Jews, Idumaeans, and Ancient Arabs Relations of the Jews in Eretz-Israel with the Nations of the Frontier and the Desert during the Hellenistic and Roman Era (332 BCE - 70 CE)
by
Aryeh Kasher
J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tubingen 1988
CIP-Titelaufnahme Kasber,
der Deutschen
Bibliothek
Aryeh:
Jews, Idumaeans, and ancient Arabs : relations of the Jews in Eretz-Israel with the nations of the frontier and the desert during the Hellenistic and Roman era (332 B C E — 70 CE) / by Aryeh Kasher. Tubingen : Mohr, 1988 (Texte und Studien zum antiken Judentum ; 18) ISBN 3-16-145240-2 ISSN 0721-8753 NE:GT
© 1988 J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) P. O . Box 2040, D-7400 Tubingen. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher's written permission. This applies paricularly to reproduc tions, translations, microfilms and storage and processing in electronic systems. Typeset by Sam B o y d Enterprise in Singapore; graphic work by Peter Schweitrieg in Stuttgart; printed by Gulde-Druck G m b H in Tubingen; bound by Heinrich Koch K G in Tubingen. Printed in Germany.
Dedicated to my venerable teacher
Professor Joshua Efron
Foreword The purpose of this book is to focus the interest of the educated reader, the student, and the research scholar on a topic which so far has not attrac ted adequate monographic attention. This review of relations between the Jews in Eretz-Israel and the nations of the frontier and the desert is pre sented in a chronological framework. At the same time, appropriated scholarly attention has been devoted in every chapter to each one of the spheres of life in which the fabric of relations between the Jews and their neighbors was shaped: religion, society, administration, politics, defence, etc., insofar as these are relevant and necessary. Since this work is extreme ly monographic in nature, the reader is required to possess considerable amount of prior general knowledge in the history of the Jewish people during the Second Temple Period. This in fact is essential for a thorough understanding of the different problems raised; the same applies to the his tory of the Nabataeans and the Ituraeans. We fear there is a certain danger that the modern reader might be tempt ed to draw analogies between historical reality as it takes form in this account and that of our own times. In anticipation of this we therefore wish to state that from the historian's point of view history does not repeat itself. Let the reader therefore not apply our conclusions or any he himself may draw while reading this book to the world scene of our time. Anyone making a historical projection of this kind errs and misleads others. It seems the great majority of those who do this are politicians with preten sions of basing their opinions on so-called experience of the past and the lessons it teaches. This is a misleading deception, for each and every histori cal period should and must be judged only by its own standards; similarities and conclusions are not to be transposed from one era to another, even if on the face of it there is a superficial resemblance between them. From the scientific aspect this book is intended to present its readers the latest historical interpretations relevant to the subject, including those aris ing from finds and findings in archaeology, epigraphy, papyrology, numis matics, and geography. A number of useful maps, a chronological chart, a bibliography, a table of abbreviations and indices are also included. In addition, most of the Aramaic, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin terms and quota tions have been translated into English, often with the addition of short explanations and notes thought to be relevant and necessary. Many trans lations of quoted passages were taken from standard works of reference,
viii
Foreword
such as the writings of Josephus Flavius (Loeb Classical Library ed.); The Mishnah (trans, by Danby); The Midrash Rabbah (trans, by Freedman); The Babylonian Talmud (ed. by Epstein); The First and Second Books of Maccabees (trans, by Bartlett), etc.
Acknowledgements It is my pleasant duty at this point to thank all those who assisted me directly and indirectly in writing and publishing this book: my mentor Professor Joshua Efron, who devoted a great deal of his time and gave me a great deal of wise and learned advice, following my work from start to finish with considerable interest, support and encouragement; Dr. Israel Ben-Shalom who devotedly and knowledgeably helped me with Talmudic problems; Dr. Ran Zadok who helped me greatly with his far-ranging ex pertise and knowledge on a number of linguistic matters relating to ancient Arabic names; Professor Israel Shatzman who read the manuscript and offered some comments; my students, Roman Wilk who contributed to the clarification of several problems by his comments and explanations, and Israel Ronen who contributed the final Appendix. Special thanks are due t o Mr. Marzell Kay who overcame the many difficulties involved and with professional skill translated the book into English. Translation into English was made possible largely thanks to the gener ous assistance extended by the School for Jewish Studies, the Faculty of Humanities at Tel Aviv University and the Yaniv Fund, for which I extend profound thanks to Professors Abraham Tal, Gabriel Cohen, Moshe Gil, David Vital, and Mr. Gideon Spiegel. Without their assistance this book could not have been published. Aryeh Kasher
Tel Aviv 1987.
Contents Foreword
vii
Acknowledgements
ix
Contents
xi
Abbreviations
xiii
Preface
xv
Introduction The Idumaean Incursion into the Region of Southern Judaea Nabataen Penetration into the Eretz-Israel Region The Ituraean Penetration into the Region of Eretz-Israel
1 6 11
Chapter 1: In the Mists of Early Generations Alexander the Great in Eretz-Israel ( 3 3 2 - 3 3 1 BCE) The War of the Diadochi and the Syrian Wars ( 3 2 3 - 1 6 8 BCE)
15 16
Chapter 2: Days of the First Hasmonaeans Judas Maccabaeus ( 1 6 7 - 1 6 1 BCE) Jonathan ( 1 6 0 - 1 4 3 BCE) Simon ( 1 4 3 - 1 3 5 BCE)
25 34 42
Chapter 3: The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall John Hyrcanus I ( 1 3 5 - 1 0 4 BCE) Judas Aristobulus I ( 1 0 4 - 1 0 3 BCE). . Alexander Jannaeus (103—76 BCE) Queen Salome-Alexandra ( 7 6 - 6 7 BCE) Decline of the Hasmonaean Kingdom ( 6 7 - 4 0 BCE)
44 79 86 105 108
Chapter 4: Reign of the Herodian Dynasty King Herod ( 4 0 - 4 BCE) The Tetrarchs Philip (4 BCE - 34 CE) and Herod Antipas (4 BCE - 39 CE) King Agrippa I ( 3 7 - 4 4 CE)
174 184
Chapter 5: In the Shadow of the Great Calamity The Last Procurators in Judaea ( 4 4 - 6 6 CE). .
192
126
xii
Contents
Agrippa II ( 5 0 - 9 2 / 3 CE)
194
During the Great Jewish Revolt ( 6 6 - 7 0 CE)
195
Epilogue
,
206
Appendix A: Arab Rulers (Nabataeans and Ituraeans)
212
Appendix B: Jewish Nationatism Among the Idumaeans The Costobar Conspiracy and the Sons of Baba "Varus' War"
214 214 220
The Great Jewish Revolt
224
Bibliography
240
Indexes
255
Personal Names and Deities Geographical Names Kingdoms, Nations, Tribes and Languages
255 259 263
Abbreviations AAAS AASOR ADAJ AE AJP ANRW ARAST BA BASOR BCH BMC CIG CIJ CIL CIS CPJ CQ EB FGrH HSCP HUCA IE J IG IGRR JBL JEA JJS JNES JQR JRS JTS MUSJ OGIS PAAJR PCZ
Annates arch&ologiques arabes de Syrie Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan Anne~e e"pigraphique American Journal of Philology Aufstieg undNiedergang der romischen Welt Atti della reale Academia di scienze di Torino Biblical Archaeologist Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research Bulletin de Correspondance HelUnique Catalogues of the Greek Coins in the British Museum Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum (ed. A. Boeckh et al.) Corpus Inscriptionum Judaicarum (ed. J.B. Frey) Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum (ed. S. Krauss) Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum (ed. V. Tcherikover et al.) Classical Quarterly Encyclopaedia Biblica Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (ed. F. Jacoby) Harvard Studies in Classical Philology Hebrew Union College Annual Israel Exploration Journal Inscriptiones Graeca Inscriptiones Graeca ad Res Romanas pertinentes (ed. R. Cagnat) Journal of Biblical Literature Journal of Egyptian Archaeology Journal of Jewish Studies Journal of Near Eastern Studies Jewish Quarterly Review Journal of Roman Studies Journal of Theological Studies Melanges de Vuniversite" Saint-Joseph Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selecta (ed. W. Dittenberger) Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research Catalogue ge'ne'ral des antiquite's e"gyptiennes du Mus6e du Caire: Zenon Papyri (ed. C.C. Edgar), Cairo 1 9 2 5 - 1 9 3 1
xiv PEQ QDAP RB REA RE(PW) RES REG REJ SCI TAPA TDNT Yediot ZDMG ZDPV ZPE
Abbreviations Palestinian Exploration Quarterly Quarterly of the Department of Antiquities of Palestine Revue biblique Revue des Etudes anciennes Realenzyklopadie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft Pauly, G. Wissowa, W. Kroll) Revue des e"tudes se'mitiques Revue des Etudes grecques Revue des Etudes juives Scripta Classica Israelica Transactions of the American Philological Association Theological Dictionary of the New Testament Yediot Bahqirat Eretz-Israel Weatiqoteha Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlandischen Gesellschaft Zeitschrift des deutschen Palastina-Vereins Zeitschrift fiir Papyrologie und Epigraphik
(ed. A.
Preface
Relations of the Jewish community in Eretz-Israel with the Idumaeans and the Arab tribes and nations have until now not had the benefit of any particular clarification through research and thus no monograph devoted mainly to this topic has ever been written. Scholars' attention has in gen eral focussed on the history of the people of Israel or of the great Hellenis tic kingdoms of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid dynasties and their successor, the Roman Empire. Only very little has been devoted to the history of the small nations in the area . The main reason for this no doubt lies in the lack of any written literary sources, especially of national chronicles written by authors belonging to these nations. It has already been frequently remarked that we unfortunately have no knowledge of the existence of an Idumaean, a Nabataean, or an Ituraean Josephus leaving future generations a written record of his people. All recently attempted research for writing such a history is of course based on diligent gleaning of crumbs of information, mainly from Hellenistic and Roman historiography and a little more from epigraphic and archeological finds, sources which at best are quite limited. 1
If for example we should want to investigate the history of the Idu maeans, we would face the complete absence of any Indumaean literary sources. Even on the epigraphic level there are only the scantiest of rem nants and, apart from the mention of typical Idumaean names, we have no criterion by which we can even identify an Idumaean inscription. Neither can we recognise a typically Idumaean style of building enabling us to distin guish an Idumaean structure from any other — not even in any kind of cultic function. From a professional archeological point of view, it is not even possible to compare the Idumaeans with the Nabataeans and Ituraeans in the period under discussion. The Nabataeans did after all have some form of in dividuality in their architecture and their ritual objects, particularly since a
1 An impression easily confirmed, if only from a fleeting glance at bibliographic lists on the Naba taeans and tiny Arab principalities such as Chalcis, Ituraea, and Abila (Abilene), found in the books by Schflrer, I , pp.707, 726, I , pp.561, 574; also; Starcky, Dictionnaire, cols. 1 0 1 6 1017. Only in recent years has there been a certain change concerning the Nabataeans and Itu raeans, as may for example be seen from the bibliographic list compiled by Bowersock (Roman Arabia, p. 193 ff.) on the Nabataeans, as well as the studies by Schmitt and Schottroff, see: G8tz Schmitt, ZDPV, XLVIII (1982) p p . 1 1 0 - 1 2 4 ; Schottroff, ZDPV, XLV1II (1982) p p . 1 2 5 - 1 5 2 . 4
s
Preface
xvi
2
special style of Nabataeans ceramics may be clearly recognised . As for the Ituraeans, there is today a tendency in certain Israeli archeological circles to identify "Ituraean ceramics" or "Golan ceramics" . On the other hand, inso far as "Idumaean ceramics" have been identified in modern research, these in volve periods much earlier than the one we are discussing here . It appears that the absence of Idumaean sources ever since the Persian period has to a large, even critical extent, dictated the lack of interest on the part of mod ern scholarship. When compared with the biblical period, the difference is enormous, since this very people then presented a fascinating subject for extensive scientific study. The very opposite holds good for their descen dants in the period of the Second Temple, and there has not been even one serious attempt — in the form of an independent and unbiased scholarly monograph — to examine their history comprehensively . Ronen's final Master's thesis presented at Tel-Aviv University is in the nature of an at tempt to correct this . Let us hope it represents a beginning. Idumaean history included in the chapters of this monograph is therefore meant to help scholars planning to pursue this same project in the future. 3
4
5
6
Due to the revolutionary changes which took place in the Near East following the rise and fall of the great powers of Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia, most neighboring nations in Transjordan of biblical times (such as the Ammonites and Amorites, for example) disappeared from the stage of history in the region. Also contributing to a not inconsiderable extent were the great demographic changes which occurred and which inter alia were characterized by incursion of the Arab tribes from the south, the east, and the north. A quick review of the history of nations in the Eretz-Israel region will show that/only the Idumaeans (or Edomites, as they are called in the BibleTsucceeded in surviving as a "nation"; thus in the Hellenistic era they were recognised in every respect as an "ethnos". The special nature of this phenomenon is even more striking in view of the fact that this nation had moved to a new "homeland" where they then took root so successfully and thoroughly that for many generations it was named Idumaea after them. In contrast, their old homeland (i.e., biblical Edom), under the new demographic and political circumstances (to be more pre cise, from the end of the sixth century BCE), had its name changed, so
2 For an impression on Nabataean individuality in architecture, art, ritual buildings, carving graves in rock, in pottery and jewelry, see Negev, Masters of the Desert, p.86ff. 3 See Kasher, Cathedra, XXXIII (1984), p p . 2 7 - 2 8 , note 45, and further details there. 4 E.g., see Ronen, Idumaeans etc., p.9. 5 Though devoting a fairly large section to the Idumaeans and Idumaea and on certain problem also diverging to the Persian period, Kochmann in his dissertation still does not represent a break through in the direction of monographic study on the subject of Idumaeans. 6 See Ronen, Idumaeans etc.
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xvii
much so that in the Hellenistic period it was already known by the name of "Arabia". As we know, the Helenistic conquest brought the nations of the Orient into contact with a new and foreign culture whose influence was very powerful, due both to its political and institutional strength and also to its well-developed and solid urban infra-structure, steeped in the spirit of Greece and her heritage. In this monograph we intend to show the conse quence of Hellenistic influence on Idumaean society and the effects these projected on their relations with the neighbouring Jewish nation. In the course of our discussion we will try to trace the historical process which led most of the Idumaeans to join the Jewish people, becoming so integrated with them as in fact to accept Jewish customs and religion. That of course is one of the most interesting riddles of Jewish history, the more so since we remember the fact that at the close of the biblical period the Edomites were considered to be one of the more despised nations. They were, as we know, accused of full collaboration with Babylonia in the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple (586 BCE), and were denounced for enriching themselves on the ruins of the Kingdom of Judah, taking substantial por tions of its land. And yet, amazingly, they of all people (or more precisely, an overwhelming majority of them) were eventually absorbed into the Jew ish people, so much so that they became an inseparable part thereof. To solve this strange puzzle, we shall submit the most penetrating questions to historical discussion: were the Idumaeans converted by force and compul sion? Or rather was this an act undertaken willingly and deliberately? Was there proselytization of individuals, or perhaps massive collective conver sion? Was this the end of an extended, unorganised, natural process, or was it characterized by its uniqueness and its organisation — initiated from above,'i.e., by both the Idumaean and the Jewish leadership? Were there demonstrations of internal opposition to the conversions within the pro selytizing Jewish community? How, if at all, did the Idumaean converts integrate with the different sectors of Jewish society? Did they, despite their conversion, preserve an Idumaean "ethnic" identity in later genera tions? These and other questions are clarified in the following chapters and as far as we can we have drawn historical conclusions or proposed possible logical solutions. We also pose similar questions on the conversion of the Ituraeans in Galilee. Difficulties in examining Ituraean history are as great, if not greater, than those concerning the Idumaeans, since the former did not possess, a single political entity or a single defined territorial concentration. Most of the sources concerning them are recorded in the writings of Josephus, with only a few rare echoes sounded by other Hellenistic-Roman writers. Epigraphic and numismatic information as well as archeological finds of course contribute considerably in revealing their story, but without the
xviii
Preface
writing of Josephus we would be completely in the dark. As a Jewish hist orian, Josephus naturally refers to Ituraean episodes and problems only in sofar as they relate to Jewish history. For him, the history of the Ituraeans per se does not represent an historical topic; but this fact does not allow us to obtain an authentically Ituraean point of view. Since the objective we have chosen for the present monograph is relations of the Jews to the neigh boring nations, we are of necessity bound to the historiographic path map ped by Josephus. Furthermore, the paucity of alternative sources prevents us from the start from obtaining a fully objective view of the situation con cerning relations of Jews and Ituraeans, one which would be checked by in dependent comparative study, free of bias and preference. Our examination of relations between Jews and Ituraeans is therefore dictated by limitations which we cannot properly overcome, so that a considerable part of our review is based on the proposition of possibilities, mainly in specific cases, which seem logically probable, rather than proven as solid and certain factual truths. The Nabataeans also produced no historians and writers or moralists and prophets such as arose in Israel, and there is not even a single Nabataean chronicle which tells the story of this people from its own point of view. The only written Nabataean "literature" which has been preserved for us is in the field of epigraphy, mainly from tombstones and coins. The language of the inscriptions is Aramaic and not Arabic, showing that their written culture was borrowed from "foreign" sources and was not based on nation al foundations . Stephanus Byzantius did mention the fact of the exis tence of an essay called 'Arabica' ('Apa(3tKd) written by an author called Uranius and apparently containing important historical and geographical information on the Nabataeans. But unfortunately we have no clear idea of the man and his precise period, whether he was of Nabataean-Arab origin or a Greco-Roman writer, nor do we even know the contents of the book or its form . Among Hellenistic-Roman writers there are also none who systematically wrote the history of the Nabataeans. In truth, they are only mentioned incidentally either on the occasion of reviewing various episodes in Hellenistic or Roman history, or in relation to geographic sur veys of regions with which the Nabataeans had connections . Just as for the Idumaeans and the Ituraeans, it appears that the writings of Josephus are the most important and richest source of information we 7
8
9
7 For a superficial impression only, see e.g.: Negev, Masters of the Desert, p.l 3 9 - 1 4 2 . 8.See: Jacoby, FGrH, II.C, 675, F . 2 4 - 2 5 ; West, HSCP, LXXVIII (1974), p p . 2 8 2 - 2 8 4 . See also Starcky, Dictionnaire, cols. 903, 906. 9 We shall here only mention the main references of the following writers: Diodorus Siculus, Posidonius of Apamea, Hieronymus of Cardia, Strabo, Pliny the Elder, Cassius Dio, and the so-called Periplus maris Erythrai.
Preface
xix
have on the Nabataeans; It is true he wrote not Nabataean but rather Jew ish history, yet the many existing points of contact between the two peoples contributed quite considerably, though only indirectly, to a recon struction of Nabataean history, even if only in the most general terms. However, since Josephus refers to various Nabataean episodes exclusively on the basis of their implications on Jewish history, it is quite obvious that his approach and point of view (on Nabataean history) are far from objec tive and it would therefore be difficult for us to put his writing to the test of critical and impartial comparative study. Indeed, we are necessarily bound to follow the path laid down by Josephus, and frequently we will be quite unable to escape the bonds of this restraint in order to test historic truth from a point of view different from his. On the other hand, the wealth of information contained in his writing on the Nabataeans, out of all proportion to what he relates concerning the Idumaeans and the Ituraeans, allows us at least in several cases to trace his sources and in this way t o improve our understanding of the nature of his writing and its historiographic tendencies. For example, in his Herodian chapter - the richest in extent and quality in its revelation of Nabataean history — Josephus relies on j the history written by Nicolaus of Damascus who, as official court historian and the king's most senior adviser, stood very close to Herod. 'This fact in itself can show the critical reader a little of the tendentious nature of Josephus' writing in this important chapter, thereby casting on it a heavy shadow of unreliability, or at least the suspi cion of propagandist rewriting of history, of attempting to exalt and praise Herod, to hide his failures and shortcomings, and to defend him as far as is possible. In the Hellenistic-Roman period, relations between Jews and Nabataeans underwent the most extreme changes. In the course of our survey we at tempt to examine them and, as far a_s is possible and logically probable, explain how within a short time it came about that, from close friendship and cooperation in the days of the early Hasmonaeans, in the reign of Alex ander Jannaeus only one generation later, those relations had changed to enmity and bloodshed. We have of course attempted to throw some light on the reasons for the continuation and broadening of mutual enmity between the two nations, which reached its peak in blood-drenched wars and acts of horrifying cruelty of the kind that occurred in the days of the Great Revolt against the Romans.
Introduction The Idumaean Incursion into the Region of Southern Judaea In this short introduction on the Idumaeans we do not intend to solve the question of their precise ethnic origin, a very complex problem involv ing a special study into the biblical period. For the purpose of our discus sion we will merely mention the fact accepted by most scholars that theirs was one of the Semitic-speaking nations (or tribes) who in the 14tH cen tury BCE had apparently invaded the region of Transjordan and driven out or absorbed the previous inhabitants. It appears that the Idumaean settle ment within a specific geographic region of Transjordan, well-defined by natural boundaries — the Zered Brook in the north, Eilat Bay in the south, the Araba Wadi to the west, and the Syrian-Arabian desert to the north east helped them preserve their ethnic (or tribal) individuality over a very long period of time. In fact, the other nations (or tribes) who had invaded together with them (i.e., Moabites, Ammonites, and Amorites of Gilead) had also settled into fairly well-defined geographic boundaries, and there fore they too from the start developed political entities which were welldefined and distinguishable from each other. Archeological finds prove further that over the generations the natural boundaries of the biblical Land of Edom were also marked by strong systems of fortifications in tended to block the possible incursion of nomad tribes from the desert . This also helped the Edomites (as they were called at the time) preserve their specific ethnic character. In fact, for many years they succeeded in preventing massive intrusions of desert nomads into their country; in this they were not inconsiderably helped by their high degree of political pro gress (compared with others in their region), with the aid of which they managed to establish an orderly and properly organised realm that reached the peak of its glory and prosperity in the Assyrian and Babylonian periods. However, despite all this, the Edomites of the biblical period were unable to resist the continuous and unending pressure of the nomads invading from the desert — tribes of Arabs, Nabataeans, and Kedarites, who pene1
1 See basic information on this: Glueck, 'Edom', EB, I (1955), p p . 9 1 - 9 8 .
Introduction
2
trated into their subsistence area at a growing rate, particularly in the 7th and 6th centuries BCE. The simultaneous decline of the Kingdom of Judah, and the Edomites' commercial interests in the control of traffic arteries leading from Transjordan to the sea-coast of Eretz-Israel, weakened even further their powers to resist the invaders from the desert. It appears that under these circumstances their expansion to the west, into the southern regions of the land of Judaea, was a form of compensation and release for the weakening of their hold on their own country. The beginnings of the Edomite invasion of southern Judaea had in fact already started in the 8th century BCE, a fact confirmed by archeological findings such as pottery, ostraca, seal imprints, etc. In the 7th and 6th centuries BCE this process became stronger , following on and concurrent with the growing Nabataean invasion of the Land of Edom. In fact we will not be far wrong in stating that the Edomite penetration into southern Judaea was a gradual process which had already begun in the Assyrian period, gathered strength during the Babylonian period, and came to an end in the Persian (Achemenid) period at the end of the 6th century BCE . It seems that this very same process, which as indicated continued for a few hundred years, was concurrent with the "Arabization" of the biblical Land of Edom, which was also not a one-time event and did not cause any dramatic and revolutionary change in the region. It appears that the archeo logical finds connected with the Nabataeans also confirm the continuous nature of this process. Thus for example the continuity of Edomite pres ence within the bounds of the biblical (i.e., Transjordanian) Land of Edom is very evident throughout the whole of the Nabataean period, particularly in epigraphy, a fact clearly borne out by the considerable use of Edomite (later Idumaean) theophoric names containing the component 'Kos' (or Koze, Cos, Qos, etc.) . It also stands out in the continuance of cus tomary Edomite (or Idumaean) ritual under Nabataean rule . Continuity of the use of the Aramaic language, from the time it took root in the Land of Edom in the 8th century BCE and inclusive of the Nabataean era, also indicates continuity of Aramaic-Idumaean culture, which eventually the Nabataeans themselves also came to adopt and accept . Generally speaking: 2
3
4
5
6
2 Bartlett, JTS, 20 (1969), pp. 1 5 - 1 7 ; Kochavi, IEJ, XVII (1967), p.227ff. Compare further: Biran, Qadmoniot, XI (1978), p p . 2 0 - 2 3 ; Aharoni, Arad Inscriptions, p. 180; and recently: Bart lett, PEQ, CXIV (1982), p.l5ff. 3.Eph'al, Dissertation, p.130, 141ff. 4 Bartlett, PEQ, CXI (1979), p p . 5 2 - 6 6 (esp. p.54); Starcky, Levant, VII (1975), p.16.; idem, RB, LXXV (1968), p p . 2 0 6 - 2 3 5 . 5 E.g. see: Vriezen, Oildtestamentische Studien, XIV (1965), p p . 3 3 3 - 3 3 4 ; Milik, Syria, XXXV (1958), p p . 2 3 6 - 2 4 1 ; idem, Syria, XXXVII (1960), p p . 9 5 - 9 6 ; Teixidor, Syria, XLIX (1979), p p . 4 1 9 - 4 2 0 ; and see recently: Patrich, Cathedra, XXVI (1982), p.57 with further details. 6 See Naveh, BASOR, CCIII (1971), p p . 2 7 - 3 2 ; Bartlett, PEQ, CXI (1979), p.56.
The Idumaean Incursion into the Region of Southern Judaea
3
survival in Transjordan of the earlier tribes (Edomites, Moabites, and Am monites) alongside the Arab tribes (headed by the Nabataeans) took the form of ethnic and cultural co-existence, at least at the beginning. Naturally and understandably, with passing generations there began a process of which we do not know sufficient details of both ethnic and cul tural merging and integration. At the end of this process a new entity was created in the region, syncretistic but with a prominent and dominantly Arab-Nabataean character, which to a large extent reflected the demograph ic superiority of the desert nomads . It therefore appears that over a quite extended period similar processes were taking place simultaneously in biblical Edom and in southern Judaea (later to become "Idumaea"). In parallel with increasing intrusion of the Arab-Nabataean tribes into the region of Transjordan, there was growing Edomite migration westwards into southern Judaea and the northern Negev. We therefore cannot speak of a one-time occurrence of a sudden migration of nations, but rather of a continuous and gradual process that gained considerable impetus in the years 5 8 7 - 5 8 2 BCE, at the time of the destruction of the Kingdom of Judah and the great expulsion of its inhabitants to Babylonia. It is com monly accepted that the national catastrophes of the Kingdom of Judah merely increased the rate of Edomite (later Idumaean)-Nabataean incur sions in the south and did not serve as a marker indicative of a new demo graphic phenomenon. It simply appears that the invaders succeeded at that time in gaining control of the regions which they had entered long before and gave them a new political character, Edomite (or Idumaean)-Arabic , thereby filling the vacuum created in the wake of the national disasters which had befallen the Kingdom of Judah. It is inconceivable that the Edomite incursion into and domination of the regions in the south took place without a base of consent and cooperation from the Babylonian regime of those days. For that reason it seems that from then onwards Edom became the symbol of evil in Jewish consciousness , at least to the end of the Ptolemaic period (as we shall see later). 7
8
9
7 See Glueck, Deities and Dolphins, p.5; Glueck, Transjordan, p p . 1 3 6 - 1 3 7 ; Eph'al, Dissertation, p.145. 8 Clear indications of this in prophesies of Ezekiel, 35:15 and confirmation III Ezra, 4:50. Epi graphic support is found in Beersheba and Arad ceramics from the 4th century BCE, containing scores of Arab and Idumaean names - see: Naveh, Beersheba, I, p p . 7 9 - 8 2 ; idem, Tel Aviv, VI (1979), p p . 1 8 2 - 1 8 9 ; idem, Arad Inscriptions (ed. Aharoni), p p . 1 6 7 - 2 0 4 ) . The papyri of Wadi Daliyeh in the Samaria Desert (north of Jericho) also testify to the demongraphic phenomenon of ethnic assimilation in Eretz-Israel following the waves of migration from the east in the Persian period. Among the names mentioned there, from their theophoric components it is possible to identify Idumaean, Moabite, Aramaic, Babylonian and Jewish or Samaritan names - see: Cross, New Directions in Biblical Archaeology, esp. p.5 2. 9 See Hoffman, in-.Uffenheimer (ed.), Bible and Jewish History, p p . 7 6 - 8 9 , and particularly pp. 85-89.
4
Introduction
An entirely different interpretation holds that tribal groups, having clear genealogic ties with Edom, had in fact been settled from earliest times on the southern slopes of the Hebron mountains and in the northern Negev (later to become the "Idumaea" of Hellenistic times). In other words, the indicated region of settlement had from earliest times included tribal groups with the names in their genealogical records proving a clear connec tion to those of biblical Edom. Pursuing the logic of this opinion, the great Edomite migration of the 7th and 6th centuries BCE was therefore of the nature of a homecoming and an attempt to revive a previously extant ethnic and political situation. Dormant traditions of a genealogical relation ship linked with the eponym "Edom" were thus likely to have served here as formal grounds for demanding recognition of a separate ethno-political Edomite identity from the Babylonian authorities. According to this con ception, the massive migration of Edomites westwards following the grow ing Nabataean incursion on the one hand, and the decline of the Kingdom of Judah on the other, only encouraged and spurred on separatist ambi tions for the establishment of an independent ethno-political Edomite entity. At all events this was not a new creation. Since we have neither the intention nor the capacity within this frame work to deal with the deeper problems of the biblical period, we will therefore not put the above opinion to the test of historical examina tion. For the moment, and for the purpose of our discussion, we will merely note that the bias and one-sidedness of this opinion are evident, since it is clearly guided by the idea that the conversion of the Idumaeans in the Hasmonaean period never took place, for the Idumaeans had long since been fully-fledged Jews. Pursuing its reasoning one must therefore relate to information on conversion of the Idumaeans in the days of John Hyrcanus I as merely referring to the act of political annexation of Idumaea to Judaea, an act according to the wishes of the local inhabitants, who thereby recovered their original political holding of long a g o . Literary sources from the Persian period clearly indicate that according to official political terminology, the lands south of Beth-Zur were Arab; in the days of Nehemiah for example they were under the rule of Geshem (or Gashmu) the Arab. Archeological finds however prove that in actual fact the population there was quite mixed, an impression which may be obtained from the mention of people with Arabic, Idumaean, and Aramaic names. One cannot deduce from this that ethnic mixing was total and equal in every single region. It appears for example that the Idumaean element 10
10 See extensively: Kochman, dissertation, p p . 1 5 8 - 1 7 8 . On conversion of Idumaeans to Judaism in the days of John Hycanus I, more is brought below, but the problematics of the whole subject are presented in a totally different light.
The Idumaean Incursion into the Region of Southern Judaea
Map 1: The Idumaean and Arab Penetration during the Persian Period ( 6 - 4 Centuries BCE)
N a
b
a t a e a n s
6
Introduction
was prominent and even dominant in southern Judaea, that is, the areas lying between Beth-Zur and Beersheba. On the other hand, in the area south of Beersheba the Arab character was more prominent. The fact that in Hellenistic times an Idumaean political entity was born — a fact that found expression in the establishment of an administrative unit named Idumaea in the areas between Beth-Zur and Beersheba — indicates not only a political turning point, of secession from a pact with the Arabs (as exis ting in the Persian period), but also a policy of creating new administrative units having an as clearly-defined as possible local ethnic character. Choice of the name of Idumaea can therefore serve as a fairly authoritative indica tor of the composition of the local population, namely, that the Idumaean element was the most prominent and dominant therein. In our opinion, the process of political renunciation by the foreign administration in EretzIsrael of its pact with the Arabs gained its great impetus beginning in the days of Antigonus Monophthalmus, who wanted to impose his rule over Petra. This same renunciation however found concrete administrative ex pression in the creation of Idumaea, only with the establishment of Ptolem aic rule in Eretz-Israel.
Nabataen Penetration into the Eretz-Israel Region The Nabataens' origin was and still is a subject for serious dispute among scholars. One of the ideas initially prevalent inclined to determine their origin as Aramaic, mainly in view of the Aramaic language used in Naba taean inscriptions and on official coinage . In this case however, linguistic evidence is in fact inconclusive since, though Aramaic was the principal written language of the Nabataeans, this fact if not to be interpreted and seen as a proof on the question of their origin, but rather evaluated as an expression of the cultural standards they adopted. It should be noted that the Nabataeans did not have a written language of their own, also that in the Near East, Aramaic had for many hundreds of years been the inter national language by means of which it was possible to maintain contacts and communicate between the different peoples and nations. In relation to the Nabataeans, whose main occupation was international trade, this fact has special and important significance. Their adoption of the Aramiac language was therefore due not only to the strong influence of Mesopotamian culture, but also and perhaps principally for pragmatic reasons, appro11
11 See details: Dussaud, La Penetration des Arabes en Syrie avant I'Islam, p.21; Patrich, Cathedra, XXXVIII (1985), p.6.
Nabataen Penetration into the Eretz-Israel Region
'
priate to traders who travel the roads and need an efficient, widely accept able form of linguistic communication. In the 19th cenutry, modern schol ars had already preferred the possibility of solving the riddle of the Naba taeans' origins on the basis of investigating the selection of names in com mon use among them. It was T. Noldeke - basing himself on detailed linguistic study of Nabataean names — who first determined that 'Arabism' formed their dominant element and that therefore the Nabataeans' origin was to be seen as Arab . This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the identification of those called "Nabatu" (in inscriptions) with the "Sons of Nebajoth" mentioned in the Bible and in the Assyrian chronicles of Assurbanipal - the answer to which is apparently negative - and we shall therefore merely mention the opinion accepted in research today, that their origin was Arabic . The main historic information on the Nabataeans was as we know drawn from the writings of the historian Diodorus Siculus. It is corroborated by Hieronymus of Cardia who participated in the campaign against Petra in the year 312 BCE and whom Antigonus Monophthalmus appointed to super vise the Dead Sea area and the gathering of asphalt . According to Diodo rus, in addition to the Nabataeans there were also other Arab tribes and nations (II, 4 8 , 1) settled in the eastern region of what he called Arabia, showing that the Nabataeans formed only one element in the family of Arabic tribes there . Diodorus makes a distinction between them and all the others, not only because of their great wealth but also in view of their 12
13
14
15
12 On the meaning of the name 'Arab' and early epigraphic occurrence see: Eph'al, Biblical En cyclopaedia, VI p.355ff.; Noldeke, ZDMG, XVII (1863), p p . 7 0 3 - 7 0 8 ; XXV (1871), p.l22ff.; see also idem, apud: Euting, Nabatdische Inschriften aus Arabien, pp. 7 3 - 8 0 ; Kammerer, Petra, p p . 2 7 - 2 8 ; Cantineau, Le Nabataen, pp.x,9,12; Starcky, Dictionnaire, cols. 900, 903, 924; com pare also: Negev, ANRW, II, 8, p.527; Negev, M r s f m of the Desert, p.33. 13 See M. Eilat, "Nebajoth", Biblical Encyclopaedia, V, p p . 7 4 4 - 7 4 6 (with bibliographic details); Starcky, Dictionnaire, col.903; Winnett & Reed, Ancient Records from North Arabia, p.99; Eph'al, Ancient Arabs, p.221ff; see also: Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.l4ff with up-to-date bibliographic details. Latest studies by Patrich on the prohibition of human images in Nabataean art greatly reinforce the opinion concerning their Arabic origin, see: Cathedra, XXVI (1982), pp. 4 7 - 1 0 7 ; XXXVIII (1985), p p . 3 - 5 4 . 14 See: Diodorus Siculus, II, 48, 1 - 9 ; 49; XIX, 94, 1 - 1 0 ; 97, 1 - 7 ; 100, 1 - 2 . Analysis and full details on this journey see: Abel, RB, XLVI (1937) p p . 3 7 3 - 3 9 1 . On Hieronymos of Cardia see recently Hornblower, Hieronymus of Cardia, esp. p p . 4 4 - 5 0 ; additional details see note 28 below. 15 Diodorus (XIX, 94, 1) expressed himself thus: 'the land of the Arabs called Nabataeans (=TT}I> xojpav TLOV 'Apdpwv TU)V na\ovnevojv Na^arlcov), indicating that in his eyes there were also other Arabs not Nabataeans. Later in his survey (XIX, 94, 4) he clearly distinguished between Nabataeans and what he called other 'Arab tribes' ('ApafSiKdjv iOvGiv), and he even distinguished them from the others by indicating their wealth. Later (XIX, 94, 10) he again distinguishes be tween them and 'other Arab tribes' (SXKa yev-q rdv Apd/ko«>), several of whom farmers and had customs similar to those of the 'Syrians', apart from the fact that they did not live in permanent houses.
8
Introduction 16
small numbers, which according to him did not far exceed ten thousand . It is hard to evaluate this figure, whether it refers to the total of individuals in this tribe or only to the number of fighting men. In our opinion the second assumption seems more probable, in view of the fact that the sub ject of Diodorus' survey was the military campaign to Petra. From various sources, literary and epigraphic, we know the identity of the other tribes at which Diodorus Siculus hinted, even if the information is limited just to their names. Thus for example, in I Mace, 5:4 there is men tion of the Sons of Baean (p. 2 7 - 2 8 below), and ml Mace, 9:66 we have the Odomera tribe and the Sons of Phasiron, who operated in the Teko'a desert south of Judaea. In I Mace, 9:36 as well as in Safaic and Greek in scriptions there is mention of the Sons of Jambri living and operating in the vicinity of Medeba (p. 34 below). Members of another tribe, called "Salmu" in inscriptions, were allies of the Nabataeans and were mentioned in the inscriptions on graves atMada'in Sali'ah (in the Arabian Peninsula) and in Petra. But it is not clear whether their subsistence area extended just over the north of the Arabian Peninsula, or if eventually it reached as far as the Auranitis mountains . In the northeast of the Sinai Peninsula lived the "Utai" tribe mentioned by Pliny, one of their centres of settlement being in Qasrawet *. If we judge by the mention of Nabataean names con taining semi-theophoric components not given particularly to kings, and which some scholars are inclined to believe are names of tribes, there are, besides all these, also epigraphic traces of additional Arab tribes . The Hellenistic Era led to a great flourishing of international trade with the countries in the East and, in its wake, also to the rapid development of the Arabs as a whole and the Nabataeans in particular. This period wrought far-reaching changes in the social life and political structure of the latter. The Nabataeans as well as other Arab tribes tended gradually to abandon the traditional nomadic life, going over to a semi-permanent residential life-style that included the adoption of administrative and political order from the Hellenistic world around them. Eventually these would find sig nificant expression in the establishment of an organised dynastic monarchy, more than a little based on political models and administrative frameworks borrowed from the neighboring kingdoms. This was to a large extent made possible when the Nabataeans realized the advantages of leaving their re stricted tribal world, in order to create a broad confederation incorporating a number of Arab tribes. In Greek this phenomenon might be described as 17
1
19
16 17 18 19
Diodorus XIX, 9 4 , 4 . See Milik, Syria, XXXV (1958), p.231ff. Tsafrir, IEJ, XXXII (1982), p p . 2 1 2 - 2 1 4 . See: Milik, Liber Annum, X ( 1 9 5 9 - 6 0 ) , p.150. For further details see: Patrich, Cathedra, XXXVIII (1985), p p . 7 - 8 and notes 2 3 - 2 7 .
Nabataen Penetration into the Eretz-Israel Region
9
that is a federative union of several tribes for the purpose of serving common interests in the spheres of security, policy, economy, and culture. The Nabataeans were the first to understand this and were there fore the motive power for political initiative in this direction. It was this fact that raised their importance to such a high degree and established their leadership among the Arab tribes. awoLKLOfjidc:,
Not only that: the Nabataeans also succeeded in bringing other ethnic elements from among the previous permanent residents who lived in their vicinity on the edge of the desert into their tribal federation. This applies to the Moabites, the Ammonites, and the Edomites known from the Bible. Although Nabataeans assumed control over these peoples' lands , we simultaneously hear of continuity of the national-ethnic existence of the subject peoples, a fact that for example found expression in the continuity of settlement and the survival of traditional national ritual, even in later generations . Based on archeological findings, modern scholarship has proved that Nabataean penetration into the land of biblical Edom during the Persian period did not involve overall destruction or general and organ ised exile of its previous inhabitants. Accepted opinion of the expulsion of the Edomites from their lands by the Nabataeans has been shown to be not quite accurate. The findings indicate the gradual process of Edomite demo graphic attenuation which gathered momentum in the 5th and 4th centur ies BCE, apparently due to Persian inspiration and permission or at least Persian non-intervention and non-prevention. In this period the signs of this process could be clearly recognised in the renewal of settlements and their expansion under a new Nabataean political framework . Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that despite the Edomite decline, Edomite settle ments did not wholly disappear from the scene. It was simply the growing Nabataean influence which gave the region a new character. 20
21
22
20 On Nabataean rule in Ammon and Moab, see: Clermont-Ganneau, Recueil d'Archeologie Orien tate, II (1898), p p . l 8 5 - 2 1 9 ; G l u e c k , BASOR, LXVIII (1937), p.15. 21 Thus for example the cult to the Moabite god Kemosh, which continued from the Persian up to the Roman period, is evidence of continuity of Moabite settlement of a definite ethnic and ritual character - see: Glueck, Deities and Dolphins, p p . 4 7 - 6 2 ; Milik, Liber Annuus, IX ( 1 9 5 8 - 5 9 ) , p p . 3 3 1 - 3 4 1 . The same applies to the Edomite cult to the god Kos (or Koze, Qos, Cos etc.), which survived in quite a number of places in the sphere of Nabataean rule, if to judge by the widespread use of the theophoric component 'Kos' and if to judge by actual ritual finds - see: Milik, Syria, XXXV (1958), p p . 2 3 5 - 2 4 1 (No. 3); Starcky, Levant, VII (1975), p.16; idem, RB, LXXV (1968), p p . 2 0 8 - 2 0 9 ; see also: Patrich, Cathedra, XXVI (1982), pp.57,80,82,88 and cf. p.79, note 113. Kindler, Coinage of Bostra, p.84. On the god Kos see extensively: Vriezen, Oudtestamentische Studien, XIV (1965), p p . 3 3 0 - 3 5 3 . 22 On accepted opinion concerning the displacement of the Edomites westwards into the region of Idumaea see: Glueck, AASOR, XV (1935), p.l38ff.; idem, op.cit., XVIII-XIX ( 1 9 3 7 - 1 9 3 9 ) , p.23ff.; Starcky, BA, XVIII (1955), p.86; Meyers, in: Goedicke (ed.), Near Eastern Studies in Honor of W.F. Albright, p.386ff; Dussaud, Penetration etc., p.23; on the new opinion taking shape lately, see: Bartlett, CXI (1979), p p . 5 3 - 6 6 .
10
Introduction
Map 2: The Nabataean Zone of Action
The Ituraean Penetration into the Region of Eretz-Israel
11
Quite an original and innovative idea has recently been put forward by A. Negev, questioning the accepted opinion concerning the occurrence of a massive one-time Nabataean invasion in the 5 th and 4th centuries BCE. In his view such an invasion did not take place, certainly not at such a late period, since the huge expanse of the Arabian Peninsula, Sinai, the Negev, Transjordan, and the Great Syrian Desert must be regarded as one huge subsistence area for many Arab tribes including the Nabataeans, where all had lived since ancient times and wandered from place to place within its boundaries. In his view the Nabataeans could therefore not be identified as invaders, but must be seen as one of the local Arab tribes, active like others within this huge desert area from very earliest times, long before the Persian period . This conclusion can find indirect support in the image of the Nabataeans found in Hellenistic-Roman literary sources. The impression arising from these is that most of the time, even in Hellenistic-Roman period, the Nabataeans were an Arab tribe of semi-nomads, whose principal source of livelihood was raising sheep and camels, guiding merchant cara vans — over all the desert trails as far as 'Arabia Felix' and the countries of the Far East, as well as robbery of travellers (on land and sea) over the whole of this vast desert region . 23
24
The Ituraean Penetration into the Region of Eretz-Israel In the inscriptions of Assyrian and Babylonian kings, the Ituraeans — whose name derives from "Jetur ( T I O ' ) " , one of the twelve sons of Ishmael (Genesis 2 5 : 1 5 ; Chronicles I, 1:31) — are called "Arabs" (Aribi, etc.). The indication is that this was what they called themselves from the earliest times, a name which without a doubt was intended to clearly identify and define them ethnically . In Hellenistic-Roman literature they are some times mentioned as "Arabs" and sometimes as "Syrians" , names which 25
26
23 Negev, Masters of the Desert, p.33ff. At the end of the book there is an up-to-date and useful bibliography. 24 E.g. see: Diodorus Siculus, XIX, 94, 4;cf. ibid., 2, 43, 4 - 5 ; Strabo, XVI, 4, 18 (777); 26, ( 7 8 3 784); Pliny, Natural History, VI, 162, and there are many more items of information. On Naba taean trade, see extensively: Kammerer, Petra, p.32ff; Rostovtzeff, Caravan Cities, passim; idem, SEHHW, passim, esp. pp. 1 2 4 3 - 1 2 4 8 ; Negev, Masters of the Desert, p.24ff; Casson. TAP A, CX (1980), pp.21 - 3 6 ; Groom, Frankincense and Myrrh, passim. 25 See Eph'al, dissertation, p.l72ff, esp. p.175. Since our discussion here is restricted only to rela tions of the Ituraeans to the Jews, for the definition of their ethnic identity and location of their subsistence area we shall merely mention the findings together with agreed and up-to-date opin ions in modern scholarship. 26 See in detail: Schurer, I , p.562. s
Introduction
12
include ethnic allusions,, but a clear geographic distinction is drawn, when of all Arabs those in Syria are singled out. In fact the biblical sources already provide us the important basic data for understanding the history of Ituraeans in the coming generations and up to the Hellenistic period . All references to them in the Bible bear the stamp of a tribal nomadic way of life, connected with sheep and camels, living in tents, villages ( o ^ n s n ) , and castles ( m i 'B ), archery and plunder . Their tribal organisa tion was in the form of a "nation", comparable with the Hebrew aR'fl'a, which corresponds to the current Arabic term hamula. Their heads were called "princes of their nations" ( n n a N ? D ^ K ^ J ) , known in Greek as yvXapxoi, as in the Septuagint and in several other sources from the Hellen istic period . As we know, the subsistence area of "the Sons of Ishmael" as a whole extended over the desert region of Syria, Eretz-Israel, and Egypt, and was mentioned a number of times in the Bible; e.g., the journeys of the Ishmaelite traders from the Gilead to Egypt (Gen. 37:25, 2 7 - 2 8 , 36; 39:1), the wars of Gideon against the tribes of Midian, Amalek and Bnei-Qedem (Judges 6—8), the war of Saul against Amalek (I Samuel, 15:2, 5—9). In biblical times there is information on the activities of the Ituraeans in Gilead, the Batanaea, and up to Mount Hermon and Snir (i.e. the north of Transjordan), around Damascus and the slopes of Mount Lebanon and the Lebanon Valley . At the time of the conquests of Alexander the Great there is a record of their attempts to prevent him from cutting down trees for building rafts and towers for laying siege to -the city of Tyre, until he was forced to subdue them in a short military campaign, in which he penetrated deep into the Valley of Lebanon and up to the ridges of Anti-Lebanon . Their kinsmen around Damacus and areas of the Gaulanitis, Batanaea, Trachonitis, and Auranitis were defeated by Alex27
28
1
29
30
31
27 Of the more up-to-date study on the Ituraeans, mention must be made of Schiirer's appendix to the amended edition of Vermes and Millar: Schflrer I , p . 5 6 1 - 5 7 3 ; see also the studies of Schmitt Schottroff (as mentioned in the bibliography). 28 See for example: Gen. 25:16;Isaiah 21:17; 42:11; 60:1; Jeremiah, 49:29; 3-132;Psalms 120:5; Song of Songs 1:5 and more; see Eph'al, ibid. The 'villages (D "1 Sri)'are semi-permanent settle ments, which had ceased to be nomad camps but had not yet developed into an urban settlement fortified by a wall. The 'castles ( m *T>B)' were at first small half-temporary villages which later developed into small townships. 29 Gen. 25,26; Strabo, XVI.2,10 (753) and more; cf. below, p.28 and note 13. 30 Compare: / Chronicles, 5 : 9 - 1 1 , 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 3 , Snir is identified with Anti-Lebanon. See: Aharoni, 'Hermon', EB, III, p.295. From the start of the settling era of the tribes of Israel (Reuben, Gad and half the tribe of Menashe), and mainly since the days of King Saul, the Ituraeans were ap parently pushed further and further north, into the regions north of Damascus, including the Valley of Lebanon. 31 Arrian, 11,20,4-5; Curtius Rufus, IV.2,18,24;Plutarch, Alexander 24,3. s
,
13
The Ituraean Penetration into the Region of Eretz-Israel
Map 3 : The Iuraean Zone of Action
Arados uj •>Emesa
R.Eleutheros
LaodiceiavP Uj Tripolisj Teoprosopqn| Or
C
Or
c
o
C
Cr
Uj
•o Heliopolis O
Q
C
Berytus
Uj Chalcis O /Abila Sidorg
Damascus R. Chrisoroas
Tyre| •Paneas.
Trachon/itis Batanaea Gaulanitis
Introduction
14
32
ander's supreme commander Paramenion . The very fact that the Arabs of the Lebanon who attacked Alexander were called "peasants" can be an indication that around that time they had changed, at least in this region, to living in permanent settlements and had abandoned their traditionally nomadic way of life. This process was probably not the lot of the tribes around Damascus, for in the days of Herod they are still heard of as cavedwellers who robbed the trade caravans and cast fear into the permanent settlers in their vicinity . 33
34
32 Curitus Rufus, I V , l , 4 - 6 . 33 Idem, op.cit., 24. Strabo, for example, clearly distinguishes between two kinds of Ituraeans, those he calls robbers (xanovpyoi.) and those called 'farmers' (yeopyoi) living in the valleys, in dicating that the change of life of permanent dwellings was not complete and that many contin ued to lead lives of nomads, including robbery and plunder. The description by Strabo (XVI,2, 19) concerns the time of Pompey, that is some 270 years after Alexander the Great. 34 See below, p. 15 8ff.
Chapter 1
In the Mists of Early Generations
Alexander the Great in Eretz-Israel (332-331 BCE) As we have indicated above, by the end of the Persian era (i.e., the close of the fourth century BCE) the Nabataeans had already become an impor tant, perhaps even the preeminent factor in Transjordan and the Negev region of Eretz-Israel. Herodotus, the historian of the Persian-Greek wars, unfortunately failed to specify the identity of the Arabs then controlling the caravan trade from the Arabian Peninsula to the Sinai coast and Egypt, so it is not surprising that their identity is still controversial. For example, there is uncertainty over the Nabataeans' relationship to the Kedarite Arabs, who in the period of Achemenid Persia lived in the south-western regions of Eretz-Israel — the Gaza area - and the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula . From the dawn of the Hellenistic era however, the Nabataeans' major strength clearly found expression in their control of the spice trade-routes from Arabia Felix (Yemen of our days) and the Land of Punt (Somalia), which supplied the Greek world by way of either Syria or Egypt. Western commercial relations with the East - through the agency of Arabs, includ ing the Nabataeans - were extremely ramified and extended as far as India . This international trade could not be maintained without the Arabs as intermediaries; this fact gave the Nabataeans a tremendous advantage which, in the Hellenistic period, greatly contributed to their flourishing economy and inevitably also to their growing political strength. Near the end of his life (323 BCE), Alexander the Great was planning to bring the Arabs under his rule and colonize the shores of the Persian Gulf and its islands, aiming soon to turn them into a kind of Phoenicia of the region (Arrian, VII, 19, 6). It seems his high assessment of the commercial importance of Arab trade had made him determined to organize it under his own protection. Due to his sudden death, however, nothing came of his 1
2
1 On this and their relations with the kings of Achemenide Persia see: Eph'al, The Ancient Arabs, p p . 1 9 2 - 2 1 4 . Milik on the other hand insisted on identifying these Arabs with the Nabataeans, see: Milik, in: Hadidi (ed.), Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan, p.262. 2 See above, Introduction, note 24.
16
In the Mists of Early Generations
military preparations for the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula {pp.cit., 20). The great caution his officers exercised in exploring the peninsula and Alexander's own advance decision to grant his future Arab subjects full autonomy can serve to indicate the Macedonian conqueror's high respect for Arab strength. Unfortunately we know nothing of the identity of the "Arab mercenar ies" whom Alexander fought in Gaza, nor of any links or relations they had with the Nabataeans . The -description "mercenaries" possibly indicates they were not of local origin, perhaps not even from the neighboring regions. Since Gaza's security needs related chiefly to the caravan trade of the Sinai Desert and the Negev of Eretz-Israel, it would be reasonable to assume that any such "Arab mercenaries" hired to protect the city had ap propriate military training, namely: desert warfare. The explicit mention of Nabataeans in connection with events shortly after this (in the days of Antigonus Monophthalmus, 3 1 2 BCE) reinforces the impression that Gaza's defenders were after all Nabataean or some closely related tribe. Either way they belonged to the political camp of Alexander's opponents and the sup porters of Darius III of Persia - one which also included the Jews, at least until the conquest of Gaza in August 332 BCE. Apart from the fact that they belonged to the same political faction, we have no positive knowledge of any political partnership or connection between Gaza and Jerusalem at that time, but it is not inconceivable that there was contact between them and if so, then also between the Arab defenders of Gaza and the people of Judaea. There is a total absence of any information concerning contacts and relations between Jews and Nabataeans in 312 BCE, when Atheneus com manded the army of Antigonus Monophthalmus and his son Demetrius in their campaigns against Petra . It was in fact only then that the Nabataeans made their first clearly identified appearance in recorded history. 3
4
The War of the Diadochi and the Syrian Wars (323-168 BCE) For some 200 years following the death of Alexander in 323 BCE and with the exception of only brief interludes, Eretz-Israel became the arena for continued political and military conflict which disrupted international
3 See: Arrian, II, 25, 4ff.; Curtius Rufus, IV, 6, 7ff.; cf. Josephus, Ant. XI, 320. Kammerer (Petra, p.l 14ff.) for example, referred to the defenders of Gaza as Nabataeans; he did not even consider a different possibility. 4 See above, Introduction, note 14. Also cf. Kammerer, Petra, p.l 16ff.; Negev, Masters of the Desert, p.25ff.
The War of the Diadochs and the Syrian Wars
17
trade and at times threatened its very existence. Mainly affected was the most important trade-route till then, the Via Maris. The Nabataeans, with access to alternate routes, gained greatly in importance. Knowing the by ways of the desert, they could keep commercial activity alive, even in the stormiest days; this became a most important factor in this sensitive region. The longer and more frequent the wars, the more the Nabataeans grew in importance - all this besides "the power and economic strength they ac quired by virtue of the handsome profits to be made in times of interna tional tension and war. This seems to be one of the secrets of their great success and was perhaps the most important factor in their relatively swift transition from a group of semi-nomadic tribes to an organised political power, adopting along the way Hellenistic forms of government. They became a weighty political factor whose existence and interests could not be belittled or ignored. In this stormy period the Nabataeans almost certainly adopted political stands largely if not decisively reflecting their commercial interests. It may accordingly be assumed that having prospered from mediation in commerce between the East (i.e., the Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa, and the Far East) and the West, they feared the creation of direct contacts which would bypass their position as agents. By the same reasoning, the Naba taeans must have looked most favorably on the Syrian Wars, which tied down most of the resources and efforts of the two great Hellenistic powers. As a result the latter had also abandoned their international trade activities with the East, which dropped like ripe fruit into the Nabataeans' lap. Since most of the fighting was concentrated in western Eretz-Israel and the coastal strips of Phoenicia and Syria, they gained an additional prize: they could conduct their commercial activity on the "King's Highway" almost without interference and thereby strengthened their military and diploma tic hold on its southern portion. Also by the same reasoning, during the military contest between the Hel lenistic powers, the Nabataeans might have been expected to strive for diplomatic and military neutrality, since in this way they would derive great benefits. In reality however, matters followed a different course. In their political wisdom the Nabataeans realized that their economic success depended mainly on Egypt. In the long run, Ptolemaic control for about a century (301—200 BCE) over outlets of the trade routes within the sphere of Nabataean activity tipped their policy to cooperation with the rulers of Egypt — cooperation and not political dependency. It seems the Ptolemies were interested in cooperation, though they did not resist from attempting to combat piracy by Arabs (including Nabataeans) in the Red Sea shipping lanes . 5
5 See extensively: Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria, I, p.l76ff.; Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.21 - 2 8 .
18
In the Mists of Early Generations
Diodorus Siculus (XIX, 94, 2; 6ff.) had already realized that the Naba taeans were devoted lovers of freedom. The secret of their success in its preservation he ascribed only to the desert, which alone had enabled them to avoid political enslavement and remain free men. He emphasized that great powers like Assyria and Persia had failed to impose their rule upon them. For the same reasons, Macedonian efforts in the days of Antigonus Monophthalmus had also failed to capture their stronghold in Petra and the Hellinistic powers likewise, could not subdue them. Several times and especially in connection with the Fourth Syrian War, Polybius — our main source of information on the Syrian Wars in EretzIsrael — mentions the involvement of forces whom he refers to as Arabs (Polybius, IV, 70, 1 - 4 ; 79, 3 ; 82, 12 and more). Some scholars have tended to identify them with the Nabataeans , but in fact there is no certainty that this identification is correct. There were after all other Arab tribes within Eretz-Israel, particularly in Transjordan, pursuing policies not in line with those of the Nabataeans. For example, in the days of Judas Maccabaeus and later, while the Nabataeans displayed open friendship to the Hasmonaeans and even actively cooperated with them, other neighboring Arab tribes showed their hostile attitude in determinedly anti-Hasmonaean actions (for full details, see below, p.27ff.). It must further be remembered that the numerical strength of the Nabataeans was relatively small , and it is therefore doubtful if, as a third power, their influence was appreciable enough to disturb the balance of political and military power in the region. At the time of the Syrian Wars, the Nabataeans still lacked the neces sary political strength for this, since they were not yet organised as a regular state with the requisite forms of administration, government, and army. When first heard of, they were under the leadership of King Aretas I, ruling under Seleucid suzerainty in the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes . 6
7
8
6 E.g. see: Altheim-Stiehl, p.74. 7 As we have seen above, Diodorus Siculus (XIX, 94, 4) indicates that in the days of Antigonus Monophthalmus the Nabataeans numbered no more than ten thousand. Even if we assume that he greatly underestimated their numbers or only referred to the number of men who could bear arms, this figure should nevertheless be taken into account as a basis for our demographic esti mates. In other words: we must not make the mistake of overestimating Nabataean strength. Also very instructive in this context are other facts, such as the information that in the year 312 BCE Antigonus Monophthalmus sent a force of 4000 light infantry and 600 horsemen to subjugate the Nabataeans to his rule (Diodorus Siculus, XIX, 94, 1). There is every reason to believe that in his estimation this force was adequate for the task and if so, this can indicate the strength of the opposing force of Nabataeans. After Atheneus failed in this mission, his master Antigonus Monophthalmus did in fact more than double the military force and sent his own son Demetrius Poliorcetes, commanding 4000 light infantry and over 4000 horsemen (ibid., 96, 4), but these figures cannot alter the basic conclusion above, concerning the limited numerical strength of the Nabataeans in those days. 8 Details see below, p.23f.
The War of the Diadochs and the Syrian Wars
19
For the Nabataeans, the Ptolemaic period appears to have been a period of political consolidation in which they carved out political and military supremacy for themselves over the neighboring tribes in the south of Trans jordan. Apart from the fragmentary evidence on Hyrcanus son of Joseph son of Tobias supplied by Josephus (Ant., XII, 229—234), hardly anything is known of relations between Jews and Arabs in the Ptolemaic period. The record relates that after his father's death, Hyrcanus set up a fortified position in the Land of Tobias in Transjordan "and fought ceaselessly against the Arabs, killing many of them and also taking many prisoners". The identity of these Arabs is not clear and there are insufficient grounds for the tendency to regard them as Nabataeans . On the contrary, it even lacks historical logic, for the Nabataeans on the whole tended to side with the Ptolemies, who were their principal source of income. The fact that Hyrcanus son of Joseph son of Tobias was an outspoken supporter of the Ptolemies therefore casts a great shadow of doubt on the identification of these Arabs as Nabataeans. As we have indicated, the Arabs of that region were not all cast in the same mold, especially since the Nabataeans had yet to complete the impo sition of their authority over them all. In the Land of Tobias before the days of Hyrcanus, there had been no need to set up a citadel that was strongly fortified and surrounded by a deep moat as such as done by Hyr canus. This fact may show that in the Ptolemaic period the military gar rison there faced no serious military threat. Though there was a fortress there, as indicated by the names "Tyrus" and "Birtha" mentioned in the Zenon papyri, in its elaborate system of fortifications it was certainly unlike that constructed by Hyrcanus son of Joseph son of Tobias . It ap pears that in addition to the fortified citadel he commissioned the excava tion, over a considerable distance in the rock of the mountain opposite, of roomy caves with chambers as dormitories for permanent residence and 9
10
9 E.g. see: Kammerer, Petra, p.l20ff., esp. 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 ; Altheim-Stiehl, p.77, 86; see also: Hengel, Jews, Greeks and Barbarians, p.l 13; cf. p.35, 38. 10 See: PCZ, 59003. Mentioned there is the place known by its Aramaic name as Birtha, indicating it was fortified. According to Josephus however, the major portion of the fortification works were carried out by Hyrcanus son of Joseph son of Tobias. For details of the place and its arche ological findings, see: McCown, BA, XX (1957), p p . 6 3 - 7 6 ; Lapp, BASOR, CLXV (1962), pp. 1 6 - 3 2 ; idem., BASOR, CLXXI (1963), p p . 3 - 3 8 ; Brett, BASOR, C1XXI (1963), p p . 3 9 - 4 5 . Recent support for those doubting^|he information provided by Josephus comes from Gera, who claims the citadel was built at a much earlier date; details of this view are due to appear in Gera's article to be published by Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi in the collection 'Greece and Rome in EretzIsrael'. In this context it should be noted that most scholars identify the site of Hyrcanus' monu mental construction (a detailed description of which follows) with Qasser-el-Abed close to Iraqel-Emir. We feel that Gera's reservations are not sufficiently substantiated, especially as they bring no substantial archeological evidence to undermine Josephus' credibility.
20
In the Mists of Early Generations
even for banqueting halls. The network of caves was provided with running water which in addition to its practical benefits gave the place a special beauty of splendor. For security reasons the entrances to the caves were cut only large enough to allow the passage of a single person to help its defend ers in times of siege. Around these structures Hyrcanus set up spacious enclosures and provided them with large orchards, probably also building fruit trees. From the description of this monumental project, it is easy to see con siderable Nabataean influence, especially in the splendid caves cut into the rock and in the nearby installations, features already known from Petra itself. It may be assumed that in this construction project Hyrcanus em ployed local craftsmen and any of his allies experienced in such monumen tal construction. Moreover, it is hard to accept the idea that he managed at one and the same time to work on the project and engage in "ceaseless" fighting (as described by Josephus) against the Arabs of the vicinity. If we assume that those Arabs belonged to the tribes who had not yet submitted to Nabataean hegemony and were not cooperating with them, we may con clude that there was in fact a strong base for cooperation between Hyrca nus and the Nabataeans. This impression becomes even stronger in view of the information given by Josephus and confirmed by archeological remains, on the great splendor invested in this construction project, all showing it was not executed under conditions of pressure and hardship, with inadequate resources of man power and raw materials. In our opinion this clearly demonstrated Hyrca nus' feeling of security, largely based on the pact with his nearby Naba taean neighbors. Also very significant in this context is the fact that in his wars with the other Arabs in the region Hyrcanus took many prisoners. Some of them he possibly employed as forced labor on his construction work, but at the same time it must be remembered that capturing prisoners produced a further and even greater economic advantage by way of the slave trade, in which the Nabataeans were strongly interested and had ex tensive experience. In our opinion, most of the Nabataeans' slave trade was naturally channelled to Ptolemaic Egypt as their principal, traditional market, rather than to the markets of Syria and Phoenicia which were controlled by the Seleucid enemy. Thus Hyrcanus son of Joseph son of Tobias clearly found allies in the Nabataeans, enjoying their friendship and good services. For their part they not only reaped considerable commercial profits from his wars against 11
11 For details on the slave trade between Eretz-Israel and Ptolemaic Egypt, with Nabataeans as intermediaries, see e.g. report by Tcherikover on the Zenon papyri: Jews in the Greek and Roman World, p p . 9 0 - 9 4 ; Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria I, p.74.
21
The War of the Diadochs and the Syrian Wars
those Arab tribes who had not submitted to their rule and apparently sup ported the Seleucids, but in practice he also helped them gain supremacy in the region over those tribes. Taking no active part in the fighting against the pro-Seleucid Arab tribes, they could adopt an outward semblance of neutrality, but quietly, behind the scenes, they apparently assisted Hyrca nus. In return he performed the task of winning for them the Arab hege mony for which they were aiming. Their pursuit of this policy gave them opportunities for extensive political manoeuvering: whenever expedient they could easily retreat from their previous position, and appear obedient and cooperative towards the Seleucids. In our opinion, such a switch pos sibly occurred in 169 BCE when, in the wake of their country's conquest by Antiochus IV Epiphanes, the fortunes of the Ptolemies plunged. At that moment or shortly afterwards, the fate of Hyrcanus son of Joseph son of Tobias was sealed . One of the first pieces of evidence concerning relations of the Jewish community in Eretz-Israel with the Nabataean Arabs relates to the affair of the Hellenized Jewish leader, Jason (IIMace., 5 : 8 - 1 0 ) , in the reign of the Seleucid king Antiochus IV Epiphanes. More precisely, the information is incorporated in the review of an abortive attempt to seize Jerusalem, when Jason exploited the opportunity provided by one of the military campaigns for the conquest of Egypt conducted by Antiochus Epiphanes. In the chronological reconstruction most widely accepted by modern schol ars, Tcherikover proposed that the affair began in 168 BCE, during Antio chus Epiphanes' second Egyptian campaign of conquest . In fact however, as we shall immediately see, there is no certain and solid base for this sug gestion. It should be remembered that the description*in II Mace, concerning the affair of Jason does not match the account in / Mace., which in general is a fairly accurate and reliable historical record, even if it deliberately ignores everything concerning the Hellenizers such as Jason himself. Further more, however tempting the intrinsic logic of Tcherikover's chronological reconstruction might be, we must not forget the significant and decisive fact that it is based on the book of II Mace. This source by its own admission is not an historical book at all and deliberately sacrifices accuracy of detail on the altar of literary content and the didactic-educational and instruc12
13
12 See below, p p . 2 3 - 2 4 . 13 Tcherikover, Jews and Greeks, p. 15Iff; idem, Hellenistic Civilization, p.00; idem, Jews in the Greek and Roman World, p.l65ff, cf. Abel, Les livres des Maccabies, p.339;Momigliano,/Wme linee di storia delta traditione maccabaica, p. 193; Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, I, pp.11, 2 7 5 276; II, p.8, note 47; Schurer, I , p p . 1 5 0 - 1 5 3 , esp. notes 32, 37; see recently: Bringmann, Hellenistische Reform und Religionsverfolgung in Judaa, p p . 2 9 - 4 0 (esp. 3 9 0 ; Th.Fischer, Klio, LXVII (1985), p p . 3 5 1 - 3 5 2 . s
22
In the Mists of Early Generations
tional-m oralis t objectives its author sets for himself (IIMace, 2 : 1 9 - 3 2 ; 15: 3 8 - 3 9 ) . Therefore what is described there as the "second campaign" to Egypt (5:1) need not, as do most scholars in following Tcherikover's lead, necessarily be taken as the second in the sequence of campaigns described in the book of Daniel ( l l : 2 5 f f . ) , or as second in relation to the single campaign described in I Mace. (1:16—19). By strict logic, its "second"ness must be examined in relation to another campaign, previously mentioned in the book of II Mace, itself (4:21), and also directed against Egypt. It is therefore much more reasonable to assume that the author of / / Mace. used the numbering "second" on the basis of his own numbering and not that of another source. It is therefore not inconceivable that / Mace, and // Mace, in actual fact referred to the very same campaign, each author illuminating the affair involved from his own special point of view and in accordance with his own conception, inclination, and emphases . The cor relation between / Mace, 1 : 2 9 - 3 5 and IIMace, 5:24—26 on the second conquest of Jerusalem can only confirm the conclusion that the first con quest described in each one of these two chronicles (i.e., I Mace 1:20—25, and IIMace 5:11 —20) is in fact one and the same; the disparities between the two descriptions arises as indicated from differences in approach and outlook between the two records. To sum up: according to our reasoning, Jason attacked Jerusalem in 169 BCE and that same year, on the return of Antiochus IV Epiphanes from Egypt, he fled the city. Following this, Jerusalem was captured and the Temple robbed of its treasures and holy vessels. IIMace 5:7 goes on to 14
14 My thanks are due to Efron, from whom I first heard these reservations on Tcherikover's sugges tion. According to //Mace. (4:21), the first campaign took place in 172 BCE; at that time Pto lemy VI Philometor, following the line of Eulaeus and Lenaeus - the militants of his court issued aggressive political proclamations against the Seleucids, with the intention of bringing Eretz-Israel back into the Ptolemaic kingdom. On this incident see Bevan, The House of Ptolemy, p.283ff;also Will, II, p p . 2 6 3 - 2 6 6 . The story in / / Mace. ( 5 : 5 - 1 0 ) on the affair of Jason is a complete literary entity with an evidently didactic educational purpose: to prove that the fate of the wicked was determined by the degree of his crime. It therefore relates the story of Jason in full, from his march on Jerusa lem until his death in Sparta. Only then does 77 Mace, go on to the other episode, beginning with the return of Antiochus IV Epiphanes from Egypt and ending with the religious persecutions against Judaism. Since II Mace, does not normally record dates, there is no way of knowing how these two series of events interrelated chronologically. In any case, if only by the logic of simple chronological arithmetic, there is no reason to believe that the entire story of Jason ending in his death in Sparta, had unfolded before the return of Antiochus IV Epiphanes from Egypt (that being the narrative sequence in II Mace). After all, it is highly improbable that such evidently long-drawn-out events could have been packed into a period as short as that taken by Antiochus IV Ephiphanes to march from Egypt to Eretz-Israel. Since / / Mace, does not indicate the cause for Jason's flight from Jerusalem, we also cannot state with any certainty that it was because of the Jewish uprising (as suggested by Tcherikover) or the return of Antiochus IV Epiphanes from Egypt (to whom we incline). In short, this chronological problem is too complex for a generally agreed and certain solution.
The War of the Diadochs and the Syrian Wars
23
relate that Jason, "again" a fugitive, fled to the land of the Ammonites (ipwyao, itd\iv etc. T-QV 'AnnaviTiv dnrjXOep), and as he had done once before (in the year 172 BCE), when deposed from the High Priesthood by Menelaus, probably "again" asked for refuge with Hyrcanus son of Joseph son of Tobias . Unlike the previous time however, in 169 BCE he did not make good his escape. According to IIMace. 5:8: "his career came to a miserable end; for, after being imprisoned by Aretas the ruler of the Arabs, he fled from city to city, hunted by all, hated as a rebel against the laws (i.e., of the Torah) and detested as the executioner of his country and his fellowcitizens, and finally was driven to take refuge in Egypt" etc. It therefore appears that this time he did not find political asylum with his former benefactor (Hyrcanus son of Joseph son of Tobias), and this it seems because the latter had committed suicide, literally frightened to death by Antiochus IV Epiphanes (Josephus, Ant., XII, 2 3 6 ) . This dating makes such behavior understandable, for Antiochus IV Epiphanes had just succeeded in conquering Egypt and taking captive her king, Ptolemy VI Philometor, who till then had provided solid support for Hyrcanus son of Joseph son of Tobias . The dating is also acceptable in view of the fact that the capture of Jerusalem in the same year (169 BCE) might have indicated to Hyrcanus that he would not for long escape a similar fate. It is not impossible that the pro-Ptolemaic Land of Tobias at that time came under renewed attack by several Arab tribes simultaneously, 15
16
17
15 Cf. / / Mace,4:26 —^irya? eic ri)v 'Kmiavlnv xwpa" ovvrfXaoro, and the use of the word7ra\u> (= again) in II Mace, 5:7 is well understood in its context. See Abel, Les Livres des Maccabies, p.338; Momigliano, Prime linee di storia della traditione maccabaica, p.193; Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, I, p.275. The use of the term 'Ammanitis' is apparently derived from the Ptolemaic nomenclature, which was familiar to / / Mace. There is every reason to believe that 'Ammanitis' herein refers to 'the Land of Tobias', whose center Tyrus-Birtha is described in the Zenon papyri as a place lying in the region of 'Ammanitis', e.g. see PCZ, 59003.. 16 On the complex chronological problem connected with 'the House of Tobias', cf. Tcherikover, Jews and Creeks, p p . 1 0 2 - 1 1 2 ; Stern, Trabiz, XXXII (1963), p p . 3 5 - 4 7 ; Fuks, Cathedra, VIII (1978), p p . 6 - 9 ; idem, Scythopolis, a Greek City etc., p p . 4 7 - 4 9 . As for the suicide of Hyrcanus son of Joseph son of Tobias, it need not necessarily be assumed that the text of Ant. XII, 236 indicates it occurred in the first year in the. reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, i.e. 175 BCE, as was recently proposed - e.g. by Bar-Kochva (The Seleucid Army, p. 198; The Hasmonaean Wars, p. 93) and Th. Fischer (Seleukiden und Makkabaer, p. 13). On the contrary, it is more rea sonable to assume that the seven years' rule of Hyrcanus refer to this year, that is seven years starting 175 BCE(!); cf. Abel, loc.cit.; Mimigliano, ibid., pp.185, 193; Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, I, p p . 2 7 5 - 2 7 6 ; idem, Jews, Greeks and Barbarians, p.67 and note 17. Cf. also: Ricciotti, History of Israel, p.223. Gera's attempt to reject outright the story of Hyranus' suicide and to argue it was merely a literary invention (see note 10 above) does not pass the test of sources' criticism, since he quotes no real support for his argument. 17 On Hyrcanus'.policy, see; Bitchier, Die Tobiaden und die Oniaden, p.50ff; Swain, Classical Philo logy, XXXIX (1944), p.76ff.;P16ger, ZDPV, LXXI (1955), p.79ff; see further: Goldstein, I Mac cabees, p p . 2 9 8 - 2 9 9 ; idem., / / Maccabees, p.208; also Goldstein, in: Studies for Morton Smith III, p p . 8 9 - 9 3 , 9 9 - 1 0 1 .
24
In the Mists of Early Generations
in coordination with the Seleucids and perhaps even with their active assis tance . These it seems were the same tribes whom Hyrcanus had already fought in the past and for fear of whom he had built his fortified citadel surrounded by a deep m o a t . In his distress, Jason apparently appealed to the Nabataean ruler ("ty rant" in the original), Aretas I , presumably having some standing at the Ptolemaic royal court, thanks to his people's traditional friendship and extensive trade with Egypt. From the text of II Mace. (5:8) it is not clear when Jason was impri soned by Aretas and at least two logical proposals may be made for this: a) His arrest came immediately after Jason escaped from Jerusalem to Transjordan, either because Aretas feared the vengeance of Antiochus IV Epiphanes should he grant asylum to Jason and thereby openly demon strate a pro-Ptolemaic stand, or because the Nabataean ruler had some what modified his political stand following the far-reaching changes wrought by the conquest of Egypt, the capture of Ptolemy VI Philometor, and the conquest of Jerusalem ; or b) Jason's arrest occurred at a later date, perhaps in 167 BCE, following the friendship formed between Judas Maccabaeus and the Nabataeans (/ Mace. 5:25) with the object of handing him over to the Jews. Either suggestion is feasible and so the riddle remains unresolved. 18
19
20
21
18 Kammerer (Petra, p.l35ff) tried to complete the picture by proposing that there had been an additional Seleucid campaign supported by Menelaus and his followers, but his suggestion seems to be nothing more than mere speculation. 19 See above, p.00 and note 10. 20 At first sight, the title 'tyrant' indicates that Aretas did not yet bear the title of 'king', but one of the epigraphic finds at Elusa, which can be no later than 150 BCE indicates another possibil ity, as it clearly mentions a king of that name. Details on this see Schiirer, I , p.557 and note 7; Negev, Between Hermon and Sinai, p. 153; idem., Masters of the Desert, p.31; Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p. 18. On the term 'tyrant' in relation to Arab rulers, see also Altheim-Stiehl, pp.133, 136, 290. 21 Hammond (The Nabataeans etc., p.16) for example, believed that in view of the aforementioned political events, Aretas hoped to use Jason as a possible political bargaining counter with the Sel eucids; he did not elaborate. s
Chapter 2
Days of the First Hasmonaeans
Judas Maccabaeus (167-161 BCE) The Arab tribes in the region of Transjordan were not all cast in the same mold; their relations with the Jewish community were therefore also not uniform. During the fourth Syrian War, for example, there were quite a number of Arab tribes who supported the Seleucids . In the course of the military campaign to rescue persecuted Jews throughout the country (163 BCE) "Judas then made war on the descendants of Esau in Idumaea and attacked Acrabattene, because they hemmed Israel in" (/ Mace, 5:3). The "descendants of Esau" (or rather the "Sons of Esau" = i w y 'a a), a name no doubt borrowed from biblical nomenclature, is applied to the in habitants of Idumaea (henceforth, the Idumaeans). As for Acraba or Acrabeta, and more precisely, the region of Acraba (Acrabattene) as in the text (17 'AKpa^aTTrjwn), its location is in dispute. Some scholars interpret it as the Ascent of Akrabbim in the Negev and mentioned in the Bible (Num., 3 4 : 4 ; Joshua, 15:3; Judges, 1:36) ; others favor the Acrabeta district on the eastern boundary of Judaea and Samaria, known to have had a mixed and therefore also a very strife-ridden popula tion (cf. Josephus, War, II, 2 3 5 ) . Those preferring the second opinion tended to correct 'Ibovnaia (Idumaea) to 'lovSaia (Judaea), even though this correction does not resolve the geographic difficulty arising out of the simple fact that the Acrabeta district was not an organic part of Judaea. Actually, emphasis should be laid on the factual (and thus also the textual) connection linking the Sons of Esau and Edom with the Acrabeta district, 1
2
3
1 See above, p. 18 and note 6. See also Livy, XXXVII, 40, 12; and Bevan, House of Seleucus, I, p.317, II, p.289; Bar-Kochva, Seleucid Army, pp.49, 136, 229 (note 128). On changes in rela tions between the Nabataeans and Seleucids on one hand and the Ptolemies on the other, see also Altheim-Stiehl, p.73ff., but exception must be taken to the tendency to identify the Arabs in this connection with the Nabataeans. 2 E.g. see Abel, Les livres des Maccabies, p.89; Kahana, Apocrypha, II p.l 18; Marcus, Josephus, VII, p.170 (Ant., XII 328); Schflrer, I , p.164 and note 3; I I , p.192, note 32. 3 See Avi-Yonah, Carta's Atlas, map 27; idem., Hellenistic period, p.l 14. Cf. also Hdlscher, Palastina in der persischen undhellenistischen Zeit, 1903, p.169; idem, ZPDV, XXIX (1906), p.l37ff.; Be'nevot, Die beiden Makkabderbuecher, ad loc. s
s
26
Days of the First Hasmonaeans 4
a connection which is also supported by archeological findings . On the other hand, Josephus' paraphrase (Ant., XII, 328) creates the impression that the reference is to the Ascent of Akrabbim in the Negev, the historic subsistence area of the Sons of Esau. It is, however, very likely that he created this impression based on his own personal interpretation and not on the use of an independent source. The distinction in I Mace, between this assault by Judas Maccabaeus on the Sons of Esau in 'I5ou/mta/Idumaea (or 'Iou5ou'a/Judaea) in the Acrabeta district (t) AKpaPaTTrjur)) and his assault on the Sons of Esau in the Land of the Negev (this is discussed further below) may indicate that I Mace, made a clear geographic distinction, and that the reference was to two completely distinct operations in two different places. Against that interpretation, however, there is also the possibility, no less probable, that the description of the second attack (I Mace, 5:65—68) was of a schematic nature written in typically biblical terms, such as Sons of Esau, "Hebron and her [depen dent] villages" (n ' m a m p - i n n ) , and others. It is hard to choose between the two possibilities, since we clearly have no way of determining with any degree of certainty which of them to prefer. Taken at face value, the first assault, in an area close to Judaea, was a surprise attack with the apparent object of opening the way for contact with the Jews of Peraea; whereas the second campaign, apparently at a later date, was conducted against the Sons of,Esau in the Land of the Negev ( m a n y-)x). Then Judas Mac cabaeus defeated Hebron and her dependent villages, surrounded by their fortifications and towers, later also Marisa in western Idumaea thus aveng ing the defeat of his subordinates, Joseph son of Zechariah and Azariah, 5
6
4 On the connection between Mount Esau and Edom in the Bible, see: Kochmann, dissertation, p.214ff. As for the Acraba district, it is worth noting that in the Book of Judith (7:18) there is mention of an Edomite settlement called Koz (in the southern Mikhmetath Valley) apparently named after the Idumaean god, see Safrai, Borders and Rule in Eretz-Israel, p.52. Finds in Wddi Daliyeh also prove that among the fugitives of southern Samaria at the end of the 4th century BCE there were some with names prominently containing the Idumaean theophoric component Kos (or Qos, Cos etc.), see: Cross, in: New Directions in Biblical Archaeology (eds. Freedman & Greenfield), p.47. On the toparchy of Acraba or Acrabeta (Acrabattene) see also: Safrai, ibid., in various places (from index); Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, pp.18, 22, 33, 47, 51, 62, 66, 69, 122;Eusebius also mentions a place called Adumim in the Land of Benjamin, a village which in his time was already known as Edouma (ESovnd), in the Acrabattene district, some twelve miles from Neapolis, see: Onomastikon, p.86.11.24-26. 5 This impression of the nature of the invasion is supported by the version of Josephus who used the verb imneaCjv (eniirlnTU).). 6 / Mace, 5 : 6 5 - 6 6 ; Ant., XII 353; cf. IIMace, 1 0 : 2 1 - 2 3 . Rappaport's reservation (Doron, p.222, note 14) concerning the accuracy of / Mace, based on comparison with the text of the Book of Jubilees XXXVII-XXXVIII, is not convincing, since the latter is not an historic record at all, more so since its historical obscurities cannot be dispersed easily, if at all. Fuller details on this campaign in western Idumaea, see below.
Judas Maccabaeus
27
while he was on his campaign in the Gilead and his brother Simon was similarly engaged in Galilee (IMace, 5 : 5 5 - 6 2 ; Ant., XII, 3 5 0 - 3 5 2 ) . The Idumaeans' hostility towards their Jewish neighbors at this time should not be interpreted as a perpetuation of hostile relations from the Persian era. Even if it seems an over-simplification, Rappaport's interpreta tion that the Idumaeans at that time "resembled tribes of the various kinds of nomads and looters" and that they were therefore motivated "by objectives of robbery and plunder rather than by substantial differences between them and the Jews" , under the circumstances does reflect the reality of that time. Furthermore, in that historical period the rural Idu maean population was still controlled by the cities of Marisa and Adora (or Adoraim). It seems that with the growing Hellenization initiated by Antiochus IV Epiphanes, in those very days serious internal rifts and con flicts had begun to form between the rural and the urban sectors of the Idumaean people. In consequence, with the Jews demonstrating powers of resistance to the Seleucid regime and the surrounding Hellenistic cities, the rural sector of Idumaeans gradually began to develop an identity of inter ests with the Jews - interests of oppressed native village populations, with a background of shared hostility to the Seleucid regime and its close allies, the Hellenistic cities. In Rappaport's opinion, this shared experience even tually, in a later generation, also led to the conversion of the Idumaeans to Judaism . 7
8
This seems to us a fairly convincing explanation of the turn for the better in relations between Jews and the rural sector of Idumaeans, who in contrast to their urban brethren did not incline to Hellenization. Apart from this, there are grounds for assuming that Idumaean society, by nature tribal, was at that time divided on a basis of clans into two principal groups. Families and leaders in western Idumaea were apparently more inclined to accept the Phoenician-Hellenistic influence of the neighboring coastal cities, while those in eastern Idumaea and the Negev regions were more suscepti ble to the influence of Jewish society, whose main strength lay in the interior of the country. No wonder therefore that at the battle of Emmaus urban Idumaeans already took an active part on the side of the Seleucids against the Hasmonaean rebels . During his campaign, Judas Maccabaeus turned to Transjordan where he first disposed of the Sons of Baean who had been setting ambushes on the roads and robbing those who used them. Though their precise identity has 9
7 Rappaport, Down, p.222. 8 A specific, detailed discussion of this problem will be brought below, p.46ff. 9 See full details on this in my book, Jews and the Hellenistic Cities, (forthcoming), ch.2. We will not discuss this affair here, since by nature it belongs to the fabric of relations between the Jews and the Hellenistic cities.
