HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
History Philosophy by
Julián
Marías
T r a n s l a t e d f r o m the Spanish b y Stanley
Appelbaum and
Clarence C.
Strowbridge
Dover Publications, Inc. New York
Copyright © 1967 by Dover Publications, Inc. A l l rights reserved under Pan American and International Copyright Conventions.
History of Philosophy is a new English translation of the twenty-second Spanish edition of Historia de la Filosofía, © 1966 by J u l i á n Marias, published by Revista de Occidente, S.A., Madrid, i n 1966. T h i s edition is for sale i n the United States of America, its dependencies and the Philippine Islands only.
Library
Standard Book Number: 486-21739-6 of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-29156
Manufactured in the United States of America Dover Publications, Inc. 31 East 2nd Street, M i n e ó l a , N . Y 11501
To the memory of my teacher MANUEL
GARCIA
MORENTE
who was dean and guiding spirit that Faculty of Philosophy
of
and Letters
where I was introduced to philosophy
Preface to the English
REFLECTIONS
ON ONE
OF M Y
Edition
BOOKS
As I take a fresh l o o k at this book w i t h t h e r a t h e r general t i t l e History of Philosophy, w h i c h , completed twenty-five years ago, is now to be published i n N e w Y o r k i n a n English t r a n s l a t i o n , I feel as i f I were seeing a c h i l d o f m i n e w h o has g r o w n u p a n d is a b o u t to set o u t o n a l o n g j o u r n e y . I t is the first o f m y books, a n d i t has also been the most successful. Since its i n i t i a l p u b l i c a t i o n i n M a d r i d i n J a n u a r y , 1941, i t has gone t h r o u g h t w e n t y - t w o Spanish editions. I t has become the stand a r d text i n the h i s t o r y o f philosophy for numerous classes i n Spanish a n d L a t i n A m e r i c a n universities. I n 1963 i t was translated i n t o Portuguese; n o w i t makes its appearance i n t h e English-speaking w o r l d . Is i t n o t e x t r a o r d i n a r y that a Spanish b o o k o f philosophy should have m e t w i t h such great success ? H o w d i d i t h a p p e n t h a t , despite the enormous prestige t h e n enjoyed b y G e r m a n philosophy i n Spain a n d L a t i n A m e r i c a , this book b y a n u n k n o w n twenty-six-yearo l d Spaniard was able t o supplant almost entirely the G e r m a n works t h a t h a d d o m i n a t e d the i n t e l l e c t u a l marketplace a n d universities o f the Spanish-speaking w o r l d ? A n d h o w was this possible w h e n , f r o m its opening page, the b o o k recalled the i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i t i o n o f the years f r o m 1931 to 1936, w h i c h was t h e n a l l b u t completely proscribed a n d condemned to ostracism a n d o b l i v i o n ? Perhaps a n e x p l a n a t i o n can be f o u n d t h r o u g h a n investigation o f the roots o f this History of Philosophy. I h a d been a student i n the F a c u l t y o f Philosophy a n d Letters o f the U n i v e r s i t y o f M a d r i d f r o m 1931 to 1936. T h e i n t e l l e c t u a l excellence w h i c h t h a t Faculty's courses vi'i
viii
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h a d a t t a i n e d was so superior to a l l t h a t h a d come before a n d , m o r e over, lasted such a short t i m e t h a t i t scarcely seems possible today t h a t i t ever existed. T h e D e p a r t m e n t o f Philosophy, especially, h a d acquired a b r i l l i a n c e a n d a precision u n k n o w n i n Spain either before or after. I t was i n s p i r e d a n d a n i m a t e d b y one o f the greatest creative geniuses i n the philosophy o f our age, w h o was at the same t i m e a n outstanding teacher: Ortega. F o r h i m , philosophy was a personal m a t t e r ; i t was his very life. W e M a d r i d students were t h e n present at the s p e l l b i n d i n g a n d almost unreal spectacle o f a philosophy t h a t was being shaped before o u r eyes. Those w e r e t h e last years o f one o f the most b r i l l i a n t a n d f r u i t f u l epochs o f E u r o p e a n t h o u g h t , the years between Husserl a n d Heidegger, f r o m D i l t h e y to Scheler, f r o m Bergson to U n a m u n o . W e were aware t h a t philosophy was discovering new possibilities, t h a t this was a g e r m i n a l p e r i o d . ( I t h i n k i t really was a n d t h a t i f its h o r i z o n seems less p r o m i s i n g today, i t is n o t because those possibilities were n o t real a n d are n o t still w i t h us, b u t because there have been certain failures o f the w i l l , slothfulness a n d e v i l passions w h i c h perhaps afflict m a n i n some eras.) There was a d a w n like atmosphere i n the M a d r i d F a c u l t y o f Philosophy ; w e were confirmed i n this feeling as we saw a n e w philosophy o f great i m p o r t being constructed l i k e a sailing vessel i n a s h i p y a r d . T h e image o f the shipyard is n o t i n a p p r o p r i a t e , because t h a t Faculty was b e g i n n i n g to be a school. Ortega's associates w e r e M a n u e l Garcia M o r e n t e , X a v i e r Z u b i r i a n d José Gaos, a l l p u p i l s o f h i s ; these m e n , together w i t h the older f e l l o w professors, w e r e a l l coll a b o r a t i n g o n t h e same task. W i t h o u t i n d u l g i n g i n excessively w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g , one c o u l d believe that perhaps the p r i m e m e r i d i a n o f E u r o pean p h i l o s o p h y w o u l d some day pass t h r o u g h M a d r i d for the first time i n history. T h e F a c u l t y o f Philosophy was convinced t h a t p h i l o s o p h y is inseparable f r o m its history, t h a t its i m m e d i a t e content is t h e achievements o f the philosophers o f the past t h a t are still v a l i d t o d a y ; i n other w o r d s , t h a t philosophy is h i s t o r i c a l a n d t h a t t h e h i s t o r y o f philosophy is strict philosophy: the creative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the philosophic past f r o m the v i e w p o i n t o f a t h o r o u g h l y c o n t e m p o r a r y philosophy. Therefore, we studied the classic thinkers o f W e s t e r n culture w i t h o u t regard to epochs: Greeks, medieval w r i t e r s a n d moderns, f r o m the pre-Socratics to contemporaries, w e r e r e a d — almost always i n their o r i g i n a l languages—studied, c o m m e n t e d o n ; a l l this w i t h o u t a trace o f " n a t i o n a l i s m " or " p r o v i n c i a l i s m . " Spain, w h i c h between 1650 a n d 1900 h a d r e m a i n e d isolated f r o m E u r o p e i n m a n y respects—although not so completely as is sometimes t h o u g h t —
Reflections on One of My Booh
ix
h a d become one o f the countries i n w h i c h there prevailed a less n a r r o w v i e w o f the r e a l h o r i z o n o f c u l t u r e . Spanish t h o u g h t — p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y very modest u p to the present—was n o t given any special emphasis. I n every course the classic w r i t e r s were studied. Z u b i r i , i n his lectures o n the history o f philosophy, i n t r o d u c e d us to the pre-Socratics a n d A r i s t o t l e , to St. Augustine a n d O c c a m , to Hegel, Schelling a n d Schleiermacher, to L e i b n i z a n d the Stoics. M o r e n t e , w h o h e l d the chair o f ethics, expounded the ethical teachings o f Aristotle, Spinoza, K a n t , M i l l , Brentano. T h e courses i n logic a n d esthetics g i v e n b y Gaos l e d us to Plato, to Husserl. O r t e g a , l e c t u r i n g o n metaphysics, c o m m e n t e d o n Descartes, D i l t h e y , Bergson a n d the F r e n c h , E n g l i s h a n d G e r m a n sociologists. T h i s was the atmosphere i n w h i c h I received m y education, these were the presuppositions o f m y v i e w o f philosophy; i n short, these are the intellectual roots o f this book. B u t I d o n o t t h i n k they are sufficient to e x p l a i n , first, h o w I came to do something w h i c h neither m y teachers n o r m y classmates d i d : to w r i t e a History of Philosophy; a n d , secondly, h o w this book became the one w h i c h for a quarter o f a c e n t u r y has i n t r o d u c e d Spanish-speaking people to this discipline. T o e x p l a i n this I m u s t relate w h a t m i g h t be called the personal roots w h i c h m a d e this b o o k possible. T h a t a d m i r a b l e Faculty gave p e n e t r a t i n g a n d i l l u m i n a t i n g courses o n specific subjects, b u t there was n o general survey course o n the history o f p h i l o s o p h y ; there was n o t even a course t h a t studied any large p e r i o d as a whole. A n d yet a l l students, no m a t t e r w h a t t h e i r field o f specialization, h a d to pass a n e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e n called the examen intermedio ( " i n t e r m e d i a t e e x a m i n a t i o n " ) , i n w h i c h they were questioned o n the entire history o f philosophy a n d its m a j o r themes. Needless to say, this examination w o r r i e d everyone, p a r t i c u l a r l y those w h o h a d taken o n l y i n t r o d u c t o r y courses i n philosophy a n d were o b l i g e d , i n p r e p a r i n g for the e x a m i n a t i o n , to read l o n g a n d d i f f i c u l t books, almost always i n foreign languages a n d n o t always very clear. A g r o u p o f w o m e n students, f r o m eighteen to t w e n t y years o l d , classmates a n d very close friends o f m i n e , asked me to help t h e m p r e pare for this e x a m i n a t i o n . T h i s was i n O c t o b e r o f 1933; I was nineteen years o l d a n d i n m y j u n i o r year o f u n i v e r s i t y studies, b u t I h a d f o l l o w e d m y professors' lectures attentively a n d h a d voraciously read a large n u m b e r o f books o n philosophy. W e organized a small a n d u n o f f i c i a l course i n one o f the meeting halls o f the women's d o r m i t o r y , o f w h i c h M a r i a de M a e z t u was t h e n the d i r e c t o r . W e h e l d class whenever w e c o u l d , f r e q u e n t l y for t w o or three hours o n Sunday m o r n i n g s . T h e
X
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girls were quite successful i n t h e i r examinations, t o the r a t h e r great surprise o f the professors. T h e f o l l o w i n g year some other girls, w h o w e r e faced w i t h the same e x a m i n a t i o n , asked m e to give the course a g a i n ; b u t the girls w h o were most interested i n such a class were those w h o h a d already passed the e x a m i n a t i o n a n d w a n t e d to continue to a t t e n d those classes i n p h i l o s o p h y . A t the end o f each o f the t w o courses, t h e y showed their g r a t i t u d e w i t h a g i f t : Heidegger's Sein und £eit a n d N i c o l a i H a r t m a n n ' s Ethik i n 1934, a n d t w o volumes o f D i l t h e y ' s Gesammelte Schriften i n 1935. I s t i l l have these four volumes, inscribed w i t h the names o f the g i r l s ; I also still have a n i n d e l i b l e m e m o r y o f those classes a n d a g r a t i t u d e w h i c h they could n o t even have suspected. I have also kept u p m y f r i e n d s h i p w i t h almost a l l o f t h e m . T h e f o l l o w i n g academic year, 1935-1936, M a r i a de M a e z t u entrusted m e w i t h a f o r m a l course i n p h i l o s o p h y for the residents o f the d o r m i t o r y ; a n d thus, d u r i n g m y three undergraduate y e a r s — I received m y degree i n philosophy i n J u n e , 1936, one m o n t h before the C i v i l W a r — I f o u n d myself transformed i n t o a university professor. Those philosophy courses were unique i n m a n y respects, b u t part i c u l a r l y i n one: m y students were m y classmates, m y friends, girls o f m y o w n age. T h u s they d i d n o t automatically respect m y o p i n i o n . T h i s experience i n w h a t m i g h t be c a l l e d ' ' lectureship w i t h o u t respect'' was invaluable to m e . These y o u n g girls accepted n o t h i n g in verba magistri; they d i d not recognize the argument o f a u t h o r i t y . I n those days a boundless esteem for c l a r i t y a n d i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y prevailed t h r o u g h o u t the F a c u l t y o f Philosophy. Ortega often q u o t e d Goethe's verses: I c h bekenne m i c h z u dem Geschlecht, das aus dem D u n k e l ins Helle strebt. (I declare myself to be of those W h o from the darkness to the light aspire.)
A n d t i m e a n d t i m e again he s a i d : " I n philosophy, c l a r i t y is courtesy." T h e r e was no satisfaction w i t h w h a t Ortega h i m s e l f h a d once labeled " t h e l u x u r y o f i n t e l l e c t u a l o b s c u r i t y . " This means t h a t m y students insisted u p o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g everything I was t e a c h i n g t h e m , w h i c h was n o t h i n g less t h a n the e n t i r e history o f Western philosophy. T h e y asked m e to clarify e v e r y t h i n g , to justify e v e r y t h i n g ; to show w h y every philosopher t h o u g h t as he d i d a n d to show t h a t his t h o u g h t was coherent, or, i f i t was n o t , w h y n o t . B u t this means t h a t I h a d to unders t a n d i t myself, i f not beforehand, t h e n at least d u r i n g the progress o f t h e class. I have never h a d to w o r k harder, or m o r e r e w a r d i n g l y , t h a n i n f r o n t o f that class o f f o u r t e e n to sixteen y o u n g w o m e n ; s m i l i n g girls,
Reflections on One of My Books
xi
m o c k i n g at times, w i t h m i n d s as fresh as t h e i r complexions, f o n d o f discussion, eager to see clearly, inexorable. N o one else, not even m y professors, t a u g h t m e so m u c h philosophy. T o be perfectly fair, I ought to share the royalties f r o m m y books w i t h t h e m . A c t u a l l y , I a m sharing the royalties w i t h one o f t h e m . A t the close o f the C i v i l W a r i n 1939, the j o b possibilities open to a m a n like me, w h o h a d remained i n Spain a n d was resolved to be f a i t h f u l to the spirit o f t h a t university a n d to w h a t i t represented i n o u r n a t i o n a l life, were extremely l i m i t e d a n d u n c e r t a i n . I t was pointless to t h i n k about o b t a i n i n g a teaching position i n any o f the Spanish universities or even o f c o n t r i b u t i n g articles to magazines a n d newspapers. I was forced to undertake unusually significant tasks because the lesser jobs were a l l closed to m e . T h i s is one o f fate's m a n y ironies. O n e o f the girls w h o h a d taken the courses, and w h o t w o years later was to become m y wife, u r g e d m e to w r i t e a History of Philosophy. W h e n I pointed o u t to her the enormous difficulties o f the enterprise, she presented me w i t h a large stack o f notebooks: they contained her admirable, clear a n d extremely accurate notes o n m y i n f o r m a l lectures. I began to w o r k w i t h t h e m : they were the first draft o f this book. I h a d to fill i n m a n y i t e m s ; I h a d to r e t h i n k e v e r y t h i n g , f i n d a w r i t t e n instead o f o r a l expression for w h a t was said there. I n short, I h a d to w r i t e a book t h a t w o u l d really be a book. After a w h i l e I became discouraged ; I r a l l i e d a n d w e n t back to w o r k . I n December o f 1940 I wrote the last page. T h e r e was still t i m e , w h i l e correcting the proof, to a d d a reference to Bergson's death, w h i c h occurred i n the first days o f J a n u a r y , 1941.1 o u g h t to m e n t i o n t h a t O r t e g a , w h o was consulted b y his son about the a d v i s a b i l i t y o f p u b l i s h i n g this book, w h i c h i n every w a y represented a considerable risk, w i t h o u t h a v i n g read i t replied i n the affirmative f r o m his exile i n Buenos A i r e s ; a n d so the Revista de Occidente, the most respected publishing house i n Spain, published a book b y a n a u t h o r o f w h o m the most they c o u l d hope for was t h a t no one w o u l d k n o w h i m . Z u b i r i , w h o h a d been m y instructor i n the history o f philosophy for four years a n d w h o h a d t a u g h t me countless t h i n g s — h e was at this t i m e a professor i n B a r c e l o n a — w r o t e a preface to the book. * O n the seventeenth o f J a n u a r y I dedicated the first copy to that g i r l , whose n a m e was L o l i t a Franco a n d w h o a few months later was to change her n a m e to m i n e . I have related these details about the m a n n e r i n w h i c h this book came to be w r i t t e n because I t h i n k they are the r e a l reasons for its * Not included in the English edition.
Preface to the English
Edition
e x t r a o r d i n a r y success. Its readers have received the same impression f r o m i t t h a t m y first students h a d : the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f philosophical doctrines, the h i s t o r y o f Western man's efforts to t h r o w l i g h t o n the deepest layers o f r e a l i t y ; a history i n w h i c h even error is explained a n d becomes i n t e l l i g i b l e a n d , to t h a t extent, j u s t i f i e d . One o f Ortega's central concepts, w h i c h permeated philosophical instruction i n M a d r i d d u r i n g m y student years, is t h a t o f historical reason. T h i s book, inspired b y t h a t p r i n c i p l e , takes i n t o account the total setting o f each philosopher, since ideas d o n o t derive solely f r o m other ideas, b u t also f r o m the overall w o r l d situation i n w h i c h each m a n must create his philosophy. T h u s , a h i s t o r y o f philosophy can be w r i t t e n o n l y philosophically, only b y r e c o n s t i t u t i n g the entire series o f past philosophies f r o m the standpoint o f a present philosophy t h a t is capable o f g i v i n g m e a n i n g to t h e m , one t h a t does n o t cast t h e m aside as obsolete errors, b u t acknowledges t h e m as its o w n roots. M a n y years have passed b y since 1941, a n d this b o o k has been enlarged, kept u p to date, polished a n d m a d e m o r e precise d u r i n g the course o f successive editions; b u t i t is the same book t h a t came i n t o being i n f r o n t o f a h a n d f u l o f y o u n g girls i n one o f the purest a n d most intense experiences o f that p h e n o m e n o n : philosophic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . JULIÁN
Madrid July, ig66.
MARÍAS
Contents
Introduction
page GREEK
PHILOSOPHY
T h e Suppositions o f Greek Philosophy T h e Pre-Socratics 1 2 3 4
i
9 11
The Milesian School, n The Pythagoreans, 15 Parmenides and the Eleatic School, ig From Heraclitus to Democritus, 25
T h e Sophists a n d Socrates
35
1 The Sophists, 35 2 Socrates, 38 Plato 1 2 3 4 5
42 The Ideas, 43 The Structure of Reality, 48 Problems Raised by the Theory of Ideas, 5/ Man and the City, 54 Philosophy, 56
Aristotle 1 The Levels of Knowledge, 2 Metaphysics, 64
59 62
Contents
xiv 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
The Modes of Being, 66 Substance, 6g Logic, 74 Physics, 77 The Theory of the Soul, 78 Ethics, 8o Politics, 82
T h e I d e a l o f the Wise M a n / 2 3 4
Ethical Philosophies in the Socratic Tradition, 88 Stoicism, go Epicureanism, g4 Skepticism and Eclecticism, g6
Neoplatonism CHRISTIANITY C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d Philosophy Patristic Speculation St. A u g u s t i n e 1 Life and Character, 113 2 Philosophy, 116 3 The Significance of St. Augustine, MEDIEVAL
ng
PHILOSOPHY
Scholasticism 1 The Era of Transition, 125 2 The Mature of Scholasticism,
127
T h e G r e a t Themes of the M i d d l e Ages 1 The Creation, 131 2 The Universals, 133 3 Reason, 136 T h e M e d i e v a l Philosophers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Scotus Erigena, 140 St. Anselm, 143 The Twelfth Century, 146 Eastern Philosophies, 152 The Spiritual World of the Thirteenth Century, 157 St. Bonaventure, 160 Aristotelico-Scholastic Philosophy, 163 Roger Bacon, 174 Christian Philosophy in Spain, 176
Contents
xv
10 Duns Scotus and Occam, 177 11 Meister Eckhart, 181 12 The Last Phase of Medieval Philosophy, MODERN
182
PHILOSOPHY
The Renaissance T h e Renaissance W o r l d
89
1 The Spiritual Circumstances, 2 Humanist Thought, ig2
18g 196
T h e B e g i n n i n g o f M o d e r n Philosophy 1 Nicholas of Cusa, igy 2 Giordano Bruno, 200 3 Modern Physics, 201 4 Spanish Scholasticism, 205 Seventeenth-Century Descartes 1 2 3 4 5
Idealism 210
The Cartesian Problem, 213 Man, 214 God, 216 The World, 221 Rationalism and Idealism, 222
Gartesianism i n France
224
1 Malebranche, 224 2 The Religious Thinkers, 227 Spinoza
231
1 Metaphysics, 232 2 Ethics, 234 3 Being as a Desire to Survive, 235 Leibniz 1 2 3 4
236
Leibniz' Philosophic Situation, 237 Leibniz' Metaphysics, 238 Theory of Knowledge, 242 Theodicy, 244 Empiricism
British Philosophy i Francis Bacon, 2 Hobbes, 250 3 Deism, 252
247 248
xv!
Contents 4 5 6 7
Locke, 254 Berkeley, 256 Hume, 258 The Scottish School,
25g
The Enlightenment 1 2 3 4
261
The Enlightenment in France, 262 The "Aufklärung" in Germany, 267 Vico's Doctrine of History, 268 Spanish Philosophers of the Enlightenment,
270
T h e F o r m a t i o n o f the M o d e m E p o c h 1 2 3 4 5
272
Philosophy and History, 272 The Rationalist State, 273 The Reformation, 274 Modern Society, 276 The Loss of God, 281 German Idealism
Kant
284
1 Transcendental Idealism, 285 2 The "Critique of Pure Reason," 3 Practical Reason, 2g3
287
T h e Problem o f K a n t i a n Philosophy 1 2 3 4
297
The Interpretations of Kant's Philosophy, Theory of Knowledge, 300 Being, 302 Philosophy, 305
Fichte
2g7
307
1 Fichte's Metaphysics, 308 2 Fichte's Idealism, 311 Schelling
313
The Phases of Schelling's
Philosophy,
314
Hegel 1 2 3 4 5
317 The The The The The
Outline of Hegel's Philosophy, 318 "Phenomenology of the Spirit," 31g "Logic," 320 Philosophy of Nature, 323 Philosophy of the Spirit, 324
T h e T h o u g h t o f the R o m a n t i c Age 1 The Literary Movements,
331
330
Contents 2 3 4 5
The School of Schleiermacher Derivations of Schopenhauer,
xvii
History, 331 and the Philosophy of Religion, Idealism, 333 338 Nineteenth-Century
332
Philosophy
T h e T r i u m p h over Sensationalism 1 Maine de Biran, 2 Spiritualism,
341
344
345
Comte's Positivism
348
1 History, 349 2 Society, 350 3 Science, 351 4 The Significance of Positivism, 353 Philosophy o f Positivist I n s p i r a t i o n
355
1 The French Thinkers, 355 2 English Philosophy, 356 3 The Positivist Era in Germany, 357 T h e Discovery o f Life 1 Kierkegaard, 2 Nietzsche,
360
361
362
T h e R e t u r n to T r a d i t i o n a l Metaphysics 1 The First Attempts, 2 Gratry, 368
365
366
Contemporary Philosphy Brentano 1 2 3 4
Brentano's Position in the History of Philosophy, Psychology, 373 Ethics, 375 The Existence of God, 377
The Idea of Life 1 2 3 4 5
371 371
378
Dilthey, 378 Simmel, 384 Bergson, 387 Blondel, 389 Unamuno, 390
English-Language Philosophy 1 Pragmatism, 393 2 Personalism, 398 3 Recent Trends, 399
393
XVI
Contents
ti
Husserl's Phenomenology 1 2 3 4 5 6
403
Ideal Objects, 404 Meanings, 406 The Analytic and the Synthetic, 407 Consciousness, 408 Phenomenology as a Method and as an Idealist Thesis, Phenomenological Philosophy, 411
418
Value Theory 1 The Problem of Value, 2 Scheler, 422 3 Hartmann, 423
410
418
Heidegger's Existential Philosophy
425
1 The Problem of Being, 427 2 The Analysis of Dasein, 429 3 "Existentialism," 435 O r t e g a a n d His Philosophy o f V i t a l Reason 1 2 3 4 5 6
Ortega's Personality, 442 The Genesis of Ortega's Philosophy, Vital Reason, 451 Human Life, 455 Historical and Social Life, 458 The School of Madrid, 462
442
446
Bibliography
469
Index
489
History Philosophy
Introduction
P H I L O S O P H Y . Philosophy has been understood to mean p r i n c i p a l l y t w o t h i n g s : knowledge a n d a way of life. T h e w o r d " p h i l o s o p h e r " contains the t w o different meanings o f " the m a n w h o possesses a certain k n o w l e d g e " a n d " t h e m a n w h o lives a n d acts i n a p a r t i c u l a r w a y . " Philosophy as knowledge a n d philosophy as a w a y o f life—these are t w o ways o f i n t e r p r e t i n g the w o r d , a n d the t w o interpretations have alternated a n d at times even existed simultaneously. Ever since the first philosophical speculation i n Greece, a certain theoretic life has been spoken of, a n d at the same t i m e philosophy has meant k n o w l edge, speculation. I t is necessary to understand the w o r d " p h i l o s o p h y " i n such a w a y t h a t i n our idea o f i t there is r o o m for b o t h meanings at the same time. B o t h interpretations are v a l i d , inasmuch as they have constituted philosophic reality itself. A n d one can discover the full m e a n i n g o f the w o r d a n d the reason for the d u a l i t y only i n the t o t a l comprehension o f t h a t philosophic r e a l i t y , t h a t is, i n the history o f philosophy.
T h e r e is a n i n d u b i t a b l e connection between the t w o ways o f understanding philosophy. A l t h o u g h the p r o b l e m o f e x p l a i n i n g this connection is i n large p a r t the p r o b l e m o f philosophy itself, we can understand that the t w o interpretations are i n t i m a t e l y connected, a n d i n fact have never been completely separated. Philosophy is a way of life— an essential way—that consists precisely of living according to a certain knowledge; therefore, this way of life postulates and requires this certain knowledge. It is thus knowledge which determines the meaning of the philosophic life. B u t w h a t k i n d o f knowledge ? W h a t is the n a t u r e o f philosophic i
2
Introduction
knowledge ? T h e i n d i v i d u a l sciences—mathematics, physics, history — a f f o r d us a c e r t a i n t y i n regard to some t h i n g s — a partial certainty, w h i c h does n o t exclude d o u b t outside the r e a l m o f its concern. M o r e over, the various certainties afforded us b y these i n d i v i d u a l sciences contradict one another a n d d e m a n d a h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y t o a r b i t r a t e a m o n g t h e m . I n order to k n o w precisely w h a t t o r e l y o n , m a n needs a f u n d a m e n t a l a n d universal certainty, b y means o f w h i c h he can l i v e a n d arrange the other p a r t i a l certainties i n a h i e r a r c h i c a l perspective. R e l i g i o n , a r t a n d philosophy give m a n a t o t a l c o n v i c t i o n r e g a r d i n g the whole o f r e a l i t y — b u t n o t w i t h o u t essential differences. R e l i g i o n is a certainty w h i c h is received b y m a n , g i v e n g r a t u i t o u s l y b y G o d : i t is revealed. M a n does n o t achieve this c e r t a i n t y b y himself; h e does n o t conquer i t , a n d i t is n o t o f his o w n c r e a t i o n : r a t h e r , j u s t t h e opposite is true. A r t also indicates a certain c o n v i c t i o n b y means o f w h i c h m a n finds himself, a n d f r o m w h i c h he interprets the sum t o t a l o f his life. B u t this b e l i e f — w h i c h is, o f course, o f h u m a n o r i g i n — d o e s n o t j u s t i f y itself; i t cannot account for itself; i t does n o t possess i n t r i n s i c evidence. I t is, i n short, unable to answerfor its own consequences. Philosophy, o n the other h a n d , is a f u n d a m e n t a l , universal c e r t a i n t y w h i c h is also autonomous; t h a t is, p h i l o s o p h y justifies itself; i t constantly demonstrates a n d proves its o w n v a l i d i t y ; i t thrives exclusively o n evidence. Philosophy is always r e n e w i n g the reasons for its c e r t a i n t y ( O r t e g a ) . T H E I D E A O F P H I L O S O P H Y . I t is useful t o d i r e c t our a t t e n t i o n for a m o m e n t to a few historical h i g h points i n order to see h o w the i n t e r pretations o f p h i l o s o p h y as knowledge a n d as a w a y o f life have been expressed simultaneously. For A r i s t o t l e , philosophy is a rigorous science, wisdom o r knowledge par excellence: the science o f things as they are. H o w e v e r , w h e n he speaks o f the various ways o f life, he includes a m o n g t h e m , as a n exemplary f o r m , a theoretic life w h i c h is precisely the life o f the philosopher. A f t e r A r i s t o t l e , i n t h e Stoic a n d Epicurean schools a n d the like, t h a t o v e r r u n Greece f o l l o w i n g the death o f A l e x a n d e r — a n d later the entire R o m a n E m p i r e — p h i l o s o p h y empties itself o f scientific content. M o r e a n d m o r e i t is converted i n t o a w a y o f l i f e — t h e life o f the serene a n d i m p e r t u r b a b l e wise man, w h i c h is, i n fact, the h u m a n i d e a l o f the epoch.
W i t h i n the C h r i s t i a n era, philosophy is to St. Augustine a question o f the even m o r e p r o f o u n d contrast between a vita theoretica a n d a vita beata. A n d several centuries later, St. T h o m a s is concerned w i t h a scientia theologica a n d a scientia philosophica; the d u a l i t y has passed f r o m the sphere o f life itself to the sphere o f the various forms o f knowledge. For Descartes, w h o l i v e d at the b e g i n n i n g o f the m o d e r n era, p h i losophy is no longer a question o f knowledge, o r at least n o t exclusively
Introduction
3
so; i t m i g h t perhaps be called a knowledge for life. I t is a question o f l i v i n g , o f l i v i n g i n a certain way, k n o w i n g w h a t one does a n d especially w h a t one o u g h t to do. T h u s , philosophy appears as a w a y o f life w h i c h postulates a science. B u t at the same t i m e , the highest standards o f i n t e l l e c t u a l precision a n d absolute c e r t a i n t y become a p a r t o f this science. T h e history does n o t end here. A t the m o m e n t o f m o d e r n Europe's m a t u r i t y , K a n t speaks to us ( i n his Logic a n d at the end o f the Critique of Pure Reason) of scholastic a n d worldly concepts o f philosophy. A c c o r d i n g to his scholastic concept, philosophy is a system o f a l l philosophic k n o w l edge. B u t i n its w o r l d l y sense (the m o r e p r o f o u n d a n d f u n d a m e n t a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) philosophy is the science o f the relationship between a l l knowledge a n d the essential goals o f h u m a n reason. T h e philosopher is no longer the artificer o f reason, b u t r a t h e r the legislator o f h u m a n reason. A n d i n this sense, K a n t says, one m a y be p r o u d to call oneself a philosopher. T h e u l t i m a t e goal is m o r a l destiny; therefore, the concept o f the moral person is the c u l m i n a t i o n o f K a n t i a n metaphysics. Philosophy i n its w o r l d l y sense—as a n essential w a y o f life o f m a n — i s w h a t gives m e a n i n g to philosophy as a science. F i n a l l y , i n o u r day, w h i l e Husserl insists once more o n presenting philosophy as a strict and rigorous science a n d D i l t h e y links i t essentially to h u m a n life a n d history, Ortega's idea of'vital reason restates the very nucleus o f the question i n a f u n d a m e n t a l w a y a n d establishes a n intrinsic a n d necessary relationship between r a t i o n a l knowledge a n d life itself. T H E O R I G I N O F P H I L O S O P H Y . W h y d i d m a n begin to philosophize? R a r e l y has this question been raised a n d discussed adequately. Aristotle's t r e a t m e n t o f i t was such t h a t i t decisively influenced the entire subsequent development o f philosophy. T h e opening section o f his Metaphysics is a n answer to t h a t q u e s t i o n : All men desire naturally to know. F o r A r i s t o t l e , the reason for man's desire to k n o w is n o t h i n g less t h a n t h a t i t is his n a t u r e . A n d the n a t u r e o f a t h i n g is its substance, t h a t o f w h i c h i t r e a l l y consists; therefore, knowledge seems to define m a n ; man's v e r y essence moves h i m to k n o w . H e r e again we f i n d a m o r e evident l i n k between knowledge a n d life, whose meaning w i l l become more a n d m o r e clear d u r i n g the course o f this book. B u t A r i s t o t l e says something else. A l i t t l e further o n i n the Metaphysics, he w r i t e s : It is because of awe that men begin to philosophize—now and in the beginning. At fast, men were awed by strange things that were closer to hand; later, pushing forward little by little in this manner, men investigated the most important things, such as the movements of the moon, sun and stars and the generation ofeverything. T h u s w e f i n d the most concrete r o o t o f the process o f p h i l o s o p h i z i n g to
4
Introduction
be a h u m a n a t t i t u d e — a w e . F i r s t m a n wonders a b o u t n e a r b y things, a n d t h e n about the sum t o t a l o f a l l t h a t exists. Instead o f c i r c u l a t i n g a m o n g things, using t h e m , e n j o y i n g t h e m or fearing t h e m , m a n stands apart f r o m t h e m , alienated f r o m t h e m ; he inquires w i t h awe a b o u t these nearby, everyday things w h i c h n o w for the first t i m e appear to be opposite h i m a n d therefore alone, isolated b y the q u e s t i o n : " W h a t is this ? " Philosophy begins at this m o m e n t . T h i s is a completely new h u m a n a t t i t u d e , w h i c h Z u b i r i has called theoretic i n contrast to mythic attitudes. T h i s n e w h u m a n o u t l o o k appears i n Greece one d a y for the first t i m e i n h i s t o r y , a n d f r o m t h a t m o m e n t there is something r a d i c a l l y new i n the w o r l d , something w h i c h makes philosophy possible. T o m y t h i c m a n , t h i n g s are p r o p i tious or h a r m f u l powers w h i c h he lives w i t h a n d w h i c h he uses or shuns. T h i s is the p r e - H e l l e n i c a t t i t u d e and one w h i c h the people to w h o m the b r i l l i a n t Greek discovery has n o t penetrated c o n t i n u e to share. T h e o r i z i n g consciousness, o n the other h a n d , sees things where previously i t saw o n l y powers. T h i s constitutes the great discovery o f things, a discovery so p r o f o u n d t h a t today i t is d i f f i c u l t for us to realize t h a t i t actually was a discovery or to imagine t h a t i t c o u l d have happened any other w a y . I n order to realize its significance, w e must m a k e use o f forms o f t h o u g h t w h i c h , w h i l e d i f f e r i n g f r o m the m o d e r n W e s t e r n a t t i t u d e , r e t a i n a remote analogy w i t h the m y t h i c a t t i t u d e : for example, t h a t o f the i n f a n t i l e consciousness, t h e a t t i t u d e o f the c h i l d w h o finds h i m s e l f i n a w o r l d f u l l o f b e n i g n o r hostile powers or persons, b u t n o t , s t r i c t l y speaking, o f things. W h e n m a n begins to theorize, instead o f b e i n g among the things, he is opposite t h e m , alienated f r o m t h e m , a n d thus they acquire a m e a n i n g o f t h e i r o w n w h i c h previously they d i d n o t have. T h e y seem to exist for themselves, apart f r o m m a n , a n d to have a d e t e r m i n e d consistence: t h a t is, they possess a n u m b e r o f properties, something o f their o w n , s o m e t h i n g t h a t belongs to t h e m alone. T h e n the things are seen as realities t h a t exist, t h a t have a special content. A n d o n l y i n this sense can one speak o f t r u t h or falsity. M y t h i c m a n moves outside the r e a l m o f this discovery. O n l y as something existing can things be true or false. T h e oldest f o r m o f this awakening to the t r u t h o f the things is awe. A n d therefore i t is the r o o t o f philosophy. P H I L O S O P H Y A N D I T S H I S T O R Y . Philosophy's relationship to its history is unlike t h a t o f science, for example, to its o w n history. I n the l a t t e r case, the t w o things are d i s t i n c t : science, o n the one h a n d , a n d o n the other, w h a t science was, t h a t is, its history. T h e t w o are independ e n t o f one another, a n d science can exist a n d be understood a n d c u l t i v a t e d separate f r o m the history o f w h a t i t has been. Science is
Introduction
5
constructed f r o m a n object a n d f r o m the knowledge w h i c h at a particu l a r m o m e n t is available a b o u t t h a t object. I n philosophy, the p r o b l e m is philosophy itself ; moreover, i n every instance this p r o b l e m is stated according to the historical a n d personal situation i n w h i c h the philosopher finds himself, a n d this situation is i n t u r n d e t e r m i n e d i n large measure b y the philosophic t r a d i t i o n to w h i c h the p a r t i c u l a r philosopher belongs. T h e entire philosophic past is i n c l u d e d i n every act o f philosophizing. I n the t h i r d place, the philosopher m u s t investigate the philosophic p r o b l e m i n its t o t a l i t y and, therefore, philosophy itself f r o m its o r i g i n a l root. H e cannot start f r o m a n d accept a readym a d e (de facto) state o f knowledge ; rather, he must start at the b e g i n n i n g a n d at the some time f r o m the historical s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h he finds himself. T h a t is, philosophy must establish a n d f u l f i l l itself w h o l l y i n every philosopher, n o t i n j u s t any m a n n e r , b u t i n every philosopher i n a u n i q u e l y a p p r o p r i a t e w a y : the w a y i n w h i c h he has been conditioned b y a l l previous philosophy. Therefore, a l l philosop h i z i n g includes the entire history o f philosophy; i f i t d i d n o t , i t w o u l d n o t be i n t e l l i g i b l e a n d , w h a t is more, i t c o u l d n o t exist. A t the same t i m e , philosophy possesses o n l y t h a t reality w h i c h i t achieves h i s t o r i c a l l y i n each philosopher. T h e r e is, then, an inseparable connection between p h i l o s o p h y a n d the history o f philosophy. Philosophy is historical, a n d its history is a n essential p a r t o f i t . M o r e o v e r , the history o f philosophy is n o t a mere e r u d i t e account o f the opinions o f philosophers, b u t the t r u e exposition o f the real content o f philosophy. T h e n i t is, i n a l l t r u t h , philosophy. Philosophy does n o t exhaust itself i n a n y one o f its systems; rather, i t consists o f the true history o f a l l philosophic systems. A n d , i n t h e i r t u r n , none o f these systems can exist independently, for each one requires a n d involves a l l previous systems. T h e r e is still another p o i n t : each system o f philosophy achieves m a x i m u m reality, f u l l truth, o n l y outside o f i t s e l f — t h a t is, i n the t h o u g h t o f those philosophers w h o are to succeed i t . A l l philosophizing originates f r o m the t o t a l i t y o f the past a n d projects itself t o w a r d the f u t u r e , thus advancing the history o f philosophy. T h i s is, briefly, w h a t one means w h e n one says t h a t philosophy is historical. T R U T H A N D H I S T O R Y . T h e foregoing account does n o t m e a n t h a t truth is n o t o f interest i n philosophy, t h a t philosophy is to be considered m e r e l y as a historical p h e n o m e n o n unconcerned w i t h t r u t h a n d falsity. E v e r y philosophic system claims to be true ; o n the other h a n d , contradictions between systems are evident a n d far f r o m c o i n c i d e n t a l ; b u t these contradictions do n o t b y a n y means signify complete i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y . N o system o f philosophy c a n c l a i m absolute a n d exclusive v a l i d i t y ,
6
Introduction
because none exhausts r e a l i t y ; t o t h e extent t h a t any system c l a i m s to be the o n l y t r u e system, i t is false. E v e r y philosophic system apprehends a p o r t i o n o f reality—precisely t h a t p a r t w h i c h is accessible f r o m its p o i n t o f v i e w or perspective. N o r does the t r u t h o f one system i m p l y the falsity o f other systems, except o n points w h i c h a r e f o r m a l l y c o n t r a d i c t e d . A c o n t r a d i c t i o n arises o n l y w h e n a philosopher affirms m o r e t h a n he actually sees. T h u s a l l philosophic visions are t r u e ( I m e a n , o f course, p a r t i a l l y true) a n d i n p r i n c i p l e do n o t e x c l u d e one another. M o r e o v e r , every philosopher's p o i n t of v i e w is c o n d i t i o n e d b y his historical situation, a n d therefore every system, i f i t is t o be f a i t h f u l to its o w n perspective, must i n c l u d e a l l previous systems as p a r t o f its o w n composition. T h u s , t h e various true philosophies are n o t i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e ; rather, they are rigorously determined a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r sequence i n h u m a n history. * * See
my Introducción a la Filosofía
[Reason
and Life],
ch.
XII.
GREEK
PHILOSOPHY
i
The Suppositions of Greek
Philosophy
I f we ignore t h e obscure p r o b l e m o f O r i e n t a l ( I n d i a n , Chinese) philosophy, i n w h i c h w h a t is most p r o b l e m a t i c is the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d " p h i l o s o p h y " itself, a n d focus o u r a t t e n t i o n o n w h a t philosophy has been i n the West, w e w i l l find t h a t its first stage is the philosophy o f the Greeks. T h i s i n i t i a l phase, w h i c h lasted for more t h a n a m i l l e n n i u m , differs f r o m a l l later phases i n t h a t i t does n o t have a philosophic t r a d i t i o n b e h i n d i t ; t h a t is, Greek philosophy emerges f r o m a concrete h u m a n s i t u a t i o n — t h a t o f " a n c i e n t " m a n — w h i c h contains n o p h i l o sophical element o r ingredient. T h i s circumstance has t w o i m p o r t a n t consequences: i n the first place, the b i r t h o f philosophy i n Greece has a p u r i t y a n d o r i g i n a l i t y superior t o a l l t h a t is t o come l a t e r ; secondly, ancient man's v i t a l a n d historical s i t u a t i o n d i r e c t l y conditions H e l l e n i c speculation t o the p o i n t t h a t the m a j o r theme o f the history o f Greek p h i l o s o p h y consists i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h y m a n , u p o n r e a c h i n g a certain stage i n his development, f o u n d h i m s e l f compelled t o f u l f i l l a completely n e w a n d u n k n o w n need, w h i c h today w e call philosop h i z i n g . W e cannot discuss this p r o b l e m here, b u t w e m u s t at least p o i n t o u t some o f the historic suppositions w h i c h made p h i l o s o p h y possible a n d necessary i n the H e l l e n i c w o r l d . * A w a y o f life is defined above a l l b y its r e p e r t o r y ofbeliefs. N a t u r a l l y , beliefs change, as O r t e g a has shown, f r o m generation to g e n e r a t i o n — this is w h a t constitutes historical m u t a t i o n . B u t a certain basic core o f beliefs endures t h r o u g h several generations a n d gives t h e m the h i g h e r * Cf. my Biografía de la Filosofía, I . " L a filosofía griega desde su origen hasta P l a t ó n . " ( E m e c é , Buenos Aires, 1954). [Obras, vol. I I . ] 9
lO
The Suppositions of Greek Philosophy
u n i t y w h i c h we designate b y such words as epoch, era or age. W h a t are the basic beliefs h e l d b y Greek m a n w h i c h l i m i t a n d give f o r m to his philosophy? H e l l e n i c m a n finds h i m s e l f i n a world w h i c h has always existed a n d w h i c h is therefore never a p r o b l e m ; a l l q u e s t i o n i n g presupposes this w o r l d , takes i t for g r a n t e d . T h e w o r l d is i n t e r p r e t e d as nature a n d , therefore, as a n o r i g i n a l principle, or as t h a t f r o m w h i c h a l l concrete r e a l i t y emerges o r issues. T h u s the w o r l d appears t o be endowed w i t h potentiality, w i t h p r o d u c t i v e capacity. B u t at the same t i m e i t is a multiplicity ; the w o r l d contains m a n y things w h i c h are capable o f changing a n d are defined b y opposites. E v e r y one o f these t h i n g s has a n independ e n t consistency, b u t the things themselves are n o t permanent. T h e y change, a n d their properties are understood i n terms o f opposites: c o l d is the opposite o f w a r m , even the opposite o f o d d , a n d so o n . T h i s p o l a r i t y is characteristic o f the ancient m i n d . T h e properties inherent i n the things p e r m i t t h e m to be used i n a technic basically different f r o m magical procedures, i n w h i c h things are t r e a t e d as powers. T h e Greek's w o r l d is intelligible. I t can be understood, a n d comprehension consists i n seeing or c o n t e m p l a t i n g t h a t r e a l i t y a n d of explaining it. Theory, logos a n d being are the three decisive terms o f H e l l e n i c t h o u g h t , a n d they are r o o t e d i n this p r i m a r y a t t i t u d e t o w a r d the w o r l d . As a consequence, the w o r l d appears as something w h i c h is ordered a n d subjected to l a w : this is the n o t i o n o f the cosmos. Reason is inserted i n t o this l a w f u l order o f the w o r l d , w h i c h can be governed a n d directed, a n d the concrete f o r m o f this l a w f u l o r d e r i n h u m a n affairs is the p o l i t i c a l coexistence o f m e n i n cities. I t is necessary to keep this basic outline o f ancient beliefs i n m i n d i n o r d e r t o understand the historical fact o f Greek philosophy.
The
i.
T H E
Pre-Socratics
MILESIAN
SCHOOL
T h e Greek philosophers p r i o r to Socrates are called thepre-Socratics. T h i s n a m e has, to begin w i t h , a chronological value: these are the thinkers w h o l i v e d f r o m the end o f the seventh century to t h e close o f the fifth century before Christ. However, the t e r m also has a more p r o f o u n d m e a n i n g : the earliest beginnings o f Greek philosophy can be considered true philosophy because after t h e m there existed a f u l l a n d indisputable philosophy. E x a m i n e d i n the l i g h t o f m a t u r e p h i l o s o p h y — f r o m Socrates o n w a r d — t h e first H e l l e n i c speculations are seen to be philosophic, a l t h o u g h n o t a l l o f t h e m w o u l d m e r i t this designation were they n o t the b e g i n n i n g a n d promise o f s o m e t h i n g to come later o n . By being pre-Socratics, b y a n n o u n c i n g a n d p r e p a r i n g a philosophic m a t u r i t y , the first thinkers o f I o n i a a n d M a g n a Graecia are themselves already philosophers. O n e must n o t forget t h a t i f i t is t r u e t h a t the present depends o n the past, t h e n the present sometimes redounds on the past a n d colors i t as w e l l . Specific affirmations o f the oldest I n d i a n a n d Chinese thinkers are often similar to those o f the Greeks; the m a j o r difference between these t w o philosophies is t h a t after the pre-Socratics came Socrates, whereas the s t a m m e r i n g O r i e n t a l speculation was n o t followed b y a philosophic fullness i n the sense w h i c h this phrase has taken o n i n the West. T h i s explains the f u n d a m e n t a l difference w h i c h we notice between the earliest t h i n k i n g o f the H e l l e n i c people a n d t h a t o f the Orientals. T h e last pre-Socratics do n o t predate Socrates; they are his c o n t e m poraries i n the second h a l f o f the fifth century. However, they r e m a i n ii
12
The Pre-Socratics
p a r t o f t h e g r o u p t h a t antedates h i m because o f t h e theme a n d character o f their speculation. Mature (
voto\oyoi, physicists; they create a physics b y philosophic m e t h o d . C o n f r o n t e d b y n a t u r e , the pre-Socratic adopts an attitude t h a t differs enormously f r o m t h a t o f Hesiod, for example. T h e latter attempts t o narrate h o w the w o r l d has been shaped a n d ordered, or supply t h e genealogy o f the gods; h e creates a theogony, relates a myth. M y t h a n d p h i l o s o p h y are closely related, as A r i s t o t l e has observed, a n d this constitutes a serious p r o b l e m ; b u t m y t h a n d philosophy are t w o different things. T h e pre-Socratic philosopher confronts nature w i t h a theoretical q u e s t i o n ; he attempts to t e l l what it is. Philosophy is chiefly defined b y the question w h i c h motivates i t : What is all this ? T h i s question cannot be answered w i t h a m y t h , b u t o n l y w i t h a philosophy. M O T I O N . W h a t is i t t h a t makes the Greeks w o n d e r a b o u t the n a t u r e o f things ? W h a t is the r o o t o f the awe t h a t first m o v e d t h e Greeks t o philosophize ? I n other w o r d s , w h a t is i t that alienates H e l l e n i c m a n a n d makes h i m feel strange i n t h e w o r l d i n w h i c h h e finds himself? Bear i n m i n d first t h a t the pre-Socratics' situation differs f r o m t h a t o f a l l later philosophers. T h e later m e n , u p o n setting themselves a p r o b l e m , f o u n d u n i t e d w i t h i t a repertory o f solutions already p r o posed a n d t r i e d , whereas t h e pre-Socratics a b a n d o n e d t h e answers g i v e n b y t r a d i t i o n o r m y t h for a n e w instrument o f certainty-—reason. T h e Greek wonders a t a n d is awed b y motion. W h a t does this mean ? M o t i o n (Kwrjois) has a fuller m e a n i n g i n Greek t h a n i n E n g l i s h or the R o m a n c e languages. W h a t w e c a l l m o t i o n is o n l y a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m of kinesis, whereas i n Greek " m o t i o n " means change o r v a r i a t i o n . T h e Greeks distinguished f o u r types o f m o t i o n : ( i ) l o c a l m o t i o n (thopd), change o f place; (2) q u a n t i t a t i v e m o t i o n , t h a t is, augmentat i o n o r d i m i n u t i o n (av^rjms KCU 6lais); (3) q u a l i t a t i v e m o t i o n , o r a l t e r a t i o n (aXXolcoms); a n d (4) substantial m o t i o n , t h a t is, generation a n d decay (yeWo-ts K<XI 9opd). A l l these kinds o f m o t i o n , a n d especially the last n a m e d , w h i c h is the most p r o f o u n d a n d r a d i c a l , p e r t u r b a n d t r o u b l e Greek m a n because they make the existence o f things p r o b l e m a t i c ; they o v e r w h e l m h i m w i t h uncertainty t o t h e p o i n t t h a t he does n o t k n o w w h a t to rely o n i n respect t o t h e m . I f things change, w h a t are they really? I f a w h i t e object ceases t o be w h i t e a n d becomes green, i t is a n d i t is n o t w h i t e ; i f something that is ceases to be, t h e n the t h i n g b o t h is a n d is not. M u l t i p l i c i t y a n d c o n t r a d i c t i o n permeate t h e v e r y b e i n g o f things; thus, t h e Greek wonders w h a t the things really are, t h a t is, w h a t they are permanently, b e h i n d their m a n y appearances. C o n f r o n t e d b y the numerous aspects o f the things, t h e Greek searches
The Milesian School
'3
for their permanent a n d i m m u t a b l e roots, w h i c h are superior to this m u l t i p l i c i t y a n d w h i c h can give i t m e a n i n g . Therefore, w h a t is t r u l y interesting is the i n i t i a l question o f philosophy: W h a t is a l l this really ? O r : W h a t is N a t u r e , the source f r o m w h i c h a l l things emerge ? T h e history o f Greek p h i l o s o p h y is made u p o f the various answers given to this question. Greek philosophy has a very concrete a n d w e l l - k n o w n o r i g i n . I t begins o n the I o n i a n coasts, i n the Hellenic cities o f Asia M i n o r i n the first years o f the sixth c e n t u r y before C h r i s t — o r perhaps at the end o f the seventh century. T h e o r i g i n o f philosophy c a n be said to be excentric, since i t took place outside the center o f the Greek w o r l d ; i t was n o t u n t i l m u c h later (the fifth century B . C . ) t h a t philosophic speculation appeared i n Greece proper. T h e cities o n the eastern coast o f the Aegean were r i c h e r a n d more prosperous t h a n those o f Hellas, a n d i t was i n the Aegean cities t h a t a n economic, technical a n d scientific awakening first developed. T h i s a w a k e n i n g was p r o m o t e d i n p a r t b y contact w i t h other cultures, especially w i t h the E g y p t i a n a n d Persian civilizations. I t was i n M i l e t u s , the most i m p o r t a n t c i t y i n this region, t h a t philosophy first appeared. T h e r e , a g r o u p o f philosophers w h o were also m e n o f great stature i n the affairs o f the c o u n t r y and w h o belonged to a p p r o x i m a t e l y three successive generations, a t t e m p t e d to supply answers to the question o f w h a t nature is. These first philosophers are usually referred to as the I o n i a n or M i l e s i a n school; the three p r i n c i p a l a n d representative figures are Thales, A n a x i m a n d e r a n d Anaximenes, a n d their a c t i v i t y fills the sixth century. T H A L E S O F M I L E T U S . Thales l i v e d f r o m the last t h i r d o f the seventh century to the m i d d l e o f the sixth century. A n c i e n t documents credit h i m w i t h several occupations: those o f engineer, astronomer, financier, p o l i t i c i a n ; therefore, he is i n c l u d e d a m o n g the Seven Wise M e n o f Greece. H e m a y have been b o r n i n distant Phoenicia. Thales is t h o u g h t to have traveled t h r o u g h E g y p t , a n d is credited w i t h h a v i n g i n t r o d u c e d i n t o Greece E g y p t i a n geometry (the calculation o f distances a n d heights b y means o f the equality a n d s i m i l a r i t y o f triangles, b u t certainly by e m p i r i c a l methods). Thales also predicted a n eclipse. H e is, t h e n , a great m a n o f his t i m e .
Aristotle is our m a j o r a n d most valuable source o f i n f o r m a t i o n for w h a t most interests us here, Thales' philosophy. I n fact, Aristotle is o u r best a u t h o r i t y o n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f e v e r y t h i n g pre-Socratic. H e says t h a t according to Thales, the source or o r i g i n a l p r i n c i p l e (apxy) o f a l l things is w a t e r ; t h a t is, the moist state. T h e reason for this is p r o b a b l y t h a t animals a n d plants have moist n u t r i t i o n a n d seed.
The
Pre-Socratics
T h e l a n d floats o n w a t e r ; moreover, the w o r l d is f u l l o f spirits a n d souls a n d m a n y demons. O r , as A r i s t o t l e says, " a l l things are f u l l o f gods." This a n i m a t i o n or v i v i f i c a t i o n o f m a t t e r is called hylozoism. B u t the t r u l y significant t h i n g about Thales is the fact t h a t , for the first t i m e i n history, a m a n is questioning everything t h a t exists, n o t because he is w o n d e r i n g a b o u t the m y t h i c o r i g i n o f the w o r l d , b u t because he w a n t s to k n o w w h a t n a t u r e really is. Between theogony a n d Thales there is a n abyss—the abyss w h i c h separates philosophy f r o m a l l previous thinking. A N A X I M A N D E R . T o w a r d the m i d d l e o f the sixth century, A n a x i mander succeeded Thales as the leader o f the M i l e s i a n school. H a r d l y a n y t h i n g a b o u t his life is k n o w n w i t h certainty. H e w r o t e a w o r k (which has been lost) k n o w n b y the t i t l e later assigned t o the greater p a r t of pre-Socratic w r i t i n g s : On Nature (-jrepl tivcews). V a r i o u s i n v e n tions of a m a t h e m a t i c a l a n d astronomical character are a t t r i b u t e d to h i m ; he is also c r e d i t e d — w i t h greater l i k e l i h o o d — w i t h d r a w i n g the first m a p o f the w o r l d . T o the question concerning the source o f things, A n a x i m a n d e r answers t h a t i t is the dpeiron, TO a-neipov. T h i s w o r d means, l i t e r a l l y , i n f i n i t e , n o t i n a m a t h e m a t i c a l sense, b u t rather i n the sense o f limitlessness or indeterminateness. I t is convenient to understand i t as something grandiose a n d u n l i m i t e d i n its magnificence, something w h i c h provokes awe. I t is the marvelous t o t a l i t y o f the w o r l d i n w h i c h m a n is surprised to find himself. T h i s nature is, furthermore, a source: f r o m i t a l l things spring f o r t h . S t a r t i n g f r o m this apxq, some things come to be, others cease to be, b u t the source endures because i t is independent o f a n d superior to these i n d i v i d u a l changes. T h i n g s are created t h r o u g h a process o f separation; they separate f r o m the mass o f nature i n a sieve-like m o v e m e n t — f i r s t c o l d a n d w a r m , a n d t h e n the other things. T h i s process o f being created and d y i n g is a n injustice, an ¿Si/a'a, a n unjust predominance o f one opposite over another ( w a r m over c o l d , d a m p over d r y , a n d so o n ) . I n d i v i d u a l things m a i n t a i n their p r e d o m i n a n c e b y means o f this injustice. H o w e v e r , there is a n a t u r a l l a w w h i c h w i l l m a k e things r e t u r n to a n u l t i m a t e end t h a t is w i t h o u t injustice, the i m m o r t a l a n d i n c o r r u p t i b l e dpeiron, i n w h i c h opposites d o n o t p r e d o m i n a t e over one another. Time is the means b y w h i c h this n a t u r a l l a w m u s t be realized. T i m e w i l l m a k e a l l things r e t u r n to this u n i t y , to the q u i e t u d e a n d irresolution o f the vais, f r o m w h i c h they have unjustly departed.
A n a x i m a n d e r was also an astronomer, a n d made a considerable c o n t r i b u t i o n to the development o f this science, b u t we cannot here discuss his achievement i n this field. As a philosopher he represents
The Pythagoreans the step f r o m the simple designation o f a substance as a source o f n a t u r e to a m o r e acute a n d p r o f o u n d idea o f nature, a n d one w h i c h already shows the features w h i c h w i l l later characterize a l l p r e Socratic p h i l o s o p h y : a t o t a l i t y w h i c h is the source o f e v e r y t h i n g , w h i c h is free f r o m m u t a t i o n a n d p l u r a l i t y a n d w h i c h is set in opposition to the things. W e w i l l see these features reappearing constantly i n the very h e a r t o f Greek philosophical development. A N A X I M E N E S . Anaximenes, w h o l i v e d i n the second h a l f of the sixth century, was a p u p i l o f A n a x i m a n d e r , a n d was also f r o m M i l e t u s . T h e f i n a l i m p o r t a n t M i l e s i a n , he adds t w o n e w concepts to the d o c t r i n e o f his master. First, he supplies a concrete i n d i c a t i o n o f w h a t the source o f n a t u r e is: air, w h i c h he relates to r e s p i r a t i o n o r breathing. A l l things are created f r o m air a n d r e t u r n to i t w h e n they decay. This appears to be something o f a r e t u r n to Thales' p o i n t o f view, except t h a t w a t e r has been replaced b y a i r ; b u t Anaximenes adds a second s t i p u l a t i o n : t h a t the things are f o r m e d f r o m air i n a specific w a y — b y condensation a n d rarefaction. T h i s is o f the greatest i m p o r t a n c e ; we n o w have n o t o n l y the designation o f a p r i m a l substance b u t also the explanation o f h o w a l l things are made f r o m i t . Rarefied a i r is f i r e ; w h e n air is m o r e condensed, i t becomes clouds, water, l a n d , rocks, depending o n the degree o f density. T o the first substance, w h i c h supports the c h a n g i n g v a r i e t y o f things, is added a source o f m o t i o n . A n d i t is at this m o m e n t t h a t the Persian d o m i n a t i o n o f I o n i a impels philosophy t o w a r d the West.
2.
T H E
PYTHAGOREANS
PYTHAGORAS. T h e Pythagoreans were the first philosophic g r o u p to appear after t h e Milesians. A t the e n d o f the sixth century, p h i losophy was transported f r o m the I o n i a n coasts to the coasts o f M a g n a Graecia, to southern I t a l y a n d to S i c i l y ; there i t formed w h a t Aristotle called the Italic school. T h e Persian invasion of Asia M i n o r a p p a r e n t l y forced c e r t a i n I o n i c groups to m o v e t o w a r d the extreme western edge o f the H e l l e n i c w o r l d , a n d Pythagoreanism arose f r o m this fertile e m i g r a t i o n .
Pythagoreanism is one o f the most obscure a n d complex chapters i n Greek philosophic history. I n the first place, everything r e l a t i n g to the history o f the m o v e m e n t is p r o b l e m a t i c ; i n the second place, i t is extremely difficult to interpret. W e w i l l have t o l i m i t ourselves here to p o i n t i n g o u t its most i m p o r t a n t features, w i t h o u t discussing the serious questions i t raises. Pythagoras was the founder o f this school, b u t he is little m o r e t h a n a
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The Pre-Socratics
n a m e ; we k n o w h a r d l y a n y t h i n g about h i m , a n d n o t h i n g a t a l l w i t h certainty. I t appears t h a t he came f r o m the i s l a n d o f Samos a n d settled i n C r o t o n , i n M a g n a Graecia. Several j o u r n e y s are a t t r i b u t e d to h i m , i n c l u d i n g one to Persia, where he is said to have m e t the M a g u s Zaratas, t h a t is, Zoroaster or Z a r a t h u s t r a . H e was p r o b a b l y n o t at a l l concerned w i t h mathematics, a l t h o u g h his school later became interested i n this subject. Pythagoras' a c t i v i t y m u s t have been p r i n c i p a l l y religious i n character, connected w i t h the O r p h i c mysteries, w h i c h were, i n t u r n , related to the cults o f Dionysus. Aristotle speaks o f the Pythagoreans i n a n impersonal m a n n e r , a n d underscores this vagueness w i t h his favorite expression: those called Pythagoreans T H E P Y T H A G O R E A N S C H O O L . T h e Pythagoreans settled i n a series o f cities on the I t a l i a n m a i n l a n d a n d i n Sicily, a n d t h e n c o n t i n u e d i n t o Greece proper. T h e y f o r m e d a league or sect a n d s u b m i t t e d t h e m selves to m a n y strange rules a n d taboos: they d i d n o t eat meat or beans, they c o u l d n o t w e a r clothes made o f w o o l , or p i c k u p a n y t h i n g t h a t h a d fallen, or stir a fire w i t h an i r o n , a n d so o n . I t is difficult to see the reasons for these r u l e s — i f indeed there were any. T w o groups o f Pythagoreans, the akousmatikoi a n d the mathematikoi, are distinguished, according to the n a t u r e a n d degree o f t h e i r i n i t i a t i o n . T h e Pythagorean order t e n d e d to oppose the aristocracy, b u t i t ended i n f o r m i n g one itself a n d i n t a k i n g p a r t i n politics. A s a result o f this, there was a v i o l e n t d e m o c r a t i c reaction i n C r o t o n , a n d the Pythagoreans were persecuted. M a n y were k i l l e d a n d h a d t h e i r homes b u r n e d . T h e founder escaped a n d , according to legend, d i e d shortly afterward. L a t e r , the Pythagoreans achieved a new f l o w e r i n g , called neo-Pythagoreanism.
M o r e interesting to us a t this p o i n t , however, is the m e a n i n g o f the Pythagorean order as such. I t was a proper school. ( T h e w o r d " s c h o o l " (pxoX-q) means, i n Greek, leisure: i t is useful to bear this i n m i n d . ) T h i s school is defined b y the w a y o f life o f its m e m b e r s — e m i g r a n t s , e x p a t r i a t e s — i n short, foreigners. F o l l o w i n g the example o f the O l y m p i c games, the Pythagoreans spoke o f three ways o f l i f e : t h a t o f those w h o b u y a n d sell, t h a t o f those w h o r u n i n the s t a d i u m , a n d t h a t o f the spectators, w h o l i m i t themselves to w a t c h i n g . T h e Pythagoreans, inquisitive foreigners i n M a g n a Graecia, l i v e d as spectators. T h i s is w h a t is called the pios OecoprjTiKos, the theoretic or c o n t e m p l a t i v e life. T h e m a i n difficulty i n l e a d i n g this k i n d o f life lies i n the b o d y , w i t h its necessities w h i c h subdue m a n . I t is necessary t o free oneself f r o m these necessities. T h e b o d y is a t o m b (acip.a orjfj.a), say the Pythagoreans; one must t r i u m p h over i t , b u t one must n o t lose i t . I n o r d e r to accom-
The Pythagoreans plish this, the soul m u s t first a t t a i n the state o f enthusiasm—that is, ecstasy. H e r e the connection w i t h the Orphics a n d their rites, founded o n mania (madness) a n d o n orgy, is evident. T h e Pythagorean school utilizes a n d transforms these rites. I n this w a y one attains a selfsufficient, theoretic life, a life n o t tied to the necessities o f the body, a d i v i n e life. T h e m a n w h o achieves this is a wise m a n , a ao6s. ( I t appears t h a t the w o r d philosophia, or love o f w i s d o m , m o r e modest t h a n sophia, was first used i n Pythagorean circles). T h e perfect sopkos is at the same t i m e the perfect c i t i z e n ; because o f this, Pythagoreanism creates a n aristocracy a n d ends u p b y t a k i n g p a r t i n politics. M A T H E M A T I C S . A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t aspect o f the a c t i v i t y o f the Pythagoreans is their speculation i n the field o f mathematics. Greek a n d m o d e r n mathematics d o n o t greatly resemble one another. T h e f o r m e r was b e g u n — a l m o s t as a mere operative t e c h n i q u e — i n the M i l e s i a n school, a n d i n h e r i t e d the knowledge o f E g y p t a n d Asia M i n o r . B u t i t was n o t u n t i l the t i m e o f the Pythagoreans t h a t mathematics was converted i n t o a n autonomous a n d rigorous science. W i t h i n the Pythagorean s c h o o l — a n d especially i n the so-called neoPythagorean p e r i o d — t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l knowledge w h i c h was later t o be c o n t i n u e d i n the schools o f Athens a n d Gyzicus was developed. I n the f o u r t h century, the P l a t o n i c A c a d e m y a n d the school o f Aristotle were to forge the m a j o r philosophical concepts w h i c h , i n the Hellenistic period, b e g i n n i n g w i t h the t h i r d century, w o u l d p e r m i t t h e elaboration a n d systemization o f mathematics, as epitomized i n the w o r k o f E u c l i d .
T h e Pythagoreans discovered a type o f e n t i t y — n u m b e r s a n d geom e t r i c figures—which is n o t corporeal, b u t has r e a l i t y a n d offers resistance to the m i n d ; this discovery leads m e n to t h i n k t h a t being cannot be identified b a l d l y w i t h corporal being, a n d this i n t u r n necessitates a decisive a m p l i f i c a t i o n o f the n o t i o n o f e n t i t y . B u t the Pythagoreans, carried a l o n g b y their o w n discovery, m a k e a new i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , this t i m e i n reverse o r d e r : for t h e m , b e i n g comes to m e a n the being o f m a t h e m a t i c a l objects. N u m b e r s a n d figures are the essence o f things, a n d entities w h i c h exist are imitations o f m a t h e m a t i c a l objects. I n some texts i t is a f f i r m e d t h a t numbers are the things themselves. Pythagorean mathematics is n o t a n operative technique; r a t h e r , i t is the discovery a n d construction o f new entities, w h i c h are changeless a n d eternal, as opposed to things, w h i c h are v a r i a b l e a n d t r a n s i t o r y . This situation gives rise to the mystery s u r r o u n d i n g the discoveries o f this school—for instance, the discovery o f regular polyhedrons. O n e t r a d i t i o n relates t h a t Hippasus o f M e t a p o n t u m was d r o w n e d — o r rather shipwrecked, punished b y the g o d s — d u r i n g a
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The
Pre-Socratics
sea voyage f o r h a v i n g revealed t h e secret o f the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the dodecahedron. L o o k i n g i n t o another m a t t e r , w e find t h a t a r i t h m e t i c a n d geometry are closely r e l a t e d : the n u m b e r i stands for a p o i n t , 2 for a l i n e , 3 for a surface, 4 for a s o l i d ; the n u m b e r 10, the s u m o f t h e first four numbers, is the famous tetractys, the m a j o r n u m b e r . T h e Pythagoreans speak geometrically o f square, o b l o n g , plane a n d cube n u m b e r s a n d the like. T h e r e are mystical numbers, endowed w i t h special properties. T h e Pythagoreans establish a series o f opposites, b y m e a n s o f w h i c h qualities m a i n t a i n strange interrelationships: the u n l i m i t e d w i t h t h e l i m i t e d , t h e even w i t h the o d d , t h e m a n y w i t h the one, a n d so f o r t h . T h e s y m b o l i s m o f these ideas is p r o b l e m a t i c a n d d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r stand. T h e Pythagoreans also created a m a t h e m a t i c a l t h e o r y o f music. T h e y m a d e use o f the relationship between the lengths o f t h e strings o f instruments a n d the corresponding notes to carry o u t a q u a n t i t a t i v e study o f e v e r y t h i n g m u s i c a l ; since the distances of the planets f r o m the e a r t h correspond a p p r o x i m a t e l y t o t h e musical i n t e r v a l s , i t was t h o u g h t t h a t every star e m i t t e d a note, a n d a l l the notes together c o m prised the so-called h a r m o n y o f the spheres o r celestial music, w h i c h w e d o n o t hear because i t is constant a n d w i t h o u t v a r i a t i o n . T h e Pythagoreans' contributions t o t h e field o f a s t r o n o m y were p r o f o u n d a n d penetrating. Ecphantus affirmed the r o t a t i o n o f t h e earth, a n d A l c m a e o n o f Crotón m a d e penetrating studies i n the fields o f b i o l o g y a n d embryology. A r c h y t a s o f T a r e n t u m a n d Philolaus o f Crotón were the t w o most i m p o r t a n t figures i n the field o f P y t h a g o r e a n mathematics. * I n the Pythagorean school w e have a first clear e x a m p l e o f philoso p h y u n d e r s t o o d as a w a y o f life. T h e p r o b l e m o f the self-sufficient life leads the people o f this school t o a special discipline consisting o f cont e m p l a t i o n . T h e r e appears i n Greece w i t h the Pythagoreans t h e theme o f freedom, the theme o f the m a n w h o is self-reliant, w h i c h is t o become one o f the permanent themes o f H e l l e n i c t h o u g h t . T h i s preo c c u p a t i o n w i t h the soul leads t h e Pythagoreans to t h e d o c t r i n e o f t r a n s m i g r a t i o n o r metempsychosis, w h i c h is related t o t h e p r o b l e m o f i m m o r t a l i t y . A n d the p r o b l e m o f i m m o r t a l i t y , w h i c h is i n t i m a t e l y related t o age a n d t i m e , is l i n k e d w i t h speculation a b o u t n u m b e r s ; numbers are, above a l l , measures o f t i m e , the ages of things. W e thus see * Concerning the problem of Greek mathematics, see my Biografía de la Filosofía, I, p. iii, and especially Ensayos de teoría, " E l descubrimiento de los objetos matemáticos en la filosofía griega" [Obras, I V ] .
Parmenides and the Eleatic School t h a t the u n i f y i n g base o f the extremely complex Pythagorean movement is centered i n the theme o f the contemplative a n d divine life. 3.
PARMENIDES A N D T H E ELEATIC
SCHOOL
There is another philosophic b u d d i n g i n M a g n a Graecia besides Pythagoreanism: the Eleatic school. Parmenides is the major figure i n this g r o u p , a n d Z e n o a n d Melissus are his p r i n c i p a l followers. T h i s philosophic g r o u p is o f the greatest i m p o r t a n c e , for w i t h these philosophers, philosophy acquired a level a n d r a n k i t d i d n o t previously possess. Parmenides' influence has h a d a decisive i m p a c t o n the history o f philosophy u p to the present day. I t is convenient to m e n t i o n at this time a precursor o f the Eleatic school—Xenophanes. X E N O P H A N E S . Xenophanes was f r o m C o l o p h o n , i n Asia M i n o r . T h e exact dates o f his b i r t h a n d death are n o t k n o w n , b u t i t has been ascertained t h a t he was at least n i n e t y - t w o years o l d w h e n he d i e d a n d t h a t he came after Pythagoras a n d before H e r a c l i t u s . Therefore, he l i v e d i n the second h a l f o f the sixth c e n t u r y B . C . a n d the first h a l f o f the fifth. I t is also k n o w n t h a t he traveled t h r o u g h o u t Hellas r e c i t i n g poetry, usually his o w n . Xenophanes' w o r k was w r i t t e n i n verse; i t comprises elegiac verse o f a poetic a n d m o r a l n a t u r e , i n w h i c h are i n t e r m i n g l e d conjectures o n cosmological doctrine. T h e most significant things about Xenophanes are, i n the first place, his c r i t i c i s m o f the Greek p o p u l a r r e l i g i o n and, secondly, a certain " p a n t h e i s m , " a n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f the d o c t r i n e o f the oneness o f being t h a t was developed i n the Eleatic school.
Xenophanes felt p r i d e i n w i s d o m , w h i c h he believed to be superior to b r u t e force or physical skill. H e thus t h o u g h t the a d u l a t i o n accorded the winners o f the games, races, a n d the l i k e , u n m e r i t e d . Xenophanes found the gods o f H o m e r a n d Hesiod i m m o r a l a n d a b s u r d ; f r o m t h e m , he said, one can l e a r n o n l y robbery, a d u l t e r y a n d deception. A t the same t i m e , he rejected the a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c concept o f the gods, saying that, j u s t as the Ethiopians conceive o f gods as being flat-nosed a n d black, lions or oxen w o u l d — i f they c o u l d — m a k e their gods i n the image o f lions or oxen. Confronted w i t h this a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c o u t look, Xenophanes spoke o f a single god. H e r e are the four fragments f r o m his satires w h i c h refer to this (Diels, frag. 2 3 - 2 6 ) : " A single g o d , the greatest a m o n g gods a n d m e n , n o t similar to m e n either i n f o r m or i n thought H e sees i n his entirety, thinks i n his entirety, hears i n his entirety B u t , w i t h o u t effort, he governs e v e r y t h i n g b y the force o f his s p i r i t . . . . A n d he dwells always i n the same place, w i t h o u t m o v i n g at a l l , n o r does i t suit h i m to displace h i m s e l f f r o m one side to the other."
20
The
Pre-Socratics
T h e m e a n i n g o f these fragments is clear enough. T h e r e is a d i v i n e u n i t y , a n d its d i v i n i t y is strongly emphasized. A n d this single god is i m m o v a b l e a n d all-inclusive. I t is for this reason t h a t A r i s t o t l e said t h a t Xenophanes was the first person w h o " o n e - i z e d " (ivl^eiv) t h i n g s ; t h a t is, t h a t he was a partisan o f the O n e . Therefore, even w h i l e i g n o r i n g the obscure p r o b l e m o f influences, w e m u s t consider X e n ophanes as a precursor o f the doctrine o f the Eleatics. P A R M E N I D E S . Parmenides is the most significant o f a l l the preSocratic philosophers. I n the history o f p h i l o s o p h y he represents a m o m e n t o f m a j o r i m p o r t a n c e — t h e appearance o f metaphysics. W i t h Parmenides, philosophy acquires its t r u e h i e r a r c h y a n d constitutes itself as a strict discipline. U p u n t i l his t i m e , Greek speculation h a d been cosmological, physical, w i t h a philosophic purpose a n d m e t h o d . I t is Parmenides w h o discovers the p r o p e r t h e m e o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d the m e t h o d b y w h i c h this theme can be approached. I n his hands philosophy comes to be metaphysics a n d o n t o l o g y . H e is n o longer s i m p l y going to discuss things; he is going to discuss thingsybr what they are, t h a t is, as entities. T h e E n t i t y , the iov, ov (on), is Parmenides' great discovery. T h i s is t r u e to such a degree t h a t philosophy sensu stricto begins w i t h h i m , a n d metaphysical t h o u g h t to o u r day retains the i m p r i n t o f Parmenides' m i n d . A n d together w i t h the object is the m e t h o d w h i c h p e r m i t s us to reach i t , w h a t t h e Greeks called vovs (nous) a n d the ancient Romans translated as mens: m i n d , intelligence, or even i n some cases perhaps, spirit. As w e shall see, this nous is essentially u n i t e d w i t h the 6n. T h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Parmenides' philosophy presents serious difficulties w h i c h w e cannot discuss here; we w i l l s i m p l y p o i n t o u t w h a t was newest a n d most efficacious i n his t h o u g h t . T h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f this Eleatic philosopher has been decisively advanced i n recent years b y the w o r k o f K a r l R e i n h a r d t a n d , especially, b y m y teacher, X a v i e r Z u b i r i .
Parmenides o f Elea l i v e d at the end o f t h e s i x t h c e n t u r y a n d i n the first h a l f o f the f i f t h : his dates cannot be d e t e r m i n e d w i t h greater precision. A l t h o u g h Xenophanes i n d i s p u t a b l y influenced h i m , i t is u n l i k e l y t h a t the t w o m e n k n e w each other personally. Parmenides was also a p p a r e n t l y influenced b y the t h i n k i n g o f the Pythagoreans. Plato dedicated a dialogue to Parmenides, n a m i n g i t after h i m ; i t is perhaps the most i m p o r t a n t o f a l l the Platonic dialogues. A r i s t o t l e studied Parmenides' w o r k very carefully. I n a d d i t i o n , large fragments o f a p o e m b y Parmenides are preserved; t h e p o e m is w r i t t e n i n hexameters a n d is k n o w n b y the t r a d i t i o n a l t i t l e , On Mature. P A R M E N I D E S ' " O N N A T U R E . " T h i s p o e m consisted o f a n i n t r o d u c t i o n o f great poetic power a n d t w o succeeding parts. T h e first p a r t
Parmenides and the Eleatic School
21
dealt w i t h the way of truth, a n d the second w i t h the way of opinion. M o r e o f the first p a r t is preserved t h a n o f the second. W e w i l l l i m i t ourselves to p o i n t i n g o u t t h e most i m p o r t a n t passages o f the poem. I n the i n t r o d u c t i o n the poet is t r a v e l i n g the r o a d o f the goddess i n a chariot d r a w n b y spirited horses. T h e daughters o f the Sun guide h i m ; they draw aside the veils from their faces a n d leave the abode o f n i g h t , w h i c h is g u a r d e d b y Justice. T h e goddess greets Parmenides a n d tells h i m t h a t i t is necessary for h i m to l e a r n everything, " t h e i n v i o l a b l e heart o f w e l l - r o u n d e d t r u t h , as w e l l as the opinions o f m o r t a l s , w h o do n o t possess t r u e c e r t a i n t y . " She also informs h i m t h a t one can speak o f b u t one w a y o f life. T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n to the poem ends at this p o i n t . T h e r e is a clear allusion to the passage f r o m m y t h i c a l to theoretical consciousness: the daughters o f the Sun have rescued Parmenides f r o m darkness. T h e m e t a p h o r o f the veils stands for t r u t h , w h i c h was understood i n Greece as a n unveiling or discovering (¿Airela). I n the first p a r t o f the b o d y o f the p o e m the goddess speaks o f " t w o w a y s , " b u t these are n o t the t w o aforementioned ways, the ways o f t r u t h a n d o p i n i o n , for the latter is, s t r i c t l y speaking, a t h i r d w a y . T h e first t w o are ways w h i c h are possiblefrom the point of view of truth, o f the things as they are: first, the w a y o f what is a n d what could not possibly not be (the w a y o f persuasion a n d t r u t h ) a n d , secondly, the w a y o f what is not. T h i s latter w a y is i m p r a c t i c a b l e , since w h a t is n o t cannot be k n o w n o r expressed. H e r e we see the i n t i m a t e connection between the nods a n d the ón, between the m i n d or spirit i n t r u t h a n d the E n t i t y . A f t e r w a r d there follows w h a t we c o u l d call Parmenides' o n t o l o g y ; t h a t is, the e x p l i c a t i o n o f the attributes o f the E n t i t y w h i c h he has j u s t discovered. B u t this subject requires a d e t a i l e d exposition. T h e second p a r t o f the p o e m abandons the w a y o f t r u t h i n order to enter u p o n the w a y o f the o p i n i o n o f mortals. T h e few extant fragments o f this section deal w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f m o t i o n or change, n o t f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f nous, or, therefore, f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f the E n t i t y , b u t r a t h e r f r o m t h a t o f sensory perception a n d o f things. T h i s discussion also includes a few cosmological statements. T h e various ways can be shown schematically as follows: method
object
way
nous
the
Entity
of truth (way o f ' w h a t is " ) of impasse (way o f " what is n o t " )
sensory
the
things
of opinion (way o f ' w h a t is and is n o t " )
perception THE
PREDICATES OF T H E E N T I T Y .
I t is useful to enumerate a n d
22
The Pre-Socratics
explain briefly the predicates w h i c h according to Parmenides corresp o n d to the civ, E n t i t y . 1. T h e ón is present. T h e things, insofar as they are, are present to the m i n d , the nous. T h e E n t i t y neither was nor w i l l b e ; i t tr n o w , i n the present. "Ov ( L a t i n , ens) is a present p a r t i c i p l e . T h e things can be far a w a y f r o m or close to the senses, either present or absent, b u t as Entities they are contiguous w i t h the noüs. T h e m i n d possesses the presence o f the ov. 2. A l l things are E n t i t i e s ; t h a t is, they are. T h e y are enveloped b y b e i n g ; they are u n i t e d , one. T h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f the things does n o t affect the oneness o f the E n t i t y . T h e ón is one. Therefore, Parmenides arrives at the statement t h a t the E n t i t y is a sphere w i t h o u t spaces o f non-being. 3. F u r t h e r m o r e , this E n t i t y is immovable. M o t i o n is understood as a m o d e o f being. C o m i n g to be or ceasing to be implies a d u a l i t y o f entities, a n d the E n t i t y is one. F o r this reason, f r o m its o w n p o i n t o f view, the E n t i t y is homogeneous a n d indivisible: i f I d i v i d e a t h i n g i n t o t w o parts, the E n t i t y remains as u n d i v i d e d as ever; i t envelops the t w o parts equally; the d i v i s i o n does not affect i t i n the least. 4. T h e E n t i t y is full; i t has no e m p t y spaces. ( T h e p r o b l e m o f the v o i d is very i m p o r t a n t t h r o u g h o u t Greek philosophy.) T h e E n t i t y is continuous a n d all-inclusive. I f something happened to be outside o f the E n t i t y , i t w o u l d n o t exist, a n d i f something existed outside o f the E n t i t y , i t would be—that is, i t w o u l d be the Entity. 5. For the same reason, the E n t i t y is uncreated a n d imperishable. T h e c o n t r a r y w o u l d i m p l y a non-being, w h i c h is impossible. These are the p r i n c i p a l predicates o f the E n t i t y , n o t o f the things. These predicates are discovered b y the first w a y , the w a y o f truth. O P I N I O N . I n a s m u c h as the second way, the w a y o f what is not, is i m p r a c t i c a b l e , we w i l l examine the t h i r d w a y , the w a y o f 8o|o£, the o p i n i o n o f mortals. T h i s t h i r d w a y moves w i t h i n the sphere o f t r u t h , a n d therefore can be t r u t h or falsity. T h e extent t o w h i c h one or the other exists can o n l y be decided o n the basis o f t r u t h . 1. Dóxa relies o n w o r l d l y i n f o r m a t i o n , i n f o r m a t i o n based o n things. T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n is manifold a n d capable of changing. T h e things are green, red, h a r d , cold, water, air, a n d so o n . M o r e o v e r , the things transform themselves f r o m one t h i n g to another a n d are i n a constant state o f flux. H o w e v e r — 2. Dóxa understands this m o t i o n , this change, as a c o m i n g t o be, a n d this is where i t is w r o n g . Being is not discovered b y the senses, b u t b y nous. A n d dóxa, w h i c h moves i n the r e a l m o f sensory perception, w h i c h
Parmenides and the Eleatic School is w h a t i t possesses, j u m p s d i r e c t l y to being w i t h o u t benefit o f nous, w h i c h i t lacks. T h i s is w h y i t is unreliable. 3. ¿4ofa, besides being o p i n i o n , is ofmortals. T h i s is because its organ is sensory perception, atodtjcris; sensory perception is composed o f opposites and therefore is m o r t a l , perishable, j u s t as the things t h e m selves are. O p i n i o n does n o t have nous, the o n l y t h i n g w h i c h is divine, i m m o r t a l , as being is. I n this w a y Parmenides interprets m o t i o n as light a n d darkness, as an i l l u m i n a t i n g a n d a d a r k e n i n g . T h a t is, c o m i n g to be is n o t h i n g more t h a n a coming to be apparent. T h i n g s w h i c h seem to come to be already existed, b u t i n darkness. M o t i o n is change, n o t generation: therefore, f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f being i t does n o t exist. A l l m o t i o n or change is convention (vo/nos); t h a t is, names w h i c h m e n give to things. ONTOLOGY A N D M E T A P H Y S I C S . W e can n o w ask ourselves the m e a n i n g o f Parmenides' discovery. T h e t h i n g s — i n Greek irpdyp.ara, prdgmata—manifest m u l t i p l e predicates or properties to the senses. T h i n g s are colored, w a r m or c o l d , h a r d or soft, large or small, animals, trees, rocks, stars, fire, boats m a d e b y m a n . B u t w h e n they are considered w i t h another o r g a n , w i t h the m i n d or nous, the things manifest a p r o p e r t y w h i c h is o f the greatest i m p o r t a n c e a n d c o m m o n to a l l : before being w h i t e , or r e d , or w a r m , the things are. T h e things simply are. Being is seen to be a n essential p r o p e r t y o f things, w h a t has since been called a real predicate, a q u a l i t y w h i c h manifests itself o n l y to nous. T h e things are n o w ovra, entities. A n d the 6v a n d vovs are seen to be essentially related, a n d the one does n o t occur w i t h o u t the other. Parmenides says t h a t i n this sense b e i n g a n d the noein or nous are the same. W h e n seen t h r o u g h nous, the E n t i t y is one a n d immovable, i n contrast to the plurality a n d changeability o f the things perceived b y the senses. I n Parmenides' t h i n k i n g we see already b e g i n n i n g the division between the t w o worlds, the w o r l d o f t r u t h a n d the w o r l d o f appearances ( o p i n i o n or doxa); the latter w o r l d is false w h e n i t is taken as true r e a l i t y . T h i s division comes to be decisive i n Greek t h o u g h t .
U p o n looking at things somewhat more closely, we can say t h a t Parmenides, after t h i n k i n g t h a t the things have a determined consistency, realizes t h a t this implies they have a determined consistency, w i t h the w o r d " consistency " n o w emphasized. T h e things consist o f s o m e t h i n g ; b u t n o w a t t e n t i o n is n o t directed to t h a t something b u t to t h e i r previous consistency, whatever i t m a y be t h a t they consist of. T h i n g s appear, above a l l , as consistencies; a n d this is precisely w h a t the p a r t i c i p l e eon, on, w h i c h is the core o f Parmenidean philosophy, means. T h i n g s consist o f this o r t h a t because they consist previously;
The
Pre-Socratics
t h a t is, they consist o f b e i n g what is consistent (to on). Therefore, Parmenides' discovery m i g h t be expressed as follows: before a l l other determinations, the things consist of consisting. W i t h Parmenides, then, p h i l o s o p h y changes f r o m physics to o n t o l o g y — a n o n t o l o g y o f the cosmic, physical E n t i t y . A n d since t h e E n t i t y is i m m o v a b l e , physics is impossible f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f being, a n d , therefore, o f philosophy. Physics is the science o f n a t u r e , a n d n a t u r e is the p r i n c i p l e o f the m o t i o n o f n a t u r a l things. I f m o t i o n is not, t h e n physics as a philosophic science o f nature is n o t possible. T h i s is the serious p r o b l e m that is t o be debated b y a l l t h e later preSocratics a n d t h a t w i l l o n l y be adequately solved b y A r i s t o t l e . I f the E n t i t y is one a n d i m m o v a b l e , there is n o n a t u r e , a n d physics is impossible. I f m o t i o n is, an idea o f the E n t i t y distinct f r o m t h a t o f Parmenides is necessary. T h i s n e w idea o f the E n t i t y is w h a t A r i s t o t l e achieves, as we shall see later o n . Before Aristotle, Greek p h i l o s o p h y is the effort to m a k e m o t i o n possible w i t h i n Parmenidean metaphysics, a f r u i t f u l effort w h i c h inspires p h i l o s o p h y a n d makes i t restate the p r o b l e m i n a basic w a y — a struggle o f giants over b e i n g , t o quote Plato. Z E N O . Zeno, Parmenides' most i m p o r t a n t p u p i l , d i r e c t l y succeeded h i m as leader o f the Eleatic school. F r o m Elea also, Zeno seems to have been some f o r t y years younger t h a n Parmenides. H i s m e t h o d , k n o w n as dialectics, is his most interesting discovery. T h i s m a n n e r o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n consists o f t a k i n g a thesis t h a t has been accepted b y the adversary or has been c o m m o n l y a d m i t t e d , a n d o f s h o w i n g t h a t t h e consequences o f this thesis c o n t r a d i c t one another or c o n t r a d i c t the thesis itself; i n short, t h a t a c c o r d i n g to the p r i n c i p l e o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n , w h i c h Parmenides i m p l i c i t l y used, the thesis is impossible. Parmenides' theses, especially those relative to the oneness o f b e i n g a n d the possibility o f m o t i o n , c o n t r a d i c t general o p i n i o n . T o s u p p o r t Parmenides' ideas, Zeno constructs several arguments w h i c h b e g i n w i t h the idea o f m o t i o n a n d show t h a t i t is impossible. F o r example, one cannot traverse the distance AB, because i n order to a r r i v e at B i t is necessary t o pass first t h r o u g h a m i d d l e p o i n t C; i n o r d e r to reach C, one most pass t h r o u g h p o i n t D, h a l f w a y between A a n d C, a n d so o n , to i n f i n i t y . T h u s , one w o u l d have to pass t h r o u g h a n i n f i n i t e series o f i n t e r m e d i a t e points, a n d m o t i o n w o u l d be impossible. T o give another example, Achilles, w h o runs ten times faster t h a n the tortoise, w i l l never catch u p w i t h i t i f the tortoise has a certain h e a d start. T h i s is because w h i l e Achilles is r u n n i n g o f f this head start, the tortoise advances one-tenth o f t h a t distance; w h i l e Achilles runs o f f this new distance, the tortoise advances another one-tenth o f the n e w distance,
From Heraclitus
to Democritus
a n d so o n , to i n f i n i t y ; therefore, Achilles never catches u p w i t h the tortoise. Zeno proposed several other aporlai (anopiai) or problems, b u t we need n o t go i n t o d e t a i l a b o u t t h e m here. N a t u r a l l y , the aporlai cited above do n o t m e a n t h a t Zeno believed that things actually h a p p e n i n this way. Motion is demonstrated to be in the act of moving; b y moving along one gets f r o m A to B a n d Achilles catches u p w i t h the tortoise. However, i t is n o t a question o f this, b u t rather o f explaining m o t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to the ideas o f the era, m o t i o n is impossible a n d Parmenides is r i g h t . I n order for m o t i o n to be interpreted ontologically, a different idea o f the E n t i t y is necessary. I f the E n t i t y is the E n t i t y o f Parmenides, t h e n m o t i o n is not. Zeno's aporiai reveal this fact very clearly. Aristotle's entire o n t o l o g y w i l l be necessary i n order to answer adequately the p r o b l e m posed b y Parmenides. M o t i o n cannot be built upfrom parts, any m o r e t h a n the c o n t i n u u m can be composed i n this w a y . A r i s t o t l e w i l l construct a n idea o f being w h i c h is essentially different f r o m t h a t o f Parmenides, a n d o n l y then w i l l the being o f m o t i o n be explained, a n d physics be possible. M E L I S S U S . Melissus, the last i m p o r t a n t m e m b e r o f the Eleatic school, was n o t f r o m E l e a ; he was I o n i a n , f r o m Samos. H e was a n a d m i r a l o f this island d u r i n g the r e b e l l i o n against Athens, a n d achieved a great n a v a l v i c t o r y i n 442 B . C . Melissus represents the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f Parmenides' t h o u g h t — w i t h some i n d i v i d u a l characteristics. H e denies m u l t i p l i c i t y a n d the possibility o f m o t i o n ; he denies t h a t knowledge o f m a n i f o l d things constitutes knowledge o f t r u t h . B u t , whereas Parmenides affirmed t h a t the E n t i t y is finite, Melissus says t h a t i t is i n f i n i t e , because i t has neither o r i g i n nor end, since these w o u l d be d i s t i n c t f r o m i t . F o r the same reason he rejects the idea t h a t the E n t i t y is a sphere; a sphere m i g h t be i n t e r p r e t e d as a l i m i t e d p a r t o f the extension o f the E n t i t y . P A R M E N I D E S ' I N F L U E N C E . I t is useful to r e m e m b e r t h a t Parmenides' most p r o f o u n d influence i n philosophy is f o u n d n o t w i t h i n his s c h o o l — that is, expressed i n the t h o u g h t o f the E l e a t i c s — b u t outside o f i t . As is the case w i t h a l l genuine philosophy, Parmenides' philosophy is effective because o f the very p r o b l e m w h i c h i t poses, n o t because o f scholastic or g r o u p a c t i o n . H i s great discovery sets Greek philosophy earnestly developing a l o n g metaphysical lines; a n d the consequences o f Parmenides' discovery are still felt today.
4.
F R O M HERACLITUS TO
DEMOCRITUS
T H E G E N E R A L P R O B L E M . Parmenides succeeded i n discovering things as Entities, as something that is; a n d as a consequence o f this he
z6
The
Pre-Socratics
h a d to a t t r i b u t e t o the E n t i t y a series o f predicates t h a t t u r n e d o u t to contradict the w a y i n w h i c h things a c t u a l l y h a p p e n e d ; this is h o w the p r o b l e m arose. A c t u a l l y , a p r o b l e m is precisely t h i s : the awareness o f a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . T h e classic example is t h a t o f the pole w h i c h is submerged i n water. I t is straight to the t o u c h a n d b e n t to t h e sight; i t is a n d is n o t s t r a i g h t ; therefore, i t is a n d is n o t . Likewise, the E n t i t y is one a n d i m m o v a b l e , b u t actually t h i n g s — w h i c h e x i s t — m o v e a n d are m a n i f o l d . T h i s is basically the same c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h a t Parmenides dealt w i t h : the c o n t r a d i c t i o n between b e i n g a n d n o n - b e i n g . Parmenides discovered t h a t w h e n we say a t h i n g is w h i t e , we have not o n l y the t h i n g a n d the whiteness, b u t also the is; this is penetrates the t h i n g a n d the whiteness a n d makes the t h i n g be w h i t e . T h e E n t i t y is, as Plato says, a t h i r d t h i n g , a certain t h i r d element, rpirov TI. T h i s p r o b l e m o f the 6v, the E n t i t y , permeates a l l t h e concrete theorizing w h i c h arises after Parmenides i n the field o f p h i l o s o p h y ; a l l questions resolve themselves i n t o this a n t i n o m y o f b e i n g a n d n o n being, w h i c h is closely l i n k e d w i t h the a n t i n o m y o f oneness a n d m u l t i p l i c i t y , a n d also w i t h that o f m o t i o n . M o t i o n , i n fact, is m o v i n g from a source to a n e n d — i t was understood as such i n Greece. T h e r e fore, i t assumes at least a d u a l i t y , something c o n t r a r y t o the u n i q u e ness o f the E n t i t y , a n d also a n inconsistency: m o t i o n is realized between opposites (the passage f r o m w h i t e t o black, f r o m w a r m to cold, f r o m b e i n g to n o n - b e i n g ) ; a n d here w e f i n d ourselves again at the very center o f the p r o b l e m o f being one. A l l Greek philosophy f r o m Heraclitus to D e m o c r i t u s moves w i t h i n the scope o f Parmenides' idea o f the E n t i t y , a n d this gives a basic u n i t y to the entire period. T h e philosophy o f this era is a progressive s p l i n t e r i n g o f Parmenides' idea o f the E n t i t y (his predicates are r e t a i n e d a n d the essence o f the concept o f the E n t i t y is unaltered) i n order t o i n t r o d u c e m u l t i p l i c i t y i n t o this E n t i t y a n d m a k e possible m o t i o n a n d the solution o f the other problems w h i c h h a d been posed. B u t this is n o t enough. Parmenides' concept o f the E n t i t y does n o t a l l o w m u l t i p l i c i t y . W e g a i n n o t h i n g b y f r a g m e n t i n g i t ; the p r b b l e m w i t h d r a w s , b u t i n the f i n a l instance i t remains i n t a c t . T h i s is w h a t Zeno's arguments demonstrate to us. I t w i l l be necessary t o investigate the oneness, the u n i t y itself, a n d a r r i v e at a n idea o f b e i n g w h i c h , w i t h o u t e x c l u d i n g u n i t y , m a y make i t c o m p a t i b l e a n d coexistent w i t h m u l t i p l i c i t y . T h u s i t is necessary to alter r a d i c a l l y the very idea o f the E n t i t y . A c e n t u r y a n d a h a l f later, Aristotle w i l l give us the idea o f the hi, the one ( w h i c h is essentially different f r o m the E n t i t y o f Parmenides) a n d w i t h this also a n absolutely new concept o f b e i n g . A n d i n the l i g h t o f this n e w concept o f being, Parmenides' difficulties can be explained.
From Heraclitus to Democritus
2
7
Aristotle w i l l t h e n be for ced to say t h a t the Entity is expressed in many ways. W e w i l l soon see w h y this is so. A t this t i m e i t is interesting to f o l l o w the first attempts to solve Parmenides' p r o b l e m — a t t e m p t s t h a t r e m a i n w i t h i n the philosophic l i m i t s w h i c h his b r i l l i a n t discovery established. Heraclitus L I F E A N D C H A R A C T E R . Heraclitus, w h o was f r o m Ephesus i n Asia M i n o r , l i v e d w i t h i n the sixth a n d fifth centuries. I t is said t h a t he was f r o m the r o y a l f a m i l y o f Ephesus a n d i n l i n e to r u l e the city, b u t t h a t he renounced this position a n d dedicated himself to philosophy. T h e r e are subtle problems o f chronology as regards Xenophanes, Parmenides a n d H e r a c l i t u s ; they are a p p r o x i m a t e l y contemporary, b u t Heraclitus moves w i t h i n the P a r m e n i d e a n dialectic o f being a n d non-being a n d can therefore be considered as Parmenides' successor philosophically. Heraclitus despised the masses a n d condemned the cults a n d rites o f the p o p u l a r religion. Theophrastus calls h i m " m e l a n c h o l y . " Because o f his rather sibylline style, the Greeks gave h i m the nickname o f " H e r a c l i t u s the O b s c u r e . " T h e D e l p h i c O r a c l e used to say t h a t i t neither showed n o r concealed its t h o u g h t , b u t i n d i c a t e d i t by signs. A n d this c o u l d also, perhaps, be said o f Heraclitus' w r i t i n g s . B E C O M I N G . T h e i m p o r t a n t t h i n g is to characterize Heraclitus' metaphysics a n d place i t w i t h i n the e v o l u t i o n o f philosophy after Parmenides. H e r a c l i t u s affirms i n a l i m i t e d w a y the change or m o t i o n o f things: iravra pel, everything runs, every thingflows. N o one can bathe twice i n the same r i v e r ; the river endures, b u t the water is no longer the same. R e a l i t y is changing, unstable. Therefore, the p r i m o r d i a l substance is fire, the least consistent o f a l l substances, the substance w h i c h most readily transforms itself. H e adds, moreover, t h a t war is the father o f a l l things, woAe/uos irar^p navTOJv. T h a t is, discord, contrariety, is the o r i g i n o f everything i n the w o r l d . T h e w o r l d is an eternal fire w h i c h transforms itself. As, according to a n o l d p r i n c i p l e o f knowledge, l i k e is k n o w n b y like, so the d r y soul, the one w h i c h resembles fire, is the best soul a n d the one best at a c q u i r i n g knowledge: the soul o f the wise m a n . T h e d a m p soul, w h i c h is like m u d , is inferior.
A t first glance, i t appears t h a t H e r a c l i t u s ' theories could n o t be i n greater opposition to those o f Parmenides. Heraclitus seems to i n v e r t the terms completely a n d to posit c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m o b i l i t y i n the things. Even i f such were the case, one w o u l d still have to interpret H e r a c l i t u s ' theories as being very closely related to those o f Parmenides, since their opposition is too complete to be c o i n c i d e n t a l ; b u t we must consider a
z8
The Pre-Socratics
few other points as w e l l . I n the first place, w h e n H e r a c l i t u s speaks o f m u l t i p l i c i t y , he is speaking o f the w o r l d , the cosmos, a n d Parmenides also recognized m o t i o n a n d m u l t i p l i c i t y i n the w o r l d : he simply denied t h a t this m o t i o n a n d m u l t i p l i c i t y i n the things h a d a n y t h i n g to d o w i t h the E n t i t y . B u t there are a n u m b e r o f fragments b y Heraclitus i n w h i c h his o w n emphasis is q u i t e different. First o f a l l , Heraclitus says t h a t i t is judicious " t o confess t h a t a l l things are o n e . " M o r e o v e r , nous is c o m m o n to a l l . These affirmations are very different f r o m his statements about flux a n d m u l t i p l i c i t y a n d c o n t a i n clear overtones o f Parmenides. A n d there is still another p o i n t to consider: Heraclitus introduces a new concept, for w h i c h he claims the t r a d i t i o n a l predicates o f Parmenides' philosophy. T h i s is the concept o f the ooov. Heraclitus speaks o f the sophon, w h i c h is the neuter f o r m o f the w o r d " w i s e . " I t is neither the wise m a n nor w i s d o m . H e r a c l i t u s says o f this sophon t h a t i t is, o f course, one, a n d t h a t i t is at all times. M o r e o v e r , i t is separated from all things, vavroiv Kexcopio/xdvov. As we can see, the predicates o f the sophon are the same as those o f the E n t i t y o f Parmenides. Heraclitus advises us t h a t we ought to be g u i d e d b y what is common to all men, a n d this, according to w h a t w e have seen, is nous. T h i s becomes especially clear w h e n we keep i n m i n d the fragment w h i c h says: " T h o s e w h o are awake have a c o m m o n w o r l d , b u t each sleeping person returns to his i n d i v i d u a l w o r l d . " T h e meaning o f these texts is evident. W e see a n e w d i v i s i o n o f the t w o w o r l d s : the w a k i n g m a n , w h o follows w h a t is c o m m o n to a l l , nous, is the one w h o reaches the sophon, w h i c h is one a n d always. I n contrast, there is the w o r l d o f sleep, w h i c h is the i n d i v i d u a l w o r l d o f every one o f u s — i n short, ofopinion. I t is i n this latter w o r l d t h a t everyt h i n g is change a n d becoming. T h e r e is a key to this d u a l i t y i n one o f H e r a c l i t u s ' most expressive sentences: vois KpvTrreo-Ocu
From Heraclitus to Democritus
2-9
W e n o w see the most general significance o f H e r a c l i t u s ' philosophy. I t is a n a t t e m p t to i n t e r p r e t m o t i o n b y changing i t f u n d a m e n t a l l y , b y c o n v e r t i n g i t entirely i n t o continuous change, w h i l e t a k i n g great care t o distinguish i t f r o m the ooov, w h i c h is separated from everything. Being is still separated f r o m a l l m o t i o n a n d a l l m u l t i p l i c i t y . T h u s we r e m a i n w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f Parmenides' metaphysics.
Empedocles L I F E . Empedocles was f r o m A g r i g e n t u m i n Sicily i n M a g n a Graecia. A l t h o u g h he h e l d a pre-eminent position, he was n o t content to be k i n g ; he w a n t e d to be a g o d . Some people believed h i m to be a d e m i g o d ; others t h o u g h t h i m a charlatan. H e traveled t h r o u g h o u t Sicily a n d the Peloponnesus teaching a n d p e r f o r m i n g cures, a n d he was venerated b y m a n y people. T h e story is t o l d t h a t i n order to have a death w o r t h y o f his d i v i n i t y he t h r e w himself i n t o M o u n t E t n a . A n o t h e r legend claims t h a t he was raised u p to the skies—an end something like Elijah's. I t appears more likely t h a t he died i n the Peloponnesus. Empedocles was a n e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y v i t a l a n d interesti n g person. H e w r o t e t w o p o e m s — O n Nature a n d The Purifications— w h i c h were i m i t a t e d b y L u c r e t i u s ; the fragments o f these t h a t are preserved contain very interesting religious, cosmological a n d biological ideas a n d , above a l l , a doctrine w h i c h is t r u l y philosophical i n nature. C O S M O L O G Y . W e shall merely enumerate the most i m p o r t a n t points o f Empedocles' cosmology. A c c o r d i n g to h i m , there are t w o suns: one authentic sun, f i r e ; a n d another reflected sun, w h i c h is the one we see. I t h a d been discovered t h a t the l i g h t o f the m o o n is reflected l i g h t , a n d m a n , as always, h a d d r a w n analogies f r o m his discovery. Empedocles, w h o says t h a t n i g h t is p r o d u c e d b y the interposition o f the earth between the sun a n d fire, was the one w h o discovered the true reason for eclipses. A c c o r d i n g to h i m the stars and the planets are authentic, n o t reflected, f i r e ; the stars are fixed a n d the planets are free-moving. Empedocles believes l i g h t to be something t h a t goes f r o m one place to another i n a very short i n t e r v a l o f t i m e . B I O L O G Y . Beings are m o r t a l , b u t their o r i g i n is eternal. T h e first things t h a t were, were trees; Empedocles has a vague suspicion that plants have sex. H e a t is p r i n c i p a l l y male. H u m a n beings are produced b y the chance aggregation o f separate components a n d only those that are p r o p e r l y organized survive. H e believes i n the t r a n s m i g r a t i o n o f the soul, a n d says o f himself: " I n another t i m e , I have been boy a n d g i r l , a shrub a n d a b i r d , a n d a d u m b fish i n the sea." H e also has an
The Pre-Socratics interesting t h e o r y o f perception. T h e r e is a fixed relationship between sensory perception a n d the size o f the pores: therefore, t h e organs for the different senses v a r y i n size. L i k e things are k n o w n b y l i k e t h i n g s : I k n o w fire, i f fire is f o u n d in me; a n d the same for water a n d the other things. T H E F O U R R O O T S . L e t us examine the central question i n E m p e d ocles, the p r o b l e m o f the being o f things. I t is necessary t o reconcile i m m o v a b l e b e i n g w i t h the changeable m u l t i p l i c i t y o f things. Empedocles tries to solve this p r o b l e m b y means o f the f o u r elements: air, fire, water a n d earth. T h i s marks the first f o r m a l appearance o f the four t r a d i t i o n a l elements. Empedocles says t h a t these elements, w h i c h are the roots of all things, p i f ai/ion-a iravriov, are opposites; they c o n t a i n the contrarieties o f d r y a n d d a m p , o f cold a n d w a r m .
These roots are eternal. Empedocles bases this a f f i r m a t i o n o n Parmenides' t h i n k i n g , b u t he makes a new p o i n t : the E n t i t y o f Parmenides was a homogeneous sphere w h i c h c o u l d n o t change. I t is also a sphere for Empedocles, b u t instead o f being homogeneous, i t is a mixture. A l l bodies are composed t h r o u g h the aggregation o f elemental substances. L O V E A N D H A T E . I n order to e x p l a i n m o t i o n — t h a t is, h o w , d e r i v i n g f r o m the four roots, a l l things are engendered a n d perish—Empedocles introduces t w o m o r e principles: iXla Kal veiKos (love a n d h a t e ) . H a t e separates the different elements, a n d love tends to j o i n t h e m ; this already constitutes m o t i o n . I n a certain sense, i t is hate w h i c h j o i n s things, because the u n i o n takes place w h e n the elements are separate, at w h i c h t i m e s i m i l a r elements u n i t e w i t h each other. A u t h e n t i c love is the a t t r a c t i o n o f dissimilarities. T h e r e are four periods i n the m o t i o n o f the w o r l d :
1. 2. 3. 4.
T h e m i x e d sphere. H a t e , w h i c h gives rise to separation. T h e d o m i n a t i o n o f the neikos; n o w hate has separated e v e r y t h i n g . Philia (love) returns a n d the things begin to unite a g a i n .
T h i s cycle is repeated over a n d over. I n this manner things u n i t e d i n very different ways are f o r m e d — l i o n s w i t h the head o f a n ass, arid so o n — a n d only those w h i c h have a logos, a ratio, a n i n t e r n a l structure w h i c h permits t h e m to continue to exist, survive a n d propagate. V a r i o u s cycles i n w h i c h the things continue to change t h r o u g h the action o f love a n d hate occur i n this fashion, b u t the four roots r e m a i n i n v a r i a b l e a n d eternal. A n d so w e are again faced w i t h b e i n g a n d n o n being, the cosmos t h a t does n o t really exist, a n d the being w h i c h really is. M u l t i p l i c i t y is i n t r o d u c e d i n t o Parmenides' E n t i t y b y d i v i d i n g i t i n t o
From Heraclitus
to Democritus
four elements, b u t this still does n o t explain m o t i o n f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f being. T h e ontology o f m o t i o n , physics as philosophy, continues to be impossible. Anaxagoras L I F E . Anaxagoras was f r o m Clazomenae i n Asia M i n o r a n d l i v e d i n the fifth century. L i k e Empedocles, he was f r o m a noble f a m i l y and was i n line to r u l e . H e renounced this position i n order to dedicate himself to a theoretic life. I n d e e d , Anaxagoras was considered the m a n w h o l i v e d this type o f life i n exemplary fashion. O n the one h a n d , he seems to us to be l i n k e d w i t h Empedocles as the second o f the t w o i m p o r t a n t physici recentiores. But, o n the other h a n d , he is l i n k e d i n a different w a y w i t h the Sophists a n d , especially, w i t h Protagoras. B o t h Anaxagoras a n d Protagoras were teachers o f Pericles. Anaxagoras was the first philosopher i n Athens, even t h o u g h he was n o t b o r n i n t h a t city. T h i n g s d i d n o t go w e l l for h i m there. T h e Athenians were n o t very tolerant at t h a t t i m e a n d there was l i t t l e freedom o f t h o u g h t : Pericles (perhaps influenced b y his mistress, Aspasia) w a n t e d to b r i n g the I o n i a n w a y o f life to Athens a n d make the c i t y m o r e democratic. T h e Athenians made f u n o f Anaxagoras a n d called h i m "JVous." L a t e r they m a d e accusations against h i m , b u t i t is n o t k n o w n exactly o f w h a t he was accused; n o r can we be certain o f the p u n i s h m e n t to w h i c h he was sentenced—there are conflicting stories about a l l this. I t appears t h a t he was freed b y Pericles a n d t h a t because he c o u l d n o t r e m a i n i n Athens, he set f o r t h to Lampsacus, where he was very w e l l received. Anaxagoras h a d a great influence o n A t h e n i a n life, a n d b e g i n n i n g w i t h his t i m e Athens becomes the leading p h i l o sophical c i t y i n Greece. Philosophy, after h a v i n g spread t h r o u g h o u t the O r i e n t a n d the Occident, t h r o u g h Asia M i n o r a n d M a g n a Graecia, belatedly settles i n Greece proper, where i t is to have its major center. Anaxagoras' influence was n o t extrinsic to his t h o u g h t ; rather, i t was closely l i n k e d w i t h his philosophy. T H E H O M O I O M E R E I A I . F o r Anaxagoras, there are n o t four b u t an infinite n u m b e r o f elements. There is everything in everything. H e calls the homogeneous parts, the minuscule particles o f w h i c h things are made, homoiomereiai (ofioiofj-epeiai). Anaxagoras says t h a t i f we take a t h i n g , a n y t h i n g , a n d d i v i d e i t , we w i l l never o b t a i n the roots specified b y Empedocles; w h a t w e w i l l find are the h o m o i o m e r e i a i . I n the smallest p a r t o f everything there are m i n u t e parts o f a l l other things; this theory is called panspermia, the belief t h a t every t h i n g contains seeds o f a l l other things.
The Pre-Socratics H o w , then, does one explain the f o r m a t i o n o f the various things ? B y the u n i o n a n d separation o f the h o m o i o m e r e i a i . W e n o w witness one more step i n the division o f the E n t i t y o f Parmenides: first, the E n t i t y was placed i n relationship w i t h fire, w h i c h moves a n d changes ( H e r a c l i t u s ) ; t h e n , i n order to e x p l a i n the w o r l d a n d m o t i o n , i t was d i v i d e d i n t o the four roots o f Empedocles, a n d the w o r l d a n d m o t i o n were shown to derive f r o m the roots; n o w Anaxagoras fragments i t i n t o the h o m o i o m e r e i a i . A n d this is n o t the f i n a l stage i n the process. Parmenides' predicates o f the E n t i t y are preserved, a n d m o t i o n is explained b y a process o f u n i o n a n d separation. T h i n g s differ because the h o m o i o m e r e i a i g r o u p themselves i n various ways, according to the positions w h i c h they occupy. A n a x agoras discovers the importance o f the f o r m , o f the etdos; t h a t is, o f the arrangement o f things. W e can make a n analogy to a n i m p o r t a n t element i n the A t h e n i a n life o f t h a t p e r i o d — t h e t h e a t e r — a n d say t h a t w h a t Anaxagoras c o n t r i b u t e d to philosophy was perspective; the fifth century i n Athens is given over to the eidos, to sculpture a n d the visual arts; i t is a c e n t u r y o f spectators. " N o u s . " Nous is the cause o f m o t i o n . F o r Anaxagoras, nous is p r o b a b l y the subtlest f o r m o f m a t t e r , b u t i t is n o t s p i r i t u a l ; the concept o f spirit is foreign to the t h o u g h t o f this epoch. T h e other things are n o t f o u n d i n the nous, b u t some o f these—the l i v i n g t h i n g s — h a v e nous. Therefore, nous is u n m i x e d . Anaxagoras a r r i v e d at this doctrine o f vovs t h r o u g h considerations o f astronomy. Nous is the r u l i n g p r i n c i p l e o f the universe, a n d seems to be connected w i t h the o r i g i n o f Greek m o n o t h e i s m . * Anaxagoras' doctrine possesses a scope a n d d i g n i t y w h i c h surpass even his o w n development o f i t . Plato a n d A r i s t o t l e v a l u e d the concept o f the nous very h i g h l y , a n d reproached Anaxagoras for h a v i n g m a d e very restrained use o f the theory; Anaxagoras h a d used vovs almost exclusively to e x p l a i n m o t i o n , whereas i t promised to be the e x p l a n a t i o n o f the o r i g i n o f the w o r l d . However, A n a x a g o r e a n nous, separated f r o m m a t t e r or at least at the m a r g i n o f i t , is, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g its being the orderer o f cosmic motions, s i m i l a r to a n impersonal intelligence. A c c o r d i n g to Anaxagoras, knowledge has certain l i m i t a t i o n s because the h o m o i o m e r e i a i cannot be perceived b y the senses. H i s idea o f perception is c o n t r a r y to t h a t o f Empedocles: things are k n o w n b y their opposites. These t w o ideas o f perception are opposing theses w h i c h are contrasted i n this p e r i o d . * Gf. W . Dilthey: An Introduction to the Sciences of the
Spirit.
From Heraclitus to Democritus
33
Democritus T H E A T O M I S T S . T h e Atomists are the last pre-Socratics. T h e y are a p p r o x i m a t e l y c o n t e m p o r a r y w i t h Socrates, b u t follow the t r a d i t i o n o f those preoccupied b y vois a n d , above a l l , i n the line o f Eleatic philosophy. T h e t w o p r i n c i p a l Atomists were Leucippus a n d D e m o c r i t u s . B o t h (or at least the latter) were f r o m A b d e r a i n T h r a c e . A l m o s t n o t h i n g is k n o w n about Leucippus. H i s doctrine was basically the same as t h a t o f D e m o c r i t u s , w h o was a great i n t e l l e c t u a l figure i n Greece a n d a great traveler a n d w r i t e r . As is the case w i t h the rest o f the works o f the pre-Socratics, o n l y fragments o f Leucippus' w o r k r e m a i n . W e can, therefore, address ourselves p r i n c i p a l l y t o D e mocritus. T H E A T O M S . T h e Atomists make the final division o f the E n t i t y o f Parmenides. T h e y arrive at the atoms (&TO[IOI); t h a t is, at " u n c u t table, " i n d i v i s i b l e parts w h i c h cannot be b r o k e n d o w n further. These atoms are distinguished f r o m one another solely i n t h a t they have different forms, a n d t h e i r properties depend o n t h e i r f o r m . T h e y m o v e i n w h i r l w i n d s a n d u n i t e i n various ways, a n d i n this m a n n e r the things are p r o d u c e d . T h e r e are m a n y w o r l d s , some i n the process o f f o r m a t i o n , some i n the process o f disintegration, a n d others i n a c t u a l existence. Properties are based on the f o r m a n d also o n the degree o f subtlety o f the atoms. A n d every one o f these atoms retains the f u n d a m e n t a l attributes o f Parmenides' E n t i t y , w h i c h one m i g h t say here appears t o be completely pulverized. M A T E R I A L I S M . D e m o c r i t u s ' ideas represent the first f o r m a l a t t e m p t to create a m a t e r i a l i s m . E v e r y t h i n g , even t h e soul, is composed o f atoms. T h i s is the materialistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the E n t i t y . Therefore, m o t i o n comes t o be, above a l l , local m o t i o n ((f>opa). A n d t h e n the p r o b l e m o f l o c a t i o n confronts the Atomists, the p r o b l e m o f the rorros i n w h i c h the atoms must be located. I n d e e d , the Atomists w i l l say t h a t the atoms are i n the void. T h i s is o f great i m p o r t a n c e . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , the v o i d was n o n - b e i n g , b u t n o w n o n - b e i n g is necessary as a place for the atoms. D e m o c r i t u s takes a very o r i g i n a l step: he attributes a cert a i n b e i n g t o the v o i d , a n d converts i t i n t o space. Instead o f b e i n g considered absolute non-being (O¡5K Ó V ) , the v o i d is i n t e r p r e t e d as relative n o n - b e i n g (fir] Ó V ) , i n comparison t o w h a t is f u l l , or t o the atoms. T h e v o i d has a spatial being. T h e p r o b l e m o f b e i n g a n d n o n b e i n g is m i t i g a t e d b u t n o t resolved b y this atoms-space concept. T h i s constitutes the final a t t e m p t to solve this question w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f Parmenides' concept o f the E n t i t y . KNOWLEDGE.
A c c o r d i n g to D e m o c r i t u s , perception is realized i n
34
The
Pre-Socratics
the f o l l o w i n g m a n n e r : the things e m i t a k i n d o f spectre o r subtle image (eiSojXov) w h i c h is composed o f finer atoms. These finer atoms penet r a t e the sense organs, a n d thus t h e m i n d receives a copy o r replica o f the t h i n g ; this is w h a t knowledge consists of. Therefore, D e m o c r i t u s ' is a sensationalist doctrine. D e m o c r i t u s ' m o r a l ideas already b e g i n to delineate the figure o f the " w i s e m a n , " the ooos, whose characteristics are i m p e r t u r b a b i l i t y , serenity, control over himself.* However, D e m o c r i t u s ' frame o f reference is still physics, cosmology, speculation concerning t h e heavens a n d the w o r l d a n d t h e m o t i o n o f t h e things as opposed t o i m m o v a b l e being. B u t we are n o w i n the time o f Socrates. * Concerning the idea of serenity, refer to my study "Ataraxia y alcionismo" (" AtaraxiaandHalcyonism") in El oficio delpensamiento,
1958 [Obras,
VI].
The Sophists and Socrates
B e g i n n i n g w i t h the fifth c e n t u r y a new phase o f philosophy commences i n Greece. T h i s p e r i o d is essentially characterized b y the t u r n i n g o f man's a t t e n t i o n to the study o f himself. Preoccupation w i t h the w o r l d is succeeded b y concern w i t h m a n . Such concern h a d n o t been l a c k i n g previously; w e have seen the n o t i o n o f the theoretic life, the d o c t r i n e o f i m m o r t a l i t y or t r a n s m i g r a t i o n , a n d the like. B u t m a n n o w realizes t h a t he must ask w h o he h i m s e l f is. T h i s t r e n d o f t h o u g h t was influenced b y some factors external to philosophy: the pred o m i n a n c e o f Athens after the Persian W a r s , the t r i u m p h o f democracy, a n d so f o r t h . T h e r e appears i n the forefront the figure o f the m a n w h o can speak w e l l , the c i t i z e n ; a n d the Athenian's interest turns to p o l i t i c a l a n d civic realities, a n d thus to m a n himself. T h e tenor o f life i n Greece i n this p e r i o d changes considerably. T h e perfect citizen, the TTOMTTJS, replaces the former ideal o f the KCLXOS Kayados, the m a n comme ilfaut, endowed w i t h a handsome person a n d r e m a r k a b l e talents, w h a t we w o u l d perhaps call the perfect gentlem a n . I n the center o f Greek t h i n k i n g is no longer j>vais (the n a t u r e o f the outside w o r l d ) , b u t eihaifiovia (happiness), i n the sense o f the development o f the essence o f the i n d i v i d u a l . A n d there appears, as the outstanding representative o f this t i m e , the Sophist.
i.
T H E
SOPHISTS
T h e Sophist m o v e m e n t appears i n Greece i n the fifth c e n t u r y . A t this m o m e n t , w h e n philosophy is b e g i n n i n g to exert an influence o n 35
The Sophists and Socrates A t h e n i a n life, there is a certain s i m i l a r i t y between the Sophists a n d Anaxagoras. B u t the Sophists present essential differences. T h e y are characterized o u t w a r d l y b y c e r t a i n traits : they were i t i n e r a n t teachers w h o w e n t f r o m t o w n to t o w n i n s t r u c t i n g the y o u n g m e n ; a n d they t a u g h t for money, accepting a fee—a new situation i n Greece, a n d one t h a t occasioned n o l i t t l e surprise. T h e i r éclat a n d social success were great; they were orators a n d rhetoricians, a n d basically educators. T h e y c l a i m e d t h a t they k n e w a n d c o u l d teach e v e r y t h i n g — i n fact a n y t h i n g a n d its opposite, the thesis a n d the antithesis. T h e y h a d great influence o n Greek life a n d were i m p o r t a n t personalities ; some were extremely i n t e l l i g e n t . B u t w h a t is o f most consequence a b o u t t h e Sophists, the reason t h a t they interest us here, is the m a n n e r i n w h i c h the p a t h o f t h e i r m o v e m e n t crossed t h a t o f philosophy. T h e w o r d " S o p h i s t " is a f o r m a t i o n o f the w o r d sophia (wisdom) w h i c h appears i n the w o r d " p h i l o s o p h y . " Philostratus says o f the Sophists t h a t they speak a b o u t the things t h a t philosophers speak a b o u t . A n d A r i s t o t l e says: " S o p h i s t t h o u g h t is a p p a r e n t l y w i s d o m , b u t r e a l l y is n o t , a n d the Sophist is a m a n w h o practices w h a t is a p p a r e n t l y w i s d o m , b u t r e a l l y is n o t . " I n these t w o v e r y b r i e f q u o t a tions the p r o b l e m o f the Sophist m o v e m e n t is characterized; i t speaks o f philosophic themes a n d appears to be w i s d o m , b u t r e a l l y is n o t . T h e Sophist appears to be a philosopher, b u t really is n o t . H e is a v e r y strange m a n , says Plato, whose b e i n g consists i n n o t b e i n g . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t this does n o t m e a n the Sophist is not a philosopher; t h a t negative description fits the carpenter as w e l l ; b u t the carpenter does n o t consist i n n o t being a philosopher, b u t i n being a carpenter, w h i l e b e i n g a Sophist consists i n seeming to be a philosopher a n d n o t b e i n g one. T h e r e are t w o problems : ( i ) the philosophy that m a y exist i n the Sophist m o v e m e n t ; (2) the philosophic p r o b l e m o f the r e a l i t y o f t h e Sophist. Sophist t h i n k i n g poses once m o r e the p r o b l e m o f b e i n g a n d n o n being, b u t apropos o f itself a n d , thus, o f m a n . T h e aristocracy's concept o f w h a t a m a n should be h a d been transformed i n Greece. N o w , instead o f its being the w e l l - f o r m e d , n a t u r a l l y gifted m a n w h o is a d m i r e d — a good w a r r i o r , for e x a m p l e — i t is the clever m a n , the m a n w i t h nous, w h o knows w h a t should be said a n d done, the g o o d citizen. W h e n this new concept became c u r r e n t i n Greece, the result (since every m a n has nous a n d nous is c o m m o n to all) was a democracy. T h i s nous a n d b e i n g able to use i t i n speaking were w h a t c o u n t e d . So i t was philosophy t h a t made possible this s i t u a t i o n a n d , therefore, the Sophist m o v e m e n t itself. T h e Sophists move i n a m i l i e u o f rhetoric. T h e y are concerned w i t h
The
Sophists
37
saying things i n a c o n v i n c i n g manner, " s p e a k i n g w e l l " (ev Xeyeiv). T r u t h does n o t m a t t e r , a n d for this reason theirs is a false philosophy. I n the face o f this, Socrates a n d Plato w i l l c a l l for " t h i n k i n g w e l l , " t h a t is, for t r u t h . F u r t h e r , the Sophist m o v e m e n t is p u b l i c , t h a t is, addressed to the citizen; i t has, thus, a clear p o l i t i c a l tendency. A n d , lastly, i t is apaideia, f o r m a l i n s t r u c t i o n , the first p r o p e r l y so-called to exist. T h e positive d i m e n s i o n of the Sophists a n d t h e i r historical justificat i o n is t h a t , i n the face o f a philosophy w h i c h based itself on the E n t i t y a n d neglected the things (the Eleatic school), they signified the need to base philosophy o n the things a n d to t r y to account for t h e m . T h e serious flaw was t h a t the Sophists p r o c l a i m e d the non-consistency o f things a n d a b a n d o n e d the v i e w p o i n t of being a n d t r u t h , w h i c h h a d to be readopted b y Socrates a n d Plato, w h o thus at the same t i m e gave the Sophists' d e m a n d for emphasis o n the things its j u s t due. Socrates a n d Plato h a d to investigate w h a t things are, or, stated i n other terms, the consistency o f things. T h e r e were m a n y i m p o r t a n t Sophists. Several are k n o w n to us i n a v i v i d a n d p e n e t r a t i n g w a y t h r o u g h Plato's dialogues. T h e details o f t h e i r activities a n d ideas are less interesting t h a n the t o t a l significance o f the movement. T h e most i m p o r t a n t were H i p p i a s , Prodicus, E u t h y d e m u s a n d , above all, Protagoras a n d Gorgias. P R O T A G O R A S . Protagoras, like Democritus, came f r o m A b d e r a . H e was very i n f l u e n t i a l i n Athens at the t i m e o f Pericles. H e concerned h i m s e l f w i t h g r a m m a r a n d language, was a great r h e t o r i c i a n , a n d manifested a c e r t a i n skepticism w i t h regard to the possibility o f knowledge, especially knowledge o f the gods. B u t his greatest fame rests o n a statement o f his reported b y several later philosophers: " M a n is the measure o f all things, of those t h a t are, t h a t they are; a n d of those t h a t are n o t , t h a t they are n o t . " N u m e r o u s interpretations have been given for this sentence, r a n g i n g f r o m r e l a t i v i s m to subjectiv i s m . W e cannot go i n t o this theme here; i t is sufficient to p o i n t o u t Aristotle's r e m a r k t h a t i t w o u l d first be necessary to k n o w whether m a n is there referred to as the arbiter of real knowledge or ofsensations; t h a t is, whether reference is m a d e to the v i e w p o i n t o f t r u t h or s i m p l y o f d6xa. Protagoras does n o t speak o f the on (being), b u t o f things as opposed to being (xpTj/xara), things t h a t are h a n d l e d , movable goods, a n d hence used i n the sense of money (chrematistics). T h u s , this is the w o r l d o f doxa, a n d the sentence is therefore understood w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f Parmenides' conceptual w o r l d . Doxa is " t h e o p i n i o n o f m o r t a l s , " " names t h a t m e n give to t h i n g s , " convention. GORGIAS.
Gorgias, f r o m L e o n t i n i i n Sicily, was one o f the great
The Sophists and Socrates Greek orators. H e w r o t e a book called On Non-being, i n w h i c h the clear dependence o f the Sophists o n the Eleatics is once m o r e apparent. H e p o i n t e d o u t the difficulties o f the Eleatics' d o c t r i n e o f the E n t i t y , a n d affirmed t h a t there is n o E n t i t y , since i f i t existed i t w o u l d n o t be k n o w a b l e b y m a n , a n d i f m a n c o u l d k n o w i t he c o u l d n o t c o m m u n i cate this knowledge. T h u s the Sophists lead us to a f i n a l dissolution o f Parmenides' dialectic o f b e i n g a n d non-being. Philosophy loses itself i n rhetoric a n d i n r e n u n c i a t i o n o f t r u t h . I n order to restate the p r o b l e m o f metaphysics i n a p r o d u c t i v e m a n n e r i t w i l l be necessary to place i t o n new bases. T h i s is w h a t Socrates w i l l d e m a n d a n d i n i t i a t e a n d w h a t Plato a n d especially Aristotle w i l l accomplish.
2.
SOCRATES
T H E L I F E O F S O C R A T E S . Socrates' life fills the second h a l f o f the fifth c e n t u r y i n A t h e n s ; he d i e d at the age o f seventy i n 399 B . C . , at the b e g i n n i n g o f the f o u r t h century, the century w h i c h was to see Greece's greatest philosophical o u t p o u r i n g . H e was the son o f a sculptor a n d a m i d w i f e , a n d used to say t h a t his a r t , like his mother's, was maieutike ( m i d w i f e r y ) , the a r t o f d e l i v e r i n g c h i l d r e n i n the n a m e o f t r u t h . Socrates is one o f the most interesting a n d d i s t u r b i n g personalities i n a l l o f Greek h i s t o r y ; he i n f l a m e d his contemporaries, so m u c h so t h a t i t cost h i m his life, a n d his role i n the life o f Greece a n d i n philosophy is n o t l a c k i n g i n mystery. H i s a c t i v i t y as citizen a n d soldier was noble a n d courageous; b u t , above a l l , he was the m a n o f the agora, the m a n o f the street a n d t o w n square w h o , t a l k i n g , t r o u b l e d a l l o f Athens. A t the outset Socrates seemed to be j u s t one m o r e Sophist. O n l y later was i t seen t h a t he was n o t ; t h a t , to the contrary, he h a d come to the w o r l d precisely to supersede the Sophists a n d to reestablish the m e a n i n g o f t r u t h i n Greek t h i n k i n g . H e soon gained a circle o f eager pupils a n d a d m i r i n g followers; the cream o f the y o u t h o f Athens, a n d even o f other Greek cities, h u n g u p o n his every w o r d ; Alcibiades, X e n o p h o n , above a l l Plato, were n u m b e r e d a m o n g his enthusiastic listeners.
Socrates claimed to be accompanied b y a " g e n i u s " or f a m i l i a r spirit (hcapoviov) whose voice counseled h i m at the c r i t i c a l moments o f his life. T h i s daimonion never m o v e d h i m to a c t i o n , b u t w o u l d o n occasion restrain h i m a n d dissuade h i m f r o m a n a c t i o n . I t was a n i n s p i r a t i o n w i t h i n h i m t h a t has at times been i n t e r p r e t e d as somet h i n g divine, as a voice o f the D e i t y . Socrates' a t t i t u d e is exasperating. A n oracle h a d said t h a t no one was wiser t h a n Socrates. H e modestly claims t h a t he w i l l demonstrate the c o n t r a r y ; a n d to d o this, he goes about the streets a n d squares
Socrates
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asking his fellow citizens the m e a n i n g of things t h a t he does n o t k n o w ; this is the w e l l - k n o w n Socratic irony. T h e r u l e r , the cobbler, the soldier, the courtesan, the Sophist, a l l suffer the barbs o f his questions. W h a t is b r a v e r y ? W h a t is justice ? W h a t is friendship ? W h a t is true k n o w l edge ? I t turns o u t t h a t they do n o t k n o w either; b u t , u n l i k e Socrates, they are n o t even aware o f their ignorance, a n d the upshot is t h a t the oracle was r i g h t . T h i s is supremely a n n o y i n g for those being quest i o n e d , a n d this malaise becomes concentrated i n t o hate, w h i c h terminates i n a n accusation against Socrates " f o r i n t r o d u c i n g new gods and c o r r u p t i n g the y o u t h . " T h e result is a ridiculous t r i a l , w h i c h Socrates takes w i t h composure a n d i r o n y , a n d a death sentence, w h i c h he accepts calmly. N o t w i s h i n g to violate the unjust laws b y r u n n i n g away, a l t h o u g h his friends propose a safe means o f flight to h i m , he d r i n k s the hemlock i n the m i d s t o f a keen-edged discussion o n i m m o r t a l i t y w i t h his pupils. S O C R A T I C K N O W L E D G E . W h a t m e a n i n g does knowledge have for Socrates ? H o w does Socrates ask his questions, a n d w h y are people unable to answer h i m ? H e opposes, above a l l others, the Sophists, a n d directs his greatest efforts to p r o v i n g the emptiness o f their presumptive knowledge. T o accomplish this, he confronts the r h e t o r i c a l discourses of the Sophists w i t h his o w n c l i p p e d dialogue of questions a n d answers. W e m a y ask w h a t , i n short, is Socrates' c o n t r i b u t i o n to p h i l o s o p h y ; w e find a passage i n A r i s t o t l e i n w h i c h t h a t a u t h o r states categorically t h a t we owe t w o things to Socrates:'' i n d u c t i v e reasoning a n d the universal d e f i n i t i o n . " B o t h , A r i s t o t l e adds, are related to the very b e g i n n i n g o f knowledge. W h e n Socrates asks a question, he asks what is, for example, justice. H e asks for a definition. T o define a t h i n g is to set limits to i t , thereby stating w h a t i t is, its essence; definition leads to essence, a n d knowledge understood as simple discernment or dist i n c t i o n is succeeded, t h r o u g h the efforts of Socrates, b y a new k n o w l edge o f h o w to define, w h i c h leads us to say w h a t things are, to discover their essence ( Z u b i r i ) . F r o m this p o i n t originates a l l the f e r t i l i t y o f Socrates' t h i n k i n g , t u r n e d t o w a r d the quest o f t r u t h , centered once m o r e i n the v i e w p o i n t of being, f r o m w h i c h the Sophists h a d t u r n e d away. I n Socrates there is the a t t e m p t to say t r u l y w h a t things are. A n d this p a t h of defined essence is the one t h a t leads to the Platonic theory o f the Ideas. S O C R A T E S ' E T H I C A L T E A C H I N G . Socrates is p r i n c i p a l l y concerned w i t h m a n . T h i s is n o t n e w ; we have seen i t as a characteristic o f the Sophists a n d o f the whole era. B u t Socrates considers m a n f r o m a different p o i n t o f v i e w : t h a t of his i n n e r life. " K n o w yourself" (yvwdi aeavrov), says Socrates; b r i n g your i n n e r self to l i g h t . A n d this bears a
4o
The Sophists and Socrates
new m e a n i n g i n Greece; i t means reflection, c r i t i c i s m , m a t u r i t y t h a t e n r i c h the Greek even i f costing h i m something o f the f r a n k a n d courageous impulsiveness w i t h w h i c h the first centuries o f Greek history h a d been l i v e d . O n e cannot speak o f corruption, b u t i t is assuredly t r u e t h a t Socrates decisively changed the spirit o f A t h e n i a n y o u t h . (See Ortega's Espiritu de la letra [ S p i r i t o f the L e t t e r ] . ) T h e core o f Socrates' ethics is the concept of arete, v i r t u e . T h i s is n o t v i r t u e i n its usual sense, b u t more l i k e w h a t the w o r d means w h e n one speaks o f the virtues o f plants or o f a v i o l i n virtuoso. V i r t u e is the deepest a n d most basic propensity o f m a n , t h a t for w h i c h he was actually b o r n . A n d this v i r t u e is knowledge. A b a d m a n is b a d t h r o u g h ignorance; the m a n w h o does n o t f o l l o w the good fails to d o so because he does n o t recognize i t . T h u s , v i r t u e can be t a u g h t (intellectualist ethics), a n d w h a t is necessary is for everyone t o k n o w his o w n arete. T h i s is the m e a n i n g of the Socratic i m p e r a t i v e , " K n o w y o u r s e l f . " I t is thus a m o r a l imperative, whereby m a n m a y g a i n possession o f himself a n d be his o w n master, t h r o u g h knowledge. Just as f r o m the Socratic d e f i n i t i o n there arises the p r o b l e m o f essence a n d w i t h i t a l l the metaphysics o f Plato a n d Aristotle, so f r o m Socrates' ethics originate a l l the ethical schools t h a t w i l l f i l l Greece a n d the R o m a n E m p i r e f r o m t h a t t i m e o n : first the Cynics a n d Cyrenaics, a n d t h e n , especially, the Epicureans a n d the Stoics. A l l o f Greek philosophy f r o m the b e g i n n i n g o f the f o u r t h century o n is rooted i n Socrates; w h a t is m e r e l y o u t l i n e d or sketched i n h i m was to be realized i n the f r u i t f u l t r a d i t i o n based o n his teachings. Socrates' d o c t r i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to philosophy was modest. H e was p r o b a b l y n o t a m a n o f m a n y p r o f o u n d metaphysical ideas, as Plato a n d Aristotle were shortly to be. H i s role was to prepare for t h e m a n d m a k e t h e m possible, placing philosophy for the second t i m e o n the way of truth—the only p a t h i t can f o l l o w — f r o m w h i c h i t h a d been d i v e r t e d b y the rhetoric o f the Sophists a n d the apparent w i s d o m o f " s p e a k i n g w e l l , " w h i c h was incapable o f being a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n opinion. T H E T R A N S M I S S I O N O F S O C R A T I C T H O U G H T . Socrates never w r o t e a n y t h i n g . H e has left us n o t a page, not a line o f his o w n . W e k n o w his t h o u g h t t h r o u g h references b y other philosophers, especially b y his pupils. X e n o p h o n wrote the Memorabilia, devoted to reminiscences o f his master, as w e l l as a Symposium, or Banquet, a n d a n Apology of Socrates. B u t i t is Plato above a l l others w h o has preserved for us the t h o u g h t a n d v i v i d figure o f a Socrates d i f f e r i n g considerably f r o m X e n o p h o n ' s . Plato's p o r t r a y a l o f Socrates is i n c o m p a r a b l y richer, m o r e p r o f o u n d a n d more attractive t h a n X e n o p h o n ' s . B u t since Plato makes Socrates
Socrates
4*
the p r i n c i p a l character i n his dialogues a n d puts his o w n philosophy i n t o his teacher's m o u t h , i t becomes difficult at times t o determine where Socrates' authentic t h i n k i n g ends a n d where Plato's o r i g i n a l philosophy begins. Nevertheless, the situation is clear i n the m a j o r i t y o f cases. A n o t h e r source o f i n f o r m a t i o n o n Socrates, n o less valuable for b e i n g i n d i r e c t , is A r i s t o t l e . Aristotle's b r i l l i a n t p e n e t r a t i o n makes a l l his i n f o r m a t i o n priceless; i n a d d i t i o n , his t w e n t y years spent i n Plato's c o m p a n y must have given h i m a great f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h Socrates' t h i n k i n g . T h i s t h i r d source is o f especial value i n d e t e r m i n i n g the boundaries between the teachings o f Socrates a n d those o f Plato himself. A n d there is a n almost symbolic value t o the fact t h a t Socrates' teaching is f o u n d i n the works o f other m e n , j u s t as the greatest f l o w e r i n g o f his philosophy was o n l y t o come t h r o u g h these other followers o f his. * * One should not forget the enormous historical value of the image of Socrates—• distorted and hostile, but the reflection of an attitude of Athenian society—in The Clouds of Aristophanes.
Plato
L I F E . Plato was b o r n i n Athens i n 427 a n d d i e d i n 347 B . C . , w h i l e still w h o l l y dedicated to his intellectual activities. H e belonged to a n o l d aristocratic f a m i l y , w h o claimed descent f r o m Codrus a n d Solon. H i s position b y b i r t h a n d his personal v o c a t i o n were d r a w i n g h i m i n t o p o l i t i c a l life w h e n the a t t r a c t i o n o f Socrates led h i m to devote himself to philosophy. A f t e r t w o attempts at p l a y i n g a role i n A t h e n i a n p u b l i c life, he was t u r n e d a w a y f r o m such a career b y the death o f Socrates. A l l t h a t r e m a i n e d o f this career was Plato's p e r m a n e n t interest i n p o l i t i c a l themes, w h i c h m a d e h i m give such a p a r a m o u n t position i n his system to the theory o f the State, a n d w h i c h made h i m several times — e v e n at a grave r i s k — u r g e his p u p i l D i o n to make the i d e a l Platonic state a n a c t u a l i t y d u r i n g the r e i g n o f D i o n ' s b r o t h e r - i n - l a w Dionysius, the t y r a n t o f Syracuse, a n d later i n the r e i g n o f D i o n ' s nephew, the younger Dionysius. These projects fell t h r o u g h , a n d P l a t o l i m i t e d his activities to his b r i l l i a n t philosophical meditations, his great labors o f authorship, a n d his personal i n s t r u c t i o n i n the school o f p h i l o s o p h y he founded, a r o u n d 387 B . C . , o n a piece o f l a n d very close to t h e Cephissus, o n the r o a d to Eleusis. T h i s p r o p e r t y i n c l u d e d a grove dedicated to the hero Academus, a n d Plato's school thus became k n o w n as the A c a d e m y . I t lasted, t h o u g h w i t h p r o f o u n d changes, u n t i l 529 A . D . , the year i n w h i c h the E m p e r o r J u s t i n i a n ordered i t closed. Plato fulfilled the duties o f master there u n t i l his death, i n close a n d p r o f o u n d coll a b o r a t i o n w i t h his greatest p u p i l , A r i s t o t l e . W R I T I N G S . T h e corpus o f Plato's w r i t i n g s is almost completely preserved. Plato's works, together w i t h those o f A r i s t o t l e , f o r m the
4*
The Ideas
43
pinnacle o f a l l o f Greek philosophy a n d c u l t u r e . I n a d d i t i o n , their l i t e r a r y value is perhaps the highest a m o n g a l l H e l l e n i c productions. Plato's philosophic genius combines w i t h a miraculous gift o f language w h i c h enables h i m to f i n d the perfect expressions a n d metaphors for establishing a new w a y o f thought. T h e Platonic c o n t r i b u t i o n to the f o r m a t i o n o f philosophical terminology is incalculable. As the l i t e r a r y genre for expressing his thought, Plato chose the dialogue, w h i c h is i n t i m a t e l y related to his doctrine o f dialectic as a philosophic m e t h o d . M a n y o f these dialogues are o f astonishing poetic beauty. T h e p r i n c i p a l character is always Socrates, w h o bears the b u r d e n o f the a r g u ment. T h e y o u t h f u l dialogues, the Apology, the Crito, the Euthyphro, are strongly tinged w i t h Socratic teachings. A m o n g the most i m p o r t a n t dialogues o f Plato's m a t u r e years are the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Euthydemus, o n the Sophists; the Phaedo, o n the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the soul; the Symposium, or Banquet, o n love; the Phaedrus, w h i c h contains Plato's theory o f the soul; a n d the Republic, o n justice a n d the concept o f the State. Lastly come the Theaetetus; the Parmenides (perhaps the most i m p o r t a n t o f a l l the Platonic w r i t i n g s ) , the Sophist a n d the Statesman; a n d , i n Plato's o l d age, the Timaeus, c o n t a i n i n g his references to A t l a n t i s ; the Philebus; a n d a notable w o r k , the largest i n v o l u m e , c o n t a i n i n g a second exposition o f the theory o f the State a n d i n c l u d i n g no m e n t i o n o f Socrates: the Laws. T h e a u t h e n t i c i t y o f certain Platonic works, especially some o f the letters ascribed to h i m (a few o f w h i c h , like the seventh, are h i g h l y i m p o r t a n t ) has been the subject o f serious doubts a n d problems. Plato's t h i n k i n g shows a n e v o l u t i o n ; i t takes its departure f r o m the teaching o f Socrates, arrives at the b r i l l i a n t discovery o f the Ideas, a n d culminates i n the e x a m i n a t i o n o f the difficulties a n d problems posed by the theory o f the Ideas, a n e x a m i n a t i o n assuredly p r o m p t e d b y personal discussions w i t h Aristotle. W e cannot follow here this development o f Platonic metaphysics; we w i l l confine ourselves to a n exposition o f the most s t i m u l a t i n g a n d f r u i t f u l features o f his m a t u r e philosophy, w h i c h c o n t a i n a l l the problems t h a t were to set i n m o t i o n the f u r t h e r history o f Greek t h o u g h t . *
i.
T H E
IDEAS
T H E D I S C O V E R Y . W h a t p r o b l e m must Plato come to grips w i t h ? W i t h the p r o b l e m t h a t a l l Greek metaphysics since Parmenides h a d
* A n examination as to origins of the teachings of Plato within Greek philosophy and history will be found in my Biografia de la Filosqfia (Biography of Philosophy), cited above.
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Plato
posed: the p r o b l e m o f b e i n g a n d non-being. F o r m o r e t h a n a century Hellenic philosophy h a d striven to solve the aporia (perplexing p r o b l e m ) o f m a k i n g the Entity—one., i m m o v a b l e a n d e t e r n a l — c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the things—manifold, v a r i a b l e a n d transitory. W e have seen t h a t pre-Socratic philosophy subsequent to Parmenides h a d been a series o f attempts to solve this central p r o b l e m , attempts w h i c h , strictly speaking, signified n o progress beyond the level o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n w h i c h Parmenides h a d set the p r o b l e m . Plato, o n the other h a n d , gives a decisive d i r e c t i o n to the question; he takes a step f o r w a r d . T h e t r a i n o f t h o u g h t t h a t he initiates is so new a n d b r i l l i a n t t h a t he is h i m s e l f irresistibly d r a w n a l o n g w i t h i t , a n d f r o m t h a t t i m e o n he must m a k e laborious efforts to cope w i t h his o w n discovery, his doctrine, w h i c h becomes his most serious p r o b l e m . Plato discovers n o t h i n g less t h a n the Idea. W h a t does this m e a n ? Plato is seeking the b e i n g o f things. B u t i n this search he runs i n t o several difficulties o f a v a r i e d n a t u r e w h i c h d r i v e h i m , coincidentally, to a f u n d a m e n t a l solution, one t h a t appears p a r a d o x i c a l . I n the first place, Plato finds t h a t things themselves do n o t exist; if, for example, I examine a sheet o f w h i t e paper, i t turns o u t t h a t a c t u a l l y i t is n o t w h i t e ; t h a t is, i t is n o t completely w h i t e , b u t has some g r a y or yellow i n i t ; i t is no m o r e t h a n almost w h i t e . T h e same must be said o f its presumed r e c t a n g u l a r i t y : its sides are n o t t o t a l l y a n d absolutely straight, n o r does i t have perfect r i g h t angles. W h a t is m o r e , this sheet o f paper has n o t existed always, b u t only since a certain t i m e ; w i t h i n a few years i t w i l l n o longer exist. Therefore, i t is w h i t e a n d n o t w h i t e , i t is rectangular a n d n o t rectangular, it is and it is not; o r — w h a t amounts to the same t h i n g — i t does n o t f u l l y a n d t r u l y exist. B u t if, i n the second place, w e look at the other side o f the question, we f i n d t h a t a l t h o u g h the sheet o f paper is n o t strictly w h i t e , i t is almost white. W h a t does this m e a n ? W h e n we say t h a t something is almost w h i t e , w e deny i t absolute whiteness b y c o m p a r i n g i t to somet h i n g t h a t is u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y w h i t e ; t h a t is, i n order to see t h a t a t h i n g is n o t t r u l y w h i t e , I must k n o w already w h a t whiteness is. B u t since no visible t h i n g — n e i t h e r snow, nor clouds, n o r f o a m — i s absolutely w h i t e , I a m referred to a r e a l i t y t h a t is distinct f r o m a l l concrete things, the r e a l i t y o f t o t a l whiteness. Expressed i n other terms, the fact t h a t m a n y things are almost white requires the existence o f the t r u l y w h i t e , w h i c h is n o t any t h i n g , b u t w h i c h exists outside the r e a l m o f things. T h i s true being, w h i c h is distinct f r o m things, is w h a t Plato calls a n Idea. I n the t h i r d place, t h i s p r o b l e m comes i n t o sharpest focus i f we keep i n m i n d Plato's p o i n t o f departure i n regard to the theory o f k n o w l -
The Ideas
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edge. Plato is b u i l d i n g u p o n concepts established b y Socrates. Socrates—who, strictly speaking, does n o t engage i n metaphysics b u t reestablishes the v i e w p o i n t o f t r u t h i n philosophy—desires to k n o w what things are; t h a t is, he seeks definitions. Whereas Parmenides moves i n a m i l i e u o f being a n d tries to distinguish t h a t w h i c h has true being f r o m w h a t w h i c h merely appears to be, Socrates attempts to state what (TL) that-which-is is, i n other words, to define, discover a n d f i r m l y establish the essences o f things. F r o m this concrete standpoint Plato initiates his philosophy. A d e f i n i t i o n is, to begin w i t h , & predication o f the f o r m " A is B . " I n this predication I come across a p r o b l e m o f oneness a n d m u l t i p l i c i t y . W h e n I say, " M a n is a n a n i m a l t h a t speaks," I identify " a n i m a l " w i t h " m a n , " I say t h a t t w o things are one, that A is B. W h a t makes i t possible for m e to make a t r u e p r e d i c a t i o n ? W e should note t h a t i n the statement " A is B , " A fulfills t w o functions. First, i t is the subject, w h e n I say " A . " B u t , i n the second place, w h e n I say t h a t i t is B, I a m speaking n o t only of B, b u t a m i n c l u d i n g A i n that predicate as w e l l . I n other words, I a m n o t merely m e n t i o n i n g A first a n d B next, w i t h n o f u r t h e r connection; B is the b e i n g B o f A a n d , consequently, A has t w o functions. I n the p r e d i c a t i o n " A is B " i t is presupposed t h a t A is A, t h a t is, t h a t A is i d e n t i c a l w i t h itself. T h i s concept i n its t u r n is f o u n d to consist o f these t w o presuppositions: ( i ) t h a t A is one 5(2) t h a t A is permanent. W h e n I say, then, that m a n is a speaking a n i m a l , i t is necessary t h a t " m a n " be univocal a n d , i n a d d i t i o n , t h a t w h e n identified as a speaking being, " m a n " should continue to be " m a n . " D e f i n i t i o n i n the Socratic a n d Platonic sense originates i n the supposition t h a t entities are self-identical a n d p e r m a n e n t — a supposition t h a t raises one o f the weightiest possible problems. I f I w a n t to make a statement a b o u t the horse, i t occurs to me, first o f a l l , that there are m a n y horses; i n the second place, t h a t these horses I now see are n o t p e r m a n e n t : they d i d n o t exist fifty years ago a n d w i l l n o t exist fifty years f r o m n o w . F i n a l l y , i f I say t h a t a horse is black, this is n o t strictly true, because the horse has some w h i t e or g r a y o n i t ; the perfect horse, the u n c o n d i t i o n a l horse, does not exist. I t m a y be said t h a t we jw&yj-predicate certain ^iwwi-properties o f certain quasi-things. Plato, w h o realizes this ( a n d i t is here t h a t his genius lies) supposes— a n d this is the m a t t e r o f consequence—that this quasi-blackness is a defect i n the horse, because the horse o u g h t to be absolute a n d absol u t e l y black. Confronted w i t h this difficulty, he takes no m o r e notice o f the i n d i v i d u a l horse, w h i c h is a n d is not, w h i c h does n o t exist c o m pletely, a n d seeks the true horse; because, n a t u r a l l y , the fact t h a t
4
6
Plato
a p p r o x i m a t i v e horses exist presupposes the existence o f a t r u e horse. T h e r e are t w o things w h i c h Plato must d o : f i n d the absolute horse, a n d f r o m i t account for the a p p r o x i m a t i v e horses w h i c h g a l l o p i n the w o r l d . Plato transfers his a t t e n t i o n f r o m the w o r l d o f things, w h i c h do not p e r m i t rigorous predications, to the w o r l d i n w h i c h such predications are possible, to w h a t he calls the w o r l d o f Ideas, B u t w h a t is m e a n t b y Ideas ? T H E B E I N G OF T H E I D E A S . T h e
word " I d e a "
(iSe'ce)—sometimes
eidos (eiSos) is used—means " i m a g e , a s p e c t " : i n short, t h a t w h i c h is seen. I t c a n also be translated, i n certain contexts, as " f o r m " ; thus, i n A r i s t o t l e i t appears as a s y n o n y m o f morphe, a n d elsewhere i n his w r i t i n g s i t is equivalent to "class, species." ( I n L a t i n , species is f r o m the same r o o t as the v e r b spicio, "see, look at, " j u s t as the Greek words elSos a n d iSeot are connected w i t h the n o t i o n o f seeing; a n d a m o n g the meanings o f the L a t i n species is also f o u n d t h a t o f " b e a u t y , " w h i c h makes i t equivalent to forma, f r o m w h i c h formosus, " b e a u t i f u l , " is derived.) A n " idea " is w h a t I see w h e n I see something. W h e n I see a m a n , I see h i m as h i m s e l f — t h a t is, I see h i m as a m a n — b e c a u s e I already have the idea o f m a n , because I see h i m as sharing i n t h a t idea. I n the same way, w h e n I say t h a t a sheet o f paper is n o t completely w h i t e , w h a t permits m e to v i e w i t as almost w h i t e is the idea o f w h i t e ness. W h e n I read a w r i t t e n w o r d , I see i t i m m e d i a t e l y because I already possess the idea o f i t ; i f i t happens to be a w o r d i n a foreign language I do n o t k n o w at a l l , I do n o t see i t directly as i t is, b u t o n l y as a g r o u p o f l e t t e r s — a l t h o u g h , o n the other h a n d , I possess the ideas o f the i n d i v i d u a l letters. B u t i f I t u r n to a w o r d w r i t t e n i n characters I a m not f a m i l i a r w i t h , I do n o t , strictly speaking, see the letters, a n d I c o u l d n o t reproduce t h e m w i t h o u t previously e x a m i n i n g t h e m i n d e t a i l a n d r e d u c i n g t h e m to groups o f f a m i l i a r strokes. A m a n w h o does n o t merely n o t k n o w h o w to read, b u t does n o t k n o w w h a t r e a d i n g is, does not see a book, because he lacks the idea o f one. T h e " I d e a , " therefore, is the basis for knowledge a n d for v i e w i n g things for w h a t they are. T h e discovery o f the Ideas was already p a r t i a l l y prepared for i n the philosophy before Plato. First, let us recall the perspective, b y means o f w h i c h Anaxagoras' h o m o i o m e r e i a i could v a r y t h e i r positions a n d take o n distinct forms; secondly let us recall the Socratic definition, w h i c h tells us n o t w h a t each concrete t h i n g is b u t rather a l l the things each concrete t h i n g comprises; t h a t is, its class. B u t there is a vast difference between these anticipations a n d Plato's d o c t r i n e . T r u e being, w h i c h philosophy h a d been seeking since Parmenides, does not reside i n things, b u t outside o f t h e m : i n the Ideas. These, therefore, are metaphysical entities which contain the true being of things;
The Ideas
47
they are t h a t w h i c h a u t h e n t i c a l l y exists, w h a t Plato calls OVTWS OV. T h e Ideas possess the predicates t r a d i t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d o f the E n t i t y , w h i c h cannot be possessed b y things as perceived b y the senses; the Ideas are one, changeless, eternal; they c o n t a i n no a d m i x t u r e o f n o n b e i n g ; they are n o t subject to m o t i o n or decay; they absolutely and u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y are. T h e b e i n g o f things, w h i c h is a subordinate a n d defective being, is f o u n d e d o n the being o f the Ideas i n w h i c h the things share. Plato originates the division of reality i n t o t w o worlds, the w o r l d o f things perceived b y the senses, w h i c h he discredits, a n d the w o r l d of the Ideas, w h i c h is t r u e a n d f u l l being. W e see, therefore, the necessity for the Ideas: ( i ) i n order to k n o w things for w h a t they are; (2) i n order t h a t these things, w h i c h are a n d are n o t (i.e., do not t r u l y exist) m a y be; (3) i n order to u n d e r s t a n d h o w i t is possible for things to come to be a n d cease to b e — i n general, h o w they move or c h a n g e — w i t h o u t c o n t r a d i c t i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l p r e d i cates of the E n t i t y ; a n d (4) i n order to make the oneness o f the E n t i t y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f the things. T H E O R Y OF K N O W L E D G E . W h e n Plato investigates the being o f the things he comes across a r a t h e r paradoxical s i t u a t i o n : t h a t these things have no being a n d , therefore, cannot help h i m to discover being. W h e r e t h e n should he seek i t ? T r u e being resides i n the Ideas, b u t the Ideas are n o t d i r e c t l y accessible to m y consciousness, they are not i n the w o r l d . Nevertheless, I k n o w t h e m i n some w a y , they are w i t h i n m e a n d thus p e r m i t me, as we have seen, to k n o w the things. H o w is this possible ? T o solve this p r o b l e m , Plato resorts to one of his characteristic procedures: he relates a m y t h . T h e m y t h i n the Phaedrus simultaneously explains the o r i g i n of m a n , our knowledge of the Ideas, a n d the intellectual m e t h o d o f Platonism. A c c o r d i n g to the now-famous m y t h w h i c h Socrates relates to Phaedrus o n the b a n k o f the Ilissus, the soul, i n its o r i g i n a l state, can be c o m p a r e d to a c h a r i o t d r a w n b y t w o w i n g e d horses, one a docile t h o r o u g h b r e d , the other a n ungovernable steed (the passions a n d sensual instincts). T h i s c h a r i o t is d r i v e n b y a charioteer (reason) w h o strives to guide i t p r o p e r l y . I n a region above heaven (TWOS virepovpavios) the c h a r i o t travels t h r o u g h the w o r l d o f the Ideas, w h i c h the soul thus contemplates, a l t h o u g h n o t w i t h o u t difficulty. T r o u b l e s arise i n g u i d i n g the flight o f the t w o horses, a n d the soul falls; the horses lose t h e i r wings a n d the soul becomes i n c a r n a t e d i n a b o d y . I f the soul has seen the Ideas, even t h o u g h o n l y b r i e f l y , this b o d y w i l l be h u m a n a n d n o t bestial. D e p e n d i n g o n the greater or lesser extent o f their c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f the Ideas, souls are placed i n a h i e r a r c h y o f nine grades, r a n g i n g f r o m the philosopher d o w n to the
4
8
Plato
t y r a n t . T h e o r i g i n o f m a n as such, therefore, is the f a l l o f a soul w h i c h has come f r o m heaven a n d has there contemplated the Ideas. B u t the i n c a r n a t e d m a n does n o t remember t h e m . O f his former wings there r e m a i n o n l y a c h i n g stumps, w h i c h are stimulated w h e n m a n sees things, because the things make h i m remember the Ideas w h i c h his soul saw i n its earlier existence. T h i s is the m e t h o d o f knowledge. M a n starts w i t h t h i n g s — b u t n o t to r e m a i n at t h e i r level, n o t to find i n t h e m a being w h i c h they do n o t possess—but i n order t h a t they m a y excite his m e m o r y or reminiscence (andmnesis) o f the Ideas he c o n t e m p l a t e d at a n earlier t i m e . K n o w l e d g e , therefore, is n o t seeing w h a t is outside o f us, b u t , o n the c o n t r a r y , remembering w h a t is inside o f us. T h i n g s are o n l y a stimulus for us to a b a n d o n t h e m a n d raise o u r thoughts to the Ideas. Things, Plato says, w i t h a n expressive m e t a p h o r , are shadows of the Ideas. Shadows are signs o f things a n d they can make one a w a r e o f the existence o f things. T h e m u t i l a t e d stumps o f the f o r m e r wings are agitated a n d l o n g for regeneration; there is a feeling o f restlessness, a p a i n f u l i t c h i n g : " T h e v i r t u e o f wings consists i n l i f t i n g heavy things u p w a r d , bearing t h e m t h r o u g h the air to the place where the race o f the gods resides," says Plato. T h i s is, as we shall see i n d e t a i l , the cognitive m e a n i n g o f the Platonic e'ros: love, s t a r t i n g w i t h the c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f b e a u t i f u l things, o f b e a u t i f u l bodies, ends b y m a k i n g us remember the I d e a o f beauty itself a n d leads us i n t o the w o r l d o f Ideas. M a n , w h o is for Plato a fallen being, is nevertheless distinguished as h a v i n g seen the Ideas, the t r u e being o f things, a n d as s h a r i n g i n t r u t h ; this is w h a t defines m a n . O n e o f the most p r o f o u n d arguments t h a t Plato uses to prove the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the soul is t h a t , i n o r d e r to k n o w t r u t h , the soul must have a certain affinity w i t h i t ; we have already seen the connection between the E n t i t y a n d nous i n Parmenides. A n entire metaphysic is i m p l i c i t i n this a r g u m e n t . ( I n present-day philoso p h y the p r o b l e m o f the eternity o f truths has been raised w i t h acuteness, especially b y Husserl a n d Heidegger. Opposed to t h e idea o f the eternity o f truths is t h a t o f a t e m p o r a l l i n k between truths a n d h u m a n existence. B u t this is a n extremely complex question, w h i c h cannot be gone i n t o here.)
2.
T H E STRUCTURE
OF R E A L I T Y
T H E M Y T H OF T H E C A V E . I n the seventh book o f the Republic, Plato relates a m y t h o f astonishing power, i n w h i c h he represents symbolically the s i t u a t i o n o f m a n i n r e l a t i o n to philosophy, a n d , a t the same t i m e , the structure o f reality. I t is curious to note t h a t i m m e d i a t e l y
The Structure of Reality
49
before this, at t h e end o f the sixth book, Plato h a d expounded i n the f o r m o f a thesis this same doctrine o f r e a l i t y a n d the methods o f k n o w i n g i t . T h i s procedure o f Plato's r e c a l l s — b u t w i t h a n essential change of sequence—his customary technique of m a k i n g a t r u t h c o m prehensible b y means o f a poetical representation t h a t renders i t clear a n d precise for the m i n d ' s grasping; b u t this inversion o f terms reveals that this is n o simple example i n the f o r m o f a m e t a p h o r , b u t t h a t the m y t h adds something to the exposition preceding i t . T h e content o f the m y t h c a n be reduced i n its essentials to the f o l l o w i n g : Plato pictures some m e n w h o have remained f r o m their c h i l d h o o d i n a cave w h i c h has a n o p e n i n g t h r o u g h w h i c h the l i g h t f r o m outside enters. T h e m e n are b o u n d i n such a w a y t h a t they cannot move o r look i n a n y other d i r e c t i o n t h a n at the back o f the cave. Outside the cave, b e h i n d the men's backs, blazes the b r i g h t g l o w of a fire b u r n i n g o n a lofty place i n the t e r r a i n , a n d between the fire a n d the chained m e n there is a r o a d w i t h a l o w w a l l along i t . D o w n this r o a d pass m e n c a r r y i n g a l l sorts o f objects a n d small statues t h a t rise above the t o p o f the w a l l ; the chained m e n see the shadows o f these things projected o n t o the back of the cave. W h e n the passers-by speak, i t seems to t h e prisoners t h a t those voices proceed f r o m the shadows they see—their o n l y reality. O n e o f t h e prisoners, freed f r o m his chains, views the real w o r l d outside; the l i g h t makes his eyes ache a n d he c a n scarcely see; t h e sun dazzles h i m p a i n f u l l y a n d blinds h i m . L i t t l e b y l i t t l e he tries t o g r o w accustomed to the l i g h t ; first, he manages to see shadows; then, the images of things reflected i n bodies of w a t e r ; a f t e r w a r d , t h e things themselves. H e sees the sky at n i g h t , the stars a n d the m o o n , a n d at d a w n , the reflected image o f the sun. F i n a l l y , after a l o n g p r e p a r a t i o n (yvfxvaola), he can look a t t h e sun itself. T h e n he realizes t h a t the w o r l d he l i v e d i n previously was u n r e a l and c o n t e m p t i b l e . B u t w h e n he speaks to his companions i n t h a t w o r l d of shadows a n d says t h a t the shadows are n o t real, they w i l l l a u g h at h i m ; a n d w h e n he tries to save t h e m a n d b r i n g t h e m i n t o t h e real w o r l d , they w i l l k i l l h i m . W h a t is symbolized i n this m y t h ? T h e cave is the w o r l d perceived b y the senses, a n d its shadows are the things of the w o r l d of the senses. T h e outside w o r l d is the t r u e w o r l d , the w o r l d perceived b y the m i n d , or the w o r l d o f the Ideas. T h e objects o f the outside w o r l d symbolize the Ideas; the sun symbolizes the I d e a of the G o o d . F o l l o w i n g Plato's o w n indications, w e can represent g r a p h i c a l l y the structure of r e a l i t y referred to i n the m y t h of the cave. THE
D I A G R A M O F T H E T W O W O R L D S . P l a t o distinguishes t w o great
regions o f r e a l i t y , the w o r l d o f the senses (of things) a n d the w o r l d o f
Plato the m i n d ( o f Ideas), w h i c h he symbolizes as t w o segments o f a l i n e . E a c h one o f these t w o regions is d i v i d e d i n t o t w o parts, s t a n d i n g for t w o degrees o f r e a l i t y w i t h i n each w o r l d . T h e r e is a correspondence between the first portions a n d between the second portions o f the t w o segments. F i n a l l y , to each one o f the four forms o f r e a l i t y there corresponds a w a y o f knowledge; the t w o t h a t p e r t a i n to the w o r l d o f the senses constitute o p i n i o n , or doxa; those o f the w o r l d o f the m i n d are manifestations o f nous. I n this we notice echoes o f Parmenides' teachings. Schematically, therefore, reality has the f o l l o w i n g structure: W O R L D O F T H E SENSES
(Apparent reality) shadows
real things
conjecture
belief
W O R L D OF T H E M I N D
( T r u e reality) mathematical entities Ideas reasoning
noetic vision (perception by the m i n d )
dôxa
T H E M E A N I N G OF T H E M Y T H . T h e
m y t h o f the cave, n a r r a t e d
by
Plato as a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f this schematic presentation, adds something to i t . I n concrete fashion, i t symbolizes simultaneously the ontological structure o f r e a l i t y a n d the m e a n i n g o f philosophy, a n d thus i n t r o duces the f u n d a m e n t a l oneness o f those t w o w o r l d s . T h e t w o great regions o f r e a l i t y are u n i t e d i n t o one r e a l i t y b y v i r t u e o f the role played b y m a n , w h o comes face to face w i t h b o t h o f t h e m . T h e visible w o r l d a n d the w o r l d o f the m i n d n o w appear related to t w o essential h u m a n potentialities : seeing a n d understanding. T h e m a n w h o is at first i n the cave a n d t h e n i n the l i g h t is the one w h o gives a u n i t y to the t w o w o r l d s ; the w o r l d as a whole is a double w o r l d i n t e g r a t e d b y man's passage f r o m darkness to l i g h t . ( F r o m another p o i n t o f v i e w , there is a second u n i f y i n g l i n k : the G o o d , the ontological basis o f the b e i n g o f b o t h worlds.) W h a t happens to the m a n i n the cave is something t h a t can be n a r r a t e d , a n d i t is o f this n a r r a t i v e t h a t the m y t h consists. T h e theme o f the m y t h o f the cave is, i n its most p r o f o u n d dimension, the essence o f philosophy; a n d this, as we see, is something m o r e clearly a r r i v e d at i n a n a r r a t i v e t h a n i n a d e f i n i t i o n . E v e n t h o u g h Plato is the c h a m p i o n o f the definition, philosophy i n its essence cannot be denned ; i t must be set f o r t h i n a n a r r a t i v e , or r e l a t i o n . W h a t happens to the philosopher, the d r a m a o f philosophy, is w h a t makes clear the structure o f r e a l i t y : this is the double substance o f the m y t h o f the cave.
Problems Raised by the Theory of Ideas L e t us n o t forget, however, t h a t the j o u r n e y o f the m a n i n the m y t h includes a r e t u r n t r i p : the prisoner, once he has viewed the w o r l d of l i g h t a n d freedom, goes back to the cave; t h a t is, he intends to e x p l a i n the shadows o n the basis o f the visible things, a n d the reality perceived b y the senses o n the basis o f the Ideas. W e see prefigured here the philosophy o f Plato, a n d at the same t i m e we notice t h a t Plato's philosophy is not carried to its conclusion, because Plato should have r e t u r n e d to the cave i n order to e x p l a i n the being o f things o n the basis o f the theory o f Ideas. S t r i c t l y speaking, as we shall see, he d i d n o t do this, b u t r e m a i n e d i n the w o r l d o f the m i n d , dazzled a n d detained b y his i n n e r problems. A n d the tragic e n d i n g o f the m y t h reflects the f o r m i n w h i c h the philosopher's life was l i v e d i n Plato's age: the m e m o r y o f the death o f Socrates is latent i n the k i l l i n g o f the philosopher by his companions i n the cave.
3.
PROBLEMS R A I S E D B Y T H E T H E O R Y OF IDEAS
B E I N G A N D E N T I T Y . W e have seen t h a t Plato was i n q u i r i n g i n t o the being o f things. B u t he learned t h a t they do n o t have a b e i n g of t h e i r o w n ; they have a share o f being, w h i c h they receive f r o m another r e a l i t y t h a t is outside o f the things. A n d Plato at t h a t p o i n t discovered the Ideas. I t is necessary to pause for a m o m e n t to consider w h a t this discovery means. T o begin w i t h , i t was the discovery o f the m o d e o f being o f things, the discovery o f w h a t makes things be, a n d therefore at the same t i m e the discovery o f w h a t can be k n o w n about things, t h a t is, w h a t they are. T h e p r o b l e m o f the theory o f knowledge is inseparably l i n k e d to the p r o b l e m o f b e i n g a n d is thus strictly metaphysical. I t is n o t possible to discover one i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g and see i t w i t h o u t seeing the I d e a o f i t ; w i t h o u t seeing the I d e a of m a n , i t is impossible to see a m a n . A n a n i m a l , as we have seen, cannot see a book because i t has no " i d e a " o f the book, a n d the r e a l i t y " b o o k " does n o t exist for the a n i m a l . W h a t , t h e n , has Plato discovered? W h a t a c t u a l l y is the Idea? I n r e a l i t y , Plato has discovered the being o f things. Being is w h a t makes things be, w h a t makes t h e m entities. Being is the b e i n g o f the entity, a n d at the same t i m e , to k n o w a t h i n g is to k n o w w h a t that t h i n g is: to understand the b e i n g o f t h a t entity. L e t us suppose t h a t I have a t h i n g w i t h w h i c h I a m g o i n g to become acquainted. T h i s t h i n g is an e n t i t y ; b u t w h e n I have come to k n o w i t , I do n o t have the t h i n g itself i n m y consciousness. W h a t d o I have, then? I have the being of the t h i n g , w h a t t h a t t h i n g i s — w h a t Plato w o u l d c a l l " its I d e a . " Plato
Plato w o u l d describe the process o f k n o w i n g as seeing a t h i n g i n its Idea. I n short, we f i n d t h a t Plato has discovered being, r a t h e r t h a n the E n t i t y . Parmenides h a d discovered the E n t i t y , things for w h a t they are. Plato discovers being, t h a t w h i c h makes things be, a n d he finds t h a t this being is n o t to be confused w i t h the things. B u t i n a d d i t i o n to m a k i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e m , he separates t h e m : t h e Ideas are something separate f r o m things, something absolute. N o w he runs i n t o a most serious d i f f i c u l t y : he was i n q u i r i n g i n t o the b e i n g of things, and has n o w f o u n d b e i n g ; b u t he does n o t k n o w yet w h a t the things are. Plato remains at the level of the Ideas, the being he has discovered. W h a t is l a c k i n g i n his system is n o t h i n g less t h a n the a b i l i t y to e x p l a i n the being of things o n the basis of the Ideas ( O r t e g a ) . T h i s is w h a t happens w h e n a m a n makes a b r i l l i a n t discovery such as the discovery of the Ideas: Plato stops short at t h a t p o i n t , a n d never succeeds i n e x p l a i n i n g the t h i n g s ; he stops short w i t h o u t creating his metaphysics. (See O r t e g a , Filosofia pura [ P u r e P h i l o s o p h y ] . ) Such a task is precisely w h a t A r i s t o t l e w i l l accomplish. H e reproaches Plato w i t h h a v i n g used these m y t h s , n o t because they are m y t h s , b u t because they are n o t supported b y a metaphysics. T h e concept o f " p a r t i c i p a t i n g " or " s h a r i n g " (fiedegis) is completely insufficient. F o r Plato, peOegis is the type of relationship t h a t exists between the Ideas a n d the things. T h i n g s share i n the Ideas. T h e Ideas, Plato says, are like a v e i l t h a t covers various things, w h i c h share i n i t . T h e I d e a of m a n is like a c o m m o n v e i l covering a l l m e n . A r i s t o t l e w i l l say t h a t a l l this is n o t h i n g b u t metaphor. W h a t is this " s h a r i n g , " ontologically speaking? I t means that the Ideas are present i n the things. B u t h o w is this sharing ontologically possible ? W h a t is the m o d e of this presence ? T H E " C O M M U N I C A T I O N " OF T H E I D E A S . W i t h i n the w o r l d o f Ideas itself Plato also runs i n t o problems. L e t us consider the I d e a o f m a n . M a n is a l i v i n g r a t i o n a l creature. T h e being of m a n is the I d e a of m a n . Does this m a n I have here before m e share i n the I d e a o f " l i v i n g " o r the I d e a o f " r a t i o n a l " ? W i t h i n the very w o r l d o f Ideas I have the p r o b l e m o f the one a n d the m a n y . H o w is Plato g o i n g to solve this p r o b l e m o f the koinonia, the " c o m m u n i c a t i o n , " of the Ideas? H e w i l l use a n o t i o n similar to t h a t of sharing. T h e I d e a of m a n is i n communication w i t h the I d e a of l i v i n g , the I d e a of r a t i o n a l , a n d so f o r t h . By these paths Plato arrives at t w o i m p o r t a n t concepts: the I d e a o f b e i n g as the highest genus a n d the I d e a of the G o o d as the I d e a of the Ideas, or, as he says i n a final m e t a p h o r , as the " sun of the I d e a s . " T H E G O O D . W h a t is the G o o d ? W h a t is the I d e a o f the G o o d ? Before a l l else, i t is a n I d e a . T h i s I d e a is placed at the pinnacle o f a
Problems Raised by the Theory of Ideas h i e r a r c h y i n w h i c h a l l the Ideas are f o u n d : because the Ideas are ranged a n d organized i n a h i e r a r c h y — t h i s is w h a t makes their Koivcovia, o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n , possible. Plato tells us t h a t the Idea o f the G o o d is the worthiest a n d highest I d e a ; t h a t i t is, I repeat, the sun of the Ideas, a n d , above a l l , t h a t i t is the I d e a o f the Ideas. T h i s should n o t be understood as a mere hyperbole, b u t i n a m u c h stricter sense: the " I d e a o f the Ideas " is the Idea w h i c h makes a l l the others be Ideas, w h i c h confers u p o n t h e m their character as Ideas. B u t the Ideas are the true entities a n d thus, i f the I d e a o f the G o o d gives the rest o f the Ideas t h e i r character, i t gives t h e m their being. B u t w h a t can make t h e m be ? N a t u r a l l y , being. I t is being t h a t makes each i n d i v i d u a l e n t i t y be a n e n t i t y ; b e i n g is present i n a l l entities, g i v i n g t h e m their character as entities. T h i s being is w h a t Plato calls the G o o d ; b u t i n Greece " t h e G o o d " is understood i n a sense closer to t h a t o f our p l u r a l " g o o d s , " t h a t is, w e a l t h . T h i s permits us to see clearly the l i n k between being a n d the G o o d . T h e " g o o d " o f each t h i n g is w h a t that t h i n g is, w h a t i t is useful f o r ; conversely, w h e n w e say a t h i n g is good we m e a n t h a t i t is w h a t i t is. A good knife is one w h i c h is f u l l y — t r u l y — a k n i f e ; a n d a good statesman is one w h o is f u l l y — t r u l y — a statesman. N a t u r a l l y , this concept is close to t h a t interrelationship o f being, the G o o d , a n d the O n e (those aspects t h a t the medieval Scholastics w i l l call the transcendentals) w h i c h we w i l l find i n A r i s t o t l e . I n a certain sense, Plato's doctrine o f the G o o d is his theology. T h e G o o d appears i n m a n y Platonic texts ( a l t h o u g h n o t always w i t h sufficient c l a r i t y ) i n such a w a y t h a t we are led to u n d e r s t a n d i t as God. Plato's teaching was i n t e r p r e t e d i n this way, first b y the Neoplatonists a n d then b y St. A u g u s t i n e ; i n this f o r m i t became a m o t i v e force i n the entire medieval C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n . T H E E N T I T Y AS A GENUS. A second i m p o r t a n t p o i n t remains to be considered: the I d e a o f the E n t i t y as a genus. F o r Plato, i t is the highest genus. A l l other things are successive species o f this u n i q u e genus. T h u s the E n t i t y could be d i v i d e d i n t o genera a n d species; this w o u l d be a hierarchical division, w i t h successive differentiations being added on. Aristotle resolutely opposes this p o i n t o f v i e w also, for profound reasons w h i c h we w i l l examine later. I n his c r i t i c i s m o f Plato's theory o f Ideas, Aristotle w i l l m a k e several major affirmations: ( i ) that the Ideas are not separate f r o m the things; (2) t h a t the E n t i t y is not a genus, b u t the highest universal; (3) t h a t the E n t i t y , the G o o d , and the O n e are m u t u a l l y associated; finally (4) t h a t b e i n g is expressed i n m a n y ways a n d t h a t these expressions o f b e i n g are expressions by analogy. A l t h o u g h the f o r m Aristotle gives t h e m is new, these last t w o notions are not alien to Plato's system o f t h o u g h t .
Plato
54 4.
M A N AND THE CITY
I n Plato, the I d e a o f the G o o d appears simultaneously as the D i v i n i t y a n d the A r t i f i c e r or Demiurge of the w o r l d . Plato imagines the creation of a " w o r l d s o u l , " halfway between the Ideas a n d the things. T h i s soul animates the w o r l d . T h e h u m a n soul, too, as we have seen, is something intermediate. O n the one h a n d , i t has fallen f r o m heaven, i t has been i n c a r n a t e d i n a body, i t is i n bondage to the w o r l d o f the senses, i t is changeable and subject to decay. O n the other h a n d , i t has seen the Ideas a n d has a special connection w i t h t h e m ; t h r o u g h t h e m i t shares i n t h a t w o r l d of the Ideas w h i c h is eternal a n d perceived b y the m i n d . D O C T R I N E O F T H E SOUL. W e have already seen, i n the Phaedrus, Plato's account o f the m y t h i c a l o r i g i n o f m a n . Plato p a r t i c u l a r l y i n sists o n the i m m o r t a l i t y of the soul. I n d o i n g this, he adopts a deepseated element o f Greek r e l i g i o n a n d o f all Greek t h i n k i n g . Belief i n the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the soul h a d been a c a r d i n a l p o i n t of the Dionysiac and O r p h i c mysteries and o f Pythagoreanism. T h e Pythagoreans h a d a p r o f o u n d influence on Plato, i n this area as w e l l as t h a t of their m a t h e m a t i c a l teachings. H i s p r i n c i p a l proofs o f the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the soul are based o n the soul's u n c o m p l i c a t e d f o r m , its i m m a t e r i a l i t y and its analogy to the eternal Ideas a n d to t r u t h , w h i c h is k n o w n t h r o u g h the soul. These proofs have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been used i n Greek and C h r i s t i a n philosophy. T h e soul has three parts: a n " a p p e t i t i v e " or sensual p a r t , the p a r t most closely related to the needs o f the b o d y ; a second, " s p i r i t e d " p a r t , corresponding to the drives a n d emotions; a n d , finally, a r a t i o n a l p a r t , b y means of w h i c h knowledge o f the Ideas a n d v o l i t i o n i n the deliberative sense—following the dictates o f reason—are possible. T h i s o u t l i n e o f psychology is developed f u r t h e r i n Aristotle's thinking. E T H I C S . Plato's ethics shows a strict parallelism w i t h his theory o f the soul. T h e parts o f the h u m a n psyche correspond rigorously to ethical requirements. Each p a r t must be governed i n a c e r t a i n way, must possess a p a r t i c u l a r virtue, the q u a l i t y t h a t makes possible its perfect f u n c t i o n i n g . T h e sensual p a r t requires m o d e r a t i o n , w h a t is t r a d i t i o n a l l y called temperance (sophrosyne). T o the e m o t i o n a l p a r t corresponds f o r t i t u d e , or andria. T h e r a t i o n a l p a r t must be endowed w i t h w i s d o m or prudence, phrdnesis. B u t there is also a f o u r t h v i r t u e ; the parts o f the soul are elements o f a u n i t y , a n d are thus i n t e r r e l a t e d ; a good relationship a m o n g its parts constitutes the most i m p o r t a n t r e q u i r e m e n t o f the soul a n d , consequently, its highest v i r t u e : justice,
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or dikaiosyne. These are the four virtues t h a t were handed d o w n as the c a r d i n a l virtues; they passed even i n t o C h r i s t i a n doctrine, where they are usually t e r m e d prudence, justice, f o r t i t u d e a n d temperance. T H E C I T Y . I n d i v i d u a l m o r a l i t y is transferred almost exactly i n t o the theory o f the c i v i l constitution, or politeia, as Plato expounds i t i n the Republic a n d , later, i n a n attenuated, m o r e easily realized f o r m , i n the Laws. T h e c i t y , like the soul, can be considered as a w h o l e c o m posed o f three parts, w h i c h correspond to t h e three parts of the soul. These parts are the three great social classes recognized b y P l a t o : the mass o f citizens, i n c l u d i n g the tradesmen, artisans and farmers; the g u a r d i a n s ; a n d the philosophers. T h e r e is a close correlation between these classes a n d the faculties o f the h u m a n soul, so t h a t each o f these social groups is p a r t i c u l a r l y associated w i t h one o f the virtues. T h e p r o p e r v i r t u e o f the p r o d u c i n g class is temperance; the v i r t u e o f the guardians, or w a r r i o r s , is f o r t i t u d e ; a n d the v i r t u e of the philosophers is w i s d o m , phrónesis or sophia. H e r e , too, the p r i m e v i r t u e is justice, w h i c h i n this case is understood even m o r e r i g o r o u s l y : i t consists here i n the e q u i l i b r i u m a n d proper relationship o f the individuals a m o n g themselves a n d w i t h the State, a n d o f the different classes a m o n g themselves a n d w i t h the social c o m m u n i t y . T h u s justice governs a n d determines the life o f the b o d y p o l i t i c , w h i c h is the city. T h e Platonic state is the t r a d i t i o n a l Greek polis, o f s m a l l dimensions a n d scanty p o p u l a t i o n ; Plato never imagines a n y o t h e r type o f political u n i t . T h e philosophers are the " a r c h o n s , " or b o a r d o f governors, charged w i t h the supreme d i r e c t i o n of the State, w i t h legislation a n d w i t h the education o f a l l the classes. T h e guardians have a m i l i t a r y f u n c t i o n : the defense o f the State a n d the established social a n d p o l i t i c a l order against their enemies w i t h i n a n d w i t h o u t . T h e t h i r d class, the p r o d u c i n g class, has a m o r e passive role a n d is subservient to the t w o higher classes, w h i c h i t must sustain economically. I n exchange i t receives f r o m t h e m d i r e c t i o n , education a n d p r o t e c t i o n . I n the t w o higher classes Plato establishes a communistic governm e n t , w h i c h involves c o m m u n i t y ownership n o t o n l y of p r o p e r t y , b u t also o f wives a n d c h i l d r e n , a l l o f w h o m belong to the State. O n l y the lowest class is a l l o w e d p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y a n d p r i v a t e families. T h e governing classes must have no p r i v a t e interests, b u t must subordinate all their interests to the highest service o f IHEPÓLIS. E d u c a t i o n , w h i c h is similar for w o m e n a n d for m e n , is administered i n stages; i t constitutes the selective process a m o n g the townspeople, d e t e r m i n i n g the class t h a t each citizen is to belong to, according to his aptitudes a n d merits. Those w i t h the fewest n a t u r a l gifts receive elementary i n s t r u c t i o n a n d go to m a k e u p the p r o d u c i n g class o f
Plato society; those w h o are m o r e a p t continue their education, u n t i l a new selection separates those w h o are to r e m a i n a m o n g the guardians f r o m those w h o , after f u r t h e r p r e p a r a t i o n , enter the class o f philosophers a n d are thus called u p o n to bear the b u r d e n of government. I n Plato's system o f education physical exercises alternate w i t h i n t e l l e c t u a l disciplines; the role of each citizen is rigorously d e t e r m i n e d according to his age. Procreation a n d the relationship between the sexes are strictly dependent o n the interests o f the State, w h i c h regulates these matters for its o w n convenience. Plato's entire conception of the polis reveals a t h o r o u g h g o i n g s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l to the interests o f the c o m m u n i t y . A u t h o r i t y is exercised vigorously, a n d the p r i m a r y c o n d i t i o n for the f u n c t i o n i n g o f the p o l i t i c a l life o f the c i t y is t h a t the c i t y be r u l e d b y justice. 5.
