minister was informed of the poll result, but the idea that the proposal had been explored further was probably pure speculation. Although several leading figures in the dispute had envisaged a solution emerging in an EC context, until the EC developed as a political entity endowed with the capacity to formulate defence and foreign policy the idea was unlikely to make any progress, even if – and it was a big if – both Spain and Britain thought it was a good one.

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Later in the year the Gibraltar issue re-emerged at the United Nations, almost 30 years after the UN Special Committee on Decolonization had first discussed it, and with a solution satisfactory to Spain no closer. The occasion was a speech by King Juan Carlos to the UN General Assembly on 7 October 1991, the second time he had spoken at that forum (the first was in September 1986). The 30-minute speech was wide-ranging, but included a reminder to the Assembly that Gibraltar was ‘a colonial problem which had still not been resolved, which affects Spain’s territorial integrity, and which . . . is particularly sensitive for all Spaniards’. The King expressed the hope that the ongoing negotiation process would succeed in reaching a solution ‘in tune with the times in which we live’ (El País, 9 October 1991). It would have been interesting to know what the King (and his speech-writers) had in mind by that phrase, and what it implied regarding the future sovereignty of the Rock. Within an EC context, it could be argued that the pooling of sovereignty was more in tune with the times than its transfer. The question of external frontier controls had remained in abeyance since negotiations broke down in July. Spain had also suspended cooperation with Britain on the control of tobacco and drug-smuggling between the Rock and Spain, although it was hard to see what advantage it hoped to gain. Frontier control talks were renewed on a bilateral basis when a British delegation went to Madrid on 14 October. In the interim, the issue had become a struggle between the Spanish Interior and Foreign Ministries. The British Home Secretary, Kenneth Baker, had proposed to his Spanish counterpart, José Luis Corcuera, that the agreement should allow Spanish control at the Gibraltar–Spain border to be maintained. The Spanish Interior Minister was inclined to accept the proposal, but the Foreign Ministry argued that it would contradict both the requirement of the Single European Act to suppress internal borders and Article 1 of the proposed agreement which does not allow two consecutive external entry points (in this case Gibraltar and Spain) to be maintained. There was a suspicion in Spain that because of the overlap between Interior Ministry responsibility for border controls and Foreign Ministry responsibility for a decolonization issue (as they saw it), Britain had deliberately tried to reach an agreement with the Interior Ministry to which it knew the Foreign Ministry would object. The meeting on 14 October made little progress, and was more of an introductory meeting between the newly appointed Director for European Affairs at the Spanish Foreign Ministry, Carmen Rico, and her British counterpart, David Greenstock.4 A new figure in Anglo-Spanish discussions on Gibraltar made his appearance at the end of October. José María Aznar, leader of the centreright Partido Popular and future Prime Minister, visited London for talks with Conservative colleagues on issues of mutual interest. On 28 October he discussed drug-trafficking and money-laundering between Gibraltar and Spain with the Home Secretary, Kenneth Baker. According to reports

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of their talks, each pointed to the degree of responsibility held by the other country for these problems. When Aznar met Major the following day, their discussion on Gibraltar was described as ‘a dialogue of the deaf’ (El País, 30 October 1991). If the talks proved anything, it was that the British line on Gibraltar when talking to Spanish politicians of the right was the same as when they talked to those of the left. The same could not be said of the Partido Popular when talking of Gibraltar on the one hand and Ceuta and Melilla on the other. For while Aznar was arguing to Major that ‘it is quite illogical for such a tiny colony to be a constant tooth-ache for 40 million Spaniards’ (idem), in a debate in the Spanish Parliament held on the same day (29 October) his party was arguing (and losing the vote) that the North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla should be established as autonomous communities like the rest of Spain on the grounds of their Spanishness, and that the Socialist and United Left (Izquierda Unida) Groups, who opposed the proposal on the grounds that the timing was inappropriate, were acting more in the interests of Morocco than of Spain. Ominously for both Britain and Spain, the day after Aznar’s meeting with the British Prime Minister news appeared of the formation of a new political party in Gibraltar, the Gibraltar National Party, which planned to fight for ‘the indisputable right of the Gibraltarian people to selfdetermination’ (idem). Certainly the growing activity on the Rock, with new office space and improved telecommunications, was boosting Gibraltarians’ confidence in their ability to go it alone financially. In November a further boost was provided, ironically, by Spain’s largest bank at that time, the Bilbao Vizcaya, which used the Rock in preference to Luxembourg to raise capital of £167.5 million ($301.5 million) for the largest placement of preference shares on the US stock market by a non-US bank. The founders of the GNP only had to wait until 16 January 1992 to find out whether they had accurately judged the mood of the voters. In the run-up to the election, the polls gave Bossano and the GSLP a substantial lead, predicting that they would get 70 per cent of the vote. With the pre-1988 governing party, the AACR, having collapsed, the main opposition came from the Gibraltar Social Democrats (GSD), led by a young barrister, Peter Caruana. The election was fought on the issue of Gibraltar’s relationship with Britain. The GSD believed that Gibraltar’s leaders should participate in the Brussels Declaration negotiations with a view to influencing their outcome. Bossano, who accused the GSD of being ‘soft on Spain’, hoped that a crushing defeat of the Social Democrats would make Britain and Spain think again about the Brussels Declaration process. His argument was that Gibraltar was now virtually financially independent from Britain (support now came only in the form of Ministry of Defence spending, and this accounted for only 15 per cent of Gibraltar’s income), and that it was

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ready for a new, non-colonial relationship with Britain and other members of the European Community in the post-Maastricht context of pooled sovereignty. In a 71.7 per cent turn-out (5 per cent lower than in 1988), Joe Bossano obtained an overwhelming 75.3 per cent of the vote – 17 points higher than four years previously. The GSD obtained just over 20 per cent and the new GNP 3 per cent, while the leading Independent candidate, Reginald Valerino, came close to taking a seat off the GSD. For the British and Spanish Foreign Ministries, the result of the election could not have been a much harder slap in the face. Bossano’s call for a change in Gibraltar’s status had clearly been given a boost. He described the result as ‘an expression of the self-determination of the people of Gibraltar’, and said that if there was to be dialogue with Spain, he would have to be the one to speak for Gibraltar, not the FCO (El País, 18 January 1992). El País on 22 January recognized that such an overwhelming victory could not be ignored. The answer to a vote for Gibraltarian independence had to be pragmatic and practical. The only way to convince the Gibraltarians that their future lay with Spain, said the paper, would be to establish a single tax regime, get rid of smuggling, invest large amounts of money in the whole of the Campo area, set up a joint Campo–Gibraltar Council, build a new airport in Algeciras, and finally invite Joe Bossano to Algeciras, Seville and Madrid for talks about the interests of the people he represents. Some of these proposals were clearly more realistic than others. The irony is, however, that although the paper was clearly hostile to the notion of Gibraltarian independence which Bossano so firmly advocated, within a week the Chief Minister had actually implemented one of the proposals – on 29 January, 13 days after his election victory, he went outside the terms of the Brussels accord and signed an agreement to form a joint economic coordination council with the Mayor of Algeciras, Patricio González. With that, and with Britain’s continued willingness to let Gibraltar have the final word on any agreement with Spain, the Brussels Declaration was beginning to look rather frayed around the edges.

22 The external frontier issue remains unresolved (February 1992–March 1993)

Early in 1992 Britain was rudely reminded of the hazards of maintaining a virtually autonomous colony that operates at arm’s length from the Foreign Office but for which the Foreign Office holds ultimate responsibility. When things go wrong, the mother country takes the blame. On 3 February the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants published a report accusing the Governor of Gibraltar of inflicting ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ on thousands of Moroccans who came to work in Gibraltar after General Franco closed the border with Spain in 1969. The drafting of some 5,600 workers (all but 600 were Moroccans) to the Rock during the 1970s enabled Gibraltar in general – and its military bases in particular – to survive the blockade. Problems arose largely because the situation was viewed as being temporary, but in fact it lasted for 16 years, by which time the guest workers had put down roots and did not wish to return to Morocco. The men were given temporary resident permits, conditional upon their having a job, on the assumption that they would return to North Africa when things returned to normal. Most left their families behind and had to live in overcrowded, squalid hostels. Some men were deported because they no longer had a job, and when wives and children came to visit and tried to stay, they too were deported on the grounds of being unemployed. Some 2,500 Moroccans remained on the Rock; if any of them were laid off, they were also liable to be deported. Lawyers were therefore planning to present a series of cases against the Foreign Office at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. However, to make matters worse for the immigrants, under EC regulations that came into force on 1 January 1992 Europeans were to be given preference for any new jobs that became available. It was often ordinary Gibraltarians – who were conscious of the valuable role played by the Moroccans during the 16 years of siege – who came to the defence of immigrants threatened with deportation for being unemployed. And ironically, it was often Spaniards – whose Government had been responsible for the siege – who now came to take the jobs on the Rock’s new construction sites for which Moroccans and other non-Europeans were not eligible.

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The attitude towards the Moroccans in Gibraltar was, however, only a reflection of an increasingly circumspect, not to say hostile, attitude towards non-Community citizens which was being manifested across Europe as the questions of external frontiers, immigration and refugees became a major EC preoccupation. In fact it was Spain’s North African enclaves that were seen as among Europe’s most vulnerable entry points for illegal immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa. Given that the British Government was having to accept the blame for the treatment of the Moroccans at the hands of Gibraltarian administrators, there will have been some in the FCO who will have found a certain attraction in the ideas expressed by Joe Bossano at the opening session of the new Gibraltar Parliament on 14 February. The Chief Minister took the opportunity to make plain his intention to seek a change in Gibraltar’s constitution and status by transferring responsibility for Gibraltar’s defence and foreign affairs to the EC, while Britain retained sovereignty and the Rock had autonomy in all other matters. In this way, because there was to be no transfer of sovereignty, change could be effected without contravening the Treaty of Utrecht. Bossano set a timetable of four years for these reforms to be agreed. With Madrid, to say the least, unlikely to take kindly to the proposal, and with talks between the Chief Minister and the Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd due to take place in London on 20 February, the FCO response to Bossano’s remarks was noncommittal and restrained. Such utterances as that of Bossano tend to bring out Spain’s sensitivity on the Gibraltar question, and this manifested itself on 2 March when the British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Robin Fearn, was summoned to the Spanish Foreign Ministry to explain why 44 members of the Gibraltar Regiment had been on a military exercise in the Sierra Nevada. Their presence in Spain had come to light when one of the officers was killed in an avalanche on 20 February. The British Ministry of Defence explanation was that the exercise, called Operation Snowfox, was an annual adventure training event, not a military exercise. The explanation was eventually accepted, but the fact that one was called for in the first place – and at ambassadorial level – is a reflection of the irritation that the unresolved Gibraltar problem still caused in Madrid. The Spanish Foreign Minister described the incident as having ‘little importance’, although three weeks later British troops were banned from exercises in Spain.1 At the end of April the Partido Popular published a draft manifesto of foreign policy that was highly critical of the Spanish Government’s policy on Gibraltar, which it described as ‘a resounding failure’. It reproached the Government for its ‘concessions and blandishments’, which had done nothing to bring a solution any nearer (El País, 2 May 1992). In government, the document argued, the Partido Popular would denounce the British Government to the EC and to NATO for the ‘passive complicity’

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shown with regard to solving the problem, and would demand the opening of negotiations with Britain which would have as the sole objective the return to Spain of sovereignty over the Rock. The party would put pressure on Britain by strengthening border controls and progressively restricting border-crossing facilities, even to the point, if necessary, of closing the land-border completely and imposing a blockade (idem). It was an astonishingly reactionary appeal to Spanish chauvinism, and ignored the similarity of this approach to the failed strategy of General Franco. However, although the Government would have dismissed the PP’s criticisms as unjustified and their proposals as impractical in the context of Spain’s modern role, they would have accepted that the PP was also reflecting the growing frustration with the post-Brussels Process, a frustration which the Government itself shared.2 The imminence of a general election in Britain had been responsible for the postponement of the annual talks between Foreign Ministers that last occurred in February 1991. With the Conservative Party re-elected for a fourth consecutive term of office on 9 April, it was still Douglas Hurd as Foreign Secretary who met his Spanish counterpart, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, in Madrid on 4 May 1992. With the implementation of the Maastricht agreement and the war in former Yugoslavia their major preoccupations, and with Britain due to take over the Presidency of the Community in July, the two Foreign Ministers spent very little of their time discussing the Gibraltar problem. In their press conference, they merely announced that officials would be meeting shortly in order to prepare for a ministerial session in the autumn. It was looking increasingly unlikely, therefore, that an agreement would be reached on external frontiers in time for its implementation at the beginning of 1993. John Major made it clear on 11 May that he would not allow Gibraltar to be excluded from the Convention on External Frontiers. The week before, Fernández Ordóñez had confirmed his Government’s position that Spain would not accept the inclusion of Gibraltar as an external frontier of the Community unless the application of the Convention were subject to a bilateral agreement, involving joint police and customs control at the port and airport. Spain, in other words, hoped to secure with Britain the same kind of accord on the external frontier issue as it had on the airport question in December 1987. On this occasion, however, the British Government was being less compliant, arguing that the exclusion from the agreement would marginalize Gibraltar from the advantages of the Single Market. Discussions continued, with Spanish and British delegations meeting outside Lisbon on 1 June to consider the frontier question. They came up with the proposal that passports of travellers entering Gibraltar would be read by Spanish immigration officers in La Línea via an optical reader, and that permission for entry would have to be granted by an official in both locations. It was formally presented to the British and Spanish Prime

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Ministers on 3 June in a letter from their Portuguese counterpart, Anibal Cavaco Silva, who was anxious to unblock the External Frontiers issue during the Portuguese presidency of the Community, which was due to end later that month. The proposal was discussed over the following weekend by Tristan Garel-Jones and his Spanish counterpart, Carlos Westendorp. Felipe González rejected it not on the grounds of expense or impracticality (such machines were already in operation in three Spanish airports), but because it would only further delay a solution to the airport agreement which Spain had been seeking for four and a half years.3 Spain was making more progress on another front in relation to Gibraltar, namely its participation in NATO. In May 1992 it completed the negotiations on the two remaining basic missions of its contribution to NATO – the use of Spanish territory for logistics and support, and the control of the Strait (see Chapter 20) – and these were confirmed on 24 June. It was the second of these missions that had a direct bearing on Gibraltar. On 22 June it was announced that in 1993 Spain would participate for the first time in the ‘Open Gate’ manoeuvres in the Strait. This would also be the first occasion on which Gibraltarian forces would not be taking part. Hitherto, Spanish forces had been excluded from participation in NATO operations in the area. Now there was the possibility that GIBMED (the NATO command in Gibraltar) would disappear in a restructuring exercise, leaving the way open for Spain to assume control – together with French, Italian and US participation – of the Strait on NATO’s behalf. It remained Spain’s hope that the weakening of Gibraltar as a military base would open the way to progress on the political aspect of the problem. However, political progress (at least in a direction that Spain would find acceptable) had become increasingly unlikely as long as Gibraltarians supported political parties that encouraged the concept of selfdetermination. Even more worrying for Spain was the fact that it was not only Joe Bossano’s GSLP that adopted such a position but also the main opposition party, the Gibraltar Social Democrats, and on 10 September the leadership of both parties headed a demonstration of over 1,000 people who marched on the Governor’s residence calling for selfdetermination for Gibraltar. Later in the year, a group calling itself the Self-Determination for Gibraltar Group (SDGG) emerged. The SDGG got little encouragement from the British Government, but made its feelings clear about the Brussels Declaration by ceremoniously burning a copy of it on 27 November – the eighth anniversary of its signing. With the British Government fully occupied with the presidency of the European Union in the second half of 1992, the bilateral meeting of Foreign Ministers scheduled for the autumn was further postponed. British and Spanish officials met in London on 15 September to set up the talks, against the background of a European Commission report issued

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earlier in the month which not only criticized Britain for its stance on border control checks from 1 January 1993, but which also called for Britain and Spain to resolve the sovereignty dispute over Gibraltar. The plan was that they would agree an agenda and a date for the meeting between Douglas Hurd and the new Spanish Foreign Minister, Javier Solana, who had taken over from Francisco Fernández Ordóñez in June following the latter’s resignation on grounds of ill-health. There were rumours, mentioned in the British press, that Spain would press for a response to Spain’s leaseback or power-sharing proposals, which Britain had never formally answered. The month of November had been mentioned as a possibility for the meeting, but once again pressure on Britain from its tenure of the EC presidency meant that the meeting was put back until March 1993. That was probably just as well from the British point of view, because relations between the Gibraltar Government and the FCO in London were somewhat strained in the closing months of 1992. Indeed, there were suspicions in Spain that this was the real reason for the delay. In October Britain had to remind Gibraltar that as the EC member state Britain was responsible for the implementation of EC decisions on the Rock, and that as a crown colony Gibraltar could not decide for itself not to implement certain EC regulations just because they might undermine its aspirations as an offshore financial centre. Bossano had a direct confrontation over the issue with the Foreign Secretary in London on 12 November, when Hurd reminded Gibraltar’s Chief Minister that the Rock is only in the EC because it is a British colony, and that there was no mileage in Gibraltar’s pretensions to be the thirteenth EC member. Bossano’s argument was that Gibraltar’s House of Assembly had already implemented EC directives under its own initiative, and that it could therefore claim to have acted as an independent member. Clearly there was no way that Britain was going to accept Gibraltar’s position, but with Gibraltar already an EC problem in two respects – the airport agreement and the external frontiers convention – Britain was anxious to avoid a confrontation with its partners on the question of the implementation of EC directives. Spain might view Gibraltar as a stone in its shoe; under Joe Bossano’s leadership, Gibraltar was increasingly becoming a thorn in Britain’s side. As the date for the March encounter between the two Foreign Ministers approached, the Partido Popular, through its foreign affairs spokesman Javier Rupérez, took the opportunity to put the Spanish Government on the back foot by suggesting that what he called its ‘total neglect’ of the Gibraltar issue was doing great damage to the people of the Campo (El País, 27 February 1993). He argued that the difference in tax regimes between Algeciras and Gibraltar meant, for example, that in 1992 twice the number of ships took on supplies in the British colony rather than in the Spanish port. ‘Why should we tolerate on our border’, he asked, ‘a

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centre for money-laundering, tax evasion, smuggling and drug-trafficking which is renowned throughout Europe?’ (idem). With a general election in Spain scheduled for June 1993, this was more of an attempt at party political point-scoring than a justifiable criticism of the González Government. However, when the long overdue encounter between the two Foreign Ministers finally took place in Madrid one year late on 1 March 1993, there was an implicit recognition that the Brussels Process was leading nowhere and that a new approach was required. Exactly what that approach might be was not made fully clear when Douglas Hurd and Javier Solana appeared at a press conference after their meeting. There was talk of the drafting of a new constitution for Gibraltar, in which Spain might be involved, although given Hurd’s comment that he had ‘not put forward any new proposals on sovereignty’ it was unlikely that it would imply any Spanish involvement in the running of Gibraltar’s affairs thereafter (El País, 2 March 1993). Hurd gave no indication that he was prepared to force Gibraltar to budge on the airport issue, despite a specific Spanish request that he should do so, and insisted upon the well-worn formula of continuing to ‘respect the wishes of the Gibraltarian people’ (idem). Solana, while inviting Gibraltarian leaders to rejoin the negotiating process as part of the British delegation (an invitation which Joe Bossano continued to reject), secured Douglas Hurd’s agreement that self-determination for Gibraltar was out of the question. He recognized that the Gibraltarians had to normalize their relations with Spain; that would partly be done by persuasion – including a 3,000 million peseta ($27 million) investment by the Spanish Government in the Campo de Gibraltar, plus a bid for EC regional development funds. However, Solana indicated that it would also partly be done by economic pressure, and he repeated the threat of building a second airport on the Spanish side of the border – a threat which was wearing somewhat thin three years after it had first been made, and with the Spanish economy clearly in the grip of recession. Three weeks after the meeting between the two Foreign Ministers, Solana’s report to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Spanish Parliament did not suggest that there had, in fact, been much of substance agreed. He declared himself to be ‘reasonably satisfied’ because there had been a ‘new stimulus’ to the Brussels Process (El País, 24 March 1993) – scarcely an indication of anything very radical. Once again Solana came under populist attack from the Partido Popular, who called for further border restrictions, and he was therefore obliged to use the opportunity to address a wider national and international audience, calling the Gibraltarian situation ‘an obstacle in the development of bilateral relations between Spain and the UK and increasingly so in the development of the construction of a new Europe’ (idem). After a two-year wait and meticulous preparations for the meeting

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(including a private session between the two Foreign Ministers during a NATO gathering in Brussels four days beforehand), much importance had been attached to the encounter. However, after nine relatively unrewarding years of the Brussels Process, no-one was convinced that a solution to the problem of Gibraltar was in reality any closer.

23 Setbacks in moves towards economic independence (April 1993–April 1994)

As is often the case following high-level meetings over Gibraltar’s future, the dispute returned to ground (or in this case sea) level when in early April 1993 Gibraltarian authorities began to place marker buoys three kilometres out from the coast in the Bay of Algeciras to indicate the extent of British territorial waters. Maritime patrols started boarding thirdcountry boats that were moored in the bay, handing out maps plus leaflets extolling the advantages of using the port of Gibraltar. Other buoys were placed at six kilometres from both the peninsula and (more provocatively) the isthmus. Time was when such action would have resulted in sharp exchanges between the Spanish Foreign Ministry and the British Embassy, especially since on one occasion a Spanish police patrol boat accidentally came under fire from a Gibraltarian patrol boat during firing practice. However, although it was denounced by the Bay Port Services Association because of the financial impact that luring away their potential customers might have, the only reaction from the Spanish Government was a press release on 14 April repeating that Spain did not recognize British sovereignty over these waters. At the end of June, Gibraltar suffered a setback in its attempt to establish the right for its airport to be treated in the same way as any other airport in the EC with regard to the free movement of goods and passengers. The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg rejected the first of five applications by the Government of Gibraltar for the annulment of EC air transport directives, arguing that Gibraltar’s status within the EC did not legally entitle it to make such applications.1 Underlying the ruling were the political factors of Gibraltar’s refusal to implement the 1987 airport agreement, and the unresolved dispute between Britain and Spain over the external border question. The Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry chalked up the Court’s decision as a technical knockout in its favour. However, Gibraltar’s reaction to the decision seems to have been to attack Britain, who joined Spain in supporting the Court’s ruling on the grounds that it upheld Britain’s jurisdiction over the colony. Perhaps more accurately, Gibraltar did not so much attack Britain as Britons living

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in Gibraltar, for Chief Minister Bossano decided that with effect from 1 July 1993 the Gibraltarian Government would give employment preference to Gibraltarians and to citizens from EU states other than the UK.2 The discrimination did not stop there; in September Bossano issued a directive to the effect that Britons living in Gibraltar would have their right to family income benefit withdrawn, and single parents and anyone unemployed who happened to be a British immigrant would no longer receive free education for their children.3 The situation grew so bad that in early October the British Citizens’ Association, which was founded when the first restrictions were introduced, took the Gibraltar Government to court in order to reverse what they saw as serious discrimination. The decision of the European Court seemed to have had the effect of pushing the Chief Minister in a strongly anti-British direction, and he would have lost many supporters in the process. Apart from Britons living in Gibraltar, however, the people most harmed by the political intransigence over the airport were not the politicians in London, Madrid or even the Rock itself but the ordinary business people of Gibraltar and of the Campo, who saw the airport as a much under-used economic resource. On 8 September, representatives of the Association of Small and Medium-Sized Businesses in La Línea met with members of Gibraltar’s Chamber of Commerce with the aim of putting pressure on their respective governments to resolve the situation. GB Airways (a subsidiary of British Airways) was the only company operating out of Gibraltar airport, with flights to London, Manchester, Tangier, Casablanca and Marrakesh. Although nearly 300,000 people used the airport in 1992 – increasingly they were Spaniards living in the Campo, because flights to London were cheaper than from Málaga – this figure was virtually the same as in 1989, and was equal to the number of passengers using Málaga airport in one month in the summer. It was estimated that with joint use the airport could handle a million passengers a year, with the creation of 400 jobs. However, political considerations rather than economic ones remained to the fore. The annual cycle of events meant that in July the Decolonization Committee of the UN went through the routine of looking at the Gibraltar issue, while on 12 October Bossano addressed the UN General Assembly for the first time. He tried to persuade its members to shift from what he saw as its pro-Spanish position (repeated most recently in that forum by Javier Solana in September) of the re-establishment of Spain’s territorial integrity to one of a right of self-determination for Gibraltar. He expressed the hope that Gibraltar would one day be welcomed to the General Assembly in the same way as Andorra (which in May 1993 had adopted a new constitution) had been a year earlier (Guardian, 22 November 1993).4 There was no doubt that the Chief Minister was pushing harder than ever at this juncture for self-determination for Gibraltar to be taken seri-

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ously. He had established a ‘national day’ on 10 September (the anniversary of the 1967 referendum), which was given the status of a public holiday, and the Gibraltarian red and white flag was now more in evidence than the Union Jack. The competition for a new national anthem was won by a composer living in England who wrote: ‘Gibraltar, Gibraltar, the Rock on which I stand / Oh may you be forever free, Gibraltar, my own land’. What Bossano needed above all was to establish Gibraltar’s economic independence, as a stepping-stone towards political independence. The problem was that Ministry of Defence spending in the local economy was down from 65 per cent in the early 1980s to 11 per cent in 1993, with a predicted further loss of more than 1,000 civilian jobs by 1997, while tourism was failing to take off (the bed-occupancy rate in 1993 was under 30 per cent). Gibraltar’s economic self-sufficiency was therefore dependent on the establishment of the Rock as an offshore financial centre, and this was not proving to be as successful as had been hoped. The financial services sector only accounted for 15 per cent of Gibraltar’s GDP (compared with 45 per cent in the Isle of Man). In an interview for the Guardian on 22 November while preparing to visit London to attend a one-day conference on the status of British Dependent Territories, Bossano rejected the idea that these difficulties were due to the recession, and pursued his attack on Britain by suggesting that they were caused by the British Government’s failure to press Gibraltar’s case for proper recognition at European level. He gave as an example the fact that there was no EU directive5 which defined what a company was in relation to Gibraltar, whereas every member state had such a definition. He described Gibraltar’s constitutional relationship with the UK as a ‘nightmare’, and accused the UK Government of ‘criminal negligence’ (Guardian, 22 November 1993). Although the language might seem somewhat intemperate, Bossano did have a point. Community directives were developed on the assumption that there were 12 member states each with its own set of laws. However, in some domestic matters Gibraltar’s constitution allowed its laws to be different from those of the UK, and the EU did not recognize such differences. Banks had to be established by a ‘competent authority’ in order to be recognized in the EU, but the Banking Supervisor who under Gibraltarian law licensed banks in Gibraltar was not such an authority, so technically the banks set up in Gibraltar were not properly licensed. Despite this, banking had clearly done well since Bossano was first elected in 1988, but by the latter half of 1993 they and other financial services had reached their peak, and the acting Financial Services Commissioner, Michael Constantine, agreed that the offshore project ‘has not gone ahead to the extent that had been hoped’ (Guardian, 20 December 1993).6 While Bossano blamed Britain, others blamed the lack of access by air other than from the UK or Morocco, the delays at the border-crossing, and the continuing uncertainty over sovereignty.

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The truth was probably a combination of all four, plus the ongoing recession. However, the fact of the matter was that, despite the attraction of exempt companies being allowed to be managed and controlled from within Gibraltar (unlike other British off-shore territories such as the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands), the expensive attempt to turn Gibraltar into a European Hong Kong was floundering. Government borrowing to finance infrastructure projects had risen from £4 million ($7.2 million) in 1987 to £65 million ($117 million) in 1991, largely to finance construction developments in partnership with the Danish company Baltica Finans on land reclaimed since 1988 on the west side of the promontory by the Gibraltar Land Reclamation Company. Part of the one square kilometre development was used to build over 2,000 dwellings. On the remainder the firm Bruun Laursen built Europort, consisting of a luxury hotel, a complex of eight seven-storey office blocks, a set of 200 apartments called Eurotowers and a waste incinerator. By the end of 1993, only ten of the apartments had been sold, 22 per cent of the floorspace in Europort had been let, and the hotel was unfinished. As a result, Baltica collapsed in 1992, and in May 1993 another Danish company, Hafnia, which was also involved in the insurance for the project, went bankrupt with debts of over £650 million ($1,170 million). A third Danish company, Gefion, had taken over the complex and was trying to sell it for the best price on offer.7 No wonder Joe Bossano was feeling a sense of frustration and annoyance with Britain. However, the feelings also went in the opposite direction: the British Government was trying to get Gibraltar to implement EU directives on banking and customs, and Gibraltar seemed to be in no hurry to do so. The issue started to rumble in the spring of 1994; it was set to flare into a major row between Bossano and the FCO in the latter part of the year.

24 The Brussels Declaration ten years on Slow progress on all fronts (June–December 1994)

The proximity of the 12 June elections – both for European Parliament and for the Andalusian regional assembly – were the most likely explanation for the timing in late May 1994 of a formal protest by Spain via the British Embassy in Madrid concerning a rise in drug-smuggling involving Gibraltar and a failure of the British and Gibraltarian authorities to deal with it. There was no doubt that there had been an increase in drug-trafficking from Morocco across the Strait. Tobacco-smuggling continued apace, depriving the Spanish Government of an estimated 20,000 million pesetas ($180 million) in duty revenue in 1994. According to Spanish Customs Control some 200 speedboats operated out of Gibraltar, contributing to the estimated 650 million packets of contraband cigarettes sold in Spain in 1993, worth some 120 billion pesetas ($1.1 billion).1 The substances were now shifting from cannabis and tobacco to cocaine and heroin. There was no clear evidence as to how much of it went through Gibraltar before reaching the Costa del Sol or the Costa de la Luz (to the west of Gibraltar), and nor – by the very nature of the activity – was there any hard evidence regarding the extent to which Gibraltar was being used as a money-laundering centre and operational base by international drugtraffickers. The only clear fact was that there was a worsening problem, and that Spain had chosen a politically useful moment to draw attention to it. There was further bad news for the Gibraltarian economy on 7 July 1994, when the Armed Forces Minister, Jeremy Hanley, announced a further reduction of military and civilian manpower in a written reply in the House of Commons. The 900 service personnel stationed in Gibraltar at that time were due to be reduced to 700 by 1997, with related civilian jobs due to go down from 1,250 to 950 (representing a reduction of the workforce from 10 per cent to 7.5 per cent) (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 7 July 1994, Cols 262–3).2 Hanley did say that the Government was conscious of the economic implications of the plans, and that it was ‘examining wider initiatives to support the Gibraltar economy’ (idem, Col. 263), but clearly the news heightened the importance of increasing activity in other sectors, particularly in financial services.

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The Minister’s statement was made as part of a review conducted in the light of political and strategic changes, and included not only the garrison’s size but also its functions. For the latter half of the 1990s these were defined as providing berthing facilities for Britain’s nuclear warships, air access, information for the Windmill Hill Signal Station and the Maritime Data Centre, a military unit in the shape of the Gibraltar Regiment as presently constituted, and a headquarters with supporting infrastructure for both Britain and NATO. In addition Britain needed ammunition and fuel storage facilities, and planned to keep the Gibraltar Squadron in existence. Meanwhile, the usual frustrations at the border-crossing continued. In one incident in early July the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to allow telecommunications equipment to cross the border into Gibraltar after it had been shipped to Lisbon and transported overland to La Línea. The equipment had to be returned to London and sent to Gibraltar by air. Because it was destined for Government House, Britain had thought that it would be given diplomatic privilege under the Vienna Convention, but Spain insisted that the Convention only covered material being delivered to an embassy and not to the seat of a colonial government. The protests of the British Embassy in Madrid to the Spanish Government were to no avail, but the action did nothing to improve relations between the two Governments. Indeed relations had reached such a low ebb that the Foreign Minister Javier Solana announced in early October that there was no date fixed for bilateral discussions to be resumed, despite the fact that he and his British counterpart had not met specifically to discuss the Gibraltar issue since March 1993. Relations at Foreign Minister level were not the only ones at a low ebb, however. Just as Bossano had been losing patience with Britain over its apparent failure to defend Gibraltar’s interests, the British Government was getting tired of Gibraltar’s failure to act on outstanding international agreements related to banking and customs controls, and when the Chief Minister met Douglas Hurd in London on 21 September it was made clear to him that Britain expected to see some action taken on these matters over the coming months. Despite the bad odour between London and Gibraltar, the British Government was not averse to helping the Rock to move towards selfsufficiency, and so in early October Gibraltar’s Chief Minister was invited to be part of the official British delegation to the annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank. The problem was that although Joe Bossano had attended such meetings before, this year’s meeting was held in Madrid. Bossano was there to promote Gibraltar’s financial services, but the Spanish Foreign Ministry described his presence as ‘ill-timed’, and Solana criticized the contradiction between the reason for his visit to Madrid and his inaction over ‘illegal activities’, by which he clearly meant drug trafficking and money laundering (El País, 8 October 1994). The

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British delegation clearly regretted having offended their Spanish hosts, and awkwardly excluded Bossano from a party given by the British Ambassador. Bossano’s attempts to set up meetings between himself and Spanish officials during his visit met with refusals. The whole episode was a diplomatic embarrassment. Meanwhile the now familiar accusation that Gibraltar was a ‘colonial anachronism’ had another airing at the UN General Assembly on 30 September, this time from the lips of the Foreign Minister Javier Solana (Reuters World Service, 30 September 1994). It was the same term that King Juan Carlos had used in 1986 in the same forum, and one that had been repeated since by Fernández Ordóñez and by Prime Minister González. The intractability of the Gibraltar question and the lack of progress made on the substantive issue of sovereignty is well illustrated by the fact that leading Spanish figures were still using the phrase uttered by the Head of State eight years earlier and arguing that ‘the decolonization of Gibraltar is a priority of the Spanish Government’ (idem), while the British Government continued to give the straight-bat response that ‘its views on Gibraltar are well known to the Spanish Government’ (Press Association, 3 October 1994). Eleven days later it was Joe Bossano’s turn to appear before the UN Decolonization Committee, just as he had done 12 months earlier. The Committee’s resolution, which called upon Spain and Britain to continue to negotiate, despite Bossano’s statement that ‘there was no hope of achieving decolonization through negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain . . . unless the people’s right to self-determination were respected’ (Federal News Service, 12 October 1994), clearly changed nothing. The issue of Gibraltar’s lack of representation in the European Parliament reappeared in Strasbourg at the end of October, when an amendment by a UK Labour MEP to give voting rights to all citizens of the EU in a resolution which came before the Parliament’s Rules Committee was defeated thanks to the votes of UK Conservative MEPs, who did not want to create difficulties with Spain over the issue. Labour criticized the Tories for putting relations with Spain ahead of defending the rights of Gibraltarians (Press Association, 27 October 1994). It was not clear, however, whether the Labour member who tabled the amendment had any suggestion as to how the votes of Gibraltarians might be incorporated into Britain’s single-member constituency voting system, which had always been one of the difficulties whenever this question was raised. The defeat of the amendment spared him having to provide a clear answer.3 Douglas Hurd, however, found himself having to give a clear answer to a question which had lain unanswered for almost ten years, namely whether Britain might respond positively to proposals involving a leaseback arrangement put forward in 1985 by the then Foreign Minister Fernando Morán to Hurd’s predecessor Sir Geoffrey (now Lord) Howe. In a House of Commons written reply on 2 November Hurd revealed that such

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a solution had been reiterated at the March 1993 meeting, but that he had made it clear that Britain ‘could not accept . . . “the Morán proposals” as a basis for talks because of their precondition that sovereignty would be transferred. That position has not changed’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 2 November 1994, Col. 1206). It is quite remarkable that it had taken so long for the British Government to make public its reply to the Spanish Minister’s proposal, but it will have come as no surprise to Madrid. The British Foreign Secretary’s statement came at the beginning of the month which marked the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Brussels Declaration on 27 November 1984, and it provided an opportunity for Morán to take a retrospective look at the events leading up to the Declaration and what had happened since. Not surprisingly, he still saw the Gibraltar problem as one involving Spain’s ‘prestige and dignity’, and he reiterated the validity of his proposed solution of either a condominium or a leaseback arrangement that, he argued, had still not been formally rejected (El País, 28 November 1994). He accused the British Government of using ‘delaying and obstructionist tactics’ such as allowing the Gibraltarian Assembly a veto over the airport question, which was, he claimed, a foreign affairs issue beyond Gibraltar’s competency (idem). He urged Spain to use a three-pronged approach through the European Union – by using the framework of the EU to turn a conflict between two member states into an issue of cooperation, by using the expansion of the EU to formulate national identities, and (in a coded reference to the rise of international terrorism)4 by making sure that Spain ‘harmonizes its determination with a flexibility which the future may require’. He called upon Spain ‘to make history, not to have history done to it’ (idem). Morán’s position ten years after the signing of the historic AngloSpanish document provides a further indication of the lack of progress made during the Brussels Process. The ex-Minister’s preferred solution was still the one which he had put forward in the spring of 1985 but which Britain had explicitly (if not formally) rejected, and his call for Spain to use the EU to provide a framework for a solution (no doubt coloured by his position as a member of the European Parliament) was couched in inevitably imprecise language. However, Morán was known still to be a close adviser to the Spanish Prime Minister, and his remarks were therefore interpreted as a sign that Spain was about to start a fresh initiative on the Gibraltar issue. The tenth anniversary predictably became the focus for some of the most serious strains in Anglo-Spanish relations in recent years. At the end of October – some four weeks before the actual anniversary date – thoroughgoing checks at the border-crossing were reintroduced, ostensibly to look for drugs and tobacco. This meant delays of six or seven hours, and on one occasion the car of Gibraltar’s Chief Minister was subjected to a detailed search. Under the orders of the new Civil Governor of the adjoin-

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ing Province of Cádiz, César Braña, border officials used any excuse – including failure to carry a first-aid kit (with surgical gloves), fire extinguisher, blankets and even a second pair of glasses for the driver in case the first pair got broken – as a reason to delay travellers, impose on-thespot fines of upwards of £50 ($90) or even refuse entry from the Rock into Spain. As a result the border-crossing had been dubbed ‘Checkpoint Franco’, a term reminiscent of ‘Checkpoint Charlie’ between East and West Berlin during the Cold War, and, of course, a reminder of the 16-year border closure under the regime of the Spanish dictator. The delays continued for weeks. On 27 November Gibraltarians, whose traders reported a fall of 35 per cent in takings, were invited to boycott Spain both as a protest against the border restrictions and also in acknowledgement of the Brussels Declaration anniversary. In a rare event between EU governments, the British Minister for Europe, David Davies, formally complained on 1 December to the Spanish Ambassador in London, Alberto Aza, that the border checks were intrusive, indiscriminate, undermined cross-border cooperation and ‘interfered with the daily life’ of Gibraltar (Reuters World Service, 1 December 1994). Madrid’s response was that the checks, which took place once cars had actually crossed the frontier into Spain and were mostly carried out on Spanish vehicles, were producing results in the crackdown on smuggling, and that the delays had nothing to do with impending talks between Spanish and British Foreign Ministers. However, the attempt to catch smugglers would not explain the fact that on some days cars entering Gibraltar from Spain were subjected to the same scrutiny. In any case, as illustrated by a foiled attempt on the night of 27 November by 50 speedboats from Gibraltar to land tobacco and drugs on beaches at La Línea, most smuggling occurred not via the land border but by sea, leading to speculation in some reports that the reason for the action at the border was the hope by the Spanish authorities that it would encourage Gibraltarians to put pressure on their leaders to clamp down harder on smuggling.5 Six weeks after the tighter border controls were introduced things got worse rather than better when extra checks were made on pedestrians as well as motorists, sometimes resulting in queues hundreds of metres long on both sides of the border. There were fears in Gibraltar that the Spanish authorities would actually close the border-crossing completely, for an escalation of controls culminating in closure was exactly what Franco had done 25 years earlier. There were even calls for the ministerial talks, scheduled for 20 December, to be cancelled unless Spain stopped its action at the border. With action being applied at local level, the Spanish Government might have felt that it was doing enough to draw attention to the Gibraltar problem to satisfy the main opposition, the Partido Popular. However, on 11 December the PP spokesman on foreign affairs, Javier Rupérez, made it clear that his party was not prepared to let the Government off the hook.

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While supporting the Government in wishing to reclaim the sovereignty of Gibraltar, he accused it of ‘neglect’ over the problem, arguing that ‘Britain would never negotiate unless enough pressure were applied’ (El País, 12 December 1994). The Spanish Government must have wondered what else it could do at this juncture to satisfy the opposition. Meanwhile John Major was being pressed to take action against Spain, at a time when a number of Euro-sceptic Conservative backbenchers were making life difficult for the British Government over European issues, including increased fishing rights for Spain in British waters. On 13 December one of the leading Euro-dissidents, Sir Teddy Taylor, described the Spanish Government’s actions as ‘blackmail’. He called on the British Prime Minister to visit Gibraltar to assure it of the support of the British Parliament, and also urged him to raise the issue of Gibraltar’s position within the EU at the next meeting of the European Council (Press Association, 13 December 1994). Major gave no commitment to do either, but repeated the mantra ‘that we have no intention of deviating from the commitment to the people of Gibraltar in the 1969 constitution’ (idem). There were suggestions that Spanish action at the border was having some positive effect, in that according to a report in the Independent on 14 December Bossano had been reminded by London of his talks with Douglas Hurd in September concerning Gibraltar’s obligations to bring its banking and customs regulations into line with the rest of the EU. The Gibraltarian authorities did accept that there was a backlog in the implementation of EU directives, but rejected the allegation that this was due to reluctance on its part and reacted angrily to the suggestion (denied by the FCO) that Britain might be contemplating taking measures which could lead to the imposition of direct rule at the end of January if action had not been taken by then. If there had been any kind of ultimatum from London, the FCO was anxious to play it down. Aware that Spain was keen to exploit drug-trafficking and money-laundering issues and to drive a wedge between Britain and Gibraltar in the run-up to the ministerial talks, the British Government did not want to put itself at a disadvantage by being seen to be at loggerheads with Gibraltar. There was certainly a sense that the talks between the two Foreign Ministers were about to take place in a different atmosphere from their previous encounters. Javier Solana remarked upon it when he described the situation as ‘unusual’, noting at a meeting of the Association of European Journalists that ‘this is the first time that a different view is being expressed in the UK’ (El País, 16 December 1994). Typical of that different view was a leading article in the conservative Daily Telegraph, which actually suggested – as El País gleefully quoted two days later – that ‘Gibraltar’s historic future must lie ultimately in rejoining Spain, and it is legitimate to hope that one day Gibraltarians will see their own interests lie in that direction’ (Daily Telegraph, 16 December 1994). The paper urged Spain to woo the Gibraltarians by making it attractive for them to join a

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growing economy, rather than stiffen their resistance through ‘crude economic pressure’ (idem).6 Such views in a right-wing British newspaper will certainly have quickened the pulse of the Spanish negotiating team. Despite protestations by the Gibraltarian authorities that the delay in the implementation of EU directives had been due to an administrative backlog, with only three days to go before the meeting of the two Foreign Ministers Joe Bossano announced on 16 December that Gibraltar would immediately work towards the application of the directives relating to the tightening of banking procedures in order to combat money-laundering. The open rift between London and the Rock and the apparent inability by the British Government to control illegal activities in its European colony was clearly giving Madrid the initiative in the run-up to the talks, and the FCO in London can have left Bossano in no doubt of the importance of not playing into Spain’s hands in this way. The Chief Minister may well have come to realize of his own accord that the bad publicity which the situation was arousing – whether justified or not – was undermining Gibraltar’s case for greater autonomy. Coinciding with his announcement, though, the harsh controls at the border-crossing were immediately suspended by the Spanish authorities, pending the ministerial talks. In an interview for El País, Joe Bossano’s predecessor, Sir Joshua Hassan, admitted that there had always been some smuggling in Gibraltar, but that it had clearly got worse since the run-down of the British military presence on the Rock and the consequences for its economy. As far as money-laundering was concerned, he argued that this was much exaggerated by Spain and that it was no worse in Gibraltar than in Madrid or London (El País, 18 December 1994). However, his defence of Gibraltar in this respect was undermined by a report in the Sunday Telegraph which suggested that ‘British experts from the Treasury, Foreign Office and Customs and Excise suspect that authorities and individuals close to the administration in Gibraltar may have had an active or passive part in the growth of fringe banking on the Rock associated with the drugs trade’ (Sunday Telegraph, 18 December 1994). Suspicions are not facts, but they are sufficient to undermine the probity of those suspected, and not surprisingly these comments were once again seized upon by El País the following day (19 December) for dissemination within Spain. By the eve of the ministerial talks, the rift between Gibraltar and the FCO was clearly still wide open. At a press conference on 19 December Douglas Hurd gave the usual reassurances as far as sovereignty was concerned, and warned Spain that Britain could not be expected to negotiate under duress (Reuters World Service, 19 December 1994). However, Joe Bossano told BBC radio that ‘the present [British] administration . . . is more concerned about their relationship with Spain than with their debt to the people of Gibraltar’ (idem). He accused the British Government of orchestrating a ‘dirty tricks’ campaign against him (Evening Standard, 19 December 1994), and of trying to destabilize the colony earlier in the

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year by sending a private detective to investigate the affairs of a number of ministers, including the then Attorney General, John Gittings, who resigned in August with a year of his three-year appointment still to run (Daily Telegraph, 19 December 1994). Whilst Bossano was probably right about the British Government’s priorities vis-à-vis Spain,7 talk of a whispering campaign and destabilization seem highly implausible, although it was quite likely that the British Government wanted to be seen to be putting Gibraltar under pressure to tackle the smuggling and money-laundering issues, and thereby provide an objective to be achieved in the formal talks. The much-heralded encounter between Douglas Hurd and Javier Solana – the ninth formal meeting between Foreign Ministers as part of the Brussels Process – got under way at the British Minister’s official country residence in Chevening, Kent on 19 December 1994, although the formal discussions on Gibraltar were scheduled for the following day. The length of the delay since the last official meeting in March 1993 and the sour climate between all three parties involved meant that there could be little expectation of progress on the main issues of sovereignty, external frontiers and use of the airport. Despite the fact that the original purpose of the annual encounter between Foreign Ministers was to provide a forum for the issue of sovereignty to be discussed, Solana’s briefing on the eve of the talks made it plain that the focus would be on smuggling rather than on sovereignty. In an unusual move by the FCO to make plain its position publicly even while the talks were under way, the British Government allowed a debate on Gibraltar in the House of Commons while the two Foreign Ministers were still in session. In the Foreign Secretary’s absence, the junior Minister Alastair Goodlad, reaffirmed the Government’s commitment to the people of Gibraltar, gave ‘every assurance’ that Britain had not been involved in a ‘dirty tricks’ campaign, condemned Spanish behaviour at the border as ‘intolerable’, and called for ‘practical cross-border cooperation which could benefit both economies’ (a comment as much directed at Gibraltar as at the Spanish authorities) (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 20 December 1994, Col. 1533). Goodlad’s remarks were a clear affirmation that in the British Government’s view the climate was not right for any progress to be made on the substantive issues. Small wonder that the statements from both sides issued following the talks were downbeat and low-key. While Hurd said ‘I don’t think we’ve made significant headway on the longstanding differences between Britain and Spain over Gibraltar’, his Spanish counterpart commented: ‘We have not advanced much today’ (Reuter European Community Report, 20 December 1994). As expected, the agreements that were reached related to trafficking on the one hand and border checks on the other. The two sides announced that ‘an effective mechanism’ would be set up in January ‘to improve consultation and cooperation’ in dealing with illegal trafficking, and would include representatives from Gibraltar itself (El País, 21 December 1994).

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Hurd told a press conference that he had informed Solana that the ‘intrusive frontier and secondary checks were not acceptable’ (idem). In a separate press conference at the Spanish Embassy, the Spanish Foreign Minister informed journalists that the border checks8 had given them valuable information and had been very worthwhile. However, the joint communiqué issued following the talks indicated that Spain would not reimpose the secondary checks within Spanish territory. It was also noteworthy that the communiqué made no mention of money-laundering, an indication that Spain accepted that technically this was an internal matter for Britain (idem). This was not the first time that an organized attempt to tackle smuggling had been agreed; working groups had been set up back in 1990 following ministerial talks (see Chapter 17). The real significance of the agreement was the fact that the body to be set up to deal with smuggling would include independent participation by the Gibraltarian authorities. Spain would be looking to see the extent to which Gibraltar was willing seriously to tackle the problem, because an effective clampdown would have an impact upon an important source of income for the Rock. In Gibraltar, the sense immediately following the talks was that an impact on tobacco-smuggling was now inevitable. In all major respects, especially from the Spanish perspective, the London talks showed no sign of progress, and could even be said to have taken a step backwards. There was a distinct lack of clarity about whether or not there was any substantive discussion of sovereignty,9 but there was certainly no progress on the questions of the airport or external frontiers. Even the issue of a new Gibraltarian constitution, which had been mentioned as a possibility in the March 1993 talks, had disappeared off the agenda. It was probably fortunate for Solana that the season of goodwill was just around the corner, for he could otherwise have expected a fairly rough ride from his political opponents at home for securing such a miserly Christmas present from Britain.

25 Defiant Bossano finally gives way ( January–July 1995)

The attempt to tackle the issue of smuggling, as agreed in the London talks in December 1994, began on 26 January 1995, when police and customs representatives from Britain, Spain and Gibraltar met in Seville. Although for security reasons no details of the discussions were published, César Braña, the Civil Governor of Cádiz who was responsible for implementing the rigorous customs checks at the border, also attended the meeting, and said afterwards that he was ‘moderately optimistic’ (El País, 27 January 1995). Gibraltar, for its part, started to take further steps in order to minimize Spanish objections towards its efforts to expand its financial services sector. The first ever money-laundering trial in Gibraltar opened on 6 February, when two Germans appeared at committal proceedings charged with assisting in the transfer of 8.6 million pesetas ($78,200) from drugtrafficking in order to avoid a confiscation order. Later that month legislation began its passage through the Gibraltarian House of Assembly to implement the EU directives on banking regulations, which would eventually enable Gibraltar’s banks to do business in the EU. Joe Bossano also went onto the offensive by using the participation by Gibraltar in its own right in the talks on cross-border cooperation to illustrate the inadequacies of the Brussels Process, in which Gibraltar was only invited to participate as part of the British delegation. In a talk given in Madrid on 8 March under the title ‘The Gibraltarians’ right to selfdetermination and relations with Spain’, he argued that the reason why the bilateral negotiations had not achieved anything in ten years was because the Gibraltarians’ view was not being taken directly into account. He said that it was ‘absurd to talk of decolonizing a country like mine through an arrangement between a colonial power and the neighbour of the colony’ (El País, 9 March 1995). The Gibraltarians were a real people, he claimed, with their own personality, and therefore any decision affecting the colony but which did not take its inhabitants into account would not be worth the paper it was written on. It was an astute move on Bossano’s part to try to turn the new working group to his own advantage by comparing it with the Brussels Process meetings, but it cut no ice with either the British Foreign Office or the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry.1

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One sign that over the years some progress had been made – at least in relations between British and Spanish royal households – was the fact that Prince Charles accepted an invitation to Seville on 18 March to attend the wedding of the Infanta Elena, the eldest daughter of King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia, whereas 16 years earlier the Spanish monarchs had declined to attend Prince Charles’ own wedding because of the dispute over Gibraltar. Some Gibraltarians called for the Prince to stay away, arguing that one snub deserved another, but those who did so had forgotten that since 1987 members of the two royal households had seen a lot of each other privately, and such gestures belonged to another age. The second meeting of the group to discuss cross-border smuggling and other issues took place in London on 27 April, and it immediately became clear that the problem was not going to be any easier to resolve than it had been when the working groups to tackle the issue were set up in 1990 (see Chapter 19). The meeting was scheduled to last until five o’clock in the afternoon, but broke up three-and-a-half hours early, and no official communiqué was issued. It was also clear that the border-crossing delays between Spain and Gibraltar – which Spain had agreed to improve in exchange for the establishment of the ‘mechanism for cooperation’ – were once again getting worse. With the Schengen Agreement (in which seven EU countries, including Spain, agreed to remove internal border controls) having come into effect on 26 March, Spain either felt obliged (or took the opportunity) to tighten up its controls at external entry points, one of which (in Spain’s view) was the border with Gibraltar.2 By the beginning of April Gibraltarians were complaining of delays of four hours to cross into Spain, as every passport was checked by the Spanish police. It would be impossible to establish with any certainty whether there was any connection between Spain’s return to tighter border controls and the next diplomatic incident between Spain and Britain that occurred on 17 April. The British Ambassador in Madrid, David Brighty, was summoned to the Foreign Affairs Ministry so that the Spanish Government could convey its displeasure at the fact that Britain had sided with Canada in a dispute caused by the Canadians’ seizure of a Spanish fishing boat in international waters, an action which came to be known as ‘the war of the “fletán” ’. The Spanish Minister for EU Affairs, Carlos Westendorp, passed on his Government’s displeasure at the British Government’s support for Canada, which was trying to secure a new agreement to conserve stocks of halibut and resulted in an agreement strongly in Canada’s favour. The Spanish Government’s action may have been a tit-for-tat move in response to the events of 1 December 1994, when the Spanish Ambassador in London was called to the Foreign Office, but it is more likely to have been a reflection of the longstanding hostility between British and Spanish Governments over anything to do with fishing, and in particular Britain’s apparent lack of solidarity with a fellow-member of the EU. Whatever the

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reason, the fact that once again two EU partners were indulging in this kind of rebuke at ambassadorial level was a clear indication that diplomatic relations between Spain and Britain were still as tense as they had been in the run-up to the December 1994 talks over Gibraltar. With Spain due to take over the Presidency of the EU in the second half of 1995, Britain was anxious to improve those relations in order to avoid the possibility that Spain might appeal to the EU on the grounds of non-compliance of EU regulations in Gibraltar, in particular directive 91/308/EEC, which was designed to tackle money-laundering. During May, therefore, the British Government continued to apply pressure on Gibraltar to implement the EU directives with greater alacrity than it had so far demonstrated. The Foreign Office was clearly anxious for its dissatisfaction at the speed of implementation to be made known publicly, for it issued a press statement to that effect on 16 May following talks in London between Douglas Hurd and Gibraltar’s Chief Minister. Meanwhile, there were reports in both the Spanish and British press that with the breakdown of the cross-border working party talks on smuggling, the Spanish Government was considering imposing tough sanctions on Gibraltar. Although no specific measures were disclosed, it was suspected that in addition to tough land-border controls these could include a partial naval blockade and possibly the introduction of fiscal measures for Gibraltarians travelling to Spain. Foreign Office Minister David Davis took the opportunity to warn the Spanish Government in the House of Commons that ‘it beggars belief that one EU state could even contemplate what amounts to a military blockade and sealing off its frontier with another member state’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 17 May 1995, Col. 307). Javier Solana did not deny the speculation that the Spanish Government was considering ‘measures to put an end to, or at least to obstruct, illegal trafficking’ (El País, 25 May 1995). Joe Bossano remained defiant, saying that ‘we are not going to allow the British Government to tell us which laws we must adopt in Gibraltar’ (idem). However, the leader of the opposition in Gibraltar, Peter Caruana, wondered whether ‘the demands made by Douglas Hurd are unacceptable to Gibraltar or just unacceptable to Joe Bossano’ (idem). He called upon the Chief Minister to publish the list of directives that the Foreign Office required Gibraltar to implement, but the call fell on stony ground. It was at this point that Bossano began to sow the seeds of his future downfall in elections a year later. For while most Gibraltarians wanted their political leaders to secure the Rock’s financial self-sufficiency, they were unwilling for that to be done if it meant that their economy had to be based on dubious financial dealings. When the Chief Minister was asked on 24 May why he refused to apply the list of directives and regulations that Douglas Hurd had given him, he replied that it was ‘because it may be something which does not suit Gibraltar’’ (idem). The trouble with such an evasive answer was that it gave credence to the kind of suspicions

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about money-laundering and smuggling that were harboured by those who were not sympathetic towards Gibraltar’s position.3 Once again there was talk of the imposition of direct rule from London, whereby through an Order in Council, Gibraltar would become a Crown dependency, and the Foreign Office, when challenged, did not deny that such measures were being considered. Some Gibraltarians feared that if London were to take such powers, it would be that much easier for the transfer of sovereignty to be put in train. It may well have been repetition of such talk which prompted the first public admission by the Chief Constable of Gibraltar, Joe Canepa, on 9 June that there were about 70 speedboats based in Gibraltar involved in smuggling between Morocco and Spain (although this was a far lower figure than the 200 claimed by Spanish customs authorities).4 Meanwhile ordinary Gibraltarians were losing patience with the fact that there seemed to be no sign of improvement in the delays caused by the strict border checks, and on 11 June the Self-Determination for Gibraltar Group organized a noisy demonstration of several hundred people at the border for 26 minutes to mark the twenty-sixth anniversary of the closure of the frontier by General Franco in 1969, and to protest at the continuing border restrictions which were causing delays of up to three hours. The Spanish response was to announce on 14 June that Spain would refuse to re-start the cross-border cooperation talks until measures that had been agreed in December 1994 in Seville were implemented. One such measure, according to César Braña, was that the Gibraltarian police were not arresting the speedboats returning from tobacco- or drugsmuggling runs, despite tip-offs from the Spanish police. He claimed that not a single arrest had taken place, despite the fact that police in Cádiz province had captured 11 tonnes of cannabis and two million packets of cigarettes since January, and he called Gibraltar ‘a refuge for crooks’ (United Press International, 14 June 1995). Bossano now began to indulge in a Jekyll-and-Hyde game with London. On 13 June he announced that he had written to Douglas Hurd, indicating that he was prepared to accept a position which would satisfy the British Government’s demand that Gibraltar introduce legislation to regulate all money suspected of links with illegal activity. He claimed that this legislation would go beyond the EU directive relating to moneylaundering connected with drug-trafficking, but warned that there was the danger that if regulations in Gibraltar were too draconian, potential investors might go to other European tax havens such as Luxembourg or the Channel Islands. However, on 15 June, in an interview published in the European, he accused the British Government of wanting to hand Gibraltar over to Spain and of indulging in dirty tricks in order to undermine the colony.5 On the same day, there was a demonstration by about 1,000 Gibraltarians against the British Government for failing to get Spain

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to lift the border restrictions. With a meeting between the two Foreign Ministers scheduled for 19 June (officially to discuss Spain’s forthcoming presidency of the EU), the Foreign Office in London must have wished for a somewhat clearer message coming from the Rock. If Javier Solana was aware of Bossano’s declaration that legislation was in hand to clean up Gibraltar’s act, there was no indication of it in his remarks at a dinner for foreign correspondents in Madrid on 13 June, when he declared that ‘every day that goes by Gibraltar’s economy becomes that bit more involved in illegal trafficking and in moneylaundering’ (El País, 18 June 1995). He entered the talks with Douglas Hurd, therefore, with a sceptical view of London’s ability to bring Gibraltar into line or Gibraltar’s willingness to tackle the two main problems. The threat of sanctions by Spain which had been mentioned in May (suggestions now included control of investments of Gibraltarian capital in Spain and the reintroduction of restrictions on the use of Spanish airspace for planes landing in Gibraltar) remained a strong possibility, and the likelihood was that if they were to be implemented at all, the Spanish Government would rather do so before taking up the reins of the EU presidency on 1 July. With such an unsettled climate over the Gibraltar issue, and with relations between Spain and Britain at a low ebb following Britain’s stance in the incident with Canada, Douglas Hurd made it clear in an article published in The Times on 19 June – the day he was due to meet his Spanish counterpart in Madrid – that his priorities were to try to solve the practical issues on Gibraltar: the lifting of the delays at the border-crossing (he described as ‘absurd’ the use of the Schengen Agreement as an excuse), the restoration of the ferry crossing from Algeciras, and further crossborder cooperation such as the tripartite talks on illegal trafficking (although he did not mention that these had stalled). In response to the statement made by the Chief Minister of Gibraltar six days earlier, Hurd welcomed the fact that Gibraltar was now ready to implement the EU banking directives and argued that the right regulatory framework would increase investors’ confidence rather than deter them. He urged the Gibraltar Government to tackle any drug-trafficking that may be taking place (although he did not mention tobacco-smuggling). So Douglas Hurd saw the talks as a means of trying to move practical matters forward. If officials in the Spanish Foreign Ministry were looking for any encouraging signs for the future, there were, however, two remarks in the Foreign Secretary’s statement for them to latch on to. First, there was a hint that the 1969 Constitution, in which was enshrined the now standard commitment (described by Hurd as ‘absolute and unqualified’) regarding the sovereignty of Gibraltar, could at some future date be revisited (‘If the Chief Minister of Gibraltar and his colleagues have ideas for changes in the 1969 Constitution, we are ready to look at them’) (The Times, 19 June 1995). Second, there was the statement that ‘Gibraltar’s

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future is linked by geography to that of Spain’ (idem). The British Foreign Secretary was stating the obvious, but a Spanish optimist might say that geographical links do at least have the potential to develop ultimately into deeper relationships. At a joint press conference held after the talks, Douglas Hurd claimed that progress had been made in four areas – the establishment of a commission to look at Gibraltar’s financial services, the adoption of EU directives by Gibraltar by the end of the year, a clamp-down on moneylaundering, and increased action by Gibraltarian police against drugsmuggling (El País, 20 June 1995). He and Javier Solana agreed that a third meeting on cross-border cooperation should take place, despite the fact that Solana declared that Spain ‘was not very happy with the outcome of the first two’ and that there had been ‘too many words and too few actions’ (idem). Hurd pointed out that he was not in a position to instruct the Chief Minister of Gibraltar, but could only try ‘to persuade him and carry him with us’ (The Times, 20 June 1995). Nevertheless, Solana did agree that the majority of the sanctions drawn up by the Spanish Treasury and Interior Ministries would at least be postponed until after the third meeting of the cross-border cooperation group, although he said that Spain would go ahead with a complaint against Britain to the European Commission that an estimated 20,000 million pesetas ($143 million) was being lost to the Spanish Treasury each year as a consequence of smuggling involving Gibraltar (El País, 20 June 1995). The meeting between Hurd6 and Solana was not, in fact, part of the cycle of talks to discuss the future of Gibraltar – these were scheduled to take place on an annual basis, and the previous meeting had been held barely six months earlier. However, the two Foreign Ministers had felt obliged to discuss the issue in Madrid partly because there were practical matters which needed to be resolved and partly because they (Britain in particular) did not want the issue to fester and interfere with bilateral relations during Spain’s presidency of the EU in the second half of 1995. As had been threatened, on 23 June Spain lodged its formal complaint about smuggling and lost revenue with the Directorate-General of Customs and Excise of the European Commission. Spain alleged that since 1989, 84,000 million pesetas ($600 million) had been lost in tobacco duty, together with a further loss of sales of 43,000 million pesetas ($307 million) by the state-owned company Tabacalera. In addition, in the first five months of 1995 19.5 tonnes of cannabis worth 38,000 million pesetas ($271 million) had been seized, suggesting that the value of drugs getting on to the Spanish market across the Strait of Gibraltar was at least 200,000 million pesetas ($1.4 billion) per year. The complaint lodged with the Commission also accused Gibraltar of inadequate regulations against money-laundering. Ten days later, on 3 July, Gibraltar introduced the legislation to extend the crime of moneylaundering to cover proceeds from all serious crime, and not just drugs.

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That legislation completed its passage through the Gibraltarian Assembly four days later on 7 July. On the same day Gibraltar police confiscated over 50 rigid inflatable speedboats from the marina that were suspected of involvement in drugtrafficking from Morocco to Spain, prompting demonstrations which turned into violent protests by boat owners and young people the following day and resulted in dozens of arrests. Following discussions with the Governor of the Rock, Field Marshal John Chapple, Joe Bossano appeared on television on 9 July to express the Gibraltarian Government’s determination to put a stop to the drug-trafficking, and declared a ban (confirmed by law on 22 July) on the importation of the rigid inflatable boats (known as RIBs) used for this activity (El País, 10 July 1995). On 14 July, in one of the biggest demonstrations seen on the Rock, nearly a quarter of the population of 30,000 marched through the streets in support of the Government’s stand against money-laundering and smuggling, which included an increase in tobacco duty, the insistence on the storage of cartons of cigarettes in bonded warehouses, and control of their distribution to retailers. The size of the turn-out for the demonstration suggested that perhaps Bossano should have taken this kind of action sooner. With the Gibraltarian authorities at last demonstrating that they were prepared to take action against money-laundering, drug-trafficking and tobacco-smuggling, Spain’s immediate response on 13 July was to ease the strict border controls (despite the fact that since the end of March these were supposed to have been linked to the implementation of the Schengen Agreement). What remained to be seen, however, was how effective the Gibraltarian authorities’ action would be, and whether in the longer term these measures might lead to a change in Spain’s attitude towards the development of the Rock as an off-shore financial centre.7

26 Changing Spanish attitudes? ( July 1995–April 1996)

Joe Bossano ignored suggestions that in view of the civil disturbances on the Rock he should cancel his visit to appear before the United Nations Decolonization Committee on 11 July 1995, and duly took his annual opportunity to argue for the right to self-determination for Gibraltar. On this occasion he underlined the inconsistency of observing the stipulation in the Treaty of Utrecht that sovereignty would revert to Spain if Britain were to relinquish it, whilst ignoring other aspects of the Treaty such as the prohibition of Jews or Moors from living in the territory. He also criticized Spain for vetoing Gibraltar’s participation in international sporting events, refusing recognition of Gibraltar’s police as members of Interpol, and not recognizing Gibraltarian identity documents, which was contrary to Spain’s obligations under EU agreements. Bossano clearly saw the position of the UN regarding the future of Gibraltar as crucial. His reasoning was that it was only in that international forum (outside the framework of the bilateral Brussels Declaration negotiations to which he was in any case opposed) that Gibraltar stood any chance of moving towards what it saw as a position of genuine decolonization. Britain was unlikely to persuade Spain unilaterally to put the Treaty of Utrecht to one side, but Joe Bossano hoped that he could convince the UN Decolonization Committee to persuade the General Assembly to rule on whether the Treaty was an obstacle to self-determination. In this endeavour Bossano had the full support of the Gibraltarian people. The trouble was that by the latter half of 1995 he had lost a lot of their support over his administration’s dilatoriness in dealing with the smuggling and money-laundering issues. Success at the UN was essential to the Chief Minister’s political survival. Gibraltar’s respectability in the eyes of the international community will have been enhanced by a press conference held in Cádiz on 5 September by the Civil Governor, César Braña, and the British Ambassador to Madrid, David Brighty, who both declared that the problem of drug- and tobacco-smuggling had been resolved, thanks to the action taken by the Gibraltarian authorities against the speedboats in July. The only outstanding issue, according to Braña, was that of money-laundering, but he

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agreed that it would take time for the EU directives to take effect. As it turned out, it would also take more time for the smuggling to be dealt with than Braña and Brighty had anticipated. Unexpected support for Gibraltar from Spanish origins came on Gibraltar Day (10 September) in the form of messages of solidarity from leaders of nationalist parties from the autonomous communities. Carlos Campuzano, representative for Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) and President of the Nationalist Youth of Cataluña (Juventud Nacionalista de Catalunya) was struck by the thousands of Gibraltarians wearing national colours of red and white, and told the crowd assembled in the main square that, just as there were many peoples in Europe in the process of ‘building their freedom and achieving their independence’, ‘now it is your turn, and no Ministry of Foreign Affairs can stop you. Long live free Gibraltar!’ (El País, 11 September 1995). Campuzano’s echoes of General de Gaulle in Quebec were supported by Pedro Caballero, a senator for the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), who received loud applause when he told the crowd that ‘you will definitely have our support in ensuring that it is the people of Gibraltar who will decide its future’ (idem). There was even an unprecedented message read out by Joe Bossano from the Chairman of the UN Decolonization Committee, who expressed the hope that the National Day ‘would fill them all with pride at being Gibraltarians’ (idem). Perhaps Bossano’s July visit to New York had been more successful than he had realized. Meanwhile more fundamental issues such as cross-border cooperation had to be dealt with, and it came as no surprise when it was announced on 23 November (seven months after the previous meeting) that the third session of talks had ended in failure. Gibraltar’s explanation was that Spain was trying to turn the talks into bilateral rather than tripartite ones, and seeking to extend the scope of the discussions beyond that of crossborder matters, whereas César Braña argued that the failure of the talks was due to the fact that Joe Bossano was blocking the anti-trafficking measures (El País, 24 November 1995). So much for his statement in September that tobacco- and drug-smuggling had come to an end. The end of 1995 saw a change at the head of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when Carlos Westendorp replaced Javier Solana, who had taken up the post of Secretary General of NATO. Westendorp had been Minister for European Union Affairs, and therefore came to the top foreign affairs job fully familiar with the Gibraltarian issue. However, even greater political changes were to take place on 4 March 1996, when in early general elections Spanish voters finally, if not decisively, wrested power from the hands of the PSOE and from Prime Minister Felipe González after more than 13 years, and gave a majority (although not an absolute one) to José María Aznar, leader of the centre-right Partido Popular. Before the Aznar-led Government could be installed, however, a major

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incident occurred on 10 April 1996, when a police helicopter crashed into the sea while giving chase to one of the Gibraltar-based rigid inflatable speedboats which, although reduced in number since July 1995, continued to collect cannabis from Morocco and deliver it to Spanish beaches. The accident, which may have been caused by an oar having been thrown into the helicopter’s tail rotor, resulted in the death of a Spanish Civil Guard technician and led to the British Ambassador being summoned to the Spanish Foreign Ministry for a formal protest to be lodged against the ongoing drug-running across the Strait involving Gibraltar-based craft. It also prompted – more out of Spanish vexation than anything else – the reimposition of tighter customs controls and long delays at the border, resulting in predictable condemnation and a call for ‘co-operation, not confrontation’ from the FCO (Guardian, 13 April 1995). The day after this diplomatic clash, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister Joe Bossano announced that a general election would be held on 16 May. In 1992 Gibraltarian voters had given Bossano a landslide endorsement for a second term for his policy of bringing greater self-determination to Gibraltar. Four years on, one of the main issues of the election would undoubtedly be whether they would continue to approve of the manner in which he had conducted the colony’s affairs, given that it had led him into conflict not only with Spain (to which Gibraltarians were wellaccustomed) but also with the British Government, particularly over the implementation of the EU directives relating to financial matters. Although Bossano had made serious efforts (some would say belatedly) to tackle the issue of smuggling, it was clear from the helicopter incident that it continued to be a major problem,1 and one that not only brought the colony into international disrepute but also undermined business confidence. Perhaps more significantly, however, by causing the Spanish authorities to reimpose border controls the smuggling-related incident reduced the number of daily visitors to the Rock and thereby hit Gibraltarian traders where it hurt most – in their cash-registers. With one eye on the election he had just announced, on 12 April Bossano proposed new rules to de-register high-speed boats suspected of involvement in drugtrafficking. Within a month he would find out whether he had done enough to persuade Gibraltarian voters to give him four more years as Chief Minister.

27 All change, but no change Aznar, Caruana and Blair in power (May 1996–June 1997)

May 1996 was marked by formal political changes in both Spain and Gibraltar. On 3 May, after finally gaining the support of several nationalist parties in order to produce a majority, José María Aznar was sworn in as the first conservative Prime Minister since the death of General Franco. As expected, in putting forward his programme to the Spanish Parliament, he indicated that under his leadership the Spanish Government would continue to press its claim to the British colony of Gibraltar. On 6 May the new Foreign Minister, Abel Matutes, made clear in press interviews that the Government was going to continue to take a tough line on the smuggling issue, and ‘would adopt, if necessary, all alternative measures’ (Agence France Presse, 6 May 1996), which was taken to mean that the closure of the border was not ruled out. Coincidentally, on 6 May the Gibraltarian parties published their manifestos ahead of the elections, and the contrast with the Spanish Government’s line could not have been more stark. Bossano’s ruling GSLP called for the decolonization of the territory and a ‘free association’ agreement with Britain (similar to that enjoyed by the Isle of Man, whereby the British Government would retain responsibility for defence and foreign affairs). The opposition centre-right party, the Gibraltar Social Democrats led by Peter Caruana, stated that their ultimate objective was ‘to ensure a decolonized status in which Gibraltar enjoys the security of continuing close links with Britain and full European rights’ (idem). Also taking part in the election was the National Party, led by Joseph Garcia, who called for ‘city-state’ status for Gibraltar (like Monaco or San Marino) with the British monarch remaining as Head of State; and an independent candidate, Peter Cumming, who was advocating that Gibraltar should acquire the status of an autonomous province within Spain (idem). The main issue in the election, as on previous occasions, was Gibraltar’s relationship with Spain. Both main parties ruled out any change on sovereignty and were committed to greater self-determination for Gibraltar while retaining close ties with Britain, so the main choice for the voters was the extent to which they wanted their government to achieve it by working with Madrid and London or through confrontation. Joe

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Bossano’s record showed that his approach was a confrontational one, while Peter Caruana made it clear that he recognized that Gibraltar’s economic future lay in improved cooperation with Spain. With that knowledge, the new Spanish Government would no doubt have been quite content to see the back of Joe Bossano, and the threats by Abel Matutes of a worsening border situation if Gibraltar did not clean up its act may well have been designed to encourage the electorate of Gibraltar to vote Bossano out of office. The British Government, meanwhile, took a timely opportunity during questions in the House of Lords to the Foreign Office Minister Baroness Chalker to reassure Gibraltarians of its commitment to the territory (Hansard House of Lords Debates, 14 May 1996, Col. 385). The election campaign was bitterly fought. Joe Bossano accused Caruana of being a fascist and a traitor, but the main focus of his campaign was to attack Spain; his campaign slogan was ‘Give Spain No Hope’, and a party newspaper carried the headline ‘Matutes Declares War on Gibraltar’. Peter Caruana concentrated his attack on Joe Bossano for trying to run a godfather-type administration that had damaged Gibraltar’s reputation and image, and for trying to turn the territory into a oneparty state. He warned Gibraltarians that four more years of GSLP government would make the present situation worse (Daily Telegraph, 13 May 1996). In the run-up to polling day, opinion polls were predicting a narrow victory for Caruana and his Social Democrats. Although some younger working-class voters were planning to switch away from the GSLP, older residents remembered the ‘Doves’ of 1968 (see Chapter 3), who were prepared to negotiate a settlement with Madrid, and preferred to stick with Bossano. The general view of a televised eve-of-poll debate on 15 May was that Peter Caruana had strengthened his position. He suggested that what Gibraltar needed was ‘a more constructive approach to our relationship to the British Government so that we engage a little bit of brain and less of our political fists’ (Reuters World Service, 15 May 1996). Endorsement in the editorial column of The Times on polling day itself will not have done Caruana any harm. As he must have known all along, Joe Bossano had lost the election as far back as July 1995, when there were demonstrations in the streets of Gibraltar and many residents felt that their image had been tarnished by an administration which had failed to take a sufficiently tough line on tobacco-smuggling and drug-running. Weary also of the effect that bad relations with Spain had had on the border-crossing, and concerned about the rising rate of unemployment, a majority of the electorate of 18,400 was ready to give a chance on 16 May to a would-be Chief Minister who promised the promotion of tourism to boost the economy, the improvement of the Rock’s international image through a more accountable administration, and better relations with both Britain and Spain. So it came as little surprise that on a record 88 per cent turn-out the

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GSD gained 52.7 per cent of the vote, with the GSLP on 45.6 per cent. The National Party and the independent candidate, Peter Cumming, shared the remainder of the votes between them. It was quite clear from the fact that Cumming secured only 214 votes that very few inhabitants of the Rock had any appetite for integration with Spain. Peter Caruana, the 39-year-old lawyer turned new Chief Minister,1 pledged that the first priority of his administration would be ‘a campaign to restore Gibraltar’s somewhat damaged image’ (Reuters World Service, 17 May 1996). That would be achieved through the creation of an environment of political and economic stability, which he put before the pursuit of decolonization, although he also gave a commitment to discuss with the British Government the modernization of Gibraltar’s constitution. While he saw the value of ‘engaging Spain in dialogue to try to find a way of reducing the historical tensions and hostilities in the relationship’, he made it clear at the same time that ‘our sovereignty is not negotiable and it is not for sale in exchange for better relations with Spain’ (idem). On the major question of sovereignty, the reaction of the Spanish press to the outcome of the election was generally gloomy. In a résumé published in the Guardian, the conservative ABC thought that the result of the election was irrelevant as far as the Gibraltar problem was concerned. El Mundo took some comfort from the possibility that the dialogue that the new Chief Minister said he wanted could lead to the creation of conditions for a peaceful resolution of the sovereignty dispute. El País welcomed Caruana’s willingness to cooperate with Spain on issues such as ‘human and commercial relations’, and called on him to start by lifting the veto on the joint use of the airport. However, the paper lamented the fact that ‘the Gibraltarians still do not want to allow for the possibility of forming part of the Spanish state, however democratic, “communautaire” and respectful of cultural differences it may have become since the implementation of the 1978 Constitution’ (quoted in the Guardian, 22 May 1996). Nevertheless, some saw this change of leadership in Gibraltar, following close on the heels of the election of a new administration in Madrid, as the best opportunity since the Brussels Declaration for progress to be made on the dispute. Despite the new Chief Minister’s stance on sovereignty (and he could rely on the British Government of the day to support his position), he had indicated that he wanted to improve relations with Spain through dialogue on economic issues. Consequently there was a markedly positive response to the election of Caruana by political leaders in the Campo de Gibraltar region. José Luis Landero, the Chairman of the Association of Campo de Gibraltar Councils, said that ‘the body that he represented wanted more dialogue with the Government of Gibraltar because what local people are interested in is not questions relating to sovereignty but maintaining good relations as friends and neighbours’ (El País, 20 May 1996). The Mayor of Algeciras, Patricio González, wanted

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relations between people on both sides of the border to be opened up, while the Chairman of the Council of Los Barrios, Alonso Rojas, expressed the hope that the result of the election meant progress as far as dialogue between the Rock and the Campo was concerned (idem). So at a local level the change of leadership in Gibraltar was broadly welcomed. The crucial questions were whether it would be possible for relations to improve locally without any progress on the issue of sovereignty nationally, and whether Madrid would make any concessions to Caruana’s desire for Gibraltar’s own voice to be heard in any discussions. History suggested that the answer was likely to be negative in both cases, particularly in the light of the reaction of the Spanish Government to the results of the Gibraltarian elections. Predictably enough, the Spanish Prime Minister stressed that ‘the future of Gibraltar remains a matter to be resolved only between the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom’ (The Times, 18 May 1996), and he urged Britain to ensure that the new Gibraltarian administration cracked down rapidly on smuggling (Reuters World Service, 17 May 1996).2 That much was to be expected, but in any case Spain was pushing at an open door, for the new Chief Minister had made it plain that he intended to get rid of the remaining 14 or 15 high-speed boats still operating out of Gibraltar. However, Caruana also expressed the hope that the new Spanish Government might feel able to introduce some new ideas into the debate over Gibraltar since, unlike the PSOE, it needed to have no fear of criticism from the political right. This looked like a rather vain hope when Foreign Minister Abel Matutes (sounding disturbingly like a latter-day Castiella from the Franco era) made it clear in an interview published on 18 May by ABC (which viewed the opening of the border in 1985 as a serious mistake) that he would close the border again ‘if the situation demanded it’ (quoted by Agence France Presse, 18 May 1996). Just to prove how serious he was, he immediately reimposed the double checks at the border, resulting once more in long delays of up to six hours. So much for new ideas. Even César Braña, who had first introduced the double checks, said on the eve of his retirement as Civil Governor of Cádiz that their reintroduction at this juncture was a bad idea, and in an interview published in the Gibraltar Chronicle on 25 May he called on the Spanish Prime Minister to restart the tripartite talks on practical issues which had last met in November 1995.3 The Mayor of La Línea, José Antonio Fernández Pons, was also dismayed at the action imposed by the Spanish Foreign Office at the border, and he spoke for several other mayors in the Campo de Gibraltar region in calling for the Government to seek ‘measures to improve relations at a human and economic level’ (The Times, 23 May 1996). He had in mind the 1,500 workers who crossed daily into Gibraltar to earn their living, as well as the effects of a fall in Gibraltarian customers on trade in La Línea’s market.