28
Days of the First Hasmonaeans
not been sufficiently well established, the author of / Mace, apparently adopted the biblical nomenclature (Num., 32:3) which was applied to the city of Ba'al Me'on (ibid., 3 8 : ] near Medeba in the Moab re g i o n . The Sons of Baean ( p y m ' j a ) are characterized as typical nomads (beduin) lurking on the roads to plunder trade caravans (see also below). After that, Judas Maccabaeus attacked the Sons of Ammon, who had "great power and large numbers" and were commanded by Timotheus (/ Mace, 5:6). Who were the Sons of Ammon? No doubt this name, like Sons of Esau and Sons of Baean, is also borrowed from biblical nomen clature and in reality was probably connected with the Ammanitis region, where the first battle against them took place — more precisely, at a place called Jazer ('Iafrjp) . From the description of the battle against Timoth eus we learn that his forces included many from the Arab tribes in the vicinity who fought alongside the regular forces under his c o m m a n d . . These were certainly among the tribes who, as indicated above, had re mained loyal to the Seleucids since the fourth Syrian War. Timotheus himself was apparently the Seleucid strategos in command of Transjor10
11
12
13
10 Most scholars believe the name Baean (or Be'on) was a phonetic corruption of the nameAfe'oM (Joshua, 13:17) or Beth-Me'on (Jeremiah, 48:23), see: Abel, Les livres des Maccabees, p p . 8 9 - 9 0 ; Avi-Yonah, Hellenistic Period, p.l 14. In Avi-Yonah's opinion the ambushes of the Sons of Baean were designed to sever the link between the Jews and their friends the Nabataeans. 11 There is no doubt the use of the term 'hand' (xeip) or 'arm' derives from biblical usage, as already rightly pointed out by Abel (ibid., p.90), but it seems that also in Greek this term indicates a military unit, see: Liddell &Scott, Lexicon, s.v. xetp (v), p,1984;not for nothing did Josephus in his parallel version use the expression 'force' (Swafiiq). The term \aov noXvs could indicate the Arab contingent in the forces of Timotheus, see also below, note 12. 12 Cf. / / Mace, 10:32, which gives Gezer; this is universally accepted to be a misconstruction or mistake of copy-scribes, and they should have written 'Jazer'. Today the place is identified with great certainty with the Hirbet a-Sir site - see Abel, Les livres des Maccabdes, p p . 9 0 - 9 1 , 415; Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p.166; Avi-Yonah, Gazetteer, p.68. Goldstein (IIMaccabees., p. 3 94) on the other hand, tried to explain the change of names on the basis of biblical similari ties, but he was too free with his imagination. 13 I Mace, 5:39; Ant., XII 341; cf. II Mace, 1 2 : 1 0 - 1 2 . In / / Mace, 8:32, one of Timotheus'com manders was called ipvkapxw (=head of tribe), which can be accepted as reasonable in view of the participation of Arab tribes in his campaigns. See Abel, ibid., p.394 (II Mace, 8:30); BarKochva, Battles of the Hasmonaeans, p.355; Bartlett, / / Mace, 2:32, p.285; Fischer, Seleukiden und Makkabtier, p.63 and note 162. On use of the term *pv\apxns see also Strabo, XVI, 2, 1 0 11, (753); XVI, 1,28, (748); Josephus, Ant., XIII 384; Cicero, Ad Fam., 15, 1, 2; Le Bas & Waddington, Ins. No. 2404 etc. Also see extensively, Altheim-Stiehl, passim. In the view of BarKochva (Battles of the Hasmonaeans p.357) Timotheus' forces were not regular army units but were composed of local militias, mercenaries from among the nomads and perhaps also a small garrison force. However, his arguments are not fully convincing, even less so since he has not succeeded in depriving the terms 'mercenaries' and 'Asian horse' (or 'Asian cavalry') mentioned in / / Mace, 10:24, of real meaning, indicating regular units in the Seleucid army; cf. explanation by Goldstein, II Maccabees, p p . 3 9 6 - 3 9 7 . Very persuasive on the other hand is the chronological reconstruction Bar-Kochva proposes in connection with the review of Judas Maccabaeus' cam paigns in Transjordan according to II Mace, (Battles of the Hasmonaeans, p.353ff.).
Judas Maccabaeus
29
14
d a n and his military activity was probably intended to eliminate nests of local resistance by Ptolemaic loyalties, headed by the inhabitants of the Land of Tobias . The military campaign by Judas Maccabaeus to rescue the Jews of Trans jordan was conducted in three stages: a) The march to the Land of Ammon (Ammanitis), which ended in the conquest of Jazer and its dependent villages (IMace, 5:6-8) . b) The war in Gilead, which focussed mainly around Bostra in the Land of T o b and the fortress of Dathema (ibid., 2 8 - 3 4 ) . c) The final campaign against Timotheus around Raphon and Karnaim (ibid., 3 6 - 5 4 ) . It is worth noting that in these campaigns Judas Maccabaeus from the outset enjoyed the cooperation of the Nabataeans (ibid., 25), showing that their policy was clearly anti-Seleucid. This should come as no surprise and may be understood in the light of their economic interests that were strongly linked with Egypt since the beginning of the Hellenistic period. 15
1 6
1 7
1 8
14 Cf. Abel, ibid., p.90 (to / Mace, 5:6), p.394 (to II Mace, 8:30); Rappaport, Doron, p.221; Bar-Kochva, Battles of the Hasmonaeans, p.357. As against this, Goldstein was misled by the chronologically confused information of II Mace, and made the mistake of thinking there were two commanders called Timotheus, see Goldstein, I Maccabees, p . 2 9 6 - 2 9 7 ; idem., II Maccabees, pp.339, 340, 395, 433 and cf. also Kahana, Apocrypha, II p.214. Against this possibility, see Doran, Temple Propaganda etc. p.59; Bar-Kochva, Battles of the Hasmonaeans, p.353ff, and esp. p.355 and note 5. 15 See Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, I, p.276; Bar-Kochva, Battles of the Hasmonaean, p.93 (note 26). 16 On biblical comparisons of this campaign Goldstein, as indicated, let his imagination run wild (note 14 above). 17 / Mace, 5:13 reads: ol ovres kv rot? rovQlov and the reference is to those who had been butcher ed by their neighbors (1000 in number), under the command of Timotheus. Who were these people? Some identify them with the inhabitants of the biblical Land of Tov (Judges, 11:3; 77 Samuel, 10:1) - see for example Kahana's commentary to I Mace, (Apocrypha, II 1, p.119); Abel, Les livres des Maccabdes, pp.93, 436; Dancy, I Maccabees, p.104; Bartlett, Maccabees, p p . 6 9 - 7 0 ; Meyer, Ursprung etc. II, p.134, note 1. Conversely some scholars, on the grounds of the use of the term x^wpxta would identify them as "Tobias' men", who were soldiers - see for example Niese, Geschichte der griechischen u. makedonischen Staaten etc., Ill, p.226, note 1; Hengel, ibid., I p.276; and cf. also Goldstein, I Maccabees, p . 2 9 8 - 2 9 9 . This report in I Mace. should also serve as base for that in II Mace, 12:17 concerning Judas Maccabaeus' march to the rescue of "the Jews called Tubians", (=rovq \eyonevovs TOVQULVOVS 'lovSaiovq) who lived in a place called 6 Xdpa£, located at a distance of 750 stadia from Caspein. The geographic difficul ties in identifying the place and the problematic data of distances in this connection were already noted by Abel (ibid., p p . 4 3 6 - 4 3 7 ) and it is not clear whether the reference is to the city of Charax or some sort of military location, or more precisely a "fortified camp" in the Land of Tobias, cf.: Habicht, 2. Makkaba'erbuch, p.262. In fact the possibility that II Mace, 12:17 refers to a fortified place in the Land of Tobias (and not the Land of Tov) is definitely acceptable, especially in view of the distances mentioned (750 stadia are some 125 km.). Cf. also the article by Gera to be published soon (chap.l, note 10). 18 See full details, including discussion of the parallel evidence in II Mace, in: Bar-Kochva, Battles of the Hasmonaeans, Appendix 6, p.353ff, and see also p.30 below.
Days of the First Hasmonaeans
30
The friendly meeting between Judas Maccabaeus and the Nabataeans, when he received vital information on the fate of the Jews of Gilead (ibid., 2 5 - 2 6 ) , took place after a three days' march in the desert. Unfortunately its location cannot be identified and therefore Starcky's suggestion of Auranitis is far from certain . In any case, from the description in I Mace. it may be deduced that the desert he crossed must have extended to the east of Gilead . The friendship the Nabataeans showed to Judas Macca baeus was sincere and genuine. In this context it must be sharply distin guished from the report in 77 Mace. ( 1 2 : 1 0 - 1 2 ) about the attitude of "the Arabs" and the "nomads" who, after he had defeated them, were forced to relinquish their hostility to Judas Maccabaeus for an appeasing and con ciliatory policy. There is indeed a significant difference between the de scriptions of these events in I Mace, and II Mace . Some scholars therefore believe it was not hatred in principle or politi cal hostility which induced the Arabs of Transjordan to harass their Jewish neighbors, but rather a lust for robbery and plunder typical of such nomad ic tribes . Though this explanation is logical and on the whole correct, it cannot ignore the fact that these tribes also operated in an orderly fashion under the leadership of a Seleucid commander (Timotheus). The apparently inevitable conclusion points to a Seleucid effort to unify the small Arab tribes of Transjordan in order to curb Nabataean expansionist tendencies and to foil their ambitions for Arab sovereignty in cooperation with the Jewish rebels in this desert region. Unfortunately there is no indication of the precise tribal identity of the Arabs whom Judas Maccabaeus fought. But the concentration of most of the sites of engagements and battles east and north of the Jarmuk (Hieromyces) River — Bostra, Bosor, Alema, Caspein (or Casphor), Maked (or Maker), Karnaim and Raphon (IMace, 5:26ff; / / Mace, 1 2 : 1 0 - 2 6 ; Ant., XII, 3 4 4 - 3 5 5 ) - may indicate their political identification with Seleucid adherents in the Damascus region. Presumably at least some of them were Ituraeans, which would agree with the scene of fighting so far to the North . 19
20
21
22
2 3
24
19 Starcky, Dictionnaire, col. 905; Negev, ANR W, II, 8, p.532. 20 Smith, Historical Geography, p.395, note 3, also Avi-Yonah, Holy Land, p.40. Bowersock (Ro man Arabia, p. 19) recently again maintained like Starcky that the meeting took place in Aurani tis, where in his opinion the Nabataeans had long since penetrated. Stalemate. 21 This in contrast to Kahana, Apocrypha, II, p.219 (in his commentary to II Mace, 1 2 - 1 0 ) . Cf. Abel, Les livres des Maccabies, pp.96, 435; Bar-Kochva, Battles of the Hasmonaeans, p.357. Cf. also: Ant., XII 3 3 5 - 3 3 9 ; also Rappaport, Doron, p.220, and note 4; also see recently: Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.l 9 - 2 0 . 22 Rappaport, loc.cit.; idem, Jewish Religious Propaganda, p p . 6 7 - 6 8 . 23 On identification of places, see Abel's commentaries on the Books of the Maccabees (in the relevant references) also Avi-Jonah, Hellenistic Period (Hebrew), p.232, note 48. 24 Cf. Avi-Yonah, Carta's Atlas, map 34, p.27, and see map 4.>
Judas Maccabaeus
3\
Map 4: Judas Maccabaeus' Campaigns to Transjordan (163 BCE)
25
The differences arising later on between Bostra and Petra , and the ties between Bostra and the Hellenistic cities of Transjordan may be an indica tion of tension between the two cities in earlier times as well. In any case,
25 See: Kindler, The Coinage of Bostra, p. 12.
32
Days of the First Hasmonaeans 26
the extended campaign by Judas Maccabaeus — far from the borders of his homeland and under adverse conditions in arid, mountainous terrain — forces the conclusion that, beyond the mere supply of information (as described in I Mace, 5:25), he enjoyed local cooperation and generous logistic support, provided either by the Nabataeans or by other anti-Seleucid tribes under their rule. This conclusion is also supported by the fact he had to conquer well-fortified places, which probably also required the em ployment of siege engines , supporting operations in the construction of dikes for siege and breaching actions, draft animals for hauling and trans portation, supplies of stone missiles, arrows, etc. It is simply inconceivable that Judas Maccabaeus on his own could have contended with such prob lems without practical assistance by local forces. Their geographic location indicates with certainty that these fortified places formed part of the Seleucid line of defence protecting Damascus and its access roads. This explains why Timotheus, the Seleucid area command er, took personal charge of their defence and that is why the Nabataeans were so anxious to strike out against them. In short, the Nabataeans had important interests and strong motives for assisting Judas Maccabaeus; without their help, it is very doubtful whether he would have succeeded in his mission of rescuing the small and remote Jewish communities who were under pressure from their neighbors. In this context it should be noted that the operation of gathering the Jewish refugees and bringing them to Judaea was also n o simple matter, but rather quite a complex undertaking, requir ing the solution of considerable logistic problems. It is again most unlikely that Judas Maccabaeus could have handled these without local assistance. We must also remember that the military campaign to Transjordan involved Judas Maccabaeus in conflict, or at least great risk of conflict, with several Hellenistic cities , a fact which created additional obstacles for him, furth27
28
26 It is hard to estimate how long Judas Maccabaeus stayed in Transjordan but it was certainly a number of months. 27 Interpretation of the names of settlements Bostra and Bosor are probably related to the term (=fortress) indicating they were fortified sites. See: Lowenstamm, EB, II, p . 3 0 8 . 1 Mace, 5:30 relates as though by the way that in Dathema a great deal of booty, including ladders and military machines fell into the hands of Judas Maccabaeus; these were probably used in the breaching operations he conducted against some of the fortresses in Transjordan. Though the description of the battle for Caspein (IIMace, 1 2 : 1 3 - 1 6 ) stated the place was captured without iron rams and siege machines, the allegoric mention of the capture of Jericho in the days of Joshua son of Nun (in the prayer of Judas Maccabaeus before the walls of Caspein) should indi cate these things were said for rhetorical effect and with considerable exaggeration, for the pur pose of inflating the victory achieved in breaching the walls of the city. In any case, a short while later Judas Maccabaeus employed military machines against the Acra (in Jerusalem) and at BethZur (/ Mace, 6:20, 5 1 - 5 2 ; see also: Bar-Kochva, Battles of the Hasmonaeans, p p . 8 9 - 9 0 , 231, 2 4 2 - 2 4 3 , 2 5 8 - 2 5 9 ) , and the impression remains that he already had past experience in their use. 28 This affair is extensively treated in my book Jews and Hellenistic Cities (forthcoming).
Judas Maccabaeus
33
er demonstrating that he really must have had the benefit of assistance from local forces. We have no knowledge whatever as to when and under what historic circumstances the aforementioned Jews had settled in the district south of Damascus. Galling believed they were remnants from the days of the King dom of Israel in the days of the First Temple , whereas a late Talmudic tradition connects them with the "immigrants from Babylon" (^nn '^ny) of the Persian Period . There are no grounds for rejecting one description or the other; either one refers t o small Jewish enclaves whose problems could be solved by a rescue operation such as that mounted by Judas Mac cabaeus. The latest research findings on Nabataean prohibitions of statues and pic tures, at times even going as far as active and fanatical iconoclasm , might shed light from a slightly different angle on the good relations between the Nabataeans and their Jewish neighbors. Days of adverse religio-spiritual pressure — as in the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes — when it became vital to withstand the already powerful Hellenistic influences, now sup ported and directed by governmental decrees and appropriate legislation, created an identity of interests between Judas Maccabaeus and the Naba taeans who, in the face of Hellenistic pressure, were now both pursuing the shared objective of cultural and religious survival. It is logical to imagine that the small Arab tribes collaborating with the Seleucids were under greater Hellenistic influence, a consequence of the very fact of their col laboration with and loyalty to the regime. The Nabataeans' attempts to subjugate these tribes — who we assume were the Hellenizers in the Arab sector — may be regarded as conforming with Nabataean aims: to preserve an independent Arab character and to confine Hellenistic influence exclu sively to the sphere of material culture. The strong stand taken by their Jewish neighbors under Hasmonaean leadership against the threat of Hellenism could serve the Nabataeans as an example, instilling them with the courage to defend their tradition and character, and inviting political and military cooperation with the Jews against the aggressive Seleucid regime, as it developed under the rule of the eminently Hellenistic king Antiochus IV Epiphanes. 29
30
31
29 See: Galling, Palastina Jahrbuch, XXXVI (1940), p p . 7 2 - 7 5 . 30 Sussmann, Tarbiz XLV (1975), p p . 2 1 3 - 2 5 5 . 31 See: Patrich, Cathedra, XXVI (1982), p p . 4 7 - 1 0 4 .
34
Days of the First Hasmonaeans
Jonathan (160-143 BCE) After the death of Judas Maccabaeus, when his brother Jonathan was forced to hide in the Teko'a desert to evade the Seleucid commander Bacchides and his forces, Hasmonaean-Arab friendship found most meaningful expression. I. Mace. (9:35) states that at Jonathan's request the Nabataeans had assisted him by storing the large quantities of war equipment and booty which he had accumulated by then. Bacchides' success and his energentic policy of building fortifications along the borders of Judaea seems to have created conditions so difficult that Jonathan was not even able to hold the first Hasmonaean stronghold in the mountains of Gophna. He was forced to move, camping near the Pool of Asphar in the desert of Teko'a. This was from earliest times a convenient place of refuge and asylum for the persecuted and rebellious, especially since its proximity to the Jerusa lem center allowed a swift return, within the space of a single day, to the focus of political events. However, the hostile activities of the Odomera tribe and the Sons of Phasiron while he camped there (/ Mace, 9:66) in dicate that even in the Teko'a desert Jonathan could not have felt com pletely secure. These difficulties enhanced the vital importance of connections with the Nabataeans, especially since their strongholds lay far beyond the Seleu cids' effective reach. Entrusting Hasmonaean wealth to Nabataean safe keeping could therefore ensure the financing for continued Hasmonaean anti-Seleucid activities; it is important to stress that, in that historic con text, the Nabataeans were expressly described as "friends" (JMace., 9:35). However, Jonathan's plan was not too successful; one of the Arab tribes from the neighborhood of Medeba (or Medaba) ambushed the Hasmonaean force taking all these possessions to the Nabataean sanctuary, killed every one including John the Hasmonaean and carried off all the goods (ibid., 36ff.; Ant., XIII. 11). This was an extremely serious blow and was liable to cripple, if not completely destroy, Jonathan's fighting capability for the future. The precise origin and descent of this Arab tribe cannot be deter mined from their name: Jambrites (Tioi 'Id/xj3pt). CI. Ganneau believed it was 'Ya'amrV, relating to a similar name (Ya'amru) mentioned in a Naba taean inscription from Umm el-Rasas near Medeba . If so, they may 32
33
34
32 On identification of the place today called Bir a-Za'phran, see: Abel, Les livres des Maccabies, P. 176. 33 The identity of these tribes is unfortunately still unknown. It is not clear on what grounds AviYonah determined that Jonathan contacted these tribes in order to harass Bacchides (Carta Atlas, map 45), as there is no support for this in the sources. 34 See: CI. Ganneau, Recueil d'Archiologie Orientate, II (1898), p p . 2 0 7 - 2 1 5 . Smith, Historical Geography, p.384, note 3; cf. Abel, G&ographie, II, p.381 - 3 8 2 ; Starcky, Dictionnaire, col. 905. On the popularity of the Arab name Ya'amuru and its Greek derivatives ('lanapos, 'lanovpas) in
35
Jonathan
possibly have had close contact with the Nabataeans and by their criminal act they had simply betrayed their allies out of lust for plunder . The fact that they laid ambush to the Hasmonaean caravan might arouse the suspicion they had prior knowledge of the planned route, which they could have obtained by intimate contact with the Nabataeans. In his paral lel version, Josephus (Ant.,XUl 11) speaks of Sons of Amaraios (ol 'Afiapaiov IlatSetc), apparently a garbled version of the biblical name of Amorite, noted also in the Bible for their ties with the Moabite region and the city of Medeba . His version seems to preserve the original phrasing of I Mace, where we know the biblical style and its nomenclature were adopted. This may also be seen in the report on the wedding feast for one of the daugh ters of this tribe: the bridge is described as "the daughter of one of thegreat nobles of Canaan (Xavaav)," (I Mace, 9 : 3 7 ) , while Josephus, in the parallel version (Ant., XIII 18), describes her in a logical-interpretive manner as "the daughter of one of the distinguished men among the Arabs." One way or another, the case of the ambush itself indicates the Naba taeans were not yet fully masters of the region, not all the Arab tribes in it yet having submitted to their authority . It is not clear where Josephus took the number of 400 killed among the Sons of Amaraios in the retalia tory action by Jonathan and Simon (Ant., XIII 12) — I Mace gives no figures. Did Josephus have access to a fuller version or perhaps additional information? We cannot answer this with any degree of certainty, but it seems reasonable to think this was merely one of his own logical elabora tions, intended to embellish his writing for his Greek readers . 35
36
37
38
39
35
36
37 38 39
the epigraphy, see: CIS, II(Aramaic), No. 195 CIG, 6416 = IG, XIV, 1661 = IGR, 1, 266;Nouvelles archives des missions scientiflques, 10 (1902), p.685ff. (nos. 126; 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 ) ; Ganneau, op. cit.. Ill, p.347ff.; Lidzbarski, Eph.sem.Epig., I, p.2f6. It is worth noting that there is information on Arab tribes in Moab, who had joined the union of Kedarite tribes already as far back as the Persian era. See: Milik, Liber Annuus, IX, (1958/59), p p . 3 4 0 - 3 4 1 . On the latest comprehensive research on the Sons of Jambri in the HellenisticRoman period see: idem, ADAJ, XXIV (1980), p . 4 1 - 5 4 ; he calls them Sons of Amrat (= Bani Amrat). To complete his findings see also: Patrich, Cathedra, XXXVIII (1985), p. 8 and notes 24,25. At all events they are not to be identified automatically with the Nabataeans, as some scholars are inclined to do (e.g. cf. Kammerer, Petra, p. 139) and Bowersock is right to comment on this (Roman Arabic, p.20). Numbers 2 1 : 3 0 - 3 1 . Cf. Marcus, Josephus, VII, p.233, note 4. In I Mace, 9:37 there is mention of a place called Nadabat (Na.8a.0ad), or Nabata (Na/3a0d) according to Josephus (Ant., XIII 18), to which members of this tribe were connected. It is identified by Abel (Giographie, II, p.394) with a site close to Medeba in the south. There are no logical grounds for the identification pro posed by Klein (Land of Judah, p.66) with Narbatha in the Northern Sharon. Cf. also: Klein, MGWJ, LXXV (1931), pp.75, 208; Schalit, Concordance, Suppl. I, p.88. Cf. slightly different explanation offered by Abel, Les livres des Maccabies, p. 168. Contra Kammerer (Petra, p. 139) and see also note 34 above. On comparison of the evidence from Josephus and /Mace, and the conclusions arising therefrom, see Gafni, Zion, XLV (1980), p p . 8 1 - 8 5 where there is considerable bibliographic detail, with quite a number of examples.
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Days of the First Hasmonaeans Map 5: Jonathan's Campaigns to Transjordan and the Judaean Desert J o n a t h a n (161 B C E )
——
Johanan
(157BCE)
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(157 B C E )
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Jonathan (156BCE)
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Jambrites Jonathan
Philadelphia
o
phna
TyrosBirtha
•
From the time of these events at the beginning of Jonathan's reign up to the sweep of conquest in the days of John Hyrcanus I, there is absolute silence of sources on all that concerns the relations of Jews and Arabs in Transjordan. We will probably not err in saying the silence of sources on this matter at least indicates an absence of conflict between the sides. As for the Nabataeans, there is every reason to assume that they continued to maintain their friendship with the Hasmonaeans and, exploiting the Seleu cid weakness, devoted most of their efforts to obtaining Arab hegemony in the region, in a constant struggle to impose their rule on mutinous tribes and recalcitrant lovers of freedom. The weakness pervading the Seleucid kingdom after the death of Antio chus IV Epiphanes, following the war of succession to the throne between Demetrius I and Alexander Ballas and later, between Demetrius II and Tryphon, inevitably led to a strengthening of local political froces in the region of Syria and Eretz-Israel. Particularly prominent among these local forces were the Ituraeans, living on Mount Lebanon and in Syria, and the Jews under Hasmonaean leadership. The various contestants in the war of
37
Jonathan
succession for the Seleucid crown more than once asked for the intervention and support of these local forces, which of course encouraged the latter to energetic action in order to obtain results as swift and significant as possi ble. Our attention will therefore focus on this scene, with the object of examining the achievements of these forces and the mutual relations which developed among them, against the background of the fateful and rapid historic events on their borders. The first important event involves the dramatic change of 146 BCE, with the breach of the pact between Ptolemy VI Philometor and his Seleucid son-in-law Alexander Ballas. In the face of Ptolemaic armies advancing north along the Phoenician coast and in view of tendencies of desertion and treason at home, Alexander Ballas sought refuge and fled to "Arabia" in order to hide there (I Mace, 11:16). The use of the term "Arabia"should not lead to a misunderstanding and is therefore not to be identified with the land of the Nabataeans, for further on / Mace. (11:17) relates that a certain "Zabdiel the Arab chieftain cut off Alexander's head and sent it to Ptolemy". It is hard to know where that particular Zabdiel (or rather Zabilus) operated - whether it was the Palmyra desert area or in the Valley of Lebanon. Though the second possibility is very tempting, in view of another event (to be discussed later) relating to the war of Jonathan with the Zabadaean Arabs south of the Eleutherus River (a war conducted very near in time, I Mace, 1 2 : 3 0 - 3 1 ) , there is no certainty whatever about it. The name Zabdiel (Zaj35ii?X) we know from the testimony of Polybius (V, 7, 79) on the battle of Raphia (217 BCE), in which Antiochus III the Great employed 10,000 Arab archers who were under his command . The popularity of this name throughout the Arab world , including the 40
4 1
42
43
40 Josephus in his parallel version (Ant., XIII 118) calls him Zabeilus (and in various manuscripts ZdpLkoq, Zd0r)\oc, Zd/3e\oO and he calls him Svvdorns, that is head of the tribe or leader. Dio dorus Siculus (XXXII, 9 - 1 1 ) relates that he was murdered by two of his officers (Heliades and Cassius) and calls him Diocles which could be his Greek name. 41 So thought Abel (Les livres des Macabies, pp.206, 2 1 1 - 2 1 2 , 226) and Schiirer ( I , p.183 and note 25). 42 Cf. Polybius, V, 85, 4: ibid., 10. Their importance in battle was emphasised by the fact that they were stationed on the flank of the Macedonian phalanx (Polybius, V, 82, 12). According to the evidence from Livy (XXXVII, 40, 12) Arabs also formed a part of the army of Antiochus III the Great at the battle of Magnesia. They were organized in units of camel-riders, armed with long bows and especially long swords. Cf. also: Appian, Syriace, 6, 32. On these two battles, see ex tensively: Bar Kochva, Seleucid Army, pp.l28ff, 163ff. 43 For details see: Alfheim-Stiehl, pp.279, 296, 356 (note 9). It is worth noting that the Gospel of Matthew ( 4 : 2 0 - 2 2 ) mentions two brothers Jacob and John and their father Zebedai who were fishermen on the Lake of Galilee. It is not impossible,that their origin was the house of Zabadaeans from Mount Lebanon. See note 49 below, on the common occurrence of sites connected with this name. However the popularity of this name in Israel in biblical times (see entries: *T3T, ' " T I T , ^ K ' T D T , rp "T2T, in the EB, II, p p . 8 9 1 - 8 9 3 ) prevents us from reaching a clear conclu sion in this matter. s
Days of the First Hasmonaeans
38
regions under Nabataean control in southern Transjordan and the Syrian desert to the north, prevents us from determining with any certainty just where this particular Zabdiel was based. In the year 145 BCE, it appears that Syrian and Lebanese Arabs once again became involved in the fortunes of the Seleucid kingdom. Tryphon, one of Alexander Ballas' senior commanders, made contact with Imalcue or Imalku (luaXnove, ELUCLXKOVGLL) the Arab (I Mace, 11:39) who was holding Antiochus VI son of Alexander Ballas (cf. Ant., XIII 131; Diodorus Siculus, XXXIII 4a; Appian, Syriace 68) and asked him to place the child under his (Tryphon's) protection so he should rule in the child's name and foil the designs of Demetrius II to seize the throne. Diodorus referred to this Imalku by the name Iamblichus ('Idjuj3Xixoc), the recognized Greek transliteration of the popular and well-known Arab name Malichus . Some scholars believe he must be identified with the son of the above Zabdiel mentioned in I Mace, 11:16—17 (the one who had killed Alexander Bal las), which might explain the presence in his hands of Ballas' small s o n . To the information in I Mace, Josephus (Ant., XIII.131) adds the remark that at first Imalku distrusted Tryphon and only after lengthy persuasion agreed to cooperate with him. It appears that Josephus added this comple mentary description out of a desire to add his own historic touch to the story in I Mace. - even if his words are not within a certain logic of their own. According to I Mace, (11:40), Tryphon spent quite a long time with Imalku until he succeeded in consolidating his political and military posi tion by the capture of Antioch. The fact that Diodorus Siculus (XXXIII, 4a) sets his place of residence, or more precisely his base of operations, in the region of Chalcis might possibly serve as grounds for identifying the home of Zabdiel and his son (?) Imalku in the region of the Valley of Lebanon. Under these circumstances the Ituraeans and the Hasmonaeans were in opposing camps: the Ituraeans as allies of Tryphon, with the Has monaeans allies of Demetrius II. Jonathan's march to Antioch to assist Demetrius II (IMace, 11:43—51 ;Ant., XIII 134—143) seems to have taken place along the Phoenician coast controlled by Demetrius I I and not in the country's interior. The political situation however was very unstable and in consequence there were extreme changes in the position and rela tions of the nations in the region. When Demetrius II became estranged of Jonathan, the latter turned his back upon him and joined his enemies 44
45
46
47
44 45 46 47
4
5
For details, see Schurer, I , p.234 (note 25); do. I , p.183 (note 25). Abel, ibid., p.212, and see also note 37 above. For identification of Chalcis in Lebanon, see recently; Will, ZDPV, CXIX (1982), p.l46ff. Bevan, House of Seleucus, II, p p . 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 , and see also p p . 4 0 - 4 1 .
Jonathan
39
headed by Tryphon (144 BCE), thus finding himself in one camp with the Ituraeans. This pact produced immediate political results of major importance for the fate of northern Eretz-Israel: the appointment of Simon the Hasmon aean as strategos over a region extending "from the Ladder of Tyre to the borders of Egypt" (I Mace, \\:59\ Ant., XIII 146). Taking place against this background was the military action at Hazor in Galilee (IMace, 11: 6 3 - 6 4 ; Ant., XIII. 154, 1 5 8 - 1 6 2 ) , at the end of which Jonathan foiled the designs of the Phoenician city of Tyre which, in close cooperation with Demetrius II, sought to extend its sphere of influence in Galilee . The expansionist tendencies of the Phoenician cities on the one hand, and the internal political strife in the Seleucid kingdom on the other, created con ditions favorable for cooperation between the Hasmonaeans and the Itur aeans, yet it may be said that to the same extent they also created condi tions for generating friction between them. These opposing tendencies found instructive expression in two contrasting events: a) Jonathan's campaign against the Zabadaean Arabs (I Mace, 12:31), the 48
49
booty from which he sold in the streets of Damascus (Ant., XIII 1 7 9 ) . b)The campaign to the Land of Hammath in the year 143 BCE (I Mace^ 12:25; Ant., XIII 174) , designed to push the armies of Demetrius II north beyond the line of the Syrian border drawn by the Eleutherus River. The preliminary scouting which Jonathan conducted in the region to pre pare this campaign and his military preparations for the timely attack on the camp of Demetrius II indicate that he had allies in the region, since both from a logistic and a strategic point of view such operations are inconceivable without local assistance". The two contrasting events men tioned above may be explained only if we assume that, unlike their cousins in Transjordan, the Arabs of Syria and the Lebanon were not united under a single leadership and at least at that time there were differences and en mity between the Zabadaeans and the inhabitants of Chalcis. 50
48 This will be extensively discussed in my book Jews and Hellenistic Gties (forthcoming). 49 Accoording to Josephus (Ant., XIII 179) the name of the Zabadaeans was mistakenly changed for that of the Nabataeans. There was possibly a connection between those called "Zabadaeans" and a ruler called "Zabdiel" (see above, p.37) and if so then their place of settlement must be located in the Valley of Lebanon. Cf. CIG, 9893, where there is mention of a village called Kattpo£aj38atojv today the village Zabed on the Beirout-Damascus highway. On this site and other settle ments connected with the name Zabed in more northerly areas see: Dussaud, Topographie historigue de la Syrie antigue et midiivale, p p . 2 0 3 - 2 0 4 ; see also the findings of S. Dar, Hermon and its Foothills, p p . 6 2 - 6 3 , 143. 50 Land of Hammath ('Anadinv xw/oai>) is universally agreed to be the biblical Lebo-Hammafh, see: Mazar, EB, IV, p p . 4 1 6 - 4 1 8 ; idem, Gties and Districts in Eretz-Israel, p p . 1 6 7 - 1 8 1 , and he identifies it with Lab'we in the northern Lebanon Valley. 51 A similar conclusion was also reached by Dar, ibid., p. 143.
40
Days of the First Hasmonaeans
Map 6: Jonathan's Campaigns to "The Land of Hammath' and to BethZabdai (143 BCE)
41
Jonathan
In this connection it is interesting to note that the campaign to the Land of Hammath was designed to prevent Demetrius II from invading Jonath an's "country" (I Mace, 12:25). The wording there could give the impres sion that from Jonathan's point of view the northern border of "his coun try" coincided with the biblical border, passing through Lebanon and going as far as Lebo-Hammath . This impression however could be misleading, since in fact the reference was to the politically recognized border of CoeleSyria of those days, which we know extended along the Eleutherus River . It is important to note that in the year 146 BCE (i.e., three years earlier) Jonathan himself had accompanied Ptolemy VI Philometor right up to this very border. It is therefore reasonable to believe that in 143 BCE Jonathan also simply attributed great political and military importance to this border-line, in view of his brother Simon's appointment as Strategos "from the Ladder of Tyre to the border of Egypt ." Some scholars believe Jonathan's defeat of the Zabadaean Arabs after his march to Hammath is also indicated inMegillath Ta'anith {The Scroll of Fasting), which says: S2
53
54
"On the seventeenth [day of the month of Adar] the gentiles arose against the remainder of the scribes (= D ' T S 1 0 nW^S ) in the country of Chalcis and Beth Zabdai, but there was salva tion (for the Children of Israel)".
On this evidence it is tempting to believe this was a cryptic reference to Jonathan's resourcefulness in rescuing Jewish fugitives who were living in the land of the Ituraeans in the Valley of Lebanon, where they had sought sanctuary from the Seleucids since the religious persecution in the days of Antiochus IV Epiphanes. It seems that the political rivalry that developed between Jonathan and the Zabadaeans over the wars of succession to the Seleucid throne led to persecution of these Jewish fugitives, which in turn was the cause for Jonathan's campaign. This policy of rallying to the rescue of oppressed and persecuted Jews in and around Eretz-Israel had been adopted long before by Judas Maccabaeus. Nevertheless, in spite of this attractive comparison and the logical probability of the proposed historical interpretation, it should not be taken as a certain and authoritative solu tion . 55
52 E.g. see Numbers, 13:21; 4 : 7 - 9 ; / K i n g s , 8:65;Ezekiel 4 7 : 1 5 - 1 7 ; Amos 6:2 and more. See note 47 above. 53 Strabo, XVI, 2, 12 (753). This is also confirmed by the papyrologic find and other evidence, see: Tcherikover, Jews in the Greek and Roman World, p p . 1 0 8 - 1 1 0 ; Stern, History of Eretz-Israel The Hellenistic Period, p.46. 54 See Dancy, /Maccabees, p.168. 55 On this whole mysterious episode, see: Lichtenstein, HUCA, VIII-IX ( 1 9 3 1 - 2 ) , pp.36, 293; Derenburg, Essai etc., p.100; Wellhausen, Die Pharis'der etc., p.58. Kahana, Literature of Israel's History, I, p.8; idem, Apocrypha, II, p.159; Abel, Les livres des Maccabies, p.226; Klausner, History of the Second Temple, III, p.63. Cf. also: Schurer, I , p.238 and note 34; idem., I , 4
s
Days of the First Hasmonaeans
42
Simon (143-135 BCE) Of the days of Simon we have in fact no knowledge of any particular development in relations between Jews and Arabs, nor in relations with Transjordan or the neighbors to the north. It is reasonable to assume that the silence over this in the sources indicates continuing good relations as in the days of Jonathan. The frequent political changes which accompan ied the war of succession to the Seleucid throne also led to the lapse of Simon's authority as Seleucid strategos, but nothing is known of any con sequences this had on the relations between Jews and the Arabs of the North. Simon's main military activity during the short period of his reign was concentrated in the coastal cities and did not, as in the past, extend beyond the close vicinity of Judaea. In his period there were therefore no points of contact or friction with the Arab peoples of the frontier and the desert, so it may be.assumed that the earlier friendship continued without any disturbing influence. The episode of Simon's murder and the base intrigue of his son-in-law, Ptolemy son of Habubu, in collusion with Antio chus VII Sidetes (I Mace, 16:11 - 2 2 ; Ant., X I I I . 2 2 8 - 2 3 5 ) may perhaps indirectly throw some light on relations with the Arabs of Transjordan. We know his treacherous son-in-law found refuge with Zenon Kotoulas, the tyrant of Philadelphia, who we believe was assisted throughout his reign by the Arabs of the vicinity loyal to the Seleucids . There is no doubt that the Nabataeans had no part in this affair, since Philadelphia was not under their rule or influence until the days of the Roman Emperor Trajan. We also do not know the identity of the tyrant Zenon Kotoulas and, despite an inclination to do so, there are n o sure grounds for taking him to have been a Hellenized Arab . 56
57
p.185 and note 34. On the other hand, B.Z. Lurie instead sets the affair in the days of King Jannaeus, relying on the Scholion (=Commentary) to Megillat Ta'anith (=The Scroll of Fasting), see his book: From Jannaeus to Herod, p p . 3 1 - 3 2 ; idem, Scroll of Fasting, p p . 1 9 4 - 1 9 6 . His basic historiographic mistake is his preference of the Scholion, which was composed in the Mid dle Ages and perhaps even in Babylonia, far from the scene of events, both in time and in location. See extensively: Efron, Studies on the Hasmonean Period, p p . 2 0 8 - 2 0 9 ; cf. also Urbach, Yad la-Talmud (The HalakhaJ, p.73 (he does not however reject the evidence of the Schol ion and sees it as information on an additional event which occurred in the time of Jannaeus). Ginzberg, on the other hand, gave free rein to his imagination and believed that the episode could be a hint at the story in the Damascus Scroll on the flight of members of the sect headed
by'TlTinn
Itf ") 1 7 NTH p p i n a n " (and according to him this is an allusion to the
D'TSIO .nE'^S
in the Scroll of Fasting), see: Ginzberg, An unknown Jewish Sect., p.268. Urbach (ibid.) did not completely reject this possibility either. 56 Goldstein (/ Maccabees, p.542) suggested that he was a convert to Judaism, but this should be considered a mere conjecture. 57 See p.44 below. Zenon called Kotoulas was apparently not of Arab descent at all - neither his first nor his last name support such a possibility, since both Zevov and KoroiAd? are common Greek names, the latter bearing no relation whatever to the Semitic root Q-T/TL. My thanks to Dr. Ran Zadok for clarifying this matter to me.
Simon
43
To summarize this chapter, it may be said that in the period following the death of Antiochus IV Ephiphanes there was a gradual improvement in the standing of the nations of Syria and Eretz-Israel, mainly because they became the objects of political and military wooing by the various contes tants in the war of succession to the Seleucid throne. This fact gave a tre mendous impetus to the realization of their plans for sovereignty and the expansion of their borders. Any display of cooperation among themselves, as well as the creation of mutual friction and confrontations, must be understood in this context. This complex and multi-faceted structure of relations, with the Jews at its center, is of course important for our pur poses. Two countercurrent trends of development — friendship and cooper ation on the one hand, mutual competition, suspicion, and rivalry on the other — will find more significant expression, particularly in the following period discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall John Hyrcanus I (135-104 BCE) The political and military weakness of the Seleucid kingdom found ex pression not only in the western and northern areas of Eretz-Israel but also in Transjordan. There too it appears to have heightened inter-Arab tribal rivalries in the struggle for superiority and hegemony. Thus for example Philadelphia succeeded in becoming an independent city with its own local tyrant named Zenon,also called Kotoulas. Ptolemy son of Habubu, Simon's treacherous son-in-law, found asylum with him there, after fleeing from the fortress of Docus near Jericho following the siege laid by John Hyrcanus I (Ant., XIII.235; War, 1.60). As indicated above, it is reasonable to assume that, as he had done in the past, this Zenon employed Arab mercenaries from among the small tribes in the vicinity who were independent of the Nabataeans. Immediately following the death of Antiochus VII Sidetes( 129 BCE) , John Hyrcanus I began systematically to hem in and confine these tribes, taking control of their zones of opertaion. The first of his campaigns of conquest was against Medeba and Samaga (War, I. 63; Ant., XIII. 255), and ended after a wearying siege of Medeba which lasted six months. The conquest gave him control of a small section of the "King's Highway" and at the same time he also acquired important strategic depth for strengthen ing the Jewish Peraea. Eventually it became clear that this success sowed the seeds for a conflict of interests between Nabataeans and Hasmonaeans, 1
2
1 This was one of the most ominous turning points in the history of the Seleucid kingdom, from which it went into an uninhibited decline. Antiochus VII Sidetes was perhaps the last great Seleucid king and on his death the kingdom was dragged into frequent wars of succession to the throne which in the end destroyed it completely. On the difficulty in determining the exact date of the military campaign by John Hyrcanus I into Transjordan, see: Bar-Kochva, Hasmo naean Wars, p. 145 (note 5a). 2 On the identification of Samaga (Zanayd) with the place known today as Samik east of Heshbon, see Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p.106; idem, Carta's Atlas, Map 57. Schalit differed from these and proposed the name Misgav ( 3 A W ?3), relying on a dubious textual correction (see: Schalit, King Herod, pp.107, 409, note 180) and doing so without identifying the proposed name with any specific site. The two cities, Medeba and Samaga, were apparently ruled by the 'Sons of Ya'amri' mentioned above. See recently: Foerster, Eretz-Israel, XV(1981), p p . 3 5 3 - 3 5 5 .
45
John Hyrcanus I
ultimately leading to most serious military confrontations and deadly enmity that endured for generations. Map 7: The Conquests of John Hyrcanus I in Transjordan and the Annexa tion of Idumaea ( 1 2 9 - 1 2 5 BCE)
• — — —
John H y r c a n u s I. King's H i g h w a y I n t e r l a n d Roads Via M a r i s
N
xJ^
46
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
In the meantime, John Hyrcanus I applied himself to the fortification of the southern borders of Judaea. In 125 BCE he completed the conquest of Idumaea (War, I 63; Ant., XIII 257; cf. also XIV 88) giving him strategic depth and, in addition, control of access to the main southern roads leading to Gaza. In fact, with the exception of the cities of Adora (Adoraim) and Marisa , we may speak of the annexation of Idumaea rather than of con quest, since there is every reason to believe that the Idumaean rural popu lation joined the Jewish people by choice and not under duress. This appears to have arisen out of a common hostility to the Hellenistic cities and Seleucid rule - shared feelings which gradually developed into a full sharing of destinies. Ultimately this found expression in conversion to Ju daism by the Idumaeans, of their own free will and collectively. We learn of the Idumaeans' conversion from several sources, but before discussing them, they should first be quoted individually: 3
a) Josephus Flavius (Ant., XIII 2 5 7 - 2 5 8 ) : "Hyrcanus also captured the Idumaean cities of Adora and Marissa and after subduing all the Idumaeans, permitted them to remain in their country so long as they had themselves circum cised and were willing to observe the laws of the Jews. And so, out of attachment to the land of their fathers, they submitted to circumcision and to making their manner of life conform in all other respects to that of the Jews. And from that time onwards they have continued to be Jews ." 4
b) Josephus Flavius (Ant.,
XV 254):
"Now Hyrcanus had altered their (i.e. the Idumaeans') way of life and made them adopt the customs and the laws of the Jews" (cf. also: ibid., 255).
c) Ptolemy the Historian, from the late 1st century BCE (Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, I, no. 146): "The Idumaeans, on the other hand, were not originally Jewish, but Phoenicians and Syrians, having been subjugated by the Jews and having been forced to undergo circumcision, so as to be counted among the Jewish nation and keep the same customs, they were called Jews."
d) Strabo (Geographica,
XV, 2, 34):
"The Idumaeans are Nabataeans, but owing to a sedition they were banished from there, joined the Judaeans and shared in the same customs with them."
3 Their conquest will be extensively discussed in my book Jews and Hellenistic Gties (forthcom ing). 4 This evidence appears to be the foundation for the tradition preserved in the book of Josippon, X71: ^ 3 3 3 D I O K ' n n ' 1 3 3 O N ' 3 ' 1 OVTK DN ^ » D U p i i n N171 (= "he, Hyrcanus who circumcised Edom and brought them into the covenant and bound them in the bonds of circumcision "), see: Josippon (Flusser edition), p.58); ibid.. XXIX, 9 - 1 1 : DTTN ]1 NA riK Stt3">1 DTTK ? T l t t n a r i N 1*1 • 1TN yTK bx -] ?"> ) J70' 1 ^333 0^3 3 ' 1 O - l l P p ' l T'PTan ' 3 ,71 b 1A 71 7$ l^yOtib DKPW 1 8
t
m
D - n a i u n o ^ i a v n n N ^ m N i n n D i T i a i ,an^my nw3 n s n^a .u>33 - I W K D ^ I A T I bib p a n nwy p i , n ^ i a n iy " r m n m a w a (="and he set out and went to the Land of Edom and smote Marisa of Edom and subdued the pride of Edom and placed them in bond service until the exile, for the king took them captive
John Hyrcanus I
47
A superficial reading of these pieces of testimony readily shows that there is a common denominator between the first and the third which stresses conversion by force, namely the enforced imposition of the duty of circumcision, together with the obsvervance of Jewish customs and laws. The second piece of evidence is neutral in nature and, without stressing the motif of compulsion in a decisive and unequivocal manner, simply reports the supplanting of Idumaean customs and laws on the initiative of John Hyrcanus I. Strabo's evidence, on the other hand, stands out as different, since it sets the Idumaeans' union with the Jewish people against the back ground of their exile from their country following some unknown rebel lion. This could easily be interpreted as an act of free will on their part. At all events this testimony holds not even the slightest hint of any form of Jewish coercion or any Jewish pressure on them to convert. The exceptional nature of Strabo's evidence stands out even more in view of what we know of his hostile attitude towards the Hasmonaean rul ers, whom he held responsible for destroying original Mosaic Judaism by introducing a regime of tyranny, and also for harassing their own people and their neighbors (Strabo, XVI, 2, 37: ibid., 40). The question must be asked: in the same context, why did Strabo not condemn the Hasmonaean "tyrants" and "robbers" for the forced conversion of their Idumaean neighbors and for threatening to expel the recalcitrants among them from the country? After all, he condemned the Hasmonaeans over the conquest of their country and, as a Hellenistic writer, he presented the deed as an expression of barbaric hostility and a deliberate assault on Hellenistic civilization . Therefore his very silence on the matter of compulsory con version may prove that he was simply not aware of this story, since it was nothing more than a creation of subsequent propaganda. This conclusion finds additional support in the fact that Strabo was not averse to propagandist exaggeration against the Jews. An example of this is found in his saying that "this people has already made its way into every city and it is not easy to find any place in the habitable world which has not received this nation and in which it has not made its power felt ." Much as we might try by circuitous interpretation to soften the impression 5
6
and bound them in bonds of circumcision and circumcised their foreskins. And from that day onwards they practised circumcision and kept guard on the Lord's Torah until the exile, and thus the king did with all the peoples he conquered", op.cit., p.l 16); cf. also ibid., LIX, 2 - 3 (op.cit., p.220). We may point out that the evidence of Josippon has no real historic value: at best it reflects the way of survival of historic memories in Jewish consciousness during the early Middle Ages. 5 See: Stern, in: Essays in Jewish History and Philology, p p . 1 7 8 - 1 7 9 . 6 This passage is quoted by Josephus in the name of Strabo, Ant., XIV, 115.
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
48
of these words, we cannot ignore the propagandist anti-Jewish exaggeration they contain . Strabo's silence concerning the compulsory conversion of the Idumaeans thus becomes even more significant . The fact of Strabo's testimony predating all the others would also have to be explained away . Yet there is a catch. Since Strabo's evidence mistakenly identifies the Idumaeans as Nabataeans, it accordingly seems possible to place a method ological obstacle in our way so that we may ask: may we use a faulty source for the purpose of a precise historic conclusion on such a critical matter? Is it admissible for use in the correction of other evidence, arguing that those others are in error? At first sight it appears that such arguments are conclusive, but on second thought Strabo's mistake over the Idumaeans' origins may also be explained away quite reasonably. We believe it arose from the known historical fact that the majority of the Idumaeans migrated from their ancient homeland in the mountains of Edom and their capital Sela' (later to become Petra, where the Nabataeans settled) and moved westwards t o a region south of Judaea in the neighborhood of the Jews. Apart from that, it is hard to expect a Greek to make the fine distinction between Idumaeans and Nabataeans, especially since there was a tendency to regard the Nabataeans as a complete ethnic entity that incorporated different tribal groups . 7
8
9
10
On the other hand, the fact that the Jewish historian Josephus Flavius writes clearly and self-evidently that the Hasmonaean conquest involved compulsory conversion need not necessarily serve as proof of the story's veracity. It will later become clear that Josephus drew his information from inimical Hellenistic sources of a later date than Strabo, apparently headed by Nicolaus of Damascus, whose hatred for the Hasmoneans was nurtured both by his Hellenistic Damascene origin and his political subservience to his master Herod. The propaganda on this matter was apparently so overpoweringly suc cessful that Josephus too was trapped by it or perhaps, from fear of being thought a heretic to "truths" so widely accepted in the Hellenistic-Roman
7 Details see Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, I, p.280. 8 My thanks are due to my student Ronen who drew my attention to this aspect - see his MA thesis, Idumaeans and Idumaea in the Days of the Second Temple, p p . 6 6 - 6 7 . 9 Strabo was bom around 64 BCE and died in the twenties of the 1st century CE; for details see: Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, I, p.261ff. 10 Other writers also made similar mistakes: thus for example Diodorus Siculus on one occasion (XIX, 48,6) indicates that the Dead Sea was in the land of the Nabataeans, while on another occasion (XIX, 68) he states that the Dead Sea lay in the centre of what he called the 'Satrapy of Idumaea'. Incidentally, it seems the dispute between the Idumaeans and the Nabataeans was also mentioned by Diodorus (ibid., 99, 1), showing the two authors drew their mistakes from similar sources which failed to differentiate properly between Idumaens and Nabataeans.
John Hyrcanus I
49
society of his day, he dared not deny it. We must not forget that the "plague" of conversion was then very widespread in Rome itself and was thought one of the identifying symptoms of the sickness of Roman society. Furthermore the Jews were regarded as determined "soul-hunters" intent upon taking over the whole world . In Josephus' own time, the phenome non of mass conversion was also known in the nearby cities of Syria. In Damascus for example the citizens were aroused to take violent and drastic steps against the Jews of the city; the same applies to Antioch on the Orontes . No wonder therefore that in his ingratiation and preening before his Hellenistic-Roman reader, Josephus flaunted words of self-praise, relating that in the days of the Great Jewish Revolt against the Romans, he person ally had prevented the forcible conversion of two subjects of King Agrippa II, nobles from the Trachonitis region who had come to him with their horses, weapons, and money (Vita, 1 1 3 ) . According to him, his Jewish friends wanted to force them to observe the custom of circumcision as a condition for taking them into their midst. However, he (i.e., Josephus) himself had forbidden any act of compulsion toward them, declaring that everyone must worship God according to his own conscience and not under coercion. The fact that he did not relate his friends' demand to a supposedly accepted custom or ruling of law in this matter is quite significant. Further more, had this been based on law, the Jewish community would not so easily have accepted the 'liberal' proclamation of this braggart, Josephus . In short, Josephus here wrote what he believed would appeal to his readers and enhance his 'progressive' image. In War, II. 454, Josephus brings another example, involving a Roman officer named Metilius who, with his men, had surrendered to the Jewish rebels and whose life was spared only thanks to his pleadings and a promise to become a Jew and be circumcised. His description implies that the rest of the soldiers met their death heroically, after having been duped by a false agreement on the part of the Jews. Josephus denounces the Jews' treachery as a heinous crime, a view he suggests was shared by the majority of the Jewish public (ibid., 4 5 5 - 4 5 6 ) . He also indicates this act charac terized Metilius as a man of poor spirit and a coward, his conversion result ing from fear, not from any reason of the spirit, and lacked any inner 11
12
13
14
11 See Heinemann, Zion, IV(1939), p p . 2 6 9 - 2 9 3 , esp. 278ff.; J. Levy, Studies in Jewish Hellenism, p.l61ff.;Feldman, in: The Diaspora, pp. 1 8 8 - 2 0 7 . 12 War, II 5 5 9 - 5 6 1 ; ibid., VII 42ff. In Against Apion, II 280 Josephus stresses that the conversion aroused the envy of the whole world. 13 My thanks are due to R. Wilk who drew my attention to this evidence. 14 We may also assume the Jewish community, like Josephus himself, knew that there were volun tary converts who could not meet the demands of the commandments of Judaism and returned to their former state of being gentiles (Against Apion, II 123). See also below, p.58.
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
50
conviction. The exception taken by the Jewish public to the whole episode (loc.cit.) probably also applied to the quality of this Roman officer's con version, and Josephus' words are not all to be taken literally. In fact, prevalent to this day even among modern scholars is the opinion that conversion of the Idumaeans, as well as that of the Ituraeans (to which we have devoted a separate discussion), was an isolated act performed under pressure and compulsion in the course of the conquest and Judaization of Eretz-Israel . This opinion is very widely accepted, even despite the knowledge that forced conversion was in total conflict with what was accepted in the tradition of Jewish law. In Tractate Gerim, for example, we find expressly: 15
"Anyone who converts because of a woman, because of love, because of fear is no convert, and this is what R. Judah and R. Nehemia would say: All those who converted in the days of Mordechai and Esther are not converts, as it is said 'and many of the people of the land became Jews for fear of the Jews had befallen them' and everyone who does not convert for spiritual reasons is no c o n v e r t . " 16
The most instructive example of proselytism out of mere fear, which is denounced and forbidden, is connected with the Cuthaeans. In Jewish tradi tion those were considered to be 'lions'-converts' ( n v i K " H A ) , according to the story in / / Kings 17:24ff . Josephus himself also makes sure of fre quently calling them "Cuthaeans", stressing that this was their correct name 17
15 Here we present only a sample selection of research monographs: Halevy, I 3, p.393; Weiss, I, p.117; Schurer, I , p . 2 7 5 - 2 7 6 ; idem, I , p p . 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 ; also A.H.M. Jones, JRS, XXI, (1931), p p . 2 5 5 - 2 5 6 ; idem, CERP, pp.251, 454 (n.39); Bamberger, Proselytism in the Talmudic Period, p.20; Jeremias, Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus, p.320; Sullivan, ANRW, II 8, p.314; AltheimStiehl, p p . 3 1 5 - 3 1 6 ; Feldman, in: The Diaspora etc., p p . 1 9 8 - 1 9 9 ; Eddy, The King is Dead, p p . 2 5 0 - 2 5 1 etc. etc. 4
s
16 Masekhet Gerim, VII; see full details: R. Kirchheim (ed.), Minor Treatises, p p . 3 8 - 4 4 . See also M. Higger (ed.), Minor Treatises: Masekhet Gerim, I 3, p.69. Though there is reasonable ground for believing that Masekhet Gerim is of a late date and apparently post-Talmudic, it seems most of the rulings included therein are dispersed throughout Talmudic literature (cf. Higger, ibid., p.6). Not inconceivably this ruling was, as Higger thought, formulated only after the Bar-Kokhba rebellion (ibid., I 1, p.68), but it seems we will not err in proposing that its origins were already established in the proposing that its origins were already established in the days of the Second Temple, an impression also indirectly arising from Josephus' evidence (Vita, 113; War, II 454). 17 J. Gittin, I, 43c; cf. B. Ketubboth, 75b; B. Sanhedrin, 85b; B. Baba Kamma, 38b; B. Hullin, 3b ff; B. Niddah, 56b; B. Yebamoth, 24b etc. As already pointed out by G. Alon, the attitude of Jewish tradition to the Cuthaeans (=Samaritans) in the Yavneh period - and close to certainly also before the Destruction of the Temple - is in fact ambivalent and differs from one Sage to the next; furthermore, at a later period - between the time of Ussha and the days of Rabbi Judah Ha-Nasi (the editor of the Mishnah), it varies with the generations. It appears that despite the hatred towards them, at least some of the sages recognized them as Jews; so for example did Rabban Gamliel of Yavneh and Rabbi Akiba, in contrast to Rabbi Eliezer son of Hyrcanus and Rabbi Ishmael. It also appears that sages who denied their Judaism would describe them as "lions' converts" (111 ' I K "HA ), while those who accepted them as full Jews called them "true converts" or "righteous converts" (J7~T 2? " ' I A); see J. Gittin, I, 43c; cf. J. Kethuboth III, 27a. See also G. Alon, History of the Jews, II, p p . 2 4 8 - 2 5 8 . However, even those sages who
John Hyrcanus I
51
in Hebrew (namely, D T I T 3 ), as distinct from the name "Samaritans" (2a/xain Greek, (Ant., IX.290), to indicate that their idolatrous origin (from the sons of Cutha) was preserved in Jewish consciousness for the express purpose of preventing their identification erroneously as sincere and true converts. Furthermore, Josephus himself several times stresses the falseness of their conversion , which even he accepts as justification for the use of the derogatory name "Cuthaeans". In view of the above, it appears that in retrospect the forced conversion of the Idumaean ascribed to John Hyrcanus I should be regarded in a negative light, as was done by Josephus himself. Most modern scholars were aware of all this, but nevertheless it did not occur to them to cast doubt on the actual credibility of the evidence for compulsory conversion. Even scholars well-versed in Talmudic literature, like Halevy and Weiss, did not question the historic credibility of the deed ascribed to John Hyrcanus I and instead attempted to excuse it by intricate and sophist reasoning. Halevy for example was well aware of the fact that the conversion of the Idumaeans was (in his words) "against the spirit of Israel and against the ways of the Torah", and he consequently interprets it as nothing more than a political act, one which in his view was the out come of the unacceptable ways of the Hellenizers. To Halevy, John Hyrca nus I's Sadducee leanings indicate he was affected by the stigma of Hellenizing. In his eyes, conversion of the Idumaeans was therefore not a religious act. It is doubtful whether the act was even worthy of being considered conversion — in which case the coerced converts thus remained complete gentiles. "They were guided by principles which were not founded on faith, the Torah, and the commandments, but rather on the laws of a state that the citizens should be equal and have no outer indication to distin guish them." In his view, John Hyrcanus I "did not act out of zeal for his religion, from which he was completely estranged and from which these gentiles remained remote even after being circumcised. This was however the basic principle of the Hellenizers and their approach to the laws of the state — that all citizens must behave in the same way towards all the laws and public forms of conduct in the s t a t e . "
peiTai)
18
19
accept the Samaritans as Jews have reservations over them for two main reasons: 1) their attach ment to Mount Gerizim; 2) the fact that they do not observe a considerable and important por tion of the obligations according to the Pharisaic halakha. There is therefore dissent among the Sages concerning the circumstances when it is permissible to rely on them and those when this is not permissible. From this we may deduce that all the sages rejected conversion under duress, so that the term "lions' converts" in later generations became an accepted term explaining their rejection. On the relationship to the Cuthaeans in Talmudic literature, see also Urbach, The Halakha, p.96ff. 18 Ant., IX 2 9 i ; XI, 341; XII, 2 5 7 - 2 6 4 . 19 Halevy, I 3, p,393.
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
52
Weiss was also well aware of the contradiction between forced conver sion and halakhic tradition, except that he claimed to resolve it with the argument that the halakhic rulings rejecting such conversion were all of a later date and do not reflect the situation prevailing in the days of John Hyrcanus I. Based on this approach he could argue that "this coercion was applied not only for political reasons but also on religious grounds, for he (i.e., John Hyrcanus I) tried with all high might to remove the snares and trappings of religion around him, in order to maintain the religion of the Torah and place it on a reliable foundation." In this way he tried to wipe out the "unclean stain in John's (Hyrcanus) life." Furthermore, Weiss was even aware that forced conversion constituted an historic perversion, ac cording to which John Hyrcanus I performed an act of religious coercion of the very kind his fathers had suffered at the hands of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, and that is what he himself wrote: "After all, the wars which his fathers had fought and over which myriads in Israel had shed their blood like water, were for the freedom of belief and religion; how could he himself now force others to forsake their religion?" Weiss posed this rhetor ical question as sufficient reason for questioning the credibility of the information on the Idumaeans' forced conversion, but appeased his con science by an evasive and ingenuous question and answer: "But how can we know today what powerful reasons at that time motivated him to perform an act, even though he could not justify i t ? " 20
In an attempt to avoid the halakhic difficulty indicated, Luzzatto found moral justification for John Hyrcanus I in this act: he thinks it was in tended on the one hand to protect the Jewish religion, on the other to save the Idumaeans themselves, closely related in origin to the Jews, from anni hilation or exile . It may be pointed out that this approach tries to seize both ends of the stick — denouncing the act while at the same time finding moral justification for condoning it. Klausner, on the other hand, tried to avoid the dilemma by a different line of apologetics, arguing the conquest of Idumaea simply retrieved a national and political loss, the Judaea Negev. In his opinion, this region had been populated mostly by Jews, not just at the time of the First Temple but also in the Persian period. John Hyrcanus I may thus be re garded as acting to right an historic injustice in merely reclaiming "stolen property". He further argues the number of Idumaean converts was not even very large, particularly since there were also many Jews in the Idu maean cities, who had remained from those times . 21
22
20 Weiss, I, p.l 17. 21 Luzzatto, // Giudaismo illustrate (lezioni di Storia Israelitica), p p . 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 . 22 Klausner, History of the Second Temple, III p.87. In my opinion, his view is somewhat exag-
53
John Hyrcanus I
Baron holds that in all the places which in the days of the First Temple had been considered a part of the Kingdoms of Israel and Judah, the in habitants were forced to accept the Jewish religion in order that idolatry should not defile the land that for generations had been h o l y . He did not elaborate or base his opinion on a source of any kind. Gratz on the other hand did not deny the records of forced conversion and at the same time he was also conscious of the negative attitude of halakhic tradition on this matter. Hence he categorically declared that the act of John Hyrcanus I ran counter to the spirit of the Jewish religion and therefore ultimately brought catastrophe to the Jewish people . In complete contrast, Tcherikover is quite unaware of any conflict between forced conversion and the tradition of the Sages (in Talmudic sources). In this he accepts the version of Josephus as self-evident and did not even remember Strabo's relevant passage, which contains no mention at all of the subject of coercion . Morton Smith allowed his imagination to lead him even further afield and referred to compulsory conversion of the Idumaeans as a politically motivated act, in his view conducted on the model of Rome's actions in Italy. Also, conversion of people "less Pharisaic" was likely to assist the Sadducee ruler (John Hyrcanus I) against the Pharisee opposition . It is worth noting that he too ignored the contradiction between this act and the tradition of the Sages. His argument that John Hyrcanus I was a Sad ducee perhaps served him as cover for this. His Roman allusions in any case have no sources for support and are no more than interpretive speculation. The selection of historic interpretations quoted here is only a representa tive sample of the wide spectrum of opinions prevalent among modern scholars, all sharing acceptance, in principle and unquestioningly, of the varied evidence on forced conversion. Reservations concerning their truth were quite few, prominent among them being those of Klein. The latter was for many years almost alone, one of the few to understand the total contradiction between the testimony from Josephus (Ant., XIII.257—258) and that of Strabo (XV, 2, 34), since the latter not only does not speak of 23
24
25
26
23
24 25 26
gerated because of a nationalistic approach. True or not, it agrees with the common conclusion about the compulsory conversion of the Idumaeans. Baron, Social and Religious History of the Jewish People, (Hebrew) I, p. 136. To his words here, compare ibid., II, pp.16, 165 (note 17) which somewhat contradict the above reference, especial ly concerning the conversion of the Ituraeans - see note 25 below. Below we discuss the Itu raean problem further. E.g. Gratz (Engl, version), II, p p . 8 - 9 . Tcheriokover, Jews and Greeks, p. 197. M. Smith, Donum Gentilicum etc. in honour of David Daube (eds. Bammel et al.), 1978, p.5ff.
54
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall 27
conversion under duress, but rather indicates a choice freely made . If Josephus were right, collective conversion of Idumaeans would at least have evoked some echo in Mishnah literature, but there is no hint of it in the records, indicating it most probably never happened. In fact, Klein is prepared to accept Josephus' words only on the conquest of the two Idu maean cities, Marisa and Adora (Adoraim). In this he prefers the very brief passage in War, I 6 3 , which only mentions that John Hyrcanus I captured a number of cities in Idumaea, among them Adora and Marisa . A very original view on this problem comes from the well-known his torian Simon Dubnow. He pointed out the historic process whereby the Semitic peoples of eastern Eretz-Israel (such as Moabites and Ammonites) progressively assimilated with their Arab neighbors (the Nabataeans), whereas their friends the Idumaeans in western Eretz-Israel were gradually drawn into the sphere of influence of Judaea and were evidently inclined to a cultural merger with the Jews. According to Dubnow, John Hyrcanus I merely completed the annexation of the rest of the Land of Edom and the final Judaization of the Idumaeans . Despite the refreshing innovation in this view, Dubnow was unable to ignore entirely the information on the compulsion to convert, so he softened his view somewhat by saying that in order to validate the merging of the Idumaeans with the Jewish people, John Hyrcanus I decided to induct them into the bonds of the Jewish re ligion and permit residence in the country only to those who accepted the Jewish religion. As a result, a great majority of the Idumaeans accepted this condition and agreed to circumcision . Alon too, in his critique on Braude's book concerning converts and con version, continued in the spirit of these words. Only by a small hint did he raise some doubt concerning what he called "the absorption (or assimila tion)" of the Idumaeans in the Jewish nation. Reflecting some scepticism, 28
29
30
27 Klein, Land of Judah, p p . 7 4 - 7 5 . He relies on the Hebrew translation of Strabo by Saliternik (publication by the Hebrew Society for the Exploration of Eretz-Israel and its Antiquities, 1935, p.235) and writes: "the Idumaeans are Nabataeans exiled from their land for [some] rebellion, who joined up with the Jews and adoptedtheir laws". The end of this quotation emphasizes the Idumaeans' wish for a union with the Jews. 28 Klein, loc.cit. He believes memory of that conquest is preserved in the apocryphal folk-tale in the Book of Jubilees and the Hebrew adaptation of the Midrash Va-Yiseu' (ibid., p.75ff.). It seems that Baron was considerably influenced by Klein's opinion denying enforced conversion, except that he applies it fully to conversion of the Ituraeans and only partially to conversion of the Idumaeans. In fact he interpreted Klein's words concerning the latter and stated that the conquest and conversion of 'all the Idumaeans' (as claimed by Josephus) by John Hyrcanus I was in fact restricted to the inhabitants of Adoraim and Marisa (Baron, Social and Religious History [Hebrew], II, p. 16). 29 Dubnow, A General History of the Jewish People, II, p.73 (Hebrew). 30 Ibid., p.74. It seems that (like Klein) Dubnow for this purpose did not differentiate between the Idumaeans living in the cities of Marisa and Adoraim and the rest - i.e. the rural sector, a matter which we discuss again later.
John Hyrcanus I
55
he wrote: "In the days of Herod this assimilation was not yet complete, for Costobar, Herod's governor in Idumaea, wanted to liberate the Idu maeans from Jewish rule and from the obligation to follow Jewish customs (Ant., XV.7; g ) . " It seems that with these few words Alon wanted to argue that the conversion of the Idumaeans was not a proper conversion so that the evdience concerning its imposition was not to be taken as correct. It is only in recent years that a number of scholars have submitted the complex problem of the Idumaean conversion to an examination in depth, after totally and legitimately rejecting the evidence from Josephus and Ptolemy the Historian. They raised a number of persuasive historic reserva tions and arguments, holding that in the main the conversion of the Idu maeans (like that of the Ituraeans, which we will discuss below) was a voluntary act, the culmination of a gradual, drawn-out process of conver gence between eastern Semitic ethnic groups nursing shared hostility to the Hellenistic world, which threatened their independent existence . In their view, the policy of intensified Hellenizing urbanization, prevalent in the Seleucid kingdom since the days of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, merely speeded up the process. Among the nations in the East it exacerbated the feeling of being socially excluded, of civil and political deprivations, which in any case already existed during the whole Hellenistic period and so typi fied the local, native population such as the Jews, the Idumaeans, and the Ituraeans. It should be mentioned that their inferior status, both in theory and in practice, was anchored in the laws and jurisprudence of the Hellenis tic monarchies of the East that discriminated very clearly between "natives" (Xaoi) and "citizens (tio\iTai) of the Hellenistic cities . Without a doubt, the steadfast stand by the Jews under Hasmonaean leadership against the designs of the Seleucid regime and their allies in the Hellenistic cities for forcing them into apostasy made a powerful impres sion on the nations around t h e m . The Jewish successes on the battlefield and the wide sweep and speed of their conquests in the second generation of the Hasmonaean revolt — which even gained international recognition 3 1
32
33
34
31 Alon, Studies in Jewish History, II, p.281 - 2 8 2 , note 6. 32 See for examples: P. Churgin, Studies in the Times of the Second Temple, p.79; Rappaport, in: Doron, pp.219, 229 etc; Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, I. p.225. In fact, rights of priority on this go to Klein and Dubnow (notes 2 7 - 3 0 above), cf. also Baron, op.cit., II, pp.16, 165 (note 17). Sevenster also found it hard to accept the idea of voluntary conversion (to Judaism), but for entirely different reasons. In his view, the difficulty arose out of his disbelief in the abil ity of Judaism to compete with the influence of Hellenism on the population of Eretz-Israel see: Sevenster, Do You Know Greek?, p.l 14. He undoubtedly judged matters from the per spective of the classic school, seeing the culture of Greece as the pinnacle of creation of human culture in times of antiquity, which in his eyes could have no rivals. 33 This will be extensively discussed in my forthcoming book Jews and Hellenistic Cities. 34 Cf. I Mace, 3:9, 25-2;ibid., 5:6;ibid., 14:29, etc.
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The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
(on the part of Rome, Sparta, Ptolemaic Egypt, and other countries in the eastern Mediterranean basin) — brought the Hasmonaeans a great deal of renown that not only raised their prestige but also made them into a spearhead in the struggle against the Seleucid regime and its allies, the Hellenistic cities. Jewish influence on their Idumaean neighbors (as well as on the Ituraeans) quite naturally grew stronger for, contending alone, the Idumaeans (or the Ituraeans) had after all no chance of surviving for any length of time in the struggle against the powerful Hellenistic world that surrounded and threatened them. Allowing for the possible existence of Jewish propaganda generated in the elation of victory, we may appre ciate the great measure of Jewish influence that gave these eastern nations an added impetus along their converging course. It is thus not surprising that the Hasmonaean victories and the joy that followed gradually and persis tently paved the way for feelings of identity on the part of these nations that led many of their members, by choice and in no way by compulsion, to full conversion to Judaism. In fact, this explanation most persuasively clarifies the rapidity of Hasmonaean conquests in Idumaea and Galilee. Yet, however correct and convincing the above analysis might be, we still have to explain and justify how the element of compulsion came to be in troduced into the historical accounts on the conversion. In responding to this we have divided the following discussion into two parts: first, we prove that enforcement of conversion — by imposing the obligation of cir cumcision and with it the remainder of Jewish law — does not stand up to the test of historic criticism and thereby we complement the opinions already stated. Second, we expose the complex of reasons motivating Hel lenistic-Roman historiographers including Josephus to describe the conver sion in a maliciously propagandist manner as an arbitrary act perpetrated by those great tyrants, the rulers of the Hasmonaeans dynasty. Detailed analysis of the four pieces of evidence quoted above shows that not one of them is free of fundamental errors and that all of them are based on half-truths. First, the very observation concerning the imposition of circumcision on the Idumaeans is quite strange in itself, since it is wellknown that, like other Semitic nations in those days, they themselves had long observed this custom . Confirmation of this is in evidence dating back to the time following the destruction of the First Temple . In the Hellenis tic period it was apparently only the urban population of Marisa and Adora who had ceased to practice circumcision due to the strong Greek influence 35
36
35 Licht, EB, IV, p p . 8 7 9 - 8 9 8 ; see also Tcherikover, CPJ, I, 4; Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, I, pp.2-4;II, pp.620-625. 36 Jeremiah, 9 : 2 4 - 2 5 ; Ezekiel, 3 2 - 2 9 ; see also Haran, Ben-Gurion Volume, p p . 6 2 - 6 7 ; cf.Rappaport, Down, p.229.
John Hyrcanus I
57
37
t h e r e (the same is known of the Hellenizing circles in Jerusalem before the Hasmonaean revolt — cf. I Mace, 1:15; 2:45). There is therefore no escaping the conclusion that the whole story concerning the enforcement of circumcision on the Idumaeans does not stand up to the test of historical criticism but rather is founded on what is at best a half-truth. In other words, if any of the Idumaeans had really been forced to undergo circum cision, in practice this applied at most to their urban sector. Moreoever, if we carefully examine the text of Ant., XIII.257—258, we easily discover that this did not even apply to the whole urban sector, but rather only to those who preferred not to leave their country. From a simple interpre tation of the source, these were given the choice of performing circum cision or going into e x i l e . The fact that there were Idumaeans who emigrated from their country to Egypt and there continued to worship their god Koze (or Kos, Qos, Cos, e t c . ) can show that conversion was not in fact imposed on them by force. In truth, the condition set by John Hyrcanus I did not in principle represent the introduction of a custom previously unknown to the Idumaeans. On the contrary, the act could be seen as the revival of an ancestral custom of their own; in the spirit of the Hasmonaean period, it was merely provided with Jewish content, giving expression to the process of Idumaean-Jewish repproachement, and receiving the blessing of most of the Idumaeans themselves, at least of the rural sector. Though we accept that circumcision was demanded of all converts , we must not deduce that such an obligation indicated that conversion by com pulsion was an accepted norm of Jewish society in the days of the Second 38
39
40
37 Greek influence reached there through the settlement of Hellenized Phoenician migrants. On the Phoenicians' amount of influence and presence in Marisa see: Peters and Thiersh, Painted Tombs in the Necropolis of Marisa, passim; Tcherikover, Jews and Greeks, p p . 3 6 0 - 3 6 1 (note 126); Schurer, I I , p p . 4 - 5 (note 8); see recently Oren and Rappaport, IEJ, 34(1984), p p . 1 1 4 - 1 5 3 , esp. 149ff. Phoenician-Hellenistic influence is also easily recognized in the libels pf Menaseas of Patara, see: Against Apion, II 1 1 2 - 1 1 4 ; Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, I, p p . 9 9 - 1 0 1 (no. 28). 38 It seems that at least some of those who remained in the country did not accept the obligations of Judaism and continued to live as gen tiles, judging by the case of Costobar (or Kostobar), who not only used a name based on the Idumaean idol Kos, but he also believed (during the overharsh reign of King Herod) that it did not befit the Idumaeans to adopt Jewish laws in place of their own and to be subject to them (Ant., XV, 255). Furthermore, with the aid of Cleopatra VII Queen of Egypt, Costobar took political steps in an attempt to turn back the clock of history {ibid., 2 5 6 - 2 5 8 ) . 39 Details see: Rappaport, Rev. de Philol., XLIII (1969), p p . 7 3 - 8 2 . See also Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria, I, p.280ff., II, p.438ff.; Hengel, Jews, Greks and Barbarians, p.94 and no.10. 40 Support for this is found in the Book of Judith (14:10), in the story of the conversion of Achior the Ammonite, whose circumcision was a prime precondition for his affiliation to the House of Israel - see: Grintz, Book of Judith, p p . 1 6 7 - 1 6 8 ; Gevaryahu, Jacob Gil Volume, p.69. The dispute ascribed to the days of the Tanna'im Talmud (Yebamoth, 46a) - on the obligation of s
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
58
Temple. Since it was intended for self-praise, the story told by Josephus (Vita, 113) - that, against the. wishes of the Jewish community around him, he had forbidden the imposition of circumcision on two gentile nobles from among the subjects of King Agrippa II who had fled to him cannot serve as proof, especially since the supposed Jewish stand was not founded on any halakhic custom whatsoever . On the contrary, it is more reasonable to assume that Josephus' own attitude on this subject repre sented the accepted norm in Israel, for otherwise Josephus would not have succeeded in persuading the Jewish community. Of course he presented, matters the way he did, for reasons of personal prestige, self-praise, and a desire to win the hearts of his Greco-Roman readers. Out of hostility and ignorance the latter would of course think that the conversion of gentiles and their absorption in Judaism stemmed from to a decisive degree from coercion. 41
In this context it is however worth noting that the writings of Philo of Alexandria also take strong exception to the idea of imposing circum cision on converts by force. Though his words in this matter are in the form of philosophical comment and interpretation on biblical texts, yet there are reasonable grounds for assuming they were in practice addressed to those whom Wolfson called 'spiritual converts' or 'half converts', that is those who according to Philo had curtailed the "pleasures and desires and all the other delights of the soul" and who demonstrated "rejection (aXXorptojaic) of the beliefs of worshippers of many idols and the establishment of close relations (oiKeicoaiO with those who worshipped the one God, father of the universe ." Philo, who lived at least one generation before Josephus, brings quite clear evidence on the reservations of the Jewish Sages in the days of the Second Temple to enforced conversion; in any case his words well reflect the spirit of Jewish tradition and unmask a little of Josephus' boastfulness and exaggerations. In considering the Idumaeans' conversion, it cannot be compared with the forcible circumcision, by Judas Maccabaeus and his men, of boys they 42
circumision incumbent on converts - was intended to clarify whether immersion (for purification) alone was sufficient for conversion or whether circumcision was also required, and vice versa. It seems however that this discussion was mainly academic, not reflecting practical day-to-day reality; in fact the examples brougth up in this dispute came from the acts of the forefathers in biblical times and not from current events. Conversion of the kings of Adiabene on the other hand could prove the importance of the obligation of circumcision since, according to Josephus in the same context, Izetas believed he could not be a real Jew if he was not circumcised (Ant., XX 38; cf.ibid., 4 1 - 4 8 ) - See extensively: Bamberger, Proselytism in the Talmudic Period, p.42ff.; Feldman, Josephus, IX, pp.410-411 (note a). 41 See above p.49f. 42 Philo, Questions and Answers on the Book of Exodus, II 2 and see extensively: Wolfsohn, Philo - Foundations of Religous Philosophy etc. (Hebrew version), II, p.226ff.
John Hyrcanus I
59
found uncircumcised 'within the borders of Israel' (I Mace, 2:45) for this only concerned uncircumcised sons of Jews and not gentiles; also, this was 'within the borders of Israel' and not a population outside the bounds of the Jewish community. Furthermore, from the aspect of factual context, the acts of Judas Maccabaeus relate to a struggle against the religious de crees of Antiochus IV Ephiphanes, mainly against the one forbidding circumcision in Israel; in consequence there were many who for fear of their lives had not fulfilled this elementary Jewish obligation. The small number of sources available unfortunately precludes a solu tion, by detailed and convincing comparative studies, of the problems of the Idumaean conversion — one which would remove any doubts. Under present conditions we have no choice but to be content with scraps of in formation and can merely propose a possible and logical solution. The epic poem of Theodotus on Sichem and the affair of Dinah is the only Jewish source where there is mention of enforced conversion to Juda ism within the borders of Eretz-Israel of a complete ethnic group. From the outset however we must restrict the validity of this source and empha size that it related to an expressly biblical affair, not an event from real life in the Second Temple Period. Its only importance therefore lies in the wording it employs, most likely taken from the vocabulary of expressions commonly accepted in the time of its author, who lived in the middle of the second century B C E — very close to, if not actually contemporary with the days of John Hyrcanus I. We think it reasonable and permissible, at least for the purpose of our discussion, to assume this epic poem repre sents Jewish concepts prevalent in the days of the Hasmonaeans, on the duty of conversion to Judaism of gentiles who had sexual or marital rela tions with Jewish women; possibly it may also lead to conclusions on the conversion of the Idumaeans and the Ituraeans. In other words, the very physical proximity of these nations to the Jews — apparently finding daily expression in mixed marriages, living together in continuous contact and with joint activities — created the need for a clear halakhic ruling to the facts of this reality . The prohibition of sexual 43
44
43 On the estimated period of Theodotus, see recently: Stern, in: The Diaspora, etc., pp.218, 348 (note 42) and additional bibliographic details there. 44 Similar phenomena may also be found in much later periods, such as that mentioned in the Babylonian Talmud (Yebamoth, 46a): "R. Hiyya b. Abba once came to Gabla where he observed Jewish women who [had] conceived from proselytes who were circumcised but [had] not per formed the required ritual ablution; he also noticed that idolaters were serving Jewish wine and Israelites were drinking it, and he also saw that idolaters were cooking lupins and Israelites ate them; but he did not speak to them on the matter at all. However, he called upon R. Johanan who instructed him: Go and announce that their children are bastards, that their wine is forbid den as nesek wine and that their lupins are forbidden as food cooked by idolaters, because they are ignorant of the Torah." It seems that arising in this case was also a serious halakhic problem
60
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
intercourse and marriage of Jews with gentile women of Eretz-Israel was known in Talmudic tradition as the "decree of the Hasmonaean court of law ( J T n i t f n *?w i r v n ^ m u ) " , so it appears the only possible logical solution which could have compiled with this prohibition was Has monaean initiative towards proselytization. It is important to stress this as further support for the thesis of voluntary conversion of the Idumaeans (and the Ituraeans) as an act performed in coordination with the Hasmon aean leadership, on their initiative and encouraged by them. We are not clear how radical this conversion was and whether the Idu maean converts were from the outset considered 'true proselytes (••» i A P T 2 ? ) ' , i.e. genuine and sincere converts. However, since we learn from Talmudic tradition that the concept of a 'ger-toshav (=:iunn ••">:*, namely a partial convert who had only renounced idolatry and was therefore obliged only by Noah's seven commandments) only existed when the cus tom of the jubilee year was observed (i.e. in the days of the First Tem p l e ) , it appears that the Idumaeans' conversion was complete and unqua lified . Indirect support for this may be found in the passage from the Jerusalem Talmud (Yebamoth, VIII 8a): "R. Samuel the son of Hiyyah son of Judah [says] in the name of Rabbi Haninah : a ger and toshav are to be tolerated (= in a y j •>*? aa ) for twelve months, if he changes his mind, 4 S
46
47
which urgently demanded a clear solution, apparently due to the dimensions of the phenomenon and the likelihood that it would recur. 45 B. Abodah Zarah, 36b; cf. also B. Sanhedrin, 82a. On the attempts of this court to distinguish between Israel and the gentiles and to erect a wall between them, see: Urbach, Halakha, pp.43, 57. As for the above two pieces of Talmudic evidence, it should be noted that-this is reported in the name of Rav Dimi, who was an important Amora of the T l i n j and who reported many rumors originating in Eretz-Israel, which he had heard from Rabbi Johanan Napkha. It is however hard to discover the true original version of this report of the "Hasmonaean Beth-Din (court of law)". At all events, in the Babylonian version (Abodah Zarah, 36b) the Gemara recognizes three stages in the prohibition of contact between a Jew and an 'Aramaic' woman, where the first stage found expression in the famous portion in Mishnah Sanhedrin IX, 10, i.e. rPa°")N ^"On etc. ("he who cohabits with an Aramaic woman etc.") and according to the Gemara it is from the Torah. The reference is to cohabitation in public ( K ' 0 m S 3 ) , whereas the "Hasmonaean Beth-Din" sets out to punish "cohabitation in private" (NjnX 2 while the disciples of Hillel and Shammai (referring to "the eighteen decrees") also forbade the 7 T n ' K , namely union (being together without witnesses) with the gentile woman. Possibly the original report is quoted, in B. Sanhedrin, 82a "When R. Dimi came, he said: the Beth-Din of the Hasmonaeans decreed that one who cohabits with a heathen woman is liable to punishment on account of NaShGA (i.e. niddah, shifhah, goyyah, esheth ish)". This may be an obscure tradition of fana tical acts in the days of the Hasmonaean revolt and requires further study. My thanks are due to Dr. Ben-Shalom who guided me on the meaning of these. 46 B. Arakhin, 29a, a tradition quoted from R. Simeon ben Eleazar from the end of the second century CE. On 'ger-toshav' see: Urbach, "Ger", Hebrew Encyclopaedia, XI, p.l 75. 47 Worth mentioning in this connection is the opinion of Kaufmann, (History of the Jewish Belief, VIII, p p . 2 9 6 - 2 9 7 ) that no religious conversion existed in the days of Ezra and Nehemiah, for then the Idumaean problem was in fact encountered for the first time.
