This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
namus:
prophanas nouitates uerborum deuita
however, the shrewdly oblique statement, as
if
",
Praef.
uttered tongue-in-cheek.
6).
One
of illud
auctoritas
Apostoli should note,
Ronca
338
nowhere about
is
claimed that the one
it
trivial
questions
make
about important questions
The
based
are
superior to the other.
is
on
either
use of both.
of the
two;
15
Arguments arguments
16
quantitative upgrading of auctoritas diuinae paginae, while re
establishing the correct balance in the eyes of the religious, has another function: to harmonise Reason with Scripture. At the same
important
God on
time, what William grants to
the
other,
so
reducing
the one hand, he gives to Caesar on the
considerably
sphere
of
of
competence
scriptural authority.
The harmonisation between
and rationes
auctoritates diuinae paginae
generally achieved by a shrewd re-interpretation of the philosophonim 17 and is certainly a part of former according to Abelard s fourth rule is
the grand apologetic plan. Predictably, therefore,
who
it
is
always the
Duke
points out a discrepancy and asks for an explanation of a particular
auctoritas.
But quotes,
only one side of the coin. Sometimes the Philosopher unsolicited, a new scriptural authority to support a bold rethis
is
interpretation, as in the heated debate about the alleged
above
the
legitimated
mentioned reason
at
111,75
"that
at
11,59
birds
all
at III,65ff.
and
et
procedure
may become
opinion uel
is
argumentis
certainty of
The
necessariis".
auctores.
fishes
induxeris".
"Auctoritate
does not move); or
s
sapientum
are obviously
frozen waters
supported and fully epistemological definition of opinio and ratio
Indeed the
the uncertainty of
assensu
rationem uel auctoritatem
As
18 .
by William earlier:
"uel
"sapicntes"
As
firmament
originated
The Duke
ratione,
is
non
from waters I shall not believe, Ambrosius auctoritas.
nisi
satisfied with
conuiciis,
ilium
conuince"
(that
the
Earth
(on the frozen waters above the firmament).
Abelard s five rules to reconcile found in the Prologue to the Sic et
conflicting
Non (PL
biblical
or
178,1339-1349)
patristic
authorities
and summarised
in
are
M.
der scholastischen Methode, vol.2, Graz 1957, p.200-202 (but see matters cit, p.362, n.l). The fourth rule applies to controversial in which the disagreement is more apparent than real, due to the semantic ambivalence of certain terms. In such cases the solution will be easier if one can prove that the different authors with different meanings" (si eadem controversial term is used
Grabmann s Geschichte also M. D. Chenu, op.
"by
verba 178,
18
in
diversis
significationibus
a
diversis
auctoribus posita defendere poterimus:
PL
1344D). Cf.
Dragm.
auibus caeli biblical
111,65
"Aliquando
"
illudunt
term caelum).
(to
explain
aer dicitur caelum, ut that the sense of acr
ibi is
[= Baruch 3,17] Qui in sometimes implicit in the
Reason and Faith
9.
As
the restriction
for
of the
in the
Dragmaticon
field
of competence of the auctoritas
diuinae paginae, the crucial evidence
is
339
provided by the discussion of the
frozen waters above the firmament. In the Philosophia the frozen waters
reported as anonymous, the opinion
is
theory
end of
the Dragmaticon
in
it;
Duke
the
Bede. This prompts the Philosopher to
pertain
contradict
catholic
or
faith
is
disproved, and that
attributes
s
bold reply:
moral
instruction
is
the
to the Venerable
it
those matters which
"In
is
it
not
allowed
to
Bede or any other of the holy
Fathers. If, however, they err matters pertaining to physics, it is permitted to state an opposite view. 19 For, although greater than we, they were only human beings". This statement has been quoted out of context to make of William of Conches in
an idealised pre-Galilean martyr for freedom of thought. 20 not the authority of the Bible that
is
at stake here,
It is,
however,
but only that of the
Church Fathers (represented by Bede, certainly not the greatest authority among them). William would hardly have dared to raise such a fundamental objection against the Bible (as did Galilei, but only in the 17th century) or the Gospel, the authority of which he rates higher than that of the Fathers. 21
Here he merely emphasises the human condition of and plays them off against each other (using Abelard s
two
authorities, 22 rule ). That
fifth
William had
auctoritates
heterogenous
can
mind
in
be
a certain hierarchy within the
reasonably
assumed. 23
That
he
did
19
eis quae ad fidem catholicam, uel ad institutionem morum Dragm. 111,65-66 non est fas Bedae uel alicui alii sanctorum patrum contradicere. In eis tamen quae ad philosophiam [read: physicam] pertinent, si in aliquo errant, licet diuersum affirmare. Etsi enim maiores nobis, homines tamen fuere". Note that in the Gratarolus "In
pertinent,
a
edition
line
is
scripturae sacrae
added,
in
brackets but
nevertheless arbitrarily,
after
"patrum":
"(citra
authoritatem)".
Tina Stiefel, "Science, Reason and Faith in the Twelfth Century: The CosAttacks on Tradition", Journal of European Studies, vi (1976), 1-16. The article does not take into consideration the development of William s thought and gives a one-sided picture of it, based almost the Philosophia. Incidentally, entirely on Stiefel s translation of the above statement, on p.6, is incorrect. Cf.
mologists
He words
retracts,
"quia
nee
for in
instance,
on
Euangelio nee
his
view on the divine sanctorum patrum illud
early
in scriptis
Persons inuenimus"
with
the
(Dragm.
Praef., 6).
This applies to controversies where the disagreement is real. In such cases no semantic trick will do, but the different authorities should be weighed against each other and preference given to that which appears be supported by the most solid evidence and best confirmed" (Quod si forte adeo manifesta sit controversia, ut nulla "to
aboliri ratione, conferendae sunt auctoritates, et quae potioris est testimonii et maioris confirmationis, potissimum retinenda: PL 178, 1345A). 23 In addition to the above evidence, cf. Dragm. 1,23 (the Duke should feel free to compare what is going to be said about the elements with any other available authority
possit
Ronca
340
distinguish the hierarchical status of the Gospel is
from that of the Fathers,
beyond doubt.
To sum
With the proviso
up:
Bede
that
authority should be taken
s
drawing of a line between the domains of Reason and Sacred Authority still remains a clear sign of to
William
and
bold
s
of
separation
Fathers
the
represent
modernistic
amazingly
two
the
the
alone,
of
spheres
The
attitude.
competence
is
clear-cut
tantamount
to
a
declaration of independence of Science (natural philosophy) from Religion,
or
the
to
dogma.
autonomy of
of
right
research
scientific
from
theological
24
To
The new
form of the Dragmaticon is shrewdly exploited for apologetic purposes: the Philosopher wants to convince his religious readers that they can safely use his new work as a companion 10.
conclude:
dialogical
philosophorum; he also formally appeases his theological opponents by ostensibly redressing the imbalance between secular reason and sacred authority; and, last but not least, William of St Thierry is
to
their lectio
granted his retractatio errorum and confessio the
in
"retreat"
sense
of
Flatten
s
fidei. All this is
"Rikkzug".
In
fact,
connected with the Riickzug are ambivalent and subtly
not a
mere
most passages Even for
allusive.
the apparently most fideistic of those passages, as are the conclusion of
the confessio fidei and the miraculous creation of Eve, William explanations, and
to provide the necessary rational that:
he ends his Profession of Faith by saying that he believes
a)
these
manages
ironically allusive
things,
contrary to believes:
approving
human
"because
some
reason";
the
men
with
human
reason,
others,
at "all
although
he then promptly gives the reason why he who wrote them were inspired by the Holy
nor to affirm anything but epistemological certainty guaranteed assensu certainty". sapientum; and against those inspired holy writers are played off all contemporary (by implication religious) liarsl b) As for the miraculous Spirit
(...)
and they profess neither to
In
creation of Eve, he "plausible
lie
other words:
reasons"
is
willing to accept
it,
but only because
God had
to intervene personally in such an act contra naturam:
to the most convincing of them - another application of Abelard s enim quaerendum est qui dixerint, sed quid dixerint. Non tamen nego conferre qualitatem personae bono open maiorem gratiam conferre". Of course gratiam is not quite the same as auctoritatem conferre
and give fifth
his assent
rule):
"Non
.
24
von Conches, Koln Cf. H. Flatten, Die Philosophic erster Linie betont unser Scholastiker die Selbstandigkeit der Wissenschaft". des
Wilhelm
1929,
p.34:
"In
Reason and Faith
"He
in the
did this not from a shortage of material, but 1) to
should be joined to sacrality of marriage,
His side
man and be and
subject to
him
3) to prefigure the
in the sacraments".
25
That
341
Dragmaticon
(...);
show
that
woman
2) to confirm the
Church which issued from
in defiance of the laws of physical
is,
causation, he exceptionally admits the possibility of miracle, evidence can be produced to prove that such a miracle
if
substantial
is
reasonably
6
justified?-
University of South Africa
25
Dragm. et
111,77:
suhditam
esse
"quod
non penuria materiae
debere
significaret,
et
fecit,
sed ut mulierem uiro coniunctam
sacr[ament]um
ecclesiam, quae ex latere eius in sacramentis profluxit,
coniugii
confirmaret
et
praefiguraret".
Elsewhere, in reply to the objection that God can intervene any time to change natural course of events, he had rejoined: "Quid est stultius quam affirmare aliquid quia Creator potest illud facere? Fecitne quicquid potest? Qui igitur Deum aliquid contra naturam facere dicit, uel sic esse oculis uideat, uel rationem quare the
<esse>
hoc
sit
ostendat, uel utilitatem
ad quam hoc
sit praetendat"
(Dragm.
111,68-9).
CECILIA TRIFOGLI
The Place
of the Last Sphere in Late-Ancient and
Medieval Commentaries
Aristotle
treatment
s
frequently discussed
of
the
place
of
the
last
of his doctrine of place
topic
the
is
sphere
most
Late-ancient
among
and Medieval commentators. 1 They raise many questions about it and attempt different solutions which often reflect either conceptions of place different
from Aristotle
The
exposition
primary concern of consider
the
to the
it
of
Rome
To
this paper.
s
position
on
this
context
of
the
and
problem
doctrine of place seems to be inconsistent
s
same
topic
we
introduce his position
is
the
shall briefly
the
major
when
applied
proposed by the commentators.
heavens since
but, at the
or innovations introduced in the doctrine.
Aristotelian
interpretations of
Aristotle
s
of Giles
it
turns out that the heavens cannot be in a place,
time, must be in a place. In particular, the definition of
place as an external
container"
and the derived
criterion for being in a
3
deny a place to the heavens. For this criterion claims that only bodies which are contained by another external body are in a place. As a consequence, the heavens or the outermost body of the universe cannot place
be
in a place, since they are not
however,
heavens
other
must
contained by another body. There are,
primary assumptions about place which show that the be in a place. They concern the essential connection
between place and
local
motion;
this requires that
every body that moves
wish to thank prof. F. Del Punta for advice and comments on this paper; I am Rega Wood for her patience in helping me to elucidate some of the linguistic oddities and for her precious remarks and encouragement. I
also indebted to dr.
On
the
history
of Aristotle
Systeme du
Monde
(10 vols.),
s
of place, see, for instance: P. Duhem, Le A. Hermann, 1913-1959; vol.1, pp.197-205, 297-300,
doctrine
Paris,
313-320, 333-350; vol.7, pp.158-302; vol. 10, pp.50, 79-81, 100, 157-160, 204-210, 396-412; E. Grant, "The Medieval Doctrine of Place: some Fundamental Problems and Solutions",
XIV
secolo
Paravicini Bagliani)
Roma,
in:
Studi sul
in
memoria
di Anneliese
Maier
(a
cura
di
A.
Maieru e A.
Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1981, pp.57-59.
See Aristotle s Physics (a Revised Text with Introduction and 1 Ross), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936 IV.4, 212a20-21. 3 See Aristotle, Physics, IV.5, 212a31-32. ,
Commentary by W.D.
TJie
with
motion must be
local
circular
motion,
Aristotle
s
in
Place of the Last Sphere
i.e.
4
a
in
343
But the heavens move with
place.
with a kind of local motion. So the problem with
doctrine can be
summed up
as follows: the heavens cannot
be
a place, since they are not contained, but must be in a place, since
they
move with In
local motion. this
facing
the
problem,
Aristotelian
reached
two
unavoidable
and
tradition
different positions:
the
1)
first
declares
that
contradiction
the
is
the Aristotelian doctrine of place completely. This position was
rejects
who
supported by Simplicius and Philoponus, Following
place.
Damascius
doctrine,
formulate other doctrines of defines
Simplicius
as
place
measure of the position of the bodies, whereas Philoponus defines three-dimensional incorporeal extension.
Proponents
2)
of
second
the
the
it
as a
remove
the
5
to
attempt
position
contradiction without giving up the whole Aristotelian doctrine, but by
some
modifying
principles
from
which
it
This
derives.
was
position
supported by some Greek commentators and commonly by the Medieval commentators. These commentators, however, followed different routes to save
Aristotle
difficult
s
doctrine;
all
them
of
reflect
of
interpretations
the
passage of Physics IV.5 where Aristotle attempts to deal with the 6
place of the heavens.
Aristotle claims that only the parts of the heavens are in a place
move from
since only they
a place to another; the heavens as a whole
are not in a place since they do not change place, as they rotate. This solution assumes that circular motion for
right, its
it
is
not the rotating body
is
not a local motion in
parts.
There are two main terminological ambiguities which
commentators.
The
first
for the
concerns
ambiguity
the
See, in particular, Aristotle, Physics,
See Simplicii In
Aristotelis
term
and the universe,
continuous parts which compose the
(
Aristotle
text
s
this
last
parts
.
Since
term can stand
sphere or
(ii)
for
IV A, 211al2-14.
Physicorum
Physicorum Commentaria, ed. H. Regia Borussica, Berlin 1887, pp.557,8-585,4.
Aristotelis
See Aristotle, Physics, IV.5, 212a31-b22.
ed. H. Diels (CA.G. vol.IX), 1882, pp.601, 1-645, 19; loannis Philoponi In
Commentaria,
Academia Litterarum Regia Borussica, Berlin
6
in
justify the different reconstructions of his solution offered by the
Aristotle mentions both the heavens (i)
own
its
changes place, but only
itself that
Vitelli
(C.A.G.
vol. XVI),
Academia Litterarum
344
Trifogli
the single celestial spheres
as
parts of the celestial region or
(iii)
for
spheres and the sublunar elements as parts of the universe. The second ambiguity concerns the expression per accidens
both the
celestial
.
For Aristotle
s
heavens
the
account of the place of the heavens clearly indicates that are in a place in virtue of their parts, but Aristotle
concludes that they are If
only
the
second
of
Aristotle
reconstructions
The
traditions.
per paries
in a place per accidens.
ambiguity solution
s
1)
the
different
broad
exegetic
considered,
two
into
assumes that per accidens simply means the second tradition makes a distinction between the meaning
;
tradition
first
of per accidens and that of per paries
The
.
seems chronologically
tradition also
first
and
Themistius
in
is
fall
for
first
it
appears
and
in
Philoponus paraphrasis Simplicius commentaries. 7 These commentaries also show that this tradition divides into two, according to the interpretation given to the first ambiguity, to
the term
refers
are
parts
According
.
continuous
the
second they are the single the Middle
the
Ages
commentary, who Themistius, in faithful
of
parts celestial
the
it
i.e.
the parts to which Aristotle
first,
last
sphere,
according
to
the
spheres and the sublunar elements. In
interpretation reappears in
first
accepts
to the
but falsely ascribes
it
Thomas Aquinas
to Themistius.
8
For
follows the second. Both these interpretations remain
fact,
on two important aspects: 1) they accept motion of a body can be reduced to the local
to Aristotle s doctrine
the view that the circular
motion of
its
parts;
definition of place
is
2)
they assume
that
an essential element of the
containing the located body. Both these aspects are
rejected by the second exegetic tradition. 2)
This
second tradition
Albert the Great, criticized by
Rome
and such important
See Themistii In
starts
from Averroes;
it
followed
is
Thomas Aquinas, and defended by
later
authors as Walter Burley.
Aristotelis Physica Paraphrasis,
Academia Litterarum Regia Borussica,
Berlin,
ed.
9
Its
by
Giles of peculiar
H. Schenk (C.A.G. vol.V,
p.
II),
1900, pp.119,12-121,20. Simplicius, Physics,
pp.588,1-595,26. loannes Philoponus, Physics, pp.593,1 1-597,4; 600,25-604,19. o See S. Thomae Aquinatis In octo Libras Physicorum Expositio, ed. Torino-Roma, Marietti 1965, Bk.IV, lectio 7, pars. 478-480, pp.232-233.
P.M. Maggiolo,
See Averrois Cordubensis Aristotelis de Physico audito (Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. IV), Venetiis 1562 (repr. Minerva G.M.B.H., Frankfurt 1963), Bk.IV, Comment 43, fol.!41L-M; Comment 45, fols. 143M-144E. Alberti Magni Physicorum Libri
VIII (Opera
Omnia,
Thomas Aquinas, Romani Commentaria in
p.269.
ed. A. Borgnet, Parisiis 1890, Bk.IV, tract.I, cap.XIII, Bk.IV, lectio 7, par.477, p.232; par.486, p.234. Aegidii octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Venetiis 1502 (repr. Minerva vol.III),
Physics,
The Place of the Last Sphere
the distinction between being in a place per paries and being in a
trait is
which refer
place per accidens,
heavens
When
.
turn
in
to
different
meanings of
the
the heavens are conceived as the whole celestial region,
because the single celestial spheres a place; but when the heavens are conceived as the last sphere,
they are in a place per paries, are in
345
i.e.
they are in a place per accidens,
i.e.
per centrum, namely the earth. This is clearly an innovation
account of the accidental location of the heavens introduced by Averroes and, furthermore, Aristotle
it presupposes the rejection of which reduces circular motion to the motion of the principle
s
parts of the rotating body. I
will
discuss
treatment of the accidental location of
Giles
next
the heavens.
To
Giles
clarify
position
claim that the last sphere
is
in
it is necessary to analyze further the a place in virtue of the earth. It includes
two assumptions which are conceptually and factually distinct. The first comes out from the spatial relationship between the sphere and the not contain
earth.
So
The
earth
is
contained by the
last
last
sphere but does
in
attempting to solve the problem of the place of the heavens, the second tradition gives up the primary axiom on place, that of containment, and admits an internal place, at least for the bodies it.
which move with circular motion.
But
this
does not yet explain why,
contained inside the is
chosen to define
last its
among
all
the bodies which are
sphere, the one most distant from
place.
The explanation
is
it,
the earth,
provided by the second
assumption concerning the immobility of place: place must be immobile and the earth is the only body in Aristotle s universe which is properly immobile. All the followers of the second exegetic tradition share both these
assumptions and occasionally repeat the arguments which Averroes used to support them.
Regarding internal place, Averroes declares that it is not necessary to have an external place, since they move circa and not in continente. aliquid Furthermore, he seems to accept for
spherical bodies
Avempace
G.M.B.H., Aristotelis
s
arguments on
Frankfurt Expositio
et
1968),
this
Bk.IV,
Quaestiones,
York, 1972), Bk.IV, fol.l02vb.
topic:
lectio
Venetiis
8,
unlike the rectilinear bodies,
fol.82ra-b.
1501
(repr.
Walter
Hurley,
In
the
Physicam
Georg Olms, Hildesheim-New
346
Trifogli
sphere
is
by something
does not need to be completed
in itself and, therefore,
complete else, a
10
containing place.
Regarding the immobility of place, he declares that the heavens are in
a place because of the earth since the immobility of the earth
cause of the /lv/0 of the heavens.
is
the
11
Besides repeating these arguments, Giles formulates other arguments in
favour of the opinion that the heavens are in a place per centrum.
These arguments describe a new interpretation of the connection between place and local motion. For they stress the function of place in the description of local motion, but they deny any real dependence of local
A
motion on place. from this function. In
new
quantitative concept of place
what follows
aspects
I
shall
try to
Giles
in
appear
sphere and of the immobility of the treatment of the
In
framework
within
emphasi/ed. Giles against
Thomas
of
virtue
its
parts,
before and after
it.
claim, showing that these last
first
problem, the function of place as a
and
are
rest
described
is
chiefly
main argument formulated by
position.
Thomas
Following Aristotle, in
derive
place.
appears, for instance, in the
It
to
treatment both of the place of the
motion
which
this
prove
seems also
held that the
since each
Giles
part
criticism
is
is
last
sphere
in a place
is
contained by those which are
the following:
with the relative order of the parts of the
last
if
place
is
identified
sphere, the last sphere
undergoes motion, but it cannot be recogni/.ed and described, since this order does not change, as it moves. The correct frame of reference is an internal
i.e.
the
because the position of the
last
sphere changes with respect to the earth, as it rotates. For, as Giles explains: Moto enim celo, partes celi habent alium ordinem ad paries centri. Pars
enim
place,
earth,
que prius respiciebat hanc partem aliam partem terre. Totum ergo celum semper ilia
terre,
moto
respicit
celo,
respicit
totam terram, sed
non semper respicit earn eodem modo, partes vero celi non semper respiciunt easdcm partes terre, propter quod, si comparamus celum ad centrum
10
See
Comment 11
et
partes celi ad partes centri, inveniemus
Averroes,
Physics, 45, fol.l44B.
Bk.IV,
See Averroes, Physics, Bk.IV,
Comment
Comment
43,
quod totum celum
fols.!41M-142B,
43, fo!.142G.
142E,
142M-143A;
347
The Place of the Last Sphere
mutat locum secundum dispositionem, partes vero eius mutant locum
secundum substantiam
The same
12 .
criticism
raised against the opinion that identifies the
is
place of the last sphere with
cum ad
convex surface:
its
huiusmodi superficies
Si
celum semper uniformiter se habeat, sequeretur quod celum ex motu suo nullo modo mutaret locum, esset locus celi,
quod
est
illam superficiem
omnino inconveniens
The
function
description of local
of place in the
underlined
definitively
13 .
the
in
third
argument
motion
favour
in
is
also
of Averroes
Tertia via sumitur ex parte eorum que debemus salvare circa locum. Sic enim tribuendus est alicui locus ut per motum eius localem opinion:
modo
mutet locum. Si enim ponemus celum nullo Alexander, vel
ponemus ipsum
si
posuit Themistius, vel ultime, ut
Sed
si
quidam
alii
si
esse in loco solum
diceremus ipsum esse
posuerunt,
ponimus ipsum esse
esse in loco, ut posuit
secundum
nunquam per motum
in loco per
partes, ut
in loco ratione superficiei
eius mutaret locum.
comparationem ad centrum
vel per
comparationem ad terram, cum totum celum semper respicit eandem terram, partes vero celi non semper respiciant easdem partes terre, salvabimus in celo quod per eius
motum mutet locum
et
salvabimus quod
quantum ad eius partes mutet locum secundum substantiam, quantum ad se totum mutet locum secundum dispositionem 14 .
These passages show first that the causal connection between the motion or rest of the heavens and the earth, maintained by Averroes, has completely
disappeared.
Furthermore,
they
show a
sharp
distinction
between the existence of motion and the elements necessary to describe it it, and place appears to be relevant only for the description. From this follows that Giles gives
of
place.
Place,
Aristotelian
surface
provided that this function
it
it it
no
clear indications about the physical properties
be
seems,
could
of
container,
the
either
a
of
space
several
or
things
an internal
-
the
place-
allows a suitable description of motion. But to perform
must meet an
essential requirement:
it
must not only be
physically separated from the mobile body but immobile since, as Giles Omnis enim motus fit respectu alicuius immobilis; nunquam explains: 12
Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio
8,
fol.82vb.
fol.83ra. This opinion is not mentioned Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, by Averroes, but by Albert the Great, who ascribes it to Gilbertus Porretanus (see Albertus Magnus, Physics, Bk.IV, tract.I, cap.XIII, p.270). lectio 8,
14
Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio
8, fol.83rb.
348
Trifogli
cnim possumus imaginari motum 15 cuius aliquid dicatur moveri
nisi
imagincmur
aliquid
immobile respectu
.
The
espoused by all the followers of the second exegetic tradition, whereas the second is introduced by Giles. It contains an explanation of the immobility of place that is clearly conclusion in this passage
first
congenial to the
new
is
function of place. Averroes himself, for instance,
explained this point in a different way: the place towards which a body moves must be immobile because: Si aliquid movetur ad motam rem, tune
motus eius This Aristotle
esset ociosus
explanation,
16 .
that
real connection
absent
completely
in
it
to
assumes a
between place and motion based on the nature of bodies. of the immobility of place also shows which
physical properties place
These
rest.
refers
Giles,
treatment
Giles
and
is
doctrine of natural place and motion. Therefore,
s
must have
out
turn
properties
provide a description of motion
to
be
to
different
from
those
of
Aristotle s place.
To
explain
this
point
we must
turn
Giles
to
distinction
between
introduced to counter an
formal and material place. This distinction
is
objection against the immobility of place:
place, according to Aristotle,
if
the surface of a natural body, since each natural
is
can
be
place
answered
if
and
body
immobile?
Giles
admits
that
this
body can move, how objection cannot be
completely reduced to the surface of the containing place Locus est immobilis formulates the following distinction: is
formalitcr, mobilis vero materialiter.
The of the place fixed
material place coincides with the Aristotelian place as surface
containing body in
is
the ordo
points
contact
ad universum of
of the
universe
with
the
contained,
this surface,
(the
earth
i.e.
and the
its
whereas formal
relationship to the poles). The Thomas Aquinas
celestial
of this distinction already appear commentators offer an explicit definition of the ordo Neither commentary. ad universum; there are, however, some differences in the terms and essential
in
traits
examples they use which
illustrate
Giles
place.
15
16
Acgidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio Averroes, Physics, Bk.IV,
Comment
8, fol.83rb.
41, fol.!40A.
1
Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio
7, fol.Slra.
quantitative
notion of formal
The Place of the Last Sphere
To
how
349
ad universum remains unchanged when the founded vary Thomas introduces the following analogy: Sicut etiam dicitur idem ignis manere quantum ad formam, licet secundum materiam varietur, consumptis et additis quibusdam lignis 18 explain
on which
surfaces
the ordo is
it
.
Thomas
ordo, therefore,
common
to
the
all
similar to Aristotle s form, being a quality
is
containing surfaces and conferring the function of
place upon them. But there
no analogy between place and form
is
in
commentary. For Giles explains the permanence of place by the permanence of the distance between the located body and the fixed points Giles
consequenter ponitur, ideo locus est immobilis quia, licet, te quiescente, possit moveri aer qui est iuxta te vel aliquod aliud corpus circumdans te, semper tamen diceris esse in eodem loco quia of universe:
semper
es in
From
Nam,
ut
eadem
distantia
this
it
passage
ad centrum evident
is
et
ad polos
that
19 .
Giles
replaces
the
generic
notion of ordo with the quantitative notion of distantia. This distance
can be measured and, therefore, the formal place conceived as distance is
a suitable
framework
The comparison
for the description of local
motion and
rest.
of the quoted example with other similar examples
offered by Giles reveals a doctrinal aspect that, though not systematically
developed
by
position. For,
located
body
the
consequences of his example, Giles refers to the distance between the and the fixed points of the universe, whereas in the elucidates
Giles,
theoretical
in this itself
examples he refers to the distance between the surface of the containing body and these points. How can this be explained? Perhaps, other
the explanation could be
when considering formal
found place,
remark by Edward Grant 20 that, the Medieval authors speak indifferently a
in
measured from the place itself or from the body in that since place and the external surface of the located body are
of the distances place,
coincident, according to Aristotle. Consequently, the distance
both cases formal
is
place,
identified
with
simply completes Aristotle but
seems
to
replace
essentially to evaluate
it.
s
a
no longer something
is
distance,
in
Thomas Aquinas,
motion and
in
rest
fact,
and
it
according
performs
Physics, Bk.IV, lectio 6, par.468, p.227.
10
Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio
7,
See E. Grant,
Place"...,
"The
that
notion of place as surface of the container, Place,
10
?n
measured
the same. This explanation has a further implication: the
Medieval Doctrine of
fol.Slrb.
p.65, note 25.
to
Giles,
this function
serves
when
350
it
is
Trifogli
defined as a distance that remains the same,
at rest,
and
indifferently itself
varies,
if
satisfied
the located body
when
the
is
distance
if
the located
to
introduce
the
is
motion. Both conditions are
is
measured from the located
and from the surface of the body containing
body it seems superfluous
body
in
containing
located body, at least as far as the description of motion
it.
Consequently, besides the
surface is
concerned.
emphasis on the role of place in the description of motion seems to lead to a quantitative and relational notion of place. In conclusion, Giles
Giles, however,
does not completely substitute the Aristotelian notion of is only one of the
place for that of place as a distance. Place as distance
two notions of place which appear in his commentary. The other, which is related to material place, assumes an intrinsic connection between place and the located body
that cannot
Universita degli Studi di Pisa
be founded on distance alone.
WHITE
G.
Ockham and Hume s Question
There has been, bring of
Ockham
scepticism",
secondary
some
no shortage of attempts to
literature,
sort of meaningful relationship with
however
Such
conceived.
Ockham
link
to
attempts
in the
into
with
later
attempts
figures;
thus
about induction and the
possibility of a scepticism
Goddu 1
problem with
go
generally
the
raises
reliability of causal
Ockham
connections, which gains a hold because of
"the
s
principle that the
existence of one thing cannot necessitate the existence of another thing.
Even though have, as
this
later did
it
Goddu seems fact
principle did not lead
Hume; and
to think, needs to
Ockham
the fact that
to scepticism,
didn
t
is
it
could
something
that,
be explained.
We
find a similar chain of thought in
that
Ockham subscribed to that God could cause
principle
it
a
certain
us
to
Adams. 2 Again, we have principle
believe
-
in
this
falsehoods
assertion that this principle leads to a form of scepticism
-
-
case,
the the
and the
in this case,
3 scepticism about mind-independent material objects. Here, too, the path from the principle to fully-fledged scepticism is one that Ockham didn t
take, but
1.
somebody
else
-
in this case
Prepositional Structure, Assent,
Descartes
-
did.
and Cause
Ockham s key texts: the Prologue to concerned here with the structure4 of acts of
Let us start by examining one of his
Ordinatio.
Ockham
is
Andre Goddu, The Physics of William of Gcistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 16 (Leiden 1984), p. 217. "
Marilyn Ockham",
In
McCord Adams,
Cognition,
Certainty,
Studien
und
and Scepticism
Texte
in
zur
William
Traditio 26 (1970), pp. 389-398. See p. 394.
her
Scepticism",
A. C. Pegis,
definition in
of
scepticism,
she
follows
Etienne
Gilson,
The
Road
to
The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York 1937), pp. 61-91, and
"Concerning
John Boler, 85-98. See p. 86: Cf.
"Intuitive
Ockham.
William of
"Ockham "the
Ockham",
doctrine
Traditio 2 (1944), pp. 465-480.
Cognition", Franciscan Studies NS 36 (1976), pp. of intuitive cognition depends upon an analysis of the
on Evident
White
352
assent
more
with
(specifically
evident
assent
to
theological
here interested
He
the evident assent which belongs to science
in
but
propositions,
generally with evident assent to propositions in general.)
not
is
(i.e.
that
comes from knowledge of first principles and the like; 5 such in principles are known when the terms occurring in them are known
which
Ockham
fact,
statement
of
knowledge
first
(complcxa) which
knowledge of called
I
terms. it
-
their
knowledge
(notitia
someone
broad definition of
s
it
know
-
applies
is
white.
Ockham
as
sees
Socrates and being
at
9
and whiteness existing
Socrates
sees
intuitively
knowledge of
intuitive
extends to the sort of knowledge of
it
someone has when looking
Socrates, then (s)he can
evidently that Socrates
is
in
white.
thought."
Sent.
Ockham, Bonavcnture "Si
with
contrast
by
intuitiva),
a rather general definition, and
able to judge on that basis that Socrates
structure of
However,
with will be like
(notitia abstracted).
Ockham
empirical facts which
if
the
to
to a variety of cases. Firstly,
...
6
in that it is knowledge of propositions be caused simply by (a certain sort of) terms (incomplexa}? The sort of knowledge of terms
able
knowledge
is
contains
terms".
principles
is
shall call this It
which
Aristotle
we know their Ockham is concerned
in that
principles
intuitive
abstractive
in
passage
of evident assent that
the sort
is
a
to
refers
know
"We
NY
dicatur
Prol.
qu.
quod
Opera
1,
Theologica
ed.
I,
G.
Brown
S.
Gal,
(St.
6:
1967), p.
cvidens veritatis
notitia
contingentis
nunquam
causatur sufficicnter
incomplcxa terminorum, quia tune scirctur cognitis terminis. Sed omnc tale 18est principium per se notum, secundum Philosophum I Posteriorum [c. 3 t. 21, 72 26]. Sed nulla veritas contingens est per se nota; igitur etc.: Dicendum quod propositio per se nota est ilia quae scitur evidentcr ex quacumque notitia terminorum ipsius propositionis, sive abstractive sive intuitiva. Sed de propositione contingente non est hoc possibile ex
notitia
..."
"Principia
cognoscimus
in
quantum terminos
cognoscimus."
Post. Anal.
3
c.
t.
21, 72
18-26. "Notitia
evidens
est
cognitio
vcri
alicuius
incomplexa immediate vel mediate nata sufficientcr O.Th. I, p. 5.
complexi, causari."
ex
terminorum
notitia
Ockham,
Sent.
Prol.
qu.l,
Q
The this is
existence
proved
"...si
in
aliquis
of such a
Ockham, videat
ibid.
distinction
intuitive
evidenter scire quod Sortes est
is
Conclusio
1
of qu.
1
(Ockham,
ibid.
p.
15);
pp. 22-30.
Sortem
albus."
et
Ockham,
albedinem
Sent. Prol. qu.
exsistentem 1,
O.Th.
I,
in
p. 6.
Sorte,
potest
Ockham and Hume s much
applies to
it
Secondly,
evident
is
Ockham mental
states.
above;
such
(This
mental
associated with terms
-
-
incomplexa
and thus
we have
in the technical -
things
huiusmodi
et
tristitiae
delectationes,
are
the
-
our
argues
own
of our
described
way
intellectiones,
and
-
10
have:
love, are happy or are
fact,
that
intuitiva
be interpreted
states
we
that
contingent
to notitia
to
is
of a
is
knowledge,
must be due
-
we
introspective knowledge that
knowledge that we understand something, sad
353
Question
affectiones,
notitia
intuitiva
is
referring to these things.)
polemics against Scotus, Ockham seems to insist on this precisely property of intuitive cognition - that it guarantees of the propositions that it occurs in. But we can also see now knowledge in
And,
the
his
of
point
certain
Ockham
that
objections
made
Scotus
to
characterisation of the distinction:
When
(1)
Scotus
said
some diminished whatever
11
When
(2)
the
in
est
quod
notitia
aliqua
refers
not
-
"according
to
objects to this that, according to
anything,
and,
one
can
must be
it
consequently,
doubt
12 abstractively under that description.
in
that,
whereas
intelligibile
cuius
or
exist
know something
Scotus said
omne
"...
sensibile,
one
description
motive,
Ockham
similitude".
whether that thing possible to
intuitive
knowledge only has to do with the object
abstractive
to
knowledge has to do with the description" (sub perfecta ratione), whereas
that
a complete
"under
object
a
intuitive
knowledge, the thing
abstractive
solo
intellectu sufficit
incomplexa
knowledge
ad
itself
is
it
is
some
apprehensibile et nullo modo notitiam evidentiam alicuius
de eo et aliqua notitia incomplexa eiusdem non sufficit, potest duabus cognitionibus specie distinctis. Sed intellectiones, affec tiones, delectationes, tristitiae et huiusmodi sunt intelligibiles et nullo modo sensibiles, et aliqua notitia incomplexa earum sufficit ad notitia evidentem utrum sint vel non sint,
veritatis
contingentis
ab
cognosci
et etc.
intellectu
utrum sint in tali subiecto vel non, Minor quantum ad primum partem
et
aliqua
patet,
notitia
earundem non
sufficit;
delectatur, tristatur; et ista notitia, cum sit respectu contingentis, ligit, diligit, potest accipi ex propositionibus necessariis." Ockham, Sent. Prol. qu. 1, O.Th. I, p. 28.
qu. 6 n.
Scotus, Quodl.
Ockham,
Sent. Prol.
O.Th.
1
Ockham,
Sent.
(Oxford
1982), misidentification
Prol.
p.
I,
8;
Wadding, XII,
145; ed.
and
tr.
non
Wolter, pp. 135f. Cf.
p. 34.
O.Th.
219:
ed.
igitur
quia quilibet experitur in se quod intel-
"...
pp. 36f. Cf. the property
I,
Gareth Evans, The of
being
Varieties
of Reference through of a term] is not one
immune
to
error
[which corresponds to Ockham s notitia intuitiva which applies to propositions simpliciter, but one which applies only to judgments made on this or that basis. Once we appreciate this relativity to a basis, which arguably must be taken into account in the case of mental self-ascription as well, the fact that there
are
cases
the involving the self-ascription of physical predicates in which error has been provided for [these correspond to Ockham s notitia abstractiva] will be seen not to impugn the fact that there are cases in which it just as clearly has not." possibility
of
White
354
representative of the thing.
comes about by natural acting
God
directly;
13
Ockham thus
located at
God
Rome
about
bring
knowledge of things without the things point talks of
God
can be brought about by
causality
can
objects to this that whatever
14
acting.
an
such
intuitive
And Ockham
at
one
bringing about intuitive knowledge of something
(presumably when he
is
15 away from Rome.)
A
modern philosopher may have a few reservations good. describing mental states as things, and describing psychological
So about
far so
language as referential tout court, but otherwise John Boler seems to be more or less on track when he remarks, citing Jerry Fodor, that 16 I think Ockham s enterprise [could] be ... fruitfully compared to ... those recent studies which claim some relation between logical form and linguistic structure, and between those and cognitive psychology.
And
Ockham
all
Socrates
we
that
way
white
is
attitudes (let
has surely done I
,
am happy
-
to
is
and
certain
analyse
to
claim that,
propositions
we
if
-
analyse the
deal with such propositions there must be different mental us say) corresponding to the terms; these mental attitudes
give us, for each term, a grasp of the corresponding object.
Very
similar
made by Gareth Evans when he
talks
about
been
have
distinctions
personal pronouns; he 17 "Ideas".
Now
in
the mental attitudes corresponding to terms
calls
Ockham
s
analysis,
there
two ways of having a
are
we know
grasp of objects, corresponding to whether or not proposition evidently;
too,
so,
in
knowledge that we can have of propositions such 13
Scotus, Quodl. qu. 13,
Ockham, 14
15
Sent. Prol.
Ockham,
O.Th.
Sent. Prol.
Ockham,
II
Sent.
I,
n.
cd Wadding, XII,
p.
My
as
311; ed.
and
tr.
legs are crossed
Woltcr,
p.
292. Cf.
p. 34.
O.Th. qq.
10;
the relevant
theory, there are two sorts of
Evans
I,
p. 37.
12/13,
O.Th. V, ed. G. Gal, R.
Wood
(St.
Bonaventure
NY
per cognitio intuitivam iudicamus rem esse quando hoc est, et cognitio naturaliter causetur sive supernaturaliter a solo Deo. Nam si naturaliter causaretur, tune non potest esse nisi obiectum exsistat praesens in debito approximatione, quia tanta potest esse distantia inter obiectum et potcntiam quod naturaliter non potest potentia tale obiectum intueri. Et quando p.
258:
obiectum
est
1981),
igitur patet quod gcneraliter sive intuitiva "Sic
sic
praesens
modo approximatum, modo praedicto. Si autem
tali
potest
intellectus
per
actum
supernaturalis, puta si Deus causaret in me cognitionem intuitivam de aliqua obiecto exsistente Romae, statim habita ita bene cognitione eius intuitiva possum iudicare quod illud quod intueor et video est, ilia sicut si cognitio haberetur naturaliter." Ockham does say elsewhere that
assentiendi iudicare
rem
esse,
sit
"in
cognitione intuitiva [obiectum] est praesens in 16 J. Boler, "Ockham on Evident Cognition",
se";
Thought (New York, 1975). Evans, The Varieties of Reference, p. 104.
II
p.
Sent. 12/13, 86;
he
O.Th. V,
cites J.
p. 310.
Fodor, The Language of
Ockham and Hume s or
(evident
corresponding precisely to two different
this
non-evident);
355
Question
18 And these two uses will differ person pronoun. in whether the utterances precisely they are used in are grounded by
uses
of
other
the
first
or
propositions
concerns and
Adams
not;
this
analysis of
establishes
Ockham
s
a
these
19
position.
However, things are not as simple as illuminating to say that
continuity between
that.
It
is
possible,
and
20
... the doctrine of intuitive cognition depends on an analysis of the structure of thought, an analysis which is controlled directly not by any observation of the parade of cognitive activity but rather by the demands of the analysis of propositions.
It is maybe even when he says: 21
true.
a concept
And Ockham
himself says something very similar
given so that
it corresponds to utterances, so understood by an external utterance, so understood] by the concept signified [by the utterance]. ...
However,
Ockham
is
as something
just
the
is
continuities
that
this
establishes,
is
between
thought and modern philosophy of mind, are entirely of one are to do, that is, with the functional role of language, mental they
sort;
s
attitudes,
and the
like.
Now
there are two sides to the philosophy of
mind; on the one hand, you have to
talk
various theoretical entities that you use. tell
analysis
that, [it
certain causal stories which describe
about the functional role of the
On
the other hand, you have to
how our
brains (or our souls)
And the work that I have just described ignores another in Ockham s theory, besides the analysis of ingredient propositions; it ignores, that is, Ockham s ontology and his physics. My claim is that it is these which give Ockham s theory some of its most actually do the
distinctive
and
stuff.
features,
and which are responsible
for
its
major
difficulties
peculiarities.
10
Evans, The Varieties of Reference pp. 215-220. Cf. Sidney Shoemaker, "SelfReference and Self-Awareness", in S. Shoemaker, Identity, Cause and Mind (Cambridge ,
1984), pp. 6-18; 1958), pp. 66-7.
19
Adams,
and Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Blackwell, Oxford
"Intuitive
Cognition in
Ockham", p.
393.
on J.
Boler,
21
"Ockham
on Evident
Cognition",
p. 86.
conceptus ponitur ut correspondeat vocibus, ut sicut aliquid intelligeretur prolata voce et concepto suo significato." Ockham, Questione in Libras Physicorum Aristotelis qu. 5, ed. Stephen Brown, Opera Philosophica VI (St. Bonaventure NY 1984), p. 405. (Cf. Ockham, Exp. Periherm. I, Proem, 4, O.Ph. II, pp. 349f.) ...
White
356
1.1
Logical Atomism
Now Ockham evident
a
to
proposition.
I
proposition was;
and immediately by
Now
as
this quaestio,
began
assent
it
(a certain sort of)
this definition is not,
have described, by defining what is assent that is caused solely
knowledge of the terms of
any particular analysis of the proposition
in
that
biased in favour of
at this stage,
question.
One
for
could,
example, very well introduce the distinction in the way that Gareth Evans does: in Evans terms, such knowledge is not identification-dependent; is not the result of knowledge that b is thus, knowledge that a is
F
F
and
a
that
firstly,
is
that
propositions
work
b\ But Evans
done
is
it
terms
in
he
from Ockham
subject-predicate 22
interested
is
differs
a
of
in;
two ways;
in
s
of
analysis
secondly, he does not
the as
talk,
23 does Ockham, of knowledge being caused by other pieces of knowledge - Evans talks, rather, of propositions being deduced from, or grounded
on, others.
However, elsewhere Ockham imports a bias intuitive
knowledge of terms (this
is,
remember,
just that
knowledge of
terms that causes evident assent to the propositions that they occur
He
defines
it
as follows:
of
definition
his
in
in).
24
knowledge of a thing is such knowledge by virtue of can be known whether the thing exists or not, in such a way that if the thing exists, the intellect always judges that it unless perhaps it is it exists and evidently Knows that exists, impeded because of an imperfection of that knowledge. And, in the same way, if a perfect such knowledge were conserved, by divine power, when the thing did not exist, by virtue of that knowledge of a term [notitia incomplexa] it would evidently be known that the thing did not exist." ...
Now
intuitive
which
it
this
is,
on
the
of
face
it,
term can occur
propositions that the
of a term a, then, according to
a
on
restriction
in;
Ockham
if
we have
s
broad
the
of
analysis
intuitive
knowledge this
definition,
should
guarantee knowledge of a whole variety of propositions with a occurring 22 23
Evans, The Varieties of Reference, pp. 180ff.
Note
that
praemissorum
Ockham est
causa
explicitly talks of efficient causality notitiae conclusionis" (Ockham, Sent.
in
this
Prol.
qu.
context; 8;
"notitia
O.Th.
I,
p.
Furthermore, he defines per se notae propositions in this way, "propositio per se nota cognoscitur ex notitia terminorum" (Sent. Prol. qu. 2, O.Th. I, p. 81), as well as ratione propositions scibilis est quod eius the idea of a knowable proposition;
222).
"de
notitia possit causari ex notitia principiorum" (ibid., p. 82).
24
Ockham,
Sent. Prol. qu.
1;
O.Th.
I,
p. 31.
Ockham and Hume s them.
in
In
actual
a
Ockham
though,
fact,
and a does not
357
Question
two
about
talks
only
25
(And, in fact, only the propositions; former applies in the normal course of events.) Let us call this Ockham s narrow definition of intuitive knowledge of a term. He adds to it (as an exists
extension? a corollary?
it is
exist
not quite clear) that
.
26
knowledge is such that, when several things are of which one inheres in the other, or one is spatially distant from the other, or is related to the other in some other way, then always, by virtue of that knowledge of terms [corresponding to] those things, it is known if the things inhere in each other or not, if they are distant from each other or not, and so on for other contingent truths ... Thus, if Socrates is, in fact, white, that knowledge of Socrates and of whiteness, by virtue of which it can evidently be known that Socrates is white, is called intuitive knowledge. And generally every knowledge of terms ... by virtue of which some contingent truth can evidently be known ... is intuitive Similarly, intuitive
known
knowledge.
Ockham
thus seems to be sliding between the narrow definition and
There are probably several reasons
the broad definition.
One
for this.
Scotus originally defined intuitive cognition by saying that
that
se
"per
existence."
This
of
existence,
27
This
is
and
one
the
attains
it
the
factor;
fact
in
object that
intuitive
was
it
own
its
is
actual
was
cognition
not simply an isolated oversight;
in Ockham, II Sent. qq. 12/13, O.Th. V, mediante qua cognoscitur res esse quando est, et non esse quando non (p. 256); and ibid.: quolibet sensu, qui habet aliquam cognitionem virtute cuius potest cognoscere rem esse quando est et non esse quando non est, est cognitio intuitiva et experimentalis. Quia ilia est cognitio intuitiva per quam sic cognosce rem esse vel non esse". (pp. 268f.) See also ibid., pp. 286f.
we
is
have:
est
intuitiva
"[cognitia]
ilia
est"
notitia
"Similiter,
una inhaeret statim
virtute si
inhaeret,
Sortes
in
omnis I,
aliqua
intuitiva
una
vel
non
veritate
sit
quod
est
distat
talis
res
quod quando aliquae
loco
ab altera vel
alio
modo
cognoscuntur quarum habet ad alteram,
se
incomplexae illarum rerum scitur si res inhaeret vel non et sic de aliis veritatibus contingentibus ... Sicut si
notitiae
vel
cognosci
notitia
cognosci
illius
distat rei
evidenter
O.Th.
alteri
"in
distat,
albus,
Sortes
incomplexa termini veritas contingens
albus,
vel ...
Sortis
notitia
ilia
est
dicitur
terminorum
est
notitia
et
albedinis
notitia ...
virtute
intuitiva."
virtute
Et
intuitiva.
cuius
Ockham,
cuius
potest Sent.
potest
universaliter
evidenter
Prol.
qu.
1,
pp. 31f.
Similarly, immediately after the passage similar analysis of the proposition
from
II
Sent,
above
cited
(n.
25),
there
is
a
this is introduced with corpus est album so it seems as if it is supposed to follow from the definition in terms of quia existence and non-existence. (Nothing of the sort is added after the second passage referred to there.) And in IV Sent. qu. 2 there is the claim that per cognitionem alicuius accidentis absoluti devenitur in O.Th. VII subiecti"; cognitionem (St. Bonaventure NY 1984), p. 23. There is no indication of whether this happens necessarily, or only in the normal course of events.
very
;
,
"...
27 Scotus,
Ockham Logic in
s
Quodl.
and
Italy in the
XXV:521. Cf. Katherine M. Tachau, "The Response to Epistemology (1320-1340)", in Alfonso Maieru (ed.), English and 15th Centuries (Naples 1982), pp. 185-217. See p. 192. Vives
13;
Aureol If"
s
White
358
designed,
Another
the
factor
is
to
which
according
the
solve
to
initially,
shape
many
of
problem
Ockham
of
semantics
s
are
propositions
of
existence.
and
ontology,
knowledge
equivalent
logically
propositions which assert that a certain relation holds between a
set
to
of
Now
this corresponds to a very important strain in Ockham s Goddu rather vigorously summarises his views, 28 reduced natural phenomena to Ockham s philosophy of nature
terms.
thought; as
...
and their functions, [and] existences expression of relations, acts, and events functionally. absolute
Now
this
is
rather problematic. For example,
the
prescribed
leads to an analysis of
it
I am happy into a proposition asserting that there is a 29 in Ockham was which inheres me; and, as we have seen, happiness in and to describe our such terms, correspondingly, quite willing to talk 5
the proposition
knowledge of our mental
states in
terms of
However, those of us
things as happinesses.
intuitive
probably find such reification disturbing. This semantic assumption, however, explains
will
so
between
easily
broad
the
and
the
interested
the
in
intuitive
was mainly interested
in
it
read Wittgenstein
how Ockham
could
slip
definitions.
Since
his
narrow
semantics treated individuals so prominently,
knowledge of such
who have
why he was so and why he
explains
knowledge of referential terms,
one particular
sort of proposition: a proposition
asserting the existence, or non-existence, of an individual. to
this
has
it
later;
to
do
with
We
narrow definition
the
return
will
of
intuitive
knowledge.
1.2
The Razor at Work
However, there
one of Ockham
is
s
objections to Scotus which seems
much more
problematic, and which has attained
Scotus
that
says 30
objects,
capacity,
28
29
Ockham and
essential
its
intuitive
its
objects to this that
30 Scotus, 552f.
(Vivs
intuitive
When
notoriety. existent,
knowledge
is
present
a mental
object (the thing the term refers to) cannot be one of
causes.
It
can therefore continue to
Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham, Above,
some
knowledge can only be of
exist
with
the
thing
p. 236.
p. 2.
Opus Oxoniense II dist. 3 pars 2 qu. 2 nn. 318-322 Ockham, Sent. Prol., O.Th. I, p. 33.
qu. 9 n. 6.) Cf.
(ed. Vaticana
1973), pp.
Ockham and Hume s we can
destroyed;
have
therefore
359
Question
intuitive
knowledge
nonexistent
of
31
objects.
Now
there are two separate things here that
may seem
problematic,
only one of which is, I think, genuinely so. The first is the very idea that we can have intuitive knowledge of nonexistent objects at all. Now if we think of this in terms of Ockham s broad definition of intuitive
knowledge,
this
knowledge
in
will
terms
lead us to give an abstract definition of intuitive
of
a
functional
but
role;
a
functional
role
is
something which is manifested when the term occurs in a range of propositions; and here this range of propositions seems to include the a does not exist Now in the normal course of events, we have intuitive knowledge of a when we stand in certain causal relations to it (when we can see it, and so on). Thus, the empirical realities of the proposition
way
that
that
we
.
we have
intuitive
knowledge rule out the semantic
could have intuitive knowledge form. However, there
this particular
about by direct divine causality that -
nonexistents
just
knowledge of what chains
apparently
we
general
could,
going on in sort
problematic
nonexistents; and
very
is
usual
of the
as
Ockham
definition
lets
of
nothing to prevent
we could have divine
by
Rome
about
and the
himself in for intuitive
it
causality,
us.
causing
component
bringing
it
knowledge of have
intuitive
there are no causal
This
is
one of the
knowledge of because he gives a simply intuitive
knowledge
of the truth
God
intuitive
(that
knowledge of some component of a proposition which evident
possibility
figured in a proposition of
Rome, even though
between things
is
when a
is,
is
that
is
it
suitable
for
of propositions containing the
knowledge and because he does not specify any particular
in question),
how this knowledge should arise. I also suspect that much about intuitive knowledge of nonexistents because
causal story about
Ockham
talks so
existence assertions are so prominent in his semantics anyway, so that
if
he wanted to establish a clear difference from Scotus, since Scotus would not have found the intuitive knowledge of existence problematic,
Ockham
had to commit himself firmly to the intuitive knowledge of nonexistence. In fact, one of the major differences between Ockham and
his
contemporaries seems to be that his contemporaries would define intuitive
and abstractive cognition case by case, in terms of such things as the presence or absence of the object; e.g. Richard Campsall says that the Sent. Prol., O.Th. I, pp. 35f. There is an extensive A. Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham, pp. 32-51.
Ockham, argument
in
treatment
of
this
White
360
same mental
when
intuitive cognition 32
is
entity
abstractive cognition
when
it is
the object
is
present,
and
absent.
However, there is something genuinely problematic about Ockham 33 position, and that is the way that he argues for it. He says:
s
... every absolute thing, different in place and subject from some other absolute thing, can, by absolute divine power, exist without the latter thing (since it does not seem likely that, if God wanted to destroy one absolute thing existing in the sky, that (s)he would necessarily have to destroy another thing existing on the earth.) But intuitive vision - sensitive or intellectual - is an absolute thing, distinct in place and subject from its object. Just as, if I see whether intuitively a star existing in the sky, that intuitive vision sensitive or intellectual - is distinct in place and subject from the object seen; therefore, that vision can remain, with the star destroyed; therefore, etc.
What
is
here
problematic
is
Ockham
that
simply
of the
thinks
vision, or, generally, the intuitive knowledge corresponding to a term, as 34
which
Ockham
talks
an absolute thing, generally,
mental
of
naturally supposit for their objects.
when
that,
of
knowledge
guarantee
A
constant.
absoluta
res
this
36
propositions
modern philosopher
-
entities
mind.
s
And Ockham seems
held
is
constant, that
it
for example,
its
Evans
of the grasp of propositional components in the
that
Ockham
32
is,
Katherine M. Tachau,
Oxford
Thought",
in
is
"The
in)
who
-
same
is is
of Richard
(to
held
willing to
of
way
same
sort
Campsall on Fourteenth-Century
(eds.), From 1987), p. 112.
Anne Hudson, Michael Wilks
Studies in Church History, Subsidia 5 (Blackwcll, Oxford
role also
sort
willing to talk of certainty in the
Influence
assume
to just
functional
occurs
talk
and who
35
And, more which ("intellectiones")
located in the knower
is
Ockham
to
Wyclif;
1
res absoluta, distincta loco et subiecto ab alia re absoluta, potest per "...omnis divinam potentiam absolutam existere sine ilia, quia non videtur verisimile quod si Deus vult destruere unam rem absolutam exsistentem in caelo quod necessitetur destruere unam aliam rem exsistentem in terra. Sed visio intuitiva, tarn sensitiva quam intellective, est res absoluta, distincta loco et subiecto ab obiecto. Sicut si videam
exsistentem in caelo, ilia visio intuitiva, sive sit sensitiva sive manere distinguitur loco et subiecto ab obiecto viso; igitur ista visio potest
stellam
intuitive
intellectiva,
Stella destructa; igitur
34 35
Cf.
etc."
Ockham,
Sent. Pro/, qu.
1,
O.Th.
A. Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham, pp.
I,
pp. 38f.
30f.
One
be careful, however, to notice that, for Ockham, something should intellectual does not per se have a physical location; it is "subiective in intellectu, non extensive in aliquo composite sive organo corporali" (II Sent. qq. 12/13, O.Th. V, p. est in loco, quia corpus est in loco" 285). Correspondingly, "Anima enim per accidensh O.Ph. V, p. 100). (Expositio in Libros Physicorum IV cap. 8 3, t. 45 212 7-13, 36 sicut vox ita 411: O.Ph. VI, p. Ockham, Quaestiones physicorum qu. 7, naturaliter pro supponit ex institutione pro suo significato, ita ista intellectio supponit "Et
re cuius
est."
Ockham and Hume s would probably be much more
of way,
knowledge
components would
prepositional
-
reticent about talking of intuitive
In fact, such an intuitive grasp of
a thing in this sense.
as
361
Question
normal case
the
in
-
involve
the
functioning of suitable causal chains from the object to the knower, and if
the object, or the causal chains
Such an
also go.
This
head.
Fontaines.
1.2.1
"intuitive
grasp",
is
someone
not really located in
made by Godfrey
already
s
of
37
Action at a Distance
However, we should notice
Ockham
explanation in believed
action
in
propagation of
medium 39
-
lynxes
e.g.
then,
objection which was
an
is
were destroyed, then the grasp would
means of
s
-
light
41
in
this
is
he
that
connection
the
in the
Now when Ockham fulfills
of
Rega Wood,
In this connection, one can even talk of
of a distant object, brought about by divine power, and
me and
without anything caused between
Century
cited
which does not happen by means of species
action at a distance.
cognitions
he
distance;
a strong element of causal
still
of the crucial factors
and the action of magnets. 40 Furthermore, certain animalcan see through walls, and this too is to be explained by
intuitive vision
which
is
One 38
a
at
that there
theory.
a
certain
the
of
in
42
of a notitia intuitiva,
functional
existence
"Intuitive
Perspective",
talks
the object.
the
role:
namely,
when
object
it
Cognition and Divine Omnipotence:
Anne Hudson, Michael Wilks
(eds.),
this it
is
something
causes
and of
exists,
Ockham
evident
in
its
Fourteenth-
From Ockham
to
Wyclif,
pp. 51-61.
38
Ockham,
III Sent.
qu.
2,
O.Th. VI
(St.
Bonaventure
NY
1982), pp. 48-58.
-JO
Although sometimes the light source causes illumination of the medium: aliquando causatur aliquid a colore in medio, sicut prius dictum est ... Sed quando est et quando non, difficile est dare experientiam in visu..." Ockham, III Sent. qu. 2, O.Th. "...
VI, p. 81.
Tertia experientia est de magnete, qui secundum Commentatorem, commento ferrum distans ab eo localiter: trahit, dico, immediate et non virtute aliqua medio vel in ferro." Ockham, III Sent. qu. 2, O.Th. VI, p. 53. trahit
aliquod
"...
murum, 2,
et
O.Th. VI,
illud
animal videt per
medium non
medium opacem,
recipit
sicut
speciem aliquam,
patet
igitur
9,
in
de lynce qui videt per
etc."
Ockham,
III
Sent.
qu.
p. 81.
objectum distans ab angelo et a me potest intuitive videri ab angelo et a me, per potentiam divinam objectum nihil causet in medio, nee speciem nee cognitionem." Ockham, III Sent. qu. 2, O.Th. VI, pp. 55f. "...
etiam
si
White
362
when
noncxistencc
be told
to
it
does not
each case:
in
exist.
"the
And
there are relevant causal stories
judgment of existence
is
caused by the
cognition together with the object, while the judgment of nonexistence
is
43
caused by the cognition in the absence of its object." Thus, we have an which fulfills a certain functional and a causal role, entity story about how it does it; the difference from the modern theory is this, that
nowadays one talks about information propagating through the physical environment by means of physical processes, whereas Ockham talked of things acting directly at a distance.
Now
one asked him why this intuitive cognition was a cognition 44 And object, he would have a story about similitude to tell.
of this
Ockham
if
about representation quite generally
talks
in
terms of similitude;
Ockham
example, representation is transitive because similitude is. had clearly not read Nelson Goodman. And since, quite for
causation
of
is
46
like
by
like,
as
is
this
representation,
generally,
brings
the
semantic and causal categories very close to one another, in Ockham s view. Tfms he can talk of knowledge of the premises of an argument being the efficient cause of the knowledge of the conclusion, he can talk first principles as being those propositions knowledge of whose terms causes assent to the proposition, and of a demonstration being the cause of assent to its conclusion (so that one cannot demonstrate
of the
principles;
2.
one already assents
to
them when one knows
their terms.)
Hume now
Let us
think about
Hume. Why was Hume
a sceptic? Well, he
project of basing a philosophical methodology upon a
and such a science of of
associative
Rcga Wood, 44 "...
anima
sensitivam
utraque
est
relations
"Intuitive
est
by which the
45
46
man",
Cognition and Divine
mind constructed thoughts and
Omnipotence", pp. 51-61.
per cognitionem omnium. Nam per cogmtionem per cognitionem intellectivam omnia intelligibilia. Et
est
sensibilia ita
et
perfecta
similitudo
obiecti
Ockham, II Sent. qq. 12/13, O.Th. V, p. of Later Medical Philosophy (Cambridge
Campsall", p.
had a
have, as a major component, a theory
ligibilis]."
History
of
quoddammodo omnia
omnia
cognitio
man would
"science
121.
Ockham,
II
Sent. qq. 12/13,
O.Th. V,
p. 304.
Ockham,
II
Sent. qq. 12/13,
O.Th. V,
p.
287 f.
et perfectio quam species [intel309. Cf. M. Adams, in the Cambridge
1982),
p.
439;
K.M. Tachau,
"Richard
Ockham and Hume s theories out of the ideas presented to
was constructed
man"
in the
way
363
Question 47
it.
And, because
his
"science
of
was, he thought he had a grasp of
it
mechanisms underlying the functioning of the mind which (although not complete) was enough to undermine the usual views of common sense. Thus, one s causal theory of the mind has to have a the
causal
certain sort of their
pursue
autonomy
for
one
be a Humean; causal explanations the world, and do not satisfy the to
own way through
requirements of grounding propositions.
Not so they do not
seem
be
to
for
Ockham. Although he does
seem
postulated
in
order
semantic facts he has discovered. very interested in
And
because of
talk of causal
to figure in his theory in their
"the
physics,
He
to
implement
own
mechanisms,
right;
whatever
they mostly interesting
does not, as Tachau remarks, seem
psychology, or mathematics of
this disinterest,
48 vision".
even though he assumed a rather naive
psychological parallelism, the causal mechanisms that he proposed were so flexible
that
he
ended
Wittgenstinian malgre is
lui\
up
as
what
one
can
only
describe
the significant factor in his philosophy of
as
a
mind
given by the prepositional and semantic component, not by the causal
mechanisms.
Clare Hall, Cambridge
Cf.
J.
Passmore,
Tachau,
Hume s Intentions (London
"Response",
p. 198.
1980), p. 106.
JOHN
Thomas
WIPPEL
F.
of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future Contingents
(Quodlibet
While the date of Thomas Sutton
comes some time
clearly
comes
after
after the criticism of
Moreover, Sutton with
Henry
would suggest
s
s
theory
.
death
Aquinas
treatment of
Ghent
of
qu 5)
Quodlibet
s
the
of future contingents by William of
II,
s
of
intention
Sutton
s
is
still
uncertain,
Thomas Aquinas.
it
also
It
views concerning divine knowledge
Mare
la
this issue
in the latter s
Correctoriwn
presupposes that he
of essential
is
.
familiar
being (esse essentiae). This
that Sutton s Quodlibet should date
1280s, or as other indications suggest,
the
II
in
some time from
the
1290s.
1
It
is
within
not
my
here to attempt to settle the question of the exact dating of Quodlibet, but rather to turn to him as one representative of the
English Dominican school who was strongly influenced by the views of Thomas Aquinas. This should be useful in enabling us to determine of future divine knowledge s of and Aquinas position. understanding application As regards Aquinas s position, medieval, renaissance, and twentiethcentury interpreters have differed with respect to one issue in particular.