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Clearly, local political leaders did not appreciate the actions of the Spanish Government. Nor did the FCO, which complained to the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry via the British Ambassador in Madrid on 30 May. The situation will not have been eased by a two-day visit to the Rock by the Duke of Edinburgh at the end of May – his first for 42 years – to celebrate 25 years of his Award Scheme for achievement in social work and sport. The Spanish Foreign Ministry expressed its displeasure at the visit (Agence France Presse, 30 May 1996), while Prince Philip (not always renowned for his diplomacy) joked about the current border delays in a speech when he said that everyone had an adventurous expedition at some time, ‘even if it is only trying to get across the border into Spain’ (The Times, 31 May 1996). Peter Caruana went to London on 6 June to discuss relations with Spain with the British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, who had taken over when Douglas Hurd stepped down. It was unfortunate, especially given the unfriendly reception that Caruana’s election had received from the Spanish Government, that Rifkind was unable to see him, for the Foreign Secretary had coincidentally gone to Madrid that same day as part of his tour of EU capitals designed to achieve a lifting of the ban on British beef exports following the BSE crisis. Clearly Rifkind and Matutes touched on the subject of Gibraltar in their encounter in Madrid, for at a joint press conference the Spanish Foreign Minister indicated his willingness to relax the border controls. From that it would appear that the whole episode had been designed to enable the new Spanish Government to regain the initiative from the outset of its administration. The strict controls had still not been lifted, however, by the time that David Davis, Rifkind’s deputy on European matters, arrived in Gibraltar for talks with the Chief Minister on 1 July. Following the visit, during which he also spoke with Joe Bossano, Davis indicated that he would press for a resumption of the cross-border talks. These were proving to be as problematic as the Brussels Process talks had come to be. It soon became clear that despite the change of government in Gibraltar there was not going to be any real change in the attitude of the Chief Minister to the desire for a greater degree of self-determination for the territory. Like his predecessor, Peter Caruana found himself criticizing both Britain and Spain in an interview with ABC on 12 August. ‘We feel we are victims of circumstances which frustrate our democratic rights to decide our future’, he said. ‘We do not accept that the rights of a people should be based on a 300-year-old treaty’ (quoted by Agence France Presse, 12 August 1996). His complaint was a reflection of the fact that Britain was not prepared to grant any greater degree of self-determination to Gibraltarians because that would damage relations with Spain. It therefore suited Britain to use the Treaty of Utrecht to retain sovereignty of the Rock, but at the same time to collaborate with Spain as partners in supra-

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national or international enterprises. That approach might have been right for Britain, but it was not what Gibraltar wanted. One consequence of the change of government in Spain, however, was a different attitude towards the extent of Spain’s participation in NATO. Spain joined the Atlantic Alliance in June 1982 when the UCD was still in power, but it did not become part of the military structure (in part due to the fact that there is a NATO command based in Gibraltar). When in opposition the PSOE had opposed Spain’s membership of NATO, and in the run-up to the 1982 election they campaigned on a commitment to hold a referendum on withdrawal (this was eventually held in 1986, but with the Government having done a volte-face and officially campaigning for the status quo) (see Chapter 12). Having been sorely troubled by the issue of NATO in the early 1980s, it was scarcely surprising that since then Felipe González and his government had preferred to leave it alone. The Aznar government had no such problems, and on 9 September Abel Matutes announced its intention to secure Spain’s full membership of NATO by the end of the year, coinciding with the reform of the Alliance (including a new European command structure) scheduled for agreement at the Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels on 11 December. The announcement was made on the occasion of the first official visit to Spain by the former PSOE Spanish Foreign Minister, Javier Solana, since he had become Secretary General of NATO in December 1995. Amongst the conditions that Spain proposed regarding its entry into the military structure was that the GIBMEB NATO command post in Gibraltar should be phased out, since Spain wanted a command sited in Spanish territory to control NATO zones which would cover both the Iberian Peninsula (excluding Portugal, which had its own IBERLANT command) and the access to the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar. Solana, now wearing his NATO hat, urged the Spanish Government not to bring Britain’s role in Gibraltar into this particular issue, but he pledged to throw his weight behind the Spanish Government’s proposal that it should integrate fully into the Alliance. As a former PSOE minister, Solana’s support for the plan guaranteed that the main opposition party would not oppose the proposal during its passage through the Spanish Parliament. Britain was strongly opposed to the notion of Spanish command over Gibraltar. Portugal was not happy with the idea either, but for different reasons: the Lisbon Government proposed that together with Spain and France (which at that stage was planning to rejoin the NATO military structure) they should in rotation control the Strait from a Lisbon-based command. Not surprisingly the idea met with greatest hostility from the Gibraltarians: ‘The suggestion that a Spanish commander should lord it over British assets here in Gibraltar would be anathema to us all’, said Peter Caruana (Daily Telegraph, 14 October 1996). He hoped that, whatever the outcome, Britain would use the opportunity to insist

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that Spain should soften its approach to the whole issue of its claim to Gibraltar. Abel Matutes and Malcolm Rifkind met in London on 17 October, and the question of Gibraltar was briefly discussed both as an issue in itself and in connection with Spain’s proposals regarding NATO. Little of substance emerged from that meeting, but as negotiations progressed between Spain and NATO officials in Brussels it became clear that the Spanish Government was not going to get everything that it had asked for. First, it looked increasingly unlikely that there would be a new Spanish-led command based in Spain covering the zones of Spanish interest from Naples to the Strait, and second Spain would have to agree that ships of the British Navy would no longer be prohibited from sailing in Spanish territorial waters. The latter point touched on issues relating to the sovereignty of Gibraltar, since Spanish agreement on this matter could be interpreted as acquiescence to Britain. On 23 October the British Ministry of Defence announced that the present GIBMED commander, Major-General Simon Pack, would be replaced in April 1997 by Commodore Alastair Taylor, who was one rank lower. This was seen by some observers as a first step towards accommodating Spanish conditions for joining NATO’s military structure, making it likely that Gibraltar would return to a strictly British command rather than a NATO-integrated one. The NATO issue progressed on 13 November following a two-day debate in the Spanish Parliament, when members voted by 293 to 23 in favour of empowering the Government to negotiate Spain’s full integration into the Atlantic Alliance. The PSOE and all other main parties apart from the Izquierda Unida voted with the Government’s resolution, which included the condition that Spain must remain free of nuclear weapons, but which did not make specific reference to Gibraltar.4 Meanwhile, the new Chief Minister had his first opportunity to put Gibraltar’s case to the UN Decolonization Committee on 7 October. The thrust of his approach was to try to persuade the Committee in its annual resolution on the dispute not just to call on Britain and Spain to engage in dialogue on the future of the colony, but also to insist on the inclusion in the resolution of the right of the people of Gibraltar to have their own representation at those talks. Unlike his predecessor, who had rejected the idea of dialogue with Spain, Peter Caruana said that he and his government were keen to talk with Britain and Spain ‘anytime and in any place, provided only that at those talks the people of Gibraltar have a separate voice of their own and can therefore speak for and represent themselves through their own constitutionally and democratically elected government’ (Reuters World Service, 7 October 1996). He said that the pressure exerted on Gibraltar by Spain over the years had led to a relationship with the Spanish state that was marked by ‘friction, resentment and mistrust’, but that his government was deter-

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mined to do everything possible to reverse what he called ‘this destructive spiral’ (ibid). Caruana persisted with his demand for equal status for Gibraltar in future talks between Britain and Spain when he visited Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind in London on 18 November. However, since Spain was adamantly opposed to the ‘two flags, three voices’ idea, there was no possibility that Britain would press for such status on Gibraltar’s behalf. During his visit, the Chief Minster discussed Spain’s full integration into NATO and reiterated his opposition to the appointment of a Spaniard as head of the restructured southern command, saying that ‘the suggestion . . . is as offensive to the people of Gibraltar as the idea that Argentina should exercise control over the Falklands’ (The Times, 19 November 1996). He also made clear his desire to persuade Britain to bring Gibraltar’s relationship up-to-date by modernizing the constitution (using his predecessor’s analogy with the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man) – in other words, to end Gibraltar’s colonial status but without breaking the political bonds with London. There was no indication that Malcolm Rifkind was ready to take up that particular challenge, either. José María Aznar also made a visit to London in November, his first as Prime Minister. Although the main items on the agenda of his talks with John Major were the European Union, NATO and so-called fisheries ‘quota-hopping’, in an interview for The Times prior to the visit on 27 November Aznar did indicate that he would raise the question of Gibraltar: Our position is crystal clear. We want it back. Full stop. But we are not going to let that become an unhelpful obsession in our bilateral relations. The dispute is . . . an ‘inconvenience’, one that prevents us from having a full relationship, but we are determined not to let it get in the way of everything else. The Times, 26 November 1996 There may have been a change of government in Spain, but clearly there was no hint of a change in the country’s stance or expectations on Gibraltar. However, at a press conference following his meeting with John Major, Aznar did accept the importance of discussing the issue ‘within a framework of solidly friendly relations’ (El País, 28 November 1996), recently boosted by Britain’s public support for Spain in its row with Cuba over the latter’s withdrawal of its acceptance of a new Spanish ambassador. Peter Caruana’s government was meanwhile pursuing the goal of greater economic self-sufficiency. One facet of his approach was to improve the tourist industry through a £5.2 million ($9.4 million) investment in promotion and refurbishment, including expenditure on passenger facilities at the airport, improvements to the port terminal for cruise liners, the refurbishment of Main Street, and the conversion of garrison

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facilities into tourist attractions such as exhibitions, museums and cottage industries. Another facet of economic growth, however, depended on improved cross-border relations with Spain, and there was no sign that this was in the offing. Indeed, an unannounced visit to Gibraltar and the border-crossing on 4 November by the EU Commissioner for Immigration and Judicial Affairs, Anita Gradin from Sweden, provoked irate protests from Madrid and from Spain’s Ambassador to the EU, Javier Elorza, who described the visit as ‘an underhand and illegal inspection’ (El País, 13 November 1996). The official reason for the protest was that Commissioner Gradin had not given the required 30 days’ notice of such a visit. However, also at issue were other sensibilities: she had chosen to investigate smuggling from the Gibraltar side of the border rather than from the Spanish side; she had visited Morocco and then entered Gibraltar via London, rather than via the ferry from North Africa; and, most importantly from the Spanish perspective, she appeared to have accepted the Gibraltarian case that Spain was impeding the free movement of people and goods within the EU by time-consuming inspections at the border, whereas Spain’s argument was that since under the terms of its EU membership Gibraltar was not part of the EU customs union and did not apply VAT, Spain had the obligation to treat the Gibraltar–Spain border from a commercial perspective as an external border. Like so many actions and protests before it, this one evaporated without any permanent damage being done. However, it served to illustrate that nearly 12 years after the full reopening of the border, the old tensions and sensibilities over it were as strong as ever they were. The year 1996 ended on a disturbing note for Gibraltarians – or at least that was how they saw it – with the announcement on 3 December from the FCO that following the retirement of the Governor, Vice-Admiral Sir Hugo White, in February 1997 he would be replaced by a civilian Governor for the first time in the territory’s history. The British Government had some justification for taking such a step, in view of the changed role of Gibraltar in Britain’s defence strategy, the downgrading of the Commander (British Forces Gibraltar) announced in October, and the imminent demise of GIBMED as part of the NATO military command. Even so, the news was received with some concern in Gibraltar because the choice of a civilian was seen as a weakening of Britain’s commitment to the colony. The man in question was Sir Richard Luce, a former junior Foreign Office Minister who, together with the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, had resigned at the time of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis in 1982 in recognition of the Ministry’s failure to warn the Government of an impending Argentinian invasion of the islands. The connections both with the FCO and with the Falklands/Malvinas crisis were in themselves not the best of recommendations to Gibraltarians, who were also mindful of the

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fact that a civilian – former Minister Chris Patten – had been appointed as the last Governor of Hong Kong, and they were concerned that parallels might be being drawn in the minds of FCO officials. They were also annoyed that the appointment had been made without any consultation with the Gibraltarian Government, especially at a time when it was feared that imminent changes in NATO might result in Spanish control of a new sub-regional NATO command that would include Gibraltar.5 The decision of the present Governor, Admiral Sir Hugo White, to return to Britain because of his wife’s health was regretted by Gibraltarians for more reasons than just sympathy for the Governor. The New Year 1997 did not start on a very positive note for Gibraltarians, either. With the tenth formal meeting between British and Spanish Foreign Ministers scheduled for 22 January, customary Spanish pressure began to build up beforehand. This time it took the form of Spanish press reports about a threat in a letter sent to the British Embassy on 14 January that Gibraltarian passports would not be recognized as valid by the Spanish authorities. The Spanish argument was that although Gibraltarian passports (issued by the Governor on behalf of the Crown) had been accepted since the signing of an agreement between Britain and Spain in 1960, Gibraltarians should now be required to carry EU passports issued by the British Foreign Office. Spain was trying to exploit the fact that as Gibraltar was a British dependent territory, its citizens did not have the same rights of movement as residents of Britain. The counter-argument put by Britain was that Gibraltar was also part of the EU, which gave its citizens the right to move freely between EU member states, and if Spain went ahead with its threat the British Government would take the issue to the European Commission and, if necessary, to the European Court. Not surprisingly, the Gibraltarians were incensed by the threat. Clearly, if it were carried out it would prevent large numbers of them from leaving the Rock by land. Following the hue and cry, including questions in the House of Commons, Madrid announced on 17 January that it was ‘only studying the possibility of changes to the [1960] treaty’ (The Times, 18 January 1997). However, once again the purpose had been served – to heighten awareness of Spain’s dissatisfaction with the present situation over Gibraltar prior to the talks at Foreign Minister level. These took place in Madrid on 22 January, although without the participation of Chief Minister Peter Caruana, who had taken the decision, like his predecessor, not to attend on the grounds that he would not be treated as a third party. At a joint press conference following the talks, Malcolm Rifkind announced that his Spanish counterpart had guaranteed ‘total freedom of movement’ for Gibraltar passport-holders (The Times, 23 January 1997), and had thereby allayed British concerns, although a joint commission would be set up to clarify the position of citizens of other British dependencies who held British passports and were resident in Gibraltar.

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However, it was to emerge that such mollification on Britain’s part about guaranteed freedom of movement was premature. In addition to passports, it also became clear that the Foreign Ministers had discussed the standard issues of sovereignty (which Matutes recognized would take ‘a long time’ to resolve), drug-trafficking and moneylaundering. Rifkind said he was looking for Gibraltar to become a ‘transparent finance centre’ operating in accordance with EU regulations (idem). Matutes also put the question of the airport back on the agenda, and although the British Foreign Minister said he saw benefits for both sides in joint use of the airport he expressed doubts that any progress would be achieved in the short term (idem). It transpired later, through a leak to the Spanish daily paper ABC, that Matutes had once again informally raised the idea of joint sovereignty in some detail, including a time-scale of up to 100 years before transfer to Spanish rule. Although this represented a far more extended time-scale than any of Matutes’ predecessors would ever have contemplated, predictably the British Foreign Secretary rejected the proposal because it would not have the consent of the people of Gibraltar, and Prime Minister John Major reaffirmed Britain’s position on Gibraltar in answer to a question in the House of Commons on 30 January (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 30 January 1997, Col. 502). There was a sense of weariness in the British press that, 20 years after the restoration of democracy in Spain, the Spanish approach to the Gibraltar issue had essentially remained unchanged. Peter Caruana decided it was time to take the initiative in seeking recognition of Gibraltar’s European status when he took a delegation to Brussels on 28 January for a three-day visit to air Gibraltar’s grievances with members of the European Parliament and the European Commission. There were two main objectives to the visit. The first was to secure voting rights for residents of Gibraltar (including those who were citizens of other EU countries) in elections to the European Parliament – something that Gibraltarians had attempted but failed to secure on previous occasions. The Gibraltarians argued that as citizens of the EU they had a right to suffrage to the Parliament. The practical obstacle was the fact that the population was too small to constitute a European constituency such as those established in the UK for European Parliamentary elections, and whether or not they had a right of representation was (it was argued) debatable because they were excluded from certain obligations of EU membership, including contributions to the EU budget. Unlike France’s overseas territories, or the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which are constitutionally an integral part of the mother country, Gibraltar, as the only dependent territory in Europe of an EU member state, is in a unique position. The second objective of the visit was to draw attention to the restrictions imposed by Spain on Gibraltar, including the absence of direct

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maritime and air links with Spain, restrictions on the use of airspace in the vicinity of Gibraltar airport, delays at the border-crossing, the nonrecognition of identity cards as valid identity documents and the nonrecognition of Gibraltar’s international telephone dialling code.6 More contentiously, Gibraltar wanted to secure the right to open a delegation office in Brussels.7 ‘Our rights as European citizens do not and should not depend on Spanish approval’, said Caruana (Press Association, 28 January 1997), and he accused Brussels of preferring to see these as problems to be resolved between Britain and Spain rather than by the EU itself. He was also critical of the British Government for not defending Gibraltar’s rights for fear of increasing tensions with Spain. The Commission in turn required Gibraltar to give an undertaking that it would comply with all outstanding EU directives relating to insurance, banking and securities by the end of the year. There were suggestions in the British press that EU officials were being leant on by the Spanish Government to frustrate the Gibraltarian delegation. Whether there was any substance to this, or whether the officials were merely concerned not to upset Spanish sensibilities, the fact is that none of the four EU Commissioners (two of whom were Spanish) who Caruana and his colleagues had hoped to see was able to find time to meet them. They had also hoped to see the President of the European Parliament, José María Gil-Robles (also Spanish), but he too declined to see them. Although Commissioners take an oath not to act in the sectional interests of their country of origin, the lawyer who advised the Gibraltar government on EU affairs, Michael Llamas, could not help speculating that ‘just meeting us would bring any political career they want to have back home to an end’ (Guardian, 29 January 1997). That could explain why no Spanish MEPs or members of the Spanish delegation to the EU turned up to the reception held for the Gibraltarian visitors at the UK representation offices. There was a predictably angry reaction in Spain to the visit of the Gibraltarian delegation to Brussels. Inocencio Arias, the Director-General of the Spanish Office of Diplomatic Information, said that his Government saw ‘nothing normal at all in the visit by local authorities, such as those of Gibraltar, to the European Commission in Brussels’, adding that ‘only the Foreign Office in London has responsibility for the colony’s external relations’ (The Times, 28 January 1997). However, as the Leader of the Gibraltar in Europe Group, MEP Alf Lomas, wrote in a letter to The Times on 1 February, leaders of local authorities are frequent visitors to Brussels, even though Gibraltar could hardly be described in that way, and Caruana’s predecessors had frequently visited the EU Commission in the Belgian capital. Despite the snubs it received, the Gibraltar delegation could claim some success in the sense that the Commission did agree to look into allegations that Britain and Spain were in breach of EU law over

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the two main objectives of the visit. However, looking into allegations is one matter; giving a ruling on them in favour of the plaintiff is quite another. Against the background of the announcement on 10 February by Kvaerner, the owners of the shipyard since 1992, that they would close the yard for financial reasons in September after nearly a century of shiprepair operations, the new Governor of Gibraltar, Sir Richard Luce, duly arrived on the Rock as planned in mid-February. The Gibraltar Chronicle on 3 March drew some comfort from the fact that, unlike Chris Patten (the civilian Governor of Hong Kong, who donned a grey suit), Sir Richard chose to continue to wear the ceremonial attire of ‘a sabre and hat with flowing swan feathers’. On 24 February he addressed Gibraltar’s House of Assembly. His message was that his appointment signified ‘no change whatsoever in the policy and commitment of the British Government towards Gibraltar’, and that there was ‘no hidden agenda’ (Reuters World Service, 24 February 1997). In reply, the Chief Minister reiterated his government’s desire to ‘get rid of its colonial status through a process of constitutional modernization’ (Agence France Presse, 24 February 1997). The difficulty for Gibraltar was that the reassurance conveyed by the Governor’s message also represented a frustrating stalemate, because ‘no change whatsoever’ also meant no move towards the kind of change that Gibraltar sought. It became clear on 6 March that the problem of the recognition of identity documents had not been fully resolved, when a group of Gibraltarian schoolchildren were refused entry into Spain on a collective passport. Britain protested via the Embassy in Madrid, arguing that ‘the use of children to pursue political aims is not an acceptable way of conducting business between fellow members of the EU’ (The Times, 7 March 1997). However, the justification given by the Spanish Foreign Ministry was that the passport indicated that the ‘country’ of issue was ‘Gibraltar’, and that neither Spain nor the international community recognizes Gibraltar as a country (El País, 6 March 1997). There were further reports of harassment later that month, including that of a British nurse who was allowed to cross into Spain although her two children, whose passports had been issued in Gibraltar, were not. The ‘total freedom of movement’ of Gibraltarian passport-holders which the Spanish Foreign Minister had guaranteed on 22 January was still, apparently, subject to the condition that the document did not indicate Gibraltar as the place of issue. Talks about the problem were held in Madrid on 7 April by the joint commission set up at the time of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in January. The talks, which according to the FCO were confined to discussion of non-EU passports issued in Gibraltar and collective passports, were followed two days later by a further incident in which the Commander of British Forces in Gibraltar, Major-General Simon Pack, was stopped at the border and required to return home to produce papers confirming that

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he was resident in Gibraltar before being allowed to enter Spain. Together with other incidents in Barcelona and Málaga at which Gibraltarians had their passports rejected, the episode was seen in Gibraltar as deliberately provocative and a further example of Spain ‘behaving like a bully’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 4 April 1997). The week before this incident the final phase of the agreement to deregulate commercial air traffic within the EU came into effect. It was a process that had been agreed in December 1987, but with the exclusion of Gibraltar airport at the insistence of the Gibraltarians, who recognized the implications for sovereignty of joint use of the airport. There were some, however, who suggested that it was as much in the interests of the people of the Campo for flights from Gibraltar to Madrid to be set up, and hoped that the people living in the Campo might put pressure on the Spanish Government to allow joint use outside the 1987 agreement. The trouble was that even the people of Gibraltar, let alone the residents of the Campo, were now getting accustomed to using the airports at Málaga and Jerez for access to other Spanish cities. A change of government in Britain on 1 May, with the Labour Party led by Tony Blair replacing the Conservatives for the first time since 1979, did not arouse much expectation in Spain of a change of attitude over Gibraltar. Although Inocencio Arias felt that the leadership of the Labour Party was more flexible on Gibraltar than had been that of the previous government (El País, 3 May 1997), Foreign Minister Abel Matutes told Spanish national radio that the Spanish Government would continue to have good relations with Britain, ‘and naturally the question of Gibraltar, which for Spain is an obstacle in that excellent relationship, will continue as it was’ (Reuter European Community Report, 2 May 1997). He said that he intended to pursue his proposal for shared sovereignty with the new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook (Agence France Presse, 3 May 1997). Needless to say, Cook was in no hurry to discuss the issue with Matutes, especially given that there was a far more pressing colonial issue on his desk – namely the handing over of Hong Kong to China scheduled for 1 July. However, in order to make sure that the FCO did not neglect them entirely during the intervening period, the Gibraltarians staged a major demonstration on 13 May, when 10,000 residents marched down Main Street holding placards, waving their passports and calling for Spain to recognize their EU rights and for the new British Government to stand firm against apparent Spanish efforts to oppose them.8 The demonstration, organized by a movement calling itself The Voice of Gibraltar Group (VOGG), was clearly a sequel to Peter Caruana’s visit to Brussels earlier in the year, and a protest against continuing impediments to the free movement of Gibraltarian residents across the border with Spain. It was also an attempt to make British and Spanish political leaders sit up and take notice of the strength of feeling in Gibraltar, although as the leader column in the Gibraltar Chronicle commented the following day: ‘In the

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cold morning light we are faced with the challenge of moving ahead in the face of Spain’s unrelenting bid to both deny us our rights and press for sovereignty against our wishes’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 14 May 1997). The immediate response by the Spanish authorities to the demonstration was to extend the delays at the border-crossing. It would be an exaggeration to say that the arrival of Matutes at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs meant that the clock had been turned back, but it would be hard to claim that the hands of the clock were still moving forwards.

28 Spain’s full integration into NATO (May–December 1997)

As he entered the second year of his term of office, Peter Caruana continued with his campaign to highlight the rights of Gibraltarians by raising the territory’s case once again before the UN Decolonization Committee, first at a regional seminar in Antigua on 23 May and again on 6 June in New York. The Chief Minister claimed that although Britain and Spain were both members of the EU, the European Commission would not intervene to defend EU rights for Gibraltarians in what it saw as a dispute between two member states. The UN, he argued, at least provided an alternative international forum in which Gibraltar could air its grievances, even though the Committee itself could do little more than draw the problem to the attention of the General Assembly. In his speech to the Committee, Caruana urged them to make clear their position with regard to Gibraltar’s right to participate with its own voice in discussions over its future. Not surprisingly, the Spanish Ambassador to the UN, Javier Pérez Griffo, argued that Gibraltar should resume the place it occupied until 1988 in the discussions as part of the British delegation (M2 Presswire, 10 June 1997). Following his speech in New York, Caruana took the opportunity to announce on 9 June that at his first meeting with the new British Foreign Secretary, scheduled for 7 July, he would propose a change in Gibraltar’s status from that of Crown colony or dependent territory to Crown dependency, similar to that enjoyed by the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man. This would involve a transfer of responsibility for Gibraltarian affairs from the Foreign Office to the Home Office, and the abolition of the post of Governor, who in theory has wide-ranging executive and legislative powers. In reality little would change, but the effect would be, as Caruana put it, ‘to strengthen and modernize Gibraltar’s historic ties to the United Kingdom, as well as to give to the people of Gibraltar their right to selfdetermination’ (The Times, 10 June 1997). The Chief Minister had floated the idea when he met the then Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, in November 1996. The re-flotation of the idea ahead of the formal meeting with the new Foreign Secretary was no doubt aimed at eliciting a preliminary reaction.

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Meanwhile, Gibraltar’s hopes of developing its financial services sector received a boost on 12 June when the British Government gave it clearance to market insurance services in the UK and elsewhere in the EU without further authorization (known as ‘passporting’). This move at once gave Gibraltar an advantage over other offshore British territories such as the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. At the same time the Gibraltar Government appointed a Financial Services Development Director, who saw in Gibraltar the potential to become ‘the offshore extension of the City of London’ (International Money Marketing, 13 June 1997). Not surprisingly, the Spanish Government, which did not recognize the authority of the Gibraltar Financial Services Commission, expressed concern about the political implications of the transfer of competencies which were exclusive to member states of the EU, and there was little doubt that Spain would endeavour to put obstacles in the way of the sale of such services in Spain itself. However, for Britain and for Gibraltar this represented one more step on the path towards the territory’s self-sufficiency, and hence towards economic – if not political – independence. As the end of June approached, the attention of the world turned to Hong Kong. On the expiry of the 99-year lease under the Treaty of Nanking and the agreement signed between Britain and China in 1984, the British colony was to be handed back to China. Nowhere was interest greater than in the Spanish Foreign Office, for (as has been noted) Spain frequently drew attention to what it saw as Britain’s inconsistent attitude towards Hong Kong on the one hand and Gibraltar on the other. On a visit to China on 19 June the Spanish Foreign Minister, Abel Matutes, claimed that Hong Kong was ‘a precedent which will weigh heavily in the future for the decolonization of Gibraltar’ (South China Morning Post, 20 June 1997) – a claim that was firmly rejected in London. Gibraltar itself was full of journalists at this time, looking for parallels between events in Hong Kong and future scenarios in other outposts of the British Empire. At the handing-over ceremony and the swearing-in of the new Legislative Assembly in Hong Kong, Spain was represented by the Deputy Prime Minister, Rodrigo Rato, due to the delicate health of the Foreign Minister. Matutes had said on his earlier visit that there was a strong parallel between the cases of Gibraltar and Hong Kong. Rato did not fully support that argument, saying in an interview before setting off from Madrid that ‘the situation in Gibraltar contains certain factors which are not the same as those of Hong Kong’ (El País, 30 June 1997), but instead he took the line that there was no longer any justification for the Treaty of Utrecht and that it should therefore be accepted as ‘unquestionable’ that Spain should have exclusive sovereignty of Gibraltar. With such remarks from senior members of the Spanish Government, it was scarcely surprising that the transfer of sovereignty in Hong Kong caused some anxiety in Gibraltar. Although the arrangements in international law were clearly different in the two cases, the lowering of the

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Union Jack for the last time and the emotional scenes as the British royal yacht Britannia, with the heir to the British throne and the last Governor on board, set sail in a downpour of heavy rain, were not a happy sight for citizens in the remaining British colonies. As the editor of the Gibraltar Chronicle wrote on 1 July: ‘Most readers will have shuddered at least a little as they watched the ceremony on television last night. Britain walking away from Hong Kong as gracefully as she can.’ In order to allay anxieties, a British Labour MP, Andrew Mackinlay, put forward two Bills in the House of Commons on 1 July designed to give representation in (or at least access to) Westminster and Brussels for Gibraltarians and citizens of other British dependencies. There was no chance that the Bills would become law, if only because the British Government would not wish to antagonize Spain by allowing them the necessary Parliamentary time, but the measures were designed to provide Gibraltarians with a timely reassurance that their situation was different from that of Hong Kong and a similar fate would not befall them.1 Shortly afterwards, on 7 July, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister had the opportunity to put across his ideas for the ending of Gibraltar’s colonial status and for a new constitutional arrangement for the territory at his first formal meeting with the new British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook. With Hong Kong no longer the number one colonial issue for the British Government, Gibraltarians saw this encounter as a very important one, and one which would set the tone of UK–Gibraltar relations for at least the next five years. Not surprisingly, Cook preferred to play down the idea of constitutional change, although he did (according to Caruana) express a willingness to look at any proposals provided that they were in keeping with the Treaty of Utrecht and the UK’s international responsibilities for Gibraltar. Cook was anxious not to antagonize Spain on the issue of the sovereignty of Gibraltar at this time, especially as Gibraltar-related questions were about to come back on to the agenda on 9 July at the NATO summit in Madrid, at which Spain was hoping to secure agreement for its integration into the Alliance’s military command structure. On the eve of the summit, which was also due to agree the membership of the first three former Warsaw Pact countries (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic), the British Foreign Secretary appeared to take the Spanish Government rather by surprise by announcing in a radio interview that Britain would not support Spain’s integration unless Spain agreed to relax restrictions on air space for British aircraft using Gibraltar, and that Britain would oppose a Spanish NATO sub-regional command over Gibraltar. Although Cook’s Spanish counterpart, together with the Defence Minister, Eduardo Serra, had indicated to the Spanish Parliamentary Defence Committee on 24 June Spain’s willingness to negotiate over naval access to the Rock (ships were currently not allowed to dock in Spanish ports if they were heading for or coming from Gibraltar), Matutes’ response at the

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summit on the question of air access made it certain that no agreement was going to be reached in the near future, when he argued (in relation to the isthmus on which the airport was located) that Spain ‘will not lift any restrictions that might affect its rightful claim to sovereignty’ (Press Association, 8 July 1997). Perhaps from Gibraltar’s point of view that was just as well, since if Spain had agreed to a relaxation of air restrictions that might have resulted in the anomalous situation of Spanish military aircraft using Gibraltar’s airport under the auspices of NATO, while deadlock continued over its civilian use. In the event, Britain’s threatened veto was not aired at the summit itself. Owing to the need to resolve what were termed ‘technical difficulties’ (in particular the question of control over the area between the Canary Islands and the Iberian peninsula, currently part of the Atlantic command,2 as well as the status of Gibraltar within NATO), Spain had to settle for a target date of the end of the year for agreement on full integration.3 Matutes showed a surprising degree of understanding about Britain’s position – or was it a touch of malice? – when he said at a press conference that ‘it was important to remember that this is a particularly sensitive time in the UK because they have just handed over Hong Kong’ (El País, 9 July 1997). The Spanish press took the opportunity to blame Britain for Spain’s failure in Madrid to achieve full integration into NATO, whereas it was clear that other factors were involved as well. Reporting back on the NATO summit to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Blair told the House of Commons that ‘while we want to see Spain contributing fully to Alliance security, we are determined to ensure that the interests of Gibraltar are fully safeguarded in this process’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 9 July 1997, Col. 938). He also said that the meeting in Madrid had met ‘all the objectives we sought to secure’ (idem), which clearly included taking a tough stance on the issue of the air space in the vicinity of Gibraltar. The Labour Government was clearly pleased with the fact that it had had the opportunity to demonstrate to Spain and other European partners that Britain would not be a ‘soft touch’ just because the Conservatives were no longer in power. However, later that month Spain claimed a victory over Britain in connection with border controls agreed in the EU Treaty signed in Amsterdam on 18 June. The meeting in Amsterdam, which was designed to reform the Maastricht Treaty but in reality changed very little of substance, had been the new Labour Government’s first EU summit since the May election, and there had been much discussion following the summit as to whether Britain’s understanding of what had been agreed was accurate. Britain had wanted to opt out of the main agreements on the abolition of internal border controls, but Prime Minister Blair’s understanding was that Britain could opt in to certain aspects of the agreements (which included visas, immigration, police cooperation and intelligence-sharing)

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at a later date on the basis of a majority vote of the member states. However, at the last minute Spain had insisted that such a vote would have to be unanimous, specifically so that Britain could not use a vote to force the lifting of restrictions at the Gibraltar border-crossing, and it was this that had found its way into the text of the treaty. Following the summit Britain indicated its intention to have the majority vote proposal reinstated, but on 29 July Britain backed down and left the unanimity requirement in the treaty, while insisting on an additional declaration that any veto (for that was the implication of a unanimous vote) would not be used in pursuit of ‘outside disagreements’.4 The Gibraltarians were not best pleased, even though they recognized that the whole issue was hypothetical because it would only apply in the event that Britain decided to opt in to the border controls agreement. They could not help feeling let down by Britain in this instance, and argued that ‘if Britain’s vision for Gibraltar were clear and known to us, that might give her the same clarity of intent and action as Spain shows (Gibraltar Chronicle, 1 August 1997). An unlikely link occurred in August between the eruption of a volcano in the Caribbean and the future of Gibraltar. The volcanic eruption took place on the island of Montserrat, one of Britain’s 13 remaining overseas territories, and criticism was levelled at the British Government over the way in which it handled the consequences of the eruption for the islanders. In order to distract attention from the criticism, the FCO announced on 27 August a policy review on how it would deal with the remaining colonies and their 180,000 inhabitants. The review was due to be concluded by February 1998, when the Assembly of Dependent Territories was scheduled to convene in London. In the event Gibraltar did not form part of the review (the reason given by the British Government was that the Brussels Process was already in place),5 but the announcement of the review did serve to highlight Britain’s need to establish a clear position, just as the Gibraltarians had been calling for. An article in the Independent on 28 August argued that the future of the Rock ‘is a test, to be sure, as much of the political maturity of Spain’s political class, media and people as of British willingness to grasp a nettle’. The trouble was that there had been little sign of either of these since the Brussels Process had begun nearly 14 years earlier. If there was to be any imminent progress towards change, the Gibraltarians soon had an opportunity to remind the British Government of the direction in which they would like to see change occur. The occasion was the thirtieth anniversary on 10 September of the 1967 referendum, when an overwhelming majority had voted for continuing association with Britain. The anniversary on Gibraltar’s national day was marked by a demonstration of over 12,000 people in the streets of Gibraltar calling for the kind of constitutional changes that the Chief Minister had been arguing for since his election.

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However, on the same day there came a confusing statement from Kenneth Purchase, the Parliamentary secretary to the British Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, who was quoted as saying that ‘Spain holds a key to Gibraltar’s decolonization’. This assertion was firmly rejected on 16 September by Peter Caruana, who stated that ‘Spain has no say in Gibraltar’s constitutional future’ (Agence France Presse, 16 September 1997), especially given that the changes he was proposing did not involve any change of sovereignty. The apparent undermining of Gibraltar’s position in this way did nothing to give Gibraltarians confidence in the willingness of the FCO to maintain its opposition to Spanish designs on Gibraltar. The opportunity soon arose for some confidence to be restored on 7 October, when the British Minister for Europe, Doug Henderson, visited Gibraltar – the first occasion on which a member of the new Labour Government had done so. The exchanges between Caruana and Henderson were predictable enough, with the former putting forward his proposals for constitutional change and the latter stressing the British Government’s commitment to the people of Gibraltar. Just prior to Henderson’s visit, however, it was Spain’s turn to be annoyed, when on 2 October Gibraltar finally opened its representation office in Brussels. At the official opening ceremony, the Chief Minister argued that the purpose of the office was to promote Gibraltar’s commercial, financial and tourist interests (it was particularly interested in developing an image as a conference and short-break centre), and to keep the government in Gibraltar better informed about legislative proposals affecting the territory. He also saw it as providing an opportunity to remind the European Commission of Gibraltarians’ rights as EU citizens. Spain’s fear, however, was that Gibraltar’s purpose in opening the office was to negotiate bilaterally with the European Commission as if it were an independent state. There was no immediate sign that there were any grounds for such concern on Spain’s part.6 The United Nations season came round again, with both Spain and Gibraltar taking the opportunity to put their case. On 29 September Abel Matutes addressed the main issues of the General Assembly’s debate on human rights in the context of UN reform, but then went on to tell the Assembly that ‘Spain was directly and painfully affected by the question of Gibraltar’ (M2 Presswire, 29 September 1997). Perhaps somewhat unwisely, however, in a debate on human rights, he stated that he had ‘recently publicly formulated a generous offer allowing the incorporation of Gibraltar into Spain’. This position was reiterated on 10 October when the Spanish representative, Javier Pérez Griffo, addressed the UN Fourth (Special Political and Decolonization) Committee. The Committee also heard from Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, who argued that, contrary to Spain’s assertion, Gibraltar did have the right to self-determination under United Nations doctrine and international law. In reality, the UN showed no signs of bringing a solution to the Gibral-

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tar problem any closer. Spain adhered to the UN resolutions of the past that had argued in favour of the idea of the restoration of Spain’s territorial integrity; Gibraltar’s aim was to persuade the UN to see human rights as a more important concept than the rewriting of history. The UN, for its part, clung to its determination that this was a problem best solved between Britain and Spain, as the decision agreed by the Fourth Committee on 28 October made clear, and Britain was content to argue that that was precisely why it had agreed to the Brussels Process back in 1984. As the end of the year approached and both the NATO summit and the annual meeting of the two Foreign Ministers loomed closer, a good deal of verbal sparring took place between the Spanish and British Governments (with a few comments from Gibraltar thrown in for good measure). On 10 October, José María Aznar took the opportunity to remind Tony Blair when they met at a Council of Europe summit in Strasbourg of the importance of not allowing a bilateral problem to interfere with a multilateral organization like NATO. In similar vein, Abel Matutes indicated at a press conference on 21 October that Spain had no wish to ‘pollute’ NATO with a bilateral problem, but reiterated the fact that Spain would not lift the air and naval restrictions without obtaining ‘acceptable advantages’ in the form of ‘major progress in the handover of sovereignty to Spain’ (Agence France Presse, 21 October 1997). A week later, on 28 October, the Spanish Government put further pressure on Britain by demanding joint military control of the airport in return for the lifting of restrictions. The proposal was swiftly dismissed by the FCO and by the Chief Minister of Gibraltar, who was promptly rebuked by Matutes for interfering in matters to do with defence and NATO. ‘It is high time’, said the Spanish Foreign Minister, ‘that someone told Peter Caruana what subjects he can and cannot talk about. In other words he needs to be put in his place’ (Agence France Presse, 28 October 1997). Caruana also got involved in the run-up to the meeting of Foreign Ministers scheduled for 10 December when on 5 November he informed the press that he had indicated to the British Foreign Secretary that he wished to participate in the talks as a principal player, and that ‘nothing can be agreed without Gibraltar’s agreement’ (Agence France Presse, 5 November 1997). The war of words grew more heated on 13 November, when Spain’s Foreign Minister warned in a television interview that ‘if the dialogue does not progress we are going increasingly to turn the screw and make life difficult for Gibraltar, which survives thanks to Spain’ (Agence France Presse, 13 November 1997). He followed this by an interview for ABC on 16 November, in which he made it clear that he was using the juxtaposition of the NATO and Foreign Minister meetings to try to extract concessions from Britain. The time had come, he said, ‘to take a first step toward resolving the issue of the transfer of sovereignty over Gibraltar, and the reform of NATO structures provides a wonderful opportunity’. In order to deflect some of the heat that was being generated before

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the two major meetings, Robin Cook and Abel Matutes agreed to hold bilateral discussions on Gibraltar at the European employment summit in Luxembourg on 21 November. The hour-long breakfast meeting was frosty, and it was now the turn of the British Foreign Secretary to warn Spain not to bring the Gibraltar sovereignty dispute into the NATO talks. Formal proposals made to Cook by his Spanish counterpart concerning the deployment of Spanish troops at Gibraltar airport together with joint air-traffic control received an immediate rejection from the British side. The signs were not auspicious for the impending formal meetings. Just to make sure that Britain was firm in its resolve, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister went to London on 25 November for brief talks with the Foreign Secretary. One of the issues on which Caruana will no doubt have briefed him was the progress being made to improve the Rock’s economy. The Gibraltar Government had shifted the developmental emphasis from finance to tourism. The number of cruise ships calling at the port had been declining, and several steps had recently been taken to tackle the problem, including the refurbishment of the cargo shed and its conversion into a modern passenger terminal. The objective of the Tourist Board chief executive was to turn Gibraltar from a port of call for cruise ships into a hub for fly-cruises, while the Government had joined the recently established MedCruise Association, designed to promote the Mediterranean as a cruise area and to set minimum standards for port facilities. The NATO discussions started on 1 December with a meeting of the military chiefs of staff from the 16 members, with Defence Ministers meeting on 2 and 3 December and Foreign Ministers holding their biannual meeting on 16 December. It was clear from the outset that the political dispute over Gibraltar was the main area of difficulty that might impede an agreement on a more flexible command structure.7 The war of words continued, with Abel Matutes saying on 1 December that the lifting of restrictions ‘would imply that Spain had to pay a levy for collaborating in NATO’ (Independent, 2 December 1997), and that Spain was ready to call Britain’s bluff over its threat to veto the new NATO structure. However, work was clearly going on behind the scenes, as briefings on 2 December suggested, and somewhat to the surprise of NATO officials the British Defence Minister George Robertson announced to his NATO counterparts that Britain would lift its veto on the new command structure, and would deal with Spain as a separate issue during the ensuing 12 months. Robertson made plain, however, that whatever agreement was eventually reached with Spain, it would have to be ‘sovereignty neutral’ (The Times, 3 December 1997). The British Government had clearly realized that if it vetoed the structural reforms over a bilateral issue it would have suffered the opprobrium of the other 15 members, so Madrid and London agreed to ‘wrap the problem in cellophane’ (as El País put it on 3 December) until a bilateral solution could be achieved. It became clear

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some seven months later what Britain hoped to achieve by the withdrawal of its veto (see Chapter 29). The meeting was therefore able to proceed to an agreement on the proposal to reform the command structure, in particular to reduce the number of subregional command posts from 65 to 20, with the full details to be agreed in December 1998. Britain reserved the right to oppose the implementation of the final proposal if there was no agreement on Gibraltar by that date. Spain saw Britain’s move as ‘a triumph for Spanish diplomacy’ (El País, 3 December 1997), while Britain described it as a ‘gesture of goodwill’ (European, 4 December 1997). By taking such a step – in effect the deferral of a solution on the Gibraltar issue as it affects NATO – Britain had turned the tables and put the diplomatic pressure on Spain. Spain’s reaction, through a television interview by the Foreign Minister, was to attack Gibraltar for being ‘obstructionist’, and once again to threaten a tightening of border controls, with ‘relations between Gibraltar and its people with the rest of Spain’ – a subtle insinuation that Gibraltar was really part of Spain – ‘becoming increasingly restricted and difficult’ (El País, 4 December 1997). However, in addition to using the stick in the form of threats over border controls, Matutes once again tendered a carrot in the form of a constitutional framework for the incorporation of Gibraltar into Spain that would allow the territory’s distinctiveness to be retained. There was no evidence, however, that Gibraltar was ready to respond either to the stick or to the carrot. The timing of Matutes’ renewed ‘offensive’ was as much prompted by the imminence of his annual formal meeting with his British counterpart in London on 10 December as it was by the aftermath of the NATO summit. It had become the custom in the run-up to such annual meetings for one or other participant to take action that grabbed the attention of the media, or to float a proposal and gauge the reaction of the other side. On this occasion the Spanish Foreign Ministry let it be known that once again it intended to push the proposal of shared sovereignty over a long time-scale.8 The plan was to sell the proposal to Gibraltar through social and economic measures, together with greater self-determination through a specially tailored statute of autonomy. For its part, the Gibraltar Government took the opportunity to indicate that members would not be attending the talks because ‘it has not been possible to obtain a sufficient degree of satisfaction of our terms for participation’ (Agence France Presse, 8 December 1997). With all the pre-meeting discussion of what Spain would propose and how Britain would respond, the outcome of the two-hour talks (the eleventh since the Brussels Process began) brought few surprises, albeit different interpretations. Abel Matutes presented his lengthy document proposing joint sovereignty over an undefined period, during which time ‘the autonomous Government of Gibraltar could enjoy wide-ranging legislative and administrative powers like Catalonia and the Basque Country’

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(El País, 11 December 1997). He indicated that Gibraltar ‘would continue to have current fiscal, financial and customs advantages’ (idem)9 and its residents could opt for British, Spanish or joint nationality. Spain’s view was that under these proposals Gibraltarians would enjoy a greater degree of autonomy than they currently have as a British colony. Robin Cook reminded him that any solution to the Gibraltar problem had to be subject to the wishes of the people of Gibraltar. The joint communiqué issued after the talks indicated that the proposal would be studied by a working group, along with any others that might be made by Britain or Gibraltar regarding closer economic cooperation with Spain.10 The statement also expressed the regret of both sides that Gibraltarian representatives had chosen not to attend as part of the British delegation, as they had thereby missed the opportunity to hear Matutes’ proposal. However, both sides were aware that even if they had been present the Gibraltarians would not have indicated much support for the proposal, despite Matutes’ assertion in a radio interview on 11 December that ‘we can’t call this a victory, but for the first time we have made slight progress’ (Agence France Presse, 11 December 1997). The ‘progress’ referred to was the fact that the British Government had not rejected the proposal outright, and this was a novelty which the Spanish press latched on to in their reports the day after the talks. Following on the heels of an apparent British climbdown in the NATO talks on the lifting of air and sea restrictions to Gibraltar, plus the apparent veto conceded to Spain over the Schengen Agreement in June, it brought some criticism of the British Foreign Secretary from the Conservative Foreign Affairs and Defence spokesmen in a letter to The Times on 10 December. Robin Cook had no doubt originally felt that he could afford to agree to study the Spanish proposal and thereby avoid creating tension between the Spanish and British Governments, since the Gibraltarians’ wishes would be paramount and his realistic appraisal of the likely reaction in Gibraltar was that the proposal would be rejected: ‘None of the surveys I have seen suggests to me that Gibraltar is going to support the idea of co-sovereignty’, he said (The Times, 10 December 1997). However, domestic political censure – especially criticism that the Labour Government was not prepared to stand up to Spain over Gibraltar – was even more important than upsetting Spanish sensibilities, and the strategy of letting Spain think that it had made some progress was quickly abandoned. In a swift but brief reply to his Conservative opponents the following day, the British Foreign Secretary dashed any illusions about possible change from the status quo when he wrote: ‘On Spanish proposals for joint sovereignty of Gibraltar, there is no question of any compromise on sovereignty’ (The Times, 11 December 1997). However, by not immediately rejecting the joint sovereignty proposal Cook was to find himself criticized by both Gibraltarians and political opponents over the coming months, while Matutes was able to make play of the fact that he was still awaiting a response.

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To judge by the view of the Chief Minister, Cook was absolutely right about the reaction of the Gibraltarians, for Caruana told journalists: ‘We haven’t been part of the Spanish state for 293 years and, therefore, none of these permutations which compromise our British sovereignty are going to be acceptable’ (Belfast Telegraph, 11 December 1997). He repeated his willingness to engage in dialogue with Spain, and to explore better relations and better cooperation, but there was no hint of compromise on sovereignty: ‘We don’t want to be Spanish, we don’t want to be integrated into the Spanish state. We shouldn’t be expected to give anything for civilized, good neighbourly relations in the European Union on the eve of the 21st century’ (idem). It was scarcely surprising that in support of his case Caruana should refer to the EU, with its philosophy of cooperation between states on the one hand and of subsidiarity on the other, although it could be a risky game to play, since the other side of the EU coin included the pooling of sovereignty and possible changes in fiscal and other regulations to which Gibraltar was not currently subject. So another summit on Gibraltar had come and gone. Spain’s approach of trying to sell the idea of conceding to Gibraltar the maximum amount of autonomy in exchange for the ultimate prospect of the return of the territory to Spanish sovereignty was clearly not part of the British or Gibraltarian game-plan. In a long interview for the Gibraltar Chronicle published on 23 December, Matutes made it clear that as far as he was concerned the joint sovereignty proposals would be considered further, although he was ‘open to other formulas and to negotiate the time spans and modalities’. He also stated: ‘We are trying to exhaust the possibilities that the Brussels Process offers. If that fails then Spain has to put forward its alternatives. That moment has not arrived.’ The crucial questions were how much life the Brussels Process had left in it, and what would happen if and when it expired. In all probability, the Spanish Foreign Minister did not know the answer to either question.

29 The shadow of the shared sovereignty proposal ( January–December 1998)

If Abel Matutes had felt that the climate was right to pursue the shared sovereignty argument with London, the results of a poll published on 12 January in the Gibraltar journal Panorama will have forcefully disabused him. When asked whether (if it were an option) they favoured integration with Britain, 90 per cent of respondents on the Rock answered affirmatively, with only 6 per cent against (but favouring a variety of alternatives). If the British Government had wanted to update the 1967 referendum on the future of Gibraltar, this would clearly have been a good moment to have held another one; however, Britain had no interest in upsetting the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry at this juncture, and preferred to leave the Spanish Government to draw its own conclusions from the Panorama poll. Chief Minister Peter Caruana held talks in London on 28 January with Robin Cook, and the following day with Douglas Henderson (the Minister with specific responsibility for Gibraltar), but took the opportunity to get his message across to the wider British public through a television interview broadcast three days earlier. There was considerable value for Caruana in defending the Gibraltarian case on television, for if he could persuade the British public to support their cause, it would make it that much more difficult for the British Government to yield to Spanish pressure. In the interview he rejected the idea of Gibraltar becoming part of Spain because ‘we Gibraltarians are not Spanish, we don’t feel Spanish, we have been British for 300 years, we want to remain British’, and he described as ‘offensive’ the idea of the territory becoming Spanish while the inhabitants could retain their British citizenship (Panorama, 23 February 1998). He called on Spain to ‘stop trying to harass us into changing our minds’, and as for Matutes’ proposal to Robin Cook made the previous month, that received short shrift: ‘The idea of joint sovereignty is sharing something which is ours with somebody who really has no entitlement to it’ (idem). Instead he repeated his own proposals of strengthening Gibraltar’s relationship with Britain by changing its status from that of a colony to a Crown dependency.1 Caruana raised his proposals in his talks with the Foreign Secretary.

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Although some Gibraltarians were surprised at Cook’s rejection of the idea, given that integration with Britain did not contravene the Treaty of Utrecht, the Foreign Secretary made it clear that it was a matter of principle, and that ‘integration was not a realistic prospect or a practical option for any dependent territory’ (Panorama, 2 February 1998). Despite this, the Caruana interview and the meeting with ministers from the FCO will certainly not have given the Spanish Government any encouragement that things were about to change in their favour. On 4 February, at the Assembly for the Chief Ministers of the British Dependent Territories, the Foreign Secretary announced the outcome of the review of the remaining colonies that had been proposed the previous August in the wake of the volcanic disaster in Montserrat. The result was a reorganization of the Government’s responsibilities towards 12 of its remaining 13 colonies, the exception being Gibraltar. In future they were all (Gibraltar included) to be known as British Overseas Territories rather than British Dependent Territories, but in addition (apart from Gibraltar) they were to be managed exclusively by a single FCO minister (the Minister for Overseas Territories) rather than jointly with the Department for International Development.2 The official reason why Gibraltar was singled out was because its membership of the EU justified different treatment, but the fact of the dispute between Spain and the UK over the Rock must also have played a part. Nevertheless, the Gibraltarians latched on to the statement contained in the Foreign Secretary’s press release that ‘self-determination applies to all the remaining colonies, with no exception or qualification’, and that ‘Gibraltar has been given the opportunity to pursue options for decolonization in the context of equal treatment with other UK Overseas Territories and without reference to the bilateral process with Spain’ (Panorama, 9 February 1998). If that was the Gibraltarian reading of the statement, it was highly likely that they were shortly to be disappointed. Some good financial news for Gibraltar came in mid-January with the announcement that the UK ship-repair company Cammell Laird would take on a 20-year renewable lease to run the shipyard, which had been closed since Kvaerner pulled out in September the previous year. In addition to providing employment, the deal guaranteed an annual income to the Gibraltar government of £250,000 ($450,000). Here was an opportunity for Gibraltar to capitalize on its geographical location and its shiprepair expertise in a way that hitherto it had failed to do (partly because of trade union disputes) ever since the naval base had been closed in 1984.3 There was also some good financial news for a handful of Spaniards in early February when the Supreme Court in Madrid ruled that the Spanish Government had to pay compensation to Spaniards who had been forced to abandon their businesses in Gibraltar when General Franco closed the border in 1969. It was estimated that up to 240 million pesetas ($1.7 million) could be involved in compensation claims.

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On 18 February, Abel Matutes made one of his regular appearances before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Congress. He received allparty support for the proposal he had made to his British counterpart the previous December of a special statute of autonomy for Gibraltar together with a period of shared sovereignty. Equally significantly, Matutes indicated to the Committee his willingness to meet with Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, Peter Caruana. No doubt he wanted to convey the details of his autonomy proposals directly to Gibraltar’s first citizen, in the hope that Caruana might see the advantages of the offer by comparison with the status quo. Since Spain argued that only the British Government had the right to negotiate on Gibraltar’s behalf, nothing of substance could be expected from such an encounter, but at least it suggested a change of attitude on Spain’s part. A formal invitation was to be issued in April. The issue of the Gibraltarians’ right to vote in the European elections (due in June 1999) arose once again in a House of Commons debate on 24 February on the European Parliamentary Elections Bill that was designed to divide Britain into nine electoral regions. The Conservative spokesman, Sir Brian Mawhinney, who had proposed an amendment to extend voting rights to Gibraltar, was roundly criticized by the Home Office minister Joyce Quin for the fact that his Government had done nothing about the issue during their 18 years in office (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 24 February 1998, Col. 206). One aspect of the proposal was that for the purposes of the elections Gibraltar would be incorporated into one of the nine electoral regions (the London region was suggested, but only on the dubious logic that most visitors to and from Gibraltar flew in and out of London). The advantage of this was that it could be done without Britain having to seek to change the Annex to the 1976 Act on Direct Elections, which referred only to ‘the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’. The Government’s argument, however, was that the 1976 Act excluded Gibraltar because it is not subject to all EU legislation, and that to change this position would require legislative changes which would be very difficult to secure because they would have to be ratified by all other member states, including Spain. The Government had evidently decided that it was unwilling to take on that fight at this stage, and the opposition proposal was defeated. However, the Bill then went to the House of Lords, and in the run-up to the debate (eventually held in June) many peers found themselves being lobbied by Gibraltarians for support. Another point of conflict which had surfaced from time to time, that of fishing rights, returned on 13 March when a Spanish customs helicopter allegedly threatened a Gibraltar police vessel during an incursion by Spanish fishing boats into territorial waters claimed by Britain and Gibraltar but not recognized by Spain. The Spanish fishermen were also accused of using drift nets banned by the EU. Gibraltar’s Chief Minister described the incident as ‘intolerable’, and called upon London to provide the Rock

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with a fishing protection vessel from the Royal Navy (Panorama, 16 March 1998). However, the incident also drew protests from the Spanish Government, which claimed that the Gibraltar police were engaging in a policy of deliberate harassment, and the British Ambassador in Madrid was summoned to the Foreign Ministry on 17 March. In Gibraltar a protest march organized by two community groups was held on 21 March, and a letter was handed in at the Governor’s residence demanding increased military assistance from the British Government. Much to the annoyance of the protesters, the Governor himself was in Spain at the time. When a further maritime incident was reported on 6 April, it appeared that the calls of the protesters had had some effect, for two British naval vessels, including the destroyer HMS Nottingham, were used to escort a Spanish patrol boat out of Gibraltarian coastal waters. It was feared in Gibraltar that these were orchestrated incidents (they had increased seven-fold in the first four months of the year compared to the same period the year before) designed to make a political point about Gibraltarian rights over its coastal waters, and they were to be repeated a few months later. Just as Gibraltar had watched with interest the handover of Hong Kong to China in July 1997, so it took an equally keen interest in the outcome of the negotiations between Britain and Ireland over the future of Ulster, in what became known as the Good Friday Agreement. Two differing views emerged in Gibraltarian publications. On 14 April, Panorama showed how unfavourable the Brussels Agreement had been to Gibraltar by comparison with the benefits of the Good Friday Agreement to the people of Northern Ireland, which accepted the principle of democratic consent and which included the renunciation by the Irish Government to its formal claim to the North. Consequently it called for the replacement of the Brussels Agreement ‘by a more enlightened accord, where the wishes of the people of Gibraltar are paramount’. The Gibraltar Chronicle of 15 April, however, recognized that if [the] Good Friday [Agreement] offers models they are for dialogue and for such a process to tailor an agreement between the disputing parties. [It] offers little comfort to policies that seek the right and exercise of self-determination for a status that decolonizes Gibraltar and excludes Spain having any say in the outcome. If this view is a criticism of the Chronicle’s sister paper, it can also be taken as a warning that a Good Friday-style arrangement in relation to the future of Gibraltar would inevitably result in Spain being involved in Gibraltarian affairs. It was not surprising that four years later the British Government’s plans for Gibraltar had echoes of its attempt to solve the problems of Northern Ireland. On 28 April, two months after he had indicated his willingness to do so,

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Matutes issued his formal invitation to Chief Minister Peter Caruana to attend bilateral talks in Madrid. Although the starting points of the two participants were clearly going to be a long way apart, the fact that the Spanish Government was prepared to talk directly with the principal representative of the Gibraltarian people rather than solely to the British Government represented a major step. Matutes would no doubt be hoping that the concession of direct talks would be met by a shift in the Chief Minister’s stance. However, Caruana, who was on a visit to Brussels when the invitation was made to complain to the EU Commission about Spanish restrictions on travel to and from Gibraltar, let it be known in his acceptance that ‘the concept of a Spanish Gibraltar now or in the future is unacceptable. Gibraltar does not want to be part of Spain, no matter how generous the offer of autonomy’ (Daily Telegraph, 30 April 1998). In addition he made it quite apparent that even if Spain raised the issue of sovereignty in the talks, he had no intention of discussing it. Clearly the Spanish Foreign Minister was looking for a further opportunity to publicize his ideas of shared sovereignty prior to transfer to Spain, and no doubt also hoping that the British Government would bring some pressure to bear on Peter Caruana before the talks actually took place during the summer. Otherwise it promised to be a dialogue of the deaf. Matutes will not have been much encouraged by opinion polls taken on the Rock. A poll published in the Gibraltar Chronicle on 6 May showed that only 54 per cent of Gibraltarians wanted dialogue with Spain. There was a higher figure (66 per cent) amongst supporters of the governing GSD than among the main opposition party, the GSLP (41 per cent). On the basis of this poll, at least Caruana was doing the right thing by accepting the invitation, and if Matutes entertained any thoughts that the Chief Minister might be out of step with the people he represented, he would have been sorely mistaken: 35 per cent saw integration with Britain as the most acceptable final status for Gibraltar, with a further 37 per cent looking for a Channel Islands-style relationship or a relationship of Free Association. Only 2 per cent would accept Matutes’ proposals.4 Against such odds, it was scarcely surprising that the Spanish Foreign Ministry let it be known that if their current initiative failed, they would revert to the ‘border policy’ (El País, 30 April 1998).5 It was reported that Rodríguez Spitteri, the head of the European desk at the Spanish Foreign Ministry, had privately indicated on a visit to La Línea ten days earlier that Spain would like to close the border, but could not do so because ‘unfortunately the EU would not allow it’ (Panorama, 18 May 1998). Rodríguez Spitteri was also quoted as having ruled out any Spanish investment in Gibraltar’s airport if joint use ever came into operation, claiming that Spain now viewed Jerez as the airport for the Campo region (a view that was not well received in La Línea). Britain had held the presidency of the EU during the first semester of 1998, and it transpired towards the end of that period, to the chagrin of

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the Gibraltarians, that there were three decisions in the area of justice and home affairs taken on 28 and 29 May in which Britain allowed Spain to veto the inclusion of Gibraltar. One such decision was the convention on driving disqualification, whereby a driver committing a serious driving offence in an EU country would have his driving licence revoked by his country of origin. Spain’s insistence (accepted by the British Government in order that progress could be made) that Gibraltar be excluded from this agreement was interpreted by some in Gibraltar as strengthening the Spanish case that Gibraltar is not fully a part of the EU. The European Parliamentary Elections Bill, which had been debated in the House of Commons in February, reappeared on the agenda of the House of Lords for debate starting on 24 June. A petition calling for Gibraltarian representation in the European Parliament had been signed by nearly 90 per cent of the electorate on the Rock and passed to sympathetic members of the Upper House, including Lord Bethell, a former MEP, who had proposed a cross-party amendment to the Bill to that effect. One speaker, Lord Shepherd, said: ‘Our relations with Spain may be important. But if we in any way diminish human rights and democratic rights . . . without doubt we weaken our own rights’ (Hansard House of Lords Debates, 24 June 1998, Col. 289). However, under pressure from the Government the amendment met the same fate as it had in the Commons, and for the same reasons – namely that the British Government wanted to avoid having to seek the consent of other EU countries, including Spain, to a change to the 1976 Act. There was strong disappointment in Gibraltar once again that Britain had, as they saw it, put pragmatism before principle. The Chief Minister went to New York to address the UN Decolonization Committee once more on 29 June, and gave what must surely be seen as the most forthright speech that the Committee had heard from the holder of his office since Joe Bossano instituted the practice on a regular basis in 1992. Caruana welcomed Spain’s adherence to the principle of democratic consent which had been articulated by Matutes in December 1997 and which he saw as a new departure, but argued that it did not go far enough towards recognizing Gibraltar’s right to self-determination, a right which it sought to exercise by changing its constitutional relationship with Britain. He accused Spain of preaching democracy to the world and yet denying it to the people of Gibraltar on its own doorstep. He suggested that the Spanish Foreign Minister was mistaken in arguing that his proposals would offer Gibraltar a greater degree of autonomy than it currently enjoyed, and accused the UN of supporting ‘the same old, annual, now tired, consensus resolution between the UK and the Kingdom of Spain calling for a continuation of the sterile and fruitless bilateral dialogue’.6 In reply, Pérez Griffo, the Spanish Ambassador, argued that Spain could not renounce its goal of the recovery of sovereignty over Gibraltar, and urged the UN to adhere to what he called its established doctrine on the issue.7

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An important breakthrough in relations between Britain and Spain in the context of NATO occurred on 5 July when Spain agreed to lift the military restrictions that had threatened to be a stumbling block in the negotiations on the reform of the command structure in December 1997 (see Chapter 28). Unreported talks had been taking place between officials since January, and the objectives behind Britain’s sudden withdrawal of its veto to the structural reforms at the end of 1997 now became clear. Spain agreed to allow military aircraft to overfly Spanish airspace (subject to prior authorization) when using Gibraltar’s airport, to permit naval vessels to call at Spanish ports after having docked at Gibraltar, and to use Spanish communication systems, provided that in all cases except emergencies they were involved in NATO operations and not British national ones. Spain also agreed in future to withdraw its refusal to participate in NATO exercises that involved Gibraltar. In return, Spain, which insisted that these concessions in no way affected the claim to sovereignty over Gibraltar, would be able to establish its NATO command in Madrid. The agreement was something of a gamble for Spain: given the relative weakness of the British position over the isthmus on which the airport was located, a concession to allow unrestricted use of Spanish airspace by NATO (which would inevitably mean predominantly British) aircraft could turn-out to be the thin end of the wedge with regard to its use by civil aircraft, rather than a step towards Spanish sovereignty over the airport. The Spanish Government may have recognized it as a gamble, which could explain why the news of the agreement was leaked to the press rather than announced with any kind of fanfare. The opposition parties in Gibraltar described the agreement as a victory for Spain, on the grounds that activities by British aircraft outside the agreement remained prohibited. On 9 July Peter Caruana felt it opportune, since the question of the use of the airport had arisen earlier that week, to invite Spain to consider joint civil use of the airport. ‘We are very willing to permit Spanish use and exploitation of the airport and the participation of Spanish companies to help run it,’ he announced in Madrid, adding: ‘But we will not accept joint ownership, which would put into doubt our sovereignty over the airport’ (Independent, 10 July 1998). There was no chance that Spain would be interested in that kind of offer, but there was some confusion in Madrid (fuelled by statements made by opposition spokesmen on the Rock) over whether Gibraltar’s Chief Minister was trying to reopen the 1987 airport agreement. Caruana insisted that he was not, and issued a press release on 23 July asserting that the only potential role for Spain in the airport was commercial. Madrid responded that Spain was only interested in the airport agreement as it stood. Changes did occur not far from the airport at the beginning of August, however, when the Spanish Government announced that the administration of the La Línea customs post would in future be dealt with in Algeciras. There were strong objections in La Línea at the downgrading of their

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town and at the lack of consultation over the decision – points not lost on the Gibraltarians who recognized that they would be liable to the same treatment if ever they were to become part of Spain. Towards the end of August antagonism between Spanish fishing vessels and Gibraltarian police boats escalated once more, with fishermen from Algeciras endeavouring to demonstrate that Gibraltar does not have its own territorial waters by fishing within them, and also firing flares at the patrol boats.8 The situation threatened to intensify, first with the cutting of the nets of a Spanish trawler by a British naval launch on 26 August, and then through an incident the next day in which Spanish police from the jetty at La Línea allegedly shot at a boat occupied by two young Gibraltarians. The British Ambassador in Madrid lodged a formal protest, but the Spanish authorities did not acknowledge that such an incident had occurred. Things got worse before they got better: 15 Spanish fishing boats stayed around the port area of Gibraltar on the night of 14 September, and the Governor, Sir Richard Luce, called on the British Government to issue a further protest. Spanish fishermen from Algeciras and La Línea followed this up with a demonstration at the Gibraltar border on 26 September, and up to 1,000 people turned up to voice their grievances while ten Spanish fishing boats dropped anchor outside the port. On 1 October a Gibraltar patrol boat apprehended three Spanish trawlers in disputed waters, and the next day the Spanish authorities responded to what they saw as ‘this provocation’ by stepping up the inspection of vehicles at the border, thereby creating delays of up to four hours. Another formal British protest to the Spanish Foreign Ministry was met with a Spanish complaint at what was described as the ‘grave harassment’ of the Spanish trawlers (Daily Telegraph, 3 October 1998). Robin Cook and Abel Matutes met while both were in Luxembourg on 5 October and discussed the fishing dispute. At this point a degree of confusion arises. There was a verbal agreement (verbal because a written agreement would have required one party to change its formal position) that there would be ‘a return to traditional fishing practices’, although this expression appears to have been interpreted in different ways by the parties concerned. Britain and Gibraltar interpreted the phrase to mean a reversion to the situation which operated from 1991, when Gibraltar passed a Nature Protection Ordinance designed (amongst other things) to preserve fish stocks by banning the use of nets and rakes in what it considers to be its territorial waters. Spanish trawlers in pursuit of shoals of fish would sometimes stray into such waters, but would leave when requested to do so. Since 1997 Spanish fishermen had changed their tactics, increasing the number of incursions, using larger vessels and often confronting police vessels by refusing to leave. Spain, on the other hand, suggested that the verbal agreement reached between the two Foreign Ministers allowed Spanish fishermen to revert to the pre-1991 situation.

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The Chief Minister of Gibraltar had to issue a statement on 7 October indicating that he had received assurances from London that this was not the case, although there was the suspicion in Gibraltar (later refuted by the Foreign Office) that the British Government had made some concessions to Spain.9 Meanwhile Rodríguez Spitteri from the Spanish Foreign Ministry went to Algeciras on 6 October to explain to community leaders the details of the Spanish interpretation of the agreement,10 and later that day the border restrictions were lifted. However, two further incidents involving Gibraltar police vessels, the Royal Navy and Spanish trawlers in the early hours of 8 October raised the tension once more, and in the absence of the British Ambassador his deputy was summoned to the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry to receive a formal protest. Some 50 Spanish fishing vessels demonstrated outside Gibraltar harbour on 17 October against what they saw as continuing harassment by the British Navy and Gibraltarian Police, and although tensions subsided for a few weeks they increased again in the latter part of November when large numbers of trawlers returned, this time accompanied by a Spanish fisheries protection vessel. It was quite clear that in all these confrontations the Spanish fishermen were not acting on their own, but had the tacit support of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. The same can no doubt be said of the actions of the officials at the border-crossing, while at the same time the Gibraltarian authorities will certainly have been in contact with London. This was a dispute ostensibly about fishing rights and practices, but in reality it was a sparring match over issues of sovereignty. The foremost concern of the Gibraltarian Government was not that Spanish trawlers should not enter Gibraltarian waters – everyone accepted that they had frequently done so between 1991 and 1997 – but that when they did so they should leave at the behest of the Gibraltar police, thereby acknowledging Gibraltarian control, jurisdiction and sovereignty of the waters. Spain’s response to what it saw as Gibraltar’s failure to implement the Matutes interpretation of the Luxembourg agreement of 5 October was to resort to the use of its main retaliatory weapon, the imposition of delays at the border-crossing. As has been seen, it was a weapon that had been used many times before, and would be used again with equally frustrating effect. Meanwhile, at the end of September Gibraltar’s Chief Minister had gone to London to lobby MPs at the Labour Party annual conference and to hold talks with Foreign Office Ministers. There was a suggestion in the British press that as part of its general investigation into constitutional reform the British Government was prepared to consider reform for Gibraltar that might give some encouragement to Spain. However, the FCO was quick to dismiss such an idea, although a spokeswoman admitted that Spain’s joint sovereignty proposals were still being considered, and Caruana expressed his concern that this encouraged the Spanish Government ‘to feel that the UK thinks there is some mileage in their claims’

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(Daily Telegraph, 30 September 1998). In an address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on 21 October, Caruana was even more forceful in rebuking the British Government for ‘not engaging or confronting Spain in response to whatever action or position Spain takes in relation to Gibraltar’, and argued that Spain will not moderate her actions nor modernize her ambitions in respect of Gibraltar until Her Majesty’s Government begins to exercise leverage over Spain – until there is a price for her to pay for pursuing the line and taking the action that she does. (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 21 October 1998) The FCO will not have appreciated the rebuke, although it will surely have recognized that it was to a certain extent accurate. Whether it was prepared to exercise such leverage was, however, doubtful, and there was certainly no sign of it when Tony Blair met José María Aznar in London on 2 November. A Downing Street spokesman indicated that Gibraltar and the fishing dispute had been discussed among a range of issues, and that Britain ‘welcomed the efforts the Spanish have made to keep [the problem] under control’ (Press Association, 2 November 1998). However, given that the meeting lasted for only one hour and that the extradition proceedings against General Pinochet of Chile from Britain to Spain were making the headlines at the time, it is not surprising that the Gibraltar issue did not figure very prominently. One thing of which both Prime Ministers will have been well aware was the progress that Gibraltar had made in continuing to work towards its economic self-sufficiency. This was due in large part to expanding activity in the port, with 140 cruise liners in 1998 bringing in increasing numbers of consumer-spending tourists, bunkering activity rising tenfold over ten years and visits from merchant vessels going up by 50 per cent between 1997 and 1998. Overall visitor numbers to the Rock now exceeded six million (a rise of 20 per cent since 1995). Cammell Laird doubled its workforce in 12 months, while other enhancements to economic activity arose from the opening of a wine-bottling plant and three telecommunications satellite ground stations that brought in large licensing fees. It was small wonder that Gibraltar no longer received any budgetary support from Britain and earned a surplus of over £12 million ($21.6 million) in 1998. Such economic success in Gibraltar was as gratifying for Britain as it was irritating for Spain, for it would have better suited Spain’s case if both Britain and Gibraltar had felt that there was some economic advantage to be had if Gibraltar were to be absorbed into Spain. The continuing dispute over fishing and the problems at the frontier were in part reflections of Spain’s frustration at Gibraltar’s success. Although ostensibly about sovereignty, the timing of the action taken by Spain on 26 November to block a directive on an automatic right to compensation for air

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passengers on overbooked flights, because it applied to Gibraltar, could also be seen as an act of retaliatory obstruction. By the end of 1998 there was a sense of annoyance and disappointment on the part of most Gibraltarians towards the British Government for having declined throughout the year to dismiss Spain’s joint sovereignty proposals outright, thereby allowing the Spanish Government to entertain the notion that they would be seriously considered at the heads of government meeting scheduled for January 1999. Those feelings on the Rock took tangible form in a petition with over 12,000 signatures presented to Downing Street on 10 December urging the British Prime Minister to reject any such proposals. There were also reports in December that the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was planning to step up the strict frontier controls early in the New Year in another attempt to force Britain’s hand on the cosovereignty proposal. The last year of the twentieth century promised to have a difficult start as far as the Gibraltar issue was concerned.