John Hyrcanus I
61
well and good; if not, he is as a gentile for all purposes". Likewise the Babylonian Talmud, (Avodah Zarah, 65a) in the name of R. Johanan, quotes: "a ger-toshav who allows twelve months to pass without becoming circumcised is to be regarded as a heretic among idolaters!". From this we may infer that even if we accept the possibility that at first the masses of converts in Hasmonaean days were considered partial converts (i.e. having the status of ger-toshav) they could not retain this status for more than one year - if in fact we assume the same ruling was in force in those days. Bialoblocki believes the status of ger-toshav was a transitional stage from the status of 'gentile' to that of 'true proselyte'. During this transitional stage the convert would be bound by 'the seven commandments of the sons of Noah' and after that progressively also by other commandments - in cluding circumcision, this being one of the most important symbols of a convert's acceptance into the Jewish community . In fact, Bialoblocki and also Bamberger cast doubt on the possibility that the rules for a ger-toshav were applied in the time of the Second Temple; in their opinion these were merely theoretical . Finkelstein on the other hand believes the opposite, namely that these rules reflect reality and more precisely, the dispute between the Sages and the Hasmonaean rulers concerning conversion. By this dispute, so he believes, the Sages wished to impose the observance of 'the seven commandments of Noah's sons' on the non-Jewish population, whereas the Hasmonaeans aimed for complete Judaization by outright conversion . These scholars quite understandably had difficulties in reconciling the information drawn from Hellenistic-Roman historiography, with the sig nificant silence in Talmudic tradition concerning the enforced conversion at the initiative of the Hasmonaean rulers. Faced with this uncertainty we are strongly attracted by Rappaport's opinion: he completely rejects Finkelstein's approach, but on the other hand also denies any possible doubt over the actual existence in the Hasmonaean era of the status of ger-toshav. He believes this status was not of the nature of an interim stage preceding complete conversion, but rather "an arrangement allowing a gentile to come and go, even to reside in the country without coming into conflict with Jewish society ." This issue had no special and exclusive bearing specifically on the conversion of the Idumaeans, but there was here a wise Hasmonaean attempt to apply the spirit of the Bible inherent in the laws of ger-toshav, thereby solving the pressing circumstantial problem raised by 48
49
50
51
48 49 50 51
Bialoblocki, Bar-Ilan II, (1964), p.44ff. Bialoblocki, ibid., p.49; Bamberger, Proselytism etc., p . 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 . Finkelstein, JBL, L (1930), p p . 2 0 - 4 4 ; idem, The Pharisees, p.597. Rappaport, Dissertation, p p . 8 4 - 8 5 .
62
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fail
the extensive conquests from the days of John Hyrcanus I. Clearly also, the Hasmonaeans could not eliminate or expel every gentile from the areas they had conquered; they were consequently in immediate need of a solution to the poignant question of coexistence. Implementation of the biblical laws relating to ger-toshav could have provided a sound and practical answer, especially as they reflected known Hasmonaean aims - to revive observance of the Bible commandments in the parts of Eretz-Israel liberated from the gentiles. To sum up: according to our reasoning, the status of ger-toshav could only serve as a brief and limited transitionary stage for the Idumaeans in their complete conversion performed by free agreement and mutual desire. Following the halakha of the Tanna'im, the converts were obliged to observe four things: acceptance of the Torah, circumcision, ritual immer sion and sacrifice . We think it reasonable to maintain that the halakha on this subject first began to crystallize in the days of John Hyrcanus I, pos sibly following the conversion of the Idumaeans. However, the fact that of all these obligations Hellenistic-Roman historiography only stressed the duty of circumcision, arouses suspicion of hostile and propagandist ten dencies there. Strange and paradoxical as it might sound, it may be pointed out that one of the important proofs of the successful conversion of the Idumaeans is the division of Judaea after its conquest by Pompey in 63 BCE. It ap pears that he refrained from detaching the eastern region of Idumaea from partitioned and truncated Judaea, indicating that he considered this to have been an expressly Jewish area . Moreover, Josephus regarded this policy of dismemberment carried out by Pompey as "confining the [Jewish] nation w i t h i n i t s o w n b o u n d a r i e s " (War, I 155; also cf. Ant., XIV 74), clearly showing that eastern Idumaea was recognised as an area lying within the ethnic Jewish borders. Western Idumaea on the other hand was influenced more by the Hellenistic culture of the coastal cities. Its detach ment from Judaea must therefore be interpreted as resulting from the poli tical ambitions of the polis Marisa and not a particular expression of national Idumaea aspirations of separatism. Though in the days of Herod there was still a group of Idumaeans who continued to adhere to the cult of Kos (or Koze, Qos, Cos etc.), there is reason to believe this was just a small group with no appreciable influence 52
53
52 See extensively: Schiffman, in: Josephus Flavius, Historian of Eretz-Israel, p.260ff and extensive ly detailed bibliography therein. 53 On the administrative incorporation of Idumaea in Judaea which then became an integral part thereof, see: Schalit, King Herod, p.l 13ff; Stern, Tarbiz, XXXIII (1968), p p . 2 1 5 - 2 2 9 ; Z. Safrai, Studies in the History of the Jewish People and the Land of Israel, IV (1978), p.l03ff; Stern, Jewish People in the First Century, I (1974), p.341.
John Hyrcanus I
63 54
in Idumaea and something of an exception . In any case, the very fact of the existence of such a group clearly indicates that conversion had not been imposed by force on all the Idumaeans collectively, for otherwise they would not have survived to Herod's reign. Furthermore, the fact that in 63 BCE there had been no official approach to Pompey by an Idumaean dele gation asking to revive the cult of their ancestral god is for our purpose very significant in this context. Had the Idumaeans been forcibly con verted, they would surely have approached the Roman commander asking to redress the wrong . As an argumentum ex silentio this could indicate the depth of Idumaean integration in Jewish society of those days. The sincerity of the Idumaeans' conversion and their considerable in tegration into Jewish life may also indirectly be seen by their activist stand during the Great Revolt against the Romans. They proved themselves faithful sons to the Jewish nation and fought with uncompromising devo tion, a fact which may serve to show the depth of their national and religious integration. It appears that Herod himself already feared the powerful and unequivocal display of Jewish nationalism among certain Idumaean circles, for otherwise he would not have had to send his brother Joseph to Idumaea with a considerable military force (2000 infantry and 4 0 0 horse) to put down the revolt by supporters of Mattathias Antigonus in the winter of 3 9 - 3 8 BCE (War, I 303 ;Ant., XIV 431). Additional corroberation for this may be found in the fact of the presence of "Idumaean disciples in the House of Shammai ", indicating that among the "Idumaeans" there were learned people well-versed in the Torah and as punctillious in the observance of matters of halakha as the House of Shammai. This school of Sages we know represented those faithful to the earlier halakha, uncompromising and marked with the seal of zealot piety, as it had taken shape since the days of the Hasmonaean revolt and from which it drew its aggressive and belligerent inspiration. Out of the House of Shammai also came the zealot ideology of the rebels against Rome and it is therefore no wonder that the well-known Eighteen Decrees (= m i M l a i n"') were issued from the upper storey of the house of Eliezer son of Hananiah son of Hezekiah son of Garon, one of the disciples of the House of Shammai who had previously been appointed to be one of the army commanders leading the revolt in Idumaea (War, II 566). It is instructive 55
56
54 See note 38 above. 55 Cf.: Kochman, Dissertation, p. 180. 56 See: Sifre Zutta (ed. Epstein), Tarbiz, I (1930) p.70 and see also Introduction, ibid., p.52. See also: Ben-Shalom, Dissertation, p . 5 3 1 - 5 3 2 . It should be stressed that in this context (also the use by Josephus in connection with the days of the Great Jewish Revolt) the term "Idumaeans" is intended to indicate the geographic origin from Idumaea as a name given the southern region of Judaea.
64
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
in this connection that, as an essential pre-condition for the longed-for redemption, The Eighteen Decrees were intended to deepen the gulf be tween Jews and gentiles in Eretz-Israel and help in purging the Jewish nation and the Holy Land of revelations of idolatry . Recent archeological finds could also serve to corroberate our conclusons concerning the Idumaean converts' integration into Jewish society. In a newly found grave inscription in the necropolis of Hellenistic Marisa were the names of a brother and sister, Baba (Bd0a) and Babatha(Bayard), the descendants of someone called Kosnathan son of Amaraios, i.e. of Idu maean origin. If we accept the tempting suggestion that they had family connection with the sons of Baba from Herod's time, mentioned by Joseph us as having for twelve years found a hiding-place from Herod on the estate of Costobar (or Kostobaros) in Idumaea (Ant., XV 2 6 0 - 2 6 6 ) , we may assume that members of the same family, like Herod's own, had become converted during the Hasmonaean period . Their integration into Jewish society finds very significant expression in bonds of marriage with one of the major branches of the Hasmonaean families, and not in vain were they described by Josephus as members of the family of John Hyrcanus II 57
58
(ibid.,
2 6 6 ; T ) TT?C "TpKavov
ovvyevela).
From this point of view these marriage bonds resemble those of Herod to Mariamme the grand-daughter of Hyrcanus II and of course testify to the tendency of Idumaean nobility to integrate with the upper strata of the Jewish national leadership. If we identify Baba son of Buta, whom Talmudic tradition counts among the Sages of the House of Shammai , as belonging to the aforementioned sons of Baba, we can of course understand the reasons for Herod's hostility towards them, since the House of Sham mai represented the activist oppositionary stand against him and his Roman patrons . Furthermore, in this way we can understand how, in the days 59
60
57 M. Sabbath, I 2; T. Sabbath, I 16 (ed. Lieberman, Mo'ed, p.4);7. Sabbath, I, 3 c - d ; f i . Sabbath, 1 3 b - 1 4 b ; see Ben-Shalom, Dissertation, p.358ff.; ibid., p.562ff. Ben-Shalom follows Gratz (III 2, p.810ff), except that his review is far broader and more exhaustive. 58 See details: Oren and Rappaport, IEJ, XXXIV (1984), p.144, esp. no.68. In fact, the names Baba and Babata have for some time been known from epigrapha in Marisa, see: Peters and Thiersch (note 37 above), p.45, inscriptions 10—11. Until the latest discovery however there had been no hint of any connection of bearers of the above name to people speci fically of Idumaean origin. Logically, Oren and Rappaport also believe there was a connection between the Baba family and R. Judas son of Baba, one of the sages of the Yavneh generation (a third-generation Tanna) who, like R. Akiba, was martyred in the days of Hadrian and thus challenged the religious persecution of those days. In fact his extreme piety strongly recalls that of Baba ben-Buta and conformed with the ideology of the School of Shammai, still current during Hadrian's religious persecution (on this see Ben-Shalom, in: Bar-Kokhba Revolt etc. p p . 1 - 1 1 2 ) ; the matter requires further examination. 59 On Baba son of Buta see extensively: Ben-Shalom, Dissertation, p p . 2 3 5 - 2 3 8 . 60 This is the important innovation of Ben-Shalom, who as indicated expanded the initial ideas of Gratz (note 57 above).
John Hyrcanus I
65
of the Great Revolt, Idumaean circles were (as indicated above) swept into extremist positions against Roman rule . This demonstrates once more the degree of their integration into Jewish society and the fervor of their Jewish nationalism, which in our opinion could have developed only if we assume their conversion was by choice, out of full identity of interests and fortune shared with those of the Jewish community around them. Despite the fact that the Idumaean House of Antipatros pursued an out spokenly pro-Roman policy and despite the Hellenistic leanings demon strated by its life-style and culture, one cannot overlook the traces left by the conversion — in the Hebrew names of members of the family, such as the daughter Shalom (Salome) and also three men named Joseph, one the brother of Antipatros and Herod's uncle who became Salome's husband ?, the second a son of Antipatros and Herod's brother , and the third the son of Herod's brother Joseph who married Olympias, daughter of Herod and Malthace the Samaritan . Herod's cousin also bore the expressly Hebrew name, D K T J K (Achiabus) . In view of all that has been said above, if we reexamine Josephus' own words on the Idumaean conversion, we can instil them with a content somewhat different from what has so far been accepted. According to him, John Hyrcanus I "permitted (ene'Tpe\pev) them to remain in the country so long as they had themselves circumcised and were willing (de'Xoiev) to observe the laws of the Jews" (Ant., XIII 257). The phrasing clearly indi cates that this was a matter of the free will and consent of both parties. At first glance one might ask: Had the Idumaeans any other choice? How can one speak of consent and free choice? In answer to this, we must first point out that, had they been taken into slavery, they would in any case have been circumcised (or more precisely those among them who were not circumcised) and forced t o observe the seven commandments of the sons of Noah, as demanded by the laws of slaves . However, no compulsory alter61
6
63
64
65
66
61 See for example War, II, 566, 6 5 2 - 6 5 4 ; IV 224ff; 5141T; V 248 and more. In fact, already in the days of the "Varus War" (4 BCE) there was an uprising of 2000 discharged soldiers from Herod's army in Idumaea (War, II 55; also compare: Ant., XVII 270), see: Hengel, Die Zeloten, p.333, note 7; Ben-Shalom, dissertation, p p . 3 6 7 - 3 6 8 , note 35. Eventually the number of rebels in Idumaea reached 10 000 and among them were even members of the Herodian family itself (War, II 7 6 - 7 8 ; Ant., XVII 2 9 7 - 2 9 8 ) . 62 War, I 4 4 1 - 4 4 3 ; / I n r . , XV 65, 6 8 - 7 2 , 8 1 - 8 2 , 8 6 - 8 7 , 169, 204, 254. 63 War, I 181, 266, 286, 288, 303, 323, 325, 342; Ant., XIV 121, 361, 390, 392, 413, 438, 448, 450; XVIII 134. 64 War, I 562; II 74; Ant., XVII 20; XVIII 134. As for the third Joseph, Josephus' information is confusing, for in one place he is called 6 &ve\jjv6<; 'Apx&aov (War, 11.74) whereas in the parallel record (Ant., XVII 294) he is called b &i>ei//i
66
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fail
native of this nature was presented to them. On the contrary, they were given the choice between exile from their country and the revival of a cus tom they themselves had adopted long before and only temporarily aban doned because of an alien, outside influence . Admittedly the revival of circumcision was given Jewish content, but if among the Idumaeans them selves (or more precisely, the rural sector which included the majority of them) there had not already existed a tendency to draw close to the Jews and become a part of their society, John Hyrcanus I would not have of fered them (or more precisely their urban sector, who were only a minority among them) any such choice. In fact, considering Hasmonaean implacabil ity towards the pagan population of Hellenistic cities, there is no escaping the conclusion that John Hyrcanus I had behaved very liberally towards the Idumaeans. If we accept this conclusion, we shall become even firmer in our concept of shared fortunes, developing by choice between the Jews and the Idumaeans and reaching a climax in the act of conversion. The fact that Alexander Jannaeus appointed Antipas, Antipatros' father and Herod's grandfather, strategos for the whole of Idumaea (Ant., XIV 10) illustrates the degree of trust existing between the heads of the Idu maeans and the Hasmonaean leadership. It is simply hard to accept the thought that such an appointment was possible without being preceded by a tradition of cooperation and a true and sincere affinity. Ptolemy the Historian adds one more error to the accepted story of forcible conversion, stating the Idumaeans were 'Phoenicians and Syrians' in origin, but though there were Phoenician elements in the Idumaean cities of Marisa and Adora, this does not mean the Idumaeans can in general be identified as Phoenicians. It is not clear what ethnic meaning this writer attached to the term 'Syrians'. If he was in fact referring to Arab elements, he agrees with Strabo, who had represented the Idumaeans as a group of Nabataean exiles who had left their country due to some uprising, because of which they had also joined up with the Jews. One way or another, it is worth emphasizing that among both the Phoenicians and the Arabs the cus tom of circumcision was in no way unusual , so the matter of its imposi tion could not have been in the nature of a decree, but rather at most the revival of an ancestral custom which had been discontinued under the influence of Hellenistic culture . 67
68
69
(History of Israel, IV, p. 170) was of the opinion that John Hyrcanus I presented the Idumaeans with the choice of undergoing circumcision and becoming his slaves or leaving the country; however, Jawitz goes on to indicate the enslavement was never carried out, being replaced by the Idumaeans' conversion to Judaism. As there are no sources to support this view, there is no need to comment on it. 67 See note 69 below. 68 See note 35 above. 69 Herodotus (II, 104) already noted that as time went by the Phoenicians abandoned the custom
John Hyrcanus I
67
In view of the aforesaid, it follows that most of the Idumaeans were already circumcised; thus the duty of circumcision in fact only affected a minority among them and as such, was only of marginal importance. It is inconceivable that the Idumaeans in general (and the same applies later on to the Ituraeans), who already practised circumcision in accordance with their own ancestral tradition, would have had to be circumcised a second time. On the base of what we know of the laws of Israel and just to avoid any danger of creating the condition of "mutilated canal (n asu; n n 3 ) " , where the convert was already circumcised only a symbolic act of "shedding blood of the covenant ( m i a - m n s u n ) " would have been required of him . 70
Quite a different and unorthodox solution to the problem of the Idu maeans' conversion was recently proposed by Kochman in his dissertation; this aspires historically to disprove altogether the veracity of the traditional version of the Idumaeans' conversion . Accoring to Kochman, all the evid ence on Idumaeans' integration in Jewish society (as already discussed above) in the generations after John Hyrcanus I only indicates that, follow ing Hasmonaean successes in establishing Jewish sovereignty in EretzIsrael, the Idumaeans had abandoned their separatism, returning once more to the old traditions concerning the origins they shared with their brothers the Jews. Under this conception, the conversion in the days of John Hyrcanus I is interpreted as merely a formal act, between the inhabi tants of Judaea and those of southern Judaea, of resuming relations; the annexation of Idumaea to Hasmonaean Judaea expressed the latter's supre macy. According to him, "the question of circumcision might have been raised in this connection, since there had not been strict attention to its observance following the decrees of Antiochus IV Epiphanes ." In truth however this argument is rather strange, since the Hasmonaean revolt under the leadership of Judas Maccabaeus and his brothers was in fact character ized by its particular attention to observance of the commandment of cir cumcision and its forcible imposition on Jews who had not circumcised 71
72
of circumcision; he stressed this was due to the influence of the Greek world with which they came into close contact commercially. 70 Details see: Bamberger, Proselytism etc., p.42, 56(n.l8). The demand to "draw blood of cove nant" ( r P I S D T T ' O n ^ ) from the circumcised convert (J. Yebamoth VIII, 9a;B. Yebamoth 71a; T. Yebamoth 16,9; Zuckermandel, p.133; B. Sabbath 135a) was brought in the name of the School of Shammai and it is reasonable to assume it reflected the earlier and stricter halakha ruling in the time of the Hasmonaeans. On the dispute between the schools of Hillel and Sham mai see: Bialoblocki, Bar-Ilan, II, p p . 4 4 - 6 0 . On the early date and strictness of the rulings of the Shammai School see extensively the dissertation of Ben-Shalom. 71 Kochman, Dissertation, p.l78ff. 72 Kochman, ibid., p.184.
68
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
their sons, whether because of the decrees or as a symptom of Helleniza tion (cf. I Mace, 2:45;Ant., XII 278). Kochman also attempted to advance his opinion in another direction, arguing that the term 'Idumaens' in the literature of the Hellenistic period has no ethnic, but only territorial significance . However, this argument is equally strange and in addition it is without any factual base and inaccu rate. Sufficient in this context to recall Strabo (XV,22) who states that the population of Coele-Syria consisted of 'Coele-Syrians', Syrians and Phoeni cians, and in addition to these, another four 'tribes' or rather 'nations' (edvr\) who are intermingled with these, namely: Judaeans, Idumaeans, Gazaeans and Azotians . This information speaks for itself and use of the term edvoq is illustrative and decisive in this case. Furthermore, though the many and clear ethnic indications reflecting the separate existence of the Idumaeans in Jewish Hellenistic literature, such as Pseudo-Aristeas and the Books of Maccabees, might possibly be suspected of bias with the object of emphasizing the distinction between the Idumaeans and the Jews, yet that very fact itself would have to be explained. Anyhow, evidence from non-Jewish sources like Strabo (see above) and Menaseas of Patara {Against Apion, II 1 1 2 - 1 1 4 ) may certainly trusted in this case, especially since the last piece of evidence sees the two nations as avowed enemies. The same holds good for the testimony from Ptolemy the Historian, which clearly states that "the Idumaeans, on the other hand, were originally not Jews, but Phoenicians and Syrians" etc. Finally, Kochman argues, the silence of Talmudic sources on the Idu maeans' conversion should be interpreted as proof that this act was never performed and he thinks it can help us deny the historic authenticity of the evidence on the forced conversion of the Idumaeans. This silence in itself however is not sufficient proof, because by their nature the Talmudic sources do not provide us with historic surveys or descriptions of any era whatever, certainly not of the Hasmonaeans period, which left behind it only faint rumors and dim recollections. On the whole, Kochman's reasons cannot serve as grounds for denying the actual act of conversion. On the other hand, we share his view that there is no question of conversion im posed by force and that the integration of Idumaeans in Jewish society took place out of mutual desire and a common historic destiny. The second part of our study is devoted largely to clarifying the reasons why the conversion of the Idumaeans was described as an arbitrary act of imposition by force. 73
74
73 Ibid., p. 182. 74 Elsewhere, it will be remembered, Strabo stated that the Idumaeans were Nabataeans exiled from their land for rebellion etc. (XIV, 2, 34).
John Hyrcanus I
69
Unfortunately Josephus did not reveal the source on which he based his main report (Ant., XIII 257—258). It is however easy to guess that he drew most of his information on the days of John Hyrcanus I from Nicolaus of Damascus , especially since this name appears in close textual proximity (cf. Ant., XIII 251). Nicolaus of Damascus was we know the most respected attendant at Herod's court, particularly since he served as senior political adviser and court historian. His anti-Hasmonean stand is well-known , and the tendentious and hostile tone, which to the best of our comprehension can be detected in the report on the conversion of the Idumaeans, is un doubtedly attributable to him. In accordance with accepted practice in Hellenistic-Roman historiography hostile to the Hasmonaeans, Nicolaus had tried to represent them as 'tyrants', who by force imposed their faith and religious laws on a population they had conquered. This was an accusa tion of a typically apologist and propagandist nature, the purpose of which was to place on the Jews themselves the blame for religious persecution of their neighbors, thereby obscuring the fact that in the past they had been the real victims of such persecution by the Hellenistic world . The text associated with Ptolemy the Historian deserves fully identical evaluation, especially if like other scholars we identify him with Ptolemy the grammarian from Ascalon, who lived at the end of the 1st century BCE and, like Nicolaus of Damascus, wrote an essay on Herod's history (Historia Herodis)™. His origins in Ascalon can serve as a pointer to his basic atti tude, probably conforming with that prevalent in the Hellenistic cities of Eretz-Israel, where the Hasmonaean rulers were regarded as 'tyrants' and enemies of Hellenistic culture. Even though unharmed by John Hyrcanus I and his son Alexander Jannaeus, Ascalon cannot be assumed to have been indifferent to events all around or to have related with equanimity to the threatening Hasmonaean neighbor. In fact, the city was saved from the fate of its neighbors, not so much thanks to its moderate politics, but rather to 75
76
77
75 Cf. Marcus, Josephus, VII, p p . 3 4 0 - 3 4 1 , note c. On Josephus' degree of dependency in general on Nicolaus of Damascus see: Stern, in: Bible and Jewish History, p.375ff, esp. p.390ff; idem, Greek and Latin Authors, I, p.227ff. 76 See Efron, Studies of Hasmonaean Period, p p . 1 4 1 - 1 4 4 , 1 5 8 , 1 8 0 - 1 8 2 , 201, 239; Stern, op.cit., p.390ff. 77 On similar tendencies in Hellensitic-Roman historiography, designed to provide justification for the religious persecutions by Antiochus IV Ephiphanes and thereby also for further persecution, see for example Diodorus Siculus, XXXIV-XXXV, 1, 1 - 4 . In a similar vein, Josephus indicated Posidonius of Apamea, Apollonius Molon, Strabo, Nicolaus of Damascus and others, whose reports on Antiochus IV Epiphanes' religious persecutions were of a distinctly apologetic and pro pagandist nature - see: Against Apion, II, 7, 79ff. 78 On this identification see: Schiirer, I , p . 2 7 - 2 8 ; Stem, op.cit., p p . 3 7 9 - 3 8 0 and note 26. Though Stern raises possible reservations on this identification, he proposes no alternative and does not reject it outright. s
70
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall 79
the Ptolemaic patronage it had been granted . It is therefore quite easy to deduce that Ptolemy the grammarian from Ascalon had no amicable feel ings for the Hasmonaeans, but judged their conquests by strictly Hellenistic norms, in no way differing from those which guided Nicolaus of Damascus himself. If we also take into account the well-known fact that there was nurtured in Ascalon, at least since the days of King Jannaeus, a tradition of burning enmity to the J e w s , this conclusion is even stronger confirmed. And yet, why did Hellenistic-Roman literature particularly stress the imposition of circumcision as the act symbolizing conversion more than any other, and not ritual immersion or sacrifice? It is undoubtedly illumi nating that, of all the Jewish customs which the Idumaeans undertook t o observe, circumcision (to which as indicated above, they were no strangers) was the one emphasized. It seems we will not be wrong in saying this reeks of venomous, hostile propaganda; is it not reasonable to assume that, since Hellenistic-Roman historiography regarded circumcision as castration and an injurious habit among followers of barbaric superstition , the Idu maeans' conversion was therefore also depicted in such negative and mali ciously hostile propagandist imagery? Notoriously, the success of propagandist literature depends to a large extent on the sophisticated and cunning use of half-truths; in the affair under discussion a number of such half-truths may be mentioned. The most prominent of these and one readily available to Hellenistic-Roman propa ganda was founded on the fact that the Judaization of all the areas annexed to the Hasmonaean state involved first and foremost the elimination of idolatry. In Hasmonaean eyes this was a mandatory biblicalcommandment; hence the zeal for the Torah and, accompanying all their wars, the idea that redemption of the land depended on its purification (of gentile idolatry, of course), hence also they held up Phineas and Elijah as ideals for religious inspiration. No wonder therefore that Judas Naccabaeus in his wars in the northern part of Transjordan - at Karnaim — and in his attack on Azotus (following the operation at Marisa) held up the episode of Modi'in to serve as an example. This course was we know also adopted by Jonathan who burnt down the temple of Dagon in Azotus and by Simon who expelled the pagan inhabitants from Joppa and Gezer and cleansed these places of idolatrous defilement . It was easy, at least through the eyes of Hellenistic80
81
82
79 See full details on this matter in my book Jews and Hellenistic Gties (forthcoming). 80 For further details see my book mentioned above and the appendix of Efron. 81 See for example: Against Apion, II, 13, 1 3 7 - 1 4 4 . See extensively: Rabillo, in: Bar-Kochva Revolt etc. p p . 2 7 - 4 6 . 82 See / Mace, 2 : 2 5 - 2 6 , 4 4 - 4 7 ; ibid., 4 : 4 3 - 4 4 ; ibid., 5 : 4 4 - 6 8 ; ibid., 6:7; ibid., 10:84; ibid., 11:4; ibid., 1 3 : 4 7 - 4 8 ; Cf. with commands in the Bible: Exodus, 23:24; ibid., im;ibid., 34:13; Numbers, 33:52; Deut., 7:5ff; ibid., 12:3; Judges 6:25 and more. See extensively: Ed. Meyer,
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Roman writers, to see the war on idolatry as religious coercion, one aspect of which being the forced conversion. Another half-truth, which also made it easier for Hellenistic-Roman pro paganda to represent Judaization of Eretz-Israel in Hasmonaean times as a deed of coercion, was contained in the very fact of mass conversion of large groups, all taking place at one and the same time. Prima facie such an argu ment might be raised in this context with the 'conversion' of gentiles who were inhabitants of Eretz-Israel (including the Idumaeans), captured into slavery followig Hasmonaean conquests and remaining in the possession of Jewish owners. If in fact this argument were even only partially true — in itself quite doubtful, in the absence of factual information on the keeping of such slaves in Jewish society of the Second Temple Period - we must assume these were treated in accordance with biblical and halakhic com mandments relating to 'a Canaanite slave'; they would undergo circumci sion and ritual immersion and would therefore, also from a religio-nationalist aspect, be considered J e w s . If this had in fact been true, it would have given the Hellenistic-Roman writers quite effective propagandist ammuni tion, equating the Hasmonaeans to absolute tyrants, forcibly circumcising a gentile population they had captured and enslaved. But unfortunately, since the whole matter is clouded in uncertainty, we can draw no definite, confirmed conclusion. As indicated, during the Hasmonaean wars the conversion of enslaved captives was in itself an unlikely act and there is no real proof that it did in fact take place. We shall therefore examine another facet of group conver sion, concerning those who joined the Jewish people of their own free will; this we believe was done by most of the Idumaeans, later also by a sec tion of the Ituraeans. In order to understand how, in the eyes of the Greek and Roman writers, an act of choice turned into one of coercion, we will here examine just the collective form of this conversion. We think the answer lies in the character of Idumaean tribal society, 'where decisions by its patriarchial leadership served to determine forms of behavior and actions. In other words, we think conversion of the Idumaeans occurred to a decisive degree after a voluntary agreement between John Hyrcanus I and the Idumaean leaders of his day, very probably including the Herodian family. This conclusion seems likely in view of the fact that only a short 83
84
Ursprung und Anfange des Christentums, p p . 2 7 9 - 2 8 1 ; Baron, Social and Religious History (Hebrew), I, p.36; Rappaport, Doron, p p . 2 2 6 - 2 2 7 ; Efron, Studies of the Hasmonaean Period, p p . 1 9 - 5 4 , esp. p.53. 83 This will be discussed in my forthcoming book, Jews and Hellenistic Gties. 84 See extensively, incl. bibliographic details: Urbach, Zion, XXV(1964), p p . 1 4 1 - 1 8 9 ; idem, Papers of the Institute of Jewish Studies, 1964, pp. 1 - 9 4 ; Jeremias, Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus, pp. 3 4 5 - 3 5 1 ; Stern, in: The Jewish People in the First Century, 11(1976), p p . 6 2 4 - 6 3 0 .
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
72
time afterwards Alexander Jannaeus appointed Herod's grandfather Antipas strategos of all Idumaea including the Gaza area (Ant., XIV 10). Further more, in describing the latter's son Antipatros, Josephus explicitly wrote he was "an Idumaean by race, his ancestry, wealth and other advantages put him in the front rank of his people" (War, I 123) - which speaks for itself. A few more and comparable incidents may be mentioned. Numerous subjects of the Adiabene kingdom converted to Judaism, following the example of their king . This description probably also applies to the con version of Aziz king of Hammath (Emessa) on his marriage to Drusilla, sister of King Agrippa I (Ant:, XX 139), for the conversion of a king alone would be inconceivable without that of an entourage of servants, relatives and subjects. Also to be noted in this connection is the mention of con verts to Judaism in v a n , apparently Emessa (= "Eneoa, or "Ejueaaa) and, prominent among them according to a tradition ascribed to R. Hiyya bar-Abba, was a whole group of 'converts sons of converts' ( ' n D'*U D ' ny ) called - n n w y - i n * m (i.e. the family of Bar-Ashtor) . The same holds good for the conversion of Polemon of Cilicia (Ant., XX, 146), ex cept that subsequently he repented of his Judaism, and it seems he was followed by those of his subjects who had originally converted together with him. Knowing the social tribal-partriarchial structure of Arab society, it is not inconceivable that Herod too had hopes that the expected conver sion of Syllaeus the Nabataean (as a condition for his marriage to Herod's sister Salome — Ant.,XVl,225) would induce many Nabataean Arabs also to convert in his wake. Incidentally, the Mishna (Niddah, 7:3) also contains hints of collective conversion in the 1st century or the beginning of the 2nd century CE, seemingly by Arabs of Nabataean origin. Mentioned there is Rekem ( o p n ) in Transjordan as a place of settlement of converts, except we do not know the circumstances of their conversion or its motives; very possibly it was also not known t o the Sages and there were therefore some of them who doubted if these converts were fully conversant with the Jewish com85
86
4
85 Schiirer, III , p . 1 6 9 - 1 7 2 ; Neusner, JBL, LXXXIII(1964), p p . 6 0 - 6 6 ; Teixidor, Berytus, XVII (1967/68), p p . 1 - 1 1 ; Garni, Niv Hamidrashiah, 1971, p p . 2 0 4 - 2 1 2 ; Ha-Cohen Weingarten, Sinai, LXXXVIII(1981), p p . 1 5 5 - 1 5 8 ; Schiffman, in: Josephus Flavius - Historian of Eretz-Israel etc., p p . 2 4 7 - 2 6 5 and also extensive bibliographic details. Even if we agree with Schiffman that the number of converts in Adiabene was limited just to a thin upper crust, then too this is a one time group act performed following the example of the royal house. One way or another, the fact that some of the people of Adiabene were among those who volunteered to fight in Jerusa lem in the days of the Great Jewish Revolt against the Romans shows the converts were not necessarily few in number. 86 See /. Demai, VI, 25b; / Yebamoth, XI, l i d ; / Bikkurim, I, 64a. My thanks to R. Wilk who drew my attention to this.
John Hyrcanus J
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mandments. Quite a similar phenomenon was also known at Gabala (= bzi) south of the Dead Sea in Transjordan, where there was mention of "con verts who circumcised but did not perform ritual baths ( K ^ I I'rnw o n i i B )", especially that they were not particular about wine known to have been handled by an idolator, or suspected of this (i.e. l o a - P ' ) and some gentile f o o d s . A similar conversion, not far removed in time, is apparently also implied concerning the Qarduans ( • " ' m p living in the land of Ara rat), the Qartuans ( o ' n m p - living in a mountainous region in Media) and the Tadmorites . Later on, in the 4th century CE, Rava wrote of his town Mahoza in Babylonia, that there were many converts living there ; possibly their conversion too had been a group conversion, of the type described in connection with those living in their vicinity, in Adiabene. All the cases mentioned above concern whole groups of converts concen trated together within quite specific geographic sites or bounds, indicating the collective nature of the conversion, also quite conceivable in view of the socio-tribal nature of the inhabitants of these places. At a late date there was also collective one-time conversion of the subjects of another Arab kingdom, from the Hejaz in the north of the Arabian Peninsula (in the 3rd or 4th century CE) and like them also the subjects of the kingdom of Hemiar in the south of the Peninsula (5th century CE), led by Abukarib As'ad ( C . 3 8 5 - 4 2 0 C E ) , father of the famous Yusuf dhu-Nuwas . 87
88
89
90
91
87 See: B. Yebamoth, 46a. The attachment of Gabla ( ^ 2 3 ) to the Arabs was already known in biblical times - see: Mazar, EB, II, p p . 4 0 3 - 4 0 4 ; also in the days of the Second Temple, the Mishnah and the Talmud, see: Ant., II 6; III 4 0 ; IX 188; Onomastikon, p.195 {Te&a\r\vri)\ B. Kethoboth, 112a; Jonathan's Targum of Genesis, 32:4; ibid., 36:8. See also Klein, Jewish Transjordan, p p . 5 9 - 6 0 . It seems these converts also converted as a group. 88 See entries: "I"Hp, N*» J T I p , i m p in: Eshel, Jewish Settlements in Babylonia etc. Cf. Kohut, Aruch Completum, entries 1 7 1 p , P " ) p , 1"T~)D. See also: Gafni, in: Nation and its History, 1, p.203 with further details. See recently: Oppenheimer, entries: Qardu, Qartu, in: Babylonia Judaica in Talmudic Period, p p . 3 7 3 - 3 7 6 , 3 8 2 - 3 . 89 M. Yebamoth, XVI, 1 - 2 ; / . Yebamoth, I, 3 a - c etc. See Alon, Studies in Jewish History II, p . l l (Appendis A), 282. 90 B. Kidushin, 73a. 91 See for example: J. Hirschberg, Israel in Arabia, p.48ff. On this subject M. Gil recently published a paper casting new light on the origin of the Jews of Yathrib (=el-Medina), see: Gil, Studies in Arabic and Islam, IV(1984), p p . 2 0 3 - 2 2 4 . Also known from mediaeval times are similar phenomena, such as the legendary conversion of Berber tribes in North Africa at the end of the seventh century following their Queen Kahina (Dahiyya or Damiya or Dahaba) who converted, as reported by the Arabic writer Ibn-Khaldon (see: Hirschberg, History of Jews in North Africa, I, p p . 5 3 - 5 4 , 6 1 - 6 7 , 1 0 6 - 1 1 0 ) and the proselytization of the kingdom of Khazarians following their king Bulan (as reported by Rabbi Judah Halevi in Sefer ha-Kuzari). In fact the conversion to Islam of the Arab world itself was performed in quite a similar manner and was an historical spectacle, astounding in its speed and numerical extent. In this case too it is possible to observe, side by side, the factor of coercion operating as a result of the Moslem "holy war" (jihad) and the readiness of Arab tribes and nations to convert to Islam by way of negotiation. A new study by Z. Rubin showing collective
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The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
On the other hand, we must remember that most of these cases were also not without some display of determined refusal and resistance to the conversion among the leadership of the tribes concerned — thus at least in early times. Josephus for example stresses that there was a contest of strength between a group of notables from Adiabene and their king Izates concerning circumcision and in fact over the very idea of conversion . In another place he relates the efforts made by Costobar (or Kostobaros) to foil the conversion and revive the customs of his pagan forefathers, starting with the cult of the idol Koze (or Kos, Qos, Cos etc.), whose name formed the prefix of his own name. From this we see that Costobar had supporters among the Idumaeans, not all of whom followed the House of Antipa tros . In this context it is interesting also to note the arguments which Syllaeus the Nabataean brought up before Herod, against making his mar riage conditional on his conversion. As he put it, his Arab brothers would certainly oppose such an act, protest his abandoning the customs of his fathers and throw stones at him (Ant.,XVI,225). This argument should be seen not as a mere evasive subterfuge, but there are definitely grounds for believing it also held a certain element of truth: the possible conversion of Syllaeus would not have gone without the protest and opposition of groups and leaders from among members of his tribe. Altogether, according to our own views as given above, conversion of the Idumaeans was not a smooth affair, willingly accepted by all the in habitants of Idumaea; here a distinction must be made between those dwelling in Marisa and Adora (Adoraim) — the Hellenized cities hostile to the Jews - and those living in the rural periphery, friendly and inclined to Judaizing. The practise adopted in the hostile Hellenistic-Roman historio graphy, of labelling the Hasmonaean rulers 'tyrants', match the propagan dist tendencies in that literature which labelled the conversion as an act of coercion and despotism. Explanation is needed of the fact that the title of 'tyrant' was even awarded to the leaders of converting tribes, such as Silas the Jew and Dionysus from Tripolis, who is generally identified with Bacchius Iudaeus . According to this propagandist logic a two-fold com pulsion is involved — that of the Hasmonaean 'tyrant' himself and that of the 'tyrant' undergoing conversion; the latter acquiring the nature of a norm arising out of the tribal and patriarchial nature of his society and 92
93
94
conversion to Christianity of Arab tribes in southern Eretz-Israel in fact proves the same prin ciple, arising out of the tribal nature itself of Arab society, see Cathedra, XLVII(1988),pp.25-49. 92 Ant., XX, 17ff., esp. 38ff, 75ff. 93 Ant., XV, 2 5 5 - 2 5 7 . Revelations of intra-Idumaean opposition on the part of the local leadership to the house of Antipatros also found expression in the subversive attempts of Malichus and his fatal conspiracy against Antipatros, Herod's father (Ant., XIV, 2 8 0 - 2 9 3 ; War, I, 2 2 7 - 2 3 5 ) . 94 Ant., XIV, 3 9 - 4 0 ; Strabo XVI, 2, 18, (755) and see also below.
John Hyrcanus I
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forming an obligation for all his flock of followers. Revelations of internal resistance to conversion which developed in such societies (as indicated above) could only strengthen the impression created by anti-Jewish writers, of the coercive nature of such acts. In defining conversion as the act of despots (=tyrants), HellenisticRoman historiography therefore relied on half-truths, with the object of gaining propagandist advantages. The historic truth was apparently differ ent, namely: the Judaization of the Idumaeans (also the Ituraeans, as we shall see later) was a gradual process of approach spanning a number of generations but, finally gathering great momentum, in the days of John Hyrcanus I it culminated in complete and final conversion. There remains however one troubling question: why was Josephus so swept along by the hostile propaganda originating from Greco-Roman writers that he too described the conversion of the Idumaeans (and the Ituraeans) as an act performed under duress? At first sight, one may be tempted to reply that his description of this resulted from his intimate acquaintance with the obligation of circumcision incumbent of converts, but we have already seen there, is a difference between this obligation and enforced conversion, against the wishes of the converts. There is it seems no escaping the conclusion that the only logical reply to the above question lies in Josephus' sycophantic eagerness to pay lip-service to his Roman mas ters, in whose eyes the Hasmonaeans were despised as 'tyrants' and enemies of Hellenistic and Roman civilization. In this connection it should be stressed that the Jewish zealots rebelling against Rome in Josephus' own time drew their inspiration from the Hasmonaean revolt and regarded them selves as the successors to the latters' zealot tradition . As we know, the 'Hasmonaean' atmosphere generated in the days of the Great Revolt against the Romans found expression among other things in attacks by groups of zealots on Hellenistic cities and in the Eighteen Decrees ( i m r»'"» n n n ) , intended to deepen the' rift between the world of pagan impurity and the Jewish world — just as in the days of decrees issued by the first pair (of Sages), Jose son of Joezer of Zeredah and Jose son of Johanan of Jerusa lem, in the first generation of Hasmonaean rule. The all-engulfing elation following victory over the Roman commander Cestius Gallus at Beth-Horon revived in Jewish public consciousness the atmosphere of the victory by Judas Maccabaeus in the very same place. 95
It is reasonable to believe that, in addition to the hostile sources which in any case served Josephus in his writing, these facts easily sufficed to sweep him along with the propagandist anti-Hasmonaean trends so charac-
95 Farmer, p.l25ff; Kasher, The Great Jewish Revolt, pp.11, 3 8 - 4 3 , 8 5 - 8 7 with many additional bibliographic details.
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The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
teristic of Hellenistic-Roman historiography, until his writings served as a complete reflection of his Roman masters' relations to the zealots in his day. The vast proportions of conversion within the Roman empire and in the City of Rome were a thorn in the flesh of her leaders and intellectuals and it is inconceivable that Josephus was unaware of this or unaffected by it. A completely different explanation was proposed by Churgin, who held that the bitter struggles between the Hasmonaean dynasty and the House of Herod, with the abysmal hatred which developed in their wake, aroused the followers of the Hasmonaeans to cast aspersion on Herod's lineage by the story of the forced conversion of his Idumaean forefathers and thus the story also passed into the writings of Josephus . There are however no grounds for this opinion, since the story of compulsory conversion was not a Jewish invention at all and can already be found in the writings of Pto lemy the Historian, many years before Josephus, and the former certainly did not receive it from Hasmonaean sources. The silence of Talmudic tradi tion on this subject, especially since Herod was greatly detested therein, shows it had no roots whatever in Jewish circles. Furthermore, when re garded from a Jewish point of view, Herod's foreign origin was not consi dered a stain just because of his Idumaean roots, as he was after all born of a Nabataean mother; nonetheless the Talmudic writings do not contain the slightest reference to this matter as a reason for finding fault with this man. Yet if his inferior origin still represented a fault in Hasmonaean eyes, this was first and foremost to disqualify Herod for the crown and thereby persuade the Romans themsevles not to deviate from their customary practice in their protectorates, of chosing the rulers from among candi dates belonging to the royal families of the country (Ant., XIV, 4 0 3 - 4 0 4 ; cf. ibid., 3 8 6 - 3 8 7 ; ibid., 489 and more). Thus the blemish cast on Herod in this connection stemmed not from his conversion but from his lowly origin — not only that he was not a mem ber of the royal family who would be worthy of the crown, but also that "he was a commoner and an Idumaean, that is a half-Jew" (ibid., 4 0 3 , tSicoTTj re bvri Kai 'ISOUJUGUCJ TOVTCOTLV TJ/LUOU5 GU'<^ ). The expression "half Jew" is merely an explanation of the first two terms and is therefore in tended to tarnish Herod's lineage and not his religion. Is it after all possible for someone to be a "half-Jew" from a religious aspect? One or the other either he was a complete Jew or a complete gentile. The expression here is 96
97
96 Sufficient in this connection to recall the words of the Roman philosopher Seneca who said: "in the meantime the customs of this accursed race gained such influence that they are now ac cepted throughout the world. The vanquished gave laws to the victors" (see: Seneca, De Superstitione, apud: Augustinus, De Civitate Dei, VI, 11). 97 Churgin, Studies in the Time of the Second Temple, p.79.
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not of this kind, especially since from a linguistic aspect, the word rovreaTIV indicates that it is intended to qualify the two preceding words and it refers to no more than Herod's inferior lineage . Having elaborated the question of the Idumaeans' conversion, we will now resume our historic survey of the achievements of John Hyracanus I, with indications of the subsequent developments they presaged. Thus for example, it appears his territorial achievements in Transjordan and Idumaea set the course for expansion during the reign of his son Alexander Jannaeus and this we know led to the creation of the great rift between Jews and Nabataeans which endured for generations. It is unclear to what extent the conquests of John Hyrcanus I (in these regions) were already clouding relations in his own days. Possibly, even very probably, the Nabataeans then had yet to grasp the future implications of these conquests, since they were at that time still engaged in imposing their authority on defiant Arab tribes in the area south of the Arnon River, also in the desert highland areas south of Philadelphia (today Amman) and in the open reaches of the Negev south of Beersheba, a task to which they devoted themselves and which they completed in the days of their first two kings, Aretas I and Aretas II. 98
It is reasonable to assume that these two Nabataean kings, to establish the monarchy they were founding in Transjordan, should first have had to create basic political and military instruments which would be required to meet the challenge of conquering developed territories populated with permanent settlements. From the fragmentary evidence of Pompeius Trogus (apud Justin us, Historiae Philippicae, XXXIX, 5,5—6) we learn it was King Erotimus (i.e. Aretas II) who exploited the weakness of Seleucids and Ptolemies in the years 110—100 BCE in order to enhance his own military and political strength . Under those circumstances, it seems he wanted to impose Nabataean presence at the access to the trade routes coming from the Arabian Peninsula and by proper permanent conquest, establish the start of his hold there. Achievements by the Hasmonaeans in this area were however faster and more determined, either because of the superior experience in battle which they had been acquiring since the days of Judas Maccabaeus, or by their speedier capacities for adaptation to Hel lenistic standards in the political, organisational and military fields . In 99
100
98 Cf. Otto, p.16, and see also below p.l28ff. 99 Trogus Pompeius tells of Nabataean raids and incursions deep into the heart of the two Hellenis tic kingdoms; see also: Taeubler, Klio, X (1910), p.25Iff. 100 Conversion of the Hasmonaean army from one of rebels, spontaneous and amateurish in its character and methods of operation, into a regular established national army already began in the days of Simon, who also laid the foundation for the employment of mercenary units (/ Mace, 14:32). A further development took place in the days of John Hyrcanus I, who pioneered recruitment of foreign (non-Jewish) mercenaries {War, I 61; Ant., XIII 249). For a factual and
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The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
the race of conquest for the expansion of borders which opened immediate ly after the death of Antiochus VII Sidetes (129 BCE), the Jews were faster and better prepared. Control over trade routes, or even just over portions of them, in parti cular those of major strategic importance, resulted in invaluable economic advantages. The collection of customs duty on merchandise in transit from foreign countries or on internal trade had always been one of the best sources of revenue. Duty was generally collected at the borders (external or inter-regional), in mountain passes, at bridges over rivers and streams, at road junctions, at the gates of cities and markets and at stopping places for trading caravans. Rates of duty were quite high and varied from around 25 to' 50% of the value of the merchandise, all according to its nature and the degree of danger in its transporation . The collection of duty was in fact not only a source of income and wealth, but also constituted clear proof and the official symbol marking the collectors' spheres of political sovereignty and military control. No wonder therefore that sooner or later the Hasmonaeans and the Nabataeans were bound to reach a point of serious confrontation, and this in fact occurred in the reign of King Alexan der Jannaeus. 101
Preserved in the Scholion to Megillath Ta'anith (for the 15th and 16th Sivan) there is a very obscure reference to the conquest of Scythopolis by John Hyrcanus I and this is what it says: "and even they (i.e. the people of Beth-She'an and the Valley) were a thorn ( n y n 7 rp ) in the side of Isreal in the days of the Greeks [and] to the Arabs ( D ' a n y n ' D ^ D ) " etc. The words are very obscure and unclear and it is very doubtful if they have very real historic value concerning the period discussed, for the Scholion was composed at a later date and even underwent editing by the Amoraim in Babylonia. In any case, from the simple meaning of the text, we may understand that the Arabs in that region also suffered from the Greek regime; yet what is the connection of Arab suffering with a Jewish holiday on which no fasting is allowed? Some scholars tried to take the words of the Scholion out of their simple meaning and by way of commentary declare that the expression D •'anyn isbz is equivalent to the expression "like the Arabs" ( a ' a n y r ? l a s ) , i.e. the words are to be understood as intended to describe the hatred of the Arabs towards the Jews, like the hatred for other nations who also invaded Eretz-Israel and settled on its land. However, the obscurity surrounding this place of information pre cludes any clear conclusion. 1 0 2
apposite historical evaluation on the emergence of the political and military regime of the Hasmo naeans, see recently: Rappaport, History of Eretz-Israel etc., p p . 2 3 2 - 2 4 4 . 101 Full details on this see: Schalit, King Herod, p p . 1 4 9 - 1 5 4 . 102 See tor example Lurie, Megillath Ta'anith, p.124.
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Judas A r i s t o b u l u s I ( 1 0 4 - 1 0 3 B C E ) Though covering more than a generation, there is no information what ever on the relations of Jews with the Arabs or the North, from the reign of Jonathan and until the days of Judas Aristobulus I. From Judas Aristobu lus I's brief reign there is only the fragmented evidence from Timagenes, of the 1st century BCE, a quotation by Josephus at second-hand - of Strab o . The evidence concerns the problematic subject of the Ituraeans' conversion and, because of its importance, we will quote the words of Timagenes in full: 1 0 3
"This man (i.e. Judas Aristobulus I) was a kindly person and very serviceable to the Jews, for he acquired (npoaenTr^aaro) additional territory for them and brought over (^Keiojoaro) a portion of the Ituraean nation whom he joined to them by the bond of circumcision".
This quotation in fact served as textual documentation to the introduc tory words by Josephus himself (Ant., XIII, 318), which are merely words of commentary and not identical in their content, as the following quota tion will show: "He made war (noKennaaq) on the Ituraeans and acquired a good part of their territory for Judaea and compelled the inhabitants, if they wished to remain in their country, to be cir cumcised and live in accordance with the laws of the Jews". 104
On Josephus' part, this was a clever way of proposing first his own version in a dogmatic and definite manner, only later supporting it with a nebulous quotation from an external source, where the obscure exceeds the explicit; perhaps this was the reason he chose to quote at second hand, Why did he really not quote Strabo's own words - if the latter is supported by Timage nes, he (i.e. Strabo) must also have written about it himself. It is hard to avoid the suspicion that Strabo's words on this subject were no different from those on the voluntary conversion of the Idumaeans, since they "joined the Judaeans and shared in the same customs with them" (Geographica, XVI, 2, 34). It is important to stress that Josephus, on all those occasions when he had referred to the Idumaeans' conversion, did not find it necessary even by a hint to mention Strabo and his express words u s e d . In this case 105
s
103 Ant., XIII 319. Details see: Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, I, p p . 2 2 2 - 2 2 6 ; Schiirer, I , p p . 2 2 23. 104 At first sight the impression may be formed that Josephus' remark {War, I 76) on Antigonus, son of John Hyrcanus I, who went to his mysterious death adorned in splendid armor obtained in Galilee, hints at the war of conquest in Galilee in the days of Judas Aristobulus I. Though Malinowski has reservations on this, he does not in fact reject it outright - see: Malinowski, Galilean Judaism in the Writings of Josephus, p.34, n.2. 105 Ant., XIII 2 5 7 - 2 5 8 ; ibid., XV 254; War, I 63.
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too, as in that of the conversion of the Idumaeans, the question arises: why did Josephus act like this? In our opinion, the only logical reply is his eagerness to pay lip-service to his Roman patrons, in whose view the Hasmonaeans were equated to 'tyrants' and enemies of the Greco-Roman world, who by force imposed their beliefs and the laws of their religion on the population in regions they conquered and filled them with fear. It appears that in this case, as also in that of the Idumaeans' conversion, Josephus succeeded in his historiographic aim; the proof is that until recent years, modern scholarship was dominated by the widespread view accord ing to which the conversion of the Ituraeans was also a one-time act per formed under duress and coercion, in the process of Judaization of Gali lee Only recently have several scholars come out against this opinion and raised a number of quite convincing historical arguments: a) At least in connection with the Idumaeans, Strabo's evidence is in com plete conflict with that of Josephus and that of Ptolemy the Historian, especially since neither of the latter stand up to the test of historic criticism . b) The continuity from early times of Jewish settlement in Galilee is a clear, proven fact and is therefore in contradiction to the possible conversion by force of its inhabitants at so late a date. c) The report in I Mace, (5:17ff.) on the evacuation of Jews from Galilee in the days of Judas Maccabaeus refers only to western Galilee and not to other parts thereof . d)Mention of Alexander Jannaeus' education in Galilee (Ant., XIII, 322) indicates an early Jewish presence there and perhaps even Hasmonaean control in parts of it (if not officially then in practice) as far back as the days of John Hyrcanus I. e) The attack by Ptolemy IX Lathyrus on the city of Asochis (102 B C E ) and deliberately launched on a Sabbath, proves its inhabitants to have been Jews, long since very devoted to their religion. This would be very hard to ascribe to converts under duress and only recently converted . 106
107
108
109
110
106 Cf. note 15 above. The latest study on the Ituraeans is: Schottroff, ZDPV, XCVIII (1982), pp. 1 2 5 - 1 5 2. 107 See p. [OOff.] above. 108 See: Meisterman, Capernaum et Bethsa'ide, p p . 2 5 6 - 2 5 7 ; Hoelscher, Palaestina in der persischen und hellenistischen Zeit, pp.31 - 3 7 ; cf. also: Kaminka, Studien zur Geschichte Galildas, p p . 2 8 38; Klausner, Jesus of Nazareth, I, p.l 89, note 2. 109 Ant., XIII 337. Asochis ("AawxiO in the south-west of the Beth Netopha valley, see: Klein, Land of Galilee, p p . 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 ; Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p p . 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 . 110 Rappaport, Doron, p.219, 229; Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, I, p.225. In fact the first to propose this were: Smith, Historical Geography, p.270, n.4, and Klein, Land of Galilee, p . l 18. Cf. further: Schalit, King Herod, p p . 1 0 7 - 1 0 9 , 4 0 9 - 4 1 0 (n.183); Malinowski (note 104
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As an additional argument, the attack by Alexander Jannaeus on the strong city of Ptolemais (Acco), which for generations had been a principal base for Hellenistic rule in Eretz-Israel, could have been implemented only with effective support from a sizeable local population in the region of western Galilee; the military campaign of Ptolemy IX Lathyrus against Asochis and Sepphoris clearly proves this conclusion. According to Jose phus, in Asochis alone twenty thousand local Jews were taken into captivity, indicating the size of its Jewish population. Even if this figure is exaggerated, Ptolemy IX Lathyrus' failure to capture Sepphoris also indicates the large concentration of Jewish forces there. In contrast to the introductory interpretation by Josephus himself (Ant., XIII, 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 ) , detailed examination of the evidence from Timagenes actually proves the latter referred to annexation of Galilee by Judas Aris tobulus I, rather than its conquest. The expression "he acquired additional territory" need not necessarily be interpreted as an act of military con quest. On the contrary, the speed of the action speaks for itself, indicating no real military opposition, if any, was offered there. In Ant., XIII, 304 however, Josephus refers to a successful military campaign from which Aristobulus' brother, Antigonus, returned in glory; from an indirect hint in War, I, 76, Marcus assumed it took place in Galilee . His assumption on the scene of the fighting however is far from certain, for with the same degree of probability it could be assumed the reference was to some cam paign against one of the Hellenistic cities in the northern Sharon or the Carmel coast, such as for example Strato's Tower, where everyone anti cipated Antigonus would be killed (Ant., XIII, 3 0 9 - 3 1 3 ) . One way or another, Josephus did not explain where and against whom Antigonus fought, but in any case it does not seem that he referred to a serious and extended military contest. The proposal from Shemariah Gutmann concerning the region of opera tions by Judas Aristobulus I against the Ituraeans appears to throw addi tional light on the problem. He believes many of this nation penetrated from the Hermon foothills into the region of Paneas and the northern 111
above), p . 8 0 - 8 1 . Bar-Kochva proposed a diametrically opposed view, trying to deny complete ly the historical truth contained in all the evidence mentioned of the early date of Jewish settle ment in Galilee, see: Bar-Kochva, Colloque National CNRS No 936 - Armee"s et fiscaliti dans le monde antique, pp. 1 9 1 - 1 9 4 . To the best of my knowledge however, this is still only an isolated opinion. Though correctly arguing the tendentiousness and exaggerations in at least some of the evidence, it cannot overthrow the accepted conclusions mentioned above. At best it can cast on them some small shadow of doubt, since he did not after all produce any clear evidence refuting the first and proving the opposite. No wonder therefore that the new editors of Schiirer, wellknown historical study reconfirm the accepted opinion, raising no reservation following the lines of Bar-Kochva's opinion - see Schiirer, I I , p p . 8 - 1 0 . I l l Marcus, Josephus, VII, p.381, note a; cf. Rappaport, Doron, p.230; idem, History o)'Eretz-Israel etc., p.220. s
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The Hasmonaean KingdomHn Rise and Fall
Huleh Valley, in those days even getting as far as certain areas east of Lake of Galilee. By his reasoning, this expansion is also confirmed by the arche ological findings in recent surveys, more precisely by the ceramic finds of the Hellenistic period, which recently tend to be called "Golan ceramics". According to Gutmann and other scholars, these ceramics are of a clearly Ituraean character, being typical of and restricted to the Ituraean subsis tence area. However, since distribution of these ceramics did not extend south of the Paneas region and the northern Huleh Valley (to around TelAnafa), Gutmann thought the Ituraean expansion beyond this area was halted by Judas Aristobulus I's military initiative, intended to safeguard renewed Jewish rule in Galilee . Conversion of the Ituraeans in the north112
Map 8: The Annexation of Galilee by Judas Aristobulus I ( 1 0 4 - 1 0 3 BCE)
112 See: Gutmann, Roman Era in Eretz-Israel, pp. 2 0 4 - 2 0 5 ; idem, mi-Bephnim, XXXV(1973), p.l43ff.; Epstein-Gutmann, Judaea, Samaria and Golan - Archeological Review in 1968, p.250;
Judas Aristobulus I
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eastern border regions of Upper Galilee was by this conception designed to strengthen Jewish rule in Galilee. Judas Aristobulus' achievements must in our opinion be regarded as operations undertaken to consolidate the final annexation of Galilee to the Hasmonaean state and indicate the imposition there of Hasmonaean authority, including the laws of Jewish religion. Possibly, even quite proba bly, the act of annexation was accompanied by limited military activity, intended to foil an Ituraean attempt to continue their penetration from their Lebanese base in the Chalcis region and perhaps take over parts of Galilee, even though in the evidence from Timagenes there is no explicit reference to this. One way or another, the notion that in 103 BCE Judas Aristobulus I conquered the land of the Ituraeans in Lebanon proper and forced conversion on its inhabitants should be rejected outright, because subsequent generations of Ituraean kings acts as independent rulers and there is not the slightest evidence of any political subjection to the Hasmo naean k i n g d o m . Annexation of Galilee and Judaization of those of its inhabitants who belonged to one of the Ituraean tribes were apparently the climax of a gradual, drawn-out historical process, after generations of Jewish influence and perhaps even propaganda . Fortunately, a Talmudic traditional story, bearing the stamp of folk legend, preserved information on the exemplary behavior of Simon son of Shatah, evoking Arab esteem and admiration for the man's honesty which derived from his faith in the God of Israel. The story deals with the ques tion of a gentile's lost property, which was found by a Jew. It extolled the tale of Simon son of Shatah whose disciples bought him an ass from some 113
114
Dar, Hermon and its Foothills, p.l21ff, also giving additional bibliographic details. On the loca tion of the conquered area taken from the Ituraeans in the Golan Heights of our day, first rights go to Jones (JRS, XXI(1931), p p . 2 6 5 - 2 6 6 ; idem, CERP, p.253). In this connection it is worth stressing that the distribution of "Golan ceramics" - in the region extending to the foot of Mount Hermon, in the region of Paneas, the northern Huleh basin and northern Golan Heights of our day - does not differ from the geographic data given by Josephus on the tetrarchy of Lysanias and Zenodorus (below), which in addition also included the districts of Trachonitis, Batanaea and Auranitis (e.g., cf. Ant., XV 3 4 3 - 3 4 6 ; War, I 3 9 8 - 4 0 0 etc.). 113 On this opinion see: Lurie, From Jannaeus to Herod, pp.227, 2 3 1 - 2 3 3 ; idem, Hebrew section of HUCA, LII(1981), p.24. Additional proof against this opinion see below, note 206. 114 See extensively above p.46ff. Most of the reasoning and arguments concerning the Idumaeans' conversion also hold good for that of the Ituraeans and there is no point in repeating them. The theory of enforced conversion was so deep-rooted and widespread that there were also some who by inference attributed it to Alexander Jannaeus (see: Hengel, Jews, Greeks and Barabrians, p.73), though there are no sources containing any hint of this. The only occasion when Alex ander Jannaeus was mentioned in connection with such acts is the dobious attempt to convert the citizens of Pella, reservations to which are presented in my forthcoming book Jews and Hel lenistic Cities.
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Arab; when a pearl was found hanging round its neck, the Jewish sage returned it to the vendor of the ass even though the latter knew nothing of his "loss". In great admiration and wonder the Arab cried out: "Blessed be the Lord, God of Simon son of Shatah ". Though there is no indication of this Arab's ethnic identity, whether he was Ituraean, Nabataean or of some other n a t i o n , the tale is a small illustration of Jewish influence in the region, among Arabs living in close contact with their Jewish neigh bors. It should be stressed that Simon son of Shatah taught his pupils never to despise or exploit the gentiles (in this specific case the Arab vendor), but rather to treat them at all times with scrupulous honesty and thereby open their hearts to a spark of faith in the God of Israel. To sum up: among the Ituraeans of Galilee, Hasmonaean victories over common enemies such as the Seleucid regime and the Hellenistic cities, the natural pact of interests among disadvantaged eastern nations harboring resentment of social exclusion and civil deprivation, as well as Jewish religiocultural strength, all paved the way for the creation of friendship and feelings of identification with the Jews, following which many of the former freely chose to become fully-fledged Jews themselves. The inter pretation indicated above does in fact adequately and more convincingly explain how Judas Aristobulus I conquered and annexed Galilee so rapidly to the Hasmonaean kingdom. The degree to which the Ituraeans in the following generations drew closer to Jewish society and integrated with it, may by indirect implication be deduced from later epigraphic and archeological evidence, such as: a) A grave epitaph on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem, which gives the name "Mariamme, wife of Alexander of Capua" iCIJ, II, 1284) apparently referring to the Ituraean Capua on Mount Hermon (today Mazra at Kapwa) and not Capua in Italy . b) The existence of a Jewish synagogue next to an Ituraean temple in the mixed settlement at the Kharuvi'a site, indicating a Jewish-Ituraean symbiosis which existed in mixed settlements . c) Another epitach from Mount Scopus in Greek, giving the name of Justus of Chalcis the fig dealer . 115
116
117
118
119
115 Debarim Rabbah, III 3(ed. Liberman), p.85; Yalkut Shimoni La-Ketubim, 947; and cf. J. Baba Mezi'a, II, 8c, which appears to be the earlier literary version. 116 The wording of the Jerusalem Talmud is ">N pi ' D , which is equivalent to "> Ipl O; instruc tive in this context is the fact that "the Saracen people" is mentioned in one of the inscriptions on Mount Hermon - see: Mouterde, MUSJ, 83/4, 20c = BCH, XXI (1897), 63/4. It is easy to as sume that in that region the term was a synonym for the local Ituraeans. The inscription is of a later date and is dated 330 CE. 117 See: Schwabe, Sepher Yerushalayim p.366; Dar, Hermon and its Foothills, pp.67, 152. 118 Dar, ibid., p p . 6 6 - 6 7 . 119 See Klein, JPCI, No,83.
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d ) A gravestone in Nazareth (preserved in the Franciscan museum) with the Hebrew inscription o r u m - i n D j n o ttfsn m i ° . e) The Greek inscriptions of Beth She'arim (Schwabe-lifshitz, no. 1 1 6 118), with the name "Arthis ("Ap0i
121
1 2 2
Unfortunately this is all which for the moment may be extracted from the archeological finds and even this is with difficulty and conjectural.
120 See: Klein, Sepher Ha-Yishuv, p.110; Dalman, ZDPV, XXXVII (1914), p.136. The name DJ71D is almost certainly Ituraean and is known in Greek transciption as Loaijuoc One of Herod's followers was Soaemus the Ituraean {Ant., XV 185; 2 0 4 - 2 2 9 ) . We also know of an Ituraean king of that name in Chalcis (see: Cassius Dio., LIX, 12, 2), who was granted his crown by the Emperor Caligula; after his death in 49 CE his country was annexed to the province of Syria (Tacitus, Annales, XII, 23). It appears this name is also known in the dynasty of the Ituraean kings of Emesa, see: Altheim-Stiehl, pp.155, 3 6 8 - 3 7 0 , 372. I am grateful to Dr. R. Zadok who drew my attention to the fact that in some Arabic dialects (such as Safaitic and Thamudic) the names S'mt, S m (see: Harding, An Index etc., p.321) originated from the Arab name Sa m, meaning speed, run etc. This should also be compared to the name Sw m {CIJ, II, 988), which is quite similar to the Arab name Sa'ama, meaning a reconciliation, which also appears in the Safaitic dialect in the form of S'mfmJ and in the Thamudic dialect in the form S'mr; for more details see: Harding, op.cit., p.351. 121 Oh the connection of the Ituraeans in the Mt. Hermon region to the Phoenicians, as this found expression in local sanctuaries, the idols worshipped there and names of inhabitants of the region, see: Dar, New Findings on the Hermon, pp.4-9; Applebaum, New Findings on the Hermon, p.23. Cf. further: Schwabe-Lifshitz, Beth-Shearim: Greek Inscriptions, no.120. 122 Archeological finds proves that since the second century CE there was a "Renaissance" on Mt. Hermon in the construction of pagan shrines to Phoenician gods, hellenized in the style of the Roman period. See details in a new study by Dar soon to be published in the collection: Greece and Rome in Eretz-Israel. Possibly the above Titus son of Judas officiated in one of these tem ples, following the pagan "revival" among the Ituraeans in the days of Emperor Hadrian. c
c
e
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86
Alexander Jannaeus (103—76 BCE) More than any other Hasmonaean ruler, Jannaeus wanted to take advan tage of the historical developments which followed the increasingly rapid disintegration of the Seleucid kingdom to the north and the recurrent internal disputes in the Ptolemaic kingdom to the south. His policy of con quest was designed to obtain a firm grip on the two principal trade routes passing through Eretz-Israel - the Via Maris and the King's Highway - and so secure a share of the enormous revenue which could be collected from those who used them. His plans however had to be temporarily suspended because of the major attack launched in the years 1 0 3 - 1 0 2 BCE by Pto lemy IX Lathyrus governor of Cyprus against his mother Cleopatra III, and designed to turn Eretz-Israel into a bridgehead for his conquest of Egypt. The big Hellenistic cities of Ptolemais (Acco) and Gaza collaborated with Lathyrus, but territorial contiguity between them was impossible without the subjugation of King Alexander Jannaeus. It may reasonably be assumed that Ptolemy IX Lathyrus tried to achieve this object by forging political and military ties with the Nabataeans and the Hellenistic cities in Transjor d a n , in order to pin down Jannaeus on several fronts at one time and in this way to split his forces and so reduce his fighting capacity. 123
Support for this argument may be found in the sortie by Ptolemy Lathy rus from Ptolemais towards Asochis and Sepphoris and from there eastward across the Jordan to a place Josephus called Asophon (Aouapdv or Aoaipcov) on the border of Peraea and Gilead, probably the biblical Saphon ( p a s ) . Not inconceivably, beside the desire to link up with the Naba taeans, this campaign was intended also for economic gains, obtainable after ejecting Alexander Jannaeus from him strongholds at the access points to the major trade routes; it is even possible that this campaign was conducted in parallel with the clashes on the Red Sea between the Naba taeans and the Ptolemies . Although the attack by Ptolemy Lathyrus was very damaging to Jan naeus, its consequences must not be exaggerated and in any case, its de scription by Josephus is based on hostile sources and should therefore not be taken as accurate . One way or another, the stay by Lathyrus within 1 2 4
125
126
123 Stern thought he particularly wanted to join the forces of Theodorus, the Tyrant of Amathus (=Hamtan), see: Stern, Jerusalem Cathedra, 1(1982), p.36. 124Cf. Abel, Giographie, II, p.442; Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p p . 1 6 6 - 1 6 7 . See also: Aharoni, Eretz-Israel in Biblical Times, p. 105, also Stern, op.cit., p.36, n.70. 125 See Diodorus Siculus, III, 43, 4 - 5 ; Strabo, XVI, 4, 18, (777) and cf.: Justinus, XXXIX, 5,6 (see above, p. [00] note 99). See: Kortenbeutel, Der agyptische Siid- und Osthandel in der Politik der Ptolemder und romischen Kaiser, p.45; Otto und Bengston, Zur Geschichte des Niederganges des Ptolemderreiches, pp. 1 9 4 - 2 1 8 ; Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria, I, pp. 1 8 2 - 1 8 4 . 126 See extensively: Stern, Tarbiz, XXXIII (1964), p.331.
A lexander Jannaeus
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the borders of Eretz-Israel did not long outlive his political and military defeat in the confrontation with his mother Cleaopatra III. As soon as the danger was past, Alexander Jannaeus launched an extensive operation in Transjordan (101 B C E ) and, as reported by Josephus {Was, I, 86), the impression may be obtained that this offensive was launched to coincide with the invasion of Egypt by Lathyrus. Clearly having learnt an important lesson from the campaign of Ptolemy IX Lathyrus, Jannaeus with great tactical wisdom first tried to capture Gadara (capital of Gilead) and its vicinity, for thereby he would obtain control of the natural and secure geographical border to the north of the Gilead — the Yarmuk River. After besieging the city for ten months (Ant., XII, 3 5 6 ) , Jannaeus succeeded in conquering it and thereby also managed to detach the first link in the chain of Hellenistic cities east of the Jordan; because of the trade caravans passing through their localities and requiring their services, these were the Nabataeans' natural allies. Later, or possibly simultaneously, he also conquered the fortress of Amma thus north of the Jabbok River , which according to Josephus (loc. cit.) was the biggest fortress in Transjordan, the place where Theodorus, son of Zenon named Kotoulas the tyrant of Philadelphia, kept his trea sures. Though Theodorus succeeded in recapturing the Amathus fortress in a retaliatory operation which took the form of a most daring r a i d yet in the end, in the general scramble of conquests for Transjordan, Alexander Jannaeus succeeded in beating the Arab tribes to the spoils. Like his father, he succeeded in establishing facts, namely a military and political presence in the area, without till then having come into direct military confronta tion with the Nabataeans themselves. At this point, (around 100 BCE) Alexander Jannaeus apparently began his great project of fortifications in the south-east of his kingdom, with 127
128
129
127 War, I 8 6 - 8 7 ; Ant., XIII, 13 356. Josephus in the same context uses the term Coele-Syria ( = K O I \ T J Zvpia) and there it is applied to northern Transjordan, from Gilead northwards. See: Marcus, Josephus, VI, p.326, note a; Smallwood, Jews under Roman Rule, p. 15 (note 38), p.45 (note 4) with bibliographic details. 128 The two reports by Josephus (War, I 86; Ant., XII 356) do not note any difference in time between the battles of Gadara and Amathus. This may indicate they took place simultaneously, in planned coordination, attacking in a pincer movement from north and south. On the location of Amathus see: Abel, Giographie, II, p p . 2 4 2 - 2 4 3 ; Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p. 165. 129 This may be indirectly deduced from Ant., XIII, 374, which relates of the destruction of the fortress by Jannaeus, seemingly in his second campaign of conquest, cf.: Schiirer, I , p.223. It was possibly the counter-attack by Theodorus which foiled the completion of the above pincer movement by Jannaeus and thereby temporarily also saved the city of Pella. We know Pella and its vicinity was conquered only in Jannaeus' second campaign in Transjordan in 8 3 - 8 0 BCE (below). The casualties this Theodorus inflicted on the army of Jannaeus, according to Josephus 10 000 killed, is a 'round' number and suspect of arising out of hostile bias; it also does not seem credible as the outcome of a limited sortie of this kind made by Theodorus. 5
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the construction of the fortresses of Machaerus and Masada {War., VII, 171, 2 8 5 ) . Strategically located on the soutern border of Peraea, the for tress of Machaerus was one the most famous in ancient literature and the same applies to Masada . The advantages of Masada were even greater, since it served not only as a desert hiding-place in times of danger and revolt, but the geographical proximity of the fortress to Jerusalem, only one day's journey from the scene of political events, gave those sheltering there the ability to return swiftly to the central arena. At the time how ever, the importance of the fortresses for Jannaeus lay in the function they could fulfil against his Arab neighbors on the south-eastern border. In the conquest of Gaza and its satellite settlements around the year 100 BCE, Alexander Jannaeus still managed to avoid a direct confrontation with the Nabataeans . In fact, his involvement in the war against Ptolemy IX Lathyrus on the one hand and his pact with Cleopatra III on the other prepared the political ground for the conquest of Gaza; he thereby stole a march on the Nabataeans, creating facts on a political and military level before they could try to realize their interests there. Following retreat from the scene in Eretz-Israel of the armies of both Ptolemaic rivals, it seems that Jannaeus simply did not want to miss the rare opportunity thus presented to him — especially since there was reason to fear that Egypt might change its policy of friendship towards him , the more so after Cleopatra Ill's death at the end of 101 BCE. In actual fact, Cleopatra's abandoning Gaza to Alexander Jannaeus need not be understood merely against the background of her war with her rebel lious son Lathyrus, but was also due to a change in Nabataean policy, which as indicated had come into conflict with Ptolemaic interests on the 130
131
132
1 3 3
130 According to War, VII 285, it was "High Priest Jonathan" who first built a fortress (TO ypovplov) and called it Masada. It is not clear however if he meant Jonathan the Hasmonaean, brother of Judas Maccabaeus, who became aware of the nature of the site as a place of hiding and refuge when at the low ebb of his fortunes he stayed in the Teko'a desert in fear of Bacchides; see for example Abel, Giographie, II, p.380. On the other hand, some scholars believe the name Jonath an refers to Alexander Jannaeus, which we find more likely - see: Schalit, King Herod, p.175; Yadin, Masada, p.205. As we know, the two forts were later destroyed by Gabinuis, Ant., XIV 89; War, I 1 6 7 - 1 6 8 . 131 Strabo, XVI, 2, 44(764); Pliny, Natural History V, 16, 7 2 ; Josephus, War, III A6-Al;Ant., XVIII 112. 132 An exhaustive discussion of this conquest with bibliographic details see: Fuks, in: Joseph Flavius - Historian of Eretz-Israel, p . l 3 3 - 1 3 5 . The campaign itself will be discussed at length in my book Jews and the Hellenistic Cities (forthcoming). 133 Cf. Ant., XIII, 3 5 3 - 3 5 4 , reporting the attempts by Cleopatra's advisers to persuade her to con quer Jannaeus' kingdom and restore the Ptolemaic empire to its former glory. It was Hannaniah, the senior army commander and son of Onias IV who foiled the advice with express words of warning. On Ptolemaic policy towards Gaza and its vicissitudes, see Stern, Tarbiz, XXXIII(1964), pp.326-328;Kasher, Cathedra, XV(1980), p p . 2 7 - 3 2 .
A lexander Jannaeus
89
Red Sea, as well as the political turnabout among the Gazaean leaders themselves, who had become her enemies and the allies of both Ptolemy IX Lathyrus and the Nabataeans. We believe that Alexander Jannaeus' eager ness to conquer the city and its surroundings reflects the Hasmonaeans' desire to forestall the Nabataeans in taking control of the access points to the major trade routes leading from the Arabian peninsula to Egypt, Syria and Phoenicia; the conquest of Gaza might in effect have signalled his in tention of seizing control of the trans-Negev routes, thereby stirring the Nabataeans from their complacency. As we know, Arab ties with the cities in the coastal plain of Palestine, and Gaza in particular, had already found expression in the days of the First Temple and the Persian period; follow ing the Hellenistic conquest, the ties of the Nabataean tribes were particu larly prominent . There is therefore no reason to wonder at the promise by Aretas II to come to the rescue of the besieged in Gaza and deliver them from the threat of conquest by Alexander Jannaeus (Ant., XII, 301). It is not clear why his assistance was late in arriving; at all events, Jannaeus suc ceeded in conquering the city and its vicinity without encountering the line troops of the Nabataeans themselves. The conquest brought the Hasmonaean kingdom two enormous advan tages, economic and strategic respectively, since Gaza was the main sea port for the movement of merchandise from Eretz-Israel to Egypt and strategic ally the prime obstacle to an army invading Eretz-Israel from Egypt. In the fabric of improved political relations between Alexander Jannaeus and Ptolemaic Egypt, the second advantage had no practical implications what ever in the days of Jannaeus, but those of the first were most serious for, until his conquest of Gaza, the Nabataeans had enjoyed free, unimpeded access to the p o r t . Indirect allusions in the writings of Josephus indicate that at first Jannaeus made no attempt to cut off the Nabataeans from the use of Gaza as a port of departure for their trade with the countries of the West — he only wished to benefit from the fruits of that trade, by imposing a variety of customs duties which they had to pay for the use of roads and facilities connected with this trade, now come under his control. In fact, even before the conquest of Gaza, Jannaeus had tried to over come the anticipated conflict of interests in his relations with the Naba taeans by the appointment of Antipas (father of Antipatros and Herod's grandfather) as strategos over "the whole of Idumaea" (Ant., XIV, 1 0 ) , 134
135
136
134 Kasher, ibid., p.21ff and full bibliographic details. 135 Economic relations of Gaza with the Nabataeans at that time are clearly proven from numis matic findings - see: Meshorer, Qedem, 111(1975), p.9; and cf. Bowersock, Roman Arabia, pp.22-23. 136 It is not clear what is implied in this context by the term "all Idumaea" (8kr\s TI?C 'Ifioujuauz?) and whether or not it included Gaza and its dependent villages. Though Josephus did not indicate
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The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
particularly in view of the fact that this man had strong ties of friendship with the Nabataeans as well as with both Gaza and Ascalon. In view of his growing strength however, it seems Nabataean hostility and suspicion re mained undispelled, for otherwise it would be hard to understand the positive response by King Aretas II from Petra to the appeal by Gaza for military assistance against King Alexander Jannaeus. Since there was ex pectation of a real danger that troops from Petra would in fact come to the scene, the Hasmonaean king wanted to anticipate the danger and was therefore so quick to conquer the city and, by its annexation to his king dom (round 100 BCE), establish inequivocal political and military facts on the ground. It is almost certain that with the conquest of Gaza and the surround ing area, Jannaeus with no further effort also won the areas south of Beersheba as far as Elusa as well as the land south of the Dead Sea and bor dering on Moab. Very possibly the conquest of those areas even somewhat preceded the conquest of Gaza as it aimed to prevent military assistance from Aretas II. The reasoning inherent in this possibility conforms with the mention by Josephus of he isolation of Gaza due to the earlier conquest of the cities of Anthedon and Raphia (Ant., XIII 357). If this conjecture is correct, this might possibly have been the first military confrontation between Jannaeus and the Nabataeans. With that, however, there is no more reason to assume that a proper military operation had been involved, since there is no indication of this in the sources. It is more reasonable to think that Jannaeus beated in surprise the meagre Nabataean garrisons there. It seems that the loss of Elusa urged the Nabataeans to establish an alternative large urban settlement in the Negev; this was done by King Obodas I, who gave his name to the city of Eboda (i.e. m a y ) . Under the circumstances, armed conflict with the Nabataeans was inevitable, except that initially it erupted in Transjordan. It broke out when Alexander Jannaeus tried to expand his holdings in the region of Moab and Gilead, whose inhabitants he wanted to subjugate to his rule and from whom he wanted to exact tribute (War, I, 89; Ant., XIII, 374). The sequence of events in the military operaton itself is not clear, neither in fact do we know the date it began or its extent in time. We must remain content with the general observation that, if we are to judge by the proxi mity of material in the writings of Josephus (Ant., XIV, 375), it started at the beginning of the reign of the Nabataean king Obodas I (96—87
the time of Antipas' appointment, whether it was before or after the conquest of Gaza, informa tion on the destruction of the city (Strabo, XVI, 2, 30; Josephus, Ant., XIII, 360 and cf. ibid., XIV 76, 88) hints at the possibility that the appointment was made even before then. It may reasonably be assumed that the use of this expression was borrowed from the time of Antipatros - cf. Schalit, King Herod, p.14; Schiirer, I , p.234. s
Alexander Jannaeus
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Map 9: Alexander Jannaeus' First Campaigns in Transjordan and the Negev
BCE). In the initial stage, the fortress of Ammathus was apparently recap tured from the hands of Theodorus and this time it was razed to the foundations (loc.cit.). Only in the second phase, between around 9 3 - 9 0
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
92
BCE, did Alexander Jannaeus for the first time get involved in a direct confrontation with the Nabataeans led by King Odobas I . The latter laid him an ambush, stationing camel riders in one of the mountain passes near to some village on the border of Gaulanitis and Gilead (see below); accord ing to Josephus, Alexander Jannaeus extricated himself only with difficulty and was forced to return the way he had come. 137
Locating the scene of the action is an intriguing problem in itself, mainly in view of the discrepancy, as it seems at first sight, between the various versions Josephus offers on this point. The version in War, I, 90, clearly stresses "near Gaulanitis" or "opposite Gaulanitis" (/card rfiv TavXdvqv), while in Ant., XIII, 375, he wrote "near Gadara, a village of the Gilead" (Kara Tdbapa K.u>nr)v T T ? C r a X a S m S o O - In fact we do not think there is any need to see a discrepancy between the two versions, for that in War., I, 90 is unspecific and generalized, not necessarily indicating the place itself was in Gaulanitis, but that it is simply to be found "near Gaulanitis" or "facing Gaulanitis". Gadara here is not to be confused with the polis Gadara, capital of Gilead, as it involves a "village" (KCO/XT?), not a c i t y and therefore Ant., XIII, 3 7 4 - 3 7 5 is not to be regarded as a paraphrase of Ant., XIII, 356. A careful inspection proves that the last two references apply to quite disparate chronological context. 138
139
It is also worth noting that the name "Gadara" in Ant., XIII, 375 is quite uncertain, since in some manuscripts there are alternate names such as TapdSa or XapdSpa. Thus Abel's identification of the scene of the battle in the Gaulanitis region is not at all certain . There are also no grounds for identifying the place with Gedor, capital of Peraea mentioned in War., IV, 413 because of the great geographic distance, which cannot match the description of War, I, 90 "near Gaulanitis" or "facing Gaulani tis" (Kara 7r\v ravXdvrjv) . 140
141
s
137 Concerning the date, see Schiirer, I , p.577; Negev, in: Between Hermon and Sinai p.155. 138 The reading "Gadara a village in Gaulanitis" (rdSapa K W J U T J P rrjq rau\avi6oc) in Schalit's He brew translation is based on a textual correction performed by Niese, based on comparison with War, I 90; cf. also Marcus, Josephus, VII, p p . 4 1 4 - 4 1 5 and note e. On this meaning of the word K a r a with the accusative case, see: Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, p.883(B.3). 139 Cf.: Schiirer, I , note 17; contrary to Dothan's opinion (note 148 below). 140 Abel, Giographie, II, p.149; cf. Negev, ANRW, II 8, p.96. Influenced by Abel, Ma'oz recently suggested a location for the site somewhat to the south, near the slope of Bir A-Shakim and north of Susitha. The Arab name "Horn of Jerda" was related to a neighboring site which is now Kib butz Ein-Gev - see: Ma'oz The Land of Golan, LXXXI(1983), p.17. His suggestion might be attractive, but only if Nabataean penetration into the area really reached the chora of Hippus (Susitha); forthermore, we should remember that Josephus quite clearly referred to a village in the Galaditis! 141 Cf.: Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, pp.62, 165; idem, Carta's Atlas, map 65; see also: Thac keray, Josephus, III, p p . 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 , note 2; and see also Stern, Jerusalem Cathedra, 1(1981), p.42. s
A lexander Jannaeus
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According to the version of Ant., XIII, 375, the scene of the battle itself was "in a rough and difficult region" (e^ x P ' W rpaxeat nai duapdroif;), which explains why Alexander Jannaeus fell into the ambush (evebpa) that Obodas I had laid for him (cf. War, I, 90). As related, the army of Jannaeus was repulsed and crushed by a great mass of camels, sweeping down while they were in a deep and narrow moat or valley (fiadeiav . . . yapayya) from which he extricated himself only with difficulty . The term r) ipapay% usually indicates a river-bed, ravine, valley or natural mountain pass, but can also serve to describe an artificial trench or m o a t . Though logical probability in this case inclines to the first possibility, mainly because of the discription of the area as "a rough and difficult region", yet we cannot exclude the possibility that this was a narrow natural gorge or valley which in addition had been artificially prepared to serve as a mili tary obstacle for defensive purposes . One way or another, the place of the battle must be located in an area topographically very broken, to allow the preparation of a successful ambush: one of the mountain passes in the central "bow" of the Yarmuk (Hieromyces) River on the border between Gilead and Gaulanitis matches this description very well. Scholars generally tended to identify the name of the place with that called "Trench of Antiochus" 0? 'AUTLOXOV yapay%) mentioned by Josephus as one of the places conquered by Jannaeus, together with the towns of Golan and Seleucia and the fortress of Gamala (Ant., XIII, 3 9 4 ; War, I, 105). For this reason some scholars even go so far as inclining to hint at a geographic point much further north, even wanting to correct the name of the place to "Plain of Antiochus" or "Valley of Antiochus", names which in their opinion were derived from the Talmudic n a m e i n rPDT •> o JIK in the upper Huleh V a l l e y . The meaning of the word 17 yapay% w
142
143
144
145
142 Exaggeratedly, the parallel version of War, I 90 states that he lost all his army; it seems this de scription was inspired by the source on which Josephus depended (possibly Nicolaus of Damas cus) and was designed to harm the image of Jannaeus as a conquering, victorious king. His rapid recovery after this proves the description of total defeat in the War version clearly unfounded. In this context there was at most a question of a reverse of limited scope, for a distinction must be made between the loss of a battle and defeat in a whole campaign. 143 See: Liddell & Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. 17 tpapayt. Cf. use by Josephus himself of the same term, War, I 99, l05;Ant., XIII 394. 144 It should be noted that an artificial, man-made moat was defined by Josephus in close textual proximity (Ant., XIII 390) by the term 1^ rd^po? applied to the "Jannaeus Line". However, in the parallel version of War, I 99, Josephus used the term 1? ipapa-yt to define the same "Jan naeus Line", which could indicate the terms are synonymous. His use of the second term in reference to the artificial moat at Gamala (War, IV 6) where no mistake is possible, gives grounds to think that Josephus did in fact mean a "trench" dug to integrate with local natural obstacles. 145 E.g., cf.: Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p.152: idem, Carta's Atlas, map 67; see also: idem, Yediot, X(1943), p. 19; Tcherikover, Jews and Greeks, p.81. On this matter they follow Schlatter, Zur Topographie und Geschichte Paldstinas, p p . 3 1 4 - 3 2 0 , esp. p.319; this is also the reason for rejecting the identification with Tel Anafa, see: Fuks, SCI, V(l 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 0 ) p. 1 7 8 - 1 8 4 .