Sutton
s
contingents, and
Qn
Aquinas
I -"or
views
personal
s
detailed
concerning
his
by reason of their eternal presence to
account,
is
it
discussion
of
conflicting
opinions
concerning
the
dating
of
God
Sutton
s
two quodlibets see the Introduction to M. Schmaus s edition of Sutton s Quodlibeta (Munich, 1969), pp. xvi-xxii (as early as 1284-1285 or as late as the mid-1290s). Schmaus s remark that Sutton s Quodlibet I, qu. 14 is refuted by Godfrey of Fontaines first
Quodlibet VII, qu. 9 (of 1290, or possibly 1291/1292, as I have suggested elsewhere) is need not be to highly questionable, it seems to me. The alleged reference by Godfrey Sutton. But Schmaus is correct in noting how difficult it is to arrive at any exact of these dating for these first two Quodlibets, and in his acknowledgment that any proposed datings seems to be too early if Sutton only became a Master in Theology in 1299/1300 (see p. xix, commenting on Gloricux). For a strong defense of an early see F. dating for Sutton s becoming a Master and for Quodlibet I, i.e., 1284 or before, Kellcy,
Introduction
Aristotelis
1976),
De
1-31.
pp.
For
SchneyJer^ Introduction pp. 44 .57 .
Thomae Aquinatis in Libros edition of Expositionis D. de Sutona (Munich, corruptions. Continuatio per Thomam reaction to this and defense of a later dating see J. critical
to
his
generatione
et
to
his
ed.
of Sutton
s
Quaestiones
Ordinariae
(Munich,
1977),
Thomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future he knows future contingents? Or
that
awareness of the eternal decrees of that
is
365
Contingents
God
rather by reason of
it
s
concerning such contingents
his will
he knows them? 2 In Quodlibet
II,
qu. 5, the following question
Did God have from
was posed
aetemo) certain knowledge of future
eternity (ab
contingents insofar as they are contingents?
3
Sutton comments that the
question has been properly phrased since the reduplication they are
-
contingents"
would pose only by fact that
little
God
is
-
"insofar
as
Without the reduplication, the question is contingent can be known not
crucial.
difficulty;
even what
but by us once
you are now
for Sutton:
has been realized in actuality. Thus the
it
Even
anyone here can be once such a contingent Hence, not undetermined but necessary in the
sitting is contingent.
so,
certain of this simply by using his eyes.
event
is
realized in actuality,
one
sense that while
When
is
it
is
sitting,
it
is
necessary for him to be
sitting.
viewed as future and as contingent, however, it is not something yet determined to one side or the other. Therefore, when it is so viewed, it cannot be known with certainty. Hence it seems to remain in doubt is
whether even
God
can know such a contingent as contingent.
It
is
clear,
continues Sutton, that no created intellect can do so; for then
it
could
only
know such
a contingent as
it
exists in its causes.
And
these causes
4
may be impeded from producing their effect. Sutton now begins to develop his reply by
God knows But God knows God s knowledge is
arguing that
all future contingents insofar as they are in their causes.
them with
certainty
measured by
and from
eternity. This
is
because
But eternity is iota simul and nonetheless contains the whole of time. Therefore all things which are in eternity just as
is
his being.
time or in any part of time are always present to God, and were so present from eternity.
2
For
Hence Sutton reasons
that the divine vision bears
recent interpreters of Aquinas concerning this see J. Dei futurorum contingentium secundum S. Thomam eiusque primos sequaces (Krakow, 1938), pp. 7-10. For this in classical commentators on Thomas see F. Schmitt, Die Lehre des hi. Thomas von Aquin vom gottlichen Wissen des Zukunftig Kontingenten bet seinen grossen Kommentatoren (Nijmegen, 1950), especially pp. 196-202. differences
Groblicki,
De
among
scientia
Schmaus ed., p. 202. "...utrum deus ab aeterno futurorum contingentium, secundum quod contingentia sunt." 4
Ed.
cit.,
pp. 202-03.
habuit
certam
cognitionem
366
Wippcl
such things from eternity (ab aeterno) even though they take 5 place only in the course of time. Moreover, Sutton continues, it is not only the essences of such all
upon
known by God from eternity when such a contingent exists even Therefore,
things but their actual existences which are as
present in
only
God its
s
himself.
to
its
its
cause,
coming in
knowledge and,
when
cause as
future
it
time.
This
is
when
contingent himself.
6
because
In
it
is
support
cause
its
as present before
is
actually does
the is
future for us as
upon
Sutton
comes
it
present forth
same degree of
bears
of this
still
to
from
turns
certainty
actually realized in itself in
God s knowledge
still
is
Hence, argues Sutton, any such
so.
future in itself as
still
is
fact,
from
known by God with when it
is
contingent
when
it
forth
to
upon any such future that
the
which
well
is
present to
known view
of
Boethius as set forth in his Consolation of Philosophy, V. This follows, Sutton continues, because for
Then Sutton present to
God from
God
there
is
no past or
warning. Even though
a
issues
eternity in
future. all
things
have been
terms of their actual existence,
it
does
not follow from this that they have actually existed in themselves from 8
of la
reminded of an objection raised by William Mare against the position of Thomas Aquinas, and of Henry of
Ghent
s
Here the reader
eternity.
effort to avoid
the objection
is
this:
is
being driven to if
this
same
conclusion.
The
point of
things are eternally present to God, they must
9 have actually existed from eternity. Sutton counters that for something to be said to be present to God s knowledge from eternity, it is enough
5 Ibid.,
p.
quacumque 6
203.
See
parte eius,
especially:
"...et
ideo
semper sunt deo praesentia
omnia, quae sunt in toto et ab aeterno fuerunt...."
tempore
vel
Ed.cit., pp. 203-04.
^
For Boethius see The Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy, by H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand, S.J. Tester (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), Bk V, 6, p. 426:77-80, 61-66. Sutton also cites Augustine. See De ch itate Dei XI, c. 21 (CSEL 40.1, p. 541). 8
Ed.
cit.,
p. 205.
See William s criticism of Aquinas s ST I, q. 14, a. 13 in his Correctorium. See ed. by P. Glorieux Les premieres polemiques thomistes: I. - Le Correctorium Quare (Le Saulchoir, Kain, Belgium, 1927), p. 18. While the date of this work has been disputed for some time, the general consensus now is that it falls ca. 1278-1279. See R. Wielockx, ,
IILI. Apologia (Florence, 1985), p. 39, n. 68, for the and especially V. Heynck, "Zur Datierung des Correctorium Wilhelms de la Mare," Franziskanische Studien 49 (1967), pp. 1-21. For fratris Thomae Henry see Quodlibet VIII, qu. 2 (Paris, 1518), fol. 303v. For discussion see my Meta 267-70. physical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C., 1984), pp.
Aegidii
Romani opera omnia
important
references,
Tfiomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future Contingents for
it
God
to enjoy actual existence at any point in time. This
s
to
present
future.
support from
embraces
It
other texts in
existence in
existing
in
This
itself.
when viewed
future
in
that
something
God from
is
it
one
that
it
Henry
defend in meeting William s challenge. As Sutton continues, something its
when
existence
present exceeds
the
as
owing
divine
to the
To
warning.
now
does not
time. This
actually
distinguish
essence
immensity of
possibles
that to say its
existence
enjoys actual existence from
of
la
Mare
in his critique
Ghent had attempted
to
may be
present to
God
in
terms of
actually exist in itself; for the divine that the divine present contains both
exists
and that
in
which
it
does not,
a
proper likeness for all creatures 12 But now Sutton introduces a perfection.
itself its
of pure
11
means
which the contingent
that time in just
all
it
to
eternity in terms of
eternity. This point was not granted by William of
of Aquinas, though
Sutton
Thus Sutton can hold
not the same as to say that
is
(esse)
enable
God s knowledge
and
in actuality.
present to
is
should
as
of any contingent, whether past or present or
itself,
which are never realized
God
be viewed by
not
precision
God s knowledge
between
finds
1
helpful point. If something never enjoys
will
it
itself,
Once more Sutton
Consolation.
s
so because
is
from past through
transition
of time.
all
Boethius
Here Sutton has made a actual
no
eternal and admits of
is
present
367
hold that things are
is
known by God from
eternity because
they are eternally present to him should not be taken as implying that
from eternity they are what they are through their own essences as distinct from the divine essence and as realized in some way outside God. This would be contrary to the faith which maintains that thing (res)
from
Sutton essential
Sutton to
nature, 10
12 13
refers to
what
I
existential
i.e.,
Ed.
cit.,
See
n.
an
p. 205.
is
true
Pp. 205-06.
we
is
a
intrinsic
theory of hold that Henry, might
i.e.,
limit the
name
"thing"
s
(res)
to that
which enjoys or is a of It would be contrary to principle operation.
being belongs,
or
See Boethius, Consolation V, 6
9 above. For Sutton see p. 205.
Ibid.
if
Henry of Ghent
take to be
being (esse essentiae). Someone,
which
alone
eternity.
now
previous denial
s
God
13
to
that
(p. 432).
368
Wippcl hold that any such
to
faith
from God. 14 But
if
divine
or
intellect,
by
"thing"
we
"thing"
mean
be such things from
God
it
is
not opposed to faith for essences to
One
might even argue that it is necessary to be things in this sense from eternity. And
eternity.
for essences other than
that
thereby
impossible, one might hold that
such things might also be said to be outside the expression
from eternity in distinction mind an object of the which is not intrinsically
existed
rather have in
God from
eternity
if
we
take
in the negative sense,
meaning thereby that such things are not God. Defenders of this view, i.e. Henry, would not claim that such things exist outside God in the subjective sense from "outside
God"
15
eternity.
other words, Sutton
In
is
presenting in his
own way Henry s view
because the essences of things arc objects of God s knowledge from eternity and thereby constituted as intrinsically possible in themselves, that
may
they often
put
also it,
be called
one
may
"things"
(res)
accordingly
from
ascribe
eternity.
an
As Henry would
eternal
esse
essentiae
Yet, Henry would always insist, this is not to (essential being) say that they actually exist in themselves from eternity. Existence comes to them only in the course of time owing to the added intervention of to them.
the divine will, to them.
when
it
communicates
existential being (esse existenliae)
16
Sutton will have no part of this theory. But, like Henry, he has defended the eternal presence of contingents to God s knowledge against the
by William of la Mare that this entails admitting But now he quickly distances himself from theory of an eternal essential being (esse essentiae) which the
charge
raised
eternally existing creatures.
Henry s P. 206.
Ibid. For discussions of Henry s complicated theory see J. Paulus, Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa metaphysique (Paris, 1938), pp. 69-74, 123-25; J. Gomez Caffarena, Ser participado y ser subsistente en la mctafisica de Enrique de Gante (Rome, 1958), pp. 65-92; J. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines (Washington, D.C., 1981), pp. 66-79; "Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines on the Reality of Nonexisting Possibles," in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, pp. 173-80; S. Marrone, Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 104-29.
On my (as distinguished from Godfrey s) reading of Henry, he assigns an eternal real (but not actual) being to possibles or essences insofar as they are objects of God s eternal knowledge. Marrone (pp. 122, 123, and n. 83, and 124-29) seems to overlook this distinction in my reading; hence the need for me to state it explicitly here.
Thomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future
And
Master from Ghent assigns to such possible creatures.
Henry
appreciates
that
such a theory
is
Sutton clearly
taken from
as
res
reor,
one
if
required
to
is
not merely
fact that nonexisting possibles are truly res,
account for the
chimerae (or
claim
s
369
Contingents
but genuine essences and
reris),
1
objects of knowledge (res as taken from ratitudine.}.^ Sutton begins his criticism of this part of
observing that in this case poison
from
the
eternity
intellect.
But
intellect
it
it
were
objects
does not follow that whenever something
also
is
hidden under honey.
creatures
of
essences
is
Henry
a thing
especially
(res),
when
s
by
position
He
grants that
of
the
is
the latter
divine
an object of is taken in
Henry s strict sense. For something can be understood by human intellects even when it does not exist. For instance, today I can understand yesterday even though yesterday
is
not
now
a thing
(res). If
the fact that
something is known suffices for it to be called a res, it would follow from the fact that I understand yesterday here and now that yesterday is 18 here and now a res, and, adds Sutton, an actually existing thing. In
like
fashion,
continues
Sutton,
God knew
all
creatures
from
eternity, not merely in terms of their essences but also in terms of their
actual existences.
enough
for us to regard
existed,
for the sake of discussion
them
as things (res).
they were understood by
that
fact
Suppose
such creatures were understood by
the fact that
which now
exist,
God
It will
that
or which ever will
all
we
Henry
grant
God from
that
eternity
also follow
is
from the
creatures which have
exist
must have enjoyed
actual existence from eternity. Sutton rejects this conclusion. Therefore
he also rejects the claim that whatever
is
an object of
intellect
must
also
19
be a
thing.
Sutton
from
counters
eternity
and
that that
the
they
essences
were
of
not
creatures
essences
were not things from
In
eternity.
themselves from eternity they were simply nothing. Otherwise they would not have been created by God in the course of time; for creation is
production ex nihilo. But if they were nothing from eternity, they were not for nothing means the same as thing" (nulla res). This "no
"things";
For a good presentation of 18
this distinction in
Henry see Marrone,
pp. 108-13.
Ed.cit., pp. 206-07.
19
P. 207. Henry, of course, would not admit that, simply because a creature thing (res) in the sense of enjoying essential being, it therefore enjoys actual existence.
is
a
370
Wippel
objection
creation
concerning
was frequently
others, for instance, by Godfrey of Fontaines.
Nor, continues Sutton, does the mere
something to
for it
be realized
raised
fact that
it
as a thing (res). In other words, intrinsic possibility
technical sense.
not repugnant
is
in actual existence suffice for
us to describe something as a
when
"thing"
Here Sutton appears
Henry by
against
20
is
us to refer to
not enough for
term
is taken in Henry s mind Henry s claim that
that
to have in
something is not contradictory in itself, i.e., if it is be a res. Against possible, it must enjoy essential being and
if
counters that such a possible
still
is
of the soul of the Antichrist.
true
nothing
21
in
his
(In
itself,
own
intrinsically this
much
as
Sutton is
now
discussion of divine
2, Henry had contingents 22 of the the issue to attention considerable devoted Antichrist.)
knowledge
Sutton is
in
of future
insists
not enough for
Quodlibet VIII, qu.
that the fact that it
to
be a
thing.
something
He
they have actually existed
recall that, as
to say that
God
(extra Deutri) amounts to from eternity. 23 Here we should
essences were things from eternity outside saying that
the object of an idea
is
repeats his criticism:
Sutton had earlier presented Henry
s
position,
Henry does
not admit that essences were things from eternity and outside God sense, i.e., as existing apart from God. They are "subjective"
in the
"outside"
God
in
the
in
not
are
that
God. Sutton
they negative sense, only apparently regards this distinction as a subterfuge: to say that essences other than God were things from eternity and outside God in the negative
20
For Godfrey see Quodlibet VIII, qu. 3 (1292/1293 by my dating). If he things he has created in the same way he knows things he is to create, must know their existence as well as their essential being from eternity. Hence Henry should grant the eternity of all things, past, present, and future, both as regards their essence and existence (Les Philosophes Beiges, Vol. 4, p. 37). Moreover, Godfrey argues P.
207.
God knows
Henry s view really implies God, they are not thereby created
that
that
when
(p. 45).
creatures
receive
existential
See Quodlibet IX, qu. 2
(p.
190),
being
and
from
my The
Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey, pp. 136, 140. 21 Ed. cit., p. 207. For other texts from Henry see, for instance, Quodlibet III, 9 (Macken ed., pp. 53-55); Quodlibet IX, qq. 1-2 q. 1 (f. 61r, bottom); Quodlibet I, q. (Macken ed., pp. 7-8, 22-23, 34-37); Quodlibet X, q. 7 (Macken ed., pp. 151-52); Summa
quaestionum Ordinariarum, 22 23
See Quodlibet VIII, qu. P. 207.
a. 28, q.
2, ff.
4 (Paris, 1520), Vol.
301v-302v.
1, fol
167v.
Thomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future sense
is
ho-d they existed outside
to
really
sense, that
"subjective"
is,
in
that they actually existed apart
sums up by
Sutton
God
the
and
stronger
from God. 24
from eternity
that
stating
371
Contingents
God had
certain
knowledge of future contingents insofar as they are contingents; but from eternity. 25
such contingents did not enjoy the status of In assessing Sutton s position, which
"things"
we
should
Sutton
that
recall
grounds
contingents on the eternal mode of God
s
taken largely from Aquinas,
is
God
knowledge of future knowledge and therefore on the s
eternal presence of such contingents to God. There is no indication that Sutton would account for this by appealing to God s knowledge of the
decrees of his
will,
Sutton
therefore,
as
Henry of Ghent ends by
appears
me
to
be
to
an
doing.
accurate
On
this
point,
interpreter
of
Aquinas.
to
On the other hand, Sutton states that God in terms of their actual existence,
eternal existence in themselves. First of
God
his
were eternally present
terminology could be misleading.
as did Aquinas, Sutton speaks of things as being present to
all,
"from
Here
things
without their having enjoyed
eternity"
(ab aeterno}. This could give the mistaken impression
27 In fact temporal succession. both Sutton and Aquinas would deny this. Secondly, for Sutton to say that things were eternally present to God is misleading. It would be
that he regards eternity itself as subject to
better for
him
to say that they are eternally present to
Sutton
Finally,
Cf.
p.
the
rejects
God
presence of creatures to
claim
as their
that
God. 28
admission
knower
entails
of
the
ascribing eternal
For Sutton s rejection of a third esse between being extra intellectum see Quaest. Ord. 26 (Schneider ed., p. 725).
206.
and ens naturae
eternal
in
the
mind
dicendum quod ab aeterno deus habuit certain cognitionem futurorum contingentium secundum quod contingentia, quae tamen non fuerunt res ab aeterno" (p. "Et
207).
See the references given reading of Aquinas see
in
n.
2
above.
my Metaphysical Themes,
For
justification
of this
as
the
correct
pp. 244-64.
For Thomas see ST I, q. 14, a. 13: "Unde omnia quae sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt: sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate" (Marietti ed., Turin-Rome, 1950, pp. 86-87). For discussion see my Metaphysical Themes, 28 Perhaps Sutton
p. 268, n. 82.
s usage was partly determined by the way the question was framed (see n. 3 above). But for other texts where he uses similar language see p. 205:73-74; and the concluding text cited above in n. 25.
372
Wippel
(actual) existence to them. In
making this point, he is in agreement with Henry of Ghent. But Sutton has distanced himself from Henry s theory of an eternal essential being which would be enjoyed by all possibles insofar as they are eternally objects of
God s
The Catholic University of America
knowledge.
REGA WOOD
Calculating Grace:
The Debate about
Latitude of Forms
According to Adam de
Most
today believe
Christians
the
that
and
Scholastics
Wodeham
nature
of
is
grace
veiled
in
achieved
sought greater precision. They determined that grace was an accident not a subject. They asked: to which of the nine categories of accidents, described by Aristotle in his mystery.
was
a
to which of the four species of quality does
it
does
Categories,
inquired:
it
belong?
Concluding
that
it
quality,
they
belong? They
belonged to the first species; it was a habit or disposition. And since any such quality is subject to increase and decrease, they felt obliged to ask how grace increased or decreased. The intensification and decided that
remission
it
of
was
grace
one
of
most
the
hotly
debated
theological
questions in fourteenth century Oxford.
At the same
time, increasing and decreasing forms, like grace,
a subject of intense controversy
among
were
natural philosophers. Although
masters of arts were forbidden to discuss theological questions, most fourteenth century philosophers and theologians assumed that degrees of charity were gained or lost in exactly the same way heat was intensified or
Whether spiritual or physical, any quality which was and subject to change by degree was considered a form with Arguments about latitude of forms dealt with continua and the
diminished.
divisible latitude.
1
nature of gradual change.
Many
of the
same
issues raised in discussion of
the intensification of charity were also topics in the discussion of time
and motion. 2 Hence fourteenth century theology on degrees of charity Chatton, Reportatio,
I,
d.
17,
q.
2,
a.
1,
cod.
Paris.
Bibl.
Nat.
lat.
15,887, fol. 48rb:
subiectum sub calore corrumpendo, et ille non est indivisibilis, cum sit eiusdem rationis cum praecedente, et per consequens habeat latitudinem, ergo adhuc restat pars corrumpenda post istud instans ... Si in illo instanti est sub frigore, idem argumentum est, quia illud non est indivisible sed habet latitudinem." "Si
2
in
instanti
Wodeham,
[alteratione,
illo
Tractatus
motu
indivisibilibus,
est
et
quaest.
1,
50 omnibus his cap. (Continuum): "[D]e par ratio sicut de continue." fol. 139va); Tractatus de quaest. 3, dub. 4: "(Djifficultas est aequalis de omnibus
alphabeticus,
tempore] art.
1;
est
Wood
374
was
scientific
not just
also in the sense that
it
sense that
the
in
was a
was
it
logically
but
rigorous,
topic in natural science: latitude of forms.
Edith Sylla discusses the debate about latitude of forms among the 3 Oxford Mertonians from about 1320 to 1337. Sylla describes three positions:
(1)
and
the
(3)
succession of forms theory (2) the admixture theory
the
addition
intensification of
theory.
The
succession
theory
describes
the
forms as a series of instantaneous changes. The addition
theory describes a gradual change over time as infinitesimal parts are gained or lost. Sylla considers Walter Burley as a proponent of the succession
admixture
the
represented by Roger Swineshead, and the addition theory by John Dumbleton and Richard theory;
is
theory
Swineshead.
The English Franciscan
theologian,
Adam Wodeham
discusses Oxford
opinions on the subject of latitude of form, in the period 1316-1329, in his Tractatus alphabeticus,
dated about 1333.
4
Thus Wodeham was writing
about a period that overlaps with the earlier period Sylla has described for the Mertonians. Wodeham was chiefly concerned with the views of
Wodeham
and
5
Ockham,
Fitzralph.
Fitzralph,
and
himself are addition theorists. Chatton adheres to an admixture
identified
theory,
Chatton
Ockham,
Campsall,
by
Wodeham
Thomas Aquinas. 6 Campsall
as
held a
a
"modern
associated
theory"
new theory according
to
with
Wodeham,
compositis divisibilibus, sivc intensive sive extensive ... [et] apud me ilia quae inducunt difficultatem [in] inquisito, omnia inducunt difficultatem circa continuum, licet non e converse."
et
...
"Et
nota quod omnia haec duhia aequaliter possunt fieri in augmentatione sicut de continue." (ed. R. Wood, Dordrecht, 1988, pp. 34, 180).
decremento formarum
of dating Burley s works, it is not clear exactly what the difficulty under discussion. But Weisheipl dates Burley s Tractatus primus, 1320 to 1327. Roger Swineshead wrote his Descriptiones motuum between 1328 and 1337. See James Weisheipl, "Ockham and Some Mertonians," Mediac\>al Studies 30 (1968), p. 185, 1%, 212 and Sylla, "Medieval Concepts of the Latitude of Forms," Archives d histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen age 40 (1973), p. 240n.
Given
period
4
is
Codex
Re
Erfurt, Stadtsbibliothek,
CampsalPs
Wyclif, ed.
see
dates,
Amplon., Folio 133,
Tachau,
A. Hudson and M. Wilks,
p.
134ra-145va.
fol.
"Richard
K.,
Campsall,"
in
From
Ockham
to
HOn.
Tractatus alphabeticus, cap. 2 (Aciio maxime reperitur in qualitate): contra hoc et pro ista conclusione arguitur et contra argumentum Thomae, I Sent. d. 17, q. 2, art. 2, cuius est opinio quod calor remissus per <prima parte Summae
Wodeham,
"Sed
E>,
approximationem agentis modernos eadem res ut esse, est
A
calor."
great
(fol.
many
fit
est
postea intensus, nulla (!) sibi addito, ita quod secundum transmutatione est latitudo quaedam, ut autem in quieto
in
134ra).
theories
were
theories. Quaest. in III Sent., q. 8
current.
(OTh
Ockham
list
four
kinds
of
addition
VI, 220s.). Aureol describes six possible opinions
Calculating Grace: Adam de
one which we
will
succession of forms
is
In this paper
I
call
connotation
a
Wodeham
theory.
No
375
of
proponent
the
named. 8 will discuss three issues in the
theory of latitude of
Do
forms undergo intension and remission? (2) How are intensified? and (3) Are maximal degrees in the intensity of qualities forms possible? I will be chiefly concerned with the views presented by forms:
(1)
Adam Wodeham
by reference to the views discussed by another fourteenth Walter Chatton, and by Edith Sylla. The least
amplified
century
but the discussion will be
in his Tractatus alphabeticus,
Franciscan,
controversial of these issues for fourteenth century philosophers
1.
is first:
Do forms undergo intension and remission?
Addition and succession of forms theorists agree on this issue; in no sense is it true that the same form undergoes remission or intension.
For the simultaneous existence of contrary forms in exactly the same subject is impossible. Ockham and Wodeham held that strictly speaking it is the subject, not the form, which becomes more white, more hot or
more
charitable.
added
of intensification, parts are
case
same form which was remiss does not become new form appears in which the additional parts are and the new form is more intense than the previous form
As Anneliese Maier
succession
like
the
in
though
Rather, a
incorporated, 10
And
to the form, the
intense.
was.
9
succession of
theorists,
new
forms.
pointed out, this means that addition theorists,
hold
They
on augmentation. Scriptum super 1 Sent.,
that
intensification
differ only in
dist. 17,
pars 17,
is
the
result
of
a
claiming that the parts of
a. 1
(ed.
Romae 15%,
427-35).
Q
Scotus,
and
Ockham
Scotus, Ordinatio, I Sent., dist. 17, q. 5
loquendo de ipsa
fit
Non quod ideo
talis
plures
1
vi
si
intensior,
this
2,
q.
(ed.
non vel
(OTh
III,
de quantitate
extensiva."
(OTh
Ockham, Scriptum
in
V, 418s.).
481ss.).
<
lectio
dubia>
"Ultra dico (Augmentatio): quod etiam et remitti. Sed auctores hoc errant, quod additur formae alia forma, ex qua
subtrahitur aliqua
pars ut
forma remissior
numero primo sit intensa forma habet veram latitudinem intensivam realiter
Godfrey of Fontaines.
15 alphabeticus, cap. nulla forma potest intendi,
aliqua una forma
partes
view to
Vaticana, V, 234ss.).
pars
485); Quaest. in II Sent., q. 19
in I Sent., dist. 17, q. 4
vocis,
attribute
III,
Tractatus
dicentes intendunt, et
him,
17,
(OTh
Ockham, Scriptum
Wodeham,
d.
I,
following
distinctas (fol.
constituentes earn
135rb).
sit
quam
praefuit.
et post remissa vel e converse. vel gradualem, quia habet in
[ut]
qualitatem,
sicut
suo
modo
Et se est
Wood
376
11
the old form are not destroyed in the process. at
stake
lower
whether there
is
is
As
Sylla puts
it
"What
is
within the higher degree a part equal to the
12 degree."
Chatton subject
too
agrees
that
undergoes
statement forma suscepit magis
speaking
strictly
and
intension
et
remission.
minus
not
the
form
but
its
13
Strictly
the
speaking
is false.
Wodeham
is expressing a common view when he argues that properly dearness cannot be increased, because no underlying, constant speaking 14 subject remains. According to Wodeham, when we say that the dearness
increases, this
greater than
more and
it
less.
parts of the
means
same dearness
that the
that formerly existed
is
now
formerly was. But one and the same thing cannot be both 15
However, according
same form can be added
to
proponents of the addition theory, which were
to the parts of dearness
and the new parts together with the old parts make which the form inheres more dear. And wherever there
originally present,
the substance in
genuine latitude of form, it must be possible to add and subtract parts of that form to an underlying substance. When Peter become dearer, his is
former
dearness
is
not
really
intensified.
Rather
additional
parts
of
dearness reach him and combine with the preexisting form to produce a
Annclicsc Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie, zur Naturphilosophie dcr Spatseholastik II (Rome, 2nd cd., 1951), p. 54.
Studien
"
Sylla, "Medieval Concepts," p. 231s.
est hie una opinio quod non est Chatton, Reportatio, I, d. 17, q. 3, a. 4: dicendum quod forma suscipiat magis et minus Contra. Unde calorem suscipere magis et minus non est nisi subiectum suum esse calidius. Sed tamen ad hoc bene requiritur quod forma sit maior vel perfection Et si hoc intendebant quidam dicentes "Et
...
istam augmentationem
fieri
Norman Kretzmann
per inesse subiecto, discusses
a
similar
bene."
(fol.
problem
Aristotelian Anti-Atomism," History of Philosophy Quarterly
Wodeham, secundo quod vel
logice
Tractatus sicut
loquendo,
non per
alphabeticus, suscipit,
illo
cap.
...
51va). in 1
his
"Adam
Wodeham
s
Anti-
(1984), 381-97.
(Augmentatio): "Dico
E>
modo
praedicationem
crementum huiusmodi cum hoc adverbio
magis quia non potest dici quod forma talis, puta albedo sit magis albedo quam ante. Immo, quod plus est, nee intensa albedo est talis magis albedo quam sit remissa, licet sit maior, id est intension Sed
C>
minus album
et
postea magis vel e
converse." (fol.
135 ra).
Calculating Grace:
Adam
16
form of greater
377
form combine
distinct parts of a
Numerically
intensity.
Wodeham
de
to constitute a unified whole.
When
intensify,
qualities
according to this account, the preexisting
form becomes part of something greater. Only Richard Campsall presented obvious
the
to
objection
view:
this
this
"On
account
is
nothing
more
intense; and neither augmented." the resulting whole nor the new part existed before, so they cannot have been intensified.
For what was there before
not
is
But though most fourteenth century medievals agree on
common
their views are not the result of
views
are
contrary
sense observation. Indeed, these
our ordinary experience
to
increase and decrease in their intensity.
another;
was a
God
-
namely, that qualities wall can be whiter than
The ground
by Aristotle
supported
consideration,
logical
One
love for Peter can increase.
s
this subject,
s
for this denial
authority:
a form
cannot increase or decrease while retaining its identity any more than a number can. 18 Different accidents can inhere in the same subject at different times,
of the
19
but different degrees of whiteness cannot be predicated to examples: Peter can be dearer, but his
same form. Returning
grace cannot increase while retaining its identity. If one wall is whiter than another, a different form of whiteness inheres in it; a wall which increases in whiteness by being painted gains a
new form.
How are forms intensified?
2.
Considering qualities as Aristotelian forms,
change more
qualitative
1
Tractatus
Wodeham, intelligi
non
ad
etiam bene
vim
vocis,
difficult.
Emphasis on
alphabeticus,
cap.
15
commune dictum quod
illud
alicui
quia
made medieval
formae
advenit
(Augmentatio):
forma aliquid
discussions of
a related logical dictum
suscipit
modo
"Alio
magis
constituens
et
cum
potest
minus ilia
-
,
licet
formam
perfectiorem. Et ideo dicitur suscipere magis et minus. Aliquando veto subtrahitur pars aliqua, qua subtracta non remanet ilia forma sed alia minor priore, non quod eadem sit et post minor, nee e converse. Et potest improprie dici quod maior cuius pars subtrahitur minuitur, vel adhuc magis proprie quod minor quae remanet minuitur,
primo maior pro eo quod
ista est
minor
ilia totali
quae
praefuit."
(fol. 135ra).
est 3: I, 17, 2, opinio (marg.: Campsale), q. augmentatio per additionem], quia si aliquando sic, tune nihil esset auctum, quia nee pars nova, cum ilia non praefuit, nee praecedens, quia ilia non est intensior quam prius, nee totum, quia non praefuit." (fol. 49ra).
Chatton,
d.
Reportatio,
quod nunquam
[est
18 Aristot., Metaph., VIII,
19 Aristot., Topica,
II, c.
c.
3 (1044a 9-10).
7 (113a 34-35).
a.
"Et
Wood
378
contrary
cannot
qualities
raises similar
What
problems
inhere
simultaneously
same
the
in
subject
-
second issue discussed here.
in considering the
the process by which forms intensify? Fourteenth century medieval authors tried to answer this question in such a way as would is
allow them to affirm that (1) qualitative change
is
gradual (2) the quality
resulting
from change constitutes a unified whole and
do
exist
not
simultaneously
of
paradigm
of qualities
The
are added.
parts
nature of change.
added
same
also allows that as a quality increases,
It
a
is
would combine
parts are
new
qualitative
it
could not account for
whole. According to Richard
unified
Campsall, a Mertonian contemporary of believe that old and
new
form which remains.
new form
the
that
change.
theory readily accounts for the gradual
addition
to the preexisting
fact
quantitative
forms
theorists
a successive process in which infinitesimal
is
Opponents of the addition theory claimed the
(3) contrary
Addition
subject.
resembles
change
qualitative
Intensification
the
in
Ockham, there -
parts
is
no reason
or individuals of a form
to -
produce a unified whole. For the only things which one, are actual beings which can be combined with
to
when combined make or
beings,
potential
entities
receiving
which
can
combined
be
with
would be parts of the same the same subject, they would not constitute a
received entities. But parts of a single form kind, so
if
they inhered in
whole, but remain separate individuals. Consequently, any intensible form
acquired over time would be composed of an infinite number of separate 20 parts and constitute an actual infinity, which is absurd.
Campsall claims
the infinitely
that
many new and
preexisting parts
posited by addition theorists would remain separate and unintegrated and
an
constitute
20
actual
Chatton, Reportatio,
91
detur
secundum,
Addition
alphabeticus,
quod
in
cap.
quolibet
secundum inconveniens,
scquitur
21
scilicet
sit
sequitur:
quod alteratum
consequentiae, quia quacumque infinitae albedines tantae virtutis sunt
est infinitae virtutis
maioris virtutis ilia.
-
argumentum
Et in
si
sit
in
fine
virtutis
infinitae
in
demonstrata in actu, hoc subiecto, igitur hoc subiectum
albedine in
Consequentia patet, quia actualiter habet infinitas quia cito post hoc instans habebit tune
quam
and
data,
.
isto posito, erit
Aristotle
57 (Infmitum in augmentatione conlinua): nova albedo praecedcntibus remanentibus,
Probatio
vigore.
like
theorists,
d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, fol. 49rb.
Tractatus
Wodeham,
"Si
I,
infinite.
quam
virtutes.
Hoc dato antecedens patet quarum quaelibet
infinitas qualitates
quia quaelibet adquisita post datam erit intensior rcmissior ordinate, contra: illo modo tenet ipse fundasti TE, igitur argumentum tuum contra TE
virtus data,
quaelibet
sequens
hoc argumento
cum
fuerit
(Campsall).
Respondeo concedendo
illud
quod
infertur
in
ista
forma qua
infertur.
Et hoc etiam
Calculating Grace:
almost
all
actual
medieval thinkers,
in
agreed
de
Wodeham
Wodeham
that
states
simply
379
the
rejecting
But addition theorists had no
infinity.
objection.
Adam
possibility
replying to this
difficulty
infinitely
of an
many
parts
qualitative
infinite, provided each producing successive part is less than the part which preceded it. Although attacks of this kind were not taken seriously by addition
added
be
can
an
without
actual
were committed
theorists, they did take seriously the claim that they
holding that contraries simultaneously coexisted in the
same
subject.
to
By
same genus but are maximally different appears to be the case that when something
definition contraries belong the
from
each
other.
gradually changes
period
22 its
It
color from white to black, there
when we might
say that
is
it
is
an intermediate
both black and white, which
is
a
contradiction.
Ockham and Wodeham
agree with succession of forms theorists that contraries cannot inhere in the same subject. They disagree with Chatton
who
holds that addition theorists must embrace the claim that remiss 23
Ockham degrees of contrary forms can coexist in the same subject. explains that it is unnecessary to posit that remiss degrees of contrary qualities inhere in the
same
subject; the degrees of quality
added when
forms are intensified are not contraries, but individuals of the same kind, numerically not specifically different. It is the addition of numerically distinct individuals of a form which produces intension. And these distinct constitute together a single unified form. No change in when tepid water is added to tepid water, because recorded intensity 24 the forms involved remain in distinct subjects. Change takes place individuals
is
successively, part
CAMPSALE,
25
by
part.
cuius est argumentum, concedere habct de partibus albedinis extensae,
neget indivisibilia." (fol. 140vb). Chatton, Reportatio, I, d. 17, q. componeretur ex infinitis partibus,
2,
a.
3:
tempore mensurante ilium motum sunt novum quod nunquam praefuit." (fol. 49ra). 22 23 2,
Aquinas, In Metaph.
Ockham, Quaest. a.
sis,...
1:
Sed
gradibus, formae."
24 25
"Dicunt
isti
quidquid quia
(fol.
aliter
X,
nulla
infinita
lect. 5, n.
19
in II Sent.,
q.
quod aqua
est
tune quaelibet forma augmentabilis alia nee pars alterius, quia in
est
instantia,
in
quolibet
est
aliquid
V, 418s.). Chatton, Reportatio, I, d. 17, q. quia calor et frigus sunt in partibus diver-
(OTh
tepida
de hoc, teneo quod non salvaretur successio
sit
in I Sent., dist. 17, q.
Quaest. in II Sent., q. 19
et
2032^4.
[contraria] in
motu
et
48va).
Ockham, Scriptum Ockham,
Aristot.,
"Item,
quarum
cum
7
(OTh
(OTh V,
III,
418s.).
542-5).
compatiuntur in
se
adquisitione
in
remissis
partiali
talis
Wood
380
The forms.
addition theory
We
come now
was the most popular theory of the
to the minority views. Succession of
latitude of
forms
theories
change on substantial change, the kind of change described as generation and corruption. According to succession theorists,
model
qualitative
a quality appears to increase, a more remiss quality is replaced by an entirely different form of greater intensity. When something changes
when
from white to black, there is no intermediate period when the subject is partly white and partly black, rather there are a series of entirely forms; all the various shades of white, grey and black succeed each other. This means that what appears to be gradual change is really different
a series of sudden changes.
A
succession theorist can readily deny that contrary forms coexist
same
the
in
subject.
forms with
entirely
For intensification
new
intense
is
the result of replacing remiss
But
forms.
succession
difficulty accounting for the fact that qualitative
is
have
theorists
gradual, since
change change takes place suddenly, and forms cannot be intensified by adding parts.
Not only was the succession theory vulnerable was contrary
to the charge that
to our experience of gradual qualitative change,
it
was
it
also
attacked as a form of indivisibilism. According to Richard Campsall,
if
qualitative change involves the annihilation and replacement of forms,
it
is
is
instantaneous. But
composed
principles,
if
this is
motion,
of indivisibles, which as a
common
is
we have
to conclude that
motion
contrary to Aristotelian philosophical
opinion concedes. So according to
Wodeham,
Campsall claimed that adherents of the succession theory were committed to indivisibilism, just as addition theorists were committed to defending an actual
infinity.
Tractatus alphabeticus, cap. 57 (Infmitum in augmentatione continua): hoc ALIQUI arguunt quod si in tola transmutatione non maneat eadem lectio dubia> mensuretur instanti vel qualitas maior et minor, sequitur vel quod motio quod alteratum sit infinitae perfectionis in vigore. Consequentiam probant, quia si non maneat etc., aut igitur in quolibet instanti est alia et alia forma corrupta priori; aut priori manente si corrupta praecedente, tune ille motus solum mensuratur instanti, quia ille motus non est nisi ista qualitas secundum quam movetur mobile. Ire enim ad calorem est calor quoquo modo. Sed ista qualitas tune non mensuratur nisi instanti. Et praeterea lectio dubia> si motus ille tune non sit haec qualitas nunc exsistens,
Wodeham,
"Et
ideo ex
<
<
quaero a
Nee
TE
praeterita,
est iste motus: aut qualitas praesens aut praeterita aut futura. nee futura, quia non sunt, nee aggregatum ex his propter Deum. Igitur
quae res
motus ille sit qualitas praesens, et tune sequitur expositorie est motus, igitur ille non manet nisi per instans, ilia qualitas
oportet ista
tune dicere quod
qualitas
E>
,
est contra philosophiam." (fol. 140vb).
Calculating Grace:
Succession
theories
sacrifice
Adam
de Wodehatn
other
all
retain a strong interpretation of the dictum,
or
By
decreased."
eccentric
can
seldom
theory,
supporters, however, a view attributed to
is
s
same to
according
espoused,
Wodeham
order
to
an
is
It
subject. 27
Among
Sylla.
bete noire, Walter Chatton;
28
its
also
is
it
Thomas Aquinas. admixture
the
of
Roger Swineshead. Swineshead
is
in
cannot be increased
"forms
the
in
coexist
The Mertonian advocate Sylla,
consideration
contrast, the admixture theory embraces an apparent
contraries
contradiction:
381
s
described
theory,
model of
qualitative
by
change
both from quantitative change and from substantial change. In answer to the question "what causes an increase in the intensity of a differs
form?"
Swineshead argues that
qualities
intense without anything being added, that
weakened. So
is
subject
this
that intensification involves a
In fact
Wodeham
addition of any
new
the contrary quality inhering in
same
subject, but not in the sense
new admixture
of forms or parts of forms.
characterizes this view as the view that
same form can be
remiss and afterward intense,
first
become more
a subject can
in
an admixture theory in the sense
is
that contrary qualities inhere in the
if
"altogether ...
the
without the
29 [part]."
contrary Wodeham argues that there cannot be any the addition of a new part. Against the admixture without augmentation
To
theory,
the
Wodeham 30
The
Fitzralph. quality 27
can be
repeatedly adduces an argument presented by Richard
gist
of this argument
without
increased
is
that
extrinsic
it
is
absurd to claim that
change and addition.
It
is
Sylla, "Medieval Concepts," p. 232n.
98 1
Sylla, "Medieval Concepts," p. 232n.;
29
Wodeham,
Tractatus
d. 17, q. 1, a. 1.
forma potest 1 "Nulla (Augmentatio): cap. sua specie sine additione novae partis ad praeteritam ex
augmentari nee fieri maior in quibus fiat una forma. Et haec
omnino primo
Chatton, Rcportatio,
alphabeticus, est
contra opinionem tenentium quod eadem forma est eodem subiecto et e converse." (fol. 134ra).
intensa et post remissa in
30
alphabeticus, cap. 2 (Actio maxime reperitur in qualitate): quod aliqua parva albedo potest fieri perfectior quam aliqua creatura mundi de facto sit, nullo sibi addito, quod est absurdum. Probatur consequentia secundum Fitzralph (Fi-r), quia secundum istam opinionem aliqua res potest fieri duplo perfectior absque aliquo novo sibi addito, sicut caritas remissior potest fieri duplo intensior, nullo sibi adveniente. Et eadem ratione, adhuc duplo intensior, et adhuc, et
Wodeham,
"Contra:
Si
hoc,
Tractatus
sequitur
in infinitum. Sed quidquid praeter Deum potest imaginari intellectus simplici apprehensione sine conceptu composite ex repugnantibus, potest Deus facere cum sit omnipotens. Et tune patet ista consequentia, quia omnis creatura perfectior ista caritate excedit earn in proportione finita, et quacumque finita potest Deus facere perfectiorem."
sic
(fol.
134ra).
Wood
382
of a quality could incongruous to suggest that the perfection or intensity without be increased ad infinitum adding anything.
Swineshead
how more
s
admixture theory encounters no
difficulty in explaining
intense forms constitute a unified whole, since no
Gradual
added.
are
of
new
parts
also
readily qualitative change between contrary equilibrium changing theory explained by would be hard-put to show that he was not qualities. But Swineshead
are
degrees of
his
committed
to the view that
a
contrary qualities could inhere in the
His views are also vulnerable to Fit/ralph
subject.
view would be consistent with increase without
s
same
that
argument
his
addition.
The form of admixture theory espoused by Walter Chatton and attributed to Thomas Aquinas is not vulnerable to Fitzralph s attack, since
it
does not explain
between
equilibrium
Swineshead qualities
s
qualitative
contrary
change as a It
qualities.
result
has
of a
shifting
common
in
with
version of the admixture theory only the view that contrary
can inhere
in
the
same
subject at the
same
time.
31
Even
this
view does not appear to be a distinctive tenet of admixture theories; 32 also held that such as Scotus many medieval addition theorists -
remiss degrees of contrary qualities could coexist. Unlike other medieval theories of qualitative
change,
Chatton
s
version of the admixture theory treats spiritual qualities differently from
31
Chatton, Rcportatio, I, d. 17, q. 2, a. 3: "teneo ... oppositam, scilicet quod aliquac contrariae compatiuntur se in ecxJcm suhiccto in gradihus rcmissis. ... (fol. additioncm partis novae 49rh) ... Contra: quod aliquando fiat augmcntatio formarum per ad praecedcntem probo." (fol. 49ra-49rb) qualitates
est enim ... quod qualitates eiusdcm speciei cum contrariis compatiun hoc multipliciter .... (fol. 49vb) ... tenco quod parte subiecti, et probavi caritas augetur et aliae formae multae. Sed quomodo? Aliqua per additionem partis ad ubi est successio propter incompossibilitatem partem, aliqua non. Ilia videlicet non,
Art. 4:
tur sc in
"Dictum
eadcm
formae prioris ad sequentem. Unde si in intcllcctionibus procederctur continue a forma minus pcrfecta ad maius perfectam, ibi foret unus modus augmentationis non per additioncm partium sed per successionem continuam formae perfections, novae totaliter, post
impcrfecliorem
totaliter
corruptam.
...
Unde
in
talibus,
ubi
est
successio propter
etiam casu ubi formae sunt simplices, nunquam incompossibilitatem formarum, vel alio est augmentatio per additionem. Sed tamen aliquando est augmentatio formae per de imperfecto ad additionem, quando scilicet ita est quod successio motus et processus formarum sed ex hoc quod passum est perfectum non provenit ex incompossibilitate remissam cuius diminutio requitur ... et ita in isto indispositum per formam contrariam casu habetur in fine motus forma quaedam composite, cuius adquisitio erat partis post "
partem. (fol. 49va-49vb) Quaest. 3, art. 3: Tenui
ex ... quod aliquando est augmentatio ubi successio provenit ilia non est per additionem, praecedentis et sequentis, et ubi non ex hoc sed magis ex indispositione passi per contrariam aliquando formam vel propter limitationem agentis (fol. 50va). 32 242 (ed. Vaticana, V, 255). num. Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 17, pars 2, q. 2, incompossibilitate
formae
P>
..."
Calculating Grace: Adam de
Spiritual
are
Wodeham
indivisible
383
and
increase
or
physical
qualities.
decrease
manner described by the succession theory; physical are divisible and increase or decrease in the manner described
qualities
in
qualities
the
by the addition theory. Chatton s claim that some forms are, and other forms are not augmented by addition was anticipated by Thomas Aquinas, who also held, as Chatton does, that charity does not increase by addition.
33
was
Chatton
on
strong
ground
when he argued
indivisible
subject like
that
spiritual
He
could not increase by addition.
qualities
argued that a simple or the soul could not have a compound accident. 34
But
if the accident or quality being intensified is indivisible, it does not have parts. It would be nonsense to say that an indivisible quality could be intensified by adding parts. Since he adheres both to the addition and the succession theory, Chatton s views have most of the same strengths
And
and weaknesses as those theories.
like
Wodeham, Chatton
the view that there could be increase without addition.
attacked
35
Chatton
s versions of the addition and succession theories provide a account of the successive or gradual character of qualitative change. He claims that gradual change is always the result of some form
distinctive
In
of resistance.
cases
where increase by addition
is
impossible,
the
successive quality of change arises from introducing incompatible forms. In the case of forms susceptible of increase by addition, the successive quality of the intension of forms,
as
or,
subject; qualities
could
we might not
inhere
say,
in
is its
the
a result of the indisposition of the resistance
same
to
subject,
change. the
If
contrary
intensification
of
forms which results from the addition of parts would not be successive. 36
34
Thomas Aquinas, Summa
theol., 1-2, q. 52, a. 2, resp.
See Chatton, as quoted
note 36.
in
d. "luxta istam imaginationem diceretur I, 17, q. 3, a. 3: augmentatione et remissione formarum, quod eadem forma prius remissa, sine productione cuiuscumque novi, eadem penitus sit forma intensa ad praesentiam activi nati augmentare, non quod aliqua pars praefuerit, et aliqua non; et tune consequenter dicendum esset quod totum est novum et quod totum praefuerit." (fol. 51ra).
Chatton,
quod
ita
Reportatio,
est in
Chatton, Reportatio, I, d. 17, q. 2, a. 4: "Ex his ergo simul cum tertio articulo infero solutionem quaestionis, et teneo quod caritas augetur et aliae formae multae. Sed quomodo? Aliqua per additionem partis ad partem, aliqua non - ilia, videlicet, non, ubi
propter incompossibilitatem formae prioris ad sequentem. ... Et hoc, primo quia intellectio non habet partes, et secundo quia forma prior et forma posterior non compatiuntur se naturaliter. Unde in talibus ubi est successio propter incompossibilitatem formarum, vel in alio etiam casu ubi formae sunt simplices, nunquam est augmentatio est successio
per additionem.
Wood
384
Thus Chatton holds
that
takes
change
place
the
result
in
successively
cases of intensification and remission, but not for the
same reason.
all It
is
forms of resistance, incompatible forms or an
of different
indisposition in the underlying subject.
The
last
we encounter
theory
Adam
in
Tractatus alphabeticus
s
is
Richard Campsall, a Mertonian, most of whose works are lost. CampsalPs cogent attacks on the succession and addition theories were that of
mentioned earlier. They are clearly reported by Wodeham and Chatton. But CampsalPs own views are more difficult to discover, and Wodeham s account differs from that of Chatton. What follows is a reconstruction which
may be mistaken
some
in
respects.
Most probably Campsall began
his
career as an adherent of the
succession of forms theory. Chatton says that he had heard Campsall, 37
and that Campsall s attempt to defend the succession theory had been Chatton tells us that Campsall had had to come up with new
refuted.
views because the succession theory had been disproved. 38 At the time of Chatton s Reportatio, Campsall evidently entertained three views: (1) succession of forms (2) an addition theory according to
which an to
number
infinite
make
whole
a
augmentation and
same;
they
remain
altogether
are
discrete,
in
acquired
(3) a form of admixture theory. Chatton quotes long
arguments by Campsall, the
of individuals of a form, which do not combine
but
are
39
the proponent of the view that forms are never annihilated
being
constantly
and replaced. 40
But
Scd tamen aliquando est augmentatio formae per additioncm, quando scilicet ita est quod successio motus et processus de impcrfccto ad perfcctum non provenit ex incompossibilitate formarum sed ex hoc quod passum est indispositum per formam contrariam remissam cuius diminutio requiritur et ita in isto casu habetur in fine motus forma quaedam composita, cuius adquisitio erat partis post partem." (fol. 49vb). ...
Chatton,
Reportatio,
d.
I,
17,
de partibus continui, ex quo negant
4:
a.
2,
q.
"Ad
aliud,
indivisibilia, sicut audivi
eos
a.
via
38
Chatton, [erat]
Reportatio,
d.
I,
17,
improbata. Ideo excogitaret
q.
homo
3,
3;
"Ista
duplicem aliam viam
..."
est
illud
negare."
non (fol.
aeque contra eos
(fol.
placet
50ra).
mihi,
et
prius
50vb).
39
We discussed only two or three of the eight arguments against addition theory by Campsall quoted by Chatton. According to one argument not mentioned above, addition by parts could not result in a more perfect form. The more perfect a form is, the simpler it is, so adding parts detracts from the perfection of the resulting form. Chatton, Rcportatio,
I,
d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, fol. 49rb.
Chatton, Reportatio,
I,
d.
17,
q.
2,
a.
3-4:
Tertius articulus
est
utrum generaliter
nunquam sit augmentatio per additionem novae partis ad praecedentem facientem per se unam cum ilia. Et est opinio (marg.: Campsale) quod nunquam. Ideo (fol. 49rb) dicunt quod semper in materialibus forma perfectior est totaliter alia numero a ...
...
praecedenti
cui
succedit,
ita
quod
ibi
oportct
recipiens
denudari
a
natura
recepti
...
Calculating Grace:
on the
although
385
Wodeham
it
third
connotations.
of
Wodeham
de
s Tractatus alphabeticus, Campsall had can be called a connotation theory which theory, does not describe the process of qualitative change in terms
evidently by the time of settled
Adam
Chatton describes
view as one which could be
this
consistently maintained by adherents of connotation theories; Campsall
was a connotation
What held
when
that
to
According "possible
theorist
when
discussing relations.
the CampsalPs theory? According to
is
intensification
matter
Chatton,
object."
"In
Wodeham, Campsall
quality
be other than
it
way
that
hi
place
remiss
whole
is
the
is
a
becomes
the agent does not cause
form."
same
No
thing
addition
presence of the agent. The same form which was
new,
and
description of the process
when forms
called
being,
was. Rather altogether the
intense in the presence of a suitable agent. In
form
same.
the
the presence of a natural agent, this being
something which was previously potential becomes the actual takes
remains
diminished
a
contains
the form. This happens in such a to
the
occurs,
the
whole
makes
it
form
clear
existed
that
some sense 41
previously.
a potential
is
are intensified. So the denial that intensification
the
This
actualized is
motion
(fol. 49vb) ... Ad primum argumentum opinionis Campsal in tertio articulo, ilia consequentia maxime procedit contra eos. Si enim semper in processu illo est totaliter alia forma numero, nulla erit aucta, igitur directe est hoc contra ipsos." (fol. 49ra-vb) Quaest. 3, art. 3, dub. 2: "Item, quantitas potest augeri etiam in rarefactione, et non
per partes eiusdem rationis, sed potest esse absque hoc quod quantum recipiat aliquid eiusdem rationis. Ergo eodem modo in formis aliis est .... possibilis quod sit augmentatio sine additione et compositione partium eiusdem rationis. Qui teneret istam conclusionem quam inferunt haec argumenta ... posset earn ponere secundum triplicem viam, quarum una est quod quaelibet augmentatio est successio formarum simplicium, ita quod [vetus] semper totaliter corrumpitur et succedit totaliter nova forma. Ista via non placet mini, et prius [erat] improbata. Ideo excogitaret homo duplicem aliam viam: una est quod prior et posterior forma non semper sunt incompossibiles, nee tamen unquam faciunt unum, sed remanent distinctae simul in eodem subiecto, sicut dicunt quidam de duabus caritatibus simul manentibus in anima, scilicet CAMPSAL et sui sequaces, ut superius recitatum est. Ita posset dici quod agens naturale continue inducit aliud et aliud individuum formae, sed illae non faciunt unum, sed simul manent (fol. 50vb). ..."
Chatton,
Reportatio,
I,
d.
17,
q.
3,
a.
3:
"Alia
est
quod
in
materia
est
unum
diminutum, quod vocatur possibile obiectum, et quod istud ens diminutum ad praesentiam naturalis agentis fit forma, ita quod agens non facit aliud quam prius, sed illud idem penitus quod prius erat in potentia, illud idem absque omni addito ad praesen tiam agentis fit forma actu. luxta istam imaginationem diceretur quod ita est in augmentatione et remissione formarum, quod eadem forma prius remissa, sine productione cuiuscumque novi, eadem penitus fit forma intensa ad praesentiam activi nati augmentare, non quod aliqua pars praefuerit et aliqua non. Et tune consequenter dicendum esset quod totum est novum et quod totum praefuit. Et maxime TENENTES CONNOTAens
TIONES in in
dicere possent
praesentia agentis
quod formam et formam
talis,
praesentia alterius agentis
contrarii."
formam esse talem qualis nata est esse esse remissam est esse talem qualis nata est esse
intendi est
(fol. 51ra).
Wood
386
means only
change involved
that the
instantaneous and hence properly
is
described not as motion but as transmutation. This explains the claim
quoted by Wodeham: throughout the entire transmutation, the 4 both greater and lesser, remains the same.
quality,
Like a succession of forms theorist, Campsall describes qualitative change as a series of instantaneous changes which resemble substantive
Hence CampsalPs theory does
change. nature
of
On
change.
qualitative
not account well for the gradual
other
the
the
hand,
was
theory
designed to explain how the resulting quality constitutes a unified whole. It was for this reason that Campsall, like the admixture especially
Roger Swineshead, held that in the process of intensification added, there are no new parts. But unlike succession theorists, nothing would maintain that the form was the same, and had retained its Campsall theorist
is
same time
underlying nature at the
To sum up treated
like
change
by
by Chatton
theory.
like
theory,
treated
is
substantial
intensifying
spiritual
instances of substantial change and physical qualities like
change. Roger Swineshead and Richard Campsall discussed
quantitative qualitative
was new.
it
addition
change
quantitative
succession
like
qualities
that
the major points of disagreement: qualitative change
change as a unique case. Campsall agrees with Swineshead that same in intensification. Roger Swineshead holds that
the form remains the
what changes
of contrary
forms
are
objects
potential
balance
a
is
in
qualities.
Campsall holds that
presence of the appropriate natural
the
agent.
The
connotation
successively of the to
inhere
allows
theory
same
contraries
be
to
predicated
subject; the admixture theory allows contraries in
simultaneously
same
the
a
in
subject
remiss
degree
according to Chatton. But most fourteenth century addition and succession Fit/ralph and Burley deny that the
Wodeham, Ockham,
theorists like
form can have different
intensities
and
43
Addition
and
in
the
same
Wodeham,
subject.
Tractatus
ideo ex hoc
"Et
qualitas
maior
quod alteratum
ALIQUI
alphabeticus,
cap.
arguunt quod
si
succession
57
et
minor, sequitur vel quod motio
sit
infinitae perfectionis in
Ockham, Scriptum q.
13
(dist.
Oxford, Oriel fol.
17, 15,
135ra. Burley,
q.
I
Sent.,
Utrum
dist.
17,
intensio
agree
that
q.
4
lectio
dubia>
mensuretur
instanti vel
140vb).
(OTh
III,
formae accidentalis
481ss.). fiat
Fitzralph,
per additionem,
Sent.,
cod.
Tractatus alphabeticus, cap. 15 (Augmentatio), instanti, as cited by Sylla, "Medieval Concepts," p. 234n.
fol.
De
in 1),
<
(fol.
1
I,
theorists
(fnfinitum in augmentations continud): tola transmutatione non maneat eadem
in
vigore."
same
that contrary qualities can inhere
48vb-49rb.
Wodeham,
Calculating Grace:
intensification involves
new
Adam
de
Wodeham
387
forms, but differ on the question of whether
the old form in annihilated, whether forms have parts, and whether the
change takes place successively or instantaneously.
The appearance that intensifying whole was an argument against addition takes
change
place
constitute
theorists,
who maintained
by
part
successively,
a
qualities
part.
unified that
Opponents of addition
theory maintained that parts, or individuals, of quality would not combine to
form a unified whole.
The appearance theorists
of
and connotation
change
gradual
A
theorists.
mitigates
against
succession
connotation theorist would maintain
was the result of one or more instantaneous changes. succession theorist would agree that change takes place suddenly, and
that intensification
A
forms cannot be intensified by adding parts. Though intensification or rather changes - really take appears to be continuous, the change that
place suddenly. Proponents of the addition theory disagree, claiming that intensification
is
a successive process, in which parts are added. Chatton
holds that both successive and sudden changes in intensity occur. In cases of successive change, where parts are added, those parts do combine to constitute a single form. In the case of forms which have no parts,
change
is
sudden.
3. Is there
a
maximum
degree in the intensity of a form?
Most medievals were addition
theorist
who
followed Aristotle in denying
form can be greater or lesser, and Wodeham was an adherent of the common view on both these subjects. But Wodeham and the older that a
he most respected, Richard Fitzralph44 and William disagreed with common opinion on the subject of maximal
contemporaries
Ockham,
whom
45
degrees.
Most medievals maintained quality.
Both admixture
argue that there
is
a
theorists,
were maximal degrees of Roger Swineshead and Walter Chatton, there
that
maximal degree
in
the
intensification
of forms.
Chatton holds that we should not deny that God could create such a degree. The succession theorist, Walter Burley, holds that maximal degrees 44 Fitzralph,
Sent.,
I,
q.
15
(dist.
cantos possit augeri, cod. Oxford, Oriel 45 See note 48.
17,
15, fol.
q.
3),
Ad
53vb-54rb.
quaestionem
principalem:
Utrum
Wood
388
of a quality are possible. Godfrey of Fontaines defends this claim, on the
grounds that
this possibility is
not repugnant to the nature of charity or
A
beyond the power of God. John Duns Scotus, also held
number
this view.
4
of addition theorists, including
Wodeham and Ockham
denied
be a maximal degree of charity which could be produced. specify, God could add a part and create a
that there could
For whatever degree we 48
greater degree.
Thus both proponents and opponents of maximum degrees base their arguments on divine omnipotence. Those who deny maximal degrees argue that
God
because
is
omnipotent, he could add a part and create a greater
degree, however intense the existing form was. Proponents of a
degree
-
such
Scotus, Chatton and Godfrey
as,
-
claim that
maximum God is so
powerful that he could create a maximal degree.
Conclusion
This brings to an end our discussion of the debate about latitude of
forms as
it
raised in
is
Adam
de
Wodeham
s
Tractatus alphabeticus
.
This
was part of an intense debate, one which was conducted with vocabulary like individuals of form (individua formarum) and
Tractatus
novel
To
quantities of quality. 46 III,
Godcfridus
de
389s.). Burley,
47 Scotus,
48
Fontibus,
De
Ockham, Scriptum cap.
17
in
it
was a
by
VII, q. 12 (cd. M. de Wulf Sylla, "Medieval Concepts," p. 235n.
III, d. 13, q. 4, n.
I Sent.,
dist.
17,
(Augmentari potest
2 (cd.
8
Wadding,
(O q. quantum
lTi
VIM,
III,
debate, in
scientific
Quodlibet
instanti, as cited
Opus Oxoniense,
alphabeticus,
a limited extent
Hoffmans,
J.
261ss.
547-67).
infinitum):
-
Wodeham,
"Item,
tria
Tractatus
sunt
quae
quod Deus non potest facere maius in specie illius dati. Primum: si illud esset indivisible. Unum enim indivisibile eiusdem speciei non potest esse maius alio, ut supra patct. Secundum: quia variatio quantitatis variat speciem. Ideo Deus non potest facere unum ternarium maiorem alio, quia omnis unitas variat speciem. Et hoc etiam est ex causa quare Deus non potest facere unum bicubitum maius alio. Tertium
E>:
non potest esse aliquod individuum in specie temporis praeter illud et partes suas. Et hoc etiam est ratio quare est contradictio quod sit unum individuum maius et perfectius Deo. Ubicumque ergo nullum istorum trium impedit, ibi quocumque dato potest Deus facere maius. Sic est de gratia, ergo etc. ... Quinto apparet mihi, similiter cum Ockham et multis aliis doctoribus, quod omnis forma augmentabilis secundum intensionem in infinitum potest intensive crescere, modo superius posito et concesso. Hoc est quod non est dare ita intensam quin possit a Deo fieri
duplo intensior
(Lumen
et
quadruple, et
sic
infinitae intensionis), fol. 142ra-142rb.
in
infinitum."
(fol.
135va-135vb).
Cf.
cap.
61
Calculating Grace:
s
today
Adam
Wodeham
de
389
sense of an investigation of the results of experience.
Ockham
argued that his conclusions accord with reason and experience. Chatton replied that in discussing simple substances, our reason and experience
Ockham
mitigate against an acceptance of
were
participants in this debate their
experience
intensity.
Strictly
forma non
-
suscepit magis.
account.
Nonetheless
deny the most basic increase and decrease
most participants
And
4
willing to
namely, that qualities speaking,
s
many
result of in
their
the debate agreed that
in
proponents of the theory of succession of
forms even denied the evidence of their senses that such changes were gradual.
Clearly logical considerations about the nature of forms and contrary qualities
were
just
compelling as the result of experience. Perhaps
as
fourteenth century medievals were correct to place as high a value on as
logic
on what experience appears
counterintuitive scientific doctrines.
confront situations in which the
of naive
basis
situation
like
observation.
And
all
theory depends both on
In
is,
we
often
no one
the appearances.
it
We
today also accept
we sometimes
like the medievals,
fact is
how compatible
attractive
teach.
not decide between viable theories on
the medievals. There
which can account for
philosophically
we do
to
it
The is
find
ourselves
logically coherent
in
a
theory
decision to accept a given
with observation and on
from a mathematical or
logical
how
point of
view.
How did fourteenth century medievals decide between rival theories about latitude of forms? The greatest difference was between admixture theories
and
realization
all
other
theories.
Admixture
of a qualitative change without any
form. Since the form remains the same as
it
is
theories
allow
new form
for
the
or part of a
transmuted, such theories
49
Chatton, Reportatio, I, d. 17, q. 2, a. 2: "Dicunt respondendum, turn secundo quia duae partes albedinis sunt componibiles, saltern secundum extensionem faciunt unum per agens creatum, quare ergo non eadem parte praecise, cum sic solvantur multae difficultates,
nee ratio nee experientia
obviet."