30 Confrontation sparked by fishing row escalates ( January–March 1999)

The year began with a continuation of the confrontations over fishing that had marked the previous year, culminating in the arrest of the appropriately named vessel the Piraña with its 14 crew members on 27 January 1999 for fishing in disputed waters, using nets prohibited under the 1991 Gibraltar Nature Protection Ordinance. The extent of these incursions was confirmed in a written answer by Foreign Office Minister Joyce Quin to a question in the House of Commons when she stated that 520 incidents had been recorded during 1998. However, she also reported that during that year only six arrests in two incidents had been made, thereby confirming Gibraltarian concerns that the authorities were not taking a tough enough line in protecting Gibraltarian territorial waters (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 19 January 1999, Col. 437). As a consequence of the action of the British and Gibraltarian naval authorities, on the following day the British Ambassador in Madrid was summoned to the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry. Although the crew and the vessel had been released on bail by the Magistrates Court in Gibraltar pending proceedings set for 10 February, Spain demanded their unconditional release and the return of the confiscated nets and equipment, together with the delivery of a formal British ratification within 72 hours of the agreement (as interpreted by Spain) reached between Robin Cook and Abel Matutes in October the previous year. Failing that, the Spanish Government would adopt ‘appropriate measures’, which clearly referred to stricter border controls (El País, 28 January 1999). Interviewed on Spanish television, Matutes took the opportunity to repeat all the current concerns that exercised Spain regarding Gibraltar, including its failure to implement all EU directives,1 money-laundering linked to drugtrafficking, and the lack of transparency in the activities of the 53,000 companies registered on the Rock. It was clear that once again the frustration felt in the Spanish Foreign Ministry over the lack of progress on the Gibraltar issue lay very close to the surface, and that conflicts over fishing rights, which were closely linked to sovereignty issues, served to bring these frustrations to the fore. On the night of 28 January it was reported that Gibraltar police vessels

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prevented 11 Spanish boats from fishing off the coast, and early the following day some 300 Spanish fishermen from Algeciras and La Línea began a blockade on the road leading to the border, preventing people and vehicles from entering Gibraltar and allowing only Spaniards to leave.2 By the end of the afternoon the 500 people who were gathered on the Gibraltar side of the border decided to prevent the Spaniards from leaving and created a blockade of their own. Joe Bossano, the former Chief Minister, who was in the gathering called on the Spanish fishermen to direct their anger at Madrid and London over the fishing agreement. The fishermen, who the previous night had been promised an escort of police patrol boats, felt let down by their own side when they were told by the Government representative in Andalusia that ‘the safety of the boats cannot be guaranteed one hundred per cent because the police patrol boats have other important matters to attend to all the way along the coasts of the Strait’ (El País, 30 January 1999). Not surprisingly, therefore, the demonstration by the trawlermen petered out in the early hours of 30 January. However, that did not result in a return to normality at the border, since with the expiry of the 72-hour deadline for the ratification of the fishing agreement later that day the Spanish Government ordered the tightening of the screws at the customs post. Matutes insisted that this was ‘not in retaliation but rather in accordance with a strict application of the current laws’ (El País, 31 January 1999). That justification was not given much credence either in Gibraltar or in London. Nor was it supported by the PSOE, whose foreign affairs spokesman Rafael Estrella was calling at this time for a more cooperative approach to the whole dispute over Gibraltar, including the ‘freezing’ of the sovereignty issue (Gibraltar Chronicle, 29 January 1999). Meanwhile on 31 January Peter Caruana invited four Spanish fishermen for talks on the Rock, and they agreed to postpone a return to fishing in disputed waters until an agreement had been reached. A number of Gibraltarians objected to the fact that Caruana had invited the fishermen for talks, and there were angry demonstrations as they tried to leave and return to Spain (Panorama, 1 February 1999). The negotiators returned the following day and, much to the annoyance of the Spanish Foreign Minister, an agreement in principle was reached between the fishermen and the Gibraltar Government about returning to the ‘normality’ of the period 1991–1997. Matutes met local Campo representatives on 2 February, and told them that since the issue of sovereignty was involved there was no way that the Spanish Government was going to recognize any agreement reached with the Gibraltarian authorities.3 The following day, however, the fishermen began the implementation of the agreement, arguing that ‘we are not concerned with questions of sovereignty or territorial waters, all we want to do is fish’ (El Mundo, 4 February 1999). Under the agreement, which recognizes the right of the

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Gibraltarian authorities ‘to legislate in relation to fishing as they see fit’,4 a maximum of four boats could fish at any one time at a minimum distance of 225 metres from the Gibraltar coast. Peter Caruana reiterated the point that the agreement from a Gibraltarian perspective was all about the right of Gibraltar to enforce its laws and about the sovereignty, jurisdiction and control over ‘our’ waters (Panorama, 4 February 1999). Not surprisingly, the British Government expressed its strong support for the agreement, but for Spain’s Foreign Affairs Minister that was like rubbing salt into the wound. Indeed Abel Matutes became increasingly irritated at the British Government’s position, in particular its apparent refusal to ratify the verbal agreement on fishing (as interpreted by Spain) made in October 1998, and he claimed that ‘it has left itself in a very humiliating, not to say ridiculous situation’ (El País, 5 February 1999). One consequence of his annoyance was that the strict border controls remained in place, and at a meeting of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 February he confirmed that he was considering increasing pressure at the border through such measures as the non-recognition of driving licences issued in Gibraltar. He also threatened (although there was no reason to suggest that he would have any cause to carry it out) to ban all civil aircraft en route to and from Gibraltar from using Spanish air space in the event that the Gibraltarian authorities tried to make a local agreement on the use of the airport similar to that which they had made over fishing. It also became clear that the Spanish Government had put in place a plan to ‘tighten the screws’ on Gibraltar if there were no progress on sovereignty negotiations, and this included the establishment of an Inter-departmental Committee under the chairmanship of the Deputy Prime Minister Francisco Alvarez Cascos to coordinate measures to alleviate the effects on the Campo de Gibraltar, in particular on the more than 2,000 Spaniards who crossed the border daily to work on the Rock (El País, 11 February 1999).5 While representatives of the Campo communities welcomed such measures, they also criticized Matutes’ strategy over border controls as ‘pointless’ and unjustifiable (El País, 12 February 1999). The British Government objected to the Spanish threats on driving licences and airspace via the Ambassador to Spain, Peter Torry, and the Ambassador to the EU, Sir Stephen Wall, who wrote to the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer. On the question of overflying Spanish airspace, the FCO argued that while this was ‘a matter for Spanish air traffic control, it would be extraordinary and unprecedented if an EU member state was to impose an overflight ban on another EU member state’ (Independent, 11 February 1999; El País, 12 February 1999).6 It was equally unlikely that Spain would ignore its legal obligation to recognize driving licences issued in Gibraltar.7 That was why in Brussels the Spanish threats were interpreted as being largely for domestic consumption. As far as the border controls were concerned, the European Commission took the view that Spain was entitled to operate strict controls at what was an

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external border to the Schengen zone, although not surprisingly the Gibraltarian view was that the resulting delays put Spain in contravention of the right to the free movement of people and goods across European borders (El País, 13 February 1999). Whether by accident or by design is not clear, but during this period Robin Cook and Abel Matutes had failed to communicate by telephone. When they finally did so and spoke at length on 12 February, they agreed to take the opportunity to discuss the Gibraltar issue on 21 February when they would both be in Luxembourg for a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers. That meant that the Gibraltarians and the inhabitants of the Campo were faced with at least a further ten days of border delays before there was any possibility of the strict controls being lifted, bringing condemnation of the politicians in both Madrid and London. There was, even then, no guarantee that the meeting would result in the prompt easing of restrictions, since the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry made it clear that they saw the talks as an opportunity to discuss the sovereignty issue. Throughout the dispute the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs had been keen to remind Spanish journalists that he was still awaiting a response to his joint sovereignty proposals made at the end of 1997. The fact that over a year had passed since the proposals were made had given Matutes a stick with which to beat the British Government. That, together with criticism from Gibraltarians and from the Conservatives for not having rejected the proposals at the time they were made, must have made the British Foreign Secretary wish that he had given Matutes an answer. Before the two Foreign Ministers had the chance to meet, the question of the right of Gibraltarians to vote in elections for the European Parliament reappeared as an issue on 18 February when the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled on the case brought five years earlier by a British citizen living in Gibraltar (Denise Matthews). She claimed that the British Government was in breach of the Convention on Human Rights by denying Gibraltarians and other European nationals resident in Gibraltar the right to vote and to stand for the European Parliament. The claim was upheld, and the reaction in Gibraltar was one of delight, while the ruling (by 15 votes to two) put pressure on the British Government to tackle the question of seeking to amend the 1976 European Communities Act on Direct Elections, which (it was thought) would require the support of all other member states, including Spain. Britain had thus far shied away from tackling the issue in order to avoid a row with Spain, but it could do so no longer, and the FCO welcomed the ruling to the extent that it would strengthen the basis on which to approach other member states. However, it was plain that it would be no easy task to secure unanimous support, and in any case the time-scale was too short for any progress to be made in time for the elections due in June 1999. When the keenly anticipated meeting between Abel Matutes and Robin Cook took place in Luxembourg on 21 February it was clear that both

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were determined not to yield on any aspect of their respective positions, but rather to ensure that there was no escalation of the immediate conflict. The British Foreign Secretary would not agree to the Spanish request to drop the charges against the Piraña fishing vessel and return the confiscated nets, arguing that the legal process was already under way,8 and as a consequence his Spanish counterpart indicated that the tight controls at the border would not be eased, although he did undertake to ensure that they would not be extended. In response, Robin Cook contended that the border controls were ‘unacceptable in a modern-day Europe’ and they should not be used for political purposes (The Times, 22 February 1999). In addition, Cook agreed to ensure that Gibraltar applied all EU directives as soon as possible, although he maintained that only eight directives remained to be implemented, whereas Spain claimed that the number was 66. He did not accept Spain’s claim that Gibraltar continued to be a haven for tax evasion and money-laundering, but proposed a three-way meeting between Madrid, London and Gibraltar (a suggestion not well-received by his Spanish counterpart) to deal with the issue. It was hardly surprising that at the end of the talks there was no joint statement and that the language in the separate press conferences was strong, with Cook accusing Spain of having a ‘siege mentality’ and Matutes describing Gibraltar (not for the first time) as a ‘parasite on the Spanish economy’ (El País, 22 February 1999; El Mundo, 22 February 1999). Matutes felt satisfied with the commitment that Gibraltar would soon be made to apply all European directives (hardly a major concession on Britain’s part, but by highlighting Gibraltar’s non-compliance with EU legislation Spain was able to justify the continuation of the strict border controls),9 while Cook was relieved that a fundamental discussion of the sovereignty issue had been avoided. Predictably, the Foreign Affairs spokesman for the PSOE, Rafael Estrella, described the meeting as ‘a complete and utter failure’, and called upon the two Prime Ministers to intervene in the dispute (El País, 23 February 1999). It so happened that Tony Blair and José María Aznar were due to attend an informal EU summit near Bonn on 26 February, and had arranged to meet the evening before to discuss EU financial reforms. Reports of their talks indicated that they agreed on everything except on Gibraltar. Both maintained their respective positions, agreed to continue discussions at their bilateral ‘summit’ meeting, which had already been arranged for 10 April, and meanwhile to leave negotiations in the hands of their respective Foreign Ministers. Clearly neither wanted to give the present difficulties a higher profile than they already had, and past experience suggested that in time normality at the border would be restored. No-one was keener for that to happen sooner rather than later than the Spanish workers who lived in the Campo and worked on the Rock, some of whom had already lost their jobs because of the loss of trade suffered by businesses on both sides of the border. Their representatives met Abel

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Matutes and the Minister for Labour and Social Affairs in Madrid on 24 February, but (as the Prime Ministers’ meeting the following day confirmed) there was to be no rapid change of policy. On 28 February, Gibraltarians tried to ensure wide dissemination of what they described as harassment at the border by setting up cameras which showed live pictures on an Internet website. However, the Spanish border police later moved the checkpoint out of camera range and then put up a 20-foot-high canvas screen to block the entire view of the border, prompting the caption under that picture to ask: ‘What have they got to hide?’ (El País, 6 March 1999). Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, disappointed at the failure of the two Prime Ministers to resolve the situation and their apparent lack of a sense of urgency, pressed Tony Blair to take a tougher line against the Spanish tactics at the border (The Times, 1 March 1999). Yet the following day Abel Matutes reiterated his intention to maintain strict border controls on the grounds that in Gibraltar ‘a number of criminal organizations are developing’ with (he claimed) the ‘connivance’ of the Gibraltarian authorities (El País, 2 March 1999). Small wonder that the FCO in London called for ‘a period of calm so that the situation can be studied in a reasonable manner’ (idem). There was little immediate chance of that, however, when on 3 March some 5,000 Spaniards demonstrated in La Línea against the continuing restrictions, claiming that the region had suffered losses of more than 1,000 million pesetas ($7.1 million) as a result of the border restrictions. In addition to shouts of ‘Fewer restrictions, more solutions’ were heard ‘Matutes, resign, La Línea doesn’t want you’ and ‘Listen Madrid, La Línea is up in arms’ (El País, 4 March 1999), making it plain where the demonstrators laid the blame – at the door of the Foreign Affairs Minister (for being more concerned about issues of sovereignty than about the daily lives of ordinary Spaniards who happened to live next to the disputed territory), and at the Government’s door more generally (for the long neglect suffered by the people of the Campo, who through lack of investment continued to depend on employment in and trade with Gibraltar). The extent of Spain’s concern about alleged illegal activities on the Rock had been confirmed to the British Government when the two Prime Ministers had met in Germany, for it emerged several days after their meeting that Aznar had handed Blair a dossier that argued that, despite steps taken three years earlier with the implementation of appropriate regulations and legislation, the British territory remained a base for drugtraffickers and a haven for money-laundering. In particular, the document alleged that the existence of a large number of ‘exempt companies’ that did not have to declare their accounts or the names of shareholders created a climate of ‘financial opaqueness’ that allowed such activities to be carried out.10 There was even the suggestion that, since weapons had been found in the break-up of a criminal network during Operation Victoria in October 1998, Gibraltar-based gangs might be responsible for ‘kidnapping and murder’ (El Mundo, 3 March 1999).

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It was the insinuations about such serious crimes as kidnapping and murder that really infuriated Gibraltar’s Chief Minister. In an interview for the Spanish TV channel Tele 5, he described the accusations as ‘idiotic’ and said that ‘the campaign of slander’ was ‘merely provoking an attitude of hatred towards Spain among the people of Gibraltar’ (idem). In a letter to El Mundo, the British Ambassador in Madrid, Peter Torry, defended the colony, arguing that the fact that there is smuggling in Gibraltar ‘does not make the Gibraltarian authorities any less keen to combat it than the relevant Spanish authorities are keen to combat smuggling in, say, Galicia’ (Press Association, 4 March 1999). Meanwhile the gulf between Madrid and the Campo de Gibraltar over the dispute continued to widen. The Inter-departmental Committee set up in mid-February to consider ways of assisting the Campo region met for the first time on 4 March but, much to the disappointment of the residents of the Campo, who had been hoping for some immediate assistance, there was no announcement of any new measures or strategy, nor even a date when the Committee would meet again. The Government also made it clear that despite the demonstration the day before there would be no let-up in the severity of the border controls. At the same time, business associations and trade union representatives from Gibraltar and the Campo metaphorically thumbed their noses at Madrid by deciding to revitalize the Consultative Committee which had been established two years earlier to discuss common concerns and to promote economic and social links on both sides of the border. Comments by the Minister for Development, Rafael Arias-Salgado, did suggest, however, that the Madrid Government realized that it needed to have a strategic plan to assist the Campo region to become less economically dependent on the Rock (El Mundo, 6 March 1999). At present Madrid’s policy towards the Campo appeared to be driven entirely by the Foreign Ministry and the use of the border with Gibraltar as a weapon in pursuit of Spain’s sovereignty claim.

31 Border events continue to predominate (April–July 1999)

In contrast to the tension that was still evident at the border-crossing between Spain and Gibraltar, the cordiality between the British and Spanish Prime Ministers was such that when Aznar met with Blair on 10 April 1999 to discuss EU economic reforms and to agree to establish a joint working group to advance their ideas, the encounter was held in the relaxed atmosphere of the British Prime Minister’s official country residence at Chequers, with both families present. With their common vision for the economy of Europe and other urgent questions to discuss (such as the situation in Kosovo and the possible extradition of General Pinochet of Chile to Spain), neither Prime Minister wanted to allow the Gibraltar issue to impinge on their talks any more than was necessary. It was not surprising, therefore, that when the two heads of government spoke to journalists during a break in their talks Aznar indicated that he and Blair would discuss Gibraltar ‘with great prudence, but not in public’. For his part, Blair said that he would give very careful consideration to the document on illegal activities on the Rock that had been passed to the British Government in February (El Mundo, 11 April 1999).1 Here was further evidence that even though serious incidents (approved if not actually orchestrated by Madrid or London) might be causing considerable local tension between Gibraltar and the neighbouring Campo, at this time the mutual national interests of the two governments were paramount and neither was willing to allow the Gibraltar dispute to interfere with them. It could be argued that close collaboration with Spain on international as well as other bilateral matters worked to Britain’s advantage by reducing the significance of the differences between them over the Rock. However, the fact that ten days after the meeting the Governor of Gibraltar, the Chief Minister and the House of Commons had not been informed about the discussions on Gibraltar at Chequers suggested that perhaps the British Government was going too far in diminishing the significance of the current difficulties over Gibraltar. Certainly Peter Caruana was concerned that the Spanish Government would interpret Britain’s attitude to signify that the two countries could develop good relations irrespective of restrictions imposed by Spain at the

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border (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 1999a: Examination of Witnesses, 20 April 1999, Questions 143–149). Towards the end of May 1999 the Gibraltar issue was used once more by Spain to block Britain in an EU context when, at a meeting of Justice and Interior Ministers in Brussels, the British Government formally sought limited participation in the Schengen Agreement.2 It became clear that such a request would not obtain Spanish approval when the Minister for the Interior, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, argued that as Schengen involved reciprocal recognition of police and judicial authorities this could not occur between Spain and Gibraltar since Gibraltar was ‘a colony in our territory’ (El Mundo, 28 May 1999). However, Gibraltar was not the sole reason for Spain’s objections, for Calvo Sotelo also claimed that the Schengen Agreement was ‘a harmonious whole with rights and duties’ which Britain (and Ireland, which had sought limited involvement at the same time) should not be allowed to adopt in a selective way (idem).3 Such broader objections were quietly dropped in subsequent discussions on the question of Britain and Schengen, but those on Gibraltar remained. It is not often that municipal elections in Spain impinge upon Gibraltar, but they did so in a high-profile manner in June 1999 through the person of Jesús Gil, Mayor of Marbella since 1991 and leader of the Grupo Independiente Liberal (GIL) – the party whose name was coined solely to promote the profile of its founder. In the local elections on 13 June the GIL achieved significant success in a number of municipalities, including La Línea. The absolute majority which they gained there – securing 17 of the 25 seats – was due to several factors: Jesús Gil’s successful entrepreneurship in Marbella, the lack of investment and employment opportunities provided by the traditional political parties, and in particular the hardship that La Línea had endured during the Government’s policy of tight border controls, which invited a protest vote. The GIL soon made clear its intentions towards Gibraltar by announcing an immediate plan to establish a Gibraltar Relations Department in the Town Hall, initially to explore cooperation in areas such as culture and sport, but with an eye to examining more lucrative business and investment activities, including use of the airport. If that announcement did not set alarm bells ringing in Madrid, the proposed visit by Jesús Gil and Juan Carlos Juárez, the Mayor-elect of La Línea, to see Gibraltar’s Chief Minister on 24 June certainly did. In the event, Gil himself did not cross the border, fearing that he would be arrested for breaking the conditions of the bail that had been set earlier in the year in relation to charges that had been brought against him for diverting municipal funds to his football club, Atlético Madrid. However, his son, the GIL Secretary General Jesús Gil Marín, did hold talks with Juárez and Peter Caruana on the Rock, and Jesús Gil senior made sure that the national press photographed him near the border. For his part,

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Gibraltar’s Chief Minister ran a degree of risk in being seen to be associated with a character allegedly linked with shady financial dealings, but he could not resist the opportunity to cock a snook at the Spanish Foreign Office, which refused to have any direct dealings with Gibraltar. Nor did he wish to turn his back on the potential opportunities for Gibraltarian firms to increase their investments in nearby Spanish towns, and he did express his admiration for the fact that the GIL had ‘a reputation for achieving things’ (El País, 25 June 1999). In return, Jesús Gil Marín appreciated the ‘recognition and respect’ that he and Juárez had been accorded in Gibraltar, and which he claimed had been systematically denied them in Spain since the announcement of the election results (El Mundo, 25 June 1999). There was no doubt that both the PP and the PSOE were worried about the expansion of the GIL, not only because of the votes they had lost to them on 13 June and which they might not regain in the general election due in 2000, but also because of the havoc they could cause in areas that were politically highly sensitive. Having received assurances that the representatives of the GIL would not discuss issues relating to the sovereignty of Gibraltar, the Spanish Foreign Office attempted to play down the significance of two local leaders discussing cooperation. However, they must have been just as concerned about possible interference by the GIL in their overall strategy towards Gibraltar as they were about similar interference in the Spanish-Moroccan dispute over the North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, where the GIL (at least initially) had also gained power in the June 1999 elections (see Gold 2000: 66–84). In the annual visit by Gibraltar’s Chief Minister to address the UN Decolonization Committee in New York on 21 June, his remarks were as forthright as they had been the year before, but this time the criticism was as much directed towards the UN’s own position as it was against Spain. In response to the case argued by the Spanish Representative – that the UN doctrine of respect for the territorial integrity of the State where the colony is located should be applied – Peter Caruana argued that according to the UN’s own doctrine (supported by rulings of the International Court of Justice regarding territorial retrocession) the only acceptable resolution to the process of decolonization was self-determination, and that since the UN doctrine on territorial integrity could not be applied to a situation which arose long before that doctrine was established, Spain’s claim to Gibraltar on the strength of its desire to restore its territorial integrity could not be upheld. He urged the Committee ‘not to recommend the continuation of bilateral dialogue between the United Kingdom and Spain as an alternative to recognizing our right to self-determination’ (M2 Presswire, 24 June 1999). Coincidentally, the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee published a report on 22 June which supported Caruana’s criticism of the bilateral talks known as the Brussels Process on the grounds

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that in allowing discussion of the issue of sovereignty, it creates ‘exaggerated fears in Gibraltar and false hopes in Spain’ (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 1999a: para. 119). It therefore recommended that the joint sovereignty proposals put forward by Abel Matutes in December 1997 be rejected and the Brussels Process ‘be replaced by a new phase in British/Spanish relations over Gibraltar’ (idem), which would involve Gibraltar in direct discussions with Madrid (idem, para. 123). The report was critical of the Government for not taking a sufficiently robust stance against Spain on occasions in defence of Gibraltarian interests (idem, para. 125).4 Amongst the more contentious recommendations of the report was the proposal to use a Royal Navy patrol boat to support the Gibraltar police over fishing and smuggling (idem, para. 49), and the adoption of ‘proportionate reciprocal measures’ against Spanish aviation interests if civil overflights of Spain en route to or from Gibraltar were banned, as had been threatened (idem, para. 39). With regard to support for the Gibraltar police over fisheries protection, the Government’s response to the report pointed out that ‘Gibraltar has no commercial fisheries and therefore no requirement for fisheries protection’ (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 1999b: para. 16), while it clearly considered the overflight ban highly unlikely, arguing that it would be ‘unprecedented and inconsistent with the provisions of international conventions’ (idem, para. 2). The most interesting statements in the Government’s response, however, were those that responded to the Committee’s recommendation to reject the Matutes proposals and to replace the Brussels Process. The comment that ‘the Brussels Process was launched by mutual agreement between Spain and the previous administration’, and that ‘having inherited it, we have honoured that commitment’ (idem, paras 20–2), contained the implicit suggestion that the Blair Government would not have agreed to the Brussels Process in its existing form. The response acknowledged that ‘there is no realistic prospect of the present Government of Spain agreeing to exclude sovereignty from dialogue on Gibraltar’, but that the British Government ‘will reply to Señor Matutes’s proposals at the next meeting of the Brussels Process’ (idem, para. p. 8). What that reply would be was not made clear. The aspect of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee report that most stung the British Government was the accusation of a lack of robustness in the defence of Gibraltarian interests. The Government’s response was again partly to shift the blame on their predecessors – ‘it is not clear whether they [the Committee] are referring to the present administration’ (idem, para. p. 8) – but also to reject the criticism on the grounds that the Committee did not produce any examples. The report itself was well received in Gibraltar – any Parliamentary report which called upon the British Government to stand up for Gibraltar could not fail in that respect – but neither the report nor the British Government’s response gave any encouragement to Madrid regarding future discussions on the sovereignty issue.

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Meanwhile, with the strict border controls still causing long delays the EU Commissioner for the Internal Market, Mario Monti, threatened at the beginning of July to start proceedings against Spain on the grounds that the Commission was receiving a large number of complaints (allegedly orchestrated by Gibraltarian interests) that Spain was contravening the principle of the free movement of people in EU territory. Madrid rejected the EU Commission move on the grounds that since Gibraltar was outside the Schengen zone, Spain was doing nothing more than impose strict controls on entry in order not only to check the legitimacy of those crossing the border but also (as Gibraltar was not part of the Customs Union) to ensure that appropriate duties and taxes on goods had been levied. At issue was whether the controls were proportionate to the objective being pursued, and clearly different interpretations were being applied. Here was another instance of Spain using Gibraltar’s unique status vis-à-vis the EU to apply pressure on Britain and its colony for progress on the sovereignty issue5 – which was, after all, the ultimate purpose behind every action that Spain took over Gibraltar. There were further examples of the Gibraltar dispute intervening in the progress of EU directives at this time. Britain drew the Commission’s censure for failing to apply four EU directives on company law to Gibraltar, one of which had been outstanding since 1980 (see El Mundo, 30 June 1999). The Commission threatened to take Britain to the European Court of Justice, prompting the adoption of primary legislation in Gibraltar on 15 October 1999 in relation to two of the directives. Meanwhile, Spain had vetoed a Commission proposal to harmonize legislation to protect minority shareholders in transnational takeovers on the grounds that if there were a takeover bid involving Gibraltar, Spain would not recognize Gibraltar as a competent authority to supervise it (Guardian, 22 June 1999). EU ministers with responsibility for the Internal Market met on 28 October and again on 7 December, but on neither occasion was agreement reached on the takeovers directive on account of the failure of Britain and Spain to agree over its application in Gibraltar. Towards the end of July, Spain’s Foreign Minister indicated in a press article that he would welcome greater cooperation between the Campo and Gibraltar, but only if it were accompanied by ‘serious negotiations for a solution to the conflict’, by which he meant negotiations on sovereignty (El País, 26 July 1999). It was also clear that he increasingly took exception to Gibraltar’s privileged financial status within the EU, criticizing it as ‘a giant duty-free outlet aimed at the Spanish market’ and ‘a broad-based economic and fiscal dumping’ (idem). Furthermore he objected to the increasing independence being given to Gibraltar, exemplified by the local fishing agreement reached between the Chief Minister and the Campo representatives at the beginning of February, and expressed the Government’s determination to put an end to what he referred to as ‘earlier periods of permissiveness and inaction’ (idem). Spain, he con-

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tended, had a three-pronged approach: to develop the Campo region, to tackle illegal activities involving the Rock, and to oppose Gibraltar’s attempts to acquire its own identity in its relations with the EU. He rejected the idea put forward by his PSOE counterpart, Rafael Estrella, to ‘freeze’ the issue of sovereignty, as ‘an exercise in hypocrisy or an attempt to deceive Spanish public opinion’ (idem). However, there was no evidence at this stage to suggest that the Matutes approach was more likely to succeed in advancing the Spanish case for a transfer of sovereignty in the future than had hitherto been the case. The Spanish Foreign Minister was following a predetermined path which all of his predecessors over the previous 35 years had trodden before him, albeit Matutes was probably closer to the hard line taken by Franco’s Foreign Affairs Minister Castiella than anyone since the transition to democracy. At the same time, Gibraltar’s resolve to withstand pressure from Spain was even more determined under Peter Caruana than at any time since the establishment of the post of Chief Minister. Fifteen years after the implementation of the Brussels Process, there was arguably more divergence than convergence between the positions of the main protagonists in the dispute. It may have been coincidence, but on the same day as the Matutes article appeared, extracts from a speech by Gibraltar’s Chief Minister to the Royal Commonwealth Society in London were published in the British press. He argued that Gibraltarians had as much right to self-determination as the colonists in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South America and the countries of the Caribbean. He wanted Gibraltar to engage in dialogue and cooperation with Spain, and they had achieved it with municipal, provincial and regional governments, but not at national level. He recognized Spain’s concern that tripartite dialogue might give the people of Gibraltar a degree of recognition that Spain believes ‘will prejudice her fundamental position on Gibraltar’, and expressed willingness ‘to work to find a formula for dialogue with which we were both content and could live’ (Independent, 26 July 1999). However, he did not suggest what such a formula might be, and given the distance in approach between the two sides it is difficult to see how one might have been arrived at, especially if Gibraltar were to insist on the exclusion of any discussion about sovereignty. The Chief Minister spelt out four immediate aspirations for Gibraltar: ‘to assert our right to decide our own political future’; ‘to obtain respect for our EU rights’; ‘to continue to develop our economic, social and political fabric’; and ‘to engage our neighbour, Spain, in a process of meaningful and constructive dialogue’ (idem). He concluded by expressing the wish that Spain ‘will come to terms with the inescapable reality that whatever happened 295 years ago, the people of Gibraltar . . . have rights and legitimate aspirations which need to be respected and accommodated’ (idem). The problem with referring to the number of years since Gibraltar was

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last part of Spain is that the figure acts as a double-edged sword. On the one hand it is so long ago that to persist with claims for its return seems anachronistic and unreasonable (arguably 12 generations of settlers could have lived there since the beginning of the eighteenth century, and indeed with some families this has actually been the case) (Gold 2001: 74–5); on the other hand the very length of time that has elapsed since the capture of the Rock means that the desire for its return has become so deeply embedded in the Spanish psyche (or at least in the psyche of its national politicians) that it has become virtually impossible for it to be relinquished. The fact that the present situation began so long ago was another reason why any rapprochement between Britain and Spain over Gibraltar had become increasingly more difficult.

32 A second term and a satisfying agreement for Caruana (August 1999–April 2000)

To add to its other financial advantages, by August 1999 Gibraltar was about to become a betting haven. Betting and other similar forms of gambling are not, of course, illegal activities, but given the view of Gibraltar held by the Spanish authorities there must have been the suspicion that an increase in betting would provide further opportunities to launder money from illegal activities. Although it was recognized that the whole of Spain’s Mediterranean coast was for a number of reasons a paradise for criminal organizations, with 170 organized crime groups identified by the Spanish Interior Ministry, it was also alleged that investigations into 19 financial crimes connected with Gibraltar had been carried out in 1998, revealing the laundering of over $40 million (5,600 million pesetas) in drug money (Inter-Press Service, 5 October 1999). The increase in betting activity arose from the decision taken in June 1999 by a British independent bookmaker, Victor Chandler, to set up a call-centre in Gibraltar, where the service fee of 3 per cent compared favourably to the combined tax and racing levy of 9 per cent collected by the Government on betting in Britain. This not only caused a problem for major betting companies, who were losing a significant number of highspending British gamblers,1 but it was also affecting the amount of money that was being put back into horse racing in Britain, since about 11 per cent of the betting tax levied in the UK was dedicated to this purpose. When Ladbrokes took the decision at the end of August that they would follow Chandler in order to recoup some of their lost clients, and other major competitors such as William Hill and Coral began to consider doing likewise, the threat to British Government revenue (the betting tax brought in £480 million, or $860 million) increased sharply. Britain’s loss was Gibraltar’s gain, for in addition to revenue from the issue of a restricted number of licences the Gibraltarian economy stood to gain from the income generated by the relocation of betting company staff – Chandler had already brought 300 people to the Rock. For perhaps the first time, the anomalous situation of Gibraltar as an offshore financial centre posed a serious economic threat to Britain.2 As a consequence, the British Government announced in its pre-Budget report in November

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1999 that it would ban the last remaining opportunity for offshore companies to advertise via teletext and other electronic media. Despite this, Ladbrokes announced at the end of November that after six weeks of accepting business from Britain it had 4,000 customers, and a total of 150 staff at its new call-centre in Gibraltar. Coral also established an operation on the Rock, and eventually, following a Government review into the gambling industry, the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave in to the threat by announcing the abolition of Britain’s tax on betting in March 2001.3 In the annual exchange of views at the United Nations, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister rejected the statement made by Abel Matutes at the General Assembly on 21 September regarding Gibraltar’s options. Matutes had argued that Gibraltar’s only alternative to remaining a British colony was to become part of Spain as recognized by the UN General Assembly Resolution 2353. Addressing the Decolonization Committee on 5 October, Caruana again argued (as he had done the previous year) that while Spain based its claim on the principle of territorial integrity, ‘in the process of decolonization, there was no alternative to the principle of selfdetermination’ (M2 Presswire, 6 October 1999). Nor did Caruana accept Spain’s contention that Gibraltarians could not be given the right of selfdetermination because those who settled on the Rock did so after the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht, since (he argued) ‘the UN Charter grants the right of self-determination to self-governing territories, not to indigenous peoples’ (Agence France Presse, 5 October 1999). The interventions from the Gibraltarian and Spanish representatives at the UN highlighted once more the different perception of the problem held by both sides and the continuing gulf between their respective positions. At the same time, the resolution approved by the Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization) on 13 October tacitly accepted the fact that there was little sign of progress in the talks between the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Britain and Spain, noting that it was almost two years since they had met for what were intended to be annual meetings (M2 Presswire, 13 October 1999).4 However, by the turn of the year there was still no sign that any such meeting was about to take place. Of course, in Gibraltar as in the rest of the world the turn of the year on this occasion involved the celebrations to greet the arrival of the new Millennium, and it was perhaps on the back of the feel-good factor that such celebrations aroused that on 10 January 2000 Gibraltar’s Chief Minister decided to call an election to be held exactly one month later. Peter Caruana’s GSD had been in power since May 1996, and there was little sign that Gibraltarians were dissatisfied with the way in which he had conducted his government in the three key areas that mattered most to the electorate: running the economy (including cleaning up Gibraltar’s image on money-laundering and tobaccosmuggling), relations with Britain, and relations with Spain. The Independent candidate, Peter Cumming, who had received only

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214 votes in 1996 but who had stood in a recent by-election and received the support of about 3,000 voters, was standing again on a platform of shared sovereignty with Spain. Although he envisaged a Spanish joint Head of State, the title of his manifesto (‘The Independent Royal City State of Gibraltar in Free Association with Britain and Spain’) did not completely chime with what the Spanish Foreign Minister had had in mind when he put forward his detailed proposal to his British counterpart in December 1997. However, the main challenge this time came from an alliance of the GSLP, led by former Chief Minister Joe Bossano, and the small Liberal Party, whose leader was Joseph Garcia. The Liberals brought a greater level of campaigning activity into the political arena, and in the first two weeks following the announcement of the election the opposition alliance had delivered leaflets to voters on pensioners, students and housing. However, Caruana’s GSD did not neglect bread-and-butter social issues either when it published its manifesto two weeks before polling day, and one of the main issues of the election was whether Gibraltar should have a new hospital on a new site (the GSLP/Liberal proposal), or whether (as the GSD argued) it should involve the refurbishment of an existing building. Indeed, Panorama on 31 January remarked that ‘not for many years has a general election been fought on domestic matters, with the Spanish question (so far) being edged out’. If there were differences between the two main contenders for the post of Chief Minister on the question of relations with Spain, they were more to do with tone and style rather than substance. With opinion polls throughout the campaign showing a likely GSD victory, it came as no surprise that the Caruana’s party won comfortably on 10 February with 58.35 per cent of the poll on an 83.56 per cent turnout (over 4 per cent lower than four years earlier). The GSLP/Liberal alliance was a long way behind, with 40.57 per cent (a swing of over 5 per cent to the GSD since 1996), while Cumming and another Independent shared the other 1 per cent between them. Despite Bossano’s contention that Caruana was soft in his dealings with Spain (a more accurate reference to Caruana’s younger days rather than his four years as Chief Minister), it was clear that the vast majority of Gibraltarians were content for Caruana, still only 43 years old, to continue to pursue his policy of standing firm against Spain’s sovereignty claims but continuing with dialogue and cooperation in areas that would assist Gibraltar’s economy. Interviewed after his second victory, Caruana said that Gibraltarians ‘are not anti-Spanish in not wanting to change our British sovereignty that we have enjoyed for 300 years. We want to remain British, but we don’t want to turn our backs on Spain’ (Agence France Presse, 11 February 2000).5 That may have been a different message from the one that Joe Bossano would have given if he had won, but it must have been clear to the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Madrid that they were in for another four years

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of stalemate. An editorial comment in El Mundo on 12 February reflected that mood: ‘. . . we are faced with several more years of frustrating fossilization, tension at the border and a dialogue of the deaf’. This, the writer argued, was impeding the progress of both Gibraltar and the Campo region, and he criticized all sides for ‘clinging to a priori positions and nationalistic reflexes’. The result of the elections meant that there was at least one key figure, in the shape of Peter Caruana, who would remain on the scene. A general election in Spain followed one month after the poll in Gibraltar, and there is no doubt that, on the basis of pronouncements made by the Spanish opposition Foreign Affairs spokesman Rafael Estrella about putting aside the issue of sovereignty for a given period, the outcome preferred by Gibraltarians would have been a victory for the PSOE. However, there was never seriously much chance of that happening, and José María Aznar was returned for a second term as Prime Minister on 12 March. Although the architect of Aznar’s policy towards Gibraltar, Abel Matutes, had announced before the election that he would not serve in the next government for health reasons, there was no indication that the new PP government was likely to change course. One change that did suggest a possible difference of approach at this time involved the appointment of the next Governor of Gibraltar. At the opening of the new session of Gibraltar’s Assembly on 23 February, Sir Richard Luce, whose term of office ended in late March, described Spain’s approach to the Gibraltar issue as ‘counterproductive’, and called on Spain to rethink its position. ‘The policy of pressure must give way to the policy of friendship’, he said (Agence France Presse, 23 February 2000). Some Gibraltarians hoped that Sir Richard’s replacement would, like so many of his predecessors, be a former military man, but in the event the post was given to a career civil servant, David Durie. With experience both at the Department of Trade and Industry in London and in Brussels, his appointment was an indication of the British Government’s intention of promoting Gibraltar’s economy in the early years of the twenty-first century rather than of confronting Spain. This was an approach very much in keeping with that of the re-elected Chief Minister, although Caruana made it clear in the new Assembly that he intended to press for a change in Gibraltar’s relationship with Britain, by preserving its British sovereignty but seeking a non-colonial relationship with the United Kingdom. At issue was the question of whether a change of status for Gibraltar was compatible with the policy of friendship called for by the outgoing Governor. All the evidence suggested that it was highly unlikely, and that for this reason the British Government would be loath to make any concessions to Gibraltar for fear of upsetting Anglo-Spanish relations. These relations were in any case about to be tested, if not upset, over the failure to agree on matters concerning Gibraltar in relation to Britain’s attempt at partial participation in the Schengen Agreement. The

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intention was that Blair and Aznar would sign an agreement when they met in Lisbon at an EU summit on 25 and 26 March. At issue was the question of recognition of the competent authority in matters of issuing identity cards and cooperating on cross-border policing. Since May 1999, when Britain had indicated an interest in joining some parts of Schengen, Spain had insisted that it would only recognize Britain and not Gibraltar as the competent authority in activities pertaining to it. In the run-up to the summit, the outgoing Spanish Foreign Minister, Abel Matutes, certainly let it be known to the press that he expected an agreement to be reached, but there were concerns in Gibraltar that Britain was prepared to make concessions to Spain which would result in a loss of Gibraltarian autonomy, and Gibraltar’s Chief Minister had talks in London with Robin Cook three days before the summit to express his anxiety. Caruana insisted on three conditions for any agreement to be acceptable: that it should not affect Gibraltar’s sovereignty in any way, that the level of selfgovernment should not be reduced, and that Gibraltar should continue to be able to issue its own documents. With Gibraltar unwilling to accept the proposed wording on competent authorities and police cooperation, the British and Spanish Prime Ministers had to postpone any announcement about Schengen in Lisbon and continue with talks to find a solution. As a consequence, a number of European Commission directives that were awaiting resolution of the Schengen question remained blocked. The gloss in the Spanish press, however, was that, according to Spanish Government sources, an announcement was not made in Lisbon ‘because it would detract from the importance of the main business of the summit meeting’ (El Mundo, 29 March 2000). It was not until 19 April that an agreement was finally announced between Britain and Spain over Schengen and Gibraltar. The basis of the agreement was that a unit would be established within the FCO to act as a ‘postbox’ and be responsible for all formal communications and decisions taken in Gibraltar that might affect its external relations either overseas or with an EU institution or member state. The significance of this from the Spanish perspective was, as the acting Foreign Minister Matutes saw it, that the agreement ‘brought to an end the view of Gibraltar held by some people’ – a clear reference to the former Chief Minister, Joe Bossano – ‘that it is the sixteenth state of the EU’ (El Mundo, 20 April 2000). It was also confirmation, according to Matutes, that although the issue of sovereignty was not part of the agreement, as far as Spain was concerned the sovereignty of Gibraltar was the responsibility of Britain and not of Gibraltar itself. The British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, preferred to play down the significance of the agreement, which he referred to as an ‘arrangement’, and stressed that it had been reached ‘without surrendering a single dot on our commitment that Gibraltar is British territory’ (idem). The advantages from the British perspective were, first, that it meant that the

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European directives previously vetoed by Spain could now be implemented, including regulations on transnational company takeovers and on insolvency laws. Gibraltar would also be free to export its financial services to the rest of the EU. In addition, from the end of May Britain would be able to participate partially in the Schengen Agreement. The arrangement excluded the abandonment of border controls but involved crossborder cooperation, including between the Gibraltarian and Spanish police in preventing and combating crime.6 The Spanish signatory to the agreement, Javier Elorza (permanent representative to the EU in Brussels), acknowledged that ‘there were no victors or vanquished, only pragmatic solutions to technical problems’ (idem).7 One such pragmatic solution concerned identity cards issued in Gibraltar. Spain (and all other EU member states apart from the UK and Sweden) had hitherto refused to accept the ID cards as valid travel documents in lieu of a passport; in future Gibraltar would continue to issue these, but in the name of and on behalf of the British authorities (with the words ‘United Kingdom’ added on the front). In Gibraltar there was concern amongst the opposition parties not only that the agreement involved a loss of Gibraltar’s separate identity, given that all communications and decisions would have to be channelled via London, but more significantly that for the first time Spain had been allowed to interfere on issues relating to Gibraltar documents. They concluded that the agreement was another step in the appeasement of Spain at Gibraltar’s expense. However, the position of the Caruana Government was more pragmatic, maintaining that what was important was not how the decisions were to be communicated but rather the place where the decisions were to be made, since this signified an acknowledgement that Gibraltar possessed its own competent authorities. The same approach was taken to the issue of documents: the place of issue was considered more significant than the words that the documents bore. In a statement to the Gibraltar Assembly on the same day that the agreement was signed, therefore, the Chief Minister declared that his Government was ‘wellsatisfied’ with the outcome, because Spain would now have to recognize not only documents issued in Gibraltar, but also (under the Schengen Convention) the Royal Gibraltar Police as the constitutional police authority of Gibraltar (Panorama, 25 April 2000). All sides claimed that they had secured something from the agreement to their satisfaction – that was obviously why an agreement had been reached – but Gibraltar remained sensitive about any wider implications that might be drawn from it. When the new Governor issued a statement on 21 April suggesting that the new arrangements represented a step towards the future high priority of confidence-building between Spain and Gibraltar, the Chief Minister’s office immediately responded: ‘There is no new “high priority for the future” nor do these arrangements represent a step in any such new priority’ (idem).

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Thus, although the agreement served to remove a number of points of friction between Spain, Britain and Gibraltar in principle, it remained to be seen whether all aspects of the agreement would actually be implemented in practice. At the same time other, more substantial issues remained unresolved – movements at the border-crossing, the use of the airport, and, of course, the thorny issue of sovereignty.

33 The saga of HMS Tireless (I) (May–December 2000)

The appointment of the new Spanish Foreign Minister to succeed Abel Matutes was eventually made at the beginning of May 2000. Josep Piqué’s first act in relation to Gibraltar was to reject direct talks with Peter Caruana when the Chief Minister visited Madrid on 9 May, on the grounds that the Spanish Government would only discuss the future of Gibraltar bilaterally with the British Government. If Gibraltarians had been hoping for signs of a softer line from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, they were to be disappointed. However, on his first visit to London in his new capacity at the beginning of July Piqué took a measured approach to the Gibraltar issue, arguing that he intended to ‘continue with a more active pursuit of the Brussels Process than in recent years’, but also recognizing that a solution to the problem will require ‘a good deal of work, effort, imagination and time’ (El Mundo, 4 July 2001). Meanwhile, an event occurred that was to dominate the Gibraltar issue for the best part of the next 12 months and place a significant strain on relations between London, the Gibraltarians, Spaniards living in the Campo region, and the Government in Madrid. On 12 May, a few days into an eight-month tour of duty, a nuclear-powered Trafalgar class submarine of the British Royal Navy, HMS Tireless, developed a water leak in the reactor cooling system while in the Mediterranean, and on 19 May sought refuge in Gibraltar for temporary repairs prior to returning to Britain. Before the vessel’s arrival in Gibraltar, the British Government informed Spain of the accident and of its intention to direct the submarine to Gibraltar from central Mediterranean waters near Sicily. Despite assurances from the Ministry of Defence in London that there was no danger of a radiation leak and that there was no risk either to the crew or to local residents, there were immediate protests at the presence of the vessel both in Gibraltar and in the Campo, including by the Spanish environmental groups Agaden and Verdemar, who concluded that since the reactor had been shut down the incident must have been a serious one.1 The initial intention was that the vessel would remain in the Gibraltar dockyard no longer than was strictly necessary to make it sufficiently safe to undertake the journey back to Britain for a full repair. However, a

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month after its arrival the decision was taken by the British Ministry of Defence that the repairs to the submarine would be carried out in Gibraltar, despite the fact that the facilities were unsuitable, requiring a temporary enhancement from a so-called Z berth (equipped to receive nuclear submarines for recreational and operational purposes) to an X berth (designed to permit repairs and with additional equipment and management organization).2 Initially no explanation was given for the decision not to remove the vessel to the British shipyard in Plymouth,3 and local anxieties about safety issues (despite assurances from the Royal Navy) prompted another wave of protests within Gibraltar itself. There was criticism by the Self-Determination for Gibraltar Group of the British Government as the administering power for failing in its duty of care towards Gibraltar under the UN Charter. This was an issue that was clearly not going to go away quietly. As has been indicated in earlier chapters there were numerous occasions when Gibraltar’s right to representation in the European Parliament was highlighted in both Britain and Gibraltar. This right was again argued by a British MP, Andrew Mackinlay, only on this occasion his case was not merely that the people of Gibraltar should be represented in Strasbourg but also that they should be represented in Westminster. He proposed that all British overseas territories should be able to discuss matters relating to defence, foreign affairs and other areas over which their local legislatures had no jurisdiction. As Mackinlay pointed out, this would put them on the same footing as French, Spanish and Dutch overseas territories, and territories such as Guam, the Virgin Islands and Samoa in relation to the United States (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 14 June 2000, Cols 942–4). There was no chance that his Representation of Overseas Territories Bill would become law, but it did serve to highlight the anomalous situation of Gibraltar and other British colonies compared to other dependent territories. One of the reasons why the proposal was destined not to succeed was because it was put forward as a Private Member’s Bill, for which Governments rarely make time in their legislative programme. However, another reason was undoubtedly the British Government’s desire not to offend Spain, for reasons that will later become apparent.4 Later in June, Peter Caruana was prevented from appearing before a European Parliamentary Committee in Brussels because of objections by Spanish members. The irony was that the Committee in question was the Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights. Caruana did manage to fulfil a number of engagements while in Brussels, including an opportunity to press the EU Commission to take action against Spain over its refusal to allow Gibraltar to obtain more telephone numbers for subscribers, as well as to enable mobile phones from Gibraltar to operate in Spain.5 At the annual meeting of the United Nations Decolonization Committee on 6 July there was a growing sense of exasperation on the part of the Gibraltarian representatives, Caruana and Bossano, over the fact that year

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after year the recommendation was made to the Fourth Committee that bilateral dialogue between Spain and Britain should continue, thereby denying a proper voice to the primary interested party, the people of Gibraltar. Such a recommendation, argued Caruana, gave comfort to Spain’s thesis that Gibraltar was not a case for decolonization but rather a bilateral sovereignty dispute in which the Gibraltarians had no rights. Spain’s representative, Silvia Cortes, maintained that her country’s position remained unchanged: Gibraltar was a colony in the process of decolonization, and she quoted General Assembly resolutions in support of her case that Spain was seeking the re-establishment of its national unity and territorial integrity (M2 Presswire, 6 July 2000). Meanwhile, the issue of the stricken submarine HMS Tireless rumbled on. A demonstration organized by the Voice of Gibraltar Group on 12 July delivered a statement of protest to the Governor, calling for the vessel to be taken elsewhere for its repairs. It was also clear that a split was emerging between the Gibraltar Government and the opposition on the issue. Whereas the opposition was arguing that the vessel must not be repaired in Gibraltar at all, the Government’s stance was that it must be satisfied that the repair would pose no threat to public safety or the environment. To that end, although the British Ministry of Defence nuclear regulator would only issue a certificate for work to start on the submarine if he was satisfied that it was safe to do so, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister insisted that a panel of independent nuclear consultants appointed by the Gibraltar Government must also give its decision on the matter of safety. Consequently a unilateral decision taken by the MoD on 17 August to start repair work on 21 August was postponed following strong objections by the Gibraltarian Government. Although constitutionally the British Government, which has responsibility for defence matters in Gibraltar, could have gone ahead with the repairs, it was obviously felt in Whitehall that it was important to do everything possible to allay the fears of the local population on both sides of the border. To the relief of the British Government and the dismay of the people of Gibraltar and the surrounding region, Madrid formally accepted the argument that it would be less risky to repair the vessel in Gibraltar than it would be to move it elsewhere. After an analysis of the results of air and water tests carried out by the Spanish Navy, and an examination of British naval reports, the Spanish Government announced on 29 August that, exceptionally, it would not object to repairs being carried out on the Rock, although a week later it did ask the British Government via the Ambassador in Madrid, Peter Torry, for further technical details in order to be able to put in place an appropriate emergency plan for the local Spanish population. Once again the national Governments took an agreed stance which was jointly opposed by Gibraltarians and Spaniards from the neighbouring Campo, who for evident reasons felt themselves to be more vulnerable than officials safely ensconced in London or Madrid.

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Not surprisingly, national politicians from the Spanish opposition parties took the opportunity to criticize the Government’s handling of the situation. On 13 September the Defence Minister, Federico Trillo, was not only forced on to the defensive in both the Senate and the Congress about Britain’s decision to repair the Tireless in Gibraltar but was also obliged to assert that the Spanish Government accepted British assurances ‘because they are allies and fellow-members of the EU irrespective of our claims over Gibraltar’ (El Mundo, 14 September 2000). The fact of the matter was that everyone was aware that the fuss about the presence of the submarine in Gibraltar was partly due to the dispute over sovereignty, and Trillo only highlighted the fact by making reference to it. The continuing disquiet felt in the Campo de Gibraltar was reflected in a demonstration by thousands of people in La Línea on 14 September against the presence of the submarine, and the announcement by local politicians that they were intending to use the courts to try to force the vessel to leave.6 When the Gibraltar Government declared on 15 September that it had finally been persuaded by the report from its independent consultants to allow the repairs to proceed as an exceptional case there was considerable disappointment in the Campo, and the region’s seven mayors announced ambitiously that there would be demonstrations every week until the submarine left the Rock. The resentment felt in the Campo7 at their vulnerability on account of decisions taken by a foreign government (Britain) prompted the Spanish Foreign Minister to announce to Congress on 26 September that he had proposed to Britain that Spain should be involved in the control of Gibraltar’s naval base in order to avoid the possibility of a repetition of the Tireless episode. That cut little ice with the political representatives of the Campo region, who accused the Spanish Government of not standing up to the British Government in order to avoid a diplomatic incident – an accusation more frequently levelled by Gibraltar at the British Government for wanting to avoid confrontation with Spain. In the annual joust at the United Nations, Spain’s Foreign Minister, Josep Piqué, seized the opportunity to bring the issue of Gibraltar into a general debate in the General Assembly on 15 September. While urging the UN to do more to protect human rights and expressing strong support for the Secretary-General’s efforts towards conflict prevention, he referred to the colonial situation in Gibraltar as an example of the need to conclude the decolonization process. The British representative, Stewart Eldon, used his right of reply to defend Britain’s position, with the predictable references to the Treaty of Utrecht, the 1969 constitution and the 1984 Brussels Declaration (M2 Presswire, 15 September 2000). Caruana and Bossano had to wait, however, until later in the month before having the opportunity to have their say when they addressed the Fourth Committee on Decolonization. The Chief Minister put forward a four-point plan to the Committee on 27 September: the despatch of a UN

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delegation to Gibraltar; a statement by the Committee of the right of the Gibraltarians to self-determination; alternatively, the referral of that right to the International Court of Justice; and the inclusion of a ‘proper and distinct voice’ for Gibraltar in the dialogue called for by the UN (Panorama, 27 September 2000). Bossano supported him, but was more belligerent in his views. He asserted that when Gibraltar produced a new constitution, its acceptance by the people in a referendum would constitute the exercise of the Gibraltarians’ right to self-determination and the end of its colonial status. He accused Britain of duplicity for its assertion that the only option open to Gibraltar for decolonization (because of the Treaty of Utrecht) was integration with the UK, but then denied Gibraltar that option. ‘Let me assure your Excellencies’, he said, ‘that neither Spain’s veiled threats of hostility to our aspirations, nor UK’s neglect of its obligations under the Charter, nor the indifference of this Committee to our repeated calls for justice and recognition of our human rights is going to deflect us from our path’ (idem). Such utterances were undoubtedly as much for consumption by the Gibraltarians as by members of the UN Committee. Moreover, it was unlikely that such comments won Gibraltar many new friends, while at home Gibraltarians were aware that it was far easier to talk about constitutional reform than to agree on a proposal and secure the implementation of change. In response, Spain’s representative, Silvia Cortes, again called for the decolonization of Gibraltar, and argued that its obscure financial and corporate systems had an adverse effect on the standard of living of the inhabitants of the Campo. Predictably, the Fourth Committee urged Britain and Spain as usual to find a solution (Panorama, 2 October 2000). Meanwhile, preliminary work began on the repair to HMS Tireless. To the dismay of all concerned, a statement by the British Ministry of Defence on 14 October suggested that the repair could take longer than anticipated, since there was some uncertainty regarding both the actual extent of the crack that had caused the leak (‘two millimetres’ had now become ‘a few centimetres’) and also its precise location (Panorama, 14 October 2000). A week later, on 21 October, came the announcement by the British Royal Navy that all 12 nuclear-powered submarines like the Tireless were to be withdrawn from service and checked in case of a generic fault in the cooling system. Both announcements added fuel to the fire of those groups on both sides of the Gibraltar border who were opposed to the submarine’s presence in Gibraltar. While the Voice of Gibraltar Group argued that ‘we are constitutionally and morally entitled to raise and condemn Britain’s cynicism in thrusting Tireless on our laps’ (Panorama, 24 October 2000), the Mayor of Algeciras, Patricio González, went to Gibraltar on 26 October to file a formal complaint to the courts about the presence of the submarine, which he claimed contravened international regulations. Acknowledging that ‘the Spanish Government does not recognize the judicial system in Gibraltar’, he explained that he

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was obliged to involve the Gibraltar courts because ‘only a judge on the Rock could order the cessation of the repairs on Gibraltarian soil’ (El Mundo, 27 October 2000). When Tony Blair and José María Aznar met in Madrid on 27 October for bilateral talks, it was inevitable that HMS Tireless would figure prominently in their discussions. The day before the meeting, Josep Piqué raised the temperature by expressing in a letter to his counterpart, Robin Cook, Spain’s ‘anxiety’ about the latest information on the submarine, and describing information provided thus far as ‘highly inadequate’ (El Mundo, 26 October 2000). This prompted the PSOE spokesman, Jesús Caldera, to present a motion to Parliament calling on Aznar to ask Blair to remove the vessel from Gibraltar (El País, 27 October 2000). In addition, it was suggested in the Spanish press that Aznar would reiterate the proposal made by Piqué one month earlier that there should be Spanish involvement in the control of Gibraltar’s naval base (idem). Popular demonstrations took place outside the British Embassy in Madrid, while the mayors of the Councils of the Campo region went to the Spanish capital to make their concerns known. As predicted, the stricken submarine played a significant role in the prime-ministerial talks. At a press conference following their meeting, Aznar and Blair repeated their acceptance of the advice that the repairs needed to be carried out in Gibraltar. Both reiterated their understanding of the concerns of the communities living in the vicinity, but argued that there was no risk to the local population. However, in stark contrast to the statement in Josep Piqué’s letter written two days earlier, Aznar stated that ‘the British Government has constantly and properly kept us informed’, and he believed that the two governments would continue to work within a framework of ‘confidence and transparency’ (El Mundo, 28 October 2000). As part of the commitment to maintain the flow of information, it had been agreed that there would be a meeting the following week between British and Spanish nuclear experts. However, despite persistent questioning by both Spanish and British reporters, there was no indication that any Spanish nuclear experts would be permitted to go on board the vessel to undertake their own inspection, although Tony Blair did say that this issue could be discussed when the nuclear experts met. This sparked an angry reaction not only from the British Navy but also from the Conservative defence spokesman in Britain as well as the Gibraltar Government, all of whom were concerned about Spanish interference in what they saw as an essentially British matter. Before that aspect of the matter could be resolved, the British Prime Minister tried to allay fears of a threat to the local population by reporting that the same problem of metal fatigue that had caused the leak on the Tireless had been detected in some of the other submarines of the same class and these were now in dock in the UK awaiting repairs. The inference was that he did not feel concerned about those repairs because there

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was no serious danger to the people living near the relevant British ports. However, that reassurance was undermined by a report published in the Guardian on 28 October under the headline ‘Nuclear sub was hours from meltdown’, which suggested that the crack ‘is understood to be at a critical junction of pipes in the pressurized water reactor’s cooling system which cannot be isolated’. Not surprisingly, the story was picked up the following day by the Spanish media and became the leading item in news bulletins. They not only highlighted how close (according to the report) the Tireless had been to a major disaster, but also the fact that the junction of pipes where the fault had been discovered had not been checked in this reactor design for 30 years. In the context of that information, Aznar’s attempt at humour in the press conference – ‘of course, it was more fun when we used to sing The Yellow Submarine’ – looked singularly out of place (El País, 28 October 2000) and was criticized by Jesús Caldera of the PSOE as ‘frivolous behaviour’ (El Mundo, 29 October 2000).8 The Spanish Government appeared to be losing the initiative over the Tireless incident. In addition to the conflicting messages from Josep Piqué and José María Aznar regarding the amount of information that had been forthcoming from Britain, there was now opposition and media criticism of the Spanish Prime Minister both for his light-hearted comments and, more importantly, for the fact that he appeared to be taking a soft line with the British Government over the problem of the submarine. On 29 October Piqué brought his comments more into line with those of the Prime Minister, stating in Lleida that the British Government had given Madrid ‘all available information’ about the progress of the repairs and the nature of the problem (El Mundo, 30 October 2000). Whilst this removed any differences between Piqué and his Prime Minister, it seemed strange that Piqué should soften his criticism of Britain only one day after the suggestion of a near meltdown had appeared in the British press. The reason for Piqué’s change of tone was due to the fact that Prime Minister Aznar did not wish to jeopardize his burgeoning relationship with his British counterpart, either on a personal level or in relation to EU matters, nor did he want to fall out with Britain over its handling of a sensitive incident in which, in reality, he had very little freedom of action. Therefore, in order to refocus the arguments, on 29 October Piqué chose to use the Tireless incident to restate Spain’s claim to the sovereignty of Gibraltar. In addition to repeating the view that Gibraltar was a ‘major anachronism at the start of the 21st century’ (idem), Piqué linked the issue of sovereignty to the question of the naval base and the safety of Spanish citizens which had been threatened by the presence of the stricken submarine: ‘the Spanish Government will continue to state its claim to Gibraltar since, although it is a British base, the activities that take place there may affect 300,000 Spanish citizens, for whose security the Spanish Government has responsibility’ (idem). Such a tactic by Piqué did not prevent calls for further demonstrations by local political leaders against the

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presence of HMS Tireless, as well as their continuing criticism of the way in which the Government in Madrid had handled the whole episode. On 30 October, the extent of the additional delay due to the nature and size of the cracks in the cooling system became known. The Gibraltar Government’s panel of experts announced that the Ministry of Defence’s Nuclear Regulatory Panel (NRP) would need to design, plan, test and validate a new repair scheme for the Tireless, and it was confirmed the following day that this meant that repairs would not begin until January 2001. Spain’s nuclear advisory body, the Council for Nuclear Safety (CSN), which had received all the reports emanating from Britain throughout the crisis and had based its advice to the Spanish Government on them, could do no other than accept the latest information because, by the admission of its president, it had no expertise of its own relating to nuclear-powered submarines.9 That did not prevent the PSOE Foreign Affairs spokesman, Manuel Marín, from expressing on 2 November his astonishment that the information to which the CSN had had access had been delivered verbally, together with a few photographs and diagrams, and he demanded that Spanish nuclear experts verify in person the extent of the problem on the stricken submarine (El Mundo, 3 November 2000). Marín was clearly pushing at an open door, for the next day (3 November), unbeknown to the Gibraltar Government, a meeting between British and Spanish officials in Madrid was followed that afternoon by a visit to HMS Tireless by two Spanish nuclear experts. Gibraltar’s Chief Minister was aware several days beforehand that, following the meeting between the two Prime Ministers, Britain intended to allow such a visit to take place, and he had made strenuous representation in order to prevent it from happening – especially since the British Government had not yet responded to the suggestion made by Josep Piqué regarding Spanish involvement in the control of Gibraltar’s naval base and the implications of that suggestion for the issue of sovereignty. The British Government, which had responsibility for defence matters, could take unilateral action on all issues relating to the submarine, but Peter Caruana (in an interview for El País on 1 November) seemed confident that Britain’s attempt made in August to proceed without the agreement of Gibraltar would not be repeated. On this occasion, however, London did not back down. Caruana only found out about the visit from a telephone call by dock workers when it was actually under way, and inevitably a major row ensued between Gibraltar and Britain, with the Chief Minister describing the visit of the Spanish nuclear experts as an ‘unacceptable interference’ (El Mundo, 4 November 2000). Given the brevity of the visit and the limitations of access to the reactor itself,10 it was clear that the Spanish nuclear experts could have gleaned little or no new information regarding safety matters. Indeed, a member of the CSN, José Angel Azuara, was quoted as saying before the visit took place that the CSN finds it ‘much more useful to receive studies on the

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safety of the repairs from the British military regulatory body than to carry out an inspection visit’ of the submarine (El País, 1 November 2000). The British Government had clearly taken the decision to allow the visit for tactical and diplomatic reasons; according to the British Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, it was ‘an act of good neighbourliness without any implications for the sovereignty of Gibraltar’ (Efe, 3 November 2000).11 That was not the way that Gibraltarians saw it, but Britain clearly felt it was worth upsetting Gibraltar if the visit helped to minimize mistrust and improve transparency as far as Spain was concerned. It fell to the Governor, David Durie, to attempt to pour oil on troubled waters via an official communiqué. According to one Labour MP, Lindsay Hoyle, the reason why Caruana had not been informed of the visit before it took place could well have been due to the difficulty encountered by the British Defence Minister in making telephone contact with Gibraltar rather than a deliberate snub by Britain. Not surprisingly, however, the opposition parties in Gibraltar, who were opposed to the repairs to the submarine taking place there, argued that the Chief Minister had been ‘ridiculed and humiliated’ by events, and that his credibility as Chief Minister was now in question (Panorama, 6 November 2000). Caruana began to rethink his position towards the Tireless, indicating that ‘the Government will oppose the carrying out of repairs in Gibraltar’ if its own experts were denied what they felt to be essential access to the reactor compartment (Government of Gibraltar Press Release 177, 7 November 2000). Meanwhile, the Spanish Government made the most of the fact that Britain had allowed the inspection by Spanish experts,12 even though the latter knew beforehand that they would learn nothing new. Josep Piqué was even moved to describe it as an act of ‘political courage’ on Britain’s part, although this defence of Britain was designed to enable him to attack the leader of the PSOE, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, rather than to suggest any sympathy with Britain’s position (El País, 8 November 2000). However, in the process Piqué laid himself open to angry criticism by the opposition for stating that the submarine was in ‘a port under British sovereignty’, a phrase that Spanish Ministers of Foreign Affairs historically had avoided (El Mundo, 9 November 2000). In its turn, the Partido Popular was able to accuse the PSOE of putting forward a proposal to debate the submarine in the European Parliament, in which ‘the Spanish socialists suggested giving the Gibraltarian authorities the right to address European institutions, contrary to Spain’s historical position’ (Efe, 13 November 2000). The British Government was quite content to watch Spanish politicians attacking each other instead of directing their verbal fire at London or Gibraltar. The Gibraltarians were still smarting from the fact that the British Government had allowed the visit to the Tireless by the Spanish nuclear experts and that there had still been no rejection from London of the pro-

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posal by Piqué for Spanish involvement in the control of the naval base. Consequently a resolution agreed in advance between Caruana and Bossano was passed unanimously by the Gibraltar Assembly on 20 November calling on the British Government to publish Piqué’s letter to Robin Cook of 26 October, and to publish a reply categorically rejecting the Spanish proposal. The British Foreign Secretary did eventually reject the proposal in a letter of reply sent at the end of November, and the Gibraltar Government published his letter on 19 December. However, Cook declined to respond to Gibraltar’s request to provide a copy of Piqué’s letter in which the original proposal had been made, arguing that he preferred to ‘keep confidential’ his correspondence with his Spanish counterpart (Efe, 19 December 2000). In the light of subsequent events, it would seem that in addition to the proposal about the naval base the letter referred to other, more far-reaching matters. The British Government had hoped that the repair would be underway by January 2001. However, on 22 November 2000 the Gibraltar Government panel of experts reported that the British Ministry of Defence had decided that, in view of the fact that the cause of the defect to the piping had not been established with certainty, a section of the damaged pipe would need to be cut away using specially made tools and sent to Britain for examination. This would enable a repair scheme to be properly designed, but would inevitably delay the whole process. It was small wonder that a demonstration organized in La Línea for 25 November attracted between 10,000 and 15,000 people, during which there were calls for the Madrid Government to take action in order to get rid of ‘this nuclear bomb’ (El Mundo, 26 November 2000). The delay also increased tensions between the Government and the opposition parties in Spain, who were accused by Josep Piqué of ‘taking advantage of the understandable fears of our people, with statements devoid of due basis in fact and consequently of the appropriate rigour and the slightest sense of responsibility’ (El Mundo, 30 November 2000).13 In an interview on 3 December, Piqué continued to maintain the line that the British Government had been completely straight in its approach to the Tireless affair, and that the Spanish Government had every confidence regarding the way in which Britain would deal with matters of safety when the submarine’s engine was eventually re-fired (El País, 3 December 2000). However, local politicians in the vicinity of Gibraltar were stepping up their calls for the Spanish Government to take action. The President of the Junta de Andalucía, Manuel Chaves, told journalists on 5 December that Piqué and Aznar ‘should demand the transfer of the Tireless to a British port which has the necessary facilities to carry out the repairs’ (Efe, 5 December 2000), while on the same day the Council in Córdoba made an identical proposal and argued that Spain’s sovereignty ‘is being damaged by the national Government’s permissiveness’ over the continuing presence of the British submarine in Gibraltar (idem).

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The following day, the Spanish Prime Minister, under pressure from the calls for action coming from the south of the country, seemed to shift the Government’s position, only then to change it back again. He appeared to call on Britain to take the vessel back when he argued in an interview for The Times that ‘the most reasonable, logical and desirable thing would be for it [the submarine] to be taken to the United Kingdom’ (The Times, 6 December 2000). As the day wore on his position became more categorical, and in the early afternoon he stated not only that an actual request had been made for the Tireless to be removed from Gibraltar, but that the best mode of transport would be for it to be towed back to Britain (El Mundo, 7 December 2000). Before the day was out, however, the information office of Spain’s Foreign Affairs Ministry reported that no formal request to that effect had been made to the British Government (idem). By that stage the damage had been done, and opposition parties and pressure groups took Aznar’s earlier statements at face value. The PSOE spokesman in the Congress, Jesús Caldera, welcomed the Prime Minister’s apparent change of heart in calling for the submarine to be removed, and accused the Government of ‘terrible weakness’ towards Britain over its handling of the affair (El Mundo, 8 December 2000). In addition, the Greens, Greenpeace and the Partido Andalucista all claimed some credit for what they saw as the Government’s change of position. It was all a reflection of the continued political pressure to which the Spanish Government was being subjected over the issue. In order to try to lower the temperature, Aznar wisely let it be known that he and Tony Blair did not discuss the Tireless problem when they held a bilateral meeting in Nice on 8 December at the beginning of the EU Intergovernmental Conference.14 However, the opposition parties were not going to let the Government off the hook lightly, and the PSOE and the Partido Andalucista pressed the issue to a debate in the Congress on 12 December in the hope that that they could oblige the Government to request formally the transfer of the Tireless from its current location. However, the Government party took what its spokesman claimed was a morally responsible, non-alarmist position, and won a comfortable majority on its own amendment.15 Nevertheless the Spanish Government realized that it could not continue to support the British position indefinitely, and, following a private undertaking given by the British Ministry of Defence, Josep Piqué announced on the same day as the debate in Parliament took place that if the repairs had not been completed by March 2001, a formal request would be forthcoming for the transfer of the submarine to Britain.16 Just before Christmas, José María Aznar indicated that ‘the beginning of April’ had become the goal for the vessel’s departure (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 20 December 2000). Meanwhile, the key to keeping everyone on board until then was the transmission of information about the repairs from the British Royal Navy to the Spanish Government via the Council for Nuclear Safety (CSN). Just

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to prove the point, a reminder in mid-December from the Chairman of the CSN, Juan Manuel Kindelán, that he had been waiting for over a month for additional information quickly prompted a meeting in Madrid of nuclear experts from both sides, a report on the repair plans and an invitation to the Spanish experts to visit the naval base in Plymouth, where a team was preparing the repair work. So the year 2000 came to an end with HMS Tireless still stricken in the Gibraltar repair yard, with the Governments of Britain and Spain still of the view that there was no threat to public safety and (apart from the wobble on 6 December) in agreement that it was best to carry out the repair in situ. The people and their pressure groups on both sides of the Gibraltar border remained anxious about the situation,17 but neither demonstrations nor recourse to EU institutions looked likely to make any difference. Predictably, the Spanish opposition parties turned Aznar’s handling of the situation into a useful stick with which to beat the Government, while the Gibraltar Government was also attacked by opposition parties and felt threatened by the actual or potential concessions made in London to keep Madrid on side. All concerned must have nurtured the hope that the Tireless would be on its way as early in 2001 as possible.