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however totally precludes this possibility, since it cannot indicate a broad valley but as we said, it means a deep and narrow gorge, ravine, mountain pass or alternately a deep trench or moat made by man. Another proposal wishes to identify r) 'kvrioxov yapayt, with a place called 6 KCKIKUV avXdov, mentioned at the end of Alexander Jannaeus' list of conquests (Ant., XIII, 397), locating it in the valley between the Jordan, the Yarmuk River and the Sea of Galilee, by Hammath-Gader . This iden tification is even stranger, since it is hard to accept the idea that Josephus used the first name in Ant., XIII, 3 9 4 , while further along and so close to the first (Ant., XIII, 397) he already used a different name and still referred to the very same p l a c e . Dothan's geographic logic rightly guided him to locate the place of the battle (between Obodas I and Alexander Jannaeus) in the bow of the Yar muk River, on the border between Gaulanitis and Gilead. Unlike him how ever, we do not think it probable that the place must have been within the urban chora of the city of Gadara; why not in the bounds of the chora of Susitha (=Hippus) or in the lower Gaulanitis? One way or another, we think the "deep trench" (Ant., XIII, 375) should be located somewhere in the central part of the Yarmuk (Hieromyces) bow and en visaged as a mountain pass or ravine, which had been further fortified by suitable excavation and was intended to halt or disrupt the free movement of a massive army in this region. In our opinion there is however no possi bility for deciding with any certainty whether the "deep trench" (or "deep ravine") was in fact identical with the place called "Trench of Antiochus" 146
147
148
146 See Dothan, Eretz-Israel, 11(1953), p p . 1 0 6 - 1 0 9 . Cf. further Schalit's opinion, note 160 below. 147 It should be stressed that 6 niXucibv abkobv appears in a series of settlement names in the Moab district (Ant., XIII 397) and there is therefore no logical grounds for linking them together, as Dothan inclined to do in his aforementioned article (note 146 above). In fact Dothan fol lowed Klein and Schalit, except that unlike Klein (Jewish Transjordan, p.9) he 'transported' the site from the neighborhood of Abila to that of Gadara and thereby also opposed Schalit (EretzIsrael, I, p.l04ff) by remaining fiathful to Josephus' version and tried to locate it in Moab. 148 Dothan inclined to this, since he connected the name Antiochus with the name Antioch which we know was given to the city of Gadara. However the name Antioch was used by at least two additional cities in the vicinity: Gerasa and Hippus (Susitha). Dothan rightly rejected Gerasa from the start, for reasons of geographic dissimilarity. Yet his rejection of Hippus (Susitha) by arguing it was not mentioned in the list of conquests by Jannaeus (e.g. cf. Ant., XIII 3 9 5 - 3 9 7 ) is misleading and incorrect, as it is mentioned in the list of captured cities by Syncellus - see: Georgius Syncellus, Chronographia, I, (ed. Dindorff), p.559. Credibility of the evidence by Syncellus on this matter is no longer in doubt, as he quotes Julius Africanus, who it seems drew his information from Justus of Tiberias - see: H. Gelzer, Sextus Julius Africanus, I, Leipzig 1880, pp.4, 20, 118, 256ff. Furthermore, Josephus himself included Hippus (Susitha) among the cities which Pompey took out of Jewish hands and returned to their "legal inhabitants" (War, I 156; Ant., XIV 75), indicating it had been conquered by Jannaeus. Why therefore did Dothan a priori reject the area of Hippus (Susitha)? See also our reservation to Ma'oz' suggestion (note 140 above).
A lexander Jannaeus
95
which Alexander Jannaeus captured a short time later (ibid., 393) — and apparently within the borders of Gaulanitis itself, if we are to judge by the joint mention, together with the settlements of Golan, Seleucia and Gama l a . The textual proximity itself raised doubts over this identity, other wise Josephus would simply have called the <papay% wherein Jannaeus was routed by its full name; r\ 'AVTIOXOV yapay\. It is hard to be certain after which Antiochus the second trench is named, but it was probably some Seleucid king who had became famous for his war in these regions, after adopting a similar stratagem. Possibly the reference is to Antiochus XII Dionysus (87—84 BCE) who, because the capital Antioch (on the Orontes) had been captured by his brother Philip, was forced to place his trust in Damascus; in view of the activities initiated by the energetic Nabataean king Aretas III (87—62 BCE), this Antiochus sought to defend Damascus against a possible Nabataean attack from the south by excavating a trench subsequently named after him on the road going up to Damascus, in one of the mountain passes within the boundaries of Gaulanitis. It seems in those days the defensive device — of excavating fortified trenches combined with local natural obstacles - was commonly adopted by each of the rival political factions in the region. The Nabataean "trench" (yapay%) was we believe constructed by Obodas I somewhere in the Yarmuk bow, on the border between Gaulanitis and Gilead, and the attack in the area by Alexander Jannaeus was repelled with its help (War, i, 90; Ant., XIII, 397). The Seleucid "trench" was apparently excavated by Antiochus XII Dionysus (and thereafter named the "Trench of Antiochus" after him) in one of the mountain passes (or ravines) located on one of the roads leading to Damascus; later, in his campaign on Gaulanitis in the years 83—80 BCE it was captured by Alex ander Jannaeus (War., I, 105; Ant., XIII, 37). A third "trench" was dug by Jannaeus himself in the Aphek pass near Antipatris , but this one failed to resist the attack by Antiochus XII Dionysus in the year 85 BCE (War, I, 9 9 - 1 0 2 ; Ant., XIII, 3 9 0 - 3 9 1 ) . According to Josephus, following the defeat of Alexander Jannaeus at the hands of King Obodas I the Nabataean, a civil revolt broke out against Jannaeus, lasting about six years and endangering his very throne (Ant., XIII, 3 7 6 f f . ) Participation of the Seleucid king Demetrius III Eukairos 149
150
151
149 Cf. Schalit, Complete Concordance to Flavius Josephus, p.13; Bar-Kochva, ZPDV, XLII(1976), p.64. 150 Details on the "Jannaeus Line" as a whole string of fortresses, see: J. Kaplan, Yediot, XVI(1951), p p . 1 7 - 2 3 ; idem, Archeology and History of Tel-Aviv - Jaffa, p p . 8 4 - 8 6 . Cf. also: Smith, Historical Geography, p. 116. 151 There is obviously no denying the historic evaluation by Josephus on the miserable situation of Jannaeus, but the former's exaggerations must be rejected, for example casting doubt on the
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
96
or Akairus ( 9 6 - 8 8 BCE), on the side of the rebels and at their invitation, brought Jannaeus "to the necessity of surrendering to the king of the Arabs the territory which he had conquered in Moab and Galaaditis and the strongholds therein, in order that he might not aid the Jews in the war against him" (Ant., XIII, 382); this apparently occurred in the year 90 B C E . Loss of these regions (at least most of them) was however only temporary, for Josephus later lists the cities of Moab as being within his kingdom at the end of his reign (Ant., XIII, 397; XIV, 18). This naturally leads to the simple conclusion that at some time after 90 BCE Alexander Jannaeus once again annexed most of the areas he had surrendered. It is reasonable to assume that this occurred towards the end of his reign, be tween the years 8 3 - 7 6 BCE, when he had already overcome the internal crisis in his kingdom and when external circumstances facilitated the performance of this t a s k . It is not clear whether this occurred before, during or after the campaign of conquest which he conducted against the cities of Gilead and Gaulanitis ( 8 3 - 8 0 BCE), as described in War, I, 1 0 4 106 and Ant., XIII, 3 9 3 - 3 9 4 . It is however possible that the attack by Antiochus XII on the Naba taeans in the year 88/87 BCE (War, I, 9 9 - 1 0 2 ; Ant., XIII, 3 8 7 - 3 9 1 ) could throw more light on this affair . It must be remembered not only that this king died in that abortive attack, but so also did Obodas I him self, a short time later. Under the new political situation, his heir Aretas III devoted most of his efforts to the Damascus arena and in obscure circumstances, whose details are not sufficiently clear to us, even took over control of that city (War, I, 103; Ant., XIII, 392); as shown by numismatic finds, he held it over the years 8 5 / 4 - 7 2 B C E . On the other hand it is very probable that the missing link could in fact be interpreted against the background of the agreement for a Nabataean retreat, signed by Alexander Jannaeus and Aretas III ( 8 7 - 6 2 BCE) after the latter's obscure foray across the borders of Judaea, which in 84 BCE culminated with his victory at the battle of Adida (War, I, 103; Ant., XIII, 392). Aretas' incursion may be explained against the general disorder prevailing in Syria and de scribed by Josephus in Ant., XIII, 384—386. The Nabataean retreat from Judaea on the other hand may be understood against the background of the struggle over Damascus, which developed between Aretas III and the Ituraean ruler Ptolemy son of Mennaeus and was recorded by Josephus 152
153
154
155
152 153 154 155
enormous number of his losses then (50 000 men); cf. Stern, Jerusalem Cathedra, I (1981), p.31. See Stern, Tarbiz, XXXIII(1964),-.334. Details, see Stern, ibid., pp.335-336 Jerusalem Cathedra, 1(1981), p.28. Details on this date see: Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.24 and note 417. See Meshorer, Qedem, 111(1975), p p . 1 2 - 1 6 , 8 6 - 8 7 .
A lexander Jannaeus
97 1 5 6
in the very same context (War, I, 103 ;Ant., XIII, 3 9 2 ) . But to the same extent it is also not impossible that Josephus lacked an additional informa tive link which could have explained Alexander Jannaeus' turn of fortunes and the Nabataean retreat mentioned above. The Nabataean victory at the battle of Adida and their retreat from Judaea "after concluding a treaty" (or "after coming to terms with h i m " ) are not matters which from a logical aspect can easily be recon ciled with one another. One or the other: either Alexander Jannaeus' defeat at Adida is a literary falsehood reflecting the trends in the antiHasmonaean historiography on which Josephus d e p e n d e d , or his evid ence lacks a connecting link which could explain the transition from Jannaeus' failure to the Nabataean retreat: possibly there was even some connection between t h e m . As we know, the lists of cities in Ant., XII, 3 9 7 and^4w/., XIV, 18 have raised considerable difficulties in modern scholarship and the attempt to identify them is subject to dispute which so far has not been resolved by any final and satisfactory solution. The reason for this lies first and fore most in the many textual errors in the manuscripts, presenting a broad spectrum of possibilities and in their wake also of suitable and at times even quite speculative solutions. Schalit for example, in his far-reaching proposal for solving the puzzle of the above lists, offered the speculation that Josephus had relied on some poetic composition, which he thinks was writ ten on the occasion of Jannaeus' victories on the battlefield and based on imitating the famous prophecy against Moab (i.e. 2 K i » Kttfa =Burden of Moab) in Isaiah (15:5—8) and Jeremiah ( 4 8 : 3 - 3 4 ) . One must however 157
158
159
1 6 0
156 In fact the rivalry between the Nabataeans and the Ituraeans over control of Damascus did not cease even after its temporary annexation to the Nabataean kingdom ( 8 4 - 7 2 BCE); this may be deduced from later events - see: Ant., XIII 418; War, I 115; see: Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, II, p.867 and see more below. Also to be remembered in this connection is the political and mili tary confusion which pervaded all Syria following the invasion by Tigranes the Armenian (83 BCE) - see below, p.l05ff. 157 War, I 103; Kara awdrjica^ avexibpf\oev; Ant., XIII 39: em ovvdt$Kai<; avex^P^oev. 158 On the hostile tendencies in Hellenistic-Roman historiography against the Hasmonaeans in general and Jannaeus in particular, see: Efron, Studies of the Hasmonaean Period, p . H l f f ; Stern, in: Uffeneimer, B (ed.), Bible and Jewish History, pp.3 7 5 - 3 8 4 . 159 According to Stern, the absence of such a link may be explained by the nature of Josephus' sources which aimed at belittling Jannaeus' military and political achievements. For example, it is thus unclear to what degree there is a hint at the missing link in the obscure words of Syncellus (see Chronographia, ed. Bonn), I, p.559) concerning the campaign conducted by Digaius the Galilean commander against the Nabataeans, cf. Stern, ibid., p.336 and note 72. Starcky on the other hand believed Aretas retreated under special terms which apparently included renewed opening of the ports of southern Judaea to Nabataean trade. With that however, he admits the battle of Hadid (Adida) indicates a balance of power between the sides - see: Starcky, Biblical Archaeologist, XVIII(1955), p.91; cf. Hammond, The Nabataeans, p.18. 160 See Schalit, Eretz-Israel, I (1951), p p . 1 0 4 - 1 2 1 ; Schalit, Theokratia, 1(1967/8), p p . 3 - 5 0 . Cf. Avi-Yonah, The Holy Land, p.71.
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differ from his view, for if in fact there was an allusion to the above Proph ets, we would have expected the anonymous poet to have used some of the more important and prominent sites mentioned there (particularly in Jeremiah). Schalit dealt with the list in Ant., XIV, 18, the one which is also the more problematic, in a way which is wholly based on rewriting and correcting the text in an excessive manner, till it becomes quite hard to escape the impression this was done to adapt the written source to his ideas . The list in, Ant., XIV, 18 in fact does not, as Schalit thought, in any way correlate with that in Ant., XIII, 397; only speculative involutions and corrections of the text can serve to prove otherwise. In short, the list in Ant., XIV, 18 is not restricted only to cities in Moab, as Schalit believed. Places such as Elusa in the Negev and perhaps other sites can also be iden tified therein . The epigraphic and archeological finds at Elusa for exam ple clearly indicate the presence there of Nabataeans, going back at least to the days of Obodas I, i.e. to the reign of Alexander Jannaeus himself . Furthermore it is very hard to accept the idea that the list in Ant., XIV, 18 was in fact taken from a Hasmonaean poem honoring Jannaeus' victor ies, since it is actually in a context singing the praises of Antipatros the Idu maean, for having induced John Hyrcanus II to return, to the Nabataeans, 161
162
163
161 The attempt to decipher the name 6 KIXIKOJU avkdbu a? applying to the "Valley of Salt" or the "Vale of Siddim" near the Dead Sea (Gen., 14:3, 8) is a typical example of his method, resting on a tortuous correction of the word KiXUiov which becomes 'AXVKOV (see: Eretz-Israel I, pp.116 - 1 1 7 ) . Is it not more logical to think of some place named after the unit of Cilicians who served in Jannaeus' army (Ant., XIII, 4 - 3 7 ) ? It is difficult to decide whether the term avXJjv indicated an artificial moat dug across some mountain pass similar to the Pass of Thermopylae in Greece at the time of Antiochus III (Livy, XXXVI, 16, 6; Appian, Syriace, 18 (78)) or whether the re ference is to a valley, gully, depression or rift or even a water channel or sea narrows; cf. with these interpretations in the Liddell and Scott Lexicon. One way or another, according to the sequence of places mentioned in Josephus' list, it is logical to locate it somewhere in the neigh borhood of the Decapolis cities (cf. Klein, Jewish Transjordan, p.9). In this connection it should be remembered that Eusebius (Onomastikon p. 14, 11.22f.) wrote as follows on the name Hazeroth (Deut., 1:1): "a large, long plain called Aulon (='Avkibv) to this day, surrounded by mountains on all sides, extending from the Lebanon to the Par'an desert, and in Aulon there are famous cities: [TiberiasJ and the lake beside it, Beth-She'an, Jericho and the Dead Sea and the districts around them. Within them flows the Jordan, coming out from the springs of Paneas and disappearing in the Dead Sea". It is therefore reasonable to assume that the place called b KtXUtjJv ai)\J)v is meant to identify a specific spot in the Jordan Valley (taking avXcov as just a name without particular specific meaning). It is very likely that the Targum Jonathan of Deut., 34:8 which mentions a place called ">Rpb">\?l D^»nK(or ' K p ^ ' p l O ^ l l K in the Jerusalem Targum) in fact refers to 6 KtKinojv av\ojv, since the names associated with it re inforce this impression - cf. Hildesheimer, in: Borders of Eretz-Israel, p p . 6 3 - 6 4 and note 255. However, to be completely rejected is Bar-Droma's opinion (Ve-Zeh Gevul ha-Aretz, p.200ff) based on the opinion of Klein (in Borders of Eretz-Israel, p. 171). 162 Cf. Abel, Geographic II, p. 148. 163 See Negev, ANRW, II, 8, pp.546, 634; the same applies to Eboda (Avdat), ibid., p p . 5 4 6 - 5 4 7 .
Alexander Jannaeus
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territory conquered by Alexander Jannaneus. With that we do not intend to question the fact of annexation to Jannaeus' kingdom of Moabite cities, but we argue that there is no sure way of reconstructing the sequence of historic events leading up to this. One way or another, annexation or conquest of the Moabite cities (whatever the phrasing might be), gave Alexander Jannaeus full control of all the Dead Sea shore. Beside the eco nomic benefits of seizing a further section of the Kings' Highway, this incorporated an additional prize: exclusive ownership of the sources of asphalt. This material as we know served for the waterproof of ships and boats and was also an important raw material for the manufacture of medicinal salves and cosmetics, the demand for which was particularly great in Egypt where they were used in embalming the d e a d . Income from this trade was quite considerable and until then it had been in the nature of a Nabataean monopoly. All previous attempts to take it out of their hands had failed; as an example we may mention the defeat in the year 311 BCE of Demetrius Poliorcetes son of Antigonus Monophthalmus, one of the most important of the Diadochi. We believe Alexander Jannaeus' great success in these conquests must be explained against the background of the Nabataeans' entanglement in events in Syria in general and the Damascus arena in particular. In this con nection it should also be remembered that the big Armenian attack on Syria after the conquest of Antioch by King Tigranes in 85 BCE was a deterrent and restraining factor on the Nabataeans' expansionist impetus, giving Jannaeus the opportunity and the self-confidence to expand his own conquests in Transjordan . The Nabataeans, always more effective in defensive wars in desert regions than in wars of conquest in populated areas, could not compete with Alexander Jannaeus under those complex circumstances, especial ly since the size of their army and their experience were inferior to his. After extricating himself from the internal crisis and having regained the confidence of his people, he set out with renewed impetus and united forces, on his last race of conquest against the cities of Gilead and Gau lanitis ( 8 3 - 8 0 BCE), exploiting to the full the preoccupation of the Naba taeans on the Damascus scene. In his review of his campaign (War, I, 104-106;^4«/., XIII, 3 9 3 - 3 9 4 ) Josephus did not give many details beyond sketchily review of the places conquered, leaving the reader with the impres164
165
164 See Strabo, XVI, 2, 4 2 - 4 3 , 4 5 ; Diodorus Siculus, II, 4 8 , 6 - 9 ; XIX, 9 8 - 9 9 ; Josephus, War, IV, 476ft"; cf. also Pliny the Elder, Natural History, V, 72; Tacitus, Historiae, V, 6, 2 - 4 . On the use of ashphalt in ancient times see in detail: Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, I, p. 181. 165 See: Stern, Jerusalem Cathedra, I ( i 9 8 1 ) , p p . 4 5 - 4 6 . Stern even gave logical consideration to the possibility of a political association between Jannaeus and Tigranes.
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sion that these fell into his hands like ripe fruit. It is possible somehow to feel between the lines that in order to spare praise of Jannaeus, the inimi cal source on which he relied had deliberately refrained from describing the military operations. The fact that this campaign of conquest lasted three whole years suggests that at least some stories of heroism and great victories must have formed a part of that s u c c e s s . Thus for example, the encirclement of the city of Gerasa with a triple dyke or siege wall was a mighty feat in itself - considering its size and geographic location in difficult and remote mountain terrain on the edge of the desert. According to Josephus, Alexander Jannaeus wanted the treasures of Theodorus son of Zenon Kotoulas, the tyrant of Philadelphia, who had deposited them there for safekeeping; that is why Jannaeus be sieged the city until it surrendered "without a battle", apparently for lack of w a t e r . These treasures had already eluded him once before in the past, when he captured the fortress of Amathus (War, I, 8 6 - 8 7 ; Ant., XIII, 356). Then they had been transferred to the more remote Gerasa, but this time, after he encircled this city with a triple dyke, they did not escape him. It is reasonable to assume these treasures represented the accumula tion of profits on international trade, namely the merchant caravans moving north out of the Arabian peninsula; like the treasures of Petra itself they too were deposited in one of the local fortresses. The economic importance of Gerasa, as one of the main stations on the international trade route (the King's Highway) on the edge of the desert and close to the intersection with the desert route of Wadi Sirhan, was seemingly a very tempting factor for conquering it, especially since Jannaeus thereby tried to forestall the Nabataeans in their race to eliminate the dynasty of tyrants in Philadelphia. Very probably the fall of the city "without a battle" must also be explained, as in Gaza at the time, against the de fenders' despair of receiving Nabataean aid. In the absence of any other information, we can merely offer support for this likely supposition. 1653
166
167
One way or another, the great wealth which had collected in the city and the enormous economic advantages which were inherent in its location
165a The fact that famous Jewish commanders acted at that time (Ant., XVI, 419) is self-evident. 166 The name of the city appears in Ant., XIII, 393 in a mutilated form - "Eooav - and has been generally and logically corrected to Tepaaaau according to the parallel version in War., I 104. 167In the version of Ant., XIII 393, some manuscripts clearly state "without a battle" (djuaxO and this is to be preferred to other manuscripts which gave "in battle" (na-xy) - see details in Niese, Flavii Opera Omnia, ad loc. This finds support in the fact that Gerasa was not included among the cities which Pompey and Gabinius rebuilt on their ruins, unlike Gadara for example (Ant., XIV, 75, 88; War, I 1 5 5 - 1 5 6 , 166) indicating it fell into the hands of Jannaeus "without a battle". For this reason most scholars also incline to correct the version in War, I 104 on the conquest of Gerasa and to read Slxa fidxr)^ instead of 6WL ndxys (cf. the same expression in War, IV 372).
Alexander Jannaeus
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on the international trade routes in the region, greatly tempted Alexander Jannaeus to annex it to his kingdom and thereby force the Nabataeans to recognize the fact of his existence and his claim for participation in the profits of trade in the region, which till then had been their exclusive monopoly. For markedly similar reasons Alexander Jannaeus had also cast his eyes on other cities and fortresses of strategic importance within the borders of Gilead and Gaulanitis: Pella, Dium, Golan (or Gaulana), Gamala and Seleucia (War, I, 1 0 4 - 1 0 6 ; Ant., XIII, 3 9 3 - 3 9 4 ) and, according to the complementary evidence of Syneclus, in addition also Abila, Philoteria and Hippus (Susitha) . These conquests were not "without a battle", as in the case of Gerasa, which had surrendered after a siege and without an assault. From the fragmented description concerning Gamala for example, it may be ded^w^d that its defenders offered stiff resistance and its forti fications were therefore destroyed . The destruction of the place called "Trench (or Ravine) of Antiochus" which as indicated was a natural moun tain pass or gorge in the vicinity of Gamala and which had been exploited for military purposes (p.93f. above), reflects intense military activity in the region on the part of Jannaeus. The dismissal, for obscure accusations, of his commander Demetrius who had been appointed governor of this district, is also an indication that the extensive campaign (as mentioned, it lasted three whole years) was not without problems and difficulties. "His (i.e. Jannaeus') successful career brought him a cordial welcome from the nation" (War, I, 105 and cf. Ant., XIII, 394) for it not only ex panded the borders but also provided a base for economic well-being in the future. It appears that Jannaeus' keen desire to fight the Nabataeans also arose out of his national needs, because for this purpose all sections of the nation were united, thereby putting an end to internal dissension which had threatened to shatter the foundations of his kingdom from the inside. Following Jannaeus' success, in order to reach Damascus and the other cities of Syria his rivals the Nabataeans were forced to switch over to the use of trade routes passing further to the east. Nelson Glueck argued that for the Nabataeans Wddi Sirhan and its tributaries, providing convenient passage for caravans and because of their relative abundance of water, then became the principal channels for communication between the Arab168
169
s
168 Syncellus (ed. Bonn), I p p . 5 5 8 - 5 5 9 . See Klein: Jewish Transjordan, p.7ff: Schiirer, I , p.226 (note 25); 228 (note 31); Avi-Yonah, Carta's Atlas, map 67. 169 Ant., XIII 394; also cf.: War, I 166, which reports the restoration by Gabinius and re-popula tion. For some reason its name was omitted from the list in Ant., XIV 88. On the different conjectures on the location of Gamala, see extensively: Bar-Kochva, ZDPV, XLII(1976), p p . 5 4 71.
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
102
Map 10: Alexander Jannaeus' Last Wars ( 8 7 - 7 6 BCE)
[• . • [ J a n n a e u s ' K i n g d o m prior to 8 3 B . C . E .
Conquest of 8 3 - 8 0 B.C.E
O Damascus
•
Jews
Seleucids •*• I t u r a e a n s
Alexander Jannaeus
103
170
ian peninsula, Petra and Damascus . This alternative route possessed the great advantage of by-passing the King's Highway, yet it also had its disadvantages: it forced the Nabataean trade caravans to travel along the edge of Auranitis and Trachonitis, regions where the Ituraeans and related tribes lived and operated. This background largely explains the growing intensity of the three-cornered (Nabataean, Ituraean and Hasmonaean) struggle for Damascus, which was to erupt in the days following the death of Jannaeus, in the reign of Queen Salome (Shlomzion )-Alexandra. This energetic Hasmonaean king was not served well by his excessive eagerness to exploit the favorable political conditions of his time and the impetus of his success in order to start additional military operations. The end of the war was for him just the start of an illness (War, I, 105), which developed due to drunkenness (Ant., XIII, 398) and was diagnosed by Josephus as "quatran fever (or ague)". He "hoped to shake off the malady by returning to active life", but this was beyond his strength and his last operations brought his death nearer (War, I, 106; Ant., loc.cit.). The last campaign also lasted three years (79—76 BCE), but of it we know nothing beside the fact that Jannaeus died in the city of Gerasa, in the course of a siege he had laid on the fortress of Ragaba (='Paya(la). From the descrip tion by Josephus the location of this site (Ant., XIII, 3 9 9 ) was within the bounds of the chora of Gerasa but its precise geographic location is not known. If we accept the proposal of Abel and Avi-Yonah, we may identify it with the village of Rajib , lying some 12 km east of the Jordan and 22 km west of Gerasa on the upper Rajib River, on the line of the route passing along the Peraea and joining the eastern King's Highway at EinGan (Eglon), a little to the east of the Amathus fortress. 111
In summarizing the available findings on Alexander Jannaeus' wars with the Nabataeans, we may say the unknown still exceeds what we know. The meager information from Josephus is undoubtedly marred by the hostility of the sources — led by Nicolas of Damascus — on which he de pended. One gets the impression that the omissions and curtailments in the story of Jannaeus resulted from a calculated trend designed to diminish the glamor of his achievements and victories, in order to detract from his historic stature and importance. More than any other Hasmonaean ruler, Jannaeus did succeed in realizing the dream of his forefathers to "make Judaea into Eretz-Israel", as Klausner put i t . His military and political achievements, accompanied by the economic benefits accruing from the control of international trade routes, made Jannaeus into one of the most 1 7 2
170 Glueck, Transjordan, p p . 4 5 - 5 1 . 171 See: Abel, Giographie, II, p.424; Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p.162. 172 Klausner, History of the Second Temple, 3, p. 146.
104
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall 173
important factors in the whole area . In the political and military race for the succession of the disintegrating Seleucid kingdom, this vigorous Hasmonaean warrior king won the biggest prizes and in this there was no other political force or factor in the area to compare to him. As for the Nabataeans, not only did he beat them in this race, but at the same time he also fought against them and overcame them. The hostile relations between the Nabataeans and the Jews, as these found expression in the generations which followed and particularly in Herod's days, were a direct and inevitable result of the events which occurred in the days of Alex ander Jannaeus. Subsequent events have shown that Alexander Jannaeus' policy of con quests was in fact basically mistaken, mainly because his Jewish subjects did not possess the physical, political and military strength permanently to hold the conquered territories. Furthermore, his frequent and numerous wars in Transjordan sowed the seeds for generations of enmity which devel oped between the Nabataeans and the Jews. It is not impossible that the Pharisees' criticism of his rule arose among other things also out of these reasons, for we know of their opposition to his policy of conquests; this conclusion possibly follows hints in the Talmudic tradition, indirectly perhaps also from the writings of Josephus himself (cf.:^4«/., XIII, 375— 376, 3 7 9 - 3 8 3 ; War, I, 9 0 - 9 2 , 9 6 - 9 8 ) . As for relations between Jews and Ituraeans during the reign of Alex ander Jannaeus we do not in fact have any direct, clear information. The attempt to find in Talmudic literature some echo of a military confronta tion between them in those days has little to go on, as there are no grounds for identifying Chalcis with "Kohalith in the desert ( 1 2 7 » n'^nn)", mentioned in the tradition of the Babylonian Talmud as one of Jannaeus' objectives in some unknown campaign of conquest which ended in the capture of "sixty cities (D'ma D'ttfitf)" in the vicinity . On the con trary, there are grounds to believe that in the days of Alexander Jannaeus, relations between Jews and Ituraeans were actually quite good and it seems that silence of the sources goes to prove t h i s . In his youth, during the time of his education in Galilee (Ant., XIII, 322), it is not impossible that bonds of understanding and friendship had been forged between him and the Ituraeans, relations which would yield political fruit in the days of 174
175
173 E.g. see: Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, II, p.841; Jones, Herods of Judaea, p.159. 174 B. Kiddshin, 66a. See details in Efron, Studies on the Hasmonean Period, p. 178, which proves there are no factual grounds for the proposal by Lurie, King Jannaeus, p.25; idem, From Jan naeus to Herod, p.31ff. Cf. also: Kohut, Aruch Completum, 4, p.215, who held the reference was to Cilicia in Asia Minor. Cf. also Neubauer, La Gedgraphie du Talmud, p.393, who believed the reference was to the n 'DT '13 D^T n . However, the probability of the last two proposals are even more tenuous than the first.
Queen Salome-Alexandra
105
his son Judas Aristobulus II (as we shall see later). Alexander Jannaeus made good use of the nebulous external political situation and the general confusion in the region, which led to the incursion by Tigranes the Ar menian into the area of Syria (83 BCE): he then swiftly completed the con quest of Gilead, Gaulanitis and the Huleh Valley and annexed them to his kingdom ( 8 3 - 8 0 B C E ) . The young Ituraean ruler Ptolemy son of Mennaeus (85—40 BCE) was then quite busy in consolidating the position of the Ituraean dynasty he headed, especially since he was devoting great efforts to conquests beyond the borders of the Valley of Lebanon . Jannaeus thus created an establish ed fact, yet in truth the possibility is not to be excluded that the two (Jannaeus and Ptolemy son of Mennaeus) between them coordinated their stands concerning their policy of conquest, with the object of avoiding needless confrontations and clashes. 176
177
Queen Salome-Alexandra (76—67 BCE) Alexander Jannaeus left his widow a large kingdom, quite strong and internally even fairly calm during his last years. Thus the years of SalomeAlexandra's reign were first and foremost distinguished by military and political power. According to Josephus, she "recruited a large force of mer cenaries and also made her own force twice as large, with the result that she struck terror into the local rulers around her (rovq ne'pi% Tvpavvovq) and received hostages from them" (Ant., XIII, 409). Use of the term "rulers" (and more precisely "tyrants") undoubtedly indicates Arab leaders (or sheikhs) such as the tyrant of Philadelphia, but nothing is known of their identity or numbers. Her son Judas Aristobulus II favored an additional increase in military strength, in order to serve as a deterrent against "Aretas the Arab and the other princes" (Ant., XIII, 414). This was the cause for considerable tension between the son and his mother, who apparently wanted to devote herself more to domestic matters and eliminate the sources. 178
119
175 Butcf. p.79 above. 176 See: Ant., XIII 3 9 3 - 3 9 4 ; War, I 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 . Archeological finds from Tel Anafa confirm the Has monaean conquest at this time - see: Weinberg, IE J, XXI(1971), p p . 8 6 - 1 0 9 , esp. p.97; Fuks, SCI, V(1979/80), p p . 1 7 9 - 1 8 0 , 1 8 2 - 1 8 4 . 177 On the extent of the realm of Ptolemy son of Mannaeus, see: Strabo, XVI 2, 18 (755). The latter reported that he gained control of the whole Valley of Lebanon and also cast his eye on the Phoenician coast, by acquiring a hold on at least two small ports and threatening the vicinities of Biblos and Berytus. 178 Cf. War, I 112: "besides collecting a considerbale body of foreign troops". Though nothing is said of their origins, they apparently came from the Greek world, like the mercenaries recruited before that time by John Hyrcanus I.
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
106
In her desire to appease the Pharisees, she almost acceded to their de mands to execute many of the senior army officers who had participated in the slaughter of 800 leaders of the opponents which, according to the information of Josephus, Alexander Jannaeus had perpetrated (War, I, 1 1 3 - 1 1 4 ; Ant., XIII, 380, 41 Off.). After the leading officers had been exe cuted (Ant., XIII, 111), Judas Aristobulus and "leading citizens" (ol bvvaToi) warned of the possibility of mass desertion of soldiers to the enemy, even warned that Aretas the Nabataean would be happy to wel come deserters with names like theirs to his camp (ibid., 414). In great confusion, the queen was in the end forced to accept the compromise proposed by Judas Aristobulus II: keep the officers out of direct contact with the people and entrust them with guarding the border fortresses of the kingdom. At the same time (around 69 BCE) the queen sent Judas Aristobulus II himself with a military force to capture Damascus (Ant., XIII, 4 1 8 ; War, I, 115) apparently with hope that the war would again rally support by arousing patriotic feelings of joy in victory, just as had happened at the time in the days of her husband King Alexander Jan naeus . As we know, the struggle for the succession in the disintegrating Seleucid kingdom reached its climax in the days of Queen Salome-Alexandra. It was a bitter struggle, with each contestant trying to steal a march on his rivals in order to establish facts on the g r o u n d . Thus for example the defeat and death of Antiochus XII Dionysus in 87 BCE in the battle o f Cana against Aretas III the Nabataean paved the way for the annexation 180
181
182
179
Cf.:
War,
I 112
— ^po^epdv 6e
K O U rolq
e%ojBev elvai
SwdaraLq.
\80 Ant., XIII 394; War, I 105 and cf. also Ant., XIII 406. Most scholars generally incline to see this affair as proof of the anti-Pharisee stand taken by Judas Aristobulus II and thereby also made him an express ally of the Sadducees, as following in the footsteps of his father Jannaeus. In fact however there is no explicit reference in the writings of Josephus which could confirm this opin ion. Persons of rank and influence who joined him are not to be identified with the Sadducees; furthermore, Judas Aristobulus II was not represented in this affair as the enemy of the Pharisees, but rather as a clear-sighted politician showing sincere concern over the possible liquidation of the officer corps, the central support of any army, and of an internal bloodbath which would weaken the kingdom and strengthen its enemies. The fact that the queen, the Pharisees' favorite, in the end accepted his proposal clearly proves that this was really the true state of affairs. As against this, the fact that at a later date "the elders of the Jews" together with John Hyrcanus II presented themselves before the queen - to get her to express an opinion on the actions by Judas Aristolulus II in taking control of the kingdom (Ant., XIII, 428) - does not necessarily indicate that John Hyrcanus II belonged to the Pharisee camp. On this problem see extensively: Efron, Studies on the Hasmonean Period, p.227f and esp. p.229ff; see also p.l 11 below. 181 See in detail: Altheim-Stiehl, p.293ff, 356ff. 182 War, I 102; Ant., XIII 391. On location of the place, see: Abel, Geographie, I, p.273;2, p.149; it appears to lie in the north-eastern Negev, ANRW, II, 8, p.537. Concerning the date, see: Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.24 and note 47.
Queen Salome-Alexandra
107
183
of Damascus to the Nabataean k i n g d o m , but at the same time it also encouraged the Ituraean ruler Ptolemy son of Mennaeus to try and lay his own hands on the city. From an Ituraean point of view, it was quite essen tial to capture Damascus, since it was a connecting link of the greatest importance between the Trachonitis district (the Leja region), where the Ituraeans and related Arab tribes had their homes, and the slopes of the Hermon and the Valley of Lebanon (i.e. the district of Abilene and Chal c i s ) , where for some time an Ituraean kingdom was being established under his leadership. However, the invasion of Syria by Tigranes King of Armenia, which as indicated had already begun in 83 BCE, changed the whole situation and completely foiled Ituraean plans for expansion, particularly since in 72/71 BCE it even forced the Nabataeans to evacuate Damascus . The Armenians appear to have posed quite a serious threat for all the forces in the region, including the Hasmonaean kingdom: in 69 BCE their army reached the very gates of Ptolemais (Acco) and the Armenian king even had plans for thrusting south, to the borders of Judaea itself. Though Salome-Alexandra managed in good time to buy him off with presents and pacts of friendship, the Armenian menace was in fact not removed until Tigranes retreated to his own country following the big Roman offensive in the Pontus region, under the command of the wellknown commander Lucullus . 184
185
186
The political vacuum which suddenly formed in the wake of the Arme nian withdrawal once again focussed military and political activities of the different forces in the area on the fate of Damascus; in Ptolemy son of Mennaeus in particular, it roused a taste for conquest. The Hasmonaean queen was probably aware of the possibility that this city would fall into his hands and encourage further Ituraean expansionist tendencies. As indicated, she sent a military force under the command of her son Judas Aristobulus II (69 BCE) in order to foil the expansionist schemes of the Ituraean ruler . According to Josephus however the Jewish force accom plished nothing of note and returned home (War, I, 115; Ant., XIII, 418). 187
183 War, I 103; Ant., XIII 392. See note 141 above, also note 185 below. 184 Abilene is identified with the place known today as Suk Wadi Barada, in southern Anti-Lebanon, on the southern section of the important Beirut-Damascus highway. See Benzinger, s.v. Abilene, RE(PW), I, cols.98-99. Chalcis is identified with Majdal An'jar on the western peaks of AntiLebanon and it controls the whole Valley of Lebanon. See: Strabo, XVI, 2, 10 (753); op.cit., 18 (755); op.cit., 20 (756), and see also: Altheim-Stiehl, p.314; Von Gotz Schmitt, ZDPV, XLVIII(1982), pp. 1 1 0 - 1 1 2 ; Will, ZDPV, 99(1983), p. 146ff. 185 See Schiirer, I , p.79, note 79; Altheim-Stiehl, p.298 and see also note 155 above. 186 Ant., XIII 4 1 9 - 4 2 1 ; cf. War, I 116 and see extensively: Altheim-Stiehl, p.356ff. 187 In Applebaum's opinion, this military campaign was connected with the struggle for control of the King's Highway, leading from Eilath in the south to the Decapolis cities in the north — see: s
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The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
It seems very likely that there is in these obscure words an indirect hint of solution, by way of political negotiations between Judas Aristobulus II and Ptolemy son of Mennaeus (this is discussed below), to a potential Ituraean-Hasmonaean dispute. Furthermore, it would be reasonable to assume that one of the queen's objectives in sending an army led by Judas Aristobulus II on the military campaign to Damascus was her desire to divert his energies into other channels, away from his growing rivalry with his brother John Hyrcanus II. However it appears that in reality things unfolded differently, and the growing rivalry itself between the brothers led to the "failure" of the military campaign to Damascus. In our opinion, the campaign "failed" because the Ituraean-Hasmonaean dispute was resolved by means of political negotiations by Judas Aristobulus II, who in this way sought to win over the Ituraeans as his allies and as a counter weight to the Nabataean allies of his brother John Hyrcanus II and the latter's partner, Antipatros the Idumaean (see more below).
Decline of the Hasmonaean Kingdom (67—40 BCE) The final struggle between the Hasmonaean brothers Judas Aristobulus II and John Hyrcanus II over the succession to the Hasmonaean throne broke out while their mother lay on her deathbed (67 BCE); it found ex pression in military preparations by the two sides in anticipation of a possible contest. It appears that Judas- Aristobulus II "gathered an army from Lebanon, Trachonitis and the [local] princes ", words which hint at mercenaries from among the Ituraeans and other tribes related to them, who perhaps also included subjects of convert rulers like "Silas the Jew" and Dionysius of Tripolis , who are mentioned again below. This fact should not be surprising, even if we assume that the Hasmonaean-Ituraean contest for Damascus had not been entirely resolved. It seems that Judas Aristobulus II did all he could to obtain military support from outside 188
189
Applebaum, Jewish People in the 1st Century, II, p.636. As for the date when this event occur red, Sartre (REA, LXXXI[ 1 9 7 9 ] , p.41) believes it must be placed earlier than 72 BCE, for ac cording to him the Nabataean retreat from Damascus was the result of the Ituraean and not the Armenian threat. However, Josephus' statement - "at the same time" - rather favors the year 69 BCE. 188 y4«/., XIII 427. In fact it may be translated thus: "from the Lebanon and Trachonitis and from their kings" (dn-d re Ai(3dvov Kal Tpaxu>w<; «al TGJV novdpxijou). In the parallel evidence - War, I 117 - there is no mention of the sources of recruitment of Judas Aristobulus II, but there is the simple statement that he recruited mercenaries. This does not necessarily indicate the land of Ituraea was under Jewish control, as Lurie thinks (see note 174 above) in following Klein (Land of Galilee, p. 18) and even expanding his proposal. \%9Ant., XIV 3 9 - 4 0 .
Decline of the Hasmonaean Kingdom
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and not rely only on the army at home, whose stand would be hard to pre dict while the queen mother was still alive. It seems unlikely that these mercenaries enrolled just on the base of personal contractual undertaking and without political motives or dictates from their rulers. On the contrary, mention of "the princes" proves this was not a personal agreement with the enrolled mercenaries, but an expressly political commitment. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Judas Aristobulus II contacted the Ituraean leaders behind his mother's back and gave them a free hand (and perhaps even actual aid) over the conquest of Damascus in return for assistance in consolidating his status as king of Judaea and their backing in the impend ing struggle with his brother John Hyrcanus I I . This suggestion is, among other things, also based on the analogy with the political course taken by John Hyrcanus II. As we know he too, through the agency of Antipatros the Idumaean, reached an agreement (at that time perhaps already concluded) with Aretas III, king of the Naba taeans, for political and military cooperation (Ant., XIV, 18—41). The Nabataean connections of Antipatros were in fact the continuation of relations formed at the time his father Antipas was appointed strategos of all Idumaea, a position he in turn had inherited from his father . Signi ficantly, these ties also found expression in the fact of his marriage to the daughter of a noble Nabataean family — Cypros, who bore him his four sons: Phasael , Herod, Joseph and Pheroras, as well as his daughter Sa lome (War, I, 181; Ant., XIV, 121). Josephus further stresses that the Nabataean king's friendship was firm and strong, mainly thanks to that marriage, demonstrating its great importance in the eyes of both s i d e s ; a chronological calculation shows it was consecrated at the beginning of Queen Salome-Alexandra's r e i g n . 190
191
192
193
194
190 A basic starting point for this proposal is the fact of the involvement of Ptolemy son of Men naeus the Ituraean in the quarrel between the Hasmonaean brothers and his close ties with Judas Aritobulus II, as these found expression in the words of Josephus: War, I 1 8 5 - 1 8 6 ; Ant., XIV 126; below, we deal extensively with this. 191 See p.89 above and note 136. See also: Schurer, I , p.234; Schalit, King Herod, p. 14. 192 The name Phasael is an Aramaic name which was common among the Nabataeans and is frequent ly found in Nabataean epigraphy - see: Cook, Textbook of Northern Semitic Inscriptions etc., p p . 3 0 8 - 3 0 9 (No.143). The name means "God opened (the mother's womb)" and was generally given to the first-born son who according to the customs of the East was of great prestige (see: Teixidor, p.159). Among Nabataean inscriptions recently published by Khairy (PEQ, CX1II [ 1 9 8 1 ] , p.22, line 3) there is mention of Phasael son of the Nabataean king Malichus II, indicat ing it was even accepted in the royal family itself. It appears the modern Arab version is Phaisal (Khairy, ibid., p.23). Giving this name to the son of Antipatros can of course indicate the Naba taean atmosphere prevailing in his house under the influence of his wife Cypros. 193 It is not clear on what grounds Cypros was identified as the sister of Aretas III the Nabataean king, as claimed by Altheim-Stiehl, p.301. 194 War, loc.cit.; Ant., XVII 148 states that in the year of his death (4 BCE) Herod was about 70; s
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The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
It may be inferred that Judas Aristobulus II at that time already knew of the pro-Nabataean orientation of the Idumaean circles at the Hasmo naean court. Small wonder therefore that he wished to check or halt it by cultivating a political counter-orientation, particularly with Antipatros scheming to involve the Nabataeans actively; this is what in fact happened after the death of Queen Salome-Alexandra, with the outbreak in full force of hostilities between the two brothers (67 BCE). His early prepara tions helped Judas Aristobulus at least against the great Nabataean attack and the intense siege laid on Jerusalem in the year 65 BCE {Ant., XIV, 3 9 - 4 0 ) ; this episode of course brings us back to the Nabataeans. As indicated, Antipatros was the chief initiator and sponsor of the political and military ties between John Hyrcanus II and the Nabataean king Aretas III, according to which John Hy inus II obtained asylum in Petra, and Nabataean military aid in the conduct of the struggle against his brother Judas Aristobulus II over the succession in Jerusalem, all this in return for suitable compensation, starting with the restoration of the twelve cities in the souther parts of Eretz-Israel, taken at the time by King Alexander Jannaeus . Antipatros no doubt also had personal interests in furthering this agreement, starting with his desire to bring back the Naba taean trade caravans, with the handsome profits to be derived from them, moving once more within the borders of Idumaea and from there to Gaza and its satellite settlements. For the Nabataeans too this had considerable attraction, since it could save them the need for resorting to long, indirect roads or highways infested with caravan robbers. In addition, this would also relieve them of the need to pay commissions such as transit duties of various kinds, harbor and service charges, increase their profits and strength en even further their trade with Egypt. It may be assumed that the contract 195
if so he was born around 75 BCE. From this calculation it appears his father's wedding took place at the start of Queen Salome-Alexandra's reign or even at the end of Jannaeus', since the first-born Antipas was born at least a year or two before that. On the other hand, Ant., XIV 158 states that in 46 BCE, when Herod executed Hezekias the Galilean he was only 15. By this reckoning calculation he was born only in 61 BCE; if so his father's marriage must have taken place at the end of Queen Salome-Alexandra's reign or even some time later. The first possi bility seems more probable for two reasons: a. If he was really born in 61 BCE, at his death he had not reached 70; b. It is hard to assume that a boy of 15 was in fact appointed governor of Galilee (cf. Schiirer's reason, I > p.275, note 29) and that he was treated seriously and had political backing from Sextus Caesar the Syrian Governor, who then even appointed him to an additional senior army post (Ant., XIV 1 7 8 - 1 8 0 ; War., I 2 1 1 - 2 1 3 ) . It is therefore not incon ceivable that in the second version there occurred a writer's error of about 10 years, so that Herod was infact appointed governor of Galilee at the age of 25 and not 15. In this way the discrepancy between the two versions can be resolved, rejecting the proposal by Otto (p. 18) who for some reason prefers the second version. 195 Ant., XIV, 1 4 - 1 8 ; War, I 1 2 4 - 1 2 6 . On the identity of these cities, see: Marcus, Josephus, VII, p.459, also p.98 above. s
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Decline of the Hasmonaean Kingdom
of agreement between the Nabataeans and Antipatros settled affairs to the satisfaction of both parties. At the head of a mighty army which according to Josephus numbered 50,000 horsemen and infantry , Aretas III in the spring of 65 BCE thrust across the border into Judaea and quickly laid siege to Jerusalem . De scriptions in Ant., XIV, 21—28 of the siege and the operation speak of a national tragedy, accompanied by serious crimes even from a religious aspect, such as the base murder of Onias the Rainmaker ( ? A y n n •» i"\n ) , one of the most famous personalities in the Jewish nation at that time, and the criminal repudiation of an agreement with the besieged of Jerusa lem for the supply of sacrificial animals. This should suffice to refute the opinion which associates the Pharisees with the camp of John Hyrcanus I I . It is also hard to accept the idea that the Jewish masses who had welcomed the conquests of Alexander Jannaeus in the Nabataean region (Ant., XIII, 3 9 4 ) would readily join their enemy of yesterday, so willingly and just as lightly give up the conquests, be indifferent to the besieging of their capital and even take an active part in it. After all, under those cir cumstances the leaders of the nation, "the Jews of highest r e p u t e left the country and fled to Egypt" (ibid., 21), especially since the neutral position taken by Onias the Rainmaker in no way whatsoever conformed with the stand of those besieging Jerusalem, i.e. John Hyrcanus II's sup porters. And yet, how is it possible to reconcile the contradictory and discrepant descriptions by Josephus, of the respective supporters of John Hyrcanus II and Judas Aristobulus II, saying on the one hand that "the citizens, joining Hyrcanus' side, assisted him in the siege, while only the priests remained loyal to Aristobulus" (ibid., 20) and on the other hand "Nor was it as easy to take by force a city which was among the most fortified and powerful, as to drive out some fugitives together with the Nabataeans, who were not well fitted for warfare" (ibid., 32). 196
197
=l
198
199
196 Thus according to War, I 126. According to Ant., XIV 19 the impression might be received that the force amounted to 50 000 horsemen beside the infantry. That is how Thackeray and Marcus for example understood the words of this source. It seems their impression is based on interpreta tive exaggeration because of the word d/xa which may also be interpreted simply by some mean ing like that of avv and nerd (i.e. with, together) and the like. In any case, this figure in relation to the Nabataean force is exaggerated and might with difficulty represent all the supporters of John Hyrcanus II. 197 Ant., XIV 21, 25 reports that the siege of Jerusalem took place at the time of Passover; see also: Schurer, I , p.236 and note 7. 198 Full details: Efron, Studies on the Hasmonean Period, p.227ff, esp. p.229. See also note 180 above. 199 Without a doubt the title - oi SoKincbraroi TCOV 'lov8aiu)v - is more suited to leaders of the Pharisees than of the Sadduccees. s
112
The Hasmonaean Kingdom in Rise and Fall
Map 11: Nabataean Involvement in the Civil War between Judas Aristobu lus II and John Hyrcanus II ( 6 6 / 5 - 6 4 BCE)
>• Scaur us
No doubt "the fugitives" here are the supporters of John Hyrcanus II and if so, then this description completely contradicts the one before, wherein "the citizens" were his allies. It appears that these discrepancies are joined by another - where did "a large force" suddenly appear for Judas Aristo bulus II after the lifting of the Nabataean siege on Jerusalem, so that he
Decline of the Hasmonaean Kingdom
113
was able to defeat Aretas III at the battle of Papyron (Ant., XIV, 33)? Incidentally also to be considered in this context, those who supported first the one and then the other, in the end were "against them both" (ibid., 41). It therefore appears that no hasty conclusion is to be drawn from the contradictory descriptions by Josephus, particularly since it is obvious that they are based on inimical foreign sources, primarily Nicolaus of Damas cus . The Roman invasion in 64 BCE, the conquest of Damascus by Scaurus and his march towards Jerusalem represent a fateful political turning point in the history of the whole region. When the two warring Hasmo naean brothers appealed to Scaurus for aid in their family feud with each other, the Roman commander first complied with the request from Judas Aristobulus, even ordered King Aretas III the Nabataean to lift the siege on Jerusalem forthwith or run the risk of being declared an enemy of Rome (War, I, \28; Ant., XIV, 32). On hearing the threat, Aretas retreated from Judaea towards Philadelphia, which at that time was under his c o n t r o l , while Judas Aristobulus, encouraged by the lifting of the siege, fell upon the retreating Nabataeans and in a battle near Papyron inflicted a decisive defeat on t h e m . It appears that Antipatros and John Hyrcanus II did not give up; by means of a large bribe, they succeeded in bringing over to their side both Scaurus and Gabinius (Ant., XIV, 37), senior commanders of Pompey, who were at that time staying in the winter camp by Antioch on the Orontes (64/63 B C E ) . This bribery undoubtedly had great influence on the stand adopted by Pompey in the quarrel between the Hasmonaean brothers, but in fact he was guided first and foremost by his own political and strategic considerations. As we know, one of the outstanding funda mentals of his policy consisted of the liberation of Hellenistic cities from 200
201
202
203
204
200 See the excellent and exhaustive analysis on all details of the problem: Efron, Studies of the Hasmonaean Period, p p . 2 0 1 - 2 0 5 . 201 War, I 127; Ant., XIV 29. There is no support for the information in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 11:32, on the continuation of Nabataean rule in Damascus and its credibility is to be totally rejected - see: Schflrer, I , p p . 5 7 9 - 5 8 0 , note 17. 202 It will be remembered that Philadelphia was under the rule of the independent tyrant Zenon called Kotoulas (Ant., XIII 235; War, I 60), who it seems - since he no longer had Seleucid support as in the past (see p.42 above) - was forced to acknowledge Nabataean rule and coop erate with them. The wish for survival thus forced him to recognize Nabataean hegemony. 203 According to Josephus the Nabataeans left 6000 dead on the battlefield, including Phalion (or rather Cephalon) brother of Antipatros. On the meaning of his name, see: Schalit, King Herod, p.347, note 24; idem, A Complete Concordance etc., p.74 (s.v. Ke<£aX\i'u>i>). The battle of Papy ron apparently took place near Jericho - cf.: Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p.l09;Schlater, Geschichte Israels, p.393, n.l. 204 See Schalit, King Herod, p.347, notes 2 6 - 2 7 . s
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the rule of eastern 'tyrants', granting them his protection and patronage to guarantee their liberty and sovereignty . Pompey's harsh treatment of the rulers of Mount Lebanon (Ant., XIV, 3 8 - 4 0 ) faithfully reflected this policy, especially since it also augured what would eventually happen in Judaea. According to Josephus, the country of Ptolemy son of Mennaeus was badly devastated, while he personally was only saved from heavy punishment after paying a penalty to atone for his " s i n s " . These sins probably comprised his attempts to control the trade routes (by means of "robbery", according to accepted Greco-Roman nomenclature in such cases) and his repeated efforts to capture Damascus. His kinsman (by marriage) Dionysus the ruler of Tripolis, on the other hand, did not escape the Roman a x e . On the same occasion, somewhere in Lebanon Pompey also destroyed the fortress of Lysias , at that time 205
206
207
208
205 See Schalit, King Herod, p.24ff, also p.505ff (Appendix b). Further details of the subject will be discussed in my forthcoming book Jews and Hellenistic Cities. 206 On the injuries suffered by the Ituraeans at the hands of Pompey, cf. also Strabo, XVI 2, 18; see also Schiirer, I , p.564 and note 22. In his official capacity Ptolemy son of Mennaeus became a prince with complete dependency on Rome, or as he was called on his coins, "tetrarch" - see: BMC, Syria, p p . 2 7 9 - 2 8 0 ; Seyrig, Ant.Syr., IV, p.l 15. On Lurie's claim (The Jews of Syria, p p . 4 1 - 4 2 ) of the 'Jewishness' of Ptolemy son of Mennaeus there is no evidence whatever in the sources and it is therefore to be rejected outright. The fact that he eventually married Alexandra daughter of Judas Aristobulus II does not make him a Jew. Incisive proof of this is the significant fact that his coins bear the likeness of Zeus; furthermore he is there called dpxiepevq and this clearly does not imply the High Priest in the Jerusalem Temple. The same applies to his son Lysanias, whose coins also bear the likeness of Zeus and other pagan symbols - see: Head, Historia Numorum, p.783ff; Wroth, BMC, Syria, p p . 2 7 9 - 2 8 1 ; Galatia, Intr., p.LXIII; Seyrig, Syria, XXVII(1950), p p . 4 6 - 4 9 ; idem, Syria, XXXK1954), p p . 8 9 - 9 2 ; Schottroff, ZDPV, XCCIII (1982), pp.138, 142. 207 There is a tendency to identify him with Bacchius Judaeus whose name is preserved on a Roman coin of the Aedile Aulus Plautius from the year 54 BCE. See Schiirer, I , p.237, note 14; Craw ford, Roman Republican Coinage, p.454; Narkiss (Tarbiz, XI[1940J, p p . 2 2 0 - 2 2 2 ) wanted to see the historic background to his execution in the suppression of the rebellion by Alexander son of Aristobulus II in the year 55 BCE and this opinion was also held by Lurie (The Jews in Syria, p p . 4 0 - 4 l ) , but since there is no support for this in the sources, beside the proximity of dates, there is no way of denying the evidence by Josephus. See also: Kindler, Seal's Coin and Medal Bulletin, 11(1951), p p . 5 3 - 5 5 ; Sydenham, Roman Republicaan Coinage, p.156, no.392; Smallwood, The Jews under Roman Rule, p.26. n.16; Meshorer, Nabataean Coins, p . l 6 ; Schalit, King Herod, p.348, n.29; idem, Kbnig Herodes, p.9, n.29; Scullard, Festivals and Ceremonies of the Roman Republic, pp.41 97ff. 208 Lurie (HUCA [Hebrew Section], p.21) tried to link the name of the fortress with the Seleucid commander Lysias, who in 164 BCE was placed in charge of the affairs of King Antiochus IV Epiphanes, from the Euphrates to the border of Egypt (I Mace, 3 : 3 1 - 3 2 ) , but this is very dubious and is without foundation. On the fortress Lysias see also: Honigmann, ZDPV, XLVI (1923), p.57, n.278; also Altheim-Stiehl, p.145, 150. Some scholars locate the fortress some where between Antioch and Apamea on the Orontes - see: RE(PW), s.v. Lysias (5); Dussaud, Topographic historique etc.. p.152; Schiirer, I , p.237, n.14. On Pompey's conquest see also: Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East, p.206ff. s
s
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209
under the control of a certain Silas the J e w . Politically however, it appears that the Roman commander also demonstrated quite shrewd political realism in his relations with the Ituraeans, apparently stripping from their country the areas they had conquered on the Phoenician coast, as well as parts of Mount Lebanon; these he placed under the protection of the province of Syria, but compensated the Ituraeans by the grant of other areas: northern Gaulanitis, Batanaea, Auranitis and Trachonitis . He thereby of course intensified the rivalry between them and the Naba taeans, according to the well-known political precept — divide et impera. The political and territorial readjustments in the north of the country were it appears, similarly intended to exert indirect influence on the rela tions between Jews and Ituraeans. A part of the areas detached from the Hasmonaean kingdom (northern Gaulanitis and the Huleh Valley) were as indicated given to Ptolemy son of Mennaeus the Ituraean, after the latter had regularized his standing with the Roman conqueror in return for the payment of a bribe of a thousand talents (Ant., XII, 38—39). It is reason able to assume that by this step Pompey intended to drive a wedge between the Ituraeans and the Hasmonaeans; but in practice, at least in this case, he did not succeed. The latter could not immediately react to this, since they were troubled by more serious problems concerning their own political survival. Only later, in the days of Herod, did conditions become ripe for a collision of interests between Jews and Ituraeans, the reference being to the affair of Zenodorus(p. 157ff. below), one in which the Nabataeans too became involved, so demonstrating that Pompey's policy did in fact sow the seeds for three-way troubles in days to come. We believe the steps taken by Pompey were designed to halt the Nabataean-Hasmonaean contest for territorial expansion, either by imposing severe and uncompromising political restrictions, or by 'balance' with the aid of a third force, which in this case took the shape of the Ituraeans. The 'balance' found expression in the grant of the territory south of Damascus to the Ituraeans, which concealed potential conflicts of interests even more serious than before, since it could inherently cause disputes between any one party and all the others. This of course promised to perpetuate for Rome the long-term task of arbitrator and supreme judge. The halting 210
,
209 Silas (Zikas) is almost certainly the Aramaic name Shila (K*? \D), also borne by several Jewish sages in Eretz-Israel and Babylonia - see: Heinemann, History of Tanna'im and Amora'im, III, p p . 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 4 . My thanks are due to Dr. Ran Zadok, who drew my attention to this. Cf. also Ch.4,note 150 below. 210 See Appianus, Methridaticus Liber, 106, 499; Eutropius, Breviarium ab Urbe Condita, VI, 14, 1; Orosius, Historiae adversum paganos, VI, 6, 1. The areas from the Phoenician coast were appar ently returned to the Phoenician cities which were under the protection of the province of Syria, with the object of strengthening their stand against the Ituraean "tyrants". Cf. Avi-Yonah, His torical Geography, p.51: idem, Carta's Atlas, map 75 (p.52).
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of Nabataean expansion northwards has also been well-authenticated by the archeological finds of Auranitis and Trachonities, whether by the absence of Nabataean ceramics at the local sites of settlement, the abun dance of figurative art in the local cults, or the scarcety of Nabataean epigraphy and the proliferation of local deities not forming a part of the Nabataean pantheon . After the Ituraean cities of Heliopolis and Chalcis had surrendered to Pompey, he crossed the ridges of Mount Lebanon and reached Damascus, where he had his first direct encounter with the feud between the Hasmo naean brothers (Ant., XIV, 4 1 - 4 7 ) . In his meeting with the two, the Roman commander wanted to hear the actual issues involved at first hand — on the internal level of Judaea and on the broad regional level — so en abling him to formulate a practical, wise policy faithful to basic Roman interests. The words of calumny and slander voiced on that occasion by John Hyrcanus II and Antipatros against Judas Aristobulus II, were in tended to represent the latter as a usurper, a 'tyrant', a 'robber' and the one who "had instigated the raids against neighboring peoples and acts of piracy at sea" (ibid., 43); they thereby tried to place him in one class with the outright enemies of R o m e . Perhaps the (possible) ties between Judas Aristobulus II with the Ituraeans (above, p. 109f.) were also of the nature of a warning for Pompey, perhaps also the bitter complaints of the Hellenis tic cities against both Judas Aristobulus II and the Ituraeans; in his wisdom however he refrained from taking a clear stand until he had carefully exam ined the third corner of the political triangle in the region — the position and involvement of the Nabataeans (ibid., 46). It seems that Judas Aristobulus II understood the deterioration which within a short time had taken place in his position and when he realized his hopes of Pompey would be disappointed, he slipped away without taking his leave of the Roman commander; this happened in the city of Dium where Pompey was getting ready for a possible military campaign against the Nabataeans . On becoming aware of the escape, Pompey postpones his Nabataean plans and hurried towards Judaea. His diversion that way was possibly and perhaps mainly due to purely military considerations, a 211
212
213
211 Full details see: Patrich, Cathedra, XXXVIII(1985), p p . 3 - 5 4 . 212 The 'neighbors' were apparently the Hellenistic cities (cf. Schalit, King Herod, p.16) and in these words there may be a hint of the Hasmonaean attempt to conquer Damascus. It is not clear what act was referred to as "piracy at sea"; in any case this accusation struck home in one of the sensitive points in Pompey's policy, for in the year 67 BCE he had set out on his well-known campaign to eradicate piracy in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean. Also worth mentioning in this connection are the expansionist tendencies of Ptolemy son of Mennaeus, the ally of Judas Aristobulus II, towards the ports of the Phoenician coast (Strabo, XVI, 2, 18). 213 War, I 132;Ant., XIV 47; Schurer, I , p.238; Schalit, King Herod, pp.16, 349 (note 38). s
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Map 12: The Arrangements under Pompey (63 BCE)
reluctance to risk the existence in his rear of an entity of dubious political and military loyalty. The conquest of Judaea could help him in the logistic preparations for a campaign against Petra, not at all an easy task in itself, as
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proven by the past experience of great commanders like Atheneus, who had served Antigonus Monophthalmus and his son Demetrius Poliorcetes. The conquest of Judaea was in any case important for the preparations to conquer Egypt, and therefore his decision was to begin with the military campaign against the Hasmonean kingdom. As we know, that campaign marked the end o f the Jewish sovereignty and the dawn of a new era in the history of Israel - the period of Roman rule. After Pompey had entrusted the province of Syria to Scaurus and returned victoriously to Rome (62 BCE), it was finally the turn of Petra . The campaign against the Nabataean capital however was from the start replete with many mishaps and difficulties, particularly at the logistic level. It was Antipatros and John Hyrcanus II who saved the Romans from starvation and shortage of vital supplies and equipment. Antipatros even excelled himself, sparing Scaurus the need to continue the war and capture Petra by going as emissary from Scaurus and persuading Aretas III to pay 3 0 0 talents in return for the cessation of hostilities by the Romans, while he (i.e. Antipatros) himself personally guaranteed this payment with his own property (War, I, 159); Ant., XIV, 8 0 - 8 1 ) . In fact the Nabataean kings from then on were forced to recognize Roman supremacy and be came 'allied kings' and dependents who received dictates from the governor of S y r i a ; this saved them from the humiliation and risk of actual military conquest. There is no doubt that Antipatros, the prime sponsor of this arrange ment, became the hero of the day in the eyes of the Romans, whom he had spared the necessity of fighting against the Nabataeans in difficult mountainous desert terrain and more so since he had brought them, on a silver platter and at negligible cost, a very important political achievement. Little wonder then that at a single stroke he thereby became a political personality of the first rank within the entire region; it appears that he also knew how to extract great personal benefits from all t h i s . Under the new 214
21s
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214 On the Roman intentions and plans to conquer the Nabataean kingdom, see: Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p p . 3 0 - 3 3 . 215 Later, when Scaurus served asAedilein Rome (58 BCE) he perpetuated this political achieve ment by striking coins showing Aretas III kneeling before a camel - see: Schiirer, I , p.244. Pompey also boasted of his victory (despite its limited achievements), also taking credit for it, since Scaurus was after all just an officer under his command - see:Diodorus Siculus, XL 4;cf. Cassius Dio, XXXVII 15, 1 - 2 ; Plutarch, Pompey, 4 1 ; Oros. VI 6, 1; Appian, Mith. 106/497. The official status of Aretas was certainly that of "allied king and friend of the Roman people". 216 In fact the initiative to aid the Romans actually came from John Hyrcanus II, so that Antipatros acted on his orders (Ant., XIV 80), exactly as it was in other cases also (ibid., 99, 127), indicat ing that John Hyrcanus II was not as worthless as appears in the source used by Josephus, namely Nicolaus of Damascus. There is no doubt that this description is biased and wholly aimed at singing the praises of Antipatros. In any case, it was he who succeeded in drawing the greatest personal benefit: the advancement of his political career. 5
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circumstances it was possible to offer the Nabataeans an outlet to the Mediterranean and Antipatros must have made handsome profits from his services in this matter, a fact which can throw additional light on his friend ship and close ties with the Nabataeans. However, it appears the Nabataeans did not for long accept their new political status as permanent and sought the first opportunity to try and rid themselves of Roman patronage . This apparently came to them in the stormy days of 56—55 BCE when Gabinius, the governor of Syria, was busy in Judaea putting down the revolts under the leadership of Judas Aris tobulus II and his son Alexander, immediately following which he set out on his march to Egypt, where he became submerged in the maze of politi cal problems of the Ptolemaic dynasty. However, in the spring of 55 BCE, when Gabinius was finally free of these occupations, just one successful military campaign against the Nabataeans was sufficient for him to bring them back into l i n e . It is unclear if this time too Antipatros offered his services as intermediary, but there is definite support for this possibility in the facts that Gabinius did not march on Petra itself and Antipatros in those same days sent his own family to the King of Petra for safety (War, I, 181;i4nr.,XIV, 122). In 49 BCE Judas Aristobulus II and his son Alexander fell victims on the altar of the Roman civil war between the rival camps of Julius Caesar on the one hand and Pompey on the other (50—48 BCE), or more precisely they were executed by the followers of Pompey (Ant., XIV, 124—126; War, I, 183—185). Under those circumstances Ptolemy son of Mennaeus the Ituraean took the children of Judas Aristobulus — the son Mattathias Antigonus and his two sisters — under his protection, having succeeded in separating them from their mother, who till then had taken temporary refuge in Ascalon. Furthermore, his own son Philippion even fell in love with Alexandra, one of the daughters of Judas Aristobulus II, and married her. Later on Ptolemy son of Mennaeus married her himself, having killed his son over her (in unknown circumstances) and after this he became even more devoted to her sister and brother . It is reasonable to assume that the friendship between the Ituraeans and this branch of Hasmonaeans also 217
218
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217 On Nabataean activity hostile to Rome during the governships of Marcus Phillipus ( 6 1 - 6 0 BCE) and Lentulus Marcelinus ( 5 9 - 5 8 BCE), see: Appian, Syriace, 51. 218 War, I 178; Ant., XIV 103. There is no indication who was then the Nabataean king; in any case; Hammond's view (The Nabataeans, p.19) that it was Aretas III is to be rejected completely. More probably it was Malichus I - cf. Schurer, I , p.580; Negev, ANRW, II, 8, p.542; Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p p . 3 5 - 3 7 . 219 Ant., XIV 126; War, I 1 8 5 - 1 8 6 . From information on this marriage, the conclusion does not necessarily arise that these Ituraean leaders had in fact converted to Judaism as Lurie believed (see note 206 above) and see also below. s
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deepened as a counterweight to the close friendship of Antipatros and John Hyrcanus II with the Nabataeans. These were typical alliances of interests, of two pairs of rivals vying with each other for supremacy in political and military strength. It is not impossible that the marital bonds between the Ituraean leaders and the Hasmonaean family reflect trends existing among the Ituraeans, of drawing closer to Judaism; back in the days of Judas Aristobulus I this had already brought many of them to con version. One way or another, the connections and marriage bonds between the family of Judas Aristobulus II and the Ituraean rulers correspond to what we know of such relations previously (cf. also Ant., XIV, 297). The civil war in Rome had far-reaching consequences for the entire region of Syria and Eretz-Israel. Thus for example the dependency of the Nabataeans on the Romans found practical expression in the despatch of auxiliary forces to help Pompey on the battlefield at Pharasalus (48 BCE). In 47 BCE however, when Julius Caesar got into his great difficulties in the so called "Alexandrian War", the Nabataeans already found themselves rendering aid to their enemy of yesterday. The initiative for providing this aid came from Antipatros and John Hyrcanus II, who recruited 3 0 0 0 soldiers including many Jews, as well as troops from "the chiefs of Arabia", "rulers of Syria" and "almost all the c i t i e s " . Though Josephus did not specify who "the chiefs of Arabia" were, he probably referred first of all to Malichus I the Nabataean, about whose aid to Julius Caesar we also know from the most official source for that war, "The Alexandrian War" . The remaining "chiefs of Arabia" and "rulers of Syria" were probably Arab princes and heads of tribes, two of whom mentioned by Josephus were the Ituraeans, Iamblichus and Ptolemy son of Soaemus, about whose precise identity we known only very l i t t l e . It 220
221
222
220 Ant., XIV 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 ; War, I 1 8 7 - 1 8 8 ; cf. also Ant., XIV 139. Later, the letter of rights from Julius Caesar (Ant., XIV 193) stated that in the Alexandrian War 1500 Jewish soldiers took part, while Ant., XVI 52, gave their number as 2000. In view of these numerical inconsistencies, it may be assumed the figure of 3000 referred to all the force recruited by the rulers of Arabia and Syria. 221 See Bell, Alex. 1 , 1 . Worth mention in this context is that the Ituraeans won great fame for themselves as excellent archers - e.g. see Strabo, XVI 2, 18; Caesar, African War, 20; Virgil, Georgica 2, 448; Lucanus, Pharsalia 7, 230, 514. 222 See Marcus, Josephus, VII, p p . 5 1 6 - 5 1 7 , note b.; against this cf. Abel, Histoire, I, p. 309. The name Iamblicus (='Idju/3Xixo?) is a synonym for Malichus (=Ma\i'xo?) or Malchus (=Md\x«?) e.g. see: Ant., XIII 131; XIV 370. Cf. also to the name Imalchu (='lna.\K.ove) in I Mace, 11:39 and see: Schiirer I , p. 183, note 25. Altheim-Stiehl believe this Iamblicus is Iamblicus I the Ituraean ruler of the Emesa principality (see: Altheim-Stiehl, index of names). On Ptolemy son of Soaemus, on the other hand, Josephus writes he was an inhabitant of Mount Lebanon (Ant., XIV 129). At a later date he was apparently a rival of Ptolemy son of Mennaeus. Around the year 38 BCE Herod recruited 800 mercenaries on Mount Lebanon and there is sense in the belief that these came from the same circles (Ant., XIV 452; War, I 329). It seems the above two Ituraean rulers refused to accept the rule of Ptolemy son of Mennaeus and the hegemony of the Chalcis s
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is very probable that these two were allies and intimates of the Ituraean dynasty of rulers of Emesa, north of the Valley of Lebanon. They did not acknowledge the authority of Ptolemy son of Mennaeus, the energetic ruler of Chalcis; due to internal rivalries they must have formed ties with the Nabataeans and Antipatros the Idumaen, otherwise the latter would not have succeeded in recruiting them for the task of extricating Julius Caesar. As for the "cities" which joined the supporting forces in that war, their identify is hard to determine, but there are grounds to believe it was mainly those maintaining good relations with the Nabataeans and Antipa tros, such as the cities of the Decapolis in Transjordan, Gaza and As calon . 223
The appointment of Antipatros as Procurator of Judaea in 47 BCE, as a reward for his aid to Julius Caesar, increased his dependency on Rome and hence, also in the eyes of the Nabataeans, he became the unquestioned representative of Roman interests. This fact was to become one of the major reasons for the friction which, as described below, at a later date developed between them and the House of Antipatros. In 4 4 BCE Antipators still enjoyed the bonds of friendship and marriage with the Nabataean nobility and the royal court at Petra; this was proved by the failure of the plot concocted by his rival Malichus, an Idumaean notable and one of the more important army commanders in the service of John Hyrcanus II, who intended to remove him from his position of power (Ant., XIV, 2 7 7 279: War, I, 2 2 3 - 2 2 4 ) . Antipatros' distress in this case was grave enough to force him to make use of an "army of Arabs" from Transjordan (ap parently an auxiliary Nabataean unit on loan) and improvised militias recruited from among the "natives" (arpaTdv eyx^ptop) whose identity is hard to determine. As against this, Mattathias Antigonus in 42 BCE found faithful protec tion and close military and political cooperation from his Ituraean brother-
principality; they therefore maintained ties (at least temporarily) with forces such as the Naba taeans and Jews outside Mount Lebanon, all according to the circumstances and needs. Inner divisions among the Ituraeans was therefore very like that which divided the Hasmonaean king dom, even more since they too sought external allies to assist them in their internal struggle. The Nabataeans were then one of the factors who responded to the political wooing of one of the sides. On the great respect of the Romans for the Ituraeans' military capabilities, which found practical expression in the recruitment of units of auxiliaries from among them, see: Schottroff, ZDPV, XCVIIK1982), pp.l46ff. 223 The friendship of Gaza and Ascalon with Antipatros will be discussed in my forthcoming mono graph - Jews and the Hellenistic Gties. The friendship of the Decapolis cities with the House of Antipatros may be explained by Herod's appointment by Sextus Caesar in the year 46 BCE, to the post of strategos of Coele-Syria. It will be remembered that Ascalon served as a base for the forces headed by Mithridates of Pergamum and Antipatros, who set out to rescue Julius Caesar from the entanglements of his "Alex andrian War" - see: Ant., XIV 128, 139; War, I 187.
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in-law Ptolemy son of Mennaeus, as well as from Marion, the tyrant of T y r e . Furthermore, he also succeeded in gaining access to the Roman governor of Damascus, by one of the means which were most persuasive for the majority of Roman legates - a bribe . Expectations of a big Parth ian attack on the Roman Empire from the North seemed to have raised hopes that the end of Roman rule in the area was imminent; in fact, when the Parthians crossed the Euphrates River two years later (40 BCE) and successfully invaded Syria, it looked as if these hopes were to be realized . The Parthian prince Pacorus who headed tht^nvading force came to the aid of Mattathias Antigonus and helped him in the conquest of Judaea and Jerusalem . In granting this aid, Pacorus no doubt was guided by his own political and military considerations: if he wanted to rule in Syria for any length of time, he would have to think about allies from the South, to make the blocking of a possible counter-attack from the Egyptian border easier for him. Mattathias Antigonus the Hasmonaean and his partners the Ituraeans could definitely be the answer to this need; their political price was after all cheap enough: recognition of their soverignty. It is impossible to exclude the thought that the Parthians' aid in the reestablishment of the Hasmonaean kingdom was also guided by 'Jewish' considerations. Let us not forget that within the borders of their kingdom was the greatest concentration of the Jewish people and it is hard to as sume that it had no influence in this matter. Suffice it to mention the wish and desire to renew the living ties between Babylonia and Jerusalem, as 224
225
226
227
224 These rulers enjoyed the benefit of the anarchy in the Roman Empire, due to the civil war which erupted after the death of Julius Caesar. It seems that in return for a bribe Cassius, the ruler of Syria in those days, gave them support - cf. Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, I, p.1003. 225 There are quite a number of differences between the two versions of Josephus in this affair (War, I 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 and Ant., XIV 2 9 7 - 2 9 9 ) , but it seems the latter is more accurate and complete. It should be noted that Mattathias Antigonus also gathered an army, except that nothing was said of its size - see: War, I 250tT; Ant., XIV 334ff; Kasher, The Great Jewish Revolt, p.26. 226 On the atmosphere of hatred for Rome prevailing in those days in the East, see: Schalit, King Herod, p.47 and note 72. See also note 232 below. 227 Under those circumstances Mattathias Antigonus was pronounced king of Judaea and thereby upheld the continuity of royal rule by the Hasmonaean family. The testimony that Pacorus was induced to help him in return for a bribe of 1000 talents and 500 concubines (Ant., XIV 330, 343, 379; cf.: War, I 248, 257) in our eyes is suspect of propagandist anti-Hasmonaean bias of the source on which Josephus relied (most probably Nicolaus of Damascus). As explained direct ly below, it is far more probable to think that Pacorus was guided by political considerations and interests. To be added in this connection is that Josephus called the Parthians "barbarians" (Ant., XIV 3431, 343, 347; War, I 255, 257, 261, 264, 268, 274), indicating the hostile charac ter and approach of his source to the whole affair. The fact that the same evidence uses the term "enemies" in referring to the Parthians as well as to the Jewish followers of Mattathias Antigonus (Ant., XIV 335, 337, 339, 342, 349, 352, 3 5 6 - 3 5 7 ; War, I 253) speaks for itself and indicates an expressly Herodian (and Roman) point of view.