PHILOSOPHY
L e t us now see w h a t philosophy means to Plato. W h a t is understood b y " p h i l o s o p h y " a n d " p h i l o s o p h i z i n g " at this p o i n t , w h e n H e l l e n i c t h o u g h t has reached its first stage of f u l l m a t u r i t y ? A t the b e g i n n i n g of the seventh book of the Republic, as w e have seen, Plato relates the myth of the cave, w h i c h symbolizes, o n the one h a n d , the differences between everyday life a n d the life of the philosopher a n d , o n the other, the various strata o f reality w i t h i n the P l a t o n i c metaphysical system. M o r e o v e r , Plato says i n the Symposium: " N o n e o f the gods philosophizes or wishes to become wise, because the gods already are so; nor does any wise m a n philosophize, either. N o r do the i g n o r a n t philosophize or desire to become wise. " A n d he adds further o n : " W h o , t h e n , are those w h o philosophize, i f they are neither the wise n o r the i g n o r a n t ? Clearly, those w h o are intermediate (/Lterafu) between these t w o g r o u p s . " T h i s is definitive. I n Plato's m i n d , neither the wise m a n nor the i g n o r a n t m a n philosophizes. T h e i g n o r a n t m a n does n o t h a v e k n o w l edge, a n d t h a t is t h a t . T h e intermediate m a n does n o t have k n o w l edge either, b u t he realizes t h a t this is so; he knows t h a t he does n o t k n o w , a n d therefore he wants to k n o w : he feels the lack o f t h a t k n o w l edge. S t r i c t l y speaking, neither the wise m a n nor the i g n o r a n t m a n feels the w a n t o f knowledge. I do n o t have branches, b u t I do n o t feel the lack o f t h e m . O n l y t h a t m a n philosophizes w h o feels t h a t k n o w l edge is l a c k i n g . T h i s leads us to t w o i m p o r t a n t matters w h i c h emanate, as i t were, f r o m Plato's t h o u g h t : the relationships philosophy can have w i t h love, o n the one h a n d , a n d Divinity, o n the other. I n the Symposium, the theme is discourse " o n l o v e , " a n d also the
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eulogy o f the god Eros, w h o is closely related to philosophy. F o r Plato, love is the feeling t h a t something is l a c k i n g , a search for w h a t one does n o t have, for w h a t is missing. A c c o r d i n g to the m y t h , Love, w h o is the son o f Porus ( " m e a n s , " p l e n t y ) a n d P e n i a ( p o v e r t y ) , possesses a l l sorts o f w e a l t h , b u t at the same t i m e is needy. Love, as w e l l as the lover, the erastes, seeks t h a t w h i c h is l a c k i n g , especially beauty. Socrates i n the Symposium scandalizes everyone w h e n he says t h a t i f L o v e seeks beauty, L o v e must feel the lack o f beauty a n d therefore cannot be a god. W h a t is L o v e , t h e n ? A great " d e m o n " or " g e n i u s , " a metaxy, something halfway between m e n a n d the gods. A n d this is the very t h i n g t h a t happens to the philosopher, w h o is also metaxy, halfway between the wise m a n a n d the i g n o r a n t m a n . W i s d o m is knowledge o f the most beautiful things, a n d love is love o f the b e a u t i f u l ; therefore, L o v e must be a philosopher. T h r o u g h the b e a u t i f u l one arrives at the t r u e , a n d thus philosophers are "lovers o f the vision o f t r u t h . " T h e r e is a n essential association between b e a u t y a n d t r u t h . I m m e d i a t e l y below the I d e a o f the G o o d a n d o f t r u t h , the object of philosophy, Plato places the I d e a o f the b e a u t i f u l . A n d beauty, for Plato, is m o r e easily visible t h a n t r u t h ; i t can be better seen, is b r i g h t e r , is m o r e v i v i d l y a n d i m m e d i a t e l y i n evidence. Beauty can lead us to t r u t h : therefore the philosopher is a lover, a n d f r o m the c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f the beauty o f a b o d y he raises his m i n d to the beauty o f bodies i n general, t h e n to the beauty o f souls a n d , finally, to t h e beauty o f the Ideas themselves. A n d t h a t is w h e n he knows, w h e n he t r u l y has sophia. L e t us recall t h a t " b e a u t y " i n L a t i n is forma, a n d t h a t w h i c h is b e a u t i f u l , formosus. Beauty is also one o f the meanings of species; a n d species, l i k e the Greek eidos or idea, is t h a t w h i c h is seen. T h a t w h i c h is seen can be beauty a n d the Idea; a n d the same applies toforma, w h i c h is w h a t constitutes the essence o f a t h i n g , its " g o o d " i n the Greek sense. W e see t h a t the n o t i o n o f love appears i n Plato as a n essential element i n philosophy. B u t the m a t t e r is n o t so simple, because there are m a n y words for love i n Greek. T h e three p r i n c i p a l words are epws, (f>iXla a n d ar/cnrr). £ros, as we have seen, is p r i m a r i l y a desire for somet h i n g t h a t one does n o t have a n d misses, basically a l o n g i n g for beauty. Philia is t o be f o u n d at the very r o o t o f the w o r d " p h i l o s o p h y . " I t is a type o f f r i e n d s h i p : concern a n d f a m i l i a r companionship. A r i s t o t l e chose philia for speaking a b o u t philosophy. Agape was a r a t h e r m a r g i n a l w o r d ; i t signified a type of dilectio, reciprocal esteem a n d w a r m t h . T h i s concept is essentially m o d i f i e d b y C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d becomes caritas ( c h a r i t y ) i n the L a t i n translations of St. J o h n a n d St. P a u l ( Z u b i r i ) . A n d St. Augustine utters this simple sentence, w h i c h limits
Plato a n d defines the w o r d : Non intratur in veritatem nisi per caritatem ( " O n e does not enter t r u t h except t h r o u g h c h a r i t y " ) . T h u s , i n three philosophical systems as great as those o f P l a t o , Aristotle a n d St. Augustine, philosophy uses as a m e t h o d , as a w a y o f access to t r u t h , the three forms of love i n Greek. For Plato, one cannot g a i n access to philosophy except t h r o u g h e'ros; for A r i s t o t l e , t h r o u g h a certainphilia; for St. A u g u s t i n e , t h r o u g h caritas (agape). A n d again, twelve centuries later, Spinoza w i l l define philosophy as amor Dei intcllectualis (the i n t e l l e c t u a l love o f G o d ) , a n d i n o u r o w n c e n t u r y Ortega w i l l define i t as " the general science of l o v e . "
Aristotle
W i t h Aristotle, Greek philosophy achieves f u l l a n d perfect m a t u r i t y . T h i s is true to such a n extent t h a t philosophy begins to decline after his t i m e , a n d does n o t again reach a similar h e i g h t ; i n fact, the Greeks are n o t even capable o f m a i n t a i n i n g the level o f Aristotle's metaphysics, because they lack the a b i l i t y to grasp the philosophic p r o b lems i n the p r o f o u n d dimension i n w h i c h A r i s t o t l e h a d stated t h e m . T h u s , Hellenic t h o u g h t becomes t r i v i a l i n the hands o f the schools of moralists w h i c h , after Aristotle's t i m e , fill the H e l l e n i c cities a n d later the cities o f the R o m a n E m p i r e . Aristotle, together w i t h Plato, is the greatest figure i n Greek philosophy, and even, perhaps, i n a l l philosophy. I n greater degree t h a n any other t h i n k e r , he d e t e r m i n e d the paths w h i c h philosophy after his t i m e was to follow. H e was the discoverer o f a deep s t r a t u m o f metaphysical questions; the shaper o f m a n y o f the most i m p o r t a n t concepts w h i c h for m a n y l o n g centuries the h u m a n m i n d has used i n order to reflect on the being o f things; the creator o f logic as a discip l i n e , w h i c h has been m a i n t a i n e d u n t i l this day p r a c t i c a l l y w i t h i n the l i m i t s w h i c h Aristotle set for i t , modified b y o n l y t w o or three b r i l l i a n t endeavors over the entire course of the history o f p h i l o s o p h y ; i n short, the m a n w h o possessed a l l the w i s d o m o f his t i m e . Wherever he placed his h a n d he has left the i m p r i n t o f his u n i q u e genius. A r i s t o t l e has, thus, influenced a l l philosophy i n a n incalculable m a n n e r , a n d because o f this he is, perhaps, o u r first p r o b l e m , the p r o b l e m w h i c h present-day t h i n k i n g must most earnestly confront i f i t wishes to understand itself a n d root itself i n its o w n era a n d i n the true p r o b l e m o f philosophy. 59
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L I F E . Aristotle was n o t s t r i c t l y Greek ; he was a M a c e d o n i a n , b u t he was certainly greatly influenced b y Greek c i v i l i z a t i o n . H e was b o r n i n Stagira, o n the C h a l c i d i c peninsula, i n the year 384 B.C. H i s father, Nicomachus, was a physician a n d a friend o f A m y n t a s I I , k i n g o f M a c e d o n i a . I t is possible—as Ross points o u t — t h a t this b a c k g r o u n d influenced Aristotle's interest i n physical a n d b i o l o g i c a l questions. W h e n he was eighteen years o l d he entered Plato's school i n A t h e n s ; he r e m a i n e d there nineteen y e a r s — u n t i l the master's d e a t h — i n the capacity o f student a n d also o f teacher, a l l the w h i l e v e r y closely related to a n d at the same t i m e i n p r o f o u n d disagreement w i t h Plato. A r i s t o t l e , the o n l y a u t h e n t i c Platonist, shows h o w i n one sense o n l y one t r u e disciple o f a philosopher is possible. W h e n Plato d i e d , Speusippus took over the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the A c a d e m y , a n d at this t i m e A r i s t o t l e left the school a n d Athens. H e w e n t to M y s i a , where he r e m a i n e d three years a n d where he m a r r i e d . L a t e r , his first wife h a v i n g died, he l i v e d w i t h another w o m a n , w h o became the m o t h e r o f his son, Nicomachus. A r i s t o t l e also spent some t i m e i n M y t i l e n e , o n the island o f Lesbos. A b o u t the year 343, P h i l i p o f M a c e d o n i a i n v i t e d A r i s t o t l e to take charge o f the education o f his son Alexander, w h o was t h e n t h i r t e e n years o l d . A r i s t o t l e accepted the position a n d proceeded to M a c e d o n i a . H i s influence o n Alexander must have been very great. I t is k n o w n t h a t they disagreed o n the question o f the fusion o f Greek c u l t u r e w i t h t h a t o f the O r i e n t , A r i s t o t l e n o t believing this p l a n to be advisable. I n 334 Aristotle r e t u r n e d to Athens a n d founded his o w n school. I n the suburbs o f the city, i n a grove t h a t was consecrated to A p o l l o Lyceus a n d the Muses, he rented some houses w h i c h were to constitute the L y c e u m . T h e r e , while strolling, he discussed the most p r o f o u n d philosophic questions w i t h his best students ; therefore, the members o f this school were called the Peripatetics. I n the afternoons he used to e x p o u n d o n m o r e accessible t o p i c s — r h e t o r i c , sophistry or p o l i t i c s — t o a larger audience. Aristotle's intellectual a c t i v i t y was enormous. A l m o s t a l l of his works date f r o m the p e r i o d 334 to 323 B.C. H e assembled a n i n c a l culable b o d y of scientific data w h i c h p e r m i t t e d h i m to advance the knowledge of his t i m e prodigiously. A t the death o f A l e x a n d e r , i n 323, a n a n t i - M a c e d o n i a n m o v e m e n t broke o u t i n Athens, a n d this hostility also came to be directed against A r i s t o t l e . H e was accused o f the crime o f i m p i e t y . Saying t h a t he d i d n o t w a n t Athens to be responsible for a t h i r d sin against philosophy (he was referring to the persecution o f Anaxagoras a n d to Socrates' d e a t h ) , he m o v e d to Chalcis, o n the island o f Euboea, where M a c e d o n i a n influence was strong. H e d i e d there i n the year 322.
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W O R K S . A r i s t o t l e w r o t e t w o types o f books. Some were i n t e n d e d for a w i d e audience; these, called the exoteric works, were, i n general, i n the f o r m o f dialogues; they were greatly a d m i r e d for their elegant style and l i t e r a r y value. H i s other books are the philosophical or acroamatic works, t h a t is, his esoteric w r i t i n g s ; these dealt w i t h the m o r e p r o f o u n d questions a n d were directed solely to the superior students a t the L y c e u m ; the esoteric w r i t i n g s were, as a r u l e , i n the f o r m o f textbooks or lectures, a n d a few are preserved i n rough-draft f o r m , w i t h o u t e l a b o r a t i o n — t h a t is, as mere notes. A l l the dialogues have been lost; o n l y fragments o f t h e m r e m a i n . I n contrast, the greater p a r t o f Aristotle's scientific w r i t i n g s is preserved. N a t u r a l l y , one must bear i n m i n d t h a t there are spurious pieces a m o n g the writings a t t r i b u t e d to A r i s t o t l e , a n d t h a t m a n y treatises were w r i t t e n b y h i m i n collaborat i o n w i t h students, or were composed b y students f r o m their classroom notes a n d papers. Aristotle divides the sciences i n t o three groups: T h e o r e t i c a l or Speculative Science, Practical Science a n d Poetical Science. T h i s division must be explained. Poiesis, w h i c h is connected etymologically w i t h our w o r d " p o e t r y , " means, i n Greek, " p r o d u c t i o n , manufact u r e " ; the characteristic o f this a c t i v i t y is t h a t i t has an end or goal distinct f r o m itself. F o r example, i n the manufacture o f an a r m o i r e , the a r m o i r e is the goal, a n d i n the composition o f a n ode, the ode is the goal. Praxis or Practical Science is a n action, a n activity, whose goal is the action itself, n o t something external to the performance o f the a c t i v i t y . Praxis is superior to poiesis because i t is its o w n goal; therefore, i t is self-sufficient—it is the autarchia w h i c h the Greeks so greatly a d m i r e d . Politics is a n example. O n e s h o u l d n o t forget that theoria or c o n t e m p l a t i o n is a type o f praxis. Theoria is also Practical Science; T h e o r e t i c a l a n d Practical Science differ o n l y i n t h a t T h e o r e t i c a l Science is the highest praxis, i n contrast to something t h a t is only pract i c a l a n d does n o t succeed i n being theoretical. C o n t e m p l a t i o n is a n a c t i o n w h i c h is its o w n goal, b u t w h i c h also contains its object w i t h i n itself. I n order to be able to act, the statesman, for example, r e q u i r e s — i n a d d i t i o n to h i m s e l f — a city. B u t the m a n w h o practices T h e o r e t i c a l Science needs n o t h i n g b u t his o w n m i n d ; this m a n is thus the most self-sufficient o f a l l m e n , a n d therefore the superior m a n . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the sciences results i n three ways o f life a n d three modes o f knowledge. B u t first we must m e n t i o n one science t h a t does not enter i n t o the discussion o f the others because i t is previous to them a l l . T h i s is the science of logic. I t is called the Organon, or i n s t r u m e n t — t h e title given to i t — a n d i t serves a l l the sciences. Aristotle's Organon is composed o f
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various treatises: the Categories, De Interpretatione, the Prior a n d Posterior Analytics, the Topics, Sophistical Refutations a n d other b r i e f w o r k s o n logic. T h e T h e o r e t i c a l Sciences are mathematics, physics a n d metaphysics. T h e p r i n c i p a l works p e r t a i n i n g to this g r o u p o f sciences are the Physics, the book De Caelo ( O n the Heavens), the De Mundo ( O n the W o r l d ) , the De Anima ( O n t h e S o u l ) , a whole series o f treatises o n physical a n d biological questions a n d , especially, the f o u r t e e n books o f the Metaphysics or First Philosophy. T h e Practical Sciences are ethics, politics a n d economics; t h a t is, those sciences w h i c h are concerned w i t h man's p r i v a t e a n d social life. Aristotle's p r i n c i p a l works i n this area are the three Ethics: Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics a n d Magna Moralia. ( T h e last is the least i m p o r t a n t o f the three a n d is n o t authentic.) T h i s g r o u p o f w r i t i n g s also includes t h e Politics a n d the Economics, b u t these are of i n f e r i o r interest a n d are c e r t a i n l y spurious. T h e m a j o r poetical works are the Poetics, w h i c h has w i e l d e d a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y influence, a n d the Rhetoric. T o complete the list o f the most i m p o r t a n t works b y A r i s t o t l e t h a t have come d o w n to us, one must a d d a great n u m b e r o f b r i e f treatises on every subject i n the A r i s t o t e l i a n scientific corpus, a n d also a r e p e r t o r y o f questions o n m a n y t h i n g s ; this collection, w h i c h is p r o b a b l y o f later composition, is called the Problems.
i.
T H E L E V E L S OF K N O W L E D G E
A t the b e g i n n i n g o f his Metaphysics, A r i s t o t l e raises the p r o b l e m o f knowledge p a r excellence, w h i c h is precisely w h a t he c a l l e d " f i r s t p h i l o s o p h y " a n d w h i c h , since the e d i t i o n o f his works p r e p a r e d b y A n d r o n i c u s o f Rhodes, has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been called metaphysics. ( T h e texts o n " f i r s t p h i l o s o p h y " were g r o u p e d after those o f physics, a n d were called td metd taphysikd; this p u r e l y e d i t o r i a l designation was later i n t e r p r e t e d to m e a n something w h i c h was beyond physics, a " transphysics,'" a n d , as is w e l l k n o w n , the name for the highest p h i l o s o p h i c science came a b o u t t h r o u g h this chance circumstance.) T h e first sentence i n the Metaphysics says, " A l l m e n desire n a t u r a l l y to k n o w . " A r i s t o t l e is q u i c k to a d d t h a t the pleasure w h i c h we derive f r o m our senses, a n d especially f r o m the sense o f sight, is a n i n d i c a t i o n t h a t this is so. H e distinguishes the use we m a k e o f senses for t h e i r value i n accomplishing things, f r o m the enjoyment t h a t we also derive f r o m t h e m w h e n we are n o t going to do a n y t h i n g . B u t these senses, w h i c h presuppose a lowest level o f knowledge, are n o t exclusively m a n ' s ;
The Levels of Knowledge animals also have t h e m , a n d some animals even have m e m o r y , w h i c h , b y p r o v i d i n g for the r e t e n t i o n o f knowledge, p e r m i t s learning. M a n , o n the other h a n d , has other, higher modes o f knowledge. H e has, especially, experience, empeiria, i n the sense o f one's " e x p e r i e n c e o f t h i n g s . " T h i s is an i n t i m a t e knowledge o f t h i n g s — o f p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s — i n a n i m m e d i a t e a n d concrete w a y , something w h i c h gives us i n f o r m a t i o n o n l y about the p a r t i c u l a r things. Therefore, empeiria cann o t be t a u g h t ; one can o n l y place another person i n the circumstances under w h i c h he m a y acquire i t . T h e r e is another, higher m o d e o f k n o w l e d g e — a r t or technique, re'^vij; t h a t is, a r t i n its t r a d i t i o n a l m e a n i n g , as w h e n one speaks o f the a r t o f healing, w h i c h is the example t o w h i c h Aristotle most closely refers. Tekhne is a " k n o w how. " T h e tekhnites, the artisan or technician, is the m a n w h o knows h o w to d o things, knows w h a t means t o use i n order to o b t a i n the desired results. B u t a r t does n o t give us a n understanding o f i n d i v i d u a l things; r a t h e r , i t provides a c e r t a i n universal, an idea o f things. Since one can discuss w h a t is universal, a r t c a n be taught, whereas w h a t is i n d i v i d u a l can o n l y be seen or shown. T h u s tekhne is superior to empeiria; b u t the latter is also necessary—for example, i n order t o heal, since the doctor does not have to heal m a n i n general, b u t Socrates (that is, a n i n d i v i d u a l w h o is a m a n ) ; therefore, the d o c t o r heals Socrates d i r e c t l y , and m a n o n l y i n a n i n d i r e c t way. T h i s tekhne gives us the what o f things, a n d even t h e i r why; b u t we k n o w a t h i n g completely o n l y w h e n we k n o w i t i n its causes a n d first p r i n c i p l e s ; o n l y w i s d o m , sophia, can give us this type o f knowledge. T h i s highest mode of knowledge m u s t tell w h a t things are a n d w h y they a r e ; t h a t is, i t must demonstrate these things o n the basis o f t h e i r principles. Science, demonstrative knowledge, is called episteme i n Greek; this is the true science, the science w h i c h A r i s t o t l e seeks, ^7]Tovfj.€vrj eVto-Tij/iTj. B u t principles cannot be d e m o n s t r a t e d — t h a t is w h y they are principles; they d o n o t derive f r o m a n y t h i n g . Therefore, an i n t u i t i v e knowledge o f principles is necessary, and this is w h a t nous is; i t is a n o t h e r essential i n g r e d i e n t w h i c h , together w i t h episteme, comprises t r u e wisdom. A n d w i t h this we reach the highest level o f knowledge, w h i c h has for its object the E n t i t y for w h a t i t is, things for w h a t t h e y are, understood i n t h e i r causes and principles. A l l the sciences, A r i s t o t l e says, are m o r e necessary t h a n this one, b u t none is superior t o i t . A n d m a n reached this k n o w l e d g e — w h i c h is, i n short, p h i l o s o p h y — because o f a w e ; awe is a l w a y s — t o d a y as i n the b e g i n n i n g — t h e r o o t o f philosophy.
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2.
METAPHYSICS
I n his Metaphysics ( I V , i ) A r i s t o t l e defines'' first p h i l o s o p h y ' ' as the science t h a t considers the Entity as such i n a universal m a n n e r ; t h a t is, the t o t a l i t y o f things for w h a t they are. T h e other sciences study a p o r t i o n o f the things according to a d e t e r m i n e d , a r b i t r a r y arrangem e n t ; for example, b o t a n y is the study o f plants as vegetable organisms; mathematics is the study o f figures a n d n u m b e r s f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f measure. Metaphysics, o n the other h a n d , has as a n object the t o t a l i t y o f things, b u t for w h a t they are, the E n t i t y as a n E n t i t y , T O oV fj 6v. M o r e o v e r , Aristotle says t h a t i n t w o senses metaphysics is a d i v i n e science: i n the sense t h a t i f G o d possessed a n y science, i t w o u l d be the science of metaphysics, a n d also, i n the sense t h a t G o d is t h e subject o f metaphysics. T h u s metaphysics is also called t h e theological science, or theology, BeoXoyiKrj imarr}[it). A n d , finally, A r i s t o t l e defines metaphysics i n other places as the science o f substance, irepl rr)s ovalas. W h a t does this m e a n ? A r e there three sciences, or is there b u t one ? T h i s question concerns A r i s t o t l e deeply; he returns t o i t t i m e a n d again, a n d then affirms the oneness o f first philosophy. Metaphysics is a single science, a n d is at the same t i m e the science o f t h e E n t i t y for w h a t i t is, the science o f G o d a n d the science o f substance. W e w i l l a t t e m p t to show the i n t e r n a l connection a m o n g these three aspects, a n d b y d o i n g this also show the u n i t y o f A r i s t o t e l i a n metaphysics. T H E E N T I T Y AS SUCH. T h e r e are different types o f entities. I n the first place, there are natural things, physical objects. F o r A r i s t o t l e , n a t u r e is the p r i n c i p l e of the m o t i o n o f things (apxr) rrjs Kivqaeuts); something is n a t u r a l i f i t contains w i t h i n itself the p r i n c i p l e o f its m o t i o n . For example, a tree or a horse is a n a t u r a l t h i n g , b u t a table is n o t . ( T h e concept o f m o t i o n here includes repose as w e l l , i f repose is the natural state o f a t h i n g ; thus, a stone is also a n a t u r a l t h i n g . ) N a t u r a l things are, t h e n , t r u e things; b u t they move, they come to be a n d cease to be, a n d to this extent they are n o t f u l l y entities. Mathematical objects are another k i n d o f e n t i t y , a n d they do n o t m o v e ; i t w o u l d seem t h a t the science w h i c h concerned itself w i t h these objects w o u l d be a higher science. B u t m a t h e m a t i c a l objects have one v e r y serious d r a w b a c k : they are n o t things; they exist i n the m i n d , b u t n o t outside o f i t , n o t separately. I f m a t h e m a t i c a l objects have greater d i g n i t y as entities because they are i m m o v a b l e , they have less stature as entities because they do n o t exist as things. B u t w h a t must a n e n t i t y be l i k e i f i t is to u n i t e the t w o conditions ? I t w o u l d have to be i m m o v a b l e b u t also separate—a t h i n g . I f such a n entity existed, i t w o u l d be self-sufficient; i t w o u l d be t h e highest e n t i t y , the one w h i c h w o u l d completely m e r i t the n a m e o f Entity.
Metaphysics G O D . Aristotle says t h a t this highest entity is d i v i n e ; he says t h a t i t is g o d , deos. A n d the highest science, the one w h i c h deals w i t h this E n t i t y , is a theological science. F o r Aristotle, G o d is the aggregate of metaphysical conditions w h i c h makes a n e n t i t y be f u l l y a n e n t i t y . T h e science o f the E n t i t y f o r w h a t i t is a n d the science o f G o d , the E n t i t y p a r excellence, are one a n d the same science. Provisionally, this E n t i t y is alive, because l i v i n g beings exist more completely t h a n i n e r t beings. B u t , i n a d d i t i o n , this E n t i t y must be self-sufficient. W e s h o u l d remember t h a t there are several different types o f a c t i o n ; there are, for instance, poiesis a n d praxis. T h e former is essentially insufficient, since its goal is outside itself, a. product. I f God's a c t i v i t y were a poiesis, he w o u l d require those products i n order to exist; he w o u l d n o t be self-sufficient, a n d thus w o u l d n o t be G o d . I n praxis, o n the other h a n d , the goal is not the p r o d u c t , the ergon, b u t the v e r y process o f acting, the a c t i v i t y or energeia. F o r example, p o l i t i c a l praxis has t w o drawbacks. I n the first place, i t requires a c i t y i n w h i c h i t c a n be exercised, a n d t o this extent is not self-sufficient, t h o u g h as an a c t i v i t y i n itself i t m i g h t be considered to be self-sufficient. I n the second place, p o l i t i c a l knowledge always refers t o a specific opport u n i t y , a specific m o m e n t — i t is knowledge dependent u p o n opportunity. H o w e v e r , as we have seen, there is another k i n d o f praxis—theoria, t h e theoretic life. T h i s f o r m o f praxis deals w i t h seeing a n d discerning the b e i n g of things i n t h e i r t o t a l i t y . T h i s is the highest w a y of life; therefore, G o d must lead a theoretic life, for i t is the supreme mode of b e i n g . B u t this is n o t enough, because i n order t o lead a theoretic life m a n requires the E n t i t y ; he needs the things i n order t o k n o w t h e m , a n d thus is n o t absolutely self-sufficient. O n l y i f this theoria were concerned w i t h itself w o u l d i t be self-sufficient. Therefore, G o d is the thought of the thought, vorjo-is vorjoeaos. God's a c t i v i t y is the highest k n o w l edge, a n d metaphysics is d i v i n e because i t is the science o f G o d . T h i s is so i n t w o ways, since G o d is the object o f metaphysics a n d at the same t i m e its pre-eminent subject. Theoria is no mere c o n t e m p l a t i o n ; rather, i t is t a k i n g care to see t h a t things are w h a t they are, p l a c i n g t h e m in the light (iv a>Tl). T h i s is sophia, w i s d o m , a n d i n a s t r i c t sense, o n l y G o d has i t . O n l y at certain moments can m a n have i t . W h a t m a n can possess is aphilosophia, a love for sophia. Aristotle says t h a t i f a m a n is to be a philosopher, i t is not enough for h i m to have a m o m e n t a r y vision ofsophia; he needs a I f is, a habit, a w a y of l i v i n g . A n d according to Z u b i r i , this is w h a t is t r u l y problematic. SUBSTANCE. T h i r d l y , metaphysics is the science o f substance; i t is
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necessary to show that that science is one w i t h the science o f the E n t i t y as a n E n t i t y a n d the science o f G o d . Aristotle says (Metaphysics, I V , 2) t h a t w h i l e the E n t i t y is expressed i n m a n y ways, i t is n o t expressed a m b i g u o u s l y ; b u t i t is expressed analogously; t h a t is, w i t h r e l a t i o n to a single p r i n c i p l e w h i c h gives a u n i t y to its m a n y meanings. Therefore, the E n t i t y is one a n d manifold at the same t i m e . As we shall see more clearly later, substance is the basic m e a n i n g o f being. T h e other modes o f being depend o n this one, because a l l are either substances or " a f f e c t i o n s " (attributes) o f substance. Color is color of a substance, a n d i f we say " t h r e e , " we are referring to three substances. E v e n the concept o f w a n t or d e p r i v a t i o n contains this reference to substance. I n order for there to be a science, there must be a u n i t y , a certain N a t u r e i n terms of w h i c h a l l other things are expressed. T h i s u n i t y is t h a t o f substance, w h i c h is the p r i n c i p a l expression o f b e i n g , the basis of the analogy. Substance is present i n a l l forms of being a n d , therefore, i t is n o t distinct f r o m the E n t i t y as a n E n t i t y a n d f r o m G o d ; rather, the E n t i t y as an E n t i t y finds its u n i t y i n substance. W h a t we have, t h e n , is a single first philosophy or metaphysics w i t h a three-part root. W e began b y seeking the same science w h i c h A r i s t o t l e sought, a n d discovered the characteristics oisophia. W e saw t h a t i t is the science o f G o d a n d the science o f the E n t i t y as a n E n t i t y , because G o d is the whole complex o f the ontological conditions o f the e n t i t y . W e t h e n saw t h a t this science is also a d i v i n e science, because i n i t m a n resembles G o d . F i n a l l y , we saw that this science is the science o f substance, w h i c h is present i n a l l the modes o f the E n t i t y . T h e Oeos is n o t h i n g b u t the E n t i t y as a n E n t i t y , the p l e n a r y f o r m o f substance; a n d the essential u n i t y o f the science we sought is based o n this conclusion.
3.
T H E M O D E S OF B E I N G
T H E A N A L O G I C A L N A T U R E OF T H E E N T I T Y . A t e r m is u n i v o c a l w h e n
i t has a single m e a n i n g ; for example, m a n . A t e r m is ambiguous w h e n i t has t w o or m o r e independent meanings w h i c h have no other simil a r i t y t h a n t h a t they are b o t h expressed w i t h the same w o r d ; for example, the w o r d " c h e s t , " w h i c h designates a p a r t o f the b o d y or a piece o f f u r n i t u r e . W e saw t h a t the w o r d " b e i n g " is n o t ambiguous i n spite o f its m a n y meanings, because its various meanings have a connection o r u n i t y i n themselves; t h a t is, they are n o t e n t i r e l y dissimilar. " B e i n g " is a n analogous or analogical w o r d , as is the w o r d " h e a l t h y " i n the phrases " a healthy m a n , " " a healthy a p p e t i t e , " " a healthy i n f l u e n c e . " I n each case something different is m e a n t : the m a n posses-
The Modes of Being
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7
ses health, the appetite indicates h e a l t h , the influence promotes h e a l t h . These are different meanings, b u t they involve a c o m m o n reference to w e l l - b e i n g . I t is well-being, t h e n , t h a t creates the analogous u n i t y . As w e have seen, a similar t h i n g happens w i t h being, w h i c h has its u n i t y i n substance, because i n a b r o a d sense a l l the forms of the E n t i t y are substances or attributes o f i t . B u t this concept m u s t be stated even m o r e precisely. W h e n I say t h a t being is expressed i n m a n y ways, I d o n o t m e a n only t h a t there are m a n y entities, or j u s t t h a t there are m a n y kinds of entities, b u t t h a t the w o r d " b e i n g " means something different w h e n I say t h a t somet h i n g is a m a n , or is green, or that objects are three, or t h a t a c o i n is counterfeit. I t is n o t t h a t the objects n a m e d are distinguished f r o m one another, b u t r a t h e r t h a t the w o r d " is " means a different t h i n g i n each case, even t h o u g h i t always involves a n a l l u s i o n — d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t — to substance. T H E FOUR MODES O F B E I N G . Aristotle says concretely t h a t b e i n g is expressed i n four ways. T h e four modes o f being are the f o l l o w i n g : ( i ) being per se faced' avro) or per accidens (Kara. crvfi^e^Kos); t h a t is, b y essence or b y a c c i d e n t ; (2) according to the categories; (3) true being and false b e i n g ; a n d (4) a c c o r d i n g to the potential a n d the actual. L e t us briefly examine the m e a n i n g o f these four modes o f being. " P E R SE " A N D " P E R ACCIDENS. " I f we say, for instance, t h a t m a n is musical, we are p o i n t i n g o u t something t h a t is i n m a n b y accident or chance. M u s i c a l i t y is accidental i n m a n ; i t is s i m p l y something t h a t comes about i n a m a n b u t is not p a r t o f his essence. I f we say t h a t the j u s t m a n is musical, w e are again p o i n t i n g o u t something t h a t is per accidens, because the t w o qualities, " j u s t " a n d " m u s i c a l , " belong to the subject, " m a n , " b y accident. Being perse is expressed essentially. M a n is l i v i n g , for example, not b y accident, b u t b y essence. T h i s essential being is expressed w i t h different meanings, a n d these are the modes according to w h i c h being can be predicated. These modes are the so-called predications or categories. CATEGORIES. T h e categories are the various modes i n w h i c h being can be predicated. T h e y are, thus, the inflections or grammatical "cases" of being, Trrcvaeis rov ovros. A r i s t o t l e gives several lists o f these predications, a n d the longest list consists o f t e n : Substance (for example, m a n ) , Q u a n t i t y (two cubits i n h e i g h t ) , Q u a l i t y ( w h i t e ) , R e l a t i o n ( d o u b l e ) , Place ( i n the L y c e u m ) , T i m e (yesterday), Position (seated), State (wearingshoes), A c t i o n ( c u t t i n g ) a n d Passivity (being cut). I t is not a question o f the differences between these things, b u t rather t h a t b e i n g itself is inflected i n each o f these modes a n d means
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something different i n each o f the categories. Therefore, i f to the question, " W h a t is this ? " one answers, " S e v e n , " there is, a p a r t f r o m the t r u t h or falsity o f the statement, a n incongruence, because the is o f the question moves i n the category of substance, a n d the answer moves i n the category o f q u a n t i t y . These categories have a u n i t y , w h i c h is precisely substance, because a l l the other categories refer to i t : this is the clearest instance o f the analogous n a t u r e o f oneness. Substance is present i n a l l the other categories, a n d i n the f i n a l analysis, a l l the other categories refer to substance a n d have m e a n i n g o n l y w h e n i t is presupposed. T H E T R U E A N D T H E FALSE. T r u t h a n d falsity occur p r i m a r i l y i n j u d g m e n t s . T h e statement " A is B , " w h i c h unites t w o terms, necessarily embraces t r u t h or falsity, depending o n whether i t unites w h a t i n reality is u n i t e d or unites w h a t i n r e a l i t y is separated—or, negatively, whether i t separates t h a t w h i c h is really u n i t e d or t h a t w h i c h is separated. B u t there is a more f u n d a m e n t a l m e a n i n g o f t r u t h a n d falsity, w h i c h is the t r u t h or falsity o f things, o f being. T h u s w e say, " T h i s coin is false," or " T h i s coffee is r e a l . " H e r e t r u t h o r falsity refers to the t h i n g itself. A n d w h e n we say t h a t t w o a n d t w o are four, the m e a n i n g o f the v e r b " t o b e " is to be truly. S o m e t h i n g is t r u e (a\r)0es) w h e n i t shows the being w h i c h i t has, a n d false (ipevSos) w h e n i t shows a b e i n g other t h a n its o w n , w h e n i t presents one b e i n g for another, as w h e n a mere lead disk has the appearance o f a c o i n . T h e lead disk as such is perfectly t r u e , b u t i t is false as a coin; t h a t is, w h e n i t pretends to be a c o i n a n d is n o t a c o i n , w h e n i t shows a n a p p a r e n t being, a b e i n g w h i c h i t does n o t really have. T h i s demonstrates the f u n d a m e n t a l m e a n i n g o f t r u t h , aXrjdeia, i n Greek. T o be t r u e means to be uncovered, patent, a n d there is falsity w h e n w h a t is uncovered is not the being w h i c h a t h i n g has, b u t a n apparent b e i n g ; t h a t is, falsity is a concealment o f being, the revelation o f a f r a u d u l e n t being where a t r u e being should be, as w h e n the true b e i n g of lead is concealed b e h i n d the deceitful appearance of money. T H E P O T E N T I A L A N D T H E A C T U A L . F i n a l l y , b e i n g is d i v i d e d accordi n g to the p o t e n t i a l (Bvvafus) a n d the a c t u a l (ivepyeia). A n e n t i t y can exist i n a c t u a l i t y , or o n l y as a possibility. A tree can be a n a c t u a l tree or a p o t e n t i a l tree, a tree i n the r e a l m of possibility, t h a t is to say, a seed. T h e seed is a tree, b u t o n l y i n the r e a l m of p o t e n t i a l i t y , j u s t as a c h i l d is a p o t e n t i a l m a n , a n d w h a t is small is p o t e n t i a l l y large. B u t one must keep t w o things i n m i n d : i n the first place, p o t e n t i a l i t y does n o t exist i n the abstract; p o t e n t i a l i t y is always p o t e n t i a l i t y for a specific a c t u a l i t y . T h a t is, a c e r t a i n seed has the p o t e n t i a l to be a n oak tree, b u t n o t to be a horse, or even a p i n e tree. T h i s means—as A r i s t o t l e a f f i r m s — t h a t
Substance
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the a c t u a l is p r i o r (ontologically) to the p o t e n t i a l , since the potential is p o t e n t i a l for a specific a c t u a l i t y . T h e actuality is already present i n the p o t e n t i a l i t y itself. T h e oak tree is present i n the acorn, a n d the hen i n the e g g — f o r the simple reason t h a t there are no simple, abstract ggs; a n egg is, for instance, a hen's egg. T h e n the chicken is already i m p l i c i t i n the egg a n d is w h a t gives the egg its p o t e n t i a l i t y . I n the second place, i n order to exist, p o t e n t i a l beings must have a certain a c t u a l existence, a l t h o u g h n o t as potentialities. T h a t is, a seed, w h i c h is a p o t e n t i a l oak tree, is a n actual acorn, a n d a n egg, w h i c h is a p o t e n t i a l chicken, is a v e r y real a n d actual egg. T h e same e n t i t y has, t h e n , a n actual being a n d the p o t e n t i a l being o f another entity. This concept is o f the greatest i m p o r t a n c e to the metaphysical interpretation of motion. e
A r i s t o t l e uses two different words to express the idea o f a c t u a l i t y : energeia (ivepyeia) a n d entelechy (ivreXexeia). E v e n t h o u g h these words are sometimes used as synonyms, they are n o t equivalent because energeia indicates simple actuality whereas entelechy means " t h a t w h i c h has a r r i v e d at its e n d , " its te'los, a n d therefore supposes a n actualization. I t is possible to say t h a t G o d — w h o is p u r e actuality a n d w h o , as we shall see, does n o t have either p o t e n t i a l i t y or m o t i o n ; w h o is, t h e n , actual, b u t n o t actualized—is energeia, b u t one cannot say strictly t h a t G o d is entelechy. W e n o w see that the four modes o f being have a f u n d a m e n t a l analogous u n i t y , w h i c h is t h a t o f substance. I t is for this reason t h a t Aristotle says t h a t the major question o f metaphysics is, " W h a t is b e i n g ? " H e clarifies this b y adding, " T h a t is, w h a t is substance?" W e must now investigate Aristotle's ontological analysis o f substance.
4.
SUBSTANCE
I n Greek, " s u b s t a n c e " is ovala, ousia. I n the everyday language, this w o r d means holdings, p r o p e r t y , goods, t h a t w h i c h is possessed. I t is the w h o l e complex o f available components o f a t h i n g , those parts w h i c h can be utilized. W e f i n d a similar m e a n i n g i n E n g l i s h w h e n we say t h a t something has substance—a substantial d i n n e r , for example. W e also use this w o r d somewhat differently, as w h e n we say that evidence is insubstantial. T h e w o r d " s u b s t a n c e " itself points out another t r a i n o f t h o u g h t : something that is substantia is underneath, subject, i n the literal m e a n i n g oisub-jectum, w h i c h is n o t the translation o f ovala, b u t o f another Greek w o r d , viroKelpievov, w h i c h means subs t r a t u m o r subject. T h i s is a decisive p o i n t : substance is the support or s u b s t r a t u m for its " a c c i d e n t s " ; r e d , h a r d , square, a n d so o n , are
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supported b y the substance " t a b l e . " O n the other h a n d , " accidents " are predicated of other things, subjects, whereas substance is n o t p r e d icated o f a n y other t h i n g . T h e table is a table i n itself, whereas the red is the r e d of the table. B u t we must n o t forget t h a t t h e p r i m a r y m e a n i n g o f substance is n o t this concept o f substratum, b u t t h a t o f ousia, a n d t h a t precisely because substance is a t h i n g i n itself, i t can be a subject of w h i c h " a c c i d e n t s " are predicated. Therefore, substance is, above a l l , a thing, something separate, independent, something t h a t exists i n itself a n d n o t i n something else. A n d the f u n d a m e n t a l mode o f substance is n a t u r e (vcns), because, as we have seen, substance consists o f the p r i n c i p l e o f m o t i o n , o f w h a t constitutes the i n d i v i d u a l possibilities o f each t h i n g . B u t there are various classes o f substances. First o f a l l , we have concrete, i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s : this m a n , this tree, this stone. These are substances i n the strictest sense, w h a t A r i s t o t l e calls p r i m a r y substances. B u t we have another k i n d o f e n t i t y — u n i v e r s a l s , genera a n d species, man or tree ( t h a t is, the counterpart o f the P l a t o n i c Ideas). These things are evidently n o t substances i n the strict sense o f separate t h i n g s ; A r i s t o t l e sees t h a t they are not, b u t asks to w h a t o t h e r category can they correspond? I t is clear t h a t they can correspond t o no other category t h a n the category o f substance; t h e n A r i s t o t l e must distinguish t h e m f r o m p r i m a r y substances b y c a l l i n g t h e m secondary substances. W h a t does this m e a n ? W h a t is the ontological structure o f substance? I n order to e x p l a i n this, A r i s t o t l e expounds his b r i l l i a n t t h e o r y of m a t t e r a n d f o r m . M A T T E R A N D FORM. Substance is i n t e r p r e t e d as a composite o f t w o elements: m a t t e r a n d f o r m . T h i s is n o t a question of two real parts t h a t u n i t e to f o r m substance, b u t o f t w o ontological moments or ingredients w h i c h can be distinguished i n ousia b y analysis. M a t t e r is t h a t of which a t h i n g is m a d e ; f o r m is w h a t makes a t h i n g be w h a t i t is. F o r example, the m a t t e r o f a table is w o o d , a n d its f o r m , t h a t o f table. M a t t e r (uAij) a n d f o r m (/nop^ij, eloos) c a n n o t exist separately; m a t t e r is always f o u n d d e t e r m i n e d b y f o r m , a n d f o r m is always f o u n d d e t e r m i n i n g m a t t e r . A n d f o r m should n o t be understood i n a n exclusively geometr i c a l sense, w h i c h is a secondary m e a n i n g , b u t as t h a t w h i c h confers b e i n g ; t h a t is, w o o d or meat have, respectively, the f o r m o f w o o d or meat, b u t another f o r m can be superimposed o n this f o r m . F o r example, the f o r m of table can be superimposed o n w o o d . I n such a case w o o d , w h i c h c o u l d itself be f o r m , functions as m a t t e r i n r e l a t i o n to the f o r m o f table. T h e concrete E n t i t y is a hylomorphic c o m p o u n d ( f r o m hyle a n d morphe), a n d is also called avvoXov, synolon. T h e universal is f o r m , b u t —
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u n l i k e the Platonic I d e a s — i t is not separated f r o m the things b u t present i n t h e m , d e t e r m i n i n g them. T h a t is, m a n , the species m a n , is n o t separated f r o m each i n d i v i d u a l m a n ; r a t h e r i t is present i n each m a n as the h u m a n f o r m . T h i s explains for the first t i m e the problem t h a t Plato attempted i n v a i n to clarify w i t h the insufficient concept o f s h a r i n g — t h e p r o b l e m o f the relation o f Ideas or species to i n d i v i d u a l things. Universals are substances, b u t abstract substances, abstract ingredients o f each i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g , and for this reason they are called secondary substances. T h e r e is a close connection between m a t t e r a n d f o r m a n d the potent i a l a n d the actual. M a t t e r is simply possibility; i t is potential t h a t actuates itself b y shaping itself; thus, i t does n o t have reality i n itself. F o r this reason, G o d , w h o is pure actual reality, cannot be matter, because G o d is not a m i x t u r e o f the p o t e n t i a l a n d the a c t u a l ; G o d is pure actuality. T h i s theory permits the p r o b l e m o f m o t i o n to be solved for the first t i m e since Parmenides. M O T I O N . L e t us recall t h a t there were t w o serious problems t h a t were debated i n early Greek philosophy, a n d t h a t these t w o problems were i n t i m a t e l y connected: the p r o b l e m o f the oneness o f being a n d the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f things, a n d the p r o b l e m o f m o t i o n . T h e two p r o b lems were merged i n the momentous question o f b e i n g a n d non-being. W e have seen t h a t the first p a r t o f the p r o b l e m finds its solution i n Aristotle's assertion t h a t the E n t i t y is one a n d , at the same time, b y means o f analogy, m u l t i p l e ; this reconciles a n d resolves the aporia. L e t us n o w examine something t h a t refers more concretely to m o t i o n . M o v i n g or c h a n g i n g is a coming to be a n d a ceasing to be. A l l m o t i o n presupposes t w o l i m i t s : a p r i n c i p l e a n d a n end. I f the E n t i t y is one, this d u a l i t y is ontologically impossible. So, w i t h i n Aristotelian metaphysics, this d u a l i t y does not exist. W h a t is m o t i o n for Aristotle ? T h e apparently obscure d e f i n i t i o n w h i c h he gives for i t is at b o t t o m extremely clear: the realization of the possible in so far as it is possible. W e have already i n d i c a t e d the suppositions necessary for understanding this. W e have seen t h a t a p o t e n t i a l entity, such as a n egg or a seed, also has a certain actuality, to w i t , that w h i c h makes i t possible for us to eat a n egg or to trade i n w h e a t ; this involves dealing w i t h realities, not w i t h pure possibilities. H e w h o eats a n egg eats a n actual egg, not a p o t e n t i a l chicken; w h e n t h a t potential, instead o f r e m a i n i n g as a possibility, actualizes itself, there is m o t i o n , w h i c h is, concretely, generation. T h e n , w h a t has been called the step f r o m the potential to the actual is v e r i f i e d ; this has been referred to m o r e precisely as the step f r o m the p o t e n t i a l e n t i t y to the actual e n t i t y . M o t i o n had been impossible since Parmenides, because i t h a d been understood as a step
7
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f r o m non-being to being, or vice versa. T h e theory o f the analogous nature of the E n t i t y shows t h a t i t is a question of passing f r o m one mode of being to a n o t h e r ; t h a t is, of r e m a i n i n g always w i t h i n the r e a l m of the one a n d m u l t i p l e being. W i t h this discovery, the crucial p r o b l e m o f m o t i o n finds its m a t u r e solution w i t h i n H e l l e n i c p h i l o s o p h y ; physics as a philosophic discipline becomes possible, because one can speak of nature f r o m the p o i n t o f view of being. T H E CAUSES. For Aristotle k n o w l e d g e — w h i c h is concerned w i t h universals (because w h a t is i n d i v i d u a l has a n i n f i n i t y of attributes a n d cannot be exhausted i n knowledge) a n d w h i c h is n o t b y accident b u t b y essence—is, above a l l , demonstrative knowledge, w h i c h makes things k n o w n b y their causes a n d principles. K n o w l e d g e is n o longer a discerning, as w i t h the pre-Socratics, n o r is i t even a d e f i n i n g , as w i t h Socrates a n d P l a t o ; i t is r a t h e r a demonstrating, a k n o w i n g why. (Cf. Z u b i r i : Filosofiay metafisica.) T h e principles are, at one a n d the same t i m e , principles o f being a n d o f k n o w i n g ; i n A r i s t o t l e , as i n a l l authentic philosophy, the theory o f knowledge is essentially l i n k e d to metaphysics. T h e causes are the possible senses i n w h i c h " w h y ? " can be asked. I n the first book o f his Metaphysics, Aristotle reviews the doctrines o f his predecessors i n order to show t h a t they c o n t a i n i n a s t a m m e r i n g fashion his o w n theory of the causes. These causes are four i n n u m b e r : m a t e r i a l cause, f o r m a l cause, efficient cause a n d final cause. T h e m a t e r i a l cause is m a t t e r , t h a t of which something is made. T h e f o r m a l cause or f o r m is w h a t determines a n e n t i t y a n d makes i t be w h a t i t is. T h e efficient cause is the first p r i n c i p l e of m o t i o n or change; i t is w h a t makes the t h i n g t h a t is caused. Lastly, the final cause is the end, the answer to the q u e s t i o n e r what purpose. I f we take a statue, as a n example, the m a t e r i a l cause is the bronze o f w h i c h i t is m a d e ; the f o r m a l cause is the m o d e l or shape; the efficient cause is the sculptor w h o has m a d e i t ; a n d the final cause is the reason w h y i t has been s c u l p t u r e d — f o r example, as a n a d o r n m e n t or to c o m m e m o r a t e somet h i n g . T h e f o r m a l cause a n d final cause frequently coincide. * G O D . W e n o w c o m m a n d the elements necessary for u n d e r s t a n d i n g Aristotle's theory of G o d , w h i c h he expounds p r i n c i p a l l y i n the t w e l f t h book o f his Metaphysics. G o d is the unmoved prime mover. W h a t does this mean ? Every m o v i n g b o d y requires a mover. A is m o v e d b y B ; B is m o v e d b y C, a n d so o n . H o w far back does this process go ? I t w o u l d have to go back to i n f i n i t y , eis dneipov, b u t this is impossible. I t is -
* O n the internal difficulties of the Aristotelian theory of substance and its interpretation from the standpoint of matter and form, potentiality and actuality, see my Biografia de laFilosofia, App. 11 [Obras, I I , pp. 487-494].
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necessary t h a t the series of movers end sometime, t h a t there be a p r i m e mover. A n d this m o v e r must be u n m o v e d , so t h a t , i n t u r n , another mover w o u l d n o t be necessary, and so f o r t h , to i n f i n i t y . This u n m o v e d mover, like the object o f love and desire, t h a t moves w i t h o u t b e i n g moved, is G o d . T h e Aristotelian 8eos is the e n d , the te'los of all motions, a n d he himself does n o t move. Therefore, he must be pure a c t u a l i t y , w i t h no m i x t u r e o f the p o t e n t i a l ; G o d is, t h e n , f o r m w i t h o u t m a t t e r . I t follows t h a t G o d is the sum of reality, the E n t i t y whose possibilities are a l l r e a l : the p l e n a r y substance, the E n t i t y as such. T h e G o d o f A r i s t o t l e is the absolute moment of the world. His mission is to make m o t i o n possible a n d , even m o r e , to m a k e possible the oneness of m o t i o n ; i t is he, t h e n , w h o makes there be a Universe. B u t G o d is not a creator; this idea, w h i c h w i l l m a r k the deep difference between Hellenic a n d C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g , is foreign to Greek thought. T h e G o d o f Aristotle exists separately and consists o f p u r e theoria, i n t h o u g h t o f t h o u g h t or vision o f vision, vorjais vorjoews. S t r i c t l y speaking, contemp l a t i o n as something t h a t is possessed i n a p e r m a n e n t w a y occurs o n l y i n G o d . T h e A r i s t o t e l i a n G o d is the absolutely self-sufficient E n t i t y a n d , therefore, the highest E n t i t y . A l l o f Aristotle's philosophy c u l m i nates i n this theory. T H E E N T I T Y AS A TRANSCENDENTAL. I n order to complete this b r i e f investigation o f A r i s t o t e l i a n metaphysics, i t remains for us to t o u c h u p o n a n especially i m p o r t a n t and d i f f i c u l t p o i n t . As we saw, Plato considered the E n t i t y as the highest genus. T h i s genus could be d i v i d e d i n t o species, w h i c h w o u l d be the different classes o f entities. Aristotle categorically denies t h a t the E n t i t y is a genus. T h e reason he gives is the f o l l o w i n g : I n order for i t to be possible to divide a genus i n t o species, i t is necessary for a specific difference to be added to the genus; thus, to the genus animal, the difference rational is added i n order to o b t a i n the species man; b u t this is n o t possible w i t h being, for the difference must be distinct f r o m the genus; i f the difference is distinct f r o m being, i t does not exist. Therefore, there can be no specific difference to be a d d e d to being, and therefore being is not a genus. Aristotle's reasoning is incontestable. H o w e v e r , even after recogn i z i n g its i n d i s p u t a b i l i t y , we are left w i t h a certain uneasiness, because w e see w i t h e q u a l c l a r i t y the possibility o f d i v i d i n g the E n t i t y . O n e thinks o f the different classes of entities t h a t exist, a n d sees that d i v i s i o n is, i n fact, possible. N a t u r a l l y , Aristotle w o u l d not deny this; he h i m self makes several divisions. T h e n w h a t does a l l this mean ? Something very simple: one m u s t not confuse the d i v i s i o n o f genus a n d species w i t h simple division. T h e E n t i t y can be d i v i d e d , b u t not i n such a simple fashion. T h e r e is a m u c h more c o m p l e x ontological connection,
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w h i c h is precisely the analogous nature of the Entity. T h e r e are m a n y modes of being, b u t they are not species; rather, they are, for example, categories, inflections of the Entity, a n d being is present i n a l l these modes w i t h o u t i n t e r m i n g l i n g w i t h any o f t h e m . Aristotle says t h a t the E n t i t y is the most universal o f a l l things, KaOoXov /judXiara TTOCVTOJV, a n d that i t envelops a n d permeates a l l things, w i t h o u t i n t e r m i n g l i n g w i t h any o f t h e m . Being is one o f the m e d i e v a l philosophers' three p r i n c i p a l transcendentals: the E n t i t y , the O n e a n d the G o o d . T h e y are n o t things, b u t they permeate a l l things, a n d — A r i s t o t l e says—always occur together. A n entity is one, a n d its being is its good i n the A r i s t o telian sense. T h i s is the t r i p l e u n i t y o f the 6v, the tv a n d the dyaOov. ESSENCE. A r i s t o t l e distinguishes between the w o r d " s u b s t a n c e " a n d " essence." Essence is expressed i n Greek b y a strange expression, T O Tt rjv etvai, w h i c h has been translated i n t o L a t i n as: quod quid erat esse, l i t e r a l l y , what being was. T h e interesting t h i n g about this expression is t h a t i t employs the past tense. Essence is, therefore, p r i o r to b e i n g ; i t is w h a t makes i t possible, w h a t makes i t be. Essence cannot be understood as a complex o f especially i m p o r t a n t attributes o f a n e n t i t y ; rather, i t expresses t h a t w h i c h makes a n entity be w h a t i t is. I f we say t h a t m a n is a r a t i o n a l a n i m a l , or a n a n i m a l t h a t has Idgos, t h a t talks, i t is not t h a t we take t w o major attributes of m a n , his a n i m a l nature a n d his r a t i o n a l i t y , a n d u n i t e t h e m , b u t t h a t this a n i m a l n a t u r e a n d r a t i o n a l i t y , essentially u n i t e d , are w h a t m a k e a specific e n t i t y be a m a n . Therefore, w h e n i t is said t h a t logos gives the essence o f a t h i n g , i t does not s i m p l y m e a n t h a t logos enunciates its m a j o r attributes, b u t t h a t i t manifests or makes patent i n t r u t h the h i d d e n b e i n g o f w h i c h the t h i n g consists, t h a t w h i c h makes i t be. Essence always has a strict ontological significance, a n d i t cannot be understood as a m e r e correlative o f a d e f i n i t i o n .
5.
LOGIC
As we have already seen, Aristotle's treatises o n logic are g r o u p e d together under the general title o f Organon, or '' instrument, " t h e t i t l e given to t h e m b y Alexander o f Aphrodisias. T h e Organon is the first w o r k i n w h i c h the problems o f logic are studied directly a n d systemat i c a l l y ; i n i t logic itself is established as a discipline. A r i s t o t l e accomplished this so w e l l t h a t the entire corpus o f his logical w r i t i n g s has endured almost unaltered to the present d a y ; o n l y at rare moments i n history have new viewpoints been i n t r o d u c e d . A l l subsequent studies o f logic have felt the weight o f this work's perfection; this has n o t been w i t h o u t its disadvantages a n d has perhaps hindered the development
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o f the discipline. B u t i t should n o t be forgotten t h a t the logic t r a d i t i o n a l l y used a n d called A r i s t o t e l i a n has to a great extent been f u r t h e r systematized a n d rendered t r i v i a l ; the fecundity o f the Organon i n its o r i g i n a l f o r m has n o t yet been exhausted, not b y far. Before a l l else, let us look at the significance o f this discipline w i t h i n the t o t a l i t y of Aristotle's w o r k a n d the relationship i n w h i c h logos stands to b e i n g a n d truth. " L O G O S . " T h e w o r d logos (Aoyos) i n Greek means " w o r d . " Its L a t i n t r a n s l a t i o n is verbum, as i n the opening o f the Gospel o f Saint J o h n : In principio erat Verbum ( " I n the beginning was the W o r d " ) . B u t i n Greek logos also means " p r o p o r t i o n " or " r a t i o " i n the m a t h e m a t i c a l sense a n d , therefore, " m e a n i n g " ; a n d , finally, " r e a s o n " i n its fullest significance. ( T h e English w o r d " r e a s o n " is also derived f r o m the L a t i n ratio, w h i c h n u m b e r e d " r a t i o " and " r e a s o n " a m o n g its meanings.) B u t i t should be remembered that the p r i m a r y meani n g o f logos is derived f r o m the v e r b Ugein, " t o j o i n t o g e t h e r " or g a t h e r ' ' a n d also " to say.'' Logos is '' saying,'' that is, a " m e a n i n g f u l word." Logos tells us w h a t things are, a n d is closely related to being. T h e principles o f l o g i c — f o r example, the principles o f i d e n t i t y or contrad i c t i o n — a r e ontological principles t h a t refer to the behavior o f entities. I cannot say or t h i n k t h a t A is a n d at the same t i m e is n o t B, because A cannot be and not be B. L o g i c is n o t h i n g b u t metaphysics. N o w , we have seen that being is expressed i n m a n y ways. W h a t m o d e of being is logos concerned w i t h ? E v i d e n t l y , w i t h being as seen f r o m the v i e w p o i n t o f t r u t h or falsity. W e have observed that the n o t i o n o f " t r u e " and "false " is based o n the w a y i n w h i c h the being o f things is m a d e patent or manifest. T r u t h a n d falsity exist only w i t h i n the r e a l m o f t r u t h i n the b r o a d sense, understood as alétheia, as discovery, u n v e i l i n g or openness. A n d things are especially revealed i n speech, w h e n i t is said w h a t they are, w h e n their b e i n g is declared. Thus A r i s t o t l e says that our j u d g m e n t is the n a t u r a l seat o f t r u t h . W h e n I say A is B, I a m o f necessity d e c l a r i n g a t r u t h or a falsehood; this does n o t occur w i t h other v e r b a l moods, i n a wish, for example ( " L o n g live the Q u e e n ! " ) , or w i t h interjections ( " A h ! " ) . A declarative statement places things i n the r e a l m o f t r u t h . B u t , n a t u r a l l y , the possibility o f d o i n g this depends on the p o t e n t i a l i t y for t r u t h w h i c h each t h i n g has, on the p o t e n t i a l i t y for openness o f each thing's being. T r u t h shows the being o f a t h i n g , w h i l e falsity substitutes something else for i t . I n a true affirmative j u d g m e n t , I unite those things t h a t i n t r u t h are u n i t e d ; i n a true negative j u d g m e n t I separate those things
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t h a t i n t r u t h are separated. I n a false j u d g m e n t I do the opposite i n each case. M a n is the a n i m a l t h a t has lâgos a n d is therefore the i n s t r u m e n t o f t r u t h . H e is the e n t i t y t h r o u g h w h i c h the t r u t h o f things flows; he discovers the things a n d places t h e m i n their t r u t h ( Z u b i r i ) . A r i s t o t l e says t h a t the h u m a n soul is thus i n a certain sense a l l things. T h e r e is a n essential relationship between b e i n g a n d the m a n w h o knows i t a n d expresses i t . T h e basis for this relationship is knowledge, sophla, p h i l o sophy. I n philosophy b e i n g attains its veritable r e a l i t y , i n the l i g h t o f truth. T H E C O N T E N T OF T H E " O R G A N O N . " T h e treatise o n the
Categories,
w i t h w h i c h Aristotle's w o r k o n logic opens, studies t h e terms o f logic first a n d distinguishes the isolated use o f the t e r m s — o u t o f c o m b i n a t i o n , aveu avp.irXoKrjs—from the connected u s e — i n c o m b i n a t i o n , /carà avp.wXoK'qv. T h i s leads h i m t o the doctrine o f t h e categories (or " p r e d i c a t i o n s " ) , w h i c h b y themselves neither a f f i r m n o r negate a n y t h i n g a n d therefore are neither t r u e n o r false u n t i l t h e y enter i n t o a c o m b i n a t i o n to f o r m propositions o r j u d g m e n t s . T h e treatise On Interpretation, or Hermeneutics (Tlepl ipfiyvelas), distinguishes, first o f a l l , between t w o classes o f w o r d s : the n o u n (5vop.a) a n d the verb (prjp-ci). T h e n o u n is a ojvi] a-qp-avriKt], a w o r d t h a t b y convention is m e a n i n g f u l , a n d makes no reference t o t i m e ; none o f its separate parts has a m e a n i n g o f its o w n . T h e v e r b has, i n a d d i t i o n t o its p a r t i c u l a r m e a n i n g , a reference to t i m e , or tense. I t is the sign o f something t h a t is being said about another t h i n g ; t h a t is, the v e r b operates w i t h i n speech or discourse (Xôyos). Lôgos is a m e a n i n g f u l e n u n c i a t i o n , the i n d e p e n d e n t parts o f w h i c h have m e a n i n g . B u t n o t every lâgos is a declaration, o n l y t h a t logos i n w h i c h t r u t h or falsity resides ; t h a t is, a f f i r m a t i o n (KaTaaois) a n d negation (àir6d>aais) are the t w o species i n t o w h i c h declaration (àrr6avais, or lâgos apophantikos) is d i v i d e d . W i t h these basic assumptions, A r i s t o t l e studies the relationships a m o n g propositions. T h e Prior Analytics contains Aristotle's theory o f the syllogism, w h i c h constitutes a central chapter o f logic a n d is elaborated i n a l l b u t d e f i n i tive fashion b y A r i s t o t l e . T h e syllogism (avXXoyicrp.6s) is opposed i n a c e r t a i n sense to i n d u c t i o n (eVaycuy^) ; even t h o u g h i n d u c t i o n appears at times to be a reasoning process, reducible to a syllogism (this w o u l d be complete i n d u c t i o n ) , i t has the character o f a d i r e c t i n t u i t i o n w h i c h progresses f r o m consideration o f p a r t i c u l a r , concrete cases to t h a t o f p r i n c i p l e s ; the things induce us t o look for the universal principles. T h e Posterior Analytics concentrates o n the p r o b l e m o f t r u e k n o w l edge, a n d thus o n the p r o b l e m o f demonstration (ànooeiÇis). D e m o n -
Physics
77
s t r a t i o n leads to the d e f i n i t i o n , w h i c h is related to the essence o f things. F u r t h e r m o r e , demonstration is based on first principles, w h i c h are per se indemonstrable a n d can o n l y be apprehended d i r e c t l y a n d i m m e d i a t e l y b y the nous. T h e highest knowledge, as we have seen elsewhere, is demonstrative, b u t its u l t i m a t e basis is the noetic vision o f the principles. T h i s is the c u l m i n a t i o n o f A r i s t o t e l i a n logic. T h e last t w o treatises, the Topics a n d the Sophistical Refutations, are o f secondary i m p o r t a n c e ; they are concerned, respectively, w i t h the commonplaces o f dialectics t h a t are used i n a r g u i n g f r o m p r o b a b i l i t y , a n d w i t h the analysis and r e f u t a t i o n o f Sophistic arguments. *
6.
PHYSICS
P H Y S I C A L SCIENCE. Physics has for its object t h e study o f m o v i n g entities. I f metaphysics is " f i r s t p h i l o s o p h y , " t h e n physics is second philosophy. I n theme i t agrees w i t h the content o f Greek philosophical speculation o f the pre-Socratic era. F o r this reason, A r i s t o t l e , i n the first book o f his Physics, m u s t deal w i t h the opinions o f his predecessors, a n d especially the Eleatics, w h o deny the existence o f n a t u r e a n d thus the v e r y possibility o f physics. F o r the Eleatics, m o t i o n does not exist; t h a t is, m o t i o n is not, i t does n o t have being, a n d consequently there can be n o science o f nature. I n t h e face o f this thesis, A r i s t o t l e must restore the reality o f m o t i o n ; he establishes as a p r i n c i p l e a n d assumpt i o n t h a t a l l , or at least some, n a t u r a l entities m o v e . T h i s , he adds, is evident f r o m experience or i n d u c t i o n {Physics, 1,2). F r o m this p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e , Aristotle must a r r i v e at the principles, causes a n d elements o f n a t u r a l phenomena. Science must begin w i t h p h e n o m e n a that are i n t r i n s i c a l l y less k n o w a b l e i n the final sense, b u t easier for us to " k n o w " i n the everyday sense a n d accessible to o u r senses—concrete, m i x e d things. F r o m t h e m science w i l l arrive a t t h e principles a n d elements, w h i c h are f u r t h e r removed f r o m us, b u t clearer a n d i n t r i n sically knowable. T h i s is the m e t h o d of that concrete f o r m o f analysis o f n a t u r e w h i c h Aristotle established as his physics. N A T U R E . Aristotle makes a distinction between entities w h i c h exist b y n a t u r e (voei) a n d those w h i c h exist f r o m other causes, for example a r t i f i c i a l beings (ano T C X ^ S ) . A m o n g the n a t u r a l entities are animals * O n the problem of Aristotelian logic, and its traditional interpretations, see my Introducción a la Filosofía, p. 6 i [Obras, I I ] [Eng. trans. Reason and Life, pp. 2 6 8 - 2 8 1 ] . Cf. also Ensayos de teoría (Essays on Theory) [Obras, I V , pp. 4 1 4 ¬ 4 1 9 ] and La filosofía del Padre Gratry (The Philosophy of Father Gratry) [Obras, I V , pp. 2 7 4 - 2 7 7 a n d 3 i 2 - 3 i 4 ] .
8
Aristotle
7
a n d t h e i r parts, plants, a n d the simple bodies such as e a r t h , fire, water, a i r ; o n the other h a n d , a b e d or a cloak is a r t i f i c i a l . N a t u r a l entities are those t h a t have a n a t u r e ; a n d b y nature (vcns) Aristotle understands theprinciple of motion or rest, w h i c h is i n h e r e n t i n the things themselves. I n this sense, n a t u r e is substance, t h a t w h i c h a t h i n g can make use o f for its i n n e r transformations. G i v e n these assumptions, A r i s t o t l e must establish his t h e o r y o f the f o u r causes a n d , above a l l , must pose the p r o b l e m of motion, f o l l o w i n g the t h r e a d o f the doctrine o f p o t e n t i a l i t y a n d a c t u a l i t y . M o t i o n , as a realization of the possible in sofar as it is possible, consists i n a m o d e o f being w h i c h determines the step f r o m p o t e n t i a l being to a c t u a l being, i n v i r t u e o f Aristotle's discovery t h a t the E n t i t y is n o t u n i v o c a l b u t analogical, a n d is expressed i n m a n y ways (iroWaxtos) • A f t e r w a r d , Aristotle must study the physical problems o f location o f the v o i d ( T O KHVOV) a n d , above a l l , o f t i m e (xpovos), w h i c h he defines as " the n u m b e r o f m o t i o n according to before a n d a f t e r . " Aristotle's detailed study o f the problems o f m o t i o n leads h i m to infer the u n m o v e d p r i m e mover ( G o d ) , w h i c h , because i t is u n m o v e d , is n o t a p a r t o f nature, a l t h o u g h i t is the key to nature. T h u s the study o f the p r i m e mover does n o t come u n d e r physics ( a l t h o u g h i t has its place i n the problems o f this discipline), b u t under first philosophy, or metaphysics, w h i c h , as we have seen, is the theological science. (TOTTOS),
7.
T H E THEORY
OF T H E S O U L
A r i s t o t l e deals w i t h the p r o b l e m o f the soul i n his book e n t i t l e d IJepl >pvxfjs, usually called b y its L a t i n name De Anima. First o f a l l , one m u s t keep i n m i n d t h a t De Anima is a book o n physics, one o f the treatises concerned w i t h n a t u r a l things. Aristotle made the first systematic e l a b o r a t i o n o f the p r o b l e m o f the psyche, a n d this falls w i t h i n the sphere ofbiology. T H E ESSENCE O F T H E SOUL. T h e soul (^vx ?) * p r i n c i p l e o f life; l i v i n g entities are animate, i n contrast to i n a n i m a t e entities, like stones. F o r A r i s t o t l e , the life o f a n e n t i t y consists o f its n o u r i s h m e n t , g r o w t h a n d self-consumption. T h u s the soul is the form or realization o f a l i v i n g body. T h e soul " i n f o r m s , " or gives f o r m t o , the m a t t e r o f a l i v i n g t h i n g , g i v i n g i t its c o r p o r a l being a n d m a k i n g i t a l i v e b o d y ; t h a t is, i t is n o t a question o f the soul's being superimposed o n the b o d y o r a d d e d to i t ; rather, the b o d y is a l i v i n g body because i t has a soul. A c c o r d i n g to Aristotle's d e f i n i t i o n (De Anima, I I , 1), the soul is the r e a l i z a t i o n or first entelechy o f a n a t u r a l organic body. I f the eye were a l i v i n g creature, Aristotle says, its soul w o u l d be its sight. T h e eye is 7
s t
n
e
The Theory of the Soul
79
the m a t t e r o f sight, a n d i f sight is lacking there is no eye; and j u s t as the eye, strictly speaking, is the physical eye u n i t e d w i t h the power o f sight, so the soul a n d the b o d y make u p the l i v i n g t h i n g . I t is " l i v i n g " t h a t defines the animate e n t i t y ; b u t " l i v i n g " is spoken o f i n m a n y senses, a n d thus there are different classes o f souls. A r i s t o t l e distinguishes three: the vegetative soul, the only type o f soul possessed b y plants b u t one also f o u n d a m o n g animals and m e n ; the sensitive soul, w h i c h plants lack; a n d the r a t i o n a l soul, w h i c h m a n alone possesses. L e t i t be understood, however, t h a t each l i v i n g t h i n g has only one soul; m a n , concretely, has a r a t i o n a l soul, w h i c h is the f o r m o f his body, a n d t h a t soul includes the other elementary functions. M a n possesses sensory perception (otioOricns), w h i c h provides a direct contact w i t h i n d i v i d u a l things, a n d , as w e have already seen, constitutes the lowest s t r a t u m o f knowledge. M a n ' s i m a g i n a t i o n , t h r o u g h the agency o f his memory, makes generalizations possible. T h e t h i r d level is the nous, or intelligence, man's highest m e n t a l faculty. Aristotle rejects Plato's doctrine of innate Ideas a n d reminiscence, or anamnesis; i n place o f this metaphor he uses another, t h a t o f the tabula rasa, the wax tablet o n w h i c h impressions are engraved; the nous is passive. But alongside this passive intelligence A r i s t o t l e introduces the so-called nous poietikds, or active intelligence, the role o f w h i c h remains r a t h e r obscure; this nous poietikds constituted one o f the favorite themes o f the medieval Scholastics i n their disputes w i t h the philosophy o f Averroes. I n a famous a n d obscure passage (De Anima, H I , 5) Aristotle says t h a t this nous " i s such that i t becomes a l l things a n d is such t h a t i t makes a l l things, according to its h a b i t o r p a t t e r n , as l i g h t does; since i n a certain sense l i g h t , too, turns p o t e n t i a l colors i n t o actual colors. T h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e , " he adds, " i s separable, impassive and w i t h o u t m i x t u r e , since i t is essentially an a c t i v i t y . . . . O n l y after i t has been separated is i t t r u l y w h a t i t is, and o n l y this is i m m o r t a l a n d e t e r n a l . " T h i s is the p r i m a r y reference i n Aristotle to the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the soul or a p a r t of i t ; b u t the sense i n w h i c h this i m m o r t a l i t y should be understood has been i n t e r p r e t e d at length f r o m the t i m e of the ancient commentaries u p to the m o d e r n age. Since knowledge a n d sensory perception are, i n a certain sense, t h a t w h i c h is k n o w n or sensed t h r o u g h their agency, Aristotle can say t h a t i n a certain m a n n e r the soul is all things. U s i n g a felicitous m e t a p h o r , he adds that the soul is l i k e the h a n d , since l i k e the h a n d i t is the i n s t r u m e n t o f the i n s t r u m e n t s — t h a t w h i c h gives the i n s t r u m e n t , or tool, its actual being as a n i n s t r u m e n t . Intelligence is the f o r m of the forms, a n d the senses are the f o r m o f the sensible things. As we have already seen, i t is t h r o u g h b e i n g k n o w n t h a t things acquire their true being,
So
Aristotle
their openness, t h e i r ¿\rjdeia; i n a certain m a n n e r , they come to exist w i t h i n the soul, w h i l e nevertheless r e m a i n i n g outside i t . T h e stone is not i n the soul, A r i s t o t l e says, b u t o n l y the f o r m of the stone. ESTHETICS. Aristotle's esthetic teachings, w h i c h we cannot examine i n detail here, are closely connected to his theory o f the soul. O u r p r i n c i p a l source for these teachings is the Poetics, i n w h i c h A r i s t o t l e studies tragedy. H e makes a distinction between poetry a n d history, n o t because poetry uses verse a n d history uses prose—this is m e r e l y i n c i d e n t a l — b u t because history recounts w h a t has actually h a p p e n e d a n d poetry speaks o f w h a t could happen. Poetry, Aristotle says, is m o r e philosophical a n d more i m p o r t a n t t h a n history, because p o e t r y speaks more o f the universal, whereas history concentrates o n the p a r t i c u l a r occurrence. H i s t o r y states t h a t someone really said or d i d s o m e t h i n g ; poetry, o n the other h a n d , determines w h a t a certain t y p e o f m a n w o u l d p r o b a b l y or necessarily say or do i n a certain s i t u a t i o n . H e r e Aristotle points to a certain comprehension o f reality a n d h u m a n life w h i c h is essential to poetry i f i t is to have m e a n i n g . I n the masterly study t h a t A r i s t o t l e devotes to tragedy, h e considers this a r t f o r m as a n i m i t a t i o n of a serious a c t i o n t h a t arousesfear and pity a n d causes a catharsis, or p u r i f i c a t i o n , o f those emotions. These are p a i n f u l emotions, a n d yet tragedy, b y its artistic nature, becomes a n esthetic pleasure. T h e a r t o f the tragic a u t h o r frees these experiences f r o m their disagreeable associations a n d occasions a n e m o t i o n a l release, b y v i r t u e o f w h i c h the soul is soothed a n d p u r i f i e d .
8.
ETHICS
Aristotle's ethics is his ontology o f m a n . W e have already i n d i c a t e d , i n speaking o f possible types o f lives, the most p r o f o u n d aspects o f the p r o b l e m o f ethics. H e r e we shall m e r e l y review these ideas briefly a n d complete t h e m . T H E H I G H E S T GOOD. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l exposition o f Aristotle's ethics is f o u n d i n the Micomachean Ethics, p r o b a b l y edited b y his son Nicomachus a n d t a k i n g its name f r o m h i m . I n this w o r k A r i s t o t l e poses the question o f the good (ayadov), w h i c h is the u l t i m a t e goal o f things a n d thus o f h u m a n actions. T h e highest good is happiness (evSai/xovla). B u t even more clearly t h a n i n Socrates, a d i s t i n c t i o n is m a d e between eudaimonla a n d pleasure, or hedone. Pleasure is s i m p l y " a supervening e n d , " something t h a t cannot be desired a n d sought d i r e c t l y , b u t is o n l y a n accompaniment to the f r u i t i o n o f a w a y o f life. I n his De vita beata ( O n the H a p p y L i f e ) , Seneca, w h o adopted Aristotle's ethical teachings, c o m p a r e d pleasure to the poppies t h a t
Ethics
8t
g r o w i n a field o f g r a i n a n d embellish i t , as a n a d d i t i o n , w i t h o u t h a v i n g been p l a n t e d or sought for. H A P P I N E S S . Happiness is the f r u i t i o n o f a man's w a y o f life, i n the t r u l y h u m a n aspect o f t h a t w a y o f life. T h e good o f each t h i n g is its o w n f u n c t i o n , its w a y o f being, w h i c h is at the same t i m e its realizat i o n ; thus, vision is the good o f the eye a n d w a l k i n g is the good o f the foot. I t is clear t h a t there is a n a c t i v i t y proper to the carpenter o r the cobbler; b u t Aristotle asks w h a t is the a c t i v i t y proper to man as m a n , w i t h o u t f u r t h e r qualifications. H e examines the hypothesis t h a t i t is " l i v i n g , " b u t finds that life is c o m m o n to plants and animals as w e l l ; he continues to seek that w h i c h is peculiar to m a n . H e decides i t is " a certain active life proper to r a t i o n a l m a n " ; this is h u m a n happiness. T h i s f o r m o f life is the c o n t e m p l a t i v e or theoretic life, w h i c h , i t goes w i t h o u t saying, is superior to the life o f pleasures, b u t is also superior to the life governed b y poiesis, or p r o d u c t i o n , a n d the merely p r a c t i c a l l i f e — f o r example, the p o l i t i c a l life. B u t Aristotle points o u t t h a t i n order for this " t h e o r e t i c " w a y o f l i v i n g to be happiness, i t m u s t t r u l y occupy one's life, " because one swallow does n o t make a summer, nor does one day, a n d therefore, neither does one day or a b r i e f t i m e make man fortunate and happy." T H E C O N T E M P L A T I V E L I F E . T h e contemplative way o f life is, i n the first place, the most excellent f r o m t w o points o f v i e w : because o u r intelligence is o u r most excellent faculty, a n d because the things k n o w n t h r o u g h the agency o f o u r intelligence are the most excellent a m o n g k n o w a b l e things. I n the second place, the contemplative life is the most continuous w a y of life, since i t does n o t cease w h e n its goal is o b t a i n e d ; vision or i n t e l l e c t i o n o f a n object persists even after the object has been seen or t h o u g h t . I n the t h i r d place, this type o f life is accompanied b y pure a n d stable pleasures, w h i c h are necessary to happiness, a l t h o u g h they are n o t to be confused w i t h i t . I n the f o u r t h place, the contemplative life is the most self-sufficient f o r m o f life, because every m a n has need o f things necessary for life, b u t the j u s t m a n , o r t h e brave m a n , needs other people i n order to exercise his justice, o r b r a v e r y , w h i l e the wise m a n can exercise his c o n t e m p l a t i o n even i n complete solitude. F i n a l l y , the contemplative life is the o n l y w a y of life t h a t is sought after a n d loved for its o w n sake, since i t has no result outside o f c o n t e m p l a t i o n , whereas i n a n active life w e seek something t h a t is outside o f our a c t i v i t y itself. T h i s " t h e o r e t i c " f o r m o f life is, i n a certain sense, higher t h a n the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , a n d is o n l y possible i n so far as there is something divine i n m a n . E v e n i f we are m e n a n d m o r t a l , Aristotle says, w e d o n o t necessarily have to have h u m a n a n d m o r t a l feelings; i t is necessary to
8z
Aristotle
i m m o r t a l i z e ourselves as m u c h as we can a n d live i n accordance w i t h the best t h a t is i n us, even i f i t is only a t i n y p a r t o f o u r reality. T h e best t h a t is i n a n y t h i n g is w h a t is most characteristic o f i t , or proper to i t ; a n d " i t w o u l d be a b s u r d , " Aristotle concludes, " n o t to choose o u r o w n life, b u t someone else's " (Nicomachean Ethics, X , 7). T H E VIRTUES. A r i s t o t l e divides the virtues i n t o t w o classes: the dianoetic, or intellectual (virtues o f the didnoia, o r o f the nous), a n d the ethical, or m o r e strictly m o r a l virtues. A n d he states t h a t the character o f v i r t u e consists i n the m e a n (p.eaoTi)s) between t w o opposed h u m a n tendencies; for example, bravery is the t r u e m e a n between cowardice a n d rashness; generosity is the mean between avarice a n d profligacy, a n d so o n . ( I t w o u l d take us too far afield to investigate the deeper m e a n i n g o f this theory o f the mesdtes, or m e a n . I shall merely indicate, for purposes o f o r i e n t a t i o n , t h a t i t is related to the idea o f measure, metron, a n d t h a t measure is related to the One, w h i c h i n t u r n refers d i r e c t l y to the E n t i t y , since the One a n d the E n t i t y are m u t u a l l y associated as transcendentals.) Aside f r o m this, the content o f A r i s t o t e l i a n ethics is p r i m a r i l y a study of character: a n exposition a n d evaluation o f h u m a n modes o f being, o f the different types o f souls a n d their virtues a n d vices. I t is to A r i s t o t l e t h a t we owe the subtle descriptions o f the soul t h a t have enriched the language o f the Western w o r l d w i t h such precise a n d expressive terms as " m a g n a n i m i t y , " " p u s i l l a n i m i t y , " a n d so f o r t h . 9.
POLITICS
I n the eight books o f his Politics Aristotle was deeply concerned w i t h the problems o f society a n d the State. I n a d d i t i o n , he was e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y w e l l versed o n the subject o f the constitutions o f the Greek cities; b u t o f the 158 studies k n o w n to have been i n his school's collection, o n l y one, the Constitution of Athens, has been preserved. H e c o m b i n e d w i t h this i n f o r m a t i o n a p r o f o u n d knowledge o f economic matters. SOCIETY. Aristotle disagrees w i t h the Sophists a n d Cynics, w h o for various reasons i n t e r p r e t e d the city, the polis, as nomos, l a w or convent i o n . Aristotle, d i f f e r i n g f r o m t h e m , includes society w i t h i n nature. H i s g u i d i n g idea is t h a t social organization is a n a t u r a l state a n d not c o n v e n t i o n ; thus, society is inherent i n m a n , n o t merely something statutory. I n accordance w i t h the principles o f A r i s t o t e l i a n ethics, every activity, or praxis, is carried o n w i t h some good i n v i e w ; this good is thus the goal o f the a c t i v i t y a n d gives i t its m e a n i n g . I t is o n this assumption, a n d o n the assumption t h a t every c o m m u n i t y (koinonia) or society strives for some good, t h a t Aristotle bases his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the being oithepolis.
Politics A r i s t o t l e meditates o n the o r i g i n of society. F o r h i m , the elementary, p r i m a r y f o r m of society is the household or f a m i l y (OIKIO), the result of the u n i o n of m a n a n d w o m a n for the p e r p e t u a t i o n o f the species. T o this p r i m a r y sexual f u n c t i o n is added the f u n c t i o n o f c o m m a n d , represented b y the master-slave relationship; the goal o f this second relationship is the a t t a i n m e n t o f economic s t a b i l i t y w i t h i n the oikia. Therefore, as Hesiod says, a m o n g the poor the ox takes the place of the slave. T h e g r o u p i n g o f several families i n t o a higher social u n i t produces the village, o r home. T h e u n i o n o f several villages forms the c i t y , or polls—for A r i s t o t l e the highest type o f society. T h e u n i f y i n g b o n d i n the village is the f a m i l y relationship, the c o m m u n i t y of " b l o o d " : children a n d children's children. T h e polls is a "perfect c o m m u n i t y , " self-sufficient a n d meeting a l l its o w n needs, i n contrast to villages, w h i c h are n o t self-sufficient, b u t m u t u a l l y dependent. T h e goal of the f a m i l y , or oikia, is merely to live ( T O Ijjv); the goal of the village, or kome, is m o r e c o m p l e x : to live well, t h a t is, i n comfort ( T O e$ Irjv). Since the perfect f o r m of each t h i n g is its n a t u r a l state, and the polls is the most perfect o f a l l communities, the polls, too, is a n a t u r a l state. Consequently, m a n is b y nature a " p o l i t i c a l a n i m a l " — a n a n i m a l w h o lives i n a pdlis—a social creature (££>ov TTOXITIKOV). W h o e v e r — b y nature a n d n o t b y some chance—lives w i t h o u t a city is either lower or higher t h a n m a n ; whoever cannot live i n a society, or needs n o t h i n g because he is sufficient u n t o himself, is n o t a m a n , b u t a beast or a god. L A N G U A G E . T h e social n a t u r e o f m a n is made manifest i n his language, i n his speech, or logos. A n i m a l s also have a voice (a>vrj), w h i c h expresses pleasure a n d p a i n ; b u t words (Aoyos) are m e a n t to indicate the useful and the h a r m f u l , the j u s t a n d the unjust. K n o w l e d g e of such things is the characteristic o f m a n a n d the basis o f c o m m u n i t i e s . Thus, justice is essential to the c i t y — a s Plato had said; i t is the order o f the polls. M a n can f u n c t i o n as a thing—as is the case w i t h w o m e n and slaves—or as a m a n ; he can f u n c t i o n as a m a n o n l y w i t h i n the comm u n i t y . M a n is a speaking a n i m a l (£<2ov Xoyov ex ) > d speaking is a social f u n c t i o n ; i t is t e l l i n g someone w h a t things are—for example, whether they are j u s t or unjust. Therefore, m a n needs a c o m m u n i t y i n w h i c h to live, a n d his p o l i t i c a l being is based on his b e i n g articulate, his power of speech. T h i s is precisely w h a t is not the case w i t h G o d — especially the A r i s t o t e l i a n g o d ; this god can ignore the w o r l d and be m e r e l y ndesis noeseos, t h o u g h t o f t h o u g h t , vision o f vision. Whereas m a n needs some other e n t i t y o n w h i c h to fix his c o n t e m p l a t i o n , and a neighbor or fellow man to w h o m he can tell w h a t he has seen, G o d is completely self-sufficient a n d contemplates himself. ov
a r
8
Aristotle
4
S O C I E T Y A N D T H E S T A T E . A r i s t o t l e grants a n i m p o r t a n t r o l e to free w i l l i n social matters, a n d does n o t distinguish " n a t u r a l " societies, like the f a m i l y , o f w h i c h one is a m e m b e r i n v o l u n t a r i l y , f r o m associations created b y a v o l u n t a r y act, like a c l u b , to w h i c h one belongs or ceases to belong at w i l l . F u r t h e r m o r e , he emphasizes the v o l u n t a r y a n d sometimes even unjust character o f the constitutions o f various villages a n d cities, b u t says t h a t these communities exist by nature: we w o u l d n o t say this today. Such passages show t h a t A r i s t o t l e l i k e d to use the concept o f nature i n the sense o f the n a t u r e o f each i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g , rather t h a n i n the b r o a d sense o f n a t u r e i n general. These t w o senses o f the w o r d i n t e r m i n g l e constantly f r o m the time o f the preSocratics o n . Therefore, since society a n d the c u l m i n a t i o n o r perfect i o n o f society—the polls—are n a t u r a l , society a n d the State are i d e n t i c a l : social has the same m e a n i n g as p o l i t i c a l , a n d the polls indicates society interpreted i n terms o f the State. A r i s t o t l e does n o t realize t h a t society is n o t the same as the State, t h a t i n his day the t w o coincide because o f historical circumstances; thus he calls the polis—the city-state—the perfect society. After the creation o f Alexander's empire, w h e n the o l d boundaries o f H e l l e n i c life are b r o k e n , ancient m a n is disoriented w i t h respect t o the real l i m i t s o f communities. T h i s disorientation culminates i n the cosmop o l i t a n i s m o f the Stoics. THE
O R G A N I Z A T I O N OF T H E
STATE.
The
hierarchy
of
the
city
dwellers is i n accordance w i t h the possible types o f lives. M e n i a l labors w i t h a p u r e l y economic a i m are the responsibility o f slaves, at least i n p a r t . A r i s t o t l e u p h e l d the idea o f slavery i n accordance w i t h the o l d H e l l e n i c conviction t h a t the barbarians o u g h t to serve the Greeks. O n this p o i n t A r i s t o t l e differed f r o m the p o l i c y w h i c h A l e x a n d e r followed a n d w h i c h led to the f o r m a t i o n o f the Hellenistic cultures. Economics, says Aristotle, should t e n d t o w a r d self-sufficiency, so t h a t the c i t y can provide for its o w n needs as m u c h as possible. Here, projected i n t o the p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y , we f i n d once again the Greek i d e a l of self-sufficiency. Therefore A r i s t o t l e is more f a v o r a b l y i n c l i n e d t o w a r d a n a g r i c u l t u r a l city t h a n t o w a r d a n i n d u s t r i a l one. I n r e g a r d to the f o r m o f the government, or c o n s t i t u t i o n , Aristotle does n o t believe t h a t there must o f necessity be o n l y one k i n d . H e considers three p u r e forms possible, governed i n accordance w i t h the interests o f the c o m m u n i t y . These three forms degenerate i f the rulers begin t o act for their o w n personal interests. T h e g o v e r n m e n t m a y be a m o n a r c h y , a n aristocracy or a democracy, depending o n w h e t h e r the sovereignty resides i n a single i n d i v i d u a l , i n a m i n o r i t y m a d e u p of the
Politics best citizens o r i n the c o m m u n i t y as a w h o l e . T h e respective degenerate forms are t y r a n n y , oligarchy (almost always based o n plutocracy) a n d demagogy. A r i s t o t l e p a r t i c u l a r l y dwells o n the advantages offered b y a " m i x e d g o v e r n m e n t , " or r e p u b l i c (politeia), a m i x t u r e o r c o m b i n a t i o n o f the p u r e forms, since he considers this to afford the greatest stability a n d security (asphdleia), a n d security is the basic theme o f his Politics.* W e m u s t keep i n m i n d t h a t A r i s t o t l e , like Plato, is t h i n k i n g always o f the city-state, w i t h o u t i m a g i n i n g other, broader types o f p o l i t i c a l units as desirable forms. T h i s is a l l the more surprising i n Aristotle ( a l t h o u g h i t can be understood after t h o r o u g h considerat i o n ) , since he was then witnessing the transformation o f the H e l l e n i c w o r l d . I n his o w n day a n d b y the agency o f his p u p i l Alexander, the m u l t i t u d e o f independent cities was b e i n g u n i f i e d i n t o a great t e r r i t o r i a l e m p i r e . T h i s ephemeral M a c e d o n i a n E m p i r e was soon t o break u p i n t o the kingdoms of the D i a d o c h i , b u t the idea o f a m o n a r c h y o f vast extent was to linger o n f r o m t h a t t i m e , a n d there was to be no r e t u r n to the fragmentation i n t o city-states. Aristotle's philosophy cannot be compressed i n t o a n exposition such as the present one or even a m u c h longer one, a n d m u c h less so a discussion o f the fundamental problems his philosophy raises, w h i c h are, i n a way, the problems philosophy has faced ever since a n d the ones we must solve today. His philosophy is a whole w o r l d o f ideas: the most b r i l l i a n t a t t e m p t i n history to systematize the problems o f metaphysics i n t h e i r most profound strata. Therefore, more t h a n anyone else, A r i s t o t l e determined the subsequent course o f the h i s t o r y o f philosophy, a n d f r o m this p o i n t o n w e w i l l f i n d h i m everywhere. I t has been necessary i n this discussion to o m i t m a n y i m p o r t a n t a n d even essential matters. Faced w i t h this necessity, I chose f r o m the start to leave o u t almost a l l the specific information a n d scholarly details o f Aristotle's teachings, a n d to give instead the central problems o f his metaphysics, presenting t h e m w i t h some degree o f precision a n d w i t h o u t falsification. I believe i t is n o t so serious a t h i n g for one t o be i g n o r a n t o f the greater p a r t o f w h a t A r i s t o t l e actually said, b u t one must have a clear awareness o f the problems t h a t m o t i v a t e d h i m a n d o f the b r i l l i a n t o r i g i n a l i t y o f his solutions. I n this w a y w e see h o w Hellenic p h i l o s o p h y reaches its m a t u r i t y i n Aristotle's Metaphysics a n d how he m a r k s the effective conclusion o f one stage o f philosophy. F o r l o n g centuries philosophy w i l l o f necessity r u n i n the channels w h i c h Aristotle's t h i n k i n g m a r k e d o u t for i t . | * Gf. my Introduction to the Politics of Aristotle (Madrid, 1950). f See my Introduction to the Nicomachean Ethics (Madrid, 1960).
The Ideal of the Wise Man
After Aristotle, Greek philosophy loses the character w i t h w h i c h he a n d Plato had endowed i t . I t ceases to be explicitly metaphysics a n d becomes mere ethical speculation. I t does n o t really cease to be ontology, b u t i t is no longer concerned f o r m a l l y a n d t h e m a t i c a l l y w i t h the major problems o f metaphysics. A f t e r a n era o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y a c t i v i t y i n this r e a l m , there comes a l o n g hiatus i n philosophy, one o f those that appear repeatedly i n the history o f h u m a n t h o u g h t . I n a sense, the history o f philosophy is essentially discontinuous. T h i s does not mean that philosophy is absent d u r i n g this l o n g p e r i o d , b u t t h a t i t ceases to be a u t h e n t i c a l l y o r i g i n a l a n d creative philosophy a n d becomes i n large p a r t a l a b o r o f exegesis, o r c o m m e n t a r y . A t the same t i m e , as always i n such periods, m a n appears as almost the exclusive theme o f philosophy. Philosophy t h e n becomes p r i n c i p a l l y ethics. M o r a l questions are p a r a m o u n t , a n d especially w h a t has been called the ideal o f the wise m a n , or sophos. I f we disregard the obvious differences, we c o u l d say t h a t something similar occurred i n the Renaissance, i n the age o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d i n the nineteenth century. T h e study o f m a n , i n different forms r a n g i n g f r o m h u m a n i s m to " K u l t u r , " m a d e its appearance a t those times w h e n metaphysical tension h a d g i v e n w a y . I t w o u l d seem t h a t m a n k i n d cannot sustain metaphysical t h o u g h t for any l o n g t i m e . Historically, philosophy appears concentrated a t certain periods o f t i m e , after w h i c h i t seems to slacken a n d lose its v i t a l i t y a n d precision for l o n g years. T h i s discontinuous structure o f philosophy w i l l become m o r e a n d more evident i n the course o f this book. 86
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T h e stage o f Greek philosophy we n o w come t o is usually designated as post-Aristotelian philosophy. I have rejected this name for t w o reasons: first, because a p r i o r philosophic c u r r e n t , o r i g i n a t i n g i n Socrates, is closely related to the philosophic movements o f this period — t h e earlier c u r r e n t i n c l u d i n g the Cynics a n d Cyrenaics; a n d secondly, because N e o p l a t o n i s m is also later t h a n Aristotle, b u t Neoplatonism returns to metaphysics a n d differs p r o f o u n d l y f r o m the e t h i c a l philosophy we are discussing. A n d there is also a t h i r d reason, perhaps the most serious: even though the n a m e " p o s t - A r i s t o t e l i a n " is i n itself purely chronological, i t nevertheless seems to i m p l y a n a f f i l i a t i o n ; whereas the philosophy o f the p e r i o d u n d e r consideration derives only i n very small measure f r o m A r i s t o t l e , or at least f r o m his t r u l y l i v i n g and efficacious t h o u g h t . Doubtless, this new philosophy is closely related to the schools founded b y Plato a n d A r i s t o t l e ; b u t i t is clear t h a t after the d e a t h o f these t w o great figures b o t h the Academy a n d the L y c e u m have r a t h e r l i t t l e to do w i t h the real philosophical significance of their founders. W e shall, then, consider here a philosophic c u r r e n t lasting several centuries, f r o m Socrates i n the f o u r t h century B.C. to the apogee o f the R o m a n E m p i r e , t h a t is, at least u p to the e n d o f the second century A . D . a n d perhaps even later. T h i s movement, i n i t i a t i n g i n the Socratic t r a d i t i o n , proliferates enormously i n the Hellenistic age, and even m o r e i n the R o m a n p e r i o d . I t s general character is as we have already n o t e d : lack o f concern w i t h metaphysics as such; a n a t t e n t i o n directed p r i m a r i l y to questions o f ethics; a conception o f philosophy as a w a y o f life, together w i t h a neglect o f its theoretic v a l u e ; i n short, a new loss o f the m e a n i n g o f t r u t h , a l t h o u g h this deviation f r o m t r u t h is o f a quite different aspect f r o m t h a t o f the Sophists. A l l this is summed u p i n the p r o b l e m o f the wise m a n , i n the discovery o f those traits that define the independent, self-sufficient m a n , the m a n w h o lives as is needful, i n complete serenity a n d balance, the m a n w h o embodies the philosopher's w a y o f l i f e — w h i c h now is n o t precisely Aristotle's theoretic life. B u t the most serious p r o b l e m raised b y these Hellenistic philosophies is this: f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f knowledge, a l l o f t h e m — e v e n the worthiest, Stoicism—are clumsy, almost completely lacking i n i n t e l l e c t u a l precision a n d extremely l i m i t e d i n t h e i r flights o f i m a g i n a t i o n . T h e r e is no comparison possible between these schools a n d the m a r velous speculation o f Plato a n d Aristotle w i t h its miraculous acumen a n d metaphysical p r o f u n d i t y . Nevertheless, i t is a n overwhelmingly evident historical fact t h a t i m m e d i a t e l y after the death o f Aristotle
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The Ideal of the Wise Man
these schools displace his philosophy a n d flourish u n i n t e r r u p t e d l y for five centuries. H o w is this possible ? * D u r i n g these centuries there is a substantial change i n t h e m e a n i n g the Greeks a t t a c h to the w o r d philosophy. I n Plato a n d A r i s t o t l e i t is a "science," a knowledge o f w h a t things are; the character o f t h i s k n o w l edge is d e t e r m i n e d b y the necessity o f l i v i n g i n the r e a l m oí truth, a n d the o r i g i n o f this knowledge is awe. B u t i n the later schools p h i l o s o p h y comes to connote something v e r y different. For E p i c u r u s , " p h i l o s o p h y is a n a c t i v i t y t h a t attains the h a p p y life b y means o f discourse a n d r e a s o n i n g . " A c c o r d i n g to the Stoics, philosophy is the practice o f a n art, the a i m o f w h i c h is the p r o p e r g o v e r n i n g o f one's life. T h u s , the m e a n i n g o f philosophy changes. I t is n o t t h a t the teachings o f the Stoa or o f E p i c u r u s replace the teachings o f Aristotle. R a t h e r , the m a n o f the late f o u r t h a n d early t h i r d centuries B.C. abandons philosophy-asknowledge a n d seeks a basis for his life i n another a c t i v i t y . T h i s new a c t i v i t y is given the name o f p h i l o s o p h y — n o t w i t h o u t a c e r t a i n a m b i g u i t y — a n d has i n c o m m o n w i t h philosophy a n u m b e r o f ideas a n d problems. T h e deepest reason for this change is the historical crisis o f the ancient w o r l d . A t the m o m e n t w h e n his situation becomes c r i t i c a l , the Hellene returns to philosophy, the highest creation o f his c u l t u r e ; b u t he no longer makes the same requests o f i t . Instead, he w a n t s i t to be a substitute for the religious, p o l i t i c a l a n d social c o n v i c t i o n s — i n short, the moral c o n v i c t i o n s — w h i c h have b y n o w become d u b i o u s . Philoso p h y , once m o r e diverted f r o m the way of truth, becomes a sort o f " o c c a s i o n a l " religiosity, suitable for the masses. Therefore, the i n t e l lectual i n f e r i o r i t y o f the philosophies o f this period is precisely one o f the conditions for their enormous success. U s i n g t h e m , a n c i e n t m a n i n his c r i t i c a l h o u r acquires a m i n i m a l m o r a l i t y for h a r d times, a m o r a l i t y o f resistance, u n t i l the crisis is overcome i n radical fashion b y Christ i a n i t y , w h i c h signifies the advent o f the new man. W e shall n o w a t t e m p t to sketch briefly the traits o f t h e various schools i n this g r o u p . i.
E T H I C A L PHILOSOPHIES I N T H E SOCRATIC T R A D I T I O N
W e have already seen the most f r u i t f u l a n d b r i l l i a n t m o m e n t s o f the Socratic t r a d i t i o n : Plato a n d , t h r o u g h h i m , Aristotle. Nevertheless, i t w i l l be remembered that w h a t P l a t o n i s m adopted f r o m Socrates was p r i n c i p a l l y the necessity of knowledge as a definition o f t h e u n i v e r s a l ; * For a more detailed analysis of this problem see my study " L a filosofía estoica" (Stoic Philosophy) in Biografía de la Filosofía (Biography of Philosophy).
Ethical Philosophies in the Socratic
Tradition
8
9
this led Plato to his theory o f the Ideas. Y e t Socrates' o w n concern was largely ethical. T h i s other d i r e c t i o n o f his t h o u g h t is the one t h a t is continued i n t w o branches o f H e l l e n i c philosophy o f p u r e l y secondary i m p o r t a n c e : the Cynics and the Cyrenaics. The Cynics T h e founder o f the Cynic school was Antisthenes, a p u p i l o f Socrates, w h o founded a g y m n a s i u m i n the square o f Cynosarges ( " N i m b l e D o g " ) ; hence the name Cynics (dogs o r , rather, doglike) t h a t was given to the followers o f this sect, a n d w h i c h they accepted w i t h a certain p r i d e . T h e best k n o w n a m o n g the Cynics is Antisthenes' successor, Diogenes of Sinope, w h o l i v e d i n the f o u r t h c e n t u r y B.C. Diogenes is famous for his eccentric life a n d certain displays o f w i t . T h e Cynics exaggerate a n d push to extremes Socrates' d o c t r i n e o f eudaimonia, o r happiness, a n d give i t , i n a d d i t i o n , a negative sense. I n the first place, they identify happiness w i t h autarchia, or self-sufficiency; i n the second place, they f i n d t h a t the w a y to a t t a i n happiness is to suppress a l l necessities. T h i s entails a negative attitude t o w a r d life as a whole, f r o m m a t e r i a l pleasures u p to the life o f the State. T h e o n l y desirable v a l u e t h a t remains is independence, the absence o f necessities, t r a n q u i l l i t y . N a t u r a l l y , the result o f this is a beggar's existence. T h e s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g is lowered, a l l refinements are lost, as are a l l bonds w i t h the c i t y and c i v i l i z a t i o n . I n d e e d , Greece became f u l l o f these beggars w i t h more or less philosophical pretensions w h o traversed the l a n d as vagabonds, sober a n d disheveled, p r o n o u n c i n g m o r a l discourses a n d frequently resorting to charlatanism. Cynic d o c t r i n e , i f i t exists, is q u i t e scanty: i t is rather the r e n u n c i a t i o n o f a l l theorizing, a disdain for t r u t h . A l l t h a t matters is the necessities o f l i f e — l i f e , n a t u r a l l y , i n the Cynic manner. T h e g o o d o f m a n consists merely i n living in society with oneself. E v e r y t h i n g else— comfort, riches, honors a n d t h e i r opposites—does n o t c o u n t . T h e pleasures o f the senses and love are the worst things o f a l l a n d are most to be shunned. W o r k , exercise, ascetic practices: these are the o n l y things desirable. Since the C y n i c despises a l l that is convention a n d n o t nature, he is unconcerned w i t h f a m i l y a n d c o u n t r y , and feels h i m s e l f to be a kosmopolites, a citizen o f the w o r l d . T h i s is the first i m p o r t a n t appearance o f t h a t cosmopolitanism w h i c h was to have such w e i g h t y consequences i n the Hellenistic a n d R o m a n w o r l d . The Cyrenaics T h e C y r e n a i c school, founded b y A r i s t i p p u s of Cyrene, a Sophist w h o later j o i n e d the Socratic circle, is extremely similar to the C y n i c
go
The Ideal of the Wise Man
school, despite the great differences a n d even a p p a r e n t contradictions between t h e m . F o r A r i s t i p p u s , the highest good is pleasure. Subjective impressions are o u r value criteria, and pleasure is whatever impression is agreeable. T h e p r o b l e m i n this conception is t h a t pleasure must n o t d o m i n a t e us; rather, w e must d o m i n a t e our pleasure. T h i s is i m p o r t a n t . T h e wise m a n must be master o f himself; therefore he must n o t give v e n t to his passions. M o r e o v e r , pleasure easily becomes disgust w h e n i t dominates us a n d upsets us. T h e wise m a n must be master o f a l l circumstances, must always rise above t h e m , must adapt himself to a l l situations, to w e a l t h a n d to poverty, to prosperity a n d to i l l fortune. A t the same t i m e , the Cyrenaic must select his pleasures i n such a w a y t h a t they are moderate, lasting a n d n o t l i k e l y to get the better o f h i m . I n short, the supposed hedonism o f the Cyrenaics is e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y similar to the asceticism o f the Cynics, a l t h o u g h the p o i n t o f departure is very different. I t should n o t be forgotten t h a t w h a t is i m p o r t a n t for the ethical philosophers i n the Socratic t r a d i t i o n , as for the Stoics a n d Epicureans later o n , is the independence a n d i m p e r t u r b a b i l i t y o f the wise m a n ; the m a n n e r i n w h i c h these desirable qualities are a t t a i n e d is secondary. I t m a y be t h r o u g h asceticism a n d v i r t u e or t h r o u g h the moderate, peaceful pleasures o f day-to-day life. Cosmopolitanism is a t r a i t o f the Cyrenaics, too. I n a d d i t i o n , this school presents m a r k e d Hellenistic features; i t m e r e l y emphasizes a n d exaggerates another aspect o f Socrates' t h o u g h t — t h a t crossroads f r o m w h i c h the various directions o f the Greek m e n t a l i t y take their departure.
2.
STOICISM
T h e philosophers o f the Stoic school are i n t r i n s i c a l l y related to the earlier ethical philosophers i n the Socratic t r a d i t i o n , especially to the Cynics. I n the final analysis, Stoicism revives the a t t i t u d e o f these earlier schools t o w a r d life a n d philosophy, a l t h o u g h Stoicism p r o duced m e n o f superior intellectual attainments a n d presented a m o r e f u l l y w o r k e d o u t theoretic system. T H E STAGES O F STOICISM. W i t h i n the history o f Stoicism, three periods are distinguished: the E a r l y Stoa, the M i d d l e Stoa a n d the L a t e Stoa. T h e school's entire history extends f r o m about 300 B.C. to the second century A . D . , t h a t is, h a l f a m i l l e n n i u m . Zeno o f C i t i u m founded the Stoic school i n Athens, i n the so-called Painted Portico (Stoa poikile), a p u b l i c h a l l decorated w i t h paintings b y Polygnotus. T h e g r o u p took its name f r o m this meeting site. T h e p r i n c i p a l figures o f the E a r l y Stoa, a p a r t f r o m Zeno, were Cleanthes o f Assos, a former
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boxer whose m i n d was d u l l a n d a n y t h i n g b u t theoretic, a n d , above a l l , the t h i r d leader of the school, Chrysippus, the t r u e founder of Stoicism as a doctrine. O n l y titles a n d fragments of his numerous writings have come d o w n to us. T h e leaders of the so-called M i d d l e Stoa were Panaetius of Rhodes (180-110) a n d the S y r i a n Posidonius (175-90). Panaetius was influenced b y the teachings o f the A c a d e m y ; i t was he, the friend of Scipio a n d Laelius, w h o i n t r o d u c e d Stoicism to Rome. Posidonius, Cicero's teacher i n Rhodes, was one o f the finest thinkers o f the ancient w o r l d . I n the late period, w h i c h was almost exclusively R o m a n , the o u t s t a n d i n g a n d most i n f l u e n t i a l Stoic was Seneca (4 B . c - 6 5 A . D . ) , w h o was b o r n i n Cordova. Seneca was the t u t o r o f N e r o , a n d i t was b y Nero's order t h a t he f i n a l l y opened his veins i n his b a t h . Aside f r o m his tragedies, Seneca w r o t e philosophical works w h i c h included De ira ( O n A n g e r ) , De providentia ( O n Providence), De beneficiis ( O n Benefits), De constantia sapientis ( O n the Constancy of the Wise M a n ) , De brevitate vitae ( O n the B r e v i t y o f L i f e ) , De tranquillitate animi ( O n Serenity o f M i n d ) , De dementia ( O n Clemency), De vita beata ( O n the H a p p y L i f e ) , Maturates quaestiones (Investigations of N a t u r e ) and the Epistulae ad Lucilium (Epistles to L u c i l i u s ) . After Seneca come t w o other i m p o r t a n t Stoic t h i n k e r s : Epictetus (50-120 A . D . ) , a Phrygian slave, later a freedman, a u t h o r o f the Diatribes, or Dissertations, a n d o f a b r i e f Enchiridion, or Manual, w r i t t e n i n Greek; a n d the emperor M a r c u s Aurelius (121-180 A . D . ) , o f the A n t o n i n e succession, w h o w r o t e , also i n Greek, the famous Meditations, the title o f w h i c h is l i t e r a l l y To Himself (Els iavrov). S T O I C DOCTRINE. T h e center o f Stoic concern is once again m a n , the wise m a n . Stoic p h i l o s o p h y is d i v i d e d i n t o three p a r t s — l o g i c , physics a n d e t h i c s — b u t the t r u e interest o f Stoicism is o n l y i n questions o f m o r a l i t y . I n epistemology, the Stoics are sensationalists. For t h e m , i t is sensory perceptions t h a t leave their trace i n the h u m a n soul a n d f o r m its ideas. T h e Stoics' p r i n c i p a l concept is the avTaaia KaTaX-qTrTiK-q ( " t h e i m a g i n a t i o n t h a t conveys direct a p p r e h e n s i o n " ) — a h i g h l y difficult concept to grasp. T h e m i n d makes use of association a n d comparison i n order t o a r r i v e at this " i m a g i n a t i o n . " T h e Stoics spoke of c e r t a i n Koivai Hvvoiai, notiones communes ( c o m m o n ideas), t h a t are present i n everyone a n d d e t e r m i n e a universal consensus. L a t e r o n , Stoic o p i n i o n as to the o r i g i n o f these c o m m o n ideas changed, a n d they were t h o u g h t to be i n n a t e . Absolute certainty was d e r i v a b l e f r o m these ideas. T h i s theory has influenced very p r o f o u n d l y a l l the m o d e r n theories w h i c h c l a i m t h a t ideas are i n n a t e . T h e repercussions o f Stoicism i n logic as w e l l as i n ethics have been m u c h m o r e extensive a n d persistent t h a n is generally t h o u g h t ; i n the Renaissance especially,
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Stoic philosophy was perhaps the most i n f l u e n t i a l o f a l l t h e ancient systems t h a t were rediscovered. Stoic physics is based o n m a t e r i a l i s m or, m o r e precisely, o n the concept o f corporeality. T h i s physics establishes t w o principles, a n active a n d a passive; t h a t is, matter, a n d reason residing i n matter. T h i s reason is called God. T h i s is a corporeal p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h mingles w i t h m a t t e r i n the f o r m o f a generative fluid, or seminal reason (Xoyos aneppariKos). Aside f r o m the t w o principles, the Stoics distinguish the f o u r elements: fire, water, a i r , earth. B u t the active p r i n c i p l e is i d e n t i f i e d w i t h fire, f o l l o w i n g the i n s p i r a t i o n o f H e r a c l i t u s . N a t u r e is conceived o f as i f i t were a craft (Texvrj), d Are is thus called the craftsman or artificer (irvp rexviKov). H i s t o r y repeats itself i n cycles; w h e n the stars regain their o r i g i n a l positions, a great year has ended a n d the w o r l d is dest r o y e d i n a conflagration. After the w o r l d has thus r e t u r n e d to the p r i m o r d i a l fire, the cycle is repeated. T h i s doctrine is clearly a forer u n n e r o f Nietzsche's concept o f the eternal return. a
n
Stoicism identifies G o d w i t h the w o r l d ; G o d is the r u l e r o f the w o r l d , b u t he is i n t u r n substance, a n d the whole w o r l d is the substance o f G o d . N a t u r e , w h i c h is governed b y the p r i n c i p l e o f reason, is i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the D e i t y . T h e divine p r i n c i p l e binds a l l things together b y means o f a law, w h i c h is i d e n t i f i e d w i t h universal reason; this inexorable enchainment is destiny, o r fate (elp.app.evq). T h i s d o c t r i n e makes d i v i n a t i o n possible a n d leads to a determinism. B u t , o n the other h a n d , the Stoics believe t h a t a c e r t a i n element o f chance a n d o f h u m a n freedom are i n c l u d e d i n the general p l a n o f destiny, w h i c h appears at the same t i m e to be providence. A l l things serve the perfection o f the w h o l e ; the o n l y c r i t e r i o n for v a l u a t i o n is the universal d i v i n e l a w w h i c h holds e v e r y t h i n g i n its bonds, a n d w h i c h we call Nature. N a t u r e is the c u l m i n a t i o n o f Stoic physics a n d the f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e school's ethical teachings. Stoic ethics is also based on the idea of autarchia, or self-sufficiency. M a n , especially the wise m a n , must be self-sufficient. T h e connections o f Stoic ethics w i t h the ethics o f the Cynics are very p r o f o u n d a n d complete. T h e highest good is happiness—which has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h pleasure; happiness consists o f v i r t u e . V i r t u e , i n t u r n , consists i n l i v i n g i n accordance w i t h one's t r u e n a t u r e : vivere secundum naturam, Kara <j>vaiv M a n ' s nature is rational, and the life demanded b y Stoic ethics is the r a t i o n a l life. H u m a n reason is a p o r t i o n o f universal reason, a n d thus o u r nature puts us i n accord w i t h the entire universe, t h a t is, w i t h Nature. T h e wise m a n accepts N a t u r e j u s t as i t is, a n d molds h i m s e l f completely to the w i l l o f destiny: parere Deo libertas est, obedience to G o d is freedom. T h i s acceptance o f destiny is charac-
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teristic o f Stoic ethics. T h e Fates, said the Stoics, g u i d e the m a n w h o wishes to be g u i d e d ; t h e m a n w h o does n o t w i s h t o be guided they d r a g a l o n g w i t h t h e m . T h u s , resistance is useless. T h e wise m a n achieves independence a n d bears u p under a l l events, l i k e a rock t h a t defies a l l t h e assaults o f the waves. A t the same t i m e , t h e wise m a n attains selfsufficiency b y r e d u c i n g his needs: sustine et abstine, bear u p a n d do w i t h o u t . T h e wise m a n m u s t shed a l l his passions i n order to acquire i m p e r t u r b a b i l i t y , apathia, ataraxia. T h e wise m a n is master of himself, he lets n o t h i n g o v e r w h e l m h i m , he is n o t at t h e mercy o f external events; he can be h a p p y i n the midst of the severest pains a n d ills. T h e good things o f life m a y be, at the most, desirable a n d w o r t h y to be sought after, b u t t h e y d o n o t have true value a n d i m p o r t a n c e — o n l y v i r t u e has these qualities. V i r t u e consists i n r a t i o n a l c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e order of things, i n right reason. S t r i c t l y speaking, the concept o f d u t y , o f w h a t one " o u g h t " to do, does n o t exist i n ancient ethics. T h e ancient words for t h a t w h i c h " o u g h t " to be done—KaOrjKov i n Greek a n d qfficium i n L a t i n — c o n n o t e , rather, w h a t is " fitting," or " d e c e n t " ( t h a t is, w h a t is suitable, id quod decet), w h a t is " r i g h t " almost i n a n esthetic sense. T h a t w h i c h is " r i g h t " ( L a t i n rectum) is p r i m a r i l y t h a t w h i c h is " c o r r e c t " (i
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coexistence o f m e n i n cities, nations or a n y other f o r m o f c o m m u n i t y : "My
kingdom is not of this
world."
T h i s u n i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e is f u n d a m e n t a l l y missing i n Stoicism. I t makes its appeal o n l y to the n a t u r e o f m a n , b u t this is n o t a sufficient basis for a society. M e r e s i m i l a r i t y o f n a t u r e does not presuppose a c o m m o n concern t h a t can g r o u p a l l m e n together i n one c o m m u n i t y . I f cosmopolitanism is based o n l y o n this, i t is false. B u t there is another set o f reasons—historical reasons—that lead the Stoics to this i d e a : the replacement o f the city as a p o l i t i c a l u n i t . O v e r a l o n g p e r i o d , starting w i t h A l e x a n d e r the Great a n d c u l m i n a t i n g i n the R o m a n E m p i r e , the polls loses its v i t a l i t y . A n c i e n t m a n feels that the c i t y is no longer the l i m i t o f society; his p r o b l e m is i n seeing w h a t the n e w l i m i t is. But this is difficult to see; w h a t is obvious is the insufficiency o f the o l d idea. Therefore, ancient m a n tends to exaggerate the s i t u a t i o n , believing t h a t the l i m i t can o n l y be reached b y i n c l u d i n g the whole w o r l d — w h e r e a s the t r u t h is t h a t the p o l i t i c a l u n i t of the age is o n l y the E m p i r e . T h i s lack o f historical awareness, the brusque j u m p f r o m the city to the w o r l d , w h i c h kept ancient m a n f r o m a sufficiently precise and p r o f o u n d study of the character a n d needs of the E m p i r e , was one of the p r i n c i p a l causes of the decline o f the R o m a n E m p i r e , w h i c h never a t t a i n e d its f u l l and perfect f o r m . T h e Stoics, a n d especially the E m p e r o r M a r c u s Aurelius, felt t h a t they were citizens o f R o m e or o f the w o r l d ; they d i d n o t k n o w enough to be w h a t i t was t h e n necessary for t h e m to b e : citizens of the E m p i r e . T h u s the E m p i r e fell.
3. E P I C U R E A N I S M
Just as the Stoics correspond to the Cynics w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f post-Aristotelian philosophy, so the Epicureans display a m a r k e d parallelism w i t h the Cyrenaics; a n d j u s t as there was a f u n d a m e n t a l i d e n t i t y between the t w o earlier schools i n the Socratic t r a d i t i o n , so is there a k i n s h i p between Stoicism a n d E p i c u r e a n i s m . Epicurus was a n A t h e n i a n citizen b u t was b o r n i n Samos, to w h i c h his father h a d emigrated. H e came to Athens at the end of the f o u r t h c e n t u r y , a n d i n 306 B.C. he f o u n d e d his school, or c o m m u n i t y , i n a garden there. H e seems to have been a remarkable figure, w i t h e x t r a o r d i n a r y influence u p o n his followers. I n Epicureanism i t is clear t h a t the Greeks no longer understand philosophy as knowledge, b u t as a special w a y o f life. A few w o m e n also belonged to E p i c u r u s ' garden. T h e school acquired—especially after the founder's d e a t h — a n almost religious character, a n d was extremely i n f l u e n t i a l i n Greece a n d t h e R o m a n w o r l d . E p i c u r e a n i s m m a i n t a i n e d its a c t i v i t y a n d influence u n t i l the
Epicureanism f o u r t h century A . D . T h e most i m p o r t a n t exposition of the teachings o f Epicurus is to be f o u n d i n the poem b y T i t u s Lucretius Garus (97-55 B.C.) entitled De rerum natura ( O n the N a t u r e of T h i n g s ) . Epicurean p h i l o s o p h y is based o n a materialistic physics; essentially, i t revives D e m o c r i t u s ' philosophy, w i t h its t h e o r y of the atoms. E v e r y t h i n g is corporeal a n d formed b y the aggregation o f various atoms. T h e universe is p u r e l y mechanical: i t has no teleological end, a n d the gods take n o p a r t i n its o p e r a t i o n . T h e gods, like m e n , are m a t e r i a l , b u t t h e y are made o f finer, s h i n i n g atoms a n d , i n a d d i t i o n , are i m m o r t a l . Sensory perception is also explained b y the atomistic theory o f the eidola, or images, o f the things, w h i c h penetrate t h e sensory organs. But the Epicureans, too, are l a c k i n g i n the feeling for philosophical speculation. W h e n they discuss physics, they are not interested i n discovering the t r u t h concerning n a t u r e , b u t merely i n c a l m i n g t h e m selves. For example, they give not one, b u t several different physical explanations for t h u n d e r and l i g h t n i n g ; they are not really concerned about the t r u e e x p l a n a t i o n , b u t o n l y a b o u t k n o w i n g that explanations are possible. T h e y w a n t to show t h a t l i g h t n i n g is a n a t u r a l p h e n o m enon and n o t a display o f divine w r a t h ; they wish to make i t possible for m a n to l i v e i n serenity w i t h o u t fear o f the gods. A l l the teachings o f the Epicureans are directed t o w a r d ethics, the type of life t h a t the wise m a n should l i v e . Epicurus considers pleasure to be the t r u e g o o d ; i n a d d i t i o n , he says i t is pleasure t h a t shows us w h a t suits o u r nature a n d w h a t is repugnant to i t . H e thus corrects t h e notions o f u n n a t u r a l h o s t i l i t y t o w a r d pleasure t h a t were i n v a d i n g large areas o f Greek philosophy. A t first sight, Epicureanism a n d Stoicism appear to be at opposite poles; b u t the similarities between t h e m go deeper t h a n the differences. I n the first place, Epicurus makes v e r y definite demands o f pleasure: pleasure must be p u r e , u n m i x e d w i t h p a i n or discontent; i t m u s t be lasting a n d stable; finally, i t must leave m a n master of himself, free, i m p e r t u r b a b l e . T h i s eliminates sensual pleasures almost completely, and opens t h e w a y for other, m o r e subtle a n d spiritual pleasures— above a l l , for friendship and the j o y s o f h u m a n companionship. V i o l e n t passions are excluded f r o m E p i c u r e a n ethics because they overcome m a n . T h e ideal of the wise m a n is thus that o f the serene man, moderate i n everything, governed b y temperance, free f r o m worries, m a i n t a i n i n g a perfect balance i n a l l circumstances. N e i t h e r adversity n o r physical p a i n nor d e a t h disturbs the E p i c u r e a n . I t is w e l l k n o w n w i t h w h a t k i n d and cheerful resignation Epicurus bore u p under his extremely painful illness a n d his death. T h u s , this is a n i d e a l
9
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The Ideal of the Wise Man
of great asceticism w h i c h , i n its deepest roots, coincides w i t h t h e Stoic ideal. T h e w i t h d r a w a l f r o m p u b l i c office, the isolation f r o m the c o m m u n i t y , is even stronger i n Epicureanism t h a n i n Stoic circles. T h e two schools have a different p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e : i n one case, v i r t u e is to be a t t a i n e d ; i n the other case, pleasure is sought. B u t i n this t w i l i g h t period of the ancient w o r l d the type of life t h a t results i n the t w o schools is the same, a n d is denned b y t w o traits i n d i c a t i v e of h u m a n weariness: self-sufficiency a n d i m p e r t u r b a b i l i t y , b e i n g sufficient u n t o oneself a n d being d i s t u r b e d b y n o t h i n g .
4.
SKEPTICISM A N D ECLECTICISM
T h e lack o f interest i n t r u t h w h i c h dominates the eras i n w h i c h theoretic tension is absent,, is n o r m a l l y associated i n such eras w i t h the lack of confidence i n t r u t h , or skepticism. M a n has no t r u s t ; there arise suspicious a n d distrustful generations, w h i c h d o u b t t h a t m a n can a t t a i n t r u t h . T h i s is w h a t occurs i n the ancient w o r l d , a n d the process of the decline of theoretic speculation, w h i c h begins w i t h the d e a t h o f Aristotle, is contemporaneous w i t h the f o r m a t i o n o f the Skeptic schools. One of the roots of such skepticism is generally to be f o u n d i n a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f o p i n i o n s : u p o n becoming aware t h a t there have been m a n y different beliefs about each issue, the Skeptic loses a l l confidence that a n y o f the answers m a y be t r u e o r t h a t some new answer m a y be true. T h i s is the famous a r g u m e n t o f the oicahcovla r&v Sof <3i> (discrepancy a m o n g opinions). Nevertheless, a d i s t i n c t i o n m u s t be made between skepticism as a philosophical thesis a n d skepticism as a n a t t i t u d e i n life. As a philosophical thesis, i t is a c o n t r a d i c t o r y one, since i t affirms the impossibility o f k n o w i n g t r u t h , a l t h o u g h this affirmation itself claims to be true. T h u s , skepticism as a thesis refutes itself i n the v e r y act of being f o r m u l a t e d . T h e o t h e r aspect is d i f f e r e n t : this is the abstention f r o m a l l j u d g m e n t s (eVo^ij), skepticism i n life, w h i c h neither affirms n o r denies. T h i s skepticism appears i n h i s t o r y t i m e and again, a l t h o u g h here, too, i t is d o u b t f u l whether h u m a n life can r e m a i n floating i n this abstention w i t h o u t t a k i n g root i n convictions. T h e first a n d most famous of the Greek Skeptics, i f we disregard his forerunners a m o n g the Sophists, is P y r r h o , at the beginning o f the t h i r d century B.C. O t h e r Skeptics are T i m o n , Arcesilaus a n d Carneades, w h o l i v e d i n the t h i r d a n d second centuries B.C. L a t e r , b e g i n n i n g w i t h the first century A . D . , a new Skeptic c u r r e n t appears w i t h Aenesidemus a n d the famous Sextus E m p i r i c u s , w h o lived i n the second century a n d w r o t e the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Ilvppwveioi
Skepticism and Eclecticism
97
viroTVTTwoeis). Skepticism c o m p l e t e l y invaded the A c a d e m y , w h i c h since t h e d e a t h of Plato h a d m o v e d f u r t h e r and f u r t h e r a w a y f r o m the metaphysical stamp given i t b y its founder. T h e A c a d e m y was the h o m e o f Skepticism u n t i l its closing i n 529 A . D . b y o r d e r o f J u s t i n i a n . T h e Skeptics we have n a m e d belonged to the M i d d l e A c a d e m y a n d N e w A c a d e m y , so called to distinguish t h e m f r o m the O l d , o r o r i g i n a l , A c a d e m y . F o r centuries the t e r m " A c a d e m i c " m e a n t skeptic. Eclecticism is another p h e n o m e n o n o f eras o f philosophic decline. A t such times the spirit o f compromise and c o n c i l i a t i o n appears, b o r r o w i n g ideas f r o m various sources a n d b u i l d i n g systems t h a t w i l l b r i d g e the deepest discrepancies. I n general, this procedure tends to make philosophy t r i v i a l ; this was especially t r u e o f R o m a n c u l t u r e , w h i c h used the results o f philosophical t h o u g h t o n l y as m a t e r i a l for e r u d i t i o n a n d m o r a l i z i n g , keeping always at a distance f r o m true philosophic problems. T h e most i m p o r t a n t of the R o m a n eclectics is Cicero ( 106-43 - 0 • T h e life o f this major figure is very w e l l k n o w n . H i s philosophical w r i t i n g s are n o t o r i g i n a l , b u t are valuable as a copious repository o f references t o Greek philosophy. A t the same t i m e , Cicero was extrao r d i n a r i l y gifted i n p h i l o l o g y , a n d the t e r m i n o l o g y he coined to translate t h e expressions of Greek philosophy has h a d a great influence on m o d e r n languages a n d o n a l l E u r o p e a n philosophy, even t h o u g h his translations were n o t always perfect. O t h e r interesting figures are P l u t a r c h , w h o lived i n the first a n d second centuries A . D . a n d wrote, i n a d d i t i o n t o his famous Lives, a Moralia w i t h a n ethical c o n t e n t ; and P h i l o o f A l e x a n d r i a , a H e l l e n i z e d J e w w h o l i v e d i n t h e first century A . D . P h i l o t r i e d to find B i b l i c a l correspondences i n H e l l e n i c p h i losophy, above a l l for the p h i l o s o p h y o f Plato. T h e J e w i s h character of his d o c t r i n e is revealed especially i n the i m p o r t a n t role played i n i t b y G o d , a n d i n Philo's effort to reconcile Greek ideas w i t h the O l d Testament. I n c l u d e d a m o n g his works are a study o n the C r e a t i o n ( k n o w n by the L a t i n t i t l e De opificio mundi) a n d others on the i m m u t a b i l i t y o f G o d a n d o n the contemplative life. B
c
Neoplatonism
Metaphysics, w h i c h , s t r i c t l y speaking, h a d been absent f r o m Greek p h i l o s o p h y since A r i s t o t l e , reappears once again i n t h e last great system o f the Hellenic world—Neoplatonism. For the last t i m e the great metaphysical p r o b l e m is stated i n Greek terms; the f r a m e o f reference is still Greek, even t h o u g h i t shows definite C h r i s t i a n influences as w e l l as the influences of the w h o l e g r o u p o f O r i e n t a l religions w h i c h enter the G r e c o - R o m a n w o r l d i n the first centuries o f the C h r i s t i a n era. T h i s is a c r u c i a l m o m e n t , i n w h i c h philosophy is split i n t o t h e o n l y t w o t r u l y discontinuous phases i n its h i s t o r y ; there is, o n t h e one h a n d , ancient philosophy, a n d , o n the other, m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y , or, w h a t is the same t h i n g , Greek a n d C h r i s t i a n philosophy: the t w o basic types o f a u t h e n t i c a l l y philosophic t h o u g h t t h a t have appeared i n the w o r l d to date. P L O T I N U S . N e o p l a t o n i s m was founded i n the t h i r d c e n t u r y A . D . b y Plotinus (204-270). B o r n i n E g y p t , he started for the O r i e n t , going t o Persia a n d I n d i a w i t h the E m p e r o r G o r d i a n I I I ; l a t e r he settled p r i n c i p a l l y i n R o m e . H e was a v e r y i m p o r t a n t person i n his d a y a n d a t t r a c t e d t h e devoted a n d fervent a t t e n t i o n o f m a n y p u p i l s . Plotinus led a life o f strange asceticism a n d mystery, a n d he c l a i m e d t o have h a d several mystical experiences. H i s w r i t i n g s were collected b y his p u p i l , P o r p h y r y , i n six groups o f n i n e books each, w h i c h were consequently called the Enneads. T h i s w o r k is o f p r o f o u n d interest a n d contains a n o r i g i n a l philosophy w h i c h was enormously i n f l u e n t i a l o n later C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t . I t s influence was felt t h r o u g h o u t the M i d d l e Ages b u t p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g the first centuries o f t h a t e p o c h ; i n the t h i r 08
Neoplatonism
99
t e e n t h century i t was superseded b y the w r i t i n g s o f A r i s t o t l e , w h i c h h a d j u s t become k n o w n i n the West. Plotinus' system is governed b y t w o p r i n c i p a l features: its pantheism a n d its opposition to m a t e r i a l i s m . T h e p r i n c i p l e o f its ontological h i e r a r c h y is the One, w h i c h is at the same t i m e b e i n g , the Good and the D e i t y . A l l things emanate f r o m the O n e : first, nous, the w o r l d of the s p i r i t , o f the Ideas. Nous presupposes a recollection o f itself, a reflect i o n , a n d , therefore, a d u a l i s m . Secondly, the soul, the reflection o f noüs; Plotinus speaks o f a " w o r l d s o u l , " the v i v i f i e r a n d animator o f the entire w o r l d a n d o f the i n d i v i d u a l souls, w h i c h r e t a i n a trace o f the oneness of the w o r l d soul, w h i c h is, as i t were, t h e i r source. These souls occupy an i n t e r m e d i a t e position i n the w o r l d , a position halfway between nous and the bodies they i n f o r m . T h e lowest level o f being is m a t t e r , w h i c h is almost n o n - b e i n g : that w h i c h is m u l t i p l e , w h i c h barely exists or exists o n l y i n the furthest reaches o f the emanation. T h e soul must liberate itself f r o m matter, i n t o w h i c h i t periodically relapses t h r o u g h the reincarnations w h i c h are a p a r t o f the theory o f t r a n s m i g r a t i o n . T h e r e is the possibility o f frequent ecstasies; t h a t is, states o f being outside (or beside) oneself. I n such a state the soul frees itself f r o m matter e n t i r e l y a n d unites w i t h the D e i t y , the One, to become the One itself. M a k i n g use of one of Plato's concepts, Plotinus assigns great i m p o r t a n c e t o b e a u t y : beautiful things are the most accurate visual representations o f the Ideas, a n d b y means of them the suprasensible w o r l d is manifested i n sensible f o r m . Neoplatonism is pantheistic. I t does not distinguish between G o d a n d the w o r l d ; the w o r l d proceeds f r o m the O n e , n o t b y the process of c r e a t i o n (an idea foreign to Greek t h o u g h t ) , b u t b y t h a t o f emanation. T h e One's very being diffuses a n d manifests itself, makes itself explicit i n the entire w o r l d , f r o m noüs d o w n to m a t t e r . Plotinus employs s t r i k i n g l y beautiful a n d significant metaphors to e x p l a i n this emanat i o n . F o r example, he compares the Universe to a tree w i t h a single r o o t , f r o m w h i c h the t r u n k , the branches a n d even the leaves spring. I n a yet more acute a n d p r o f o u n d metaphor he compares i t to a l i g h t , a p o w e r f u l beam w h i c h spreads a n d diffuses t h r o u g h space; d u r i n g the fight against darkness i t grows progressively d i m m e r a n d is gradually extinguished. T h e last g l o w , j u s t before the l i g h t is extinguished a n d darkness reigns, is m a t t e r . T h e l i g h t is always the same i n t h a t i t comes f r o m the same powerful source, b u t i t passes t h r o u g h a series of degrees o f strength r a n g i n g f r o m plenary being d o w n to nothingness, to become ever weaker a n d m o r e diminished. O n e sees similarities between Neoplatonic d o c t r i n e a n d several C h r i s t i a n themes (perhaps d u e to the influence o f P l o t i n u s ' teacher, A m m o n i u s Saccas) and this
too
Neoplatonism
explains Neoplatonism's great influence o n the Fathers o f the C h u r c h a n d o n m e d i e v a l thinkers, p a r t i c u l a r l y the mystics. M a n y o f the w r i t i n g s o f the mystics are o f N e o p l a t o n i c i n s p i r a t i o n , a n d p a n t h e i s m has been a great danger w h i c h C h r i s t i a n mysticism has constantly h a d to skirt. S t r i c t l y speaking, Plotinus represents the first Greek w h o — d o u b t less influenced b y C h r i s t i a n doctrines—dares to conceive o f the w o r l d as something t h a t is a c t u a l l y produced, instead o f as s o m e t h i n g t h a t is m e r e l y " m a n u f a c t u r e d " o r " o r d e r e d . " T h e w o r l d ' s b e i n g is received; i t is a p r o d u c t of the D e i t y , t h e O n e . H o w e v e r , H e l l e n i c t h o u g h t is n o t capable o f c o m i n g to grips w i t h t h e p r o b l e m o f the void, a n d so the w o r l d is seen t o have been p r o d u c e d b y the O n e , not from nothingness, butfrom itself. I n the f i n a l analysis, d i v i n e being a n d t h a t o f the w o r l d are i d e n t i c a l . T h i s theory gives rise to the concept o f emanation, the concrete f o r m o f N e o p l a t o n i c p a n t h e i s m , w h i c h a c t u a l l y amounts to a n a t t e m p t t o conceive o f t h e c r e a t i o n w i t h o u t a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h e v o i d . T h i s is t h e characteristic r e a c t i o n o f the Greek m i n d w h e n conf r o n t e d w i t h t h e idea o f c r e a t i o n , w h i c h was i n t r o d u c e d b y JudaeoChristian thought. M a n occupies a n i n t e r m e d i a t e position i n Plotinus' system. H i s place is between t h a t o f the gods a n d t h a t of the animals, a n d a c c o r d i n g to Plotinus m a n can i n c l i n e t o w a r d the one o r the other. T h e r e is a l i n k between m a n a n d w h a t is superior to h i m , a n d he can raise himself u p to t h e highest level. Plotinus adds, " M a n is a b e a u t i f u l creature, the most b e a u t i f u l creature possible, a n d his fate i n the p l o t o f the universe is superior to t h a t o f any other a n i m a l o n e a r t h . " NEOPLATONIC
PHILOSOPHERS. Neoplatonism
flourished
without
i n t e r r u p t i o n u n t i l t h e s i x t h c e n t u r y — t h a t is, u n t i l t h e e n d o f the a n c i e n t w o r l d . I t s influence p e r m e a t e d the t h o u g h t o f t h e Fathers o f the C h u r c h a n d later t h a t o f t h e medieval Scholastics. O n e sees references t o the Platonic sources o f the first centuries o f Scholasticism, b u t one m u s t realize t h a t these are largely N e o p l a t o n i c influences, w h i c h have constituted a n exceptionally active element i n a l l later philosophy. P o r p h y r y (232-304 A . D . ) , P l o t i n u s ' closest p u p i l , w r o t e t h e school's most i n f l u e n t i a l books; he condensed his master's doctrines i n t o a b r i e f treatise e n t i t l e d 'Aoppai 7700s- TCC voryra. (Aids to the S t u d y o f the
I n t e l l i g i b l e s ) . H e also w r o t e a n Eisagoge, or I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the Categories o f A r i s t o t l e , w h i c h is also called On the Five Terms (genus a n d species, difference, p r o p e r t y a n d accident), a w o r k o f g r e a t r e n o w n i n t h e M i d d l e Ages. I a m b l i c h u s , a S y r i a n w h o died a r o u n d the year 330, was a p u p i l o f P o r p h y r y ; he was p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the
Neoplatonism
101
religious aspect o f N e o p l a t o n i s m , a n d became v e r y famous. T h e emperor J u l i a n t h e Apostate was also a N e o p l a t o n i s t . T h e last i m p o r t a n t philosopher o f the school was Proclus ( 4 2 0 - 4 8 5 ) , f r o m Constant i n o p l e . Proclus was a n active w r i t e r a n d teacher, a n d dealt w i t h a l l the philosophical themes o f the epoch. H e w r o t e a rather u n o r i g i n a l general study, a systematization of N e o p l a t o n i c t h i n k i n g entitled the Uroixelojcris OeoXoyiK-q (Elementatio theologica, as i t was called i n L a t i n ) . H e also w r o t e l e n g t h y commentaries on Plato a n d o n the first book o f Euclid's Elements; the l a t t e r commentaries are o f great interest i n the history of Hellenic m a t h e m a t i c s , a n d the p r o l o g u e w h i c h accompanies t h e m is considered a m a j o r text for this h i s t o r y . W e must also i n c l u d e a m o n g the N e o p l a t o n i c thinkers the anonymous fifth-century a u t h o r w h o u n t i l the fifteenth c e n t u r y was t h o u g h t t o be Dionysius the Areopagite, the first bishop of Athens; he is n o w generally referred t o as Pseudo-Dionysius. H i s w o r k s — T h e Celestial Hierarchy, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy,
The Divine
Names a n d Mystical
Theology—were
trans-
l a t e d i n t o L a t i n several times, a n d w i e l d e d i m m e n s e a u t h o r i t y a n d influence d u r i n g the M i d d l e Ages. Greek philosophy ends w i t h Neoplatonism. A f t e r w a r d there comes a new philosophic stage, i n w h i c h the C h r i s t i a n m i n d ponders the metaphysical p r o b l e m . Greek philosophy was t h e earliest philosophy; this fact is essential, since philosophy received its f u n d a m e n t a l character a n d methods a t t h e hands of the Greeks. A l l later philosophy passes t h r o u g h the channels w h i c h the Greek m i n d opened. T h e i m p r i n t o f H e l l e n i c philsophy is therefore—as the Greeks wished i t to be—-for always, is ael. W e s t e r n man's very modes o f t h o u g h t are i n essence derived f r o m the Greeks. T h i s is true to such a degree t h a t philosophers w h o have h a d to conceive of kinds of objects o r even realities other t h a n those t h a t were discussed i n Greece have h a d t o struggle w i t h the p r o b l e m o f freeing themselves f r o m the H e l l e n i c molds o f Western mentality. T h u s , Greek p h i l o s o p h y enjoys an active existence as a n i n t e g r a l p a r t of present-day philosophy.
CHRISTIANITY
Christianity
and Philosophy
C h r i s t i a n i t y marks the most p r o f o u n d division i n the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y ; i t separates the t w o great phases o f Western t h o u g h t . However, i t w o u l d be w r o n g to t h i n k o f C h r i s t i a n i t y as a p h i l o s o p h y ; i t is something q u i t e d i f f e r e n t — a r e l i g i o n . N o r can one speak precisely o f " C h r i s t i a n p h i l o s o p h y , " i f the adjective " C h r i s t i a n " is m e a n t to define the character o f the philosophy. T h e o n l y philosophy t h a t we can call C h r i s t i a n philosophy is the philosophy of Christians as Christians; t h a t is, t h a t philosophy w h i c h is shaped b y the C h r i s t i a n s i t u a t i o n f r o m w h i c h a p a r t i c u l a r philosopher begins to philosophize. I n this sense C h r i s t i a n i t y has played a decisive role i n the history o f m e t a physics, because i t has essentially altered the presuppositions u p o n w h i c h m a n bases his thought a n d actions a n d , therefore, the s i t u a t i o n f r o m w h i c h he m u s t philosophize. T h e C h r i s t i a n is different a n d therefore his p h i l o s o p h y is also different; for example, different f r o m Greek philosophy. * C h r i s t i a n i t y introduces an entirely new idea to i n t e r p r e t the existence o f the w o r l d and m a n : the idea o f the Creation. In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram: m o d e r n philosophy derives f r o m this first sentence o f Genesis. W e saw t h a t the Greek's p r o b l e m concerned m o t i o n : things are problematic because they move, because they change, because they come to be a n d cease to be w h a t they are. Being is opposed b y non-being, by something's n o t being w h a t i t is. B e g i n n i n g w i t h the C h r i s t i a n era i t is nothingness, the v o i d , t h a t menaces being. * See my study " L a escolástica en su mundo y en el nuestro" in Biografía la
de
Filosofía.
IOJ
io6
Christianity
and Philosophy
T h e Greek d i d n o t question the existence o f a l l things, whereas this is exactly w h a t the C h r i s t i a n finds strange a n d i n need of e x p l a n a t i o n . I t is possible t h a t things m i g h t not have existed; a n d so t h e i r v e r y existence—and n o t w h a t they are—requires j u s t i f i c a t i o n . ' ' T h e Greek is alienated b y the w o r l d because of its changeability. T h e E u r o p e a n o f the Christian era is alienated by its n u l l i t y or, better yet, its nihility.... F o r the Greek, the w o r l d is something t h a t changes; for the m a n o f the C h r i s t i a n era i t is a nothingness t h a t seems to be o r e x i s t . . . . W i t h this change of perspective being comes to m e a n s o m e t h i n g toto caelo different f r o m w h a t i t m e a n t i n Greece: for a Greek, b e i n g means to be there, at h a n d ; for the W e s t e r n European, being means, first o f a l l , not being nothingness. . . . I n a c e r t a i n sense, t h e n , the Greek still philosophizes from
the point of reference of being, and the W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n philoso¬
phizes/rom the point of reference of nothingness." de
( Z u b i r i : Sobre
elproblema
lafilosofia.)
T h i s basic difference separates the t w o great phases o f philosophy. T h e p r o b l e m is stated i n t w o essentially different ways: i t becomes a new p r o b l e m . A n d , j u s t as i n the life o f the C h r i s t i a n there are t w o w o r l d s — t h i s w o r l d a n d the o t h e r — t h e r e m u s t be t w o different meanings for the w o r d " b e i n g " i f i t is to a p p l y i n b o t h instances; t h a t is, to God's being a n d to the world's being. T h e concept o f the Creation allows the being o f the w o r l d to be i n t e r p r e t e d through the being of God. O n one h a n d we have G o d , the t r u e being, the C r e a t o r ; o n the other h a n d we have t h e created being, God's creature, whose being is received. T h e religious t r u t h o f the Creation requires the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this being, a n d poses the philosophic p r o b l e m o f the creative a n d created b e i n g ; t h a t is, God's being a n d t h a t o f H i s creature. T h u s Christianity, w h i c h is n o t philosophy, affects philosophy i n a decisive w a y ; a n d the philosophy t h a t arises f r o m the basic s i t u a t i o n o f the C h r i s t i a n is w h a t m a y w i t h precision be called Christian philosophy. T h i s t e r m involves neither Christianity's consecrating a philosophy nor the necessity of m a k i n g a n untenable a t t r i b u t i o n o f the C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n to some philosophy; rather, i t describes the p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h emerges out o f the major p r o b l e m confronting C h r i s t i a n i t y — t h a t o f its o w n r e a l i t y before G o d . I n a b r o a d sense, this takes place i n a l l E u r o p e a n philosophy after the Greek era, a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the first centuries of the C h r i s t i a n era a n d i n medieval philosophy.
Patristic
Speculation
T h e t h o u g h t o f the Fathers o f the C h u r c h i n the first centuries o f the Christian era is called Patristic speculation. T h e Christians' purpose is neither i n t e l l e c t u a l n o r theoretical. I n spite o f the e x t r a o r d i n a r y p r o f u n d i t y o f t h e i r w r i t i n g s , St. J o h n a n d St. Paul do not i n t e n d to create a p h i l o s o p h y ; i t is another m a t t e r t h a t philosophy must i n e v i t a b l y c o n cern itself w i t h t h e m . B u t , l i t t l e b y l i t t l e , speculative themes a c q u i r e a place i n C h r i s t i a n i t y . This is b r o u g h t a b o u t p a r t i c u l a r l y b y t w o s t i m u l i o f a p o l e m i c a l n a t u r e : heresies a n d the intellectual reaction o f p a g a n ism. Religious t r u t h s are i n t e r p r e t e d , elaborated o n , a n d f o r m u l a t e d i n t o dogma. T h e first centuries o f the C h r i s t i a n era are those o f the establishment o f Christian dogma. O r t h o d o x i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is accompanied b y m a n y heresies, w h i c h c a l l for greater conceptual precision i f the C h u r c h is to discuss t h e m , repel t h e m a n d convince the f a i t h f u l o f the a u t h e n t i c t r u t h . D o g m a is f o r m u l a t e d a l l d u r i n g the struggle against the numerous heretical movements. O n the other h a n d , the pagans p a y belated a t t e n t i o n to the r e l i g i o n o f Christ. A t first i t seemed to t h e m t o be a strange a n d a b s u r d sect, one w h i c h they d i d n o t clearly distinguish f r o m J u d a i s m ; they considered i t a r e l i g i o n m a d e u p b y m e n w h o were almost insane, w h o worshipped a d e a d — a n d c r u c i f i e d — G o d , a r e l i g i o n o f people w h o related the most surprising a n d disagreeable stories. W h e n St. P a u l speaks on the Areopagus to the refined a n d curious Athenians o f the first century, w h o are o n l y interested i n saying or hearing s o m e t h i n g new, they listen a t t e n t i v e l y a n d courteously w h i l e he speaks o f the unknown God w h o m he has come to announce ; b u t w h e n he mentions the resurrection o f the dead, some 107
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l a u g h a n d others say t h a t they w i l l listen to h i m speak of t h a t some other time, a n d almost a l l o f t h e m leave h i m . T h e almost t o t a l ignorance of C h r i s t i a n i t y o n the p a r t of even such a m a n as T a c i t u s is w e l l k n o w n . L a t e r , C h r i s t i a n i t y acquires greater influence; i t reaches the higher classes, a n d paganism begins to take notice o f i t . T h e n the intellectual attacks begin, a n d the new r e l i g i o n m u s t defend itself f r o m t h e m i n like m a n n e r ; to effect this i t must m a k e use of the i n t e l l e c t u a l instruments w h i c h i t has at its c o m m a n d : t h e Greek philosophical concepts. I n this w a y C h r i s t i a n i t y , w h i c h shows a total hostility t o w a r d reason i n m a n y of its earliest figures (the most famous example is T e r t u l l i a n ) , ends b y assimilating Greek p h i l o s o p h y i n order to use i t , i n Apologist w r i t i n g s , i n defending itself against attacks based o n t h e p o i n t of view of Greek philosophy. T h u s , C h r i s t i a n i t y sees itself c o m m i t t e d , first, to the i n t e l l e c t u a l f o r m u l a t i o n o f d o g m a a n d , secondly, to a r a t i o n a l discussion w i t h its heretical or pagan enemies. T h i s is the o r i g i n o f Patristic speculation, the purpose of w h i c h , I repeat, is not philosophical, and w h i c h c a n be considered philosophical o n l y i n a l i m i t e d sense. THE
PHILOSOPHICAL
SOURCES
OF
PATRISTIC
SPECULATION.
The
Fathers of the C h u r c h do n o t have a definite a n d precise system. T h e y take f r o m H e l l e n i c t h o u g h t the elements w h i c h they need at t h a t p a r t i c u l a r m o m e n t . O n e must also bear i n m i n d t h a t their knowledge of Greek philosophy is very incomplete a n d f a u l t y . I n general, they are eclectics: they select f r o m a l l the pagan schools w h a t seems to t h e m most useful i n o b t a i n i n g their goals. W e f i n d a f o r m a l d e c l a r a t i o n o f eclecticism i n the w r i t i n g s o f Clement o f A l e x a n d r i a (Stromateis [Miscellanies] , 1 , 7 ) . B u t the major philosophic source w h i c h nourishes the Fathers is, o f course, Neoplatonism, w h i c h is to influence t h e M i d d l e Ages so greatly, especially u n t i l the t h i r t e e n t h century, w h e n its influence w i l l pale before Aristotle's prestige. T h e Fathers come to k n o w Plato ( i n a r a t h e r imprecise w a y ) t h r o u g h the N e o p l a t o n i c philosophers (Plotinus, P o r p h y r y , etc.), a n d they look for analogies to C h r i s t i a n i t y i n P l a t o n i c t h o u g h t . T h e y do n o t k n o w very m u c h a b o u t A r i s t o t l e ; the R o m a n philosophers—Seneca, C i c e r o — a r e better k n o w n to t h e m , a n d i n these figures they f i n d a repertory o f ideas w h i c h stems f r o m t h e w h o l e range of Greek philosophy. T H E P R O B L E M S . T h e questions w h i c h most concern the Fathers o f the C h u r c h are the most i m p o r t a n t problems created b y dogma. As a general rule, philosophic problems are created b y religious, revealed t r u t h s w h i c h r e q u i r e r a t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a n d this is the case i n the M i d d l e Ages. T h u s , reason is used to clarify a n d f o r m u l a t e d o g m a , or to defend i t . T h e C r e a t i o n , God's relationship w i t h the w o r l d , e v i l ,
Patristic
Speculation
the soul, t h e m e a n i n g o f life a n d o f redemption—these are t h e m a j o r problems w i t h w h i c h the early Fathers o f the C h u r c h concern t h e m selves. A n d alongside these p r o b l e m s we find strictly theological questions, such as those t h a t refer to the essence o f G o d , t h e T r i n i t y o f d i v i n e persons, a n d so o n . T h i r d l y a n d finally, there appear the C h r i s t i a n moralists w h o are to establish the bases o f a n e w ethics w h i c h , a l t h o u g h i t makes use o f H e l l e n i c concepts, is essentially founded o n the idea of sin, o n grace a n d o n man's relationship w i t h his Creator, a n d w h i c h culminates i n a n idea w h i c h is f o r e i g n t o Greek t h o u g h t — t h e concept of salvation. These problems are dealt w i t h b y a whole series of thinkers w h o are frequently o f the first r a n k b u t w h o d o n o t always r e m a i n o r t h o d o x ; they sometimes fall i n t o heresies. W e w i l l briefly consider the most i m p o r t a n t moments i n the e v o l u t i o n w h i c h culminates i n the' b r i l l i a n t t h o u g h t o f St. Augustine: t h e Gnostics, the Apologists, St. J u s t i n M a r t y r a n d T e r t u l l i a n , the A l e x a n d r i a n s (Clement a n d O r i g e n ) , the C a p p a d o c i a n Fathers, a n d so f o r t h . T H E G N O S T I C S . T h e p r i n c i p a l heretical movement o f the first centuries is Gnosticism. I t is r e l a t e d t o Greek philosophy o f the f i n a l epoch, p a r t i c u l a r l y to N e o p l a t o n i c ideas, a n d also to t h e t h o u g h t o f P h i l o , the Hellenized J e w w h o i n t e r p r e t e d the Bible allegorically. Gnosticism, a Christian heresy, is also closely l i n k e d w i t h a l l the syncretism o f t h e O r i e n t a l religions w h i c h was so complex a n d i n t r i c a t e at the b e g i n n i n g o f the C h r i s t i a n era. T h e Gnostic p r o b l e m concerns the r e a l i t y o f the w o r l d a n d , m o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y , of e v i l ; i t is a d u a l i s m between g o o d (God) and e v i l ( m a t t e r ) . By the process o f e m a n a t i o n the d i v i n e b e i n g produces a series o f eons whose perfection g r a d u a l l y decreases ; the w o r l d is a n i n t e r m e d i a t e stage between w h a t is divine and w h a t is m a t e r i a l . T h i s system allows the essential features o f C h r i s t i a n i t y — s u c h as the c r e a t i o n o f the w o r l d a n d the r e d e m p t i o n o f m a n — t o a c q u i r e a n a t u r a l character, as simple moments o f the great struggle between the elements o f t h e dualism, between w h a t is d i v i n e and w h a t is m a t e r i a l . A f u n d a m e n t a l Gnostic idea is t h a t o f the anoKardaTaais rravTUiv, the restitution or restoration of a l l things to their proper places. Gnostic knowledge is n o t knowledge i n t h e usual sense of the w o r d , n o r is i t revelation ; i t is a special, superior i l l u m i n a t i o n or intelligence, the so-called gnosis (yv&ais). Obviously, these ideas can be reconciled w i t h the sacred C h r i s t i a n texts only b y r e s o r t i n g to very forced allegorical interpretations, a n d the Gnostics therefore become heretics. Closely related to t h e m is a movement t h a t has been called C h r i s t i a n gnosis, w h i c h opposes t h e Gnostics w i t h great a c u i t y . T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f Gnosticism, w h i c h almost became a m a r g i n a l , hetero-
1
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d o x c h u r c h , was very great, especially u n t i l t h e F i r s t C o u n c i l o f N i c a e a i n the year 325. THE A P O L O G I S T S . Faced w i t h divergences w i t h i n the C h r i s t i a n w o r l d a n d , above a l l , w i t h t h e attacks o f the pagans, the Apologists c a r r y o n a strong defense o f C h r i s t i a n i t y . T h e t w o most i m p o r t a n t Apologists are J u s t i n , w h o suffered m a r t y r d o m a n d was canonized, a n d T e r t u l l i a n . L a t e r a n d less i m p o r t a n t Apologists are St. C y p r i a n , A r n o b i u s a n d L a c t a n t i u s , w h o l i v e d i n the t h i r d t o f o u r t h centuries. J u s t i n w r o t e i n Greek; T e r t u l l i a n wrote i n the L a t i n o f Carthage, i n R o m a n i z e d n o r t h A f r i c a , as d i d St. Augustine later. T h e r e is a p r o f o u n d difference between J u s t i n a n d T e r t u l l i a n i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e t o w a r d Greek c u l t u r e a n d , especially, philosophy. J u s t i n came o u t o f t h a t c u l t u r e ; he knew i t a n d studied i t before his conversion to C h r i s t i a n i t y . H e uses this b a c k g r o u n d i n his exposition o f the t r u t h o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , m a k i n g constant reference t o H e l l e n i c ideas; he tries to show t h a t these ideas are i n agreement w i t h C h r i s t i a n revelation. Therefore there is evident i n Justin's w r i t i n g s a n acceptance of the pagans' r a t i o n a l methods of t h o u g h t w h i c h contrasts w i t h T e r t u l l i a n ' s hostility to those methods. Tertullian Apologeticus,
(c. 160-220 A . D . ) w r o t e various i m p o r t a n t books: De idolatria,
De anima. H e was a passionate enemy o f
Gnosticism a n d the entire p a g a n culture, i n c l u d i n g the very concept o f r a t i o n a l knowledge. I n his attacks o n the Gnostics, w h o resorted t o philosophic methods, h e attacks philosophy itself. T h e r e is a w h o l e g r o u p o f famous sayings o f T e r t u l l i a n t h a t a f f i r m t h e certainty o f r e v e l a t i o n o n the v e r y basis o f its incomprehensibility, its r a t i o n a l impossibility. O u t s t a n d i n g a m o n g these sayings is a n expression t r a d i t i o n a l l y a t t r i b u t e d to h i m , a l t h o u g h not f o u n d i n his w r i t i n g s : Credo quia absurdum ( I believe because i t is absurd). B u t this o p i n i o n , s t r i c t l y e x a m i n e d , is inadmissible i n C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g , a n d the doctrines o f T e r t u l l i a n — a fiery, severe a n d eloquent A p o l o g i s t — a r e n o t always irreproachable. T h i s is t r u e , for example, o f his traducian doctrines concerning the soul, w h i c h he believed to be i n h e r i t e d t h r o u g h p r o creation f r o m one's parents, like physical traits. T h i s doctrine was p a r t i c u l a r l y intended to e x p l a i n the transmission o f o r i g i n a l sin f r o m one generation to the next. A l l things considered, despite T e r t u l l i a n ' s vehement opposition to H e l l e n i c speculation, he is greatly indebted t o i t , a n d his w r i t i n g s are permeated b y the influence o f the Greek philosophers. T H E G R E E K F A T H E R S . Gnosticism was combated i n a n especially i n t e l l i g e n t m a n n e r b y a series o f C h u r c h Fathers o f Greek b a c k g r o u n d a n d language, f r o m St. Irenaeus (second c e n t u r y A . D . ) u n t i l the end o f
Patristic
Speculation
the f o u r t h century. St. Irenaeus, one of the earliest f o r m u l a t o r s of d o g m a i n the East, uses f a i t h , pistis, t o oppose the special i l l u m i n a t i o n , gnosis, o f the Gnostics. T h i s is a h i g h l y significant m o m e n t : the r e t u r n to the security of revealed t r a d i t i o n , to the c o n t i n u i t y o f t h e C h u r c h , w h i c h h a d been menaced b y the Gnostic movement. C l e m e n t of A l e x a n d r i a , w h o d i e d at the b e g i n n i n g o f the t h i r d cent u r y , w r o t e the Stromateis (Miscellanies), a n eclectic b o o k f u l l of Greek philosophic ideas. H e places a n immense value o n reason a n d p h i losophy, a i m i n g to achieve a comprehension, a t r u e a l b e i t a Christian gnosis, w h i c h w i l l be s u b o r d i n a t e to revealed f a i t h . Such a gnosis w o u l d be the supreme c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h , and philosophy a p r e l i m i n a r y stage for a r r i v i n g at t h a t unsurpassable knowledge. O r i g e n , a p u p i l o f C l e m e n t w h o l i v e d from 185 t o 254 A . D . , wrote a w o r k of c a p i t a l i m p o r t a n c e , ilepi dpx&v, De principiis. O r i g e n , too, is greatly influenced b y Greek t h i n k i n g , even more so t h a n his teacher. H e gathers together the w h o l e w o r l d of ideas t h a t were i n ferment i n t h i r d - c e n t u r y A l e x a n d r i a . A r i s t o t l e , Plato and the Stoics, especially as t r a n s m i t t e d b y Philo a n d the Neoplatonists, are O r i g e n ' s sources. T h e d o c t r i n e o f Creation has a p a r t i c u l a r significance i n his w r i t i n g s . T h i s d o c t r i n e , decisive for a l l l a t e r philosophy, interprets t h e Creation rigorously as the p r o d u c t i o n o f the w o r l d from nothingness b y a n act o f free w i l l of G o d . Creation is thereby clearly contrasted w i t h every type of generation or e m a n a t i o n , a n d the separation between Greek and C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g is sharply demarcated. But n o t even O r i g e n was completely free from heterodoxy, w h i c h was a constant menace i n those first centuries of C h r i s t i a n i t y w h e n dogma was n o t y e t sufficiently precise a n d w h e n the C h u r c h d i d n o t yet possess the m a t u r e body o f d o c t r i n e t h a t began to exist o n l y w i t h the theology of St. A u g u s t i n e . A f t e r A l e x a n d r i a , A n t i o c h a n d Cappadocia were t h e centers i n w h i c h Eastern theology most flourished. A series of heresies, p r i m a r i l y A r i a n i s m , Nestorianism a n d Pelagianism, occasioned a series o f cont r o v e r s i e s — T r i n i t a r i a n , C h r i s t o l o g i c a l and a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l , respectively. A r i a n i s m was c o m b a t e d b y St. Athanasius, bishop o f A l e x a n d r i a ( f o u r t h c e n t u r y ) , and b y the three Cappadocian Fathers, St. Gregory of Nyssa, his brother St. Basil the Great and St. G r e g o r y o f Nazianzus, w h o were o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y i m p o r t a n c e i n the f o r m a t i o n o f C h r i s t i a n d o g m a a n d ethics. I n the West, A r i a n i s m was c o m b a t e d b y St. Ambrose, t h e famous bishop o f M i l a n . Patristic t h o u g h t attains its f u l l m a t u r i t y i n the f o u r t h century, at the m o m e n t w h e n the heretical attacks become most acute. T h e three heresies m e n t i o n e d above, together w i t h the great M a n i c h a e a n
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m o v e m e n t extending f r o m East to West, are, o n the one h a n d , t h r e a t e n i n g the C h u r c h . O n the other h a n d , C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t has a c q u i r e d p r o f u n d i t y a n d c l a r i t y , as w e l l as social v a l i d i t y w i t h i n the R o m a n E m p i r e . T h e ancient w o r l d is i n its last stage. F o r some t i m e the barbarians have been c l a m o r i n g at a l l the gates o f the E m p i r e . A l l a l o n g the Empire's frontiers is felt the pressure o f the G e r m a n i c tribes, w h o continue to i n f i l t r a t e slowly before accomplishing their great b r e a k - t h r o u g h i n the fifth c e n t u r y . Above a l l , paganism has ceased to exist. R o m a n culture wears itself o u t i n labors o f c o m m e n t a r y , a n d goes o n d e r i v i n g its n o u r i s h m e n t , after so m a n y centuries, f r o m a p h i l o s o p h y — G r e e k philosophy-—that is incapable o f r e n e w a l . A t this p o i n t St. Augustine appears, the c u l m i n a t i o n o f Patristic t h o u g h t . I n his immense personality he combines the ancient w o r l d , t o w h i c h he s t i l l belongs, a n d the m o d e r n age, w h i c h he heralds a n d f o r w h i c h he h i m s e l f is the p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e . T h e w o r k o f St. A u g u s t i n e sums u p this decisive step f r o m one w o r l d to another.
St.
i.
Augustine
LIFE AND
CHARACTER
St. Augustine is one o f the most interesting figures o f his t i m e , o f C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d o f p h i l o s o p h y . H i s h i g h l y o r i g i n a l a n d many-faceted personality leaves a p r o f o u n d i m p r i n t on e v e r y t h i n g to w h i c h he turns his h a n d . M e d i e v a l p h i l o s o p h y and theology, w h a t has been called Scholasticism; a l l o f C h r i s t i a n dogma; entire disciplines, such as the philosophy of the s p i r i t a n d the philosophy o f history, show the u n m i s takable m a r k he set o n t h e m . B u t there is m o r e : the s p i r i t o f Christianity a n d o f the m o d e r n age have been decisively influenced b y St. August i n e , a n d the R e f o r m a t i o n as w e l l as the C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n h a d recourse to his w r i t i n g s as a p a r t i c u l a r source o f d o c t r i n e . St. Augustine was f r o m A f r i c a . This must n o t be forgotten. H e was, l i k e T e r t u l l i a n , f r o m A f r i c a , a son o f that R o m a n i z e d a n d Christiani z e d A f r i c a of the f o u r t h c e n t u r y w h i c h was a h o t b e d o f heresies, where v a r i e d religious forces coexisted, all a n i m a t e d b y a n extraordinary vehemence. H e was b o r n at Tagaste i n N u m i d i a , near Carthage, i n 3 5 4 . I n his f a m i l y b a c k g r o u n d t w o quite different influences m e t : the influence of his father, Patricius, a pagan magistrate w h o was bapt i z e d o n l y when d y i n g , a v i o l e n t and w r a t h f u l m a n o f fiery sensuality ( t h a t sensuality w h i c h was later to trouble A u g u s t i n e so g r e a t l y ) ; a n d the influence o f his m o t h e r , M o n i c a , later canonized b y the C h u r c h , a w o m a n o f great v i r t u e a n d a deeply C h r i s t i a n s p i r i t . Augustine, w h o l o v e d his mother devotedly, was faced w i t h i n w a r d struggles between the conflicting impulses o f his double inheritance. " 5
ii4
St.
Augustine
A u r e l i u s Augustinus pursued his studies at a very e a r l y age i n Tagaste, i n M a d a u r u s , and t h e n , w h e n he was seventeen, i n Carthage. A t this t i m e he fell i n love w i t h a w o m a n , w h o bore h i m a son, Adeodatus. I t was also i n this p e r i o d t h a t Augustine first f e l t the power of philosophic revelation, w h e n he r e a d the Hortensius of Cicero, w h i c h made a v e r y s t r o n g impression o n h i m . F r o m t h a t t i m e o n he a c q u i r e d a n awareness o f the p r o b l e m o f philosophy, a n d his l o n g i n g for t r u t h was never to leave h i m u n t i l his d e a t h . H e examined t h e Scriptures, but they seemed childish to h i m , a n d his p r i d e f r u s t r a t e d this first contact w i t h C h r i s t i a n i t y . H e t h e n began to seek t r u t h i n the M a n i chaean sect. Manes was b o r n i n Babylonia at the b e g i n n i n g of the t h i r d c e n t u r y , and preached his doctrines i n Persia a n d m u c h of Asia, even reaching I n d i a a n d C h i n a . R e t u r n i n g to Persia, he was arrested a n d crucified. His influence extended t h r o u g h o u t the West also, a n d was a serious p r o b l e m to C h r i s t i a n i t y w e l l i n t o the medieval p e r i o d . M a n i c h a e i s m contained m a n y elements o f C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d o f various heresies, reminiscences o f B u d d h i s m , Gnostic influences a n d , especially, the f u n d a m e n t a l concepts of M a z d a i s m , the Persian r e l i g i o n o f Zoroaster. T h e p o i n t o f departure o f M a n i c h a e i s m is the i r r e d u c i b l e d u a l i s m of good a n d e v i l , l i g h t a n d d a r k n e s s — i n short, o f G o d a n d the d e v i l . A l l o f life was held to be a struggle between the t w o i r r e c o n c i l able p r i n c i p l e s . St. Augustine came to M a n i c h a e i s m f u l l o f e n t h u siasm. I n Carthage Augustine t a u g h t r h e t o r i c a n d o r a t o r y a n d devoted himself to astrology and philosophy. T h e n he traveled t o R o m e , a n d f r o m R o m e to M i l a n , to w h i c h c i t y his m o t h e r followed h i m . T h e r e he m e t the great bishop St. Ambrose, theologian a n d o r a t o r , whose sermons he a t t e n d e d faithfully a n d w h o c o n t r i b u t e d greatly to his conversion. A u g u s t i n e discovered at t h a t t i m e the s u p e r i o r i t y o f the Scriptures a n d , n o t yet a C a t h o l i c , became alienated f r o m the sect o f Manes. F i n a l l y he entered the C h u r c h as a catechumen. F r o m t h a t time o n he m o v e d closer and closer to C h r i s t i a n i t y , s t u d y i n g St. P a u l and the Neoplatonists. T h e year 3 8 6 was a decisive one for h i m . I n a garden i n M i l a n he was seized b y a f i t of weeping and discontent w i t h himself, of remorse a n d anxiety, u n t i l he h e a r d a child's voice o r d e r i n g h i m to " t a k e a n d r e a d " ("Tolle, lege"). Augustine opened his N e w Testament a n d read a verse of the Epistle to the Romans w h i c h refers to the life of C h r i s t as contrasted w i t h the appetites of the flesh. H e felt transformed a n d free, f u l l of l i g h t ; t h e obstacle o f his sensual n a t u r e disappeared. Augustine was n o w f u l l y a C h r i s t i a n . F r o m t h a t m o m e n t o n his life was different, dedicated e n t i r e l y to
Life and Character
G o d a n d to religious a n d theological activities. T h e story o f his life becomes the story of his works and his evangelical efforts. For a w h i l e he r e t i r e d to a friend's c o u n t r y house w i t h his m o t h e r , his son a n d a few p u p i l s ; f r o m this sojourn came some of his most interesting w r i t i n g s . T h e n he was baptized b y St. Ambrose a n d decided to r e t u r n to A f r i c a . Before leaving I t a l y he lost his mother, w h o m he m o u r n e d fervently; t w o years later, i n Carthage, his son d i e d . H e was t h e n ordained as a priest i n H i p p o i n n o r t h A f r i c a and later consecrated as bishop of the same city. His a c t i v i t y was extraordinary, a n d as the fervor of his soul became more a n d m o r e a model for Christians, so d i d his w r i t i n g s continue to increase. I n A u g u s t of the year 430 St. Augustine died i n Hippo. W O R K S . St. Augustine's o u t p u t was copious, b u t uneven i n scope a n d value. His most i m p o r t a n t works are those concerned w i t h dogma a n d theology a n d those w h i c h expound his philosophic thought. T h e most valuable are the f o l l o w i n g : T h e thirteen books o f the Confessions, a n a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l w o r k i n w h i c h St. Augustine, w i t h a n i n t i m a c y u n k n o w n i n the ancient w o r l d , relates his life u p to the year 387, at the same t i m e i n d i c a t i n g his i n t e l l e c t u a l development a n d the stages t h r o u g h w h i c h his soul passed before a r r i v i n g at the t r u t h of C h r i s t i a n i t y ; i n the l i g h t of this t r u t h his w h o l e life is i l l u m i n a t e d as he confesses i t a l l before God. This is a b o o k w i t h o u t a c o u n t e r p a r t i n w o r l d l i t e r a t u r e , a w o r k o f the highest philosophical interest. T h e other m a j o r w o r k o f St. Augustine is e n t i t l e d De civitate Dei ( T h e C i t y o f G o d ) . T h i s is the first philosophy o f history, a n d its influence lasted to the t i m e of Bossuet a n d , later, Hegel. W e may include alongside these t w o books the three dialogues t h a t St. Augustine w r o t e s h o r t l y after his conversion: De beata vita, Contra Academicos a n d De ordine. W e m i g h t also name, a m o n g others, the Soliloquia and the De
Trinitate.
St. Augustine adopts a n u m b e r o f H e l l e n i c doctrines, especially those o f the Neoplatonists Plotinus and P o r p h y r y . H i s knowledge o f Plato a n d Aristotle is very l i m i t e d and i n d i r e c t ; he knows m u c h m o r e of the Stoics, Epicureans a n d Academicians a n d , above a l l , Cicero. T h i s invaluable stock o f Greek philosophy passes i n t o C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d the M i d d l e Ages t h r o u g h St. Augustine. B u t he generally adapts the contributions o f the Greeks to the philosophic necessities o f Christian d o g m a ; this is the earliest instance i n w h i c h Greek philosophy as such comes i n t o contact w i t h C h r i s t i a n i t y . T h a n k s to these efforts, the stabilization o f d o g m a takes a vast step f o r w a r d a n d St. Augustine becomes the most i m p o r t a n t o f the L a t i n C h u r c h Fathers. H i s p h i l o -
St.
Augustine
sophical w o r k is one o f the m a j o r sources t h a t later metaphysics d r e w u p o n . W e w i l l examine this philosophy i n special detail.
2.
PHILOSOPHY
P O S I N G T H E P R O B L E M . T h e content o f St. Augustine's philosophy is expressed most fundamentally i n the Soliloquies i n the statement: Deum
et animam scire cupio. Nihilneplus?Nihil
omnino. ( I desire to k n o w G o d
and
the soul. N o t h i n g more ? N o t h i n g at a l l . ) T h a t is, there are o n l y t w o themes i n St. Augustine's p h i l o s o p h y : G o d a n d the soul. T h e central p o i n t o f his speculation w i l l be G o d — h e n c e his metaphysical a n d theological efforts; secondly, St. A u g u s t i n e , the m a n of i n t i m a c y a n d confession, w i l l bequeath to us the philosophy of the s p i r i t ; a n d lastly, the relationship o f this spirit, w h i c h lives i n the w o r l d , to G o d w i l l lead St. Augustine to the idea of the civitas Dei a n d thus to the p h i l o s o p h y o f history. These are St. Augustine's three great c o n t r i b u t i o n s to p h i losophy, a n d they f o r m the three-part r o o t o f his t h i n k i n g . G O D . T h i s element of St. Augustine's t h o u g h t has w e i g h t y consequences. O n e o f t h e m is the p l a c i n g o f love, c h a r i t y , i n the forefront o f man's intellectual life. K n o w l e d g e is n o t to be h a d w i t h o u t love. Si sapientia Deus est (he writes i n the De civitate Dei), verus philosophus
est
amator Dei ( I f G o d is wisdom, t h e n the t r u e philosopher is a lover o f G o d ) . A n d w i t h even greater c l a r i t y he states: Non intratur in veritatem nisi per caritatem ( O n e cannot enter t r u t h except t h r o u g h c h a r i t y ) . T h u s r e l i g i o n is at the very root o f his t h i n k i n g and sets his philosophy i n m o t i o n . I t is f r o m St. Augustine t h a t are u l t i m a t e l y derived the concept o f the fides quaerens intellectum ( f a i t h seeking understanding) a n d the p r i n c i p l e credo ut intelligam ( I believe i n order to u n d e r s t a n d ) — a concept a n d a p r i n c i p l e t h a t are to have p r o f o u n d repercussions i n Scholasticism, especially i n St. A n s e l m a n d St. Thomas. T h e problems o f the relationship between f a i t h a n d knowledge, between r e l i g i o n a n d theology, are already posed i n St. Augustine's w o r k . St. A u g u s t i n e adopts the philosophy o f Plato, b u t w i t h i m p o r t a n t changes. I n Plato, the p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e consists o f things; St. Augustine, o n the other h a n d , bases his philosophy above a l l o n the soul as the innermost reality, o n w h a t he calls the inner man (or the interior of man). Therefore, St. Augustine's dialectic i n his search for G o d is confession. St. Augustine relates his o w n life. T h e soul is raised f r o m the b o d y to the c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f itself, t h e n to reason, a n d f i n a l l y to the l i g h t w h i c h illuminates i t , G o d Himself. T o arrive a t G o d , one begins w i t h the reality of God's c r e a t i o n , a n d especially w i t h the i n n e r nature o f m a n .
Philosophy
Since m a n is t h e i m a g e o f G o d , he finds G o d , as i n a m i r r o r , i n the i n t i m a c y of his o w n soul. T o t u r n away f r o m G o d is the same as to r i p out one's o w n vitals, to e m p t y oneself and to wane constantly. O n the other h a n d , w h e n m a n enters w i t h i n himself, he discovers the D e i t y . But m a n can k n o w G o d d i r e c t l y only b y means of a supernatural i l l u m i nation. G o d , according to St. Augustine's d o c t r i n e , created the w o r l d f r o m nothingness (not, t h a t is, f r o m His o w n being) a n d of His free w i l l . St. Augustine also adopts Plato's theory o f the Ideas, b u t i n Augustine's system the Ideas are located i n the D i v i n e m i n d : they are the exemp l a r y models a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h G o d created the things b y v i r t u e o f a decision of His w i l l . T H E S O U L . T h e soul plays a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n St. Augustine's philosophy. W h a t interests us most is n o t his specific theory about the soul, b u t , above a l l , the fact that he makes us aware o f the peculiar r e a l i t y of the soul i n a w a y i n w h i c h no one h a d done previously. T h e i n t i m a t e analysis o f his o w n soul w h i c h constitutes the theme o f the Confessions is enormously valuable for the i n n e r knowledge of m a n . F o r example, there is St. Augustine's c o n t r i b u t i o n to the p r o b l e m o f experiencing d e a t h . T h e soul is s p i r i t u a l . T h e character o f the s p i r i t u a l is not m e r e l y negative, that is, n o t mere i m m a t e r i a l i t y , b u t something positive, to w i t , the faculty o f entering within oneself. T h e spirit has a within, a chez soi, i n w h i c h i t c a n seclude itself—a p r i v i l e g e w h i c h i t shares w i t h no other reality. St. A u g u s t i n e is the philosopher o f the inner m a n : Noli foras ire, in te redi, in interiore homine habitat Veritas, he writes i n De vera religione. (Do n o t go outside, r e t u r n w i t h i n yourself; t r u t h dwells i n the i n t e r i o r of man.) M a n , w h o is a t one a n d the same t i m e r a t i o n a l — l i k e an a n g e l — a n d m o r t a l — l i k e a n a n i m a l — h a s an i n t e r m e d i a t e position. B u t he is, above a l l , the i m a g e o f G o d , imago Dei, because he is a m i n d , a s p i r i t . I n the triple d i v i s i o n o f the faculties of the s o u l — m e m o r y , intelligence and w i l l or l o v e — S t . Augustine discovers a trace o f the T r i n i t y . T h e u n i f y i n g factor i n t h e p e r s o n — w h o possesses these three i n t i m a t e l y interconnected faculties, b u t who is n o t a n y one of t h e m — i s the single ego, w h i c h remembers, understands a n d loves, m a k i n g a perfect dist i n c t i o n a m o n g these faculties, and yet preserving the oneness o f life, m i n d a n d essence. U s i n g formulas analogous to Descartes' cogito, b u t different f r o m Descartes' f o r m u l a i n t h e i r deep m e a n i n g a n d philosophic scope, St. Augustine affirms the i n t e r n a l evidence for t h e existence o f the ego, w h i c h is exempt f r o m a n y possible d o u b t , i n contradistinction to t h e
ii8
St.
Augustine
dubious testimony concerning the existence of things furnished b y the b o d i l y senses a n d r a t i o n a l t h o u g h t . " I n these t r u t h s , " he says (De civitate Dei, X I , 26), " t h e r e is no need to fear the arguments o f the Academicians, w h o say ' W h a t i f y o u are mistaken ? ' Because i f I a m mistaken, I exist. Because the m a n w h o does n o t exist, t r u l y , cannot be mistaken, e i t h e r ; a n d therefore, I exist i f I a m mistaken. A n d g r a n t i n g t h a t I exist i f I a m mistaken, h o w can I be mistaken about m y existence, w h e n i t is certain t h a t I exist i f I a m mistaken ? A n d thus, since I , the mistaken one, w o u l d exist even i f I were mistaken, w i t h o u t a d o u b t I a m n o t mistaken i n k n o w i n g t h a t I exist. " T h e soul, w h i c h b y its n a t u r a l reason, or ratio inferior, knows the things, itself a n d , i n d i r e c t l y , G o d , W h o is reflected i n His creation, can receive a s u p e r n a t u r a l i l l u m i n a t i o n f r o m G o d , a n d b y means o f this ratio superior can raise itself to the knowledge of eternal things. W h a t is the o r i g i n of the soul ? St. Augustine is somewhat perplexed i n the face o f this question. H e f a l t e r s — a n d along w i t h h i m so do a l l the other Fathers a n d a l l the early m e d i e v a l philosophers—between generationism or traduciansim, a n d creationism. Is the soul engendered like the b o d y f r o m the souls o f one's parents, or is i t created b y G o d on the occasion o f the procreation o f the b o d y ? T h e d o c t r i n e o f o r i g i n a l sin, w h i c h seems more comprehensible to St. Augustine i f the soul of the c h i l d , l i k e its body, proceeds d i r e c t l y f r o m its parents, leads h i m to favor generationism ; b u t at the same t i m e he realizes the weakness o f t h a t theory, a n d does n o t reject the solution p r o v i d e d b y creationism. M A N I N T H E W O R L D . I n the w r i t i n g s o f St. Augustine, the m o r a l p r o b l e m is seen to be i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h the theological questions o f n a t u r e a n d grace, predestination a n d man's free w i l l , a n d sin a n d r e d e m p t i o n ; b u t we cannot discuss these relationships i n d e t a i l here. H o w e v e r , we must p o i n t o u t t h a t this whole complex o f theological problems has h a d a great influence o n the later development of C h r i s t i a n ethics. Moreover, St. Augustine's writings—exaggerated a n d altered f r o m their true m e a n i n g — w e r e w i d e l y used i n the sixteenth c e n t u r y b y the leaders o f the R e f o r m a t i o n (remember t h a t L u t h e r was a n A u g u s t i n i a n m o n k ) , a n d i n this w a y an A u g u s t i n i a n root persists i n m o d e r n Protestant ethics. For St. A u g u s t i n e , i n the same w a y t h a t m a n has a n a t u r a l l i g h t w h i c h makes i t possible for h i m to k n o w , m a n has a moral conscience. T h e d i v i n e eternal law to w h i c h everything answers illumines o u r i n t e l ligence, a n d its imperatives constitute natural law. I t m i g h t be likened to a t r a n s c r i p t i o n o f divine l a w i n o u r souls. E v e r y t h i n g o u g h t to be subject to a perfect order : ut omnia sint ordinatissima.
B u t i t is n o t e n o u g h
The Significance
of St,
Augustine
119
for m a n to know the law; he must also love i t . T h i s is where the p r o b l e m of free w i l l arises. T h e soul possesses a weight w h i c h moves a n d transports i t , a n d this weight is love: pondus meum amor mens ( m y w e i g h t is m y love). L o v e is active, a n d i t is love w h i c h actually determines a n d qualifies free w i l l : recta itaque voluntas est bonus amor et voluntas perversa mains amor ( a n d so a
proper w i l l is good love and a perverse w i l l is b a d love). Good l o v e — t h a t is, c h a r i t y i n the strict sense o f the w o r d — i s the central p o i n t o f Augustinian ethics. Therefore, its most significant and concise expression is the famous i m p e r a t i v e Love and do what you will (Dilige, vis
et quod
jac).
I n St. Augustine's writings, the philosophy o f the State a n d the philosophy o f history depend on G o d , j u s t as ethics does. Augustine lived i n days t h a t were crucial for the E m p i r e . T h e p o l i t i c a l structure of the ancient w o r l d was r a p i d l y c h a n g i n g , to make w a y for a n e w order. T h e barbarians were pressing h a r d e r every day. A l a r i c succeeded i n o c c u p y i n g Rome. C h r i s t i a n i t y h a d already deeply penetrated R o m a n society, and the pagans b l a m e d the misfortunes t h a t were happening o n the abandonment o f the gods and on C h r i s t i a n i t y . T e r t u l l i a n h a d already h a d to confront these accusations, a n d to answer t h e m St. Augustine embarked o n a n enormous w o r k o f a n apologist nature i n w h i c h he expounds the f u l l meaning o f h i s t o r y : The City of
God.