34 The saga of HMS Tireless (II) ( January–May 2001)

Early in the New Year, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister renewed formal contact with Spanish politicians in the Campo. He was anxious to continue to be seen in dialogue with local Spanish representatives as part of his strategy to make cooperation work on the ground and thereby distract Spain from concerns about ‘the bigger picture’. As traditionally the politicians in power in the Campo region represented the PSOE, it was therefore with representatives of that party that Peter Caruana met on 11 January 2001 to discuss health, the environment, education, economic development, cross-border issues and (with the Tireless very much in mind) emergency planning. With a report appearing on 11 January in El País quoting official Spanish Government sources to the effect that repairs to HMS Tireless were expected to start on 22 January, emergency planning was still all too relevant. The report, which was based on the known view of the British Ministry of Defence, was immediately countered in Gibraltar, where the Government indicated on 12 January that work would not start until it was satisfied, on the basis of information from its own panel of nuclear experts, that it was safe to proceed. It added that it was ‘unlikely’ that it would be in such a position by the given date (Panorama, 12 January 2001). However, in a radio interview on 18 January Peter Caruana announced that the initial phase of the repairs could go ahead as planned, by which time he expected that his Government’s experts would have sufficient information to be able to decide whether or not further stages of the repair could continue (Efe, 18 January 2001).1 Once again, the Gibraltar Government insisted on asserting its authority in order to stave off further domestic criticism of its handling of the situation, while conscious of the careful line that it had to tread vis-à-vis the British Government, which clearly wanted the repairs to be completed in Gibraltar as soon as possible. Meanwhile, opposition parties and anti-Tireless groups in southern Spain had been planning another demonstration, to be held on 20 January, against the continuing presence of the submarine. In the runup to the demonstration, the arguments between regional representatives

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of the Partido Popular – who supported the Madrid Government’s policy and therefore opposed the demonstration as ‘an act of demagogy and irresponsibility’ (El País, 19 January 2001) – and the PSOE – who were making as much political capital out of the situation as possible – became heated and bitter, with the Secretary General of the PP, Javier Arenas, accusing the PSOE Government under Felipe González of allowing the repair of nuclear submarines in Gibraltar while it was in power, and now demanding a public explanation. The demonstration itself, which took place in Algeciras and attracted tens of thousands of Andalusians (estimates varied from 20,000 to 80,000), was good-humoured, with many of the demonstrators singing the Beatles’ Yellow Submarine as a light-hearted way of attacking the Spanish Prime Minister’s policy over the vessel since his much criticized reference to the song three months earlier. By way of support for José María Aznar, a report appeared in El País on the day of the demonstration that the British Government had secretly agreed that, even if it required to be towed, the submarine would be removed from Gibraltar by 19 May. The fact that this would mark one year to the day since the arrival of the Tireless in Gibraltar did raise some doubts as to the veracity of the report, and a spokeswomen for the British Ministry of Defence disclaimed any knowledge of such an agreement (Press Association, 21 January 2001). After a week of confusion in which the Gibraltar Government appeared to say that the repairs to the submarine could not start until after 26 January and then not until after 30 January, the panel of experts suddenly confirmed on 22 January that, on the basis of reports of an identical repair being carried out in Plymouth on HMS Torbay, one of the sister ships of the Tireless, they had ‘improved confidence in the totality of the repair scheme’ (Panorama, 23 January 2001), and work finally began on 24 January, only two days later than the MoD had scheduled. Coincidentally, a meeting had been arranged between Josep Piqué and his British counterpart Robin Cook in London on 24 January. However, despite agreement between Madrid and London over how best to proceed over the repairs to the submarine, there was no apparent agreement on anything else, including whether they should even be discussing the resumption of the Brussels Process talks – a matter which (to Cook’s surprise) was raised by Piqué even though it was not on the agenda for discussion. The fact that there had been no Brussels Process talks since December 1997, Piqué told representatives of the Spanish press after the meeting, was due to ‘a lack of British interest’ (Efe, 24 January 2001). The following day the Governor of Gibraltar, David Durie, gave his views on Anglo-Spanish relations to the Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce and laid himself open two days later to public criticism from the Chief Minister. At the Chamber annual dinner the Governor pointed to the fact that Britain and Spain had developed a strong relationship in seeking to ‘turn the European super-tanker’, and that ‘when the issue of

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the relationship with Spain over Gibraltar is viewed against that sort of background, it takes on a different perspective from that viewed here’ (Panorama, 26 January 2001). Here was explicit evidence that good AngloSpanish relations within the EU context were assuming a growing importance in Whitehall, and an oblique warning that Gibraltar might get caught in the choppy waters caused when a large tanker has to change direction. It was not this aspect of his comments, however, which upset Peter Caruana. The Governor also argued that the British Government should ‘firmly but politely’ stand up for the rights of Gibraltar in its bilateral relations with Spain (something that many Gibraltarians would say that Britain did not do sufficiently), with the European Commission and with other member states. Then he added that the European Commission and the other member states – including Spain – were entitled in return to insist that Gibraltar upholds EU law and does not permit or condone behaviour that undermines it (El País, 27 January 2001). When on 28 January both men found themselves as guests at the annual dinner of the Gibraltar Federation of Small Businesses, Caruana took the opportunity to rebuke the Governor for his earlier remarks, arguing that it would have been fairer if in addition he had said that Spain should not be allowed to get away with non-compliance regarding issues affecting Gibraltar (no doubt he had in mind, amongst other things, border delays and telephone lines). The Governor was unable to respond at the dinner (although a public argument would hardly have been very edifying), as he was not an invited speaker, but it was an unprecedented action by the Chief Minister, an embarrassment for all concerned, and a reflection of the frigid relationship that had developed between the Convent (the Governor’s residence) and No. 6 (the office of the Chief Minister) (Panorama, 28 January 2001). It was also a reflection of increasingly tough language used by Peter Caruana, which prompted him to describe Spain’s action over telephone restrictions as ‘economic sabotage’ (El País, 31 January 2001). Meanwhile, as work proceeded on the Tireless, the protest group in the Campo de Gibraltar escalated its challenge to the authorities on 31 January by bringing a legal action in Madrid against the British and Spanish Prime Ministers, their Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers, as well as the captain of the submarine, on a range of charges ranging from causing damage to natural resources to (in Aznar’s case) treason. The mayors in the region were invited to add their names to the suit, but declined to do so. Josep Piqué dismissed the allegations by saying that ‘there are attitudes and behaviour that go beyond the most basic boundaries of common sense’ (Efe, 31 January 2001). His comments, however, failed to recognize the strength of feeling over the perceived dangers to 200,000 people in the region from the final phase of the repairs to the submarine. That said, reports from the CSN, which met with its British counter-

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parts in Madrid on 1 February, suggested that the repair was proceeding according to plan. In fact the first stage of the repair was completed on 4 February, five days later than the original schedule. What concerned the anti-submarine protesters at this stage, however, was not just the carrying out of the repair (which was eventually completed on 20 February) but also the fact that, once it had been completed, the submarine’s nuclear reactor would be re-started in Gibraltar. Significantly, environmental and safety groups within Gibraltar agreed on 8 February to join forces with the Campo protest group in order to try to prevent this from happening – an example of collaboration between ordinary Spaniards and Gibraltarians against the respective positions of their two Governments. The Tireless and the issue of Gibraltar’s sovereignty were brought together once again on 8 February when Josep Piqué appeared before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, which was debating an Izquierda Unida motion against the repair to the submarine and the re-starting of the reactor. The motion was defeated, but Piqué took the opportunity to reiterate the Government’s policy over sovereignty, as well as to indicate that Spain’s relations with Britain could deteriorate if Britain supported Gibraltar’s attempts to reform its Constitution. This was a reference to the fact that towards the end of 1999 the Gibraltarian Assembly had established a Constitutional Committee with a view to revising its constitution in such a way that Gibraltar would change its relationship with Britain. During the first week in February the Committee had been receiving oral submissions, and these had been receiving local publicity. It was no doubt this publicity that had prompted renewed hostility from Spain’s Foreign Affairs Minister as he launched into a hostile attack on Britain and Gibraltar, but it also reflected the Spanish Government’s frustration at Britain’s apparent ‘lack of political will’ to re-start the Brussels Process talks (El País, 9 February 2001), as illustrated by Robin Cook’s reaction in London two weeks earlier.2 Piqué referred to the Rock as ‘an increasingly difficult burden’, and described the attitude of the Gibraltar Government as ‘intransigent’. The language he chose was provocative and reminiscent of that of his predecessor 18 months earlier3 as he referred to ‘illegal dealing’ and ‘financial opaqueness’, describing Gibraltar as ‘a parasite economy’, ‘an enormous duty free shop’ and ‘an economic and tax dumping-ground’ (Efe, 8 February 2001). He made it clear that cooperation with Gibraltar on matters such as the border and telephones4 would only improve ‘within the framework of negotiations on sovereignty’ (idem). On possible changes to the Constitution, he confirmed Spain’s implacable opposition to any attempt by Gibraltar to exercise its right to self-determination or to integrate with Britain. This was described as ‘the toughest criticism of Britain since the PP came to power five years earlier and the end of the honeymoon between the Blair and Aznar governments’, although the British Embassy

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in Madrid diplomatically noted only ‘the change of tone’ in the Spanish Government’s remarks (idem). London, however, was rather taken aback by the strength of Piqué’s remarks, given that the meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries in January had been so friendly and constructive (or so Whitehall had viewed it), and there was no immediate response from the FCO. When it came, a spokesman merely stated that ‘the UK has made it clear that it has attached great importance to keeping open all our channels of communication’ (Daily Telegraph, 10 February 2001). Caruana was also nonplussed by Piqué’s outburst, and in an interview for El País expressed his surprise that the Spanish Foreign Minister had changed his position so radically since his visit to London. Caruana had applauded Piqué’s ‘intelligent’ comment that ‘if Spain had any possibility of realizing its ambitions in Gibraltar it would have to do so by getting the Gibraltarian people on its side’ (El País, 18 February 2001). Then, said Caruana, came ‘a collection of old accusations that have no real basis’, as if some official had searched in the Foreign Ministry archives ‘in order to put into a single speech all of the arguments that have ever been thrown at Gibraltar’ (idem). Gibraltar’s Chief Minister decided that Piqué’s remarks were more to do with domestic Spanish politics and felt that they contributed nothing positive to the problem. More significantly (or was it wishful thinking?), he surmised that Spain may not be too eager to reach a solution to the Gibraltar question because (apart from the frequently referred to issue of Ceuta and Melilla with Morocco) a degree of autonomy would need to be granted to the territory that would have significant consequences for some of the autonomous communities. If Spain were really serious about solving the problem to its advantage, Caruana argued, it would not be doing things that made matters worse. The Chief Minister made it clear that there was no possibility at the present time of the Gibraltarians agreeing to a change of sovereignty, ‘but between democrats, in the EU there are ways of changing the dynamic of the problem. Future generations of all parties involved might come to feel differently about things’ (idem), but, he concluded, the necessary mutual trust and reduction in historical tension will only emerge from ‘a relationship that is based on much less ambitious objectives than the ultimate one’ (idem). Such an analysis was certainly perspicacious and should have given officials in the Spanish Foreign Ministry some pause for thought, but the problem was that it would require such a major cultural shift on Spain’s part to implement such a strategy that in reality nothing was likely to change. Piqué’s apparent volte-face between 24 January in London and 8 February in the Madrid Senate illustrated just how difficult any transition would be. A touch of British pageantry gave Spain another excuse to criticize the Gibraltar situation as an anachronism when, for the first time in its

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history, the Royal Gibraltar Regiment undertook royal guard duties at several sites in London, including Buckingham Palace, on four occasions over a period of two weeks beginning on 2 March. A spokesman for the Spanish Foreign Ministry described it as a sign of ‘outdated colonialism’ (Efe, 1 March 2001). The response of Gibraltar’s Chief Minister was that the activity of the Gibraltar Regiment was ‘none of Spain’s business’ (Panorama, 6 March 2001). He saw the military duties as an opportunity for Gibraltar to demonstrate its loyalty to the British Crown. The effect of the dispute over Gibraltar on EU decision-making once more came to the fore in early March 2001, when it was announced by the Commissioner for Transport, Loyola de Palacio, that the proposed ‘Single European Sky’ agreement would be taken off the agenda for discussion by Commissioners in order to ‘prevent the initiative from being stillborn’ (Efe, 7 March 2001). It was hoped that the clause that had first been applied in 1987 to exclude Gibraltar’s airport from an air transport agreement (see Chapter 14) could be invoked for the ninth time in relation to aviation matters so that the ‘Single Sky’ agreement could be reached, thereby providing common management of European airspace by 2004, which would result (amongst other things) in the reduction of airport delays across Europe. However, Britain had decided not to apply the socalled Gibraltar clause again because it was of the view that since the 1987 agreement between Spain and the UK on the joint use of Gibraltar’s airport had never been put into effect, that agreement had therefore lapsed. However, Spain was keen to point out that the reason the agreement had never been implemented was because of ‘Gibraltarian intransigence tolerated by the United Kingdom’ (Efe, 9 March 2001).5 It was probably the re-emergence of the dispute over the airport that prompted the Government party to table a debate in the Spanish Congress in which they called upon the Government to remind Britain of ‘the need to put an end to Gibraltar’s colonial situation as soon as possible’, including ‘the illegal and totally unofficial occupation by the United Kingdom of the isthmus that joins the Rock to the rest of Spanish territory’ (Efe, 13 March 2001). Spanish politicians knew very well that the isthmus (of which the Treaty of Utrecht makes no mention) was Britain’s Achilles heel in relation to its legal claim to Gibraltar, and inextricably linked to the airport question. The Spanish Government offensive was reiterated in Congress by Josep Piqué when he appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee on 14 March. He picked up on the question of possible change in Gibraltar’s constitutional relationship with Britain that had so aroused him in his appearance before the Committee a month earlier,6 reminding Gibraltar that Spain would consider any move towards self-determination ‘a dangerously hostile act’ that would seriously damage Anglo-Spanish relations (Efe, 14 March 2001). Piqué’s somewhat hyperbolic choice of phrase could be explained by the context in which he was speaking (the conduct

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of the Aznar Government’s foreign policy was constantly under attack from the PSOE opposition), but to the surprise of many José María Aznar spoke in similar terms in a radio interview when he agreed that any change in the Rock’s status would be viewed as ‘a very serious act’ (Efe, 15 March 2001).7 Later Piqué (also speaking on the radio) called in aid the resolutions of the United Nations and the Treaty of Utrecht itself in order to deter Gibraltar from attempting to go down the road towards self-determination, and he expressed ‘the hope that at some point Gibraltar will cease to be an obstacle so that relations between the UK and Spain, two countries that have more and more in common with each other, can develop fully and seriously’ (idem).8 Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, Peter Caruana, argued that what was being considered was the ‘modernization’ of Gibraltar’s constitution, and that it would not involve a change of sovereignty. He said that it was in any case a matter for the British and Gibraltarian governments, and accused Spain not only of ‘anti-democratic and un-European intimidation’ by referring to ‘dangerously hostile acts’, but also of being selective about the application of the Treaty of Utrecht to Gibraltar in the twenty-first century (why is Spain not calling for the expulsion from Gibraltar of Muslims and Jews, he asked?) (idem). He claimed that in any case the Treaty merely imposed restrictions on some models of decolonization. ‘At no time does it [the Treaty] specify that [self-determination] is incompatible with decolonization’, he claimed (idem), and he urged the Spanish Government to test the Treaty at the International Court of Justice if it was so confident of its interpretation. The position of the FCO in London was that although it would consider any proposal from Gibraltar at the appropriate time, it would do nothing to contravene international law, including the Treaty of Utrecht.9 It became clear in these exchanges not only that the Treaty of Utrecht was only called into play when it suited the purpose of one of the parties concerned, but also that there have always been different interpretations of the meaning of Article X of the Treaty. The Gibraltar Government issued a statement that challenged whether Spain actually ceded Gibraltar to Britain as a colony at all (implying that Gibraltar’s status as a British colony is independent of the Treaty): When Spain ceded Gibraltar to Britain in perpetuity, it did not do so as a colony. Spain’s linkage of a colonial status for Gibraltar and the Treaty of Utrecht has no basis in the Treaty itself. Spain simply ceded the territory to Britain. The arrangements for the self-government of Gibraltar are therefore, even under the Treaty, a matter entirely for the UK. Provided, therefore, that Gibraltar does not cease to be of British sovereignty, the Treaty of Utrecht (even if it were still valid in this respect) is no impediment to the decolonisation of Gibraltar. (Panorama, 15 March 2001)

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The view in Spain, however, was that the Treaty ‘establishes that Gibraltar cannot aspire to self-determination and that it will pass to Spanish sovereignty at the very moment that it ceases to be a British colony’ (El Mundo, 16 March 2001). In fact the last sentence of the Article states that if Britain decides to dispose of the possession of the town of Gibraltar, Spain will have first preference (see Appendix 1); the terms ‘colony’, ‘selfdetermination’ or even ‘sovereignty’ do not appear. Spain’s concern about a change in Gibraltar’s constitutional position was, in one sense, premature, since no formal proposal had been put forward by Gibraltar to London. However, there were indications of the Gibraltar Government’s thinking, and in particular the model of selfdetermination that was favoured by the Chief Minister. This was not independence (seen to be impracticable), nor integration with Britain (viewed as potentially destabilizing economically, with Gibraltar’s interests overshadowed by that of other regions, and in any case rejected by Britain), nor even free association (which could lead to independence and would therefore be seen as contravening the Treaty of Utrecht). Caruana favoured the so-called ‘fourth option’:10 the removal from Gibraltar’s constitution of the residual powers of the Governor and the British Government, the retention in the Preamble to the fact that ‘Gibraltar is part of Her Britannic Majesty’s dominions’, and the inclusion of a reference to the right to self-determination. This would be subject to approval in a referendum by the people of Gibraltar, and put to the United Nations as constituting the decolonization of Gibraltar with, if necessary, adjudication by the International Court of Justice in The Hague (El País, 16 March 2001). If such a proposal ever reached the UN, it was certain that Spain would object vigorously, and Britain might even do likewise because of the effect that it would have on Anglo-Spanish relations. The first encounter between Spanish and British Foreign Ministers since January occurred on 22 and 23 March at the Council of Ministers meeting in Stockholm. Josep Piqué made it clear beforehand that he expected to have unofficial discussions with Robin Cook about Gibraltar, but the Rock also had an indirect impact on the Council’s business, since the British and Spanish Governments had wanted to secure the adoption of the Single European Airspace (or ‘Single Sky’) directive for the efficient management of air traffic in order to reduce delays and therefore costs. The Spanish Commissioners made it clear that they wanted the usual ‘Gibraltar exclusion clauses’ to be inserted (they were so far present in 15 EU directives), whereas Britain no longer accepted that such clauses would be systematically included in EU agreements but rather considered on a case by case basis11 (the impending general election in Britain and Tony Blair’s desire for a problem-free summit may have been factors in the adoption of this stance). These positions were backed up by open letters from Blair and Aznar to the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, but, as indicated earlier, the Transport

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Commissioner had withdrawn the proposal prior to the summit. In their discussions in Stockholm, Aznar and Blair agreed to seek a solution to the ‘Single Sky’ policy by the middle of June so that it could be agreed at the next summit in Gothenburg and implemented by 2004, although the time-scale looked decidedly short for sufficiently significant progress to be made. Robin Cook and Josep Piqué also agreed to renew the Brussels Process talks ‘before the summer’ (Efe, 23 March 2001). Meanwhile, with the expected date for the departure of HMS Tireless looming, the Spanish Government could have found itself in an awkward position when it was announced on 31 March that due to a slight delay in the repairs the expected departure would now take place sometime in May. Josep Piqué had earlier given a pledge that it would request the removal of the submarine if it had not left by 15 April. However, Britain tried to defuse any strong local opposition by agreeing to the presence of an observer from the Spanish Council for Nuclear Safety (CSN) at the hydrostatic tests following the completion of the repair and prior to the restarting of the nuclear reactor. To the surprise of many (given his previous track record) Peter Caruana did not object, although he insisted that this would have to be understood as ‘neighbourly cooperation’ and had no implications for Spain’s role in Gibraltar’s naval base (Efe, 2 April 2001). Further good news for the British Government and the Royal Navy came on 11 April when the Gibraltar Government agreed, on the basis of advice from its own panel of experts, that on completion of the necessary tests the submarine’s reactor could be re-started in the dockyard. However, less good news for the British Government emerged on the same day when the Foreign Affairs Select Committee published its periodical report on Gibraltar. The Committee criticized the Government, especially the Minister with responsibility for Europe, Keith Vaz, for its failure to be ‘sufficiently robust’ with Spain over such issues as delays at the border and telephone lines. The Report made six recommendations, including the commencement of proceedings in the European Court of Justice if Spain did not agree to the reduction of border delays by a specific date, and the investigation of the scope for similar legal action with regard to telephone lines. The Report also asked the Government to spell out the action it proposed to take to ensure that the Gibraltarians had the right to vote in the next European Parliamentary elections (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2001a). In its response, published several months later, the Government indicated its preference for action through the European Commission or through bilateral talks rather than via legal action, and insisted that it ‘takes its duty towards Gibraltar in the EU . . . seriously and will continue very firmly to defend Gibraltar’s interests’ (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2001b). However, the Chairman of the Committee recognized that the Government had its own set of priorities when he said, in his conclusion to the Committee’s examination of the Minister,

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that ‘for the Foreign Office, Spain is the big picture; for us, the injustices to Gibraltar are an equally big picture’ (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2001a: Examination of Witnesses, Question 43, 7 March 2001). The HMS Tireless saga took one more step towards its conclusion on 16 April, when the Ministry of Defence in London was able to report that the hydrostatic tests had proved that the repair had been successful. There were calls in the region for the Government in Madrid to insist that the submarine should leave Gibraltar immediately and start its reactor at a distance, but the Spanish observer from the CSN, Antonio Munuera, was satisfied that it would be quite safe to do so in Gibraltar, and even argued that in case of any difficulties after 11 months of inactivity it might even be sensible to do so. In the event the test firing was successfully begun on 1 May, accompanied by protest marches at May Day events in nearby Spanish towns. Even to the last, politicians in the Campo region, such as the President of the Junta de Andalucía, Manuel Chaves, were arguing that Aznar should never have allowed the submarine to be repaired in Gibraltar because not only was it a genuine danger to Spanish people but it also ‘damaged Spain’s self-respect’ (Efe, 4 May 2001). Not surprisingly, Aznar’s jest that the smooth departure of the Tireless was ‘a bit of bad news for some people’ (implying that they would have one fewer stick with which to beat the Government) did not go down too well with those who had felt most threatened by the submarine’s presence (El Mundo, 5 May 2001). After 12 days short of a full year in Gibraltar HMS Tireless finally set sail on the morning of 7 May, bound (although this was not made known for security reasons) for the Clyde Naval Base in Scotland. The departure was marked by a small group of protesters (two of whom jumped into the water with a funeral wreath with the inscription ‘the region of Gibraltar will not forget you’), and the opening of bottles of champagne by wellwishers. However, arguments immediately began about whether an episode such as the Tireless would ever be repeated. Josep Piqué, while arguing that his Government had followed the right course of action, claimed that his counterpart, Robin Cook, had given his ‘clear determination and decision’ during the previous weekend that such an event would never happen again, whereas Captain Peter Wilkinson, spokesman for the British Royal Navy, had said that there was no reason for nuclear submarines not to go to Gibraltar in the future. It was left to the British Ambassador in Madrid, Peter Torry, to explain on 7 May that while Britain had given a guarantee to the Spanish Government that Gibraltar would not become a base for the repair of nuclear submarines and that the infrastructure erected for the repair to the Tireless would be dismantled immediately, that would not preclude such a boat from being repaired in Gibraltar in the future if that seemed to be the best option in the event of an accident. However, rather than playing the sovereignty card as the

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justification for such a stance, the British diplomat preferred to thank Spain for its ‘understanding’ and to appeal to Spanish obligations as members of the Atlantic Alliance. ‘As NATO allies’, he reminded journalists, ‘we know that future accidents cannot be precluded’ (El Mundo, 8 May 2001). At the same time, local Spanish politicians continued to accuse each other of playing politics with the whole episode. The President of the Partido Popular in Cádiz invited Manuel Chaves ‘to apologize for the alarm’ that he had caused among the people of the Campo when his only objective had been to arouse criticism of the Madrid Government’s handling of the affair. Chaves in return called her ‘shameless’, and reminded her that she too had called for the departure of the submarine (idem). The long episode of HMS Tireless provided an interesting reflection of the state of relations between Gibraltar and Britain at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In one respect Britain always had the upper hand on the issue, since there was no disputing the fact that it had responsibility for defence matters, which made it difficult for Gibraltar to oppose the imposition of Britain’s will regarding the place where the repairs to the submarine would be carried out. However, the objections raised in Gibraltar were based on considerations of public safety and the protection of the environment, which were clearly the responsibility of the Gibraltar Government. Spain was also an important participant in the episode, and there were similar concerns on the Campo side of the border, particularly amongst environmental organizations. However, there was also an element of opportunism on the part of opposition political groups in Spain who could not resist the temptation to use the episode both to attack the Spanish Government’s handling of the issue and as a reason to raise the question of sovereignty over Gibraltar. London was quite content to watch Spanish politicians arguing with each other rather than attacking Britain. As far as Gibraltar was concerned, in raising its objections it had to be mindful of the fact that it could not afford to lose the goodwill of the British Royal Navy, for although Ministry of Defence expenditure as a percentage of Gibraltar’s GDP had gone down from 50 per cent in the early 1980s to 10 per cent at the turn of the century (with a consequent fall in the percentage of defence-related employment from 35 per cent to around 8 per cent), there remained the theoretical threat that Britain could transfer all of its Western Mediterranean naval base requirements to a nearby port such as Rota, the Spanish–US naval base near Cádiz which is due to be upgraded by 2010 (see Financial Times, 18 October 2000; Guardian, 15 February 2001). With the damage that that could do to the local economy in mind, Peter Caruana must initially have been more relieved than disappointed that his independent consultants endorsed the view of Britain’s Ministry of Defence team to give the green light for the repairs to go ahead in Gibraltar. However, as the saga unravelled

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and the problem turned out to be more complex and potentially more serious than had originally been thought, there was growing opposition on the Rock to the continuing presence of the Tireless. Caruana’s initial relief will have turned first to concerns about safety, then to anxiety about local criticism and later to anger over the sovereignty implications of Britain’s willingness to allow an unprecedented degree of Spanish involvement in the repair process. For all these reasons no-one would have been more relieved than Gibraltar’s Chief Minister to see the Tireless finally set sail, and no-one would have been more concerned to ensure that such an event would not be repeated.12

35 The Brussels Process resumed (May–October 2001)

As has been observed earlier, it was not just weighty issues such as nuclearpowered submarines that stirred Spanish passions over Gibraltar’s sovereignty but also matters of ostensibly less consequence (except to the participants), such as Gibraltar’s participation in international sporting events.1 At the end of May 2001, Gibraltar applied for the first time to participate in the World Badminton Championships to be held in Seville. The application from Gibraltar, which had been a member of the International Badminton Federation (IBF) since 1986, had been accepted in September 2000, but on 8 May, two weeks before the event was due to take place, the international body informed the Gibraltar Badminton Association (GBA) that ‘the Secretariat at the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Spain has intervened and, citing Spanish legislation, has ruled that Gibraltar may not take part in this event in any capacity’ (Universal News Service, 21 May 2001). In fact there was no such Spanish legislation, only Spanish Government policy, and the GBA vigorously objected to what it saw as political interference. That view appeared to be justified when, five days later, the IBF informed the GBA that the Spanish Government would accept Gibraltar’s participation ‘but only with neutral representation as an IBF team under the IBF flag with no reference to Gibraltar’ (idem). Initially the GBA refused to accept such restrictions, accusing the IBF of not upholding one of its own statutes that states that players cannot be denied entry to a tournament on political grounds, and they took the case to the International Court of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) in Lausanne. However, the Court refused to grant an interim order in favour of the GBA, and the Gibraltar team decided to participate on the compromise terms. From a purely sporting perspective they probably wished they had not done so, for the team lost all its matches heavily, and one of the Gibraltar players was defeated by a member of the Mexican team in straight games in a worldrecord time of six minutes (Agence France Presse, 29 May 2001). Even so, given that Spain had originally said that Gibraltar would not be allowed to participate ‘in any capacity’, from a strategic point of view Gibraltar felt that it had at least won a point.

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The IBF’s position with regard to Gibraltar’s participation was that it did not have the power to override the stipulation made by the Spanish Badminton Association, which itself had been imposed by the Spanish Government. The GBA took the IBF to task when the annual meeting of the Federation was held on 3 June, arguing that no host nation should in future be allowed to dictate the rules, but with the issue still before the Court of Arbitration full discussion of the matter was cut short. As things stood, whatever the articles and statutes of an international sports federation might say, they clearly remained subject to the political dictates of the host nation, which could override them if it chose to do so. Alternatively – as was to happen later in the year – an international federation could change its statutes in order to avoid political difficulties. The issue of the ‘Single Sky’ agreement should have returned to prominence on 15 June when the EU biannual summit was held in Gothenburg near the end of the Swedish presidency. Britain and Spain had given a commitment in March that they would try to reach a bilateral agreement prior to the summit, but both sides accepted that this would have to be postponed in view of the timing of the British general election, which had been expected to be held earlier but which in fact did not take place until 7 June. With Tony Blair and the Labour Government comfortably returned for a second term of office, thus ensuring continuity in any discussions, the next target date for agreement to be reached was the meeting of Transport Ministers in Luxembourg on 28 June. However, well before that, on 19 June, diplomatic sources indicated that rather than endeavour to reach agreement by the end of June the two sides would aim for ‘before August’, and that this would be ‘within the framework of a wider discussion on the whole range of bilateral relations’ (Efe, 19 June 2001). Part of such a ‘framework’ was the Brussels Process, and since the British and Spanish Foreign Ministers had indicated their intention in March to revive these negotiations (see Chapter 34) it came as no surprise that the new British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, confirmed this intention in the debate on the Queen’s Speech on 22 June (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 22 June 2001, Col. 284). Yet another agreement was being delayed by the Gibraltar dispute at this time, namely the Convention on Criminal and Civil Corruption originally proposed by the Council of Europe in 1999. By mid-2001 Spain was the only remaining EU country not to have signed the Convention,2 but before it would agree to do so it wanted a guarantee from Britain that the Gibraltarian authorities, including the police and judicial system, would not be allowed to have a voice at international level, and that all matters would have to be dealt with directly with Britain. One PSOE Member of Parliament described the Spanish Government’s stance as ‘ridiculous’, and suggested that ‘if the Government is as interested as it says it is in tackling corruption in the tax haven of Gibraltar, the first thing

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it should do, if it wants to practise what it preaches, is to sign the Convention’ (El País, 18 June 2001).3 Gibraltar’s status as a tax haven interfered with yet another international agreement later in June when Spain refused to subscribe to the final report of the OECD on the activities of 35 territories (including Gibraltar) that were deemed to operate ‘harmful’ tax practices. Under pressure from the United States the OECD, which first drew up the list of tax havens in June 2000, agreed to allow the territories to continue with their special tax status in return for a greater transparency in their fiscal operations, the latter to be reported by 30 November that year. Spain sought a guarantee that Britain (as the colonial power) would modify Gibraltar’s status from tax haven to preferential tax regime, thereby taking on responsibility for reporting on whether Gibraltar had met the OECD requirements. Otherwise, in Spain’s view, if Gibraltar were to report directly to the OECD this would confer an international status on the colony to which it was not entitled. Britain claimed that it was unable to comply, as it had awarded responsibility for taxation matters to Gibraltar itself. So the publication of the report was postponed until 31 July 2001, and then further deferred ‘pending a resolution to the Gibraltar issue’, according to an OECD spokesman (Gibraltar Chronicle, 11 October 2001).4 While Spain’s concerns about financial practices in Gibraltar were nothing new, there was no doubt that Gibraltar was prospering from increasing non-financial commercial activities. With 80,000 vessels passing through the Strait of Gibraltar each year, this was especially true in the sphere of shipping. The growth of bunkering activities had resulted in the delivery of over 2.7 million tonnes of fuel in the year 2000 (far more than in any other port in the region),5 and companies were keen to persuade visiting ships to make use of other supply facilities on the Rock, such as drinking water, food and spares.6 Following a change in regulations, Gibraltar-based vessels had also recently been able to increase trade in offport limits (the servicing of ships outside the port area) – which provided ships with a faster service in transferring goods and crew – although they were in competition with a well-established service operating from Algeciras.7 As part of a five-year plan for the development of the port and maritime area in Gibraltar there were also plans to build better passenger facilities in order to increase the number of visits from cruise ships (175 in 2000) and to persuade them to extend their stay through the expansion of tourist activities such as trips to Morocco, or whale and dolphin safaris (Lloyd’s List, 27 June 2001; 23 October 2001). Such current and planned commercial activity only affected Spain in so far as it took similar activity away from the Campo. With Algeciras holding important cards in the shipping sector, at this stage Spain could afford not to be unduly concerned about some healthy competition. Gibraltar received a rare visitor on 17 July in the form of the British

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Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, who was making the first visit by the holder of his office for five years. Hoon stressed ‘the special relationship’ between Britain and Gibraltar, describing it as a ‘vital asset’ for Britain’s armed forces (Agence France Presse, 17 July 2001). He acknowledged the contribution made by Gibraltarians during the ‘difficult time’ of the presence of HMS Tireless, but did not rule out a repetition of such an episode in future. With regard to sovereignty he reiterated the mantra of Britain’s commitment to honour the wishes of the Gibraltarians, but the most significant incident during the joint press conference held with the Chief Minister concerned a question asking whether there might be joint military exercises in Gibraltar with Spain given that it was now fully integrated into NATO. Hoon declined to answer, but Caruana interjected: ‘As far as the government of Gibraltar is concerned the Spanish armed forces are not welcome in Gibraltar while Spain maintains its sovereignty claim to the territory’ (idem). Hoon internally congratulated himself for having kept his own counsel, but he was left in no doubt as to Gibraltarian opinion on the matter. It is also possible – in the light of events a year later – that Hoon’s own thinking on the role of Gibraltar in Britain’s defence strategy was significantly influenced by his visit. Spain’s Foreign Minister, Josep Piqué, met with his new counterpart, Jack Straw, in Brussels on 15 July, where amongst other things they discussed the issue of the airport at Gibraltar in the context of the ‘Single Sky’ policy. However, if EU colleagues thought that with the end of July approaching an agreement was imminent (as diplomatic sources had indicated a month earlier), they will have been sorely disappointed to hear Piqué announce in an interview on 22 July that the target for an agreement was now the European Council meeting in Ghent, scheduled for October (Efe, 22 July 2001). Once again some will have suspected that the reason for the further delay (the original intention had been to try to reach agreement in March) was because current Anglo-Spanish discussions were not confined to the ‘Single Sky’. Sure enough, the following day the Spanish Foreign Ministry announced that after an interval of over three and a half years the Brussels Process negotiations would be restarted on 26 July when Piqué would briefly meet Straw in London en route to Peru, prior to a more substantive meeting in the autumn. It was stressed by Madrid that the proposals regarding a transfer of sovereignty put forward in December 1997 by the then Foreign Minister, Abel Matutes, were still on the table, prompting a swift intervention from Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, who said: ‘The British government has no other option but to reject the proposals’ (Agence France Presse, 24 July 2001). The London meeting duly took place, and a joint communiqué was issued in which both sides indicated their intention ‘to make every effort to bring these talks to a successful and speedy conclusion to the benefit of all parties concerned’ (Efe, 26 July 2001). The problem was that the

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parties concerned had different ideas regarding the definition of the word ‘successful’ in this context. One Spanish reporter recognized that the communiqué subtly revealed the different priorities of the two principal participants, ‘with Britain particularly concerned to resolve practical issues (such as telecommunications8 and air traffic), while Spain is determined to defend its claims to the sovereignty of the Rock’ (El Mundo, 27 July 2001). Initially, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister confirmed that he would not be taking part in the proposed talks. In a BBC radio interview on the day of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Caruana made it clear that representatives from Gibraltar would not participate in any talks that involved the question of sovereignty. ‘We are not participating in them as indeed we haven’t participated in the last 14 years in these talks. There has to be dialogue to enhance cooperation, to improve relations, rather than dialogue to dispose of our sovereignty’, he said (Agence France Presse, 26 July 2001). However, after the meeting his position was interpreted differently by Spanish journalists in Almería, who reported that he was ‘ready to participate in the talks agreed between Britain and Spain concerning the conflict over Gibraltar, including sovereignty, “provided that the will of the people of Gibraltar is taken into account” ’ (Efe, 26 July 2001).9 From remarks made later in the day it would appear that there had been no suggestion from the British Government of any change in its position on the issue of sovereignty, especially given the fact that Caruana was reported to be quite satisfied with the outcome of the talks following a telephone conversation with Jack Straw (El País, 27 July 2001). Because Straw had told Piqué that the Matutes proposals were ‘not, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, an acceptable basis for discussion, since Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar is envisaged in them as a predetermined outcome’ (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 27 July 2001), Caruana assumed that the question of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar would not be the focus of the discussions. He therefore indicated his readiness to participate in the talks, because he envisaged that Britain and Spain ‘will instead seek other formulas and other models for possible solutions’ (idem). However, his participation would be subject to two conditions: that Gibraltar would be present as a separate party on all issues,10 and that nothing affecting the Gibraltarians would be agreed without the consent of the Gibraltarian people and its government. Piqué confirmed that the Matutes proposals were ‘just another working document’, and that he and Straw had both undertaken ‘to work with an open mind’ (El País, 27 July 2001). Piqué must have had some inkling that an open mind involved a change in the British stance on the question of sovereignty, but Caruana, along with everyone else, was at this stage still in the dark as to the form that any such change might take. Matters moved on when Peter Hain, the British Foreign Office Minister with responsibility for Europe, including Gibraltar, made a nine-hour visit

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to the Rock on 6 September in anticipation of the autumn meeting agreed in July. He would have found of interest a poll published by Panorama on 4 September, only two days before his arrival, indicating that 97 per cent of those questioned felt that Gibraltar should remain Gibraltarian/British. The brevity of his visit in itself aroused suspicions, and political sources were quoted as saying that ‘fear is mounting in Gibraltarian circles that the Minister is just going through the motions of “consulting” Gibraltar’s leaders to later justify a hidden agenda that “smells of some kind of sell-out” ’ (Panorama, 5 September 2001). Those suspicions appeared to be justified when Hain spoke to journalists after his meetings and talked not just of ‘working towards the normalisation of relations for the people of Gibraltar with Spain and the EU’ (Agence France Presse, 6 September 2001), but also reminded them that the Matutes proposals on shared sovereignty had not been rejected but merely ‘set aside’ (Panorama, 6 September 2001). However, Caruana, who also spoke to the journalists, said that Britain had restated her constitutional commitments to Gibraltar, and he believed that it would not renege on its assurances on sovereignty (idem). The annual Gibraltar’s Day celebrations on 10 September, with everywhere decked out in red and white, provided the opportunity for the Chief Minister to tell a rally of over 10,000 Gibraltarians – and also the British and Spanish foreign ministries – that there would be no compromise over Gibraltar’s right to self-determination: ‘Nothing which is of any value to us as a community are we willing to put on any discussion table, let alone on any negotiating table’ (Panorama, 11 September 2001).11 The British Government was, however, now set on a course that would take it further in the direction of meeting Spanish demands than any of its predecessors had been prepared to do in the past three centuries. In an interview with Peter Hain published in the Gibraltar Chronicle on 17 September, it was made clear that the two foreign ministries had set themselves the ambitious objective of resolving the Gibraltar issue over a 15-month timeframe – in other words, by the end of 2002. Hain bluntly (if somewhat opaquely) warned the Gibraltarians that ‘if people want to get stuck in the past, the future will leave them behind’ (El País, 17 September 2001), and made it plain that ‘the status quo is not sustainable’ (The Times, 17 September 2001). Although he reiterated the British Government’s commitment to seek the consent of the people of Gibraltar on any agreement that might be reached, the tone was one that suggested that the British Government was impatient and wanted the Gibraltarians to recognize that they had no alternative but to comply. Josep Piqué was enthusiastic about the fact that the British Government ‘was prepared to negotiate seriously’ (El Mundo, 18 September 2001), but made it clear that the Spanish Government ‘would never give way to Gibraltarian demands for the right to self-determination, nor renounce its full claim to sovereignty of the territory’ (El Mundo, 19 September 2001).

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This rather contradicted Hain’s non-specific claim that he had ‘detected a change of attitude in Madrid’ (The Times, 17 September 2001), and although Piqué claimed that his Government would be flexible in the negotiating process, it was evident from the outset that there would be very clear-cut limitations to such flexibility. Spain’s limitations were matched by Peter Caruana when he broke his silence on the proposals: ‘Our response to that is that our right to self-determination is permanent and irrenounceable. We will not surrender or compromise it and we will not yield on sovereignty’ (Press Association, 20 September 2001). Such a marking out of initial positions was entirely predictable, but gave a clear indication of how difficult it was going to be to find any common ground on the matter of sovereignty. Caruana’s response was combined with an angry condemnation of the British Government’s decision, communicated to him that same day, to exclude Gibraltar from the ‘Single Sky’ agreement rather than stand up to Spain on the issue.12 There was general condemnation by Gibraltarians of the fact that Gibraltar would, to all intents and purposes, not be viewed as a part of the EU on this issue. There had been hopes in the summer that an agreement on ‘Single Sky’ would already have been reached, but as that had not happened, the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September inevitably brought pressure to bear on enabling the implementation of that directive as soon as possible as a contribution to the improvement of security in the air in Europe. There were, however, predictable suggestions from Spain that the exclusion of Gibraltar was more to do with British pressure on Gibraltar to agree to share power with Spain over the airport and Hain’s assertion that the situation of Gibraltar was unsustainable.13 Some Gibraltarians, ever sensitive to matters to do with sovereignty, saw in their exclusion from the ‘Single Sky’ agreement a concession by Britain to Spain over the sovereignty of the airspace over Gibraltar. ‘This leaves in tatters’, they argued, ‘Mr Hain’s assertion that Britain would never contemplate giving in to the Spanish sovereignty demands, given that so far as it concerns our national airspace the British Government has already given in’ (Panorama, 3 October 2001).14 The exclusion provided Gibraltarians across the political spectrum with the opportunity not only to publicize their combined case for the defence of their sovereignty, the right to self-determination and the protection of their EU rights, but also to counter the remarks made by Peter Hain on his visit. On 4 October, in an unprecedented step, all current and many former members of the House of Assembly signed a Declaration of Unity prior to a demonstration through the streets by an estimated 10,000 people, which had been organized by the Self-Determination for Gibraltar Group (SDGG) and Voice of Gibraltar Group (VOGG) and which was addressed by their leaders. The Declaration contained three propositions: the people of Gibraltar

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will never compromise or give up our inalienable right to self determination; will never compromise or give up our sovereignty neither for good relations nor for economic benefit; will not compromise our right to self determination, still less sovereignty, in exchange for the respect for rights which are ours anyway. (idem)

A copy was accepted by the Governor for transmission to the FCO in London. He had earlier issued a statement acknowledging the depth of feeling in Gibraltar on the ‘Single Sky’ issue and, in comments to journalists, argued that problems like Gibraltar’s exclusion ‘would not recur if the Spanish Government would allow its broader interest for progress in Europe to be given precedence over its narrow interest in Gibraltar’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 5 October 2001).15 In anticipation of the forthcoming discussions between Britain and Spain, Peter Caruana remarked to journalists that if the solution to the dispute over Gibraltar involved any concessions over sovereignty, ‘then a solution will not be possible in fifteen months or even fifteen years’ (Efe, 4 October 2001). Caruana had a brief meeting with Jack Straw in London on 9 October. The British Foreign Secretary was proposing to go to Gibraltar in the near future, but following the visit of Peter Hain the Chief Minister told him that there was little point in him going to Gibraltar unless the Gibraltar Government’s conditions for talks with Spain were accepted. The meeting in London took place only because Caruana was en route to New York for his annual address to the UN Fourth (Special Political and Decolonization) Committee. There, having berated the UN for ignoring the arguments that he and his predecessors had put for the previous ten years, he urged the Committee to take the view that there is no basis in the UN Charter or in international jurisprudence for believing that ‘the mere existence of a territorial sovereignty dispute is sufficient to displace and override the right to self determination of a colonial people’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 11 October 2001). For that reason, he claimed that the annual consensus resolution calling on the UK and Spain to resolve their differences over Gibraltar is ‘fundamentally flawed’, because it is ‘the language of territorial disputes; it is not the language of decolonization and selfdetermination’ (idem). Caruana revealed that he had an ally in this regard within the UN itself. He referred to a paper written by the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Donigi, in which he had proposed that a referendum should be held in Gibraltar on the question: ‘Should Gibraltar remain a selfgoverning territory of the United Kingdom?’. If Gibraltarians voted so to remain, Donigi argued that Gibraltar should no longer remain on the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. If Spain wished to pursue its sovereignty claim, he said, it could do so via another organ of the UN, but not

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the Decolonization Committee, since it was not part of its remit to deal with competing sovereignty claims (idem). This view undermined the position that the Committee had been taking in passing the issue to Britain and Spain to resolve, but the UN could only suggest this to Britain as a course of action, and having committed itself to the re-launch of the Brussels Process it was highly unlikely that at this juncture Britain would have anything to do with it. Joe Bossano, who always accompanied Caruana on his visits to the UN and made his own hard-hitting contribution, was particularly scathing about Peter Hain, accusing him of ‘hypocrisy and misrepresentation’ (idem). He agreed with the Minister of State’s words that the status quo is not sustainable, and called for a new constitution with Britain, ‘which will decolonize Gibraltar and remove us from your (the Fourth Committee’s) agenda’ (idem). The issue of money-laundering in Gibraltar, which had been lying dormant since 1999, reappeared in the wake of the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the financing of terrorist organizations. A report written for a French Parliamentary committee criticized not only the City of London for its ‘permeability’ but also Britain in general for its offshore financial centres (including Gibraltar), which it described as ‘veritable machines that launder criminal money’ (idem). In London the report was rejected as being wholly out of date, while the Gibraltarian Government claimed that it was based on a negative briefing received by the French delegation when it was in Madrid en route to Gibraltar in May 2000 to undertake the investigations on which the report was based (Gibraltar Chronicle, 13 October 2001). However, the general climate of hostility at this time towards tax havens and offshore banking and their possible association with the funding of international terrorist activities led to a motion overwhelmingly passed in the European Parliament in Strasbourg calling on the Council of Ministers and the Parliament ‘to abolish off-shore banking and tax havens in order to effectively counter money-laundering practices’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 18 October 2001). Whether there was a link between the French report and the resolution in Strasbourg is not clear. Prague was the scene of a defeat for Gibraltar on 11 October when the European Football Union (UEFA), meeting in the Czech city, rejected Gibraltar’s application for membership. The application under consideration had been submitted in 2000, but objections from Spain had led to several postponements on the decision as well as the commissioning of a report (which actually supported Gibraltar’s application) by UEFA’s Executive Committee. In order to avoid a confrontation with Spain (whose federation, the RFEF, had threatened to withdraw from European competitions if Gibraltar were allowed to become a member), UEFA decided to change its statutes and grant membership only to countries recognized as independent by the United Nations (although it decided

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not to tackle the issue of the separate memberships of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, nor to rescind the membership of the Faroe Islands, the Danish protectorate which had been a member of UEFA since 1988). It was clear that pressure from the Spanish Government via the RFEF was ultimately responsible for the decision taken by UEFA, for there had been no difficulty for Gibraltar in gaining international recognition by the organizations responsible for basketball, athletics, swimming, volleyball and boxing. The problem with football was that it is a sport with a very high international profile.16 There was a flurry of diplomatic activity and planning during October concerning the forthcoming Brussels Process negotiations, which involved the setting of dates for meetings at Prime Ministerial and Foreign Secretary levels, technical talks at coordinator level, a visit by the British Foreign Secretary to the Rock, and briefings of Opposition leaders in both London and Madrid. The strange thing was that it was only by reading the Spanish press that Gibraltarians came to learn what was going on. Inevitably they drew the conclusion that if they were being kept in the dark, and if Opposition leaders were being briefed (as happened at the time of the signing of the Anglo-Irish agreement on the future of Northern Ireland), it must be because Gibraltarians were not going to be best pleased with what was going to be proposed. Part of the preparatory process was what the Gibraltarian Opposition called a ‘softening-up exercise’, with the publication of articles by former British Ministers Tristan Garel-Jones (Gibraltar Chronicle, 16 October 2001) and Sir Geoffrey Howe (The Times, 24 October 2001) in which both urged Gibraltarians to change their current position.17 In preparation for the impending onslaught on what the Gibraltarians’ Chief Minister described as their ‘inalienable right to self determination’ (Panorama, 24 October 2001), Peter Caruana took the opportunity to argue his people’s case in a speech at the London School of Economics on 24 October – coincidentally, United Nations Day. Having described briefly the origin of the Gibraltarian people, the nature of Gibraltar’s constitution and its economy, he proceeded to dismiss the basis of Spain’s claims to sovereignty over the Rock, using the well-rehearsed arguments that he had honed on several occasions at the United Nations. However, he also criticized the British Government for swapping the principles that it had previously stood by when arguing in defence of Gibraltar at the UN in the 1960s in exchange for the political or diplomatic expediency that Spain’s change of status since that time appeared to require. The stumbling block, Caruana argued, was the Treaty of Utrecht, which both Spain and Britain saw as denying Gibraltar the option of decolonization, but neither country was prepared to let the International Court of Justice express a view on the effect of the Treaty on the rights of the Gibraltarians (idem). Caruana listed what he described as the political aggressiveness and doggedness with which Spain prosecuted her sovereignty claim to

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Gibraltar, but maintained that despite this Gibraltar was eager for dialogue with Spain on matters of good relations and mutual cooperation. However, he insisted – and this was his main message to London – that Gibraltar cannot ‘agree to our rights and aspirations as a people being ridden roughshod over, simply to alleviate what has clearly become an inconvenience to Anglo/Spanish relations and to fluidity of EU business’ (idem). To Madrid his message was that a solution to the future of Gibraltar can be found through dialogue, ‘but Spain would first have to moderate her aspirations and accept the principle of consent’ (by the Gibraltarian people for any change). Significantly, Caruana did not say that the Gibraltarian people would never consider a change of status, but rather that ‘the current generations of Gibraltarians would not consent to Spanish sovereignty’ (idem). He made it clear that present-day Gibraltarians wished to retain their ties with Britain but under a modern constitution that would give them a non-colonial status, and he concluded with the peroration: How can any modern, European, democratic politician assert that someone other than the people of Gibraltar should decide Gibraltar’s future? Such a position is democratically bankrupt and politically indefensible in today’s Europe. Yet that is what it means to assert that Gibraltar does not enjoy the right to self-determination. (idem) There will undoubtedly have been some officials from the FCO in the audience at the LSE, who would have been left in no doubt as to the difficulty of their Minister’s task in trying to wrest any agreement from the Gibraltarians for a change of sovereignty in Spain’s favour. The ‘secret’ objectives of the bilateral talks scheduled for 20 November – an attempt to reach an agreement on shared sovereignty or a gradual return of sovereignty to Spain – that had been suspected by Gibraltarians since July finally came out into the open in the British and Spanish press on 29 October. A report in the Guardian18 was picked up in Spain, but when the Spanish Prime Minister was challenged at a press conference to elaborate on the report, he declined to do so on the grounds that progress could best be made if the ‘very discreet talks’ that had been taking place for some time remained that way (Efe, 29 October 2001). He did, however, concede that the relaunch of the Brussels talks did contain ‘some important new elements’. Foreign Minister Piqué, at a press conference in Luxembourg, appeared to be singing from the same hymn sheet, but was also at pains to stress that it was Britain that had signalled the time-scale for the conclusion of negotiations by the end of 2002. However, there were three major stumbling blocks (or ‘red-line’ issues, as they came to be called) that would make it difficult, if not impossible, to meet such a time-scale. Two of these had already been flagged. The first

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was the fact that the British Government continued to make it clear that any agreement reached between Britain and Spain would be put to a referendum in Gibraltar, and that both countries would respect the results (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 30 October 2001, Col. 738) – so if the proposal were rejected by the Gibraltarians, Britain would be highly unlikely to ignore their collective views. Spain’s position, however, was that ‘the Gibraltarians cannot have the right of veto on matters discussed by two sovereign states’ (El País, 30 October 2001). The second issue (on which both sides had a ‘red-line’ position) was the fact that Britain would be looking for any agreement to be permanent, whereas shared sovereignty would be seen by Spain only as a step in the right direction; as Piqué indicated, Spain ‘will never be able to renounce its claim for the restoration of full sovereignty’ (Efe, 31 October 2001). The third ‘red-line’ issue was the as yet unstated fact that Britain was determined to retain control over the military facilities on the Rock. Between them, these three issues would guarantee that the road to an agreement would not be an easy one.

36 Piqué and Straw meet in Barcelona (November 2001)

In anticipation of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting scheduled for 20 November in Barcelona, the main protagonists made full use of the media to stake out their respective positions. Gibraltar’s Chief Minister reiterated his standpoint that he was willing to attend the talks but that he would definitely not do so unless by 10 November he were given the power of veto by Britain on any agreement that Britain and Spain might make (Panorama, 2 November 2001). He also made it clear in an official communiqué that ‘Gibraltarians would never renounce their right to selfdetermination’, and that ‘he would not accept the setting-up of any crossborder committees or bodies that would give Spain a role or a voice in Gibraltar’s affairs’ (Efe, 5 November 2001). For his part Piqué repeated his view that Gibraltar did not have the right to self-determination, and that ‘this is about talks between two sovereign states over a territory that, according to the UN, is liable to a process of decolonization’, although he did accept that in practice if it chose to do so Britain could oppose any agreement with Spain that was rejected by the Gibraltarians (El Mundo, 5 November 2001). In a debate on Gibraltar in the House of Commons on 7 November, Peter Hain tried to give reassurance regarding the Government’s position by making the pledge that ‘we will never ask any Gibraltarian to sacrifice his or her citizenship unless they freely choose to do so. Gibraltarians shall remain British citizens for as long as they want’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 7 November 2001, Col. 88WH). However, for the Gibraltarians that was not the issue; they were concerned about the political rights of the people and the sovereignty of the territory (Panorama, 7 November 2001). Hain gave no pledges about sovereignty, and repeated his statement of 17 September that ‘the status quo is not sustainable’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 7 November 2001, Col. 89WH). He reiterated his belief, also first stated in September, that ‘Madrid’s approach to Gibraltar is genuinely starting to change’ (idem, Col. 90WH), although his grounds for saying so remained unclear. He again expressed the British Government’s hope that Gibraltar’s Chief Minister would take part in the Barcelona meeting (idem, Col. 91WH), but there was clearly a strong difference of

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opinion between Hain and Caruana as to whether or not Britain had met Gibraltar’s terms for participation in the talks. In an exchange of statements Hain asserted that ‘all of the conditions are in place to allow him to [attend]’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 9 November 2001), while Caruana argued that the FCO had refused to give him an assurance that nothing will be agreed ‘above the Gibraltar Government’s head on any issue affecting Gibraltar’ (idem). Neither was there any concession to Gibraltar’s wish to participate in any talks as a separate voice rather than as part of the British delegation. The Chief Minister accused Hain of trying to pretend that Gibraltar’s conditions for attendance had been met when in fact they had not.1 While the rift between the FCO and the Gibraltar Government was growing wider by the day, the spokesman for the Spanish Government, Pío Cabanillas, felt confident enough to claim that bilateral relations between Spain and Britain were ‘probably the best they have been for a long time’ (Efe, 8 November 2001). Blair and Aznar confirmed this sentiment when they met in London on 9 November to discuss not only Gibraltar but also the ‘war on terrorism’ in Afghanistan, and progress on economic reform and liberalization in Europe during the forthcoming Spanish presidency of the EU. The British Prime Minister acknowledged that neither side would change its constitutional position on Gibraltar (a fact that would severely restrict the possibility of any agreement being reached), but he referred to the very different relationship between Britain and Spain in recent years and the fact that the process in which their differences could be resolved was one ‘in which two friends and partners are engaged’ (Press Association, 9 November 2001). With the British Government apparently determined to reach a definitive solution on the future of Gibraltar, the closeness of this relationship at both a personal and a governmental level was what most concerned the Gibraltarians. At the same time as the two Prime Ministers were treading carefully over the issue prior to the meeting of the two Foreign Affairs Ministers ten days later, Peter Hain and Peter Caruana were continuing their war of words over the air-waves and in the printed media. Hain repeated his assurances and urged Caruana to attend the talks, while in reply Caruana described as ‘democratically obscene’ Hain’s insistence that Britain and Spain were entitled to make decisions on Gibraltar’s future sovereignty, subject to the subsequent agreement of the Gibraltarians (The Times, 10 November 2001). Hain held out the prospect from the talks of ‘an enormous prize and opportunity’ for Gibraltar, as a result of which it could become the main financial centre for the region (Independent, 10 November 2001), whereas Caruana saw the whole process as an attempt by Britain ‘to buy off the Spanish blackmails and the Spanish vetoes of European business’ in exchange for Gibraltarian sovereignty (idem). In case Britain and Spain were in any way unclear about Gibraltar’s resolve to resist any change to the status quo, Peter Caruana made a

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statement on 12 November in a live broadcast to Gibraltarians in which he asserted that there was no prospect of the Gibraltar Government or its people accepting joint or shared sovereignty ‘or any arrangement that integrates us wholly or partly into the Spanish State or renders us subject to the Spanish Constitution’ (Panorama, 12 November 2001). Neither would they accept any involvement by Spain in the conduct of Gibraltar’s affairs via structures such as Anglo-Spanish committees, nor a Spanish military presence, and they were strongly opposed to the inclusion of Gibraltar in the EU Customs Union or a change of status within the EU. Given all that, and given Britain’s commitment to give the last word to the Gibraltarians on any agreement reached, it was not surprising that Caruana said he was unclear as to how Britain was expecting to resolve the issue. The fact was that it was not clear to anyone else either, including Peter Hain and his FCO officials. The Spanish Foreign Ministry must also have been wondering about the British Government’s game plan, especially after Caruana, in Madrid on 13 November for a Spanish TV programme appearance, took the opportunity to explain his views directly to Carlos Bastarreche, the Secretary General for Foreign Affairs at the Ministry.2 Both sides described the encounter, which took place at Caruana’s hotel and not at the Ministry, as ‘positive’ (Panorama, 14 November 2001), which in diplomatic parlance means that both sides gave a clear view of their respective (but different) positions. One apparent concession by Britain that did not go unnoticed in Gibraltar was the publication of the OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices report on 14 November following the lifting of the veto imposed by Spain in June 2000. This followed acceptance by Britain (published in a footnote to the report) of its responsibility for Gibraltar’s tax obligations, in contrast to the position that it had previously adopted (see Chapter 35). However, the chair of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, who refused to speculate on the reasons for the lifting of the veto at this juncture, confirmed that Gibraltar’s status within the OECD had not changed, and that it was still considered to be a jurisdiction in its own right (Gibraltar Chronicle, 15 November 2001). There were certainly those in Gibraltar who suspected that the British statement, the lifting of the veto and the forthcoming talks in Barcelona were not unconnected. Moreover, there was an awareness on all sides that as part of the ‘war on terrorism’ and the desire to expose the role of secret bank accounts and money-laundering3 in the financing of terrorist organizations, the OECD was now largely concerned with transparency and the exchange of information.4 In the run-up to the Barcelona talks, there was inevitable press speculation regarding the likely outcomes. It was suspected that there would be no substantial progress without the participation of Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, but there were expectations of ‘sweetener’ agreements on practical issues such as an increase in the number of telephone lines for the Rock and free treatment for Gibraltarians in Spanish hospitals, as well as

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possibly the implementation of the 1987 airport agreement (El País, 17 November 2001). There was also speculation about the reasons for the British Government’s unprecedented decision to try to reach a solution on the sovereignty issue within a specified time-scale. It was broadly agreed that these reasons combined the good personal relations between the two Prime Ministers; a desire to remove once and for all what was seen as a longstanding, anachronistic bone of contention between their two nations and thereby reinforce the growing Anglo-Spanish entente cordiale as a counterweight to the Franco-German axis within the EU; and a determination to remove a cause of irritation among the other EU members whenever the Gibraltar dispute disrupted the application of EU directives.5 There were also warnings to Gibraltar, based upon quotations from unidentified Spanish Government sources, that sooner or later Gibraltar would have to accept whatever Britain and Spain decided regarding the future of the territory. As one senior government official in Madrid put it: ‘Caruana does not seem to realise that the only architects who are going to build the house are Spain and Britain, and all that he’s going to be able to do is to express a view about the colour of the rooms’ (El Mundo, 18 November 2001). At a press conference given at a meeting in Brussels the day before the talks, Spain’s Foreign Minister commented that this was the first time in the history of the dispute that he could refer to the ‘clear political will by the British Government to make significant progress in resolving the Gibraltar situation’ (El País, 19 November 2001). However, he also stressed that the Barcelona meeting was just the start of a process that would last for months, and that expectations should not be set too high (idem). There was a demonstration by some 200 Gibraltarians and local sympathizers outside the Foreign Office in London on 17 November, and another of about 30 Gibraltarians in Barcelona on the day of the talks themselves, who bore placards saying ‘British Gibraltar. Not for Sale’ (Guardian, 21 November 2001).6 The British Conservatives made capital out of the situation, with their foreign affairs spokesman, Michael Ancram, accusing the Government of ‘a stitch-up’ in an interview for BBC TV (Guardian, 19 November 2001) prior to a visit to Gibraltar on the eve of the talks as a gesture of solidarity with the Gibraltarians. In a press conference held by Ancram and Caruana, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister made his position clear: ‘There is no question of any Spanish flag flying on any building in Gibraltar, not in twelve months, not in a lot longer than that, probably never’ (Efe, 19 November 2001). The long-awaited meeting on 20 November between Foreign Ministers to discuss the future of Gibraltar within the Brussels Process was undoubtedly an anticlimax for those expecting a clear roadmap towards a solution. As predicted, the meeting between Jack Straw and Josep Piqué came to no conclusions on Gibraltar’s future other than the setting of a target of the summer of 2002 – surprisingly several months earlier than the previous

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target – by which time, according to the joint statement issued after the meeting, they expected to have a comprehensive agreement covering ‘all outstanding issues, including those of cooperation and sovereignty’ (FCO 2001). This inevitably led to speculation that the basis of an agreement had already been reached behind the scenes. The statement made specific mention of progress on some practical matters, namely the increase in telephone numbers to 100,000 – rejected by Gibraltar in a press release as ‘not sufficient to eliminate Spain’s flagrant breach of EU competition rules in relation to Gibraltar’s telecommunications system’ (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 191/2001, 20 November 2001);7 greater access to healthcare facilities for Gibraltarians in Spain (which the Gibraltar Government welcomed but said was a matter for agreement between Gibraltar and the competent authority, namely the Andalusian Regional Government);8 plus further discussion of the pensions issue.9 The statement also repeated the desire on the part of the two Governments for Gibraltar’s Chief Minister to participate in future talks, but Caruana was quick to reiterate his willingness to do so only as a separate voice and with an assurance that no agreement would be made over the head of the Gibraltar Government (idem). In the joint press conference following the meeting, the question of Gibraltar’s contribution to any final agreement was raised. The difference between the statements of the two Foreign Ministers was significant. Straw repeated that any change in sovereignty would have to be confirmed in a referendum by the people of Gibraltar, and that if they rejected it Britain would continue to exercise sovereignty over the territory (Efe, 20 November 2001). Piqué, however, asserted that Spain would never accept a referendum as a right to self-determination by Gibraltar, and that Gibraltar did not have the right of veto on the negotiations. He also reaffirmed that Madrid would never renounce its claim to full sovereignty of Gibraltar (idem). Not surprisingly, one report described the meeting as ‘a dialogue of the deaf as far as each Government’s aspirations are concerned’ (El Mundo, 21 November 2001). These conflicting statements in themselves clearly indicated potential areas for disagreement that could impede any eventual settlement. However, the response of the Gibraltar Government to the joint statement and the joint press conference ensured that any such settlement would quickly run into the sand. In a press release, the Government said that in its view there is absolutely no prospect of the people of Gibraltar accepting any proposal that involves any transfer of sovereignty, joint sovereignty, shared responsibility for Gibraltar’s EU or NATO affairs, the establishment of cross-border bodies or committees that give Spain a role or say in our affairs, or any Spanish military presence in Gibraltar. (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 191/2001, 20 November 2001)

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The immediate reaction of the GSLP/Liberal opposition in Gibraltar was to call for a Gibraltar-organized referendum in order to derail the negotiating process, rather than wait for one to be organized by the UK following an Anglo-Spanish agreement. It was not long before the Gibraltar Government recognized the wisdom of this approach.10 In general the Spanish press welcomed the fact that the British Government seemed committed to finding a solution to the issue within a relatively short time-scale, although the commitment to a referendum in Gibraltar made them less optimistic. In Britain there was a mixed reaction to the prospect of an unprecedented attempt by a British Government to negotiate away its exclusive ownership of Gibraltar. The Rock had the support of the British Conservative Party (partly for reasons of making political capital; after all, the Brussels agreement always envisaged that discussions would be held on the future sovereignty of the territory), plus a significant number of Labour backbenchers, most members of the allparty Foreign Affairs Select Committee and a good proportion of ‘middleBritain’. However, parts of the British press were less than sympathetic. The Guardian argued that ‘for Britain to cling to the Rock against its own broader interests makes no sense at all. It is time to start letting go’ (20 November 2001). The Financial Times called the dispute ‘an absurd anachronism in a Europe of dissolving borders, shared sovereignty and common governmental institutions’ (20 November 2001), and called upon the Gibraltarians to compromise. The Evening Standard went even further and pulled no punches, describing Gibraltar as ‘a festering anachronism’, ‘a scruffy little outpost of Empire up to its neck in moneylaundering, smuggling and similar pursuits’ and a ‘pestiferous possession’ (21 November 2001).11 The notion that the British wanted to retain Gibraltar while Spaniards demanded its return was, on the basis of comments such as these, clearly over-simplistic. Thus far there had been no mention in any reference to the talks of the military facilities in Gibraltar. However, a number of British Members of Parliament began to put questions about the military facilities very shortly afterwards to relevant Ministers. A written Parliamentary question on 26 November asked ‘what joint exercises have been held between the UK and Spanish forces over the past five years [and] which have used facilities at Gibraltar?’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 26 November 2001, Col. 670W). The Defence Minister Adam Ingram provided a list of eight such exercises between September 1997 and September 2000, but added that ‘none have [sic] used facilities at Gibraltar’ (idem). This was despite the fact that, between November 1999 and November 2001, 40 non-UK NATO warships and 59 non-UK military aircraft had visited or operated from Gibraltar (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 27 November 2001, Col. 763W).12 However, the main subject of Parliamentary questions was that of sovereignty. When Jack Straw was questioned in the House of Commons a week

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after the Barcelona talks, the points raised from both government and opposition benches were all sympathetic to the position of the Gibraltarians – none more so than those made by Straw’s Conservative shadow minister, Michael Ancram. Straw predictably reminded Ancram that the Brussels agreement had been negotiated 17 years earlier by his party in government, and had committed Britain to discuss the issue of sovereignty. What Ancram succeeded in achieving, however, was an admission from the Foreign Secretary by omission. When Ancram asked ‘whether joint or shared sovereignty in any shape or form is on the agenda of the current talks with Spain’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 27 November 2001, Col. 823), Straw chose to respond on a different point. That was tantamount to saying that joint sovereignty was indeed on the agenda, and so it would prove to be. The cat was virtually out of the bag.13

37 Rumours of joint sovereignty proposals (November 2001–January 2002)

Gibraltar’s Chief Minister embarked on a round of media appearances and lobbying of politicians and journalists in London to seek wider support for Gibraltar’s position. In addition to seeking support for Gibraltar’s opposition to any Anglo-Spanish proposal, he also sought support for an alternative future for Gibraltar of its own choosing. In a speech at a Foreign Press Association dinner on 27 November 2001, he made it clear that Gibraltar was seeking a new relationship with Britain through what he called ‘modern decolonization’ (El Mundo, 28 November 2001). This involved remaining part of the United Kingdom and under British sovereignty, but becoming a self-governing Crown dependency such as the Isle of Man. It was highly unlikely that Spain would contemplate such a proposal – Gibraltar would argue that it was none of Spain’s business – but experience suggested that nothing could be achieved without Spain’s involvement. In any event, it was clear from the Chief Minister’s speech that this was the direction in which Gibraltar’s House of Assembly Committee on Constitutional Reform was heading. The most influential group that Peter Caruana lobbied on his London visit, however, was the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which invited him to appear before it as a witness. He reiterated some of the arguments that he had used with the UN Fourth (Special Political and Decolonization) Committee six weeks earlier (see Chapter 35) on the supremacy (in his view) of the right to self-determination over the Treaty of Utrecht, and his desire to see that tested at the International Court of Justice. He defended more than once his reasons for his non-participation in the Brussels Process talks, and vehemently regretted the Foreign Secretary’s remarks made in the House of Commons the day before which repeated what Caruana called Spain’s ‘politically motivated, slanderous slurs’ against Gibraltar over supposed financial and legal irregularities, both of which – as he pointed out – are constitutionally not the Chief Minister’s responsibility (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2001c: Examination of Witness, para. 13).1 Caruana expressed his concern to the Committee as to whether the Gibraltarians were guaranteed a referendum on all matters that may be agreed between London

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and Madrid, or only those that might involve a transfer of sovereignty, but excluding possible Spanish involvement in Gibraltar’s affairs. In a wideranging session, Caruana (who predictably received a sympathetic hearing from most members of the Committee) also vigorously expressed his views on a number of other issues, including the parallel between Gibraltar and the Spanish North African enclaves, the ‘Single Sky’ and aviation security agreements, and telecommunications. Later the same day, Peter Hain also came before the Committee and announced that the Government would introduce domestic legislation to enable the people of Gibraltar to participate in the elections to the European Parliament scheduled for June 2004.2 Through its Chair, Donald Anderson, the Committee welcomed that announcement (idem, para. 42), but clearly their real concern was to ask him about the negotiations over the future sovereignty of Gibraltar. What emerged from his answers were two explanations for the preparedness of the British Government to seek an imminent solution to the dispute. One of these has already been mentioned, namely pressure from the EU (specifically in this instance the European Council) (idem, para. 44). The second explanation was, however, made explicit for the first time: the success that the Government appeared to have had in the negotiations over the future of Northern Ireland (idem, para. 43). Inevitably this led one member of the Committee to wonder, if there were parallels with the situation in the island of Ireland, whether Madrid had indicated its willingness to renounce its claim for full sovereignty over Gibraltar ( just as Dublin had done with regard to Ulster), but the Minister was giving nothing away about the details of the negotiations. In addition, mention of the situation in Northern Ireland raised concerns amongst Gibraltarians about the possibility of power-sharing arrangements – concerns that had been articulated by the Chief Minister earlier in the day.3 Peter Hain also made it clear during his questioning that the integration of Gibraltar with Britain (in the manner of some of the former French colonies with France, or Ceuta and Melilla with Spain) was not an option. He gave two reasons: the first was to do with the reference in the Treaty of Utrecht to Spain having first option if there were to be a change of sovereignty (although integration would not evidently involve a change of sovereignty),4 while the second was the rather more enigmatic explanation that it is ‘not what modern Europe is about’ (idem, paras 80–1). The significant proportion of Gibraltarians who favoured integration with Britain as a solution to the dispute will not have been impressed or encouraged by his answers. Apart from the negative impact on Gibraltar’s economic situation, Britain’s view of integration was that it would sour Anglo-Spanish relations to such a degree that it was not prepared to pay that price. The Minister’s appearance before the Committee was a lengthy one, and most of the questioning made it clear (as earlier reports on Gibraltar

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had already done) that the Committee did not support the British Government’s approach to the Gibraltar question. However, it was not simply these factors that caused Hain to sound rather weary of the whole problem. ‘I do not need this’, he said at one point, but explained that it was the duty of the Government to try to resolve it. But then, revealingly, he admitted: ‘If we are unable to do it, at least we shall have tried’ (idem, para. 86). This statement made plain not only that the British Government accepted (even anticipated) that it might not be able to achieve any change from the status quo through the current negotiations, but also that in those circumstances it would at least be able to say to Madrid that the failure to reach an agreement was not the fault of the British Government. Provided that Spain’s demands were not unreasonable, this might then enable Britain and Spain to continue with their cooperation at EU level, to have no qualms about excluding Gibraltar from EU agreements (thereby relieving the pressure from other EU members for a rapid solution to the problem) and to lay the blame for the ongoing Gibraltar issue squarely at the door of the Gibraltarians themselves. The renewal of the Brussels Process had added urgency to the need for the Gibraltar House of Assembly Constitutional Committee (chaired by the Chief Minister) to conclude and publish its proposals. Gibraltarians believed that these proposals would be a matter for discussion between Britain and themselves, but Peter Hain wanted to make it clear to the Gibraltarian Committee that its proposals would be treated by the British Government as part of its overall concern to ‘achieve a more secure, stable and prosperous future for Gibraltar’ (in other words, within the Brussels Process), and in a letter dated 30 November he invited Caruana and the Committee to London to discuss the question of constitutional reform (Gibraltar Chronicle, 4 December 2001). In turn, Caruana invited Hain to give evidence to the Committee on constitutional reform, either in London or in Gibraltar, before 31 January 2002, and he took the opportunity to give the Committee’s view that ‘the reform of the Gibraltar Constitution is exclusively a matter between the UK and Gibraltar, and not a matter for discussion or negotiation with Spain or for inclusion in any proposed comprehensive Anglo-Spanish Agreement’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 5 December 2001). With both sides refusing to give way on their respective positions on constitutional reform, it quickly became clear that there would be no point in either invitation being taken up.5 The appearance of Peter Caruana and Peter Hain before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee created a flurry of further activity in Parliament. A number of MPs decided to pursue the cause of the Gibraltarians by asking no fewer than 27 written questions (answered by Hain on Jack Straw’s behalf) over the three-day period 10–12 December,6 although none of them produced any surprises. There was also a 90-minute debate in the House of Lords on 12 December (Hansard House of Lords Debates, 12 December 2001, Cols 1386–410), in which several members of the

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upper chamber (including the former Foreign Secretary, Lord Howe)7 expressed their support for what they referred to as ‘an Andorran solution’, although it was not clear whether they all had the same understanding of what that would mean.8 Another aspect of Caruana’s strategy was to explain his position and to seek support in those parts of Spain where there would be some sympathy for the concept of self-determination. Clearly this was the case in Catalonia, and his visit to Barcelona on 10 December (where he addressed a meeting of the discussion group, La Tribuna, and met representatives of all political parties except Aznar’s Partido Popular) gave him just such a platform, followed by expressions of understanding (Efe, 10 December 2001). There was a time when Caruana expressed concern about receiving overt support from regionalist groups and declined to invite them to speak at rallies on Gibraltar Day in order not to irritate Madrid, but clearly he was now prepared to try anything that would prevent Britain and Spain from interfering with Gibraltar’s sovereignty. In the run-up to the next meeting between the Foreign Ministers, Caruana held a second meeting (this time on the Costa del Sol) with Carlos Bastarreche, the Secretary General at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, on 5 January 2002 to discuss conditions for Caruana’s participation in the talks. Caruana could not resist making the claim that his meeting was ‘proof that the Madrid Government accepts the office of the Chief Minister of Gibraltar as the relevant person with whom to speak on matters affecting Gibraltar’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 10 January 2002), a claim that the Opposition parties (which were opposed to any dialogue with Spain) described as ‘exaggerated’ (idem). Two days later Caruana held similar talks in Gibraltar with Jack Straw’s political adviser, Sir Emyr Jones Parry.9 Neither diplomat made much headway, as they were still unable to satisfy Caruana’s conditions, but the fact that both sides were making such efforts was an indication of how anxious they were to secure Gibraltar’s participation in the talks and thereby tie Gibraltar into any agreement that might be reached. An article in El País on 11 January set the rumour mill running, amongst those opposed to any deal, that Britain and Spain were about to announce an agreement to share the sovereignty of Gibraltar. The frontpage article claimed that ‘Spanish and UK representatives at the negotiations on Gibraltar are studying an agreement that will enable the sovereignty of the Rock to be shared’ (El País, 11 January 2002). This, the article pointed out, was a first for both sides: Britain had never before been prepared to sign an agreement on joint sovereignty, while Spain – for the first time – ‘did not mount insuperable opposition to such a hypothesis’ (idem); in other words, Spain did not insist at this stage that this had to be seen as a first step towards full Spanish sovereignty. The key would be in the interpretation of the word ‘indefinitely’, which could be understood to mean either ‘for an indefinite (but limited) period’ or

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‘forever’. The leader writer of El País that day was convinced (or perhaps wanted to make sure that Britain understood) that for Spain it could not mean that sovereignty would be shared ‘forever’, since Spain was not about to renounce its historical claim to sovereignty over the territory, but exactly how the word ‘indefinitely’ should be interpreted could be left for later in the negotiations (idem). That interpretation was to prove to be a major stumbling block. The following day, the statement that ‘Britain plans to end Gibraltar’s 298-year-old colonial status by signing a historic agreement with Spain to share sovereignty’ was attributed to the Foreign Office (Daily Telegraph, 12 January 2002), and there were immediate calls for clarification from the FCO on whether such an agreement had been reached. A statement from a spokesman that ‘there is no hand-over agreed’ (Press Association, 12 January 2002) or that ‘these press stories are conjecture and speculation’ (Agence France Presse, 12 January 2002) did little to assuage concerns. According to British Government sources, the appearance of the speculation in the press was attributable to those who wished to scupper the next round of talks (Independent on Sunday, 13 January 2002). The Shadow Foreign Secretary, Michael Ancram, pressed Jack Straw in a private notice question on 14 January to make a statement in the House of Commons. Although initially Straw stated that ‘no agreement has been reached with the Spanish Government’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 14 January 2002, Col. 21), Ancram then asked him to tell the House ‘clearly and unequivocally whether he is discussing shared sovereignty with his Spanish counterpart, Mr Piqué, and whether such an arrangement would be time-limited, indefinite or with a built-in mechanism to transfer to full sovereignty in due course’ (idem). Just as he had done on 27 November 2001, the Foreign Secretary chose to respond to one of the many other questions posed by Ancram, and thereby confirm by omission. Straw defended himself from Conservative attacks over any discussion of Gibraltar’s sovereignty, of course, by pointing out that it was a Conservative Government that had committed Britain, as part of the Brussels Process agreement in 1984, to discuss issues of sovereignty. This put Ancram on the defensive, as he then had to admit that he was not arguing for the abandonment of that Process. After half-an-hour of mostly antagonistic questioning from both sides of the House, Straw had given nothing explicit away about the details of the current negotiations, but he did agree to go to Gibraltar ‘if it is appropriate’ (idem, Col. 29).10 Even though the British Government continued to be asked about its commitment to give the Gibraltarians the final say through a referendum on any agreement that might be reached with Spain (Straw repeated it eight times in the 30-minute debate in the House of Commons on 14 January), the Gibraltarians did not feel sufficiently protected by such a commitment. In an official communiqué issued on 11 January, Peter Caruana explained that it was one thing to consult the Gibraltarians in a

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referendum with proposals that, if rejected, would be the end of the matter, whereas ’done deals’ would remain in place as an agreement between the UK and Spain, even if they were not implemented. Any such agreement, even if it were rejected in a referendum, would ‘set and limit the parameters of what is possible for Gibraltar in the future, legitimise the Spanish sovereignty claim for all time in the eyes of the international community and will amount to a total betrayal of our right to selfdetermination’ (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 8/2002, 11 January 2002). Small wonder that many Gibraltarians were keen to prevent an agreement being reached between London and Madrid. As part of this strategy, the leader of the Opposition and former Chief Minister, Joe Bossano, held an hour-long meeting in London with Peter Hain on 16 January. Bossano came to the conclusion that the Foreign Office ‘knows all too well that any agreement will be rejected in the subsequent referendum’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 17 January 2002), and that the only reason why the British Government is holding the next round of talks is because it wishes to demonstrate to Brussels that it has ‘gone the extra mile to resolve the Gibraltar problem’ (idem).11 The strategy also involved the distribution in Gibraltar by the opposition of a leaflet calling for an immediate referendum to bring a halt to the Anglo-Spanish negotiations. Called ‘Time for Action’, the leaflet rejected point by point the supposed benefits of the agreement currently being negotiated: respect by Spain for their way of life and respect for their EU rights (both of which Gibraltarians claimed they were entitled to anyway), self-government (which, they argued, was a matter for agreement between Britain and Gibraltar), and sharing sovereignty with Spain (in which Gibraltarians were not interested) (Panorama, 18 January 2002). In the absence of any announcement of firm proposals, the rumour mill now began to produce more detail in relation to a possible agreement. The editor of the Gibraltar Chronicle, on the basis of apparently reliable sources, wrote that the negotiating officials were not turning to the Andorran model for shared sovereignty but rather devising a new one ‘under which Gibraltar would be a special EU member territory on an indefinite basis’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 19 January 2002).12 This would involve Gibraltar enjoying full EU rights and obligations, with full autonomy except in defence and foreign affairs, nominal integration into both Britain and Spain, and free choice regarding the retention of links, institutions and citizenship (idem). He also referred to details of the constitutional reforms being finalized in Gibraltar, which had been publicly aired by the Chief Minister in March 2001 (see Chapter 34), and suggested that the Anglo-Spanish negotiators, in anticipation of these reforms, were seeking to incorporate them into their own formula, but only in the context of an Anglo-Spanish agreement (idem). It also transpired that whilst rumours that former Northern Ireland Minister, Peter Mandelson, was to become the next Governor of Gibraltar (see, for example, Gibraltar

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Chronicle, 30 January 2002) were unfounded, nevertheless Mandelson was involved in discussions with leading Gibraltarians and it was suggested that he may have some role to play following a referendum (idem).13 Meanwhile, as had been the case since 1989, cross-border cooperation continued at a practical level when Caruana went to Los Barrios in the province of Cádiz on 22 January to sign a commercial agreement that established a joint body to develop cross-border trade and elaborate joint project proposals for EU funding. These were the kinds of joint activities that Gibraltarians found acceptable and to which no objections were raised. Caruana was due to meet Jack Straw and later Peter Hain in London on 25 January, prior to the next encounter between the two Foreign Ministers that was finally scheduled for 4 February. Coincidentally, Britain and Spain were engaged in one of their regular minor territorial squabbles at this time when a British naval vessel, the minesweeper Grimsby, was attempting to dispose of an unexploded Second World War bomb in territorial waters off Gibraltar and had to warn off the Spanish patrol boat Conejera after it entered the safety exclusion zone. According to several reports, the captain of the Conejera refused to remove his ship on the grounds that the British had no right to operate in what he claimed were Spanish waters.14 As one British official put it, ‘it wasn’t exactly the Armada’, and it may have had nothing to do with increasing pressure on the issue of the colony’s future (as one report claimed) (Daily Telegraph, 25 January 2002), but it did illustrate the ongoing tensions between the two sides and served to remind some Gibraltarians ‘that Spain has not changed one inch’ (Panorama, 25 January 2002). In London the Chief Minister reiterated his terms for participation in the February talks, and there was a suggestion in one report that Caruana might join them (The Times, 26 January 2002). Caruana admitted in a late phone call on 25 January that considerable progress had been made in persuading London to agree that Gibraltar could have its own, separate voice (Gibraltar Chronicle, 26 January 2002) and in an interview a week later stated that this is what he had been offered (El País, 3 February 2002). However, the other sine qua non was that there should be no ‘done deals’ that would be ‘left on the table’ – ‘hanging like a sword of Damocles’ (idem) was the Chief Minister’s more graphic description – if rejected in a referendum. Caruana said he was much more hopeful now than at any time in the previous six to twelve months (idem). However, when Gibraltarian officials met representatives at the FCO late on 25 January, they were told that Britain and Spain planned to sign a ‘statement of principles’ which would commit both sides to share sovereignty irrespective of whether Gibraltar ratified the agreement in a referendum (Sunday Telegraph, 27 January 2002). This was precisely the sort of ‘done deal’ that so concerned Caruana, who described such an agreement as ‘a complete betrayal’ and said that ‘to establish a commitment to diluting sovereignty

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that will override a referendum makes a farce of democracy’ (idem). Small wonder that British officials had been bending over backwards to find a way of satisfying Caruana’s first condition for participation in the talks (which they knew would be less difficult to ‘sell’ to Madrid), if they were planning to undo him over the second. The Chief Minister sought clarification from Jack Straw on the position regarding the second of his conditions. Although it was reported before the end of January that as he had received no response15 he would not attend the next round of talks in London (Gibraltar Chronicle, 30 January 2002), he kept open the possibility of doing so until the last minute before declaring that he would definitely not attend. With the imminent encounter between the two Foreign Ministers preceded by press reports on meetings and rumours on possible agreements, it is not surprising that there was a flurry of interest in Gibraltar among British Members of Parliament anxious to be seen to be playing a part. On 28 January several questions were put to Peter Hain on Gibraltar, while on 29 January the House magazine (a regular in-house Parliamentary journal) published a position statement on the Gibraltar issue from spokesmen for the three main political parties. These, predictably, had as their main thrust a call for improving relations between Britain and Spain by resolving the Gibraltar dispute (Hain), defending the interests of the Gibraltarians (Ancram), and promoting confidence-building measures (Heath, for the Liberal Democrats). The main pre-talks event in Parliament, however, was a threehour adjournment debate on Gibraltar called by the Government on 31 January. Opening the debate, Peter Hain maintained that the Government had four objectives for Gibraltar in negotiating with Spain: ‘safeguarding Gibraltar’s way of life; measures of practical cooperation underpinned by economic assistance to secure normalization of relations with Spain and the EU; extended self-government; and sovereignty’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 31 January 2002, Col. 137WH). The Government’s argument was the usual combination of carrot and stick: things can only get better for Gibraltar if the dispute is resolved, and in any case change for Gibraltar is inevitable because of initiatives regarding taxation from the OECD and the EU. However, there was also a stronger than usual case made regarding the importance of improving relations with Spain, both because it is an ally to Britain in the reform and the future direction of the EU, and because it is playing a greater role on the world stage. As the Minister for Europe put it, ‘[Gibraltar] will continue to matter to us, but so does our relationship with Spain’ (idem, Col. 136WH). Most of the arguments both for and against change had been heard before, but there were two new factors of interest. First, Hain clarified, albeit with some difficulty, that if Britain and Spain reached an agreement (and he admitted that there were still major issues to be resolved), there would be a ‘joint declaration of proposals’ (idem, Col. 140WH) – a term

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that was yet another indication that the talks were using the model of the 1993 Joint Declaration for Peace (known as the Downing Street Declaration) on Northern Ireland. Spain had agreed that these proposals could be put to the Gibraltarians, who could debate them (or not, as they chose) and then, outside the Brussels Process, the Gibraltar Government could negotiate with Britain and Spain on them before putting them to a referendum (but not if the Gibraltar Government did not support them). This was designed to deal with the ‘empty chair’ problem in the negotiations, but it was hardly likely to be attractive to the Gibraltarians, although it arguably did represent ‘fresh thinking’, as Hain claimed for it (idem). Second, Hain explained that the arrangements for Caruana’s participation in the talks which were agreed at the meeting on 25 January would involve him as ‘a full member of the composite British delegation, which would comprise distinct British and Government of Gibraltar parts led by the Foreign Secretary’, with the Chief Minister having ‘a full and separate voice on the British side of the table with no restriction on the issues on which he could speak’ (idem, Col. 178WH). This was the ‘two flags, three voices’ formula that Caruana had sought since 1996 and, together with an agreement that he could contribute to any aspect of the discussions, represented the ‘considerable progress’ to which Caruana referred following his meetings in London on the night of 25 January (Gibraltar Chronicle, 26 January 2002). However, whether or not the terms of the Chief Minister’s participation in the talks were now acceptable on a ‘flags and voices’ basis, there still remained the issue of ‘done deals’ and whether the British Government would give an assurance that any agreement reached between Britain and Spain would not remain on the table if the Gibraltarians rejected it in a referendum (Gibraltar Chronicle, 1 February 2002). Crucially, the Minister in the debate did not address that aspect of Caruana’s attendance. In his summing up, Peter Hain once again declined to comment on the question put to him during the debate as to whether an agreement to share sovereignty had been reached (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 31 January 2002, Col. 177–80WH). Although one speaker had suggested that ‘it would all end in tears’ because Spain had been given false hopes (idem, Col. 161WH), Hain expressed his confidence that the negotiation process would reach a successful outcome. ‘I predict that it will not end in tears’, he said, ‘but that things will move forward’ (idem, Col. 179WH). However, 1,000 miles away many Gibraltarians listened to the House of Commons debate, and afterwards, armed with Union Jacks and Gibraltar flags, several thousand of them took to the streets to demonstrate their opposition to any concessions on sovereignty.16 They were determined to ensure that Peter Hain would be proved wrong.