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these had existed in the days of the Hasmonaean monarchy. If we consider that serving in the Parthian army there were probably also Jewish soldiers from Babylonia, who we know had quite a splendid military tradition, we may also understand that this could have been an additional reason, in fluencing the Parthians to give aid to Mattathias Antigonus . It can well be imagined that the joint appearance of the men of Pacorus and of Mat tathias Antigonus in the streets of Jerusalem was received with nostalgic spiritual elation which recalled the days of his grandfather King Alexander Jannaeus, whose court was visited at times by political emissaries of his Parthian allies . Phasael and Herod, the Idumaean brothers and principal rivals of Mat tathias Antigonus, could not withstand the flood of attacking forces headed by Pacorus and the new Hasmonaean king. It seems that Phasael paid no heed to the warnings of Saramalla (Sapa/idXXa) , the richest man in Syria at that time; he consequently fell into captivity of the Parth ians and at a later date even paid for this with his life. Herod on the other hand succeeded in escaping and set out for Petra (Ant., XIV, 3 6 3 , 370), 228
229
230
228 Cf. Kasher, Cathedra, XI(1979), p.55, note 38. 229 See: Efron, Studies of the Hasmonaean Period, p. 134. On a possible political pact, already formed in the days of John Hyrcanus I, see: Pucci, Zion, XLVI(1981), p p . 3 3 3 - 3 3 8 . If so the tradition of ties between the Parthians and the Hasmonaeans had an even richer past. 230 War, I 259; Ant., XV 19) with which Herod later entrusted him show his international connec tions. The man was probably a rich merchant and shipowner (Ant., XIV 345) who profited from trade connections between East and West. Klausner (History of the Second Temple, 3, p.245) supposed he was a Jew in origin, and that his name was just the Greek transcript of the Hebrew title Sarha-Ma'ala (TibJ7?anHe was possibly influenced in this interpretation by the fact that the man's name was given in the book of Josippon as n ^ a i t t f - see Josippon, (ed. Flusser), p.184, line 34, or perhaps rather from the opinion of Gratz (I, 3, p.192) who described the man as "a rich Jew from Antioch", even though there is nothing to support this opinion. My thanks are due to R. Wilk who drew my attention to these details. Schalit (King Herod, p.367, note 82) disagreed with this and claimed his other title - "the richest Syrian at that time" (War, I 259) - does not conform with his being Jewish; cf. also Schalit, Konig Herodes, p p . 6 8 7 - 6 8 9 ; it is worth noting what was written long time ago by Krauss REJ, XLV(1902), p p . 3 4 - 3 5 . Schalit therefore proposes to identify him as a rich Nabataean who supported Roman hegemony in the region and opposed the Parthian invasion. Though it is hard to reconcile this suggestion with the information on the man's connections with the Parthians (above), there is nevertheless some logic in his identification as an Arab, whose original name might have been 'Saramalla' with Alia as one of its components. Thus for example thought Lurie (Jews in Syria, p.44) except that one has to reject his idea that this man was a convert, since there is no support for this in the sources. We should therefore accept Schalit's opinion with but one reservation: that the man is not to be identified as a Nabataean, since he could also have been a shrewd Palmyran merchant, who was involved not only in international trade but also at times sold services of intermediary and information. Recently his having been an Arab became clear beyond any doubt, as may be deduced from his name known in the pre-Muslim Arab onomasticon, whose transcrip is Srm'l, see: Harding, Index and Concordance etc., p.371. It appears that the first component of this name (S-r-m) is well-known in various Arab dialects; if that is so, there are no more doubts on his having been an Arab. My thanks are due to my colleague Dr. Ran Zadok who cleared up this problem for me.
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where he hoped to find help from loyal allies, especially since he believed he would be able to raise money there — that which Nabataean nobles owed his father and some as a loan - in order to redeem his brother Phasael from Parthian captivity. However, the Nabataean King Malichus I was in a state of great consternation, the Parthian invasion with its startl ing impetus on the one hand and the Roman civil war on the other having upset all his plans. It appears that he was not the only king in the region vacillating in the fact of these dramatic events, who had turned their backs on the Romans and in submission (at times even willingly) welcomed the Parthian invader. This was also the course of action chosen by Antiochus I Theos of Comagene, Ptolemy son of Mennaeus and his son Lysanias from Ituraean Chalcis, Artavasdes II from Armenia and o t h e r s . Advice from the Arab tribal chiefs at his court, who at the same time also wanted to renounce their financial debts to Herod's father Antipatros, in addition to the direct Parthian threat against him if he should offer any form of help to Herod, deterred the Nabataean King Malichus; he therefore ordered Herod to go back whence he came, else he would have to expel him (War, I, 2 7 4 - 2 7 7 ; Ant., XIV, 3 7 0 - 3 7 3 ) . It is quite possible that Malichus at this opportunity even wanted to free himself of his political dependence on Rome, the first small step in this direction of course being his act of renouncing Herod, the Romans' devoted ally and protege. In time, this mistake was to cost Malichus very dearly, in spite of his immedi ate repentance . In this connection it should be mentioned that from a Roman aspect Malichus was considered a collaborator with the Parthian enemy, just like Mattathias Antigonus himself, a fact which is also con firmed in records (Cassius Dip, XLVIII, 41, 5 ) . 231
232
233
Herod in his great political wisdom — and also for lack of choice — turned his face to Rome in order to obtain help and to participate in plans
231 Bowersock (Roman Arabia, p.39) wanted to argue that Herod demanded of the Nabataeans the return of the areas which Antipatros his father had surrendered to them at the start of his career, at the time of the war between the Hasmonaean brothers Judas Aristobulus II and John Hyrcanus II. There is however no support in the writings of Josephus for this opinion of his, and what is more, one of the quotations brought by Bowersock in note 40 (ibid.) is faulty. On reading his words, the impression is obtained that he requires this argument in his burning desire to show the Nabataeans in as favorable a light as possible and cover up their treachery towards Herod the Romans' favorite. 232 See details: Schiirer, I , p p . 5 6 4 - 5 6 5 ; Sullivan, ANRW, II 8, pp.209, 766ff.; Sartre, REA, LXXXI (1979), p.47; see also Debevoise,^ Political History ofParthia, p p . 1 0 8 - 1 2 0 . 233 Ant., XIV 375; War, I 278. When Herod's brother Joseph heard that Malichus had changed his mind, he too thought of fleeing to Petra with all the fugitives of Masada whom he was appointed to guard (Ant., XIV 390; War, I 286). Incidentally, Masada which then served as a place of refuge for those close to Herod from Mattathias Antigonus (cf.; Ant., XIV 361), eventually was due to be rebuilt as an important stronghold in his strategic array against the Nabataeans (War, VII 172). s
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to reconstruct Roman hegemony in the region . Only in this way could he hope for real achievements, and in fact history proved that he was not wrong. Herod's crowning by the Romans in 4 0 BCE opened a new chapter, not only in the history of the Jewish people but also in the history of rela tions of the Jewish community in Eretz-Israel with its neighbors, first and foremost with the Nabataeans to the East.
Chapter 4
Reign of the Herodian Dynasty
King Herod ( 4 0 - 4 BCE) Before we review and analyse the Jews' relations with their Arab neigh bors in King Herod's reign, we should first consider what is known of this king's foreign, non-Jewish origins, which it seems also had indirect im plications on the subject of our s t u d y . In 3 9 - 3 7 BCE, with his political fate hanging in the balance, Mattathias Antigonus the last Hasmonaean king tried to persuade the Roman commander Silo to decide in his favor, and for that purpose he offered an important and interesting argument. According to Josephus Ant, XIV 403ff), amongst other things he then said it would be not in ac cordance with the Roman's own justice if they gave the throne to Herod who is a commoner and an Idumaean, that is a "half-Jew", and that follow ing their own established custom they must give it to one of the royal family . However, there arises the question, whether from the halakhic aspect there were any grounds for regarding Herod as a "half-Jew"? In replying to this, some scholars refer to the tradition of the Mishnan (Yeba moth VIII, 3) which states: 1
2
"An Egyptian and Edomite, whether males or females are forbidden only for three generations",
and accordingly argue that Herod was a full Jew, since he was the third generation from conversion on his father's side . In fact this concept is correct only on condition that the reservation "up to three generations" applies up to the third generation and not to the end of the third generation. There is no doubt that the Mishnah in this matter refers to the passage in Deut., 23:9 which states: 3
"The children that are begotten to them (i.e. the Edomites and the Egyptians) shall enter into the congregation of the Lord in their third generation",
1 For an introduction to this discussion see p p . 7 1 - 7 2 above. 2 This argument is itself also supported by Ant., XIV 3 8 6 - 3 8 7 , 4 8 9 - 4 9 1 ; XV 63; and cf. also XV 164, 168, 209, 220, 263, 374. As for the expression "half-Jew", see p p . 7 6 - 7 7 above. 3 See: Ben-Shalom, Dissertation, pp.49-51 (note 20) with complementary details.
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and the literal reading of the Bible leaves the impression there was no blem ish on Herod's Jewishness. For us it is of course important to know wheth er the Mishnah did not deprive this passage of its literal meaning and determined "up to [and including] the third generation." We think the answer is negative, for otherwise the Mishnah would not have repeated the reference to the Bible passage. In addition, a comparative examination of the usage in the Mishnah of the word 7 y (= up to) in connection with a number gives quite reasonable grounds to believe that the expression "up to three generations" should be interpreted as a limitation of time giving the relevant point in time and not "up to [and including] three genera tions ". If the Mishnah had stated "till after the passing of three genera tions", there really would have been a flaw in Herod's Jewishness and there would have been grounds for considering him "a half-Jew", this expression having religious meaning and no other . It is however also important to clarify to what degree the fact of his birth of a Nabataean mother presented an obstacle for Herod. Though that Mishnah passage states in addition that the prohibition is said on males and females alike, it continues explicitly that 'Rabbi Shimeon per mits females at once', indicating that the reservation 'up to three gen erations' presented no obstacles for Herod on his mother's side - if we assume that she did in fact convert at the time of her marriage to Anti patros . At first sight we could argue that Rabbi Shimeon (bar-Yohai) belonged to a later period, but the Mishnah takes pain to point out clearly, from the mouth of Rabbi Shimeon himself, that this ruling was not his own (i.e. he had not arrived at it 'by inference from minor to major'), but had been passed down to him from earlier times by his teachers. In conclusion, 4
5
6
4 Cf. for example M. Bikkurim, I 5, and see the great number of examples in the Otzar Leshon Hatanna'im, (by Kosovsky) and see also: Aruch Completion (by Kohut), VI, p.170. My thanks are due to my friend Prof. Abraham Tal who clarified this problem for me. 5 In contradiction to the above and to p p . 7 6 - 7 7 above, Smallwood (Jews Under Roman Rule, p. 19), believed the Idumaeans were for a long time still considered as foreigners in their ethnic origin or "by [theirj race" and as 'dubious Jews', but she did not support her opinion from any source whatever. We think there are no grounds for this approach, especially in view of the Sages' attitude to Agrippa I, as expressed in the affectionate phrase "for you are our brother", points to a conclusion differing from Smalfwood's. Agrippa I was judged by the Sages for his deeds and not his Idumaean or Hasmonaean origin. 6 Though Josephus says nothing of this, there is no doubt about it. If things had been otherwise, it would surely have come through and found expression in Josephus' writings. His complete silence on this demands an explanation; Josephus after all did not refrain from attacking any attempt to embellish Herod's genealogy (Ant., XIV 8 - 9 ) . The fact that Cypros and Antipatros had given two of their children Hebrew names - Joseph and Salome - can also reinforce the impression that at her husband Antipatros' command Cypros had in fact accepted the Jewish faith.
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from a formal aspect there appears to have been no blemish on Herod's Jewishness. In view of this it may be deduced that the negative attitude of our Sages to this king formed mainly on the grounds of his acts, which were 'foreign' to the spirit of Israel and the Torah; this led to the antagonism towards him and his descendants after him. The tradition in the Mishnah Sotah VII, 8, praising King Agrippa for his behavior on the occasion of the Torah reading at the end of the first day of the Feast of Tabernacles, faithfully reflects the negative and rejective attitude of the Sages to the House of Herod. Not for nothing did the passage relate of Agrippa that tears flowed from his eyes when he reached the phrase 7
"You may indeed set a king over you whom the Lord your God will choose. One from among your brethren you shall set as king over you; you may not put a foreigner over you who is not your brother" (Deut., 17:15).
We accept Ben-Shalom's opinion, that this mishnaic tradition proves the negative attitude to Herod's reign was very widespread and accepted, furthermore the Sages at quite an early date had rejected, his kingship (on the grounds of his foreign origin), so that during the reign of Agrippa I this was already public knowledge. It is moreover reasonable to believe the halakhic problems arising from the above biblical passage, forbidding the appointement of a man of foreign origin to any public office "until his mother becomes one of Israel", originate in a tradition which began to form from the days of Herod or soon after them . There is also grounds for believing that the commandments given in the Temple Scroll — 8
"you shall not put a foreigner over you, who is not your brother" (LVI, 15); "and he shall not go out until he comes before the High Priest" (LVIII, 18)
- reflect realistic conditions from the end of the Second Temple period and are appropriate for the time following Herod's reign . If this opinion is correct, we have additional confirmation of the fact that it was Herod's rule which gave the impetus for formulating the rules 9
7 Scholars differ on the identity of the Agrippa mentioned here, whether I or II - see: Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshutah, VIII, Nashim, p . 6 8 3 Schurer, I , p.447, note 27; Jeremias, Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus, p p . 3 3 3 - 3 3 4 , n n . 8 6 - 8 8 . We think Agrippa I preferable. 8 See note 2 above. Schiffman thought Agrippa I could not have been considered a Jew since his mother Berenice was not a Jewess (being the daughter of Costobar and Herod's sister Salome, whose own Jewish status was in doubt because of the Nabataean mother Cypros) - see: Schiff man, Judaism, XXXIV (1985), p p . 7 9 - 8 0 . 9 Wilk, The Kingdom in the Temple Scroll etc., p p . 1 1 - 1 3 . Wilk interprets the passage O'ttf D DU? ~]bl2 HO ' b J? (Temple Scroll, LVI, 14), compared with -\bn "J O'tPJl D (as in Deut., 17:15), as a hint at opposition to Herod's kingship and therefore it should (in his opinion) be read 'OJ27 and not Dttf'. Furthermore, Wilk believes the commandment concerning separa tion of the High Priest's authority from that of the king (not a queen), as given in the Temple Scroll (LVIII, 18), apparently hints at an historic situation which had arisen with Herod. s
;
1
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to disqualify a foreigner for public office in general and kingship in particu lar. Worth mentioning in this connection is the fact that Josephus himself was also aware that Herod consciously ignored the laws of Israel and ad hered openly and even demonstratively to the laws of gentiles and to their idolatrous customs . It was in fact this behavior, not his father's origins which determined the relations to him as a foreigner. King Agrippa I on the other hand persevered in his efforts to win the affection of the Jewish people and took care knowingly, even meticulously, to meet all the obliga tions of the Jewish religion . No wonder therefore that the tradition of the Mishnah showed a positive attitude towards him, which was certainly based on his deeds and behavior. Reservations about Herod were not the outcome of discrimination or reservations of principle against converts in general: these very often enjoyed great affection of the Sages though there were some of the latter who treated them with suspicion and caution, at times not even free of fear lest they return to their evil ways (that is their gentile w a y s ) . Herod's ways and habits no doubt provided enough grounds for the suspicious and negative attitude towards him, so much so that he was considered a "foreign king", to whom the passage in Deutero nomy (17:15) must be applied. As we know, Christian traditions of a relatively late date (Fathers of the Church) also tried to find fault with Herod's foreign origin, making him 10
11
12
13
10 See for example: Ant., XIV 168, 1 7 3 - 1 7 4 , 388; XV 4 0 - 4 1 , 2 6 7 - 2 8 3 , 296, 3 2 8 - 3 3 0 , 339, 341, 3 6 3 - 3 6 4 , 3 6 8 - 3 7 2 ; XVI 1 - 5 , 1 3 7 - 1 4 0 , 1 5 0 - 1 5 9 ; XVII 1 4 9 - 1 5 4 (cf. War, I 6 4 8 - 6 5 5 ) , 1 5 8 159, 168; XVIII 329 etc. 11 Ant., XVIII 2 9 3 - 3 3 4 , and see: Kasher, The Great Jewish Revolt, p p . 6 4 - 6 6 . 12 Shemayah and Abtalion for example are by tradition considered descendants of converts from the Assyrian King Sennacherib's offspring, and the following is related to them: "It happened with a high priest that as he came forth from the Sanctuary, all the people fol lowed him, but when they saw Shemayah and Abtalion, they forsook him and went after Shemayah and Abtalion. Eventually Shemayah and Abtalion visited him to take their leave of the high priest. He said to them: May the descendants of the heathen come in peace. They answered him: May the descendants of the heathen, who do the work of Aaron, arrive in peace, but the descendants of Aaron who does not do the work of Aaron, he shall not come in peace". (B. Yoma, 71b). Yet despite the High Priest's haughty behavior, the two enjoyed the affection of the whole na tion. In his monograph on proselytism Bamberger frequently stressed the Sages' positive and ardent attitude to conversion and their love for converts - see: Bamberger, Proselytism in the Talmud Period, passim; but cf. Urbach, The Sagese, their Concepts and Beliefs, p.480ff. and see note 13 below. 13 See: Alon, Studies in the History of Israel, II, p.278ff who relies among others on Josephus (Against Apion, II 23) on this matter. Urabch rightly states that the Sages' attitudes on the sub ject of converts is not uniform and they are not to be classified, so as to distinguish between those with liberal-universal tendencies who opposed conversion and spoke adversely of converts (The Sages etc., p.488). It is more correct to believe that the character of the gentiles they had encountered and what they had experienced at the hands of those pagans who came closer to Judaism and read the Bible also determined the reaction of the Sgaes (ibid., p.482).
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the descendant of a 'temple slave' (LepoSovXoq) from Ascalon. As related by Julius Africanus (in Eusebius, Hist. Eccles., I, 6, 2 - 3 ; ibid, 7, 11), Herod's father Antipatros was the son of someone called Herod from Asca lon. In his childhood the latter had been taken captive by Idumaean robbers who raided Ascalon and its temples; since his poor father could not pay the ransom he remained in their power and therefore grew up with them, was taught by their customs and became an Idumaean . Schalit tried to find the origin of this tradition among supporters of the Hasmonaeans, arguing that it sprang from political motives, designed to besmirch Herod and represent him not only as the descendant of an Idumaean convert but also a contemptible inhabitant of Ascalon, i.e. "a temple slave" from Ascalon who engaged in ritual prostitution. According to Schalit, Jewish popular tradition in this context also interpreted the name of the city of Ascalon as originated from the Hebrew expression p*?p-uPN (= man of shame, i.e. a man engaged in prostitution of idolatry), and according to him it was accepted as long as Herod's descendants were active on the po litical scene. Only after these descended from the stage of history was this tradition in his words 'forgotten among the Jews', but it did not disappear completely, for the Christians borrowed it for their own theological pur poses . We find it more likely however that this tradition was nothing but a late Christian fabrication and the attempt to place it in Jewish circles among followers of the Hasmonaeans seems a mere speculation . 14
15
16
After deviating somewhat from the chronological route of our investiga tion in order to examine Herod's Idumaean and Arab origins, and after concluding that the reserved attitude of the Jewish people towards him (so much that he was considered "a foreign king") arose out of his "foreign" behavior and actions (and not because o f his Idumaean and Arab origins), we shall again unroll the historic tapestry of his relations with the nations of the frontier and the desert, led by the Nabataeans. The story of his relations with this Arab nation was marked from the outset by tension and war, indicating that in this case he enjoyed no ancestral rights, neither from his Idumaean grandfather nor from his Nabataean mother. The historical information of Herod's relations with the Nabataeans is drawn predominantly from the writings of Josephus Flavius, which in turn are based as we know on the descriptions of Nicolaus of Damascus, historian of the Herodian royal court. This basic fact indicates that the
14 See Schalit, King Herod, p.346 (note 17) with a list of the other sources in Christian tradition; see also Smallwood, Jews under Roman Rule, p p . 1 9 - 2 0 (note 50). 15 See extensively: Schalit, Proceedings of 3rd World Congress for Jewish Studies, 1965, p p . 2 3 4 236; idem, Ha-Umah, IV (1963), p p . 2 7 9 - 2 9 8 . 16 See for example: Klausner, History of the Second Temple, 3, p p . 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 ; and cf.: Smallwood, loc.cit.
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history which emerges from the writings of Josephus is mostly Herodian history in its nature; it can and must therefore be regarded as biased his tory, whose purpose is to praise and exalt King Herod, and as far as possible to conceal his omissions and failures in an apologetic and involute manner. It appears however that the praise and glorification in the writings of Josephus do not simply confine themselves to describing Herod's valor and presenting him as an extremely resourceful military commander and charis matic leader. From the following discussion it will become clear that the main objective of this tendentious history was political and that it was intended to present Herod as "an allied king and friend of the Roman people" (Rex socius et amicus populi Romani) in every fibre of his body, a king who obediently and precisely carried out the instructions of his Roman masters. We think there was here a sophisticated attempt to hide the truth and our discussion will throw new light on the whole episode . Immediately after Herod's success in obtaining the throne of Judaea from the Romans (40 BCE) he hurried home (38 BCE) and began a great offensive to establish his rule. Treatment of the ungrateful Nabataeans was left to the Romans, for in those days Herod himself had far more dangerous enemies whom he had to fight. The first payment was exacted from Malichus I with the help of Ventidius Bassus, commander of Mark Antony's army, conducting the great Roman counter-attack against the Parthians in 39 BCE. To finance this campaign Ventidius Bassus (among other things) imposed a heavy fine on the Nabataean king Malichus I (Cassius Dio, XLVIII, 4 1 , 5) and on the Parthians' Ituraean allies (Appian, Civil War II, 7, 31). As we shall see later, the second payment exacted from the Nabataeans was part of the political arrangements made by Anthony after 36 BCE. Compared with the bitter and violent fate of the Ituraeans, whose king Lysanias (heir to Ptolemy son of Mennaeus) was executed and their coun try given as a present to Cleopatra VII Queen of Egypt, the Nabataean got off lightly, for in 34 BCE they lost only portions of their land to the Egyptian queen (Ant., XV 92, 94, 9 6 ; War, I 3 6 0 - 3 6 1 ) . Cleopatra in fact strove to restore the Ptolemaic kingdom to its imperial dimensions, 17
1 8
17 My thanks are due to my colleague Prof. Mattityahu Mine, who first told me of this idea and led me to investigate it. He had already toyed with this idea many years ago, when being a student of Prof. Schalit at the Hebrew University; since then it had been filed away and forgotten. 18 Cf.: Plutarch, Anthony, 36, 2; Cassius Dio, XLIX, 32, 5. See in detail: Otto, p p . 4 3 - 4 S ; Schiirer, I , p.565 and 2 8 7 - 2 8 9 (particularly note 5); Schalit, King Herod, appendix 6, p p . 5 1 2 - 5 1 ; Schalit, Konig Herodes, pp.772-777'. On the location of the Nabataean and Ituraean areas which Cleopatra received, see below, p.l43f. See also Starcky, Dictionnaire, col. 910; Dar, Hermon and its Foothills, p p . 1 4 5 - 1 4 6 . Unfortunately however, it is impossible to draw a line between the zones of Nabataean and Ituraean influence, since all the sources speak in a general and indefinite way of the 'Arab' region in northern Transjordan: Auranitis, Trachonitis and Batanaea (cf. s
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as in its glory in the 3rd century BCE. For that reason she wished to get rid of the local rulers in Eretz-Israel including Herod (Ant., XV 77, 92; War, I 440). The stand Lysanias and Malichus I took during the Parthian invasion only presented her with an effective political weapon for carrying out her scheme and it appears that Herod was aware of this danger from the start. According to Josephus (War, VII 300—303), one of the main reasons for the fortification of Masada was the danger threatening Herod from Cleo patra, more severe in his eyes than the danger of being deposed by the masses of the Jewish people in order to restore the Hasmonaean dynasty to the throne in his place. In that context Josephus repeatedly stresses that Cleopatra never concealed her hostile intentions towards Herod and was in the habit of talking extensively about them with her patron An thony, trying to persuade him to execute Herod and give her his kingdom. Josephus in conclusion argues that it was miraculous that Antony had not given in to her pleading. Even if we argue that this description is apologetic and full of tenden tious exaggeration, we cannot escape the basic truth contained therein — Herod was exposed to tangible danger from Cleopatra. According to Josephus he was very much aware of it; worth noting in this connection is the statement that because of these fears Herod fortified Masada (loc. cit.). How great his fears were may be judged by the enormous physical resources and engineering efforts which he devoted to the place, showing that he was not planning to prepare just a temporary refuge till danger had passed, but a permanent place of shelter, able to serve him for an extensive period and as far as possible in royal style. By his pragmatic policies in the end Antony succeeded at least temporarily in restraining Cleopatra's ambitions, forcing her to be satisfied with only a limited few territorial prizes. In those days, uncertainty over his political future was we believe one of the most important factors shaping Herod's policies and determining his acts. For this reason it is important to discover how he viewed the steps taken and policies followed by Antony, what he thought of his chances under those circumstances, what were the implications of Antony and Cleopatra's policies on his own relations with the neighboring nations and, in the circumstances then existing, what room he had for political manoeuvering. The answers to these questions can undoubtedly illuminate Herod's behavior and his policies in the fateful days of the Battle of Actium, in-
Ant., XV 96). Unlike Lysanias who was executed, Malichus I was apparently saved from death beacuse in contrast to Lysanias he had not actively aided the Parthians, but nevertheless he was in real danger (War, I 440).
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eluding his complex relations with the Nabataeans - particularly since it will become clear that there was a connection between them. The political declarations by Antony in Alexandria in 34 BCE must have been a most serious 'red light' of warning for Herod, chiefly because Antony thereby clearly showed he intended to join his political fortunes with Cleopatra's. In a festive ceremony before the whole people, the Egyp tian queen with her son Caesarion (her son by Julius Caesar) was declared Queen of Egypt, Cyprus and Coele-Syria. Her sons by Antony were then also declared kings: Alexandros the King of Armenia, Media and Parthia (when conquered) and Ptolemy King of Phoenicia, Syria and Cilicia (Plu tarch, Antony, 54). The seriousness of this declaration in Herod's eyes could be gauged by the fact that Antony had not yet ceased to represent the official interests of the Roman Empire as a whole. These facts must of necessity have sharpened Herod's political instincts and increased his alert ness, to allow timely, appropriate and wise anticipation of any possible development in his fortunes. It is hard to imagine him unaware of Octavian's growing strength in the west of the Empire and Antony's military failure in the war against the Parthians. It may also be assumed he knew the opinions widely prevalent in Rome of the close ties between Anthony and Cleopatra which found expression in the declarations of Alexandria in 34 BCE: these were interpreted as an attempt to prepare the ground for parti tioning the Empire. In short, the events of 34 BCE in Alexandria made Antony suspect of providing growing support for Cleopatra's political aims, to a large degree also intended to serve his own personal plans. It will be readily understood that the Egyptian queen's ambitions and pretences represented a serious danger to Herod's very existence politically, as a king under Roman protection — at least in his own eyes: if the Ptole maic empire were restored as Cleopatra desired, it would certainly mean the end of all the local principalities in Eretz-Israel and Syria, as had hap pened to Lysanias the Ituraean. These would presumably be annexed as integral parts to the Ptolemaic kingdom, to be ruled in the best Ptolemaic tradition by officials appointed by the Alexandrian court. Roman.policy on the other hand maintained and even fostered local monarchies through out the Empire so as to make their own rule easier. Though it expressed one of the forms of dependency on Rome, to the local kings in their own realms the legal title — Rex socius et amicus populi Romani — still formally and practically preserved a large measure of sovereignty — economic, juridi cal, administrative and over internal security. By this method Rome avoided needless confrontation with the peoples and countries within the Empire and thus created the impression of maintaining dynastic continuity, re specting local traditions of rule and preserving permanent forms which would also continue in the future, on condition that the rules of political affiliation to Rome were observed.
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Having been made king by that very system, Herod could not remain indifferent to the significant changes taking place before his eyes with Antony's declaration of 34 BCE in Alexandria. In Antony's policies of those days, it is in fact already possible to find quite a strong echo of the existence of the two conflicting trends in the events shortly before his declaration in Alexandria. On the one hand, from Josephus (Ant., XV, 7 6 - 7 9 ) e learn that Antony remained faithful to Rome's political tradition in relation to the "allied kings and friends of the Roman people", but to the same degree his words bring a clear echo of significant erosion which had taken place in his attitude, finding expression in the concessions he made to Cleopatra (ibid., 88—95) . Under the new circumstances (ac cording to Herod) it was Octavian, not Antony who consistently main tained Roman political tradition mentioned above. It is therefore reason able to believe that already then Herod began to examine the possibility of a change in orientation, in the case of a possible confrontation between the two Roman personages. An operative decision on those lines could not of course be immediately implemented, since Antony was still the unchallenged ruler in the East, at least until his confrontation with Octavian in 31 BCE. The words of Josephus should not however be taken to imply that Herod had willingly and unquestioningly accepted Antony's policies as expressed in the declarations of Alexandria in 34 BCE. It shoud after all be remembered that important portions had been torn from his kingdom for Cleopatra and, apart from the considerable loss of income he suffered as a result, this clearly demonstrated his vulnerable status and the temporary nature of his reign, wholly dependent on Antony's whim. Though he had no choice but submissively to accept his masters' decisions, he could not possibly have been happy with the situation. Illustrating this are the explicit words Josephus put in his mouth, concerning his deep fear of injury to his king dom and its security (Ant., XV 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 ) . W
19
In view of all this it may reasonably be assumed that under those condi tions Herod had already weighed the option of turning his back on An tony and trying his luck in a part with Octavian, ensuring the stability and security of his throne in line with the traditional rules of Roman policy towards "allied kings and friends of the Roman people". He had of
19 The version in War, I 3 5 9 - 3 6 2 does not to an equal degree stress Antony's vaccillations between these two contradictory political trends; merely in a general manner, Josephus notes his enslave ment to Cleopatra, even though he was sufficiently alert to be aware that her demands actually bordered on the despicable. Later it will become evident that Herod had been exposed to addi tional dangers from Cleopatra: danger from within - due to Cleopatra's ties with his motherin-law, Alexandra the Hasmonaean on the one hand and her ties with Costobar the Idumaean on the other.
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course to act with the utmost caution and in a balanced and clear-sighted manner, to avoid losing everything through a false move. Later examination of his actions proves he did in fact walk a very thin line, endeavoring op posite Rome to preserve as low a political profile as possible, leaving himself in a position flexibly and smoothly to choose the course best for his own future and able to adapt to any possible development in the fortunes of the Roman empire. This policy is typical of a man in fear for his very survival and therefore involves not inappreciable elements of risk, even if they are concealed and outwardly disguised. As explained below, it was Herod's relations with the Nabataeans which gave him the room for manoeuver necessary for such a political gamble, together with the pos sibility of disguishing his real motives. His great opportunity came in 32 BCE, with growing political and mili tary tension between Antony and Octavian and their preparations for a contest on the battle field. Herod was almsot certainly aware of tendencies for desertion from Antony's camp to Octavian's, which did not exclude persons of greatest importance . Herod's hostility to Cleopatra can and must be explained more significantly against this background, more so since this was a weighty reason for making him too into a potential can didate for desertion. Openly turning his back on Antony at so early a stage however could be interpreted in his own eyes as a serious mistake and he believed would seem so even in the eyes of Octavian himself, for normally he would have been expected to be loyal to his master Antony, especially since any digression from this could be interpreted as derelic tion of his duties and was therefore liable in principle to disqualify him from reigning under Roman protection. Herod well realized the limitations of his status of "allied king and friend of the Roman people" and there fore when he met Octavian in Rhodes after Antony's defeat at Actium, he also took pains to stress his loyalty to Antony, as required by his status . It is important in this connection to stress that Rome had never officially declared war on Antony, but only on Cleopatra! Not in vain did Herod later make good use of this fact, enabling him to present himself on every occasion as the Egyptian queen's sworn enemy, one who had warned Antony against subservience to her interests . 20
21
22
20 See: Volkmann, Kleopatra, Politik und Propaganda, pp.158 —178. It is important to emphasize that even in Herod's close proximity there were such desertions, such as that of lamblichus I the Ituraean, ruler of Arethusa and Hammath (Emesa) - see: Altheim-Stiehl, p.365ff. 21 See: Ant., XV 1 8 8 - 1 9 3 ; War, I 3 8 6 - 3 9 2 . It appears that not only Herod's speech stressed the obligations arising out of his position as "allied king and friend of the Roman people", but also Octavian's own words. 22 Ant., XV 1 9 1 - 1 9 2 , War, I 3 9 0 - 3 9 1 . Cf. also: Ant., XV 88ft'; War, I 359ff. All the reports at tempt to demonstrate the great influence Cleopatra had on Antony. They were included in King Herod's memoirs {Ant., XV 174) and most probably were written from a later historic
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Overt treason against Antony at such an early stage would also have been illogical for the simple reason that there was no way of correctly predicting the outcome of the contest with Octavian. Under those circum stances the practical dilemma facing Herod was therefore difficult and serious: how to behave in the imminent Roman civil war, the fateful and inevitable conflict threatening the integrity and unity of the Empire as well as the fate of all nations dependent upon it? In such a confusing situation, how to choose his moves without excessive danger to himself, leaving room for political manoeuvering between the two rival Roman camps? How to further the defeat of Cleopatra and Antony without exposing the fact? Below we shall see it was his rivalry with the Nabataeans, which under those circumstances provided him with an excellent way out of his dif ficulty. It must be remembered he had a personal account to settle with the Nabataeans since 40 BCE, when they rebuffed him at the time of the Parthian invasion which made Mattathias Antigonus king. The political arrangements made by Antony in Eretz-Israel under Cleopatra's influence and in the spirit of the declarations of 34 BCE only added fuel to the fire of his disturbed relations with the Nabataens. We know it was Cleopatra who had forced him to lease the collection of taxes and revenue in the areas torn from the Nabataean kingdom, and that Malichus I did all he could to foil the collection of the tax, for the payment of which to Cleopatra Herod had pledged her his own property. Herod's enforcing payment of the tax on Malichus by the application of military force was legally acceptable, as a legitimate means which did not exceed the limited authority of "an allied king" who needed Roman consent for any military initiative. Herod had thus succeeded in placing himself in a situation where he was considered to have declared war on Malichus I, formally so as to further Cleopatra's interests and was thereby prevented from taking an active part in the battle of Actium at the side of his master Antony, as would have been expected from "an allied king" in his political position . In fact his war against the Nabataeans interfered even more with Anthony's efforts in the Roman civil war, for it also stopped any aid coming from Herod's rivals the Naba taeans. 23
Their reports from Cassius Dio (L, 6,5) and Plutarch (Antony, 56, 4 and see also below) demonstrates the mighty efforts of recruitment among the allied kings, rulers, tetrarchs, nations and citites in preparation for the
perspective, knowing the facts concerning Roman policy and the historic developments resulting from it. 23 Ant., XV 96, 106, 1 8 9 - 1 9 0 . On this matter the version in War, I 3 6 4 - 3 6 5 is very brief and does not reveal the process by which Herod was drawn into war with the Nabataeans, as may be learnt from the version in Ant.
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Battle of Actium. From Plutarch's evidence (Antony, 6 1 , 2) Herod was among the kings who sent Antony auxiliary forces but did not lead them in person; it appears that his rival Malichus I the Nabataean king did like wise (loc. cit.). If in fact we evaluate the assistance the two sent to Anthony as symbolic and merely intended to fulfill their political obligation, we will find no discrepancy between Plutarch's evidence and Josephus' silence on this. However, in complete contradiction to this, the evidence presented by Josephus seeks to create the impression that Herod did not assist Antony at the battle of Actium because he had got involved in war with the Naba taeans, not at his own instigation but due to Cleopatra's wiles. Following this evidence, the Egyptian queen hoped to profit from this war, for if Malichus had won she would have gathered the fruit of his victory and taken over Herod's kingdom and if the opposite had occurred, she would have been able to take over the Nabataean kingdom, for she had intended from the start to use the one to get rid of the other . Presenting matters in this way is quite sophisticated and in fact it is hard to evaluate whether it is correct or not, or more precisely, whether it repre sents the whole truth or only a part of it. It is not at all impossible that presenting matters in this way was a calculated attempt on the part of Herod's court historian, Nicolaus of Damascus, at tendentious historical rewriting after the event — a post factum attempt to obscure his master's calculated initiative of starting a war with the Nabataeans in order to weaken Antony and Cleopatra, while at the same time also serving as a convincing excuse to explain Herod's absence from Actium. Such historical rewriting could also throw additional mud at Cleopatra, the official enemy of Rome, whose base wiles were supposed to have involved Herod in an unnecessary war. However, the discrepancies in Josephus' evidence are transparent enough: in Ant., XV 108 he states that from the start Herod had intended to go to war against Malichus and that the contest at Actium had only served him as an excuse for postponing that war. In War., I 388 and Ant., XV 189 there is the completely contradictory story, giving the impression that Herod was about to assist Antony at the battle of Actium, except that he was prevented from doing so because "he had been distracted therefrom by the Arabs". In Ant., XV 110 Josephus again presents a different stand, according to which it was Antony (at Cleopatra's request) who ordered Herod to go to was against the Nabataeans. This of course gives cause to wonder, since it is after all hard to reconcile Herod's initiative on the one hand with Antony's command on the other. 24
24 War, I 365; Ant., XV 110.
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Chronological reconstruction of the sequence of events which led Herod to set out to fight the Nabataeans, could cast additional light on the whole affair and reinforce the conclusion concerning his calculated initiative to "get involved" in it. The practical preparations for the military confronta tion between Antony and Octavian began as we know at the end of 32 CE, after Antony had divorced Octavia and his will had already become known in the summer of that year; actual military activities however only began at the start of 31 BCE, when Octavian's forces landed on the coast of Turini in Epirus. The fateful battle of Actium took place September 2nd of that year, while Antony's death in Egypt occurred in August of 30 BCE. The earliest date mentioned by Josephus for the start of Herod's war with the Nabataeans is the 187th Olympic year, that is any time after July of 32 BCE, and it should be mentioned that in his words it broke out simultaneously with Antony's preparations for the battle of Actium. It is of course hard to rely on such an obscure and bald statement. At all events we know definitely that the great earthquake which occur red in Eretz-Israel at the beginning of spring in 31 BCE , was one of the last events in Herod's war with the Nabataeans, since immediately after it (and apparently in the summer of the same year) Herod finally defeated his Arab enemies (War, I 371 - 3 8 5 ; Ant., XV 1 2 3 - 1 6 0 ) . From this chrono logical marker it may therefore be deduced that the war with the Naba taeans began back in the summer of 32 BCE and went on a whole year, until the summer of 31 BCE. It is simply inconceivable that all this mili tary activity - the battle at Diospolis, the march to Canatha, the battle with Cleopatra's commander Athenion and the guerilla campaign Herod conducted after recovering his strength in the mountains - took place at the beginning of 31 BCE and before the earthquake at the beginning of spring. It is after all impossible to pack so many events into such a short time; furthermore ground conditions and the difficulty of conducting a frontal campaign in the rainy season eliminate such a possibility from the outset. As against that it is reasonable to assume that the winter was in fact the more suitable season for guerilla warfare, which Herod began im mediately after his defeat by Athenion, again indicating that he did in fact start the war with the Nabataeans back in the summer of 32 BCE . To sum up, the start of the war coincided with the military prepara tions which preceded the battle of Actium, and that at a time when An thony needed every possible reinforcement and military aid. This further strengthens the impression of Herod's permeditated initiative to start a 2S
26
25 War, I 370; Ant., XV 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 ; and see Otto, p.40; Schalit, King Herod, pp.71, 382 (note 98); Schurer, I , p.289,note 6. 26 Cf. also p. 146f.below on the progress of the war itself. s
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war against the Nabataeans in order to evade the duty imposed on him against his wishes. If we should in fact accept the version in Ant., XV 110 (also cf. War, I 365) according to which Herod began the war against the Nabataens only on Antony's orders (and at Cleopatra's demand), then the sequence of events would be even more astounding. It must be remembered that accord ing to Josephus' description the Arabs were pursued after their defeat at Diospolis and came to Canatha where they would have been even more decisively beaten if Athenion, Cleopatra's strategos in those areas, had not come to their assistance . Though Josephus interprets Athenion's interven tion as an expression of his mistress's intrigues, designed to prevent defeat of one of the contestants, yet if we accepted this explanation at face value, a very penetrating question would have to be asked: why did Athenion not try to prevent Herod's victory after the earthquake in the spring of 31 BCE? If indeed he had been entrusted with such a task, he would have been obliged to intervene at every single stage of the campaign, consistent ly playing a double game as ordered by Cleopatra (War, I 3 6 5 ; Ant., XV 110). In fact however we hear no such thing, indicating two possibilities: a) Athenion had 'vanished' from the scene in Eretz-Israel, because he had gone to the aid of Cleopatra and Antony in the battle of Actium;since this is the only acceptable explanation, then he was not defeated by Herod (cf. also below, p. 148) and from this it may be deduced that Herod's Nabataean war had preceded the battle of Actium. b)This double game by Athenion was no more than a literary fiction , intended to besmirch Cleopatra even more, while at the same time con cealing the truth about Herod exceeding his authority as a ruler under Roman patronage, since he had gone to war against the Nabataeans on his own initiative without obtaining permission of his Roman masters, as required of a ruler of his station . We believe the description by Josephus of the preparations made by Athe nion for his military intervention clearly indicates that the double game was indeed mainly a literary invention, since it is clearly indicated that he had planned from the start to take a one-sided stand; he wrote: 27
28
29
27 Here we cannot discuss the status of the Decapolis cities and their relations with Athenion, but on the extent of the area see also pp. 143ff below. 28 Herodian rewriting of history on the subject of the Nabataeans at least in one case had not es caped the eyes of Josephus himself - cf. Ant., XV 1 7 4 - 1 7 8 . 29 At a later date Herod's reign was placed in jeopardy, when Augustus suspected him of instigating the opening of his second campaign against the Nabataeans (Ant., XVI 2 8 9 - 2 9 0 , 293, 2 9 8 - 2 9 9 , 335ft".), a subject which later we will discuss extensively.
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" ... for he had made up his mind to remain inactive if the Arabs performed brilliantly, but if they were defeated, as they actually were, to attack the Jews with a force of his own that he had prepared from the natives of the region who had joined him." (Ant., XV 116).
It is interesting to note that this report by Josephus said nothing of the reverse possibility, as would be expected from someone intending to play a double game - and this demands an explanation . Furthermore, in the same context Josephus called Athenion in the clearest possible way "He rod's enemy" or one who "was hostile to him" (Ant., XV 116; War, I 367). Our suggestion concerning Herod's initiative in the war against the Naba taeans could even clarify most persuasively the very fact of Athenion's intervention. How is that? The order he received from Cleopatra to attack Herod must after all have received Antony's approval, since the Egyptian queen's free intervention in such a decisive matter would surely be incon ceivable behind the back of the region's real ruler, namely Anthony. After all, her previous attempts to change the political map in Eretz-Israel had not succeeded and it was Antony who then had restrained her desires (Ant., XV 7 7 - 7 8 ; War, I 3 6 1 - 3 6 2 ) . In other words, only Antony could have 'given the green light' for Cleopatra to send Athenion against Herod. We think this could have been done only in response to Herod's exceeding his authority as an "allied king" who had taken the initiative to start a war against the Nabataeans. 30
A further logical justification for this could lie in the fact that by his self-initiated military activity Herod prevented and avoided the giving of the fullest possible assistance to Antony when the latter was preparing himself for battle at Actium. Despite her territorial greed, it is also hard to assume that in order to get rid of Herod and Malichus, Cleopatra herself
30 In this connection we should also mention Klausner, who did not accept at face value Josephus' words on Cleopatra's initiative to involve Herod in war with the Nabataeans. He even went beyond this and claimed it was Herod himself and no one else who inititiated the war. From his words, the impression may be obtained that Herod had simply succeeded in manipulating him self into a situation where he received orders from Anthony to attack the Nabataeans (see: Klaus ner, History of the Second Temple, 4, p p . 2 2 - 2 3 and note 39). Although one may accept this impression cum grano salis, his proposal in principle corroborates our own opinion concerning the literary invention incorporated in the story of the war with the Nabataeans. Klausner even went so far as to claim that the source on which Josephus relied simply made up the story of intervention by Athenion, in order to excuse Herod's defeat in a more convincing manner. Klausner's reservations arise from the discrepancies in Josephus' writing, mainly because he wondered how Cleopatra's army commander could have attacked Herod who was acting on her own orders. However, his extreme conclusions are not acceptable, since it is simply hard to accept the thought of Athenion's intervention being a complete fabrication. It would be more acceptable to moderate his proposal and to argue that Herod had simply succeeded in getting himself into an unclear situation in which he could claim - or create the impression - that the war against the Nabataeans had been imposed on him by Cleopatra's wiles (and possibly with Antony's con sent), but in fact this was a war started entirely on his own initiative.
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would use such devious schemes which would at the same time sap the strength of her benefactor and chief ally Antony, in particular while he was getting ready for the biggest and most fateful of his battles; after all she did not know what the future held in store. In addition to the puzzling questions connected with Athenion, we may also wonder with what authority Herod had sent political envoys to make peace with the Nabataeans (Ant., XV 124; War, I 371). In his position as "allied king and friend of the Roman people" he was after all not free to take such initiative without obtaining suitable permission from his Roman masters. Yet it is this very fact, not concealed by Josephus, which could support our suggestion concerning Herod's initiative for war: just as by himself he made contacts for peace, so too he had also made war by him self. Where was Athenion at the time of these peace feelers? In following the instructions of the dual game he had supposedly been ordered to play, he should have prevented this development - if in fact he was still in the area. To all these questions there is no answer in Josephus' tendentious description. The dramatic and surprising turning-point in Herod's favor in the course of the war also gives cause to wonder. After all, the very fact of the dispatch of peace envoys proves his great military distress; he also had to conduct guerilla warfare in the form of sudden raids and sallies, clearly designed to avoid involvement in open battles which would have forced him to descend from the mountains where he had found safety (Ant., XV 120). Can we simply accept the words of Josephus - that it was Herod's bombastic speech to his soldiers which caused the extreme and surprising turning-point in his favor by injecting them with courage? In truth it is hard to escape the conclusion that the description of the military operation has undergone very carefully calculated literary editing, with some facts concealed and others added, all in order to present Herod as having become involved in a war against his will and as having been in great distress, from which he was able to extricate himself, thanks only to his resourcefulness and charismatic leadership. Herod's absconding from Anthony's camp is also indirectly proved from Plutarch's reports (Anthony, 71) and Cassius Dio (LI, 7) which are also confirmed by Josephus himself (Ant., XV 195; War, I 3 9 2 ) , though the subject is an event which occurred after the battle of Actium (September 2nd, 31 BCE); here Herod assisted Quintus Didius the governor of Syria against Antony's gladiators who, as soon as they heard of Anthony's defeat at Actium hurried from their encampment at Cyzicus in Asia Minor (where they were training for his anticipated victory celebrations) and rushed towards Alexandria to assist their master. Together, Herod and Didius intercepted them in Syria and by forcing them to surrender, placed another nail in Antony's coffin. This must not however leave the impres sion that Herod's betrayal only began when he heard of Octavian's victory
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at Actium and that he only then joined the general wave of desertion spreading through Antony's camp. We believe this impression is mistaken, it being more likely that only then Herod first openly took a public stand against Antony, but in fact had already deserted him before that time, under cover of his war against the Nabataeans. In fact Plutarch (ibid., 72) reports that for some time Herod's mind had already been made up on this and that Antony's attempt, by the dispatch of a special personal messenger called Alexas sent to influence Herod — "to keep him from transgression" - failed utterly; furthermore, the mes senger himself was induced to desert his client. Though Josephus tells us that at the meeting with Octavian at Rhodes Herod said that he had not deserted Antony even after the defeat at Actium and that he had even advised him to kill Cleopatra in order to save his own skin at the last moment (Ant., XV 1 9 0 - 1 9 2 ) , yet it is easy to see the falseness of this story , since nothing is known of any meeting between Herod and Antony after the battle of Actium, in which he could have rendered such advice . If such a meeting had taken place, why did Antony have to send Herod his special messen ger Alexas in order to keep Herod from betrayal? How could this be re conciled with the reports of the gladiators and Herod's collusion with Quintus Didius to foil their support for Antony ? 31
32
33
We think Nicolaus of Damascus included this affair in Herod's apologetic speech at Rhodes because this was an acceptable argument which would well explain Herod's behavior throughout the whole period; furthermore, Cleopatra as a common enemy would prove his basic loyalty to Rome better than any other argument. The hatred towards her therefore became a guideline in Herodian historiography and also became the principal and most persuasive factor on which could be placed the blame for Herod's in volvement in war with the Nabataeans. The secret ties between his mother-in-law Alexandra the Hasmonaean and Cleopatra, as well as the possibility they would exert practical in fluence on Antony's policy concerning the status of the Hasmonaean
31 This Alexas was later executed by Octavian (Plutarch, loc.cit; Josephus, War, I 393, and cf. Ant., XV 197). Some scholars believe he was the brother of the Ituraean ruler Iamblicus, ruler of Arethusa and Hammath (Emesa) until 31 BCE - see: Altheim-Stiehl, p.365. 32 Cf. Schalit, King Herod, p.75. This lie, like another concerning Cleopatra's lust after Herod and his plans to murder her (Ant., XV 9 6 - 1 0 3 ) , should also be considered as rewriting of history after the event. 33 It is simply hard to comprehend how Schalit could accept the authenticity of this story (King Herod, p.74). These things were obviously included in Herod's rewritten speech, which he most probably quoted from the official royal book of history written by Nicolaus of Damascus; cf. Otto, p.50. Just "for this reason it may be assumed in advance that the king had written at least a large portion of this with no intention of verifying them with actual events, but rather relating to the objectives he had before him when he wrote his memoirs" - and those are Schalit's own words in that same connection (loc.cit).
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family and the High Priesthood (Ant., XV 23ff), probably provided Herod with another likely reason for turning his back on A n t o n y , particularly since they placed him in actual danger (ibid., 64ff). Another internal danger in which Cleopatra was also involved, found expression in the Costobar affair . This man was appointed by Herod in 37 BCE to the post of strategos of Idumaea and the Gaza Strip; he was later accused of making plans with the aid of Cleopatra to break away from Herod's rule. Furthermore, accord ing to Josephus, Costobar wanted to turn back the clock, renounce the Idumaeans' conversion to Judaism and revert to the pagan religion of the worship of Kos (or Koze, Cos etc.) as in days gone by. Though his plans failed since Antony did not submit to Cleopatra's blandishments in this matter, yet it was in the nature of a sign auguring dangers which had been threatening him since 34 BCE and could have encouraged him to seek a new political orientation which would promise him stability and safety. 34
It is therefore reasonable to assume that for Herod the war with the Nabataeans was also an excellent escape from political entanglements at home. Further, through it he could obtain national Jewish cooperation and unity under his leadership and thereby somewhat blunt the internal hatred towards him, presenting him as a military commander and warrior leading the nation to repulse her enemies. The war even provided tempting oppor tunities for far-reaching territorial and economic achievements like those existing in the days of Alexander Jannaeus. It is very doubtful whether under different circumstances such a war could even have been initiated and conducted in a desirable and effective manner, far from the watchful eye of the Romans. An examination of this aspect also is therefore appro priate. Unfortunately, location of the Arab region which at the time was taken from the Nabataeans and given to Cleopatra was not described by Josephus in a precise and clear manner. In Ant., XV 79 Josephus used the name "Coele-Syria" and Plutarch did likewise (Anthony, 36). Cassius Dio (XLIX, 5) on the other hand indicates that the reference was to areas controlled by Malichus I the Arab and Lysanias the Ituraean (and without using the term "Coele-Syria"). Suffice it to compare the above versions in order to deduce that the reference is to the northern areas of Transjordan - Aurani-
34 Ant., XV 2 5 3 - 2 5 8 . For details on this affair see appendix B p.214ff. The name Costobar (KOOTOPapoq) consists of two parts: the one is 'Cos' or 'Kos', the name of the Idumaean god, the other derives from the root T-B-R which may be interpreted in one of two ways: a) It may have been Aramaic in origin, meaning "destroy, smash" (the enemy); b) It was possibly of Arabic origin, meaning 'hoe, axe, hatchet'. One way or another, the two alternatives do not justify changing the name to Cosgever ( I S ^ D T p ) , as proposed by several scholars. My thanks are due to Dr. Ran Zadok who assisted me in this matter; cf. Appendix B, note 1.
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tis, Trachonitis and Batanaea . In War, I 361 Josephus simply and in a generalized manner combined the Nabataean and Herodian areas which were given to Cleopatra, and of them he referred explicitly only to the palmgroves in the Jericho district, where the balsam grew. In Ant., XV 96 he also expressed himself in a general and obscure manner and did not speci fically define the "parts of Arabia which had been given to her". Only in the description of Herod's military campaign did Josephus first give a few geographic indications. More precisely, he mentioned Athenion as "a strategos of Cleopatra in charge of those places" (eni TUV 4Kel — ibid., 116) and in that context, among "those places" he mentioned the cities of Diospolis and Canatha (ibid., 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 ; War, I 366) which we know were two cities of the Decapolis. Diospolis is Dium and lies on the King's Highway leading to Damascus, whereas Canatha lay on the border of Auranitis and was defined as "a place in Coele-Syria ". Herod's attack on these areas in particular may serve to reveal the aims of his campaign from a different point of view. By simple logic, we would have had to expect that he would attack the Nabataeans 36
35 Smallwood, The Jews under Roman Rule, pp.45, 6 1 ; cf. Marcus, Josephus, VI, p.326; 7, p p . 5 4 55, notes a, b. On the uses of the term 'Ceole-Syria' see: Schalit, Scripta Hierosolymitana, I (1954), p p . 6 4 - 7 7 ; Bikermann, Revue Biblique, LIV (1947), p p . 2 5 6 - 2 6 8 A . H . M . Jones, CERP, p p . 2 5 9 - 2 6 1 ; Parker, JBL, XCIV (1975), p p . 4 3 7 - 4 4 1 . See further: Schurer, I I , p p . 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 , 132, 1 3 5 - 1 3 7 , 147, 150, 1 5 7 - 1 5 8 ; Fuks, Scythopolis, A Greek City etc., p p . 1 7 0 - 1 7 2 ; cf. note 14 above. As illustration only, we will bring here a number of references from Josephus' writings, which give quite solid grounds for concluding that Coele-Syria was a term referring to areas in Transjordan including the Decapolis region, see for example: Ant., XIII 3 5 5 - 3 5 6 , 3 9 2 ; XIV 34, 40, 79, 180, 280; XV 112; XVI 275; War, I 103, 155, 213, 366. Unfortunately in all the sources referring to the areas given to Cleopatra we are unable to draw a clear borderline between the areas under Nabataean rule and those ruled by the Ituraeans. It seems the expressly Ituraean areas were concentrated in the northern Golan Heights around the city of Paneas, while in the large region of the Auranitis, Trachonitis and Batanaea districts there was unfettered com petition between Nabataeans and Ituraeans for control over it and it was therefore eventually described as an area exposed to the activities of 'robbers' (cf. p. 131 and note 18 above, also p. 160ff below). 36 See: Abel, Histoire, I, p.354, note 2; idem, Giographie, II, p.150, 306; Schurer, I I , p p . 1 4 0 142, 1 4 8 - 1 4 9 ; Schalit, King Herod, p.38; Schalit, Konig Herodes, p p . 6 9 7 - 6 9 8 ; Negev, ANRW, II, 8, p.543. On the expression Coele-Syria see p.143 and note 35 above. As for Canatha, it should be noted that a short distance to the south there was an important Nabataean cultist centre (called Leeta, i.e. Seeia) with temples to Ba'al-Shamin and Dushara. Epigraphic evidence shows the Ba'al Shamln temple and the nearby theatre were built between 33/2 BCE and 2/1 BCE, i.e. in the reign of Malichus I, indicating the Nabataean penetration into this region had begun at least a generation before then. The inscriptions also indicate that the sanctuaries were still operating after the Herodian conquest and until the reign of his son the tetrarch Philip; for details see: Smith, Historical Geography, p.412; Negev, ibid., p.614ff; idem, Masters of the Desert, p p . 9 4 - 9 5 ; Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.59, note 2. Only in the reign of Emperor Clau dius was the place annexed to the Province of Syria; this may be learnt from a local inscription of dedication from the 7th year of the Emperor's reign (CIS, II, 170). On an inscription of dedica tion in Herod's honor, which was on the base of a memorial with his statue (which is lost) see: OGIS, 415; Sourdel, Les cults du Hauran a Vipoque romaines, p.21. ;
s
s
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in areas closer to Judaea, but facts indicate that he directed his offensive to the remote region in the north of the Nabataean kingdom, far from any common border. This is quite surprising, since a march to Diospolis (= Dium) and to Canatha considerably lengthened his supply lines, which in itself could have endangered the whole offensive. However, it is this fact which can show that his military initiative was carefully calculated and that it was preceded by meticulous preparations and serious consideration. The report by Josephus (War, I 3 6 6 - 3 7 6 ; Ant., XV 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 ) also indicates that in the two cities mentioned, prior preparations had also been made by the Nabataeans in consultation with Athenion, so there is no escaping the conclusion that the aims of Herod's attack were known to them from before, for otherwise they would not have prepared in advance for effec tive defence. The chosen scene of operations can throw additional light on the aims of the war, which we believe was a war over the fate of the Decapolis cities or at least some of them. As long as these cities were under the protection of the Province of Syria, Herod would not even have dared to think about this possibility, but when the control of some of them was given to Cleopatra and when they became an overt base for a threatening Nabataean military array, he could act differently. It should be remembered that Herod had earlier ties with this region, since twice already in the past he had been appointed "Strategos of Coele-Syria", first in 46 BCE by Sextus Caesar (Ant., XIV \ 80;War, I 213), the second time by Cassius (Ant., XIV 280; cf. War, I 225) in 42 BCE . This of course can explain his risking a distant offensive, for he certainly must have known the area well from those days and had perhaps even formed ties there with groups of the local popula t i o n . One can imagine that Herod had long since understood the strategic and economic advantages inherent in this important region, which controls access to the King's Highway leading to Damascus and the branch from it leading to the bypassing road in Wadi Sirhan. Penetration by the Naba taeans into the areas south of Damascus and their taking control of at least some of them (see note 36 above) could have worried him consider ably and therefore the offensive in this area was designed to push them further to the south. 37
38
The timing too was it seems a tempting and not a negligible factor in Herod's calculations and considerations to start the war against the Naba taeans. The political fog, which enveloped the Roman Empire as a result of the tension and the preparations leading up to the battle of Actium, was convenient and quite suited his designs. If in fact that fog was really ex-
37 Cf. Momigliano, Giudea Romana etc., p.219ff. 38 Cf. Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.42.
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pected to disperse following a victory by Octavian as (we believe) Herod hoped would happen, then there were logical grounds to hope and believe that all political and territorial arrangements centering around Cleopatra would be cancelled. Under such conditions Herod could expect that areas which had been taken from his hands in the past would be restored to him. Furthermore, in the new situation their capture from the hands of Cleo patra's army commander (i.e. Anthenion) was also likely to be act seen favorably by Octavian; there were therefore increased chances that he would be permitted to continue holding them in the future. For our pur pose it is important to recognize the significant fact that he attacked areas which were under Cleopatra's control; also that he got involved in fighting against her army, indicating he had chosen a road from which there was no turning back. In his delicate and special situation, in view of his inability to manoeuvre politically he had in fact no other choice. Had he taken the field at Actium alongside Antony he would have lost in either case. Had Antony won, Cleopatra's position was liable to have become even stronger and she would probably have been encouraged to increase her pressure on Antony with additional territorial demands. There is every reason to believe that Herod also feared the Hellenistmonarchistic tendencies of which Antony (under Cleopatra's influence) showed signs, lest they harm the local kings of the East, himself included. On the other hand, if Antony were defeated in battle while Herod was at his side, this could also have been the end of Herod himself; it was after all difficult if not impossible to foretell his personal fate on the battlefield, apart from the possibility that even if he was saved from death, Octavian was liable to take punitive action against him, as was the usual custom of a victor with a defeated e n e m y . One way or another, he could expect to lose in both cases. His absence from the scene of Eretz-Israel would benefit only the Nabataeans, for under such circumstances, without restraint, they could create facts on the ground in the areas contested with him. We believe that Herod had cherish ed great hopes; it seems that Octavian's victory at Actium and his own victory in his war with the Nabataeans appeared in his eyes to have a reasonable chance of coming to pass, incorporating the most tempting opportunities for a rosy and secure future. Progress of the war against the Nabataeans consisted of four principal stages : a) The march to Diospolis (=Dium) and Canatha {War, I 3 6 6 - 3 6 7 ; Ant., XV 1 1 1 - 1 1 5 ) . 39
39 This was the fate of Alexas for example - see: Plutarch, Antony Ant., XV 197.
72; Josephus, War, I 393;
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b) Intervention by Athenion and Herod's defeat. c) Herod's guerilla warfare, the earthquake and the failure of his peace initiative (War, I 3 6 9 - 3 7 1 ;Ant., XV 1 2 0 - 1 2 5 ) . d) Herod's counter-attack in the Philadelphia area and his victory (War, I 3 8 0 - 3 8 7 ; ^ . , XV 1 4 7 - 1 6 0 ) . Map 13: Herod's First War with the Nabataeans ( 3 2 - 3 1 BCE)
Herod's K i n g d o m H e r o d i a n t e r r i t o r y given to C l e o p a t r a V I I (34B.C.E.) Conquered a r e a by Herod (31B.C.E.)
Herod
**
Malichos * A t h e n i o n •* °
Petra
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From the chronological sequence of Josephus' review it is quite clear that the battle of Actium took place at the height of the third stage men tioned above; this might also explain Athenion's 'disappearance' from the scene of the fighting, since he was apparently (so we believe) called to the aid of his mistress (p. 139 above). The description of the fourth stage is the most detailed and the most reliable, apparently because it ended in Herod's victory and because there was no more need to cover up his omissions or to hide his intentions and policies. In this stage Herod no longer risked attacking his enemies in some distant region as before, but could concen trate his efforts in the region of Philadelphia, close to Peraea . At first he succeeded in taking one of the most important fortress which lay in the 'no-man's land' between the Nabataean front line and his own forces. The battle over that fortress swayed strongly either way, with many dead on both sides, but in the end the Nabataeans were routed and in their flight they lost 5000 dead. The important strategic position of the fort and its control over the water sources in the whole region gave Herod an im mense advantage in the subsequent stages of the war. The Nabataeans and their commander Elthemus quickly got into serious difficulties, since Herod succeeded in putting them under strict and close siege in which he was to defeat them by thirst . 4 0 0 0 of the besieged lost hope and surrendered into captivity, while another 7000 fell in battle when they tried to break through the besieging forces . According to Ant., XV 1 59, the defeated Arabs were so impressed by Herod's strength and leader ship that they declared him "prostates of their nation". This declaration is not to be regarded as an official appointment of any kind and it should be seen as a decision to award an honorary title without political signifi cance - a sort of 'protector' or 'patron' , neither should it be taken as 40
41
413
42
40 Thus according to War, I 380. In the parallel version in Ant. there is no indication in this case of the scene of battle. 41 This fact could hint at the summer session (31 BCE) and, considering the date of the battle of Actium (September 2), the Nabataeans' surrender should be dated close to this. As for the for tress in which Elthemus took up his position and the sources of water in the vicinity, it seems reference is to one of the forts in the neighborhood of Heshbon - such as Sumiye (to the west) or Kh. Bal'ath (to the north). Perhaps due to this conquest Herod later was given the whole Heshbon region - see pp. 1 5 2 - 1 5 4 below. 41a These are probably exaggerated round numbers. 42 Cf. Ant., XlV444;War, I633;II 135;IV569;Ant., Ill 9 8 ; I V 1 8 5 ; VII 340, 3 8 0 ; X 161;XIV 157; XX 90, and see also: Marcus, VIII, p p . 7 6 - 7 7 , note a. Negev (ANRW, II, 8, p.544) solved the problem by translating 'prostates' as 'governor' or 'ruler', but he thereby went beyond the literal meaning, especially since the translation does not conform with political reality - see also note 43 below. Jeremias however thought all the Nabataeans who surrendered, or most of them, were sold as slaves (see: Jeremias, Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus, p.346). Though unable to reject the possibility that at least some of them in fact suffered this fate, in no way must this be taken to apply to all or most of them, since this is in direct contradiction to the report by Josephus, even if we peel off the layers of propaganda praising Herod by noting the fact that the captured Naba taeans "had declared him prostates of their people".
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hinting at Herodian control of Nabataean territory , but as a decision of those defeated Arabs who had surrendered to Herod and were perhaps even accepted into his army. It is reasonable to assume that by this declara tion they expressed their gratitude to him for having let them escape with their lives and even enrolling them in his army, so that this declaration was also considered a form of public declaration of their loyalty and their oath of allegiance to their new master ; it should also be recalled that Herod was after all the son of a high-ranking Nabataean lady. In this connection it should also be noted that the Nabataean cultic centre in the occupied Canatha region continued to exist and function throughout the days of Herod's reign and even in his son Philip's reign (note 36 above), showing that the Nabataeans who lived there voluntarily accepted Herodian rule and that Herod and his son Philip recognized their right to continue undisturbed the rituals of their fathers. Results of the victory over the Nabataeans were of course conditional upon the approval of Octavian, the victor of Actium, but in fact, taking precedence over this was the far more crucial question relating to Herod's own reign, a question which was due to be resolved at the meeting between the two at Rhodes (in spring of 30 BCE). The fate of all the countries which had submitted to the authority of the defeated Antony, and among those also that of the land contested with the Nabataeans, was due to be decided only later, after Octavian's conquest of Egypt. However, before the fateful meeting at Rhodes, Herod attempted to pre pare the ground at home and pave his way to secure rule by eliminating the last of the possible rival candidates from among the Hasmonaeans, namely John Hyrcanus II. Herod accused him of plotting with Malichus I the Naba taean king in order that the latter should restore him to the throne in 44
45
43 Cf. Smallwood, The Jews under Roman Rule, p.68 and note 20. Otto (p.90) on the other hand did not trouble greatly with this passage and declared the whole story was false. In fact it is hard to reject his judgement, but also had simply to accept it without explanation. We therefore offer another proposal (below), though it is only a speculative solution attempting to settle differences and solve difficulties. 44 It is not clear to what extent these Arabs were in fact Nabataeans. Josephus uses the generic ethnic term 'Arabs' which could be misleading. However, if we accept the Nabataeans as a con federation of several Arab tribes, we may better understand this phenomenon, since they were not all cast in one mold and probably did not always and under all conditions adopt the same positions. Furthermore, it was not uncommon in antiquity that captives of war would be enlisted to the army of their victorious enemy. 45 Their contact was someone called Dositheus, described as a friend of John Hyrcanus II and hav ing connections with the Nabataeans (Ant., XV 168, 1 7 0 - 1 7 2 ) . He belonged to a family who it seems had from the beginning opposed Herod's accession to the throne, if we may deduce this from his brother's execution by Mark Antony at Tyre, when he appeared there at the head of a delegation of protest against Herod's coronation (War, I 2 4 5 - 2 4 7 ; Ant., XIV 3 2 7 - 3 2 9 ; XV 169). According to Josephus, Dositheus had weighty reasons for hating Herod (Ant., XV 169) and apparently also because of the execution of his relative and Herod's brother-in-law Joseph
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Jerusalem. It seems that Josephus himself doubted the truth of this accusa tion, which he extracted from Herod's rewritten memoirs; he himself regarded this, like other cases, as slander invented by Herod (Ant., XV 174—178). It is easy to recognize the justice of this impression, not only because of what was said of the slack and politically unabmitious character of John Hyrcanus II (ibid., 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 ) but also for the simple reason that it was not likely that the Nabataeans could present a military threat to He rod's rule after their recent crushing defeat. It is also easy to recognize the artificial similarity between this libel and the story of the plot devised at the time by John Hyrcanus II and Aretas II at the instigation of Herod's father Antipatros* against Judas Aristobulus II (Ant., XIV 14ff) . This was simply a convenient excuse and was also an excellent opportunity for dis posing of John Hyrcanus II, for in view of the national consensus of hatred for the Nabataeans it was easier to reconcile Jewish public opinion with putting John Hyrcanus II on trial for treason by plotting with them. It is easy to assume that the people had not forgotten the bitter and painful memories of the siege which the Nabataeans, in collusion with John Hyrcanus II, had placed on Jerusalem — a siege which signified the loss of Jewish sovereignty and subjugation to Rome. Nevertheless, John Hyrcanus II being put on trial before the Great Sanhedrin was something quite inconceivable and therefore the 'sanhedrin' which judged him should be interpreted as a typical Herodian court of law, of the kind which was also operated in quite a similar manner in other cases . Nevertheless, despite the Nabataeans' military defeat, they still repre sented a danger for Herod, in the political contest due to develop over the inheritance of the Ptolemaic kingdom. It seems they too hurried to adapt to the new circumstances by offering military aid to Octavian. Plutarch (Antony, 69) relates that, immediately following the battle of Actium, Cleopatra planned a great and daring deed: she wanted to carry her fleet across the narrowest point of the isthmus between the Red Sea and the Me diterranean, in order to get her ships to the Gulf of Arabia (i.e. the Red Sea), get away with a lot of money and an army and so escape servitude 46
47
(War, I 443; Ant., XV 87, 169). Dositheus however changed sides and betrayed John Hyrcanus II. Seemingly in this case his instinct for survival overcame his personal loyalty. It therefore appears it was he who had betrayed Hyrcanus and exposed his supposed 'plot' with the Nabataeans. Nevertheless we may judge by his part in the Costobar plot (Ant., XV 252) that he had not completely buried his plan of one day deposing Herod. It seems the whole group of conspirators - and Costobar at their head - who like Herod himself were of Idumaean origin, did not look kindly on his rule over them and tried in a number of ways to dispose of him, whether by con spiring with the Nabataeans or by making a pact with Cleopatra VII, Queen of Egypt. 46 Additional reasons for rejecting the authenticity of this evidence see: Otto, p.52ff; Schalit, King Herod, p p . 3 8 3 - 3 8 4 (note 103). 47 See: Efron, Studies on the Hasmonean Period, p.312.
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and war. Unfortunately for her however, the Arabs living near Petra burnt the first ships that were brought there. Without a doubt this initiative of the Nabataeans annoyed Herod, because of the fear that they might gain an advantage from Octavian's possible gratitude for this. Nothing was said (in connection with events of 30 BCE) of the fate of the Nabataean lands, which on orders from Antony had at the time been taken from them and given to Cleopatra. Silence on this matter gives ground to believe these lands were returned to the Nabataeans in accor dance with Octavian's calculated policy which favored the principle of status quo ante. The same applies to the areas taken from the Ituraeans after the execution of Lysanias and which had been given on lease from Cleopatra to his successor Zenodorus (Ant., XV 344). The fact that only in 23 BCE were they annexed to Herod's kingdom indicated that in the political arrangements of 30 BCE Octavian restored them to the Ituraeans, i.e. to their prior holders (more is said of this further on). Ruling condi tions really invited such a policy, furthermore it was also very character istic of Octavian in other matters and proves he acted wisely and with moderate and clear-sighted consideration. This did not of course prevent him from altering these political arrangements at a later date, when his policies in the region had become more consolidated and were founded on a more solid foundation of information and a proper understanding of local political conditions. Herod's fear of the unknown before the meeting in Rhodes found instructive expression in his behavior towards his wife Mariamme and her mother Alexandra, whom he placed under house arrest in the Alexandrian fortress. A most instructive detail for our study is that one of the personages Herod entrusted with guarding them was Soaemos the Ituraean, who with Joseph "the housekeeper" was considered one of his most faithful follower ers (Ant., XV 185). Soaemos must have been the army officer who was in charge of guarding the place (ibid., 2 0 4 ) and, being a soldier, he was quite different from Joseph the "the housekeeper" (6 raniaq) who prob ably cared for the daily comforts of the distinguished ladies. It is very 4 8
48 In fact Schalit also rightly regarded him as a soldier - cf. Schalit, King Herod, pp.67, 77, 7 9 80, 281, 465 (note 815). It seems we must totally reject Josephus' report of his appointment to the post of meridarches of some district in Herod's kingdom (Ant., XV 216), as we know of his execution a very short time later (ibid., 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 ) . Quite possibly the report of his appointment was of the nature of a literary ornament intended to cover up Herod's cruelty on the one hand and on the other to emphasize the plot woven against him behind his back, especially since thereby it was possible to demonstrate Herod's open-mindedness and generosity. Schalit on the other hand tended to accept the report and even proposed the meridarchia was located in the non-Jewish part of Herod's kingdom (King Herod, p.413, note 245). If so, the Ituraean origins of this Soaemus might indicate areas in the north of Transjordan, but these we know were an nexed to Herod's kingdom only in the years 2 3 - 2 0 BCE, a fact which casts an additional shadow of doubt on the truth of the above information.
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possible that the choice of Soaemos for this task followed not only for reasons of personal loyalty, but also out of a desire not to provoke the worthy ladies by the appointment of a hostile Hellenistic officer. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that Herod also did not want to take the risk of appointing a Jewish officer, fearing it might have been possible to arouse or even play on hidden nationalistic and Hasmonaean sympathies such a man might have had. There is every reason to believe this Soaemos was a commander in the Ituraean military unit which had been recruited by Herod on Mount Lebanon (War, I 3 2 9 ; Ant., XIV 4 5 2 ) back in 38 BCE, when he was returning with auxiliary unit he had sent to assist the Romans in repelling the Parthians across the Euphrates (battle of Samosata). In the end Herod passed the Rhodes 'test' with no trouble and was con firmed as king ; after that, by gifts and the provision of services to his new master on his way to Egypt, he simply knew no bounds in demon strating his loyalty (Ant., XV 1 9 6 - 2 0 1 , War, I 3 9 3 - 3 9 5 ) . Octavian on his part repaid Herod handsomely when making the territorial arrangements following the dissolution of the Ptolemaic kingdom. In this Herod did even better than all the other rulers in the region, for not only did he get back all the lands which had been taken from him by Antony and given to Cleopa tra, but in addition he got control of the cities of Gadara, Hippus (=Susitha), Samaria, Gaza, Anthedon, Joppa and Strato's Tower (Ant., XV 217; War, I 396). The military, political and economic advantages he thereby obtained were especially significant in the light of his rivalry with the Nabataeans, so much so that from this aspect they can be compared only with the achievements of Alexander Jannaeus. Avi-Yonah thought that on that occasion, in addition to Gadara and Hippus, Herod also officially received Heshbon and its vicinity, which he thinks had in fact already been conquered during the war against the Nabataeans (31 BCE) . He relies mainly on mention of the place as a military settlement of calvary, founded by Herod at the same time as the founding of the city of Sebastia (Ant., XV 294), namely around 25 BCE . 49
50
51
If in fact he is right, then Heshbon apparently became a part of the for tified military complex which Herod constructed on the eastern border of his kingdom, as a result of the lessons learned in his war with the Naba taeans. This complex included a line of fortresses, strongholds, fortified villages and towns which extended along the border of Peraea and were intended to protect it from the Nabataeans and their allies in the cities
49 His supposed fears before his journey to Rhodes (Ant., XV 1 6 1 - 1 6 3 ) are considerably exag gerated and inter alia were designed to embellish the story of the execution of Hyrcanus II, as may be deduced from the context in Josephus' report. 50 Cf. note 41 above. 51 Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p.55 ;cf. idem, Carta's Atlas, maps 82, 83, 84.
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of Decapolis outside the borders of his kingdom . The main sites in this defensive belt were (from south to north) : a) The Machaerus fortress, which Herod restored and in fact rebuilt, after the extensive destruction wrought on it by Gabinius (War, I 1 7 2 - 1 7 4 ; VII 1 7 1 - 1 7 7 ) . From Josephus' description Mount Machaerus was sur rounded by a double system of walls incorporating well-fortified towers. The site also became a place of settlement with a pleasant palace, large storehouses for food and water, as well as huge stocks of stone missiles including ballistic machines. Herod made Machaerus into a major fortress able to resist prolonged siege, even took care artificially to steepen the slopes in order to make its capture more difficult. Not for nothing did Pliny state that the fortress of Machaerus was surpassed in its strength only by Jerusalem (Natural History, V 16, 7 2 ) . b)Besimoth or rather Beth-Jeshimoth (=Br}(njUw0) north of the Dead Sea, which was among the settlements attacked by Placidus, an army com mander for Vespasian in the days of the Great Jewish Revolt (War, IV 438). Its geographic location indicates it formed a part of the military complex intended to guard the Jordan crossings. Very probably this task was already given it by Herod himself, and the same applies to the following three locations. c) Herodium fortress in the Peraea, built not only for security but also in order to perpetuate the name of its builder (War, I 419), in addition to Herodium in the Teko'a desert of Judaea. There is a tendency today to identify it with Tel-el-Hammam, a site by the city of Livias-Julias in central Peraea . d)Abila, capital of one of the toparchies in Peraea (War, II 252) which eventually was also captured by Placidus (War, IV 4 2 6 ) . \S e) Beth-Nimrin or Bethennabris, known as a fortified village in the days of the Great Jewish Revolt (War, IV 4 2 0 ) . 53
54
55
56
57
52 Definition of the borders of Peraea was given in detail by Josephus in War, III 4 4 - 4 6 , where he indicates the border districts of Moab in the south, the Land of Arabia (i.e. the Nabataeans) and the cities Philadelphia and Gerasa to the east and the city of Pella in the north. The friendship of the Nabataeans with the Decapolis cities in Herod's time deserves a separate study. 53 Details concerning geographic identification and bibliographic information, see Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p p . 1 6 5 - 1 6 7 . 54 In Otto's opinion (p.82) the Machaerus fortress was rebuilt after Herod's first war against the Nabataeans and as a result of it - which seems very likely. Choice of the place as a strong-point against the Nabataeans was probably made in pursuit of a strategy similar to that of King Jan naeus. 55 See Malon, Biblica, XIV(1933), p p . 4 0 1 - 4 0 5 . The city of Livias-Julias itself was fortified only in the reign of Herod Antipas (Ant., XX 159, War, II 252). 56 This Abila was Abel Ha-Shitim of the Bible. Sources are divided over its precise identification see: Abel, Geographic II, p.234; Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p.166 ;Loewenstamm, Bibli cal Encyclopaedia, I, p p . 3 9 - 4 0 . 57 See sources and bibliography: Avi-Yonah, Gazetteer, p.40.
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f) 'Birtha of Ammanitis' or 'Tyros' (Tavpoq; Tvpoq) already known as an important fort in the Ptolemaic period (Ant., XII 2 3 3 ; Strabo, XV 2, 40) g) Gedor/Gedora (Tdbapa, or Tado!>pa), the fortified capital of the whole Peraea district (War, IV 4 1 3 ) which by Mishnah tradition was known as a walled city from the days of Joshua son of Nun (Arakhin IX, 6) and today is identified with the e-Tell site by Ein Gedor east of e-Salt . h)Zia village (Zla or M i a ) which was an area contested by the Jewish in habitants of Peraea and by Philadelphia, in the days before the out break of the Great Jewish Revolt (Ant., XX2), and which today is iden tified with Khirbet Zey (see note 59). i) Ammathus Fortress, one of the largest of the Peraea forts in the days of King Alexander Jannaeus (Ant., XIII 3 5 6 ; War, I 8 6 ) . S8
59
60
In short, if we accept the above, we can imagine the existence of a kind of well-organised fortified border (like a Limes) in the east of Peraea . Actual proof must of course await the archeologist's spade. In the view of a number of scholars, Herod at the same time also took care to fortify the southern border of his kingdom in the Negev, for the purpose of protecting Idumaea from Nabataean penetration and harass ment from the south . This fortified border stretched from the Dead Sea, (south of Arad) and to the Gaza Strip (around M e ' o n ) and included for tresses, strongholds, watch towers, observation posts, encampments and fortified rear settlements. This project lasted many years and later the Romans even improved it and made it considerably deeper, when it became known as Limes Palestinae *. 61
62
63
6
58 59 60 61
See details: Avi-Yonah, Gazetteer, p. 102. See: Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, pp.62, 165. Op.cit., pp.45 46, 51, 52, 62, 165; idem, Gazatteer, p.28. This line is the direct continuation of the 'Limes Arabicus', drawn in the Roman era between the Arnon River and the Red Sea - see Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p.l72ff. 62 According to Josephus the southern border was marked by the village of lapSa (War, III 51) and its name possibly hints at Arad of our time - cf. Thackeray, Josephus, II, p.590, note d; AviYonah, Historical Geography, p. 115; idem, Gazeteer, p.60. 63 See Avi-Yonah, Gazetters, p.78 (Ma'on II). 64 This border was extensively studied both by historians and archeologists - see: Applebaum, Zion, XXVII (1962), p.Iff; Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, p.l68ff.; Gichon, Dissertation; idem, IEJ, XVII (1967), p p . 2 7 - 4 2 ; idem, Roman Frontier Studies, p p . 8 4 3 - 8 6 4 ; idem, Doron, p p . 2 0 5 - 2 1 8 ; idem, Eretz-Israel, XII (1975), p p . 1 4 9 - 1 6 6 . Shatzman has recently asked to reject the accepted theory on the existence of a limes line already at the time of Herod or in the reigns, of the Flavian Emperors and he relates the time of its erection to much later periods - see: Shatzman, Cathedra, XXX (1983), p p . 3 - 3 2 , and esp. p.27ff. With that however, Shatzman does not reject the possibility that a number of components of the fortified border had begun to be created in earlier periods, although there is yet no question of an orderly limes as we know it from the end of the 3rd century CE.