T h e central idea o f this w o r k is t h a t a l l h u m a n history is a struggle between t w o k i n g d o m s : the k i n g d o m o f G o d a n d the k i n g d o m o f the W o r l d ; that is, between the civitas Dei a n d the civitas terrena. T h e State, w h i c h has its roots i n profound principles o f h u m a n nature, is charged w i t h overseeing t e m p o r a l things: w e l l - b e i n g , peace, justice. T h i s gives i t a divine significance as w e l l . F o l l o w i n g St. Paul's example, St. Augustine teaches t h a t a l l power comes f r o m God. Therefore, r e l i gious values are n o t foreign to the State, a n d the State must become saturated w i t h C h r i s t i a n principles. A t the same time, the State must lend its power to support the C h u r c h , so t h a t the C h u r c h can f u l l y realize its mission. St. Augustine believes t h a t politics can no m o r e be separated f r o m the consciousness t h a t man's u l t i m a t e goal is n o t w o r l d l y t h a n can ethics. M a n ' s goal is to discover G o d i n the t r u t h t h a t resides i n the i n t e r i o r of the h u m a n creature.
3.
T H E
SIGNIFICANCE
OF ST.
AUGUSTINE
I t has been said t h a t St. Augustine is the last ancient m a n a n d the first m o d e r n m a n . H e is a son o f R o m a n i z e d Africa, w h i c h h a d been
St.
1ZO
Augustine
permeated w i t h G r e c o - R o m a n c u l t u r e a n d converted, a l o n g t i m e before, i n t o a n I m p e r i a l province. Augustine's century witnesses a w o r l d i n crisis, threatened o n a l l sides b u t still subsisting. T h e social and p o l i t i c a l h o r i z o n t h a t he finds is the R o m a n E m p i r e , t h e grandest creation i n ancient history. T h e i n t e l l e c t u a l sources f r o m w h i c h he draws sustenance are largely o f Hellenic o r i g i n . T h u s St. Augustine's t h i n k i n g is nourished b y a n t i q u i t y . This influence, f u r t h e r m o r e , is the m o r e p r o f o u n d because St. Augustine is n o t a C h r i s t i a n f r o m the outset; his first v i s i o n o f p h i losophy comes to h i m f r o m sources w h i c h are clearly p a g a n , such as Cicero, one o f the chief representatives o f ancient man's w a y o f life. Christianity takes a l o n g t i m e to conquer A u g u s t i n e : Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tarn antiqua et tarn nova! ( I came to love y o u late, y o u b e a u t y
at the same t i m e so ancient and so n e w ! ) , St. Augustine exclaims i n the
Confessions.
Ortega w r i t e s : " S t . Augustine, w h o h a d remained i m m e r s e d i n paganism for a l o n g t i m e , w h o h a d for l o n g seen the w o r l d t h r o u g h ' a n c i e n t ' eyes, c o u l d n o t help b u t esteem the a n i m a l values of Greece and R o m e . A n d i n the l i g h t of his new f a i t h , such an existence w i t h o u t G o d was b o u n d to seem n u l l and e m p t y . Nevertheless, t h e evidence w i t h w h i c h the v i t a l grace o f paganism asserted itself to his i n t u i t i o n was such t h a t he used to express his esteem w i t h a n ambiguous statement : Virtutes ethnicorum splendida vitia ( T h e pagans' virtues are splend i d vices). Vices? T h e n they are negative values. S p l e n d i d ? T h e n they are positive v a l u e s . " * This is the s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h St. Augustine finds himself. H e sees the w o r l d t h r o u g h p a g a n eyes, and he f u l l y understands the m a r v e l o f the ancient w o r l d . B u t f r o m the standpoint o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , a l l t h i s — w i t h o u t God—seems to h i m to be p u r e nothingness a n d evil. T h e w o r l d — a n d w i t h i t , classical c u l t u r e — h a s a n enormous v a l u e ; b u t one must u n d e r s t a n d a n d live i t f r o m the r e a l i z a t i o n of G o d . O n l y t h e n is i t estimable i n the eyes of the C h r i s t i a n . St. Augustine, a frontiersman w h o lives o n the b o u n d a r y between two different cultures, not o n l y knows a n d embraces the t w o , b u t also reaches w h a t is most p r o f o u n d and o r i g i n a l i n b o t h . H e is, perhaps, the ancient t h i n k e r w h o best understands t h e o v e r a l l significance o f the E m p i r e a n d R o m a n history. O n the o t h e r h a n d , St. A u g u s t i n e represents one o f the most perfect realizations o f the idea of C h r i s t i a n i t y , one o f the three or four highest modes i n w h i c h the new t y p e o f m a n * Ortega adds the following note: " A s is well known, this statement, which has always been attributed to St. Augustine, is not to be found in his works; but all his work paraphrases it. Cf. Mausbach: Die Ethik Augustinus."
The Significance of St.
Augustine
121
has been expressed. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g Scholasticism's great achievements, i t derives essentially f r o m St. A u g u s t i n e . T h e last ancient m a n represents the b e g i n n i n g o f the great medieval stage o f Europe's history. St. Augustine's t h o u g h t contains something characteristic n o t o n l y o f C h r i s t i a n i t y b u t also of the m o d e r n e p o c h : i n t i m a c y . W e have seen h o w he bases his philosophy o n the i n n e r m a n . H e asks m a n to enter the i n t e r i o r o f his o w n soul i n order to find himself, a n d w i t h himself, G o d . T h i s is the great lesson w h i c h St. A n s e l m w i l l l e a r n first, a n d t h r o u g h h i m a l l o f Western mysticism. I n contrast to the flights i n t o the external w o r l d t h a t characterized ancient m a n , the m a n o f the agora a n d f o r u m , St. Augustine finds h i m s e l f i n the c a l m i n t e r i o r o f his o w n ego. T h i s leads h i m to a f f i r m t h e ego as the highest c r i t e r i o n of certainty, i n a statement w h i c h a l t h o u g h reached b y means o f different suppositions, is similar to Descartes' cogito: Omnis qui se dubitantem intelligit,
verum intelligit, et de hac re quarn intelligit, certus est ( E v e r y
m a n w h o understands himself to be d o u b t i n g , understands t r u l y , a n d is certain o f this t h i n g w h i c h he understands). M o r e t h a n anyone else i n his t i m e , St. Augustine achieved w h a t was to constitute the very essence o f a n o t h e r mode o f b e i n g ; his i n c o m parable f e c u n d i t y derives f r o m this fact. T h e Confessions represents man's first a t t e m p t to approach himself. U n t i l the advent o f i d e a l i s m — t h a t is, u n t i l the seventeenth c e n t u r y — n o one w i l l achieve a n y t h i n g comparable. A n d w h e n m o d e r n m a n , g u i d e d by Descartes, r e t u r n s to himself a n d remains alone w i t h his o w n ego, St. Augustine w i l l again acquire p r o f o u n d influence. St. A u g u s t i n e determined one o f the t w o great aspects o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , t h a t of i n t e r i o r i t y , a n d made i t possible for that aspect to achieve f u l l development. T h e other element r e m a i n e d i n the hands o f t h e Greek theologians, a n d therefore i n the Eastern C h u r c h . This s i t u a t i o n has i n large measure determined E u r o p e a n history, w h i c h since its b i r t h shows the i m p r i n t of A u g u s t i n i a n t h o u g h t .
MEDIEVAL
PHILOSOPHY
Scholasticism
i.
T H E ERA
OF TRANSITION
T h e a n c i e n t w o r l d ends a p p r o x i m a t e l y i n the fifth c e n t u r y A . D . ; i f we focus o u r attention o n the h i s t o r y o f thought, we can consider 430, the year o f St. Augustine's death, as the cut-off date. T h e M i d d l e Ages extends m i d w a y i n t o the fifteenth c e n t u r y , and 1453, the year i n w h i c h the B y z a n t i n e E m p i r e fell i n t o T u r k i s h hands, is frequently taken as its l i m i t . T h i s means we are dealing w i t h t e n centuries of history, too l o n g a p e r i o d t o be studied as a single epoch. I n such a l o n g i n t e r v a l o f time there are b o u n d to be great changes, and a u n i t a r y exposition of medieval philosophy w o u l d necessarily have to pass over large differences. T h e r e is, i n the first place, a l o n g gap of four centuries, f r o m the fifth to t h e n i n t h , i n w h i c h a c t u a l l y there is no philosophy. T h e w o r l d is essentially changed w i t h the f a l l o f the R o m a n E m p i r e . T h e great p o l i t i c a l u n i t y o f a n t i q u i t y is replaced b y f r a c t i o n i z a t i o n ; waves of b a r b a r i a n s surge over E u r o p e a n d cover i t almost c o m p l e t e l y ; they f o r m b a r b a r i c kingdoms i n the various regions o f the E m p i r e , and classical c u l t u r e is overwhelmed. O n e i m p o r t a n t consequence o f the G e r m a n i c invasions is often n o t sufficiently n o t e d : the isolation. T h e social a n d p o l i t i c a l u n i t y o f the different peoples of the E m p i r e is now replaced b y the separativeness o f the barbaric states. Visigoths, Swabians, Ostrogoths, Franks f o r m various unconnected p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t i e s , w h i c h are a l o n g t i m e i n establishing ties w i t h their n e i g h b o r s ; a n d w h e n these ties are finally established they do
12Ô
Scholasticism
n o t result i n the reèstablishment o f the Western E m p i r e , as was expected at the t i m e , b u t i n a n entirely new c o m m u n i t y — E u r o p e . T h u s the elements of the ancient c u l t u r e are a l l b u t lost a n d , above a l l , dispersed. T h e c u l t u r e itself is n o t destroyed to t h e extent usually believed, a n d the p r o o f of this is t h a t later, l i t t l e b y l i t t l e , i t reappears. B u t very little of i t remains in any one place. A n d so a new p r o b l e m arises : to save w h a t is f o u n d , to preserve the remains o f the shipwrecked c u l t u r e . This is the mission o f the intellectuals o f these four centuries; t h e i r labor is n o t — n o r can i t b e — c r e a t i v e ; i t is o n l y a process o f c o m p i l a t i o n . I n Spain, France, I t a l y , Germany, E n g l a n d , a few m e n , w o r k i n g along parallel lines, carefully collect e v e r y t h i n g t h a t is k n o w n a b o u t a n t i q u i t y a n d gather i t i n books o f a n encyclopedic n a t u r e . These books, were n o t at a l l o r i g i n a l ; they were mere repositories o f G r e c o - R o m a n knowledge. Nevertheless, these m e n save the c o n t i n u i t y o f Western history, a n d w i t h t h e i r patient labor f i l l the h o l l o w o f those centuries of historic f e r m e n t a t i o n , i n order t h a t the new E u r o p e a n c o m m u n i t y m a y arise later o n . A major figure o f this t i m e is St. Isidore o f Seville, w h o l i v e d i n the s i x t h a n d seventh centuries ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y f r o m 570 to 6 4 6 ) . Besides other theological a n d historical works o f secondary interest, he c o m p i l e d the t w e n t y volumes o f the Etymologiae, or Origins, a t r u e encyclopedia of his t i m e ; i t does n o t l i m i t itself to the seven l i b e r a l arts, b u t includes a l l the religious, historical, scientific, m e d i c a l a n d technical knowledge and p r a c t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t he c o u l d u n e a r t h . T h e cont r i b u t i o n to the c o m m o n base o f medieval knowledge m a d e b y this great personality o f V i s i g o t h i c Spain is one o f the most significant o f his t i m e . I n I t a l y , the most i m p o r t a n t t h i n k e r of this p e r i o d is Boethius, counselor to the Ostrogothic k i n g Theodoric, w h o f i n a l l y i m p r i s o n e d h i m a n d ordered h i m beheaded i n the year 524 or 525. W h i l e i n prison Boethius composed a v e r y famous book i n prose a n d verse e n t i t l e d De consolationephilosophiae. I n a d d i t i o n , he translated i n t o L a t i n Porphyry's Eisagogé as w e l l as some o f Aristotle's treatises o n logic, a n d w r o t e monographs on logic, mathematics and music, a n d several theological treatises (De Trinitate, De duabus naturis in Christo, De hebdomadibus),
the
p r i n c i p a l interest o f w h i c h consists i n their definitions, w h i c h were u t i l i z e d b y philosophers a n d theologians for centuries. M a r t i a n u s Gapella, w h o lived i n the fifth century, was f r o m Carthage b u t settled i n R o m e . H e w r o t e a treatise entitled The Marriage of Mercury and Philology, an o d d encyclopedia i n w h i c h the studies w h i c h were to become d o m i n a n t i n the M i d d l e Ages are systematized : the trivium ( g r a m m a r , rhetoric a n d dialectic) and the quadrivium ( a r i t h m e t i c ,
The
Nature
of
Scholasticism
geometry, astronomy and m u s i c ) . Together these subjects comprised the seven l i b e r a l arts. Cassiodorus, w h o , like Boethius, was a minister to T h e o d o r i c , is also i m p o r t a n t . T h e B r i t i s h Isles were affected b y the barbaric invasions to a lesser degree t h a n the rest of Europe, a n d so i n England we f i n d i m p o r t a n t groups o f scholars g u a r d i n g the legacy of classical c u l t u r e . I n I r e l a n d especially, there were monasteries i n w h i c h the knowledge o f Greek e n d u r e d , something that was a l l b u t lost i n the West. T h e most i m p o r t a n t figure i n these circles was the Venerable Bede ( n o w St. Bede), a m o n k f r o m J a r r o w ( N o r t h u m b e r l a n d ) , w h o lived f r o m 673 to 7 3 5 — t h a t is, one century after St. Isidore. T h e Venerable Bede's most i m p o r t a n t w o r k , w h i c h marks the b e g i n n i n g of English history, is the Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum, k n o w n i n English as the
Ecclesiastical
History oj the English People. H e also w r o t e other treatises, n o t a b l y the De natura rerum, w h i c h was i n s p i r e d b y St. Isidore's w o r k . A l c u i n (739-804, approximately) was f r o m the school o f Y o r k , i n E n g l a n d . H e t a u g h t at Charlemagne's c o u r t for several years a n d was one of the m o v i n g spirits o f the C a r o l i n g i a n intellectual renaissance, w h i c h was p r i n c i p a l l y of English o r i g i n . A l c u i n ' s most i m p o r t a n t p u p i l was Rabanus M a u r u s , w h o established t h e school at F u l d a , i n G e r m a n y , where other intellectual centers w e r e set u p at M u n s t e r , Salzburg, and so f o r t h . T h r o u g h o u t this era of t r a n s i t i o n , the ancient w i s d o m o f the pagan writers a n d t h a t of the Fathers o f the C h u r c h is preserved i n disorganized fashion and w i t h o u t i n t e l l e c t u a l precision. N o d i s t i n c t i o n is made as t o disciplines o f knowledge, a n d a systematic a n d congruent b o d y o f doctrines is o f course completely lacking. T h i s phase is concerned o n l y w i t h the a c c u m u l a t i o n o f knowledge, b u t i t prepares the w a y for the prodigious speculative l a b o r of the f o l l o w i n g centuries.
2.
T H E NATURE
OF
SCHOLASTICISM
B e g i n n i n g w i t h the n i n t h c e n t u r y there appear, as a consequence o f the C a r o l i n g i a n Renaissance, the schools, and w i t h t h e m Scholasticism, a special knowledge cultivated i n the schools. I n contrast to the seven l i b e r a l arts o f the trivium a n d quadrivium, this knowledge is p r i n c i p a l l y theological a n d philosophical. T h e school's w o r k is o f a collective n a t u r e ; i t is a cooperative l a b o r a n d is closely connected w i t h the ecclesiastical organization, w h i c h assures an unusual c o n t i n u i t y of t h o u g h t . I n Scholasticism there e x i s t s — p a r t i c u l a r l y f r o m the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries—a u n i t a r y body o f doctrine w h i c h is preserved as a common property: a b o d y o f doctrine w h i c h the various i n d i -
128
Scholasticism
v i d u a l thinkers collaborate o n a n d w h i c h they a l l use. I n Scholasticism, as i n all spheres o f m e d i e v a l life, the personality o f the i n d i v i d u a l is n o t emphasized. Just as the cathedrals are immense anonymous w o r k s — o r almost such, the results of entire generations' l o n g collective l a b o r — s o medieval t h o u g h t is c o n t i n u e d u n i n t e r r u p t e d l y over a c o m m o n base u n t i l the end o f the M i d d l e Ages. Therefore, t h e m o d e r n m e a n i n g o f the w o r d " o r i g i n a l i t y " does n o t have a p p l i c a t i o n to Scholasticism. F r e q u e n t l y a w r i t e r i n this p e r i o d uses i n the most n a t u r a l way b o r r o w e d m a t e r i a l w h i c h cannot be a t t r i b u t e d to h i m l i g h t l y w i t h o u t danger o f e r r o r . B u t i t does not b y a n y means follow t h a t Scholasticism is homogeneous, or that i t lacks e m i n e n t personalities. O n the c o n t r a r y : i n the M i d d l e Ages we f i n d some o f the most p r o f o u n d a n d perspicacious m i n d s i n a l l of the history o f p h i l o s o p h y ; a n d medieval thought, w h i c h is o f a surprising richness a n d variety, experiences d u r i n g the course o f this epoch a definite a n d basic evolut i o n w h i c h we w i l l a t t e m p t to trace w i t h some degree o f precision. T h e volume of Scholastic w r i t i n g s is so great t h a t we w i l l o f necessity have to l i m i t ourselves to p o i n t i n g out the major phases o f the problems i n v o l v e d and to o u t l i n i n g briefly the significance o f t h e medieval philosophers who most deeply influenced philosophy. THE EXTERNAL FORM OF SCHOLASTIC WRITINGS. The Scholastic l i t e r a r y forms correspond to the circumstances i n w h i c h they were developed; they m a i n t a i n a close relationship w i t h e d u c a t i o n a l life, at first w i t h the life o f the schools a n d later w i t h t h a t o f the universities. Scholastic teaching is first developed on the basis o f texts t h a t are read a n d commented o n ; i t is for this reason t h a t we speak o f lectiones (lectures); sometimes these texts are f r o m the Scriptures themselves, b u t frequently they are works o f the Fathers o f the C h u r c h , o f theologians or o f ancient or m e d i e v a l philosophers. T h e Liber sententiarum o f Peter L o m b a r d (twelfth c e n t u r y ) was read a n d c o m m e n t e d o n constantly. A t the same t i m e , the d a i l y give a n d take o f academic life leads to the disputationes, i n w h i c h i m p o r t a n t questions ( a n d , at the end o f the M i d d l e Ages, u n i m p o r t a n t questions as w e l l ) are d e b a t e d , a n d b y means of w h i c h the p a r t i c i p a n t s become skillful i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d i n establishing proof.
T h e literary forms s p r i n g f r o m this activity. F i r s t o f a l l t h e r e are the commentaries (Commentaria) o n the various books s t u d i e d . Secondly, there are the Quaestiones, huge repertories of problems w h i c h h a d been discussed, together w i t h t h e i r authorities, arguments a n d solutions (Quaestiones disputatae, Quaestiones quodlibetales); w h e n the p r o b l e m s are
d e a l t w i t h i n d i v i d u a l l y i n brief, independent studies, t h e works are called Opuscula. F i n a l l y , there are the great d o c t r i n a l syntheses o f the
The Nature
of
Scholasticism
M i d d l e Ages i n w h i c h the general content o f Scholasticism is summ a r i z e d , the Summae. O u t s t a n d i n g a m o n g the Summae are those of St. T h o m a s , p a r t i c u l a r l y his Summa theologiae. These are the p r i n c i p a l forms i n w h i c h the t h o u g h t o f the Scholastics is set f o r t h . P H I L O S O P H Y A N D T H E O L O G Y . W h a t is the content o f Scholasticism ? Is i t philosophy ? Is i t theology ? Is i t b o t h , or something different still ? T h e answers to these questions are n o t i m m e d i a t e l y clear. O f course, Scholasticism is theology; there can be no d o u b t a b o u t t h a t . B u t i t is no less t r u e t h a t i f there is a n y philosophy i n the M i d d l e Ages, i t is especially to be found i n the works o f the Scholastic w r i t e r s . T h e next logical t h o u g h t w o u l d be t h a t theology and philosophy coexist i n this p e r i o d , t h a t alongside Scholastic theology there is a Scholastic philosophy. A t once there arises the p r o b l e m o f the relationship between theology and philosophy. A n a t t e m p t is usually made to resolve this p r o b l e m by resorting to the idea o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n and recalling the o l d phrase philosophia ancilla theologiae (philosophy, the h a n d m a i d e n o f theology); f r o m this v i e w p o i n t , philosophy is a n a u x i l i a r y , subordinate discipline, w h i c h theology makes use o f for its o w n ends. T h i s conception is simple and a p p a r e n t l y satisfactory, b u t o n l y apparently. Philosophy is not and cannot be a subordinate science, used as a means to something else. As Aristotle already k n e w , philosophy is not useful for a n y t h i n g , and a l l the other sciences are m o r e necessary t h a n philosophy, though none is superior to i t (Metaphysics, I , 2 ) . O n the other h a n d , j u d g i n g f r o m the facts, i t is n o t c e r t a i n t h a t i n the M i d d l e Ages there was any philosophy separate f r o m theology for theology to m a k e use of. T h e t r u t h o f the matter is something q u i t e different. T h e problems of Scholasticism, like the problems o f Patristic t h o u g h t w h i c h preceded t h e m , are p r i m a r i l y theological p r o b l e m s — one m i g h t say merely d o g m a t i c problems, i n v o l v i n g the f o r m u l a t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of dogma, a n d at times i n v o l v i n g r a t i o n a l explanat i o n or even demonstration. These theological problems c a l l f o r t h new questions, a n d these are philosophic questions. L e t us take as a n example the d o g m a o f the Eucharist. T h i s is a religious m a t t e r w h i c h i n itself has n o t h i n g to do w i t h philosophy. B u t i f we wish to u n d e r s t a n d i t i n some fashion, we must have recourse to the concept o f transubstantiat i o n , a s t r i c t l y philosophic concept. This idea leads us i n t o a different w o r l d , the w o r l d of A r i s t o t e l i a n metaphysics; the question o f how the transubstantiation of w h i c h the Eucharist consists is possible, is stated i n terms o f the philosophic theory o f substance. S i m i l a r l y , the dogma of the C r e a t i o n compels us to consider the p r o b l e m o f being, b r i n g i n g us back t o the realm o f metaphysics. I t is the same w i t h a l l the other dogmas. T h u s Scholasticism deals w i t h philosophic problems that
Scholasticism
arise in connection w i t h religious a n d theological questions. B u t philoso p h y is not used as a tool i n these cases ; rather, the f r a m e w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h the philosophic problems are considered is rigorously determ i n e d b y the actual s i t u a t i o n f r o m w h i c h they arise. M e d i e v a l philoso p h y is essentially different f r o m t h a t o f t h e Greeks, p r i n c i p a l l y because its questions are different a n d are based o n different suppositions. T h e outstanding example o f this difference is the p r o b l e m o f the C r e a t i o n , w h i c h r a d i c a l l y transforms the great o n t o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m ; as a result o f this, C h r i s t i a n philosophy comprises a n e w p e r i o d i n the history o f philosophy q u i t e separate f r o m the ancient p e r i o d . A t a l l times i n our consideration o f Scholasticism we shall be v i e w i n g i t as a c o m p l e x o f theology and p h i l o s o p h y u n i t e d b y a special tie corresp o n d i n g to the a t t i t u d e t o w a r d life w h i c h gives rise t o the speculation o f the C h r i s t i a n theorist. I t is St. Anselm's l e m m a fides quaerens intellectum (faith seeking u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) — i n w h i c h equal stress must be g i v e n to fides a n d intellectus, w i t h i n the f u n d a m e n t a l u n i t y o f the quaerere. T h e t w o poles between w h i c h medieval Scholasticism w i l l m o v e are j o i n e d together i n this quaerere, this quest. * W e shall examine briefly t h e three major problems o f m e d i e v a l philosophy : those o f the C r e a t i o n , the universals a n d reason. I n the e v o l u t i o n of these three problems, w h i c h have a p a r a l l e l development, w e w i l l f i n d concentrated t h e entire history o f m e d i e v a l t h o u g h t a n d o f the era as a whole. * See my above-mentioned study, " L a escolástica en su mundo y en el nuestro."
The Great Themes of the Middle Ages
i.
T H E CREATION
W e have already seen t h a t the C h r i s t i a n p o i n t o f departure is essentially different f r o m the Greek's; t h a t is, t h e C h r i s t i a n begins w i t h the nihility of the world. I n other words, the w o r l d is contingent, not necessary. I t does n o t c o n t a i n w i t h i n itself its reason for being, b u t receives i t f r o m another, f r o m G o d . T h e w o r l d is a n ens ab alio (entity w h i c h derives its b e i n g f r o m a n o t h e r ) , as distinguished f r o m the D e i t y , w h o is the ens a se ( e n t i t y w h i c h derives its being f r o m itself). G o d is the C r e a t o r a n d the w o r l d is H i s c r e a t i o n : t w o p r o f o u n d l y different, perhaps i r r e d u c i b l e modes o f being. T h u s , the C r e a t i o n appears as the first metaphysical p r o b l e m o f the M i d d l e Ages, f r o m w h i c h , i n fact, a l l the others are d e r i v e d . T h e C r e a t i o n must n o t be confused w i t h w h a t the Greeks called genesis o r generation. G e n e r a t i o n is a type o f m o t i o n , substantial m o t i o n . I t presupposes a subject, an e n t i t y t h a t moves, passing/rom a b e g i n n i n g to a n end. T h e carpenter w h o makes a table makes i t o f w o o d , a n d the w o o d is the subject of the m o t i o n . T h i s does not occur i n the C r e a t i o n ; there is no subject. G o d does n o t m a n u f a c t u r e or make t h e w o r l d out o f a previously existing m a t e r i a l , b u t creates i t , sets i t i n existence. T h e C r e a t i o n is a creation from nothingness—in Scholastic t e r m i n o l o g y , creatio ex nihilo, or m o r e e x p l i c i t l y , ex nihilo sui et subjecti. B u t i t is a p r i n c i p l e o f m e d i e v a l philosophy t h a t ex nihilo nihil jit, n o t h i n g can be made f r o m n o t h i n g . T h i s w o u l d seem t o indicate t h a t t h e C r e a t i o n is impossible, t h a t being cannot result f r o m nothingness; »3«
The Great
Themes of the Middle Ages
this p r i n c i p l e w o u l d be the f o r m u l a o f pantheism. B u t the sense i n w h i c h this phrase is used i n the M i d d l e Ages is t h a t n o t h i n g can be m a d e f r o m n o t h i n g without the intervention of God, t h a t is, p r e cisely without the Creation.
T h i s concept opens u p between G o d a n d the w o r l d a m e t a p h y s i c a l g u l f w h i c h was u n k n o w n to the Greeks. Consequently, there n o w appears a new question, w h i c h affects being itself: can t h e one w o r d " b e i n g " be applied to G o d a n d to H i s creatures ? Is i t n o t a n equivoc a t i o n ? A t most, one m i g h t speak o f a new analogical c o n c e p t i o n o f the E n t i t y , i n a sense m u c h m o r e p r o f o u n d even t h a n A r i s t o t l e ' s . I t was even denied t h a t b e i n g can be applied to G o d at a l l ; being is a created t h i n g , distinct f r o m its Creator, w h o is b e y o n d being. Prima rerum creatarum est esse (Being is the first o f the c r e a t e d things), said the medieval Platonists (see Z u b i r i , " E n t o r n o a l p r o b l e m a d e D i o s " ) . T h u s we see t h a t the idea o f the Creation, religious i n o r i g i n , p r o f o u n d l y affects medieval ontology. T h i s C r e a t i o n could be ah aeterno or w i t h i n t i m e . T h e o p i n i o n s of the Scholastics are d i v i d e d . T h e y are n o t so m u c h d i v i d e d w i t h regard to the d o g m a t i c t r u t h t h a t the C r e a t i o n d i d occur w i t h i n t i m e , as w i t h r e g a r d to the possibility o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g this r a t i o n a l l y . S t . T h o m a s considered t h a t the Creation was demonstrable, b u t n o t i t s t e m p o r a l i t y , w h i c h c o u l d be k n o w n o n l y t h r o u g h revelation. M o r e o v e r , the idea o f a Creation d a t i n g f r o m eternity is not c o n t r a d i c t o r y , since b e i n g created means only receiving being f r o m G o d , t h a t is, ah alio, a n d this is independent of t i m e relationships. B u t a new question arises: the relationship o f G o d to the w o r l d w h i c h has been created. T h e w o r l d is not sufficient u n t o i t s e l f for its existence; i t does not have sufficient reason for being. I t is m a i n t a i n e d i n its existence b y God so t h a t i t does n o t lapse i n t o nothingness. T h u s , aside f r o m the Creation, there is a need for preservation. G o d ' s a c t i o n u p o n the w o r l d is constant; H e m u s t keep on causing i t to exist at each m o m e n t . T h i s is t a n t a m o u n t to a continuing creation. T h u s , the w o r l d always has need o f God a n d is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y needy a n d insufficient. T h e early Scholastics believed i t was so. T h e ontological basis o f the w o r l d is f o u n d i n G o d , n o t o n l y at the o r i g i n o f the w o r l d , h u t also at the present t i m e , at a l l times. B u t i n the n o m i n a l i s m o f the f o u r t e e n t h a n d fifteenth centuries this c o n v i c t i o n wavers. T h e n o m i n a l i s t s t h i n k t h a t c o n t i n u i n g creation is n o t necessary, t h a t the w o r l d does n o t need to be m a i n t a i n e d . T h e w o r l d is still understood to be a n ens ah alio w h i c h is n o t self-sufficient a n d w h i c h has received its existence at the hands o f its Creator, b u t the nominalists believe t h a t the b e i n g w h i c h G o d gave the w o r l d w h e n H e created i t is sufficient for its subsistence.
The
Universals
T h e w o r l d is a n e n t i t y w i t h the capacity to go on existing b y itself; God's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n its existence, after H i s act o f creation, consists m e r e l y of not a n n i h i l a t i n g i t , of a l l o w i n g i t to exist. I n this manner, the idea of c o n t i n u i n g c r e a t i o n is succeeded b y the idea of the relative selfsufficiency a n d a u t o n o m y of the w o r l d as a creature. T h e w o r l d , once i t is created, can exist w i t h o u t further a i d ; i t can be left to operate i n accordance w i t h its o w n laws, w i t h o u t the d i r e c t a n d constant interv e n t i o n of the D e i t y . W e see t h a t i n the development of the p r o b l e m o f the Creation i n the M i d d l e Ages philosophers are led to g r a n t the creature greater independence w i t h r e g a r d to the Creator; this contributes to an estrangement f r o m G o d . F o l l o w i n g separate paths, a l l the great p r o b lems o f medieval metaphysics lead m a n to a single situation at the close of the medieval p e r i o d .
2.
T H E
UNIVERSALS
T h e question of the universals is omnipresent i n the M i d d l e Ages. I t has even been said t h a t the entire history of Scholasticism is the history of the dispute over the universals. T h i s is n o t t r u e , b u t i t is true t h a t this p r o b l e m is present i n a l l the other problems a n d its development is closely connected w i t h t h a t o f a l l the others. T h e universals are the genera and species, i n contradistinction t o i n d i v i d u a l things. T h e question is one of k n o w i n g w h a t type of r e a l i t y these universals possess. T h e objects w h i c h present themselves to o u r senses are i n d i v i d u a l s : this t h i n g , t h a t t h i n g . O n the other h a n d , the concepts b y means o f w h i c h we imagine these same objects are universals: m a n , tree. T h e things we see before us are conceived of t h r o u g h t h e i r species and genera. W h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p do these universals have w i t h the things ? I n other words, i n w h a t measure do our perceptions correspond to r e a l i t y ? I n this w a y there arises the question o f k n o w i n g whether or not the universals are things, a n d i n w h a t sense. T h e idea we are to have of b o t h the b e i n g of things and the n a t u r e of knowledge is depend e n t u p o n the solution t o this p r o b l e m . A t the same t i m e , a m u l t i t u d e of h i g h l y serious metaphysical and theological problems are connected w i t h this question. T h e medieval p e r i o d begins w i t h an extreme position, realism, a n d ends w i t h the opposite extreme solution, nominalism. O f course, n o m i n a l i s m has origins almost as ancient as those of realism, a n d the history of b o t h has m a n y complications a n d various gradations. B u t the general line o f historic development is the one t h a t has j u s t been i n d i c a t e d . Realism, w h i c h is the generally accepted position u n t i l the
The
Creat
Themes of the Middle
Ages
t w e l f t h c e n t u r y , maintains t h a t the universals are res, t h i n g s . T h e adherents o f the extreme f o r m o f realism believe t h a t t h e universals are present i n a l l the i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t fall under their headings (for instance, the universal " m a n " w o u l d be present i n each i n d i v i d u a l m a n ) a n d t h a t , consequently, there is no essential difference between i n d i v i d u a l s , there are o n l y accidental differences. T h e universals are p r i o r to the i n d i v i d u a l things (ante rem). I n essence there w o u l d thus be only one m a n , a n d the d i s t i n c t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l m e n w o u l d be p u r e l y accidental. T h i s is t a n t a m o u n t to a denial o f i n d i v i d u a l existence a n d comes dangerously close to pantheism. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the realist solution had great s i m p l i c i t y , a n d was, moreover, adaptable to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of various d o g m a s — f o r example, t h a t of o r i g i n a l sin. I f i n essence there is o n l y one m a n , A d a m ' s sin n a t u r a l l y affects the essence of h u m a n i t y , a n d thus a l l later m e n . Realism is represented b y St. A n s e l m a n d , i n its extreme f o r m , b y W i l l i a m o f G h a m p e a u x (eleventh a n d t w e l f t h centuries). But adversaries of the realist thesis soon arise. B e g i n n i n g i n the eleventh c e n t u r y there appears w h a t has been called n o m i n a l i s m , starting p r i n c i p a l l y w i t h Roscellinus o f Gompiegne. A c c o r d i n g to n o m i n a l i s m , i t is the individuals t h a t exist. There is n o t h i n g i n nature t h a t is universal. T h e universals exist o n l y i n the m i n d , as something posterior to the things (post rem), a n d they are expressed i n words. Roscellinus arrives at a p u r e l y verbalistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the universals ; they are no more t h a n exhalations of the voice, flatus vocis. B u t this theory, too, is very dangerous. I f realism, exaggerated, threatens to lead to pantheism, n o m i n a l i s m , w h e n a p p l i e d to the T r i n i t y , leads us to t r i t h e i s m : i f there are three persons, there are three G-ods. M o r e over, the I n c a r n a t i o n is very difficult to conceive of w i t h i n the framew o r k o f Roscellinus' ideas. T h u s , the first t w o solutions a r e imperfect and do n o t solve the p r o b l e m . A l o n g a n d painstaking m e n t a l effort, a large share of w h i c h falls to the Jews a n d Arabs, leads to m o r e m a t u r e and subtle formulas i n the t h i r t e e n t h century, especially i n t h e w r i t i n g s of St. T h o m a s . T h e t h i r t e e n t h century contributes solutions of its o w n t o the p r o b lem o f the universals: these consist of a moderate realism. T h e adherents of this philosophy recognize t h a t the true substance is t h e i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g , as was m a i n t a i n e d b y A r i s t o t l e , whose a u t h o r i t y St. A l b e r t u s M a g n u s a n d St. Thomas invoke. T h e i n d i v i d u a l is the first substance, prote ousia. B u t this philosophy is n o t a f o r m o f n o m i n a l i s m ; the i n d i v i d u a l is a t r u e reality, b u t is a n i n d i v i d u a l of a species, a n d is obtained f r o m the species b y i n d i v i d u a t i o n . T h u s , i n order to e x p l a i n the i n d i v i d u a l r e a l i t y , there is need o f a p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n , principium
The
Universal*
individuationis. St. T h o m a s says thatformaliter the universals are p r o d ucts o f the spirit, b u t t h a t fundamentaliter they are based o n the reality outside the m i n d . T h e universals, considered f o r m a l l y — t h a t is, as s u c h — a r e products o f the m i n d . T h e y do n o t have a n independent existence, b u t are f o r m e d b y the m i n d . T h e y d o , however, have a basis in re, i n r e a l i t y . T h e universal has a n existence, not as a separate thing, b u t as a n i n g r e d i e n t of the things. I t is n o t a res, as the
extreme realists c l a i m e d , b u t neither is i t m e r e l y a w o r d . I t is in re. N o w i t is necessary t o f i n d a p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u a t i o n . T h a t is, w h a t is i t t h a t makes this e n t i t y be this one a n d n o t this other one? St. Thomas says t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l is n o t h i n g b u t materia signata quantitate. T h u s , q u a n t i f i e d m a t t e r is the p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u a t i o n . A certain q u a n t i t y o f m a t t e r is w h a t i n d i v i d u a t e s the universal f o r m t h a t shapes the m a t t e r . B u t i t should n o t be forgotten t h a t there is a hierarchy o f entities r a n g i n g f r o m p r i m a l m a t t e r to p u r e a c t u a l i t y ( G o d ) . P r i m a l m a t t e r cannot exist a c t u a l l y , because i t is p u r e possibility. But " i n f o r m e d " m a t t e r m a y be f o r m or m a t t e r , d e p e n d i n g on h o w i t is considered. For example, w o o d is itself a f o r m , b u t i t is the m a t t e r o f a table. Thus, there is a series of hierarchic forms w i t h i n a single entity, a n d there are essential forms a n d accidental forms. T h i s p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n raises a serious p r o b l e m for St. T h o m a s : W h a t about the angels ? T h e angels have no m a t t e r ; h o w is i n d i v i d u a t i o n possible a m o n g t h e m ? A c c o r d i n g to the T h o m i s t s o l u t i o n , i t is i n no way possible. St. Thomas says t h a t the angels are n o t i n d i v i d u a l s , b u t species. T h e u n i t among angels is n o t the i n d i v i d u a l , b u t the species, and each species is exhausted i n each angel. I n the final p e r i o d o f the M i d d l e Ages, the p r o b l e m o f the universals undergoes a p r o f o u n d development. By the t i m e o f J o h n D u n s Scotus, the great British Franciscan, a n d especially i n t h e t h o u g h t of W i l l i a m of O c c a m , there is a r e t u r n to the nominalist f o r m u l a t i o n of the quest i o n . Scotus makes m a n y distinctions; the distinctio realis, the distinctio formalis
a n d the distinctio formalis
a parte rei. T h e first or real distinction
is the one t h a t exists between one type o f t h i n g a n d another: for example, between a n elephant a n d a table. T h e r a t i o n a l or f o r m a l d i s t i n c t i o n is the one t h a t is made w h e n considering one t h i n g i n its various aspects; i t can be a n actual or a p u r e l y n o m i n a l distinction. I t is a c t u a l i f , for example, we distinguish a vase as a recipient for water f r o m a vase as a decorative object. A n o m i n a l d i s t i n c t i o n does not correspond to the r e a l i t y o f the t h i n g , b u t m e r e l y to its designation. T h e distinctio formalis a parte rei, finally, is also a f o r m a l distinction, b u t r a t h e r t h a n being a parte intellectus, i t is a parte rei. T h a t is, here also i t is a question o f things n o t n u m e r i c a l l y distinct, b u t i n this case i t is not
The Great
Themes of the Middle
Ages
the m i n d t h a t makes the d i s t i n c t i o n ; the d i s t i n c t i o n is present i n the t h i n g itself. T h u s , according to Scotus, a m a n has various forms: he has a h u m a n f o r m , or humanitas, b u t he also has a f o r m w h i c h distinguishes h i m f r o m a l l other m e n . T h i s is a f o r m a l d i s t i n c t i o n a parte rei, w h a t Scotus, using a n o r i g i n a l t e r m , calls haecceitas, or " thisness." Haecceitas consists i n b e i n g haec res, this t h i n g . Peter a n d Paul b o t h c o n t a i n f u l l h u m a n essence, b u t Peter possesses a n a d d i t i o n a l formalitas, w h i c h is " Peterness," a n d Paul possesses " Paulness." T h i s is Scotus' p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u a t i o n , w h i c h is n o t o n l y m a t e r i a l , as i n T h o m i s t metaphysics, b u t also f o r m a l . Scotus' position opens the w a y for n o m i n a l i s m . F r o m his t i m e o n , a n d especially i n the fourteenth c e n t u r y , the distinctions m u l t i p l y a n d the existence o f the i n d i v i d u a l s is increasingly p r o c l a i m e d . Even i n Scotus' conception, there are multipleformalitates, w i t h o u t exc luding the forma o f the species. O c c a m goes one step f u r t h e r a n d absolutely denies the existence o f the universals i n nature. T h e y are exclusively creations o f the spirit, of the m i n d . T h e y are terms (hence the name terminism w h i c h is also given t o this d i r e c t i o n of t h o u g h t ) . A n d the terms are m e r e l y signs for t h i n g s ; they are m e n t a l substitutes for the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f the things. T h e y are n o t conventions, b u t natural signs. T h i n g s are k n o w n t h r o u g h our concepts o f t h e m , a n d these concepts are universal. I n order to k n o w a n i n d i v i d u a l we m u s t have recourse to knowledge o f the universal, the I d e a ; if, w i t h O c c a m , we understand the universals to be mere signs, knowledge becomes symbolic. O c c a m is the artificer of a great r e n u n c i a t i o n : m a n w i l l renounce the possession of the things a n d w i l l resign himself to r e m a i n o n l y w i t h the symbols of things. T h i s is w h a t w i l l make possible m a t h e m a t i c a l k n o w l edge, based o n the use of symbols, a n d m o d e r n physics, w h i c h derives f r o m the n o m i n a l i s t schools, especially t h a t o f Paris. A r i s t o t e l i a n a n d m e d i e v a l physics desired to u n d e r s t a n d m o t i o n , the causes themselves; m o d e r n physics is content w i t h the m a t h e m a t i c a l signs for a l l of t h a t . A c c o r d i n g to Galileo, nature's book is w r i t t e n i n m a t h e m a t i c a l signs; we thus have a physics t h a t measures variations i n m o t i o n , b u t no longer seeks the knowledge of w h a t m o t i o n is. W e see t h a t , j u s t as i n the case of the p r o b l e m of the C r e a t i o n , the i n t e r n a l dialectics o f the p r o b lem o f the universals leads the m a n o f the fifteenth c e n t u r y to t u r n his eyes t o w a r d the w o r l d a n d f o r m u l a t e a science of n a t u r e . T h e t h i r d great question o f medieval philosophy, the p r o b l e m o f reason, w i l l definitively center man's a t t e n t i o n o n the new theme o f the w o r l d . 3.
REASON
Logos has been a n essential theme i n C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t f r o m the very
Reason
beginning. T h e first sentence of the Gospel A c c o r d i n g to St. J o h n says l i t e r a l l y t h a t i n t h e b e g i n n i n g was the w o r d , t h e Idgos, a n d t h a t G o d is logos. T h i s means t h a t provisionally G o d is the w o r d a n d , i n a d d i t i o n , reason. Several especially i m p o r t a n t problems arise as a result o f this situation, a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r the p r o b l e m o f man's situation i n the universe. W h a t is m a n ? H e is a finite e n t i t y , a creature, an ens creatum, one t h i n g among t h e o t h e r things; like the w o r l d , m a n is finite a n d c o n t i n gent. B u t at the same t i m e m a n is logos; a c c o r d i n g to a l l Hellenic t r a d i t i o n , m a n is a n a n i m a l w h i c h possesses logos. O n the one h a n d , m a n is j ust one more t h i n g i n the w o r l d , b u t o n the o t h e r h a n d , m a n , like G o d , is cognizant o f the w h o l e w o r l d a n d , a g a i n l i k e G o d , possesses logos. W h a t is the n a t u r e o f man's relationship w i t h G o d a n d the w o r l d ? I t is a n essentially a m b i g u o u s relationship; m a n is a n e n t i t y w h i c h p a r takes of being i n the sense t h a t a l l creatures do, b u t m a n is also a spirit capable of k n o w i n g w h a t the w o r l d is; t h a t is, a n e n t i t y w h i c h is Idgos. T h e philosophers o f the M i d d l e Ages w i l l say t h a t m a n is a creature w h i c h exists h a l f w a y between nothingness a n d G o d : medium quid inter nihilum et Deum. M o r e o v e r , man's special s i t u a t i o n was already p o i n t e d o u t i n Genesis: Faciamus
hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem
nostram.
M a n is made i n the image a n d likeness o f G o d . T h a t is, the I d e a o f m a n , the exemplary m o d e l according t o w h i c h m a n is created, is G o d himself. I t is for this reason t h a t Meister E c k h a r t said t h a t i n m a n there is s o m e t h i n g — a spark, scintilla, Funken—that is uncreated a n d u n creatable. T h i s statement was condemned as pantheistic because i t was i n t e r p r e t e d t o m e a n t h a t m a n was n o t created. However, as Z u b i r i has c l e a r l y shown, its correct m e a n i n g is t h a t m a n has a scintilla—that is, his v e r y I d e a — t h a t is u n c r e a t e d a n d uncreatable; and this concept is completely o r t h o d o x . I n w h a t ways is C h r i s t i a n thought to influence philosophy ? I n o r d e r to k n o w t r u t h , one m u s t enter oneself, one m u s t t u r n one's a t t e n t i o n w i t h i n oneself, as w e have already learned w h e n discussing St. Augustine's c o n t r i b u t i o n to philosophy. Intra in cubiculum mentis tuae
(Enter i n t o the c h a m b e r o f your m i n d ) , St. A n s e l m too w i l l say. A c c o r d i n g l y , i f m a n wants to learn, the worst t h i n g he can do is t o begin to observe the things o f the w o r l d , because t r u t h is n o t i n the things b u t i n G o d ; a n d m a n finds G o d i n himself. Since t r u t h is G o d , i t can only be a r r i v e d at t h r o u g h caritas: we reach G o d o n l y t h r o u g h love, a n d only G o d is t r u t h . T h i s is the precise m e a n i n g of St. Anselm's phrase, fides quaerens intellectum (faith seeking u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) . St. Bonaventure w i l l c a l l philosophy the j o u r n e y o f the m i n d t o w a r d G o d (Itinerarium mentis in Deum), a n d w i l l say t h a t this j o u r n e y begins w i t h
The Great Themes of the Middle
Ages
faith. T h i s concludes the o u t l i n e o f t h e state o f early m e d i e v a l p h i losophy. I n St. T h o m a s , theory is r a t i o n a l , speculative knowledge. T h e o l o g y rests o n f a i t h i n so far as i t is based o n revealed, s u p e r n a t u r a l i n f o r m a t i o n ; b u t m a n scrutinizes this i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h his reason i n order to i n t e r p r e t i t a n d a r r i v e at theological knowledge. T h e r e f o r e , complete accord between G o d a n d h u m a n reason is assumed. I f G o d is logos, as St. J o h n says, a n d i f m a n is also d e n n e d b y logos, there is accord between the t w o a n d knowledge o f t h e d i v i n e essence is possible. Theology can be r a t i o n a l even t h o u g h based o n revealed i n f o r m a t i o n . But i f theology a n d philosophy b o t h deal w i t h G o d , h o w do t h e y differ ? St. T h o m a s says t h a t the material object o f theology a n d philosophy can be the same w h e n b o t h speak o f G o d , b u t t h a t their f o r m a l objects are different. T h e o l o g y a n d philosophy a p p r o a c h the d i v i n e E n t i t y b y different paths, a n d therefore theology a n d philosophy h a v e different f o r m a l objects, even t h o u g h t h a t E n t i t y m a y be n u m e r i c a l l y the same. W e pass f r o m this state of e q u i l i b r i u m i n St. T h o m a s t o a v e r y different s i t u a t i o n i n D u n s Scotus a n d O c c a m . For Scotus, theological knowledge is no longer speculative, b u t p r a c t i c a l , m o r a l i s t i c . M a n is a r a t i o n a l i z i n g a n i m a l a n d thus w i l l create a r a t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y , because this is a m a t t e r o f logos. B u t o n the other h a n d , theology is s u p e r n a t u r a l ; reason has l i t t l e to d o w i t h i t ; i t is, above a l l , praxis. O c c a m exaggerates Scotus' ideas. F o r O c c a m , reason comes t o be an exclusively h u m a n concern. Reason is, indeed, characteristic o f m a n , b u t n o t o f G o d . G o d is o m n i p o t e n t a n d cannot be subject t o any law, n o t even t o the l a w o f reason; O c c a m says t h a t i f i t "were otherwise, the d i v i n e w i l l w o u l d be inadmissibly l i m i t e d . T h i n g s are as they a r e — t r u e , good, a n d the like—because God wills them so; the followers o f O c c a m w i l l say t h a t i f G o d w a n t e d the act o f m u r d e r to be good, or two a n d t w o t o be nineteen, they w o u l d be so. O c c a m is a v o l u n t a r i s t and believes v e r y strongly i n the p r i o r i t y o f the d i v i n e w i l l ; he does n o t a d m i t o f a n y t h i n g superior to God's w i l l , n o t even r e a s o n . " O n e m i g h t say t h a t , b e g i n n i n g w i t h this m o m e n t , metaphysical speculation h u r l s itself i n t o a vertiginous race i n w h i c h logos, w h i c h begins as the essence of G o d , ends u p as merely the essence o f m a n . A t this m o m e n t i n the fourteenth c e n t u r y O c c a m declares t e x t u a l l y a n d i n so m a n y words t h a t the essence o f the D e i t y is arbitrariness, free w i l l , o m n i p o t e n c e , and t h a t therefore the need to rationalize is a p r o p e r t y w h i c h is peculiar to h u m a n t h o u g h t . . . . A t this m o m e n t w h e n Occam's n o m i n a l i s m reduces reason t o a m a t t e r o f doors within m a n , t o a p u r e l y h u m a n q u a l i t y instead o f the essence o f the D e i t y , the h u m a n spirit also becomes separated f r o m the D e i t y . A l o n e , alienated f r o m the w o r l d
Reason
a n d f r o m G o d , the h u m a n spirit begins to feel insecure i n the universe. ' ' ( Z u b i r i : Hegely el problema
metqfisico.)
I f G o d is n o t reason, t h e n h u m a n reason c a n n o t concern itself w i t h G o d . A t the end o f the M i d d l e Ages, the D e i t y ceases to be man's great theoretic subject, a n d this separates m a n f r o m G o d . Reason concerns itself again w i t h those objects to w h i c h i t is a p p r o p r i a t e , to a r e a l m w h e r e i n i t can be f r u i t f u l . W h a t are these objects ? Above a l l , m a n himself. Secondly, t h e w o r l d , whose marvelous order is j u s t t h e n b e i n g discovered; i t is f o u n d to possess a m a t h e m a t i c a l as w e l l as r a t i o n a l o r d e r . Symbolic knowledge, to w h i c h n o m i n a l i s m h a d led us, is a d a p t e d to the m a t h e m a t i c a l character o f n a t u r e . A n d this w o r l d w h i c h is independent o f G o d — w h o set i t i n m o t i o n b y H i s act o f C r e a t i o n b u t w h o does n o t have to sustain i t — b e c o m e s the other great object o f concern t o h u m a n reason w h e n the D e i t y becomes inaccessible to reason. M a n a n d the w o r l d are the t w o p r i n c i p a l themes o f the age; therefore, h u m a n i s m a n d m o d e r n physics, the science o f n a t u r e , come to be the t w o c h i e f concerns o f Renaissance m a n , w h o finds h i m self alienated f r o m G o d . W e now see h o w t h e three deepest questions o f medieval philosophy — t h e problems o f t h e C r e a d o n , the universals a n d reason—combine t o lead to this n e w s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h we find m o d e r n metaphysics.
The Medieval
Philosophers
M e d i e v a l philosophy proper begins i n the n i n t h century. As we have seen, the i n t e l l e c t u a l activity p r i o r to this t i m e consisted merely o f a labor o f c o m p i l a t i o n a n d preservation o f classical culture a n d Patristic speculation; i t was w i t h o u t o r i g i n a l i t y , a n d d i d n o t possess great i n h e r e n t possibilities. F u r t h e r m o r e , the organization necessary to philosophic study was completely l a c k i n g a n d was o n l y to appear i n the schools, w h i c h arise at the b e g i n n i n g o f the n i n t h c e n t u r y ; these flourish p a r t i c u l a r l y i n France, a r o u n d the c o u r t o f C h a r l e m a g n e , a n d constitute w h a t is k n o w n as the C a r o l i n g i a n Renaissance. F r o m these schools, l e d b y teachers f r o m a l l the E u r o p e a n countries, a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y b y F r e n c h m e n , Englishmen a n d I t a l i a n s , there arises i n the r e i g n o f Charles the B a l d the first i m p o r t a n t b u d d i n g o f philosophy i n the M i d d l e Ages; this new activity is centered a r o u n d the figure o f the English t h i n k e r J o h n Scotus Erigena o r Eriugena. i.
SCOTUS
ERIGENA
J o h n Scotus Erigena was b o r n i n the B r i t i s h Isles, p r o b a b l y i n I r e l a n d , w h e r e more t h a n i n any other region the knowledge o f classical c u l t u r e a n d even o f the Greek language h a d been preserved. However, E r i g e n a carried out his i n t e l l e c t u a l activity p r i n c i p a l l y i n France, at the c o u r t o f Charles the B a l d , w h i c h he reached t o w a r d the m i d d l e o f the n i n t h century. Erigena represents the first example o f English influence o n European c u l t u r e . I t is quite t r u e t h a t m a n y European intellectual movements a n d ideas have originated i n E n g l a n d ; however, as a r u l e these ideas have n o t been developed i n t h e i r 140
Scotus
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141
c o u n t r y o f o r i g i n , b u t o n the C o n t i n e n t , a n d later have passed f r o m E u r o p e b a c k to Great B r i t a i n , w h i c h has again undergone their influence. T h i s is w h a t happens w i t h Scholasticism, a n d happened later w i t h t h e n a t u r a l sciences, w h i c h were begun b y R o g e r Bacon a n d developed i n France a n d I t a l y , o n l y to r e t u r n a n d flourish once more i n E n g l a n d i n the seventeenth century. Something s i m i l a r occurs l a t e r : t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t was also o f British i n s p i r a t i o n , b u t i t was developed i n France a n d i n the G e r m a n states, u n d e r g o i n g the sensationalist e m p i r i c i s m a n d deism o f the English philosophers. F i n a l l y , the diffusion o f romanticism presents a n analogous p h e n o m e n o n : i t was b o r n i n t h e British Isles t o w a r d the end of the eighteenth century, b u t flowered i n G e r m a n y a n d i n the rest o f the C o n t i n e n t , a n d later was reborn i n England. Scotus Erigena is greatly influenced b y N e o p l a t o n i c mysticism a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y b y the anonymous w r i t e r once k n o w n as Dionysius the A r e o p a g i t e , a n d n o w k n o w n as Pseudo-Dionysius. Scotus Erigena translated his works f r o m Greek to L a t i n , a n d w i t h this effort assured t h e i r fame a n d enormous influence o n medieval t h o u g h t . Erigena was h i m s e l f v e r y successful. H e was persuaded to w r i t e a treatise against the idea o f predestination w h i c h some heresies were t h e n m a k i n g very fashionable; his treatise, Depraedestinatione, was considered excessively d a r i n g a n d was condemned. H i s major w o r k was a n o t h e r treatise, De divisione naturae.
Scotus Erigena's purpose is always strictly o r t h o d o x ; he does n o t even i m a g i n e that there c a n be a discrepancy between t r u e philosophy and revealed r e l i g i o n ; reason is merely the i n s t r u m e n t w h i c h interprets the sacred texts for us, n o t h i n g more. W h e n b o t h philosophy a n d r e l i g i o n are true, they are i d e n t i c a l : veram essephilosophiam veram religionem, conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam.
I n the first r a n k
Scotus places revelation, s t r i c t l y u n d e r s t o o d — t h a t is, t h e a u t h o r i t y o f G o d . H o w e v e r , there are other sources o f a u t h o r i t y — t h e Fathers o f the C h u r c h a n d the earlier commentators o n sacred t e x t s — a n d this type of a u t h o r i t y must be subordinated to reason, w h i c h occupies the second r a n k , the r a n k below the d i v i n e w o r d . Scotus Erigena's metaphysics is expounded i n his De divisione naturae. T h i s d i v i s i o n assumes a series o f emanations o r acts o f sharing b y means o f w h i c h a l l things are b o r n f r o m the single t r u e E n t i t y w h i c h is G o d . T h e r e are four stages i n this process: (1) N a t u r e w h i c h is creative a n d n o t created (natura creans nec creata); t h a t is, G o d i n his first r e a l i t y . H e is u n k n o w a b l e , a n d can be dealt w i t h o n l y b y means o f the negative theology w h i c h Pseudo-Dionysius had m a d e so p o p u l a r .
The Medieval
Philosophers
(2) N a t u r e w h i c h is creative a n d created (natura creans creata); t h a t is, G o d i n so far as H e contains t h e first causes of the entities. U p o n k n o w i n g these causes i n H i m s e l f , G o d creates a n d manifests H i m s e l f i n H i s theophanies.
(3) N a t u r e w h i c h is created a n d not creative (natura creata nec creans); the corporeal or s p i r i t u a l beings created i n time w h i c h are mere m a n i festations or theophanies o f G o d . Scotus Erigena, w h o is a n extreme realist, affirms the p r i o r i t y o f the genus w i t h respect t o t h e species, a n d o f the species w i t h respect t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l . ( 4 ) N a t u r e w h i c h is n e i t h e r created nor creative (natura nec creata nec creans); t h a t is, G o d as the e n d o f the entire universe. A l l m o t i o n ends w h e r e i t began; G o d returns t o Himself, a n d the things become deified, they resolve themselves i n the d i v i n e a l l (dewcris). J o h n Scotus Erigena presents a n interesting metaphysics w h i c h touches acutely u p o n several m a j o r problems i n the M i d d l e Ages a n d constitutes the earliest phase o f Scholasticism. H o w e v e r , his doctrine is dangerous a n d n a t u r a l l y i n c l i n e d t o w a r d pantheism. B o t h w e l l - a n d i l l - f o u n d e d accusations o f pantheism are leveled against numerous thinkers d u r i n g the M i d d l e Ages, the m a j o r i t y o f w h o m , we must r e m e m b e r , d i d not b y a n y means deliberately profess p a n t h e i s m ; b u t t h e i r d o c t r i n e s — o r sometimes o n l y their professions of f a i t h — i n c l i n e d t o w a r d i t . As a consequence o f this extreme f o r m o f r e a l i s m , Scotus E r i g e n a comes to believe i n a single soul for a l l m a n k i n d — a n o t h e r o f the various dangers w h i c h are t o menace Scholasticism. T h u s , i n the first i m p o r t a n t medieval t h i n k e r we f i n d the features w h i c h are t o characterize the epoch as w e l l as the difficulties w i t h w h i c h the era must come to terms. F R O M S C O T U S E R I G E N A T O S T . A N S E L M . For W e s t e r n E u r o p e , the t e n t h century is a t e r r i b l e c e n t u r y : there are battles a n d invasions everywhere; the N o r m a n s attack, devastate a n d sack; the C a r o l i n g i a n Renaissance a n d a l l the i n t e l l e c t u a l awakening o f the n i n t h century disappears, a n d the schools f i n d themselves i n a d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n . M e d i e v a l t h o u g h t shuts itself u p i n the cloisters a n d f r o m this t i m e begins to acquire the monastic n a t u r e w h i c h is t o w e i g h u p o n i t for a l o n g t i m e ; the Benedictine O r d e r becomes the p r i n c i p a l repository o f theological a n d philosophical knowledge. Great personalities are r a r e ; the one of greatest interest is t h e m o n k Gerbert.
G e r b e r t of A u r i l l a c o b t a i n e d a n exceptionally complete education, p r i n c i p a l l y i n Spain, w h e r e he h a d contact w i t h the A r a b i c schools. L a t e r , after teaching i n R h e i m s a n d i n Paris, he was m a d e a n abbot, t h e n a n archbishop a n d f i n a l l y pope, under the n a m e o f Sylvester I I . H e d i e d i n 1003. Gerbert was n o t a n o r i g i n a l t h i n k e r ; he was most con-
St.
Anselm
H3
cerned w i t h logic a n d ethics a n d is i m p o r t a n t m a i n l y because he was the center of a n i n t e l l e c t u a l nucleus w h i c h achieved f u r t h e r developm e n t i n the eleventh c e n t u r y . I n this century the extreme realism we have m e n t i o n e d is i n v o g u e ; i t has a notable representative i n O d o n , o f T o u r n a i , where there was a very p o p u l a r school. O d o n applied his realism p r i n c i p a l l y to the problems of the m e a n i n g o f o r i g i n a l sin a n d the creation o f the souls o f c h i l d r e n ; according to h i m , the latter question involved o n l y the appearance o f new i n d i v i d u a l , accidental qualities o f the single h u m a n substance. T h i s realism is opposed b y the o p i n i o n of the nominates (nominalists), the sententia vocum, w h i c h declares that the universals are voces (terms), not res (real things). T h e leader o f this g r o u p is Roscellinus of C o m piegne, w h o taught i n France, E n g l a n d a n d R o m e t o w a r d the end of the eleventh century. T h i s b u d d i n g n o m i n a l i s m scarcely outlived Roscellinus; i t reappears o n l y i n the last centuries o f the M i d d l e Ages, a n d t h e n i t is based o n different suppositions.
2.
ST.
ANSELM
L I F E A N D W O R K S . St. A n s e l m was b o r n i n 1033 a n d died i n 1109. H e was f r o m Aosta, i n P i e d m o n t . As a m e m b e r o f the medieval C h r i s t i a n c o m m u n i t y a n d o f the European c o m m u n i t y w h i c h h a d b e g u n to take shape, he d i d n o t restrict his life a n d a c t i v i t y to the c o u n t r y o f his o r i g i n , b u t l i v e d p r i n c i p a l l y i n France a n d E n g l a n d . H e w e n t first to the abbey o f Bee, i n N o r m a n d y , where he spent m a n y years, the best and most i m p o r t a n t of his life. H e was p r i o r and then a b b o t o f Bee, a n d u l t i m a t e l y was named A r c h b i s h o p o f Canterbury, i n 1093; he remained i n t h a t office u n t i l his death. St. Anselm's entire life was devoted to study a n d religious activity, a n d i n his last years he was concerned w i t h u p h o l d i n g the Church's rights as a s p i r i t u a l power, w h i c h were t h e n being seriously threatened. 1
St. A n s e l m is the second great medieval philosopher, Scotus Erigena b e i n g the first. S t r i c t l y speaking, St. A n s e l m was the founder of Scholasticism, for i t is o n l y w i t h h i m t h a t this m o v e m e n t acquires its definite character. O n the other h a n d , he is i m m e r s e d i n the Patristic t r a d i t i o n o f A u g u s t i n i a n a n d Platonic (or, m o r e precisely, Neoplat o n i c ) o r i g i n . T h e i n t e l l e c t u a l influences w h i c h differ f r o m those o f Patristic speculation a n d later strongly affect the character of Scholast i c i s m are not yet evident i n h i m : the influences o f the Arabs a n d , t h r o u g h t h e m , A r i s t o t l e . St. Anselm is a f a i t h f u l A u g u s t i n i a n ; i n the preface to his Monologium
he w r i t e s : Nihil potui invenire me dixisse quod
144
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non catholicorum Patrum et maxime beati Augustini scriptis cohaereat. H e is
aware o f his constant c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the Fathers o f the C h u r c h a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h St. A u g u s t i n e . Nevertheless, we a l r e a d y detect i n A n s e l m the great lines w h i c h are to define Scholasticism, a n d i n fact his w o r k constitutes a first synthesis o f i t . T h u s , m e d i e v a l philosophy a n d theology are p r o f o u n d l y influenced b y his t h o u g h t . St. A n s e l m w r o t e several books. M a n y are of p r e d o m i n a n t l y theological interest; there are n u m e r o u s letters f u l l of d o c t r i n a l substance. T h e most i m p o r t a n t philosophical w o r k s — a l l short pieces—are cont a i n e d i n the Monologium
(Exemplum
meditandi de rationefidei—A
Model
for M e d i t a t i o n o n the Reason o f F a i t h ) a n d the Proslogium, w h i c h carries as a m o t t o the phrase w h i c h summarizes the m e a n i n g of all his p h i l o s o p h y : Fides quaerens intellectum ( F a i t h seeking u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) . H e also w r o t e the reply to Gaunilo's book o n the fool, t h e De veritate a n d the Cur Deus homo ? F A I T H A N D R E A S O N . St. Anselm's t h e o l o g i c a l — a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l — w o r k is p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h proofs of the existence o f G o d . T h i s is the topic w h i c h receives most discussion i n his w r i t i n g a n d the one most closely associated w i t h his n a m e . However, these proofs cannot be p r o p e r l y understood unless one is aware o f the w h o l e r a n g e o f St. Anselm's t h o u g h t .
St. A n s e l m begins w i t h f a i t h ; the proofs are n o t m e a n t to l e n d support to f a i t h , b u t are themselves supported b y f a i t h . H i s p r i n c i p l e is credo ut intelligam ( I believe i n o r d e r to understand). I n t h e Proslogium, his m a j o r w o r k , he w r i t e s : neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo
ut intelligam (For I do n o t w i s h t o understand i n order to b e l i e v e ; r a t h e r , I believe i n order to u n d e r s t a n d ) . However, this is n o t a question o f something distinct f r o m f a i t h ; f a i t h itself desires to k n o w , seeks i n t e l lection, a n d this desire for knowledge arises f r o m the i n t e r n a l character of f a i t h . St. A n s e l m distinguishes between l i v i n g f a i t h , w h i c h is actually operative, a n d dead f a i t h , w h i c h is useless; l i v i n g f a i t h is f o u n d e d o n dilectio, love, a n d this is w h a t gives i t life. T h i s love makes m a n , w h o is separated f r o m the face o f G o d b y sin, anxious to return to God's presence. L i v i n g faith wants to contemplate the face of G o d ; i t wants G o d to reveal H i m s e l f i n the l i g h t , i n t r u t h . Therefore, l i v i n g f a i t h seeks the true God, a n d this is intelligere, understanding. " I f I d i d n o t believe, I w o u l d n o t u n d e r s t a n d , " adds St. A n s e l m ; t h a t is, w i t h o u t f a i t h , or rather, dilectio, love, he c o u l d n o t a t t a i n God's t r u t h . T h i s is a clear echo o f St. Augustine's statement, non intratur in veritatem nisi per caritatem, w h i c h i n t u r n is perhaps fully understood o n l y i n the l i g h t o f St. Anselm's w o r k . T h u s we see t h a t theology relates i n a special w a y to S t . Anselm's
St.
Anselm
r e l i g i o n ; however, the result o f theology does n o t so relate. I n his w r i t i n g s St. A n s e l m says t h a t " T h e C h r i s t i a n s h o u l d approach unders t a n d i n g t h r o u g h f a i t h ; he should n o t a p p r o a c h f a i t h t h r o u g h unders t a n d i n g , or w i t h d r a w f r o m faith i f he cannot understand. W h e n he can reach intelligence, he w i l l Be contented; a n d i f he cannot understand, he should w o r s h i p " (Epistle X L I ) . T h i s statement is a clear d e f i n i t i o n of the i n t e l l e c t u a l basis for a l l o f St. Anselm's philosophy. T H E O N T O L O G I C A L A R G U M E N T . I n his Monologium, St. Anselm gives various proofs o f the existence of God, b u t the most i m p o r t a n t p r o o f is the one he expounds i n the Proslogium, a n d w h i c h , since the t i m e o f K a n t , has generally been referred to as the o n t o l o g i c a l argument. T h i s p r o o f o f the existence o f G o d has h a d enormous repercussions i n the entire history of philosophy. Even d u r i n g St. Anselm's lifetime a m o n k n a m e d G a u n i l o attacked the proof, a n d St. A n s e l m himself replied to Gaunilo's objections. L a t e r o n , o p i n i o n was d i v i d e d a n d interpretations o f the a r g u m e n t differed. St. Bonaventure took a position close to t h a t o f St. A n s e l m ; St. Thomas rejected the p r o o f ; Duns Scotus accepted i t w i t h m o d i f i c a t i o n s ; Descartes a n d L e i b n i z made use of i t , w i t h certain alterations; t h e n K a n t , i n his Critique of Pure Reason, established its i m p o s s i b i l i t y i n an a p p a r e n t l y definitive way. Y e t H e g e l afterward restated the p r o o f i n different terms, a n d still later, i n the nineteenth c e n t u r y , i t was studied i n d e p t h b y Brentano a n d especially b y Father G r a t r y . U p to the present d a y the ontological a r g u m e n t is a c e n t r a l theme of philosophy, because i t involves n o t o n l y mere logical a r g u m e n t a t i o n , b u t also a question t h a t concerns a l l o f metaphysics. T h i s is the reason for the singular r e n o w n of St. Anselm's proof.
W e cannot here enter i n t o details o f the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the a r g u m e n t . * I t w i l l be sufficient to indicate briefly its essential meaning. St. Anselm's p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e is God, a h i d d e n G o d w h o does not m a n i fest H i m s e l f to m a n i n his fallen state. T h i s is a religious p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e : the f a i t h o f m a n , w h o was made i n order to see G o d b u t has not seen H i m . T h i s f a i t h seeks to understand, to practice theology: i t is a fides quaerens intellectum. B u t there does n o t yet appear the necessity or the possibility o f demonstrating the existence o f G o d . St. Anselm cites the t h i r t e e n t h ! p s a l m : Dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus (The
fool
h a t h said i n his heart, T h e r e is no G o d ) . T h i s d e n i a l calls the existence o f G o d i n t o question for the first t i m e a n d gives St. Anselm's p r o o f a m e a n i n g i t lacks w i t h o u t the fool's statement. St. A n s e l m formulates his famous p r o o f i n these terms: W h e n the fool says t h a t there is no * See my book San Anselmoy
el insensato [Obras,
IV].
f [Psalm 13 in the Vulgate, Psalm 14 in the King James V e r s i o n . — T R A N S . ]
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G o d , he understands w h a t he is saying. I f we say t h a t G o d is t h a t e n t i t y such t h a t no greater e n t i t y can be i m a g i n e d , the f o o l w i l l understand this as w e l l . Therefore, G o d is i n his u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; w h a t he denies is t h a t G o d is also in re, t h a t is, t h a t H e really exists. B u t i f G o d exists o n l y i n the i m a g i n a t i o n w e are able to imagine t h a t H e c o u l d also exist i n r e a l i t y , and this conception o f H i m is greater t h a n the earlier one. Therefore, we are able to i m a g i n e something greater t h a n G o d i f H e does n o t exist. B u t this contradicts our premise t h a t G o d is such t h a t n o t h i n g greater t h a n H e can be i m a g i n e d . T h e n G o d , w h o exists i n the understanding, m u s t also exist i n reality. T h a t is, i f H e exists o n l y i n the understanding, H e does n o t fulfill the necessary cond i t i o n ; therefore, i t w o u l d n o t be G o d of w h o m we were speaking. As a m a t t e r o f fact, St. Anselm's p r o o f shows t h a t the existence o f G o d cannot be denied. I t consists o f c o n f r o n t i n g the fool's d e n i a l w i t h the meaning o f w h a t he is saying. T h e fool does not u n d e r s t a n d the f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n o f w h a t he is saying, a n d for this very reason he is a fool. H e is n o t t h i n k i n g o f God, a n d his d e n i a l is a n error. H i s f o l l y consists o f t h i s : he does not know what he is saying. I f , instead, we i m a g i n e G o d
as
f u l l y as possible, we see t h a t i t is impossible t h a t H e s h o u l d n o t exist. Therefore, St. Anselm confronts folly w i t h the doctrine o f i n t i m a c y , the r e t u r n to oneself, f o l l o w i n g the example o f St. A u g u s t i n e . W h e n m a n enters w i t h i n himself a n d finds himself, he also finds G o d , i n whose image a n d likeness he is made. T h u s , the o n t o l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t is a n appeal to the sense of i n t i m a c y , to the depths o f t h e personality, and is based concretely on the r e f u t a t i o n of the fool. T h i s m e e t i n g w i t h G o d i n t h e i n t i m a c y o f the m i n d opens a clear p a t h to St. Anselm's speculation. T h i s is the course t h a t medieval t h o u g h t w i l l follow i n the subsequent p e r i o d .
3.
T H E TWELFTH
CENTURY
After the w o r k of St. A n s e l m , Scholasticism is established. T h e r e is a f r a m e w o r k o f problems w i t h i n w h i c h Scholasticism can m o v e f o r w a r d , a n d t h a t b o d y o f doctrine appears w h i c h c o u l d be called t h e " c o m m o n p r o p e r t y " o f the M i d d l e Ages, or the "Scholastic synthesis." T h i s b o d y o f d o c t r i n e prepares the w a y for t h e great general works o f the t h i r t e e n t h century, especially St. T h o m a s ' Summa theologiae. A t the same t i m e the w o r l d of ideas o f Western Europe acquires s t a b i l i t y ; the historical groups t h a t are to compose Europe a t t a i n consistency. D u r i n g the entire twelfth c e n t u r y the social organization o f the M i d d l e Ages progresses t o w a r d consolidation, w h i c h i t w i l l achieve i n the f o l l o w i n g century. T h e schools become i m p o r t a n t i n t e l l e c t u a l centers
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w h i c h w i l l soon lead to the creation o f the universities. T h e p r i n c i p a l h o m e o f philosophy i n this p e r i o d is France, especially the schools o f Ghartres and Paris. L a t e r , the foundation o f the U n i v e r s i t y o f Paris, the most i m p o r t a n t i n t e l l e c t u a l focal p o i n t o f the entire medieval era, w i l l definitively establish Paris as the capital o f Scholasticism. I n the twelfth c e n t u r y , the question o f the universals is t h o r o u g h l y discussed. I n general, realism prevails, b u t there is a series o f attempts to oppose the extremes o f realism, a n d these attempts come close to the moderate solution t h a t St. Thomas w i l l impose. A r a b i c a n d Jewish influences are b r o u g h t to bear intensively o n Scholasticism a n d , w i t h t h e m , the influence o f A r i s t o t l e , whose o r i g i n a l works were almost u n k n o w n u n t i l t h e n . T h i s intellectual f e r m e n t a t i o n also gives rise to heterodox theological movements, especially pantheistic movements, a n d there is a resurgence o f dualism i n the A l b i g e n s i a n a n d Catharist heresies. Lastly, m y s t i c i s m o f a speculative n a t u r e enjoys a great flowering. A l l these tendencies, c o m i n g to the fullness o f their developm e n t , w i l l produce the c u l m i n a t i n g period i n m e d i e v a l philosophy, w h i c h includes R o g e r Bacon, Meister E c k h a r t , St. Bonaventure a n d St. T h o m a s A q u i n a s . T H E S C H O O L O F G H A R T R E S . T h e school o f Chartres was founded b y F u l b e r t , bishop o f Chartres, w h o died at the b e g i n n i n g of the eleventh c e n t u r y ; b u t o n l y i n the t w e l f t h century d i d the school acquire its true i m p o r t a n c e as a center o f Platonist a n d realist t h o u g h t . A m o n g the most interesting thinkers i n this group are the brothers Bernard a n d T h i e r r y (Theodoric) o f Chartres, w h o were chancellors of the school. T h e i r teachings are p r i n c i p a l l y k n o w n t h r o u g h the works o f their E n g l i s h p u p i l J o h n o f Salisbury. T h e y believed t h a t o n l y the universal realities deserved the n a m e o f entities; t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l sensibles were no more t h a n shadows. Bernard distinguished three types o f realities: G o d ; m a t t e r , w h i c h was b r o u g h t o u t o f nothingness b y the C r e a t i o n ; and the Ideas, exemplary forms t h r o u g h w h i c h the possibles a n d the existents are present i n the m i n d o f G o d . T h e u n i o n o f the Ideas w i t h m a t t e r produces the sensible w o r l d . A strong Platonic influence is visible i n this extreme f o r m of realism.
G i l b e r t de la Porrée (Gilbertus Porretanus), w h o became bishop of Poitiers, was a p u p i l o f B e r n a r d a n d chancellor o f the school of Chartres after B e r n a r d a n d before T h i e r r y . G i l b e r t opposed the realism o f the school o f Chartres. H e avoided a l l danger o f p a n t h e i s m b y distingu i s h i n g the d i v i n e Ideas f r o m their copies, w h i c h are the innate forms i n h e r e n t i n the sensible things. T h e universals are n o t the Ideas, b u t images o f the Ideas. T h e m i n d compares s i m i l a r essences a n d unites t h e m m e n t a l l y ; this c o m m o n f o r m is the universal, genus or species.
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T h u s , G i l b e r t de la Porree is the a u t h o r o f the first sketchy o u t l i n e o f the t h i r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y solution to the p r o b l e m of universals. O t h e r i m p o r t a n t thinkers related t o the school o f Chartres are W i l l i a m o f Conches a n d the above-mentioned J o h n o f Salisbury, a keen a n d interesting philosopher w h o w r o t e t w o m a j o r works, the Metalogicus a n d the Polycraticus. Separate f r o m this g r o u p , b u t related to i t a n d engaging i n polemics w i t h i t , are various adversaries o f the extreme realist positions. These m e n fashion several theories to solve the p r o b l e m o f the universals, t a k i n g as their p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e the existence of the individuals a n d considering the genera a n d species as different aspects of the i n d i v i d u a l s . Especially n o t e w o r t h y a m o n g these philosophers are the Englishman A d e l a r d (^Ethelard) of B a t h a n d the F l e m i n g W a l t e r (Gautier) o f M o r t a g n e , authors o f the t h e o r y o f the respectus (the aspects o f the i n d i v i d u a l s ) , the status a n d , lastly, the collectio. I n the theory of the status, or states, essences r e m a i n unchanged i n themselves, b u t change their " s t a t e " according to the bodies w i t h w h i c h they are u n i t e d . I n the theory o f the collectio, a g r o u p of i n d i viduals taken collectively is accorded a universality t h a t is denied to the i n d i v i d u a l s taken separately. A B E L A R D . T h e figure o f A b e l a r d , the belligerent a n d passionate d i a l e c t i c i a n , together w i t h the story o f his affair w i t h Heloise, his castration a n d the restless n a t u r e o f his entire life, are a l l too w e l l k n o w n . T h e r e have even been attempts to construct o n the basis o f these established facts a n image of A b e l a r d as a freethinker a n d a n t i scholastic, b u t m o d e r n research has p r o v e d this image to be false. A b e l a r d was b o r n near Nantes i n 1079 i n t o a f a m i l y o f soldiers w h o l i k e d to spend a few years s t u d y i n g before t a k i n g u p t h e i r m i l i t a r y profession. A b e l a r d was destined to d o the same, b u t he was w o n over b y the academic life a n d remained i n i t always. H i s pugnacious spirit led h i m i n t o involvement i n dialectics a n d polemics w i t h his successive teachers. H e attended the school o f Roscellinus, t h e n the school o f W i l l i a m o f C h a m p e a u x . A f t e r w a r d , he founded a school at M e l u n , w h i c h was later transferred to C o r b e i l . Years later, he r e t u r n e d to Paris, studied theology w i t h A n s e l m o f L a o n , a n d t a u g h t w i t h enormous success. A c c o r d i n g to a letter w r i t t e n b y a c o n t e m p o r a r y , his pupils came f r o m a l l over France, Flanders, E n g l a n d a n d Swabia. After this p e r i o d o f glory came his misfortunes. T h e n Peter A b e l a r d became a m o n k , leading his restless life a n d bearing his teachings f r o m monastery to monastery u n t i l his death i n 1142.
A b e l a r d was a passionate a n d refined spirit. H e was a h i g h l y c u l t u r e d m a n , a n d i t has been said t h a t i n h i m and i n the entire t w e l f t h century there is a p a r t i a l a n t i c i p a t i o n o f the Renaissance. H i s w r i t i n g s
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i n c l u d e a large theological w o r k , f r o m w h i c h a n Introductio ad theologiam is preserved; his famous book Sic et non, i n w h i c h he unites a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y theological a n d B i b l i c a l authorities i n a n effort o f c o n c i l i a t i o n ; a philosophical w o r k , Scito te ipsum, seu Ethica; a Dialéctica ; a n d various other works. Peter A b e l a r d establishes firm relationships between philosophy a n d religion. T h e C h r i s t i a n mysteries, a c c o r d i n g to h i m , cannot be demonstrated a n d k n o w n experimentally; they c a n o n l y be understood or believed b y means o f analogies or similitudes. I n spite o f this f o r m u l a t i o n , A b e l a r d tended i n practice to i n t e r p r e t various dogmas — t h a t o f the T r i n i t y , for e x a m p l e — a n d lapsed i n t o errors that were condemned. W i t h r e g a r d to the question o f the universals, he first c r i t i c i z e d Roscellinus' " n o m i n a l i s m , " b u t l a t e r especially attacked W i l l i a m of C h a m p e a u x because of his extreme realist doctrines. A c c o r d i n g to A b e l a r d , the intellect apprehends the similarities bet w e e n individuals b y means o f abstraction. T h e result o f this abstract i o n — w h i c h is always based o n the i m a g i n a t i o n , because knowledge begins w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l a n d the sensible—is the universal. T h e universal cannot be a t h i n g (res), because things are n o t predicated o f subjects, whereas universals are so predicated. B u t the universal is n o t m e r e l y a vox (a mere t e r m ) either ; i t is a sermo, a w o r d as used i n discourse, w h i c h is related t o the real content; i t is a t r u e nomen (noun) i n t h e strict sense t h a t is equivalent to vox significativa (a meaningful w o r d ) . T h e theory o f the sermones comes close to w h a t w i l l later be f o r m u l a t e d as conceptualism. Therefore, a l t h o u g h A b e l a r d does n o t have a d o c t r i n a l importance comparable to t h a t o f Scotus Erigena or St. A n s e l m , he exercised a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y personal influence i n the schools a n d made keen cont r i b u t i o n s to m a n y i m p o r t a n t questions. H i s a c t i v i t y prepared the w a y for the apogee o f Paris as a Scholastic center a n d for the p h i l o sophical and theological fulfillment of the t h i r t e e n t h century. THE V I C T O R I N E S . T h e Augustine A b b e y o f St. V i c t o r i n Paris becomes i n the t w e l f t h c e n t u r y one of the most i m p o r t a n t intellectual centers o f C h r i s t e n d o m . Above a l l , i t is a center o f mysticism, b u t o f a mysticism w h i c h does n o t exclude r a t i o n a l knowledge or even the p r o fane sciences, w h i c h i t a c t u a l l y encourages energetically. T h e A b b e y o f St. V i c t o r indulges intensively i n philosophy a n d theology; the V i c t o r i n e s ' p r o f o u n d religious spirituality is sustained b y a precise a n d w i d e - r a n g i n g knowledge. I n the w o r k of the philosophers of St. V i c t o r , especially H u g h a n d R i c h a r d , the systematization o f Scholasticism takes a step f o r w a r d .
H u g h of St. V i c t o r , the m a j o r figure a m o n g t h e m , is the author o f a
The Medieval
Philosophers
comprehensive synoptic w o r k e n t i t l e d De sacramentis, w h i c h is already a Summa theologiae, m o r e complete a n d perfect t h a n A b e l a r d ' s a t t e m p t . H u g h recommends l e a r n i n g a l l the sciences, sacred a n d profane ; he believes t h a t they m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t a n d strengthen one a n o t h e r a n d t h a t they are a l l useful. H e distinguishes four sciences: theoretic science, w h i c h investigates t r u t h ; p r a c t i c a l science, or ethics ; m e c h a n i cal science, the study o f h u m a n activities ; a n d logic, t h e science o f expression a n d discussion. H u g h especially recommends t h e study o f the seven l i b e r a l arts, the trivium a n d the quadrivium, w h i c h he considers to be inseparable. I n discussing the p r o b l e m o f the universals a n d knowledge, H u g h o f St. V i c t o r also uses the theory o f abstraction, A r i s t o t e l i a n i n o r i g i n , i n advance o f the great influence o f A r i s t o t l e i n the t h i r t e e n t h century. H e considers the history of the w o r l d to be ordered about t w o p r i n c i p a l moments : the C r e a t i o n o f the w o r l d a n d its restoration t h r o u g h C h r i s t I n c a r n a t e a n d the sacraments. T h e w o r k of restoration is t h e p r i m a r y object o f the Scriptures, b u t the C r e a t i o n is studied b y t h e profane sciences. I n this w a y the t w o classes o f sciences are u n i t e d i n H u g h ' s t h o u g h t . H u g h ' s philosophy is strongly tinged w i t h A u g u s t i n i a n i s m ; he affirms t h a t man's first knowledge is of his o w n existence a n d o f t h e soul, w h i c h is distinct f r o m the b o d y . T h i s is another p h i l o s o p h y o f i n t i m a c y , a n d this, too, is a facet o f H u g h ' s o r t h o d o x m y s t i c a l o r i e n tation. R i c h a r d o f St. V i c t o r , a p u p i l o f H u g h , restated his master's t h o u g h t a n d c o n t i n u e d i t w i t h o r i g i n a l elements. R i c h a r d w r o t e a Liber excerptionum a n d the De Trinitate. Concerned w i t h the proofs of t h e existence o f G o d , he rejected the a p r i o r i proofs a n d especially emphasized the v a l i d i t y o f sensory perception a n d observation. R i c h a r d ' s w o r k , too, contains the close u n i o n between mysticism a n d r a t i o n a l a r g u m e n t t h a t was to c u l m i n a t e i n the speculative mysticism of M e i s t e r E c k h a r t . T h e knowledge of G o d a n d o f m a n i l l u m i n a t e each o t h e r . W e k n o w m a n t h r o u g h experience, a n d w h a t w e f i n d i n h i m serves as a basis for i n f e r r i n g — m u t a t i s mutandis—some o f the properties o f t h e d i v i n e E n t i t y . Conversely, the i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h r a t i o n a l a r g u m e n t gives us concerning the D e i t y can be a p p l i e d t o w a r d a knowledge o f m a n , the image o f G o d , i n his most p r o f o u n d being. Perhaps R i c h a r d o f St. V i c t o r is the philosopher w h o m a d e the most technical a n d acute use o f t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l m e t h o d w h i c h consists i n c o n t e m p l a t i n g the r e a l i t y o f G o d a n d H i s h u m a n image a l t e r n a t e l y w i t h the various suitable means for d o i n g so. Therefore, his De Trinitate is one o f the most interesting m e d i e v a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o theology a n d a n t h r o p o l o g y at one a n d the same t i m e .
The Twelfth
Century
T h e great t w e l f t h - c e n t u r y C h r i s t i a n figure St. B e r n a r d of C l a i r v a u x is also closely related to m y s t i c i s m . I t was St. B e r n a r d w h o vivified a n d i n s p i r e d the Cistercian O r d e r , w h i c h h a d been f o u n d e d at the end o f t h e preceding century i n o r d e r to make religious practice at C l u n y m o r e rigorous a n d ascetic. T h e Cistercian spirit was one o f extreme austerity, as was St. Bernard's o w n life. H i s spirit o f a r d e n t religiosity a n d his capabilities as a leader o f m e n are w e l l k n o w n . H e grants p h i l o s o p h y its due, b u t m y s t i c i s m is d o m i n a n t i n his t h o u g h t ; indeed, St. B e r n a r d is one o f the p r i n c i p a l representatives o f mysticism i n the M i d d l e Ages. A m o n g the theologians w h o use philosophy o n l y as a tool, the most interesting is Peter L o m b a r d , called the magister sententiarum (master o f t h e sentences, or m a x i m s ) p a r excellence. H e was bishop o f Paris, a n d d i e d i n 1164. T h r o u g h o u t the M i d d l e Ages his Libri I V sententiarum w e r e a repository o f theology, commented o n numberless times i n the e n t i r e Scholastic age t h a t f o l l o w e d . T H E H E R E S I E S O F T H E T W E L F T H C E N T U R Y . T h i s c e n t u r y , so f u l l o f i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y , c o u l d n o t keep itself free f r o m heterodox currents i n theology. These currents were related to philosophic orientations m a r g i n a l to the general development o f Scholasticism. I n this sense i t c a n be stated, along w i t h M a u r i c e de W u l f , t h a t these philosophies are " a n t i s c h o l a s t i c " ; b u t i t should not be f o r g o t t e n t h a t they have i n c o m m o n the same set o f problems as Scholasticism a n d t h a t i t is for this reason t h a t the solutions o f the t w o groups appear divergent a n d t h a t the polemics are k e p t alive t h r o u g h o u t the M i d d l e Ages. These heresies are p r i n c i p a l l y concerned w i t h a few points t h a t received special discussion: atheism (infrequent i n its strict f o r m ) , pantheism, m a t e r i a l i s m , the e t e r n i t y o f the w o r l d . These are the most disputed p o i n t s , those to w h i c h A r a b i c philosophy w i l l later c o n t r i b u t e , a n d w h i c h w i l l have heterodox repercussions u n t i l the end o f the M i d d l e Ages.
T h e r e appear i n the t w e l f t h century, especially i n France a n d some places i n I t a l y , t w o d i f f e r e n t b u t i n t e r r e l a t e d heretical movements: t h e Albigenses ( f r o m A l b i i n southern France) a n d the C a t h a r i . T h e v i o l e n t struggles w h i c h these heresies aroused are w e l l k n o w n , as is the intense a c t i v i t y of theologians a n d preachers w h i c h they p r o d u c e d , a n a c t i v i t y t h a t c u l m i n a t e d i n the f o u n d a t i o n o f the D o m i n i c a n O r d e r b y St. D o m i n i c ( D o m i n g o de G u z m a n ) . These heresies professed a d u a l i s m o f good a n d e v i l ; e v i l , opposed to G o d , h a d a n independent n a t u r e . T h i s was t a n t a m o u n t to a denial of C h r i s t i a n monotheism a n d , i n a d d i t i o n , the heresy h a d m o r a l consequences. Cathari means the pure; a m o n g the C a t h a r i , the perfect led a p a r t i c u l a r l y austere life a n d -
1JZ
The Medieval
Philosophers
constituted a special clergy. T h i s contrast between a m o d e l difficult to follow a n d a great m a j o r i t y incapable of such perfection l e d to serious i m m o r a l i t y . T h e suppression o f the Albigensian m o v e m e n t , at the b e g i n n i n g o f the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y , was extremely severe a n d ended after several " c r u s a d e s , " w i t h the consequent devastation o f the regions affected b y the struggle. T h e heresy o f the C a t h a r i was p a r t i c u l a r l y dangerous, because their m a t e r i a l i s m , w h i c h d e n i e d the spiri t u a l i t y a n d the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the soul, contradicted the Catholic dogmas a n d , at the same t i m e , the v e r y f o u n d a t i o n of C h r i s t i a n ethics. I n another d i r e c t i o n , there was a series o f movements t h a t more or less a p p r o x i m a t e d pantheism. T h e N e o p l a t o n i c concepts o f m o n i s m a n d e m a n a t i o n were i n vogue. O n e such philosopher was B e r n a r d o f T o u r s , a u t h o r o f a book called De mundi universitate. T h e sect l e d b y A m a l r i c o f Bena was more i m p o r t a n t . A c c o r d i n g to A m a l r i c , everyt h i n g is one because e v e r y t h i n g is G o d : omnia unum, quia quidquid est est
Deus. T h e being of all things is based o n the being o f G o d ; thus, there is a n i m m a n e n c e o f the D e i t y i n the w o r l d . M a n is a manifestation or a p p a r i t i o n o f G o d , as is C h r i s t H i m s e l f . These ideas s t i r r e d u p m u c h controversy, h a d m a n y repercussions (for example, i n the w o r k o f J o a c h i m of Flora) a n d encountered l i v e l y opposition. A n o t h e r representative of the pantheistic tendencies was D a v i d of D i n a n t , w h o m a d e a d i s t i n c t i o n between G o d , souls a n d m a t t e r , b u t believed t h a t they were one i n n u m b e r a n d t h a t G o d was identical w i t h m a t t e r . I n 1215, the C a r d i n a l R o b e r t de C o u r c o n forbade the reading i n the U n i v e r s i t y of Paris of the physical a n d metaphysical works of A r i s t o t l e , w h i c h h a d j u s t become k n o w n , together w i t h the w r i t i n g s of D a v i d o f D i n a n t , A m a l r i c a n d a certain M a u r i c e of Spain ( M a u r i t i u s H i s p a n u s ) . I n this c o n d e m n a t i o n o f Aristotle a l o n g w i t h the representatives o f the p a n theistic tendencies, w h i c h were so foreign to his t h o u g h t , can be seen the confusion of Aristotelian doctrines, still l i t t l e k n o w n , w i t h those o f c e r t a i n A r a b i c commentators. T h e influence o f Averroes, especially, w i l l later produce an u n o r t h o d o x m o v e m e n t k n o w n b y the name o f L a t i n Averroism.
4.
EASTERN
PHILOSOPHIES
A t the same t i m e t h a t philosophy was developing i n the West, a similar m o v e m e n t h a d o r i g i n a t e d a m o n g the peoples o f the East, especially the Arabs a n d Jews. I n n o case is this a n o r i g i n a l , autonomous A r a b i c or H e b r e w philosophy. N o r is i t a n isolated speculation, w i t h o u t contact w i t h the Christians. I n the first place, the impulse comes p a r t i c u l a r l y f r o m the Greeks, p r i n c i p a l l y Aristotle a n d some o f
Eastern
Philosophies
the Neoplatonists. I n the second place, C h r i s t i a n i t y has a decisive influence on M o s l e m a n d Jewish t h o u g h t . I n the case o f M o h a m m e d a n i s m , the influence extends to the r e l i g i o n itself. S t r i c t l y speaking, I s l a m m i g h t be considered a Judaeo-Christian heresy t h a t appears b y v i r t u e o f M o h a m m e d ' s connections w i t h Jews a n d Christians. T h e M o s l e m dogmas are f o r m u l a t e d negatively, w i t h a polemic air, against the doctrine o f the T r i n i t y , the influence o f w h i c h , for example, they d e n o u n c e : " T h e r e is n o G o d b u t A l l a h ; he is n o t the son or the father, nor does he have a p a r t n e r . " H e r e m a y be n o t e d a polemic against the p r i m i t i v e polytheism o f the Arabs as w e l l as against the T r i n i t a r i a n dogma. Conversely, the philosophy of the A r a b s a n d Jews is k n o w n to the C h r i s t i a n Scholastics a n d influences t h e m strongly. I n a d d i t i o n , acquaintance w i t h the works o f Aristotle gave Eastern philosophy a head start w i t h respect to C h r i s t i a n philosophy, a n d i n the t w e l f t h c e n t u r y Eastern t h o u g h t h a d already reached m a t u r i t y , whereas this was n o t to occur i n E u r o p e u n t i l the f o l l o w i n g century. B u t , above a l l , the great role o f the A r a b s a n d Jews was as the transmitters of A r i s t o t e l i a n thought. I t was especially the Spanish A r a b s w h o b r o u g h t the texts o f the great Greek philosopher to the countries o f the West, a n d this c o n t r i b u t i o n marks the p e r i o d o f Scholasticism's m a t u r i t y . F r o m the p o i n t of view o f this transmission as w e l l as f r o m the p o i n t of v i e w o f philosophic a c t i v i t y , A r a b i c Spain merits first place i n the w o r l d o f medieval Eastern philosophy.
Arabic
Philosophy
C H A R A C T E R . I n the seventh century, d u r i n g the Abbasid E m p i r e , the Syrians i n t r o d u c e Aristotle's t h o u g h t to the Arabs i n r a t h e r i n d i r e c t fashion. T h e A r i s t o t e l i a n texts are t r a n s l a t e d — n o t always a c c u r a t e l y — f r o m Greek to Syriac, f r o m Syriac to A r a b i c , a n d sometimes also pass t h r o u g h the H e b r e w language. These extremely i n d i r e c t A r a b i c translations are i n t u r n translated i n t o L a t i n a n d then come to the a t t e n t i o n o f the Scholastics. Sometimes Aristotle's works are transl a t e d first i n t o Spanish a n d then i n t o L a t i n ; o n the other h a n d , a Greek version is occasionally available, a n d t h e n the L a t i n translation is made directly f r o m the o r i g i n a l . M o r e o v e r , the Aristotle to w h i c h the Arabs are i n t r o d u c e d has frequently been disfigured by the Neoplatonic commentators. Nevertheless, a considerable A r i s t o t e l i a n element enters i n t o w h a t has been called Arabic syncretism. T h e A r a b s — especially Averroes—were the great commentators o n Aristotle i n the M i d d l e Ages.
A r a b i c philosophy is also a Moslem Scholasticism. Its p r i n c i p a l topic is
The
Medieval
Philosophers
the r a t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the K o r a n , a n d the relationships between r e l i g i o n a n d philosophy p a r a l l e l those i n the West. T h e same t h i n g happens w i t h Jewish p h i l o s o p h y ; i n this way, a r o u n d the three religions, three scholastic movements o f u n e q u a l i m p o r t a n c e are created, a n d a l l three influence one another. A R A B P H I L O S O P H E R S I N T H E E A S T . A r a b i c philosophic speculation begins a r o u n d the intellectual center o f Baghdad. A first great figure appears i n the n i n t h c e n t u r y ; this is A l k i n d i , a c o n t e m p o r a r y of J o h n Scotus E r i g e n a . A n o t h e r , m o r e i m p o r t a n t , t h i n k e r lives i n the f o l l o w i n g c e n t u r y : A l f a r a b i , w h o d i e d a r o u n d 950. A l f a r a b i does n o t l i m i t h i m s e l f to t r a n s l a t i n g ; instead he devotes himself p r i n c i p a l l y to c o m m e n t i n g o n Aristotle a n d introduces the concept o f t h e " a c t i v e i n t e l l e c t " as a separate f o r m o f m a t t e r , a theory w h i c h c a m e to have great i m p o r t a n c e i n M o s l e m philosophy. H e also introduces the dist i n c t i o n between essence a n d existence. L a t e r we have A v i c e n n a ( I b n Sina), w h o l i v e d f r o m 980 to 1037. H e was a philosopher, theologian and one of the most famous physicians o f the Islamic w o r l d a n d of the w h o l e m e d i e v a l p e r i o d . H e was s i n g u l a r l y precocious, a n d his life was disturbed a n d occupied b y pleasures a n d p u b l i c duties, b u t i n spite o f this he left a large body o f w o r k . H i s most i m p o r t a n t w o r k , Al-Shifa ( T h e Book o f Recovery), is the Summa o f his philosophy a n d shows strong A r i s t o t e l i a n influences. A v i c e n n a also w r o t e Al-JVadjat (The Book o f S a l v a t i o n ) , as w e l l as m a n y other treatises. I n t h e M i d d l e Ages, t h e so-called Avicennae metaphysices compendium was v e r y i n f l u e n t i a l , a n d a large share o f the ideas o f the C h r i s t i a n Scholastics derives f r o m i t . A v i c e n n a accepted the d i s t i n c t i o n between essence a n d existence, a n d i n his hands i t a c q u i r e d great importance. H e also i n t r o duced the concept of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , w h i c h is so f r u i t f u l i n o u r day, a n d left a p r o f o u n d i m p r i n t o n a l l later philosophy, p a r t i c u l a r l y o n t h a t o f St. T h o m a s . I n o p p o s i t i o n to this group of philosophers there appears a m o n g the Arabs a n o r t h o d o x theological m o v e m e n t t h a t is l i n k e d w i t h the mysticism o f Sufism, w h i c h was greatly influenced b y C h r i s t i a n i t y (cf. A s í n : E l Islam cristianizado) a n d b y I n d i a n Neoplatonic c u r r e n t s . T h e most i m p o r t a n t o f these theologians is A l - G a z e l , a u t h o r o f t w o books e n t i t l e d The Destruction
of the Philosophers
and
The Restoration
of the
Sciences of Religion. U n l i k e other A r a b s w h o accepted the theories o f e m a n a t i o n , A l - G a z e l was a n o r t h o d o x mystic, not a pantheist. T H E S P A N I S H A R A B P H I L O S O P H E R S . F r o m the tenth to the t h i r t e e n t h centuries, A r a b i c Spain is a n extremely i m p o r t a n t i n t e l l e c t u a l center. C o r d o v a is t h e nucleus of this flowering. I n the East p h i l o s o p h y begins to decline, b u t i n Spain i t is at a n apogee, a n d the Spanish b r a n c h o f philosophy represents a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the speculation w h i c h c u l -
Eastern
Philosophies
m i n a t e d i n Avicenna's w o r k . Beginning at t h e e n d o f the eleventh c e n t u r y a n d a l l d u r i n g t h e t w e l f t h century, several great M o s l e m thinkers make t h e i r appearance i n the W e s t e r n w o r l d : Avempace ( I b n Bajja), w h o d i e d i n 1138; I b n T u f a i l (1100-1185), a n d most n o t a b l y Averroes. Averroes ( I b n R u s h d ) was b o r n i n C o r d o v a i n 1126 a n d died i n 1198. H e was a physician, m a t h e m a t i c i a n , lawyer, theologian a n d philosopher; he h e l d the position o f j u d g e a n d was i n a n d out of favor depending o n the times. D u r i n g the entire M i d d l e Ages Averroes is considered the c o m m e n t a t o r p a r excellence: Averois, che'l gran comento
feo (Averroes, w h o m a d e the great c o m m e n t a r y ) , D a n t e remarks i n the Divine Comedy. Averroes also w r o t e o r i g i n a l treatises, and i n t h e f o l l o w i n g centuries his t h i n k i n g greatly influenced the treatment o f several philosophical topics. F i r s t a m o n g these topics is the eternity o f the w o r l d , a n d therefore o f m a t t e r and m o t i o n . M a t t e r is a universal p o t e n t i a l i t y , and the p r i m e m o v e r extracts the active forces f r o m m a t t e r ; this process is repeated e t e r n a l l y a n d is t h e cause o f the sensible, m a t e r i a l w o r l d . Secondly, Averroes believes t h a t the h u m a n intellect is a n i m m a t e r i a l , eternal a n d single f o r m ; i t is the last o f the planetary intelligences and there is o n l y one for the entire species; i t is therefore impersonal. T h e different ways i n w h i c h m a n is u n i t e d w i t h the universal intellect determine the various classes o f knowledge, r a n g i n g f r o m t h e sensible t o the i l l u m i n a t i n g w i s d o m o f mysticism a n d prophecy. F o r this reason i n d i v i d u a l consciousness is lost, a n d o n l y the consciousness o f the species endures; Averroes denies personal i m m o r t a l i t y ; o n l y the one intellect o f the species lasts forever. T h e eternity o f m o t i o n a n d the oneness o f h u m a n intellect are the t w o areas i n w h i c h L a t i n A v e r r o i s m appears at the heart of Western philosophy. F i n a l l y , Averroes establishes a syst e m o f relationships between faith a n d knowledge. H e distinguishes three classes o f spirits: m e n o f proof; m e n o f dialectics, w h o are cont e n t w i t h p r o b a b l e reasonings; a n d m e n o f e x h o r t a t i o n , w h o are satisfied w i t h o r a t o r y a n d images. T h e K o r a n ' s meaning varies d e p e n d i n g o n h o w p r o f o u n d l y i t is i n t e r p r e t e d , a n d therefore i t is useful t o everyone. T h i s idea gives rise t o t h e famous theory o f the double truth w h i c h was d o m i n a n t i n L a t i n A v e r r o i s m ; according to this t h e o r y a t h i n g c a n be theologically true a n d philosophically false, a n d vice versa. Jewish
Philosophy
I n the M i d d l e Ages, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n S p a i n , Jewish philosophy develops under the influence o f the Arabs. T h e eleventh a n d t w e l f t h
ie 5
The Medieval
Philosophers
centuries are the centuries o f greatest a c t i v i t y , j u s t as t h e y are for A r a b i c philosophy. Jewish p h i l o s o p h y is similar i n character to A r a b i c philosophy, f r o m w h i c h indeed i t derives, b u t is also influenced b y N e o p l a t o n i c a n d mystic elements o f the Cabbala. Just as the Arabs a t t e m p t t o establish a M o s l e m Scholasticism, so the Jews t r y to create a H e b r e w Scholasticism, a n d t h e i r philosophy is inseparably l i n k e d w i t h theological questions. O n e of the most i m p o r t a n t Spanish Jewish philosophers is A v i c e b r o n ( I b n G a b i r o l ) , w h o l i v e d i n the first h a l f o f the eleventh c e n t u r y a n d w h o was v e r y w e l l k n o w n a m o n g Christians for his Fons vitae ( T h e W e l l o f L i f e ) . Avicebron's most famous thesis is t h a t the soul is c o m posed o f p o t e n t i a l i t y a n d a c t u a l i t y a n d therefore is m a t e r i a l , a l t h o u g h not necessarily corporeal. A v i c e b r o n was greatly influenced b y Neop l a t o n i s m . O t h e r interesting thinkers are I b n Z a d d i k o f C o r d o v a a n d J u d a h H a l e v y , a u t h o r o f the Sefer ha-Kuzari, a book of J e w i s h apologetics. H o w e v e r , the p r i n c i p a l figure o f Jewish philosophy is M a i monides. Moses ben M a i m o n or Moses M a i m o n i d e s ( u 35-1204) was b o r n i n C o r d o v a , as was Averroes, his M o s l e m c o n t e m p o r a r y , a n d his p r i n c i p a l w o r k is the Guide for the Perplexed (Dux perplexorum); this t i t l e used to be i n c o r r e c t l y i n t e r p r e t e d as a guide for the strayed or misled. I t was w r i t t e n i n A r a b i c , i n H e b r e w characters, u n d e r t h e t i t l e o f Dalalat al-Hairin, a n d later translated i n t o H e b r e w w i t h the t i t l e Moreh Nehuchim. T h e book's purpose is to reconcile A r i s t o t e l i a n philoso p h y w i t h J u d a i c r e l i g i o n . I t is a t r u e Summa of Jewish Scholasticism, the most complex a n d perfect example o f this type of w o r k i n Eastern philosophy. T h e supreme object o f r e l i g i o n a n d p h i l o s o p h y is the knowledge o f G o d ; i t is necessary to f i n d agreement between the principles a n d results of b o t h . M a i m o n i d e s ' treatise is directed at m e n w h o , possessing this knowledge, are u n c e r t a i n or perplexed a b o u t h o w to make the t w o things c o m p a t i b l e ; i t is a question o f indecision, not o f s t r a y i n g f r o m the p a t h . M a i m o n i d e s ' t h i n k i n g is s i m i l a r to t h a t o f Averroes, b u t the t w o m e n disagree o n several points. M a i m o n i d e s does n o t completely accept the allegorical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the B i b l e ; however, he admits t h a t i t is necessary to keep i n m i n d the undeniable results of p h i l o s o p h y w h e n i n t e r p r e t i n g the Bible, a n d to a v o i d l e t t i n g oneself be d o m i n a t e d by l i t e r a l i s m . I n spite of its conservative character, M a i m o n i d e s ' philosophy seemed suspect to the J e w i s h theologians a n d encountered considerable opposition. H i s is a negative philosophy; one can say w h a t G o d is n o t , b u t n o t w h a t H e is. God's essence is n o t accessible, but H i s effects are. T h e r e is a h i e r a r c h y o f spheres between G o d a n d
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the entities o f the w o r l d ; i n the f o r m o f Providence G o d concerns H i m s e l f w i t h the t o t a l i t y o f the things. T h e h u m a n intellect is single and separate, j u s t as Averroés says. A n i n d i v i d u a l m a n possesses passive intellect, b u t t h r o u g h the workings o f the active intellect a n acquired intellect develops i n h i m , a n d this a c q u i r e d intellect is destined to u n i t e w i t h the active intellect after death. T h i s u n i f i c a t i o n w h i c h philosophy effects thus provides m a n w i t h the possibility o f perp e t u a t i n g a p a r t o f himself. These ideas influenced the t h o u g h t o f Spinoza, w h o , b e i n g a Jew, takes M a i m o n i d e s ' w o r k i n t o account. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f A r a b i c and Jewish p h i l o s o p h y — p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t o f their p r i n c i p a l representatives, A v i c e n n a , Averroés and M a i monides—is great; however, this is due m o r e to their influences o n C h r i s t i a n Scholasticism t h a n to their i n h e r e n t interest. T h e A r a b i c a n d Jewish achievements i n the fields o f metaphysics a n d theology cannot be c o m p a r e d w i t h those of the great medieval Christians. Yet the A r a b i c a n d J e w i s h thinkers h a d one great advantage w h i c h a l l o w e d t h e m to g a i n a century o n the Christians: their knowledge o f Aristotle's w o r k . U n t i l the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y they possessed p h i l o sophical m a t e r i a l enormously superior to t h a t o f their contemporary C h r i s t i a n thinkers. I n this book, whose subject is Western philosophy, we cannot deal w i t h the particulars of A r a b i c and Jewish t h o u g h t , b u t o n l y w i t h their ties w i t h philosophy i n the W e s t : their Greek inspirat i o n , c o n t r i b u t i o n to Scholasticism and influence o n subsequent Western philosophy. A later figure of decisive i m p o r t a n c e was the A r a b i c philosopher I b n K h a l d u n . O f Spanish ancestry, he was b o r n i n T u n i s i n 1332 a n d d i e d i n C a i r o i n 1406. H i s m a j o r c o n t r i b u t i o n to philosophy
is the Muqaddimah,
the i n t r o d u c t i o n to his
Universal History,
a
b r i l l i a n t philosophy of society and history.*
5.
T H E SPIRITUAL WORLD
OF T H E T H I R T E E N T H
CENTURY
T H E R E A P P E A R A N C E O F A R I S T O T L E . T h e t h i r t e e n t h century marks a new phase o f philosophy. I n its early stages C h r i s t i a n i t y h a d to conf r o n t Greek t h o u g h t , a n d this necessity arises once again under somew h a t different circumstances i n the M i d d l e Ages. U p u n t i l this t i m e C h r i s t i a n philosophy h a d been constructed o n the basis of a few Greek w r i t i n g s of Platonic or Neoplatonic character; i n the t h i r t e e n t h cent u r y the t h o u g h t o f the greatest of the Greek philosophers bursts f o r t h i n the West, a n d Scholasticism has to take i n t o account this marvelously p r o f o u n d a n d acute philosophy w h i c h comes to i t b y way of the Arabs
* Cf. Miguel Cruz H e r n á n d e z : L a filosofía árabe, Madrid, 1963.
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a n d w h i c h is different f r o m a n y t h i n g i n its o w n philosophic t r a d i t i o n . C h r i s t i a n philosophy passes t h r o u g h a stage i n w h i c h A r i s t o t e l i a n t h o u g h t is assimilated; this task is accomplished p r i m a r i l y b y St. Albertus M a g n u s a n d St. T h o m a s A q u i n a s . T h i s effort enormously enriches the possibilities of Scholasticism, b u t at the same t i m e i t leads C h r i s t i a n philosophy away f r o m paths d o w n w h i c h its o r i g i n a l n a t u r e m i g h t have taken i t . I n any case, Aristotle's appearance signals the a r r i v a l of a new a n d extremely f r u i t f u l era. A large a n d i m p o r t a n t role i n this l a b o r of assimilation falls to Spain. Ever since the t w e l f t h century there h a d been intense a c t i v i t y i n Spain i n the field o f translation ; the school of translators i n T o l e d o w h i c h was founded b y the A r c h b i s h o p D o n R a i m u n d o deserves special m e n t i o n because i t was one o f the most active centers i n a l l o f E u r o p e . A r a b i c a n d Jewish books were translated : the works of A l f a r a b i , Al-Gazel, A v i c e n n a , A v i c e b r o n ; later, the A r a b s b r i n g to the West t h e i r translations of A r i s t o t l e , w h i c h are translated i n t o Castilian a n d t h e n i n t o L a t i n or else d i r e c t l y i n t o L a t i n . T h e most i m p o r t a n t o f these translators was Gundisalvus, or D o m i n i c u s Gundisalvus, sometimes mistakenly called Gundissalinus, the a u t h o r o f a philosophical encyclopedia o f A r i s t o t e l i a n character e n t i t l e d De divisione philosophiae a n d a treatise called De immortalitate animae. G e r a r d o f C r e m o n a a n d Johannes Hispanus were also i m p o r t a n t . A few translations d i r e c t l y f r o m the Greek are also made i n E u r o p e , a n d these are m u c h superior to the i n d i r e c t translations; a m o n g the best are those o f R o b e r t Grosseteste, bishop o f L i n c o l n , a n d , most notably, those o f W i l l i a m o f Moerbeke, the great D o m i n i c a n translator w h o u n d e r t o o k the retranslation a n d revision o f Aristotle's works at the request o f St. T h o m a s . A l l of Aristotle's philosophy b u t p a r t i c u l a r l y his Metaphysics a n d his books o n n a t u r a l science was suspect. H i s t h o u g h t was seen to consist o f a great n u m b e r o f i m p o r t a n t doctrines m i x e d i n w i t h the rather u n o r t h o d o x theories of the A r a b i c commentators. I n 121 o a p r o v i n c i a l c o u n c i l i n Paris forbade a l l persons to read a n d c o m m e n t o n Aristotle's works o n n a t u r a l philosophy ; i n 1215 the legate R o b e r t d e C o u r ç o n renewed the p r o h i b i t i o n b u t authorized the reading o f Aristotle's works o n logic a n d ethics i n the n e w l y founded U n i v e r s i t y o f Paris. O n the other h a n d , the r e a d i n g o f a l l o f Aristotle's w o r k c o n t i n u e d to be authorized i n Toulouse. A l i t t l e later, Pope Gregory I X ordered a revision of Aristotle's w o r k , so t h a t after i t was corrected he c o u l d allow i t to be read. Aristotle's fame increased steadily, to such a p o i n t t h a t i n 1366 Pope U r b a n V ' s legates made the r e a d i n g of Aristotle a requirem e n t for the degree i n arts. I t was the immense labor o f St. T h o m a s
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m o r e t h a n a n y t h i n g else t h a t effected the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of Aristotelian philosophy i n t o C h r i s t i a n thought. F r o m this t i m e , Scholasticism's destiny is decided. T o the PlatonicA u g u s t i n i a n influences is added the even m o r e i m p o r t a n t influence o f Aristotle's t h o u g h t . T h e Christian thinkers n o w possess immeasurably superior intellectual m a t e r i a l and achieve m a t u r i t y . T h e t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y also witnesses the simultaneous appearance of the most i m p o r t a n t universities—most n o t a b l y those of Paris a n d O x f o r d — a n d of the t w o great m e n d i c a n t orders, the Franciscans a n d the Dominicans. T o g e t h e r these elements produce the great classical century o f the M i d d l e Ages. THE F O U N D I N G O F T H E U N I V E R S I T I E S . T h e U n i v e r s i t y of Paris, one of the greatest s p i r i t u a l powers of the M i d d l e Ages, is created at the b e g i n n i n g o f the t h i r t e e n t h century. A u n i v e r s i t y was then neither a b u i l d i n g nor a single center o f learning, b u t a large gathering o f teachers and p u p i l s f r o m the schools (universitas magistrorum et scholarium), all subject to the a u t h o r i t y o f a chancellor. U n i v e r s i t y life prospers i n Paris; l i t t l e b y l i t t l e i t becomes organized and is f i n a l l y d i v i d e d i n t o four faculties: theology, arts ( p h i l o s o p h y ) , law and m e d i cine. M o s t numerous are the students a n d teachers o f the faculty o f arts, a n d these are d i v i d e d according to nations (those f r o m Picardy, f r o m G a u l , f r o m N o r m a n d y , f r o m E n g l a n d , a n d the l i k e ) ; t h e i r leader is the rector, w h o ends u p b y r e p l a c i n g the chancellor i n the d i r e c t i o n of the university. T h e degrees a w a r d e d b y the university are the baccalaureate, the licentiate a n d the doctorate, the r a n k o f doctor o r magister. T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Paris was subject to t w o protective influences: t h a t o f the k i n g of France a n d t h a t o f the pope. B o t h realized the immense i m p o r t a n c e o f this i n t e l l e c t u a l center, a n i n fluence t h a t has even been compared w i t h t h a t o f the E m p i r e and the papacy. Pope I n n o c e n t I I I was the great protector and inspirer of the U n i v e r s i t y of Paris i n its first years.
A l i t t l e later the U n i v e r s i t y of O x f o r d is f o u n d e d , a n d i t too acquires great i m p o r t a n c e . T h u s a n English i n t e l l e c t u a l center distinct f r o m the one i n France is created i n w h i c h the Platonic a n d A u g u s t i n i a n traditions are kept very m u c h alive. A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m is also cultivated i n the English university, b u t there the emphasis is on the e m p i r i c a l a n d scientific aspects of Aristotle's system. Instead of underscoring the logical a n d metaphysical aspects a n d s u b o r d i n a t i n g the theological aspect, O x f o r d makes use of the mathematics a n d physics of Aristotle a n d the A r a b s a n d prepares the w a y for Occam's n o m i n a l i s m a n d the E n g l i s h e m p i r i c i s m o f the m o d e r n era. T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C a m b r i d g e dates f r o m somewhat later, b u t was fully organized i n the fourteenth
i6o
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century. T h e U n i v e r s i t y of Bologna is as o l d as t h a t of Paris, b u t i n the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y i t was i m p o r t a n t as a center for legal rather t h a n philosophical studies. L a t e r , the universities o f Padua, Salamanca, Toulouse a n d M o n t p e l l i e r were f o u n d e d ; then, i n the f o u r t e e n t h cent u r y , those of Prague, V i e n n a , H e i d e l b e r g , Cologne a n d , i n Spain, the U n i v e r s i t y of V a l l a d o l i d . T H E M E N D I C A N T O R D E R S . A t the b e g i n n i n g o f the t h i r t e e n t h cent u r y the t w o great m e n d i c a n t o r d e r s — t h e Franciscan a n d t h e D o m i n i c a n — a r e f o r m e d ; i n a certain sense these replace the Benedictine O r d e r as the focal p o i n t of intellectual life. St. Francis o f Assisi founds the O r d e r o f the Friars M i n o r , a n d St. D o m i n i c ( D o m i n g o de Guzmán) founds the O r d e r o f Preachers. I n p r i n c i p l e , the functions o f these orders are different: devotion appertains more to the Franciscans and preaching appertains more to the D o m i n i c a n s . T h e l a t t e r order, w h i c h was f o r m e d to combat the Albigensian heresy, was charged w i t h the defense o f o r t h o d o x y , a n d therefore the I n q u i s i t i o n was entrusted to i t . B u t the Franciscans also q u i c k l y display great theological a n d philosophical a c t i v i t y o f comparable v o l u m e a n d q u a l i t y . T h e F r a n ciscans preserve the earlier P l a t o n i c - A u g u s t i n i a n influences, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the b r a n c h w h i c h St. Bonaventure represents; b u t after Duns Scotus the Franciscans, like the D o m i n i c a n s , p a r t a k e o f A r i s t o telianism. T h e m e n d i c a n t orders q u i c k l y penetrate the U n i v e r s i t y o f Paris, b u t not w i t h o u t great polemics w i t h the l a y m e n . F i n a l l y the presence of the Franciscan a n d D o m i n i c a n Orders is accepted, a n d t h e n they a t t a i n such influence t h a t the U n i v e r s i t y comes under their c o n t r o l . T h e first D o m i n i c a n teacher was R o l a n d o f C r e m o n a a n d the first Franciscan was A l e x a n d e r o f Hales. F r o m t h a t t i m e f o r w a r d the greatest figures o f medieval philosophy belong t o these orders: St. Albertus M a g n u s , St. T h o m a s A q u i n a s a n d Meister E c k h a r t are D o m i n i c a n s ; St. Bonavent u r e , R o g e r Bacon, Duns Scotus a n d W i l l i a m of O c c a m are Franciscans. T h u s the Friars M i n o r a n d the Preachers b o t h m a i n t a i n themselves at the level o f true philosophic creativity. I f St. T h o m a s systematized Scholasticism a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d Aristotle i n t o C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t better t h a n anyone else, t h e n , to compensate, t h e English Franciscans established the basis for n o m i n a l i s t physics a n d prepared the w a y for the m o d e r n n a t u r a l science of Galileo a n d N e w t o n , o n the one h a n d , a n d , o n the other, for the philosophy t h a t was t o c u l m i n a t e i n the p e r i o d o f idealism f r o m Descartes to L e i b n i z . 6. LIFE A N D WORKS.
ST.
BONAVENTURE
St. Bonaventure ( J o h n o f Fidanza) was b o r n at
5r. Bonaventure
i6t
Bagnorea i n T u s c a n y i n 1221. H e entered the Franciscan O r d e r , a n d studied i n Paris as a p u p i l of Alexander o f Hales, a n interesting t h i n k e r w h o has left us a n i m p o r t a n t Summa theologiae. St. Bonaventure t a u g h t i n Paris as Alexander's successor d u r i n g the polemics against the m e n d i c a n t orders, a n d was a good friend o f St. T h o m a s . I n 1257 he was n a m e d General o f the O r d e r a n d gave u p teaching. H e died w h i l e t a k i n g p a r t i n the C o u n c i l o f Lyons i n 1274. T h e C h u r c h has given h i m the n a m e of Doctor
seraphicus.
St. Bonaventure's p r i n c i p a l works a r e t h e Commentaries on the Sentences [ o f Peter L o m b a r d ] , the Quaestiones disputatae, the De reductione artium ad theologiam, t h e Breviloquium
a n d , above a l l , the
Itinerarium
mentis in Deum.
W h a t St. B o n a v e n t u r e represents i n t h e t h i r t e e n t h century is t h e spirit ofcontinuity; thanks to h i m the general lines of t r a d i t i o n a l Scholastic ideology are m a i n t a i n e d . I n his Commentaries on the Sentences he writes e x p l i c i t l y : Non enim intendo novas opiniones adversare, sed communes
et approbatas retexere ( F o r I do n o t i n t e n d to p u t f o r t h new opinions, b u t to renew c o m m o n l y h e l d a n d approved ones). H i s personal character, as w e l l as the influences o f St. Augustine, St. B e r n a r d a n d the Victorines on the development o f his t h o u g h t , lead h i m t o continue these m a j o r currents of twelfth-century speculative mysticism. H e emphasizes the m o r e practical a n d e m o t i o n a l sides of theology rather t h a n the p u r e l y theoretic side, thus becoming a n u n m i s t a k a b l e forerunner o f t h e nominalists o f the next t w o centuries. St. Bonaventure, full o f religious a r d o r , is i m b u e d w i t h a tenderness t h a t is t y p i c a l of his authentically Franciscan lineage. F o r St. Bonaventure, n a t u r a l things, created after the semblance o f the D e i t y , r e t a i n a trace of H i m ; love of the things is also love o f G o d , o f w h o m they bear this trace. I t should not be forgotten that these tender feelings o f the Franciscans t o w a r d n a t u r e are i n no w a y alien to the splendid g r o w t h o f m a t h e m a t i c a l physics i n the Renaissance, a l t h o u g h this m a y seem strange to some. D O C T R I N E . T h e goal of h u m a n knowledge is G o d . T h i s knowledge is gained i n different ways a n d o n different levels and culminates i n the mystic u n i o n . T h e influence o f St. A u g u s t i n e is evident i n St. Bonaventure's w r i t i n g s . F o r St. Bonaventure, philosophy is i n reality itinerarium mentis in Deum (the j o u r n e y o f t h e m i n d t o w a r d G o d ) . K n o w l e d g e o f G o d can be obtained f r o m n a t u r e , since n a t u r a l things bear a trace o f H i m . G o d can be k n o w n i n a more direct w a y i n H i s o w n image, w h i c h is o u r s o u l — a reappearance of St. Augustine's a n d St. Anselm's theme o f the i n n e r m a n . W h e n d i v i n e grace c o m m u n i cates the three theological virtues, G o d is seen in imagine, w i t h i n o u r selves. Lastly, G o d c a n be k n o w n d i r e c t l y , i n H i s being, i n H i s
2 6z
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Philosophers
goodness, i n the v e r y mystery o f t h e T r i n i t y a n d , as a c u l m i n a t i n g experience i n ecstatic c o n t e m p l a t i o n , i n the apex of the mind (apex mentis), to use St. Bonaventure's expression. St. Bonaventure believes i n the possibility o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g the existence o f G o d , a n d accepts St. Anselm's ontological proof. T h e proper u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the d i v i n e essence makes us see t h e necessity for His existence. W i t h regard to G o d a n d the soul, St. B o n a v e n t u r e does n o t believe t h a t they are k n o w n b y means o f the senses, as the other things are, b u t d i r e c t l y ; G o d is l i g h t , a n d this knowledge is gained b y means o f the uncreated l i g h t . Necessario enim oportet ponere quod anima novit Deum et se ipsam et quae sunt in se ipsa sine adminiculo sen-
suum exteriorum ( F o r i t must of necessity be posited t h a t the soul knows G o d , itself, a n d t h a t w h i c h is i n itself w i t h o u t the a i d o f t h e external senses). M o r e o v e r , St. Bonaventure, rejecting the A v e r r o i s t d o c t r i n e o f the oneness o f the intellect of m a n k i n d , insists w i t h special emphasis t h a t m a n is the efficient cause o f his o w n m e n t a l actions. St. Bonaventure affirms the p l u r a l i t y o f the substantial f o r m s ; besides theforma completiva, he recognizes other subsidiary forms. T h i s theory was generally professed b y the Franciscans, f r o m A l e x a n d e r o f Hales to the end o f the M i d d l e Ages. T h e w o r l d was created w i t h i n t i m e ; this d o g m a t i c t r u t h is denied b y n o one except the heterodox Averroists. B u t i n a d d i t i o n St. Bonaventure believes t h a t this t r u t h is k n o w n n o t o n l y t h r o u g h revelation b u t also r a t i o n a l l y , a n d t h a t the Creation ab aeterno, w h i c h St. T h o m a s considers possible, is c o n t r a d i c t o r y . T h i s p r o b l e m o f the e t e r n i t y o f t h e w o r l d is one o f t h e central questions of the p e r i o d , aroused b y study o f A r i s t o t l e a n d b y the A r a b i c commentators. St. Bonaventure a n d St. T h o m a s , w h o are i n agreem e n t i n r e g a r d to the t e m p o r a l i t y o f the C r e a t i o n , differ c o n c e r n i n g the o r i g i n o f the knowledge o f this t r u t h . T h e Franciscan assigns this knowledge to reason, whereas the D o m i n i c a n refers i t to f a i t h . F r o m the w o r k o f St. Bonaventure is derived a n entire c u r r e n t o f medieval speculation, one w h i c h w i l l be extremely f r u i t f u l . T h e controversy between this d i r e c t i o n o f t h o u g h t a n d the T h o m i s t position animates the philosophy of the M i d d l e Ages. A n d i f i t is t r u e o n the one h a n d that T h o m i s m d o m i n a t e d Scholasticism i n greater measure, o n the other h a n d the o r i e n t a t i o n o f the Franciscan thinkers has exerted a greater influence o n m o d e r n philosophy, w h i c h represents the most authentic a n d f r u i t f u l c o n t i n u a t i o n o f m e d i e v a l C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t . F O L L O W E R S O F S T . B O N A V E N T U R E . T h e great Franciscan master's a c t i v i t y as a teacher was c o n t i n u e d b y a l o n g succession o f p u p i l s a n d followers. I n the first line is M a t t h e w o f A q u a s p a r t a , w h o t a u g h t i n Paris a n d Bologna, a n d was General o f the O r d e r , as w e l l as a c a r d i n a l
Aristotelico-Scholastic
Philosophy
a n d bishop of O p o r t o . A n o t h e r personal p u p i l o f St. Bonaventure was J o h n Peckham, w h o was a master at O x f o r d a n d later A r c h b i s h o p o f C a n t e r b u r y . L a t e r , less direct, followers were Petrus Johannis O l i v i (Pierre O l i e u ) a n d , above a l l , R i c h a r d o f M i d d l e t o n , k n o w n as Ricardusde Mediavilla. T h e influence of these Franciscan masters was very great; they preserved the general lines of St. Bonaventure's t h o u g h t i n the face of the p r e v a i l i n g T h o m i s m . Nevertheless, at the end o f the t h i r t e e n t h cent u r y , there appeared once m o r e w i t h i n the O r d e r of the Friars M i n o r a figure w h o was to p l a y a l e a d i n g role i n philosophy, J o h n D u n s Scotus. F r o m t h a t m o m e n t o n , the Franciscan movement was emb o d i e d i n Scotism, a n d the direct influence o f St. Bonaventure was d i m i n i s h e d . B u t i t should n o t be forgotten t h a t i n reality his influence endures efficaciously, i n the most interesting w a y possible i n p h i l o sophy : n o t i n a close a n d u n c h a n g i n g teacher-pupil relationship, b u t as the i n s p i r a t i o n of a metaphysical renewal. T h e role of an authentic philosopher is n o t to perpetuate h i m s e l f w i t h i n any one " i s m , " b u t to be effectually present i n the t h o u g h t o f other philosophers w h o have t h e i r o w n , different, names, a n d thus to activate the inexorable a d vance of the history of philosophy.
7.
ARISTOTELICO-SCHOLASTIC
PHILOSOPHY
As we have seen, the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y is faced w i t h the enormous p r o b l e m o f c o m i n g to grips w i t h A r i s t o t l e , w i t h a philosophy o f a d e p t h a n d i m p o r t a n c e w h i c h strike one i m m e d i a t e l y u p o n first contact. I n Aristotle's system there are m e n t a l tools w h i c h make great progress possible, b u t they must n o w be a p p l i e d to themes very different f r o m those for w h i c h they were o r i g i n a l l y invented. T h e i n t i m a t e u n i o n o f theology a n d philosophy k n o w n as Scholasticism is somet h i n g completely different f r o m the r e a l m of ideas i n w h i c h Aristotle's t h o u g h t operated. H o w can Aristotle's t h o u g h t be applied to the p r o b lems o f the M i d d l e Ages ? A n d there is a still more serious obstacle. Aristotle's system does n o t merely comprise the extremely perfect logic of the Organon; n o r is i t merely an arsenal o f concepts—matter, f o r m , substance, accident, categories, a n d the l i k e — w h i c h are useful as tools. Before a l l else, i t is a philosophy, a metaphysics, conceived i n the Greek language, based o n r a d i c a l l y different, n o n - C h r i s t i a n , suppositions, b u t a philosophy w h i c h nevertheless i n m a n y senses seems to be truth. W h a t is to be made o f this ? A r i s t o t l e speaks o f G o d a n d says extremely acute a n d interesting things a b o u t H i m ; he speaks o f the w o r l d a n d o f m o t i o n , a n d accounts for t h e i r existence w i t h a n en-
The Medieval
Philosophers
l i g h t e n i n g p e n e t r a t i o n as yet u n k n o w n i n the M i d d l e Ages. B u t this G o d is n o t the C h r i s t i a n G o d ; H e is n o t the Creator, H e does n o t have three persons, H i s relations w i t h the w o r l d are different. N o r is the A r i s t o t e l i a n w o r l d the one w h i c h came f o r t h f r o m the h a n d s o f G o d according to the book o f Genesis. T h i s is a v e r y serious p r o b l e m . Scholasticism c a n n o t renounce A r i s t o t l e ; i t cannot ignore h i m . T h e Stagirite's p h i l o s o p h y commands a t t e n t i o n t h r o u g h its o v e r w h e l m i n g s u p e r i o r i t y a n d the t r u t h w h i c h i t so obviously contains. B u t i t is necessary to a d a p t i t to t h e new situat i o n , to the problems t h a t concern m e n o f the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y . Aristotle's t h o u g h t must be assimilated i n t o C h r i s t i a n philosophy. W h a t consequences w i l l this have for C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g ? T h a t is another question. Perhaps the c o m p e l l i n g b r i l l i a n c e of the A r i s t o t e l i a n system was too great to be a d o p t e d w i t h o u t risk. Perhaps Aristotle's influence obliged C h r i s t i a n philosophy t o become s o m e t h i n g different f r o m itself, a n d frustrated certain o r i g i n a l potentialities t h a t m i g h t have come to m a t u r i t y i f another p a t h h a d been f o l l o w e d . T h i s is still a n open question. T h e influence o f A r i s t o t l e is already evident i n the w o r k s o f St. Bonaventure, b u t o n l y m a r g i n a l l y , i n a secondary w a y ; t h e Peripatetic system d i d n o t affect the central core o f St. Bonaventure's p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h r e m a i n e d essentially u n d e r the influence of P l a t o a n d St. Augustine. T h i s was n o t enough. I t was necessary to c o n f r o n t resol u t e l y the gigantic mass o f A r i s t o t e l i a n philosophy, to investigate i t a l l , t r y to u n d e r s t a n d i t a n d incorporate i t i n t o the ideological system o f the M i d d l e Ages. T h i s is the e x t r a o r d i n a r y task t h a t was u n d e r t a k e n a n d achieved i n the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y b y t w o D o m i n i c a n s , master a n d p u p i l , b o t h canonized b y the C h u r c h : A l b e r t o f Boilstädt ( k n o w n i n his o w n day as A l b e r t o f Cologne a n d today as St. A l b e r t u s M a g n u s ) a n d St. T h o m a s A q u i n a s .
St. Albertus
Magnus
L I F E A N D W R I T I N G S . St. A l b e r t was p r o b a b l y b o r n i n 1 1 9 3 — t h e date is not c e r t a i n ; others say 1206 or 1207. H e d i e d i n Cologne i n 1280. H e entered the D o m i n i c a n O r d e r a n d w o r k e d a n d traveled a great deal, teaching at Cologne, H i l d e s h e i m , F r e i b u r g , Ratisbon a n d Strassburg. H e r e t u r n e d to Cologne, where he was the teacher o f St. T h o m a s Aquinas, a n d f r o m there m o v e d o n to Paris, the center o f Scholasticism. A f t e r w a r d he was bishop o f R a t i s b o n . H e f i n a l l y settled i n Cologne, where he followed a n o r m a l course o f life a n d i n s t r u c t i o n . St. A l b e r t ' s a c t i v i t y as teacher a n d cleric was e x t r a o r d i n a r y .
Aristotelico-Scbolastic
i6j
Philosophy
His w r i t i n g s are v o l u m i n o u s . T h e a u t h o r i t y he acquired was so enormous t h a t he was q u o t e d alongside such great m e n o f the past as A r i s t o t l e , Averroes or A v i c e n n a , a c c o r d i n g to Roger Bacon's emphatic statement, or alongside the C h u r c h Fathers. H i s ample a n d r i c h works are p r i n c i p a l l y paraphrases of the greater p a r t of Aristotle's books, b u t he also p r o d u c e d o r i g i n a l treatises o n philosophy a n d theology, a n d a vast a c c u m u l a t i o n o f e r u d i t i o n w h i c h also includes the w o r k o f the A r a b s a n d Jews a n d w h i c h made possible the b r i l l i a n t synthesis of his p u p i l , St. T h o m a s . T H E W O R K O F S T . A L B E R T U S M A G N U S . St. Albert's purpose was to i n t e r p r e t a n d assimilate a l l o f Aristotle's philosophical disciplines:
nostra intentio est omnes dictas partes facere
Latinis
intelligibiles
("our
i n t e n t i o n is to make a l l the aforementioned parts i n t e l l i g i b l e to those w h o read L a t i n " ) . T h u s , he paraphrased the works o f A r i s t o t l e , exp l a i n i n g t h e m at l e n g t h , i n order to make t h e m m o r e easily u n d e r stood, a n d a u g m e n t i n g t h e m w i t h commentaries b o r r o w e d f r o m the Arabs a n d the Jews as w e l l as some of his o w n . T h i s a t t e m p t at p o p u l a r i z a t i o n m e t w i t h great difficulties, w h i c h caused numerous defects i n St. A l b e r t ' s w r i t i n g s . These w r i t i n g s suffer f r o m a frequent lack o f c l a r i t y ; the sense o f perspective is often lost; there is no rigorous a n d precise m e n t a l architecture, such as St. T h o m a s w i l l later supply. F u r t h e r m o r e , the assimilation w h i c h is sought for is often n o t a t t a i n e d . St. Albertus M a g n u s was too m u c h the prisoner o f the t r a d i t i o n a l thought-structure o f Scholasticism. H e p o u r e d f o r t h his immense knowledge of Aristotle i n t o these Scholastic molds, b u t d i d n o t succeed i n u n i t i n g the H e l l e n i c thinker's philosophy a n d C h r i s t i a n m e n t a l i t y i n t o a congruent a n d harmonious synthesis. W h a t he d i d accomplish was to p u t i n t o c i r c u l a t i o n a n incalculable n u m b e r of ideas, w h i c h h a d n o w become the c o m m o n p r o p e r t y of the thinkers o f the p e r i o d . H e n c e f o r t h Aristotle's philosophy is r e a d i l y available, something t h a t can be easily studied a n d u t i l i z e d . T h e diffic u l t task of assimilation has already been a t t e m p t e d ; the materials are already at h a n d : St. Thomas w i l l f i n d the most p a i n f u l a n d least p r o f o u n d p a r t o f the l a b o r already accomplished b y his teacher, a n d w i l l be able to devote himself to the higher task a n d achieve i t . Seen f r o m another v i e w p o i n t , St. A l b e r t u s M a g n u s — i n this a true follower o f A r i s t o t l e — w a s also a m a n of encyclopedic knowledge. Roger Bacon i n E n g l a n d a n d St. A l b e r t i n G e r m a n y are the t w o great figures o f t h i r teenth-century science. St. A l b e r t was acquainted w i t h a n d practiced all the sciences, f r o m astronomy to medicine, a n d advanced t h e m a l l . T h e feeling for observation a n d experiment, w h i c h was i n n o w a y alien to the M i d d l e Ages, g u i d e d his copious labors i n this area.
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Philosophers
F i n a l l y , i n a d d i t i o n to his m o r e s t r i c t l y philosophical works, St. Albertus M a g n u s a p p l i e d himself to theology as w e l l , a n d here, too, made use o f the i n t e l l e c t u a l f r a m e w o r k o f A r i s t o t e l i a n t h o u g h t , thus a n t i c i p a t i n g the m a t u r e achievement of St. T h o m a s .
St. Thomas
Aquinas
L I F E A N D W O R K S . St. T h o m a s , b o r n at Roccasecca about 1225, was of the f a m i l y o f the Counts o f A q u i n o . H i s first studies w e r e i n the monastery of M o n t e Cassino. I n 1239 he w e n t to Naples to take u p the seven l i b e r a l arts; there he studied the trivium ( g r a m m a r , r h e t o r i c a n d dialectic) w i t h Peter M a r t i n a n d the quadrivium ( a r i t h m e t i c , geometry, astronomy a n d music) w i t h Peter o f I b e r n i a . H e also studied i n the faculty of arts at the U n i v e r s i t y of Naples, a n d i t was i n Naples i n 1244 t h a t he donned the D o m i n i c a n h a b i t . S h o r t l y afterward he started o u t for Paris w i t h the Master-General of the O r d e r , b u t his brothers, a n g r y over his b e c o m i n g a m o n k , k i d n a p p e d h i m en route a n d c a r r i e d h i m off to Roccasecca. T h e f o l l o w i n g year he w e n t to Paris, w h e r e he m e t St. Albertus M a g n u s , under w h o m he studied there a n d , later, i n Cologne. I n 1252 St. Thomas r e t u r n e d to Paris, where he became a master i n theology a n d where he l i v e d a n d w o r k e d for some years. F r o m 1259 to 1269 he taught i n various cities i n I t a l y ( A g n a n i , O r v i e t o , R o m e , V i t e r b o ) . H e then r e t u r n e d to Paris, his t r u e center o f a c t i v i t y . A f t e r w a r d he resided i n Naples; he set o u t f r o m Naples i n 12 74, answering the summons o f G r e g o r y X to attend the Second C o u n c i l of Lyons. B u t his health c o u l d n o t support the o v e r w h e l m i n g intellectual l a b o r to w h i c h he was c o m m i t t e d : he fell i l l o n the j o u r n e y and d i e d at Fossanova o n M a r c h 7,12 74.
St. T h o m a s was a m a n o f p u r e s p i r i t u a l i t y . His w h o l e life was dedicated to p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d theological labors a n d i n s p i r e d b y religion. H e was a m a n of singularly simple a n d k i n d l y ways, devoted heart and soul to the great intellectual task w h i c h he fully accomplished. Testimonials b y those nearest to h i m tell o f the p r o f o u n d affection w h i c h he i n s p i r e d i n his closest friends. These i n c l u d e d his teacher, St. Albertus M a g n u s , w h o at a very advanced age set o u t for Paris to defend his p u p i l ' s doctrines, w h i c h h a d been condemned b y Bishop T e m p i e r , a n d w h o i n the latter years o f his life deeply m o u r n e d the death o f St. T h o m a s ; St. T h o m a s ' b i o g r a p h e r , W i l l i a m o f T o c c o ; and, above a l l , his fellow D o m i n i c a n a n d f a i t h f u l f r i e n d , B r o t h e r R e g i n a l d o f Piperno. T h e C h u r c h canonized Thomas, acknowledging, along w i t h his sainthood, his great i m p o r t a n c e i n Scholasticism. St. Thomas has been given the name of Doctor angelicus.
Aristotelico-Scholastic
Philosophy
l6y
T h e works o f St. T h o m a s are very numerous. Some are o f interest m o r e as apologist w r i t i n g s or as exegeses o f sacred texts, for instance, the Catena aurea super quattuor Evangelia
( T h e G o l d e n C h a i n o n the F o u r
Gospels). Others are strictly theological, d o g m a t i c a l or j u r i d i c a l . H e r e we are especially interested i n his works o n philosophy and the syst e m a t i z a t i o n o f theology, i n w h i c h T h o m i s t philosophy is most p a r t i c u l a r l y expounded. I n first place come his Commentaries on Aristotle, a l o n g series o f w r i t i n g s i n w h i c h he studies a n d analyzes the t h o u g h t o f the Stagirite. I n second place are the Opuscula, short treatises o n philosophy or theology, r i c h i n d o c t r i n e , a m o n g w h i c h are the works De ente et essentia ( O n Being a n d Essence), De unitate intellectus ( O n the Oneness o f the I n t e l l e c t ) , De principio individuationis ( O n the P r i n c i p l e o f I n d i v i d u a t i o n ) , a n d so f o r t h . I n t h i r d place are the Quaestiones quodlibetales (Miscellaneous Questions) a n d the Quaestiones disputatae ( D i s p u t e d Q u e s t i o n s ) — D e veritate ( O n T r u t h ) , Depotentia ( O n P o t e n t i a l i t y ) , De anima ( O n the Soul), a n d so f o r t h . L a s t l y , there are the theological treatises, especially the Summa contra Gentiles ( T h e S u m m a Against Non-Believers), the Compendium theologiae adReginaldum
(Compendium
o f Theology Addressed to R e g i n a l d ) a n d , above a l l , St. T h o m a s ' most i m p o r t a n t w o r k , the great systematic exposition o f his o w n t h o u g h t a n d , indeed, o f Scholasticism i n its e n t i r e t y : the Summa theologiae. These are the T h o m i s t w r i t i n g s t h a t must be borne i n m i n d i f St. T h o m a s is to be studied f r o m the v i e w p o i n t o f the history o f philosophy. B e g i n n i n g i n the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y itself, these became the m a j o r texts o f Scholasticism, a n d a large p a r t o f the subsequent productions o f Scholasticism consisted o f commentaries o n books b y St. T h o m a s , especially o n the various parts of the Summa theologiae. R E L A T I O N S H I P W I T H A R I S T O T L E . St. T h o m a s accomplished the a d a p t a t i o n o f Aristotle's Greek p h i l o s o p h y to the C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t o f Scholasticism. T h e general content o f his t h o u g h t , therefore, d e r i v e d f r o m C h r i s t i a n dogma, the C h u r c h Fathers, the earlier medieval t r a d i t i o n a n d , above a l l , A r i s t o t l e . St. T h o m a s l a b o r e d extensively over the Peripatetic w r i t i n g s , using p r i n c i p a l l y W i l l i a m o f Moerbeke's direct translations f r o m the Greek. I n s t e a d o f St. A l b e r t u s M a g n u s ' l o n g a n d i n v o l v e d paraphrases, w h i c h were imprecise a n d f u l l o f unresolved difficulties, St. T h o m a s w r o t e commentaries i n w h i c h he f o l l o w e d Aristotle's text closely a n d t r i e d to e x p l a i n i t f u l l y . T h e r e is u n d o u b t e d l y a close a f f i n i t y between the m i n d s o f St. T h o m a s a n d A r i s t o t l e ; B r e n t a n o , using a felicitous w o r d , speaks o f a congeniality. Because o f this, the exposition o f St. T h o m a s ' doctrines is equivalent i n m a n y points to t h a t o f A r i s t o t l e ' s ; this occurs i n the area o f logic, i n the general lines o f t h e i r physics a n d metaphysics, a n d i n the o u t l i n e o f
The Medieval
Philosophers
their psychology a n d their ethics. B u t i t should n o t be f o r g o t t e n t h a t St. Thomas, a t a distance o f sixteen centuries, utilizes these same A r i s t o t e l i a n ideas w i t h very different ends i n m i n d , a n d , above a l l , t h a t he a n d A r i s t o t l e are separated b y the development of C h r i s t i a n i t y . Moreover, St. T h o m a s was too b r i l l i a n t a philosopher s i m p l y to subm i t to the A r i s t o t e l i a n system, a n d t h e general meaning o f his o w n system is p r o f o u n d l y different. O n e need o n l y remember t h a t a l l of St. T h o m a s ' i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y was directed t o w a r d the establishment of Christian theology, w h i c h is based o n suppositions completely alien to the H e l l e n i c m i n d . Aristotle's great p r o b l e m concerned t h e modes o f b e i n g ; he was a t t e m p t i n g t o solve the question t h a t h a d p a i n f u l l y racked Greek philosophy since t h e times o f Parmenides. H i s p r i n c i p a l solution o f this p r o b l e m was the elaboration of the t h e o r y of substance, w h i c h was closely related t o t h e E n t i t y as such a n d t o G o d understood as t h e p r i m e mover : t h a t is, the establishment o f metaphysics, t h e " soughtafter knowledge, " a n d the complete systematization of the p r o b l e m o f knowledge. I n a d d i t i o n , Aristotle's d o c t r i n e o f the oneness a n d changelessness o f the E n t i t y achieved the restoration o f physics, w h i c h h a d been called i n t o question b y the Eleatics. T h e problems t h a t concern St. Thomas are v e r y different: above a l l , t h e demonstration o f the existence o f G o d a n d the explanation, i n so far as possible, o f H i s essence ; the r a t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the dogmas o r the i s o l a t i o n o f the core o f t h e i r s u p r a r a t i o n a l , b u t n o t a n t i r a t i o n a l , mystery (for example, the T r i n i t y , the C r e a t i o n o f the w o r l d , the Eucharist) ; i n another d i r e c t i o n , the doctrine o f the s p i r i t u a l a n d i m m o r t a l h u m a n soul; ethics, o r i e n t e d t o w a r d the s u p e r n a t u r a l life ; the p r o b l e m o f the universals ; a n d m a n y others. T h u s , t w o q u i t e different things are i n v o l v e d , a n d the v e r y c o m m o n expressions, Aristotelico-Scholastic
philosophy
o r Aristotélico- Thomist
phi-
losophy, are misleading. T h e y are m e a n i n g f u l o n l y i f a p p l i e d to these medieval systems w h i c h we are s t u d y i n g ; here they signify t h e assimilation o f the A r i s t o t e l i a n system i n t o Scholasticism. B u t they cannot be understood as names for a single philosophy c o m p r i s i n g the systems o f A r i s t o t l e a n d o f St. T h o m a s . T h u s , strictly speaking, t h e t w o above-mentioned terms are n o t equivalent, a n d the second one is inexact: there is n o A r i s t o t e l i c o - T h o m i s t philosophy, b u t a Thomist philosophy p u r e a n d simple, a n d T h o m i s m is Aristotelico-Scholastic i n the sense w h i c h has j u s t been i n d i c a t e d . P H I L O S O P H Y A N D T H E O L O G Y . F o r St. T h o m a s , there is a clear dist i n c t i o n between philosophy a n d theology : they are two sciences, t w o different kinds o f knowledge. T h e o l o g y is based o n divine r e v e l a t i o n ,
Aristotelico-Scholastic
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philosophy o n the exercise o f h u m a n reason. I t has been said, a n d r i g h t l y , t h a t strictly speaking, theology is n o t practiced b y m a n , b u t b y G o d , w h e n H e reveals Himself. Philosophy a n d theology m u s t be t r u e ; G o d is t r u t h itself a n d i t is impossible to d o u b t revelation, whereas reason, p r o p e r l y used, also leads us to t r u t h . Therefore, there can be no conflict between philosophy a n d theology, since this w o u l d be a discord w i t h i n the r e a l m o f t r u t h . T h u s , these are t w o independent sciences, b u t w i t h a c o m m o n area o f investigation. T h e difference between t h e m arises, above a l l , f r o m the v i e w p o i n t o f their formal objects, t h o u g h their material objects part i a l l y coincide. T h e r e are revealed dogmas w h i c h can be k n o w n t h r o u g h reason—for example, as St. T h o m a s w i l l p o i n t o u t , the existence o f G a d a n d m a n y of His attributes, the C r e a t i o n , a n d so o n . Nevertheless, the revelation o f these dogmas is n o t superfluous, because i f reason alone were used, v e r y few people w o u l d k n o w these truths. I n the cases where r a t i o n a l understanding is possible, this is preferable to p u r e belief. H e r e we encounter a softened allusion to the fides quaerens intellectum; St. T h o m a s n o w believes t h a t i t is o n l y part i a l l y possible to t r y to understand the object of f a i t h r a t i o n a l l y . T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f reason to themes w h i c h are also topics for f a i t h a n d theology is the so-called natural theology; there is thus a n a t u r a l theology alongside the theologiafidei. T h i s n a t u r a l theology is w h a t St. T h o m a s considers philosophy, a n d the most i m p o r t a n t aspect o f p h i l o s o p h y ; strictly speaking, i t is Thomistphilosophy. R e v e l a t i o n is the c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h . I n the case o f a c o n t r a d i c t i o n between revelation a n d philosophy, the e r r o r can never be o n the p a r t o f revelation. Therefore, the disagreement o f a philosophic d o c t r i n e w i t h a revealed d o g m a is a sign t h a t the doctrine is false, t h a t reason has gone astray a n d has n o t a r r i v e d at t r u t h ; i t thus jars against t r u t h . I n this sense philosophy is s u b o r d i n a t e d , n o t exactly to theology as a science, b u t to revelation. B u t this does n o t operate as a h i n d r a n c e or i m p o s i t i o n ; o n the c o n t r a r y , philosophy sets u p as its n o r m t h a t w h i c h is most p r o p e r to i t ; t h a t is, t r u t h . R e v e l a t i o n keeps philosophy o n its g u a r d , b u t i t is philosophic reason itself t h a t w i l l have to seek o u t t r u e knowledge. T H E D I V I S I O N OF P H I L O S O P H Y . F o r St. T h o m a s , as for the Greeks,
the o r i g i n of philosophy is awe; the desire to k n o w is satisfied o n l y w h e n things are k n o w n i n their causes. St. T h o m a s is a good A r i s t o t e l i a n ; but inasmuch as the first cause is G o d , o n l y knowledge o f G o d can suffice for the h u m a n intellect a n d satisfy philosophy. T h e goal o f this philosophy is t h a t there be depicted i n the soul the entire order o f the universe a n d its causes; ut in ea describatur totus ordo universi et causarum
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ejus. T h e h u m a n soul ( w h i c h i n Aristotle's w o r k h a d already been c o m p a r e d w i t h the h a n d , because, j u s t as i n a certain sense the h a n d is all the instruments, so the soul is i n a c e r t a i n w a y a l l the things) envelops the t o t a l i t y of the universe w i t h its knowledge, a n d thus rises above its position as a mere creature i n o r d e r to share i n the character o f the spirit, i n the image o f the D e i t y . T h i s o r d e r o f the universe is threefold. I n the first place, there is a n order w h i c h the h u m a n intellect finds as already existing: the order o f the things, o f n a t u r e , of true being. T h i s type o f order is the concern o f n a t u r a l philosophy i n a strict sense, or physics, whose object is the ens mobile; i t is also the concern o f mathematics, b u t especially of m e t a physics, w h i c h , according to the A r i s t o t e l i a n definition, studies the ens in quantum ens (the e n t i t y as a n e n t i t y ) a n d culminates i n knowledge o f G o d . Secondly, there is the o r d e r o f understanding, w h i c h is the object o f r a t i o n a l philosophy or logic. T h i r d l y , the order o f the acts o f w i l l , a n order p r o d u c e d b y m a n ; this is the m o r a l order, a n d i t is the object o f m o r a l philosophy or ethics; i n its collective dimensions this order includes the sciences o f the State—economics a n d politics. T h i s is an o u t l i n e o f the T h o m i s t philosophic disciplines. W e c a n n o t here enter i n t o a detailed discussion o f this d i v i s i o n o f philosophy, for this w o u l d take us too far a f i e l d ; i t w i l l suffice to explain briefly the most interesting features, those t h a t are responsible for this scheme's posit i o n of esteem a n d influence i n the h i s t o r y of philosophy. M E T A P H Y S I C S . A c c o r d i n g to St. T h o m a s , w h o adopts t h e Aristotel i a n doctrines, being is the most universal o f a l l concepts. Mud quod prima cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cujus intellectus includitur in omnibus,
quaecumque quis apprehendit ( t h a t w h i c h first comes under one's apprehension is the E n t i t y , the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h i c h is i n c l u d e d i n a l l things, whatever one apprehends). B u t , as Aristotle h a d earlier shown w h e n c o n f r o n t i n g Platonic doctrine, this universality is n o t t h a t of the genus; the E n t i t y is one o f the transcendentals, w h i c h are present i n a l l the things w i t h o u t i n t e r m i n g l i n g w i t h any. These transcendentals are ens, res, aliquid, unum et bonum. A n d as special forms o f the bonum r e f e r r i n g
to u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d desire, we have the verum a n d ihepulchrum, a n d beauty.
truth
T h e t w o p r i n c i p a l meanings o f the w o r d " b e i n g " are essence a n d existence; the Scholastics h a d l o n g debated the difference between these terms. St. Thomas affirms the a c t u a l difference between the essence a n d existence o f creatures, w h i c h are c o n t i n g e n t entities. However, there is no such difference between the essence a n d existence o f G o d . God's existence follows necessarily f r o m H i s essence. T h i s is the concept o f aseity or self-existence, to be a n ens a se; i t plays a n
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essential role i n the p r o o f o f the existence o f G o d a n d i n a l l o f theology. St. T h o m a s rejects St. Anselm's ontological p r o o f a n d gives five methods o f p r o v i n g God's existence; these are the famous Jive ways. ( i ) B y m o t i o n : m o t i o n exists; e v e r y t h i n g t h a t moves is m o v e d b y a n o t h e r m o v e r ; i f this mover moves, i t w i l l r e q u i r e another m o v e r i n t u r n , a n d so o n to i n f i n i t y ; this is impossible, because there w o u l d be n o m o v e r i f there were n o t a first, a n d this first m o v e r is G o d . (2) B y the efficient cause: there is a series of efficient causes; there must be a first cause, because otherwise there w o u l d be no effect; a n d thatfirst cause is G o d , (3) By the possible a n d necessary: generation a n d decay show t h a t there are entities w h i c h can be or n o t b e ; at one t i m e these entities d i d n o t exist, a n d there must have been a t i m e i n w h i c h n o t h i n g existed a n d i n w h i c h n o t h i n g came to b e ; there must be a n E n t i t y w h i c h is necessary i n itself, a n d i t is called G o d . (4) By the degrees o f perfection: there are various degrees o f a l l the perfections w h i c h m o r e or less a p p r o x i m a t e the absolute perfections, a n d therefore they are degrees of the absolute perfections. T h u s , there is a n E n t i t y w h i c h is completely perfect, the highest E n t i t y ; this E n t i t y is the cause o f a l l perfection a n d a l l b e i n g a n d is called G o d . (5) By the o r d e r i n g o f the w o r l d : i n t e l l i g e n t entities t e n d t o w a r d a goal a n d a n order, n o t b y chance b u t because o f the intelligence w h i c h directs t h e m ; there is a n i n t e l l i g e n t E n t i t y w h i c h orders n a t u r e a n d w h i c h impels i t t o w a r d its goal, a n d this E n t i t y is G o d . These are the five ways, briefly stated. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l idea w h i c h inspires t h e m is t h a t G o d , w h o is invisible a n d i n f i n i t e , is demonstrable b y means o f H i s visible a n d finite effects. T h u s , that God is, is k n o w n , b u t n o t what He is. B u t i t is possible t o l e a r n something about G o d b y observing H i s creatures, a n d this is effected i n three ways: b y means o f causality, b y means o f excellence a n d b y means o f negation. St. T h o m a s distinguishes at least t w o possible modes of seeing: one m o d e is b y means o f mere n a t u r a l reason, a n d the other is b y means o f a s u p e r n a t u r a l l i g h t . Some see the l i g h t , he says, b u t they are n o t i n the l i g h t : quidatn vident lumen, sed non sunt in lumine.
T h e w o r l d has been created b y G o d ; we have already seen t h a t the C r e a t i o n consists o f p l a c i n g the w o r l d i n existence b y means o f a v o l u n t a r y a n d free act o f G o d ; revelation adds t h a t this occurs i n t i m e , b u t a c c o r d i n g t o St. T h o m a s this is n o t r a t i o n a l l y demonstrable. G o d is the cause o f the w o r l d i n a double sense: H e is the efficient cause a n d also the e x e m p l a r y cause; moreover, H e is the f i n a l cause, since a l l goals direct themselves to G o d . W i t h respect t o the universals, St. T h o m a s ' doctrine is one o f
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moderate realism, as has already been p o i n t e d o u t . T h e universals are r e a l , b u t exist o n l y i n abstract f o r m ; the species appears o n l y i n a n i n d i v i d u a l state, a n d the p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n is the materia signata (sígnate m a t t e r ) . T h i s gives rise t o t h e t h e o r y t h a t each angel is a species r a t h e r t h a n a n i n d i v i d u a l , since the angels are i m m a t e r i a l . T H E SOUL. T h o m i s t doctrine r e g a r d i n g the soul differs f r o m the t r a d i t i o n a l Scholastic doctrine, w h i c h was o f P l a t o n i c - A u g u s t i n i a n o r i g i n , a n d approximates Aristotle's t h e o r y , w h i c h i t adapts t o the C h r i s t i a n v i e w p o i n t . I n accordance w i t h A r i s t o t e l i a n psychology, St. T h o m a s interprets the soul as a substantialform of the h u m a n b o d y , the first p r i n c i p l e o f its life. T h e soul is w h a t makes the b o d y b e a b o d y — t h a t is, a l i v i n g b o d y . T h e r e are as m a n y souls or substantial forms as there are h u m a n bodies; St. T h o m a s rejects the theory t h a t there is a single soul for a l l m a n k i n d , w h i c h was o f A r a b i c o r i g i n a n d w h i c h reappears w i t h force i n L a t i n A v e r r o i s m . H e also denies t h a t the b o d y a n d the soul are t w o complete substances, a n d t h a t the soul gives the b o d y life b u t n o t corporeality. St. T h o m a s believes t h a t t h e soul a n d the b o d y f o r m a substantial union; t h a t is, the soul a n d the b o d y together, and w i t h o u t t h e h e l p o f any other f o r m , constitute the c o m p l e t e a n d single substance w h i c h is m a n . T h e C o u n c i l o f V i e n n a (1311-12) described the r a t i o n a l soul as the i n t r i n s i c a n d essential f o r m o f the h u m a n body. O n the other h a n d , the human s o u l — i n contrast to the a n i m a l s o u l — is a subsistentform; t h a t is, the i n t e l l e c t o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g has a n operat i o n o f its o w n i n w h i c h the b o d y does n o t essentially p a r t i c i p a t e ; therefore, the i n t e l l e c t can subsist a n d exercise t h a t o p e r a t i o n even t h o u g h i t is separated f r o m its c o r p o r e a l substratum. T h u s the soul is i n c o r p o r e a l a n d is n o t composed o f m a t t e r a n d f o r m ; a n d i t is s p i r i t u a l , since i t possesses reason a n d is a mens. Therefore, the h u m a n soul is i n c o r r u p t i b l e a n d i m m o r t a l ; its i m m a t e r i a l i t y a n d s i m p l i c i t y preclude decomposition a n d decay; its s p i r i t u a l i t y a n d consequent subsistence p r e v e n t i t f r o m accidentally destroying itself w h e n the h u m a n b o d y decays. T h u s the h u m a n soul is i m m o r t a l , a n d w o u l d perish o n l y i f G o d were t o a n n i h i l a t e i t . St. T h o m a s finds f u r t h e r p r o o f o f personal i m m o r t a l i t y i n man's desire to c o n t i n u e t o l i v e ; a n d , he adds, since this n a t u r a l desire c a n n o t be i n v a i n , a l l i n t e l l e c t u a l substance is incorruptible. E T H I C S . T h o m i s t ethics is based o n the f r a m e w o r k o f A r i s t o t e l i a n ethics, b u t i t keeps the C h r i s t i a n p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e constantly i n m i n d . Ethics is motus rationalis creaturae ad Deum,
movement by the rational
creature t o w a r d G o d . T h e goal o f this m o v e m e n t is bliss, w h i c h consists i n the direct vision of G o d . Therefore, man's u l t i m a t e g o a l is G o d ,
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a n d this goal is achieved t h r o u g h knowledge, t h r o u g h c o n t e m p l a t i o n ; St. T h o m a s ' ethics has a clear intellectualist nuance. T h e first l a w o f the h u m a n w i l l is lex aeterna, quae est quasi ratio Dei (the e t e r n a l l a w ,
w h i c h is, as i t were, the reasoning o f G o d ) . St. T h o m a s ' philosophy o f the State is subordinated to Aristotle's philosophy o f politics. M a n is b y n a t u r e a n animal sociale o r politicum, a n d society exists f o r the benefit o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l , a n d n o t vice versa. Power derives f r o m G o d . St. T h o m a s studies the possible kinds o f government, a n d considers m o n a r c h y tempered b y f u l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n o n the p a r t o f the people t o be the best f o r m a n d t y r a n n y to be the worst. I n a n y event, t h e highest power is t h a t o f the C h u r c h . THE
RESPONSE T O T H O M I S M . St. T h o m a s ' system represented a
r a d i c a l i n n o v a t i o n w i t h i n Scholasticism. I t s opposition t o m a n y P l a t o n i c - A u g u s t i n i a n doctrines a n d clear preference for Aristotel i a n i s m made t h e Franciscans hostile t o i t . E v e n a few D o m i n i c a n s opposed T h o m i s m . First T h o m i s m elicited w r i t t e n challenges; the p r i n c i p a l attacks were the w o r k o f W i l l i a m de la M a r e a n d R i c a r d u s de M e d i a v i l l a a n d were p r i m a r i l y i n reference t o the t h e o r y o f the oneness o f the substantial forms. L a t e r i t attracted official condemnations. T h e first (1277) was t h a t o f Etienne T e m p i e r , t h e bishop o f Paris, a n d was a i m e d at certain T h o m i s t propositions. T h i s condemnation was a t first restricted to the diocese of Paris, b u t later was extended to O x f o r d b y the action o f two Archbishops o f C a n t e r b u r y , R o b e r t K i l w a r d b y , a D o m i n i c a n , a n d J o h n Peckham, a Franciscan. B u t simultaneously a n d w i t h greater strength T h o m i s m was w e l c o m e d t r i u m p h a l l y ; this occurred first i n t h e O r d e r o f Preachers, i m m e d i a t e l y thereafter at the U n i v e r s i t y o f Paris, a n d soon i n a l l the schools. I n 1323 St. T h o m a s was canonized, a n d f r o m t h a t t i m e u n t i l this t h e C h u r c h has p a r t i c u l a r l y insisted o n the h i g h value o f the T h o m i s t system. N E O - T H O M I S M . St. T h o m a s ' influence o n theology a n d philosophy has c o n t i n u e d w i t h o u t i n t e r r u p t i o n ; since his death, the n u m b e r o f commentaries o n his Summa theologiae a n d other works has been m u l t i p l y i n g . T h e o l o g y i n p a r t i c u l a r has d r a w n new life f r o m the immense T h o m i s t c o n t r i b u t i o n , w h i c h gave i t a precise a n d rigorous structure. H o w e v e r , after the M i d d l e Ages a n d the transitory splendor o f Spanish Scholasticism i n the sixteenth century, T h o m i s t t h o u g h t lost fecundity. I n the second h a l f o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y intense intellectual movem e n t was i n i t i a t e d w h i c h was enthusiastically supported b y t h e C h u r c h a n d especially b y Pope Leo X I I I i n his encyclical AeterniPatris
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(1879). I n I t a l y i t was fostered b y Gaetano Sanseverino, S. T o n g i o r g i and L u i g i T a p a r e l l i . T h i s m o v e m e n t a t t e m p t e d to restore T h o m i s m and to a p p r o a c h theological a n d philosophical p r o b l e m s t h r o u g h general suppositions. T h e most f r u i t f u l consequence o f this m o v e m e n t has been the U n i v e r s i t y o f L o u v a i n , w h i c h was i n s p i r e d a n d made i n t e l l e c t u a l l y energetic b y C a r d i n a l M e r c i e r . A m o n g t h e p r i n c i p a l N e o - T h o m i s t thinkers we s h o u l d i n c l u d e Jacques M a r i t a i n a n d Father M a r é c h a l a n d , i n G e r m a n y , Georg v o n H e r t l i n g a n d Clemens Báumker, w h o c o n t r i b u t e d so m u c h to the study o f m e d i e v a l philoso p h y ; also, A . Dyroff, V i c t o r C a t h r e i n , w h o was dedicated to m o r a l philosophy, the psychologist J . Fróbes, a n d Etienne Gilson, the h i s t o r i a n o f philosophy.
8. R O G E R B A C O N
T h e t h i r t e e n t h century is almost completely filled b y Aristotle's influence a n d b y the great T h o m i s t systematization. Nevertheless, there are a few very interesting independent philosophic activities w h i c h deviate f r o m the c e n t r a l c u r r e n t o f Scholasticism. O n e such a c t i v i t y is the above-mentioned Latin Averroism, the p r i n c i p a l representative of w h i c h was Siger o f B r a b a n t . L a t i n A v e r r o i s m revived the A r a b i c doctrines o f the e t e r n i t y o f the w o r l d a n d the oneness o f the h u m a n intellect a n d , most i m p o r t a n t , placed i n the forefront the famous theory of the double t r u t h . I n contrast to this m o v e m e n t there was a b r a n c h o f English Scholasticism w h i c h was o f t h e PlatonicA u g u s t i n i a n t r a d i t i o n b u t w h i c h was also dedicated i n a new a n d intense w a y to the c u l t i v a t i o n o f the experimental sciences. T h i s B r i t i s h c u r r e n t formed ties w i t h a n A n g l o - F r e n c h g r o u p established at Chartres i n the t w e l f t h c e n t u r y a n d thereafter enjoyed a higher level of development i n O x f o r d . H e r e , languages, mathematics a n d the n a t u r a l sciences were studied a l o n g w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l disciplines o f philosophy a n d theology; Aristotle's other great aspect, w h i c h h a d been neglected o n the C o n t i n e n t , was developed i n E n g l a n d a n d later flourished i n the E u r o p e a n Renaissance. T h i s group's first i m p o r t a n t figure was R o b e r t Grosseteste, bishop o f L i n c o l n , b u t R o g e r Bacon was its o u t s t a n d i n g member. L I F E A N D WORKS. Roger B a c o n was a singular a n d fertile t h i n k e r — c e r t a i n l y m o r e so t h a n was Francis Bacon, w h o l i v e d three centuries later. R o g e r was b o r n a r o u n d 1210-14; he studied i n O x f o r d a n d i n Paris, entered the Franciscan O r d e r a n d passionately dedicated h i m self to the study of philosophy, languages a n d the sciences. W i t h i n the O r d e r he was the object of constant persecutions a n d suspicions o n the
*7J
Roger Bacon
p a r t of his superiors; he enjoyed o n l y a b r i e f respite d u r i n g the p o n t i f i cate o f Clement I V (1265-1268), his f r i e n d G u y Foulques, w h o p r o tected h i m a n d p r o m p t e d h i m to compose his m a j o r w o r k s : the Opus majus, the Opus minus a n d the Opus tertium. H e w r o t e u n t i l 1277;
around
t h a t t i m e several o f his ideas were c o n d e m n e d b y T e m p i e r , a n d the f o l l o w i n g year Bacon was i m p r i s o n e d . I t is n o t k n o w n h o w l o n g he r e m a i n e d i n p r i s o n , n o r has the exact date o f his death been ascert a i n e d ; i t is believed t h a t he died a r o u n d 1292-94. R o g e r Bacon dedicated himself to the study o f all the sciences t h a t were k n o w n i n his day, a n d his knowledge o f t h e m was superior to t h a t o f any o f his contemporaries. H e was a genuine investigator a n d experimenter. H e a p p l i e d mathematics to physics, m a n u f a c t u r e d o p t i c a l instruments, was a n alchemist, astronomer a n d linguist. H e also studied medieval t h o u g h t , a n d i n his Opus majus one finds w h a t m i g h t be called a n a t t e m p t a t w r i t i n g a history o f philosophy. D O C T R I N E . F o r Bacon, philosophy a n d the sciences have n o m e a n i n g other t h a n to e x p l a i n the t r u t h revealed i n the Scriptures: Una est tantum sapientia perfecta quae in sacra scriptura
totaliter continetur.
God
t a u g h t m e n to philosophize, for m e n w o u l d n o t have been able to do this b y themselves; b u t h u m a n evil prevented G o d f r o m manifesting the truths f u l l y , a n d so they became m i x e d w i t h error. T h a t is w h y t r u e w i s d o m is to be f o u n d i n the early times, a n d for this reason i t is necessary to look for i t i n the works o f the ancient philosophers. F r o m this s i t u a t i o n there arises the need for history, languages a n d mathematics i n o r d e r to i n t e r p r e t nature. T h u s Bacon represents w h a t has been called scientific traditionalism, a designation i n w h i c h i t is i m p o r t a n t to emphasize b o t h terms equally. Bacon recognizes three modes of k n o w l e d g e : a u t h o r i t y , reason a n d experience. A u t h o r i t y b y itself does n o t suffice; i t requires reasoning. B u t reasoning is n o t c e r t a i n unless i t is c o n f i r m e d b y experience, the c h i e f source of certainty. Experience is t w o f o l d : external a n d i n t e r n a l . T h e first is per sensus exteriores, whereas the second is a t r u e scientia interior, founded o n d i v i n e i n s p i r a t i o n . T h e enlightenment o f G o d , w h i c h culminates i n raptus ( r a p t u r e ) , plays a n i m p o r t a n t role. A t one extreme Bacon's e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n is r e l a t e d to the supernatural i n t u i t i o n of mysticism. A c t u a l l y , i n the fields of philosophy a n d theology Bacon represents a less advanced p o i n t t h a n , for example, St. T h o m a s ; b u t his w o r k contains a n e w g e r m — i n t e r e s t i n n a t u r e . B y means o f the Franciscan physicists o f the f o u r t e e n t h a n d fifteenth centuries a n d the school o f Paris, this g e r m develops i n t o m o d e r n n a t u r a l science.
Ij6
The Medieval
9.
Philosophers
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY I N SPAIN
A p a r t f r o m the aforementioned A r a b s a n d Jews, p h i l o s o p h y does not present great personalities i n the M i d d l e Ages i n Spain. F o r reasons t h a t require l e n g t h y e x p l a n a t i o n , C h r i s t i a n S p a i n is at the p e r i p h e r y o f the f o r m a t i o n o f Scholasticism. I t plays a n extremely interesting b u t secondary role i n this development, a role t h a t consists p r i n c i p a l l y i n the transmission o f t h o u g h t , as at the school o f translators i n T o l e d o , o f w h i c h D o m i n i c u s Gundisalvus, w h o has already been m e n t i o n e d , was the o u t s t a n d i n g figure. Nevertheless, given these l i m i t a t i o n s , we f i n d i n Spain several i n h e r e n t l y interesting philosophers w h o w i e l d e d influence i n t h e i r o w n t i m e ; a n d at least a few o f these m e n influenced t h o u g h t over a p e r i o d o f m a n y centuries. Petrus Hispanus, w h o was b o r n i n P o r t u g a l , was e x t r e m e l y active i n the t h i r t e e n t h century. H e was a bishop, archbishop, c a r d i n a l a n d finally, pope, w i t h the n a m e o f J o h n X X I . H e s t u d i e d medicine, theology a n d philosophy a n d w r o t e several Summulae logicales w h i c h enjoyed e x t r a o r d i n a r y fame i n t h e i r t i m e ; they were a c t u a l l y used as textbooks. H e was the a u t h o r o f the m n e m o n i c verses o f syllogistic and o f the names for the v a l i d modes o f the syllogism, Barbara, Celarent, and so f o r t h . A r n a l d o de V i l a n o v a , a V a l e n c i a n physician a n d t h e o l o g i a n , is also o f interest, as is R a i m u n d u s L u l l u s , o f w h o m i t w i l l be necessary to speak i n some d e t a i l . I n the fifteenth century there l i v e d another C a t a l a n theologian a n d physician, R a i m u n d o de S a b u n d e (Sabiuda, called R a y m o n d Sebond b y M o n t a i g n e ) , w h o m M o n t a i g n e treated at l e n g t h ; he was the a u t h o r o f a Theologia naturalis seu Liber de creaturis
( N a t u r a l Theology, or the Book o f the Creatures), w h i c h was inspired b y the w o r k o f L u l l u s . R A I M U N D U S L U L L U S . R a i m u n d u s L u l l u s ( R a m o n L l u l l i n its u n l a t i n i z e d C a t a l a n f o r m , often R a y m o n d L u l l y or L u l l i n English) was b o r n i n M a l l o r c a , a p p a r e n t l y a b o u t 1233, a n d d i e d a r o u n d 1315; i t has n o t been established w h e t h e r he was killed b y the Saracens. I n his y o u t h he was a courtier o f "scandalous g a l l a n t r y , " b u t t h e vision o f Christ crucified appeared to h i m several times, a n d he a b a n d o n e d his f a m i l y , estate a n d c o u n t r y a n d dedicated himself to p r e a c h i n g a m o n g the infidels. H i s life was as f u l l o f adventure as a n o v e l . H e made numerous trips t h r o u g h I t a l y a n d France, a n d traversed large parts o f A f r i c a a n d Asia. H e sailed the entire M e d i t e r r a n e a n , was shipw r e c k e d , taken prisoner a n d stoned. I t is said t h a t he t r a v e l e d as far as Abyssinia a n d T a r t a r y . H i s life was a n i m a t e d b y apostolic zeal a n d exalted fervor.
Duns
177
Scotus and Occam
I n order to be able to convert the infidels, R a i m u n d u s L u l l u s learned A r a b i c a n d studied logic. H e investigated the sciences, a n d was also a mystic a n d poet. H e w r o t e a l o n g series o f books i n C a t a l a n , L a t i n a n d A r a b i c . H i s chief works are Libre de contemplado en Deu, Art abreujada
d'atrobar
veritat (Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem sen Ars
magna et major), Liber de ascensu et descensu intellects,
Ars generalis
ultima,
a n d the mystical book e n t i t l e d Libre de amic e amat w h i c h forms p a r t o f his philosophic novel Blanquerna. T h i s M a l l o r c a n t h i n k e r believed t h a t the conversion o f the infidels r e q u i r e d r a t i o n a l p r o o f o f the C h r i s t i a n t r u t h ; he t h o u g h t t h a t reason c o u l d a n d o u g h t to prove everything, a n d i n his hands philosophy becomes apologetics. R a i m u n d u s L u l l u s proposed a process for finding a n d a u t o m a t i c a l l y p r o v i n g t r u t h : this is the so-called Ars magna. I t consists o f a complex c o m b i n a t i o n o f ideas w h i c h have special reference to G o d a n d the soul a n d w h i c h f o r m tables capable o f being m a n i p u l a t e d like a m a t h e m a t i c a l symbolism i n order to find a n d prove God's attributes, a n d the like. These tables operate i n a fashion t h a t is very difficult to understand a n d become m o r e a n d more numerous a n d complicated. T h i s idea o f constructing philosophy i n a deductive and almost m a t h e m a t i c a l m a n n e r b y means of a general c o m b i n a t o r y system later exerted a strong a t t r a c t i o n o n other thinkers, p a r t i c u l a r l y on L e i b n i z ; however, the philosophic value o f these attempts is m o r e t h a n questionable. L u l l u s ' most interesting feature is his singular a n d forceful persona l i t y ; he was called the Doctor illuminatus, a n d inspired great a d m i r a t i o n . H i s intellectual b a c k g r o u n d was clearly Franciscan; i t was b u i l t on a Platonic a n d A u g u s t i n i a n base a n d c u l m i n a t e d i n mysticism. T h e s p i r i t u a l relationship between Roger Bacon a n d R a i m u n d u s L u l l u s has been p r o p e r l y p o i n t e d out. T h e t w o cultivate the sciences a n d O r i e n t a l languages w i t h the same goals o f evangelizing a n d r e f o r m i n g C h r i s t i a n i t y . I n b o t h there is a clear p r i o r i t y o f theological—even m y s t i c a l — k n o w l e d g e over a l l other knowledge, a n d i n the w o r k o f each the t w o themes o f Franciscan t h o u g h t — t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f a l l knowledge to theology a n d the progress o f the i n d i v i d u a l intellect t o w a r d G o d — a r e taken u p . These t w o themes are summarized i n the titles to two works b y St. Bonaventure: De reductione artium adtheologiam a n d Itinerarium mentis in Deum. io.
D U N S SCOTUS A N D O C C A M
T h e p e r i o d f r o m the end o f the t h i r t e e n t h century t h r o u g h the fourteenth century represents a new phase of Scholasticism, a phase w h i c h continues i n decadentfashion i n the fifteenth century. T h e fullness o f
The Medieval
Philosophers
T h o m i s t philosophy is followed b y a philosophic c u r r e n t o f Franciscan character w h i c h , like St. T h o m a s , incorporates A r i s t o t e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y ; however, t h e n e w c u r r e n t acquires m o r e a n d m o r e p r o n o u n c e d v o l u n t a r i s t a n d n o m i n a l i s t characteristics. W i t h these thinkers w e come t o the extremes o f the dialectical e v o l u t i o n o f the great problems o f medieval philosophy. W e have already seen, above, the positions w h i c h they take i n regard t o the three questions o f the C r e a t i o n , t h e universals a n d logos. W e shall n o w p o i n t o u t the most i m p o r t a n t features o f the philosophy o f the t w o great English Franciscans, J o h n Duns Scotus a n d W i l l i a m o f O c c a m .
Scotus
L I F E A N D WORKS. Scotus was b o r n somewhere i n t h e B r i t i s h Isles either i n 1266 or i n 1274. H e entered the Franciscan O r d e r , a n d studied a n d taught at O x f o r d . I n 1304 he w e n t to Paris, a n d i n 1308 to Cologne, where he d i e d t h a t same year, still very y o u n g . Scotus is one o f the few precocious philosophers i n history, he a n d Schelling b e i n g a m o n g the few exceptions t o the general rule t h a t great philosophers are o f necessity fully m a t u r e m e n . D u n s Scotus displayed b r i l l i a n c e i n philosophy f r o m a very early age; his keen a n d p e n e t r a t i n g m i n d w o n h i m t h e sobriquet o f Doctor subtilis. H e was a c h a m p i o n o f the n o w official d o g m a o f the I m m a c u l a t e Conception of the V i r g i n . Several o f the works t r a d i t i o n a l l y a t t r i b u t e d t o Scotus are n o t a u t h e n t i c . A m o n g those t h a t are c e r t a i n l y his, the most i m p o r t a n t are the Opus oxoniense, especially, a n d t h e treatise De prima rerum omnium principio. PHILOSOPHY A N D THEOLOGY. T h e e q u i l i b r i u m i n w h i c h the two
disciplines o f philosophy a n d theology appear i n the works o f St. T h o m a s w i l l soon be upset. T h e distance between t h e t w o is m u c h greater i n Scotus' writings, a n d w i l l be even greater i n those o f O c c a m . T h e y n o w differ not o n l y i n theirformal object, b u t also i n t h e i r material object. T h e o l o g y is reduced to t h a t w h i c h is given to us t h r o u g h revelat i o n , b y supernatural means; o n the other h a n d , e v e r y t h i n g w i t h i n the natural scope o f reason is a topic for philosophy. T h e history o f the late M i d d l e Ages a n d the m o d e r n p e r i o d w i l l be the progressive dissociat i o n between the w o r l d o f n a t u r e a n d the w o r l d o f grace, a n d the o l d p r i n c i p l e gratia naturam non tollit, sedperficit (grace does n o t take away n a t u r e , b u t perfects i t ) w i l l be forgotten. Theology i n this p e r i o d is n o longer speculative, b u t p r a c t i c a l . M o r e a n d more, theologia rationis w i l l disappear, leaving the field t o theologia fidei alone. Soon ratio, o r logos, w i l l become completely separated f r o m theds.