38 Gibraltarians plan their resistance (February 2002)

The third meeting between the Spanish and British Foreign Ministers in the recently renewed Brussels Process took place in London as scheduled on 4 February 2002. As expected it was held without the participation of Peter Caruana, since the assurance he sought regarding ‘done deals’ had not been forthcoming. As on so many previous occasions, the build-up – and the rumours that went with it – left many people with a sense of anticlimax when the joint communiqué was issued, followed by a press conference given by Straw and Piqué. The communiqué said nothing of substance that was not already known and, despite expectations, it made no mention of an agreement on joint or shared sovereignty, since evidently there were still significant differences between the two sides. One of these will undoubtedly have been the definition of sharing for an ‘indefinite’ period, since in the press conference Piqué repeated Spain’s determination ultimately to achieve full sovereignty (El Mundo, 5 February 2002). Despite that, it was by now clear to everyone that shared sovereignty was one of the goals towards which the negotiators were working, and Caruana had earlier indicated that he had been informed that this was the case by the principal FCO negotiator, James Bevin (El País, 3 February 2002). At the press conference, Jack Straw claimed ‘good progress’ but added: ‘We still have some way to go’ (El Mundo, 5 February 2002). Both Ministers underlined the complexity of the issues, although they repeated that the intention was still to produce an agreement by the summer. In an attempt to try to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Gibraltarians, Jack Straw gave an interview to the Gibraltar Chronicle, which was published on 5 February – the day after the talks had taken place in London. Two major points emerged: first, it seemed clear – if not explicitly so – that the Foreign Secretary recognized that Spain’s historical unwillingness to renounce its claim to full sovereignty could well be a stumbling block to reaching an agreement; second, he made it clear that there was no possibility of any bilateral discussions between the Gibraltar Government and the FCO over Gibraltar’s new constitutional proposals (despite the fact that no proposals had formally been submitted).1 This appeared to mark a

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change in the British Government’s position since December, when there had been correspondence with Peter Hain about a meeting to discuss constitutional change (see Chapter 37). Despite this, Straw came across as more sympathetic to the Gibraltarians’ situation than Peter Hain, who had long since established himself as the number-one hate figure in Gibraltar, but then Jack Straw was contemplating a visit to Gibraltar in the near future, and this interview was clearly one way of trying to prepare the ground. On the day of the London meeting the Gibraltarian opposition parties, headed by Joe Bossano, organized a demonstration near the bordercrossing with Spain (the location was chosen to indicate that, as far as Gibraltarians were concerned, their sovereign territory included the isthmus) in order to indicate that ‘this is where Spain ends and Gibraltar begins’ (Agence France Presse, 4 February 2002). Some of the several thousand demonstrators carried placards in English (‘Better dead than Spanish’, ‘Kill the deal’) as well as in Spanish (equivalent to ‘Gibraltar is not for sale’, ‘No to shared sovereignty’), and in one case in the local dialect, llanito – a mixture of the two languages – (‘Gibraltar es de los llanitos forever’) (El Mundo, 5 February 2002). In anticipation of a declaration being made in London (which was not in fact forthcoming), the organizers of the demonstration issued their own Gibraltar Declaration, which repeated the points made in their ‘Time for Action’ leaflet issues a few weeks earlier.2 There was also a small gathering of Gibraltarians outside the Foreign Office in London. The following day, as had been the case three weeks earlier, the British Foreign Secretary was required to make a statement in the House of Commons in answer to a private notice question. Several significant points emerged. First, it transpired that the Conservative Foreign Affairs spokesman, Michael Ancram, had written to Jack Straw on 18 January suggesting that neither the British nor the Spanish Governments should claim that any agreement had been reached in the negotiation process until after it had been approved in a referendum in Gibraltar. Ancram argued that anything less ‘would be a dishonourable betrayal’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 5 February 2002, Col. 737), but Straw’s response was that it would be far better instead for Gibraltar’s Chief Minister to be sitting alongside him in the negotiations.3 Straw was clearly not going to try to change the rules of the negotiation game at this stage and incur the wrath of his Spanish counterpart. However, in a second significant point he may well have irritated the Spanish Foreign Minister by suggesting that, despite Piqué’s assertion that he did not accept Gibraltar’s right to selfdetermination, Spain’s agreement to accept the result of a referendum in Gibraltar is tantamount to doing so: ‘We can argue about whether that really is self-determination’, he said, ‘but in the context that I have described I think that it is’ (idem, Col. 739). Clearly Straw was taking the position that the guarantee of a referendum that offered a virtual veto on

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any Anglo-Spanish agreement was self-determination by any other name, whatever Spain might want to call it.4 Whether the Gibraltarians agreed with Straw’s definition of self-determination was, however, a different matter. The third point of significance to emerge was the confirmation that negotiations were inevitably destined to run into difficulties over Spain’s determination ultimately to recover full sovereignty over Gibraltar, since Straw made it clear that ceding the sovereignty of Gibraltar entirely to Spain ‘is not part of our agenda – not now, not for the future’ (idem, Col. 740). Given that it was highly unlikely that Spain would withdraw from its oft-repeated position on this point, this made it very improbable that Britain and Spain would get to the stage of reaching agreement on Gibraltar’s future. The Foreign Secretary also confirmed that if an agreement with Spain were reached in the negotiations, he would not take what he described as ‘the Enron approach to foreign affairs’ (idem, Col. 745) of tearing up what had been agreed.5 Therefore that agreement would remain ‘on the table’ if rejected by the Gibraltarians in a referendum, thereby confirming that the second of Caruana’s conditions for attending the talks had not been (and would not be) met. Finally, when Straw was asked why he had not considered allowing Gibraltarians the option of full integration into the United Kingdom, his response was: ‘That proposal has not been put before us, but if it happened, all Gibraltar’s economic and tax advantages would go’ (idem, Col. 748).6 It is noteworthy that, unlike Peter Hain in November 2001 (see Chapter 37), he did not say that such a proposal would contravene the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht (which it would not, as there would be no change of sovereignty), nor did he say that it would fall outside the terms of the Brussels Process (which it would, and the Spanish Government had already made clear a year earlier that it would strongly object to any change in Gibraltar’s constitutional relationship with Britain – see Chapter 34). However, no-one picked up on one weakness in Straw’s argument against integration, namely that he had been indicating that Gibraltar was due to lose its tax advantages anyway through changes in EU and OECD rules (although the extent to which this will be the case has yet to be seen). Peter Caruana continued with the programme of explaining his position and that of the people he represented to anyone of influence who would listen, especially if it brought some useful media coverage. So the day following the London meeting between Straw and Piqué, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister found himself in Strasbourg, having been invited by the MEP Lord Bethell, where he met the president of the European Parliament7 and addressed a group of MEPs on his view of the future of the Rock. In a subsequent press conference, he made it clear that there was no possibility either of Gibraltar agreeing to share sovereignty or of Spain being given a major role in its affairs (El País, 6 February 2002). He attributed accusations that Gibraltar is a centre for money-laundering and

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does not observe community norms in financial matters to the ‘systematic lies propagated by Madrid’ (idem), and vigorously refuted both charges. He announced the start of a political campaign in Europe and Britain, including a demonstration by the whole of the Gibraltarian population, in order to prevent what he called the ‘obscenity’ of an agreement from being reached (El Mundo, 6 February 2002). On his return to Gibraltar, which coincided with the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Queen Elizabeth II’s accession to the throne, Caruana took the opportunity to send a message on behalf of the people of Gibraltar which, as well as congratulating and thanking Her Majesty, pointedly expressed the hope that ‘Your Majesty will permit me also to express the desire of Her loyal subjects here that Her Sovereignty, and that of Her Successors, will prevail in this part of Her realm exclusively and indefinitely’ (Panorama, 7 February 2002). This was a highly unusual step, since protocol would normally expect a congratulatory message to be sent by the Governor rather than the Chief Minister. Nor, under normal circumstances, would the Chief Minister have appealed directly to the Monarch over the head of the British Government on the political future of the colony. By sending such a message, Caruana was also saying that he had no faith in Her Majesty’s Government to protect the best interests of the people of Gibraltar. Caruana had another platform closer to home when he addressed the Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce on 7 February. His message was a call for unity in the face of what he referred to as ‘the greatest challenge since the Great Siege [of 1779–83]’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 8 February 2002). He gave his audience details of Gibraltar’s economy to demonstrate that it is ‘safe, prosperous and secure’,8 arguing that the territory did not need a deal on sovereignty either to secure its standard of living9 or to oblige its finance centre to comply with the requirements of the OECD, which it was proposing to do anyway.10 He also rejected the proposal that Gibraltar should join the EU Customs Union, involving the introduction of VAT as well as the harmonization of excise duty, which would put it at a disadvantage because retailers in Gibraltar (unlike southern Spain) cannot buy in bulk. On the proposed ‘declaration of principles’ Caruana came up with the soundbite: ‘what is a historic milestone for them [the Spanish Government] will be a massive millstone for us’ (idem).11 In addition to speeches, there were other aspects to the campaign by the Gibraltar Government to gain support and raise awareness of the Rock’s situation. The Gibraltar Office in London had been given a budget of £1 million ($1.8 million) for this purpose,12 and one of the first items of expenditure was the funding of a four-day visit to Gibraltar by 11 MPs and a member of the House of Lords on a fact-finding mission in mid-February. Other plans in hand included repainting 25 London taxis in order to use them as vehicles for promoting Gibraltar. One MP sympathetic to Gibraltar’s cause had taken on the Director of the Gibraltar Office in London,

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Albert Poggio, as a researcher so that he could gain easy access to the House of Commons. This would have helped to explain why the all-party Gibraltar group, which supports Gibraltar’s cause, now had 123 members (Guardian, 16 February 2002).13 On 17 February there occurred one of those events that in the past would have caused a major diplomatic incident, but which on this occasion seemed to have aroused amusement in Spain and embarrassment in Britain. Between 20 and 30 British Royal Marines, armed with assault rifles and light mortars and in full combat gear, accidentally invaded Spain on a training exercise from the helicopter-carrier HMS Ocean by landing their amphibious craft on the wrong side of the Spanish– Gibraltarian border. Nearby Spanish fishermen and a Spanish police patrol informed them that they were in Spain – on a beach next to the Playa de la Poniente (Western Beach) near La Línea – and the soldiers quickly departed (Europa Sur, 18 February 2002). The following day a Ministry of Defence spokesman, who said that ‘we are not trying to take Spain and have no plans to do so’ (Independent, 19 February 2002), apologized for the ‘regrettable’ error’ (Associated Press, 18 February 2002) that was blamed on either poor visibility or poor map-reading. Despite occurring at a time when sensitive sovereignty negotiations were in progress, the Spanish Foreign Ministry chose not to make anything of the incident at the time.14 It was, to say the least, ironical that it was the Marines who had made the mistake, for this is the regiment that bears the name of Gibraltar on its corps crest to reflect its part in the invasion of the Rock in 1704.15 Caruana took a clear and significant step away from his policy of trying to negotiate an acceptable arrangement for his participation in the Brussels Process talks when he made a statement at a press conference in Gibraltar on 21 February.16 He said that since he had failed to persuade the British Foreign Secretary to provide the assurances that he sought (of ‘no declaration of principles left on the table after rejection in a referendum’), he would no longer attempt to do so and that this ‘condemns the Gibraltar government to not participating in the dialogue’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 22 February 2002). Caruana’s statement revealed that he had finally received a reply from Jack Straw regarding the assurances he had sought, and in it the Foreign Secretary had stated that ‘he will enter into a joint UK/Spanish declaration which will establish a framework for what he thinks will be a durable solution. He confirms that this Anglo-Spanish declaration would survive the referendum as a statement of the British Government’s view of “the best way forward” ’ (idem). Consequently, Caruana described the empty chair that he was constantly being invited to fill at the Brussels Process talks as ‘booby-trapped’ (idem). The Opposition parties, which were opposed to participation in the Brussels Process, welcomed the Chief Minister’s decision17 and called upon the Gibraltar Government to unite with them in a campaign to derail the Anglo-Spanish

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talks (Panorama, 22 February 2002). Caruana confirmed that ‘we will therefore now step up our campaign against the intended ‘done deal’ between the UK and Spain on applicable principles and in principle, sovereignty concessions without the consent of the people of Gibraltar’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 22 February 2002).18 As part of the campaign a mass demonstration was quickly organized by the Council of Representative Bodies (Panorama, 26 February 2002), an umbrella organization that had earlier been established to bring together all groups in the territory that were active in defending Gibraltar’s interests. The long-awaited announcement of the endorsement by the Gibraltar House of Assembly of the recommendations from the Constitutional Committee was made on 27 February. The main changes proposed in the 69-page report included the appointment of the Governor (re-titled ‘Lieutenant Governor’) to be subject to consultation with the Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, the curtailment of the Lieutenant Governor’s special legislative powers and the removal of the requirement for the Lieutenant Governor’s recommendation on taxation and the appropriation of funds. The Lieutenant Governor’s powers would be clearly defined, with all other powers, apart from external affairs and defence being vested in the Gibraltar Government, and in the case of external affairs there would be consultation with the Chief Minister. The proposals also included the re-designation of the ‘Assembly’ as the ‘Parliament’ with a minimum of 17 members, and the removal of the appointment by Britain of both the Attorney General and the Financial and Development Secretary (Gibraltar Chronicle, 28 February 2002). Gibraltar’s new Constitution would be put to the Gibraltar people in a referendum, described as ‘an act of self-determination’, in order to facilitate ‘the process of Gibraltar’s proper delisting from the UN’s list of non-selfgoverning territories’ (Panorama, 27 February 2002). There would be no transfer of sovereignty, with the Crown retaining executive authority over the territory, but nor would there any longer be a colonial relationship with Britain. Gibraltar would become ‘part of Her Majesty’s Dominions, known as the City of Gibraltar’ (idem). Some six years after Peter Caruana had first raised the idea, and more than two years after the Constitutional Committee of the House of Assembly had begun its deliberations, the proposed Constitution emerged with the unanimous endorsement of Gibraltar’s elected representatives. The proposal was in keeping both with the United Nations’ support for decolonization and with the idea of a modern relationship between a former colonial power and a former colony that was not seeking independence. It was based upon the concept of self-determination together with adequate protection for a territory of limited resources in relation to foreign affairs and defence matters. The problem was that it was entirely at odds with the direction that the Anglo-Spanish negotiations had been taking ever since the British Government had agreed to renew the Brussels Process.

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Whatever the FCO might have thought of the proposed Constitution, the only way in which it was likely to be given serious consideration in the current circumstances would be in so far as any of the proposals could be incorporated into the agreement that London was still trying to forge with Madrid.19

39 Gibraltarians take to the streets (March–April 2002)

With the Government and Opposition in Gibraltar having established common ground in their position towards participation in the Brussels Process talks, all groups now combined in their efforts to undermine the Anglo-Spanish negotiations. The first manifestation of this was the careful planning of the demonstration by the whole population of the Rock organized for 18 March. The call went out to all employers to allow as many employees as possible to attend (Panorama, 6 March 2002). However, the Ministry of Defence, having declined to give permission for the Naval Ground to be used as the starting point for the rally as ‘it was inappropriate due to the political nature of the demonstration’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 9 March 2002), then refused to allow its employees to take time off work in order to participate. Free transport was laid on, enabling the organizers to decline the MoD’s offer of the Naval Ground as a car park in a ‘thanks-but-no-thanks’ gesture, while some 8,000 free Union Jacks and Gibraltar flags were made available in the days beforehand. On 17 March, the day before the rally was scheduled, Gibraltar’s political leaders were handed a useful weapon in their campaign when a statement issued following the Council of Europe meeting in Barcelona under Spain’s six-month presidency included a paragraph supporting British and Spanish efforts to reach a comprehensive agreement over Gibraltar.1 The statement gave the distinct impression that Spain was using its tenure of that office (but with British support) to ensure endorsement by the EU of any AngloSpanish agreement that might be reached by the summer,2 thereby leaving Gibraltarians even more broadly isolated if they rejected an agreement in a referendum. Reports in the Spanish press referred to an agreement reached by EU leaders in private talks on a development package (the figure of 50 million euro or $60 million was mentioned) for Gibraltar and the Campo region if Gibraltar supported whatever Britain and Spain proposed. In a radio interview on 17 March, Peter Hain suggested that such a package invested in Gibraltar’s port, airport and other transport links could, in conjunction with Algeciras on the Spanish side, make the Rock ‘the biggest and most effective harbour in southern Europe’, bringing significant economic benefits (The Times, 18 March 2002).3

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The political representatives of the Campo region, such as the President of the Partido Popular in the Campo and the Mayor of La Línea, were naturally very interested in the funds that would come their way under this arrangement (see Efe, 19 March 2002). This would be the first instance of EU funds being used jointly for the Campo region and for Gibraltar,4 and it suggested quite clearly that a joint sovereignty proposal was on the cards in the negotiations (El País, 20 March 2002). Following the Barcelona statement, no time was wasted in bringing together Commission experts on structural funds and officials from London and Madrid to consider how a package might be developed, and they held their first meeting on 21 March in Brussels. Possible projects were not discussed at that meeting, but suggestions by observers included infrastructure, maritime links between the ports of Gibraltar and Algeciras, tourism, support for SMEs and a waste treatment plant in the Campo for the benefit of the Rock (El País, 21 March 2002). The figures now being mentioned were between 50 million and 60 million euro ($60 million to $72 million) and the intention was to have a plan in place by 2003, subject, of course, to an AngloSpanish agreement on the future of the Rock (Efe, 21 March 2002; El País, 22 March 2002).5 In Gibraltar the whole Barcelona exercise was interpreted as an attempt to bribe the Gibraltarian people, and was roundly condemned.6 The Chief Minister issued a statement protesting that ‘Gibraltar’s sovereignty – and our rights and wishes as a people – is not for sale’ (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 46/2002, 18 March 2002). He regretted ‘the EU Council’s failure to refer to the wishes of the people of Gibraltar’, which, he said, ‘is not compatible with the EU’s own inclination to preach adherence to democratic principles outside the EU’, and concluded: ‘The EU Council statement . . . makes it all the more important that we should have a massive turnout at Monday’s demonstration’ (idem). Caruana ‘s call certainly did not go unanswered. With all normal activities suspended from one o’clock in the afternoon on 18 March, almost the entire population (some 25,000 according to police estimates) turned out to march in what the Gibraltar Chronicle (19 March 2002) described as ‘a referendum on foot’. In addition to the flags, which were either carried or draped from buildings along the route, there were placards saying ‘Shame on the British Government’ and ‘I was born British and I want to die British’. Both Prime Ministers were addressed by placards, too: ‘Blair, stuff your bribe. Gibraltar is not for sale’, said one, while the one for Aznar read: ‘No way, José’. The banner at the head of the march could scarcely be described as pithy, but contained the essence of the Chief Minister’s position: ‘No to in-principle concessions against our wishes. Yes to reasonable dialogue’ (Panorama, 18 March 2002, El Mundo, 19 March 2002). At a press conference just before the demonstration, Caruana indicated that he hoped that it would achieve ‘the political objective of getting

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London and Madrid to realize once and for all that the bilateralism that they used as a mechanism to advance the talks about sovereignty was a piece of democratic stupidity without the slightest chance of success’ (Efe, 18 March 2002). He also gave the first indication that he was thinking of calling Gibraltar’s own referendum on any in-principle agreement that Britain and Spain might reach (idem). At the end of the march, Caruana declared to general acclaim: ‘Today we have spoken with one voice. Our rights, our wishes, our aspirations as a people are not for bilateral negotiation between Britain and Spain. Gibraltar is ours. It is neither Britain’s to give away nor Spain’s to claim’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 19 March 2002). The Chief Minister read out a declaration: We the people of Gibraltar here gathered declare as follows: 1

2

3

The future of Gibraltar, both in practice and in principle, including our sovereignty, can only be decided by the people of Gibraltar in exercise of our right to self-determination. We reject and condemn, as a betrayal of our rights and wishes as a people, any Anglo-Spanish declaration or agreement of principles which makes in-principle sovereignty or other concessions to Spain against our wishes. We therefore call on the British Government not to enter into any such agreements and we say: YES to reasonable dialogue.7 YES to good, neighbourly European relations with Spain based on reasonable dialogue and mutual respect, and NO to in-principle sovereignty or other concessions to Spain against our wishes. (idem)

The Chief Minister will hardly have expected that such a declaration in itself would bring an immediate halt to the talks between London and Madrid, but will have been aware of the benefits of the international publicity that the mass demonstration will have brought in support of the Gibraltarians’ position. Buoyed by the turn-out on the Rock, plus a MORI poll which showed that 79 per cent of the British population supported the view that the Gibraltarians should be allowed to determine their own future (The Times, 19 March 2002), on the following day Caruana went to speak to the Welsh Assembly in Cardiff as part of his campaign to seek support in Britain. He chose the example of the Falklands/Malvinas in support of his case, calling for Britain to defend the sovereignty of Gibraltar with ‘the equivalent political and democratic force’ as it had demonstrated 20 years earlier in the South Atlantic (Gibraltar Chronicle, 20 March 2002).8 He referred to the conventional wisdom that the real reason for Britain’s willingness to do a deal with Spain over Gibraltar was the desire to ensure a successful alternative axis within the EU to the Franco-German one, but he added: ‘Spain

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needs the axis as much as Britain, so why is Britain the only one paying the price?’ (idem). Otherwise, the arguments were by now well rehearsed. Gibraltarians had frequently argued that what they were really looking for from Spain were practical measures that would improve communications. Such a measure was, to their surprise, taken on 21 March following an announcement from the Spanish Foreign Ministry that for the first time a second car channel for traffic entering Spain would be opened at the land border on the Spanish side. What had prompted the decision was the announcement by the European Commission that it had completed its investigation, begun in November 2000 (see Chapter 33), into complaints of excessive delays at the border, and that it could find no proof that legally supported claims that the border checks had been disproportionate or incompatible with community law (European Commission 2002; see also El Mundo, 19 March 2002). In what Peter Caruana described as ‘careful choreography’ between the two events, the Spanish authorities took the opportunity to respond to the request from the British Government to improve communications by opening the second channel, although one report stated that ‘official Commission sources indicated that their announcement is a further “political gesture” to avoid any difficulties in the negotiations over Gibraltar’ (El País, 20 March 2002). The first response by a member of the British Government to the mass demonstration came from Peter Hain on 19 March, when he met representatives of the Gibraltar Trades Union Council in London. He indicated how impressed he had been with the turn-out for the demonstration, but he might well have been somewhat concerned at what it implied for the possible success of a referendum. At any event, he seemed to be preparing the ground for the possibility that the Anglo-Spanish talks might not end in an agreement – which would, of course, obviate the need to seek the views of the Gibraltarians – for, according the GTUC President, the Minister indicated that ‘if Britain and Spain do reach an agreement, which at the moment is very difficult, Spain is going to have to compromise on some things’ (idem). However, at Prime Minister’s Questions on 20 March the Conservative leader, Iain Duncan Smith, claimed that the Government briefing of the previous day had indicated that ‘a deal on joint sovereignty had already been agreed’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 20 March 2002, Col. 300). Interestingly, Blair declined to answer the question as to whether any agreement would remain on the table (idem, Cols 300–1) – it was the issue that had prevented Caruana from attending the talks – although he did say (contrary to Peter Hain’s usual message regarding economic matters) that there would be no reprisals or penalties for the Gibraltarians if they rejected the proposals (idem, Col. 300). An unusual response to the demonstration also came from Spain in the form of an open letter from the Foreign Minister Josep Piqué published on 26 March in the Gibraltar Chronicle. Having seen the demonstration and the rejection by Gibraltarians of an Anglo-Spanish agreement that had not

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yet been put to them, Piqué appealed to them to ‘abandon their often irrational gut reactions’ about a Spain ‘which, fortunately, no longer exists’. He promised them that they had nothing to fear from modern, tolerant, diverse Spain with its respect for differences guaranteed by the Constitution, and urged their representatives to take part in the negotiations. He assured them that Spain was only interested in the sovereignty of the territory, not its people, but he will not have persuaded many Gibraltarians by talking of ‘Spain’s historic claim which, as you well know, is entirely justified’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 26 March 2002).9 In his response, published the following day, Peter Caruana said he ‘appreciated the moderate, even sensitive approach, language and tone of your letter’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 27 March 2002), but he reminded the Spanish Minister that although individuals may occasionally express visceral or irrational sentiments, ‘the overwhelming majority of Gibraltarians bear deeply and reasonably held grievances about the behaviour to which they have been historically subjected by Spain’ (idem). He explicitly rejected both Piqué’s remark about Spain’s territorial claim and the notion that sovereignty of the territory and the rights and wishes of the people can be separated. He urged Spain to agree to open-agenda talks instead of a process of dialogue ‘from which may emerge prejudicial agreements of principles above our heads, affecting Gibraltar and our political rights, that will survive our rejection in a referendum of proposals based on those principles’ (idem). Caruana expressed the hope that Piqué’s letter marked the start of a new era in which Gibraltar can have a ‘prosperous, secure and stable future even if we choose not to succumb to your country’s historical sovereignty claim’ (idem). However, the Chief Minister will certainly not have put any money on that being the case, and no doubt recognized that the letter was much more likely to be part of an attempt at a charm offensive in the run up to a declaration of principles by Britain and Spain. The President of the Self-Determination for Gibraltar Group (SDGG) described Piqué’s letter as being like ‘crude propaganda leaflet-dropping’ (Daily Telegraph, 27 March 2002). While the war of words (albeit now accompanied by blandishments) continued between Gibraltar on the one hand and London and Madrid on the other, the spirit of practical cooperation and good neighbourliness between the Gibraltarian and Campo region administrations was reestablished, following some mutual hatchet-burying between the Mayor of Algeciras, Patricio González, and Gibraltar’s Chief Minister after a good deal of hostility at the time of the Tireless episode two years earlier (see Chapter 33). On 4 April, González, accompanied by the Mayor of Los Barrios, Alonso Rojas, met Caruana in Gibraltar with a view to discussing future collaborative projects of an economic, cultural and sporting nature.10 Rojas remarked that it was important for the Government in Madrid to develop projects in the Campo, irrespective of any agreement about the future of the Rock (Efe, 4 April 2002), while Caruana reported

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that both Mayors had agreed that any EU aid should not be conditional on an Anglo-Spanish agreement (Panorama, 4 April 2002). Once more, it became clear that at local level the issue of the sovereignty of the Rock was of relatively little significance.11 Caruana continued with his campaign to seek the support of public opinion – and possibly to change the minds of the British Government – by giving a talk at the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House) in London on 10 April. The broad arguments were by now familiar – the new metaphor was to accuse Straw and Piqué of engaging in a ‘salami slicing job’ over the future sovereignty of the territory (Press Association, 10 April 2002) – but for the first time it became clear that the Ministry of Defence (as distinct from the Foreign Office) was now insisting that, whatever else might be conceded on the question of sovereignty, Britain should retain full sovereignty of the military base (Gibraltar Chronicle, 11 April 2002).12 The Chief Minister also gave some substance to the suggestion that there was a link between concessions on the sovereignty of Gibraltar and the desire by the British Government to establish a strong Anglo-Spanish axis within the EU, by quoting a discussion paper that had been considered by the FCO which proposed that an enduring alliance with Spain would require Britain to give up some policy positions, and that Gibraltar should be used as ‘a bargaining chip’ (idem). Finally, he also made the interesting revelation to reporters after the talk that the British Government had told him that he could be given details of the progress of the negotiations, subject to a confidentiality clause – an offer that he rejected: ‘Having the information and not being able to use it politically is worse than not having it’, he said (Efe, 10 April 2002).13 If Caruana had accepted the offer, he would already have picked up the fact that the differences between the two sides were taking longer to resolve than had been anticipated. After the meeting between the two Foreign Ministers at the beginning of February, the next meeting had originally been planned for early April; however, now it was announced that it would not take place until May. Piqué explained that the stumbling blocks were ‘complex matters regarding sovereignty, but also regarding cooperation and the expression of the views of the Gibraltarians’ (El País, 10 April 2002). Certainly one of the complexities regarding sovereignty was the fact, as the Spanish Prime Minister confirmed, that Spain eventually expected to secure full sovereignty, even if joint sovereignty was the current focus of the negotiations (Efe, 11 April 2002). It was also reported that even if a bipartite agreement were reached by the summer, officials in London and Madrid were suggesting that the holding of a referendum ‘could be put on ice until the political climate in Gibraltar changed’ (Financial Times, 11 April 2002) and ‘to avoid a domestic political storm’ in Britain (Gibraltar Chronicle, 16 April 2002). All in all a significant number of question marks remained, but it seemed increasingly unlikely that any major issues would be decided in the immediate future.14

40 Negotiations run into difficulties (April–May 2002)

It is not uncommon during a lengthy dispute between two parties that intemperate language begins to creep in as frustration mounts over the failure to make progress. That appeared to be what happened when Peter Hain described possible ‘discriminatory pension practices’ in Gibraltar as a ‘scam’ that might cost British taxpayers £77 million ($138.6 million) (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 16 April 2002, Col. 453). This prompted Peter Caruana to lodge a formal protest with the Prime Minister, claiming that Hain’s ‘disgraceful and outrageous’ remarks were ‘onesided, incomplete and self-serving’, in the sense that they were designed to reduce domestic support for the territory by making it sound ‘like a financial millstone around the UK taxpayer’s neck’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 18 April 2002). Caruana and others assumed that the mention of ‘pension practices’ referred to the fact that, at the insistence of the British Government, the pensions of Spaniards who formerly worked in Gibraltar had been frozen at 1987 levels, and he therefore argued that the Spanish pensioners (who had taken their complaint to the European Commission), were in dispute with Britain rather than with Gibraltar since the British Government had subsequently assumed responsibility for these pension payments.1 Hain issued a statement clarifying that the complaints of the Spanish pensioners referred to the Household Cost Allowance (HCA), which was paid to Gibraltarians from a Community Care Trust. If these payments were found to breach EU law, liability would fall on the Government of Gibraltar to make similar payments to non-Gibraltarians. ‘The issue is not about frozen pensions’, argued Hain (Panorama, 18 April 2002), but Caruana insisted that even if the HCA were abolished, Spanish pensioners would still be demanding the uprating of their pensions and that would be Britain’s responsibility (Gibraltar Chronicle, 20 April 2002). The Chief Minister was convinced that there was a link between the raising of this issue by the British Government and the sovereignty negotiations, suggesting that if Gibraltar accepted the Anglo-Spanish agreement, ‘the problem [of payments to pensioners] would disappear and someone would come forward to pay up’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 24 April 2002). It is likely that this

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particular war of words would have been more temperate, and may not have occurred at all, if British Ministers – Peter Hain in particular – had not felt quite so embattled in their endeavour to achieve their objectives over the future of the Rock in the near future.2 That sense of embattlement and frustration came from opposition to the Government’s plans both in Britain and Gibraltar, but also from the knowledge that Spain was as committed in the negotiations to adhere to its ‘red-line’ issues as Britain was to its own. The next meeting at Foreign Minister level was now scheduled for 13 May in Brussels (in fact it took place two days after that), and there was talk of an agreement – if achieved, a hugely significant step involving a declaration of principles that would, it was suggested, replace the Treaty of Utrecht3 and bring the Brussels Process to an end – being signed and published around 22 May (El País, 18 April 2002; Panorama, 19 April 2002). Ramón de Miguel and Peter Hain, the two Ministers charged with preparing the way for an agreement, met beforehand in Madrid on 18 April (Efe, 18 April 2002). No formal statement was made after their meeting, but they evidently came away from it convinced that they had made a breakthrough, although this only emerged several months later. According to a report in the Western Mail on 24 December 2002 and confirmed by an FCO source, Hain and de Miguel had reached an agreement (no details were given) which involved shared sovereignty, British control of the military base and a referendum in Gibraltar on the package. However, during Hain’s return from Madrid to London Jack Straw received a phone call from Josep Piqué informing him that the Spanish Prime Minister had intervened to block the agreement. In view of the known Spanish position on these ‘bottom-line’ issues, it is scarcely surprising that the agreement made at junior minister level was overruled. Under the circumstances, the two junior Ministers were obliged to recommend to their senior colleagues that a further discussion before their May meeting would be advisable. Hence the unscheduled private encounter between Straw and Piqué (plus their Ministers of State) on 23 April, while both were in Valencia for a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership conference (El Mundo, 24 April 2002). Since most bilateral meetings were flagged up in advance, even if only a matter of days beforehand, Michael Ancram tabled a series of Parliamentary questions demanding to know whether any notice had been given of the Valencia meeting, what had been discussed, what conclusions had been reached and whether any further ministerial-level meetings were planned (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 30 April 2002, Col. 650W). Jack Straw and Peter Hain must have come away from Valencia with the view that, at the least, there would be some slippage in their timetable for an agreement. Back in London an FCO spokesman was quoted as saying that the talks were making good progress, but it was not a ‘foregone conclusion’ that London and Madrid would be able to strike a deal by the

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summer (Press Association, 24 April 2002), while Peter Hain, in a written answer in the House of Commons, said that the British Government’s aim was to reach an agreement by the summer ‘if possible’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 24 April 2002, Col. 295W). Although Piqué claimed to be ‘very satisfied’ with the discussions in Valencia, his response to reporters – to call for ‘a little patience’ and to urge ‘let’s not rush things’ (Efe, 24 April 2002) – was his way of indicating the same reservations about the time-scale. Although all three of Britain’s ‘red-line’ issues (a permanent solution, a referendum, and retention of the military base)4 remained to be resolved, the principal area of difficulty appeared to be reconciling Britain’s insistence that any agreement must be permanent, with Spain’s claim to full sovereignty, which Spain would not renounce; its position on this was reconfirmed by the spokesman for the Spanish Government, Pío Cabanillas (Efe, 26 April 2002; El Mundo, 26 April 2002). There was a suggestion that a secret deal of ‘total shared sovereignty’ had been discussed in Valencia, whereby ‘everything would be as Spanish as it was British’, with no fixed date for the expiry of shared sovereignty but the option of full sovereignty for Spain in the future if London or Gibraltar should propose it – a ‘reversionary’ clause similar to that contained in the Treaty of Utrecht (El País, 24 April 2002; Guardian, 25 April 2002) – but neither side made any comment on that suggestion one way or the other.5 However, Peter Caruana was convinced that a basic agreement to share sovereignty had already been reached, and decided to respond at this point to the suggestion made two weeks earlier that following an agreement the referendum in Gibraltar might be postponed, by indicating that he and his Government would organize their own referendum (El País, 25 April 2002). That did not mean giving up on the campaign to win hearts and minds, and on 28 April the Chief Minister embarked on a speaking tour that took him to the UN in Geneva, the University of Oxford, and the Royal Commonwealth Society in London. In Geneva on 29 April he appealed to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to protect the rights of Gibraltarians in exercising self-determination. He argued that by entering into negotiations with Spain with a view to agreeing to share sovereignty against the wishes of the Gibraltarians, Britain’s latest position denies Gibraltar the right to self-determination leading to decolonization other than through the acceptance of what Britain and Spain propose. ‘This is unacceptable,’ he said (Panorama, 30 April 2002). With the schedule for reaching an agreement now clearly threatened, both Britain and Spain engaged in a flurry of arranging further meetings or uttering position statements. On 30 April, Jack Straw announced in a Parliamentary written answer that Hain and de Miguel would meet in London on 2 May within the framework of the Brussels Process (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 30 April 2002, Col. 650W).6 More significantly, the British Foreign Secretary said that he would visit Gibraltar on 3 May (idem). According to the FCO, the purpose of the visit was for Jack Straw

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to listen to the views of the Gibraltarians and to explain the British Government’s objectives. However, if he thought that he might be able to persuade the Gibraltarians that Spain was anxious to win their hearts and minds, his position was promptly undermined by the Spanish Prime Minister, who made it clear in an interview for the Guardian that not only would Spain ‘always aspire to having complete sovereignty over Gibraltar’ but that if Gibraltar rejected the imminent agreement (however that might be phrased as a declaration of principles), Spain ‘will continue with restrictions to [the use of] Gibraltar airport, to the development of Gibraltar and to relations between Britain and Spain’ (Guardian, 30 April 2002). As one British Government official commented, ‘it is stating the obvious to say that Spain claims sovereignty, but there is a thin line between stating the obvious and issuing threats’ (idem). Josep Piqué took a similar line to that taken by his Prime Minister when he gave a press conference on 30 April following his appearance before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. He would accept a ‘lasting’ agreement on shared sovereignty, he said, but not one that was ‘permanent’ – the term used by Peter Hain at a press conference for foreign correspondents on 25 April (Efe, 25 April 2002) – because Spain would never renounce its claim to full sovereignty (Efe, 30 April 2002).7 He indicated that he thought it possible to find a form of words to satisfy the British Government’s concerns about Gibraltar’s naval base, although his position was that ‘the base cannot be excluded from the scope of the application of the agreement’. He warned that bilateral relations would ‘seriously deteriorate’ if the negotiations were unsuccessful (idem). Clearly both Spain’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were singing from the same hymn sheet, as part of a coordinated message designed to try to keep the negotiation schedule on track. With an in-principle agreement due to be reached in a mere matter of weeks, Spain’s political leaders were determined to make clear what their ‘red-line’ issues were. It is unlikely that such public clarity was deliberately designed to make life difficult for Jack Straw on his visit to Gibraltar – the first by a British Foreign Secretary since 1989 – but it certainly had that effect. Although the exact date of Straw’s visit was only announced a few days before it was due to take place, he had made it clear some time earlier that he intended to visit the Rock at an appropriate time. In January, the Chief Minister felt able to say: ‘I believe the people will welcome his visit and that he would be received as Gibraltar should receive the British Foreign Secretary’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 26 January 2002). By the beginning of May, a Gibraltar Government statement only welcomed the visit in so far as it would give him ‘the opportunity to gauge for himself the depth of Gibraltar’s opposition to his proposed done deal with Spain’ (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 78/2002, 1 May 2002). The statement also regretted the short notice of the visit as well as the fact that the Government was notified of it via a leak (for which the

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Foreign Secretary apologized), and repeated the position that if, as rumoured, Britain reaches an agreement with Spain but decides to delay putting it to the people of Gibraltar in a referendum, the Gibraltar Government will organize its own (idem). Straw himself was under no illusions about what sort of reception he would receive, and said in an article on the eve of his visit: ‘I do not expect to be welcomed with open arms’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 3 May 2002). He did give reassurances that he would never sign an agreement that would end Gibraltar’s links with Britain; pave the way for Spanish control of Gibraltar; restrict Gibraltarians’ right to British citizenship; end British military arrangements there; change the legal system or the House of Assembly; discriminate against local culture; or affect the minimum wage, social security or pension arrangements (idem) and insisted that Britain would stand by Gibraltar even if it rejected an agreement in a referendum, but he also added his regular warning that the status quo is not a realistic option (idem). The six-hour visit on 3 May was certainly not one of the more comfortable excursions that Jack Straw has made away from Westminster. A crowd of hundreds booed and jostled him as he arrived at the Governor’s residence, and in exchanges with people in the crowd shouts of ‘Traitor!’ and ‘Judas!’ were heard (The Times, 4 May 2002). He met representatives of numerous groups, including the Council of Representative Bodies, whose statement (based upon Caruana’s declaration at the 18 March rally) was read out to him. He participated in a television phone-in programme, and many callers were hostile. There was also a rally organized by the Opposition, with speeches given by Joe Bossano and the Liberal leader, Joseph Garcia, indicating total opposition to any agreement, and at the end of it further shouting and jostling as a police cordon enabled Straw to make his way through a crowd of 3,500 to meet the Chief Minister. Following their hour-long meeting, statements made at a doorstep press conference were shouted down (Gibraltar Chronicle, 4 May 2002). Afterwards the Foreign Secretary’s Spanish counterpart expressed admiration for his ‘political courage’ (Efe, 6 May 2002), which in part must have referred to his physical courage in having entered the lion’s den. Jack Straw returned to London with a very clear impression of the strength of the opposition to any agreement. However, at least he would now be able to claim to his political opponents that he had personally listened to the views of Gibraltarians representing all parts of the community, and he would also be able to remind Josep Piqué that, as reports of his visit show, Britain has very little room for manoeuvre in the negotiation process. Straw apparently found himself under attack from his own side soon after his visit to Gibraltar, according to the contents of a letter sent by the

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Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, to the Foreign Secretary that was made available to the press.8 Hoon expressed concern at the joint sovereignty proposals partly because, he alleged, they were contrary to the principle of self-determination, but also because, in the view of the MoD, an agreement to allow joint use of the facilities (which appeared to be what Spain was seeking) even with the retention of control by Britain could damage the operational capability of the naval base and airfield, thereby putting Britain’s strategic interests at risk (The Times, 10 May 2002).9 There was a suggestion that the United States had made it clear that it was eager for Britain to avoid any change in the status of Gibraltar’s military base, following the attacks on the US the previous September and the subsequent ‘war on terror’ (idem). The implication was that currently British support for US military operations that might require the use of Gibraltar could virtually be taken for granted, whereas this would not necessarily be so if arrangements regarding the military facilities were altered. The notion that Britain might attempt to exclude the military facilities from any agreement prompted a Spanish Foreign Ministry spokesman to argue in a BBC radio interview that ‘one cannot concede all of Gibraltar but not the base. The base is part of Gibraltar. Certainly, a complete split of Gibraltar and the base, keeping the base out of the agreement – we are not contemplating that solution’ (Press Association, 10 May 2002). A rejoinder came from Jack Straw, who made clear that ‘we have a number of red-lines. One of these is the importance of British control of the military base. It remains to be seen whether we reach an agreement on that part, but if we don’t there is no agreement’ (idem). Whereas Piqué repeated his position of 30 April that ‘we can find a form of words that satisfies the wishes and needs of the British Navy because we are NATO allies’ (Efe, 9 May 2002), Straw rejected the idea, saying: ‘We are talking about a British base here’ (Press Association, 10 May 2002). There seems to be some blurring of the distinction in these position statements between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘control’ with regard to the base, and the British position (at least in public) had not been made clear on this point – largely because, with the military facilities distributed across different locations, it was difficult to talk about a ‘sovereign’ base. Ministers therefore frequently used a paraphrase such as ‘retaining current arrangements’ and referred to ‘exclusive control’, without specifying how that related to sovereignty. One Spanish commentator was persuaded that sources have confirmed that Britain does not aspire to exclusive sovereignty over the Gibraltar base, in the way that it is sovereign, for example, over the base in Cyprus. If an agreement is reached, the sovereignty of the base would therefore be shared, like the rest of the Rock, and there will be nothing to prevent the Spanish flag flying alongside the British one on the base. (El País, 11 May 2002)

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It is doubtful whether anyone in the British negotiating team would have recognized that as a plausible reflection of its position. However, whether viewed from the perspective of ‘sovereignty’ or ‘control’, what was clear was that the military facilities had now become one of the major points of disagreement in the negotiations; they were a ‘red-line’ issue for both sides (The Times, 11 May 2002; El Mundo, 11 May 2002), and as such liable to make an agreement extremely difficult, not to say impossible. The next meeting in the negotiation process saw Hain and his counterpart de Miguel together in London on 9 May at what was described as a ‘technical’ meeting (Efe, 9 May 2002). They established that the remaining disagreements could not be resolved by the time that Straw and Piqué were due to meet to discuss Gibraltar on 15 May, and consequently that meeting became reclassified as an informal lunch meeting with no press conference to follow, rather than a meeting following which they had been expected to announce that an agreement had been reached. Hain’s doubts showed in an interview published on 13 May, when he admitted that ‘we’ve hit a very sticky patch’ (Guardian, 13 May 2002). He warned that ‘Madrid really has to decide whether it’s going to give enough to get a historic deal which would end the dispute’, adding ‘there are difficulties to resolve and we may not be able to resolve them’ (idem). Piqué, although more optimistic about finding ways around the opposing positions, admitted that it was not certain that an agreement would be announced on 20 May by the two Prime Ministers. ‘I’ll be able to tell you on the twenty-first’, he told his questioner (Efe, 13 May 2002). Other interested parties fired salvos on the eve of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. Michael Ancram went to Gibraltar for the second time in six months and called for the Anglo-Spanish talks to be suspended because it was clear that an agreement could not be reached (Gibraltar Chronicle, 14 May 2002). Gibraltar’s Chief Minister reiterated his position that joint sovereignty was as unacceptable as full sovereignty, and criticized as ‘unprincipled’ the British Government’s willingness to prejudice the civilian and political rights of Gibraltarians while keeping an exclusive hold on its military interests (idem). He warned against trying to solve the problem ‘semantically’ because that would not settle the dispute once and for all, and described the British strategy whereby anything can be agreed even if it is not implemented as ‘lacking democratic credentials’ (idem).10 Piqué and Straw met in London on 15 May, and although the atmosphere was described as ‘friendly and constructive’ it came as no surprise that the communiqué issued afterwards (there was no press conference) indicated that ‘real difficulties remain to be resolved’ (Daily Telegraph, 16 May 2002). They proposed to meet again in late June or early July, which enabled them to retain the commitment to reach an agreement ‘by the summer’ (idem), although that sounded increasingly unrealistic given the Spanish Foreign Minister’s statements in an interview with ABC on 18 May, when he reiterated Spain’s ‘red-line’ positions on its historic claim

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to full sovereignty, the need for the military facilities to be treated in the same way as the rest of the territory, and the interpretation of a referendum in Gibraltar as a consultation on the type of self-government they will enjoy rather than as a decision that would bind the British Government (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 18 May 2002). As a consequence, there were no expectations from the meeting between Blair and Aznar in London on 20 May, which was now seen ‘more as an interim staging post’ rather than a final make-or-break day (Press Association, 20 May 2002). On the morning of the Prime Ministers’ meeting, Jack Straw caused a stir in Madrid when he gave the impression in a radio interview that if the Gibraltarians rejected an agreement in a referendum the agreement would no longer be ‘on the table’ (Daily Telegraph, 21 May 2002), but a clarification was later issued by the FCO (Independent, 21 May 2002). Following the meeting, the two leaders seemed anxious to play down the significance of Gibraltar in the context of the agenda they had been discussing. Tony Blair confirmed that the talks would continue, while José María Aznar denied that there was a crisis (Efe, 20 May 2002), but it was becoming clear to many observers that there was little sense in trying to adhere to the artificial summer deadline for an agreement to be reached. Michael Ancram called upon the Prime Minister to suspend the negotiations and start to protect Gibraltar from Spain’s ‘unfriendly activities’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 21 May 2002), but Blair said that the talks would continue (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 22 May 2002, Col. 292). Jack Straw also confirmed that if and when Britain and Spain reach an agreement, there would be a long process of negotiation (possibly up to two years) before an official referendum was held (The Times, 21 May 2002). Straw hoped that this would give the Gibraltarians time to recognize the advantages of an agreement, but in fact it merely made the Gibraltarians that much more determined to hold their own poll sooner rather than later. In Spain, reaction to the London meeting was mixed: whereas the Partido Popular spokesman for Foreign Affairs, Gustavo Arístegui, noted only ‘a slight loss of momentum in the progress of the negotiations’, Trinidad Jiménez for the PSOE criticized the Spanish Government for raising expectations and for ‘excessive triumphalism’, while Felipe Alcaraz for the Izquierda Unida forecast that the negotiations were going to ‘end in complete failure’ (El País, 22 May 2002). Meanwhile, the Gibraltarians’ determination to put their case continued. The Minister for Trade and Industry, Keith Azopardi, argued for their right to self-determination at the annual regional seminar of the UN Committee on Decolonization in Fiji in mid-May (see Gibraltar Chronicle, 15 May 2002), while closer to home full-page colour advertisements were published in The Times on 16 May and in the remainder of the British press the following day. Under the heading ‘Gibraltar seeks your support: no deals with Spain against the wishes of the people of Gibraltar’ (The Times, 16 May 2002) a large picture of the 18 March demonstration was

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shown, and readers were urged to contact the Gibraltar Government Office in London to demonstrate their support – which they did in large numbers.11 Peter Caruana undertook a series of speaking engagements in Britain, and both he and Joe Bossano gave a number of radio and television interviews for British, Spanish and foreign media between 19 and 21 May in order to gain further publicity for Gibraltar’s cause. In one Spanish radio interview, Caruana found himself agreeing with the words of the Spanish Prime Minister. While Aznar had said that ‘the survival of a colony in Europe makes no sense’, Caruana agreed that ‘there was no place for colonies in the twenty-first century’ (Efe, 20 May 2002). However, he emphasized that ‘they should disappear in a manner befitting the principles of the twenty-first century and not the eighteenth’ (idem). That was a fundamental difference between Gibraltar and Madrid, given that the Spanish Government believed that the decision on the future of Gibraltar should be taken by the two sovereign nations. Whether by coincidence or consequence, one of Madrid’s fears – that the proposal to give Gibraltar greater self-government under a joint sovereignty arrangement would lead to demands for similar treatment from some of the autonomous communities in Spain – was articulated at this time when the Catalán leader, Jordi Pujol, called for discussions to be opened on joint sovereignty for Catalonia. Speaking at a conference on the future of the EU (which was also attended by Josep Piqué), Pujol recalled that joint sovereignty had been Catalonia’s relationship with Spain until 1714. Gibraltar and Cataluña, he argued, ‘are the fruit of the same political situation’ (El País, 21 May 2002).12 Although Piqué dismissed Pujol’s proposal as ‘absurd’ (El Mundo, 23 May 2002), such stirrings, together with the predictable linkage made by Morocco’s Foreign Minister between Gibraltar and Spain’s North African enclaves (El País, 24 May 2002), must have caused some of the members of Aznar’s Government to wonder whether a successful outcome of the negotiations on Gibraltar might not result in the opening of a Pandora’s box that would have been better left closed. Spain’s Foreign Minister clearly remained optimistic that an AngloSpanish agreement would soon be reached by announcing that within the European Desk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs he would set up an Office for Gibraltar Affairs. The proposal to establish the new Office was agreed at a meeting of the Cabinet on 24 May, with a remit to ‘prepare and pursue the appropriate negotiations in order to achieve a solution both with regard to cooperation and to sovereignty’, as well as ‘to carry forward the development and the application of the agreements that may result from these negotiations’ (Efe, 24 May 2002). However, Piqué showed no signs of trying to woo the Gibraltarians, according to an interview he gave on Spanish television on 22 May in which he described Gibraltarians as ‘irrelevant’ in the debate over sovereignty since it concerned an Anglo-Spanish dispute over territory and

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not people. He argued that any referendum should not be about sovereignty but could be about the degree of self-government on offer, and that in any case a referendum was an internal British matter and Spain could not be asked to recognize its outcome (El Mundo, 22 May 2002). Such utterances had been heard before, but in the context of a possibly imminent agreement they were guaranteed to persuade the Gibraltarians not to support it. The sensitive stage that the negotiations had reached resulted in a diplomatic casualty on 27 May when the Spanish Prime Minister cancelled a meeting with the Conservative leader Iain Duncan Smith and his foreign affairs spokesman Michael Ancram, who were visiting Spain, Portugal and France to learn about their health-care systems. According to Conservative Central Office they were asked to tone down their criticism before the visit (which had been arranged some weeks earlier), and as they declined to moderate their stance the invitation was withdrawn (The Times, 27 May 2002). The reason for the cancellation given by the Spanish Prime Minister’s office was the fact that they were combining the trip with a visit to Gibraltar (El Mundo, 28 May 2002). Duncan Smith blamed the withdrawal of the invitation on the British Government for raising Spanish expectations over Gibraltar when all the signs were that the Gibraltarians would refuse to accept any agreement (The Times, 28 May 2002). However, it was also possible that Aznar did not wish to do anything that might undermine the negotiation process at this stage – discussions with a leading British politician who opposed the Anglo-Spanish talks could have sent a confusing message – and so decided that the safest move was to cancel the meeting. Duncan Smith played down the apparent snub from Madrid, saying that he fully understood Aznar’s position and that he ‘had a suspicion there would be a problem’ (idem). In any case, at this juncture a British politician who succeeded in getting on the wrong side of Aznar for standing up for Gibraltar was likely to be well received on the Rock, and so it was that when he arrived he was given a hero’s welcome, in stark contrast to the reception given to Jack Straw three weeks earlier (Panorama, 28 May 2002). Although he had to inject a note of realism about what a Conservative Government would do, saying ‘I do not want to raise hopes. We are listening to see what is feasible and what is not feasible’ (The Times, 28 May 2002), the kind of treatment he received must have made him wish that Gibraltarians could vote for him in future elections.

41 Straw announces agreed principles (June–July 2002)

At the beginning of June, a report appeared in the Guardian indicating that Jack Straw had written to the Gibraltar Government asking why it had not published revenue and expenditure figures for over a year and GDP and other economic performance figures for five years. This absence of data, the paper said, coincided with ‘serious worries in Whitehall that Gibraltar could be used as a money-laundering centre’ (Guardian, 3 June 2002). The reaction by Peter Caruana was to see the report (which was picked up by other British as well as Spanish newspapers) as a ‘pathetic and crude attempt’ by the Foreign Office to discredit Gibraltar, on account of the success it was having in securing the support of British public and Parliamentary opinion, by feeding the press with damaging accusations of improper activities (Gibraltar Chronicle, 6 June 2002).1 The report gave the Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister, Josep Piqué, the opportunity to say that when Gibraltar produces its financial data they will confirm that its present status ‘is not sustainable either from a financial or a commercial perspective’ (Efe, 4 June 2002). The Gibraltar Government’s sternest critic, Joe Bossano, pointed out to the Spanish media that statistics on the financial services sector are published by the independent regulator, although he agreed that the way in which some Government figures were calculated had not been published since 1996. However, he defended Gibraltar’s anti-money-laundering laws as being much tougher than the Spanish ones, and he pointed out that there was no connection between the non-publication of the figures and money-laundering (idem). This episode, together with an attempt through secret filming to accuse a pro-Government lawyer of purportedly giving money-laundering advice to journalists posing as clients (Panorama, 7 June 2002), was a further reflection of the determination by the British Government to present the Gibraltarian administration in a bad light.2 On 6 June, Caruana made his annual appearances before the UN Committee of 24 to argue the case yet again for the principle of selfdetermination to prevail over not only the Committee’s call for bilateral negotiations to resolve the differences between Britain and Spain, but also over Spain’s claim for the restoration of its territorial integrity (idem). Joe

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Bossano made his forthright contribution by calling on the Committee to adjudge whether the draft decolonization constitution agreed by the Gibraltar House of Assembly met the criteria of the Committee for selfdetermination. He was pleased with the support that Gibraltar’s case received from some members of the UN Committee (M2 Presswire, 7 June 2002), and an interview he gave for the Catalán daily La Vanguardia a few days later reflected a new-found confidence on his part that the AngloSpanish talks would fail (see Gibraltar Chronicle, 12 June 2002). By contrast, the British and Spanish representatives at the UN felt able to inform the Committee that they were hopeful of completing in the near future the task that the UN had set them 40 years earlier, by reaching an overall agreement on the future of Gibraltar. However, coincidentally, a Parliamentary written answer by the Spanish Government in Madrid on the same day made the achievement of an agreement that much less likely, since it reiterated Spain’s position that it will never abandon its historical aspiration to recover full sovereignty over Gibraltar (Gibraltar Chronicle, 7 June 2002). There were further indications that the British Government was preparing the ground for the failure of the negotiations when the British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Peter Torry, told Spanish journalists on 12 June: ‘We either have to come to an agreement or decide that, despite good will on both sides, on this occasion it has not been possible to reach an agreement and then decide on the best way to continue the process in the future’ (Efe, 12 June 2002). This was echoed by Peter Hain when he responded to a debate on Gibraltar in Westminster Hall on 18 June, and said: ‘A solution to the Gibraltar dispute has eluded Britain and Spain for more than 300 years.3 It may continue to elude us. We may have to wait a while’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 18 June 2002, Col. 38WH). He also stated twice in his speech that no agreement was better than a bad agreement, and made clear that ‘serious differences remain between us’ (idem, Col. 40WH). He warned: ‘If we do not settle [the dispute] now, it will not get settled for a long while’ (idem, Col. 41WH), a prophecy that most Gibraltarians who were listening will have hoped would come to pass – at least on the basis of the manner in which the British Government was attempting to settle it. A further indicator was the fact that Ministers from both sides appeared to have stopped discussing the issue of Gibraltar on an informal basis. The meeting between Hain and de Miguel on 10 June was barely reported, and de Miguel declined to say whether they had even talked about Gibraltar (Efe, 17 June 2002), while Piqué confessed even on the day itself that he had no idea whether he would be holding any bilateral talks with Straw while they were both in Luxembourg on 17 June (idem). The following day Aznar flew in to London as part of a tour before the concluding summit at the end of his semester as EU President of the Council of Ministers, but he and Blair said afterwards that they had not discussed Gibraltar

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(Efe, 18 June 2002).4 Straw and Piqué had a brief meeting in the margins of the summit in Seville on 23 and 24 June, but a further complicating factor was a wave of bombings by the Basque terrorist group ETA in several tourist areas during that very weekend. This led to British officials now briefing the British press to the effect that the Anglo-Spanish talks were likely to collapse because the Spanish Government was concerned that as any agreement with Britain would have to allow a referendum in Gibraltar, this might encourage the Basques to demand the right to a referendum on their relationship with Spain, and that was something that Spain would wish to avoid (Panorama, 24 June 2002). It was, of course, entirely possible that the activities of ETA were a convenient excuse for the failure to reach an agreement at this juncture, since the talks had clearly already run into difficulties anyway, but the Spanish Government had previously made clear its concern about the way in which a referendum in Gibraltar might be perceived elsewhere in Spain (see Chapter 40). Piqué and Straw met over dinner in London on 26 June, and despite the fact that one Spanish newspaper predicted that Straw would tell his counterpart that he wished to suspend the talks (Cinco Días, 26 June 2002), a communiqué was issued afterwards which confirmed that there would be a meeting as part of the Brussels Process in Madrid on 12 July. There was no explicit reference to the aim of reaching an agreement before the summer, which until recently had become a standard accompaniment to any announcement of future meetings (Daily Telegraph, 27 June 2002), and a few days later Piqué acknowledged that the meeting in Madrid ‘was unlikely to be the last, but it would be one of the last’ (Efe, 3 July 2002). However, there remained the strong possibility that the two governments would still want to announce some level of agreement in Madrid – a ‘half-cooked’ deal, as one paper described it (Panorama, 1 July 2002) – and so the lobbying continued, with a group of MPs from the Foreign Affairs Select Committee visiting Gibraltar at the beginning of July at their own instigation to hear the views of Gibraltarians on the negotiations, and Michael Ancram calling once again for the suspension of the talks (Gibraltar Chronicle, 1 July 2002). With attention focusing on the meeting between Foreign Ministers in Madrid, the negotiation process was suddenly thrown off course by the announcement on 9 July that, as part of a Spanish Cabinet reshuffle, Josep Piqué had been replaced by Ana Palacio, the first woman ever to head the Spanish Foreign Ministry. It was evident that if the two sides had been on the point of declaring a significant agreement Aznar would have delayed announcing the changes to his Government, and one former Prime Ministerial aide was quoted as saying: ‘The Gibraltar deal is not going to happen. A new face is needed to let the issue die a natural death’ (Daily Telegraph, 10 July 2002). Whether that was part of the strategy remained to be seen, but it was clear that the new Minister – an MEP and a lawyer with limited experience of foreign affairs – would need some time to adjust to

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her new role and in particular to familiarize herself with the details of the Gibraltar issue. Consequently, the Spanish Ministry swiftly announced the postponement of the scheduled talks until after the summer (Efe, 10 July 2002). Jack Straw, although willing to go to Madrid anyway, expressed his understanding of the new Spanish Minister’s position, while Downing Street recognized that this would mean a ‘pause’ in the negotiations (Press Association, 11 July 2002). Caruana – more in hope than expectation – sought clarification from the FCO as to whether the negotiations had now come to an end (Panorama, 11 July 2002), but the fact is that the enforced pause gave the negotiators some much-needed breathing space. With the postponement of the Madrid meeting, Straw took the opportunity to make a statement on Gibraltar in Parliament on 12 July. To shouts of ‘Sell-out!’ and ‘Surrender!’ he announced that Britain and Spain had agreed a number of principles: that they should share sovereignty over Gibraltar (including the isthmus); that Gibraltar should have a greater degree of self-government; that it should retain its traditions, customs, way of life and institutions; that Gibraltarians should retain the right to British nationality and also gain the right to Spanish nationality; and that Gibraltar could choose to participate fully in the EU single market and other EU arrangements (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 12 July 2002, Col. 1166). However, he also listed Britain’s ‘red lines’, which made it clear that several major differences remained to be resolved, and indicated that an agreement acceptable to the people of Gibraltar will continue to be sought. What he commended to the House, therefore, was the Government’s policy rather than an agreement already reached (idem, Col. 1167). The Shadow Foreign Secretary, Michael Ancram, described the statement as part of ‘a shabby and dishonourable process’ that Straw should accept is doomed (idem, Col. 1168). He called for the reconstitution of the talks on the basis of an agenda that deals with the normalization of relations between Gibraltar and Spain and that excludes sovereignty, ‘upon which agreement cannot be reached’, and described the talks as ‘a humiliating episode’ for the Government (idem). As the Secretary of State’s statement was delivered on a Friday, when many MPs were back in their constituencies, the House was sparsely attended, but that did not account for the fact that, as on previous occasions, Straw received little support from those who spoke in the ensuing debate. In Spain, the statement was welcomed by the new Deputy Prime Minister and Government spokesman, Mariano Rajoy, although a Foreign Ministry spokesman pointed out that Spain did not see the proposal of shared sovereignty as a permanent solution (Press Association, 12 July 2002). For the PSOE, Rafael Estrella expressed a degree of surprise that ‘at a time when there was talk of a crisis and the abandonment of the negotiation process, the British Government makes a statement in which it expresses its determination to continue with that process and its objectives’ (Efe, 12 July 2002).

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The reaction in Gibraltar was one of anger and dismay at the fact that Straw had gratuitously made a statement conceding the principle of joint sovereignty and thereby legitimizing Spain’s claim. Caruana accused the British Government of ‘betrayal and violation of our rights as a people to self-determination’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 13 July 2002). He also attacked as ‘unacceptable interference in local politics’ a statement issued by the Governor, David Durie, in which he invited Gibraltarians to suggest improvements to the British Government’s proposals, and described him as ‘a spokesman for the Foreign Office’ (idem). In considering the Gibraltar Government’s plan of action, a spokesman referred to the possibility of an early referendum as ‘one option upon which the Government has already made its position clear’ (idem). There were some demonstrations outside the naval base and the Governor’s residence in reaction to both statements. Jack Straw’s tactics in making the statement to Parliament remained unclear. On the one hand he was fulfilling a commitment to report to the House of Commons before the summer recess on the progress of talks, and the cancellation of the meeting with his Spanish counterpart provided Straw himself with the opportunity to do so, rather than leaving the task to his deputy the following week when he (Straw) would be in the Far East (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 12 July 2002, Col. 1165). On the other hand, it was widely recognized that there were major stumbling blocks to further progress in the negotiations, and Straw was under no obligation to make a unilateral statement about the principles that had been agreed at this stage – especially about an epoch-making principle to share sovereignty, which had been widely touted for some time but never previously acknowledged on the floor of the House of Commons by a Government Minister. Hence the charge from Gibraltar that such a statement was gratuitous, although at least Caruana had a clear answer to his question posed the day before as to whether the negotiations had now come to an end. Clearly they had not, and Straw may simply have wished to indicate that as far as the British Government was concerned the negotiation process was still in progress and ready to be picked up again in the autumn. That was certainly the sentiment behind Peter Hain’s comment on Sky TV on 14 July when he described what was on offer to Gibraltarians as a ‘fantastic deal’ (Agence France Presse, 14 July 2002). It might result in a Spanish flag flying on the Rock, he said, but ‘what does that amount to? Life will go on as usual, except for the better’ (idem). Whatever the thinking at the FCO, the fact is that Straw’s statement triggered a reaction in Gibraltar later in the month that was to have a major impact on the whole negotiation process. If Ana Palacio thought she was going to enjoy a peaceful summer across the spectrum of foreign affairs while she familiarized herself with her new portfolio, she was sorely disappointed. On 11 July, two days after taking on her new office, 12 Moroccan armed police occupied a tiny uninhabited

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island 200 metres off the Moroccan coast near Ceuta called the Isla de Perejil (Parsley Island), known in Morocco as Leila. Legal ownership of the island is disputed between Spain and Morocco,5 but the precise reason for the occupation at this juncture was unclear,6 although relations between Madrid and Rabat had been cool since October 2001 when the Moroccan Ambassador was recalled from the Spanish capital. Once the Moroccan flag had been raised on the island, which was no larger than a football pitch, Spain decided to use force, and on 17 July sent in 28 special operations marines who successfully dislodged the Moroccan occupants, whereupon Morocco accused Spain of an act of aggression. International concern was raised at the possibility of an armed conflict in a geopolitically sensitive arena, and this led to the involvement of the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, in the dispute. Mindful of the location of Gibraltar between the two disputants, Britain tried to remain neutral regarding the rights and wrongs of the matter, while making vague expressions of support for its EU and NATO ally (Daily Telegraph, 18 July 2002). In Gibraltar, Spain’s show of force to regain the tiny island did nothing to enhance the Gibraltarians’ view of Spain’s diplomatic maturity. When, under pressure from the US, Madrid and Rabat started talking to each other on 22 July, it became clear that the invasion of Parsley Island had also served as a means by which Rabat was able to draw international attention to its claims to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, at a time when Spain was clearly making progress in its claim over Gibraltar. As was so often the case, questions were asked at different levels internationally about the differences between Gibraltar on the one hand and Ceuta and Melilla on the other, but as always Spain argued that the two cases were entirely different, and that there was no possibility of Spain discussing the North African enclaves with Morocco (El País, 24 July 2002). Ana Palacio repeated the mantra of Spanish foreign policy when she stated that one of the differences was that the enclaves were part of the EU whereas Gibraltar ‘is not EU territory; it is territory subject to decolonialization’ (Efe, 23 July 2002), thereby choosing to ignore the fact that Gibraltar joined the European Community at the same time as Britain under Article 227(4) of the EEC Treaty, which recognizes that another member state is responsible for the territory’s affairs.7 The anxieties of those concerned about the defence implications of an Anglo-Spanish agreement were heightened when the British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Peter Torry, indicated in a radio interview in Spain on 23 July that Spain would enjoy joint sovereignty of the whole territory and joint use of the military base, and the only point that needed clarification was that ‘we need one command, one person in charge’ (The Times, 25 July 2002). FCO officials in London insisted that the Ambassador had said nothing that contradicted the statement of the Foreign Secretary in Parliament on 12 July (idem), but it is difficult to reconcile the two statements and make them mean the same thing.

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However, from subsequent statements it was hard to be certain exactly what the British Government’s position was regarding the military facilities. In an interview published in Spain on 25 July, Peter Hain appeared to be trying to put a gloss on the Ambassador’s statement when he said that the military base would be treated as a NATO base rather than a British one,8 and as such it would be available to Spain as a member of the Atlantic Alliance,9 but with Britain retaining military control (El País, 25 July 2002). Tony Blair, however, appeared to contradict the position put forward by Torry and Hain when he stated at a press conference that ‘if the question is whether Britain is going to share military sovereignty of the base with Spain, the answer is no’ (Efe, 25 July 2002). Although here he may have been equating ‘military sovereignty’ with ‘military control’ (El País, 26 July 2002),10 he also said: ‘If it is for NATO purposes, or any other purposes, it is only with British consent and British sovereignty’ (Independent, 26 July 2002). That seemed like a clear contradiction of the view expressed by Torry, since it suggested that Britain would retain full sovereignty and control over the military facilities. Wisely, both the Spanish Foreign Minister and Prime Minister declined to comment until such matters were discussed through proper negotiating channels (El País, 27 July 2002), although in a later interview Palacio made it plain that a NATO base under exclusively British sovereignty would not be acceptable to Spain: ‘Shared sovereignty means that we have to have shared sovereignty of the base,’ she said (El País, 26 September 2002). In any event, the Foreign Secretary’s 12 July statement – together with this apparent further concession to Spain about the military facilities and also some uncertainty as to whether any ‘permanent’ agreement could subsequently be re-negotiated11 – had already prompted a decision by Gibraltar’s Chief Minister to take decisive action. On 25 July he went on Gibraltar television to condemn what he described as Jack Straw’s ‘betrayal of our political rights’, to claim that Gibraltarians had done ‘everything humanly possible to lobby against a done deal on principles’, to confirm that he had been right to agree to participate in an open agenda dialogue about Gibraltar’s future – but also right to reject the terms on which he had been invited to do so – and above all to explain the reasons why the Gibraltar Government now considered that it was appropriate to hold its own referendum in the last week of October (Gibraltar Chronicle, 25 July 2002).