(fol.
48va)
concede ilium modum augmentations in albedine et multis aliis, sed non generaliter in omnibus. Et cum dicunt, "bonum est ex quo et quando non est contra "Ad
aliud
solvuntur multae difficultates," ita dico quod bonum est habemus rationem et experientiam in oppositum, sicut in formis simplicibus, ut in speciebus in medio et in angelis et in anima Christi et ludae et in actibus intellectus vel voluntatis, quae omnia sunt formae simplices." (fol.
rationem nee experientiam negare ilium modum unde <sic
49ra) Art.
et
P>
4: "tamen dico quod experientia vadit ad hoc, quod unum contrariorum remittit reliquum, et non totaliter corrumpit, quia tune in motu remissionis contrarium suum causaret contrarium, quod repute magis absurdum." (fol. 50ra). Cf. Ockham, Scriptum in I Sent., dist. 17, q. 5 (OTh III, 487).
Wood
390
allow their adherents to explain the appearance that qualities intensify while remaining unified, straightforwardly; these theories would also have little
are
accounting for gradual change. But admixture theories
difficulty in
from a
unattractive
and Aristotelian point of view. Their
logical
proponents must maintain that there can be increase without addition, and they must affirm that forms can be intensified which is contrary to Aristotle.
other
All
followed
theories
cannot be intensified. Chatton
be called a mixed theory; addition
theories.
And
without
addition,
nor
identity.
The
physical
and
it
Aristotle
is
that
can
qualities
intensify
as
differently,
From an Aristotelian point position when they claimed
while
theory offers
s
and
can be increase
there
that
suggests
forms
greatest attraction Chatton spiritual
forms
that
maintaining
a combination of succession
really
neither
it
in
so-called admixture theory might better
s
retaining that
is
and
divisible
it
their treats
indivisible
qualities.
of view, addition theorists were in a
weak
that
divisible
inhered
accidents
in
50 Chatton even claims that his Chatton points out. 51 The position on indivisible qualities is an argument from experience. weakness in Chatton s view is that it requires that he account for
indivisible subjects as
continuous changes Chatton accepted.
in
terms of
indivisibles.
This was a consequence that
Chatton also accepted the old-fashioned view that contrary qualities could inhere
the
in
addition
century
same
subject
and succession
in
a
remiss degree. Most fourteenth unlike
theorists,
contraries could inhere simultaneously in the is
the
greatest
espoused
itself,
contribution its
of the
same
succession
Chatton, subject.
theory.
denied that
Here perhaps
Though seldom
influence led addition theorists to alter the account of
change presented by Scotus in this regard. Addition and succession theories present very similar accounts of qualitative change. A decision between these views could not be based on qualitative
empirical considerations.
The
addition theory preserves the appearance of
gradual motion better, but the succession theory accounts better for the unified character of the
new
intensified or
addition
and
succession
to
Campsall,
unattractive
weakened theories
quality.
were
from an Aristotelian point of view: Addition
See above, note
36.
See above, note 49.
According
also
equally
theorists
were
Calculating Grace:
committed
to defending an actual infinite,
committed to
hand,
But
indivisibilism.
disprove Campsall
other
Adam
it
s
Wodeham
391
and succession
in fact addition theorists
we saw
argument, as
would be
de
difficult
in
a
for
Wodeham
succession
theorists
found s
it
reply.
theorist
were
easy to
On
the
to
deny Campsall s charge. And once committed to indivisibilism, a theorist must abandon Aristotle s account of continua. For, according to Aristotelian physics,
makes
instants
good
serve
sense
not as the locus of change but as
to
the
reject
assimilation
of
its
limits.
intensification
It
and
remission to a series of mutations. Not only does addition theory allow its proponents to describe intensification as a gradual change, but as
continuous successive motion,
A
further
advantage
really divisible like time
it is
of
theory was
addition
and motion.
its
assimilation
of
qualitative to quantitative change.
For by describing
result of the addition of parts,
ensured that the units of change were Mertonians in their schemes for
commensurable. This was useful
it
intensification as the
to later
quantifying change.
But the basic advantage of addition theory was the adaptation of Aristotelian theories about continua. theorist
to
deny maximal degrees,
inhere in the their
same
subject,
is
And
their
like
fourteenth century
denial that contraries can
new view
of divine power, but a
of the potentially infinite parts of a divisible quantity
accounts for this novel theological doctrine.
St.
move by
a reflection of the greater sophistication of
understanding of Aristotle. Not a
new understanding
the
Bonaventure University
JACK ZUPKO
John Buridan
On Abstraction and Universal Cognition
For the nominalist, the claim that the mind can cognize universally, or that its thoughts can range over non-individual objects such as human being
whiteness
or
,
further
requires
,
when
happens, psychologically speaking,
What
explanation.
is
that
it
cognize universally? Given the
I
standard assumption of nominalist ontologies that the world contains no non-individual entities, what status do the objects of universal thought
how do
have, and
come
they
There are two
to
be entertained?
distinct questions here:
one semantic, asking how a and the other psychological,
mental act can mean something universal, asking about the genesis of universal thoughts. Aristotle second can be found even
thinking,
if
he
in
De memoria, where he not
is
thinking
says,
1
thus, the intellect thinks of
triangularity, -
particular
s
what
is
common
answer to the
someone who
of something with
something with a size before his eyes, and thinks of size;"
"...
a
or universal, such as
by an effort of abstraction from what is determinate or 2 triangles having physical dimensions. His answer to the first
can be reconstructed from his famous remark 3 identical."
perceiving,
without
The
defined
identity
the
as
does
whenever
Arist.,
U.
P.,
this I
in
question of
sort
De anima
in
mean
my
is
that
is
change
formal in
that
intellect
there
is
becoming
something
"in
is
the
thought is,
like
received
triangularity
a
triangularity formally.
universal
in
my mind
think universally?
De mem.
1.450a4-6;
Arist.,
De
an. I.1.403bl5;
Arist.,
De
an. III.4.430a3-5.
3
is
thinking
which form
tr.
Sorahji,
Aristotle
On Memory
1972), 48-49.
2
-
makes my thought of
and so what
matter
thought of that universal
But
places
size,
not as having a
it
case of objects which involve no matter, what thinks and what are
is
cf.
HI.4.429518, III.7.431bl2, III.8.432a5.
(Providence:
Brown
John Buridan on Abstraction and Universal Cognition
John
was
with
this
of his Questions on Aristotle s
"De
Buridan
Question
8,
quite
taken
393
Book
in
problem
III,
4 anima"
lectura).
(tertia
This Question, which asks Whether the intellect understands the universal before the singular, or vice versa
contains several lengthy digressions on
,
the nature and objects of universal cognition, including a psychological
how
of
explanation
the
mind can cognize
without
universals
As
a universal or containing any universal entities.
becoming
actually
a nominalist,
Buridan often asserts the particularity of the mind s conceptual contents. But he also wants to claim that this presents no obstacle to some paper some of he the consequences of the theory of universal cognition develops in concepts being about universals.
Question
Does
8.
want to explore
his explanation of
how
in this
concepts are generated
on what universal thoughts are about?
views
his
I
this
Is
compatible with his nominalistic assumption that the mind all
of
them
s
fit
with
explanation contents are
particular?
Buridan
never
To do
universally.
attempts
to
deny
that
can
intellect
so would be absurd, since this
is
cognize
usually taken to be
paradigmatic function. His task is rather to explain the evident fact of universal cognition in view of his nominalistic assumptions about the its
sorts of entities
which might figure
example, both
for
soul
and not
represented
that
"intelligible
as
universally,
the
to
singularity
assumption
claim that
"our
Plato
intellect is
in
such an explanation. exist
things thought",
singularly
He
assumes, the
outside
singularly
and that they are also
from
extended to the mind
the s
5 beginning."
"...
This
contents in the further
concepts exist in our intellect as singularly and distinctly
from one another and from other things as colours and flavours do
in
have edited this Question as part of a complete edition of Book III of Buridan s I Quaestiones in libros De anima Aristotelis secundum tertiam lecturam [hereafter QDA ], prepared from four manuscripts: Vat. lat. 2164 ff. 197vb-233rb; Vat. lat. 11575 ff. 65va87ra; Reg.lat. 1959 ff. 47va-69rb; and Codex Vindobonensis Pal. 5454 ff. 41ra-56vb. References to this work will be given using (1) the line numbers of the corresponding folio[s] of the last ms. listed above [hereafter ]. There are twenty questions in the tertia lectura of Book III.
V
Item sicut
cum
res
intelligibiles
posuit Plato, et
existunt
singulariter
cum etiam cognoscuntur
extra
animam
my
et
edition,
non
and
(2)
universaliter,
a sensu singulariter et per consequens a
principio repraesentantur intellectui singulariter ... [QDA III.8, 11. 130-134] [V f.46ra]. Buridan comes closest to defending the claim that there are no non-individual entities
in
his
Quaestiones
M: Minerva, 1964)
[hereafter
in
QM
Metaphysicen Aristotelis (Paris: 1518, rpr. Frankfurt-amVII.15 ff. 50rb-51ra, and VII.16, ff. 51ra-52ra. ],
394
Zupko and that
bodies",
such
"although
extension or corporeal location, they
Now location,
do not
concepts
themselves have
in
all exist singularly."
6
given that concepts are singular but lack extension or corporeal
might
it
embodying
look
as
if
are
they
kind
a
of metaphysical hybrid,
the numerical distinctness of particulars together with the lack
of physical dimension associated with universals. But the rather of the
word
to describe
singular
semantic side of Buridan the
first
question above.
the universal
is
s
concepts
theory of universal cognition
As he
odd use
actually a feature of the
is
-
answer to
his
on the Physics, the mind by which we
says in his Questions
properly a term or a concept in
conceive simultaneously and indifferently outside the soul, and that concept
is
many
strictly
"...
things existing singularly
posterior to those singular
His strategy is to recast objectively caused by them. metaphysical questions about universal cognition semantically, so that the
things, since
problem what is
it
is
no longer one of explaining away the apparent universality of my mind when I think universally, but rather of giving an
is
in
account of the universality of universal terms in mental language. This linguistic turn on a metaphysical question does have precedent elsewhere
Buridan
in
s
It
writings.
problem of universals the
strictest
sense,
approach to the and universality as being, in
characteristic of his general individuality
terms
of
properties
Whether
discussing the question, to the individual
is
to treat
rather
than
substances the species
in
by a substantial or accidental differentia
Item conccptus nostri
nostro
intcllcctu
in
singulariter et
ita
,
8
of
he
things. is
contracted
says:
distincte
ab invicem
Quamvis conceptus tales non hahcant extensioncm ncc situm corporcum. immo omnia cxistunt singulariter.
ah
aliis
III.8,
II.
cxistunt
sicut
In
colorcs ct sapores in corporihus.
in
et eis
[QDA
207-210] [V f.46rh].
Quaestiones
subtillisimae
Frankfurt-am-M, Minerva, terminus sive conceptus singulariter
extra
super 1964) in
animam
mente
existentes,
singularibus, quia est ab eis objective
Although I concentrate III.8, Buridan also treats
QM VII.15-16
(ff.
octo
in
this
Physicorum
QP
[hereafter
simul
quo et
j
iste
libros 1.7,
f.
Aristotelis
8rb:
indiffcrenter
conceptus
bene
"...
(Paris: est
bene
concipimus est
posterior
1509, rpr. universale
plures illis
res
rebus
causatus."
paper on the account of universal cognition in QDA issue at some length in QP 1.7 (ff. 7vb-10ra). See as well
this
50rb-52rb).
o
See Peter King, "Jean Buridan s Theory of Individuation", forthcoming in an anthology on the problem of individuation in the High Middle Ages, edited by Jorge E. Gracia.
QM
VII. 17, f. 52va, Utrum in substantiis differentiam substantialem aut accidentalem :
"...
species contrahitur ad ista contractio non est
individuum
per
quantum ad
res
John Buridan on Abstraction and Universal Cognition
395
the contraction is not with respect to the things signified, ... leaving concepts aside, since a man or animal or body or substance, exists singularly in this way, just like Socrates or Plato, etc., because nothing other than Socrates or Plato Jor some other individual] is a man. Since, then, a man or an animal would be a thing existing singularly, it is obvious, even with everything else left aside, that no contraction would be needed in order for it to exist singularly. One must say, then, that contractions of this kind have to be understood with respect to concepts or terms be significative of things ... And so a term which is a species would said to be contracted to a singular term by the addition of a differentia restricting the specific term to suppositing for that thing alone for which the singular term supposits.
Buridan
is
claiming here that the way to understand contraction
by imagining a
common
somehow squeezed
or specific nature as
term, the reference of which
is
term by
restricted to that of a singular
the addition of a differentia. For example, the reference of horse
general sentence,
The
horse
addition of the differentia if
Brunellus, is
is
a quadruped
oldest
an
common
by construing the specific nature as a specific or
individual, but
not
is
into
in the
could be restricted by the
,
-
to pick out a single individual
say,
Brunellus happens to be the oldest horse. Again, contraction
no longer a metaphysical question about the
restriction of essence or
commonality, but a semantic question about the restriction of reference.
Buridan wants to deny that the universality from any intrinsic property of concepts,
stems
in
universal
since
cognition
would be
this
tantamount to the admission of conceptual universals. What makes a thought universal rather,
is
not any property belonging to the concept
structural
certain
properties
it
possesses
as
a
term
itself,
in
but
mental
10
language:
circumscriptis conceptibus, quia ita singulariter existit homo vel animal aut corpus aut substantia etc., sicut Socrates et Plato, quia nihil aliud est homo quam Socrates vel Plato. Cum ergo homo vel animal sit res singulariter exsistens, etiam si omnia alia essent circumscripta, manifestum est quod non indiget aliqua contractione ad hoc quod singulariter exsistat. Oportet ergo dicere quod huiusmodi contractiones habent intelligi quantum ad conceptus sive terminos significativos rerum ... Ita etiam terminus qui est species diceretur contrahi ad terminum singularem per additionem differentiae restringentis terminum specificum ad supponendum pro illo solo pro quo supponit terminus singularis." significatas,
Tractatus de suppositionibus III: Maria Elena Reina, "Giovanni Buridano: Tractatus de suppositionibus in Rivista critica di storia della filosofia XII (1957): Sed ... notandum [est] quod, cum universalia, sccundum praedicationem principaliter ",
dicta,
non
sint
praeter
indifferenter concipit
animam,
plures res,
ista ut,
non sunt
quia
nisi
conceptus
omnes homnes
animae
quibus
anima
indifferenter concipit conceptu
396
Zupko But ... it should be noted that since universals in the predication mentioned principally [i.e. Man is running do not exist outside the soul, they do not exist except as concepts of the soul by which the soul indifferently conceives more than one thing, as for instance, because it conceives all men indifferently by some concept, the name man is imposed, and likewise for the concept of animal as regards animals. Therefore, since species and genera are universals in predication, it is apparent that species and genera are such concepts of the soul; it is true that spoken terms are consequently also colled genera and species (such as the utterances man and animal ), but they are not called universals or genera or ]
species principally, but rather significatively, in attribution to those universal [concepts], because in them they are imposed to signify other things ...
man
mental particular, it can function as a universal in propositional contexts, such as when I am Man is a rational animal where it refers to no man in thinking
Thus,
my
although
concept
itself
is
a
,
particular but to
men
all
indifferently.
Buridan spends most of Question 8 giving the psychological under pinnings of this semantic approach. He begins by saying that one reason, not
although
sufficient
even
universally,
universally
a
reason,
the
why
nor
understood not on account of the
fact
understand
can
intellect
though the things it understands are themselves universals, is that
neither "...
things
exist
are
that they are in the intellect, but
because their species, which arc representative likenesses of them, are in 11 the intellect." Furthermore, he holds (1) that this likeness-relation has a
natural
the
in
namely,
cause,
nature
their
or
likeness
a
fact
same
outside the soul belonging to the
essential
nomcn homo
that
"...
things
species or the
agreement
existing
singularly
same genus have greater
than
in
those
de conceptu animalis quantum ad animalia. secundum praedicationem, apparel quod species et genera sunt tales conceptus animae; verum est quod consequenter termini sed non vocales dicuntur etiam genera et species, ut istae voces homo et animal aliquo,
imponitur hoc
cum
Ideo
et
species
genera
,
ct
sic
universalia
sint
,
dicuntur
universalia
attributionem ad
vel
istos
significandum res alias
...
[conceptus] [p.
202,
species principaliter, immo significative, secundum universales, eo quod secundum eos impositi sunt ad
vel
genera 11.
65-76].
unam causam,
licet non sufficientem, quare intellectus potest intelligere universaliter, quamvis res intellectae nee universaliter existant nee universales sint, ego dico quod haec est causa: quia res intelliguntur non propter hoc
Si
ergo volumus assignare
quod ipsae
sint
in
intellectu,
sed
sentativae earum, sunt in intellectu.
quia species earum,
[QDA
quae sunt similitudines reprae-
210-216] [V ff.46rb-va]. Cf. QP 1.7: ... res intelliguntur non per hoc quod sunt apud intellectum, sed per suas similitudines existentes apud intellectum. [f.Svb]. III.8,
11.
John Buridan on Abstraction and Universal Cognition
397
12 and (2) that belonging to different species or different genera"; 13 In is transitive. or essential sort of property-likeness agreement
member
way, a likeness which the intellect acquires from one or genus will apply to indifferently.
all
For example, Buridan
agreement or likeness ex natura
rei,
same time
"...
ass
indifferently represent
asses have a mutual
all
when
that
by way
the intelligible
of likeness,
will at
it
my
Buridan contends,
all."
Plato or other men.
to
understands
intellect
"the
In the same way, any ass at from Socrates will not belong
abstracts
intellect
more than
Socrates any
which the name
man
is
taken.
And
this is to
when
the
contrary",
of the
namely, the concept from
understand
But where do these concepts come from? of Socrates begins
the
"On
men by means
all
representation indifferently, in a single concept,
thinking
of a species
of that species or genus
if
must be
this
14
the species-likeness to
says, it
some
species in the intellect represents
the
members
of the other
this
intellect
15 universally."
Buridan says that the
receives
species
thought of Socrates from a phantasm, making Socrates appear as
if
a
or
he
Tune accipimus quod res extra animam singulariter existentes de eadem specie vel eodem genere habent ex natura sui similitudinem seu convenientiam essentialem maiorem quam illae quae sunt diversarum specierum vel diversorum generum. [QDA 111.8,
de 11.
218-221] [V f.46va]. Cf.
QP
1.7:
convenientiam Postea
Res autem extra [animam] ex natura et simiiitudinem
D
est simili ipsi
et
ex essentia sua habent inter se
[f.Svb].
aliqua ad invicem similia, quidquid est invicem similia, ipsum est simile unicuique sint similia secundum albedinem quia sunt alba,
ego iterum suppono quod si eo in quo sunt duo
simile uni illorum, in illorum. Verbi gratia, sicut
...
si A, B et C A, oportet quod
sit
sint
in
consimili ipsi
B
et
C.
[QDA
111.8,
11.
243-247]
[V
f.46va]. Cf. 1.7:
Modo
QP
uni eorum,
Ideo
si
sit
quantum ad hoc si
omnes
asini
ita
in
ex
quod sint multa invicem similia, omne illud quod quo sunt similia, est simile unicuique aliomm. [f.Svb]. natura
rei
habent
ad
invicem
convenientiam
et
est simile
similitu
dinem, oportet quod quando species intelligibilis in intellectu repraesentabit per modum similitudinis aliquem asinum, ipsa simul indifferenter repraesentabit quemlibet asinum ...
[QP
1.7, f.Svb].
Ideo consequitur ex quo repraesentatio fit per similitudinem quod illud quod erat repraesentativum unius erit indifferenter repraesentativum aliorum, nisi aliud concurrat et obstet, sicut dicetur. Ex hoc finaliter infertur quod cum species et similitudo Sortis fuerit
apud intellectum
et
fuerit
abstracta a speciebus extraneorum,
ilia
non magis
erit
quam Platonis et aliorum hominum; nee intellectus per earn magis intelliget Sortem quam alios homines. Immo sic per earn omnes homines indifferenter homo Et hoc est intelintelliget uno conceptu, scilicet a quo sumitur hoc nomen ligere universaliter. [QDA III.8, 247-257] [V f.46va]. repraesentatio Sortis
.
11.
398
Zupko
were
the
in
someone cogni/ing him. 16 The phantasm
of
prospect
is
construed as a particular produced by the sensitive part of the soul, representing a bundle of undifferentiated properties. By means of this received species or thought, the intellect is said to understand Socrates in
a
mode.
singular
If
the
intellect
then
is
able
to
substance
whiteness
or
something which could
Socrates,
concept,
man.
exist
the
in
longer
as
perceived
someone cognizing him,
treats
way
this
of
product
substantial
the
of
process
required: the concept abstracted from
He
taken.
is
common
the
abstract
might
Socrates does not represent Socrates any
from which the name man
a concept of
it
concept. For example, from the singular
then
abstraction as universal in the
no
is
the prospect of
intellect
Buridan
Socrates
that
common
then there will be a concept,
so
the
differentiate
properties represented by the phantasm, and abstract from
more than
and
Plato,
it
is
that
adds that any power which can
17 perform this sort of abstraction can cogni/.e universally. But in what sense is the product of abstraction something nonuniversal? Buridan does not say very much about abstraction. Aristotle, as
we saw intellect
or
understands
above, distills
is
Aquinas
particular.
intellect
what
"bestows
abstraction
common has
a
the
as
or universal from what similar
determinate
is
the
that
claiming
explanation,
universality on understood forms
the
whereby
process
to the extent that
it
speaking, this is Buridan s account of how we cogni/e singular objects which we are not acquainted directly, hut only by means of a description. He holds that genuine singular cognition requires direct contact with the object in question [see QDA III.8, 11. 319-399]. There are some difficulties with the latter account which I do not have the space to discuss here: e.g. how the claim that some singular concepts are acquired by direct contact is compatible with the view that the intellect 1
Strictly
with
knows things by means of likenesses. Surely knowing degree of generality not present when it is said that we know
Tune ergo revertendo ad propositum,
dico
speciem vel intellectionem Sortis cum facientem apparere rem per modum existentis recipit
intelligit
ilium
abstrahere
modo
singulari.
Si
conceptum substantiae
modum
a
X
likeness
quod cum in
intellectus
confusione
tali
of
X
introduces
a
directly.
prospectu
a
phantasmate
magnitudinis cognoscentis,
et
situs,
intellectus
potest illam confusionem distinguere et albedinis a conceptu situs, ut non amplius res
intellectus vel
in prospectu cognoscentis, tune erit conceptus comconceptus Sortis abstracte a conceptibus albedinis et situs et aliorum accidentium vel extraneorum, ille non magis repraesentabit Sortem quam Platonem, et erit conceptus communis a quo sumitur hoc nomen homo Et quaecumque virtus potest facere huiusmodi abstractionem, sive ilia sit sensus sive
percipiatur
munis.
per
Unde cum
existentis
elicitus
fuerit
.
intellectus, ilia potest universaliter cognoscere.
[QDA
III. 8,
11.
347-360] [V f.47ra].
John Buridan on Abstraction and Universal Cognition
them from individuating material
abstracts
18
399
Buridan, however,
principles."
must be extremely cautious about adopting either of these explanations without qualification. Since he wants to maintain the particularity of the
mind
s
contents,
cannot be that the mind becomes or takes on a
it
it cognizes universally; it is not open to him to assert and object are formally identical in Aristotle s sense, for thought would seem to concede the existence of mental universals. So there
whenever
universal that that
must be another way of accounting
what the
for
intellect
does when
it
abstracts.
Buridan hints terminology.
He
a
at
representation of sense that understanding
is
from
a
shift
in
from a particular not a universal but a "commmon concept", and
what the
something
in
intellect
abstracts
accordance with a
amounts
that thinking universally
related Question
explanatory strategy with
different
says that
to.
19
his Questions
He
on
common
expands on
Aristotle s
this
"Physics",
is all
concept
remark in
in a
which he
says that the intellect can abstract the species or conception of a stone
from the species or conception of some location or other, and that every stone is understood by means of a common concept as being no more 20 here than there. But I m afraid he doesn t develop things much beyond he sometimes permits the old terminology to return in embarrassing ways by showing no aversion to speaking of the common concept as a kind of universal. In an effort to explain the relationship
this.
Indeed,
between a
common
concept and the singular concept from which
it
has
been abstracted, he says that each universal is tied to a corresponding vague singular, and that sense-conceptions of vague singulars immediately rise
give
to
intellective
conceptions of the corresponding universals, by
the abstraction of a conception of the thing from a conception of place. Finally,
18
he adds that that universal
Quaestiones de Anima, ed.
dicendum quod
intellectus dat
19
non eo quod
sit
unus
first
in
the
intellect
to
which
Robb (Toronto: PIMS, 1968), Q.2, p. 73: "Ad sextum formis intellectis universalitatem in quantum abstrahit cas
a principiis materialibus individuantibus." Cf. Q.3, p. 86, ad 8: "Sic igitur sua
universalis,
is
in
abstractione
omnibus, sed
in
quantum
intellectus est
facit
istam
unitatem
materialis."
See n.17. 1.7: Ideo intellectus poterit abstrahere speciem vel notitiam lapidis a specie vel huius situs vel alterius, et sic intelligitur lapis, vel quantum ad hoc intelligendo esse hie vel illic, et tune indifferenter omnis lapis intelligitur conceptu communi
QP
notitia
de non magis hie quam
ille.
[f.9ra].
400
Zupko
there corresponds the vague singular
first
in
the sense.
are unfortunate, given that Buridan has
universal
21
left
These uses of
means
us no
make
characterizing the product of abstraction which does not
it
of
into a
very good candidate for a universal. Might there be another way out of this difficulty?
Although Buridan has can
some
in
fill
little
to say about abstraction,
He
of the details for him.
believe
I
we
needs something metaphysically
much more
ordinary than the sort of abstraction suggested by Aristotle and Aquinas. Since he holds that the universality of thought is not a of
result
anything
of
virtue
in
possess
the
intellect
the
fact
but
does,
their
that
property which
a
thoughts
embodying singular concepts
naturally refer to sets of individuals in the world, he needs an account of
which
abstraction
stripped-down characterize
plays
singular
concept,
kind
a
as
it
up the
idea
that
while
of universal.
common
the
a
is
down any attempt
playing
As
concept
in
this
a to
direction,
I
aspects of cognitive processing
is
step
propose the following.
For Buridan, the singularity of contained
in
all
these three claims:
(1)
Intelligible things exist singularly outside the soul
(2)
Intelligible
things
are
to
represented
the
intellect
singularly
from the beginning Concepts
(3)
Buridan
s
all exist
account of
22
singularly.
how we
get from things outside the soul to concepts
the relata of which are depends upon the relation likenesses. Moreover, as we saw above, he assumes that:
of representation,
Likenesses have a natural cause
(4)
QP
1.7:
Modo
ultimo
considerandum
est
quod
unicuique
universal!
correspondet
unum
singulare vagum, et alteri universal! alterum singulare, ut homini/hic homo, animali/hoc animal, corpori/hoc corpus, et sic de aliis.* ... illud universale est prius apud intellectum cui correspondet singulare vagum prius
apud sensum. ... Sed unumquodque universale est propinquissimum et immediatum suo individuo aliud singulare vagum vago, statim enim et immediate ex notitia sensus secundum abstractionem notae consurgit notitia intellectiva secundum universale correspondens per rei a notitia situs, sicut
*Cf.
22
QDA
III.8,
Seenn.5-6.
11.
ante dictum
392-399;
fuit. [f.9vb].
V f.47rb.
John Buridan on Abstraction and Universal Cognition
From
and
(4)
(5),
An
some time
ass
of
side
of
representing
Buridan
some
s
ass
is,
all,
and
at
Now
we
if
the
this is the
the
claim
is
central
which
concept
of
virtue
at
and
(4)
(5)
the
to
does
the
above,
also
concept from which the term
construe abstraction as simply the filtering process by comes to have a representation, say, of Socrates
intellect
whiteness,
apart
is
Socrates
from
no prima
particular
sitting
down, being
in virtue of (4) all
feet
six
it
(call
properties
s-whiteness,
exhibited
and
(5)
it
for
abstracted
extension
of
things.
its
is
simply
by him. Moreover, s-whiteness is is a likeness of his whiteness. But
above, s-whiteness will also indifferently repre
general
property
corresponding predicate
The
it
then
short) separated from the
white things: not only Socrates, but Plato, Aristotle,
the
etc.,
tall,
facie reason to regard this as a universal;
whiteness
s
his
causally related to Socrates because
white
This
all.
an
rei,
same time
is
taken.
which the
sent
agree ex natura
of likeness
theory: in
asses
all
by way
representing any ass
representing any ass at
from
C
intellect
representing some
semantic
other
B
like
instantiation
indifferently
there
like
is
he infers
Recall his remark that because intellect
is
is
representing (i.e. having the likeness of) of natural property P is at the same indifferently representing all other P-instantiations.
(6)
ass
A A
Natural-kind likenesses are transitive, such that if in being white^ and B is like C being white, then in being white.
(5)
401
transitivity
of
s-whiteness, is
white
natural-kind
,
etc.;
we
that
is,
the
cognize
which ranges over
likenesses
ensures
that
should an intellect have instead abstracted p-whiteness (from Plato) or awhiteness (from Aristotle), it would still cognize by means of p-whiteness or a-whiteness something coextensional with what
is
cognized by means
of s-whiteness.
There
is
a certain pragmatism
attaching to this interpretation:
whiteness does not count as a universal because distilled
23 24
it
is
from the sensible representation of Socrates; but
Seenn.12-13.
See nn.14-15.
s-
Socrates whiteness, it
is
common
402
Zupko
25 enough, that the concept corresponding to it can be enough, or vague used to refer not only to Socrates but also to all other individuals k from which k-whiteness can be abstracted. No universal need be invoked
to explain the natural similarity of properties.
While
account
this
avoids
populating
mental
the
realm
with
and while there is something to be said for natural resemblance as the source of commonality, if not universality, let me add a proviso: it is not clear how Buridan might, using such an account, explain the important difference between having the concept s-whiteness universals,
and taking universally a vague
surely
this
concept to be true of other things besides
amounts
S. If
cognizing
to the recognition that the predicate corresponding to
common
concept refers to a set of individuals indifferently, then recognizing this would be another mental operation; that is,
abstracting
Another operation
be what
cannot
s-whiteness
needed
is
other individuals besides S
-
-
that
in
it
means
to
think
of taking s-whiteness
universally.
refer
to
to
order to grasp the universality of that
concept.
Buridan does speak
in his
common
Questions on Aristotle s
"De
anima"
about
under the guise of which things are concept being 26 but gives no details about how this works. Still, understood universally, we can reconstruct. Since concepts properly function as terms in mental the
that
language, most thinking will consist in our combining these concepts in
well-formed ways into mental language propositions. also will
holds that only be
in
is
it
it
actually
are refers
strictly
since Buridan
relevant.
presupposes
that
it
questions about the ontology
Using a concept
in
a
context
the user already has a fairly
firm grip on the signification of that concept.
concepts and come
And
propositional contexts that terms refer,
propositional contexts that
of thought-objects
where
only
in
Of
to appreciate their generality
is
course,
how we
learn
an important matter.
The very closest Buridan comes to something like the account I m sketching is in treatment of cognition in his Questions on Aristotle s "Physics", where he says that each universal is tied to a corresponding vague singular, and that sense-conceptions of vague singulars immediately give rise to intellective conceptions of the corresponding universals, by abstracting a conception of the thing from a conception of the place [see n. 21 above]. I think the vagueness of mental representations is exactly the notion his
Buridan needs to focus on if he wishes to avoid conceptual universals. A charcoal drawing of someone, for example, can be a vague representation of that person without being a universal, even though it depicts only some of his or her actual features. 26 See n.17 above.
John Buridan on Abstraction and Universal Cognition But here we
seem
to
reach
charitably be added to Buridan
In
reconciling
nominalistic
his
The
think universally. ability
to
cognize
of what
limits
can
reasonably and
original account.
s
Buridan
think
I
conclusion,
the
403
for
is
world-view with
task for the nominalist
without
universally
most the is
successful
part
problem
in
how we
of
to explain our evident
postulating
universals,
either
as
products of abstraction or thought-objects. Buridan endeavours to steer clear of both these obstacles by on the one hand stipulating that the species by which
we
entertain a universal
is
and on the
itself singular,
other by treating the universality of thought as a function of the
way
which
but
concepts
not
refer
And
to
abstract
concepts
or
entities,
in
to
account of concept-generation explains intellectual abstraction in such a way that its product still looks like a good candidate for a universal, we can tell a more suitable story individuals in the world.
without
much
difficulty.
At
although his
least
in
this
respcet,
Buridan
s
psychology
does not compromise his ontology.
Cornell University
27 I
wish to thank Calvin
earlier versions of this paper.
Normore and
especially
Norman Kretzmann
for
comments on
SECTION THREE
TRIVIUM
AND THE SCIENCES
E.J.
ASHWORTH
Paul of Venice on Obligations: The Sources for both the Logica and the Logica Parva Versions
on
Treatises
obligations
contribution
to
twelfth
late
insolubles.
but
century;
1
part
with
along
logic
consequences, and
formed
most
work presented the theory
the stage for
all
supposition
go back as early
theory,
far as the
treatise
was the
of Walter Burley, which dates from around
Tractatus de Obligationibus 1302. This
may
important
medieval
specifically
on
treatises
Their history
the
the
of
Magna
in a fully
subsequent discussion. For
my
developed form, and
set
purposes, the next leading
figure was Roger Swyneshed, who probably wrote between 1330 and 1335, and who held controversial views about the treatment of conjunctions and
His
disjunctions.
were
doctrines
Martinus Anglicus, 2
Robert
in a favourable light by and Richard Lavenham, 3 but were
presented
Fland
otherwise generally rejected. Richard Billingham,
who became
a fellow of
Merton College, Oxford, in 1344, wrote a text on obligations which formed part of the Logica Oxoniensis, a loose collection of logic treatises which was popular in the fifteenth century, and which was printed in 4
Another Englishman, Ralph Strode, who was a fellow of Merton 1359-1360, wrote a treatise which was especially popular
England as
late as 1530.
For general Obligations: A. History
discussion
of
and further references, see E. Stump, obligations to the early fourteenth century in The Cambridge edited by N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg
From the beginning of Later Medical Philosophy,
(Cambridge
Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 315-334; and Developments in the fourteenth century ibid., pp. 335-341.
etc.:
Obligations: B.
P.V.
Spade,
,
See E.J. Ashworth, after English Obligationes Texts Roger Swyneshed: The Tracts beginning "Obligatio est quaedam in The Rise of British Logic, edited by P. Osmund Lewry, O.P. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1985), pp.311-312. ars"
See Spade, op.cit., pp.334-338. Martinus Anglicus and Robert Fland.
There
4
are
some
striking
similarities
between
For Billingham s Ars Obligatoria and the subsequent manuscript tradition, see For the Logica Oxoniensis, see L.M. de Rijk, Ashworth, English Obligationes Texts Logica Oxoniensis: An Attempt to Reconstruct a Fifteenth Century Oxford Manual of Logic Medioevo 3 (1977), pp.121-164; and E.J. Ashworth, The "Libelli Sophistarum" and the Use of Medieval Logic Texts at Oxford and Cambridge in the Early Sixteenth Century Vivarium 17 (1979), pp.134-158. .
,
,
Ashworth
408 5
in
At
Italy.
Paris,
we
Albert
find
6
of
Saxony,
whose discussion of
was
Logica particularly influential for the 7 1360 treatise of the Dutchman William Buser. In turn, Buser s treatise in
obligations
his
Perutilis
8
was heavily used in the treatise by his pupil, Marsilius of Inghen. Two Italian authors must also be mentioned. Peter of Candia, later Pope Alexander V, wrote an obligations treatise perhaps between 1370 and 1380
9
Peter of Mantua, writing between 1384 and 1392, included a long
.
on obligations
section
Logical This
his
in
the background
is
against
which Paul of Venice must be considered.
Four independent
logic treatises
have been attributed to Paul: the
12
the Quadratura; and the Sophismata Logica Parva-^ the Logica Magna; Aurea. The first two are general texts, each of which contains a section
on obligations. There but
I
shall not consider
some
also
is
it
here.
13
relevant material in the Quadratura,
Francesco Bottin has given reasons for
dating the Logica Parva 1395-96 and for dating the Logica
am
I
edition
presently preparing an edition of this text of the rest of Strode s Logica. References in
Obligationcs, in Consequentie Strodi ^
Albert
of
Olms, 1974),
Saxony, va
fol.46
Perutilis
-fol.51
etc.
in
(Venice,
.are
-fol.93
(Venetiis, 1517), fol.78
Logica
paper
to
1397-
Maieru
s
Ralph Strode,
.
Hildesheim,
1522;
A.
with
conjunction
this
Magna
New
York:
Georg
.
ra
7
For have used Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Canon.Class.Lat. 278, fol.72 -fol.78 discussion of Buser, see C.H. Kneepkens, The Mysterious Buser Again: William Buser of Heusden and the Obligationes Tract Ob Rogatum in English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries, edited by A. Maieru (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1982), pp.147-166. I
.
r
8 I
r
MS 2602, fol.70 -fol.!01 MS Canon.Class.Lat. 278,
have used Cracow, Biblioteka Jagielloriska
.
vb ra For fo!.65 -fol.69 have used Oxford, Bodleian Library the date, I have used Green-Pedersen s conjecture about the date of Peter of Candia s
9
I
Consequentiae: see N.J. Green-Pedersen, The Rise of British Logic, p.307.
Early
British
Treatises
.
on Consequences
G
G
in
viii For ii I have used Peter of Mantua, Logica (Venice, 1492), sig. -sig. the dating of his logical works, see T.E. James, Peter Alboini of Mantua: PhilosopherHumanist Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (1974), pp.161-170. .
,
Venetus, Logica (Venice, 1472; Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms, For a translation of this edition, see A.R. Perreiah, Paulus Venetus. Logica Parva (Miinchen, Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1984). I shall use the citation LP, with page references to the 1472 edition. These references are included in Perreiah s translation. Paulus
1970).
Paulus Venetus, Logica Magna (Venetiis, 1499); E.J. Ashworth, editor and translator, Venice. Logica Magna. Pan II. Fascicule 8. Tractatus de Obligationibus (printed
Paul of
Academy by the Oxford University Press, 1988). I shall use the citation with folio references to the 1499 edition. These references are included in my edition.
for the British
LM,
Paulus
Dubium
Venetus,
Quadratura
tertium, cap.6, cap.23, cap.29.
(Venetiis,
1493):
see
Dubium
secundum,
cap.ll;
Paul of Venice on Obligations 98.
14
409
is some controversy about the relationship between has even been asked whether Paul was the author of
However, there
these works; and both.
15
it
In this paper
the Logica
the Logica
on
treatise
Magna
light of what
shall first give a brief survey of the sources for
I
obligations;
have discovered, there
I
Magna and
is
and
shall then argue that, in reason to attribute both good I
same
the Logica Parva tracts on obligations to the
author.
The
first
thing to notice about the Logica
Magna
is
that despite
its
heavy dependence on other sources, it is an integrated and interesting work. It contains useful clarification of such matters as the frequent
function
of
in
ordering
16
obligational
abundance of new sophisms. For sophisms for positio seem to appear completely new
obligatio
instance, in
and
with
a
in
statement,
respondent, or a preface to
the
or
literature.
an
there
of
twenty-seven
no other source. 18
Instead or
action,
an
an
is
the
sixty
There are two
innovations. First, Paul offers a definition of
doctrinal
seems
disputations;
which
obligatio
of
of binding
act
an
identifying
some statement showing how
the
should be
it
he preferred to define an obligatio as a relation which arose when the opponent s positum was admitted by the respondent. Second, treated,
Paul
offers
suppositio,
a
somewhat novel
positio,
and
division
tripartite I
depositio.
of
obligationes
somewhat
say
novel
,
F. Bottin, Logica e filosofia naturale nelle opere di Paolo Veneto Filosofia all Universita di Padova nel Quattrocento, edited by A. Poppi alia Storia dell Universita di Padova 15. Trieste: Lint, 1983), pp.87-93.
e
into
because
in
Scienza
(Contributi
See F. del Punta and M.M. Adams, edition and translation, Paul of Venice. Logica Magna. Part II. Fascicule 6. Tractatus de Veritate et Falsitate Propositionis et Tractatus de Significato Propositionis (Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press, 1978), p.xiii: ...while the common authorship of the Logica Magna, the Logica Parva, the Sophismata, and the Quadratura is highly probable, it has not been proved with certainty.... We have found that the teachings of the Logica Parva are in any event often inconsistent with those of the Logica Magna. Perreiah, op.cit., pp.327-343, gives the strong impression that he doubts common authorship of the
Logica Parva and the Logica Magna.
For some discussion see in
Obligational Disputations: pp. 175-193.
E.J.
Some
Ashworth, The Problems of Relevance and Order Late Fourteenth Century Views Medioevo 1 (1981), ,
ra
17
These sophisms are found LM fol.l81 -fol.l89 the fourth sophism directed against the second rule), 4.6,
4.7,
4.8,
5.2,
supplementary sophism), 18
19
6.2,
6.1,
6.3,
8.1,
12.1, 12.2, 12.4.
LM foUTT*"^. LM fol.!78va -fol.l79 ra
.
8.3,
vt>
9.3,
The new sophisms
.
3.1,
9.4,
3.2,
9.5,
3.4,
10.3,
3.5,
3.7,
10.4,
are:
2.4
(i.e.
4.2,
4.3,
4.4,
10.4A
(i.e.
a
Ashworth
410
references
Mantua;
to
20
casus in Burley and
make
found
are
suppositio
Ockham.
21
Nor
the as
situation
The main
true.
to
agreed
respondent
background of assumed
fact.
is
links with that of
accept
a
set
to
obligatio in
of
description
would then be
obligatio
was
a category of which Paul
it
was a kind of preliminary
real use. Briefly, suppositio
which
Billingham, Strode and Peter of
in
and because the notion seems to have close
the
initial
against
this
22 However, Paul himself wrote:
In what follows, I shall not discuss the first species of obligatio, unless perhaps accidentally in the context of a positio or depositio, nor are since it is not a sentence used to test logical skills <
>,
misleading disputations produced through the Logica
In
Magna Paul combines
it.
discussion with long
original
paraphrases or even straightforward quotations from earlier sources, a technique which doubtless enabled him to produce a work so enormously 23
However,
long.
is
certainty
the
Albert of Saxony.
24
Burley and Swyneshcd
figures as
To some
extent the situation
source
direct
earliest
can
with
establish
the material which relates to such
All
also found in Albert, Buser or Strode.
is
the
is
one
same with
respect to Billingham and
the Logica Oxoniensis, but here there are a few places in which Paul uses 25 examples found only in some version of the Logica Oxoniensis. William Buser is an important source, especially for the discussion of
rules or
26
sophisms; 20
G
suppositio
Library
MS
is
Ralph Strode. This
Billingham, Ars faObligatoria, Salamanca University v Strode has the word suppono op.cit., sig.
Richard
of Mantua,
word
but the most important overall
appears
Canon. misc.219,
.
in
at
one
least
fol.37
of
the
v
MS ,
1735,
foLg9
op.cit.,
fol.78
see
Oxford,
manuscripts:
is
,
so
Peter
;
but the Bodleian
.
21
For Burley, see Stump, op.cit., p.322. Tor Ockham, see William Ockham, Summa I. St. Bonaventure, Logicae, edited by P. Boehner, G. Gal, S. Brown (Opera Philosophica N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1974), pp.735-736. ra 22 This is my translation of LM, fol.!79 .
For 24 II.
25
Cf.
full details,
Punta
Del
Fascicule
I
refer the reader to s
notes on
my
forthcoming edition: see note
sources
the
for
12.
Paul of Venice. Logica Magna.
Part
6.
V
is found in ) Oxford, in examples on LM fol.lgl in fol.22 of two relation to the third rule for dissimilars are reminiscent ibid., sophisms
For
instance,
the
Library
MS
Bodleian
tenth
rule
Lat.misc.e
for
79,
depositio r
fol.23
;
(LM
and
fol.!91
the
.
26
Given
the
similarities
between
Buser
and
Marsilius
of
Inghen,
one
might
Kneepkens offers reasons for thinking that Paul followed Buser: Kneepkens, op.cit., pp. 161-164. Kneepkens view is borne out by my own observations. For instance, Paul nowhere mentions Marsilius characteristic division of obligatio into positio, depositio, and dubie positio; and in at least one place where Marsilius and Buser offer different solutions to a sophism, it is Buser whom Paul
wonder whether Paul had used
Marsilius.
Paul of Venice on Obligations with
not
respect
Of
themselves.
the thirty-three sophisms for positio
the
to
sophisms I have
whose sources
and of these, eight are found only
traced, nineteen are found in Strode, 27
but
discussion
theoretical
to
only
41 1
Of five sophisms for both Peter and Paul, Peter provides the only source I know for three. 28 Moreover, of Paul s twelve rules for depositio, all but in
Strode.
Peter of Candia was another source.
positio found
in
two are found
29
Paul has largely adopted of the and and three rules, Paul s rules seven, wording examples; eight and nine, are unique to Peter of Candia. Finally, there is Peter of Mantua. He was not a strong influence; but there are various passages in Peter
Peter of Candia.
explicitly in
s
which Paul seems to be drawing on his text. 30 Let us now turn to the Logica Parva. At obvious feature of the Logica Parva
Like
Oxoniensis.
the
on various
treatises
31
Parva and
Oxoniensis,
in the
loose
a
is
it
was
as
32
collection
of
particularly striking, at least with
is
In the Logica Oxoniensis the standard
follows:
1.
Introductory
definitions of key terms. 2. Rules for positio. 3.
Sophisms and rules Interchangeable
for
for
6.
conjunctions
and
including
for positio. 4.
Sophisms and disjunctions.
5.
and dissimilar propositions. 7. Paul of Venice omits the section on
Similar
for depositio.
disjunctions,
outline exactly. This does not
section,
conjunctions
posited
propositions.
Sophisms and rules posited
most
in
Logica Oxoniensis
contents
of
the
logical topics,
summulae
respect to the table of contents. list
blush,
and like the Logica Oxoniensis it opens which terms, propositions and syllogisms are The resemblance between the obligations tracts in the Logica
with a brief discussed.
Logica
first
close relationship to the Logica
its
is
but
he
otherwise
mean, however,
follows
this
that the contents of each
section are the same. In fact, there are considerable differences.
The
first
difference concerns the introduction. Paul has substituted
Albert of Saxony
follows: see
27 28 o O zv
The
The
LM
LM
definition of
s
obligatio
ra
fol.l90
Marsilius, op.cit., fol.94 in
Strode are
Peter of Candia,
in
Billingham
1 ;
2.2, 2.3, 3.3,
three found only in Peter of Candia are v3 -vfl ;
found
r ;
eight found only
fol.191
for that
Buser,
3.5A, 5.3, 10.1, 10.2,
3.6, 5.4,
op.cit., fol.69
op.cit., fol.77
and
*.
and
12.3.
9.2.
ra -vh .
LM
For instance, foi.178 draws on Peter of Mantua, op.cit., sig. the distinction between concedenda participialiter and concedenda nominaliter
.
31
LPpp.[l]-[30].
32
For some reason
I
denied
this in
English Obligationes Texts
,
p.317.
G
ii
for
Ashworth
412
and the Logica Oxoniensis. Moreover, unlike Billingham, who mentioned both impositio and suppositio, but like all the other versions of the Logica Oxoniensis, Paul gives just two kinds of obligatio, namely positio and depositio. In both these respects the Logica Parva is unlike the Logica Magna where, as I have already pointed out, we find a completely
new
and where suppositio as a type of obligatio is Alan Perreiah finds these differences length.
definition of obligatio,
discussed
some
at 34
significant,
but
mere
six lines,
such
relatively
do
I
and
not.
this
The Logica Parva
marginal
notions
as
is
very brief, a
Furthermore,
suppositio.
Magna was written
believe, the Logica
introduction
alone would preclude the paying of attention to
after the
why Paul should not have changed his mind about appropriate way of defining obligatio. Instead of continuing Albert of Saxony, he developed his own view of the matter. reason
When one
as
if,
Logica Parva, there the to
is
I
no
most follow
turns to the sets of rules and sophisms, one again finds
between the Logica Parva and the Logica Oxoniensis On considerable, though I shall not pause to demonstrate this here. Parva and the the between the the other hand, Logica Logica relationship that the difference is
Magna
is
basis of his
very close.
This relationship was noted by Perreiah, on the
comparison of the rules.
He
wrote:
The treatment
of obligations in the two works thus reveals a close Apart from the initial definition and typology of obligations which are markedly different in the two works, the rules of obligation including the examples used to illustrate them are strikingly close. Because the Logica Parva expressions are normally simpler and briefer and because of a reduction of the number of to rules in several groups, the Logica Parva account would appear derive either from the Logica Magna treatment or more likely from a source which both works nave in common. kinship.
I
have two points to make about Perreiah s claims. First, if Bottin is Magna is later than the Logica Parva and there is hence
right, the Logica
no question of the former serving
as
source for the
latter.
Second, an
Magna and the Logica be absurd to explain by
investigation of the sources for both the Logica
Parva 33
reveals
a
Albert of Saxony,
situation
op.cit.,
which
^1.46^; LP
it
would
p.[118].
Perreiah, op.cit., pp.340-341.
The
material
relevant
Obligationes Texts
.
36 Perreiah, op.cit., p.343.
for
making
a
comparison
is
found
in
Ashworth,
English
Paul of Venice on Obligations
413
some as yet unknown intermediate source. mean by looking at each section of the Logica Parva
I
postulating
what
I
there are the rules for positio.
First,
are nine; in the Logica
Magna
31
shall
illustrate
in turn.
In the Logica Parva there
there are twelve. Rules three and five of
the Logica
Magna
are both included in rule three of the Logica Parva and
rules four
and
of the Logica
six
Magna
are both included in rule four of
the Logica Parva. Rule ten of the Logica
Magna appears
as a corollary to
rule seven of the Logica Parva. However, the ordering of the rules is otherwise exactly the same. This is significant, because I know of no
other source with just that ordering.
38
Moreover, rule one
to the effect that every possible proposition should
normally put forward as a
though
it
both works,
be admitted, was not
was a generally acknowledged
and rule
ten, the corollary to rule seven in the 39 not a standard rule either. It comes from Ralph Strode.
principle;
was
rule,
in
Logica Parva,
Second, there are the sophisms for positio. There are just ten of these
in
the
40
Nine of the ten are found
Magna.
Logica Parva,
as
compared in the
to
the
of the Logica
sixty
Logica Magna.
Of
these nine,
three are popular sophisms found in most sources; three are found
Strode and is
most one other source; one
at
closely related to a sophism of Strode
s;
is
found
and one
in
Strode alone; one
is
only in the Logica
Magna. The remaining sophism is very close to one found Candia, another of the known sources for the Logica Magna. Third, there 37
is
ra
LM
fol.l79
in
the section on interchangeable propositions.
ra
-fol.!80
;
LP
is
Peter of
41
There
pp.
">0
Perreiah, op.cit., p.341, points out that the Logica Parva rules omit the phrase He believes this to be important, but I scitum esse tale infra tempus obligationis think it could be explained by the brevity of the text. In the Logica Magna s treatment .
of sophisms 39 Strode,
The
little
seems to hinge on the presence or absence of the phrase
op.cit.,
fol.VS^.
relations are as follows:
Sophism
1
(LP
p.[122])
is
of Mantua. Sophism 2 (LP p.[123]) (following Strode) Peter ra Candia, op.cit., fol.67 Sophism 3 (LP p.[124]) is
LM
.
Sophism 4 (LP
in question.
LM
and found
LM is
found in Strode and one in Peter of found in Strode alone.
1.1,
similar to
3.3,
a variety of sources. Sophism 5 7.1 and found in a variety of sources. Sophism 6 (LP p.[126]) is p.[125]) is 9.1 and is found in Albert of Saxony and Strode. Sophism 7 (LP p. [127]) is
LM
found found
in
p.[125])
is
4.1
in
Strode and the Logica Oxoniensis. Sophism 8 (LP p.[128])
LM
is
LM LM 11.1
(LP 8.2
and and
Sophism 9 (LP p.[128]) is LM 12.1 and is similar to a sophism in Strode. Sophism 10 (LP p.[129]) is LM 12.2. For full references, see my edition cited in note 12. In the case of sophism 3, Perreiah s punctuation (op.cit., pp.218-219) obscures the sense. It should read: I posit to you this proposition: "You run and You do not run is to be conceded by you". 41
in
LP
a variety of sources.
pp.[129]-[134].
Ashworth
414
is
Logica Magna, and the
in the
no such separate section
six rules
found
in Logica Parva are not in the Logica Magna. Nor do they feature in here a case have so we I that authors know, may any of the other which Paul included new material in the Logica Parva, only to change his in the
mind about
its
Be
value before he wrote the Logica Magna.
may, the bulk of the section on interchangeable propositions the discussion of one sophism, I posit to you: "There is a
human being
is
a
donkey
are
interchangeable".
is
that as
it
devoted to
God and A
This sophism
is
discussed
in three separate places in the Logica Magna, and the third discussion, which owes a great deal to the long and elaborate discussion found in
extremely long and elaborate, occupying one whole page in 42 the 1499 edition. My hunch is that Buser inspired Paul s interest in the is itself
Buser,
this interest in the
sophism, that Paul indulged
worked
The fully
more
through the material yet fourth section
discussed
is
fully in
on similars and
is
dissimilars.
also discussed in the Logica
the sophism mentioned previously,
it
Logica Parva, and that he
the Logica
Magna
Magna. 43
The one sophism
at length and,
like
44
The
derives from William Buser.
the Logica package of rules is the same in both the Logica Parva and in any of be found is to no such and neatly organized package Magna; the other sources that I know.
The
final section
is
on
45
Here the Logica Parva has
depositio.
five
where the Logica Magna has twelve. Of the Logica Magna rules, the first two appear as general principles rather than as rules in the sources. Rule three of the Logica Magna is rule one of the Logica Parva. Rules rules
four and ten of the Logica
Magna
are included in rule two of the Logica
Parva; rules five and six are included in rule three; and rules seven and nine in rule four. Most of rule twelve is captured by rule five of the in Logica Parva. Rule eight of the Logica Magna, which also appears of Peter of Candia, does not appear in the Logica Parva .^ Rule eleven
the Logica
Magna appears
a definition given after the rules in the
as
Logica Parva. Apart from the placing of the Logica twelve, the content and ordering is virtually the
LM foLlTB*;
1
1
foI.lSO"
*; fol.lSS va
LP
pp.[134]-[138];
44
LP
fol.76 pp.[134]-[135]; Buser, op.cit.,
45
46
fol.l90
Buser, rb
"*;
43
LM
same
-fol.!91
-fol.75
op.cit., fol.74
.
vb
ra
-fol.77
LM foLWl^-foUM*; LP pp.[138]-[142]. LM 01.191^; Peter of Candia, op.cit.,
;
LM
va fol.!90
"
.
rules ten
in
va
va
3
"
42
Magna
.
and
both cases.
Paul of Venice on Obligations
While
415
have already argued that Peter of Candia was the main source for the Logica Magna rules, he was not responsible for their ordering. I
depositio.
are
there
Finally,
One
four
sophisms
the Logica Parva
in
section
on
of these features in the Logica Oxoniensis but not in the
A
47
second is given a different wording in the Logica but the discussion, which largely derives from Peter of Candia, is
Magna
Logica
Magna
,
same. 48 The remaining two sophisms appear 49 Magna, and they both come from Strode. exactly the
To sum
up: the pattern of sources for the Logica Parva
of obligations
Magna
Logica
in
is
s
the
exactly
same
We
treatment.
as
the
pattern
the Logica
treatment
s
of sources
for
the
find Albert of Saxony, Buser, the Logica
The rules given are generally standard rules, but their organization is idiosyncratic, and common to both the Logica Magna and the Logica Parva. The sophisms in the Logica Oxoniensis, Strode and Peter of Candia.
Parva are nearly all found in the Logica Magna. Given these facts, I would be astounded to discover that the same man had not compiled both treatises. Whether similar conclusions can be drawn for other parts of the Logica Parva remains to be seen.
University of Waterloo
47
Antichristus
non
est
albus
Oxoniensis, see English restored to the text found there.
Logica 48
Tu
homo
es
est
homo
animal
:
vel
tu
49
Aliquae op.cit.,
fol.192
fol.89 ;
propositiones .
Tu
es
et
Antichristus
Romae
es
LM fol.191
vel
Obligationes
-fol.192
:
.
LP
Strode, op.cit., fol.89
.
tibi
,
p.326.
pp.[139]-[140];
Peter of Candia,
non sunt simul verae
omne
coloratus
est
Texts
depositum
:
est
LP
:
Tu
LP a
non
should be
Romae
es
va
op.cit., fol.69
For the
p.[140].
The word
vel
aliquis
.
ra
LM
p.[140]; te negandum
fol.192 :
LP
;
Strode,
p.[141];
LM
NAIDA ANNA BACCIN
Homerus
estpoeta:
un caso
di prcdicazionc
secundum accidens
Con del
distinzione tra predicazione
la
CLVOLL
verbo
il
passo
Kcttf
21 a 25-28
auTO De
ancor oggi un oggetto di complesse discussioni. Non voglio addentrarmi nel problcma
Kara
e
del
Interpretatione
dell interpretazione
costituisce
del testo
la traduzione boeziana, della quale si greco, ma mi limitero a proporne awalgono commentatori medievali: Verum autem dicere de aliquo et simpliciter, ut quendam hominem hominem aut quendam alburn hominem album; non semper autem, sed quando in adiecto quidem aliquid oppositorum inest quae consequitur sed falsum est, ut mortuum hominem contradictiq, non verum hominem dicere, quando autem non inest, verum. Vel etiam quando inest quidem semper non verum, quando vero non inest, non semper verum, ut Homerus est aliquid. ut poeta. ergo etiam est an non? secundum accidens enim praedicatur esse de poeto est, sed non secundum se, Homcro; quoniam praedicatur de Homero quoniam est. i
<enim>
Nella prima parte del capitolo undicesimo del De Interpretatione si sono delineate le condizioni d inferenza da un enunciate con predicazione disiunctim
da e si
al
corrispondenteco/im/icf/w: est
"Socrates
da
inferire:
L inferenza non
si
per esempio, da
dato infenire
coniunctim
1
Per
la
posteriore
a
pu6
est
inverso,
est
homo
albus".
tuttavia generalizzare, senza
"Socrates
est
bonus"
bonus
ossia
e da
"Socrates
veda
in
opportune est
restrizioni:
citharedus"
non e
citharedus".
d inferenza
quello
una disiunctim, presenta analoghe
difficolta si
albus"
"Socrates
"Socrates
caso
II
est
"Socrates
puo
homo"
CLVOLL degli usi di e particolare: S. Knuuttila in
da
una
restrizioni.
predicazione L inferenza
e nella tradizione filosofica Hintikka, The Logic of Being, Reidel:
Aristotele J.
Dordrecht 1986. 2
Cfr.
A.M.S. Boetii Commentarii
Meiser, Lipsiae 1877, pp. 370, 373.
in
librum Aristotelis
ITepc Epfrnvet occ;,
II
ed.,
rec.
Un caso non e
una qualche forma
ci sia
quando
valida,
-
della predicazione
componenti
secundum accidens
di predicazione
oppositio
opposizione tra
di
le parti
-
adiecto
in
417
-
oppure quando passi da una predicazione
si parafrasando con una terminologia moderna con il verbo esse in accezione puramente copulativa -
sua accezione
alia
esistenziale.
testo
II
due
dunque
complesse come dall accezione
inferenza
(ossia
da
A
est
sua scia
sulla
B
A
ad
in
Nel
est).
di
et C,
De
De
del
ossia
esse
A
ergo
est
convinzioni
da
inferenza
A
et
est C, e
sua forma esistenziale
alia
Sophisticis Elenchis*
nuovo accomunati e
i
due schemi
classificati
come
4
tende
si
Interpretation
1
B
accomuna
-
nostre
le
differenti:
B
di
tardo-antica
dall esegesi
undicesimo
est
secundum quid et simpliciter.
casi $\ fallacia
Fin
A
medievale
esegesi
secondo
che,
copulativa
d inferenza vengono
validi
1
sostanzialmente
appaiono
predicazioni
non
e
d inferenza,
tipi
semantiche,
1
-
greco
alia
connettere
a
il
secundum
fallacia
passo et
quid
simpliciter degli Elenchi, secondo una linea, che tende a sviluppare una
tradizione
comune
Nel medioevo da
due opere.5
alle I
esempio
"Homerus est
spiega con la contaminazione tra
Ci6 forse
si
forniti nel
De
"Quod
non
poeta"
che e ricondotto a
"Homerus est in opinione",
est, est opinabile,
di "Homerus est
ergo
i
est poeta,
"Homerus
Interpretatione:
6
In ogni
est".
viene a volte sostituito
"Homerus est opinabilis".
due seguenti esempi, ergo
modo
una maggiore uniformita nella trattazione dei due valida o fallacia secundum quid. Sembra infatti che
in
entrambi
natura della determinazione, che funge da predicato
o
da
*
predicato
De Sophisticis Elenchis Occam
c.5,
("est
homo
mortuus"),
a
e
("est
i
ad
non
di inferenza
tipi
la
parte
est"
trasformazione
in "Homerus est in opinione/opinabilis" porta
poeta"
del
Homerus la
casi sia
opinabilis")
condizionare
la
167a sgg.
la necessita di precisare che la fallacia secundum quid et due modi: un modo, per cui si passa da est tertium adiacens ad est secundum adiacens; un secondo modo, per cui parte eiusdem extremi, vel a compositione sumpta cum determinatione, arguitur ab aliquo sumpto cum addito ad ipsummet sumptum sine addito". (Si veda: Guillelmi de Ockham, Expositio super libros Elenchorum in: Opera Philosophica et Theologica, III, ed. F. del Punta, St. Bonaventure
Tuttavia gia
simpliciter
si
sente
articola in
"a
University 1979, p. 54). 5
Cfr. S. Ebbesen, "The dead man is alive", Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle s
in:
Synthese,
40 (1979),
Sophistici Elenchi,
v.L,
p. 43 e idem, Leiden 1981, p.
171. 1
L esempio
di
inferenza
dato talvolta nella versione:
non
valida
"Chimera
"Quod
non
est opinabilis,
ergo
est, est".
est
opinabile,
ergo
est"
viene
Baccin
418
era piuttosto
poeta"
ad
inferenze coniunctim-disitmctim
di
possibilita
1
in
(mentre
est
"Homerus
uso contestuale a decidcre del senso da annettere
est).
entrano in gioco nella spiegazione dei due tipi non di e diminuens di detenninatio d inferenza: quella quella
Due validi
nozioni
detrahens
determinatio
come
mortuus
dcterminazione
homo
alter!
"Socrates
(distraint]
mentre
il
L
distrahens.
comunemente,
piu
o,
fondamentale e che in espressioni
homo
est
come
mortuus",
la
termine
del
significato
idea
est
in
determinazione attenui (diminuit) o indebolisca il grado opinione", essere espresso dalla copula. Si ammette infatti che il verbo esse,
di
-
delerminato
,
in
espressioni
"Homerus
la
in
almeno presenza di certa determinazioni, pcrda importo esistenziale - e che di indebolito un a nel senso di esse extra grado designare passi -
1
essere, quale
A
comportino uniscono.
8
1
Se
accetta la
si
e
Vimpositio assai
irripetibile
problematico
cui
per
secolo,
("voces
acccttare
,
il
significato
per
che,
dei
dei
suis
csempio,
su
ossia
cui
termini,
diffusa nella
non cadunt a
-
poiche pare che esse
significato
comunemente
tesi,
9
tredicesimo
del
distrahentes
-
adiccto
in
sostanziale
alterazionc
e soprattutto dalle quaestiones,
determinazioni
sulle
focalizzata
e
tuttavia,
che implicano un oppositio
quelle
del
commenti
giudicare dai
attenzione
1
essere mcntale, quello immaginato e cosi via.