Duns
Scotus and Occam
Nevertheless, this a t t i t u d e should n o t be confused w i t h the theory o f the d o u b l e t r u t h derived f r o m Averroes, since the revealed t r u t h o f theology remains i n first place a n d offers a supernatural certitude. I t is the impossibility o f p e n e t r a t i n g the mystery o f G o d r a t i o n a l l y t h a t separates philosophy f r o m knowledge concerning the D e i t y . SCOTIST METAPHYSICS. Scotus, whose distinctions are always i n n u m e r a b l e a n d subtle, distinguishes three classes o f p r i m e m a t t e r : materia prima prima, w h i c h is i n d e t e r m i n a t e , b u t has a certain r e a l i t y , l i k e something created; materia secundo prima, w h i c h possesses the a t t r i butes o f q u a n t i t y a n d already presupposes shaping b y a corporeal " f o r m " ; a n d , lastly, materia tertioprima, w h i c h is m a t t e r available for the modifications of already corporeal entities. M o r e o v e r , there are several forms, also, a n d Scotus makes a distinct i o n between the res a n d the formalitates w h i c h constitute i t . W e have already seen the role p l a y e d b y these formalitates, especially haecceitas ( " t h i s n e s s " ) , a n d b y the f o r m a l d i s t i n c t i o n a parte rei i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the p r o b l e m of the universals. D u n s Scotus accepts St. Anselm's ontological a r g u m e n t for the d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f the existence o f G o d , a d d i n g a few modifications w h i c h were later adopted b y L e i b n i z . I f G o d is possible, t h e n H e exists; i t is first necessary to demonstrate H i s possibility. Scotus proves this—as L e i b n i z w i l l — o n the basis o f the impossibility of God's contrad i c t i n g Himself, since i n G o d there is n o t h i n g negative. G o d , as a n ens ase, is necessary, a n d H i s essence coincides w i t h H i s existence; therefore, H i s possibility implies H i s reality. T h i s is w h a t Scotus called colorari ista ratio Anselmi de summo cogitabile ( " l e n d i n g color to t h a t p r o o f
o f Anselm's o n the highest i m a g i n a b l e Being " ) . Scotus, i n contrast to St. Thomas, is a voluntarist. H e affirms the p r i o r i t y of the w i l l over the intellect i n a l l fields. T h e w i l l is n o t passive, b u t active; i t is n o t d e t e r m i n e d b y necessity: voluntas nihil de necessitate
vult (the w i l l has n o t h i n g to do w i t h necessity). T h e ethical i m p o r t a n c e o f the w i l l is greater, a n d therefore love is superior to faith. I t is better to love G o d t h a n to k n o w H i m ; conversely, the perversion of the w i l l is m o r e serious t h a n the perversion o f the intellect. A l l these Scotist tendencies w i l l acquire t h e i r m a x i m u m force i n the f o l l o w i n g centuries a n d w i l l determine the passage f r o m the M i d d l e Ages to the Renaissance. W e shall c o n t i n u a l l y encounter i n the f o l l o w i n g pages the consequences o f Scotus' t h o u g h t . Occam
L I F E A N D WORKS. W i l l i a m o f O c c a m ( O c k h a m ) was so called f r o m the t o w n o f O c k h a m i n E n g l a n d , where he was b o r n at the end o f the
i8o
The Medieval
Philosophers
t h i r t e e n t h century. H e , too, was a Franciscan w h o s t u d i e d a t O x f o r d a n d was a professor there a n d later i n Paris. After his i m p o r t a n t scientific activities, he took p a r t i n p o l i t i c a l a n d religious controversies, a n d some o f his propositions were condemned. I n the f o u r t e e n t h century the great medieval social s t r u c t u r e was b e g i n n i n g t o dissolve; t h e struggle between the pontificate a n d the H o l y R o m a n E m p i r e was r a g i n g once more. O c c a m sided w i t h the emperor a n d was excomm u n i c a t e d b y Pope J o h n X X I I because o f his stand o n t h e question o f t e m p o r a l rights. O c c a m took refuge a t the c o u r t o f t h e E m p e r o r L u d w i g o f Bavaria, t o w h o m he addressed the famous l i n e : Tu me defendas gladio, ego te defendam calamo (Defend me w i t h the s w o r d , I shall defend y o u w i t h the pen). O c c a m d i e d i n M u n i c h a b o u t 1350. Aside f r o m his p o l i t i c a l a n d ecclesiastical works (Quaestiones octo de auctoritate summipontificis,
Compendium errorum Joannispapae
XXII,
Brevi-
loquium de potestatepapae, a n d so f o r t h ) , O c c a m w r o t e Super IV
Libros
sententiarum,
Sacra-
Quodlibeta septem, t h e Centiloquium
theologicum,
De
mento altaris, Summa totius logicae a n d commentaries o n A r i s t o t l e . OCCAM'S
P H I L O S O P H Y . A l l t h e tendencies t h a t are
outlined i n
Scotus' w r i t i n g s are carried t o extremes i n Occam's. W h a t Scotus presented as the g e r m o f a n idea, O c c a m develops t o its u l t i m a t e consequences. I n the first place, he puts the greatest possible distance between theology and physics. T h e o l o g y receives a n even greater scope t h a n i t h a d , b u t n o t as a r a t i o n a l science; the t r u t h s o f f a i t h are inaccessible to reason, a n d philosophy has n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h e m . Science is cognitio vera seddubitabilis
natafieri evidensper discursum (a
t r u e knowledge, b u t one i t is d o u b t f u l can be made evident t h r o u g h discourse). G o d is not reason; reason is something t h a t o n l y has t h e value o f " d o o r s w i t h i n " m a n . G o d is omnipotence, free w i l l , w i l l w i t h o u t hindrances, not even the hindrances of reason. Scotus' v o l u n t a r i s m is converted i n t o this a t t i t u d e w h i c h separates reason f r o m the D e i t y a n d thus removes the D e i t y f r o m the field o f man's r a t i o n a l speculation. G o d disappears f r o m the intellectual h o r i z o n a n d ceases to be a p r o p e r object for the m i n d , as H e has been i n the M i d d l e Ages up t o this t i m e . A t this p o i n t begins the process w h i c h m a y be called the loss of God, the stages o f this process being the stages o f m o d e r n history. W i t h r e g a r d to the question o f the universals, O c c a m , as w e have seen previously, is a nominalist. F o r h i m , the universals have r e a l i t y neither i n the things nor i n the m i n d o f G o d as eternal exemplars o f the t h i n g s ; they are abstractions o f the h u m a n m i n d — c o n c e p t s o r t e r m s : conceptus mentis significans univoce plura singularia
(a concept o f t h e
m i n d designating several things or single things b y one a n d the same
Meister
Eckhart
181
t e r m ) . Science is related to the universals a n d therefore is not a science of things, b u t o n l y o f signs or symbols. T h i s prepares the w a y for the apogee o f m a t h e m a t i c a l t h o u g h t i n the Renaissance. T h u s , O c c a m represents the extreme development of the Franciscan tendencies i n medieval philosophy. M a n , w h o h a d been cut off f r o m the w o r l d since the i n c e p t i o n o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , is n o w left w i t h o u t G o d . " A l o n e , alienated f r o m the w o r l d a n d f r o m G o d , " writes Z u b i r i , " the h u m a n spirit begins to feel insecure i n the u n i v e r s e . " F r o m this t i m e on a n d t h r o u g h a l l the centuries o f the m o d e r n age, m a n w i l l seek i n philosophy security first o f all. M o d e r n philosophy w i l l be inspired b y c a u t i o n , b y wariness, m o r e b y the fear of error t h a n b y the y e a r n i n g for truth. 11.
MEISTER ECKHART
T h e great figure o f Meister E c k h a r t is l i t t l e k n o w n a n d studied. H e is one o f the most b r i l l i a n t personalities i n medieval philosophy, b u t the difficulties i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of his w r i t i n g s are very great. W e c a n n o t here go deeply i n t o the study o f his t h o u g h t , b u t shall merely p o i n t o u t the role he played a n d observe t h a t his w o r k is a n essential element for the comprehension o f medieval philosophy a n d the t r a n sition to m o d e r n philosophy. E c k h a r t was b o r n i n 1260, p r o b a b l y i n G o t h a . H e was a D o m i n i c a n , perhaps a personal p u p i l o f St. Albertus M a g n u s . H e taught theology i n Paris at the same t i m e as Scotus, at the b e g i n n i n g o f the fourteenth c e n t u r y . L a t e r he h e l d various offices i n the D o m i n i c a n O r d e r a n d was a n i m p o r t a n t preacher. T h e Franciscans instigated a t r i a l against h i m , a n d he was accused o f pantheism a n d A v e r r o i s m . I n 1329, t w o years before his death, several o f his propositions were condemned. " B u t , " writes Z u b i r i , " n o t h i n g c o u l d be further f r o m E c k h a r t t h a n the p a n t h e i s m t h a t was ascribed to h i m w i t h unbelievable h a s t e . " E c k h a r t left m a n y sermons i n G e r m a n a n d various works i n L a t i n . His speculative mysticism h a d a p r o f o u n d influence o n the entire development o f G e r m a n mysticism, as w e l l as o n the Flemish a n d F r e n c h mysticism of the fifteenth century. I t also h a d a direct influence on the great Spanish mystics of the sixteenth century. W e have already seen the m e a n i n g o f Eckhart's doctrine o f the scintilla animae, the spark o f the soul, uncreated a n d uncreatable; we have seen t h a t there is no pantheism i n this affirmation, b u t r a t h e r the s t r i c t l y o r t h o d o x c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the Idea of man, his exemplary m o d e l , of w h i c h he is the image, is G o d H i m s e l f . G o d is beyond b e i n g ; E c k h a r t even says t h a t G o d is a pure nothingness, thus d e n o t i n g H i s f u n d a m e n t a l infiniteness a n d s u p e r i o r i t y to a l l essences. T h e r o a d t h a t
The Medieval
Philosophers
leads to G o d is the soul itself, a n d E c k h a r t seeks solitude a n d w i t h d r a w a l f r o m society. T o quote Z u b i r i : " W i t h o u t E c k h a r t the o r i g i n o f m o d e r n philoso p h y w o u l d be completely inexplicable. I t is easy, b u t inexact, to say t h a t i t derives f r o m Cusa or O c c a m . Despite a l l appearances, Occam's n o m i n a l i s m , w i t h its p r e v a i l i n g negativity, w o u l d be i n c a p a b l e o f g e r m i n a t i n g the positive p r i n c i p l e that Nicholas o f Cusa was t o extract. . . . A n d the d i f f i c u l t y o f understanding E c k h a r t is m o r e serious t h a n i t m i g h t seem at first sight, n o t o n l y because n o t a l l his L a t i n w r i t i n g s are yet k n o w n , b u t because a n honest appraisal of the p r o b l e m w o u l d oblige us to go back a n d review c o m p l e t e l y o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of medieval m e t a p h y s i c s . . . . T h e n we w o u l d see i n E c k h a r t a b r i l l i a n t t h i n k e r w h o does n o t succeed i n expressing i n Scholastic concepts a n d terms his new metaphysical i n t u i t i o n s , w h i c h are i n m a n y senses a n t i p o d a l to A u g u s t i n i a n thought a n d the R e f o r m a t i o n . F o r St. Augustine, the p r o b l e m is the w o r l d , because h e came to believe t h a t he knew w h a t G o d is. F o r Eckhart, the p r o b l e m is G o d , perhaps because he believed he already knew w h a t the w o r l d is. O n the other h a n d , whereas the R e f o r m a t i o n makes its appeal t o the i n d i v i d u a l , E c k h a r t has recourse to w i t h d r a w a l i n t o the i n n e r life, a n a t t i t u d e w h i c h is p r o b a b l y miles a w a y f r o m every L u t h e r a n tendency. O n l y i n this way w i l l we k n o w w h a t is speculation a n d w h a t is m y s t i cism i n E c k h a r t , a n d w h e r e i n the fundamental tie b e t w e e n the t w o consists."
12.
T H E L A S T P H A S E OF M E D I E V A L P H I L O S O P H Y
A f t e r O c c a m a n d E c k h a r t , m e d i e v a l philosophy enters i n t o a r a p i d decline, w h i c h is d o m i n a t e d b y the g r o w i n g c o m p l i c a t i o n o f its distinctiones a n d b y a n excessive b r a n c h i n g o u t i n t o secondary questions. B u t i t w o u l d be w r o n g to t h i n k t h a t i t is a l l over i n the m i d d l e o f the fourteenth century, or that the speculation of the late f o u r t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n d fifteenth century contained n o f r u i t f u l elements t h a t w e r e to figure later i n m o d e r n philosophy. W i t h o u t entering i n t o the complex p r o b lems raised b y this p e r i o d , i t w i l l be interesting to p o i n t o u t a t least the m a j o r elements a n d figures o f this final stage, the crisis o f Scholasticism. T H E OCCAMISTS. I n E n g l a n d a n d France especially, O c c a m i s m spreads r a p i d l y a n d is fostered b y a series of keen m i n d s . A m o n g these are the English D o m i n i c a n R o b e r t H o l k o t , a c o n t e m p o r a r y o f O c c a m , a n d above a l l , the Parisian master Nicolas d ' A u t r e c o u r t , w h o l i v e d s l i g h t l y later, a c r i t i c a l m i n d w h o at times comes close to L a t i n
The
Last Phase of Medieval
Philosophy
A v e r r o i s m . T h e n , too, there is Nicolas' p u p i l , C a r d i n a l Pierre d ' A i l l y (1350-1420), w h o was versed i n cosmography, a n d whose Imago mundi decisively influenced C o l u m b u s ' ideas o n the sphericity o f the earth, the ideas w h i c h l e d h i m to the discovery o f the N e w W o r l d . A p u p i l o f the c a r d i n a l a n d his successor as chancellor o f the U n i v e r s i t y o f Paris was J e a n Gerson ( 1363-1429), one of the most i m p o r t a n t figures o f the fifteenth c e n t u r y ; Gerson finally t u r n e d t o w a r d mysticism. I n another d i r e c t i o n , the French nominalists practice the n a t u r a l sciences w i t h great intensity a n d , strictly speaking, anticipate m a n y o f the discoveries o f the Renaissance physicists. J e a n B u r i d a n , w h o l i v e d i n the first h a l f o f the fifteenth c e n t u r y ; A l b e r t o f Saxony, w h o d i e d i n 1390; a n d especially Nicholas Oresmus, w h o d i e d i n 1382, are t h e p r i n c i p a l "scientific Occamists, " as they are called b y Gilson. N i c h o las Oresmus, bishop o f Lisieux, w h o w r o t e i n b o t h L a t i n a n d F r e n c h — i n this a f o r e r u n n e r o f Descartes—was a t h i n k e r o f great i m p o r t a n c e w h o a p p r e c i a b l y advanced physics a n d astronomy. H e w r o t e t h e treatise De difformitate qualitatum,
the Traité de la sphere a n d c o m m e n -
taries o n the physical works of A r i s t o t l e . A V E R R O I S M . T h e philosophical m o v e m e n t called L a t i n A v e r r o i s m began i n the t h i r t e e n t h century, c o n t i n u e d to t h e end o f the M i d d l e Ages, a n d still h a d repercussions i n the Renaissance. I t can be said t o have constituted a philosophical c u r r e n t independent o f Scholasticism, a l t h o u g h closely related to its problems. T h e most i m p o r t a n t figure o f L a t i n A v e r r o i s m is Siger o f B r a b a n t , w h o l i v e d i n the t h i r teenth c e n t u r y a n d based his t h o u g h t o n the teachings of Aristotle as i n t e r p r e t e d b y Averroës. Siger o f B r a b a n t , m a n y o f whose propositions w e r e condemned, t a u g h t the eternity o f the w o r l d and the oneness o f h u m a n intellect ; i n his view, there is a single intellect for the entire h u m a n species, a n d belief i n the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the i n d i v i d u a l m a n disappears. Also o f L a t i n Averroist o r i g i n is the aforementioned d o c t r i n e o f the double truth, according to w h i c h a single proposition m a y be t r u e i n theology a n d false i n philosophy, o r vice versa. I n the f o u r t e e n t h century, Jean o f J a n d u n (d. 1328) continues t h e A v e r r o i s t tendency, c a r r y i n g i t to even greater extremes a n d emphasizing its dependence o n the C o r d o v a n philosopher. Jean of J a n d u n makes philosophy the superior discipline a n d ascribes t r u t h p r i m a r i l y toit. S P E C U L A T I V E MYSTICISM. T h e influence o f Meister E c k h a r t extends to several i m p o r t a n t mystics of the f o u r t e e n t h century, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n G e r m a n y a n d t h e Netherlands, w h o m a i n t a i n relations w i t h the F r e n c h mystics, such as the above-mentioned Gerson a n d Denys the C a r t h u s i a n . These mystics, w h o more o r less d i r e c t l y inspire the r e l i -
The Medieval
Philosophers
gious renewal o f the fifteenth c e n t u r y , especially the so-called devotio moderna, an a n t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e Renaissance, are p r i n c i p a l l y Johannes T a u l e r (1300-1361), H e i n r i c h Suso (1300-1365), J a n v a n Ruysbroeck (1293-1381) a n d the a u t h o r o f the Theologia deutsch, w h i c h h a d such great influence o n L u t h e r . F r o m these religious groups arise the s t i m u l i t h a t w i l l inspire t h e s p i r i t u a l life o f the sixteenth c e n t u r y , a m o n g the Protestants as w e l l as i n the C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n . T H E F I F T E E N T H CENTURY. I n the last century o f the M i d d l e Ages the decline of Scholasticism is accentuated. T h e p r i n c i p a l schools— T h o m i s t , Scotist, Occamist—persist, b u t their a c t i v i t y becomes a sterile f o r m a l i s m . T h e r e are a few i m p o r t a n t commentators, like C a r d i n a l Cajetan, the c o m m e n t a t o r o f St. T h o m a s , a n d the Scotists Peter T a r t a r e t u s , famous for his commentaries o n A r i s t o t l e , a n d the B e l g i a n Peter Crockaert, l a t e r a D o m i n i c a n a n d a T h o m i s t , w h o was the teacher o f Francisco de V i t o r i a . Scotism lasted u n t i l the seventeenth century, w i t h representatives like L u k e W a d d i n g , the famous e d i t o r o f Scotus' w o r k , a n d J u a n de M e r i n e r o , a professor at A l c a l á . B u t the last i m p o r t a n t Scholastic whose efforts d i d n o t m e r e l y consist o f exegesis or instruction was t h e Occamist G a b r i e l B i e l (1425-1495). T h e resurgence o f Scholasticism i n Spain i n the sixteenth c e n t u r y is different i n character a n d is openly influenced b y the Renaissance. W e have seen the paths t h a t medieval philosophy followed. W e have glanced briefly at its immense w e a l t h o f t h o u g h t , b u t closely enough to understand the f u n d a m e n t a l problems i t raised a n d the exemplary p r o f u n d i t y w i t h w h i c h i t was able to attack those problems. O n t h e other h a n d , we have seen i n the last few pages t h a t medieval philosophy is n o t fully e x h a u s t e d — w h a t , after a l l , w o u l d t h a t m e a n ? — a n d t h a t its final phase points to something new. I t is a n e n d i n g because i t is a beginning at the same time, a n d i t w i l l continue to be operative i n the p e r i o d t h a t n o w opens. M o d e r n philosophy does n o t arise f r o m nothingness. N o r , as the humanists so superficially t h o u g h t , d i d i t arise as a r e a c t i o n to Scholast i c i s m a n d a r e t u r n to the Greeks a n d Romans, especially Plato a n d the Stoics. I n fact, i t was j u s t the opposite. T h e t h o u g h t o f the Greek philosophers—there is l i t t l e to be said for the R o m a n s — g a i n e d new efficacy i n the Scholastic era, a n d the humanists' p r e s u m p t i v e restorat i o n was a hindrance a n d a retrogression w h i c h lasted u n t i l t h e a u t h e n t i c m o d e r n philosophy, f r o m Descartes to L e i b n i z , c o u l d open u p a p a t h for itself. I t is i n this m o d e r n philosophy, r a t h e r t h a n i n a n y " r e n a s c e n c e , " t h a t Scholasticism, a n d w i t h i t , the l i v i n g t h o u g h t o f the Greeks, find their t r u e c o n t i n u a t i o n .
The Last Phase of Medieval
Philosophy
F r o m Plato a n d A r i s t o t l e (or even Parmenides) to Descartes a n d L e i b n i z a n d t h e n to K a n t a n d H e g e l a n d even after, there is a line u n i n t e r r u p t e d as regards problems a n d t r u t h , a l t h o u g h i n t e r r u p t e d perhaps as regards t i m e ; a n d this line is precisely the line o f the history o f philosophy.
MODERN
PHILOSOPHY
THE RENAISSANCE
The Renaissance
i.
World
T H E S P I R I T U A L CIRCUMSTANCES
By the end o f the M i d d l e Ages, man's religious situation h a d become p r o b l e m a t i c . T h e o l o g y was i n a state o f p r o f o u n d crisis; its supern a t u r a l aspect was b e c o m i n g more a n d more p r o n o u n c e d , a n d thus i t was c h a n g i n g i n t o mysticism. Moreover, the entire medieval organizat i o n — b o t h C h u r c h a n d E m p i r e — w a s i n equally c r i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n . T h e E m p i r e ' s p o w e r — w h i c h was almost m o r e s p i r i t u a l t h a n t e m p o r a l — h a d been b r o k e n , a n d nations were b e g i n n i n g to take shape. N o w preoccupation w i t h the State begins; d u r i n g the course o f the Renaissance there appear a l l the p o l i t i c a l theorists o f v a r i e d t r a d i t i o n — f r o m M a c h i a v e l l i to Hobbes. I n general, the p r o b l e m o f the dissolution o f the o l d o r g a n i z a t i o n is approached b y means o f the r a t i o n a l i s m t h a t comes i n t o being, t h a t new use o f reason as a p p l i e d to m a n a n d nature, the t w o topics to w h i c h reason is directed after G o d is renounced. A n d r a t i o n a l i s m is a n t i h i s t o r i c a l ; t h r o u g h o u t the m o d e r n epoch, antihistoricalism has been the f u n d a m e n t a l vice o f the p h i losophy o f society a n d the State, w h i c h are historical realities. A t t e m p t s are m a d e to solve the p r o b l e m schematically: De optima reipublicae statu, deque nova insula Utopia, b y T h o m a s M o r e ; the Civitas Solis,
by
C a m p a n e l l a ; later, the Leviathan, b y Hobbes. M y s t i c i s m flourishes i n Flanders a n d later i n France a n d the rest o f E u r o p e . People l i v e i n communities t h a t cultivate a new religiosity. T h e y are averse to theology. I t is not i m p o r t a n t to k n o w , b u t to feel a n d to a c t : " I t is better to feel c o m p u n c t i o n t h a n to be able to define 189
The Renaissance
World
i t . " I n Flanders, i n a r t as w e l l as i n a l l other fields, the end o f the M i d d l e Ages is already the Renaissance: this is the case, for example, w i t h the brothers v a n Eyck. A n d i n the r e a l m o f mysticism there is J a n v a n Ruysbroeck. M y s t i c i s m is represented i n France b y Denys the C a r t h u s i a n and J e a n Gerson; i n G e r m a n y b y H e i n r i c h Suso, Johannes Tauler and Thomas a Kempis. People of this t i m e , obviously inspired b y the Franciscans, begin to discover n a t u r e . E v e r y t h i n g , f r o m St. Francis o f Assisi's love o f n a t u r a l objects to the Franciscan philosophers' n o m i n a l i s m , w h i c h p r o d u c e d m a t h e m a t i c a l t h o u g h t , leads to a n interest i n n a t u r e . Petrarch is characteristic: he ascends a m o u n t a i n i n order to contemplate o n the s u m m i t ; b u t once there he does n o t yet k n o w enough to look a r o u n d , a n d instead reads St. Augustine. A few expressive book titles illustrate the d i v i d i n g l i n e between the two epochs: De contemptu mundi ( O n C o n t e m p t for the W o r l d ) , b y Petrarch (and m a n y o t h e r s ) ; De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum ( O n the U n c e r t a i n t y a n d V a n i t y o f the Sciences), b y A g r i p p a ; De docta ignorantia ( O n I n s t r u c t e d I g n o r a n c e ) , b y Nicholas o f Cusa. A l i t t l e later Francis Bacon writes the Novum Organum, a t i t l e w h i c h points to a new d a w n , i n contrast to the other titles, w h i c h represent the setting o f the sun.
De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum
(The
Advancement
of
L e a r n i n g ) , also b y Bacon, is i n reply to A g r i p p a ' s t i t l e . B u t the most e x u l t a n t a n d significant t i t l e is De interpretatione naturae et regno hominis
( O n the I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f N a t u r e a n d the R e i g n o f M a n ) . T h e era q u i c k l y loses its a u t u m n a l character a n d , i n contrast, becomes aware of the emerging consciousness of the " Renaissance." H u m a n i s m appears a n d q u i c k l y spreads far a n d w i d e . Greek a n d L a t i n books reach the W e s t ; the worship o f a n t i q u i t y is carried to great lengths, b u t people lack discernment a n d d o n o t value things according to their true w o r t h . Scholasticism is attacked. A w a r e t h a t a r e f o r m is necessary, h u m a n i s m establishes ties w i t h the new religiosity ; at first this idea o f a r e f o r m is o r t h o d o x , b u t soon i t becomes the L u t h e r a n R e f o r m a t i o n . Interest i n nature transcends its o w n sphere. M a n is no longer content to concern himself wholeheartedly w i t h n a t u r a l objects; he tries to impose a n a t u r a l character o n everything. T h e r e is to be n o t o n l y a n a t u r a l science, b u t also a n a t u r a l law, a n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n , a n a t u r a l ethics, a n d h u m a n n a t u r a l i s m . W h a t does " n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n " m e a n ? I t is w h a t remains o f r e l i g i o n after everything s u p e r n a t u r a l — r e v e l a t i o n , dogma, history, a n d the like—has been w i t h d r a w n f r o m i t . N a t u r a l r e l i g i o n is w h a t m a n feels " b y " his o w n n a t u r e : a G o d ; n o t the personal G o d of C h r i s t i a n dogma, b u t a n idea of G o d . N a t u r a l l a w
The Spiritual
Circumstances
a n d n a t u r a l ethics are the disciplines t h a t a p p e r t a i n to m a n simply because he is m a n . I t is a m a t t e r o f something outside o f history a n d , especially, outside o f grace. T h u s , i n the Renaissance m a n y things are accomplished. There are discoveries that extend the w o r l d , n o t a b l y those b y the Spanish a n d Portuguese; inventions, such as the p r i n t i n g press, firearms a n d a series o f techniques superior to those o f the M i d d l e Ages; realistic politics o f the new nations, such as t h a t o f F e r d i n a n d the Catholic or Louis X I , and theories o f the State; humanistic l i t e r a t u r e i n good L a t i n and i n the v e r n a c u l a r ; ethics; mysticism; a n a r t t h a t abandons the G o t h i c a n d revives ancient styles. Something called philosophy is also c u l t i v a t e d to some extent, a n d i t is w o r t h w h i l e to examine this topic i n some detail. W e m u s t distinguish t w o different aspects i n Renaissance p h i losophy : one o f these aspects is the b o d y o f t h o u g h t o f the fifteenth a n d sixteenth centuries w h i c h displays the t w o p r i n c i p a l characteristics of the " R e n a i s s a n c e " — o p p o s i t i o n to the M i d d l e Ages a n d the restorat i o n , rebirth, o f a n t i q u i t y ; the other current—less visible, perhaps, b u t more p r o f o u n d — i s t h a t w h i c h continues the a u t h e n t i c philosophy o f the M i d d l e Ages a n d achieves f u l l m a t u r i t y i n Descartes. H e r e , n a t u r a l l y , there is no break, b u t rather a c a r r y i n g o f the i n t e r n a l dialectics of the medieval philosophic problems to their u l t i m a t e consequences. T h e h u m a n i s t s — t h e thinkers o f the Platonic A c a d e m y o f Florence w h i c h was founded i n 1440; those o f the R o m a n A c a d e m y ; a l l those saturated w i t h the w e a l t h o f classical l e a r n i n g w h i c h proceeded chiefly f r o m the r u i n e d Byzantine E m p i r e , f r o m Lorenzo V a l l a to Luis Vives—propose as a p r i m a r y goal the deprecation o f Scholasticism a n d the renewal o f the philosophy o f the ancients. However, they forget t h a t Scholasticism was founded i n large p a r t o n Platonic a n d N e o p l a t o n i c w r i t i n g s a n d especially o n A r i s t o t l e , himself an ancient philosopher. W h a t does this m e a n ? T h e t r u t h o f the m a t t e r is t h a t the Aristotle o f Scholasticism was n o t very interesting. H e h a d been L a t i n i z e d — i n i m p u r e , medieval L a t i n — a n d moreover h a d been handed d o w n t h r o u g h theology. H e was f u l l o f syllogisms a n d distinctions, the n u m b e r o f w h i c h h a d been increased b y the medieval monks. This was n o t w h a t was interesting about the ancient w o r l d . O f greater interest was Plato, w h o p e r m i t t e d one to speak o f the soul a n d o f love, a n d w h o w r o t e i n such b e a u t i f u l Greek. B u t there was something still more interesting: Stoicism. T h e Stoics h a d a l l the advantages: they preferred to concern themselves w i t h m a n — a n d this conformed w i t h the interests o f h u m a n i s m a n d the general preoccupation o f the
igz
The
Renaissance
World
Renaissance—in w r i t i n g s that were f u l l o f d i g n i t y a n d n o b i l i t y ; they offered examples o f a quiet and serene life t h a t was f u l l of m o d e r a t i o n and removed f r o m the frenzy o f the close o f the M i d d l e Ages ; a n d , most i m p o r t a n t , they made their w h o l e philosophy revolve a r o u n d the concept t h a t was most i n vogue: n a t u r e . T o live a c c o r d i n g to n a t u r e — t h i s is w h a t was necessary. I t m a t t e r e d l i t t l e t h a t the Stoic idea of nature, thephysis, resembled very slightly the Renaissance idea of nature ; nor was i t i m p o r t a n t t h a t for a l o n g t i m e the w o r d nature h a d been equated w i t h t h e w o r d grace. I t was n o t necessary t o take such subtle distinctions i n t o account. Renaissance philosophy is characterized b y a considerable lack o f precision a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l discipline. I f we compare i t w i t h the best moments o f Scholasticism, its i n f e r i o r i t y becomes e v i d e n t ; i n fact, i t w o u l d not be going too far to say t h a t the Renaissance was a p e r i o d o f negligible a c t i v i t y from the viewpoint of philosophy. T h e Renaissance i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ancients is superficial a n d false b e y o n d measure. Cicero and Q u i n t i l i a n are cited as great philosophers a n d are p u t o n a level w i t h Plato. T h e Renaissance ideas o f Platonism ( f u n d a m e n t a l l y Neoplatonic) a n d A r i s t o t l e lack philosophical a n d historical significance. T h e Renaissance is certainly n o t a p e r i o d o f creative metaphysics. Its philosophers have not yet f u l l y pondered the ontological situation w h i c h the M i d d l e Ages bequeathed : a w o r l d i n h a b i t e d b y r a t i o n a l m a n a n d alienated f r o m G o d . M a n has not seriously questioned his new i n t e l l e c t u a l position. T h i s questioning, w h i c h continues the a p p a r e n t l y i n t e r r u p t e d metaphysical t r a d i t i o n , begins i n the first decades o f the seventeenth century, i n the w o r k o f Descartes. I n Cartesianism the m o d e r n age ponders metaphysically its o w n suppositions.
2. H U M A N I S T T H O U G H T
I T A L Y . T h e Renaissance begins i n I t a l y . Some persons, at the risk of h a v i n g this concept lose a l l precise significance, have wished to date i t f r o m the end o f the t h i r t e e n t h century so as to i n c l u d e D a n t e . T h i s v i e w is exaggerated, b u t Petrarch (1304-13 74) can be considered a n early example of Renaissance m a n . I n the fifteenth c e n t u r y a center o f great a c t i v i t y — m o r e l i t e r a r y t h a n philosophic—arises at t h e c o u r t o f Cosimo de' M e d i c i i n Florence, a n d the Platonic A c a d e m y appears, w i t h such h u m a n i s t personalities as the Greek C a r d i n a l Bessarion, M a r s i l i o F i c i n o , Pico della M i r a n d o l a , a n d so o n . T h e r e are also " A r i s t o t e l i a n s " i n I t a l y , w h o c h a m p i o n a b a d l y disfigured A r i s t o t l e ; a m o n g these are such m e n as E r m o l a o Barbaro a n d Pietro Pomponazzi.
Humanist
Thought
T h e theoreticians o f politics a n d the State f o r m a separate g r o u p , but one w h i c h is closely connected w i t h the aforementioned humanists. I n first r a n k is the clever F l o r e n t i n e secretary Niccolô M a c h i a v e l l i (1469-1527), w h o i n his Prince expounded the theory of a State w h i c h is n o t subordinated to a n y higher a u t h o r i t y , either religious or m o r a l . T h e r e is also T o m m a s o C a m p a n e l l a (1568-1639), a C a l a b r i a n m o n k ; he w r o t e o f the Civitas Solis, a u t o p i a o f communistic tendencies i n spired, like a l l works o f this type, b y Plato's Republic. However, Campanella's State is a universal m o n a r c h y of a theocratic character i n w h i c h p a p a l a u t h o r i t y is supreme. A m o n g the first r a n k o f I t a l i a n Renaissance thinkers oriented t o w a r d n a t u r e we find the great artist a n d physicist, L e o n a r d o da V i n c i (1452-1519), a n d B e r n a r d i n o Telesio (1508-1588), w h o dedicated himself to the study of the n a t u r a l sciences a n d founded a theory o f v i t a l i s m o n a physical basis. T h e w a y is prepared for the f o u n d a t i o n o f m o d e r n n a t u r a l science, w h i c h i n I t a l y is to p r o d u c e the b r i l l i a n t figure of Galileo. F R A N C E . T h e Renaissance i n France has a p r o n o u n c e d skeptic tendency. T h e r e is M i c h e l de M o n t a i g n e , author o f the Essais, w h i c h were m o r e notable for t h e i r perspicacity a n d l i t e r a r y value t h a n for their philosophic p r o f u n d i t y . Montaigne's m o c k i n g a n d penetrating b u t o f f h a n d criticism h a d great influence u p u n t i l the E n l i g h t e n m e n t . T h e skeptic p a r excellence is Pierre C h a r r o n . As for the movement t h a t was a n t i - A r i s t o t e l i a n a n d i n opposition to Scholasticism, its chief figure i n France is Pierre de la R a m é e , called Petrus Ramus, w h o v i o l e n t l y attacked A r i s t o t e l i a n philosophy and ended u p embracing C a l v i n i s m . H u m a n i s m was q u i c k to establish ties w i t h the Reformat i o n ; so was the great Hellenist H e n r i Estienne (Stephanus) a n d , i n Spain, J u a n de Valdés. S P A I N . A p a r t f r o m p u r e l y l i t e r a r y a c t i v i t y , the Renaissance i n Spain has representatives w h o are characteristic of thetimes, a n d even among the most i m p o r t a n t figures. A l t h o u g h the fact has sometimes been questioned, Spanish c u l t u r e was affected b y Renaissance currents; there is i n Spain as i n a l l o f E u r o p e a preoccupation w i t h esthetics, a n interest i n the vernacular (Valdés) a n d i n classical languages and literatures (the C o m p l u t e n s i a n U n i v e r s i t y [of A l c a l á de Henares], Cisneros, N e b r i j a , F r a y L u i s de L e ó n , Arias M o n t a n o ) . I n Spain the Renaissance was certainly less at odds w i t h medieval t r a d i t i o n t h a n i t was i n o t h e r countries, a n d for this reason i t was less noticeable. Nevertheless, i n reference to philosophic t h o u g h t , the skeptic current is seen to be represented b y the Portuguese Francisco Sánchez, author of the famous book Quod nihil scitur. A n d anti-Scholastic b u t orthodox
The Renaissance
World
Catholic h u m a n i s m , faithful to the p r i n c i p a l elements of t h e medieval w o r l d b u t at the same t i m e full o f the spirit o f the times, produces i n Spain the great figure o f Luis Vives (1492-1540), w h o was b o r n i n Valencia, l i v e d i n L o u v a i n , Paris a n d E n g l a n d , and died i n Bruges. Vives, a f r i e n d o f the most eminent m e n o f his t i m e — a citizen o f Europe i f ever there was one—is a n unassuming t h i n k e r ; the historical nucleus to w h i c h he belonged d i d not contain a full-fledged philosophy, but he was u n d e n i a b l y sagacious a n d is o f considerable interest today. Vives w r o t e a great deal o n questions o f ethics a n d education, and his treatise De anima et vita is one o f the most vigorous a n d penet r a t i n g books t h a t the humanist movement produced. Sebastián F o x M o r c i l l o also w r o t e philosophical treatises w h i c h were independent i n spirit f r o m Scholasticism, as d i d the physicians Vallès a n d , especially, G ó m e z Pereira, t h e author o f t h e Antoniana Margarita, published i n 1554, i n w h i c h scholars have c l a i m e d to find ideas analogous w i t h some o f Descartes'. But w h a t is most i m p o r t a n t i n Spanish t h o u g h t i n the sixteenth a n d seventeenth centuries is n o t to be f o u n d here, b u t i n t h e splendid though ephemeral flowering o f Scholasticism arising out o f the C o u n cil o f T r e n t ; i t philosophically a n d theologically directs the entire C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h is f u r t h e r a n i m a t e d b y the w o r k o f the great mystics, especially St. Teresa a n d St. J o h n o f the Cross, whose intellectual interest is very h i g h , a l t h o u g h n o t strictly philosophical. E N G L A N D . T h e most interesting figure i n English h u m a n i s m is Thomas M o r e , w h o was chancellor to H e n r y V I I I a n d was beheaded because o f his opposition to the king's refusal to obey the p o p e ; he has recently been canonized b y the C h u r c h . M o r e wrote the Utopia (De óptimo reipublicae statu, deque nova insula
Utopia),
about another ideal
State. T h e most famous of such treatises published i n the Renaissance, i t was also c o m m u n i s t i c i n nature a n d f u l l o f Platonic echoes. H O L L A N D . T h e greatest o f the E u r o p e a n humanists, t h e one w h o most fully embodied its characteristics a n d at the same t i m e achieved the greatest fame a n d wielded the most extensive influence was Erasmus o f R o t t e r d a m . Possessed of a great talent for w r i t i n g i n L a t i n , he composed his works i n a precise a n d elegant style that f o u n d e n t h u siastic i m i t a t o r s a n d admirers t h r o u g h o u t Europe. Erasmus w r o t e several books t h a t were w i d e l y read i n a l l countries, i n p a r t i c u l a r The Praise of Folly (Enchiridion
(Encomium
moriae),
militis christiani)
the Manual
of the Christian
a n d the Colloquies (Colloquia).
Knight
I n spite o f
his contact w i t h t h e reformers, Erasmus kept w i t h i n the bounds o f dogma, b u t his Catholicism was unenthusiastic a n d always m i x e d w i t h i r o n y a n d c r i t i c i s m of the C h u r c h . Erasmus, himself a canon a n d
Humanist
Thought
close to the cardinalate, d i d n o t cease to be a C h r i s t i a n ; his f a i t h was perhaps n o t as deep as t h a t o f medieval m a n , b u t his spirit was open a n d comprehensive. I n spite o f a l l his limitations a n d undeniable liberties, Erasmus, w h o represents the spirit o f concord i n a h a r d a n d violent epoch, is the most perfect example of Renaissance m a n . G E R M A N Y . T h e Renaissance i n G e r m a n y is o f great i m p o r t a n c e . T h e r e i t presents a character different f r o m t h a t shown i n other countries, a n d i t perhaps has m o r e philosophic fecundity. Instead o f disp l a y i n g a p r e d o m i n a n t l y h u m a n i s t i c nature w i t h p r o n o u n c e d l i t e r a r y tendencies, G e r m a n t h o u g h t at the end o f the fifteenth a n d i n the sixteenth century is closely connected to speculative mysticism. H e i n r i c h Suso ; Johannes T a u l e r ; Angelus Silesius (Johannes SchefHer) ; the author o f the Theologia deutsch, a l l derive f r o m Meister Eckhart's speculative m y s t i c i s m ; the Protestant mystics are also l i n k e d to this t r a d i t i o n . T h e G e r m a n Renaissance makes equal use o f alchemy, astrology a n d even magic. I n this w a y mystical speculation becomes i n v o l v e d i n the development of the n a t u r a l sciences. T h i s complex m i x t u r e o f science a n d mysticism, together w i t h the rejection of r a t i o n a l a n d rigorous philosophy, is f o u n d i n A g r i p p a v o n Nettesheim, the a u t h o r o f the book entitled De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum, w h i c h has already been mentioned. Philippus Aureolus Paracelsus (Theophrastus v o n H o h e n h e i m ) , a physician a n d eccentric philosopher, employed these ideas i n the study o f the physical w o r l d a n d m a n , w h o m he considered a m i r r o r of the universe. I n spite of his extravagant theories, some advances i n the field of the n a t u r a l sciences must be credited to Paracelsus. Religious a n d mystical t h o u g h t is of great interest i n G e r m a n y , and i n p a r t i c u l a r , of course, the theology o f the Reformers, especially that of L u t h e r a n d , to a lesser degree, t h a t o f the Swiss Z w i n g l i ; b u t this subject goes beyond the scope o f o u r discussion. T h e R e f o r m a t i o n is l i n k e d w i t h the G e r m a n h u m a n i s m o f P h i l i p M e l a n c h t h o n and J o h a n n R e u c h l i n o n the one h a n d a n d , on the other, w i t h Protestant mysticism. T h e p r i n c i p a l Protestant mystics are Sebastian F r a n c k , V a l e n t i n W e i g e l a n d , most i m p o r t a n t , J a k o b Böhme ( i 5 7 5 - 1 6 2 4 ) . B ö h m e was a cobbler w h o led a r e t i r i n g and simple life dedicated to m e d i t a t i o n . H i s chief w o r k is a book k n o w n as Aurora, w h i c h shows the influence o f Paracelsus a n d o f Nicholas o f Cusa ; f r o m the l a t t e r i t derives its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of G o d as the u n i t y of opposites. B ö h m e was a pantheist; i n his w o r k G o d a n d the w o r l d are synonymous. His influence o n G e r m a n t h o u g h t has been long-lasting.
The Beginning of Modern
Philosophy
W e must n o w study the most fertile moments i n the t h o u g h t o f the fifteenth a n d sixteenth centuries, those events t h a t a c t u a l l y prepared the w a y for the great m o d e r n metaphysical systems b e g i n n i n g w i t h Descartes. T h e r e is a discontinuous a n d h i d d e n line o f thinkers w h o keep the a u t h e n t i c philosophical p r o b l e m alive or create the necessary bases o n w h i c h to state the essential questions o f the new E u r o p e a n metaphysics i n a n o r i g i n a l a n d sufficient way. T h e t w o m a j o r themes are the c o n t i n u i t y o f the m e d i e v a l a n d Greek t r a d i t i o n o n the one h a n d a n d the new idea o f nature o n the other. I t is for this reason t h a t elements w h i c h are apparently disparate a n d usually studied separatel y are i n c l u d e d together i n this c h a p t e r : first, Nicholas o f Cusa a n d G i o r d a n o B r u n o ; secondly, the m o d e r n physicists; t h i r d l y , t h e Spanish Scholastics o f the sixteenth century. A t first glance i t appears t h a t the first t w o figures are p a r t o f so-called Renaissance philosophy, whereas the physicists are outside the r e a l m o f philosophy a n d the Spaniards represent a movement back t o w a r d the "superseded" M i d d l e Ages. A c t u a l l y , the physicists t h i n k i n terms o f the m o d e r n idea o f n a t u r e , founded o n medieval n o m i n a l i s m , a n d their suppositions, i f n o t their science, are strictly p h i l o s o p h i c a l ; moreover, the idealist metaphysics o f the seventeenth century cannot be p r o p e r l y understood unless the role p l a y e d b y the new physics is taken i n t o account. As for the Spaniards, except for a few w h o have proper claims to places i n the history o f philosophy, they are p r i n c i p a l l y theologians. T h e Spanish Scholastic has the clear purpose o f g a t h e r i n g a l l medieval philosophy a n d synthesizing i t f r o m the higher perspective o f the new age; this is 196
Nicholas
of
Cusa
lay
the case w i t h Suarez, i n p a r t i c u l a r . I t is n o t a question of m e r e l y c o m m e n t i n g o n St. T h o m a s or Duns Scotus, b u t o f a n a t t e m p t b y m e n w h o are no longer o f the t h i r t e e n t h century, w h o are m o t i v a t e d b y m o d e r n ideas, to state the problems i n a n o r i g i n a l way. I f there were any need to p r o v e this, i t w o u l d suffice to p o i n t out a few very obvious facts: this Scholasticism gives rise to something as modern as i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, the p r i n c i p a l nucleus of w h i c h is established b y Jesuits, men of their o w n t i m e i f ever there were such. Above all, these thoughts center a b o u t the C o u n c i l o f T r e n t ; t h a t is, they are situated at the c r u c i a l p o i n t of the m o d e r n age, i n the struggle between the R e f o r m a t i o n a n d the C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n . W e must bear i n m i n d the deep a n d m o r e or less explicit influence of Suarez o n Descartes a n d L e i b n i z and o n a l l G e r m a n philosophy u p to H e g e l — h i s actual presence, therefore, i n a l l m o d e r n philosophy.
i.
N I C H O L A S OF C U S A
C H A R A C T E R . Nicholas Chrypffs (Krebs) was b o r n i n Cusa (Kues) i n 1 4 0 1 ; f r o m his native city he received the name b y w h i c h he is k n o w n : Nicolaus Cusanus, or Nicholas o f Cusa. H e studied at Padua, h e l d h i g h offices i n the C h u r c h a n d became a c a r d i n a l a n d bishop o f B r i x e n . H e d i e d i n 1464. Nicholas o f Cusa w r o t e several philosophical works, the most i m p o r t a n t o f w h i c h are De docta ignorantia, Apologia doctae ignorantiae a n d De conjecturis; the first-named is the most significant, his masterwork. Nicholas o f Cusa is one o f the most interesting philosophers o f his t i m e . I n one w a y , he is i n the line of development of Scholasticism, b u t at the same t i m e , he touches o n themes that m a r k the t r a n s i t i o n to m o d e r n philosophy. O c c a m a n d Descartes are separated b y nearly three h u n d r e d years, a p e r i o d w h i c h represents a significant lack of c o n t i n u i t y , a n extremely l o n g gap between t w o moments o f metaphysical m a t u r i t y . I n this i n t e r v a l are to be f o u n d a few thinkers w h o keep alive the authentic spirit o f philosophy a n d achieve the i n t e r mediate stages: C a r d i n a l Cusanus is one of these m e n . P H I L O S O P H Y . Nicholas o f Cusa's s t a r t i n g p o i n t is mysticism, part i c u l a r l y t h a t o f E c k h a r t ; that is, speculative mysticism. H e combines w i t h this an unusual interest i n the w o r l d a n d a facility i n h a n d l i n g metaphysical concepts. T h i s is the p a t h b y w h i c h m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y is reached. T h e o u t l i n e of Cusanus' system is the f o l l o w i n g : G o d , or the i n f i n i t e ; the w o r l d a n d m a n , or the f i n i t e ; G o d the Redeemer, w h o is the u n i o n o f the finite a n d the i n f i n i t e . T h i s theme o f the u n i o n o f the two is the central p o i n t o f his philosophy. T h e r e are different kinds o f
The Beginning
of Modern
Philosophy
k n o w l e d g e : i n the first place, knowledge derived t h r o u g h the senses (sensus); this k i n d o f knowledge does n o t furnish us w i t h a sufficient t r u t h , b u t o n l y w i t h images. Secondly, there is ratio ( w h i c h a G e r m a n idealist w o u l d have translated as Verstand, or u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) ; the ratio, i n a n abstract a n d f r a g m e n t a r y way, comprehends these sensory images i n t h e i r diversity. T h i r d l y , there is the intellectus (this, i n t u r n , w o u l d correspond to the G e r m a n idealist's Vernunft, or reason); the intellectus, aided b y s u p e r n a t u r a l grace, leads us to t h e t r u t h o f G o d . B u t this t r u t h makes us c o m p r e h e n d that the i n f i n i t e is i m p e n e t r a b l e , a n d t h e n we learn o f our i g n o r a n c e ; this is t r u e p h i l o s o p h y , the docta ignorantia (instructed ignorance) of w h i c h the highest k n o w l e d g e consists. A n d this is related to the idea oinegative theology a n d t o the general s i t u a t i o n o f the p e r i o d . Ratio does not take us past the diversity o f opposites; o n the o t h e r h a n d , intellectus leads us to i n t u i t the oneness o f G o d . T h e D e i t y appears i n Nicholas o f Cusa's w r i t i n g s as coincidentia oppositorum, the coincidence o f opposites. I n this h i g h e r u n i t y , c o n t r a d i c t i o n is o v e r c o m e : i n the i n f i n i t e a l l different factors coincide. This idea has h a d its most p r o f o u n d repercussion i n H e g e l . Nicholas employs m a t h e m a t i c a l ideas to m a k e this understandable: for example, a s t r a i g h t line a n d the circumference o f a circle t e n d m o r e a n d m o r e to coincide as the radius of the circle is c o n t i n u a l l y increased; they do coincide a t the l i m i t , i f the radius approaches i n f i n i t y . I f , conversely, t h e r a d i u s becomes i n f i n i t e l y small, the circumference coincides w i t h t h e center o f the circle. A straight line w i l l f i n a l l y coincide w i t h a t r i a n g l e i f one o f the angles is c o n t i n u a l l y increased. Nicholas o f Cusa compares the m i n d o f G o d w i t h t h e m i n d of m a n , and at t h e same t i m e draws a sharp distinction between t h e m . " I f a l l things are present as precise a n d proper truths i n t h e m i n d o f G o d , " he writes, " they are a l l present i n our m i n d as images o r likenesses o f p r o p e r t r u t h ; that is, n o t i o n a l l y . I n d e e d , knowledge is g a i n e d t h r o u g h likenesses. A l l things are present i n G o d , b u t there they a r e the exemplars o f the things; they are a l l present i n our m i n d , b u t h e r e they are likenesses o f the t h i n g s . " T h e w a y i n w h i c h the things r e l a t e to their exemplary Ideas i n the m i n d o f G o d can be c o m p a r e d w i t h the w a y i n w h i c h h u m a n ideas relate to the things. K n o w l e d g e , f o r Cusanus, is based o n likenesses; this is a serious asseveration, since i t implies a change i n the Scholastic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f knowledge a n d t r u t h as adaequatio intellectus et rei ( m a k i n g the m i n d a n d the t h i n g equal). F o r Cusanus, to k n o w is no longer to gain possession o f the t h i n g itself, b u t o f something similar to i t . A n d C a r d i n a l Cusanus adds: " Between the m i n d o f G o d a n d our m i n d there is the same difference as between
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d o i n g a n d seeing. W h e n the m i n d o f G o d conceives, i t creates; w h e n our m i n d conceives, i t assimilates, t h a t is, likens notions, or w h e n i t acts, i t assimilates i n t e l l e c t u a l visions. T h e m i n d o f G o d is a n entifying, or entity-creating force; o u r m i n d is an assimilating f o r c e . " T h e seeing a c t i v i t y o f m a n corresponds to the creative a c t i v i t y of G o d . Assimilare is to make like, to o b t a i n a similitudo, a likeness of the t h i n g w h i c h G o d created. W h e n G o d creates the things, he gives t h e m t h e i r character as entities; m a n obtains a precipitate w h i c h is the assimilation. T h e r e is no adaequatio, b u t merely assimilatio. T h e t r u t h o f the h u m a n m i n d is a n image and likeness of the t r u t h of the m i n d of G o d . Nicholas o f Cusa is very m u c h concerned w i t h the w o r l d ; he is greatly interested i n setting i t i n h a r m o n y w i t h G o d a n d reconciling opposites. M e d i e v a l m a n is interested i n the being o f the w o r l d because i t was created b y G o d a n d helps m a n discover G o d ; Nicholas is interested i n G o d i n order to understand the w o r l d . A n d the w o r l d , according to Cusanus, is explicatio Dei. T h e oneness o f the infinite is explained and manifested i n the m u l t i p l i c i t y a n d v a r i e t y o f the w o r l d . A l l things are present i n G o d , b u t conversely G o d is present i n a l l things and explains or explicates t h e m . T h e w o r l d is a manifestation o f G o d , a theophany. Each t h i n g , says Cusanus, is quasi infinitas finita aut deus creatus, a finite i n f i n i t y , as i t were, or a created G o d . H e goes so far as to say t h a t the universe is Deus sensibilis ( G o d apparent to the senses) a n d t h a t m a n is a deus occasionatus (a circumstanced g o d ) . These expressions provoked a n accusation o f pantheism against C a r d i n a l Cusanus similar to the one b r o u g h t against Meister E c k h a r t . A g a i n like Eckhart, Nicholas combated this accusation forcefully. A c c o r d i n g to Nicholas, the presence o f G o d i n the w o r l d a n d the interp r e t a t i o n o f the w o r l d as explicatio Dei do not i m p l y a d e n i a l o f the d u a l i t y o f G o d a n d the w o r l d or o f the idea o f the C r e a d o n ; b u t we have seen t h a t at the close of the M i d d l e Ages there is a n emphasis on the independence of the created w o r l d w i t h respect to its Creator. Cusanus' w o r l d is the best o f w o r l d s ; this idea was to be adopted b y L e i b n i z i n his metaphysical o p t i m i s m . Moreover, his w o r l d is order a n d reason; this p r i n c i p l e w i l l also be professed b y H e g e l . I n a d d i t i o n , i t is infinite i n space a n d t i m e — n o t like G o d , w h o has positive a n d t o t a l i n f i n i t y a n d eternity, b u t w i t h a sort o f indeterminateness or limitlessness. I n this, the m o d e r n position w i t h regard to i n f i n i t y is n e a t l y defined. F o r a Greek, to be infinite was a defect i n a t h i n g ; i t was, precisely, a lack o f l i m i t s . T o have limits, to be something determ i n e d , was a positive q u a l i t y . O n the other h a n d , C h r i s t i a n i t y attributes i n f i n i t y to G o d as the highest value; finiteness is felt to be a l i m i t a t i o n , something negative; b u t the finitude o f created being,
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m a n a n d the w o r l d , is always emphasized. N o w , Nicholas o f Cusa extends this " n e a r - i n f i n i t y " to the w o r l d i n a physical a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l sense. T h i s position concerning i n f i n i t y prevails t h r o u g h o u t m o d e r n metaphysics, f r o m G i o r d a n o B r u n o to the G e r m a n idealists. Nicholas' influence o n Spinoza is very strong. Lastly, C a r d i n a l Cusanus proclaims a p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y w i t h i n the w o r l d . Each t h i n g is a n i n d i v i d u a l concentration o f the cosmos, a u n i t w h i c h , like a m i r r o r , reflects the universe. T h i s is especially t r u e of m a n ; each m a n reflects the w o r l d i n a different way, and m e n are true microcosms. T h e r e is a n absolute variety i n these units because G o d never repeats Himself. T h i s is a first sketch o f L e i b n i z ' theory of the monads. T h e m i n d is " a l i v i n g measure w h i c h achieves its f u l l capacity b y measuring other t h i n g s . " Mens is here i n t e r p r e t e d as mensura. K n o w l edge o f the measurable w o r l d gives us as a necessary consequence a knowledge o f m a n . H e r e we f i n d the seeds of physics a n d o f h u m a n i s m , w h i c h are b o r n together. A n d i f the m i n d is a m i r r o r , i t is a living m i r r o r w h i c h consists i n a c t i v i t y . I f the m i n d of G o d is a vis entifkativa, the h u m a n m i n d is a vis assimilativa; i t is o n l y a step f r o m this to L e i b n i z ' " f o r c e of representation." T h u s , at t h e beginning of the fifteenth century, w i t h i n the d i r e c t t r a d i t i o n o f the nominalist philosophers a n d the speculative mystics, there appear one after another the m a j o r themes o f m o d e r n metaphysics. I n the w o r k of Nicholas o f Cusa we have, i n e m b r y o , a l l the philosophy t h a t is to develop i n E u r o p e , f r o m G i o r d a n o Bruno's imprecise a n d confused attempts u p to the splendid m a t u r i t y o f Hegel. B u t this philosophy begins to have t r u e reality o n l y i n the seventeenth century, i n the t h o u g h t o f Descartes. T h i s f u l l y justifies the present i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Renaissance.
2. G I O R D A N O B R U N O
L I F E . G i o r d a n o Bruno is the most i m p o r t a n t I t a l i a n philosopher o f the Renaissance. H e was b o r n i n N o l a i n 1548. H e entered the D o m i n ican O r d e r , b u t later, accused o f heresy, abandoned t h e O r d e r a n d traveled t h r o u g h several E u r o p e a n countries: S w i t z e r l a n d , France, E n g l a n d a n d G e r m a n y . A f t e r w a r d , he r e t u r n e d to I t a l y . T h e R o m a n I n q u i s i t i o n imprisoned h i m i n 1592, a n d i n 1600 he was b u r n e d for refusing to retract his heterodox doctrines. H i s tragic death a n d the impassioned brilliance o f his w r i t i n g s w o n h i m great fame, a n d this helped increase his subsequent influence. T h e influences o f Bruno's t i m e are p r o m i n e n t i n his w o r k , w h i c h
Modern
zoi
Physics
reveals ties w i t h R a i m u n d u s L u l l u s , w i t h the practitioners o f n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y (Copernicus p a r t i c u l a r l y ) , a n d especially w i t h Nicholas o f Cusa. F o r B r u n o , too, the w o r l d is the m a t t e r o f chief concern, a n d he speaks o f i t w i t h poetic e x a l t a t i o n a n d enthusiasm for its i n f i n i t y . G i o r d a n o Bruno's p r i n c i p a l works were De la causa, principio ed uno, De I'infinito,
universo e dei mondi a n d Degli eroicifurori,
i n Italian; and, i n
L a t i n , De triplici minimo et mensura, De monade, nutnero et figura a n d
De
immenso et innumerabilibus.
D O C T R I N E . B r u n o is a pantheist. H i s m a j o r thesis is the i m m a n e n c e of G o d i n the w o r l d . As i n Cusa's w r i t i n g s , G o d is complicatio omnium (the t a k i n g together o f a l l things), coincidentia oppositorum; b u t B r u n o goes even f u r t h e r . G o d is, i n a d d i t i o n , the soul o f the w o r l d , causa immanens. T h i s was i n t e r p r e t e d as p a n t h e i s m , as e q u a t i n g t h e w o r l d w i t h G o d , even t h o u g h G i o r d a n o B r u n o d i d n o t consider h i m s e l f a pantheist a n d m a d e reference to the concept oinatura naturans, creative n a t u r e , t h e d i v i n e soul of the w o r l d , as contrasted t o natura naturata, the w o r l d o f p r o d u c e d things. B u t this does n o t succeed i n c l a r i f y i n g the decisive p r o b l e m o f the transcendence o f G o d . F o r B r u n o , t h e transcendent G o d is o n l y an object o f p r a y e r a n d w o r s h i p , b u t t h e p h i l o sophic G o d is the i m m a n e n t cause a n d h a r m o n y of the universe; f r o m this arises Bruno's tendency to revive the Averroist d o c t r i n e o f t h e double truth. T h i s universe is i n f i n i t e , even spatially. I t is f u l l o f life a n d beauty, since e v e r y t h i n g is a factor i n the d i v i n e life. E v e r y t h i n g is richness a n d m u l t i p l i c i t y . B r u n o has a n esthetic enthusiasm for n a t u r e w h i c h is the key t o t h e Renaissance a t t i t u d e . B r u n o also adopts Nicholas o f Cusa's t h e o r y o f the monads. T h e i n d i v i d u a l units o f life are i n d i v i s i b l e a n d indestructible, a n d t h e i r i n f i n i t e combinations produce universal h a r m o n y . T h e soul o f the w o r l d is the basic m o n a d , monas monadum (the m o n a d o f m o n a d s ) . Substance is a l l one, a n d i n d i v i d u a l things are no more t h a n p a r t i c u larizations—circonstanzie, B r u n o calls t h e m — o f the d i v i n e substance. Bruno's theory o f individuals relapses once m o r e i n t o pantheism. Its influence reappears i n L e i b n i z a n d especially i n Spinoza a n d i n Schelling.
3. M O D E R N PHYSICS T H E FOUNDERS OF T H E N E W SCIENCE O F N A T U R E . W i t h n o m i n a l i s t
metaphysics as its starting p o i n t , a n a t u r a l science is established i n the sixteenth a n d seventeenth centuries w h i c h differs essentially f r o m t h a t o f A r i s t o t l e a n d the M i d d l e Ages i n t w o decisive p o i n t s : the idea o f
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n a t u r e a n d the physical m e t h o d . Scientists f r o m Copernicus to N e w t o n fashioned this new physics, w h i c h was handed d o w n as a r e m a r k a b l e a n d respected body of knowledge to o u r o w n day, w h e n i t u n d e r w e n t a n o t h e r r a d i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n at the hands o f E i n s t e i n , w h o f o r m u l a t e d his theory o f r e l a t i v i t y ; Planck, w h o f o u n d e d q u a n t u m mechanics; a n d the physicists w h o established the bases o f wave mechanics (Heisenberg, Schrodinger, de Broglie, D i r a c ) a n d nuclear physics ( H a h n , F e r m i , O p p e n h e i m e r , and so f o r t h ) . Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish canon, lived f r o m 1473 to 1543. H e studied mathematics, astronomy a n d medicine, a n d i n t h e last year o f his life published his w o r k De revolutionibus orbium caelestium, i n w h i c h he declared t h a t the sun is t h e center o f our celestial system a n d t h a t the e a r t h a n d the other planets revolve a r o u n d i t . T h i s idea, w h i c h a d o p t e d very ancient Greek suppositions, was received w i t h hostility i n m a n y areas o f o p i n i o n because i t contradicted a l l t h e customary conceptions. I n Spain the C o p e r n i c a n system was accepted a n d t a u g h t v e r y q u i c k l y . F r o m this t i m e o n , the a c t i v i t y of a p p l y i n g m a t h e m a t i c a l t h o u g h t to physics becomes v e r y intense. J o h a n n K e p l e r (1571-1630), a G e r m a n astronomer, adopted Copernicus' ideas a n d i n 1609 published the Physica caelestis. K e p l e r supplied rigorous m a t h e m a t i c a l expressions for Nicholas Copernicus' discoveries, w h i c h he f o r m u l a t e d i n the famous three laws o f p l a n e t a r y orbits. I n these laws he established that the orbits o f planets are ellipses (not circles, w h i c h h a d been considered a m o r e perfect f o r m ) , t h a t the radius vectors o f the planets sweep o u t equal areas i n equal intervals o f t i m e , a n d t h a t the squares of the p e r i o d i c times o f the planets are p r o p o r t i o n a l to the cubes of their mean distances f r o m the sun. K e p l e r was a n extremely energetic c h a m p i o n o f the role o f mathematics i n science: " M a n can k n o w n o t h i n g perfectly except magnitudes or b y means o f m a g n i t u d e s , " he w r o t e . Nevertheless, K e p l e r d i d n o t yet k n o w the general principles of the n e w physics, nor was he f u l l y master of the m o d e r n idea of nature. Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), b o r n i n Pisa, I t a l y , is the t r u e founder o f m o d e r n physics. H i s p r i n c i p a l works are // Saggiatore, t h e Dialogo dei massimi sistemi a n d the Discorsi
e dimostrazioni
matematiche intorno a due
move scienze. A professor at Padua, he discovered t h e satellites o f J u p i t e r a n d declared himself a follower of Copernicus. H e was t r i e d b y the R o m a n I n q u i s i t i o n a n d forced to r e t r a c t ; t h e t r a d i t i o n a l tale, not p r o v e d , is that o n this occasion he u t t e r e d his famous phrase, eppur si muove. Subsequently the C h u r c h recognized the great v a l u e a n d o r t h o d o x y of his t h o u g h t . I t is i n Galileo's w o r k t h a t we f i n d stated clearly the idea o f n a t u r e t h a t is to characterize the m o d e r n age,
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a n d the f u l l use o f the scientific m e t h o d . W e shall presently examine these ideas, w h i c h appear completely m a t u r e d i n his w r i t i n g s . After Galileo there is a l o n g series o f physicists w h o complete a n d f u r t h e r develop his science: T o r r i c e l l i , his p u p i l , w h o invented the barometer; the F r e n c h m a n Gassendi, w h o remodeled t h e atomic t h e o r y ; the Englishman R o b e r t Boyle, w h o gave chemistry its scientific character; t h e H o l l a n d e r Huygens, w h o discovered i m p o r t a n t laws o f mechanics a n d originated the wave theory o f l i g h t ; Snellius, w h o d i d i m p o r t a n t w o r k i n optics ; Descartes, w h o i n v e n t e d analytical geometry ; L e i b n i z , w h o i n v e n t e d the infinitesimal calculus ; a n d , above all, t h e Englishman N e w t o n , w h o invented i t simultaneously a n d w h o made the general f o r m u l a t i o n of the principles of m o d e r n physics. Isaac N e w t o n (1642-1727) was a professor a t C a m b r i d g e , a p h i losopher, m a t h e m a t i c i a n , physicist a n d theologian. I n 1687 he p u b lished one of the most i m p o r t a n t books i n history: Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica. N e w t o n f o r m u l a t e d the l a w o f universal g r a v i t a t i o n and interpreted the t o t a l i t y o f mechanics as a f u n c t i o n o f the attractions between masses, expressible m a t h e m a t i c a l l y . I n his w o r k m o d e r n physics attains its purest f o r m a n d comes t o be based o n a u n i t a r y p r i n c i p l e of m a x i m u m generality. W i t h the t w o great mathem a t i c a l instruments o f the seventeenth century, a n a l y t i c a l geometry a n d the infinitesimal calculus, physics can now follow along its p a t h , the "sure p a t h of science " of w h i c h K a n t w i l l speak a c e n t u r y later. N A T U R E . A r i s t o t l e u n d e r s t o o d n a t u r e to be theprinciple of motion ; a n
e n t i t y is n a t u r a l i f i t contains w i t h i n itself the p r i n c i p l e of its movement a n d , thus, its o w n ontological possibilities. Aristotle's concept of nature is closely related to his idea o f substance. T h u s , a d o g is a n a t u r a l entity, whereas a table is a r t i f i c i a l , a p r o d u c t of a r t , a n d has no p r i n ciple o f m o t i o n w i t h i n itself. T h e physics o f Aristotle a n d the M i d d l e Ages is t h e science o f nature, t h e science w h i c h is concerned w i t h discovering theprinciple or the causes of m o t i o n . Beginning w i t h Occamism, knowledge is conceived o f as a k n o w l edge n o t o f things, b u t o f symbols. This leads us t o m a t h e m a t i c a l t h i n k i n g , a n d Galileo w i l l say l i t e r a l l y that the great book of nature is w r i t t e n i n mathematical characters. Aristotelian m o t i o n was a c o m i n g to be or ceasing to be; i t was thus understood i n a n ontological way, f r o m the v i e w p o i n t o f the being o f things. Beginning w i t h Galileo, m o t i o n is considered as a v a r i a t i o n of phenomena : something q u a n t i tative, capable o f being measured a n d expressed m a t h e m a t i c a l l y . Physics w i l l be n o t a science of things, b u t a science o f variations of phe-
nomena. Faced w i t h the p r o b l e m o f m o t i o n , the physics o f A r i s t o t l e a n d the M i d d l e Ages sought its principle, a n d therefore a real a f f i r m a t i o n
The Beginning of Modern Philosophy concerning t h i n g s ; m o d e r n physics renounces principles a n d seeks o n l y a m a t h e m a t i c a l l y determined law o f phenomena. T h e physicist r e nounces the quest for the knowledge o f causes a n d contents himself w i t h a n e q u a t i o n w h i c h w i l l p e r m i t h i m t o measure t h e course o f phenomena. T h i s r e n u n c i a t i o n , so fertile i n its results, separates physics f r o m t h a t w h i c h is n o t physics—philosophy, for e x a m p l e — a n d establishes i t as a positive science; thus m o d e r n physics is created. (Cf. Z u b i r i : L a nuevafisica.) M E T H O D . F o r a l o n g t i m e i t was t h o u g h t t h a t the characteristic feature of the new physics was the use of experiments. T h u s , i n contrast to r a t i o n a l Scholastic physics, Galileo's was said t o be e x p e r i m e n t a l and e m p i r i c a l , springing f r o m the observation o f n a t u r e . T h i s is n o t t r u e ; w h a t distinguishes m o d e r n physics is w h a t is called t h e analysis of nature. T h e physicist's starting p o i n t is a hypothesis, t h a t is, a m a t h e m a t i c a l type of a p r i o r i construction. Before p e r f o r m i n g his experiment, Galileo knows w h a t w i l l h a p p e n ; the experiment is m e r e l y a n a post e r i o r i c o n f i r m a t i o n of that a p r i o r i knowledge. T h e physicist examines n a t u r e w i t h a n already existing o u t l i n e o r questionnaire, w h i c h is his m a t h e m a t i c a l hypothesis, his m e n t a l c o n s t r u c t i o n ; mente concipio, I conceive w i t h m y m i n d , Galileo said. A n d w i t h his instruments, w i t h his experiment, the physicist puts his question to n a t u r e a n d compels her t o answer, t o c o n f i r m o r refute t h e hypothesis. " T h u s , " O r t e g a writes, "physics is an a p r i o r i knowledge confirmed b y a n a posteriori k n o w l e d g e . " Physics is a science, a n d therefore a n a p r i o r i construct i o n ; i t is n o t , however, a n i d e a l science, like mathematics, b u t a science o f reality, a n d therefore requires experimental c o n f i r m a t i o n . But t h e decisive t r a i t o f Galileo a n d o f the entire nuova scienza is t h e former factor, the a p r i o r i character o f physics. M o r e o v e r , experiments never c o n f i r m the hypothesis exactly, because the r e a l conditions do n o t coincide w i t h those o f the i d e a l case i n the a p r i o r i m e n t a l cons t r u c t i o n , a n d t h e Scholastic physicists based their statements on experi-
ments i n their disputes w i t h the moderns. T h u s , a b a l l r o l l i n g d o w n a n i n c l i n e d surface w i l l never satisfy the l a w of the inclined plane, because the i m p e r f e c t i o n o f the plane a n d o f the sphere a n d the resistance o f the a i r i n t r o d u c e d i s t u r b i n g f r i c t i o n . Nevertheless, the physical l a w does n o t refer t o real balls t h a t r o l l d o w n planes t h a t exist i n r e a l i t y , b u t t o non-existent perfect spheres a n d perfect planes i n frictionless space. (Cf. Ortega y Gasset: La "Filosofia de la Historia" de Hegely la historiologia.)
T h e inductive m e t h o d — h e r e t h e w o r d " i n d u c t i v e " has a m u c h broader m e a n i n g t h a n t h a t w h i c h Francis Bacon gives i t — i s t h e m e t h o d t h a t m o d e r n physics has used effectively since K e p l e r , w h o
Spanish
Scholasticism
20J
m a d e use o f i t t o d e t e r m i n e the e l l i p t i c a l f o r m o f the p l a n e t a r y o r b i t s . N e w t o n — w h o called i t analysis, i n contrast t o synthesis—brought great precision t o this m e t h o d a n d believed i t capable o f the greatest achievements. T h e a n a l y t i c a l m e t h o d begins w i t h phenomena a n d e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n a n d works u p to universal laws. In hac philosophia [experimentali],
N e w t o n writes, propositiones
deducuntur ex phaenomenis,
et redduntur generales per inductionem. T h e basis o f this i n d u c t i v e m e t h o d is the very idea o f nature as the p e r m a n e n t m o d e o f the being a n d behavior o f reality. Given the existence o f n a t u r e , the i n d i v i d u a l things induce us to raise ourselves to general propositions. A single fact reveals a n a t u r a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y v i r t u e of nature's p e r m a n e n t concord w i t h itself; n a t u r e is sibi semper consona. A n d , N e w t o n adds, this is the basis o f a l l p h i l o s o p h y : Et hoc estfundamentumphilosophiae
totius. *
T h i s n e w idea o f n a t u r e comes about for philosophical reasons a n d is based o n metaphysical suppositions, w h i c h are foreign to the positiveness of science. Therefore, the principles o f n a t u r a l science do not belong i n the d o m a i n o f n a t u r a l science a n d constitute a p r o b l e m for p h i losophy. 4.
S P A N I S H SCHOLASTICISM
I n the sixteenth c e n t u r y there is a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y flowering o f Scholasticism; i t has its center i n Spain a n d culminates i n the C o u n c i l o f T r e n t . T h e great theologians confront the problems w h i c h the R e f o r m a t i o n has c r e a t e d ; i n a d d i t i o n , t h o u g h faced w i t h Renaissance criticism, t h e y r e a f f i r m t h e i r belief i n the Scholastic t r a d i t i o n . These philosophers t u r n a g a i n t o T h o m i s m a n d the great systematic works o f the M i d d l e Ages, n o t to repeat t h e m , b u t to c o m m e n t o n a n d clarify t h e m — a c t u a l l y , to p e r f o r m an o r i g i n a l a n d f r u i t f u l labor. M o r e o v e r , the Spanish Scholastics investigate a series of p o l i t i c a l a n d social p r o b lems w h i c h the Renaissance h a d questioned; thus, i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w is a n i m p o r t a n t t o p i c t o t h e m , a n d ties i n w i t h the p r o b l e m o f the c o n d i t i o n o f the I n d i a n s i n the recently discovered N e w W o r l d . T h e two i n t e l l e c t u a l centers o f this movement are Salamanca a n d A l c a l á , b u t the m o v e m e n t has d i r e c t repercussions i n C o i m b r a a n d also i n R o m e . A l m o s t a l l o f these Spanish Scholastics a c q u i r e d their educat i o n i n Paris, w h i c h c o n t i n u e d to be a n extremely i m p o r t a n t intellect u a l focal p o i n t . H o w e v e r , this flowering was short-lived. I t r e m a i n e d isolated i n Spain a n d P o r t u g a l , a n d i n 1617, after the death o f Suárez, i t entered i n t o a p e r i o d o f decline. T h e predominance o f theology over philo¬ * See my essay " F í s i c a y metafísica en Newton" in San Anselmo y el insensato [Obras, I V ] .
2o6
The Beginning of Modern Philosophy
sophical interest, a n o r i e n t a t i o n d e t e r m i n e d b y the C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n , prevented the Spanish Scholastics f r o m establishing sufficient contact w i t h the philosophy a n d n a t u r a l sciences o f m o d e r n E u r o p e , a n d so this vigorous m o v e m e n t d i d n o t become i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the n e w metaphysics. I f things h a d n o t occurred i n this w a y , t h e destiny o f Spain a n d t h a t o f E u r o p e w o u l d p r o b a b l y have been different. N a t u r a l l y , the d o c t r i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to C a t h o l i c theology a n d d o g m a i n the C o u n c i l o f T r e n t is w h a t has h a d the greatest i m p o r t a n c e a n d most lasting effect. T H E THEOLOGIANS. T h i s restorative l a b o r is c a r r i e d o n b y t w o great Orders, b o t h f o u n d e d b y Spanish saints: the O r d e r o f Preachers, founded b y St. D o m i n i c G u z m á n , a n d the Society ofjesus, f o u n d e d b y St. Ignatius o f L o y o l a . B o t h o f these O r d e r s i n c l u d e d Spanish a n d French elements a n d h a d widespread significance f r o m the very beginning. I f the D o m i n i c a n O r d e r represents the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the C h u r c h i n the t h i r t e e n t h century, the Society ofjesus stands for the defense o f C a t h o l i c i s m i n the sixteenth c e n t u r y . First come the D o m i n i c a n s . A m o n g t h e m we find Francisco de V i t o r i a (1480-1546), w h o studied i n Paris a n d was a professor at Salamanca. H e w r o t e some i m p o r t a n t commentaries o n the Summa theologiae, a n d his lections or relections—especially De justitia a n d De Indis etjure belli—are a valuable c o n t r i b u t i o n to i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w , a n d one w h i c h considerably predates G r o t i u s ' Dejure belli acpads (1625). V i t o r i a was s u r r o u n d e d by several significant D o m i n i c a n p u p i l s : D o m i n g o de Soto (1494-1560), w h o was also a professor at Salamanca; M e l c h o r Cano (1509-1560), w h o t a u g h t a t A l c a l á a n d l a t e r at Salamanca, was bishop o f the C a n a r y Islands a n d w r o t e a n i m p o r t a n t w o r k , De locis theologicis. L a t e r there was C a r r a n z a , a n d n o t a b l y , D o m i n g o Báñez (1528-1604), w h o w r o t e commentaries o n the Summa a n d carried theology to new extremes o f a c u i t y i n his t h e o r y oí physical premotion.
T o w a r d the m i d d l e of the sixteenth c e n t u r y Jesuit theologians begin to appear i n Spain. T h e most i m p o r t a n t w e r e Alfonso Salmerón, a professor at I n g o l s t a d t a n d a theologian at the C o u n c i l o f T r e n t ; L u i s de M o l i n a (1533-1600), the a u t h o r o f the famous treatise De liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis concordia, i n w h i c h he expounds his t h e o r y o f the middle science, a d o c t r i n e w h i c h h a d a great influence o n theology a n d shaped the m o v e m e n t k n o w n as M o l i n i s m ; the Portuguese t h i n k e r Fonseca, a great c o m m e n t a t o r o n A r i s t o t l e ; a n d , most i m p o r t a n t , Francisco Suárez, w h o was a n o r i g i n a l philosopher as w e l l as a theologian. T h e last i m p o r t a n t t h i n k e r o f this g r o u p was the Portuguese J o a o de
Spanish
zoy
Scholasticism
Sâo T o m é (1589-1644), the a u t h o r o f a Cursus philosophicus Cursus theologicus, b o t h still of great interest.
and a
FRANCISCO S U Á R E Z . Francisco Suárez was b o r n i n G r a n a d a i n 1548 and d i e d i n L i s b o n i n 1617. H e was b o r n i n the same year as G i o r d a n o B r u n o , a n d his dates o f b i r t h a n d d e a t h are j u s t one year later t h a n those o f Cervantes. Suárez j o i n e d the Society o f Jesus i n 1564, after h a v i n g once been rejected because he was j u d g e d n o t sufficiently b r i g h t . H e was a professor at Segovia, Á v i l a , V a l l a d o l i d , R o m e , Alcalá, Salamanca, a n d finally, f r o m 1597, at the U n i v e r s i t y o f C o i m b r a . H e was called Doctor eximius a n d was q u i c k to achieve w i d e spread respect. After c o m p l e t i n g several theological treatises, Suárez p u b l i s h e d , i n the same year i n w h i c h he began his professorship at C o i m b r a , his philosophical w o r k : the two great volumes o f his Disputationes metaphysicae. H i s complete works, w h i c h comprise twenty-six folio volumes, i n c l u d e the treatise De Deo uno et trino, his great legal opus De legibus ac Deo legislatore, the Defensiofidei
adversus Anglicanae sectae
errores—against
K i n g James I o f E n g l a n d — a n d the treatise De Anima. Suárez, the o n l y great Scholastic philosopher after O c c a m , encounters a centuries-old theological a n d philosophical t r a d i t i o n w h i c h had been o v e r w h e l m e d b y a m u l t i t u d e o f opinions a n d commentaries and been h a n d e d d o w n i n r o u t i n e fashion. A b o v e a l l , therefore, i t is necessary for S u á r e z to understand t h a t past, to explain i t ; i n short, to reconsider tradition in terms of present-day knowledge. I n order to do this he
separates metaphysics f r o m theology for the first t i m e i n the h i s t o r y o f Scholasticism, a n d creates a systematic construction o f first p h i losophy, based o n A r i s t o t l e b u t i n d e p e n d e n t o f h i m , t h a t keeps i n m i n d all the doctrines o f the Greek a n d m e d i e v a l commentators a n d the w o r k o f the Scholastics—especially t h a t o f St. T h o m a s — i n o r d e r to determine the " t r u e j u d g m e n t . " T h u s , i n the fifty-four Disputationes metaphysicae he studies the p r o b l e m o f b e i n g w i t h c l a r i t y a n d precision, d i v o r c i n g i t f r o m theological questions; however, he does n o t lose sight o f the fact t h a t his metaphysics is o r i e n t e d to theology, w h i c h serves as a p r i o r f o u n d a t i o n . Z u b i r i has w r i t t e n , " S u á r e z represents the first a t t e m p t after A r i s t o t l e to m a k e metaphysics an i n d e p e n d e n t b o d y o f philosophic doctrine. W i t h S u á r e z , metaphysics is elevated t o the level o f an autonomous a n d systematic discipline. " S u á r e z ' w o r k is n o t merely a c o m m e n t a r y . I t is an o r i g i n a l philoso p h y t h a t remains relatively faithful to T h o m i s m , b u t t h a t m a i n t a i n s the same independence t o w a r d i t t h a t w e saw i n Duns Scotus a n d other great m e d i e v a l thinkers. H e disagrees w i t h St. Thomas o n m a n y problems, even o n some i m p o r t a n t ones ; however, i n S u á r e z ' w o r k
zo8
The Beginning
of Modern
Philosophy
these problems are t h o u g h t o u t a n d resolved f r o m his o w n situation a n d f r o m a different perspective, one that includes a consideration o f the entire d o c t r i n a l content o f Scholasticism. F o r these reasons, Suarez is a real a n d effective philosopher w h o should be included i n a m o d e r n history of philosophy; he has influenced m o d e r n t h i n k i n g more t h a n is generally believed. W e are n o t discussing here a n '' u n k n o w n genius,'' an unpublished ' great t h i n k e r ' ' w i t h o u t influence or consequence, for t h r o u g h o u t the seventeenth a n d eighteenth centuries the Disputations was used as a textbook i n m a n y E u r o p e a n universities a n d even i n some Protestant schools. Descartes, L e i b n i z , Grotius a n d the G e r m a n idealists k n e w a n d m a d e use o f this w o r k . I t can be t r u t h f u l l y said t h a t for t w o centuries E u r o p e learned metaphysics f r o m Suarez, even t h o u g h his o w n metaphysics was utilized i n order to create a different metaphysics, r a t h e r t h a n continued a l o n g the lines o f its o r i g i n a l i n s p i r a t i o n . T h e most f r u i t f u l aspects o f t h e w e a l t h of Scholastic l e a r n i n g passed i n t o m o d e r n philosophy b y w a y o f Suarez, a n d i n this w a y Scholasticism was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a new metaphysics created f r o m a new p o i n t o f v i e w a n d b y a different method. 1
Suarez' metaphysics studies the major points o f Scholastic philoso p h y w i t h astuteness a n d precision. As we have seen, he endeavors to r e m a i n as faithful as possible to T h o m i s m , b u t he does n o t hesitate to deviate f r o m this d o c t r i n e where he thinks i t necessary to d o so. Sometimes he adopts the v i e w o f p r e - T h o m i s t philosophers; at other times he comes closer to Duns Scotus a n d the nominalists; a t still other times he expounds new solutions o f his o w n . T h e T h o m i s t d o c t r i n e o f the real distinction between essence a n d existence seems false to h i m ; he believes that the d i s t i n c t i o n consists i n a mere i n t e l l e c t u a l abstraction, a n d t h a t i n an existing complex entity the existence o f each one o f the metaphysical elements is i m p l i e d i n its essence. Existence, as w e l l as essence, involves composition o f p a r t i a l elements; to be specific, p r i m e m a t t e r possesses a n existence o f its o w n w h i c h is free f r o m the a c t u a l i t y t h a t determines f o r m , a n d therefore G o d could m a i n t a i n i t separately. W i t h regard to the p r o b l e m o f the universals, Suarez, w h o pays part i c u l a r attention to the p r o b l e m o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to persons a n d to i m m a t e r i a l entities, does n o t accept materia signata quantitate as b e i n g the principle o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n . T h e decisive t h i n g a b o u t i n d i viduals is their incommunicability; Suarez affirms t h a t the constituent elements of each substance are principles of i n d i v i d u a t i o n : the m o d a l u n i t y o f these elements constitutes the i n d i v i d u a l i t y o f the c o m p o u n d . Suarez' profound investigations i n t o the n a t u r e o f personality are o f T r i n i t a r i a n and a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l interest.
Spanish
Scholasticism
zoo
S u á r e z affirms the analogous n a t u r e of being, w h i c h is predicated o f G o d i n a p r o p e r a n d absolute w a y , a n d o f the things o n l y as things created i n reference to the D e i t y . H i s d e n i a l o f the real d i s t i n c t i o n between essence a n d existence does n o t i m p l y an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n bet w e e n d i v i n e being a n d created being, since these are, respectively, a se a n d ab alio—the first necessary a n d the second, c o n t i n g e n t . F o r S u á r e z , the o n l y i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e arguments for d e m o n s t r a t i n g the existence o f G o d are metaphysical arguments, a n d he affirms t h e imposs i b i l i t y o f seeing a n d k n o w i n g G o d n a t u r a l l y ; G o d is seen a n d k n o w n o n l y i n d i r e c t l y , t h a t is, as H e is reflected i n H i s creatures. I n his Treatise on the Laws, Suárez takes a position o n the question o f t h e source o f a u t h o r i t y . H e rejects the theory o f the d i v i n e r i g h t o f kings, w h i c h the Protestants h a d m a d e use of a n d according t o w h i c h a k i n g derives his a u t h o r i t y d i r e c t l y f r o m G o d , a n d instead affirms the thesis o f p o p u l a r sovereignty. T r u e a u t h o r i t y is based o n the consent o f t h e people; the people a c t u a l l y possess the power d e r i v e d f r o m G o d , a n d t h e y have the r i g h t to dismiss sovereigns w h o are u n f i t t o g o v e r n . * A n E n g l i s h philosophical c u r r e n t begins i n the sixteenth c e n t u r y — w i t h B a c o n a n d H o b b e s — w h i c h antedates Descartes a n d C o n t i n e n t a l i d e a l i s m ; however, we w i l l discuss Cartesianism a n d i d e a l i s m first, because the B r i t i s h c u r r e n t is t h e source o f the English e m p i r i c i s m o f t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o centuries a n d forms a separate chapter i n m o d e r n E u r o p e a n philosophy. * See " Suárez en la perspectiva de la r a z ó n histórica " in Ensayos de teoría [Obras, IV].
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
IDEALISM
Descartes
M o d e r n philosophy is f o r m e d i n the seventeenth c e n t u r y . After attempts to restore a n t i q u i t y a n d refute Scholasticism, the discontinuous l i n e o f thinkers w h o k e p t alive the m e a n i n g o f metaphysics enters i n t o a phase o f splendid philosophic m a t u r i t y . E a r l i e r , I alluded to the discontinuous structure o f p h i l o s o p h y ; we have witnessed l o n g periods o f t i m e that were l i k e great gaps i n philosophic speculation, epochs i n w h i c h m a n is reduced to c o m m e n t i n g o n o r i n t e r p r e t i n g earlier works or to a t r i v i a l m e d i t a t i o n o n himself. I n contrast, there are other periods i n w h i c h several b r i l l i a n t thinkers a p p e a r i n close succession. T h i s is w h a t happens i n the fifth a n d f o u r t h centuries before C h r i s t i n Greece, where, after the great figure o f Parmenides a n d the later pre-Socratics, w e f i n d , i n a direct t e a c h e r - p u p i l r e l a t i o n ship to one another, Socrates, Plato a n d Aristotle. T h e n comes a l o n g p e r i o d o f decline. There is a n analogous situation i n the M i d d l e Ages: the t h i r t e e n t h century a n d the first h a l f o f the fourteenth century w i t ness a procession made u p o f the great personalities o f medieval t h o u g h t : St. Bonaventure, St. T h o m a s , Duns Scotus, R o g e r Bacon, E c k h a r t , O c c a m ; and t h e n there is a new f a l l i n g off, u n t i l the seventeenth c e n t u r y . A t that t i m e such thinkers as Descartes, M a l e b r a n c h e , Spinoza, L e i b n i z — n o t to m e n t i o n Bossuet, Fenelon a n d Pascal, w h o are o n the borderline between philosophy and religious t h o u g h t — appear i n close succession. T h e r e are also the E n g l i s h m e n , f r o m Francis Bacon to H u m e . T h e n metaphysics declines once again, u n t i l G e r m a n i d e a l i s m — f r o m K a n t to Hegel—achieves a n e w s p l e n d i d outburst ; this is soon followed b y the somber positivist a n d naturalistic 210
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il
i
p e r i o d of the nineteenth century. A n d today w e are witnessing a latest m i g h t y renaissance o f metaphysical thought. I t is i n the first decades o f the seventeenth c e n t u r y t h a t the p h i l o sophic p r o b l e m is first stated b y the m o d e r n age. T h i s is the w o r k o f Descartes. * L I F E A N D C H A R A C T E R . R e n é Descartes is the decisive figure i n the transition f r o m one era t o another. His generation marks the passage f r o m the medieval w o r l d to t h e m a t u r e m o d e r n spirit. Ortega has called Descartes thefirst modern man. Descartes was b o r n o f a noble f a m i l y i n L a H a y e , T o u r a i n e , i n 1596. As he was sickly i n c h i l d h o o d he r e q u i r e d special care, b u t his cheerful disposition later caused his h e a l t h to i m p r o v e . W h e n he was eight years o l d he went to study a t the Jesuit school i n L a Flèche. This school was extremely i m p o r t a n t i n F r e n c h intellectual life at t h a t t i m e a n d had a p a r t i c u l a r interest i n classical languages a n d literatures, a n d these Descartes studied intensely. A f t e r w a r d he began to study p h i losophy, b u t a philosophy t h a t was l i m i t e d b y the molds o f t r a d i t i o n a l Scholasticism a n d t h a t d i d not refer to or take i n t o consideration the discoveries of m o d e r n n a t u r a l science. M a t h e m a t i c s appealed to h i m , b u t he found i t lacked a p p l i c a t i o n to physics ; this is something w h i c h he himself was one of the first to establish, i n b r i l l i a n t fashion. I n 1614 he q u i t L a Flèche to go to Paris and lead a life o f pleasure. A t this t i m e he became a complete skeptic. T h e knowledge t h a t he h a d learned i n L a Flèche seemed to h i m to be inconsistent, d o u b t f u l ; o n l y logic a n d mathematics appeared to contain self-evidence a n d cert a i n t y ; b u t o n the other h a n d , they were o f no help i n the quest for knowledge of reality. I n order to see the w o r l d , Descartes took u p m i l i t a r y life i n H o l l a n d i n 1618 under the c o m m a n d o f Prince M a u r i c e o f Nassau. T h e r e he became f a m i l i a r w i t h mathematics a n d the n a t u r a l sciences. As Goethe r e m a r k e d , Descartes took advantage o f every o p p o r t u n i t y to observe everything, to immerse h i m s e l f i n the cont e m p l a t i o n o f reality, w i t h o u t considering effort, expense o r danger. Later, a t the b e g i n n i n g o f the T h i r t y Years' W a r , he entered the i m p e r i a l a r m y of M a x i m i l i a n o f Bavaria. M a x i m i l i a n was fighting the Bohemians, w h o were l e d b y Frederick V ; i t was w i t h Frederick's daughter, the Princess Palatine Elizabeth, t h a t Descartes enjoyed a deep a n d noble friendship. Descartes traveled t h r o u g h Germany, A u s t r i a , H u n g a r y , S w i t z e r l a n d a n d I t a l y o n various campaigns.
* The reader will find a more detailed account of the historical origins and the structure of the philosophy of this time in " L a metafísica moderna" (in Biografía de la Filosofía) [Obras,!!].
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W h i l e i n w i n t e r quarters i n N e u b u r g o n N o v e m b e r i o, 1619, he m a d e the sensational discovery o f his method. L a t e r he w e n t t o L o r e t t o i n order to f u l f i l l a v o w of gratitude to t h e V i r g i n for this discovery, a n d i n 1625 he a g a i n settled i n Paris. F r o m 1629 > lived, i n H o l l a n d . T h i s country's t r a n q u i l l i t y , liberal atmosphere a n d independence appealed to h i m . T h i s was Descartes' most f r u i t f u l p e r i o d , i n w h i c h he w r o t e a n d p u b l i s h e d his most i m p o r t a n t works. H e established contact w i t h E u r o p e a n p h i losophers a n d m e n of science a n d at the same t i m e was deeply h u r t b y attacks o n his doctrines; these attacks w e r e l e d p r i n c i p a l l y b y the Jesuits, i n spite o f his still being a C a t h o l i c . A t this t i m e a few o f his pupils deceived a n d disappointed h i m , a n d as a result of this he c u l t i vated his epistolary friendship w i t h the Princess Elizabeth w i t h greater intensity t h a n ever. W h e n Descartes m e t her i n 1643, he realized t h a t E l i z a b e t h , a p r e t t y g i r l of twenty-five years, h a d studied his works w i t h interest a n d intelligence; he mentions this fact w i t h e m o t i o n i n the dedication to his Principles of Philosophy. A f t e r this, t h e friendship became even m o r e p r o f o u n d a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l l y r e w a r d i n g . o n
n
e
Descartes left H o l l a n d only to make short trips, one of t h e m t o D e n m a r k . L a t e r he made more frequent excursions i n t o France, where he had become famous. I n 1646 he began corresponding w i t h Q u e e n Christina o f Sweden, w h o later i n v i t e d h i m to come to S t o c k h o l m ; Descartes accepted a n d a r r i v e d i n the Swedish capital i n O c t o b e r o f 1649. I n spite o f his friendship a n d a d m i r a t i o n for C h r i s t i n a , whose conversion to C a t h o l i c i s m his conversations helped to effect, Descartes d i d not feel a t ease i n her c o u r t . A few m o n t h s later, i n F e b r u a r y , 1650, the cold S t o c k h o l m w i n t e r b r o u g h t o n a n attack o f p n e u m o n i a , a n d Descartes d i e d t h a t very m o n t h . T h u s ended this exemplary life o f a searcher after t r u t h . W O R K S . Descartes' l i t e r a r y w o r k is q u i t e extensive. H i s w r i t i n g s are not restricted to philosophical works, b u t also comprise basic books i n the fields o f mathematics, biology a n d physics, a n d a n extensive correspondence. H i s p r i n c i p a l works are Discours de la méthode, p u b lished i n 1637, together w i t h the Dioptrique, the Météores a n d the Géométrie; the Meditations
on First Philosophy
(1641), together w i t h the
Objections b y A r n a u l d , Gassendi, H o b b e s a n d others, a n d Descartes' Replies to t h e m ; the Principia philosophiae de l'áme (1649),
a
n
d
( 1 6 4 4 ) ; the Traite des passions
the Regulae ad directionem ingenii (Rules for the
Direction of the Mind), published after his d e a t h , i n 1701. A m o n g his n o t strictly p h i l o s o p h i c a l works are the above-mentioned Géométrie analy¬ tique a n d the Traitéde Vhomme. Descartes w r o t e i n L a t i n , as d i d p r a c t i cally a l l the thinkers of his d a y — b u t also i n F r e n c h ; he was one o f the
The
Cartesian
Problem
first F r e n c h prose writers a n d one o f the first to discuss philosophy i n the vernacular. i.
T H E CARTESIAN PROBLEM
D O U B T . I n his development as a philosopher, Descartes realizes t h a t he is deeply insecure. N o t h i n g seems t r u s t w o r t h y to h i m . T h e past history o f philosophy is completely c o n t r a d i c t o r y ; m e n have c h a m p i o n e d the most d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed theses. T h i s m u l t i p l i c i t y of opinions gives rise to skepticism (the so-called historical Pyrrhonism). O u r senses often deceive us a n d we are also subject to dreams a n d hallucinations. O u r thought processes are u n t r u s t w o r t h y because we f o r m u l a t e paralogisms and frequently f a l l i n t o error. T h e o n l y sciences t h a t seem to have a secure basis, mathematics and logic, are n o t real sciences; they d o n o t aid us to k n o w reality. W h a t are we to do i n this s i t u a t i o n ? Descartes wishes to c o n s t r u c t — i f this is possible—a c o m pletely c e r t a i n philosophy, one w h i c h cannot be d o u b t e d , a n d he finds h i m s e l f t o t a l l y overwhelmed b y d o u b t . T h u s i t is precisely his d o u b t w h i c h must be the f o u n d a t i o n o n w h i c h to b u i l d ; o n b e g i n n i n g to philosophize, Descartes starts w i t h the o n l y t h i n g he possesses: his o w n d o u b t , his p r o f o u n d u n c e r t a i n t y . I t is necessary to cast d o u b t o n all things at least once i n one's l i f e t i m e , Descartes says. H e must n o t accept a single " t r u t h " that is open to d o u b t . I t is not sufficient t h a t he does n o t a c t u a l l y d o u b t t h a t " t r u t h " ; there must not be r o o m even for the possibility o f a d o u b t . Therefore Descartes makes d o u b t the very m e t h o d o f his philosophy. O n l y i f he finds some p r i n c i p l e w h i c h i t is impossible to d o u b t w i l l he accept i t for his philosophy. I t should be kept i n m i n d t h a t he has rejected the presumptive evidence o f the senses, the r e l i a b i l i t y o f the t h o u g h t processes a n d , of course, t r a d i t i o n a l a n d received knowledge. Therefore, Descartes attempts first of all to r e m a i n completely alone; this is, i n effect, the situation i n w h i c h m a n finds himself at the close o f the M i d d l e Ages. Starting w i t h this solitude, Descartes must t r y to reconstruct certainty, a security t h a t is unassailable b y d o u b t . As a p r i m a r y goal, Descartes attempts not to err. T h i s is the b e g i n n i n g of the p h i l o s o p h y o f caution. A n d , as we shall see, there arise the three great questions of medieval p h i l o s o p h y — a n d perhaps of all p h i l o s o p h y : the w o r l d , m a n a n d G o d . T h e o n l y t h i n g t h a t has changed is their order a n d the role each one plays. T H E O L O G Y . W i t h regard to theology, w h i c h had always afforded a greater c e r t a i n t y , Descartes begins b y a f f i r m i n g that separation o f p h i l o s o p h y f r o m theology w h i c h he f o u n d before h i m . O n e should n o t
zi4
Descartes
concern oneself w i t h theology, h i g h l y respectable t h o u g h i t m a y b e — precisely because i t is too respectable a n d lofty. T h e reasons he gives are s y m p t o m a t i c o f the e n t i r e w a y o f t h o u g h t o f t h e close o f the Scholastic era. " I revered our theology a n d h o p e d as m u c h as anyone else to a t t a i n heaven ; b u t h a v i n g learned, as a v e r y sure fact, t h a t the r o a d t o heaven is no less open to the most i g n o r a n t t h a n to the most l e a r n e d , a n d t h a t the revealed truths w h i c h lead us there are above the level o f our i n t e l ligence, I w o u l d n o t dare t o s u b m i t these truths t o m y w e a k powers o f reasoning, a n d I t h o u g h t t h a t i n order to t r y to e x a m i n e t h e m a n d succeed one w o u l d need to have some e x t r a o r d i n a r y assistance f r o m heaven a n d to be m o r e t h a n m a n " (Discourse on Method, P a r t I ) . Descartes emphasizes the p r a c t i c a l , devout side of t h e o l o g y . W h a t is i n v o l v e d is to a t t a i n h e a v e n ; b u t i t happens t h a t this c a n be done w i t h o u t k n o w i n g a n y t h i n g a b o u t theology, a n d this makes its uselessness manifest. I t should be observed t h a t Descartes does n o t present this as a discovery of his o w n , b u t j u s t the opposite : i t is s o m e t h i n g he has learned. Therefore, i t is a fact already k n o w n , h a n d e d d o w n a n d , i n a d d i t i o n , perfectly c e r t a i n ; i t is thus current opinion. Secondly, this is a m a t t e r o f revelation w h i c h is b e y o n d the level o f h u m a n intelligence. Reason can accomplish n o t h i n g w i t h the great topic o f G o d ; i t w o u l d be necessary to be more than man. I t is clearly a question o f j u r i s d i c t i o n : o n one side, m a n w i t h his reason; o n the other, G o d — o m n i p o t e n t , inaccessible, higher t h a n a l l r e a s o n — w h o occasionally deigns to reveal himself to m a n . I t is n o t m a n w h o practices t h e o l o g y , b u t G o d ; m a n has n o t h i n g to do w i t h this m a t t e r : G o d is too e x a l t e d . 2. M A N
T H E " C O G I T O . " W i t h the first steps he takes, Descartes must renounce the w o r l d . N a t u r e , w h i c h showed itself so j o y o u s l y to Renaissance m a n t h r o u g h the agency o f his senses, is s o m e t h i n g completely u n c e r t a i n . H a l l u c i n a t i o n s , the deceitfulness of our senses, o u r errors i n j u d g m e n t — a l l o f these m a k e i t impossible to f i n d the least c e r t a i n t y i n the w o r l d . Descartes prepares h i m s e l f to t h i n k t h a t e v e r y t h i n g is false, b u t he finds t h a t there is one t h i n g w h i c h cannot be false: his o w n existence. " W h i l e I wished to t h i n k thus, t h a t e v e r y t h i n g was false, i t necessarily h a d to be t r u e t h a t I , w h o was t h i n k i n g this, was somet h i n g ; a n d , observing t h a t this t r u t h — / think, therefore I am—was so firm a n d so sure t h a t a l l the most extravagant suppositions o f the skeptics were incapable o f shaking i t , I j u d g e d t h a t I c o u l d accept i t w i t h o u t a scruple as the first p r i n c i p l e of the philosophy I was seeking " (Discourse
on Method, P a r t I V ) .
Man
zij
I n effect, i f I a m i n e r r o r , i t is / w h o a m i n e r r o r ; i f I a m mistaken, i f I feel a d o u b t , / a m the mistaken one, / a m the d o u b t e r . I n order to be w r o n g i n declaring t h a t / am, I w o u l d need first o f a l l to be; t h a t is, I cannot be w r o n g a b o u t this. T h i s first t r u t h o f m y existence, the cogito, ergo sum o f the Meditations, is the first i n d u b i t a b l e t r u t h , w h i c h I cannot d o u b t even i f I wish t o . T h e r e is n o t h i n g c e r t a i n except myself. A n d I a m n o t h i n g more t h a n a thing that thinks: mens, cogitatio. Ego sum res cogitans, Descartes says t e x t u a l l y : je ne suis qu'une chose qui pense. T h e r e f o r e , I a m n o t even a
b o d i l y m a n , I a m o n l y reason. F r o m w h a t we have seen, i t is impossible to h o l d o n t o the w o r l d : i t slips a w a y ; n o r is i t possible to retain the b o d y ; the o n l y t h i n g t h a t is secure and c e r t a i n is the t h i n k i n g subject. M a n is left alone w i t h his thoughts. Philosophy is to be based o n " m e " as a consciousness, as reason; b e g i n n i n g n o w a n d for centuries to come, philosophy w i l l be idealism—Descartes' great discovery a n d great error. T h i s solution is consistent. G o d had been left o u t because H e was no longer an object o f reason; this was the decisive factor. Thus, i t is n o t surprising t h a t reason is f o u n d to be the o n l y solid p o i n t on w h i c h t o base philosophy. Despite a l l appearances, this is n o t h i n g new; w h a t occurs n o w is t h a t reason is a h u m a n m a t t e r ; therefore, philosophy is not merely rationalism, b u t idealism as w e l l . T h e r e w i l l be an a t t e m p t t o base a l l metaphysics o n m a n , or rather o n the ego; the history o f this a t t e m p t is the history o f m o d e r n philosophy. T H E C R I T E R I O N FOR T R U T H . T h e w o r l d d i d n o t w i t h s t a n d Descartes'
d o u b t ; o n its first contact w i t h this d o u b t , the w o r l d was lost a n d o n l y the ego stood f i r m . B u t Descartes has o n l y j u s t b e g u n his philosophy, setting his foot on solid g r o u n d . Descartes is interested i n the w o r l d ; he is interested i n the things a n d i n t h a t n a t u r e w h i c h is the concern of the science of his day. B u t he is a prisoner o f his o w n consciousness, locked u p i n his t h i n k i n g ego, a n d he is unable t o take the step w h i c h w i l l lead h i m to the things. H o w can he emerge f r o m this subjectivity? N o w t h a t he has f o u n d his i n d u b i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e , h o w can he continue his philosophy ? Before seeking a second t r u t h , Descartes lingers over the first. I t is a very h u m b l e t r u t h , b u t i t w i l l help h i m see w h a t a t r u t h is like. T h a t is, before u n d e r t a k i n g the quest for n e w truths, Descartes examines the o n l y one he possesses i n order to see w h a t its truthfulness consists of, w h a t there is about i t t h a t makes h i m k n o w i t is true. H e thus seeks a criterionfor certainty i n order to recognize the truths he m a y come across ( O r t e g a ) . H e finds t h a t the t r u t h o f the cogito consists i n his being unable t o d o u b t i t ; a n d he cannot d o u b t i t because he sees t h a t i t must be so, because i t is self-evident. T h i s self-evidence consists i n
2l6
Descartes
the absolute clearness and distinctness w h i c h this idea possesses. T h a t is the criterion for t r u t h : self-evidence. I n possession of a f i r m t r u t h a n d a sure criterion, Descartes prepares himself for the reconquest o f the w o r l d . B u t to accomplish this he must take a long, circuitous route. A n d , strange to say, Descartes' r o u n d a b o u t p a t h for g e t t i n g f r o m the ego to the w o r l d passes t h r o u g h G o d . H o w is this possible ?
3.
GOD
T H E " M A L I G N A N T GENIUS. " W e have seen t h a t Descartes abandons theology, t h a t G o d is incomprehensible; a n d n o w , surprisingly, the D e i t y interposes itself between m a n a n d the w o r l d , and Descartes has to concern h i m s e l f w i t h i t . I t is necessary to explain this. Descartes knows t h a t he h i m s e l f exists, a n d he knows i t because he clearly a n d distinctly perceives the t r u t h o f i t . I t is a t r u t h w h i c h justifies itself; whenever he comes across something s i m i l a r , he w i l l of necessity have to accept i t as t r u t h — u n l e s s he is i n a s i t u a t i o n where he is being deceived, unless he is the v i c t i m of a n i l l u s i o n , unless there is someone w h o makes h i m see as self-evident t h a t w h i c h could not be m o r e false. I n that case self-evidence w o u l d be o f no use at a l l , a n d he c o u l d n o t affirm any t r u t h other t h a n t h a t he himself existed; this w o u l d still be possible because, n a t u r a l l y , i f someone deceives me, I a m the deceived or, w h a t amounts to the same t h i n g , I , the deceived, am. I n this situation m a n w o u l d definitely r e m a i n a prisoner w i t h i n himself, a n d could not w i t h certainty k n o w a n y t h i n g other t h a n his o w n existence. W h o w o u l d be able to deceive me i n such a w a y ? G o d , i f H e exists; we d o not know t h a t H e does exist, b u t neither do we k n o w t h a t H e does n o t . ( I t is understood t h a t this argument is based o n the v i e w p o i n t o f rational philosophic knowledge, a n d is considered apart f r o m revelat i o n , w h i c h Descartes excludes f r o m the r e a l m o f d o u b t . ) B u t i f G o d were to deceive m e i n this way, m a k i n g me believe i n something t h a t does not exist, p l u n g i n g me i n t o error, n o t because of m y weakness or because of m y rashness, b u t because of m y o w n feeling of self-evidence, H e w o u l d n o t be G o d ; the m i n d shrinks f r o m i m a g i n i n g such deceitfulness o n the p a r t o f the D e i t y . I do n o t k n o w t h a t G o d exists, b u t i f H e exists, H e cannot deceive me. O n e w h o c o u l d do this w o u l d be some powerful malignant genius. I n order to be sure o f the self-evident, i n order to be able to trust i n the t r u t h w h i c h presents itself as t r u t h accompanied b y clear a n d distinct proofs, w e w o u l d have to d e m o n strate the existence of G o d . Otherwise, we cannot take another step i n philosophy or seek any t r u t h other t h a n t h a t the ego exists. T H E D E M O N S T R A T I O N OF T H E EXISTENCE OF G O D .
I n effect, Descartes
God proves the existence o f G o d . H e does this i n several ways, w i t h a r g u ments v e r y different i n scope. O n the one h a n d , Descartes says, I f i n d w i t h i n m y m i n d the idea o f God, t h a t is, o f a n e n t i t y w h i c h is i n f i n i t e , completely perfect, o m n i p o t e n t , a l l - k n o w i n g a n d so o n . N o w , this idea cannot come f r o m nothingness, nor can i t o r i g i n a t e w i t h i n myself. I a m finite, imperfect, weak a n d f u l l o f d o u b t a n d ignorance, a n d i f the idea o r i g i n a t e d w i t h i n me, the effect w o u l d be superior to the cause. T h i s is impossible. Consequently, the idea o f G o d must have been placed w i t h i n me b y some h i g h e r entity w h i c h attains the perfection o f t h a t i d e a ; that is, b y G o d Himself. This proves H i s existence. T h e other d e m o n s t r a t i o n is the one w h i c h since K a n t is generally k n o w n as the ontological proof, that is, the a r g u m e n t used b y St. A n s e l m i n his Proslogium (see above). Nevertheless, there are p r o f o u n d differences between the m e a n i n g o f St. Anselm's a r g u m e n t and Descartes' proof. Descartes says: I possess the idea o f a completely perfect e n t i t y , w h i c h is G o d ; n o w , existence is an element o f perfection, and I f i n d t h a t existence is i n c l u d e d essentially i n the concept o f this e n t i t y ; thus, i t is necessary for G o d to exist. T h e t w o Cartesian proofs, w h i c h are closely related to each other, have a factor i n c o m m o n : /possess the idea of a perfect entity, therefore it exists. T h e difference b e t w e e n the two proofs is
i n the reasons Descartes gives, that is, i n the m a n n e r i n w h i c h the c o n cept proves existence: the first p r o o f declares t h a t o n l y G o d can place the idea o f H i m s e l f w i t h i n m e ; the second p r o o f shows that this idea o f G o d w h i c h I possess implies H i s existence. Therefore, the t w o proofs m u t u a l l y r e q u i r e a n d support each other. S t r i c t l y speaking, the p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e for Descartes' demonstrat i o n is the r e a l i t y o f the ego, taken together w i t h a clear a n d distinct concept o f the D e i t y . M y finiteness a n d i m p e r f e c t i o n are contrasted w i t h the i n f i n i t y a n d perfection of G o d , the idea of w h o m I f i n d w i t h i n myself. B y raising to the infinite w h a t is positive i n me a n d r e m o v i n g a l l limits, I raise myself intellectually to G o d . I n other words, m a n has w i t h i n h i m the image o f G o d , w h i c h permits h i m to arrive at the k n o w l edge o f G o d . " T h i s idea [ o f G o d ] , " Descartes says at the end o f his t h i r d Meditation, " w a s b o r n a n d p r o d u c e d together w i t h me at the m o m e n t o f m y c r e a t i o n , j u s t as the idea I have o f myself was. A n d i n t r u t h i t should n o t be a cause for surprise i f G o d , w h e n creating m e , placed t h a t idea w i t h i n m e so t h a t i t m i g h t be like the artisan's mark stamped on his product; n o r is i t necessary for this m a r k to be something different f r o m the p r o d u c t itself; on the c o n t r a r y , b y the very fact t h a t G o d created me, i t is easy to believe t h a t i n a certain manner H e p r o duced m e i n H i s image and likeness, a n d t h a t I conceive this likeness, i n
zi8
Descartes
w h i c h the idea o f G o d is contained, b y means o f the same f a c u l t y w i t h w h i c h I conceive o f myself; t h a t is, t h a t w h e n I reflect u p o n myself, I not only k n o w t h a t I a m a n imperfect t h i n g , one t h a t is incomplete a n d dependent u p o n s o m e t h i n g else and t h a t unceasingly reaches and aspires t o w a r d something better a n d greater t h a n w h a t I a m , b u t I also k n o w at the same time t h a t t h a t u p o n w h i c h I a m dependent possesses w i t h i n itself all those great things to w h i c h I aspire, the ideas of which I find within myself, and possesses t h e m n o t i n an indefinite m a n n e r or o n l y i n p o t e n t i a l i t y , b u t enjoys t h e m effectually, actually and unlimitedly, a n d t h a t therefore i t is G o d . A n d the entire force o f the a r g u m e n t w h i c h I have used here to p r o v e the existence of G o d consists i n m y recognizing t h a t i t w o u l d n o t be possible for m y n a t u r e to be the w a y i t is, t h a t is, for me to possess w i t h i n myself the idea o f a G o d , i f G o d d i d n o t t r u l y exist." But the key to Descartes' p r o o f is the significance w h i c h he a n d , together w i t h h i m , almost a l l seventeenth-century philosophers, give to the w o r d " i d e a . " A n idea is not merely s o m e t h i n g w h i c h occurs to m a n ; nor is i t s o m e t h i n g w h i c h m a n thinks a n d w h i c h m u s t coincide w i t h r e a l i t y . I t is r e a l i t y itself, seen. L'idée
est la chose même conçue,
Descartes says t e x t u a l l y . T h i s is the decisive p o i n t , t h e basis o f his t w o f o l d proof; at the same t i m e , i t is the most questionable p a r t o f the proof, b u t this is n o t the place for an extended investigation o f the problem involved. W e have seen the necessity for G o d and the reasons w h i c h Descartes adduces to prove H i s existence, and n o w one m a y w e l l ask w h a t is the ontological m e a n i n g o f t h a t strange a r g u m e n t a b o u t the " m a l i g n a n t genius. " T H E C O M M U N I C A T I O N B E T W E E N T H E SUBSTANCES.
I f we are deceived
b y some perverse p o w e r , i f o u r strongest self-evidence is m e r e l y error, this means that m y ideas have no t r u t h , t h a t they are merely " ideas, " corresponding to n o t h i n g outside o f themselves. T h e n I w o u l d be a prisoner w i t h i n myself, a t h i n k i n g substance w h i c h c o u l d n o t reach the other things—specifically, the extended substance w h i c h is the w o r l d . This p r o b l e m o f t r u t h and knowledge, stated i n Cartesian terms, is the p r o b l e m o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the substances, w h i c h proves to be so difficult w h e n the s t a r t i n g p o i n t is m y ego, a t h i n k i n g t h i n g w h i c h is absolutely heterogeneous a n d different f r o m every extended t h i n g , even f r o m the extremely close r e a l i t y o f m y o w n body. " F r o m this I k n e w t h a t I was a substance the entire essence or n a t u r e of w h i c h is m e r e l y to t h i n k and w h i c h i n order to exist has no need o f any place n o r is dependent u p o n a n y m a t e r i a l t h i n g ; so t h a t
God this ego, t h a t is, the soul, t h r o u g h w h i c h I a m w h a t I a m , is completely distinct f r o m the b o d y " (Discourse on Method, Part I V ) . R E A S O N A N D B E I N G . Descartes has t a k e n such great care to e m p h a size the separateness or independence o f his reasoning soul t h a t n o w he cannot emerge i n t o the w o r l d . Despite a l l their self-evidence, the ideas of the res cogitans m a y be pure chimeras, lacking the least connection w i t h the res externa, w h i c h is separated f r o m t h e m b y a metaphysical g u l f : they m a y be clear and distinct fantasies. But, serious as this m a y be, i t is n o t the most serious p r o b l e m . T h i s impossibility o f the ego's t r u l y k n o w i n g the w o r l d has an effect n o t o n l y o n this knowledge o f the w o r l d b u t also o n the very nature o f the res cogitans. Reason is n o t the faculty for p r o d u c i n g ideas w i t h o u t t r u t h a n d w i t h o u t r e a l i t y ; i f i t is incapable o f g a i n i n g possession o f the w o r l d , i f i t does n o t p e r m i t the ego to envelop the entire extension o f the things t h r o u g h t h a t strange process called " k n o w i n g " and to possess the t r u t h of the things, i t does not deserve to be called reason. Therefore, i f m a n is to be i n r e a l i t y w h a t he is for Descartes—a t h i n k i n g t h i n g , a r a t i o n a l e n t i t y — h e must achieve a knowledge o f the things, he must transcend himself a n d be capable o f t r u t h . A n d i t is God w h o furnishes the certainty t h a t this is so; H e does n o t deceive m a n ; t h a t is, H e causes man's clear a n d dist i n c t ideas to be true. I n other words, G o d brings i t about t h a t w h e n man's ideas are completely clear a n d distinct, they are more than ideas a n d reflect the r e a l i t y of the things. G o d is the i n f i n i t e substance w h i c h is the basis for the being o f the extended substance and the t h i n k i n g substance. T h e t w o are separate a n d heterogeneous, b u t they have something i n c o m m o n : they b o t h have being, i n the same basic sense o f created being. A n d this c o m m o n r o o t w h i c h the t w o finite substances f i n d i n G o d is the basis for the possibility o f t h e i r coinciding, a n d , i n short, for the possibility o f t r u t h . G o d , the ontological basis o f the ego a n d o f the things, makes i t possible for m a n to know the w o r l d . O n l y f r o m this p o i n t of view do Descartes' proofs acquire t h e i r f u l l m e a n i n g . T h e ideas w h i c h I possess o f the things, he says, m a y very w e l l be no m o r e t h a n something I have produced, something dependent u p o n m y nature as a thinker, a n d n o t h i n g m o r e ; a n d therefore, these ideas m a y be true or false. N o t h i n g assures me t h a t w h a t they signify really exists, that they correspond to a n y t h i n g outside o f m y subjectivity, w h i c h is t h i n k i n g t h e m . O n the other h a n d , the idea o f G o d is one o f such perfection a n d so foreign to m y nature a n d m y possibilities t h a t i t cannot originate w i t h i n m e ; I receive i t f r o m w i t h o u t , a n d therefore f r o m another t h i n g w h i c h is not I , v i e w i n g a r e a l i t y w h i c h is different f r o m myself. Therefore, the idea o f G o d exerts a
220
Descartes
l i b e r a t i n g action u p o n m a n a n d makes h i m emerge f r o m his o w n self a n d come face to face w i t h the actual reality o f t h a t w h i c h is n o t himself. T H E P R O B L E M OF SUBSTANCE. Here, however, there arises a n e x t r e m e l y serious question w h i c h affects Descartes' o n t o l o g y at its r o o t . T h e ego a n d the w o r l d are t w o created, finite substances, a n d t h e i r ontological basis is G o d , t h e infinite substance; b u t n o w one must ask: W h a t is res, w h a t is substance ? Per substantiam, Descartes says (Prin¬ cipia,
I , 51),
nihil aliud intelligere possumus,
nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum
quam rem quae ita existit, ut
(By substance w e
can
understand
n o t h i n g other t h a n a t h i n g w h i c h exists i n such a m a n n e r t h a t i t has need o f n o other t h i n g for its existence). Thus, substance is defined b y independence; to be a substance means not to need another t h i n g i n order to exist; this involves a negative d e t e r m i n a t i o n w h i c h does n o t tell us positively w h a t i t is to be a substance. O n the other h a n d , Descartes observes t h a t , s t r i c t l y speaking, the o n l y independent entity is G o d , since the created entities have need o f H i m , a n d the w o r d " s u b s t a n c e " is n o t applied to G o d a n d to the created entities univocally, b u t o n l y analogically. I t is precisely here however, that the difficulty begins. T h e m i n d a n d the w o r l d are called substances because they need only G o d i n order to exist, Descartes says; thus, they possess a relative, a t t e n u a t e d independence. B u t Descartes adds t h a t we cannot k n o w substance alone, as p u r e substance, because i t does n o t affect us, a n d t h a t w e apprehend i t o n l y b y means o f some a t t r i b u t e , such as extension o r t h o u g h t . T h e n we m u s t ask a g a i n : W h a t is there i n c o m m o n between G o d and the created entities t h a t p e r m i t s us to call t h e m b o t h substances ? (
Descartes explains t h a t they are so called merely b y a n a l o g y ; b u t , as A r i s t o t l e showed i n the past, a n analogy requires a basis that must, n a t u r a l l y , be univocal. W h a t c a n be the c o m m o n basis for Descartes' analogical conception of substance? A c c o r d i n g to Descartes, the o n l y d e f i n i n g t r a i t of substance is independence. B u t this is also an analogical conception, since the independence o f the created substances is o n l y r e l a t i v e . T h e basis o f the p r e s u m p t i v e analogy is i n t u r n a n a l o g i c a l ; this amounts to saying t h a t for Descartes the n o t i o n o f substance is ambiguous. A c t u a l l y , Descartes does n o t have a sufficiently strict conc e p t i o n of being; he considers i t something so obvious t h a t he believes he can neglect to define i t precisely a n d can concern h i m s e l f d i r e c t l y w i t h entities. This is the basic defect of Descartes' metaphysics, the consequences of w h i c h affect a l l t h e t h o u g h t of the m o d e r n age. F r o m the foregoing we see t h a t before Descartes can concern h i m -
The
World
zzx
self w i t h the w o r l d , he must first consider G o d , a n d t h a t even t h o u g h he has renounced theology, there comes a time w h e n he must concern h i m s e l f intellectually w i t h G o d . B u t i t is certainly n o t necessary for h i m to construct a theology; he need o n l y prove the existence o f G o d , a n d this he does by means o f the ontological proof. T h e ontological a r g u m e n t allows the idealist, w h o h a d lost G o d a n d t h e n also the w o r l d , to recover the one a n d , consequently, the other. Cartesian p h i l o s o p h y a n d , as we shall see, a l l o f idealism u p to L e i b n i z are based o n the ontological argument.
4.
T H E WORLD
T H E " R E S E X T E N S A . " I n Descartes, the physical w o r l d is determ i n e d b y extension. T h e res infinita, w h i c h is G o d , is accompanied by t w o f i n i t e substances : the t h i n k i n g substance (man) a n d the extended substance (the w o r l d ) . These t w o spheres of reality do n o t have any c o n t a c t w i t h each other a n d are completely dissimilar. T h i s situation gives rise to the p r o b l e m o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n between t h e m ; this d i l e m m a , w h i c h is a consequence o f idealism, becomes the chief p r o b l e m o f the seventeenth century. T h e v e r y fact of knowledge o r o f man's b e i n g already poses this question. H o w can I come to k n o w the w o r l d ? H o w can t h a t w h i c h is extended penetrate to me, w h o a m unextended a n d non-spatial ? W h a t is m o r e , i f m y body a n d I are t w o different realities w i t h o u t any possible i n t e r a c t i o n , how can I govern m y body a n d m a k e i t move? I t must be G o d , the ontological basis o f the t w o f i n i t e substances, w h o effects this impossible c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the substances. T h e p r o b l e m w h i c h Descartes poses has three possible solutions ; these are given b y Descartes himself (and m o r e clearly by M a l e b r a n c h e ) a n d b y Spinoza a n d L e i b n i z . T h e w o r l d is pure extension. E n e r g y is not a clear idea to Descartes a n d so he does n o t consider i t . Cartesian physics is g e o m e t r y ; L e i b n i z w i l l correct this n o t i o n b y p l a c i n g the concept of energy i n the foreg r o u n d a n d by changing static physics i n t o dynamics. Descartes' and L e i b n i z ' t w o great m a t h e m a t i c a l discoveries—analytical geometry a n d the infinitesimal calculus—correspond to these t w o conceptions. A n a l y t i c a l geometry consists o f the a p p l i c a t i o n o f analysis, o f operat i o n a l calculus, to g e o m e t r y — a n d , therefore, i n Descartes, to physical r e a l i t y itself; the infinitesimal calculus makes possible the calculation o f v a r i a t i o n s and the development o f dynamics. M a t t e r a n d space are one a n d the same; spatiality is the p r i n c i p a l q u a l i t y o f m a t t e r . T h e w o r l d c o u l d be explained b y means o f a series o f w h i r l w i n d motions, a n d after being created c o u l d develop i n a p u r e l y mechanical fashion.
222
Descartes
T h i s is a n echo o f the theory t h a t God's maintenance o f t h e w o r l d — continuous creation—is unnecessary, a n d that, once created, the w o r l d is self-sufficient. B I O L O G Y . Descartes applies this mechanistic theory to a l l o f physics, to his studies i n the fields o f optics a n d meteorology, a n d even to biology. F o r h i m , animals are s i m p l y automatic machines, res externa. Since they are the w o r k o f God's hands, they are, o f course, absolutely perfect machines, b u t they have n o t h i n g i n c o m m o n w i t h t h e s p i r i t u a l a n d t h i n k i n g substance w h i c h is m a n . I n m a n , the p i n e a l b o d y — t h e o n l y o r g a n i n the area o f the b r a i n w h i c h occurs singly a n d f u r t h e r m o r e one whose f u n c t i o n is u n k n o w n — i s the p o i n t at w h i c h the soul a n d the b o d y can affect one another. F r o m the p i n e a l b o d y the soul directs the a c t i v i t y of the animal spirits, a n d vice versa. L a t e r Descartes realized the impossibility o f e x p l a i n i n g the c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h i c h obviously takes place. I n his Treatise on the Passions Descartes begins a series o f attempts to explain the mechanism o f the h u m a n psyche by means o f a c o m b i n a t i o n o f a few f u n d a m e n t a l operations o f the m i n d . T h i s concludes a basic sketch o f Descartes' theory of the w o r l d .
5.
RATIONALISM A N D IDEALISM
Descartes bases his speculation o n the c r i t e r i o n o f self-evidence. T h i s self-evidence does n o t relate either to perception or t o the senses w h i c h f r e q u e n t l y deceive us, b u t to the clearness a n d distinctness o f ideas; i t is the self-evidence of reason. Therefore, Descartes' m e t h o d is r a t i o n a l i s m . M a n ' s only v a l i d c r i t e r i o n is reason, w h i c h is c o m m o n to a l l m e n . M a n is a t h i n k i n g substance, raison; and reason i s one o f the roots o f the a p r i o r i science o f the seventeenth c e n t u r y . Cartesian r a t i o n a l i s m is also the cause o f the equally a p r i o r i a n d a n t i h i s t o r i c a l spirit t h a t shapes the entire f o l l o w i n g century a n d c u l m i n a t e s i n d r a m a t i c fashion i n the French R e v o l u t i o n . O n the other h a n d , Descartes' m e t h o d is also idealist. H o w can this be ? T h e thesis o f idealism is i n d i r e c t opposition to m e t a p h y s i c a l realism. As represented i n ancient Greece and the M i d d l e Ages, realism is the belief that the things have a being of t h e i r o w n , that the ego exists merely as one t h i n g a m o n g others, a n d t h a t t r u e reality consists o f the things, res. T o be means to be (or exist) separately, to have a being that is independent of me. I d e a l i s m , o n the contrary, is t h e belief t h a t the ego has no sure knowledge o f a n y t h i n g other t h a n itself (the cogito); t h a t I k n o w the things only w h i l e I a m seeing t h e m , t o u c h i n g t h e m , t h i n k i n g o f t h e m , desiring t h e m , a n d so forth. (The w o r d cogitatio does not m e a n o n l y thought; i t also includes a l l mental processes.) I n other
Rationalism
and Idealism
223
w o r d s , I know the things o n l y w h i l e I have dealings w i t h t h e m and witness t h e m . I do not a n d cannot k n o w w h a t the things are like w h e n they are apart f r o m m e — n o t even i f they exist i n m e , since I k n o w n o t h i n g o f t h e m w i t h o u t b e i n g present. T h a t is, the things appear as existing or being/or me; thus, they are provisionally ideas o f m i n e and the r e a l i t y that corresponds to t h e m is a n ideal r e a l i t y . T h e being o f things is based on the ego, a n d resembles ideas on the p a r t o f the ego: this is idealism. Since i n Descartes' t h o u g h t reason is o f course no longer the p o i n t i n w h i c h m a n links himself w i t h the supreme reality o f G o d b u t rather s o m e t h i n g exclusively man's o w n , something restricted to his subject i v i t y , rationalism is necessarily changed i n t o i d e a l i s m ; thus later o n i t becomes necessary for G o d to save this subjectivism a n d assure the transcendency o f the t h i n k i n g subject. Descartes bases his philosophy o n these t w o principles o f rationalism a n d idealism, a n d w i t h rare exceptions, f r o m his t i m e u n t i l o u r o w n , philosophy is b o t h o f these things. O n l y i n recent years has metaphysics reached conclusions w h i c h , although d e r i v i n g f r o m the great p a r t i a l truths that the t w o Cartesian principles c o n t a i n , correct t h e element of error t h a t affects t h e m . Recent metaphysics on the one h a n d points out that the ego is i n t u r n essentially dependent on the things i t encounters constantly d u r i n g its life; a n d o n the other h a n d transforms the exclusively speculative a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l conception o f reason. Ortega took a decisive step i n this d i r e c t i o n w i t h his metaphysics o f v i t a l reason. * * Cf. "Los dos cartesianismos" in Ensayos de Uoria [Obras, I V ] .
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Descartes shapes a l l the p h i l o s o p h y o f the seventeenth century on the C o n t i n e n t . H i s influence is seen n o t o n l y i n his p u p i l s a n d i m m e diate followers, b u t also i n the independent thinkers a n d even the theologians Pascal, Fénelon a n d Bossuet. I n France i t is especially apparent i n M a l e b r a n c h e , a n d outside o f France i n the g r e a t figures o f Spinoza a n d L e i b n i z . L e t us see h o w this philosophy develops. i.
MALEBRANCHE
Nicolas de Malebranche was b o r n o f a p r o m i n e n t f a m i l y i n Paris i n 1638 a n d d i e d i n 1715. As he was always i n very poor h e a l t h he endured great suffering a n d had to be extremely cautious. H e s t u d i e d p h i losophy at the Collège de l a M a r c h e , b u t felt deceived, j u s t as Descartes h a d at L a Flèche; later he studied theology at the Sor¬ bonne, b u t the intellectual methods there d i d not satisfy h i m either. I n 1660 he j o i n e d the Congregation o f the O r a t o r y , an o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t has given France a great m a n y m e n o f superior m e n t a l i t y , f r o m M a l e b r a n c h e himself to F a t h e r G r a t r y i n the n i n e t e e n t h century. Fontenelle r e m a r k e d t h a t M a l e b r a n c h e h a d been raised t o the priesthood " b y n a t u r e and grace." T h e members o f the C o n g r e g a t i o n h a d great i n t e l l e c t u a l restlessness a n d studied Plato and St. A u g u s t i n e at the same t i m e t h a t they investigated Descartes' philosophy. I n 1664, M a l e b r a n c h e b o u g h t a copy o f Descartes' Traité de l'homme i n a bookstore ; i t m a d e a tremendous impression o n h i m and he discovered i n i t the m e t h o d w h i c h he had always secretly looked and l o n g e d for. F r o m 224
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t h a t t i m e o n his p r e d i l e c t i o n for philosophy was decided, a n d he began to study Descartes' p h i l o s o p h y seriously. H e completed his education b y s t u d y i n g the w o r k o f St. Augustine i n p a r t i c u l a r a n d also that o f A r n o l d Geulincx, a t h i n k e r f r o m the Netherlands as w e l l as that o f others w h o were concerned w i t h advancing the progress o f n a t u r a l science : Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Gassendi, a n d so o n . T e n years later M a l e b r a n c h e began his l i t e r a r y p r o d u c t i o n . A t the same t i m e he established cordial and/or dissentious relationships w i t h most of the great contemporary figures: A r n a u l d , Fénelon, Bossuet, L e i b n i z , L o c k e , Berkeley. M a l e b r a n c h e was very m u c h d r a w n to the quiet life a n d to solitary m e d i t a t i o n , a n d his life i n the bosom of the c o m m u n i t y of the O r a t o r y was as r e t i r i n g a n d silent as he could make i t . H e died at the age o f seventy-seven, f u l l o f t r a n q u i l l i t y a n d p r o f o u n d religious feeling. WORKS.
M a l e b r a n c h e ' s p r i n c i p a l w o r k is the Recherche de la vérité.
A f t e r w a r d he published the Conversations chrétiennes, a n d later the Méditations chrétiennes. S t i l l l a t e r he w r o t e the
Traité de la nature et de la
grâce, a w o r k that occasioned a violent controversy a n d was included i n the I n d e x b y the R o m a n I n q u i s i t i o n . H e also w r o t e a very i m p o r t a n t dialogue called Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, and a Traité de morale. These are the most i m p o r t a n t items o f Malebranche's philosophie p r o d u c t i o n . OCCASIONALISM. T h e core o f Malebranche's philosophy is his t h e o r y o f occasionalism, w h i c h h a d been begun b y A r n o l d Geulincx, a professor at L o u v a i n a n d later, after his conversion to Calvinism, at L e i d e n . Malebranche's p r o b l e m , w h i c h arises f r o m the Cartesian s i t u a t i o n , is t h a t o f the transcendency o f the t h i n k i n g subject and, i n general, o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the substances. Descartes h a d already attempted to m a k e allowance o f a sort for the interaction between the substances b y reducing i t to the t i n y motions and changes o f the pineal body. M a l e b r a n c h e affirms textually t h a t there is n o t , nor can there be, any c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the m i n d a n d corporeal bodies. " I t is self-evident t h a t bodies are n o t visible i n themselves, that they cannot act u p o n our spirit or manifest themselves to i t " (Recherche de la vérité, explanation X ) . D i r e c t knowledge of the w o r l d is therefore absolutely impossible; however, there is something that makes knowledge o f the w o r l d possible: God has w i t h i n H i m s e l f the ideas o f a l l the created entities ; this is p a r t o f the e x p l a n a t i o n ; f u r t h e r m o r e , " G o d is very closely u n i t e d to our souls b y His presence, so t h a t i t can be said t h a t H e is the site o f spirits, j u s t as space is i n a sense the site o f bodies. Given these t w o things, i t is certain t h a t the spirit can see w h a t there is i n G o d t h a t manifests the
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created beings, since this is v e r y s p i r i t u a l , v e r y i n t e l l i g i b l e a n d v e r y m u c h present t o the s p i r i t . " A n d a few pages f u r t h e r o n , M a l e b r a n c h e adds : " I f we d i d n o t see G o d i n some m a n n e r , we w o u l d n o t see anyt h i n g " (Recherche de la vérité, book I I I , p a r t 2, chapter V I ) . T h e d i f f i c u l t y is f o u n d i n the phrase " i n some m a n n e r . " G o d is k n o w n i n d i r e c t l y ; H e is reflected i n the created things, as i n a m i r r o r ; according t o t h e text o f St. Paul ( R o m a n s 1:20) : Invisibilia Dei. . .per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur ( T h e invisible things o f h i m . . .
are clearly seen, being understood b y the things t h a t are m a d e ) . M a l e b r a n c h e strives to r e t a i n a correct a n d admissible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the vision o f G o d , b u t he does n o t succeed i n a v o i d i n g e r r o r . H e freq u e n t l y inverts the terms o f the Paulist f o r m u l a a n d affirms t h e direct knowledge o f G o d a n d o f the things i n H i m . T h i s error has h a d repercussions, especially on A n t o n i o R o s m i n i - S e r b a t i a n d V i n c e n z o G i o b e r t i , I t a l i a n " ontologists " o f the n i n e t e e n t h century. I t is G o d w h o makes i t possible for m e to k n o w the inaccessible things. H i s s p i r i t u a l i t y carries w i t h i n i t the ideas o f t h e c o r p o r e a l things created b y H i m . A l l things have i n c o m m o n the fact t h a t they are created beings. Being is present i n the things a n d i n a sense unifies t h e m , i n spite o f their basic diversity. T h i s complete o n t o l o g i c a l l i n k is w h a t p e r m i t s us to speak m e a n i n g f u l l y oîreason. F r o m the c o n d i t i o n o f a subjectivity w i t h o u t reference to r e a l i t y , one w o u l d n o t be able t o say t h a t r e a l i t y existed. T h e things are extended a n d corporeal, foreign to m y s p i r i t ; b u t God's ideas, the models a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the things are created—a u n i o n of A u g u s t i n i a n i s m a n d Cartesianism—are spiritual, adapted to the t h i n k i n g being, a n d G o d is the site o f the spirits. M a n partakes o f G o d , a n d through Him o f the things, a n d thus the m e t a physical g u l f is b r i d g e d . T h e r e is n o d i r e c t i n t e r a c t i o n between the substances; the h a r m o n y between t h e m is achieved b y G o d ; this is the theory o f the occasional causes : I do n o t perceive the things ; rather, on the occasion o f a movement o f the res externa, G o d arouses i n me a certain idea ; o n the occasion of a v o l i t i o n o n m y p a r t , G o d moves the extended b o d y t h a t is m y a r m . W h a t is decisive is the h u m a n spirit's relationship w i t h G o d , and w i t h the things o n l y t h r o u g h h i m . M a l e branche is f u l l y aware o f this: " T h e r e is no one w h o does n o t agree that a l l m e n are capable o f k n o w i n g t r u t h ; a n d even t h e least enlightened philosophers agree t h a t m a n partakes o f a c e r t a i n reason w h i c h they d o n o t specify. Therefore, they define m a n as animal RATiONis particeps : for there is no one w h o does not k n o w , at least confusedly, t h a t the essential characteristic o f m a n consists i n the necessary u n i o n t h a t he has w i t h universal r e a s o n " (Recherche de la vérité, e x p l a n a t i o n X ) .
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Malebranche's w o r d s are so clear a n d m e a n i n g f u l t h a t I prefer to quote t h e m t e x t u a l l y , r a t h e r t h a n c o m m e n t u p o n t h e m . I n God we see a l l the things ; this is the necessary c o n d i t i o n for a l l knowledge a n d a l l t r u t h . M a l e b r a n c h e takes l i t e r a l l y a n d s t r i c t l y St. John's words i n the f o u r t h Gospel : G o d
is lux vera quae illuminât omnem hominem venientem in
hunc mundum (the T r u e L i g h t , w h i c h l i g h t e t h every m a n that cometh i n t o the w o r l d ) . Therefore, G o d is absolutely necessary; a l t h o u g h the t o t a l i t y o f the essence o f G o d is not k n o w n , i t is necessary to k n o w at least that H e exists. Malebranche's philosophy also requires p r o o f o f the existence o f G o d , a n d finds its basis i n this. M a l e b r a n c h e carries Cartesianism to its u l t i m a t e consequences i n the d i r e c t i o n indicated by its founder. O t h e r philosophers w i l l begin at the same p o i n t b u t w i l l follow different paths.
2.
T H E RELIGIOUS THINKERS
I n the seventeenth c e n t u r y and i n the first years o f the eighteenth there is i n France a series o f Catholic thinkers, m o s t l y theologians a n d even mystics, w h o are p r o f o u n d l y influenced b y Cartesian philosophy. There thus originates a n extremely f r u i t f u l i n t e l l e c t u a l current t h a t characterizes F r e n c h s p i r i t u a l life for a c e n t u r y a n d conditions the subsequent destiny o f F r e n c h philosophy. I n other countries theological t h o u g h t remains attached to the m e n t a l a n d even expository forms of Scholasticism, w h i l e m o d e r n philosophy follows a separate course w i t h o u t even t o u c h i n g t h e m . T h e French religious thinkers follow i n the medieval t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h is composed of t w o p r i n c i p a l p a r t s — t h e philosophy o f St. Augustine a n d t h a t o f St. T h o m a s ; b u t they are influenced b y Cartesianism, especially i n regard to Descartes' m e t h o d , a n d f r o m this synthesis there arises a new f o r m o f t h o u g h t w h i c h could perhaps be called " Cartesian t h e o l o g y " or even modern theology. T h e general architecture o f T h o m i s m is m a i n t a i n e d over a base of August i n i a n presuppositions b u t , at the same t i m e , Descartes' philosophic discoveries are u t i l i z e d , as are his methods o f investigation and l i t e r a r y exposition. I n this w a y the Hellenic a n d m e d i e v a l traditions are salvaged a n d are studied i n the l i g h t of m o d e r n t h o u g h t ; thus i n France Catholic t h o u g h t retains a v i t a l i t y that i t soon loses i n other places. O n the other h a n d , these theologians constantly t o u c h o n philosophic problems, a n d f r e q u e n t l y they b r i n g to bear o n philosophy the precision and h i g h standards w h i c h theology has always c o n t r i b u t e d to metaphysical t h o u g h t . T H E JANSENISTS. Cornells Jansen or Jansenius, bishop o f Ypres, w h o was closely connected w i t h the A b b é de S a i n t - C y r a n , t r i e d to
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create a theological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f h u m a n n a t u r e a n d grace based o n the t h o u g h t o f St. Augustine a n d the Fathers o f the C h u r c h . I n 1640, shortly after the author's death, Jansen's Augustinus was p u b lished; i t was c o n d e m n e d three years later. T h e Jansenist s p i r i t i n f i l t r a t e d i n p a r t i c u l a r the abbey o f P o r t - R o y a l , w h i c h was r u n b y M o t h e r A n g é l i q u e A r n a u l d . I n France, t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n o f the Augustinus a n d the condensation o f Jansenist d o c t r i n e i n t o five p r o p o sitions, w h i c h w e r e also condemned, l e d t o a l o n g a n d l i v e l y c o n t r o versy, the details o f w h i c h do n o t p e r t a i n t o this discussion. I n brief, the Jansenists opposed the m o r a l casuistry o f t h e Jesuits, w h o m they accused o f l a x i t y . T h e most i m p o r t a n t t h i n k e r s o f the P o r t - R o y a l g r o u p were A n t o i n e A r n a u l d (1612-1694) a n d Pierre N i c o l e (1625¬ 1695). A p a r t f r o m t h e i r theological w o r k s , they are together t h e authors o f the famous book e n t i t l e d La logique ou Vart depenser, k n o w n b y the t i t l e o f Logic of
Port-Royal.
PASCAL. Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), a b r i l l i a n t m a t h e m a t i c i a n o f exceptional p r e c o c i t y a n d a mystic a n d polemicist w i t h a p r o f o u n d a n d passionately religious spirit, m a i n t a i n e d close ties w i t h the recluses o f P o r t - R o y a l . A p a r t f r o m his physical a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l treatises, Pascal w r o t e the Lettres a un Provincial or Lettresprovinciales, b y means o f w h i c h he took p a r t i n the anti-Jesuit polemics, a n d above a l l , his Pensées sur la religion, a f r a g m e n t a r y w o r k o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y religious a n d philosophic interest; a c t u a l l y i t consists o f o n l y r a n d o m notes for a book t h a t was never w r i t t e n . Seemingly, Pascal is opposed to Cartesianism, to its confidence i n reason, a n d is almost a skeptic. B u t i n r e a l i t y Pascal is i n large measure Cartesian, even w h e n he opposes Descartes. P r i m a r i l y he is rigorously m o t i v a t e d b y C h r i s t i a n presuppositions, a n d his t h o u g h t evolves f r o m t h e m . I f on the one h a n d Pascal, like Descartes, apprehends m a n i n his t h i n k i n g d i m e n s i o n , o n the other h a n d he is acutely aware o f m a n ' s f r a i l t y , dependence a n d misery: m a n is a t h i n k i n g reed (un roseaupensant). A n d one rises f r o m this misery o f m a n separated f r o m G o d to the greatness o f m a n together w i t h G o d , w h o is great because he recognizes his dependence a n d can have knowledge o f the D e i t y . Pascal's a n t h r o p o l o g y is o f v e r y great interest. W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p r o b l e m o f Pascal's a t t i t u d e t o w a r d reason, i t is necessary to emphasize t h a t he distinguishes between w h a t he calls raison—which is generally understood to m e a n reasoning p o w e r o r s y l l o g i s m — a n d w h a t he calls cceur, heart. " T h e h e a r t , " he says, " h a s its reasons o f w h i c h reason knows n o t h i n g . " A n d he adds, " W e k n o w t r u t h not o n l y t h r o u g h reason, b u t also t h r o u g h the h e a r t ; w e k n o w the first principles b y the latter way, a n d i n v a i n does reasoning, w h i c h
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does n o t p a r t a k e o f t h e m , t r y to discredit t h e m . . . . O u r knowledge o f the first principles is as f i r m as any knowledge t h a t reasoning furnishes us. A n d i t is o n knowledge obtained t h r o u g h the heart a n d the i n s t i n c t t h a t reason must depend a n d o n w h i c h i t m u s t base a l l its discourse. " Cœur has n o t h i n g to d o w i t h sentiment; r a t h e r , for Pascal i t is a f a c u l t y for o b t a i n i n g knowledge of the p r i n c i p a l t r u t h s w h i c h are the basis for reasoning. Pascal seeks G o d , b u t since he is basically a religious m a n , he wants to seek G o d i n C h r i s t , a n d n o t o n l y i n m e r e reason; he writes these words, w h i c h echo A u g u s t i n i a n t h o u g h t : " T r u t h itself is m a d e a n i d o l . B u t t r u t h separated f r o m c h a r i t y is n o t G o d ; i t is H i s image, a n i d o l w h i c h one need n o t love o r w o r s h i p . " A n d he sums u p his w h o l e philosophic attitude i n a phrase w h i c h illuminates its t r u e m e a n i n g : " T w o excesses: to exclude reason; to a d m i t n o t h i n g but reason." BOSSUET. O n e o f the major figures o f t h a t theological c u r r e n t i n fluenced b y Descartes' philosophy was Jacques Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704), bishop o f M e a u x . Bossuet was a n i m p o r t a n t personality of his day, a n d the soul o f the C h u r c h i n France for h a l f a century. H e was a great religious orator, historian, t h e o l o g i a n a n d philosopher. I n association w i t h L e i b n i z , he was very active i n the trente negotiations aimed at r e c o n c i l i n g the Protestant a n d C a t h o l i c Churches; i n this c o n n e c t i o n , he w r o t e his History of the Variations in the Protestant Churches.
His most significant philosophical works are the treatise De la connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même a n d the Discours sur l'histoire universelle, a t r u e
philosophy o f h i s t o r y w h i c h relates to St. Augustine's City of God a n d w h i c h , i n a c e r t a i n m a n n e r , prepares the w a y for the w o r k o f V i c o , H e r d e r a n d especially Hegel. F É N E L O N . A n o t h e r great ecclesiastical figure i n France is Fénelon (1651-1715), the A r c h b i s h o p o f C a m b r a i . Fénelon engaged i n a c o n troversy w i t h Bossuet over quietism, the heresy w h i c h was i n t r o d u c e d b y the S p a n i a r d M i g u e l de M o l i n o s , a u t h o r o f the Guia espiritual, a n d was spread a b r o a d i n France by M a d a m e G u y o n . C e r t a i n propositions i n Fénelon's Histoire des maximes des saints were condemned ; as a faithful C h r i s t i a n , he retracted his error. H i s most interesting p h i l o sophical w o r k is the Traité de l'existence de Dieu.
I n a c e r t a i n sense, Fénelon represents a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f Bossuet's t h o u g h t , b u t he carries i t even further. N o t o n l y does he adopt a series of Descartes' discoveries, such as his d u a l i s m a n d the conception o f m a n as a t h i n k i n g e n t i t y ; he also makes Descartes' m e t h o d his o w n : universal d o u b t . S t a r t i n g w i t h the i n d u b i t a b l e self-evidence o f the ego, he attempts to reconstruct reality a n d to a r r i v e at G o d . T h e second
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p a r t o f his treatise is u n a d u l t e r a t e d Cartesianism. B u t whereas Descartes is purely a n d s i m p l y a philosopher, Fenelon is above a l l a theol o g i a n ; i n the last analysis, therefore, the o r i e n t a t i o n o f his t h o u g h t is v e r y different.
Spinoza L I F E A N D W O R K S . Baruch de Spinoza was b o r n i n A m s t e r d a m i n 1632. H e came f r o m a family o f Spanish Jews w h o years before h a d e m i g r a t e d to P o r t u g a l and afterward to the Netherlands. H i s religious opinions caused his expulsion f r o m the synagogue, a n d f r o m t h a t t i m e o n he was m o r e closely associated w i t h C h r i s t i a n circles, a l t h o u g h he d i d n o t profess Christianity. H e L a t i n i z e d his given n a m e B a r u c h (blessed), using the f o r m Benedictus. H i s life was spent i n H o l l a n d , especially i n the c i t y o f his b i r t h a n d i n T h e H a g u e ; he was always poor a n d w i t h d r a w n , a n d he earned his l i v i n g b y polishing lenses. Spinoza (or perhaps he m i g h t be called b y the Spanish f o r m o f his n a m e , Espinosa, w h i c h his f a m i l y p r o b a b l y used o r i g i n a l l y ) was always sickly a n d felt a great need o f independence. W h e n offered a professorship at the U n i v e r s i t y o f H e i d e l b e r g , he refused i n o r d e r n o t to compromise his freedom. Spinoza was a loyal friend o f J a n de W i t t . H e was still y o u n g when he d i e d i n 1677.
H i s w r i t i n g s , w i t h the exception o f a few works i n D u t c h , are almost a l l i n L a t i n . T h e most i m p o r t a n t w o r k s are the Tractatus de intellects
emendatione, the Brief Treatise on God, Man and His Happiness (in D u t c h ) , the Tractatus theologico-politicus, the Tractatus politics (an exposition o f Descartes' Principia), the Cogitata metaphysica a n d , above a l l , his masterw o r k , p u b l i s h e d after his death: the Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. T h i s w o r k follows the manner o f exposition customary i n books o n mathematics, w i t h axioms, definitions, propositions w i t h t h e i r proofs, scholia a n d corollaries. I t is an example o f the rationalistic a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l tendencies carried to their extreme a n d b y this t i m e affecting even the e x t e r n a l f o r m o f philosophy.
Spinoza
2J2 i.
METAPHYSICS
T H E P O I N T O F D E P A R T U R E . Spinoza appears as the heir o f several philosophical traditions. First o f a l l a n d most d i r e c t l y , he follows i n the p a t h recently established b y Descartes; i n a d d i t i o n , he has ties w i t h Scholasticism, p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h Scotism a n d O c c a m i s m ; he has studied the w o r k o f Suarez. H e also has contact w i t h Jewish sources: first, w i t h the Bible a n d the T a l m u d ; secondly, w i t h medieval Jewish philosophers, p r i n c i p a l l y M a i m o n i d e s and those o f the C a b b a l a . A n o t h e r influence should be n o t e d : the Greek t r a d i t i o n , especially Stoicism. A n d , o f course, there is the influence o f the n a t u r a l science o f Spinoza's day a n d the philosophy o f G i o r d a n o B r u n o , as w e l l as H o b b e s ' theories of the State a n d politics. These are the p r i n c i p a l roots o f Spinoza's t h o u g h t ; f r o m t h e m he derives his u n i q u e p h i l o sophical personality w i t h i n seventeenth-century metaphysics. S U B S T A N C E . Spinoza adopts Descartes' situation as his starting p o i n t . For Descartes, substance was understood as t h a t w h i c h has need o f n o t h i n g else i n order to exist; strictly speaking, o n l y G o d c o u l d be substance. A f t e r w a r d Descartes came across other substances w h i c h d i d n o t need other creatures i n order to exist, a l t h o u g h they d i d need G o d ; these were the res cogitans a n d the res extensa. Spinoza accepts this q u i t e rigorously, and defines substance i n this w a y : Per substantiam
intelligo id quod in se est et perse concipitur ; hoc est, id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat ( " B y substance I understand t h a t w h i c h exists i n itself a n d is conceived t h r o u g h itself; t h a t is, t h a t t h i n g the concept of w h i c h does not have need o f the concept o f any other t h i n g , by w h i c h i t must be f o r m e d " ) . Therefore, Spinoza w i l l o n l y recognize a single substance. W h a t , then, are a l l the other things ? T h e y are not substances, b u t attributes; an a t t r i b u t e is t h a t w h i c h the m i n d perceives i n substance as a constituent o f its essence. T h e r e are a n i n f i n i t e n u m b e r o f attributes, b u t the intellect knows o n l y t w o : cogitatio a n d extensio, t h o u g h t a n d extension, t h a t is, Descartes' res cogitans a n d res extensa, n o w demoted i n the ontological h i e r a r c h y ; they are no longer substances, b u t merely attributes o f the one substance. T h e individual things—which Descartes h a d already deprived o f t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l nature as p a r t o f substance, reserving the name o f substance for his t w o res—are modes o f substance, t h a t is, affections o f substance; they are t h a t w h i c h exists i n some other t h i n g a n d is conceived through some other t h i n g . These modes affect substance according to its different attributes. G O D . Spinoza defines G o d as the absolutely infinite e n t i t y , t h a t is, the
Metaphysics substance w h i c h consists o f i n f i n i t e attributes, each one o f w h i c h expresses a n eternal a n d i n f i n i t e essence. T h i s e n t i t y coincides w i t h the single possible substance. G o d is the necessary e n t i t y , the e n t i t y a se, a n d is synonymous w i t h substance ; the attributes o f substance are the i n f i n i t e attributes o f G o d . A n d this G o d o f Spinoza's, w h o is equated w i t h substance, is nature. Deus sive natura (God, or n a t u r e ) , Spinoza says. Substance—or G o d — i s everything that exists, a n d a l l the things are affections o f H i m . Therefore, H e is nature i n a double sense. I n one sense, a l l things proceed f r o m G o d a n d G o d is the o r i g i n o f a l l things; this is w h a t Spinoza calls natura naturans. B u t , o n the other h a n d , G o d does n o t create a n y t h i n g w h i c h is different f r o m Himself, so t h a t H e is n a t u r e i n another sense : H e is the emerging, b u d d i n g things t h e m selves; this is w h a t Spinoza calls natura naturata. T h u s , Spinoza's system is pantheistic. Spinoza's G o d is expressed t h r o u g h the i n d i v i d u a l things i n the t w o basic attributes w h i c h m a n knows : t h o u g h t a n d extension. T h u s , this is a reappearance o f Descartes' o u t l i n e , b u t w i t h a n essential change: o f Descartes' three substances, one infinite and t w o finite, o n l y the first is s t i l l characterized as substance, w h i l e the other t w o are n o w a t t r i butes o f substance. C O M M U N I C A T I O N B E T W E E N T H E S U B S T A N C E S . W e have seen h o w the p r o b l e m o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the substances made its appearance w i t h i n Descartes' metaphysics, a n d we have observed the first s o l u t i o n to i t as p r o v i d e d b y occasionalism. M a l e b r a n c h e denies t h a t there is any actual c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the substances. Spinoza's doctrine is m u c h m o r e r a d i c a l : he f r a n k l y a n d openly denies a l l p l u r a l i t y o f substance. T h e r e is o n l y one substance, w i t h t w o a t t r i butes ; there can be no communication, b u t only correspondence. T h e r e is a strict parallelism between the t w o attributes o f the single substance w h i c h m a n knows, extension a n d t h o u g h t , and therefore, between the m i n d a n d corporeal things : Ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum (The order a n d connection o f ideas are the same as the order a n d connection o f the t h i n g s ) . A n d i t is precisely b y his d e p r i v i n g extension a n d thought ( i n short, the world'm. its broadest sense) o f their s t a n d i n g as substances, w h i c h they still retained for Descartes, and r e d u c i n g t h e m to mere attributes o f the single substance, t h a t Spinoza is compelled to identify substance w i t h God, o n the one h a n d , and w i t h n a t u r e , on the other : Deus sive substantia sive natura ( G o d , or substance, or n a t u r e ) . I t is at this p o i n t that Spinoza's p a n t h e i s m arises. H i s p h i l o s o p h y is scarcely concerned w i t h a n y t h i n g else b u t G o d , b u t a l t h o u g h this w o u l d seem to be a new theology, i t is o n l y the metaphysical study o f substance a n d , at the same t i m e , the r a t i o n a l
Spinoza consideration o f nature, understood as Descartes unders t o o d i t , geometrically. I n Spinoza's system, as i n a l l o t h e r seventeenth-century systems, i t is necessary to establish the existence o f G o d , b u t here i n a perhaps even m o r e extreme sense, since i t is necessary to a t t r i b u t e to nature itself n o t o n l y the standing o f substance b u t godhood as w e l l . F o r Spinoza, being does not m e a n being that is created by God, b u t s i m p l y
God's being. 2.
ETHICS
T H E P L A N O F T H E " E T H I C S . " Spinoza's metaphysics culminates i n his ethics. Therefore, his m a j o r w o r k , i n w h i c h he expounds the general content o f his philosophy, bears that title. T h e Ethics (Ethica ordine geométrico demonstrata) is d i v i d e d i n t o five parts: I . O f G o d ; I I . O f the N a t u r e a n d O r i g i n o f the M i n d ; I I I . O f the O r i g i n a n d N a t u r e o f the Passions; I V . O f H u m a n Bondage, or O f the Force o f the Passions; a n d V . O f the Power o f the Intellect, o r O f H u m a n F r e e d o m . First o f a l l , therefore, he expounds his o n t o l o g y : the theory o f G o d , or substance. Secondly, he studies the structure o f the m i n d a n d takes u p the p r o b l e m o f knowledge. T h e n he enumerates a n d defines the passions, w h i c h he interprets i n a naturalistic a n d geometrical fashion: he wishes to speak a b o u t h u m a n actions a n d drives " as i f discussing lines, planes or solid b o d i e s . " Lastly, he expounds his theory o f h u m a n slavery or freedom, depending o n w h e t h e r man's passions o r his reason p r e v a i l ; i t is i n these final sections, i n w h i c h he states his ethical p r o b l e m p r o p e r , t h a t the meaning o f his whole p h i losophy is s u m m e d u p .
M A N . F o r Spinoza, everything is n a t u r e ; i t makes no sense to contrast something else, such as spirit, w i t h nature. M a n is cogitatio, t h o u g h t , b u t this thought is j u s t as m u c h nature as a stone is. M a n is a mode o f substance, a mere m o d i f i c a t i o n o f G o d i n the t w o attributes o f extension a n d t h o u g h t ; i n this consists the u n i q u e s t a n d i n g o f m a n , w h o has a b o d y and a soul; the soul is the idea o f the b o d y . A n d j u s t as there is a n exact correspondence between ideas a n d things, so there is a strict parallelism between the soul a n d the body. E v e r y t h i n g t h a t happens to or affects m a n , a n d especially his o w n passions, is n a t u r a l a n d follows the necessary course o f nature. For Spinoza, " t h a t t h i n g is called free w h i c h exists only b y necessity o f its nature a n d determines its actions b y i t s e l f " ; this is a concept o f freedom w h i c h allows freedom o n l y to G o d . Spinoza is a d e t e r m i n i s t : " M a n cannot be considered as a n e m p i r e w i t h i n another e m p i r e . " Therefore, m a n is n o t free a n d the w o r l d does n o t have a teleological e n d ; everything is necessary a n d
Being as a Desire to Survive causally determined. M a n is a slave because he believes he is free w h i l e being d r a w n a l o n g b y necessity. O n l y one type o f freedom remains open : knowledge. W h e n m a n knows w h a t he is, he knows t h a t he is not free a n d does n o t feel constrained or coerced, b u t determ i n e d according to his essence; therefore, reason is freedom. T h e being o f m a n , w h o is a m o d e o f substance, a mens a n d a corpus, consists i n n o t being free a n d k n o w i n g i t , i n l i v i n g w i t h i n n a t u r e , i n G o d . T h i s is a n echo o f the Stoic p r i n c i p l e -.parère Deo libertas est, obedience to G o d is freedom. Philosophy, the knowledge concerning b e i n g a n d substance, is a knowledge of G o d . A n d this highest type o f knowledge, i n w h i c h freed o m a n d happiness reside, is amor Dei intelleclualis, the intellectual love o f G o d , w h i c h for Spinoza represents the c u l m i n a t i o n o f b o t h p h i losophy a n d h u m a n life. 3.
B E I N G AS A
DESIRE
TO
SURVIVE
I n the t h i r d p a r t o f his Ethics, Spinoza expounds a conception o f being as a longing to go o n l i v i n g forever; i t is i m p o r t a n t to touch on this conception, i f only v e r y briefly. Every t h i n g , says Spinoza, i n so far as i t exists i n itself, tends to persevere i n its being, a n d this desire is n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n the a c t u a l essence o f the t h i n g ; i t is a desire i n v o l v i n g a limitless, i n f i n i t e t i m e ; i t is a l o n g i n g to continue to exist forever. T h e h u m a n m i n d wishes to endure w i t h o u t l i m i t a t i o n i n t i m e a n d is aware of this desire, w h i c h , w h e n referring to the m i n d alone, is called the will, and w h e n r e f e r r i n g to the m i n d a n d the body together, is called an urge. T h i s urge to live is n o t h i n g other t h a n the very essence o f m a n : his wish is the awareness o f his urge. W e do not seek after things, Spinoza says, we do n o t w a n t or l o n g for something because we believe i t is good, b u t j u s t the reverse: we t h i n k something is good because we seek i t , w a n t i t , l o n g for i t or desire i t . This cupiditas (longing) is man's p r i n c i p a l e m o t i o n ; there are t w o other major emotions, j o y a n d sadness, w h i c h correspond to an i n crease or a d i m i n u t i o n , respectively, of being a n d perfection. A l l the other emotions are d e r i v e d f r o m these three, as is man's entire psychic life : love, hate, and so f o r t h . Therefore, w h a t constitutes the being o f things for Spinoza is a desire, a striving, a n d this desire is a yearning to l i v e forever. Thus, for Spinoza, to be means to want to be forever, to have a longing for eternity or at least for a lasting existence. T h e essence o f m a n is wishing : m a n consists i n the wish to l i v e forever and the knowledge that he wishes i t . T h i s is the deep-rooted f o r m i n w h i c h the problems o f being a n d i m m o r t a l i t y are l i n k e d together i n Spinoza's philosophy.
Leibni^
L I F E A N D C H A R A C T E R . G o t t f r i e d W i l h e l m L e i b n i z was b o r n i n L e i p z i g i n 1646 a n d died i n H a n o v e r i n 1716. His family- was Protestant, a n d m a n y o f his forebears h a d p r a c t i c e d law. L e i b n i z devoted himself to intensive study f r o m a v e r y early age. H e learned the classical languages, Greek a n d L a t i n ; the literatures of a n t i q u i t y ; Scholastic philosophy, o f w h i c h he acquired a v e r y good knowledge; a n d , afterw a r d , m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y — F r a n c i s Bacon, Campanella, Descartes, Hobbes. H e became acquainted w i t h the mathematics a n d physics o f his day, a n d studied the works o f K e p l e r a n d Galileo. I n a d d i t i o n , he seriously p o n d e r e d questions o f l a w a n d history, took u p the study o f alchemy a n d felt a boundless curiosity for a l l forms of knowledge.
L e i b n i z soon began to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the life o f his age. H e sent papers to the E u r o p e a n learned societies; he went to France as p a r t o f a d i p l o m a t i c mission, and made the acquaintance of the greatest intellectuals o f t h a t t i m e ; he also visited L o n d o n . L a t e r , i n 1676, he invented the infinitesimal calculus, le calcul des infiniment petits, at the same t i m e t h a t N e w t o n invented the same discipline, a l t h o u g h N e w t o n developed i t i n a different f o r m a n d called i t the method of fluxions. A great controversy raged between the partisans o f b o t h m e n — g r e a t e r than t h a t between the t w o originators themselves—but i t appears t h a t each one developed the calculus independently, w i t h o u t reciprocal influences. W h e n L e i b n i z r e t u r n e d to G e r m a n y , the D u k e o f B r u n s w i c k appointed h i m l i b r a r i a n of the d u c a l l i b r a r y at H a n o v e r , where he lived almost constantly f r o m t h a t t i m e o n , except when he was t r a v 236
Leibniz^ Philosophic Situation eling. A t H a n o v e r he was engaged i n intense i n t e l l e c t u a l , d i p l o m a t i c a n d p o l i t i c a l activities ; he also busied himself as a historian, c o m p i l i n g the Annales Brunswicenses. O n his o w n i n i t i a t i v e he founded the B e r l i n A c a d e m y o f Sciences i n 1700, m o d e l i n g i t o n those o f Paris a n d L o n d o n ; he was its first president. A n i m p o r t a n t figure o f his t i m e , he also traveled i n I t a l y , A u s t r i a a n d H o l l a n d . H e was actively concerned w i t h his p l a n to u n i f y t h e Catholic a n d Protestant Churches. L e i b n i z was very m u c h a t t r a c t e d t o Catholicism, b u t d i d n o t wish to renounce his background a n d be converted ; he wished instead to reconcile t h e t w o creeds. Despite his efforts a n d those o f Bossuet a n d Rojas Spinola, the project failed. L e i b n i z d i e d i n obscurity, almost totally neglected after an intense life f u l l o f marvelous i n t e l l e c t u a l achievement. W O R K S . L e i b n i z w r o t e numerous books o n mathematics, physics, history a n d especially philosophy. N e a r l y a l l his works are w r i t t e n i n French or i n L a t i n , a n d o n l y a very few, secondary ones i n G e r m a n . N o one h a d yet c u l t i v a t e d G e r m a n as a language suitable for p h i losophy; i t was L e i b n i z ' p u p i l W o l f f w h o first d i d this. L e i b n i z ' entire personality reveals a strong French influence, a n d alongside the i n t e r national l a n g u a g e — L a t i n — h e preferred to use French, the civilized language o f the era. L e i b n i z ' p r i n c i p a l philosophical works are t w o l o n g books, the Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain a n d the Théodice'e. T h e first o f these, directed against the English philosopher Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, was n o t published d u r i n g L e i b n i z ' lifetime, because Locke died w h i l e i t was being prepared for p u b l i c a t i o n . T h e Theodicy poses the p r o b l e m o f the justification of God's ways, t h a t is, the p r o b l e m o f reconciling God's goodness and o m n i p o tence w i t h the existence o f evil a n d w i t h h u m a n freedom. I n a d d i t i o n , L e i b n i z produced several b r i e f writings, i n p a r t i c u l a r the Discours de métaphysique, perhaps his most systematic a n d interesting philosophical
exposition ; the Système nouveau de la nature ; the Principes de la nature et de la grâce, fondés en raison ; a n d the Monadologie, w r i t t e n for Prince Eugene of Savoy. Besides these, L e i b n i z left a great deal o f correspondence o n intellectual matters w i t h A r n a u l d , Clarke a n d others ; most o f this is still unpublished. 1.
LEIBNIZ'
PHILOSOPHIC SITUATION
L e i b n i z represents t h e end of the period o f p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h began w i t h Descartes a n d w h i c h more or less corresponds to the Baroque age. T h i s means that L e i b n i z appears at the end o f a seldom equaled epoch of intense metaphysical speculation; indeed, w h e n Leibniz reached his intellectual m a t u r i t y this metaphysical o u t b u r s t h a d already been going o n for sixty years. T h e rationalist systems h a d succeeded one
Leibniz^ another r a p i d l y — t h o s e o f Descartes, M a l e b r a n c h e , Spinoza, the thinkers o f P o r t - R o y a l , the Jansenists. T h i s era h a d also witnessed a great outburst o f theological speculation: Spanish Scholasticism, w h i c h i n c l u d e d Suarez, M e l c h o r Gano, Banez, M o l i n a a n d a l l the speculation centered o n the C o u n c i l o f T r e n t . L e i b n i z is aware o f this double c u r r e n t m a d e u p o f rationalism, o n one h a n d , a n d Scholastic i s m — p a r t i c u l a r l y Spanish Scholasticism—on the other. H i s pages are sprinkled w i t h Spanish names, precisely the names o f those i n d i viduals w h o possessed true intellectual w o r t h a n d c o m m a n d places i n the l i v i n g h i s t o r y o f t h o u g h t , those w h o have affected philosophy a n d been i n t e l l e c t u a l l y precise; this is c o m f o r t i n g to anyone w h o keeps the meaning o f t r u t h alive a n d does not d e l i g h t i n easy praise w h e r e i n a l l clarity a n d c r i t i c a l j u d g m e n t are lost. L e i b n i z rose completely above that disdain o f Scholasticism w h i c h characterized the superficial thinkers o f the Renaissance and w h i c h the earliest rationalists retained, at least e x t e r n a l l y ; he once more e x p l i c i t l y makes use of A r i s t o t e l i a n ideas, as w e l l as numerous medieval ideas a n d m a n y o f the acute theological concepts p u t forth at T r e n t . I n a d d i t i o n , he devotes h i m self intensely to mathematics and the new n a t u r a l science, a n d a d v a n ces b o t h to a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y degree. I n this w a y he unites a n d c o m pletely dominates a l l philosophic, theological a n d scientific traditions. Leibniz is the e p i t o m e o f the entire age. T h e specific b a c k g r o u n d against w h i c h L e i b n i z moves is the p h i l o sophic s i t u a t i o n bequeathed by Descartes a n d Spinoza. L e i b n i z is perhaps the first idealist i n the strict sense o f the w o r d ; i n Descartes, idealism is still weighed d o w n w i t h realism a n d Scholastic ideas, a n d Spinoza is n o t really a n idealist w i t h r e g a r d to w h a t is most characteristic or personal i n his t h o u g h t , a l t h o u g h perhaps the ideological tenor o f his t i m e , w i t h i n w h i c h he stated his problems, was idealistic. Leibniz w i l l see h i m s e l f obliged to set f o r t h w i t h precision the great questions o f the epoch, a n d he w i l l have to alter essentially the conception o f physics a n d the very idea o f substance, i n w h i c h philosophy since Aristotle has always been centered.
2.
LEIBNIZ'
METAPHYSICS
D Y N A M I S M . F o r Descartes, being was either res cogitans o r res extensa. T h e physical w o r l d was extension, something at rest. T h e concept o f force was foreign to h i m ; he found i t confusing a n d obscure, a n d d i d not see how i t c o u l d be translated i n t o geometrical concepts. Descartes understood m o t i o n as a change of position o f a m o v i n g b o d y i n respect to a p o i n t o f reference; the t w o points are interchangeable: to say t h a t
Leihniz^ Metaphysics A moves i n respect to B is the same as saying t h a t B moves i n respect to A; physics is interested o n l y i n change o f position. Descartes believed that the q u a n t i t y o f m o t i o n i n the universe (mv) remains constant. Leibniz shows t h a t w h a t is constant is the kinetic energy, vis viva (\mv ). Descartes' static, geometrical concept o f physics seems absurd to L e i b n i z . M o t i o n is n o t mere change o f position, b u t something real, something p r o d u c e d b y a force. I f one b i l l i a r d b a l l collides w i t h another, the l a t t e r is sent off; this is so because there is a force, a vis, w h i c h sets the second b i l l i a r d b a l l i n m o t i o n . T h i s concept o f force, vis, impetus, conatus, is the basis o f L e i b n i z ' physics—and his m e t a physics as w e l l . Descartes'notion o f static a n d i n e r t nature is replaced by a dynamic concept o f n a t u r e ; a physics based o n energy is set u p i n opposition to a physics based on e x t e n s i o n — i n short, a physical rather t h a n a geometrical concept o f n a t u r e . O n e must not forget that since the days o f Greece nature was the principle of motion. N o w Leibniz must a r r i v e at a new idea o f substance. 2
T H E M O N A D S . F o r L e i b n i z , the metaphysical structure o f the w o r l d consists o f the monads. M o n a d ( i n Greek, /¿ovas) means unity. T h e monads are basic substances, substances w i t h o u t component parts, w h i c h g r o u p to f o r m complex things; they are the elements o f the things. Since they are not made up o f parts, they are strictly indivisible —atoms—and therefore unextended, for atoms cannot have extension, inasmuch as extension is always divisible. A " m a t e r i a l a t o m " is a c o n t r a d i c t o r y expression: the m o n a d is aformal atom. These elemental monads cannot decay or perish t h r o u g h disintegration, nor can they be b u i l t u p f r o m parts. Therefore a m o n a d comes to be only t h r o u g h creation a n d ceases to be only t h r o u g h a n n i h i l a t i o n . Thus a m o n a d comes i n t o being tout d'un coup and n o t b y a process of generation. Leibniz says t h a t these monads are " w i n d o w l e s s " ; that is, t h a t n o t h i n g can issue f r o m one m o n a d a n d pass o n and affect another. T h e monads possess qualities and are different f r o m one a n o t h e r ; moreover, they change continually. H o w e v e r , this changing is n o t extrinsic; r a t h e r i t is the u n f o l d i n g o f the monad's internal possibilities.
T h e m o n a d is vis, force; a vis repraesentativa, or force o f representat i o n . E v e r y m o n a d actively represents o r reflects the entire universe from its own perspective. Therefore, the monads are irreplaceable, since each one reflects the universe i n its o w n special way. L e i b n i z ' m e t a physics shows t h a t he is a pluralist a n d t h a t he believes the things actually exist, even w h e n no perceiver is present. T h e monads are n o t all o f equal r a n k ; they reflect the universe w i t h v a r y i n g degrees o f clarity. F u r t h e r m o r e , n o t a l l monads are conscious o f their power o f
2^0
Leibniz^
reflection. W h e n monads have this consciousness a n d also m e m o r y , i t is possible to speak n o t o n l y oí perception b u t also oí apperception : such is the case w i t h the h u m a n monads. A n d this representation o f the universe is active : i t is the monads' purpose, t e n d e n c y — a desire t h a t arises f r o m the monad's ontological basis itself, f r o m its o w n reality. E v e r y t h i n g t h a t happens to a m o n a d arises f r o m its o w n being, f r o m its internal possibilities; the monads are completely insensitive to external influences. Thus Leibniz does j u s t the opposite o f S p i n o z a ; Spinoza reduces substance to a single e n t i t y — n a t u r e or G o d — w h e r e a s L e i b n i z restores to substance the character o f an individual thing w h i c h i t h a d h a d since Aristotle. I n a c e r t a i n sense this represents a r e t u r n to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the concept o f substance as a thing's property or goods (ovala, i n Greek), instead o f stressing the significance o f the independence—as d i d Descartes and, even m o r e so, S p i n o z a — w h i c h i n Greek metaphysics was always a consequence o f the character o f substance i n the sense o f ousia. Aristotle said t h a t substance is what is peculiar to each thing. L e i b n i z , w h e n faced w i t h the Cartesian d u a l i s m o f the res extensa a n d the res cogitans governed b y the res infinita, w h i c h is G o d , returns to the idea o f an absolute m u l t i p l i c i t y o f substantial monads w h i c h contain strictly w i t h i n themselves a l l their ontological possibilities. Substance o r nature is again the p r i n c i p l e o f m o t i o n i n the things themselves, as i n Aristotle. I n spite o f his apparent close relationship w i t h Plato because of the theory o f innate ideas, L e i b n i z is the most A r i s t o t e l i a n o f the rationalist metaphysicians ; f r o m this he derives i n p a r t his i n comparable fecundity, a q u a l i t y w h i c h philosophy has always possessed when i n live contact w i t h Aristotle. P R E - E S T A B L I S H E D H A R M O N Y . Since the m a n i f o l d monads t h a t make u p the w o r l d are windowless, the p r o b l e m o f the impossibility o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the substances no longer involves only the source o f knowledge, b u t above a l l , the very order a n d congruency o f the w o r l d as a whole. H a p p e n i n g s i n the universe can be explained o n l y b y starting w i t h the supposition that everything emerges f r o m the depths o f a l l the i n d i v i d u a l monads. H o w does i t h a p p e n , t h e n , t h a t the monads f o r m a w o r l d t h a t is full o f coherent relationships, t h a t i t is possible to k n o w the things, a n d that everything happens i n the w o r l d as i f there existed t h a t chimerical c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the substances w h i c h we find i t necessary to reject ? O n e must acknowledge for each m o n a d a previously established order t h a t sees to i t t h a t as i t unfolds its possibilities, i t coincides w i t h a l l the other monads, so t h a t they a l l find themselves i n h a r m o n y w i t h one another, thus constit u t i n g a w o r l d i n spite o f their essential solitariness a n d independence.
Leibniz^ Metaphysics A n d this o r d e r c a n o n l y have been m a d e b y G o d i n his g r a n d design w h e n c r e a t i n g the monads, w h i c h are at once solitary a n d u n i t e d . " T h u s i t is necessary to say that G o d first created the soul, or some other r e a l u n i t y , i n such a way t h a t e v e r y t h i n g w o u l d evolve f r o m its o w n depths w i t h perfect spontaneity w i t h respect to itself, a n d nevertheless i n perfect c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the things outside itself" (Système nouveau, 14). T h i s is w h a t Leibniz called pre-establishedharmony. T h u s there are three possible solutions to the idealist p r o b l e m o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the substances : occasionalism, m o n i s m a n d pre-established h a r m o n y . A c c o r d i n g to the famous comparison, the p r o b l e m is equivalent to that o f s y n c h r o n i z i n g several clocks. I n Descartes' a n d Malebranche's solution, the clockmaker (God) constantly synchronizes the two clocks ( t h o u g h t and extension) w h i c h have no d i r e c t relationship whatsoever. Spinoza denies the p r o b l e m ; t h a t is, i n his philosophy there are n o t t w o clocks, b u t only one w i t h t w o faces : t w o aspects o f the same r e a l i t y , t w o attributes o f the same substance, w h i c h is synonymous w i t h G o d . I n Leibniz, there are n o t t w o clocks, b u t m a n y ; they do n o t have a n y interrelationship either, nor does the clockmaker constantly synchronize t h e m : this w o u l d be a p e r p e t u a l m i r a c l e a n d i t seems absurd to L e i b n i z ; however, the clockmaker has constructed the clocks i n such a w a y that they keep perfect t i m e w i t h o u t affecting one another a n d w i t h o u t His t o u c h i n g t h e m ; independently, a n d b y v i r t u e o f their previous construction, the clocks keep t i m e w i t h one another, r e m a i n h a r m o n i o u s . This constitutes p r e established h a r m o n y . T H E R O L E O F G O D . I f we t u r n o u r a t t e n t i o n to the p r o b l e m o f knowledge, w e f i n d t h a t i n L e i b n i z , too, G o d assures the correspondence between m y ideas a n d the r e a l i t y o f the things w h e n H e makes the development o f m y t h i n k i n g m o n a d coincide w i t h a l l the universe. I f i n M a l e b r a n c h e a l l the things are seen and k n o w n in G o d , i t can p r o p e r l y be said t h a t i n L e i b n i z they are k n o w n o n l y through G o d . L e i b n i z expresses this i n extremely clear t e r m s : " A c c o r d i n g to strict metaphysical t r u t h , there is no external cause t h a t actuates us b u t G o d alone, a n d H e communicates w i t h us d i r e c t l y o n l y b y v i r t u e o f our continuous dependency o n H i m . F r o m this i t follows t h a t there is n o other external object t h a t touches o u r soul a n d directly stimulates o u r perception. T h u s , w e have the ideas o f a l l the things i n o u r soul o n l y b y v i r t u e o f God's c o n t i n u a l a c t i o n o n us . . . " (Discours de métaphysique, 28). I n other words, the monads do i n fact have w i n d o w s , b u t instead o f p u t t i n g the monads i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h one another, these w i n d o w s a l l open o u t o n t o the D e i t y .
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T h u s i n the midst o f L e i b n i z ' m a t u r e philosophy w e see once again the necessity for establishing the existence o f G o d . G o d is a basic supposition i n a l l L e i b n i z ' metaphysics, since i t is H e w h o makes possible the existence o f the monads, understood as t h a t a u t o n o m o u s a n d spontaneous force o f representation w h i c h m i r r o r s the universe f r o m the i n f i n i t e p l u r a l i t y o f the m o n a d s ' i n d i v i d u a l perspectives. T h u s L e i b n i z must philosophically p r o v e the existence o f G o d , a n d to d o this he too employs as a tool the often used ontological a r g u m e n t . H e modifies i t , a n d t h e n i t becomes a m a j o r tenet o f all rationalist metaphysics o f the seventeenth century. A c c o r d i n g to L e i b n i z , i t is necessary to prove the possibility of God, a n d o n l y t h e n is His existence assured b y v i r t u e o f the ontological proof, since G o d is the ens a se. I f G o d is possible, H e exists. L e i b n i z says t h a t the D i v i n e Essence is possible because, since G o d does n o t contain any n e g a t i o n , H e cannot c o n t a i n a n y c o n t r a d i c t i o n whatsoever; therefore, G o d exists (cf. Discours de métaphysique, 23, and
Monadologie, 4 5 ) . N o w L e i b n i z goes f u r t h e r : he also attempts a n a p o s t e r i o r i a n d experimental proof. I f the ens a se is impossible, so also are a l l the entities ab alio, since these exist only t h r o u g h this aliud w h i c h is, precisely, the ens a se; therefore, i n such a case n o t h i n g w o u l d exist. I f the necessary entity does n o t exist, there are no possible entities ; however, these exist, since we see t h e m ; therefore, the ens a se exists. These t w o propositions taken together comprise L e i b n i z ' p r o o f o f t h e existence of
God. If the necessary entity is possible, it exists; if the necessary entity does no exist, there are no possible entities. T h i s reasoning is based o n t h e existence ( k n o w n a posteriori) o f the possible a n d c o n t i n g e n t entities. T h e simplest expression o f this a r g u m e n t w o u l d be : Something exists, therefore
God exists.* 3.
THEORY
OF
KNOWLEDGE
P E R C E P T I O N A N D A P P E R C E P T I O N . T h e monads have perceptions. H o w e v e r , these perceptions are not always the same ; they can be clear o r obscure, distinct o r confused. Things have insensible perceptions, perceptions w i t h o u t consciousness, and m a n also has such perceptions, i n v a r y i n g degrees. A sensation is a confused idea. W h e n perceptions have c l a r i t y and consciousness a n d are accompanied b y m e m o r y , they are apperceptions, a n d these are peculiar to souls. T h e r e is a hierarchy a m o n g souls, a n d h u m a n souls come to k n o w u n i v e r s a l a n d necessary truths ; then i t is possible to speak o f reason, a n d the soul is spirit. A t the
* For an analysis of the problems posed by this proof, see my essay " E l problema de Dios en la filosofia de nuestro tiempo" in San Anselmoy el insensate- [Obras, I V ] .
Theory of Knowledge
H3
s u m m i t o f the hierarchy o f the monads is G o d , w h o is p u r e a c t u a l i t y . T R U T H S O F R E A S O N A N D T R U T H S O F F A C T . L e i b n i z distinguishes between w h a t he calls vérités de raison a n d vérités de fait. T h e t r u t h s o f reason are necessary ; i t is inconceivable t h a t they do n o t exist ; t h a t is, they are based on the p r i n c i p l e o f contradiction. Therefore they are evident f r o m a p r i o r i knowledge, apart f r o m a l l experience. T r u t h s o f fact, o n the contrary, c a n n o t j u s t i f y themselves o n a p r i o r i knowledge alone. T h e y cannot be based solely on the principles o f i d e n t i t y a n d contradiction ; rather, they require the p r i n c i p l e o f sufficient reason. T w o and t w o are f o u r ; this is a t r u t h o f reason, a n d is based o n w h a t t w o is and w h a t f o u r is ; t w o and t w o cannot n o t be four. C o l u m b u s discovered A m e r i c a ; this is a t r u t h o f fact, a n d requires e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n f i r m a t i o n ; i t is conceivable t h a t i t is n o t t r u e ; t h a t is, i t is not self-contradictory t h a t Columbus d i d n o t discover A m e r i c a . T H E I N D I V I D U A L N O T I O N . H o w e v e r , this idea is not as simple as i t appears. W e must not forget that the m o n a d contains w i t h i n itself a l l its r e a l i t y , a n d that n o t h i n g outside i t can influence i t ; therefore, e v e r y t h i n g t h a t happens to i t is i n c l u d e d i n its essence a n d , conseq u e n t l y , i n its complete notion. C o l u m b u s discovered A m e r i c a because the act o f discovering A m e r i c a was i n c l u d e d i n Columbus' being, i n the complete n o t i o n of Columbus. I n a famous example L e i b n i z says t h a t i f Caesar h a d not crossed the R u b i c o n he w o u l d n o t have been Caesar. Therefore, i f we could k n o w the complete i n d i v i d u a l notions we w o u l d see t h a t truths o f fact are i n c l u d e d i n the essence o f the m o n a d , a n d t h a t their absence is self-contradictory. T h e n a l l truths are vérités de raison, that is, necessary a n d a p r i o r i . B u t w h o possesses the complete n o t i o n o f the monads ? O n l y G o d ; therefore, this d i s t i n c t i o n between t r u t h s o f reason and truths o f fact disappears o n l y for H i m , a n d still exists for m a n .
S t r i c t l y speaking, then, L e i b n i z does n o t allow accidental occurrences ; he says that every true p r e d i c a t i o n is based on the n a t u r e o f things. T h u s a l l j u d g m e n t s are analytic j u d g m e n t s : they o n l y m a k e explicit the n o t i o n o f the subject. L a t e r K a n t , using metaphysical suppositions different f r o m those o f L e i b n i z , w i l l p o i n t out the i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n between analytic a n d synthetic judgments. I N N A T I S M . I n L e i b n i z , all ideas proceed f r o m the i n t e r n a l a c t i v i t y o f the monads ; n o t h i n g is received f r o m outside. Leibniz is a h u n d r e d leagues r e m o v e d f r o m every type o f e m p i r i c i s m , w h i c h is f o r m a l l y impossible i n his metaphysics. T h u s the ideas are innate i n this concrete sense. I t is m o r e a metaphysical t h a n a psychological p r o b l e m . T h e ideas have t h e i r o r i g i n — w h i c h is a c t i v e — i n the m i n d itself, i n the vis
Leibni^ repraesentativa that produces t h e m . T h u s Leibniz is completely opposed to L o c k e a n d a l l the B r i t i s h e m p i r i c i s m that influences the C o n t i n e n t greatly a n d comes to d o m i n a t e the eighteenth c e n t u r y . L e i b n i z amends the t r a d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t there is n o t h i n g i n the understanding that has not been previously i n the senses b y excepting f r o m this statement the u n d e r s t a n d i n g itself: Nihil est in intellectu quod prius
nonfuerit in sensu... nisi intellects ipse. L O G I C . T r a d i t i o n a l , demonstrative logic does n o t satisfy L e i b n i z . H e thinks i t is useful o n l y i n p r o v i n g already k n o w n t r u t h s , a n d o f no use i n discovering new t r u t h s . T h i s objection, as w e l l as the tendency t o w a r d innatism, appeared as far back as Descartes, a n d i n L e i b n i z b o t h ideas find their fullest expression. Leibniz w a n t e d to create a t r u e ars inveniendi, a logic t h a t w o u l d be useful i n discovering t r u t h s , a universal combinatory system t h a t w o u l d study the possible combinations o f concepts. Such a system c o u l d investigate t r u t h as i f i t were a m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o b l e m , a n d c o u l d supply an a p r i o r i a n d certain knowledge. This is the famous Ars magna combinatoria, inspired i n p a r t b y R a i m u n d u s L u l l u s ' w o r k ; f r o m i t is derived the idea o f the mathesis universalis, w h i c h has recently demonstrated its f e c u n d i t y i n the fields o f phenomenology a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l logic.
4.