42 Gibraltar holds its own referendum ( July–November 2002)

In an interview for El País, Peter Hain made it immediately clear on behalf of the British Government that it would not recognize the result of any referendum in Gibraltar that it had not helped to organize (El País, 25 July 2002), especially the one proposed by Gibraltar at this juncture, since no agreement had formally been reached with Spain. The intention was that the official referendum would not be held for some time after the agreement was reached, in order, as Hain put it, to allow the Gibraltarians to reflect on the magnitude of the change (idem). A note issued by the FCO to Peter Caruana reinforced this view: ‘What we would not recognize is a referendum called simply to reject [British] policy without any thought, discussion, or time for proper debate. That would short-circuit democracy and short-change the people of Gibraltar’ (Guardian, 26 July 2002). Ana Palacio’s initial comment was that Caruana’s initiative was ‘not a matter for Spain’ (Efe, 25 July 2002), but the following day in a radio interview she described it rather curiously as ‘contravening international legality’ (El País, 26 July 2002), although it only became clear later what she might have had in mind. Jack Straw was even more dismissive of the proposal than his junior Minister had been. In a radio interview he described it as ‘a rather eccentric, rather expensive idea to tell us what we knew already’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 27 July 2002), and was concerned that the day after the result ‘they’ll still be faced with the same reality’ (idem). He argued that he was trying to persuade the Gibraltarians to ‘concede a little theoretical sovereignty’ in order to end up with far greater control over their lives (idem). However, there was no doubt that the Foreign Secretary was annoyed at the fact that Caruana had seized the initiative in an attempt to put an end to the negotiations. Caruana was not surprised at the British Government’s reaction, although he dismissed the suggestion that the referendum could be described as ‘short-circuiting democracy’ as ‘indefensible and lacking political credibility’ (The Times, 27 July 2002). However, he felt that it was important to provide an early reaction to the idea of shared sovereignty so that there could be no doubt about Gibraltar’s opposition to it, and he argued that Britain would be unable to deny that the referen-

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dum result reflected ‘the democratically expressed wishes of the people of Gibraltar’ (idem).1 With the arrival of the month of August the issue of the Anglo-Spanish negotiations cooled, and there was a truce in the war of words between Gibraltar and London for a few weeks. Tony Blair appointed a new Foreign Office Minister, Denis MacShane (Yorkshire Post, 1 August 2002), who at the end of October would replace Peter Hain as Minister with responsibility for Gibraltar. Later in August a Labour peer, Lord Pendry, went to Gibraltar for informal talks, and suggested that it would be a good idea for the British and Gibraltar Governments to hold talks before the Anglo-Spanish negotiations began again in September (Gibraltar Chronicle, 24 August 2002), but nothing came of it. The first ministerial encounter after the holiday break occurred on 30 August, when Palacio and Straw were both at a Council of Ministers meeting in Denmark. It had been expected that they would announce the schedule for the next round of Brussels negotiations on Gibraltar, but that did not materialize (El País, 31 August 2002). Meanwhile, the normalization of Gibraltar–Spanish relations continued to be impeded by Spanish Government policy, as illustrated by the ban imposed on Spanish entries and Spanish judges for Gibraltar’s International Dog Show on 1 September (Panorama, 31 August 2002). ‘A silly example’, Caruana was to say a few days later, ‘but a monument to Spain’s lack of commonsense in signalling to Gibraltar any change in attitude’ (Daily Telegraph, 11 September 2002).2 Meanwhile arrangements for the referendum were underway in Gibraltar, and on 3 September Caruana announced that the vote would be held on 7 November, slightly later than originally anticipated. A Government spokesman announced that there would be a single question on joint sovereignty, and three categories of people who would be eligible to vote: resident registered Gibraltarians; resident British Overseas Territories citizens by virtue of a connection with Gibraltar; and other British nationals who have been ordinarily resident in Gibraltar for at least ten years (Gibraltar Chronicle, 4 September 2002).3 Following the announcement, the Foreign Office indicated that its position on the so-called ‘eccentric’ referendum had not changed since its initial reaction on 26 July (Gibraltar Chronicle, 5 September 2002). Gibraltar’s National Day on 10 September (‘part Notting Hill Carnival, part parish fete, part trade union rally’ – Independent, 11 September 2002) provided a sizeable proportion of residents with the opportunity to take to the streets in a show of strength and solidarity against the shared sovereignty proposals. Some Union flags were visible, but Gibraltar’s own red and white flag was either worn or carried in large numbers,4 while some wore tee-shirts with messages such as ‘Gibraltarians we are, British we stay’ and ‘We will never surrender’. Several times speakers at the rally gave their audience the opportunity to indicate what they felt about the British

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Government’s proposals and the individuals responsible for them, and their views were made clear with jeers and whistles (The Times, 11 September 2002). Lord Bethell, a Conservative MEP and longstanding friend of Gibraltar, drew huge cheers when he said that Gibraltar must not be given to the Spanish Prime Minister’s daughter as a wedding president (Gibraltar Chronicle, 11 September 2002) – a reference to the fact that some viewed the close relationship between José María Aznar and Tony Blair (who had attended the daughter’s wedding near Madrid on 5 September) as the reason for British concessions to Spain over Gibraltar (Daily Telegraph, 6 September 2002). It was at the United Nations in New York that Ana Palacio threw some light on what she might have meant when describing Gibraltar’s referendum as a contravention of international law. Addressing the General Assembly on 17 September she accused Gibraltar of ‘interfering in the proper development of the negotiations’ (Efe, 17 September 2002), and in a later press conference she described the ‘ploy’ of the referendum as being ‘not only harmful for the negotiation process but also blatantly damaging to the doctrine of the United Nations’ (idem). This, she explained, was because the Spanish Government considered that the UN Resolutions 1514, 2353 and 2429 ‘confirmed amongst other things the doctrine that the colony undermined Spain’s national unity and territorial integrity’ (idem). One commentator in Gibraltar saw in Palacio’s reference to the ‘interference’ of the referendum a reflection of the Spanish view that, as a consequence of Straw’s 12 July statement, ‘all can be achieved, agreement is easy, and that the people should not become some kind of nuisance to spoil this’. His view of the referendum, however, was that ‘it is the voice of a people who are being given no proper venue or recognition to speak for themselves about their own future’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 20 September 2002). Despite the British and Spanish Governments’ commitment to renew the negotiations under the Brussels Process in order to try to reach an agreement ‘in the autumn’ (El País, 25 July 2002), Ana Palacio did not seem particularly eager to press for a meeting to discuss the issue with her British counterpart. Admittedly there were other important issues that required their attention, in particular the situation in Iraq, and in Spain’s case there was the additional challenge of attempting to improve relations with Morocco, for whom any discussions over disputed territory were highly sensitive. As a consequence, the momentum that the talks had gathered between July 2001 and June 2002 appeared to be in danger of being lost. That loss of momentum was also partly due to the change of personnel on the Spanish side and the need on Palacio’s part to ‘read’ herself into her portfolio, and to the evident difficulties that remained with the ‘red-line’ issues, in particular the question of the military facilities. There was now the added question of the timing around the Gibraltar-led referendum, and the fact that it would add weight to the Gibraltarians’ vote if

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they were to reject an actual agreement rather than simply a statement of intent. For all these reasons, there was no sense of urgency about further negotiations, and the first formal meeting between Palacio and Straw in London on 27 September was outside the Brussels Process and involved the discussion of a number of issues (El País, 28 September 2002). On Gibraltar, the joint communiqué said that ‘the visit provided a valuable opportunity for us to take stock’ (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores. Press communiqué, 27 September 2002),5 but there was no indication of when the Brussels Process talks might be renewed or any suggestion of a target date for an agreement. ‘I am against target dates’, said Palacio, in a reversal of the position of her predecessor, who had constantly referred to an agreement being reached ‘by the summer’. ‘The process is currently sufficiently advanced that we don’t need a date to spur us on’, she said (Efe, 27 September 2002). A further disincentive for an early agreement to the Gibraltar question came from the head of the autonomous government in the Basque region, Juan José Ibarretxe, who led the non-violent Basque Nationalist party (PNV). On 27 September Ibarretxe announced a plan to hold a referendum on self-determination for the region, advocating a form of shared sovereignty with Spain that would turn the Basque region into a self-governing state in free association with Spain. The model was a combination of the Gibraltar proposals and the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. The reaction of spokesmen for the two main national parties, the PP and the PSOE, suggested that they were very concerned by the prospect, and, echoing London’s reaction to Gibraltar’s announcement of a referendum, warned that a referendum that had not been called by Madrid would be illegal (Guardian, 30 September 2002). One commentator suggested that at present Caruana’s best allies were Ibarretxe and the Prime Minister of Morocco, Mohammed Benaissa (El País, 7 October 2002), because their agendas (Basque separatism and claims on Ceuta and Melilla) were acting as a deterrent regarding Madrid’s designs on Gibraltar. While Ana Palacio had stated Spain’s position on Gibraltar at the United Nations in September, on 3 October it was the turn of Gibraltar’s political leaders to go to New York once again and address the UN Fourth (Special and Decolonization) Committee. Caruana and Bossano reiterated their usual arguments, but also sought to adduce others in defence of their call for decolonization through self-determination. Caruana said that the shared sovereignty proposal would not eliminate the colonial situation of Gibraltar but enshrine it forever, and with reference to the referendum he denounced the reactions of both British and Spanish Governments as ‘profoundly undemocratic’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 4 October 2002). Bossano criticized both the British Government and the Fourth Committee itself – the one for failing to meet its obligations under the Charter to proceed with decolonization, and the other for ‘permitting the interests of the

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United Kingdom and Spain to be put above the wishes of the people of the colony’ (idem). What was of particular interest was the fact that several members of the Committee noted the high level of self-government that Gibraltar already enjoyed, and suggested that Gibraltar was ready to be removed from the list of non-self-governing territories. What it needed, as the Chief Minister pointed out, was a non-colonial constitutional status (idem), which was, of course, precisely what the Gibraltar House of Assembly had approved in February (although it had not yet submitted it to London). Despite all this, it surprised no-one that the usual resolution calling on Britain and Spain to resolve the dispute via the Brussels Process was adopted. Preparations for the referendum took a step forward on 7 October when the Gibraltar Government issued a statement giving notice of a motion (subsequently approved in the House of Assembly a week later) that included the question to be put in the referendum, as well as a list of the 25 people who were to act as international observers. The question contained a preamble referring to the statement made by the Foreign Secretary on 12 July, but the issue to be answered with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ could not have been more clear: ‘Do you approve of the principle that Britain and Spain should share sovereignty over Gibraltar?’ (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 187/2002, 7 October 2002). The following day in Bournemouth Peter Caruana addressed a meeting at the annual Conservative Party conference, which he was attending as part of his ongoing lobbying strategy, and threw down a challenge to the British and Spanish Governments: ‘You give the results of this referendum whatever political value your political and democratic conscience dictates. Because no-one will be able to say that it is not the freely and democratically expressed will of a democratic European people on a political issue’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 9 October 2002). The Gibraltar Opposition was much more explicit in what it expected the referendum to achieve: ‘[it] will serve not just to derail the Anglo-Spanish negotiating process, but also to close the door once and for all on any future sovereignty negotiations with Madrid’ (idem). One piece of news that most Gibraltarians will have welcomed just prior to the referendum was the announcement on 24 October that, as a consequence of a Government reshuffle, the Minister for Europe with responsibility for Gibraltar was no longer Peter Hain, described as ‘not the most liked man in Gibraltar’ (Panorama, 25 October 2002). His replacement was Denis MacShane, who was already a member of the Foreign Affairs team. Some Gibraltarians will have been encouraged by MacShane’s first Parliamentary pronouncement in his new position, when he said on 5 November ‘Gibraltar will be safe in my hands’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 6 November 2002), but with the referendum only two days away they will have reserved judgement until he could demonstrate what that might mean in a practical sense.

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As the date for the referendum approached, the positions of the Spanish and British Governments predictably remained unchanged. In a radio interview Ana Palacio described it as a ‘virtual consultation’ because it was based on a hypothetical agreement. She called in aid the position of her British counterpart, who, she said, ‘is treating it as of no significance and no value’ (Efe, 3 November 2002), an assessment that he duly confirmed in the House of Commons on 5 November (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 5 November 2002, Col. 135). As far as future negotiations were concerned, diplomatic sources in Spain were quoted as saying that, since it was clear what the sticking points were, there was no point in the two sides meeting unless it was to settle the terms of a definite agreement or, alternatively, to bring the negotiations to an end (Efe, 4 November 2002). Gibraltar’s political leaders left no stone unturned in trying to ensure both that the number of people who might be tempted to vote ‘yes’ was kept to a minimum and that the turn-out for the ‘no’ vote was maximized. Peter Caruana made a ministerial broadcast on 5 November that began: ‘On Thursday Gibraltar has a date with one of the most important occasions of our collective journey as a people.’ He went through, in detail, all of the reasons why it was important to vote ‘no’, and concluded: So this referendum is not about ‘dialogue’ or ‘acceptable solutions’. It’s about respect for our wishes and our political rights. It’s about rejecting joint sovereignty as a principle and a concept. It is about rejecting Anglo-Spanish joint sovereignty as the way forward for Gibraltar. It’s about how they’ve gone about these discussions. It’s about rejecting the concept of ‘done deals’ and a referendum which leaves things and principles that we reject on the table. It’s about whether the UK should agree the principles applicable to our sovereignty, to our political rights and to our future against our wishes and without our consent. (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 207, 5 November 2002) All three main party political leaders addressed rallies on the eve of the referendum with the same message to all their supporters. On the day of the referendum itself the presence of international media representatives, including Spanish ones, was considerable, indicating that whatever the British and Spanish Governments might have said about the referendum being irrelevant, many people in the rest of the world did not see it that way. There were 12 fixed polling stations, plus four mobile ones that enabled the immobile or the incarcerated to cast their vote. British and Gibraltarian flags were to be seen everywhere, while loudspeaker vans decked in red, white and blue bunting toured the town urging voters (in Spanish) ‘to show the government of Britain that we reject the principle of joint sovereignty’ (Financial Times, 7 November

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2002). Voting was brisk from the time that the polling stations opened at eight o’clock, and within three hours almost a quarter of the electorate had voted. A high turn-out was what Gibraltar’s political leaders wanted and they were not disappointed, with 87.9 per cent of the eligible voters casting their ballot. Although there had never been any doubt about the outcome, the percentage of Gibraltarians who rejected the concept of shared sovereignty – 98.97 per cent (or 17,900) of the valid votes cast – was considerably higher than anyone had predicted. A mere 187 voted ‘yes’ to the question on the ballot paper (Efe, 8 November 2002). Following the announcement of the result at 2.30 in the morning, a delighted Chief Minister declared: Fellow Gibraltarians, today we have sent a clear message to the world and it is roughly divisible into three parts. One, that this is our homeland; two, that we are a people with political rights that we will not give up; and three, that those rights include the right to freely decide our own future. (Gibraltar Chronicle, 8 November 2002) The size of the turn-out and the massive ‘no’ vote enabled him to argue that ‘absolutely nobody has the right to act differently to what we have said tonight’, and he called upon the British Government to give up on the course of joint sovereignty ‘because there is nothing but grief down that road for everyone’ (idem). Caruana received another boost as the polls closed, with the publication of the latest report on Gibraltar from the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee. The report’s conclusions were scathing about the British Government’s attitudes and actions over the whole negotiation process, and in some of its recommendations the Committee made it perfectly clear that in its view the Government should be far more proactive in standing up for Gibraltar and the Gibraltarians. The Chief Minister will have approved of the conclusion ‘that it will be a long time, if ever, before any agreement based on the principles outlined by the Foreign Secretary to the House on 12 July 2002 – including joint sovereignty – can be made acceptable to the people or to the Government of Gibraltar’, and he will also have supported the recommendation ‘that the British Government take full account of the views of the people of Gibraltar as expressed in the referendum held on 7 November’ (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2002b: List of conclusions and recommendations, Paragraphs b) and c)).6 The British Government still viewed the referendum as invalid, but reaction in London was less hostile than in Madrid. Although Denis MacShane argued that ‘the fact remains that there can be no stable future for Gibraltar while the dispute with Spain continues and important issues remain unresolved’ (Agence France Presse, 8 November 2002), his com-

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ments were certainly more conciliatory than would have been the case with his predecessor. He agreed that the Foreign Office would need to reflect on the vote,7 and also suggested that the British Government blamed Spain’s attitude for Gibraltar’s overwhelming rejection, when he said in a radio interview that ‘a little bit of tender loving care on the part of Madrid might calm things down’ (The Times, 9 November 2002).8 Ana Palacio, however, commented in a radio interview that the referendum ‘has no legal validity and contravenes every single UN resolution. It does nothing to resolve the problems of Gibraltar, nor of the Gibraltarians, the Campo region and in general the citizens of the EU’ (Efe, 8 November 2002). Although spokesmen for both Governments spoke of the negotiations continuing, the question now was whether the referendum result would affect the tenor of those discussions. However, there was a more immediate event that had implications for Gibraltar as a result of the referendum, and this took place at some physical distance from Gibraltar itself. On 13 November, the tanker the MV Prestige – Greek-owned, registered in the Bahamas and sailing from Latvia with a cargo of 77,000 tonnes of high-sulphur fuel oil – developed a crack in its hull in heavy seas and high winds off the north-west coast of Spain and began to leak oil. The single-hull tanker drifted towards the coast, and several thousand tonnes of oil polluted the Galician coastline before it was successfully towed out into the Atlantic, where a week later it broke in two and sank. Well before that happened the Spanish authorities began an investigation in order to establish responsibilities, and both Brussels and Madrid rapidly pointed the finger at Gibraltar (as well as other countries) because it was thought to be the last port at which the Prestige had called in order to refuel before travelling to Latvia. By coincidence, the EU Commissioner who led the enquiry was Loyola de Palacio, the sister of Spain’s Foreign Minister, and she asked Britain – despite the fact that the responsibility in such matters rests with the Gibraltar Maritime Administrator and the Transport Ministry (Gibraltar Chronicle, 16 November 2002) – whether a proper inspection had been carried out on the vessel when it last visited the Rock (Independent, 15 November 2002).9 Ramón de Miguel, Spain’s Minister for Europe, called on Britain to take steps to oblige Gibraltar to apply EU norms to avoid such incidents (Gibraltar Chronicle, 15 November 2002). It was also implied by Spain that the vessel had frequently called at Gibraltar and that it was destined for Gibraltar when it foundered, whereas in fact it had visited only once (in June 2002) in four years and its ultimate destination, which had not been specified on its bill of lading, was Singapore, with no visit to Gibraltar scheduled (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 215, 14 November 2002). Spain’s irritation with the situation over Gibraltar was such that even the Spanish Prime Minister claimed that ‘it is quite clear, and it has been confirmed and verified, that the ship was bound for Gibraltar’ (Efe, 18 November 2002), although, as the Gibraltarian

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Government pointed out, even if that had been true, ‘that still does not make Gibraltar blameworthy for accidents suffered by the ship en route to Gibraltar’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 19 November 2002). Loyola de Palacio went further, and used the incident to repeat accusations against Gibraltar of ‘inappropriate activities, smuggling and tax evasion’ (El País, 16 November 2002). There were further accusations and counter-accusations about the destination of the tanker and its cargo (see El País, 17 November 2002; Efe, 18 November 2002), caused by the fact that it was not uncommon, as had happened in this case, for ‘Gibraltar for orders’ to be given as the destination on a tanker’s documentation for insurance purposes if the cargo had not been sold at the time of sailing, without meaning that the vessel would actually visit Gibraltar (Expansíon, 19 November 2002).10 The Gibraltar Government saw the attempt to impute blame on Gibraltar as ‘an example of the dishonest lengths to which some in Spain, and their allies elsewhere,11 will go to discredit Gibraltar for their own political objectives’, and it called upon the British Government to defend Gibraltar against these accusations (idem).12 Caruana even phoned in to a Spanish TV programme to defend Gibraltar’s position, to accuse Spain of ‘false propaganda’ and to explain that ‘this is why 99 per cent of Gibraltar vote against Spain, because of abuse like this’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 16 November 2002). It seems highly likely that Spain’s implication of Gibraltar in the incident – despite the fact that there were so many other countries to blame – was so swift and so strident precisely as a consequence of the very recent result of the referendum on sovereignty. Spain’s Foreign Minister certainly recognized that the Government’s reaction had been interpreted in that way, for she felt the need to assert to a Committee in Congress that the issues were ‘totally unconnected’ and she did not otherwise mention Gibraltar while speaking of the Prestige (Efe, 25 November 2002). Spain’s irritation at Gibraltar’s overwhelming rejection in the referendum promptly turned into an attempt to tarnish the latter’s reputation well before the full facts about the Prestige were established. What worried the Gibraltarians, however, was whether this was a foretaste of Spanish behaviour towards them in the event that – as they hoped – the Anglo-Spanish negotiations suffered the same fate as the Prestige itself.13

43 Recognition of democratic reality (December 2002–June 2003)

In the aftermath of the referendum, both British and Spanish Ministers put on a brave face about the stalled negotiations. Aznar reported after a lengthy informal chat with Blair in Corfu that he expected the talks to be resumed in a ‘reasonably short’ period of time (Efe, 1 December 2002). Ramon de Miguel told the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee that a delay of a few months in reaching an agreement ‘was of little significance’, and that there had been a lot of discussion on the ‘red-line’ issues even if no solution had yet been found (Efe, 4 December 2002), while his counterpart, Denis MacShane, had indicated the British Government’s willingness to continue with negotiations (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 25 November 2002, Col. 133). However, there was no sign of any attempt to set a date for the renewal of the Brussels Process, and when MacShane – the seventh Minister with responsibility for Gibraltar in seven years – met Gibraltar’s Chief Minister for the first time in London on 17 December he was informed that there were no signs of movement on that front (Gibraltar Chronicle, 18 December 2002). When Ana Palacio was asked in an interview about the post-referendum situation on the Gibraltar issue, she quoted the official British position that ‘the statements of the members of the British Government are that they wish to continue trying to find a solution and to negotiate’ (El Mundo, 24 December 2002), but there was no suggestion that anything was about to happen. In his Christmas message, the Governor, David Durie, suggested that the Gibraltar issue was likely to be placed on the back burner, for he did not ‘detect great enthusiasm either in London or Madrid to pursue the talks with the same urgency or intensity as was the case earlier in the year’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 30 December 2002). Denis MacShane was still publicly standing by the British Government’s commitment ‘to put the whole package to the people of Gibraltar in a referendum, if we reach an agreement on a comprehensive settlement’ (Parliamentary Brief, January 2003), but behind the scenes Whitehall sources were indicating that the negotiations had dropped down the Foreign Office’s list of priorities and were now ‘parked’, possibly for years unless Madrid modified its stance (Independent, 23 December 2002).

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For the Gibraltarians, it was beginning to look as though the referendum had achieved the desired result. According to his New Year Message, the Chief Minister was persuaded that ‘the Anglo-Spanish joint sovereignty negotiations are now in the long grass and it seems improbable that a joint Anglo-Spanish agreed declaration of principles, that is ‘the done deal’, will now occur’ (Panorama, 3 January 2003). In that context, he said that he now felt that it was appropriate to initiate a process of formal discussion with the British Government about the proposals for constitutional reform (ibid). Later he made clear that the reason the proposal (agreed in February 2002 by the House of Assembly) had not yet formally been submitted to London was because his Government did not want to run the risk of it being subsumed into the joint sovereignty negotiations (Speech to the House of Assembly, in Gibraltar Chronicle, 27 May 2003).1 Meanwhile, issues relating to oil-tankers reappeared. Following the Prestige incident Spain introduced a ban on single-hull tankers carrying heavy oil from calling at Spanish ports from 1 January 2003, although EU legislation requiring this to be implemented had not yet come into force. Despite this, Gibraltar was incorrectly accused in the Spanish media for not observing EU directives, and the Foreign Office had to come to Gibraltar’s defence (Gibraltar Chronicle, 17 January 2003).2 A barge carrying over 1,000 tons of oil across the Bay of Gibraltar sank on 21 January, threatening the coastline around the Bay (Agence France Presse, 21 January 2003),3 while a day earlier some 14 Spanish journalists and six Greenpeace activists were arrested by Gibraltar police for boarding a tanker in Gibraltarian waters (Efe, 20 January 2003).4 The Rock was clearly not about to be let off this particular hook. Ministerial meetings at which Gibraltar was on the agenda took place from time to time – MacShane and de Miguel met in London on 10 February, for example (Gibraltar Chronicle, 12 February 2003) – but there were other issues, notably the military action against Iraq, which required more urgent consideration. Consequently, although the official position was to continue with negotiations on joint sovereignty, there was no indication of any progress or dates set for future meetings. Peter Caruana decided it was time to press for the abandonment of further negotiations on joint sovereignty in the light of the referendum result, and said so on 12 February on BBC radio during a visit to London. ‘What’s the point’, he asked, ‘of continuing with dialogue in the direction of an agreement based on joint sovereignty which the British Government knows is massively rejected?’ (Press Association, 12 February 2003). Aznar and Blair met later in the month in Madrid and discussed Gibraltar, although the little that they had to say about it afterwards in their press conference indicated that the only thing they agreed upon was that negotiations would continue (Efe, 28 February 2003). With Britain and Spain part of the so-called ‘alliance of the willing’ over Iraq, bilateral relations in the context of that crisis were far more important at this juncture. Indeed, so concerned was

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Britain not to upset relations with Spain that in the House of Commons Denis MacShane suggested that current recognition by Gibraltarians of Spain as an ally was more important than celebrating the 300th anniversary of British sovereignty over Gibraltar in 2004 (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 25 February 2003, Col. 108).5 Inevitably there were suggestions that commitments on Gibraltar had been given to Spain in exchange for its support for action in Iraq, but these were peremptorily dismissed by Tony Blair (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 2 April 2003, Col. 914).6 Such rumours reappeared a month later, when it was suggested that commitments were made to Spain about Gibraltar at a pre-war summit in the Azores between Blair, Aznar and President Bush (Gibraltar Chronicle, 8 May 2003). This required a further rebuttal by Denis MacShane, during a House of Commons debate on 13 May, who said: ‘I can assure them [two previous speakers] that Gibraltar was not discussed there [in the Azores]. Believe it or not, Ministers talk regularly to their opposite numbers in Spain about a whole range of global and European issues, without Gibraltar having to feature’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 13 May 2003, Col. 22WH). Such was the sensitivity about the British Government’s intentions, in particular since 12 July the previous year, that some Gibraltarians would find that difficult to believe. During April and May the question of the future of Gibraltar remained off the agenda between British and Spanish Governments, and it only appeared in connection with related issues, such as objections about the presence in the port of nuclear-powered warships or ships carrying weapons in the aftermath of the conflict in Iraq. There was increased discussion of the possibility of Gibraltar seeking some form of integration with Britain, an idea that had had currency for many years but was now seen by a growing number in Gibraltar as an option to be pursued more vigorously,7 by others as an option to be treated with caution, and by the British Government as an option that was not on the agenda.8 May 2003 also saw a change of Governor, when David Durie’s three-year term of office came to an end. On the eve of his departure, he gave a television interview in which he suggested that it was unlikely that the AngloSpanish negotiations would be reactivated in the near future (Iberianews, 14 May 2003). Durie was replaced by Sir Francis Richards, who was sworn in at the House of Assembly on 27 May.9 In formally welcoming the new Governor, both the Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition took the opportunity to point out that as far as they were concerned the way forward for the territory was through the modernization of the Constitution as agreed in February 2002, and not via a continuation of the Brussels Process (Gibraltar Chronicle, 28 May 2003). Sir Francis can have been left in little doubt as to the determination of the Gibraltarians to keep to their chosen path. As far as Anglo-Spanish meetings were concerned, it was reported that Aznar had written to Blair on 19 May to propose the renewal of talks in

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order to try and settle the dispute prior to forthcoming EU institutional reforms and the imminent enlargement of its membership (Cinco Días, 28 May 2003).10 Denis MacShane and Ramon de Miguel met in Madrid on 6 June to discuss a number of issues of mutual concern. Ana Palacio insisted that the meeting was not part of the negotiation process over Gibraltar, although she said that the Spanish Government would do everything it could to reach an agreement on shared sovereignty, which she hoped would be within the year (Efe, 5 June 2003). Whether or not the two Ministers had planned to talk about Gibraltar, it will have been difficult for them to have avoided some discussion of the announcement made the previous day by the Spanish Foreign Minister that Spain had filed proceedings at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg against recent British legislation enabling people in Gibraltar to vote in the elections to the European Parliament in 2004 as part of a British Euro-constituency (El País, 6 June 2003).11 Caruana commented on the legal action: ‘I hope this will open certain eyes in London to the realities they have not always accepted. Spain appears to be willing to subordinate even human rights to its obstinate and obsessive stance over Gibraltar’ (Daily Telegraph, 6 June 2003). Something certainly did open Denis MacShane’s eyes – or that is how it appeared – for the day after his meeting with his Spanish counterpart he stated in an interview for El País (another was also published in El Mundo) that it was clearly impossible to reach an agreement with Spain that would be acceptable to the people of Gibraltar. ‘Gibraltar is for Britain rather like Ceuta and Melilla for Spain’, he said, guaranteeing to irritate the Spanish Government immensely. ‘It is not part of our territory, but the people there feel themselves to be very British, just as the people who live in Ceuta and Melilla feel themselves to be one hundred per cent Spanish’ (El País, 8 June 2003). In his view, it was very unlikely that the Gibraltarians would support any change in their status ‘without a lengthy period of very calm and friendly relations with Spain’, by which he meant 25 or 30 years (idem). Reflecting the terms of the Brussels agreement, he thought that the year of negotiations between 2001 and 2002 had been useful because ‘it allowed London and Madrid to examine all their differences in great depth’, but he had come to the conclusion that to persevere would be like ‘banging my head against a brick wall’ and considered that ‘Madrid and London have more important matters to discuss’ (idem). He also made clear that Britain intended to keep full control of the military base in Gibraltar, arguing that ‘if Europe wants to be a super-power at the world level it is important for France and Great Britain to keep their military bases in different parts of the world, including the Gibraltar military base’ (idem). This was an indication of the significance that this particular ‘redline’ issue had assumed during the course of the negotiations, and made it clear that it would be a major impediment to the attempt to reach an agreement to share sovereignty.12

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The Gibraltarians will have been pleased to hear a British Minister with responsibility for Gibraltar state what Gibraltarians themselves had been saying for some time: We no longer live in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries when diplomats could sign treaties and peoples had to obey them. We live in a world of modern citizens, where anybody has the democratic right to express their view and for the citizens and the British parliament, the chances of achieving an agreement which is accepted by the Gibraltarians are simply zero. (idem) If MacShane was stating the view of his senior colleagues – and Tony Blair confirmed in Parliament on 11 June that ‘the Minister certainly did speak for the Government’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 11 June 2003, Col. 669) – then the Anglo-Spanish negotiation process initiated two years earlier had just come to an unofficial close, at least for the foreseeable future.13 De Miguel was clearly taken by surprise by MacShane’s comments. He described them as ‘unusual and inopportune’ because they went against the ‘constructive tone’ that had been evident from both sides. Such statements, he said, ‘seem designed to create a rift (. . .) that goes against what both the Spanish and the British governments want’ (Efe, 8 June 2003). He was insistent that Gibraltar had not been discussed on 6 June, and that as far as he was concerned nothing had changed. Not surprisingly, he picked up MacShane’s reference to the North African enclaves, expressing astonishment that ‘a European colleague, a Minister for Foreign Affairs, does not know the difference between Ceuta and Melilla, and Gibraltar’, and he spelt out the differences at some length (idem). What he had not picked up on was the fact that later in his interview MacShane had said that ‘the people of Gibraltar feel their British identity as strongly as the people of Ceuta and Melilla feel their Spanish identity’ (idem); in other words he was not referring to Gibraltar’s legal status, but to the centurieslong emotional attachment for Gibraltarians with Britain that was evident from their response to the negotiation process, culminating in the November referendum result. De Miguel said that there was no point in engaging in a war of words with Britain over MacShane’s remarks (idem), but reaction from opposition politicians was much tougher. The PSOE spokesman on Europe, Manuel Marín, called MacShane’s remarks ‘offensive and dangerous’ (Independent, 19 June 2003), while the Senator for Cádiz, José Carracao, said that they made a laughing stock of Spain and the Anglo-Spanish negotiations and called for a ‘forceful’ response from the Government (Efe, 9 June 2003). Carracao’s colleague, Salvador de la Encina, asked what kind of ally Britain was to Spain, and accused Britain of ‘treating the

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Spanish Government like dirt’, with the ‘indulgence’ of the Foreign Minister Ana Palacio. They demanded that she make a statement in the Spanish Parliament (idem). Palacio’s initial view, however, based on reassurances from the British Foreign Office, was that nothing had changed: ‘The negotiations on Gibraltar are in the same situation as they were a month ago’, she said (El País, 10 June 2003), although this was before Tony Blair gave his public support for the statements of his Minister for Europe. It was possible to interpret MacShane’s comments and Blair’s support of them as an indirect but calculated response to Aznar’s call, made a month earlier, to make progress with the negotiations (El País, 12 June 2003). However, when informed of the British Prime Minister’s position, Palacio interpreted it to mean that the negotiations were going to continue but would take longer than had been anticipated. Her objective now was ‘to move the negotiations forward and hand over the baton with things in a better position than they were when I took over’ (Europa Sur, 12 June 2003). Predictably, the Gibraltar Government welcomed the statements made by MacShane, which reflected what it called ‘a recognition of the democratic reality’, respect for the Gibraltarians’ position as well as success for its own campaign (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 133/2003, 9 June 2003). The GSLP/Liberal opposition called for the negotiations ‘to be confined to the dustbin of history, where they belong’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 10 June 2003), while the Labour Party called for Jack Straw’s statement of principle made on 12 July 2002 to be formally withdrawn (idem). Denis MacShane could look forward to a fairly hospitable welcome when he visited Gibraltar on 4 and 5 July.14 As far as the Spanish Government was concerned, Ramón de Miguel indicated a shift in its position when he told the Foreign Affairs Committee in Congress on 18 June that Spain had no difficulty with Gibraltarians holding a referendum of self-determination on an Anglo-Spanish agreement, provided that they understood that the choice was between maintaining the status quo and accepting a change of status that was neither integration with Britain nor independence (Efe, 18 June 2003). This was rather different from Piqué’s position of May 2002, when Spain saw a referendum in Gibraltar merely as a consultation on the type of selfgovernment it would enjoy under Spanish sovereignty (see Chapter 40). However, on Spain’s other ‘red-line’ issues nothing had changed. De Miguel clearly expected the negotiations to continue on the same basis as before, but both he and Ana Palacio now recognized that the time-scale for a conclusion was open-ended, and likely to be later rather than sooner. However, the official position of the British Government was that its policy remained unchanged. When Jack Straw was asked by Michael Ancram on 19 June whether the Government’s policy was still to share the sovereignty of Gibraltar with Spain, the Foreign Secretary replied: ‘I refer the honourable gentleman to the statement I made to this house on

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12 July 2002’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 19 June 2003, Col. 401W). MacShane himself referred to Jack Straw’s July 2002 answer when asked a similar written question from a Labour MP a few days later (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 23 June, Col. 587W), leaving a certain degree of confusion, since there were clearly discrepancies between what the two Ministers had said in July 2002 and June 2003 respectively. What began to emerge as revised British Government policy on Gibraltar by July 2003 was that the guarantee given in the Preamble to the Constitution of 1969 was sacrosanct; that commitments given by Britain in the Brussels Agreement to negotiate practical issues and to discuss sovereignty remained; that Gibraltar was welcome to participate in any future discussions under the ‘two flags, three voices’ formula; that shared sovereignty was still the ultimate objective; but that it was recognized that for the foreseeable future Gibraltarians were opposed to any involvement by Spain in their affairs and it expected Spain to take steps to improve relations with Gibraltar on practical issues before any change on sovereignty could even be contemplated. That was a compromise on Britain’s position as adopted in July 2001 when the Government decided it would attempt to move from the status quo, but, like most compromises, it satisfied no-one. Spain had been led to believe that Britain could deliver joint sovereignty only to find that it could not, and Spain was therefore no nearer to achieving even the first step towards its ultimate objective; Britain had not solved the ‘problem’ of Gibraltar and in the process had upset both Gibraltar and Spain; while Gibraltar had prevented an agreement of principles between Britain and Spain but was no further forward in ‘modernizing’ its constitutional position, felt betrayed by the British Government, and still faced the possibility of Britain and Spain one day reaching an agreement over its future to which a majority of Gibraltarians remained opposed.

44 Conclusion

Three hundred years have elapsed since British and Dutch forces seized the Rock of Gibraltar. Over 290 years have passed since the Treaty of Utrecht handed Gibraltar to Britain in perpetuity. Ever since then Spain has sought to regain the sovereignty of the territory, at times through the use of military force but from the 1960s through diplomatic (and not so diplomatic) pressure and negotiation, combined with harassment extending from over a decade and a half of physical blockade at one extreme to petty and frustrating border delays, restrictions on telecommunications, or attempts to exclude Gibraltarian participation at international sporting events. Spain’s diplomatic pressure has had the support of the United Nations since the 1960s because Gibraltar is on its list of territories awaiting decolonization, but the UN has left Britain and Spain to resolve the dispute on a bilateral basis because the sovereignty of the territory is in dispute. By the beginning of the twenty-first century relations between Britain and Spain, and between Gibraltar and Spain, have changed from those of the acrimonious 1960s and the besieged 1970s, and yet Gibraltar remains as firmly British as it was when the ink dried in Utrecht in 1713. More significantly, as we have seen, the Gibraltarians remain more resolutely opposed than ever to the transfer of sovereignty that Spain seeks. With Spanish democracy now as well established as it has ever been, a rate of economic growth in Spain amongst the best in Europe, and with Spain and Britain both members of the EU and NATO, why should this be so? Why do the vast majority of Gibraltarians not wish to be Spanish, refuse to allow their territory to become part of Spain, and reject any Spanish involvement in their affairs? The answers to those questions are complex, but are contextualized by the fact that so much time has elapsed since Britain’s acquisition of Gibraltar at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The multifarious origins of the modern inhabitants of Gibraltar from across the Mediterranean as well as from Spain and Britain, combined with the influence in all its forms of British culture over three centuries, have resulted in the creation for well over the last 100 years at least of a hybrid Gibraltarian culture and identity1 which means that most Gibraltarians identify them-

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selves as being part of a distinctive entity – Gibraltarian or British Gibraltarian, but certainly not Spanish. Joe Bossano, one of the most outspokenly pro-British Gibraltarians, was quite clear on the matter: ‘What I am is the result of 300 years of British influence. That makes me a British Gibraltarian. Spanish is the last thing I want to be’ (Guardian, 9 November 1991). Peter Caruana defined his British Gibraltarian-ness more objectively when he said: ‘We are British by our political nature and Gibraltarian for geographical and anthropological reasons’ (Efe, 28 May 2002), while Gibraltar’s official archivist, Tom Finlayson, defined a Gibraltarian as ‘a Latin, Mediterranean creature with strong links to Andalusia, over which is imprinted the British system of administration, justice and education’ (Independent, 4 February 2002). Although few Gibraltarians would agree with the one who said: ‘Gibraltar’s problem is that we are Spaniards who don’t want to be Spaniards’ (El País, 3 November 2002), many more would echo the sentiments of another who put it this way: ‘Asking us to become Spanish is like asking a Scotsman to become English’ (Daily Telegraph, 19 October 2002). It is not that Gibraltarians necessarily have a strong sense of patriotism towards Britain, but more a matter of Britishness always having been part of their identity; as one teenager succinctly expressed it: ‘I think it’s a misconception that we’re very patriotic about being British. It’s just, we’re British because we’ve grown up being it and it’s part of being Gibraltarian’ (BBC News Online, 14 March 2002). There are, of course, historical influences that have inculcated such a strong identification with Britain in Gibraltar. The significance of Gibraltar as a naval base during the height of the British Empire; its role during the Second World War when the Mediterranean became the main theatre of the war in Europe and most Gibraltarians were evacuated to Britain; its contribution to other subsequent conflicts involving British military engagements (notably the war in the South Atlantic) when it has served as a forward military base for British forces – these are the most obvious examples. The readiness of Gibraltarians to demonstrate their loyalty in times of need, despite having no real option, has been a reflection of their identification with Britain, and one of the reasons why they feel most hurt by the British Government’s recent apparent willingness to negotiate away their sovereignty is because they sense that this loyalty has not been sufficiently important to Britain that it is prepared to demonstrate loyalty in return. Following the 2002 referendum result, Peter Caruana explained: ‘One of the reasons Gibraltarians are so upset by the attitude of the British Government is that our unconditional loyalty and support is not being reciprocated’ (quoted in the Daily Telegraph, 13 February 2003). Typical of several contributions to a parliamentary debate on Gibraltar following the referendum was that of Mark Francois, MP: ‘The people of Gibraltar have been scrupulously loyal to this country for hundreds of years . . . they simply cannot understand why the Government in Britain [does] not return that loyalty . . .’ (Hansard House of Commons

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Debates, 13 May 2003, Col. 12WH). There is a general recognition of the loyalty of the Gibraltarians to Britain amongst the British population at large, and the expression ‘as solid as the Rock of Gibraltar’ has a moral as well as a geological significance. It is a sentiment that can be – and has been – exploited by both Gibraltarians and British opposition politicians alike in order to oppose those who would attempt to allow Spain to have a say over the future of Gibraltar. Certain historical events have also resulted in an equally strong antipathy in Gibraltar towards Spain, most obviously the 16-year closure of the border. One Gibraltarian woman who was 18 at the beginning of the blockade, and was speaking 17 years after it had been lifted, explained: ‘Before we had more dealings with Spain. When the border was closed, we got much closer to each other, and now, even though the border is open, relations are not the same as they were’ (El País, 3 November 2002). Clearly that period of isolation has left its mark on those Gibraltarians – and that still means most – who remember what life was like during the blockade. However, whereas they might have expected that following the restoration of democracy Spain would try to compensate for the misguided actions of the dictator Franco and his Foreign Minister Castiella, the opposite often seems to have been the case. The systematic harassment at the border, the attempt by Spain at apparently every turn to thwart any action that might be construed as offering Gibraltar a separate identity and the exclusion of Gibraltar from numerous EU directives at Spain’s insistence are manifestly unlikely to cause the inhabitants of Gibraltar to want Spain to have an involvement in their affairs, let alone to attract them to become part of that nation. Some of these actions can be explained by the fact that officials and Ministers in Madrid feel constrained to look over their shoulder at what the effect on the Basques or the Catalans might be if Gibraltar is seen to be offered an enhanced status within a Spanish context. However, that does not account for the problems at the border, which are caused by entirely other considerations. Spain’s view that Gibraltar is not fully a part of the EU and therefore the border with Gibraltar has to be treated as an external EU frontier in relation to customs duties is entirely plausible, although whether the regime of border controls is always proportionate and exclusively motivated by such concerns is another matter. Marie Lou Guerrero, Chairman of the Gibraltar Federation of Small Businesses, provided the MP Andrew Rosindell with a catalogue of actions inherited from the blockade and taken by post-Franco Spain in order to frustrate Gibraltar’s development – to exclude Gibraltar from all measures related to the airport; to deny direct air or ferry access from anywhere in Spain; to prohibit the diversion of flights in bad weather from Gibraltar to Málaga; to limit telephone links; to refuse to recognize Gibraltar’s international dialling code; to block the roaming facility of Gibraltarian mobile phones; to create queues at the border at any time of the day or night; to

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veto any international event entered by Gibraltar; to delay much EU legislation unless Gibraltar is excluded, while insisting on the implementation by Gibraltar of all EU directives (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 18 June 2002, Cols 25–26WH).2 For the same purpose, Spain continues to accuse Gibraltar of financial impropriety for which there appears to be little or no evidence (idem, Col. 26WH). It would seem fairly evident to an outside observer that following the failure of the blockade ‘only law-abiding civility from Madrid has the slightest chance of persuading Gibraltarians that shared sovereignty will not be the alien rule they so fear’ (Independent, 13 July 2002), but the problem is that ‘Spain seems incapable of pursuing a charm offensive, and itches all too visibly to resort to the big stick’ (The Times, 13 July 2002). J. E. Triay (a supporter of shared sovereignty) argues that ‘the Spanish tend to confront their enemies rather than to convert them. They do not know how to befriend their adversaries as the British do’ (Daily Mail, 13 September 2002). Joe Bossano said in the House of Assembly debate to approve the referendum motion that ‘[in the Brussels Process] the Spanish were never going to attempt to win the hearts and minds of the Gibraltarians because they did not think they could’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 15 October 2002). In all probability they did not know how to do so. Spain has been so obstructionist in part because obstructionism has become such an entrenched culture in the Foreign Affairs Ministry that every aspect of international relations involving Britain and Gibraltar has to be scrutinized for its implications for Spain’s sovereignty claim and objected to if there is any hint that this might in any way be threatened or undermined, even down to the level of sporting events and dog shows. However, as already indicated, there is in addition a fear that if Gibraltar were to gain international recognition in any sphere, this would spark off a claim for a similar status among those ‘nations’ in Spain – notably the Basque Country and Cataluña – that are also seeking greater recognition of their nationhood within the wider international community. Despite the confrontation from Madrid, that has not prevented crossborder cooperation at local level. The strategy of both Bossano and Caruana as Chief Minister has been to develop cross-border activities for the mutual benefit of both communities. A major step forward was taken with the setting up of the joint cross-border company, Mercomed, between Gibraltar and Los Barrios in January 2002, and at a conference in Altea the Mayor of Los Barrios, Alonso Rojas, argued that there was a general recognition that ‘Gibraltar and the Campo could live without each other, but [they] were much better together’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 8 October 2002). However, it did not need substantive projects like Mercomed to prove the point. People on both sides of the border assisted each other economically on a daily basis; at the time 1,566 Spanish workers were registered in Gibraltar, many others came across to work on contract, while Gibraltarians help the Campo by shopping and using the

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restaurants (idem). The Mayor of La Línea, Juan Carlos Juárez, spoke for many when he said: ‘A lot of people want to know about what the economic solutions between Spain and the UK for this area are . . . Economic solutions are more important than sovereignty’ (BBC News Online, 15 March 2002). So why is it that successive governments in Madrid have been so insistent on regaining the sovereignty of this small, appendix-like territory? The main argument that Spanish representatives have always used at the United Nations has been that the country’s territorial integrity (which they claim is a principle that has primacy over self-determination) was damaged by the taking of Gibraltar by force, confirmed by the Treaty of Utrecht; that Gibraltar should be decolonized in accordance with the UN Charter; and that marrying these two together means that Gibraltar should be returned to Spain. In addition to these arguments they adduce others, including the usurpation (as they would see it) of the isthmus (which is not covered by the Treaty); the presence of a military base over which they have no control and which is situated in a strategic location that (they claim) threatens the proper defence of their territory;3 and damage to the economy of the Campo through Gibraltar’s fiscal advantages and (they claim) dubious financial dealings (which appear to be no worse than other financial centres). There is also the obvious argument of geographical proximity, although perhaps not surprisingly Spain tends not to use that one very often, for it leads down the path towards Morocco’s claim to Ceuta and Melilla (Spain has always been very insistent that their status is totally different from that of Gibraltar), not to mention the Canary Islands (which are closer to Africa than to Spain) and other anomalous, historical left-overs such as the towns of Llivia or Olivenza.4 There is, however, an historical imperative that goes back several centuries to the will of Queen Isabella of Castille who, through her marriage to King Ferdinand of Aragon, united Spain’s two largest kingdoms and laid the foundations of the modern Spanish state. The Queen ‘impressed the near sacred importance of the Rock upon Spanish national consciousness’ (Jackson 1987: 66) by including in her will of 1504 a charge on her successors ‘that weighs on the conscience of all Spaniards to this day’: I ask and require of the Kings, my successors, that they may hold and retain the said City [of Gibraltar] for themselves and in their own possession; and that no alienation of it, nor any part of it, nor its jurisdiction, civil or criminal, shall ever be made from the Crown of Castille. (Quoted in Jackson 1987: 72) The notion that such a charge still carries significance in Spain 500 years later may be fanciful, but it may nevertheless serve to explain why Spain’s persistence has survived for so long, and why no Spanish prime minister, monarch, president or dictator could ever be seen to abandon Spain’s

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‘historic claim’ to the Rock, for according to Queen Isabella’s last will and testament no less than the head of state is responsible for observing it. The main problem for Spain, however, is that (leaving aside the question of the isthmus)5 the existence of the Treaty means that there can be no dispute about the legal ownership of the territory, although the wording of Article X (as indicated in Chapter 2) could have made the detail somewhat more precise. One detail that is clear, however, is the reversionary clause that makes it indisputable that if Britain should decide to relinquish the sovereignty of Gibraltar it automatically reverts to Spain. Spain’s task, therefore, has been to persuade Britain to take that important decision. There is, of course, a case for setting aside the Treaty of Utrecht if all parties were to agree, since the basis on which territories and peoples were bartered or exchanged at the beginning of the eighteenth century is no longer seen as appropriate three centuries later, and in any case several of the stipulations contained in the Treaty have long since been abandoned as contrary to the modern concept of human rights or as simply unenforceable.6 Gibraltar has argued for a resolution of its future on the basis of more modern values, principally the right to self-determination, which is enshrined in the UN Charter and which, Gibraltar claims, should prevail over any other treaty. Thus there are several conflicting considerations that are used by the parties concerned to support their position, and together these have created a tangled web that is extremely difficult to unravel: the stipulations of the Treaty of Utrecht, the UN principles of self-determination and of territorial integrity (which Gibraltar and Spain respectively claim to be paramount but which in any case have been set aside by the UN because the sovereignty of the territory is disputed), and in addition the Preamble to the Gibraltarian Constitution of 1969, which virtually gives Gibraltar the power of veto over any sovereignty proposal and which is interpreted by Britain (but not by Spain) as a form of self-determination (see Chapter 38).7 Despite this Gordian knot of conflicting considerations, Spain’s persistence in trying to regain the sovereignty of Gibraltar was clearly rewarded in that in addition to support at the UN it obtained the commitments from Britain contained in the Lisbon Agreement of 1980 and the Brussels Declaration of 1984. However, unless Britain had the serious intention of agreeing to some change in relation to Gibraltar, why did Britain agree to sign these undertakings, and how committed was Britain in the ensuing negotiation processes? Was the Labour Government’s decision in 2001 to resume the Brussels Process and to attempt to negotiate an agreement to share sovereignty a logical continuation of what had been started over 20 years earlier? We have seen that in the late 1970s Britain felt constrained to take an initiative on Gibraltar for two reasons: first, because the UN Resolutions

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called upon Britain and Spain to resolve the dispute through negotiation, and second because, whatever Margaret Thatcher’s feelings about the European Community, she had always been keen on its enlargement for the potential new markets and opportunities for investment that it offered British businesses – especially a country of the size and potential of Spain. She also recognized that the incorporation of Spain into the EC would assist the consolidation of Spanish democracy, which (as the attempted military coup in 1981 indicated) remained fragile. Following the acceptance in 1976 of Spain’s application to join, therefore, Britain had to find a way of encouraging Spain to open the border gates with Gibraltar in order to allow for the free movement of people within the enlarged EC, and the Lisbon Agreement of 1980 was designed to achieve this. However, the implementation of that agreement was fraught with difficulties, not least on account of the Falklands/Malvinas War, Spain’s ambivalence during the conflict about where its loyalties lay, and the subsequent sensitivity on Britain’s part about discussing the future of one of its remaining colonies with one Hispanic nation when it had just engaged in armed conflict with another such nation over another remaining colony. Although Lisbon did eventually start to produce results, another agreement that explicitly referred to sovereignty was required if Britain was to succeed in persuading Spain to fully open the border. Hence the agreement signed in Brussels in 1984.8 Specifically on sovereignty, it is worth recalling that the agreement says that ‘both sides accept that the issues of sovereignty will be discussed in that process’ (see Appendix 3). The use of the word ‘discussed’ is significant. ‘Discussion’ is not the same as ‘negotiation’, let alone ‘concession’; the position taken by British Foreign Secretaries between 1984 and 1997 in meetings with their Spanish counterparts was that Britain was not willing to negotiate or concede any change on sovereignty unless the Gibraltarians wished it. Jack Straw was wrong, therefore, to conclude: ‘It is impossible to conceive of why it [sovereignty] was on the agenda unless one of the likely conclusions was that there would be shared sovereignty’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 12 July 2002, Col. 1173). Such a conclusion had not previously been drawn, not even by those who drafted and signed the Brussels agreement. Tony Blair’s confirmation of the precise words in the Brussels communiqué – ‘the issues of sovereignty will be discussed in that process’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 17 July 2002, Col. 286) – merely underlines the point that the only commitment was to ‘discussion’. What Straw and Blair had overlooked was the fact that the sentence in the Brussels Declaration that immediately follows the reference to ‘sovereignty’ states: ‘The British Government will fully maintain its commitment to honour the wishes of the people of Gibraltar as set out in the preamble of the 1969 Constitution’ (see Appendix 3). Why, therefore, did the Labour Government think that it could reach a solution with Spain on the issue in 2001? It is clearly nothing new for

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British Governments to try to use Gibraltar as a bargaining chip in an attempt to secure what are seen at the time as greater advantages. Those who have written in detail about earlier periods of Gibraltar’s post-1704 history have made clear that Britain did not originally see possession of Gibraltar as an integral part of its strategic plans and were prepared to negotiate it away (see, for example, Jackson 1987: 115–32). More recently there is evidence that some twentieth-century governments, notably Edward Heath’s Conservative Government, considered it as an option in 1971, even though no action was taken (see Chapter 39, n. 14). However, the 1997 Labour Government was the first to try to do so, and argued that it was the Conservative Government of the 1980s that had opened the door to the possibility. Labour’s strategy at the beginning of the twenty-first century was to attempt to reach an agreement with Spain that would strengthen the Anglo-Spanish axis within the EU in order to shape Europe as they wished to see it. Jack Straw’s position was not far different from the stance of the Earl of Stanhope in trying to forge alliances in the eighteenth century on behalf of King George I by using Gibraltar as a bargaining chip (Jackson 1987: 116–22). One of the main differences, however, was that during the intervening years a civilian population had established itself in Gibraltar, and they had their own views about who they were and how they saw their future. Moreover, if Britain insisted on discussing Gibraltar’s future with Spain, the Chief Minister was quite adamant about the terms under which he was prepared to participate. Caruana may not have been as averse to the discussions as Bossano, but nor was he as willing as Hassan to comply with the British Government’s wishes. Thus the first of the British Government’s miscalculations was the extent to which Gibraltar would engage with the process. However, it made four more serious errors in relation to the talks with Spain on joint sovereignty. The first was a misunderstanding about the acceptability of sharing sovereignty ‘indefinitely’ (which Spain took to mean ‘for an undefined but finite period’) and Spain’s willingness to renounce its claim to full sovereignty (no doubt too many false parallels were drawn here by the British Government with the Republic of Ireland and its position vis-à-vis Ulster). The second regarded sharing the military facilities: the FCO might not have seen any problem with this, given Spain’s NATO status and the fact that the Gibraltar base had been downgraded in the NATO structure anyway, but the MoD had a better appreciation of the strategic importance of Gibraltar than the FCO and ultimately it was the MoD’s view, shared by the Pentagon, that was adopted by the British Government. The third concerned the extent of opposition in Britain to sharing the sovereignty of Gibraltar, both at a popular and at a political level: popular because, unlike Hong Kong, many British people are familiar with Gibraltar, it is recognizably British and the inhabitants are European; political because although the Conservatives signed the Brussels

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Declaration they had a different interpretation of what ‘discussing sovereignty’ meant, and made much political capital out of defending the Gibraltarians’ sense of loyalty. The final miscalculation was how the Gibraltarians would respond to the Anglo-Spanish attempt to reach an inprinciple agreement: the British Government seemed taken by surprise when they went ahead with their own referendum, and were even more exercised when they found that the result, although predictable, could not be readily ignored.9 Straw’s dismissal of it as ‘eccentric’ (see Chapter 42) more accurately described the FCO’s handling of the whole saga. Given that Britain wished to try and come up with a viable solution to an apparently intractable problem, why did it believe that sharing sovereignty could be made to work? In one sense, joint sovereignty was an obvious answer – neither Britain nor Spain wins everything, neither loses everything, the Gibraltarians get the best of both worlds. However, in addition to the different understanding of how long such an arrangement was intended to last, it was never made clear exactly what was understood by the concept of joint sovereignty or how it would function. Moreover, as Caruana argued with some justification, ‘if sovereignty means a sense of belonging to, a sense of allegiance, that can’t be divided. If it means ultimate control and ultimate authority, that can’t be divided’ (Federal News Service, 7 June 2002). Later he claimed that it was ‘untried, politically and legally misconceived and would condemn Gibraltarians to a neo-colonial status for all time . . . [it is] a political and legalistic nonsense’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 26 September 2002). Those who were attracted by the so-called Andorra solution were not always clear what that implied, in particular the post-1993 Andorra wherein sovereignty was invested in the people. That has not been on offer to Gibraltar; if it had been it might well have been seriously considered, as Caruana made clear in 2002 (see Chapter 37, n. 8). Even supposing that joint sovereignty could be made to work as far as civil Gibraltar is concerned, the question of sharing the sovereignty – or the control – of the military facilities (it was never made clear by the British Government which they intended to refer to) seems not to have been thought through before the Anglo-Spanish talks began. When the Brussels Process was resumed in July 2001 there were two so-called ‘redline’ issues for Britain (the holding of a referendum in Gibraltar on any agreement and the permanency of an agreement on joint sovereignty). As we have seen, as the negotiations progressed the question of the military base became a third ‘red-line’ issue, whereby the British Government insisted on retaining exclusive control/sovereignty of Gibraltar’s military facilities.10 In view of the year-long experience of the repair to HMS Tireless in Gibraltar’s dockyard (which may well have been problematic under joint sovereignty), it is somewhat surprising that the military base was not a ‘red-line’ issue from the outset. Be that as it may, several factors may have been involved in turning it into one, but the most influential is likely

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to have been the view of the Pentagon following the events in the United States in September 2001. In the uncertain climate that is the so-called ‘war on terror’, the US Administration has tried to minimize risk and opt for certainties – or as close as it can get to them. In the case of Britain, Spain and Gibraltar, according to one American analyst the US would feel more confident with the Rock in British hands. Although Spain is currently ‘a stalwart friend’ of the US, ‘coalitions come and go’, and Spain contains sufficient political complexities to raise questions about the wisdom of letting indispensable air and sea-lanes and the Rock astride them go to Spanish jurisdiction. Spain did not lend a helping hand at an important juncture before11 and the prevailing political culture there would counsel prudence about its future conduct . . . Gibraltar in the hands of our most certain ally . . . constitutes good strategic insurance. (Grant 2002–2003)12 Once Britain had been persuaded of the continuing strategic value of Gibraltar both to British as well as US security (in particular because of the communications facilities that include an Echelon satellite listening centre), the sharing of the military base with Spain was no longer on offer, and given the dispersed nature of the facilities across the territory13 it is difficult to see in practical terms how this could be excluded from joint sovereignty. Thus the military value of Gibraltar – its original raison d’être when Britain took possession of it in 1704 – was seen in 2001 as being insufficient for Britain to insist upon it remaining exclusively in British hands, but a year later it had come to be the most intractable aspect of the attempt to negotiate an Anglo-Spanish agreement. Britain’s current position on the military facilities will only serve to reinforce the unfounded Spanish view that they threaten Spain’s strategic interests. If the negotiations on joint sovereignty have now been kicked into the long grass for the foreseeable future, what are the realistic options for Gibraltar? One that has been popular in the past and currently has substantial (if not overwhelming) support is for some form of integration with Britain. A poll conducted in March 2003 showed that 39 per cent backed integration while 32 per cent supported free association, 12 per cent a negotiated settlement (unspecified) between Britain and Spain, 9 per cent independence and 6 per cent the status quo (Gibraltar Chronicle, 13 March 2003). Integration with the mother country is supported as an option for decolonization by the UN, and arguably would not undermine the Treaty of Utrecht since it would not affect Gibraltar’s sovereignty. However, most political leaders in Gibraltar (except those of the IWBP) agree that integration would means a loss of the current level of selfgovernment, although Caruana said that he would not reject it outright (Iberianews, 14 March 2003). There is also the question of Gibraltar’s

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advantageous tax regime, and what might be needed would be for Gibraltar to be granted special fiscal status; however, there is no evidence as to how the British people would react to such an arrangement. Moreover, there remains the possibility that within a matter of a few years it will not be possible for any EU territories to maintain special tax regimes, so any protective arrangement could well be short-lived. In order for integration to become a serious option, it would have to find favour with the British Government. At present that appears to be unlikely, as recent remarks by Government Ministers have made apparent (see Chapter 43, n. 8). The Government’s view of the integration of Gibraltar with Britain seems neither consistent (see Chapter 37) nor clear, but it is probably still based on the view to be found in a ministerial briefing paper for a meeting in 1970 with the then Chief Minister, Robert Peliza, leader of the IWBP, which listed three objections: it would cause difficulties with Spain, it could cause difficulties with the UN (although it is hard to see on what grounds), and it would encourage other colonies to try to do the same (quoted in Durie 2003). To enable it to be considered for Gibraltar now, the British Government would have to put aside those concerns, as well as withdraw from its recent position of being prepared to consider sharing sovereignty with Spain. For all these reasons, the British Government seems unlikely to change its position in the near future. The incorporation of Gibraltar in the South-West of England constituency for the elections to the European Parliament in 2004 could be seen as a first step towards integration, but it would not be easy to argue for full integration with Britain on the basis of the special circumstances of giving Gibraltarians a means of voting in Europe. If not integration, what then? The modernized constitutional arrangement, mooted by Caruana when he first came into office, agreed by Gibraltar’s House of Assembly in February 2002 and involving further devolution of powers from Britain, may find favour when given consideration by the British Government,14 provided that Britain is prepared to stand up to inevitable Spanish objections. If some Spanish involvement is a sine qua non in Gibraltar’s future, only an arrangement such as that enjoyed by modern Andorra, with the sovereignty invested in the people and a nominal responsibility resting with the British and Spanish Crowns, would stand a chance of acceptance in Gibraltar, but not in the near future. Does that mean that the integration of Gibraltar with Spain will never happen? Those who think like Joe Bossano (and it is not surprising given the history of the past 40 years to find that there are many who do) would certainly say ‘never’, but Gibraltar’s other two long-serving Chief Ministers have taken a more open-minded stance. In 1986 Hassan thought that future generations would have no problem with the question of sovereignty (see Chapter 13), and in 2001 Caruana agreed that future generations might feel differently from the present one (see Chapters 34, 35).

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However, that will only come about if certain changes are implemented in order to establish a new climate between Gibraltar and Spain. An editorial article in Parliamentary Brief 2003 entitled ‘The New Message the New Minister Must Take to Madrid’ expressed the essence of what is now required: Good relations will not come until a new approach based on the realization that Gibraltar will never be Spanish ‘until or unless’ the people of Gibraltar desire to be Spanish. Britain cannot, and for the most part does not want to, deliver Gibraltar to Spain. This means ‘wooing’ Gibraltar, to repeat the term used by the Select Committee in November 2002. ‘As Prime Minister Jim Callaghan put it to Spain’s first prime minister after the death of General Franco, “you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar”. Spain did not understand that then, and one must hope that they will now’ (Parliamentary Brief, 2003).

Appendix 1: The Treaty of Utrecht (2–13 July 1713)

(Extract from Article X, translated from the Latin.) The Catholic King does hereby, for Himself, His heirs and successors, yield to the Crown of Great Britain the full and intire propriety of the Town and Castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications, and forts thereunto belonging; and He gives up the said propriety, to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right for ever, without any exception or impediment whatsoever. But that abuses and frauds may be avoided by importing any kind of goods, the Catholic King wills, and takes it to be understood, that the above-named propriety be yielded to Great Britain without any territorial jurisdiction, and without any open communication by land with the country round about. Yet whereas the communication with the sea by the coast of Spain may not at all times be safe or open, and thereby it may happen that the garrison, and other inhabitants of Gibraltar may be brought to great straits; and as it is the intention of the Catholic King, only that fraudulent importations of goods should, as is abovesaid, be hindred by an inland communication, it is therefore provided that in such cases it may be lawful to purchase, for ready money, in the neighbouring territories of Spain, provisions, and other things necessary for the use of the garrison, the inhabitants and the ships which lie in the harbour. But if any goods be found imported by Gibraltar, either by way of barter for purchasing provisions, or under any other pretence, the same shall be confiscated, and complaint being made thereof, those persons who have acted contrary to the faith of this Treaty shall be severely punished. And Her Britannic Majesty, at the request of the Catholic King, does consent and agree, that no leave shall be given under any pretence whatsoever, either to Jews or Moors, to reside or have their said dwellings in the town of Gibraltar; and that no refuge or shelter shall be allowed to any Moorish ships of war in the harbour of the said town, whereby the communication between Spain and Ceuta may be obstructed, or the coasts of Spain be infested by the excursions of the Moors. But whereas Treaties of friendship, and a liberty and intercourse of commerce are between the British and certain territories situate on the coast of Africa, it is always to be understood, that the British subjects cannot refuse

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the Moors and their ships entry into the port of Gibraltar purely upon the account of merchandizing. Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain does further promise, that the free exercise of their religion shall be indulged to the Roman Catholic inhabitants of the aforesaid town. And in case it shall hereafter seem meet to the Crown of Great Britain to grant, sell, or by any means to alienate therefrom the propriety of the said town of Gibraltar, it is hereby agreed and concluded, that the preference of having the same shall always be given to the Crown of Spain before any others.

Appendix 2: The Lisbon Agreement (10 April 1980)

1

2 3

4

5

6

The British and Spanish Governments, desiring to strengthen British and Spanish Governments, desiring to strengthen their bilateral relations and thus to contribute to Western solidarity, intend, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, to resolve, in a spirit of friendship, the Gibraltar problem. Both Governments have therefore agreed to start negotiations aimed at overcoming all the differences between them on Gibraltar. Both Governments have reached agreement on the re-establishment of direct communications in the region. The Spanish Government has decided to suspend the application of the measures at present in force. Both Governments have agreed that future co-operation should be on the basis of reciprocity and full equality of rights. They look forward to the further steps which will be taken on both sides which they believe will open the way to closer understanding between those directly concerned in the area. To this end both Governments will be prepared to consider any proposals which the other may wish to make, recognizing the need to develop practical co-operation on a mutually beneficial basis. The Spanish Government, in reaffirming its position on the reestablishment of the territorial; integrity of Spain, restated its intention that in the outcome of the negotiations the interests of the Gibraltarians should be fully safeguarded. For its part the British Government will fully maintain its commitment to honour the freely and democratically expressed wishes of the people of Gibraltar as set out in the preamble to the [1969] Gibraltar Constitution. Officials on both sides will meet as soon as possible to prepare the necessary practical steps which will permit the implementation of the proposals agreed to above. It is envisaged that these preparations will be completed not later than 1 June.

Appendix 3: The Brussels Declaration (27 November 1984)

1

2

3

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Right Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, and the Spanish Foreign Minister, His Excellency Sr Don Fernando Morán López, held a meeting in Brussels on 27 November during which they agreed on the way in which the Spanish and British Governments will apply by not later than 15 February 1985 the Lisbon Declaration of 10 April 1980 in all its parts. This will involve simultaneously: a The provision of equality and reciprocity of rights for Spaniards in Gibraltar and Gibraltarians in Spain. This will be implemented through the mutual concession of the right which citizens of EC countries enjoy, taking into account the transitional periods and derogations agreed between Spain and the EEC. The necessary legislative proposals to achieve this will be introduced in Spain and Gibraltar. As concerns paid employment, and recalling the general principle of Community preference, this carries the implication that during the transitional period each side will be favourably disposed to each other’s citizens when granting work permits. b The establishment of the free movement of persons, vehicles and goods between Gibraltar and the neighbouring territory. c The establishment of a negotiating process aimed at overcoming all the differences between them over Gibraltar and at promoting co-operation on a mutually beneficial basis on economic, cultural, touristic, aviation, military and environmental matters. Both sides accept that the issues of sovereignty will be discussed in that process. The British Government will fully maintain its commitment to honour the wishes of the people of Gibraltar as set out in the preamble of the 1969 Constitution. Insofar as the airspace in the region of Gibraltar is concerned, the Spanish Government undertakes to take the early actions necessary to allow safe and effective air communications. There will be meetings of working groups, which will be reviewed periodically in meetings for this purpose between the Spanish and British Foreign Ministers.

Notes

1 Introduction 1 For the text of Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht, see Appendix 1. For further historical background on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Chapter 2. 2 According to a survey undertaken by the author, 75.8 per cent claim to speak Spanish fluently, and a further 18.2 per cent speak it moderately well (Gold 2001). 3 In terms of population, comparable states in Europe would be Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino. However, unlike Gibraltar, these states could call upon friendly neighbours (Switzerland, France, Italy, respectively) in times of need (see Gold 2001: 71). 4 Spain has inevitably drawn parallels between Gibraltar and Hong Kong, as later chapters will illustrate (see, for example, Chapter 9). 5 For a recent study of Ceuta and Melilla, see Gold 2000. 2 British Gibraltar (1704–1963) 1 This chapter is not intended to provide a detailed history of Gibraltar prior to the main period on which the book focuses, but rather a synthesis that puts the contemporary situation of the Rock into its historical context. It is based principally on three sources: Hills 1974, Jackson 1987 and Harvey 1996. 2 Before Charles II of Spain died without heirs in 1700, he declared as his successor Philippe d’Anjou, the grandson of the Bourbon King Louis XIV of France. Louis pledged to keep the thrones of France and Spain separate in order to avoid posing a threat to England and Holland, but when French troops invaded Holland in 1701 the English and the Dutch allied themselves with the Hapsburg Archduke Charles of Austria and supported his claim to the Spanish Crown. The ensuing conflict became known as the Wars of the Spanish Succession (Jackson 1987: 89–91). 3 Around 1812 that most British of institutions, fox-hunting, was established, initially in Gibraltar itself and later in the Campo, where the Royal Calpe Hunt was active until the Second World War (Jackson 1987: 222). 4 Hills 1974: 372, suggests the civilian population was 17,000 by 1830. 5 The other two seats went to right-wing independents. Prior to the 1954 elections the Commonwealth Party, to the right of the AACR, was set up, but made relatively little impact (Harvey 1996: 161–2).

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3 Gibraltar incommunicado (September 1963–October 1979) 1 The full title of the Committee was the United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 2 From November 1966 the British Government provided economic assistance for a development programme designed to make Gibraltar’s economy independent of that of Spain. 3 In a statement in the House of Commons, the Foreign Secretary, George Brown, referring to the British proposal, said: ‘It will be for the Court to decide on all questions referred to it, including the question of sovereignty. The Spanish Government and Her Majesty’s Government would be bound by the Court’s decision’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 31 October 1966, Cols 34–35). This was the first time that Britain had been prepared to allow for any discussion on the sovereignty issue. Over 35 years later, Gibraltar is still calling for the arbitration of the International Court of Justice. 4 They referred to Article 73 and the need for the British Government to safeguard the interests of the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories for which it was responsible. 5 The elections resulted in the formation of a coalition, led by Major Robert Peliza as Chief Minister, between five members of the Integration with Britain Party and three Independents. This marked a brief interruption in Hassan’s premiership. 6 Currency equivalents used throughout are those pertaining in March 2004, as follows: £1  US$1.80; C1 (1 euro)  US$1.20; US$1  140 pesetas. 7 These had originally been conveyed to Hassan (who had been re-elected in 1972) while on a visit to Brussels in February 1973, but had not been made public. They remained confidential until 7 November 1974, when a series of letters were exchanged through the columns of The Times between 14 October and 12 November. 8 In January 1975, the Moroccan Government called on the UN Committee of 24 to declare that Spain’s claim to Gibraltar was not consistent with its continued presence on Moroccan territory in Ceuta and Melilla. 9 It was published on 26 June 1976, and is known as the Hattersley Memorandum. 10 In the Gibraltarian elections held on 26 September 1976, the Integration with Britain Party, whose demise had begun a year or so earlier, was replaced as the main opposition party by the Gibraltar Democratic Movement (GDM). This was led by Joe Bossano, a founder member of the Integration with Britain Party, but when three of the four GDM representatives crossed the floor of the Assembly in 1977 Bossano formed the Gibraltar Socialist Labour Party. As leader of the GSLP, Bossano became Chief Minister in 1988. 11 The autonomy statutes for various regions of Spain that the constitution eventually contained aroused interest as a possible solution to the problem of Gibraltar. In September 1977 the Party for the Autonomy of Gibraltar was formed with this in mind, and unsuccessfully put up three candidates in the elections in February 1980. 4 The Lisbon Agreement (July 1979–April 1980) 1 A reference to the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces in September 1979, followed by the overthrow and execution of President Amin. Because the situation involved one of the superpowers, initially it constituted a major international crisis. The withdrawal of Soviet troops was not completed until almost ten years later.

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2 El País was not always consistent in its attitude towards the strategic importance of Gibraltar. On 28 March, the leader-writer wrote: ‘Whatever this country’s position might be . . . on our entry into the Atlantic Alliance, it is clear to everyone that Gibraltar is no longer the “key to the Mediterranean” and that modern military strategy is not in fact based on fortified towns.’ 3 For the full text of the Lisbon Agreement, see Appendix 2. 4 Groups who would be likely to suffer the effects of the opening of the border were owners of Moroccan ferries who operated on the five- to six-hour crossing from Tangier to Algeciras, the inhabitants of Ceuta (where Spaniards went shopping for tax-free goods which in future they would be able to get in Gibraltar) and, above all, Moroccan workers in Gibraltar, who feared they might be replaced by Spaniards. On the latter point, on 15 April Joe Bossano, leader of the GSLP, issued a statement calling upon the Gibraltarian authorities to guarantee jobs first to Gibraltarians and Moroccans currently working in Gibraltar, second to workers from EC countries, and third to Spaniards. 5 Spain’s approaches to NATO (June 1980–March 1982) 1 The United States signed a treaty with Spain in 1954 allowing the establishment of US bases on mainland Spanish territory. Spain had already started negotiations with the US on the renewal of the treaty relating to these bases, the latest version of which was due to expire in October 1981. In view of its NATO application, Spain suspended the negotiations and extended the existing treaty. 2 A comparison of this report with that produced by the Committee’s successors in 2002 (see Chapter 42) makes extraordinary reading. 3 Such was the strength of feeling in the debate in the House of Commons on 2 June 1981 that the British Government accepted the amendment later that month. 4 There was also concern expressed in the Foreign Affairs Committee debate as to whether there should be some reference in the protocol about Ceuta and Melilla, since the North Atlantic Treaty excludes territory in Africa. It was argued that specific mention of the enclaves could upset Morocco. It was decided in the end not to mention them by name. 5 This was part of the Defence Review The UK Defence Programme: the Way Forward, MoD, 1981, introduced by the Secretary of State for Defence John Nott. 6 ‘Different and distant’?: the Falklands/Malvinas dispute (April–June 1982) 1 The editorial writer also learned how careful he would have to be when writing about the Falklands/Malvinas issue. In explaining the difference between Gibraltar and the Falklands/Malvinas, he said that ‘the Falklands/Malvinas had never belonged to Argentina’, and a correction was published following the editorial on 6 April to the effect that Argentina had formally held sovereignty between 1820 and 1833. However, this is not accepted by Britain, and is at the least disputable. 2 This view of Pym was softened a few days later, when he was described as a man of great experience and flexibility, and even mentioned as a possible Prime Minister in the event of a political crisis (see El País, 9 April 1982). 3 The Spanish press always put the word ‘liberar’ in inverted commas, as it did not wish to be seen to be supporting the British view of the issue. 4 It was unofficially recognized, however, that the fact that Spain abstained rather than voting with Argentina, as it would normally have done, was a gesture towards the British Government. However, the PSOE felt that Spain

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ought to have supported Britain’s proposal. In addition, abstention by a potential member of the European Community was not well received in Brussels. Spain was the only country to abstain in a vote by the Council of Europe in support of Britain’s position at the meeting held in Strasbourg on 30 April. Either both sides expected that the Falklands/Malvinas conflict would be settled within that time span and that the air would have cleared sufficiently for the talks to get under way successfully, or else Britain felt that a longer delay could arouse feelings of bad faith on its part, and if necessary a further postponement could be proposed. The second possibility seems the more realistic one. The same editorial suggested that the initial intention on the British side had been to keep to the original schedule. However, when London indicated uncertainty as to who would head the British delegation, Spain made it clear that it would insist upon foreign affairs ministers or nothing, and so London responded accordingly. Britain had recently passed the new Nationality Act, due to come into force the following year. Under the Act, British passport-holders in Gibraltar were made exceptions to the patriality rule (whereby one of the grandparents had to be of British origin in order that the colonial citizen might be eligible for the right of abode in Britain). Even the Falkland Islanders, at that time, did not enjoy the same privilege (although the events of 1982 caused the Act later to be amended). A reference to the grandson of Louis XIV of France, Philippe d’Anjou, who became the first of King Juan Carlos’ Bourbon ancestors as ruler of Spain in 1700, and who signed the Treaty of Utrecht which handed Gibraltar to Britain. Colonel Francisco Tejero was the leader of the attempted coup on 23 February 1981. The King’s grandfather, Alfonso XIII, had married one of Queen Victoria’s granddaughters in 1906, making Juan Carlos a distant cousin of Queen Elizabeth II.

7 Spain joins NATO but the border remains closed (May–October 1982) 1 In New York on 23 June she declined to confirm that she had made this statement (see El País, 24 June 1982). 8 Felipe opens the gates (October–December 1982) 1 ‘Normalization’ is perhaps the appropriate word rather than ‘re-establishment’, since despite the closure of the border in 1969, by the time of its reopening Spain was already the third most important supplier of goods to Gibraltar after Britain and Morocco (see El País, 15 December 1982). 9 Towards the Brussels Declaration (March 1983–November 1984) 1 As part of the attack on Francis Pym, the new Conservative Party Press Officer, journalist Anthony Shrimsley, published an article a few days before his appointment was announced, harshly criticizing Pym for his policy towards Madrid on the Gibraltar issue (El País, 16 March 1983). 2 It was reported (El País, 19 April 1983) that the Admiral-in-Chief of the Spanish Naval Staff was informed of the manoeuvres by the Embassy in London on 30 March, but that the Spanish Foreign Office only found out from a Gibraltar television programme on 8 April. 3 Spain also saw an inconsistency in the British argument that the refusal by

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7 8

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Spain to open fully the border between Spain and Gibraltar was harming the Gibraltarian tourist industry, while at the same time threatening the Gibraltarian economy with the closure of the shipyards that provided 4,000 jobs (see El País, 15 April 1983). Britain argued that this would require a change in Gibraltar’s legislation, without mentioning the fact that the Governor of Gibraltar could initiate such legislation as a sign of goodwill on Britain’s part (see El País, 13 April 1983). The Spanish Government was committed by its election manifesto to hold a referendum on continued membership of NATO, and its intention was at this stage that such a referendum would be held in 1985. A different type of confusion arose some six months later when changes to British passports meant that the bearer’s place of residence was no longer indicated. This meant that Gibraltarians wanting to cross the border had to depend on the police either recognizing them or being able to tell from their accent that they were Gibraltarians (see El País, 17 June 1984). Morán took up the analogy between Gibraltar and Hong Kong in his meeting with Howe in New York in September (see The Times, 27 September 1984). The link between Gibraltar and Spain’s relationship with NATO appeared once more in October when it was reported that Lord Carrington, who had taken up his appointment as Secretary General to NATO in June, had indicated his willingness in principle to mediate between Madrid and London over the Gibraltar dispute if the two NATO members were to ask him to do so. Carrington’s appointment to the NATO post had been warmly welcomed in Madrid, for as Foreign Secretary he had negotiated the Lisbon Agreement (see El País, 26 October 1984). To these were later added social security and communications by sea. For the full text of the Brussels Declaration, see Appendix 3.

10 The border is fully opened; negotiations get under way (January–February 1985) 1 Since the opening of the border to pedestrians in 1982, many Gibraltarians had transported their cars by boat from Tangier to La Línea and left them parked there so that they could cross the border on foot, pick up their car and then drive along the Costa del Sol at will. 2 For a brief history of the dispute over the isthmus, see José Uxo Palasi 1986a. 3 Leaseback had, of course, been considered by the British Government in relation to the Falklands/Malvinas between 1979 and 1980, prior to the Argentinian invasion in April 1982. The reaction to the idea from backbench Conservatives at that time would have made any Foreign Secretary think twice before allowing it currency in relation to Gibraltar (see Young 1990: 259–60). 4 Other figures showed that 76 per cent were in favour of the full opening of the gates, but 73 per cent were opposed to the early concession to Spaniards of the same rights as citizens of other EC countries (see El País, 5 February 1985). This was an early indicator, borne out by the elections in 1988, that the GSLP was more in tune with majority opinion in Gibraltar that the then ruling party, the AACR. 11 Osmosis begins (February–November 1985) 1 Some residents of Gibraltar found it difficult to cross into Spain for many months after the full opening of the border, however. Members of the Indian community often had to travel to London to obtain a visa to enter Morocco, and then travel to Morocco to obtain a visa to enter Spain (see El País, 8 July 1985).