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Map 14: Herod's Defense System against the Nabataeans in South-East Judaea
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An examination o f the map o f Herod's fortifications (map 14) clearly reveals that all the sites listed above were linked together to create an exter nal security belt along the border with the Nabataean Kingdom. Herod probably was not satisfied with this, and also concerned himself to the for tification of old and ruined Hasmonaean strongholds such as: Sartaba
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(Alexandrium), Docus, Threx and Taurus (in the royal winter palace of Jericho), Hyrcanium, Beth-Zur and Adora. He added the Cyprus fortress (named after his mother), controlling the road going up from Jericho to Jerusalem, as well as the Herodium fortress in the Teko'a desert, represent ing the central defensive link in that wide-open desolate region. All these sites certainly represented an inner chain, defending Judaea and Idumaea in general and Jerusalem in particular. Apart from the border fortifications, the policy conducted by Augustus of Pax Romana also seemed to have imposed a calming down of relations between Herod and the Nabataeans. Possibly this might explain the disap pearance of Malichus I from the political scene. Some scholars in fact believe he was deposed by Octavian, indicating the great importance the latter attached to Herod in the political structure of the whole region . Around 27 BCE Obodas III (or II) ascended the throne in Petra , being more amenable and submissive to Roman policies — and Herod seemed to have come to a political and military understanding with him. Furthermore, in 26—25 BCE the two sides (Herod and Obodas) even had to cooperate in sending auxiliary forces to Aelius Gallus the governor of Egypt, in his campaign to subdue the Red Sea and its Arab coast, including the southern straits and the Ethiopian coast . As an understatement, it may be said the campaign did not achieve its aims: in fact it was a complete failure. Eventurally it became clear that one of the main causes of this failure was Syllaeus, commander of the Nabataen auxiliary forces, who was sup posedly acting as guide and was responsible for logistic arrangements during the campaign. It appears he wove plans to exploit the political indifference of his king Obodas III, in whose court he served as epitropos, in order to seize the royal Nabataean throne for himself when the time was ripe and prepare the ground for conquest of the Arabic coasts of the Red Sea and its Narrows. He succeeded in well disguising his acts of treachery and to cause the failure of the campaign; only in 6 BCE was he found guilty in a Roman court and condemned to death . 65
66
67
68
1
69
65 January 16th, 27 BCE the senate awarded Octavian the title Augustus, to demonstrate their appreciation for him. His foreign policy was expressed by the term Pax Romana, i.e. the peace which derived from the political power and security of Rome, also characterized by the develop ment of the Empire and concern for the welfare of its inhabitants. 66 Cf. Bowersock, Augustus and the Greek World, p.57; Stern, The Herodian Period, p.58; Bower sock, Roman Arabia, p p . 4 6 - 4 9 . 67 On the date, see Bowersock, Roman Arabia, pp.34, 46. 68 According to Josephus' chronological order, the campaign took place a little later, in the years 2 4 - 2 5 BCE (cf. Ant., XV 299, 317), but apparently his version is inaccurate. For a full survey on the variety of historic evidence concerning this affair, see: Schiirer, I , p.290, note 8; Stern, op.cit., pp.60, 251 (note 13) with additional details. See also: Bowersock, Roman Arabia, pp.46 - 4 9 and also note 60 below. 69 Strabo, 15, 4, 2 2 - 2 4 ; Cassius Dio, LIII, 29; Pliny, Natural History VI, pp.32, 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 ; Res s
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Meanwhile Herod continued to make political progress, thus in 23 BCE Augustus also attached to his kingdom the regions of Trachonitis, Batanaea and Auranitis. The eastern boundary of Auranitis extended at least to the vicinity of the place today called El-Mushnaf, where an inscription of dedi cation from the days of Agrippa I was found on the door-post of a pagan sanctuary, indicating that in fact all Mount Hermon was under control of the House of Herod . The background to Herodian expansion in these regions was reported by Josephus in fullest detail in two versions — Ant., XV 3 4 3 - 3 6 4 ; War, I 398—400 - and for convenience of discussion we will refer to it as the 'Zenodorus affair'! The reference is (so it seems) not to Zenodorus son of Lysanias but another Zenodorus, who might have family connections with the family of Ituraean kings . This man was appointed tetrarch over areas which at the time had been taken from Lysanias and leased back to him by Cleopatra in 3 4 BCE (see above pp. 143— 144 and note 35). His identity is also known to us from a number of coins marked in Greek with the words: "of Zenodorus the Tetrarch and High Priest" as well as the evidence from Cassius Dio (LIV, 9, 3). 70
71
It seems the anarchy which reigned in the region, following the Roman civil war and Herod's war with the Nabataeans, prepared the ground for his own revolt. In view of the new circumstances which had developed after the death of Cleopatra, Zenodorus probably saw himself exempt from pay ing rent to the Romans and was apparently very disappointed and disillu sioned with the policies of Augustus; in contrast to his actions towards Herod, Augustus did not restore Zenodorus to full ownership of the regions
Gestae, 26; and see Schiirer, loc.cit. The campaign by Gallus was an effort by Augustus to expand trade with the Far East by way of the Egyptian ports in the Red Sea - see: Rostovtzeff, SEHRW, p.53, note 94; Bowersock, loc.cit. When suspicions were voiced against Syllaeus over the failure of the campaign, there was an increase of Roman suspicion of the Nabataeans in general, so that Herod's position as a faithful ally of the Romans became stronger. On the bitter end of Syllaeus see also p p . 1 7 2 - 1 7 3 below. Bowersock (ibid., p p . 4 7 - 4 9 , 53) raised doubts over Syllaeus' re sponsibility for the failure of this campaign, arguing it was merely a libel concocted by Strabo in retrospect from 6 BCE, when Syllaeus' trial was taking place in Rome, and against its back ground his later activities were taken into account (see pp. 1 6 9 - 1 7 1 below). In his opinion, Strabo - our main source on Gallus' campaign - had a strong personal motive for covering up the real cause of what was in fact a failure of the Roman commander Aelius Gallus himself, since they were closely befriended with each other. However, the learned attempt by Bowersock is very tortuous and not without sophisticated speculations whose purpose is quite evident - for some reason to hide Syllaeus' treachery. Furthermore it appears that Bowersock has given this subject considerable attention, for in the past he held quite a different, even a contrary opinion - see: Bowersock, JRS, LXI (1971), p.227. 70 See: Dar, Hermon and its Foothills, p.44. 71 Details see : Schiirer, I , p p . 5 6 5 - 5 6 7 ; cf. also: Altheim-Stiehl, pp.352 (note 338), 365; see also: Schmitt, ZDPV, XCVIII (1982), p.l 11. s
15 8
Reign of the Herodian Dynasty 72
indicated but only continued to lease them to h i m . To this the latter re acted by rebelling and he started with acts of robbery against the trade caravans on their way from Arabia Felix to Damascus; he thereby attacked the security arrangements introduced by the Romans, at the access to the Kings' Highway and also within the borders of the Province of Syria itself. Strabo's brief, factual report (Geographica, XVI 2, 20) tells of ambushes set in narrow mountain passes, with the participation of large gangs of ban dits, numbering up to 4 0 0 0 men, hiding in many of the caves in the vici n i t y . A more detailed description of the tactics used in robbers' raids and ambushes was given by Josephus in Ant., XV 344—348. The many complaints from the inhabitants of the Damascus region to Varro, the Roman governor in Syria served as a pretext for a revision of Roman policies in the area. For a start, the governor applied military force and cleared the area of bandits; according to Strabo (loc.cit.) he did this on his own, a fact also confirmed as reported by Josephus (War, I 3 9 9 ) . Afterwards, wishing to ensure permanent order and safety on the roads, he proposed the Emperor should consider making suitable political changes in the region; in support he also appended to his proposal the complaints from the inhabitants of Damascus, also a personal recommendation to give the unallocated land to Herod, a recommendation possibly formulated in consultation with Herod. A hint of this may be found in the report on Zenodorus, journeying to Rome to try and foil the detachment of land from his kingdom and to denounce Herod (Ant., XV 349). The logic behind this denunciation gives reasonable ground to believe that Herod was in fact from the start an active participant in this affair. In this con nection it should also be noted that Herod already had political contacts at the highest levels in Rome and even had a proper 'lobby' at the court of the Emperor himself . 73
74
75
76
72 This fact becomes probable from War, I 399, which states clearly that the Roman governor in Syria had deprived him of the lease; see also p.160 below. 73 No wonder the region is known to this day by the Arabs as Lejja, meaning hiding place, refuge etc. 74 The reference is apparently to Marcus Terentius Varro who was in office 2 4 - 2 3 BCE - see: Schiirer, I , p.256. 75 The version in Ant., XV 3 4 4 - 3 4 8 on the other hand says nothing of the military initiative by Varro, but only of the despatch of a complaint to the Emperor and later (ibid., 348) relates that it was Herod who disposed of the robbers after he had received the unruly territories into his possession. Though the events cannot be denied, their presentation in this way is a part-truth, apparently designed to stress beyond all proportion the part Herod played in the affair. In short, this is typical historical re-writing which though not false, does conceal part of the truth with the purpose of praising and exalting Herod. 76 This is proved by the despatch of his sons from Mariamme the Hasmonaean to be educated in Rome, under the patronage of his friend Q. Asinius Pollio (Ant., XV 3 4 2 - 3 4 3 ) - see: Feldman, TAPA, LXXXIV (1953), p p . 7 3 - 8 0 . Herod's great friendship with Marcus Agrippa was by then s
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Zenodorus used every possible device to avert the evil of a decision detri mental to his interests. Before the arrival of the Emperor's instructions awarding the areas to Herod, he hurried to sell the Auranitis to the Naba taeans for fifty talents. (Ant., XV 352). Josephus explicitly reports that this was a sale of land and not a sale of the concession of leasing. This in fact was precisely the subject of conflict for Zenodorus saw himself as master of the region and not the lessee (cf. p. 157 and note 71). The act of sale of course in this case indicates a Nabataean-Ituraean identity of interests, op posed to those of Herod and his efforts to seize the access to the King's Highway to Damascus. By submitting legal appeals before the legal institu tions in Rome, the Nabataeans tried to realize their claims to Auranitis on the strength of the above act of sale. At the same time they began a series of violent assaults and harassment, designed to weaken Herod's military hold in the area; the poor and embittered in his army they also tried to incite to mutiny. Herod however succeeded in foiling their schemes and, by moderation and restraint towards his soldiers, he managed to avoid a breach in his camp (Ant., XV 352—353). Not inconceivably, some of these soldiers were Nabataeans, those who had been enrolled in his army after their de feat in the battle against Elthemus in the no-man's land between Peraea and Philadelphia (see p. 148 above). It seems the Nabataean recourse to legal channels in Rome were heard before Marcus Agrippa, right hand to Augustus, who with his army was in Mitelene on the island of Lesbos in the winter of 2 1 / 2 0 BCE and who on the same occasion also dealt with another legal problem which had become a part of the 'Zenodorus affair', namely Herod's dispute with the city of Gadara (Ant., XV 3 5 1 , 3 5 4 - 3 5 9 ) . The tension reached its peak in 21/20 BCE, when the citizens of Gadara, enthusiastically supported by Zenodo rus, demanded political separation from Herod's kingdom and direct an nexation to the province of Syria. The decision was finally reached during the Emperor's visit to Syria (in 20 BCE); according to this Herod won both the legal and the political battle . Luckily for him, Zenodorus died that same year (20 BCE) in Antoich from a serious disease and Augustus attach ed his land - "Ulata and Paneas and the country around" — to Herod's realms (Ant., XV 3 6 0 ) . The clear-cut decision of Augustus concerning 77
78
also well-known, as arises from their meeting in Mitelene in 23/22 BCE, showing they had become friends even before then, and possibly this was during the frequent meetings with Octavian in Rhodes and in Eretz-Israel on the latter's way to Egypt and back (Ant., XV 187, 1 9 9 - 2 0 1 , War, I 387, 3 9 4 - 3 9 5 ) . 77 This episode has for some reason not received appropriate and adequate study; this ought to be rectified at the earliest opportunity. 78 See also: Cassius Dio, LIV 9, 3. In War, I 400 this territorial grant was defined as the region be tween Trachonitis and Galilee, i.e. Northern Golan Heights and Batanaea. This however contra dicts another passage by Josephus, whereby Batanaea had already been attached to Herod's
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these Ituraean lands was concluded with a standing order given to the Governors of Syria, to cooperate with Herod on everything connected with the security of the region (Ant., XV 360). There is reason to believe the transfer into Herod's control of the re mains of Zenodorus' tetrarchy was also the result of political pragmatism formulated in view of the demographic facts in the area. After all, not a few Jews were living in the area (from Hasmonaean times) and in addition, they were joined over the years by Ituraean converts. Dissolution of this tetrar chy and its transfer to Herod therefore expressed a realistic policy, accord ing to which Herod was considered not only the most promising factor for preserving the stability of that area, but also the one who would be able to find support among a trusted Jewish population, eventually strengthened and consolidated even further around the military settlement Ecbatana (=Bathyra) in Batanaea founded by Babylonian Jews under their com mander Zamaris, (Ant., XVII 23ff) and the Idumaean settlers of Trachoni tis (Ant., XVI 2 8 5 ) . Augustian policy, striving to impose supervision and order in the wild areas which till then had been under Ituraean control, at the same time strengthened and favored the urban elements in the Phoeni cians coastal plain. He thereby attempted to block Ituraean efforts to ex pand westwards. Following the same policy also led to the foundation of the Roman colony of Berytus (=Beirut) around the year 16 BCE . According to War, I 399, Herod was also appointed to serve as "Epitropos (=procurator) of all Syria". This does not seem at all plausible and at most this may be corrected to read "Epitropos of Coele-Syria", so we can compare this appointment to others granted to Herod previously — in the years 46 and 4 2 BCE . Even a superficial glance at a map of the areas added to Herod's realm in the years 23—20 BCE clearly proves the objec tive of Roman policy in this connection was aimed at the creation of a security belt for the defence of Damascus from the south, also blocking the expansion of "robbers" (probably Nabataeans and the like) northward. Quite clear language in this sense was used by Josephus in War, I 399 (and cf. also Ant., XV 345). Eventually this Herodian security belt became most 79
80
81
kingdom in 23 BCE (War, I 398; Ant., XV 343). It seems this discrepancy may be bridged only if we assume that in 23 BCE there had been talk not of all Gaulanitis but only of a part of it. 79 See Applebaum, Studies in the History of the Jewish People and the Land of Israel, I (1970), p p . 7 9 - 8 8 ; G.M. Cohen, TAPA, CHI (1972), p . 8 3 - 9 5 . On Jewish inscriptions from Naveh (or Naweh) - see: G. Schumacher, Across the Jordan, p p . 1 7 2 - 1 7 4 . Here it should be noted that the Greek name Trachonitis derived from the word rpaxw, meaning 'ragged', 'rough', 'harsh', 'savage' etc. 80 Cf. Lauffray, ANRW, II, 8, p p . 1 3 5 - 1 6 5 ; Jones, JRS, XXI (1931), pp. 2 6 6 - 2 6 7 . 81 The original text is Zvp(a<; 0X17? emrponou, and it seems this should be corrected to read Kotkrjs Zvplaq enlrponov. See: Otto, p.74; Schiirer, I , p.319 and note 122; Smallwood, The Jews tinder Roman Rule, p p . 8 7 - 8 8 , note 94 and cf. also p p . 1 4 3 - 1 4 4 and note 35 above. s
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Map 15: Herod's Defense System in the North-East of his Kingdom
vital for the Romans, for at the time of intensive military activity against the Parthians on the northern border of Syria, they were relieved of the need to disperse their forces between two fronts. It is not inconceivable that it was Augustus himself who already appreciated the military value of this security belt, in the course of strategic considerations of Rome's
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relations with the Parthians, because of which he visited Syria in 20 BCE . The fact that Tiberius (the future Emperor) had participated in shaping the policies and tactical considerations of Augustus at that time promised con tinuity for the coming years, contributing considerably to the success of the House of Herod in striking deep roots in the new regions. It was Herod himself who for the first time in those wild regions of Transjordan operated a deliberate program of settlement which forced the bands of robbers to abandon their semi-nomad way of life and to go over to a framework of permanent agricultural settlements and peaceful cultiva tion of their land (Ant., XVI 271 ) . However, according to Josephus, "this was not what they wanted, nor did the soil bring much profit in return for their labor" (op.cit., 272) indicating that a robber's life attracted them more, since cultivation of the rocky lava soil of the Lejja promised far smaller returns, when compared with the large and easy 'traditional' profits which came from robbing trade caravans. Herod's political and military successes therefore brought only tem porary calm to the region, with his enemies therefore only waiting for the opportunity when they could rebel. Possibly already in the spring of 14 BCE - when he set out to go to the aid of Marcus Agrippa in his military campaign to the Bosphorus — and, if not then, clearly on the occasion of his journey to Rome in 12 BCE (following the dispute with his sons), the inhabitants of Trachonitis seized the opportunity and revolted. It was the alertness of the Herodian army commanders which enabled them on this occasion to put down the revolt (Ant., XVI 1 3 0 ) . Forty "brigand chiefs" (apxiXvorai) among the leaders of the revolt left their country and fled to the Nabataeans, who gave them shelter and refuge so they could await there the next opportunity for another attempt (Ant., XVI 2 7 3 - 2 7 5 ) ; these had no choice but to throw in their lot with the Nabataeans. How ever, the Nabataeans leaders were at that time inclined to put out diploma tic feelers for negotiating a reconciliation with Herod . 8 3
84
85
82 It seems these considerations also came up at the end of Emperor Tiberius' days (pp. 1 8 0 - 1 8 1 below), when they finally induced the Romans to set up the Province of Arabia - see: Bowersock, JRS, LXI (1971), p.214ff (esp. 227). 83 We have interesting epigraphic evidence indicating that similar efforts, intended to convert the wild, semi-nomadic cave dwellers of Auranitis and Trachonitis into permanent settlers living in proper houses and cultivating their land, were made later (in 41 CE) by Agrippa I (IGRR, III, 1223). Jones believes that, as may be learnt from quite a considerable list of inscriptions, the Herodian dynasty's efforts in this direction bore fruit - see: JRS, XXI (1931), p p . 2 6 9 - 2 7 0 . 84 See also another fragment in evidence from Nicolaus of Damascus, in Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, I, no.97, p.250ff. 85 Ant., XVI 224; and cf.: 220ff. In Abel's opinion (Histoire, I, p p . 3 8 7 - 3 8 8 ) this already happen ed in 20 BCE, but the affair may be postponed to a later date.
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The first contacts produced results and apparently found expression in the granting of a loan of 60 talents by Herod to Obodas III the Nabataean king (Ant., XVI 279) and the leasing of pasture land to Nabataean herd" owners (ibid., 291). Possible the initiative for peace originated with Syl laeus, the all-powerful epitropos to the slack and weak Obodas, wanting to establish his future standing in order to depose his king and seize the throne for himself . He therefore schemed to form marriage ties with Herod's family, intending to take Herod's sister Salome for a wife in the hope this would open doors in Rome — on whose approval the ascent to the throne of any Nabataean king in fact depended . In personal negotiations with Herod, conducted at intervals of two to three months, Syllaeus attempted to stress the mutual benefits which would arise from this union for both sides, especially in view of the fact that actual rule in Petra was entrusted into his hands and that his own chances of ascending the throne were very good (Ant., XVI 224). With great cunning, Syllaeus succeeded also in stir ring the imagination and exciting the intended bride who was probably anxious to become a proper queen . Herod gave the matter serious consi deration and after some time (two to three months, as indicated) made his assent conditonal on Syllaeus' conversion to Judaism (ibid., 225). Herod need not be suspected that by this condition he was expressing fear of the religious difficulty of a mixed marriage or that he thereby displayed zeal for the Jewish religion out of consideration for public opinion in his country — more likely simply to see in this step purely a clever strategem. From it he probably hoped to make political capital, whose purpose was from the outset to demonstrate his senior status in the political partnership due to be formed between himself and Syllaeus, and the latter's complete dependency on h i m . It seems for this very reason Syllaeus expressed his refusal to convert. His argument, that "if he did submit, he would be stoned to death by the Arabs" (loc.cit.) was just an excuse, intended to serve him as an opening for evasion. This argument could, indeed, be ac cepted as reasonable against a national (and not personal) background, the 86
87
88
89
90
86 Concerning Syllaeus' status at the Nabataean royal court, we have one inscription from Miletus in which the man is described as "the king's brother" (RES, 1100). It is hard to tell to what degree this expression represented a political title at the Nabataean court or whether he really was King Aretas Ill's brother - see: Hammond, The Nabataeans, p.23; Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.51 and note 25. 87 Worth remembering that ever since the campaign by Pompey in Eretz-Israel (63 BCE) the Naba taeans admitted Roman sovereignty, their king being an "allied king and friend of the Roman people" under Roman control - see: War, I 159, 178;Ant., XIV 8 0 - 8 1 , 103. 88 Ant., XVI 2 2 1 - 2 2 5 ; cf. War, I 487. It appears that Salome was also suspected of conspiring with Syllaeus - see: Ant., XVI 322; War, I 5 3 4 - 5 3 5 and cf. also Ant., XVI 139. 89 E.g., cf. Marcus, Josephus, VIII, p p . 2 9 8 - 2 9 9 note a. 90 Bowersock (Roman Arabia, p.50) for some reason ignored this whole episode and presented Herod from the start as having wanted to cause the failure of this marriage.
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more so when taking into consideration the long enmity between Jews and Nabataeans since Alexander Jannaeus. But in fact, it was Syllaeus' own personal decision which could dictate his followers' position; they were after all members of a tribal patriarchal society, who were used and were educated to obey their leaders. From then on his rivalry with Herod devel oped with increasing momentum and with growing vigor. Under the new circumstances Syllaeus wanted to make the forty "bri gand chiefs", who had been the leaders of the revolt in Trachonitis, into the spearhead of his struggle against Herod. As indicated, he gave them a fortified place from which they could sally forth with their men towards Herod's kingdom in Judaea and Transjordan . The fortress was called Ra'epta and, though its geographic location is not known with any degree of certainty, it should seemingly be identified with Qal'at a-Rabad, north west of 'Ajlun; the phonetics of the Arab name perhaps even still preserves the original name . If this identification is in fact true, then Syllaeus really used a most successful trick, since he had given those bandits a place which officially was not his, but had merely been leased to him. It was apparently a fort or stronghold guarding a part of the chora of one of the Decapolis cities and possibly the reference is to the vicinity of Gerasa . 91
92
93
Cooperation between the Decapolis cities (or at least some of them) and the Nabataeans is very probable when seen against the background of their common hatred for the Jews. In consequence of the completion in those very days of the construction of the city of Caesarea Maritima (Ant., XVI 136), a joint economic worry was perhaps added to this: that the greater portion of international trade be diverted to it and thus harm their econo mic interests. The bandits' sallies encouraged by Syllaeus were designed to damage Herod's achievements and destroy the security reigning on the in ternational trade routes passing through the area under his control. The fact that the two cities - Gerasa and Philadelphia — were attached to the Pro vince of Arabia when this was founded in the days of Emperor Trajan (106
91 The original text reads "Judaea and all Coele-Syria" (Ant., XV 275). On interpretation of the term Coele-Syria see pp. 1 4 3 - 1 4 4 and note 35 above. The term Judaea in this context is apparently of political and not geographic significance, for it is hard to believe the raiders reached the vici nity of (geographic) Judaea itself. It is reasonable to assume that the reference is to the Peraea region, which for a very long time had been an integral part of (political) Judaea. 92 In Greek the place was called 'Paerrra, and in other versions 'Painra, 'Paienrd and Repta (Ant, XVI 283, 288). On its location see: Abel, Mstoire, I, p.389; Dussaud wanted to identify it with Raphon - see: Dussaud, Topographie historique de la Syrie antique et midiivale, p.339. 93 On the other hand, Starcky believed the fortress lay somewhere within Ammon, i.e. in the chora of Philadelphia - see: Starcky, Dictionnaire, col. 903; idem, BA, XVIII (1955), p.95. Though his proposal is quite reasonable, I prefer that of Abel, if only for the simple reason that the Gerasa district is closer to the scene of the rebellion in Trachonitis and geographically it is suitable for launching raids both in Peraea and in Northern Transjordan.
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CE), indicates their close ethnic and ecomomic ties with the Nabataeans, which is also further coroberated by information on the opening of the new Petra-Bostra road . Besides that fortress, Syllaeus also provided Herod's enemies with addi tional bases for operations (bpp.77 Trjpia) (Ant., XVI 275), apparently within areas under his direct control. Without obtaining prior approval of the Roman authorities, Herod could not react by direct acts of retaliation against the robbers' bases since his status of Rex Socius restricted his powers and thereby also tied his hands. The only fast reprisal which under those circumstances seemed feasible to Herod was an attack on the families of the bandits, who were living in the Trachonitis region under his control and were therefore hostages in his hands (ibid., 276). However, the laws of blood feuds accepted in Arab tribal society only aggravated the feelings of vengeance and found expression in an increase in the raids, acts of rob bery and murder, so much so that Herod was left no choice but to ap proach the Roman authorities, asking that he be permitted to act and punish the robbers and capture them in areas not under his rule. The nearest authorised Roman representative was the governor of Syria, the legate Q. Sentius Saturninus, aided by his assistant Volumnius the procu rator . It appears however that his approach to the Roman authorities in this case had no immediate effect and therefore did not serve the Arab bandits as a sign of warning for the future. On the contrary, they increased their activities even more, spreading terror and destruction, "so that their out breaks resembled a war, for they numbered about a thousand" (ibid., 278). Furthermore, Syllaeus, the moving spirit in the whole affair, had in those days already completely deposed his king Obodas III and was himself un restrainedly conducting the affairs of the kingdoms. He was in no way intimidated by Herod's approach to the Roman governor, since he knew the Romans were cautious in such matters and would not adopt a one sided stand without first examining the problems in depth. Herod increased his pressure on the governor, demanding that the robbers be handed over to him and that action be taken to return the debt of 60 talents which he had at one time loaned to Obodas and which was now due for repayment. Syllaeus adopted a policy of evasion and claimed the robbers were not in his country; as for the debt, he simply asked to postpone the date of repay ment. After arguments before the Syrian governor and his procurator, an agreement was finally reacted whereby Herod would receive what he was 94
95
s
94 See: Schiirer, I , p p . 1 5 3 - 1 5 4 , 1 5 7 - 1 5 8 . 95 Full details of their identity see: Schiirer, I , p.257; Smallwood, Jews under Roman Rule, p.97, note 129); Negev, ANRW, II, 8. p.566. s
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owed within 30 days, but it was agreed that before then there would be an exchange of subjects between the two sides. Between the lines it may be understood that, since Herod held no Arab citizens at all, "exchange of subjects" was a disguised euphemism, in fact meaning delivery of the robbers from Trachonitis who had found refuge with Syllaeus (ibid., 279—281). Possibly this was a diplomatically success ful phrasing, achieved as a compromise and following Nabataean pressure, in order not to present the agreement as a one-sided victory for Herod. It appears that from the start Syllaeus had never intended to fulfill the terms of the agreement, for he immediately went to Rome to try his luck before the Emperor himself. The fact that the day of payment had passed without Syllaeus fulfilling his obligations served as legal justification for Herod to take practical steps, with the knowledge and the consent of the Syrian governor (ibid., 2 8 2 - 2 8 3 ) . At the same time Herod sent a delegation of his own to Rome, to protect his interests and foil any dan gerous initiative by the Nabataeans (cf. ibid., 289). On the military level, he succeeded in beating the robbers in their stronghold Ra'epta and even captured it. Aid from the Nabataeans under the command of Nakebos was ineffective, since he fell in battle together with his senior aides, while the rest fled for their lives. Afterwards, Herod began an operation of military settlement founded by three thousand Idumaean soldiers in the Trachoni tis region. On all his activities he wrote in detail to the "governors" (i.e. Saturninus the Syrian governor and Volumnius his procurator) who at that time were staying in Phoenicia, informing them that he had acted in the spirit of the agreement signed in their presence and with their intervention. After the two had examined the matter, they came to the conclusion that he was in fact right (ibid., 2 8 3 - 2 8 5 ) . Though at first sight the impression may be obtained that the descrip tion was apologetic and biased in nature and that it reflected the Herodian historiographic stand ex post factum, in this case however there is even greater logical likelihood that Herod took care punctiliously to go by the agreement. In a juridical examination which was later conducted before Augustus and in which Herod was represented by Nicolaus of Damascus, it was strongly emphasized that he had acted in strict adherence to the agree ment and that the military campaign was in principle also conducted with the consent of the Syrian governor (Ant., XVI 3 4 3 - 3 4 6 ) . There is no argu ing with the .legal correctness of this argument, yet it still appears that there was some legal stigma in the military campaign itself. There is reason to assume that the Syrian governor and his deputy were not entirely sure of themselves and feared that in Rome the impression could be formed that, 9 6
96 On the legal aspects of the problem, see extensively: Schalit, King Herod, p p . 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 .
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both in its geographic objectives and in its scale, Herod's military operation exceeded the limits defined in the agreement as permissible. Possibly the greatest fault lay in the fact that Herod reacted in too great haste (cf. ibid., 298), in that he did not sufficiently consider the fact that the main target of his attacked was after all a 'neutral' place, which was not officially under Nabataean control (see pp. 1 6 3 - 1 6 4 above and note 92). In the same connection, Syllaeus' protests that there had been no units of his army in that area could acquire greater significance . The journey of this cunning swindler to Rome could also have caused trouble for the Syrian governor and his deputy, so there was also good reason to send en voys to Rome in their name, both to protect their interests from any pos sible misrepresentation and also to report directly to the Emperor on their own decision in the dispute between Herod and Syllaeus. Quite possibly the governor's representatives wanted to learn directly of the Emperor's policy towards all the factors present in the region and perhaps also to obtain clearer and more definite instructions on how to act in future. Though in Ant., XVI 289 these envoys are mentioned only incidentally, yet the very fact of their presence at the meeting between Syllaeus and the Emperor is quite significant in this connection. 97
When Nabataean envoys reached Rome, hastening to inform Syllaeus of Herod's actions, the former decided to seize the opportunity and strike a blow against his rival at the political level. In a supposedly accidental meet ing with the Emperor, dressed in mourning and with dramatic behavior, Syllaeus described the terrible injuries the Nabataeans had suffered at Herod's hands. As against this he stressed his own peaceful intentions, well conforming with the Augustan policy of Pax Romana; in fact he succeeded in persuading the Emperor he was right — by the very fact of his own per sonal presence in Rome, which he claimed was intended to settle the dis pute with Herod by political means and not on the battlefield. He even went further and argued persuasively that if he had known of a possible military campaign he would have remained in his own country. The scheme succeeded beyond all expectations, especially since an accidental meeting may be carefully staged, avoiding cross-examination and detailed legal inquiry. According to Josephus, the Emperor was very angry to hear such things. The testimony of the Nabataeans envoys, which in principle could not be contradicted by the representatives of the Syrian governor, satisfied the Emperor without the need for discovering the whole truth and for cross-examination of and by Herod's people. In fact, this description of his
97 It surely seems no accident that in the whole long tract of arguments by Nicolaus of Damascus in favor of Herod (ibid., 3 3 9 - 3 5 0 ) there is no reference whatever to the military operation in Raepta. On the meaning of this see pp. 1 7 0 - 1 7 1 below.
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behavior arouses some surprise, particularly in view of the great friendship and mutual trust which to that moment had existed between him and Herod. It seems there is no escaping the conclusion that the report by Josephus (more precisely by Nicolaus of Damascus) for obvious reasons did not tell us of all Herod's military actions and of the full extent of their results. Though it is reasonable to assume the Nabataean envoys greatly exagger ated in their description of the extent of destruction and scope of the op erations, they nevertheless succeeded in creating the impression that Herod had gone far beyond a limited punitive action and that he had thereby broken the agreement signed under the auspices of the Syrian governor . Almost certainly, Augustus suspected Herod of acting with exaggerated self-confidence and of relying excessively on his personal ties in Rome and his, the Emperor's, own policy which till then had lavished favor and good will upon him. This was the reason Augustus found it necessary to take a disciplinary step, sending Herod a strong letter of reprimand, informing him he would be treated by him as a subject and not as a friend (Ant., XVI. 2 9 0 ) " . We think this indicates that Augustus was in fact aware that Herod had not formally exceeded his authority and that his anger was caused only from his impression of Herodian excesses in the offensive action and from his reservations concerning the objectives of the attack, which in part were also in the Decapolis area and not just in Nabataean territory. Syllaeus was extremely pleased by this development and wrote of this to his colleagues in Petra. The consequences were not slow in coming: encouraged by this, the Nabataens continued to ignore the agreement signed before the Syrian governor, even using the opportunity once more to incite the inhabitants of Trachonitis to rebel against Herod's Idumaean garrisons, and more vigor ously renewed their raids for robbery (ibid., 291—292). This time Herod had to swallow the bitter pill without appropriately reacting to the rebels and the looters operating from outside the borders of his kingdom. He had simply lost his confidence in the Emperor and felt himself hurt and de graded. The special delegation whom he sent to Rome to explain the 98
98 The truth probably lay somewhere in between, between Herod's minimalist version (Ant., XVI 284, 341, 350) and the maximalist one of Syllaeus (ibid., 2 8 7 - 2 8 8 , 341, 3 5 0 - 3 5 1 ) , cf. Smallwood, ibid., p.97. 99 The significance of the reprimand was that Herod lost his standing as one of the "Emperor's closest friends" (on this standing we learn from Ant., XV 199; cf. War, I 396. Ant., XV 361 even states that the Emperor honored no man more than Herod, except Marcus Agrippa; cf. also War, I 400) and some scholars therefore believe the meaningful step Augustus had taken with Herod deprived him of the exalted position of "the Emperor's friend" - see : Crook, Con silium Principis, p p . 2 1 - 3 0 ; Bammel, Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXVII (1952), p p . 2 0 5 210; Hoehner, Herod Antipas, p.19. note 2.
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background for his punitive expedition did not succeed in correcting the injustice, for the Emperor did not alter his attitude and continued to justify the position of Syllaeus (ibid., 293—294). Meanwhile there were changes in Petra itself. King Obodas III died (9 BCE), apparently poisoned in a plot to which Syllaeus was a partner without actually being present on the s p o t . Syllaeus' plans to seize control were however foiled, for someone called Aeneas got ahead of him, hurriedly crowned himself king and changed his name to Aretas , becom ing Aretas IV. With all his plans suddently upset, Syllaeus tried to repair the damage politically and for this made use of his freshly-found connec tions at the Emperor's court, including bribery. As in his contest with Herod, he chose a clever strategy and once more succeeded in striking one of the sensitive points in Roman policy: making the Emperor aware of the bitter truth that Aretas' coronation had not occurred with the Emperor's knowledge, as was required from the status of a Nabataean king, who was after all "an allied king and friend of the Roman people". In fact the Em peror was very angry about this, not even being conciliated by the letter and presents Aretas IV sent in order to pacify him, and angrily sent away the special ambassadors from Petra (Ant., XVI 2 9 6 — 1 9 7 ) . 100
101
102
Herod on his part also did not rest, for he refused to reconcile himself to the bitter fact that he was suspect in the Emperor's eyes. To try and cor rect the situation he therefore decided to send to Rome an additional delegation headed by Nicolaus of Damascus, his senior advisor and faithful confidant (Ant., XVI 299, 3 3 3 , 335ff). The latter succeeded in taking advantage of treachery in the camp of Syllaeus' supporters (seemingly following the accession of Aretas IV to the royal throne) to obtain in formation and documents proving his misdeeds and deceits, possibly even
100 Ant, XVI 296; cf. ibid., 337, 339. Apparently the scheme was to poison Obodas slowly and thereby conceal the part of Syllaeus played in the affair. Two bi-lingual inscriptions, one at Miletos and the other at Delos, can indirectly indicate the king's anticipated death, for in both there is the prayer "for Obodas' health" showing their writer Syllaeus (named in them "king's brother") already expected his death while on his way to Rome; details on these inscriptions see note 86 above. 101 It is reasonable to assume he was related in some way to the royal family, but nothing is known of this. It is however also possible he was a noble or high-ranking army officer, who took the op portunity to seize the throne. See also: Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p p . 5 1 - 5 2 . 102 In Hammond's opinion (The Nabataeans, p.25) all the remarks by Josephus concerning the Naba taean kingdom's dependence on Rome, as though only Rome was authorized to approve Aretas as king, are neither correct nor realistic. He believes the Romans had never ruled over the Naba taeans and that Aretas' political actions, as well as his coins and inscriptions also prove his in dependence. This opinion however is unsupported: Josephus did not invent these things. The political status of the Nabataean kingdom ever since the days of Pompey had been regulated by Rome, according to the best rules relating to "allied kings and friends of the Roman people". Otherwise Aretas IV would not have petitioned Augustus to recognize his kingship.
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succeeding in cooperating for this with agents of Aretas (ibid,, 336—337, 339). The opportunity for getting rid of Syllaeus was not slow in coming (apparently in 7 BCE), for in the political and legal contest conducted before Emperor Augustus between him and the delegation representing Aretas IV, Nicolaus of Damascus seized the right opportunity, directed the litigation into channels desirable for him and exposed the injustice caused to his master Herod by the wiles of the cunning rogue Syllaeus. Coopera tion between Aretas's representatives and Nicolaus may be clearly recog nized by the nature of the accusations Nicolaus raised against Syllaeus, for these referred at one and the same time to the interior level of intrigues at the Nabataean court itself and the exterior aspect of relations with He rod . This cooperation is not to be taken as a general reconciliation with the Nabataeans, but rather as cooperation occasioned by circumstances, di rected against the common and dangerous e n e m y . By the nature of things, Josephus extensively reviewed the legal arguments relating to the wrong done to Herod. As a clever lawyer, Nicolaus succeeded in presenting his master's military initiative against the Nabataeans as an action made necessary by the rules of Hellenistic-Roman laws and justice; he therefore argued that Herod had not exceeded his authority. In his words, Herod's limited military initiative was not to be regarded as war, but rather a legi timate means employed to enforce payment of a debt, especially since it was based on a document legally signed after juridical proceedings before the Syrian governor in Berytus. As proof, Nicolaus even brought the loan agreement made with the Nabataeans and the Arbitrator's decision — by the governor, acting as legal arbitrator — concerning repayments of the d e b t and the extradition of the robbers. After the successful and well-documented legal argument over the motive for Herod's action, Nicolaus • could review the military operation itself in a new and more persuasive manner. For ulterior motives and for obvious 103
104
10s
103 The murder of Obodas and of other Arab notables, as well as Syllaeus' adultery with Arab women were all matters of internal Nabataean concern, while his monetary borrowings without intention of repayment and distortion of the truth concerning Herod's attack directly affected Jewish-Nabataean relations. Accusations against Syllaeus of adultery with Roman women were only designed to invest his corruption with a sensational element, since this would probably make a stronger impact on Roman public opinion. 104 Against this circumstantial reconciliation it may be possible to explain the ties of women from the house of Herod's brother Pheroras with the Nabataean royal court (War, I 583; Ant., XVII 6 2 - 6 3 ) , especially since Pheroras himself also had connections there (War, I 590). 105 It is unclear how that debt grew from 60 to 500 talents - cf. Ant., XVII 279, 343. Possibly the large sum also included rent for the lease of Herodian land to the Nabataeans (ibid., 291) and perhaps the reference is also to personal loans given to Syllaeus himselfwhile he was still friendly with Herod.
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reasons, in his brief review he omitted mention of the location of the main battle and even succeeded in creating the impression that Herod had only taken defensive action, after the Arab army of the Nabataean commander Nakebos had attacked him (ibid., 350). In the list of his arguments he ap parently also included complaints from several cities of Nabataeans acts of robbery. Their identity was unfortunately not mentioned, but it may be supposed they were headed by Damascus, just as it had been in the days of Zenodorus (cf. Ant., XV 344ff) and apparently also the Phoenician cities of Tyre and Sidon, if to judge by their interests in the area from later events (cf. Ant., XVIII 1 5 2 - 1 5 4 ) . The Emperor was completely convinced by Nicolaus' arguments and finally ordered Syllaeus to return to his own country, arrange the matter of his financial debts to Herod, then return to Rome and prove to the court that he had obeyed the judgment (Ant., XVI 3 5 2 - 3 5 3 ) . It is not plausible that under those circumstances Syllaeus had already been condemned to death (as claimed by Josephus): it is hard to rely on a man condemned to death to settle his debts and return to Rome for execution of sentence. It is more reasonable to assume the judgement stated that Syllaeus would be subject to execution if he could not prove to the court that he had fulfilled his obligations as demanded. The political turn by Augustus in favor of Herod was impressive and perhaps even exaggerated. At first his intentions were to attach all the Nabataeans' land to Herod's kingdom and thereby also settle accounts with Aretas IV himself, but on second thoughts he decided not to do so, for on the same occasion he became aware of the extent of Herod's troubles at h o m e and decided "it would not be well to add another kingdom to Herod now that he was old and having trouble with his sons" (ibid., 355). For that reason he found it right to become reconciled with Aretas IV, received his envoys and his presents, confirmed his rule and went no further than an official reprimand of the hasty manner of the coronation performed without his own knowledge or consent (he. cit.). 1 0 6
This was a realistic and wise solution, leaving the Emperor all political options open for any action he might in future see fit to take in the region, meanwhile preserving the status quo there, one of the political guarantees for its preservation being traditional tactics of divide et impera in relations with Herod and Aretas. Herod on his part had learnt an important lesson from the whole affair and gave more energetic impetus to his settlement activities in the Trachonitis region (Ant., XVII 2 3 f f ) . 107
106 See extensively: Ant., XVII 2 2 9 - 2 7 0 , 3 0 0 - 3 3 4 ; War, I 4 8 8 - 5 3 5 . 107 Full details on the subject see note 79 above.
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In 6 BCE (or possibly the following year) the Syllaeus affair came to an e n d . He returned to Rome in order to report to the Emperor on his action in connection with what had previously been decreed (p. 171 above). From the parallel versions of Josephus in this affair it appears that Herod's son Antipatros and Syllaeus submitted simultaneous claims against each other, but it seems that this time Syllaeus was unlucky and his strategems and wiles no longer served him. In his renewed trial before Augustus, in the conduct of which Herod spared no financial c o s t s , representatives of Aretas IV also appeared and from the joint fabric of accusations the following picture emerged: Syllaeus had completely failed to fulfill the Emperor's decision of 9 BCE, relating to the repayment of his debts t o Herod; furthermore, he had tried through bribery to corrupt Phabatus, the Emperor's slave and financial agent (who had probably been sent to accom pany him and supervise performance of the financial part of the Emperor's decision) so as to distort the truth and ensure the latter's services for him self. Phatatus however had managed to play a double game and cunningly took an even bigger bribe from his rival Herod. In return he revealed a plot by Syllaeus to have Herod murdered by one of his bodyguards, someone of Arab origin called Corinthus. 108
109
When the plot was revealed, Herod succeeded in catching two addi tional Arabs who were partners to the murder plot, one the head of some Arab tribe and the other a close friend of Syllaeus. After questioning under torture they confessed their crime and after additional questioning by Saturninus governor of Syria they were sent t o Rome to stand trial . The double game played by Phabatus eventually cost him his life, it being Syl laeus of course who made sure this would be his fate (Ant., XVI 54), but not before accusing him of betraying the Emperor's interests for Herod's (War, I 575). It appears that in those circumstances the cunning rogue Syllaeus devised not just a single scheme for murder against the House of Herod and it is known that Herod's brother Pheroras was poisoned by his 110
108 Josephus described this in two versions (Ant., XVII 54ff; War, I 5 7 4 - 5 7 7 ) which are not iden tical, but are also not contradictory and it seems the one can be complemented with the help of the other. On the process of Syllaeus' downfall and liquidation see also: Otto, p. 129. See also: Volkmann, Zur Rechtsprechung im Prinzipat des Augustus, p p . 1 6 7 - 1 6 9 and see also note 69 above. 109 According to the version in War, I 606, the expenses reached around 200 talents, showing how interested Herod was in bringing him to trial (and having him found guilty), for the trial could at the same time also conclusively prove his own innocence before Augustus and thereby blot out the troubled chapter in his relations with Rome starting in 12 BCE. 110 The version in War, I 577 seems more reliable and fuller in this matter. It seems the trial of these two was linked with the reopened trial of Syllaeus himself (below).
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111
contrivance . As indicated, the Nabataean king Aretas IV on his part added similar accusations: "of having killed many of the notable men of Petra against his (Aretas') will, especially Soaemos, a man most deserving of esteem for his complete virtue" (Ant., XVII 54) and who was "one of the most powerful personages in Petra" (War, I 574). All these episodes were re-enacted at the renewed trial of Syllaeus in Rome and in the end, when it finally became clear that he was to blame for the failure of the military campaign of Egypt's governor Aelius Gallus at the Red Sea (25 BCE), his fate was sealed. In this connection it should be noted that Strabo also indicated (Geographica, XVI 4, 24, 782c) that Syllaeus was tried not just for this crime, but "also for other crimes" (= nal dXXa Kanovp-ycov). Since Strabo was the personal friend of Aelius Gallus the Egyptian governor, he focussed his attention on this aspect of Syllaeus' crimes and did not specify what were "the other crimes". Unfortunately, he did not give the date of Syllaeus' trial and execution and from this aspect his evidence may be complemented by that of Josephus . Herod did not live long enough to have satisfaction at the great downfall of his enemy Syllaeus, who in his intrigues could only be compared with Herod himself. He died shortly afterwards, in 4 BCE, and his kingdom rapidly submerged in a confusion of rebellions which brought in its wake energetic acts of repression under the command of the Syrian governor P. Quinctilius Varus and which in Jewish tradition are known as "The Varus War'''' ( o n x i o i a ? i s ). Prominent among the forces under the control of the Roman governor were units of auxiliaries sent by Aretas IV, including horsemen and infantry. No doubt the Nabataeans' participation in this war originated from the political obligations of their king Aretas IV as "allied king and friend of the Roman people", but the excessive zeal of his soldiers in performing deeds of robbing, burning and killing in Jew112
2
111 War, I 5 8 2 - 5 8 3 . In the parallel version of Ant., XVII 6 2 - 6 3 there is no clear exposition of Syllaeus's part and there is only mention in this connection of his mistress and his lady-friend, both Nabataean women. The remainder of this review by Josephus brings a completely different and quite tortuous version (ibid., 68ff.). Though having a parallel in War, I 592ff, this version makes it apparent that distinction must be made between two different conspiracies: a. The Nabataean poison plot, hatched between the women at Pheroras' court and Syllaeus with Antipatros (ibid., 582ff); b. The Egyptian poison plot, hatched by Antipatros, his uncle Theodion, Pheroras, his wife and others (ibid., 592ff.). It is hard to understand why the first plot was obscured in the Ant. version. The only plausible explanation is apologetics, designed to show Herod in a more tragic manner, as being persecuted on all sides by his own family and thereby to some degree justifying his behavior. On alternate and additional explanations which could cast doubt on the credibility of this version by Josephus, see: Otto, p. 145. 112 For a summary of the political liquidation of Syllaeus, carried out in two legal stages, see note 108 above.
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ish villages doubtlessly arose from feelings of hatred, from strong and longlived Nabataean enmity for the Jews and for Herod (Ant., XVII 287, 2 8 9 - 2 9 0 ; War, II 6 8 - 7 0 ) . The locations where the Nabataeans 'distinguish ed' themselves in acts of plunder, arson and murder were two villages named Arus (ApouO and Sappho ( S a ^ o i ) , the first identified with the vil lage of Haris in Samaria, some 16 km. south-west of Nablus (Sichem), the second with Sappho in Judaea, some 12 km. north-east of E m m a u s . There was historically quite a symbolic element in the re-appearance of Nabataean army units within Judaea in those days, for all remembered a similar appearance of such as these in the days of the Roman conquest (63 BCE); in both cases they participated in the crushing of Jewish sover eignty by the Romans. History it seems jested one more time, for in the days of the Great Jewish Revolt, forming part of Vespasian's auxiliaries, it brought the Nabataean units back once again — to the smoking ruins of Jerusalem (War, III 68). Then too, they put their hands to plunder and rob bery and did not refrain from monstrous acts, such as the disembowelling of Jewish fugitives in order to search them for gold coins and other valu ables, which even aroused the disgust of the Romans themselves. Apart from the eagerness to plunder for its own sake, they were no doubt led by feelings of deep hatred for their Jewish enemies, that same hatred doubt lessly feeding on the woeful historic memories which Herod inflicted on them. 113
The Tetrarchs Philip (4 B C E - 3 4 CE) and Herod Antipas (4 BCE - 39 CE) After Herod's death and the end of the "Varus War", great calm de scended on relations between Jews and Nabataeans, mainly thanks to the restrained policies of the rulers on both sides, Aretas IV on the one side and the Herodian tetrarchs on the other. From the little to be learnt from epigraphy, the impression may be received that the expression "lover of his people" (= n a y n m ) by which Aretas IV was known and which is an equivalent term to philodemons in Greek, was designed to stress his mod eration and congenial relations with his people and their affairs , and probably reflects his political moderation in general. The relative prolifera tion of Nabataean inscriptions at Dedan, in the necropolis of Hejra (in the 114
113 See Abel, Geographic II, pp.251, 448; Avi-Yonah, Historical Geography, pp. 108, 122; idem, Gazetteer, pp.32, 92; Marcus, Josephus, VIII, p.507, notes 3 - 4 . 114 See Gutschmidt, Kleine Schriften, IV, p.l 16, and cf. Schiirer, I , p.582. s
The Tetrarchs Philip and Herod Antipas
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Arabian peninsula) and in the Sinai peninsula indicates the direction of activity and interests of Aretas IV. It would be reasonable to assume that the constantly growing importance of the province of Syria in the Roman Empire, following the growing tension in the Parthian theatre, led the Nabataeans to the conclusion that they had no reasonable chance of ex tending their sphere of influence to the north and they therefore wanted t o concentrate their major efforts in the southern regions. This in itself is enough to understand the meaning of the calm in rela tions with the rulers of the Herodian family, whose tetrarchies were in the regions north of the Nabataean kingdom - especially since they enjoyed full political protection of the Syrian province and the close friendship of its governors. As indicated above Philip and Herod Antipas, unlike their father, were in addition moderate rulers, lacking ambition for territorial expansion and high political aspirations of the kind which had character ized their father. Both devoted themselves more to interior matters of their tetrarchies, with the bulk of their energies and resources going t o in creased Hellenization among their subjects . Philip's tetrarchy included "Batanaea, Trachonitis, Auranitis and a cer tain portion of what was called the domain of Zenodorus" (Ant., XVII, 3 1 9 ) . Although the population of Trachonitis was quite mixed (Jews, Nabataeans, Ituraeans and citizens of Hellenistic cities) and crowded into a relatively small area, we know of no friction or dispute whatever during Philip's rule. It seems we will not err in ascribing this to his moderate and clear-sighted policies and the supreme personal devotion to the well-being of all inhabitants, while meticulously maintaining equality and mutual consideration. The existence of pagan settlements and sanctuaries alongside expressly Jewish settlements (such as the sanctuary at E-Senamin of our day, lying very close to the centre of the well-known Jewish village Bathyra) clearly shows t h i s . According to Josephus (War, III 58), co-existence 115
1 1 6
117
115 More will be said later on their Hellenizatory politics. Political moderation was specifically at tributed by Josephus to Philip - see: Ant., XVIII 1 0 6 - 1 0 8 ; a moderate, balanced and wise policy is however also to be attributed to Herod Antipas, at least to the end of his days as tetrarch, as will be seen below. 116 Cf. also Ant., XVII 189; War, II 95 (and 'lanveiav should be corrected to TlavetdSa, cf.: Schiirer, I , p.567, note 33). As will be remembered, the estate of Zenodorus also included the region of Paneas and Ulatha (or Huleh) - cf. Ant., XV 360 and see also p.159 and note 78. In the New Testament (Luke, 3:1) Philip is described as "tetrarch of Ituraea and Trachonitis" (=TerpaxovvT0
pa) P-HO, 1.27f.; p.166, 1.1, see also: Dussaud, La penetration des Arabes en Syrie avant VIslam, pp. 1 7 6 - 1 7 8 ; Schottroff, ZPDV, XCVIII (1982), pp.l30ff. s
s e e
117 The following is a list of sites where pagan temples have been found: El-Mushanaf, See'ia (or Sei'a), El-Qanawat in Auranitis, Suwieda and Tzur in Trachonitis, Aerobe (or Aqrabe) in North ern Batanaea. Full details: Dar, Hermon and its Foothills, p p . 4 2 - 4 6 ; Applebaum, Hermon and
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of Jews and 'Syrians' (a term used to describe this mixed population) in the whole region from Trachonitis in the east, to the city of Julias (namely Bethsaida in the past) in the west also continued during the reign of Agrip pa II, most probably the heritage from Philip's rule. Instructive epigraphic evidence have remained in the Auranitis region from the remains of the Nabataean cultic centre to the gods Dushara and Ba'al-Shaemln, established at Seei'a (= Seeia) by Canatha (today Qanawat). Construction of this centre had already begun in 3 3 / 3 2 BCE during Herod's reign, continuing until its completion in 1/2 CE in the reign of Philip the Tetrarch (see note 36 above). The absence of any mention of Nabataean kings reigning at the time (i.e. Obodas II and Aretas IV) as against mention of D S 7 i 3 K J m K a (= our master Philip) for dating one of the inscriptions (30/29 CE) proves beyond any doubt that politically the place was under his rule, showing the Nabataean colony there had been allowed to maintain its cult without interference and enjoyed the full protection of the tolerant Jewish tetrarch. On the other hand, there are mufflled echoes of some political unrest on Mount Lebanon itself, close to the border of Philip's tetrarchy, in one of the inscriptions from the days of the Syrian governor P. Sulpicius Quirinius, or more accurately from the date of the well-known census which he con ducted in Syria and Judaea in 6/7 CE. The inscription perpetuates the words of one of his prefects, an officer named Q. Aemilius Secundus, who inter alia reports that "when I was sent by Quirinius against the Ituraeans, I conquered one of their forts on Mount Lebanon", and according to the beginning of the inscription these words refer to a military operation con ducted to enforce the c e n s u s . The fact that in the same year in connec tion with the census the Romans had met with armed resistance from the Ituraeans of course indicates that the Jews were not alone to react by resistance. Unfortunately it is not clear which parts of the Ituraean tetrar chy was detached and incorporated in the province of Syria in the course of this military operation; there is also no information whatever of any connection or coordination between the Jewish revolt headed by Judas the Galilean and the insubordinate Ituraeans mentioned in the inscription. The temptation to think there was some connection between them is very great, but unfortunately it is completely unproven and will therefore re main just a conjectured possibility. The position of Herod Antipas in his relations with his Arab neighbors to the south (i.e. the Nabataeans) and with the Roman authorities of the 118
its Foothills, p p . 1 5 - 1 6 . It is worth noting that a characteristic syncretism formed in these regions, whereby the Greco-Roman gods replaced the local Semitic ones, a process noted some time ago by Smith, Historical Geography, p.420. 118 Bibliographic details from Schiirer, I , pp.259, 405, 563. s
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province of Syria was much more sensitive and complex. The fact that there is no indication of political or military conflict between him and the rulers in Petra until the last years of his long reign requires explanation. It seems there is no escaping the conclusion that the two sides tried to pre serve political restraint and consciously wanted as far as possible to main tain good neighborly relations. Nevertheless, Herod Antipas acted with great caution and reinforced the defensive system of his tetrarchy in successful combination with his urban and hellenizatory policy. This for example found prominent expression in the conversion of the ruined settlement of Beth ha-Ramtha (known in Greek as Br)Qapaii
120
121
122
123
s
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119 On the change of names see: Jones, CERP, p.275; Schiirer, I , p.342 ; I I , p p . 1 7 4 - 1 7 6 . 120 Details on the Nabataean princess see: Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.59 note 1. 121 Cf. Suetonius, Augustus, 48, stating that Augustus joined the kings who were allies to Rome among each other by mutual family links, always being ready and willing to serve as go-between or initiator for any possible marriage and connection of friendship. See also Schiirer, I , p.342. This was a typical Augustan device designed to assist the implementation of the policy of Pax Romana, in order to ensure peace and prosperity and prevent unnecessary disturbances in the Empire. s
s
122 See: Plummer, St. Luke (ICC), p.349; Schiirer, I , p.342 and note 5 ; Hoehner, Herod Antipas, pp.343-347. 123 Matthew 24:3ff; Mark 6 : 1 4 - 2 9 ; Luke 3 : 1 9 - 2 0 . We will not be able to discuss the chronological problem associated with this event, about the solution of which a great deal of ink has already
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It appears that the political marriage did not in the long run succeed in permanently bridging the differences between the two sides. In fact it may be said that the marriage merely postponed renewal of the conflict to a later date. In detail and in the best traditions of Hellenistic fiction taken from the source he used, Josephus reviewed the breach of this marriage (Ant., XVIII 109ff). His readers are provided with a description in the form of a fascinating love story, secretly woven between Herod Antipas and Herodias, daughter of Aristobulus, Herod's Hasmonaean son executed in 7 BCE, and sister of Agrippa I. It seems the worthy lady conducted her love affair with Herod Antipas while still married to his brother (from a differ ent m o t h e r ) , Philip the Tetrarch. According to Josephus the story of this affair was whispered to Aretas' daughter, but she pretended to know nothing, especially since under the guise of innocence she had asked her husband Herod Antipas to let her visit and stay in the Machaerus fortress on the Peraea border with the Nabataean k i n g d o m , also asking him for suitable escort on her way to visit her father, while Herod Antipas himself was paying a visit to Rome. Her request was granted without suspicion and thus she reached Petra with a close escort of, in succession, the local com manders (strategoi), both of her husband Herod Antipas and her father Aretas IV in t u r n . When Aretas himself heard of the affair, he was very angry "and made this the start of a quarrel (against Herod Antipas)" (Ant., XVIII 113). 124
125
126
been split. We therefore merely indicate the date accepted by the majority of scholars - see also: Hoehner, Herod Antipas, p p . 3 0 7 - 3 1 2 . Schurer ( I , p.344) avoided adopting a dogmatic stand and generally argued that in the last decade of his reign (i.e. approximately in the years 2 6 - 3 6 CE) Herod Antipas was under the influence of his wife Herodias. Further details relating to the imprisonment and death of John the Baptist, see recently: Nir, The Image of John the Baptist, p p . 7 9 - 9 5 , including extensive bibliography and clear historical analysis. 124 Philip, or Herod Philip by his full name, was we know the son of Herod and Mariamme daughter of Simon son of Boethus (the High Priest), while Herod Antipas was the son of Herod and Malthace the Samaritan. 125 From the evidence given by Josephus (Ant., XVIII 112) the impression may be received that the Machaerus fortress was at that time under the control of Aretas IV the Nabataean, yet from other reports in his writings we know the fort was in fact in Jewish territory, see for example: War, II 486; VII 1 6 3 - 1 7 7 and esp. ibid., 111. Important further to remember that John the Baptist was put to death by Herod Antipas in the Machaerus fort (Ant., XVIII Matthew 14:3ff; Mark 6 : 1 4 - 2 9 ; Luke 3 : 1 9 - 2 0 ) , showing the place was within his tetrarchy. The suggestion by Schurer ( I , p . 3 4 4 - 3 4 5 , note 20) to correct the text in this matter is quite reasonable, especially since it can resolve the difficulty. 126 The title strategos was also current among the Nabataeans (and in the Aramaic they used: KAn "ION , which of course indicates the influence of Hellenistic culture. Examples of the use of this title in inscriptions at Medeba and its vicinity, not far from the Machaerus fortress, see: Jones, CHRP, p p . 2 9 1 - 2 9 2 ; Feldman, Josephus, IX, p.79, note e; Hoehner, Herod Antipas, p p . l 4 3 - 1 4 4 ; c f . also Negev, Masters of the Desert, p.14. p p . 1 8 2 - 1 8 3 . 5
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The Tetrarchs Philip and Herod Antipas
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Map 16: The Division of Herod's Kingdom (4 BCE) and Herod Antipas' War against the Nabataeans (36 CE)
From here on and without a break, Josephus went on to the border dispute in the "district of Gamala" (=ev jft TH r a / m X i T i S i ) , which he said developed into a proper war. His description may create the impression that dissolution of the marriage to the Nabataean princess and outbreak of the border war between Herod Antipas and Aretas IV were two chronolo gically contiguous and adjoining events. This impression however is com pletely wrong and is to be totally rejected. If we carefully examine the text 1 2 7
127 The usual textual correction accepted by the majority.of scholars who maintain it should be VapaXinSi (see for example details by Feldman, Josephus, IX, p p . 8 0 - 8 1 note a) does not stand up to geographic-historic criticism, as we shall see below pp. 1 8 2 - 1 8 3 . Identification of the place
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and the context in which Josephus placed the affair of Herodias, we will find all his chronological references except one were of a later date and refer to a time which is later than 36 CE and the one earlier date refers to 34 C E . From this it clearly follows that the border dispute broke out in 36 CE or shortly before then. It is reasonable to believe that Josephus merely wanted to precede it with an impressive background story and that he therefore introduced here the Herodias affair, as being the principal cause for the break between Herod Antipas and Aretas IV. In fact there was a gap of about eight years between annulment of the marriage and the out break of war. The family rift which as indicated had already occurred in 28 CE, at most only added an additional embellishment to the border dis pute but the real reasons were we believe quite different. The circumstantial background to the dispute apparently lay in the 'war of succession' over Philip's tetrarchy, which began immediately after his death in 34 CE. Emperor Tiberius in this case adopted a policy insuffi ciently defined, perhaps even deliberately obscure, seen to be marked by impermanency. On the one hand he annexed the tetrarchy to the Province of Syria, yet on the other he also preserved its identity and its administra tive and fiscal separation (Ant., XVIII 108). Possibly this political arrange ment created the impression that it was not the last word on the fate of the tetrarchy, the Emperor taking this special step to allow him to form a clearer and more determined policy in the near future. The fact that for about 10 years ( 2 1 - 3 1 CE), the Roman governor L. Aelius Lamia had not been present in Syria , could have been interpreted by Aretas IV as a lack of any Roman consolidated policy on this question. It is not clear to what degree if at all there was a change in Roman policy after this, i.e. between 3 2 - 3 5 CE, during the governorship of Pomponius Flaccus . At all events 128
129
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of Gamala is also strongly disputed (see extensively: Avi-Yonah, Gazetteer, p.58; Bar-Kochva, ZPDV, XLII (1976), p p . 5 4 - 7 1 ) , whether it lay on the rock south of the Nahr el-Ruqqad at Tell el-Ahdab or Tell e-Dra, by the Arab village which to this day is known as Jamie (as AviYonah and Bar-Kochva believe), or whether it lay on the cliff of Khirbet el-Salaam in Wadi Daliah below the Arab village of Dir Karuakh (thus according to the identification accepted by the majority of scholars today, further supported by the recent archeological excavations by S. Gutmann). One way or another, at least the "district of Gamala" (i.e. the extent of the chora of Gamala) also extended south of the Nahr el-Ruqqad, else the name Gamala would not have been preserved in that region to this day. 128 The following is a list of dates together with the appropriate references: Ant., XVIII 89 - return of Pontius Pilate to Rome between the end of December 36 CE and mid-February 37 CE; loc.cit - death of Emperor Tiberius March 17 37 CE; ibid., 90ff - visit by Vitellius to Jerusalem in 37 CE (at earliest in spring); ibid., 9 6 - 1 0 5 - pact of friendship between Vitellius and Artabanos the Parthian in 36 CE (or perhaps even 37 CE); ibid., 106 - death of Philip the Tetrarch in 34 CE. See also : Bowersock, Roman Arabia, pp.65 - 6 6 , and also p. 182 and note 134 below. 129 See Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.67 and note 82. He argues the absence of a Roman governor in the Province of Syria could have been a fitting explanation for the initiative taken by Aretas IV. 130 In Bowersock's opinion (loc.cit), it is very doubtful if he ever served as governor in Syria.
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he left no impression whatever in Syria, so that the real change only took place on the occasion of the appointment of Vitellius as governor of the Syrian province in 35 CE, following the growing tension on the Parthian border . It would be logical to believe that Herod Antipas saw himself as the natural and obvious heir to Philip's tetrarchy, since its previous owner was after all his own brother, especially as the latter had died without an heir; for this reason Herod Antipas apparently hoped the new governor (i.e. Vitellius) would help him. However there is reason to believe that Emperor Tiberius himself no longer wanted to give him Philip's tetrarchy, apparent ly because he did not think him as fitted as his father Herod had been to take charge of Syria's southern security cordon (cf. pp. 160— 162 above) and particularly in view of growing activities by the Parthians in those very days. Possibly the Emperor's hesitancy was interpreted by Aretas IV as a sign auguring a deviation from Rome's policy, pro-Herodian till then; this could have been made even stronger by information of Vitellius' anger against Herod Antipas, because of the part he had taken in the political negotiatios with the Parthians (Ant., XVIII 1 0 5 ) . Abel on the other hand suggusted a different, but no less logical explanation for the warlike initiative by Aretas IV the Nabataean king. He thinks that with both Vitellius and Herod Antipas absent from the Eretz-Israel Syrian scene on the occasion of their political preoccupation in the peace negotiations with the Parth ians, Aretas had simply seized the opportunity to attack the "district of Gamala" (r\ rafxaXurj), attached in theory only to the Province of Syria but in fact under the control of Herod Antipas . Since the report by Josephus on this affair is laconic in the extreme and gives no details of its development, not even a date connected with it, it is very hard with any degree of certainty to reconstruct its progress and the circumstances under which it occurred. One way or another, the dispute between Aretas IV and Herod Antipas over the "district of Gamala" must 131
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131 On the Parthian background to the affair see: Debevoise, A Political History ofParthia, p.l 57ff. 132 As we know, Herod Antipas caused Vitellius considerable embarrassment, especially since he also greatly injured his prestige, by being first to report to Emperor Tiberius on the signing of the peace treaty with Artabanos the Parthian, to which Vitellius had been prime sponsor (Ant., XVIII 1 0 1 - 1 0 5 ) . Though this grievance is not to be regarded as a proper breach between Herod Antipas and Vitellius, since later on they cooperated in the military campaign planned by Vitel lius against Petra (Ant., XVIII 122, and see also p. 183 below), the existence of such a grievance and the possibility of exploiting it cannot be ignored. 133 See Abel, Histoire, I, p.442 and he was followed by Hoehner, Herod Antipas, p.255. To Abel's credit it may be said that he did not incline to alter Josephus' text and even maintained it was rj FavakiKri, and like him also Starcky (Dictionnaire, col.914) and Bowersock (Roman Arabia, p p . 6 5 - 6 6 ) . Incidentally, in this connection it is important to note that the very same expression also recurs in War, III 59, where it clearly refers to a complete toparchy.
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we think be explained against the background of events in 36 CE, so that it connects properly and specifically with the war of succession over the land of the late Philip's tetrarchy . Recently, Bowersock has even added a logical reason for the Nabataeans' attack in that area, holding that con quest of Gaulanitis would have given them important strategic advantages in the struggle with Herod Antipas, representing a serious threat to He rod's reign itself. It is logical to believe that Herod Antipas hoped the military initiative by Aretas IV against himself would lead to a RomanNabataean political confrontation, for Aretas had thereby exceeded his authority as "allied king and friend of the Roman people", similar to what at the time had happened (in reverse) with his father Herod. Thus it seems we must understand the fact that he officially submitted a serious protest to Emperor Tiberius; surprisingly, the latter reacted beyond his expectations and ordered his governor Vitellius to declare war on Aretas IV, to take him prisoner in chains or to deliver his cut-off head (Ant., XVIII 115, 125). There is also reason to believe that Herod Antipas had hoped the outcome of this was would conclude with the annexation of Philip's tetrarchy to his own, but the sudden death of Tiberius upset all his plans. As indicated above (note 127), the attempt by some scholars to correct Josephus' text (Ant., XVIII 113) to read ra/Ja\t'rt5t or ra/JaXuaj and thereby move the scene of the war between Aretas IV and Herod Antipas to the South does not stand up to simple geographic criticism . After 134
135
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134 Starcky was also guided by this reasoning, except he did not support his view by textual or geographic-historic analysis - see: Starcky, BA, XVIII (1955), p p . 9 7 - 9 8 . On the date of the war see: Smallwood, JJS, V (1954), pp. 1 9 - 2 0 , Schurer, I , p . 3 5 0 - 3 5 1 . 135 Cf. further: Hoehner, Herod Antipas, p p . 2 5 4 - 2 5 5 , n.4: Jones, CERP, p.449, n.19.; Schurer, I , p.350; Smallwood, Jews under Roman Rule, p p . 1 8 6 - 1 8 7 and note 23; Negev, Masters of the Desert, p.65. It seems this textual amendment is also based on biblical mentions of a people called Gebal (Psalms, 83:8) mentioned together with Edom, Ishmael, Moab, Ammon and Ama lek. Connected with that people (or tribe) there is also a tract of land in biblical Edom, south east of the Dead Sea, called ro/3oXin? or rePaXnvri and it is mentioned for example by Josephus, Ant., II 6; III 40; IX 188; see also: Eusebius, Onomastikon, p . 1 0 2 , 1 . 2 5 ; p . l 0 4 , 1 . 1 - 2 . Jonath an Targum (a) of Genesis (36:8); ibid.. Gen., 32:4; see also Mazar: Biblical Encyclopaedia, II, p p . 4 0 3 - 4 0 4 . The place is also remembered from Talmudic tradition, e.g. B. Ketuboth, 112a; B. Yebamoth, 46a. 136 Though he did not admit it, it seems Negev was aware of this geographic difficulty and therefore offered quite a sophisticated solution, by which the Gabaloth region was the hilly region of all Biblical Edom. In his opinion the name (Gebal) should link up with the arabic word j'ebel or j'ib'al meaning mountain or mountains, hence Gabalitis (or Gabalene) he thinks should be interpreted as "land of mountains", which is also most appropriate for Edom - see: Negev, ANRW, II, 8, p p . 5 3 0 - 5 3 1 . It must be admitted the solution is clever and captivating, but this cannot explain away the most significant fact in this context, which is the presence of fugitives from Philip's tetrarchy in that particular region. Negev incidentally was himself aware that there was no corroboration from Josephus to these proposals and this is enough to cast a shadow of doubt on his suggestion. s
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all, the region of Gabaloth lay far to the south of the Arnon river (i.e. south of the border between Peraea and the Nabataean kingdom) deep in the region southeast of the Dead S e a . Moreover, the involvement of "some refugees, who had come from the tetrarchy of Philip" (Ant., XVIII 114) in the military operations between Aretas IV and Herod Antipas is not at all plausible if the reference is to the southern region of Gabaloth; not so in connection with the "district of Gamala" from whose vicinity those fugi tives had come. Furthermore, the location of the "districts of Gamala" as a toparchy within the borders of Philip's tetrarchy which also extends to areas south of the Nahr el-Ruqqad (note 127 above), also fits well to the description by Josephus of the nature of the war, which in fact was no more than a border dispute (Ant., XVIII 113). It appears that the "district of Gamala" bordered not only on the Naba taean kingdom and Philip's tetrarchy but also on the chora of the cities of Gadara and Hippus which had been annexed to the Province of Syria. In fact, the armed conflict between Aretas IV and Herod Antipas in this particular region could throw some light on the reasons for the prepara tions made by Vitallius for a campaign against the Nabataeans at the end of that year (or the winter of 37 CE) on the order of Emperor Tiberius (Ant., XVIII 1 2 0 - 1 2 5 ) . The "district of Gamala" had after all also been annexed to the Province of Syria and there is therefore every reason to believe that Aretas's attack in the same region was of the nature of a casus belli for Rome. It is very doubtful if Emperor Tiberius would have been alarmed enough to declare war on the Nabataeans in the case of a marginal border conflict in so remote a region as Gabaloth, which was not an integral part of the province they controlled. At most he would have reprimanded the aggressor and warned him, as at the time Augustus had acted towards Herod. However, the death of Tiberius and the coronation of Gaius Calligula as Emperor (16th May 37 CE) cut short Vitellius' preparations and military moves at the very last moment. 137
1 3 8
137 In fact there was also a tendency to correct to ra\a6m<;, as was done in the past by Schiirer, ( I , p.445). Also following him at first was Abel (Geographie II, p.158) except that he later changed his mind (Histoire, I, p.442). Starcky (Dictionnaire, col. 914) inclined to this correction, apparently following those before him. At first the correction seems quite plausible, at least from the aspect of the geographic logic behind it, but in fact it raises palaeographic difficulties which cannot easily be overcome - cf. Feldman, Josephus, IX, p.80, note a; Schiirer, I , p.350, note 80. Schalit's attempt to identify Gamala here with Beth-Gamul mentioned in Jeremiah (48:23) as a place within the borders of Moab (Schalit, Namenwdrterbuch zu Flavius Josephus, p.32) is geographically improbable because of its distance from the borders of Peraea; cf. also BarKochva's reasoning (ZPVD, XCII (1976), p.59, n.14) and see also note 133 above. 138 Since Tiberius died March 16 37 CE, it is reasonable to believe the preparations for Vitellius' military campaign were made in the winter of 36/37 CE. 5
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King Agrippa I (37-44 CE) Only a short time after ascending the throne in Rome, the new Emperor made Agrippa I king of his uncle Philip's tetrarchy as well as over part of the Ituraean tetrarchy of Lyssanias around the city of A b i l e n e . It appears he was not the only one to benefit from the Emperor's favors in those days: also in this vicinity, Soaemus was crowned king of Ituraeans in the region extending from the city of Heliopolis as far as the vicinity of Laodiceia in Lebanon . The information we have on the political arrangements made in the region at that time include one more detail which is insufficiently clear and raises considerbale difficulties. The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (11:32) says "in Damascus the ethnarcb of King Areta (Ape'ra) kept the city of the Damascenes with a garrison" and that Saul of Tarsus (the wellknown Christian apostle Paul) fled from him for his life, after having been lowered outside the city walls in a basket, through the window of one of the houses there (cf. Acts of the Apostles, 9:23—25). No doubt the king's name is a corruption of the spelling Ape'daq, the accepted Greek form of the name Aretas, and the reference in this context is of course to Aretas IV the Nabataean king. This could give the impression that Damascus at that time was ruled by the Nabataeans and that for some reason or other the Romans had entrusted it to Aretas, or that he had con quered it under some obscure circumstance . Even though such an im pression is false, Starcky tried to resolve the difficulty with the logical argument that since the term 'ethnarch' usually signifies an independent ruler of a definite ethnic group living in some particular place (such as; politeuma), he could reasonably be identified with the head of a Nabataean colony (or congregation) living in Damascus . This solution might be com139
140
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139 Philo, In Flaccum, 25; Josephus, Ant., XVIII 237, War, II 181; Cassius Dio, LIX,8, 2;cf. Ant., XIX 275; XX 138; War, I 103. Schurer believed there were two men named Lysanias, the one son and heir to Ptolemy son of Mennaeus who was executed at the instigation of Anthony and Cleopatra, whereas the second was tetrarch of Abilene, who lived some two generations later see Schurer, (4, p.716ff.; idem, I , p p . 5 6 7 - 5 6 9 ; Stein, RE(PW), XIII (1927), cols. 2507ff.; Altheim-Stiehl, p.319; see also: Schottroff, ZDPV, XCVIII (1982), p.138, 1 4 1 - 1 4 2 , 143 and note 91. 140 Cassius Dio, LIX, 12, 2; see Schurer, I , p.569; Schottroff, op.cit., p p . 1 4 4 - 1 4 5 . On relations of Gaius Galligula with other kings, cf.: Box, Philonis Alexandrini in Flaccum, p.83; Stern, "Reign of Agrippa I", p.l 23. 141 That in fact is what other scholars believed - e.g., see: Grohmann, RE(PW), XVI (1935), col. 1463; Schurer, I , p . 5 8 1 - 5 8 2 (and note 25); idem, I I , p p . 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 (and note 223); AltheimStiehl, p.298. 142 Starcky, Dictionnaire, col. 915; idem, AAAS, XXI (1971). He was followed by Bowersock, s
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plemented by the suggestion that he was the city governor of Damascus (as well as head of the Nabataean congregation), who had been appointed by the Syrian governor in consultation with Aretas IV, and hence his title "ethnarch of King Areta". How can this be? Examination of Josephus' writing (Ant., XVIII 152— 154) shows that after the death of Philip the Tetrarch a new neighbors' quarrel broke out between the cities of Damascus and Sidon over the southern Ituraean territories (i.e. the remains of the Zenodorus and Lyssanias tetrarchies), each city striving to enlarge its chora. Since both cities as well as the contested areas were under the control of the Province of Syria, the dispute was heard before the Syrian governor L. Pomponius Flaccus. The probable date for this event is some time during 35 CE, after Philip's death and before that of the Syrian governor. Going through his friend Agrippa I (before he had been crowned king), Damascus tried to influence the governor; Agrippa's brother Aristobulus foiled this by making public the fact of the acceptance of a bribe the Damascenes put into Agrip pa's pocket so he should advance their case with the governor . L. Pom ponius Flaccus died suddenly, apparently before he had the time to form a clear policy on the dispute. Vitellius, his successor to the position of governor, being very worried by involvement in the tangle of Parthian politics, was also not immediately free to devote himself to this case. It seems the earliest he could have found the time to deal with this problem was the last year of Emperor Tiberius' reign (i.e. 36 C E ) , but it is more reasonable to assume he 143
144
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Roman Arabia, p.69. The revised edition of Schiirer, I , p.582, disputed Starcky's opinion, argu ing that from the words of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians arises the clear conclusion that the same ethnarch was governor of the city of Damascus. Though many must also have considered the evidence in the Acts of the Apostles (9:23—25), which tells of the persecution of Paul by the Jews of Damascus without mentioning the Nabataean governor there, they did not find it contradictory evidence, but rather complementary - see for example: Plummer, / / Cor inthians (ICC), p.334; Rackham, The Acts etc., p. 138. Though precedence of the historic source on which / / Cor. was based and its authenticity (on this see : Plummer, op.cit., Intr., p.xiff) can verify the information itself, the simple literal interpretation is liable to mislead us into thinking that Damascus really was under the rule of Aretas the Nabataean (see also below). In any case, another report in the New Testament on Paul's journeys and wanderings clearly indicates the distinction between Arabia and Damascus (Epistle to the Gala dans, 1:17, and cf. 4:25), according to which the rule of Arabia did not extend to Damascus; see also: Burton, Galatians (ICC), p p . 5 7 - 5 8 . 143 Agrippa was expelled from Damascus and made his way to Italy, where he arrived after an ardu ous journey via Ptolemais (=Acco), Anthedon (by Gaza), Alexandria and Puteoli (Ant., XVIII 1 5 5 - 1 6 0 ) . His arrest by Emperor Tiberius seemingly occurred at the end of 36 CE, while his release by Gaius Calligula happened a few days after the murder of Tiberius (March 16 37 CE). These chronological calculations concerning the adventures of Agrippa allow us with greater certainty to date the dispute between Damascus and Sidon in 35 CE, which we believe arose fol lowing the general upheaval in the region following Philip's death. 144 Inclined to this possibility was Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.68.
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actually did so only during the first year in the reign of Emperor Gaius Calligula (that is 37 CE), as part of the political arrangements (such as the coronation of Agrippa I and Soaemus the Ituraean) made in the whole region at the instigation of the new Emperor. It is not clear how the dispute was finally resolved, who won and who if anyone lost; it is even very likely that it ended in a compromise which satisfied both sides. In any case, the fact to be remembered in this connection is that in the reign of Calligula, Damascus ceased striking coins bearing the image of the Roman Emperor and resumed regular autonomic municipal minting, including the traditional use of the Seleucid numbering of years . If here we accept the evidence of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (11:32), i.e. of a Nabataean ethnarch ruling in the city, we may take this as one of the expressions of political autonomy which Calligula had grant ed Damascus in those days. We think it reasonable to believe this was done in consultation with Aretas IV, perhaps even as a form of compensation for the far-reaching favors the Emperor had lavished on his neighbors Agrippa I and Somaeus the Ituraean, so preventing any frustrated feelings of anger and jealousy . One way or another, such a step would conform to and re semble the way the Emperor had dealt with the others. In 39 CE the Emperor deprived Herod Antipas, Agrippa I's other uncle of his post of tetrarch and in 40 CE gave his tetrarchy also to Agrippa I . In 41 CE, on the accession of Claudius to the throne, the areas of Judaea and Samaria were also attached to Agrippa's kingdom, as well as the Abi lene district — one of the remains of the Lysanias tetrarchy — and what remained of the Emperor's private holdings on Mount L e b a n o n . At Agrippa's request, Claudius also made his elder brother Herod king of Chalcis (War, II 217; Ant., XIX 277). The latter had strong family ties by marriage with the Herodian family at large and with that of Agrippa I in particu l a r . As demonstrated for example at the convention of kings in Tiberias 1 4 s
146
1 4 7
148
149
145 The latest coin bearing the image of Emperor Tiberius was from the year 33/34 CE - see: Schurer, I , p.582, note 25; idem I I , p.129. 146 Cf. Smith, Historical Geography, p p . 4 1 3 - 4 1 4 , note 10. 147 Ant., XVIII 252; War, II 183. On the chronolocigal difficulty in reconstructing these events see: Schurer, I , p p . 3 5 2 - 3 5 3 , note 4 2 ; D. R. Schwartz, p p . 6 7 - 6 8 . 148 Ant., XIX 2 7 4 - 2 7 5 ; War, II 2 1 5 - 2 1 7 . The Emperor's private holdings on Mount Lebanon most probably were within the borders of the Ituraean tetrarchy of Lysanias (see War, loc.cit). See also Schwartz, op.cit., p.70. 149 According to Josephus, Herod of Chalcis was first married to Herod's grand-daughter Mariamme (and daughter of Olympias daughter of Herod and Joseph son of Joseph, Herod's brother) from whom he had a son called Aristobulus who married Salome (daughter of Herodias and widow of Philip the Tetrarch) and was eventually made king by Nero over Little Armenia (Ant., XVIII 134, 137; XX 158; War, II 252). Herod of Chalcis' second wife was Berenice, daughter of Agrippa I, whom he married on ascending the throne in Chalcis (Ant., XIX 277, 354; War, II 220 and see: Schurer, I , p p . 5 7 1 - 5 7 2 ) . s
s
s
s
King Agrippa!
187
(see below), these ties ensued political cooperation between the two rulers and contributed considerably to the future ties between Ituraeans and Jews. The Jews' relations with the Arab sector within the borders of the former tetrarchies of Philip and Herod Antipas are an unknown quantity, since nothing has been reported on this in our sources; we can therefore only assume that, like the two tetrarchs and his grandfather Herod, Agrippa I also continued to maintain correct relations with the non-Jewish inhabi tants there. At all events, he must have continued the policy of his prede cessors on the subjects of urbanization, administration and the army. One of the inscriptions found near the city of Canatha (today El-Qanawath, north-east of Suweida) in western Auranitis, apparently from 41 CE, is addressed to the cave dwellers in the whole region (Trachonitis and Aurani tis) asking them to give up their nomadic life in the wild and become per manent settlers living in proper h o u s e s . In spite of his concern for the welfare of all the population and his efforts to preserve moderation and a balance between the different sectors in the population of his country, it seems that in time his 'Jewish' tenden cies prevailed. This may be interpreted as a clear deviation from the tradi tions of his grandfather Herod (cf. Ant., XIX 3 2 8 - 3 3 0 ) and it probably increased the tension, at least between the Jews and the Hellenic sector in the kingdom. The disturbed balance possibly also affected Jewish relations with the Arab sector, as the 'Silas affair' may indicate. This was an old personal f r i e n d of Agrippa I (Ant., XVIII 204) who was appointed "com m a n d e r of all the a r m y " i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r Emperor Claudius m a d e Agrippa king in 41 CE (Ant., XIX 299). The name Silas, with its explicitly S e m i t i c sound, Aramaic-Babylonian in origin and common among the Arab tribes in Lebanon, thus possibly indicates the man's Ituraean origin . Agrippa 150
151
150 Le Bas et Waddington, Inscriptions grecques et latines, III 2 3 2 9 a ; 0 G / S , 4 2 4 (=IGR, III, 1223). 151 This was also the name of the tyrant of the Lysias fortress in Lebanon destroyed by Pompey (Ant., XIV 40). The name was also in use among the Jews at that time - cf.: War, II 520, 616; III 20. Graetz tried to find a clue in Talmudic tradition (B. Abodah Zarah, 55b) for this Silas. The text reads: (bx ">b m =) A " "I AN K3X")U; OS ' "I 3 K *? etc. Gratz be lieved the text should be amended to read: a " •) DK O S ' " U K b\D 1 W bxw (= ^N'^ajl T^")) indicating (so he thought) this was not a Jewish army commander - see: Gratz, III , 1, p.347, n.3. Klausner (History of the Second Temple, IV, p.293) also concurred. The fact that in the service of Agrippa II there was a Jewish army commander named Silas (War, II 520) need not change anything. His appellation, the Babylonian, could strengthen the impression that the name was designed to distinguish him from other personages with the same name, of Arabian origin (or Ituraean as we believe). For an epigraphic example of this Arab-Aramaic-Babylonian name from Mount Lebanon see: Lidzbarski, Ephemierisis fur semitische Epigraphik, I Nr.99, p.200. Following Applebaum, Schwartz is recently inclined to see Silas, "the commander of all the army" in the service of Agrippa I, as a Jewish officer from the Babylonian military settlement in Batanea and Trachonitis (Schwartz, op.cit., p.81). s
188
Reign of the Herodian Dynasty
probably first becme friendly with him while living in the tetrarchy of his uncle Herod Antipas and occupying the post of agoranbmos of Tiber ias. Silas' appointment as "commander of all the army" was apparently made not only out of personal friendship and loyalty, but also for political reasons. We believe this was one of the first steps Agrippa I took to break away from his grandfather Herod's expressly Hellenistic traditions and make reforms and changes in the upper army command, to weaken the influence of the Hellenistic officer corps which had till then been pre dominant. Two inscriptions from Auranitis are evidence of at least one more 'Arab' officer (of Ituraean or Nabataean origin), Diomedes son of Aretos, in Agrippa I's army: the one (OGUS, 4 2 2 ) records the construc tion of a military camp in north-western Auranitis (at Dir-a-Shair of today), work performed on the strength of his appointment as eparchos (i.e. senior officer and administrator), while the other {ibid., 4 2 1 ) indicates his later move to command the Augusta cohort serving in the vicinity of ancient Eitha (el-Hit of today). In this appointment Agrippa I had actually not deviated from the ways of his grandfather Herod, who in his time had also employed a senior Itu raean officer named Soaemus (Ant., XV 204 and see p. 151 f. above). An extreme 'Jewish' turn-around at such an early stage could have aroused ferment and suspicion. It seems that Silas' appointment as supreme com mander was not an exceptional and unusual act at all, for Ituraeans' mili tary skill and capability had long been famous in the Roman Empire . Moverover, this appointment could have represented a conciliatory step to preserve the army's internal equilibrium, and at the same time give Agrippa I sufficient pause to examine his future course. If in fact he had then already planned radical 'Jewish policies' for the future, his close friendship with Silas could have disguised his intentions, also avoiding needless upheavals in the Hellenistic sector of his kingdom. According to Josephus however, Silas was a great braggard, taking pains at every social occasion and event to stress all he had done for Agrippa, only thanks to which Agrippa had overcome his difficulties and risen to his exalted position. He therefore also became insolent in the king's pre sence, demanding that he treat him as an equal. In time Agrippa came to loathe Silas and regarded him as a foolish nuisance. The king finally even became very angry and when he felt he was secure on the throne and ready to intensify the reforms in his army (so we believe), he dismissed Silas from his post of supreme commander of the army and furthermore, "send him back to his own homeland and consigned him to captivity"(Ant., XIX 320). 152
152 For full details on the military service of Ituraean units among the auxiliary forces of the Roman Empire, see: Schottroff, ZPVD, XLVIII (1982), p p . 1 4 3 - 1 5 2 .