THEODICY
L e i b n i z ' Theodicy carries as a subtitle " Essays o n the Goodness o f G o d , the Freedom of M a n a n d the O r i g i n o f E v i l , " thus revealing the m e a n i n g a n d scope o f this " j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f G o d . " O n one h a n d , G o d is defined as o m n i p o t e n t a n d i n f i n i t e l y good, b u t evil exists i n the w o r l d . O n the other h a n d , i t is said t h a t m a n is free a n d responsible, b u t L e i b n i z o n the contrary points o u t that everything t h a t occurs is previously included i n the m o n a d . T h e problem is, h o w can these ideas be m a d e compatible ? M E T A P H Y S I C A L O P T I M I S M . E v i l can be metaphysical (the imperfect i o n a n d finiteness o f the w o r l d a n d m a n ) , physical ( p a i n , misfortune, a n d the like) or m o r a l (wickedness, sin, and so o n ) . M e t a p h y s i c a l evil derives f r o m the impossibility o f the world's being i n f i n i t e l i k e its Creator. Physical evil has its j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n t h a t i t gives rise to higher values (for example, adversity gives rise to the o p p o r t u n i t y for such virtues as fortitude, heroism a n d self-sacrifice to a p p e a r ) ; f u r t h e r m o r e , L e i b n i z believes that life as a whole is not evil, a n d t h a t pleasure is m o r e prevalent than p a i n . F i n a l l y , m o r a l evil, w h i c h is w h a t constitutes the most serious p r o b l e m , is actually a deficiency, something negative. G o d does not desire m o r a l e v i l ; he simply p e r m i t s i t to exist
Theodicy
H5
because i t is a c o n d i t i o n for other, greater good. Facts cannot be j u d g e d singly, for we do not k n o w God's total p l a n ; i n order to be understood, facts w o u l d have to be viewed w i t h knowledge o f God's complete design. Since G o d is o m n i p o t e n t a n d good we can rest assured t h a t the w o r l d is the best of all possible worlds: t h a t is, t h a t i t contains the m a x i m u m good a n d the m i n i m u m evil proper for the good o f the whole. T h i s is called the principe du meilleur, and is connected w i t h arguments used b y Scotus to prove the I m m a c u l a t e C o n c e p t i o n . G o d does e v e r y t h i n g for the best because H e can and because H e is g o o d ; i f H e c o u l d n o t , H e w o u l d n o t be G o d , since H e w o u l d n o t be o m n i p o t e n t ; i f H e could b u t d i d n o t w i s h to, H e w o u l d also n o t be G o d , since H e w o u l d n o t be infinitely good. " H e could do i t , i t was f i t t i n g to d o i t , a n d so H e d i d i t , " Scotus concluded. I n an analogous w a y L e i b n i z bases his metaphysical o p t i m i s m on the a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t the w o r l d is the best o f a l l possible w o r l d s . F R E E D O M . A l l the monads are spontaneous because n o t h i n g outside t h e m can coerce or compel t h e m at a l l ; b u t this is n o t e n o u g h to make t h e m free. I n a d d i t i o n to spontaneity, freedom requires d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d decision. M a n is free because he chooses between possibilities after d e l i b e r a t i n g o n t h e m . B u t the D i v i n e Prescience introduces itself as a d i f f i c u l t y ; G o d sees the b e i n g o f the monads f r o m the beginning, a n d the monads contain w i t h i n themselves a l l t h a t is to h a p p e n to t h e m a n d everything t h a t they are to do. T h e n h o w is freedom possible ?
I n order to interpret God's knowledge, Leibniz makes use of certain subtle distinctions o f Catholic theology, especially some points advanced b y the Spaniard M o l i n a . G o d has three kinds o f knowledge: ( i ) knowledge of pure intellection, (2) knowledge of v i s i o n , ( 3 ) m i d d l e knowledge. By the first k i n d G o d knows a l l possible t h i n g s ; b y k n o w l edge o f vision H e knows a l l real or future things; b y m i d d l e k n o w l edge H e knows the " f u t u r i b l e s , " t h a t is, the c o n d i t i o n e d future, the things t h a t w i l l come to be i f c e r t a i n conditions arise, a l t h o u g h i t is n o t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t such conditions shall arise. God knows h o w free w i l l w o u l d act, w i t h o u t its being d e t e r m i n e d that i t must act i n this way a n d therefore that these must be f u t u r e events, j u s t as C h r i s t knew that i f miracles h a d been performed i n T y r e and Sidon the people w o u l d have repented ( M a t t h e w 11:21). Contingent things are n o t necessary; necessity accrues to t h e m only i n a n a posteriori way, f o l l o w i n g a decision o f the D i v i n e W i l l , subsequent to knowledge of simple intellection a n d m i d d l e knowledge. G o d creates m e n a n d H e creates t h e m free. T h i s means t h a t they d e t e r m i n e their o w n actions freely, a l t h o u g h G o d has d e t e r m i n e d t h a t
2^6
Leibniz^
they s h o u l d exist. G o d wishes m a n to be free, a n d H e allows h i m t o sin because the freedom to sin is preferable to the lack o f such freedom. T h u s sin is a possible evil t h a t p e r m i t s a higher g o o d : to w i t , h u m a n freedom. G O D I N S E V E N T E E N T H - C E N T U R Y P H I L O S O P H Y . W e h a v e seen t h a t despite the separation of theology f r o m philosophy i n this p e r i o d , G o d was n o t lost. A l l rationalistic a n d idealistic philosophy f r o m Descartes to L e i b n i z can be established because G o d is t h e r e — a t a distance, i t is t r u e , b u t surely there. Perhaps reason cannot gain knowledge o f God's essence a n d is n o t able to practice theology, b u t i t does k n o w w i t h c e r t a i n t y t h a t G o d exists. T h e philosophers o f this p e r i o d , I repeat, possess a G o d w h o is somewhat remote, somewhat inaccessible a n d w i t h o u t direct effect o n i n t e l l e c t u a l activity, b u t w h o nevertheless surely exists. G o d provides these philosophers w i t h a sure f o o t i n g , even t h o u g h H e is n o t a prospect o n w h i c h their eyes rest w i t h steady interest. H e ceases to be the ever-visible horizon a n d becomes the solid ground beneath eighteenth-century E u r o p e a n philosophic speculation. T h i s is w h a t gives the p e r i o d o f the history o f philosophy w h i c h runs f r o m Descartes to L e i b n i z its essential u n i t y . T h i s g r o u p o f p h i l o sophic systems appears as i f enveloped i n a c o m m o n atmosphere, w h i c h reveals a similar i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f ideas. A basic coherence can be observed among a l l the philosophic constructions t h a t are clustered together i n these few decades. A n d taken as a g r o u p , these systems w i l l appear as i f i n contraposition to another g r o u p o f lofty metaphysical edifices: the so-called G e r m a n idealism w h i c h o r i g i nates i n K a n t a n d culminates i n Hegel. T h e philosophers o f the R o m a n t i c age w i l l h u r l a r e p r o a c h at the metaphysics o f the entire Baroque era. I n this objection the seventeenth-century systems w i l l be g r o u p e d together i n t o one complex a n d w i l l n o t be treated separately as i n d i v i d u a l constructions. I t is interesting to n o t e the significance o f q u a l i f y i n g t h e m as a single complex. This Baroque philosophy is called dogmatic. W h a t does this mean? F o r a n answer we shall have to see w h a t the fate o f the p r o b l e m o f G o d w i l l be at the hands o f the G e r m a n idealists. T h i s p r o b l e m w i l l be s u m m e d u p i n t h e question o f the ontological a r g u m e n t and w i l l reveal to us the m e t a physical s i t u a t i o n of the new stage i n m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y . * * See my essay " L a perdida de Dios" in San Anselmoy el insensato [Obras, I V ] .
EMPIRICISM
British
Philosophy
F r o m the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, r u n n i n g parallel w i t h C o n t i n e n t a l rationalistic idealism, a p h i l o s o p h y w i t h clearly developed characteristics o f its o w n develops i n B r i t a i n . Between Francis Bacon a n d D a v i d H u m e there extends a series o f thinkers w h o i n a certain measure oppose the philosophers we have j u s t studied, the g r o u p f r o m Descartes to L e i b n i z . British p h i l o s o p h y presents t w o features w h i c h distinguish i t f r o m C o n t i n e n t a l t h o u g h t : a lesser concern w i t h strictly metaphysical questions, accompanied b y a greater concern w i t h theory o f knowledge ( w h i c h , n a t u r a l l y , always presupposes a metaphysics) a n d the philosophy o f the State; and, as regards m e t h o d , a sensationalist empiricism as contrasted w i t h an a p r i o r i , m a t h e m a t i c a l l y i n c l i n e d rationalism. B r i t i s h philosophy has a tendency to become psychology and to grant first place to sensory experience as a source o f knowledge. T h i s British philosophy o f the m o d e r n age is u n d e n i a b l y i m p o r t a n t , b u t perhaps more because o f its influence a n d h i s t o r i c a l consequences t h a n i n consideration o f its strictly philosophical significance. Despite t h e i r great r e n o w n a n d the widespread influence w h i c h they exerted, the B r i t i s h philosophers o f these three centuries d o n o t have the significance o f those e x t r a o r d i n a r y British thinkers o f the M i d d l e Ages, R o g e r Bacon, Duns Scotus a n d W i l l i a m o f O c c a m , n o t to m e n t i o n others w h o are somewhat less i m p o r t a n t t h a n these b u t whose i m p o r tance is still very great. B r i t a i n ' s great c o n t r i b u t i o n to philosophy must therefore be sought i n the medieval p e r i o d , at least as m u c h as i n the m o d e r n age. 247
148
British Philosophy
A n d yet i t was the British thinkers o f the sixteenth t o eighteenth centuries w h o furnished the ideas w h i c h perhaps most intensely i n fluenced the transformation o f E u r o p e a n society: sensationalism; the c r i t i q u e o f the cognitive faculty, w h i c h i n some cases a r r i v e d at skepticism; the ideas o f tolerance; l i b e r a l p r i n c i p l e s ; the s p i r i t o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t ; deism, or n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n ; a n d finally, as a p r a c t i c a l m i n d e d r e a c t i o n to metaphysical skepticism, the philosophy o f comm o n sense, u t i l i t a r i a n ethics a n d p r a g m a t i s m . A l l these elements, o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y influence o n the structure o f Europe i n t h e eighteenth a n d nineteenth centuries, have their o r i g i n i n the ideological systems w h i c h were d o m i n a n t i n B r i t a i n i n the preceding centuries. These systems have p r o f o u n d repercussions i n the nations of the C o n t i n e n t , especially i n France a n d Germany.
i.
FRANCIS
BACON
L I F E A N D W O R K S . Bacon was b o r n i n 1561 a n d died i n 1626. H e is thus a couple o f generations earlier t h a n Descartes. H e was L o r d Chancellor o f E n g l a n d and was ennobled as B a r o n V e r u l a m ; he was a great p o l i t i c a l figure i n Elizabethan a n d Jacobean E n g l a n d . L a t e r he was shorn o f his offices and i n his r e t i r e m e n t devoted h i m s e l f to i n t e l lectual labors. T h e a t t r i b u t i o n to Bacon o f the works of Shakespeare is highly improbable.
Bacon's m a j o r w o r k is the Novum Organum, w h i c h presents a n i n d u c tive logic, as opposed to Aristotle's deductive a n d syllogistic logic. H e also w r o t e , a l l u n d e r the general t i t l e o f Instauratio magna ( T h e Great R e n e w a l ) , the treatise Dedignitate et augmentisscientiarum ( T h e A d v a n c e ment o f L e a r n i n g ) a n d numerous essays o n different subjects: Filum Labyrinthi ( T h e T h r e a d T h r o u g h the L a b y r i n t h ) , De interpretatione naturae et regno hominis ( O n the I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f N a t u r e a n d the R e i g n
of M a n ) , Temporis partus masculus sive instauratio magna imperii humani in universum ( T h e M a l e C h i l d o f T i m e , or the Great R e n e w a l o f M a n ' s E m p i r e i n the Universe), Cogitata et visa (Things T h o u g h t a n d Seen), a n d so o n . W e note that a l l these titles are positive i n o u t l o o k a n d herald the t r i u m p h a n t beginning o f a new science. D O C T R I N E . Bacon's fame has been greater t h a n his t r u e m e r i t . F o r a l o n g t i m e he was considered the renewer o f m o d e r n philosophy, equal or superior to Descartes. T h i s v i e w has l i t t l e f o u n d a t i o n , a n d i t has been necessary to l i m i t Bacon's achievement to the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f empiricism a n d the inductive m e t h o d . B u t even here i t is n o t possible to forget the role played by his fellow c o u n t r y m a n and namesake o f
Francis Bacon three centuries earlier, R o g e r Bacon, w h o was m o r e o r i g i n a l t h a n the Renaissance chancellor a n d w h o to a great extent prepared the w a y for h i m , even t h o u g h the consequences o f R o g e r Bacon's w o r k were i n c o m p a r a b l y less noticeable. Francis Bacon represents the c u l m i n a t i o n o f the Renaissance, w h i c h i n philosophy is n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n the l o n g stage o f indecision reaching f r o m the last of the o r i g i n a l a n d lively Scholastic systems—Occamism — u p to the first m a t u r e a n d clear f o r m u l a t i o n o f the t h o u g h t o f m o d e r n times—Cartesianism. Bacon combines speculative w i t h techn i c a l concerns: knowledge is power. F r o m the v e r y outset o f his Novum Organum, he places o n the same plane doing a n d understanding, the h a n d a n d the m i n d ; hence the v i t a l new m e a n i n g w h i c h he gives to A r i s totle's m e t a p h o r o f the organon, or tool, as a designation o f logic. N e i t h e r the bare h a n d n o r the isolated a n d u n a i d e d m i n d can dominate the things; m a t e r i a l a n d m e n t a l tools together l e n d h a n d a n d m i n d their true efficacy. A n d j u s t as the craftsman does, so the thinker must s u b m i t to the exigencies o f r e a l i t y : natura non nisi parendo vincitur, i t is possible to conquer n a t u r e o n l y by obeying her. Bacon believes t h a t philosophic investigation requires a previous e x a m i n a t i o n o f the prejudices (idols) w h i c h c a n conceal t r u t h . As i n Cartesianism, so here concern w i t h c r i t i c i s m a n d fear o f error make their appearance. Bacon speaks of four i d o l s : i . Idola tribus. These are the prejudices o f the tribe, the h u m a n species, a n d are inherent i n the nature o f m a n : illusions o f the senses, the tendency to personify i n a n i mate objects, a n d so f o r t h . 2. Idola specus. These arc the prejudices o f the cave i n w h i c h each m a n finds himself ( a n allusion to the Platonic m y t h ) : i n d i v i d u a l tendencies and predispositions w h i c h m a y lead m e n i n t o error. 3 . Idola fori. These are the idols o f the marketplace, o f h u m a n society a n d o f the very speech w h i c h w e use. 4 . Idola theatri. These are the prejudices o f authority, based o n the prestige w h i c h a few m e n enjoy o n the stage o f public life; these prejudices m a y h i n d e r men's direct a n d personal vision of the things a n d lead their opinions o f f the true p a t h . I n a d d i t i o n , Bacon criticizes the syllogistic m e t h o d . T h e presumptive logical r i g o r w h i c h gives the syllogism its demonstrative value is nullified because the major premise o f a syllogism is a universal p r i n c i p l e w h i c h is n o t itself o b t a i n e d syllogistically, b u t f r e q u e n t l y by means o f a n inexact a n d superficial apprehension o f things. T h e rigor and cert a i n t y o f inference are p u r e l y formal and have n o pertinence i f the major premise is n o t c e r t a i n . T h i s leads Bacon to establish his theory o f induction: f r o m a series o f individual facts, g r o u p e d i n a suitable system a t i c way, one obtains b y abstraction, after f o l l o w i n g a rigorous
British Philosophy experimental a n d logical procedure, the general concepts o f the things a n d the laws o f nature. This i n d u c t i o n o f Bacon's, w h i c h is also called incomplete i n d u c t i o n i n contrast to i n d u c t i o n based on all the p e r t i n e n t i n d i v i d u a l cases, does not afford a n absolute certainty, b u t i t does p r o v i d e sufficient certainty for the purposes o f science w h e n c a r r i e d out scrupulously. I n a certain sense, this m e t h o d is opposed to the m e t h o d of philosophic rationalism a n d even to the m e t h o d o f m o d e r n m a t h e m a t i c a l physics w h i c h began w i t h Galileo. Bacon was n o t clearly aware o f the value o f mathematics a n d a p r i o r i reasoning, a n d his e m p i r i c i s m was m u c h less f r u i t f u l t h a n the nuova scienza of the Renaissance physicists or the rationalism o f the philosophers w h o based their systems o n t h a t o f Descartes.
2.
HOBBES
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) is another interesting E n g l i s h t h i n k e r . H e enjoyed a l o n g life a n d outlived even Spinoza, b u t , as c a n be seen f r o m the date o f his b i r t h , actually belonged to the generation before Descartes. H o b b e s m a i n t a i n e d close contact w i t h France, a n d there he became a c q u a i n t e d w i t h Descartes a n d i m b u e d w i t h the m e t h o d o f the m a t h e m a t i c a l a n d physical sciences. F o r several years i n his y o u t h he was secretary to Bacon, a n d he shares Bacon's concerns; b u t Hobbes applies the n a t u r a l i s t i c m e t h o d o f m o d e r n physics to the study o f m a n k i n d . M a n as a n i n d i v i d u a l and i n society, a n d thus psychology, anthropology, politics, the science o f the State a n d society: these are Hobbes' themes. H e w r o t e i n L a t i n a n d E n g l i s h ; his p r i n c i p a l works are De corpore, De homine, De cive a n d Leviathan, w h i c h contains his theory of the State a n d is named after the beast m e n t i o n e d i n the Book of J o b . Hobbes, too, is a n empiricist. For h i m , knowledge is based o n experience, a n d his concern is to instruct m e n for practical purposes. O n the other h a n d , he is a nominalist, a n d thus a continuer of the medieval O x f o r d t r a d i t i o n . T h e universals exist neither outside t h e m i n d n o r even w i t h i n i t , because our representations are i n d i v i d u a l ; t h e u n i v e r sals are merely names, signs for the things, a n d t h o u g h t is a symbolic operation, a sort o f calculus, closely l i n k e d to speech. Hobbes' metaphysics is naturalistic. H e seeks causal explanations, b u t eliminates f i n a l causes a n d wishes to e x p l a i n phenomena m e c h a n i cally, on the basis o f motions. Descartes, too, a d m i t t e d m e c h a n i c a l explanations w i t h regard to the res extensa, b u t contrasted w i t h this the i m m a t e r i a l w o r l d o f t h o u g h t . Hobbes believes t h a t the processes o f the
Hobbes
zjl
soul a n d the m i n d have a material a n d corporeal basis; according to h i m , the soul cannot be i m m a t e r i a l . Hobbes is a materialist a n d denies the freedom o f the w i l l . A n a t u r a l d e t e r m i n i s m prevails i n e v e r y t h i n g that happens. T H E D O C T R I N E O F T H E S T A T E . Hobbes' theory of the State presupposes the e q u a l i t y o f all men. H e believes t h a t a l l m e n aspire t o w a r d the same goal a n d t h a t w h e n they fail to achieve i t , enmity a n d hate spring u p . W h o e v e r does not o b t a i n his desire distrusts the m a n w h o has met w i t h success a n d , i n order to w a r d off a possible attack, attacks h i m . Hence arises Hobbes' pessimistic conception o f m a n k i n d : homo homini lupus, m a n is a w o l f to m a n . M e n have no direct interest i n the company o f t h e i r fellows, except to the extent that they can reduce them to submission. T h e three motives o f discord a m o n g h u m a n beings are c o m p e t i t i o n , w h i c h provokes aggression w i t h gain as a n object; mistrust, w h i c h makes m e n attack each other i n order to achieve security; a n d v a n i t y , w h i c h creates e n m i t y between rivals for fame. This natural s i t u a t i o n defines a state o f p e r p e t u a l struggle, o f a w a r of all against a l l (bellum omnium contra omnes), to use Hobbes' awesome phrase. T h i s does n o t m e a n isolated outbursts o f warfare, b u t a state o f w a r — a time o f w a r , Hobbes calls i t — i n w h i c h m a n k i n d exists, a permanent c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h no one can be sure o f peace. M a n is endowed w i t h a power w h i c h he uses as he sees f i t ; he has certain passions a n d desires w h i c h cause h i m to seek for things a n d want to acquire t h e m for himself at everyone else's expense. Since everyone is aware o f this attitude, m e n distrust one another; man's n a t u r a l state is one o f aggression. B u t m a n realizes that this s i t u a t i o n of insecurity is u n t e n a b l e ; his life is w r e t c h e d i n this state o f struggle and he is compelled to seek peace. Hobbes distinguishes between jus, or r i g h t , w h i c h he interprets as freedom, a n d lex, or law, w h i c h signifies obligation. M a n has the f r e e d o m — t h a t is, the r i g h t — t o do a n y t h i n g he can or desires to d o ; b u t three things can be done w i t h a r i g h t : i t m a y be exercised, renounced or transferred. T h e m u t u a l transfer o f a right is called a pact, contract or covenant. T h i s leads to the idea o f a political c o m m u n i t y . I n order to g a i n security, m a n tries to substitute a status civilis for the status naturae t h r o u g h a covenant by w h i c h each m a n transfers his rights to the State. S t r i c t l y speaking, this is n o t a covenant w i t h the person or persons charged w i t h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the State, b u t o f each m a n w i t h every other m a n . T h e sovereign merely represents the force established b y the covenant; a l l the other m e n are his subjects. N o w , the State as thus constituted is absolute: j u s t as f o r m e r l y the
British Philosophy power o f the i n d i v i d u a l knew no restriction, so i t is now w i t h the a u t h o r i t y o f the State—it is coextensive with its might. W h e n the State strips the i n d i v i d u a l m e n o f their power, i t assumes a l l o f i t itself a n d governs w i t h o u t l i m i t a t i o n s . T h e State is a m i g h t y machine, a monster w h i c h devours the i n d i v i d u a l s , and f r o m w h i c h they cannot appeal to any higher a u t h o r i t y . Hobbes finds no m o r e suitable name for this monster t h a n t h a t o f the great beast of the B i b l e : Leviathan; this is the State, superior to a l l else, a m o r t a l G o d , as i t were. Hobbes' State decides u p o n everything, n o t o n l y politics, b u t also m o r a l i t y and r e l i g i o n ; i f r e l i g i o n is not recognized b y the State, i t is merely superstition. T h i s system, acute a n d p r o f o u n d i n m a n y points, represents the a u t h o r i t a r i a n a n d absolutist conception o f the State, based simultaneously o n the p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y a n d o n a t h o r o u g h l y pessimistic view o f h u m a n nature. A l t h o u g h H o b b e s speaks o f G o d at times, the outlook o f his w o r k is basically atheistic. I n contrast to the ideas ofspirituality a n d freedom, Hobbes' p o l i t i c a l system is d o m i n a t e d b y naturalistic mechanics a n d the a f f i r m a t i o n o f the universal power o f the State. T h i s doctrine, w h i c h was extremely i n f l u e n t i a l i n the eighteenth century and h a d l o n g - r a n g i n g historical consequences w h i c h are still felt today, aroused t w o kinds o f reaction i n its o w n day. O n e type o f reaction was t h a t o f Sir R o b e r t Filmer, a u t h o r o f The Patriarch, w h o t r i e d to salvage the absolute monarchy o f the Stuarts b y means o f the theory o f the d i v i n e r i g h t o f kings; the basis o f this theory is t h a t m a n is n o t b o r n free, b u t is subject to his father's a u t h o r i t y , f r o m w h i c h is derived the legitimacy o f the paternal a n d p a t r i a r c h a l rule o f kings. T h e other type o f r e a c t i o n , w h i c h was opposed to F i l m e r as w e l l as to Hobbes, was t h a t o f Locke, w h o upheld the principles o f l i b e r t y a n d parliamentarianism, t h a t is, the principles o f the second English revolution, t h a t o f 1688. 3.
DEISM
T h e naturalism o f the m o d e r n age leads as a m a t t e r of course to the concept o f natural religion. T h i s is also called deism, as distinguished f r o m theism. Theism is the belief i n G o d , t h a t is, i n the supernatural G o d o f religion w h o is k n o w n t h r o u g h revelation. Deism, o n the other h a n d , arises as a reaction to the atheism t h a t creeps into English philosophy, b u t i t remains w i t h i n the r e a l m o f the strictly n a t u r a l . G o d is k n o w n b y means o f reason, w i t h o u t any supern a t u r a l aid. N a t u r a l r e l i g i o n is merely w h a t o u r reason tells us a b o u t G o d and our relationship w i t h H i m . Therefore, i t is a religion w i t h o u t revelation, w i t h o u t dogmas, w i t h o u t churches a n d w i t h o u t f o r m a l NATURAL RELIGION.
Deism w o r s h i p . T h e entire eighteenth-century E n l i g h t e n m e n t , w i t h its idea o f the " Supreme B e i n g , " is d o m i n a t e d b y deism. D e i s m thus appears i n the w r i t i n g s o f the English t h i n k e r E d w a r d H e r b e r t o f C h e r b u r y (1581-1648), whose major works are De veritate,
prout distinguitur a revelatione, a verisimile, apossibili, et afalso ( O n T r u t h , as D i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m Revelation, P r o b a b i l i t y , Possibility a n d Falsity)
a n d De religione gentilium, errorumque apud eos causis ( O n the R e l i g i o n o f the Heathens, a n d the Causes o f T h e i r E r r o r s ) . T h e content o f n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n — a very scanty c o n t e n t — i s universally a d m i t t e d b y a l l m e n , because i t proceeds solely f r o m n a t u r a l reason. T h i s content can be reduced to the belief i n the existence o f a " Supreme B e i n g , " to w h o m we owe a veneration consisting o f v i r t u e a n d piety, the belief t h a t m a n m u s t repent for his sins a n d , lastly, the belief i n a life to come i n w h i c h man's c o n d u c t w i l l receive its j u s t r e w a r d or j u s t p u n i s h m e n t . T h e revealed religions, according to H e r b e r t , have a historical o r i g i n a n d are d e r i v e d f r o m poetical imaginings, philosophical ideologies or the interests o f priestly classes. A c c o r d i n g to h i m , C h r i s t i a n i t y , especially i n its p r i m i t i v e f o r m , is the purest revealed religion a n d the closest to natural religion. H e r b e r t ' s argument, o f course, loses sight o f m a n y things. T h e universal agreement as to the content o f n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n is n o t so assured as he claims, nor d i d religions really originate i n the w a y he states. Besides, he overlooks the a u t h e n t i c content o f r e l i g i o n , religio, the bond between G o d and m a n . N A T U R A L M O R A L I T Y . I n a m o v e m e n t t h a t parallels deism, the E n g l i s h moralists o f the seventeenth century attempt to base m o r a l i t y o n n a t u r e a n d to make i t independent o f a l l religious or theological content. T h i s a t t e m p t is made b y the bishop R i c h a r d C u m b e r l a n d (162 2-1718), author of the book De legibus naturae, i n w h i c h he asserts t h a t m a n k i n d has a peaceful a n d benevolent social i n s t i n c t , j u s t the opposite o f Hobbes' conception. A c c o r d i n g to C u m b e r l a n d , m o r a l i t y is based o n the experience o f n a t u r e a n d h u m a n behavior; the good is t h a t w h i c h proves to be useful for the c o m m u n i t y . T h u s , there appears here a n early manifestation o f the social u t i l i t a r i a n i s m w h i c h is to c u l m i n a t e i n the nineteenth c e n t u r y i n the w o r k o f J e r e m y B e n t h a m a n d J o h n Stuart M i l l . O t h e r B r i t i s h moralists f i n d the basis for m o r a l i t y , n o t i n experience, b u t i n the direct, a p r i o r i self-evidence o f reason. M o r a l i t y consists i n a d j u s t i n g oneself to the true n a t u r e o f the things and r e l a t i n g oneself to t h e m a c c o r d i n g to their m a n n e r o f b e i n g ; direct i n t u i t i o n shows us this n a t u r e o f the things. This m o v e m e n t is chiefly represented b y R a l p h C u d w o r t h (1617-1688) a n d S a m u e l Clarke (1675-1729). C u d w o r t h
British Philosophy w r o t e The True Intellectual System of the Universe a n d A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality. Clarke was also a n o t a b l e metaphysic i a n , w h o meditated p r o f o u n d l y o n the p r o b l e m o f the D e i t y a n d c a r r i e d o n a discerning correspondence w i t h L e i b n i z . H i s most i n teresting w o r k is A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God. B u t the most interesting a n d characteristic f o r m o f B r i t i s h m o r a l philosophy is t h a t o f Shaftesbury ( A n t h o n y Ashley C o o p e r , t h i r d earl o f Shaftesbury, 1671-1713), a u t h o r ofCharacteristics of Men, Manners,
Opinions, and Times. H i s is the ethics o f the moral sense: m a n has a n i n n a t e faculty for j u d g i n g behavior a n d personality ( a n d this j u d g m e n t is v a l i d ) a n d for deciding o n t h e i r m o r a l qualifications, a p p r o v i n g o r rejecting them. I t is this d i r e c t m o r a l sense w h i c h influences men's decisions a n d guides t h e m , especially i n evaluating a t y p e o f personality i n its t o t a l i t y , a b e a u t i f u l a n d harmonious f o r m o f h u m a n soul. Shaftesbury is influenced b y Greek a n d Renaissance ideas, a n d his ethics is deeply tinged w i t h estheticism. Shaftesbury's influence i n a r t a n d l i t e r a t u r e was very widespread i n B r i t a i n , a m o n g the thinkers o f the F r e n c h E n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d a m o n g the G e r m a n classicists f r o m H e r d e r t o Goethe. 4.
LOCKE
J o h n L o c k e was b o r n i n 1632 a n d d i e d i n 1704. A t O x f o r d he studied philosophy, medicine and the n a t u r a l sciences; later a n d w i t h greater interest he studied Descartes a n d B a c o n ; he also established contact w i t h R o b e r t Boyle, the great E n g l i s h physicist a n d chemist, a n d w i t h T h o m a s S y d e n h a m , the physician. I n the househ o l d o f the first earl o f Shaftesbury (the grandfather o f the abovem e n t i o n e d moralist) he h e l d the position o f counselor, physician a n d t u t o r o f the earl's son a n d grandson. This connection l e d L o c k e i n t o politics. H e emigrated d u r i n g the r e i g n o f James I I a n d later took p a r t i n the second English r e v o l u t i o n o f 1688. H e l i v e d i n H o l l a n d a n d F r a n c e for a number o f years. Locke's influence has been extremely i m p o r t a n t , greater t h a n t h a t o f any other E n g l i s h philosopher. T h r o u g h his leadership, e m p i r i c i s m , w h i c h found i n h i m its most able a n d fortunate expounder, came to dominate eighteenth-century thought. L I F E A N D WORKS.
Locke's most i m p o r t a n t w o r k is the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, published i n 1690. H e also wrote p o l i t i c a l w o r k s — T w o Treatises on Government—and the Letters on Toleration, w h i c h defined his position o n religious matters. T H E I D E A S . Locke, also, is a n empiricist: the o r i g i n o f knowledge is experience. As is customary w i t h English thinkers, he uses the w o r d
Loch
" idea " i n a very b r o a d sense: i t includes everything t h a t one thinks or perceives, the whole content o f consciousness; understood i n this way, i t conies close to the m e a n i n g o f the Cartesian cogitatio, to w h a t today w e w o u l d call representation or, better yet, percepts. A c c o r d i n g to Locke, ideas are n o t i n n a t e , as C o n t i n e n t a l r a t i o n a l i s m h a d thought. T h e soul is tamquam tabula rasa, like a clean slate o n w h i c h n o t h i n g has been w r i t t e n . T h e ideas come f r o m experience, w h i c h can be o f two classes: external perception o b t a i n e d b y means o f the senses, or sensation; a n d i n t e r n a l perception o f psychical states, or reflection. I n either case reflection operates o n m a t e r i a l i n t r o d u c e d b y sensation. T h e r e are two kinds o f ideas: simple ideas a n d complex ideas. T h e f o r m e r result directly f r o m a single sense or f r o m several senses simultaneously, f r o m reflection, or, finally, f r o m a c o m b i n a t i o n of sensation a n d reflection. Complex ideas are the result of the a c t i v i t y of the m i n d , w h i c h combines or associates simple ideas. Locke distinguishes a m o n g simple ideas those w h i c h have objective v a l i d i t y ( p r i m a r y qualities) f r o m those w h i c h have o n l y subjective v a l i d i t y (secondary qualities). T h e p r i m a r y qualities ( n u m b e r , figure, extension, m o t i o n , solidity, a n d so on) belong to the bodies a n d cannot be separated f r o m t h e m ; the secondary qualities (color, odor, taste, temperature, a n d the like) are subjective sensations o f the m a n w h o perceives t h e m . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n is n o t o r i g i n a l w i t h L o c k e — i t dates f r o m ancient philosophy, figuring i n philosophic t h o u g h t f r o m the t i m e o f the Greek atomists to t h a t o f Descartes—but i n Locke's p h i losophy i t plays an i m p o r t a n t role. M e m o r y is the basis o n w h i c h complex ideas are f o r m e d . Simple ideas are n o t instantaneous; rather, they leave a n impression i n the m i n d ; thus they can be c o m b i n e d or associated w i t h other ideas. This concept o f association is o f great importance i n E n g l i s h psychology. T h e modes, the notions o f substance and r e l a t i o n are complex ideas a n d result f r o m the associative a c t i v i t y of the m i n d . T h u s , i n the final instance a l l these ideas, i n c l u d i n g the ideas of substance a n d the very idea o f G o d , proceed f r o m experience, b y means o f successive abstractions, generalizations a n d associations. Locke's empiricism l i m i t s the possibility of knowledge, especially i n r e g a r d to the great t r a d i t i o n a l themes of metaphysics. W i t h h i m there begins the distrust o f the cognitive faculty t h a t is to c u l m i n a t e i n H u m e ' s skepticism a n d w h i c h w i l l oblige K a n t to f o r m u l a t e the crux o f the p r o b l e m of the v a l i d i t y a n d possibility of r a t i o n a l knowledge. E T H I C S A N D T H E S T A T E . Locke's ethics presents c e r t a i n inconsistencies. I n general, he is a determinist, a n d does n o t g r a n t t h a t h u m a n w i l l is free; however, he a d m i t s a certain freedom of indifference w h i c h
British Philosophy allows m a n to decide. M o r a l i t y , i n d e p e n d e n t o f r e l i g i o n , consists o f a c c o m m o d a t i n g oneself to a n o r m , w h i c h can be d i v i n e l a w , the l a w o f the State, or the n o r m o f c o m m o n social o p i n i o n . W i t h respect to the State, Locke is the t y p i c a l representative o f l i b e r a l ideology. H e returned to E n g l a n d f r o m H o l l a n d o n the same boat w i t h W i l l i a m o f O r a n g e — t h e k i n g o f the l i m i t e d m o n a r c h y accompanied b y the theoretician o f the l i m i t e d m o n a r c h y . Locke rejects Filmer's advocacy o f a p a t r i a r c h a l i n s t i t u t i o n a n d his d o c t r i n e o f the d i v i n e r i g h t a n d absolute p o w e r o f kings. Locke's p o i n t o f departure is analogous to t h a t o f H o b b e s : the n a t u r a l state. For L o c k e , however, this t e r m ( w h i c h he considers t o include equality a n d l i b e r t y , since a l l m e n have the same experience o f b i r t h a n d possess the same faculties) does n o t have an aggressive tinge. O b l i g a t i o n is b o r n o u t o f l i b e r t y ; there is a master a n d l o r d o f a l l things, w h o is G o d , a n d H e imposes a natural law. I n Hobbes, e q u a l i t y gave rise to a fierce a n d aggressive independence, whereas i n L o c k e i t promotes love for one's fellow m a n ; m e n ought never to b r e a k this n a t u r a l l a w . S t r i c t l y speaking, m e n are n o t b o r n in a state o f l i b e r t y (therefore t h e parents w h o have to raise t h e m exercise a l e g i t i m a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e m ) , b u t are indeed b o r nfor liberty. A n d so the k i n g does n o t h a v e absolute a u t h o r i t y ; rather, he receives his a u t h o r i t y f r o m the people. T h u s the proper f o r m o f the State is t h a t o f a constitutional a n d representative m o n a r c h y , independent of the C h u r c h , tolerant o n matters o f r e l i g i o n . Such is Locke's t h o u g h t , w h i c h corresponds to the f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t adopted i n E n g l a n d as a result o f the r e v o l u t i o n o f 1688, w h i c h e l i m i n a t e d c i v i l wars a n d revolutions f r o m the previously t u r b u l e n t English history a n d established a p e r i o d o f i n t e r n a l peace t h a t has already lasted for more t h a n a q u a r t e r o f a m i l l e n n i u m . U s i n g Ortega's t e r m i n o l o g y , we could say t h a t a skinlike State replaced one that h a d been i n the nature o f a n o r t h o p e d i c apparatus.
5.
BERKELEY
L I F E A N D W O R K S . George Berkeley was b o r n i n I r e l a n d i n 1685. H e studied at T r i n i t y College i n D u b l i n , a n d later became d e a n o f D r o more a n d o f D e r r y . Still later he w e n t o f f to A m e r i c a w i t h visions o f f o u n d i n g a great missionary college i n the Bermudas. A f t e r r e t u r n i n g to I r e l a n d he was named A n g l i c a n bishop o f Cloyne. T o w a r d the end o f his life he m o v e d to O x f o r d , where he d i e d i n 1753. Berkeley was f u l l o f a religious spirit t h a t p r o f o u n d l y influenced b o t h his p h i l o s o p h y a n d his life. H i s philosophic f o r m a t i o n depends o n Locke especially; he is a n actual c o n t i n u e r o f Locke's t h o u g h t even t h o u g h he presents a
Berkeley
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m u c h more intense a n d d i r e c t preoccupation w i t h metaphysical questions t h a n does his predecessor. Berkeley was v e r y greatly influenced b y the Platonism t h a t was t r a d i t i o n a l i n E n g l a n d ; his spiritualist philosophy was shaped b y his religious convictions, w h i c h he attempts to defend against attacks b y skeptics, materialists a n d atheists. T h u s he arrives at one o f the most extreme forms o f i d e a l i s m ever k n o w n . H i s p r i n c i p a l works are Essay Towards a Mew Theory of Vision; Three
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous; Principles of Human Knowledge; Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, a n d the Siris, i n w h i c h along w i t h metaphysical a n d m e d i c a l reflections he expounds the virtues o f pine tar. M E T A P H Y S I C S . Locke's theory o f ideas leads Berkeley i n t o the r e a l m o f metaphysics. Berkeley is a n o m i n a l i s t ; he does n o t believe that general ideas exist; for example, there cannot be a general idea o f a triangle, because any t r i a n g l e i m a g i n e d is necessarily either equil a t e r a l , isosceles or scalene, whereas the general idea o f the triangle does n o t i n v o l v e such distinctions. Berkeley refers to the intuition o f the triangle, b u t he does n o t believe i n the concept or t h o u g h t o f the triangle, w h i c h is t r u l y universal.
Berkeley professes a n extreme f o r m o f s p i r i t u a l i s m a n d idealism. F o r h i m , m a t t e r does n o t exist. P r i m a r y qualities are j u s t as subjective as secondary qualities; extension or solidity are ideas, j u s t as color is an i d e a ; they are a l l the content o f m y p e r c e p t i o n ; there is no material substance behind the ideas. T h e i r being is exhausted i n being perceived : esse estpercipi; this is Berkeley's basic p r i n c i p l e . T h e entire m a t e r i a l w o r l d is b u t a representation or perception o f m i n e . T h e only t h i n g t h a t exists is the s p i r i t u a l Self, o f w h i c h we have a n i n t u i t i v e certainty. Therefore i t is senseless to speak o f causes o f physical phenomena a n d to give real m e a n i n g to t h a t expression; there are o n l y concordances, relations between ideas. Physical science establishes these laws o r connections between phenomena, w h i c h are understood as ideas. These ideas proceed f r o m G o d ; H e puts t h e m i n o u r spirit: the r e g u l a r i t y o f these ideas, w h i c h is based o n God's w i l l , causes to exist for us w h a t we call a corporeal w o r l d . O n c e a g a i n a n d under very different circumstances we f i n d G o d as the basis o f the w o r l d i n this new f o r m o f idealism. A c c o r d i n g to M a l e b r a n c h e or L e i b n i z , we can see a n d k n o w the things o n l y i n or t h r o u g h G o d ; according to Berkeley, there are o n l y the spirits and G o d , w h o is the O n e who acts u p o n the spirits a n d creates a " m a t e r i a l " w o r l d for t h e m . W e do not o n l y see the things i n G o d ; rather, l i t e r a l l y , " w e l i v e , move and exist in God."
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British Philosophy 6.
HUME
D a v i d H u m e is the philosopher w h o carries to its u l t i m a t e consequences the empiricist d i r e c t i o n i n i t i a t e d by Bacon. H u m e was b o r n i n Scotland i n 1 7 1 1 a n d d i e d i n 1776. H e studied l a w a n d p h i l o s o p h y ; at various times he l i v e d i n France for a n u m b e r o f years, a n d he h a d a great influence o n the Encyclopedists a n d E n l i g h t e n m e n t circles. H e was secretary to the English embassy, a n d his fame spread q u i c k l y t h r o u g h o u t E n g l a n d , France a n d G e r m a n y . LIFE A N D WORKS.
His most i m p o r t a n t w o r k is the Treatise on Human Nature. H e also wrote several recastings o f different parts o f this w o r k , such as An
Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals a n d the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. I n a d d i t i o n to his philosophical w o r k , H u m e was extremely p r o d u c t i v e i n the field o f historiography, the most i m p o r t a n t w o r k i n this field being his great History of England. S E N S A T I O N A L I S M . I n H u m e e m p i r i c i s m reaches an extreme a n d becomes sensationalism. A c c o r d i n g to h i m , ideas are necessarily based on i n t u i t i v e impressions. Ideas are pale a n d lifeless copies o f direct i m pressions ; the belief i n the c o n t i n u i t y o f r e a l i t y is based on this capacity to reproduce experienced impressions a n d to create a w o r l d o f representations. Berkeley h a d made a general c r i t i q u e o f the concept o f substance, b u t he h a d restricted i t to m a t e r i a l a n d corporeal substance. T h e " t h i n g s " have a being that is exhausted i n being perceived; b u t the spiritual r e a l i t y o f the Self t h a t does the perceiving remains f i r m . H u m e makes a new c r i t i q u e of the idea o f substance. A c c o r d i n g to his theory, perception a n d reflection p r o v i d e us w i t h a number of elements w h i c h we a t t r i b u t e to substance, w h i c h acts as a basis or support for t h e m ; b u t nowhere do we find the impression o f substance. I encounter impressions o f color, consistency, taste, odor, extension, roundness, smoothness, a l l o f w h i c h I refer to a n u n k n o w n something t h a t I call a n apple, a substance. Sensible impressions have more v i t a l i t y t h a n imagined impressions, a n d this causes us to believe i n the reality o f w h a t is represented. T h u s , H u m e explains the n o t i o n o f substance as the result o f a n associative process, w i t h o u t observing that a c t u a l l y the opposite is t r u e : m y direct a n d i m m e d i a t e perception is o f the apple, a n d the sensations are abstract elements w h i c h appear o n l y as I complete m y perception o f the thing.
There is another aspect to this p r o b l e m . H u m e does n o t l i m i t his criticism to m a t e r i a l substances, b u t extends i t to the ego itself. T h e ego is also a b u n d l e or collection o f perceptions or contents o f consciousness that succeed one another c o n t i n u a l l y . T h u s the ego does n o t have
The Scottish School
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substantial r e a l i t y ; i t is a result o f the i m a g i n a t i o n . H u m e forgets t h a t i t is / w h o have the perceptions, t h a t i t is / w h o f i n d myself facing t h e m a n d t h a t therefore I a m distinct f r o m t h e m . W h o unites this collection o f states o f consciousness a n d makes t h e m constitute a soul ? W h e n form u l a t i n g his sensationalist criticism, H u m e does not even touch u p o n the p r o b l e m o f the ego; apart f r o m the p r o b l e m o f its nature, substant i a l or not, the ego is something basically distinct f r o m its representations. Together w i t h the c r i t i q u e o f the concepts o f substance and the soul, H u m e makes a c r i t i q u e o f the concept o f cause. A c c o r d i n g to h i m , the causal connection signifies only a relationship o f coexistence and succession. W h e n a p h e n o m e n o n repeatedly coincides w i t h another o r succeeds i t i n t i m e , b y v i r t u e o f an association of ideas we call the first " c a u s e " a n d the second " e f f e c t , " a n d we say t h a t the latter occurs because the former takes place. N o m a t t e r h o w m a n y times this succession is repeated, i t does not afford us the c e r t a i n t y o f its indefinite rei t e r a t i o n , a n d i t does not allow us to a f f i r m a causal l i n k i n the sense o f a
necessary condition. S K E P T I C I S M . I n H u m e , empiricism reaches its ultimate consequences a n d becomes skepticism. K n o w l e d g e c a n n o t achieve metaphysical t r u t h . T h e i n t i m a t e a n d immediate convictions b y w h i c h m a n lives cannot be p r o v e d or refuted. T h e reason for this is that, as n o m i n a l i s m long ago p o i n t e d o u t , i n this instance knowledge is not knowledge o f the things. As a result, reality becomes perception, experience, idea. T h e c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f these ideas, w h i c h do not succeed i n b e i n g things, w h i c h are n o t h i n g b u t subjective impressions, is skepticism. W e see w h a t happens to idealism w h e n G o d is n o t present to assure transcendency, to save the w o r l d a n d m a k e the ideas be ideas of the things a n d cause there to be something t h a t merits the name of reason. K a n t , f o l l o w i n g i n Hume's footsteps, w i l l have to investigate this p r o b l e m f r o m its roots; and his philosophy w i l l consist of precisely a
Critique ofPure Reason.
7.
T H E
SCOTTISH
SCHOOL
W i t h i n the scope o f British philosophy, a n d more precisely i n Scotl a n d , there arises i n the eighteenth century a n d at the beginning o f t h e nineteenth a reaction to Hume's skepticism. T h i s movement constitutes the so-called " S c o t t i s h S c h o o l , " w h i c h h a d considerable i n fluence o n the C o n t i n e n t . T h e chief thinkers o f this school are T h o m a s R e i d (1710-1796) a n d D u g a l d Stewart (1753-1828). R e i d w r o t e An Inquiry into the Human
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British Philosophy
Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essays on the Active Powers of Man; Stewart w r o t e Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Outlines of Moral Philosophy, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers. T h e i r p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e is always e m p i r i c a l ; experience is the o r i g i n of knowledge. B u t this experience is understood as s o m e t h i n g direct a n d i m m e d i a t e t h a t gives us the r e a l i t y o f the things as they are understood b y sane reason. T h e p h i losophy o f the Scottish School consists o f an appeal t o c o m m o n sense. C o m m o n sense is the m a x i m u m source o f c e r t a i n t y ; a l l c r i t i cism leaves its i m m e d i a t e self-evidence beyond d o u b t . T h i s acceptat i o n places us d i r e c t l y i n the midst o f the things, a n d a g a i n anchors us i n their reality. B u t the philosophical insufficiency o f t h e Scottish School d i d n o t p e r m i t i t to solve, or even to state i n a m a t u r e m a n n e r , the p r o b l e m w i t h w h i c h i t was concerned. I n spite of this, the Scottish School exercised p r o l o n g e d influence i n France (Pierre P a u l R o y e r - C o l l a r d , a n d so on) a n d i n S p a i n , especially i n Catalonia, where its i m p r i n t is seen i n J a i m e L u c i a n o Balmes a n d i n M a r c e l i n o M e n é n d e z y Pelayo.
The
Enlightenment
T h e complex intellectual m o v e m e n t called the E n l i g h t e n m e n t cannot be considered a mere manifestation o f empiricism. I t is m a d e u p of various other elements—many o f w h i c h derive f r o m idealist r a t i o n a l ism a n d , i n the final analysis, f r o m Gartesianism. H o w e v e r , there are t w o reasons for our i n c l u d i n g the t h o u g h t o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t i n the c u r r e n t o f e m p i r i c i s m : i n the first place, as we have seen, B r i t i s h e m p i r i c i s m depends i n large p a r t o n C o n t i n e n t a l r a t i o n a l ism, a n d does n o t exclude ( b u t , o n the contrary, presupposes) the influence o f this school o f t h o u g h t ; secondly, the E n l i g h t e n m e n t , i n the scant measure i n w h i c h i t is philosophy, is more concerned w i t h the problems of knowledge t h a n w i t h metaphysical questions, a n d follows e m p i r i c a l paths, c a r r y i n g t h e m to the extreme o f absol u t e sensationalism. O n the other h a n d , the most i m p o r t a n t elements o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t — d e i s m , p o l i t i c a l ideology c h a m p i o n i n g freed o m a n d representative government, tolerance, the economic doctrines, a n d the l i k e — h a v e t h e i r o r i g i n i n the empirical t h o u g h t o f t h e sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. T h e epoch o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t , the eighteenth century, represents the e n d o f the metaphysical speculation o f the seventeenth c e n t u r y . A f t e r almost a century of intense a n d p r o f o u n d philosophical a c t i v i t y , we encounter a new hiatus i n w h i c h philosophic thought loses m o m e n t u m a n d becomes t r i v i a l . T h i s is a n epoch i n w h i c h the ideas o f the preceding p e r i o d are disseminated. A n d dissemination always has the f o l l o w i n g consequence: i n order to act u p o n the masses, i n order to t r a n s f o r m the face o f history, ideas must necessarily become t r i v i a l , z6i
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lose t h e i r precision a n d d i f f i c u l t y , become superficial images o f t h e m selves. T h e n , i n r e t u r n for ceasing to be w h a t they r e a l l y are, they are spread about a n d the general p u b l i c shares t h e m . I n the eighteenth c e n t u r y , a group o f able a n d ingenious writers w h o w i t h as m u c h insistence as i m p r o p r i e t y c a l l themselves " p h i l o s o p h e r s " e x p o u n d , i n t e r p r e t a n d popularize a series o f ideas c o n c e i v e d — i n a different f o r m a n d a different scope—by the great European m i n d s o f the seventeenth c e n t u r y . After a few years these ideas permeate the atmosphere, become p a r t o f the a i r one breathes, suppositions w h i c h everyone takes for granted, a n d t h e n we find ourselves i n a different w o r l d . E u r o p e has changed completely i n a r a p i d , almost brusque, revolutionary manner. A n d this t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f p o p u l a r t h o u g h t w i l l soon shape the radical a l t e r a t i o n o f history that we k n o w as the F r e n c h Revolution.
i.
T H E ENLIGHTENMENTI N FRANCE
I n the last years o f the seventeenth century a n d t h r o u g h o u t the eighteenth, France u n d e r w e n t a change i n ideas a n d convictions w h i c h altered the character o f its politics, social o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d s p i r i t u a l life. T h e most substantial changes took place between 1680 a n d 1715; a l l that followed was a process o f dissemination a n d p r o p a g a t i o n o f the new ideas, b u t b y t h a t t i m e the o u t l i n e o f F r e n c h history h a d already changed. T h e r e was a transition f r o m the notions o f discipline, hierarchy, a u t h o r i t y a n d dogma to those o f independence, e q u a l i t y a n d n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n , even a decided opposition to C h r i s t i a n i t y . I t was the transition f r o m the m e n t a l i t y of Bossuet to t h a t o f V o l t a i r e : the c r i t i q u e o f a l l t r a d i t i o n a l convictions, f r o m the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h to absolute monarchy, b y means o f a review o f history a n d social norms. I t was, i n effect, a r e v o l u t i o n i n the intellectual presuppositions o f F r a n c e a n d , since France was t h e n the g u i d i n g n a t i o n i n the E u r o p e a n c o m m u n i t y , o f all Europe. (See Paul Hazard's m a g n i f i c e n t book, The European Mind, 1680-1715.)
The Encyclopedia P I E R R E B A Y L E . T h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t wishes to gather together a l l scientific knowledge a n d m a k e i t available to a w i d e p u b l i c . S t r i c t l y philosophical problems, n o t to m e n t i o n theological ones, are relegated t o a secondary level. " P h i l o s o p h y " at this t i m e refers p r i n c i p a l l y to the findings o f n a t u r a l science a n d the e m p i r i c a l a n d deistic doctrines o f the B r i t i s h ; i t is a p o p u l a r i z a t i o n o f the less metaphysical portions o f Cartesianism a n d , at the same t i m e , o f British t h o u g h t . F o l l o w i n g the
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Cartesian t r a d i t i o n , the t h o u g h t o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t is rationalistic a n d , consequently, r e v o l u t i o n a r y : i t attempts to state a n d solve p r o b lems once a n d for a l l , m a t h e m a t i c a l l y , w i t h o u t t a k i n g historical circumstances i n t o account. F o l l o w i n g the British t r a d i t i o n , the prev a i l i n g theory o f knowledge is sensationalist empiricism. These t w o philosophic currents, the C o n t i n e n t a l a n d the British, converge i n the Enlightenment. T h e suitable organ for this p o p u l a r i z a t i o n of philosophy a n d science is the " e n c y c l o p e d i a , " a n d , i n fact, the first typical representative o f this movement, Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), d i d w r i t e one, the Dictionnaire historique et critique. Bayle subjected numerous questions to keen negative criticism. A l t h o u g h he d i d n o t deny the truths o f r e l i g i o n , he m a d e t h e m completely independent o f reason, a n d even c o n t r a r y to reason. H e was a skeptic w h o believed that reason can comprehend n o t h i n g o f dogma. I n a n age t h a t d o t e d o n reason, this v i e w p o i n t h a d to end i n a complete estrangement f r o m religion ; abstention becomes resolute denial, and the enemies of C h r i s t i a n i t y later make copious use o f Bayle's ideas. T H E E N C Y C L O P E D I S T S . M u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n Bayle's w o r k , however, was the so-called Encyclopedia, or Rational Dictionary ofSciences,
Arts and Trades (Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers), issued f r o m 1750 to 1780, despite attempts to prevent its p u b l i c a t i o n . T h e general editors o f the Encyclopedia were Denis D i d e r o t a n d Jean L e R o n d d ' A l e m b e r t ; the contributors i n c l u d e d the greatest figures o f the t i m e : V o l t a i r e , Montesquieu, Rousseau, A n n e R o b e r t Jacques T u r g o t , P a u l - H e n r i H o l b a c h a n d m a n y others. T h e Encyclopedia, w h i c h at first glance seemed n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a dict i o n a r y , was the greatest vehicle for Enlightenment ideas. W i t h considerable circumspection a n d skill, i t interpolated c r i t i c a l thoughts a n d attacked the C h u r c h a n d most p r e v a i l i n g convictions. D ' A l e m b e r t was a great m a t h e m a t i c i a n ; besides his scientific c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the
Encyclopedia, he wrote its Preliminary Discourse (Discours préliminaire), w h i c h is a n attempt to classify the sciences. D i d e r o t was a prolific w r i t e r , a novelist, p l a y w r i g h t a n d essayist, whose m a t u r e o r i e n t a t i o n was almost totally materialistic a n d atheistic. S E N S A T I O N A L I S M A N D M A T E R I A L I S M . T h i s t r e n d i n the E n l i g h t e n m e n t originates w i t h a C a t h o l i c priest, the A b b é Étienne de C o n d i l l a c , w h o was b o r n i n 1715 a n d d i e d i n 1780. H i s major w o r k is the Traité des sensations, i n w h i c h he expounds a purely sensationalistic theory. C o n d i l l a c imagines a statue w h i c h w o u l d be endowed, one b y one, w i t h a l l the senses, f r o m the sense o f smell to that o f t o u c h . W h e n the statue possessed all the senses, i t w o u l d have full h u m a n consciousness
The Enlightenment a n d , therefore, f u l l cognitive powers. Condillac, w h o was a C h r i s t i a n , excludes f r o m his sensationalism the era previous to the f a l l o f A d a m , as w e l l as the life beyond the grave, a n d speaks o f G o d a n d o f the simple soul as a u n i t o f consciousness. B u t later this exclusion is n o t m a i n t a i n e d . Whereas the so-called ideologues, especially the C o u n t Destutt de T r a c y (1754-1836), i n d u l g e according to their m e t h o d s i n psychology o r logic, Condillac's sensationalism is c o n t i n u e d b y the most extreme g r o u p among the Encyclopedists, who t u r n i t i n t o a mere atheistic m a t e r i a l i s m . T h e p r i n c i p a l thinkers o f this g r o u p are the physician J u l i e n de L a M e t t r i e (1709-1751), a u t h o r o f a book w i t h a very e l o q u e n t t i t l e : L'homme machine; C l a u d e - A d r i e n Helvétius (1715-1771), w h o w r o t e De l'Esprit; a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , a G e r m a n w h o resided i n Paris, B a r o n P a u l - H e n r i H o l b a c h (1723-1789), a u t h o r o f the Système de la nature a n d La morale universelle. A l l these w r i t e r s believe t h a t the o n l y means of knowledge is sensory perception ; t h a t everything i n n a t u r e is m a t t e r , i n c l u d i n g the foundation o f psychical life ; that religions a r e a decept i o n a n d t h a t , n a t u r a l l y , i t is impossible to speak o f the existence o f G o d or the i m m o r t a l i t y of the h u m a n soul. T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l value o f t h e i r r a t h e r u n o r i g i n a l works is v e r y slight. M u c h g r e a t e r interest attaches to those E n l i g h t e n m e n t thinkers w h o are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d history a n d the theory o f society a n d the State, especiaLly V o l t a i r e , M o n t e s q u i e u a n d Rousseau, a n d also T u r g o t and A n t o i n e - N i c o l a s de Condorcet, the theorists o f the idea o f progress. V O L T A I R E . François A r o u e t de V o l t a i r e (1694-1778) was a great figure o f his age. His fame was e x t r a o r d i n a r y and w o n h i m the friendship o f Frederick the Great o f Prussia and Catherine t h e Great o f Russia. H i s success and influence were u n m a t c h e d i n t h e eighteenth c e n t u r y . N o other w r i t e r was so w i d e l y read, commented o n , discussed, or a d m i r e d . Voltaire's actual value does not measure u p t o his r e n o w n . I n considering his w o r k we m u s t distinguish three aspects : its r e l a t i o n to l i t e r a t u r e , to philosophy a n d to history.
V o l t a i r e is a n excellent stylist. I n his works F r e n c h prose reached one o f its peaks; he is enormously keen, w i t t y and a m u s i n g . H i s short stories a n d novels, especially, reveal a splendid l i t e r a r y talent. H i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e r i t is something q u i t e different. H e is neither an o r i g i n a l n o r a profound t h i n k e r . H i s Dictionnaire philosophique is saturated w i t h the philosophic ideas o f the seventeenth c e n t u r y , w h i c h he adopts i n their most superficial guise: e m p i r i c i s m , d e i s m a n d a p o p u l a r i z a t i o n o f the physical i m a g e o f the w o r l d . T h u s V o l t a i r e has n o real philosophical interest. H i s antireligious ideas, "which were devastating i n his o w n age, appear ingenuous a n d harmless to us
The Enlightenment in France t o d a y . H e h a d a complete lack o f comprehension for religion a n d Christianity, a n d i n his hostility he reveals most clearly the inconsistency o f his thought. I t is n o t merely that he attacks Christianity, b u t t h a t he does i t i n so supremely superficial a w a y , t a k i n g a n anticlerical position w i t h o u t even a n awareness o f the real issue. Voltaire's most interesting a n d p r o f o u n d c o n t r i b u t i o n to the development o f t h o u g h t is his historical w o r k . H e w r o t e a book o n the great age p r i o r to his o w n , called Le siècle de Louis XIV. B u t his p r i n c i p a l historical p r o d u c t i o n is the Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations. I n this w o r k there appears for the first t i m e a new conception o f history. H i s t o r y is no longer a chronicle, a mere n a r r a t i o n o f deeds or events; instead, its object becomes the customs a n d spirit o f nations. T h u s the nations appear as historical units, each w i t h its o w n spirit a n d customs : the G e r m a n concept o f Volksgeist, " national s p i r i t , " is, as O r t e g a has shown, merely a translation o f this esprit des nations. V o l t a i r e finds a new object for history, a n d i n his hands i t takes the first step t o w a r d becoming a n authentic science, although i t does n o t succeed i n overc o m i n g naturalism. M O N T E S Q U I E U . B a r o n Montesquieu (Charles de Secondât, 1689¬ 1755) made a different sort o f c o n t r i b u t i o n to the thought o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t . H e , too, is a w i t t y w r i t e r ; this is most evident i n his Lettres persanes, a graceful a n d i r o n i c critique o f F r e n c h society of his day. B u t , above a l l , he is a p o l i t i c a l a n d historical w r i t e r . H i s major w o r k is Uesprit des lois ( T h e S p i r i t o f the L a w s ) . H i s thesis is t h a t the laws o f each c o u n t r y are a reflection o f the people w h o live b y t h e m ; the n a t u r a l i s m o f the age causes M o n t e s q u i e u to emphasize especially the influence o f climate. M o n t e s q u i e u recognizes three types o f constitutions w h i c h are repeated i n history. First o f a l l , there is despotism, w i t h no place for a n y t h i n g b u t fearful obedience; then there are t w o types o f States i n whose history he discovers a guiding motive, different for each. I n a monarchy the p r i n c i p a l m o t i v e is honor; i n a republic, virtue. W h e n these qualities are l a c k i n g i n their respective forms o f government, a n a t i o n does not f u n c t i o n as i t should. W i t h this theory Montesquieu furnishes a decisive c o m p l e m e n t to Voltaire's i d e a o f history : a d y n a m i c element w h i c h explains historical events. (Cf. Ortega : Guillermo Diltheyy la idea de la vida [ W i l h e l m D i l t h e y a n d the Idea o f L i f e ] . )
Rousseau Despite his connections w i t h the Encyclopedists, Rousseau merits a place o f his o w n i n the history o f thought. Jean-Jacques Rousseau was
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b o r n i n Geneva i n 1712, the son o f a Protestant watchmaker. H i s c h i l d h o o d was one of precocious i n t e l l e c t u a l s t i m u l a t i o n ; his later life was t h a t o f a n u n h a p p y wanderer, a n d frequently revealed traces o f a b n o r m a l i t y . H i s Confessions, a book i n w h i c h he r o m a n t i c a l l y exhibits his inmost feelings, is the best account o f his life. H e w o n a prize offered b y the A c a d e m y o f D i j o n w i t h his Discours sur les sciences et les arts, i n w h i c h he denied t h a t the sciences a n d arts h a d c o n t r i b u t e d t o w a r d the p u r i f i c a t i o n o f manners. This study m a d e h i m famous. Rousseau believes t h a t m a n is good b y nature, a n d t h a t i t is c i v i l i z a t i o n w h i c h ruins h i m . H i s i m p e r a t i v e is the return to nature. This is Rousseau's famous naturalism, w h i c h is based o n religious ideas proceeding f r o m his o r i g i n a l C a l v i n i s m . Rousseau denies o r i g i n a l sin a n d affirms the n a t u r a l goodness o f m a n , to w h i c h m a n o u g h t to r e t u r n . These ideas inspired another w o r k of his, the Discours sur V origine de V inégalité parmi les hommes (Discourse o n the O r i g i n o f I n e q u a l i t y a m o n g M e n ) ; he applied his ideas to the field o f education i n his famous book Emile. Rousseau represents a strong sentimental reaction against the c h i l l y rationalistic a r i d i t y o f the Encyclopedia ; he w r o t e a passionate, tearful novel w h i c h was immensely successful : Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse. T h i s n a t u r a l i s m is l i n k e d w i t h the idea o f r e l i g i o n . Rousseau converted to Catholicism, then back to C a l v i n i s m a n d ended u p a deist; his religion is sentimental ; he finds G o d i n n a t u r e , for w h i c h he feels a deep a d m i r a t i o n . B u t i t is Rousseau's social philosophy t h a t has h a d the most i m p o r tant consequences. H i s w o r k o n this subject is the Contrat social. M e n , i n their state o f n a t u r e , make a tacit c o n t r a c t . T h i s is t h e o r i g i n o f society a n d the State, w h i c h , according t o Rousseau, are thus based o n a v o l u n t a r y agreement; the i n d i v i d u a l is p r i o r to society. I t is man's w i l l t h a t determines the State ; b u t , aside f r o m the w i l l of the i n d i v i d u a l , Rousseau distinguishes between t w o collective wills : the volonté générale a n d the volonté de tous. T h e latter is t h e s u m o f the wills o f all the i n d i viduals, a n d is almost never u n a n i m o u s ; t h e volonté générale is the one w h i c h has p o l i t i c a l importance : i t is the w i l l o f the m a j o r i t y , which is the will of the State. T h i s is the i m p o r t a n t element. T h e w i l l of the m a j o r i t y , j u s t because i t is the w i l l of the m a j o r i t y , is the w i l l of the c o m m u n i t y as such, t h a t is, even of those w h o disagree ; for such people, i t is t h e i r w i l l not as i n d i v i d u a l s , b u t as members o f the State. T h i s is the p r i n c i p l e o f democracy a n d o f universal suffrage. W h a t is significant here is, o n the one h a n d , respect for minorities, w h o have the r i g h t t o a t t e m p t t o make their w i l l p r e v a i l , a n d , a t the same t i m e , acceptance b y t h e minorities o f the general w i l l as a n expression o f the w i l l o f the p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y . T h e consequences of these ideas were p r o f o u n d . Rousseau
The "Aufklärung"
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died i n 1778, before the beginning o f the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , b u t his ideas were a n essential element i n the b a c k g r o u n d o f the R e v o l u t i o n a n d influenced E u r o p e a n political history for a l o n g t i m e .
2.
T H E "AUFKLÄRUNG" I N GERMANY
Corresponding to the E n l i g h t e n m e n t i n France there was a similar, b u t not i d e n t i c a l m o v e m e n t i n G e r m a n y , w h i c h is also called a n " e n l i g h t e n m e n t " or " i l l u m i n a t i o n " : Aufklärung. H e r e , too, i t consisted o f a p o p u l a r i z a t i o n o f philosophy, especially t h a t o f L e i b n i z , as w e l l as o f B r i t i s h t h o u g h t . B u t i n Germany this spirit o f enlightenment is less r e v o l u t i o n a r y a n d less i n i m i c a l to r e l i g i o n ; the R e f o r m a t i o n h a d already achieved the transformation o f the content o f G e r m a n r e l i gion, a n d the Aufklärung does not come face to face w i t h a Catholic t r a d i t i o n o f l o n g s t a n d i n g , as d i d the E n l i g h t e n m e n t i n France. O t h e r wise, the same rationalistic a n d scientific spirit prevails i n G e r m a n y , a n d the Prussian c o u r t o f Frederick the Great, a l o n g w i t h the B e r l i n A c a d e m y o f Sciences, is a great center o f E n l i g h t e n m e n t ideology. W O L F F . T h e p o p u l a r i z e r o f L e i b n i z ' philosophy was C h r i s t i a n W o l f f (1679-1759), a professor at H a l l e . A f t e r w a r d , expelled f r o m the U n i v e r s i t y o f H a l l e , he t a u g h t at M a r b u r g , b u t was later reinstated at H a l l e w i t h great honors b y Frederick. W o l f f , a rather u n o r i g i n a l thinker, w r o t e m a n y works i n L a t i n a n d even m o r e i n G e r m a n ; the general title o f these w o r k s is frequently Rational Thoughts on Wolff i n t r o d u c e d the G e r m a n language i n t o the universities a n d i n t o p h i l o sophic w r i t i n g s . H i s t h o u g h t consisted o f the p o p u l a r i z a t i o n a n d dissemination o f L e i b n i z ' philosophy, especially its less p r o f o u n d aspects. F o l l o w i n g the precedents set b y J o h a n n C l a u b e r g a n d Jean Leclerc at the end o f the seventeenth century, he i n t r o d u c e d the division o f metaphysics i n t o ontology (or general metaphysics), r a t i o n a l theology, rational psychology a n d r a t i o n a l cosmology ( t h a t is, the ontology o f G o d , m a n a n d the w o r l d ) . T h e philosophy studied as a m a t t e r o f course i n G e r m a n y i n the eighteenth c e n t u r y was t h a t o f W o l f f ; i t is thus W o l f f ' s philosophy t h a t K a n t w i l l have to deal w i t h most d i r e c t l y
i n his Critique of Pure Reason. E S T H E T I C S . A philosophical discipline w h i c h is established independently i n the G e r m a n E n l i g h t e n m e n t is esthetics, the science o f beauty, w h i c h is here treated autonomously for the first time. T h e founder o f esthetics was a p u p i l o f W o l f f , Alexander B a u m g a r t e n (1714-1762), whose Aesthetica was published i n 1750. Also related to these problems is the historical a c t i v i t y o f J o h a n n J o a c h i m W i n c k e l m a n n , a contemporary o f B a u m g a r t e n , w h o w r o t e the famous History of the Art of
i68
The Enlightenment
Antiquity, w h i c h is so i m p o r t a n t for t h e study o f the a r t a n d c u l t u r e o f Greece. L E S S I N G . T h e w r i t e r w h o most clearly represents the spirit o f the Aufklärung is G o t t h o l d E p h r a i m Lessing (1729-1781). H e was a great l i t e r a r y figure, a poet, dramatist a n d essayist. H e was deeply concerned w i t h philosophic questions, especially w i t h the m e a n i n g o f history a n d the quest for knowledge. Lessing is the a u t h o r o f the famous saying t h a t i f G o d were to show h i m t r u t h i n one h a n d a n d i n the other the p a t h t h a t leads t o t r u t h , he w o u l d choose the second. H i s study o f the L a o c o ö n sculpture is another i m p o r t a n t step t o w a r d the u n d e r standing o f Greek a r t . Lessing's r a t i o n a l i s m — w i t h Spinozistic tendencies—is t o l e r a n t , n o t aggressive like V o l t a i r e ' s , a n d does n o t include Voltaire's hostility t o w a r d the C h r i s t i a n religion. T H E T R A N S I T I O N T O G E R M A N I D E A L I S M . T h e G e r m a n religious currents o f the eighteenth century—specifically t h e Pietism founded b y P h i l i p p J a k o b Spener a n d August H e r m a n n F r a n c k e — a n d the i n terest i n history lead the G e r m a n E n l i g h t e n m e n t onto different paths. Great value is once more attached t o s e n t i m e n t — a p h e n o m e n o n w h i c h appears i n France w i t h Rousseau; there is a n a t t e m p t to find the m e a n i n g o f the great stages o f history; there is a renewed a d m i r a t i o n for the M i d d l e Ages a n d G e r m a n c u l t u r e , as a reaction t o the Aufklärung, w i t h its c o l d rationalism. T h e r e appears the movement called Sturm und Drang. H e r d e r is perhaps the b r i d g e between the t w o trends. L a t e r there appears a group o f writers w h o prepare the w a y for o r accompany G e r m a n idealism, the great phase o f philosophy w h i c h extends f r o m K a n t to Hegel.
3. Vico's D O C T R I N E O F H I S T O R Y
A n o u t l i n e o f the intellectual p a n o r a m a o f the eighteenth c e n t u r y should n o t o m i t t h e figure o f the N e a p o l i t a n philosopher G i a m b a t tista V i c o (1668-1744), w h o stands somewhat a p a r t f r o m t h e rest. A l t h o u g h , strictly speaking, his t h o u g h t does n o t f i t exactly i n t o t h e forms a n d suppositions of the E n l i g h t e n m e n t , his historical position is determined b y s i m i l a r conditions, a n d his philosophy is frequently related to t h a t o f the founders o f t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l movement. V i c o was b o r n d u r i n g the period w h e n Naples was a Spanish vicer o y a l t y . H e was a j u r i s t and a philologist. H e was the first to cast d o u b t o n the existence o f H o m e r (formerly there h a d merely been c o n t r o versies over t h e place o f his b i r t h ) . F o r V i c o , H o m e r , Zoroaster a n d Hercules are n o t persons, b u t personified epochs o r c u l t u r a l cycles. After p u b l i s h i n g several works i n L a t i n — D e antiquissima Italorum
Vico's Doctrine of
History
269
sapientia ex linguae Latinae originibus eruenda ( O n the M o s t A n c i e n t W i s d o m o f the I t a l i a n s as Discovered i n the O r i g i n s o f the L a t i n L a n g uage), De uno universi juris principio etfine uno ( O n the One P r i n c i p l e a n d the O n e E n d o f U n i v e r s a l L a w ) , De constantia jurisprudentis ( O n the Constancy o f the J u r i s t ) — V i c o w r o t e his famous Scienza nuova, the f u l l title o f w h i c h is Principii di scienza nuova d'intorno alia comune natura delle nazioni (Principles o f a N e w Science Concerning the C o m m o n N a t u r e o f the N a t i o n s ) ; the first e d i t i o n o f this w o r k dates f r o m 1730, a n d the definitive edition (called the Scienza nuova seconda) f r o m 1744. Vico's p h i l o s o p h y — o n e o f great c o m p l e x i t y a n d confused structure —considers a series o f nations as the protagonists o f universal history. V i c o establishes a series o f p r i o r axioms (degnita) a n d remarks t h a t , whereas philosophy studies m a n as he o u g h t to be, l a w considers h i m as he is. Legislators take man's vices a n d t r a n s f o r m t h e m i n t o useful activities: f r o m savagery is derived the m i l i t a r y ; f r o m avarice, c o m merce ; f r o m a m b i t i o n , the life o f the c o u r t i e r . W e are halfway between the idea o f n a t u r e a n d the idea o f history. H u m a n customs have a cert a i n nature, a structure w h i c h is manifested i n language (therefore he calls history " p h i l o l o g y " ) a n d especially i n proverbs. T h e historical e v o l u t i o n o f the nations, w h i c h are the subjects o f history, occurs i n accordance w i t h an alternate r h y t h m o f corsi a n d ricorsi ( " c y c l e s " a n d " r e - c y c l e s " ) . T h e corso consists o f three phases: (a) T h e first phase, characterized b y the d o m i n a n c e o f the imagination over the reasoning f a c u l t y ; this i m a g i n a t i o n is creative. V i c o calls i t divine, because i t creates gods. M e n are savage, b u t they revere the gods they have created; i t is the era o f theocracy, (b) T h e heroic age: there is a belief i n heroes or demigods o f d i v i n e o r i g i n ; the f o r m o f government is aristocracy, (c) T h e human age: people are k i n d , i n t e l l i gent, modest a n d reasonable; government is based on equality, a n d appears i n the f o r m o f monarchy. T h e m e n o f the first of these ages are religious a n d pious; those o f the second are litigious and irascible; those o f the t h i r d are a c c o m m o d a t i n g a n d d i l i g e n t , their manners h a v i n g been f o r m e d b y civic duties. T o these three stages correspond three languages: one for silent religious acts (mental language), another for the exercise o f arms (language o f words o f c o m m a n d ) , a t h i r d for conversing (language for u n d e r s t a n d i n g one another). V i c o ' s ideas present an o u t l i n e o f a theory o f the functions of speech. W h e n a n a t i o n has passed t h r o u g h the three stages, the cycle begins a n e w ; this is the ricorso. I t is a p e r i o d n o t o f decadence, b u t o f r e b a r b a r i z a t i o n . These ideas are echoed i n Comte's theory o f the three states, b u t i n Comte's theory the positive state is the
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270
definitive one, i n contrast to w h a t happens w i t h the h u m a n age i n Vico's outline.
4.
SPANISH PHILOSOPHERS
OF T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T
I n Spain the E n l i g h t e n m e n t h a d characteristics o f its o w n : its p r i n c i p a l accomplishment was to b r i n g Spain u p to the level o f the era by i n t r o d u c i n g the science a n d philosophy t h a t h a d been developed elsewhere since the seventeenth c e n t u r y ; i n other words, to Europeanize Spain (despite the opposition o f the partisans o f n a t i o n a l p u r i t y ) . T h e m e n o f the Spanish E n l i g h t e n m e n t were n o t irreligious, b u t they c o m b a t e d the abuses o f the C h u r c h a n d the lack of freedom, w h i l e r e m a i n i n g l o y a l to their f a i t h . T h e y were champions o f p o l i t i c a l a n d social r e f o r m , b u t n o t revolutionaries; the great m a j o r i t y o f t h e m were dismayed b y the violence a n d suppression of freedom d u r i n g the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n . T h e reigns o f Fernando V I (1746-1759) a n d Carlos I I I (1759-1788), especially, represent an i n t e l l i g e n t transformation o f Spanish society. T h i s social progress was p a r t i a l l y undone d u r i n g the r e i g n o f Carlos I V , i n w h i c h a strong r e a c t i o n set i n , a n d finally destroyed b y the Napoleonic invasion w i t h its p o l i t i c a l struggles a n d b y the absol u t i s m o f Fernando V I I (1814-1833). T h e Spanish E n l i g h t e n m e n t was a t i m e o f assimilation o f ideas rather t h a n o f c r e a t i v i t y , a n d thus is n o t of great philosophical i m p o r t a n c e ; i t m e r e l y signifies the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f m o d e r n t h o u g h t at a time w h e n Scholasticism h a d become least p r o d u c t i v e . A leadi n g figure was the Benedictine Benito Jerónimo Feijoo (1676-1764), a G a l i c i a n , w h o was a professor at O v i e d o and the a u t h o r o f the Teatro critico universal i n eight volumes a n d the Cartas eruditas y curiosas, i n five volumes. A great essayist whose works were w i d e l y read, he was understanding a n d tolerant and concerned w i t h r o o t i n g o u t mistaken beliefs a n d superstitions. O t h e r i m p o r t a n t thinkers were Feijoo's friend a n d collaborator, Father M a r t í n Sarmiento (1695¬ 1771); the philosopher a n d physician Andrés Piquer (1711-1772),
author o f Lógica moderna a n d Filosofía moral para la juventud española; the doctor M a r t í n M a r t i n e z , w h o w r o t e Filosofía escéptica; a n d A n t o n i o X a v i e r Pérez y L ó p e z , a u t h o r o f Principios del orden esencial de la naturaleza. A n o t h e r interesting personality was the Jesuit J u a n Andrés, a u t h o r o f Origen, progreso y estado actual de toda la literatura, a ten-volume w o r k t h a t perfectly reflects the temper a n d accomplishments o f the era. T w o other Jesuit writers were Esteban de Arteaga (La belleza ideal) a n d L o r e n z o Hervás y P a n d u r o (Historia de la vida
Spanish Philosophers of the Enlightenment
2 j i
del hombre, Catálogo de las lenguas de las naciones conocidas). T h e greatest t h i n k e r o f the century was Gaspar M e l c h o r de Jovellanos ( 1 7 4 4 ¬ 1811), a u t h o r o f i n n u m e r a b l e essays a n d monographs. H i s most b r i l l i a n t insights are contained i n his Diarios (Journals).* * See my books Los Españoles (1962) and La España posible en tiempo de Carlos I I I (1963) [Obras, V I I ] .
The Formation
i.
of the Modern
PHILOSOPHY AND
Epoch
HISTORY
Ideas are conceived i n the r e a l m o f philosophy b u t end u p h a v i n g historical consequences. Concepts become generalized a n d are slowly converted i n t o a n a c t i v a t i n g force t h a t reaches d o w n to the masses. T h i s phenomenon has always taken place, b u t occurs to a greater degree t h a n ever i n the epoch w h i c h we are n o w considering. T h e entire eighteenth c e n t u r y , a l l t h a t we k n o w as the E n l i g h t e n m e n t , consisted of a process i n w h i c h ideas conceived i n previous centuries a c q u i r e d influence a n d social r e a l i t y . A n d this circumstance is n o t coincidental. T o a c e r t a i n extent, a l l eras exist on ideas; however, i t is n o t necessary for ideas to show themselves as ideas, as theories; i n fact, ideas generally o b t a i n force b y disguising themselves—for example, as t r a d i t i o n a l forms. B u t i n the eighteenth century ideas have i m p o r t a n c e precisely because they are ideas; people endeavor to live a c c o r d i n g to those ideas, according to raison. T h e ideas do n o t have to disguise t h e m selves, a n d thus acquire m a x i m u m force. Precisely the same t h i n g happens i n regard to the metaphysical ideas, a n d the religious a n d theological ideas related to t h e m , t h a t I have a t t e m p t e d to set f o r t h i n the preceding chapters. T h e ideas g r a d u a l l y spread to a n d exercise influence over w i d e r a n d w i d e r circles. Slowly, everyday life a n d the sciences become shaped b y the results w h i c h philosophy o b t a i n e d for t h e m previously. A n d i n this fashion the face of the w o r l d is changed. T h e deep-rooted reasons for the change are p r i o r a n d r e m a i n h i d d e n ; w h a t manifests itself is the complete alteration o f the surface o f life. B u t this change can o n l y be 2JZ
The Rationalist State
z
73
understood properly a n d i n its entirety i f one recognizes the subt e r r a n e a n forces that are i n operation. W e must investigate p h i losophy's place i n history after this change, and see h o w its character is shaped b y its very s i t u a t i o n .
2.
T H E RATIONALIST
STATE
T h e epoch subsequent to the Renaissance is characterized b y the discovery o f m a t h e m a t i c a l reason—rationalism. I t was d u r i n g the sixteenth a n d seventeenth centuries t h a t the great r a t i o n a l systems of physics a n d philosophy were constructed: those o f Galileo, N e w t o n , Descartes, Spinoza, L e i b n i z . T h i s rationalism has obvious historical consequences. A B S O L U T I S M . F r o m the v e r y b e g i n n i n g of the m o d e r n State, the absolute State, people commence to discuss reason, the reason o f the State: Machiavelli's ragione di Stato. T h e State n o w has a personality, a n d also its reasons; therefore, i t operates like a m i n d . T h i s rationalist personification of the State makes its appearance at the same t i m e as the m o d e r n nations. Descartes mentions politics o n l y i n passing; he says t h a t things are better made w h e n they are made according to reason a n d b y o n l y one person, rather t h a n b y several. T h i s is the r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n of absolute monarchy, a n d f r o m this same p r i n c i p l e there emerges, later o n , the revolutionary spirit. T h e States created d u r i n g the Renaissance become powerful units o f absolute power. D I P L O M A C Y . A t this m o m e n t , a new concept o f d i p l o m a c y makes itself evident. I t amounts to n o t h i n g more t h a n the s u b s t i t u t i o n o f an abstract personal relationship for the direct relationship between States; this diplomacy results f r o m the unification t h a t the nations have achieved; previously i t existed only i n the m e d i e v a l I t a l i a n States—precisely those states w h i c h most resembled nations i n the m o d e r n sense o f the w o r d . ( T h i s m a y be the reason w h y i t took I t a l y so l o n g to become a unified c o u n t r y . ) Thanks to d i p l o m a c y , a consequence o f unification, the u n i t y itself becomes accentuated. France as France begins to exist for F r e n c h m e n a n d for people o f other countries w h e n they see i t represented a n d personified, c a r r y i n g o n relations w i t h other countries. T h e change can be demonstrated b y c o m p a r i n g the consciousness of Spanishness o f a subject of the C a t h o l i c Kings w i t h t h a t o f a subject o f P h i l i p I I . A t Isabella's death, F e r d i n a n d of A r a g o n c a n still " r e t u r n to his States"; i n the t i m e o f P h i l i p I I this w o u l d n o longer have been possible. A n a t i o n is personified by its absolute k i n g ; relations between nations are c a r r i e d o u t a n d
The Formation of the Modern Epoch personalized i n the conversation o f a few men. T h e various States begin to be factors i n the consciousness o f all individuals.
3.
T H E
REFORMATION
T h e R e f o r m a t i o n has a s t r i c t l y religious dimension, t h e o r i g i n o f w h i c h c o u l d easily be traced t h r o u g h the M i d d l e Ages to L u t h e r . H o w e v e r , we are not going to consider this aspect, b u t the v i t a l a n d historical dimension of the R e f o r m a t i o n — t h a t is, the s p i r i t u a l situat i o n t h a t m a d e i t possible a n d the new situation t h a t i t created. F R E E D O M O F I N T E R P R E T A T I O N . T h i s most i m p o r t a n t element i n the R e f o r m a t i o n is the concept o f freedom o f i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f religious texts. This concept assumes t h a t , instead o f there being a C h u r c h a u t h o r i t y to i n t e r p r e t the sacred texts, each i n d i v i d u a l must i n t e r p r e t t h e m for himself. T h i s is p u r e r a t i o n a l i s m ; there is a presentim e n t here o f Descartes' statement, " G o o d sense is the most w i d e l y d i s t r i b u t e d t h i n g i n the w o r l d . " B u t L u t h e r is the least r a t i o n a l m a n i n the w o r l d , a n enemy of reason a n d o f philosophy. W h a t does this m e a n ? I t is one more p r o o f t h a t , i n spite o f his o w n i n d i v i d u a l ideas, a m a n is oriented b y the beliefs o f the epoch i n t o w h i c h he is b o r n , a n d t h a t the p r e v a i l i n g suppositions o f the epoch influence h i m m u c h m o r e t h a n his o w n ideas do ( O r t e g a ) . T h e destruction of the C h u r c h is the necessary consequence o f this spirit o f free i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; as soon as one says, ' m a n a n d G o d a l o n e , " the C h u r c h becomes an obstacle placed between m a n a n d G o d . T h e C h u r c h has always kept very close w a t c h over mystical positions because they skirt this danger. A C a t h o l i c mystic's awesome statement is w e l l k n o w n : " G o d and I , a n d no w o r l d at a l l . " M a n is alone w i t h G o d . Protestant f r a c t i o n i z a t i o n is the result o f this concept; p l u r a l i t y is o f the essence o f Protestantism. L e t us investigate t w o aspects o f the reformed c h u r c h — t h e " n a t i o n a l " C h u r c h (for example , the A n g l i c a n ) a n d that characterized b y the Augsburg Confession—in o r d e r to see h o w they contain w i t h i n themselves the seed o f their o w n dissolution. 1
T h e n a t i o n a l c h u r c h revolves a r o u n d the person o f the k i n g . T h e k i n g o f E n g l a n d or some G e r m a n p r i n c e is the head o f the C h u r c h , w h i c h is n a t i o n a l , political. A f u n d a m e n t a l l i n k between r e l i g i o n a n d politics, between the C h u r c h a n d the State, is thus created. T h e State becomes a religious state, b u t something quite different f r o m w h a t a religious state was i n the M i d d l e Ages. T h e medieval State assumes a n d accepts the Church's religious p r i n c i p l e s ; now, r a t h e r the o p p o site o c c u r s — r e l i g i o n is affected b y n a t i o n a l principles; the cujus regio,
The Reformation ejus religio f o r m u l a is established. T o a certain extent, this spirit penetrates the Catholic countries also, a n d i n Protestant a n d Catholic countries alike people speak o f the " a l l i a n c e between the throne a n d the a l t a r , " forgetting those extremely clear words i n the Gospels: My kingdom is not of this world. T h e various m o d e r n inquisitions—so unlike the medieval I n q u i s i t i o n — a r e really instruments o f the State rather t h a n organs of the C h u r c h . T h i s nationalization o f the C h u r c h leads to the loss o f its religious c o n t e n t a n d its absorption w i t h temporal interests. O u r era is n o t witnessing the disappearance o f Protestantism, b u t i t does indeed witness frequent shortcomings o f the " n a t i o n a l churches." O n the other h a n d , the A u g s b u r g Confession, for example, assumes a n agreement on matters o f f a i t h . People subscribe to i t because they are i n agreement w i t h its d o g m a t i c content. I t is a n association of isolated i n d i v i d u a l s ; the i n d i v i d u a l s constitute a C h u r c h , b u t they are not within a Church, as Catholics are ; the distinction is obvious. However, a comm u n i t y founded on c o n c o r d a n t o p i n i o n is subject to change. Governed b y the spirit o f i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , o p i n i o n evolves i n m a n y ways a n d becomes d i v i d e d ; the single Confession is succeeded by various sects ; these i n t u r n splinter even more, a n d thus we arrive at the i n d i v i d u a l creed. So-called l i b e r a l Protestantism consists o f the suppression of almost a l l d o g m a t i c content, to such a degree that the w o r d " C h r i s t i a n i t y " is p r a c t i c a l l y a mere anachronism w h e n applied toit. T H E P R O B L E M O F T H E R E F O R M A T I O N . T h e Catholic countries undertake the C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n , t h a t is, a R e f o r m a t i o n i n reverse. I n this w a y a schism is created between the Protestant a n d Catholic countries, a n d E u r o p e , w h i c h was handed d o w n to us as a u n i t , appears to be split i n t w o . C o n t e m p l a t i n g these t w o halves into w h i c h Europe has been d i v i d e d , we can believe ( i ) t h a t u n i t y is m a i n t a i n e d b y Catholicism, a n d t h a t the R e f o r m a t i o n is a t r a n s i t o r y a n d u n a d u l terated e r r o r ; (2) t h a t Protestantism represents Europe's destiny, and t h a t the Catholic populations are reactionaries (Hegel a n d François G u i z o t h i n t at this, a n d i t is France t h a t precludes t h e m f r o m accepting this historical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) ; or (3) that b o t h w i l l subsist a n d that Europe's u n i t y is a dialectical u n i t y , a tense, d y n a m i c u n i t y made u p o f those t w o halves. Observe t h a t this latter position does not touch u p o n the question o f the i n h e r e n t t r u t h o f C a t h o l i c i s m ; the Christian m i n d finds itself facing the fact t h a t G o d has allowed the Reformation to take place, j u s t as, o n the other h a n d , H e has a l l o w e d more t h a n t w o religions to coexist. O n e cannot ignore the fact o f the R e f o r m a t i o n , a n d the C h u r c h has not i g n o r e d i t ; note t h a t the C h u r c h does not take the
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same position w h e n faced w i t h the b r e a k w i t h the O r t h o d o x Eastern C h u r c h a n d w h e n faced w i t h the Protestant m o v e m e n t : i n the first instance, the C h u r c h loses the obedience o f a l l the Eastern countries a n d remains u n c h a n g e d ; i n the second instance, i t conducts a CounterReformation : the existence o f the C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n demands the existence o f the R e f o r m a t i o n , no mere schism, w h i c h p r o v o k e d the Counter-Reformation. T h i s position creates a new p r o b l e m for us: W h a t is the n a t u r e o f the i n t e r a c t i o n between the Catholic a n d Protestant worlds ? W h a t is the nature of the u n i t y t h a t these t w o w o r l d s establish ? A n d , f i n a l l y , w h a t must the synthesis be like t h a t resolves this a n t i n o m y ? W e c o u l d t h i n k — a n d this idea, welcome to a C a t h o l i c m i n d , is seen not to be c o n t r a dicted b y the evidence o f our a g e — t h a t the synthesis m i g h t consist o f the u l t i m a t e reabsorption o f Protestantism b y Catholicism after the former comes to the end of w h a t is erroneous i n its p a t h a n d reaches its u l t i m a t e consequences. Perhaps Protestantism w i l l refute itself historically a n d f i n d itself i n a superior t r u t h . T h e resultant u n i t y o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h w o u l d n o t b y a n y means be the same as t h a t u n i t y w h i c h i t h a d p r i o r to the R e f o r m a t i o n ; i t w o u l d n o t be as t h o u g h the R e f o r m a t i o n had never t a k e n place. Rather, i t w o u l d be preserved i n this concrete f o r m o f its absorption.
4.
MODERN
SOCIETY
W e have seen the roles played b y t w o m a j o r elements o f the m o d e r n age: r a t i o n a l i s m a n d the R e f o r m a t i o n . N o w we must see h o w these elements influence the era's social structure, how, by v i r t u e o f p h i losophy a n d theology, a l l m o d e r n l i f e — f r o m the intellectual to the social a n d p o l i t i c a l — a c q u i r e s a new air t h a t culminates i n the eighteenth c e n t u r y w i t h the t w o great historical facts o f the E n l i g h t enment a n d the French R e v o l u t i o n .
Intellectual Life T H E C H A R A C T E R O F T H E I N T E L L E C T U A L . W h a t kinds o f intellectuals do these centuries produce ? W h a t characterizes a n intellectual m a n o f this p e r i o d , a n d to w h a t purpose is his l a b o r ? W h a t does being a n intellectual i n the seventeenth century i n v o l v e , and how does i t differ f r o m being a n intellectual i n the M i d d l e Ages, i n the Renaissance or i n the eighteenth century ?
D u r i n g the M i d d l e Ages, the true i n t e l l e c t u a l is the cleric, especially the m o n k . T h e w o r k o f Scholasticism, w i t h its connotation o f a school, a c o l l a b o r a t i o n , is carried out b y m e n w o r k i n g j o i n t l y w i t h i n the
Modern Society O r d e r or the U n i v e r s i t y . T h e philosopher o f this p e r i o d is a m a n o f the monastery, o f the c o m m u n i t y , or rather a magister. H e is the Scholastic —scholasticus—who collaborates on the great collective w o r k . D u r i n g the Renaissance, the intellectual is a humanist. H e is a m a n o f the w o r l d , a l a y m a n , w h o cultivates his personality, chiefly i n the dimensions o f a r t a n d literature, b o t h o f w h i c h are saturated w i t h the essence o f classical c u l t u r e . T h e Renaissance intellectual had a certain freshness i n his m a n n e r o f v i e w i n g nature a n d the w o r l d . Pietro Bembo is t y p i c a l , i n spite o f his cardinal's hat, a n d so also are Thomas M o r e , Erasmus, G u i l l a u m e Bude (Budaeus) a n d Vives. N o w we find a different type o f i n t e l l e c t u a l : Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza. T h e i n t e l l e c t u a l of this epoch, as O r t e g a has pointed out, is the m a n o f m e t h o d . H e does n o t h i n g b u t seek for methods, open new roads t h a t a l l o w h i m to reach the things, new things, new regions. H e is the m a n w h o , using the essential i m p e r a t i v e o f r a t i o n a l i t y , constructs his science. T h e m a n o f the seventeenth c e n t u r y has an effective a n d precise awareness o f m o d e r n i t y . I t was Renaissance m a n w h o h a d symptoms, signs o f m o d e r n i t y , who went a b o u t f i n d i n g ancient things, w h i c h seemed new precisely because they were so o l d . I f the Renaissance is seen i n d e t a i l , i t becomes clear t h a t i n m a n y ways i t was a negative movement. T h e things that the m o d e r n age accomplishes are anchored more i n the M i d d l e A g e s — i n O c c a m , E c k h a r t , the school o f P a r i s — t h a n i n the Renaissance. T h e Renaissance is dazzling, b u t i t has little intellectual p r o f u n d i t y . Renaissance m e n such as Vives a n d R a m u s t u r n their backs o n the M i d d l e A g e s — a n d their a t t i t u d e endures: a century later, w h i l e people's very lives derive f r o m medieval roots, the M i d d l e Ages a n d Scholasticism are still t h o u g h t to be completely false. L e i b n i z is the first m a n to possess a sense o f history a n d recognize Scholasticism's value as w e l l as the value o f the new science. T H E T H E M E O F N A T U R E . T h e R e f o r m a t i o n split Europe i n t o two halves—not one reformed a n d one u n r e f o r m e d , b u t b o t h reformed, although i n different senses. There is one exception: France, w h i c h is not a country o f the R e f o r m a t i o n , b u t neither, perhaps, of the CounterR e f o r m a t i o n . France does combat the Calvinists, a n d even goes to the extreme o f St. Bartholomew's Eve, b u t i t also indulges i n politics cont r a r y to t h a t o f A u s t r i a a n d , d u r i n g the T h i r t y Years' W a r , makes political alliances w i t h o u t regard for religious ties. F u r t h e r m o r e , France promulgates the E d i c t o f Nantes a n d establishes the G a l l i c a n C h u r c h , still R o m a n Catholic, still subordinate to the Pope i n r e l i gious matters, b u t w i t h a strong nationalistic tinge. I t is perhaps for this reason t h a t L e i b n i z , w h e n a t t e m p t i n g to reunite the Catholic a n d Protestant Churches, approached neither the hierarchs o f the Spanish
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C h u r c h (except the bishop Rojas Spinola) n o r R o m e d i r e c t l y , b u t instead, Bossuet i n p a r t i c u l a r — t h e spokesman o f the G a l l i c a n C h u r c h . W e find a very i m p o r t a n t difference between those E u r o p e a n countries w h i c h l i v e u n d e r the C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n a n d the rest o f E u r o p e : i n the C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n lands there are p r a c t i c a l l y no investigators o f n a t u r a l science, except for the I t a l i a n physicists, the chief o f w h o m , Galileo, became e m b r o i l e d w i t h the ecclesiastical authorities. T h e C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n countries do cultivate another discipline w h i c h is very i m p o r t a n t : jus naturae. Instead o f physics, they practice n a t u r a l law, a j u r i d i c a l science o f m a n . B u t there is a s i m i l a r i t y u n d e r l y i n g the differences: the l a w t h a t is studied is natural law, a n d the theme o f nature reappears here, too. T h i s theory o f law, as developed b y the Spanish theologians, is still based on G o d ; b u t at the hands of the D u t c h a n d E n g l i s h — H u g o Grotius, Shaftesbury, H u t c h e s o n — i t becomes strictly n a t u r a l l a w , a theory o f l a w o f h u m a n nature. Philosophers speak o f n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n , or deism, a n d o f a n a t u r a l G o d . T h i s is a l l p a r t of the naturalistic movement t h a t c u l m i nates i n Rousseau. T h e C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n r a n a strange course: i t r e m a i n e d i n t e l lectually self-contained a n d isolated, a n d d i d n o t f o r m ties w i t h the new philosophy a n d the new science. Descartes a n d L e i b n i z are acquainted w i t h the Spanish theologians, b u t the Spanish themselves do not establish connections w i t h the m o d e r n philosophers; they are interested o n l y i n their o w n k i n d o f philosophy. T h e y r e m a i n outside the new E u r o p e a n intellectual c o m m u n i t y , a n d thus the splendid Spanish flowering is soon cut off and does n o t have direct f r u i t f u l consequences. B u t i t must be noted that the w o r k o f the Spanish thinkers f r o m V i t o r i a to Suarez was not sterile; i t is j u s t t h a t its effectiveness became evident at a far remove f r o m w h a t was seemingly its con-
tinuation. T H E I N T E L L E C T U A L U N I T Y O F E U R O P E . I n the seventeenth century there is a s p i r i t u a l c o m m u n i t y i n Europe w h i c h is guided b y philosophy a n d n a t u r a l science a n d even by theology. O n e element o f this comm u n i t y has disappeared today, b u t possibly i t w i l l reappear before long, after these years of crisis: the intellectuals o f the seventeenth century used to w r i t e each other l o n g letters. A considerable p a r t o f the works o f Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, L e i b n i z , A r n a u l d , Clarke a n d a l l the representative m e n o f the age consists o f their scientific correspondence. T h i s means t h a t they were interested i n each other's endeavors a n d , w h a t is more, corrected each o t h e r ; this exchange of objections gave a n enormous precision to the works o f the p e r i o d . I t is the age i n w h i c h m e n publish b r i e f pamphlets w h i c h transform p h i -
Modem Society
¿79
losophy w i t h fifty l u c i d l y w r i t t e n pages : Discours de la méthode, Discours
de la métaphysique, Monadologie. Social Transformation T h e profession o f " i n t e l l e c t u a l " d i d n o t yet exist as such i n the seventeenth century. Descartes, m u c h to the chagrin o f his f a m i l y , d i d n o t choose a profession—the m i l i t a r y , l a w or the C h u r c h : gens de robe etgensd'épée—but shut himself u p w i t h his w o r k a n d studies. H e was a m a n o f independent means a n d good social standing, un homme de bonne compagnie, a n d devoted himself to intellect u a l pursuits w i t h o u t becoming a cleric o r a professor. As the seventeenth century proceeds, the type o f m a n w h i c h Descartes inaugurated becomes more prevalent. THE
N E W CLASSES.
O n the one h a n d , the intellectual clears a p a t h for himself, w h i l e , o n the other, the n o b i l i t y become dependents o f the r o y a l palace. E v e n at the end o f the eighteenth century the intellectual class has n o t yet become completely established. Stendhal quotes a nobleman's r e m a r k
about Rousseau : Cela veut raisonner de tout etríapas quarante mille livres de rente ( T h a t fellow wants to philosophize a b o u t everything a n d his income isn't even forty thousand livres). B u t at the same t i m e a m i d d l e class is i n f o r m a t i o n ; this bourgeoisie w i l l have a share i n intellectual pursuits, because one o f its higher strata is composed o f m e n o f science. T h e traces o f feudalism die out a n d the independence o f the n o b i l i t y comes to a n end. T h e final active manifestations o f feudalism are the Fronde i n M a z a r i n ' s France a n d , i n Spain, the rising o f A n d a l u s i a u n d e r the D u k e o f M e d i n a Sidonia d u r i n g the reign o f P h i l i p I V . T h e nobles have to f o r m ties w i t h the other t w o forces, the t h i r d estate a n d the m o n a r c h y . T h e y become courtiers o f the k i n g , while at the same time establishing contact w i t h the bourgeoisie. T h e n o b i l i t y is supp o r t e d b y these t w o social elements, a n d its situation is very difficult after the French R e v o l u t i o n . T h e bourgeoisie, on the other h a n d , becomes stronger l i t t l e b y little. T h e m o n a r c h y has reached its absolute c u l m i n a t i o n — r e g a l i s m — a n d has achieved a complete organization o f the State, w h i c h begins to be a perfect machine. A u t o m a t i c a l l y , a series o f matters w h i c h h a d been considered i n d i v i d u a l a n d p r i v a t e concerns become concerns o f the State. T h e State furnishes m o r e a n d m o r e services, takes m o r e problems o n its shoulders a n d also makes its weight felt m o r e a n d more. T h i s is w h a t is k n o w n as i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m o f the State; this p r o cess expands constantly a n d today the State enters i n t o every p a r t o f o u r lives.
z8o
The Formation of the Modern Epoch
N A T U R E A N D G R A C E . W e have seen h o w R e f o r m a t i o n t h o u g h t a n d r a t i o n a l i s m involve a n interest i n nature, a p a r t f r o m G o d . I n the M i d d l e Ages, the t w o concepts o f n a t u r e a n d grace were contraposed, a n d i n the Renaissance, m a n flung himself i n t o the p u r s u i t o f nature, neglecting grace a n d forgetting the o l d C h r i s t i a n p r i n c i p l e : gratia naturam non tollit, sedperficit (grace does n o t remove n a t u r e , b u t perfects i t ) . Nineteenth-century philosophers so completely forget t h a t grace was once the c o m p a n i o n o f nature t h a t they o n l y contrast culture w i t h nature, a n d this effectively transforms the idea o f nature. T o d a y p h i losophers prefer to speak o f spirit—a w o r d r i c h i n m e a n i n g , b u t also i n a m b i g u i t y — a n d , f r o m another p o i n t o f view, ofhistory.
W i t h the Renaissance the natural mode o f t h o u g h t t r i u m p h s . T h e world ceases to be C h r i s t i a n , a l t h o u g h i n d i v i d u a l people still a r e — something very different. M a n is now a mere n a t u r a l e n t i t y . Protest a n t i s m started out w i t h a completely pessimistic conception o f m a n : i t considered h i m a fallen being whose n a t u r e was essentially corr u p t e d b y o r i g i n a l sin a n d whose justification c o u l d be achieved o n l y through faith, b y the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the merits o f C h r i s t ; works are i n o p e r a t i v e : m a n is incapable o f earning his o w n salvation. I n the face o f this view, the C o u n c i l o f the C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n at T r e n t proclaims as its theme faith and works. I n the Renaissance, m a n becomes progressively m o r e estranged f r o m G o d as a consequence o f God's inaccessibility to reason. F o r the Protestant, God's works have n o t h i n g to do w i t h grace; they are merely works o f nature, w h i c h dominate the w o r l d i n accordance w i t h physical laws; thus, m a n drifts away f r o m G o d a n d f r o m grace. T h e consequence o f this is t h a t w h e n m a n remains alone w i t h the w o r l d , accomplishing great things w i t h i t , a n d loses interest i n the p r o b l e m o f grace, he no longer considers himselfevil. Pessimism was based o n the viewp o i n t o f grace, b u t i f m a n is a natural entity a n d is enjoying great success w i t h his rationalistic physics, w h y should the o l d o u t l o o k continue ? Protestant pessimism, finding itself i n the r e a l m o f mere nature, becomes the o p t i m i s m o f Rousseau. M a n forgets a b o u t o r i g i n a l sin a n d considers himself to be naturally good. T H E F R E N C H R E V O L U T I O N . W h a t results w i l l this s i t u a t i o n have i n the eighteenth c e n t u r y ? T h e eighteenth century is the era w h i c h makes use o f the t h o u g h t o f the seventeenth. I n history there are periods o f intense c r e a t i v i t y a n d others w h i c h m a k e use o f w h a t has gone before t h e m , w h i c h d o n o t themselves grapple w i t h i m p o r t a n t o r i g i n a l problems, b u t o n l y a p p l y a n d p u t i n t o effect p r i o r discoveries. E v e r y t h i n g is o n a lower level. T h u s , i n place o f the seventeenthcentury intellectual there is the Encyclopedist, w h o is essentially a
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manifestation o f j o u r n a l i s m , b u t for w h o m science is still a l i v i n g t h i n g , even t h o u g h , i n general, i t has been previously worked out. These m e n disseminate the t h o u g h t o f the seventeenth century, o n w h i c h the f o l l o w i n g century lives. I f an idea is to f o r m the basis for l i v i n g , i t is necessary for t i m e to elapse a n d for the masses to receive the idea, not as some i n d i v i d u a l ' s conviction, b u t as a p r e v a i l i n g belief. T h i s is a slow process; as O r t e g a points out, the tempo o f the life o f a c o m m u n i t y is m u c h slower t h a n t h a t o f the life o f an i n d i v i d u a l . T h u s , i n the eighteenth century, the ladies o f Versailles discuss the themes w h i c h i n the seventeenth h a d been the p r i v a t e d o m a i n o f the most acute t h i n k e r s : Newton's physics a n d Monsieur Descartes' w h i r l w i n d s , w h i c h V o l t a i r e had made accessible to the Court. A l l this leads to the French R e v o l u t i o n . T h e Renaissance b r o u g h t us t w o things: r a t i o n a l i s m a n d the R e f o r m a t i o n . These h a d t w o results : n a t u r a l i s m a n d o p t i m i s m . W e have seen t h a t rationalism produces absolute m o n a r c h y i n a very direct m a n n e r ; b u t absolute m o n a r c h y is a phase i n a process that began i n the M i d d l e Ages. T h e medieval p e r i o d created a m i l i t a r y s p i r i t — k n i g h t h o o d — a n d the m o n a r c h is a leader w i t h pronounced m i l i t a r y traits. D u r i n g the entire course o f the seventeenth century, preparations are m a d e for a struggle between t w o forces, the m i l i t a r y a n d the i n t e l l e c t u a l . T h e concept o f m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d becomes more adapted to c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c a l life; i t becomes intellectualized. A n d since reason is essentially one and the same, a n d since w h a t reason arranges is therefore t h a t w h i c h ought to beforever, a revolutionary state o f m i n d is engendered. M e n w h o are rational a n d naturally good find themselves i n a society w h i c h was created historically, l i t t l e b y l i t t l e , i n an imperfect fashion, a n d w h i c h is based o n a m o n a r c h i c concept t h a t is no longer alive a n d o n a religious t r a d i t i o n t h a t has lost social v a l i d i t y . These m e n decide to tear d o w n the entire system i n order to create a better one r a t i o n ally, perfectly, once and for a l l : thus, they demand the " rights o f m a n a n d o f the c i t i z e n " a n d make no concessions to history. W e find ourselves i n the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n . T h e w o r l d is to be organized i n a definitive, geometrical way. Raison is to govern f r o m n o w o n . 5. T H E Loss o r G O D I do not wish to i m p l y that the e v o l u t i o n o f the p r o b l e m o f G o d , w h i c h I have studied i n detail i n the preceding pages, was the only i n t e l l e c t u a l cause o f a l l the changes i n Europe at this time. T h a t w o u l d be a n exaggeration; b u t i t is true t h a t a very i m p o r t a n t g r o u p o f these changes consists o f the transition f r o m a situation based o n C h r i s t i a n i t y , w i t h the idea o f G o d as the f o u n d a t i o n o f all the sciences a n d w i t h a
The Formation of the Modern Epoch d i v i n e l a w a n d religious m o r a l i t y based o n dogma a n d theology, to another t o t a l l y different s i t u a t i o n , i n w h i c h G o d is replaced b y h u m a n reason a n d nature. T h e r e is a factor w h i c h accelerates the t r i u m p h a n d dissemination o f these ideas w h i c h do a w a y w i t h G o d a n d d r i v e H i m o u t o f the sciences a n d intellectual researches. I t is the p r i m a c y w h i c h the m o d e r n age grants to negative concepts. I n d e e d , i n the m o d e r n p e r i o d , the s t a r t i n g hypothesis is t h a t i t is necessary to j u s t i f y a positive outlook, whereas a negative o u t l o o k is v a l i d f r o m the outset. T h u s , one must make a n effort to demonstrate freedom as opposed to determ i n i s m , or the existence o f the external w o r l d or the possibility o f knowledge. I do not m e a n to say t h a t i t is n o t really necessary to prove these things; I a m referring to the tendency, the a t t i t u d e w h i c h is today's p o i n t o f departure. Fontenelle has a p a r t i c u l a r l y expressive passage i n this connection: " T h e testimony o f those w h o believe a n established t h i n g carries no w e i g h t as a support o f their belief; b u t the testimony o f those w h o do n o t believe i t is strong enough to destroy i t — s i n c e those w h o believe i t m a y n o t be i n f o r m e d about the reasons for n o t believing i t , b u t i t is n o t possible that those w h o do n o t believe i t are n o t i n f o r m e d about the reasons for believing i t . " T h u s , b y v i r t u e o f this supremacy o f the negative, the progressive secularization o f sciences acquires more strength. T h i s explains w h y , j u s t as i n the past p a r t i c u l a r reasons were n o t given for each o f those sciences to justify their b e i n g based o n the D e i t y , so n o w sufficient proofs are n o t given to e x p l a i n the exclusion o f G o d f r o m i n t e l l e c t u a l disciplines. O u r age, w i t h its i m p e r a t i v e o f starting o u t f r o m neither one o f these t w o attitudes a n d o f j u s t i f y i n g things, w i l l have to come to a decision o n such a serious question. I have tried to show to w h a t unknown and impenetrable skies, i n Paul Hazard's phrase, G o d has been relegated. B u t we have also seen t h a t , despite everything, G o d r e m a i n e d secure a n d f i r m i n seventeenthc e n t u r y philosophy. H o w d i d people forget this dimension a n d concern themselves only w i t h the other, w h i c h separates us f r o m the Deity? I said above t h a t G o d ceases to be the h o r i z o n o f the thinkers a n d becomes the g r o u n d beneath their feet. I n fact, H e is no longer the d i v i n e object o f speculation a n d science, b u t only their presupposition. M a n goes to G o d , n o t because G o d interests h i m , b u t because the w o r l d concerns h i m . G o d is o n l y the necessary c o n d i t i o n for the reconquest o f the w o r l d . O n c e the w o r l d is securely i n man's grasp, G o d has no further i m p o r t a n c e . N o t h i n g is o f less interest to m a n t h a n the g r o u n d beneath h i m ; precisely because i t is solid a n d secure, he
The Loss of God neglects i t a n d gives his a t t e n t i o n to other things. T h u s , m o d e r n m a n forgets G o d a n d gives his a t t e n t i o n to nature. I n the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m the M i d d l e Ages to m o d e r n times we see an outstanding example o f t h a t historical d y n a m i s m w h i c h , i n a l t e r n a t i o n , converts w h a t was f o r m e r l y man's h o r i z o n i n t o a presupposition w i t h a q u i t e different role. B u t , above a l l , there is another, m u c h more decisive reason. T h e process w h i c h we have briefly witnessed does not end here. T h e metaphysics of the p e r i o d f r o m Descartes to Leibniz is o n l y a first stage i n the process. W e have yet to see h o w G e r m a n idealism, i n the philosophy o f K a n t , completes the loss o f G o d i n speculative reason b y declaring the ontological p r o o f impossible. Therefore, this expulsion o f G o d , w h o is lost to theoretic reason, is i n the m a k i n g f r o m O c c a m to G e r m a n idealism. By the time o f L e i b n i z we are o n l y halfway a l o n g the p a t h . W h a t is t h e n i n the forefront, w h a t is carried o n most vigorously, w h a t is being effected, is the banishment o f G o d ; the ontological bridge w h i c h still j o i n s us to H i m is o n l y a vestige w h i c h defines a phase. T h i s is w h a t gives the years of change w h i c h we have been considering their fundamental u n i t y and makes t h e m , i n spite of their extreme complexity, constitute a real stage i n history.
GERMAN IDEALISM
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W e have seen w h a t happens i n the seventeenth a n d eighteenth centuries, the f u n d a m e n t a l s i t u a t i o n w h i c h faces m a n as a consequence o f r a t i o n a l i s m . T h e explanations set f o r t h i n the preceding section h a d a d o u b l e purpose: first, they were a n a t t e m p t to explain the historical r e a l i t y o f those t w o centuries; secondly, they represented a n endeavor to establish rather precisely the i n t e l l e c t u a l e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h K a n t a n d the other G e r m a n idealists are to move. I t is useful t o emphasize t w o i m p o r t a n t aspects o f the t h o u g h t o f those t w o centuries: one is the physical image o f the w o r l d w h i c h m o d e r n p h y s i c s — m o r e specifically, N e w t o n — h a s given us; the other is the subjective a n d psychological c r i t i q u e w h i c h L o c k e , Berkeley a n d H u m e — p a r t i c u l a r l y H u m e — h a v e made. W i t h these elements i n view, we c a n u n d e r take a n explanation o f K a n t i a n i s m , one o f the most difficult things one c a n a t t e m p t to do. I t w i l l be necessary to give a p r e l i m i n a r y b r i e f a n d simple exposition o f the content o f this philosophy, so t h a t later we can discuss the significance o f the K a n t i a n p r o b l e m .
Kantian Doctrine I m m a n u e l K a n t was b o r n i n K ö n i g s b e r g i n 17 2 4 ; he d i e d i n the same c i t y i n 1804 after h a v i n g passed his e n t i r e l o n g life there. K a n t was always a sedentary person; he never t r a v e l e d b e y o n d the boundaries o f East Prussia a n d r a r e l y w e n t o u t side K ö n i g s b e r g itself. K a n t ' s father was a master saddler; the f a m i l y was o f modest means, a n d K a n t grew u p i n a n atmosphere o f honest artisanship a n d deep Pietistic religiosity. H e studied at the u n i v e r s i t y K A N T ' S LIFE A N D WORKS.
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i n his n a t a l city, gave p r i v a t e lessons a n d later t a u g h t at the university; however, not u n t i l 1 7 7 0 was he n a m e d Privatdozent o f logic a n d metaphysics, a position he h e l d u n t i l 1 7 9 7 w h e n , seven years before his death, he abandoned i t because o f age and weakness. K a n t ' s health was always very delicate, b u t i n spite o f this he a t t a i n e d the age o f eighty a n d led a life o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y exertion. H e was p u n c t u a l , m e t h o d i c a l , serene a n d u n c o m m o n l y k i n d . H i s w h o l e life was a quiet b u t passionate quest for t r u t h . W e can distinguish t w o epochs i n K a n t ' s w o r k , a n d also i n his p h i l o s o p h y : that w h i c h is called the pre-critical p e r i o d — p r i o r to the p u b l i c a t i o n of the Critique of Pure Reason—and the later, critical period. T h e most i m p o r t a n t works o f the earlier phase are Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (General N a t u r a l H i s t o r y a n d T h e o r y o f the Heavens) a n d Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes ( O n l y Possible G r o u n d o f P r o o f for the Existence o f God) (1763). I n 1 7 7 0 K a n t published his L a t i n dissertat i o n , De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis causa etprincipiis ( O n the F o r m a n d Principles o f the Sensible a n d I n t e l l i g i b l e W o r l d ) , a w o r k w h i c h marks the transition to the c r i t i c a l period. I t was f o l l o w e d b y a long silence lasting ten years, at the end o f w h i c h , i n 1781, there appeared the first e d i t i o n o f Kritik der reinen Vernunft ( C r i t i q u e o f Pure Reason). L a t e r , i n 1 7 8 3 , K a n t p u b l i s h e d the Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (Prolegomena to any F u t u r e Metaphysics W h i c h W i l l Be A b l e to Come F o r t h as Science), i n 1 7 8 5 the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten ( F u n d a m e n t a l P r i n ciples o f the Metaphysics o f Ethics), and i n 1 7 8 8 the w o r k t h a t completes his ethics, the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft ( C r i t i q u e o f Practical Reason). F i n a l l y , i n 1 7 9 0 , he published his t h i r d book o f criticism, the Kritik der Urteilskraft ( C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t ) . K a n t ' s most i m p o r t a n t works are grouped i n a space o f ten years. Also o f great i m p o r t a n c e are Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797), Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (Religion w i t h i n the Boundaries o f Pure Reason), the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht a n d the Lectures on Logic, w h i c h were edited b y G o t t l o b B e n j a m i n Jäsche i n 1800. K a n t ' s works also i n c l u d e m a n y more o r less b r i e f w r i t i n g s o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y interest a n d some others published after his death (see Kants Opus postumum, edited b y E r i c h Adickes a n d later b y A r t u r Buchenau) t h a t are essential for the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f his thought.
1. KANT'S
SOURCES.
TRANSCENDENTAL
IDEALISM
T h e p r i n c i p a l source of K a n t i a n philosophy is to
be f o u n d i n Cartesian p h i l o s o p h y a n d , consequently, i n r a t i o n a l i s m u p
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to L e i b n i z a n d W o l f f . O n the other h a n d , K a n t says t h a t H u m e ' s criticisms awakened h i m f r o m his d o g m a t i c slumbers. ( W e shall presently see w h a t this adjective means.) I n Descartes the res cogitans a n d t h e res extensa have something i n c o m m o n : being. As w e have seen, this b e i n g w h i c h is based o n G o d is w h a t creates the u n i t y between the t w o res, a n d w h a t makes knowledge possible. I n Parmenides, w h o represents the b e g i n n i n g o f metaphysics, b e i n g is a real q u a l i t y o f the things, something t h a t is in them, as a color can be, b u t i n such a w a y t h a t i t is p r i o r to a l l other possible qualities. I n short, i n Parmenides the things are real. I n idealist philosophy, the case is different. B e i n g is n o t real, b u t transcendental. " I m m a n e n t " means w h a t remains i n , immanet, manet in. " T r a n s c e n d e n t " refers to w h a t exceeds or transcends something. " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l " means neither transcendent n o r i m m a n e n t . A table has the q u a l i t y of being, b u t a l l the table's other qualities also have b e i n g ; the q u a l i t y o f b e i n g permeates a n d envelops a l l the rest b u t does not become i n t e r m i n g l e d w i t h a n y o f t h e m . A l l the things are r o o t e d i n being, a n d therefore being serves as a bridge between the things. This is transcendental
being. T R A N S C E N D E N T A L K N O W L E D G E . T h i s concept, however, does n o t satisfy K a n t . K n o w l e d g e cannot be explained simply b y i n t e r p r e t i n g being as transcendental; i t is necessary to create a transcendental theory o f knowledge, a n d this knowledge is to be the b r i d g e between the ego a n d the things. A c c o r d i n g to the realist, knowledge is k n o w l edge o f the things, and the things transcend me. A c c o r d i n g to the idealist (Berkeley), w h o says t h a t for m e there is n o t h i n g b u t m y ideas, the things are i m m a n e n t , a n d knowledge is knowledge o f m y o w n ideas. B u t the situation is very different i f I believe t h a t m y ideas are of the things. T h e things do not t h e n appear to m e as objects t h a t are independent o f m e ; the things occur to me in my ideas; b u t these ideas are n o t o n l y m i n e , they are ideas of the things. T h e y are things t h a t appear to m e , phenomena i n the l i t e r a l sense o f the w o r d .
I f knowledge were transcendent, i t w o u l d k n o w external things. I f i t were i m m a n e n t , i t w o u l d k n o w o n l y ideas; t h a t is, w h a t is i n me. B u t knowledge is transcendental: i t knows the phenomena, t h a t is, the things in me (emphasizing equally b o t h parts o f this expression). H e r e there arises the K a n t i a n distinction between the phenomenon a n d the thing-in-itself. T h e things-in-themselves are inaccessible; I cannot k n o w t h e m because i n so far as I k n o w t h e m they are in me, affected b y m y subjec t i v i t y ; the things-in-themselves (noumena) are neither spatial nor t e m p o r a l , a n d I cannot conceive o f any t h i n g t h a t is outside o f time a n d
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space. T h e things i n the f o r m i n w h i c h they manifest themselves to me, as they appear to me, are phenomena. K a n t distinguishes t w o elements of knowledge: w h a t is given a n d w h a t is posited b y the t h i n k i n g subject. Something occurs to me (a chaos o f sensations) a n d I posit something (the space-time reference, the categories), a n d f r o m the c o m b i n a t i o n o f these t w o elements there arises the known thing or phenomenon. T h u s , w h e n t h o u g h t orders the chaos o f sensations i t makes the things; consequently K a n t says t h a t t h o u g h t does not adapt itself to the things, b u t the other w a y a r o u n d , a n d t h a t his philosophy represents a " Copernican r e v o l u t i o n . " B u t t h o u g h t does n o t create the things a l l b y itself; i t makes use o f given m a t e r i a l . T h u s , the things, w h i c h are distinct f r o m the unknowable things-in-themselves, arise o u t of the act o f transcendental knowledge. P U R E R E A S O N . K a n t distinguishes three modes o f knowledge: sensib i l i t y (Sinnlichkeit), reflective understanding (Verstand) a n d reason (Vernunft). T o the n o u n " r e a s o n " K a n t adds the adjective " p u r e . " Pure reason is based o n a p r i o r i principles; i t is independent o f experience. I n K a n t , " p u r e " means a p r i o r i , b u t n o t only that:pure reason is n o t the reason o f a n y one m a n , nor even h u m a n reason, b u t simply t h a t of the rational being. Pure reason is equivalent to the rational conditions of rational beings in general. However, the titles o f K a n t ' s works can be misleading. H e calls one the Critique of Pure Reason a n d the other the Critique of Practical Reason. Practical seems to be i n opposition to pure, b u t this is n o t so. Practical reason is also pure, a n d is the opposite o f speculative or theoretic reason. T h u s the f u l l expression w o u l d be speculative (or theoretic) pure reason a n d practical p u r e reason. B u t since i n the first Critique K a n t studies the general conditions o f pure reason a n d i n the second the practical aspect o f the same reason, he adopts a n abbreviated f o r m i n his titles.
Speculative reason refers to a theory, to a p u r e knowledge o f the things; i n contrast, p r a c t i c a l reason refers to a c t i o n , to a d o i n g , i n a sense close to the Greek praxis, and is the focal p o i n t o f K a n t i a n ethics.
2.
T H E
" C R I T I Q U E OF P U R E
REASON"
K a n t writes his Critique as a propaedeutic to or p r e p a r a t i o n for metaphysics, w h i c h is understood as a p r i o r i philosophical knowledge. H e must determine the possibilities o f knowledge a n d the basis o f its v a l i d i t y . This is the general p r o b l e m . T h e Critique was published i n 1781, a n d K a n t altered i t significantly i n the second e d i t i o n o f 1787;
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b o t h editions are o f great interest i n the history o f philosophy. T h e f o l l o w i n g is a n o u t l i n e of the Critique ofPure Reason: Introduction I.
(statement of the p r o b l e m a n d the theory of j u d g m e n t s ) .
The Elements of Transcendentalism. 1. Transcendental esthetics (theory of space and time). 2. Transcendental logic. (a) Transcendental analytics (possibility of pure physics). (b) Transcendental dialectics (problem of the possibility of metaphysics).
I I . Method 1. The 2. The 3. The 4. The
of Transcendentalism. discipline of pure reason. canon of pure reason. architectonic of pure reason. history of pure reason.
Judgments K n o w l e d g e can be either a p r i o r i or a posteriori. T h e former is knowledge whose v a l i d i t y is n o t based o n experience; t h e latter is knowledge whose v a l i d i t y derives f r o m experience. A posteriori k n o w l edge cannot be universal or necessary; therefore, science requires a p r i o r i knowledge, t h a t is, knowledge t h a t is n o t l i m i t e d b y the c o n t i n gencies of experience i n the here a n d now. K a n t finds several kinds of a p r i o r i k n o w l e d g e : mathematics; physics; t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics, w h i c h claims to k n o w its three o b j e c t s — m a n , the w o r l d a n d G o d . These objects are beyond experience because they are " i n f i n i t e syntheses." I cannot have an i n t u i t i o n o f the w o r l d , for example, because I a m p a r t o f i t a n d i t does n o t appear to me as a thing. K a n t wonders i f metaphysics is possible; he finds t h a t the o t h e r sciences (mathematics a n d physics) travel along a sure path, b u t i t seems to h i m t h a t metaphysics does not. So K a n t formulates his three m a j o r questions: H o w is mathematics possible ? (Transcendental esthetics) H o w is p u r e physics possible? (Transcendental analytics) Is metaphysics possible ? (Transcendental dialectics). Observe t h a t the t h i r d question differs i n f o r m f r o m the other t w o ; K a n t does not assume the possibility o f metaphysics. (Esthetics does n o t here refer to w h a t is beautiful, b u t to sensibility, i n its Greek sense o f aisthesis.) T r u t h a n d knowledge, therefore, occur i n j u d g m e n t s . A science is a systematic complex o f j u d g m e n t s . K a n t must first o f a l l establish a logical theory o f j u d g m e n t . A N A L Y T I C J U D G M E N T S A N D S Y N T H E T I C J U D G M E N T S . A n analytic j u d g m e n t is one whose predicate is contained i n the n o t i o n of t h e subject. A synthetic j u d g m e n t , o n the c o n t r a r y , is one whose predicate is n o t
The "Critique
of Pure Reason"
i n c l u d e d i n the n o t i o n o f the subject b u t is joined or added to i t . F o r example: bodies have extension, a sphere is r o u n d ; b u t o n the c o n t r a r y , a table is w o o d e n , lead is heavy. Extension is i n c l u d e d i n the n o t i o n o f a b o d y a n d roundness i n t h a t o f a sphere; b u t woodenness is n o t i n c l u d e d i n the n o t i o n o f a table, n o r is heaviness i n c l u d e d i n t h a t o f lead. ( O n e should observe t h a t i n L e i b n i z ' philosophy a l l j u d g ments are analytic j u d g m e n t s , since a l l the determinations of a t h i n g are necessarily i n c l u d e d i n the complete n o t i o n o f the t h i n g ; however, o n l y G o d possesses the complete n o t i o n o f a t h i n g . ) A n a l y t i c j u d g m e n t s explicate the concept o f the subject, whereas synthetic j u d g m e n t s amplify i t . T h u s synthetic j u d g m e n t s augment o u r knowledge a n d are the ones t h a t have value for science. A P R I O R I A N D A P O S T E R I O R I J U D G M E N T S . W e have already alluded to another d i s t i n c t i o n , one w h i c h deals w i t h a p r i o r i j u d g m e n t s a n d j u d g m e n t s based o n experience. A t first glance i t seems t h a t analytic j u d g m e n t s are a p r i o r i j u d g m e n t s , t h a t they are obtained p u r e l y b y analysis o f the concept o f the subject, a n d t h a t synthetic judgments are a posteriori j u d g m e n t s . T h e first statement is t r u e , a n d i n general a posteriori j u d g m e n t s are synthetic j u d g m e n t s ; however, the converse is n o t t r u e ; there are a priori synthetic judgments, even t h o u g h this m a y seem to be a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n terms, a n d these are the j u d g m e n t s t h a t are o f interest to science because they f u l f i l l the t w o required c o n d i tions : they are o n one h a n d a p r i o r i , t h a t is, universal a n d necessary, a n d o n the other, synthetic, t h a t is, they effectively augment our k n o w l edge. T h e equation 2 + 2 = 4 , statement t h a t the sum of the three angles o f a triangle is equal to t w o r i g h t angles—these are a p r i o r i synthetic j u d g m e n t s ; t h e i r predicates are n o t contained i n the subjects, a n d the j u d g m e n t s are n o t based o n experience. W e find a p r i o r i synthetic j u d g m e n t s outside o f mathematics also, i n physics a n d metaphysics: " e v e r y p h e n o m e n o n has its cause," " m a n is free," " G o d exists." T h u s , the question o f the possibility o f these sciences is reduced to this other question: H o w are a p r i o r i synthetic j u d g m e n t s possible — i f indeed they are p o s s i b l e — i n each one o f these sciences ? t n e
Space and Time P U R E I N T U I T I O N S . E v e r y t h i n g I k n o w is m a d e u p o f t w o elements: t h a t w h i c h is given a n d t h a t w h i c h I posit. T h a t w h i c h is given is a chaos o f sensations, a n d chaos is precisely the opposite o f knowledge. I do something w i t h t h a t chaos o f sensations. W h a t do I do ? I order i t — first, i n space and t i m e , t h e n , as we shall presently see, according to the categories. T h e n , u t i l i z i n g the chaos o f sensations, I make things—not
Kant things-in-themselves, b u t phenomena, things subject to space a n d t i m e . N o w , are space a n d t i m e things-in-themselves ? N o , they are not. T h e n w h a t are they ? K a n t says t h a t they are pure intuitions. T h e y are the a priori forms of sensibility. Sensibility is n o t o n l y receptive, b u t also active; i t leaves its i m p r i n t on everything t h a t i t apprehends; a n d i t possesses its forms i n a n a p r i o r i way. Space a n d t i m e are forms w h i c h sensibility gives to the things w h i c h occur to i t f r o m outside; these forms are necessary conditions i f I a m to perceive; a n d I posit these conditions. I have a p r i o r i knowledge o f space a n d t i m e ; I do n o t k n o w t h e m f r o m experience, b u t rather j u s t the opposite: they are indispensable c o n d i tions to m y h a v i n g experience. I t is i n these forms that m y perception resides. T h u s they are p r i o r to the things a n d belong to the r e a l m o f p u r e subjectivity. M A T H E M A T I C S . I k n o w space a n d t i m e i n a n absolutely a p r i o r i way. T h u s j u d g m e n t s t h a t relate to the forms o f sensibility are a p r i o r i j u d g m e n t s , even t h o u g h they m a y be synthetic j u d g m e n t s as w e l l . Therefore such j u d g m e n t s are possible i n mathematics, a science t h a t is based on constructions of concepts. T h e v a l i d i t y o f mathematics is based o n the a p r i o r i i n t u i t i o n o f relationships between spatial figures a n d numbers w h i c h are based o n the temporal succession o f units. Conseq u e n t l y , space a n d t i m e constitute the logical—-not p s y c h o l o g i c a l — basis o f mathematics, a n d synthetic a p r i o r i j u d g m e n t s are possible. Transcendental esthetics solves the first p a r t o f the p r o b l e m .
The Categories Space a n d t i m e separate us f r o m the r e a l i t y o f the things-in-themselves. Sensibility presents to our u n d e r s t a n d i n g only phenomena, things w h i c h i t has already " d e f o r m e d " or operated o n . As O r t e g a has shown so w e l l , t h i n k i n g is essentially a process o f transforming. B u t the understanding, l i k e sensibility, also possesses a p r i o r i forms b y means of w h i c h i t apprehends a n d understands the things: these forms
are the categories. I n Aristotle, the categories were modes or inflections o f being to w h i c h the m i n d adapted itself. I n K a n t , conversely, the m i n d already contains the categories, a n d the things c o n f o r m to the m i n d ; this is the concept K a n t referred to as a "Copernican revolution.'''' T h e categories are i n our u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d not d i r e c t l y i n the being o f the things. N o longer are we separated f r o m r e a l i t y in itself only b y space a n d t i m e ; now there is a second " d e f o r m i n g ' ' factor, the categories. T H E JUDGMENTS A N D T H E CATEGORIES.
K a n t begins w i t h the logical
The "Critique of Pure Reason" classification o f the j u d g m e n t s , as m o d i f i e d b y h i m , i n accordance w i t h four points o f v i e w : q u a n t i t y , q u a l i t y , r e l a t i o n and m o d a l i t y . I.
Quantity Universal Particular Singular 3Relation
2.
Quality
Affirmative Negative Infinite
Categorical Hypothetical Disjunctive 4Modality
Problematical Assertory Apodictic F r o m these j u d g m e n t s , each one o f w h i c h is a mode o f synthesis, the categories are derived. Since the subdivision o f the j u d g m e n t s is completely a p r i o r i , the categories derived f r o m t h e m are modes o f p u r e a p r i o r i synthesis, the modalities of the concept of a n object i n general. I n this w a y we get the f o l l o w i n g table o f pure concepts of the under-
standing, or categories: I.
Quantity Unity Plurality Totality 3Relation Substance Causality C o m m u n i t y or reciprocal action
Quality
Reality Negation Limitation 4Modality
Possibility Existence Necessity T h e close relation between the classes of j u d g m e n t s a n d the categories is evident. T h e categories are relationships a m o n g objects, corresponding to those a m o n g thejudgments.
ZQZ
Kant
P U R E P H Y S I C S . U s i n g space, t i m e a n d the categories, the understanding fashions the objects o f p u r e physics; the category o f substance a p p l i e d to space gives us the concept of matter; the category o f causality taken together w i t h the f o r m o f t i m e gives us the physical concept o f cause a n d effect, a n d so f o r t h . Since we always r e m a i n entirely w i t h i n the r e a l m o f a p r i o r i thought, i n w h i c h experience plays n o p a r t , the v a l i d i t y o f p u r e physics does n o t depend o n experience, a n d a p r i o r i synthetic j u d g m e n t s are possible w i t h i n the d o m a i n o f p u r e physics. T h i s is the result o f transcendental analytics.
The Critique of Traditional Metaphysics T r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics, i n its medieval forms a n d especially i n the generalized f o r m u l a t i o n o f W o l f f i n the eighteenth century, consisted o f t w o p a r t s : a metaphysica generalis, or ontology, a n d a metaphysica specialis, w h i c h was concerned w i t h the three great areas o f b e i n g : m a n , the w o r l d a n d G o d ; this gives us three disciplines: r a t i o n a l psychology, r a t i o n a l cosmology a n d r a t i o n a l theology. K a n t is faced w i t h these sciences a n d their r e p e r t o r y o f problems (the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the soul, freedom, the finiteness or infiniteness o f the w o r l d , the existence o f G o d , a n d so o n ) , a n d i n his transcendental dialectics attacks the p r o b l e m of whether this m e t a p h y s i c s — w h i c h does n o t seem to have set o u t u p o n the sure path ofscience—is possible. METAPHYSICS. F o r K a n t , metaphysics is i d e n t i c a l w i t h p u r e , a p r i o r i knowledge. B u t real knowledge is possible only w h e n sensory perception o r experience is added to the f o r m a l principles. N o w , the principles we have obtained are f o r m a l a n d a p r i o r i ; i n order to have knowledge o f reality, i t w o u l d be necessary to supplement t h e m w i t h a posteriori elements, w i t h experience. T r a d i t i o n a l speculative metaphysics is the a t t e m p t to acquire, b y a p r i o r i t h o u g h t , a real knowledge o f objects—the soul, the w o r l d , G o d — w h i c h are beyond any possible experience. Therefore, i t is a v a i n a t t e m p t . These three objects are " i n f i n i t e syntheses," and one cannot posit the necessary conditions for i n t u i t i n g t h e m ; therefore, i t is impossible to acquire this knowledge. K a n t examines i n t u r n the paralogisms contained i n the demonstrations o f r a t i o n a l psychology, the antinomies o f r a t i o n a l cosmology a n d the arguments o f r a t i o n a l theology (the ontological proof, the cosmological p r o o f a n d the physico-theological p r o o f o f the existence o f G o d ) , a n d concludes t h a t these disciplines are i n v a l i d . W e cannot go i n t o the details of this c r i t i q u e , since this w o u l d take us too far afield. A l l t h a t is o f interest here is to indicate the basis of K a n t ' s c r i t i q u e o f the ontological argument, since this c r i t i q u e is the key to his whole philosophy.
Practical
Reason
2-93
T H E ONTOLOGICAL A R G U M E N T . K a n t shows that the a r g u m e n t t h a t originates w i t h St. A n s e l m is based o n a n o t i o n o f b e i n g w h i c h he rejects: the n o t i o n o f b e i n g as a real predicate. T h i s is m o r e true o f Descartes' f o r m of the proof, w h i c h is the f o r m K a n t is concerned w i t h . T h i s p r o o f understands existence to be a perfection t h a t cannot be l a c k i n g i n the most perfect E n t i t y . T h a t is, existence is i n t e r p r e t e d as something t h a t is in a thing. B u t K a n t declares t h a t b e i n g is n o t a real p r e d i c a t e : Sein ist kein reales Prädikat. T h e t h i n g w h i c h exists contains n o t h i n g t h a t the t h i n g w h i c h is o n l y t h o u g h t o f does n o t c o n t a i n : i f i t were otherwise, the concept i n question w o u l d n o t be o f t h a t t h i n g . A h u n d r e d real crowns (coins), K a n t says i n his famous comparison, c o n t a i n n o t h i n g t h a t is n o t contained i n a h u n d r e d possible crowns. Nevertheless, he adds, i t makes a difference to me w h e t h e r I have a h u n d r e d possible or a h u n d r e d real crowns; of w h a t does the difference consist? T h e actual crowns are connected w i t h sensory p e r c e p t i o n ; they are present, along w i t h a l l the other things, i n the t o t a l i t y o f experience. T h a t is, existence is n o t a p r o p e r t y of the things, b u t their relationship w i t h a l l the other things, the positive position o f the object. Being is n o t a real, b u t a transcendental predicate. Seventeenth-century metaphysics understood i t to be real, a n d therefore accepted the ontological p r o o f ; this is the m e a n i n g o f the epithet w h i c h K a n t applies to Baroque t h o u g h t : dogmatism, ignorance of the transcendental nature ofbeing. T H E I D E A S . T h e three disciplines o f t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics are, a c c o r d i n g to K a n t , n o t v a l i d . Metaphysics is not possible as a speculative science. Its themes have n o t h i n g to do w i t h science, b u t r e m a i n as objects o f f a i t h , a n d as such cannot be refuted. " I h a d to suppress k n o w l e d g e , " K a n t says," i n order to make w a y for b e l i e f . " B u t metaphysics continues to exist as a natural predisposition of m a n t o w a r d the absolute. A n d the objects o f metaphysics are those w h i c h K a n t calls Ideas; they are like new, higher categories corresponding to the syntheses of j u d g m e n t s i n p u r e reasoning. Since these Ideas are not open to i n t u i t i o n , they can o n l y have a regulative use. M a n o u g h t to behave as if his soul were i m m o r t a l , as if he were free, as if G o d existed, even t h o u g h theoretic reason cannot prove a l l this. B u t this is n o t the o n l y role o f the Ideas. A l o n g w i t h this h y p o t h e t i c a l v a l i d i t y for speculative reason, the transcendental Ideas also possess another v a l i d i t y o f a different k i n d , one w h i c h is absolute a n d u n c o n d i t i o n a l ; they reappear i n the deepest layer of K a n t i a n philosophy as postulates of practical
reason. 3.
PRACTICAL
REASON
N A T U R E A N D FREEDOM. K a n t distinguishes between t w o w o r l d s : the
Kant
w o r l d of n a t u r e a n d the w o r l d o f freedom. T h e former is d e t e r m i n e d b y n a t u r a l causality, b u t alongside this, K a n t allows the existence o f a causality
through freedom,
w h i c h governs the other d o m a i n . O n the
one
h a n d , m a n is a psychophysical subject, r u l e d b y the physical a n d psychical laws o f n a t u r e ; this is w h a t K a n t calls the empirical ego. Just as the b o d y obeys the l a w o f g r a v i t y , the w i l l is shaped b y s t i m u l i , a n d i n this e m p i r i c a l sense i t is n o t free. B u t to this e m p i r i c a l ego K a n t contraposes a pure ego, w h i c h is n o t d e t e r m i n e d n a t u r a l l y , b u t o n l y b y the laws o f freedom. M a n , as a rational person, belongs to this w o r l d o f freedom. B u t w e have already seen t h a t theoretic reason does n o t extend this f a r ; w i t h i n its o w n field i t is incapable of k n o w i n g freedom. W h e r e d o we encounter freedom ? O n l y i n the fact of morality; here there appears practical reason, w h i c h is n o t concerned w i t h being b u t w i t h how one ought to be; here i t is n o t a question o f speculative k n o w l edge b u t o f m o r a l knowledge. A n d j u s t as K a n t studied the possibilities of the f o r m e r i n the Critique of Pure Reason (theoretic reason), he must n o w w r i t e a Critique of Practical Reason. T H E '' F A C T U M '' OF M O R A L I T Y . I n discussing p r a c t i c a l reason, K a n t accepts postulates w h i c h are n o t demonstrable w i t h theoretic reason, but w h i c h possess a direct a n d absolute self-evidence for t h e t h i n k i n g subject. Therefore, they are postulates a n d their acceptance is r e q u i r e d and u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y imposed, a l t h o u g h n o t speculatively. K a n t is faced w i t h a fact, &factum, w h i c h is the p o i n t o f departure for his ethics: m o r a l i t y , the consciousness o f d u t y . M a n has a feeling o f responsib i l i t y , o f d u t y . T h i s is a p u r e fact, i n d i s p u t a b l e a n d self-evident. N o w , d u t y a n d the consciousness of responsibility presuppose t h efreedom o f m a n . B u t freedom is not demonstrable b y theoretic reason; f r o m the speculative p o i n t of view, i t is merely a regulative Idea: one o u g h t to act as if one were free. O n the other h a n d , freedom n o w appears as somet h i n g absolutely certain a n d r e q u i r e d b y the consciousness o f d u t y , even t h o u g h theoretic reason does n o t t e l l us how i t is possible. M a n , i n so far as he is a moral person, is free, a n d his freedom is a postulate o f p r a c t i c a l reason. T H E OBJECTS O F METAPHYSICS. A n a l o g o u s l y , the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the
soul a n d the existence of G o d , w h i c h i t was n o t possible to p r o v e i n the Critique
of Pure
Reason,
reappear as postulates i n t h e o t h e r Critique.
The
objects o f t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics are v a l i d i n a d o u b l e sense: as regulative Ideas i n the r e a l m o f theoretic reason, a n d as postulates w i t h absolute v a l i d i t y i n the r e a l m o f p r a c t i c a l reason. T h i s is to be the basis o f K a n t ' s ethics. THE
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE.
Metaphysics
of Morals,
I n t h e Fundamental
Principles
of the
K a n t formulates the p r o b l e m o f ethics as the
Practical
Reason
zoj
question o f the highest good. G o o d things may be good for something else or good i n themselves. K a n t says t h a t the only t h i n g t h a t is good i n itself, w i t h no restrictions, is a good will. T h e p r o b l e m o f m o r a l i t y is thus b r o u g h t i n t o relation n o t w i t h actions, b u t w i t h the w i l l w h i c h motivates t h e m . K a n t wishes to create a n ethics t h a t w i l l state h o w m a n ought to be. T h i s ethics must also be i m p e r a t i v e , obligatory. T h u s K a n t seeks an imperative. B u t the m a j o r i t y o f imperatives are not suitable as a basis for ethics, because they are hypothetical, t h a t is, they depend u p o n a c o n d i t i o n . I f I say: nourish yourself, a c o n d i t i o n is u n d e r s t o o d : if you want to live; b u t for a m a n w h o wants to die, such a n i m p e r a t i v e has no v a l i d i t y . K a n t has need o f a categorical i m p e r a t i v e w h i c h w i l l be u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y and absolutely a u t h o r i t a t i v e . T h e categorical i m p e r a tive's obligatory power must be f o u n d w i t h i n itself. Since the highest good is a good w i l l , the m o r a l evaluation o f a n action is based o n the w i l l t h a t m o t i v a t e d the a c t i o n , n o t o n the action itself. A n d a good w i l l is one w h i c h wills w h a t i t wills purely out of regard to duty. I f I p e r f o r m a good action because i t pleases m e to do so, or o u t o f sentiment, fear, a n d the like, it has no moral value. ( H e r e K a n t raises the t h o r n y p r o b l e m o f whether regard to d u t y is n o t itself a sentiment.) T h e categorical i m p e r a t i v e is expressed i n different ways; its basic m e a n i n g is the f o l l o w i n g : Act in such universal
a way that you can will
what you are doing
to be a
law of nature.
I n effect, the m a n w h o commits a w r o n g action does it as a mistake, as a n exception, a n d is a f f i r m i n g the universal m o r a l l a w at the very m o m e n t w h e n he is i n f r i n g i n g i t . I f I lie, I cannot w i l l t h a t l y i n g should be a universal law, since this w o u l d destroy the meaningfulness of w h a t people say, a n d w o u l d even make impossible the effect of m y o w n lie ; l y i n g presupposes, precisely, t h a t the universal l a w is to tell the t r u t h . A n d a similar t h i n g occurs w i t h every other instance o f wrongdoing. T H E M O R A L PERSON. K a n t i a n ethics is autonomous, not heteronomous; t h a t is, its laws are dictated b y the m o r a l conscience itself, not b y a n a u t h o r i t y outside the ego. T h e ego is a legislator in the kingdom of ends, i n the w o r l d o f m o r a l freedom. F r o m another v i e w p o i n t , this ethics is formal, not material, because i t prescribes n o t h i n g concrete, no action t h a t is determined as to c o n t e n t ; i t prescribes o n l y the form of a c t i o n : keep d u t y i n m i n d , whatever y o u d o ; act o u t of regard to d u t y , do w h a t you
will.
Strictly speaking, the last-mentioned expression is accurate: y o u ought to d o w h a t y o u w i l l ; n o t w h a t y o u desire, l o n g for or f i n d suitable, b u t w h a t y o u r r a t i o n a l w i l l is able to will. K a n t asks m a n to be
2Q6
Kant
free, to be autonomous, not to let himself be determined b y any m o t i v e alien to his w i l l , w h i c h makes its o w n laws. I n this way, K a n t i a n ethics culminates i n the concept o f the moral person. A n ethics is always an ontology o f m a n . K a n t asks m a n to realize his essence, to be w h a t he t r u l y is, a rational being—because K a n t i a n ethics is not concerned w i t h the e m p i r i c a l ego, o r even w i t h the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , b u t w i t h a p u r e ego, a purely r a t i o n a l being. O n the one h a n d m a n , as a n e m p i r i c a l ego, is subject to n a t u r a l causality; b u t o n the other h a n d he belongs to the k i n g d o m o f ends. K a n t says t h a t each and every man is an end in himself. I m m o r a l i t y consists i n t r e a t i n g a m a n — o n e ' s o w n self or one's fellow—as a means for something else, whereas m a n actually is a n end i n himself. T h e m o r a l l a w s — t h e categorical i m p e r a t i v e — a r e derived f r o m the legislation o f one's o w n w i l l . Therefore, the i m p e r a t i v e a n d m o r a l i t y are o f interest to us, because they are a t h i n g o f o u r o w n m a k i n g . T H E P R I M A C Y OF P R A C T I C A L REASON. P r a c t i c a l reason, as contrasted
w i t h theoretic reason, possesses direct v a l i d i t y o n l y for the ego, a n d consists i n d e t e r m i n i n g one's o w n actions. B u t K a n t affirms the p r i m a c y o f p r a c t i c a l over speculative reason, t h a t is, its p r i o r i t y a n d superiority. T h e p r i m a r y aspect o f h u m a n life is n o t theoria, hut praxis, action. K a n t ' s philosophy culminates i n the concept o f the m o r a l person, understood as a free person. K a n t was not able to perfect his metaphysics f u l l y , a n d left o n l y an o u t l i n e o f i t , because his whole life was taken u p b y the task o f criticism w h i c h h a d to be completed first. B u t i t is necessary to take as a p o i n t o f departure the p r i m a c y o f practical reason a n d o f these notions oifreedom a n d a c t i o n , i f one is to understand the philosophy o f G e r m a n idealism, w h i c h is b o r n i n K a n t a n d ends i n Hegel. T E L E O L O G Y A N D ESTHETICS. For o u r present purpose, we can o m i t a n exposition o f the content o f the Critique of Judgment, w h i c h is concerned w i t h problems o f teleology i n the biological organism a n d i n the field o f esthetics. K a n t ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f the beautiful is w e l l k n o w n ; he calls i t a finality end, t h a t is, something w h i c h contains a finality w i t h i n itself, b u t w h i c h is n o t subordinated to any end alien to esthetic pleasure. K a n t also distinguishes between the beautiful, w h i c h produces a pleasant feeling a n d is accompanied b y the consciousness o f l i m i t a t i o n , a n d the sublime, w h i c h causes a pleasure t h a t is m i n g l e d w i t h h o r r o r a n d a d m i r a t i o n — a storm, a lofty m o u n t a i n or a tragedy is s u b l i m e — because the sublime is accompanied b y the impression o f i n f i n i t y o r limitlessness. These K a n t i a n ideas h a d i m p o r t a n t repercussions i n nineteenth-century t h o u g h t . without
The Problem of Kantian
i.
T H E INTERPRETATIONS
OF K A N T ' S
Philosophy
PHILOSOPHY
M E T A P H Y S I C S . K a n t is a n unusual philosopher, because he represents a n essential r e v o l u t i o n i n philosophic t h o u g h t . H e himself uses a n expressive metaphor i n presenting his philosophy: he says t h a t i t is l i k e a Copernican revolution. Therefore, i t is something essentially new, w h i c h opens different paths. T h i s w o u l d be sufficient to explain the difficulty o f K a n t ' s t h o u g h t . B u t i n a d d i t i o n i t so happens t h a t K a n t d i d not achieve the creation o f a complete system, the f u l l realization o f his system. W e need o n l y observe the titles o f his basic w o r k s : they are Critiques, something b y means o f w h i c h he sets certain limits to reason a n d delimits its objects; b u t i t seems t h a t after these critiques was to come his positive d o c t r i n e — w h i c h never came. T h e r e are o n l y fragments w h i c h p o i n t i n this d i r e c t i o n . T h i s is t r u e , b u t o n l y h a l f true. I t w o u l d n o t be p r o p e r to state b l u n t l y t h a t K a n t d i d not create his metaphysics, because a metaphysics is contained i n his Critiques, even (in fact, especially) i n the Critique of Pure Reason. A n d here the difficulty begins: since this metaphysics was n o t created as s u c h — i n d e e d , i t is n e g a t e d — i t is very easy to overlook i t or to misunderstand i t . T h e case of K a n t , as O r t e g a has very r i g h t l y observed, is similar to t h a t of Plato. T h e problems w h i c h the things created for Plato led h i m to the discovery o f the Ideas; a n d w h e n a m a n has discovered the Ideas, he has already done q u i t e a b i t . Plato r e m a i n e d i n the r e a l m o f the Ideas, amidst the difficulties that they caused h i m , a n d h a d no t i m e left to r e t u r n to the things. I n his o l d age he longed to solve these 297
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difficulties—as i n his dialogue Parmenides—and to r e t u r n t o the things, to create his metaphysics. Something similar occurs w i t h K a n t . H e was a slow m a n , n o t at a l l p r e c o c i o u s — h a r d l y anyone i n the history o f philosophy w a s — a n d w h e n he a r r i v e d at o l d age, he h a d yet to accomplish the constructive p a r t o f his w o r k ; b u t his metaphysics was already created i n its essentials: the Critique of Pure Reason is already metaphysics (see O r t e g a : Filosofiapura a n d , f r o m another standpoint, Heidegger: Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik). B u t this is already a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : K a n t himself nowhere states t h a t i t is metaphysics; instead, he says t h a t metaphysics is not possible. Therefore, t o say t h a t i t is ontology requires some justification. T h i s has n o t always been affirmed. W e can consider three major phases o f K a n t ' s influence o n subsequent p h i losophy: G e r m a n idealism, n e o - K a n t i a n i s m a n d the philosophy o f the present t i m e . T H E PHILOSOPHIC PAST. Before I b e g i n this discussion, I must make a p r e l i m i n a r y r e m a r k . Some people m a y t h i n k t h a t the ideas people have h a d of K a n t are not i m p o r t a n t to us, a n d t h a t the o n l y t h i n g t h a t matters is w h a t K a n t ' s philosophy means today. T h i s v i e w p o i n t is w r o n g . W h e n I speak o f K a n t ' s philosophy, I c l a i m to speak of somet h i n g t h a t has reality. A t h i n g is real w h e n i t affects me, w h e n I must take account of i t . W h e n I speak o f K a n t i a n i s m , I speak o f something t h a t is r e a l : I a m using the present i n d i c a t i v e o f the v e r b to be. T o be real means to be real now. I take the past i n t o account, for example, i n so far as I a m r e m e m b e r i n g i t n o w , at the present t i m e . R e m e m brance consists of the presence of the past as the past. Likewise, the hope o f a future consists o f the presence of the future as the future. T h u s we see t h a t the present lends reality to b o t h the past a n d the future. I f I ignore the present, the past no longer exists a n d the future does n o t yet exist. F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n we say t h a t the past was, we m e a n t h a t i t once was the present; a n d w h e n we say t h a t the future w i l l be, we mean t h a t the future w i l l be the present. W h a t does a l l this signify ? T h a t the past as the past does n o t exist except i n a present t h a t gives i t reality a n d i n r e l a t i o n to w h i c h i t is the past. L e t us keep these ideas clearly i n m i n d a n d r e t u r n to the case o f K a n t i a n i s m . K a n t i a n i s m has reality; b u t K a n t i a n i s m as i t was t h o u g h t of back i n the eighteenth century is n o w a t h i n g of the past. Therefore i t receives reality o n l y f r o m the present—for example, w h e n I t h i n k o f i t now. T h u s we f i n d t h a t w h a t is the present today was n o t the present t h i r t y years ago. Therefore, the reality of K a n t i a n i s m is g i v e n b y each present i n w h i c h K a n t i a n i s m is actualized, a n d we see t h a t , far f r o m its
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b e i n g u n i m p o r t a n t to us, w h a t interests us is w h a t K a n t i a n i s m has been i n each m o m e n t . A n appeal to K a n t i a n i s m as such, d i v o r c e d f r o m w h a t i t m e a n t to K a n t ' s followers, is basically false, because i t is based o n a pure i l l u s i o n , namely, t h a t I can r e t u r n to K a n t i a n i s m in itself, w h e n actually the most I can do is reactualize K a n t i a n i s m i n my present, not i n t h a t o f K a n t . I actualize i t i n a present, a n d I also take t h a t present to be K a n t ' s present; here lies the error. K a n t i a n i s m is K a n t i a n i s m as i t has been active i n the various philosophies—and n o t h i n g else; i t is K a n t i a n i s m i n the f o r m i n w h i c h I find i t i n me as the p a s t — a n d n o t h i n g else. T h i s does n o t mean t h a t I cannot discover new a n d unrealized elements i n i t , b u t o n l y t h a t such elements have h a d no a c t u a l r e a l i t y u n t i l n o w . T h i s discussion m i g h t be a p p l i e d to the entire history of philosophy. W h a t justifies its b e i n g raised i n connection w i t h K a n t is t h a t K a n t i a n ism has been a c h a n g i n g concept a n d has h a d very different i n t e r pretations ; there have been several different K a n t i a n i s m s , a l l m o r e or less authentic. L e t us n o w consider the three p r i n c i p a l interpretations o f K a n t ' s philosophy. 1. G E R M A N I D E A L I S M . K a n t is recognized as the father of a splendid philosophical m o v e m e n t : G e r m a n idealism. T h i s is t r u e to such a degree t h a t the idealists begin b y presenting t h e i r o w n philosophies as interpretations o f K a n t ' s . Fichte actually says: " K a n t has n o t been p r o p e r l y understood; I understand h i m , perhaps better t h a n he understood h i m s e l f . " W h i l e t r y i n g to explain K a n t , Fichte adopts a p o i n t o f v i e w t h a t differs f r o m K a n t ' s , a n d t h e n he a n d the other idealists create t h e i r o w n philosophies. A c t u a l l y , they create t h e i r o w n p h i losophies along K a n t i a n lines a n d , s t a r t i n g f r o m K a n t ' s w o r k , complete w h a t K a n t left undone. Expressed i n general terms, the three great idealists—Fichte, Schelling a n d H e g e l — a t t e m p t to create the metaphysics t h a t K a n t never got a r o u n d to creating. W e w i l l presently see the extent to w h i c h this is t r u e . 2. N E O - K A N T I A N I S M . L e t us consider the second manifestation o f K a n t i a n i s m . I t is h e l p f u l to fix o u r a t t e n t i o n o n the name i t s e l f — n e o Kantianism. T h i s m o v e m e n t is a n express a c t u a l i z a t i o n of the past, for these m e n are n o t K a n t i a n s , b u t /wo-Kantians. Therefore, K a n t i a n i s m is n o t something t h a t is i n the present, b u t something t h a t needs to be renewed, actualized. T h e neo-Kantians become the exegetes o f K a n t i a n i s m : H e r m a n n Cohen a n d P a u l N a t o r p , especially. T h e y do not c l a i m to present K a n t , b u t a ««o-Kant. T h e i r position i n r e l a t i o n to t h a t o f the G e r m a n idealists is: K a n t ' s philosophy is n o t as y o u have presented i t ; i t is something different, w h i c h we w i l l n o w e x p o u n d . N e o - K a n t i a n i s m is n o t merely K a n t i a n i s m , a n d so something m u s t
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have taken place somewhere along the l i n e to justify the p r e f i x . W h a t can have happened? Positivism ( f r o m 1835-40 to 1880, a p p r o x i m a t e l y ) . T h e neo-Kantians are positivista w h o cease to b e positivists, w h o derive f r o m p o s i t i v i s m ; this is w h a t determines the character o f n e o - K a n t i a n philosophy. K a n t i a n i s m has the f o l l o w i n g characteristics: (1) t h e denial o f metaphysics i n any f o r m ; (2) a very p r o n o u n c e d tendency to become a theory o f knowledge; (3) a great interest i n the. positive sciences a n d (4) the tendency to understand philosophy as a t h e o r y o f positive science. As for the Critique of Pure Reason, (1) i t attempts t o determine the possibilities o f knowledge; (2) i t attempts to establish a philosophic theory of the science o f its d a y — m a t h e m a t i c s a n d N e w t o n i a n physics; (3) i t comes to reject t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics as impossible. A l l this is p a r t of the Critique of Pure Reason, a n d this is w h a t the positivists see i n K a n t ; b u t the Critique contains a great deal more, a n d m u c h m a t e r i a l o f greater i m p o r t a n c e . N e o - K a n t i a n i s m is colored b y p o s i t i v i s m a n d tends to become a theory o f science, a philosophic reflection o n knowledge a n d the positive sciences. Therefore, i t is s o m e t h i n g very different f r o m G e r m a n idealism. 3. PRESENT-DAY P H I L O S O P H Y . W e n o w come d o w n t o the present t i m e . K a n t ' s w o r k can m e a n something q u i t e different t o us because m a n y very significant events separate us f r o m the n e o - K a n t i a n s : (1) the elaboration o f a philosophy o f life o f a metaphysical character, w h i c h began w i t h K i e r k e g a a r d , Nietzsche, D i l t h e y a n d Bergson; (2) the establishment o f Husserl's phenomenology, for w h i c h Brentano prepared the w a y , a n d (3) most recently, the d e v e l o p m e n t of a metaphysics of h u m a n life or rather of v i t a l reason ( O r t e g a ) , o r a n ontology o f existence (Heidegger). W e have therefore r e t u r n e d to metaphysics. I t has once again been clearly perceived t h a t p h i l o s o p h y is metaphysics a n d n o t h i n g else, a n d t h a t theory of knowledge is metaphysics a n d cannot be considered a n autonomous a n d p r i o r discipline. T h u s , the n e o - K a n t i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of K a n t seems to us to be i n c o m p l e t e — t h a t is, false—because i t emphasizes o n l y w h a t is least i m p o r t a n t . For us, K a n t is first o f all a metaphysician, one w h o d i d n o t elaborate his philosophy systematically b u t w h o nevertheless left i t t o u s — i n the pages w h i c h the neo-Kantians f o u n d o f least interest. A n d K a n t ' s metaphysics has to be such t h a t i t makes clear h o w the other metaphysical systems o f G e r m a n idealism arose o u t o f i t . (For further discussion o f a l l these questions, see the above-mentioned essay b y O r t e g a : Filosofía
pura.) 2.
T H E O R Y OF
KNOWLEDGE
L e t us a t t e m p t a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f K a n t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n b y con-
Theory of
Knowledge
sidering t w o aspects o f his w o r k : the d o c t r i n e o f being a n d the d o c t r i n e o f knowledge. These t w o aspects, w h i c h are i n t i m a t e l y i n t e r connected, can lead us to a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f K a n t ' s basic concept, t h a t o f the m o r a l person a n d p r a c t i c a l reason. W h e n we achieve t h a t understanding we w i l l f i n d ourselves at a h i g h p o i n t o f K a n t i a n philosophy, a n d f r o m there w e w i l l be able to view subsequent developments. T h e t w o aspects o f the p r o b l e m are inseparable. K a n t r a d i c a l l y alters the concept o f knowledge. T h i s subject is w h a t is k n o w n as criticism a n d w h a t interested the neo-Kantians. W e are g o i n g to emphasize a different aspect i n o u r discussion, one w h i c h w i l l reveal K a n t ' s idea o f being. L e t us keep i n m i n d the K a n t i a n d o c t r i n e o f the phenomenon a n d the thing-in-itself. O f this, w h a t n o w interests us is the f o l l o w i n g : K n o w l e d g e is a n active f u n c t i o n o f the t h i n k i n g subject; i t does n o t consist o f receiving something t h a t happens to be at h a n d , b u t o f creating something t h a t is k n o w n ; i n K a n t i a n terms, the subject posits something. K a n t says t h a t we k n o w o f the things o n l y w h a t we have posited i n t h e m ; thus, for K a n t the things are n o t at h a n d ; rather, the t h i n k i n g subject creates t h e m u p o n k n o w i n g t h e m . T h i s must be understood l i t e r a l l y , for otherwise i t m i g h t be t h o u g h t t h a t the o n l y t h i n g t h a t exists i n itself is the ego, t h a t the o n l y t h i n g - i n itself is the ego, a n d t h a t the other things are in me. B u t this is n o t so; I a m n o t i n myself a thing-in-itself because I a m a t h i n g to myself o n l y i n so far as I k n o w myself. W e are going to emphasize the opposite aspect: the objective aspect. O n e must a v o i d possible subjectivist interpretations o f K a n t i a n i s m . I neither create n o r i n v e n t the things; instead, there is something t h a t is essentially given to me, a n d u p o n this I posit the a p r i o r i forms o f sensibility a n d the categories. O n l y after I have applied these forms to w h a t is given is i t m e a n i n g f u l to speak o f k n o w n things or o f the being o f the things. H o w e v e r , the situation is n o t such t h a t there is o n one h a n d w h a t is given, w h a t K a n t calls the chaos o f sensations, a n d o n the other the ego w i t h its subjective determinations. T h i s w o u l d m e a n t h a t there were t w o things-in-themselves a n d t h a t knowledge arose f r o m t h e i r u n i o n or contact; the t r u t h is t h a t the chaos o f sensations c a n occur o n l y i n m y subjectivity, because i n order to exist i t must occur i n space a n d t i m e a n d , therefore, i n m e ; a n d , conversely, the ego exists o n l y i n r e l a t i o n to w h a t is given. T h u s i t happens t h a t knowledge, far f r o m being the result o f the contact or u n i o n o f w h a t is g i v e n a n d w h a t is posited, is rather the superior fact o n w h i c h is based the very possibility o f speaking o f w h a t is given a n d w h a t is posited.
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3.
Philosophy
BEING
W e have seen t h a t K a n t ' s idea o f knowledge is r a d i c a l l y n e w ; i t constitutes a " Copernican r e v o l u t i o n " because i t is accomplished b y a new idea of being. O r t e g a has seen this w i t h e x t r a o r d i n a r y c l a r i t y . B E I N G A N D E N T I T Y . M a n has always asked himself what is being; this question embodies t w o meanings. W e must distinguish between t w o essentially different things : being a n d entity. These terms are generally used as synonyms, a n d there are languages such as F r e n c h i n w h i c h there is b u t one w o r d to convey b o t h meanings : l'être (the w o r d étant has recently been i n t r o d u c e d i n order to preserve the d i s t i n c t i o n w h e n translating G e r m a n expressions). I n scholastic L a t i n we have esse a n d ens; i n Greek, etvai a n d 6v; i n Spanish, ser a n d ente; i n G e r m a n , das Sein a n d das Seiende. I t is n o t a n accident t h a t these words have been generally confused, because i t has n o t been realized t h a t they deal w i t h t w o different things. Being is something t h a t belongs to the things t h a t exist, or something t h a t happens to t h e m a n d t h a t allows i t to be said of t h e m t h a t they are entities. A p a r t f r o m the question of w h a t — o r rather who—is the e n t i t y , o f w h a t things are, there exists the f u r t h e r a n d more p r o f o u n d question o f w h a t we m e a n w h e n we say t h a t things are. A r i s t o t l e , w h o i n his Metaphysics studied the e n t i t y as an entity, at least glimpsed this fundamental problem.
T h e e n t i t y has been spoken o f almost always, a n d i t has been understood as substance, subsistence; thus, w h e n Descartes affirms his idealist thesis, he affirms the ego, b u t the ego as a n e n t i t y , as a p r i m e substance : ego sum RES cogitans. A n d so idealism does not t o u c h u p o n the question o f w h a t is m e a n t b y substance, o f w h a t substance ( a n d therefore being) is. As l o n g as idealism is n o t h i n g b u t idealism, i t does n o t come to grips w i t h the basic p r o b l e m o f philosophy ; i t merely deals w i t h the relative r a n k of substances. T h e prôte ousia becomes the ego. W h a t the ego does is cogitare ; thus, w h a t actually exists a n d is the basis for the being of the other things is the cogitatio or idea. T h i s , therefore, is idealism. I n realism, i t is the res t h a t p r i n c i p a l l y exists, whereas i n idealism i t is the idea ; however, the idea is also res, res cogitans. T h e Cartesian concept o f substance is based o n the n o t i o n o f independence w h i c h h a d been t r a d i t i o n a l since A r i s t o t l e . T h i s i n dependence, this self-sufficiency, this subsistence, is in se. L e t us recall the difference between being in se a n d being a se. Being in se is this independence of the substance; o n l y G o d is a being a se. A n e n t i t y can be in se or in alio a n d , o n the other h a n d , a se or ab alio. T h e independence o f a color, a horse a n d a G o d , for example, are v e r y different.
Being
O n e cannot conceive o f a color b y itself, alone; not to be independent, to be i n association w i t h extension—this is p a r t o f the essence o f c o l o r ; color is ab alio, b u t i t is also in alio. A horse does n o t need anyt h i n g else i n order to be a horse; i t is independent in se. T h i s is i n reference to its essence—but w h a t a b o u t its existence? I n order to exist i t needs to be somewhere, for this is the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d " e x i s t . " Even i f we ignore the question o f the Creation, a horse or a stone or any finite e n t i t y cannot be said to exist independently, because o f the very significance o f the v e r b " t o exist." T o exist is ex-sistere; i n G e r m a n , da-sein. B o t h words c o n t a i n an obvious reference to place: ex, da, to be there, outside something. A c t u a l l y , i t is n o t a question o f place. L e t us recall K a n t ' s explanation o f the difference between one h u n d r e d possible crowns and one h u n d r e d real crowns; there is no difference i n the concept o f t h e m , b u t the one h u n d r e d real crowns exist n o t o n l y i n m y t h o u g h t , as do the possible crowns, b u t also outside i t , a m o n g the things. Therefore, they have need o f the existence o f other t h i n g s ; there must at least exist something in w h i c h the crowns can exist. W h a t is r e q u i r e d is a w o r l d i n w h i c h crowns and horses a n d stones can exist. T h u s , even i f we ignore the question o f w h e t h e r or n o t these things are independent o f G o d , they are still dependent o n the w o r l d . T h e horse a n d the stone are independent as regards essence, b u t dependent as regards existence; they are in se, b u t ab alio. O n l y G o d , whose essence contains H i s existence, is a n ensase. T R A N S C E N D E N T A L B E I N G . I t is here t h a t we f i n d K a n t ' s metaphysics. Its o r i g i n a l i t y derives f r o m this r a d i c a l i n t u i t i o n : being is not a real predicate. A real predicate w o u l d be something t h a t the things possessed i n themselves; t h a t is, the one h u n d r e d crowns w o u l d have something i n themselves t h a t w o u l d make t h e m be r e a l ; K a n t sees t h a t they d o not have a n y t h i n g i n themselves t h a t makes t h e m different f r o m the one h u n d r e d possible crowns. T h e difference is one of position, i n t h a t the real crowns are o u t there; they are placed a m o n g the things a n d are i n association w i t h the t o t a l i t y of experience. ( I n K a n t , this continuous connection w i t h experience is also a sign o f reality as opposed to dreams.) T h e character o f t h a t w h i c h exists is n o t a n i n t r i n s i c character; i t is a transcendental character: i t consists of a being in; i t is something t h a t transcends each t h i n g a n d is based o n each thing's r e l a t i o n to a l l the other things. A t this p o i n t there enters i n t o p l a y K a n t ' s extremely i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n between t h i n k i n g a n d k n o w i n g . K n o w l e d g e is knowledge o f something, knowledge o f things; thus i t is n o t l i m i t e d to m y ideas, b u t involves a t r u e reference to the things. B u t one must distinguish
The
Problem
oj Kantian
Philosophy
between this idea o f k n o w i n g a n d the one w h i c h a realist w o u l d have. A realist w o u l d say t h a t m y knowledge knows things, b u t things t h a t are there, things-in-themselves. F o r K a n t , this is n o t the case; i t is n o t t h a t there are t w o things-in-themselves—the ego a n d the k n o w n t h i n g — a n d t h a t the ego knows the things, b u t t h a t i t is precisely i n the k n o w i n g t h a t the things are things a n d the ego is the ego. I t is n o t t h a t the things simply transcend me, for w i t h o u t m e there are no things; rather, knowledge is the basis for the being o f the k n o w n things a n d o f the ego t h a t knows t h e m . K n o w l e d g e is n o t something t h a t intervenes between the things a n d the ego, b u t neither are the things ideas o f m i n e ; knowledge makes the things be things w h i l e they are k n o w n to the ego, a n d the ego be the ego w h i l e i t knows the things. I n this way, knowledge gives the things a n d the ego their respective being, b u t does not become i n t e r m i n g l e d w i t h either. B u t this is n o t h i n g more t h a n w h a t we have called transcendental; we have thus explained w h y knowledge a n d being are b o t h called transcendental. G O D . T h e foregoing section explains K a n t ' s position r e g a r d i n g the ontological argument. T h i s p r o o f presupposed t h a t b e i n g was a real predicate and existence a n intrinsic perfection w h i c h G o d h a d to possess. B u t i f being is transcendental, m e r e l y to possess the idea o f G o d is n o t sufficient p r o o f t h a t H e exists; the existence o f G o d w o u l d o n l y be assured b y H i s position. A n d since G o d , b y H i s very n a t u r e as a n i n f i n i t e E n t i t y , does n o t furnish m e w i t h the possibility o f positing the conditions necessary to i n t u i t H i m , the result is t h a t G o d remains b e y o n d any possible experience. Since real things are distinguished f r o m possible things precisely b y their o c c u r r i n g to m e i n connection w i t h experience, neither the existence nor the non-existence o f G o d can be demonstrated. T h i s refutation o f the ontological a r g u m e n t shows t h a t i t is not j u s t a n y a r g u m e n t whatever, t h a t i t is n o t a piece o f reasoning o f the sort i n w h i c h one must observe whether or n o t i t is conclusive, b u t t h a t i t is a thesis w h i c h involves a n idea o f being, a n d thus a metaphysics; i t is possible to raise objections to i t o n l y b y starting o u t w i t h a different idea o f being. A n d any objection raised against this c r i t i q u e o f K a n t ' s must necessarily be raised against K a n t i a n metaphysics as a whole. N o w we can understand i n its entirety the p r o b l e m o f G o d i n the philosophy o f idealism. I n K a n t , speculative reason must renounce the intellectual possession o f G o d , a n d can no longer use H i m as a basis. As a result o f this, metaphysics is r a d i c a l l y changed. T h e metaphysics j u s t before this, seventeenth-century r a t i o n a l i s m , was based o n the presupposition o f the certainty o f God's existence. T h i s is n o w impossible. Being is i n t e r p r e t e d i n a different sense, a n d i n contrast to
Philosophy
the dogmatic idealism, f r o m w h i c h K a n t , according to his famous phrase, had awakened, philosophy becomes a transcendental idealism. T h i s changes the situation o f G o d vis-à-vis the m i n d , the entire p r o b l e m o f b e i n g a n d , w i t h i t , philosophy. T h i s change is also occasioned b y the fact t h a t the ontological argument is no longer considered v a l i d a n d conclusive. T h u s begins the last stage of idealism ; the b o n d w h i c h has u n t i l n o w c o n t i n u e d to u n i t e G o d w i t h theoretic reason is b r o k e n , a n d the metaphysical process w h i c h began at the close o f medieval Scholasticism is completed. I n this last stage, G o d reappears i n a new guise i n the r e a l m o f p r a c t i c a l reason, a n d i n a different f o r m i n a l l metaphysics subsequent to K a n t , especially t h a t o f Hegel. A t t h a t p o i n t the ontological a r g u m e n t acquires new p h i l o sophical v a l i d i t y . 4.
PHILOSOPHY
K a n t i a n metaphysics reaches its c u l m i n a t i o n i n the concept o f the m o r a l person a n d i n the theory of p r a c t i c a l reason. W e have seen t h a t K a n t f o u n d metaphysics to be impossible as a science; b u t t w o i n d u b i t a b l e facts imposed themselves o n K a n t : the fact o f metaphysics as a natural predisposition of m a n a n d the fact of m o r a l i t y . K a n t asked himself whether metaphysics was possible as a science, b u t n o t whether i t was possible as a y e a r n i n g , as a n a t u r a l predisposition, because i t has existed as such for centuries a n d centuries. I t is necessary to take l i t e r a l l y the expression natural predisposition (Naturanlage), something w h i c h is i n n a t u r e . T h i s means t h a t m a n has i n his very n a t u r e the predisposition to practice metaphysics. W O R L D L Y CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY. K a n t gives certain reasons to e x p l a i n w h y m a n philosophizes ; he is n o t content merely to say t h a t i t is a n a t u r a l predisposition. T r u e philosophy is n o t philosophy i n a scholastic sense (Schulbegriff), b u t i n a w o r l d l y sense (Weltbegriff). In this sense, philosophy is the system o f the u l t i m a t e ends o f reason; b y means o f philosophy m a n chooses the u l t i m a t e ends. T h e u l t i m a t e problems of w o r l d l y philosophy are four i n n u m b e r : ( 1) (a) (3) (4)
What What What What
can I k n o w ? (Metaphysics) o u g h t I to do ? (Ethics) m a y I hope for ? (Religion) is m a n ? ( A n t h r o p o l o g y )
" B u t b a s i c a l l y , " K a n t says, " a l l o f this can be left to a n t h r o pology, because the first three questions a l l refer to the last." P h i losophy becomes anthropology. T h e u l t i m a t e end o f philosophy is t h a t m a n should k n o w himself. T h e highest object o f metaphysics is the h u m a n person.
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The Problem
of Kantian
Philosophy
I t happens that the knowledge o f w h a t a h u m a n person is involves m a n y questions : W h a t is the w o r l d i n w h i c h this person is located ? W h a t is a person ? W h a t m a y he hope for a n d , thus, w h a t can he k n o w a b o u t G o d ? T h i s brings us back to the three themes o f classical metaphysics. W h a t does this m e a n ? H o w is K a n t able to r e t u r n t o these inaccessible objects ? H e r e they do n o t appear as objects o f theoretic, b u t o f p r a c t i c a l reason. These objects are n o t a t t a i n e d b y means o f speculative knowledge ; rather, m a n apprehends himself as a moral person i n a w a y w h i c h is not open to p r o o f b u t w h i c h is d i r e c t l y self-evident to the subject. A n d this factum o f m o r a l i t y requires a n e x p l a n a t i o n . W h a t are the things w h i c h make i t possible for m a n to be a m o r a l person? T h e y are the freedom o f the w i l l , i m m o r t a l i t y a n d the existence o f G o d . Practical reason places us i n e x t r e m e l y close, u n c o n d i t i o n a l a n d absolute contact w i t h these things, w h i c h are its postulates. Practical reason consists i n the absolute self-determ i n a t i o n o f the m o r a l subject. T h i s is the f u n d a m e n t a l m e a n i n g o f K a n t ' s pure reason.
Fichte
L I F E A N D W O R K S . J o h a n n G o t t l i e b Fichte was b o r n at R a m m e n a u i n 1762. H e was o f h u m b l e o r i g i n , the son o f a weaver. By chance, a focal n o b l e m a n recognized Fichte's e x t r a o r d i n a r y capabilities w h e n he was l i t t l e m o r e t h a n a c h i l d , a n d enabled h i m to pursue his studies. Despite great economic difficulties F i c h t e studied theology at the U n i v e r s i t y o f Jena, a n d then devoted himself to private t u t o r i n g . I n 1791 he met K a n t , w h o was already a n o l d m a n , and the next year, t h r o u g h the good offices o f the great philosopher, he published his Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (Essay towards a C r i t i q u e o f A l l R e v e l a t i o n ) , w h i c h appeared w i t h o u t his name a n d was a t t r i b u t e d to K a n t . W h e n the t r u e author became k n o w n , the a t t e n t i o n aroused b y the book was directed t o w a r d Fichte a n d q u i c k l y made h i m famous. F r o m 1794 to 1799 he was a professor at Jena, where his a c t i v i t y as a w r i t e r was also great. H e had a clash w i t h the government concerning a n article published i n his review t h o u g h n o t w r i t t e n b y h i m , w h i c h was accused o f atheism; the philosopher's arrogance caused h i m to lose his position. H e moved o n to B e r l i n , where he became a m e m b e r o f the R o m a n t i c circles, at the same t i m e g i v i n g private classes w i t h great success. W h e n the French u n d e r N a p o l e o n invaded G e r m a n y , Fichte was active i n the campaign to arouse the G e r m a n s p i r i t ; i n the years 1807 a n d 1808 he delivered his famous Addresses to the German Nation (Reden an die deutsche Nation), w h i c h were one o f the decisive contributions t o w a r d the f o r m a t i o n o f Germany's n a t i o n a l consciousness. I n 1811 he was rector o f the U n i v e r s i t y o f B e r l i n , w h i c h h a d been f o u n d e d j u s t the year before. I n 1813 he took p a r t i n the Napoleonic 3°7
jo8
Fichte
c a m p a i g n as a n orator, w h i l e his wife w o r k e d as a nurse i n the hospitals of B e r l i n . A n infection w h i c h his wife contracted a n d w h i c h F i c h t e caught caused his death i n J a n u a r y , 1814. Fichte's o u t p u t is extensive. H i s p r i n c i p a l works are a series o f elaborations, each more m a t u r e t h a n the last, of one m a j o r w o r k t i t l e d Wissenschaftslehre ( T h e o r y o f Science). I n a d d i t i o n , he w r o t e Die Bestimmung des Menschen ( T h e V o c a t i o n o f M a n ) , Die Bestimmung des Gelehrten ( T h e V o c a t i o n o f the Scholar), the First a n d Second Introduction to the Theory of Science—four books w h i c h are useful as a n i n t r o d u c t i o n to Fichte's difficult philosophy—as w e l l as the Anweisung zum seligen Leben ( W a y to a Blessed Life) a n d , aside f r o m the abovem e n t i o n e d Addresses, several lectures o n the philosophy o f history t i t l e d Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters ( T h e Characteristics o f the Present A g e ) . Fichte was a personality o f exceptional vividness. H e always h a d a leaning t o w a r d p u b l i c a n d o r a t o r i c a l a c t i v i t y , a n d his c o n t r i b u t i o n to the f o r m a t i o n of the G e r m a n n a t i o n was very great. Fichte's l i t e r a r y style is energetic, lively a n d expressive.
1.
FICHTE'S
METAPHYSICS
K A N T A N D F I C H T E . Fichte's philosophy is directly derived f r o m K a n t ' s . A t the beginning, he presents his philosophy as a m a t u r e a n d p r o f o u n d exposition o f K a n t i a n i s m . B u t i t is difficult to see this philosophical genesis i f we adhere to the p o p u l a r image o f K a n t handed d o w n to us b y the nineteenth century. I t is necessary to r e t u r n to the p o i n t at w h i c h K a n t s u m m e d u p the m e a n i n g of his philosophy. T h e c u l m i n a t i o n of K a n t i a n philosophy was p r a c t i c a l reason. K a n t ended b y a f f i r m i n g the p r i m a c y o f p r a c t i c a l over theoretic reason, a n d the m o r a l person, K a n t ' s pure ego, d e t e r m i n e d himself p r a c t i c a l l y a n d u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y . T h e self-determination o f the ego b y p r a c t i c a l reason is very clearly seen i n the f o r m t h a t c o u l d be given to the categorical i m p e r a t i v e : do what you will, emphasizing the will; do w h a t y o u are able to w i l l . For Fichte, the m o r a l i m p e r a t i v e consists i n saying: become the man you are (werde, der du bist), a n d i n this sense Fichte's i m p e r a t i v e is n o t far removed f r o m K a n t ' s , because w h e n K a n t says, " D o w h a t y o u w i l l " or " B e f r e e , " he asks m a n to act i n accordance w i t h w h a t he u l t i m a t e l y is, to determine himself, w i t h freedom. I n this w a y the e m p i r i c a l ego, w h i c h is d e t e r m i n e d by m a n y things, o u g h t to act, according to K a n t , as i f i t were free, or, expressed differently, the e m p i r i c a l ego o u g h t to a i m to be the p u r e ego t h a t i t is essentially. T h u s Fichte tells m a n : " Be the m a n y o u a r e , " a i m to be the m a n y o u
Fichte
s
Metaphysics
are essentially. I n Fichte (as i n K a n t , w h e n a l l is summed up) m o r a l i t y consists i n adjusting to w h a t one t r u l y is, i n n o t falsifying oneself. T h e t w o positions have a presupposition i n c o m m o n : t h a t h u m a n matters can have v a r y i n g degrees o f r e a l i t y . T o say, " Become the m a n y o u a r e , " is to m a i n t a i n the w e i g h t y hypothesis that h u m a n m a t e r i a l admits o f degrees o f reality, that i t is possible to be m a n i n v a r y i n g degrees of greater or lesser imperfection. T H E EGO. I t was n o t a n a r b i t r a r y choice to begin this very b r i e f exposition o f Fichte's t h o u g h t w i t h his ethical doctrine. T h e p o i n t o f departure of his metaphysics—and at the same t i m e the p o i n t at w h i c h i t is affiliated w i t h K a n t i a n i s m — i s this self-determination o f the ego. A t the same t i m e we see w i t h c l a r i t y t h a t ethics is n o t h i n g other t h a n metaphysics, a major aspect o f a l l o f metaphysics a n d even, perhaps, its c u l m i n a t i o n . T h e ego is the basis o f Fichte's philosophy. W e must direct o u r a t t e n t i o n for a m o m e n t to this concept, w h i c h we have been enc o u n t e r i n g w i t h increasing frequency a n d w h i c h has been becoming m o r e a n d m o r e central to philosophy. O r t e g a l i k e d to relate the marvelous story of the ego. A t the outset, i n Greece, the ego was practically non-existent or else was a secondary t h i n g . For a Greek, the ego was a t h i n g ; i t h a d certain i n d i v i d u a l traits, b u t i t was after a l l j u s t another t h i n g . W h e n the G r e e k s — m e n of i n v o l v e d a n d tortuous m e n t a l i t y , w h o carried their u r b a n i t y even i n t o m e t a p h y s i c s — h a d to speak o f the ego, they used the p l u r a l a n d said " w e , "
rj/xe
Is.