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2 One of the consequences of an increase in the number of tourists to the Rock was the threat posed to the Gibraltar apes. On 5 June an incubator was made available to assist new-born apes, and in keeping with established custom, following Howe’s visit it was expected that the next ape to be born would be called Geoffrey (see El País, 17 June 1985). 3 Such ratifications went through national Parliaments throughout the Community, including in Gibraltar, where predictably the vote was eight to seven in favour following the debate on 29 November. 12 Sovereignty and sovereigns (December 1985–April 1986) 1 Payments began in February 1986. By the time that an agreement was reached in 1989, whereby Britain would meet most of the cost of £15 million ($27 million) per year to be paid over 15 years, Britain had already paid £58 million ($104.4 million). 2 McQuarrie later denied that he had ever made such a statement (see El País, 14 April 1986). 3 For a brief study of the dispute over territorial waters, see José Uxo Palasi 1986b. 13 Into Felipe’s second term: guards and gates (June 1986–January 1987) 1 It was not until September 1992 that Spain reciprocated and withdrew its ceremonial guard. 2 It was reported that the interview caused a political storm in Gibraltar, and that Hassan denied having said that the Gibraltarians were British out of convenience. See El País, 24 September 1986, p. 15; Gibraltar Chronicle, 24 September 1986. 3 GIBMED came under the control of AFSOUTH (Allied Forces Southern Europe), based in Naples, which is part of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command Europe) near Brussels. 4 Sir James Fawcett QC, former legal adviser to the Foreign Office, believed that free association for Gibraltar would not conflict with the Treaty of Utrecht. See Gibraltar Chronicle, 13 December 1987. 14 The battle over the airport (January–December 1987) 1 One of the first companies to make Gibraltar its international headquarters was Barlow Clowes. The Times reported on 26 March 1987 that ‘Gibraltar has no intention of allowing its new-found status to become soiled by scandal and is keeping a close watch on its regulations to see whether there is scope for tightening its grip.’ On 7 June 1988 joint liquidators were appointed to wind up Barlow Clowes International and Peter Clowes was convicted on a number of charges of theft, conspiracy to steal and false accounting on 10 February 1992. This undoubtedly became a setback for the image of Gibraltar as an attractive international financial centre that the administration was trying to foster. 2 Fernández Ordóñez denied that the question of Gibraltar airport had only been raised on 9 June. He claimed that it had been discussed a year earlier with Sir Geoffrey Howe, but that Spain had not wished to make it public in order not to hinder the talks (see El País, 28 June 1987). 3 In Gibraltar the leader of the opposition, Joe Bossano, tabled a motion to be debated in the House of Assembly in which Spain was accused of ‘an attempt to deprive Gibraltar and its people of their rights as part of the European Community’ (see El País, 30 June 1987). 4 So called because it was first used in Luxembourg by France in 1966.

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5 It was such a statement, first made by Britain in 1966, that contributed to the closure of the border by Franco. 6 El País, reporting the same incident the same day (18 September 1987), quoted Hassan as having said to Plumb: ‘I have no wish to be humiliated (. . .) you have insulted all Gibraltarians.’ 7 The editorial in El País on 10 December 1987 tried to do so, however, by claiming that ‘the logic of the agreement is to put into question the principle of British sovereignty over the Rock.’ 15 Gibraltarians vote to resist (December 1987–March 1988) 1 An interim agreement was reached on 10 August 1988 whereby the British Government would provide £2.36 million ($4.24 million) between midSeptember (when Gibraltarian funds ran out) and 7 December (by which date a new agreement had to be reached). This new agreement was announced on 3 December. 2 The incident was to re-emerge in March 1989 (see Chapter 18). 3 Joe Bossano had acquired most of his early political experience as a trade unionist. Between 1958 and 1972 he spent a good deal of time in Britain, working first in the London docks and then as a merchant seaman. In Gibraltar he was a branch officer in the TGWU, turning it into the Rock’s most powerful union. He also spent some further time in Britain studying at Birmingham University. 16 First visits by first ladies (April–December 1988) 1 Spain’s Defence Minister, Narcís Serra, visited London on 21 April to discuss the proposal with his British counterpart, George Younger. An agreement was reached along the lines of the British proposal, but not identical to it. Narcís Serra’s defence of Spain’s position was that it avoided the NATO aspect of Gibraltar interfering with negotiations. 2 For further discussion of the inquest, see Chapter 18. 3 Thatcher was also the last of the EC heads of state or government to visit Spain following Spanish entry into the Community in January 1986. 4 The pressure took the form of a request by Lynda Chalker, Minister of State at the FCO, to Joe Bossano when he visited London at the end of September that he should put in writing his objections to the airport agreement. 5 It was reported (El País, 19 October 1988) that Gibraltar’s Chief Minister interpreted the Queen’s comments as a clear indication of the British Government’s respect for the Gibraltarians’ right to determine their own future. 17 The Bossano strategy (January–February 1989) 1 The Mayor of La Línea, Salvador Pagán, expressed the hope that Joe Bossano’s idea of turning Gibraltar into the Hong Kong of the Mediterranean (see Chapter 18) would act as a further way of encouraging a move on the airport issue, as it would require the use of the airport to be extended (El País, 2 January 1989). 2 One of the first acts of the Bossano administration was to establish the Gibraltar Land Reclamation Company which, during a nine-month period in 1988, increased building land in Gibraltar by one-sixth. It involved bringing 200,000 tons of rock from Spain, which were levelled off with 2.5 million cubic metres of sand. 3 A further incident occurred ten weeks later when a Gibraltarian barge, the Rock Service, was accused of discharging waste within Spanish waters.

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4 The issue of the airport had also been picked up by the Governor Sir Peter Terry in his New Year message, when he referred to the British Government’s desire to reach a solution on the airport issue. Bossano replied, again rejecting any cooperation within the framework of the Brussels Declaration because it represented ‘a threat to the British sovereignty of Gibraltar and to the identity of the Gibraltarians’ (El País, 9 January 1989). 5 The Chief Minister was under some pressure not just from the FCO; the influential Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce wanted him to allow flights between Gibraltar and Madrid as a first step in order to improve commercial links with the Spanish capital. 6 Many Gibraltarians already had a vested interest in developing such cooperation. Over 1,000 of them rented apartments in the Campo region, while annually Gibraltarians were now spending some £15 million ($27 million) in Spain. 7 The meeting had been scheduled for mid-December 1988, but had been postponed due to Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to Britain. 18 A European Hong Kong? (March–December 1989) 1 The Attorney General in Gibraltar eventually quietly dropped charges in January 1990. 2 Gibraltar had been excluded from an agreement on tackling contraband signed at the EC summit in Madrid three days before the incident occurred. It was estimated that 500 tons of hashish per year were brought across the Strait from Morocco and entered Europe either through Gibraltar or the Spanish Costa del Sol. It was also alleged that this had led to the laundering of drug money on the Rock, and that some of the thousands of new companies set up in Gibraltar were being used by drug traffickers to buy up Spanish property. Spain and Britain attempted to improve cooperation on these matters through accords signed in February 1990 (see Chapter 19). 3 Some weeks later a right-wing Senator for Málaga, Enrique Bolín, was sentenced to four months imprisonment in Gibraltar for possession of cocaine. He was released on medical grounds on 19 September after serving three weeks of his sentence following an appeal to the Gibraltarian Supreme Court. On release he claimed that the Gibraltarian authorities had ‘wanted to show their teeth to Spain’, and regretted the fact that the Spanish authorities had done nothing to help him (see El País, 20 September 1989). 4 Earlier in the year it had been reported that Gibraltarian Ministers were considering proposals to extend the airport on reclaimed land. They included a new terminal and a longer runway that would enable larger planes to land than the current Boeing 737s. It was seen as part of Gibraltar’s plan to reject the agreement reached between London and Madrid on joint use of the airport, and to offer an alternative that would be acceptable to all parties concerned. At that stage (April 1989), the Gibraltar Government had not taken any decision on the proposals. 5 However, as Gibraltar’s Chief Minister pointed out in a letter to The Times on 17 February 1990, the 1987 Agreement did give the people of Gibraltar or their elected representatives the right to decide whether or not to implement it, and they had chosen not to do so on numerous occasions. 6 Montegriffo was calling for Gibraltar to be allowed to participate in the talks in its own right, and not just as part of the British delegation. There was no indication that Spain was likely to concede on this point.

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19 Tackling money-laundering and smuggling (February–December 1990) 1 According to the results of a survey published in Panorama, 78 per cent of Gibraltarians were also opposed to the European directive on joint use of the airport. 2 In June 1991, a Financial Services Commission was established to regulate all financial companies. One of the measures introduced to combat moneylaundering was to restrict cash deposits to £10,000 ($18,000) in all Gibraltarian banks, and to investigate the origins of those over £5,000 ($9,000). 3 By early 1992, the amount of investment in Spain originating from Gibraltar exceeded 37,000 million pesetas (over $264 million) per year. An Income Tax Reform Law introduced in Spain in January 1992 made such companies subject to Spanish taxation through the Special Company Tax (Impuesto Especial sobre Sociedades). In anticipation, during the course of 1990 and 1991 many of these companies located in Gibraltar transferred to other countries, particularly to Holland, where the tax system was less rigid than in Spain and with whom Spain had an agreement to avoid double taxation in such cases. 4 In a Parliamentary reply to Jerónimo Andreu in November 1990, this ‘loophole’ – whereby speedboats could operate out of Gibraltar – was blamed by the Spanish Government for the failure of their anti-smuggling measures passed in September 1989. In August 1989, a memorandum from the Guardia Civil to the Treasury accused the Gibraltarian authorities of aiding and abetting tobacco smuggling. 5 An important contact between the Rock and the Campo was re-established at Governor level when, on 11 May, Admiral Derek Reffell, the Governor of Gibraltar, paid the first official visit for 25 years to the Governor of the Campo, General Carlos López Poza. However, this was a diplomatic formality that had more of a symbolic than a practical impact. 6 In mid-December Gibraltar offered to open its airport to Spanish planes, but the Spanish Government turned down the offer on the grounds that it was outside the 1987 agreement. 20 Felipe visits London (January–May 1991) 1 The book concerned was Clive Ponting’s 1940: Myth and Reality. For a more accurate description of events, see Costello 1991: 359. 2 This position was totally contradicted later in the year by the General Secretary of the centre-right Partido Popular in Spain, Francisco Alvarez Cascos. On 3 May, speaking in Algeciras, he said that the Spanish Government should never have opened the border, arguing that ‘any surrender of the Spanish position on Gibraltar should be rejected if it does not contribute to the advancement of the recovery of sovereignty, even though there may be favourable economic reasons to do so’ (El País, 4 May 1991). 3 Gibraltar’s Chief Minister was also in discussion with the Mayor of Jerez, Pedro Pacheco, and on 15 January returned the latter’s visit to the Rock made in August 1990. 4 United States air and naval forces used Gibraltar for an anti-terrorist exercise simulating the rescue of diplomatic personnel on 9 February. British troops were not involved. Whereas at one time such activities would have provoked Spanish protests, there were none on this occasion. 5 Several British newspapers claimed that this was the first visit to Britain by a Spanish Prime Minister. In fact, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo had visited Britain as Prime Minister in January 1982 (see Chapter 5). 6 Margaret Thatcher had, of course, visited Spain in September 1988 (see

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Chapter 16), and as heads of government she and Felipe González would have encountered each other on many occasions. The fact that they probably did not find much to say to each other is indicated by a report of the dinner held in Versailles on 20 November 1990 at the CSCE summit. The Prime Ministers of Spain and Britain were seated next to each other, but when asked, González said that he did not speak to Thatcher ‘because I don’t speak English and there wasn’t an interpreter’ (El País, 23 November 1990). If they had really wished to do so, they could have communicated in French. 7 However, according to the Chairman of the British Gibraltar Group in the House of Commons, Michael Colvin, those polled were not asked whether sovereignty should be part of the negotiations (see Hansard House of Commons Debates, 15 July 1991, Col. 198). 21 Four more years for Joe Bossano (May 1991–January 1992) 1 The ecu (the name was an acronym of ‘European currency unit’, but also the name of an old French coin) was the forerunner of the single European currency, the euro. On 28 December 1991 Harrods became the first British retail store to accept Gibraltarian ecus, in anticipation of ecu coins to be minted elsewhere. 2 For a study of Spain’s efforts to deny Gibraltar international sporting recognition (including Gibraltar’s attempts to join FIFA and its European equivalent, UEFA), see Gold 2002. 3 The boot was on the other foot just over a year later when, in July 1992, the International Cricket Council was asked to consider an application from Spain for affiliate membership. Gibraltar, with five cricket grounds on the Rock, played in the ICC Trophy tournament as an associate member of the Council, and viewed Spain’s application with some apprehension. 4 However, an EC agreement was reached at the end of October on the mutual recognition of tourist visas for visitors from third countries. The agreement did not mention border controls, and the Gibraltar dispute did not therefore affect it. 22 The external frontier issue remains unresolved (February 1992–March 1993) 1 By contrast an incident at the end of January, in which two Gibraltar-based Harrier fighters intercepted an Aviaco Fokker 27 flying from Melilla to Málaga, provoked no reaction at all from the Spanish authorities. 2 An opposition motion calling on the Spanish Government to insist upon the implementation of the 1987 airport agreement in Gibraltar was defeated in the Spanish Parliament on 19 May. 3 Despite a good deal of pressure being applied by other member states during May 1992, Britain was able to use the fact that the signing of the External Borders Convention was being delayed as a means of insisting upon immigration checks for all travellers even after the Single European Act came into effect at the beginning of 1993. 23 Setbacks in moves towards economic independence (April 1993–April 1994) 1 The remaining four applications were similarly dealt with in October 1993. 2 In September the Government of Gibraltar announced that it would offer early retirement and repatriation to the 2,000 workers from Morocco, in order to provide more employment for Gibraltarians and other EU citizens.

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3 Britons living in Gibraltar were technically immigrants until they had lived there for 25 years. 4 Since the thirteenth century the sovereignty of the principality of Andorra had been vested in the Head of the French State and the Spanish Bishop of Urgell as ‘co-princes’. However, in 1993 the people of Andorra voted to convert the country into an independent, democratic principality with sovereignty vested in the people, although under the new constitution the French President and the Bishop remained joint heads of state. When later references were made to the ‘Andorran model’ of sovereignty, awareness of the 1993 conversion was not always apparent, as it was still held up as a model of ‘joint sovereignty’ even though this was no longer the case (see Chapter 37). 5 With the entry into force at the beginning of November 1993 of the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union (EU), references to the EC will hereafter be replaced by those to the EU. 6 The appointment of a permanent Commissioner was being held up by the lack of clarity over whether he should be answerable to London or Gibraltar. The issue was finally resolved in July 1994 with the appointment of John Milner, formerly a banker in Hong Kong, as Financial Services Commissioner, with Gibraltar having to concede that he was answerable to the UK Treasury and the Bank of England, since Britain was the party answerable to the European Commission for Gibraltar’s financial affairs. 7 To make matters worse, the Gibraltar Government was accused in a Danish Court case in March 1994 of bribery against Baltica. 24 The Brussels Declaration ten years on: slow progress on all fronts (June–December 1994) 1 The only source of income for many families in and around La Línea came from unloading the cases smuggled on to Spanish beaches (at 2,000 ptas or $18 per case) or storing them (at 1,000 ptas or $9 per case), while those working the speedboats out of Gibraltar could earn £100 ($180) for every trip involving 20 cases. The so-called ‘Winston boys’ in Gibraltar and the low paid or unemployed of the Campo had a common interest in the survival of the tobacco-smuggling trade. As for the Gibraltar Government, income from legally imported cigarettes (mostly from the US) amounted to £16 million ($28.8 million) in 1994, about 20 per cent of total revenue, but if all of the tobacco imports were consumed on the Rock it would mean that each inhabitant was smoking an average of seven packets per day. 2 The 10 per cent figure in 1994 compared with 51 per cent in 1960. Comparative GDP figures were 9 per cent and 65 per cent. 3 Gibraltar’s call for self-determination was given support by the European Parliament’s Gibraltar in Europe Representation Group following a visit to Brussels in early November by Joe Bossano. However, the claims of the group spokesman, Alf Lomas, that the fate of the Gibraltarians ‘is going to be a big issue in the coming months’ (Press Association, 9 November 1994) proved to be somewhat over-optimistic. 4 ‘The Straits and the Western Mediterranean arena are likely to play a significant role in the immediate future’ (El País, 28 November 1994). 5 The size of the problem is indicated by figures from the Spanish police authorities, showing that the amount of cannabis seized rose from ten tons in 1992 to 32 in 1993 and over 50 in 1994. 6 The sense of outrage felt in Gibraltar at such a betrayal from the mouthpiece of middle England was reflected in a letter that the same newspaper published on 22 December written by the leader of the opposition (later to become Chief

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Minister), Peter Caruana. ‘You are mistaken’, he wrote to the editor, ‘in urging Spain to pursue a policy of seduction to achieve final and peaceful union. The people of Gibraltar have been British for nearly 300 years and wish to remain so. We do not want to be Spanish. It is as mistaken as it is offensive to us to suggest that we might be seduced from our deeply-felt allegiance to the Crown by Spanish kindness and pesetas’ (Daily Telegraph, 22 December 1994). 7 Joe Bossano found an ally in the shape of the Labour MP Andrew MacKinlay, who in a debate in the House of Commons accused the British Foreign Secretary of appeasing Spain and behaving in a ‘reprehensible and unreasonable way’ towards Gibraltar’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 19 December 1994, Cols 1443–4). 8 A Spanish reporter observed that unusually Solana used the word frontera (frontier or border) six times during the press conference rather than the usual la verja (literally ‘the gate’, the established term used in Spain to refer to the frontier with Gibraltar) or la línea divisoria (the dividing line). An Embassy official later described this as ‘a slip of the tongue’ (El País, 21 December 1994). 9 A more positive view came from the Spanish camp, with Solana reporting that ‘we have discussed and exchanged ideas in great depth’, and expressing the hope that one day these would bear fruit, while Hurd said to reporters that the issue ‘of sovereignty has not been dealt with in any depth’ (El País, 21 December 1994). 25 Defiant Bossano finally gives way (January–July 1995) 1 Joe Bossano was back in Madrid at the beginning of April, when he had informal discussions over dinner with the Minister for Public Administration, Jerónimo Saavedra, and the Social Affairs Minister, Cristiana Alberdi. This was apparently the first time that he had succeeded in his endeavours to meet Spanish ministers, as part of his strategy to establish a direct dialogue with the Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana, learned with displeasure about the meeting from the Gibraltarian press. 2 It was because Spain saw the frontier with Gibraltar as an external border that travellers entering Spain from Gibraltar, even from other EU states, had always had to show their passports rather than national identity cards. The legality of this was challenged in the European Commission by a British MEP on 19 May, and on 1 July Spain decided to allow EU citizens to use identity cards instead of passports. However, the identity cards issued to British residents in Gibraltar were not recognized by the Spanish authorities, and in November Britain lodged a formal complaint against Spain. 3 The situation was not assisted by the arrest near Algeciras on 26 May of three Gibraltarians plus two residents from Ceuta on board a boat that contained cigarettes worth 150 million pesetas ($1.1 million). 4 Canepa also made it known that between March 1994 and May 1995 the British Government had given Gibraltar £250,000 ($450,000) to assist the Gibraltarian police in the fight against smuggling. 5 In an enquiry in June 1996 into allegations of corruption against the Deputy Commissioner of the Royal Gibraltar Police, it emerged that the British Foreign Office ordered an illegal bugging operation against police and others suspected of involvement in the drug trade in Gibraltar, without the knowledge of Joe Bossano (see The Times, 23 June 1996). 6 Shortly after this engagement on 23 June, Douglas Hurd announced that he would be stepping down as Foreign Secretary. He was replaced by Malcolm Rifkind. 7 To illustrate how important banking had become within Gibraltar’s financial

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services sector, in 1995 there were 28 international banks (21 were locally incorporated and seven were branches of banks incorporated elsewhere in the EU). Eleven of the banks offered only offshore services. 26 Changing Spanish attitudes? (July 1995–April 1996) 1 To illustrate the point, in a letter to The Times printed on 19 April the Spanish Ambassador in London wrote that since July 1995 (when action against the high-speed boats was taken), 12 out of 51 reported incidents of drug-running via Gibraltar-based boats involved craft which were supposed to have been confiscated. The letter, however, prompted a rejoinder on 26 April from Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, who accused Spain of not being as tough as Gibraltar in its antismuggling legislation and controls. 27 All change, but no change: Aznar, Caruana and Blair in power (May 1996–June 1997) 1 Peter Caruana’s background could not have been more different from that of his predecessor as Chief Minister. He was educated at an independent school in Britain, and went to the University of London to study Law. He married the daughter of Joseph Triay, one of the ‘Doves’ of the 1960s. A third-generation descendant of Maltese outfitters, he was a former Commodore of the Royal Gibraltar Yacht Club. He was outpolled in the election by four votes by his deputy, Peter Montegriffo, who founded the GSD in 1989. 2 Just as Javier Solana had done in 1994 (see Chapter 24, n8), Aznar inadvertently referred to ‘the border’ (la frontera) rather than the standard diplomatic term of ‘the gate’ (la verja), when, following the Gibraltarian election, he talked of the ‘serious irregularities that disturb normal operations in the Campo de Gibraltar and the border with Spain’ (El País, 18 May 1996). 3 When the next session of talks was eventually scheduled for 27 September in London, they failed to take place because the participants could not agree on the language in which the talks would be conducted. 4 To the chagrin of the four representatives of Coalición Canaria the resolution made no specific reference to Spanish NATO command over the Canary Islands, and they abstained. 5 In the event, it was agreed in December that the restructuring of NATO would be postponed until a meeting in July 1997 in Madrid, pending the resolution of a disagreement, between France and the United States over NATO’s southern European command in Naples, which the US insisted should remain under American control because of the presence of the US Sixth Fleet. Subsequently, as a result of this disagreement, France decided not to rejoin NATO’s military structure, and the whole restructuring exercise was further postponed (see Chapter 28). 6 The Gibraltarians claimed that the Spanish Government had imposed this restriction on Gibraltar via Spain’s then state-owned company, Telefónica. It meant that Gibraltar’s telephone lines came out of those allocated to the province of Cádiz, with a maximum of 30,000 numbers. Spain did, however, recognize Gibraltar’s international telex code, leading to the charge of inconsistency. 7 The office was eventually opened in October 1997. 8 The number of demonstrators was given as 5,000 in the Spanish press. There was a touch of irony in the fact that some of the placards were written in Spanish, including one that said ‘Gibraltar británico mientras exista un gibraltareño’ (‘Gibraltar will be British for as long as there are Gibraltarians’) (El País, 14 May 1997).

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28 Spain’s full integration into NATO (May–December 1997) 1 By a stroke of fate, Sir Joshua Hassan, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister between 1964 and 1987 (with the exception of the period 1969–1972), died at the age of 81 on the very day that Hong Kong was returned to China. 2 Spain and Portugal eventually reached a bilateral agreement on 1 October that the Canary Islands and their surrounding waters, despite being located in the Atlantic Ocean, would be part of the redefined Mediterranean command SACEUR, thus ensuring that the whole of Spanish territory would be under the same NATO command. In exchange, Spain agreed formally to recognize Portuguese sovereignty over three uninhabited islands 80 miles to the north-east of the Canaries, known as the Islas Salvajes, which would remain under the Atlantic command SACLANT. 3 The full integration of France was also deferred until the question was resolved over who should control the Southern Europe command in Naples; the US insisted on retaining control because of the presence of the US Sixth Fleet. 4 The Treaty stated that Spain could exercise controls over anyone entering Spain from the UK or Ireland ‘or from any territory whose foreign relations are their responsibility’, thus leaving intact Spain’s right to treat the bordercrossing with Gibraltar as an external border. Robin Cook later admitted to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee that a diplomatic ‘misunderstanding’ had given Spain a veto if Britain should decide in the future to opt in to aspects of the Schengen Agreement on open frontiers (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 1997: Minutes of Evidence, 4 November 1997). 5 The Falkland Islands were also excluded from the review, confirming Gibraltarian suspicions that the British Government wanted to avoid discussion, in the review, of territories disputed by other nations. 6 In February 1998, Gibraltar was due to open a tourist office in the centre of Madrid. However, the Spanish authorities, as unhappy about the idea as they had been about the office in Brussels, blocked the opening, apparently on the grounds of non-compliance with fire regulations. It eventually opened in January 1999. 7 The other issue that was resolved only at the last minute was the dispute between Greece and Turkey over control of the Aegean Sea. 8 A Spanish Foreign Ministry spokeswoman described a report in The Times on 8 December suggesting that Spain would propose a 99-year lease to Britain as ‘wrong’ (El País, 9 December 1997). A proposal to share sovereignty had also been put forward in 1985 by the then Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández Ordóñez (see Chapter 11). 9 These advantages included the fact that the exempt companies could be managed and controlled from within Gibraltar (unlike other UK off-shore financial centres such as the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man). In addition Gibraltar was not party to any double taxation agreement, and therefore did not exchange information with any other fiscal authority (see Mondaq Business Briefing, 17 June 1998). Other fiscal incentives included the absence of capital gains tax, wealth tax, inheritance tax, gift and estate duty, as well as VAT. 10 The idea of a working group was a new departure, and probably more to the advantage of Spain than to any other party because it would enable it to keep an eye on any developments regarding Gibraltar’s proposal to change its relationship with Britain.

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29 The shadow of the shared sovereignty proposal (January–December 1998) 1 The Chief Minister came in for some criticism for the fact that his confidential proposals had not been debated in Gibraltar and only became public via a leak to the Gibraltar journal. Later in the year Peter Caruana gave the clear impression that the Gibraltar Government and the FCO were in the process of working out how to modernize Gibraltar’s constitution (The Times, 17 November 1998). 2 The announcement by the British Foreign Secretary also included an indication that the Government would be examining the possibility of granting full British citizenship, including the right of abode in the UK, to all 186,000 citizens in the overseas territories (such a right was currently held only by citizens of Gibraltar and the Falklands/Malvinas, and some Hong Kongese). These options were confirmed when the Government published its White Paper ‘Partnership for Progress’ in March 1999 (see Hansard House of Commons Debates, 17 March 1999, Cols 1125–37). 3 The Cammell Laird venture proved immediately successful, and in May and June 1998 sales were approaching £1 million ($1.8 million) (see Panorama, 13 July 1998). However, later in the year some redundancies were reported (Panorama, 2 November 1998). 4 The bad news for the British Government was that in a poll published by Panorama on 18 May, 81 per cent said that in general terms they thought that the British Government’s support for Gibraltar tended to be either bad or indifferent. 5 Several weeks later, Matutes went as far as to say that if Gibraltar were to become part of Spain, Gibraltarians would be able to keep their British nationality indefinitely (see Agence France Presse, 23 July 1998). The ‘border policy’ was put into operation five months later. 6 Available online at http://www.gibnet.com/texts/pcun98.htm (accessed 17 March 2004). See also Caruana’s speech at the UN Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization), 7 October 1998, available online at http://www.gibnet.com/press/pcun1098.htm (accessed 17 March 2004), the Spanish response and the UK reply (M2 Presswire, 13 October 1998). 7 On 27 September the Spanish Foreign Minister put his offer of joint sovereignty to the UN; the UK representative Stewart Eldon reiterated the British Government’s standard line referring to the Treaty of Utrecht and the 1969 Constitution, implying that the British Government had no intention of changing its position. 8 Although the Treaty of Utrecht makes no mention of territorial waters, cession of such waters together with the territory are usually considered as implicit in relation to treaties of cession, while the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone not only states that sovereignty extends to ‘a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea’ but also instituted the convention of the median line which divides rights over the territorial sea between neighbouring states (see Panorama, 7 September 1998). 9 See Sunday Times, 27 September 1998; El País, 6 October 1998; Panorama, 19 October 1998. 10 It later transpired that the Spanish interpretation of the agreement was very different from that understood by the British Government. According to a press release issued by the Gibraltar Government Secretariat on 4 November, Spain claimed that the agreement permitted fishing in breach of Gibraltarian laws, and also that Spanish law applies to Spanish fishermen in Gibraltarian waters (http://www.gibnet.com/press/p981105.htm). The British Government

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rejected this interpretation in a letter on 5 November from the Minister of State, FCO, to the Chief Minister (http://www.gibnet.com/press/fco1.htm) that was immediately made public. 30 Confrontation sparked by fishing row escalates (January–March 1999) 1 On 29 January Matutes wrote to the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, complaining that, despite assurances given throughout 1997, ‘a large number of directives remain to be applied in Gibraltar’, and calling on the Commission to ‘require the British Government to fulfil its obligations as the member country responsible for the colony of Gibraltar’ (El País, 30 January 1999). Spain’s objective appeared to be to reduce Gibraltar’s capacity to maintain its independent economic viability, as well as to protect the economy of the Campo. Gibraltar’s Chief Minister responded by saying that most of the directives mentioned by Matutes had indeed been implemented, and that Spain’s record was worse than that of Gibraltar (Panorama, 4 February 1999). 2 Coincidentally, on 29 January Gibraltar opened a tourist office in Madrid. Both Gibraltarian authorities and the Spanish Foreign Ministry were at pains to stress that the office was in no way to be seen as a diplomatic mission (Agence France Presse, 29 January 1999). 3 Matutes was quoted as having said (in rather undiplomatic language): ‘As far as I’m concerned they can hang these agreements or permits or whatever they are on their ship’s mast, they can put them in their papers or they can frame them and hang them in their bathroom’ (El País, 2 February 1999). 4 See House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (1999a), Minutes of Evidence, Appendix 4. 5 About 1,400 of these workers were ‘official’, with an equal number ‘unofficial’. Many were paid ‘cash in hand’, and if they could not get across the border they did not get paid (El País, 4 March 1999). Several hundred set themselves up on 12 February as the Union of Spanish Workers in Gibraltar in order to put pressure on the Government to ease the border restrictions (El País, 14 February 1999). 6 Coincidentally, British Airways, which subcontracted its Gibraltar flights to GB Airways, agreed on 12 February to buy a 9 per cent stake in Iberia, the Spanish flagship airline that was in the process of being privatized (The Times, 13 February 1999). 7 It would appear that the licences referred to were not those issued to residents of Gibraltar but some 6,000 issued to Spaniards who (it was alleged) fraudulently claimed that they were resident in Gibraltar (see letter from the Spanish Ambassador in London, Alberto Aza, published in the Daily Telegraph, 17 February 1999). 8 On 14 April the Gibraltar Court returned the confiscated nets and equipment, fined each fisherman £180 ($325), and repaid £120 ($216) of the £300 ($540) bail that had been paid at the time of the arrests. The relatively small fine imposed was in part due to the fact that by the time the judgement was made the activities for which they had been charged were no longer illegal. 9 When explaining the rationale for the Government’s actions, Matutes said: ‘We are not talking about a fishing dispute, nor even Spain’s claim to the sovereignty of the Rock, but the application of EU directives in the British colony’ (El País, 25 February 1999). 10 The argument about the directives appeared to hinge on whether some that had been adopted in Gibraltar were actually being applied. The regulations relating to ‘exempt companies’ prohibited both residents in Gibraltar and

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British subjects from setting them up. Invariably those who did so were Spanish, prompting Abel Matutes to ask his British counterpart to extend the prohibition to Spanish citizens. 31 Border events continue to predominate (April–July 1999) 1 By way of reinforcing the Spanish allegations, an investigation carried out in 1998 by the Spanish Government into money-laundering in Gibraltar from the sale of drugs bought in Morocco in exchange for electronic equipment was reported in the media in May 1999 (see BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 May 1999; El País, 10 May 1999). 2 The aspects of Schengen in which Britain intended to participate concerned police cooperation, legal assistance in criminal matters, tackling drugtrafficking, and the Schengen computer system. 3 Letters from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Gibraltar to the FCO dated 28 November 1998 and 23 February 1999 made it clear that Gibraltar wanted to participate in all aspects of Schengen in which the UK participated, and that ‘only the UK’s own non-participation should determine the extent of Gibraltar’s participation’. To the disappointment of the Chief Minister, the FCO ‘took note’ of Gibraltar’s wishes but did not guarantee to honour them, in order to give Britain the option (should it wish to do so) of participating in those parts of Schengen that involved border controls without prompting a Spanish veto on account of Gibraltar (see House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 1999a: Minutes of Evidence, Appendix 9). 4 As reported in the Minutes of Evidence to the Report, the Foreign Office Minister with responsibility for Gibraltar, Joyce Quin, made it clear that Britain had on several occasions allowed Gibraltar to exclude itself from EU agreements when Spain refused to recognize the competence of Gibraltarian authorities. On such occasions Britain had felt that it was preferable to adopt such a position in order not to delay the implementation of certain EU directives, but members of the Committee argued that this stance allowed Spanish objections to hold sway (see House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 1999a: Examination of Witnesses, 30 March 1999, Questions 46–54; 108–13). 5 In the event, the Commission voted on 1 July to postpone a decision on legal proceedings against Spain for border delays until September, when a new Commission was due to take office. 32 A second term and a satisfying agreement for Caruana (August 1999–April 2000) 1 Ladbrokes had been operating in Gibraltar since 1992, but did not accept bets from the UK until 1999. 2 At the beginning of October 1999 the British Government announced that it intended to persuade overseas territories, including Gibraltar, to change their legislation so that British companies could not gain tax advantages to the tune of about £1 billion ($1.8 billion) per year. 3 The abolition took effect in October 2001, three months earlier than planned. As a consequence, a number of jobs in the betting industry in Gibraltar, which by the spring of 2001 had risen to over 1,000, were repatriated to Britain, although some gambling operations continued to be operated out of Gibraltar (see News Media Age, 3 May 2001). In February 2002 there were eight betting companies operating in Gibraltar with a total of 412 jobs (Gibraltar Chronicle, 20 February 2002). This had risen to 11 companies and 537 jobs by October the same year (Gibraltar Chronicle, 19 October 2002).

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4 See also M2 Presswire, 8 October 1999, for an elaboration of the Spanish argument. 5 An early indication of the continuation of Caruana’s cooperation policy with the neighbouring Campo was the offer made towards the end of February 2000 to local councils to open an office in Gibraltar to promote tourism in the Campo region (Panorama, 28 February 2000). 6 Gibraltar would be included in all aspects of Schengen in which Britain was opting to participate, except the Schengen Information System (the computer network relating to law enforcement and border controls) and the provisions on cross-border surveillance, following objections from Spain. 7 For a more negative view of the outcome from a Spanish perspective, see Felipe Sahagún (El Mundo, 20 April 2000), who believed that the EU, the Gibraltarians and the UK in that order came out best from the agreement, and that Spain had made all the concessions. 33 The saga of HMS Tireless (I) (May–December 2000) 1 The arrival of the submarine coincided with a visit to Gibraltar by the junior Foreign Office Minister Keith Vaz, who upset Gibraltarians by apparently making light of their concerns over the presence of the stricken vessel (Panorama, 22 May 2000). 2 Two years earlier, the Commander of British Forces had made it clear that repairs to nuclear power plants on submarines would not be carried out in Gibraltar (see Panorama, 26 June 2000). One of the requirements for categoryX status (to which the Gibraltar docks evidently could not conform) is that there should not be a substantial population centre in the vicinity. This led to a degree of cynicism about the provisional change of status of the repair berth, although the British Government insisted that it was a temporary enhancement and not an upgrade. 3 It would clearly have been highly dangerous to have attempted to tow a nuclear-powered submarine back to its home port in Britain, but it was also suggested that the fact that this involved one of its frontline hunter-killer submarines, which had only re-entered service 12 months earlier after an extensive multi-million pound refit, would be politically embarrassing (see Panorama, 3 July 2000). Another option – transporting the 4,000-ton submarine by boat – was proposed from time to time by interested parties such as the Dutch company Smit Transport (see Efe, 7 November 2000), but consistently rejected by the British Government. 4 Further pressure was applied in August 2000 by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in a report that reaffirmed many of the recommendations made a year earlier. The new report called upon the Government to take unilateral action, if necessary, to extend the franchise to Gibraltarians for the 2004 elections for the European Parliament (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2000a: para. 9). The response by the Foreign Secretary indicated that unilateral action remained under consideration (see House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2000b: para. 6, Recommendation 13). Discussions took place in London in early October 2000 to consider legislative and administrative matters concerning Gibraltar’s enfranchisement for European elections (see Panorama, 13 October 2000). 5 When communications were restored between Spain and Gibraltar in 1982, Spain refused to recognize Gibraltar’s international dialling code 350. As a compromise, Gibraltar was given the code 9567 as part of the Spanish domestic network (see Chapter 27, n6) for fixed-line operation (run as a joint venture between the Gibraltar Government and Nynex, part of the US company

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7 8

9 10

11

12 13

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Verizon Communications). With the introduction of mobile phones, 4,000 of these numbers were allocated to the mobile system (operated by Gibtel, a joint venture between the Gibraltar Government and British Telecom that ran Gibraltar’s international telephone system until Gibtel and Nynex merged in 2001 to form Gibtelcom). By early 2000 Gibraltar had run out of available numbers; in addition, Gibraltarian mobile phones could not communicate with Spain while Spanish mobiles did not work on the Rock because Spain had no roaming agreements with Gibraltar. According to one British Labour MEP, for an economy heavily dependent for economic growth on offshore financial services, the restriction of telephone numbers amounted to ‘electronic strangulation’ (see Daily Telegraph, 25 June 2000). The Regional Government in Andalucía announced on 26 September that it would start legal proceedings to have the repair to the submarine halted on account of ‘the lack of protection for 250,000 Andalusians’ (El Mundo, 27 September 2000). As a result of the strong anti-Tireless feelings, there were reports that British secret service agents were posing as tourists in La Línea in order to try to prevent any sabotage attempts against the submarine (see Panorama, 3 October 2000). Three weeks after the meltdown story had appeared in the Guardian, the Sunday Times ran with the same story on 19 November, and again there was an echo in the Spanish press the following day. The Spanish Embassy in London received confirmation from the FCO that the story was ‘absurd, irresponsible and without foundation’ (Efe, 19 November 2000). This view was publicly countered by the Staff Association of the CSN in a statement on 6 November (see El Mundo, 7 November 2000). In fact the Spanish nuclear experts were not permitted to visit the reactor compartment due to ‘military restrictions’, so although the CSN subsequently reported that their earlier conclusions about safety issues had been confirmed by the visit, representatives of groups opposed to the presence of the submarine in Gibraltar called the visit ‘a farce’ and ‘playing to the gallery’ (Efe, 4 November 2000). It was also suggested by the General Secretary of the Izquierda Unida that Tony Blair’s agreement to allow the visit was designed to help José María Aznar to counter criticisms for his handling of the submarine affair (see El Mundo, 5 November 2000). Following their inspection visit, representatives of the CSN met with British counterparts every two weeks so that information could be exchanged regarding the progress of the repairs. Despite its predominance, the Tireless incident was not, of course, the only arena of conflict over Gibraltar at this time. It will have been of some comfort to Gibraltarians to learn on 30 October that the European Commission had written to the Spanish Government to express its concern at the continuing border delays due to what it considered to be disproportionate checks, and asked Spain to justify the measures. The letter, which was welcomed by Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, also expressed disappointment at the fact that the agreements reached in April 2000 on competent authorities and recognition of Gibraltar ID cards as valid documents did not appear to have reduced the number of complaints about delays at the border. On 20 December, Spain submitted a report justifying its actions. The question of the border became an issue at the EU summit in Nice. There was initially some confusion in Gibraltar as to whether an agreement had been reached in the early hours of 12 December that matters relating to external borders would no longer need to be decided by unanimity, and that Spain had secured support for a clause which excluded Gibraltar from the agreement.

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15 An attempt by the Spanish socialists in a debate on 14 December to enlist the support of the European Parliament for the removal of the submarine from Gibraltar also failed. 16 The Government’s position was not assisted by the revelation at this time that the submarine had continued to sail under nuclear power for some 36 hours after the leak had first been discovered, despite the fact that a considerable amount of irradiated coolant had escaped into the ship’s bilge. This only served to undermine confidence in the British Navy’s ability to take appropriate safety precautions in relation to the repairs. 17 A survey undertaken by the Centre for Sociological Studies reported that only 0.6 per cent of Spaniards said that it was the main issue for them (see Panorama, 28 December 2000). However, that represents about a quarter of a million people – virtually all of whom, no doubt, lived in the vicinity of the Rock. 34 The saga of HMS Tireless (II) (January–May 2001) 1 Meanwhile, to the embarrassment of the authorities, an international group of Greenpeace activists managed to breach the security cordon around the submarine on 16 January and unfurled a banner calling for a nuclear-free sea. 2 There were also suggestions that Piqué’s tough stance was more for domestic consumption, to counteract recent criticisms of the Spanish Government on the mishandling of the appearance of BSE or ‘mad cow disease’ in Spain and the exposure of Spanish troops to depleted uranium in the Balkans (see The Times, 10 February 2001), not to mention public concern over the Tireless. 3 Abel Matutes had described Gibraltar in these terms in July 1999 (see Chapter 31). 4 Gibraltar had asked for recognition of the 350 code and a massive increase in the number of telephone lines. Apart from the loss of a weapon against Gibraltar if these concessions were granted, what worried Spain most was the fact that it would result in unfair competition because Gibraltar could offer Spanish businesses a telephone service that was exempt from VAT, whereas Spanish companies charged 16 per cent. 5 This was not the only EU air transport initiative that was blocked by the Gibraltar dispute at this time; there were a further five measures, including EU membership of the European air traffic control body, Eurocontrol. 6 Felipe Sahagún (El Mundo, 15 March 2001) argued that Piqué’s tough reaction was more part of the Spanish Government’s strategy to re-establish the Brussels Process talks than any unease concerning the latest manoeuvres in Gibraltar. 7 Two weeks later, a representative of the PP proposed a motion in Congress rejecting any change to Gibraltar’s colonial status that might lead to selfdetermination. The motion was supported by representatives of all parties, excluding the Basque Nationalist Party which (for obvious reasons) defended the right to self-determination in all cases (Efe, 3 April 2001). 8 Little did Piqué realize that within a few months Britain would reciprocate these sentiments, accepting the argument that it was contradictory to expect Spain to discuss questions of cooperation while Britain refused to discuss sovereignty. However, he also raised once more the issue of Spain’s involvement in the use of the military base in Gibraltar, and, citing the case of HMS Tireless, he underlined the need for Spain’s ‘legitimate security interests’ (Efe, 14 March 2001) to be taken into account. He could not have realized (or could he?) that this would ultimately prove to be a major stumbling block in Britain’s reciprocation.

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9 To Spain’s surprise, Britain also confirmed that the Brussels Process was ‘still operative’ (despite the fact that there had been no meeting to discuss sovereignty since the end of 1997) (Efe, 15 March 2001). 10 The ‘fourth option’ was established by a UN General Assembly resolution in 1970 in recognition of the peculiarities of the then remaining 22 territories that still had colonial status. The resolution stated that if none of the three conventional routes to decolonization (independence, integration or free association) was appropriate, then a territory could adopt any appropriate status in keeping with its circumstances and accepted by its people in an act of self-determination – in other words a referendum (El Mundo, 20 January 2002). 11 Gibraltar accused Britain of going back on this position just over a year later when London and Madrid agreed a system in relation to EU aviation measures, whereby the Commission would decide whether or not any measure involves airports in general and Gibraltar airport in particular. If it does, Spain will request and Britain will agree to the application of the Gibraltar suspension clause. Gibraltar condemned such arrangements as illegal and politically unacceptable (see Gibraltar Chronicle, 23 March 2002) because it gave Spain a say in Gibraltar’s affairs. The justification given by the FCO was that the events of 11 September 2001 required a degree of pragmatism in order to guarantee aviation security across the EU (El Mundo, 23 March 2002). 12 The cost of the repairs totalled more than £3.5 million ($6.3 million), including at least £600,000 ($1.1 million) to support the boat’s crew in Gibraltar (Western Morning News, 3 March 2001). 35 The Brussels Process resumed (May–October 2001) 1 See Chapter 21 for Spain’s opposition to Gibraltar’s application for membership of the International Olympic Committee. For details of Spain’s attempts to join international sporting organizations, as well as problems relating to efforts by Gibraltar to participate in international sporting competitions, see Gold 2002: 164–78. 2 Spain had still not signed by February 2003 because of the issue of Gibraltar (Efe, 12 February 2003). 3 The annual discussion of Gibraltar before the UN Special Committee on Decolonization took place in New York on 19 June 2001. Not surprisingly, the arguments put forward by all sides remained the same as in previous years (see Efe, 19 June 2001; M2 Presswire, 20 June 2001). 4 It had been intended to postpone the July deadline to 30 November, but this was never confirmed by OECD ambassadors (Gibraltar Chronicle, 11 October 2001). In November, the deadline for the submission of letters of commitment to the OECD requirements was fixed for 28 February 2002 (United Press International, 17 January 2002). 5 In 2001 the bunkering figure for Gibraltar was almost three million tonnes, compared to 1.5 million for Algeciras (Lloyd’s List, 1 August 2002). 6 Delays at the border-crossing, which could affect the schedule for the transit of supplies to visiting vessels, clearly put Gibraltar at a competitive disadvantage, but this was offset by the advantage of the proximity of the airport for the transfer of personnel. 7 Gibraltar was also exploring the possibility of establishing a container transhipment terminal, but again Algeciras was a competitor since the Danish company Maersk Sealand already operated such a terminal in the Spanish port, and later in the year the Government announced that such a project was unlikely to be commercially viable (Gibraltar Chronicle, 6 November 2001).

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8 Piqué indicated Spain’s willingness to tackle the telecommunications issue, ‘strictly provided that this did not open the way to unfair competition’ from Gibraltar (El País, 27 July 2001). He was planning to propose the increase of several tens of thousands of new fixed telephony lines ‘as a gesture of goodwill in the talks’ (Efe, 2 August 2001). This brought a sharp reaction from the Gibraltar Government, which objected to the link that Spain was making between the talks and telecommunications, as well as Spain’s attempt to control Gibraltar’s competitive commercial activity. What Gibraltar really wanted, it was argued, was for Spain to recognize Gibraltar’s right to its own numbering system independent from Spain, and for Gibraltarians to be able to use the roaming facility for their mobile phones in Spain. The offer to recognize the independent code 8563 together with 100,000 new numbers was eventually announced at the end of 2002 (see El País, 31 December 2002). 9 Piqué was under the impression that Caruana would take part in the talks, according to Efe in London, which reported on the same day (26 July) that ‘at Britain’s initiative, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, Peter Caruana, will take part in the negotiations. Piqué said that his participation is “very positive” and “very important” ’. 10 A week later Piqué made it quite clear what he thought of the first condition when he told journalists of his hope that Caruana would participate in the talks ‘but only as part of the British delegation and in matters within his competence’ (El Mundo, 3 August 2001). 11 One speaker at the rally argued that ‘if Miss Gibraltar can take part in Miss World, then the footballers of Gibraltar can take part in the world cup’ (Panorama, 10 September 2001), a reference to the fact that on 7 September the Executive Committee of UEFA had decided to postpone a decision on Gibraltar’s application for membership until 2003 (El País, 8 September 2001). 12 As a consequence, Caruana withdrew his intention to participate at the third annual conference of the chief ministers of British Overseas Territories in London. The other representatives issued a statement in support of Gibraltar and criticized the British Government for failing ‘to uphold their rights [of the people and Government of Gibraltar] as members of the European Community’ (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 154/2001, 25 September 2001). 13 As recently as June 2001 the British Foreign Office had been arguing that ‘it was not acceptable to systematically exclude Gibraltar’ from such measures (Panorama, 25 September 2001). However, Britain was quite prepared to change that policy to suit the context of the broader negotiations with Spain that were now in the offing. 14 Gibraltar was further excluded on 11 October from a proposed EU Commission regulation on aviation security, following Spain’s threat to veto the measure unless Britain agreed to exclude Gibraltar. Although the British Government said that it would nevertheless ensure the same standards of security at Gibraltar airport as elsewhere, the Gibraltar Government was highly critical of London for its failure to stand up to Spain on this issue (Gibraltar Chronicle, 13 October 2001). Further exclusions occurred in April and May 2002 (see Gibraltar Chronicle, 1 June 2002), and on passenger rights in December 2002 (Gibraltar Chronicle, 9 December 2002). 15 The Governor’s comments, together with the fact that he said he would receive the demonstrators as the representative of the Queen, gave some observers the impression that he was distancing himself from the FCO line on Gibraltar (see Panorama, 8 October 2001). 16 For full details of Spain’s attempt to join UEFA, see Gold 2002: 167–71. 17 The Voice of Gibraltar Group accused the Foreign Office of ‘wheeling Howe

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out of hibernation’, and argued that Gibraltarians ‘should never have placed our trust in his hands’ in the 1980s (Gibraltar Chronicle, 27 October 2001). 18 The report, which contained a number of factual errors and which was seen in Gibraltar as ‘a “planted” story by an anonymous Foreign Office official as part of the campaign to pressurise Gibraltarians into submission’ (Panorama, 29 October 2001), included the rather surprising suggestion that British officials ‘believe Gibraltarians will accept a compromise, which will be put to a referendum’ (Guardian, 29 October 2001). In view of subsequent events, this was either wishful thinking, or else it calls into question the efficacy of FCO intelligence on the matter. On the same day Agence France Presse, however, quoted a more cautious British spokeswoman who said that ‘joint sovereignty is viewed as an “extreme” option by the government’, while on the following day a FCO representative was quoted as saying that ‘there are no proposals on the table on either side on the discussion’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 30 October 2001). However, the proposals in the Guardian story were evidently placed on the table during the ensuing three weeks. 36 Pique and Straw meet in Barcelona (November 2001) 1 While the British and Spanish Governments were urging Gibraltar’s Chief Minister to attend the talks, other political representatives were also trying to get an invitation. The Mayor of Algeciras, Patricio González, argued that he and other mayors from the Campo region should be invited as their region was directly affected by Gibraltar’s status (see Efe, 10 November 2001). As a compromise, they were invited to a briefing with the Foreign Office Minister, Ramón de Miguel, following the talks. 2 The Minister for Europe, Peter Hain, claimed responsibility for bringing Caruana and Bastarreche together (Gibraltar Chronicle, 29 November 2001). 3 There was a parallel OECD initiative specifically designed to tackle moneylaundering, called the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), with its own blacklist (it did not include Gibraltar) which was separate from that relating to harmful tax practices (see Accountancy Age, 18 April 2002). 4 This was the focus of the letter that Gibraltar duly submitted just before the deadline at the end of February 2002, in which it gave a commitment to achieve transparency by 2005. As a consequence, it was removed from the list of territories deemed to have harmful tax practices (Efe, 14 March 2002). However, the letter made it clear that Gibraltar expected its fiscal autonomy to be recognized (Gibraltar Chronicle, 15 March 2002). Despite the nature of the OECD requirement, Gibraltar agreed to abolish differentials between domestic and offshore corporate tax rates, although the uniform rate was yet to be decided (International Money Marketing, 6 December 2001). Although Gibraltar had been removed from the OECD list, the Spanish Government retained Gibraltar on its own official blacklist of 48 tax havens (El Mundo, 22 April 2002). 5 Peter Hain had made this last point explicit when he said in the House of Commons: ‘Our European partners do not understand why a dispute between two member states over territory with a population one fifteenth that of Luxembourg should be a deciding factor in such decisions’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 7 November 2001, Col. 90WH). Needless to say, Gibraltarians were not impressed by the reference to the size of the Rock’s population, which implied that the situation might be different if more people were going to be affected. 6 Prior to the start of the meeting, three of the demonstrators were invited for a brief discussion with the Foreign Secretary. They wanted to know why they had

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not yet received a reply from the Prime Minister to a letter that, together with the Declaration of Unity, had been handed to a Foreign Office official at the Governor’s residence on 4 October. Somewhat to Straw’s surprise, an official reminded the Foreign Secretary that he had replied to the letter on Blair’s behalf the day before, although by 18 December no reply had apparently been received (Panorama, 18 December 2002). The Gibraltar Government later formally gave four reasons why the offer of additional telephone numbers was unacceptable both from a commercial and a regulatory perspective (see Gibraltar Chronicle, 24 January 2002). This subsequently prompted the Mayor of La Línea to seek regional government funding for a new hospital (Gibraltar Chronicle, 24 January 2002). This referred to the pensions payable by Britain to pre-1969 Spanish workers in Gibraltar that had been frozen by the British Government since an agreement was signed in 1996, and which the Gibraltar Government claimed could be increased by Britain at any time (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 191/2001, 20 November 2001). The Gibraltarian opposition parties were also calling for urgent progress by the House of Assembly Committee on Constitutional Reform (which had been meeting since December 1999) in order to finalize its proposals for a revised relationship with Britain (see Chapter 34) as an alternative to any proposals from the Anglo-Spanish talks (see, for example, Panorama, 20 November 2001). Three days after the talks in Barcelona there was a meeting of the Committee that reported some progress. However, opposition parties expressed serious concerns about the apparent lack of urgency by the Committee in finalizing its proposals for the de-listing of the territory as a colony (see, for example Panorama, 26 November 2001). There was also a hostile article in the Scotsman. All of the antagonistic articles, especially the accusations of financial irregularities, were vigorously rebutted in letters from leading Gibraltarians, including the Chief Minister (see Panorama, 22 November 2001). On 4 December, two weeks after the Barcelona meeting, another written Parliamentary question asked ‘What discussions have taken place between the [Defence] Department and the Spanish Government over (a) joint use and (b) joint decision making of the (i) naval base and (ii) RAF base at Gibraltar?’. This time Ingram merely answered ‘None’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, Vol. 376, 4 December 2001, Col. 226W). Such a response does not make it certain that these matters were not discussed between the two Foreign Ministers, since the question asked specifically about discussions with the Ministry of Defence, but it does suggest that at this early stage the question of the military facilities had not been raised in the sovereignty negotiations. In response to another questioner, Straw admitted that the issue of the airport would also be part of the discussions. Contrary to the position taken by British Governments hitherto, Straw accepted that Britain’s sovereignty claim to the isthmus was different from the remainder of the territory (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 27 November 2001, Cols 824–5), thereby raising fears once more in Gibraltar that the Government might be considering a separate sovereignty deal on the isthmus and the airport. However, Straw’s junior Minister, Peter Hain, corrected this view in a written answer a few days later when he stated that the territory of Gibraltar ‘includes both the Rock and the southern part of the isthmus (. . .) UK title is based on both the Treaty of Utrecht and continuous possession over a long period of time’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 5 December 2001, Col. 312W).

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37 Rumours of joint sovereignty proposals (November 2001–January 2002) 1 Under Gibraltar’s Constitution, the Governor (who is appointed by the FCO) is responsible for law and order, while the implementation and supervision of financial regulations are the responsibility of the Financial Services Commissioner, who is appointed by the Foreign Secretary. 2 Hain claimed that the British Government had been able to proceed with the extension of the franchise to Gibraltar for European Parliamentary elections on the basis of an agreement with the Spanish Government that they would not oppose it (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2001c: Examination of Witness, Paragraph 69). Spain had wisely withdrawn its veto, since to have done otherwise would have meant opposing a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (see Chapter 30). However, because the enfranchisement of Gibraltar was through a change in UK law only, the territory remained excluded from the EU Act on direct elections to the European Parliament (see Panorama, 5 July 2002). 3 The talks on the future of Northern Ireland did, however, offer the negotiation model that Gibraltar was seeking, whereby a party that was not a sovereign state was permitted to participate in its own right (the ‘two flags, three voices’ model). 4 Some months later, when the Foreign Secretary was asked about integration with Britain as an option, he gave the opposite answer, remarking that it ‘would be consistent with the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht’. However, the negative reasons he gave were that Gibraltar would have to accept all the acquis of the EU, including the Common Agricultural Policy, the Common Customs Union, the Single Market and Common Taxation, none of which was currently the case (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2002a: Examination of Witness, Paragraph 54). 5 It was clear from a Parliamentary written answer to a question on 12 December that no imminent meetings were planned on either side (see Hansard House of Commons Debates, 12 December 2001, Col. 853W). 6 See Hansard House of Commons Debates, 10 December 2001, Cols 630–3W; 11 December 2001, Cols 825–6W; 12 December 2001, Cols 853–4W. 7 Lord Howe’s intervention, in which he commented that Gibraltar ‘is probably the biggest disappointment of my time [at the Foreign Office]’ (Hansard House of Lords Debates, 12 December 2001, Col. 1391), drew trenchant criticism from the GSLP/Liberal Opposition in Gibraltar: ‘He should understand that these problems [faced by Britain in Europe] are the result of his own failure, when he was Foreign Secretary, to safeguard the position of Gibraltar before Spain joined the Community’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 19 December 2001). 8 It is highly probable that those who referred to the Andorra model in the debate thought of it as an example of a territory in which sovereignty is shared. However, since 1993 the sovereignty of Andorra has been vested in the people, and it was for that reason that Gibraltar’s Chief Minister was attracted by the idea: ‘I do think that the new post-1993 Andorra model supported by both France and Spain is precisely the sort of solution we could well examine and might well support’ (Parliamentary Brief, 1 May 2002). Even the British Foreign Secretary seemed to misunderstand the nature of the sovereignty in modern Andorra (Gibraltar Chronicle, 8 May 2002). There was a suggestion (Panorama, 14 March 2002) that the British Government had been considering ‘an Andorran solution’ to the problem of Gibraltar in 1971, and that the relevant Foreign Office file was being withheld. 9 Sir Emyr was the UK Ambassador to NATO but, according to the FCO, ‘for

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12

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14 15

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historical reasons retains responsibility within the FCO for the renewed discussions between the UK and Spain over Gibraltar’ (quoted in Panorama, 7 January 2002). He relinquished this responsibility in October 2002. In fact Jack Straw had been contemplating making a visit to Gibraltar for some time, and in December 2001 had sent one of his advisers, Ed Owen, to the Rock to take some soundings on the advisability of such a visit. Bossano also learned that a sub-group of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee had recently met a similar group of their Spanish counterparts in Madrid, at which meeting the question of Gibraltar’s possible participation in the Customs Union and VAT were discussed. Bossano pointed out to the Committee that such matters were ‘none of Spain’s business’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 18 January 2002). Speculation about a change in Gibraltar’s EU status as part of the AngloSpanish negotiations had led to a motion in the House of Assembly on 20 December 2001 and a letter to the Foreign Secretary on 11 January 2002, to which a response from Peter Hain was written on 20 February. The reply indicated that ‘if a change in the status of Gibraltar within the EU could help advance that objective [of a better future, greater self-government and better relations with Spain], then the British Government would be prepared to consider this, in consultation and discussion with the Government of Gibraltar’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 28 February 2002). The Gibraltar Opposition, who insisted that there should be no change to Gibraltar’s terms of membership of the EU unless the Gibraltar Government initiated a request for it, rejected this reply. They feared that Britain might discuss such a change with Spain that Gibraltar may not then be able to veto (idem). Suggestions that Mandelson was attempting to position himself for later involvement were supported by his co-sponsorship of an Early Day Motion in the House of Commons calling for the First [sic] Minister to participate in the next round of talks. Mandelson was chairman of the Anglo-Spanish Parliamentary Group (Gibraltar Chronicle, 24 January 2002). This version of events was denied by the Governor’s spokesman, who said that the Spanish vessel did withdraw and made no claim about territorial waters (Gibraltar Chronicle, 26 January 2002). On 31 January, Peter Hain told the House of Commons that he had written to Caruana following the ‘long, friendly and constructive discussions with him’ on 25 January (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 31 January 2002, Col. 137WH). Although he did not indicate whether he had answered Caruana’s concerns about a ‘done deal’, it became clear that he had not done so. The demonstration had been called by the opposition GSLP–Liberal Alliance, which for some time had opposed any participation in the Brussels Process. Since the Government did not support the demonstration, it did not attract widespread support (Gibraltar Chronicle, 1 February 2002).

38 Gibraltarians plan their resistance (February 2002) 1 Caruana responded two days later by saying that if the British Government refused to consider constitutional change on a bilateral basis, then Gibraltar’s response would be to opt for ‘no constitutional modernisation’ and instead focus on a programme of political lobbying (Gibraltar Chronicle, 7 February 2002). The Opposition in Gibraltar attacked Caruana’s apparent submission regarding Gibraltar’s constitutional proposals, which were still awaiting approval by the House of Assembly (Panorama, 7 February 2002). 2 See Chapter 37. For a detailed account of the demonstration, see Gibraltar Chronicle, 5 February 2002.

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3 Straw indicated that Caruana had given him reasons ‘that I do not want to go into in public’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 5 February 2002, Col. 739) as to why he felt he could not take part in the discussions. 4 Piqué’s interpretation of the referendum seemed to be rather different. In an interview given on 7 February but not published until a few days later he said that ‘Spain cannot accept that the Gibraltarians have the right to selfdetermination’ over British territory, but had ‘no objections to them being consulted about their regime of self-government’ within the framework of Spain’s highly devolutionary constitution (El Mundo, 11 February 2002). This suggested that Britain and Spain were some way apart on the significance of a referendum, both in terms of whether it would represent a power of veto and what it would really be about. Spain’s position was partly determined by concerns over the effect of a referendum in Gibraltar on some of the regions of Spain, notably the Basque Country, if it were seen as an act of self-determination. 5 This was a reference to the fact that the accountancy firm Arthur Andersen had shredded substantial parts of the records of the giant US corporation Enron when the latter ran into financial difficulties in 2001. Straw’s position was later confirmed when Peter Hain was questioned in the House of Commons on 16 April (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 16 April 2002, Col. 452). 6 Gibraltar’s tax regime was introduced in 1967 and was aimed at attracting international business. It applies income, corporation and withholding tax, but also offers ‘non-resident, non-Gibraltarian individuals and entities to either be tax exempt or substantially reduce their exposure to these taxes’. It has no VAT or other sales tax, estate duty or capital gains tax (FT, 4 June 2002). If Gibraltar were to be integrated with Britain, it would be possible for it to retain a special tax status. This is the case with Spain’s North African enclaves Ceuta and Melilla. 7 On this occasion, unlike Sir Joshua Hassan’s attempt to visit the then President, Lord Plumb, in 1987 (see Chapter 14), Spain did not raise any objections to his meeting with the current President, Pat Cox. It emerged that the President confirmed to the Chief Minister that any financial support from the European Commission to Gibraltar as part of an Anglo-Spanish settlement would have the backing of the European Parliament (Gibraltar Chronicle, 11 February 2002). 8 Together with the activities of the finance centre, tourism and shipping continued to grow. According to the Minister for Tourism and Transport, tourism represented about 35 per cent of GDP and numbers of visitors had increased from four million in 1996 to seven million in 2001, with 200,000 cruise passengers. Overnight stays had increased by almost 30 per cent during the same period. In shipping, the number of vessels calling into Gibraltar had risen from 3,500 in 1996 to 6,500 in 2001, and the provision of supplies had increased from one million to three million tonnes (Parliamentary Brief, 1 May 2002). 9 The standard of living of Gibraltarians remained significantly higher than that of the inhabitants of the Campo. Per capita income in Gibraltar was 21,534 euro ($25,840) (178 per cent higher than the Campo), while unemployment was at 2.5 per cent (compared to nearly 30 per cent in the Campo) (Cinco Días, 19 March 2002). 10 In addition to replacing tax-exempt and qualifying companies (of which there were some 8,800 and 120 respectively) by a low uniform tax rate, Gibraltar was continuing to develop its finance centre through the enactment of a number of ordinances designed to improve various sectors such as captive insurance, fund management, securitization/repackaging and wealth management (formerly known as private banking). The total assets of the 19 banks in Gibraltar amounted to $7.8 billion in September 2001 (Financial Times Expat, 1 March

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15 16

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2002; see also Cinco Días, 19 March 2002), although for those that conduct only offshore business the amount was $2.7 billion (see Gibraltar Chronicle, 20 March 2002). Caruana then embarked on a series of lectures in Britain, starting with the University of Cambridge on 11 February 2002, in which he sought the support of British public opinion. By contrast, it was revealed a few months later that the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry had dedicated C30,000 ($36,000) from its reserves to finance a campaign aimed at persuading the Gibraltarians that they would benefit from the Anglo-Spanish talks (El País, 25 June 2002). The Guardian article incorrectly suggested that the funds for the promotional campaign came from the FCO (see Panorama, 17 February 2002). Four months later, it was suggested by Spanish Government sources that the Marines had deliberately planned the ‘invasion’ in order to put pressure on the British Government to halt the negotiations. This suggestion was based on the fact that ten minutes was longer than the troops needed to realize their mistake, and also that the weather (given as a reason for the mistake) could not have been a factor that day (El Mundo, 26 June 2002). The PSOE tried to make political capital out of the story, but the Defence Minister considered the matter closed (El Mundo, 27 June 2002). It may have been more than coincidence that this story emerged at a time when the negotiations appeared to be floundering. A second incident occurred when a landing craft lost power and drifted outside Gibraltarian waters, before returning to them once the fault had been fixed (Panorama, 18 February 2002). The representatives of the Spanish media at the press conference walked out at the conclusion of the statement because, unusually, Caruana chose not to repeat his statement in Spanish (although he did provide a written translation) (Panorama, 25 February 2002). Caruana found it difficult, however, to let go entirely of the notion that, if there were an open agenda, he would be willing to participate in talks (see, for example, Panorama, 12 April 2002). For the benefit of securing a wider audience and broader press coverage, Caruana flew to London to deliver the statement at the Foreign Press Association building in London on the following day. Twelve of the taxis bearing the Gibraltar logo and slogan were prominently on show outside the building (Gibraltar Chronicle, 23 February 2002). This explains why the Constitutional proposals were not submitted as soon as they had been agreed, and why the British Government only received them in December 2003.

39 Gibraltarians take to the streets (March–April 2002) 1 It was reported that when the European Parliament endorsed a resolution on 20 March supporting the Anglo-Spanish negotiating process, an error with the CCTV feed from a closed meeting between the Spanish Prime Minister and the European Popular Party Group (to which both Aznar’s party and the British Conservative Party belong) led to the public airing of an angry intervention from a Conservative MEP, who told Aznar that it was as unacceptable for Gibraltar to be handed to Spain as it would be for Ceuta and Melilla to be handed to Morocco (El País, 21 March 2002). 2 Peter Caruana explicitly accused Spain of abusing the presidency. Since Spain had the right to draft the communiqué, he argued, and since none of the other EU members (apart from Britain) had any great interest in the subject,

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4

5 6

7 8 9

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none of them was going to bother to ask for that paragraph (on page 16 of a 23-page communiqué) to be taken out (El Mundo, 19 March 2002). However, he may have forgotten how tedious other member countries found it whenever EU agreements either had to make special exclusions for Gibraltar or else could not be implemented on account of the dispute between Britain and Spain. According to Lloyd’s, this was not the case: Algeciras would lay claim to be southern Europe’s leading container port, being a hub for the Danish company Maersk Sealand and having major expansion plans. Moreover, even without further investment Gibraltar is already a major bunkering port, supplying three million tonnes of fuel per year, much of it Spanish, which it would lose if its tax advantages were to be removed as a consequence of any agreement reached (Lloyd’s List, 21 March 2002). Both territories were, however, already in receipt of their own EU funds – the Campo was given a share of the C12,000 million ($14,400 million) for the period 2000–2006 received by Andalusia for its ‘Objective 1’ status, while Gibraltar had ‘Objective 2’ status because of special development problems and received C8.4 million ($10 million) over the same period, plus C400,000 ($480,000) to assist with commercial relations with Morocco (El País, 19 March 2002). The reaction in Brussels was that the figures being suggested were too high: the French Commissioner for Regional Policy was quoted as saying that it was ‘a lot of money for such a small place’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 4 April 2002). It was also condemned by Michael Ancram on behalf of the Conservative Party. He wrote a letter of support to Gibraltar’s Chief Minister in which he described the reference to Gibraltar in the statement as ‘a blatant bribe’ and the Government’s treatment of Gibraltar as ‘shoddy’. He pledged that the Conservatives would ‘fight this sell-out tooth and nail’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 19 March 2002). Joe Bossano, on behalf of the Opposition, made it clear that he remained opposed to any dialogue (idem). El País (20 March 2002), commenting on Caruana’s linkage of Gibraltar and the Falklands/Malvinas, recalled the stance that Spain had taken 20 years earlier, namely that the two cases were ‘different and distant’. The original English version of the letter in the Gibraltar Chronicle is unavailable. The translations are therefore the author’s, from the Spanish version available on-line dated 25 March 2002: http://www.mae.es/documento/ 0/000/000/500/carta_abierta_gib_250302.pdf. Following the meeting, the Mayors, together with the President of the Cádiz Regional Council, announced a proposal to establish a joint venture company with Gibraltar to undertake flights from Madrid and Barcelona to the Rock to benefit the communities on both sides of the border (Efe, 9 April 2002). On the Spanish side, this arrangement was, however, predicated on the successful completion of an agreement between Britain and Spain, much to the irritation of the Opposition in Gibraltar who knew nothing about the plan. Caruana explained that the proposal did not raise any political issues as far as the airport was concerned (Gibraltar Chronicle, 13 April 2002). Further cross-border projects were announced on 22 May: a unilateral proposal by the President of the Andalusia Regional Government and a joint venture between Gibraltar and Los Barrios (see Gibraltar Chronicle, 23 May 2002). On 2 August two crossborder companies were formed, one registered in Los Barrios and the other in Gibraltar, to foster economic development. There was also a suggestion that Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar was becoming less of an issue for ordinary Spaniards generally. A poll published in La Vanguardia showed 41 per cent not opposed to Gibraltar being granted some

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form of independence (traditionally the figure had been around 25 per cent) (quoted in Panorama, 5 April 2002). A poll published seven weeks later in the same paper showed 60 per cent supporting Gibraltar’s independence (Panorama, 23 May 2002). 12 Thereafter, the issue of the military facilities in Gibraltar became a third ‘redline’ issue in the negotiations, as Peter Hain made explicit for the first time on behalf of the Government in the House of Commons on 16 April (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 16 April 2002, Col. 451). For a more detailed study of this aspect of the negotiations, see Gold 2004. 13 Prior to the talk, Caruana told a reporter that that he was taking legal advice on how Gibraltar’s Constitution could be used to prevent or challenge a joint declaration of principles, since such a declaration might infringe the Preamble. If such a challenge were brought, it would be undertaken through a process of judicial review (see Panorama, 11 April 2002). 14 At about this time, newly declassified Foreign Office papers revealed that in 1971 the Conservative Government of the day had been considering divesting itself of Gibraltar. The then Ambassador in Madrid described Gibraltar as economically ‘of no benefit to us and indeed of late [it] has begun to cost the British taxpayer money. Militarily, in the age of the intercontinental ballistic missile, Gibraltar can only be an extinct volcano’ (Sunday Times, 14 April 2002). The Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was considering some form of lease-back over 999 years as a ‘form of token recognition of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar’, while another idea put forward a compromise plan of handing over the territory to the Catholic Order of Malta under a lease agreement (idem). Owing to the major domestic preoccupations of the Government, nothing came of these ideas, and in early 1974 the Labour Party took power. However, these revelations of earlier Conservative thinking were inevitably used by the current Labour Government to attack Conservative opposition to its plans (see, for example, Hansard House of Commons Debates, 16 April 2002, Col. 454). 40 Negotiations run into difficulties (April–May 2002) 1 The issue had last come to the fore at the end of 1993 on the expiry of the agreement about pension payments reached in 1988. Until then Gibraltar had been paying the pensions out of a special Social Security fund, and when it was closed the Spanish Government, jointly with the Junta de Andalucía, took over the payments as an interim measure until (as the Spanish authorities saw it) Britain met its obligations, which it finally did from March 1996. 2 That was not the end of the matter over pensions, as it reappeared two months later. The accusations about a pensions ‘scam’ were repeated when Straw appeared before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 19 June. When asked whether he would support Hain’s use of the word ‘scam’, the Foreign Secretary said: ‘I think that the common definition of a scam would be something which was opaque, not transparent and also potentially unlawful. I am afraid to say that both apply to the pensions situation in Gibraltar’ (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2002a: Examination of Witness, Paragraph 29). The Chairman of the Committee later described the use of the term as ‘provocative, extravagant and unhelpful’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 3 July 2002). On 2 February 2003 it was reported that the EC had found that there had been no discrimination against Spanish pensioners, and that neither the Household Cost Allowance nor the Elderly Persons Allowance (which had also been brought into the equation) were subject to EU regulation (Gibraltar Chronicle, 3 and 4 February 2003).

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3 The Foreign Secretary later denied that any agreement would affect the Treaty of Utrecht (Gibraltar Chronicle, 7 May 2002). 4 Spain’s understanding was that Britain was not seeking to retain full sovereignty over the military facilities, but rather full control, and that although this could be problematic in a regime of shared sovereignty it would not be insuperable (El País, 27 April 2002). 5 There was also speculation regarding the manner in which under a shared sovereignty arrangement Gibraltar could be incorporated into the Spanish administrative system. One suggestion was to give Gibraltar the status of autonomous town, as in the case of Ceuta and Melilla, by applying Article 144b of the Constitution, which establishes that ‘if there are reasons of national interest’, Parliament can ‘agree a statute of autonomy for territories that are not part of the provincial system’ (La Vanguardia, quoted in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26 April 2002). The reaction in Gibraltar to this was that it would make any deal even less acceptable (Panorama, 29 April 2002). Spain’s Foreign Minister described such thoughts as ‘speculation that does not correspond to reality’ (Efe, 30 April 2002). 6 A communiqué following their meeting announced that they had made progress but that ‘major difficulties’ remained (El País, 2 May 2002). 7 It was suggested that Aznar’s comments in the Guardian interview on 30 April might well have been prompted by Hain’s reference to a ‘permanent’ solution (El Mundo, 1 May 2002). 8 There were those who suggested that Hoon’s letter was viewed by the FCO as damaging to the negotiations, and that it reflected the Defence Secretary’s ambition to succeed Jack Straw as Foreign Secretary (The Times, 10 May 2002). 9 It is unclear when the letter from Hoon was written and sent to the Foreign Secretary, but it is likely that it was before 16 April, when Hain made clear that the British Government’s position on maintaining current arrangements at the military base was now a ‘red-line’ issue. The reason for the deliberate leak at this stage, almost one month later, was partly as a response to Piqué’s statement of 30 April and partly to provide the opportunity for the Foreign Office to reiterate, both for the benefit of the heads of the armed services in the MoD and the Pentagon as well as for the Spanish negotiators in the meetings that were scheduled over the coming weeks, that its non-negotiable stance on the military base was for strategic defence reasons. 10 The state of negotiations affected a sporting event at this juncture, when the Gibraltar Government withdrew its support for teams to attend the Fifth Strait Games due to be held on 31 May and 1 June 2002 in San Roque in the Campo, since the host town insisted on describing itself in relation to the Games as ‘San Roque – where the town of Gibraltar resides’ [‘La ciudad de San Roque – donde reside la de Gibraltar’]. This is a motto that has been attached to the name of the town following the displacement of the original population of Gibraltar in 1704, and which the Town Council insisted was officially part of the town’s name, although apparently this is not confirmed in the records of the Spanish Ministry of the Interior. The Gibraltar Government claimed that the use of the phrase was ‘contrary to the spirit and intent of the Games’ (see Gibraltar Chronicle, 14 May 2002). 11 It was later reported that some 300,000 messages and 45,000 e-mails were sent to the Government Office of Gibraltar in London following the placement of the advertisements (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 18 June 2002, Col. 24WH). 12 A few days later, on 27 May, Joe Bossano took part in a debate with three law professors on Basque regional television on the question of selfdetermination. In the course of the debate one of the professors suggested that

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the concept of joint sovereignty might also be appropriate for the Basque country (Gibraltar Chronicle, 30 May 2002). 41 Straw announces agreed principles (June–July 2002) 1 In his budget speech a week later, Caruana repeated his accusations of a ‘dirty tricks’ campaign and explained that the data referred to were currently being produced but had hitherto been unreliable and therefore had not been published. On money-laundering, he angrily suggested that there was ‘more money-laundering in the City of London in 25 minutes than in Gibraltar in an entire year’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 15 June 2002). 2 In the same session before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in which Jack Straw had repeated the accusation of a pensions ‘scam’ (see Chapter 40), he also reiterated in an increasingly bitter exchange his annoyance about the absence of published Government statistics in an annual abstract (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2002a: Examination of Witness, Paragraphs 29–50). This prompted a statement by Gibraltar’s Accountant General, who claimed that ‘full information of the public finances of Gibraltar is made available to the public and any suggestion that this is not the case is just not true’ (Panorama, 27 June 2002). Further investigation by the Select Committee resulted in its conclusion that the Foreign Secretary had given misleading evidence and was wrong to criticize the Government of Gibraltar (Panorama, 29 July 2002). 3 A slight exaggeration: the 300th anniversary of British occupation of the Rock did not occur for a further two years. 4 Nor, apparently, did they do so during the G8 summit in Canada towards the end of June (Efe, 28 June 2002). 5 Spain has sovereignty over four islands off the coast of Morocco, but the 1912 treaty with France that set the boundaries of the Spanish protectorate in Morocco omitted to mention the Isla de Perejil. Soon after Morocco gained independence in 1956 the solution agreed with Spain was that neither country would occupy the island, and that agreement was honoured until 2002 (The Times, 19 July 2002). 6 Reasons given from Rabat included a desire to draw attention to the war against terrorism, illegal immigration and drugs, whereas Madrid suspected that the invasion had also to do with Madrid’s support for a UN resolution that a referendum be held in Western Sahara, a former Spanish territory annexed by Morocco in 1975 (ABC, 13 July 2002). The invasion also coincided with the celebration of the wedding of the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, not to mention the scheduled bilateral announcement of a declaration of principles agreed between Britain and Spain over Gibraltar. 7 Later in the year Palacio’s junior Minister, Ramón de Miguel, contradicted this view when welcoming the decision of the European Commission to investigate the fairness of Gibraltar’s tax regime He insisted that Gibraltar was part of the EU and therefore subject to the same financial directives as other EU territories (Efe, 14 October 2002). 8 It was unclear exactly what was meant by a ‘NATO base’ – NATO countries can seek permission to use military facilities in bases located in the sovereign territory of other members, but NATO has very few bases of its own where the Alliance is in command and according to a NATO spokesman there was no suggestion that Gibraltar should become an Alliance facility (see The Times, 27 July 2002). 9 As a member of NATO Spain already had access to the military facilities on the Rock, but had chosen not to make use of them.