King Agrippa I
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It would be logical to assume this "homeland" (iraTplq) lay within the borders of Agrippa's realm, for otherwise his order for imprisonment (ibid., 3 2 2 - 3 2 5 ) would have been ineffective. Perhaps the reference was to one of the cities in his kingdom with a Hellenized Ituraean population — like for example Canatha, Naveh, Caesarea Philippi or even Abilene on the slopes of Mount Hermon; quite possibly however the reference was to the principality of Chalcis, ruled by Agrippa's brother Herod, which is plausible in view of the report in Ant., XIX 353 concerning the latter's part in Silas' execution, immediately after Agrippa's death (44 CE) and before it had become public knowledge. It seems reasonable to believe that apart from Silas' braggard character and behavior, Agrippa I had other weighty reasons for dismissing him, not particularly at the level of personal relations be tween them, but rather at the level of internal politics. In other words, quite possibly Agrippa sacrificed Silas on the altar of his internal policies, with the latter's troublesome nature and bragging only serving for public consumption, as a reason and excuse for dismissing him. In this connection we should also consider the fact that despite his efforts to maintain equili brium within his kingdom in the fabric of relations between Jews and gentiles, Agrippa I in time inclined more and more to the Jewish sector, the only one on which he could rely in implementing his new policy — designed to strengthen his kingdom politically and militarily — and in striving for greater autonomy. As we know, the crowning glory of this policy found expression in his attempt to strengthen Jerusalem's wall by constructing the famous 'third wall' (Ant., XIX 3 2 6 ; War, II 218) and in calling the con vention of kings in Tiberias (Ant., XIX 3 3 8 - 3 4 2 ) . The fact that in the Syrian governor Gaius Vibius Marsus, Agrippa's policies aroused suspicions of possible preparations for a revolt so that he took practical steps to foil Agrippa's plans, can indicate how delicate and dangerous these policies were. No wonder therefore that in such circumstances this Jewish king wanted the support of a reliable team, totally identified with his policy which was so nationalist-Jewish in nature. Almost certainly this was an additional and important reason for dismissing Silas from his post as "commander-inchief of the entire army", a position second in importance only to the king's. This impression becomes stronger since we know he was replaced by Helkias ( r p p ^ n ) , on that occasion named "prefect (6 enapxoq) and friend of the k i n g " . Helkias was an important member of the Herodian family who had married Cypros, daughter of Antipatros (son of Herod's 153
153 Ant., XIX 353. Otto logically believed Helkias' full title was "commander of all the army and the King's friend" (6 errapxo<; [iravro*; rov OTparevvaTOs] ical <^t'\oc rov QaoiXeux;) — see: Otto, p.96.
Reign of the Herodian Dynasty
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daughter Salome and Costobar) and Cypros (daughter of Herod and Mariamme the Hasmonaean). This lady was Agrippa's first cousin and like him she had Hasmonaean blood flowing in her v e i n s . Personal and family ties between Helkias and his king were made even stronger by the marriage contract between Mariamme, Agrippa's daughter and Helkias' son Julius Archelaus, which made them direct in-law relations . Helkias had adopted a resolute and energetic stand against Gaius Calligula's 'idol decree' and headed a Jewish delegation to the Syrian governor Petronius asking his help to foil this vicious edict (Ant., XVIII 273); this was most probably an addi tional factor tightening the bonds between himself and Agrippa. Helkias was originally called by his Greek name Alexas (ibid., 138), but it seems he preferred the Hebrew, a fact which could be interpreted as an attempt to appear before the Jewish public as o f a clear, proud national consciousness. 154
155
We believe that at some earlier stage a rivalry and enmity had developed between Helkias and Silas over positions of influence at the royal court, with each one apparently backed by a different sector of the population, Silas by the 'Arab' and perhaps also the 'Hellenic' sector, Helkias by the Jews. We suggest Agrippa I at first wanted to preserve a balance of power but, as time went by, with ever-growing Jewish nationalist trends in his kingdom he increasingly inclined to be drawn towards the Jews, eventually dismissing Silas from the head of the army command and appointing Helkias in his place. The fact that Helkias would play a major part in the former's execution (Ant., XIX 3 5 3 ) can only illustrate the great enmity between t h e m . It appears that in this, Helkias acted in collusion with Herod of Chalcis (brother o f Agrippa I his king), especially since on that occasion Silas was described as the enemy of both Helkias and Herod of Chalcis. This was probably a very old hatred, else the two would not have acted together in putting him to death. The conspirative nature of their move indicates that in their estimation the man was so dangerous that it was best to kill him, there being no other way of stopping him. The enmity of Herod of Chalcis for Silas could easily be explained if in fact we assume that Silas was an Ituraean nobleman, with connections and influence in Chalcis itself, and that he was suspected of subversion 156
154 See family genealogical tree at the end of Schalit's book King Herod. The father of Agrippa 1 (Aristobulus) and the mother of Cypros were brother and sister, the children of Herod and Ma riamme the Hasmonaean. 155 Ant., XIX 355. Mariamme was a minor (aged 10) at the death of her father Agrippa I; later on the marriage agreement was implemented as planned (Ant., XX 140), though the couple event ually separated (ibid., 147). 156 Their enmity very much recalls that which later reigned between Varus (or Noarus the Ituraean - who was active at the court of Agrippa II - ) and the Jewish army commander Philip, com mander of the military garrison of the "Bablyonians" in Trachonitis - see also below p. 195f.
King Agrippa I
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against Herod's rule there. Since King Agrippa I's sudden death had led to a clear and immediate change in Roman policy in the region, expressed in greater suspicion and an increase of political and military supervision of the Jewish population, and since the convention of kings in Tiberias could also have aroused suspicion against Herod of Chalcis for having participated, it may be imagined that the plot against the life of Silas took on the nature of the removal of a witness to suspicious evidence, if we assume that after the death of Agrippa I he would have been anxious to bring down his enemies.
Chapter 5
In the Shadow of the Great Calamity
The last Procurators in Judaea (44—66 CE) As we know, Agrippa I's death opened the flood-gates of hostility in rela tions between Jews and gentiles in Eretz-Israel. The restoration of Judaea to the status of a Roman province served as an excellent background for this and even provided the conditions for ever-increasing inflammation of feelings between the Jews and their neighbors. An absolutely identical fate also befell the kingdom of Soaemus the Ituraean (who died in 49 CE); a Roman procurator subordinate to the Province of Syria was appointed over it (Tacitus, Annates, XII, 23). In this case also, the extreme political rever sal upset the internal equilibrium on Mount Lebanon and incited feelings among the extreme nationalist elements, until there too the dykes against hatred and rebellion broke down, finding extreme expression also in inimi cal relations between various sectors of the population. In Eretz-Israel in In Eretz-Israel in those days there was also no shortage of violent out breaks between Jews and Arabs, even though knowledge on this is at times very tenuous and its echoes very muffled. In the days of Procurator Cuspius Fadus ( 4 4 - 4 6 CE) for example we know an "arch-brigand" named Tholomaeus was arrested by the provincial security forces and executed for "doing many evil things in Idumaea and to the Arabs" {Ant., XX 5). Since the expressions "brigand" and "arch-brigand" are used by Joseph us according to a dictionary of political terms from Hellenistic-Roman historiography , it is therefore hard to determine if the reference was to one of the leaders of the Jewish revolutionary movement who operated against Rome and at the same time also against the gentile population, or whether this was in fact a real robber. The scene of activites (southern parts of the country) and the chief objective of this Tholomaeus (namely the Arabs, and it seems the reference is to the Nabataeans) might definite ly indicate the second possibility. Accordingly, we may think for example 1
1 See Kasher, Great Jewish Revolt, p. 19 note 29; see also: Kreissig, Die sozialen Zusammenhange des judaischen Krieges, p.137; Rajak, Josephus - The Historian and his Society, p.84ff; Isaac, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, LXXXVIII (1884), pp.171 - 2 0 3 .
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The Last Procurators in Judaea
of the robbing of Nabataean trading caravans crossing the southern part of the country, including Idumaea. We would however prefer to merge and connect the two possibilities and so regard Tholomaeus as a Jewish rebel standing at the head of a whole group, who robbed caravans in order to obtain the means for conducting the struggle against the Roman authori ties . Possibly the scene activities of the group in the southern and desert regions of Eretz-Israel was chosen for practical reasons, with the objective of making it harder for the Romans to act against them. It is not impossible that there was some form of connection between Tholomaeus' activities against the Arabs and the land dispute in Trans jordan between some Jewish village and the city of Philadelphia, a dispute which went far beyond a local dispute between two settlements, for it involved all the Jewish population in the Peraea (Ant., XX 2—4). Philadel phia was for most of its existence a faithful ally of the Nabataeans and not without reason was it annexed by Emperor Trajan in 106 CE to the Pro vince of Arabia, since apart from Gerasa this did not happen to any of the Decapolis cities. Some scholars even believe the populations of these cities were in origin largely Nabataean or from the other Arab tribes who were associated with t h e m . From what we know from the writ ing of Josephus, the connection between the events in Transjordan and those linked with the name of Tholomaeus is purely chronological, but it seems likely that the strong-handed policy of Cuspius Fadus east of the Jor dan (Ant., XX 4) evoked the violent activities of Tholomaeus (ibid., 5). Judging by the words of the source, the scene of these operations is not to be considered as confined only to Idumaea , and it is reasonable to believe the activities against the Arabs extended over the Negev region, first and foremost against the important Nabataean centre at Eboda (Avdat). 2
3
4
It appears the finding of a layer of destruction in the city, though to this day not accurately dated or interpreted, could nevertheless indicate a great local disaster during the reign of Malichus II and we think it should be attri buted to the handiwork of the "arch-brigand" Tholomaeus. In this connec tion it should also be noted that, according to archeological findings, the Nabataean army camp erected in his time by Aretas IV beside the city of Eboda (Avdat) was abandoned in the middle of the first century CE and s
6
2 It is hard to imagine that governor Cuspius Fadus would have devoted means and efforts in clear ing the country of bandits in his operation against Tholomaeus in the south (Ant., XX 5) if those bandits were not rebels against Rome. 3 E.g. see: Negev, Masters of the Desert, p.198 and cf. ibid., p.91. 4 The precise quotation: rr\v 'ISovfiaiau Kai row? "Apa/3ac 5 See Negev, ANRW, II, 8, pp.570, 637; idem, PEQ, CVIII (1976), p.l25ff. and cf.: Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.72. 6 Negev, Masters of the Desert, p. 85.
In the Shadow of the Great
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Calamity
we believe this too should be related to the historical circumstances men tioned above. The activities of Tholomaeus in the southern regions (i.e. Idumaea and the Negev) give grounds for believing he was a local inhabi tant and that he operated "on home ground". If in fact this "arch-brigand" and his "gang" were as we believe of Idumaean origin, this could indicate how much as such they identified in their nationalism and their seal as full Jews.
Agrippa II (50-92/3 CE) In the north of the country the Roman arrangements relating to renewal of the provincial regime were from the Roman point of view more successful. Herod of Chalcis died in 4 8 / 4 9 and Emperor Claudius (apparently in 50 CE) appointed young Agrippa II, the son of King Agrippa I as tetrarch in his place (Ant., XX 104; War, II 2 2 1 , 223). Only a few years later however (in 53 CE) Claudius deprived him of his position there and in compensation gave him Philip's tetrarchy (i.e. Gaulanitis, Batanaea, Auranitis and Tracho nitis) and in addition also the remains of Lysanias the Ituraean's tetrachy in the Abila (Abilene) region, as well as other areas on Mount Lebanon . Later on — in 61 CE — Emperor Nero also gave him considerable portions of east ern Galilee and Peraea, more precisely the vicinity of the cities of Tiberias and Tarichaea, as well as the Livias-Julias region and in it fourteen vil lages . Agrippa II by all indications succeeded in maintaining good neighborly relations with all the Arab rulers in his vicinity and, in accordance with traditions from the time of Augustus, even took care to bolster them with marriage ties. Thus for example he gave his sister Drusilla in marriage to Aziz king of Hammath (=Emesa) north Syria), who even agreed to circum cision (Ant., XVIII 139). In fact these were not the first marriage ties be tween the two dynasties, since Aziz' father Sapsigeramus had married his daughter Jotape to Aristobulus, the brother of Agrippa I (Ant., XVIII 135) ; in this connection the close political ties between King Agrippa I and Sapsigeramus should also be noted, the latter as we know also partici pating in the convention of kings in Tiberias (Ant., XIX 338). This Aziz apparently belonged to one of the Ituraean tribes and by agreeing to cir7
8
9
7 Ant., XX 138; War, II 247. Mentioned in the second version is also "the tetrarchy of Varus", which in Schiirer's opinion ( I , p.472, 570) was part of the tetrarchy of Soaemus the Ituraean. 8 Ant., XX 159; War, II 252 and see extensively: Schurer," I , p p . 4 7 2 - 4 7 3 and note 8. 9 This Aristobulus eventually became king of Hamath (Emessa) and was then called Iamblicus II - see: Altheim-Stiehl, p.368. 5
s
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cumcision we believe he kept up the tradition of conversion to Judaism prevalent among the Ituraeans since the days of Judas Aristobulus I. Logic inclines to believe he was not alone in converting and that others from among his family and followers also went in his footsteps and perhaps even quite a few people from his tribe. It is however clear that this greatly strengthened the local Jewish community, some echoes of whom survived, mainly in the Talmudic tradition of later periods . It is not known what happened after the dissolution of the marriage between Aziz and Drusilla: whether he changed his mind over his conver sion or not. The silence on this subject, compared with another instance of the same sort , might possibly indicate that he adhered to his Jewishness, though this does not in any way represent proof. In 54 CE Aziz died and his brother C. Julius Soaemus who then ascended the throne (Ant., XX 158) would eventually, during the Great Jewish Revolt, provide the Ro mans with auxiliary army units for fighting against the Jewish rebels . This need not necessarily indicate anything on his relations with the Jewish religion, since after all Agrippa II also in practice aided the Romans in sup pressing the revolt. 10
11
12
During the Great Jewish Revolt (66-70 CE) The outbreak of the Great Jewish Revolt against the Romans also coin cided with a breaching of the dykes, releasing enmity between the Jews and the gentile population throughout the whole country. Though most of the collisions involving bloodshed were associated with the Hellenistic cities, it appears they did not also leave out the Arab sector, mainly in the regions ruled by Agrippa II. The most outstanding event is connected with the name of Varus (or Noarus), a relative of Soaemus the Ituraean king of Hammath (=Emesa) ,who had been appointed by Agrippa II to take charge of the affairs of the kingdom during his visit to the city of Berytus in order to welcome the Syrian governor Cestius Gallus on his journey south to13
10 E.g. see: / Bikkurim, I, 64d; /. D'mai, VI, 25b; J. Yebamoth, XI, l i d and see: Kohut, Aruch Completum, 3, p p . 4 3 1 - 4 3 2 ; Lurie, Jews in Syria, p.210ff. 11 Reference is to Polemon King of Cilicia, who ceased to uphold the customs of the Jews after his divorce from Berenice (Ant., XX 146). 12 War, II 501; III 68; VII 226 and cf.: Tacitus, Historiae, II, 81 and see: Feldman, Josephus, IX, p p . 4 7 4 - 4 7 5 , note c. 13 On his name, see: Thackeray, Josephus, I, p.12, note b.; idem, op.cit., II, p.421, note b and also p.510, note a. See also: Barret, AJP, XCVIII (1977), p. 154, n.6; Sullivan, ANR W, II, 8, pp.218, 333-334.
196
In the Shadow of the Great
Calamity 14
wards Judaea. From the writings of Josephus , it seems this Varus (Noa ms) was the personal rival of the Jewish commander Philip, who was active in the service of Agrippa II and commanded the Babylonian military gar rison of Trachonitis. Varus (Noams) exploited the absence of Agrippa II as well as the departure of Philip for Jerusalem at the command of his master in order to strengthen the peace party here (War, II 421); Varus seized control of Trachonitis, having the support of the population in the capital Caesarea-Philippi (previously Paneas), who were the instigators and planners of the whole act. Apparently the latter instilled him with political hopes and the ambition to place an Ituraean royal crown on his head — like others of his family throughout the Syrian-Lebanese region. It is almost certain most of them were of Ituraean origin like him and therefore saw in him a kind of natural leader who could realize their political desires. How do we know they were in fact of Ituraean origin? The fact that Josephus gives them the name "Syrians" (Vita, 52, 53, 59) indicates his desire to deprecate their value because of their eastern origin, indicating they were in fact Hellenized natives of the area . Since the most prominent ethnic factor in the demo graphic structure of the population in the region was Ituraean, it is there fore self-evident that the "Syrians" of Caesarea-Philippi were Ituraeans in origin. In that case, their scheme may be seen as an attempt at a coup d'etat, with the objective not only of deposing Agrippa II from his throne, but also to endow the tetrarchy with Ituraean character, so that in this part of the country there would be a revival of the ancient tradition of Itu raean rule which had been badly damaged ever since the disappearance of Lysanias and Zenodorus from the political scene in the region. 15
In order to conceal the scheme from Roman eyes, Varus (Noams) plan ned to abandon the Jews of the city into the hands of its Hellenized citi zens and as a first step put many of them to death (Vita, 53). This affair could of course inflame the spirits of the tetrarchy to the extent that the Jewish inhabitants would be swept into acts of retaliation, in a way that would make them suspect of inclinations to revolt against Rome in the general spirit of the time, similar to what happened in most places with a mixed population. In general, Varus (Noams) wanted to fish in the trou bled waters of dormant Jewish-Ituraean rivalry and in fact to rouse it from
14 Vita, XI 4 8 - 6 1 ; ibid., 35 1 7 9 - 1 8 4 ; War, II 4 8 1 - 4 8 3 . There are slight discrepancies between the two versions, but it seems the one in Vita is more detailed and precise, and therefore also prefer able. Inferiority of the version in War stands out for example in the presentation of Varus (Noarus) as one motivated in all his schemes only by his lust for money (War, II 483). This is too simplified to be acceptable, mainly in view of the detailed description in Vita, exposing the poli tical motives (full details below). 15 Cf. Levim, JJS, XXV (1974), p.381 (n.3), p.387 (n.35).
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its dormancy and inflame it even more. By his actions he intended to present himself and the citizens of Caesarea-Philippi as the natural and out spoken allies of Rome, taking active steps to enforce rule and order in the capital against subversive and rebellious elements, identified of course with the Jews. Any attempt by Agrippa II to stand by his Jewish subjects, as he was expected to do under such circumstances, at least in relation with his faithful "Babylonian" subjects, could immediately have made him sus pect of attempts to condone the rebels' crimes, which would most prob ably have brought about his political liquidation if not his execution, (cf. Vita, 52). To implement his scheme, Varus (Noarus) spread a rumor that the mem bers of the military settlement of Trachonitis had joined the revolt against the Romans and had even mutinied against their master Agrippa II. He therefore sent a delegation of twelve notables from among the Jews of Caesarea-Philippi, supposedly as intermediaries, and demanded of the Jews of Trachonitis to prove their loyalty by surrendering their weapons and sending a delegation of seventy of their leaders to present themselves before him in order to refute the accusation. When the delegation from the central settlement in Bathyra reached him he put them all to death — except one who succeeded in escaping from his talons at the last moment and hurried to warn the Jews of Trachonitis of the plot to destroy them. The mem bers of the military settlement, on hearing the dreadful fate of their leaders, left behind them everything they possessed and fled from their villages to the fortress of Gamala, in order to find refuge there before a possible attack by Varus (Noarus) and his people. It is quite possible that by this step, behind which there was also the echo of a plot to eliminate the Jewish community of Caesarea-Philippi (Vita, 61), all the "Babylonian" Jews almost joined the revolt against Rome. It was only the appearance of Philip at Gamala which at the very last moment prevented them from taking such a hasty step (ibid., 60). Nevertheless it seems this episode influenced several "Babylonian" groups to change their position and go over to the side of the rebels. In our opinion this is the background explaining the desertion of Silas the Babylo nian, the senior officer from the army of Agrippa II (War, II 520), who apparently joined the rebel centre in Gamala and eventually reached Jeru salem. The complications created by the whole affair were extreme and it was very difficult for Agrippa II to take drastic steps against Varus (Noa rus). Declaration of war against him as a rebel was liable to be interpreted as an anti-Roman act, since he and his brother Soaemus king of Hammath (Emesa) were outright allies of the Romans. It was this which in fact prevented Agrippa II himself from executing Varus (Noarus) even after his scheme had been clearly revealed (War, II 483). To his great sorrow he was forced to be content with dismissing the man and in his place appoint-
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ed his own personal friend Aequus Modius, who as may be learnt from his name was apparently a Roman citizen. In the end Agrippa II also ordered his commander Philip to return with the unit of Babylonians under his command to the military settlement of Trachonitis and he could thus ignore the whole affair (Vita, 61). Apparently not a little due to this episode, Gamala's inclination to revolt against the Romans found expression in the fact that as soon as Philip and his men had left the place, the inhabitants joined the ranks of the rebels (ibid., 177—185). In this connection it should also be noted that despite Philip's moderate stand, most probably reflecting the official stand taken by his master Agrippa II, there were not a few of the Jews from Trachonitis and Gaulanitis who did after all join the rebellion (War, III 5 4 1 - 5 4 2 ) ; this also included members of Philip's own family, who even took part in the revolt at Gamala (War, IV 81). These facts may to some extent reveal the biased nature of Josephus'evidence, which attempted as far as possible to gloss over and obscure any unpleasant facts connected with the followers of Agrippa II indicating that the rumor spread at the time by Varus (Noa ms) of rebellious tendencies among Agrippa's people was not entirely without foundation. No doubt the latter exaggerated them greatly and tried to turn them into a tool for making political and personal capital, especially to exploit the dispute in Caesarea-Philippi and revive Ituraean 'patriotism' under Roman patronage. Agrippa II's wisdom and restraint prevented the scheme from succeeding and confined the conflagration while there was time. The march towards Judaea of Cestius Gallus, the Roman governor in Syria, opened a new stage of the rebellion: no longer just local armed col lisions between Jews and their neighbors, but proper war against a regular Roman army. In this stage the part played by the neighboring Arab peoples from the north in the operation against the Jews evidently also became formalized and so it appears the following units of auxiliary troops (= auxilia) participating in Cestius Gallus' campaign to the south: Antiochus king of Comagene (from northern Syria) provided the Romans with 2000 mounted archers and 3 0 0 0 on foot, Agrippa II also sent a force of almost identical size and Soaemus the Ituraean sent 4 0 0 0 soliders, one third mounted and mostly archers (War, II 5 0 0 - 5 0 1 ) . The operational nature of the units of this auxiliary force of course indicate the Romans' need for the assistance among other things of soldiers trained in the form of warfare anticipated from the Jews . In the descriptions of the fighting it is unfor16
16 On the employment in the Roman army of auxiliary units of various kinds of Arab archers (foot and horsemen), particularly prominent among whom being the Ituraeans, see extensively: AltheimStiehl, p p . 6 6 1 - 6 7 7 ; Schottroff, ZPDV, XCVIII (1982), p p . 1 4 5 - 1 5 2 .
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tunately very difficult to trace the particular part played by these units. Nevertheless we will attempt to the best of our ability to extract as much as possible from the descriptions by Josephus. Cestius Gallus' army assembled in the city of Ptolemias (Acco or Acre) and from there set out for the first military objective, the capture of the Jewish town Chabulon (Kabul) which adjoined the city chora of Ptole mias. His army captured the town and its vicinity with no military opposi tion of any kind and 'distinguished' itself mainly by robbery and looting, spreading destruction and malicious arson in the neighboring villages. According to Josephus (War, II 5 0 3 - 5 0 5 ) , those who "excelled" in these deeds were "the Syrians, particularly those from Berytus". Undoubtedly "the Syrians" is a generic term used for the soldiers of Antiochus of Comagene and Soaemus the Ituraean. A similar fate befell Joppa (= Jaffa) and Narbatha, whose Jewish inhabitants were butchered in large numbers, their possessions plundered and their villages set on fire (ibid., 507—509). Josephus did not indicate who among the solidiers did what, and we there fore cannot note the particular part played by the auxiliary units from the nations to the north. Only in the description of the attack on Narbatha (ibid., 509) he notes as though incidentally that the massacre of the Jewish inhabitants, the acts of destruction and the looting was perpetrated by a large body of horsemen — and these were mostly from the above auxiliary units . 17
Vespasian, who in 67 CE was appointed commander of the Roman army in Judaea, also made use of auxiliary units recruited from among the neigh boring nations. Once again, Antiochus of Comagene, Agrippa II and Soae mus the Ituraean participated, each providing him with 2000 archers and 1000 horsemen (War, III 68). Compared with the number of soldiers they had supplied the year before (for service with Cestius Gallus), there was a significant reduction, possibly because of the defeat suffered by Gallus. These facts may be interpreted in one of two ways: either these units had suffered very heavy casualties in Gallus' defeat, or Vespasian did not entire ly trust them, whether because (at least) some of them lacked battle ex perience (ibid., 502) or for fear of tendencies to desertion, for example from Agrippa II's army (cf. ibid., 520). As against this he found com pensation in the addition of 1000 horsemen and 5000 foot (mostly archers) sent to him by Malichus II king of the Nabataeans , on whom he could rely because of their long historic account with the Jews. 18
17 See Shatzman, Judaea and Rome - Jewish revolts, p p . 3 0 4 - 3 0 5 . On the operation to conquer Narbatha, see extensively: Zertal, Zemanim, X (1983), p p . 3 3 - 4 5 . 18 War, III 68. Starcky disagrees with the accepted identification with Malichus II, arguing that Josephus wrote MdXxoc and not Md\ixo
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Beside the regular activity of every army, the special and principal tacti cal tasks entrusted to the "Arab" auxiliary units were quite varied. First, while the Roman army was on the march, they were sent ahead as advance units, to halt any sudden attack by the rebels , to make roads in areas difficult to cross and provide artillery support (of archers and slingmen) during battles and siege, as happened for example in the fight for Iotapata . The last task was one of the more prominent in the siege of Jeru salem , indicating how important a part - from an operational aspect - was played by the "Arab" auxiliaries. The Nabataeans also assisted the Roman army in matters of logistics and in a particular case even played a decisive part. This was Titus' march in the spring of 70 CE with his select forces from Egypt to Caesarea Maritima. From the description by Josephus (War, IV 66 - 6 6 3 ) the route - from Pelusium on the edge of the desert in the Sinai Peninsula in the west and to the vicinity of Gaza - was divided into five sections; each section re presented one day's march and ended at a camp for rest and the replace ment of supplies and water. The fact that in one place, Ostracine, there was a station lacking water which would be brought from elsewhere (op.cit., 661) may indicate that there was in fact need for an advance solution of logistic problems, even before Titus began his march. There is no con ceivable conclusion other than one which connects these operations of assistance with the local population of the Sinai desert, who throughout the whole region were then under the full control of the Nabataeans. Quite similar logistic assistance was provided at the time to Cambyses the Persian king in 525 BCE and to Alexander the Great in 332 BCE; in both cases meticulous preparations had been made in advance and this of course required cooperation of the Arab tribes of that same region . 19
20
21
22
23
19 20
21 22 23
soldiers were well-known as archers - see: Starcky, BA, XVIII (1055), p.101. However, his pro posal seems forced since the form Md\x
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Among the Roman army besieging Jerusalem, the Nabataean Arab auxi liary particularly 'distinguished' themselves in the acts of robbery and plunder they perpetrated against the city's population and the fugitives from it. Josephus particularly stressed their unbridled cruelty, which he ascribed both to their hatred of the Jews and their greed for loot. He de scribed their habit of disembowelling Jewish fugitives who had surrendered to the Romans, to search their open intestines for gold coins, following the rumor that this was a way Jewish fugitives were using to smuggle their wealth out of beseiged Jerusalem. According to Josephus, this cruel crime so enraged Titus - who feared it would discredit himself and his army and thereby spoil his image - that he executed those found guilty of it; he even threatened anyone else who in future would repeat the act with the same fate (War, VII 550—561). Very probably, judging from the way it referred to the Arab 'barbarians', there is a considerable aura of apologetic propa ganda round this story, having the object of cleansing the Roman army itself from this terrible and disgraceful accusation. Perhaps the story was also designed to flatter Titus, who, even at the height of the last battle, tried to preserve a humane image and thereby atone for his cruelty. Unfortunately we have no other sources for comparison although, of all the other units drawn from the neighboring peoples who were assisting the Romans in repressing the rebellion, Tacitus (Historiae, V, 1) gives pro minence to the Nabataean auxiliary unit in their enmity and hatred of their neighbors. At all events, the Nabataeans' cruelty at the time of their wars against the Jewish people is quite a well-known phenomenon in the period of the Second Temple and this should suffice to remove any doubt whether Josephus was right, even if only in part, in attributing to them these acts of cruelty. In the Talmudic tradition on the destruction of Jerusalem and of the Temple, there remain obscure (though instructive) echoes on the part played by the Arabs in the destruction of the city and the Temple. The Midrash Rabbah on Lamentations (Eikhah Rabbati, i, 3 1 ) interprets the phrase "Her adversaries are become the head" (Lamentations 1:5) in these words: 24
2 S
"Her adversaries are become the head" - this refers to Vespasian. "Her enemies are at ease" this refers to Titus. For three and a half years Vespasian surrounded Jerusalem , having with 26
24 E.g. cf.: War, II mi; Ant., XVII 290. 25 See Eikhah Rabbati, I, 31 (Buber ed. p.65ff). The source quoted below is according to the Vilna print. 26 The length of the siege (three and a half years) quoted here is not a realistic figure. Efron has already proved that an identical period of time was mentioned in the tradition of the Jerusalem Talmud concerning the siege of Beth-Ther (J. Ta 'anioth, IV, 68b) which in his opinion is the regular format for a eschatological purpose which in the course of time became the stereotype in Tal-
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him four generals, the general of Arabia, of Africa , of Alexandria and of Palestine. With regard to the general of Arabia, two teachers (Amora'im) differ as to his name, one declaring it was Killus (OT b ">p) and the other Pangar ( ") > J S ) . . . R. Johanan b. Zakkai came out and went among the soldiers of Vespasian . . . They began to speak to him in parables. 'If a snake nested in a cask, what is to be done with it?' He answered, 'Bring a charmer and charm the s n a k e and leave the cask intact.' [Then they asked,] 'If a snake, nested in a tower, what it to be done with it?' He answered, 'Bring a charmer and charm the snake, and leave the tower in tact.' Pangar said, 'Kill the snake and burn the tower.' R. Johanan said to Pangar, 'All neighbors who do harm, do it to their neighbors; instead of putting in a plea for the defence you argue for the prosecution against us!' He replied, 'I seek your welfare; so long as the Temple exists, the heathen kingdoms will attack you, but if it is destroyed they will not attack you.' R. Johanan said to him, 'The heart knows whether it is for "akkeV (bpJ? ) or akalkaloth (mbp bpy) ... When Vespasian had subdued the city, he assigned the destruction of the four ramparts to the four generals, and the western gate was allotted to Pangar. Now it had been decreed by Heaven that this should never be destroyed because the Shechinah abode in the West. The others demol ished their sections but he did not demolish his. Vespasian sent for him and asked, 'Why did you not destroy your section?' He replied, 'By your life, I acted for the honour of the kingdom; for if I had demolished it, nobody would [in time to come] know what it was you destroyed; but 2 8
29
30
31
mudic literature of Eretz-Israel; see Efron, in: Bar-Kokhba Revolt etc. p p . 6 7 - 6 8 and note 102, also p. 9 2. 27 In an alternate version of the text (ed. S. Buber, Midrash Eikhah Rabbati, loc.cit.) it is 0 3 I T K p ' J S N l and Alon already remarked on this (Studies in the History of Israel, I, p.240, note 65) that the reference is to Phoenicia, as is also the publisher's opinion (ibid., note 245). In Efron's opinion (ibid., p.95) this makes no difference, since the geographic-political and historic reality which is reflected in this source matches the Byzantine period in which, as we shall see below, this Midrash was written. 28 In these names there is of course no real indication to a real historic personage. The Buber edition (ibid.) gives "I ^ 3 K or ") y ft H as an alternative to the name Pangar, and in Baer's opin ion these alternatives are preferable since they reflect the Christian source which is behind this legend, through the namedT 3 2 K(Abgar) indicating the dynastic name of the princes of Edesa (see extensively: Zion, XXXVI [1971] p.l71ff). Efron on the other hand prefers to see the names Killus and Pangar, like the other names appearing in the same midrash, as symbolic. Pan gar he believes is derived from panegyrikos in Greek and is intended to present the man as one who seemingly celebrates in his speech and publicly glorifies himself; he is therefore also called 0 T b ' p (Killus) which means praise (see: Efron, ibid., p.96, note 229). If in fact Pangar and Killus were synonymous, then Efron's symbolic interpretation seems convincing. If it is not so however, but rather that each name stood alone, then other solution may also be proposed, such as that the name Pangar derives from the Greek word navdypios, i.e. wild and cruel, which sym bolically suits the quality of the man's malicious advice. I believe Applebaum was carried away by an unconvincing etymological association, when he proposed to identify the symbolic name Pangar with the components of the names Agrippinus, and thereby supposedly hinting at the settlement project for Jewish prisoners in North Africa, put into practice by Roman commanders at the initiative of Vespasian and Titus and which is implied in the later Jewish Midrash (12th century CE) quoted by A. Neubauer, Mediaeval Jewish Chronicles I,.p.190 (see: Applebaum, Jews and Greeks in Ancient Cyrene, Jerusalem 1969 [HebrewJ, p.230). 29 The historic mistake in this case is obvious, for the reference is to Titus. 30 "I 2") n (Khover) is a magician who whispers spells; cf.: Deut., 18:11. 31 This is a well-known saying which implies that only he who does a thing knows whether his in tentions were good or bad. It is attributed to Resh Lakish (B. Sanhedrin, 26a) who was walking with a number of sages when they met a man who was pruning vines in the sabbatical year and his act raised the question, whether he was cutting vines for making an b j?J? (akkel is a wicker basket), i.e. a legitimate purpose, or was he going in crooked ways (mbpbpy D'DIT), namely committing some perverseness.
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when people look [at the Western Wall], they will exclaim, "Perceive the might of Vespasian from what he destroyed!" ' He said to them, 'Enough, you have spoken well, but since you dis obeyed my command, you shall ascend to the roof and throw yourself down. If you live, you will live; and if you die, you will die.' He ascended, threw himself down and died. Thus the curse of R. Johanan b. Zakkai alighted upon him. (Translation by J. Rabinowitz)
In this fable there is, from a Jewish aspect of course, a bitter and very important fact relevant to the subject of our discussion: the Arabs are accused of malicious intent to persuade the Romans not merely to kill the snake, i.e. punish the rebels, but also to smash the cask or burn the tower, i.e. destroy Jerusalem and the Temple. It appears that from this point of view there is here a similarity to what was said in the prophecy of Ezekiel (26:2), on the evil thoughts of the people of Tyre against Jerusalem at the time of the Destruction of the First Temple. If there is in fact objective truth in this fable, then the Arabs (and clearly the reference here is to the Nabataeans) toyed with the hopes of profiting from the Jews' calamity. At all events, their full participation in the destruction of Jerusalem is clearly expressed in this fable, which reflects the bitter dregs of memories the Jew ish people preserved for generations. At first sight the fable could also seem ingly indicate that the Jewish people had not remembered the fact that it was the Roman Emperor who had decided to destroy Jerusalem and its Temple, since instead it attributes this advice to the leader of the neighboring Arabs. However the story about the act of that same leader (Pangar) who did not destroy his portion and paid for it with his life indicated that the Emperor's responsibility for the destruction and burning of the Temple not only re mained engraved in the memory of the Jewish people, but was also the final and decisive tone in this fable. To sum up this matter: despite the late date of this Midrash, whose com position should be related to the Byzantine period, and despite the signs of Jewish Babylonian amendments to be found in it, it shows signs of an au thentic historic foundation having parallelism and points of proximity with the evidence of Josephus on the sequence of events leading to the destruc tion of the Temple . For our purposes here it is of course important to stress the strong historic echo concerning the participation of Arab forces in the suppression of the Jewish rebellion and their burning enmity which guided their actions. Another Talmudic tradition, which contains an additional muffled echo of the miserable fate of the land of Judaea after the destruction of the Second Temple, is the one contained in the following colorful Midrash : 32
33
32 See: Efron, ibid, p p . 9 1 - 9 6 and esp. note 226. 33 Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael (ed. Lauterbach), Tractate Bahodesh, Chap. I, Vol. II, pp. 1 9 3 - 1 9 4 .
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'And thus it says: "If thou knowest not, O thou fairest among women" (Cant., 1:8), and it also says: "Because thou didst not serve ... therefore shalt thou serve thine enemy" (Deut., 2 8 : 4 7 48). Once R. Johanan b. Zakkai was going to E m m a u s in Judaea and he saw a girl who was picking barleycorn out of the excrements of a horse. Said R. Johanan b. Zakkai to his disciples: 'What is this girl?' They said to him: 'She is a Jewish girl.' 'And to whom does the horse belong?' 'To an Arab horseman,' the disciples answered him. Then said R. Johanan b. Zakkai to his disci ples: 'All my life I have been reading this verse and I have not realized its full meaning: "If thou knowest not, O thou fairest among women etc." - you were unwilling to be subject to God, behold now you are subject to the most inferior of the nations, the A r a b s ' . 34
3 5
36
In fact this evidence, indirectly indicating the presence of an Arab (and apparently Nabataean) military unit in Judaea, is unique and has no parallel in other traditions . If it does contain a grain of truth, then the fact of its connection with the name of Rabban Johanan b. Zakkai might perhaps indicate that it reflects conditions during the last days of the war of de struction, or at most a very short time later - while Arab auxiliary forces were still serving with the Roman army. After the suppression of the Great Jewish Revolt, when the province of Judaea was reorganized, there is no trace of the presence of these units among the provincial standing garrison. Almost certainly, they were removed intentionally and in pursuit of a cal culated policy, designed as far as possible to relieve the tension with the Jewish population and not repeat the mistakes of the past, which had left residues of hatred and had poisoned relations with the local auxiliary units and assisting forces from among the neighboring nations . The picture of the Arab riding his camel with a lance in his hand, which comes from the Amora Raba bar-bar-Hanahi is from a much later date and furthermore in his stories and fables there is often an allegoric and symbolic form of expression for internal Jewish matters and moralist ideas; not only that 37
38
39
34 In another version it is spelled ] T J? 73 (Ma'ori) and not D T K ? 3 o r D i y 7 3 i.e. Emmaus. 35 Biichler (Studies of the Mishnah and Talmudic Period, p. 106) prefer the version of Ma'on, indi cating a settlement in southern Judaea near Hebron. Klein (Land of Judah, p. 156 and note 31) on the other hand argued that the alternative - D 1 N73 (Ma'us) as written and D T y 73 in another version - was preferable, the reference of course being to the site of Emmaus in the Valley of Ayalon. He was followed also by Alon, History of the Jews, 1, p.42. 36 Cf. to the Baraitha in B. Ketuboth, 66b, where that young woman is identified as the daughter of Nakdimon ben-Gurion, one of the wealthy citizens at the time of the Destruction, cf. also Aboth de-Rabbi Nathan (version A), XVII 8. As against this, in J. Ketuboth, V, 30c, this young woman is identified with Martha daughter of Boethus and the story is told of the city of Acre without any connection with the Arabs; see also note 41 below. 37 The Mekhiltah, as we know one of the earlier Midrashim - see Zunz, Derashoth etc., pp.43, 2 4 1 - 2 4 3 (notes 4 6 - 4 9 ) etc. In the Babylonian parallel version it says "she was gleaning grain among the dung of the Arabs' cattle and there is no mention of an Arab horsemen, just simply Arabs. 38 See extensively: Mor, The Bar Kokhba Revolt, dissertation, p.21ff (also appendix at the end). 39 E.g. see: B. Ta'anith, 22b; B. Baba Bathra, 74b. Raba bar-bar-Hanah was one of the disciples of the Amora R. Johanan and he belonged to the third generation of Amora'im, i.e. from the end of the 3rd and beginning of the 4th century CE. He travelled extensively, mainly from Babylonia to Eretz-Israel and the above imagery apparently came from what he would see on his travels.
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there are no grounds for identifying this Arab with a soldier, since he is explicitly described as Ny^ta, i.e. an Arab merchant. Though there is another faded tradition preserved under the name of this Amora, on the participation of Tadmorian archers in the war of destruction , it seems that by the term Tadmorian', which he knew from the days of his resi dence in Babylonia, he indiscriminately (since real historic knowledge was far removed from him) included and commingled Arabs of any kind. The cruelty of the Arab troops and their atrocities against the fugitives from Jerusalem found additional and shocking expression in the tradition of the Eretz-Israel Midrash, relating of Martha (Miriam) daughter of Boethus and widow of the High Priest Joshua son of Gamala, about whom 40
Said R. Eleazar son of R. Zadok: "May I not live to see the Redemption, if I did not see her whose hair was tied to the tails of Arabs' horses and they would make her run from Jerusalem to L y d d a " . 41
This type of atrocity might suit the Arabs, especially if we think of the ancient historic memory, according to which in the days of Alexander the Great, on the occasion of the conquest of the city of Gaza, they had experienced it on their own flesh . 42
40 See: B. Yebamoth, 16b. Cf. with other similar traditions: Eikhah Rabbati, II, 5; Bereshith Rabbah, LVI, 19. 41 Eikhah Rabbati, I, 50; Bacher, Aggadoth Ha-tana'im, I, 1, p.37. R. Eleazar son of R. Zadok was a Tanna of the second generation and lived in the time of the Second Temple, being a witness to its destruction. Tradition of the Jerusalem Talmud (Ketuboth, V, 30c) connects the event with the city of Acre, without connection to the Arabs, as in the tradition of the Mekilta (note 33 above). We think in this case the tradition in Eikha Rabbati is to be referred, whether because the happening of the event seems more probable against a background of the destruction of Jeru salem, or because the tormenting of that woman by tying her hair to horses' tails and dragging her long distances seems more probable in connection with Arabs (see note 42 below). Inciden tally in the Jerusalem Talmud there is also a difference in the woman's identity, who there is called Miriam daughter of Shimeon ben-Gurion and not Martha daughter of Boethus (see note 36 above) and not Miriam daughter of Nakdimon ben-Gurion. The tradition in Eikhah Rabbati, I, 51 on the other hand connects the deed with a woman gleaning corn on behalf of Miriam daughter of Nakdimon ben-Gurion and the event occurred in Acre (and here also without the mention of Arabs). The same applies to the tradition of the Tosefta, Ketuboth, V 9 (end), ed. Zuckermandel, p.256; Tosefta Ki-Fshutah (ed. Lieberman), p.74. Comparison of all the versions of the two stories on the two wealthy and well-known women of Jerusalem, Miriam daughter of Boethus and Miriam daughter of Shimeon (or Nakdimon) ben-Gurion, who in hard times reached an unequalled shameful degradation, indicate that they were confused with one another, so that the prime and precise level of the story is hard to distinguish. One way or another, the in troduction of Arabs into these traditional stories seems correct and we believe preserves a dim echo of events which occurred. 42 Curtius Rufus, IV, 6, 62ff.
Epilogue In summarizing the study of relations between the Jews of Eretz-Israel and the nations of the frontier and the desert, it is difficult not to note the extreme historical reversals and upheavals in these relations from the begin ning of the Hellenistic period and up to the Great Jewish Revolt against the Romans. For example, the Edomites/Idumaeans were at the outset of this period the symbols of evil in Biblical literature, whereas at its end most of them had become involved and integrated to the fullest degree within Jewish society. Furthermore, in the days of the Great Revolt against the Romans they enthusiastically and in large numbers joined the ranks of the rebels, even rallying under the banners of extremist leaders: first John of Gischala and later Simon son of Gioras. According to Josephus, they numbered around 20 0 0 0 and they were determined to fight the Romans and their collaborators to the bitter end (War, IV 235). Even if this figure is greatly exaggerated , there is no escaping the conclusion that "The Idumaeans" represented one of the largest groups in the ranks of the rebels, especially since they represented one of the most organized large groups among them with their own independent command. Though Josephus, in trying to pay lip-service to his Roman masters, described the Idumaeans as a wild nation fond of disturbances and, out of a love for upheaval, rebellion and murder always ready for a fight (ibid., 2 3 1 , 3 1 0 ) , yet in a moment of truth he himself could not conceal the sincere and real motivation which induced them to take up arms against the Romans; in other words, a love of Israel and great national devotion to Jerusalem and the ideals of libterty . The connections in those days be tween the zealot ideology of the School of Shammai and the Idumaeans is already a fact which requires no further proof, indicating how devoted they were during the days of the Great Revolt to the ideals of liberty which in an earlier period had inspired the Hasmonaeans . History really provided them with a destiny of violent changes. 1
2
3
4
1 This figure clearly differs from the number of Idumaeans (5000) who were in the forces under the command of Simon son of Gioras - see also: Ronen, p.143 (note 8), 151 (note 41). 2 See: Baer, Zion, VI (1971), p.l52ff. 3 War IV, 273, 2 8 1 - 2 8 2 , and cf. ibid., pp.235, 239, 243, 2 4 5 - 2 4 8 , 258; VI 92, 148, 378ff. 4 See: Lieberman, Yerushalmi ki-Fshuto, p.38; idem, Hellenism in Jeiwsh Palestine p.140; Urbach, Sages etc., pp.164, 528, 533. A memorable contribution on this subject comes from Ben-Shalom,
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It appears that Herod's reign was the only bitter fruit which the Idu maeans left behind them in Jewish memory for generations. His harsh tyranny on the one hand and his complete subservience to the Romans on the other left a deep wound in the heart of the Jewish nation and in con sequence, an abysmal hatred for him, his offspring and for Rome. This found very significant expression in the transposition of the name "Edom" (as a symbol of evil) to the power of Rome, as may be seen in the wellknown and common saying among Jews — "Edom is Rome" . After the Great Jewish Revolt, the Idumaeans as an ethno-geographical entity com pletely disappeared from the consciousness of the Jewish people, yet the description "Edom" remained alive in the nation's imagery as a symbol of evil and malice (based of course on the Biblical image) and from time to time it was 'borrowed' by different generations and applied to the oppres sors of Israel in their own period. In summarizing the information on the fabric of relations between Jews and Nabataeans, as these developed from the days of conquest by Alexan der the Great until the days of the Great Revolt against the Romans, here too we may find a highly meaningful change, but in a direction diametri cally opposed to that which applies to the Idumaeans. If we found that in the Hellenistic period, particularly in the days of the first Hasmonaeans, there existed genuine friendship between the two nations which even led to cooperation on fields of battle against the Seleucid regime and its ad herents, yet from the moment when the two sides aspired to expansion of their borders and to political and military power in the region, the seeds of hostility and rivalry were sown between them. With the start of the mad race of succession in the disintegrating Seleu cid kingdom after the death of Antiochus VII Sidetes in 129 BCE, in which both the Hasmonaeans and the Nabataeans participated, the two sides became so inimical to one another that they often found themselves fighting each other to the death. It appears that the restoration of the border regions conquered earlier from the Nabataeans, as occurred at the instigation of Antipatros the Idumaean and John Hyrcanus II, as well as the marriage of Antipatros to one of the daughters of Nabataean nobility and his good connections in Petra were no longer able to bridge the abyss of hatred separating the two nations. 5
who developed an old idea from the notable scholar Gratz (in one of the appendices to his monu mental work on the history of the Jewish people) and proved clearly and persuasively that the zealot ideology of the rebels against Rome came out of the school of Shammai - see: BenShalom, dissertation, passim; see especially for our subject here, p p . 5 3 1 - 5 3 2 . 5 See: Ben-Shalom, ibid., pp.39, 333, also 3 9 0 - 3 9 2 (note 160) with additional details including references to Talmudic literature. On "Attitude of Pharisees to Roman rule and the Herodian dynasty", see: Alon, Zion, III (1935), p p . 3 0 0 - 3 2 2 (= Studies in the History of Israel, 1, p p . 2 6 47).
208
Epilogue
In the difficult period at the outset of his political career, Herod was briefly tempted to believe that the Nabataean blood flowing in his veins would be in his favor and helpful, but he quickly abandoned his vain il lusions and immediately became the sworn enemy of the Nabataeans; it is therefore not surprising that the Jewish-Nabataean confrontation reached its peak in his days. The artificial Roman-style attempts to alleviate this mutual hatred by political matchmaking and marriages (like the scheme to marry Herod's sister Salome to Syllaeus or the marriage of his son Herod Antipas to the daughter of the Nabataean King Aretas IV) did not stand the test of real life. At best these efforts led to a short suspension of the outbursts of hos tility between the two nations, but they were powerless to settle the dif ferences and bring the two sides to general friendship and cooperation. On the contrary, active Nabataean participation in the suppression of the Great Jewish Revolt against the Romans which was accompanied by dis graceful acts of plunder, atrocious murder and monstrous torment of fugitives from Jerusalem, may be taken as an indication of the depth of hatred for the Jews which the Nabataeans nurtured at that time. Some forty years later, when Emperor Trajan founded the Province of Arabia in 106 CE the Nabataeans without a whimper lost the autonomy in their own country . Later still — in 132—135 CE — this province provided the Romans important military support in the suppression of the Bar-Kokhba Revolt and as we know contributed the only complete legion they had for this operation . There is indeed some evidence of symbiosis between Jews and Nabataeans during the interval between these two great Jewish revolts, in the region of Zo'ar (in the town of Mahoza) south of the Dead Sea, as may be seen from the famous Babatha archives . However, the effort of modern scholarship — to beautify the history of the two nations with the aid of this fact — in the long run founders on the counterindication that in the stormy days of the Bar-Kokhba Revolt this famous Jewish widow sought refuge in the caves of the Judaean Desert together with the Jewish rebels. If we try to explain her association at that time with Jewish rebels by purely legal arguments, we may assume that she also had legal expectations from the success of the Revolt, so that the rights of ownership of her property 6
7
8
6 See: Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 1 4 - 1 5 ; Amianus Marclinus, 14, 8, 13; Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p. 8 Iff. 7 There is great uncertainty in modern scholarship on the identity of this legion, whether it was the / / / Cyrenaica Legion or the VI Ferrata Legion. For details see: D.L. Kennedy, HSCP, LXXXIV (1980), p p . 2 8 3 - 3 0 8 . 8 See: Bowersock, Roman Arabia, p.76ff with references.
Epilogue
209
would be recognized and confirmed according to the Laws of Israel. On the other hand there is reason to believe that she did not seek legal remedies in the Province of Arabia, since she apparently anticipated the failure awaiting her in the local law courts . Summary of the Ituraean chapter of our study is shrouded in denser mists of uncertainty than others, mainly because of the absence of sources or their weak and meagre nature. From the little we know it may be said with certainty that the Ituraean political entity in Lebanon was shattered during the Roman period into the tiniest fragments. Two large Arab concentrations may be identified in western Syria and northern Lebanon even before the Roman conquest in 65—63 BCE — the one centred around the city of Hammath ( E m e s a ) and the second around the centre in Chalcis. It seems these two Arab concentrations were close to one another, so they may be identified and distinguished from the Arab concentrations of eastern and northern Syria (such as the Tadmorians) and called by the general ethnic term of "Ituraeans" or "Ituraean Arabs". These two groups never attained political union under a single dynastic rule. The political separation in the Roman period particularly harmed the Ituraeans connected with the centre of Chalcis and it was Pompey who began the process of comminution and division of the feeble Ituraean entity on Mount Lebanon. Very possibly his policy was guided by pragma tic, practical considerations, fearing the Ituraeans' connections with the Hasmonaeans which even developed as far as dynastic marriages at the high est levels. From this aspect there is correlation between Pompeian politics in Judaea and that in Ituraea. Liberation of the coastal strip from Ituraean control and their forced withdrawal to the upper regions of Mount Leba non were designed to strengthen the Hellenized Phoenician cities; in this matter Pompey may be regarded as their patron and liberator from the danger of conquest by an eastern and barbaric nation led by 'tyrannical leaders'. The British scholar Jones long ago proved that, throughout the Ituraean subsistence area, following the Pompeian conquest the Romans had applied a systematic and consistent policy of urbanization, with rigid adherence to perpetuation of political disunity and separation . Undoubtedly this fact affected the Ituraeans' chance for survival, not only from the nationalpolitical aspect, but also culturally. The repeated blows and great disasters which befell the neighboring Jewish people after the Roman conquest 9
10
11
9 I believe there is room to expand studies in this direction. 10 Concerning this, see extensively: Altheim-Stiehl, p p . 1 3 9 - 1 6 3 and more. 11 See: A.H.M. Jones, JRS, XXI (1931), p p . 2 6 5 - 2 7 5 .
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Epilogue
gave added impetus to the process of dissolution undergone by the Itu raeans and their submersion into the depths of oblivion in the region's history, for only the Jewish people could have served them as support of any kind for independent survival. No wonder therefore that in time every last remaining vestige of the phenomenon of Judaization on Mount Lebanon was also totally eradicated. Archeological findings for example clearly prove that the energetic policy of urbanization and Hellenization in the reign of Emperor Hadrian brought the ancient local paganism — in an adapted Helleno-Roman guise — back to Mount Hermon and the borders of Jewish Galilee. Hadrian's reign in fact marks the end of a lengthy process which began with the conquest by Pompey. It appears that the Herodian dynasty fulfilled an important task in the process of urbanization and Hellenization leading to the disapperance of the Ituraeans from the stage of history. Herod himself 'contributed' to this by an energetic policy of permanent settlement in the Auranitis, Trachoni tis, Batanaea and Gaulanitis regions, a policy which almost led to elimina tion of the phenomenon of nomadism and robbery there. In this of course he enjoyed unreserved Roman backing and support, especially since his very rule over these regions resulted from Roman initiative. Following him on the same course were his descendants and other members of his family — his son Philip, Agrippa I and Herod of Chalcis (his grandsons) and Agrip pa II (his great-grandson), each of whom in his turn ruled over one or more parts of the Ituraean tetrarchies. The new Hellenistic cities which were founded within the Ituraean region, or rather the old existing cities which were politically and cul turally Hellenized (such as Caesaria-Philippi, Abila [= Abilene], Chalcis, Heliopolis, Arka, Naveh, Canatha, Laodiceia and Emesa) became the backbone of the new order. Apart from Naveh and'Canatha, all the other cities were subjected to powerful Phoenician and Greco-Roman influence, a fact which was reflected in their political and religio-cultural character. These cities of course also radiated this influence over their vicinity, a fact which for example found significant expression from the start of the 2nd century CE in the revival of local paganism on Mount Hermon in GrecoRoman disguise. It appears that idol-worship eventually outweighed Judaism in the re gions of Mounts Hermon and Lebanon; quite possibly the national disasters which befell the Jewish nation in its land after the Great Revolt contribut ed not inconsiderably to the acceleration of this process, especially when combined with the philo-Hellenic policy pursued by Emperor Hadrian and his edicts against Judaism. On the other hand, the regions of Trachonitis, Auranitis, Batanaea and part of Gaulanitis - relatively far removed from direct Phoenician and Hellenistic-Roman influence and densely populated
Epilogue
211
by considerable concentrations of Jewish settlers since the days of Herod — remained Jewish in their character, a fact especially evident in the period of the Mishnah and the Talmud. It seems reasonable to assume that the national disasters which over came the Jews in their own country brought to these regions quite con siderable numbers of refugees who in their turn added their contribution to strengthening the Jewish character and its hardening against foreign influence.
Appendix A
Arab Rulers (Nabataeans and Ituraeans) I. List of the Nabataean
Kings (following Schurer & Bowersock)
Aretas I
169 BCE
Rabael I Aretas II Obodas I Aretas III Obodas II Malichus I Obodas III Aretas IV Malichus II Rabael II Provincia Arabia
100 BCE (Perhaps 110-96 BCE) 9 6 - 8 7 BCE (approximately) 8 7 - 6 2 BCE (approximately) 6 2 - 5 7 BCE (approximately) 5 7 / 6 - 2 8 BCE (approximately) 2 8 - 9 / 8 BCE (approximately) 9/8 B C E - 4 0 CE 4 0 - 7 0 CE 7 0 - 1 0 6 CE 106 CE
II List of the Ituraean Rulers in the Roman Period (following Schiirer, Schmitt & Schottroff) Ptolemy son of Mennaeus Lysanias (1) a) The rulers of Arka (North-East
Soaemus Varus (Noarus) — Annexation to Syria Agrippa II — Annexation to Syria
85—40 BCE 4 0 - 3 4 BCE to
Tripolis)
38—49 CE (approximately) 49—53 CE (approximately) 5 3 - 7 0 CE 7 0 - 9 2 / 3 CE 92/3 CE
Arab Rulers (Nabataeans and Ituraeans)
b) The rulers of Abila
213
(Abilene)
Lysanias (2) Agrippa I — Roman temporary rule Agrippa II — Annexation to Syria
? - 3 7 CE 3 7 - 4 4 CE 4 4 - 5 3 CE 5 3 - 9 2 / 3 CE 9 2 / 3 CE
c) The rulers of Chalcis ?
Herod (of Chalcis) 41 - 4 8 CE Agrippa II 4 8 - 5 3 CE Aristobulus ruler of ? (during Emperor Vespasian reign) Little Armenia ( 5 4 - 7 2 CE) — Annexation to Syria 92/3 CE d) The Rulers of Ulatha, Paneas, Zenodorus King Herod Philip — Roman temporary rule Agrippa I — Roman temporary rule Agrippa II — Annexation to Syria
Auranitis, Trachonitis 3 4 - 2 0 BCE 2 0 - 4 BCE 4 B C E - 3 3 / 4 CE 34—37 CE 3 7 - 4 4 CE 4 4 - 5 3 CE 5 3 - 9 2 / 3 CE 92/3 CE
& Batanea
1
1 Auranitis, Trachonitis and Batanea were formally annexed to Herod's Kingdom in 23 BCE.
Appendix B
Formation of Jewish Nationalism Among the Idumaeans by I. Ronen
The Costobar Conspiracy and the Sons of Baba Many scholars tend to believe as obvious that in Jewish Eretz-Israel Herod found support mainly among the population of Idumaea; it is how ever important to. remember that not all Idumaeans supported him, at least not in his first days on the throne. Even with Idumaea in his hands after he returned from his coronation in Rome, he dared not leave the members of his family in the region of his birth but brought them to the polis of Sama ria, showing that only there did he feel secure. It seems his opponents in Idumaea rallied around Idumaean notables heading rival families. One of their typical representatives was Malichus, a confidant of John Hyrcanus II who had eliminated Antipatros (Ant., XIV 2 7 3 - 2 9 3 ; War, I 2 2 3 - 2 3 5 ) . Another was Costobar, in the name of King Herod "governor of all Idu maea and Gaza" and second husband of Herod's sister Salome (Ant., XV 254), who was a rich man owning land and farming estates (ibid., 265). Josephus indicates that Costobar was of Idumaean origin (Ant., XV 253): Koordpapoc. r)v yevei p.ev '15ovixaioc,, and that his forefathers had even been priests of Kos, the Idumaean national god, a fact which might indicate that as a distinguished family of priests, at the time Costobar's family had most probably objected to conversion to Judaism. This fact could of course explain his name and to a certain degree might also be the reason why he had been represented as one who strove to restore the religion of his fathers (Ant., XV 255). As evidence of Costobar's oppositionary tendencies there is the fact that in 37 BCE, with Herod's conquest of Jerusalem, he reneged on the task Herod had imposed on him — to prevent the escape of his 1
1 Some scholars maintain that the name Costobar is but a garbled version of the name "123 0 1 [7 (Cosgever). On this see the coment by Marcus on Ant., XV 253: Josephus, VIII, p.l 19 note f; cf. Milik, Syria, XXXV (1958), n.7, and Flusser, The Jewish People in the First Century, II 1976, p p . 1 0 7 4 - 1 0 7 5 . But cf. Chap. 4, note 34. See lately a list of Idumaean names together with bibliographic references in the article by Oren and Rappaport, IEJ, XXXIV (1984), p p . 1 1 4 - 1 5 3 .
The Costobar Conspiracy and the Sons ofBaba
215
enemies from the city — giving refuge to the Baba family, related to the Hasmonaean dynasty and supporters of Mattathias Antigonus. At that time this had not yet become known to Herod, and as indicated, he ap pointed Costobar governor of Idumaea and Gaza; to bind him with ties of personal loyalty, he also gave him his sister Salome in marriage. How ever, it appears that neither his office nor the fact of being Herod's brotherin-law reduced his opposition to Herod. His ambition was it seems to be come ruler of Idumaea with the aid of Cleopatra VIII of Egypt, whose enmity to Herod was well-known, also her desire for territorial gains at the expense of his kingdom . The approach to Egypt may also be explained against the background of Costobar's plan to restore the cult of Kos. It must be remembered that worship of this god had not yet disappeared from the face of the earth, for in Memphis in Egypt there was still an Idumaean poliieuma of military settlers having a sanctuary conducted by Dorion, priest to the god Kos (or Cos) , and it closely recalls the Jewish politeuma headed by Onias IV at Leontopolis. It should be noted that this same Dorion who headed the Idumaean politeuma at Memphis, like his Jewish counterpart Onias IV at Leontopolis, served both as High Priest and as commander . The cult of Kos is also known on the Nabataean scene. On a stone found at a Naba taean site at Khirbet Tanur there is an inscription of dedication to the Idumaean god Kos:K m n /n*?K o p V i ' p a o p t ^ y ">*T (= "this is [the statue] erected by Kosmelekh to Kos god [of] Khoroa"). From palaeographical considerations the inscription is dated in the 1st century BCE . The excavations conducted at Ramath el Khalil, the ancient Mamre, also revealed a small altar with the name Kos inscribed on its base and it was possibly an altar to the Idumaean god . 2
3
4
5
6
Let us now return to the Costobar conspiracy. As related by Josephus, Herod heard of Costobar's approach to Cleopatra, but thanks to the inter vention of his sister Salome and his mother he forgave Costobar's treachery. Only later, when Salome had left her husband, she accused him of conceal ing the Sons of Baba and together with a number of companions (Antipa-
2 Cleopatra, as related in Ant., XV 258, did in fact ask Anthony to take Idumaea out of Herod's hands, but was refused. 3 See Rappaport, Rev. De Philologie, XLIII (1969), p p . 7 3 - 8 2 , and especially inscription OGIS, 737. 4 See Kasher, Jews of Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, p p . 5 5 - 5 6 . 5 Patrich, Cathedra, XXVI (1963) p.57; ibid., in note 40 there is a reference to first publication of the inscription. 6 Patrich, ibid., 79 note 113; he does not indicate a dating of the altar mentioned; see also Flusser, The Jewish People in the First Century (in note 49) also see comprehensive study: Vriezen, Oudtestamentische Studien, XIV (1965), p p . 3 3 0 - 3 5 3 .
Jewish Nationalism Among the Idumaeans
216
tros, Lysimachus and Dositheus) of conspiring against King Herod. Follow ing Salome's denunciation, Herod ordered the execution of Costobar and his companions and with them also all the members of the Baba family found in their hiding place in Idumaea. (Ant., XV 2 5 9 - 2 6 6 ) . Schalit does not accept Josephus' explanation, that though Herod heard of Costobar's connections with Cleopatra he said nothing of it. On the con trary, Schalit argues that it was not Herod's custom to forgive anyone who might endanger his reign. Therefore, he argued, Costobar possibly succeed ed in simply concealing his actions from Herod, especially since there is reason to believe that on the death of Cleopatra Costobar finally despaired of his separatist plans and hoped these would not become known to Herod and would be forgotten . Thus is is reasonable to believe that Costobar's acts and plans would not have become known without the denunciation by his wife Salome who wanted to put an end to her marriage with Costobar and had her eye on more tempting possibilities, such as marriage to Syllaeus the Arab, strong man of Petra, who untiringly and with great cunning was contriving to seize the Nabataean royal throne. According to Josephus, twelve years passed from Costobar's concealing the Sons of Baba till the execution of everyone involved, i.e. this happened in 25 BCE. Schalit however (following Otto), argues that the execution of the Sons of Baba and of Costobar and his companions already occurred in 28/27 BCE, a short time after the execution of Alexandra the Hasmo naean . In Schalit's opinion, Josephus confused the order of events, for the story in Antiquities first relates Costobar's success, which aroused in him the ambition for great things: attain independent rule over Idumaea under the protection of Cleopatra. Nevertheless, so argues Schalit, there is no doubt that Costobar's betrayal of Herod had in fact already begun in 37 BCE and had found expression in that he did not fulfill Herod's orders and concealed the Sons of Baba on his estate in Idumaea. Costobar wanted to save the Sons of Baba, because of the bonds of friendship which had apparently formed between the two families even before Herod accession to the throne and possibly even before Antipatros had done so. Schalit believes that only later did Costobar go so far as to betray Herod by form ing ties with Cleopatra with the aim of gaining control of Idumaea under her protection. As indicated, Costobar's plan fitted in with Cleopatra's territorial ambitions. In 35 BCE the latter, while in Laodiceia, as we know had asked Anthony for all Judaea, but had to be satisfied with the Jericho Valley and Gaza; from this Schalit deduced that Costobar's proposal was 7
8
7 Schalit, King Herod, p.83. 8 Schalit, op.cit. pp.84, 387 (notes 162, 163) and see also comment by Marcus to Ant, (Josephus, VIII, p. 125, note a).
XV 261
The Costobar Conspiracy and the Sons of Baba
217
addressed to Cleopatra some time close and prior to this, i.e. 36 or 35 BCE . Though reconstruction of the Costobar affair (as proposed by Schalit) indicates there was no direct connection between the preservation of the Baba family and Costobar's political plans, there is nevertheless ground to believe there was in fact such a connection and that saving the Sons of Baba and their concealment on his holdings in Idumaea was not inspired merely by innocent friendship. It is definitely reasonable to believe that Costobar's enmity for Herod had not just begun in 37 BCE and that its roots lay in past rivalry between two Idumaean tribal families. Costobar's marriage to Salome at that time was designed merely to moderate this rivalry. If our evaluation is in fact correct, it is possible to believe that granting refuge to the Sons of Baba was based on a political plan or perhaps more correctly, on a political illusionary dream, wherein the Sons of Baba were to have served as a bridge for creating an Idumaean-Hasmonaean pact under the patronage of Cleopatra the Egyptian, since Ptolemaic endeavors for rule or at least influence in Eretz-Israel and in Judaea had long since come into existence, especially since we know that relations of genuine friendship had already been formed in the past. 9
Stern has also written in this strain: "possibly this act (saving the Sons of Baba) was already performed on the assumption that it would provide its instigator with a degree of support among wide circles of the population, support which would help Costobar attain independent rule in Idumaea. He possibly also had the daring and paradoxical idea of forming a pact between Idumaeans and Hasmonaeans, with the purpose of undermining the founda tions of the House of Antipatros" . Together with Costobar, Herod executed several more people suspected of being part of the conspiracy: "Lysimachus, Antipatros surnamed Gadia and also Dositheus" (Ant., XV 252). Very possibly this Dositheus belonged to a family who had from the start opposed the ascent to the throne of the Antipatros family. In any case, his brother had been a member of the delegation which had presented itself before Anthony in an attempt to per suade him to cease his support of the Antipatros family and who were executed in Tyre (Ant., XV 269). The members of this family seemingly made peace with Herod, at least outwardly. Dositheus' relative Joseph became Herod's brother-in-law (as his sister Salome's first husband) with influence at the royal court, all this at the time that old John Hyrcanus II 10
9 Schalit, op.cit., pp.70, 83, 387 note 259. 10 Stern, Tarbiz, XXXV (1966), p.238; see also summary of affair by Smallwood, Jews under Roman Rule, p p . 6 2 - 6 3 , 72.
218
Jewish Nationatism A mong the Idumaeans
returned to Jerusalem (36 BCE). As we know, this Joseph was executed in 34 BCE, after Herod returned from his meeting with Anthony at Laodiceia (Ant., XV 87). Dositheus continued his activities for several more years and his name was connected with the affair which led to the execu tion of John Hyrcanus I I . According to the story taken from Herod's memoirs (Ant., XV 174), Alexandra and John Hyrcanus II entrusted Dositheus (who was considered Hyrcanus' friend) to act as intermediary between them and Malichus the Nabataean king. Though Disotheus "had considerable reasons for being an enemy to Herod" (op.cit., 169), he still preferred in the end to demonstrate loyalty to Herod by betraying John Hyrcanus II (Ant., XV 1 6 7 - 1 7 2 ) . He did not however survive for long and was put to death for involvement in the Cos tobar conspiracy . The presentation of Dositheus as having connections with the Nabataeans, his involvement with the Costobar conspiracy and the family ties with Herod's brother-in-law Joseph hint at a possibility that per haps he too belonged to an Idumaean family who served the Hasmonaean dynasty and whose sons were close to John Hyrcanus I I . On the other hand, there is no way of knowing the origins of the other two figures also involved in the Costobar conspiracy - Lysimachus and Antipatros-Gadia . In connection with the Costobar conspiracy the question of the identity of the Sons of Baba is of course also of interest. Rappaport has recently raised the possibility that this family too was of Idumaean origin and finds the grounds for his proposal in the inscriptions from the necropolis 11
12
13
14
15
11 On this see Schalit, king Herod, p p . 3 8 3 - 3 8 4 (note 105). 12 See Stern, op.cit., p p . 2 3 9 - 2 4 0 . Stern uses Dositheus as an example of people who shifted their loyalties from support of the Hasmonaean dynasty to support of Herod. 13 The story of his betrayal of Herod is based on the fact that Dositheus was accepted by John Hyrcanus II as a faithful friend (Ant., XV 168). Dositheus is a very common Greek name among Jews from the Greek diaspora, being a translation of the Hebrew names Mattithyahu ( T n T1D73 ) and Netanyahu ( T H ' ^ D J ) and, in reverse order, also of the name Jonathan ( ' f i l l I D ' ); there has in fact been a proposal to identify this Dositheus with a Dositheus of Alexandria mentioned in Ant., XV 252 (Josephus, VIII, p.l 18, note e). 14 Lysimachus son of Pausanias is mentioned in Ant., XIV 222, 307 among the delegates of John Hyrcanus II who handled the matter of rights of the diapora Jews and there is no way of knowing if this was the same man. As for Antipatros, it is interesting that his Semitic nickname Gadia (raSia) is also mentioned. According to Schalit this is an Tdumaean-Hebrew' name; see idem, King Herod, p.387, (note 161). On the other hand Marcus comments in connection with Ant., XV 252 (Josephus, VIII, p.l 18 note d) that the meaning of the name Gadia could be 'child', 'boy' (kid) or 'lucky'. Was he too in fact of Idumaean origin? In Schalit's opinion (loc.cit.), his Hellen ist name Antipatros raises the possibility that he was in fact "one of Herod's Idumaean relatives". See the recent and interesting study by Hachlili, Eretz-Israel, XVII (1984), p p . 1 8 8 - 2 1 1 , and concerning this name: op.cit., pp. 1 9 6 - 1 9 7 . In this connection we should also mention one of the sons of Mattathias, John named Gaddis ) rd56rj? (IMaccabees, 2:2; Ant., XIII 10). 15 See Oren & Rappaport, IEJ XXXIV (1984), p p . 1 1 4 - 1 5 3 . On the matter of Babatha and the sons of Baba see ibid., p. 144, esp. note 68.
The Costobar Conspiracy and the Sons of Baba
219
of Marisa. As we know, one of the grave inscriptions newly discovered there by Oren contains the name BafiaTaq i.e. "of Babatha", a name previously known from Marisa inscriptions, like that of Bdj3a . It seems that Babatha is the feminine form while Baba is masculine. Bearers of the two names appear at Marisa in an expressly Idumaean context: Baba and Babatha were brother and sister, descendants of Kosnathan son of Amaraios. It is worth stressing that the name Babatha is also well-known from documents in the Cave of Letters in the Judaean desert , this of course being the Aramaic form, while in Greek it is spelled Bdfiada, as it appears on the graves at Marisa . The male form is Baba (e.g. N U T n i a K a n ) and Bd/3a in Greek. As indicated, the Sons of Baba are mentioned in (Ant. XV 266) as rela tives of the Hasmonaeans and Rappaport conjectured this was the same family whose members are mentioned by name in the grave inscriptions of Marisa. According to his supposition, reference is to a family who lived in this area like other Idumaean families converted to Judaism, became inte grated with Jewish society and by marriage even /ormed ties with the Hasmonaean family. According to Rappaport, the Sons of Baba's ties to the Hasmonaeans do not conflict with the possibility of their Idumaean origin, since the family of Antipatros later also married into the Hasmo naean family, so this must also have been possible in an earlier period. Irrespective of the possible Idumaean origins of the Sons of Baba, it is very commonly assumed there was a connection between them and the sage Baba ben Buta who is known in Talmudic tradition as one of the active members of the Shammai s c h o o l . One story (B. Baba Bathra, 3b—4a) even links the man with Herod's period and presents Herod, under the name "the slave of the Hasmonaean house" as one who rebelled against his masters, killed all the Hasmonaean family except one girl whom he wanted to take for a wife, except that she preferred suicide over marriage to him. When Herod seized the throne, the Sages quoted against him the Biblical verse "one from among your brethren you shall set a king over y o u " (Deut., 17:15) and he therefore murdered them all, leaving alive only Baba ben-Buta whose eyes he put out. After 16
17
18
19
20
21
16 Loc.cit., and see also: Peters and Thiersch, Painted Tombs in the Necropolis of Marissa, p.45, nos.10-11. 17 Yadin-Polotsky, Yediot, XXVI (1969), p p . 2 1 1 - 2 4 1 . 18 Babatha known from the Cave of Letters in the opinions of Rappaport-Oren (loc.cit.) lived in an area which was Idumaean-Nabataean from the geographic and ethnic aspect. 19 See note by Marcus to Ant., XV 266 (Josephus, VIII, p . l 2 6 - 1 2 7 , note b). In this connection it should also be noted that the name Sabba (2d/3/3a) appears in several manuscripts (Ant., XV 260, 261, 263, 264) and most scholars prefer Baba (Bd/Ja). Details: Schiirer, I , p.304 note 52. 20 Levine, Cathedra, VIII (1978), p. 19 note 36 rejects this identification. See however Derenburg, p.78; Alon, Studies in the History of Israel, I, p.39; Ben-Shalom, Dissertation, p.147. (In this identification all scholars in fact follow Gratz.) s
Jewish Nationalism Among the Idumaeans
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this, the story continues, Herod went incognito to the miserable man in order to test his feelings towards himself and lay a trap for him. After the latter had refused to curse him, Herod revealed who he was, expressed his regret for killing the sages and asked for a 'remedy' through repentance for himself. Baba ben-Buta suggested he should resume the building of the Temple, and after Herod expressed fear of the Romans, Baba ben-Buta sug gested a way in which he could evade their anger. In Ben-Shalom's opinion , though this story contains a faint reflection of events in Herod's time, it cannot provide proper information on Baba ben-Buta, even if it possibly does preserve some recollection of the persecu tion of sages in Herod's days, in the course of which perhaps also the Sons of Baba were put, to death. Rappaport even believes there is a possible connection between this family and Judah ben Baba mentioned several times in Talmudic literature . Rappaport emphasizes that at all events our concern here is with an uncommon name (i.e. Baba) and that the person ages mentioned above are the only ones in the literature of that time who bore it. If indeed there is truth in the conjecture on the Idumaean origins of the Sons of Baba and of Baba ben-Buta, one of the elders of the School of Shammai, it may be possible to relate to them the contents of a passage in Sifre Zutta found in the Geniza, on the activist stand adopted by Idu maean disciples in the School of Shammai on the eve of the Great Jewish Revolt; there may also be an opening here for seeking a link between the Idumaeans and the Zealot ideology, as will be clarified later in connection with that rebellion . 22
23
24
"Varus' War" After Herod's death, when Archelaus left for Rome to obtain the ap proval of Augustus for his accession, Eretz-Israel raged with a series of revolts known in our sources as "Varus' War" . One of the centers of the revolt was in Idumaea, with the uprising of two thousand discharged sol diers from Herod's army and Herod's cousin Achiabus set out against 25
26
21 Ben-Shalom, op.cit., p . 2 3 5 - 2 3 8 brings all the information to be found among sources from the Sages concerning Baba son of Buta. 22 Op.cit., p.238. 23 Oren-Rappaport, loc.cit., with reference to M Eduyoth, VI, I; M. Yebamoth, XVI, 3, 5, 7; M. Erubin II, 4, 5. 24 See note 84 below. 25 Summary of events following Herod's death see: Kasher, The Great Jewish Revolt, p p . 3 1 - 3 7 ; Ben-Shalom, op.cit., p p . 3 1 4 - 3 2 5 , 3 6 2 - 3 7 6 . 26 Ant., XVII 270; War, II 55. Though the version in Antiquities states that the revolt of Herod's
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27
t h e m . It seems that the force available to Achiabus was not adequate for dealing with the rebels and he was forced to retreat to some fortified locations (War, II 55) or high places (Ant., XVII 2 7 0 ) . Josephus goes on to relate that the number of rebels in Idumaea increased and reached ten thousand. That is when Varus set out for Idumaea at the head of his legions and the rebels surrendered to him without a fight, with Achiabus acting as intermediary. Their leaders were sent to Rome for trial and incidental to this we learn they included members of the Herodian family itself and also that they were condemned to death . It is important to discover who were those who joined the two thousand rebellious veterans of Herod's army and who were the leaders of the revolt. Unfortunately, apart from the incidental information on members of the Herodian family among the leaders of the rebels, Josephus provides no details which might answer these questions, so the answers can be no more than mere speculation. We believe the population of Idumaea was mostly rural and agricultural, suffering from not inconsiderable economic hardships and deep social polarization. However, may it legitimately be said that during Herod's reign their situation had become worse than in the stormy period between Pompey's conquest and the new arrangements imposed by Julius Caesar, or when compared with the days when Judaea was exploited by Cassius, the Republican governor of Syria? It seems there is no reason to accuse Herod of increasing the burden of taxation . There is no doubt that he was a capable administrator who directed his kingdom with efficiency and not without reason, scholars speak of the realm's economic affluence during his reign. However, when we speak of economic prosperity, we must 28
29
30
27
28 29 30
discharged veterans was in Judaea, in this case it seems that in view of the context of the events, the version in War is preferable - see Ben-Shalom, op.cit., p.367 (note 35). It should be noted that Herod's cousin bore a Hebrew name, not so very typical in the Herodian family from the days of his sons for example. An additional member of the family with a Hebrew name was Herod's nephew, who was called after his father and was killed in battle near Jericho in 38 BCE (Ant., XVII 294, XVIII 134). See Ben-Shalom, op,cit., p . 3 1 9 - 3 2 0 ; Shatzman (Mil'et, I,[ 1 9 8 3 ] , p.92) estimates the force available to Achiabus as round a thousand soldiers. War, II 7 6 - 7 8 ; Ant., XVII 2 9 7 - 2 9 8 . A summary of the economic and social situation in the country in Herod's reign see Ben-Shalom, op.cit., p p . 1 7 0 - 1 7 9 , and notes contain references to further literature. There ( p . 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 ) Ben-Shalom brings the conclusions of Momigliano's study, that Herod did not significantly alter the tax system in force since the time of Julius Caesar. According to him the amounts of tax he collected were less than those Agrippa I collected from a smaller area. Herod apparently had additional sources of income to balance his budget beside taxes, such as: his family's property, property confiscated from his rivals, income from activity in industry and trade, even abroad (such as the copper mines in Cyprus) as well as the numerous contributions from diaspora Jewry with whom he maintained excellent relations. He could therefore afford to ease the tax burden on the people in times of drought (Ant., XV 2 9 9 - 3 1 6 ) and twice to grant reductions of taxes (Ant., XV 365, XVII 64).
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remember that such economic prosperity is not necessarily identical with social justice! When speaking of a thriving economy, we must ask which social class or classes enjoyed its benefits. Relying principally on the relatively detailed information available on the Ptolemaic kingdom, if we then assume the agrarian and administrative regime in Herod's kingdom was organized on the Hellenistic model normal in eastern countries, there is quite solid ground for believing the king and his associates and friends enjoyed great privileges, such as grants of land, economic concessions and the like. The local rural population on the other hand, like their neighbors the 'natives' (Xaoi) in Egypt, were mainly wretch ed people, shackled by quite stringent leases and tenancy agreements which allowed them not a comfortable income but merely a sparse subsistence. If we also take into account the logical assumption that right at the start of his reign Herod introduced a rigid and uncompromising regime to sup press any oppositionary expression whatever in his kingdom, we may understand that every slight exhibition of disobedience or protest against economic exploitation and hardship were met with the most severe and resolute reactions. Under such conditions, growing discontent and opposi tion became a time bomb. It therefore seems the reason for the hatred of Herod, and its eruption after his death is not to be sought in a worsen ing of the economic situation, but rather in enormous economic and class distinction, in polarization between the king with his associates and a broad class of farmers and tenants who felt themselves greatly exploited and with out hope for any improvement in their position. Scattered throughout the two great works by Josephus (War and Anti quities) there is information indicating considerable land holdings belong ing to Herod throughout Jewish Eretz-Israel . Though there is no informa tion on his possessions in Idumaea, it may be assumed with a great degree of plausibility that the notable Idumaean family whose offspring he was, owned land there . It is also probable that at least the property of his enemy Costobar came into his possession after the former was executed. Though there is no way of knowing with certainty whether the land within the chora of the former poleis Marisa and Adora (Adoraim) became 'king's land' , if it was so then a very considerable portion of the land in Idumaea was in Herod's possession. At all events, there was a large number of farmers throughout Jewish Eretz-Israel, and including also Idumaea, who were tenants of the king and his associates. 31
32
33
31 See Ben-Shalom, op.cit., pp.174, 2 6 1 - 2 6 2 (notes 1 3 7 - 1 4 5 ) . 32 In Schalit's opinion the origin of the Herodian family was in the Marisa region: "there lay their estates and properties for generations"; see Schalit, History of 3rd World Congress for Jewish Studies, p.234; idem. Annual of the Swedish Theological Institute, 1(1962), pp.l09ff. 1962, pp.579-581. 33 See: Schalit, King Herod, p. 135.
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In this connection the question of course once more arises: what were the relations between Herod and the peasants who were farming his land? We have unfortunately not a trace of direct information on this subject and there is even no way of knowing whether the situation of the tenantfarmers became better or worse when the land passed to Herod from its previous owners. However it seems Ben-Shalom was right in his cautious and well-considered words, when he wrote: "It may be assumed the feeling of strangeness and enmity which the masses retained for Herod and his regime deepened also because of conflicting economic and class inter ests" . There is also room to assume that the socio-economical factor combined with dissatisfaction of Herod's regime of oppression and his policy of Hel lenization, that is his preference of the gentile population in Eretz-Israel and the establishment of cultural institutions cast in the Hellenistic-Roman m o l d . In addition there is of course the fact that the origins of opposi tion to Herod in Idumaea already existed at the beginning of his reign (i.e. back in his years of struggle with Mattathias Antigonus) and were in fact linked to local rivalries with Herod on the part of several Idumaean families who became outspoken allies of the Hasmonaeans. The events of the 'Varus War' therefore express quite an advanced stage in the process of integration of Idumaean society in Judaea and consolida tion of its Jewish identity. Applebaum's remarks on this matter are wellplaced: "These events should be regarded as the birth of Jewish nationalism among the Sons of Edom, which reached its most extreme expression in the days of the destruction of the Second Temple" . 34
35
36
34 Ben-Shalom, op.cit., p.175; see also Applebaum, Kirjath Sepher, XXXI (1969), p.14. One of the characteristics of the period from Herod's reign to the Great Jewish Revolt is ever-increasing social polarization - see: Brunt, Klio, LIX (1977), p p . 1 4 9 - 1 5 3 . It is hard to believe this process by-passed Idumaea; quite the reverse, on this background we could possibly characterize the acti vities of Simon son of Gioras in Idumaea in the days of the Great Jewish Revolt (War, II 6 5 2 654; cf.: ibid., IV 504, 529, 533ff.: see Stern, Society and Religion in the Days of the Second Temple, p.l82ff and esp. in his summary: "first and foremost Simon son of Gioras is to be re garded as leader of the lower classes in Judaea, Peraea, Idumaea and northern Judaea" (ibid., p. 185). 35 On the connection of the Idumaeans to Jerusalem we find incidental information in Josephus' writings. When reporting the riots in Jerusalem after Herod's death, Josephus notes that the city was full of pilgrims, among them pilgrims from Idumaea (War, II 43). 36 See Applebaum (note 34 above), p. 15. He combines the Costobar conspiracy and the conceal ment of the Baba family, together with the transfer of the three thousand Idumaeans for settle ment in Trachonitis as well as the events of the 'Varus War', into one factual structure and this requires further investigation.