A f t e r the Greeks, the ego acquires a new a n d extraordinary r a n k . I n the C h r i s t i a n M i d d l e Ages, i t becomes the subject of a mission, o f a destiny; the ego is a creature, b u t one created i n the image a n d likeness o f G o d , a n d the subject of a destiny, o f a personal mission. L a t e r , after the Renaissance, i n the Baroque age, the ego's career is i n the ascendant. " A s i n O r i e n t a l tales, the m a n w h o was a beggar awakens as a prince. L e i b n i z is so b o l d as to call m a n un petit Dieu. K a n t makes the ego the supreme legislator of nature. Fichte, immoderate i n this as i n a l l else, w i l l n o t be content w i t h less t h a n saying: the Ego is everyt h i n g " ( O r t e g a : Las dos grandes metdforas [ T h e T w o Great M e t a phors]). I t is necessary to a d d that the idea o f man has undergone very p r o f o u n d changes. I n a n t i q u i t y , m a n is a distinctive e n t i t y w h o possesses the strange property o f k n o w i n g the other things, a n d since he is one t h i n g a m o n g the others, i n a certain sense he envelops t h e m a l l . I n the M i d d l e Ages, m a n is a creature made i n the image a n d likeness o f G o d ; as a result of this, G o d is i n v o l v e d i n the p r o b l e m o f
J20
Fichte
m a n (this, let i t be said i n passing, shows the impossibility o f u n d e r standing C h r i s t i a n ethics as heteronomous, since G o d is never s o m e t h i n g alien t o m a n b u t , o n the c o n t r a r y , his exemplary I d e a ) . B u t i n Greece there h a d already occurred something analogous, a l t h o u g h very different: the " d i v i n e s o m e t h i n g " w h i c h m a n possesses i n Aristotle's philosophy. I n the m o d e r n age, something t o t a l l y new occurs. U p to n o w philosophers have spoken o f m a n , b u t i n the m o d e r n age i t seems t h a t m a n himself vanishes, leaving a token o f himself i n his p l a c e ; i n effect, we see t h a t people speak a b o u t the ego, the w i l l , reason, n a t u r a l l i g h t a n d so f o r t h , b u t n o t a b o u t m a n . W h e n Descartes says ego sum res cogitans, he does n o t say man is, b u t lam; therefore, i t is meaningless t o raise objections to Descartes f r o m the standpoint o f A r i s t o t l e , o r vice versa, because Descartes a n d K a n t speak a b o u t the ego whereas A r i s t o t l e speaks a b o u t m a n . N a t u r a l l y , m a n contains a n element o f egoity, b u t m a n a n d the ego are n o t identical. N o r is the fullness o f h u m a n life exhausted i n the ego. * T h i s digression allows us t o understand the basis o f Fichte's p h i losophy. Fichte says t h a t the ego posits itself and in so doing posits the nonego. W h a t does this mean? I n the first place, the non-ego is s i m p l y everything t h a t is n o t the ego, e v e r y t h i n g t h a t the ego encounters. F i c h t e returns energetically to K a n t ' s concept of position. T h e ego posits itself; this means t h a t i t posits itself as existing, t h a t i t affirms itself as existing. T h e ego posits itself i n an a c t i o n , and i n every a c t i o n there is i m p l i c i t the position o f the ego w h i c h executes i t . L e t us a p p r o a c h this f r o m the other d i r e c t i o n . I n K a n t , position was the positing or p l a c i n g o f oneself a m o n g the things. T h u s , i n F i c h t e , w h e n the ego posits itself, i t posits t h a t w h i c h is other t h a n the ego, i n contrast to w h i c h i t posits itself. T h e position of the ego cannot occur i n i s o l a t i o n ; i t must be a position along with the " o t h e r . " Beginning w i t h Brentano, philosophers have once again defined h u m a n actions as intentional actions; t h a t is, a n action is always directed t o w a r d a n object, the object o f t h a t action. A n a c t i o n presupposes the f o l l o w i n g : a subject t o execute i t , the action itself a n d the object t o w a r d w h i c h the a c t i o n is directed. T h i s idea o f the f u n d a m e n t a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y of m a n has shaped a l l of present-day philosophy. A n d i t is not strange t h a t this philosophy has looked back to F i c h t e as a classic forerunner o f its position. REALITY. The
thing—results,
p o s i t i o n o f the ego a n d the n o n - e g o — t h a t is,
every-
according to Fichte, i n a n action. R e a l i t y is thus p u r e
*See my anthology of philosophical writings, El tema del hombre, particularly the Introduction (Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1943).
Fichte
s
Idealism
activity, liveliness, n o t substance or a t h i n g . T h i s is decisive, a n d constitutes the most p r o f o u n d a n d o r i g i n a l aspect of Fichte's metaphysics. A n d since this r e a l i t y is based o n a n action o f the ego, Fichte's p h i losophy is also idealism. For Fichte, this transcendental idealism is the o n l y philosophy proper to free m a n , a n d he says i n a famous sentence: " T h e type of philosophy one chooses depends o n the type of m a n one is."
2.
FICHTE'S IDEALISM
" T A T H A N D L U N G . " W e have seen t h a t for Fichte the position of the ego a n d the non-ego is reduced to p u r e action, p u r e a c t i v i t y ; true r e a l i t y is far f r o m being substance; i t is Tathandlung, w h i c h means a c t i v i t y , liveliness, deed. R e a l i t y loses its character as a substance a n d becomes p u r e d y n a m i s m . T h i s is the p r o f o u n d i n t u i t i o n o f Fichte's t h o u g h t , as O r t e g a has seen. I N T U I T I O N A N D CONCEPT. I n t u i t i o n , however, is one t h i n g , a n d concept or t h o u g h t another. K a n t said t h a t t h o u g h t w i t h o u t i n t u i t i o n was b l i n d , b u t t h a t i n t u i t i o n w i t h o u t t h o u g h t was n o t science. I n t u i t i o n m u s t raise itself to concepts. H o w e v e r , Fichte is n o t able to express his i n t u i t i o n conceptually a n d adequately because he is a prisoner o f the K a n t i a n i s m w h i c h he strives to continue. T h i s makes h i m r a t h e r uneasy, a n d thus his entire w o r k is a series of re-elaborations of his basic book. T h e w o r d " i n t u i t i o n " comes f r o m intueri, to see, a n d " c o n c e p t " comes f r o m concipere, capere cum, to grasp w i t h . Fichte does not have the intellectual tools w i t h w h i c h to grasp w h a t he has seen, a n d he does n o t succeed i n t a k i n g possession of i t . Therefore he carries on w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f K a n t i a n philosophy, and his metaphysics is idealist. O f w h a t does Fichte's idealism consist ? I D E A L I S M . T o begin w i t h , the p r i m a r y reality is the ego. Fichte does not say t h a t there is a reality one o f whose elements is the ego, a n d t h a t the ego is necessarily opposed b y the non-ego (this expresses his p r o f o u n d i n t u i t i o n ) ; instead he says t h a t the ego posits itself a n d u p o n d o i n g so posits the non-ego. T h a t is, the non-ego necessarily accompanies the ego, b u t this non-ego is n o t o r i g i n a l ; rather, i t is posited o n l y i n so far as the ego posits i t . Therefore, the non-ego is rooted i n the ego, a n d i t is the ego t h a t posits the non-ego. W h a t is i m p o r t a n t and positive i n Fichte is t h a t this position is n o t secondary; in order to be the ego, the ego must co-posit or compose the n o n ego. H o w e v e r , the ego is the basis for the non-ego, a n d i t has a basic p r i o r i t y . A n d this is still idealism. T h e non-ego's function is to l i m i t the ego; u p o n l i m i t i n g i t , i t gives
Fichte
the ego its t r u e reality. A p u r e ego, one t h a t exists u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y a n d separately, w o u l d be indefinite a n d u n r e a l . T h e ego affirms itself as the ego i n contrast to the non-ego i n a position w h i c h is p u r e a c t i v i t y , a n d w h i c h consists ofactively doing. ( I n this exposition o f t h e p r o b l e m o f Fichte's idealism I have f o l l o w e d , i n general, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of m y teacher, Ortega.) K N O W L E D G E . T h e ego posits i t s e l f — i t affirms itself as ego—as i d e n t i c a l to itself. Its position is t h a t A = A , ego = ego. T h i s is n o t j u s t a t a u t o l o g y ; rather, i t expresses the f o r m a l character of t h e ego: the ego recognizes itself. M a n c a n enter i n t o himself a n d recognize h i m s e l f as something w h i c h is n o t i d e n t i c a l w i t h the non-ego. T h e synthesis of the thesis'' ego = ego'' a n d the antithesis'' non-ego ^ ego'' is measure. H e r e Fichte is i n the most classical t r a d i t i o n , one t h a t dates f r o m Greece. Measure, the one, is w h a t makes the things be. T h e synthesis o f the ego a n d the non-ego is effected b y knowledge.
K n o w l e d g e is the
transcendental
unity of the ego and the non-ego. A n d Fichte says: " W e d o n o t possess knowledge, rather knowledge possesses us. K n o w l e d g e is n o t i n us, rather we are i n k n o w l e d g e . " T h i s is the precise m e a n i n g o f the expression to be in truth.
Schilling
L I F E A N D WORKS. F r i e d r i c h W i l h e l m Joseph v o n Schelling was b o r n i n W ü r t t e m b e r g i n 17 75 a n d d i e d i n 1854. H e was one o f the very few philosophers w h o were e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y precocious. H e studied theology at T ü b i n g e n w i t h Hölderlin a n d Hegel, w h o were friends o f his. Schelling also devoted himself intensely to studies i n philosophy, a n d i n 1795, w h e n he was t w e n t y years o l d , he published his book Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie ( O n the Ego as a Principle of P h i l o s o p h y ) , a w o r k w h i c h was greatly influenced b y Fichte. T w o years later Schelling w r o t e the Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (Ideas for a N a t u r a l Philosophy), a n d the f o l l o w i n g year he was a p p o i n t e d a professor at Jena. T h e r e he established ties w i t h the R o m a n t i c circles ( L u d w i g T i e c k , the h i s t o r i a n o f Spanish l i t e r a t u r e ; Novalis, the brothers Schlegel). L a t e r he m a r r i e d Caroline Schlegel, a n interesting personality w i t h i n the R o m a n t i c m o v e m e n t a n d the former wife of August W i l h e l m Schlegel. A t Jena Schelling w r o t e one o f his major works, System des transzendentalen Idealismus (System o f Transcendental I d e a l i s m ) , the Bruno a n d the Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie (Exposition o f M y System o f Philosophy). T h e n he w e n t to W ü r z b u r g a n d , i n 1806, to the A c a d e m y o f Sciences i n M u n i c h . H e was a professor at E r l a n g e n f r o m 1820 to 1827 a n d at M u n i c h f r o m 1827 to 1841. F r o m 1841 he was a professor at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B e r l i n . T o complete the list o f his most i m p o r t a n t works we must a d d his investigations Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (On the N a t u r e o f H u m a n Freedom) (1809). I n the f i n a l p e r i o d of his life he w r o t e p r i n c i p a l l y o n the philosophy o f r e l i g i o n :
Schelling
3H
der Mythologie und Offenbarung (Philosophy o f M y t h o l o g y and Revelation). Schelling, w h o h a d a very acute u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the n a t u r a l sciences a n d , at the same t i m e , o f beauty a n d a r t , is a representative figure of the R o m a n t i c age. H i s influence o n the science o f esthetics has been p r o f o u n d . H e also devoted m u c h a t t e n t i o n to p r o b l e m s o f r e l i g i o n a n d history.
Philosophic
THE
PHASES O F S C H E L L I N G ' S
PHILOSOPHY
P H I L O S O P H I C PERSONALITY. T h e r e have been v e r y few precocious philosophers, a n d Schelling is the most spectacular example. B y the time he was t w e n t y he h a d w o r k e d o u t a system o f p h i l o s o p h y ; however, since he l i v e d to be almost eighty, he m a d e u p f o u r distinct systems. A l l four systems are i n reality b u t the i n t e r n a l e v o l u t i o n o f a single system w h i c h develops a n d matures over this p e r i o d of t i m e ; b u t the phases differ f r o m one another enough so t h a t one can speak of f o u r different systems: those of'the philosophy of nature and spirit, oiidentity, of freedom,
a n d o f p o s i t i v e religious
philosophy.
Philosophically, Schelling derives f r o m K a n t a n d F i c h t e , a n d f r o m the latter i n very direct fashion. Hegel, w h o was a f r i e n d o f his, represents a later m o m e n t i n metaphysics, a m o m e n t o f f u l l m a t u r i t y , even t h o u g h Schelling was somewhat the younger o f the t w o . G e r m a n idealism culminates i n Hegel, a n d achieves its p l e n i t u d e a t the t i m e o f his death. A c t u a l l y , Schelling's longevity represents n o t h i n g b u t mere survival. N A T U R E A N D SPIRIT. W e saw t h a t Fichte began w i t h t h e position o f the ego, w h i c h established the basic d u a l i s m o f the ego a n d the n o n ego. I n G e r m a n idealism this division gives rise to the p r o b l e m o f the distinction between the k i n g d o m o f n a t u r e a n d the k i n g d o m o f freed o m . T h e idealists must establish a relationship b e t w e e n these t w o very different modes o f b e i n g : nature a n d spirit. T h i s is t h e p r o b l e m w i t h w h i c h Schelling is concerned, a n d i t culminates i n H e g e l i a n philosophy. T h e first phase o f Schelling's t h o u g h t makes considerable use o f the n a t u r a l science o f t h a t day, especially o f chemistry a n d biology, w h i c h Schelling frequently interprets w i t h too m u c h freedom a n d i m a g i n a t i o n . E l e c t r i c i t y h a d o n l y j u s t been discovered—the d i s p r o p o r t i o n ate use o f the adjective " e l e c t r i c " i n the l i t e r a r y works o f this era is w e l l k n o w n — a n d i n this w a y N e w t o n i a n mechanics h a d been c o m pleted. O n the other h a n d , evolutionary ideas were m a k i n g t h e m selves felt i n the field o f biology. Schelling's p h i l o s o p h y o f nature,
The
Phases
of Schelling's
Philosophy
w h i c h sometimes abandons itself to p u r e i m a g i n a t i v e speculation w i t h o u t contact w i t h reality, greatly influenced psychology a n d also, i n p a r t i c u l a r , medicine i n the R o m a n t i c age. N a t u r e is intelligence i n the process o f " b e c o m i n g , " Schelling says—spirit w h i c h is c o m i n g to be. A c t u a l l y , i t occurs as a slow awakening of the spirit. T h i s explains the connection between n a t u r e a n d spirit w h i c h is especially m a n i fested i n the l i v i n g organism or i n works o f art, each one i n its respective sphere. T h e absolute w h i c h is at the base o f b o t h is revealed i n history, a r t a n d r e l i g i o n . W e see i n these ideas e m b r y o n i c forms o f elements t h a t w i l l appear f u l l y developed i n Schelling's later systems. I D E N T I T Y . T h e second system, t h a t o f i d e n t i t y , consists i n establishing a bridge between n a t u r e a n d spirit b y means o f s o m e t h i n g t h a t m a y be b o t h spirit a n d n a t u r e , a m o m e n t at w h i c h n a t u r e a n d spirit are identical. I n the previous system, spirit is the u l t i m a t e phase of the e v o l u t i o n o f nature. H e r e there is a c o m m o n , i d e n t i c a l zone i n w h i c h nature is spirit a n d spirit, n a t u r e . T h i s i d e n t i t y , Schelling says, cannot be expressed conceptually; i t can o n l y be k n o w n b y intellectual intuition (intellektuelle Anschauung). H e g e l said that this was " like a pistol s h o t " ; a n d t h a t i d e n t i t y , w h i c h according to Schelling is a n indifference, was like the n i g h t " w h e r e i n a l l cats are g r a y . " T h i s system o f i d e n t i t y is pantheistic. As Hegel demonstrated, any system a f f i r m i n g t h a t being is always being a n d nothingness always nothingness is pantheistic, because i n such systems the p r i n c i p l e ex nihilo nihil fit is i n t e r p r e t e d i n a n absolute way, a n d the C r e a t i o n is impossible. I n this phase o f Schelling's t h o u g h t being is i d e n t i c a l w i t h itself and nothingness is also i d e n t i c a l w i t h itself. T H E METAPHYSICS O F FREEDOM. I n his t h i r d system, Schelling renounces the system o f i d e n t i t y . H e explains r e a l i t y as a n u n f o l d i n g , a n e v o l u t i o n b y means o f w h i c h i t develops b y degrees a n d manifests itself i n successive stages. I t changes f r o m i n o r g a n i c n a t u r e i n t o organic n a t u r e , a n d f r o m organic nature i n t o spirit. T h i s theory is connected to the movement o f the n a t u r a l sciences (especially biology) i n the d i r e c t i o n o f e v o l u t i o n a r y ideas at the b e g i n n i n g o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y . A c c o r d i n g to Schelling, reality evolves u n t i l i t reaches the highest f o r m , h u m a n freedom. N a t u r e awakens a n d raises itself by degrees u n t i l i t reaches freedom. T h i s idea h a d great beauty a n d a p o w e r f u l esthetic effect w h i c h was g r a t i f y i n g to the R o m a n t i c s p i r i t ; however, i t exasperated Hegel's rigorously logical a n d metaphysical mind. P O S I T I V E R E L I G I O N . T h e last phase o f Schelling's t h o u g h t denotes an a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f positive C h r i s t i a n religion, a l t h o u g h i t does not achieve o r t h o d o x y . Schelling creates a theistic metaphysics based on
Schelling
the idea o f h u m a n f r e e d o m ; its a c t i v i t y is oriented i n p a r t i c u l a r t o w a r d the theological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f religion. A t t h a t m o m e n t speculative theology was b e i n g c u l t i v a t e d intensely i n G e r m a n y , a m o n g the Hegelians j u s t as m u c h as a m o n g the followers o f Schleiermacher. Schelling devoted p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to the study o f m y t h o l o g y . I n his last years he was s u m m o n e d to B e r l i n to c o m b a t " H e g e l i a n p a n t h e i s m , " b u t as we have seen Hegel's p a n t h e i s m was never as complete a n d real as t h a t o f Schelling i n a n earlier p e r i o d . T h i s final stage o f Schelling's philosophy was regarded w i t h s y m p a t h y b y o r t h o d o x Protestants a n d even, i n a certain l i g h t , b y his Catholic contemporaries.
Hegel
L I F E A N D WORKS. Georg W i l h e l m F r i e d r i c h Hegel, a Swabian, was b o r n i n S t u t t g a r t i n 1770. H e came f r o m a middle-class Protestant f a m i l y . H e g e l was a serious student at the Gymnasium i n S t u t t g a r t a n d t h e n studied theology a n d philosophy at T ü b i n g e n . T h e r e he was an i n t i m a t e friend o f Schelling a n d Hölderlin; his friendship w i t h the l a t t e r was the longer-lasting, because Hegel a n d Schelling clashed on the question o f greatest i m p o r t a n c e to t h e m b o t h : philosophy. Afterw a r d , f r o m 1793 to 1800, H e g e l was a p r i v a t e t u t o r , a n d l i v e d i n Bern a n d i n F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n . I n 1801 he was a Privatdozent at Jena, b u t there his scant gifts as a n o r a t o r a n d the difficulty o f his classes failed to w i n h i m very m a n y students. H e was already f u l l y m a t u r e w h e n i n 1807 he published his first major w r i t i n g , one w h i c h contains a personal philosophy a n d n o t j u s t a p r o g r a m : the Phänomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology o f the S p i r i t ) . Germany's economic situation was at t h a t t i m e affected b y w a r , a n d this circumstance obliged Hegel to accept a position as editor o f a newspaper published i n B a m b e r g i n order to l i v e ; however, he considered this a t e m p o r a r y a n d p a i n f u l task. T w o years later he was n a m e d dean o f the Gymnasium at N u r e m berg, a n d he remained there u n t i l 1816, w h e n he o b t a i n e d a university chair at H e i d e l b e r g . Hegel's stay i n N u r e m b e r g was very f r u i t f u l and busy; he m a r r i e d there i n 1811, a n d f r o m 1812 to 1816 he published his m a j o r w o r k , Wissenschaft der Logik (Science o f L o g i c ) . I n 1818 he was called to the U n i v e r s i t y o f B e r l i n ; he was a professor there u n t i l his death, a n d i n his last years he was also dean. W h i l e i n B e r l i n he p u b lished the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (Encyclopedia 3'7
Hegel
of the Philosophical Sciences) a n d gave enormously successful lectures w h i c h made h i m the m a j o r figure i n G e r m a n philosophy a n d even i n all philosophy at t h a t t i m e . H e d i e d o n N o v e m b e r 14, 1 8 3 1 , d u r i n g a cholera epidemic w h i c h ravaged B e r l i n . T h i s date marks the end of a b r i l l i a n t stage of philosophy a n d perhaps also of a n epoch of history. Besides the above-mentioned works, we must m e n t i o n several very i m p o r t a n t ones w h i c h were published as his course lectures. These i n c l u d e the
Philosophy
(Vorlesungen
iiber
of
Right,
die Philosophic
the der
Philosophy Weltgeschichte),
of
Universal the
History
Philosophy
of
a n d the History of Philosophy, the first exposition of this subject f r o m a strictly philosophical p o i n t of view. H e g e l was i n essence a philosopher. H i s entire life was consecrated to a m e d i t a t i o n t h a t left a p r o f o u n d stamp o f wear o n his face. " H e was w h a t his philosophy w a s , " Z u b i r i writes. " A n d his life was the history o f his p h i l o s o p h y ; everything else was for h i m his counterlife. F o r h i m , n o t h i n g h a d personal m e a n i n g unless i t c o u l d acquire m e a n i n g b y being relived philosophically. T h e Phenomenology did and does represent his awakening to p h i l o s o p h y — p h i l o s o p h y itself, the intellectual r e l i v i n g o f his existence as a manifestation o f w h a t he called absolute spirit. T h e h u m a n element i n Hegel, w h i c h is so quiet and foreign to philosophy o n the one h a n d , acquires, o n the other h a n d , the r a n k of philosophy b y raising itself to the highest celebration of w h a t is conceived. A n d , reciprocally, his conceptual t h o u g h t occurs i n the i n d i v i d u a l w h o was Hegel w i t h a force conferred o n i t b y the absolute essence o f spirit a n d the intellectual sediment o f a l l history. Therefore, i n a certain sense Hegel represents Europe's m a t u r i t y . " Religion
Hegel's t h o u g h t is as difficult as i t is i m p o r t a n t . I t is the c u l m i n a t i o n of a l l G e r m a n idealism i n its most rigorous a n d m a t u r e f o r m . O n e o f the most fertile attempts to understand a n d i n t e r p r e t Hegel's p h i losophy has been made b y m y teacher, Z u b i r i , w h o m I have q u o t e d above. T h e stamp of his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is evident i n the discussion t h a t follows.
1.
T H E O U T L I N E OF H E G E L ' S
PHILOSOPHY
F o r Hegel philosophy is a p r o b l e m a n d therefore he feels t h a t i t must justify itself. Hegel f o u n d himself i n the midst of a philosophy a n d a theology w h i c h sought " n o t so m u c h for self-evidence as for e d i f i c a t i o n . " Philosophy h a d become more a n d more colored b y vague generalities a n d sterile profundities u n t i l i t h a d t u r n e d i n t o a mere hazy enthusiasm. T h i s seemed intolerable to H e g e l : n o t the leaning t o w a r d a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e enthusiasm, a vague sentiment of God, b u t the
The
"Phenomenology
of the
Spirit"
w i s h to make this i n t o philosophy or, since this is of course impossible, to make i t pass for philosophy. " P h i l o s o p h y must a v o i d the desire to be e d i f y i n g . " I n discussing the thinkers to w h o m he refers, Hegel says t h a t " t h e y believe they are a m o n g the elect to w h o m G o d grants w i s d o m w h i l e they slumber, b u t w h a t they actually conceive a n d give b i r t h to thus i n their slumbers are nonetheless o n l y d r e a m fantasies." But Hegel is n o t content w i t h mere reproaches. These words are f o l l o w e d b y the h u n d r e d s o f pages o f the Phenomenology
of the
Spirit.
H e g e l explains his purpose: " T h e true f o r m i n w h i c h t r u t h exists can o n l y be the scientific system o f t r u t h . T o c o n t r i b u t e t o w a r d m a k i n g philosophy a p p r o x i m a t e the f o r m of science—toward enabling i t to shed its name ' love o f k n o w l e d g e ' a n d be a real k n o w l e d g e — t h i s is w h a t I propose to d o . " I n the Phenomenology of the Spirit Hegel expounds the stages o f the m i n d u p to its a t t a i n m e n t o f absolute knowledge a n d the practice o f philosophy. O n l y f r o m this p o i n t on can a philosophy be created. T h e n he writes the Science of Logic, and later the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, i n w h i c h we find this o u t l i n e : L o g i c , Philosophy of N a t u r e , Philosophy o f the S p i r i t . Philosophy o f the S p i r i t includes i n t u r n the phenomenology o f the spirit, w h i c h we saw at the outset. W h a t m e a n i n g does this have? T w o very different viewpoints are i n v o l v e d : the Phenomenology contains the exposition o f the successive stages o f the spirit u p to its a t t a i n m e n t of absolute knowledge; b u t once philosophy has been practiced, this absolute knowledge embraces and comprehends everything, a n d the h u m a n spirit w i t h a l l its stages becomes p a r t o f i t . T h e spirit appears as an element of philosophy. F o r Hegel, reality is the absolute, w h i c h exists i n a dialectical e v o l u t i o n t h a t is logical a n d r a t i o n a l i n character. A c c o r d i n g to his famous statement, e v e r y t h i n g t h a t is real is r a t i o n a l a n d everything t h a t is r a t i o n a l is real. E v e r y t h i n g that exists is a n element o f this absolute, a stage i n the dialectical evolution w h i c h culminates i n philosophy, where the absolute spirit possesses itself i n knowledge.
2.
T H E "PHENOMENOLOGY
OF T H E
SPIRIT"
A B S O L U T E K N O W L E D G E . I n the Phenomenology of the Spirit Hegel explains the i n t e r n a l dialectic o f the spirit u p to its a r r i v a l at the b e g i n n i n g of philosophy. H e g e l re-examines the modes of knowledge. ( T h i n k i n g is different f r o m k n o w i n g . T o k n o w is to k n o w w h a t the things a r e ; k n o w i n g has a n essential element w h i c h refers to the things; we have already seen t h a t this was w h a t K a n t called " t r a n s cendental k n o w l e d g e . " ) Hegel distinguishes mere i n f o r m a t i o n
3
Hegel
2 0
(history) f r o m conceptual knowledge, i n w h i c h I possess t h e concepts o f the things (this w o u l d be the situation i n the sciences i n w h i c h there is a real knowledge). B u t a n absolute knowledge is still r e q u i r e d . Absolute knowledge is a n all-inclusive knowledge. I f i t is to be absolute, i t cannot leave a n y t h i n g outside itself, n o t even error. I t includes error as error. H i s t o r y must be this w a y : i t m u s t include a l l the elements o f the h u m a n spirit, even the elements o f e r r o r , w h i c h appear as such f r o m the standpoint of t r u t h . D I A L E C T I C S . T h i s dialectic o f the spirit i n H e g e l is logical, i t is a dialectic of pure reason. T h i s is w h a t casts d o u b t today o n Hegel's p h i losophy o f history. T h e spirit passes t h r o u g h a series o f stages before i t reaches absolute knowledge. A t the outset o f p h i l o s o p h y is being. Philosophy begins here. T h u s , philosophy begins w i t h b e i n g .
3.
T H E "LOGIC"
T H E M E A N I N G OF T H E " L O G I C . "
T h e p r o b l e m " W h a t is dialectic ? "
is ancient a n d c o m p l e x ; this question, w h i c h has been a concern o f philosophy f r o m the t i m e o f Plato, reaches its greatest urgency i n H e g e l , since i t constitutes the core o f his system. D i a l e c t i c is n o t a passage o f the m i n d t h r o u g h various stages, b u t a movement of being. T h e r e is a necessary t r a n s i t i o n f r o m one stage to another, a n d each stage contains the truth o f the one before. (One should r e m e m b e r the significance o f " t r u t h " i n Greek—aletheia—patency.) I n each stage, the previous one is manifested a n d made evident, a n d this is its t r u t h . E a c h stage includes the one before i t , w h i c h is absorbed w i t h i n i t , t h a t is, preserved and superseded at the same t i m e . Hegel's Logic is thus a dialectic o f being, a logos o f the on, of the e n t i t y ; thus, onto-logy. Hegel's logic is metaphysical. THE
STAGES OF H E G E L I A N T H O U G H T . S u m m i n g u p w h a t we
have
said a b o u t Hegel's conception of knowledge, we find t h a t i t fits i n t o the f o l l o w i n g o u t l i n e ; i t should be noted t h a t this is n o t a division b u t , once a g a i n , a m o v e m e n t o f being. Phenomenology of the spirit (beginning of philosophy) Knowledge
Science of logic < Philosophy (the Encyclopedia) J Philosophy of the spirit Philosophy of nature
{
Doctrine of being Doctrine of science Doctrine of concept
The
"Logic"
W i t h i n being we distinguish the f o l l o w i n g three elements: i . Determinateness (quality) 2. Quantity 3. M e a s u r e
{
W i t h i n quality—to f o l l o w the example o f H e g e l i a n d i a l e c t i c — w e distinguish three stages: 1. Being (Sein) 2. Existence (Dasein) 3. Being for oneself (Fiirsichsein)
{
W i t h i n the first o f these t h r e e — t h i s being distinguish:
without
quality—we
1. Being (Sein) 2. Nothingness (Nichts) 3. Becoming (Werderi)
{
A l l this, I repeat, is n o t a logical division, b u t the m o v e m e n t o f the absolute itself. Hegel's Logic w i l l have to pass t h r o u g h these stages i n reverse; t h a t is, i t w i l l b e g i n w i t h simple being w i t h o u t q u a l i t y a n d w i l l ascend to each h i g h e r v i e w p o i n t . T h u s we see t h a t Hegel's dialectic has a t e r n a r y s t r u c t u r e , i n w h i c h the thesis is opposed b y the antithesis a n d b o t h are u n i t e d i n the synthesis. T h e synthesis, however, is n o t a mere conciliation; r a t h e r , the thesis leads necessarily t o the a n t i thesis, a n d vice versa, a n d this movement of being leads i n e x o r a b l y to the synthesis, i n w h i c h the thesis a n d the antithesis are preserved and superseded—aufgehoben, t h a t is, absorbed, according to the translation p r o posed b y Ortega. E a c h stage finds its truth i n the one t h a t follows. T h i s is the n a t u r e o f the dialectical process. W e shall a t t e m p t to e x p l a i n the principles o f the first elements o f this dialectical m o v e m e n t o f being. T H E PROGRESS OF D I A L E C T I C S . A t the end of'the phenomenology
of the
spirit we a r r i v e at the absolute b e g i n n i n g o f p h i l o s o p h y — b e i n g . T h i s b e i n g is p u r e being, absolute being. Being is indefinable because i n this case the t e r m to be defined w o u l d have to enter i n t o the d e f i n i t i o n ; b u t i t is possible to make some statements about i t . A c c o r d i n g to Hegel, b e i n g is the indeterminate
immediate
(das unbestimmte
Unmittelbare).
I t is
free f r o m a l l determinateness as regards essence; i t s i m p l y is; i t is n o t this or the other.
T h i s b e i n g has n o t h i n g to differentiate i t f r o m w h a t is n o t itself, since i t has no determinateness; i t is pure indeterminateness a n d emptiness. I f w e t r y to i n t u i t or t h i n k o f being, we i n t u i t n o t h i n g ; i f i t were otherwise, we w o u l d i n t u i t something (Etwas) a n d this w o u l d n o t be pure b e i n g . W h e n I t r y t o t h i n k o f being, w h a t I t h i n k o f is nothingness. T h u s , f r o m b e i n g we pass t o nothingness. B u t n a t u r a l l y , i t is b e i n g itself t h a t
322
Hegel
makes the transition, a n d n o t the ego. Being, the i n d e t e r m i n a t e i m m e d i a t e , is i n fact nothingness, n o t h i n g m o r e or less t h a n n o t h i n g . W e have seen i n being these t w o characteristics w h i c h H e g e l gives us at the outset: immediacy a n d indeterminateness. T h e characteristic of indeterminateness is being nothing; t h a t o f i m m e d i a c y is being first. F r o m being we were h u r l e d i n t o nothingness. B u t w h a t is n o t h i n g ness? I t is perfect emptiness, the absence o f determinateness a n d content, the incapacity to be separate f r o m itself. T o t h i n k o f or to i n t u i t nothingness is j u s t t h i s : to i n t u i t nothingness; this is p u r e i n t u i t i o n , pure thought. T h u s we see t h a t to i n t u i t nothingness is the same as to i n t u i t being. Pure b e i n g a n d p u r e nothingness are one and the same thing. Being, t h r o u g h its i n t e r n a l movement, has h u r l e d us i n t o nothingness, a n d nothingness i n t o being, a n d we cannot r e m a i n stationary i n either o f the t w o . W h a t does this m e a n ? W e were i n q u i r i n g after t r u t h . T r u t h is patency, the state o f being uncovered, exhibited. W e have seen t h a t the m a n n e r o f being w h i c h " b e i n g " has is t h a t o f ceasing to be " b e i n g " a n d c o m i n g to be " nothingness" ; a n d t h a t the m a n n e r of b e i n g w h i c h " n o t h i n g n e s s " has is, likewise, t h a t o f i n a b i l i t y to r e m a i n w i t h i n itself a n d c o m i n g to be " b e i n g . " T h e t r u t h is t h a t being has passed i n t o nothingness a n d nothingness has passed i n t o being. T h i s is becoming (Werden, fieri, yiyveaOaC).
I n this dialectic, I repeat, each stage contains the t r u t h o f the one before a n d finds its o w n t r u t h i n the one t h a t follows. T h u s , the t r u t h of b e i n g was i n nothingness, a n d t h a t of nothingness i n becoming. T h e t r u t h o f b e c o m i n g w i l l not be patent w i t h i n itself, either; a n d the m o v e m e n t o f being, f o l l o w i n g its inexorable ontological necessity, continues i n this w a y i n the f u r t h e r stages of the dialectic. T H E P R O B L E M OF PANTHEISM. Hegel recalls three earlier elements i n the history o f philosophy: the philosopher Parmenides, w h o makes being the absolute, the o n l y t r u t h , i n contrast to the O r i e n t a l systems ( B u d d h i s m ) , w h i c h take nothingness as their p r i n c i p l e ; Heraclitus, w h o contraposes to this abstraction the total concept o f b e c o m i n g ; a n d the p r i n c i p l e o f medieval metaphysics, ex nihilo nihil fit. Hegel distinguishes between t w o meanings o f this statement: one w h i c h is a p u r e tautology, a n d another w h i c h presupposes the i d e n t i t y o f being w i t h itself a n d o f nothingness w i t h itself. I f being is always being a n d nothingness is always nothingness, there is no b e c o m i n g ; this is the system o f i d e n t i t y (an allusion to Schelling). T h i s i d e n t i t y , Hegel says, is the essence o f pantheism. W e thus see t h a t Hegel is opposed to this pantheism because o f the w a y i n w h i c h he understands the dialectical m o v e m e n t o f being.
The
Philosophy
of
Nature
3*3
Being had passed i n t o nothingness, and vice versa. As a result of this there appears the p r o b l e m o f oppositeness. Hegel speaks o f a certain disappearance o f being i n t o nothingness a n d o f nothingness i n t o being. B u t since these are t w o opposites, the mode o f being w h i c h each one has is the exclusion o f the other, the removal o f the other. T h e G e r m a n w o r d aufheben, like the L a t i n w o r d tollere, has as one o f its meanings to raise up; to be raised u p as a n opposite o f something else is a higher m o d e o f being. W h e n t w o things are necessary, they exclude each o t h e r ; b u t they exclude each other w i t h i n a u n i t y , i n a genus. Oppositeness occurs w i t h i n a u n i t y , Aristotle said. T h i s m a n n e r o f e x c l u d i n g one another w h i c h being a n d nothingness have is a mode o f b e i n g preserved a n d raised u p i n t o the higher u n i t y o f becoming, where they exist i n a state o f m u t u a l exclusion. B u t a l t h o u g h Hegel rejects the pantheism o f i d e n t i t y a n d affirms the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m nothingness to being, i n another sense he is n o t exempt f r o m pantheism. Hegel does n o t believe that the r e a l i t y o f the w o r l d is d i v i n e , t h a t this pan is theds; b u t f r o m another v i e w p o i n t we see t h a t Hegel's G o d , the absolute, exists o n l y i n a state o f becoming. A c c o r d i n g to Hegel's o w n expression, H e is a G o d w h o becomes (Gott im Werden). T h e finite entities are n o t strictly different f r o m G o d , b u t are aspects o f this absolute, stages i n its dialectical movement. Lastly, the Hegelian Creation is not so m u c h the p l a c i n g i n t o existence o f a n e n t i t y different f r o m G o d t h r o u g h a free act o f the divine w i l l , as i t is a necessary p r o d u c t i o n w i t h i n the dialectic o f the absolute. H E G E L I A N O N T O L O G Y . W e thus see t h a t Hegel's Logic, w h i c h starts out w i t h being, w i t h the absolute beginning o f philosophy, is true ontology. T h e logic must be understood, Hegel says, as the system of pure reason, as the r e i g n o f p u r e t h o u g h t . T h i s reign is truth. Therefore, Hegel concludes, i t can be said t h a t the content o f the Logic is the exposition
of God as He is in His eternal
essence,
before
the Creation
of
nature
T h i s first stage w i l l thus be followed b y the other t w o parts o f the philosophy: the Philosophy of Nature a n d the Philosophy and any finite spirit.
of the
Spirit.
4. T H E P H I L O S O P H Y
OF
NATURE
N A T U R E . Greek philosophy understood nature to be the s u m total o f a l l existing things, w i t h a p r i n c i p l e or source (arkhe) a n d a n end or goal (te'los). Aristotle defines nature as the p r i n c i p l e o f m o t i o n . Physis is thus a c o m i n g to be. Something is called n a t u r a l i f i t moves itself. Those things are n a t u r a l , A r i s t o t l e says, w h i c h c o n t a i n w i t h i n t h e m selves the p r i n c i p l e o f t h e i r o w n m o t i o n . I n contrast to Plato, w h o
Hegel
affirmed n a t u r e t o be a n Idea, A r i s t o t l e says t h a t t h e n a t u r e o f each t h i n g is its ousia, its arkhe, the i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e o f its transformations.
I n H e g e l , n a t u r e has a clearly d e t e r m i n e d character as a n aspect o f the absolute. T h i s aspect o f the a b s o l u t e — n a t u r e — i s characterized as a being for
another, a being there. N a t u r e is w h a t is other, w h a t is not oneself.
T H E STAGES. T h i s n a t u r e is a n aspect o f the I d e a , w h i c h has different stages: 1. Mechanics. T h i s , in turn, has three aspects: (A) Space and time: the abstract aspect of being outside. (B) Matter and motion: finite mechanics. ( C ) Free matter: absolute mechanics. 2. Physics. T h i s , too, has three aspects: (^1) Physics of general individuality. (B) Physics ofparticular individuality. ( C ) Physics oftotal individuality. 3. Organic physics, also w i t h three aspects: (A) Geologicalnature. (B) Vegetable nature. ( C ) T h e animal organism.
T h i s is the end o f the e v o l u t i o n o f the stages o f n a t u r e . 5. T H E PHILOSOPHY OF T H E S P I R I T
S P I R I T I N H E G E L . W e have already discussed the significance o f the
w o r d physis i n Greece. Greek philosophy asked itself: " W h a t is t h a t w h i c h is ? " T h i s is the same as asking, " W h a t is n a t u r e ? " T h e Greeks d i d n o t ask a b o u t the spirit. T h e n o t i o n o f spirit first appears persistently outside the r e a l m o f philosophy, i n the w r i t i n g s o f St. Paul (irveviia), a n d t h e n somewhat later i n St. Augustine's t h o u g h t : spiritus sive
animus.
I n H e g e l , spirit
is being for
itself, self-identity. S p i r i t is a m o m e n t i n
the e v o l u t i o n o f the absolute, a n d i t is defined as the entrance into oneself, self-identity,
being for itself. H e g e l makes a new o u t l i n e o f s p i r i t .
STAGES OF T H E SPIRIT. L e t us p o i n t o u t the d i a l e c t i c a l a r t i c u l a t i o n
o f the stages o f spirit, so t h a t later we can briefly e x a m i n e the most i m p o r t a n t moments i n this process. 1 . Subjective spirit. (A) Anthropology: the soul. (B) Phenomenology of the spirit: consciousness. ( C ) Psychology: the spirit. 2. Objective spirit. (A) R i g h t . (B) Morality. ( C ) Social ethics.
The 3. Absolute
Philosophy
of the
Spirit
32-J
spirit.
(A)
Art.
(B)
Revealed religion.
(C)
Philosophy.
Subjective
Spirit
" S u b j e c t i v e s p i r i t " strikes us as b e i n g a f a i r l y easy-to-understand t e r m . I t is spirit a n d i t is subjective; therefore, i t is a subject, a subject t h a t knows itself, t h a t is itself, t h a t has inferiority a n d intimacy. Subj ective s p i r i t can be perceived i n so far as i t is u n i t e d w i t h a body i n a v i t a l u n i t y , i n so far as i t is a soul. A t such a m o m e n t spirit is soul a n d constitutes the subject o f the science o f anthropology. B u t subjective s p i r i t is n o t only soul ; r a t h e r , i t knows itself a n d , b y passing t h r o u g h a l l levels o f consciousness, reaches absolute knowledge ; i t becomes spirit i n so far as i t knows itself. T h i s is the w a y i n w h i c h the phenomenology of the spirit develops ; i t is the study of the consciousness, and i t prevails u n t i l being, or absolute knowledge, is a t t a i n e d . Lastly, spirit is n o t o n l y consciousness ; i t knows a n d desires. Hegel calls this m o m e n t spirit, a n d i t is the subject of psychology. T h e foregoing constitutes a n overall description o f subjective spirit.
Objective
Spirit
A new a n d more serious difficulty arises f r o m the very concept o f objective spirit: i t is spirit (being for itself, self-identity), b u t at the same t i m e i t is objective, a spirit w h i c h exists out there, a spirit w i t h o u t a subject. I t is not n a t u r e , b u t i t has nature's characteristic o f " being at h a n d . " N o t to have a subject seems to be c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o the very concept o f spirit. Objective spirit is comprised o f three forms, each one superior to the previous : right, morality a n d social ethics (objective ethics or Sittlichkeit, as opposed t o
Moralitdt).
R i g h t is based o n the idea o f the person. A person is a r a t i o n a l entity, a n e n t i t y w i t h free w i l l . R i g h t is the most elementary f o r m o f relationships a m o n g persons. A n y t h i n g t h a t is not a person is the p r o p e r t y of a person. T h i s is the character o f the f o r m o f r i g h t ; the concept o f the State does n o t enter i n t o i t a t a l l . T h e r e can be infractions o f r i g h t w h i c h do n o t i n v o l v e persons as persons b u t as things ; for example, slaves were once considered things, n o t persons. K a n t h a d already said, " A l l m e n are ends i n themselves. " M a n can never be a means to a n y t h i n g , a thing : he is a n end i n himself. Therefore, Hegel proposes t h a t transgressions o f l a w f u l order be punished, a n d his RIGHT.
32.6
Hegel
consists o f n o t h i n g b u t a r e t u r n to the previous state o f r i g h t . I n H e g e l , to p u n i s h a person is t o treat h i m once m o r e as a person. I n short, the punished person is one w h o has a r i g h t to p u n i s h m e n t . T h e c r i m i n a l has the r i g h t to be castigated, t o be treated a c c o r d i n g to r i g h t a n d thus as a person. M O R A L I T Y . T h e r e is a second stage, m o r a l i t y . I n H e g e l , m o r a l i t y is based o n intentions or purposes. A n i n d i v i d u a l ' s purpose determines the m o r a l i t y o f his action. T h u s , m o r a l i t y is subjectivized, m a d e c o m pletely non-objective, a n d so the development of the idea passes f r o m the stage o f m o r a l i t y to the stage o f social or objective ethics. I n this latter stage the development o f the m o r a l idea is seen i n the various institutions o f social life: the f a m i l y , society a n d , above a l l , the State.
punishment
S O C I A L ETHICS. Social ethics is the realization of objective spirit, the o f subjective a n d objective spirit. T h e family is the i m m e d i a t e or natural phase o f the ethical substance; society is everything p e r t a i n i n g to relationships between i n d i v i d u a l s as independent persons; a n d the State is spirit developed i n a n organic reality. T h e l a t t e r phase is the one w h i c h interests us the most. truth
T H E S T A T E . T h e State is the f i n a l f o r m o f objective s p i r i t . Hegel constructed w h a t was perhaps the first ontology o f the State. T h e State is a r a t i o n a l creation a n d the highest f o r m i n w h i c h the idea o f m o r a l i t y is developed. Hegel does n o t v i e w the State i n the r a t h e r disinterested w a y i n w h i c h Rousseau views i t . I t is a n objective r e a l i t y ; i t is a construction, a n d has the highest r a n k i n the ontological hierarchy. H o w e v e r , the idea o f the State is n o t f u l l y realized i n a n y a c t u a l state. T h e idea o f the State can o n l y be realized i n the total development o f universal history. Universal history is the u n f o l d i n g o f t h e i n t e r n a l dialectic o f the idea of the State. U N I V E R S A L HISTORY. C e r t a i n characteristics of Hegel's t h o u g h t are m o r e clearly seen i n his Lectures on the Philosophy of Universal History, one o f the most b r i l l i a n t books ever p r o d u c e d i n Europe, t h a n i n any other p o r t i o n o f his w o r k . H i s systemization is strict and complete. I n Hegel, system has a very concrete m e a n i n g : i t is the way i n w h i c h truth exists: there are no independent t r u t h s , a n d n o t h i n g is true b y itself, alone; rather, every t r u t h is sustained b y a n d based o n a l l other t r u t h s . T h i s is w h a t constitutes the systematic structure o f philosophy, i n contrast to w h a t m i g h t be called the linear s t r u c t u r e — o f mathematics, for example. T h i s systemization leads H e g e l to overlook c e r t a i n facts a n d occasionally to misrepresent r e a l i t y . Hegel tries to explain the dialectical evolution o f m a n k i n d . H i s t o r y is the realization o f the d i v i n e p l a n , a revelation o f G o d . Weltgeschichte, Weltgericht: universal history is universal j u d g m e n t . For H e g e l , every-
The
Philosophy
of the
Spirit
t h i n g t h a t is real is r a t i o n a l a n d everything t h a t is r a t i o n a l is real. Therefore, his dialectic is logic. H u m a n history is reason, p u r e reason. T h u s Hegel's philosophy o f history becomes a n a t t e m p t to explain a l l history as a n absolute knowledge t h a t does n o t o m i t a n y t h i n g , t h a t even includes error as error. H e g e l distinguishes four moments i n the historical evolution o f peoples, and he compares these moments to the stages of h u m a n life: the O r i e n t ( c h i l d h o o d ) , i n w h i c h government is i n the f o r m o f a p a t e r n a l relationship; Greece (adolescence), o r the r e a l m o f " b e a u t i f u l f r e e d o m " ; R o m e ( m a n h o o d ) , the phase o f universality, o f the R o m a n E m p i r e ; a n d the R o m a n - G e r m a n i c peoples (old age), i n w h i c h there is a contraposition o f a profane a n d a spiritual empire. I n history Hegel sees the progress o f freedom: i n the O r i e n t there is b u t one free m a n , the despot; i n Greece a n d R o m e there are several free m e n (the citizens); a n d i n the m o d e r n C h r i s t i a n w o r l d all m e n are free. H e g e l made grandiose syntheses of universal h i s t o r y : I n d i a , or the r e a l m o f the d r e a m i n g absolute s p i r i t ; Greece, or the realm o f grace; R o m e , or the r e a l m o f power, a n d so f o r t h . Hegel's w o r k represents the p r i n c i p a l attempt thus far to make a philosophy o f history. F o l l o w i n g beginnings b y St. Augustine (De civitate Dei), Bossuet (Discours sur l'histoire universelle) a n d V i c o (La scienza nuova), Hegel, i n his Philosophy ofHistory, grapples w i t h the theme o f history b r i l l i a n t l y and o n a g r a n d scale. However, o u r o w n era must seriously question t w o p r o b l e m a t i c a l points i n Hegel's t h o u g h t . O n e o f these points involves the d e n o m i n a t i o n o f objective spirit, a p p l i e d to the State, to history, a n d so o n . S p i r i t is the entrance i n t o oneself, b u t then we also find spirit w i t h o u t a subj ect. Something similar occurs i n connection w i t h social life; i t is n o t the life o f any p a r t i c u l a r person, b u t life is characterized b y being my life or the life of someone. W e glimpse a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n this. T h e second t r o u b l i n g p o i n t is Hegel's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the historical evolution o f m a n k i n d as pure reason, as a logical dialectic. T o w h a t extent is this so ? (See Ortega y Gasset: La "Filosofía de la historia" de Hegel y la historiologia.)
Absolute
Spirit
Absolute spirit is a synthesis o f subjective a n d objective spirit, a n d also o f nature a n d spirit. F o r Hegel, the i d e n t i t y between nature a n d s p i r i t is n o t a v o i d , a n indifference, as i t is for Schelling; rather, Hegel says t h a t nature a n d spirit require a common base. T h e i r c o m m o n base is the base of everything else, o f the absolute, w h i c h is in itself a n d for itself. Hegel calls this absolute spirit.
3
z8
Hegel
W e have seen t h a t this i d e n t i t y involves searching f o r a c o m m o n base w h i c h can make things be either n a t u r e or spirit. S u c h a base w o u l d be the fundamental reality. H o w e v e r , i t is not clear w h y this is t o be called spirit, for spirits are t r a d i t i o n a l l y entities w h i c h enter i n t o themselves. T h i s absolute is systematic t h o u g h t i n w h i c h each t h i n g is t r u e o n l y as a f u n c t i o n o f the system. N o w we can fully u n d e r s t a n d t h a t system is t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f each thing's being w i t h i n t h e absolute spirit. W e are n o t concerned w i t h a n absolute thing, b u t w i t h the absolute, t h a t w h i c h is the base o f the other things. T h e absolute is n o t a n aggregate, any m o r e t h a n the w o r l d is the aggregate o f the t h i n g s ; r a t h e r , the absolute is where the things occur (and this " w h e r e " is n o t p r i m a r i l y spatial). T H E A B S O L U T E A N D T H O U G H T . T h e absolute is present
t o itself; a n d
this being present to itself is thought. " B e i n g present t o i t s e l f " means being patent, alétheia. I t is n o t a question of starting w i t h t h o u g h t a n d t h e n c o m i n g to possess the absolute. R a t h e r , the absolute is patent t o itself, a n d its i m m e d i a c y to itself is t h o u g h t . W h i l e I a m n o t t h i n k i n g this, i t is n o t a being. T h o u g h t constitutes the actual b e i n g o f the things. Being is n o t latent being, b u t p a t e n t being, alétheia, t r u t h . A l l attempts to define the absolute fall short of the m a r k ; one must find oneself d i r e c t l y i n the absolute; i t is p u r e being. As w e have seen, w h e n I t h i n k o f p u r e being i t becomes absolute negation. Becoming represents t h e absolute's a t t e m p t t o a v o i d nothingness a n d t o m a i n t a i n itself i n being. T h e absolute c a n exist o n l y i n becoming. B y becoming, the absolute spirit comes t o be something. I n Greece this was called " being i n itself." N o t h i n g is self-sufficient; r a t h e r , to be something is to become somet h i n g , a n d this presupposes a b e g i n n i n g . T h e t r u t h o f a t h i n g consists i n its being i n itself w h a t i t already was i n its absolute b e g i n n i n g . T h i s is w h a t has been called essence. Essence is w h a t makes i t possible for a t h i n g to be. A n d absolute self-understanding is absolute b e i n g , concept. T h e absolute, w h i c h is the source o f a l l action, becomes b y itself; therefore, the I d e a is freedom. L a s t l y , philosophy is the absolute's knowledge of itself. Philosophy is n o t t h o u g h t a b o u t the absolute; r a t h e r , i t is the absolute
in so far
as it knows
itself
(cf. Z u b i r i : Hegel
y el
problema
metafisico). T H E STAGES OF A B S O L U T E S P I R I T . A S w e have seen, t h e t h r e e stages o f
absolute spirit are a r t , revealed r e l i g i o n a n d philosophy. A r t involves the sensible manifestation o f the absolute; here t h e absolute idea is intuited. I n religion, o n the other h a n d , the absolute idea is represented. Hegel's philosophy o f religion is enormously i m p o r t a n t , b u t we cannot discuss i t i n d e t a i l here. Hegel is opposed to Schleiermacher's r e l i g i o n
The Philosophy of the
Spirit
o f feeling, a n d his t h o u g h t gives rise to a n i m p o r t a n t t r e n d w h i c h dominates theology a n d the history o f r e l i g i o n i n the nineteenth c e n t u r y . Hegel makes a new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the ontological a r g u m e n t , a n d thus restores to i t the v a l i d i t y w h i c h K a n t ' s c r i t i c i s m has t a k e n f r o m i t . For o u r purposes i t is sufficient to p o i n t out t h a t H e g e l distinguishes between the v i e w p o i n t o f understanding—the viewpoint f r o m w h i c h K a n t ' s c r i t i c i s m w o u l d be v a l i d — a n d the v i e w p o i n t o f reason. T h e relationship between t h o u g h t a n d the absolute allows H e g e l to give new m e a n i n g to the ontological proof, w h i c h is thus able to reassume its role i n the history of philosophy. T h e final stage o f absolute spirit is philosophy. H e r e the absolute idea is no longer either i n t u i t e d or represented, b u t conceived, raised to a concept. Philosophy is the absolute's knowledge o f itself; i t is n o t t h o u g h t about the absolute; r a t h e r , i t is the explicit f o r m of the absolute itself. I t is for this reason t h a t the history o f philosophy is a n essential p a r t of philosophy itself ( Z u b i r i ) . H e g e l was the first person to make a n a c t u a l History of Philosophy. H e interprets the subject i n a dialectical m a n n e r , as a series o f m o m e n t s w h i c h preserve a n d supersede one another. Hegel believes t h a t philosophy reaches its maturity a n d attains its final f o r m i n his w o r k , that his philosophy is the c o m p l e t i o n o f philosophy. H e is acutely aware t h a t he represents the c u l m i n a t i o n and close of a n epoch, the M o d e r n E r a . Therefore, at the end o f his History of Philosophy he is able to m a k e a sweeping evaluation a n d w r i t e a Conclusion o f i n c o m p a r a b l e grandeur. " P h i l o s o p h y is the t r u e theodicy," he says. A n d he adds these words, w h i c h t h r o b w i t h a l l the majestic g r a v i t y o f the history o f philosophy a n d express i t better t h a n i t has ever been expressed, either before or after his t i m e : " T h e universal s p i r i t has come this far. T h e most recent philosophy is the outcome o f a l l previous philosophies; n o t h i n g has been lost, a l l the principles have been retained. T h i s concrete idea is the consequence o f the spirit's efforts d u r i n g almost 2500 years [Thales was b o r n i n 640 B . C . ] , o f the spirit's most earnest labor to make itself objective to itself, to k n o w itself: ' T a n t a e molis erat, se ipsam cognoscere m e n t e m . ' "
The Thought of the Romantic Age
T h e r e is a n intense intellectual a c t i v i t y i n G e r m a n y f r o m the t i m e o f K a n t u n t i l the first h a l f o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y ; we have already studied the most p r o f o u n d l y philosophical s t r a t u m o f this t h o u g h t : K a n t , Fichte, Schelling a n d H e g e l . H o w e v e r , there are at the same t i m e other philosophers o f somewhat lesser stature w h o nevertheless are o f the greatest interest to philosophy a n d to other disciplines; i t is i m p o r t a n t to note briefly the character o f this group o f thinkers. First o f a l l , we must take notice of t w o movements w h i c h arise i n the eighteenth c e n t u r y a n d w h i c h emphasize sentiment a n d the life based o n the emotions. O n e of these movements is p r i m a r i l y l i t e r a r y , the so-called Sturm undDrang ( S t o r m a n d Stress), a n d the other is p r i m a r i l y religious, Pietism. A n o t h e r m o v e m e n t , Romanticism, appears at the end o f the eighteenth a n d the b e g i n n i n g o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y ; i t derives p r i n c i p a l l y f r o m the Sturm und Drang movement. A t the same t i m e there is a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y f l o w e r i n g o f studies i n history, a n d this leads to the f o r m a t i o n o f the circle k n o w n as the " G e r m a n school o f h i s t o r y . " N a t u r a l science becomes definitely established w i t h the discovery o f electricity ( L u i g i G a l v a n i a n d Alessandro V o l t a i n I t a l y ; M i c h a e l Faraday i n E n g l a n d ) a n d the development o f b i o l o g y (Georges B u f f o n , fitienne B o n n o t de Condillac a n d J e a n Baptiste L a m a r c k i n France). Lastly, i n the field o f philosophy w e f i n d alongside the great figures we have already studied the names o f F r i e d r i c h Schleiermacher a n d A r t h u r Schopenhauer, especially, b u t also F r a n z v o n Baader, F r i e d r i c h J a c o b i a n d K a r l Krause. W e shall n o w t r y t o sketch these various currents o f t h o u g h t . 33°
The School of
1.
T H E LITERARY
History
MOVEMENTS
As a reaction against the cold rationalist spirit o f the Aufklärung, G e r m a n y produces a new literature whose greatest figures are n o t l a c k i n g i n philosophic ideas a n d a deep interest i n idealism. C h i e f o f these is J o h a n n W o l f g a n g v o n Goethe (1749-1832), w h o l i v e d l o n g enough to p a r t i c i p a t e i n every movement f r o m Classicism to R o m a n t i c i s m ; his i n c o m p a r a b l e l i t e r a r y b r i l l i a n c e was combined w i t h a remarkable f e r t i l i t y i n scientific a n d esthetic t h o u g h t . Others were F r i e d r i c h Schiller, F r i e d r i c h Hölderlin, Novalis ( F r i e d r i c h v o n H a r d e n b e r g ) , J o h a n n G o t t f r i e d v o n H e r d e r a n d the R o m a n t i c writers p r o p e r l y so-called: L u d w i g Tieck, the t w o brothers Schlegel ( F r i e d r i c h a n d A u g u s t W i l h e l m ) , the brothers H u m b o l d t (Alexander a n d W i l h e l m ) , a n d H e i n e as w e l l . R o m a n t i c i s m , as we have seen, signifies a n esthetic o f feeling. B u t i n a d d i t i o n i t involves a p a r t i c u l a r e m o t i o n for the past. Just as the E n l i g h t e n m e n t , w h e n t h i n k i n g o f the past, r e t u r n e d to the classical w o r l d , to Greece a n d R o m e , the Romantics have a n obvious preference for the M i d d l e Ages. T h i s leads m a n y o f t h e m to a p r i m a r i l y artistic a n d historical appreciation o f C a t h o l i c i s m t h a t brings t h e m close to the R o m a n C h u r c h . I n m a n y cases there takes place, i n a d d i t i o n , a n actual religious rapprochement; b u t there is always at least a n a d m i r a t i o n for the Catholic f o r m o f w o r s h i p , for the c o n t i n u i t y o f the Pontificate a n d for the splendid historical r e a l i t y w h i c h the C h u r c h is—even t h o u g h i t is so o n l y secondarily. T h i s interest i n the medieval past leads the R o m a n t i c s to cultivate the study o f history also.
2.
T H E SCHOOL OF
HISTORY
W e have already seen t h a t i n the eighteenth century i n France ( V o l t a i r e a n d M o n t e s q u i e u , f o l l o w i n g Bossuet's precedent) historical studies took a decisive step f o r w a r d . T h e results o f the French movem e n t are adopted a l o n g w i t h the contributions o f certain Englishmen ( H u m e , G i b b o n ) b y the G e r m a n school of history. A distinction is made between nature a n d spirit, as we saw, a n d spirit is interpreted historically. General history, the history o f l a w , the history o f religions, linguistics, Classical p h i l o l o g y , R o m a n c e p h i l o l o g y , a n d the like, are c u l t i v a t e d intensively b y a g r o u p o f p r o d u c t i v e scholars. F r i e d r i c h K a r l v o n Savigny, L e o p o l d v o n Ranke, Franz B o p p , B a r t h o l d Georg N i e b u h r a n d , later, T h e o d o r M o m m s e n engage i n a labor o f great i m p o r t a n c e a n d v o l u m e . T h e school o f history invents the technique o f historical research, c r i t i c a l d o c u m e n t a t i o n a n d the study o f p r i m a r y
The
Thought
of the Romantic
Age
sources, b u t i t soon shows a lack o f adequate intellectual constructiveness a n d tends to go no f u r t h e r t h a n the a c c u m u l a t i o n o f data. T h e example o f Classical p h i l o l o g y , w h i c h amassed an enormous a m o u n t o f scholarly m a t e r i a l b u t was u n a b l e to furnish a n adequate p i c t u r e o f Greece, is especially clear. Hegel reacted energetically to this tendency, a l t h o u g h perhaps he sinned i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a n excessively logical construction of history. 3.
SCHLEIERMACHER
A N D T H E PHILOSOPHY
OF R E L I G I O N
S C H L E I E R M A C H E R ' S L I F E A N D W O R K S . F r i e d r i c h D a n i e l Schleier-
macher was b o r n i n 1768 a n d d i e d i n 1834. H e was educated i n the schools o f the M o r a v i a n b r o t h e r h o o d , a n d his p r i n c i p a l a c t i v i t y t h r o u g h o u t his life was p r e a c h i n g a n d the study o f r e l i g i o n a n d the philosophy o f r e l i g i o n . For several years he was the pastor o f the Charité H o s p i t a l i n B e r l i n ; a f t e r w a r d he t a u g h t at H a l l e , a n d later, u n t i l his death, at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B e r l i n . H i s most i m p o r t a n t works are Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre (Basis o f a C r i t i q u e o f Ethics to the Present T i m e ) , Ethik, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der Evangelischen Kirche ( C h r i s t i a n D o g m a A c c o r d i n g to the F u n d a m e n t a l Principles o f the Evangelical C h u r c h ) , Hermeneutik and the Reden über die Religion (Addresses o n R e l i g i o n ) . I n a d d i t i o n , he made a splendid translation of Plato. R E L I G I O N . F o r several years Schleiermacher was the o u t s t a n d i n g figure i n G e r m a n Protestant theology. H e g e l opposed Schleiermacher's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f r e l i g i o n , a n d f r o m t h a t t i m e o n the p h i losophy o f r e l i g i o n was strongly influenced b y the conceptions of b o t h men. Schleiermacher considers possible neither a r a t i o n a l theology nor a revealed theology nor even a m o r a l theology like K a n t ' s , w h i c h was based o n the postulates o f p r a c t i c a l reason. T h e object o f Schleiermacher's speculation is n o t so m u c h God as religion; rather than theology, i t is philosophy o f r e l i g i o n t h a t he practices. H e interprets this r e l i g i o n as afeeling. His is the philosophy of'religiousfeeling. O f w h a t does this feeling consist ? I t is the feeling of absolute dependence. M a n feels needy, insufficient, dependent. T h i s state o f subjection gives rise to man's awareness o f being a creature. T h u s i n Schleiermacher's w o r k the dogmatic content of r e l i g i o n is, i n effect, deprived o f its force a n d relegated to a lower plane ; r e l i g i o n becomes p u r e l y a m a t t e r of feeling. Schleiermacher forgets the f u n d a m e n t a l m e a n i n g oîreligio as religatio, a n d thus changes its basic significance. L A T E R THEOLOGIANS. T h r o u g h o u t the nineteenth c e n t u r y
Ger-
Derivations
of
Idealism
333
m a n y is the scene o f intensive theological a c t i v i t y , p a r t i a l l y influenced b y Schleiermacher, b u t chiefly f o l l o w i n g i n the steps of H e g e l ; o u t standing i n this respect is the so-called T ü b i n g e n school. O n e o f the most i m p o r t a n t theologians o f this p e r i o d is C h r i s t i a n B a u r ; despite his greater superficiality, D a v i d Strauss also a c q u i r e d m u c h fame. O n the other h a n d , C a t h o l i c theology was represented i n G e r m a n y b y the great figure o f M a t h i a s Josef Scheeben ( d i e d 1888), whose major w o r k Die Mysterien des Christentums (The Mysteries o f Christianity) was a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n to speculative theology. 4.
DERIVATIONS
OF
IDEALISM
I n the last t h i r d o f the eighteenth c e n t u r y a n d the first h a l f o f the nineteenth several interesting thinkers flourished; their fame has been somewhat obscured b y the great philosophers o f G e r m a n idealism, b y w h o m they were influenced to a greater o r lesser extent, a n d w h o m they i n t u r n influenced. Some of these m e n opposed idealism, b u t they a l l moved w i t h i n the m i l i e u of its problems a n d were conditioned b y the philosophic position o f the age. L e t us consider briefly the most i m p o r t a n t of these m e n . H E R D E R . J o h a n n G o t t f r i e d v o n H e r d e r (1744-1803), w h o is to be considered p a r t i a l l y w i t h i n the framework o f the Aufklärung b u t was already o n the w a y t o w a r d R o m a n t i c t h o u g h t , is one of the thinkers w h o i n i t i a t e the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f historical r e a l i t y i n the eighteenth century. H e r d e r takes i n t o account the differences between nations a n d the influence o f geographical factors, b u t he considers m a n k i n d as a t o t a l i t y subject to e v o l u t i o n ; his desideratum was a " h i s t o r y o f the h u m a n soul, b y epochs a n d b y peoples." H i s p r i n c i p a l writings are Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit (Another Philosophy o f H i s t o r y for the E d u c a t i o n o f H u m a n i t y ) , w h i c h appeared i n 1774, a n d the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (Ideas o n the Philosophy o f the H i s t o r y of M a n k i n d ) , 1784-91. J A C O B I . F r i e d r i c h H e i n r i c h Jacobi (1743-1819), a friend o f Goethe i n his y o u t h a n d a representative of the p r i n c i p l e o f religious feeling, opposed r a t i o n a l i s m i n r e l i g i o n (Moses Mendelssohn) and appealed to f a i t h , w h i c h he likened to society: m a n was b o r n w i t h i n a n d must r e m a i n w i t h i n the one a n d the other. J a c o b i produced a c r i t i q u e o f K a n t i a n i s m a n d o f c e r t a i n points i n Schelling's philosophy. H i s most i m p o r t a n t w r i t i n g s are David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus ( D a v i d H u m e o n F a i t h , or I d e a l i s m a n d Realism) a n d Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung ( O n D i v i n e Things a n d T h e i r Revelation).
The
334
Thought
of the Romantic
Age
HERBART. Johann Friedrich Herbart (17 76-1841), a contemporary o f the great figures o f G e r m a n idealism a n d i m b u e d despite h i m s e l f w i t h t h e i r s p i r i t , opposed the p r e v a i l i n g tendency o f his age a n d , d r a w i n g o n eighteenth-century t h o u g h t a n d u l t i m a t e l y o n L e i b n i z , created a personal philosophy—less b r i l l i a n t t h a n t h a t o f his contemporaries F i c h t e , Schelling a n d H e g e l — w h i c h c l a i m e d to be realism.
H e r b a r t w r o t e the Lehrbuch
zur Einleitung
in die
Philosophie
( I n t r o d u c t o r y M a n u a l of Philosophy), Hauptpunkte der Logik (Principal Points of L o g i c ) , Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik ( P r i n c i p a l Points o f M e t a physics), Allgemeine Metaphysik (General Metaphysics), Theoriae de attractione
elementorum
principia
metaphysica
(Metaphysical Principles of
the T h e o r y o f A t t r a c t i o n o f the Elements), Lehrbuch zur Psychologie ( M a n u a l o f Psychology), Psychologie als Wissenschaft (Psychology as a Science), Allgemeine praktische Philosophie (General P r a c t i c a l P h i losophy) a n d Allgemeine Pädagogik (General Pedagogy). For H e r b a r t , philosophy is the e l a b o r a t i o n o f concepts; i t acts u p o n a p r i m a r y knowledge, w h i c h is experience; i t must therefore start o u t w i t h w h a t is " g i v e n , " w h a t is impressed u p o n us, w h e t h e r m a t t e r o r f o r m . T h e m a t e r i a l a n d f o r m a l aspects o f experience pose p r o b l e m s : the given is o n l y a starting p o i n t , necessary to make the problems r e a l , a n d i t obliges us to philosophize i n order t o make experience c o m prehensible ; experience alone is n o t comprehensible. Metaphysica est ars experientiam recte intelligendi (Metaphysics is the art o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g experience c o r r e c t l y ) . O n e must make t h e transition f r o m a p r o b l e m concept to a s o l u t i o n concept, a n d for this purpose there come i n t o p l a y certain c o n t i n g e n t modes o f considering the things w h i c h H e r b a r t calls zufällige Ansichten (contingent views) or modi res considerandi (modes o f considering the t h i n g s ) ; thus one arrives at the m e t h o d of " i n t e g r a t i o n o f the concepts." H e r b a r t distinguishes t h a t w h i c h is f r o m b e i n g itself, the quale w h i c h is being. T h e l a t t e r is understood as absolute position, i n d e p e n d e n t o f us; H e r b a r t calls this the " R e a l , " t h a t is, the e n t i t y — h e n c e his a t t e m p t e d r e t u r n to realism. T h e d o c t r i n e o f the Reals is based o n L e i b n i z ' t h e o r y o f the monads. O f the R e a l as a n absolute, one c a n k n o w o n l y t h a t i t exists, t h a t i t is simple, t h a t i t is n o t q u a n t i t y a n d t h a t m u l t i p l i c i t y of being ( a l t h o u g h n o t w i t h i n being) is possible; t h a t is, t h a t there c a n be one o r m o r e Reals. B u t viewed i n the l i g h t o f our forms of t h o u g h t , i t becomes a n image w i t h contingent traits w h i c h d o not c o n t r a d i c t those essential characteristics: w h a t the R e a l is for us. I n short, H e r b a r t relapses i n t o idealism. T h e ego is one o f the Reals; f o l l o w i n g u p this idea, H e r b a r t develops his psychology, w h i c h like his pedagogy is intellectualistic: the o n l y o r i g i n a l f u n c t i o n o f the soul is
Derivations
oj
Idealism
335
representation. L a s t l y , ethics is i n t e r p r e t e d as a Geschmackslehre, a theory o f taste or science o f estimative sensibility; the good is the q u a l i t y o f that w h i c h compels our a p p r o v a l , j u s t as evil compels o u r disapproval. H e r b a r t here comes very close to the idea of value w h i c h was to attain m a t u r i t y a century later. T h e good cannot be defined or discovered: one recognizes i t , accepts i t , esteems or approves i t ; ethics appears w i t h i n a n esthetic m i l i e u ; i t is related t o a m o r a l beauty w h i c h is distinct f r o m the beauty o f music or the visual arts. The. practical ideas are the f u n d a m e n t a l relations that are w o r t h y o f esteem, the exemplary valuations; these are the idea o f i n t e r n a l freedom, the idea o f perfect i o n , the idea of benevolence, the idea o f r i g h t a n d the idea of r e t r i b u t i o n or equity (cf. O r t e g a : Obras Completas, V I , 265-291). K R A U S E . K a r l C h r i s t i a n F r i e d r i c h K r a u s e (1781-1832) belongs to the g r o u p of younger idealist thinkers; strongly rooted i n religion a n d ethics, he achieves a certain o r i g i n a l i t y i n his efforts to reconcile theism w i t h the prevalent pantheistic tendencies o f his age. H i s panentheism declares t h a t a l l things are in God. Krause affirms the existence of destiny a n d the value of the person, understood i n a m o r a l sense, a n d f r o m this v i e w p o i n t he interprets l a w a n d society; m a n k i n d is a federation o f autonomous associations w i t h universal or p r i v a t e goals. Krause's p r i n c i p a l works are Entwurf des Systems der Philosophic (Sketch of the System o f Philosophy), Das Urbild der Menschheit (The I d e a l of M a n k i n d ) , System der Sittenlehre (System o f Ethics), Vorlesungen über das System der Philosophie (Lectures o n the System of Philosophy) a n d Vorlesungen über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaften (Lectures o n the F u n d a m e n t a l T r u t h s o f the Sciences). K r a u s e left behind m a n y unpublished works, some of w h i c h have since been published. Despite the confused a n d somewhat vague style o f his w r i t i n g s , he exerted a considerable influence. H i s system was developed b y some o f his G e r m a n pupils, like R ó d e r a n d L e o n h a r d i , b u t even more so i n B e l g i u m by H e i n r i c h Ahrens a n d T i b e r g h i e n a n d i n Spain, where Krause's philosophy enjoyed an unexpected v i t a l i t y w h i c h i t is o f interest to examine. S A N Z D E L R I O . J u l i á n Sanz del R i o (1814-1869) was the founder and p r i n c i p a l figure i n the Spanish K r a u s i a n school. J a i m e L u c i a n o Balmes a n d h e — c o n t e m p o r a r i e s even t h o u g h Sanz del R i o o u t l i v e d Balmes b y twenty-one years—are the t w o most i m p o r t a n t names i n nineteenth-century Spanish philosophy. I n 1843 Sanz del R i o was a p p o i n t e d professor o f the history o f philosophy at the U n i v e r s i t y o f M a d r i d a n d was sent to study i n G e r m a n y . A t Heidelberg he was a p u p i l o f L e o n h a r d i a n d R ó d e r a n d l i v e d at the home o f his history professor G e o r g Weber, where he was a c o m p a n i o n o f H e n r i
336
The
Thought
of the Romantic
Age
Frédéric A m i e l . O n his r e t u r n to Spain he inspired the c r e a t i o n o f a philosophical circle of great v i t a l i t y w h i c h influenced i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d political life for a l o n g t i m e , almost t h r o u g h o u t the entire century. Despite this, his philosophical value is scanty; at the m o m e n t o f coming i n t o contact w i t h G e r m a n philosophy, these Spanish thinkers chose i n K r a u s e a secondary t h i n k e r , one m u c h less f r u i t f u l t h a n the great figures o f the age. Perhaps Sanz del Rio's predilection for Krause was influenced b y the religious a n d m o r a l character o f the latter's philosophy. T h e best historian of the Spanish K r a u s i a n m o v e m e n t , Pierre J o b i t , * interprets i t as apremodernist movement, an a n t i c i p a t i o n i n the nineteenth century of the heterodox t r e n d t h a t arose i n certain Catholic groups a r o u n d 1900. Sanz del Rio's w r i t i n g s were h a r d l y circulated b e y o n d the entourage o f his pupils, p a r t l y because o f his obscure a n d unpleasant style, b u t also because of the real difficulties o f his t h o u g h t , w h i c h signifies a considerable philosophic effort w i t h i n the potentialities o f the Spain of his t i m e . Sanz del Rio's p r i n c i p a l works, w h i c h he presented as expositions o f Krause, are Ideal de la Humanidad Sistema
para
la vida
( M a n k i n d ' s I d e a l o f Life) ; Lecciones
de filosofía analítica
de Krause
A n a l y t i c a l Philosophy) ;
Sistema
parte,
parte,
Análisis
and
Segunda
sobre
el
(Lectures on Krause's System o f de la Filosofía
Síntesis;
Análisis
: Metafísica
:
del pensamiento
Primera racional
(Analysis o f R a t i o n a l T h o u g h t ) ; Filosofía de la muerte (Philosophy o f Death) ; and El idealismo absoluto (Absolute I d e a l i s m ) . SOCIALISM. T h e influence of the G e r m a n idealists, especially Hegel, and also t h a t o f L u d w i g Andreas Feuerbach (1804-1872), a H e g e l i a n critic o f theology i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a n atheistic a n t h r o p o l o g i s m , and D a v i d F r i e d r i c h Strauss, c o m b i n e d w i t h that o f Charles D a r w i n , were exerted o n the theoreticians o f G e r m a n socialism. ( O n e should not forget the different roots t h a t the contemporary o r slightly earlier F r e n c h socialism had.) T h e most i m p o r t a n t G e r m a n socialists were K a r l M a r x (1818-1883), F r i e d r i c h Engels (1820—1895) and F e r d i n a n d Lassalle (1825-1864). I n 1848 M a r x a n d Engels published the Communist Manifesto; they were the founders o f the I n t e r n a t i o n a l . M a r x w o n his doctorate w i t h a dissertation o n Democritus a n d E p i c u r u s , a n d later p u b l i s h e d Thesen uber Feuerbach (Theses o n Feuerbach), Die heilige Familie ( T h e H o l y F a m i l y ) , La misère de la philosophie ( i n answer to Pierre Joseph Proudhon's La philosophie
de la misère),
Z
u r
Kritik
der politischen
Okonomie
C r i t i q u e o f P o l i t i c a l Economy) a n d his major w o r k ,
(Toward Das
a
Kapital.
*Les Krausistes by the A b b é Pierre Jobit (Paris-Bordeaux, 1936). Cf. my essay " E l pensador de Illescas" in Ensayos de teoría [Obras, I V ] . See also El krausismo español by J u a n López-Morillas (Mexico, 1950).
Derivations
Lassalle w r o t e Die
Philosophie
of
Idealism
des Herakleitos
337
des Dunklen
von
Ephesos
( T h e Philosophy o f Heraclitus the Obscure o f Ephesus) and the System der erworbenen Rechte (System o f A c q u i r e d R i g h t s ) . T h e point o f d e p a r t u r e o f these thinkers is the idea o f dialectics, derived f r o m Hegel. T h i s dialectics was "speculative," idealistic; i t started out f r o m p u r e thought, Engels says, a n d was to come f r o m the most s t u b b o r n facts (von den hartnäckigsten Tatsachen). There was no place here for a m e t h o d that " w e n t f r o m n o t h i n g t h r o u g h n o t h i n g to n o t h i n g " (von nichts durch nichts zu nichts kam), as Engels remarked i r o n i c a l l y , q u o t i n g Hegel's Logic. I t was necessary to subject this dialectics to a penetrating analysis, b u t M a r x and Engels recognized " t h e enormous historical significance" o n w h i c h i t was based. This grandiose a n d epoch-making conception o f history " w a s the direct theoretic presupposition of the new materialistic i n t u i t i o n . " I n their hands Hegel's idealist dialectic becomes a materialist dialectic w h i c h leads these m e n to w h a t is called—somewhat i m p r o p e r l y — a m a t e r i a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f h i s t o r y ; i t is actually a n economic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f history. P o l i t i c a l economy thus becomes the basic d i s c i p l i n e ; Engels, for his p a r t , m a d e a searching c o m m e n t a r y on M a r x ' s treatise Z Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. P o l i t i c a l economy begins w i t h commodities ( W a r e ) , at the m o m e n t w h e n products are exchanged. T h e product i n v o l v e d i n the exchange is a c o m m o d i t y . A n d i t is a c o m m o d i t y s i m p l y because the thing, the p r o d u c t , creates a relationship between t w o persons or communities, t h a t is, between the producer and the consumer, w h o are no longer the same person. ur
T h i s is the c r u x o f M a r x ' s conception: " E c o n o m y does n o t deal w i t h things, b u t w i t h relationships between persons and, i n the f i n a l analysis, between classes; however, these relationships are always bound to things a n d appear as things." H e r e w e see h o w a thought w h i c h f o r m e r l y stressed personal relationships comes, w i t h o u t clear j u s t i f i c a t i o n , to emphasize the things. M a r x insisted o n the importance o f the economic factor i n history w i t h great insight a n d indisputable genius, b u t t h e n wished to base history completely o n this economic factor and, b y means o f an untenable a r b i t r a r y construction, to consider e v e r y t h i n g else as a superstructure o f economics. C u l t u r e , religion, philosophy, man's entire life, w o u l d be explained b y the economic component o f l i f e — a real b u t p a r t i a l component; one n o t t o be overlooked, b u t secondary i n a complete perspective. O n the other h a n d , the p o l i t i c a l ideology associated w i t h this philosophical d o c t r i n e led to a substantification o f the idea o f social "classes," to the f i x i n g o f the t w o types " b o u r g e o i s " a n d " p r o l e t a r -
338
The
Thought
of the Romantic
Age
i a n " as standard concepts. These terms were relatively useful i n explaining t h e social situation i n E u r o p e a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f the i n d u s t r i a l age, b u t are absolutely inadequate w h e n a p p l i e d t o other eras or other countries; i n such cases they v i o l e n t l y distort r e a l i t y , w h i c h cannot be adapted t o the f r a m e w o r k they impose o n i t . M a r x was a v e r y i m p o r t a n t economist, b u t is even m o r e i m p o r t a n t as a p o l i t i c a l theorist, the founder o f one o f the greatest mass movements i n history. However, this does n o t signify philosophical importance. T h e so-called " M a r x i s t t h o u g h t " o f later times has been restricted b y a very n a r r o w discipline, t o t h e extent t h a t i t constitutes a f o r m o f Scholasticism i n w h i c h t h e most f r e q u e n t l y quoted philosophical authorities, along w i t h M a r x and (secondarily) Engels, have been L e n i n a n d Stalin (the a u t h o r i t y o f the l a t t e r was quickly cancelled after his death). T o d a y the most interesting M a r x ist thinkers are the H u n g a r i a n G y ö r g y Lukäcs (b. 1885), a u t h o r o f Die
Theorie
des Romans
(Theory
o f t h e N o v e l ) , Geschichte
und
Klas-
( H i s t o r y a n d Class Consciousness), Essays über den Realismus, Die Zerstörung der Vernunft ( T h e Destruction o f Reason); and the G e r m a n Ernst Bloch, at present a professor i n West G e r m a n y , w h o has w r i t t e n Das Prinzip Hoffnung ( T h e Principle o f H o p e ) a n d Naturrecht und menschliche Würde ( N a t u r a l L a w a n d H u m a n D i g n i t y ) .
senbewusstsein
T h e d o g m a t i c materialism a n d atheism professed as principles b y M a r x i s m have given this movement a n extremely r i g i d character. Its quasi-religious features have very l i t t l e t o d o w i t h t h e o r i g i n a l core o f M a r x ' s t h i n k i n g , especially t h a t o f his y o u t h , w h i c h is today studied w i t h greater interest a n d academic freedom t h a n the forms dictated b y a n inflexible organization alien t o the a t t i t u d e o f perenn i a l restlessness, quest and j u s t i f i c a t i o n proper t o philosophy.
5.
SCHOPENHAUER
L I F E A N D W O R K S . A r t h u r Schopenhauer was b o r n i n D a n z i g i n 1788 a n d d i e d i n F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n i n 1860. H i s father was a w e a l t h y businessman a n d his mother a n i n t e l l i g e n t , c u l t u r e d novelist. A f t e r a n i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t o t h e business w o r l d , he studied philosophy i n Göttingen a n d B e r l i n . H i s d o c t o r a l thesis was his book Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde ( O n the F o u r f o l d R o o t o f the P r i n c i p l e o f Sufficient Reason). I n 1818 he finished his major w o r k , Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung ( T h e W o r l d as W i l l a n d Representation), w h i c h d i d n o t receive m u c h notice. A f t e r 1820 he was Privatdozent i n B e r l i n , b u t he h a d scarcely a n y students i n his classes, w h i c h were announced a t the same t i m e as Hegel's. W h e n
Schopenhauer
339
the cholera epidemic struck B e r l i n i n 1831, Schopenhauer fled the city and settled for good i n F r a n k f u r t ; thus he escaped the epidemic w h i c h k i l l e d H e g e l . Schopenhauer's later books were m o r e successful : Ober den Willen in der Natur ( O n W i l l i n N a t u r e ) , Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik ( T h e T w o F u n d a m e n t a l Problems o f E t h i c s ) , Aphoristnen zur Lebensweisheit (Aphorisms o n the W i s d o m o f L i f e ) , and
Parerga
und
Paralipomena.
T h r o u g h o u t his life, Schopenhauer was b i t t e r l y hostile to the postK a n t i a n idealist philosophers, especially H e g e l , w h o m he disparaged, sometimes w i t h w i t , b u t often w i t h l i t t l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n and poor insight. H i s failure to achieve success a n d fame as a professor a n d w r i t e r accentuated the b i t i n g a n d aggressive pessimism t h a t characterizes his philosophy. Schopenhauer was keenly interested i n art, music a n d literature. H e was a n a d m i r e r a n d translator o f Baltasar G r a c i a n , whose sententious a n d aphoristic style appealed to h i m . T h e strongest influences o n Schopenhauer were Plato, K a n t , the p o s t - K a n t i a n idealists—even t h o u g h he disagreed w i t h t h e m — a n d on the other h a n d , I n d i a n t h o u g h t a n d B u d d h i s m . Ever since the last years o f Schopenhauer's life, a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y since his death, his t h o u g h t has been very i n f l u e n t i a l , t h o u g h its effect has been felt more i n the realms o f literature, theosophy, and the like, t h a n i n the r e a l m o f philosophy itself. T H E W O R L D AS W I L L A N D R E P R E S E N T A T I O N . T h e title o f Schopen-
hauer's masterwork contains the c e n t r a l thesis o f his philosophy. T h e w o r l d is a " p h e n o m e n o n , " a representation or idea; Schopenhauer makes no d i s t i n c t i o n between a p h e n o m e n o n a n d an appearance; he says that the t w o are i d e n t i c a l . T h e w o r l d as we k n o w i t is a n appearance or deception. Space, time a n d causality are the forms w h i c h change this w o r l d i n t o a w o r l d of objects; they order and arrange the sensations. T h e K a n t i a n roots i n this theory are evident. However, there is a n aspect o f the w o r l d w h i c h we do not apprehend as pure p h e n o m e n o n ; this is the ego, w h i c h is apprehended i n a m o r e p r o f o u n d a n d d i r e c t manner. O n the one h a n d , the ego can be perceived as a b o d y ; b u t i t can also be perceived as something non-spatial a n d beyond t i m e a n d , w h a t is m o r e , as s o m e t h i n g free, a n d this is called the will. I n his deepest level, m a n apprehends himself as the will to live. Every object i n the w o r l d manifests itself as a longing o r w i l l to b e ; this is as t r u e w i t h respect to i n o r g a n i c things as w i t h respect to organic things a n d i n the r e a l m o f consciousness. T h u s , reality is w i l l . However, i n a s m u c h as desire presupposes insatiability, the w i l l is constant p a i n . Pleasure, w h i c h can o n l y be transitory, consists o f a cessation o f p a i n ; f u n d a m e n t a l l y , life consists o f p a i n . Thus, Schopen-
340
The
Thought
of the Romantic
Age
hauer's philosophy is rigorously pessimistic. T h e never-quenched w i l l to live is a n e v i l ; a n d , therefore, the w o r l d a n d man's life are also evils. Schopenhauer's ethics derives f r o m this idea. T h e m o r a l emotions are compassion a n d the desire to alleviate the p a i n w h i c h other beings feel. K n o w l e d g e , a r t a n d especially music also tend to do this, b u t they are fleeting remedies. T h e o n l y p e r m a n e n t salvation consists i n conquering the will to live. W h e n this w i l l is subdued, one enters nirvana; and this, w h i c h appears to be mere a n n i h i l a t i o n , is actually the greatest good, the t r u e salvation, the o n l y t h i n g w h i c h can end the p a i n a n d discontent o f the never-satisfied desire to live. Schopenhauer's ethics also has a deterministic feature, i n t h a t m a n is good or b a d essentially a n d for always; there is, for example, no possibility o f a b a d man's changing for the good. Schopenhauer opposes Socrates' d o c t r i n e a n d believes t h a t v i r t u e cannot be t a u g h t ; r a t h e r , a person is good or bad a radice. Schopenhauer's philosophy is perspicacious, ingenious a n d frequently p r o f o u n d ; i t is expressed w i t h m u c h l i t e r a r y skill a n d is animated b y his strong and fertile personality. However, i t does n o t have a solid basis i n metaphysics a n d i t has l e d m a n y thinkers to lose themselves i n a t r i v i a l dilettantism i m p r e g n a t e d w i t h theosophy, l i t e r a t u r e and I n d i a n " p h i l o s o p h y , " i n w h i c h the m e a n i n g o f p h i l o s o p h y is actually lost. W e have seen t h a t the p e r i o d o f G e r m a n idealism really ends w i t h H e g e l ; the subsequent thinkers represent the consequences o f this idealism i n t h a t they give themselves u p to a speculation w h i c h loses contact w i t h the a u t h e n t i c problems o f metaphysics. T h e vagueness, haziness a n d fantastic constructions w h i c h Hegel p o i n t e d o u t i n his o w n time reappear w i t h greater force after his death. This provokes a reactionary m o v e m e n t w h i c h sinks p h i l o s o p h y i n t o one o f its most p r o f o u n d crises: w h a t is k n o w n as positivism.
NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY
The Triumph
over Sensationalism
A history o f c o n t e m p o r a r y philosophy made i n the m i d d l e years o f the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y must place the thinkers o f the last c e n t u r y i n a new perspective, one w h i c h does n o t coincide w i t h the w a y i n w h i c h these figures are usually represented. I n d e e d , w h e n i n t e r p r e t i n g the philosophy o f the recent past, we must follow t w o r u l i n g ideas: one, the comprehension o f a t i m e w h i c h is different f r o m o u r o w n , even t h o u g h n o t far removed f r o m i t ; t w o , the necessity o f e x p l a i n i n g h o w our o w n p h i l o s o p h y derives f r o m the earlier philosophy a n d h o w i t happens t h a t the earlier epoch has been succeeded by the one i n w h i c h we live. T h i s necessitates, first o f a l l , a n a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the significance o f the nineteenth-century philosophers w h i c h does not correspond to the one w h i c h prevailed at that t i m e . A few obscure thinkers w h o were misunderstood i n their o w n day are seen today to represent the most substantial a n d efficacious aspects o f the philosophy of the last century. A n d we note t h a t often w h a t were t h e n the least k n o w n parts o f their w o r k are n o w v i e w e d as decisive a n d even as anticipations o f the most p r o f o u n d discoveries o f our o w n epoch. T h e nineteenth century is characterized b y a certain i r r e g u l a r i t y w i t h respect to p h i l o s o p h y ; actually, nineteenth-century philosophy does n o t begin u n t i l after Hegel's death i n 1831. T h e first t h i r d o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y a n d the last t h i r d o f the eighteenth f o r m a c o m pletely separate p e r i o d d o m i n a t e d b y G e r m a n idealism. A phase o f philosophy exhausts itself at Hegel's death, a n d a deep crisis t h e n overwhelms philosophy and causes i t to a l l b u t disappear. T h i s is n o t surprising, because the history o f philosophy is discontinuous, a n d 34'
The
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epochs o f m a x i m u m creative tension are always followed b y l o n g years o f relaxation, d u r i n g w h i c h the m i n d does n o t seem capable o f s u p p o r t i n g the effort w h i c h metaphysics involves. B u t i n the n i n e teenth century, philosophy is also f o r m a l l y denied, a n d this is evidence o f a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y abhorrence o f p h i l o s o p h i z i n g t h a t is at least p a r t i a l l y p r o d u c e d b y the abuses o f the dialectical m e t h o d w h i c h characterize the later phases o f the once b r i l l i a n t G e r m a n idealism. M e n feel a n u r g e n t need to concern themselves w i t h the things, w i t h reality itself, to divorce themselves f r o m m e n t a l constructions i n order to come to terms w i t h r e a l i t y as such. T h e E u r o p e a n m i n d o f 1830 finds i n the i n d i v i d u a l sciences the model w h i c h m u s t be transferred i n t o the r e a l m of philosophy. Physics, biology a n d history come t o represent the exemplary modes o f knowledge. T h i s a t t i t u d e gives rise to positivism.
T h e i n i t i a l p r o p o s i t i o n — t o concern oneself w i t h r e a l i t y itself—is irreproachable a n d constitutes a p e r m a n e n t philosophical i m p e r a t i v e . B u t this is precisely where the p r o b l e m begins: W h a t is r e a l i t y ? W e have seen t h a t philosophy cannot set bounds for itself or define itself extrinsically; r a t h e r , its very d e l i m i t a t i o n supposes a p r i o r question o f metaphysics. W i t h excessive haste, the n i n e t e e n t h century thinks t h a t i t can suppress this question, a n d affirms t h a t r e a l i t y consists of sensible facts. This is the error w h i c h invalidates positivism. I t w o u l d n o t be going too far to i n t e r p r e t philosophy f r o m C o m t e to the present as a n effort to re-establish t h a t postulate actually, to make itself t r u l y positive or, i n other words, to discover w h a t a u t h e n t i c r e a l i t y really is, w i t h o u t using m e n t a l constructions or exclusions, i n order t h a t i t m a y concern itself faithfully w i t h reality. O f course, r e a l i t y is d i l u t e d as m u c h b y additions as b y omissions. W h a t t h o u g h t superposes o n the things changes a n d falsifies t h e m ; b u t p a r t i a l i t y , to take the p a r t as the whole, to believe that something which is real is i n itself reality, does not signify a n y lesser degree o f falsity. Philosophy has repeatedly identified p o r t i o n s or elements o f w h a t exists as the s u m t o t a l o f reality, a n d i t has constantly h a d to exert itself i n order to correct this error b y i n c o r p o r a t i n g i n t o its vision o f reality elements w h i c h have been left outside i t a n d w h i c h have falsified i t b y t h e i r absence. However, the error c o m m i t t e d at the b e g i n n i n g o f the nineteenth century is m o r e serious because i t defines r e a l i t y — i t formulates a metaphysical thesis—and at the same t i m e is so unaware o f this fact t h a t i t denies the possibility o f its existence; t h a t is, i t does not u n d e r stand its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f reality as sensible facts for w h a t i t is, a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , b u t takes i t to be r e a l i t y itself. I t builds u p o n this
The
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343
supposition w i t h o u t even being aware of i t . Therefore, after positivism, a double p r o b l e m w i l l confront p h i l o s o p h y : first, philosophy w i l l have to discover the n a t u r e of authentic r e a l i t y , w h a t w i l l later be called the fundamental reality, a n d secondly, i t w i l l have to re-establish the necessity for a n d possibility of metaphysics. These t w o tasks are undertaken simultaneously and along p a r a l l e l paths, b u t n o t b y means of a speculation o n philosophy itself, b y v i r t u e of w h i c h the v a l i d i t y o f metaphysical knowledge is shown, i n order later, once this tool has been o b t a i n e d , to be able to investigate the structure of reality. O n the contrary, the v e r y effort of philosophizing w i l l lead to the evidence that positivism was already p r a c t i c i n g metaphysics at the v e r y m o m e n t w h e n i t c l a i m e d to have e l i m i n a t e d i t . Positivism practiced metaphysics w i t h o u t realizing i t , that is, i n a not very positive m a n n e r a n d , therefore, erroneously and faultily. O n one h a n d , the a t t e m p t to lead philosophy to t r u e positiveness w i l l oblige thinkers to notice realities w h i c h have s t u b b o r n l y been overlooked: specifically, the r e a l m of ideal objects a n d the reality of human life, w i t h its special modes o f being a n d a l l t h e i r ontological consequences. O n the other h a n d , i n order to conceive the above-mentioned realities i t w i l l be necessary to use new i n t e l l e c t u a l tools, a n d these w i l l give us a new conception of knowledge a n d of philosophy itself. T h u s o u r o w n age finds itself i n the situation of having to create a new metaphysics, one w h i c h t h o u g h new is rooted i n the entire t r a d i t i o n o f the philosophic past. F o l l o w i n g the anticipations o f a few b r i l l i a n t thinkers o f the nineteenth century, phenomenology, existent i a l philosophy a n d the philosophy o f v i t a l reason have created a m e t h o d o f knowledge a n d have t u r n e d man's attention to the ideal w o r l d a n d the r e a l i t y o f life. T h u s the philosophy o f our t i m e feels obliged to delve to the roots of the u l t i m a t e questions, and i n this w a y acquires its greatest o r i g i n a l i t y . Intensity returns to philosophic life i n France d u r i n g the first h a l f of the nineteenth century. After the r i c h epoch of the E n l i g h t e n m e n t there appears a g r o u p of interesting F r e n c h thinkers; they are related to the ideologists w h o l i v e d at the end o f the seventeenth c e n t u r y a n d are p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h problems related to psychology a n d the o r i g i n of ideas. T h i s philosophy, w h i c h invokes Condillac's sensationalism as its direct antecedent, initiates a g r a d u a l change f r o m this p o i n t of view a n d ends b y tackling metaphysical questions; i n a real sense this constitutes a n i m p o r t a n t phase i n the prehistory of the philosophy oflife. T h e t w o p r i n c i p a l figures representing this tendency are Pierre
The
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Laromiguière a n d Joseph M a r i e Degérando, forerunners o f the major thinker of the epoch, M a i n e de B i r a n , w h o later gives rise to the g r o u p of spiritualists. Laromiguière ( i 756—1837) w r o t e the Leçons de philosophie, w h i c h are sensationalist i n t h e i r b r o a d outlines b u t w h i c h nevertheless distinguish between reception a n d reaction, a f f i r m the a c t i v i t y of the ego as manifested i n attention, a n d thus represent a first a t t e m p t to supersede p u r e sensationalism. Degérando (1772-1842), b o r n a generation later, was also a sensationalist ; he was influenced b y the w o r k o f Bacon, Locke a n d Condillac, b u t was also w e l l acquainted w i t h G e r m a n idealism, a n d this circumstance unsettled his p h i l o sophical position. H e w r o t e a long b o o k i n four volumes e n t i t l e d Des signes et de l'art dépenser considérés dans leurs rapports mutuels, a n d t h e n the Histoire
comparée des systèmes de philosophie,
relativement
aux principes
des
i n three volumes. Degérando postulates a philosophy of experience ; he affirms a d u a l i s m of t w o elements, the ego a n d contiguous existences, w h i c h are revealed b y the fact of resistance. A t the same time he attempts to u n i t e r a t i o n a l i s m a n d e m p i r i c i s m ; this a t t i t u d e anticipates eclecticism. connaissances
humaines,
1.
M A I N E DE
BIRAN
P H I L O S O P H I C S I T U A T I O N . T h e most p r o f o u n d a n d o r i g i n a l o f the French philosophers o f this t i m e was M a i n e de B i r a n (1766-1824). H i s p r i n c i p a l w o r k is the Essai sur lesfondements de la psychologie et sur ses rapports
avec
décomposition
l'étude
de la nature
de la pensée a n d
( 1 8 1 2 ) ; the
Influence
Journal,
de l'habitude
Mémoire
sur la faculté
sur de
la
penser
also figure a m o n g his most interesting w r i t i n g s . M a i n e de B i r a n , w h o was influenced b y Destutt de T r a c y a n d b y Laromiguière a n d w h o engaged i n polemics w i t h Joseph de M a i s t r e a n d Louis de B o n a l d , occupies a position somewhat analogous to t h a t of Fichte i n G e r m a n y . H e begins w i t h a sensationalist a t t i t u d e , is t h e n led to the first r a t h e r m a t u r e comprehension o f h u m a n life, a n d ends u p as a theistic a n d Catholic t h i n k e r . P a r t l y because of the o r i g i n a l i t y o f his p o i n t of view a n d p a r t l y because of his obscure a n d inconsistent w r i t i n g s , M a i n e de B i r a n was misunderstood i n his o w n t i m e , a l t h o u g h later F r e n c h thinkers referred to h i m as their master. T o this day his philosophy is not sufficiently u t i l i z e d , i n spite of efforts m a d e i n the present century. M E T A P H Y S I C S . A c t i n g o n sensationalist suppositions, M a i n e de B i r a n seeks the primitive fact o n w h i c h science must be founded. H o w ever, i t cannot be sensation, because sensation is not even afact. I n order to be a fact, a t h i n g must be k n o w n , i t must exist for someone ; a fact requires contact between the sensory impression a n d the ego. Consciousness implies a d u a l i s m o f terms, a coexistence, a n d this i n t u r n requires
Spiritualism
345
a p r i o r milieu i n w h i c h the ego finds itself together w i t h w h a t is k n o w n . W h a t is k n o w n is always known jointly, because to k n o w means my knowing myself together with the object. E v e r y fact supposes a d u a l i s m o f terms w h i c h cannot be conceived separately, for one is a f u n c t i o n o f the other : the ego exists o n l y as i t exercises itself w h e n facing a n object of resistance. M a i n e de B i r a n converts objective concepts i n t o functional concepts; coexistence becomes a d y n a m i c a l r e a l i t y , a " d o i n g " — a c t i v i t y ; the ego a n d the object o f resistance are o n l y elements o f t h a t active reality. * T h i s results i n something quite f u n d a m e n t a l : the ego is not a thing; m a n constitutes a n antithesis to the entire universe; neither is a c t i v i t y a thing, nor are its terms, w h i c h constitute themselves as terms o n l y w h e n i n t e r a c t i n g . M a i n e de B i r a n understands life as an active tension between a n ego a n d a w o r l d w h i c h are o n l y elements i n the p r i m a r y r e a l i t y of a c t i v i t y . T h e ego becomes, i t constitutes itself i n a c t i v i t y , a n d thus m a n can i n i t i a t e series of free acts a n d lead a personal, h u m a n life. I n the t h o u g h t o f M a i n e de B i r a n w e d i m l y glimpse an i n c o n sistent and confused v i s i o n — b a d l y expressed b u t nevertheless a c c u r a t e — o f the r e a l i t y we call human life. 2.
SPIRITUALISM
T H E ECLECTICS. T h e movement k n o w n as F r e n c h spiritualism, which d o m i n a t e d official philosophy for fifty years, tooks its inspiration f r o m M a i n e de B i r a n , b u t w i t h o u t a t t a i n i n g great p r o f u n d i t y , w i t h o u t a d o p t i n g the most valuable aspects o f his t h o u g h t . T h e i n i t i a t o r o f F r e n c h s p i r i t u a l i s m was Pierre Paul R o y e r - C o l l a r d (1763-1845), a n i m p o r t a n t figure i n p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n a i r i s m , w h o adopted the teachings of the Scottish school o f Thomas R e i d a n d D u g a l d Stewart. T h é o d o r e J o u f f r o y (1796-1842) was related to this movement. B u t the most i m p o r t a n t t h i n k e r o f the g r o u p was V i c t o r Cousin (1792-1867), founder o f eclecticism, the official p h i l o s o p h y o f the Université de France d u r i n g the reign o f Louis P h i l i p p e . Cousin was an u n o r i g i n a l philosopher w h o t r i e d to reconcile the various systems; his w o r k reveals shifting influences reaching f r o m the Greeks to the G e r m a n idealists, especially Schelling, a n d o f course the Scottish philosophers and M a i n e de B i r a n . Cousin actively s t i m u l a t e d the study o f the history o f philosophy, w h i c h he h i m s e l f practiced intensively. H e published various Cours d'histoire de la philosophie, the Fragments philosophiques,
the
Du
vrai,
du beau
et du bien
and
several h i s t o r i c a l
and
b i o g r a p h i c a l works, especially studies o f the P o r t - R o y a l circle. * Cf. my study " E l hombre y Dios en la filosofía de Maine de B i r a n " in San Anselmo y el insensato [Obras, I V ] .
34
6
The
Triumph
over
Sensationalism
T H E T R A D I T I O N A L I S T S . A n o t h e r reaction against sensationalism, b u t w i t h a m a r k e d o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d social, p o l i t i c a l a n d historical problems, appeared i n a group o f C a t h o l i c thinkers whose ties w i t h R o m e were s t r o n g ; this g r o u p founded the ultramontanist movement, w h i c h recognized the Papacy a n d l e g i t i m a c y as the bases o f social order. These m e n represented a t r a d i t i o n a l i s t position w h i c h mistrusted reason a n d f o u n d the f u n d a m e n t a l t r u t h s i n " belief, " of w h i c h society is the g u a r d i a n ; i n politics they opposed the s p i r i t a n d doctrines o f the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n . T h e most i m p o r t a n t thinkers o f this circle were C o m t e Joseph de M a i s t r e ( i 753-1821) o f Savoy, w h o was Sardinia's ambassador to Russia (Du Pape ; Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg), a n d Louis de B o n a l d (1754-1840), w h o a t t e m p t e d to systematize t r a d i t i o n a l i s m (Législationprimitive; Essai analytique sur les lois naturelles de Vordre social). Félicité R o b e r t de L a m e n n a i s — w h o finally left the C h u r c h — J e a n Baptiste H e n r i L a c o r d a i r e a n d the C o m t e de M o n t a l e m b e r t (Charles Forbes) were p a r t i a l l y connected w i t h this g r o u p , b u t their o u t l o o k was m o r e l i b e r a l . T h e R e v o l u t i o n , w h i c h p r o d u c e d this t r a d i t i o n a l i s t reaction, aroused at the same t i m e a m o v e m e n t t h a t was social i n character ; this was led b y several F r e n c h theorists whose social doctrines were U t o p i a n imaginings, b u t n o t w i t h o u t p e n e t r a t i n g ideas on the p r o b l e m o f society. O u t s t a n d i n g here were S a i n t - S i m o n (Claude H e n r i de R o u v r o y ) , François M a r i e Charles F o u r i e r a n d Pierre Joseph P r o u d h o n , w h o at one a n d the same t i m e s t i m u l a t e d socialistic p o l i t i c a l currents a n d the f o u n d i n g of the social sciences. A l l these elements are u t i l i z e d i n v a r y i n g degree b y positivism, the most i m p o r t a n t aspect of nineteenth-century philosophy. B A L M E S . T h e C a t a l a n priest J a i m e L u c i a n o Balmes, w h o was b o r n at V i c h i n 1810 a n d d i e d i n 1848, represents, together w i t h Sanz del R i o , Spain's m a j o r c o n t r i b u t i o n to nineteenth-century p h i l o s o p h y ; his t h o u g h t has c e r t a i n affinities w i t h t h a t o f the above-mentioned F r e n c h theorists. H i s short life was filled w i t h a n intensive a c t i v i t y as p o l i t i c i a n , j o u r n a l i s t a n d philosopher. H i s most i m p o r t a n t works are El criterio—a p o p u l a r logic o f c o m m o n s e n s e — E l protestantismo comparado con el catolicismo—a rejoinder t o François Guizot's Histoire de la civilisation
en Europe—Filosofía
elemental
and
Filosofíafundamental.
Balmes, w h o became f a m i l i a r w i t h Scholasticism t h r o u g h his t r a i n i n g for the priesthood, was able t o renew i t i n a p e r i o d o f great decadence, b r i n g i n g to i t ideas f r o m the Scottish school, o n the one h a n d , a n d f r o m the systems o f Descartes a n d L e i b n i z , o n the other. Even w i t h i n the l i m i t a t i o n s imposed u p o n his w o r k b y the historical circumstances i n w h i c h he l i v e d a n d b y his early death, his w r i t i n g s
347
Spiritualism
still signified a serious a n d valuable a t t e m p t to revive philosophical studies i n Spain, a n d a true reawakening m i g h t have been expected as a result. Balmes' v i e w o f contemporary philosophy, especially G e r m a n idealism, is superficial and falls far short o f the m a r k ; b u t he brings m a n y other questions into sharp focus w i t h good sense a n d frequently w i t h perspicacity. Outside the strict field of philosophy a n d very close to the F r e n c h traditionalists is the w o r k o f J u a n Donoso Cortés (1809-1853), Spain's ambassador to France. I n Paris he came into contact w i t h the Catholic thinkers, w h o esteemed h i m h i g h l y . His major w o r k is the Ensayo
sobre el catolicismo,
el liberalismoy
el
socialismo.
Comtess
Positivism
L I F E A N D W O R K S . Auguste Comte was b o r n i n 1798 a n d d i e d i n 1857. A l t h o u g h he came f r o m a f a m i l y t h a t was Catholic, m o n a r c h i s t a n d conservative, he was q u i c k to a d o p t a n o u t l o o k t h a t was inspired b y the French R e v o l u t i o n . H e collaborated w i t h Saint-Simon ( w i t h w h o m he later b r o k e ) , a n d f a m i l i a r i z e d h i m s e l f w i t h social problems. H e was a student a t the École Polytechnique o f Paris, a n d there acquired a solid f o u n d a t i o n i n mathematics a n d science. L a t e r he was a t u t o r at the É c o l e , u n t i l enmities there caused h i m to lose t h e position. W h i l e still q u i t e y o u n g , he published a series o f extremely interesting Opuscules o n society, a n d t h e n began t h e great w o r k i n six t h i c k volumes w h i c h he called Cours de philosophie positive. H e next w r o t e a short general b o o k , the Discours chisme positiviste,
sur l'esprit
a n d his second basic w o r k ,
positif,
Système de politique
the
Catépositive,
ou Traité de sociologie, instituant la religion de l'Humanité, i n four volumes. T h e Cours was published between 1830 a n d 1842, a n d the Système between 1851 a n d 1854. Comte's life was h a r d a n d u n h a p p y . H e was u n f o r t u n a t e i n his p r i v a t e life a n d , i n spite o f his unquestionably b r i l l i a n t n a t u r e a n d industry, he never achieved the least economic security. I n his last years he was s u p p o r t e d b y his friends a n d followers, especially those f r o m France a n d E n g l a n d . Auguste C o m t e h a d marks o f m e n t a l imbalance w h i c h sometimes became very m u c h accentuated. A t the e n d o f his life C o m t e fell deeply i n love w i t h C l o t i l d e de V a u x , a n d her death s h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d was a loss t h a t helped o v e r w h e l m him. 348
History
i.
349
HISTORY
T H E L A W O F T H E T H R E E STATES. A c c o r d i n g to Comte, knowledge passes t h r o u g h three distinct theoretic states, i n the i n d i v i d u a l as w e l l as i n the h u m a n species. T h e law of the three states, the basic p r o p o s i t i o n of positive philosophy, is at once a t h e o r y o f knowledge a n d a p h i losophy o f history. These three states are called theological, m e t a physical a n d positive. T h e theological or fictitious state is p r o v i s i o n a l and preparatory. I n i t the m i n d seeks the causes and origins of things, t h a t w h i c h is deepest, most distant a n d inaccessible. There are three d i s t i n c t phases i n this state: fetishism, i n w h i c h objects are personified a n d a t t r i b u t e d magic or divine power; polytheism, i n w h i c h personification is w i t h d r a w n f r o m m a t e r i a l things a n d transferred to a series o f divinities, each o f w h i c h represents a g r o u p o f powers: the bodies o f water, the rivers, the forests, a n d so o n ; a n d , finally, monotheism, the superior phase, i n w h i c h all these d i v i n e powers are united a n d concentrated i n one, called G o d . As we can see, the designation theological for this state is not a p p r o priate ; i t w o u l d be preferable to say religious or perhaps mythical. T h i s state, i n w h i c h the imagination predominates, corresponds, Comte says, to infancy i n H u m a n i t y . I t is also the p r i m a r y c o n d i t i o n of the m i n d , t h a t i n t o w h i c h the m i n d falls again a n d again i n a l l epochs, a n d only a slow e v o l u t i o n can make the h u m a n spirit p a r t w i t h one idea in order to pass o n to another. T h e role o f the theological state is historically indispensable. T h e metaphysical or abstract state is essentially critical a n d transit i o n a l . I t is a n i n t e r m e d i a t e stage between the theological a n d positive states. I n i t absolute knowledge is still sought. Metaphysics tries to explain the n a t u r e o f beings, their essence, their causes. T o do this, however, i t resorts, n o t to supernatural agents, b u t to abstract entities, whence its n a m e ontology. T h e ideas of o r i g i n , cause, substance, essence denote s o m e t h i n g distinct f r o m the things, a l t h o u g h inherent i n t h e m , closer to t h e m : the m i n d , w h i c h was s t r i v i n g after the remote, step b y step approaches the things. I n the previous state the powers were summed u p i n the concept of God, b u t here Mature is the great general entity w h i c h takes the place of G o d ; b u t this u n i t y is weaker, i n t e l lectually as w e l l as socially, and the character of the metaphysical state is, above a l l , c r i t i c a l a n d negative, p r e p a r a t o r y for the step to the positive state: a k i n d o f crisis o f p u b e r t y o f the h u m a n spirit before i t reaches the age of m a n h o o d . T h e positive or real state is the definitive one. I n i t i m a g i n a t i o n is subordinated to observation. T h e h u m a n m i n d relies on the things.
Comte
s
Positivism
Positivism seeks o n l y facts a n d their laws. N o t causes o r origins o f essences or substances—all this is inaccessible. Positivism relies o n the positive, o n t h a t w h i c h is set forth or given : i t is the p h i l o s o p h y o f the datum. T h e m i n d , i n a l o n g regression, finally comes to rest face to face w i t h the things. I t renounces w h a t i t is v a i n to t r y to k n o w , a n d seeks o n l y the laws o f phenomena. R E L A T I V I S M . T h e positive spirit is relative. T h e study of p h e n o m e n a is never absolute, b u t relative to our o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d o u r s i t u a t i o n . T h e loss or g a i n o f a sense, Comte says, w o u l d completely change o u r w o r l d and our knowledge o f i t . O u r ideas are phenomena, n o t o n l y i n d i v i d u a l p h e n o m e n a b u t also social a n d collective, a n d they depend o n the conditions o f our i n d i v i d u a l a n d social existence, a n d therefore on history. K n o w l e d g e must incessantly come nearer a n d nearer to the ideal l i m i t fixed b y o u r necessities. A n d t h e goal o f knowledge is r a t i o n a l f o r e s i g h t : voir pour prévoir, prévoir pour pourvoir
(see i n o r d e r t o
foresee, foresee i n o r d e r to provide) is one o f Comte's lemmas.
2.
SOCIETY
T H E SOCIAL C H A R A C T E R OF T H E POSITIVE SPIRIT. C o m t e affirms t h a t
ideas govern the w o r l d ; there is a c o r r e l a t i o n between w h a t is i n t e l lectual a n d w h a t is social, a n d the latter depends o n the f o r m e r . T h e positive spirit m u s t find a n e w social o r d e r t o replace t h e one demolished b y c r i t i c a l metaphysics, a n d must t r i u m p h over the crisis o f the West. C o m t e formulates a n acute t h e o r y concerning s p i r i t u a l and t e m p o r a l power. T h e basis for positive knowledge is the existence of a sufficient social a u t h o r i t y . A n d this reinforces t h e historical character of positivism ; Comte says t h a t the system w h i c h explains the past w i l l be master o f the future. I n this w a y , b y historical c o n t i n u i t y a n d social e q u i l i b r i u m , Comte's p o l i t i c a l l e m m a can be realized : ordre et progrès; order a n d progress. A n d t h e i m p e r a t i v e o f C o m t e a n m o r a l i t y — w h i c h is a n essentially social m o r a l i t y — i s to l i v e for one's fellow m a n : vivre pour autrui. SOCIOLOGY. C o m t e is the founder of the science o f society, w h i c h he first called social physics and then sociology. C o m t e tries to raise the study o f collective H u m a n i t y to the positive state, t h a t is, to convert i t i n t o a positive science. T h i s sociology is, above a l l , a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f historical reality. I n society there governs, also, a n d p r i n c i p a l l y , the l a w o f the three states, a n d there are the same n u m b e r o f stages. I n one, w h i c h lasts u n t i l the t w e l f t h century, the military dominates. Comte values h i g h l y the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l role t h a t falls to the Catholic C h u r c h ; i n the metaphysical epoch social influence falls to the lawmakers; i t is the era
Science
o f the i r r u p t i o n o f the m i d d l e classes, the passage f r o m m i l i t a r y society to economic society; i t is a period of t r a n s i t i o n , c r i t i c a l and dissolvent, revolutionary ; Protestantism contributes to this dissolution. F i n a l l y , corresponding to the positive state is the industrial era, governed b y economic interests; i n i t social order must be re-established, a n d i t must be founded o n intellectual and social power. T h e great protagonist o f history is H u m a n i t y , and Comte's sociology ends by almost deifying i t and b e c o m i n g a
religion.
T H E R E L I G I O N O F H U M A N I T Y . I n his last years Comte a r r i v e d at ideas w h i c h , t h o u g h eccentric, emerge f r o m the deepest recesses o f his t h o u g h t : for example, the idea o f the " r e l i g i o n o f H u m a n i t y . " H u m a n i t y is i n its t o t a l i t y the Grand-Être, the goal o f our personal lives; therefore, m o r a l i t y is altruism, l i v i n g for others, for H u m a n i t y . A n d this Great Being must be accorded a cult, first o f a l l p r i v a t e worship, i n w h i c h m a n feels at one w i t h his ancestors and descendants, but also p u b l i c w o r s h i p . Comte came to i m a g i n e the organization o f a complete c h u r c h , w i t h " s a c r a m e n t s , " priests, a calendar w i t h feast days devoted to the great figures o f H u m a n i t y , and so o n . T h e o n l y t h i n g missing i n this c h u r c h is G o d , a n d n a t u r a l l y i t is for this reason t h a t i t has no religious meaning. W i t h this strange idea, w h i c h obviously was strongly tinged w i t h madness, Comte expresses very clearly the role he assigns to spiritual power i n the organization o f social life; he seeks his m o d e l i n the s p i r i t u a l power par excellence, the Catholic C h u r c h , the hierarchy a n d c u l t o f w h i c h are the i n s p i r a t i o n for Comte's " r e l i g i o n . " A n d thus the positivist philosopher comes to summarize his t h o u g h t i n a final l e m m a : L'Amour pour principe, l'Ordre pour base, et le Progrès pour but (Love as a p r i n c i p l e , O r d e r as a basis, a n d Progress as a g o a l ) . N o w we see the f u l l significance of the complete title o f Comte's sociology: politics, sociology and the r e l i g i o n o f H u m a n i t y are inseparably l i n k e d together. 3.
SCIENCE
T H E CLASSIFICATION OF T H E SCIENCES. C o m t e formulated a classification o f the sciences w h i c h has since h a d great influence, a n d w h i c h is especially interesting because i t t h r o w s i n t o relief certain characteristics o f his t h o u g h t . T h e sciences stand i n a determined hierarchic order, as follows : mathematics-astronomy
physics-chemistry
biology-sociology
This h i e r a r c h y has a historical a n d d o g m a t i c , scientific a n d logical meaning, says C o m t e . I n the first place, i t is the order i n w h i c h the sciences were developed and, above a l l , the order i n w h i c h they
Corns/s
Positivism
attained their positive state. I n the second place, the sciences are arranged i n decreasing order of generality a n d increasing order o f complexity. I n the t h i r d place, they are a r r a n g e d according to t h e i r independence: each one has need o f those t h a t precede i t a n d is necessary to those t h a t follow i t . F i n a l l y , they are grouped i n three groups of two, w i t h special affinities between t h e m . T h e life sciences— biology a n d sociology—are the last to emerge f r o m the theologicalmetaphysical state. Sociology, especially, is the creation of Comte, w h o converts i t i n t o a true science. T h u s , n o t o n l y is the h i e r a r c h y o f sciences completed, b u t the most i m p o r t a n t discipline w i t h i n the Comtean scheme o f philosophy, defined b y its historical a n d social character, is o b t a i n e d . Certain strange omissions w i l l be observed i n Comte's classification. I t is i m m e d i a t e l y evident t h a t metaphysics is missing. Positivism considers metaphysics impossible, a l t h o u g h , as we have seen, i t indulges i n i t , since C o m t e elaborates a concrete theory of r e a l i t y ; also missing, n a t u r a l l y , is theology; this scarcely needs a n e x p l a n a t i o n . But i n a d d i t i o n , w e do not find psychology either; that discipline is treated p a r t l y u n d e r biology, p a r t l y u n d e r sociology; C o m t e considers introspection impossible, a n d o n l y believes possible experim e n t a l psychology, w h i c h enters into the sphere o f one or the other o f the t w o life sciences, depending on whether the i n d i v i d u a l or m a n i n his social dimension is being investigated. H i s t o r y a n d , i n general, the sciences of the spirit do not appear autonomously i n Comte's list, because he was taken w i t h the idea of u n i t y of m e t h o d , a n d insisted on always a p p l y i n g the m e t h o d o f the n a t u r a l sciences, despite his i m a g i n a t i v e vision of the role o f history. PHILOSOPHY. W h a t then is philosophy for the positivist? A p p a r e n t l y , i t is a reflection u p o n science. A f t e r the sciences are exhausted, there remains no independent object for philosophy b u t the sciences themselves; philosophy becomes theory of science. T h u s positive science acquires u n i t y and consciousness o f itself. B u t i t is clear t h a t philosophy disappears; and this is w h a t happens i n the positivist movement of the nineteenth century, w h i c h has very little to d o w i t h philosophy. But this does n o t occur i n Comte's o w n t h o u g h t . Aside f r o m w h a t he believes he is accomplishing, there is his a c t u a l accomplishment. A n d we have seen t h a t , i n the first place, he has given a philosophy o f history (the l a w o f the three states); i n the second place, he has g i v e n a metaphysical t h e o r y o f reality, conceived i n such o r i g i n a l a n d novel terms as t h a t o f social being, a historical a n d relative t h e o r y ; i n the t h i r d place, he has given a complete philosophical discipline, the
The
Significance
of
Positivism
353
science o f society—so complete t h a t sociology, i n the hands o f later sociologists, has never attained the d e p t h o f vision that i t reached w i t h its founder. T h i s , i n short, is the truest a n d most interesting aspect o f positivism, the aspect w h i c h , despite a l l appearances a n d even a l l positivists, makes i t really philosophy.
4.
T H E SIGNIFICANCE
OF
POSITIVISM
W h a t attracts most a t t e n t i o n i n C o m t e is the i m p o r t a n c e he attributes to h i m s e l f at the outset. H e is conscious o f a n enormous, definitive i m p o r t a n c e w h i c h he has for the w o r l d , a n d always begins his books w i t h a n air o f v i c t o r y , steeped i n the solemnity o f a n i n a u g u r a t i o n . W h y does Comte have such i m p o r t a n c e ? W h a t does he bear i n his hands w i t h such solemnity ? Observe h o w this first grave, almost h i e r a t i c a l gesture is m e n t a l l y i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h the u l t i m a t e ceremonies o f the religion o f H u m a n i t y . W e must seek the t h r e a d t h a t goes f r o m the one t h i n g to the other. Auguste C o m t e is sure that he is n o t speaking i n his o w n n a m e ; his voice is n o t his alone: i t is the concrete, i n d i v i d u a l i z e d voice o f h i s t o r y ; that is w h y i t resounds w i t h such majesty. Comte is, w i t h o u t a d o u b t , attuned to his own time. A n d that is the i m p o r t a n t fact. Being a t t u n e d to one's o w n t i m e means being at h o m e i n positive p h i l o s o p h y ; a n d positive p h i l o s o p h y is n o t h i n g less t h a n the definitive state o f the h u m a n m i n d . Being a t t u n e d to one's o w n t i m e therefore means h a v i n g already a r r i v e d a n d n o t being i n the m i d d l e o f one's j o u r n e y . T h i s positive science is a discipline o f modesty; a n d this is its v i r t u e . Positive k n o w l edge adheres h u m b l y to the things; i t comes to a h a l t before t h e m , w i t h o u t i n v o l v e m e n t , w i t h o u t leaping over t h e m to fling itself i n t o a deceptive p l a y o f ideas; i t no longer seeks causes, b u t o n l y laws. A n d , thanks to this austerity, i t attains those laws, a n d possesses t h e m w i t h precision a n d w i t h certainty. B u t i t so happens t h a t this situation is n o t p r i m a r y ; j u s t the c o n t r a r y : i t is the result o f the efforts o f m i l l e n n i a to restrain the m i n d , w h i c h was dashing o f f to the farthest distances, a n d force i t to l i m i t itself docilely to the things. These efforts make u p a l l o f history; C o m t e w i l l have to account for a l l o f i t i n order to understand positivism for w h a t i t is, f a i t h f u l l y , w i t h o u t falsifying i t , i n a positive way. A n d i t is n o t h i n g b u t a result. T h u s we see that the very i m p e r a t i v e of positivity also postulates a philosophy o f history; a n d this w o u l d be the first aspect o f his system: the l a w o f the three states. Positive p h i losophy is, ah initio, something historical. T i m e a n d again Comte returns, i n the most explicit m a n n e r , to the p r o b l e m o f history, a n d claims i t as the proper d o m a i n o f positive
Comte
s
Positivism
philosophy. Tout est relatif; voilà le seul principe absolu ( E v e r y t h i n g is r e l a t i v e ; t h a t is t h e o n l y absolute p r i n c i p l e ) — h e h a d w r i t t e n as early as 1817, w h e n he was still a boy. A n d i n t h a t r e l a t i v i s m he finds, nearly t h i r t y years later, the reason for the h i s t o r i c a l character o f positive philosophy, w h i c h can explain the entire past. T h i s is not a l u x u r y o f philosophy, s o m e t h i n g given to i t as a n a d j u n c t , b u t , as O r t e g a has seen and shown, t h e essential p o i n t i n his metaphysics. Perhaps C o m t e w o u l d not have t a k e n account of this, because he d i d not t h i n k he was engaging i n metaphysics ; b u t the central i m p o r t a n c e of this r e l a t i v i s m d i d not escape h i m . O n i t is founded positive philosophy's capacity for progress, a n d thus the possibility of c h a n g i n g a n d i m p r o v i n g n o t o n l y the condition o f m a n , b u t , above a l l , his nature. T h i s is a m o n g the weightiest things t h a t can be said, a n d , for t h a t v e r y reason, I w i s h to do no more t h a n m e n t i o n i t ; a sufficient c o m m e n t a r y w o u l d lead t o problems t h a t c a n n o t even be sketched here. B u t I do n o t w i s h t o conclude w i t h o u t q u o t i n g a few words o f Comte, l u c i d a n d m e a n i n g f u l today, w h i c h crystallize his t h o u g h t : Today
it can be affirmed—he
sufficiently of this proof
explained
w r i t e s — t h a t that
the past in its totality
alone, intellectual
leadership
will over
doctrine
inexorably
which
obtain,
in
shall
have
consequence
thefuture.
W e see then t h a t beneath his scientific n a t u r a l i s m we find i n C o m t e , as the essential p o i n t , a system of t h o u g h t o n h i s t o r i c a l principles. A n d this is w h a t gives his philosophy its greatest contemporaneity a n d fruitfulness. I t is completely crisscrossed b y the p r o b l e m w h i c h I have attempted to specify, i n w h i c h its profoundest u n i t y is made evident. A n d t h a t u n i t y is, precisely, the positive s p i r i t .
Philosophy of Positivist
i.
T H E FRENCH
Inspiration
THINKERS
Almost a l l nineteenth-century philosophy is essentially d o m i n a t e d by positivism a n d shows its influence i n one w a y o r another. T h e presence o f positivism is more v i t a l a n d constant i n France t h a n anywhere else. H e r e i t found a representative w h o c o u l d be called " o f f i c i a l " i n M a x i m i l i e n P a u l E m i l e Littré (1801-1881), w h o i n his exposition o f Comte's w o r k d i d n o t stress its most f r u i t f u l a n d o r i g i n a l aspects. H i p p o l y t e T a i n e (1828—1893) appears w i t h i n a n analogous philosophical m i l i e u ; T a i n e is t h e a u t h o r o f a w i t t y a n d superficial book o n c o n t e m p o r a r y French philosophy (Les philosophes classiques du XIX siècle en France), a long book called De l'intelligence a n d numerous studies i n h i s t o r y a n d art. Also i n this g r o u p is Ernest R e n a n (1823¬ 1892), a n O r i e n t a l i s t a n d specialist i n Semitic p h i l o l o g y a n d the history o f religions. O n e d i r e c t i o n o f French positivism was especially devoted t o sociology, f o l l o w i n g ( w i t h less insight) the p a t h entered u p o n b y C o m t e . A m o n g these sociologists are E m i l e D u r k h e i m ( 1858¬ 1917), whose p r i n c i p a l books are De la division du travail social ( T h e Division o f L a b o r i n Society) a n d Les règles de la méthode sociologique ( T h e Rules o f Sociological M e t h o d ) ; G a b r i e l T a r d e (1843-1904), author o f Les lois de l'imitation, La logique sociale a n d Les lois sociales; a n d L u c i e n L é v y - B r u h l (1857-1939), a dedicated specialist i n studies o f e t h n o g r a p h y a n d the sociology o f p r i m i t i v e peoples, whose m a j o r w o r k is La mentalité primitive. Close connection w i t h positivism is also shown b y t h e physician Claude B e r n a r d (1813-1878), a u t h o r o f Introduction à l'étude de la medecinae expérimentelle ( I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the e
355
Philosophy
of Positivist
Inspiration
S t u d y o f E x p e r i m e n t a l M e d i c i n e ) , w h o i n his later years became involved w i t h metaphysics. Even though, strictly speaking, they go b e y o n d positivism a n d p a r t i a l l y represent a reaction against i t , i t is necessary to m e n t i o n here a g r o u p of nineteenth-century French thinkers w h o were very i n f l u ential i n their day a n d some o f w h o m p r e p a r e d the way for the renewal o f philosophy achieved by Bergson. These m e n i n c l u d e : A l f r e d Fouillée (1838-1912), author o f L''évolutionisme des idées-forces; M a r i e Jean G u y a u (1854-1888), w h o h a d c e r t a i n affinities w i t h Nietzsche (La morale d'Épicure, L'irréligion de l'avenir, Esquisse d'une morale
sans obligation
ni sanction,
La morale
anglaise
contemporaine,
L'art
au
a n d whose m a n y ideas were penetrating, t h o u g h n o t systematic; A n t o i n e A u g u s t i n G o u r n o t (1801-1877), profound a n d original t h i n k e r n o t yet thoroughly studied ( Traité de l'enchaîne-
point
de vue sociologique)
a
ment
des idées fondamentales
fondements
dans
de nos connaissances
Matérialisme,
vitalisme,
les sciences
et dans
l'histoire;
et sur les caractères de la critique
rationalisme
; Considérations
sur
les
philosophique
Essai
;
sur la marche
des idées et
des événements dans les temps modernes) ; J e a n G a s p a r d Félix RavaissonM o l l i e n (1813-1900), a continuer o f s p i r i t u a l i s m a n d one o f the renewers o f Aristotelianism i n the nineteenth c e n t u r y (Essai sur la Métaphysique
d'Aristote,
Rapport
sur la philosophie
en France
au XIX
e
siècle,
; a n d Charles Bernard R e n o u v i e r ( 1815-1903), a neocriticist t h i n k e r o f great intellectual p r o d u c t i v i t y (Manuel de Testament
philosophie sophie
philosophique)
ancienne,
analytique
Manuel
de l'histoire,
2.
de philosophie
moderne,
Introduction
à la
philo-
Uchronie).
ENGLISH
PHILOSOPHY
U T I L I T A R I A N I S M . English positivism is especially concerned w i t h ethical problems, a n d also w i t h questions o f logic. U t i l i t a r i a n ethics, first developed b y J e r e m y B e n t h a m (1748-1832) a n d later most significantly by J o h n S t u a r t M i l l (1806-1873), finds that the goal o f o u r aspirations is pleasure, a n d that the good is t h a t w h i c h is useful a n d gives us pleasure. T h i s is n o t a n egoistic ethics, b u t is social i n character; w h a t i t seeks is the greatest happiness of the greatest number (Utilitarianism, On Liberty). T h e middle-class, capitalistic a n d i n d u s t r i a l era o f the mid-nineteenth c e n t u r y finds an extremely clear expression i n u t i l i t a r i a n ethics. M i l l also published an i m p o r t a n t w o r k o n l o g i c : A System
of Logic,
Ratiocinative
and
Inductive.
E V O L U T I O N I S M . Also related to positivism a n d u t i l i t a r i a n i s m are the English thinkers w h o develop the concept o f evolution, w h i c h was F r e n c h i n o r i g i n ( T u r g o t , Condorcet, L a m a r c k ) b u t was given its
The
Positivist
Era in
Germany
357
philosophic f o r m u l a t i o n b y Hegel. T h o u g h n o t himself a philosopher, the biologist Charles D a r w i n (1809—1882) was extremely i n f l u e n t i a l . His m a j o r w o r k , On the Origin of Species, was published i n 1859-60, b u t its ideas date f r o m the 1830's a n d the famous voyage a b o a r d the Beagle; this book contained a biological theory of e v o l u t i o n based on t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f the struggle for existence
a n d adaptation
to
environment,
w i t h the consequent natural selection o f the fittest. T h i s d o c t r i n e i n f l u enced every aspect o f nineteenth-century intellectual life a n d furnished M a r x w i t h a basis for his o w n d o c t r i n e . H e r b e r t Spencer (1820-1903), a n engineer w h o devoted h i m s e l f to philosophy, adopted the idea o f e v o l u t i o n i n a different f o r m ; he enjoyed a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y p o p u l a r i t y i n the second h a l f o f the century w h i c h was t h e n q u i c k l y lost. H i s extremely voluminous o u t p u t was largely published under the general title o f A System of Synthetic Philosophy. T h e various parts are First Principles (these are the u n k n o w a b l e a n d t h e k n o w a b l e ) , Principles ciples
and
of Sociology
Principles
of Biology,
Principles
of Psychology,
Prin-
H e also wrote, a m o n g other Man versus the State, a n expression
of Ethics.
works, The Study of Sociology a n d The of liberal political individualism.
A c c o r d i n g to Spencer, there takes place i n the universe a n unceasing r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f m a t t e r a n d m o t i o n , w h i c h constitutes e v o l u t i o n w h e n the i n t e g r a t i o n o f m a t t e r a n d dissipation o f m o t i o n p r e v a i l , a n d dissolution w h e n the opposite occurs. T h i s transformation is accompanied b y a secondary one, t h a t o f the homogeneous i n t o the heterogeneous, a n d takes place t h r o u g h o u t the entire universe a n d a l l its domains, f r o m the nebulae to s p i r i t u a l a n d social life. T h e p r i n c i p a l cause o f e v o l u t i o n is the instability of the homogeneous; that which remains q u a n t i t a t i v e l y i n v a r i a b l e , as a substratum o f a l l the evolut i o n a r y processes, is a power w i t h o u t limits, w h i c h Spencer calls unknowable. T h i s doctrine, more interesting for its details (for instance, the frequently penetrating sociological observations) t h a n for its feeble metaphysics, d o m i n a t e d E u r o p e a n t h o u g h t for several decades a n d exerted a p r o f o u n d influence even o n Bergson. 3. T H E P O S I T I V I S T E R A I N G E R M A N Y A S noted earlier, G e r m a n positivism generally led to m a t e r i a l i s m a n d naturalism, w h i c h are devoid o f philosophic interest. F r i e d r i c h K a r l Christian L u d w i g Büchner, K a r l V o g t , J a c o b Moleschott, Ernst H e i n r i c h Haeckel a n d W i l h e l m O s t w a l d a r e , i n general, practitioners o f the n a t u r a l sciences, w i t h u n f o u n d e d philosophical pretensions, i m b u e d w i t h superficial atheism a n d m a t e r i a l i s m a n d , i n short, l a c k i n g i n true scientific spirit. MATERIALISM.
3J8
Philosophy
oj Positivist
Inspiration
A T T E M P T S T O S U P E R S E D E P O S I T I V I S M . O f greater interest are other, m o r e independent thinkers w h o b r i n g the p o p u l a r positivist views o f t h e i r day i n t o line w i t h the earlier G e r m a n philosophic t r a d i t i o n or a t t e m p t to replace those views. A m o n g these m e n are Gustav T h e o d o r Fechner (1801-1887), co-founder w i t h Ernst H e i n r i c h Weber o f psychophysics, a n d W i l h e l m W u n d t (1832-1920), a m a n of immense knowledge a n d i n d u s t r y a n d the most i m p o r t a n t w o r k e r i n experim e n t a l psychology a n d the so-called ethnopsychology (Völkerpsychologie). R u d o l f H e r m a n n Lotze (1817-1881), influenced b y L e i b n i z and the idealists, a n d D i l t h e y ' s predecessor i n the B e r l i n professorship, i n i t i a t e d a reaction against n a t u r a l i s m a n d w o r k e d o n the problems o f history a n d esthetics (Mikrokosmos, System der Philosophie). Friedrich A d o l f T r e n d e l e n b u r g (1802-1872), Dilthey's teacher, was, along w i t h Ravaisson, G r a t r y a n d Brentano, the m a n w h o r e i n t r o d u c e d A r i s t o telianism to his contemporaries (Elementa logices Aristotelicae, Logische Untersuchungen). Gustav Teichmüller (1832-1888), a professor at D o r p a t (Estonia) w h o was influential i n Russia, was a perspicacious and learned t h i n k e r w h o w r o t e i m p o r t a n t studies of Greek philosophy (Aristotelische
Forschungen,
Studien
zur Geschichte
der Begriffe,
Neue
Studien
a n d a n i m p o r t a n t b o o k o f metaphysics, i n w h i c h he makes a b r o a d use o f the concept o f " p e r s p e c t i v e " : Die zur
Geschichte
wirkliche
der Begriffe)
und die scheinbare
Welt:
Neue
Grundlegung
der Metaphysik
(The
R e a l a n d the A p p a r e n t W o r l d : N e w F o u n d a t i o n o f Metaphysics). T h i s author is the source o f the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t r u t h i n the sense o f the Greek
aXqOeta.
P a r t i c u l a r l y i n f l u e n t i a l i n their day were c e r t a i n philosophers whose w o r k r a p i d l y lost its p o p u l a r i t y : E d u a r d v o n H a r t m a n n (1842-1906), w h o was simultaneously inspired by G e r m a n idealism a n d the biological sciences, a n d whose major w o r k is the Philosophie des Unbewussten (Philosophy of the Unconscious); H a n s V a i h i n g e r (1852¬ 1933) (Die Philosophie des Als Ob), close to p r a g m a t i s m , w h o f o r m u l a t e d a philosophy o f the "as i f " ( a n allusion to K a n t ' s regulative I d e a s ) ; and lastly the adherents o f the so-called Empiriokritizismus—-Richard Avenarius (1843-1896): Kritik der reinen Erfahrung ( C r i t i q u e o f Pure Experience) a n d Ernst M a c h (1838-1916): Analyse der Empfindungen (Analysis of Sensations). T h e titles of their works are clearly i n d i c a t i v e o f the content. N E O - K A N T I A N I S M . I n the second h a l f of the c e n t u r y G e r m a n y is the scene o f a philosophic m o v e m e n t w h i c h attempts to supersede positiv i s m , although i t is i n fact conditioned b y its spirit. These thinkers saw the salvation o f philosophy i n the r e t u r n to K a n t , a n d i n i t i a t e d a r e v i v a l of K a n t i a n i s m . W e have already seen, w h e n s t u d y i n g K a n t ,
The
Positivist
Era
in Germany
3J9
the v i e w p o i n t f r o m w h i c h the Neo-Kantians consider h i m . T h e first impulse i n this direction came f r o m the book b y O t t o L i e b m a n n (1840-1912) e n t i t l e d Kant und die Epigonen (1865), each chapter of w h i c h c o n c l u d e d : " T h e r e f o r e , i t is necessary to r e t u r n to K a n t . " A n o t h e r step i n the same d i r e c t i o n is m a r k e d b y F r i e d r i c h A l b e r t Lange (1828-1875), a u t h o r of a famous History of Materialism. B u t the chief representatives o f the N e o - K a n t i a n movement are the thinkers of the Marburg school: H e r m a n n C o h e n (1842-1918), the most i m p o r t a n t of a l l , w h o was the teacher o f the y o u n g O r t e g a (System der Philosophie: Logik der reinen Erkenntnis [System o f Philosophy: Logic o f Pure K n o w l e d g e ] , Ethik des reinen Willens [Ethics o f Pure W i l l ] , Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls [Esthetics o f Pure F e e l i n g ] ) ; Paul N a t o r p (1854-1924), w h o f o r m u l a t e d a N e o - K a n t i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Platonism and m a d e special studies of psychological a n d pedagogical problems (Piatos Ideenlehre, Kant und die Marburger Schule); and recently, Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), a professor i n the U n i t e d States i n his last years, w h o studied the p r o b l e m of knowledge (Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit [ T h e P r o b l e m of K n o w l edge], Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff [Substance a n d F u n c t i o n ] , Philosophie der symbolischen Formen [Philosophy o f Symbolic F o r m s ] , Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis [Phenomenology o f K n o w l e d g e ] , Descartes, Leibniz' System). H e also wrote Philosophy of the Enlightenment and Philosophical
Anthropology.
A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t N e o - K a n t i a n g r o u p is the so-called Baden school, whose most i m p o r t a n t members are W i l h e l m W i n d e l b a n d (1848¬ 1915), a great h i s t o r i a n o f philosophy (Einleitung in die Philosophie, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Präludien) a n d H e i n r i c h R i c k e r t (1863-1936), devoted to studies o f m e t h o d o l o g y a n d epistemology (Die
Grenzen
der naturwissenschaftlichen
und Naturwissenschaft,
Philosophie
des
Begriffsbildung, Lebens).
Kulturwissenschaft
The Discovery
of Life
W e n o w begin to consider the thinkers o f the last t h i r d o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y . T h i s period, perhaps more clearly t h a n a n y other, reveals the m e a n i n g o f the history o f philosophy. I w i l l speak o f philosophers w h o were, i n general, somewhat m a r g i n a l to the central c u r r e n t o f t h e i r time. W e have seen d o w n w h a t f u t i l e paths the thinkers after C o m t e were led b y p o s i t i v i s m ; therefore, w e w i l l f i n d authentic philosophy only i n the thinkers w h o are at variance w i t h the tenor o f t h e i r age, i n those thinkers w h o go beyond the bounds o f the p r e v a i l i n g schools o f philosophy. T h i s is true to such a n extent t h a t these m e n either do n o t seem to be philosophers or else are misunderstood. H o w e v e r , the foregoing statement must be f o l l o w e d b y the observation t h a t such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the t h o u g h t o f the end o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y is possible o n l y i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . S t r i c t l y speaking, this t h o u g h t came to be a u t h e n t i c a n d f r u i t f u l because i t served as a stimulus a n d precedent for present-day metaphysics; i t acquires value o n l y i n the l i g h t o f m o d e r n thought. W e m u s t collect elements w h i c h the last century w o u l d have considered most cont e m p t i b l e a n d w h i c h achieve f u l l a c t u a l i t y o n l y outside themselves, to w i t , i n the philosophy o f recent years. T h e philosophers I refer to were n o t , o f course, systematic thinkers. I n general, they h a d b r i l l i a n t i n t u i t i o n s , conjectures, visions; however, a l t h o u g h a l l this amounts to a great deal, i t does n o t , strictly speaking, constitute philosophy. N a t u r a l l y , philosophy needs concepts, b u t i t also requires a system. T h i s fragmentary philosophy achieves its r e a l i t y — H e g e l w o u l d say its truth—in a later phase o f philosophy, a n d i n t h a t 360
Kierkegaard
l a t e r stage i t constitutes a first step t o w a r d a n authentic metaphysics. i.
KIERKEGAARD
Soren K i e r k e g a a r d ( 1 8 1 3 - 1 8 5 5 ) was a D a n i s h t h i n k e r whose i n f l u ence o n philosophy, a l t h o u g h h a r d l y visible, has been real a n d lasting. H e l i v e d i n Copenhagen, t o r m e n t e d by his religious a n d philosophical problems a n d influenced, i n the negative sense o f complete opposition to i t , b y G e r m a n i d e a l i s m . A m o n g Kierkegaard's works we f i n d The Gospel
the
ofSuffering,
Concluding
Either/
Unscientific
Or (Enten-Eller), Postscript,
the Philosophical
Fragments
and
one o f his most i m p o r t a n t writings.
L i k e other thinkers o f his t i m e , K i e r k e g a a r d appeals t o C h r i s t i a n i t y — i n his case, t h r o u g h Protestant t h e o l o g y — i n o r d e r t o understand man's being. H e dwells i n p a r t i c u l a r o n the concept o f suffering, w h i c h he relates to o r i g i n a l sin a n d i n w h i c h m a n feels h i m s e l f to be alone. T h i s leads K i e r k e g a a r d to f o r m u l a t e an anthropology shaped by the idea o f existence; this idea is o f v e r y great interest a n d o f considerable p h i l o sophical p r o d u c t i v i t y , i n spite o f its unsystematic character a n d o f the dangerous i r r a t i o n a l i s m w h i c h has made itself felt i n certain of Kierkegaard's followers. K i e r k e g a a r d rejects t h e " e t e r n a l i z a t i o n " t h a t Hegelianism i n t r o d u c e d i n t o philosophy because t h a t abstract a n d sub specie aeternitatis t h o u g h t does n o t take i n t o account existence, t h a t is, the very mode of man's being—every man's, even t h a t o f the abstract t h i n k e r himself. M a n is something t h a t is concrete, t e m p o r a l , i n the process o f b e c o m i n g ; something w h i c h partakes o f this m o d e o f being t h a t we c a l l existence because he is a m i x t u r e of w h a t is t e m p o r a l a n d eternal; something t h a t is submerged i n suffering. M o t i o n , w h i c h sub specie aeternitatis t h o u g h t denies, is essential to existence. A c t i n g o n religious suppositions, K i e r k e g a a r d deals w i t h h u m a n r e a l i t y i n its strictly i n d i v i d u a l a n d personal f o r m , a n d n o t i n its abstract f o r m , as m a n i n general. H e speaks a b o u t my existence i n a l l its concrete a n d irreplacea b l e personal i d e n t i t y . H o w e v e r , this positive aspect o f his t h o u g h t is obscured by his i r r a t i o n a l i s m . K i e r k e g a a r d believes t h a t we cannot conceive of existence a n d m o t i o n , because w h e n w e t r y t o conceive of these things they become i m m o v a b l e , eternal a n d , therefore, abolished. B u t , since he w h o thinks, exists, existence a n d t h o u g h t are posited at the same t i m e , a n d existence is the serious topic for philosophy. K i e r k e g a a r d influenced U n a m u n o considerably, a n d Heidegger f o u n d m u c h o f value i n his t h o u g h t . T h u s the v i t a l core o f K i e r k e gaard's metaphysics appears i n systematic a n d m a t u r e f o r m i n the v e r y center of present-day philosophy.
36z
The
Discovery
2.
of
Life
NIETZSCHE
L I F E A N D W O R K S . F r i e d r i c h Nietzsche was b o r n i n 1844. H e studied classical p h i l o l o g y i n B o n n a n d L e i p z i g a n d i n 1869, w h e n he was twenty-five years o l d , was n a m e d professor o f t h a t discipline at Basel. I n 1879 he h a d to give u p his position because of i l l h e a l t h , a n d after t h a t he s u p p o r t e d himself i n d e p e n d e n t l y as a w r i t e r . H e w e n t insane i n 1889 a n d i n 1900, at the close o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y , d i e d c o m pletely estranged f r o m the w o r l d . Nietzsche is a n extremely c o m p l e x personality; he possessed great artistic t a l e n t a n d is one of the best of the m o d e r n G e r m a n w r i t e r s . H i s style, i n prose as w e l l as i n verse, is passionate, inspired a n d o f great l i t e r a r y beauty. H i s knowledge of a n d interest i n Greek c u l t u r e play a large role i n his philosophy. H o w e v e r , the central theme o f his t h o u g h t is m a n , h u m a n life, a n d he is completely preoccupied w i t h history a n d ethics. Schopenhauer a n d R i c h a r d W a g n e r influenced h i m greatly, and perhaps this accentuated his l i t e r a r y a n d artistic value a n d broadened his influence, w h i c h has been so extensive as to be d e t r i m e n t a l to his philosophy a n d even to preclude a fair e v a l u a t i o n of his w o r k . I n d u b i t a b l y , there is i n Nietzsche m u c h more t h a n w h a t the dilettantism w h i c h took possession of his w o r k and personality at the end of the last c e n t u r y and the b e g i n n i n g o f this c e n t u r y has been accustomed to show us. One of the tasks of present-day philosophy is to b r i n g to l i g h t the metaphysical content o f F r i e d r i c h Nietzsche's thought.
Nietzsche's p r i n c i p a l works are Die T r a g e d y ) , Unzeitgemdsse Betrachtungen Menschlich.es,
(Dawn),
Allzumenschliches
der Tragodie (The Birth of ( I n o p p o r t u n e Considerations),
Geburt
( H u m a n , A l l Too
Human),
Morgenrote
( T h u s Spake Z a r a t h u s t r a ) , Jenseits von Gut und Bose (Beyond G o o d a n d E v i l ) , Z Genealogie der Moral ( O n the Genealogy of M o r a l i t y ) , Der Wille zur Macht ( T h e W i l l to P o w e r ) . T h e last book was published after his death under a title w h i c h the a u t h o r d i d n o t give i t a n d i n a f o r m w h i c h dilutes its meaning. R e c e n t w o r k b y K a r l Schlechta has revealed h o w Nietzsche's works were m a n i p u l a t e d i n order to give t h e m a racist significance a n d to relate t h e m to the " t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m " of our century. Also
sprach
%arathustra
ur
THE
PRINCIPLE OF DIONYSUS A N D T H E PRINCIPLE OF A P O L L O .
An
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h Nietzsche makes of Greek t h o u g h t comes to have great i m p o r t a n c e i n his philosophy. H e distinguishes t w o principles: the p r i n c i p l e o f A p o l l o a n d the p r i n c i p l e o f Dionysus. A p o l l o is the s y m b o l o f serenity, clarity, m o d e r a t i o n , r a t i o n a l i s m ; he is the Greek classical image. O n the other h a n d , Dionysus is the symbol of impulsive-
Nietzsche
363
ness, excess, u n c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y , the affirmation o f life, eroticism, a n d o r g y as a c u l m i n a t i o n o f the l o n g i n g to live, to say Yes! to life i n spite of a l l its sorrows. Schopenhauer's influence is t u r n e d inside o u t ; Nietzsche, instead o f n e g a t i n g the w i l l to live, places t h a t w i l l at the center o f his thought. T H E E T E R N A L R E T U R N . T O a certain extent Nietzsche derives f r o m the positivism of the age; he denies that metaphysics is possible; f u r t h e r m o r e , he assumes a loss o f f a i t h i n G o d a n d i n the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the soul. However, the life w h i c h he affirms a n d w h i c h forever wishes to live longer, w h i c h asks for an eternity o f happiness, returns t i m e a n d again. Nietzsche makes use o f a n idea t h a t derives f r o m H e r a c l i t u s i n his n o t i o n o f the " eternal r e t u r n " (ewige Wiederkunft) of the things. After a l l possible combinations o f the elements of the w o r l d have been realized, there is a n i n t e r v a l of a previously u n d e t e r m i n e d d u r a t i o n , a n d then the cycle begins again, a n d so o n , indefinitely. E v e r y t h i n g that happens i n the w o r l d repeats itself i n i d e n t i c a l fashion t i m e a n d again. E v e r y t h i n g returns eternally, i n c l u d i n g everything t h a t is e v i l , miserable a n d v i l e . B u t m e n can transform the w o r l d a n d themselves b y means o f a transmutation of all values (Umwertung alter Werte), a n d can progress t o w a r d becoming supermen. T h u s Nietzsche's a f f i r m a t i o n of life is not l i m i t e d to one's accepting a n d w i s h i n g for life o n l y once, b u t an i n f i n i t e n u m b e r o f times. THE S U P E R M A N . Nietzsche is opposed to a l l the equalitarian, h u m a n i t a r i a n and democratic trends o f his age. H e is a c h a m p i o n of m i g h t y personalities. T h e highest good is life itself, w h i c h culminates i n the will to power. M a n m u s t go beyond himself a n d become somet h i n g superior to m a n , j u s t as m a n is superior to the m o n k e y : this is the theory o f the superman. Nietzsche models his superman o n unscrupulous a n d i m m o r a l Renaissance personalities w h o nevertheless h a d g i g a n t i c capacities for life a n d w h o were strong, i m p u l s i v e a n d energetic. T h e concept o f the superman leads Nietzsche to a new idea o f morality. T H E M O R A L I T Y O F M A S T E R S A N D T H E M O R A L I T Y O F S L A V E S . Nietzsche is p a r t i c u l a r l y hostile to the K a n t i a n ethics o f d u t y , a n d also to u t i l i t a r i a n ethics a n d C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y as w e l l . H e values only the strong, healthy, impulsive life w h i c h has the w i l l to d o m i n a t e . T h i s represents good, whereas weakness, sickness a n d f a i l u r e are evil. Compassion is the greatest e v i l . T h u s Nietzsche distinguishes t w o types o f m o r a l i t y . T h e m o r a l i t y o f the masters is t h a t o f powerful i n d i v i d u a l s o f superior v i t a l i t y ; this m o r a l i t y applies o n l y to these superior beings a n d is based o n exigency and o n the a f f i r m a t i o n o f the v i t a l impulses. I n contrast, the m o r a l i t y of the slaves is t h a t o f weak a n d
The
Discovery
of
Life
miserable people, of degenerates; i t is governed b y lack o f confidence i n life a n d respect for compassion, h u m i l i t y , patience, a n d the like. N i e t z s c h e says that i t is a m o r a l i t y o f resentment, w h i c h opposes everyt h i n g t h a t is superior a n d w h i c h therefore affirms every f o r m o f e q u a l i t a r i a n i s m . Nietzsche a t t r i b u t e s this character o f resentment to C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y ; however, this is an o u t r i g h t error o n his p a r t , arising f r o m his lack o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the m e a n i n g o f C h r i s t i a n i t y . Scheler has p r o v e d the absolute distance between C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d every f o r m o f resentment (see M a x Scheler: Ressentiment). Because o f his h i g h regard for energy a n d p o w e r , Nietzsche figures a m o n g the thinkers w h o have most exalted t h e value o f w a r ; w a r seems to h i m to be a n o p p o r t u n i t y for the d e v e l o p m e n t of superior values, the spirit o f sacrifice, bravery, n o b i l i t y , a n d so o n . Nietzsche rejects t h e m i d d l e class nineteenth-century idea o f m a n as an industrious a n d useful b e i n g a n d affirms the idea o f the k n i g h t , the courageous a n d powerful m a n w h o vigorously accepts life. A l l these ideas have a p o i n t i n c o m m o n w i t h Christianity, a l t h o u g h Nietzsche was n o t a b l e to see i t . T h e most i m p o r t a n t elements o f Nietzsche's p h i l o s o p h y are his idea o f life a n d his awareness o f the existence o f v i t a l values, t h a t is, values w h i c h p e r t a i n specifically to human life. T h e expression vital values contains t w o o f the ideas w h i c h come to dominate later philosophy. Nietzsche is a source of'the philosophy of values a n d of'the philosophy oflife.
The Return
to Traditional
Metaphysics
A t the same t i m e t h a t the theme o f life appears i n the philosophy o f the n i n e t e e n t h century, a n d perhaps even a few years before this happens, the content o f p h i l o s o p h y changes and p h i l o s o p h y once again approaches the previous t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics w h i c h h a d been i n t e r r u p t e d — a t least so i t seemed—by positivism. T h i s is not j u s t a r e t u r n t o the most i m m e d i a t e f o r m o f t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics, the G e r m a n idealist t r a d i t i o n , b u t r a t h e r a r e t u r n to the traditions o f r a t i o n a l i s m , Scholasticism a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , Greek philosophy. Because o f this, philosophy regains its f u l l d i g n i t y a n d the commencem e n t o f a new stage o f philosophical p r o d u c t i v i t y becomes possible. T h i s development occurs precisely at the b e g i n n i n g o f the present century. I t is n o t mere coincidence t h a t the thinkers o f this tendency were Catholics a n d , i n fact, for the most p a r t priests. T h e C h u r c h , for p r i m a r i l y theological reasons, has kept close to the great metaphysical systems. F o r a long t i m e — w e m a y say since Suarez—Scholasticism has been practically a dead t r a d i t i o n ; to whatever extent i t has concerned itself w i t h philosophic questions, i t has done so i n a " scholastic " spirit i n t h e n a r r o w sense o f the w o r d , as a mere exegesis o f medieval t h o u g h t a n d " r e f u t a t i o n o f m o d e r n e r r o r s . " T h u s i t has a l l too often o v e r l o o k e d the entire history o f m o d e r n philosophy as i f i t d i d not exist, as i f i t were n o t h i n g b u t a mere error or w h i m w h i c h had i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l y a p p r o p r i a t e d to itself the p o p u l a r i t y once enjoyed b y the o n l y true philosophy, t h a t o f the M i d d l e Ages, a n d more specifically T h o m i s m . T h i s conception is absolutely inadmissible, for i t J6j
¿66
The
Return
to
Traditional
Metaphysics
has been completely superseded as often as thinkers w i t h i n the Scholastic t r a d i t i o n have h a d some knowledge o f m o d e r n philosophy a n d o f medieval Scholasticism itself. T h e n i t has been seen t h a t the l i v i n g philosophical c o n t i n u a t i o n o f Scholasticism is to be f o u n d n o t so m u c h i n the presumptive Neo-Scholastics as i n m o d e r n philosophy. Descartes a n d L e i b n i z are descended f r o m St. A u g u s t i n e , St. A n s e l m , St. T h o m a s , Duns Scotus, O c c a m and E c k h a r t , as anyone even m o d e r a t e l y acquainted w i t h t h e m knows very w e l l ; as, for example, F a t h e r G r a t r y so very fully k n e w . T h u s , Catholic philosophers h a d n o t lost contact w i t h metaphysics. T h r o u g h o u t the nineteenth c e n t u r y , there is a series o f attempts to restore m a t u r i t y to p h i l o s o p h y ; this movement c u l m i n a t e s i n Bren¬ t a n o . A t t h a t m o m e n t the p h i l o s o p h y o f our age is set i n m o t i o n .
i.
T H E FIRST
ATTEMPTS
B O L Z A N O . T h e A u s t r i a n philosopher B e r n h a r d Bolzano ( i 7 8 1 — 1848) l i v e d i n the first h a l f o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y . H e was a C a t h o l i c priest, professor o f the philosophy o f r e l i g i o n at Prague f r o m 1805 to 1820, i n w h i c h year he was compelled to leave his post. I n 1837 he p u b l i s h e d his major w o r k , Wissenschqftslehre ( T h e o r y o f Science); as far as the " e l e m e n t a r y p a r t " o f logic is concerned, this b o o k "leaves far b e h i n d everything offered b y universal l i t e r a t u r e i n the w a y o f systematic essays o n l o g i c , " according to the o p i n i o n o f E d m u n d Husserl, w h o considered Bolzano " o n e of the greatest logicians o f all t i m e . " Bolzano's views were m u c h closer to those o f L e i b n i z t h a n to those o f the G e r m a n idealists w h o were his contemporaries; he b r o u g h t a m a t h e m a t i c a l spirit to the study o f logic and the p r o b l e m o f k n o w l edge. I n m a n y ways Bolzano a n t i c i p a t e d ideas w h i c h have proved to be o f i m p o r t a n c e for symbolic a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l l o g i c ; his theory a f f i r m i n g the character of being as independent o f the consciousness o f s p i r i t u a l ideal contents deeply influenced Husserl's phenomenology, w h i c h , i n one o f its decisive aspects, is a new c h a m p i o n i n g o f ideal objects. Bolzano also w r o t e the Paradoxien des Unendlichen (Paradoxes o f the I n f i n i t e ) . R O S M I N I A N D G I O B E R T I . T h e t w o I t a l i a n philosophers A n t o n i o R o s m i n i - S e r b a t i (1797-1855) a n d Vincenzo G i o b e r t i (1801-1852), s t a r t i n g o u t f r o m very s i m i l a r positions, also c o n t r i b u t e d to the reinstatement o f metaphysics i n the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . B o t h were Catholic priests w h o took a n active p a r t i n p u b l i c life a n d the p o l i t i c a l movement i n b e h a l f o f I t a l i a n u n i t y . R o s m i n i was Sardinia's ambassador to the Pope, G i o b e r t i its premier. R o s m i n i w r o t e Nuovo
The
First
Attempts
3°7
( N e w Essay o n the O r i g i n o f Ideas), Principii (Principles o f M o r a l Science), Teosojia (Theosophy) a n d the Saggio storico-critico sulle catégorie e la dialettica (Historical and C r i t i c a l Essay o n the Categories a n d Dialectic). Gioberti's p r i n c i p a l works are Introduzione alio studio dellafilosofia ( I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Study o f P h i l o s o p h y ) , Degli errori filosofici di Rosmini ( O n Rosmini's Philosophical E r r o r s ) , Protologia, Del buono ( O n the G o o d ) , Del bello ( O n the B e a u t i f u l ) a n d Teorica del sovrannaturale (Theory o f the S u p e r n a t u r a l ) . saggio
suW origine
delta scienza
delle idee
morale
R o s m i n i seeks the i n t u i t i o n o f a " f i r s t t r u t h " w h i c h is the standard for a l l other truths, a n i n t e l l i g i b l e f o r m whose u n i o n w i t h the intelligence there results the intelligence itself; this is b e i n g as such, the p r i m a r y object o f the intelligence. There is a very close connection between these views a n d those o f M a l e b r a n c h e a n d , consequently, the idea o f the vision o f the things i n G o d . Analogously, i n Gioberti's t h o u g h t being is a p r i o r i i n character; therefore, the h u m a n intellect possesses essentially a direct knowledge o f G o d , w i t h o u t w h i c h i t cannot k n o w a n y t h i n g . S o m e t h i n g divine appears directly to the m i n d i n the created t h i n g s ; i t is thus n o t necessary to prove the existence o f G o d . " T h e great concept o f the D e i t y , " G i o b e r t i says, " h a s h e l d u p to n o w a more o r less secondary place i n philosophic doctrines, even i n those w h i c h , i n appearance or i n r e a l i t y , are the most r e l i g i o u s . . . . T h e speculative sciences have u p to n o w m o r e or less p a r t a k e n o f a t h e i s m . " I n o p p o s i t i o n to this, G i o b e r t i ' s idealformula declares t h a t the ontological p r i n c i p l e (God) is the l o g i c a l a n d ontological p r i n c i p l e at the same t i m e . " A l l of existence depends u p o n the E n t i t y , a n d a l l knowledge depends u p o n the i n t u i t i o n o f H i m . . . . T h e concept o f the E n t i t y is present i n a l l our t h o u g h t . " One cannot begin philosophy w i t h m a n , b u t w i t h G o d Himself, w h o posits H i s o w n Self ; m a n can recognize H i s existence, b u t c a n n o t demonstrate i t , because the so-called proofs o f the existence o f G o d presuppose " a p r i o r a n d o r i g i n a l intuition. " These I t a l i a n thinkers do violence to reality w h e n they overlook the fact t h a t G o d does n o t manifest H i m s e l f directly, b u t is h i d d e n and dwells i n a n inaccessible light; therefore, our imperfect knowledge o f H i m is the true state o f the case, a n d an effort is needed to show His existence, w h i c h can be k n o w n intellectually o n l y b y means o f the created things, per ea quae facta sunt, as St. Paul says. " N o one has ever seen G o d . " T h e ontologist error was condemned b y the C h u r c h i n 1861 a n d 1887; i t was used to a certain extent b y the complex heterodox movement k n o w n as modernism, w h i c h was defined a n d c o n d e m n e d b y the C h u r c h i n the first years o f the present century.
3
68
The
Return
to Traditional
2.
Metaphysics
GRATRY
O f greater interest a n d scope is the philosophy o f F a t h e r G r a t r y . Auguste Joseph Alphonse G r a t r y was b o r n at L i l l e i n F r a n c e i n i805 a n d d i e d i n 1872. H e s t u d i e d at the École Polytechnique a n d was o r d a i n e d as a priest ; he was a professor at Strasbourg a n d Paris, a n d i n 1852 founded the C o n g r e g a t i o n o f the O r a t o r y o f the I m m a c u l a t e C o n c e p t i o n , a renewal o f the O r a t o r y ofJesus to w h i c h M a l e b r a n c h e belonged. F r o m 1863 o n he was professor o f m o r a l theology at the Sorbonne. Gratry's most i m p o r t a n t works are La connaissance de l'âme ( T h e K n o w l e d g e of the S o u l ) , Logique, La morale et la loi de l'histoire ( M o r a l i t y a n d the L a w o f H i s t o r y ) and especially La connaissance de Dieu ( T h e K n o w l e d g e o f G o d ) , t h e best philosophical b o o k a b o u t G o d w r i t t e n i n a century. F o r m a n y years G r a t r y has been very l i t t l e k n o w n a n d almost f o r g o t t e n , especially as a, philosopher. His w o r k , w h i c h is essentially metaphysical and i n w h i c h t h e theme of G o d is c e n t r a l , c o u l d n o t be u n d e r s t o o d , strictly speaking, w i t h i n the positivist e n v i r o n m e n t o f his d a y ; his very qualities have been the chief cause o f his obscurity. B u t for precisely this reason he is o f the greatest interest t o us t o d a y . G r a t r y is clearly aware t h a t the history o f philosophy has f o l l o w e d a single course, b e g i n n i n g i n Greece a n d c o m i n g d o w n to o u r o w n d a y ; thus, i n o r d e r to e x p o u n d his personal philosophy, he begins b y showing the i n t e r n a l evolution o f the problems of philosophy f r o m Plato to r a t i o n a l i s m . Secondly, he interprets metaphysics as t h e essential element o f philosophy, i n o p p o s i t i o n to the o p i n i o n c u r r e n t i n his t i m e , a n d takes a decisive step f o r w a r d along the p a t h o f r e s t o r i n g metaphysics. H e believes, above a l l , t h a t the p r o b l e m o f metaphysics is f o r m u l a t e d as the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t w o great questions, w h i c h are the ones t h a t philosophy is c o m p e l l e d to cope w i t h t o d a y : t h a t of the person a n d t h a t of G o d . L a s t l y , i n his Logic he expounds, as the p r i n c i p a l procedure o f reason, a p r o f o u n d theory o f i n d u c t i o n or dialectic w h i c h is very closely related to the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l doctrines o f i n t u i t i o n a n d the k n o w l e d g e of essences. These are the central themes o f Gratry's t h o u g h t . I f there is a knowledge o f G o d , i t is based o n a n essential aspect o f m a n , j u s t as man's knowledge o f the things is based o n his contact w i t h t h e m , w i t h their reality. T h e knowledge of G o d , like a l l knowledge, is s o m e t h i n g derived f r o m a n o t h e r p r i m a r y ontological aspect, w h i c h is t h e basis for its possibility. T h e p r o b l e m of G o d involves m a n ; since m a n , essentially, is endowed w i t h a body a n d exists i n a w o r l d , the
Gratry
369
ontology o f m a n takes us back i n t u r n to the ontology o f the w o r l d i n w h i c h m a n finds himself. T h u s , a l l o f metaphysics is s u m m e d u p i n the problem of God. M a n , according to G r a t r y , has three faculties: the p r i m a r y faculty o f sense a n d two derived ones, intelligence a n d w i l l . Sense is the deepl y i n g p a r t o f the person. T h i s sense is threefold: external sense, by means o f w h i c h I sense the r e a l i t y o f m y body a n d o f the w o r l d ; i n t e r n a l sense, b y w h i c h I sense myself and my fellow men; a n d divine sense, b y w h i c h I find G o d i n the depth o f m y soul, w h i c h is the image o f H i m . T h i s divine sense defines man's p r i m a r y relationship w i t h God, w h i c h is prior to all knowledge and vision; i t is a fundamental relationship because the h u m a n e n t i t y has its basis and its r o o t i n G o d . T h e soul finds i n its o w n depths a contact w i t h the D e i t y , a n d therein resides its force,
which
causes it to be.
G o d is the root o f m a n , w h o depends upon H i m . G o d makes m a n live a n d sustains h i m . Therefore, H e is the basis o f h u m a n l i f e ; m a n exists a n d lives u p o n his root, supporting himself o n G o d . T h i s is the necessary presupposition o f a l l knowledge o f the D e i t y , a n d i t is f r o m this viewp o i n t t h a t G r a t r y interprets atheism. T h e atheist is a m a n w h o is d e v o i d o f the divine sense; thus, he is insensate (foolish), de-ment-ed. T h e causes o f this estrangement f r o m G o d are sensuality a n d p r i d e ; t h r o u g h sensuality, m a n makes the things the center o f his existence a n d turns away f r o m G o d , w h i l e pride makes m a n consider himself as his o w n basis. T h e n the d i v i n e sense is extinguished a n d the heart is d a r k e n e d , at the same t i m e t h a t the i m a g i n a t i o n becomes v a i n , as St. P a u l says. Because the soul is r o o t e d i n G o d , i t is able to be u p r o o t e d ; i t becomes empty, r e m a i n i n g completely w i t h o u t substance a n d consistency. T h u s the p o i n t o f o r i g i n o f the knowledge of G o d is the d i v i n e sense, the mysterious a n d obscure contact w i t h G o d i n the d e p t h o f the person, w h i c h is not knowledge b u t only a p r i o r c o n d i t i o n for the possibility o f knowledge. W h e n m a n conquers his sensuality a n d pride, he recognizes his insufficiency a n d can raise himself t o G o d through similarity a n d , especially, t h r o u g h contrast. G r a t r y distinguishes between t w o procedures o f reason: one based on i d e n t i t y , w h i c h is the syllogism or deduction, a n d the other based o n the p r i n c i p l e o f transcendence, w h i c h is i n d u c t i o n or dialectic. T h i s is the intellectual path b y w h i c h one reaches G o d . T h e result of i n d u c t i o n is n o t contained i n the s t a r t i n g p o i n t , b u t goes b e y o n d i t ; the present d a t u m refers us to another one, w h i c h is not i n c l u d e d i n the o r i g i n a l p o i n t ; i n order to raise ourselves to the new p o i n t we need a n inventive impulse (elan), w h i c h not everyone possesses. T h e things induce us to raise ourselves to G o d ;
jyo
The Return
to Traditional
Metaphysics
this is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a n d p r i m a r y m e a n i n g o f i n d u c t i o n , w h i c h is a t o t a l m o v e m e n t o f the soul. F a t h e r G r a t r y i n t u i t e d t h a t , o n the one h a n d , the e x t e r n a l w o r l d is i n v o l v e d i n the deep-lying r e a l i t y o f m a n , a n d that, o n t h e other, m a n , w h o is n o t self-sufficient, remains basically insufficient even w h e n taken together w i t h the w o r l d , because his basis i n G o d is s t i l l l a c k i n g . W h e n he enters w i t h i n his o w n depths, m a n finds, together w i t h contingency, the s u p p o r t w h i c h makes h i m be a n d live, w h i c h sustains h i m ; this f o u n d a t i o n is not the world, w h i c h touches us only superficially, b u t G o d , o n w h o m o u r root rests. T h i s shows Gratry's great significance for present-day philosophy, since his metaphysics leads us t o the latest questions t h a t w e have posed a n d indicates a sure m e t h o d b y w h i c h w e m a y deal w i t h t h e m . * * A detailed study of Gratry's thought and his place in the history of philosophy will be found in my book La Filosofía del Padre Gratry [Ob ras, I V ] .
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
Brentano
i.
BRENTANO'S
POSITION I N T H E HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY
L I F E A N D W O R K S . T h e A u s t r i a n thinker Franz Brentano is extremely i m p o r t a n t . H e was b o r n i n M a r i e n b e r g i n 1838 a n d d i e d i n Z u r i c h i n 1917. H e was a Catholic priest a n d a professor i n V i e n n a , b u t later he broke w i t h the C h u r c h — w i t h o u t abandoning his p r o f o u n d l y Catholic c o n v i c t i o n s — a n d gave u p his professorship. Brentano w r o t e b u t little, a n d the greater p a r t o f his w r i t i n g s was not published u n t i l after his death. Nevertheless, Brentano attracted unusually effective pupils, a n d his influence, t h o u g h q u i e t a n d inconspicuous, has been immense. Present-day philosophy begins w i t h h i m ; i f not its exclusive founder, he is still a major one. B r e n t a n o w r o t e short books, almost pamphlets, o f i n c o m p a r a b l e density a n d accuracy; and each one has b r o u g h t a b o u t the radical t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f a philosophical discipline. Brentano a n d D i l t h e y together represent the h i g h p o i n t o f t h e i r epoch and constitute the most efficacious a n d direct antecedent o f present-day p h i l o s o p h y . I n m a n y respects, Brentano and D i l t h e y are d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed; the former is concise, expressive, extremely clear, whereas the l a t t e r is diffuse a n d his t h o u g h t is unusually v a g u e ; Brentano adopts the n a t u r a l sciences as his model, whereas D i l t h e y changes e v e r y t h i n g i n t o history; D i l t h e y ' s most direct i n t e l l e c t u a l antecedents are f o u n d i n G e r m a n idealism, whereas Brentano condemns this t r a d i t i o n a n d , o n the c o n t r a r y , invokes that o f Descartes a n d L e i b n i z , o f St. T h o m a s a n d , above a l l , o f Aristotle. Nevertheless, D i l t h e y and B r e n t a n o essentially c o m p l e m e n t one another, a n d i t is n o t difficult to
37«
Brentano
372
see h o w the philosophy o f o u r t i m e derives f r o m t h e i r j o i n t influence. Brentano's most i m p o r t a n t works are Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkennt¬ nis ( O n the O r i g i n o f E t h i c a l K n o w l e d g e ) , a b r i e f p a m p h l e t w h i c h transformed ethics a n d led to the value theory; Die Lehre Jesu und ihre bleibende Bedeutung (Jesus' D o c t r i n e a n d Its Permanent Significance); his masterwork Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Psychology f r o m the E m p i r i c a l S t a n d p o i n t ) , f r o m w h i c h d i r e c t l y proceeds phenom e n o l o g y a n d therefore present-day philosophy i n its most rigorous o r i e n t a t i o n ; studies o n A r i s t o t l e w h i c h completely renewed A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m ; several short w r i t i n g s o n philosophy a n d its history, p a r t i c u l a r l y those entitled Die vier Phasen der Philosophie ( T h e F o u r Phases o f Philosophy) a n d ttber die Z ^ fi der Philosophie ( O n the F u t u r e o f P h i l o s o p h y ) ; Kategorienlehre ( T h e o r y of the Categories); Wahrheit und Evidenz ( T r u t h a n d E v i d e n c e ) ; a n d , lastly, a n extensive posthumous s t u d y : Vom Dasein Gottes ( O n the Existence o f G o d ) . u
un
B R E N T A N O ' S P H I L O S O P H I C A L S I T U A T I O N . Every philosopher is fixed w i t h i n a philosophical t r a d i t i o n , a n d Brentano even m o r e e x p l i c i t l y t h a n most. I t is thus necessary to establish his s i t u a t i o n i n some detail. A c c o r d i n g to his b i r t h date, he should be a post-Hegelian, immersed i n a positivist atmosphere; however, as a Catholic priest he finds himself r o o t e d i n a Scholastic a n d therefore Aristotelian t r a d i t i o n . Brentano has a manifest congeniality w i t h Aristotle a n d St. T h o m a s — m o r e so w i t h Aristotle, j u s t as t h a t m e d i e v a l philosopher h a d w i t h the Greek; after T r e n d e l e n b u r g , B r e n t a n o renews Aristotelianism i n a n epoch i n w h i c h i t h a d been a b a n d o n e d ; one should n o t forget t h a t m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y arose as a n a t t e m p t to displace Aristotle. T h i s A r i s t o t e l i a n element gives exceptional fecundity to Brentano's t h o u g h t ; whenever p h i l o s o p h y has established real contact w i t h Aristotle's t h o u g h t , i t has i m m e d i a t e l y become m o r e precise a n d serious. Brentano is a n example o f this, as was Scholasticism i n the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n d , later, L e i b n i z , a n d , later still, H e g e l . M o r e o v e r , Aristotle's close presence is one reason for the i n d u b i t a b l e p r o f u n d i t y of present-day philosophy. B r e n t a n o condemns idealist philosophy f r o m K a n t to H e g e l ; i t seems to h i m to be a straying f r o m the t r u e p a t h . I t is, a c c o r d i n g to Brentano, p a r t l y — b u t only p a r t l y — t r u e . Brentano adopts the positivist a t t i t u d e o f his t i m e ; this a t t i t u d e was j u s t i f i e d to the extent t h a t i t asked m e n to concern themselves w i t h w h a t they encountered w i t h o u t engaging i n m e n t a l constructions; its serious error lies i n the fact t h a t i t d i d n o t concern itself w i t h w h a t i t encountered, b u t i n d u l g e d i n other, no less groundless constructions. T h u s Brentano returns to a p o i n t o f view i n o p p o s i t i o n to idealism; he calls his an " e m p i r i c a l v i e w p o i n t . " O b v i o u s l y , Brentano is a n y t h i n g b u t an empiricist; he c o u l d be con-
Psychology
373
sidered such i n the sense t h a t A r i s t o t l e was an empiricist, b u t n o t i n the sense t h a t Locke was. A r i s t o t l e frequently refers to d i r e c t v i s i o n w i t h o u t r a t i o n a l d e d u c t i o n ; this has been called e m p i r i c i s m , b u t i t has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h experience i n the m e a n i n g o f sensible experience; rather, A r i s t o t l e refers to the nous, the noetic vision, b y w h i c h p r i n c i ples are apprehended d i r e c t l y . W e w i l l soon demonstrate the meani n g o f Brentano's " e m p i r i c i s m , " w h i c h leads precisely to the total defeat o f sensationalist e m p i r i c i s m i n its final psychologistic forms. B r e n t a n o establishes a c o n n e c t i o n between the purest a n d most a u t h e n t i c root o f ancient p h i l o s o p h y a n d m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y , and f r o m this position he transforms the philosophy o f his t i m e . H e begins w i t h his v i s i o n of t w o disciplines: psychology a n d ethics. L e t us now consider Brentano's c o n t r i b u t i o n to these disciplines. 2.
PSYCHOLOGY
I n Brentano's day, psychology consisted o f an a t t e m p t to change itself i n t o a n experimental, positive science; i t was a n associationist psychology related to English philosophy w h i c h a t t e m p t e d to explain e v e r y t h i n g b y means o f the associations o f ideas, a n d f u r t h e r m o r e to intervene i n the other disciplines—for example, i n logic, ethics, esthetics—in order to change t h e m i n t u r n i n t o psychology. Brentano's psychology has a completely new character. P H Y S I C A L A N D P S Y C H I C A L P H E N O M E N A . T h e first essential p r o b l e m t h a t arises is to differentiate clearly between physical a n d psychical p h e n o m e n a . T h e thinkers o f the M i d d l e A g e s — A v i c e n n a i n p a r t i c u l a r — k n e w o f a characteristic o f psychical phenomena t h a t was forgotten later o n ; this was w h a t they called intentional inexistence (the prefix on the second t e r m means in, n o t n e g a t i o n : existence in) or s i m p l y intentionality. B r e n t a n o accepts this characteristic and assigns i t a n i m p o r t a n c e a n d precision that i t d i d n o t have i n Scholasticism. Intentionality means reference to something t h a t is d i s t i n c t ; i n the case o f psychical acts, reference to a content, an object (this does not m e a n t h a t the object must be real). T h i n k i n g is always t h i n k i n g of something; feeling is feeling s o m e t h i n g ; w a n t i n g is w a n t i n g something; l o v i n g or h a t i n g is l o v i n g or h a t i n g something. T h u s , every psychical act is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a n object; the object m a y n o t exist, as w h e n I t h i n k o f a centaur or o f the squared circle or the regular p e n t a h e d r o n ; however, b o t h the squared circle a n d the regular p e n t a h e d r o n exist as correlatives o f m y t h o u g h t , as objects indicated b y m y act o f i m a g i n i n g or t h i n k i n g . Brentano says t h a t acts w h i c h are not i n t e n t i o n a l are not psychical acts—for example, the sensation of green, or a stomachache. A c c o r d i n g to h i m , sensations are simple n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l
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elements o f the psychical ( i n t e n t i o n a l ) act t h a t is m y perception o f a green tree; a n d the psychical act is the feeling o f discomfort whose i n t e n t i o n a l object is the stomach-ache. T h i s idea of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y has far-reaching consequences. I n the first place, i t leads to the reappearance o f ideal objects a n d , a m o n g these, to w h a t Husserl w i l l c a l l meanings. I t also leads to the n o t i o n t h a t t h o u g h t does not exhaust itself, t h a t i t is essentially directed t o w a r d something distinct f r o m itself. F i n a l l y , i t gives rise to the belief t h a t m a n is i n t e n t i o n a l , ex-centric, a n d t h a t he points to s o m e t h i n g distinct f r o m himself. T h e idea o f m a n as a n entity t h a t is " open to the t h i n g s " is based o n this idea of Brentano's. B R E N T A N O ' S M E T H O D . W h a t is Brentano's m e t h o d , the m e t h o d t h a t he calls " e m p i r i c a l " ? T o a n E n g l i s h m a n , to a n associationist psychologist, empiricism w o u l d have meant observation of facts. The e m p i r i c i s t observes one fact, a n d another, a n d t h e n abstracts a n d generalizes the c o m m o n factors. Brentano's m e t h o d is a different k i n d o f empiricism. L e t us suppose that I wish to observe a p h e n o m enon : I take a single case a n d see w h a t the essential p a r t o f i t is, w h a t i t consists of, w h a t i t cannot exist w i t h o u t . I n this w a y I o b t a i n the essence o f the p h e n o m e n o n : then I a m able to say, for example, not t h a t psychical acts are generally i n t e n t i o n a l , b u t t h a t t h e y are essentially i n t e n t i o n a l . Brentano intuits the essence o f a p h e n o m e n o n . T h i s m e t h o d is refined and perfected b y Husserl a n d becomes phenomenology. C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF P S Y C H I C A L P H E N O M E N A . After differentiating the psychical phenomena, B r e n t a n o must classify t h e m . Since i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is w h a t is essential i n t h e m , he classifies t h e m o n this basis, a c c o r d i n g to the various modes o f i n t e n t i o n a l reference. H e d i s t i n guishes three kinds o f acts:
{
representations (what have been called " assumptions") judgments emotions (or phenomena of interest, love or volition)
B r e n t a n o uses the w o r d representation very loosely: i t is a t h o u g h t , idea or image. T o B r e n t a n o , a representation is a n y t h i n g t h a t is present to the consciousness. H e restates a n ancient Scholastic p r i n c i p l e w h i c h we have already e n c o u n t e r e d — i n Spinoza, for e x a m p l e — a n d w h i c h is k n o w n b y the name o f Brentano's principle: " E v e r y psychical act is either a representation or is based o n a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " I f I a m h a p p y a b o u t something, m y happiness presupposes a representation o f the t h i n g w h i c h makes m e h a p p y ; or i f I desire something, o f the t h i n g w h i c h I desire, a n d so o n . Therefore, there is a first degree o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , w h i c h is simple reference to the object represented, a n d a
Ethics
second degree, i n w h i c h , while operating on the basis of a representation, I take a p o s i t i o n o n a second i n t e n t i o n a l act. Judgment consists o f accepting o r rejecting something as true. E m o t i o n , interest, w i l l o r love consists of one's mooing toward something, t h a t is, of one's a p p r e c i a t i n g or v a l u i n g i t , of one's esteeming it. T h i s also involves the t a k i n g of a position, a p p r o v a l or rejection, b u t o f a different nature. Brentano's ethics derives f r o m this, as does value p h i l o s o p h y later o n . P E R C E P T I O N . I n his Psychology, B r e n t a n o also formulates a t h e o r y of perception. H e finds t w o basic modes : internal perception (perception of psychical phenomena) a n d external perception (perception o f physical p h e n o m e n a ) . I n t e r n a l p e r c e p t i o n is direct, self-evident a n d i n f a l l i b l e (adequate) ; external p e r c e p t i o n , o n the contrary, is i n d i r e c t , not self-evident, a n d subject to e r r o r (inadequate). Therefore, internal perception is the sure criterion of c e r t a i n t y . T h i s idea has been a d o p t e d and corrected b y Husserl, w h o believes t h a t a l l external perceptions and also some i n t e r n a l (empirical) perceptions are inadequate, a n d t h a t o n l y phenomenological perceptions are adequate. I n short, i t is a question o f n o t m a k i n g positions o f existence ; the experiences s i m p l y must be described, w i t h o u t t a k i n g a position w i t h regard to the existence of a n y t h i n g external to t h e m , for example, of real objects.
3.
ETHICS
Brentano's ethics is o u t l i n e d i n Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, w h i c h is the text o f a lecture he delivered i n V i e n n a i n 1889 e n t i t l e d " O f the N a t u r a l Sanction o f the J u s t a n d the M o r a l . " Brentano applies to ethics a viewpoint analogous to the one used i n his psychology ; he calls this v i e w p o i n t e m p i r i c a l i n the sense t h a t w e have seen. S A N C T I O N . Brentano begins b y i n q u i r i n g about the n a t u r a l sanction of the j u s t a n d the m o r a l . I f I say t h a t something is good or b a d , there must be some basis, some a u t h o r i t y o r sanction that can verify the goodness or badness of the t h i n g . B r e n t a n o rejects the solutions o f various earlier philosophers: h e d o n i s m , eudaemonism, K a n t i a n m o r a l i t y , a n d so f o r t h .