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10 The reports did not agree on whether the British Prime Minister referred to ‘military sovereignty’ or just ‘sovereignty’ (see Agence France Presse, 25 July 2002). 11 Torry referred to a ‘durable’ rather than a ‘permanent’ settlement – the usual British term – and said that ‘agreements can always change if the signatories want to change’ (Daily Telegraph, 25 July 2002). Similarly, Hain, although still insisting that an agreement to share sovereignty had to be permanent, defined a permanent agreement as ‘an agreement which lasts until something else replaces it’ (El País, 25 July 2002). 42 Gibraltar holds its own referendum (July–November 2002) 1 In July 2002 the Gibraltar Government published a series of tax reforms to come into effect in July the following year, subject to approval by the EU. These involved the imposition of taxes on offshore companies for the first time through a payroll tax and an annual company registration fee. There would also be a business property tax similar to the property rates system. However, the corporate profits tax was to be abolished for domestic companies, bringing them into line with the offshore sector, except for financial services companies, which would be liable for an 8 per cent tax on profits, while utilities would be taxed at 35 per cent. The aggregate tax bill was to be capped at 15 per cent of a company’s total profits or £500,000 ($900,000), whichever was lower (International Money Marketing, 8 November 2002). On the situation relating to a European Commission investigation into Gibraltar’s tax regime, see Gibraltar Chronicle, 29 November 2002. 2 A few months later, in May 2003, Spain attempted to have the Gibraltar Kennel Club voted out of its Associate membership of the international body the Fédération Cynologique Internationale (FCI), which it had held since 1991. The proposal was almost unanimously defeated at the General Assembly in Germany (Gibraltar Chronicle, 30 May 2003). 3 There was considerable disappointment expressed by non-resident Gibraltarians at the fact that they had been excluded from those eligible to vote, but it was decided that this would avoid any possible criticism that the result was ‘distorted’ by people who would not be directly affected by joint sovereignty. There were also the added difficulties of defining non-resident Gibraltarians and of tracing them in order to compile an accurate register (Gibraltar Chronicle, 15 October 2002). 4 Some Gibraltarian pressure groups had sought to have the Gibraltarian flag flown on Ministry of Defence sites on National Day in order to demonstrate that Gibraltar territory includes the military base. Originally that had been agreed but, allegedly under pressure from the British Government, the policy was changed and no flags were permitted on MoD property (Panorama, 3 October 2002). 5 http://www.mae.es/documento/0/000/000/512/gibraltar_comunicado.pdf (accessed 23 March 2004). 6 For the Government’s response, see House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2002c. A further report published in July 2003 (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2003a) recommended (para. 12) ‘that the FCO withdraw its unacceptable joint sovereignty proposal, and then get on establishing normal and co-operative relations between Spain and Gibraltar’. The Government’s response (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2003b) was published in September 2003. 7 The Minister repeated the sentiment when the subject of Gibraltar next came up for discussion in the House of Commons (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 25 November 2002, Col. 133).

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8 MacShane did, however, slip up when he asked several rhetorical questions, including: ‘Does it [the referendum] solve the problems of communications with the rest of Spain?’ It is likely that he meant ‘the rest of the peninsula’, but Michael Ancram was not so generous, accusing MacShane of giving the game away and showing the Government’s willingness to give Gibraltar to Spain (Independent, 9 November 2002). 9 It transpired that the Prestige had taken on fuel while anchored offshore, and there is no requirement on port authorities to check a foreign-flag vessel on a routine basis if it remains outside a port (Gibraltar Chronicle, 15 November 2002). For Britain’s reply to the European Commission, see Gibraltar Chronicle, 20 November 2002. 10 Spain’s assumption that the fuel was destined for Gibraltar was partly based upon its resentment of the territory as a bunkering centre, since Gibraltar’s favourable tax regime resulted in twice the level of fuel sales as those of Algeciras just across the bay. 11 This undoubtedly refers to the European Commission and, through it, other EU members. 12 Britain’s Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Peter Torry, did come strongly to Gibraltar’s (and Britain’s) defence (see El País, 16 November 2002). 13 Almost exactly one year later, Spain appeared to confirm Gibraltar’s fears when it closed the border for the first time since 1985 after a cruise ship, the Aurora, briefly docked in Gibraltar because over 500 passengers had been taken ill with viral gastroenteritis. The border remained closed for 12 hours until after the vessel’s departure, even though those who temporarily disembarked had been obliged to leave their passports on board the ship and so could not have attempted to enter Spain. Jack Straw called the Spanish Government’s action ‘unnecessary and disproportionate’, and he protested to his Spanish counterpart, Ana Palacio, ‘in quite strong terms’ (The Times, 4 November 2003). Palacio claimed that Spain had taken the decision to close the border because it had not formally received any official information about the situation regarding the passengers, while Caruana argued that the decision was a purely political one (El País, 4 November 2003). 43 Recognition of democratic reality (December 2002–June 2003) 1 Peter Hain had made clear that this would be the case in an exchange of letters in December 2001 (see Chapter 37). 2 As a consequence of the Spanish Government’s decision, Spanish ports were losing bunkering business as there was an insufficient supply of double-hull tankers. Some of the lost business went to Gibraltar (Lloyd’s List, 6 March 2003). 3 There was immediate cooperation between the maritime authorities in Gibraltar and Algeciras in dealing with this accident, in contrast to the fact that in normal circumstances attempts by Gibraltar to discuss cooperation with Algeciras on a bilateral basis had been rejected by Madrid unless a British Government representative was present (Lloyd’s List, 17 March 2003). 4 The issue rumbled on for several months, with complaints from Ramón de Miguel, speaking on 23 April before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, about the way in which the journalists had been treated. The Minister accused Caruana of involvement in the police action (see report by Efe, 25 April 2003), prompting the Gibraltar Government Office to issue a statement reminding him of the separation of powers in Gibraltar and suggesting that his comments ‘reflect a continuing desire to poison Spanish public opinion against Gibraltar, particularly in the Campo’ (Government of Gibraltar Press Releases, 096/2003,

376

5 6

7 8

9 10

11

12

13

Notes

25 April 2003). There then followed an argument over where the case against the journalists should be held, since a local Spanish judge claimed that the Treaty of Utrecht did not give sovereignty of the land to the British Crown and argued that the nearest competent court to where the events took place was in La Línea (Gibraltar Chronicle, 15 May 2003). The Spanish Government later indicated that it did not share the judge’s interpretation of the Treaty (Gibraltar Chronicle, 24 May 2003). In December 2003, the British Government announced that Princess Anne (the Princess Royal) would visit Gibraltar as part of the tercentenary celebrations in 2004. The Armed Forces Minister did confirm (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 28 March 2003, Col. 409W) that Gibraltar’s military facilities had been put at NATO’s disposal as part of Operation Active Endeavour (subsequently renamed Endeavour/Strog when it was combined with a US–Spanish security operation). These operations related to military action in Iraq, and were designed to protect allied non-combatant shipping in the Mediterranean. This was extended to cover the Strait of Gibraltar on 10 March. The joint operation was under the command of a Spanish Vice-Admiral. The ‘Integrationists’ have their own website (http://www.gbz.org.uk) in which they argue their case. In answer to a question on the representation of the remaining 14 overseas territories at Westminster, the International Development Minister, Sally Keeble, responded that ‘this has not been this Government’s policy. At present there are no prospects of looking at that’ (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 26 March 2003, Col. 273). Subsequently, and referring specifically to Gibraltar, Denis MacShane said: ‘If that choice is put forward we’ll have a look at it’, but added: ‘It is certainly not Government policy’ (Gibraltar Chronicle, 7 July 2003). As the former Director of the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Sir Francis’ appointment was taken to indicate the continuing importance to Britain of Gibraltar as a military intelligence centre. It was also reported that Aznar, who had risked domestic unpopularity by backing action against Iraq, had written to the US President on 20 May in an attempt to enlist his support by asking him to bring pressure to bear on Britain to renew the negotiations on Gibraltar (Daily Telegraph, 20 June 2003). When the story was published in the Daily Telegraph, both Ana Palacio and the Prime Minister’s office in London denied that any such letter had been sent (Efe, 20 June 2003). However, Aznar did confirm that he had discussed Gibraltar with Bush a year earlier, although he gave no details (El País, 21 June 2003). The British Government, through the Electoral Commission, published a consultation paper in June 2003 setting out the options for Gibraltar to be combined with an electoral region in England and Wales (Electoral Commission, 2003a). On 28 August 2003 the Commission announced that in the elections for the European Parliament to be held in June 2004 and thereafter Gibraltarians would vote with the South-West England region (Electoral Commission, 2003b). The interviewer actually asked, quoting Blair’s statement in July 2002, whether Britain would insist on 100 per cent ‘sovereignty’ over the military base, to which MacShane applied in the affirmative (El País, 8 June 2003). However, it is probable – but not certain – that MacShane took this to refer to ‘control’, just as Blair had probably meant originally. MacShane insisted in a BBC interview on 9 June that he had said nothing different from Jack Straw in July 2002, in the sense that there will be no agreement unless outstanding issues can be resolved and unless it is acceptable to the people of Gibraltar (Gibraltar Chronicle, 10 June 2003). Reactions on all

Notes

377

sides suggest that everyone else understood him to be saying rather more than that. 14 The Minister certainly received a more friendly reception than his predecessor or his Secretary of State, but the headline in the Gibraltar Chronicle on 5 July, ‘Mixed reactions to MacShane walkabout’, suggested some hostility from certain groups simply on the grounds that he was a Government Minister. 44 Conclusion 1 Jackson (1987: 245) suggests that ‘the population was just beginning to become Gibraltarian, as opposed to Genoese, Portuguese, Spaniards, Jews and Britons’ in the latter half of the nineteenth century because of the common sharing of misery, particularly the ravages of disease. 2 To which could be added (at various times) fishing in disputed territorial waters, non-recognition of Gibraltarian documentation such as driving licences and ID cards, accusations of causing pollution, etc. 3 The Spanish Government’s Strategic Defence Review presented to the Defence Committee of Congress in December 2002 expressed the concern that Britain’s colonial presence, in addition to ‘restricting the exercise of our sovereignty’ could result in ‘military operations developing from the Rock that are against our interests in areas of strategic importance for Spain, such as access to the Atlantic and Mediterranean’ (Revista de Defensa, 2003). 4 Llivia is an area of about 20 square kilometres in the French Département of Pyrénées-Orientales that has belonged to Spain since 1659; Olivenza is a region of 500 square kilometres taken by Spain from Portugal in 1801 but never returned. 5 Britain’s occupation of the isthmus dates back at least to the early decades of the nineteenth century, and therefore when this came under serious challenge from Spain from the 1960s onwards Britain could at least claim possession by prescription. 6 Observance of the details of the Treaty has depended upon which party has been doing the observing. Britain (in order not to offend Spain) and Spain (because it seeks the re-integration of Gibraltar) both argue that the Treaty rules out Gibraltarian independence. Gibraltar claims that as the agreement was between Crown and Crown, the Treaty became invalid when Spain became a republic (first in 1873, and again in 1931). Moreover, since all sides choose to ignore the fact that the Treaty prohibits communication between Gibraltar and Spain by land, and that it also prohibits residence on the Rock by Jews and Moors, Gibraltarians – with some justification – question the consistency of adherence to certain commitments in the Treaty but not to others. 7 A 1971 FCO document that was declassified in 2002 revealed that ‘the creation of political structures for Gibraltar, in particular the Constitution of 1969, was only an ‘improvisation’ undertaken ‘without thinking of its serious consequences’ in order to give the impression artificially of a political identity for the Rock and to impress the UN (‘a vain hope’, the document added) (El Mundo, 27 May 2002). 8 Joe Bossano and the GSLP opposed it from the outset; Joshua Hassan and the AACR took it on board. It is probably true to say with hindsight that if Bossano had been Chief Minister in 1984 there would have been much stronger opposition from Gibraltar to the Brussels Declaration than was the case, and it came as no surprise that he replaced Hassan as Chief Minister in 1988. 9 Not surprisingly, Michael Ancram (Parliamentary Brief, 2003) questioned the judgement of advisers at the FCO, while Mary Dejevsky (Independent, 14 March 2003) saw the diplomatic failure over Gibraltar as one of a string that included

378

10 11 12

13

14

Notes

Iraq, the Middle East and Zimbabwe, and laid the blame at the door of Downing Street, which since 2001 ‘has been steering foreign policy as at no time in the recent past’. For a detailed analysis of how the third ‘red-line’ issue developed, see Gold 2004. In 1986 Spain denied US aircraft the right to overfly Spanish airspace en route to attack Libya, whereas Britain ‘granted use of US bases in its territory – and extended overflight rights to US aircraft over Gibraltar’ (Grant 2002–2003). Such a view will undoubtedly have been reinforced in the Pentagon by the election of a PSOE Government in Spain in March 2004 and the early pronouncement by the incoming Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, that he would not continue with his predecessor’s policy regarding Spanish troops in Iraq. According to the British Defence Minister, Adam Ingram, the military facilities in Gibraltar consisted of the naval base; RAF Gibraltar; the Royal Naval hospital; ammunition, fuel and stores depots; a training area, maritime exercise areas and communications facilities; sport and recreational facilities; St Christopher’s school; and accommodation for service and civilian personnel (Hansard House of Commons Debates, 23 April 2002, Col. 192W). The proposals were sent to London on 22 December 2003, and Caruana (who had been re-elected as Chief Minister on 28 November) and Straw held their first meeting to consider them on 24 May 2004. Formal discussion and negotiation was due to begin in the autumn of 2004.

Bibliography

Bibliographical note Most of the official documents relating to the period under close study in this book (from 1980 to the present) will only become available in the National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office) 30 years (or in some cases 50 years) after the events. The study has therefore had to rely heavily on newspaper and journal sources. Until recently reporting on Gibraltar was in general in much greater evidence in the Spanish press than in the UK, and therefore the early part of the study relies heavily on El País, the only Spanish daily readily accessible in the UK in archive form at the British Newspaper Library, Colindale. The availability of bound volumes of the index to The Times also resulted in heavy reliance on that newspaper as a British source. With the advent of the Internet a much wider range of sources became available, and these were used from 1996 except when hard copy was available. In the case of daily newspapers, it should be noted that as the Internet version is updated during the course of the day, news stories will sometimes bear the date of the day before publication of the printed version. The Internet has also provided invaluable access to Gibraltarian publications, in particular the daily Gibraltar Chronicle and the weekly (now daily) Panorama. However, in recent years many British and Spanish newspapers have become available only on subscription via the Internet, and the range of sources thus became restricted once more. Subsequently a limited but varied range of sources has been accessible thanks to access to the Lexis-Nexis Executive service available via the library at the University of the West of England, Bristol. The following is a list of sources accessed for this study, and is not intended to be a comprehensive reading list of works on Gibraltar.

Books, articles, government publications and websites Costello, J. (1991) Ten Days that Saved the West, Bantam Press. Documentos sobre Gibraltar (1965) Documentos presentados a las Cortes Españolas por el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid.

380

Bibliography

Durie, D. (2003) ‘Gibraltar: why is it so difficult to agree a way forward?’ Unpublished lecture delivered at Chatham House, London, 19 November 2003. Electoral Commission (2003a) Combination of Gibraltar with a European Electoral Region in England and Wales. Consultation Paper June 2003. London. Available online at http://www.electoralcommission.gov.uk/files/dms/GibraltarConsultation Paperforweb_9858-7996_E_N_S_W_.pdf (accessed 25 March 2004). Electoral Commission (2003b) Gibraltar and the European Parliament. Recommendation August 2003. London. Available on-line at http://www.electoralcommission. gov.uk/files/dms/Gibraltarfinalreport_10552-8480_E_N_S_W_.pdf (accessed 25 March 2004). European Commission. Available on-line at http://www.ue.eu.int (accessed 25 March 2004). The Falklands Campaign (1982a) The Lessons. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Falklands Campaign (1982b) A Digest of Debates in the House of Commons 2 April to 15 June 1982. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. FCO (2001) Foreign and Commonwealth Office Joint Press Communiqué. Brussels Process Ministerial Meeting on Gibraltar, 20 November 2001, Barcelona. Available on-line at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/413/1112810.htm (accessed 25 March 2004). Gibraltar: Recent Differences with Spain (1965) Misc. No. 12. Foreign Office. Gibraltar . . . the Unofficial Homepage: Reference Documents about Gibraltar and its Political Struggles. Available on-line at http://www.gibnet.com/texts/ index.htm (accessed 17 March 2004). Gold, P. (2000) Europe or Africa? A Contemporary Study of the Spanish North African Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Liverpool University Press. Gold, P. (2001) ‘Is Gibraltar a nation?’ International Journal of Iberian Studies 14: 68–79. Gold, P. (2002) ‘Sport as a Political Tool: The Case of Spain and Gibraltar’, The Sports Historian 22: 164–78. Gold, P. (2004) ‘Sovereignty negotiations and Gibraltar’s military facilities: how two “red-line” issues became three’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, June (forthcoming). Government of Gibraltar Press Releases. Available on-line at http://www.gibraltar. gov.gi (accessed 23 March 2004). Grant, T. (2002–2003) ‘Gibraltar on the Rocks’, Policy Review No. 116, December 2002–January 2003. Available on-line at http://www.policyreview.org/dec02/ grant.html (accessed 31 March 2004). Hansard House of Commons Debates. HMSO, 1966–2003. Post-1988. Available on-line at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmhansrd.htm#prev (accessed 1 March 2004). Hansard House of Lords Debates. HMSO, 1980–2001. Post-1994. Available on-line at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld/ldvolume.htm (accessed 1 March 2004). Harvey, M. (1996) Gibraltar. Spellmount. Hills, G. (1974) Rock of Contention. Robert Hale. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (1981) Seventh Report Session 1980–81. Gibraltar: The Situation of Gibraltar and United Kingdom Relations with Spain. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (1997) First Report Session 1997–98. The Treaty of Amsterdam. Available on-line at http://www.publications.

Bibliography

381

parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmfaff/305i/fa0102.htm (accessed 25 March 2004). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (1999a) Fourth Report Session 1998–99. Gibraltar. Available on-line at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/366/36602.htm (accessed 25 March 2004). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (1999b) Fourth Report. Session 1998–99. Gibraltar. Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Available on-line at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/FACresponse049899,0.pdf (accessed 31 March 2004). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2000a) Ninth Report. Session 1999–2000. Gibraltar: Follow-Up. Available on-line at http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/863/86302.htm (accessed 25 March 2004). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2000b). Ninth Report. Session 1999–2000. Gibraltar: Follow-Up, Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Available on-line at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/ kfile/FACresponse099900,0.pdf (accessed 31 March 2004). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2001a) Sixth Report. Session 2000–2001. Gibraltar: Follow-up. Available on-line at http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmfaff/319/31902.htm (accessed 25 March 2004). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2001b) Sixth Report. Session 2000–2001. Gibraltar: Follow-up. Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Available on-line at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/FACresponse060001,0.pdf (accessed 31 March 2004). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2001c) Minutes of Evidence, 28 November 2001. Published in First Report. Session 2000–2001. Gibraltar. Available on-line at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/413/1112803.htm (accessed 25 March 2004). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2002a) Minutes of Evidence, 19 June 2002. Published in Eleventh Report. Session 2001–2002. Gibraltar. Available on-line at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/ cmfaff/973/2061901.htm (accessed 25 March 2004). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2002b) Eleventh Report. Session 2001–2002. Gibraltar. Available on-line at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/973/97302.htm (accessed 25 March 2004). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2002c) Eleventh Report. Session 2001–2002. Gibraltar. Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Available on-line at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/ Cm%205714,0.pdf (accessed 25 March 2004). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2003a) Eleventh Report. Session 2002–2003. Gibraltar. Available on-line at http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/1024/102402.htm (accessed 25 March 2004). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2003b) Eleventh Report. Session 2002–2003. Gibraltar. Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Available on-line at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/ CM5954.pdf (accessed 25 March 2004).

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Bibliography

Jackson, W. (1987) The Rock of the Gibraltarians. Associated University Presses. Leguineche, M. (2002) Gibraltar. Planeta. Memorandum by Her Majesty’s Government on the Report of the Constitution Committee (1976) HMSO. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores. Available on-line at http://www.mae.es (accessed 25 March 2004). Morán, F. (1988) ‘Las relaciones hispano-británicas’, Revista de Occidente 89: 5–20. Morris, D. and Haigh, R. (1992) Britain, Spain and Gibraltar 1945–90. Routledge. Negociaciones sobre Gibraltar (1967) Documentos presentados a las Cortes Españolas por el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid. Parliamentary Brief (2003) Gibraltar Special Report, Vol. 8(9). Ponting, C. (1990) 1940: Myth and Reality. Ivan Dee. Revista de Defensa (2003) ‘Las claves para impulsar la transformación de la Fuerzas Armadas’, 179. Available on-line at http://www.mde.es/mde/public/revista/ 179/revista.htm (accessed 19 March 2004). Uxo Palasi, J. (1986a) ‘Gibraltar: el istmo’, Ejército August: 3–9. Uxo Palasi, J. (1986b) ‘Gibraltar: aguas y aeropuerto’, Ejército September: 3–9. Young, H. (1990) One of Us. Pan Books.

Journals, newspapers and press agencies ABC Accountancy Age Agence France Presse BBC News Online BBC Worldwide Monitoring Belfast Telegraph Cinco Días Daily Mail Daily Telegraph Efe (Spanish Newswire Services) Europa Sur European Evening Standard Expansión Federal News Service Financial Times Financial Times Expat Gibraltar Chronicle Guardian Iberianews Independent Independent on Sunday International Money Marketing Inter-Press Service Lloyd’s List M2 Presswire Mondaq Business Briefing El Mundo

Bibliography New Media Age El País Panorama Parliamentary Brief Press Association Reuter European Community Report Reuters World Service South China Morning Post Sunday Times The Times United Press International Universal News Service Western Morning News Yorkshire Post

383

Index

Acción Democrática 33, 42, 44 Admiralty, British 6 Afghanistan 26, 265, 343n1 Africa 330, 344n4 Agaden 228 Alberdi, Cristiana 353n1 Alcaraz, Felipe 300 Alfonsín Raúl, President of Argentina 71–2 Alfonso XIII, King 76, 345n11 Algeciras 1, 10, 11, 21, 38, 49, 64, 112, 139, 144, 202, 241, 254, 287, 288, 344n4, 353n3, 362n7, 370n3, 375n3; Bay of 18, 55, 69, 76, 131, 147, 320; bunkering in 362n5, 375n10; and customs post 202; and ferry service to Gibraltar 15, 95, 164; fishermen from 203, 208; mayor of 139, 173, 232, 291, 364n1; visited by Alvarez Cascos 350n2; visited by Bossano 128; visited by Fernández Ordóñez 98; visited by Rodríguez Spitteri 204 Alianza Popular (AP) 40, 92, 105 Almería 256 Alvarez Cascos, Francisco 209, 350n2 Amin, President of Afghanistan 343n1 Amnesty International 118 Ancram, Michael 267, 270, 275, 278, 281, 294, 299, 300, 302, 305, 306, 324, 370n6, 375n8, 377n9 Andalusia 8, 35, 208, 327, 360n6, 370n4; Andalusians 11, 241; elections 1982 47; regional assembly/ government 151, 268 Anderson, Donald 272 Andorra: as model for Gibraltar 148, 274, 276, 334, 336, 352n4, 366n8 Andreu, Jerónimo 350n4 Andrew, Prince 55

Anne, Princess (the Princess Royal) 376n5 Antigua 185 Appledore International 59 Arenas, Javier 241 Argentina 36–7, 40, 42–4, 46, 72, 177, 178, 344n1, 344n4, 346n3 Arias, Inocencio 84, 181, 183 Arias-Salgado, Rafael 213 Arístegui, Gustavo 300 Arthur Andersen 368n5 Assembly of British Dependent Territories 189, 197 Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights (AACR) 13–14, 26, 59–60, 91, 97, 101, 121, 138, 342n5, 346n4, 377n8 Association of European Journalists 156 Atlanta (Georgia) 135 Atlético Madrid 215 Aurora 375n13 Australia 219 Aza, Alberto 155, 357n7 Aznar, José María (Spanish Prime Minister 1996–2004) 170, 233–4, 243, 246, 288, 296, 301, 305, 309, 317, 319, 321–2, 324, 354n2, 372n7, 376n10; cancels meeting with Duncan Smith 302; election 1996 168; election 2000 224; at European Parliament 369n1; and HMS Tireless 233–4, 237–9, 241–2, 249, 360n11; meets Blair 191, 205, 211–12, 214, 225, 233, 238, 265, 300, 304, 312, 319–20; meets Major 137–8, 177; and NATO 175; at pre-Iraq War summit 321; and Single Sky directive 247–8 Azopardi, Keith 300 Azores 39, 321 Azuara, José Angel 235

Index Baker, Kenneth 135, 137 Balearic Islands 46 Bahamas 317 Balkans, the 361n2 Baltica Finans 150, 352n7 Banco de Bilbao/Vizcaya 87, 138 Banco Central 87 Bank of England 352n6 Baquedano, Mariano 64 Barcelona 183, 287–8; Olympic Games 1992 134–5; Straw and Piqué meeting in 264, 266–7, 269, 365n10; visited by Caruana 274 Barlow Clowes 347n1 Barranco, Juan 110 Basle 70, 99 Basque Country/Basques 5, 9, 100, 193, 305, 313, 328–9, 368n4, 372–3n12; Basque Nationalists (PNV) 33, 313, 361n7 Bastarreche, Carlos 266, 274, 364n2 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation): and ‘Death on the Rock’ 105 Beatles, the 241 Belgium 46, 89 Belize 38 Benaissa, Mohammed 313 Berlin 106, 155; Berlin Wall 129 Bethell, Lord 91, 201, 282, 312 Bevin, James 280 Blair, Tony (British Prime Minister 1997– ) 188, 212, 243, 247, 288, 290, 300, 311, 321, 323–4, 332, 365n6; and election 1997 183; and election 2001 253; and Gibraltar’s military base/facilities 309, 374n10, 376n12; and HMS Tireless 233, 238, 360n11; meets Aznar 191, 205, 211–12, 214, 225, 233, 238, 265, 300, 304, 312, 319–20; at pre-Iraq War summit 321; and Single Sky directive 247–8 Bland 75 Bolín, Enrique 349n3 Bonn 47, 211 Bossano, Joe (Gibraltar Chief Minister 1988–96) 28, 52, 59–60, 66, 81, 83, 91–2, 99, 101–4, 106, 113–14, 118–19, 121, 124, 130, 134, 139, 144, 148–50, 157–8, 162–4, 225, 237, 281, 297, 301, 303, 327, 329, 336, 343n10, 344n4, 347n3, 348n3, 353n7, 353n5, 367n11; and airport 92, 95, 97–9, 113–5, 129, 348n4, 348n1; and Brussels Process

385

62, 105, 115, 121, 124, 145, 160, 333, 349n4, 370n7, 377n8; and constitutional modernization 141; and economic self-sufficiency for Gibraltar 106, 115, 149; elections 1980 26; and elections 1984 59–60; and elections 1988 98, 101–2, 377n8; and elections 1992 138–9, 169; and elections 1996 169–71; and elections 2000 223; meets Davis 174; meets Hain 276; meets Howe 69, 113–14; meets Hurd 144, 152; and moneylaundering/drug-trafficking 123, 156–7, 166, 168–9, 171; and relations with the Campo 102, 110, 112–3, 115, 122, 128, 139, 160, 329; and selfdetermination 101, 105, 134, 139, 143, 349n4; visits Brussels 352n3, visits Canary Islands 105; visits European Parliament 91; visits Spain 68, 152–3, 353n1; visits United Nations 148, 153, 167–8, 201, 229, 231–2, 260, 304, 313 Braña, César 155, 160, 163, 167–8, 173 Brighty, David 161, 167 Britannia 31, 187 British Airways 148, 357n6 British Ambassador in Madrid 49, 55, 66, 120, 125, 141, 153, 161, 167, 169, 174, 199, 203–4, 207, 213, 249, 304, 308 British European Airways (BEA) 15 British Nationality Act/Bill 33, 345n8 British Telecom 360n5 Brown, George (British Foreign Secretary 1966–1968) 343n3 Brussels 31, 36, 41, 47, 51–2, 57, 60, 82, 88–90, 146, 175–6, 180–1, 183, 187, 190, 200, 209, 215, 224, 226, 229, 255, 267, 276, 288, 294, 317, 343n7, 345n4, 347n3, 352n3, 355n6, 370n5 Brussels Declaration/Agreement (1984) 2, 50, 60, 62–5, 69, 71–2, 86, 91, 95, 98–102, 104, 108, 115, 121–2, 126, 130, 133, 138–9, 143, 154–5, 167, 172, 199, 231, 269–70, 322, 325, 331–4, 346n10, 349n4, 377n8; Brussels Process 124, 142, 145–6, 154, 158, 160, 174, 189, 191, 193, 195, 216–17, 219, 228, 241, 243, 248, 253, 255, 260–2, 267, 271, 273, 275, 279–80, 282, 284–6, 294–5, 305, 311–14, 319, 321, 329, 331, 334, 361n6, 362n9, 367n16

386

Index

Bruun Laursen 150 Buenos Aires 41–2, 48 Bush, President George W. 321, 376n10 Caballero, Abel 88 Caballero, Pedro 168 Cabanillas, Pío 265, 295 Cádiz 49, 123, 163, 167, 354n6 Caldera, Jesús 233–4, 238 Callaghan, James (British Prime Minister 1976–1979) 23, 337 Calvo Sotelo, Leopoldo (Spanish Prime Minister 1981–1982) 31, 33–5, 38, 40, 43, 47, 215, 350n5 Cammell Laird 197, 205, 356n3 Campo de Gibraltar 6, 11, 35, 40, 52, 65, 70, 95, 98–9, 101, 112, 122–3, 208, 214, 224, 228, 233, 254, 288, 317, 342n3, 354n2, 364n1, 375n4; and airport 124, 148, 183, 200; cooperation with Gibraltar 26–7, 65, 68, 87, 102, 111, 113, 115, 122, 128, 129, 132, 173, 213, 218, 240, 329, 349n6, 359n5; and drug trafficking/ tobacco smuggling 125, 352n1; economic difficulties in 25, 53, 144, 232, 330; effect of border crossing delays in 209–11, 213; EU funds 287–8, 370n4; and HMS Tireless 228, 230–1, 242–3, 249–50; and local fishing agreement 218; need for investment in 139, 145, 212–3, 219, 291; reaction to election of Caruana 172–3; standard of living compared with Gibraltar 368n9; visit by Bossano 110, 112; visit by Governor 350n5; visit by Hassan 68 Campuzano, Carlos 168 Canada 161, 164, 219, 373n4 Canary Islands/Islas Canarias 105, 188, 330, 354n4 Canepa, Adolfo 81, 97–9, 101–2, 121 Canepa, Joe 163, 353n4 Caradon, Lord 18–19 Cardiff 289 Caribbean 189 Carlist Wars 9 Carmona, Juan 35, 39, 48 Carracao, José 110, 122, 128, 323 Carrillo, Santiago 44 Carrington, Lord Peter (British Foreign Secretary 1979–1982) 4, 24–9, 31–2, 36, 38, 40, 178; as

Secretary General to NATO 82, 98, 346n8 Caruana, Peter (Gibraltar Chief Minister 1996– ) 172–3, 177, 190, 197, 200, 204, 213–14, 219, 222, 226, 244–5, 255, 259, 261–2, 267, 283, 288–93, 295–7, 301, 303, 306, 310–11, 313, 316, 318, 322, 327, 334, 335, 336, 354n1, 357n1, 358n3, 360n13, 363n12, 365n11, 369n11, 369n16, 369–70n2, 371n13, 373n1, 375n13, 375n4; and airport 202, 370n10; and Andorran model 366n8; and Brussels Process 179, 216, 256–7, 264, 266, 280–2, 284–5, 288–90, 333, 367n15, 368n3, 369n17; calls on British Government to stand up to Spain 205, 212, 258; compares Gibraltar with Falklands/Malvinas 289, 370n8; and constitutional modernization 177, 182, 185, 187, 189, 196, 224, 246, 273, 276, 285, 314, 320–1, 336, 356n1, 367n1, 378n14; criticises Governor 241–2; and cross-border cooperation 240, 277, 291, 329, 359n5, 370n10; and elections 1996 170–2; and elections 2000 223–4; and elections 2004 378n14; and HMS Tireless 230, 235–6, 240, 248, 250–1; meets Ancram 267; meets Bastarreche 266, 274, 364n2; meets Cook 187, 192, 196–7, 225; meets Davis 174; meets Gil Marín 215–6; meets Hain 277; meets MacShane 319; meets Rifkind 177, 185; meets Straw 259, 277, 297, 368n3; and naval base 237, 248; and NATO 175, 177, 191; in opposition 138, 162, 352–3n6; and referendum 277, 282, 295, 309–11, 314–6; seeks separate voice for Gibraltar in talks 176–7, 179, 191, 264–5, 268, 274, 277–9, 363n9–10; and self-determination for Gibraltar 174, 219, 222, 247, 257–8, 261–2, 275–6, 307; sends message to Queen 283; solves fishing dispute 208–9, 218; and sovereignty proposals 195–6, 198, 200, 204, 265–6, 275–6, 280, 288, 299, 307, 313, 320, 334; at United Nations 176, 185, 190, 201, 216, 222, 229–32, 259–61, 35–18, 303, 313, 356n6; visits Barcelona 274; visits Brussels 180–1, 183, 190, 200, 229; visit to European Parliament 282,

Index 368n7; visits London 174, 271–2, 368n18; visits Madrid 228 Casablanca 148 Castiella, Fernando María (Spanish Foreign Minister 1956–1969) 15, 20, 35, 53, 173, 219, 328 Catalan Nationalists 33 Cataluña 56 Cataluña/Catalonia 5, 135, 193, 274, 301, 301, 328, 329 Cavaco Silva, Anibal 143 Centro Democrático y Social (CDS) 105 Ceuta 4, 10, 42, 44, 46, 138, 180, 216, 244, 272, 307, 308, 313, 322, 323, 330, 342n5, 343n8, 344n4, 353n3, 368n6, 369n1, 372n5 Chalker, Lynda (later Baroness) 98, 171, 348n4 Chandler, Victor 221 Channon, Paul 88 Chapple, Field Marshal Sir John 166 Charles, Prince of Wales 77, 161; and Princess of Wales 31, 77 Charles II, King 342n2 Charles of Austria, Archduke 342n2 Chatham House see Royal Institute for International Affairs Chaves, Manuel 237, 249–50 China, People’s Republic of 58, 119, 183, 186, 199, 355n1 Churchill, Sir Winston 11–12, 128 Cierva, Ricardo de la 44 Clinton-Davis, Stanley 88 Clyde Naval Base 249 Coalición Canaria 354n4 Coalición Democrática 44 Coaling Island 70 Cold War 13–14, 125, 155 Colvin, Michael 351n7 Commonwealth Party 342n5 Conejera 277 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 57, 125, 351n6 Conservative Party/Government 23, 25, 125–6, 142, 183, 188, 194, 210, 267, 269, 275, 302, 333, 370n6, 371n14 Constantine, Michael 149 Convention on Human Rights 210 Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) 168 Cook Islands 83 Cook, Robin (British Foreign Secretary

387

1997–2001) 183, 187, 190–1, 194–7, 207, 210, 225, 233, 237, 243, 249, 355n4, 356n2, 359n4; meets Caruana 187, 192, 196–7, 225; meets Matutes 192, 194, 203, 210–11; meets Piqué 241, 247–8 Coral 221 Corcuera, José Luis 135, 137 Córdoba 237 Corfu 319 Cortes, Silvia 230, 232 Cortina Mauri, Pedro 22 Costa de la Luz 151 Costa del Sol 68–9, 79, 87, 123, 274, 346n1, 349n2 Council of Europe 23, 26, 39, 41, 43–4, 91, 191, 253, 287, 345n5 Cox, Pat 368n7 Croo, Hermann de 88 Cuba 9, 177 Cumming, Peter 170, 172, 222–3 Cyprus 106, 298 Czech Republic 187 Davis, David 155, 162, 174 De Gaulle, General 168 De Miguel, Ramón 317, 319, 323, 324, 364n1, 373n7, 375n4; meets Hain 294, 295, 299, 304; meets MacShane 320, 322 De Ojeda, Jaime de 55, 82, 98 Dédalo 76 Dejevsky, Mary 377–8n9 Del Río, Rafael 58 Delors Plan 89 Democratic Party of British Gibraltar (DPBG) 26, 59–60 Denmark 311 Domínguez, Salvador 58 Donigi, Ambassador 259 Douglas-Home, Sir Alec (British Foreign Secretary 1960–1963 and Prime Minister 1963–1964) 21, 23, 371n14 Duncan Smith, Iain 290, 302 Durie, (later Sir) David 224, 226, 230, 236, 241–2, 259, 307, 319, 321, 363n15 Dutch, the 6, 326; Overseas Territories 229 Edinburgh, Philip Duke of 174 Egypt 12, 86 Eldon, Stewart 231, 356n7

388

Index

Elena, Infanta 161 Eliott, General George 8 Elizabeth II, Queen 14, 76–7, 104, 108–10, 112, 283, 345n11, 348n5 Elorza, Javier 178, 226 Encina, Salvador de la 323 Enron 282, 368n5 Escarcena, María José 64 Escuredo, Rafael 35 Estoril 69 Estrella, Rafael 208, 211, 219, 224, 306 ETA (Basque Terrorist Group) 242, 305 Eurocontrol 86 European Commission 60, 143, 165, 179, 185, 190, 248, 352n6, 353n2, 375n9, 375n11; and border controls 209, 290, 360n13; and financial support to Gibraltar 368n7; and Spanish pensions 293; and taxation in Gibraltar 373n7, 374n1; visited by delegation from Gibraltar 180–1 European Commissioners 95, 181 European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) 54, 74, 82, 88–9, 96, 98, 102, 108, 115, 131–7, 139, 141, 149, 154, 161–2, 167, 177, 181–2, 185–6, 195, 219, 231, 242, 244, 248, 257, 262, 266, 268, 272–3, 276, 278, 301, 306, 308, 317, 320, 322, 352n5, 359n7, 367n12; and air transport initiatives 361n5, 362n11, 363n14; and airport agreement 92, 94, 98, 144, 147, 362n11; and airspace 209; Amsterdam Treaty 188; AngloSpanish versus Franco-German axis in 267, 289, 292, 333; and border controls 116, 135, 155, 178, 200, 358n3; boycott of Argentina 43; British membership of 21, 98, 109, 144, 308, 326, 328; British presidency of 33, 82, 142–4, 200; Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 21, 366n4; Common External Tariff 21; competition rules 268; Convention on Criminal and Civil Corruption 253, 362n2; Convention on External Frontiers 142–4, 351n3; Council of Ministers 33, 120, 247, 260, 304, 311; and Customs Union 266, 283, 366n4, 367n11; directives 88, 144, 147, 149–50, 156–7, 160, 162–5, 168–9, 180–1, 207, 211, 218, 242, 247, 267,

320, 328–9, 357n1, 357n9–10, 358n4; and driving disqualification 201; Economic and Social Committee 88; Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 294; external frontiers 136, 141–4, 328, 352n3; and fishing regulations 198; funds for Gibraltar and the Campo 145, 277, 287–8, 291, 370n4; Gibraltar’s membership of 21, 68, 98, 120, 136, 144, 147, 156, 178–80, 197–8, 201, 218, 308, 328, 347n3, 363n12, 367n12, 373n7; Gibraltarians’ rights in 63, 190, 219, 258, 276, 347n3; Intergovernmental Conference 238; Maastricht Agreement/Treaty 142, 188, 352n5; meeting of Justice Ministers 87, 215; meeting of Transport Ministers 87–9, 94, 253; nationals in Gibraltar 68, 74, 140, 148, 344n4, 346n4, 351n2, 353n2; Schengen Agreement 161, 164, 166, 194, 210, 215, 218, 224–6, 355n4, 358n2–3, 359n6; ‘Single European Sky’ 183, 245, 247–8, 253, 255, 258–9, 272, 362n11, 363n13; Spain’s membership of 2, 16, 22–3, 25, 28–33, 39, 41, 43, 48–9, 56–7, 60–3, 68–71, 74, 77, 79, 81, 109, 326, 332, 345n4, 348n3, and Spanish pensions 371n2; Spanish presidency of 108, 162, 164–5, 265, 287, 369n2; and taxation initiatives 278, 282, 336, 373n7, 374n1 European Court of Human Rights 140, 210, 366n2 European Court of Justice 120, 140, 218, 322 European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) 108 European Parliament 88, 151, 154, 260, 369n1; Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights 229; European Democrats Group in 91–2; European Popular Party Group 369n1; Gibraltarians right to vote in elections to 21, 153, 180,198, 201, 210, 229, 248, 272, 322, 336, 352n3, 359n4, 366n2, 376n11; and HMS Tireless 236, 361n15; support for funding 368n7; visit by Caruana 229, 282; visit by Gibraltarian delegation 91, 180–1 European Union (EU) see European Community (EC) Ezquerra, Jesús 80, 84, 86, 89, 92

Index Falange 41 Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas 37–50, 54–8, 61, 71–3, 84, 109, 177–8, 289, 332, 344n1, 345n6, 345n3, 355n5, 356n2, 370n8 Far East, the 10, 109, 119, 307 Fawcett, Sir James QC 347n4 Fearn, Sir Robin 125, 141 Feetham, Michael 109 Ferdinand of Aragón, King 330 Fernández Martín, Fernando 105 Fernández Ordóñez, Francisco (Spanish Foreign Minister 1985–1992) 42–4, 71, 90–1, 100, 142, 144, 153, 347n2, 355n8; meets GarelJones 126; meets Howe 73, 85, 115–6; meets Hurd 122, 124, 129, 142; meets Thatcher 85, 115; visits Algeciras 98 Fernández Pons, José Antonio 173 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) 134–5, 351n2 Fiji 300 Finlayson, Tom 327 Florida 8 ‘Force H’ 12 Fraga, Manuel 56 France 6–8, 12, 70, 89, 175, 302, 322, 342n2, 342n3, 347n4; overseas territories 180, 229, 272 Franco, General Francisco 2, 11, 14, 22, 24, 41, 46, 56, 105, 109, 128, 130, 170, 173, 337; policy on Gibraltar 1, 3, 15–16, 35, 39, 53, 58–9, 64, 81, 140, 142, 155, 163, 197, 219, 328, 348n5 Francois, Mark 327 Fuengirola 117 Fuerza Nueva 41 Galicia 213 Gallipoli 10 Galtieri, General 36, 38, 42 Galvin, General John 104 Garcia, Joseph 170, 223, 297 Garel-Jones, Tristan 126, 136, 143, 261 GB Airways 148, 357n6 Gefion 150 Geneva 63–5, 69, 295 Genoa 8 Genoese 1, 7, 9 George I, King 7, 333 George III, King 8 German U-boats 10 Germany 11, 212, 374n2

389

Ghent 255 Gibraltar passim: airport 4, 11, 22, 24, 60, 62, 65, 69–70, 74–5, 80, 84, 86–96, 98–100, 120, 124, 127, 129, 133, 136, 142, 145, 147–8, 154, 158–9, 172, 177, 180–1, 188, 191–2, 200, 202, 209, 215, 227, 245, 255, 258, 287, 296, 328, 347n2, 348n1, 349n4 (Ch 17), 349n4 (Ch 18), 350n1, 350n6, 362n11, 362n6, 363n14, 365n13, 370n10; and 1987 airport agreement 94–8, 100–2, 104–5, 107–8, 110, 112–15, 120, 122, 124, 126, 143–4, 147, 183, 202, 245, 267, 351n2; Attorney-General in 20, 158, 285, 349n1; and aviation 17, 61, 80, 94, 114, 217, 245, 272, 362n11, 363n14; blockade of 2–3, 24, 26, 28, 140, 142, 162, 208, 326, 328–9; and border, reopening of 3, 24–5, 28, 31, 33–6, 39–40, 47, 51–4, 56–7, 61–4, 68, 73–4, 86–7, 123, 173, 178, 332, 244n4, 345–6n3, 346n1 (Ch 10), 346n1 (Ch 11), 350n2; and border controls/delays 93, 116, 137, 142, 144–5, 149, 152, 154–64, 166, 169–71, 173–4, 178, 181–4, 188–9, 193, 200, 203–4, 207–15, 218, 224, 226–7, 242–3, 248, 290, 326, 328, 356n5, 357n5, 358n5, 360n13, 362n6, 375n13; British/Britons, in , 9,147–8, 352n3, 377n1; and British defence strategy 178, 255, 372n9; bunkering in 10, 205, 254, 362n5, 370n3, 375n10, 375n2; Chamber of Commerce 148, 241, 283, 349n5; Channel Islands, compared to 150, 163, 177, 185–6, 200, 355n9; City Council 10, 13; Constitution of 1969 19, 20, 28, 61, 73, 107, 156, 164, 231, 325, 331–2, 356n7, 366n1, 371n13, 377n7; Constitution, modernisation of 141, 145, 159, 172, 177, 182, 187, 189–90, 201, 204, 232, 243, 245–7, 260, 262, 271, 273, 276, 280–2, 285–6, 304, 314, 320–1, 325, 336, 356n1, 365n10, 367n1, 369n19; Council of Representative Bodies 285, 297; and cross-border co-operation 123, 155, 158, 160–3, 165, 168, 174, 178, 225–6, 240, 264, 268, 277, 291, 329, 359n5, 370n10; and cruise ships 3, 10, 177, 192, 205, 254, 368n8; Declaration of Unity 258–9, 365n6; dockyard see shipyard; driving licences issued in

390

Index

Gibraltar – contd. 209, 357n7, 377n2; and economic independence/self-sufficiency 4, 106, 115, 119, 121, 133, 149, 162, 177, 186, 205, 357n1; and EU funds 288, 370n4–5; Europa Point 35; Europort 150; Eurotowers 150; Executive Council of 10; Federation of Small Businesses 242, 328; Financial Secretary in 13, 285; financial services in 87, 149, 151–2, 160, 165, 186, 226, 303, 360n5, 25–14n7, 368–9n10, 374n1; Financial Services Commission 186, 350n2; Financial Services Commissioner 149, 352n6, 366n1; and fishing 25, 198–9, 203–5, 207–9, 211, 217–8, 356n10, 357n9, 377n2; and free association with Britain 2, 83, 86, 97, 101, 170, 223, 247, 335, 347n4; frontier/border as external 135–7, 142, 144, 147, 158–9, 161, 178, 209–10, 328, 351n3, 353n2, 355n4, 360n14; Gibtel/Gibtelcom 360n5; Government Office in London 283–4, 301, 372n11; identity cards 181, 225–6, 353n2, 360n13, 377n2; and independence 2, 22, 49, 66, 69, 105, 109, 136, 139, 247, 285, 324, 370–1n11; and insurance services within the EU 186; and integration with Britain 2, 22, 196–7, 200, 232, 247, 272, 276, 282, 321, 335, 336, 366n4, 376n7; International Dog Show 311; Isle of Man, compared to 149–50, 170, 177, 185–6, 271, 355n9; and the isthmus 1, 4, 6–7, 9, 11–12, 17, 32, 61, 65, 70, 80, 86, 88, 90–1, 93–5, 100, 120, 127, 147, 188, 202, 245, 281, 306, 330–1, 346n2, 365n13, 377n5; Jews in 1, 6–7, 9, 167, 246, 377n1, 377n6; Legislative Council 13, 16; Maritime Data Centre 152; military base/facilities 3, 26, 31, 33, 66, 115, 130, 140, 143, 263, 269, 292, 294–5, 298–300, 308–9, 312, 322, 327, 330, 333–5, 361n8, 365n12, 371n12, 372n4, 372n9, 374n4, 376n6, 376n12, 378n13; money-laundering 123–5, 137, 145, 151, 156–60, 162–7, 207, 211–12, 222, 260, 266, 269, 282, 303, 350n2, 358n1, 373n1; Moors in 7, 167, 377n6; Muslims in 4, 246; Nature Protection Ordinance 203, 207;

National Day 149, 168, 189, 257, 274, 311, 374n4; naval base 8, 42, 59, 70, 197, 231, 233–5, 237, 248, 296, 298, 327, 36–15n12, 378n13; and ‘passporting’ 186; referendum 1967 17–18, 149, 189, 196; referendum 2002 269, 276, 289, 289, 295, 297, 309, 310–17, 319–20, 323, 327, 334, 374n3, 375n8; Royal Air Force (RAF)/base in 34, 92, 129, 365n12; Royal Anglian Regiment 113; Royal Engineers 113; Royal Gibraltar Police 204, 226, 353n5; Royal Gibraltar Regiment 113, 129–30, 141, 152, 245; Royal Green Jackets 113, 118, 129–30; Royal Navy 55–6, 129, 199, 204, 217, 228, 238, 248–9, 361n16; and self-determination 2, 83, 101, 105, 114, 134, 138–9, 143, 145, 148, 153, 160, 167, 169–70, 174, 190, 193, 197, 199, 201, 216, 219, 222, 232, 243, 245–7, 257–8, 262, 264, 271, 274, 276, 281–2, 285, 289, 295, 298, 300, 303–4, 307, 324, 331, 348n5, 352n3, 361n7; Self Determination for Gibraltar Group (SDGG) 143, 163, 229, 258, 291; shared/joint sovereignty of 71, 132–3, 180, 183, 193–6, 196, 198, 200, 204, 206, 210, 217, 223, 257, 262–3, 266, 268, 270, 274–7, 280, 282, 288, 290, 292, 294–6, 298–9, 301, 306–8, 310–11, 313–16, 320, 322, 324–5, 329, 331–4, 336, 372n4–5, 374n11, 374n3, 374n6; and shipping 254, 368n8; shipyard 35, 59–60, 70, 99, 106, 182, 197, 346n3; smuggling/trafficking, drugs/tobacco and 9, 116, 120, 123–5, 137, 139, 145, 151–2, 155–71, 173, 178, 180, 207, 213, 217, 222, 269, 318, 350n4, 352n1, 353n4, 354n1, 358n2; Spaniards in 1, 9, 18, 30–2, 35, 52–3, 55, 57, 60–3, 68, 129, 140, 148, 197, 208–9, 329, 344n4; Spaniards’ Pensions 64, 74, 99, 293, 347n1, 348n1, 365n9, 371n1–2; Spanish language in 1, 103, 342n2, 354n3; taxation and 4, 87, 91, 119, 139, 144, 163, 211, 218, 254, 266, 282, 318, 336, 355n9, 364n4, 368n6, 370n3, 374n1, 375n10; telephones/ telecommunications in 181, 229, 242–3, 248, 266, 268, 328, 354n6, 360n5, 361n4, 365n7; territorial

Index waters and 18, 76, 132, 147, 198, 203, 207–8, 277, 347n3, 356n8, 367n14, 377n2; tourism in 35, 48, 53, 66, 68, 74, 87, 149, 171, 177–8, 190, 192, 205, 254, 288, 346n3, 347n2, 355n6, 357n2, 368n8; Trades Council 92–3, 290; Transport & General Workers Union (TGWU) 59, 348n3; Voice of Gibraltar Group (VOGG) 183, 230, 232, 258, 363n17; Windmill Hill Signal Station 152 Gibraltar Badminton Association (GBA) 252–3 Gibraltar Bay see Algeciras, Bay of Gibraltar Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) 70 Gibraltar Democratic Movement (GDM) 343n10 Gibraltar Kennel Club 374n2 Gibraltar Labour Party 324 Gibraltar Land Reclamation Company 150, 348n2 Gibraltar Maritime Administrator 317 Gibraltar National Party (GNP) 138–9, 170, 172 Gibraltar Social Democrats (GSD) 121, 138–9, 143, 170–2, 200, 222–3, 354n1 Gibraltar Socialist Labour Party (GSLP) 26, 28, 50, 52, 59–60, 63, 68, 70, 91, 100–2, 105, 138, 143, 170–2, 200, 343n10, 344n4, 346n4, 377n8; in alliance with Liberals 223, 269, 324, 366n7, 367n16 Gibraltar Squadron 152 Gibraltarians passim: ancestry of 3, 220, 326; ‘Doves’, the 18, 59, 171, 354n1; evacuated in WWII 12, 327; and identity 11, 13, 80, 326, 327, 377n1; and loyalty 245, 327–8, 334; origins of population 1, 4, 342n4, 377n1; right of abode in UK 34, 356n2 Gibrepair 70 Gil, Jesús 215 Gil Marín, Jesús 215–16 Gil-Robles, José María 181 Gilmour, Sir Ian 25, 29–30 Gittings, John 158 Gladwyn, Lord 29 González, Felipe (Spanish Prime Minister 1982–1996) 32, 43, 51, 54, 75, 79, 83–4, 86, 90, 103, 126, 130–3, 136, 143, 153, 168, 175, 241, 351n6; at CSCE conference 125; and elections 1986 79; meets Howe 94;

391

meets Major 132; meets Thatcher 108 González, Patricio 139, 173, 232, 291, 364n1 Goodlad, Alastair 158 Gorbachev, Mikhail 349n7 Gordon Lennox, Nicholas 120 Gothenburg 248, 253 Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 376n9 Gozney, Richard 112 Gradin, Anita 178 Grant, John 84–5 Green, Major General Sir William 8 Green Party 238 Greenpeace 238, 320, 361n1 Greenstock, David 137 Grimsby 277 Grupo Independiente Liberal (GIL) 215–16 Grupo Mixto 43 Guerrero, Marie Lou 328 Gulf, Persian 129 Hafnia 150 Hain, Peter 257–60, 264–6, 272–3, 277–9, 281–2, 287, 290, 293–6, 299, 304, 307, 309–11, 314, 364n2, 364n5, 366n2, 367n12, 367n15, 368n5, 371n2, 371n12, 372n7, 372n9, 374n11, 375n1; meets Bossano 276; meets Caruana 277; meets de Miguel 294, 299, 304; visits Gibraltar 256–7 Hanley, Jeremy 151 Hannay, David Sir 89 Harley, Robert 6 Harrods 351n1 Hassan, Sir Joshua (Gibraltar Chief Minister 1964–1969; 1972–1987) 13, 22–3, 26, 28, 35, 40, 52, 60, 62, 70, 79–83, 86, 91–2, 98, 102–3,106, 109, 157, 333, 336, 343n5, 343n7, 347n2, 355n1; and airport agreement 91, 95, 97; announces resignation 97–8; and elections 1980 26; and elections 1984 59–60; meets Carrington 28; meets Howe 64, 72; participates in Brussels process 65–6, 74, 81, 93, 115, 124; at United Nations 17; visits Brussels 60; visits Campo 68; visits European Parliament 91, 348n6, 368n7, 377n8 Hattersley, Roy 22, 343n9 Heath, David 278

392

Index

Heath, Edward (British Prime Minister 1970–1974) 333 Helsinki 71 Henderson, Douglas 190, 196 Hernández Mancha, Antonio 105 Hill, William 221 Hitler, Adolf 11 Holland 342n2, 350n3 Hong Kong 4, 58–9, 107–8, 119, 150, 179, 182–3, 186–8, 199, 333, 342n4, 346n7, 348n1, 352n6, 355n1 Hong Kongese 356n2 Hoon, Geoff 236, 254–5, 298, 372n8–9 Howe, Sir Geoffrey (later Lord) (British Foreign Secretary 1983–1989) 57, 60, 71, 80–2, 85–6, 90–1, 93, 95, 112–13, 122, 129, 153, 261, 273, 346n7, 347n2, 363–4n17, 366n7; meets Fernández Ordóñez 73, 85, 94, 115; meets Hassan 64, 93; meets Morán 57, 60, 66; visits Gibraltar 69, 113–14 Hoyle, Lindsay 236 Hungary 187 Hurd, Douglas (British Foreign Secretary 1989–1995) 56, 141, 144, 145, 153, 156–7, 162–5, 174, 353n6; meets Bossano 144, 152, 162; meets Fernández Ordóñez 122, 124, 142; meets Solana 145, 158–9, 164, 353n9 Hussein, Saddam 130 Ibarretxe, Juan José 313 Iberia Airlines 74–5, 90, 92, 357n6 Independent Democratic Party (IDP) 98, 101 India 7, 10 Indians 1, 346n1 Infanta Elena 56 Ingram, Adam 269, 365n12, 376n6, 378n13 Integration with Britain Party (IWBP) 23, 26, 28, 97, 335, 336, 343n5, 343n10 International Badminton Federation (IBF) 252–3 International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAA) 17, 56 International Court of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) 252 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 17, 216, 232, 246–7, 261, 271, 343n3 International Cricket Council (ICC) 351n3

International League of Human Rights 118 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 106, 152 International Olympic Committee (IOC) 134–5, 362n1 Interpol 167 Invincible, HMS 55–6 IRA (Irish Republican Army) 100, 105–6, 113, 117–18, 135 Iraq 129–30, 312, 320–1, 376n6, 376n10, 377–8n9, 378n12 Ireland, Republic of 199, 215, 272, 333, 355n4 Isabella of Castille, Queen 330, 331 Isola, Peter 28, 59 Israel 37 Italy 65, 342n3 Izquierda Unida (IU) 138, 176, 243, 300, 360n11 Jamaica 12 Japan 109 Jerez de la Frontera 133, 183, 200, 350n3 Jiménez, Trinidad 300 Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants 140 Jones Parry, Sir Emyr 274, 366–7n9 Juan Carlos, King 22, 24, 42, 46, 77, 81, 94, 109–10, 130, 137, 153, 345n9, 345n11; and Queen Sofía 31, 71, 76, 84,161; at United Nations 81 Juárez, Juan Carlos 215–16, 330 Juventud Nacionalista de Catalunya 168 Keeble, Sally 376n8 Kershaw, Sir Anthony 32 Kindelán, Juan Manuel 239 King, Cecil 16 Kosovo 214 Kvaerner 182, 197 Kuwait 129–30 La Línea 9, 15, 17, 25, 35, 38–9, 48–9, 52–3, 57–8, 63, 68, 75, 101–2, 113, 133, 142, 148, 152, 155, 174, 200, 202–3, 208, 212, 215, 231, 237, 284, 346n1, 352n1, 360n7, 376n4 Labour Party/Government 22, 62, 153, 183, 188, 190, 194, 204, 253, 331–3, 371n14 Ladbrokes 222, 358n1 Landero, José Luis 172

Index Lángara 56 Latvia 135, 317 Lausanne 252 Lebanon 37 Ledesma, Fernando 87 Libya 76 Liechtenstein 342n3 Lisbon 26–8, 51, 131, 142, 152, 175, 225 Lisbon Agreement (1980) 2, 27, 29–32, 34–5, 39, 48–51, 54–7, 59–61, 126, 331, 332, 344n3, 346n8 Lithuania 135 Llamas, Michael 181 Lleida 234 Llivia 330, 377n4 Lomas, Alf 27–21, 24–17n3 London passim London School of Economics (LSE) 261–2 López Bravo, Gregorio (Spanish Foreign Minister 1969–1973) 20–2 López Poza, Carlos 350n5 López Rodó, Laureano (Spanish Foreign Minister 1973) 21 Los Barrios 122, 173, 277, 329, 370n10 Louis XIV, King 342n2, 345n9 Luce, Sir Richard 182, 203, 224n5 Luns, Joseph 46 Luxembourg 21, 48–9, 87, 89–90, 135, 138, 147, 163, 192, 203–4, 210, 253, 262, 304, 322, 364; ‘Luxembourg compromise’ 89, 347n4 Lyon, Alexander 40 McGrory, Patrick 107 177 MacKinlay, Andrew 187, 229, 353n7 McQuarrie, Albert 76, 347n2 MacShane, Denis 311, 314, 316, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 374n7, 375n8, 376n8, 376n12–13, 377n14 Madeira 12 Madrid passim Maersk Sealand 362n7, 370n3 Major, John (British Prime Minister, 1990–1997) 131–2, 142, 156, 180; meets Aznar 138, 177 Malado, Jesús 64 Málaga 62, 107, 117, 123, 133, 148, 183, 328, 349n3, 351n1 Mallorca 77 Malta 8–10, 12; Maltese 1, 354n1 Malvinas, Islas see Falkland Islands Manchester 148

393

Mandelson, Peter 276–7, 367n13 Mañueco, Gabriel 41 Marbella 103, 215 Marín, Manuel 44, 215, 323 Marrakesh 148 Martínez, Jaime 39 Matthews, Denise 210 Matutes, Abel (Spanish Foreign Minister 1996–2000) 170–1, 173, 175, 183–4, 186–8, 191–3, 198, 200–1, 204, 207–12, 219, 224–5, 228, 356n5, 357n1, 357n3, 357–8n9–10, 361n3; and joint sovereignty proposals 180, 183, 193–6, 200, 210, 217, 255–7; meets Cook 192–4, 203, 207, 210–11; meets Rifkind 174,176, 179–80; at United Nations 190, 222 Mawhinney, Sir Brian 198 Mayans, Francisco José 63 Mediterranean 1, 3, 8–12, 26, 76, 81, 128, 131, 175, 192, 221, 228, 250, 326–7, 344n2, 348n1, 352n4, 355n2, 376n6 Melilla 4, 42, 44, 46, 138, 180, 216, 244, 272, 308, 313, 322, 323, 330, 342n5, 343n8, 344n4, 351n1, 368n6, 369n1, 372n5 Mercomed 329 Mers-el-Kebir 12 Middle East 12, 129, 377–8n9 Milner, John 352n6 Minorca 7–8 Mohamed VI of Morocco, King 373n6 Monaco 170, 342n3 Monforte, Antoni 44 Montegriffo, Peter 121, 349n6, 354n1 Monti, Mario 218 Montserrat, Island of 189, 197 Morán, Fernando (Spanish Foreign Minister 1982–1985) 32, 43, 54, 60–2, 69, 71, 91, 105, 153–4; meets Howe 57, 60, 66, 69, 346n7; meets Pym 51; at United Nations 65; visits London 54–5 Morocco 1, 4, 9, 42, 44, 129, 138, 140, 149, 151, 163, 166, 169, 178, 244, 254, 301, 308, 312–13, 330, 343n8, 344n4, 345n1, 346n1, 349n2, 358n1, 369n1, 370n4, 373n5–6; Moroccans 1, 6, 20, 53, 62, 68, 140–1, 307, 308, 344n4, 351n2 Moss, David 75 Munuera, Antonio 249 Muñoz Peirats, Joaquín 44

394

Index

Nanking, Treaty of 58, 186 Naples 83, 104, 131, 176, 347n3, 354n5, 355n3; Convention of 1967 123 Napoleon 8 National Council of Civil Liberties 118 New York 25, 32, 41, 57, 60, 81, 106, 168, 185, 201, 216, 259, 312–13, 345n1, 346n7, 362n3 New Zealand 83, 219 Nice 238, 360n14 Norfolk, Virginia 46, 131 North Africa 1, 3–4, 11, 13, 129, 140, 178; North Africans 129 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 3, 26, 31–2, 34, 41–2, 44–7, 51, 55, 59, 69, 74–6, 82–3, 98, 104, 108–9, 113, 131, 141, 143, 146, 152, 175–7, 179, 187–8, 191–4, 202, 250, 268–9, 298, 308, 309, 326, 333, 344n2, 344n4, 346n8, 348n1, 354n4–5, 373n8, 376n6; and the Aegean Sea 355n7; AFSOUTH 83, 104, 131, 347n3; and Canary Islands 188, 354n4, 355n2; and France 143, 175, 354n5, 355n3; GIBAIR 83; GIBMED 82–3, 104, 130–1, 143, 176, 178, 347n3; and Greece 355n7; IBERLANT 175; and Italy 143; and Naples 83, 104, 131, 176, 347n3, 354n5; North Atlantic Council 47, 57, 175; SACEUR 46, 347n3, 355n2; SACLANT 46, 131, 355n2; Spanish membership of/participation in 2, 16, 23, 29–35, 39, 41–7, 62, 73, 75, 77, 79, 82, 85, 98, 104, 113, 130, 143, 175–7, 187–8, 192, 202, 255, 344n1, 346n5, 373n9; and Turkey 355n7; and US 354n5, 355n3 Northern Ireland 118, 198–9, 261, 272, 279, 333, 366n3; Anglo-Irish Agreement 73, 261; Good Friday Agreement 199 Nott, John 344n5 Nottingham, HMS 199 Nynex 360n5 Ocean, HMS 284 OECD 254, 266, 278, 278, 282, 283, 362n4, 364n3–4 Oliart, Alberto 47 Olivenza 330, 377n4 Olympic Charter 135 Olympic Games 134–5

‘Operation Felix’ 11 ‘Operation Torch’ 13 Oreja, Marcelino (Spanish Foreign Minister 1976–1980) 29, 30; meets Carrington 25–7; meets Owen, Hassan and Xiberras 23 Owen, Dr David (British Foreign Secretary 1977–1979) meets Oreja 23, 27; visits Spain 23 Owen, Ed 367n10 Oxford, University of 295 Pacheco, Pedro 350n3 Pack, Major-General Simon 176, 182 Pagán, Salvador 113, 348n1 Palacio, Ana (Spanish Foreign Minister 2002–2004) 305–13, 315, 317, 319, 322, 324, 373n7, 375n13, 376n10; meets Straw 311, 313; at United Nations 312 Palacio, Loyola de 317–8 Palomino, Rafael 68 Panama 48 Paris 23, 125; Treaty of (1814) 8 Parsons, Sir Richard 49, 55 Partido Andalucista 238 Partido Comunista Español (PCE) 35, 43 Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) 44, 168 Partido Popular (PP): in government 216, 224, 236, 240–1, 243, 250, 274, 288, 300, 313, 361n7; in opposition 137–8, 141–2, 144–5, 155, 168, 350n2 Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE): and elections 2004 378n12n; in government 51, 69, 75, 79, 173; in opposition 25–7, 32–3, 42–4, 47, 168, 175–6, 208, 211, 216, 219, 224, 233–6, 238, 240–1, 246, 253, 300, 306, 313, 323, 344n4, 361n15, 369n14 Party for the Autonomy of Gibraltar (PAG) 343n11 Patten, Chris 179, 182 Peking 58–9, 119; Tiananmen Square 119 Peliza, Sir Robert (Gibraltar Chief Minister 1969–1972) 20, 22, 69, 97, 336, 343n5 Pellini, Admiral Cesare 83 Pendry, Lord 311 Perejil, Isla de/Leila 307–8, 373n5–6 Pérez de Cuellar, Javier 41

Index Pérez Griffo, Javier 185, 190, 201 Pérez-Llorca, José Pedro (Spanish Foreign Minister 1980–1982) 33, 41, 44; addresses North Atlantic Council 47; meets Carrington 31–2; meets Gilmour 30; meets Pym 48–9; at the United Nations 41, 43 Peru 255 Philip V, King (Philippe d’Anjou) 6, 342n2, 345n9 Pilcher, John 114 Pinies, Jaime de 16 Pinochet, General Augusto 205, 214 Piqué, Josep (Spanish Foreign Minister 2000–2002) 228, 233–7, 241, 243–6, 257–8, 262–4, 275, 281, 290–2, 294, 296–305, 324, 361n2, 361n6, 361n8, 363n8–10, 368n4, 372n9; and HMS Tireless 233–4, 236–8, 242–3, 248–9, 361n8; meets Cook 241, 247–8; meets Straw 255–6, 267–8, 280, 282, 294–5, 299, 305; visits London 228; at United Nations 231 Piraña 207, 211 Pitaluga, Joe 75, 98, 101–2 Plumb, Lord 91–2, 348n6, 368n7 Plymouth 229, 239 Poggio, Albert 283–4 Poland 187 Pons, Félix 110 Port Stanley 41 Portugal 39, 46, 69, 175, 302, 355n2, 377n4; Portuguese 1, 4, 9 Powell, Colin 308 Prague 260 Prestige, MV 317, 318, 320, 375n9, Prieto Castro, Fermín 75 Prim, General 9 Prodi, Romano 247 Pujol, Jordi 301 Purchase, Kenneth 190 Pym, Francis (British Foreign Secretary 1982–1983) 38–9, 49, 52, 54, 344n2, 345n1; meets Morán 51, 55; meets Pérez-Llorca 48–9 Quantrill, William 120 Quebec 168 Queensway Quay 87 Quin, Joyce 198, 207, 358n4 Radford, David 80, 86, 92–3 Rajoy, Mariano 306 Rato, Rodrigo 186

395

Reffell, Admiral Derek 121, 350n5 RFEF (Real Federación Española de Fútbol) 134, 260 Rhodesia 4, 26 Rico, Carmen 137 Richards, Sir Francis 321, 376n9 Rifkind, Malcolm (British Foreign Secretary 1995–1997) 174, 177, 353n6; meets Caruana 177, 185; meets Matutes 174, 176, 179–80 Robertson, George 192 Rock Service 348n3 Rodríguez Spitteri 200, 204 Rodríguez Zapatero, José Luis (Spanish Prime Minister 2004– ) 236, 378n12 Rogers, General Bernard 82–3 Rojas, Alonso 173, 291, 329 Rooke, Admiral Sir George 6 Rosindell, Andrew 328 Rota, Cádiz 131, 250 Royal Commonwealth Society 219, 295 Royal Institute of International Affairs 205, 292 Royal Marines 284, 369n14 Rupérez, Javier 43, 144, 155 Saavedra, Jerónimo 353n1 Sahagún, Felipe 359n7, 361n6 Samaranch, Juan Antonio 134 San Marino 170, 342n3 San Roque 6, 8, 372n10 Sánchez Albornoz, Claudio 27 Sánchez Montero, Simón 35 Santer, Jacques 209, 357n1 SAS (Special Air Service) 107, 117 Serra, Eduardo 187 Serra, Narcís 348n1 Seville 86, 93, 139, 160–1, 163, 252, 305 Shepherd, Lord 201 Shrimsley, Anthony 345n1 Sicilian campaign (WWII) 13 Sicily 228 Sierra Nevada 141 Singapore 109, 317 Sintra 38, 48 Smit Transport 358n3 Solana, Javier (Spanish Foreign Minister 1992–1995) 145, 152, 156, 159, 162, 164, 353n1, 354n2; meets Hurd 144–5, 158–9, 164–5, 353n8–9; at the United Nations 148, 153; as Secretary General of NATO 168, 175 Solana, Luis 42 South America 219

396

Index

South Atlantic, the 10, 37, 42–3, 45, 47–8, 55–6, 58, 289, 327 Soviet Union 343n1 Spain passim: and defence strategy affected by Gibraltar 377n3; and North African enclaves 4–5, 33, 42, 44, 138, 141, 180, 216, 272, 301, 308, 323, 344n4, 368n6; Office for Gibraltar Affairs 301; restoration of territorial integrity 2–3, 28, 49, 61, 116, 137, 148, 191, 216, 222, 230, 303, 312, 330 Spanish Badminton Association 253 Spanish Civil War 11 Spanish Olympic Association 135 Spanish Succession, Wars of 6, 342n2 Stanhope, Earl of 333 Stark, Koo 55 Stewart, Michael (British Foreign Secretary 1965–1966; 1968–1970) 15 Stockholm 247–8 Stokes, John 40, 76 Strait of Gibraltar 1, 3–4, 13, 82, 98, 114, 125, 130–1, 143, 151, 165, 169, 175–6, 208, 254, 349n2, 352n4, 376n6 Strasbourg 23, 27, 91, 140, 153, 191, 210, 229, 260, 282, 345n5 Straw, Jack (British Foreign Secretary 2001– ) 253, 256, 269–70, 273–5, 278, 280–2, 284, 292, 294–5, 297–8, 300, 303, 306–7, 309–10, 324, 332–4, 365n6, 365n13, 368n3, 368n5, 371n2, 372n8, 373n2, 375n13; criticised by Foreign Affairs Select Committee 373n2; meets Caruana 259, 277, 297, 363n3, 378n14; meets Palacio 311, 313; meets Piqué 255, 267–8, 280, 282, 294, 299, 304–5; protests at border closure 375n13; and statement July 2002 306–7, 312, 324–5, 376n13; and Treaty of Utrecht 372n3; visit to Gibraltar 295–7, 302, 367n10 Suárez, Adolfo (Spanish Prime Minister 1977–1981) 31, 40 Sub-Saharan Africa 141 Suez Canal 9 Sutherland, Peter 89 Sweden 178 Switzerland 70, 342n3 Tabacalera 165 Tamames, Ramón 43

Tangiers 40, 148, 344n4, 346n1 Taylor, Commodore Alastair 176 Taylor, Sir Teddy 156 Tejero, Colonel 31, 40, 108, 345n10 Telefónica 354n6 Terry, Air Marshall Sir Peter 82, 104, 349n4 Thatcher, Margaret (British Prime Minister 1979–1990) 38, 49–50, 54–5, 57–8, 61, 81, 84, 89–90, 95, 102, 104, 106–9, 125–6, 131, 332; meets Calvo Sotelo 40; meets Fernández Ordóñez 85, 115–6; meets Hernández Mancha 105; visits Spain 108, 112, 118, 348n3, 350–1n6 Thomson, George 19 Tindemands, Leo 41 Tireless, HMS 228–43, 248–51, 255, 291, 334, 359n1, 359n3, 360n6–7, 360n10–11, 360n13, 361n1; 361n2, 361n8, 361n15–16, Council for Nuclear Safety (CSN) 235, 238–9, 242, 248–9, 360n9–10, 360n12; Nuclear Regulatory Panel (NRP) 235 Torbay, HMS 241 Torremolinos 117 Torry, Sir Peter 209, 213, 230, 249, 304, 308, 309, 374n11, 375n12 Triay, Joseph 329, 354n1 Trillo, Federico 231 Tunisia 129 TVE (Televisión Española) 105 UEFA (Union Européene de Football Association) 351n2; and Gibraltar’s application for membership 260, 363n11, 363n16; and the membership of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 261; and the membership of the Faroe Islands 261 Ulster see Northern Ireland Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) 30, 33, 42–4, 175 United Nations (UN) 14, 16, 18–20, 22, 25, 32, 57, 60, 81, 96, 116, 129, 137, 148, 153, 167, 185, 190–1, 201, 216, 222, 231–2, 260–1, 285, 295, 312–13, 326, 330–1, 336, 356n7, 377n7; Charter 19, 222, 229, 259, 313, 330–1; Committee of 24/ Decolonization Committee/Fourth Committee 16, 18, 106, 137, 148, 153, 167–8, 176, 185, 190–1, 201, 216, 229,

Index 231–2, 259–60, 271, 300, 303–4, 313–14, 343n1, 343n8, 356n6, 362n3; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 295; and decolonisation 2, 39, 66, 116, 216, 247, 264, 285, 304, 313, 326, 330, 335, 362n10; resolutions 1, 2, 16–21, 26, 29, 39, 43, 48, 61, 65, 73, 191, 222, 246, 312, 317, 331, 362n10, 373n6; Secretary General 19, 21, 41; Security Council 39, 48; and territorial integrity 216, 31–5, 330–1; Trusteeship Committee 18, 21 United States (US) 9, 32–3, 43, 82–3, 85, 106, 138, 143, 229, 254, 298, 308, 335, 344n1, 350n4, 352n1, 354n5, 355n3, 376n10; and 11 September 2001 258, 260, 298, 335; and attacks on Libya 1986 76, 378n11; and Guam 229; Pentagon 333, 335, 372n9, 378n12; and Puerto Rico 83, 313; and Samoa 229; security operation with Spain 376n6; and Virgin Islands 229 Urgell, Bishop of 352n4 Utrecht, Treaty of (1713) 1–2, 4, 6–7, 15, 18–20, 26, 32, 48–9, 58, 61, 69–70, 76, 80, 83, 141, 167, 174, 186–7, 197, 222, 231–2, 245–7, 261, 271–2, 282, 294–5, 326, 330–1, 335, 342n1, 345n9, 347n4, 356n7–8, 365n13, 366n4, 372n3, 376n4, 377n6

397

Valerino, Reginald 139 Valencia 294–5 Vaz, Keith 248, 359n1 Verdemar 228 Versailles, Treaty of (1783) 8 Victoria, Queen 345n11 Vienna Convention 152 Waldheim, Dr Kurt 21 Wall, Sir Stephen 209 war on terror(ism) 3, 265–6, 298, 335 Washington 82, 106 Westendorp, Carlos (Spanish Foreign Minister 1995–1996) 143, 161, 168 Western European Union (WEU) 108–9 Western Sahara 373n6 White, Vice-Admiral Sir Hugo 178–9 Wilkinson, Captain Peter 249 Windsor Castle 77 World Bank 152 World War I 10–12 World War II 8, 11, 13–14, 53, 128, 277, 327, 342n3 Xiberras, Maurice 23 Yañez, Luis 27 Younger, George 114, 348n1 Yugoslavia, former 142 Zelada, Fermín 92 Zimbabwe 38, 378n9