1
si
seconda meta
termini
6
fisso
significatis"),
e
diventa
neU espressione
homo
- manca - "Homerus est una predicazione, che rimandi poeta" esempio originate mentale o che esprima una qualchc no/.ione di modalita, e dunque li si di Boezio, secondo cui cio di cui si asserisce prcferisce mantencre la spiegazione cssere non e quanto e designate dal soggctto, ma dal predicate poeta). In altri commenti c e una netta distinzione tra il caso di oppositio in adiecto e quello di classificati come casi di predicazione predicazione accidentale, poiche entrambi vcngono con una nozione diminuens: come opinibalis diminuisce il senso di est in "Chimera est cosi fa mortuus nei riguardi di homo o pictus rispetto ad homo o ad animal opinabilis", Tractatus Called Afterwards Summule Logicales, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Petrus
Ncll
al
piano
1
Hispanus,
(cfr.
Assen 1972,
p. 158.
1
S.
9
Ebbesen,
Cfr.
History
J.
"The
dead man
Pinborg,
of
is
alive",
op.
cit.,
pp. 43-7.
Problems of Semantic Representation in Medieval Logic", in H. Parrel, Thought and Contemporary Linguistics a cura di
"Some
Linguistic
Berlino-New York 1976. Idem, Ebbesen,
"The
contributions in
a
English
"The
to
sophisma"
dead the in:
contribution man",
cit.;
discussion
the
to
H.A.G.
on univocal
Medieval Semantics and
Logic",
Synthese
Braakhuis,
40
"Kilwardby
(1979),
versus
pp.
Bacon?
19^2;
The
of being and non-being found de Metaphysics. Studies Dedicated to L.M.
signification
et Niimega, 1985; A. de Libera, "Roger Bacon and Semantics from the End of the 12th Century to the time of Ockham and Burleigh. Acts of the 4th European 1981. Symposium on Mediaeval Logic and Semantics, a cura di Braakhuis, Niimega
Rijk, a cura di Bos, Artistarium Suppl. 2,
le
probleme de Tappellatio
univoca",
in:
English Logic
Un caso mortuus
vivum
-
congiunzione con
in
sccundum accidens
perda
mantenere una
nell impossibilita di di esse
homo
termine
il
di predicazione
suo
il
419
originario
significato,
delle sue proprieta essenziali
la
-
quella
determinazione mortuum.
Se dunque si condivide la tesi della fissita del significato, occorre individuare un interpretazione semantica, capace di render conto di cio che awiene in espressioni come homo mortuus ed anche, in diversa misura, di cio che determina
come
est
"Homerus
Tra
opinione".
i
sostenitori
della
tesi
"radicale"
trovano alcuni esponenti di quella che permanenza in particolare Pietro d Alvernia e ha chiamato modista: Pinborg logica del significato
della J.
in
accezione indebolita di esse in espressioni,
1
Simone
di
si
Faversham.
mi occupero delPargomento relativamente ad alcune di Pietro d Alvernia; ricorrero anche ad un questioni In Perihermeneias In questa sede
passo, tratto dal
commento
di
Tommaso
Erfurt In Perihermeneias
di
Infme attraverso alcune delle argomentazioni
1
a
individuare
potra
di
esigenza
secondo
il
linee
larghe le
garantire
modello degli Analitici
una nuova
si
semantiche
e
scelte
Posteriori.
secundum quid o con oppositio
in adiecto
riflessione sulla teoria del singificato?
e che considerare
fatto
le
e plausibile chiedersi: perche la presenza nel linguaggio di
Ordunque
II
tra
da Rodolfo Brito 12
condizioni fondamentali del sapere scientifico,
predicazioni con determinazioni esige
nesso
il
tratte
n .
sostanzialemente
differente in
significato di
il
un termine quale homo
un espressione come
"x
est
homo
mortuus"
da quello in espressioni del tipo est homo" equivale ad ammettere che un cambiamento contestuale - quale la presenza della determinazione mortuum - o un mutamento di referenza - nel caso di est homo "x
"x
variabile
la
mortuus"
come
x
varia su
un dominio
di
enti
-
nel passato
non
solo, aspetta, possano cambiare le condizioni di verita, ma la stessa struttura semantica dei termini. Cio viola la tesi della fissita del ci
si
significato dei termini
nozioni di
tempo o
ed anche quella della
di modalita,
totale indifferenza dei
come insegna
il
nomi a
secondo capitolo del De
Interpretatione^
Si sono esaminati il Ms. F = Firenze, Ms. P = Paris BN lat. 16170.
11
12
Ms. L = Ms.
UB Leipzig
Vat. lat.
Cfr.
communi
distribuat
Ms.
B
Laur. S.Croce Plut. XII Sin.3 e
il
1356.
2141 e Ms. Vat.
Pietro
il
d Alvernia,
lat.
3061.
"Utrum quaestio signum universale additum ipsum pro suppositis presentibus, preteritis et futuris" (Ms.
terminis F,
f.lOrb
Baccin
420
Una
soluzione praticabilc potrcbbc consistere ncl mantencre
dell immutabilita
del
termini
significato,
delle
e
della suppositio
ratione
essendi.
logica
terministica
a
sviluppando,
loro
mezzi della
ai
una
volta,
di
logica
tipo dalla
costituita
appunto portante connotazione dei termini e non dalla loro funzione denotativa. intensionale,
Cio comporta che certe
espressioni,
verbo esse vada cercata
La nozione, termini
cui
piano dei
si
fa
-
analoghi:
tanto
di
I
ed
i
che cio che
pictus
prius-posterius e
&3\Vimpositio
est similis
-
rientra,
di
una
est
mortuus":
est
gia
(Homo termine
il
significati
secondari sussiste sempre una
mette
quondam
attributionern): nel caso
una relazione
in
di
continuita
fuit
materia
homini
sulla
la
"
La relazione
hominis".
tra
pura somiglianza pittorica
vero").
conta,
piu
cosi
dire,
nel
tale
relazione
"programma
un opportuna determinazione o nell atto
inscritta
quod terminus communis
la
e
fissata
del
semantico" -
nel caso del
funzione significativa,
dell imposizione,
substantialis
sicut
homo
che
in
non
ratione
nullum".
"Die Logik der Modistae", Studio Meditwistyczne, 16 (1975), pp.39-97; idem, Problems of Semantic Representation in Medieval Logic", cit., pp.263-4.
Pietro d Alvernia, q. Si sequatur: Sor f.lOva 20-1.
a
analoghi sono regolati secondo una relazione
per
di
uniti
secondario
significalo ("Homo
un opportune contesto modifica
regola,
"Intelligendum
sua tempus includit
vivus);
un
a
mentre
vivus che a quello di cadaver).
che
cio
e,
La presenza
verbo esserc
rimandano
homo
fonda invece
si
significati dei termini
secondo
un
di
tipi
verbo esse) vanno
il
infatti
homo
a
del
dei referenti.
analogia. Alcuni
vivo con quella di cadaverc sia la materia:
quod
pictus,
termine.
essi
se,
ad
concetto di
al
enim de cadavere quod
homo ed homo
55-6):
per
somiglianza (secundum
homo sembra nozione di uomo di
("Homo
non
di
"aberrante"
occorrenze
certe
di
di
quella
cadaver), oppure ad entrambi
qualche forma
di
di
presi
significato primario
dicitur
e
homo rimanda
homo rimanda il
significati e
ricorso
primario (es.: determinazioni rimandano
certe
Tra
predicativa,
sul
significato
mortuus
o
termini di sostanze corruttibili ed
i
(tutti
considerati
spiegazione del comportamento
la
funzione
in
de
diminutio
di
e
struttura
la tesi
tecnica
la
espressioni con
le
nozioni
sembrano rinunciare
modisti
i
14
cui
la
temiinonim
contenenti
comunque
Tuttavia
attraverso
nell analizzare
altre proprieties
o
distrahentes
c
est
homo
mortuus, ergo Sor
est
"Some
homo, Ms.
F,
Un caso dunque
implica
mutamento
il
sccundum accidens
di predicazionc
del
e
significato
421
reversibilita
la
dell impositio.
La nozione
di analogia
trattazione uniforme
adiecto
e
di
nell oppositio
il
in
di
tipo
adiecto
un
offre
altro vantaggio:
riconduce ad una
different! casi di predicazione
predicazione e
predicazioni
due
i
secundwn
chc
termine,
e
quid.
Cio
viene
con oppositio in nelle due
muta
che
interessato
dall analogia:
sempre un nome, che entra a comporre
il
predicate, ad essere analogo (homo), mentre nella predicazione accidentale
e analogo
il
verbo esse.
Occorre precisare che la soluzione, che si awale del criterio di come vedremo analogia, non e adottata da tutti i modisti: mentre alcuni nel caso di Rodolfo Brito
-
da quello esposto,
come
altri,
Paccolgono,
ma di
Sigieri
commento boeziano. 16 Tommaso
in
senso notevolmente diverse
Courtrai,
ripetono
il
vecchio
Erfurt riporta tanto la spiegazione
di
boeziana che quella fondata sull analogia e dell invenzione di quest ultima 17 attribuisce il merito ad Ammonio. Non e possibile in questa sede esaminare tutte le conseguenze di quest uso della nozione di analogia 1 ^;
mi limitero ad alcune considerazioni. verbo
esse,
del
usi
gli
ha
il
vantaggio
verbo;
di garantire
ambiti,
gli
per
interessata da nozioni di modalita di
seconda intenzione
II
modello analogico, applicato
una pur tenue forma
esempio,
in
("Chimera est
cui
la
di unita tra
predicazione
opinabilis")
("Homerus est in opinione")
al
e
o da termini
vengono esaminati
alia
luce dei significati secondari del verbo esse, che rappresentano, per cosi
che vuol dire che, per esempio, la di "Chimera est opinabilis, ergo Chimera non e dovuta alia netta separazione tra un uso puramente copulative ed uno esistenziale di gradi indeboliti
dire,
di
essere.
II
falsita
esse,
est"
ma
al
passaggio illegittimo da un grado forte d esistenza ad uno
debole.
Sigieri di Courtrai inserisce
comunque a qucsto proposito un rimando ad Ammonio. van Kortrijk, Commentator van Perihermeneias. Inleidende studie en tekstuitgave door C. Verhaak S.J. Verhandelingen von de koninklijke vlaamse academic voor wetenschappen, letteren en schone kunsten van Belgie. Klasse der Letteren. Cfr.
Zeger
Jaargang XXVI, 1964, n.52. Brussel 1964, p.143. 17
Ms.
18
L, f.26ra 80.
Va anche
nei testi del
Inoltre part. -
an.
detto che non dodicesimo secolo.
nelle
640b
si
tratta
di
un idea totalmente originale: era gia presente
opere biologiche di Aristotele (De gen. 726b 24, 734b 25, 735a 8; De 412b 14; ma anche: Meteor. IV, c.12 389b 31) si trovano alcuni passi
36,
del resto citati dai modisti
-
sull
equivocita dei termini di sostanze corruttibili.
Baccin
422
La
non
teoria
comunque
priva
di
di
esse,
che
viene
extra!
E
e
primario
significato
esse
dall espressione
in
re
ambiguita.
infatti
il
indicate
genericamente
suo importo
il
Qual e
csisten/.iale
(esse
in
oppure il suo riferimcnto ad essenze in atto? Alcuni passi della lettcratura modista sembrano attribuirc al significato primario di esse un
effectu}
csistcnziale.
importo
che
ritiene
il
ncll esscre
19
Tuttavia
significato
o
pcnsato
immaginato
contrapposizione
al significato
Pcrtanto
extra
Vesse
non
ma
secundum adiacens,
proposito della
fallacia
sia
(cs.:
ncl
csaurisi
dell analogia,
che
qucllo est
"Chimera 1
come
"Homcrus
in
est
esse
come
Tommaso
opinione,
in
cssere extramentale.
puro
chc
csistere
consistc
opinabilis"),
esistenziale
va intcso nclla sua contrapposizione
vicne confermata da un passo di
ipotesi
dottrina
la
esse
di
primario, chc dcsigna
puo
mcntali o fantastichc, tanto
L
sosticnc
chi
sccondario
essere di
o
entita
allc
dell essenza.
Erfurt,
che,
ergo Homerus
a
est",
afferma:
Omne ...
enim
Et ratio
verbum
"est"
effectu
et
quocumque In ogni
che
oppinione diminuit de ratione essendi absoluta subiecti est ista: quod secundum quod dicit Armonius hoc est terminus analocus, quia prius supponit pro esse in essentie el per consequens pro esse in anima et pro in
alia
modo
rinviare
1
le
secundum e
alio esse.
fa applicazione del concetto di analogia al verbo esse non tradizionali difficolta, che sussistono nel rapporto tra
tertium adiacens, alle
nuove nozioni
di significato
primario e
secondario del verbo esse. Notevoli pcrplessita affiorano anche nell applicazione dcWanalogia termini di sostanza corruttibile, di
mondo
sostanze fisiche del
significato,
different!
ma
anche
^ J.
Si
veda
Pinborg,
pp.260 sgg. 20
Ms.
21
la
distinzione
L espressione
ai
nomi
perche sussiste un etcrogeneita profonda tra termine homo annovera, per esempio, secondo suoi significati secondari, individui, che sono in
i
umane (homo
"Bezeichnung
i
sublunare verrebbero a possedere piu di un
potenza uomini, individui nel passato
sembianze
tutti
i
11
analogati.
Pietro d Alvernia, tra
come homo: non solo perche
21
pictus).
= (
cadaveri),
Ordunque,
ma
in
due accezioni di esse in effectu nella q. 56 In An.Pr. in der Logik des XIII. Jahrhunderts", Misc. Med., 8 (1971),
tra in
anche immagini e che modo, se non
ricorrc piu volte nella letteratura modista.
L, f.26rb 20-3.
Pietro d Alvernia, Ms. F, f.lOva 17-20.
Un caso puramentc equivoce statua?
si
di predicazione
sccundum accidens
di
puo parlarc
per un immagine o una
"uomo"
22
La quanto
scelta
di
di
tradurre
in
una
trovare
potrebbe
estensionale
problcmi di teoria del significato anche sua comoda interpretazione a livello
Alcuni tra
modisti non accettano
i
mantenendo
concetto
il
di
con
fmisce
terminonim,
proprieties
significato di aspetti difficilmente riconducibili
pur
conseguenze della
le
Uno
della logica terministica.
materiale (id
quod
della
permanenza
risulti
de
significatur),
proprio quello
sermonis
virtute
una semantica, che
ottiene
egli
di analogia.
nettamente due accezioni
significant,
Rodolfo Brito. Distinguendo nella (significatum ut significatum) ed uno
che uno dei concetti, che
pro
e,
agli sviluppi consueti
una continua reimposizione dei nomi, ma che dei supposita una condizione imprescindibile per la verita quindi naturale
radicale
tesi
ratio
necessita di
e
il
di questi e
un elemento formale
significatio
caricare
il
ad unita.
sviluppando una semantica per certi versi piu affine
Ed
423
Nella
q.
eius
primario
si
degli enunciati.
trova
a ridiscutere
Utrum terminus analogus 2^ Autore
significato
terminus analogus: una,
di
evita la
fa dell esistenza
1
stet
separa
come
nel caso di
termine ha piu significati, ma secondo una relazione di sanus, prius-posterius; la seconda e quella dei termini come homo, che hanno un in cui
solo
il
significato
e
che
impropriamente
sono
impiegati
per
designare
o semplici immagini. Questa seconda non e una vera e propria analogia, ma solo una certa forma di similitudo o di attributio, che viene delta analogia solo in senso lato e che non ne possiede le individui morti
caratteristiche.
permettere espressioni fare con
homo
con
"programmato"
linguistico,
il
una vaga idea
solo
di
linguistico
come homo
un
coincide
Pertanto
alPuso
homo
pictus o
deminutus.
Si
nell imposizione; il
si
somiglianza in re
termini
di
homo
Pietro
homo
come
mortuus, dove in verita
badi che questo
secondario
significato
che non intacca
impiegare
di
si
homo
in
ha a che
deminutus non d Alvernia,
tratta piuttosto del risultato di
significato di
puo
preso di per
se,
gia
un atto
ma
che
La regola sui termini analoghi pone qualche difficolta a Pietro d Alvernia. Nella q. Utrum sequatur est homo mortuus, ergo est homo (Ms. F, f.lOra 71-2) il magister accetta che ex usu auctorum un qualsiasi termine analogo, preso per se, rimandi solo al suo primo significato. Precisa tuttavia che cio non awiene de virtute sermonis: infatti secondo la natura del linguaggio un termine analogo pone tanto il suo significato primario che quello secondario. Parzialmente edita da Ebbesen,
"The
dead
man...",
pp.60-1.
424
Baccin
piega
a
espressione
1
designate
in
cui
di
cio,
passato
termine era
il
un esse secundum quid e non un esse simpliciter. L insistenza con cui PAutore ribadisce che un nome di sostanza
predicabile, ossia
puo essere usato
corruttibile la
solo equivoce per riferirsi agli individui
dopo
loro corruzione, evidenzia la sua convinzione che, al fine di confutare
semantica radicale, occorra ricondurre
la tesi
termini a quello che realmente sono: cui
in
luogo sofisma
dove
Sorte non existente,
due
intrecciano
si
fa
risalire
1
sit
quella
significative:
consueta
status
sullo
E
esistenti, poiche nel in
homo teoria
della
semantico all
tratta
si
Sortes est
vera:
II
del 25 ",
del
asserti
degli
autorita di Aristotele
idea della fondamentale equivocita dei
secundum Philosophum
Item,
non
nomi
riferiti
De animalibus si dice che: De animalibus, membrum mortuum
membrum, nisi equivoce, sicut diceret aliquis statuam regis hominem vel etiam ymaginem hominis esse hominem et non est
est
esse
equivoce.
Una
dottrina semantica, che leghi se
referenza,
e
primari
tematiche:
epistemologica
ad individui non piu
nisi
ista
presunti usi analogic! dei equivocita dei termini.
di
e
e sulla validita di alcune scicnze.
scientifici
egli
una
e
significato
che
questa
ripete
"Utrum,
casi
osservazione
i
secondari, al
ambiguita
da un lato
scientifico.
rischia
linguaggio: se
Infatti,
libera
si
e
tuttavia
non solo
nelle
il
dalla
scien/e
significato alia sussistenza della
proliferazione dei significati in
di
a
conferire
quello
una
ordinario,
biologiche
i
nomi
fondamentale
ma di
a
quello
sostanze
godono sempre di referenza, secondo quanto dice Aristotele, awiene per la scienza contenuta nel Meteorologica. In che modo
corruttibili
non
cosi
possono fare dunque asserzioni scicntifiche su fenomeni transeunti, come un eclissi, la pioggia o il tuono? 27 Nella q. Utrum rebus corruptis, corrumpatur scientia de rebus 2^ Rodolfo Brito si awale di una soluzione molto articolata, che nasce da si
presupposti gnoseologici
e
semantici ben
precisi.
usare nomi in completa assenza di referenza e
che
attraverso
Ci6
si
Radulphi 25
26
Ms.
i
phantasmata
supplisce
Ci6 che permette
la facolta della
all attualita
della
in
Vat. lat. 3061, f.44ra.
Ibidem, f.44ra, 35 sgg. Cfr. T.K. Scott,
"J.
Buridan on the Objects of Demonstrative
Science",
(1965), pp.666-7.
28
percezione:
nella questione Utrum sequatur homo mortuus, ergo homo, Quaestiones in artem veterem, ed. Venezia 1499, f.lSvb.
puo constatare
Briti
di
memoria,
Rodolfo Brito, Quaestiones In An. Po., Ms.
Vat. lat. 2141, f.205ra-206ra.
Speculum 40
Un caso condizione passato:
semantico
la
che
dell
di scienza;
A
cio
sul
corrisponde
elemento formale del
La duplice natura
425
awenuta una percezione
sia
esse.
nel
piano
dunque un sussistenza di un
significato:
rimane garantito almeno dalla
pluvia
significato formale.
modello
solo
habuerit
prius
permanenza
come
termine
e
indispensabile
dummodo
secundum accidens
di pre dicazione
un duplice
del significato permette
primo esige, accanto al significato formale, anche da una scienza qua scitur res esse et ex quibus
il
Pattualita dei referenti e
L altro
causis passiones sibi insunt.
formali
del
significato,
modello
si
costituisce sui soli element!
prescindendo dal problema della sussistenza
di
e la scienza qua scitur ex quibus causis res potest esse et ex
referenti:
29 Questa scienza studia le possunt inesse. condizioni del verificarsi dei fatti scientifici, senza presumerne 1 esistenza,
quibus causis passiones
ma si
sibi
richiede una condizione minimale d esistenza: che dei fenomeni studiati
modo da
dato un qualche caso nel passato, in
sia
nella
averne un immagine
memoria.
La
struttura
logico-grammaticale degli asserti
relativi
scientifici,
al
secondo modello, deve essere probabilmente espressa in forma implicitamente ipotetica e non categorica: sappiamo infatti che un asserto del tipo "Homo
est
sarebbe falso per Rodolfo Brito, se non esistesse piu
animal"
alcun uomo;
31
modificato in
"Si
est
homo, homo
est
animal",
esso risulta
invece sempre vero.
Quest interpretazione
Cum
dicitur:
ci
viene suggerita da un altro passo: se
que per
insunt de omni,
insunt,
quacumque
yerum
est,
sicut
differentia
temporis ponitur pro subiectum, ponitur etiam predicatum, sicut Philosophus exponit, si verum est cucere esse hominem, verum est dicere esse animal. Et si intelligendo:
pro
verum
est dicere mine esse hominem, verum est dicere nunc esse animal. Ista est sua intentio: pro quocumque tempore ponitur homo, ponitur et animal.
Pertanto un asserto generale su fenomeni transeunti, e sempre costituito nel
29 30
primo modello Ibidem, f.205rb 45-va
di scienza
da una proposizione, che
risulta essere
per
5.
Ibidem, f.205va 2-28:
"Dico
quod, corrupta
re,
non corrumpitur
scientia
de
re,
qua
scitur ex quibus et qualibus causis res potest esse et passiones sibi possunt inesse ... si res non sit, dummodo prius habuerit esse, potest esse scientia de ipsa, qua scitur ex quibus et qualibus causis possit esse."
Rodolfo Brito, Quaestiones "Sor
32
est
homo",
f.!89vb 13-5.
Ibidem, f.!98vb 22 sgg.
in
An. Po., Ms.
Vat.
lat.
2141, q.
Utrum
ista
sit
per
se:
Baccin
426
se,
ma non sempre
A
vera.
sempre
conclusione
ci
a
sottesa
semantica,
mentre ncl sccondo modello e
vera,
proposizione per se e
potrebbe chiedere quali sia la questo secondo modello di scienza.
senso
modo
riappaia
come
termini,
li
poiche
lato,
la
nozione
tonitms,
E
di analogia
eclipsis,
pluvia
mia
presa in
etc.,
ma
senza alcuna relazione a\Vesse actuate del fenomeno,
usati
struttura
si
convinzione che in qualche
da una
costituito
33
sono
solo
in
relazione alia loro possibilita d esscrc. Inoltre la condizione gnoseologica,
che rende possibile,
il
sapere scientifico su insiemi di oggetti, che non
siano sempre esistenti, e data dalla presenza dei phantasmata: e Rodolfo
anima
Brito osserva che Yesse in et
secundum
Detto
quid.
subiscono un ampliazione, possibili:
La
altrimcnti,
nel
i
stare per supposita
non
ma
attuali, 34
e questo e per Rodolfo Brito un uso analogice del linguaggio.
formale e materiale - della funzionc componenti dei termini rende comunque plausibile la teoria dei due
duplicita delle
significativa
modelli di scienza, anche se -
attuale dei referenti, pare libro
modo da
in
sempre un esse deminutum secondo modello termini
delle cose e
degli
Analytica di
"ipotetico";
universalita,
di
fatto
il
tipo di scienza, che
1
in osserva nza al capitolo iniziale del
postcriora
pero
presuppone
e
rispetto
privilegiato
quest ultimo
a
garantire
i
al
esistenza
secondo modello
caratteri
di
necessita e di onnitemporalita, che sono tipici del sapere
scientifico.
Universita
Una "Zur
"La
Sapienza"
di
Roma
J. Pinborg, posizione per certi versi affine e quclla di Boezio di Dacia: si veda 15 des Boethius de Dacia: ein Uberblick", Studio Mediewistyczne
Philosophic
,
(1974), pp.165-85. Cfr.
ratione cit.,
In
pro
pp.274-75.
Topica, suppositis
q.
6
Utrum
praesentibus,
terminus praeteritis
communis et
futuris,
distribuat in:
aequaliter
Pinborg,
et
unica
"Bezeichnung",
JOEL BIARD
Vcrbes
de
cognitifs ct appellation
la
forme
selon Albert de Saxe
Les Sophismata
de Saxe contiennent plusieurs sophismes, au
d Albert
demeurant classiques dans leur formulation, qui comprennent dans leur enonce le verbe savoir. De maniere generate, ces sophismes sont traites
la distinction
du sens compose
appel systematiquement pour resoudre
fait
la
grace a
troisieme
partie
du
recueil.
et
les
du sens
sophismes 20,
1
propositions modales, par exemple dans
II
n
1 .
32
Albert y
33 de
et
Bien evidemment, cette distinction
familiere a tous ses contemporains. Jean Buridan
Mais
divise
le
livre
est
evoque a propos des des Consequently
2 .
pour autant mise en rapport avec 1 etude des propositions comportant un verbe cognitif. Lorsqu il examine les problemes semantiques souleves par des verbes signifiant des actes de 1 esprit, Jean elle
est
pas
Buridan retrouve bien
n en
la division
du sens compose
et
du sens
divise,
pas principal moyen de resolution des difficultes; pour ce faire un concept forge a cet effet: Pappellation de raison. le
fait
il
mais
utilise
Curieusement pour quelqu un qui a etudie puis enseigne a Paris a Pepoque de Buridan, Albert n evoque pas cette notion, pourtant promise a un certain succes. En revanche, il fait un usage qui au premier abord peut paraitre curieux de
appellation de la
l
forme.
C est
pour tenter de
determiner ce qu il entend par cette expression, et pour preciser a travers comment Albert se situe par rapport a ses predecesseurs ou a ses eme contemporains que je voudrais etudier ici le sophisme 34 de la IH cela
Sortes patrem
partie:
On
suppose que
marche a quatre
Hoc
suum le
pattes.
credit esse
asinum.
pere de Socrate
Le sophisme
est revetu
d une peau d ane et
se prouve de la maniere suivante:
Sortes credit esse asinum, hoc est pater suus, ergo patrem
suum
Cf. J. Biard, Les sophismes du savoir. Albert de Saxe entre Jean Buridan et Guillaume Heytesbury, a paraitre dans Vivarium. Albert de Saxe, Sophismata, Paris, eme eme 1490, sophismes 33, 34 et 47 de la II partie, et sophismes 20, 32 et 33 de la
m
partie.
Cf.
Louvain
Jean -
Buridan,
Tractatus
Paris, 1976, pp. 56-57.
de consequents,
livre
II,
chapitre
2,
ed.
H.
Hubien,
Biard
428
asinum
csse
credit
3
L improbatio,
.
c est-a-dire
demonstration de
la
la
faussete de la proposition, procede quant a elle de la maniere suivante: Sortcs patrcm suum credit esse asinum, ergo Sortes credit quod pater
suus est asinus; hoc est falsum; la
faussete de
la
du consequent. Mais
faussete
refutee
est
Vimprobatio
infercrait le sens
le
a
grace
la
compose du sens
1
anteccdent resulterait de tenu
est
sophisme
pour
vrai,
et
d une consequence qui Dans son principe, le mode de
non-validite
divise.
resolution propose par Albert de Saxe est identique a celui
qu
il
a mis en
oeuvre pour les sophismes contenant le verbe savoir: il repose sur la these selon laquclle on ne peut pas systematiquement convertir 1 une en 1
une
autre
memes
les
comportant
sens
au
prise
proposition
mais
termes,
et
compose au
prise
sens
une
proposition
divise
longuement devcloppe par Guillaumc Heytesbury Un sophisme semblable est examine par Jean Buridan:
principe
.
esse asinum
accentue
Car
si
est
un
5 .
le
un ane, est
c est parce
voisine
de
c est-a-dirc
tu ne crois pas
est plus cxpeditive:
ctait
la
que -
vraie
que
celle
sais que tu n cs pas un ane. Mais la resolution differe. Tout d abord,
tu
elle
tu es
que
La probatio
ane.
Vimprobatio
que
credis te
paradoxe,
tu crois
voisins,
Tu
un peu differente qui En depit d une formulation le casus permet de rapprocher les deux sophismes. initiate
proposition initiale est
tu crois
que ton pere par
proposee
un ane parce
tu es
que
Albert.
les
sophismes paraissent sophisme doit etre nie, fausse, alors que chez Albert si
le
ce qui est une difference notable. Sans doute est-ce a
Vimprobatio tellc qu elle a etc ici formulee, immediate du savoir de soi et de sa propre nature humaine. Reste alors a refuter la probatio. En admettant le casus, on peut Pour quelle a conceder: aller patrem meum credo esse asinum
de
cause
1
evidence
reposant sur
1
de
intuition
jusqu raison? Jean
.
Buridan
reste
ici
asse/
elliptique:
quia
patrem
meum
meus credebam esse asinum, sed non secundum hanc propositionem Ainsi, contrairement a est asinus" scd secundum istam "Hoc est asinus". sens compose et du du distinction la a il ne fait aucunement appel "Pater
Albert,
sens divise, qui aurait pu etre 3 4
Albert de Saxe, Sophismata,
5
Guillaume
Jean Buridan, Sophismata, IV,
p. 73.
6
sign,
pertinente.
m
II
II
est vrai
Id., ibid., p. 81.
11,
ed.
qu
il
n explicite
vb.
Heytesbury, Tractalus de sensu composite P 2ra et f Bra. Sophismatibus, Venise, 1494, en part.
Cf.
cum
XXXIV,
ici
et
dn-iso,
Regule eiusdem
Th. K. Scott, Stuttgart -Bad Cannstatt, 1977,
Appellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe
son
guere
raisonnement,
mais
de
suffit
il
429
dans son
celui-ci
replacer
contexte pour Peclairer.
Pour resoudre toute
la
serie
prend place, Jean Buridan juge nomme Pappellation de raison
de sophismes dans laquelle celui-ci de faire appel a ce qu il Cette derniere, resultant de la
necessaire .
presence de verbes comme comprendre, connaitre, savoir, ne doit etre prise en compte que si le terme suit un tel verbe. Selon la theorie
credo patrem le
proposition,
difference entre
la
buridanienne,
meum
patrem
esse asinum
vient
meum du
terme patrem n appelle pas
comme
individu est compris et signifie
fait
credo esse asinum
que dans
la
et
premiere
raison selon laquelle cet
la -
pour que la proposition soit vraie, il suffit done que je croie que ceci, de maniere indeterminee, est un ane - tandis que dans la seconde proposition, le terme appelle sa Par
raison.
la
s eclaire
la
que c etait un ane, non pas selon mais selon la proposition est un "ceci
Rien de parait bien
autre chose.
s
de
formulation buridanienne:
croyais ane"
pere
la
proposition
mon
"mon
pere, je
pere est un
ane".
ne se retrouve chez Albert de Saxe. Le sophisme 33 approcher de cette idee, mais il s y agit en verite de tout
tel
A
1
argumentation qui a ete presentee plus haut,
auteur
1
ajoute ceci: li a sequitur hoc verbum scit, appellat suam formam. Et ideo hec est falsa a Sortes scit esse idem ipsi a. Quando enim precedit hoc verbum scit, tune non appellat suam formam. Et ideo nee bene conceditur: Sortes a ipsi a scit esse idem
Quando enim
.
Puisque cette appellation de la forme vient de ce qu une expression suit un verbe intentionnel, on pourrait au premier abord faire Phypothese qu il s agit
d une reformulation de
alors attribuer a Albert
la
doctrine buridanienne. Mais
il
faudrait
un grossier contresens, revenant a confondre ce
que precisement Jean Buridan differencie, a savoir Pappellation d un terme - c est-a-dire le renvoi d un terme, dans une proposition, a pour sa forme Propter ista sophisma sciendum est quod ista verba huiusmodi, de quibus post dicemus, et participia et nomina inde descendentia [...] faciunt in terminis cum quibus construuntur quosdam modos speciales appellationum. [...] Talia verba faciunt terminos cum quibus construuntur appellare rationes secundum quas imposita sunt nomina ad significandum, et non solum res cognitas ad extra, sicut faciunt alia verba; a propos de cette notion, cf. J. Biard, Le cheval de Buridan. Logique et philosophic du langage dans analyse Cf.
id.,
intelligo
,
ibid.,
pp.
cognosce
,
73-74:
scio
et
1
d un verbe intentionnel, in Die Philosophic irn 14. und 15. Jahrhundert, in memoriam K. - ou Ton trouvera Michalski, O. Pluta, ed., Amsterdam, 1988, pp. 119-137 egalement des references a de nombreux articles anterieurs sur le meme sujet. 8
Albert de Saxe, Sophismata,
XXXIV,
sign. m.II. va.
Biard
430
ce qu -
et
connote, done
il
1
Bethune,
ne suppose pas selon le maitre de
pour quoi cependant
de raison qui seule
appellation les
9
signifie, et
caracterise,
verbes signifiant des actes de
1
il
On
esprit.
peut avancer une
hypothese differente. L exemple n est pas necessairement emprunte a Buridan, car il ne est pas propre et la formulation d Albert est un peu differente. revanche, on trouve une fois de plus
meme
le
lui
En
enonce chez Guillaume
mode de division et Heytesbury, parmi tuum credis esse Patrem de composition: asinum, igitur credis patrem les
tuum
esse asinum
sens
le
La
fait
de
1
appellations.
le
encore, Heytesbury se contente d opposer
ici
sens
divise.
II
done a expliquer
reste
1
usage
appcllation.
Perutilis
L
Mais
.
et
compose
qu Albert
10
exemples relevant du huitieme
un
comprend
logica
existence
d un
tel
sur
portant
chapitre
les
chapitre, dans un oeuvre a bien des logicac de Guillaume d Ockham, traduit
egards tres proche de la Summa la place prise par ce concept d appellation dans au milieu parisien, et 1 importance nouvelle qui
les
discussions propres
lui
a etc conferee par
Jean Buridan. Mais en ce qui concerne le contenu du chapitre, Albert s ecarte de son maitre. En vertu du vieil adage selon lequel le predicat appellation est presentee comme une propricte du appelle sa forme, 1
predicat.
Mais
il
ne
s agit
ni
de reduire immediatement
1
appellation a
une espece de la supposition (comme le faisait Guillaume d Ockham), ni de nommer appellation tout renvoi a des choses que le terme signifie et pour lesquelles il ne suppose pas (comme die/ Jean Buridan), ni a plus raison
forte
penser par
(comme
la le
c etait
le
cas
avec
Guillaume de Sherwood), de
commune. Que
renvoi a une forme
le
predicat appelle sa
simplement que dans la forme mentale ou vocale selon se trouve predique dans une proposition, il peut se un terme laquelle verifier, dans une autre proposition au present, du pronom demonstratif
forme
signifie
qui renvoie a ce pour quoi suppose si
dit,
animal
qu
il
est
un animal
en montrant un homme,
est le
vraie,
11
premiere
peux
dire
.
Autrement
ceci
predicat devant conserver la
M.
est
un
forme
par ex. Jean Buridan, Summulae dialecticac, IV (Tractatus de suppositionibus), V, E. Reina in Rivista critica di storia delta Filosofta, 1957, fasc. II III, p. 343.
&
Guillaume Heytesbury, Tractatus de sensu composito 11
je
la
a dans la proposition initiale.
Cf.
ed.
Phomme
de
le sujet
Cf. Albert
de Saxe,
Perutilis logica, Venise, 1522,
F
et diviso,
16rb.
F
3va.
Appellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe
Ceci
tres
est
des
proche
ou
passages
Le
allusion a cette formule traditionnelle.
431
Ockham
Guillaume d
fait
evoque a trois reprises dans la Somme de logique. Le plus important de ces passages se trouve dans le chapitre 72 de la premiere partie. II vient a la d un
suite
developpement
contenant,
exemple,
par
a
qui
un
Venerabilis Inceptor
au
une
dans
que
precise
verbe
proposition
introduire
faut
il
passe,
1
une
terme suppose pour des choses qui existent ou que pour des choses qui ont existe. Mais, ajoute 1 auteur, cette distinction ne concerne que le terme qui est sujet et non pas celui qui est predicat distinction selon
le
puisque
d
le
A
12
appelle sa forme
predicat
.
occasion, Guillaume
cette
Ockham explique comment il comprend cette formule: Quod est sic intelligendum: non quod supponat
pro se vel pro
conceptu, sed quod per talem propositionem denotatur quod propositio in qua ipsummet praedicatum sub propria forma, hoc est ipsummet et non aliud, praedicatur de illo pro quo subiectum supponit fuit vera, si tails propositio sit de praeterito; vel quod erit vera si talis propositio sit de ruturo; vel quod sit possibilis si prima propositio sit de possibili... .
Apres avoir ecarte une hypothese selon laquelle 1 appellation de la forme serait le renvoi au terme lui-meme ou au concept (done la supposition
ou simple), Guillaume propose quelques elements d
materielle
En
premier
Autrement expliciter
le
lieu,
dans
dit,
cette
terme les
propositions
on
appellation,
bien que
chose,
si
terme
lui-meme,
morphologic du
la
et
signifiant.
sub
considere
Ton
que
va
explication.
forma. reformuler pour propria
trouver ce terme et non pas autre
doit
forme au
etre
doit
nous oriente chef
premier
En meme
ici
vers
du
ou
la
configuration
est indique
il
temps,
vers la materialitd
la
par
la
qu une
proposition dans laquelle ce terme est predique, sous cette forme propre,
de
ce
pour
quoi
proposition initiate 1
suppose le sujet, a ete est au passe; autrement
vraie, dit,
si
appellation de la forme par le predicat implique qu
sub propria forma, temporalites
ou
Sortes est albus modalites.
Par
-
et
verbe
le
si
Sortes il
fuit
fut vrai
de
la
albus, de dire,
pareillement pour les autres
consequent,
cette
formule
implique
egalement une relation semantique, qui se traduit comme c est souvent le cas par une predication, ainsi que le respect des temporalites, le privilege
donne
au
present
dans
la
formulation
predication/supposition se traduisant par 12
Cf.
Guillaume d Ockham,
13 Id., ibid., p.
216,
1.
61-68.
Summa logicae,
I,
de
la
relation
une indexation temporelle de
chap.72, p. 216.
de la
432
Biard
de
valcur
de
verite
la
DCS considerations semblables
proposition.
retrouvent dans les deux autres passages de allusion a
1
appellation de la forme par
le
Somme
la
se
de logique qui font
14
predicat
.
Tous ces elements sont bien ceux par Icsqucls Albert de Saxe explique appellation de la forme par le predicat dans son chapitre 1
lequel toutefois est 1
beaucoup plus complet sur
1
appellation que ne
1
etait
oeuvre ockhamiste.
Jean Buridan, le
lequel
il
evoque lui aussi enonce commun selon 15 sa forme Mais en depit de certaines
vrai,
appelle
predicat
convergences,
est
1
.
interpretation de cet adage
1
pas vrai au sens propre des mots
16
-
Si
le
dont
-
il
precise
qu
n
il
est
est quelque peu differente. II se propose d analyser les causes de verite de propositions comportant des termes appellatifs, qui signifient ou cosignifient des choses pour
lesquelles
ils
ne supposent pas.
terme en question
est
sujet,
il
chose, selon auteur, non seulement en appelle expression de relation au temps du verbe mais selon une disjonction de ce temps et du temps present. Par exemple, le blanc qu appelle le terme album lorsqu il sa
est
sujet
1
d une
1
au
proposition
futur,
peut
etre
signifie
comme
etant
presentemcnt ou dans un temps futur adjacent au suppot. On pcut ainsi considerer comme equivalente a album erit nigrum, la disjonction quod est vel erit album erit nigrum. Pour qu une proposition au futur soil il
vraie,
n est
pas requis que dans
futur
le
la
proposition
au present
simplement qu une certaine reduction au s Mais dans ce cas, present puisse operer. appellation doit disparaitre et le sujet doit etre transforme en terme non appellatif. II suffira en effet correspondante
soit vraie.
faut
II
1
qu
il
ait
etc vrai de dire
hoc
est
album, en montrant
proposition actuelle, qui a ce moment-la sera noir.
pour
le
predicat car celui-ci appellant
sa chose
II
le
sujet
de
la
en va diffdremment
en relation determinee
au temps du verbe de la proposition, il doit toujours, si Ton de telles transformations ou reductions, conserver la meme forme: opere 17 ... debet manere in propria forma quantum ad appellationes On et exclusive
.
retrouve ainsi Pambivalence de cette notion de
terme doit rester 14
16
17
le
meme
quant
Cf.
id., ibid., II,
Cf.
Jean Buridan, Sophismata, chap. IV,
Id., ibid., p. 64. Id., ibid., p. 63.
chap.
7, p.
a
la
materialite
271; et III-l, chap. 43, p. 473. p. 64.
forme
qui indique que le
du
signifiant,
mais
433
Appellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe
comporte en meme temps une indeniable composante semantique puisque la forme est aussi Pobjet meme de appellation telle que 1 a definie Buridan. 1
De
la resulte
forme
1
interpretation que Buridan propose de
tout terme, des lors
realite
et ceci vaut
qu
le sujet;
egalement pour
la
adage classique: en
comme
mais
exclusivement en relation au temps du verbe,
dans
1
par definition sa
est appellatif, appelle
il
formulation des causes de verite, qu
il
n
est
il
ne Pappelle pas
pas indispensable,
reste sub propria
forma 18 que ce doit etre le cas du predicat Dans ces d6veloppements de Buridan, on retrouve des questions evoquees par Albert, puisqu il s y agit, identiquement, des termes
cum
il
appellatione, alors
appellatifs.
.
De meme, on
peut deceler une facon identique de designer
la
du terme. Cependant, le developpement de Buridan insere sans equivoque dans une conception de 1 appellation de la forme
forme propre s
(comme
type de renvoi signifiant contredistingue de la supposition) qui est
absente de Pexpos6 d Albert. En revanche celui-ci met sur le meme plan questions liees aux determinations temporelles et leur effet sur le
les
predicat d une part et les problemes particuliers suscites par des verbes intentionnels d autre part, avec
comme
denominateur
commun une
idee de
qu indiquait deja Guillaume d Ockham. Si done les deux champs que Buridan traite a 1 aide des notions d appellation de forme et d appellation de raison sont de ce fait rassembles, il ne s agit forme
reduite au seul aspect
pas pour autant de confondre indument les deux concepts buridaniens; s agit
plutot de les remplacer par
d une certaine
qui,
la
vague que usage ockhamiste. avoir enumere des apres
qui est plus proche de
En
un concept d appellation de
est plus
fac,on,
effet,
la
il
forme
notion buridanienne et
1
regies
qui
concernent
appellation dans une proposition au present, au passe, au futur puis a la modalite du possible, Albert ajoute une cinquieme regie qui prend en compte les verbes tels qu intelligo, scio, cognosco. Us sont caracterises
1
que lorsqu ils sont suivis d une complexio, et non pas seulement d un adjectif ou seulement d un substantif, 1 adjectif n appelle le
par
fait
pas seulement sa forme
egalement sa complexio substantif.
Ce n
Par exemple, cette
il
est
proposition
18 Id., ibid., p.64.
pas
est vrai
-
au sens qui a etc precise plus haul - mais ici son union, sa conjonction - avec un
done
le cas,
que
6quivaut
en revanche,
Deum a
si
trinum et
hoc
le
terme precede
unum
cognovit
le
verbe.
cognovit Aristoteles;
Aristoteles,
ou
hoc
Biard
434
Mais
renverrait a Dieu.
Deum unum
Aristoteles cognovit
trinum
et
est
faux, parce que impliqucrait quo non sculement le Philosophe ait connu Dieu, ce qui etait le cas, mais encore qu il 1 ait connu comme un et 19 On retrouve encore une fois des trine, ce qui n etait pas le cas
cela
.
voisins de ceux qui etaient etudies par Jean Buridan.
phenomenes
Albert se garde d introduire Pidee d appellation de raison,
Mais
meme
la
ou
Buridan y faisait appel, par exemple a propos de Penonce canonique, d inspiration aristotelicienne, Sortem venientem tu cognoscis. Cette demarche s etend aux cas ou la complexio qui suit le verbe est
une proposition. Supposons par exemple que a signifie la proposition Deus est mais que tu 1 ignores. a scis esse verum doit etre tenue pour hoc scias esse verum, hoc renvoyant au vraie: il suffit pour cela que sujet
de
la
a
proposition
scis esse
vcrum. En
revanche, d aucune chose
hypothese tu ignores que Deus est la proposition a. On pcut done estimer que dans les cas ou la est proposition suit le verbe, elle appelle sa forme, ce qui a Pevidence
vraie tu ne
sais
c est a, puisque par
que
croyance porte sur la proposition Deus est elle-meme, ou plus prdcisement que on sache que a signifie Deus est. La forme n est done pas simplement ici Pidentitc a soi materielle du
que
ici
implique
le
ou
savoir
la
1
bien
terme,
qu
elle
qui
specifique,
etre
devrait
un
ni
impliquc,
I
renvoi
des
distingue
de supposition, mais Pidentite du terme simple ou complexe.
qu
il
soil
Meme
dans
si
concernant
Perutilis
logica,
signifiant
eclairer
suffit
de
comme
de Saxe rcste assez
Albert
cela
dernier
ce
type
habituelles
relations
signification et tel,
d un
semantique
allusif
les
quelques pour exemple, phrases des Sophismata qui avaient initialement retenu notre attention. Le
sophisme XXXIII precise: 20 appellat suam formam universali patrem suum
forma
et
in
-,
Socrate a ce
un
;
particular!. est
un
..
mais d apres
moment
En
homme est
le
li
hominem sed
effet,
-
il
Socrate
tient,
casus, la
ceci est
individu qui est son pere, alors
Id., ibid.,
m
II,
vb.
ignorat
sail
qu
le il
pronom
hoc
in
propria
cette
proposition
la
croyance de
ceci
renvoyant a
ignore cette identite.
meme
"scit",
de maniere generate
forme propre de
un ane,
meme
verbum
Sortes in dicto casu in
a juste litre,
On peut noter au passage qu on trouve le Heytesbury, attribue a Averroes. 20 Albert de Saxe, Sophismata, XXXIII, sign, m II, va. 21
a sequitur hoc
sophisme XXXIV:
esse
scit
21
que son pere pour vraie
Quando enim et le
exemple
chez
Toute
Guillaume
Appellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe
proposition qui suit
fonde
la
peu qu est
ou
croire
appelle sa forme, ce qui
savoir
non-substituabilite d expressions de reference equivalente, pour
elles soient
assez
ratio
verbe
le
435
de
forme
differente.
Le sens
exact de cette notion
a preciser mais elle est sensiblement differente de
difficile
Non seulement
buridanienne.
la
concerne aussi bien des termes
elle
mentaux que des termes vocaux, mais elle implique a la fois le respect de la litteralite du terme et une portee semantique qui peut se traduire par des propositions du genre s agit
pas
d une
simple
ceci est
confusion
un x.
II
entre
en tout cas qu il ne deux types d appellation
est clair
les
distingues par Jean Buridan. Albert cherche a elaborer, en integrant les
phenomenes semantiques que son aine raison,
de
1
done
les
appellation
demarque
ainsi
expliquait grace a Pappellation de
problemes suscites par qui
s
appuie
sur
consciemment de
Centre National de
la
Recherche
la
les
seule
la theorie
verbes cognitifs, une theorie notion de forme, et il se
buridanienne.
Scientifique, Paris
IVAN BOH
Medieval Rules of Consequences and the Idea of Demonstrative Science
Introduction. Medieval logic rules.
The
inferential for
truth,
rules
in
question
moves are such
are
been
basically a logic of
indicating what
devices
metalinguistic
help us in our rational search
that they will
such that they
i.e.,
said to have
may be
never lead from truth to
will
falsity;
and
seemingly correct inferential moves are faulty, e.i., of the sort which can lead from truth to falsity. While truth of propositions was correctness of inferences, the rules of sharply distinguished from
what
consequence were nevertheless conceived scmantically and, in the case of obligational and epistcmic logic, they essentially involved a pragmatic relation or reference to a user of language signs.
was
Logic specifically
characterized
always
one
as it
of
one
as
listed
sermocinal
of
arts.
the
and
arts
liberal
But
medieval
authors
would make a
as a science. Occasionally, they
more also
distinction
between logica utens and logica doccns, the former concept stressing the nature of logic as an ars and the latter suggesting the nature of logic as a system of correct principles which can be learned so as to enable us
speak
"to
enables us
Obviously,
truly".
"to
speak
the
congruously"
In their investigations
relation
of
was never quite
on the nature of
logic
to
grammar which
coincidental.
logic medievals
were led
to
two related questions. One was primarily ontological: If logic is a science in the sense of an enterprise of formulating a set of true propositions, it must have its proper object. But then, what is this object? Philosophers
who
spoke
of
second-intentional
being
were
Acknowledgements: The author gratefully acknowledges State
University
&
for
granting
him
the
sabbatical
year
his
ontologically
inclined
indebtedness to the Ohio
1986/87,
to
the
International
Exchange Board (I.R.E.X.), and to the U.S. Department of Education for their research grants to the German Democratic Republic and to Poland during the same academic year. Most special personal thanks are due to Dr. Gunther Schenk of the Martin Luther University (Halle) who always found ample time to share his views on the history and philosophy of logic. Research
Rules of Consequences and Demonstrative Science philosophers of logic
who
answer
tried to
this first question.
437
The
present
paper does not concern itself with this line of discussion. The second question in the discussion of the nature of logic became prominent soon after the recovery in the Latin West of Aristotle s Posterior
Analytics
the
in
translated into Latin by
half
first
demonstration?
limited
to
If
categorical
so,
syllogistics?
1
century
meet the Aristotelian requirements of
what
in
when it was The question now was: Does
twelfth
James of Venice.
logic itself conceived as a science strict
of
It
sense? is
the
demonstrative
Is
science
impact of the recovery of
on the conception of logic that interests us in this The has two parts. The first one deals with the rules of study. paper consequence considered as the very core of medieval logic. The second
Posterior Analytics
part
relates
the
systems of consequences to the idea of demonstrative
knowledge as formulated
in the Posterior Analytics.
A
concluding section
summari/.es the findings.
Pan One. Some of
history
years of progressively intensified research in the
sixty
medieval
logic,
from
pioneering
work of H.
Scholz,
I.M.
Boehner, through the studies and editions by EA. J. Pinborg, S. Ebbesen, N. Kretzmann, A. Maieru, V.Munoz Delgado, E.J. Ashworth, etc., and through a long and expanding list of other prominent investigators and editors, there can be no doubt Bocheriski,
and
Moody, L.M. De
about
the
P.
Rijk,
centrality
medieval logical
of
treatise.
rules
of
consequence
in
any
Nor can there be any doubt
comprehensive
that the idea of
consequence itself and of its types developed significantly through the centuries from the seeds found in Aristotle s Topics and Prior Analytics
and possibly from other sources. One can also observe a progressive extension of areas brought under the umbrella of a comprehensive system of rules
of consequence,
culminating,
perhaps,
in
the
treatise
entitled
Conscquentiae by Ralph Strode. This English logician collected rather eclectically, twenty four general rules of consequence among which one could find rules of prepositional logic, of alethic modal logic, of a "logic
of
quality",
of obligational disputations,
and of epistemic and doxastic
Cf. E. Serene, "Demonstrative Science", in The Cambridge History of Later Philosophy. Ed. N. Kretzmann et al., Cambridge: University Press, 1982, pp. 496-517.
Medie\>al
Boh
438
The only notable absence from
logic.
axiological rules.
The
the
set
and
of deontic
that
is
2
earlier systems of
consequences such as that of Walter Burley,
system of John Buridan
s Consequentiae developed in the 3 mid-1300s on the Continent, were indeed more perfect than the system of Strode if we consider them simply as quasi-axiomatic structures. There
or the
is
"mature"
made
a clear distinction
in
Burley and Buridan between the principal
and the derived rules of prepositional logic and the proofs of the latter from the former are consciously and carefully worked out; while in Strode all
24 general rules seem to be treated as
of
them are shown
be
to
"reducible"
"principal",
even though some
to another. This shows, of course,
independent and that from a strictly axiomatic point of view Strode could have done with fewer than 24 principal rules. Strode s that they are not
admirers
and
critics
such
as
Alexander
logicians such as Peter of
work by
raising
many
Paul
Sermoneta,
Cajetan of Thiene, and Frachantianus of Vicenza,
of
Pergula,
as well as other great
Mantua and Paul of Venice continued Strode
interesting
questions
about
various
s
problematic
points of his text.
The medieval correctly be
rules
of consequence
are
done and what should be avoided
relations in various areas of discourse. This in the controversies
of what
descriptive in
can
considering inferential
comes out
especially vividly
over the definition of consequence and in the implied
or even explicit attitude toward certain problematic rules. Everyone, of course, agreed that no consequence could be sound unless
it
rules out the
case where the antecedent obtains but the consequent not. While keeping in
mind the
distinction
between the so-called material implication,
implication, and relevant entailment, and
This
is
not
to say that medievals did
have
stipulating
a
strict
new symbol
not pursue deontic logic at
all,
=>
but only that
been
integrated into a comprehensive quasi-axiomatic system. For developments in this area, see the pioneering work of Simo Knuuttila: "The Emergence of Deontic Logic in the Fourteenth Century", in New Studies in Deontic M. Logic. Ed. R. Hilpinen, Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1981, pp. 225-248; and S. Knuuttila
deontic
rules
not
yet
&
Yrjonsuuri, "Norms and Action in Obligational Disputations", in Die Philosophic im 14. and 15. Jahrhundert (Bochum Studien zur Philosophic 10). Ed. O. Pluta, Amsterdam: B.R. Griiner, 1988, pp. 191-202. Cf.
Tractatus de Consequentiis. Ed. H. Hubien (Philosophes Medievaux 16). Louvain,
1976.
For relevant texts, see Consequentiae Strodi cum commento Alexandri Sermonetae, Gaetani in easdem Consequentias, Dubia Magistri Pauli Pergulensis,
Declarationes
Obligationes eiusdem Strodi ... Quaestiones in Frachantiani Vicentini. Venice 1517.
Consequentias Strodi perutiles
...
Antonii
Rules of Consequences and Demonstrative Science
439
ergo ) to represent systematically-ambiguously all the consequential structures of medievals, we can say that everyone agreed that if P Q is (read
=>
to
be sound, then
satisfied
as
at least
necessary
~(P & ~Q)
~O(P & ~Q)
must be
Whether these conditions were
conditions.
soundness of
sufficient conditions for
not even
if
P
=*
Q
seems
matter of some dispute throughout the ages. The
Ex
to have
also
remained a
impossibili quodlibet
and the Ex falso quodlibet rules which come along with the acceptance of ~(P & ~Q) or ~O(P & ~Q) as sufficient conditions for the soundness of
P
=>
Q also remained a source of perplexity. We should stress that medieval rules
when
there
is
a
question
of
the
of
whole
of the intellectual structures (or
"constitutive"
not formally constitute them in the
way
consequence,
system
of
"games"):
especially
them, that
is,
not
are
they do
in which, say, the rules of chess
may be said to constitute the game of chess, or in the way in which the formation rules and definitions may be said to constitute certain systems. Rather, they take the intellectual structures or
as already given.
"games"
They merely bring out explicitly the most general features inherent in or and they help to organize and tacitly assumed in those structures, possibly
the
reorganize
framework
materials.
They
also
a
provide
theoretical
comparison and contrast of various deductive fields. the mutual Thus, consequential rule which in fact allows us to use P Q and ~Q =$~P interchangeably may be seen to be operative in the system of alethic modalities, e.g., allowing for interchange of OP nQ and for the
=>
=>
~OQ
=>
of
system
CP [P
=>
~OP,
with
the
obligational
possible
proviso
disputation
and
e.g.,
that
allowing
N%Q =*N%P The general consequential rules, such as Q] and known by a to be sound [Ka (P =>C^0
n(P
(with the proviso that If =>
=>
and
Q));
for
in
interchange
the of
Ka (P=* Q)). a consequence Q)], then
is
sound
P is to be [CQ]\ should if
conceded by a [C%P], then Q must also be conceded by a not be confused with constitutive rules of the game of obligation such as the following three rules from Paul of Pergula
which
s
Obligationes:
Everything
possible and posited to you and known by you to be such must be admitted by you Everything which is possible and posited to you, is
;
and admitted by you
be conceded by you for as long as the Everything which follows from what has been posited and admitted from it alone or from it together with some thing which has
obligatio lasts
is
to
;
been conceded, or some things which have been conceded, is to be conceded The constitutive rules are sufficient to play the game, while .
Boh
440
the general rules of consequence help to explicate the logical force of
to-be-conceded, to-be-denied,
and to understand the conceptual or
etc.,
theoretical underpinnings of various types of obligationes.
Mutatis mutandis, one could
make
remarks about the rules of
parallel
a consequence is sound such as Strode s Rule 13, then if he knows the it to be sound [K (P = and a knows Q)], [P Q] a antecedent [K^], then he also knows the consequent [Ka Q]\ in relation to our first order knowledge, opinion, and justification claims in various If
epistemic logic, =>
areas of
human
We
Part Two. in
logic
will
now
some medieval views on
explore
general and of the theory of consequence
demonstrative
of
ideal
endeavor.
science
as
in
expressed
in
the
the relation of
particular to the
newly
recovered
Posterior Analytics.
As
already noted, the medievals since Boethius characterized logic loosely as both art and science. It was cultivated together with grammar, rhetoric
opposed
and other to
the
liberal
"real"
arts
-
as
opposed
and
sciences,
to mechanical arts, i.e.
The recovery
sophy, metaphysics, and theology.
and also as
mathematics, natural philo of Posterior Analytics in
the mid-twelfth century changed greatly the discussions of the nature of these disciplines. Arguments were set up to establish the status of
demonstrative science for
all
these disciplines,
-
a status which
seems
have become a high desideratum. As for logic, two remarkable phenomena should be observed.
On
to
the
one hand there was a progressive development by logicians such as Abelard, Peter of Spain, and others, of certain ideas on inference found Aristotle
in
Megaric
s
Prior Analytics
tradition),
culminating
systems of consequences.
development,
the
5
On
appeared
in
(and possibly in the Stoicformulation of quasi-axiomatic
Topics a
the other hand, and concomitantly with this -
under
the
influence
of
the
Posterior
a rising tendency to claim for logic itself the status of a demonstrative science. This tendency became especially strong by first half of the 13th century when Robert Grosseteste wrote a
Analytics strict
there
and
On
-
the relation of topics to consequence see E. Stump, Topics: their development Later Medieval Philos consequences", in The Cambridge History of
and absorption into
Kretzmann et al., Cambridge: University Press, 1982, pp. 273-299. See also Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of Topics in the Middle Ages, Miinchen: Philosophia
ophy. Ed. N. N.J.
Verlag, 1984.
441
Rules of Consequences and Demonstrative Science
detailed
commentary on every aspect of the
particular on
central concept,
its
The requirements
of
i.e.,
Prior Analytics,
and
in
that of scientific demonstration.
demonstration
scientific
as
understood
by
medievals were rather restrictive and stringent. Scientific knowledge was supposed to consist of syllogisms in Barbara whose premisses are true, universal,
better to
and necessary, as well as immediate, and more certain and the conclusion to be demonstrated. While restrictions
known than
seem
have been incorporated into the very of science and while scientific demonstration was originally syllogism
categorical
definition
to
phenomena and
thought to be a model to explain natural
certain metaphysical propositions, the concept of science
demonstration was
extended
soon
geometry and arithmetic, as well as
to
cover
other
grammar and
to establish
and of
disciplines
scientific
such
as
logic.
But although the criteria of demonstrative science were in a sense relaxed, there were still some definite criteria to be met. Thus, the
anonymous author of a mid-14th century Petri
I-III
Hispani
rules,
in logic
"for
treatise Quaestiones in tractatus
emphatically denies that logic requisites of
all
its
is
a
mere
being a science are
collection of found".
The
requisites he listed are three, viz.
the subject of which a property
which
(dignitas} means or
More
is
being demonstrated, the property
been demonstrated of the
has
subject,
and the principle
known
proposition which serves as demonstration that the property belongs to that subject.
or
the per se
the
concretely,
logic has a subject, such as syllogism ... it also has properties, such as demonstrative probable and^ apparent (as are the enthymeme, the induction, and many other things). Moreover, it has principles (dignitates), e.g. if that which appears less to inhere inheres, then that whicn appears more [to inhere] also inheres , or to whatever fits the defimens, the deiiniendum also , and many others, as is evident from Topics and from the fifth treatise of this book [i.e., Summulae Petri Hispani}. ,
Several
centuries
later,
John Versor
question of whether logic can
He
first
"analysis",
points
and
out
that
is
the
"first
material principles of syllogism,
Cf.
Jan Pinborg,
"Anonymi
(1982), pp. 1-170; pp. 12f.
means
Quaestiones
Analytics
"resolutio".
resolution"
i.e.
concerned with the same
claim to be a demonstrative science.
(etymologically)
that in Latin this
explain that there
1
itself
is
when one
have to
do with
Then he goes on
to
points out both the
terms and propositions, as well as the
in
Tractatus Petri Hispani
I-III",
CIMAGL
41
Boh
442
formal principles, i.e., the mode and figure and the regulative principles, i.e. the dictum de omni and the dictum de nullo. But after this first there
resolution
the
is
second
one
which
is
a
of
resolution
the
consequent or of the thing concluded into the principles and causes of that consequent, these causes being signified
remarked
be
and of
circularity his
Vcrsor
that
commentary on
infinite
is
fully
regress,
Prior Analytics
as seen
where he
of
It
premisses."
the
from the
initial
should
charge
possible
of
paragraph of
says:
of a conclusion acquired by a syllogism; therefore, if there be knowledge of syllogism, it too must be through syllogism. Thus, such a syllogism is either known or not known. Not the first, because then it would be known by another syllogism, and that one by another, and so there would be a process in infinitum. Nor could one say the second, because then there would he no principle on the basis of which to come to knowledge of syllogism.
Every science
demonstration;
Versor consists
possession
now demonstration
is
escape from both circularity and the recourse to the distinction between the
s
in
a
is
firm
aware
by the
a
knowledge by resolution There is no doubt
infinite
.
were
that medieval authors
fully
conscious of the
significance of the structure of their systems of consequences
procedures of deriving
regress
two senses of
some
rules
and of the
from others. Four cases should
suffice
to illustrate the point. [1]
puritate [i.e.,
rules
with
De
Walter Burley (12757-1345?), explaining artis
logicae:
Tractatus
regulis generalibus
longior,
he
consequentiarum
his
says: ]
in the
procedures "In
are laid
the
first
down
which ought to be assumed as the principles in this the rejection of incorrect rules which lead to the
De
chapter
the general
art",
together
fallacy
of
second chapter Dc modo arguendi enthymematice consequent ...; in conditionalibus ] it will be explained in what way one ought to argue on the basis of these rules in the realm of enthymematic consequences. in the
[
John Buridan (1295/1300 Consequentiae, states his aim as
[2]
of his
d.after 1358), in the
opening sentence
follows:
In this book I wish to discuss consequences, dealing as much as I can with their causes, about which many things have sufficiently been proved by others in an a posteriori manner, although perhaps they were not reduced [by them] to the first causes in virtue of
Cf.
8
Johannes Dorp, Super omnes
Ed. P. Boehner,
p. 60.
libros
nove
logice,
Koln, 1503, a2 rA.