B r e n t a n o has one r u l i n g p o i n t o f view : he makes w h a t is true correspond to w h a t is good, a n d w h a t is logical correspond to w h a t is m o r a l . H e says t h a t the ethical i m p e r a t i v e is very similar to the logical i m p e r a t i v e . W h a t is true is accepted as t r u e i n a.judgment: w h a t is good is accepted as such i n an act of love. T r u t h is believed, affirmed: goodness is loved. Conversely, falsity is denied, a n d e v i l is hated. THE M O R A L C R I T E R I O N . W h a t tells m e whether a t h i n g is g o o d or
37^
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b a d ? T h e fact t h a t I love or hate i t ? N o . A n d i n logic t r u t h does n o t depend on whether I a f f i r m o r deny s o m e t h i n g ; I m a y be w r o n g . A t h i n g is not good because I love i t ; o n the c o n t r a r y , I love a t h i n g because i t is good. B u t I m a y be w r o n g : error cannot be restricted to the r e a l m o f j u d g m e n t ; a different k i n d o f error is possible i n v a l u a t i o n . Brentano has p r o v i s i o n a l l y transferred us to the sphere o f object i v i t y . T h a t w h i c h is good is the object; m y reference m a y be erroneous; m y a t t i t u d e w i t h respect to the things receives its sanction f r o m the things themselves, n o t f r o m me. S E L F - E V I D E N C E . I f i n d myself l o v i n g or h a t i n g something. I m a y be w r o n g . W h o can t e l l m e w h e t h e r the t h i n g is good or b a d ? Brentano resorts to the parallelism o f l o g i c : h o w does logic p r o v i d e m e w i t h a c r i t e r i o n to k n o w w h e t h e r I err o r not ? Brentano distinguishes between blind judgments a n d self-evidentjudgments,.1 deny m a n y things, a n d steadfastly affirm a n d believe i n others; b u t these j u d g m e n t s are m o r e o r less obscure, based o n f a i t h , a u t h o r i t y , custom, a n d the like. I can believe i n such j u d g m e n t s w i t h complete resoluteness, b u t they d o n o t c o n t a i n w i t h i n themselves the basis o f their o w n t r u t h ; either they are n o t true, or else t h e i r t r u t h is n o t a p a r t o f t h e m . Such j u d g m e n t s d o n o t contain w i t h i n themselves the justification o f t h e i r t r u t h ; Brentano calls these b l i n d j u d g m e n t s . I n contrast, there is another class o f j u d g m e n t s w h i c h Brentano calls judgments. T h e y c o n t a i n a k i n d o f l i g h t w h i c h makes i t evident that they are t r u e j u d g m e n t s . O n e does n o t o n l y believe a n d a f f i r m t h e m ; rather, one sees t h a t they are t r u e a n d completely u n d e r stands t h a t they cannot be otherwise. I believe t h a t 2 a n d 2 are 4, n o t because I have been t o l d so, b u t because I see t h a t i t is so a n d t h a t i t cannot be otherwise. T h u s , self-evident j u d g m e n t s are those t h a t c o n t a i n w i t h i n themselves the reason for their t r u t h o r falsity. self-evident
T H E J U S T L O V E . L e t us go back to the p r o b l e m o f ethics, w h i c h deals w i t h w h a t is good a n d w h a t is b a d . Brentano says t h a t m y l o v i n g o r h a t i n g a t h i n g does n o t i n itself prove that the t h i n g is good or b a d . M y love or hate must be just. L o v e can be j u s t o r unjust, adequate o r inadequate. O n the other h a n d , there can be a love t h a t has its o w n j u s t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n itself. W h e n I love a t h i n g because i t is u n d o u b t e d l y good, t h e n m y love is ajust love. I f I love a t h i n g i m p u l s i v e l y , confusedly, m y love c a n be either j u s t or unjust. W h e n i t is perceived t h a t the t h i n g is good, a n d w h y i t is good, t h e n the justness o f the love becomes manifest. T h e adequate a t t i t u d e w h e n c o n f r o n t i n g a good t h i n g is to love i t , a n d w h e n c o n f r o n t i n g a b a d t h i n g , to hate i t . A n d w h e n a t h i n g is understood as either good or b a d , one loves o r hates i t by necessity. One's subsequent conduct is a n o t h e r m a t t e r . B r e n t a n o
The
Existence
of God
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recalls the classical verse: Video melioraproboque, deteriorasequor. Therefore, ethics is founded objectively. A n d valuation, far f r o m being c o n t i n gent on subjective choice, must adjust to the goodness or badness of the things, j u s t as belief must adjust t o t h e i r t r u t h . Brentano's ethics has given b i r t h to value theory, w h i c h contains great i n t e r n a l difficulties, but w h i c h represents a major c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the objective a n d hierarchical arrangement of values a n d therefore to the f o u n d a t i o n o f ethics a n d the other estimative disciplines. 4.
T H EEXISTENCE OF G O D
Brentano's posthumous book Vom Dasein Gottes contains several lectures o n t h e existence o f G o d w h i c h were delivered i n W i i r z b u r g a n d i n V i e n n a between 1868 a n d 1891, a n d a b r i e f treatise d a t i n g f r o m 1915 e n t i t l e d Gedankengang beim Beweisfiir das Dasein Gottes ( O u t l i n e o f a Proof of the Existence of G o d ) . I n the earlier p e r i o d , Brentano rejects the ontological p r o o f a n d affirms four a posteriori proofs: the teleological proof, the p r o o f b y m o t i o n , the p r o o f b y contingency a n d t h e psychological p r o o f b y the nature o f the h u m a n soul. Brentano p r e fers the first t w o , p a r t i c u l a r l y the teleological proof, to w h i c h he gives undreamed-of scientific precision. H o w e v e r , i n the 1915 treatise he makes use o f the a r g u m e n t b y contingency, w h i c h is of a p u r e l y m e t a physical n a t u r e . Brentano first proves the necessity f o r t h e existence o f the e n t i t y , w h i c h cannot be absolutely c o n t i n g e n t ; once the existence of a necessary e n t i t y has been proved, he affirms t h a t n o t h i n g that comes w i t h i n o u r experience, neither physical nor psychical phenomena, is directly necessary; therefore, there must be a transcendent directly necessary entity. * B R E N T A N O ' S S I G N I F I C A N C E . T h e core o f Brentano's t h o u g h t is the idea ofself-evidence. T h i s is the m e a n i n g o f his " e m p i r i c i s m " : the selfevident v i s i o n o f the essence of the things. T h i s renewed concern w i t h essence represents a r e t u r n t o metaphysics p r o p e r ; i n Brentano, philosophy once again consists o f c o n q u e r i n g essences, strictly metaphysical knowledge, w h a t philosophy has always been w h e n i t has been a u t h e n t i c . O n the other h a n d , Brentano gives us the m a j o r elements o f present-day philosophy: t h e assimilation o f the entire philosophical t r a d i t i o n , i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , t h e i n t u i t i o n o f essences, the idea o f v a l u e . D i l t h e y w i l l give us, o n his p a r t , historicism. W i t h these elements i n h a n d , the philosophy o f o u r century gets under w a y .
* O n the problems associated with this proof, see my study " E l problema de Dios en la filosofía de nuestro tiempo" in San Anselmo y el insensato [Obras, I V ] .
The Idea of
I.
Life
DlLTHEY
L I F E A N D W O R K S . W i l h e l m D i l t h e y was b o r n i n 1833 a n d d i e d i n 1911. F r o m 1882 o n he was a professor at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B e r l i n , where he succeeded L o t z e . I n the last years o f his life he r e t i r e d f r o m the university a n d gathered together a s m a l l g r o u p o f pupils at his home. Dilthey's influence has been t r u l y enormous, b u t belated, i n conspicuous a n d u n u s u a l . D i l t h e y devoted himself especially to historical studies, p r i n c i p a l l y the history o f l i t e r a t u r e and o f the other sciences o f the s p i r i t ; he also was deeply concerned w i t h psychology. H i s intellectual b a c k g r o u n d was tremendous i n scope ; he was inspired directly by the G e r m a n idealists, p a r t i c u l a r l y Schleiermacher, b u t his development was also shaped b y the great rationalists, the m e d i e v a l philosophers ( i n c l u d i n g the Arabs) a n d the Greeks. D i l t h e y ' s Introduction to the Sciences of the Spirit reveals the vast philosophical a n d historical m a t e r i a l t h a t he commanded.
Seemingly, D i l t h e y ' s p r o d u c t i o n is l i t t l e m o r e t h a n this : psychology a n d history o f the s p i r i t . Every t i m e he t r i e d to formulate his p h i losophy i n response to specific p u b l i s h i n g requirements, he was o n l y able to supply inadequate sketches. Y e t i n D i l t h e y ' s w o r k there is the inconsistent a n d always poorly expressed i n t u i t i o n o f a new idea : the idea of life. O n e o f the two m a j o r roots o f present-day p h i losophy is f o u n d i n D i l t h e y (the other is i n B r e n t a n o ) , b u t D i l t h e y ' s philosophy can o n l y be understood i n this w a y , i n its t r u t h , from the viewpoint o f the n o w m a t u r e philosophy o f t o d a y . T h i s is the reason 37
8
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379
for the essential vagueness o f Dilthey's t h o u g h t a n d style, a n d for the sparseness a n d inconspicuousness o f his influence. Dilthey's w o r k consists p r i m a r i l y o f sketches or notes, w h i c h were p a r t i a l l y published after his death. H i s m a j o r b o o k — a l m o s t his o n l y b o o k — i s the Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften ( I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Sciences of the S p i r i t ) , o f w h i c h he completed only the first v o l u m e . H e also w r o t e a series o f studies grouped u n d e r the general title o f
Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation ( V i e w o f the W o r l d a n d Analysis o f M a n since the Renaissance a n d the R e f o r m a t i o n ) ; another series e n t i t l e d Die geistige Welt: Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens ( T h e S p i r i t u a l W o r l d : I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Philosophy o f L i f e ) , i n w h i c h are to be f o u n d the Ideen ubereine beschrei¬ bende und zergliedernde Psychologie (Ideas o n a Descriptive and A n a l y t i c a l Psychology) and-Dai Wesen der Philosophie ( T h e N a t u r e of Philosophy); a m o n g the w r i t i n g s o f his final period is the Weltanschauungslehre ( T h e o r y of W o r l d V i e w s ) . H e also w r o t e a book called Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung (Experience a n d Poetry). D I L T H E Y ' S P O I N T O F V I E W . H i p p o l y t e T a i n e , Ernest R e n a n , W i l ¬ h e l m W u n d t , F r i e d r i c h A l b e r t Lange a n d H e r b e r t Spencer belong to the generation p r i o r to Dilthey's, a n d yet o u r impression is t h a t they were even f a r t h e r i n the past. T h e y represent that generation o f positivist thinkers w h i c h begins to feel uncomfortable a n d reacts against positivism. B u t strictly speaking, o n l y D i l t h e y achieves the break w i t h p o s i t i v i s m , a n d even he n o t completely. Auguste C o m t e ( b o r n i n 1798) was three generations earlier: D i l t h e y — w h o belonged to the same generation as Brentano, Nietzsche a n d W i l l i a m J a m e s — no longer undergoes Comte's direct influence, b u t o n l y the residualforce o f t h a t influence. T h e w o r k o f D i l t h e y a n d the Neo-Kantians is c o n d i tioned by their dependence u p o n positivism i n controversial matters.
F r o m Comte's philosophy D i l t h e y receives t w o very i m p o r t a n t ideas, w h i c h s t i m u l a t e his thought i n a n o r i g i n a l and different direction. O n e idea is t h a t all o f earlier philosophy was partial, t h a t i t d i d not embrace the whole o f reality as i t i s ; the other is t h a t metaphysics is impossible, a n d that only the positive sciences are a m a t t e r o f concern. D i l t h e y attempts to base philosophy " o n total, f u l l experience, w i t h o u t t r u n c a t i o n s : therefore, o n e n t i r e a n d complete r e a l i t y " ; o n the other h a n d , he attempts to supersede metaphysics as he u n d e r stands i t , t h a t is, as " absolutism o f the i n t e l l e c t " : this latter o u t l o o k is the t r i b u t e he pays to the age he lives i n . Strictly speaking, D i l t h e y created neither a system, nor a theory o f life, nor even a historical d o c t r i n e ; he d i d something less a n d somet h i n g m o r e : he came i n t o direct contact w i t h the reality o f life a n d ,
j8o
The
Idea
of
Life
thus, o f history. " A l l m e n , " I have w r i t t e n elsewhere,* apropos o f D i l t h e y , " live w i t h i n history, b u t m a n y m e n do not k n o w this. Others know t h a t t h e i r p e r i o d will be historical, b u t they do not live i t as such. D i l t h e y b r o u g h t us historicism, w h i c h is, of course, a doctrine, b u t first of all a mode of b e i n g : historical consciousness, w i t h the intellectualist a n d d o c t r i n a l nuances removed f r o m the t e r m 'consciousness.' T o d a y , fully immersed i n this historicism, we f i n d i t very difficult t o realize the o r i g i n a l i t y o f t h a t discovery. W e are conscious o f existing w i t h i n a determined p e r i o d of t i m e , w h i c h is destined to pass away l i k e a l l other periods, to be superseded b y another. W e are capable o f t r a n s p o r t i n g ourselves i n t o other ages, and we live, n a t u r a l l y , i n a w o r l d directly constituted b y t e m p o r a l i t y . W h e n we study a n y t h i n g whatever, we need to k n o w its date, how i t fits i n t o h i s t o r y ; otherwise we d o not understand i t . W e t h i n k of every t h i n g as b e i n g enclosed i n its historical surroundings; o u r v i e w of a city, for example, is not the direct v i e w o f w h a t the c i t y is at present; rather, the c i t y seems to us to be a n a c c u m u l a t i o n of strata o f time, a h i s t o r i c a l ' result,' i n w h i c h the past survives a n d the f u t u r e is i n t u r n betokened. F o r D i l t h e y , this is closely related to the skepticism produced b y the discrepancies a m o n g ideas a n d systems. T h e s p i r i t u a l attitude w i t h w h i c h we live excludes everyt h i n g definitive; we do not believe we are settling any problems once a n d for a l l ; r a t h e r , we believe we are s u p p l y i n g answers w h i c h are appropriate to o u r o w n era, b u t w h i c h are destined to be superseded or corrected i n the f u t u r e . T h e vision of history i n D i l t h e y i s ' a n immense field of r u i n s . ' I t should be recalled t h a t this was not always the case. T h e r e have been l o n g periods i n w h i c h m a n has regarded m a n y things as standing a p a r t f r o m time, as being e n d o w e d w i t h a certain timeless v a l i d i t y : this is the case w i t h a l l classical periods. B u t i n less peaceful and settled epochs, especially i n those w h i c h signified a break w i t h previous norms, the present was declared to be a new situation a n d , at the same t i m e , a valid situation, w i t h o u t f u r t h e r qualification. I n contrast to history, w i t h its storehouse of errors, the present seemed to be a rectification a n d e l i m i n a t i o n of error. T o d a y we feel the peculiar ephemerality o f the historical event, b u t at the same t i m e w e feel t h a t the m o m e n t i n w h i c h we live is i n c l u d e d i n t h a t history. I n order to understand any person's name we must a d d to i t the t w o l i m i t i n g dates of his life, a n d w h e n t h i n k i n g about ourselves we anticipate the still uncertain second date, w h i c h is represented b y a question m a r k . Never so m u c h as n o w has m a n lived his life as the true reality of counted days. A n d t h a t is history. . . . I n our age i t is a c q u i r i n g basic a n d o r i g i n a l
* Biografta de la Filosqfia, V I , 37 [Obras, I I ] .
Dilthey
characteristics h i t h e r t o u n k n o w n . . . because o u r age is discovering t h a t w h a t changes is man himself. N o t o n l y is m a n w i t h i n history, n o t o n l y does he have a history, b u t he is h i s t o r y ; h i s t o r i c i t y affects the very being o f m a n . " T h i s is D i l t h e y ' s p o i n t o f v i e w . H U M A N L I F E . D i l t h e y discovers life i n its historical dimension. O f a l l the different ways i n w h i c h the nineteenth century came to t o u c h u p o n that r e a l i t y w h i c h is life, D i l t h e y ' s has been the most f r u i t f u l . L i f e is historical i n its very substance; h i s t o r y is life itself, f r o m the v i e w p o i n t of the t o t a l i t y of m a n k i n d . T h i s v i t a l r e a l i t y is not a " w o r l d " o f things and persons; i t is a complex (Zusammenhang, the w o r d D i l t h e y constantly repeats) o f v i t a l relationships. E a c h " t h i n g " is no m o r e t h a n a n ingredient o f o u r life, and acquires its m e a n i n g w i t h i n o u r life. " [ A person's] f r i e n d is a force w h i c h exalts his o w n existence; each m e m b e r of his f a m i l y has a determined place i n his life, he understands everything i n his e n v i r o n m e n t as life a n d s p i r i t w h i c h have become objectivized there. T h e bench i n f r o n t o f his door, his house a n d garden have t h e i r essence and their m e a n i n g i n this objectivity. T h u s life creates its o w n w o r l d t h r o u g h the eyes o f each i n d i v i d u a l " ( T h e o r y of World
Views).
T h e w o r l d is always a correlate of the self, a n d the self does n o t exist w i t h o u t the other t e r m , the world. N o w , this life appears as a r i d d l e w h i c h needs t o be understood; death, especially, evokes this need, because it is the incomprehensible. B u t life can o n l y be understoodfrom its own viewpoint; knowledge cannot look b e h i n d the scenes of life. F o r this reason, i n contrast t o causal explanation, the m e t h o d of the n a t u r a l sciences, D i l t h e y makes descriptive understanding the m e t h o d o f the sciences of the s p i r i t , o f the knowledge o f life. Since understanding o f the life of others, especially i n the past, requires an explanation, Dilthey's m e t h o d is hermeneutics. Hence the " d e s c r i p t i v e a n d a n a l y t i c a l " psychology w h i c h he calls for, i n o p p o s i t i o n to the explicative psychology of the e x p e r i m e n t a l psychologists, w h o treat h u m a n life as nature. T h e structure o f h u m a n life is a u n i t a r y t o t a l i t y , w h i c h is d e t e r m i n e d b y the selfhood of the person. Every psychical state is a process, b u t life itself is n o t ; r a t h e r , i t is a lasting c o n t i n u i t y w i t h i n w h i c h occur the processes w h i c h pass by, D i l t h e y says, " i n the same w a y as a fastm o v i n g traveler sees objects disappear b e h i n d h i m w h i c h a m o m e n t before were i n f r o n t o f h i m and alongside h i m , w h i l e the t o t a l i t y o f the landscape is always preserved." T h a t is, the p r i m a r y r e a l i t y is the u n i t y of life, within w h i c h occur t h e ' ' t h i n g s , " o n the one h a n d , a n d , o n the other, the p s y c h i c a l ' ' processes.'' T h i s basic interconnection w h i c h is life is characterized byfinality.
The
Idea
of
Life
H u m a n life is a n o r i g i n a l a n d transcendent u n i t y : i t is n o t a composite o f elements; rather, starting o u t f r o m its u n i t a r y r e a l i t y , the psychical functions are differentiated, b u t r e m a i n u n i t e d w i t h life i n their i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n . D i l t h e y says t h a t this fact, w h i c h is expressed i n its highest degree as the u n i t y o f consciousness a n d the u n i t y o f the person, completely distinguishes psychical life f r o m the e n t i r e corporeal w o r l d . Therefore, D i l t h e y rejects a l l forms o f psychical f r a g m e n t a t i o n . Seen i n another way, this u n i t y occurs w i t h i n a m i l i e u . T h e u n i t y of life is engaged i n m u t u a l reaction w i t h the external w o r l d . Life consists i n the action of the v i t a l u n i t y u p o n s t i m u l i , m o d i f y i n g t h e m or a d a p t i n g t h e m to its conditions b y means o f v o l u n t a r y activity. L a s t l y , transition f r o m one set o f members to another w i t h i n psychical life does n o t take place b y simple causality i n t h e sense o f external n a t u r e ; ideas or representations do n o t c o n t a i n a reason sufficient to m a k e t h e m become processes, nor do processes have sufficient reason for their t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t o v o l i t i o n a l processes. D i l t h e y says t h a t one could imagine a n e n t i t y w h i c h w o u l d be a mere subject o f representations, and w h i c h i n the midst of the t u m u l t o f a battle w o u l d be a n indifferent a n d volitionless spectator o f its o w n destruction; o r one could imagine t h a t this same entity m i g h t f o l l o w the struggle r a g i n g about i t w i t h feelings o f fear and a l a r m , b u t t h a t nevertheless n o defensive movements w o u l d proceed f r o m those feelings. T h e connection that occurs between the elements o f psychical life is o f a p e c u l i a r nature a n d o f a superior t y p e ; i t proceeds f r o m t h a t p r i m a r y t o t a l i t y w h i c h is h u m a n life itself. Dilthey's analysis of h u m a n life, inadequate b u t e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y perceptive, is the p o i n t of departure for present-day metaphysics, a n d i t is constantly necessary to refer back to i t . P H I L O S O P H Y . " ' W h a t is p h i l o s o p h y ? ' is a question w h i c h cannot be answered i n accordance w i t h each man's personal taste; r a t h e r , the function o f philosophy must be e m p i r i c a l l y discovered i n history. I t is clear t h a t this h i s t o r y must be understood f r o m the v i e w p o i n t o f the spiritual v i t a l i t y f r o m w h i c h we ourselves proceed, and i n w h i c h we live p h i l o s o p h y . " These are Dilthey's t w o g u i d i n g ideas: the essence o f philosophy can be discovered only i n the historical reality o f w h a t i t actually has been, a n d history can be understood only f r o m the viewp o i n t of the life i n w h i c h i t is located. Therefore, D i l t h e y must make a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a l l o f history i n order to determine the b e i n g o f philosophy. T h e t w o chief traits t h a t are c o m m o n to all philosophy are universality a n d autonomy, or the c l a i m to be universally v a l i d : a l l other traits are p e c u l i a r to i n d i v i d u a l philosophies. D i l t h e y corrects the idea o f p r o d u c t i v e t h o u g h t w h i c h the G e r m a n
Dilthey
3S3
idealists found so appealing. Philosophy, D i l t h e y says, analyzes, b u t does n o t produce; i t creates n o t h i n g ; i t can o n l y show that w h i c h exists. T h a t is, he renews i n a truer a n d m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l f o r m the d e m a n d of the positivists to h o l d fast to the things, a n d not to replace t h e m w i t h m e n t a l constructions; this a t t i t u d e w i l l be shared b y phenomenology. Philosophy is the science o f the r e a l ; t h a t is, o f all the r e a l , w i t h o u t truncations. B u t D i l t h e y is v e r y far removed f r o m a position of intellectual absolutism. T h e intelligence is not something isolated and standing a p a r t ; rather, i t is a vital function a n d has m e a n i n g only w i t h i n the t o t a l i t y w h i c h is h u m a n l i f e ; knowledge o f life must be " d e r i v e d . " B u t i n the second place, knowledge does n o t exhaust the r e a l : " I n the f i n a l analysis r e a l i t y itself cannot be explained logically, b u t o n l y understood. I n a l l r e a l i t y w h i c h occurs to us as such there is something ineffable, u n k n o w a b l e . " T h a t w h i c h is supplied to us, he adds, is irrational. T h e basis o f systematic philosophy for D i l t h e y is autognosis, consciousness of one's self (Selbstbesinnung). F r o m autognosis one proceeds to hermeneutics, t h a t is, knowledge o f the life o f others, the compreh e n d i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f other lives, a n d thus o f history. Lastly, one goes f r o m that p o i n t to the knowledge o f nature. Philosophy proceeds f r o m w h a t is nearest—ourselves—to w h a t is farthest away. Even t h o u g h absolute systems are not possible—each system contains its o w n p a r t i a l t r u t h w h i c h , at least i n p r i n c i p l e , does not exclude the equally p a r t i a l t r u t h o f the other systems—man conceives them a n d they remain as a constituent fact o f h u m a n consciousness. Every m a n has a Weltanschauung, a n idea or view o f the w o r l d , w h i c h is u l t i m a t e l y r o o t e d not i n the intellect, b u t i n life itself. These w o r l d views, w h i c h philosophy at first studies historically, can be reduced to types i n order t h a t we may k n o w the possible ways o f i m a g i n i n g the universe; thus, O r t e g a (Guillermo Dilthey y la idea de la vida) summarizes the four themes of Dilthey's philosophy i n this w a y : ( 1 ) history o f the evolution o f philosophy as a propaedeutic; ( 2 ) theory o f knowledge; (3) classific a t i o n of the sciences; (4) theory o f w o r l d views. D i l t h e y calls for a
Reason; this is w h a t his Introclaims to be. H e hopes to achieve for " the other h a l f o f the globus intellectualis" w h a t K a n t d i d for the k n o w l edge o f nature. T h i s is Dilthey's g r a n d i d e a : i n opposition to the i r r a t i o n a l i s m reached i n the nineteenth c e n t u r y b y those w h o are aware of the failure o f " p u r e reason" w h e n they wish to conceive o f life a n d history, D i l t h e y champions a new, broader f o r m of reason w h i c h does not exclude the historical element. B u t strictly speaking, he duction
to the Sciences
Critique
of Historical
of the Spirit
The
Idea
of
Life
tries o n l y to apply reason to h i s t o r y ; t h a t is, reason itself. Therefore, he ends b y considering the w o r l d views as being beyond h i s t o r y , a n d to t h a t extent he cannot account, t h a t is, give a reason, for t h e m . T h e t e r m historical reason i n D i l they does n o t — c a n n o t — h a v e the scope w h i c h we shall see i t a t t a i n i n the philosophy of O r t e g a . THE M E A N I N G O F D I L T H E Y ' S P H I L O S O P H Y . W e have seen t h a t i n D i l t h e y ' s t h o u g h t t w o disciplines are indissolubly l i n k e d : psychology and history. O n the one h a n d , there is the analysis of what is human, especially b y means of autognosis: philosophy as a science of the spirit. O n the other h a n d , this h u m a n r e a l i t y is history, i t is human life; this analysis is philosophy of life a n d t h e r e f o r e — t o the extent t o w h i c h this life is t h a t of others a n d i n the p a s t — h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , hermeneutics. I t s m o d e of knowledge is n o t causal explanation b u t understanding (Verständnis), and its t h e o r y constitutes a t r u e c r i t i q u e o f historical reason. W e n o w have several of the ingredients o f present-day p h i l o s o p h y ; but the g r o u p must still be c o m p l e t e d . I n the first place, there must be a new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of vital time, supplied b y H e n r i Bergson; i n the second place, after European p h i l o s o p h y has once more re-entered its t r a d i t i o n o f metaphysical a n d systematic t h o u g h t , the r e n e w a l — d u e to B r e n t a n o — o f the idea of intentionality w i l l stimulate the r i p e n i n g i n E d m u n d Husserl's philosophy o f a new m e t h o d : phenomenology. We shall t h e n have a l l the elements t h a t constitute the philosophy w h i c h is being p r a c t i c e d today: i n G e r m a n y , existential philosophy, especially t h a t of M a r t i n Heidegger; i n Spain, Ortega's metaphysics of vital reason, w h i c h is, moreover, quite different i n meaning a n d i n its most p r o f o u n d tendencies; a n d the doctrines w h i c h are derived f r o m one or the other or f r o m b o t h .
2.
SIMMEL
L I F E A N D W O R K S . Georg S i m m e l , w h o was b o r n i n 1858 a n d d i e d i n 1918, was almost exactly c o n t e m p o r a r y w i t h Bergson a n d Husserl. H e was a professor at the universities o f Strasbourg a n d B e r l i n a n d concerned h i m s e l f especially w i t h topics related to sociology a n d history. I n spite of some essential faults, Simmel's Soziologie is one o f the most p e n e t r a t i n g attempts to give a firm basis to this discipline. S i m m e l — one o f the most i m p o r t a n t figures i n philosophy i n the early years o f this c e n t u r y — a t t e m p t e d i n his w r i t i n g s to come as close as possible to a direct contact w i t h objects a n d p r o b l e m s ; this gives his w o r k s t h e i r p r i n c i p a l source of attraction a n d , at the same t i m e , their fruitfulness.
His most i m p o r t a n t writings are
Kant
(a series of lectures),
Schopen-
Simmel hauer
und Nietzsche,
Probleme
Philosophic
der Geschichtsphilosophie
des Geldes
(The
(Philosophy o f M o n e y ) ,
Die
Problems o f the Philosophy o f
H i s t o r y ) , Grundprobleme der Philosophic ( F u n d a m e n t a l Problems o f Philosophy) and Lebensanschauung ( V i e w o f L i f e ) ; t h e n there are his i m p o r t a n t Sociology a n d a great m a n y perspicacious essays on Feminine Culture,
Philosophy
of Coquetry,
Philosophy
of Fashion,
and
so
on.
T h e most p r o f o u n d aspect o f Simmel's t h o u g h t is his conception of life, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the f o r m i n w h i c h i t is e x p o u n d e d i n the first chapter o f his Lebensanschauung. Simmel says t h a t man's position i n the w o r l d is defined, because at every m o m e n t m a n finds t h a t he is between t w o l i m i t s . Always, everywhere, we have l i m i t s , a n d therefore w e also are l i m i t s . T h e r e is always a greater and a lesser, a closer to a n d f a r t h e r t h a n our here a n d now a n d thus; our life appears to be defined b y t w o values w h i c h f r e q u e n t l y conflict w i t h one a n o t h e r : richness a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n . L I F E AS T R A N S C E N D E N C E .
B u t the interesting p o i n t is t h a t , a l t h o u g h the general l i m i t is necessary to life, any specific, i n d i v i d u a l l i m i t m a y be transcended and exceeded. O u r actions are s i m i l a r to those of the chess p l a y e r ; the chess player needs to k n o w w i t h a certain p r o b a b i l i t y the consequences of a m o v e , b u t the game w o u l d be impossible i f this prescience were to be extended indefinitely. T h e l i m i t s to h u m a n life can be displaced; thus S i m m e l says paradoxically, " i n a l l senses we are l i m i t e d , and i n no sense are we l i m i t e d . " E v e r y v i t a l action implies b o t h a l i m i t a t i o n and the o v e r c o m i n g o f a l i m i t . T h e spirit exceeds itself, transcends itself, a n d thus appears to be t h a t w h i c h is absolutely alive. I n this sense, i t is possible to say that m a n is something that o u g h t to be surpassed; m a n is a l i m i t e d entity t h a t does n o t have any limits. T I M E . S i m m e l begins w i t h a reflection on t i m e i n o r d e r to achieve a c o n c e p t i o n of life. The
present
is a n unextended moment;
i t is not time any
m o r e t h a n a p o i n t is space. T h e present is n o t h i n g b u t the c o m i n g together o f the past a n d the f u t u r e , w h i c h are themselves, of course, t e m p o r a l magnitudes, t h a t is, t i m e . However, the past no longer exists, and the f u t u r e does not yet exist; reality occurs o n l y i n the present, and therefore reality is i n n o sense t e m p o r a l . " T i m e does not exist i n r e a l i t y , a n d reality is n o t t i m e . " B u t i n spite of e v e r y t h i n g , when life is lived subjectively, i t is felt to be real i n a temporal extension. English and Spanish usage do n o t understand by " p r e s e n t " a mere p o i n t , b u t r a t h e r a p o r t i o n of the past together w i t h a p o r t i o n of the future, w i t h l i m i t s t h a t vary depending o n whether we are speaking of the personal, p o l i t i c a l or historical present. L i f e appears to refer to the future. This statement can be understood i n a r a t h e r t r i v i a l sense: m a n always proposes a f u t u r e end for himself;
3
86
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Idea
of
Life
however, this end is a n i m m o v a b l e p o i n t a n d is separated f r o m the present, a n d w h a t is most characteristic o f the present w i l l ' s v i t a l p e n e t r a t i o n (Hineinleben) i n t o the f u t u r e is that life''s present consists of its transcending the present. T h e r e is no real threshold between the present a n d the f u t u r e . T h e future is n o t a l a n d t h a t we have never t r o d d e n u p o n , separated f r o m the present b y a b o u n d a r y ; r a t h e r , we live i n a frontier region that belongs to the future as m u c h as to the present. " L i f e is really b o t h past a n d f u t u r e . " Simmel adds, " O n l y for life is t i m e r e a l . " " T i m e is the f o r m o f consciousness o f t h a t w h i c h constitutes life itself i n its i m m e d i a t e concreteness, a n d w h i c h cannot be enunciated, b u t only l i v e d ; i t is life stripped of its c o n t e n t s . " THE E S S E N C E O F L I F E . Present life transcends t h a t w h i c h is n o t its presentness, b u t i n such a w a y t h a t this transcending nevertheless constitutes its presentness. T h i s is the essence of life. Life is o u r name for a mode of existence the r e a l i t y of w h i c h is n o t restricted to the present m o m e n t , i n w h i c h the past a n d the future are n o t relegated to i r r e a l i t y ; rather, life's peculiar c o n t i n u i t y is really m a i n t a i n e d beyond this separation; t h a t is, the past really exists b y e x t e n d i n g i n t o the present, a n d the present really exists b y expanding i n t o the future.
N o w t h e n , life occurs o n l y i n individuals; and this creates a serious p r o b l e m : life is at the same t i m e u n l i m i t e d c o n t i n u i t y a n d a n ego d e t e r m i n e d b y its limits. Life's transcendence is i m m a n e n t i n i t ; life's p r i m a r y phenomenon is t h a t i t can exceed itself; i n Simmel's phrase, this constitutes " w h a t is absolute i n our r e l a t i v i t y . " Therefore, the p r i n c i p a l a n t i n o m y is the one t h a t exists between f o r m a n d c o n t i n u i t y ; f o r m is i n d i v i d u a l i t y , a n d life is everywhere individual. S i m m e l relates his conception o f life to Schopenhauer's doctrine o f the w i l l to live a n d Nietzsche's d o c t r i n e of the w i l l to p o w e r ; however, he observes t h a t w h a t is decisive is the agreement between the t w o moments. T h e r e are t w o definitions of life w h i c h r e c i p r o c a l l y complem e n t each o t h e r : life is more life a n d i t is more than life. T h i s w o r d more is no accidental a d d i t i o n . L i f e is a m o t i o n w h i c h is always p u l l i n g things t o w a r d i t , a t t r a c t i n g things i n order to change t h e m i n t o life. L i f e can exist o n l y because i t is more life. D e a t h , w h i c h according to S i m m e l resides i n life beforehand, is also a n aspect of life's transcending itself. Procreation a n d death b o t h transcend life; one u p w a r d a n d the other d o w n w a r d . L i f e requires f o r m , a n d at the same t i m e i t requires something more than form. B u t life, especially i n its creative aspect, also transcends its o w n contents. I t is n o t only more life; i t is more than life. Life is o n l y a subject's constant transcending of w h a t is foreign to i t or the p r o d u c t i o n of w h a t is foreign to i t . T h i s does n o t subjectivize this foreign b e i n g ; rather, i t
Bergson
retains its independence, its " b e i n g more t h a n life " ; t h e absoluteness o f the other, o f the more, is the f o r m u l a a n d c o n d i t i o n o f life. Life's u n i t y exists i n the f o r m o f a dualism. T h u s , i n a final clever p a r a d o x Simmel can say t h a t life finds its essence a n d its realization i n being more life a n d more than life; that is, t h a t life's positive element is as such already its comparative element. These ideas f r o m Simmel's m a t u r i t y (his Lebensanschauung dates from the year o f his death, 1918) signify a b r i l l i a n t step o n t h e r o a d to the comprehension o f the r e a l i t y o f h u m a n life.
3.
BERGSON
L I F E A N D W O R K S . W i t h Bergson w e leave the n i n e t e e n t h century a n d enter the t w e n t i e t h . Bergson's roots a n d the first phase o f his i n t e l l e c t u a l development are i n the past century; b u t his life as w e l l as the u l t i m a t e significance o f his philosophy already b e l o n g to o u r epoch or, m o r e p r o p e r l y speaking, are a typical m o m e n t o f t r a n s i t i o n , like the rest o f the philosophy o f t h a t t i m e : one more step o n the r o a d to o v e r c o m i n g positivism i n o r d e r to r e t u r n once more to metaphysics.
H e n r i Bergson was b o r n i n Paris i n 1859 a n d d i e d early i n J a n u a r y i n 1941. H e was a professor o f philosophy i n the Lycées o f Angers and C l e r m o n t - F e r r a n d , i n the u n i v e r s i t y i n the latter c i t y , i n t h e Collège R o l l i n a n d i n the L y c é e H e n r i I V o f Paris; also i n t h e École N o r m a l e Supérieure. After 1919, he was professor i n the Collège de France, the highest F r e n c h i n s t i t u t i o n o f l e a r n i n g . D u r i n g his last years, o l d age forced h i m to w i t h d r a w f r o m p u b l i c life. H i s most i m p o r t a n t works are his doctoral thesis, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, Matière et mémoire, Le rire, Durée et simultanéité, L'évolution créatrice; t w o collections o f essays a n d lectures: L'énergie spirituelle a n d La pensée et le mouvant ( w h i c h contains his Introduction à la métaphysique), a n d his last book, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion, i n w h i c h his increasing rapprochement w i t h C a t h o l i c i s m was first made public. S P A C E A N D T I M E . Space a n d t i m e are usually t h o u g h t to be comp a r a b l e a n d parallel t e r m s — K a n t understood t h e m as such. Bergson reacts energetically against this idea, a n d says t h a t these terms are opposites. Space is a n aggregate o f points, f r o m a n y one o f w h i c h we can pass t o a n y other; t i m e , o n the other h a n d , is irreversible, i t has a direction, a n d every m o m e n t o f t i m e is unsubstitutable, irreplaceable, a t r u e creation w h i c h cannot be repeated and to w h i c h w e cannot r e t u r n . B u t Bergson's time is n o t the t i m e o f the clock, spatialized t i m e , w h i c h can be measured a n d w h i c h is represented b y a l e n g t h , b u t living time
3
88
The
Idea
of
Life
as i t presents itself i n its i m m e d i a t e reality to the consciousness: i t is w h a t is called real duration, dure'e réelle. Space a n d t i m e are t o each other as m a t t e r to m e m o r y , as the b o d y to the soul; they correspond to t w o basically different a n d even, i n a certain sense, opposite i n t e l l e c t u a l modes of m a n : t h o u g h t a n d i n t u i t i o n . I N T E L L E C T A N D I N T U I T I O N . Conceptual t h o u g h t , w h i c h i n a n a r r o w sense is called intellect, is the m e t h o d of scientific k n o w l e d g e ; i t moves a m o n g the things a n d tends t o w a r d spatialization. I n general, science seeks measurement; this process is accomplished either d i r e c t l y t h r o u g h the comparison o f l e n g t h (the meter a n d the r o a d b e i n g measured) or b y means o f a n a t t e m p t to reduce o t h e r magnitudes to l e n g t h or to another f o r m of space, for example, t o a n angle, w h i c h can i n t u r n be reduced to l e n g t h (the clock, the m a n o m e t e r , the d y n a m o m e t e r a n d the t h e r m o m e t e r measure various magnitudes w h i c h are i n themselves non-spatial b y c o m p a r i n g t h e m w i t h the displacem e n t o f a needle or the expansion i n length o f a c o l u m n o f m e r c u r y ) . T h o u g h t , w h i c h is directed t o w a r d science—or t o w a r d p r a c t i c a l life, t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n o f things—proceeds by means o f logic, observation a n d concepts. T h o u g h t tends t o discover r i g i d concepts, w h i c h the i n tellect manages easily. I t tends to solidify everything. W h a t is m o r e , t h o u g h t searches for similarities, for things t h a t various i n d i v i d u a l s h a v e i n c o m m o n ; t h o u g h t generalizes. I n t e l l e c t is the sphere o f t h a t w h i c h is i n e r t , at rest, a n d therefore discontinuous; i t is the sphere o f matter. These conditions are different f r o m those r e q u i r e d for the apprehension o f l i v i n g reality. Specifically, t h o u g h t does n o t a p p r e h e n d l i v i n g t i m e , duration, the t i m e t h a t I must w a i t for sugar t o dissolve i n a glass of water. Real m o t i o n , such as i t is seen f r o m w i t h i n w h e n I m o v e m y a r m , is perceived b y the intellect as a series o f disconnected states of rest, w h i c h are not m o t i o n . M o v i n g one's a r m is a single, continuous, living m o t i o n . T h o u g h t schematizes i t , fixes i t i n a concept, stops i t ; t o be precise, i t robs i t of its f l u i d i t y . O n l y intuition is capable of appreh e n d i n g real duration, m o t i o n i n its true i m m e d i a c y — i n short, life. I n t u i t i o n can capture m o b i l i t y , i t can comprehend the v e r y process o f m o t i o n a n d l i v i n g t i m e before these things become p e t r i f i e d i n t o concepts. I n t e l l e c t has a p p l i c a t i o n to matter a n d therefore t o science, whereas i n t u i t i o n adapts itself t o life. Bergson relates this faculty t o instinct, t h a t marvelous non-conceptual a d a p t a t i o n t o v i t a l problems w h i c h animals enjoy. Bergson says t h a t science a n d philosophy, w h i c h are conceived f r o m a s p a t i a l p o i n t of view, have h a r d l y k n o w n i n t u i t i o n ; they have always o p e r a t e d w i t h the categories of conceptual t h o u g h t , which is of no use in
Blondel
3*9
life and real time. Therefore, m a n finds i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t to conceive o f these realities ; he lacks the appropriate instruments a n d , w h a t is m o r e , the h a b i t o f m a k i n g use of them. H e n r i Bergson's p h i losophy approaches the reality o f life w i t h an attitude t h a t differs f r o m the usual one ; his attitude is based o n m o b i l i t y itself, o n processes that are n o t yet realized and c o m p l e t e d , t h a t are i n the very act o f being realized. I n t u i t i o n tries to c a p t u r e life f r o m w i t h i n ; i t does n o t first k i l l life, i n o r d e r to reduce i t to a spatialized, conceptual scheme. apprehending
" T h e r e a l i t y of life is d y n a m i c ; it is a v i t a l i m p u l s e or T h i s impulse determines a n evolution i n t i m e ; a n d this e v o l u t i o n is creative, because r e a l i t y is a l i v i n g c o n t i n u i t y . I t is not composed o f given elements, a n d o n l y after reality has been consumm a t e d c a n t h o u g h t t r y to compose i t w i t h i m m o v a b l e a n d given elements, as i f one could recompose m o t i o n f r o m a series o f states of repose. T h i s puts Bergson i n contact w i t h the philosophy of life, w h i c h finds i n h i m one of its clearest a n d most fecund precursors. H o w e v e r , one must make i t clear t h a t Bergson understands life i n a biological sense r a t h e r t h a n i n a biographical or historical sense, a n d t h a t therefore he does n o t touch u p o n the most essential peculiarity o f human life. Bergson's t h o u g h t must be c o m p l e t e d along these lines i f i t is to achieve f u l l efficacy. O n the other h a n d , i t w i l l also be necessary to overcome the irrationalism t h a t menaces every f o r m of i n t u i t i o n . Philosophy is strict knowledge a n d , therefore, concept a n d reason. Reason w i l l have to conceive o f this n e w object, life, i n a l l its fluidity and m o b i l i t y ; i t w i l l be different f r o m scientific and m a t h e m a t i c a l reason, but i t m u s t always be reason. O r t e g a has seen this fully a n d clearly, and therefore he is careful always to speak of'vital reason. "ELAN VITAL.
élan vital.
4.
BLONDEL
M a u r i c e Blondel (1861-1949) is, after Bergson, the most o r i g i n a l a n d interesting figure i n c o n t e m p o r a r y French philosophy. A p u p i l o f O l l é - L a p r u n e , about w h o m he w r o t e a w o r k , Blondel represents a n aspect w i t h i n Catholic t h o u g h t t h a t has been called " p r a g m a t i s m " — i n a very different sense f r o m E n g l i s h a n d A m e r i c a n p r a g m a t i s m — o r " a c t i v i s m " or, better yet, philosophy of action. His p r i n c i p a l w o r k is a book t h a t is now already q u i t e o l d , since i t dates f r o m 1893: his d o c t o r a l thesis entitled L'Action. Essai d'une critique de la vie et d'une science de la pratique. After m a n y years d u r i n g w h i c h his a c t i v i t y as a w r i t e r was restricted to collaborations i n philosophical j o u r n a l s , Blondel published not very l o n g ago three extremely l o n g works : La pensée, L'Être et les êtres a n d a complete revision, i n t w o volumes, of his
39°
The
Idea
of
Life
old thesis VAction, as w e l l as several studies o n apologetics a n d on the C h r i s t i a n spirit i n its relationships w i t h philosophy. BlondePs p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e is the question w h e t h e r h u m a n life has m e a n i n g a n d m a n has a destiny. I act w i t h o u t k n o w i n g w h a t action is, w i t h o u t h a v i n g wished to l i v e , w i t h o u t k n o w i n g w h o I a m or i f I a m . A n d according to w h a t w e are t o l d , I a m n o t able at any cost to conquer nothingness; r a t h e r , I a m condemned to life, d e a t h a n d eternity w i t h o u t h a v i n g k n o w n o r wished for this. N o w t h e n , this p r o b l e m , w h i c h is inevitable, is i n e v i t a b l y solved b y m a n , for good or i l l , t h r o u g h his actions. A c t i o n is man's t r u e , effective answer to the p r o b l e m of l i f e ; therefore, action is necessarily man's first concern. A c t i o n is the most general a n d most constant fact of m y life: Blondel says t h a t action is more t h a n a f a c t — i t is a necessity, since even suicide is a n act. W e can p e r f o r m a n a c t i o n only b y closing o f f a l l other ways a n d d e p r i v i n g ourselves of everything we could have otherwise k n o w n or obtained. Every decision cuts off an infinite n u m b e r o f possible actions. A n d we cannot desist a n d suspend a c t i o n , n o r can we delay. I f we do not act, something acts i n us or outside us, a n d almost always against us. Blondel says t h a t peace is defeat; a c t i o n does n o t tolerate a n y postponement other t h a n death. Therefore I c a n n o t be guided b y m y ideas, because complete analysis is not possible to a finite i n t e l l i gence, a n d practical life does n o t tolerate delays: I cannot defer a c t i o n u n t i l I o b t a i n evidence, a n d a l l evidence is p a r t i a l . F u r t h e r m o r e , m y decisions usually go b e y o n d m y thoughts, a n d m y actions usually go b e y o n d m y intentions. Therefore, we must construct a science of a c t i o n ; i t must be i n t e g r a l because every f o r m o f t h i n k i n g a n d l i v i n g deliberately implies a complete solution to the p r o b l e m o f existence. B l o n d e l , w h o of course refers to the religious p r o b l e m , is opposed to i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m a n d fideism, n o t i n the name of feeling, b u t i n t h a t o f a c t i o n . H i s c r i t i c i s m of Scholasticism derives f r o m this. Entities are, above a l l , w h a t they do. Philosophy must " p r e v e n t t h o u g h t f r o m i d o l i z i n g itself, show the insufficiency a n d n a t u r a l s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f speculation, i l l u m i n e the exigencies and paths of a c t i o n , prepare a n d j u s t i f y the ways of f a i t h . " W e cannot discuss here the details o f this philosophy, the p r o f o u n d a n d difficult aspects of BlondePs t h o u g h t ; i t is sufficient to indicate the v i e w p o i n t f r o m w h i c h B l o n d e l considers the p r o b l e m of life.
5.
UNAMUNO
L I F E A N D W O R K S . M i g u e l de U n a m u n o , w h o was b o r n i n Bilbao i n 1864 a n d died i n Salamanca i n 1936, is one o f the most i m p o r t a n t
Unamuno
Spanish thinkers. H e cannot be considered a philosopher i n the strict sense, a n d yet he is o f extreme interest i n the history o f p h i l o s o p h y . H i s w o r k a n d very personality constitute a philosophic p r o b l e m i n themselves. H e w r o t e copiously i n m a n y different genres: poetry, novels a n d stories, plays, ideological essays. F r o m the v i e w p o i n t o f philosophy, his most i m p o r t a n t works are his seven volumes o f Ensayos (Essays); La vida de Don Quijote y Sancho ( T h e Life o f D o n Q u i x o t e a n d Sancho); Del sentimiento trágico de la vida ( T h e T r a g i c Sense o f L i f e ) , his most n o t e w o r t h y book; La agonía del cristianismo ( T h e A g o n y o f C h r i s t i a n i t y ) ; a n d especially some o f his novels and stories: Paz en la
guerra, Niebla, Abel Sánchez, La tía Tula, San Manuel Bueno, mártir a n d his poetical n a r r a t i v e Teresa. H i s P R O B L E M . U n a m u n o , w h o h a d a keen sense o f the problems o f philosophy, concentrated his w h o l e i n t e l l e c t u a l and l i t e r a r y a c t i v i t y on w h a t he called " t h e one a n d o n l y q u e s t i o n " : the personal immortality o f the i n d i v i d u a l m a n , w h o lives a n d dies and does n o t w i s h to die completely. A t a m o m e n t o f history w h e n the generally accepted sciences d i d n o t even touch u p o n this question, U n a m u n o , i n exasperat i o n , m a d e i t the center o f his w h o l e life. H i s religious f a i t h , weak a n d r i d d l e d w i t h doubts ( " i n the throes o f d e a t h , " to use his expression) d i d n o t satisfy h i m . H e thus felt o b l i g e d to pose the p r o b l e m o f i m m o r t a l i t y , w h i c h , o f course, leads to the p r o b l e m o f death a n d n a t u r a l l y refers back to the problems o f life a n d the. person. B u t instead o f w r i t i n g philosophical studies, as m i g h t have been expected, U n a m u n o composed essays w i t h l i t t l e scientific content, poems a n d especially stories. W h a t is the reason for this unusual l i t e r a r y p r o d u c tion? H i s M E T H O D . F o r historical reasons, because he belonged to a p a r t i c u l a r generation, U n a m u n o was i m b u e d w i t h the irrationalism w h i c h I h a v e already m e n t i o n e d repeatedly. L i k e K i e r k e g a a r d , like W i l l i a m James, like Bergson, he believed t h a t reason does n o t h e l p us to k n o w l i f e ; t h a t w h e n t r y i n g to apprehend life i n fixed a n d r i g i d concepts, reason robs i t o f its fluidity w i t h i n t i m e and kills i t . O f course, these t h i n k e r s were speaking o f p u r e reason, the reason o f physics a n d mathematics. T h i s conviction caused U n a m u n o to look a w a y f r o m reason a n d t u r n t o w a r d the imagination, w h i c h he called " t h e most substantial f a c u l t y . " Since i t was no longer possible to grasp the reality o f life b y means o f reason, he t r i e d to do i t w i t h the i m a g i n a t i o n , living life a n d anticipating the experience o f death i n narratives. R e a l i z i n g t h a t h u m a n life is a h a p p e n i n g w i t h i n t i m e , something t o l d or n a r r a t e d — i n short, h i s t o r y — U n a m u n o used the s t o r y — a n o r i g i n a l f o r m o f story w h i c h m i g h t be called existential or, better yet, personal—
392
The
Idea
of
Life
as his m e t h o d o f knowledge. T h i s k i n d o f story constitutes a very f r u i t f u l attempt t o a p p r e h e n d h u m a n reality d i r e c t l y ; i t is, t o be sure, a n inadequate a t t e m p t , b u t one that c o u l d serve as the basis for a precise metaphysics, w h i c h is not to be f o u n d i n U n a m u n o . Despite his diffuseness a n d his failure t o achieve p h i l o s o p h i c a l fullness, U n a m u n o was a b r i l l i a n t prophet w h o a n t i c i p a t e d m a n y i m p o r t a n t discoveries concerning that reality w h i c h is h u m a n life ; a n d his findings, i n c o m p l e t e as they are, frequently go b e y o n d a l l p h i l o sophical investigations u p to the present. U n a m u n o is a t r u e precursor o f the metaphysics o f existence or life, a precursor w i t h a personality o f his o w n . This justifies his inclusion i n the history o f philosophy, a n inclusion w h i c h was d e t e r m i n e d i n the final analysis b y the fruitfulness o f his prophecies, w h i c h cannot be studied i n d e t a i l here. * * See my book Miguel de Unamuno (1943) for a complete study of the philosophical problem posed by Unamuno and his contribution to contemporary philosophy (English translation, Harvard University Press, in press). See also La Escuela de Madrid [Obras, V ] .
English^Language
Philosophy
A s i n almost every era, English philosophy presents i n o u r day characteristics t h a t are relatively different f r o m those of C o n t i n e n t a l philosophy; nevertheless, this does n o t preclude parallel developments a n d a l o n g series o f reciprocal influences. Moreover, i n the last years o f the n i n e t e e n t h century a new factor enters the scene: the U n i t e d States. Closely related to the B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n b u t strongly influenced b y the Germans a n d , to a lesser extent, by the French, the philosophical speculation w h i c h begins i n A m e r i c a is conditioned b y the distinctive social structure of the c o u n t r y a n d its different perspective on the problems o f philosophy. I n o u r century, A m e r i c a n t h o u g h t has i n t u r n influenced British t h o u g h t ; m a n y thinkers o f b o t h nations have been active, have taught a n d have l i v e d o n b o t h sides o f the A t l a n t i c ; thus, a f o r m o f English-language philosophy has been created w h i c h has various nuances b u t w h i c h presents a c o m m o n configuration. I n the last few decades, this philosophy has begun to influence t h a t o f the European C o n t i n e n t , a n d i t is therefore necessary to take i n t o account, i f only very concisely, its general m e a n i n g a n d its major phases, since i t has become t o d a y a decisive component o f Western philosophy. i.
PRAGMATISM
T h e first i m p o r t a n t a n d o r i g i n a l s p r o u t i n g o f A m e r i c a n t h o u g h t was p r a g m a t i s m . Previously the " transcendentalists"—among t h e m R a l p h W a l d o Emerson ( i 803-1882) a n d H e n r y D a v i d T h o r e a u ( 1 8 1 7 - 1 8 6 2 ) — h a d i n i t i a t e d a reaction against m a t e r i a l i s m a n d the 393
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394
Philosophy
prevalence o f positivist t h i n k i n g ; this was i n N e w E n g l a n d , i n the area o f Boston a n d C a m b r i d g e , the site of H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y a n d the first center o f i n t e l l e c t u a l life i n A m e r i c a . B u t A m e r i c a reaches its first philosophical m a t u r i t y o n l y w i t h the pragmatists. T h e t e r m " p r a g matism " is especially l i n k e d w i t h the n a m e o f W i l l i a m J a m e s ; he was the first to use this designation i n w r i t i n g , i n 1898; b u t he h a d adopted the t e r m f r o m Peirce, w h o originated the d o c t r i n e a n d h a d already expounded i t t w e n t y years earlier. T h e r e has been a great deal o f discussion o n the relationship between Peirce a n d James. F o r g o t t e n for m a n y years, Peirce has recently aroused l i v e l y interest; h e has been esteemed m u c h m o r e h i g h l y t h a n James, w h o h a d enjoyed enormous prestige a n d was t h e n subjected to severe c r i t i c i s m . T h e r e has been discussion o f the connection between the t w o interpretations o f p r a g m a t i s m ; i t has even been said t h a t " the philosophical m o v e m e n t k n o w n as p r a g m a t i s m is i n large p a r t the result o f James's h a v i n g misunderstood P e i r c e . " T h i s is, w i t h o u t d o u b t , a n exaggeration w h i c h is due to the belated " d i s c o v e r y " o f Peirce a n d the reaction against the exclusive l i n k i n g o f p r a g m a t i s m w i t h James a n d his i m m e d i a t e followers. T h i s is n o t the place to review the numerous ramifications o f the p r o b l e m ; i t w i l l be sufficient to indicate the o r i g i n a l f o r m i n w h i c h the doctrine appears i n the w o r k o f b o t h m e n a n d i n the subsequent tradition. P E I R C E . Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), a c o n t e m p o r a r y o f D i l t h e y , Brentano a n d Nietzsche, was b o r n i n C a m b r i d g e , Massachusetts ; he t a u g h t sporadically at H a r v a r d a n d Johns H o p k i n s for several years, a n d p u b l i s h e d very l i t t l e — o n l y articles a n d reviews o f p h i l o sophical books, w h i c h since his death have been collected i n t o volumes: i n 1923 there appeared the v o l u m e Chance, Love and Logic, edited b y M o r r i s R . C o h e n ; f r o m 1931 o n , the eight volumes o f The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited b y Charles H a r t s h o r n e , Paul Weiss a n d A r t h u r W . Burks; a n d finally, another anthology volume,
The
Philosophy
of
Peirce
(or,
The
Philosophical
Writings
of
edited b y Justus Buchler. O n e o f the most i n f l u e n t i a l o f Peirce's w r i t i n g s was the article " H o w to M a k e O u r Ideas C l e a r , " published i n J a n u a r y , 1878; i t is the o r i g i n a l a n d basic t e x t o f p r a g matism. Peirce was able to complete o n l y one book, The Grand Logic, w h i c h was published as a posthumous w o r k a m o n g his collected papers.
Peirce),
Peirce's first readings i n philosophy were F r i e d r i c h Schiller's Letters Education of Man, R i c h a r d Whately's Logic, a n d the Critique of Pure Reason, w h i c h he learned almost b y h e a r t ; he also underwent the influence o f Scotus a n d o f his o w n education i n m a t h e on the Esthetic
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matics. Peirce's a t t i t u d e is p r i m a r i l y theoretic: for h i m philosophy belongs as a " s u b c l a s s " u n d e r the science o f discovery, w h i c h i n t u r n is a b r a n c h o f theoretic science. T h e f u n c t i o n o f philosophy is to e x p l a i n and show the u n i t y i n the diversity o f the universe; philosophy has a twofold p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e : logic, the r e l a t i o n o f signs w i t h their objects, and phenomenology, the r a w experience o f the objective real w o r l d . These t w o disciplines converge i n three basic metaphysical categories w h i c h are i n t e r r e l a t e d i n a very complex fashion; these m a y be called q u a l i t y , r e l a t i o n a n d m e d i a t i o n . Peirce's t h o u g h t , w h i c h is q u i t e fragmentary a n d n o t very systematic, touched u p o n numerous problems of the t h e o r y o f knowledge, logic a n d metaphysics; b u t , above a l l , he proposed to establish a method, a n d t h a t is precisely w h a t p r a g m a t i s m is. I t is " a m e t h o d o f ascertaining the m e a n i n g o f h a r d words a n d o f abstract concepts," or else " a m e t h o d o f ascertaining the m e a n i n g s . . . o f . . . intellectual concepts, t h a t is to say, o f those u p o n the structure o f w h i c h , arguments concerning objective fact m a y h i n g e . " M o r e specifically, Peirce proposed to clarify the t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysical questions and, where possible, to eliminate t h e m as meaningless. This shows that Peirce's p r a g m a t i s m is, above a l l , a logical discipline, as opposed to the t r a d i t i o n a l view o f p r a g m a t i s m derived f r o m a p a r t i a l a n d inexact i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the f o r m w h i c h i t a c q u i r e d i n the w o r k o f James. But i t should be noted t h a t the " l o g i c a l " side is not foreign to James, nor the " p r a c t i c a l " side to Peirce. F o r the latter, the function o f t h o u g h t is to produce habits o f a c t i o n ; b y this p a t h he arrives, laboriously a n d i n f r e q u e n t l y obscure a n d infelicitous formulations, at the idea of p r a g m a t i s m . T h e first expression o f p r a g m a t i s m ( i n " H o w to M a k e O u r Ideas C l e a r " ) is this: " Consider w h a t effects, t h a t m i g h t conceivably have p r a c t i c a l bearings, we conceive the object o f o u r conception to have. T h e n , our conception o f these effects is the whole o f o u r conception o f the o b j e c t . " A second f o r m u l a , somewhat l i g h t e r a n d clearer, runs: " I n order to ascertain the m e a n i n g o f a n i n t e l l e c t u a l conception one should consider w h a t p r a c t i c a l consequences m i g h t conceivably result b y necessity f r o m the t r u t h of that conception; a n d the sum o f these consequences w i l l constitute the entire m e a n i n g o f the c o n c e p t i o n . " L a s t l y , a t h i r d thesis gives greater precision to the m e a n i n g o f pragm a t i s m i n Peirce: " P r a g m a t i s m is the p r i n c i p l e t h a t every theoretical j u d g m e n t expressible i n a sentence i n the i n d i c a t i v e m o o d is a confused f o r m o f thought whose o n l y meaning, i f i t has any, lies i n its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical m a x i m expressible as a c o n d i t i o n a l sentence h a v i n g its apodosis i n the i m p e r a t i v e m o o d . "
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Philosophy
I n the face o f the increasing use o f the t e r m " p r a g m a t i s m " i n a sense different f r o m that w h i c h he wished to give i t , Peirce renounced the use o f i t a n d coined the n a m e " p r a g m a t i c i s m " for his o w n p h i losophy ; this name he j u d g e d " u g l y enough to be safe f r o m k i d n a p p e r s . " Peirce's w o r k , still n o t published i n its entirety a n d o n l y p a r t i a l l y k n o w n a n d studied, appears today to be very f r u i t f u l a n d valuable. J A M E S . W i l l i a m James (1842-1910), w h o was o f the same generat i o n as Peirce, was b o r n i n N e w Y o r k . A professor at H a r v a r d f r o m 1872 o n , a physician, a psychologist a n d a philosopher, h e is the most o u t s t a n d i n g figure i n A m e r i c a n philosophy. James, w h o was a n extremely v i v i d a n d s t i m u l a t i n g w r i t e r a n d lecturer, f u l l o f ideas, c o n t r i b u t e d m o r e t h a n anyone else to the a c c l i m a t i z a t i o n o f p h i l o sophical t h o u g h t i n the U n i t e d States. H i s first o r i e n t a t i o n was t o w a r d psychology, a discipline i n w h i c h he was one o f the most f r u i t f u l classic researchers; his t w o books o n psychology are b o t h masterpieces, unsurpassed i n certain respects; m a n y parts o f t h e m are s t i l l v a l i d a n d fertile. H i s a t t e n t i o n was then centered o n m o r a l a n d religious themes a n d , finally, o n metaphysics. H i s m a j o r works are The Principles of Psychology, i n t w o volumes, a n d a m o r e concise and c o m p a c t treatise, A
Textbook
Experience; A Pluralistic and
Essays
of Psychology; Pragmatism:
The
Will
A New
Universe;
The Meaning
in Radical
Empiricism.
to Believe;
Name
for
of Truth;
The
Some
Old
Varieties Ways
Some Problems
of of of
Religious Thinking; Philosophy;
James's philosophy is one o f the attempts undertaken a t the close o f the n i n e t e e n t h century to conceive o f a n d understand h u m a n life. H i s psychology represents a p e n e t r a t i n g comprehension o f the r e a l i t y o f psychical life i n its dynamic aspect: the image of the stream of consciousness is a revealing one. B u t this interest i n life assumes the f o r m — h a b i t u a l i n his d a y — o f anti-intellectualism a n d , further, o f i r r a t i o n a l i s m ; f r o m K i e r k e g a a r d t h r o u g h O s w a l d Spengler a n d U n a m u n o , a n d i n c l u d i n g Nietzsche a n d Bergson, this was the risk r u n b y a l l analogous movements. W i t h this a t t i t u d e James takes u p t h e theme o f p r a g m a t i s m . As he understands i t , there can be no difference t h a t makes no difference; we m i g h t say t h a t no difference can be indifferent. " T h e w h o l e f u n c t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y , " he says, " ought to be to find o u t w h a t definite difference i t w i l l make to y o u a n d me, at definite instants o f o u r life, i f this w o r l d - f o r m u l a or t h a t w o r l d - f o r m u l a be the true o n e . " T h i s p r a g m a t i s m , i n James's o p i n i o n , is not new: its antecedents are f o u n d i n Socrates and A r i s t o t l e , Locke and Berkeley; i t is the e m p i r i c a l a t t i t u d e , b u t i n a m o r e basic a n d less objectionable f o r m ; i t means the abandonment o f abstraction a n d insufficiency, o f v e r b a l
Pragmatism
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solutions, b a d a p r i o r i reasoning, r i g i d principles, closed systems a n d presumptive absolutes a n d origins, a n d a r e t u r n to concreteness a n d adequacy, facts, action a n d power. I n contrast to the conception of metaphysics as a n enigma t h a t is solved b y means o f a w o r d or a p r i n c i p l e , James asks for the cash value o f every w o r d ; this is not so m u c h a solution as a p r o g r a m for further w o r k a n d especially a n i n d i c a t i o n o f how existing realities m a y be changed. " T h e o r i e s thus become instruments, n o t answers to enigmas, i n w h i c h we can rest." P r a g m a t i s m thus understood has no dogmas or doctrines; i t is a m e t h o d t h a t is compatible w i t h various doctrines; i t is " the a t t i t u d e o f l o o k i n g a w a y f r o m first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; a n d o f l o o k i n g towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts." T h i s leads to a n idea o f t r u t h . James renounces the idea o f a h a r m o n y between t h o u g h t a n d the things, since one c o u l d make a j u d g m e n t about this only b y means o f t h o u g h t a n d the things are accessible only w i t h i n t h o u g h t . Ideas, w h i c h are p a r t o f o u r experience, are t r u e to the extent t h a t they help us to enter i n t o satisfactory relationships w i t h other parts o f o u r experience. T r u t h is w h a t " w o r k s , " w h a t " t u r n s out a l l r i g h t , " w h a t " i t w o u l d be better to b e l i e v e , " i n other words, w h a t " we ought to believe." T h e formulations o f this conception o f t r u t h are relatively vague a n d u n c e r t a i n i n James a n d his followers; the f r u i t f u l seed enclosed i n this idea is obscured b y the i r r a t i o n a l i s m that threatens i t , by the tendency o f these p h i losophers t o w a r d a n a r r o w u t i l i t a r i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f this " t u r n i n g o u t a l l r i g h t " or being successful, a tendency w h i c h cuts o f f a n entire decisive g r o u p of vital acts, such as those o f strict i n t e l l e c t i o n ; therefore, p r a g m a t i s m signifies a d e g r a d a t i o n o f the idea o f t r u t h , even f r o m its o w n p o i n t o f v i e w — t h a t is, f r o m w h a t its p o i n t o f v i e w w o u l d be i f one were to take i t perfectly seriously. T H E C O N T I N U E R S O F P R A G M A T I S M . T h e most i m p o r t a n t later pragmatists are J o h n Dewey, F e r d i n a n d C a n n i n g Scott Schiller a n d R a l p h B a r t o n Perry ( i 8 7 6 - 1 9 5 7 ) . J o h n Dewey (1859-1952), w h o was b o r n i n the same year as Husserl a n d Bergson, was for m a n y years a professor i n C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y ; t h r o u g h o u t his l o n g lifetime he was one o f the most i n f l u e n t i a l m e n i n the intellectual life o f the U n i t e d States, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the field o f education. His most i m p o r t a n t books are
How
We
Reconstruction The
Democracy
in Philosophy,
and Education,
Experience
Essays
and Mature,
in Experimental A Common
Faith,
of Inquiry, Problems of Man. Dewey used the w o r d t o designate his personal version o f p r a g m a t i s m .
Theory
mentalism
Think,
Logic, Logic: instru-
F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937) was b o r n i n A l t o n a (near H a m b u r g ) ,
398
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Philosophy
G e r m a n y . H e was a professor i n C o r n e l l a n d O x f o r d a n d later i n C a l i f o r n i a . His p r i n c i p a l books are Humanism a n d Studies in Humanism. Schiller is also associated w i t h James's philosophy; he considered his o w n t h o u g h t , humanism, t o be a w i d e r f o r m o f p r a g m a t i s m , one t h a t encompassed a l l philosophical disciplines. L i k e the earlier p r a g m a tists, Schiller m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t r u t h depends o n p r a c t i c a l consequences; since a l l i n t e l l e c t u a l life has as a n u l t i m a t e goal the i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n e n t i t y , a l l knowledge is s u b o r d i n a t e to h u m a n n a t u r e a n d its f u n d a m e n t a l necessities. H u m a n i s m , Schiller says, " i s m e r e l y the perception t h a t t h e philosophical p r o b l e m concerns h u m a n beings s t r i v i n g t o comprehend a w o r l d o f h u m a n experience b y the resources o f h u m a n m i n d s . " Schiller believes t h a t we actually t r a n s f o r m t h e realities b y means o f o u r cognitive efforts a n d t h a t our desires a n d ideas are therefore real forces i n the c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f the w o r l d .
2.
PERSONALISM
A second d o m i n a n t t r e n d i n t h e Anglo-Saxon t h o u g h t o f o u r t i m e is t h e movement k n o w n as personalism. O n e must note t h a t this t e r m is used i n a n a r r o w sense to designate a coherent g r o u p or school, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the U n i t e d States, a n d i n a w i d e r sense t o designate m a n y different groups w h i c h are u n i t e d b y a c o m m o n tendency a n d a s p i r i t u a l affinity; I use the t e r m here i n the w i d e r sense. Personalism's most general feature is its insistence o n the r e a l i t y a n d value o f the person a n d its a t t e m p t t o i n t e r p r e t reality f r o m this p o i n t o f v i e w . Closely related to p r a g m a t i s m w i t h respect to the p r o b l e m o f logic, opposed to mechanism a n d behaviorism w i t h respect to psychology, a n d also hostile to a naturalistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f r e a l i t y , personalism affirms h u m a n freedom a n d the personal basis o f r e a l i t y , t h a t is, the existence o f a personal G o d . A few idealist thinkers, such as Josiah R o y c e ( i 8 5 5 - 1 9 1 6 ) , are closely related to personalism. Royce, w h o was b o r n i n California a n d t a u g h t i n H a r v a r d , w r o t e The Spirit of
Modern Philosophy, Studies in Good and Evil, The World and the Individual, The Conception of Immortality, The Philosophy of Loyalty. H i s w o r k has been i n f l u e n t i a l i n E u r o p e , p a r t l y t h r o u g h the interest o f G a b r i e l M a r c e l , w h o wrote a book a b o u t h i m . F. C. S. Schiller's h u m a n i s m is also closely related to personalism. T h e classic f o r m o f A m e r i c a n personalism is represented b y a g r o u p o f thinkers centered i n N e w E n g l a n d : Borden Parker B o w n e (1847— 1910), a professor i n Boston U n i v e r s i t y (Metaphysics, Philosophy of Theism, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, Personalism); M a r y W h i t o n
Recent
Trends
399
Calkins (1863-1930) of Wellesley College (An Introduction to Psychology, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, The Good Man and the Good); E d g a r Sheffield B r i g h t m a n (1884-1952), Bowne's successor i n Boston U n i v e r sity (The Problem of God, A Philosophy of Religion, An Introduction to Philosophy). W i l l i a m Ernest H o c k i n g (b. 1873) of H a r v a r d is also connected w i t h this g r o u p ; his p r i n c i p a l w o r k is The Meaning of God in Human Experience.
3.
RECENT
TRENDS
S A N T A Y A N A . Jorge R u i z de Santayana—George Santayana, as he signed his w o r k — w a s b o r n i n M a d r i d i n 1863, grew u p i n A v i l a , was educated i n Boston, taught i n H a r v a r d , a n d died i n R o m e i n 1952. Santayana w r o t e b r i l l i a n t l y i n English a n d was a novelist a n d essayist; he was n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y systematic, a n d has at times been called a realist or n a t u r a l i s t — r a t h e r vague d e n o m i n a t i o n s — a n d also a materialist. H e left a copious a n d v a r i e d b o d y o f w o r k , p a r t l y autob i o g r a p h i c a l , t h a t perhaps culminates i n his idea o f animal faith as a m e t h o d o f a p p r o a c h i n g reality. H i s most i m p o r t a n t books are The Sense of Beauty ; The Life of Reason (five v o l u m e s ) ; Scepticism and Animal Faith; The Realms of Being (comprised o f four parts: The Realm of Essence, The Realm of Matter, The Realm of Truth, The Realm of Spirit); his a u t o b i o g r a p h y consisting ofPersons and Places, The Middle Span, a n d My Host the World; the novel The Last Puritan; and finally, Dominations and Powers. A L E X A N D E R . Samuel Alexander (1859-1938) was b o r n i n Sydney, Australia. H e was a professor i n O x f o r d a n d Manchester, a n d his t h o u g h t , w h i c h has also been i n t e r p r e t e d b o t h as n a t u r a l i s m a n d as realism, represents one o f the grandest metaphysical constructions i n c o n t e m p o r a r y English philosophy. H i s major w o r k is Space, Time and Deity. W H I T E H E A D . A l f r e d N o r t h W h i t e h e a d (1861-1947), the most i m p o r t a n t o f the contemporary English philosophers, t a u g h t i n E n g l a n d ( p r i n c i p a l l y mathematics) a n d after 1924 i n the U n i t e d States ( H a r v a r d a n d Wellesley), where he specialized i n philosophy. His m a t h e m a t i c a l a n d logical w o r k is o f enormous i m p o r t a n c e , especially his Principia Mathematica ( w r i t t e n i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h B e r t r a n d Russell). H i s deep interest i n problems o f education is evident i n a series o f works t h a t spans most of his life (The Aims of Education); the p r o b l e m of t h o u g h t a n d its forms is another p r i n c i p a l theme i n his w o r k (The Function of Reason, Adventures of Ideas, Modes of Thought); his m a j o r w o r k is a book o f metaphysics presented as " a n
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English-Language
Philosophy
essay i n cosmology," Process and Reality (1929). W h i t e h e a d ' s influence is d o m i n a n t today, perhaps even more so i n the U n i t e d States t h a n i n England. R U S S E L L . B e r t r a n d Russell (b. 1872), w h o has t a u g h t i n C a m b r i d g e , was associated w i t h W h i t e h e a d on the great w o r k Principia Mathematica a n d , like W h i t e h e a d , is the author o f some extremely i m p o r t a n t contributions to t h e theory of mathematics a n d s y m b o l i c l o g i c : The Principles of Mathematics, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. H e is also the a u t h o r o f a book o n L e i b n i z , Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibnitz; o f A History of Western Philosophy; o f t w o books entitled The Analysis of Mind a n d The Analysis of Matter; o f a general treatise, An Outline of Philosophy; o f a book on the theory o f knowledge, Human Knowledge, a n d o f numerous essays and books o n e d u c a t i o n , sociology a n d politics. H e has received the N o b e l Prize i n L i t e r a t u r e (as d i d R u d o l f C h r i s t o p h E u c k e n a n d H e n r i Bergson before h i m ) . M O R E R E C E N T M O V E M E N T S . I n E n g l a n d a n d t h e U n i t e d States, these are the decisive t h i n k e r s ; however, they d o n o t represent the o n l y trends, a n d the influence o f C o n t i n e n t a l E u r o p e a n philosophy is steadily increasing, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n A m e r i c a . T h e E n g l i s h m a n R o b i n George C o l l i n g w o o d (1889-1943) already belonged to a cosmopolitan Western t r a d i t i o n t h a t was p a r t i c u l a r l y influenced b y I t a l i a n i d e a l i s m ; this is evident i n his t w o posthumous books The Idea of Nature a n d The Idea of History. T h e same is true to a lesser degree o f George E d w a r d M o o r e (1873-1958), a u t h o r o f Principia Ethica, Ethics, a n d Philosophical Studies, w h o devoted a considerable p a r t o f his w o r k to the analysis o f w h i c h w e w i l l speak later; a n d o f C h a r l i e D u n b a r B r o a d (b. 1887), w h o w r o t e The Mind and Its Place in Nature, Five Types of Ethical Theory, Ethics and the History of Philosophy. B o t h M o o r e a n d Broad were professors i n C a m b r i d g e .
A n energetic presentation o f European t h o u g h t is also f o u n d i n such A m e r i c a n thinkers as George Boas (b. 1891) a n d especially A r t h u r O . Lovejoy (1873-1962), whose most i m p o r t a n t book is The Great Chain of Being: A Study in the History of an Idea, as w e l l as Charles W . H e n d e l , w h o studied Rousseau a n d the English philosophers, a n d B r a n d Blanshard (The Nature of Thought, and so o n ) , b o t h o f Yale, a n d P h i l i p E. W h e e l w r i g h t (The Burning Fountain, Heraclitus, Metaphor and Reality). However, the t r e n d w h i c h has the most followers i n E n g l a n d today is the one w h i c h we c a n call, rather imprecisely, " linguistic analysis," i n w h i c h almost a l l present-day British thinkers p a r t i c i p a t e , a l t h o u g h to very different extents. T h e origins o f this m o v e m e n t are p a r t l y English a n d p a r t l y E u r o p e a n , d e r i v i n g especially f r o m the V i e n n a
Recent
Trends
401
Circle ( M o r i t z Schlick, Hans Reichenbach, O t t o N e u r a t h a n d R u d o l f C a r n a p , who for m a n y years was a professor i n the U n i t e d States). T h e p r i n c i p a l influence was u n d o u b t e d l y L u d w i g W i t t g e n s t e i n (1889-1951), a n A u s t r i a n b y b i r t h , b u t for m a n y years a professor i n Cambridge. H i s famous Tractatus logico-philosophicus was first p u b lished i n 1921, a n d the f o l l o w i n g year i t was republished i n the o r i g i n a l G e r m a n , together w i t h a n English translation and a n i n t r o d u c t i o n by B e r t r a n d Russell. Later, W i t t g e n s t e i n changed his viewpoints considerably i n various articles w h i c h were collected after his death i n Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations) a n d other volumes. A m o n g the most interesting contemporary B r i t i s h philosophers are G i l b e r t Ryle (The Concept of AieW), J o h n O . W i s d o m
(Other Minds, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis), C. K . Odgen a n d I . A . Richards (The Meaning of Meaning), J o h n L . A u s t i n (1911-1960; Sense and Sensibilia, Philosophical Papers) a n d A l f r e d Jules A y e r (Lan-
guage, Truth and Logic; The Problem of Knowledge). I n spite o f t h e i r great differences, these philosophical groups have some features i n c o m m o n . I n A u s t r i a as w e l l as i n E n g l a n d a n d the U n i t e d States, the V i e n n a Circle c u l t i v a t e d symbolic or m a t h e m a t i c a l logic, i n the same m a n n e r as d i d the Polish logicians o f the so-called W a r s a w C i r c l e ; this t r e n d , a field t h a t is l i m i t e d b u t o f considerable interest, is perhaps the most valuable one. T h e w o r k o f Lukasiewicz, A l f r e d T a r s k i , C a r n a p , K u r t Godel a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n himself is l i n k e d w i t h that o f the A m e r i c a n logicians Clarence I r v i n g Lewis (Mind and '.he World Order), A l o n z o C h u r c h , Susanne K . Langer (the a u t h o r o f :he interesting book Philosophy in a New Key), W i l l a r d v. O . Q u i n e
(Mathematical Logic, Methods of Logic, From a Logical Point of View), Charles W . M o r r i s (Signs, Language and Behavior), and so f o r t h . H o w ever, aside f r o m this, a n d b y i g n o r i n g subtle differences, the positions w h i c h these groups take can be s u m m a r i l y characterized i n the f o l l o w i n g w a y : their general tendency is anti-metaphysical—some consider metaphysics impossible, others t h i n k that i t is meaningless, t h a t its statements are tautologies or p u r e l y " e m o t i v e " or w i t h o u t verifiable m e a n i n g ; they are " e m p i r i c i s t s " i n a new sense o f the w o r d — t h e s e movements are sometimes called " l o g i c a l e m p i r i c i s m " o r " l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m " or " n e o p o s i t i v i s m , " a n d sometimes " s c i e n t i f i c a l i s m " o r " p h y s i c a l i s m , " a n d they t e n d t o w a r d the m a t h e m a t i z a t i o n o f t h o u g h t . I n E n g l a n d there has been a d o m i n a n t belief t h a t the m a j o r i t y o f philosophical problems, i n c l u d i n g philosophical statements, are meaningless a n d due merely to imperfections o f language, w h i c h makes i t obligatory to undertake a clarification o f the questions b y means o f " linguistic analysis." N a t u r a l l y , philosophy has
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undertaken such clarification at a l l times, b u t present-day English thought, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n O x f o r d , claims t h a t philosophy is confined to such c l a r i f i c a t i o n . M a n y o f these thinkers believe that any scientific statement can always be reduced to a physical statement, t h a t is, one that says t h a t such-and-such a n event happened i n such-and-such a place at such-and-such a t i m e ; i n other w o r d s , to a pure statement o f fact. T h i s a t t i t u d e leads to behaviorism o r the description o f conduct, a n d i n sociology to a social behaviorism. These positions rest o n a rather a r b i t r a r y idea o f metaphysics t h a t is identified w i t h certain very special forms o f i t or, rather, w i t h the conception o f i t t h a t these thinkers i n v e n t ; o n the other h a n d , m a n y o f their affirmations are a n y t h i n g b u t e m p i r i c a l , a n d cannot be j u s t i f i e d o n the basis o f their o w n suppositions. I n general, the analysis o f " s t a t e m e n t s " ignores the factor t h a t makes t h e m philosophical statements, a n d this type o f t h o u g h t tends to raise objections r a t h e r t h a n practice philosophy. A p a r t f r o m this, m a n y o f these efforts are interesting c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f certain questions. T h e increase i n relations between E u r o p e a n d the U n i t e d States i n the last t w e n t y years has been enormous, a n d is steadily being accelerated. Phenomenology; Heidegger's w o r k ; secondarily, t h a t o f the existentialists ; Ortega's w o r k t h r o u g h numerous translations ; the presence o f E t i e n n e Gilson a n d Jacques M a r i t a i n — a l l these c o n t r i b u t e to re-establishing the complexity o f p h i l o s o p h y i n the U n i t e d States a n d o v e r c o m i n g the onesidedness o f the English influence t h a t h e l d sway for several decades. O n the other h a n d , A m e r i c a n t h o u g h t is becoming m o r e a n d m o r e w e l l k n o w n i n E u r o p e . I t is to be h o p e d t h a t the c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the t w o sections o f Western philosophy, w h i c h was b r o k e n at the t i m e o f the Renaissance a n d w h i c h since t h e n has been evident o n l y i n a few discontinuous instances, w i l l be i n creased. O n l y i n this w a y can we g a i n f u l l possession o f the Western philosophical t r a d i t i o n .
Husserl s 3
Phenomeno
H U S S E R L A N D H I S S C H O O L . E d m u n d Husserl was b o r n i n 185g—in the same year as B e r g s o n — a n d died i n 1938. H e is Brentano's most i m p o r t a n t a n d o r i g i n a l p u p i l . Husserl was a professor i n Göttingen a n d later i n F r e i b u r g . H e devoted himself to the study o f mathematics a n d , r a t h e r late i n life, t o philosophy. I n 1900 he published the first e d i t i o n o f his Logische Untersuchungen ( L o g i c a l Investigations), w h i c h renewed and transformed philosophy; i n 1913 there appeared the first v o l u m e — t h e o n l y one published d u r i n g his l i f e t i m e — o f his Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie undphänomenologischen Philosophie) (Ideas for a P u r e Phenomenology a n d Phenomenological P h i l o s o p h y ) . His p r i n c i p a l works also i n c l u d e Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft (Philosophy as S t r i c t K n o w l e d g e , 1911), Formale und transzendentale Logik ( F o r m a l a n d Transcendental L o g i c , 1929) a n d Méditations cartésiennes (1931). H i s p u p i l Heidegger p u b l i s h e d the Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren £eitbewusstseins (Lectures for the Phenomenology o f the I n t e r n a l Consciousness o f T i m e ) . After his death, several essays a n d the b o o k entitled Erfahrung und Urteil (Experience a n d J u d g m e n t , 1939) w e r e published. M u c h o f Husserl's w o r k is still u n p u b l i s h e d or i n the process o f being p u b l i s h e d , a n d this precludes a n exposition of his last doctrines, p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h respect to the genealogy o f logic. T h e Husserl Archives i n t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f L o u v a i n c o n t a i n almost 45,000 pages—mostly i n s h o r t h a n d — o f unpublished materials. T h e f o l l o w i n g w o r k s have recently been published : the o r i g i n a l text o f the Cartesianische Meditationen; Die Idee der Phänomenologie o f 1907; a new enlarged e d i t i o n o f the first book o f the Ideen and the second a n d t h i r d books o f 4°3
Husserl's
Phenomenology
t h a t w o r k ; the i m p o r t a n t b o o k Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie ( T h e Crisis o f the E u r o p e a n Sciences a n d Transcendental Phenomenology); t w o volumes o f the Erste Philosophie (First Philosophy), a n d most recently, v o l u m e I X o f the Husserliana series: Phänomenologische Psychologie (Phenomenological Psychology). Husserl derives essentially f r o m B r e n t a n o ; therefore, his p h i l o sophical t r a d i t i o n is the same as Brentano's: Catholic, S c h o l a s t i c — i n short, Greek. W e must also note the influence o f Bolzano, o f the E n g l i s h p h i l o s o p h e r s — H u m e i n p a r t i c u l a r — a n d most m a r k e d l y , of L e i b n i z ; a n d also, of course, the influence of K a n t i a n i s m . Husserl is also related to Brentano's other pupils, especially to A n t o n M a r t y a n d Alexius M e i n o n g . T h e phenomenological school, famous for its h i g h standards o f scholarship, precision and fecundity, has arisen a r o u n d the figure of Husserl; its j o u r n a l , the. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Yearbook for Philosophy a n d Phenom e n o l o g i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n ) , was first published i n 1913. T h e phenomenologists include the most i m p o r t a n t philosophers o f G e r m a n y , n o t a b l y M a x Scheler a n d Heidegger, w h o represent a n o r i g i n a l position w i t h i n phenomenology.
1.
IDEAL
OBJECTS
P S Y C H O L O G I S M . Phenomenology makes its appearance j u s t as the t w e n t i e t h century commences. As we have said, Husserl's Logical Investigations was published i n 1900; i n this w o r k Husserl says he is dealing w i t h "descriptive p s y c h o l o g y " ; the t e r m phenomenology does not yet appear. T h i s book represents a decisive step i n the restoration o f a u t h e n t i c philosophy. I n order to understand phenomenology, one must locate oneself i n the h i s t o r i c a l framework i n w h i c h i t appears. I n 1900 there was no ruling philosophy. T h e idealist t r a d i t i o n had been lost ever since the years i n w h i c h positivism h e l d s w a y ; philosophical anarchy p r e v a i l e d . T h e r e were o n l y certain trends t h a t opposed metaphysics, w h i c h they considered something to be s h u n n e d ; English-style associationist psychology was d o m i n a n t . T h i s psychology had i n f i l t r a t e d the p h i l o sophical doctrines, c o n t a m i n a t i n g t h e m w i t h psychologism. Psychologism is the a t t i t u d e b y w h i c h a philosophical discipline is reduced to psychology. F o r example, the psychologists understand logic to be a normative discipline of the psychical acts o f t h i n k i n g . L o g i c w o u l d thus consists o f rules o n how to t h i n k w e l l .
Husserl opposes this psychologism a n d devotes the first v o l u m e o f
Ideal
Objects
his Investigations to c o m b a t i n g a n d overcoming it. I f he h a d n o t b r o k e n w i t h psychologism, he w o u l d n o t have been able to create a p h i losophy. A m i n u t e l y detailed controversy was necessary, the fine points o f w h i c h need n o t concern us, since psychologism is no longer a problem. H e r e as w e l l as elsewhere, Husserl's m e t h o d consists o f m a k i n g descriptions. Husserl agrees t h a t logic deals w i t h ideas, concepts, j u d g m e n t s , a n d the like, b u t he does n o t agree t h a t i t is concerned w i t h things of a psychological n a t u r e ; r a t h e r , he says that logic always deals w i t h ideal objects. Husserl takes a single case a n d observes its m e a n i n g : for example, the p r i n c i p l e of c o n t r a d i c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to the psychologists, this p r i n c i p l e meant t h a t m a n c o u l d not conceive t h a t A is A a n d n o t - A . Husserl rejects this view a n d says that the m e a n i n g o f the p r i n c i p l e is t h a t i f A is A , i t cannot be n o t - A . T h e p r i n c i p l e of contrad i c t i o n does n o t refer to the possibility o f man's conceiving somet h i n g , b u t to the t r u t h o f the concept, to the behavior o f objects. T h e p r i n c i p l e o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n , a n d likewise a l l the other principles of logic, have objective v a l i d i t y . O n one h a n d , psychologism can be skepticism; o n the other h a n d , i t tends t o w a r d relativism. Skepticism denies that t r u t h can be k n o w n ; r e l a t i v i s m allows t h a t a n y t h i n g can be true, b u t t h a t t r u t h is relative: there is a r e l a t i v i s m o f i n d i v i d u a l s a n d a relativism o f the species; t r u t h — t h e v a l i d i t y o f the p r i n c i p l e s — w o u l d be l i m i t e d to the h u m a n species, w h i c h cannot conceive t h a t A is A and n o t - A . Husserl refutes r e l a t i v i s m , n o t only the r e l a t i v i s m o f individuals, b u t also t h a t of the species; he says t h a t i f the angels understand A, being a n d truth to mean the same things we understand t h e m to mean, they must say t h a t A cannot be A a n d n o t - A at the same t i m e . I t is a question o f a n a p r i o r i a n d absolute v a l i d i t y t h a t is independent of the psychological conditions o f t h o u g h t . Therefore Husserl calls for, i n contraposition to psychologistic logic, a. pure logic of ideal objects, that is, of the principles of logic, o f the pure logical laws a n d meanings. P H E N O M E N O L O G Y . Phenomenology is a science of i d e a l objects. I t is therefore a n a p r i o r i science; f u r t h e r m o r e , i t is a universal science,
because i t is a science o f the essences
of experiences.
An
experience
is any psychical act; i f phenomenology involves the study o f all experiences, i t must also involve the study of the objects of the experiences, because the experiences are intentional, a n d reference to an object is essential to t h e m . Therefore, phenomenology, w h i c h comprises the study o f experiences a n d their i n t e n t i o n a l objects, is a p r i o r i a n d universal. (Erlebnis)
I D E A L BEING.
I d e a l objects are distinguished f r o m real objects b y a n
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Phenomenology
essential characteristic. I d e a l b e i n g is non-temporal, whereas real being is subject to t i m e , is hie et nunc, here and n o w . T h e desk as w h i c h I a m w r i t i n g is here i n the r o o m a n d , above a l l , at this m o m e n t ; b u t the n u m b e r three, the circle a n d the principle o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n have a v a l i d i t y apart f r o m t i m e . Therefore, ideal objects are species; they do not have the p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u a t i o n w h i c h is the here a n d now. I n Greek, idea is t h a t w h i c h is seen; this is also t r u e oí species i n L a t i n . I d e a l objects are thus species or, using another t e r m , essences. P R O B L E M S O F I D E A L B E I N G . F o r Husserl, ideal objects are eternal, or r a t h e r non-temporal. B u t i t m i g h t be asked w h e r e they are located. Husserl finds this question meaningless. T h e r e are three possible hypostases, a l l of w h i c h he rejects:
(1) T h e psychological hypostasis, w h i c h w o u l d consist i n locating ideal objects i n the m i n d ; t h e i r existence w o u l d be m e n t a l , they w o u l d exist in my
thought.
(2) T h e metaphysical hypostasis—which is t h a t o f Platonism, for e x a m p l e — i n w h i c h the ideas are entities located i n a n i m m a t e r i a l place. (3) T h e A u g u s t i n i a n or theological hypostasis, i n w h i c h the ideas are located i n the m i n d of G o d , w h o is eternally t h i n k i n g t h e m . Husserl, sharing the fear o f metaphysics w h i c h was the inheritance of his era, avoids a l l semblance of i t and says t h a t i d e a l objects merely have validity. This p o i n t p r o v o k e d a controversy over t r u t h between Husserl and Heidegger. Husserl's opinion was t h a t N e w t o n ' s f o r m u l a , for example, w o u l d be t r u e even i f no one h a d conceived i t . Heidegger said t h a t this is meaningless, t h a t the t r u t h o f the f o r m u l a w o u l d not exist i f there had been no existence to conceive i t . I f there h a d been no m i n d — e i t h e r h u m a n or n o n - h u m a n — t o conceive i t , there w o u l d be heavenly bodies, there w o u l d be m o t i o n , i f y o u w i s h , b u t there w o u l d be no truth of Newton's f o r m u l a , nor any other t r u t h . T r u t h needs someone to conceive i t , to discover i t (alétheia), w h e t h e r m a n , angel or God.
2.
MEANINGS
W O R D , M E A N I N G A N D O B J E C T . W e have seen t h a t phenomenology deals w i t h meanings. L e t us see h o w this is to be understood. L e t us t h i n k o f a w o r d , table, for example. W e have a n u m b e r o f things here. First of all, a physical, acoustical p h e n o m e n o n , the sound of the w o r d ; b u t this alone is n o t a w o r d . A physical phenomenon m a y be a sign: for example, a r e d c l o t h is a sign of danger. B u t this does not suffice, either; to be a sign does not exhaust the being o f a w o r d ,
The
Analytic
and the Synthetic
407
because expressions m a y have t w o functions, one communicative, which w o u l d encompass the sign-function, a n d another w h i c h is the " solitary life o f the s o u l . " I do n o t make signs to myself i n order to understand what I am thinking. T h a t w h i c h makes a w o r d be a w o r d is meaning (as early as Aristotle a w o r d was defined as &phone semantike). W h a t is m e a n i n g ? Is it located w i t h i n the w o r d ? O b v i o u s l y not. Different words m a y have a single m e a n i n g (words i n different languages, for example). I t w o u l d then seem t h a t meaning is the object; b u t this is n o t so, because at times the object does not exist, a n d cannot be the m e a n i n g — f o r example, w h e n I say " a squared c i r c l e . " Meanings are ideal objects. I t is meaning t h a t refers to the object; i t intervenes between the w o r d a n d the object. Meanings consist o f references to i n t e n t i o n a l objects, not necessarily real objects or necessarily ideal, b u t objects w h i c h m a y be non-existent—for example, i f I speak of " a regular p e n t a h e d r o n . " T h i s object does not exist; i t is n e i t h e r real nor i d e a l , b u t impossible, a n d yet the expression has a m e a n i n g w h i c h refers to a n i n t e n t i o n a l object. N o w , whether the object exists or n o t is another question w h i c h is n o t of interest here. I N T E N T I O N A N D I M P L E T I O N . I f I hear or read a n expression, I understand i t ; b u t there are t w o very different ways of understanding. O n e is simple understanding o f the expression; the other is an i n t u i t i v e representation o f meanings. Husserl calls the mere understanding o f a m e a n i n g symbolic thought or significative intention. T h e i n t u i t i v e representation of meanings he calls intuitive thought or significative impletion (or "filling"). I n the first case there is a mention, a mere allusion; i n the second, an intuition: this is a n i n t u i t i o n o f essences. Phenomenology, w h i c h is a descriptive science, describes essences, never objects.
Therefore, i n o r d e r to express a n y t h i n g , a m e a n i n g is needed; a m e a n i n g is superimposed u p o n the p h e n o m e n o n o f the expression, and w h e n this m e a n i n g is filled With content b y means of i n t u i t i o n , we have the apprehension of the essence.
3.
T H E ANALYTIC AND T H E SYNTHETIC
W H O L E A N D P A R T . Husserl's t h i r d investigation is a study o f the w h o l e and its p a r t s ; this study is extremely i m p o r t a n t for the comprehension of phenomenology. T h e w o r d whole suggests something composed of parts. Conversely, part suggests a component of a whole. Husserl distinguishes between independent parts ( w h i c h m a y exist b y themselves, like the leg o f a table) a n d non-independent parts ( w h i c h c a n n o t exist i n isolation, like the color or the extension o f the t a b l e ) .
Husserl's
Phenomenology
Husserl calls the independent parts pieces a n d the n o n - i n d e p e n d e n t parts moments: extension, color, f o r m , a n d so o n . W i t h i n moments, t w o types m a y b e distinguished: ( i ) color, for example, w h i c h is located in the t a b l e ; a n d (2) the s i m i l a r i t y between this table a n d another one, a s i m i l a r i t y w h i c h is n o t l o c a t e d in t h e table. C o l o r is a trait of a t h i n g , s i m i l a r i t y is a relationship. I M P L I C A T I O N A N D " C O - P L I C A T I O N . " Here we r u n i n t o the p r o b l e m of w h a t i t is t h a t unites the parts. C o r p o r e a l i t y does n o t occur alone, but occurs together w i t h color, extension, and the like. Husserl speaks of two basic types of unions: (1) W e say: a l l bodies are extended. Corporeality a n d extension go together. Body implies extension; to i m p l y something means to i n c l u d e i t ; the t h i n g i m p l i e d is a t r a i t o f t h a t w h i c h implies i t . A m o n g the traits oí body is t h a t of being extended; b e i n g a d i a m o n d i m p l i e s b e i n g a stone. T h i s is w h a t K a n t calls a n analytic judgment, a n d is today generally called implication. (2) O r t e g a gave the n a m e o f " co-plication " (complicación) to t h a t relationship b y w h i c h one p a r t is united to another b u t is n o t contained w i t h i n i t . Color, for example, " c o - p l i c a t e s " extension; a n unextended color cannot exist. Husserl calls this same r e l a t i o n s h i p "founding" (Fundierung). F o u n d i n g m a y be reversible or irreversible. T r a i t A a n d t r a i t B m a y require each other's presence m u t u a l l y , o r else A m a y r e q u i r e B, b u t n o t conversely. T h e t r a i t color " c o - p l i c a t e s " the t r a i t extension, b u t n o t the other w a y a r o u n d ; o n the other h a n d , there is no r i g h t w i t h o u t a left, a n d vice versa. " C o - p l i c a t i o n " can t h u s be either unilateral or bilateral. A N A L Y T I C A N D S Y N T H E T I C J U D G M E N T S . Husserl speaks o f a n a l y t i c and synthetic j u d g m e n t s w i t h m u c h greater precision t h a n K a n t . A n a l y t i c j u d g m e n t s are those i n w h i c h the predicate is i m p l i e d i n the subject. Synthetic j u d g m e n t s are those i n w h i c h the p r e d i c a t e is n o t i m p l i e d i n , b u t added to, the subject. I t is obvious t h a t a n a l y t i c j u d g m e n t s are a p r i o r i . B u t K a n t speaks o f a p r i o r i s y n t h e t i c j u d g ments. Husserl finds t h a t such j u d g m e n t s are those i n w h i c h the subject " c o - p l i c a t e s " the p r e d i c a t e ; i n such j u d g m e n t s there is a " f o u n d i n g " relationship between the subject and the p r e d i c a t e .
4.
CONSCIOUSNESS
P h e n o m e n o l o g y is a descriptive
science
of the essences of pure
consciousness.
W h a t is consciousness ? Husserl distinguishes three w a y s o f u n d e r standing this t e r m : (1) As the
aggregate
of all
experiences:
the u n i t y of the consciousness.
Consciousness
(2)
T h e w a y the t e r m is understood w h e n one speaks o f being of a t h i n g , taking it into account. I f I see a t h i n g , seeing i t is a n act of m y consciousness (in the first sense); b u t i f I realize t h a t I see i t , I a m conscious (in the second sense) of h a v i n g seen i t . (3) Consciousness understood as a n intentional experience. T h i s is the p r i m a r y sense of the t e r m . conscious
I N T E N T I O N A L E X P E R I E N C E . T h i s is a psychical act w h i c h consists o f m o r e t h a n b e i n g a n a c t : i t refers to a n object. W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e object exists, as a n intentional object i t is something distinct f r o m t h e psychical act. A specific i n t e n t i o n a l experience has t w o groups o f elements: intentional essence a n d non-intentional contents (sensations, feelings, a n d so o n ) ; these contents i n d i v i d u a l i z e t h e experiences—for example, t h e perception o f a r o o m f r o m different viewpoints. T h a t w h i c h does n o t differ is t h e intentional essence, w h i c h is composed o f t w o elements: quality (the characteristic of the act w h i c h makes the experience be the experience of this object a n d in this manner) a n d matter. I f I say " t h e v i c t o r of J e n a " a n d " the vanquished a t W a t e r l o o , " I have t w o representations o f a single i n t e n t i o n a l object ( N a p o l e o n ) ; b u t the matter is different, since i n one case I a p p r e h e n d N a p o l e o n as the v i c t o r a n d i n the other as the vanquished. L e t us s u m u p this explanation d i a g r a m matically:
intentional essence Intentional experience
. .. , non-intentional contents
("quality (^matter fsensations . < reelings [_ drives
intentional object J
Husserl distinguishes between t h e sensory matter, o r vXrj, a n d the i n t e n t i o n a l f o r m , or / x o p ^ r j , a n d between the i n t e n t i o n a l act, or nôesis, and the objective content to w h i c h the act refers, or nôema. P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L R E D U C T I O N . W e have reached the basic aspect of phenomenology, w h a t is called phenomenological hroxq (abstent i o n ) . T h i s consists i n t a k i n g a n experience a n d " b r a c k e t i n g " i t (Einklammerung)
or " disconnecting " i t
(Ausschaltung).
T h e r o o t o f this is to be f o u n d i n Husserl's idealism. I d e a l i s m h a d reduced i n d u b i t a b l e reality to processes o f consciousness. Brentano had said t h a t i n t e r n a l perception is self-evident, adequate a n d i n f a l lible. Husserl follows Brentano's lead, b u t makes a change. W e have a perception ; for Husserl, w h a t is i n d u b i t a b l e is the perception as such ; the perception of a table consists i n m y apprehending i t as existing, as
/ilo
Husserl's
Phenomenology
real. I t is this, the belief t h a t accompanies i t , t h a t differentiates percept i o n f r o m other experiences—for example, f r o m a mere representat i o n . B u t i n order n o t to leave the r e a l m o f the i n d u b i t a b l e , instead o f saying: " I a m seeing this table, w h i c h exists," I o u g h t to say: " I have a n experience, a n d one of its characteristics is m y belief i n the existence of the t a b l e " ; b u t the belief always figures as a characteristic o f the experience. Husserl calls this process o f b r a c k e t i n g phenomenological reduction
or
epokhe.
These experiences are, after a l l , m i n e . A n d w h a t a m I ? Phenomenological r e d u c t i o n must also extend to m y ego, a n d the phenomenologist must also " s u b m i t " to epokhe as a psychophysical subject, as an existential p o s i t i o n ; a l l t h a t remains is the pure ego, w h i c h is n o t a historical subject i n the here a n d now, b u t the focus o f the experience " r a y s . " T h i s is pure or phenomenologically reduced consciousness. T h u s , we now have the experiences of pure consciousness. But this is n o t enough. W e must take a f u r t h e r step. T h e phenomenologist carries o u t phenomenological r e d u c t i o n , a n d once he is left w i t h experiences he must raise himself to essences (eidetic reduction) . E S S E N C E S . I t is impossible to describe a n y object whatsoever because i t has a n i n f i n i t e n u m b e r o f traits. B u t b y means o f eidetic r e d u c t i o n one m a y m a k e the transition f r o m experiences to their essences. W h a t are the essences ? Husserl gives a rigorous d e f i n i t i o n : The
aggregate
essence of the
of all
the traits joined
together
by founding
constitutes
the
experience.
Let us t h i n k of a t r i a n g l e ; I take one t r a i t , its b e i n g e q u i l a t e r a l ; this t r a i t is j o i n e d b y " c o - p l i c a t i o n , " or " f o u n d i n g , " to its being equiangular, a n d i n this w a y to m a n y other t r a i t s ; a l l of t h e m together constitute the essence of the equilateral t r i a n g l e . Husserl distinguishes between definite a n d indefinite m a n i f o l d s ; i n the former, w h e n c e r t a i n of their elements have been d e t e r m i n e d , the rest can be rigorously deduced. T h i s is w h a t occurs w i t h m a t h e m a t i c a l essences: i f I d e t e r m i n e the traits " p o l y g o n w i t h three sides," the entire essence of the t r i a n g l e can be rigorously deduced f r o m this. O n e cannot reach the essence of the other k i n d o f m a n i f o l d so s i m p l y or so completely. 5.
P H E N O M E N O L O G Y AS A M E T H O D A N D AS A N I D E A L I S T
THESIS
THE C O M P L E T E D E F I N I T I O N . I f we gather together the characteristics o f phenomenology w h i c h we have been discovering, we find t h a t i t is a descriptive eidetic science of the essences of experiences of pure
Phénoménologie
al
Philosophy
411
T h e m e a n i n g o f this abstruse definition is already transp a r e n t to us. W e now see w h y phenomenology is a n a priori and universal science. I t is a p r i o r i i n its fullest sense, because i t describes o n l y essences (that is, ideal a n d n o t e m p i r i c a l objects) o f the experiences o f a consciousness w h i c h is itself not e m p i r i c a l but pure a n d thus also a p r i o r i . Phenomenology is universal because i t is concerned w i t h a l l experiences, a n d since experiences refer to their objects, intentional objects are encompassed w i t h i n phenomenological considerations; t h a t is, all that exists for the phenomenologist is i n c l u d e d . consciousness.
T H E M E T H O D . T h i s m e t h o d , w h i c h we have explained, leads us to the knowledge o f essences, w h i c h is t r a d i t i o n a l l y the goal o f p h i losophy. I t is a self-evident knowledge w h i c h is based o n intuition; this, however, is not a sensible b u t an eidetic i n t u i t i o n , t h a t is, a n i n t u i t i o n o f essences (eidos). F r o m the i n t u i t i o n o f a single case I raise myself to the i n t u i t i o n o f its essence b y means o f phenomenological r e d u c t i o n . T h e example w h i c h serves as m y basis m a y be a n act o f perception or s i m p l y a n act o f i m a g i n a t i o n ; the q u a l i t y o f the act is o f no i m p o r t a n c e to the eidetic i n t u i t i o n .
T h i s phenomenological m e t h o d is the method of present-day philosophy. As a m e t h o d , phenomenology is a b r i l l i a n t discovery w h i c h opens a free p a t h to philosophy. I t is the p o i n t o f departure f r o m w h i c h one necessarily sets out. B u t i t is n o t j u s t a m e t h o d : there is a falsity at the v e r y core o f phenomenology, a n d this is its metaphysical significance. P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L I D E A L I S M . Husserl wishes to a v o i d metaphysics at a l l costs; this a t t e m p t is futile, because philosophy is metaphysics. A n d , i n fact, Husserl is i n d u l g i n g i n metaphysics w h e n he affirms that p u r e consciousness is the f u n d a m e n t a l reality. Husserl is a n idealist; i n his w o r k idealism attains its most acute a n d refined f o r m . B u t this position is untenable; idealism, i n this, its final a n d most perfect phase, shows its i n t e r n a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I f we t h i n k phenomenology t h r o u g h p r o f o u n d l y , we w i l l leave its d o m a i n . This is w h a t the metaphysics o f the last few years has done. W h e n phenomenology is f u l l y achieved, i t carries us beyond Husserl's t h o u g h t to other forms i n w h i c h the o r i g i n a l eidetic a n d descriptive science becomes t r u e philosophy i n its fullest a n d most precise f o r m : metaphysics.
6.
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY
P H I L O S O P H Y AS A P R E C I S E S C I E N C E . W i t h regard to the content o f philosophy, Husserl renews the o l d d e m a n d o f Socrates a n d Plato, o f Descartes a n d K a n t , for the establishment o f philosophy as a strict and definitive science. O n c e a g a i n , there is a refusal to a t t r i b u t e u l t i m a t e
Husserl's
Phenomenology
r e a l i t y to existing p h i l o s o p h y : i t is n o t , Husserl says, t h a t p h i l o s o p h y is a n imperfect science, b u t t h a t i t is n o t yet a science. T h e t w o chief obstacles t h a t it encounters i n its historical surroundings are naturalism — a result o f the discovery o f n a t u r e — w h i c h starts o u t f r o m thetic suppositions, f r o m existential " p o s i t i o n s , " a n d historicism—a result of the discovery of h i s t o r y — w h i c h leads to a skeptical a t t i t u d e o f a relativist f o r m . By f o l l o w i n g these, philosophy becomes Weltan¬ schauungsphilosophie, philosophy of w o r l d views, whereas Husserl calls for philosophy as a strict science. T h e p o i n t of departure, n a t u r a l l y , must be i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . A l l consciousness is " consciousness o f , " a n d the study of consciousness, as w e have already seen, includes the study o f its meanings a n d its i n t e n t i o n a l objects. W h e n every existential position is e l i m i n a t e d b y means o f cnoyf¡, we get a phenomenology o f consciousness. I n the psychical r e a l m , understood i n this sense, there is no d i s t i n c t i o n between phenomenon a n d b e i n g ; this gives phenomenology a c e r t a i n "absoluteness," w h i c h , o f course, excludes a l l positions or theses. Phenomenological i n t u i t i o n leads to the c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f essences; essences are something absolutely given, b u t as essential being (Wesenssein), never as existence (Dasein). " O n l y a really f u n d a m e n t a l a n d systematic p h e n o m e n o l o g y , " Husserl says, " c a n give us comprehension o f the p s y c h i c a l . " T h e r e fore, psychology is very closely related to philosophy; this is the kernel of t r u t h t h a t was latent i n the erroneous psychologist p o s i t i o n : the tendency t o w a r d a phenomenological establishment of philosophy. I D E A O F T H E W O R L D A N D S C I E N C E . T h e great philosophies o f the past h a d a double concern: w i t h science a n d w i t h the concept o f the w o r l d . B u t this situation has changed since the f o u n d a t i o n of a " t i m e less universitas of precise sciences"; n o w , Husserl says, there is a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between the concept of the w o r l d a n d science. T h e " i d e a " of the f o r m e r is different for each e r a ; the idea o f the latter is timeless ( " s u p r a t e m p o r a l " ) , a n d is n o t l i m i t e d b y any relationship w i t h the spirit of t i m e . O u r life goals are of two classes: some are for t i m e , others for e t e r n i t y ; science is concerned w i t h absolute, n o n - t e m p o r a l values. O n e cannot abandon eternity i n favor o f t i m e . O n l y science can d e f i n i t i v e l y overcome the necessity w h i c h arises f r o m science. C o n cepts o f the w o r l d m a y differ a m o n g themselves; o n l y science can decide, a n d its decision, Husserl says, bears the seal o f e t e r n i t y . T h i s science is one value a m o n g others w h i c h are equally j u s t i f i e d ; i t is i m p e r s o n a l , a n d its q u a l i t y o u g h t to be the clarity w h i c h belongs to theory, n o t the profundity p r o p e r to w i s d o m . O u r t i m e , Husserl says, bears the promise o f a great era, b u t i t is plagued b y negative skepti-
Phenomenological
Philosophy
413
cism wearing the mask o f positivism; i t is necessary to overcome this w i t h a true positivism, w h i c h w i l l h o l d fast o n l y to realities, w h i c h w i l l take its departure n o t f r o m philosophies b u t f r o m the things a n d problems, and w i l l thus be a science o f true principles, o f origins, o f the pi^iofiara TTUVTUIV. T h i s is the f u n c t i o n t h a t can be performed only b y the phenomenological apprehension o f essences. T R A N S C E N D E N T A L P H I L O S O P H Y . T O the extent t h a t phenomenology is philosophy a n d n o t merely a m e t h o d , i t can be defined as a new k i n d o f transcendental philosophy; i t could almost be considered a k i n d o f neo-Cartesianism, a Cartesianism t h a t has been rendered more fundam e n t a l and t h a t avoids the deviations w i t h w h i c h Descartes m a r r e d his o w n discoveries. I n effect, Husserl represents the subtlest a n d most refined f o r m o f t h a t idealism w h i c h begins w i t h Descartes.
Husserl demands the self-evidence i n w h i c h the things " themselves " are present. H o w e v e r , there is also a perfect k i n d of self-evidence, apodictic self-evidence, w h i c h confers absolute undoubtedness o n the order o f that possessed b y principles. T h e self-evidence o f the w o r l d is not apodictic; o n the other h a n d , the ego cogito is the u l t i m a t e a n d apodictically certain d o m a i n o n w h i c h a l l f u n d a m e n t a l philosophy m u s t be based. Husserl's r e t u r n to Descartes' v i e w p o i n t , to the p r i n ciple o f the cogito, stems f r o m this; however, u n l i k e Descartes, Husserl must not confuse the ego, the p u r e subject o f cogitationes, w i t h a n independent substantia cogitans, t h a t is, a h u m a n mens sive animus. Psychical life is conceived in the world; the phenomenological epokhe eliminates the existential value o f the w o r l d , brackets i t , a n d thus focuses its a t t e n t i o n o n the phenomenologically reduced transcendental ego. P U R E S C I E N C E O F T H E E G O . T h e epokhe isolates a " new a n d i n f i n i t e " sphere o f existence t h a t is accessible t h r o u g h a new f o r m o f experience, transcendental experience. Husserl states—and this is very i m p o r t a n t — t h a t to every k i n d o f real experience there corresponds something t h a t is purely fictitious, a quasi experience (Erfahrung alsob). A n absolutely subjective science thus is originated, a n d begins provisionally as a p u r e science of the ego; this leads to a transcendental solipsism w i t h w h i c h phenomenology w i l l later have to concern itself. Thanks to this peculiar transcendental experience, the ego can explicate itself indefinitely and systematically. However, this requires further explanation.
T h e basic difference between Descartes' position a n d Husserl's is the idea o f intentionality. O n e cannot be content w i t h the simple ego cogito, according to w h i c h the ego becomes a res separated f r o m a l l other reality, as Descartes believed. Since to t h i n k is always to t h i n k o f something, the precise f o r m u l a is: ego cogito cogitatum. Phenomenology
4H
Husserl's
Phenomenology
does n o t forget the w o r l d : the w o r l d remains as the cogitatum. The consciousness o f the universe is always present (mitbewusst); i t is the u n i t y o f consciousness. T h e ego o f phenomenological m e d i t a t i o n can be a spectator o f itself, a n d this " i t s e l f " comprises all o b j e c t i v i t y t h a t exists for i t such as i t exists for i t . T h e r e v e l a t i o n of the ego t h r o u g h phenomenological analysis thus comprises a l l i n t e n t i o n a l objects correlative to the acts, f r o m w h i c h every existential p o s i t i o n has, o f course, been e l i m i n a t e d . These objects exist a n d are w h a t they are o n l y as objects of a real or possible consciousness; a n d , for its p a r t , the transcendental ego (or, psychologically speaking, the soul) is w h a t i t is o n l y i n r e l a t i o n to the i n t e n t i o n a l objects. T h e ego apprehends itself as i d e n t i c a l to itself. A n d the basic f o r m of the synthesis of experienced ( " l i v e d " ) acts (each one of w h i c h has a n experienced d u r a t i o n ) is the i m m a n e n t consciousness o f t i m e . I t is a characteristic o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y t h a t every state o f consciousness has a n i n t e n t i o n a l " h o r i z o n , " w h i c h refers t o potentialities of consciousness i n a continuous protension. T h i s h o r i z o n defines a " h a l o " of possibilities t h a t could be realized i f one were t o t u r n one's perception i n another direction. Therefore, indeterminateness is a n essential characteristic o f the cogitatum; i t is never d e f i n i t i v e l y g i v e n ; rather, particularities r e m a i n i n a state of irresolution. H o w e v e r , this ego is n o t an uncharged p o l e ; b y v i r t u e o f the laws o f w h a t Husserl calls transcendental genesis (a very i m p o r t a n t concept w h i c h was developed i n Husserl's last w r i t i n g s ) the ego acquires a new, permanent p r o p e r t y w i t h every new k i n d of act. I f I make u p m y m i n d , I a m already a n ego t h a t has made u p its m i n d i n a c e r t a i n w a y : the act passes, the decision remains. G o r r e l a t i v e l y , I t r a n s f o r m myself w h e n I abjure m y decisions a n d actions. T h i s involves the c o n s t i t u t i o n of a self, a p e r m a n e n t person, t h a t retains a " s t y l e , " a personal character. T h e self constitutes itself for itself i n the u n i t y o f a history. T h e objects a n d categories t h a t exist for the self are constituted b y v i r t u e o f the laws o f the genesis. Therefore, eidetic phenomenology, w h i c h for Husserl is a " f i r s t p h i l o s o p h y , " has t w o phases: the first, static, w i t h descriptions and systemizations analogous t o those o f n a t u r a l h i s t o r y ; the second, genetic. T h i s genesis occurs i n t w o f o r m s : active, i n w h i c h the self participates i n a creative w a y (practical reason), a n d passive, the p r i n c i p l e of w h i c h is association. I n a l l these constitutions a c t i o n is i r r a t i o n a l , b u t Husserl observes t h a t " the action itself, w i t h its irrationality, is a structural concept in the system of the concrete 'a priori.'" M O N A D O L O G I C A L I N T E R S U B J E C T I V I T Y . Husserl distinguishes between the self as a mere self-identical pole a n d s u b s t r a t u m o f the
Phénoménologie
al
Philosophy
a n d the ego i n its concrete fullness, w h i c h he designates b y the L e i b n i z i a n t e r m monad. T h e m o n a d i c ego contains the w h o l e o f conscious life, b o t h real a n d p o t e n t i a l , and its phenomenological explication coincides w i t h phenomenology i n general. H o w e v e r , this solipsism is corrected b y the fact t h a t i n me, a transcendental ego, other egos, a n d thus a n " o b j e c t i v e w o r l d " c o m m o n to everyone, are transcendentally constituted. Such a w o r l d appears, a n d i n i t occurs a philosophy c o m m o n to " a l l of u s , " one w h i c h we m e d i t a t e i n c o m m o n , habitus,
a
Philosophiaperennis.
T h e ego comprises m y very b e i n g as a m o n a d a n d the sphere formed by i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ; i n this sphere there is constituted later a n ego, as i t were, reflected i n m y o w n ego, i n m y m o n a d — t h a t is, a sort of alter ego, w h i c h is a n analogue, b u t at the same t i m e other. Consequently, i t is a question of the constitution of the other as extraneous w i t h i n the sphere of m y o w n i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . T h r o u g h its c o m m o n i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , this c o m m u n i t y of monads constitutes a single w o r l d t h a t is the same for all, and this presupposes a " h a r m o n y ' ' of the monads. S P A C E A N D T I M E . M y b o d y , w h i c h is d i r e c t l y present at every m o m e n t , establishes a n interrelationship i n m y sphere: i t is given to me i n the m o d e o f " h e r e , " oihie. E v e r y other b o d y — i n c l u d i n g m y n e i g h b o r ' s — i s i n the m o d e o f there, illic. Possible changes i n m y o r i e n t a t i o n cause there to be constituted a spatial n a t u r e , w h i c h is i n i n t e n t i o n a l relationship w i t h m y body. A n y t h i n g t h a t is present, at hand, can become here, a n d I can perceive " t h e same things "from there (Mine). T h e other seems to m e t o possess the phenomena t h a t I w o u l d have i f I were there, b u t his b o d y is given to h i m i n the f o r m o f an absolute
here.
M y experiences do n o t e n d u r e ; nevertheless, they acquire for me a value o f b e i n g , o f t e m p o r a l existence, because t h r o u g h re-presentations I r e t u r n to the o r i g i n a l t h a t is no m o r e ; these representations are unified i n a synthesis accompanied by the self-evident consciousness o f the same thing. I n the case o f the ideal objects, Husserl explains their n o n t e m p o r a l i t y as an omnitemporality, correlative to the possibility o f being p r o d u c e d a n d r e p r o d u c e d at any m o m e n t o f t i m e . A n d the coexistence of m y self and the other, of my i n t e n t i o n a l life a n d t h a t of the other, of m y realities a n d those o f the other, presupposes the creation of a commonform
of
time.
T h e r e c a n be, then, b u t one c o m m u n i t y o f monads, c o m p r i s i n g all the coexisting monads: a single objective w o r l d , or n a t u r e . A n d this w o r l d must exist i f I have w i t h i n m e structures t h a t i m p l y the coexistence of other monads. THE P R O B L E M S O F P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L P H I L O S O P H Y . Husserl points
Husserl's
Phenomenology
o u t t w o stages i n phenomenological investigations: a " transcendental esthetic," i n a fuller sense t h a n the K a n t i a n , t h a t refers to a noematic a p r i o r i o f sensible i n t u i t i o n , a n d a theory o f experience of the other {Einfühlung). T h e u l t i m a t e o r i g i n of all a p r i o r i sciences is i n a p r i o r i a n d transcendental phenomenology. Husserl says t h a t transcendental phenomenology, systematically and completely developed, is a n authentic, concrete, universal ontology, w h i c h he also calls concrete logic of being. W i t h i n this there w o u l d be, first of a l l , a solipsist science o f the ego, a n d then a n intersubjective phenomenology. As we have already seen, Husserl, w h o was shaped by the presuppositions o f his age, eliminates metaphysics; however, this e l i m i n a t i o n is b u t p a r t l y successful. Phenomenology eliminates o n l y ingenuous metaphysics, t h a t is, metaphysics t h a t deals w i t h the '' absurd things i n themselves," a n d n o t metaphysics i n general. I n the i n t e r i o r o f the m o n a d i c sphere, a n d as an ideal possibility, there reappear for Husserl the problems o f contingent r e a l i t y , d e a t h , destiny, the " m e a n i n g " o f history, a n d so o n . T h e central problems o f philosophy occur w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f the reduced consciousness. T h u s there is constituted a system o f phenomenological disciplines, the base o f w h i c h is not the simple a x i o m ego cogito, b u t a consciousness o f oneself, complete, i n t e g r a l a n d universal, first m o n a d i c a n d t h e n i n t e r m o n a d i c . I t is first necessary t o lose the w o r l d t h r o u g h the eTroxq i n o r d e r to recover i t later i n this act of being conscious. T h i s is the f i n a l m e a n i n g t h a t Husserl gives to phenomenology, w h i c h renews the o l d D e l p h i c precept yvwdi creavTov ( K n o w thyself) a n d at the same time St. Augustine's statement: Noliforas ire, in te redi, in inferiore nomine habitat Veritas ( D o not go outside, r e t u r n w i t h i n yourself; t r u t h dwells i n the inner man). T h e philosophy o f E d m u n d Husserl is one o f the three or four great intellectual achievements o f o u r time. Nevertheless, the fecundity a n d scope of this philosophy are still b u t little k n o w n ; this is p a r t l y due to accidental reasons, i n c l u d i n g the not inconsiderable one t h a t the greater part of Husserl's w o r k is still unpublished. T h i s m a t e r i a l has, however, been saved f r o m t h e misfortunes o f the t e r r i b l e decade t h a t followed Husserl's death a n d is preserved at the U n i v e r s i t y o f L o u v a i n . I n his last published works Husserl begins to deal w i t h new a n d very serious problems, w h i c h lead h i m to question the v e r y idea of phenomenology and w h i c h m o t i v a t e his final development, k n o w n today o n l y i n a fragmentary w a y . I t is to be hoped t h a t i n the next years there w i l l appear a series o f volumes w h i c h w i l l give us a new image o f Husserl a n d of the roads b e y o n d phenomenology sensu stricto t o w a r d
Phenomenological
Philosophy
w h i c h the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t o f o u r t i m e must d i r e c t itself, u n d e r Husserl's i n d i s p u t a b l e — b u t m o r e o r less r e m o t e — l e a d e r s h i p . * * For a further discussion, see Ortega, Apuntes sobre el pensamiento: su teurgiay su demiurgia (Obras Completas, V , pp. 517-19 and 540-42). See also my Introducción a la Filosofía (Reason and Life), Sections "Phenomenology" (in Chapter I V ) , " T h e concept as a function of meaning" (in Chapter V ) and " T h e problem of logic" (in Chapter V I I ) [Obras, I I ] .
Value
Theory
I t is useful to distinguish value theory (Werttheorie) f r o m the " p h i losophy o f v a l u e " (Wertphilosophie) w h i c h derives f r o m R u d o l f H e r m a n n Lotze a n d is represented p r i n c i p a l l y b y W i l h e l m W i n d e l b a n d and Heinrich Rickert. T h e science o f j u d g m e n t or values begins a p p r o x i m a t e l y at the t u r n o f the century. I t s direct sources are to be f o u n d i n Brentano's ethics a n d i n phenomenology, w h i c h also derives f r o m Brentano. Brentano's i m m e d i a t e p u p i l s — A l e x i u s M e i n o n g a n d C h r i s t i a n v o n Ehrenfels, i n p a r t i c u l a r — w e r e the first to concern themselves philosophically w i t h the p r o b l e m o f value. L a t e r , value theory was magnificently developed b y t w o great G e r m a n thinkers: M a x Scheler a n d N i c o l a i H a r t m a n n . W e must study the characteristics o f values before investigating briefly the philosophies o f Scheler a n d H a r t m a n n .
i.
T H E P R O B L E M OF V A L U E
T H E P O I N T O F D E P A R T U R E . I n Brentano, " j u s t love" was t h a t selfevident love w h i c h contains w i t h i n itself the reason for its justness. I t was the love o f a n object t h a t shows self-evidently t h a t the a p p r o p r i a t e a t t i t u d e w i t h reference to i t is to love i t . W h e n a n object makes us recognize its a u t h e n t i c q u a l i t y o f r e q u i r i n g to be loved, i t becomes the object of just love. W e are only a step away f r o m value t h e o r y : I prefer a t h i n g because I see t h a t the t h i n g has value, t h a t i t is to be valued. T h u s , values are something t h a t the things possess a n d t h a t exercise a strange power over us; they are not l i m i t e d to being at h a n d , to being 41 &
The Problem
oj
Value
419
a p p r e h e n d e d ; rather, values oblige us to esteem t h e m , to value t h e m . I m a y perhaps see something t h a t is good a n d n o t seek i t , yet I cannot h e l p b u t esteem i t . To see something as good is already to esteem i t . T h i s modest, s m a l l a n d i n t i m a t e act o f esteeming t h e m is the o n l y t h i n g t h a t values oblige us to do. T h u s v a l u e is something t h a t the things have w h i c h makes us esteem t h e m . B u t this is n o t enough. W e m u s t raise a second p r o b l e m . W e have seen t h a t there is something w h i c h merits a n d at the same t i m e requires t h e name o f v a l u e ; b u t w e do not yet k n o w a n y t h i n g about this strange r e a l i t y . T h e basic question is: W h a t are values? T h e answers g i v e n to this question have frequently been w r o n g ; value has been confused w i t h other things, a n d its true n a t u r e has r e m a i n e d visible o n l y t h r o u g h the inconsistencies of those erroneous viewpoints. T H E O B J E C T I V I T Y OF V A L U E . I t has been t h o u g h t ( M e i n o n g ) t h a t a t h i n g is o f value w h e n i t pleases us a n d , conversely, t h a t w h e n a t h i n g pleases us, i t is o f value. T h i s w o u l d mean t h a t value is subjective, based o n the pleasure w h i c h a t h i n g produces i n me. B u t i t so happens t h a t things please us because they are good—or seem good to us, because we f i n d goodness i n t h e m . T h e cause o f o u r happiness is goodness apprehended. T o be d e l i g h t e d is t o be delighted w i t h something, a n d i t is n o t o u r d e l i g h t t h a t gives v a l u e ; rather, i t is the other w a y a r o u n d : value provokes o u r d e l i g h t . O n the other h a n d , i f M e i n o n g ' s theory were true, o n l y objects t h a t existed w o u l d be o f value, since they are the o n l y objects t h a t can please us; i t turns o u t , h o w e v e r — a s Ehrenfels s a w — t h a t we value most t h a t w h i c h does n o t exist: perfect justice, complete knowledge, the h e a l t h we l a c k — i n short, ideals. T h i s obliges Ehrenfels t o correct M e i n o n g ' s t h e o r y : the things w h i c h have value are n o t the things w h i c h please us, b u t the things w h i c h we f i n d desirable. V a l u e is s i m p l y the p r o j e c t i o n o f o u r desire. I n this case as i n the f o r m e r , value is subjective; i t is something t h a t belongs not to the object, b u t to the psychical states o f the subject. H o w e v e r , b o t h o f these theories are i n c o r r e c t . I n the first place, there are certain p r o f o u n d l y unpleasant things w h i c h we feel have v a l u e : to care for a person w h o is sick w i t h the plague, to be w o u n d e d o r d i e for a noble or w o r t h y cause, a n d so on. A person m a y have a m o r e fervent desire to eat t h a n to possess a w o r k o f a r t , or to be r i c h t h a n to live a j u s t life, a n d at the same t i m e value a w o r k o f a r t or righteousness m u c h m o r e t h a n food or money. O u r v a l u a t i o n of a t h i n g is i n d e p e n d e n t of our delight a n d desire. I t is not i n t h e least subjective; i t is objective a n d is based o n the r e a l i t y o f the things. T h e w o r d s " p l e a s u r a b l e " a n d " d e s i r a b l e " have a m e a n i n g other
4-2.0
Value
Theory
t h a n t h a t w h i c h pleases a n d t h a t w h i c h is desired, a m e a n i n g w h i c h is o f m o r e interest here: t h a t w h i c h deserves to be desired. T h i s desert or m e r i t is something t h a t the things possess, a d i g n i t y w h i c h they have i n themselves, something independent of m y v a l u a t i o n . T o value a t h i n g is n o t to give value, b u t t o recognize the value w h i c h the t h i n g possesses. V A L U E S A N D GOODS. H o w e v e r , we must n o w m a k e a d i s t i n c t i o n between value a n d the t h i n g w h i c h is valued. T h e things have various types a n d degrees o f value. V a l u e is a quality o f the things, n o t the things themselves. A p a i n t i n g , a landscape a n d a w o m a n have beauty, b u t beauty is not any o f these things. T h i n g s t h a t are v a l u e d are called goods. T h u s , goods are t h e bearers of values, a n d values are realized or e m b o d i e d i n the goods. U N R E A L I T Y OF V A L U E . W e say t h a t values are qualities. T h e r e are real qualities, such as color, f o r m , size, m a t e r i a l , a n d so o n , b u t value is not a real q u a l i t y . I n a p a i n t i n g I f i n d canvas, paints a n d the depicted forms, a l l of w h i c h are elements o f the p a i n t i n g ; the p a i n t i n g also possesses beauty, b u t this is a different type of possession; beauty is a n u n r e a l q u a l i t y ; i t is n o t a t h i n g , nor an element o f a t h i n g . Besides value, there are other qualities w i t h this characteristic: alikeness, for example. T h e alikeness between t w o coins is n o t h i n g t h e coins really possess, so l i t t l e so t h a t a single c o i n cannot possess alikeness. Alikeness cannot be perceived b y the senses; rather, i t is observed b y means of a comparison w h i c h the m i n d performs; alikeness is seen b y means o f the intellect. A n d yet alikeness is perfectly objective, since I cannot say t h a t a table a n d a b o o k are a l i k e ; alikeness is a r e l a t i o n s h i p between things, w h i c h is apprehended or recognized b y the i n t e l l e c t . T h e case o f value is s i m i l a r : the m i n d apprehends value as s o m e t h i n g objective w h i c h impresses itself u p o n the m i n d , b u t something perfectly u n r e a l ; value is n o t perceived b y means o f the senses, nor is i t comprehended; i t is esteemed. T o apprehend v a l u e is, precisely, to esteem i t . CHARACTERISTICS OF V A L U E . Values present c e r t a i n characteristics w h i c h clarify even f u r t h e r their o b j e c t i v e — t h e i r i d e a l l y o b j e c t i v e — sense. I n the first place, they have polarity, t h a t is, they are necessarily positive or negative, i n contrast to real things, w h i c h have t h e characteristic o f being positive (or, i n the extreme case, the characteristic o f privation). G o o d is the opposite o f b a d , b e a u t i f u l o f u g l y , a n d so o n . T h a t is, the value " beauty " possesses a positive or negative " c h a r g e , " as do a l l the others. I n the second place, there is a hierarchy o f values: there are higher a n d lower ones; elegance is inferior to beauty, beauty t o goodness, goodness, i n t u r n , to holiness. T h e r e is thus a n objective h i e r a r c h y o f precisely graded values.
The Problem
of
Value
421
I n the t h i r d place, values possess matter, t h a t is, a u n i q u e a n d i n d i v i d u a l content. Values do not merely exist; they appear w i t h i r r e d u c i b l e contents, w h i c h one must perceive d i r e c t l y : elegance a n d holiness are t w o values w i t h different matter, a n d i t w o u l d be futile to a t t e m p t t o reduce one to the other. T h e reaction o f the m a n w h o perceives values is different according to t h e i r m a t t e r : the a p p r o p r i a t e r e a c t i o n to holiness is reverence; to goodness, respect; to beauty,pleasure, a n d so on. Therefore, i t is possible to classify values w i t h regard to their m a t t e r a n d i n accordance w i t h t h e i r h i e r a r c h y ; i n every case this classific a t i o n w i l l f o l l o w the double, p o l a r f o r m o f positive a n d negative. T h u s , there are values o f utility (capable/incapable, a b und a nt / scarce); of life (healthy/ill, strong/weak, o u t s t a n d i n g / c o m m o n ) ; o f mind (true/false, self-evident/probable); o f morality (good/bad, just/ u n j u s t ) ; of esthetics (beautiful/ugly, elegant/inelegant); o f religion (sacred/profane), a n d so f o r t h . P E R C E P T I O N O F A N D BLINDNESS T O V A L U E .
Values m a y or m a y
not
be perceived; every era possesses a sensitivity to certain values a n d loses i t or lacks i t w i t h r e g a r d to others; certain m e n are b l i n d to a p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e — f o r example, to the esthetic value or to the religious value. Values—objective realities—are discovered, j u s t as continents a n d islands are discovered; b u t at times the sight o f t h e m is clouded over a n d m a n ceases t o feel t h e i r strange force. H e ceases t o esteem t h e m , because he does n o t perceive t h e m (see O r t e g a y Gasset: cQue son los valores?
i n Complete
Works,
VI).
B E I N G A N D V A L U E . T h e value theory has insisted, perhaps excessively, o n distinguishing value f r o m being. I t is said t h a t a value does not exist, b u t t h a t something has value; t h a t a value is n o t a n ens, b u t a valens. T h i s , however, is dubious, because the question, " W h a t are values ? " is m e a n i n g f u l , a n d we cannot a v o i d the p r o b l e m of being w i t h the subterfuge o f " h a v i n g v a l u e . " A careful d i s t i n c t i o n is m a d e between the good a n d its value, b u t one should n o t forget t h a t Greek metaphysics always said t h a t being, the good a n d the one accompany one another a n d are expressed i n similar ways. T h e y are, as we have seen, the transcendentals. T h e good of a t h i n g is t h a t w h i c h the t h i n g is. Being, the good a n d the one are n o t things, b u t transcendentals, somet h i n g t h a t imbues a n d envelops a l l things a n d makes t h e m be, a n d makes t h e m be one a n d good. T h u s , i t is possible to contemplate the serious p r o b l e m o f the relationship between b e i n g a n d value, w h i c h c a n n o t be considered as t o t a l l y e l i m i n a t e d . Perhaps this ontological defect has prevented value theory f r o m a c q u i r i n g greater p r o f u n d i t y a n d i m p o r t a n c e . A few years ago, i t
Value
Theory
looked as i f value philosophy were going to be the i m p o r t a n t p h i losophy o f o u r time. T o d a y i t is clear t h a t this is not t h e case. V a l u e theory is n o w seen to be a closed chapter, one w h i c h lacks a n u l t i m a t e basis. T h e philosophy of our t i m e has t u r n e d its back o n v a l u e theory a n d has chosen a more f r u i t f u l course b y resolutely e n t e r i n g u p o n the p a t h o f metaphysics. 2.
SCHELER
L I F E A N D WORKS. M a x Scheler was b o r n i n 1874 a n d d i e d i n 1928. H e was a professor at the U n i v e r s i t y o f Cologne, a n d is one o f the most i m p o r t a n t thinkers o f our age. H i s intellectual roots are i n the w o r k o f R u d o l f C h r i s t o p h Eucken, whose p u p i l he was, a n d i n t h a t o f Bergson, b u t most o f a l l i n Husserl's phenomenology, w h i c h he adapts i n a personal w a y . Scheler entered the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h a n d i n one phase o f his life was a true apologist for C a t h o l i c i s m ; nevertheless, i n his last years he strayed f r o m o r t h o d o x y i n the d i r e c t i o n o f p a n t h e i s m . Scheler is a w r i t e r o f extreme fecundity. H i s masterpiece is the Ethics, the complete title o f w h i c h is DerFormalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik ( F o r m a l i s m i n Ethics a n d the M a t e r i a l Ethics o f V a l u e ) ; i n i t he criticizes K a n t ' s formalistic ethics a n d establishes the bases for a n ethics o f values, w i t h content. H e also w r o t e Wesen und Formen der Sympathie ( T h e N a t u r e o f S y m p a t h y ) , a revision o f a n earlier w o r k ; Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen (Resentment i n the Structure o f M o r a l i t i e s ) ; Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos ( M a n ' s Place i n the Cosmos); Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft ( T h e Forms o f K n o w l e d g e a n d Society); a n d the great w o r k o f his C a t h o l i c phase: Vom Ewigen im Menschen ( O n the E t e r n a l i n M a n ) . Scheier's o u t p u t was very large, a n d p a r t o f i t is n o t yet published. H i s studies i n philosophical anthropology are especially interesting. H i s book Vom Ewigen im Menschen contains t w o o f his best essays: " R e u e u n d W i e d e r g e b u r t " (Repentance a n d R e b i r t h ) a n d " V o m Wesen der Philosophic " ( O n the N a t u r e o f Philosophy). SCHELER'S PHILOSOPHY. W e cannot enter i n t o a detailed exposition o f Scheier's t h o u g h t . For one t h i n g , i t is too complex a n d copious, a n d w o u l d lead us too far beyond the l i m i t s o f this survey: Scheier's systematic t h o u g h t cannot easily be reduced to a n essential nucleus f r o m w h i c h his m a n y v a r i e d ideas c a n be shown to emanate. F o r another t h i n g , we are still too close to h i m to make h i m a subject o f the history of philosophy i n the strict sense. W e can choose either t o e x p o u n d a n d i n t e r p r e t the content o f his philosophy, or else merely t o place h i m i n his setting. I shall confine myself completely to the second course o f action.
Hartmann Scheler is a phenomenologist. F r o m its very i n c e p t i o n , phenomenology has been a n i n t u i t i v e knowledge o f essences. Scheler sets o u t to w i n mastery over essences, especially i n the areas o f m a n a n d h u m a n life a n d i n the area o f value. Scheler's c l a r i t y a n d fruitfulness i n this knowledge o f essences are r e m a r k a b l e . B u t knowledge o f essences is n o t enough. K a n t h a d already observed t h a t i n t u i t i o n w i t h o u t a concept is n o t science, a n d even t h o u g h phenomenological i n t u i t i o n is eidetic rather t h a n sensible, philosophy cannot r e m a i n content w i t h b e i n g a descriptive science, n o t even w h e n i t is describing essences; i t must be a system a n d its basis must be metaphysics. T h i s is Scheler's great f a i l i n g . H i s t h o u g h t , acute a n d clear as i t is, is n o t strictly metaphysical. M o r e o v e r , as a consequence o f this, his philosophy is deficient i n systematic u n i t y . H i s b r i l l i a n t insights i l l u m i n a t e various regions o f reality, b u t he lacks t h a t all-inclusive coherence w h i c h philosophic knowledge requires. Philosophic t r u t h must appear i n the f o r m o f a system i n w h i c h each t r u t h is sustained b y a l l the others. T h i s system is missing i n Scheler. T h i s makes his t h o u g h t essentially provisional. H i s p h i l o s o p h y is like a hothouse where b r i l l i a n t ideas sprout i n confusion, b u t these ideas lack roots f r o m w h i c h they can g r o w a n d acquire m a t u r e significance. A f t e r using phenomenology as a knowledge o f essences, one must place i t i n the service o f a systematic metaphysics. Scheler d i d n o t do this, b u t he prepared the w a y for present-day metaphysics. H e concentrated his a t t e n t i o n o n the themes o f m a n a n d h u m a n l i f e : his philosophy was oriented t o w a r d a philosophical anthropology w h i c h he was unable t o b r i n g t o m a t u r i t y . W h e n this tendency a c q u i r e d a systematic basis a n d became a precise metaphysics, i t l e d t o existential analytics.
3.
HARTMANN
N i c o l a i H a r t m a n n (1882-1950), a professor at B e r l i n a n d later at G o t t i n g e n , also represents a phenomenological o r i e n t a t i o n w h i c h is related to Scheler's i n its concern w i t h the problems o f value. After Scheler's great w o r k o n ethics (1913), H a r t m a n n published i n 1926 his Ethics, a n i m p o r t a n t systemization o f the ethics o f values. B u t i n a d d i t i o n , H a r t m a n n was intensely occupied w i t h the problems o f knowledge a n d ontology. Therefore we observe i n his p h i l o s o p h y its clear i n t e n t i o n to be systematic a n d to become metaphysics. H i s most i m p o r t a n t works besides the above-mentioned Ethics are Platos Logik des Seins (Plato's L o g i c o f Being), Grundziige einer Meta¬ physik der Erkenntnis ( F u n d a m e n t a l Characteristics o f a Metaphysics of
Value
Theory
K n o w l e d g e ) , Das Problem des geistigen Seins ( T h e P r o b l e m o f S p i r i t u a l Being), Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus ( T h e Philosophy o f German Idealism), Z Grundlegung der Ontologie ( T o w a r d a Basis for O n t o l o g y ) , Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit (Possibility a n d R e a l i t y ) , a n d Der Aufbau der realen Welt (The Structure o f the R e a l W o r l d ) . I n 1942 he published " N e u e Wege der O n t o l o g i e " ( N e w Paths i n O n t o l o g y ) , w h i c h appeared i n a collection o f papers e n t i t l e d Systematische Philosophie, w h i c h H a r t m a n n himself edited. H i s last works to appear were Philosophie der Natur (Philosophy o f N a t u r e ) , i n 1950, a n d t w o volumes o f short essays, Kleinere Schriften. ur
Heidegger s Existential
Philoso-
L I F E A N D WORKS. M a r t i n Heidegger, w h o was b o r n i n 1889, is a professor at the U n i v e r s i t y o f F r e i b u r g i m Breisgau, where he succeeded Husserl after h a v i n g been a professor at M a r b u r g . H e is the most i m p o r t a n t G e r m a n philosopher o f the present d a y ; i n order to find a figure o f comparable stature one w o u l d have to go back to the great classic thinkers o f G e r m a n philosophy. Heidegger derives d i r e c t l y f r o m phenomenology, a n d his t h o u g h t is closely related to t h a t o f Husserl a n d Scheler; b u t o n the other h a n d , he has ties w i t h the most precise t r a d i t i o n o f metaphysics and especially w i t h Aristotle. H i s d o c t o r a l thesis was a study o f Duns Scotus. H e has w r i t t e n a n entire book o n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of K a n t as a metaphysician. I n his works one observes the constant presence o f the great philosophers o f the past: the pre-Socratics, Plato, St. Augustine, Descartes, Hegel, K i e r k e g a a r d , D i l t h e y a n d Bergson, as w e l l as those m e n t i o n e d above. Heidegger's t h o u g h t has great p r o f u n d i t y a n d o r i g i n a l i t y . I t also contains great difficulties. Heidegger has created a philosophical t e r m i n o l o g y t h a t is q u i t e h a r d to understand, b u t even harder to translate. I n his a t t e m p t to express new ideas a n d to disclose h i t h e r t o neglected realities, Heidegger does not eschew a r a d i c a l reformation of the v o c a b u l a r y o f philosophy, i n order to lead us to a clearer i n t u i t i o n o f w h a t he wants us to see. F o r another t h i n g , Heidegger's philosophy is essentially incomplete. O n l y the first h a l f o f his m a j o r book has been p u b l i s h e d ; p u b l i c a t i o n o f this was followed b y a l o n g and a l most t o t a l silence, b y shorter w r i t i n g s , q u i t e different i n character a n d o r i e n t a t i o n , a n d b y the decision n o t to p u b l i s h the second 42J
Heidegger's
Existential
Philosophy
v o l u m e . T h i s increases the difficulties o f a n exposition o f his t h o u g h t , w h i c h , strictly speaking, cannot today be c a r r i e d o u t w i t h precision a n d w i t h o u t i n d u l g i n g i n conjecture. I shall therefore have to l i m i t myself to i n d i c a t i n g Heidegger's p o i n t o f view a n d to observing a few m a j o r aspects o f his metaphysics w h i c h w i l l a i d i n the comprehension o f his meaning a n d i n the understanding o f his works. These works are n o t very extensive. Besides a dissertation o n Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus ( T h e T h e o r y o f J u d g m e n t i n Psychologism), the above-mentioned thesis, Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (Duns Scotus' T h e o r y o f Categories a n d M e a n i n g ) a n d a lecture o n " D e r Z e i t b e g r i f f i n der Geschichtswissenschaft" ( T h e Concept of T i m e i n the Science o f H i s t o r y ) , his m a j o r w o r k is the first a n d o n l y volume of Sein und Zeit (Being a n d T i m e ) , published i n 1927. I n 1929 he published his second book, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik ( K a n t a n d the P r o b l e m o f Metaphysics), a v e r y personal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the K a n t i a n i s m o f the Critique of Pure Reason, understood as a basis for metaphysics. L a t e r i n the same year he p u b l i s h e d t w o pamphlets, b r i e f b u t f u l l o f content: Was ist Metaphysik? ( W h a t is Metaphysics ?) a n d Vom Wesen des Grundes ( O n the N a t u r e o f Cause). These were followed i n 1933 b y a speech: " D i e Selbstbehauptung der deutschen U n i v e r s i t ä t " ( T h e Self-Affirmation o f the G e r m a n U n i v e r sity) a n d finally, other essays: " H ö l d e r l i n u n d das Wesen der D i c h t u n g " (Hölderlin a n d the N a t u r e of P o e t r y ) — l a t e r i n c l u d e d i n the v o l u m e Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (Elucidations o f Hölderlin's P o e t r y ) — a n d " V o m Wesen der W a h r h e i t " ( O n the N a t u r e o f T r u t h ) . I n 1947 he published a short book, Piatons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den "Humanismus" (Plato's T h e o r y o f T r u t h , w i t h a L e t t e r o n " H u m a n i s m " ) , i n w h i c h he opposes c e r t a i n interpretations o f his philosophy, distinguishing his o w n t h o u g h t f r o m Jean-Paul Sartre's " e x i s t e n t i a l i s m . " I n 1950 there appeared a v o l u m e t i t l e d Holzwege (Forest Paths), made u p o f six studies w r i t t e n at different times: " D e r U r s p r u n g des Kunstwerkes " ( T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t ) , " D i e Z e i t des W e l t b i l d e s " ( T h e T i m e o f the W o r l d I m a g e ) , " H e g e l s Begriff der E r f a h r u n g " (Hegel's Concept of E x p e r i ence) , " Nietzsches W o r t ' G o t t ist t o t " ' (Nietzsche's S a y i n g , ' G o d Is D e a d ' ) , " W o z u D i c h t e r ? " ( W h a t Is the Purpose o f the Poet?) a n d " D e r Spruch des A n a x i m a n d e r " (Anaximander's M a x i m ) . I n 1953 he published the book Einführung in die Metaphysik ( I n t r o d u c t i o n to Metaphysics) a n d , later, various pamphlets a n d articles: " G e o r g T r a k l " ; " D e r F e l d w e g " ( T h e Path i n the Fields); " . . . Dichterisch w o h n e t der M e n s c h . . . " ( M a n Lives b y P o e t r y ) ; " Aus der E r f a h r u n g des D e n k e n s " ( F r o m the Experience of T h o u g h t ) ; " Z u r Seinsfrage"
The
Problem
of
Being
( T h e Question o f B e i n g ) ; " W a s ist das—die P h i l o s o p h i e ? " ( W h a t Is This T h i n g Philosophy?); and " H e b e l — d e r Hausfreund" (Hebel, the " F r i e n d o f the F a m i l y " ) ; the recent volumes o f essays Was heisst Denken? ( W h a t Is M e a n t by T h i n k i n g ? ) ; Vorträge und Aufsätze (Lectures and Essays), w h i c h includes, a m o n g other essays, " D i e Frage nach der T e c h n i k " ( T h e Question o f T e c h n o l o g y ) ; " Ü b e r w i n d u n g der M e t a p h y s i k " (Metaphysics Superseded); " L o g o s , M o i r a , A l e t h e i a " ; a n d , finally, Der Satz vom Grund ( T h e Principle o f Cause), i n 1957, a n d a l o n g , t w o - v o l u m e w o r k , Nietzsche, i n 1961.
1.
T H E P R O B L E M OF B E I N G
B E I N G A N D T I M E . T h e p r o b l e m t h a t Heidegger deals w i t h i n his investigation e n t i t l e d Sein und Zeit is the meaning of being (die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein). H e is concerned w i t h n o t entities, b u t w i t h being. B e i n g a n d n o t h i n g else is the subject of his i n q u i r y . A n d his i n i t i a l goal is the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of time as the possible horizon for a l l intellection o f b e i n g i n general. W e must n o t forget, as others have too frequently forgotten, t h a t Heidegger p a r t i c u l a r l y insists t h a t the f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m is the m e a n i n g o f being. E v e r y t h i n g else anticipates this question a n d is i n s t r u m e n t a l i n solving i t . B E I N G A N D E N T I T Y . Heidegger begins b y considering the p r o b l e m o f b e i n g as i t has been dealt w i t h i n earlier metaphysics. Ever since A r i s t o t l e , being has been understood to be transcendental, " that w h i c h is most universal o f a l l " (Metaphysics, Book I I I , 4 ) ; its universality was understood to be n o t t h a t o f the genus, as Plato believed, b u t a u n i v e r sality based o n the u n i t y of analogy. H o w e v e r , Heidegger says t h a t this concept of b e i n g is n o t the clearest; o n the c o n t r a r y , i t is the most obscure. Being (Sein) is n o t the same as e n t i t y (Seiendes). Being cannot be defined; b u t this i n itself raises the question o f its meaning. " B e i n g " is the most understandable a n d self-evident o f all concepts. Everyone understands such statements as " t h e sky is b l u e , " " I am h a p p y . " H o w e v e r , the fact t h a t we understand the everyday use o f " b e i n g " whereas its m e a n i n g a n d relationship to the e n t i t y is obscure to us, indicates t h a t being is an enigma. T h i s is w h y we are obliged to raise the question o f the m e a n i n g o f being. E v e r y ontology, Heidegger says (Sein und Ze^); b l i n d i f i t does n o t first sufficiently explain the m e a n i n g o f being a n d t h e n embrace this e x p l a n a t i o n as its f u n d a m e n t a l theme. l s
D A S E I N A N D B E I N G . I n a s m u c h as science is a n a c t i v i t y carried o n b y m a n , i t has the m o d e of being of this e n t i t y , m a n . Heidegger calls this e n t i t y Dasein. H o w e v e r , he observes t h a t science is not the o n l y mode
4z&
Heidegger's
Existential
Philosophy
of b e i n g of Dasein, nor even the most immediate. Dasein is understood i n its b e i n g ; the understanding of being is a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the b e i n g of Dasein. I t can therefore be said t h a t Dasein is o n t o l o g i c a l . T h e b e i n g o f Dasein is Existenz, existence. Heidegger uses the t e r m existential to describe e v e r y t h i n g relative to the structure o f existence. T h e ontological analytic o f the e n t i t y Dasein necessitates a p r i o r consideration o f existentiality, t h a t is, the mode o f being o f the e n t i t y t h a t exists. W e already see i n this the idea of being, a n d t h e analytic o f Dasein presupposes the p r i o r question o f the meaning of being in general. D A S E I N A N D W O R L D . H o w e v e r , i n the r e a l m o f the sciences, Dasein deals w i t h entities t h a t are n o t necessarily themselves Dasein. A n essential element o f Dasein, t h e n , is being in a world. T h u s , the understanding o f the being of Dasein presupposes, i n a n equally primary way, the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the " w o r l d " a n d of the being of the e n t i t y t h a t is f o u n d w i t h i n the w o r l d . Consequently, the ontologies o f the entities t h a t are n o t themselves Dasein are based on the ontic structure o f Dasein. T h i s is w h y we must look for the fundamental ontology, the o n l y one t h a t can give rise to a l l the others, i n the existential analytic of Dasein (existenziale Analytik des Daseins). Dasein has a p r i o r i t y over a l l other entities. I t has, i n t h e first place, a n ontic p r i o r i t y : this e n t i t y is d e t e r m i n e d i n its b e i n g b y existence. Secondly, i t has a n ontological p r i o r i t y : because of its d e t e r m i n a t i o n as existence, Dasein is i n itself " ontological." A n d t h i r d l y , since Dasein is able to comprehend being w h i c h is n o t Dasein, i t has a n ontic-ontological p r i o r i t y : i t is the c o n d i t i o n for the possibility o f a l l ontologies. Therefore, there is no specific mode o f b e i n g t h a t Dasein does n o t comprehend. T H E A N A L Y T I C OF D A S E I N . T h e analytic o f Dasein is n o t o n l y i n c o m p l e t e ; i t is also provisional. I t merely reveals the b e i n g of this entity, w i t h o u t i n t e r p r e t i n g its m e a n i n g . Its mission is s i m p l y to prepare a n opening i n the necessary h o r i z o n for the p r i m a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f being. N o w , the m e a n i n g o f the being o f Dasein is temporality. T h i s furnishes us w i t h the ground for the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the m e a n i n g o f being. I t is from the standpoint of time t h a t Dasein comprehends a n d interprets being. T i m e is the h o r i z o n for the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f being. Therefore, philosophy's first mission is a primary explanation of time as the horizon for the understanding of being from the standpoint of temporality, as the being ofDasein. H E I D E G G E R ' S M E T H O D . T h e m e t h o d used i n connection w i t h the f u n d a m e n t a l question concerning being is phenomenological. T o Heidegger, phenomenology does n o t involve his subscribing to any " p o i n t o f v i e w " or " d i r e c t i o n , " for phenomenology is a concept of
The
Analysis
of
Dasein
method. Phenomenology does n o t describe the " w h a t " o f the object o f philosophical investigation, b u t the " h o w " o f this i n q u i r y . Heidegger understands phenomenology as a n i m p e r a t i v e to go to the things themselves, t o dispense w i t h a l l i m a g i n a r y constructions, chance discoveries a n d a p p a r e n t questions. The
w o r d " p h e n o m e n o l o g y " comes f r o m t w o Greek words, (phaindmenon) a n d Aoyo? (logos). T h e first w o r d derives f r o m phainesthai, the m i d d l e voice o f phaino, w h i c h means " to place i n the l i g h t , " i n c l a r i t y , a n d w h i c h comes f r o m the same r o o t as a>s (phos), l i g h t . Phenomenon means " t h a t w h i c h is s h o w n , " t h a t w h i c h is placed i n the l i g h t ; therefore, i t is n o t the same as appearance. Logos means a saying, a making manifest (8-qXovv); A r i s t o t l e explained i t as apophainesthai, i n w h i c h we again encounter the root o f " p h e n o m e n o n . " A n d this s h o w i n g or m a k i n g manifest is a discovering, a m a k i n g patent, a p l a c i n g i n t r u t h or ak-qdeia (aletheia). Falsity is, i n t u r n , a covering up. T h i s is the m e a n i n g o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y : a mode of access to the theme o f ontology. Ontology is possible only as phenomenology. aivoiievov
T h e m e a n i n g o f the phenomenological description o f Dasein is interpretation. Therefore, phenomenology is hermeneutics. P H I L O S O P H Y . O n t o l o g y a n d phenomenology are n o t t w o p h i l o sophical disciplines a m o n g others. T h e y are t w o descriptions w h i c h characterize philosophy b y its object a n d its method. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, a n d i t begins w i t h the hermeneutics of Dasein. T h e e l a b o r a t i o n o f the problems o f being comprises t w o topics, a n d therefore the investigation is d i v i d e d i n t o t w o sections, of w h i c h o n l y a p a r t o f the first has been published. T h e o u t l i n e is as follows: First p a r t : T h e analysis o f the t e m p o r a l i t y o f Dasein a n d the e x p l a n a t i o n o f t i m e as the transcendental h o r i z o n o f the p r o b l e m o f being. Second p a r t : T h e f o u n d a t i o n for a phenomenological destruction o f the h i s t o r y o f ontology, g u i d e d b y the p r o b l e m o f t e m p o r a l i t y . T h i s is the m e a n i n g o f Heidegger's p h i l o s o p h y ; i t is, i n the f i n a l analysis, the ancient question concerning being, w h i c h has still not been answered adequately. 2.
T H E A N A L Y S I S OF D A S E I N
T H E ESSENCE O F D A S E I N . T h e e n t i t y whose analysis Heidegger undertakes is every one o f us. T h e being of this e n t i t y is always my own (je meines). T h e essence o f this e n t i t y (its quid, its was) must be understood f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f its b e i n g or existence; however, i t is
43°
Heidegger's
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necessary to i n t e r p r e t this existence i n a m e a n i n g peculiar to this e n t i t y t h a t is us, a n d n o t i n the usual sense o f t h a t w h i c h is present (Vorhandensein). T h u s , Heidegger can say: The "essence" of Dasein consists in its existence (Das " Wesen" des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz). Dasein always implies the personal p r o n o u n : " I a m , " " y o u a r e . " Dasein is essentially its o w n possibility; therefore i t c a n " choose itself," " w i n itself," or "lose i t s e l f . " T h u s , i t has t w o modes o f b e i n g : authenticity and unauthenticity. W h e n the characteristics o f being refer to Dasein, they are called existentials, and w h e n they refer to other modes of b e i n g they are called categories. So the e n t i t y is a who (existence) or a what ( b e i n g present i n the fullest sense). Heidegger observes t h a t the a n a l y t i c o f Dasein is different f r o m a l l forms of anthropology, psychology a n d biology, a n d also p r i o r to t h e m . T h u s , i t is n o t simply t h a t Heidegger's philosophy is basically an i n q u i r y i n t o the m e a n i n g of being a n d n o t a b o u t m a n ; for previous inquiries i n t o the being of Dasein cannot be understood as anthropology either. " B E I N G - I N - T H E - W O R L D . " T h e determinations o f the being o f Dasein have to be seen a n d understood on the basis o f w h a t is called " b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d " ; this is a unitary phenomenon, a n d therefore i t s h o u l d n o t be understood as a complex of the terms i n this expression. I n this expression, " i n " is n o t a spatial concept; r a t h e r , spatiality is something that is derived f r o m the p r i m a r y m e a n i n g o f " i n " a n d is based o n " b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , " the basic mode of the b e i n g of Dasein. N o r is knowledge p r i m a r y , for i t is a mode o f being o f " being-in-thew o r l d . " K n o w i n g the things is one o f the possible modes o f dealing w i t h t h e m ; however, a l l modes presuppose the p r i o r a n d f u n d a m e n t a l s i t u a t i o n o f Dasein, constitutive o f i t , w h i c h is to be, as a m a t t e r o f course, i n something t h a t is k n o w n chiefly as world. T H E W O R L D . " B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d " (In-der-Welt-sein) c a n be f u l l y understood o n l y b y v i r t u e of a phenomenological consideration of the world. T o begin w i t h , the w o r l d is n o t the things (houses, trees, m e n , m o u n t a i n s , stars) w h i c h exist w i t h i n the w o r l d , a n d w h i c h are " w o r l d l y " (innerweltlich). N o r is the w o r l d nature, a n e n t i t y w h i c h is f o u n d i n the w o r l d a n d w h i c h can be described i n various forms a n d at various levels. N o t even the ontological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the being o f these entities refers to the p h e n o m e n o n " w o r l d , " w h i c h is already presupposedin these modes of access to objective being. O n t o l o g i c a l l y , world is a characteristic o f Dasein itself. Heidegger mentions four different ways i n w h i c h the concept world is used: ( 1 ) W o r l d as the sum t o t a l of the e n t i t y that can exist w i t h i n the w o r l d . (2) W o r l d as a n ontological t e r m : the being o f the e n t i t y o f w h i c h we
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are speaking; i t sometimes designates a region e m b r a c i n g a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f entities, as w h e n one speaks o f the w o r l d o f the m a t h e m a t i c i a n . (3) W o r l d as t h a t " i n w h i c h there lives " a factitious Dasein as such. (4) W o r l d as the ontologico-existential d e n o m i n a t i o n o f worldliness. M a n finds himself i n a w o r l d t h a t is n o t p r i m a r i l y present (vorhanden), b u t at hand (zuhanden). T h i s is the basis for the things' role as utensils (Z S )i subject w h i c h Heidegger has analyzed i n d e p t h . T a k i n g this as his p o i n t o f departure, he has analyzed worldliness a n d i n t e r p r e t e d the Cartesian ontology o f the w o r l d as res externa, i n o r d e r u l t i m a t e l y to study the spatiality o f existence. However, we cannot go i n t o the details of this m a t t e r here. eu
e
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C O E X I S T E N C E . By v i r t u e o f the constitutive nature o f Dasein, there c a n be no mere subject w i t h o u t a w o r l d ; n o r can there be one ego isolated f r o m the others. T h e others coexist i n " b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . " T h e w o r l d o f Dasein is a common world (Mitwelt): to be in means to be with others, a n d this i n h e r e n t l y " w o r l d l y " being is coexistence. T h e " w h o " o f this coexistence is n o t this one or t h a t one; i t is n o t anyone i n p a r t i c u l a r , n o r is i t everyone together: i t is the impersonal, the " they " (das Man). A n existential characteristic o f the " t h e y " is t h a t i t is a n average t e r m (Durchschnittlichkeit). T h e " t h e y " fulfills Dasein i n its everyday life. " T h e ' t h e y ' is a n existential a n d i t belongs to the positive c o n s t i t u t i o n o f Dasein as a p r i m a r y p h e n o m e n o n . " A n d a u t h e n t i c being itself is a n existential m o d i f i c a t i o n of the " t h e y . " E V E R Y D A Y L I F E . O n one h a n d , Dasein is characterized b y facticity; o n the other h a n d , i t is also characterized b y openness (Erschlossenheit), the q u a l i t y o f b e i n g essentially open t o the things. However, Heidegger distinguishes t w o different modes o f " b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . " W e have, o n the one h a n d , everydayness (Alltäglichkeit), w h i c h is t r i v i a l , unauthentic existence. T h e subject o f this t r i v i a l existence is the Man, the " o n e , " the i m p e r s o n a l " t h e y . " Existence becomes t r i v i a l — i n a n unquestionable a n d necessary m a n n e r — i n the " t h e y , " i n the " a n y o n e , " a n d is a decadence orfall (Verfallen). T h e Man sees itself as fallen a n d lost i n the w o r l d . T h e constitutive mode of existence is to find oneself i n a state o f thrownness (Geworfenheit). A U T H E N T I C EXISTENCE. H o w e v e r , Dasein can overcome this everyd a y t r i v i a l i t y a n d come i n t o its o w n ; t h e n i t becomes eigentliche Existenz or authentic existence. T h e m o d e i n w h i c h this is f o u n d is anguish (Angst)—a concept o f w h i c h K i e r k e g a a r d h a d already m a d e use. T h i s anguish is n o t due to this or t h a t cause; rather, i t is caused b y nothing; he w h o is i n anguish is i n anguish over nothing. T h u s , i t is nothingness t h a t reveals itself to us i n anguish. A n d Dasein is seen t o be
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characterized as Sorge, care, i n its p r i m a r y m e a n i n g o f concern or preoccupation. Heidegger interprets a L a t i n fable b y H y g i n u s , according to w h i c h Care made m a n a n d , i n accordance w i t h a n e d i c t o f S a t u r n ( t i m e ) , has charge of h i m w h i l e he lives. T R U T H . T h e question o f the m e a n i n g o f being is possible o n l y i f there is a n understanding o f being. ( T h i s pertains to the m o d e o f being o f the e n t i t y we call Dasein.) Being comes to mean reality. T h i s concept raises the question of the existence o f the external w o r l d , a question t h a t has been decisive i n the disputes between realism a n d i d e a l i s m ; b u t Heidegger observes t h a t the question o f whether t h e r e is a w o r l d a n d w h e t h e r its existence can be p r o v e d is meaningless, as i t is a question t h a t establishes Dasein as " b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . " Heidegger distinguishes between world as the where o f being-in (In-Sein) and "world" as a " w o r l d l y " e n t i t y . T h e n the w o r l d is essentially open (erschlossen) w i t h the being o f Dasein; a n d the " w o r l d " has also already been discovered w i t h the openness o f the w o r l d . T h i s result coincides w i t h the thesis o f realism: the e x t e r n a l w o r l d really exists. However, Heidegger makes a distinction between his thesis a n d realism; he does n o t believe, as does realism, t h a t r e a l i t y needs to be p r o v e d or can be p r o v e d . A n d w h e n idealism affirms t h a t b e i n g a n d r e a l i t y are only " i n the consciousness," i t affirms t h a t being cannot be explained b y the e n t i t y : r e a l i t y is possible o n l y i n the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f being (Seinsverstdndnis); i n other w o r d s , for a l l entities, b e i n g is " t h a t w h i c h is t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " ; b u t i f idealism consists o f r e d u c i n g every e n t i t y to a subject or consciousness t h a t is i n d e t e r m i n a t e i n its being, t h e n i t is j u s t as ingenuous as realism. T h e forerunners o f present-day philosophy ( M a i n e de B i r a n , D i l t h e y ) defined reality as resistance. H o w e v e r , Heidegger examines this p r o b l e m i n an even more f u n d a m e n t a l way. T h e experience o f resistance, discovery b y means o f the effort o f that w h i c h resists, is ontologically possible only b y v i r t u e o f the world's openness. Resistance characterizes the being o f the " w o r l d l y " e n t i t y ; b u t i t is based i n a p r i o r w a y o n " b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , " w h i c h is open to the things. "Consciousness o f r e a l i t y " is itself a m o d e o f " b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . " I f we wished to take the cogito sum as the p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e o f the existential analytic, we w o u l d have to i n t e r p r e t the first a f f i r m a t i o n , sum, to m e a n : / am in the world. H o w e v e r , w h e n Descartes affirms the present r e a l i t y o f the cogitationes, he also affirms a n ego as a res cogitans without a world. T h u s , instead o f understanding m a n as a reality shut u p i n his o w n consciousness, the existential analytic sees h i m as a n e n t i t y w h i c h is essentially open to the things a n d w h i c h is defined b y its " being-in-the-
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w o r l d " ; therefore, as a n e n t i t y w h i c h consists of transcending itself. T h e w a y was prepared for this conclusion earlier b y the discovery o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y as a characteristic o f psychical acts, a characteristic t h a t n a t u r a l l y affects man's very being. M a n transcends himself, points to the things, is open to t h e m . As we have seen, this places the p r o b l e m o f the reality o f the external w o r l d i n a r a d i c a l l y new perspective; the external w o r l d no longer appears as something " a d d e d " to m a n , b u t as something t h a t is given along w i t h m a n . T h i s is the basis for truth. Heidegger reintroduces the ancient, t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f t r u t h as adaequatio intellectus et rei ( m a k i n g the m i n d equal to the t h i n g ) i n order to prove its inadequacy. T r u t h is p r i m a r i l y the discovery o f being i n itself (a\r/8eia). A n d this discovery is possible o n l y i f based o n " b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . " T h i s phenomenon, w h i c h is a f u n d a m e n t a l a n d constitutive dimension o f Dasein, is the ontological basis for t r u t h , w h i c h is therefore seen to be based o n the very structure o f Dasein. I n his essay " V o m Wesen der W a h r h e i t " (1943), Heidegger locates the essence o f t r u t h i n freedom; freedom is seen as a " l e t t i n g be " (Seinlassen) o f the e n t i t y ; m a n does n o t " possess " freedom as a p r o p e r t y ; r a t h e r , freedom, the " e x i s t e n c e " m a n discovers, possesses m a n ; a n d Heidegger relates this to the historicity o f m a n , the o n l y historical e n t i t y . '' There is'' truth only in sofar as and while there is Dasein, Heidegger says. T h e e n t i t y is dis-covered a n d open o n l y w h e n a n d w h i l e there is Dasein. Newton's laws, the p r i n c i p l e o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n , a n y t r u t h w h a t ever : a l l these are true o n l y w h i l e there is Dasein. Before a n d afterward there is neither t r u t h nor falsity. Before N e w t o n , his laws were neither true nor false; this does n o t m e a n t h a t the e n t i t y w h i c h these laws discovered d i d n o t exist previously, b u t t h a t the laws t u r n e d out to be true t h r o u g h the agency o f N e w t o n ; b y means o f these laws the e n t i t y discovered became accessible to Dasein, and this is precisely w h a t t r u t h is. Therefore, the existence o f " eternal truths " c o u l d be demonstrated o n l y i f i t were p r o v e d t h a t there has been a n d w i l l be Dasein t h r o u g h o u t eternity. T h u s , every t r u t h is relative to the being o f Dasein; this, n a t u r a l l y , does n o t indicate either psychologism or subjectivism. B u t o n the other h a n d , t r u t h coincides w i t h being. " T h e r e i s " being—rather t h a n a n entity—when there is truth. A n d there is t r u t h only w h i l e there is Dasein. Being a n d t r u t h , Heidegger concludes, " are " equally p r i m a r y . D E A T H . I n Heidegger's philosophy the p r o b l e m o f death appears as an i m p o r t a n t theme. Dasein is always incomplete, because its conclusion implies at the same t i m e a ceasing to be. I t is possible, i n a
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certain sense, to experience the death o f one's neighbor. I n such a case, the sum o f w h a t the neighbor attains i n d e a t h is a no longer existing, i n the sense o f " n o longer being i n the w o r l d . " D e a t h produces the corpse; the end of the e n t i t y qua Dasein is the beginning of this e n t i t y qua present t h i n g . B u t i n spite of everything, the corpse is something m o r e t h a n an i n a n i m a t e t h i n g , a n d can be understood o n l y f r o m the viewp o i n t of life. D e a t h is something peculiar to each a n d every m a n : " N o one can take some one else's death away f r o m h i m , " Heidegger says. D e a t h is a n essential characteristic o f D a s e i n ; b u t i t is n o t a n event w i t h i n the w o r l d . D e a t h for the Dasein is always a " n o t y e t . " I t is a m a t t e r o f " c o m i n g to one's e n d , " a n d this is w h a t Heidegger calls literally being-towards-deaih (Sein-zum-Tode). T h i s being-towards-death is a constituent p a r t o f Dasein; a n d dying, f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f its ontological possibility, is based on Sorge, care. D e a t h is the most authentic possibility o f existence. B u t the " t h e y , " the Man, i n its t r i v i a l everyday existence, tries to hide this fact f r o m itself as m u c h as possible; they say: death w i l l surely come b u t , for the t i m e being, n o t yet. W i t h this "but," Heidegger says, the " they " denies t h e c e r t a i n t y o f death. I n this w a y , the " t h e y " covers u p the peculiar feature o f the certainty of d e a t h : t h a t i t is possible at any m o m e n t . As soon as a m a n is b o r n , he is o l d enough to d i e ; conversely, n o one is so o l d t h a t he does not still have a n open f u t u r e . D e a t h is the most proper possibility of Dasein. I n authentic existence, the illusions of the Man are overcome, a n d Dasein isfree for d e a t h . T h e state of mind w h i c h permits this acceptance o f death as the most proper h u m a n possibility is anguish. T h e r e is not o n l y a being-towards-death, b u t also a freedom for death (Freiheit zum Tode). T h i s doctrine of Heidegger's bristles w i t h question marks a n d i n t e r n a l difficulties, w h i c h cannot even be a l l u d e d to here. T E M P O R A L I T Y . W e have seen Dasein characterized as Sorge. W h a t , n o w , is the m e a n i n g of this Sorge, this care ? A n g u i s h i n the face o f death is always a not yet; concern is characterized b y a n awaiting (erwarten); thus, i t is p r i m a r i l y a m a t t e r o f something i n the future. A n d the resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) of Dasein is always i n apresent. Lastly, i n Geworfenheit, " t h r o w n n e s s , " the past, especially, functions as such. Temporality (Zeitlichkeit) manifests itself as the sense of a u t h e n t i c care, and the p r i m a r y p h e n o m e n o n o f o r i g i n a l a n d authentic t e m p o r a l i t y is the future. Heidegger subjects t e m p o r a l i t y a n d historicity (the latter based o n the f o r m e r ) to a p r o f o u n d a n d far-reaching analysis. H e finds t h a t Dasein is essentially l i n k e d w i t h t i m e , a n d this explains the connection between the t w o central terms o f Heidegger's ontology t h a t furnish the t i t l e o f his m a j o r w o r k : being a n d time.
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T h i s b r i e f o u t l i n e is n o t i n t e n d e d as a n adequate exposition o f Heidegger's philosophy, w h i c h , at any rate, is perhaps n o t yet possible today. T h i s philosopher's w o r k is n o t yet concluded, a n d f u r t h e r m o r e , its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is p r o b l e m a t i c a l a n d controversial. I t has been nearly forty years since the first v o l u m e o f Being and Time was p u b lished, a n d the works published b y Heidegger since t h e n do not represent a b o d y o f d o c t r i n e — a t least i n m a t u r e f o r m — c o m p a r a b l e to the systematic d o c t r i n e i n t h a t book. T h u s , a question arises over the m e a n i n g of Heidegger's philosophy. I n his most recent works he has skillfully criticized the too hasty interpretations o f his thought. W h a t is o f interest here is to show the sense a n d the position o f this metaphysics t h a t is so exceptionally p r o f o u n d , r i c h a n d s t i m u l a t i n g , b u t also b r i m m i n g over w i t h philosophical problems a n d risks, w h i c h are a p p a r e n t today i n the w o r k o f those thinkers w h o w i t h greater or lesser j u s t i f i c a t i o n c l a i m Heidegger as their teacher a n d inspirer. I have also t r i e d to offer assistance to those w h o wish to undertake the very necessary, t h o u g h difficult, task of reading Heidegger's b r i l l i a n t w o r k ; he is read less frequently a n d less carefully t h a n m a y be i m a g i n e d . Therefore, I deemed i t preferable to l i m i t myself p r i n c i p a l l y to the incomplete torso o f Being and Time, instead o f s t u d y i n g i n detail his later w r i t i n g s , w h i c h w o u l d require a n enormously painstaking exposition before any c l a r i t y could be a t t a i n e d .
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"EXISTENTIALISM"
I n the last few decades, a n d especially since the end o f the Second W o r l d W a r , a h i g h l y complex philosophical movement has been greatly developed; this movement, w h i c h derives its major ideas f r o m the philosophy o f life, is generally referred to u n d e r the blanket name o f " e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , " a rather ambiguous a n d inexact d e n o m i n a t i o n . Some o f its representatives are about the same age as H e i d e g g e r — f o r instance, Jaspers, M a r c e l and W a h l , w h o belong to the same generat i o n as other, differently oriented thinkers, such as Ortega, H a r t m a n n , Lavelle, L e Senne, M a r i t a i n a n d Gilson. Jaspers, M a r c e l and W a h l began their philosophy independently o f Heidegger, b u t have undergone his influence; other thinkers have c o n t i n u e d his philosophy, developed i t , a n d often denatured i t . A l l these tendencies, very diss i m i l a r i n value a n d fruitfulness, d i v e r g i n g f r o m one another considera b l y a n d v a r y i n g greatly i n significance, nevertheless have certain features i n c o m m o n . A t one p o i n t they seemed to d o m i n a t e the p h i l o sophic scene, at least i n C o n t i n e n t a l E u r o p e a n d L a t i n A m e r i c a , b u t t h e i r influence a n d prestige have slackened i n the last few years.