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The Great Jewish Revolt In Book VII of the Jewish War ( 2 5 3 - 2 7 1 ) Josephus brings a list of the various groups of rebels, arranged in ascending order of importance which reflected his own hatred for the rebels. At the top of the list of the hated is the group of rebels called "Zealots" and one degree below them, but above Simon son of Gioras, Josephus places "the Idumaeans". Further on we follow their activities in the course of the Great Jewish Revolt and in conclusion we attempt to discover how they may be characterized in rela tion to the other groups of rebels. Did they have ideological motives for their participation in the rebellion and their activities or are they to be regarded as being moved by madness and lust for war and killing for their own sake, as Josephus tries to describe them? The first hint from which we may deduce Idumaean support for the rebellion we find in War, II 566 which relates of the appointment of com manders (oTpaTriyoi) for Idumaea, namely Jesus son of Sapphas (or Sapphia — Zanipiac) "one of the leading priests" and "Eleazar son of Neus (=Ne'oO the High Priest" , whose instructions Niger of Peraea, the gover nor of Idumaea at that time, was ordered to o b e y . In the military activi ties against Ascalon which were conducted from this region, the Jewish fighters were headed by Niger, Silas the Babylonian and John the Essene (who was appointed governor of Lydda) . After the defeat at the battle in Ascalon (in which John the Essene and Silas the Babylonian were killed), 37
38
39
37 Here there is apparently a textual mutilation and it should be Eleazar son of Ananias, who stop ped the sacrifice for the Emperor's welfare - see: Thackeray, Josephus, II, p.540, note a. 38 Mention of Niger's post of governor (archon) of Idumaea creates problems: from what time was he appointed governor of Idumaea and by whom was he appointed? What was the status of Idu maea at the end of the Second Temple period? In Josephus' administrative list (War, III 5 5 - 5 7 ) , are the toparchies of Idumaea considered a part of Judaea? Perhaps Z. Safrai is right after all in his statement that, like Judaea and Galilee, Idumaea is just the name of a region (a region which is itself also subdivided into toparchies)? Perhaps the list of Pliny the Elder also expresses the state of the division of Judaea from Herod's time to the Great Jewish Revolt, while the list of Josephus represents the administrative division of Judaea, as it was shortly after 70 CE? Could this explain a number of changes in Josephus' list of toparchies - such as the appearance of Engeddi as a toparchy in its own right? We are not concerned here with the problem of the internal division of Idumaea and the identifications proposed by Z. Safrai. In this connection it should also be noted that Safari considers the tradition concerning the letter from Rabbi Johanan son of Zakkai and Rabban Shimeon son of Gamleil to the Jews in the South to be an accurate geographic-administrative source, particularly in the later version of Ha-Midrash Ha-Gadol, which in the Hoffman edition is given the misleading name 'Midrash Tanna'im' - see: Z. Safrai, Borders and Rule in Eretz-Israel etc. pp.75If. 39 Niger and Silas the Babylonian were among the outstanding fighters in the battles against Cestius Gallus -War, II 520; on tendencies of the central government to curb the influence of the rebel lion leaders, see: Rappaport, Judaea and Rome, p.36. The abortive attack on Ascalon was re viewed in War, III 9ff.
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Niger and his remaining men found refuge in an unidentified township in Idumaea called Chaallis (=XdaXXiO or Sallis (=ZdXXic) (War, III 2 0 ) . After this Idumaea served as an objective for the activities of Simon son of Gioras, before he went up to Jerusalem in the spring of 69 C E , since at that time the Idumaeans were already fulfilling an important part in the struggle for control of the capital. As we know, John of Gischala and the heads of the Zealots decided to call on the Idumaeans for help in their struggle against the moderate circles headed by the High Priest Ananus son of Ananus. Josephus relates of a letter sent to the Idumaean by means of messen gers, which stated that Ananus son of Ananus was about to surrender the city to the Romans and that the Zealots who were fighting for freedom were under siege on the Temple Mount (War, IV 224ff). In this connection Josephus describes the Idumaeans in these words: "The Zealots knew that the Idumaeans would comply forthwith, as they were a turbulent and dis orderly people (edvoc), ever on the alert for commotion and delighting in revolutionary changes, and only needed a little flattery from their suitors to seize arms and rush into battle as to a feast" . As we may see below however, the description of the Idumaeans, their acts and motives are marked by dramatic overtones and inconsistencies. Baer comments on this description of the Idumarans, that Josephus had written his words in imitation of descriptions of the Thracians in Greek literature . It should be noted that in this passage the Idumaeans are called "nation" — edvos and, whether we accept as true the description of the Idumaeans' nature or whether we reject it as Josephus' slander, there is at all events no escaping the fact that the reference is to a group, one of whose important characteristics was a common ethnical and geographical origin, due to which it is distinguished from other groups of rebels through out the years of the rebellion . Further on we also find that even after they had accepted the leadership of Simon son of Gioras they were still identified as a distinct group in his camp. 40
41
42
43
44
40 Attempt to identify this place see Klein, Land of Judah, p p . 9 - 1 0 0 , 2 5 3 - 2 5 4 ; he believes the place was called Kefar Shihlayim. See also: Schalit, A Complete Concordance to Flavius Joseph us, Suppl. I, p.105, with additional bibliographic references. 41 On the activities of Simon son of Gioras see: War, II 6 5 2 - 6 5 4 ; IV 503ff. We return to this subject further on. 42 War, IV 231; and see also War, IV 310 where Josephus says of them that the Idumaeans have a wild and murderous nature. 43 Baer, Zion XXXVI (1971), p.152; in note 89 there, Baer points out indicators in Thucydides to the Thracians; see also Stern, Tarbiz, XXIX (1960), p.209. 44 In the list of the various groups or factions of rebels in War, VII 2 5 3 - 2 7 1 , there is no other group which gets such an ethnographic definition. The siccarii for example, are characterized by 'seniority' and dynastic leadership. The men of Simon son of Gioras rallied around his charis matic personality and his actions against the wealthy. A certain parallelism to the Idumaeans
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Shocked on reading the letter from Jerusalem and hearing the words of the envoys, the Idumaean leaders called on the sons of their nation (TO eduoq) to go to war (War, IV 233). In the words of Josephus they "raced round the nation like madmen" and these answered their call and came armed "to defend the freedom of the capital" (op.cit., 234: "the mother city" — 17 nrjTpdiroXiq); they numbered altogether no less than 20 0 0 0 fighters. Incidentally, the form of their mobilization, headed by four local commanders (op.cit., 235) might possibly be an indication of the tribal-clan structure of Idumaean society, which also found expression in the structure of their military formation. In this context however we should note the fact that although Josephus does not neglect to censure the Idumaeans, he does also ascribe to them positive and exalted motiva tion; going to war for the sake of freedom in general and the liberation of Jerusalem in particular. It is really difficult to refrain from asking, whether this was not a slip of the pen which opens the way to revealing the truth. 45
No less than twenty thousand m e n , so Josephus tells us, set out for Jerusalem headed by four commanders (rwenoveq): John and James, sons of Sosas, Simon son of Cathlas and Phineas son of Clusoth . When Ananus 46
is perhaps to be seen in the company of Galilean followers (from among the Zealots) of John of Gischala: "among the latter (i.e. Zealots) for mischievous ingenuity and audacity none surpass the Galilean contingent, for it was they who had promoted John to power" (War, IV 5 5 8 - 5 5 9 ) . On this subject see: Rappaport, in: Nation and History, I, p . 9 8 ; p . l 0 3 and esp. note 27; p. 113. 45 War, IV, 235. In our opinion this number is excessive, greatly at variance with the more reason able figure of five thousand Idumaeans under the command of Simon son of Gioras, out of 25 000 city defenders whom Josephus lists according to their group affiliation (War, V, 2 4 8 250). On the likely correctness of these numerical data see: Rappaport, in: Judaea and Rome, pp.67, 345 (note 3); Broshi, in: Josephus, Historian of Eretz-Israel etc., p p . 2 1 - 2 7 . The number of inhabitants at peak occupancy on the eve of the rebellion has by a non-maximal ist estimate been set at some 80 000 souls (Broshi, in: Between Hermon and Sinai, p.71). After the fall of Galilee many poured into Jerusalem, but it does not seem reasonable to accept as a fact the entry of an additional twenty thousand men into the city, especially by secretively entering via a single gate in the wall! Why therefore did Josephus quote the figure of twenty thousand in referring to the Idumaeans? If in fact this was not based on information which he obtained, it possibly sprang out of exaggeration, in order to explain how the Zealots assisted by the Idumaeans overcame the moderates and the 'peace-loving' people? If the presence of con crete details is one of the criteria for testing the credibility of Josephus' stories (see articles by Rappaport mentioned in notes 44, 45) why did Josephus, as a historian who knew well the topo graphy of Jerusalem, not give us details such as the place where the Idumaeans camped opposite the wall and through which gate they entered the city? Did his sources really lack details of this kind? Or perhaps the absence of details casts a doubt on the credibility of the dramatic story con cerning the appearance of the Idumaeans opposite the gates of Jerusalem and their secret entry into the city under cover of a storm? 46 War, IV, 235; V, 249. As for the names of the Idumaean commanders we see they all had Hebrew or Aramaic names, two of them being brothers. Reconstruction of the name Simon son of Cath las (=Ka0\dO from the root p (= murderer) is based on comparison of the passages men tioning the man in War, V 249, and probably in VI 148 and IV 271 (cf. note 79 below); see also: Shachlit, (note 40 above), p.69; cf. also: Lieberman, Greek and Hellenism in Jewish Palestine,
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son of Ananus heard the Idumaeans were coming to Jerusalem he ordered the city gates closed and posted guards on the walls. When the Idumaeans arrived, the heads of the moderate government tried to persuade them not to attack Jerusalem and to put down their arms, this by means of a long address Josephus put into the mouth of Jesus or rather Joshua (apparently Joshua son of Gamalas). The main points of the speech were denial of the accusation of treachery made against the moderate government, abuse of the Zealots and a call to the Idumaeans to put down their arms, since otherwise they would not be allowed to enter the city (War, IV 2 3 8 - 2 6 9 ) . One of the Idumaean commanders, Simon son of Cathlas, in a speech of reply again accused the moderate government of treason (op.cit., 271 — 282), his main theme being: "We Idumaeans will preserve God's house and fight to defend our common country (TT?C. noivriq naTpidoq) from both her foes the invaders from without and the traitors within" (op.cit., 281). Again we see that in the course of the dramatic description, Josephus placed in the mouths of the Idumaeans exalted ideals of love of freedom and love of the homeland; once again the text contradicts the original characterization of the Idumaeans. From the words placed in the mouth of the Idumaean commander it is clear the Idumaeans saw the wealthy and peace-loving aristocracy as enemies and traitors. Closing the gates of Jeru salem in their faces was for them also a burning insult, especially since they considered themselves to be "the closest kinsmen" of the Jerusalem Jews and in the words of the text — op.cit., 278 — TOU ovyyeveoTaroiq eOveoiv aQpoloie)* . After the speeches, the Idumaeans remained encamped opposite the city walls. In the night there was a violent storm, under cover of which the Zealots succeeded in opening a gate in the city wall; through this the Idu maeans entered the city and joined the Zealots on the Temple Mount (War, 1
p. 139. As for the name Ewadc see: Schalit (note 40 above), p. 117. It is apparently identical with the Aramaic n a m e N W W - cf.:Levi, Erech Milin, WW(2); Kohut, Aruch Completum,XW>V; (VIII, p. 1 7 5 - 1 7 6 ) . In this connection it is worth noting the illustrative fact that two Idumaean commanders had the same names as the two most prominent Jewish leaders, John and Simon. We know the name Phinehas was a prototypic symbol of zealotry ever since the eruption of the Has monaean revolt in Modi'in. No wonder therefore that like John and Simon it was a very common name among Jews - see Hachlili, Eretz-Israel, XVII (1984), p p . 1 8 8 - 2 1 1 (esp. tab. 1 on p.189 and tab. 4, on p. 194). Two of the Idumaean commanders are mentioned in later events: Jacob son of Soasa (War, V 249; VI 92, 148, 380); Simon son of Cathlas (op.cit., V 249 and probably also in War, VI 148; cf. IV, 271). War, V 290 tells of John's death when he was struck in the chest by the arrow of an Arab archer. At this opportunity a number of words of praise are said of him, which of course contradict the stereotyped image of Idumaeans lusting for battle and murder, which had previously been painted by Josephus. The name of Phinehas the fourth com mander is not mentioned again. 47 Cf.: War, IV 265, 2 8 4 - 2 8 5 .
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IV 2 8 5 - 3 0 4 ) . The Zealots and the Idumaeans then disposed of the "mod erate" guards and began a terrible slaughter on the Temple Mount. The slaughter continued throughout the night and according to Josephus, by morning there were eight thousand five hundred dead (War, IV 3 0 5 3 1 3 ) . After this the Idumaeans went down into the city and began indiscrimate looting and murder, but mainly they were looking for the "high priests" (dpxiepeiq). They quickly succeeded in finding Ananus son of Ananus and Joshua son of Gamalas, murdered them, and in breach of the laws of Israel did not permit the burial of their bodies (War, IV 3 1 4 - 3 1 7 ) . Here Josephus briefly interrupts his narrative description of the atroci ties committed by the Zealots and the Idumaeans, to devote an emotional eulogy to Ananus son of Ananus , expressing his own outlook - of sup port for the Tightness of the man's ways. For him, this man and his suppor ters were the true representatives of the Jewish people, not the Zealots and their supporters; these were only a marginal minority, who by their crimi nal ways had led the nation to catastrophe . After the murder of Ananus son of Ananus and Joshua son of Gamalas, the Zealots and the Idumaeans continued to perpetrate atrocities, and in the words of Josephus they butchered people "as though they had been a herd of unclean animals" (War, IV 326). Young people from good families were imprisoned and tortured by them (War, IV 3 2 7 ) for the purpose of forcing them to come over to the side of the Idumaeans and the Zealots, but they all preferred to die rather than join the transgressors against the homeland. Those caught during the day were murdered at night and their bodies were thrown out of the place of their imprisonment to make room for new prisoners. A powerful state of shock enfolded the people in the face of these evil deeds, but no one dared mourn his murdered relatives or show his sorrow in public. In this way Josephus tells us twelve thousand (!) young people from good homes were murdered (War, IV 333). 48
49
s0
48 In War, IV 206 Josephus relates that Ananus son of Ananus posted six thousand guards to guard access to the Temple Mount where the Zealots had taken up position; see also Thackeray's com ment on War, IV 313 (Josephus, III, p p . 9 2 - 9 3 note a). 49 War, IV 3 1 8 - 3 2 5 ; this eulogy to Ananus son of Ananus is compared with the appreciation of Pericles' personality by Thucydides. See: Baer (note 43 above), p.153 note 95, and see his remark (ibid., p p . 1 4 0 - 1 4 1 ) on Josephus' description of the personality of Simon son of Gama liel: "Josephus learnt from Thucydides the method of sketching in brief lines the nature and personality of people who appeared in his writing as decisive factors in history". The emotional words of praise of Ananus son of Ananus are incompatible with his image, as it is drawn in the problematic passage dealing with the trial of Jesus' brother Jacob (Ant., XX 1 9 7 - 2 0 3 ) as an ar rogant, brazen and cruel man, also in another passage (Vita, 1 9 5 - 1 9 6 ) as accepting bribes. In order to serve Josephus' purpose in War the image of Ananus son of Ananus is provided with words of praise and tribute. 50 See Rappaport, in: Judaea and Rome, p.61 and also p.56.
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The next step in the activities of the Zealots and their partners the Idu maeans was the setting up of a 'revolutionary' court of law for show trials of traitors.With great pathos, Josophus describes one trial of this sort the trial of Zacharias son of Baris (or Baruch), one of the rich and respected citizens of Jerusalem (War, IV 3 3 4 - 3 4 4 ) , a trial which made the Idu maeans feel shame and remorse for their crimes. Josephus even told of one of the Zealots who secretly came to the Idumaeans and denounced them for their participation in acts of cruelty and bloodshed, calling on them to leave Jerusalem and return to their homes (War, IV 3 4 5 - 3 5 2 ) . The Idu maeans accepted his appeal and released some two thousand citizens who had been imprisoned. After these had left the city and joined Simon son of Gioras, the Idumaeans also left the city and went back to their homes (War, IV 3 5 3 ) " . Thus in fact ended the first stage of the part played by the Idumaeans in the Great Jewish Revolt in Jerusalem; later they returned to the city to take part in its defence (incidentally with no mention of their previous deeds). At first they were among the supporters of John of Gischala but eventually they left him, going over to the command of Simon son of Gioras (War, IV 556, 566ff). Of course we feel the credibility of Josephus is very doubtful and that the whole story is probably based at best on part-truths (see below). Baer for example completely invalidates the credibility of all the mis deeds Josephus reported of the Idumaeans in Jerusalem. In his opinion, "the whole first episode of the Idumaeans is fictitious, like some of the other things preceding this in Josephus' writings" . He believes the descrip tion of the rule of terror in Jerusalem by the Zealots and Idumaeans is composed on the model of the revolution which took place in Athens in 411. BCE and the struggle between the oligarchy and democracy there . The story of deeds of cruelty described and attributed to the Idumaeans 5 1
53
54
51 On the identity and trial of this Zecharias see Thackeray's comment on War, IV 334 (Josephus, III. p . 9 8 - 9 9 note a); also Baer (note 43 above), pp. 1 5 5 - 1 5 6 which indicated parallel cases in Greek literature. See also: Schalit, A Complete Concordance to Flavius Josephus, suppl. I, pp.24-25. 52 Interestingly neither Thackeray nor Baer commented on this affair relating to the speech of one of the Zealots before the Idumaeans. In truth, this episode appears in understatement to be extremely strange; the Idumaeans suddenly realized that the moderate leadership and their sup porters are not traitors, all this at the instigation of an anonymous zealot figure who attacked the acts of the adherents of his own camp. There is no attempt whatever to clarify his motives, whether he had left the zealot camp or not. The release of prisoners by the Idumaeans arouses wonder: were these prisoners of the Zealots, i.e. supporters of the moderate leadership? If so what business had they with Simon son of Gioras, sworn enemy of the notable and rich? Is it logical to believe they fled knowingly from the frying-pan (the Zealots) into the fire (Simon son of Gioras)? 53 Baer (note 43 above), p.156. 54 Op.cit., p. 154.
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and the Zealots according to Baer is impossible: it consists of a literary imitation, copied in an artificial and foreign manner from a foreign en vironment . He believes the credibility of the whole story is also inacceptable because of the inner discrepancy to be found in Josephus' book, where in one place he tells us of the Idumaeans' departure from the city (War, IV 3 5 3 ) and later, of their presence within, with no indication of how they returned there . Baer accepts as historical fact the murder of Ananus son of Ananus and Joshua son of Gamalas, since "these leaders of reaction and compromise with the Roman regime had to disappear from the political scene, even though it is difficult to know when and how this happened" . Baer therefore believes the Idumaeans only reached Jeru salem with Simon son of Gioras . In fact, by a meticulous literary and philologic analysis Baer succeeds in proving that strong doubts must be cast on the details of events report ed by Josephus, when he describes the terrible deeds by the Idumaeans and the Zealots in Jerusalem. Thus, beyond the shadow of any doubt, we clearly cannot accept his various stories at face value, nor the fantastic figure of twelve thousand young members of aristocratic well-to-do families who were murdered. The same applies to the activities of the "revolution ary court of justice", the trial of various traitors and the non-burial of those killed . All this however does not yet prove the whole episode of the Idu maeans' arrival in Jerusalem to be a complete fabrication by Josephus . After all, it is hard to avoid the impression that the details of the rallying of the Idumaeans, mentioning the names of their commanders, are based on authentic information which Josephus was presenting to his readers — especially since, as mentioned above, factual details were given about three of the four Idumaean commanders and their participation in the bat tle for Jerusalem . Perhaps we should accept as fact that the Idumaeans were called to Jerusalem to help John of Gischala and the Zealots dispose of the regime by the moderate leadership headed by Ananus son of Ananus. This leader55
56
57
58
59
60
61
55 One of the things which Baer (op.cit., p.154) indicated as implausible concerns the accusation of the Zealots of leaving the dead unburied. By Jewish religion a thing like this is in the nature of sacrilege, while in Greece it was considered a just punishment fitting traitors not worthy of burial in the soil of their homeland. This therefore exposes the foreign model on which Josephus relied. 56 Op.cit., p. 152. 57 Op.cit., p.154. 58 Op.cit., p. 157. 59 See Rappaport, in: Judaea and Rome, pp.62, 343 (notes 127, 129). 60 Criticism of Baer's opinion of what 'really' happened in rebellious Jerusalem, see Rappaport, ibid., p p . 6 2 - 6 3 ; p.343 (notes 1 3 0 - 1 3 4 , with references to additional literature). 61 See notes 4 5 - 4 6 above.
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ship had been accused by the former of treason: from the aspect of the rebels - Zealots and Idumaeans - this was a just accusation, which Joseph us himself confirmed in his obituary address for Ananus son of Ananus . And yet why did John of Gischala and the Zealots require the help of the Idumaeans? Was Josephus right in stating that at this stage in the progress of the revolt (the end of 68 and beginning of 69 CE) the moderate govern ment of Ananus son of Ananus was supported by the majority of Jerusalem's citizens? If so, the rebels (the Jerusalem Zealots) and those who had joined them from Galilee and other places must still have been a minority . As already indicated, one way or another the story of the Idumaeans' departure from Jerusalem is extremely strange. Rappaport proposes a simpler explana tion, namely that the purpose for which the Idumaeans had come to Jerusa lem was achieved, so they returned to their homes, having rescued Jerusalem from the treasonous intrigues of Ananus son of Ananus and his supporters . However, to explain the presence of the Idumaeans in the city at a later stage (among the followers of John of Gischala), we must presume that not all the Idumaeans left Jerusalem and that some of them remained in the city to assist John in establishing his regime . As indicated, the description of the Idumaeans' activities is filled with dramatic literary details and is at times even completely divorced from any relationship to the internal situation in Idumaea. Thus for example we hear from Josephus of a military campaign conducted by Vespasian in the spring of 68 CE, in the course of which he conquered western Idumaea and spread devastation there. Josephus recalls two large villages in Idumaea, the one Brirafipiq, apparently Beth-Govrin, while the other — KcupapTofia, in Hebrew m o i s D (or Caphartoba — N a o I S D ) is also in the BethGovrin region. Josephus also reports that Vespasian had spread devastation among the population of the region: over ten thousand dead, a thousand prisoners, the remaining inhabitants expelled and Roman garrisons left in the area . 62
63
64
65
66
62 According to Josephus, with the murder of Ananus son of Ananus the fate of Jerusalem was sealed and all hope of reaching agreement with the Romans was lost (War, IV 3 1 6 - 3 2 0 ) . See explanation of Josephus' views by Rappaport, in: Judaea and Rome, p.61. Descriptions in detail of the atrocities ascribed to the Idumaeans and the Zealots are of course to be rejected, but there is no doubt the moderate government was deposed by physical means - the murder of its leaders and supporters, such as Ananus son of Ananus and Joshua son of Gamala, as even Baer accepts as historic fact their murder by Zealot circles. 63 See note 25, also Rappaport, hid., p . 5 8 - 5 9 . 64 Rappaport, ibid., p.343 (note 126). 65 A conjecture on these lines was proposed at the time by Simkhoni in his Hebrew translation of The Jewish War (p.474) - see also: Smallwood, Jews under Roman Rule, p.314 note 91. 66 War, IV 4 4 7 - 4 4 8 ; for identification of places see: Klein, Land of Judah, p p . 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 ; Schalit, A Complete Concordance of Flavius Josephus, suppl. I, s.v. hrryafipK, p.26.
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Disregarding the Roman army present in the inner coastal plain (in the vicinity of Beth-Govrin), Josephus tells us how Simon son of Gioras took control of all Idumaea {War, IV 5 1 6 - 5 3 7 ) , this act of taking control being presented as a campaign of robbery against the Idumaean popula tion and the spreading of ruin and destruction throughout Idumaea: "From Hebron Simon pursued his march through the whole of Idumaea, not con fining his ravages to the villages and the towns, but making havoc also of the country . . . his cruelty and animosity against the nation contributed to complete the devastation of Idumaea. Just as a forest in the wake of locusts may be seen stripped quite bare, so in the rear of Simon's army nothing remained but a desert" (War, IV533-537). This description is not to be accepted literally and Simon son of Gioras' activities in Idumaea is to be interpreted as directed against a narrow class of the wealthy, as operations which enjoyed the support of broad sectors of the population . Rappaport expressed himself in a similar manner: "Though Josephus presents him as conqueror of Idumaea and violating the Idumaeans against their will, it seems in Idumaea there had been strong tendencies to revolt and that Simon took over control of this region with the support of broad sectors of the population. If this were not so, we would not understand the union of Idumaeans, at first with the Zealots against the moderates and later their broad support of none other than Simon son of Gioras and their service under his command together with commanders from their own people" . The operations in Idumaea are it seems to be dated, in the winter months of 69 CE since, as we shall see later, Simon son of Gioras entered Jerusalem in the spring of that year and at the beginning of summer in that year Vespasian renewed military activi ties when Cerealis, one of his officers conquered upper Idumaea, i.e. the hilly region of Idumaea . 6 7
68
69
70
67 See criticism by Baer to this matter in his article mentioned above (note 43) p. 158. 68 Josephus indicates that beside his soldiers, another forty thousand men joined Simon son of Gioras. If this is a figure at all close to reality, then there must have been massive support by the local population. 69 Rappaport, in: Nation and History, I. p.l 10; see also idem, in: Judaea and Rome, p.64. 70 War, IV 5 5 2 - 5 5 4 . The places indicated by Josephus are: a township - 'unjustly called a town' (tyev&o-nohixvuov) called Kde
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After describing the conquest by the Romans of upper Idumaea, Joephus again relates what had happened a few months previously - another attack by Simon son of Gioras on Idumaea and his entry into Jerusalem at the invitation of remnants of the moderates and Idumaeans following the reign of terror by John and the Zealots in Jerusalem {War, IV 556ff.). The atrocities committed by the Galileans and the Zealots according to this description exceeded all bounds and that is why the Idumaeans in John's camp rebelled. After a violent collision between them and the Zealots, the Idumaeans conferred with the "high priests" and invited Simon son of Gioras to enter Jerusalem (ibid., 5 6 6 - 5 7 6 ) . Like others, this episode once more raises the question of Josephus' credibility as a historian: what is the measure of truth in this story ? First to catch the eye are the inner discrepancies in which the story's plot became entangled. If we are to accept the facts related previously, we must ask: how were there suddenly Idumaeans in the city, if they had left it after putting John of Gischala in power in the city and having destroyed the government of Ananus son of Ananus? To overcome this difficulty we assumed above that apparently not all the Idumaeans had left and that a number of them had remained in John's camp. A further question is: whence came these "high priests" who decided to invite Simon son of Gioras, since according to Josephus they had already been eliminated by the Idumaens, John of Gischala and the Zealots? In reply to this it could be said that, though it would have been logical to assume the leaders of the moderates had been killed in the struggle to remove them from power, it seems their elimination had not been complete. If so, what were the motives and the part played by the survivors of the moderates in the invita tion of Simon son of Gioras, the great enemy of the well-to-do and the 71
K I 1 1 S 3 ) came from Schalit (A Complete Concordance to Josephus, p.73) and he believes it could explain the meaning of the Greek expression WevSonokixviov, or noKixvtov rov \liev8ovq, i.e. the township of lies. One way or another, Josephus indicates that with the conquest of Upper Idumaea Jerusalem was completely surrounded and the rebels retained only the three desert fortresses: Herodium, Masada and Machaerus (War, IV 555). If in fact there is truth in Josephus' story in War, IV 518ff, and we believe he is not to be suspected here of being unreliable, the im pression may be received that Herodium was held by the rebels from Idumaea. 71 See Baer's criticism on this episode in the article mentioned in note 43 above, p p . 1 5 9 - 1 6 0 . It seems Josephus' closing sentence concerning the final zealot terror, before the arrival of Simon son of Gioras, might be able to some extent to explain his excesses in describing the deeds of the Zealots and the words he wrote speak for themselves: "and all roads were closed before those (men of peace) anxious to go over to the Romans" (War, IV 565). It seems the Zealots wanted to prevent people from surrendering to the Romans, even before the siege of the city had begun and it was this fact which enraged Josephus. Of course, he brings the atrocities to a dramatic climax in order to incorporate into the story the arrival of Simon son of Gioras in Jerusalem - in a manner which suited his purpose.
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rich ? and if in fact there were Idumaeans in the camp of John of Gischala, what caused them to desert him at this stage? The explanation proferred by Josephus is of course unacceptable . Stern in general terms interprets the invitation of Simon son of Gioras into Jerusalem against the background of a desire to create a counterweight to John of Gischala's growing strength . In fact there is perhaps some point in trying to explain the split between the Idumaeans and John as the result of differences over the quality of the leadership. It may reasonably be assumed that John presented the image of an autocratic leader while the Idumaeans, as we have already seen in discussing their coming to Jerusalem, had been accustomed to collecitve leadership. The possibility that they were dissatisfied with the leadership of John of Gischala is reinforced by the significant fact that Simon son of Gioras, while still on his way to Jerusalem, already had the support of Idumaeans who had been with him since his operations in Idumaea. Logically, when the latter became the leader of the rebels in Idumaea, naturally the Idumaean rebels who had remained in Jerusalem also preferred his leadership to John's . It appears that even after having joined the camp of Simon son of Gioras they still remained organized as a separate group and operated in this manner until the fall of the city. 73
74
75
No wonder therefore that when Josephus described the array of forces defending Jerusalem before the siege, he quite clearly distinguished be tween the Idumaeans and the others in the camp of Simon son of Gioras: "The strength of the combatants and insurgents within the city was as follows: Simon had an army, exclusive of the Idumaeans, of ten thou sand men; over these were fifty officers (riyenoves), Simon himself being commander-in-chief (nvpioq). His Idumaean contingent numbered five thousand and had ten chiefs (or rather governors — apxovreq) among whom James son of Sosas and Simon son of Cathlas ranked highest" . The two Idumaean commanders mentioned here by name are known and identified from the time the Idumaeans were called to Jerusalem at the invitation of the Zealots. Though John, brother of Jacob son of Sosas is not mentioned this time, later on in the sequence of events his death is 76
72 In this matter, see Rappaport, in: Judaea and Rome, p p . 6 4 - 6 5 , also idem, in: Nation and His tory, esp. pp. 1 0 4 - 1 1 0 . 73 It should be noted that according to Josephus this was the second time that the Idumaeans sickened of the Zealot's atrocities, even though they themselves were in his eyes also not to be underrated as killers. 74 Stern, Zealots, Enc. Judaica Yearbook, p. 146; see also Stern, Society and Religion in the Days of the Second Temple, p. 185. 75 See also Rappaport, in: Judaea and Rome, p.64, also idem, in: Nation and History, p.l 10. 76 War, V 2 4 8 - 2 4 9 ; the figures here and those in the next paragraph appear realistic. See Rappa port, in: Judaea and Rome, pp.67, 345 (note 3); also Broshi, note 45 above.
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noted during the siege from an Arab bowman's arrow in the chest . Jacob son of Sosas is mentioned among the fighters who distinguished them selves in the battle for the Antonia fortress {War, VI 9 2 ) and after that he is listed together with Simon son of Cathlas in the list of the fighters who had done likewise in a hard nocturnal battle with the Romans, one which according to Josephus had ended indecisively . It should be noted that in this case also the Idumaean commanders are listed separately from the men of Simon son of Gioras ("the Jewish heroes were, of the party of Simon . . . of the Idumaeans, James and Simon, the latter son of Acatelas [=Cathlas], the former of Sosas"), indicating their separate organization in ethnic units. After burning the Temple and the Lower City, the Roman army reorgan ized for conquest of the Upper City. In the Course of the preparations for the conquest of this part of Jerusalem, Josephus tells us of a secret meeting of commanders of the Idumaeans, in which it was decided to surrender to the Romans. Five men were sent to Titus to arrange the matter of their sur render, but according to Josephus: "Titus, hoping that the tyrants also would be induced to yield through the defection of the Idumaeans who formed an important factor in the war, after some hesitation consented to spare them and sent the men back. But as they were preparing to depart Simon detected the plot. The five emissaries to Titus he at once put to death; the chiefs, of whom the most distinguished was James son of Sosas, he arrested and imprisoned; while the rank and file of the Idumaeans, rendered helpless by loss of their leaders, were narrowly watched by him and the walls manned by more vigilant guards". {War, VI, 378—381). We do not know how accurate were the details of this story, but at all events, it indicates the considerable part played by the Idumaeans in the battle for Jerusalem. Hereby ends the history of the Idumaeans as a distinct group. Of the five thousand Idumaeans who participated in the defence of Jerusalem, a part must have been killed in the fighting, mainly in the massacre the Romans perpetrated with the fall of the Upper City. Another part must have been among the thousands of prisoners intended to be sold into slavery. One way and another the memory of the Idumaeans as an ethnic-geographic entity has disappeared . 7 8
79
80
77 War, V 290, and see also note 46 above. 78 Jacob son of Sosas is also identified as 'an Idumaean commander' or 'commander of the Idu maeans' — TCJV '18ovnai<jjv fiyenojv. 79 Description of the battle: War, VI 1 2 9 - 1 4 7 ; list of those outstanding - op.cit., 148. Incidental ly, here too there is mention of the name Cathlas in a mutilated form ('AnaTeKd). Cf. War, IV 271; V 249; see also note 46 above. 80 Applebaum clearly indicated the fact that Vespasian held a separate triumph to celebrate the vic tory over the Idumaeans (Statius, Silvae, III, 3, 1 4 0 - 1 4 1 ) but from then they disappeared as
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As for Idumaea, Applebaum believes that in the period from 70 CE until the annexation of the Nabataean kingdom to the Roman Empire in 106 CE it was organized by the Romans as a special military zone, designed to prevent the penetration of Nabataeans into southern Judaea . It seems to us however that this opinion is to be rejected, if only for the simple reason that the Nabataeans were then allies of the Romans and during the Great Revolt, with great devotion fought shoulder to shoulder with them in the different operations against the Jews. In fact Applebaum's opinion is part of a broader thesis intended to date the erection of the Palestinian limes during the Flavian period, one which regards this limes as the con tinuation of the Herodian one. In our opinion, Shatzman in one of his articles has proved this opinion to be mistaken . We believe the central problem (from the aspect of secu rity) troubling the Roman regime both before the Great Jewish Revolt and also after it, was internal security in the province of Judaea, i.e. in the con trol of the local population. For this purpose Roman garrisons were sta tioned in various parts of the country and among them we know of the presence of a cohort (in 124 CE) by Hebron, a sub-division of which was stationed at Engeddi . We know that later on the Romans did indeed have to keep an eye on the Jewish population, when in the time of the Bar-Kokhba revolt the center of the revolt was located in the Hebron hills. To conclude our discussion of the Idumaeans, a few words should be devoted to their ideological connection with the idea of zealotry, as has been elucidated in modern scholarship. Though the social situation pre vailing in Judaea and Idumaea can explain why many people joined the revolt against Rome, there are grounds to conclude that the zealot ideology disseminated by the School of Shammai was also able to induce many of them to join the ranks of the rebels. Suffice it to examine the speech 81
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a defined and recognized group; see: Applebaum, in: The Jewish People in the First Century, II, p.693. 81 Applebaum, Zion XXVII (1962), p p . 7 - 9 . 82 Shatzman, Cathedra, XXX (1984), p p . 3 2 - 3 3 ; s e e also above. 83 See Shatzman, ibid., esp. p p . 2 5 - 3 0 . In the passage by Josephus describing the conquest of the Beth-Govrin area (War, IV 4 4 4 - 4 9 4 ) Applebaum and Gichon saw support of their opinion that Vespasian and Titus decided to set up a system of defence against the Nabataeans on the south ern border of Judaea and that for this purpose they turned Idumaea into an organized frontier region. Shatzman however proves (ibid., p p . 2 6 - 2 7 ) that this was an erroneous interpretation of the words of Josephus and that "seizure of the fortresses in Idumaea and the posting of garrisons in them has no connection with threats of invasion and raids for robbery from the Nabataean area in the Negev. The simple truth is that the fortresses were seized or built in Idumaea as in other parts of the country in order to ensure Roman control of the rebellious Jewish population"; cf. also to the article by Isaac, HSCP, LXXXVIII (1984), p p . 1 7 1 - 2 0 3 .
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Josephus placed in the mouth of Simon son of Cathlas, one of the Idu maean leaders, (War, IV 2 7 1 - 2 8 2 ) in order to be impressed by the power of his ideals - especially since it incorporated slogans and ideas which would not have shamed even the warriors of Judas Maccabaeus. In con nection with a fragment from the Sifre Zutta found in the Cairo Geniza which speaks of Idumaean disciples in the School of Shammai, Epstein notes the ties between the zealot ideology of the School of Shammai and the Idumaeans - he wrote: "Innocently, in the midst of a halakhic discus sion it relates (IV, 4a, 17): they said there were Idumaean disciples of the School of Shammai at that time, they said to them (namely to those dis ciples of the School of Shammai) go and see who has uncleanliness, he has the power to save etc. These 'Idumaeans' are 'Southerners', since in the language of the Mishnah 'Edom' is 'South' and thus also the 'Edomites' (Idumaeans) called by the Zealots to the aid of Jerusalem (War, IV, iv, 2 - 4 ) are simply (as Idumaeans in War, IV, iv, 9) Jews from that South". And since we know the School of Shammai were close in spirit to the Zealots - this hint in our passage gives us the connecting thread between the Zealots and the Idumaeans: that is t h e d i s i p l e s o f t h e S c h o o l o f S h a m m a i a m o n g t h e m (underlined by Epstein). The expression 'at that time' proves they were hinting at a previous time, to a known and fixed time, i.e. to the time before the Destruction, while the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel had a dispute and there was bloodshed (concerning the Eighteen Decrees) over some of the laws (halakhoth) of uncleanness. We must remember that Eleazar son of Ananias son of Hezekiah son of Garon who was appointed by the national government as commander-inchief of the army in the land of Idumaea (War, II, xx, 4) was a disciple of the School of Shammai. And the reply of the 'Idumaeans': whoever has impurity has in his power to save - so we find later quoted from R. Judah (on a different matter), Tosefta Nega'im VII, 9; Sifra, Metzora, V, 13. We also know R. Judah would have repeated the mishna of R. Eliezer the Shamuthi (Menahoth 18a)" . 84
84 Shamuthi ( TnTattf) is one who is under a ban and cannot be quoted as an authority. See Ep stein, Tarbiz, I (1930), p.52. It should be noted that Epstein's words were also accepted by Lieberman, Ha-Yerushalmi Ki-Fshuto, p.38; idem, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine etc., p.140, also by Urbach, Sages, their Concepts and Beliefs, pp.164, 528, 533. Urback (ibid., p.522) also find reference to the Idumaeans even in a passage from a late midrash Song of Songs Zutah (ed. Buber), p.41 - which says: "Elazar and disciples went up and smote Eklhanan etc." According to Urabch the reference appears to be to the murder of Ananus son of Ananus by the Idumaeans as it is told by Josephus (War, IV 3 1 4 - 3 2 5 ) . Unlike the above scholars, Baer (Zion, XXXVI (1971), p.134, note 28) completely rejects Epstein's words, arguing that: "the Idumaeans who participated in the defence of Jerusalem had been men of action and not learned men. There is no point in looking - as did Lieberman and Urbach - for links between disciples of the School of Shammai and the dubious acts of murder related by Josephus". Recently Epstein's words
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In his work Ben-Shalom revealed the zealot nature of the School of Shammai and the zealot ideology disseminated by it, which as indicated could in suitable social and political situations induce people to join ex tremist activist movements. To quote: "It is natural to assume that strong concentrations of disciples of the school of Shammai existed during the Second Temple period, in areas prominently observing zealot Hasmonaean tradition and these are first of all the areas conquered by the Hasmonaeans and settled by them. We refer principally to Galilee and to Idumaea but as indicated we have not found clear and solid evidence which would indicate that most of the inhabitants of these areas conducted themselves according to the halakha of the School of Shammai" . Furthermore Ben-Shalom even indicates that halakhoth of the School of Shammai did not disappear even following the organizational disbanding of the School of Shammai after the Destruction and that those circles who continued to follow in its halakhic path "also observed the zealot tradition of the Shammai school, even if only in a latent manner — passive hostility towards Rome which at the proper time could easily be ignited and lead to a collision with R o m e " . A study of the territorial extension of the Bar-Kokhba Revolt indicates that the heart of the revolt lay on Mount Hebron and the southern Inner Plain, that is the areas which earlier had been part of Idumaea; is this not confimration of the continued existence in south Judaea of zealot ideology which found its final expression in the Bar-Kokhba Revolt ? The Idumaeans in the first century CE were for all purposes Jews faithful to Jerusalem and the Temple, intensely involved in the movement of revolt against Rome. However, in spite of their integration in Jewish society in general and in the militant circles in particular, they maintained their in dividuality as an ethnic-geographic group; it may therefore be said that the term 'Idumaean' as used by Josephus may be considered a description or term of 'Landsmannschaft' — an association of common geographic origin. In all references to them they were presented as people adhering to 85
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were also accepted by Ben-Shalom. He even quote Epstein's words (see Ben-Shalom, Disserta tion, p.532) and accepts them to support his conclusions on the Zealot nature of the School of Shammai. 85 Ben-Shalom, op.cit., p.544. Concerning the influence on the nation's life Ben-Shalom reached the following conclusion: "There is no doubt that the School of Shammai t h e n r e p r e s e n t e d a large and i m p o r t a n t trend f o l l o w e d by masses of p e o p l e , w i t h the a d v a n t a g e of Z e a l o t i c Hassidic heritage h e l p i n g it," (stressed in the original), Ben-Shalom, ibid., p.547. 86 Ben-Shalom, coll. Bar Kokhba Revolt etc., p.3. 87 Applebaum, Kirjath Sepher XXXVI (1961), p.15 note 2. See also Dvir, Sinai, XL VIII (1944), p.301, note 20; see also Baer, Zion, XXXVI (2971) p.158 - which also points in this direction: "Simon son of Gioras was close to those districts where Simon son of Kosiba the Prince (K 'ttfJ) of Israel also lived and worked".
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their self-organization, even when they were under the command of Simon son of Gioras and that is how they acted until their own bitter end. We will it seems not be wrong in saying the tribal-clan nature of their society not only represented the cement binding them together for separate indepen dent association but it was also one of the principal causes for their extrem ism and individuality.
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Vortrage der Juden historisch
entwickelt),
Indexes Personal N a m e s and D e i t i e s
Aaron 129 Abgar 200 Abtalion 129 Abukarib As'ad 73 Achiabus 65 Achior 57 Actelos 235 Aelius Gallus 156, 157, 173 Aeneas 169 Aequus Modius 198 Agrippa I 1 2 7 - 1 2 9 , 157, 162, 1 8 4 - 1 9 2 , 194, 210, 213, 221 Agrippa II 49, 58, 176, 187, 190, 191, 1 9 4 200, 210, 212, 213 Agrippinus 202 Aulus Plautius 114 Aziz 72 Akiva (Rabbi) 50, 64 Alexander the Great 12, 1 4 - 1 6 , 200, 207 Alexander Balas 3 6 - 3 8 Alexander son of J. Aristobulus II 114, 119 Alexander of Capua 84 Alexandra 134, 142, 151, 216, 218 Alexandra (daughter of J. Aristobulus II) 114, 119 Alexandros (Cleopatra Ill's son) 133 Alexas 142, 146 Amaraios 64, 219 Ananus son of Ananus 225, 227, 228, 230, 231 233, 237 Antony 1 3 1 - 1 4 3 , 146, 149, 151, 152, 184, 217 Antigonus (son of J. Hyrcanus II) 81 Antigonous Monophthalmus 6, 7, 16, 18, 99, 118, 200 Antiochus I Theos of Comagene 124 Antiochus IV Epiphanes of Comagene 198, 199 Antiochus III the Great 37, 98 Antiochus IV Epiphanes 18, 2 1 - 2 4 , 27, 33, 36, 41, 43, 5 3 , 5 5 , 5 9 , 6 7 , 69, 114 Antiochus VII Sidetes 4 2 , 78, 207 Antiochus XII Dionysus 95, 106 Antipas (Herod's grandfather) 67, 89, 90, 109, 110 Antipatros 65, 67, 72, 74, 89, 90, 1 0 8 - 1 1 0 , 113, 1 1 6 - 1 2 1 , 127, 130, 150, 207, 214, 216, 217
Antipatros (Herod's son) 172, 173 Antipatros Gadia 215, 217, 218 Appian 3 7 , 3 8 , 98, 115, 119, 131 Apollonius Mollon 69 Archelaus 179, 220 Aretas I 18, 23, 24, 77, 212 Aretas II 77, 89, 90, 1 5 0 , 2 1 2 Aretas III 9 5 - 9 7 , 105, 106, 109, 110, 113, 118 119,163 Aretas IV 1 6 9 - 1 8 1 , 184, 185, 193, 208, 212 Aristobulus (Herod's son) 178, 190 Aristobulus (son of Herod of Chalcis) 186 Aristobulus (Agrippai's brother) 185, 194 Arrian 15, 16 Artabanos 181 Artavasdes II 124 Artis (Aretas) 85 Assurbanipal 7 Atheneus16,118 Athenion 1 3 8 - 1 4 1 , 1 4 4 - 1 4 8 Augustus 138, 156, 157, 1 5 9 - 1 6 2 , 1 6 6 - 1 7 2 , 177, 183, 200, see also Octavian Augustinus 76 Aulus Plautius 114 Aziz 194, 195 Baal Shamin 144, 176 Baba (name) 64 Baba ben-Buta 64, 2 1 9 - 2 2 1 Baba, Sons of Baba 64, 2 1 4 - 2 2 0 Babatha 6 4 , 2 0 8 , 2 1 9 Bacchides 34, 88 Bacchius Judaeus 114 Bar Ashtor 72 Bar-Kokhba 208, 236 Berenice 126, 186 Boethus 204, 205 Bulan 73 Caesarion 133 Cassius Dio xv, 85, 118, 1 2 4 , 1 3 1 , 136, 141, 156, 157, 184 Cassius Longinus 37, 122, 145, 221 Cathlas 234, 235 Cephalon 113 Cerealis 232 Cestius Gallus 75, 1 9 8 - 2 0 0
256
Indexes
Cleopatra III 8 6 - 8 8 Cleopatra VII 57, 1 3 1 - 1 4 0 , 1 4 2 - 1 4 7 , 1 5 0 152, 157, 184, 2 1 5 - 2 1 7 Claudius 144, 186 Cos (Kos, Koze, Qos) 2, 9, 26, 57, 62, 74, 143, 214, 215 Costobar 55, 64, 74, 128, 143, 150, 2 1 4 - 2 1 8 , 222-223 Corintus 172 Curtius Rufus 14, 16 Cuspius Fadus 192, 193 Cypros (Herod's daughter) 190 Cypros (Herod's granddaughter) 189, 190 Dagon 70 Darius III 16 Demetrius Poliorcetes 16, 18, 99, 118 Demetrius (Jannaeus' commander) 101 Demetrius I 36 Demetrius II 3 8 - 4 1 Demetrius III Eukairos 95 Dimi (Rav Dimi) 60 Dinah 59 Diodorus Siculus xv, 7, 8, 18, 37, 38, 48, 69, 86, 99, 200 Diomedes 188 Dionysus of Tripolis 74, 1 0 8 , 1 1 4 Dorion 215 Dositheus (friend of J. Hyrcanus II) 149, 150 Dositheus (conspirator against Herod) 2 1 6 - 2 1 8 Drusilla 194, 195 Dushara 144, 176 Eleazar son of Ananias 225, 237 R. Eleazar son of R. Zadok 205 Eleazar son of Neus 224 R. Eliezer 237 Eliezer son of Hananiah son of Garon 63 R. Eliezer son of Hyrcanus 50 Elijah 70 Elthemus 148, 159 Esther 50 Eulaeus 22 Eusebius98, 130, 175, 182 Eutropius 115 Flaccus (L. Pomponius) 180, 185 Flavian(s) 2, 36, 154 Gabinius 88, 100, 101, 113, 119, 153 Gadia 217, 218 Gaius Caligula 1 8 4 - 1 8 6 , 190 Gaius Vibius Marsus 189 R. Gamliel of Yavneh 50 Geshem (Gashmu) 4 Gideon 12 Hadrian 64, 85, 210 R. Hananiah 60 Heliades 37 Helkias 189, 190
Herod xvi, 14, 48, 55, 57, 6 3 - 6 6 , 71, 72, 74, 76, 85, 89, 109, 110, 1 2 0 - 1 7 4 , 182, 183, 1 8 6 , 1 8 8 - 1 9 1 , 207, 208, 210, 2 1 3 - 2 1 7 , 2 1 9 - 2 2 3 , 236 Herod Antipas 1 7 4 - 1 8 3 , 187, 188, 208 Herodias 177, 180, 186 Herod of Chalcis 186, 190, 191, 194, 210, 213 Herodotus 15 Hezekiah son of Garon 237 Hezekiah the Galilean 110 Hieronymus of Cardia xv, 7 Hillel 60, 67, 237 R. Hiyya bar Abba 59, 72 Hyrcanus son of Joseph son of Tobias 1 9 - 2 1 , 23, 24 IamblichusI 120, 135, 142 Iamblichus II 194 Imalku 38 R. Ishmael 50 Izates 74 Jacob (Jesus' brother) 228 Jacob (James) son of Sosas 226, 234, 235 Jacob son of Zebedai 37 Jannaeus (Alexander J.) xvi, 42, 66, 69, 70, 72, 78, 81, 86 - 89, 9 2 - 98, 100, 101, 104, 105, 110, 111, 1 4 3 , 1 5 2 , 153, 164 Jason 2 1 - 2 4 Jesus 228 Jesus son of Sapphas (Sapphias) 224 John (Hasmonaean) 34 John the Baptist 177 John the Essene 224 John Gaddis218 John of Gishchala 206, 225, 226, 2 2 9 - 2 3 1 , 233,234 John Hyrcanus I 4, 34, 36, 4 5 - 4 7 , 5 1 - 5 4 , 57, 59, 62, 6 5 - 6 7 , 69, 70, 75, 7 7 - 8 0 , 91, 123 John Hyrcanus II 64, 98, 106, 1 0 8 - 1 1 1 , 116, 118, 120, 121, 124, 149, 150, 214, 217, 218 John son of Sosas 226 John son of Zebedai 37 R.Johanan 59, 61, 204 R. Johanan ben-Zakkai 2 0 2 - 2 0 4 , 224 Jonathan (Hasmonaean) 3 4 - 3 6 , 3 9 - 4 2 , 70, 88 Jose son of Joezer of Zeredah 75 Jose son of Johanan of Jerusalem 75 Joseph son of Tobias 1 9 - 2 1 , 23 Joseph (Herod's uncle) 65, 217, 218 Joseph (Herod's brother) 63, 64, 109, 124, 127 186 Joseph (son of Herod's brother Joseph) 186 Joseph (Herod's housekeeper) 151 Josephus Flavius vi, xii, xv, xvi, 16, 19, 20, 25 35, 3 7 - 3 9 , 4 6 - 4 9 , 5 4 - 5 6 , 58, 6 2 - 6 5 , 69, 72, 7 4 - 7 6 , 80, 81, 8 6 - 9 0 , 9 2 - 9 7 , 99, 100, 105, 106, 111, 113, 114, 118, 1 2 0 - 1 2 2 , 124, 126, 127, 129, 1 3 0 - 1 3 2 , 134, 1 3 7 146, 148, 150, 151, 153, 154, 1 5 9 - 1 6 0 , 162, 1 7 0 - 1 7 3 , 175, 177, 1 7 9 - 1 8 6 , 188,
Indexes 193, 196, 1 9 9 - 2 0 1 , 201, 206, 2 1 4 - 2 1 6 , 222, 2 2 4 - 2 2 6 , 2 2 8 - 2 3 7 Joshua son of Gamalas 205, 227, 228, 230 Joshua son of Nun 32 Jotape 194 R. Judah 50, 237 R. Judah Ha-Nasi 50 Judah Halevi 73 Judas Aristobulus I 79, 8 1 - 8 4 , 120, 195 Judas Aristobulus II 1 0 5 - 1 1 0 , 112, 113, 1 1 6 120, 124 Judas Maccabaeus 18, 24, 25, 27, 2 9 - 3 4 , 4 1 , 58,59, 67,75,77, 88,237 Judas the Galilean 176 Julia 177 Julius Africanus 94, 130 Julius Archelaus 190 Julius Caesar 1 1 9 - 1 2 2 , 133,221 C. Julius Soaemus 195 Justinus 86 Justus of Chalcis 84 Kahina 73 Kemosh 9 Kos see Cos Kosnathan 64, 219 Kosmelekh 215 Killus 202 L. Aelius Lamia 180 Lenaeus 22 Lentulus Maercelinus 119 Livia 177 Lucullus 107 Lysanias 114, 1 2 4 , 1 3 1 - 1 3 3 , 143, 151, 157, 184-186, 196,212,213 Lysias 114 Lysimachus 2 1 6 - 2 1 8 Malchus (of Palmyra) 199 Malichus (Iamblichus) 38 Malichus (Idumaean notable) 74, 214 Malichus I 1 1 9 - 1 2 1 , 124, 131, 132, 136, 137, 1 4 0 , 1 4 3 , 1 4 4 , 1 4 9 , 156, 200, 212 Malichus II 109, 193, 199, 212 Malthace 65 Marcus Agrippa 159, 162, 168 Mariamme (Herod's wife) 64, 151, 190 Mariamme (Herod's granddaughter) 186 Mariamme (Agrippa I's daughter) 190 Mariamme (an Ituraean woman) 84 Marion 122 Martha (daughter of Boethus) 204, 205 Mattathias Antigonus 1 2 2 - 1 2 4 , 126, 136, 215, 223 Mattithyahu 218 Menelaus 23, 24 Mercurius 85 Metilus 49 Miriam daugher of Shimeon ben-Gurion 205 Mithridates 121 Mnaseas of Patara 68 Mordechai 50
257
Nakdimon ben-Gurion 205 Nakebos166, 171 Nehemiah 4, 60 R. Nehemiah 50 Nero 194 Netanyahu 218 Nicolaus of Damascus xvi, 48, 69, 70, 93, 113, 118, 122, 130, 136, 142, 162, 166, 167, 169-171 Niger 224, 225 Noah 6 0 , 6 1 , 6 5 Obodas I 9 1 - 9 5 , 98, 212 Obodas II 176, 212 Obodas III 156, 163, 165, 169, 170, 212 Octavia 138 Octavian 1 3 4 - 1 3 7 , 141, 146, 1 4 9 - 1 5 2 , 156 Olympias (Herod's daughter) 65, 186 Onias IV 88, 215 Onias the Rainmaker 111 Pacorus 122, 123 Pangar 202, 203 Paramenion 14 Paul (the Apostle) 184, 185 Petronius 190 Phabathos 172 Phalion 113 Phasael 109, 123, 124 Phasael (Nabataean prince) 109 Pheroras 109, 170, 173 Philip (Seleucid prince) 95 Philip (the tetrarch) 144, 149, 174, 175, 1 8 0 187, 190, 194, 196, 198, 210, 213 Philo 58, 184 Philippion 119 Phineas 70 Phineas son of Clusoth 226 Placidus 153 Pliny xv, 8, 88, 99, 153, 156, 224 Plutarch 118, 133, 136, 137, 1 4 1 - 1 4 3 , 146, 150 Polemon of Cilicia 72, 195 Polybius 18, 37 Pompeius Trogus 77 Pompey 14, 62, 63, 100, 1 1 3 - 1 1 8 , 163, 169, 209, 221 Pontius Pilate 180 Posidonius of Apamea xv, 69 Ptolemy VI Philometor 2 2 - 2 4 , 37, 41 Ptolemy IX Lathyrus 80, 81, 86, 87, 91 Ptolemy the Grammarian 69, 70 Ptolemy the Historian 46, 55, 66, 68, 69, 76, 80 Ptolemy son of Habubu 42 Ptolemy son of Mennaeus 96, 1 0 5 - 1 0 9 , 1 1 4 116, 1 1 9 - 1 2 2 , 124, 1 3 1 , 1 8 4 , 212 Quintus Didius 141, 142 Quirinius 176 Raba bar bar-Hanah 204
Indexes
258 Rabaell 212 Rabel II 212 Rava 73 Reish Lakish 202
Sa'ama 85 Sabba 219 Saul (King) 12 Saul of Tarsus 184 Salome (Herod's sister) 65, 72, 109, 127, 128, 163, 179, 190, 208, 211, 2 1 5 - 2 1 7 Salome (Herodias' daughter) 186 Salome-Alexandra 1 0 5 - 1 0 7 , 109, 110 Sampsigeramus 194 R. Samuel son of Hiyyah 60 Sancherib 129 Sapphas (Sapphia) 224 Saramalla 123 Saturninus 165, 166, 172 Scaurus 113, 118 Secundus (Quintus Aemilius) 176 Seneca 76 Sextus Caesar 116, 121, 145 Shammai 60, 63, 64, 67, 206, 207, 220, 236, 237 Shemayah 129 Shila 115 R. Shimeon ben-Eleasar 60 R. Shimeon ben-Gamliel 224 Shimeon ben-Gurion 205 R. Shimeon bar-Yohai 127 Silas 190 Silas 'the Babylonian' 224 Silas 'the Jew' 74, 108, 115, 1 8 7 - 1 8 9 Silo 126 Simon (Hasmonaean) 27, 35, 39, 41, 42, 70, 76 Simon son of Cathlas 226, 227, 2 3 4 - 2 3 6 , 238 Simon son of Gioras 206, 2 2 3 - 2 2 6 , 229, 230, 232-235 Simon son of Shatah 83, 84 S'm(m), S'm, § mt 85 Soaemus 85, 151, 152, 1 8 4 , 1 8 6 , 188, 192, 194, 1 9 7 - 1 9 9 , 212 Soaemus (notable of Petra) 173 Suetonius 177 Sosas 234, 235 Srm'l 123 Statius 235 c
Stephanus Byzantius xv Strabo xv, 14, 40, 4 6 - 4 8 , 53, 66, 68, 69, 74, 79, 80, 88, 105, 107, 114, 116, 120, 154, 1 5 6 - 1 5 8 , 173 Sw*m 85 Syllaeus 72, 74, 94, 97, 101, 156, 157, 1 6 3 172 Tacitus 8 5 , 9 9 , 1 9 2 , 195, 201 Theodion 173 Theodorus (son of Zenon Kotoulas) 86, 87, 91, 100 Theodotus 59 Tholomaeus 1 9 2 - 1 9 4 Thucydides 225, 226 Tiberius 162, 1 8 0 - 1 8 3 , 185, 186 Tigranes 99, 105, 107 Timagenes 81 Timotheus 29, 30, 32 Titus 2 0 0 - 2 0 2 , 235 Titus son of Judas 85 Tobias 1 9 - 2 1 , 23, 29 Trajan 42, 164, 193, 208 Tryphon 36, 38, 39 Varro 158 Varus (P. Quinctilius) 65, 173, 174, 220, 221, 223 Varus (Noarus) 190, 194, 196, 197, 212 Ventidius Basus 131 Vespasian 149, 153, 174, 2 0 1 - 2 0 3 , 231, 232, 235,236 Virgil 120 Vitelius 1 8 0 - 1 8 3 Volumnius 165, 166 Yusuf Dhu Nuwas 73 Zabdiel (Zabilus) 3 7 - 3 9 Zacharias son of Baris 229 R. Zadok 205 Zamaris 160 Zebedai 37 Zenodorus 115, 151, 1 5 7 - 1 6 0 , 171, 175, 185, 196,213 Zenon 20, 23 Zenon Kotoulas 42, 87, 100, 113 Zeus 114
Indexes
259
Geographical Names Abila 31, 91, 94, 101, 117, 153, 161, 179 Abila (Abel Ha-Shittim) 153 Abila (Abilene) xii, 13, 40, 107, 117, 161, 184, 189, 191, 194, 213 Acco 185, 199, 204 see also Ptolemais Acraba (Acrabeta, Acrabattene) 25, 26, 31 Actium 132, 135, 1 3 7 - 1 4 2 , 145, 146 Adiabene 58, 7 2 - 7 4 Adida 97, 102 see also Hadid Adora, Adoraim 27, 36, 45, 46, 54, 66, 74, 155 156, 221 Adumim 26 Africa 202 Agripias 155 Ajlun 164 Alema 31 Alexandria 58, 120, 121, 133, 185, 218 Alexandrium (Sartaba) 156 Amathus 87, 9 1 , 100, 102, 103, 154, 155 Amman 77 Ammanitis, Ammon 9, 23, 28, 29, 31, 164 Anthedon 90, 91, 112, 152, 185 Anti-Lebanon 12, 40, 107 Antioch 38, 95, 99, 113, 114, 123, 159 Apamea 114 Aphek 95 Apollonia 45, 91, 112, 117 Araba 82 Arabia (Arabian Peninsula) xiv, 7, 8, 11, 15, 17, 73, 77, 84, 100, 144, 150, 156, 162, 164, 175, 185, 193, 202, 204, 208, 213 Arabia Felix 11, 15 Arad (Arados) 3, 13, 154, 155 Ararat 73 Archelais 179 Arethusa 135, 142 Arka 13, 32, 191, 210, 212 Armenia 105, 133 Arnon (river) 45, 77, 91, 112, 147, 154 Arus 174 Ascalon 10,45, 68, 70, 90, 91, 102, 112, 117, 119, 121, 130, 155, 179, 191, 224 Ascent of Akrabim 25, 26 Asia 28 Asia Minor 104, 141 Asochis 8 0 - 8 2 , 86, 91 Asophon (Saphon) 86 Assyria xiii Athens 229 Aulon 98 Auran, Auranitis 5, 12, 13, 30, 40, 83, 103, 115, 116, 131, 143, 144, 159, 161, 162, 175, 176, 187, 188, 210, 213 Avdat (Eboda) 193 Ayalon 204 Azotus 4 5 , 9 1 , 117, 155, 179, 191 Ba'al Me'on 28, 36
Babylonia xiii, xiv, 3, 3 3 , 7 3 , 78, 115, 122, 123 187, 202, 204, 205 Batanaea 12, 13, 83, 115, 131, 144, 157, 159, 161, 174, 175, 187, 194, 210, 213 Bathyra 160, 197 Beersheba 3, 6, 45, 77, 90, 91, 102, 112, 155 Beer Shema 155 Beirut, Berytus 39, 40, 107, 117, 160, 170, 191 195, 199 Berenice 10 Besimoth 153 Beth-Basi 36 Bethenabris 15 Beth ha-Ramtha 176 Beth Gamul 183 Beth Govrin 231, 232, 236 Beth Jeshimoth 153, 155 Bethlehem 36 Beth-Me'on 28 Beth-Nimrin 153, 155 Beth ha-Ramtha 177 Bethsaida 176 Beth She'an (Scythopolis) 78, 98 Beth-Ther 201 Beth Zabdai 40, 41 Beth Zur 4, 6, 32, 36, 45, 155, 156 Bir a-Za'phran 34 Birtha (Tyros) 19, 31, 154, 155 Bosor 31, 32 Bosphorus 162 Bostra 10, 2 9 - 3 2 , 164 Butris 13, 117 Byblos 13, 40, 117 Cadasa 82 Caesarea 155, 161, 179, 191, 200 Caesarea Philippi 179, 189, 191, 1 9 6 - 1 9 8 Caharlobe 23 Cana 102, 106 Canatha 138, 139, 144, 145, 147, 161, 176, 179, 187, 189, 191, 210 Capua (in Italy) 84 Capua (in Ituraea) 84 Caspein (Casphor) 29, 30, 31, 32 Chaalis 225 Chabulon (Kabul) 199 Chalcis xii, 13, 3 8 - 4 1 , 84, 85, 104, 107, 116, 117, 120, 121, 161, 186, 1 8 9 - 1 9 1 , 194, 209, 210, 213 Charax 29 Caspein (Caspor) 2 9 - 3 2 Carmel 81 Chrisoroas (river) 13, 40 Cilicia 1 0 4 , 1 3 3 , 195 Coele-Syria 4 1 , 68, 87, 121, 133, 144, 145, 164 Comagene 124, 198, 199 Cutha 51 Cyprus 133, 156, 221
260
Indexes
Cyzicus 141 Damascus 10, 13, 14, 30, 32, 39, 40, 45, 95, 96, 97, 99, 1 0 1 - 1 0 3 , 1 0 6 - 1 0 9 , 1 1 3 - 1 1 7 , 122, 144, 145, 1 5 8 - 1 6 1 , 171, 1 8 4 - 1 8 6 , 191 Dathema 29, 31, 32 Dead Sea 8, 48, 73, 90, 98, 153, 182, 183, 208 Decapolis 98, 107, 121, 139, 144, 145, 153, 161, 164, 168, 174, 191, 193 Dedan 174 Delos 169 Diospolis 138, 139, 1 4 4 - 1 4 7 see also Dium Dir a-Shair 188 Dir Karuakh 180 Dium 31, 91, 101, 102, 116, 117, 1 4 4 - 1 4 7 , 161, 179, 191 Dora 82, 91, 102, 117 Docus 44, 155, 156 Eboda (Avdat) 10, 90, 91, 102, 112, 193 Ecbatana 160 Edom 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 25, 26, 46, 48, 54, 182, 207 237 Edouma 26 Egypt 10, 12, 17, 2 0 - 2 4 , 29, 39, 4 1 , 57, 87, 89, 99, 110, 111, 114, 118, 119, 122, 131, 133, 149, 152, 156, 157, 159, 173, 200, 2 1 5 , 2 1 7 , 222 Eilath 1, 107 Ein Gan(Eglon) 103 Ein Gedor154 Ein Gev 92 Eitha 188 Eleuterus (river) 13, 37, 3 9 - 4 1 Elusa 10, 24, 90, 91, 98, 102, 112, 117 Emmaus 27, 36, 204 Emesa 13, 40, 85, 120, 121, 135, 142, 194, 195, 197, 209, 210 Engeddi45, 155, 224, 236 Ephron 31 Eretz-Israel v, xii, xiii, 2, 3, 6, 11, 12, 1 5 - 2 2 , 36, 39, 41, 4 3 , 44, 54, 59, 60, 62, 64, 67, 69, 71, 74, 78, 81, 8 6 - 8 9 , 103, 110, 115, 120, 124, 132, 133, 1 3 8 - 1 4 0 , 146, 159, 163, 181, 192, 193, 2 0 4 - 2 0 6 , 214, 217, 220, 222, 223 Ethiopia 156 Euphrates (river) 114, 122, 152 Far East 11, 17 Gabala 59, 73 Gabalene 182 Gabalitis 182 Gabaloth 179, 182, 183 Gadara 10, 31, 45, 87, 91, 92, 94, 102, 117, 147, 152, 159, 161, 179, 183, 191 Galaditis 92, 96 Galilee xiv, 5, 13, 27, 31, 3 9 , 4 0 , 7 9 - 8 3 , 110, 159, 194, 210, 224, 226, 231, 233, 238
Gamala 91, 93, 95, 101, 161, 1 7 9 - 1 8 1 , 183, 197,198,205 Gaulanitis 12, 13, 40, 9 2 - 9 5 , 96, 99, 101, 105, 115, 160, 161, 182, 194, 198, 210 Gaza 10, 16, 45, 72, 86, 8 9 - 9 1 , 100, 102, 110, 113, 117, 121, 143, 147, 152, 154, 155, 179, 191, 200, 205, 214, 216 Gebal 182 Gedor45,92,154,155 Gerizim 51 Gezer 28, 70 Gilead 1, 5, 12, 27, 29, 86, 87, 90, 92, 93, 95, 9 6 , 9 9 , 101, 105 Gischala 82 Golan xiii, 82, 83, 91, 95, 101, 144, 159 Gophna 34, 36 Greece xiv Hadid (Adida) 97 Hammath (Emesa) 3 9 - 4 1 , 72, 135, 142, 194, 195, 197 Hammun 85 Haris 174 Hazeroth 98 Hazor 39 Hebron 4, 26, 204, 232, 236, 238 Hejaz 73 Hejra 174 Heliopolis 116, 210 Hemiar 73 Hermon 12, 13, 81, 84, 85, 107, 157, 189, 210 Herodium (in Peraea) 153, 155 Herodium (in Judaea) 153, 155, 156, 233 Hieromyces (river) 40, 45, 82, 93, 94, 147 see also Yarmuk Heshbon 31, 36, 44, 45, 91, 102, 147, 148, 150,155 Hippus (Susitha) 10, 13, 31, 45, 82, 91, 92, 94, 101, 102, 117, 152, 161, 179, 183, 191 Hirbet a-Sir 28 El-Hit 188 Heliopolis 13, 40 Holy Land 64 Horn of Africa 17 Horn of Jerda 92 Hulleh Valley 82, 93, 105, 115, 175 Hyrcania 155, 156 Idumaea 3 - 6 , 9, 2 5 - 2 7 , 45, 48, 54, 55, 62, 63, 72, 74, 89, 109, 110, 143, 154, 156, 199, 2 1 4 - 2 1 7 , 2 2 0 - 2 2 5 , 2 3 1 - 2 3 3 , 236, 238 Iraq el-Amir 19 Italy 53, 84 Ituraea xii, 175 Jabbok (river) 45, 87, 91, 112, 147 Jaffa (Joppa) 149 Jamnia 45, 112, 117, 155, 179, 191 see also Yavneh Jamie 180 Jannaeus Line 93
Indexes Jarmuk (river) 30 see also Hieromyces Jazer 28, 29, 31 Jericho 3, 32, 36, 4 4 , 4 5 , 9 1 , 112, 113, 144, 191, 216, 221 Jerusalem xiv, 10, 16, 2 1 - 2 4 , 31, 32, 36, 45, 57, 84, 88, 91, 102, 110, 111, 1 1 3 , 1 1 4 , 117, 122, 123, 150, 153, 156, 179, 181, 191, 201, 202, 206, 208, 214, 218, 223, 225-227, 229-238 Joppa 10, 45, 70, 91, 102, 1 1 2 , 1 1 7 , 147, 152, 1 5 5 , 1 9 1 , 199 Jordan (river) 31, 82, 86, 153 Jordan Valley 98 Jotapata 200 Judaea 1 - 3 , 6, 8, 16, 25, 26, 31, 32, 34, 36, 42 46, 48, 52, 54, 62, 67, 96, 97, 103, 109, 111, 114, 1 1 6 - 1 1 9 , 121, 122, 131, 145, 153, 155, 156, 164, 176, 192, 196, 198, 202, 204, 208, 216, 217, 221, 223, 224, 236,238 Julias 176, 177, 194 Karnaim 5, 2 9 - 3 1 , 70 Kefar Bish 232 Kefar Dikhrin 232 Kefr Othnai 82 Kefar Shihlyim 225 Khirbet Bal'ath 148 Khirbet el-Salaam 180 Khirbet Tanur 215 Khirbet Zey 215 Khoroa 215 Kidron (river) 45 King's Highway 10, 17, 44, 45, 100, 103, 107, 144, 145, 158, 159 Kohalit 104 Lab'we 39 Land of Benjamin 26 Lake of Galilee 37, 82 Land of Ammon 29 Land of Tob (Tov) 29, 31 Land of Tbias 19, 23, 29, 31 Laodiceia 13, 40, 210, 218 Laodiceia (in Lebanon) 184 Lebanon 1 2 - 1 4 , 3 6 - 4 1 , 83, 85, 98, 105, 107, 108, 1 1 4 - 1 1 6 , 120, 121, 152, 176, 187, 192, 194, 196, 209, 210 Lebo Hammath 3 9 - 4 1 Lejja 162 Leontopolis 215 Lesbos 159 Little Armenia 213 Limes Palaestinae 154 Livias 153, 177, 194 Lydda 224 Lysias (fortress) 114, 187 Machaerus 88, 91, 102, 153, 155, 178, 179, 233 Mada'in Sali'ah 8 Magnesia 37
261
Mahoza 73, 208 Maked (Maker) 30, 31 Malatha 155 Ma'on (=Me'on) 154, 155, 204 Ma'us 204 Marisa 26, 45, 46, 54, 57, 62, 64, 66, 70, 74, 219,222 Masada 88, 91, 102, 112, 124, 132, 233 Medeba 8, 28, 3 4 - 3 6 , 4 4 , 4 5 , 90, 112, 117 Media 73, 133 El-Medina 73 Mazra'at Kapwa 84 Mediterranean Sea 10, 13, 116, 119, 150 Memphis 215 Mesopotamia 6 Michmash 36 Mikhmetat Valley 26 Miletos 169 Misgav 44 Mitelene 159 Moab 9, 28, 35, 90, 94, 9 6 - 9 8 , 153, 183 Modi'in 70 Mount Esau 26 Mount Scopus 84 El-Mushnaf 157, 175 Nabata 35 Nablus 174 Nadabath 35, 36 Nabatha 199 Nahr el-Ruqqad 180, 183 Narbatha 35 Naveh 161, 179, 189, 191, 210 Nazareth 85 Neapolis 26 Near East xii, 6 Negev 3, 4, 11, 15, 18, 2 5 - 2 7 , 52, 90, 91, 106, 182, 193, 194, 236 North Africa 73 Orontes (river) 1 3 , 4 0 , 95, 113, 114 Ostracine 200 Palestine 89 Palmyra 37, 123, 199 Paneas 13, 8 1 - 8 3 , 102, 117, 144, 159, 161, 175, 196, 213 Papyron 112, 113 Paralia 82 Par'an Desert 98 Pella 31, 82, 8 3 , 9 1 , 101, 117, 147, 161, 179, 191 Pelusium 10, 200 Peraea 26, 36, 86, 98, 148, 1 5 2 - 1 5 4 , 177, 178, 183, 193, 194, 224 Pergamum 121 Persia xiii, 15, 16 Persian Gulf 15 Petra 7, 8, 10, 18, 20, 3 1 , 4 5 , 4 8 , 90, 103, 116, 118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 151, 156, 163, 164, 168, 169, 176, 177, 207 Pharsalos 120
262
Indexes
Phasaelis 179 Philadelphia 10, 31, 36, 42, 44, 45, 77, 91, 100, 102, 105, 112, 113, 117, 147, 148, 1 5 3 - 1 5 5 , 159, 161, 164, 179, 191, 193 Philoteria 101 Phoenicia 10, 15, 17, 20, 37, 39, 40, 82, 89, 105, 115, 116, 133, 147, 161, 166, 171, 179, 202, 209, 210 Plain of Antioch 93 Pontus 107 Pool of Aspar 34, 36 Ptolemais (Acco) 10, 13, 40, 45, 81, 82, 86, 91, 102, 107, 117, 161, 185, 191, 199 Puteoli 189 Qal'at a-Rabad 164 Qanawat 1 7 5 - 1 7 6 , 187 Qasrawet 8 Qasser el-Abed 19 Ra'epta 164, 166, 167 Ragaba 102, 103 Rajib 103 Ramath el-Khalil 215 Raphia 37, 9 0 , 9 1 , 102, 112, 117, 179 Raphon 2 9 - 3 1 , 164 Red Sea 10, 17, 86, 89, 150, 154, 156, 157, 173 Rekem 72 Rhodes 135, 142, 149, 152, 159 Rome 49, 53, 75, 76, 1 1 4 - 1 1 6 , 1 1 8 - 1 2 0 , 133 - 1 3 5 , 137, 150, 1 5 7 - 1 5 9 , 1 6 1 - 1 6 3 , 1 6 6 169, 1 7 1 - 1 7 3 , 176, 177, 180, 181, 183, 192, 193, 196, 197, 207, 214, 220, 221, 238 Sallis 225 E-Salt 154 Samaga 31, 36, 4 4 , 4 5 , 91 Samria5, 25, 26, 3 1 , 9 1 , 117, 147, 152, 174, 186, 214 Samaria Desert 3 Samosata 152 Sappho 174 Sartaba 155 Scythopolis 31, 78, 82, 91, 102, 117, 147, 161, 191 Sea of Galilee 94 Sebastia 152, 155, 179 Seeia 144, 1 7 5 - 1 7 7 , 180, 181 Sela' 48 Seleucia 95, 101, 102, 117, 161 Sennabris 82 Sepphoris 82, 86, 91, 102, 147, 191 Sharon 35, 81 Sichem 59, 91, 117, 147, 174 Sidon 10, 117, 161, 171, 185, 191 Sinai 8, 11, 15, 16, 175, 200 Snir 12 Sparta 22 Strata's Tower 45, 81, 82, 91, 102, 112, 117, 152
Suk Wadi Barada 107 Sumiye 148 Susitha (Hippus) 92, 94, 101, 152 Suweida 175, 187 Syria 10, 12, 17, 20, 36, 3 8 - 4 0 , 43, 96, 97, 99, 101, 105, 107, 115, 1 1 8 - 1 2 0 , 122, 123, 133, 141, 144, 145, 147, 1 5 8 - 1 6 8 , 172, 1 7 5 - 1 7 7 , 183, 185, 190, 191, 1 9 4 - 1 9 6 , 198, 209, 212, 213, 221 Syrian-Arabian Desert 1,11 Teko'a 8, 34, 36, 88, 153, 156 Tel Anafa 82, 93, 105 Tel el-Hamman 153 E-Tell 154 Tell el-Ahdab 180 Telle-Dra 180 Teoprosopon 13, 117 Thaurus 155, 156 Threx 155, 156 Tiberias 98, 186, 188, 189, 191, 194 Trachonitis 12, 13, 40, 49, 83, 103, 108, 115; 131, 144, 157, 1 5 9 - 1 6 2 , 1 6 4 - 1 6 6 , 168, 171, 175, 176, 187, 1 9 6 - 1 9 8 , 210, 213 Transjordan 3, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 24, 27, 28, 3 0 - 3 2 , 36, 38, 39, 42, 44, 45, 70, 72, 73, 86, 87, 90, 91, 99, 104, 121, 131, 143, 144, 151, 162, 164, 193 Trench of Antiochus 9 3 - 9 5 , 101 Tripolis 1 3 , 4 0 , 108, 191, 212 Tyre 10, 12, 13, 39, 41, 92, 102, 117, 122, 147 149, 161, 171, 179, 191 Tyrus (Birtha) 19, 31, 36, 155 Tzur175 Ulata 159, 175, 213 Um el-Rasas 34 Ussha 50 Uza 155 Valley of Antiochus 93 Valley of Salt 98 Valley of Siddim 98 Via Maris 10, 17, 45, 86 Wadi Daliah 180 Wadi Daliyeh 3, 26 Wadi Sirhan 10, 100, 101, 145 Yarmuk (river) 40, 87, 9 3 - 9 5 see also Hiero myces Yathrib 73 Yavneh 50 see also Jamnia Yehud 5 Zabed 39 Zered (river) 1, 45, 91, 112, 147 Zo'ar91, 102, 112, 117, 155, 208
Indexes
263
K i n g d o m s , N a t i o n s , Tribes and L a n g u a g e s Amalek 12, 182 Amaraios (Sons of) 35 Ammonites xiii, 1, 8, 28, 54, 57, 182 Amorites 1 Arab(s) xii, xiii, 1, 2, 4 - 8 , 11, 14, 1 6 - 1 9 , 21, 2 3 - 2 5 , 30, 31, 33, 35, 3 7 - 3 9 , 41, 42, 54, 66, 7 2 - 7 4 , 78, 79, 81, 84, 85, 8 7 - 8 9 , 92, 96, 105, 107, 109, 121, 123, 124, 126, 130, 131, 1 3 7 - 1 4 0 , 143, 148, 149, 151, 156, 1 6 3 - 1 6 6 , 1 7 0 - 1 7 2 , 176, 180, 1 8 7 - 1 9 0 , 192, 1 9 3 - 1 9 5 , 1 9 8 - 2 0 1 , 2 0 3 - 2 0 5 , 209, 227 Arabic xv, 4, 12, 73, 85, 143, 183 Aramaic xv, 2 - 4 , 6, 35, 109, 115, 143, 178, 187, 219, 226, 227 Armenian(s) 99, 100, 107, 108 Assyrian(s) xii, 2, 7, 10, 18 Azotians 68 Babylonian(s) xiii, xiv, 3 , 4 , 11, 190, 1 9 6 - 1 9 8 , 224 Baean (Sons of) 8, 27, 28 Bani Amarat 35 Berbers 73 Bnei Qedem 12 Canaanites 35, 71 Cilicians 99 Coele-Syrians 68 Cuthaeans 50, 51 Damascenes 184, 185 Edomites xiii, 1 - 4 , 9, 26, 182, 206, 207, 223 Egyptians 126, 131, 135, 137, 140 Esau (Sons of) 25, 26, 28 Gad (tribe) 12 Gazaeans 68, 89 Greek v, 8, 12, 35, 37, 38, 42, 48, 51, 57, 67, 71, 85, 157, 164, 177, 190, 202, 218, 219, 224 Greeks 78, 80, 105 Hasmonaean(s) xiv, 4 , 1 8 , 25, 27, 3 3 - 3 6 , 38, 47, 48, 55, 56, 59, 6 0 - 6 2 , 64, 6 6 - 7 1 , 7 5 77, 80, 83, 84, 86, 8 8 - 9 0 , 98, 1 0 3 - 1 0 5 , 1 0 7 - 1 1 0 , 113, 115, 1 1 6 , 1 1 8 , 1 2 0 - 1 2 3 , 130, 1 3 2 - 1 3 4 , 144, 152, 154, 158, 178, 190, 206, 207, 209, 2 1 7 - 2 1 9 , 223, 227, 238 Hebrew v, 51, 85, 127, 190, 226 Idumaean(s) xii, xiv, 1, 3 - 5 , 2 5 - 2 7 , 48, 5 0 56, 5 9 - 7 2 , 7 4 - 7 7 , 79, 80, 108, 110, 121, 123, 126, 127, 130, 134, 143, 160, 168, 194,206,207,214-234 Israel (kingdom) 33, 53
Israel (people) xii, xv, 25, 6 7 , 1 2 8 , 129, 182, 206, 209, 238 Ituraean(s) v, xii-xiv, 4, 1 1 - 1 4 , 30, 31, 36, 38, 41, 50, 55, 56, 59, 67, 71, 75, 7 9 - 8 1 , 84, 85, 96, 102, 104, 105, 107-109, 1 1 4 - 1 1 7 , 120, 121, 124, 131, 133, 135, 144, 151, 157, 159, 160, 175, 176, 1 8 4 - 1 9 0 , 192, 1 9 4 - 1 9 6 , 198, 199, 209, 212 Jambrites (Sons of Jambri) 8, 3 4 - 3 6 Jetur 11 Judaeans 68, 79 Judah (kingdom) xiv, 2 - 4 Kedarites 1, 5, 35 Khazarians 73 Macedonians 16, 18, 37 Menashe (tribe) 12 Midian 12 Moabites 1, 3 , 9 , 35, 59, 182 Nabataeans v, xii-xvi, 1 - 1 1 , 1 6 - 1 9 , 24, 25, 3 0 - 3 5 , 37, 38, 42, 46, 48, 66, 68, 72, 7 6 78, 8 4 - 9 2 , 9 5 - 1 0 4 , 1 0 6 - 1 1 3 , 1 1 5 - 1 2 1 , 125, 127, 128, 131, 1 3 5 - 1 5 7 , 1 5 9 - 1 7 1 , 1 7 3 - 1 7 6 , 178, 179, 1 8 1 - 1 8 6 , 1 9 1 - 1 9 3 , 200, 201, 203, 204, 208, 212, 216, 218, 219, 236 Nabatu 7 Nebajoth (Sons of) 7 Odomera 34, 36 Parthian(s) 1 2 2 - 1 2 4 , 131, 136, 152, 161, 162, 175, 180, 1 8 1 , 1 8 5 Persian(s) xiii, 2, 3 , 5 , 9 , 1 1 , 1 8 , 3 3 , 3 5 , 5 2 , 89, 200 Phasiron (Sons of) 8, 34, 36 Phoenicians 27, 46, 57, 66, 68, 85 Ptolemies xii, 6, 17, 1 9 , 2 1 - 2 5 , 5 6 , 7 0 , 7 7 , 86, 88, 89, 119, 131, 133, 150, 152, 154, 222 Qarduans (Qartuans) 73 Reuben (tribe) 12 Romans (Roman Empire) xii, xvi, 9, 48, 49, 6 3 - 6 5 , 70, 7 1 , 7 4 - 7 6 , 80, 85, 1 1 3 - 1 1 6 , 118,119, 121, 122, 1 2 4 - 1 2 6 , 131, 133— 136, 138, 139, 141, 143, 145, 152, 1 5 6 158,160, 161, 165, 169, 170, 1 7 3 - 1 7 7 , 1 8 2 - 1 8 4 , 188, 190, 1 9 2 - 2 0 1 , 203, 2 0 6 209, 220, 225, 231, 2 3 3 - 2 3 6 Safaic, Safaitic 8, 85
264
Indexes
Salmu 8 Samaritan(s) 3, 51, 65, 178 Seleucids xii, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 3 0 - 3 4 , 36 - 3 9 , 4 1 - 4 3 , 55, 77, 84, 86, 95, 104, 113, 186,207 Syrians 7, 11, 46, 66, 68, 176, 196, 199
Thamudic 85 Thracians 224 Tobiads 5 Utai 8 Ya'amri, Ya'amuru 35 see also Jambri
Tadmorian 205 Tadmorites 73, 209
Zabadaeans 37, 39, 41