Rules of Consequences and Demonstrative Science
Now
which they are saki to hold.
it
443
will
be necessary to put forward
his
discussion
some assumptions. Johannes
[3]
Dorp
sciences,
points out that,
of other sciences at
in
(fl.c.1400),
whether logic can establish
its
first
own
of
principles logic
all,
but only shows
all,
of the
question
or only those
of other
does not establish principles
how one can
correctly derive
conclusions from premisses in any science. Having said that, that
"in
principles,
from
its
Dorp adds its own
sense logic also provides a method in respect of
this
because
own
it
teaches 10
principles]."
how
form argumentation from these
to
The use
[i.e.
of logic in a deduction of derived
from the principal ones in closely analogous to the deduction of conclusions from principles of particular sciences.
rules
[4]
Alexander Sermoneta (d.1486),
on Strode tract
on
s
in the
Prologue to his commentary
Consequentiae, speculates on the proper location which a
on consequences should have
in a systematically
ordered textbook
logic:
say that this book [Consequentiae] is the most universal part of the Prior Analytics, or else is introductory to it; and therefore it should be placed immediately after the De Interpretatione, and before the Topics, Sophistical Refutations, and Posterior Analytics. This order is evident, because this book is concerned with consequence as its subject, and this is more universal than any kind of argumentation or syllogism, with which the Prior special Analytics is concerned. I
Conclusion. Medieval rules of consequence can be seen as metalinguistic
formulations of the logic of propositions and also of the most general principles of particular sub-branches of logic. The principal rules are
analogous to axiom-rules, and the derived rules are analogous to theorems in our natural deduction systems. The function of the rules of
consequence was not only to provide a logical tool for reasoning in any subject-matter and in all sciences and speculative arts, but also to make explicit
The
the most general logical presuppositions in any inferential area.
recovery
of
the
Posterior
Analytics
stimulated
the
subsequent
n
Ed. H. Hubien, p. 17. Cf. also P. King, Jean Buridan s Logic: Supposition; The Treatise on Consequences. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985.
The
Treatise
on
Johannes Dorp, Commentary on Buridan s Dialectica; quoted in E.A. Moody, Truth in Mediaeval Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1953, pp. 14f.
and Consequence
Alexander Sermoneta, 1493.
in
the Prologue to his
Commentary on Strode
s
Consequences,
Boh
444
discussions that logic
on the nature of is
because they
The Ohio
itself
logic
itself.
Medievals did come to believe
a demonstrative knowledge, but this was possible only
in fact re-defined
State University
and extended the concept of science.
HARTMUT BRANDS
Die zweifache Einteilung dcr formalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood
Von den Anfangen
bis
heute hat
man
die verschiedenen Einteilungen der
Arten und Unterarten durch sogenannte porphyriaSupposition nische Baume darzustellen versucht. Es verdient eine gewisse Beachtung, in
daB
ein
ihre
solches,
Unternehmen
im
und
triviales
Prinzip
auch
unproblematisches
von William of Sherwood gegebene Einteilung bis heute nicht adaquat gelungen ist. Der Grund hierfiir ist ohne Zweifel, daB William
of
fur die
Sherwood
bei
der
formalen
Supposition
Einteilung vornimmt. Diese wird namlich einerseits personale, andererseits in die diskrete
Es
und allgemeine
eine
zweifache
in die einfache
und
eingeteilt.
gibt zwei Modelle, diese zweifache Einteilung in die
stammbaum-
artige Darstellung zu integrieren. Das erste findet sich bereits als Marginalie in der Pariser Handschrift und faBt die zweifache Einteilung selbst als eine Zweiteilung auf.
Dies hat zur Konsequenz, daB aus zwei
Zweiteilungen eine Vierteilung wird. Da das genannte Schema in keiner der beiden Editionen 1 der Introductions in logicam des William of
Sherwood enthalten
ist,
fiihre ich es hier an:
2
Die Introductiones in logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood. Einleitung und Textausgabe von Martin Grabmann, Miinchen 1937. William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam: Critical Text. By with Peter Kunze and Bernhard Mussler. New York 1983. (Edition Lohr)
2
MS Paris
Bibliotheque Nationale,
lat.
16617,
fol. 14r.
Literarhistorische
Charles
H.
Lohr
Brands
446
Die weitcren Einteilungcn schlieBcn an die personale Supposition an und sollen hier iibergangen wcrden. Im Prin/.ip gleiche Darstellungcn finden sich in
3 4 neueren Arbeiten bei Enders und Marenbon
Modell
Das zweite
.
denkbar einfach: die Einteilung der formalen
ist
Supposition in eine diskrete und allgemeine wird weggelassen. Dieser Umstand wird von Kneale/Kneale allerdings angemerkt: "Apart from one
be noticed
pair to
later,
all
the varieties of suppositio distinguished by
6 5 William of Shyreswood are shown in the (...) table." Bei de Rijk und 7 Heyer die wohl auf Kneale/Kneale /uriickgreifen, wird die Unvollstandigkeit des Schemas indessen nicht vermerkt. Moglicherweise ist das Schema ,
bei
deshalb
Kneale/Kneale
Verhaltnis
der
denn
erschien,
one distinction
sie is
Zweiteilung monieren: he docs not explain
in
"...
allerdings,
ihnen
das
anderen nicht hinreichnend klar
/,ur
related to the
meine
Ich
weil
geblieben,
unvollstiindig
einen
how
detail
the
8 other."
daB William of Sherwood dieses Verhaltnis
keineswegs ganzlich uncrklart liiBt, merkt er doch eigens an, daB es sich bei beiden Einteilungen um vollstandige Disjunktionen handelt. nota, totaliter sub se divisionum suppositionem, comprehcndit quod utraqiie "Et
formalem
Omnis cnim
dico.
Aut
Item.
discreta.
accipitur
suppositio, out pro re defcrente
muB man
Jacobi
10
supponens out
dictio
pro forma significata
formam
et
tune est
communis
est et
aut
tune est simplex 9
personalis."
Insofern
zustimmen, daB mil dieser zwcifachen Einteilung der
formalen Supposition eigentlich eine Kreu/.klassifikation vorliege, wenn er
H.
Enders,
Munchen J.
5
Sprachlogische
Traktate
des
Mittelalters
und
der
Semantikbegriff,
1975, S. 81.
Marenbon, Later Medie\-al Philosophy, Ixmdon/Ncw York
W. Kncale and M. Kneale, The of
Peter
Spain,
Tractatus.
De\<elopment
First
1987, S. 44.
of Logic, Oxford 1962,
Critical
Edition
S. 253.
from the LXXVIII.
(Kneale/Kneale)
Manuscripts
with
an
Introduction by L.M. de Rijk, Asscn 1972. Introduction, S. in: Peter of Spain, Tractatus K. Jacobi, Rez. von Philosophise he Vgl. hierzu: dem Diagramm, das de Rijk von der Rundschau 22 (1976), S. 48 - 64; bes. S. 58: ,
"In
bei
Einteilung
communis
-
Wilhelm
von
Shyreswood
discreta gar nicht vor. Dies
ist
gibt,
jedoch
kommt
G. Heyer, Generische Kennzeichnungen, Munchen 1987, 8
(Kneale/Kneale), 9 K.
Jacobi,
Unterteilung
suppositio
S. 68.
S. 256.
S. 266.
(Edition Lohr), 1
die
unrichtig."
in den Die Ai Modalbegriffe - Koln 1980, S. 414, Anm. 127.
Shyreswood, Leiden
logischen
Schriften
des
Wilhelm
von
Die Einteilung der formalen Supposition bci William of Sherwood
auch bei
schematischen
der
11
447
von dieser Einsicht
Darstcllung
keinen
Gebrauch macht. Alle genannten
Darstellungen der
William of Sherwood
in
der Supposition des
Einteilung
Stammbaumform
miissen als wesentlich unvoll-
angesehen werden, weil keine von ihnen die von William of
standig
Sherwood eigens hervorgehobene und thematisierte suppositio simplex discreta
AuBerdem wird Williams
enthalt.
Einteilung
schematische ausgesetzt
anderen
mit
ist,
aus
diesen
den
Darstellung,
die
hatte folgende
Form:
kritischer
Schemata
nicht
vorgebrachten
seiner
Vergleich verstandlich.
Eine
Einwanden
nicht
suppositio formalis
communis
discreta
L
I
simplex
simplex
personalis
personalis
Hierauf bezogen wird unmittelbar verstandlich, was William of Sherwood an anderen Einteilungen verwirft, und es erscheint die Annahme gerechtfertigt,
daB William of Sherwood
Supposition gerade wegen hat. sit
"Volunt
divisio
discreta
die zweifache Einteilung der formalen der suppositio simplex discreta vorgenommen
enim quidam, quod haec
communis
suppositionis,
divisio, alia simplex, alia personalis,
non
quia
cadit
haec
diversitas
in
12 suppositione."
Fur diese diskrete und einfache Supposition
gibt
William of Sherwood
einen Beispielsatz, zu dessen Verstandnis es sinnvoll erscheint, zunachst
kommenden
die hier in Betracht
Definitionen der einzelnen Suppositions-
arten durchzugehen. Ein formal supponierender Terminus supponiert
immer
signifikativ. Supponiert er einfach, so supponiert er unmittelbar fur sein
Signifikat
(und
nicht,
wie bei der personalen Supposition, mittelbar fur GemaB der Definition von significatio,
eine unter dieses fallende Sache).
worunter William of Sherwood die begriffliche Vergegenwartigung bzw. Darstellung einer Form versteht, bedeutet einfach zu supponieren auch,
Form - pro forma significata enim nomen significat solam formam
fur
11
12
eine
K. Jacobi, a.a.O., S. 163.
(Edition Lohr), S. 267.
13
(Edition Lohr),
S. 268.
-
zu supponieren. Denn: 13
,.."
"Omne
Diskret schlieBlich supponiert
Brands
448
um
ein Terminus, sofern es sich
handelt wie Sokrates oder dieser
aus
Das
sich
der
Kreuzklassifikation
Mensch
Problem
stellcnde
hier
einen diskreten bzw. singularen Terminus .
offensichtlich
sich
ergibt
beiden
der
Einteilungen
gerade formalen
der
Supposition, d.h. speziell aus der Kombination von einfachcr und diskreter Supposition.
Was
soil
daB ein singularer
darunter verstanden wcrden,
Terminus, insbesondere ein Eigenname eine Form bezeichnetl Genau namlich eine Form zu bezeichnen, behauptet William of Sherwood Sokrates
Subject
seines
und
einfache
die
fiir
diskrete
dies,
vom
Supposition
gcgebenen Beispielsatzes. "Cum dico Socrates est praedicabile de uno 14 Dem Verstandnis solo respicitur pro forma significata per nomen." ,
Eigenname cine Form bezeichnct, kommt man wohl ein Stuck naher, wcnn man sich um ein Verstandnis des von William of Sherwood angefiihrten Beispielsatzes bcmuht. dessen, was es heiBt, daB ein
Kneale/Kneale erscheint
Sherwood
offensichtlich
sowohl die von William of
postuliertc suppositio simplex discreta
und
die damit
Annahme, daB singulare Termini eine Form bezeichnen, Beispielsatz abwegig:
be
said
to
a
signify
suppositio.
As
substance,
Socrates
he
"...
example means anything Socrates Socrates
is is
and
rightly
not
is
at
that
this
remarked
predicable all,
verbundene
auch Williams
name can
very strangely that a proper
insists
form
Aristotle
als
it
of
is
in
essential
to
doctrine
his
anything.
If
its
having
of
primary William s last
must mean either that being-called-
one thing or that being-identical-withpredicable predicable of only one thing, and in neither case is a form of of only
1
Socraticity
Die
involved."
kritische
Interpretation von Kneale/Kneale leuchtet ein,
man das esse praedicabile als Wenn Aristoteles sagt, daB erste
Pradikat-(in
einem Urteil)-sein
Substanzen weder
in
wenn
auffaBt.
etwas sind noch von
etwas ausgesagt werden, so besagt dies in logischer Terminologie, daB singulare Termini in einer Aussage niemals an Pradikatsstelle stehen
konnen. Folglich rekonstruieren Kneale/Kneale
Sokrates
als
einen auf
genau ein Objekt zutreffenden allgemeinen Terminus, und zwar in Form einer Relation zu Sokrates (als Person) bzw. zu Sokrates (als Namen), in der
nur Sokrates selbst
steht.
DaB
Sokrates
nur von einem
einzigen
ausgesagt wird, besagt dann, daB die als offene Schemata dargestellten 14
(Edition Lohr), S. 267.
15
(Kneale/Kneale),
S. 257.
Die Einteilung derformalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood Pradikate
x
x wird
bzw.
identisch mil Sokrates
1st
Sokrates
nur von einem einem einzigen Objekt, namlich Sokrates
449
genannt
selbst,
erfiillt
werden.
Es
mir
erscheint
Intention Williams
ob
zweifelhaft,
Es
wird.
getroffen
mit
dieser sich
bietet
die
Interpretation
namlich ein anderes
Verstandnis des esse praedicabile und damit auch des von William of Sherwood gegebenen Beispielsatzes an, da der Ausdruck esse praedicabile de uno solo als Defmiens im Pradikabilien-Kapitel der Introductiones
vorkommt, und zwar
als
Defmiens des Definiendums Individuum
individuum, quod de uno solo
:
est
"Et
nomen proprium
est praedicabile, ut est
et
pronomen et dictio communis cum pronomine. Dicitur enim individuum, eo 1 quod non dividitur in partes subiectivas." Die Erlauterungen, die William of Sherwood der Definition hinzufiigt, *
erleichtern zunachst das Verstandnis des Satzes nicht.
einen Schritt sichtlich
in
kommen: Der
weiter
den
Socrates
aquivalenten
Form
angefiihrte
Dennoch kann man
individuum
est
darf offen-
Beispielsatz
transformiert
von Kneale/Kneale keine Parallele zu Aussagen wie eine Ansatzpunkte mehr. Ferner ergibt sich Homo est species insofern species zu sein bedeutet, daB homo von werden. In dieser
bietet er fur die Kritik
,
mehreren ausgesagt werden kann. "Species autem est, quod praedicatur de 17 Weiterhin kann gesagt werden, daB wegen der angefiihrten pluribus ,.."
Socrates
innerhalb des transformierten Beispielsatzes vorliegt. Historisch
und systematisch
Wenn nun
in
einfach
von Interesse, daB W. Burleigh im gleichen praedicatur de pluribus und Socrates est
hier
ist
Homo
Kontext die Beispielsatze 18 individuum verwendet.
Socrates
der einfachen Supposition auch im Falle von
Modus
Parallele der erste
dem
Satz
Socrates est individuum
supponieren
soil,
so
kann er nicht
der Eigenname fur
die
Person
Sokrates supponieren. Folglich kann individuum nicht als solcher Begriff verstanden werden, der auf Personon zutrifft. Die Erlauterung ut est
nomen proprium sonst
Socrates
William
of
...
kann aber auch
material
Sherwood
nicht wortlich
(Edition Lohr),
17 (Edition Lohr),
W. St.
Burleigh,
weil
supponieren wiirde. Vorlaufig bleibt der von
fur
die
suppositio
simplex
Beispielsatz in beiden Versionen problematisch. 16
genommen werden, discreta
angefiihrte
Zur Vorbereitung eines
S. 237. S. 238.
De
puritate
Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955,
S.
17
artis u. 19.
logicae
tractates
longior,
edited
by Ph.
Boehner,
Brands
450
angemessenen Verstandnisses gehe vorlaufig zu dcr Frage zuriick, was cine
Form
es heiBt,
und kehre
Umweg
daB ein diskreter Terminus
bczeichnct.
Wort
Ein
ich einen kleinen
(material) noch
wenn
einfach,
supponiert
es
weder
fur
sich
selbst
Gegenstande (personal) supponiert. Dasjenige, was von etwas ausgesagt wird, sind nun aber auch weder Worter ( Sokrates ) noch entgegen der bei Aristoteles iiblichen Ausdruckweise Gegenstande fiir
(Sokrates). Ausgesagt werden in der Regel Eigenschaften bzw. Begriffe. Beide sind Kandidaten fiir dasjenige, was als Bedeutung eines Terminus im
Unterschied zu seiner Referenz Sokrates
Es
ist
Betracht gezogen wird. Die Person
das Referenzobjekt des Eigennamens Sokrates
als
Supposition
.
keine groBen Schwierigkeiten bereiten, die Theorie der
diirfte
Sherwood
in
Referenztheorie
cine
aufzufassen.
19
Fiir
William
of
wcitergehende Auffassung, daB die Referenz eines Terminus ausschliefllich eine Sache seiner Supposition sei. offensichtlich
gilt
die
Hiervon zu trennen
ist die Signifikation: die Bezcichnungsfunktion eines Terminus ist die Darstellung einer Form. So auch des singularen jeden kann sich auch durch den jeweiligen Satzkontext immer nur die -
d.h.
Supposition
20
Signifikation.
konscquent
Referenz
Was
Terminus wandeln,
eines
nicht
aber
wir somit bci William of Sherwood vorfinden,
durchgefiihrte,
die
d.h.
singularen
Termini
seine
ist
eine
einbeziehende
Semantiken sind uns
in der Gegenwarts"Wenn wir die Trennung zwischen Bedeutung wohl vertraut. philosophie und Referenz richtig beachten, spaltcn sich die Probleme dessen, was so
dualistische Semantik. Derartige
leichthin
Semantik genannt wird,
verschieden sind, daB
sic
Wir konnen von der
Tfieorie dcr
21
(
denn
Eigennamen
er
trennt
in
Namen
nicht
so fundamental
mehr
verdienen.
Bedeutung und der Tfieorie der Referenz kommt William of Sherwood sehr
ubercinstimmend
Sache
der
die
signiflcatio
)
an,
dann
muB
singulare
Termini,
speziell
eine Entitat benannt werden, die als Bedeutung
P.V. Spade, The Semantics of Medie\ al Philosophy, Cambridge 1982, theory of reference."
"71
die
Gebiete,
von der suppositio ( Referenz ). Wcndet man diesen Dualismus auf
Bedeutung
20
zwei
Dieser modernen Sicht
sprechen."
nahe,
in
einen gemeinsamen
in:
Terms",
S.
192:
The
The
Cambridge
History
of Later
theory of supposition proper
is
a
Vgl. (Edition Lohr), S. 267 (1. Dubitatio); ferner: (Kneale/Kneale), S. 254.
W.V.O. Quine,
"Anmerkungen
zur
logischen Standpunkt, Frankfurt 1979, S. 125.
Theorie
der
Referenz",
in:
ders.,
Von einem
Die Einteilung derformalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood
451
Unterschied zu ihrer Referenz fungiert. Hierbei so vermute ich, um dicjenigen Entitaten, die nur von
singularer Termini in:
handelt es sich,
einem einzigen ausgesagt werden konnen: die Individua. Diesen mochte ich mich nun in Form eines kleinen Exkurses in die Semantik der
Gegenwart zuwenden. Von den verschiedenen dualistischen Semantiken der 22 Gegenwart wahle ich die von R. Carnap in Bedeutung und Notwendigkeit entwickelte Theorie von Extension und Intension.
Carnap
semantischen Begriffe der Extension und Intension
fiihrt die
per Abstraktion ein. Dabei handelt es sich um das prazisierende Verfahren der Begriffsexplikation, bezogen auf bekannte Begriffspaare wie Umfang
oder Freges Bedeutung und Sinn Der Begriff der Intension wird vor allem im Hinblick auf die Modallogik eingefiihrt und ist nicht
und
Inhalt
.
identisch mit
dem umfassenden
Begriff der Bedeutung in
Abgrenzung zur
Referenz. Nicht nur aus diesem Grunde sind Analogisierungen zwischen
der significatio bei William of Sherwood und dem der 23 iiberhaupt nur cum grano salis zulassig. Bevor Wesenheiten gesucht werden, die als Extension bzw. Intension
dem
Begriff
Intension
wenn
Frage kommen, wird die Gleichheit, bzw. allgemein die Aquivalenz von Extension und Intension festgelegt. Ich beschranke mich hier auf die von auf die singularen d.h. Carnap so genannten Individuenausdriicke in
,
Termini. Zwei Individuenausdriicke sind extensionsgleich gdw. der Satz a = b wahr ist; sie sind intensionsgleich gdw. dieser L-wahr ist. Ein Satz
L-wahr
soil
heiBen,
Tatsachenwissen kann.
Da
wenn
seine
iiber
Wahrheit
unabhangig
von
aufgrund semantischer Regeln entschieden werden a = b genau dann wahr ist, wenn a und b auf
allein
der Satz
dasselbe Objekt referieren,
kommt
als
Extension eines singularen Terminus
nur das jeweilige Referenzobjekt in Frage. Der Begriff der L- Wahrheit ist an sich umstritten. Davon unabhangig bereitet es gewisse Schwierigkeiten, sich einen L-wahren Satz der Form a=b
vorzustellen, vor
sollen.
allem
wenn
Dementsprechend bieten
sich
a
und
b
echte
Eigennamen
sein
auch keine Wesenheiten unmittelbar
an, die als Intensionen singularer Termini in Frage
kamen. Das hiermit
angedeutete Problem scheint mir demjenigen analog zu sein, welches sich als Frage nach der durch einen singularen Terminus bezeichneten Form darstellte.
7? R. 1
und
23
Da
bei den anderen Designatoren als jeweilige Intensionen sich
Carnap, Bedeutung und Notwendigkeit,
9.
Vgl. P.V. Spade, a.a.O., S. 188.
Wien
-
New
York,
1972,
insbes.
Kap.
Brands
452
solche Wesenhcitcn ergaben, die gewohnlich als Bedcutungen odcr Begriffe
bezeichnet wcrden, Individuenbegriff
Terminus
fuhrt
zur
Carnap
Entsprechung dazu den Ausdruck
in
der
Bezeichnung
Intension
eines
singularen
ein.
In Ansehung der Analogic, aber auch im BewuBtsein der Differenzen zwischen den dualistischen Semantiken William s of Sherwood und R.
Carnaps mochte ich vorschlagen, den von William of Sherwood eindurch Individuum Terminus Individuenbegriff im Sinne gefiihrten Carnaps zu iibersetzen. Williams Erlauterung ware danach wie folgt zu verstehen: Ein Individuenbegriff ist dasjenigc, was nur von einem einzigen ausgesagt werden kann, wie dies bei der Verwendung singularer Termini der
Fall
werden
Sie
weil
sie
(im Unterschied zu Allgemeinbegriffen) keine untcrgeordneten Begriffe haben. Entsprechend ware species in dem Satz homo est species durch ist.
Individuenbegriffe
genannt,
24
Artbegriff wiederzugeben.
von
Die
hiermit
der
durch
vorgcschlagene Interpretation, welche ihren Ausgang William of Sherwood eingefiihrten suppositio simplex
kann selbstverstandlich nicht ohne Folgen fur ein Verstandnis der suppositio simplex im allgcmeinen bleiben. Es hat den
discreta
genommen
hat,
Anschein angesichts der verschiedenen, Beispielsatze,
angefiihrten
wenn
als
supponierende Termini Suppositionsart auch ganz
fur einfach
diese
verschiedene Gebrauchsweisen von Termini abdecken wiirde, welche der
personalen oder materialen Supposition nicht zugeordnet werden konnen. Feststeht, daB ein an Subjektstelle einfach supponierender Terminus durch ein bestimmtes Pradikat determiniert sein muB, und daB unter
diesem Subjektterminus ein descensus ad singularia generell nicht moglich ist. Die Griinde fiir die Unmoglichkeit eines Descensus sind allerdings andere
als bei
der immobilen Supposition.
Angesichts der Frage nach
dem
quantitativen Status von Satzen mit
einfach supponierendem Subjekt, weist William of
Sherwood
die Auffas-
sung, derartige Satze seien singular, deshalb zuriick, weil sie eine mit Semantik unvereinbare Deutung der einfachen dualistischen seiner
Supposition voraussetzt. Diese faBt namlich species
als
Eigennamen
muB fiir William Terminus homo indem
Interpretation
der
24
,
So
z.B. Kant, Logik,
A
150.
homo
in
dem
Satz
homo
est
einer Art auf, also als singularen Terminus. Diese
of er
Sherwood unakzeptabel erscheinen, weil nicht mehr als konkreter allgemeiner
Die Einteilung derfortnalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood
Terminus sondern
abstraktcr singularer Terminus 25 fungieren wiirde,
als
seine Signifikation andern wiirde.
personal und
Dann
homo ohne
aber wiirde
Zweifel
supponieren. Die gleiche Konsequenz ergabe sich einen material supponierenden Terminus durch
diskret
wenn man
iibrigens,
453
Hinzufiigen von Anfiihrungszeichen modifizieren wiirde.
Es
den
hat
wiirden
Kneale/Kneale die einfache Supposition als miBliche Folge des Umstands verstehn, daB wir zwischen abstrakten, singularen und konkreten, allgemeinen Termini im gewohnals
Anschein,
lichen Sprachgebrauch nicht hinreichend scharf unterscheiden:
use the
new
word homo
as a substitute for the
But William refuses to admit
sense.
account
incoherent
two
of
kinds
we
word humanitas, we give it a this, and produces instead an 26
of
if
"For
suppositio."
Da
dieses
sich
Verstandnis der einfachen Supposition offensichtlich mit der dualistischen
Semantik
Williams
vereinbaren
nicht
la Bt,
man
konnte
andere
eine
erwagen, welche den Vorzug hat, daB sie sich aus unserer Interpretation von Williams semantischem Dualismus ergibt und zugleich erklart, warum ein derart einfach supponierender Subjektterminus keinen Descensus zula Bt.
Wenn
es so
ist,
daB ein Terminus
nach unserer Interpretation
Signifikat,
in einfacher fiir
Supposition
sein
fiir
einen Begriff steht und dies
durch den spezifischen Charakter des Pradikats bewirkt wird, dann liegt es nahe, derartige Pradikate im Sinne Freges als Begriffe zweiter Stufe aufzufassen.
Individuum,
solche Begriffe, welche
species,
und praedicabile de uno solo
immer nur auf andere
Begriffe zutreffen.
sinde
Nun
sind
allerdings die durch solche Begriffe zweiter Stufe Begriffen erster Stufe
zugesprochenen Eigenschaften nicht auch schon deshalb Eigenschaften der unter diese fallenden Gegenstande. Das ist der Grund dafiir, daB ein
Descensus
diesem Fall nicht moglich
in
ist.
Die Beziehung der Unter-
ordnung eines Begriffs unter einen andcren, wie animal
,
ist
transitiv,
anderen, wie in
Zum FaBt
25
diejenige
Satz
homo
AbschluB mochte
man,
wie
Zweiteilungen auf,
dem
erhalt
Vgl. hierzu:
man
Fallens
est species
,
ist
(Kneale/Kneale),
dem
Satz
Begriffs
homo
unter
est
einen
dies nicht.
noch auf ein Problem
am Rande
die
W.V.O. Quine, Grundzuge der Logik, Frankfurt
26
in
eines
hinweisen.
Ausfiihrungen Williams nahelegen, beide formalen Supposition als vollstandige Disjunktionen einen Stammbaum der Arten und Unterarten der
dies
der
ich
des
S. 255.
1969, S. 262
f.
Brands
454
Supposition,
dcr den
Intentioncn von William
of
Sherwood zumindest
dahingehend entspricht,
daB
Nun
daB William dann auch die suppositio personalis
ist
es zweifellos so,
schon
discreta
einfiihren
die suppositio
simplex discreta
fiihrt
Zweiteilung
der
Supposition
personalen
determinierte und eine konfuse. Konfuse Supposition dictio
27
supponit pro
diskreten nicht fur
Ich
enthalt.
Abgrenzungsgriinden, wie das Schema ausweist, aber zu Schwierigkeiten mil der nachfolgend
aus
muB. Das
vorgcnommenen
er
multis".
Supposition sein,
liegt
vor,
in
cine
"quando
Dies kann aber keine echte Unterart der
da ein diskreter Terminus per defmitionem
mehreres supponieren kann. hoffe
gezeigt
zu
haben,
daB
die
zweifache
Einteilung
der
formalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood mil einer Reihe nicht nur formaler Probleme verbunden ist. Die Einbe/iehung der modernen Semantik hatte nicht nur den Sinn, diese Probleme besser zu verstehen, sondern
auch zu zeigen, wie modern William of Sherwood
Universitat Diisseldorf
27
(Edition Lohr), S. 266.
ist.
MARCIA L. COLISH
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot
The importance
s
Conception ofNihil
of John the Scot in the history of medieval thought has
always rested squarely on his transmission and use of Neoplatonism.
1
To
the extent that scholars have sought to bring the Latin school tradition
bear on their assessment of John
to
the
as
logic,
discipline
conceptual tool. his
2
There
which he is,
philosophy they have turned to applied the most consistently as a s
however, a key juncture in John s thought, 3, at which he distances
analysis of the term nihil in Periphyseon
himself both from the Neoplatonic tradition and from the discipline of
As
logic.
with
other
medieval
authors
confronted
with
the
task
of
explaining the idea of creation ex nihilo, John canvasses the liberal arts
and the philosophy available to him for assistance. But, in this case, he finds the help he seeks in the science of arithmetic, as it had come down to him in the works of Boethius and Martianus Capella, whom John and his
studied
associates
appeals
to
school
foundation of
all
and glossed. The
arithmetic
is
the
critical
point
at
of monad,
definition
which John the
abstract
numbers. Can the monad be equated with the deity, as Can the monad be defined as nihil!
the later Neoplatonists had argued?
I
would
like
to
acknowledge the support of the
Princeton, where this paper was written
The
in
Institute
for
Advanced Study,
1987.
conspectus on John and his relation to his Neoplatonic sources is Gersh, From lamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the ftehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden, 1978) and Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition, 2 vols. (Notre Dame, 1986). For
provided
best
by
overall
Stephen
see Marcia L. Colish, "John the Scot s Christology and Soteriology in Relation to His Greek Sources," Downside Re\ icw, 100 (1982), 138-51. For the influence of Marius Victorinus in particular see Gustavo A. Piemonte, expression quae sunt et 6 Jean Scot et Marius Victorinus," Jean Scot ecrivain: Actes du IV quae non sunt 28 aout-2 ed. G.-H. Allard international, Montreal, 1983, colloque septembre earlier literature
"L
:
Vita in omnia pervenit El vitalismo eriugeniano y Mario Victorino," Patristica et Mediae\>alia 1 (1986), 3-48. I would like thank Dr. Piemonte for making offprints of these two papers available to me. "
(Montreal/Paris, 1986), pp. 81-113; la
to
influencia de
:
}
John Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre: Theology and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1981); Gangolf Schrimpf, Das Werk des Johannes Scottus Eriugena im Rahmcn des Wissenschafts\<erstdndnisses seiner Zeit: Eine Hinfuhrung zu Periphyseon, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic und Theologie des Mittelalters, n.F. 23 (Miinster, 1982). See, especially,
Logic,
456
Colish
Can it
nihil
be viewed as the privation of essence, species, or habitusl Can logical opposite of aliquid, which it excludes? All of
be defined as the
these
contemporary
Carolingian
patristic sources.
grounds It
more
and
possibilities
3
had
been well
as
masters,
In the Periphyseon
John
and
as
by
rejects
all
their
ancient
and
these options and
argument instead on the arithmetical notion of the monad. should be noted that Periphyseon 3 is not the only place where
prologue to
John
St.
argument, and one
s
nihil.
He
does so as well
in his
all
things. Further,
coeternal and coessential with the Trinity. Since the
was not made
line
of
tune with the Boethian logic of opposition. In ipso factum est nichil
"Sine
quod factum
observes that nothing was created except through the includes
homily on the
Gospel, where he uses a much simpler
fully in
explicating the line
that
earlier
his
John addresses the idea of
Word
by
ventilated
Word is the in Him and
Word
est,"
John
because the
is
impossible to envision anything
Word
except the other Persons of the
it
logos of creation, 4
"nothing
Nihil here
at
all
remains
nihil
omnino, through of omnia in and at the the created all, nothing conceptual opposite through the Word, which omnia logically negates. The Boethian logic of Him."
is
mutually exclusive opposites is sufficient for John s task in this homily, is not the case in Periphyseon 3, where he sets for himself a much more complicated assignment. For it is here that John develops his
but this
doctrine of the primordial
causes.
It
invokes the mathematical idea of the
Periphyseon
is
largely for this reason that
monad
in his
he
handling of nihil in
3.
Before we
proceed to the Periphyseon it must be stressed that ancient Greek mathematicians had developed a standard notion of the later Neoplatonists rang their own changes. The mathematical definition of the monad as the abstract substratum of all
monad, on which the numbers, to which the
all
numbers can be reduced, was
first
formulated by
Pythagoreans. While the Pythagoreans were not averse to number
symbolism in other areas, their treatment of the monad was straight forward and strictly mathematical. This perspective was continued by the
Neopythagorean
A
mathematicians,
detailed investigation focusing
provided by Marcia L. Colish, Theological
Method,"
whose most
influential
exponent was
on Fredegisus of Tours and Ratramnus of Corbie Debates over Nihil and Tenebrae: A Study
"Carolingian
is
in
Speculum, 59 (1984), 757-95.
John the Scot, Homelie sur le Prologue de Jean 8, ed. Edouard Jeauneau, Sources chretiennes, 151 (Paris, 1969), p. 240: "nichil omnino relinquit quod in ipso et per ipsum factum For the whole argument see pp. 238-40. sit."
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot
Nicomachus of Gerasa. Written remained the
teaching and
Nicomachus
debt
the
to
conception of the monad.
5
main currents of Neopythagorean
the
textbook in the
classic
Pythagoreans
can be
centuries.
for
field
seen especially
in
his
Eschewing any cosmological applications of the
he treats number as the structure of
idea,
457
Conception c/Nihil
the second century A.D., his Intro
in
summed up
duction to Arithmetic
s
reality.
The monad and
the
and dyad, the two most primitive elements of number, refer not to as actual numbers but to the metaphysical principles of unity and alterity underlying them. According to Nicomachus, all actual numbers "one"
"two"
monad, which is a pure intelligible simple, and alone incomposite, and
derive their essential natures from the
mind
the
in
constituted
"in
When textbooks
it
of
God,
primary,
accordance with
6 itself."
Boethius was preparing his translations of the quadrivium was to Nicomachus that he turned as the authority on
arithmetic. His treatment of the
aequalitas in Latin,
the
preserves
not by any other but by
itself,
monad, which he renders
more abbreviated than
is
of
essentials
Nicomachus
as unitas or
Nicomachus, but he
that of
Boethius
Numbers,
teaching.
agrees, are diverse in themselves. They can be reduced to the concepts of "odd number" and "even number," which in turn "come forth from one 7 source."
This source
is
equality,
from which
all
inequalities are derived
8
With these definitions in hand, in which they are all resolved. Boethius propels the strictly mathematical Neopythagorean view of the monad firmly on its course in the Latin school tradition. and
The
later
Neopythagorean handling of Plato For their
part,
they sought
were
however,
Neoplatonists,
to
with
dissatisfied
this
doctrine of the one and the many.
s
explore
broader metaphysical and
the
On Nicomachus and his place in the arithmetical tradition see Frank Egleston Robbins and Louis Charles Karpinski, "Studies in Greek Mathematics," the intro. to Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic, trans. Martin Luther d Ooge (New York,
1926),
16-17,
pp.
35,
37-38,
99-102;
Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction arithmetique 1
Dernier,
Nicomachus
trans.
of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic d Ooge, pp. 190, 192, 211-12. The quotation is at 1.6.4,
De
Boethius, 13:
Janine
"ex
Number
institutione arithmetica
una tamen genitura Theory:
A
profluunt."
Translation
of the
to
intro.
her
trans,
of
(Paris, 1978), pp. 16, 24-25. 1.7.1,
1.6.1-4,
1.16.9-10,
2.1.1,
p. 190.
Godofredus Friedlein (Leipzig, 1867), p. a translation by Michael Masi, Boethian De institutione arithmetica (Amsterdam, 1983), p. 1.2,
ed.
There
is
76.
o
De
arith.
inst.
aequalitate
2.1,
processerit.
componuntur,
The same point
et is
in
p.
77:
Tota
inaequalitatis
Sed quae rerum elementa
eadem
rursus resolutione facta
also found at 1.32, p. 66.
substantia sunt,
a
principe
ex hisdem
solvuntur."
The
sui
generis
principaliter translation is
omnia mine.
Colish
458
monad
monad,
concern we can document
a
Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagitc. Since they saw the
in
especially
of the
implications
cosmological
as the opposite of
Neoplatonists held
plurality, these
all
be
to
it
even as identical with, a higher hypostasis of being. analogous Proclus envisions each order of being, not merely numbers, as starting from a monad and as being reducible to the monad at the top of its or
to,
He
particular order of being.
the deity.
and
is
9
A
similar view
docs not hesitate to equate the monad with found widely among the late Neoplatonists,
further elaborated by Dionysius. Recasting the
and the many
in
above
creation,
each order of being to the
all
the archetypes.
or
directly
Creation
simple and beings that are composite.
monad "Every
the
number it
is is
unified in the
monad,
distinguished
and
number
of
in
its
whole. In Stephen Gcrsh
monad
in
relation
Neoplatonists gave
monad
But
the
God
to this
s
more
10
restricted
sense
idea a
is
the
all
unity levels
are
that
As Dionysius it
puts
it,
proceeds from
having transferred the to
the
11 number."
warm welcome,
of
beings
creation
words, Dionysius has also recast
which creation
status
alone shares with the
but inasmuch as
multiplied,"
its
supreme
monad
contains
the quality of radical and indivisible unicity.
monad
concept
level of the
God becomes
indirectly.
problem of the one
monad up from
numerical terms, he moves the
as the archetype of that stands
of
is
God
as
as
a
"the
Other Christian
treating the deity as the
and physical worlds. They sei/cd on this notion as a useful way of conceptuali/ing the emanation of plurality from unity that harmoni/ed with the additions and revisions they imported into in relation to the angelic
the pagan Ncoplatonic view of the spiritual order.
are
12
While the Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean theories of the monad manifestly different, they were sometimes combined by authors in
Proclus, Theologia Platonis 138, 231, ed. H.D. Saffcy and I,.G. Wcstcrink (Paris, 1968- ); In Timaeum 3.106.1-17, cd. E. Dichl (Ixipzig, 1903-06); Institutio theologica 24.1-3, 2nd cd., cd. E.R. Dodds (Oxford, 1965). On this whole development sec Gcrsh, to Eriugena, pp. 63, 99, 141 n. 81, to whom this account is much A.C. Lloyd, "The later Neoplatonists." The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mcdic\ al Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1970), p. 307; Philip Merlan, "Zur Zahlenlehre im Platonismus (Neuplatonismus) und im Sefer Yezira," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 3 (1965), 175-76.
From lamblichus indebted;
also
Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominihus 5.6, ed. B. Cordier, PG, 821A. The trans, is that of Gersh, From lamblichus to Eriugena, p. 140. Gersh, From lamblichus to Eriugena, p. Neoplatonists more generally see ibid., pp. 140-41. 12
Ibid., pp. 175-77.
140.
On
Dionysius
and
3:
820D-
other
late
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot
s
459
Conception o/Nihil
Favonius Eulogius, a pupil of Augustine, produced a de Somnio Scipionis in the late fourth century which reflects a Disputatio blend of this sort. On the one hand, Favonius describes the monad as an late
antiquity.
which generates
indivisible unity
and
first
numbers 13 and, on the
all
causes manifested as God,
final
14
mind,
15
other, as the
or soul.
16
As
with
monad can be viewed as the deity The reasons leading mind or soul are far from clear. A much
Dionysius later on, he thinks that the
because of
him
primordial incapacity to suffer division.
to extend this idea to the
more
influential
commentator on the dream of
Scipio, Macrobius, follows
Consistent with his generally Neoplatonic outlook, Macrobius defines
suit.
the
its
monad
as that
"which
is
the beginning and end of
knows neither beginning nor end, distinguishes our understanding of
is
to
applied
Him from
the
all
things but itself
highest
God and
the plurality of things and
17 But, in the same passage, Macrobius goes powers subsequent to Him." on to say that the monad can also be found in the ranks of creatures
below
God,
He
which
innumerable forms of
generates,
including
intellect,
soul,
and
the
1
things.
Also open to some confusion is an author even more central than Macrobius to the educational enterprise of John the Scot and his Martianus Capella. In the seventh book of his Marriage of Mercury and Philology, devoted to arithmetic, Martianus offers both the associates,
Neopythagorean
unambiguous,
crisp,
which they return, creator
God,
Favonius
in
15 16
and a Neoplatonic
contrast with matter in
Eulogius,
Scarpa (Padova, 1974). 14
19
of
definition
principle of numbers, the source from which
all
the
monad
definition of the
a state
monad
of generation.
de Somnio Scipionis 3.1, 4.1-2, 5.12, author see Gersh, Middle Platonism, 2:739.
Disputatio
On
this
the
as
numbers proceed and
as the
20
6.1-2,
to
Even
ed.
L.
Disp. 5.4. Ibid. 6.3, 7.3.
Ibid. 5.2.
Somnium Scipionis 1.6.8, ed. JA. Willis (Leipzig, 1963), 2:19: "Haec finisque omnium, neque ipsa principii aut finis sciens, ad summum refertur deum eiusque intellectum a sequentium numero rerum et potestatum sequestrat, nee in inferiore post deum gradu frustra earn desideraveris." The translation is that of Macrobius, In
monas
initium
Gersh, Middle Platonism, 2:525. 18
In Som. Scip. 1.6.8-9, Willis, 2:19-20.
Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae Willis (Leipzig, 1983), pp. 263, 269, 270. 20
Ibid. 7.733, p. 264.
et
Mercurii
7.732,
7.743,
7.745,
cd.
J.A.
Colish
460
more problematic
is
the speech of Arithmetica which opens Book
together in
Before
all
things,
let
monad be
the
disparate notions
these
way Martianus lumps
the
7:
numbers coming
called sacred;
have taught that before everything the monad is the original quickener. For if form is an accident 01 to that anything that exists, and if that which numbers is prior which is numbered, it is fitting to venerate the monad before that which has been called the beginning. Then too, I shall not neglect to point out to those who examine the matter that because the monad is unity, it is alone self-sufficient. From it other things are is generated; it alone is the seminal force of all numbers; it alone the measure and cause of increases and the extent of losses. The monad is everywhere a part, and everywhere the whole; it endures through all things. For that which is prior to things existing and which does not disappear when they pass away, must be eternal. and Jove - a conclusion Rightly is the monad called Father of All, corroborated by the causative force of its ideal and intelligible form. have called the monad Concord, others Piety or Friendship, ... Some because it is so compact that it is not cut into parts. But more and father of the properly is it called Jupiter, because it is the head after
and associated with
it
it
gods.
Richard Johnson and E.R.
Burge,
their
in
commentary on Martianus
acknowledge the eclectic character of his treatment of the monad. But, they stress, despite his comparisons between the monad, the in practice Martianus tends to deity, and various benevolent attitudes,
arithmetic,
confine
his
application
of the
function of undergirding
all
monad more
rigorously
to
the
numbers, from the dyad on down,
abstract
in the less
rhapsodic manner of the Neopythagoreans.
Given
this
array
of
possibilities,
Neopythagorean mathematical approaches, how did John the Scot come literalism
from
Neoplatonic
to texts that freely
use
as
it
a
strictly
mathematical
to
mingle these
monad? Was he of the monad and
to grips with the
able to dismiss as an allegorical fancy the theologi/.ing to
theology
concept,
or
did
he
tread
the
monas esto, quam ante Quae si species est accidens cuilibet extantium primo, priusque est quod numeral quam illud numerandum, rite earn ante ipsum, quem principem dixere, veneramur. Nee dissimulabo ex eo, quod monas, retractantibus unum solum ipsam esse ab eaque cetera procreari omniumque numerorum solam seminarium esse solamque mcnsuram et incrementorum causam statumdum per cuncta perque detrimentorum. Quae tamen ubique pars est, ubique totum, Ibid.
cuncta
7.731,
vibrantem
pp.
262-63:
sociati
"Prae
cunctis
igitur
postmodum numeri
affata
principia
sacra
docuerunt.
non absconditur, neque enim, quae est ante extantia et quae post absumpta omnium lovem rite esse nominatam, quod potest non esse perpetua. Hanc igitur patrem testatur. ... Hanc quoque alii quidem idealis illius intellectualisque speciei vis causativa in Concordiam, hanc Pietatem Amicitiamque dixere, quod ita nectatur, ut non secetur sit idem caput ac pater deorum." The partes; tamen rectius luppitur nuncupatur, quod William H. Stahl et al., Martianus Capclla and the Seven Liberal Arts translation is petua;
by
(New York,
1977), 2:276-77.
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot
Ncoplatonic path, equating the
monad
s
Conception o/Nihil
with the deity? John
s
461
work both
as
pedagogue and as a philosopher affords an unambiguous answer. In Periphyseon 3 he adheres expressly to the Neopythagorean concept of the monad. As was suggested earlier, his inspiration here was the need a
to
distinguish
came
causes from God. But even before John
the primordial
to address that problem,
he and
had taken
his circle of educators
a solidly Neopythagorean stand on the
monad
in their
commentaries on
Martianus Capella.
There
some
is
commentaries and
on the relationships among these is not likely to be resolved
scholarly debate
their
authorship, which
a complete critical edition of all the known manuscripts has been made. 22 None the less, a scholarly consensus has been achieved on two until
main
points:
systematic
First,
study
of
while the
who
was Alcuin
it
liberal
whose
in
arts,
first
out
mapped
service
the
Martianus
the
were produced, the program was not activated until the middle of the ninth century under the leadership of Martin of Laon, John the Scot,
glosses
and other Hiberno-Latin masters. Second, while the
literary
form of the
commentary is by nature somewhat fluid, making attribution within a group of scholars joined in a common pedagogical pursuit rather difficult, it
is
agreed that the glosses contained
in a Paris
manuscript published by and those preserved in an Oxford manuscript, Book 1 of has been published by Edouard Jeauneau, 24 may be read as 23
Cora Lutz, which
authentic
brought
indices to
the
to text
the
learning,
and the point of view, which John
of Martianus. 25
In
the
addition,
continental
first
On the status of this question and the scholarly literature pertaining to it, see Gersh, Middle Platonism, 2:799 n. 100; Michael Ilcrren, "The. Commentary on Martianus Attributed to John Scottus: Its Hiberno-I^tin Background," Jean Scot ecrivain, pp. 26571; Claudio Leonardi, "Martianus Capella et Jean Scot: Nouvelle presentation d un vieux ibid.,
probleme,"
21-23,
35-36,
pp.
37-48,
"Martianus Lutz, Kristeller and F.E.
196-207; Schrimpf, 133-34. Authors not
Capella,"
Catalogus
Das Wcrk discussed
des Johannes Scottus Eriugena, pp. by these scholars include Cora E.
Translationum
Commentariorum
et
ed.
,
P.O.
Cranz (Washington, 1971), 2:367-78, who at that point attributed to Martin of Laon the commentary she had earlier published and assigned to Dunchad; and M.L.W. Laistner, "Martianus Capella and His Ninth-Century Commentators," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 9 (1925), 130-38, who attributes to Martin the Paris MS. 12960 which was later edited by Lutz and which subsequent scholars have agreed in assigning to John.
John
the
Scot,
Annotationes
in
Marcianum,
ed.
Cora E. Lutz (Cambridge,
MA,
1939).
Edouard Jeauneau, Quatre themes
erigeniens (Montreal/Paris, 1978), pp. 91-166.
Commentary on Martianus," Das Werk des Johannes Scottus Eriugena, pp. Herren,
"The
pp.
269,
21-23,
271,
35-36,
272,
37-48,
274,
285;
133-34;
Schrimpf,
"Zur
Frage
Colish
462
master to gloss Martianus, Remigius of Auxcrrc, shows a close dependence 26
and, on both the Paris and the Oxford stages of the Eriugenian project, as we will see, he shares and expands on John s treatment of the monad in particular.
One
now
of the leading scholars
Leonard!, has argued that this outlook
made
asserts,
to
recover
however,
the
decidedly Neoplatonic. John, he
guide to Martianus, in whose work he sought 27 With respect to the monad, cast of mind.
Platonic
exactly
is
Claudio
texts,
his
Dionysius
the
work on these
at
reverse
is
the
Not only does John avoid speech that would have allowed
case.
lemmatizing the portion of Arithmctica
s
on the Neoplatonic description of the monad as the line dependent on Boethius deity, he also takes a strictly Neopythagorcan He proceeds in a nomonad. the discuss he does in those glosses where
him
to
expatiate
nonsense and non-metaphorical manner. The monad, he states, is the mathematical substratum underlying all numbers, and abstract 28 Whatever their capacity for subdivision and of all numbers."
"the
principle
he
composition,
continues,
numbers are
"all
likewise
reducible
29 Finally, he notes, "once monad, which alone is irreducible." have been reduced, the monad endures ... because above
nothing, since the end of the
In
may be
line
that lies
numbers
all
constituted in
is
there
it
is
it."-
cited
time John had moved
translations,
more
to consider
dcr Authentizitat unscrcr Tcxtc von Johannes Scottus J.J.
By the work he had had the
the Periphyseon.
Platonic theory of the
and he was able
ed.
in
to the composition of that
opportunity to acquire a
Mind of Eriugena,
the
John does not speculate on what the nihil above the monad, or how they are related. This theme is last
one to which he devotes extended attention
Greek
to
numbers
all
O Meara
and
its
monad thanks
to his
merits side by side
Annotationcs
Ludwig Biclcr (Dublin,
in
Martianum,
1973),
pp.
The
125-39;
Scottus Eriugena und die Re/.cption dcs Martianus Capella im karolingischen ed. W. Beicrwaltes (Heidelberg, Eriugena: Studien zu scincn Qncllen,
"Johannes
Bildungswcsen,"
1980), pp. 135-48.
26
27 28
Herren,
The Commentary on
I^eonardi,
John
"Martianus
the
Scot,
numerorum
"omnium
Martianus," p.
Capella et
Annotations principium."
Jean
Scot,"
272.
pp. 202-03.
in Marcianurn, Musica 490.14, ed. Lut/., p. 202: Similarly Arithmctica 366.20, 367.18; Musica 490.15, pp.
155, 202.
2^ Ibid.,
Arithmctica 367.13,
quae non potest 30 Ibid.,
remanet
...
p.
155:
"quando
rcsolvuntur numeri ad
monadem
pcrvenitur
resolvi."
Arithmetica
367.15,
quia supra earn nihil
p.
155:
est,
quia
"postquam
finis
omnium
omnes numeri consummantur, monas in
ea
constat."
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot
s
monad which he
with the Neopythagorean understanding of the
463
Conception o/ Nihil
reflects in
Martianus glosses. In Periphyseon 2, the first point in the work where 31 he holds up these two alternatives almost as he refers to the monad, of the monad as the cause and end of all the notion He cites parallels. his
numbers
one instance of the general philosophical maxim
as
cause can have
effects.
many
32
He
also quotes Dionysius
mathematical understanding of the monad to the 33 and Maximus Confessor s similar analysis in cause,
that a single
yoking of the
monad
as
the
first
commentary on monadic teaching
Gregory Nazianzus, whom Maximus reports as principle that no difference should be admitted into the
Book
not until
is
It
his
"the
First
34 Cause."
3 of the Periphyseon, in the context of defining
and explaining creation ex nihilo, that John makes a preclusive choice between these contrasting approaches. His ultimate goal in this section of the work is to dismiss one Neoplatonic conception of nihil in
nihil
As he
poses the question of nihil, he asks "whether it is the complete privation of essence or substance or accident, 3 or the excellence of the divine superessentiality." The Neoplatonism of of another.
favor
initially
*
both the
which he doctrine
which John supports, and of the privative theory, has been noted by previous commentators on John s
latter position,
rejects,
of nihil,
as
well
as
the
fact
Carolingian discussions of the subject
Cf.
Greek
I.
P.
Sheldon-Williams,
monad and
identifies
it
Philosophy, with God as
which, however, does not mention the
Hiberniae, 9 (Dublin, 1972),
Ibid.
2.618B-C,
p.
Eriugena, p. 140 n. 76. 34 Periphyseon 2.615B, introducatur."
The
trans,
p.
202:
is
responding to recent
addition to older debates.
Eriugena,"
36
What
Cambridge History of Later
522, who claims that John the first cause in Periphyseon
adverts 1.1,
a
to
the
passage
at all.
ed.
and
trans.
I.
P.
Sheldon-Williams, Scriptores
p. 174.
210. This passage
is
he
p.
monad
John the Scot, Periphyseon 2.602B, Ixitini
Scottus
"Johannes
and Early Medieval
in
that
"de
has been noted by Gersh,
monade rationcm
ut
Prom lamblichus
non separatio
in
primo
to
causali
at p. 203.
3.634B, ed. and trans. I. P. Sheldon-Williams and Ludwig Bieler, Scriptores Hiberniae, 11 (Dublin, 1981), p. 60: "utrum privatio totius essentiae vel substantiae vel accidentis an divinae superessentialitatis excellentia." The trans, is at p. 61. Ibid.
I^atini
36
The
fullest
A. Piemonte,
study to date of John s doctrine of nihil in the Periphyseon is Gustavo sobre la creatio ex nihilo en Juan Escoto Eriugena," Sapientia, 23
"Notas
Donald F. Duclow, "Divine Nothingness and Self-Creation in John Journal of Religion, 57 (1977), 110-15 and Sheldon-Williams, intro. to his ed. of Periphyseon 3, pp. 5-11. Briefer accounts are given by Henry Belt, Johannes Scotus Eriugena: A Study in Medie\>al Philosophy (New York, 1964 [repr. of 1925 ed.]), (1968), 37-58; see also
Scotus
Eriugena,"
97 and Maieul Cappuyns, Jean Scot Erigene: Sa vie, son oeuwe, sa pensee (Bruxelles, 1964 [repr. of 1933 ed.]), pp. 344-50. The first scholar to note that John was respond-
p.
Colish
464
has not been appreciated
his use of the
is
Neopythagorean view of the
to exclude the Neoplatonic identification of the
monad
monad
with the
nihil, preserving nihil as a denomination for his handling of nihil in his Johannine homily, with God alone. In contrast where he treats it as the opposite of omnia, in Periphyseon 3 John
and the monad with
deity
of aliquid, here equates the divine nihil with omnia, seen as the opposite with omnia and nihil superessence. In identifying aliquid with essence and arriving at
that
John also has
destination,
to
define the nature of the
which remain eternal in primordial causes, which are created by God and themselves God. For not which are but the mind of God once created, this
purpose
as
the
well,
strictly
supplies him with conceptual
tools
notion
mathematical that
help him
of
the
monad
to obtain the desired
result.
John presents the idea of
as
nihil
the privation of being as the
major traditional position he needs to refute, including under this heading nihil as the absence of species, accidents, and habitus as well as the absence of essence
He
itself.
insists
that
there
is
between
a difference
the privation of being, on the one hand, and the apophatic method as an to the latter, he epistemic approach to God, on the other. With respect reflect appropriate to predicate negations of God, for they not denote do and our awareness of His transcendence any privation they
agrees,
is
it
of substance
means the view, says
already
37
on His
Nihil,
part.
however,
is
when
not acceptable
it
or aptitude of being. Such a privation of being or any function from a being of something it removal John, would involve the
possesses.
the
But,
nihil
that
before the
requires
when
explanation
there were
is
the
no created
creation, nothingness present of their essences or of beings yet in existence that could be deprived 38 second definition of nihil which John rejects, although anything else.
A
the exegetical tradition than he claims, is the identification of nihil with unformed matter. "For He Who made the
there
less
is
support for
it
in
and contemporaries and not just to a remoter past ing to his Carolingian predecessors J.A. Endres, Forschungen zur Gescluchte der fruhmittelalterlichen Philosophic, zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, 17:2-3 (Miinster, 1915), pp. 12-
was
Beitrage 13,
although this forerunner
is
not acknowledged by Piemonte,
"Notas,"
pp.
4M2
n.
6.
Carolingian background see Colish, "Carolingian Debates," scholars mentioned above has noticed the Speculum, 59 (1984), 757-95. None of the mathematical and anti-Neoplatonic aspects of John s treatment of nihil.
For more
37 38
details
on
the
128. Periphyseon 3.634C-D, 3.663C, pp. 60-62, Ibid.
3.634C-D, 3.686A-687B, pp. 60-62, 178-80.
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot
all,"
he plainly
backing up
states,
idea with a
this
465
Conception o/Nihil
made unformed matter
world out of unformed matter 39
s
out of nothing at
number of
familiar
40
arguments.
Having cleared the decks of these alternatives, John turns to two other theories, one of which he plans to refute and the other of which he intends to support. The
equated with
In the
nihil.
first
the
is
section of
idea
that
monad can be
the
Book 3 where he
considers this
John does not mention Martianus
specially, although he cites Boethius as an authority on arithmetic, summarizing and applying the Boethian doctrine of the monad, which we also find in the Martianus
possibility
41
Numbers, John notes, are themselves pure concepts, which can be reduced to the monad, the monad ... is the beginning and the middle and the end of all numbers."42 While they may explain the nature of changeable realities in act and operation, numbers remain eternal in glosses.
"for
their condition as
pure
intelligibles
and share,
in the
monad,
attribute
its
of abstract unity and indivisibility. Given that status, can the
monad be
regarded as the nihil out of which number was created and, through number, the phenomenal world that number can describe? After due consideration,
monad
the
John
with the
monad
reflected
it
any attempt to equate
cause. In thus de-Neoplatonizing the
first
John may well have had in mind nihil lies above the monad. This the
and with
rejects this idea,
remark
his
in the
monad,
Martianus gloss that
clear decision to bring his doctrine of
into line with a purely mathematical understanding of
and
more
still
it
is
commentary on
in
pointedly, Remigius Remigius expressly abandons the philosophical, that is, the 43 Neoplatonic, monad in favor of the exclusively mathematical monad. later,
Martianus.
39
Ibid.
3.636D, p. 66:
materiam de omnino 40
Ibid.
"Qui "
nihil.
The
enim
fecit
trans,
is
mundum
de materia informi ipse
fecit
informem
at p. 67.
3.637C-638C, 3.650B-651A, pp. 68-70, 98-100.
For the whole passage see
3.652B-663A, pp. 102-10. References to Boethius in have been noted by Goulven Madec, "Jean Scot et ses Scot ecrivain, p. 166, who emphasizes the fact that John cites Boethius auteurs," Jean primarily as a mathematician; and Alison White, "Boethius in the Medieval Quadrivium," Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford, 1981), pp. 169, this
section of the Periphyseon
195
n.
51,
arith. 1.32
who emphasizes John
and
Periphyseon
3.652C,
monas."
The
367.7,
quotations from Boethius on the
102: "est enim p. trans, is at p. 103.
Remigius of Auxerre, 367.6,
s
monad
at
De
inst.
2.1.
42
numerorum
ibid.
367.9,
367.13,
Commentum 367.15,
376.9,
in
principium
et
medium
Manianum Capellam,
377.10,
et
365.9, 377.18, 378.5, 378.12, ed.
finis
omnium
365.15,
367.4,
Cora A. Lutz
Colish
466
But John
for that choice.
Remigius offers no reasons
s
reasons for making
He has two aims in mind. First, Periphyseon are quite specific. of any unique metaphysical status by he wants to deprive the monad causes. And second, he wants to use treating it as one of the primordial for the monad as a model for explaining the primordial causes and in the
it
showing why they are not
The primordial
nihil either.
causes,
John agrees, are
eternal,
and they are the 44
Word brings all things into being. agents through which the are not nihil and they are not identical with God Himself. ,
several limitations.
creation
causes
to
They have
While they are eternal once created, they are created. causes have the capacity to be and not to be,
Hence, the primordial which is not true either of the
Yet, they
God
or of nihil. Further, before
God
ordained
phenomenal world, the capacity of the primordial 45 The actualizing of this causes was only potential.
of the
act
as
their own autonomous power but through a capacity occurred not through 46 Thus, the seminal force (vis seminalis) implanted in them by God.
called nihil. Nor, since they are created, are primordial causes cannot be dwell in the mind of God. The they identical with God, even though they nihil out of
which the world was created
Word, John
in the
says,
must be
no creature can possess, even consubstantial with the Word, those causes that occupy the second, or created and creative, subdivision a status that
of nature.
47
With
this
reasoning in place, John arrives
at
his positive definition of nihil as the superessential
aliquid,
the nihil-as-omnia
that
denotes
God
s
his
final
conclusion,
God, the opposite of
superabundant goodness.
that is infra-real but Nihil-as-omnia, John stresses, refers not to a being that are to a being that is hyper-real, "beyond all things that are and 48 In John s terms the divine nothingness is the direct antithesis of not."
the idea of
omnino
nihil,
and
it
is
the only conceivable nihil out of which
196-99. At 367.16-368.18, pp. 182-84, Remigius 1962-65), 2:177, 178, 180-82, the association of the monad with Jupiter by Martianus, and argues vigorously no way are to be under that his remarks here are merely allegorical and that they in
(Leiden, tackles
stood
44 45
46 47 48
literally.
Periphyseon 3.641C-D,
p. 78.
Ibid.
3.642C-644A, 3.663B-670D, pp. 80-82, 126-44.
Ibid.
3.672A-C, 3.679B-C, pp. 146-48, 162-64.
Ibid.
3.679C-680B,
p. 164.
Ibid. 3.681C, p. 168:
"ultra
omnia quae sunt
et
quae non
sunt."
The
trans,
is
at p. 169.
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot s Conception o/ Nihil the world can have been created.
As
the
name
of God, nihil
is
467
thus an
accurate denotation of a divine nature that admits of no privations and
an adequate reflection of the divine transcendence which makes the negativa apposite to the deity.
This
conclusion
is
via
49
of
is,
course,
compatible
perfectly
with
the
Neoplatonic theology which John derived from his Greek sources. But, as paper has sought to show, in the argument John develops enroute to
this
that
conclusion he displays a willingness to dissociate himself from the
Neoplatonic tradition, not only by rejecting a privative view of nihil but also by detaching himself from the Neoplatonic doctrine of the monad.
For
it
he substitutes the Neopythagorean understanding of the monad, by Nicomachus, Boethius, and the Latin transmitters and
mediated
accepted by John himself as a way of teasing the purely mathematical idea
of
monad
arithmetic.
out
of the
tangled
how
After
eclecticism
he
of Martianus this
observing applies metaphysical problems he addresses in Periphyseon conclusions
of our
own.
First,
3,
Capella to
principle
s
the
we may draw two
John was no mere imitator or passive
conduit of his Greek Neoplatonic sources; rather, he wields them with
independence and discrimination. Second, in investigating the intellectual principles that informed John s philosophy, we need to widen our perspective to include the science of school arithmetic, which at
work
in the case just
examined.
Oberlin College
49
Ibid.
3.684C-685A, pp. 174-76.
is
clearly
ANGEL D ORS
On Stump s Interpretation of Barley s De obligationibus
her
In
contribution
valuable
the
to
History of Later Medieval Philosophy
1
important reader Jlie Cambridge Eleonore Stump has looked into
the doctrine on obligations according to Walter Burley (ca. 1275-1344/5)
2
one of the apparently paradoxical examples analyzed In her work, E. Stump the which present paper will focus upon. by Burley does the following: a) tend to the interpretation of two texts by Burley which he respectively formulates and solves the paradox); b) reject and
specifically into
(in
offered by Burley;
solution
the
paradox. In
new
the
my
and
c)
propose a new solution to the
of Burley opinion, both the rejection
s
solution as well as
solution proposed by Stump come about by means of an incorrect of Burley s texts. Burley s solution can be defended. This is
interpretation
of the object of this paper, and along with it a greater comprehension be in my view, the nature and history of the doctrine on obligations can,
obtained.
1.
On
The
the Interpretation of Burley s texts
texts
which Stump tends are the following: ex posito et opposite Item, probatur quod non omne sequens es Romae vel bene negati sit concedendum. Et ponatur ista:
by Burley
321-
to
"tu
A. From the beginning to the early fourteenth century", in J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval 315-334. E. Stump has also gathered together a large Philosophy, Cambridge, 1982, pp. Logic of carried out in this work in a later work: the of analyses part 63 (1985), pp. 355-374, in Walter Burley s Treatise on obligations", Synthese disputation to which we can apply everything said in this paper. 1
E.
Stump,
"Obligations:
N. Kretzmann, A.
Kenny
&
"ITie
2
Burley
Treatise
s
unpublished,
by
R.