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T h e expression " e x i s t e n t i a l i s m " is the one most w i d e l y used, a n d yet m a n y o f these philosophers w o u l d reject i t as a n a m e for t h e i r doctrines. I n order to establish a n a p p r o x i m a t i v e classification, i t w o u l d be possible to distinguish between existential philosophy (Heidegger), philosophy of existence (Jaspers, M a r c e l ) a n d existentialism (a t e r m w h i c h w o u l d have to be reserved for Sartre a n d his followers). A l l these forms o f t h o u g h t have been inspired, m o r e or less remotely, b y K i e r k e g a a r d , whose shadow hovers over t h e m . K i e r k e g a a r d i n d i c a t e d his aversion to abstract or sub specie aeterni t h o u g h t a n d called a t t e n t i o n to existence: " A b s t r a c t t h o u g h t is sub specie aeterni, i t makes a n abstraction o f the p a r t i c u l a r , o f the t e m p o r a l , o f t h e process o f existence, of the anguish o f m a n , w h o is situated i n existence b y a c o m b i n a t i o n o f the t e m p o r a l a n d the e t e r n a l . " " A l l l o g i c a l t h o u g h t is g i v e n i n abstract a n d sub specie aeterni language. T o t h i n k o f existence i n this w a y means m a k i n g a n abstraction of the d i f f i c u l t y one finds i n t h i n k i n g the eternal w i t h i n becoming, w h i c h is w h a t we are obliged to d o , since whoever thinks is himself located w i t h i n b e c o m i n g . Conseq u e n t l y , t h i n k i n g abstractly is easier t h a n existing (like t h a t w h i c h is called a s u b j e c t ) . " " G o d does n o t t h i n k , H e creates; G o d does n o t exist, H e is eternal. M a n thinks a n d exists, a n d existence separates t h o u g h t f r o m being, keeps t h e m successively distant f r o m each o t h e r . ' ' " Subjectivity is t r u t h ; subjectivity is r e a l i t y . " These ideas o f K i e r k e g a a r d are the g e r m o f a great p a r t o f the existential doctrines, most d i r e c t l y those o f Jaspers a n d W a h l . These forms o f t h o u g h t have aroused lively interest. T h e deeper reason for this, l y i n g beneath any passing fads, is to be f o u n d i n the fact t h a t these philosophies are abreast of the times; they have stated the true problems o f o u r age, whatever the t r u t h o f their solutions m a y be; they have responded to the desire for concreteness characteristic o f a l l present-day t h o u g h t ; a n d above a l l , they have concentrated on the study o f t h a t reality w h i c h is, u n d e r one name or another, h u m a n life. I shall a t t e m p t to characterize briefly the most i m p o r t a n t thinkers o f this g r o u p . JASPERS. K a r l Jaspers, b o r n i n O l d e n b u r g i n 1 8 8 3 , a professor at H e i d e l b e r g a n d t h e n at Basel, was o r i g i n a l l y concerned w i t h the sciences; he came to philosophy f r o m psychiatry. H i s w r i t i n g s are numerous a n d some are enormously l e n g t h y ; the most i m p o r t a n t are Allgemeine Psychopathologie (General Psychopathology), Psychologic der Weltanschauungen (Psychology o f W o r l d V i e w s ) , Die geistige Situation der Zeit (translated as Man in the Modern Age), Philosophic ( 1 9 3 2 , three v o l u m e s : Philosophische Weltorientierung [Philosophical W o r l d O r i e n t a t i o n ] , Existenzerhellung [ E l u c i d a t i o n o f Existence], Metaphysik), Vernunft
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und Existenz (Reason a n d Existence), Nietzsche, Descartes und die Philosophie, Existenzphilosophie, Der philosophische Glaube (translated as The Perennial Scope of Philosophy), Einführung in die Philosophie (translated as Way to Wisdom), Vom Ursprung und Z™1 der Geschichte ( T h e O r i g i n a n d Goal of H i s t o r y ) , Rechenschaft und Ausblick ( A c c o u n t i n g a n d Prospects), Vernunft und Widervernunft in unserer Zeit (Reason a n d Anti-Reason i n O u r T i m e ) , Von der Wahrheit ( O n T r u t h ; the first v o l u m e , extremely long, o f a Philosophische Logik) a n d Die grossen Philosophen ( T h e Great Philosophers). Jaspers has been constantly concerned w i t h ethics a n d has studied i n detail Germany's responsibility i n the Second W o r l d W a r , the defense of freedom a n d the historic problems o f o u r t i m e . F r o m the psychology o f Weltanschauungen, o r ' ' w o r l d views,'' Jaspers progressed to a philosophy o f existence (Existenzphilosophie); his p h i losophy has been characterized b y G a b r i e l M a r c e l as " a n orography o f the i n n e r l i f e . " I t is based o n the v i e w p o i n t of w h a t Jaspers calls mögliche Existenz, or possible existence; t h a t is, the incomplete. T h e question o f being involves a n d affects the m a n w h o asks i t ; the quest for being is always unachieved, b u t essential (an echo o f K a n t ' s concept of metaphysics as a Naturanlage, or n a t u r a l predisposition; K a n t ' s influence o n Jaspers is decisive). F o r Jaspers, existence is t h a t w h i c h is never an object; i t must come to grips w i t h itself a n d w i t h its o w n transcendence. Jaspers is especially interested i n " b o r d e r l i n e " or " u l t i m a t e " situations (Grenzsituationen), w h i c h cannot be m o d i f i e d , w h i c h belong to Existenz b u t signify the transition to transcendence— the historic d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f existence, death, suffering, struggle, g u i l t . A m a j o r concept i n Jaspers' t h o u g h t is w h a t he calls das Umgreifende ( t h a t w h i c h embraces or involves, " t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e " ) ; i t is the being w h i c h is not merely subject n o r merely object: either the being i n itself w h i c h surrounds us ( w o r l d a n d transcendence) or the being we ourselves are (existence, consciousness, s p i r i t ) . W h a t we k n o w is in the w o r l d , i t never is the w o r l d ; transcendence i n its t u r n never comes to be the w o r l d , b u t " s p e a k s " t h r o u g h the being i n the w o r l d . I f the w o r l d is everything, there is no transcendence; i f there is transcendence, i t is perhaps indicated b y w o r l d l y being. B U B E R . M a r t i n Buber ( b o r n i n V i e n n a i n 1878, d i e d i n Jerusalem i n 1965) was a Jewish t h i n k e r w h o h a d close ties w i t h this existentialist t h o u g h t ; his p a r t i c u l a r interest was i n religious themes and Jewish mysticism. H e placed special emphasis o n subject-object and subject-subject relationships, a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y o n the I-Thou relationship. Buber made a great c o n t r i b u t i o n to the theme o f man's i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h his fellows. H i s most i m p o r t a n t works are: Ich und Du ( I a n d T h o u ) , Die chassidischen Bücher ( T h e Hasidic Books),
438
Heidegger's
Existential
Philosophy
^wiesprache: ein Traktat vom dialogischen Leben ( D i a l o g u e : a Treatise on D i a l o g i c a l L i f e ) , " W a s ist der M e n s c h ? " ( W h a t Is M a n ? ) and Der Mensch und sein Gebild ( M a n a n d H i s I m a g e ) . M A R C E L . T h e first representative o f these doctrines i n France was G a b r i e l M a r c e l ( b o r n i n 1889). M a r c e l , w h o converted to Catholicism i n 1929, is a philosopher and p l a y w r i g h t ; he considers his d r a m a t i c works to be an essential p a r t o f his philosophical investigations. His most i m p o r t a n t books are Journal métaphysique, Être et avoir (Being and H a v i n g ) , Du refus à l'invocation, Homo viator a n d especially, Le mystère de l'être ( T h e M y s t e r y o f Being) ; a m o n g his works for the theater are Le seuil invisible ( T h e I n v i s i b l e T h r e s h o l d ) , Le quatuor en fa dièse ( Q u a r t e t i n F Sharp), Un homme de Dieu ( A M a n o f G o d ) , Le monde cassé ( T h e Broken W o r l d ) , Le dard ( T h e D a r t ) , Le fanal ( T h e L a n t e r n ) , La soif ( T h i r s t ) , Le signe de la croix ( T h e Sign of the Cross) a n d L'émissaire. M a r c e l is not very systematic; his circuitous t h o u g h t attempts to adhere to reality, f o l l o w i n g its meanderings a n d m a i n t a i n i n g the greatest possible a u t h e n t i c i t y , as w e l l as great fidelity to the things. T h e beauty o f his intellect, his veracity a n d his lack o f f r i v o l i t y are w e l l k n o w n . A religious m a n w h o is d o m i n a t e d b y respect for r e a l i t y , he makes a w o r t h y a n d p r o f o u n d use o f his i n t e l l e c t u a l gifts. H e first used the t e r m " e x i s t e n c e " i n 1914, a n d his t h o u g h t has been called " C h r i s t i a n e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , " b u t he rejects this name. " T h e r e is a plane, " M a r c e l writes, " o n w h i c h n o t o n l y is the w o r l d meaningless, b u t on w h i c h i t is even a c o n t r a d i c t i o n to pose the question o f whether i t has any m e a n i n g ; this is the plane o f direct existence ; i t is o f necessity the plane o f the fortuitous, i t is the order o f chance. " A decisive d i s t i n c t i o n for M a r c e l is the one he makes between problem a n d mystery. F o r h i m , a p r o b l e m is something one comes across, w h i c h blocks one's p a t h ; i t is there i n its e n t i r e t y i n f r o n t o f me. A mystery, o n the other h a n d , is something i n w h i c h I find myself engaged or i n v o l v e d (engagé) ; its essence consists i n not being entirely i n front of me, as i f i n t h a t region the difference between " i n m e " a n d " f a c i n g m e " were to lose its meaning. M a r c e l believes that the p r o b lems o f philosophy are not p r o p e r l y problems, b u t rather mysteries i n this sense. M a r c e l uses the concepts o f project, vocation, creation and transcendence. T o create means to create at a level above one's self; to transcend does n o t m e a n to transcend experience, because b e y o n d experience there is n o t h i n g , b u t to have experience o f the transcendent. T h e r e exists for M a r c e l an existential fulcrum, a s t a n d p o i n t or v i e w p o i n t , w h i c h is t h a t o f m a n . T h e p r o b l e m o f the body is stated as the c o n d i t i o n o f " being incarnate " ; this means appearing as this body, w i t h o u t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n or distinction. T h e b o d y is a manifestation o f
"Existentialism"
439
the nexus w h i c h unites me w i t h the w o r l d , a n d I can say, " I a m m y b o d y . " T h e existential is concerned w i t h b e i n g incarnate, the fact o f b e i n g i n the w o r l d ; a n d this is a chez soi ; feeling is n o t a passive act, b u t a p a r t i c i p a t i o n . M a r c e l has reflected deeply o n the h u m a n situation, o n sacrifice a n d suicide, o n p a t e r n i t y a n d its r e l a t i o n to the b o d i l y care o f the c h i l d — h e n c e the possibility o f adoptive p a t e r n i t y — a n d finally o n " c r e a t i v e f i d e l i t y . " M a r c e l proposes a " c o n c r e t e p h i l o s o p h y " d e t e r m i n e d b y the " b i t e o f reality, " the themes o f w h i c h are death, suicide, b e t r a y a l . T h e belief i n the " t h o u " is a n essential p a r t o f this philosophy ; being is the site o f fidelity, w h i c h signifies a n enormous compromise a n d hope as a n infinite c r e d i t ; these ideas, along w i t h f a i t h i n personal i m m o r t a l i t y , are closely l i n k e d w i t h love, a n d are a d m i r a b l y expressed i n a line spoken b y one o f Marcel's characters : Toi quej'aime, tu ne mourras pas ( Y o u w h o m I love, y o u shall n o t die). Also o f Marcel's generation are J e a n W a h l ( b o r n 1888), a professor at the Sorbonne a n d a u t h o r of Étude sur le Parme'nide de Platon, Vers le concret, Études kierkegaardiennes, Petite histoire de "L'existentialisme" (A Short H i s t o r y o f Existentialism) a n d Traité de métaphysique; Louis Lavelle (1883-1951), whose relations w i t h existentialism are m u c h m o r e remote : a u t h o r o f De l'Être, Traité des valeurs, La dialectique de l'éternel présent, a n d so o n ; a n d R e n é L e Senne (1883-1954), whose p r i n c i p a l books are Introduction à la philosophie, Le mensonge et le caractère, Obstacle et valeur, Traité de morale générale a n d Traité de caractérologie. T h e f o l l o w i n g generation, also closer to b o t h personalism a n d spiritualism t h a n t o existential t h o u g h t , is represented b y E m m a n u e l M o u n i e r (1905-1950), founder o f the magazine Esprit a n d a u t h o r o f books o n politics a n d o f the Traité du caractère, Introduction aux existentialismes (Existential Philosophies ; a n I n t r o d u c t i o n ) a n d Lepersonnalisme. S A R T R E . T h e best-known figure i n F r e n c h philosophy i n the years f o l l o w i n g the Second W o r l d W a r is the representative o f " e x i s t e n t i a l i s m " i n the strict sense, Jean-Paul Sartre ( b o r n 1905). A lycée p r o fessor, novelist, p l a y w r i g h t , p o l i t i c a l w r i t e r a n d director o f Les temps modernes, he studied for some time i n G e r m a n y , where he was strongly influenced b y Husserl's phenomenology a n d b y Heidegger, f r o m b o t h o f w h o m a great p a r t o f his ideas are derived. Nevertheless, Heidegger has p o i n t e d o u t the great distance between h i m s e l f a n d Sartre ; i n the last few years, Sartre has come increasingly closer to M a r x i s m . H i s w o r k is q u i t e extensive; his p r i n c i p a l philosophical w r i t i n g s are L'imagination, Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions ( T h e Emotions, O u t l i n e o f a T h e o r y ) , L'imaginaire a n d L'être et le néant (Being a n d Nothingness ; his m a j o r w o r k , 1943); after a l o n g silence, he published i n i 9 6 0 a n o t h e r very l o n g book, Critique de la raison dialectique ; one should also
Heidegger's
Existential
Philosophy
i n c l u d e his essays " Situations, " " Baudelaire, " " L'existentialisme est u n h u m a n i s m e " (Existentialism and H u m a n i s m ) , Saint-Genêt, comédien et martyr, a n d so o n . I n a d d i t i o n , there are h i s " e x i s t e n t i a l i s t " novels La nausée (Nausea; 1938), L'âge de raison ( T h e A g e of Reason), Le sursis ( T h e Reprieve) a n d La mort dans l'âme (translated as Iron in the Soul a n d as Troubled Sleep) ; his stories " L e m u r " ( T h e W a l l ) , " L e s j e u x sont f a i t s " ( T h e Chips A r e D o w n ) a n d " L ' e n g r e n a g e " ( I n the M e s h ) ; his plays Huis-clos ( N o E x i t ) , Les mouches ( T h e Flies), Morts sans sépulture (translated as Men Without Shadows), La putain respectueuse ( T h e Respectful P r o s t i t u t e ) , Les mains sales (translated as The Red Gloves), Le diable et le bon Dieu ( T h e D e v i l a n d t h e G o o d L o r d ) , Nekrassov a n d Les séquestrés d'Altona ( T h e C o n d e m n e d o f A l t o n a ) ; a n d a n a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l book, Les mots ( T h e W o r d s ) . Sartre began w i t h a phenomenological psychology a n d m o v e d o n to o n t o l o g y rather b e l a t e d l y ; the subtitle o f L'être et le néant is "Essai d'ontologie p h é n o m é n o l o g i q u e . " I t is a book o f 722 t i g h t l y w r i t t e n pages, difficult to r e a d ; i t uses t r a d i t i o n a l t e r m i n o l o g y , w h i c h is generally employed w i t h transferred meanings; there are m i n u t e analyses, phenomenological descriptions, passages o f great l i t e r a r y t a l e n t a n d others where the prose is abstruse a n d f o r b i d d i n g . T h e p r i m a r y meaning o f " e x i s t e n t i a l i s m " is the p r i o r i t y o f existence over essence; this is equivalent to i n v e r t i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l terms w h i l e accepting the o l d o u t l i n e o f t r a d i t i o n a l ontology ; i n a c e r t a i n sense, one m i g h t say t h a t Sartre's philosophy is t r a d i t i o n a l Scholastic or phenomenological ontology à rebours, b u t w i t h o u t transcending the basic concepts a n d statements o f problems. Therefore, the concepts he uses constantly are being, nothingness, i n itself a n d for itself, for itself a n d for the other, a n d so f o r t h . T h e being o f m a n is i n t e r p r e t e d as pour-soi, or consciousness, a n d here he is completely i n line w i t h Husserl. "Consciousness," Sartre writes, " i s a b e i n g for w h i c h i t is essentially a question o f its b e i n g i n so far as this b e i n g implies a being other t h a n itself. " " Consciousness is a being for w h i c h i t is essentially a consciousness o f the nothingness o f its b e i n g . " Sartre states the p r o b l e m i n terms o f consciousness; i n this he is m u c h closer to Husserl t h a n to Heidegger. As for the rest, m a n y of his ideas were f o r m u l a t e d b y those t w o philosophers or b y O r t e g a : project, choice (choix), " being condemned to be free " ( O r t e g a t a u g h t decades earlier t h a t " m a n is necessarily free, " free for a n y t h i n g except for ceasing to be free, b u t at the same t i m e he saw clearly t h a t even i f m a n always chooses, n o t e v e r y t h i n g i n his life is a n object o f choice, neither his surroundings n o r his vocation or o r i g i n a l p r o j e c t ) . Sartre professes w h a t he calls " a consequent a t h e i s m , " w h i c h he
"Existentialism"
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bases o n extremely feeble a n d q u i t e unjustifiable reasons; for h i m , man's basic state o f m i n d w h e n c o n f r o n t i n g r e a l i t y is the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t everything is " too m u c h " (de trop)—consequently nausea. M a n is a passion t o f o u n d being a n d constitute the In-itself, the Ens causa sui— t h a t is, G o d . " B u t the idea o f G o d , " Sartre concludes, " i s selfc o n t r a d i c t o r y , a n d we lose ourselves i n v a i n ; m a n is a n ineffective passion." I n the Critique de la raison dialectique, Sartre says t h a t a s t r u c t u r a l a n d historical a n t h r o p o l o g y " t r o u v e sa place à l'intérieur de l a philosophie marxiste parce que j e considère le marxisme c o m m e l'indépassable philosophie de n o t r e temps et parce que j e tiens l'idéologie de l'existence et sa méthode ' compréhensive ' p o u r une enclave dans le marxisme lui-même q u i l'engendre et l a refuse t o u t à l a f o i s . " F o r Sartre, M a r x i s m is the unavoidable philosophy o f our t i m e , a n d the reason for this is t h a t M a r x i s m has h a r d l y begun to develop a n d m a n has n o t yet been able to overcome the circumstances w h i c h engendered i t : " l o i n d'être épuisé, le marxisme est t o u t j e u n e encore, presque en enfance: c'est à peine s'il a c o m m e n c é de se développer. I l reste donc l a philosophie de notre temps: i l est indépassable parce que les circonstances q u i l ' o n t engendré ne sont pas encore dépassées. " I have q u o t e d this passage f r o m Sartre's w o r k because i t exemplifies his h a b i t u a l manner o f reasoning. I n recent years, he has been the object o f m u c h criticism, a n d his prestige and influence have declined considerably. Sartre's influence o n Simone de Beauvoir, the novelist a n d a u t h o r o f philosophical studies, has been enormous ; a n d o r i g i n a l l y the great w r i t e r A l b e r t Camus ( i 9 1 3 - 1 9 6 0 ) was close to Sartre i n his t h i n k i n g ; however, Camus later broke completely w i t h M a r x i s m . M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y ( 1908-1961 ) , w h o was greatly influenced by the contemporary G e r m a n philosophers, especially the phenomenologists, is the a u t h o r o f La structure du comportement, Phénoménologie de la perception, Les aventures de la dialectique, Signes. Echoes a n d imitations o f these trends have been h e a r d i n almost every c o u n t r y o f E u r o p e a n d i n L a t i n A m e r i c a , b u t i n the last few years they have begun to diminish.
Ortega and His Philosophy of Vital Reason
i.
ORTEGA'S
PERSONALITY
L I F E . José O r t e g a y Gasset, Spain's most i m p o r t a n t philosopher, was b o r n i n M a d r i d o n M a y 9, 1883, a n d died i n the same c i t y o n October 18, 1955. F r o m 1898 to 1902 he studied for his bachelor's degree i n the F a c u l t y o f Philosophy a n d Letters at the U n i v e r s i t y o f M a d r i d , a n d took his doctorate i n 1904 w i t h a thesis on Los terrores del ano mil—Critica de una leyenda ( T h e T e r r o r s o f the Year 1 0 0 0 — C r i t i q u e o f a L e g e n d ) . I n 1905 he went to G e r m a n y a n d studied at t h e U n i v e r sities of L e i p z i g , B e r l i n a n d M a r b u r g ; at M a r b u r g , w h i c h was p h i l o sophically the most i m p o r t a n t university i n G e r m a n y at t h a t t i m e , he was a p u p i l o f the great n e o - K a n t i a n H e r m a n n Cohen. I n 1910 Ortega became professor o f metaphysics i n the U n i v e r s i t y o f M a d r i d , where he t a u g h t u n t i l 1936. Ortega began his a c t i v i t y as a w r i t e r i n 1902. H i s collaborations i n newspapers a n d magazines, his books, lectures a n d p u b l i s h i n g efforts decisively influenced Spanish life, a n d i n the last few decades his influence has become increasingly evident outside Spain. I n 1923 he founded the Revis ta de Occidente (published u n t i l 1936), w h i c h , together w i t h its book p u b l i s h i n g p r o g r a m , the Biblioteca (still i n o p e r a t i o n ) , has kept Spanish-speaking readers f u l l y i n f o r m e d o n a l l i n t e l l e c t u a l matters. B y means of translations a n d editions Ortega i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o Spanish t h o u g h t the most i m p o r t a n t parts o f E u r o p e a n — 441
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p a r t i c u l a r l y G e r m a n — l e a r n i n g a n d a repertory of classical works ; his achievement makes i t possible for scholarship i n S p a i n to be the equal of t h a t f o u n d i n any other c o u n t r y today. A consequence o f this effort a n d especially o f Ortega's o w n philosophical endeavors has been the flourishing of a philosophical school i n the f u l l sense of the t e r m ; i t is k n o w n as the School of Madrid, a n d its members i n c l u d e , a m o n g others, M a n u e l G a r c i a M o r e n t e , Fernando V e l a , X a v i e r Z u b i r i , José Gaos, Luis Recaséns Siches, M a r í a Z a m b r a n o , A n t o n i o R o d r í g u e z Huéscar, M a n u e l G r a n e l l , José Ferrater M o r a , José A . M a r a valí, L u i s Diez del C o r r a l , Alfonso G . Valdecasas, Salvador Lissarrague, P a u l i n o G a r a g o r r i , Pedro L a i n E n t r a l g o , José L u i s A r a n g u r e n a n d the a u t h o r of this book. F r o m 1936 o n O r t e g a l i v e d i n France, H o l l a n d , A r g e n t i n a , P o r t u g a l a n d G e r m a n y , w i t h sojourns i n Spain b e g i n n i n g i n 1945. These were years i n w h i c h his t h o u g h t m a t u r e d a n d i n w h i c h he w r o t e his most i m p o r t a n t works. I t was also d u r i n g these years that his w r i t i n g s came to be k n o w n outside S p a i n — w r i t i n g s w h i c h n o w can be read i n a n y of a dozen languages. Ortega always dedicated himself to a m e d i t a t i o n o n Spain, a n d a l l his w o r k is c o n d i t i o n e d b y his Spanishness ; Spanish t h o u g h t as such is an influential force i n the w o r l d today because o f his efforts. I n 1948 he founded i n M a d r i d , w i t h Julián M a r i a s , the I n s t i t u t o de H u m a n i d a d e s , where he t a u g h t a n d took p a r t i n seminars o n various topics. I N T E L L E C T U A L STYLE. Ortega was a great w r i t e r . H e occupies a secure place a m o n g the half-dozen most a d m i r a b l e Spanish prose writers o f the c e n t u r y , a n d t r u t h f u l l y none is superior to h i m . H i s l i t e r a r y gifts p e r m i t t e d h i m to effect a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n the language and style of w r i t i n g , the stamp of w h i c h is visible i n a great m a n y of our c o n t e m p o r a r y authors. O r t e g a created a t e r m i n o l o g y a n d a p h i l o sophical style i n Spanish where previously they d i d not exist; his t e c h n i q u e — t h e opposite o f Heidegger's, for example—consists i n rejecting neologisms i n general a n d i n restoring to the deeply felt, c o m m o n l y used expressions o f the language, a n d even to the idioms, their most authentic a n d o r i g i n a l significance, w h i c h is often b r i m m i n g w i t h philosophical m e a n i n g or else capable of t a k i n g o n such m e a n i n g . A t his hands the m e t a p h o r attains, i n a d d i t i o n to beauty, a strictly metaphysical value. H e used to say, " I n philosophy, c l a r i t y is c o u r t e s y , " a n d i n his writings as i n his i n c o m p a r a b l e lectures he achieved m a x i m u m transparency for his t h o u g h t . O r t e g a carries t o a n extreme the effort to make himself i n t e l l i g i b l e , t o the p o i n t t h a t he q u i t e f r e q u e n t l y leads the reader to t h i n k t h a t because one has understood h i m w i t h o u t effort, one does not have to exert oneself to under-
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and His
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of Vital
Reason
stand h i m fully. I n some o f his last writings O r t e g a a r r i v e d at a t o t a l l y o r i g i n a l w a y o f expression, i n w h i c h fidelity to the spirit o f the language is u n i t e d w i t h absolutely new stylistic procedures, a n d w h i c h corresponds to the f o r m o f reason o f w h i c h his p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t h o d consists; this is w h a t I have called the statement of vital reason. * A t the same t i m e , O r t e g a achieved a renewal o f c e r t a i n l i t e r a r y forms. T h e w r i t i n g o f his works i n view o f the circumstances i n Spain obliged h i m for m a n y years to publish his t h o u g h t i n articles i n newspapers or i n essay f o r m ; he offered j u s t t h a t a m o u n t o f philosophy t h a t his readers c o u l d effectively absorb at any m o m e n t . " I t was necessary to seduce readers t o w a r d philosophical problems w i t h l y r i c a l m e t h o d s , " he once said. T h u s , Ortega w r o t e articles a n d essays o f a special nature, w h i c h constitute some of the most i m p o r t a n t works o f the t w e n t i e t h century. Ortega's interest was n o t l i m i t e d to strictly p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems; r a t h e r , he carried his philosophical p o i n t o f view to a l l themes o f life: l i t e r a t u r e , a r t , politics, history, sociology—all h u m a n themes have been dealt w i t h b y h i m . A n d w i t h respect to a n enormous n u m b e r o f questions, one often finds i n a page or t w o b y O r t e g a the i l l u m i n a t i o n one has sought i n v a i n i n heavy tomes. However, a l l his w r i t i n g s , even those t h a t seem furthest removed f r o m philosophy, are l i n k e d to a philosophical purpose, a n d they can be understood f u l l y o n l y i n the l i g h t o f his system. T h i s is because Ortega concerned h i m s e l f above a l l w i t h philosophy; a n d so today, centuries after Suárez, Spain again reckons w i t h an authentic, o r i g i n a l a n d strict metaphysician. By means of his intellectual w o r k a n d influence, O r t e g a m a d e philosophy i n Spain possible a n d a c t u a l . W O R K S . Ortega's l i t e r a r y p r o d u c t i o n was copious. H i s Complete Works, collected i n six volumes, comprise w r i t i n g s published f r o m 1902 to 1943; his later works make u p three a d d i t i o n a l volumes. H i s most i m p o r t a n t works are Meditaciones del Quijote ( M e d i t a t i o n s o n Q u i x o t e ) , 1914; El Espectador ( T h e Spectator) (eight volumes), 1916¬ 1934; España invertebrada ( I n v e r t e b r a t e S p a i n ) , 1921; El tema de nuestro tiempo ( T h e T h e m e o f O u r T i m e ) , 1923; Las Atldntidas ( T h e A t l a n tises), 1924; La deshumanización del arte e ideas sobre la novela ( T h e D e h u m a n i z a t i o n o f A r t a n d Ideas o n the N o v e l ) , 1925; Kant, 1924¬ 1929; La rebelión de las masas ( T h e Revolt o f the Masses), 1930; Misión de la Universidad (Mission of the U n i v e r s i t y ) , 1930; Guillermo Diltheyy la * I have given a detailed analysis of this aspect of Ortega's work in my study " V i d a y razón en la filosofía de Ortega" in La Escuela de Madrid; Estudios de filosofía española, Buenos Aires, 1959 [Obras, V ] . See also my Introducción a la Filosofía [Obras, I I ] .
Ortega's
Personality
445
idea de la vida ( W i l h e l m D i l t h e y a n d the I d e a o f L i f e ) , 1933; En torno a Galileo (translated i n t o English as Man and Crisis), 1933; Historia como sistema ( H i s t o r y as a System), 1935; Ensimismamiento y alteración (Selfabsorption a n d Change), 1939; Meditación de la técnica ( M e d i t a t i o n o n T e c h n i q u e ) , 1939; Ideas y creencias (Ideas a n d Beliefs), 1940; Apuntes sobre el pensamiento: su teurgia y su demiurgia (Notes o n T h o u g h t : Its T h e u r g y a n d Its D e m i u r g y ) , 1941; Estudios sobre el amor (Studies o n L o v e ) , 1941; Eel Imperio romano ( O n the R o m a n E m p i r e ) , 1941; a n d prefaces to three books: Historia de la Filosofía (History o f Philosophy) b y E m i l e Bréhier, 1942; Veinte Años de caza mayor ( T w e n t y Years of Big-game H u n t i n g ) b y the C o u n t o f Yebes, 1942; a n d Aventuras del Capitán Alonso de Contreras, 1943. H i s later works i n c l u d e Papeles sobre Veldzquezy Goya (Papers on Velazquez a n d G o y a ) , 1950; a preface to El collar de la Paloma ( k n o w n i n English as The Ring of the Dove) b y I b n H a z m , 1952; Stücke aus einer "Geburt der Philosophie" (Pieces f r o m a " B i r t h o f P h i l o s o p h y " ) , 1953; Europäische Kultur und europäische Völker ( E u r o p e a n C u l t u r e a n d E u r o p e a n People), 1954; Velázquez, 1954. T h e p u b l i c a t i o n of his posthumous w r i t i n g s began i n 1957 w i t h his book o n sociology, El hombre y la gente ( M a n a n d People); ¿ Qué es filosofía? ( W h a t Is Philosophy ?), lectures for a class given i n 1929; the extremely i m p o r t a n t a n d very l o n g book La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evolución de la teoría deductiva ( L e i b n i z ' Concept o f Principle a n d the E v o l u t i o n o f the Deductive T h e o r y ) — p r o b a b l y the most i m p o r t a n t o f a l l his w o r k s ; Idea del teatro ( I d e a o f the T h e a t e r ) ; the Meditación del pueblo joven ( M e d i t a t i o n o n a Y o u n g People); also, a "Preface for G e r m a n s " w r i t t e n a n d published i n G e r m a n i n 1934; his first course at the I n s t i t u t o de H u m a n i d a d e s , Una interpretación de la Historia universal, Meditación de Europa, Origen y Epílogo de la Filosofía ( O r i g i n a n d Epilogue o f P h i l o s o p h y ) ; Vives-Goethe, Pasado y porvenir para el hombre actual (Past a n d F u t u r e for the M a n o f T o d a y ) and Unas lecciones de Metafísica. Ortega's university lectures are o f enormous i m p o r t a n c e , especially those o f 1929 to 1936 a n d the later ones at the I n s t i t u t o de H u m a n i dades, w h i c h are indispensable for a precise knowledge o f his thought. Several have o n l y recently been published. These lectures reveal the systematic connection a n d i n t e g r a l metaphysical scope o f his other published works. I n these courses he dealt, above a l l , w i t h the theme o f idealism a n d its c r i t i q u e , the structure of historical a n d social life a n d the metaphysics o f v i t a l reason, the first version o f Ortega's p h i l o sophical system, o f w h i c h a complete exposition has never been p u b lished. U n t i l Ortega's posthumous w r i t i n g s have been completely e x a m i n e d , i t w i l l be impossible t o w r i t e an adequate book o n his
Ortega
and His Philosophy
of Vital
Reason
philosophy; this fact conditions the present exposition w h i c h , i n spite of m y knowledge of the course lectures a n d o f p a r t o f Ortega's u n published w o r k , is o f a fragmentary a n d provisional n a t u r e a n d is meant o n l y to facilitate the a p p r o a c h to Ortega's w o r k itself. *
2. T H E GENESIS O F O R T E G A ' S
PHILOSOPHY
The Critique of Idealism R E A L I S M A N D IDEALISM. Ortega's early f o r m a t i o n was n e o - K a n t i a n ; his years i n M a r b u r g gave h i m a detailed knowledge of K a n t , a strict intellectual discipline, a n i n t e r n a l vision o f a n u l t i m a t e f o r m o f " S c h o l a s t i c i s m , " a n d an i m m e r s i o n i n the idealist a t t i t u d e . H o w e v e r , as is evident i n his first w r i t i n g s , he q u i c k l y reacted i n a personal w a y ; a short t i m e later O r t e g a a r r i v e d at positions o f his o w n w h i c h , as we shall see, were determined b y the conquest o f a l l subjectivism a n d i d e a l i s m — w i t h o u t falling back o n the o l d realist thesis: t h e pressing need for a system a n d the absolute predominance o f metaphysics. These ideas, w h i c h passed t h r o u g h a n u n i n t e r r u p t e d process o f development, led h i m to his system oí metaphysics according to vital reason, a n d secondarily represent a decisive c r i t i q u e o f idealism. Realism is a n a t t i t u d e rather t h a n a thesis. T h i s attitude presupposes t h a t true r e a l i t y consists of the things; real being means b e i n g for itself, independent o f me. However, this apparently quite obvious position w h i c h d o m i n a t e d philosophical t h o u g h t for twenty-two centuries is not beyond c r i t i c i s m . F r o m Descartes to Husserl philosophy m a i n tained a n e w thesis w h i c h corrected a n d amended the realist thesis: this is w h a t is called idealism. Descartes discovers t h a t the things are not for sure; t h a t I m a y be w r o n g : t h a t there exist such things as dreams a n d hallucinations, i n w h i c h I accept as true realities things w h i c h are not true realities. T h e only t h i n g t h a t is certain a n d beyond d o u b t is the ego. O n t h e other h a n d , I k n o w n o t h i n g of the w o r l d of the things except i n so f a r as I a m present to t h e m , i n so far as I am a witness of t h e m . I k n o w o f the r o o m because I a m i n i t ; i f I leave i t , does i t continue to exist? I n t h e final * Many specific problems are developed in detail in my above-mentioned study La Escuela de Madrid and in Ortega y tres antípodas (1950); for the first stage of his intellectual development in particular, see my commentary to the Meditaciones del Quijote (Biblioteca de Cultura Básica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1957; 2nd ed., 1966). Although it is not strictly an exposition of Ortega's philosophy, I also refer the reader to my Introducción a la Filosofía (Reason and Life), which is directly based on this philosophy; in this work I make systematic use of the method of vital reason. I n addition, a study in depth of this philosophy is to be found in my book Ortega, of which V o l . I, Circunstancia y vocación, was published in i960.
The
Genesis
of Ortega's
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447
analysis, I cannot k n o w t h a t i t does. I k n o w o n l y t h a t i t exists w h i l e I a m i n i t , w h i l e i t is with me. Therefore, the things b y themselves, independent o f m e , are foreign a n d u n k n o w n to m e ; I do not k n o w a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e m , n o t even that they exist. Consequently, the things are for me or in me, they are ideas of mine. T h e table a n d w a l l are things that I perceive. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l a n d p r i m a r y reality is the ego; the things possess a derived a n d dependent being, based o n that of the ego. T h e ego is the f u n d a m e n t a l substance. Descartes says t h a t I can exist w i t h o u t the w o r l d , w i t h o u t the things. T h i s is the idealist thesis, w h i c h c u l m i n a t e d i n its most perfect f o r m i n Husserl's idealism of p u r e consciousness, w h i c h has already been discussed. O r t e g a scrupulously opposes this thesis. T H E E G O A N D T H E THINGS. Idealism is perfectly r i g h t i n a f f i r m i n g t h a t I can k n o w the things o n l y i n so far as I a m present to t h e m . T h e t h i n g s — a t least to the extent t h a t I k n o w t h e m a n d t h a t i t is meaningful to speak o f their r e a l i t y — c a n n o t be independent o f me. However, idealism is w r o n g i n a f f i r m i n g the independence o f the subject. I cannot speak o f the things w i t h o u t m e ; b u t neither can I speak o f an ego without the things. I a m never alone; I a m always w i t h the things, d o i n g something w i t h t h e m ; I cannot be separated f r o m the things, a n d i f they need me, I i n t u r n need t h e m i n order to exist. I n an equally o r i g i n a l a n d p r i m a r y w a y I find myself w i t h m y ego a n d w i t h the things. T h e t r u e p r i m a r y r e a l i t y — t h efundamental reality—is that of the ego w i t h the things. / am myself
and my circumstance,
or
surroundings
(circunstancia), O r t e g a w r o t e as early as 1914, i n his first book. A n d at least i n p r i n c i p l e this is n o t a m a t t e r o f t w o separable elements—the ego a n d t h e t h i n g s — w h i c h are f o u n d together b y chance; rather, the f u n d a m e n t a l r e a l i t y is this i n t e r p l a y or " business " (quehacer) of the ego w i t h the things, w h i c h we call life. By using the things, m a n lives. T h i s action is t h e r e a l i t y i n w h i c h we o r i g i n a l l y find ourselves; n o w i t is not a thing—either m a t e r i a l or spiritual, because the Cartesian ego is also a res, even t h o u g h cogitans—but an a c t i v i t y , something t h a t we cannot p r o p e r l y say is, b u t t h a t is done. The fundamental is made up of what we do and what happens world,
to direct oneself toward
reality is our life. And
life
to us. To live is to deal with the
it, to act in it, to concern oneself with it. T h e r e -
fore, there is no p r i o r i t y o f the things, as the realists believed, nor does the ego have a p r i o r i t y over the things, as the idealists thought. T h e p r i m a r y a n d f u n d a m e n t a l reality, of w h i c h the ego a n d the things are but abstract moments, is the d y n a m i c " b u s i n e s s " w h i c h we call our life.
CONSCIOUSNESS. N O W we must examine the c u l m i n a t i n g m o m e n t o f idealism, idealism i n its most refined f o r m : Husserl's phenomenology.
Ortega
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Reason
T h i s is not a subjective i d e a l i s m ; he speaks n o t o f the ideas o r experiences of an e m p i r i c a l ego, b u t o f the experiences o f p u r e consciousness. I n the effort to a v o i d metaphysics, w h i l e at the same t i m e i n d u l g i n g i n i t , Husserl closes himself u p i n the consciousness. Nevertheless, i t so happens that t h o u g h t — w h a t we c a l l consciousness—consists i n positing something. T o t h i n k is to posit something as true, as existent. N o w , phenomenology says t h a t this act o f positing is followed b y a second act w h i c h consists i n p r a c t i c i n g epokhe, i n i n v a l i d a t i n g the first a n d b r a c k e t i n g i t . However, this is neither so clear nor so simple as i t appears. I do not have consciousness o f a n act w h i l e I a m experiencing i t . I have before m e o n l y w h a t is seen or w h a t is thought; I a m n o t i n contact w i t h seeing or thinking, w i t h w h a t is called consciousness. W h a t is i n v o l v e d is: I with the thing. I a m able to say t h a t I have consciousness w h e n I realize t h a t I saw a t h i n g a m o m e n t ago b u t no longer see i t . W h e n I have consciousness o f m y experiences, I a m n o t l i v i n g t h e m , b u t m a k i n g t h e m objects o f reflection. I a m p r a c t i c i n g " a b s t e n t i o n " u p o n a n object t h a t is the memory o f m y previous vision. I a m n o w experiencing another a c t : the bracketing o f m y previous act. N o r a m I p r a c t i c i n g ' ' a b s t e n t i o n ' ' i n this second act; r a t h e r , I a m experiencing i t ; I have no consciousness o f the second act w h i l e experiencing i t , either; i n i t , too, I a m positing. T h u s I can p e r f o r m phenomenological reduct i o n o n l y u p o n memories o f acts, not u p o n the experienced or lived acts. Pure consciousness, w i t h all its reduced experiences, far f r o m being reality, is merely the result of a m e n t a l o p e r a t i o n t h a t I p e r f o r m ; t h a t is, i t is j u s t the opposite of r e a l i t y : i t is a n i n t e l l e c t u a l construction, a hypothesis. Therefore, phenomenological r e d u c t i o n is impossible. Act implies actuality, the present t i m e , being n o w ; i t is p u r e presentness. Time is interposed between the act a n d its phenomenological r e d u c t i o n — t i m e , w h i c h is precisely the f o r m o f h u m a n life. Therefore, I d o n o t come i n t o contact w i t h the p u r e ego, n o r w i t h consciousness, nor w i t h reduced experiences; a l l this is the result o f m y m e n t a l m a n i p u l a t i o n o f m y previous acts: precisely the opposite o f w h a t is meant b y reality. I t is o f the essence o f acts t h a t they are experienced s i m p l y a n d t h a t one can reflect u p o n t h e m o n l y f r o m the vantage p o i n t o f another a c t ; t h a t is, w h e n they are no longer present a n d being experienced, b u t are only i n the m e m o r y . Phenomenology bears w i t h i n itself a basically false i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p r i m a r y reality. T h e t r u t h is t h a t I experience acts a n d t h a t these acts are intentional: I see something, I t h i n k something, I w a n t something; i n short, I have contact w i t h something. A n d I have contact w i t h i t i n a real a n d effective w a y , w i t h o u t any " a b s t e n t i o n " : in life. W h e n we t h i n k pheno-
The
Genesis
of Ortega's
Philosophy
449
m e n o l o g y t h r o u g h to its basis, we discover its u l t i m a t e erroneous r o o t a n d w e are left outside i t , beyond i t : we find ourselves n o t i n the consciousness, because, strictly speaking, there is none, b u t i n the f u n d a m e n t a l reality t h a t is life. T h i s is Ortega's c r i t i q u e o f idealism. H e adopts whatever was j u s t i f i e d i n the idealist thesis, the a f f i r m a t i o n o f the necessity o f the ego as a n ingredient o f reality, b u t he corrects the excessiveness o f idealism, the a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t this ego is the p r i m a r y reality. Neither the things alone n o r the ego alone is the p r i m a r y reality, b u t their i n t e r p l a y , the '' business " o f the ego w i t h the t h i n g s : i n other words, life.
The Stages in the Discovery I t is o f interest to consider very briefly the phases t h r o u g h w h i c h Ortega's t h o u g h t passed before he a t t a i n e d the m a t u r e f o r m o f his p h i l o s o p h y ; this w i l l shed l i g h t o n the m e a n i n g o f the formulas i n w h i c h the m a j o r theses o f his metaphysics are expressed. I A N D M Y CIRCUMSTANCE. Ortega's personal v i e w p o i n t first appeared i n a n essay published i n 1910 e n t i t l e d " A d á n en el P a r a í s o " ( A d a m i n Paradise; Complete Works, I , 469-498). I n the first place, he there employs the t e r m " l i f e " s t r i c t l y , i n the sense o f h u m a n life, b i o g r a p h i c a l l i f e ; i n the second place, he stresses man's e n v i r o n m e n t , e v e r y t h i n g t h a t surrounds h i m , n o t o n l y directly, b u t also r e m o t e l y ; n o t o n l y physically, b u t also historically a n d spiritually. M a n , O r t e g a says, is the p r o b l e m o f life, a n d O r t e g a understands life as something concrete, incomparable, u n i q u e : " L i f e is i n d i v i d u a l i t y . " H e defines i t w i t h greater precision as coexistence: " L i f e is a n exchange o f substances; therefore, a living together, coexisting" (p. 488). H e adds: " A d a m i n Paradise. W h o is A d a m ? A n y b o d y a n d n o b o d y i n p a r t i c u l a r : life. Where is Paradise ? Is i t a n o r t h e r n or southern l a n d scape? I t does n o t m a t t e r : i t is the u b i q u i t o u s stage for the immense tragedy o f l i v i n g " (p. 489). A d a m i n Paradise signifies: myself i n the w o r l d ; a n d this w o r l d , understood p r o p e r l y , is not a t h i n g o r a collection o f things, b u t a stage, because life is a tragedy or d r a m a , something w h i c h m a n performs, something w h i c h happens to h i m along w i t h the things. I n the Meditaciones del Quijote ( M e d i t a t i o n s o n Q u i x o t e ; 1914) there appears i n the f o r m o f a concept the idea t h a t h a d been expressed as a m e t a p h o r i n the title " A d a m i n P a r a d i s e " : / am myself and my circumstance. T h e reality r o u n d a b o u t m e " f o r m s the other h a l f o f m y person." A n d " t h e reabsorption o f his circumstance is man's concrete destiny." Starting w i t h this p o i n t o f view, O r t e g a makes an
450
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of Vital
Reason
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f w h a t a forest is, a v o i d i n g the realist as w e l l as the idealist presupposition; t h a t is, he sets i n m o t i o n t h e comprehension o f a r e a l i t y from the viewpoint of life. T h i s doctrine culminates i n a theo r y t h a t sees t r u t h as patency o r u n v e i l i n g — a l e t h e i a — c i v i l i z a t i o n as security, a n d l i g h t or c l a r i t y as t h e root o f man's c o n s t i t u t i o n (Complete Works, I , 322-358). PERSPECTIVISM. I n the same w o r k there also appears t h e idea t h a t perspective is a constituent i n g r e d i e n t o f r e a l i t y : " T h e definitive b e i n g o f the w o r l d is neither m a t t e r n o r soul, n o r a n y d e t e r m i n e d t h i n g ; i t is a perspective" ( p . 3 2 1 ) . T h i s doctrine is f o u n d already established as a doctrine ( a n d even endowed w i t h t h e n a m e perspectivism, w h i c h Ortega came t o prefer after t r y i n g other, less intellectualist names) i n a paper o f 1916, " V e r d a d y perspectiva'' ( T r u t h a n d Perspective; i n El Espectador, I ; Complete Works, I I , 15—20). " T h e i n d i v i d u a l p o i n t o f view seems to m e to be the only p o i n t o f view f r o m w h i c h we can see the w o r l d i n its t r u t h . " " Reality, precisely because i t is r e a l i t y a n d is f o u n d outside o u r i n d i v i d u a l m i n d s , c a n reach o u r m i n d s o n l y b y m u l t i p l y i n g itself i n t o a thousand faces o r facets." '' R e a l i t y can be looked at o n l y f r o m the vantage p o i n t w h i c h each a n d every m a n occupies, b y fate, i n the universe. Reality a n d t h e vantage p o i n t are correlates, a n d j u s t as r e a l i t y cannot be i n v e n t e d , so t h e vantage p o i n t cannot be f e i g n e d . " " Every m a n has a mission o f t r u t h . W h e r e m y eye is, there is no o t h e r ; t h a t p a r t o f r e a l i t y w h i c h m y eye sees is seen b y no other. T h e r e is n o substitute for a n y o f us, we are a l l necessary." I n 1923 he adds, i n a n even more precise a n d strict f o r m u l a t i o n : " Perspective is one of the components of reality. F a r f r o m being a d e f o r m a t i o n o f reality, i t is its o r g a n i z a t i o n . A r e a l i t y w h i c h w o u l d always t u r n o u t to be the same n o m a t t e r w h a t p o i n t i t was viewed f r o m is a n absurd c o n c e p t . " " T h i s w a y o f t h i n k i n g leads t o a fundam e n t a l r e f o r m a t i o n o f philosophy a n d , w h a t is m o r e i m p o r t a n t , a r e f o r m a t i o n o f o u r cosmic sensation." "Every life is a viewpoint on the universe." (El tema de nuestro tiempo [ T h e T h e m e of O u r T i m e ] ; Complete Works, I I I , 199-200). R E A S O N A N D L I F E . R e t u r n i n g again to Meditaciones del Quijote (the year 1914 is a decisive one for Ortega's t h o u g h t ) we f i n d i n t h a t book the beginnings o f a t h i r d theme, w h i c h is i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h the t w o preceding ones a n d w h i c h w i l l affect b o t h o f t h e m w h e n i t reaches its m a t u r e f o r m u l a t i o n : the theme o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between reason a n d life. " Reason cannot, need n o t aspire to replace life. T h i s very opposition between reason a n d life, w h i c h is used so m u c h today b y those w h o do n o t wish to w o r k , is already suspect. As i f reason were not a v i t a l a n d spontaneous f u n c t i o n o f the same type as sight o r
Vital
Reason
t o u c h ! " " W h e n we dethrone reason, let us be careful to p u t i t i n its proper p l a c e " (Complete Works, I , 353-354). T h i s idea reappears i n a m u c h m o r e precise a n d rigorous f o r m i n El tema de nuestro tiempo, where i t has become a doctrine o f vital reason: "Reason is only a form and function of life." "Pure reason must yield its domination to vital reason" (Complete Works, I I I , 178). L a t e r o n he says: "Pure reason must be replaced by a vital reason, in which pure reason can be localized and can acquire fluidity and the power of transformation." Philosophy needs to set aside its U t o p i a n nature, "preventing that which is a supple and expandable horizon from being ankylosed into a world." " W e l l , t h e n : the r e d u c t i o n or conversion of the w o r l d i n t o a h o r i z o n does not i n the least r o b i t of r e a l i t y ; i t merely relates i t to the l i v i n g subject, whose w o r l d i t is, a n d endows i t w i t h a v i t a l d i m e n s i o n " ( p p . 201-202). A c c o r d i n g to O r t e g a , the theme o f o u r t i m e is the conversion o f pure reason i n t o v i t a l reason: f r o m t h a t p o i n t on, his philosophy is the systematic achievement o f t h a t task. 3.
VITAL
REASON
F U N D A M E N T A L R E A L I T Y . O r t e g a says t i m e a n d again t h a t the f u n d a m e n t a l reality is o u r life. B u t this expression must be understood strictly. Fundamental r e a l i t y does not mean the " s o l e " r e a l i t y or the " m o s t i m p o r t a n t " r e a l i t y ; i t merely means w h a t i t indicates: the reality w h i c h is thefoundation for a l l other realities, i n w h i c h they have their root. T h e reality o f the things or o f the ego occurs in life, as an aspect o f life. " H u m a n l i f e , " O r t e g a writes i n Historia como sistema ( H i s t o r y as a System; Complete Works, V I , 13), " i s a strange reality, concerning w h i c h the first t h i n g t h a t may be said is t h a t i t is the fundam e n t a l reality, i n the sense t h a t we must relate a l l other realities to i t , since the other realities, actual or presumptive, must appear i n life i n one w a y o r another.'' R e a l i t y as such—as I have w r i t t e n elsewhere * — r e a l i t y as reality, is constituted w i t h i n m y life; to be real means, precisely, to have a basis i n m y life, a n d every r e a l i t y must be related to m y life, a l t h o u g h that which is real m a y transcend m y life i n some way. I n other words, m y life is the presupposition of the v e r y idea a n d sense of reality, a n d reality is i n t e l l i g i b l e only f r o m the standpoint of m y life: this means that the t e r m real can be understood f u n d a m e n t a l l y , i n its u l t i m a t e sense, o n l y w i t h i n m y life. B u t one should n o t forget that w h e n we speak oí something real a n d derive its aspect o f ' ' r e a l i t y ' ' f r o m m y life, the question o f the relationship o f m y life w i t h this "somet h i n g " remains open; stated i n a different way, to say t h a t I a m an * Introducción a la Filosofía, V I I , 66. Cf. also X I , 86.
4J2
Ortega
and His
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of Vital
Reason
ingredient o f r e a l i t y does not signify i n any w a y that I a m a p a r t or component o f the real things or entities; rather, i t means t h a t the effective n a t u r e o f t h e i r " r e a l i t y , " understood as the d i m e n s i o n or nature o f t h a t w h i c h is real, is based o n t h e i r " existence for m e , " t h e i r " being rooted i n m y l i f e . " Even i n the case where that which is real is p r i o r , superior a n d transcendent to m y life, independent o f i t a n d even — i n the case of G o d — t h e o r i g i n a n d basis o f m y life itself, its reality as such ( i f we w i s h to give some effective m e a n i n g to t h a t t e r m a n d n o t reduce i t to a n e m p t y name or a n a m b i g u i t y ) has its foundation i n the f u n d a m e n t a l r e a l i t y o f m y life, to w h i c h i t is " related " i n so far as i t is " encountered " i n i t . V I T A L REASON A N D H I S T O R I C A L R E A S O N . F o r centuries, ever since
the Greeks, reason has been understood as something w h i c h grasps the i m m u t a b l e , the " e t e r n a l " essence o f the things. Philosophers have sought to consider things sub specie aeternitatis, a p a r t f r o m t i m e . T h i s view o f reason culminates i n the m a t h e m a t i c a l reason o f the seventeenth-century rationalists, w h i c h produces the physical sciences, a n d i n K a n t ' s " p u r e r e a s o n . " B u t this m a t h e m a t i c a l reason, w h i c h is so useful i n investigating nature, t h a t is, those things w h i c h have a fixed being, a ready-made reality, does n o t w o r k so w e l l i n h u m a n affairs. T h e sciences o f h u m a n i t y — s o c i o l o g y , p o l i t i c a l science, h i s t o r y — appear strangely imperfect i n comparison w i t h the marvels o f the abstract n a t u r a l sciences a n d their corresponding applied sciences. M a t h e m a t i c a l reason is incapable o f conceiving the changing, temporal reality o f h u m a n life. W h e n dealing w i t h h u m a n life, we cannot t h i n k sub specie aeternitatis, b u t must t h i n k i n terms o f t i m e . T h i s self-evident fact, w h i c h to a greater or lesser extent has cont i n u e d to impress itself u p o n philosophical t h o u g h t since the nineteenth century, has been the source o f the waves o f i r r a t i o n a l i s m t h a t have i n u n d a t e d philosophy d u r i n g the last h u n d r e d years. O r t e g a , i n no w a y a " r a t i o n a l i s t , " is opposed to every f o r m o f i r r a t i o n a l i s m . H e has w r i t t e n : " F o r me, reason a n d theory are synonymous. . . . M y ideology does n o t oppose reason, since i t admits o f no other m o d e of theoretic knowledge b u t reason; i t opposes o n l y r a t i o n a l i s m " (jV¿ vitalismo ni racionalismo [ N e i t h e r V i t a l i s m N o r R a t i o n a l i s m ] ; Complete Works, I I I , 237). T h e most authentic a n d p r i m a r y i m p o r t o f reason is " a c c o u n t i n g for [ g i v i n g a reason for] s o m e t h i n g " ; now, the r a t i o n alist does n o t take i n t o account the i r r a t i o n a l i t y o f the materials w i t h w h i c h reason deals, a n d he believes t h a t things behave the w a y o u r ideas do. T h i s error essentially mutilates reason a n d reduces i t to something p a r t i a l a n d secondary. " A l l the definitions of reason t h a t made its essential aspect consist o f certain special ways o f using the
Vital Reason
4J3
intellect were n o t o n l y too n a r r o w ; they sterilized reason, a m p u t a t i n g or b l u n t i n g its decisive dimension. F o r me, reason, i n the true a n d precise sense, is every intellectual a c t i o n t h a t puts us i n contact w i t h reality, b y means o f w h i c h we meet w i t h the transcendent" (Historia como sistema; Complete Works, V I , 46). I n fact, O r t e g a observes that m a t h e m a t i c a l reason, p u r e reason, is o n l y a p a r t i c u l a r species or f o r m o f reason. T o understand m a t h e m a t i c a l reason as reason p u r e a n d simple is to take the p a r t for the w h o l e : a n error. Alongside m a t h e m a t i c a l , " e t e r n a l " reason, a n d above i t , is vital reason. T h i s reason is no less reason t h a n the other k i n d , j u s t the c o n t r a r y . As we have seen, O r t e g a is a n y t h i n g b u t a " v i t a l i s t " w i t h a leaning t o w a r d i r r a t i o n a l i s m . H e is speaking o f a strict reason t h a t is capable o f apprehending the t e m p o r a l reality o f life. V i t a l reason is ratio, logos, a precise concept. W h a t does i t actually consist of? V i t a l reason a n d l i v i n g are " o n e a n d the same t h i n g " ; life itself is v i t a l reason, because " t o live is to have no other remedy t h a n to reason i n the face o f one's inexorable c i r c u m s t a n c e " (En torno a Galileo; Complete Works, V , 67). W h a t does this mean? T o be alive is already to u n d e r s t a n d ; the p r i m a r y a n d f u n d a m e n t a l f o r m o f i n t e l lection is h u m a n v i t a l action. T o understand something means to relate i t to the t o t a l i t y o f m y life i n progress, t h a t is, m y life as i t is developing, as i t is living. I t is life itself w h i c h makes a t h i n g i n t e l l i g i b l e b y p l a c i n g i t i n its perspective, b y inserting i t i n its context a n d m a k i n g i t function i n t h a t context. Life is therefore the very organ of comprehension. T h u s , i t m a y be said t h a t reason is human life. A h u m a n reality becomes i n t e l l i g i b l e o n l y f r o m the v i e w p o i n t o f life, w h e n related to t h a t t o t a l i t y i n w h i c h i t is rooted. O n l y w h e n life itself functions as reason are we able to understand something h u m a n . Stated w i t h the utmost conciseness, this is w h a t is m e a n t b y vital reason. B u t the h o r i z o n o f h u m a n life is h i s t o r i c a l ; m a n is defined b y the historical level at w h i c h i t has been his l o t to l i v e ; w h a t m a n has been is a n essential component o f w h a t he is; he is w h a t he is today precisely because he was other things f o r m e r l y ; the r e a l m of h u m a n life includes history. Life w h i c h functions as ratio is historical i n its very substance, a n d history functions i n every act o f real intellection. V i t a l reason is b y its n a t u r e historical reason. * O r t e g a w r i t e s : " I t is a question o f finding the o r i g i n a l a n d autochthonous reason o f history i n history itself. Therefore the expression ' h i s t o r i c a l reason' must be understood w i t h f u l l rigor. N o t a n extra¬ * For an extended investigation of the problem of reason, see Chapter V of my Introduction a la Filosqfia, especially pp. 47-49, from which I have extracted the preceding formulations.
454
Ortega
and His
Philosophy
oj Vital
Reason
historical reason w h i c h appears to f u l f i l l itself i n history, b u t l i t e r a l l y , that which has happened to man,
constituting
substantive
reason, the r e v e l a t i o n
o f a reality w h i c h transcends man's theories a n d w h i c h is m a n himself at the b o t t o m of his theories." " H i s t o r i c a l reason accepts n o t h i n g as a mere fact, b u t fluidifies every fact i n t o the fieri f r o m w h i c h i t stems: i t sees h o w
the fact is m a d e " (Historia
como sistema;
Complete
Works,
VI,
49-50). I t is obvious t h a t this presupposes the elaboration o f a series o f m e n t a l categories a n d forms capable o f grasping historical a n d v i t a l r e a l i t y ; the m i n d ' s h a b i t of t h i n k i n g things, substances i n the " Eleatic " sense, as O r t e g a says, makes i t v e r y difficult to a r r i v e at a n adequate concept o f t h a t w h i c h is n o t a " t h i n g , " b u t a n activity, t e m p o r a l life. O r t e g a asks us to pass beyond the n o t i o n of substance a n d every f o r m o f Eleatic t h o u g h t , so t h a t we can conceive this r e a l i t y w h i c h makes itself. " I n order to speak o f being-man, we must f o r m u l a t e a n o n Eleatic concept of being, j u s t as we have f o r m u l a t e d a n o n - E u c l i d e a n geometry. T h e t i m e has come for the seed sown b y H e r a c l i t u s to produce its great h a r v e s t . " Since the v i t a l is always i n d i v i d u a l a n d u n i q u e , determined b y its surroundings, the concepts w h i c h appreh e n d life must be " occasional," such as " I , " " y o u , " " t h i s , " " t h a t , " " h e r e , " " n o w , " even ( a n d especially) " l i f e , " w h i c h is always " t h e life o f each a n d every m a n . " W e are dealing, t h a t is, w i t h concepts t h a t do n o t always signify the same thing; rather, t h e i r sense depends, w i t h f u l l r i g o r , o n their circumstance. T h u s , historical a n d v i t a l reason is narrative; b u t i t presupposes, i n its t u r n , a n analytics o r abstract theory of h u m a n life, universal a n d v a l i d for a l l life, w h i c h becomes filled i n each case w i t h circumstantial p a r t i c u l a r i t y . P H I L O S O P H Y . M a n does n o t consist p r i m a r i l y of knowing. K n o w i n g is one o f the things t h a t m a n does; m a n cannot be defined—as r a t i o n a l i s m defined h i m — b y his cognitive dimension. K n o w l e d g e occurs i n life a n d must be derived f r o m i t . O n e cannot call knowledge something n a t u r a l a n d make i t one's p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ; r a t h e r , one m u s t e x p l a i n for what reason a n d for what purpose m a n knows. T h e r e is n o t h i n g h u m a n i n m a n t h a t is natural; everything i n h i m must be d e r i v e d f r o m his life. T h i s life is something w h i c h w e must make. I t is thus a p r o b l e m , insecurity, a shipwreck, as O r t e g a calls i t i n a n expressive m e t a p h o r . I n this insecurity m a n seeks a c e r t a i n t y ; he needs to know, i n the p r i m a r y sense o f " to k n o w w h a t to h o l d fast t o . " Life is always supported b y a system of beliefs w i t h i n w h i c h we exist a n d w h i c h we m a y n o t even be aware of; w h e n these beliefs fail m a n , he must do something i n order to k n o w w h a t to h o l d fast t o , a n d this t h i n g t h a t m a n does, whatever it may
Human
Life
455
be, is called thought. T h e n m a n comes to have ideas a b o u t the things. N o w , not a l l t h o u g h t is knowledge i n the strict sense; knowledge consists o f ascertaining what the things are, a n d this presupposes the p r i o r belief t h a t the things have a being a n d t h a t this being is k n o w a b l e b y m a n . (See Apuntes sobre el pensamiento [Notes o n T h o u g h t ] — a b r i e f b u t decisive study w h i c h contains the g e r m o f a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f p h i losophy ; Complete Works, V , 513-542.) K n o w l e d g e is thus one o f the essential ways i n w h i c h m a n overcomes u n c e r t a i n t y ; b y means o f knowledge I come to possess not the things—these I already have before me, hence m y i n q u i r y — b u t the being o f the things. Being is something t h a t I make, b u t i t must be clearly understood that I make i t with the things; being is a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of reality, m y scheme o f h o l d i n g fast to the things. W h e n I receive k n o w l edge, i t is this being o f the t h i n g s — a n d not the things themselves— t h a t passes i n t o m y m i n d : the b e i n g o f the m o u n t a i n , n o t the m o u n t a i n itself. Therefore knowledge is a m a n i p u l a t i o n or, better yet, a " m e n t a l c o n s t r u c t i o n " (mentefactura) o f reality, w h i c h is deformed or transf o r m e d b y i t ; a n d this is n o t a deficiency on the p a r t o f knowledge, b u t its essence, a n d its interest consists precisely i n this. M a n never possesses complete knowledge, b u t neither does he ever completely lack knowledge. H i s state is one o f ignorance or insufficient t r u t h . M a n possesses m a n y certainties, b u t they lack a n u l t i m a t e basis a n d some are i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n to others. M a n needs a basic certainty, a highest a u t h o r i t y that can reconcile a l l antagonisms; this certainty is philosophy. Thus philosophy is the basic t r u t h , the one t h a t does not presuppose other authorities or t r u t h s ; i t must t h e n be the highest a u t h o r i t y for a l l the other p a r t i c u l a r truths. A n d therefore i t must also be a n autonomous and universal certainty. T h i s is w h a t makes i t different f r o m the sciences, w h i c h are p a r t i a l truths a n d dependent o n p r i o r suppositions. B u t i n a d d i t i o n , philosophy is its own proof; i t is responsible a n d is made by man, a n d this distinguishes i t f r o m r e l i g i o n , w h i c h is based o n revelation a n d therefore comes f r o m G o d , a n d f r o m poetry or the experience o f life, w h i c h are " i r r e s p o n s i b l e " a n d d o n o t constitute p r o o f o f themselves, even t h o u g h they are universal. T h u s , philosophy is a task or "business" t h a t m a n , w h o is lost, carries o n i n order to a t t a i n a basic certainty t h a t can i n f o r m h i m w h a t to h o l d fast to i n life. T h i s explains for w h a t reason a n d for w h a t purpose m a n philosophizes.
4.
HUMAN
LIFE
T H E " I " A N D T H E W O R L D . T h e fundamental r e a l i t y — t h a t which I find all a r o u n d me a n d distinct f r o m a l l forms o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or
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of Vital
Reason
t h e o r y — i s my life. A n d life is w h a t we d o a n d w h a t happens to us. I n other words, I find myself w i t h the things, i n a d e t e r m i n e d c i r c u m stance or surroundings, h a v i n g to do something w i t h t h e things i n order to live. T h u s I find myself i n the m i d s t of life, w h i c h is p r i o r to the things a n d to m e ; m y life is given to me, not as s o m e t h i n g already made, b u t as something to be done (quehacer). Ortega says t h a t life, i n effect, affords m u c h to be done. T h e most condensed statement o f Ortega's p h i l o s o p h y is the sentence f r o m the Meditaciones del Quijote t h a t I quoted earlier : / am myself and my circumstance (or surroundings). T h e things are i n t e r preted as circum-stantia, as t h a t w h i c h surrounds the " I , " a n d therefore the things refer to the " I . " Therefore this involves a world w h i c h is not the s u m t o t a l o f the things, b u t the horizon o f t o t a l i t y over the things a n d separate f r o m t h e m ; the things are in the world, j ust as I a m ; but this w o r l d is m y w o r l d , t h a t is, m y circumstance. T o live is to be i n the w o r l d , to act i n i t , to be d o i n g s o m e t h i n g w i t h the things. T h u s m y circumstance consists o f the other-than-I, everyt h i n g t h a t I encounter, including my body and psyche. I can be dissatisfied w i t h m y b o d y a n d also w i t h m y disposition, intelligence o r m e m o r y ; therefore, these things are received; I find myself w i t h t h e m j u s t as I find myself facing the w a l l ; these realities are the ones t h a t are closest to me, b u t they are n o t I . M y circumstance, w h i c h on t h e one h a n d includes even m y b o d y a n d psyche, o n the other h a n d also comprises all of society, t h a t is, a l l other m e n , social customs, the e n t i r e r e p e r t o r y of beliefs, ideas a n d opinions t h a t I find i n m y t i m e ; thus i t is also m y historical circumstance. A n d since I do n o t possess reality b y itself, a n d since I make m y life essentially with m y circumstance, I cannot be separated f r o m m y circumstance a n d i t a n d I together m a k e m y l i f e whole. T h i s is w h y Ortega says : I a m myself a n d m y circumstance, and i f I d o n o t save i t , I do n o t save myself. T h i s p r o f o u n d analysis leads to a series o f i m p o r t a n t questions, questions dealing w i t h the who t h a t is anyone, the " / " t h a t makes its life w i t h its circumstance or w o r l d — i n short, w i t h the m a j o r question of the person. T H E V I T A L PROJECT. Since life is n o t something t h a t is ready-made, but something t h a t m a n must make for himself, m a n must determine beforehand what he is going to be. O r t e g a says t h a t life is a poetic task, because m a n must i n v e n t w h a t he is g o i n g to be. I a m a v i t a l p r o g r a m , a project or o u t l i n e t h a t I i n t e n d to c a r r y o u t a n d t h a t I h a v e h a d to conceive i n v i e w o f m y circumstance. I find myself faced w i t h a repertory or k e y b o a r d of possibilities a n d obligations, a n d I can live o n l y b y choosing a m o n g t h e m . T h e possibilities are finite, b u t there are
Human
Life
451
always several o f t h e m , a n d they seem t o be m a n y w h e n I project m y scheme or v i t a l p r o g r a m u p o n the p u r e facilities a n d difficulties t h a t go to make u p m y circumstance. Therefore m a n cannot live w i t h o u t a v i t a l project, be i t o r i g i n a l or u n o r i g i n a l , w o r t h y or u n w o r t h y ; for good or i l l , m a n m u s t be the novelist o f his o w n life, he must imagine o r invent the character he intends to be; consequently h u m a n life is, above all,pre-tension. " H u m a n l i f e , " O r t e g a writes, " i s n o t a n e n t i t y t h a t changes accidentally; o n the c o n t r a r y , its 'substance' is precisely change, w h i c h means t h a t i t cannot be t h o u g h t o f Eleatically as substance. Since life is a ' d r a m a ' t h a t happens a n d the 'subject' to w h o m i t happens is n o t a ' t h i n g ' apart and p r i o r to the d r a m a , b u t a f u n c t i o n o f i t , t h e n t h e ' substance' is its plot. A n d i f this varies, i t means t h a t the v a r i a t i o n is ' s u b s t a n t i a l . ' . . . T h e most disparate forms o f being h a p pen to m a n . T o the despair o f the intellectualists, being is i n m a n mere happening a n d happening to him.... M a n ' goes o n b e i n g ' a n d ' u n b e i n g ' — l i v i n g . M a n continues to accumulate b e i n g — t h e past: he goes o n m a k i n g a b e i n g for himself t h r o u g h his dialectical series o f experiments. . . . M a n is w h a t has happened to h i m , w h a t he has done. . . . This p i l g r i m o f being, this substantial e m i g r a n t , is m a n . . . . I n short, man has no nature; he has instead . . . history. O r , w h a t amounts to the same t h i n g : w h a t n a t u r e is to the things, h i s t o r y — a s res gestae—is to m a n . " (Historia como sistema; Complete Works, V I , 35-41). B u t elsewhere: " T h e b e i n g o f m a n is n a t u r a l a n d e x t r a n a t u r a l at the same time, a species o f ontological c e n t a u r " (Complete Works, V , 3 3 4 ) ; a n d also: " H u m a n r e a l i t y has an inexorable structure, w h i c h is neither more n o r less t h a n cosmic matter " (Complete Works, V I , 242). E T H I C S . N o t every activity is a d o i n g . C e r t a i n activities—for example, psychical activities—are p u r e mechanisms. Strictly speaki n g , they are n o t things I do, b u t things t h a t are done or produced i n m e : I refer to such activities as i m a g i n i n g , r e m e m b e r i n g , t h i n k i n g ; at most, w h a t I do is to begin to t h i n k or i m a g i n e , i n i t i a t e t h a t a c t i v i t y , for whose result I cannot answer. I can begin to solve a p r o b l e m or w r i t e a sonnet, b u t i t is n o t i n m y hands to find the answer or the a p p r o p r i a t e rhymes a n d metaphors. Doing is an a c t i v i t y w h i c h / perform,/or some reason a n d for some purpose, and therefore something for w h i c h I a m responsible. W e l l , t h e n , m y life is a task to be done, something I must do myself; I have at every m o m e n t to decide w h a t I a m going to do-—and therefore b e — a t the next m o m e n t ; I must choose a m o n g the possibilities t h a t I encounter, a n d no one can relieve m e o f this choice a n d decision. T h e p r o b l e m oifreedom is thus stated i n a n e n t i r e l y new w a y i n Ortega's
4j8
Ortega
and H i s Philosophy
of Vital
Reason
philosophy. F r e e d o m consists i n t h a t c o m p u l s o r y choice a m o n g possibilities. " T o be free means to lack constitutive i d e n t i t y , t o n o t be ascribed to a d e t e r m i n e d being, to be able t o be other t h a n w h a t one was a n d to n o t be able t o establish oneself once a n d f o r a l l i n a n y determined b e i n g . " M a n is thus constitutively a n d necessarily free, b u t this does n o t m e a n t h a t he is completely a n d forever free. Inasm u c h as his life is n o t ready-made, b u t something he has t o make for himself, m a n cannot cease to be free; m a n is necessarily free: he does n o t have the freedom to renounce his freedom. Since I have t o decide w h a t I a m going t o do at every m o m e n t , I need to justify myself to myself for d o i n g one t h i n g a n d n o t a n o t h e r ; life is responsibility, i n its u l t i m a t e substance, i t is moral. L i k e a l l h u m a n r e a l i t y , life admits o f degrees of being. T h e things are w h a t they are: a stone is a stone a n d a horse is a horse; i t is meaningless t o say t h a t a horse is more or less o f a horse; b u t i n contrast, i t makes perfect sense to say t h a t a w o m a n is quite a woman, or t h a t a m a n is either quite a m a n or not much of a m a n . Since the being of life is n o t already a n d i m m e d i ately given, i t can be realized fully or insufficiently; i t c a n be falsified. W h e n one's life is m a d e f r o m one's o w n s t a n d p o i n t , w h e n a m a n is t r u e to the voice w h i c h calls h i m to be a d e t e r m i n e d t h i n g , a n d w h i c h is therefore k n o w n as his vocation, his life is authentic; w h e n m a n abandons himself to w h a t is t r i t e a n d h a n d e d d o w n , w h e n he is u n f a i t h f u l to his i n t i m a t e a n d o r i g i n a l v o c a t i o n , he falsifies his life a n d changes i t i n t o unauthentic life. M o r a l i t y consists i n a u t h e n t i c i t y , i n b r i n g i n g life to its m a x i m u m r e a l i t y ; to live is to live more. M o r a l i t y consists i n each man's r e a l i z i n g his o w n u n i q u e a n d unsubstitutable destiny.
5. THE
HISTORICAL A N D SOCIAL L I F E
H I S T O R I C I T Y OF H U M A N L I F E . M a n
finds h i m s e l f l i v i n g i n a
p a r t i c u l a r p e r i o d o f t i m e : at a specific h i s t o r i c a l level. H i s life is composed of a peculiar substance, " h i s t i m e . " Whereas a tiger is always the " first t i g e r , " the one w h o is being a tiger for t h e first t i m e , m a n is the inheritor of a past, o f a series of past h u m a n experiences t h a t c o n d i t i o n his being a n d his possibilities. M a n has been c e r t a i n concrete things, a n d therefore he c a n no longer be t h e m a n d must be other determ i n e d things. I n d i v i d u a l life is thus already h i s t o r i c a l ; h i s t o r i c i t y is a n essential p a r t o f the life o f every one of us. Therefore, " i n order to understand a n y t h i n g h u m a n , be i t personal or collective, i t is necessary to relate its history. T h i s m a n , this n a t i o n does such a n d such a t h i n g a n d is as he or i t is because previously he or i t d i d this other t h i n g
Historical
and Social
Life
459
a n d was this other way. Life o n l y becomes somewhat t r a n s p a r e n t , " O r t e g a says,'' w h e n viewed t h r o u g h historical reason The individual h u m a n being does n o t i n a u g u r a t e h u m a n i t y . H e i m m e d i a t e l y encounters i n his surroundings other m e n a n d the society w h i c h they comprise. Hence his h u m a n i t y , t h a t w h i c h begins t o develop i n h i m , takes its p o i n t of departure f r o m another t h a t has previously developed a n d reached its c u l m i n a t i o n ; i n short, t o his h u m a n i t y there is added a n already forged mode of being m a n , something that he does not have to i n v e n t ; he need only r o o t himself i n i t a n d use i t as a starting p o i n t for his i n d i v i d u a l d e v e l o p m e n t . " (Historia como sistema; Complete Works, V I , 4 0 - 4 3 ) . T H E GENERATIONS. H i s t o r y has a precise structure, t h a t o f the generations. Every m a n finds a w o r l d t h a t is determined b y a repertory o f beliefs, ideas, usages a n d problems. Such a f o r m o f life possesses a c e r t a i n stability, i t lasts for a certain p e r i o d of time. O r t e g a says t h a t i t lasts fifteen years.'' A generation is a zone o f fifteen years d u r i n g w h i c h a c e r t a i n f o r m of life was prevalent. T h u s the generation represents the concrete u n i t o f authentic historical chronology; or, expressed differe n t l y , history advances a n d proceeds b y generations. W e c a n n o w u n d e r s t a n d the true nature o f the affinity between m e n o f a single generation. T h i s affinity derives n o t so m u c h f r o m t h e m as f r o m t h e i r r e a l i z i n g t h a t they are obliged to live i n a w o r l d t h a t has a d e t e r m i n e d a n d u n i q u e f o r m . " (Complete Works, V I , 371). Generations are determined b y a central date a n d constitute a " z o n e o f d a t e s " o f fifteen years—seven years before a n d seven years after the decisive year. T h u s a generation is c o m m o n to a l l w h o were b o r n w i t h i n this zone o f dates. O r t e g a makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between contemporaries—those w h o are l i v i n g at the same t i m e — a n d coevals— those w h o are o f the same age, t h a t is, w h o belong t o the same generation. T h e decisive generations are those i n w h i c h historical v a r i a t i o n is m u c h greater t h a n u s u a l ; they govern the over-all struct u r e o f historical epochs. I n Ortega's h a n d , the method oj the generations becomes a tool o f exemplary precision i n understanding historical reality. * M A N A N D PEOPLE. O n e of the things we find i n the r e a l m o f o u r life is society, social acts—customs, l a w , the State. These social acts are subscribed t o only b y m e n ; n o t h i n g t h a t deserves to be called social is to be f o u n d among the other creatures, a n d the so-called " a n i m a l societies " are something v e r y different. Society is thus a fact o f h u m a n life. H o w e v e r , this raises a serious p r o b l e m , because h u m a n life is * See J . M a r í a s , El método histórico de las generaciones (1949) and the chapter entitled " D i n á m i c a de las generaciones" in La estructura social (1955).
460
Ortega and His Philosophy of Vital Reason
always my life, each man's life, t h e life of every one of us. I t is life o n a n i n d i v i d u a l a n d personal basis, i n w h i c h the " / " finds itself i n surroundings or a w o r l d , w i t h o u t the security o f existing i n t h e i m m e d i a t e i n s t a n t a n d h a v i n g always to be d o i n g something i n o r d e r to assure its existence. T h u s , to be precise, w h a t is h u m a n is w h a t I do myself, w h a t is personal, w h a t has m e a n i n g for m e , a n d therefore w h a t I u n d e r stand. Therefore, h u m a n a c t i o n presupposes a responsible subject, a n d life is, i n its essence, solitariness. O n the other h a n d , w h a t is social does n o t arise f r o m m y solitude, b u t f r o m m y living jointly w i t h other men. T h u s , society is not life i n its p r i m a r y sense. B y w h o m are the social acts performed? A m a n shakes hands because i t is w h a t one does; a p o l i c e m a n stops traffic because he is ordered to. W h o is the subject i n t h e social acts ? E v e r y b o d y a n d n o b o d y i n p a r t i c u l a r ; collective h u m a n i t y , society; i n short, people. Therefore, social actions are h u m a n a n d not something else; h o w ever, they do n o t originate w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l ; they are n o t desired b y the i n d i v i d u a l a n d frequently t h e y are n o t even understood b y h i m . T o cite a t r i v i a l b u t i m m e d i a t e example, one does n o t k n o w w h y one m a n greets another b y shaking hands. T H E I N T E R I N D I V I D U A L A N D T H E SOCIAL. However, a c e r t a i n confusion has always prevented sociologists f r o m seeing t h e i r problems clearly. T h e y have t r a d i t i o n a l l y contrasted w h a t is i n d i v i d u a l w i t h w h a t is social or collective: o n t h e one h a n d , the i n d i v i d u a l m a n ; o n the other, t w o or more m e n l i v i n g j o i n t l y , w h i c h sociologists have i n t e r p r e t e d as collective h u m a n i t y o r society. Ortega establishes a n essential distinction w h i c h opens the w a y to a new sociology. T h e r e are t w o v e r y different ways i n w h i c h m e n live j o i n t l y . O n e o f these is the interindividual way, a relationship between t w o or m o r e i n d i v i d u a l s as such: love, friendship, a n d so o n , are i n t e r i n d i v i d u a l acts; they are instances o f the coexistence o f i n d i v i d u a l s as i n d i v i d u a l s . W h a t is i n t e r i n d i v i d u a l does not leave the r e a l m o f i n d i v i d u a l life, life sensu stricto. I n contrast, the other w a y is p r o p e r l y social; i t is i m p e r s o n a l a n d neither spontaneous nor responsible. Shaking hands, the policeman's stopping traffic, the postman's relationship w i t h the addressee o f a letter—these are not o r i g i n a l a n d v o l u n t a r y acts of i n d i v i d u a l s as such w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s desire a n d understand. M a n merely performs social acts i n a mechanical fashion. CUSTOMS. A custom is w h a t we t h i n k , say or do because i t is w h a t one thinks, says o r does. Social acts are p r i n c i p a l l y customs. Customs do not o r d i n a r i l y originate w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s , b u t are imposed b y society, b y people. I f we d o not observe t h e m , society makes reprisals against us (social disapproval o f the m a n w h o does n o t greet others p r o p e r l y ,
Historical
and Social
Life
461
j u r i d i c a l or governmental pressure o n the m a n w h o crosses the street illegally). Customs are irrational a n d impersonal. T h e y are "social or collective l i f e , " a very strange f o r m o f life t h a t lacks some o f life's essential characteristics, something halfway between n a t u r e a n d m a n , a n " almost n a t u r e . " T h e r e is no such t h i n g as a collective soul." Society, collectivity, is the great soulless entity, for i t is h u m a n i t y t h a t has been n a t u r a l i z e d , mechanized, almost m i n e r a l i z e d . " Therefore i t is m e a n i n g f u l to call i t the social " w o r l d . " ( R e m e m b e r the p r o b l e m t h a t the " o b j e c t i v e s p i r i t " posed for Hegel.) Ortega says t h a t these customs p e r m i t us to foresee the conduct o f i n d i v i d u a l s w h o m we d o n o t k n o w , allow us almost to coexist w i t h strangers. F u r t h e r m o r e , they give us the i n h e r i t a n c e o f the past a n d b r i n g us abreast o f the t i m e s ; this explains h o w there can be progress and h i s t o r y : because there is society. F i n a l l y , customs, w h i l e rendering m a n y aspects o f life inflexible a n d automatic, give m a n openness for w h a t is most personal a n d a l l o w h i m " to create w h a t is new, r a t i o n a l and more p e r f e c t . " S O C I E T Y A N D DISSOCIATION. However, one must take note o f a n extremely i m p o r t a n t p o i n t : i f m e n are sociable, they are also u n sociable. T h a t is to say, society is never characterized b y s t a b i l i t y ; i t exists as a n effort to overcome dissociation a n d u n s o c i a b i l i t y ; i t is always p r o b l e m a t i c a l . Hence the f r i g h t e n i n g p a r t o f its character, its ties t o a u t h o r i t y , politics a n d the State, w h i c h " i n the f i n a l analysis are always v i o l e n c e — i n the best o f times, to a lesser degree; d u r i n g social crises, to a n a w f u l d e g r e e . " O n e m u s t c o m p r e h e n d collective life as w e l l as i n d i v i d u a l life because w h a t is collective happens to m a n i n his i n d i v i d u a l life. A f t e r s t u d y i n g h u m a n life i n its o r i g i n a l i t y , b y means o f the philosophy o f v i t a l reason one can a p p r o a c h the t w o m a j o r themes o f collective " life " : society a n d history. T h i s b r i e f sketch o f Ortega's philosophy, w h i c h cannot begin to i n c l u d e his final statements o n the most i m p o r t a n t themes, is i n t e n d e d merely to demonstrate his extreme o r i g i n a l i t y a n d i m p o r t a n c e a n d to show the d i r e c t i o n o f his t h o u g h t . W e f i n d t h a t his philosophy is completely rooted i n the p r o b l e m o f o u r t i m e . Step b y step, i n a m e a n i n g f u l progression, philosophy has led us to the discovery o f the r e a l i t y t h a t is h u m a n life. T h e destiny o f the age was to arrive at this p o i n t . As early as 1923 O r t e g a called the task o f r e d u c i n g p u r e reason to v i t a l reason the theme of our time. H e d i d n o t f a i l to respond to the inexorable summons o f this theme. H i s last works show the m a t u r i t y o f his t h o u g h t , the f i n a l positions he reached. Man and People signifies the
4-6z
Ortega and His Philosophy of Vital Reason
authentic f o u n d a t i o n o f sociology, understood as a theory o f social life a n d therefore rooted i n the theory o f i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n life, t h a t is, i n metaphysics. Ortega's 1929 course, ¿Qué es filosofía? ( W h a t Is Philosophy ?), is his first exposition o f the essential features o f his philosophic system. H i s book La idea de principio de Leibniz y la evolución de la teoría deductiva ( L e i b n i z ' Concept of P r i n c i p l e a n d the E v o l u t i o n o f the Deductive T h e o r y ) exhibits a capacity p r a c t i c a l l y u n k n o w n u p to n o w for p e n e t r a t i n g to the very r o o t o f the m e a n i n g o f Western t h o u g h t as i t is revealed i n its history : the Greeks—especially P l a t o , Aristotle, E u c l i d , the Skeptics a n d the Stoics; the Scholastics; the moderns—philosophers, mathematicians a n d physicists; a n d the contemporary " existentialists. " Ortega's c r i t i q u e shows " the level o f o u r r a d i c a l i s m " a n d the deeper m e a n i n g o f the philosophy o f v i t a l reason. A detailed exposition of these w o r k s — p r o b a b l y Ortega's most i m p o r t a n t — w i l l have to take i n t o account other w r i t i n g s t h a t are still u n p u b l i s h e d ; together, they comprise the last phase o f his t h o u g h t . (For more details o n this, see m y book Ortega, o f w h i c h the first v o l u m e has been published.)
6.
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Ortega's strictly philosophical influence has been so p r o f o u n d t h a t there is no f o r m o f t h o u g h t i n the Spanish-speaking w o r l d at the present t h a t does n o t owe some essential p a r t to h i m ; b u t this influence was exerted m o r e d i r e c t l y a n d positively u p o n his personal pupils, especially those w h o developed their t h o u g h t i n close p r o x i m i t y to h i m at the U n i v e r s i t y o f M a d r i d or those w h o were n o t i n his i m m e d i a t e surroundings b u t w h o received certain principles a n d methods o f t h o u g h t f r o m h i m . A t the b e g i n n i n g o f this chapter I m e n t i o n e d the names o f some o f the thinkers w h o comprise the so-called School o f M a d r i d ; we shall n o w examine briefly the w o r k o f four o f t h e m w h o have made c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e to the philosophy o f o u r t i m e . L i k e other members o f the g r o u p , t h e i r personalities have developed i n q u i t e different a n d independent forms, a n d this, too, corresponds to the d e m a n d for c i r c u m s t a n t i a l i t y a n d a u t h e n t i c i t y t h a t characterizes every nuance o f Ortega's t h o u g h t . M O R E N T E . M a n u e l Garcia M o r e n t e (1886-1942) was b o r n at A r j o n i l l a , near J a é n . H e studied at G r a n a d a a n d later at Bayonne a n d Paris, where he was a p u p i l o f Étienne Émile M a r i e B o u t r o u x a n d was influenced by Frédéric R a u h a n d especially Bergson, w h o was t h e n b e g i n n i n g to d o m i n a t e French t h o u g h t . A f t e r receiving his degree i n philosophy at Paris, M o r e n t e completed his studies i n G e r m a n y
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(Berlin, M u n i c h a n d M a r b u r g ) u n d e r Cohen, N a t o r p a n d Cassirer, the three most i m p o r t a n t n e o - K a n t i a n philosophers. F r o m 1912 o n he held the chair i n ethics a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f M a d r i d , where f r o m 1931 to 1936 he was dean o f the F a c u l t y o f Philosophy a n d Letters. O r d a i n e d as a priest i n 1940, he r e t u r n e d to his professorship and died i n M a d r i d t w o years later. M o r e n t e was a n extremely c u l t u r e d m a n a n d a n a d m i r a b l e teacher a n d translator. I n t h e course o f his life his t h o u g h t followed several paths. H e was attracted to the K a n t i a n i s m o f his G e r m a n teachers, a n d w r o t e a n a d m i r a b l e exposition o f i t i n his book La filosofía de Kant, w h i c h used the G e r m a n philosopher as a p o i n t of departure i n the past for a speculation concerning the present. L a t e r he became interested i n Bergson, w h o m he made the subject o f a short book, La filosofía de Henri Bergson. A p u p i l a n d friend o f O r t e g a , he attained t h e most m a t u r e phase o f his t h o u g h t i n his personal exposition o f Ortega's philosophy, w i t h extremely interesting contributions o f his o w n , such as the studies o n progress a n d p r i v a t e life i n c l u d e d i n his book Ensayos (Essays). H i s most i m p o r t a n t w o r k , w h i c h combines his v i e w o f the history o f philosophy w i t h his personal o r i e n t a t i o n , is the published version o f a course he gave at the U n i v e r s i t y o f T u c u m á n , A r g e n t i n a , Lecciones preliminares de Filosofía. * A f t e r the C i v i l W a r a n d the s p i r i t u a l crisis t h a t led to his o r d i n a t i o n as a priest, M o r e n t e published several works w h i c h are collected i n the v o l u m e Idea de la Hispanidad, as w e l l as some studies o f St. Thomas w h i c h , w h i l e n o t fully m a t u r e , give a n i n d i c a t i o n o f w h a t the final phase o f his t h o u g h t m i g h t have been. B u t this phase was i n t e r r u p t e d suddenly b y his death. Z U B I R I . X a v i e r Z u b i r i was b o r n i n San Sebastián i n 1898. H e studied philosophy a n d theology at M a d r i d , L o u v a i n a n d R o m e , t a k i n g his degree i n philosophy at M a d r i d w i t h a thesis e n t i t l e d Ensayo de una teoría fenomenológica del juicio (Essay o f a Phenomenological T h e o r y o f J u d g m e n t ) a n d his degree i n theology at R o m e . H e also pursued scientific a n d philosophic studies i n Germany. I n 1926 he became professor o f the history o f philosophy at the U n i v e r s i t y o f M a d r i d . H e was a w a y f r o m Spain f r o m early 1936 u n t i l the b e g i n n i n g o f t h e Second W o r l d W a r ; he was a professor at the U n i v e r s i t y o f Barcelona f r o m 1940 to 1942. Since t h e n he has lived i n M a d r i d , n o t engaged i n official i n s t r u c t i o n , b u t g i v i n g a series o f very i n f l u e n t i a l p r i v a t e courses or short series o f lectures since 1945. Z u b i r i ' s specifically philosophical development shows the influence * A new, considerably abridged and revised edition of this work was published posthumously in Spain under the title Fundamentos de Filosofía; the second portion of this work was written by Juan Z a r a g ü e t a .
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o f his three p r i n c i p a l teachers : J u a n Z a r a g ü e t a , O r t e g a a n d H e i degger. H i s theological studies a n d Zaragiieta's leanings gave Z u b i r i a p r o f o u n d f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h Scholasticism, the m a r k o f w h i c h is clearly visible i n his t h o u g h t . O r t e g a was a decisive factor i n his m a t u r e development a n d o r i e n t a t i o n ; Z u b i r i has w r i t t e n : " W e were m o r e t h a n pupils, we were his h a n d i w o r k , i n the sense t h a t he m a d e us t h i n k , o r a t least made us t h i n k o f things t h a t we h a d n o t t h o u g h t o f before a n d i n a f o r m we were n o t used t o . . . . A n d we were his h a n d i w o r k , we w h o were p r e p a r i n g to be w h i l e he was i n the process o f f o r m a t i o n . W e received f r o m h i m t h e n something that no one w i l l be able to receive again : the i n t e l l e c t u a l i r r a d i a t i o n f r o m a t h i n k e r i n the process o f development. " Lastly, Z u b i r i studied w i t h Heidegger a t F r e i b u r g f r o m 1929 to 1931, shortly after the p u b l i c a t i o n oí Sein und Zfitiy °\. the i m p r i n t o f this i n s t r u c t i o n has s i m i l a r l y enriched his t h o u g h t . T o this should be added Z u b i r i ' s very b r o a d a n d p r o f o u n d scientific k n o w l edge, r a n g i n g f r o m mathematics to neurology, to w h i c h h e has given e x t r a o r d i n a r y a t t e n t i o n a l l his life, a n d his studies o f classical a n d O r i e n t a l languages, p r i m a r i l y as aids i n the study o f t h e history o f religions. aTi
Z u b i r i ' s w r i t t e n œuvre has been slow i n c o m i n g a n d discontinuous, a n d its v o l u m e is still small. H i s philosophic essays—with t h e exception o f " S o b r e el p r o b l e m a de l a filosofía" a n d " O r t e g a , maestro de filosofía"—were collected i n 1944 i n the v o l u m e Naturaleza, Historia, Dios ( N a t u r e , H i s t o r y , G o d ) . H e published n o t h i n g else u n t i l 1962, w h e n his l o n g study Sobre la esencia ( O n Essence) appeared. I n 1963 he p u b l i s h e d a n edited version o f a short lecture course, Cinco lecciones de filosofía. Z u b i r i ' s historical studies comprise a large p a r t o f his w o r k a n d have e x t r a o r d i n a r y perspicacity a n d d e p t h . T h e y are composed i n a h i g h l y personal m a n n e r , as an a t t e m p t to seek the roots o f his o w n p h i l o s o p h y ; they thus have a r e l a t i o n to the present s i t u a t i o n o f t h o u g h t w h i c h gives t h e m a strictly philosophical character. T h i s is a w e l l - k n o w n q u a l i t y o f the first essays i n Naturaleza, Historia, Dios—"Nuestra situación i n t e l e c t u a l , " " ¿ Q u é es saber ?" a n d " Ciencia y r e a l i d a d " — w h i c h are a n i n t r o d u c t i o n to the consideration o f the past—as w e l l as the essays " E l acontecer h u m a n o : Grecia y la pervivencia del pasado filosófico" ( H u m a n Events: Greece a n d the S u r v i v a l o f Philosophy's Past), " L a idea de filosofía en Aristóteles," " S ó c r a t e s y la sabiduría g r i e g a " (Socrates a n d Greek W i s d o m ) , a n d " H e g e l y el p r o b l e m a metafísico. " A perspective d e r i v e d m u c h more f r o m theology, t h o u g h accompanied b y the u n m i s t a k a b l e presence o f c u r r e n t p h i l o s o p h y , is evident i n the essay " E l ser s o b r e n a t u r a l : Dios y la deificación en la
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teología p a u l i n a " ( S u p e r n a t u r a l B e i n g : G o d a n d D e i f i c a t i o n i n Pauline T h e o l o g y ) , perhaps the most i l l u m i n a t i n g a n d p r o f o u n d o f Z u b i r i ' s w r i t i n g s . His last book studies the idea o f p h i l o s o p h y t h r o u g h the works o f a discontinuous series o f thinkers: A r i s t o t l e , K a n t , C o m t e , Bergson, Husserl, D i l t h e y a n d Heidegger. H e has studied the p h i l o sophical significance o f c o n t e m p o r a r y physics i n the essay " L a idea de l a naturaleza: la nueva f í s i c a " ( T h e Idea o f N a t u r e : T h e N e w Physics). T h e most commented o n a n d i n f l u e n t i a l o f Z u b i r i ' s essays is " E n t o r n o a l p r o b l e m a de Dios " ( C o n c e r n i n g the P r o b l e m o f G o d ; 1935), w h i c h seeks the h u m a n d i m e n s i o n f r o m the standpoint o f w h i c h this p r o b l e m must be posed. M a n is implanted i n existence o r i m p l a n t e d i n b e i n g ; he is supported a tergo b y something t h a t makes us be. T h i s leads t o the idea o f b i n d i n g (religación): we are obliged to exist because we are previously bound to t h a t w h i c h makes us exist. Existence is n o t merely thrown; i t is also bound to its r o o t . M a n ' s openness to the things shows t h a t there are things; his being b o u n d reveals t h a t there is something b i n d i n g h i m a n d t h a t i t is the f u n d a m e n t a l root o f existence. Z u b i r i calls this deidad ( d e i t y ) ; the b i n d i n g w h i c h he speaks o f poses the i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o b l e m o f G o d as f u n d a m e n t a l or f o u n d i n g b e i n g . F r o m this arise the problems o f r e l i g i o n or irreligión, even i n c l u d i n g atheism, w h i c h appear posed i n this dimension o f b i n d i n g . T h e ideas i n the book Sobre la esencia were developed over a long p e r i o d o f t i m e i n university courses i n w h i c h Z u b i r i treated various problems o f metaphysics. I t is a n extremely t i g h t l y w r i t t e n and technical book t h a t investigates i n great detail a n d d e p t h a central question o f philosophy. Z u b i r i ' s purpose is to r e t u r n to " r e a l i t y i n itself a n d to ask w h a t is its s t r u c t u r a l element t h a t we c a l l essence." H e uses the concept o f structure i n a thematic way, basing his argum e n t o n the philosophy o f A r i s t o t l e . Moreover, he criticizes Aristotle's t h e o r y o f substance, a n d this c r i t i q u e leads to the concept o f substantivity, i n the discussion o f w h i c h Z u b i r i has frequent recourse to Scholastic t h o u g h t patterns a n d makes constant use o f the intellectual a p p r o a c h o f science, physics a n d even more, biology. A considerable p a r t o f the interest o f this w o r k is related to the possibilities i t offers of u n d e r s t a n d i n g biological r e a l i t y a n d especially the r e a l i t y o f species. A c c o r d i n g to Z u b i r i , essence is a n element o f a real t h i n g , a n d this element is a p r i m a r y u n i t o f its t r a i t s ; o n the other h a n d , this u n i t is not e x t e r n a l , b u t intrinsic to the t h i n g itself, a n d a p r i n c i p l e o n w h i c h all the other traits of the t h i n g are based, whether or n o t they are necessary ; essence thus understood, he concludes, is the truth o f a t h i n g that is w i t h i n i t , the t r u t h o f r e a l i t y . I n l o n g analyses he establishes the
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d o m a i n o f the " essentiable, " " essentiated " r e a l i t y a n d the very essence o f the real. T h i s complex a n d difficult book culminates i n the exposition o f the idea o f transcendental order, i n w h i c h Z u b i r i c r i t i cizes other conceptions of transcendentality and expounds his o w n . T h r o u g h o u t the book he uses concepts t h a t he h a d developed i n his courses, such as t h a t o f "sentient intelligence, " w h i c h makes m a n a n " a n i m a l o f realities, " defined b y this peculiar " h a b i t . " Despite the technicality o f his style, his constant use o f neologisms and his frequent references to the sciences, Z u b i r i ' s courses a n d w r i t i n g s are f u l l o f an unmistakable intellectual passion a n d a d r a m a t i c q u a l i t y d e r i v e d f r o m the efforts o f a n exceptionally p r o f o u n d p h i losophy to clear a p a t h for itself a m o n g its i n t u i t i o n s a n d u n f o l d t h e m dialectically i n order to a t t a i n formulas of its o w n . T h e v o l u m e Sobre la esencia is the first o f an announced series o f " Philosophic S t u d i e s " ; i n these studies Z u b i r i ' s enormous knowledge a n d p r o f o u n d t h o u g h t w i l l surely be w e l l expressed. G A O S . José Gaos was b o r n at G i j o n i n 1900. H e was a professor at the universities o f Zaragoza a n d M a d r i d , a n d rector o f the latter university f r o m 1936 to 1939; since t h a t t i m e he has l i v e d a n d t a u g h t i n M e x i c o . H i s teachers were O r t e g a , M o r e n t e a n d Z u b i r i , w i t h w h o m he w o r k e d closely i n the M a d r i d F a c u l t y o f Philosophy a n d Letters i n the years i m m e d i a t e l y preceding the C i v i l W a r . H e has devoted a great deal of effort to the t r a n s l a t i o n o f philosophic works, especially those o f Husserl a n d Heidegger. H e has w r i t t e n numerous studies o n Spanish and L a t i n A m e r i c a n t h o u g h t , o n p r o b l e m s i n the teaching of philosophy, a n d o n philosophy i n the strict sense. H i s most i m p o r t a n t books are Pensamiento de lengua española (Spanish-language Philosophy), Filosofía de la filosofía e historia de la filosofía, Dos exclusivas del hombre : la manoy el tiempo ( T w o T h i n g s Peculiar to M a n : T h e H a n d and T i m e ) , Confesiones profesionales, Sobre Ortega y Gasset, Filosofía contemporánea, Discurso defilosofía, Orígenes de lafilosofíay de su historia a n d De lafilosofía. Gaos has always been a n a d m i r a b l e teacher ; his gift, like M o r e n t e ' s , of i n s t r u c t i n g a n d c o m m u n i c a t i n g his t h o u g h t , his c l a r i t y o f o r a l expression, his intellectual curiosity, his precision, his w i d e knowledge and his sense o f h u m o r are qualities w h i c h have made h i m , i n Spain as i n M e x i c o , a m a n w h o has done m u c h to awaken a n d i n s p i r e p h i l o sophical vocations, and his influence has been very great. H i s gifts as a w r i t e r , perhaps because o f the great b u l k o f the translations he has completed, are below the level of his b r i l l i a n t a n d attractive o r a l style ; therefore, these qualities are especially to be f o u n d i n those books w h i c h are f a i t h f u l versions o f his lectures, such as Dos exclusivas del
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hombre, i n w h i c h one can discover completely u n t r a m m e l e d the o r i g i n a l i t y , freshness a n d i n s p i r a t i o n o f Gaos's t h o u g h t . C o m b i n e d w i t h his vast a n d precise c o m m a n d o f the t o t a l i t y o f the philosophic t h o u g h t o f the past, Gaos has received a threefold i n f l u ence that lends h i m special forcefulness : t h a t o f O r t e g a , w h o shaped the very r o o t o f Gaos's t h o u g h t , as he d i d t h a t o f a l l the thinkers w h o experienced his direct influence; that o f Husserl, whose works he studied w i t h exceptional perceptiveness a n d i n s i g h t ; a n d t h a t o f Heidegger, perhaps the most apparent influence i n the last few years. Gaos, w h o at times declares t h a t he is n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a professor o f p h i l o s o p h y — o n l y w h e n one is t r u l y a " p r o f e s s o r " is i t possible to develop oneself p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y — a n d w h o makes n o a t t e m p t to conceal a certain l e a n i n g t o w a r d skepticism, represents a n irreplaceable element i n the nascent Spanish philosophy o f the present day. F E R R A T E R . José (Josep) Ferrater M o r a belongs to the School o f M a d r i d o n l y i n d i r e c t l y . H e was b o r n i n Barcelona i n 1912, a n d was a personal p u p i l o f the master professors o f t h a t city's university, especially J o a q u i n X i r a u . H e emigrated i n 1939 a n d has l i v e d i n Cuba, Chile a n d finally i n the U n i t e d States, w h e r e he is a professor at B r y n M a w r . B u t his philosophic relations to the School o f M a d r i d are very close : X i r a u was a p u p i l o f Ortega ; Ferrater, referring to Ortega i n 1935, spoke o f the " f i l i a l attitude o f one w h o has absorbed f r o m h i m , more t h a n ideas, style; more t h a n thoughts, ways of t h o u g h t . " M o r e n t e a n d Z u b i r i have also exerted considerable influence o n Ferrater, a n d one should n o t forget the influence o f U n a m u n o a n d Eugenio (Eugeni) d ' O r s u p o n h i m . Ferrater's w r i t i n g s are very copious. M o s t i m p o r t a n t is his Diccionario de Filosofía, w h i c h he has enlarged a n d perfected i n successive editions u n t i l i t has become a splendid storehouse o f philosophical i n f o r m a t i o n , abreast o f the times, balanced a n d precise ; i t is a personal a n d strictly philosophic presentation o f the r e a l i t y o f past a n d present philosophy. O t h e r books b y Ferrater are Cuatro visiones de la historia universal (Four V i e w s o f U n i v e r s a l H i s t o r y ) , Unamuno: bosquejo de una filosofía (translated as Unamuno : a Philosophy of Tragedy), Ortegay Gasset : etapas de una filosofía ( O r t e g a y Gasset: a n O u t l i n e o f H i s Philosophy), Variaciones sobre el espíritu (Variations o n S p i r i t ) , Cuestiones disputadas, La filosofía en el mundo de hoy (Philosophy T o d a y ) , Lógica matemática ( i n collaboration w i t h H u g u e s L e b l a n c ) , El hombre en la encrucijada ( M a n at the Crossroads), a n d El ser y la muerte (Being a n d D e a t h ) . T h e lastnamed book is the one Ferrater considers most representative o f his t h o u g h t ; i n accordance w i t h a characteristic practice o f this a u t h o r , w h o likes to go b a c k over his o w n w r i t i n g s a n d revise t h e m , i t is a new
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version o f his earlier book El sentido de la muerte ( T h e Sense o f D e a t h ) ; its subtitle i s ' ' Bosquejo de una filosofía integracionista " (Sketch o f a n Integrationist P h i l o s o p h y ) . By " i n t e g r a t i o n i s m " Ferrater understands " a type o f philosophy whose purpose is to construct a bridge over the g u l f t h a t a l l too often yawns between t h a t t h o u g h t w h i c h takes as its axis h u m a n existence or realities described b y analogy to i t a n d t h a t t h o u g h t w h i c h takes N a t u r e as its a x i s . " H e does n o t w a n t a mere " l e v e l i n g " o f the doctrines, nor an eclectic selection o f elements f r o m t h e m , n o r a " c o m p r o m i s e " between t h e i r extreme v i e w p o i n t s ; w h a t he wants is a bridge over w h i c h one can pass i n either d i r e c t i o n , w h i l e the respective u n t e n a b i l i t y o f each p o s i t i o n is preserved. Ferrater, w h o keeps close w a t c h on everything b e i n g done i n philosophy today, i n E u r o p e , i n the Anglo-Saxon w o r l d a n d even i n the Soviet w o r l d , presents this aggregate i n a r e l a t i v e l y flat, unforeshortened perspective t h a t is n o t p r i m a r i l y his o w n personal one. Outside the area of philosophy, a n analogous a t t i t u d e m a y be observed i n his interesting book Tres mundos: Cataluña, España, Europa (Three W o r l d s : Catalonia, Spain, E u r o p e ) , w r i t t e n w i t h the t r a n q u i l l i t y , keenness a n d intelligent i r o n y t h a t characterize a l l o f his i n t e l l e c t u a l w o r k . W e have followed the entire history o f W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h y c e n t u r y b y century a n d stage b y stage, f r o m Greece to O r t e g a and the p h i l o sophical g r o u p o r i g i n a t e d b y h i m . G o d has a l l o w e d us to close this history, as is j u s t , w i t h Spanish names. As we reach this p o i n t , p h i losophy shows us the u n d e r l y i n g u n i t y o f its m e a n i n g , despite a l l its differences. A t the end we find the entire past present i n ourselves. T h i s is w h a t gives the history o f philosophy its seriousness; i n i t w e feel, in the present, the w e i g h t o f the entire past. B u t this e n d i n g is n o t a conclusion. T h e history o f philosophy comes to a close i n the present, b u t the present, w h i c h is laden w i t h the entire past, bears the f u t u r e w i t h i n itself; the mission o f the present consists o f setting the f u t u r e i n m o t i o n . Perhaps i n the t i m e to come Spain w i l l no longer be outside this movement, for i n O r t e g a Spain has made p h i l o s o p h y its o w n .
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N O T E TO T H E PRESENT E D I T I O N N o title has been added to or deleted from the Apéndice Bibliográfico as printed i n the twenty-second Spanish edition. T h i s bibliography thus remains, according to the author's wishes, a record of the works he found most useful i n writing a n d revising his book. T h e translators have added authors' first names and places of publication wherever possible. T h e y have added references to all E n g l i s h translations of works that came to their attention, at the same time deleting references to Spanish translations wherever it was possible to supply the original title or a n English translation of a work. I.
DICTIONARIES AND GENERAL PHILOSOPHY
HISTORIES
OF
Eisler, Rudolf, Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe und Ausdrücke, Berlin, 1 8 9 9 . Philosophen-Lexikon, Berlin, 1 9 1 2 . B a l d w i n , J a m e s M a r k (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, new ed. ( 1 9 2 5 , 3 v o l . i n 4 ) reprinted N e w Y o r k , 1 9 4 0 - 4 9 . L a l a n d e , A n d r é , Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, 4 t h ed. ( 2 vol.), Paris, 1 9 3 2 . Schmidt-Streller, Philosophisches Wörterbuch. R u n e s , Dagobert D a v i d (ed.), TheDictionaryofPhilosophj>,TSiewYork, 1942. F e r r a t e r M o r a , J o s é , Diccionario deFilosqfia, 5 t h ed., Buenos Aires, 1 9 6 5 . Z a r a g ü e t a [Bengoechea],Juan, Vocabulario filosófico, M a d r i d , 1 9 5 5 . E r d m a n n , J o h a n n E d u a r d , Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 3 r d ed. ( 2 v o l . ) , Berlin, 1 8 7 8 . W i n d e l b a n d , W i l h e l m , Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, n t h ed., T ü b i n g e n , 1 9 2 4 ; rev. by H e i n z Heimsoeth, 1 9 3 5 . W u n d t , W . , Oldenberg, H . , et al., Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie ( T e i l I , A b t . V of Die Kultur der Gegenwart), Berlin, 1 9 0 9 . 469
Bibliography Baeumler, A . and S c h r ö t e r , M . (edd.), Die Grunddisziplinen ( A b t . I oí Handbuch der Philosophie), M u n i c h , 1 9 3 4 . J a n e t - S é a i l l e s , Histoire de la philosophie, Paris, 1 8 8 7 . Messer, August, Geschichte der Philosophie ( 3 vol.), L e i p z i g , 1 9 1 2 - 1 6 . V o r l ä n d e r , K a r l , Geschichte der Philosophie, 9 t h ed. ( 2 v o l . ) , H a m b u r g , c. 1949-55-
B r é h i e r , É m i l e , Histoire de la philosophie ( 2 vol. in 7 ) , Paris, 1 9 2 6 - 3 2 . E n g . trans, by Joseph T h o m a s , History of Philosophy, Vol. 1 : The Hellenic Age, Chicago, 1 9 6 3 . Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy, N e w Y o r k , 1 9 5 9 . Copleston, Frederick, A History
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I946-59R i v a u d , Albert, Histoire de la philosophie ( 4 vol. ), Paris, 1 9 4 8 - 6 2 . M a r í a s , J u l i á n (ed.), La filosofía en sus textos (anthology), 2 n d ed. ( 3 v o l . ) , Barcelona, i 9 6 0 . II.
ON T H E ESSENCE OF PHILOSOPHY
Bergson, H e n r i , Introduction à la métaphysique. E n g . trans, b y T . E . H u l m e , An Introduction to Metaphysics, N e w Y o r k , 1 9 1 2 . Dilthey, W i l h e l m , Das Wesen der Philosophie, Berlin, 1 9 0 7 . E n g . trans, by Stephen A . E m e r y a n d W i l l i a m T . E m e r y , The Essence of Philosophy, Chapel Hill, 1954. Husserl, E d m u n d , "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," Logos, 1 9 1 1 . Scheler, M a x , " V o m Wesen der Philosophie," in Vom Ewigen im Menschen, 1921.
Heidegger, M a r t i n , Was ist Metaphysik?, 3 r d printing, Bonn, 1 9 3 1 . O r t e g a y Gasset, J o s é , Prólogo a una Historia de la Filosofía (in V o l . V I of Obras Completas), M a d r i d , 1 9 4 7 . Z u b i r i , X a v i e r , " S o b r e el problema de l a filosofía," Revista de Occidente, Nos. ii5andn8,
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M a r í a s , J u l i á n , Introducción a la Filosofía, M a d r i d , 1 9 4 7 . E n g . trans, by K e n n e t h S. R e i d a n d E d w a r d Sarmiento, Reason and Life, L o n d o n & New H a v e n , 1 9 5 6 . Biografía de la Filosofía, Buenos Aires, 1 9 5 4 . Idea de la Metafísica, Buenos Aires, 1 9 5 4 . III.
GREEK
PHILOSOPHY
Sources Diels, H e r m a n n (ed. & trans.), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6 t h e d . ( 3 vol.), Berlin, 1 9 5 1 - 5 2 . Ritter-Preller,Historiaphilosophiaegraecae ( 1 8 3 8 ) , 1 0 t h ed., H a m b u r g , 1 9 1 4 . A r n i m , H a n s Friedrich August v o n , Stoicorum veterum fragmenta ( 4 vol.), Leipzig, 1 9 0 3 - 2 4 . Nestle, W i l h e l m , (sel., ed. & trans.), Die Vorsokratiker, J e n a , 1 9 0 8 . Die Sokratiker. Die Nachsokratiker.
Bibliography Capelle, W i l h e l m , D i e Vorsokratiker, 1 9 5 3 . F r e e m a n , K a t h l e e n , ThePre-Socratic Philosophers, 2 n d ed., Oxford, 1 9 4 9 . Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers ( E n g . trans, of the fragments in D i e l s ) , Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 4 8 . V o g e l , C . J . de (ed.), Greek Philosophy ( 3 v o l . ) , L e i d e n , 1 9 5 9 - 6 3 . General
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Zeller, E d u a r d , Die Philosophie der Griechen ( 3 vol. i n 6 ) , L e i p z i g , 1 8 7 9 - 9 2 . G o m p e r z , Theodor, Griechische Denker ( 3 vol.), L e i p z i g , 1 9 0 3 - 9 . E n g . trans. by L a u r i e Magnus a n d G . G . Berry, Greek Thinkers ( 4 v o l . ) , L o n d o n , 1914-31.
J o ë l , K a r l , Geschichte der antiken Philosophie, T ü b i n g e n , 1 g 2 1 . H ö n i g s w a l d , R i c h a r d , Die Philosophie des Altertums, 1 9 1 7 . Cassirer, E r n s t and Hoffman, E . , Geschichte der antiken Philosophie, 1 9 2 5 . M e y e r , H . , Geschichte der alten Philosophie, 1 9 2 5 . Stenzel, J u l i u s , " M e t a p h y s i k des A l t e r t u m s , " i n A . Baeumler and M . S c h r ö t e r (edd.), Die Grunddisziplinen (Abt. I of Handbuch der Philosophie), Munich, 1934. H o w a l d , E r n s t , Ethik des Altertums, M u n i c h , 1 9 3 4 . J a e g e r , W e r n e r W i l h e l m , Paideia, 3 r d ed. ( 3 vol.), Berlin, 1 9 5 4 - 5 5 . E n g . trans, of 2 n d G e r m a n ed. b y G i l b e r t Highet, Paideia, 2 n d ed. ( 3 vol.), New York, i 9 6 0 . Stace, W a l t e r Terence, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, L o n d o n , 1 g 2 0 . Burnet, J o h n , Early Greek Philosophy ( 1 8 g 2 ) , 4 t h ed., L o n d o n , 1 9 3 0 . Greek Philosophy, I : Thaïes to Plato, L o n d o n , 1 9 1 4 . R o b i n , L é o n , La pensée grecque, new ed., Paris, 1 9 4 8 . E n g . trans, by M . R . Dobie, Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit, L o n d o n and N e w York, 1928. T a n n e r y , P a u l , Pour l'histoire de la science hellène, Paris, 1 8 8 7 . S c h u h l , Pierre M a x i m e , Essai sur laformation de la pensée grecque, 2 n d ed., Paris, 1949-
W e r n e r , C , La philosophie grecque, Paris, 1 9 3 8 . M a r í a s , J u l i á n , Biografía de laFilosofia, Buenos Aires, 1 9 5 4 .
Monographs T H E PRE-SOCRATICS G i g o n , O l o f Alfred, Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie, Basel, 1 9 4 5 . Diels, H e r m a n n (ed. & trans.), Herakleitos von Ephesos, 2 n d ed., Berlin, 1 9 0 9 . Weerts,~Emü,HeraklitundHerakliteer, Berlin, 1 9 2 6 . R e i n h a r d t , K a r l , Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, 1 9 1 6 . R i e z l e r , K u r t , Parmenides, Frankfurt a m M a i n , 1 9 3 4 . Z u b i r i , X a v i e r , Naiuraleza, Historia, Dios, M a d r i d , 1 9 4 4 , pp. 2 1 6 - 2 5 5 . Bignone, Ettore, Empedocle, 1 9 1 6 . Jaeger, W e r n e r W i l h e l m : E n g . trans, by E d w a r d S. Robinson, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, Oxford, 1 9 4 7 . Wheelwright, Philip E l l i s , Heraclitus, Princeton, 1 9 5 9 .
Bibliography T H E SOPHISTS A N D SOCRATES G o m p e r z , H e i n r i c h , Sophistik und Rhetorik, L e i p z i g , 1912. M e u n i e r , M a r i o , La légende de Socrate, 1926. K u h n , H e l m u t , Sokrates, Berlin, 1 9 3 4 ; reprinted M u n i c h , 1 9 5 9 . D a w s o n , M i l e s Menander, Ethics of Socrates, N e w Y o r k , 1 9 2 4 . C a r r i l l , H . F . , Socrates, or The Emancipation of Mankind, 1 9 2 7 . Z u b i r i , X a v i e r , " S ó c r a t e s y l a s a b i d u r í a griega, " in Naturaleza,
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Madrid, 1944. T o v a r , Antonio, Vida de Sócrates, M a d r i d , 1 9 4 7 . G i g o n , O l o f Alfred, Sokrates, Bern, 1947. PLATO Grote, George, Plato ( 4 vol.), L o n d o n , 1 8 8 8 . R i t t e r , Constantin, Platon, 1 9 1 0 - 2 3 . Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U l r i c h v o n , Platon ( 2 vol.), Berlin, 1 9 1 9 ; Platon, sein Leben und seine Werke, ed. after author's 3 r d ed. b y B r u n o Snell, Berlin, 1 9 4 8 . Pater, W a l t e r , Plato andPlatonism,
London, 1912.
Natorp, P a u l G e r h a r d , Piatos Ideenlehre, L e i p z i g , 1903. L a n d s b e r g , P a u l L u d w i g ; Span, trans., La Academia platónica, M a d r i d , 1 9 2 6 . R o b i n , L é o n , Platon, Paris, 1 9 3 8 . M o r e a u , J o s e p h , La construction de l'idéalisme platonicien, Paris, 1 9 3 8 . M a r í a s , J u l i á n , " I n t r o d u c c i ó n a P l a t ó n , " i n Fedro (Span. e d . of Plato's Phaedrus), Buenos Aires, 1 9 4 8 . ARISTOTLE Brentano, F r a n z Clemens, Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung, 1 9 1 1 . T a y l o r , Alfred E d w a r d , Aristotle, reprinted N e w Y o r k , 1955. H a m e l i n , O c t a v e , Le système d'Aristote, 2 n d ed., Paris, 1 9 3 1 . Siebeck, H e r m a n n , Aristoteles, Stuttgart, 1 8 9 9 . Ross, Sir W i l l i a m D a v i d , Aristotle, 5 t h ed., L o n d o n , 1 9 5 6 . Jaeger, W e r n e r W i l h e l m , Aristoteles, 2 n d ed., Berlin, 1 9 5 5 . E n g . trans, by R i c h a r d Robinson, Aristotle, O x f o r d , 1 9 3 4 . B r ö c k e r , W a l t e r , Aristoteles, 2 n d ed., Frankfurt a m M a i n , 1 9 5 7 . R o b i n , L é o n , Aristote, Paris, 1 9 4 4 . M a r í a s , J u l i á n , Introduction to S p a n . ed. of Aristotle's Politics, M a d r i d , 1950. I n t r o d u c t i o n to S p a n . ed. of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Madrid, 1960. A l l a n , D o n a l d J a m e s , The Philosophy of Aristotle, L o n d o n and N e w Y o r k , 1 9 5 7 . M o r e a u , J o s e p h , Aristote et son école, Paris, 1 9 6 2 . T H E I D E A L OF T H E WISE M A N G u y a u , TSÍa.rie]ea.n,Lamoraled'Épicure, Bignone, E t t o r e , Epicuro, 1 9 2 0 .
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Barth, P a u l , DieStoa, 6 t h ed., Stuttgart, 1 9 4 6 . M a r í a s , J u l i á n , " I n t r o d u c c i ó n a l a filosofía
estoica," i n Sobre la
(Span. ed. of Seneca's De vitabeatd), M a d r i d , 1 9 4 3 . " M a r c o Aurelio o l a e x a g e r a c i ó n , " in San Anselmo y el Madrid, 1944.
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Simon, J u l e s , Histoire de l'êcoled'Alexandrie ( 2 v o l . ) , Paris, 1 8 4 5 . Vacherot, É t i e n n e , Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie ( 3 vol.), Paris, 1846-51.
Whittaker, T h o m a s , TheNeo-Platonists, 2 n d ed., C a m b r i d g e ( E n g . ) , 1 9 1 8 . Inge, W i l l i a m R a l p h , The Philosophy of Plotinus, 3 r d ed., L o n d o n a n d N e w York, 1929. H e i n e m a n n , F . , Plotin, 1 9 2 1 . B r é h i e r , É m i l e , La philosophie de Plotin, Paris, 1 9 2 8 . E n g . trans, by J o s e p h T h o m a s , The Philosophy of Plotinus, C h i c a g o , 1 9 5 8 . Mehlis, Georg, Plotin, Stuttgart, 1 9 2 4 . IV.
CHRISTIANITY Sources
Migne, J a c q u e s P a u l (ed.), Patrologiae cursus completus. Séries Latina (P. L.) (221 v o l . ) , Paris, 1 8 4 4 - 6 4 ; Supplementum i n progress since 1 9 5 8 , P a r i s ; Indexes, R o t t e r d a m , 1 9 5 2 . Series Graeca (P. G.) (161 vol.) , Paris, 1 8 5 7 - 8 0 ; Indexes ( 2 vol. i n 3 ) , Paris, 1 9 2 8 - 3 6 . R o u ë t de J o u r n e l , M a r i e Joseph (comp.), Enchiridion Patristicum, 1 4 t h ed., Barcelona, 1 9 4 6 . General
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L a b r i o l l e , Pierre C h a m p a g n e de, Histoire de la littérature latine chrétienne, 2 n d ed., Paris, 1 9 2 4 . E n g . trans, by H e r b e r t W i l s o n , History and Literature of Christianity from TertulliantoBoethius,NewYoT]t, 1925. La réaction païenne, Paris, 1 9 3 4 . Batiffol, Pierre, Anciennes littératures chrétiennes. La littérature grecque, Paris, 1 8 9 7 . Bardenhewer, O t t o , Geschichte der altkirchlichen Litteratur, V o l . I , F r e i b u r g i m Breisgau, 1 9 5 2 . H a r n a c k , A d o l f v o n , Geschichte der altchristlichen
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Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte ( 3 v o l . ) , F r e i b u r g i m Breisgau, 1 8 8 8 - 9 0 . E n g . trans, of 3 r d G e r . ed. by N e i l B u c h a n a n , History of Dogma, reprinted ( 7 vol. i n 4 ) , N e w Y o r k , 1 9 6 1 . Tixeront,Joseph, Histoire des dogmes ( 3 vol.), Paris, 1 9 0 5 - 1 2 . Puech, A i m é , Les apologistes grecs dur" siècle de notre ère, 1 9 1 2 . C o r b i è r e , Le christianisme et lafin de la philosophie antique, 1 9 2 1 . F a y e , E u g è n e de, Introduction à l'histoire dugnosticisme, Paris, 1 9 0 3 . Gnostiquesetgnosticisme,Fa.ris, 1913. N e w m a n , H . , Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, 1845. MacGeffert, A.C., A History of Christian Thought, 1 9 3 2 - 3 3 . M a r i n Sola, J . , La evolución homogénea del dogma católico, 1 9 2 3 . A m o r R u i b a l , A . , Los problemas fundamentales de lafilosofíay del dogma ( 1 o v o l . ) . Z u b i r i , X a v i e r , " E l ser sobrenatural: Dios y l a d e i f i c a c i ó n en l a t e o l o g í a p a u l i n a , " i n Naturaleza,
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Prat, Origène, Paris, 1 9 0 7 .
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F a y e , E u g è n e de, Origine, sa vie, sonœuvre, sapensée ( 3 v o l . ) , Paris, 1 9 2 3 - 2 9 . Esquisse de la pensée d'Origine, 1 9 2 5 . E n g . trans, by F r e d R o t h w e l l , OrigenandHis Work, N e w Y o r k , 1 9 2 9 . C a d i o u , Introduction au système d'Origène, 1 9 3 2 . K a r r e r , Otto, Augustinus. Das religiöse Leben, 1 9 2 3 . P o r t a l i é , E u g è n e , " Saint Augustin, " in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique ( 1 5 vol. in 2 7 ) , Paris, 1 9 0 9 - 5 0 , col. 2 2 6 8 - 2 4 7 4 . E n g . trans, of article by R a l p h J . B a s t í a n , A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine, C h i c a g o , i 9 6 0 . Gilson, É t i e n n e H e n r i , Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin, 2 n d ed., Paris, 1 9 4 3 . E n g . trans, by L . E . M . L y n c h , The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, New Y o r k , 1 9 6 0 . Troeltsch, E r n s t D . , Augustin,
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E i b l , H a n s , Augustin unddiePatristik, Munich, 1923. Schmaus, Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des hl. Augustinus, 1 9 2 7 . M a u s b a c h , J . Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus (2 vol.), 1 9 0 g . P r z y w a r a , E r i c h (ed.), Die Gestalt als Gefüge, L e i p z i g , i g 3 4 . E n g . trans., An Augustine Synthesis, arranged by Erich Przywara, N e w Y o r k , 1 9 4 5 . Gui tton, J e a n , Le temps et l'éternité chez Plolin et Saint Augustin, Paris, 1 9 3 3 . Wolfson, H a r r y A u s t r y n , The Philosophy oftheChurchFathers, Vol.I, C a m b r i d g e , Mass., 1 9 5 6 . Philo : Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam ( 2 vol.), C a m b r i d g e , Mass., 1 9 4 7 .
V.
MEDIEVAL General
PHILOSOPHY Works
H u i z i n g a , J o h a n ; E n g . trans., The Waning of the Middle Ages ( 1 9 2 4 ) , reprinted New Y o r k , i g 5 4 . T a y l o r , H e n r y Osborn, The Mediaeval Mind, 4 t h ed. ( 2 vol., i g 3 8 ) , reprinted Cambridge, Mass. G r a b m a n n , M a r t i n , Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode ( 2 vol., 1 9 0 9 - 1 1 ) , reprinted G r a z , 1 9 5 7 . Mittelalterliches Geistesleben ( 3 vol.), M u n i c h , 1 9 2 6 - 5 6 . Filosofía medieval (Span, trans., 1 9 2 8 ) . Historiade la teología católica (Span, trans., 1 9 2 8 ) . Wulf, M a u r i c e de, Histoire de la philosophie médiévale, 6 t h ed. ( 2 v o l . ) , L o u v a i n , 1 9 3 4 - 3 6 . E n g . trans, of 6 t h F r e n c h ed. by E r n e s t C . Messenger, History of Mediaeval Philosophy, 3 r d e d . ( 2 vol.), L o n d o n , 1 9 3 5 - 3 8 . Gilson, É t i e n n e H e n r i , Laphilosophie aumoyenâge, 2 n d ed., Paris, 1 9 5 2 . L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale, 2 n d ed., Paris, 1 9 4 4 . E n g . trans, by A . C . H . Downes, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, N e w Y o r k , 1 9 3 6 . HistoryqfChristianPhilosophyintheMiddleAgeSjNewYork, 1955. Dempf, Alois, " Die E t h i k des Mittelalters, " in A . Baeumler and M . S c h r ö t e r (edd.), Mensch und Charakter (Abt. I I I of Handbuch der Philosophie), Munich, 1931.
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M ü n k , Salomon, Mélanges de philosophiejuive et arabe, Paris, 1 8 5 9 . C a r r a de V a u x , Bernard, La doctrine d'Islam ( 2 vol.), Paris, 1 9 0 9 . H o r t e n , M a x Joseph Heinrich, Die Philosophie des Islam in ihren Beziehungen zu den philosophischen Weltanschauungen des westlichen Orients, M u n i c h , 1 9 2 4 . N e u m a r k , D a v i d , Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters ( 2 vol. in 3 ) , Berlin, 1 9 0 7 - 2 8 . AnhangzumerstenBand, Berlin, 1 9 1 3 . C r u z H e r n á n d e z , Miguel, Filosofía hispano-musulmana. Monographs P r a , M a r i o dal, Scoto Eriugena ei il neoplatonismo médiévale, 1 9 4 1 . Dornet de Vorges, E d m o n d Charles E u g è n e , Saint Anselme, Paris, 1 go 1 . K o y r é , Alexandre, L'idée de Dieu dans la philosophie de Saint Anselme, Paris, 1 9 2 3 . Barth, K a r l , Anselms Beweis der Existenz Gottes, 1 9 3 1 . M.arias,Julian,SanAnselmoyelinsensato, Madrid, ig44O t t a v i a n o , Carmelo, " R i c c a r d o di S. V i t t o r e , " Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Atti. Classe discienzemorali, storicheefilologiche, Ser. 6 , V o l . 4 , Fase. 5 , 1 9 3 3 » PP-
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C a r r a de V a u x , Bernard, Avicenne, Paris, 1 9 0 0 . C r u z H e r n á n d e z , Miguel, La metafísica de Avicena, M a d r i d , 1 g 4 g . R e n a n , Ernest, Averroèset l'Averroisme ( 1 8 5 2 ) , Paris, c. 1 9 1 2 . S a l i b ä , J a m ï l (Saliba, D j é m i l ) (ed. & trans.), Étude sur la métaphysique d'Avicenne, Paris, 1 9 2 6 . H o r t e n , M a x Joseph H e i n r i c h , Die Metaphysik des Averroes, H a l l e an der Saale, 1912.
A s í n Palacios, Miguel, El Islam cristianizado, M a d r i d , 1 9 3 1 . Huellas del Islam, M a d r i d , 1 9 4 4 . O r t e g a y Gasset, J o s é , " A b e n j a l d ú n nos revela el secreto," i n El Espectador, V I I I , Madrid, 1937. I b n K h a l d û n , The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History, trans, and intr. by F r a n z Rosenthal ( 3 vol.), N e w Y o r k , 1 9 5 8 . Gaos, J o s é , Lafilosofía de Maimónides, 2 n d ed., Mexico, 1 9 4 0 . G i l s o n , É t i e n n e H e n r i , La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure, Paris, 1 9 2 4 . E n g . trans, by D o m I l l t y d T r e t h o w a n and F . J . Sheed, The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure^onàon, 1938. Baumgartner, Matthias, Santo Tomas ( S p a n , trans., M a d r i d , 1 g 2 5 ) . G r a b m a n n , M a r t i n , Thomas von Aquin. E n g . trans, by V i r g i l M i c h e l , Thomas Aquinas; His Personality and Thought, N e w Y o r k , 1 9 2 8 . Sertillanges, Antonin Gilbert, Saint Thomasd'Aquin ( 2 vol.), Paris, 1 9 1 0 . M a r i t a i n , Jacques, Le docteur angélique, Paris, 1 9 3 0 . E n g . trans, by J . F . S c a n l a n , The Angelic Doctor, N e w Y o r k , 1 9 3 1 . Gilson, É t i e n n e H e n r i , Le thomisme, 5 t h ed., Paris, 1 9 4 4 . E n g . trans, of 3 r d F r e n c h ed. by E d w a r d Bullough, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2 n d ed., St. Louis, i g 3 9 . Another E n g . trans, by L . K . Shook, The ChristianPhilosophyofSt. ThomasAquinas,New York, 1 9 5 6 . M e y e r , H . , Thomas von Aquin, 1 9 3 8 .
Bibliography M a n s e r , G a l l u s M..,Laesencia del tomismo (Span, trans., M a d r i d , 1 9 4 7 ) . A g u i r r e , A . , Rogerio Bacon, Barcelona, 1 9 3 5 . C a r r e r a s y A r t a u , T o m á s and J o a q u í n , Historia de lafilosofía española: Filosofía cristiana de los siglos XIIIal XV, M a d r i d , 1 9 3 9 . L a n d r y , Bernard, DunsScot, 1 9 2 2 . G i l s o n , É t i e n n e H e n r i , Jean Duns Scot, Paris, 1 9 5 2 . L o n g p r é , Laphilosophie du b. Duns Scot, 1 9 2 4 . Heidegger, M a r t i n , Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus, Tübingen, 1916. H a r r i s , C h a r l e s R e g i n a l d Schiller, Duns Scotus ( 2 vol.), Oxford, 1 9 2 7 . A b b a g n a n o , Nicola, Guglielmo di Ockam, 1 9 3 1 . M o o d y , E r n e s t Addison, The Logic ofWilliam of Ockham^ewY ork., 1 9 3 5 . K a r r e r , O t t o (ed.), Meister Eckehart; das System seiner religiösen Lehre und Lebenswahrheit, M u n i c h , 1 9 2 3 . Seeberg, E r i c h , Meister Eckhart, T ü b i n g e n , 1 9 3 4 . M u l l e r - T h y m , B . J . , University ojBeing in M. Eckhart, 1 9 3 9 . VI.
MODERN
PHILOSOPHY
1 . GENERAL WORKS Erdmann, Johann
Eduard,
Versuch
Geschichte der neuern Philosophie
einer wissenschaftlichen
Darstellung
der
( 6 v o l . ) , R i g a and D o r p a t a n d L e i p z i g ,
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Index Terms appearing in Greek characters i n the text are here transliterated and alphabetized according to English order. Abelard, Peter, 148-149 absolute, the, 320, 321, 324, 327-329 absolute knowledge, 319-320, 325, 327, 349 _ absolutism, 252, 273, 281 Academicians, 115, 118 Academy, see Platonic Academy action, 310-311, 345, 385, 389-390 active intellect, 154, 157 activism, see action actuality, 68-69, 71, 78, 135, 156, 448 Adelard of Bath (^Ethelard of Bath), 148 Adeodatus, 114, 115 adikia, 14 Aenesidemus, 96 ^Ethelard of Bath, see Adelard of Bath agäpe, 57, 58 agathön, 74, 80 Agrippa von Nettesheim, 190, 195 Ahrens, Heinrich, 335 Ailly, Pierre d', 183 aisthesis, 23, 79, 288 akousmatikoi, 16 Alaric, 119 Albert of Boilstädt or Cologne, see Albertus Magnus, St. Albert of Saxony, 183 Albertus Magnus, St. (Albert of Boilstädt or Cologne), 134, 158, 160, 164-166, 167, 181 Albigenses, 147, 151-152, 160
A l c a l á de Henares, 193, 205 alchemy, 195, 236 Alcmaeon of Crotón, 18 Alcuin, 127 Alembert, Jean L e Rond d', 263 alétheia, 21, 28, 68, 75, 80, 320, 328, 358, 406, 429, 433, 450 alethés, 68 Alexander, Samuel, 3gg Alexander of Aphrodisias, 74 Alexander the Great, 2, 60, 84, 85, 94 Alexander of Hales, 160, 161 Alexandria, i n Alfarabi, 154 Al-Gazel, 154 alienation, 4, 138-139, 180, 181, 192 Alkindi, 154 Allah, 153 alloiosis, 12 Alltäglichkeit, 431 Amalric of Bena, 152 Ambrose, St., i n , 114, 115 Amiel, Henri Frédéric, 336 Ammonius Saccas, 99 Amyntas I I , 60 analogy, 53, 66, 74, 78, 149, 220, 427 analysis, see judgment, analytic and synthetic anamnesis, 48, 79 Anaxagoras, 31-32, 36, 46, 60 Anaximander, 14-15 Anaximenes, 15 489
490
Index
Andrés, Juan, 270 andría, 54 Andronicus of Rhodes, 62 dneu symplokês, 76 Angelus Silesius (Johannes Schemer), 195 Angst (anguish), 431, 434, 436 Anselm, St., 116, 130, 134, 137, 143¬ 146, 161, 171, 179, 217, 293 Anselm of Laon, 148 anthropological controversy, 111 anthropology, 305, 325, 361, 422, 423, 430 anthropomorphism, 19 Antioch, m Antisthenes, 89 Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius, 91, 93, 94 apathla, 93 dpeiron, 14, 72 apodeixis, 76 apokatástasis pánton, 109 Apollo, 362-363 Apologists, 108, n o , 167, 177 apophainesthai, 429 apóphansis, 76 apóphasis, 76 aporta, 44, 71 aporiai of Zeno, 25 apperception, 240, 242-243 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 2, 116, 129, 132, !34> 135. : 3 8 , 145. '40, 147, 154. 158-159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 166¬ 174, 178, 179 ; see also Thomism Arabic philosophy, 143, 147, 151, 152, 1 53~155, !56> l5&, l 6 = . l 6 5 , 172» '74, 378 Aranguren, J o s é Luis, 443 Arcesilaus, 96 Archytas of Tarentum, 18 areti, 40 Arianism, 111 Aristippus of Cyrene, 89, 90 aristocracy, 36, 84-85, 269 Aristophanes, 41 Aristotelian tradition, 99, 111, 126, 143, 147, 150, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157¬ 159, 160, 162, 163-174, 178, 183, 184, 191, 192, 193, 207, 238, 356, 358, 372, 4 2 5 Aristotle, 2, 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 24, 26, 27, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 43, 52, 53, 57, 58,59-85,87,88,100, 129, 134, 163, 170, 203, 220, 240, 249, 3 ° 2 , 310, 323, 373, 407, 465
arkhê, 13, 14, 65, 323, 324 Arnaldo de Vilanova, see Vilanova, Arnaldo de Arnauld, Angélique, 228 Arnauld, Antoine, 212, 228, 278 Arnobius, n o Arteaga, Esteban de, 270 aseity, 170 Asin Palacios, Miguel, 154 Aspasia, 31 asphdleia, 85 association of ideas, 255, 259, 373 ataraxia, 93 Athanasius, St., 111 atheism, 252, 264, 338, 369, 440-441 Athens, 31-32, 35, 38, 40, 42, 60, 82, 90, 94, 107 Atlantis, 43 dtomoi, 33 atoms, 31-32, 239, 255 Aufklärung, 267-268, 331 Augsburg Confession, 275 Augustine, St., 2, 53, 57-58, m , 112, I X 3 - I S I , 137,
144.
l 6 l
>
l
8
2
, 324,
327
Augustinian tradition, 143, 150, 159, 160,161,164,172, 173, 174,182, 226, 227-228, 406, 416 Austin, John L . , 401 autarchta, 61, 89, 92; see also selfsufficiency authority (sanction), 141, 175, 209, 256, 275 autognosis, 383, 384 Autrecourt, Nicolas d', 182, 183 atixesis, 12 Avempace (Ibn Bajja), 155 Avenarius, Richard, 358 Averroës (Ibn Rushd), 79, 152, 153, 155, ' 5 ° , 157, !79 Averroism, 162, 172, 174, 182, 183, 201 Avicebron (Ibn Gabirol), 156 Avicenna (Ibn Sina), 154, 155, 373 awe, 3-4, 88, 169 Ayer, Alfred Jules, 401 Baader, Franz von, 330 Bacon, Francis, 174, 190, 204, 248¬ 250, 258 Bacon, Roger, 141, 160, 165, 174-175, 177, 247, 249 Baden school, 359 Baghdad, 154 Balmes, Jaime Luciano, 260, 335, 346¬ 347
Index
Bâflez, Domingo, 206, 238 barbarians, 112, 119, 125-126, 127, 142 Barbaro, Ermolao, 192 Basil the Great, St., i n Baumgarten, Alexander, 267 Baumker, Clemens, 174 Baur, Christian, 333 Bayle, Pierre, 262-263 Beauvoir, Simone de, 441 becoming, 27, 315, 321, 322, 328 Bede, St., 127 behaviorism, 398, 402 being, 10, 17, 39, 46, 51, 66-69, 7*. 99, 152, 203, 209, 219-220, 235, 286, 301-305, 320-324, 421-422, 427¬ 442, 455, 457, 458; see also Entity, metaphysics, nothingness Bembo, Pietro, 277 Benedictines, 142, 160, 270 Bentham, Jeremy, 253, 356 Bergson, Henri, 300, 356, 357, 384, 387-389, 391, 396, 422, 462 Berkeley, George, 256-857, 258, 284, 286 Berlin, 237, 267, 307, 316 Bernard, Claude, 355 Bernard of Chartres, 147 Bernard of Clairvaux, St., 151, 161 Bernard of Tours, 152 Bessarion, Cardinal, 192 Biel, Gabriel, 184 biology, 29 bios theoretikâs, 16 Blanshard, Brand, 400 Bloch, Ernst, 338 Blondel, Maurice, 389-390 Boas, George, 400 Boethius, 126 B ö h m e , Jakob, 195 Bologna, 160 Bolzano, Bernhard, 366, 404 Bonald, Louis de, 344, 346 Bonaventure, St. (John of Fidanza), I 3 7 - i 3 8 , 145) »60-163, 164, »77 Bopp, Franz, 331 Bossuet, Jacques Bénigne, 115, 229, 237, 262, 278, 327, 331 Boston, 394 Boutroux, Étienne Émile Marie, 462 Bowne, Borden Parker, 398 Boyle, Robert, 203, 254 Brentano, Franz, 145, 167, 300, 310,
358, 371-377, 378, 384, 403, 4 ° 4 , 409, 418
4SI Brentano's principle, 374-375 Brightman, Edgar Sheffield, 399 British Isles, 127, 140-141, 143, 160, 174, 194, 209, 247-260, 263, 267, 278, 35&-357, 393, 398, 4 ° ° , 4 ° 2 Broad, Charlie Dunbar, 400 Bruno, Giordano, 196, 200-201, 232 Brunswick, Duke of, 236 Buber, Martin, 437-438 Büchner, Friedrich K a r l Christian, 357 Buddhism, 114, 322, 339 Budé (Budaeus), Guillaume, 277 BufTon, Georges, 330 Buridan, Jean, 183 Cabbala, 156, 232 Cajetan, Cardinal, 184 Calkins, Mary Whiton, 399 Calvinism, 193, 266, 277 Cambridge, 159-160 Campanella, Tommaso, 189, 193 Camus, Albert, 441 Cano, Melchor, 206, 238 Capella, Martianus, 126 Cappadocia, 111 caritas, see charity Carnap, Rudolf, 401 Carneades, 96 Carolingian Renaissance, 127, 140, 142 Carranza de Miranda, Bartolomé de, 206 Cartesianism, 192, 224-230, 232, 24g, 250, 261, 262-263, 413, 431; see also Descartes Carthage, 114 Cassiodorus, 127 Cassirer, Ernst, 359, 463 categorical imperative, see imperatives categories, 67-68, 70, 76, 287, 290¬ 292, 4 3 ° Cathari, 147, 151-152 catharsis, 80 Catherine the Great, 264 Catholic dogma, 206, 245; see also Christian dogma Cathrein, Victor, 174 causality (cause and effect), 259, 292, 293-294 causes, 72, 136, 169, 171, 203-204, 257 cave, myth of the, 48-51,56, 249 charity (caritas), 57, 58, 93, 116, 119, 137, 229 Charlemagne, 127, 140 Charles I I I , 270
49¿
Index
Charles I V , 270 Charles the Bald, 140 Charron, Pierre, 193 Chartres, 147-148, 174 Christian brotherhood, 93 Christian doctrine, influence of, 100, 137, l53> !54 Christian doctrine, influences upon, 53, 54, 55, 57, 98, 99- I O O > I o 8 , '47, 157 Christian dogma, 107, 108, m , 115, 129, 152, 167, 168-169, 178, 274¬ 276; see also Catholic dogma, Protestantism Christina, Queen of Sweden, 212 Christological controversy, 111 Chrypffs, Nicholas, see Nicholas of Cusa Chrysippus, 91 Cicero, 91, 97, 108, 114, 115, 120, 192 Cistercian Order, 151 citizen, Greek idea of, 35, 36, 37, 55-56, 83-85 city-state, 54-56, 83-85, 94 Clarke, Samuel, 253-254, 278 Clauberg, Johann, 267 Cleanthes of Assos, 90 Clement I V , Pope, 175 Clement of Alexandria, 108, m coexistence, 431, 449 cogito, cogitatio, 117, 121, 214, 215, 222, 232, 234, 255, 302, 413-414, 4 l 6 > 432, 447 Cohen, Hermann, 299, 359, 442, 463 Coimbra, 205 Collingwood, Robin George, 400 Columbus, Christopher, 183 communication between substances, 218, 233 communication of Ideas, 52, 53 Comte, Auguste, 269-270, 342, 348¬ 354, 355, 379 concept, doctrine of, 311, 320, 328, 329 Condillac, A b b é Étienne Bonnot de, 263-264, 330, 343 Condorcet, Antoine-Nicolas de, 264, 35° Congregation of the Oratory, see Oratory, Congregation of the consciousness, 408-411, 414, 440, 447¬ 449 Cooper, Anthony Ashley, see Shaftesbury Copernicus, Nicholas, 201, 202 . co-plication, 408, 410
Cordova, 154 corsi (cycles), 269 cosmology, 29 cosmopolitanism, 89, 90, 93-94 Council of Lyons, Second, 166 Council of Nicaea, First, n o Council of Trent, 194, 197, 205, 206, 238, 280 Council of Vienna, 172 Counter-Reformation, 113, 184, 194, 197, 206, 275, 278, 280 Courçon, Robert de, 152, 158 Cournot, Antoine Augustin, 356 Cousin, Victor, 345 Creation, the, 100, 106, m , 117, 129, 130, 131-133, 136, 139, 147, Ï5°> 162, 168, 169, 171, 315, 323 creationism, 118 Crockaert, Peter, 184 Cruz Hernández, Miguel, 157 Cudworth, Ralph, 253-254 Cumberland, Richard, 253 Cusanus, Nicolaus, see Nicholas of Cusa Cynics, 40, 82, 87, 89, 90, 92 Cynosarges, 89 Cyprian, St., n o Cyrenaics, 40, 87, 89-90, 94 daimónion, 38 Dante Alighieri, 155, 192 Darwin, Charles, 336, 357 Dasein, 427-435 David of Dinant, 152 death, 381, 386, 391, 433~434 definition, 39, 45 D e g é r a n d o , Joseph Marie, 344 deism, 141, 148, 252-254, 262, 278 Deity, see God deloûn, 429 Demiurge, 54 democracy, 35, 36, 84-85, 266 Democritus, 33-34, 95 Denys the Carthusian, 183, 190 Descartes, R e n é , 2, 117, 121, 145, 160, I 97, 200, 203, 208, 210-223, 232, 234, 238, 239, 240, 241, 244, 2 5 ° , 273, 274, 277, 278, 279, 283, 285, 286, 293, 302, 310, 346, 366, 411, 446; see also Cartesianism Destutt de Tracy, Count Antoine Louis Claude, 264, 344 determinism, 92, 234, 251, 282 Dewey, John, 3 9 Í Diadochi, 85
Index
dialectic, 24, 43, 288, 320-323, 337 didnoia, 82 diaphonia ton doxon, 96 Diderot, Denis, 263 Diez del Corral, Luis, 443 dikaiosyne, 55 dilectio, 57, 144 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 3, 265, 300, 358, 371, 378-384, 432 Diogenes of Sinope, 89 Dion, 42 Dionysius, 42 Dionysius the Areopagite, see PseudoDionysius Dionysus, 16, 54, 362-363 divine law, see law divine will, see will of God dogmatism, 246, 286, 293, 305 Dominic, St. (Domingo de G u z m ä n ) , 151, 160, 206 Dominicans, 151, 159, 160, 164, 166, 173, 181, 200, 206 Donoso Cortes, Juan, 347 double truth, doctrine of, 155, 174, 179, 183, 201 doxa, 22, 23, 37, 50, 96 dualism, 147, 151, 240, 387 Duns Scotus, John, 135-136, 138, 145, 160, 163, 178-179, 2 ° 7 , 245, 247 Dürkheim, Emile, 355 dynamis, 68 dynamism, 221, 238-239, 311 Dyroff, A . , 174 Eastern Church, 121, 276 Eckhart, Meister, 137, 150, 160, 181¬ 182, 195, 197, 199, 277 eclecticism, 97, 108, 344, 345 Ecphantus, 18 ecstasy, 99, 162 Edict of Nantes, 277 education, 55-56, 266 ego, 117, 121, 215, 217-219, 222-223, 258-259, 286, 294, 295, 301, 302, 304, 308-312, 314, 339, 345, 410, 413-415, 447-449 Ehrenfels, Christian von, 418, 419 eidetic reduction, 410-411 eidola, 34, g5 eidos, 32, 46, 57, 70, 411 etnai, 302 Einstein, Albert, 202 Eleatic school, 19-25, 37, 38, 77, 168, 454, 457
493 elements, 30, 31, 92 Elizabeth, Princess Palatine, 212, 213 emanation, 99, too, 109, 111, 141, 152 Emerson. R a l p h Waldo, 393 Empedocles, 29-31, 32 empeiria, 63 empiricism, 141, 159, 204, 209, 244, 247-283, 372-374, 377 encyclopedias, 126, 127, 158, 263 Encyclopedists, 258, 263, 265, 266, 280-281 ene'rgeia, 65, 68, 69 Engels, Friedrich, 336, 337 England, see British Isles English revolution, second, 252, 254, 256 Enlightenment, 141, 248, 253, 254, 258, 261-271, 272, 276, 331; see also Aufklärung ens (ab alio, a se, etc.), 131, 132, 137, 170, 179, 209, 242, 302-303, 421 entelechy, 6g, 78 entelékheia, 68 Entity, 20-28, 30, 32, 33, 37, 38, 44, 47, 48, 52, 53, 63-67, 70, 71, 73-74, 78, 82, 132, 138, 141, 150, 168, 170, 171, 293 Entschlossenheit, 434 eón, see ón epagogé, 76 Epictetus, gi Epicureanism, 2, 40, 90, 94-96, 115 Epicurus, 88, 94~95 epistéme, 63, 64 epistemology, see knowledge epokhé, 96, 409-410, 412, 413, 416, 448 Erasmus of Rotterdam, 194-195, 277 ernstes, 57 érgon, 65 Erigena, J o h n Scotus, 140-142, 394 éros, 48, 57 Erschlossenheit, 431, 432 essence, 17, 39, 40, 45, 74, 77, 328, 374, 377, 4 ° 7 , 4 ° 9 , 4 I O " 4 1 1 , 4 1 2 , 4 ' 3 , 423 estheticism, 254 esthetics, 80, 267-268, 288 Estienne, Henri (Stephanus), 193 eternal return, g2, 363 eternity of the world, 155, 162, 174, 183 ethics, 39-40, 54-56, 80-82, 86, 93, iog, 118, i19, 168, 172-173, 234¬ 235, 255-256, 287, 293-296, 309, 310, 326, 335,340,375-377, 457-45 8
494
Index
Eucharist, 129, 168 Eucken, Rudolf Christoph, 422 Euclid, 17, 101 eudaimonia, 35, 80, 89 Eugene of Savoy, Prince, 237 Europe, development of, 126, 140-141, 143,' 146 Euthydemus, 37 evil, 109, 175, 244-246, 280 evolution, biological, 314, 315, 357 evolutionism, 356-357 existentialism, 343, 384, 423, 428, 435¬ 441 existentials, 430 experience, 175, 260, 288, 289, 290, 292, 3 ° 4 , 373, 4 ° 5 , 4°9> 4'3 extension and thought, 221, 232, 233, 238, 239, 241, 286 Eyck, van, Hubert (Huybrecht) and Jan, 190 fact, 243, 344 faith, 116, 130, 137, 138, 144-146, 162 Faraday, Michael, 330 Fates, 93 Fathers of the Church, see Patristic thought Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 358 Feijoo, Benito J e r ó n i m o , 270 Fénelon, François de Salignac de la Mothe-, 229-230 Ferdinand I I of Aragon (the Catholic), 191, 273 Ferdinand V I , 270 Ferdinand V I I , 270 Ferrater Mora, J o s é (Josep), 443, 467¬ 468 fetishism, 349 feudalism, 279 Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas, 336 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 299, 307-312, 3i3>3i4 Ficino, Marsilio, 192 Filmer, Sir Robert, 252, 256 Florence, 191, 192 Fonseca, Petrus de, 206 Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier de, 224, 282 Forbes, Charles, see Montalembert, Comte de form, 70-72, 135, 172, 386 Fouillée, Alfred, 356 Foulques, Guy, 175 founding, see co-plication
Fourier, François Marie Charles, 346 France, 140, 141, 143, 147, 151, 183, 189, 193-194. 211, 224-230, 237, 250, 260, 262-267, 275, 277, 279, 355-356 Francis of Assisi, St., 160, 190 Franciscans, 135, 159, 160, 161, 163, 173, 174. 175, '77, '78, 180, 181, 190 Franck, Sebastian, 195 Francke, August Hermann, 268 Frederick I I (the Great), 264, 267 Frederick V , 211 freedom, 18, 252, 308, 314, 315, 316, 327. 328, 433, 457-458; see also free will, determinism freedom of religious interpretation, 274-275 free will, 84, 92, 119, 234-235, 245¬ 246, 251, 255-256, 293-294, 296, 306 Freiheit zum Tode, 434 French Revolution, 222, 262, 267, 270, 276, 279, 280-281, 346 Friars Minor, see Franciscans Fröbes, J . , 174 Fronde, the, 279 Fulbert of Chartres, 147 Fulda, 127 Galileo Galilei, 136, 160, 202, 203, 204, 250» 277, 278 Gallican Church, 277-278 Galvani, Luigi, 330 Gaos, J o s é , 443, 466-467 G a r c í a Morente, Manuel, see Morente, Manuel Garcia Garagorri, Paulino, 443 Gassendi, Pierre, 203, 212 Gaunilo, 144, 145 Gautier of Mortagne, see Walter of Mortagne generationism, 118 Genesis, 105, 137, 164 génesis, 12 genus and species, 53, 57, 70, 73, 133, 134. '35, '42, '47, 148, 170, '72, 406, 427 Gerard of Cremona, 158 Gerbert of Aurillac (Pope Sylvester I I ) , 142-143 Germanic invasions, tribes, see barbarians German school of history, 331, 332 Germany, 141, 183, 195, 267-268, 283, 284-340, 357-359
Index
Gerson, Jean, 183, 190 Geulincx, Arnold, 225 Geworfenheit, 431, 434 gignesthai, 322 Gilbert de la Porrée (Gilbert Porre¬ tanus), 147 Gilson, Étienne, 174, 183, 402 Gioberti, Vincenzo, 226, 366-367 gnosis, 109, n i Gnosticism, 109-110, n i , 114 gnôthi seautôn, 39, 416 God, ancient ideas of, 53, 64, 65, 66, 69, 71, 72-73, 83, 92, 93, 99, 100, 168 God, Christian and subsequent ideas of, 106, 116-117, 119, 121, 131, 132, 133, 135, ! 3 7 , !38, 139, i 4 I - I 4 2 , : 5 2 , 157-158, 161, 163-164, 169¬ 170, 172-173, 180, 181, 197-199, 201,
209,
2I6-22I,
226,
229,
232¬
234, 235, 241-242, 245-246, 257, a l 3 ° 3 , 323, 332, 369, 465; *° ontological argument God, existence of, 144, 150, 168, 169, 170, 216-218, 227, 234, 292, 377; see also ontological argument God, loss of, 180, 181, 246, 280, 281¬ 283 Gôdel, K u r t , 401 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 211,331 Gomez Pereira, ig4 Good, the, 52-53, 54, 57, 74, 80-81, 99, 421 Gorgias, 37-38 grace, 161, 178, 192, 280 Graciân, Baltasar, 339 Granell, Manuel, 443 Gratry, Father, 145, 358, 368-370 great year, 92 Gregory of Nazianzus, St., m Gregory of Nyssa, St., i n Gregory I X , Pope, 158 Gregory X , Pope, 166 Grosseteste, Robert, 158, 174 Grotius, Hugo, 206, 208, 278 Guizot, François, 275, 346 Gundisalvus, Dominicus (Gundissalinus), 158, 176 Guyau, Marie Jean, 356 Guyon, Jeanne Marie, 229 gymnasia, 49 Haeckel, Ernst Heinrich, 357 Halevy, Judah, 156 Halle, 267
49J
Hanover, 236, 237 happiness, 81, 89, 92 Hardenberg, Friedrich von, see Novalis harmony, pre-established, 240-241 Hartmann, Eduard von, 358 Hartmann, Nicolai, 418, 423-424 Hazard, Paul, 262, 282 Hebrew philosophy, see Jewish philosophy hedoné, 80 Hegel, Georg, 115, 145, 198, 199, 229, 275, 296, 299, 305, 313, 314, 315, 3 ' ° , 317-329, 332, 336, 337, 357, 372, 461 Heidegger, Martin, 48, 298, 300, 384, 402, 403, 404, 406, 425-436, 439, 464, 467 heimarme'ne, g2 Heine, Heinrich, 331 Héloïse, 148 Helvétius, Claude-Adrien, 264 hén, 26 Hendel, Charles W . , 400 henizein, 20 Henry V I I I , 194 Heraclitus, 27-29, 32, 92, 322, 363, 454 Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 334-335 Herbert of Cherbury, Edward, 253 Hercules, 268 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 268, 331, 333 heresy, 107, 109-110, m , 112, 113, 147, 151-152 hermeneutics, 381, 383, 384, 429 Hertling, Georg von, 174 H e r v â s y Panduro, Lorenzo, 270 Hesiod, 12, 83 he'xis, 65 Hippasus of Metapontum, 17 Hippias, 37 historical Pyrrhonism, 213 historicism, 377, 380-384, 412 history, 5-6, 80, 92, 121, 126, 180, 189, 265, 268-270, 272-273, 283, 326¬ 327, 331-332, 349-350, 453-454, 458-461 history of philosophy, 4—5, 175, 185, 3i8, 329, 382 Hobbes, Thomas, 189, 212, 232, 250¬ 252, 253, 256 Hocking, William Ernest, 399 Hohenheim, Theophrastus von, see Paracelsus, Philippus Aureolus Holbach, Paul-Henri, 263, 264
496
Index
Hölderlin, Friedrich, 313, 317, 331 Holkot, Robert, 182 Holland, see Netherlands Holy Roman Empire, 180, 189 Homer, 268 homoiomereiai, 31-32, 46 Hugh of St. Victor, 149-150 humanism, 184, 190, 191, 192-195, 200, 277, 398 Humboldt, Alexander, 331 Humboldt, Wilhelm, 331 Hume, David, 255, 258-259, 284, 286, 404 Husserl, Edmund, 3, 48, 300, 366, 374, 375, 384, 4 3 - 4 i 7 , 422, 425> 439, 440, 447-448, 467 Hutcheson, Francis, 278 Huygens, Christian, 203 Hyginus, 432 hyle, 70, 409 hylomorphic, 70 hylozoism, 14 hypokeimenon, 69 0
Iamblichus, 100-101 Ibn Bajja, see Avempace Ibn Gabirol, see Avicebron Ibn Khaldun, 157 Ibn Rushd, see Averroës Ibn Sina, see Avicenna I b n Tufail, 155 Ibn Zaddik, 156 idia, 46, 57 ideal being and objects, 404-406, 407 idealism, 121, 200, 208, 210-246, 247, 257, 259, 268, 283, 284-340, 342, 365, 372, 3 8 3, 404, 4 ° 9 , 4 I O - 4 " , 413, 432, 446-449 ideas, 255, 257, 258, 259, 286, 302 Ideas, doctrine of, 39, 43-48, 4g, 50, 5!-53, 54, 57, 7 ° , 7 1 , 79, 89, 99, 117, ! 3 6 , '37, '47, 181, 198, 240, 293, 297, 324, 328 identity, 314, 315, 322, 323, 324, 325 ideologists, 343 idéologues, 264 idols, 249 Ignatius of Loyola, St., 206 Immaculate Conception, 178, 245 immanence, 152, 286 immortality, 18, 35, 54, 79, 155, 168, 172,183,235,391 imperatives (categorical, logical, moral), 40, 293-294, 295, 308, 375
impletion, 407 implication, 408 independence, see self-sufficiency In-der-Welt-sein, 430 individuation, 134-135, 136, 167, 172, 208, 406 inductive method, 39, 204-205, 248¬ 250 infinite, the, 198, 199-200, 201, 220 innatism, 243-244, 255 inner man, 116, 117, 121, 161 Innocent I I I , Pope, 159 Inquisition, 160, 200, 202, 225, 275 instinct, 388 instrumentalism, 397 integrationism, 468 intellectual life, 276-279, 281 intentionality, 154, 310, 373-374, 377, 384, 405, 407, 409, 413-415, 433, 448 interiority, 121, 325 intuition, 289-290, 311-312, 315, 322, 367, 377, 388-389, 407, 411, 423 Ionia, 11,13 Ireland, see British Isles Irenaeus, St., i i o - i n irenic negotiations, 229 irrationalism, 389, 391, 396, 397, 452 Isabella I (the Catholic), 273 Isidore of Seville, St., 126, 127 Italic school, 15 Italy, 126, 141, 174, 192-193, 273 Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 330, 333 James I , 207 James I I , 254 James, William, 391, 394, 395, 396-397 Jansen, Cornells (Jansenius), 227-228 Jansenists, 227-228, 238 Jansenius, see Jansen, Cornells J â s c h e , Gottlob Benjamin, 285 Jaspers, K a r l , 435, 436-437 Jean of Jandun, 183 Jena, 307, 313 Jesuits, 197, 206, 207, 211, 212, 228, 270 Jewish philosophy, 147, 152, 153, 155¬ 157, 158, 165, 232, 437 Joachim of Flora, 152 Jobit, Pierre, 336 Johannes Hispanus, 158 John of the Cross, St., 194 John of Fidanza, see Bonaventure, St. John of Salisbury, 147, 148
Index
John. X X I , Pope, see Petrus Hispanus John X X I I , Pope, 180 Jouffroy, Théodore, 345 John, St., 57, 75, 107, 137, 138, 227 Jovellanos, Gaspar Melchor de, 271 Judaeo-Christian thought, 100, 153 judgment, analytic and synthetic, 204, 205, 243, 288-292, 293, 376, 407-408 Julian the Apostate, 1 o 1 justice, 54-55, 5 ° Justinian, 42, 97 Justin Martyr, St., 110 kalbs k'agathos, 35 Kant, Immanuel, 3, 145, 203, 243, 255, 259, 267, 283, 284-306, 307, 308-311, 325, 329, 358, 383, 387, 408,411,423,437 Kantianism, see neo-Kantianism katà symbebekôs, 67 katà symplokén, 76 katdphasis, 76 katK auto, 67 kathêkon, 93 katôrthoma, 93 Kempis, Thomas à, see Thomas à Kempis kenôn, 78 Kepler, Johann, 202 khrémata, 37 khronos, 78 Kierkegaard, Soren, 300, 361, 391, 3g6, 43!, 436 Kilwardby, Robert, 173 kinesis, 12, 64 knowledge, 1-3, 33-34, 39, 40, 45, 47¬ 48, 5 1 , 56-58, 62-63, 65, 72, 76-77, 87, 88, 91, 116, 136, 139, 161-162, 168-169, ' 7 ° , 173, 175, 198, 200, 203-204, 235, 255, 259, 286-296, 300-302, 312, 319-320, 350, 454-455 koinai énnoiai, 91 koinonia, 52, 53, 82 kôme, 83 Koran, 154, 155 kosmopolites, 89 Krause, K a r l , 330, 335, 336 Krebs, Nicholas, see Nicholas of Cusa Lacordaire, Jean Baptiste Henri, 346 Lactantius, 110 L a i n Entralgo, Pedro, 443 Lamarck, Jean Baptiste Pierre, 330,356 Lamennais, Félicité Robert de, 346 L a Mettrie, Julien de, 264
497
Lange, Friedrich Albert, 379 Langer, Suzanne K . , 401 language, 83 Laromiguière, Pierre, 344 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 336, 337 Latin Averroism, see Averroism Lavelle, Louis, 439 law, 92, 118-119, 138, 173, 251, 256, 265, 269, 278 Leclerc, Jean, 267 légein, 75 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 145, 160, 177, '79, '97, 9 9 , 200, 201, 203, 208, 221, 229, 236-246, 254, 257, 267, 277, 278, 283, 289, 309, 334, 346, 366, 372, 404, 415, 462 Leo X I I I , Pope, 173 Leonhardi, Hermann K a r l , 335 Le Senne, R e n é , 439 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 268 Leucippus, 33 Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien, 355 Lewis, Clarence Irving, 401 Liebmann, Otto, 359 linguistic analysis, 400, 401 Lissarrague, Salvador, 443 Littré, Maximilien Paul Émile, 355 Llull, R a m ó n , see Lullus, Raimundus Locke, John, 237, 244, 252, 254-256, 284, 373 logic, 61, 74-77, 244, 249, 320-323, 405 logical positivism, 401 logos, 10, 30, 74, 75-76, 83, 136, 137, 138, 178, 320, 429, 453 logos apophantikós, 76 logos spermatikós, 92 Lombard, Peter, see Peter Lombard López-Morillas, Juan, 336 Lotze, Rudolf Hermann, 358, 418 Louis X I , 191 love, 30, 48, 56-58, 116, 119, 179, 235, J
376-377, 4 i 8 Lovejoy, Arthur O . , 400 Lucretius, 29, 95 Ludwig of Bavaria, Emperor, 180 Lukács, Gyôrgy, 338 Lukasiewicz, Jan, 401 Lullus (Lull, Lully), Raimundus (Raymond), 176-177, 201, 244 Luther, Martin, 118, 182, 184, 195,274 Lyceum, 60, 61, 87 Macedonia, 60, 85 Mach, Ernst, 358
498
Index
Machiavelli, Niccolô, 193, 273 Madrid; School of Madrid, 443, 462¬ 468 maieutiké, 38 Maimonides, Moses (Moses ben M a i m ó n ) , 156-157, 232 Maine de Biran, 344-345, 432 Maistre, Comte Joseph de, 344, 346 Malebranche, Nicolas de, 221, 224¬ 227, 233, 241, 257, 367, 368 Manes, 114 mania, 17 Manichaeism, i n , 114 Maravall, J o s é A . , 443 Marburg school, 359 Marcel, Gabriel, 398, 435, 436, 437, 438-439 Marcus Aurelius, see Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius Maréchal, Father, 174 M a r í a s , J u l i á n , 443 Maritain, Jacques, 174, 402, 435 Martin, Peter, 166 Martinez, Martin, 270 Marty, Anton, 404 Marx, K a r l , 336, 337-338 Marxism, 338, 439, 441 materialism, 33, 92, 99, 152, 263-264, 337. 338, 357 mathematics, 13, 17-19, 101, 136, 139, 159, 160, 161, 175, 181, 190, 198, 202, 203, 221, 236, 244, 250, 290; see also physics, natural sciences mathematikoi, 16 matter, 70-72, 135, 147, 154, 155, 172, 179. 257, 264, 292, 388, 409, 421 Matthew of Aquasparta, 162 Maurice of Nassau, 211 Maurice of Spain (Mauritius Hispanus), •52 Maurus, Rabanus, 127 Mausbach, J , , 120 Maximilian of Bavaria, 211 Mazarin, Jules, 279 Mazdaism, 114 meanings, 374, 406-407 Medici, Cosimo de', 192 Medina Sidonia, Duke of, 279 Meinong, Alexius, 404, 418, 419 Melanchthon, Philip, 195 Melissus, 19, 25 Mendelssohn, Moses, 333 Menéndez y Pelayo, Marcelino, 260 Mercier, Cardinal, 174
Merinero, Juan de, 184 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 441 mesóles, 82 metaphysical optimism, 244—245 metaphysics, 62, 64-74, 86, 98, 116, 129, 131, 133, 139, 142, 145, 170¬ 172, 179. '82, 192, 196, 199-200, 205, 207-209, 210, 215, 223, 232¬ 234, 238-242, 257, 267, 283, 286¬ 298, 300, 305-306, 308-311, 315, 344-345, 352, 365-370, 377. 4 ° 6 , 411, 416, 423; see also being, Entity metaxy, 56, 57 metempsychosis, see transmigration méthexis, 52, 71 métron, 82 Miletus (Milesian school), 11-15, 17 Mill, John Stuart, 253, 356 modes of being, 67-69, 70, 72, 74, 168, 323. 428, 430, 432 Mohammed, 153 Moleschott, Jacob, 357 Molina, Luis de (Molinism), 206, 238, 245 Molinos, Miguel de, 229 Mommsen, Theodor, 331 monads, theory of, 200, 201, 239-243, 245, 334, 4 I 4 " 4 I 6 monarchy, 84-85, 173, 193, 252, 256, 265, 269, 273, 279, 281 monis, 239 Monica, St., 113, 114, 115 monism, 152, 241 monotheism, 19, 32, 151, 349 Montaigne, Michel de, 176, 193 Montalembert, Comte de, 346 Montesquieu, Baron (Charles de Secondat), 263, 264, 265 Moore, George Edward, 400 Mora, J o s é Ferrater, see Ferrater Mora, José morality, 294-296, 305-306, 326, 363¬ 364 Morcillo, Sebastián Fox, 194 More, Thomas, 194, 277 Morente, Manuel Garcia, 443, 462¬ 463, 466 morphé, 46, 70, 409 Morris, Charles W . , 401 Moses ben M a i m ó n , see Maimonides, Moses Moslem philosophy, see Arabic philosophy
Index
motion, io, 12-13, 22, 23, 24-25, 26¬ 33, 47, 64, 69, 70, 71-72, 77, 78, I 0 5 , 131, 136, 142, 155, 171, 203-204, 239, 240, 323, 361, 388, 389 Mounier, Emmanuel, 439 movement of being, 320, 321, 322 multiplicity, 10, 12, 13, 22, 25, 26, 29, 30-31, 7 1 , 99, 240 mysticism, 100, 121, 141, 147, 149, 150, 151, 161-162, 181-182, 183-184, 189-190, 195, 197, 274 Natorp, Paul, 299, 359, 463 natural law, see law natural morality and religion, see deism natural sciences, 141, 160, 165, 174, 175, 181, 183, 193, 195, 201-205, 222, 278, 314-315, 330, 35 r -353, 388, 412-413; see also physics, mathematics naturalism, 250, 252, 265, 266, 278, 281, 412 nature, 10, 12, 64, 66, 70, 72, 77-78, 84, 89, 92, 136, 139, 141-142, 161, 178, 190, 192, 201-205, 233, 234, 240, 277-278, 280, 283, 293-294, 314-315, 323-324, 383 neikos, 30 neo-Kantianism, 299—300, 311, 339, 358-359, 379, 4 ° 4 , 446, 463 Neoplatonism, 53, 87, 98-101, 108, 109, i n , 132, 141, 147, 152, 153, 154, 156; see also Platonic tradition neo-Pythagoreanism, 16, 17 neo-Thomism, see Thomism Nero, 91 Nestorianism, i n Netherlands, 183, 194-195, 212, 278 Neurath, Otto, 401 Newton, Isaac, 160, 203, 205, 236, 284 Nicholas of Gusa (Nicolaus Cusanus, Nicholas Krebs), 182, 190, 195, 196, 197-200, 201 Nicole, Pierre, 228 Nicomachus (father of Aristotle), 60 Nicomachus (son of Aristotle), 60, 80 Niebuhr, Barthold Georg, 331 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 92, 300, 362-364, 386, 396 nihility, see nothingness nirvana, 340 nöema, 409 no'esis, 65, 73, 409 ndesis noeseos, 83
499 nominalism, 132, 133, 134, ^ - H S , 138, 139, H 3 , !59, 161, 178, 180, 182, 183, 190, 196, 201, 250, 257, 259 nômos, 23, 82, 93 nothingness, 105-106, i n , 117, 131, 137, 147. l 8 i , 315, 321-323, 328, 390, 431 nous, 20-23, 28, 31, 32, 36, 48, 50, 63, 77, 79, 82, 99, 373 nous poietiko's, 79 Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), 313, 331 6
Occam, see William of Occam Occamism, 182-183, 184, 203, 232, 249 occasionalism, 225-227, 241 Odon of Tournai, 143 Ogden, G. K . , 401 oikia, 83 Olivi, Petrus Johannis (Pierre Olieu), 163 O l l é - L a p r u n e , Léon, 389 omnipotence, 138 ön (eon), 20-24, 26, 28, 33, 37, 47, 64, 67, 74, 302, 320; see also Entity One, the, 53, 74, 82, 99, 312 onoma, 76 ontological argument, 145-146, 162, 171, 179, 217, 221, 242, 283, 293, 304-305, 329, 367; see also God, existence of ontology, 20, 21, 23-24, 50, 66, 86, 130, 132, 220, 240, 260, 323, 416, 428, 429; see also being, Entity, metaphysics opinion, see doxa optimism, 280, 281 Oratory, Congregation of the, 224, 225, 368 Oresmus, Nicholas, 183 ôrganon, 249 Origen, 111 original sin, n o , 118, 134, 143, 266, 280 Orphic mysteries, 16, 17, 54 Ors, Eugenio (Eugeni) d', 467 Ortega y Gasset, José, 2, 3, 9, 40, 52, 120, 204, 211, 215, 223, 256, 265, 274, 277, 281, 290, 297, 298, 300, 302, 309, 321, 327, 335, 359, 383, 384, 389, 402, 408, 417, 421, 440, 442-462, 463, 464, 466, 467, 468
Index
Ostwald, Wilhelm, 357 ousia, 64, 69, 70, 240, 324 Oxford, 159, 173, 174, 250
Philolaus of Crotón, 18 philosophia, 17, 65 philosophy of action, see action philosophy of caution, 213 paganism, 107, 108, 112, 120 philosophy of history, 115, 116, 119, paideia, 37 327 Painted Portico, go philosophy of life, 378-392, 435 pân, 323 philosophy, meaning of, 1-6, 56-58, Panaetius of Rhodes, 91 169, 175 panentheism, 335 philosophy, origin of, 3-4, 9-13, 169 panspermia, 31 Philostratus, 36 pantheism, 99, 100, 142, 147, 152, 181, phoné, 83 195, '99, 201, 2 3 3 , 3>5> 316, 322¬ phoné semantiké, 76, 407 323, 422 phorá, 12, 33 Paracelsus, Philippus Aureolus (Theophós, 429 phrastus von Hohenheim), 195 phrónesis, 54, 55 Paris, 136, 147, 149, 152, 158, 159, 160, phthisis, 12 164, 166, 173, 175, 205, 277, 347, phthorá, 12 Parmenides, 19-25, 26-33, 37, 38, 44, physics, 12, 24, 72, 77-78, 92, 136, 139, 45, 48, 5 ° , 52, 7', 168, 210, 286, 322 159, 160, 161, 168, 175, 183, 196, participation, see mêthexis 201-205, 239, 284; see also natural Pascal, Blaise, 228-229 sciences, mathematics Patricius, 113 physiológoi, 12 Patristic thought, 100, 107-112, 118, physis, 12, 14, 28, 33, 35, 70, 77, 78, 127, 128, 12g, 143, 144, 167, 228 92, 192, 323, 324 Paul, St., 57, 107, 324, 367, 36g Pico della M i r á n d o l a , 192 Peckham, John, 163, 173 Pietism, 268, 284, 330 Peirce, Charles Sanders, 394-396 Piquer, Andrés, 270 Pelagianism, i n pístis, I I I perception, 242-243, 255, 257, 258¬ Planck, Max, 202 259, 375, 4 ° 9 - 4 ! ° > 421; see also Plato, 20, 26, 32, 36, 37, 38, 40-41, 42¬ sensory perception 58, 7 1 , 73, 88, 89, gg, 101, 108, i n , Perez y Lopez, Antonio Xavier, 270 116, 1 g 1, 240, 24g, 2g7, 323-324,411 Pericles, 31 Platonic Academy, 17, 42, 60, 87, g i , Peripatetics, 60 g7; see also Academicians Perry, Ralph Barton, 397 Platonic Academy of Florence, see personalism; 398-399, 439 Florence perspective, 32, 46 Platonic tradition, 147, 159, 160, 164, perspectivism, 450 '72, 173, 174, 192, 193, 257, 406; Peter of Ibernia, 166 see also Neoplatonism Peter Lombard, 128, 151, 161 Plotinus, 98-100, 115 Petrarch, 190, 192 pluralism, 239 Petrus Hispanus (Pope John X X I ) , 176 Plutarch, 97 phainômenon, 42g pneúma, 324 phantasia kataleptiké, 91 poiesis, 61, 65, 81 phenomenological reduction, see epokhé polis, 55, 83, 84, 94 phenomenology, 244, 300, 343, 372, politeia, 55, 85 polites, 35 374, 383, 384, 402, 4 ° 3 - 4 I 7 , 423, politics and society, 35, 36, 37, 43, 54¬ 425, 428-429, 447-448 56, 82-85, 119, 173, 189, 193, 251¬ philia, 30, 57, 58 252, 256, 265, 266-267, 272-274, Philip I I , 273 Philip I V , 27g 276-281, 326, 337-338, 350-351, Philip of Macedonia, 60 459-461 Philo of Alexandria, 97, 10g, 111 Polygnotus, 90
Index
polytheism, 349 Pomponazzi, Pietro, 192 Porphyry, 98, 100, 115, 126 Porretanus, Gilbert, see Gilbert de la Porrée Port-Royal, 228, 238, 345 Portugal, 193, 205, 206 Posidonius, 91 positivism, 300, 340, 342-343, 346, 348¬ 359, 365, 372, 379, 383, 413 potentiality, 10, 68-69, 7 1 , 78, 156 practical reason, 293-296, 305, 306, 308 prdgmata, 23 pragmaticism, 397 pragmatism, 248, 389, 393-398 praxis, 61, 65, 82, 138, 287, 296 Preachers, Order of, see Dominicans pre-Socratics, 11-34, 84 pre-tension, 457 prime mover, 72-73, 78, 155, 168 Proclus, 101 Prodicus, 37 Protagoras, 31, 37 prête ousia, 134, 302 Protestantism, 118, 184, 195, 209, 274¬ 276, 280 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph, 336, 346 providence, 92, 157 Pseudo-Dionysius (Dionysius the Areopagite), 101, 141 pseûdos, 68 psychologism, 404-405, 412, 433 psychology, 54, 235, 255, 325, 373~375, 381 psykhé, 78 ptöseis toû éntos, 67 pure reason, 287, 288 pyr tekhnikon, 92 Pyrrho, 96 Pythagoras, 15-16 Pythagoreanism, 16-17, 54 quadrivium, 126, 127, 150, 166 quietism, 229 Quine, Willard van O . , 401 Raimundo, 158 Raimundo de Sabunde (Sabiuda, Raymond Sebond), 176 R a m é e , Pierre de la (Petrus Ramus), 193, 277 Ranke, Leopold von, 331 ratio, 118, 198, 453
JO I rationalism, 189, 222-223, 231, 237— 238, 240, 242, 246, 247, 250, 261, 268, 273-274, 277, 280, 281, 284, 285-286, 304, 365, 452 R a u h , Frédéric, 462 Ravaisson-Mollien, Jean Gaspard Félix, 356, 358 real duration, see time realism, 133-134, 142, 143, 147, 148, 172, 222, 286, 304, 334, 432, 446-447 reality, 48-51, 133, 135, 218, 222-223, 310-311, 342, 432, 447, 448, 450-452 real predicate, 23, 293, 303, 304 reason, 12, 47, 50, 92, 136-139, 141, 144-146, 162, 169, 175, 189, 215, 219-220, 222-223, 226, 228-229, 235, 243, 259, 263, 281, 287-296, 383-384, 38g, 391 ; see also practical reason, pure reason, vital reason R e c a s é n s Siches, Luis, 443 Reformation, 113, 182, 190, 193, 195, 197, 267, 274-276, 277, 280, 281 regalism, 279 Reginald of Piperno, 166 Reichenbach, Hans, 401 Reid, Thomas, 259-260, 345 reincarnation, see transmigration Reinhardt, K a r l , 20 relativism, 350, 354, 405 Renaissance, 91-92, 148, 161, 174, 179, 181, 183, 184, 189-209, 238, 249, 273, 280, 281 Renaissance man, 139, 192, 195, 277 Renan, Ernest, 355, 379 Renouvier, Charles Bernard, 356 Reuchlin, Johann, 195 revelation, 117, 132, 138, 141, 162, 168-169, 171 rhéma, 76 Ricardus de Mediavilla (Richard of Middleton), 163, 173 Richard of St. Victor, 150 Richards, I . A., 401 Rickert, Heinrich, 359, 418 R ö d e r , K a r l David August, 335 Rodriguez Huéscar, Antonio, 443 Roland of Cremona, 160 R o m a n Empire, 94, 112, 119, 125, 327 Romanticism, 141, 330, 331 Rome, 91, 143, 191, 205 roots, the four, see elements Roscellinus of Compiègne, 134, 143, 148, 149 Rosmini-Serbati, Antonio, 226,366-367
JOZ
Index
Ross, W . D., 60 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 363, 264, 265¬ 267, 268, 278, 279, 280 Rouvroy, Claude Henri de, see SaintSimon Royce, Josiah, 398 Royer-Collard, Pierre Paul, 260, 345 Russell, Bertrand, 399, 400, 401 Ruysbroeck, J a n van, 190 Ryle, Gilbert, 401 Sabiuda, see Raimundo de Sabunde Saint-Simon (Claude Henri de Rouvroy), 346, 348 Salamanca, 205, 206 S a l m e r ó n , Alfonso, 206 S á n c h e z , Francisco, 193 sanction, see authority Sanseverino, Gaetano, 174 Santayana, George, 39g Sanz del Río, J u l i á n , 335-336 S à o T o m é , J o ä o de, 206-207 Sarmiento, Martín, 270 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 426, 436, 439-441 Savigny, Friedrich K a r l von, 331 Scheeben, Mathias Josef, 333 Scheler, Max, 364, 404, 418, 422-423, 425 Schelling, Friedrich, 201, 299, 313— 3*6> 317, 322 Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott, 397-398 Schiller, Friedrich, 331, 394 Schlechta, K a r l , 362 Schlegel, August Wilhelm, 313, 331 Schlegel, Caroline, 313 Schlegel, Friedrich, 313, 331 Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel, 316, 328, 330, 332-333, 378 Schlick, Moritz, 401 Scholasticism, 53, 79, 100, 116, 121, 125-130, 131, 132, 133, 141, 142, *43, '44. 146, 147, 149. i5i> '53: I 5 4 » '57; '58, i59> 160, 161, 163¬ 174» I 7 7 - Ï 7 8 , 182, 184, 190, 191, '94. 196-197, '98, 204, 205-209, 227, 232, 238, 249, 270, 276-277, 3 ° 5 , 338, 346, 365-366, 372, 373, 374, 3 9 ° , 404, 464 schools, medieval, 127, 140, 142, 146¬ 147 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 330, 338-340, 362, 363, 386 science, see natural sciences
scientific method, 202, 204-205 scientific traditionalism, 175 Scotism, 163, 184, 232 Scotland, see British Isles Scottish School, 259—260, 345, 346 Scotus, John Duns, see Duns Scotus, John Scotus Erigena, John, see Erigena, John Scotus Sebond, Raymond, see Raimundo de Sabunde Secondât, Charles de, see Montesquieu, Baron self, 257, 258, 381, 383, 414 self-evidence, 215—216, 222, 229, 260, 375, 376-377, 4 ° 9 , 4 ' 3 self-existence, see aseity self-identity, see identity self-sufficiency (or independence), 61, 89, 92, 96, 220, 222, 240, 302-303, 328; see also autarchia Seneca, 80, 91, 108 sensationalism, 34, 91, 141, 247, 248, 258-259, 261, 263-264, 341-347, 373 sensory perception, 21, 30, 32, 33—34, 79, 9 i , 95, 1 5 ° , 198, 264, 292, 293; see also perception Shaftesbury, first earl of, 254 Shaftesbury, third earl of (Anthony Ashley Cooper), 254, 278 Shakespeare, William, 248 sharing, see méthexis Siger of Brabant, 174, 183 Simmel, Georg, 384—387 sin, 144, 246; see also original sin skepticism, g6-g7, 213, 248, 255, 25g, 405 skholé, 16 Snellius (Willebrord Snell), 203 socialism, 336-338 society, see politics and society Society of Jesus, see Jesuits sociology, 350-353, 355 Socrates, 37, 38-41, 43, 45, 46, 87, 8g, 340, 411 Socratic tradition, 40-41, 87, 88-90 sophia, 17, 36, 55, 57, 63, 65, 66, 76 Sophists, 31, 35-38, 43, 82, 87 sophon, 28-29 sophds, 17, 34, 86 sophrosyne, 54 Soto, Domingo de, 206 soul, 47-48, 54, 55, 57, 78-80, 91, 99,
Index
iog, n o , 116-118, 119, 142, 143, 162, 168, 170, 172, 181, 234, 242¬ 243, 251, 259, 325 space, 33, 289-290, 387-388, 415 Spain, 126, 142, 153, i54-i55> : 5 8 , 173, 176-177, 184, 193-194, 196¬ 197, 202, 205-209, 238, 260, 270¬ 27 1 , 273, 278, 279, 347, 442-443, 468 species, see genus and species Spencer, Herbert, 357, 379 Spener, Philipp Jakob, 268 Spengler, Oswald, 396 Speusippus, 60 Spinola, Cristobal Rojas de, 237, 278 Spinoza, Baruch de, 58, 157, 200, 221, 231-235, 238, 240, 277, 278, 374 spirit, 280, 314-315, 324-329 spiritualism, 257, 344, 345-347, 439 State, the, see politics and society Stendhal (Marie Henri Beyle), 279 Stephanus, see Estienne, Henri Stewart, Dugald, 259-260, 345 Stoa, 88, 90-91 stoä poiktte, go Stoicism, 2, 40, 84, 87, 88, 90-94, 95, 96, i n , 115, 191-192, 232, 235 Strauss, David, 333, 336 Sturm und Drang, 268, 330 S u ä r e z , Francisco, 197, 205, 206, 207— 209, 232, 238, 365, 444 subjectivism, 223, 325, 433, 436, 446 substance, 64, 65-66, 67, 68, 69-71, 92, 134, 168, 201, 203, 218-220, 226, 232, 233-234, 240, 258, 302, 454, 457, 465 substantial form, 172, 173 Sufism, 154 superman, 363 Suso, Heinrich, 190, 195 Sweden, 212 Sydenham, Thomas, 254 syllogismds, 76 syllogistic method, 24g Sylvester I I , Pope, see Gerbert of Aurillac symbols, 136, 13g, 181, 203 syncretism (Arabic), 153-155 sjinolon, 70 synthesis, see judgment, analytic and synthetic tabula rasa, 79, 255 Tacitus, 108
Taine, Hippolyte, 355, 379 Talmud, 232 Taparelli, Luigi, 174 Tarde, Gabriel, 355 Tarski, Alfred, 401 Tartaretus, Peter, 184 Tathandlung, 311 Tauler, Johannes, 190, 195 Teichmüller, Gustav, 358 tekhne, 57, 63, 92 tekhnites, 63 Telesio, Bernardino, 193 Ulos, 69, 73, 323 Tempier, Etienne, 173, 175 Teresa, St., 194 terminism; terms, 136, 143, 149 Tertullian, 108, n o , 119 tetractys, 18 Thales of Miletus, 13-14, 329 theism, 252, 315, 412 theodicy, 237, 244-246, 329 Theodoric (Ostrogothic king), 126, 127 Theodoric of Chartres, see Thierry of Chartres theogony, 12, 14 Theologia deutsch, 184, 195 theology, 53, 64, 65, 78, 92, 93, 99, 116, 129-130, 133, 138, 168—169, 171, 178, 180, 189-190, 206-209, 213-214, 227-230, 246, 332-333 theophany, 142, 19g Theophrastus, 27 theoretic life, 1, 2, 16, 31, 35, 65, 81, 87 theoria, 10, 61, 65, 73, 287, 296 theos, 65, 66, 73, 178, 323 theosis, 142 Thierry (Theodoric) of Chartres, 147 Thirty Years' War, 277 "thisness" (haecceitas), 136, 17g Thomas k Kempis, 190 Thomas, St., see Aquinas, St. Thomas Thomism, 163, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173-174, 178, 184, 205, 207, 208, 227, 365; see also Neo-Thomism Thoreau, Henry David, 393 thought, 303-304, 311, 319, 322, 328, 388-389 thought and extension, see extension and thought Tiberghien, Guillaume, 335 Tieck, Ludwig, 313, 331 time, 14, 78, 28g-2go, 384, 385-386, 387-389, 4 ° 6 , 412, 414, 415, 427, 428, 42g, 434-435, 448
Index
Timon, 96 Toledo, 158, 176 Tongiorgi, S., 174 topos, 33, 78 topos hyperourdnios, 47 Torricelli, Evangelista, 203 Tournai, 143 traducianism, 110, 118 tragedy, 80 transcendency, 225, 259, 385-386 transcendental philosophy, 285-288, 292-293, 3 ° i - 3 ° 6 , 3 " , 4 i 3 - 4 5 , 466 transcendentalism, 393-394 transcendentals, 53, 73-74,82, 170, 421 transmigration (metempsychosis), 18, I
35, 99 transubstantiation, 129 Trendelenburg, Adolf, 358, 372 Trinitarian controversy, 111 Trinity, 117, 134, 149, 153, 161, 168 trivium, 126, 127, 150, 166 truth, 4, 5-6, 21, 39, 68, 75-76, 87, 88, 96, 137, 144, 169, 175, 177, 181, 198, 213, 215-216, 218, 243, 320, 321, 323, 326, 383, 397, 405, 432-433 T ü b i n g e n , 333 Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques, 263, 264, 356
virtue, 40, 54, 55, 82, 93 vital action, see action vital reason, 223, 300, 343, 384, 389, 442-462 vital time, see time vital values, see value theory Vitoria, Francisco de, 184, 206 Vives, Luis, 191, 194, 277 Vogt, K a r l , 257 void, 22, 33, 78, 100, 105 Volta, Alessandro, 330 Voltaire, François Arouet de, 262, 263, 264-265, 268, 281 voluntarism, 138, 178, 179, 180 vox (term), see terminism
Wadding, Luke, 184 Wagner, Richard, 362 Wahl, Jean, 435, 436, 439 Walter (Gautier) of Mortagne, 148 Warsaw Circle, 401 Weber, Ernst Heinrich, 358 Weber, Georg, 335 Weigel, Valentin, 195 Weltanschauung, 383, 412, 437 Whately, Richard, 394 Wheelwright, Philip E . , 400 Whitehead, Alfred North, 399-400 will, 119, 179, 235, 266, 295, 339-340; Ultramontanist movement, 346 see also free will Unamuno, Miguel de, 361, 390-392, will of God, i n , 117, 138, 171 William of Champeaux, 134, 148, 149 396, 4 7 William of Conches, 148 United States, 393-402 William de la Mare, 173 universals, 70, 133-136, 147-148, 149, William of Moerbeke, 158, 167 168, 171-172, 179, 180, 208, 250 William of Occam (Ockham), 135, universities, 147, 159—160 136, 138, 159, 160, 178, 179-181, U r b a n V , Pope, 158 utilitarianism, 356 182, 247, 277, 283; see also Occamism William of Orange, 256 William of Tocco, 166 Vaihinger, Hans, 358 Winckelmann, Johann Joachim, 267¬ Valdecasas, Alfonso G . , 443 268 V a l d é s , J u a n de, 193 Windelband, Wilhelm, 359, 418 V a l l a , Lorenzo, 191 Wisdom, John O . , 401 Vallès, Francisco, 194 value theory, 335, 364, 372, 375, 377, Witt, John de, 231 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 401 418-424 Wolff, Christian, 237, 267, 292 V a u x , Clotilde de, 348 world soul, 54, 99, 201 Vela, Fernando, 443 Wulf, Maurice de, 151 Venerable Bede, see Bede. St. Wundt, Wilhelm, 358, 379 Vico, Giambattista, 268-270, 327 Victorines, 149-152, 161 Vienna Circle, 401 Xenophanes, 19-20 Vilanova, Arnaldo, de, 176 Xenophon, 38, 40 Vinci, Leonardo da, 193 X i r a u , Joaquin, 467 6
Index Zambrano, Maria, 443 Z a r a g ü e t a , Juan, 464 Zaratas, Zarathustra, see Zoroaster zên, 83, 92 Zeno of Citium, 90 Zeno of Elea, 19, 24-25, 26
zoon politikon, 83 Zoroaster, 16, 114, 268 Zubiri, Xavier, 4, 20, 39, 57, 65, 72, 76, 106, 132, 137, 138-139, 181, 182, 204, 207, 318, 328, 329, 443, 463-466 Zwingli, Huldreich (Ulrich), 195