DC
of a doctoral dissertation, as yet obligationibus is the topic to at the Catholic University of Louvain: An Introduction
Green
texts of William of Sherwood (?) been able to consult this work and texts I have stuck exclusively to the texts therefore s life and works see Una offered in Stump s work. For a complete reference of Burley cultural de Walter Burley, Biblioteca Contexto XIV. del La siglo Juarez, A., Filosofia Ciudad de Dios", Real Monasterio del Escorial, Madrid, 1978.
the
and
"La
Treatise
logical
Walter
De
obligationibus. I
With
have
Burley. Unfortunately for the analysis of Burley s
critical
not
Stump on Burley s De
469
obligationibus
Romae
te esse
est concedendum". Deinde, esse prpponatur: est concedendum". Haec est falsa et impertinens, igitur
Romae
"te
Deinde,
neganda.
proponatur:
posito et opposito bene negati". conditionahs est necessaria:
"si
Romae
concedendum, sed
est
cedendum,
igitur tu es Romae".
Romae
esse
"te
ex haec
sequitur
Haec
est necessaria, quia tu es vel te te esse non est Concessa ista te esse
Romae Romae
esse
con
Romae
"
sequitur ex posito et opposito bene negati", proponatur ista: esse Romae est concedendum". Si concedas, idem concessisti et negasti, igitur male. Si neges, cedat tempus, negasti sequens per regulam. Quia si regula sit bona, tune sequitur: te esse Romae sequitur ex posito et opposito bene negati, igitur "te
"
Romae
te esse
quod haec
Dicitur
3.22:
est concedendum". "
est
te
neganda:
esse
Romae
sequitur ex
opposito bene negati". Nee haec est necessaria. Et, si sit necessanum te esse Romae sequi ex disiunctiva, quae ponitur cum opposito alterius partis, tamen non est necesposito et t
sarium istam disiunctivam poni. E.
Stump
formulated
-
analyzes
the
in the following terms:
Oponens
Romae
est
conce-
dendum
which
the
paradox
is
Ratio
(la)
T
(2a)
F
(Ib) estpositum
(2b) est falsa et imperti-
nens
Romae sequitur e posito et opposito bene negati
(3) te esse
Romae
est
(3a)
conce-
The paradox concede
(4)
T
(3b) (3) follows from the truth of (1) and the falsity of (2)
(4a) ?
dendum
either
in
Respondens
Romae vel te esse Romae est concedendum
(4) te esse
-
3
(1) tu es
(2) te esse
text
first
resides in the fact that the respondent can not in (4a)
because
it
is
the
same proposition
(2)
which he has
already denied, or deny (4) because from (3) which has been conceded there follows the truth of (4). In
my
opinion, in this analysis
incorrect interpretation which
paradox. This
we can
already find the root of the
Stump makes of Burley
s
treatment of
this
so for at least three reasons:
first, because she analyzes the answers given by the respondent in terms of truth (T) and falsehood whereas in the text are in terms of concession and (F) they presented is
negation; second, because (3b) does not constitute an adequate analysis of
P. 323. In the presentation of these analyses I have recuperated of the enunciations translated into English by E. Stump.
the
Latin version
D
470
0rs
the concession of (3); the reason explicitly given in this text in favor of third column and third, because by introducing within the analysis as a the
reasons
given
inadequately in
my
favor
in
opinion
-
respondent s answers, it seems as though these reasons come to be part of of
-
the
the respondent. By the dialogue maintained between the opponent and in her analysis the concession of (3) in terms of truth (T), interpreting is then taken to interpret the negation of (3), which Burley
Stump
the paradox, as a declaration of the falsehood proposes as the solution to what I believe to be Hurley s intention. On the other (F) of (3), against in his text in favor of the concession of hand, the reason Burley gives the not the one to be found in Stump s analysis, but rather is (3)
conditional proposition whose consequent is not necessity of a determined in the first part of the disjunctive (1). If we analy/.e (1) (3) but rather text in the ultimate the form of (pvq), the reason alleged in Burley s the conditional instance in favor of (3) is the necessity (validity) of the of in favor reasons the given Finally, (((pvq)A-iq)^p).
not be interpreted as part of the dialogue respondent s answers must which is initially maintained between the opponent and the respondent of a metadialogue which both maintain around the but rather as part
if the respondent has rules of the the not does obey answered correctly or not and which
initial
dialogue
but
obligations
with
the
rather
object
strict
of
determining
considerations
of
truth
or
falsehood;
the
be even more urgent when and a the very initial dialogue bears upon the conditions of the dialogue, the as same enunciation can be presented as a proposed enunciation and as in the reason for one of the respondent s answers in that dialogue, distinction
between either dialogue
paradoxical
case being analy/ed
is
in
made
to
which an enunciation which
in
the
true is denied in the dialogue metadialogue would be recogni/ed as being has its of repugnance with regard to what in spite of its truth by reason
The relevance of these three observations will previously been conceded. of be made more clearly manifest when we analy/c Stump s interpretation the solution offered by Burley.
Stump
offers
two interpretations of the second
text in
which Burley
to formulates his solution to the paradox: one, more immediate, according and a which Burley s solution would be, in her opinion, extravagant, her opinion, also second more elaborated solution which is, according to
Stump on Burley s DC
4 inadequate although apparently more reasonable. According to of these two interpretations, Burlcy would have maintained in
logically
the
471
obligationibus
first
text that the answer given to (3) is incorrect given that (3) must not be conceded but rather denied and this by virtue of the fact that (3) is not necessary, a fact which according to Stump Burley would have this
concluded by is
is
derived,
text
s
Burley
completely
such a solution would effectively be, as Stump points out, 6 extravagant and completely do away with doctrine on
But what
obligations.
In
virtue, in turn, of the fact that premise (1), from which (3) not necessary. 5 If this happened to really be the meaning of
the
face
is
Stump attempts
leads,
the textual fundament of this
of the
extravagance
to
which
first
interpretation?
this
first
interpretation
a second interpretation which allows a reasonable
meaning to Burley s solution, but this interpretation, in her opinion, makes an important confusion to become manifest. 7 This interpretation is based upon a new analysis of the paradox in the following terms: 8
Oponens
Respondent (1 a)
T
(2
)
q
(2 a)
F
(3
)
p
seqiiitur ex posito et opposito bene negati
(3 a)
T
Ratio
(3 b) (3) follows from the truth of (1) and the falsity
The Stump,
9
previously mentioned confusion would be found, according to it is p and not (3 ) what follows from the truth of (! ) and
that
the falsehood of (2 favor
),
10
"On
8 9
has
to
);
be
sustained in (3 b) as the reason in
such a case, according to Stump s considered as impertinent and, in
the face of
premisses
7
(3)
is
in
Pp. 324-325. it, then, Burley is saying that (3) is to be denied because it is not reason for claiming that (3) is not necessary is that one of the derived from, namely (1), is not necessary" (p.324).
and
necessary,
6
against what
or the concession of (3
interpretation, 4
of (2)
it
is
his
P. 324. P. 324. P. 324. P. 324. "Suppose
we then consider
(3)
irrelevant
and judge
it
on
own
its
merits.
According
Burley, we ought to judge it false. If (3) had read That you are in Rome follows from the conjunction of this disjunction - namely, "You are in Rome or that you are in Rome is to be granted" - with the denial of the second disjunct then Burlcy would, I to
,
D
472
Ors
agreement with Stump s reading of Burley, to be considered as false. This es Romae" follows requires that we do not interpret (3) as if meant "(u
from
Romae
es
"tu
vel
le
Romae non
est
concede
but rather in
1
(3),
concedendum
would not
"ex
posito"
be
false and, in
its
,
my
necessarily refer to the
opinion,
I fail
meaning
my
opinion,
not say that (3)
disjunctive
Stump
s
(1),
esse
te
(3)
would
interpretation, (3)
two interpretations
of Burley
texts.
s
As
three confusions previously mentioned.
we
"
to understand).
of these
neither
and
concedendum"
agreement with Burley as to
ascertaining the true
if
est
which case Burley would have to sense in which case the expression
in
literal
has to be denied (for what reason In
Romae
esse
capable of both are the Underlying is
for the first interpretation, in
meaning of the texts, Burley docs must be denied because (3) is not necessary, but rather stick
to the literal
he says that (3) has to be denied and that (3) is not necessary; neither does he say that (3) is not necessary because premise (1), from which (3)
alleged
not
is
derives,
in
favor
of
(3),
and
to
necessity
necessary,
the this
but
concession is
so
rather because the (metadialogue
positum is not necessary because (1) should be posited.
As grasp
-
for the
since
I
rather
not s) it
of
that
the
(3)
does
because
(1)
necessary not is
not
enunciation which says that (1) is
in
its
necessary but is
the
contingent that such an enunciation
second interpretation, whose meaning I fail to completely fail to understand, as I have already stated, the value and
meaning of the alleged reason in favor of the falsehood of (3) said,
proposition
communicate
-
it
can be
opinion and for reasons I shall soon put forth, that Burley try to defend that (3) should be impertinent and false but
my
docs not
on the contrary, and here is the key to the solution proposed by him, that in the metadialogue from the moment that (2) is denied both (3) and (4) are true but repugnant with regard to the opposite of the rather,
enunciation (2) already negated; for this in the dialogue by virtue of rule 2 of the obligations (omne repugnans opposito bene negati est negandum), although they are true they must be negated. The reason for which
Burley has recourse to the non-necessary nature of (3)
is
not the defense
think, agree that (3) had to be granted. But (3) does not read that way; and if we are considering (3) as it stands, on its own merits, then Burley seems to think we should deny it because the phrase from the positum need not refer to the particular disjunction which just happens to be the positum in this particular case of obligations.
other positum; but unless it refers to It could refer to some Therefore, on Burley s view, it is a mistake to grant (pp. 324-325). (3)"
this
one,
(3)
is
false.
Stump on Barley s De of the falsehood of (3), but rather of in
order for
to
it
because what
is
its
contingency, a needed condition
be repugnant with regard
necessary
is
473
obligationibus
to
some other
From whence
not repugnant to anything.
not necessary) and should be (since
enunciation, (3)
repugnant to In the the opposite of (2)) negated. proposed interpretations it can be seen how by virtue of the inadequate analysis of the reason alleged in favor of (3) there is no adequate separation of the conditions of the can (because
it
is
it
is
dialogue and of the conditions of the metadialogue, and that there comes about an undue transposition of questions relative to the concession or the negation of enunciations in the dialogue to questions relative to the truth or falsehood of enunciations in the metadialogue.
In
opinion, in order to adequately
my
comprehend Burley
need to tend to the global meaning of the stated question: -
pretended with the paradox is to the absurd which furthermore is
is
11
s texts
that
we
which
by means of a procedure of reduction a dialogue
-
to
make problematic
the
value of one of the parts of rule 1 of the obligations: quicquid sequitur ex posito
et
opposite bene negati
est
concedendum, which can also be
expressed in the following terms:
Ax(x sequitur ex posito
etc.
->
x est concedendum),
which has the form of a universal enunciation, one of whose singulars is:
(p sequitur ex posito etc.
->
p
est
The argument around which ponendo ponens (which
Rl
I
shall call
(3)
(p sequitur ex posito etc. p sequitur ex posito etc.
(4)
p
est
from which follows
from
it
concedendum). the question revolves
is
the elemental
argument Al): ->
p
est
concedendum)
concedendum is
(3)
argued (an argument I shall call A2) that given that (4) and Rl, and that (3) has been conceded, if Rl were and
admissible rule (4) would have to be conceded (by virtue of the other part of this same Rule 1 which states: quicquid sequitur ex posito et
concedendum); now, since (4) is the same enunciation (2) which before has been denied we can now not concede it but rather we
concesso
est
to the question in a global manner and this is probably the root of her incomprehension; even in the English translation which she offers of Burley s texts she omits the initial enunciation in which the main question is
E.
what
is
Stump does not tend at
formulated
(p. 323).
D
474
must negate
it
Ors
and therefore we either have
an admissible rule (which
to conclude that (3) should
what Burley concludes) or that Rl what the objection pretends), and since
not have been conceded (this is
is
not
is
(3)
is
(supposedly) necessary and therefore must be conceded, it is concluded that Rl is not an admissible rule. Both arguments, Al and A2, are in my
opinion logically impeccable.
The key
to
s
Burley
solution,
has been
as
denial of the supposed necessity of (3) which
indicated,
lies
the
in
held in the final part of
is
argument A2. Now, why does Burley deny the necessity of (3)? In the paradox, the argument put forth in favor of the concession of (3)
and the argument put
necessity
following argument (which
of
favor
in
its
necessity
its
is is
the
argument Bl): ct
nq
opposite benc ncgati
argumented (an argument I shall call B2) that given that true and necessary since the conditional (((pvq)A-iq) ^p) in
is
(3 b)
ct
p sequitur exposito
)
from which
which
shall call
p sequitur ex (p vq)
(3 b) (3
I
forth
it
fundamenled
is
it
is
necessary, and given
is
that
Burley rejects argument
(3
Bl:
necessary )
is
the
(3
(valid),
necessary,
(3
)
is
)
has
to
true
also
does not follow from
conclusion
and
be conceded. this
premise only but rather requires two complementary premises; argument
Bl must be transformed
into the following
argument (which
I
shall call
argument Cl): p sequitur ex (p v q)
(3 b)
-iq est
ii)
(3
from which
-iq
oppositum bcne ncgali
p sequitur ex posito
)
ct
(P vcl) est positum
i)
it
is
ct
opposito benc ncgati
argumented (an argument
the three premises are true, the conclusion (3 b)
is
necessary given that both
contingent,
we can
not
i)
and
conclude that
shall call
I
is
ii)
(3
)
C2) that given that
also true but that although
are not necessary but rather is
necessary and
is
in
fact
contingent.
This
is,
in
my
opinion, the true
problem put forth by Burley. interpretation offered by in
meaning of the texts and of the is what lies beneath the second
Argument Bl
Stump but however
it
does not come to the fore
her interpretation because she does not approach the matter from the
theory of argumentation but rather from the theory of signification. She considers - incorrectly in my opinion - that (3 b) and (3 ) are two possible equivocal meanings of (3), and that Burley got
them confused
Stump on Burley s DC
475
obligationibus
understand the already mentioned confusion to which Stump alludes). But, in my opinion, this is not the analysis which Burley s text, completely removed from such a confusion, requires. Burley clearly distinguishes between (3 b) and (3 ) and he considers that both (only in this sense can
What Burley
are true. relation
I
denies
there should exist between the two a
is
and hence he denies the truth of the second
of consequence
premise and therefore the truth of the conclusion of argument B2.
2.
Critique of Burley s Solution
Whatever the meaning of Burley
s texts,
whatever his reasons for denying
Stump maintains
(3) as the solution of the paradox,
that Burley s solution does not solve the paradox since the paradox reproduces itself regardless of (3), in spite of the negation of (3), because with just (1) and (2) we would be obliged to concede (4). 12 Her argument (which I shall call Dl) in favor of this thesis is the following:
conceded we also have is
to
concede
Burley has accepted that
(4), that is (4)
if
(3)
follows from (3); and
is it
a condition, in order to admit this, that one also admit the following
argument (which
I
shall call
D2):
P
p
est
concedendum
and, for the
p
est
p E.
est
same
reason, the following argumentation as well:
concedendum concedendum
Stump
est
concedendum.
further considers that there are reasons within the art of
obligations in order to admit this argumentation and she presupposes that 13
Burley admits it. the enunciation p
conceded, and
if
In this manner,
later
if
instead of (3)
we were
to
propose
enunciation would have had to be Romae), we were to propose (4) once more, in virtue of D2,
(tu es
this
seems to have in mind the mistaken notion that if (a) is false, (c) is false hence we can deny (4) and the paradox is solved. But of course, he has not solved the paradox by such means since (c) can be true even if (a) is false. Furthermore, if Burley is willing to accept the inference from (a) to (c), we can show him that on his own views (c) must be true" (p. 325). (a) is here enunciation (3) and (c) enunciation (4). "lie
inference from (a) to (c) depends on accepting as valid the inference from (b) Rome to (c) That you arc in Rome must be granted and there is some reason for accepting the inference from (b) to (c) in an obligations disputation" (p. 325). "The
You
are in
;
D
476
it
would also have
Ors
be conceded, with the resulting reproduction of the
to
14 paradox regardless of the primitive enunciation (3).
There
however here a
is
follows from I
argument
clear
error.
If
Burley admits that
(4)
argument Dl, it is only by virtue of the have called Al whose first premise, for being precisely a rule (3)
as
said in
is
presupposed and whose fundament is none other than ponendo ponens. Why would argumentation D2 also have to be admitted? On the contrary, there are very good reasons making us think
of obligations,
is
the
D2
that
is
an inadmissible argument within the framework of obligations. in the strict sense, would lead us to absolutely concede all
To admit D2,
on obligations not only allow us but even force us to deny true enunciations which are repugnant with regard to previously conceded enunciations or with regard to the opposite of
true enunciations,
and the
rules
previously denied enunciations.
paradox
3.
is
D2
not reproduced. Burley
s
can not be admitted and therefore the solution, therefore, can
be defended.
Stump s Solution
E.
the supposition that the paradox put forth by Burley happens to
Upon
not be solved by him and that
reproduces itself regardless of (3), in argument D2, Stump proposes her own personal solution to the paradox. In order to do this she relies on both argumentation D2 as well it
virtue of
as
on
its
p
inverse (which
est
I
shall call
D3):
concedendum
P
from which she concludes the equivalency of both parts, p and disjunctive (1) which for the same reason would be equivalent
q,
of the
to
(pvq)
or to (qvq) and, in virtue of the idempotency of the disjunctive, also to
"Even
with the denial of
(3),
however, from the truth of (1) and the
Rome. And
falsity
of (2),
given the validity of the inference from (b) Rome it follows that You are in Rome is to be granted. Hence even with the denial of (3), we are committed, on Burley s own views, to the truth of (4). And so, even if we give Burley all he wants, the falsity of (3) and the validity of the inference from (a) to (c), we can demonstrate that the paradox remains. follows that you are in to (c), from You are in it
The respondent
is
same proposition
at
committed (2a)"
to
the
(pp. 325-326).
so,
truth of (4) although
he has correctly denied the
Stump on Barley s DC
p,
or to q.
15
In such a case,
with respect
q,
clear that p (or q) are not impertinent
(pvq) but rather pertinent, equivalents, and that they and therefore (2), which is none other than
to
follow from
is
it
477
obligationibus
that disjunction
insofar as
follows from (1), should not have been denied but rather
it
conceded. This not only would have solved the paradox but indeed it 16 This is Stump s proposed would have impeded its very apparition. Obviously, once D2 is rejected, and for analogous reasons D3 the art of obligations allows to concede something which is false (since
solution.
it follows from something already conceded), we can no longer admit such an equivalency between the parts of the disjunctive, nor can
when
we admit Stump
proposed solution. Burley
s
s
my
solution, in
opinion,
is
the only admissible solution, given the general rules on obligations.
4.
Conclusion
Having seen the foregoing analyses, of
insufficiencies
believe to have clearly
I
of Burley
s
s
texts
shown the
and to have
Stump interpretation come closer to the real meaning of those texts. As a result I do believe that some of the consequences to which Stump comes from her analysis of the nature of the rules on obligations within Burley
would require
revised, but such a task
a
more
s
work have
to
be
detailed study of the whole
work and of course goes beyond the scope of this paper. These analyses, however, do not merely pretend to rectify the
of Burley
s
made by Stump concerning these all, to shed some light on the
interpretations
rather hope, above
on
the doctrine
In
obligations.
my
opinion,
texts
by Burley, but
nature and history of
the distinctions established
between the dialogue and the metadialogue, between the conditions of truth and falsehood in the metadialogue and the conditions of concession and negation in the dialogue, which allow us to deny in the dialogue an enunciation which in the metadialogue
is
recognized as true,
lies
at
the
"And we can also show the converse, that if q is true, p is true. If you grant q, you are granting that p is to be granted. But if you grant that p must be granted, you cannot consistently deny p, and so you must also grant p. Hence, if q is true, so is p. Consequently, p and q are equivalent" (p. 326).
"Hence,
irrelevant.
in
In
between p and really
solved;
place"
(p. 326).
this fact,
q.
or,
case, it
And more
it
is
a
from
mistake
to
consider
(2)
in
the
schematisation
as
the positum and the implicit logical relationship so (2) ought to be granted. In this way, I think, the paradox is accurately, in this way the paradox fails to arise in the first
follows
D
478
Ors
"revolution" brought about by Swyneshed within the rules of P.V. which and Spade speaks of in his contribution to the obligations
root of the
17 same reader.
University of Navarra
17
P.V.
335-341.
Spade,
"Obligations:
B.
Developments
in
the
fourteenth
century",
op.
cit.,
pp.
ALVIN
P.
DOBSEVAGE
DC Guillclmi Occamcnsis dialcctica
Salvete
domini
omncs,
dominacquc,
philosophiae et certe sodales
litteris
professores,
fovendis
latinis.
Hodie argumenta rcnovare volo utrum nominalista sit
studiorum
cultores
aut conccptualista
noster Inceptor Venerabilis.
esse
Et responsum facile in mcntcm evenit. Sunt qui aiunt Guillclmum antcccdentem illorum Rcnati Descartes et Emmanualis Kant et
Summam
delatorem philosophiae scholasticae. Est nobis tigare ad haec omnia noscenda.
Cum nisi
de tempore
et loco
compositions
Summae
Logicae inves-
Logicae non habeamus
coniecturam... Londinii in Anglia fuisse compositam (notat G. Gal). Ibi
amicos Chatton
et
Wodeham
ciae Angliae habuit. Et
Londiniensis. Chatton
Sed
in
"Prologo"
ex ordine Fratrum
Ockham
ct
Wodeham
Summam
Logicae
Summae
Logicae
legit
Minorem
erant
(Gal
et socios
Provin-
socii
Custodiae
Adam
de Anglia
quoque
p. 55-56).
fratris et magistri
notatur:
Quam magnos
veritatis
sectatoribus
afferat
fructus
sermocinalis
scientia, quam logicam dicimus, multorum peritorum docet auctoritas, ratioque et experientia liquido cpmprobat et convincit. Unde Aristoteles, auctor praecipuus huius scientiae, nunc introductoriam
methodum, nunc viam
sciendi
modum, nunc dans
scientiam omnibus
communcm
nulli ad Averroes sapientiam patet accessus nisi in quoque, Aristotelis interpres, in Physicis dialectam dicit esse "instrumentum discernendi verum a falso". Ipsa namque cuncta dubia definit, cunctas Scripturarum difficultates dissolvit et penetrat, ut testatur doctor egregius Augustinus.
et
Et deinde
in
veritatis
"Epistola
Logica enim
appellat,
Prooemialis"
ex
his intellegere quod scientia logica erudito.
Ockham
ipse notat:
omnium
artium aptissimum instrumentum, sine qua potest, quae non more materialism instrumentorum usu crebro consumitur, sed per cuiuslibct alterius scientiae studipsum exercitium continuum recipit incrementum. Sicut enim mechanicus sui instrument! perfecta carens notitia utendo epdem recipit pleniorem, sic in solidis logicae principiis eruditus dum aliis scientns operam impendit sollicite simul istius artis maiorem in logica labilis ars adquirit periliam. Unde illud vulgare solis sapientiale studium negligentibus locum reputo obtinere. nulla
est
scientia
perfecte
sciri
"ars
est"
480
Dobsevage
eorum Swincshcad, Hcytcsbury, Gcrson
In scriptis cst
nominalista
cum
ct
conditorcm
d
ct
suae
scholac
Ailly,
crcdunt.
Ockham Ockham
ct hanc male venit partim Avicennae. Porphyrius quoque partim Augustini, partim huius problematis erat. In libcllo suo Isagogc (sive introductione in Catcgorias Aristotelis) notat Porphyrius a. Genera et species suntne
Aristotclcm a Scotistis male interpretari credit ex auctoritate
St.
substantia aut mentis notioncs? b.
corporalia vel incorporalia?
Si
c.
Si,
modo
fortassc, in se constant, suntne vel
sunt incorporalia, suntne in rebus
sensibus percipi vel eis rebus separata?
Ens horum disputationum Medii Acvi scientiae
mctaphysicam
per
Ockham scqucns
philosophiam
Aristotelem
logicam
e
erat ct
logicam
ct
theologiam
metaphysica
doctrinam
interpretari.
philosophia
et
e
theologia disiungere inccpit.
Primum de
divisione
terminorum
scribit,
subordinata conceptibus scu intentionibus
et
notat
animae".
"voces
esse signa
In cap. 4 ad
metam
venit dicens:
quia terminorum quidam sunt categorcmatici, quidem syncategoTermini categorcmatici finitam et certam habent significationem, sicut hoc nomcn homo significat omnes homines et noc nomcn animal omnia animalia, et hoc nomcn albedo omnes albedincs.... Termini autem syncatcgorcmatici, cuiusmodi sunt tales tantum totus nullus omnis inquantum et aliquis practer huiusmodi, non habent finitam significationem et certam, nee significant aliquas res distinctas a rebus significatis per categoremata. (p. 25) ...
rematici.
,
,
Per se
omnis
,
nihil significat,
sed ante
,
,
,
nomcn hominem
est classis
omnium hominum. Hie videtur logica esse instrumentum ad philosophiam naturalem fovendam. Philosophia naturalis est de rebus. Logica est de sententiis
de terminis universalibus. Et
mentis, est
de multis praedicabilc.
Ockham numquam
Cum
omne
univcrsale est
de scientia humana loquitur universalia apud
sunt individualia. Et logica universali post
rem
refert.
universalia non sunt res extra animam. Propter quod non sunt de csscntia rerum nee partes rerum extra, sed sunt quaedam entia in anima, distincta inter se et a rebus extra, quarum aliqua sunt signa rerum extra, aliqua sunt signa illorum signorum. Sicut hoc nomen universale est commune ad omnia universalia, et per conscqucns est signum omnium aliorum universalium a se. Et ideo potest concedi quod illud universale quod est pracdicabile de quinque universalibus, non tamen pro se sed pro universalibus, est genus ad universalia; sicut aliqua dictio praedicabilis de omnibus dictionibus est nomen, et ...
non verbum, nee participium, nee coniunctio Qui
vult
pleniorem
notitiam
de
universalibus
etc. (p.
et
83)
proprietatibus
habere, legere poterit Porphyrii librum. Sed Porphyrius duabus
eorum
sellis
sedet
De
Guillelmi Occamensis dialectica
ut notat Bocthius. Est inter et
Ockham
alii
scripsisse
Platonem logicam
481
Aristotclcm. Dicit Pater Boehner
ct
Aristoteleam
reapse
formalem
et
universe certam.
Ex
(signum universale) et ex haeccitate (signum individuale), aut connotatione et denotatione, ut hodie dicimus, Duns Scotus viam ad nominalisticam philosophiam logicam discipulo suo Ockham offert.
Et
quidditate
animo
in
illius
Ecclesiae Catholicae movit.
modo
Ockham est omnia eum contra Papam
in et
quaestionem vocare. Amor et Philippo et Ludovico
pro
Logicus erat qui salutem Ecclesiae promovere voluit. Sed hoc contra Papam et pro regibus ille ex ordine fratrum minorum optavit.
Praecepta Ecclesiae Catholicae in toto per fidem, non per philo sophiam noscuntur. Creatio ex nihilo non demonstratur sed sentitur.
Multum de rebus audimus
externis individualibus quas videmus, tangimus, olfacimus,
gustamus ut res particulares notantur. Universalia sunt signa mentis, sunt nomina. Benigne Guillelmo Ockham et Scoto philosophia scholastica fracta et
est.
Ockham fundamentum logicae modernae mathematicae incepit cum terminis syncategorematicis. Necesse esset hoc
Et fortasse formulare
ratum facere per logicos huius temporis ut Quine, Hiz, et al. (Aliquid de theoria Occamensi et quantificationis terminorum et propositionum de modali notatur ab Alfredo J. Freddoso: Ockhatris quoque logica TJieory
hodie
of Propositions. Part unus qui logicam
est
II
of the
Summa
Occamensem
Logicae, pp.
terminis
logicae
19-28.
Ille
hodiernae
investigat et describit.)
Hoc
loco necesse
sit,
credo, tacere. Sed
non
sine
mentione horum
logicorum hodiernorum et eruditorum historiae philosophiae naturalis qui non multum de Venerabilis Inceptoris scriptis logicis investigant. Satinest, si
vobis
quiretis?
acroasin meam ita dedi expolitam, ut improbare non multum De me quidem vestrum erit iudicium. Valete et plaudite.
Western Ct State University
482
Dobscvage
Bibliographia:
Guillelmi de
Cura
Ockham
s
Ockham. Summa
Theory of Propositions. Introduction ab Alfred
Univ of Notre Philotheus
Boehncr G. Gal, Bonavcnturc Univ. N.Y. 1974.
logicae. Ed. P.
Instituti Franciscan!. St.
Dame
J.
S.
Brown.
Freddoso.
Press, Indiana, 46556. 1980.
Boehner. Collected Articles Bonaventure, N.Y. 1858.
on
Ockham.
Institute. St.
Ernest A. Moody. The Logic of Ockham.
New York.
1935.
Ed.
Franciscan
SILVIA
Ancora una volta
DONATI
sulla
nozione di quantitas
materiae in Egidio
II
tema
di
elaborata attirato la si
1
questa
comunicazione
e
Romano*
nozione
la
di
quantitas
materiae
da Egidio Romano. La dottrina egidiana ha gia in passato attenzione degli studiosi; A. Maier fu la prima a sottolineare che
nozione quantitativa introdotta da Egidio, distinguendosi dall estensione, awicina al concetto moderno di massa. 1 II merito di Egidio starebbe
nell aver
fatto
e
analisi
di
oggetto
riconosciuto
quantitative una nozione che, come vedremo, anche
e
presuppongono
utilizzano
loro
nella
come altri
descrizione
un
concetto
autori medievali
dei
mutamenti
pero darne una precisa definizione. stato anche osservato che le maggiori innovazioni medievali sulla
quantitativi senza
E nozione alle
di quantita si
numerose
Un altra
sono avute
discussioni
occasione
di
in
un contesto
connesse
riflessione
per
con i
il
2
teologico;
problema
pensatori
basti pensare
delPEucarestia.
medievali e costituita
dalla questione della creazione di Eva, questione che viene affrontata in
genere nel corso dei commenti
appunto
problema
dell applicazione
della
creazione
al
secondo
libro
delle Sentenze. Ora, e
della nozione egidiana di quantitas materiae al di
Eva che intendiamo occuparci
in
questa
comunicazione.
Questo articolo e il frutto delle ricerche condotte grazie ad una borsa di studio Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung (Bonn). Intendo ritornare su questo tema in uno studio piu ampio attualmente in corso di preparazione. della
Cfr. 14.
Problem der quantitas materiae", in- Die Vorldufer Galileis im Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1966 p.26-52; cfr. inoltre, J.A. Concept of Matter in Fourteenth Century Science", in: The Concept of
A. Maier,
"Das
Roma,
Jahrhundert,
Weisheipl, The Matter in Greek
,
and Medieval Philosophy, E. McMullin ed., Notre Dame, Indiana, The University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, p.147-169; E. Sylla, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Motion with Respect to Quantity of the Eucharist", in: Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier, a cura di A. Maieru e A. Paravicini Bagliani, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1981, p.105-141. 2
Cfr. E. Sylla,
"Godfrey
of
Fontaines...",
p.107.
484
Donati
Secondo di
Adamo.
la
Bibbia? Eva
Pietro
un interpretazione sola
dalla
lettcralc:
costola,
4
secondo
libro dellc Sentenze,
Eva
intcro corpo di
si
fu
attiene a a partire
prodotto senza alcuna aggiunta cstrinscca. In caso contrario, 1
dovrebbe dire che Eva
infatti, si
da Dio a partire da una costola
fu prodotta
ncl
Lombardo,
anche a partire dal materiale
fu prodotta
teorico che
problema pone teologi successivi e dunque qucllo di un aumento non accompagnato da nessuna aggiunta. Parlando di un aumento non dovuto ad alcuna addizione, teologi II
aggiunto.
ai
si
i
medievali vogliono escludere
sia
ipotesi che la materia aggiunta esistcsse
1
precedenza sotto altra forma, sia ipotesi che essa venga creata ex novo da Dio, giacche anche nel caso della creazione di nuova materia il in
1
Eva contcrrebbc
di
corpo
In
costola.
trasformare
la
formazione
di
intero
in
una costola
umano
corpo
Eva rappresenta
non era contenuta
che
discussione
della
materia contenuta
un
a
sufficiente
materia
della
nocciolo
il
effetti,
senza
e
proprio
una quantita
in
creare
un caso limite
allora
se
altra
nella
Dio puo di
materia
materia.
di
La
in
aumento, cui, una ccrta quantita di materia, senza alcuna addizione estrinseca, gra/ie a una sorta di espansione, cresce fino a diventare una quantita maggiore. Per
riformulare
medievali,
porzione
di
la
nei
questionc
termini
adottati
tecnici
dagli
autori
un aumento quantitativo da parte di una ccrta materia che in se stessa rimane sostanzialmentc idcntica.
si
tratta
di
Questo processo appare chiaramente in contrasto con le norme che regolano Paumento in natura. Nella filosofia della natura medievale vengono
distinti
rarefazione. Ora, gli
due
base
della
Nell
aumento
coppia
nozione
la
comunque
autori medievali
aumento, Paumcnto vcro e propria e
di
tipi
di quantita di
sembrano distinguere di
concetti
i
quantita
due di
tipi
di
mutamento
materia
variazione
la
la
materia venga intcsa,
e
delle
sulla
estensione
dimensioni
.
e
propriamcnte intcso, accompagnata da un aumento della quantita di materia. La rarefazione, cstensione aumenta, la invece, non e un aumento reale, giacche, se materia rimane invariata. Ora, aumento reale in natura e sempre un 1
I
aumento per additionem; 3
1
agente
naturale,
che
non ha
il
potere
di
Cfr. Genesi, Lib.I, cap.2, w.21-22. Cfr.
logiae
Lombardi Sententiarum
Petri
cursus
completus,
series
libri
secunda
quatuor, Lib. II, dist. XVIII, cap.5, in: Patroaccurante J.P. Migne, t.192, Parisiis,
(latina),
1880, col.688. Sulla
distinzione
Fontaines...",
medievale
p.105-107.
tra
i
due
tipi
di
aumento
cfr.
E.
Sylla,
"Godfrey
of
La nozione
di quantitas matcriae in Egidio
Romano
485
trasformare poca materia in molta ne di creare nuova materia, puo far crescere un corpo solo aggiungendo dclla materia gia esistente sotto altra
forma. Sulla
possibilita
da parte
Dio
di
causare un tipo di aumento
di
diverse sia dall addizione che dalla rarefazione, un
registrano
aumenta
materia
di
quantita
tredicesimo
nel
S.Tommaso escludono questo sibile e di
senza
secolo
conseguenza respingono
1
la
possibilita di
rarefactione in natura, lo
un
aggiunta
discordant!.
opinioni
cio6 in cui la estrinseca,
Pensatori
si
come
aumento come teoricamente impos-
tipo di
interpretazione letterale della Genesi
data da Pietro Lombardo. Altri autori,
pur negando
alcuna
aumento
come per esempio Egidio Romano,
tipo di
aumento
sine additione et sine
ritengono possibile per Dio.
problema viene chiaramente impostato da S.Tommaso. Nel commento al secondo libro delle Sentenze egli respinge la posizione di II
Pietro
Lombardo defmendola
inintelligibile.
S.Tommaso
distingue due
modi
materia puo aumentare: o secundum quantitatem tantum oppure secundum essentiam. Nel caso di un aumento solo secundum quantitatem, in cui la
una certa materia, numericamente ad un certo momento avra una data estensione e in seguito
cioe relative soltanto alle dimensioni, identica,
acquistera un estensione maggiore. Ora, questo tipo di mutamento, che
comporta soltanto
la
variazione
delle
processo di rarefazione. Se invece essentiam, allora nel corpo, quella
che c era
materia,
alPinizio.
non importa
dopo In
1
la
aumento,
altri
se creata ex
dimensioni,
non e
altro
che un
materia aumenta anche secundum
termini,
novo o
ci
sara altra materia oltre a
sara
stata
preesistente.
aggiunta
Un
nuova
terzo tipo di
6 aumento, diverse da questi due per S.Tommaso non e possibile. Questo passo rappresenta un tipico esempio del modo di procedere che si e menzionato prima: se da una parte S.Tommaso distingue un
Cfr.
Thomas Aquinas,
In
II
dist. XVIII, q.l, a.l, in: Scriptum super libros M.F. Moos, Parisiis, Lethielleux, 1929-1947, vol.11, enim per multiplicationem materiae hoc factum dicant, oportet multiplicatiop.448: nem hanc aut secundum quantitatem tantum attendi, aut secundum essentiam materiae. Si primo modo, sic oportet ut eadem materia numero quae fuit primo sub parvis dimensionibus, postmodum majores dimensiones recipiat: hoc autem idem est quod rarefieri... Si vero multiplicatio essentiam materiae attingat, cum nihil aliud sit multiplicari quam aliquid fieri quod prius non erat, oportet quod aliquid materiae sit sub forma corporis mulieris quod prius sub forma costae non erat...". Cfr. inoltre Summa Theologiae, Pars
Sententiarum,
ed.
P.
Mandonnet
Sent., -
"Si
I,
q.92, a.3,
Taurini-Romae, Marietti, 1952, p.452.
Donati
486
aumcnto
da un aumcnto della quantita
dclla sola estensione
di materia,
7
non introduce alcun concetto quantitative divcrso da quello aumento della quantita di materia Tommaso di estensione. Per descrivere essentiam materiae, usa cioe un concetto secundum di multiplicatio parla dall altra, egli
1
non quantitative. D altronde, poiche aumento della quantita di materia e in se concepito da S.Tommaso come una moltiplicazione della materia 1
come
stessa e
sostrato, e evidente che
1
idea di una
medesima porzione
di
materia che aumcnta quantitativamente pur rimanendo sostanzialmcnte identica
gli
A
volte.
piu
appare
problema
II
inintelligibile.
della creazione di
questo argomento e
Quodlibet; piu tardi al
secondo
il
problema vicne
libro delle Scntcnze.
dottrinale:
continuita
Eva viene discusso da Egidio Romano dedicata una questione del secondo
8
trattato
nuovamente
polemica con S.Tommaso,
in
accetta
egli
pretazione di Pietro Lombardo. La soluzione del problema
un applicazione
della
nozione
egidiana
di
quantitas
commento
nel
una sostanziale
In questi testi troviamo
si
materiae.
1
inter-
fonda su Infatti,
e
proprio grazie a un concetto quantitative diverse da quello di estensione che Egidio puo difcndere 1 idea di un tipo di aumento diverse sia
addizione che dalla rarefazione.
dall
Considcriamo brevemente
Come
e
noto,
Egidio,
la
accanto
nozione egidiana alia
introduce una nozione non spaziale
di quantita.
di quantitas
nozione
tradizionale
di
materiae. estensione,
Egli distingue la quantita
occupa un certo spazio dalla quantita in molta o poca. Infatti, se la medesima quale materia, in condizioni diverse, puo assumere volumi differenti, estensione e quantitas materiae sono carattcristiche diverse. In che cosa consiste la novita di Egidio? Osservando che nella descrizione dci mutamenti in
virtu
dclla quale la materia
della
virtu
la
materia
nozione
quantitative, accanto alia
A
questo
cd.cit.,
8
proposito
cfr.
e
anche
di
volume, compaiono anche espressioni
Thomas Aquinas,
In
II
Sent.,
dist.XXX,
q.2,
a.l,
p.778-779.
anast. rist. Acgidii Columnae Romani Quodlibcta, II, q.ll, Lovanii, 1646, Frankfurt a.M., 1966, p.76-79; In If Sent., dist. XVIII, q.l, a.3, in: Aegidii Columnae Romani In secundum Libmm Sent. Quaestiones, Venctiis, 1581, vol.11, rist. anast. Minerva, Frankfurt a.M., 1968, p.68-73. questi due testi puo essere aggiunto un Cfr.
Minen/a,
A
terzo documento, gentilmente segnalatoci dal. Dr.R. Wielockx (Alhcrtus Magnus-Institut, Sentenze di Egidio Bonn), cioe una prima versione del commento al secondo libro delle tramandataci da Goffredo di Fontaines nel ms. Paris, Bibl.Nat., lat. 15819, f.311ra-312ra (la
questione
sulla
creazione
di
Aegidii
Romani Apologia, Edition
Omnia,
III, 1),
et
Eva si trova al f.311va-b). Su questi estratti cfr. commentaire par R. Wielockx (Aegidii Romani Opera
Firenze, Olschki, 1985, p. 13, nota n.35, p.75-76, nota n.3.
Sulla dottrina egidiana cfr. le opere citate alia nota n.l.
La nozione
Romano
487
Egidio, a differenza di
S.Tommaso
di quantitas matcriae in Egidio
come molta materia o poca matcria
,
e di altri autori, cerca di analizzarle. Egli sottolinea, quindi, che
molto all
si
1
altro
di
tipo 1
giustifica
uso
quantita
come
Egidio, sine
non
che
varia
variare
al
molto e poco questo nuovo concetto
di termini quali
L introduzione et
termini
i
riconducono a determinazioni quantitative. Accanto poco esistenza di un estensione, allora, si deve presupporre nella materia e
di
rarefactione
1
ipotesi di
commento
Nel
.
e
che
.
e detto, di salvare
si
dell estensione
secondo
al
consente
quantitative
a
un aumento sine additione libro
delle
Sentenze,
trattando del problema della creazione di Eva, egli riporta la posizione di
S.Tommaso. La conclusione un tipo
di
di
S.Tommaso, secondo
aumento diverse
dalla
il
o
rarefazione
quale non e possibile
i
quali
non possono trasformare poca materia
quale motive? La ragione risiede nel Essi agiscono tramite
naturali.
possono mutare condensazione,
volume
il
ma non a
di
di
1
modo
in
e
il
proprio degli agenti
moto;
un corpo tramite process!
possono modificare
differenza
la
agenti naturali,
gli
molta o viceversa. 10 Per
di agire
alterazione
osserva
dall aggiunta,
Egidio, e perfettamente corretta per quanto riguarola
di
conseguenza,
di rarefazione e di
quantita di materia; questo
inerisce alia materia piu quantita, intrinsecamente di qualsiasi qualita e della stessa forma sostanziale, oltre 11 la quale 1 azione degli agenti naturali non puo cstendersi. tipo
Non
pero alcuna ragione
esiste
impossibile un tipo di
L aver
dell estensione,
ricondotto
per
aumento quale quello
caratteristiche
molto
quali
come logicamente da Pietro Lombardo.
escludere descritto
e
nell
poco
ambito
quantitative ne fa anche delle determinazioni accidentali della materia: la
materia non e tanta o poca in virtu della propria essenza, della
quantita.
diventi
da
Allora,
poca
molta
nulla
vieta
che
una certa porzione
rimanendo
pur
sostanzialmente
ma
in virtu
di
materia
identica.
La
conclusione di S.Tommaso, sottolinea ancora Egidio, sarebbe corretta se la materia fosse tanta o poca in virtu della sua essenza, osservazione che
sembra una precisa allusione
all
idea tomista di una multiplicatio
secundum
Cfr. Aeg. Rom., In II Sent., p.69: "Scd quidam hoc dictum Magistri et etiam Hugonis, tamquam impossibile et contradictionem implicans reputantes, improbant... Sed isti optime concludunt de actione naturali creaturae...".
Ibidem, p.70: "Ergo, nullum agens creatum potest agere nisi localiter movendo vel quale faciendo. Et quia qualitas supponit quantitatem per quam materia est multa vel pauca et motus localis etiam hoc supponit, quia per motum localem non potest de materia parum fieri multum nee e converse, nullum agens naturale de poterit
materia facere multam nee e
converse".
Cfr. inoltre
Quodl.U, q.ll, p.77-78.
pauca
Donati
488
essentiam materiae. In qucsto caso,
infatti,
aumcnto o
1
la
diminuzione
materia comportcrebbero nccessariamente un cambiamcnto dclla materia in se stessa c come sostrata, consicche in ogni caso di dclla quantita di
dovrebbe effettivamente postulare un aggiunta o materia. Ma poiche la quantita e una determinazione
variazione quantitativa
una sottrazione della
estrinseca
di
si
materia,
qualsiasi quantita. Se
la
montagna fossero considerate forma, esse non differirebbero una quantita maggiore che stessa
la
viceversa.
materia,
se
in 1
un grano
una
all altra.
stesse,
facendo astrazione da ogni
dall altra e all una non competerebbe Di conseguenza, Dio, che a differenza
sostanzialmente
diventi
identica,
da
puo poca
far
che
si
o
molta
12
La posizione tuttavia
di
agire direttamente sulla materia,
puo
degli agenti naturali,
porzione di materia e in potenza a di miglio e la materia di una
qualsiasi
materia
di
Egidio sul rapporto tra materia e quantita presenta lato la quantita viene vista come
una certa ambivalenza. Se da un
una determinazione accidentale
della
materia,
quando viene
dall altro,
considerata nel suo ruolo di principio di individuazione, essa acquista carattere stesso
di
una determinazione
Egidio,
sostanzialmente
quando
la
in
un
certo
differenti,
intrinseca.
senso,
cosi
parti
come
lo
Infatti,
di
come
materia
sono individui
sottolinea
differenti diversi.
il
lo
sono
Allora,
materia aumcnta quantitavamente, ex consequent! essa viene ad
essere moltiplicata anche in se stessa, sebbene solo per accidens.
13
Ora,
queste considerazioni servono a Egidio per dimostrare ancora una volta che gli agenti naturali, non potendo agire sull essenza della materia, non
possono agire nemmeno sulla sua quantita. Sulla base di questo argomento materia egli puo concludere che la facolta di agire sulla quantita della
compete solo all agente che ha 14 materia medesima. Tuttavia, considerando
le
la
gli
Rom., In
si
potrebbe
cose sotto questo punto di
netta la distinzione tra variazione
Aeg.
capacita di creare e di annichilare la
II
Sent.,
p.71:
vista,
forse
"Miramur
Aeg.
Rom., Quodl.ll,
q.ll,
di
enim de dicentibus quod oporteat creare
materiae de se esset multa vel pauca, tune abscinderetur vel annihilaretur aliquid de ipsa materia...". !
che,
puramente quantitativa e creazione
novum subiectum sive novam materiam vel addi aliquid ipsi materiae virtute divina quodcumque sit illud ad quod essentia materiae est in essentia
obiettare
non appare piu molto
forte
ut suscipiatur ibi potentia. Si enim
non posset minorari
nisi
soprattutto p.78: "...quantitas autem, licet per se non essentia materiae per se diversificari non potest,
diversified
essentiam
diversificat
tamen ipsam per accidens. Vel, ut clarius loquamur, licet materia secundum sit diversa, est tamen alia ct alia sub diversis partibus quantitatis".
essentiam non 14
Ibidem,
p. 77.
materiae,
quia
La nozione
di quantitas matcriae in Egidio
Romano
489
15 In nuova materia.
di
effetti, in questa prospcttiva, 1 idea di una porzione materia che varia quantitativamente pur rimanendo sostanzialmente
non sembra esente da
identica
Puo non
materiae
quantitas
teoricamente altri
autori
difficolta.
essere privo di interesse osservare che, se la nozione di
1
e
idea
che
chiave
la
consente
a
Egidio
un aumento sine additione
di
non giungono
alia stessa conclusione.
Un
et
di
sine
giustificare
rarefactione,
esempio e
costituito
da Giovanni Quidort. Quidort e uno dei pochi a far propria la distinzione 16 distinzione che sembra suscitare tra egidiana tra i due tipi di quantita, 17 Nell adottare Egidio piu critiche che consensi. dottrina egidiana, Quidort conia anzi un nuovo termine per designare concetto di quantita di materia egli distingue, infatti, 1 estensione e
i
di
contemporanei
;
la il
la
sottolineando cosi la differenza tra un concetto spaziale e un
tantalitas,
18 concetto non spaziale di quantita.
Ora, Quidort concede, con Egidio, che Dio, a differenza degli agenti
ha
naturali,
la
di
capacita lui
questo significa per
quantita di materia senza contraddittoria cosi
La ragione la tantalitas,
concepita
come
di
1
quantita
della
L idea
di
materia,
tuttavia,
un aumento
della
aggiunta di alcuna materia e per questo autore
lo era per
S.Tommaso. 19
questa posizione? Essa sembra risiedere nel fatto che
pur essendo una proprieta distinta dalla materia, tuttavia e proprieta per se di questa. Per Quidort, allora, una
come una
data porzione di materia, non quantita, anzi, essa
puo
sulla
agire
creare nuova materia.
modificarla.
e,
come per
Egidio, indifferente a qualsiasi
ha una quantita certa e
fissa,
cosicche
nemmeno Dio
20
Egidio sembra prendere
in
esame un obiezione
di
questo genere
in In II Sent., p.71.
16
Cfr. In II Sent., dist.XVIII, q.2 e q.4, in: Jean de Paris (Quidort) O.P., Commentaire sur les Sentences. Reportation, Livre II, ed. J.P. Muller (Studia Anselmiana, LII), Roma,
Herder, 1964, p.144-148, 149-151. Sulle "Godfrey
18
Cfr.
critiche
of
alia
dottrina
egidiana,
A.
cfr.
Maier,
"Das
Problem...";
E.
Sylla,
Fontaines...".
Jean de Paris, In II Sent., p.150.
19
Ibidem, p.146-147.
non determinat sibi aliquem gradum maior et minor... Ad aliud dico quod differunt quantitas materiae et dimensio, quia materia habet certam quantitatem, qua non est maior quantitas vel qua non est minor, et haec, sive materia accipiatur totius Ibidem, p.144,
quantitatis.
147-148:
"Item,
materia prima
Ergo sine mutatione sua potest
mundi sive aliqua determinata materia, secundum se...".
fieri
scilicet
materia partis. Et
ista
quantitas inest ei
Donati
490
in
nozione
di
duzione
della
innovatrice
in
moderna,
realta,
Una
metafisica.
ccrti
per
e,
L intro-
conclusione un ultima considcrazione.
Ci sia consentita
quantitas
rispondc
materiac, a
vicina
vcrsi,
nozione
concetti
che appare
utilizzati
dalla
cosi
scienza
Egidio a un esigenza eminentemente
per
fungono da principi-guida nella metafisica
delle idee che
egidiana e che ritroviamo anche al fondo di questa dottrina e quella della assoluta
che
materia
della
potenzialita
materia
della
potenzialita
E
prima.
siamo
causa
a
a
indotti
assoluta
della
postulare
una
suo essere molta o poca, giustifichi cosi come dobbiamo postulare una determinazione quantitativa per spiegare la sua estensione: in se stessa la materia non e ne molta ne poca cosi
determinazione quantitativa che
come non ha un
il
estensionc maggiore o minore.
Ed
indifferenza rispetto a qualsiasi quantita che una
e grazie a questa sua
medesima porzione
di
materia, di per se, e capace di assumere quantita diverse.
dunque, in questa dottrina una strategia tipica di tendenza a liberare la nozione di materia prima da ogni
Ritroviamo, Egidio,
la
determinazione
senso
della
S.Tommaso
luce
critica
e
ne
che
fisica,
potenzialita. Alia
di
queste
rivolta
da
fisica",
"troppo
metterebbe
in
considcrazioni,
Egidio
a
giacche,
Passoluta
pericolo
risulta
chiaro
anche
S.Tommaso. La posizione parlando
di
il
di
multiplicationem
secundum essentiam matcriae, fa di una caratteristica puramente fisica come la quantita una determinazione intrinseca alia materia. Ora, degno di nota e
anche
il
fatto
che questa e una
S.Tommaso S.Tommaso non
che Egidio rivolge a
Sembra quasi che, per Egidio, formulare una nozione autenticamente metafisica
in altre occasion!.
sia riuscito a
critica
21
di
materia
prima.
Pisa
Egidio adotta la stessa strategia a proposito della materia dei corpi celesti; anche incorretibilita di questi corpi questo caso respinge la posizione tomista, che spiega sulla base della natura della loro materia, in nome dell assoluta potenzialita della dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia prima. Cfr. a questo proposito S.Donati, materia dei corpi celesti. Discussioni sulla natura dei corpi celesti alia fine del tredicesimo secolo", in Medioe\*o 12 (1986), p. 229-280. in
1
"La
LEILA
HAAPARANTA
A Frcgcan Perspective into Ockham s Method
1
.
Ockham
For
Conceptual Order
s
William
of
Ockham,
the
is
logic
of
study
the
acts
of intellect
considered as signs which constitute a mental language. In contrast to the
Ockham
conventional spoken and written words,
signify
spoken and written words logicae, the first part of which I
they
signify
naturally what
conventionally.
In his
Summa
that
natural;
is,
regards mental signs as
mainly discuss in this paper, Ockham calls the acts of the parts of mental propositions, intentions of the soul.
shall is,
of
the
soul
something something else (SL I, 12). A not itself an intention of the second
intention
species,
property,
intention.
of
Terms
Ockham
s
the
in
is
is
a
first
tertn
universal,
a
that
is
capable
An
intention
of
signifying
intention signifies something that
soul,
of
sign
soul
intellect, that
e.g.,
first
man,
intention.
and proposition
is
while a
this
man, etc., For example, genus, are terms of second
of second intention belong to the conceptual machinery
logic,
by means of which
Ockham
studies the terms of
first
intention (ibid.).
In the
Summa
logicae,
Ockham
asks whether the units which he
considers to be mental signs are representations in the
mind which would
between
mental acts and the individual objects which are signified, or whether they are acts of knowing themselves. He answers that logic is fall
interested
in
those acts of knowing themselves, and hence, that
we do
not need any intermediate images of objects between mental acts and objects.
As Ockham
from postulating
puts
it,
all
the theoretical advantages that derive
from
acts of understanding can be had without making such a distinction, for an act of understanding can signify something and can supposit for something just as well as any sign (SL I, 12).
Ockham
model so
entities distinct
thus seems to think that because he builds his logical
that he takes the mental units to be signs of a mental language,
he does not have to assume that the mental units are something more than acts. Hence, Ockham does not postulate any images in the mind,
492
Haaparanta acts. Nor does he postulate any ideal which logic would be interested in. thoughts
which would be contents of those objects like propositions or
2. Tfie
Materiality of Logic
The aim
of this paper
logic
through
logic
as
the
in
appears
it
predecessors.
logic,
and
in
considered,
was
which
s
logic
which were made
Frege
Superficially
psychologistic
Ockham
to consider
is
distinctions
and philosophy of nineteenth century
in
contemporaries and closest Ockham s view comes close to his
a
by
represented
number
great
of
nineteenth century logicians such as Beneke (1820, 1842), Sigwart (1873),
Wundt
Erdmann
(1880),
criticized
Gottlob
by
(1892),
and Lipps (1893). Those logicians were
and
Frege
other
Psychologists
antipsychologists.
human thought. Some of them believed that the rules of logic concerning how we ought to think have their origin in psychological laws of association concerning how regarded logical laws as psychological laws of
people
in
fact
Others
think.
our
took
logical
concepts of plurality, relation and possibility, to analyzing the
material,
the nineteenth century that
in
logicians
that
that
is,
logic
speaks is
about
all
metaphysical
reality,
human thought, objects. Of course
logicians different
the
who
realm
of
abstract
considered
branches
within
material logical
psychologists belonged to those
and
logic
studies.
who argued
or the
phenomenal were also
there logic
Frege
and
to
even
if
anti-
that logic mirrors the
realm
a
specific
logical
objectified the transcendental structure of
of abstract
1
is
parallel
distinct from, sense-perception.
By acknowledging
distinction
be two
other
of abstract objects and that our logical source of knowledge to,
basically
represents
the psychological
formal
1
is
logic
something
world, the transcendental conditions of or
the
was one version of the doctrine upheld by a
logic
something, whether that something
realm,
as
human mind.
Psychologistic
number of
such
concepts,
become understood by
objects
among
called
thoughts.
In
source
human
this
way,
of knowledge, Frege thought into the forms
he came to make a
three realms. For Frege, there were the realm of the
See Haaparanta (19885).
A Fregean Perspective into Ockham s Method
493
objects of sense experience, the realm of psychological events, and the 2 realm of logical objects, which provides us with logical concepts. Even if Frege acknowledged the realm of abstract objects, he took
for
it
that
granted
knowledge of analysis.
its
objectivity
structure. This
its
By means
acknowledgements
of this of
the
is
did not prevent us from having because he relied on the method of
method we truth
of
constitutive components of thoughts.
we have
of reason, to which
handle by our methodological
start
with judgements, which are
and
thoughts, 3
direct
Frege
s
come up with
the
logical objects are objects
we
access and which
are able to
tools.
we construe Ockham s procedure in Fregean terms, we notice that for Ockham we neither have direct access to our minds nor to any realm of abstract objects, because there is no such realm for Ockham. If
Ockham
believes in the conceptual priority of ordinary languages. This
belief manifests
itself
For what Ockham thought,
he
which
as a methodological choice in his logical studies.
when he
has at his disposal calls
the
mental
studies the structure of
language,
are
the
grammatical
concepts which pertain to overt languages.
we find George Boole, whose work has a number of traces from Ockham s and other medieval nominalists thought. He even comments on some of their tenets in his more philosophical considerations. He states that if a
Among
the pioneers of
modern
logic in the nineteenth century
by symbols, he would thereby take a step towards a philosophical language. However, he does not recommend the view represented by extreme nominalists which logician should succeed in expressing logical propositions
makes
dependent on language (Boole, 1965, p. 5). What idea resemble the ideas endorsed by Ockham is the fact
logic entirely
makes Boole
s
logical symbols to be founded on the laws of mental processes which they represent (ibid.). Boole s philosophy of logic is a version of psychologistic logic, for he ties
that
Boole takes the laws of the combinations of
the
mechanism of reasoning
to
the
laws
and the constitution of the
intellect. He presumes that if this constitution were changed, our would also turn out to be different from the present one (ibid., p.
human logic
2
See
GLA,
85,
Erkenntnisquellen
GGA der
XXIV, Der Gedanke (1918), KS, p. 353, and I, pp. XVIII Mathematik und der mathematischen Naturwissenschaften
(1924/25), NS, p. 286. 3
See Frege,
Frege,
Was
ist
Uber den Zweck der
Begriffsschrift
eine Funktion? (1904), KS, p. 273.
(1883),
Frege (1964),
p.
101,
and
494
Haaparanta In this peculiar sense, Boole
6).
but
Hence, what Boole of
construction
the
a
is
algebra
not an empty calculus,
medieval nominalists
in
criticizes
we do
the conviction that
s logical
and the mechanisms of the human mind.
structure
the
reflects
it
views
is
precisely
not have direct access to our minds but that
which
language
logical
language takes place by means
mental
the
represents
of the tools received from the study of
overt languages.
Like Boole
s
logic,
Ockham
s
is
his
material in the sense that
is
it
a language which speaks about the realm of the objects of
is
logic
logic
realm. Frege, for his part, assumes that
interested in the psychological
sense experience and the realm of abstract objects, and that
it
is
also
transcendental, for it gives us the structure of thought in general. Frege wants to give us a new language which is not a representation of overt languages but which is a direct symbolic representation of the forms of
Ockham
thought.
and
s
secondarily
notation
model
of
is
the
primarily a
mental,
model of overt languages
whereas
model of the realm of thoughts and
a
is
model
logical
a
Frege
s
conceptual
a representation of the
4
That is, Frege s universal language is be a language of thought itself. What this means is that Frege s and Ockham s interests and objects of study are crucially different. transcendental forms of thought.
meant
3.
to
Ockham
s
and Frege
first-order
Fregean
considered
are
constituted
is
characterized
framework
the
concepts
empirical negation,
conditionality,
Ockham
Models
language
in
by
s
generality,
of
by the idea that objects
Judgements
judgements.
and
by
logical
and
existence,
functions
identity.
Even
are like if
model does not represent the same object as that of Frege s, it Frege s model provided by a conceptual machinery which distinguishes between the material and the formal constituents of is
s
like
propositions.
That
is
because
Ockham makes
categorematic and syncatcgorematic
signs.
such expressions as every, no, some and
both
signification,
which
is
its
context, and supposition, which
For arguments (1985).
in
favour
of
this
a
distinction
Syncategorematic signs include all. A categorematic sign has
meaning independently of a is
between
sentential
a property of a term in a proposition.
interpretation
of
Frege
s
logic,
see
Haaparanta
A Ockham
proposition supposits (SL
a
s
Method
subject
495
a
or
predicate
of a
63).
I,
of three kinds, personal, material, and simple
may be
Supposition
be
can
whatever
that
states
Ockham
Fregean Perspective into
A
term supposits personally when it supposits for the thing which it signifies and when it is significant in suppositing. A term has material supposition when it does not supposit significatively but supposits 64).
(ibid.,
spoken or a written word.
for a
an
for
supposits
significatively.
of
intention
The term man
in
A
term has simple supposition when it the soul and is not functioning "Man"
material supposition, and the term
example of simple supposition. In the intention
species
has
intention of the soul
Accordingly, contains
terms
personal
man which overt
the
of
first
syncategorematic signs.
it
Man
in
latter
is
a
is
an example of species is an
example, the term of second for
supposition,
it
supposits
for
the
signifies.
Ockham
which
language,
terms
intention,
A
name
a
is
man
of
second
interested
is
intention,
in,
and
part of this language, namely, terms of second
intention and syncategorematic signs, consists of the logical vocabulary of this
language.
By means
of this vocabulary
semantic model of the overt language the mental language.
Ockham
formulates a proper and secondarily a model of
itself
5
4. Tlie
Method of Analysis
In
two methodological recommendations were emphasized. grammatical concepts like subject and predicate must not be used
Fregean
First,
logic,
as basic conceptual tools.
out
must
of
method of composing judgements replaced by the method of analyzing
Secondly, the
be
concepts judgements. This is how Frege claims to have found the primitive logical 7 functions which constitute the judgements.
seems that from the Fregean point of view Ockham s logical ought to be criticized for not giving up grammatical tools but praised for adopting the method of analysis in the logical descent to It
studies
This
kind
of
reconstruction
of
Ockham
s
project
is
given
by
Moody
(1953),
on
p. 27.
6 7
See Frege (1964), pp. 2 See Frege,
(1988a, 19885).
-
3,
and Frege an Husserl (1906), BW,
Uber den Zweck der
Begriffsschrift
,
BS
p. 102.
(1964),
p.
101.
Cf.
Haaparanta
496
Haaparanta
when
individuals
Ockham common
terms
divides
Ockham
what
clarifying
having
personal
not
are
as
suppositing terms,
discrete
Ockham
(SL
supposition.
the proper
is
name
Common terms are such 70). Among common
I,
and
discrete
into
supposition
terms. In discrete supposition the term
object or a demonstrative pronoun.
terms
common
calls
of an
suppositing personally
then distinguishes between determinate, merely
confused and confused distributive supposition. A term has determinate supposition when it is possible to descend to particular objects by means of a disjunctive
This
man
man
runs, or that
when
supposition
For example,
proposition.
is
it
runs, or
possible
...
.
A man runs reduced to A term has merely confused is
descend
to
a
to
proposition
with
a
disjunctive predicate involving particulars. For example, Every man is an animal reduces to Every man is this animal or that animal or ... A .
common
term has confused distributive supposition when
descend
individuals
to
is
possible to
a conjunctive proposition. For by means an animal reduces to This man is an animal, and
of
example, Every man is that man is an animal, and
The
it
...
.
three rules of descent which correspond to the three forms of
The
supposition must be used in a certain order. is
supposition
applied
the
first,
rule
for
must be the second, and the
supposition
rule for determinate
confused rule
last
and
applied
distributive
that
is
for
merely confused supposition. For example, the proposition Every man is an animal receives the analysis This man is this animal or that animal or
...,
and
For a
that
man
is
this
animal or that animal or
uses a often
specific read as
symbol
some
.
v,
which behaves
When
for
,
y
= VX
solving
y
The
in
his
somewhere
introduce formulas like
syllogisms, Boole gives solution of the universal
is
.
solution of the universal negative proposition
No Xs
are
Ys
,
symbolically xy
= 0,
is
= v(\-x).
The corresponding forms
for particular affirmative
are
(3)
.
Broadie (1987), pp. 17-25 and pp. 90 - 96. the structure which Boole gives to propositions lies and Frege s analysis. Unlike Frcge, Boole does not
propositions of the forms A, E, I, and O. affirmative proposition All Ys are Xs symbolically v(l-A ) = 0, solutions
(2)
8 ...
that
quantifiers. However, he an existential quantifier
The
and
clarification of this idea, sec
may be noted between Ockham s It
(1)
...,
vx = vy,
meaning Some Xs are Ys
,
and particular negative propositions
A Fregean Perspective into Ockham s Method The very
may remind
of supposition
idea
us
497
of Frege
context
s
which the meanings of words must be looked for 9 contexts. Frege s logical analysis, which starts with
principle, according to
sentential
in
judgements and not with concepts
in isolation, is true to that principle.
10
And Ockham
s descent to individuals may resemble Frege s descent to which are put into the empty argument places of functions in his objects
conceptual notation. This is how things seem to be. But
what Ockham and Frege are doing, crucially different views of analysis.
there
a
is
different
ontological
more
consider
carefully
turn out that they endorse
their
For
doctrines.
we
if
will
Someone might argue
between
difference
great
it
logics,
example,
for
that of course
they
singular
represent
sentences
like
man
are considered by Frege to be compounded out of a refers to an object, and a function name, which which proper name, refers to a function. For Ockham, there are no functions like properties
Socrates
a
is
and relations
in the
world to be referred
to;
a
instead,
man
stands for
particular men.
However, the point which
want to make here
I
a difference between ontologies,
Ockham
not that there
is
is
being a nominalist and Frege
being a kind of Platonist. Instead, the difference which we find between their views from a logical vantage point is precisely due to a difference between the ways they use the method of analysis and thus a difference
between
their epistemologies.
Both Ockham and Frege propositions
Socrates
be a
to
reading
Socrates
as
identical with a
is
man and is
is
Socrates
the
reject
man man in a
.
That
of
such
they do not think
that
essentialist is,
the sense that Socrates
identical with his essence.
is
reading
based on a sharp distinction between the
essence
is
However, Frege s of identity and
is
and vx = v(l-y),
(4)
meaning Some Xs are not Ys (Boole, 1965, pp. 32
-
33).
These formulas bear
a
striking
similarity
to
the
basic
level
of
Ockham
s
analysis,
exception that Boole stops at the structure of propositions given by elective symbols, which serve as concepts, by the symbol v, which stands for the word some and by the symbol of identity. Ockham has only discrete terms, that is, proper names and demonstrative pronouns, and the symbol of
however,
with
the
not
unimportant ,
identity at the basic level.
9 See,
e.g.,
GLA, Vorwort
,
p.
X, and
For the interpretation of Frege 93.
60. s
context principle, see Haaparanta (1985), pp. 79
-
498
Haaparanta
the
of predication, and
is
takes the sentence to
it
11
mean
that Socrates
for his part, construes
under the concept ma/?. Ockham, and a man as names of one and the same object, that falls
is,
Socrates
as suppositing
for one and the same individual (SL I, 43). A apparently similar view is held by Bertrand Russell in Ttie Principles of Mathematics (1903). Russell
between two readings of the sentence Socrates is a man He assumes that one reading expresses a relation of Socrates to the .
distinguishes
man, while the other reading expresses the identity of Socrates with an ambiguous individual (Russell, 1950, pp. 54 55). Frege in the article in his view kind of criticizes this posthumous writings class-concept
there Logik in der Mathematik (1914). He characterizes it by saying that have been people who have held that concept-words are ambiguous names and that a man is hence a new name for Socrates (NS, pp. 230 - 231).
Frcge
criticism
s
meanings which
would not
Ockham
hit
Ockham
s
theory,
according to the
for
gives to such terms as univocity
and ambiguity
common names arc not ambiguous. The name man signifies several individuals equally, but it signifies them by one convention and it is subordinated to one single concept of the mental language,
view (SL
in
Ockham
s
17).
I,
is analysis of universal, particular and singular judgements Frege include which and between distinction based on the functions, objects
s
are concepts and relations. Proper identity statements and predications would remain kept apart in his logic in order that objects and concepts 12
Frege even connects his distinction between objects and concepts with Kant s distinction between intuitions and concepts, which are the apart.
13 two irreducible and indispensable components of our knowledge.
He
with bundles of argues that objects are not identical with concepts or statement. Proper concepts. Hence, Socrates is a man is not an identity statements like Venus is the Morning Star have a special identity
content for Frege.
They
are metalinguistic statements which claim that
two names refer to one and the same object but that they have different senses (Sinne), which they ascribe to the object named, that is, they
11
See, 12
168 13
This -
e.g., is
Frege,
Uber
168 Begriff und GegenstancT (1892), KS, pp.
strongly emphasized by Frege
169.
See GI
A
27, footnote.
in
his
Uber
-
169 and
p. 174.
Begriff und Gegenstand
,
KS, pp.
A Fregean Perspective into
Ockham
to think that the
for a
view,
form
what
signifies
he also claims that
43), but
I,
whiteness is
asserted
is
it
is
499
that
one nature
Socrates
is
it
to all
white
false to think that
sentence
in the
Method
Ockham argues common
express different aspects of the object.
name man
s
white
.
In
is
false
men (SL supposits
Ockham
s
which the subject stands is (ibid., 66), Hence, Ockham and
that the thing for
the thing for which the predicate stands
Frege agree in their criticism against essentialism, but they disagree in what they think of the basic level of analysis. In Ockham s procedure, analysis brings us to the level of individual objects, while Frege s analysis
stops at the level of individuals, concepts, and relations.
5. TJie
Two Epistemologies
But why does Frege stop
at
an earlier
level
treatment of a predicative judgement like allow
any reduction
Frege thinks that via
a
of concept-words
that
a
a sense,
via
is
it
name
a
than
Socrates
names of
to
Ockham? Frege
s
man
does not
objects.
Similarly,
a
is
conceptual component, and only
related
an
to
15
Hence, every mediated by a concept under which that object falls, and every judgement is construed as an expression of an act of knowledge which consists of conceptual components alone or together sense,
apprehension of an object
is
object.
is
with symbolic representations of individual objects.
Ockham, for his part, upholds the view that all terms, both discrete and common, stand in direct relation to individual objects and, moreover, that mental signs are on a par with overt signs, that is, that they also stand in direct relation to individual objects. proposition as a composition of
conceptual components like Frege s Sinne. Of course we might suggest that
between
Ockham
repeated
point
s
and
that
Frege
they put
s
basic
forward
disregarding this alleged difference
Ockham and Frege have Frege gives his main (1892), KS, pp. 143 144. This
remark
(1892), NS, p. 135.
is
crucially
argument for
made by Frege
Ockham
s
model construes a
two names without even a mentioning of
in
the levels
reason for of
different
analysis
the is
ontological
difference
the views.
often
But
and taking into account the fact that different aims in their logical studies,
this
his
tenet
in
his
Ausfiihrungen
Uber Sinn und Bedeutung fiber
Sinn
und Bedeutung
500
Haaparanta
we may formulate
the
answer
in
another
way.
Namely, Ockham is is committed to the
committed to his scarce basic level only so far as he view that his semantic model languages,
model
is
is
model of spoken and written sign-object relations, and that this
primarily a
thus consisting of simple
then automatically extended to the mental realm. if Ockham s mental language may appear to have the
Hence, even
same
constituents as Frege
close to constructing a
new
s
Ockham does not come What prevents Ockham from
conceptual notation,
logical language.
precisely the view upheld by him that the primary which the conceptual machinery of logic is applied are overt spoken and written languages. Surprisingly enough, this conviction brings
constructing
it
is
objects to
Ockham
to a number of logical developments of the twentieth what Ockham does, expressed in contemporary terms, is to century, give a semantic theory for natural languages and not to give a new
closer
for
universal language, which Frege
Academy
s
conceptual notation was meant to be.
of Finland,
University of Helsinki
References
F.E Erfahningsseclenlehre Siegfried Mittler, Berlin, 1820.
Beneke,
als
Beneke, F.E., System der Logik als Ferdinand Dummler, Berlin, 1842.
Grundlage Kunstlchre
alles
des
Wissens,
Denkens
I
Ernst
-
//,
Boole, G., Tlie Mathematical Analysis of Logic, being an essay towards a calculus of deductive reasoning (1847), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965.
Broadie, A., Introduction
to
Medieval Logic, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1987.
Erdmann, 1923
B.,
Logik (1892), Walter de Gruyter
&
Co., Berlin
und Leipzig,
(3. ed.)
Frege, G., Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Verlag von L. Nebert, Halle a.S., 1879; von I. repr. in G. Frege. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsatze, hrsg. Angelelli, Georg Dims, Hildesheim, 1964. (Referred to as BS.) G., Die Gnmdlagen der Arithmetik: eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung uber den Begriff der Zahl, Verlag von W. Koebner,
Frege,
A Fregean Perspective into Ockham s Method
501
Breslau, 1884; repr. and transl. by J.L. Austin in Tfie Foundations of Arithmetic I Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968. (Referred to as
Frege,
GLA.) der Arithmetik,
Grundgesetze
G.,
begriffsschriftlich
Band, Verlag von H. Pohle, Jena, 1893. (Referred
to as
abgeleitet,
I.
GGA I.)
Frege, G., Kleine Schriften, hrsg. von I. Angelelli, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, und Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1967. (Referred to as KS.) Frege, G., Nachgelassene Schriften, hrsg. von H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, und F. Kaulbach, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1969. Frege,
G.,
Wissenschaftliche
Hermes, F. Kambartel, C. Hamburg, 1976. Haaparanta,
L.,
Briefwechsel, hrsg. von G. Gabriel, H. Thiel, und A. Veraart, Felix Meiner Verlag,
Frege s Doctrine of Being,
Ada
Philosophica Fennica 39,
1985. L., Frege and His German Contemporaries on Alethic Moda (1988a), in S. Knuuttila (ed.), Modem Modalities: Studies of the History of Modal Theories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988, pp. 234 274.
Haaparanta, lities
L., Analysis as the Method of Logical Discovery: Some Remarks on Frege and HusserF (1988b), Synthese 11, 1988, pp. 73-
Haaparanta, 97.
Lipps, T., Grundzilge der Logik, Verlag von Leopold Voss, Leipzig, 1893.
Hamburg und
Moody, E.A., Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1953.
Ockham. W. and
S.
of,
Summa
Brown,
Ockham, W.
of,
St.
Logicae (1323 1329), ed. by P. Boehner. G. Gal, Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974. (Referred to as SL.)
Ockham
transl.
and
Notre
Dame
s
Theory of Terms, Part 1 of the
Sigwart, C., Logik, Erster Band, Verlag der H. Tubingen, 1873. Russell, B.,
Summa Logicae, Dame Press,
by M.L. Loux, University or Notre and London, 1974.
intr.
Lauppschen Buchhandlung,
The Principles of Mathematics (1903), George Allen
&
Unwin
Ltd, London, 1950.
W,
Logik: Eine Untersuchung der Principien der Erkenntnis und der Methoden Wissenschaftlicher Forschung, Erster Band: Erkenntnis-
Wundt,
lehre,
Verlag von Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart, 1880.
BRIAN HENDLEY
A New Look at John of Salisbury s Educational Theory
In recent years, there has life
been
and works of John of of John
edition
critical
s
a resurgence of scholarly interest in the
2
John
City, talks
and a
scholar,
at
appeared with an accompanying 1980, scholars from around the world
just
among
others.
3
Similar
an international Conference held
as well
interest
interdisciplinary
at Salisbury,
book
England, with Tfie
papers being published 4 Careful attention of Salisbury.
a
as to his activities as a student,
Church administrator,
in
later
of the
writings,
s
historian, a classicist, a philosopher,
of John
World
a
on John were given by a
literary
bulk
edition
of John
commemorate the octocentennial of at Fordham University in New York
was shown the
new
volume of
At the Conference held
death.
s
A
appeared.
English and Dutch translation. gathered at various conferences to In
the second
1979, 1
Letters
Maior and Minor has
Entheticus
In
Salisbury.
was
entitled,
paid
John
to
s
and inveterate traveller. Many of the papers challenged his and views argued for a revised interpretation of John and accepted political advisor,
work. It
is
the
in
spirit
of these
"John
of Salisbury
shall take a fresh look at his educational theory. article
Daniel
by
Metalogicon
of
McGarry,
John of
entitled 5
theory of knowledge John develops
what
at stake philosophically
is
I
Salisbury."
in
of Salisbury
s
Entheticus
(Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. 3
John
York 4
of
City,
Salisbury
October
Michael
Wilks
1984). Cf. also
5
my
take
shall
that
1
concentrate on an in
Theory
special
note
of
the the
the Metalogicon in order to see defense of the arts of the Trivium
in
his
W.J. Millor and C.N.L. Brooke (eds.), The Two: The Later Letters (1163-1180) (Oxford, 1979).
John
will
"Educational
1
2
I
revisionists"
Letters
Maior and Minor,
cd.
of John
Jan
of Salisbury,
van
Volume
3
vols.
University,
New
I^aarhoven,
Brill, 1987).
Octocentennial
Conference
held
at
Fordham
25, 1980. (ed.),
The
review of Wilks
of John of Salisbury (Oxford: Basil Speculum, 62 (January, 1987), pp. 220-222.
World in
Daniel D. McGarry, "Educational Theory Speculum, 23 (1948), pp. 659-675.
in
the Metalogicon
of John of
Blackwcll,
Salisbury,"
John of Salisbury s Educational Ttieory and show how
his defense
is
relevant to
some
503
of the educational problems
of today.
McGarry on John
s
article
McGarry s
Educational Ttieory
was
the
in
pivotal
sense
that
introduced
it
many
English-speaking readers to the cultural background and the philosophical foundation for John s defense of the Trivium. 6 John wrote the
Metalogicon as a defense of with
dealing
language:
grammar,
these
because
arts
and
rhetoric,
answer the attacks of those he called the of
broad sense of the three
in the
"logic"
of
their
7
belief
that
reasoning and verbal expression comes as the
fruit
study
He
logic.
"Cornificians"
it
to
decried the
"effective
facility
in
of natural talent and 8
exercise rather than as a product of formal
wrote
who
arts
teaching."
Like contemporary
proponents of education as job-training, the Cornificians were impatient with the time being spent studying great works of the past and dubious of the need to master the rules for effective speaking, clear writing, and
cogent argumentation. They would reduce the attention paid to the arts of the Trivium to a minimum in order to expedite the entry of students into lucrative occupations. They claimed that came as an innate eloquence gift
rather than as the result of formal study.
John was
eminently suited to answer this charge, according to because of his wide reading and love for the classics. 9 As a McGarry, There had been previous studies on John on a more popular level; cf., for example, Clement C.J. Webb, John of Salisbury (London: Methuen, 1932) and Reginald Lane Poole, Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning (London, 1920). McGarry s translation of the Metalogicon did not appear until 1955. Scholars
when he
are
still
not
referred to the
Cornifician
motif
in
certain
which
"Cornificians".
John of Salisbury
Cf., s
had in particular individuals John for example, Rosemary Barton Tobin,
Metalogicon,"
History of Education,
13
mind "The
(1984),
pp. 1-6. o
McGarry, 9
This
op.
cit.,
view of John as a most notably by Janet Martin.
traditional
challenged,
p. 660.
lover Cf.
her
of
the
Classics
has
recently
of Salisbury and the interest are her articles,
"John
been
Classics"
dissertation. Harvard, 1968). Also of "John of Manuscripts of Frontinus and of Gellius," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 40 (1977), pp. 1-26; "Uses of Tradition: Gellius, Petronius and John
(unpublished
Salisbury
of
s
Viator, 10 (1979), pp. 57-76; and "John of Salisbury as Classical Scholar," The World of John of Salisbury, op. cit., pp. 179-201. Further criticism of John s classical scholarship can be found in Peter Von Moos, "The Use of Exempla in the Policaticus of John of Salisbury," in The World of John of Salisbury, op. cit., pp. 207-261. in
Salisbury,"
504
Hcndley
student of the
"Christian
humanism"
of Chartres, he was able to
draw
with upon a deep knowledge of the writings of classical authors together 10 He the Bible and the works of the Church Fathers. proposes that schools adopt the educational
wherein at
"the
lectures,
11 activity."
learning process consists in reading, active attendance reflection, memorization, exercises in imitation and original recitations,
production,
method followed by Bernard of Chartres,
full
John
s
known statement
and review,
all
of which
indebtedness to Bernard to the effect that
is
"Bernard
further
further
stress
marked
student
in his well-
of Chartres used to
compare
us to [puny] dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants. He pointed out that we see more and farther than our predecessors, not because we have
keener vision or greater height, but because we are
on
aloft
their gigantic
lifted
up and borne
12 stature."
Having traced the intellectual lineage of John s thought, McGarry is the foundation for goes on to say that "John s philosophy of education his whole pedagogical theory, and the key to his philosophy of education 13 This philosophy sees knowledge as based on is his philosophy." general
Reason frees us opinions derived from the senses and imagination. hidden natures to the access us and from deception by opinion gain helps and causes of things. Education seeks to develop reason through the fallible
study of the
arts,
which are
of experience:
light
"efficacious
tools, fashioned
by reason
in the
results expeditious short-cuts to the achievement of
10
R.W. Southern has claimed that there never was a distinctive School of Chartres with its own brand of Christian humanism. Cf. his The Schools of Paris and The School of Chartres," in Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable (eds.) Renaissance
and Renewal "Humanism
in
and
the
the
and his Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 113; of Chartres," in Medie\ al Humanism and Other Studies the issue is far from 1970), p. 74. Southern does admit that
Twelfth
School
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, settled and he refers to criticisms of his view by Nikolaus M. Haring, "Chartres and Paris Revisited," in J. Reginald O Donncll (ed.), Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Peter Dronke, "New Approaches to the School of Pegis (Toronto, 1974), pp. 268-329; de estudios medie\ ales, 6 (1971), p. 117-140; and Robert Giacone, Chartres," Anuario Books and Library at Chartres According to the Cartularies of Notre-Dame "Masters, and Saint-Pere," Vivarium, 12 (1974), pp. 30-51. Also of interest on the topic is J.O. on Cicero s De Inventione by Thierry of Chartres Date of the "The
Commentary
Ward, (ca.
1095-1160?) and the Cornifician Attack on the Liberal
Arts,"
Viator,
3 (1972), pp.
219-273. 11
Ibid., p. 673.
12
The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury, trans. Daniel D. McGarry (Berkeley/Los this remark is commonly attributed to Angeles, 1955, reprinted 1962), p. 167. Although Bernard of Chartres, Raymond Klibansky claims that the original statement comes from 147-149. Priscian; cf. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants," Isis, 26 (1936), pp. 13
McGarry,
op.
cit.,
p. 664.
John of Salisbury s Educational Theory
would
which
be
otherwise
development of reason
is
too
or
difficult
505
unattainable."
14
The
complemented by acquiring eloquence through
study of the verbal arts. Eloquence enables us to accumulate and
the
what we know by thinking correctly, accurately comprehending what we hear and read, and effectively expressing ourselves in speech distribute
and
15
writing.
have no quarrel with this since I too am a firm supporter of the 16 view that the concerns of wisdom and eloquence are mutual for John. What I cannot fathom is McGarry s attempt to connect John to presentI
day educational thinkers by labelling to
McGarry, According between several of the
"There
in
fact,
advocated
views
of an
his theory as that
exists,
"Idealist".
a remarkable parallelism in
the
Metalogicon
and
corresponding propositions presented by R.M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago in his ... [book] Higher Learning in America, and Hutchins is
an
considered
Idealist
.
Tragmatist or Materialist
The comparison not
there
...
is
no
John was no
that
question
17 ."
of John of Salisbury to Robert
Maynard Hutchins
an apt one. Hutchins was a staunch follower of Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas. He be
could
clearly
is
St.
believed that the aims and content of education
once
delineated
we recognized
the
importance
of
metaphysics. Metaphysics gives us knowledge of the ordering principles
and causes of order
of
distinction
some as
reality
studies
in
which provide the underlying framework for the education. Even the sceptic must presuppose a
between knowledge and opinion, says Hutchins.
certain, clear knowledge. If there
such,
and
it
be
which there
in
disciplines
should
beginning of our
curriculum."
taught is
is
first.
knowledge, Let us then it
certainty and
let
us
"There
must be
should be taught
enumerate the
place
them
at
the
18
The key idea is that of order. The rational order of the universe can be known and it should be mirrored by the order of studies in school.
14 15
In
a
simplistic
but
oft-quoted statement, Hutchins puts
it
this
Ibid., p. 668.
Ibid., p. 675.
A
1
New Interpretation Cf., for example, Brian Hendley, "Wisdom and Eloquence: of the Metalogicon of John of Salisbury" (unpublished dissertation, Yale, 1967). McGarry, 18
Robert
op.
M.
cit.,
p. 665.
Hutchins,
(November, 1936),
p. 588.
"A
Reply
to
Professor
Whitehead,"
Atlantic
Monthly,
158
506
Hendley
way:
"Education
implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge.
Knowledge
everywhere the same. Hence education should be 19 Practical applications of ideas have no place in same." the everywhere the proper order of higher education. What can be learned at the is
The
truth.
truth
is
university are general principles, fundamental propositions, the theory of
any discipline, unhampered by any concern for
The university own sake. The role of
results.
their
with
"true
of
"models
as the
rules
"means
for
reasoning
excellence".
scheme
and
is
to supply us
logic are singled out
Grammar, rhetoric, how excellence is achieved". Thus,
of determining classical
speaking, is
the classics in this
of writing,
rules
demonstrative."
rigorously
20
for
pressure
to study things for
is
says Hutchins,
spirit",
or
utility
"conditions
there are
under which
The culmination of
the whole
programme of studies should be metaphysics. Indeed, Hutchins asserts that we can revitalize metaphysics and restore it to its proper place in the higher learning, we may be able to establish rational order in the modern "If
world as well as It
is
21 university."
to reconcile this view of education with that of
difficult
of Salisbury.
who
in the
For one
thing,
John
a
is
self-professed
sceptic
"in
Whether such propositions may be 22
probable certitude." guide our way in
judgements effective
John
matters that are Metalogicon with the disclaimer that to a wise man, I cannot swear to the truth of what I say.
begins his
doubtful
Academic
use
experiences,
of
of
or
false,
I
am
satisfied
with
For John, there are no metaphysical certainties
Human knowledge
education.
sensation
language.
clarify
true
and
and
imagination.
We
learn
critici/e
to
It
begins
to
fallible
advances
communicate
our opinions,
with
through the our ideas and
argue with one another
about the meaning of things. The truths that Hutchins would start from in education are the ideal end or goal that John would have us strive towards, with no guarantee of success.
The
difference between the two
approaches to knowledge can be highlighted by recalling John of universals and his
commentary on Aristotle
s
s
treatment
Organon.
Although he acknowledges Aristotle as the master on the question of universals, John stops short of fully endorsing his position. For Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Higher University Press, 1936, reprinted, 1965), p. 66. 20
Learning
Ibid., p. S3.
21
Ibid., p. 105.
The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury,
op.
cit., p. 6.
in
America
(New Haven: Yale
John of Salisbury s Educational
507
Tiieory
knowledge of the universal was knowledge of sensible things
Aristotle,
under the aspect of their formal cause. The mind is able to abstract a content from particular sense perceptions and use this as a basis for scientific knowledge. For John, we have no such knowledge of universal
the formal aspects of individual things because
seemingly melts
when confronted by
the
strength of reason
"the
principles of
[first]
The
things."
our grasp and we must make do it (figmenta) which reason devises
real nature of sensible things exceeds
with universals which are delves deeper in
"fictions"
of learning, John assures us, their
"as
investigation and explanation of
its
All branches
things."
devise fictions to expedite
"unhesitatingly
23 investigations."
This
reluctance
reality
claim
to
certainty
John
in
our knowledge of sensible
apparent commentary on the Organon. toward Aristotle s Posterior Analytics which
also
is
in
s
relatively
with methods of logical demonstration. Such methods
mathematics,
and
especially
truths; but they are not of
geometry where we
scientific
knowledge
of what
is
may be
deal
is
deals
of use in
with
necessary use in our investigation of sensible
much
Strictly speaking, says John,
reality.
He
indifferent
"there
can be no necessary proof or
corruptible",
so
that
the
demonstrator
should leave
all topics that are not necessary to the dialectician and the seek only probability. John strongly prefers Aristotle s Topics which aids our investigation of probabilities by accounting for the mutual
orator
who
connection of things and words and provides us with an abundance of
to
24
Once
through language that we will advance, if not mathematical (or metaphysical) certainty, then to higher degrees of
reasons.
again
is
it
probability.
McGarry was
complementarity of wisdom and eloquence in John s educational theory. What he failed to appreciate was that John sees the efficacious use of language as our chief means to achieve wisdom. is
advantageous
wisdom."
Ibid.,
of
25
pp.
Universals,"
to
right
"Fluency "only
note the
does not always merit
when
it
is
oriented
Through reading and learning
praise,"
to
facilitated
[the
John
acquisition
by the
130, 135; cf. also Brian Hendley, "John of Salisbury and Journal of the History of Philosophy, 8 (1970), pp. 289-302.
24
tells us;
it
of]
arts
of the
the
Problem
pp. 212, 215, 201. Cf. also Brian Hendley, "John of Salisbury s Defense of the Arts Liberaux et Philosophic au Moyen Age. IVe Congres international de philosophic medievale. Montreal, 1967 (Paris, 1969), pp. 753-762. Ibid.,
Trivium,"
The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury,
op.
cit.,
pp. 91-92.
508
Hendley
we can
Trivium,
an intuitive understanding
attain
help,
Such
into the real nature of things.
(intellectus)
it
or meditative insight
must be learned.
speaking and writing correctly in order to gain comprehensibility in the use of words. We must also learn for
in
disserendi)
(ratio
reasoning"
distinguish the true from the false and what 26
impossible.
Finally,
we must
is
order
science of
be
to
able
disprove
proposed It
in
is
that
learn the art of disputation
either
is
doubtful,
to
necessary from what
or
or
denied,
something 27 one way or another by alleging reasons." precisely because John does not think we
can
underlying principles and causes of things with our natural
is
whereby we
can persuade others of the likelihood of our assertions and seek to or
and
clarity
"the
argumentative
s
language does not come We must master
facility in
naturally, as the Cornificians contend;
rules
God
eventually get beyond fallible opinions and, with
"prove
[simply]
the
grasp
abilities that
he advocates the study of the Trivium. His defense of the verbal arts does not stem from a so-called Christian humanism which values the study of the classics for like
Hutchins who
of
reality
its
own
sake; nor
is
it
the outlook of
someone
patterns the content of education on the rational order
disclosed
to
us
through
It
metaphysics.
rather
is
the
theory sceptic whose scepticism is tempered by an abiding faith in language as the means to overcome the limits of our knowledge and draw closer to the truth. This can be seen in the of
educational
a
he poses for the Cornificians: "Can the secret and hidden recesses [cuniculos] of nature be charted by one who is utterly ignorant questions
of
all
philosophy?
Can
they be understood by one
to speak correctly, nor to
Almost
as
comprehend what
surprising
as
theory with that of Hutchins
his
is
is
attempt
McGarry
s
who knows
written or to
neither
how
28 spoken?"
link
John
disavowal of
s
educational
"Pragmatism"
as
an alternative description of what John is up to. Various scholars have commented on the pragmatic turn to John s thought. According to Peter
Von Moos, fancies
and
for
effective ideas.
26
example, John had
abstract conceptions 29
It
Ibid., p. IS.
Ibid.,p.80.
29
Ibid., p. 18-19.
Peter
Von Moos,
op.
an aversion to felt
purely
theoretical
that the only valid ideas
were
has also been noted by Michael Wilks that the lack
27 28
and
cit.,
p. 209.
509
John of Salisbury s Educational Theory
outcome of ideas was seen by John as the source of bad government as well as bad philosophy. The verbal jugglers of concern for the practical
Metalogicon are the philosophical counterparts of the nonsense minstrels and prince-pleasers he attacks in the Policraticus:
he
criticizes in the
"the
of the
universalists
This
curialium."^
the
is
he espouses a naive
that sort
the
promoted by in its
same nonsense
of the
the nugae
courtiers,
not to suggest that John was anti-intellectual, nor
is
"learning
by
Cornificians.
doing"
I
approach to education of the
think
his
overall
viewpoint
is
and that
scepticism, and
combination of
faith, fallibility, pragmatic bears strong similarities to the thought of the founder of American
it
pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914).
John and Peirce
Much
has been written about Peirce
s interest in
Duns
Scotus.
31
It
should
be noted that he read and appreciated other Medieval philosophers, of Salisbury whom he called elegant writer and
also
among them John accurate
"the
32
Peirce
thinker."
specifically
refers to the Metalogicon
men
fitting since both
approaches to the
intellect
alone",
number of
While John admits
because
35
a
s
works
times.
34
and he
This seems
share a healthy scepticism which rejects infallible
truth.
attain necessary truth
the
owned and read John
we
that in
deal only with
mathematics we can
"concepts
he would agree with Peirce that
perceptible by in
regard
to
Michael Wilks, "John of Salisbury and the Tyranny of Nonsense," in The World of John of Salisbury, op. tit., p. 276. For a good sample of John s impatience with verbal jugglers cf. his remarks in the Policraticus, VII, 12, trans, by Joseph B. Pike as Frivolities of Courtiers and Footprints of Philosophers (Minneapolis: University of Baldwin archdeacon of Totnes," Minnesota Press, 1938), p. 261, and his Letter 238, in The Letters of John of Salisbury, Volume Two, op. cit., pp. 450-451. "To
21
for example, John F. Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism: A Cf., Study of Peirce s Relation to Duns Scotus (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963). 32 Charles S. Peirce, "Letters to Lady Welby," in Philip P. Wiener (ed.), Values in a Universe of Chance (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), p. 403.
33
Peirce owned a copy of John s Metalogicon (Paris, 1610) and Opera (Oxford, 1848), according to Max Fisch (personal correspondence, March 6, 1967).
and
Omnia
Weiss (eds.), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Harvard University Press, second printing, 1960), 1.560. Specific references to the Metalogicon can be found in 2.317, n.l, 2.364, 2.391, n.3, 2.434, and 8.378. Charles
Peirce
Hartshorne
(Cambridge,
Paul
Massachusetts:
The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury,
op.
cit.,
p. 250.
510
Hendley
knowledge is never absolute but always swims 36 continuum of uncertainty and indeterminacy."
sensible reality
Peirce sees the
of
fallibility
human
in a
...
"our
opinion leading to an irritation
of doubt which acts as a stimulus to inquiry, the sole object of which
settlement
the
and
of
the
fixation
of
belief.
37
This
will
is
be
opinion achieved in the long run by the efforts of a community of inquirers using common methods of investigation. Such methods should have a public and
and be directed
self-corrective character
to a
38
common
Although he would substitute an empirical, experimental method for John s more linguistic approach to finding the truth, Peirce would support John s belief that
common methods
through
reach the truth. According to Peirce,
of investigation "all
goal.
we can
ultimately
the followers of science are
animated by a cheerful hope that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to each question to 39 This "cheerful hope" of science is an abiding which they apply that we can eventually ascertain by reasoning how things really and it."
faith
truly
are.
In
much
grammar,
the
rhetoric,
same way, John argues and
logic will
that
mastery of the arts of
enable us to rise above the limitations
of the senses and reach an intuitive understanding of the exact nature of
By taking advantage of the stature of the classical authors whose we read and study, we can see more and farther than our predecessors. By learning how to communicate effectively and argue cogently, we can also, in Peirce s sense of community inquiry, stand on things.
works
one another in
Peirce
s
s
shoulder. This similarity of outlook
description
investigators
of the
and
cooperate
of the
procedure "stand
one
upon
is
brought out strikingly
natural sciences
another
communicating observations, examining hypotheses, and against
experience.
The
subject to further testing.
final
results
only
shoulders"
in
testing predictions
provisionally
accepted,
40
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, op.
37
are
s
where
cit.
,
1.171.
Ibid., 5.375.
A
good treatment of Peirce s view of community inquiry can be found in John The Spirit of American Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), and in his article, "Community and Reality," in Richard J. Bernstein (ed.), Perspectives on Peirce (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 92-119. E. Smith,
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, op.
40
Ibid., 5.413.
cit.,
5.407.
John of Salisbury
s
Educational Theory
511
Such an open-minded approach to the pursuit of truth seems much more in line with John s thought than do the dogmatic pronouncements of 41 Hutchins. McGarry directs By mis-labelling John s position as "Idealist",
most interesting features: the recognition of of human knowledge and the concomitant distrust of claims
our attention away from the
fallibility
its
to certainty, the distaste for intellectual exercises that lead
the
properly trained in
hidden
nowhere, plus powers of reason and the capacity of men, the arts of language, to help one another toward the
in
faith
ongoing
the
truth
we
all
in
the
sense
pragmatic
seek.
This
that
it
is
a
claims
view
would
I
do count
ideas
that
characterize
and
as
that
community inquiry can be an effective means to the truth. It forms the core of an educational theory that still has something to say to us today, faced as we are by challenges to liberal education from contemporary
who
Cornificians truth,
disdain study of the past, seek quick shortcuts to the
and see education as a means of
satisfying
immediate vocational
wants rather than meeting long-range needs. John serves to remind us that we must not neglect our cultural heritage for we have much to learn
from the
"giants"
need some
who
tried to
make
sense out of
life
We
before us.
also
expression and logical thinking, so that we can share and compare our ideas and talk with rather than at or about one another. Above all, we should maintain a sceptical attitude towards discipline in verbal
matters doubtful to a wise man. These are the elements in John
s
defense
of the liberal arts that are worth recalling today.
University of Waterloo
One Hutchins
could
draw
similar
made by another
"Rationality
in
Education,"
parallels
between
John
s
views
leading American pragmatist, John Social Frontier, 3 (December, 1936),
Hutchins Proposals to Remake Higher Education," Ibid. and The Higher Learning in America," Ibid. (March,
and
the
Dewey. pp.
criticisms Cf.
71-73;
Dewey
of s,
"President
1937), pp. 103-104; 1937), pp. 167-169. Also of education to ultimate first principles
interest is Dewey s objection to subordinating derived from Aristotle and St. Thomas; cf. Experience Books, 1963 [1938]).
(January,
and Education (London:
Collier
CHRISTOPH KANN
Zur Suppositionsthcoric Alberts von Sachscn
Die Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachscn wird zumeist vordergriindig als
ockhamistisch angcschen und
1st
in
ihrcr
eigenstandigen Bedcutung
umstrittcn. Wcnnglcich Alberts Eintcilung der Supposition mit derjenigen seines Vorgangers William of Ockham ubercinstimmt, so sind doch bei der
einzelner
Behandlung einfacher,
und
personalcr
am
insbesondere
von
Bcispicl
welche
deutlich,
Supposition
Abweichungen
grundlcgcnde Unterscheidung von materialer Supposition betrcffen. Dies wird
welche bereits die
festzustcllen,
wesentliche
Suppositionsartcn
in
erstc,
Alberts ihren
der
Behandlung
iiber
Differenzierungen
materialcn
Ockhams
Modell hinausgeht. Die vorliegende Untersuchung zu Alberts Suppositions sich dahcr auf cine Analyse seiner Behandlung der
theorie bcschrankt
materialen Supposition und
stellt
cinen Bc/.ug zur heutigen Unterscheidung
von Gcbrauch und Erwahnung eines Sprachzeichens her. Albert
materiale
definiert
Supposition
als
eines
Verwendung
"die
Terminus, der fur sich selbst (pro sc) oder eincn ihm entsprcchenden (sibi verwendet wird, welcher simili) odcr nicht cntsprechenden (sibi dissimiii)
modo) oder anders
auf dieselbe Weise (eodcm
welchcm
nicht /ur
cr
(alitcr)
supponiert, und
Be/eichnung beigelcgt ist, und der das, wofiir er r Wcise bezeichnet" (PL 1 ll ).
supponiert, nicht in eigentlicher natiirlicher
,
Alberts Analyse der materialen Supposition geht bereits in der Definition iiber
Ockhams Bestimmung "wenn
vorliegt,
ein
dann
hinaus, nach der materiale Supposition
Terminus
nicht
sondern
signifikativ,
fur
ein
2
gesprochenes oder geschriebenes Wort supponiert" (SL 1,64). Die letzten beiden Teilbestimmungen der Definition Alberts, nach ,
welchen ein material supponierender Terminus seinem Suppositum nicht signifikativ
beigelegt
bezeichnet,
kommen
Albertus (y.itiert in
2
Saxonia,
und
es
nicht
in
eigentlicher
natiirlicher
Weise
material supponierenden Termini generell zu. Die
Perutilis
Logica,
Vencdig
1522,
repr.
Hildesheim
1974;
eigcner Ubersetzung).
William
Hamburg
de
ist
of
1984.
Ockham,
Summe
der
Logik
Uber
die
Termini,
ed.
P.
Kunze,
Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen iibrigen
Teilbestimmungen lassen sich wie
513
disjunktiv
folgt
gegeniiber-
stellen:
acceptio termini
pro se
pro aliquo I
sibi simili
sibi dissimili
I
eodem modo
supponente
(1)
supponente
(2)
Als
Terminus
eodem modo
aliter
supponente
Beispiel
aliter
supponente
(3)
materialer
Supposition
fur sich selbst nennt Albert die
als
(4)
der
Aussage
Verwendung
"Homo
est
eines
disyllabum".
Den Teilbestimmungen der materialen Supposition als Verwendung eines Terminus fur einen anderen Terminus lassen sich Alberts Beispiele wie folgt in einer Kreuzklassifikation
zuordnen:
pro aliquo
pro aliquo
sibi simili
sibi dissimili
(1)
(3)
Sortes:"Homo est
disyllabum. (supp. materialis)
eodem modo supponente
Plato:
"Homo
est
terminus
prolatus a Sorte." (supp. materialis) (2)
(4)
Sortes:
"Homo
est
animal."
(supp. personalis) Plato: aliter
"Homo
est
terminus
prolatus a Sorte." (supp. materialis)
Homo est animal, (supp. personalis)
Animal praedicatur de homme.
(supp. materialis)
supponente
Amo deum. (supp. personalis)
Amo est verbum. (supp. materialis)
Sortes currit. (supp. personalis)
Sortem currere verum.
est
(supp. materialis)
Kann
514
(1)
Angenommen,
"Homo
Sokratcs sagt
terminus prolatus a
est
"Homo
Sorte",
den ihm entsprechendcn Terminus Weise, namlich material. (2) est
Angenommen,
Sokrates sagt
terminus prolatus a
der
mil
Plato
est
und supponiert
"Homo
"homo"
den
fur
anderer Weise,
in
personal supponiert.
is
"Men
a
3
noun
schlagt als Beispiel vor:
the
in
plural"
bezieht sich
Aussage "Man is uttered in the plural", so fiir den von ihm verschiedenen Terminus
der
steht
und
"men"
namlich material. Auf die Problematik
derselben Weise,
in
fur
derselben
sagt
"man"
supponiert
sagt
"homo"
in
und Plato
animal"
kein Beispiel. Boehner
auf die Aussage
Angenommen, Terminus
hierfiir
und supponiert
so steht der Terminus
"homo"
"homo"
(3) Albert gibt
und Plato
disyllabum",
so steht der Terminus
"homo"
"Homo
Sorte",
ihm entsprechenden Terminus namlich material, wahrend
est
dieses Beispielcs wird im folgenden noch eingegangen. (4)
auf die Aussage
Angenommen,
"Homo
est
wird durch die
animal"
Aussage "Animal praedicatur de hominc" Be/.ug genommen, so Terminus "homine" fur den von ihm verschiedenen Terminus supponiert in anderer Weise, namlich material, wahrend
steht der
und
"homo"
"homo"
personal
supponiert.
Ockhams demgegeniiber
Differenzicrung lediglich
die
matcrialen
der
Unterscheidung
Supposition
vor,
daB
ein
sieht
material
ihm selbst supponierender Terminus fiir sich selbst oder fiir eincn von verschiedenen Terminus steht (SL 1,67). Eine Entsprechung zu Alberts Fallen (1) und (2) weist Ockhams Modell nicht auf. Die Teilbestimmung, nach der ein material supponierender Terminus seinem Suppositum nicht signifikativ beigelegt ist, erlautert Albert anhand Die Aussage "Vox est monosyllaba" legt eines Beispiel wie folgt (PL 11 ): zunachst die Auffassung nahe, daB hier ein Fall mctasprachlicher Bezugnahme und damit materiale Supposition vorliege. Indessen handelt es sich
nach Albert
um
personale Supposition, da
"vox"
selbst
sich
signifikativ
Entsprechend argumentiert er in Bezug auf den vierten beigelegt ra von hypothetischen Zweifel (PL 12 ) hinsichtlich der Supposition auch hier einerseits innerhalb der Aussage "Vox est sonus". Zwar scheint sei.
"vox"
der Terminus
"vox"
material zu supponieren, da er
andererseits aber personal, da er (sich
selbst)
fiir
signifikativ beigelegt
Albert spricht in der Widerlegung dcs Zweifels (PL 12 3
Ph.
Boehner,
(1958), S. 240-289.
"A
Medieval
Theory
of
Supposition",
sich selbst steht,
in:
va )
ist.
dem Terminus
Franciscan
Studies
18
Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen personale Supposition zu, was so zu erklaren
"vox"
ist:
515
Fur sich
selbst
zu
zwar eine mogliche, jedoch weder eine notwendige noch eine hinreichende Bedingung fiir materiale Supposition. Das Stehen eines stehen
ist
Terminus
fiir
Umgekehrt
sich selbst impliziert also nicht seine materiale Supposition.
impliziert jedoch die signifikative
Verwendung
seine personale Supposition, da signifikative
eines
Terminus
bei materialer
Verwendung und einfacher Supposition per defmitionem ausgeschlossen ist. Hieraus wird klar, daB in der Aussage "Vox est monosyllaba" das Subjekt fiir sich und personal, in der Aussage "Homo selbst und material supponiert. Wahrend
selbst
sich fiir
in
est
disyllabum"
dagegen
der ersten Aussage
in
fiir
"vox"
sein urspriingliches Signifikat, d.h. einen Stimmlaut, steht, supponiert
der zweiten Aussage
"homo"
offensichtlich
nicht
fiir
seine urspriing-
Menschen, sondern fiir ein Sprachzeichen. Teilbestimmung, nach der ein material supponierender
lichen Signifikate, d.h.
Die
letzte
Terminus dasjenige, wofiir er supponiert, nicht Weise bezeichnet, betrifft mentale Termini,
in eigentlicher natiirlicher d.h.
nicht
die
Termini,
aufgrund von Beilegung, sondern natiirlicherweise etwas bezeichnen. Einem mentalen Terminus, z.B. "Mensch", kommen zwei mogliche Verweisungsfunktionen
zu:
dasjenige bezeichnen,
Terminus bezeichnet;
er
in
eigentlicher
natiirlicher
Weise
was er vermittels eines konventionell beigelegten dieser Weise bezeichnet der mentale Terminus
in
Menschen und supponiert personal. Andererseits kann allgemeiner natiirlicher Weise dasjenige bezeichnen, was er ohne
"Mensch"
er in
kann
Einerseits
einzelne
Vermittlung eines konventionell beigelegten Terminus bezeichnet; er bezeichnet dann sich selbst bzw. ihm entsprechende Termini und supponiert material, wie z.B. in der mentalen Aussage "Mensch ist ein mentaler Terminus". Der mentale Terminus "Mensch" supponiert also nur
dann
material,
natiirlicher
wenn
Im Rahmen unterscheidet diskrete
er
fiir
dasjenige
was
steht,
er
in
allgemeiner
Weise bezeichnet. einer Aufstellung von
Albert
und eine
hinsichtlich
der
Suppositionsregeln
materialen
(b) determinierte Supposition,
der komplementaren Suppositionsarten
-
was
folgendes
(PL 12
Supposition -
eine
f.)
(a)
unter Einbeziehung
Schema
ergibt:
Kann
516
Bcmcrkenswcrt
daB
ist,
es sich hicrbci
um
cine Untcrscheidung handelt,
die in Alberts urspriinglicher Eintcilung dcr Supposition
bei
Ockham und den
ra (PL ll ) sowie
bekanntcn Autoren dieser Tradition
iibrigen
lediglich
Differenzierung der personalen Supposition vorkommt. Als die ersten beiden Suppositionsregeln (PL 12 ) gibt Albert an, daB das Subjekt einer als
singularen Aussage, z.B.
"Sortcs
currit",
"Isle
homo
currit",
immer
diskret,
Aussage, z.B. "Homo est animal", aber Subjekt determiniert supponiere. Im AnschluB an die zweite Regel merkt Albert ausdriicklich an, daB die genannten Regeln neben der personalen auch die das
indefiniten
einer
materiale
betrcffen.
Supposition
Albert
nennt
Supposition
die
Als
Aussage
materiale
diskrete
fur
Beispiel
est
"Sortes
nomen",
fur
determinierte materiale Supposition die Aussage "Homo est nomen". Die Unterscheidung einer diskreten und einer determinierten materialen 4 Supposition hebt Boehner als einen besonders interessanten Aspekt in der in der Suppositionseintcilung Alberts hervor und merkt hierzu an, daB
Penttilis
Logica dieses
Aussagen
in
disyllabum",
keine
Stelle
Typs der
zu
fmden
thematisiert
der
also
sei,
wlirden,
an
der
etwa
Subjcktterminus
auch
"Omne
(c)
universelle
homo
est
konfus-distributiv
supponierte. Boehner venveist auf cine anonyme Handschrift des friihen 15. Jahrhunderts in der Wiener Dominikanerbibliothek, in der eben diese
Aussage mit material supponierendem und allquantifiziertem Subjekt vorkommt. Indessen ist hervorzuhebcn, daB der genannte Aussage-Typ durchaus auch bei Albert erwahnt wird. Im Kontext der personalen Supposition
fiihrt
Albert anhand des Beispiels
"Homo
est
disyllabum",
in
genereller Terminus material supponiert, eine allgemeine materiale Supposition ein und nennt im AnschluB an die Frage, wie diese
welchem
ein
Aussage
universalisiert
disyllabum"
(PL
ll
va ).
werden konne, das Beispiel
DaB
das distributive Zeichen
4
Ph. Boehner, Medieval Manchester 1952, S. 103f.
Logic.
An
Outline
of
its
"Omne
"omne"
Development
homo
est
hierbei nicht
from
1250-1400,
Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen
dem grammatischen
Geschlecht von homo,
immer material supponiert
ein
1st
hat,
maskulinum, angeglichen Wort, welches auch
i.e.
wird, begriindet Albert mit folgender Regel:
517
"Jedes
und undeklinierbares
neutrales
Nomen."
Aufgrund dieser Regel liegt den Fallen (3) und
zwischen
ausdriicklich
fur
differenziert,
Beispielsatz angibt.
Denn
die Moglichkeit nahe,
materialen
der
(4)
Fall
nicht
(3)
ein undeklinierbarer
daB Albert, der nicht
Supposition
keinen
zufalligerweise
Terminus kann eben nicht
von seiner urspriinglichen Form abweichen, urn fur einen dann von ihm verschiedenen Terminus material zu supponieren. Hieraus ergabe sich, daB das von Boehner angefiihrte Beispiel fiir Fall (3) inadaquat ware, denn von "Men
is
a
noun
in the
zu
plural"
"Man
is
uttered in the
wird der
plural"
material supponierende Subjekt-Terminus verandert. Ein in Analogic zu Fall
(4)
konstruiertes Beispiel
Nimmt man
auf
die
grammatisch
"Homo
Aussage
unkorrekte
Fall (3) verdeutlicht die Problematik:
fiir
-
est
"Homo
disyllabum"
durch
est
Aussage disyllabum Bezug, so wird dies zwar der Regel gerecht, nach der hier die material
supponierenden komplexen Terminus
gleichbleibt,
Nimmt man
jedoch trifft die Bestimmung aber auf die Aussage "Homo est
"pro
die
est
est
"Homo
sibi
-
verum"
Form
des
disyllabum"
dissimili"
nicht
zu.
durch die Aussage "Hominem esse disyllabum est verum" Bezug, so ergibt sich zwar einerseits eine grammatisch korrekte - Aussage nach dem Muster von Alberts Beispiel
"Sortem
currere est
genannte Regel verstoBen.
verum",
Denn
Terminus "Hominem
"Hominem
"hominem"
zwei-, sondern
"homo"
esse disyllabum est
abgewandelt
esse disyllabum est
"Homo
est
disyllabum"
darf nach ihr nicht zu verum"
werden.
verum"
aber wird gegen die
andererseits
der in der Aussage
material supponierende Terminus
der Aussage
disyllabum"
falsch,
dem
in
material supponierenden
Zudem denn
ist
die
"hominem"
Aussage ist
nicht
dreisilbig.
Die Unterscheidung von materialer und personaler Supposition wird ha ufig mit der heutigen Unterscheidung von Gebrauch und Erwahnung bzw. use und mention eines Sprachzeichens in Verbindung gebracht. Die genannte Parallelisierung ist insofern naheliegend, als das grundsatzliche
Motiv der
mittelalterlichen
und
der
modernen Unterscheidung
darin
dem Bezug von Sprachzeichen auf Dinge, d.h. gewohnlichen Signifikate, und dem Bezug von Sprachzeichen auf Sprachzeichen zu differenzieren. Dennoch ist die Gleichsetzung von iibereinstimmt, zwischen ihre
personaler
Supposition
mit
dem Gebrauch
eines
Sprachzeichens
und
Kann
518
materialer
Supposition
dcr
mil
Erwahnung
cines
Sprachzeichens
bei
gcnauer Betrachtung inadaquat.
Mensch ist ein Lebcwesen", so man die Aussage liber eincn Menschen zu sprechen. um Wort man das Mensch, gcbraucht Von dem Wort Mensch ist in dieser Aussage nicht die Rede. Spricht man Mensch ist ein Lebewesen", indem man andererseits iiber die Aussage /..B. sagt, daB in ihr das Wort Mensch vorkommt, oder bildet man die Aussage "Mensch ist einsilbig", so gebraucht man das Wort Mensch nicht, Bildet
"Ein
"Ein
sondern erwahnt
es.
Hierzu bemerkt Tarski:
In Verallgemeinerung dicscr Ansicht hatten wir dann hinzunehmen, daB jedes Wort bisweilen als sein eigener Name auftreten kann; in der T erminologie der mittelalterlichen Logik hieBe das, daB das bctreffende Wort in Suppositio materialis verwendet wird und nicht d.h. in seiner gewohnlichen Bedeutung. Die in Suppositio formalis ,
Konsequenz hiervon ware, daB jedes Wort der gewohnlichen oder wissenschaftlichen Sprachc mindestens zwei Bedeutungen hatte, und nian brauchte Beispiele fiir Situationen nicht von weither zu holen, in denen ernste Zweifel auftriiten, welche Bedeutung gerade gemeint Mit dieser Konsequenz wollen wir uns nicht abfinden und es ist. lieber zur Regel macnen, daB jeder Ausdruck (wenigstens in dcr SchriftspracheJ von seinem Namen unterschieden werde. Damit entsteht das Problem, wie man allgemein Namen von Wortern und Ausdriicken bilden soil. Hierfiir gibt es mehrere Moglichkciten. Die einfachste von ihnen besteht in der Vcrabredung, den Namen eines Ausdrucks dadurch zu gewinnen, daB man den Ausdruck in
Anfiihrungszeichen
Wesentlich hierbei
ist
setzt.
nun, daB Mensch ein genereller Terminus,
"Mensch"
aufgrund der Anfiihrungszeichen als sogenannten namendagegen bildcndem Funktor - ein singuliirer Terminus ist, den wir gebrauchen, um
den urspriinglichen Ausdruck ohne Anfiihrungszeichen zu reden, bzw. ihn zu erwahnen. Nach der Konvcntion der Anfiihrungszeichen steht also iiber
der Ausdruck
"Mensch"
(mil Anfiihrungszeichen) nicmals
fiir
den Ausdruck
"Mensch" (mit Anfiihrungszeichen), sondern immer nur fiir den Ausdruck Mensch (ohne Anfiihrungszeichen). Ein mit Anfiihrungszeichen gekennzeichneter Terminus steht also als solcher niemals fiir sich selbst.
Infolge der Gleichsetzung mit der
Erwahnung
eines Sprachzeichens
werden haufig Beispiele fiir material supponierende Termini in Texteditionen und Schriften zur mittelalterlichen Logik durch Anfiihrungs zeichen gekennzeichnet. Dies
ist
zunachst schon deshalb inadaquat, weil
materiale Supposition die Moglichkcit der
A.
Tarski,
"Suppositio
Einfuhnmg
formalis"
ist
in
die
Verwendung
mathcmatisclie
nach verschiedencn Autoren
zu personaler und einfacher Supposition.
Logik, (u.a.
W.
eines Terminus
Gottingen
1966,
S.
fiir
71;
of Sherwood) Oberbegriff
Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen sich
selbst
(pro
wie
was,
vorsieht,
se)
Rahmen Zudcm legt
im
erwahnt,
Vcrwendung von Anfiihrungszeichen ausgeschlossen
519
1st.
der die
Definition sowohl der personalen als auch der materialen Supposition als einer bestimmten
Terminus nahe,
(acceptio seu usus) eines
Verwendung
daB die Erwahnung von Sprachzeichen im heutigen Sinne innerhalb der Suppositionstheorie eher als eine besondere Weise ihres Gebrauchs aufgefaBt wird. Fur die Suppositionstheorie
ist
daB
wesentlich,
metasprachliche Bezugnahme gerade ohne die Bildung von Sprachzeichen ermoglicht und sich hiermit sogar wechselseitig
eine
sie
Namen
fur
ausschlieBt.
Die Unterscheidung
in
personale und materiale Supposition miiBte ihren
wenn
in
der Aussage
Sinn verlieren,
materiale Supposition der Terminus wiirde,
denn
Terminus
"Mensch
Mensch
ist
in
als Beispiel fiir
einsilbig"
Anfiihrungszeichen gesetzt
(mit Anfiihrungszeichen) supponiert als singularer
"Mensch"
und personal. Die Teilbestimmung Alberts, nach der ein material supponierender Terminus fiir einen ihm nicht entsprechenden Terminus stehen kann, signifikativ, d.h. diskret
schlieBt zusatzlich eine Parallelisierung mit der
zeichens aus, da nach Alberts wie auch nach
wie
eine A.c.I.-Konstruktion
currere est
"Sortem
supponieren
kann. in
Subjektterminus
verum"
dem oben genannten
material
der
In
in
Erwahnung eines SprachOckhams Auffassung z.B.
"Sortem
currere
est
Anfiihrungszeichen zu setzen, ware
Konvention sicherlich
falsch.
Zudem
ist,
der Weise, wie
wie
z.B.:
Sokrates
ist
sie
Subjektstelle
determiniert
Pradikat
6
hinweist,
Bezugnahme
durch die Iterierung von Anfiihrungszeichen moglich benennt Sokrates Sokrates benennt Sokrates. .
Grieche."
AbschlieBend an
den
nach moderner
ermoglicht, worauf King
""Sokrates"
ein
(4)
verum"
die materiale Supposition keine mehrstufige metasprachliche in
fiir
Verbform
eine Aussage mit finiter
fiir
Aussage
Beispiel
sei
einer
wird.
angemerkt, daB die Suppositionsart eines Terminus Aussage durch das auf ihn bezogene Pradikat
Z.B. wird
"Lebewesen"
der
Subjektterminus
"Mensch"
auf personale, durch das Pradikat
durch das
"einsilbig"
aber
auf materiale Supposition festgelegt. Die jeweilige Suppositionsart eines
Terminus Relation.
ist
also
Satzzusammenhang
Ausdruck
zugleich
Ein Ausdruck
in
isoliert
P.
King,
Jean
Buridan
s
Consequences, Dordrecht 1985,
Logic S. 40.
bestimmten
syntaktischen
Anfiihrungszeichen jedoch kann aus seinem werden und ist insofern von einer syntak
tischen Relation unabhangig.
1
einer
Diejenige Eigenschaft eines Terminus, die
-
The
Treatise
on
Supposition
/
The
Treatise
on
Kann
520
ist nach Auffassung der mittelaltcrlichen Scmantik kontextunabhangig 1st, der seine Signifikation. Bereits William of Sherwood erklart beziiglich
Unterscheidung von
Supposition
und
Signifikation:
beziehen sich allein auf eine AuBerung
"Manche
oder ein Wort,
Pradikate
manche auf
ein
Dies andert jedoch nicht die Signifikation. Denn so wie ein Wort ein Wort ist, bevor es in einen Satz eingeordnet wird, so hat es zu auch vorher eine Signifikation, und nicht aufgrund einer Zuordnung
Signifikat.
7
Da
anderem."
ein
ohne
Ausdrucks
Anfuhrungszeichen als Anfuhrungszeichen nicht im Sinne
Ausdruck
in
Name
desselben
eines
material
bedeutet das Setzen von
supponierenden Terminus kontextabhangig ist, Anfuhrungszeichen offenbar einen Unterschied
nicht
der
Supposition,
sondern der Signifikation.
Dusseldorf
7
William
of
zungsberichte
Sherwood,
(1937); (zitiert in
Introductions
Bayerischen Akademie eigener Ubersetzung).
der
in: in Logicam, ed. M. Grabmann, der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Abteilung
Sit1
GERHARD KRIEGER
*>Homo<
supponit simpliciter pro
natura"
Der Zusammenhang von Logik und Mctaphysik im spatmittelalterlichen Scotismus (Petrus Tartaretus)
Das
zwolfte Jahrhundert diskutiert im sogenannten Universalienstreit die
dem Zusammenhang
Frage nach
zwischen der logischen Eigenart des
und seiner Eignung, die zu begreifende Sache im Erkennen zu reprasentieren. Indem dieser Zusammenhang mil Blick auf jene BegriffBegriffs
thematisiert wird, die das Seiende in seinen allgemein-maBgeb-
lichkeit
lichen Strukturen erfaBt, erfahrt die Universaliendiskussion eine
Offnung
hin zur Kennzeichnung des Verhaltnisses von Logik und Metaphysik. Dies geschieht im Mittelalter infolge der Rezeption der arabischen Philosophic in
vollem
Umfang
Thomas von Aquin. 1
erstmals bei
Die im Folgenden dargestellte Bestimmung dieses Verhaltnisses
ist
maBgeblich gepragt durch das Scotische Verstandnis der distinctio formalis einer natura communis a parte rei und der damit verbundenen Gestalt der In
Metaphysik.
inquantum ens)
ihrer
Betrachtung
erfaBt
sie
jenen
des
"Seienden
schlechthin
als
Seienden"
einfachen Begriff,
der
(ens als
grundlegendes Moment seinerseits zu dieser Notwendigkeitsstruktur gehort, die das Faktisch-Wirkliche fundiert. SchlieBlich sei hier vorauswie
immer
es
um
die
ontologische Qualifizierung der intramentalen Realitat allgemeiner Entitaten durch Ockham stehen mag, 2
geschickt,
Vgl. begriffe
2
daB,
dazu und zum Folgenden W. Kluxen, "Bedeutung und Funktion der Allgemeinim thomistischen und scotistischen Denken", in De doctrina Joannis Duns Scoti
(Rom
229-240;
1968),
J.
Owens,
"Common
Thomistic and Scotistic
metaphysics",
Art.
in:
in:
A
nature.
Med. Stud.
19
point of comparison between
1-14; L. Honnefelder, Bd. VI, Sp. 494-504; zum Verstandnis der Universalien in der arabischen Philosophic G. Verbeke, "Introduction in: S. Van Riet doctrinale", (Ed.), Avicgnnq latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, Louvain Leiden "Natura
communis",
1980, bes. 2 -19
Fur
HWP
(1957),
.
Entwicklung in Ockhams Denken von der sogenannten Fictum- zur oder Intellectio-Theorie hat sich zuerst P. The realistic Boehner, conceptualism of William of Ockham", ausgesprochen, in: Collected articles on Ockham, ed. by E.M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure N.Y. 1958, 156-174. Darin ist ihm die weitere etwa V. Ockhams Entwicklung in der Forschung gefolgt, Richter, vgl. eine
Qualitas-
"Zu
Universalienfrage",
in:
Phil.
Jahrb.
82
(1975),
177-187.
Zu Ockhams Bestimmung
des
522
Kriegcr
aus seiner Kritik folgende Frage sich ergibt: Wie kann die begriffliche Vergcgenwartigung der Struktur und Einheit der Realitat im Erkennen die
iibcr
logisch-semantische
Funktionsbeschreibung
hinaus
fundicrt
von
wclchem
werdcn? im
werde
Ich
weiteren
niiher
erstens
beleuchten,
Ansatzpunkt aus das Vcrhaltnis von Logik und Metaphysik im spatmittelalterlichen Scotismus bestimmbar und wie hicr der ontologische Status der "allgemeinen Natur" charakterisiert und begriindet wird. Zweitens
gehc ich auf die Konsequen/ dieser Fundierung Metaphysik
Der
im
fur die
Begriindung der
ein.
des
Paris
ausgehenden
Jahrhunderts
15.
Philosoph und Scotist Petrus Tartaretus Status
ontologischen
allgemeiner
3
set/.t
Entitatcn
4
lehrende
Theologe,
der Kcnn/eichnung des
in
an
der
Stelle
an
an,
der
Ockham das Allgemeine von seiner Zeichen- und Pradikatfunktion her Ockhamsche die Tartaretus charakterisiert. greift Infolgedcssen Unterschcidung simplex auf.
5
/wischen
der
Tartaretus folgt
suppositio
Ockham
personalis
und der
siippositio
darin, mit Hilfe dieser
/.umichst
von I,ogik und Metaphysik vgl. J.P. Bcckmann, die Frage nach der Moglichkcit von Metaphysik bei Franz. Stud. 59 (1977), 1-14.
Vcrhaltnisses
"Das
Schcma und
Wilhclm von
in:
Ober iiber
sein
Lcbcn und Wcrk informicrcn:
Fran/.iskanerlehrer
des
15.
li.
Jahrhunderts",
Wegcrich, in:
Subjckt/PradikatOckham",
"Bio-bibliographische
Noti/.en
29
150-197;
Franz.
Stud.
(1942),
ferner C. Lohr, "Medieval latin Aristotle commentaries, Petrus Tartaretus", in: Traditio 28 (1972), 372-376. Den weiteren Ausfuhrungcn liegen folgende Ausgaben seiner Werke et Quodlibcta Scoti, Venedig 1583; zugrunde: Commentaria quattuor libros Sentcntianim In unwersam philosophiam opera omnia, Venedig 1621. Ich danke der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek fur die freundliche Bercitstcllung dieser Tcxte.
4
des ontologischen Status theologisch bestimmte Ort dieser Kenn/.cichnung des Engels, aus der sich die Frage Natur nach der ist die Frage Entitaten allgemeiner nach dem Individuationsprin/ip ergibt: In lib. sent. II, d. 3, q. 1, Fol. 126b: Ecce ostensum est, ubi angeli fucrunt etc. ... Primo tamen tractat de distinctione personali
Der
angclorum. diversa
Secundo
dicunt
de
loco
de
distinguuntur et qualiter de omni 5
et cognitionibus illorum; et quia diversi videre idco oportet quomodo ipsorum, personali substantia quae est principium distinctionis.
operationibus
distinctione
"Ockham s theory of supposition Suppositionstheorie vgl. P. Bochncr, in: Collected articles a.a.O. of truth", (Anm. 2), 232-267; J.P. G. Lcibold, "Zu Interpretationsfragen der Schema"; Beckmann, "Das Subjekt/Pradikat Universalienlehre Ockhams", in: W. Kluxen u.a. (Hg.), Sprache und Erkenntnis im Akten des VI. International Kongresses fur mittelalterliche Philosophic Mittclalter.
Zu Ockhams
and
the
notion
Logik und Metaphysik im Scotismus
523
Unterschcidung iiber die Richtigkcit dcr Scotischen These von der fehlenden Singularitat und Individuality der natura communis entscheiden zu wollen. in
"homo"
Beide stimmen "personaler
iiberein, daB,
Denn
haec").
ist
sich aus
"einfacher
diese"
Supposition"
Denn dann
falsch.
Aussage hingegen
die
Termini
"natura"
und
("natura
hominis
de
est
Verwendung supponieren beide Termini fur ein
bei dieser
und diesselbe Sache. In
von
werden
gebraucht, es durchaus heiBen kann:
Supposition"
Natur des Menschen
"Die
se
6
verwandt,
eine solche
ist
Natur fur einen von der
steht die
hervorgebrachten mentalen Begriff und nicht fur eine singulare, extramentale Sache. Trotzdem glaubt Tartaretus, an der Scotischen
Seele
Auffassung von der natura communis festhalten zu konnen. Denn, so
fiihrt
er begriindend aus, der Terminus "Mensch" in einfacher Supposition verwandt, steht fur die Natur als solche gemaB dem, was sie an sich
und
selbst
ihrer positiven Indifferenz
in
sua
in
et
homo
ly
("quando
pro natura ipsa secundum se
stat
simpliciter,
ist
supponit
indifferentia").
Darin sieht Tartaretus die Moglichkeit der Vermittlung seiner sich 7 Nachfolge des Scotus begreifenden und der opinio nominalium
in der
.
Indem Tartaretus Ockham
Suppositionsweisen zustimmt, folgt
Allgemeinen
als
der genannten
in
Zeichen und Pradikat.
die suppositio simplex behauptet, der fur
Natur
die
Pradikation an.
ihm
er
selbst,
Denn
er
setzt
in
Wenn
in dieser
communis
natura
als
der S.I.E.P.M. in Bonn,
ihn
heiBt,
geschieht,
1.
Verwendung Prinzip
einen Terminus in seiner Pradikatfunktion
Pradikabilien naher zu kennzeichnen, wie es in der Aussage species"
Hbd. Berlin
im
New York
Sinne
(Mis.
der
er gleichzeitig mil Blick auf
Terminus stehe
die
Differenzierung
der Charakterisierung des
der
">Homo<
suppositio
Med. 13/1)
der
gema B den simplex
est
zu
1981, 459-464.
OT
Tartaretus bezieht sich auf folgende Ausfiihrungen Ockhams: Ord. I, d. 2, q. 6, 198: ista propositio natura hominis de se est haec est distinguenda ... eo quod natura hominis potest supponere simpliciter vel personaliter, hoc est eo, quod potest stare pro re extra animam vel pro se. Si secundo modo, sic est haec falsa natura lapidis est de se haec quia tune denotatur, quod conceptus mentis, qui est universalis, de se est hie lapis; et hoc est falsum ... Si accipiatur primo modo, sic est haec vera natura hominis de se est hie homo II
,
.
In
inceptor dicit,
sent.
lib.
ut
...
ly
II,
d.
3,
Concede
illam,
natura
lapidis
Fol.
1,
q.
127b:
Respondet
ad
istam
rationem
Venerabilis
natura lapidis supponit personaliter: nego tamen illam supponit simpliciter. Et cum ista solutione solvit omnia etiam diceremus nos, quod homo supponens personaliter est
ut
ly
argumenta Scoti. Hoc modo unum numero. Nam tune supponit pro Sorte, Platone etc. Secundo etiam concede. Nam natura est unus conceptus, quia natura hoc modo supponens, significat simpliciter quendam conceptum mentis fabricatum ab anima. Tamen secundum Scotum, quando ly
homo
supponit simpliciter, stat hie est briga inter nos et ipsos, et
pro natura ipsa secundum se et in sua indifferentia, conceptus est verificabilis de multis.
ille
et
524
Krieger 8
Und indem
gebrauchcn.
Tartarctus
communis zur
natura
die
dafiir
Voraussetzung macht, begrcift er sie als Prinzip dcr Pradikation. Diese pradikative Funktion der allgemcincn Natur fundiert Tartadurch
retus
ihren
Dazu
Status.
ontologischen
auf
er
grcift
jene
Unterscheidung des intramentalen Seins zuriick, die bei Ockham zu einem Wandel in der Auffassung iiber die Natur des Allgemeinen gefiihrt hat. Tartaretus erlautert sie in folgender Weise. subiective
Trager
in
intcllectu}
der
also
hat,
dispositionen und intellectuales,
sccunda
des
Begriff
intelligendi}?
also
intentio,
Im
den
das
Gebilde;
logischc
real sie
Verstandes-
intelligibilis,
ist
zum
Intellekt
die
Wesensgehaltes,
"Objektiv"
Sinne (esse
"subjektiven"
Realitat,
Erkenntnisaktc sclbst (species
die
actus
ctwas
besit/t
habitus
zum anderen aus
resultieren
die
jener
Erkenntnis, bei der sich der Intellekt auf Vorstellungen
vergleichcnden
bezieht, die gleichfalls
Das Resultat
10 "objektiv
einer
sind".
derartigen vergleichenden
Erkenntnis
somit
ist
Kcnnzeichnung allgemeiner Priidikate (universale in den Pradikabilien, bei der ein Terminus in der Weise der actu) gemaB das Allgemeine dabei fur die suppositio simplex gebraucht wird. Da nichts anderes als jene
8
Ockhams Diese Losung des Tartaretus kommt dcr Kritik F. Inciartes an "Die Suppositionsthcorie und die Anfange der Suppositionstheorie nahe, die dicser in: cxtcnsionalcn Semantik" vorgetragcn hat, in: A. /.immcrmann, Antiqui und Modcrni. und FortxhrUtsbewufitsein im spdten Mittelalter, (Mis. Med. 9) Yraditionsbcv;ufitsein Berlin New York 1974, 126-141. Systematisch gcsehen stimmen beide Kritiker Ockhams daB dcr mil dcsscn Auffassung verbundcnen Gefahr eincr rein darin iibcrein, Hilfe
extensionalcn mil werden konne. 9 In.
sent.
lib.
d.
II,
intensionalcn,
"bcdeutungstheoretischen"
131a:
Fol.
1,
q.
subiective
omnes
habitus
intelligibilcs,
3,
modo
Uno
dupiiciter.
eincr
habere esse in esse habcnt
aliquid
scilicet
...
actus intelligendi:
et
intellectuales
omnia
Logik
in
begegnet
intellectu,
intellectu ista
stat
species
habent ipsum
intellectum pro subiecto.
^
A.a.O.
Fol.
Ola:
esse
aliquid
in
sccundo modo, scilicet obiective, est obicctum in sua specie intelligibili, quae non proxima dispositione ad movendum intellectum.
intcllectu
dupiiciter. Uno modo habitualiter movet actualiter intellectum, sed est
sicut
Hoc modo
esse
...
etiam,
species
quod
de
rosa
esse
aliquid
dicitur
in
in
intellectu
in
intellectu
obiective
alicuius,
actualiter,
scilicet
potest
obiective.
Nota
adhuc
intelligendi esse actualiter
esse actualiter ante actum intelligendi. Alio modo Primo in intcllectu obiective et actualiter ante actum intelligendi. post vel natura universalis in actu in determinata potentia, intelligendi dicitur esse species Sed illud dicitur habere esse in intellectu habens esse in intellectu
Uno modo
dupiiciter.
actum
per
obiective
actualiter post
modo secundae intelligendi:
actum
intentiones sunt
speciem.
intelligendi, in
quod
intellectu;
capit
nam non
Auf die eingangs erwahnte derelinquitur ex actu comparative intellectus. nicht braucht habitualiter obiect we esse des eingegangen zu eigens wie sich /.eigen wird, unter der hier leitenden Frage nach dem sie, Status der natura communis mil der Moglichkeit des esse obiective
et
Moglichkeit werden, da ontologicshen
esse per actum intelligendi. Isto sunt nisi quamdiu manet actus
actualiter identisch
ist,
vgl.
dazu weiter unten
Anm.
15.
Logik und Mctaphysik im Scotismus
525
allgemcine Natur selbst steht, stellt sie jene Vorstellung dar, aufgrund deren der Intellekt zu dieser Erkenntnis gelangt. Die Bestimmung der Pradikatfunktion
Terminus
eines
sich
ergibt
indem der
also,
Intellekt
aufgrund eines Vergleichs zwischen verschiedenen "allgemeinen Naturen" etwa der hutnanitas und der animalitas - die Eigenart des Terminus als
"homo"
Artbegriff ein
als
Verwendung bezeichnet.
Diese
erkennt.
das
Pradikat,
Eigenart
konkretes
ein
Einzelseiendes
11
Im Kern
auf diese
trifft
ontologische Kennzeichnung allgemeiner
Entitaten allerdings noch Walter Chattons Kritik an als
Ockhams Fictum
das ein Allgemeines gleichfalls objektive Realitat besitzt.
Kritik
darauf
"lauft
zu
das
all
13
communis
der natura
A.a.O.
als esse obiective in
ut
relatio
quo
ilia
est
fundamentum
Fictum
ein
ist,
Ockham
genus
fundatur.
illius
vel
real
ist,
Fictum
das
die begriffliche
Uno modo modo non dicit nisi
dupliciter.
Sed universale pro fundamento est illud, in fundamento est duplex, quia duplex
universale pro scilicet
relationis,
fiihrt
Universale formaliter primo
species.
Unde
intellectu
quod universale capitur
etiam,
modo pro dcnominato.
rationis,
talis
uberfliissig
dessentwillen
"um
leisten,
Notandum
132a:
Fol.
formaliter. Alio
relationem
es
zu,
Chattons
Anders gewendet: Die Charakterisierung der Realitat
hatte."
eingefiihrt
daB
hinaus,
12
denn der Erkenntnisakt, der im subjektiven Sinne
anzunehmen";
vermag
seine
ermoglicht
fundamentum
proximum
et
fundamentum
remotum. Unde fundamentum est ipsa natura actualiter existens in pluribus, quae natura ut sic non est nata proxime dici vel praedicari de ipsis inferioribus. Sed universale pro fundamento proximo est ipsamet natura, inquantum ipsa actualiter per intellectum ab illis singularibus vel inferioribus, quia ut sic abstracta nata est praedi de pluribus. Tune dicitur universale in actu. Unde ad universale in actu duae conditiones requiruntur. Prima est, quod sit natura actualiter abstracta per intellectum a suis singularibus; et tune ilia natura licet sit una numero, tamen nata est dici de pluribus; et est unum obiectum numero: et tune dicitur esse in potentia proxima ad hoc, quod dicatur in pluribus. Secunda conditio est, quod in ipsa natura sit actualis attributio praedicationis ipsius ad ipsa inferiora. Nam si ilia natura esset abstracta per intellectum et non compararctur ab ipso eodem intellectu ad sua singularia in ratione communioris et praedicabilis de illis, iam non esset universale in actu, sed secundum abstrahitur cari
vel
dici
esse universale in potentia proxima. Primo modo quando scilicet ipsa natura abstrahitur per intellectum a suis singularibus et non comparatur actualiter ad ilia, est de
consideratione
comparatur sequitur,
tamen
et secundo modo quando est abstracta et actualiter metaphysici: tune est de consideratione logici; et dicitur universale in actu. Unde
quod universale
ipsa
naturam,
illo,
natura,
et sic patet,
ut
quod
in dixi;
actu
habet suam
quia
differentia
dabilis est natura
unitatem erat
communis
et
inter
entitatem ab
ipsum
intellectu
universale
et
non
ipsam
realis.
Vgl. zu dieser Kontroverse G. Gal, "Gualteri de Chatton et Guillelmi de Ockham controversia de natura conceptus universalis", in: Franc. Stud. 27 (1967), 191-212. C. Knudsen, Walter Chattons Kritik an Wilhclm von Ockhams Wissenschaftslehre (Diss.) ,
Bonn 13
1976, 37-50.
C. Knudsen, a.a.O. 40.
526
Krieger
zwar
Eigenart
auf
eine
auBerlogische,
abcr
doch
nur
psychologische
Realitat zuriick.
Tartaretus
communis
species
hinaus
dariibcr
daB
verweist,
in
diesem ein
intelligibilis
Begriindung
dcnn auch der Einheit und Realitat der natura
sucht
der
Fundament zu geben, indem er darauf das gegeben 1st, was in der
ein
Vorgcstclltscin esse
subiective
in
und
Eigenart
begrifflichen
intellectu
besitzt.
14
Pradizierbarkeit
Diese des
Allgemeinen macht im Unterschied zu Chattons Auffassung und dariiber hinaus die Intension nicht nur zu einer Seite des Begriffs, sondern zu jenem Fundament, welches seiner Extension, d.h. seiner Verwendung als
Zeichen vorausliegt. Demzufolge wird der Wesensbegriff als Begriff gemaB der Funktion der natura communis, die als notwendige Strukturbestimmtheit des Moglichen das Faktisch-Wirkliche fundiert, zum Inbegriff der Realitat.
Diese Konsequenz zieht Tartaretus in der Charakterisierung des Verhaltnisses von intramcntaler und extramentaler Realitat: Er begrenzt namlich das ens
anima auf
in
die
logischcn
Vorstellungen;
die
extra-
mentale Realitat bildet das, was unter die Kategorien fallt. Infolgedessen sowohl das, was subjektiv im Verstand ist, wie die objektiv
gewinnt
gegebene Verstandesvorstellung die Bedeutung eines ens In dicitur in
sent.
lib.
esse
Fol.
131a:
species vel
intellectu
Intellekt, vgl.
in
natura
intellectu
universalis
per speciem. Vgl. oben
oben Anm.
Anm.
objective
10;
et
actualiter
ante
actum
animam. 15
intelligendi
determinata potentia, habens esse die species ist ihrerseits subjektiv real im
actu
in
extra
in
9.
A.a.O. Fol. 131b: Secundum dictum ... sumitur ex quinto Metaphysicae. Ubi Philosophus distinguens ens in ens in anima et ens extra animam non capit ens in animo pro ente in anima subiective, nee pro ente in anima objective, actualiter vel habitualiter, ante actum intcllectus; sed Philosophus capit ens in anima pro ente habente esse actualiter objective post actum. Pro hoc dcclarando suppono unum, quod scilicet si probovero, quod unitas ilia, quae est minor unitate numerali, sit in re extra animam, quod etiam bene probabitur, quod ilia unitas cst rcalis. Tune declaratur hoc secundum dictum. ... Philosophus ... non capit ens in anima pro scientia vel habitibus intellectualibus, quae subiective tamen omnia habea(n)t esse in intellectu. Nam ibidem dicit,
animam ponitur
in
huiusmodi scientia non sunt entia
in
ens
Et
consequens virtutes, habitus vel Philosophus capit ibidem ens in anima. Nam dicit quomodo ilia ponuntur in genere qualitatis, ut patet, et sic non capit ens in anima subiective. Dixi etiam secundo, quod non capit ens in anima objective, vel actualiter vel habitualiter, ante actum intelligendi. Nam illud, quod habet esse isto modo in aliquo praedicamento. Etiam illud, quod in anima, scilicet objective, dicitur esse habet esse in intellectu objective actualiter ante actum; quia nihil ponitur in praedica mento praeter ista. Et ita dicuntur entia extra animam. Et hoc modo intelligence, quod scilicet ilia, quae ponuntur in praedicamento, non sunt termini, sed etiam entia extra animam. Et ita relinquitur, quod per ens in anima intelligit Philosophus illud, quod habet esse in anima objective, actualiter post actum intelligendi, cuiusmodi sunt secundae intentiones et relationes rationis. Relinquitur etiam, quod per ens extra
quod
extra
genere.
anima,
per
modo quo
Logik and Metaphysik im Scotismus
Die
im
Kennzeichnung eines Terminus
pradikative
527
Unterschied
zum
16 Eigennamen beruht somit auf einer extramentalen Realitat.
Tartaretus setzt also iiber als
der
Prinzip
Ockham hinausgehend
Pradizierbarkeit
ausschlieBlich ein esse in
Terminus
eines
communis Indem er ihr
die natura an.
zuerkennt, verfallt er nicht der Kritik
intellects,
Ockhams, nach der der denkunabhangige Status allgemeiner Entitaten sowohl die Identitat des singularen Gegenstandes 17 wie die Einheit und damit die Aussagbarkeit des Begriffs zerstort. 18 Freilich stellt sich hier die weitere Frage, wie diese MaBgeblichkeit des Begriffs zu vereinbaren ist mit der fur den Theologen Tartaretus durch den Schopfungsgedanken vermittelten
Einsicht
menschlichen
Intellekts.
in
die
Es
und Verganglichkeit auf der Hand, daB Tartaretus allein
Individuality
liegt
des
dem
Erkennen eine derart fundamental Bedeutung zuzusprechen so daB alle strukturellen Bestimmtheiten des Seienden in der vermag, Realitat dieses Denkens ihren Grund fmden: In seiner Antwort auf die gottlichen
19 verweist Tartaretus auf Frage nach der Unverganglichkeit des WiBbaren
animam
intelligit
A.a.O.
ens
illis
133a:
Fol.
duobus primis modis. Dico
nam
quod universale in actu habet fieri per naturam illam abstractam ab omnibus habitudine praedicationis, quae omnia talia debent fieri per
patet,
singularibus intellectum.
cum ilia actuali Secundum dictum.
rebus,
unde
hominem
vel
ideo
primo,
universale
dicit
Intellectus
faciens
illud
universale
in
rebus,
invenit
in
moveatur ad faciendum tale universale. Unde quod intellectus dicat asinum esse universale, hoc ideo est, quia in homine vel asino est aliquid,
unde conveniat intelligitur aliter esset
nunc
illud
intellectum,
istud praedicatum, scilicet universale.
sibi
sub
ratione
ratio
in
universalis,
se
non
dicendo,
falsa,
intelliguntur
homo
est
Unde quando homo vel animal modo illis repugnanti; nam
sub
universale,
animal est universale. Et
repent aliquid in ipsis, ratione cuius potest ilia concipere, isto modo ilia ratio est bona. Nam si intellectus non reperit in homine, quare debeat illi imponere hoc nomen universale vel species plusquam in ipso Sorte, non videretur ratio, quare non posset aeque bene ipsi Sorti attribuere ilia praedicata, scilicet species et universale. Et ideo oportet, quod ex parte rei moveatur. Unde quando homo supponit simpliciter, etiam secundum nominales, supponit pro quodam conceptu communi vel ergo ille conceptus dicit rationem in se falsam, et tune nulla esset disputatio. Si ergo non dicit rationem in se falsa, oportet dicere, quod intellectus non compararet unum ad aliud, attribuendo intellectus
unum
alteri
et
faciendo
illam
praedicationem,
homo
est
aliquo modo moveretur a re ipsa. 17 Ord. I, d. 2, q. 5, II 159. 18
Ord.
I,
d. 2, q. 6,
19
Diese universam
habemus
log.
scientiam,
sit
Fol.
vel
est
genus,
nisi
197.
Tartaretus in seinem Kommentar zu den An. post., In 205rb C: Dubitatur primo, utrum scibile, seu illud, de quo
diskutiert
Frage Arist.
OT OT II
species
aeternum
et
perpetuum
et incorruptible.
528
Krieger
dem
Unzerstorbarkeit
seine
Intellekts.
nach
Sein
als
Inhalt
des
gottlichen
20
Diese
Begriindung der Struktur des Seienden fiihrt zu einem Problem, das sich logisch fassen laBt als
ontologische ihrerseits
allcrdings
zwischen
Widerspruch
der
mittelalterlich
oder,
transkategorialen
gesprochen, der transzendentalen Bedeutung von
und
einerseits
"seiend"
der kategorialen Bestimmtheit des esse subiective in intellectu als Qualitat andererseits; oder anders gewendet:
Welche Konsequenz ergibt sich aus als ens diminutumr*
der Kennzeichnung der Realitat des Denkens selbst
Im Ergebnis, so
zum
ich
zweiten der
Einheit
laBt sich
in
Lehre der
Tartaretus
die
sich
dem MaBe
begriffliche
komme
FaBbarkeit
der
sicher, wie die Erfahrung des unbezweifelbar sein kann. Wie
als
Existierenden
aktuell
kontingenten,
erweist
Punkt,
Realitat
zusammenfassend sagen und damit
intuitiven Erkenntnis zeigt,
ist
allein die
Erfahrung
der Einheit der aktuellen Existenz des Erkennenden selbst von absoluter,
unbczweifelbarer Evidenz. Die Metaphysik griindet demzufolge GewiBheit der Erkenntnis des cxistierendcn Subjckts. d.h.
in
der
II.
Zu diesem die
rung,
fiihrt
Ergebnis
dem
Tartaretus
bezeichnenderweise die Analyse der Erlautefiir den univoken "Beweis"
ersten Scotischcn
F,t si quis quaerat dc scibili remote, scilicet de subiecto vel per subiectum conclusionis, utrum sit generabilc et corruptibile. Respondctur, quod quodlibet tale crcatum secundum proprium esse potest corrumpi et desinere esse: etiam quantum ad esse cognitum, quod habct in intellectu create est corruptibile, cum quilibet intellectus crealus possit desinere illud cognoscere, sed secundum esse
A.a.O. Pol. 205vb EF:
re
significata
cognitum, quod habet
non
intelligere
talia
in
mente divina numquam corrumpetur, impossible
scibilia
Unde per quam
remota.
res
cognita
participative
et
enim
Deum
obiective
habet
est
cognoscitur: sed cognitio Dei est aeterna et quale habet cognitio, ipse Deus, ideo talia scibilia participative dicuntur esse aeterna. tale
esse,
Zur Geschichte und Bedeutung note
on
its
origin
and
meaning",
dieses Begriffs vgl. A. Maurer, "Ens diminutum: a in: Mcd. Stud. 12 (1950), 216-222. Gema B der
esse intellectu" ergibt sich bei Tartaretus im communis Unterschied zur traditionellen Auffassung, daB nicht nur die intentio secunda, sondern auch die intentio prima ein ens diminutum darstellt: In libr. Arist. de anima I Fol. 246 ra-va DE: Ad hoc, quod res cognoscatur, non oportet, quod habeat aliquod verum esse
Fundierung der natura
reale
esse
...
res reponitur in
ab aeterno
fuit
"in
praedicamento secundum eius esse essentiae cognitum, cum tale ideo res ab aeterno fuerunt in praedicamento, saltern
cognitum,
natura ipsius Dei. ... Sequitur, ... quod esse cognitum praecedit non quaerat, an illud esse cognitum sit Deus. Respondetur, quod realiter est Deus, quia non est nisi ens diminutum ... Dicitur ulterius,
secundum cognitionem esse possibile. formaliter nee
quod non
...
Et
si
est intellectio, sed est res cognita,
quae terminat intellectioncm.
Logik und Metaphysik im Scotismus
529
Charakter des Begriffs des "Seienden gibt. Die Scotische Uberlegung besagt, daB dcr menschliche Verstand unter den Bedingungen dieser Welt aufgrund der Unterscheidung zwischen sicher und zweifelhaft GewuBtem erkennen kann, daB "Seiendes" erkannt werden kann, ohne es schon als
bestimmtes -
geschaffenes oder ungeschaffenes, endliches oder unendliches
-
Seiendes
Zum
konnen.
zu
identifizieren
einen
wird
also
in
der
Univozitatsthese die FaBbarkeit der Einheit aller Realitat im Begriff des "Seienden" behauptet. Indem diese Scotische Uberlegung die "Sicherheit" dieses Begriffs mit Hilfe der Unterscheidung von sicher
(certitudo)
GewuBtem
zweifelhaft
zu erweisen sucht, macht
und
begrifflichen Erkenntnis
ihrer Inhalte
zum
sie
und
die Erfahrung der
entscheidenen und, wie die
nahere Analyse der Scotischen Lehre gezeigt hat, auch zum einzigen positiven Argument fur den Aufweis der erkennenden Vergegenwartigung dieser
Weil
Einheit.
Tartaretus
der
infolge
strukturellen Bestimmtheiten des Seienden nur
fundierem
vermag,
Erfahrung und Aufweis fur die
mehr im
die
Intellekt selbst zu
Hinweis auf die begriffliche gerade Inhalte dazu, dariiber hinaus einen besonderen
fiihrt
ihrer
ihn
Ockhams
Kritik
der
dem Erkennen
vorausliegende Fundierung des Begriffs der
Einheit der Realitat zu verlangen.
Und
es erscheint nur folgerichtig,
daB
diesem Ausweis vor das Problem der ontologischen Fundierung des Kontradiktionsprinzips gestellt wird. Denn im Scotischen Konzept bestimmt er in
sich
primare Sinn von
der
Seiendes
ist
das,
dem
"seiend"
ja
mit Hilfe dieses Prinzips,
es nicht widerstreitet zu sein:
"ens
(est hoc,)
d.h.
cui
23 non repugnat Infolgedessen steht Tartaretus in seinem Bemiihen um den Aufweis der vorgangigen Fundiertheit des Begriffs der Einheit der Realitat im Seienden selbst vor der Aufgabe einer dem Erkennen vorausesse."
liegenden Begriindung des Kontradiktionsprinzips. Im Sinne also dieser Stellungnahme geht es Tartaretus in seiner
Erlauterung des genannten Scotischen Beweises darum, die "Sicherheit" des Begriffs des "Seienden" nachzuweisen, indem er ihn als subiectum des Kontradiktionsprinzips 22
Ord.
demzufolge
3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, ed. Vat. Bd. Ill, 18, 21, 26ff.; vgl. dazu und zum Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scoius, Miinster
L.
(BGPhThM NF
16) 1979, bes. 286-294, 339-343.
Ord. IV, d. "modalen
sich
d.
I,
Folgenden Gegenstand
Dieser Begriff erweist
aufzeigt.
q. 2, n. 8, ed. Viv.
1,
Interpretation
Metaphysik",
Intemationalis,
in:
des
Regnum Hominis
Rom
1978, 305ff.
XVI
Seienden"
et
109; vgl.
dazu und zu der damit verbundenen "Die Originalitat der Skotischen
W. Kluxen, Regnum Dei. Acta
Quarti
Congressus
Scotistici
530
Kricger
dadurch
daB auf seiner Grundlage erkennbar
als sicher, 24
oder nicht
Um
ist.
dies
nach/.uweisen,
erklart
GewuBtem
scheidung von sicher und zweifelhaft Unterschiedenes am Leitfaden der
ist,
ist
Unter-
soweit, wie sich derart
Ordnung
logischen
ob etwas
Tartaretus die
Die
ergibt.
Bezweifelbarkeit etwa einer Artbestimmtheit beruht auf der Sicherheit des
um
Wissens
die Gattungsbcstimmtheit. Dieser Leitfaden verliert jedoch
zum
einen seine Bedeutung untcrhalb der Artbestimmungen; die Sicherheit, mil der ein Eigenname gewuBt wird, ohne ihn ebenso sicher von bestimmten Individuen aussagen zu konnen, erlaubt nicht den SchluB auf seine Univozitat.
keine
Vor allem aber
Sicherheit
in
vermittelt der Leitfaden der logischen
auf
bezug
die
Bestimmtheit von
Ordnung
Da
"seiend".
es
dariiber hinaus keine sichere Erkenntnis geben kann, taucht das Problem auf,
ist
wie die Sicherheit dieses Begriffs gewahrlcistet werden kann. Aufgrund der eingeschrankten Realitat der logischen Vorstellungen das Wissen um das "Seiende" im Sinne der Erkenntnis realer
Bestimmtheit jedenfalls nicht hinreichend durch die Sicherheit verbiirgt, die der Leitfaden der logischen Ordnung bietet. Deswegen stellt Tartaretus einen
gemeinsamen
das ens rationis
fur
Begriff
und das ens
Frage, fordert ihn aber zugleich fur Gott und die Kreatur.
In
lib.
Probatur,
sent.
quia
I,
d.
3,
2,
q.
Fol.
primum principium
primum principium
vel
138b:
nulli
subiectum primi
Conceptus
potest
esse
principii.
reale
in
25
entis nulli potcst esse dubium. dubium. Sed conceptus entis est
Ergo conceptus
entis
nulli
potest esse
dubius.
A.a.O. Fol. 139a-b: Contra. Obiicitur contra maiorem.
quod hoc nomen Sortes univocus omnibus illis.
...
Scotus et
disputant
quod est univocum
Si
ipsa esset vera, sequeretur,
conceptus communis ... Item universalibus, isti duo habent conceptum de universal!, utrum sit ens reale vel ens rationis. Tune ens erit
univocum pluribus individuis et Item sequeretur, quod ista vox canis
esset
Occam de
ens, et sunt dubii, enti reali et enti rationis.
erit
esset univocum.
Sed consequcns est absurdum. Ergo etc. Pro solutione istorum supponuntur aliqua. Prima supponitur, quod a pluribus suppositis impossible est aliquem conceptum univocum suppositalcm abstrahi. Patet, quia conceptus Sortes non suppositalis est incommunicabilis, sicut suppositum. Ex quo sequitur, quod potest dicere conceptum communem et univocum isti Sorti et illi Sorti. Patet, quia
nomen suppositale. ... Ad secundam instantiam supponitur, quod proxima qua possunt habere conceptum univocum communem canis latribilis et piscis marini, est substantia, quia licet sint aequivoca in ratione canis, non tamen in ratione substantiae, corporis animati et animalis, immo univocantur in omnibus istis. Modo ad argumentum. Sum certus, quod canis movetur. Distinguo, aut ly canis est vox mere Sortes ratio,
est
in
aequivoca aut ut canis
dicit
non solum
dicit
rationem
in qua ista conveniunt, ut in animali. aliquo conceptu univoco, sed solum in cadit supra animal, non sic de ente, quia
rationem proximam,
Concedo primo modo, quod non conveniunt voce. Sed secundo modo dico, quod certitudo
communem,
in
sed conceptum.
tertiam instantiam supponitur, quia talis conceptus sit conceptus communis enti reali et enti rationis. Quaeritur, utrum est realis, et sic includeretur per se et quiditative in ente rationis, et sic ens rationis, ut secunda intentio, esset ens reale, secluso omni
Ad
Logik und Metaphysik im Scotismus Tartaretus
daB
fest,
531
denn auch zu Beginn seiner eigentlichen im Bereich des conceptus rationis, also allein
stellt
lediglich
der sichere
vom
solutio
der
in
zweifelhaften Begriff verschieden
sei. logischen Ordnung Deswegen verlangt er einen besonderen Ausweis (probare) dafiir, daB Gott und die Kreatur in einem univoken und "wirklichen Begriff (conceptus
iibereinkommen. 26 Dazu geht Tartaretus davon aus, daB das und "Nichtsein" Gott und (esse) als ein Glied der Kontradiktion von der Kreatur unabhangig von aller Vernunfterkenntnis zukommt. Soil jedoch
realis}
"Sein"
"Sein"
der univoke Begriff des
muB
bilden,
er
sich
"Seienden"
als
das subiectum
Grundlage
dieser
dieser Kontradiktion
Erkenntnis
erweisen.
Eine
Erkenntnis der beiden Glieder der Kontradiktion kann es
gleichzeitige
geben, weil ein und dasselbe nicht zugleich sein und nicht sein kann. Folglich bedarf diese Erkenntnis des Seins oder Nichtseins der nicht
der
Voraussetzung
Der univoken subiectum
des
von
Vorstellung
quiditativen Begriffs des
"Etwas
Begriff des
Bestand haben kann.
d.h.
des
erweist sich also deswegen als
"Seienden"
weil
Kontradiktionsprinzips,
Erkenntnis jenes Seins
iiberhaupt",
27 "Seienden".
er
die
Grundlage
der
darstellt, das nicht zugleich mit seinem Gegenteil
"Sein"
und
"Nichtsein"
bilden demzufolge die Glieder
der Kontradiktion, die ein bestimmtes Etwas identifizieren laBt, namlich Existierendes oder Nichtexistierendes. Soil die Realitat dieses Begriffs des
durch
"Seienden"
actu
ein
Gott
und
der
Kreatur
unabhangig
von jeder
ens rationis, tune ens reale esset ens rationis, quia includeret secundum Scotum, quod enti reali et enti rationis ens non conceptum aliquem communem, sed tantum vox est communis, non sic est de ente intellectus.
dicit
Si
esset
Ex quo
ens rationis.
sequitur
respectu Dei et creaturae.
A.a.O. Fol. 139a: Circa hanc rationem sunt aliquae difficultates, sed dantur primo ad earn solutiones. Prima solutio dicit. Concedo maiorem de conceptu rationis, nego de conceptu reali, ideo habes probare, quod Deus et creaturae conveniunt in conceptu aliquo univoco reali.
A.a.O.
139a:
Fol.
Contra.
In
quibuscumque
includitur
realiter
unum extremum
contradictionis, etiam in illis ponitur aliquis conceptus realis et univocus. Sed in Deo et creatura ponitur et includitur realiter unum extremum contradictionis. Igitur etc. Maior
patet
Tune non
Ad contradictionem requiritur non solum unitas nominis, sed simul. Probatur minor, ut esse, quod est unum extremum contradictionis. Vel esse convenit Deo et creaturae per opus intellectus tantum, et sic Deus
Elenchorum.
I.
nominis
et
sic.
erit
rei
ens
cessante
opere intellectus, quod est absurdum, vel secluso opere habeo propositum. Contra. Tua contradictoria veniunt in mentem. Dicit Philosophus, quod opiniones contrariae non possunt venire in mentem, quia extrema contradictionis non possunt venire in mentem, quia impossibile est idem esse et non esse simul. Ex quo concludit, quod esse et non esse sunt contradictoria. Ex quo sequitur, quod conceptus, de quo sum certus, est alius a conceptu, de quo est dubius intellectus,
et
sic
per hoc primum principium.
...
532
Krieger
Vernunftcrkenntnis zukommendes Scin begriindct sein, fragt es sich also, als realen kontingente, aktuell existierende Seiende
welches Begriff
"seiend"
erkennen
"sicher"
Die ErfaBbarkeit der Einheit der Realitat
laBt.
dem MaBe
erweist sich somit in
als sicher, als die
Erkenntnis von aktuell
Existierendem sicher und unbezweifelbar sein kann. Die Beantwortung dieser Frage fiihrt iiber die Betrachtung des Verhaltnisses von Logik und
Metaphysik hinaus zur Lehre von der cognitio intuitiva intellectualis, durch die das aktuell Existierende als solches erfaBt wird. Deswegen kann an dieser Stelle die betreffende Auffassung des Tartaretus nur erwahnt werden, ohne
im einzelnen darzustellen und zu analysieren.
sic
Tartaretus
kausalen
Ockham 28
folgt
des
Bedeutung
in
der
existicrenden
Einschrankung (auBeren)
der
effizient-
dessen
fiir
Objekts
29
Infolgedessen sind die entsprechenden kontingenten
Urteile iiber die
vom
Urteilenden selbst verschiedenen Objekte (aliquod
nur
von
intuitive Erkenntnis.
extrinsecum)
eingeschrankter
Evidenz
conditionatd).
(evidentia
Hingegen von absoluter Evidenz (evidentia absoluta}, also unbezweifelbar sind alle kontingenten Urteile, die den Urteilenden selbst in der Einheit seiner aktuellen Existenz betreffen
(ego sum, ego cognosco, ego v/vo).
SJQ
Grundlegung zu dieser of the
later
S.J. Day, Intuitive Bonaventure N.Y. 1947;
I^ehre
St.
scholastics,
Ens inquantum ens (Anm.
22), 218-267;
non-existents according to William of
29
In
lib.
sent.
I,
d.
3,
q.
4,
Fol.
zu
Ockham
Ockham", in:
cognition,
P.
Deus
the significance
to
Scotus L.
Boehncr,
Collected articles
163b: Quidquid
a key
ferner zu
"The
(Anm.
30
Honnefelder,
notitia intuitiva of 2),
268-300.
potcst mediante causa secunda
obiccto potest causare notitiam potest immediate et se solo potest. Sed Deus mediante intuitivam. Ergo sine obiecto, cum obiectum sit causa notitiae intuitivae effectiva ...
causa effectiva secunda praecise concurrat cum Deo alio modo concurrit obiectum, quia in ratione termini, vel alio modo sic negatur maior. Ad minorem, negatur minor praecise, ratione causae quia non sufficit, quod obiectum concurrat cum Deo praecise in
Respondetur, concede maiorem.
in
ratione
efficientis
ad
notitiam
termini attingitur, quia In aliquid
duplex
et
efficientis
non
Si
alio
intuitivam,
ibi est
modo. Sed
sed
concurrit
ultra
in
ratione
termini,
et
in
ratione
attingentia.
Arist. log. In An. post., Fol. 229vb-230ra II-B: Dubitatur prime, utrum evidenter possit a nobis cognosci. Pro cuius solutione supponitur primo, quod est evidentia primi principii, vel rcducibilis ad earn. Alia est conditionata vel
unwersam
solum de supposito dicitur primo, quod possibile est, nos non etiam de multis aliis veritatibus habere evidentiam absolutam: Dicitur secundo, ... quia aliter sequeretur omnes scientias perire, quod est inconveniens quod possibile est nos de multis veritatibus contingentibus habere evidentiam absolutam;
secundum primo
ut
quid.
principio:
Hoc immo
...
quod ego sum, quod ego cognosco, quod ego vivo
est, licet
nos
aliquod
extrinsecum
evidentia conditionata.
nobis
sensibile
...
evidenter
Dicitur tertio, quod impossibile cognoscere evidentia absoluta:
Logik und Metaphysik im Scotismus
Die
Metaphysik
also
griindet
letztlich
Erkenntnis des existierenden Subjekts.
in
der
533
Unbezweifelbarkeit
der
31
III.
durch Ockhams Kritik bedingte Frage, wie iiber die logischsemantische Funktionsbeschreibung der allgemeinen Begrifflichkeit hinaus die Erkenntnis der Struktur und Einheit der Realitat zu begriinden ist,
Die
sucht
der Pariser Scotist Petrus Tartaretus zu beantworten,
diese
Strukturbestimmtheiten
Freilich
vermag
als
Prinzipien
er ihre strukturelle
zu
subiective
in
intellectu
communis
ihr
eigentliches
der
Infolgedessen
hat
er
ansetzt.
Bedeutung nur mehr durch ein
fundieren.
die
esse
natura
Fundament im unverganglichen Erkenntnisakt
Die Begriindung der allgemeinen Begrifflichkeit vorausliegenden, Gott und die Kreatur umfassenden Realitat Gottes.
fur
indem
Pradikation
den menschlichen Verstand
allein auf
dem Weg
einer
hi ist
ihr
deswegen
iiber die unbezweifel-
bare Erkenntnis des aktuell Existierenden nachweisbar. Infolgedessen ist die Erkenntnis der Einheit der Realitat nur noch begriindbar aufgrund der absolut evidenten Selbsterkenntnis des existierenden Subjekts.
Wie immer man Metaphysik Infolge
der
die
Bedeutung dieses Begriindungsversuchs der
historisch beurteilen
mag, eins scheint mir jedenfalls
Ockhams wird
Kritik
der
denkunabhangige
geleugnet, und
ihr Realitatsgehalt
sicher:
Status
der
bedarf einer
allgemeinen Begrifflichkeit eigenen Begriindung. Diese Begriindung zeigt wiederum, dafi der Gedanke der Allmacht Gottes das theoretische Weltverhaltnis des Menschen nicht allein
32
pragmatisch,
sondern
durchaus
in
einer
absolut
evidenten
Erkenntnis des wirklichen und kontingenten Seienden fundieren lieB. Die im Gedanken der Allmacht Gottes motivierte Kritik Ockhams fiihrt somit
zwar dazu, daB das wirkliche und kontingente Seiende nicht weiterhin aufgrund seiner formal distinkt unterschiedenen washeitlichen Struktur31
Vgl. in der vorangegangenen
Anm.
die explizite
Betonung der evidenten Erkenntnis
des Urteilenden selbst als Grundlage der Wissenschaft. 32 In diesem Sinne charakterisiert H. Blumenberg, Frankfurt a.M. behauptung, theoretischen Weltverhaltnisses
Versuch,
die
Leistungsfahigkeit
1974,
229
das
Sdkularisierung
und
Selbst-
Verstandnis des der Neuzeit den einen Akt humaner
spatmittelalterliche sieht deswegen in
des Menschen. Er des theoretischen Vermogens
als
Selbstbehauptung gegeniiber dem "theologischen Absolutismus" zu entfalten, wie er im Allmachtsgedanken zum Ausdruck kommt. Ausfiihrlich seize ich mien in der in Anm. 34 genannten Habilitationsschrift Arbeit mil dieser These auseinander.
534
Krieger
momente vermag
das eigcntlichc
man
Fundament der Metaphysik ausmacht. Trotzdem an
weiterhin
der
theoretisch-wissenschaftlichen
Ver-
Welt im ganzen im Sinne der Tradition standigungsmoglichkeit uber die in der festzuhalten. Urn so mehr gewinnt die Frage an Gewicht, was mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophic selbst jenen Wandel ermoglicht hat,
der
in
der Neuzeit zu der bekannten Veranderung der Fragestellung
der Metaphysik fuhrte.
Diese Frage scheint mir also insbesondere wegen der Begrundung, Tartaretus die ihr Scotischer Entwurf infolge der Kritik Ockhams bei eher beantwortbar, wenn man den theologischcn Ort, naherhin den findet,
"praktischen"
dieser
Charakter
33
Theologie
berucksichtigt.
Unter dieser
das Problem, zu welchen Konsequenzen fur Perspektive ergibt sich namlich Theorie und Metaphysik der Versuch fiihrt, gegcniiber dieser "praktischen"
humaner Praxis und Theologie eine genuin philosophische Bestimmung 34 ihrcs Verhaltnisses zur Theorie zu gebcn.
Univcrsitat
33
Bonn
bei Scotus, das auch Tartaretus in der Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens (Anm. 22),
Zu diesem Verstandnis der Theologie
Nachfolge des Scotus stehend J.H.J.
Einleitung, bes. 22-29; Bonn, 1986, 357^03.
teilt,
vgl.
Schneider,
L.
Thomas Hobbes und
die Spatscholastik,
34
(Diss.)
die theologische Kennzeichnung In diesem Sinne, als philosophische "Antwort" auf dazu meinen der Praxis bei Scotus erweist sich die Ethik des Johannes Buridanus, vgl. bei Johannes Buridanus", Ethik der und philosophischen Bedeutung Beitrag: "Die Stellung dieser Antwort fur Theorie und Metaphysik Den 12 in:
Medioevo
gehe
ich weiter
Auswirkungen
(1986).
nach
in
der
z.
Zt. in
Vorbereitung befindlichen Habilitationsschrift.
MARIA LEONOR LAMAS DE OLIVEIRA XAVIER
Trivium et Philosophic:
Dans une
Le De Maestro de
ou Pheritage des
culture
arts
Saint Augustin
liberaux etait transmis chez le
rheteur, grammaticus que Ton a plus tard appele le Triuium n etait pas seulement 1 ensemble des sciences du langage, mais
chez
et
ce
le
c etait surtout le cycle des disciplines qui pourvoyaient a la
Phomme, 1
suivant
modele de
le
modele
influence de ce
et
il
1
orateur. Augustin
meme
en a
est
formation de
ne
cru sous
et
reproduit les valeurs,
comme
1 professeur de rhetorique. Toutefois, chez Peminente autorite en oratoire Ciceron - Augustin s est eveille pour la valeur philosophique classique
de
la sagesse.
2
De
puise
devenait vitale dans
de
n avait pas oublie le nom du Christ, qu il avail 3 Monique. L union de la sagesse avec le Christ
plus,
chez sa mere
Pauteur
il
developpement de Confessionum, mais il
des
le
la
personnalite et de la pensee
du patir la mediation du il ou a rencontre le nom du Christ, mais pas trop de manicheisme, 4 et du neoplatonisme, ou il a trouve de la sagesse, mais sagesse pas le a
,
Christ, c est a dire, Pincarnation
d Augustin ou le
du Verbe. 5 Le
s est
expressement scellee Palliance entre chretien, par Punite de la sagesse de Dieu et de
Christ.
ideal
Saint
Cf. H.-I. Marrou, Premiere Partie. Cf.
3
4 5
Pouvrage
philosophe
et
personne du
Confessionum
III,
4,
Augustin
7-8
(texte
et
de
la
la
1
revision critique
Fin
ed.
de
M.
la
Culture
Skutella,
homme
et,
en
du modele de son
Antique,
Paris,
1938,
Bibliotheque Augustinienne
372-376).
Cf. Conf. Ill, 4, 8. Cf. Conf. Ill, 6, 10.
Cf. Conf. VII, 9, 13 "Ille
id
la
de sagesse demandait un nouvel
consequence, obligeait Augustin a
13, pp.
le
est
6
Mais ce nouvel
2
De Maestro
est
-
14.
autem qui consulitur docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus est Christus, incommutabilis Dei atque sempiterna sapientia." De Magistro, 11, 38 (texte du CC
rev. et cor.,
BA
6, p. 136).
Lamas De
536
Oliveira Xavier
education, ainsi que des valeurs qu
meme. La
rhetorique
emportait, entre lesquelles ressort la
il
retractation d Augustin rheteur a etc aussi profonde,
qu elle a merite, de lui, abandon de la profession et, posterieurement, dans ses ecrits, les references les plus ameres et desapprouvantes a son 1
ancien
m6tier.
Dans
ecartee.
7
Neanmoins, la rhetorique n a pas et6 defmitivement livre IV du De Doctrina Christiana, lequcl rend chretien
le
de
eloquence, Saint Augustin revient aux trois finalites de
1
art classique
1
oratoire scion Ciceron
1
-
imposant un ordre axiologique
mots
est
la
et flectere
8
mais en leur
-
tres net: la valeur essentielle
se
laquelle
de
comme
soumettcnt, 9
Get
1
usage des
des moyens
ordre
denonce,
bon usage des mots ne vaut pas autant par
ses effets
delectation
la
le
que
surtout,
a
pedagogic,
circonstanciels,
delectare
docere,
et
la
persuasion.
personne d autrui. En 10 vcritd, la pedagogic ne se justifie point par Pefficacite de Phomme. Cependant, evidence de ce fait n est pas aussi immediate, qu elle n ait du on observe, en special, au De etrc produite; et c est ccla-meme que
apparemment immediats, que par
valeur de
la
la
1
1
Magistro.
Ce
sur
augustinienne essentielle? 1
11
origine et
de
commence
dialogue
son
le
avec
la
langage
Pour des questions plus
de
du
surtout,
temps,
conventionalisme.
13
Mais
stoicisme
les
plus caracteristiquement
en
quelle
est
12 ,
questions
1
intentionalite
comme
traditionnelles,
nature des mots, Augustin
la
la
question
humain:
quoiqu
cut
il
penche vers
1
approfondissement
qu indique passage
9 10
13
le
travers
Cf.
De Doctrina
Cf.
De Doct.
Cf.
par
homme (c est comme ailleurs,
ce
impose a Saint Augustin. N6anmoins,
la
du
relations
langage
penchant conventionaliste). I
homme
3 (texte de
1,
I,
s
1
avec Ici,
ed. bcncdictine,
BA
I
4,
p.
18);
2, 2.
tibi
Christiana IV, 12, 27 (texte de
Christ. IV, 12,
De Doct.
"Quid
12
a
aussi
Contra Academicos
Cf.
2 et IX, 8
les
vrai
1
des
28
efficere uelle,
Pepin, Saint Augustin
J.
Cf.
De Doct.
1
ed. benedictine,
BA
11, p. 466).
14, 30.
Christ. IV, 16, 33.
uidemur
Cf.
-
Christ.
II,
24,
et la
37
-
le
concernant
traditionnelles,
du langage avec la r6alit6, demeureraient exterieures au on ne passait du probleme, d apres notre auteur, si
relations
nocud
de
celles
usage des vues connues
fait
cum
loquimur?"
De Mag.
1, 1.
Dialectique, Villanova, 1976, pp. 72-98.
25, 38.
Conf.
IV,
le
2,
Trivium
question de
et
Philosophic:
memoria Dei 14
1
,
dialogue
exception de
augustinien
avec
1
la priere,
intention generate de
communication a
1
1
1
evidemment au sens
prise
pas
1
A
usage des mots.
qu
emporte sur Pexterieur.
usage des mots est
du langage des mots: elle
A
De
le
negative,
la
pedagogic,
intention ne
depasse toujours, cause de cela, le fondement de 1
De
interieur, ainsi Trinitate.
Magistro correspond, chez
mais
la
comme
du langage humain devra etre chcrche a
Cependant,
1
le
Saint Augustin, posterieurement, dans le
critique
theme de
qui annonce le
de communication. 15 Alors, ce que le c est Pirreductibilite de cette intention de
etablit,
parce
1
large
Pefficacite
effet
537
du langage chez homme, dans le De Magistro, ordre des buts que Ton poursuit communement par
intentionalite
1
se trouve reduite a 1
Le De Magistro de Saint Augiistin
reflechie,
de
1
1
s identifie 1
interieur
intentionalite
1
le
que
montrera
16
moment de
auteur, au
efficacite
des
mots.
Toutefois,
du langage,
on y discerne des developpements d importance majeure pour Pepistemologie des sciences du langage et pour la philosophic de la connaissance en general. D apres un aussitot
exercice
s
que
decele
y
la
negativite
17 d explanatio grammaticale Augustin change point de vue du dialogue, en remplacant 1 orthodoxie de
elementaire
completement
le
,
18 Des lors, non plus le par 1 heterodoxie de la libre reflexion. point de vue de la grammaire institute, mais celui de la seule raison nous 1
ecole
fera 1
une autre grammaire beaucoup plus representative de C est cela qu il s agira de montrer dans le premier
decouvrir
ordre reel du langage.
De
alinea de notre essai sur le s
Magistro de Saint Augustin. Ensuite, on
appliquera a degager, parmi les conditions de
necessite de communication, dementir 1 autonomie des mots la
Vostensio:
theorie
la
la
et
generate
experience concrete de
1
connaissance.
Ce
sera le
de rendre compte de des
conditions
1
la
moment de analogie
objectives
de
de la
connaissance.
14
15
CL De Mag.
1,2.
CLDeMag. I, 1; 10, 30. Au moyen de idee de uerbum 1
De
Trinitate IX, 6, 9-11,
90-104, 464-498).
17 18
Cf.
De Mag.
2, 3.
Cf.
De Mag.
2, 4.
16;
XV,
mentis et du modele trinitaire de la psychologic: Cf. 17 - 16, 26 (texte de ed. benedictine, BA 16, pp.
10,
1
Lamas De
538
De
la
nous
sorte,
commc
avons
De
philosophic positive du
Oliveira Xavier
s
Magistro, qui
but
surtout
ouvrcnt par
de
virtualites
les
meme
la critique
du
point de vue conventionnel des sciences du langage.
1.
Grammaire conventionnelle
grammaire rationnelle
et
Augustin admet, au De Magistro,
comme choses 1
et
signe,
considere selon
le
exterieures,
qui
en
auteur reconnaissait que
fait
complexite. entre les
liaison
la
double liaison a 19
la
necessaire a la communication des esprits.
20
le
contenu
de
mots montrent
les
les
deux
1
esprit
De
au
Ordine,
choses
les
aux
et
etait
du De Magistro est, double liaison, en examinant
choses
surtout
etant
dialogue
mots dans
des
negativite
les
ce
Deja mots et
Le
pourtant, celui de mcttre en question cette
jusqu a quel point
mot
notion aristotelicienne du
la
la
role
et traduisent
critique
ne
il
cotes,
et
faut
1
Or,
esprit.
aboutissant
a
pretendre
pas
la
y
rencontrer une theorie positive du signe. Celle-ci n est vraiment ebauchee qu au De Doctrina Christiana, ou Ton assigne de 1 importance exegetique a Pensemble des arts liberaux. Mais, en dehors de ce propos, construire
une
theorie
du
generale
n a
signe
pas
soin de
le
concerne
1
esprit
d Augustin. Et cela, peut-etre, pour deux principales raisons: d une part, autonomie du langage plutot qu il en Saint Augustin est critique envers autonomie suffisante d un objet, pas de est le defenscur, et, sans 1
1
conditions pour la constitution d une science separee; d autre part, c est le mot, le signe le plus richc en virtualites, qui joue le role de cas
exemplaire du genre du signe. Tel le
De
est,
en particulier, ce qui se passe dans
Magistro.
En
fait,
dans
ce
dialogue
philosophique,
quelques elements de grammaire.
21
Ncanmoins,
on ne se ils
sert
que de
a
prouver,
suffisent
par la seulc reflexion, que celle-la ne traduit pas convenablement
1
ordre
Cette double liaison retrouve des antecedents aussi bien chez Aristote que chez les cf. J. Pepin, op.cit. pp. 67-68, 79-82, ou Ton fait ressortir des affinites entre trinomes suivants: bvo^a.-Xojo^-npa.Tf^a (Aristote), (rr^jLa.Zvov-^CKroi -rvy^dvov
stoiciens: les
(stoicisme) et dictio-dicibile-res (Principia Dialecticae,
20 21
Cf.
De
Ordine
II,
12, 35 (texte de
1
PL
ed. benedictine,
32, 1411).
BA
4,
pp. 224-226.
G. Bellissima, "Sant Agostino grammatico", Augustinus Congres International Augustinien, Paris, 1954, vol.1, pp. 35^2. Cf.
Magister.
Actes
du
Trivium
et
Philosophic:
Le De Magistro de Saint Augustin
539
du langage des mots. La grammaire de Pecole, plus fondee sur des autorites que sur la raison, ne connaissait pas les regies du langage que le De Magistro permet d enoncer: la regie de la nomination et la regie de reel
la
communication.
La
nomination, en particulier, etablit que tous les mots sont des noms, tandis que la grammaire conventionnelle consent a dire 1.1
de
regie
seulement que
On
la
noms
les
de
de Pexperience ordinaire de le pronom haec a la place
mettre
22
conjonctions
Penonce 23
et,
moyen de
tires
quelques exemples possibilite
sont une espece de mots.
Pevidence de cette regie au
est conduit a
que,
atque
at,
Pemploi du verbe
;
est
erat in Christo est et non, sed est in
"Non
1
1
analyse de
usage des mots: la de Pensemble des
comme
illo
erat"
sujet
dans
(2 Cor.
1,
24 la precede de la traduction en tant que re-nomination construction de pronuntiata complets, selon le mot de Ciceron, comme
19)
le
;
;
"displicet
avec
quia"
le role
et
"placet
qui renferment les conjonctions quia et
si",
si
25
du
sujet.
Parmi ces exemples,
les deux premiers et le dernier montrent que des mots, qui n appartiennent pas a la classe (pars orationis) des noms,
peuvent,
toutefois,
nominative du
dans
recevoir,
sujet. Aussitot,
la
et
observations du point de vue du sens: dans le
Paul,
qu
il
le
mot
joue,
est il
faut
qu
des noms, ainsi que fait
de
la
role
le
joue
il
le
le
la
phrase,
la
fonction
troisieme ajoutent des
exemple emprunte a Saint mais ce n est pas comme verbe quelque chose d autre, a la ressemblance
du
signifie
nom
de
syntaxe
deuxieme
le
uirtus
1
sujet,
mis a
la
meme
place; d autre cote, le
traduction des langues vient signaler que les mots isoles ne
sont traduisibles que
s ils
signifient
comme
des noms, c est a dire, par
rapport a une reference objective exterieure, au
moyen de
laquelle
ils
Done, Pensemble des cas examines nous fait voir des mots qui ne sont pas des noms au sens strict (morphologique), mais qui fonctionnent comme des noms dans Pordre du discours (point de vue puissent se correspondre.
syntaxique) autant qu
comme
noms, en denotant quelque chose d autre qu eux-memes (point de vue semantique). Par Pelargissement 22 23 24 25
Cf.
De Mag.
Cf.
De Mag.
5, 14.
Cf.
De Mag.
5, 15.
Cf.
De Mag.
5, 16.
5, 13.
ils
signifient
les
Lamas De
540
nom
du concept de
suppose le principe de 1 universel de la
a
ces
communes
possibilites
de
intelligible
regie,
Oliveira Xavier
1
a
d autres mots,
induction, necessaire a la construction
on parvient a
noms
ouverture du domaine des
1
a tous les mots, ce qui fait le contenu dc la regie de la nomination. II
et
26
cependant, d evaluer le jeu des autorites au long du de cette regie des mots. On peut 1 etablissement
convient,
chemin qui mene a
poids des autorites evoquees, Saint Paul ct Ciceron, est d importance mineure, puisqu clles sont tout a fait laterales a 1 obtention de la regie: 1 autorite dc Saint Paul vaut a 1 egard des choses, mais elle
verifier
le
que
27 n est pas incontestable au sujet des mots Ciceron, a son tour, est un modele ferme dans le Triuium, mais ce qu Augustin prend de lui, c est un exemple douteux et un nom technique de la dialectique, qui n influent ;
au
point
resultat
qu
il
s agit
de
28
produire.
En
fin
de
les
compte,
ne sont la que pour rcndre manifeste leur superfluite par raisonnement. D ailleurs, au analyse tout empirique des mots, rapport dans le De Magistro, exprime, a notre avis, le desir, chez Augustin, de autorites
1
retrouver un regard naif sur 1.2
La
regie
de
la
la realitc
meme
du langage humain.
communication, de son cote, demontre que
usage des mots est naturcllement disposee pour communication, ce qui repond a une question fondamentalc tionalite
de
1
1
intcn-
le
but de
et
prealable
la
au domaine technique de la grammaire institute. Afin de prouver la necessite de cette regie, un exemple suffit: celui ou Ton decompose les possibilites de sens du mot homo dans Penonce "utrum
interrogatif
interrogation
est
homo
homo
deconcertante,
29 sit".
puisqu
elle
30
Au
premier abord, cette met en doute le jugement Neanmoins, par la mediation
d identite auquel on songe immediatement. de 1 analyse, on doit reconnaitre une ambiguite originaire dans des
mots,
qui
peut
rendre
equivoques
nos jugements:
il
s agit
le
sens
de
la
un signe refiechi, en se double possibilite, pour chaque mot, en signifiant quelque signifiant soi-meme, ou d etre un signe transitif, d etre
26
28 29 30
Cf.
De Mag.
5, 14; 5, 16.
Cf.
De Mag.
5, 15.
Cf.
De Mag.
5, 16.
Cf.
De Mag.
8,
Cf.DcMag.
22
8, 22.
-
24.
Trivium
et
Le De Magistro de Saint Augustin
Philosophic:
541
En particulier, le mot homo peut etre chose d autre que soi-meme. du de signe syllabes ho-mo ou de Pentite signifiable de compose Phomme.
Ton
Si
actualise
homo
occurrences de
a
combinaisons de sens pour interpretations possibles de
de
1
1
meme
le
demandent des jugements d
double
cette
Pinterieur
mot,
interrogation,
identite,
a
dans
possibilite
enonce
cite,
les
deux
on obtient quatre
par consequent, quatre
et,
seulement
desquelles celles
savoir,
homo
ou
deux
est
un
terme univoque dans les deux occurrences, qu il soit un signe reflechi ou un signe transitif; par centre, les deux autres combinaisons, ou le mot
homo
n est
pas
s
univoque,
a
opposent
tout
jugement d
identite.
En
par analogic, nous tenions compte aussitot de la duplicite de sens des autres mots de 1 enonce (utrum, sit), la seule possibilite de les outre,
si,
reflechis nous empecherait meme de d une comprendre qu interrogation. En effet, Pambiguite non mais aussi actuelle, c est a dire, toujours presente simplement potentielle, a 1 esprit, entre les sens reflechi et transitif de chaque mot, rendrait la
comme
prendre
il
des
s agit
signes la
communication impraticable. Des dans
1
des
usage
Pequivoque,
Sans
choses.
On
possible.
langage
et
telle
voit
soit
mots,
surtout
celui
il
lors,
de
disposee
qui
consiste
a
que notre intentionalite, maniere a eviter le plus
faut
confondre
les
mots avec
les
disposition, pas de communication, pas de jugement par la Pimportance du probleme de Pintentionalite du
de ce qui puisse determiner
celle-ci.
Or, ce qui dispose habituellement notre facon de prendre les mots, chez Augustin, c est un reglage de notre attention vers les signifiables des mots (sens transitif) plutot que vers les signifiants par eux-memes
C est
qu Augustin considere une regie du langage nous traduisons par regie de la communication. que comme condition necessaire de la communication verbale,
(sens reflechi).
aussi ce
(loquendi regula)^, et
En
c est
effet,
34 Mais, de que cette regie est premierement enoncee. fois reiteree, en temoignant tres clairement de la
langage avec Pesprit:
double
Cette Dialecticae,
32 33
PL
possibilite 32, 1413-1414.
Cf.
De Mag.
8,
Cf.
De Mag.
8, 24.
"/.../;
comme
liaison
intime
du
condition de possibilite des jugements sur les
partie
du
concept
de
uis
uerbis
dans
Principia
22-24.
adsentior enim e
ea feratur animus,
fait
plus, elle est trois
quorum
tibi
ista
sermonicari nos omnino non posse, sunt
signa".
De Mag.
8, 22.
nisi
auditis uerbis ad
Lamas De
542
choses loi
de
35 ;
la
Olivcira Xavier
en tant qu applicable aux circonstances empiriques d apres unc 36 raison naturelle et, fmalcment, en qualite de constituer une ;
de
inclination
conformement
1
attendu
esprit,
a elle-meme.
Ton ne peut
que
ne
pas
penser
pas
37
Apres tout, on peut, certes, se demander si les deux regies demeurent tout a fait grammaticales, etant donne que Tune dement la autre s en passe completement, ressemblant grammaire officielle et esprit. On peut meme conceder que la grammaire ne plutot a une loi de 1
1
soit
qu un
tendance
"decor
de
n aboutissions
la
et
Magistro^, a
grammaire
ces
qu a
De
au
fond"
reduire
a
y verifie quelque
n aurions
nous
si
Mais,
logique.
nous
observations,
s
que
39
la
conclure
a
que
negativement, au sujet du dialogue philosophique d Augustin, qu il est sur le chemin oppose a la constitution dc la grammaire comme science
autonome,
de
et,
la
sur
sorte,
Toutefois, notre propos est
ici
chemin oppose au progres du savoir. inconformite des celui de montrer que
le
1
existence deux r6gles avec supposer grammaire d une autre grammaire, que nous appelons rationnelle, puisqu elle rend compte de la raison la plus interieure a ordre des mots, aussitot qu elle traditionnelle
la
fait
1
1
ne depend
Que
pas des autorites clues dans la
raison,
exclusivement
de
la tradition
la discipline.
que Ton decouvre au fond du langage, ne
grammaticale,
communication, laquclle que la raison meme de
tient la
c est
ce
manifeste
que
la
soit
regie
de
pas la
a la raison inscrite dans nos esprits. Mais,
regie de la nomination ne soit pas simplement
presupposes philosophiques. En veritc, cette regie serait a peine passible d etre formulee, si elle ne donnait de logique, c est ce
qu en accuscnt
les
id quod significatur adtendere et ex placuit enim ct recte placuit signo dato "/.../; eius consideratione uel dare uel negate quod dicitur." De Mag. 8, 23.
ergo quaerit, utrum homo nomen sit, nihil ei aliud quam esse respondeam; est. Si autem quaerit, significat ex ea parte se uelle audire, qua signum utrum animal sit, multo procliuius adnuam; quoniam, si tacens et nomen et animal tantum quid esset homo requireret, placita ilia loquendi regula ad id quod his duabus "Qui
satis
enim
syllabis
significatur,
animus
etiam tola definitio diceretur,
^
Cf.
J.
ncque
quidquam
animal rationale
non possum non putare ad
"Quia
simul
Collart,
atque
"Saint
ista
id
conclusionem
uerba
Augustin grammairien dans
Augustiniennes 17 (1971), p. 284. 39 Cf. Idem, ibid., pp. 287-289.
De Mag.
referri, scilicet
intentio."
le
nisi
responderetur
mortale."
sonuerint, ea ualet, ut auditis signis ad res significatas feratur
significatur,
plurimum
curreret, id est
De
animal,
uel
8, 24.
quod
his
regula,
De Mag.
Magistro",
duabus
quae
syllabis
naturaliter
8, 24.
Re\ ue des Etudes
Trivium
1
et
Philosophic:
Le De Magistro de
543
Saint Augustin
essor a une conception prealable dcs mots, savoir, que le propre de la
de ceux-ci est le fait de nommer. Telle est la pensee sur les mots en general, qui devient explicite au cours du De Magistro, ainsi que 40 le rend evident le point de vue semantique de la regie de la nomination. signification
Or,
c est
une
la
philosophique,
parties principales 41
Mais
langage. 1
esprit
n
il
enracinee
chez Platon, pour qui
privilege s
trouve
se
qui
du discours
le
d Augustin,
langage avec
idee
nommement
et
tradition
la
noms
etaient les
unites exemplaires de Panalyse
les
des
les
dans
noms ne
etait question,
viendrait
De
au
connaissance, afin d evaluer
pas,
du
peut-etre,
a
Magistro, de la relation du
pedagogique de meme question, converge encore 1 usage de Petymologie 42 populaire de nomen a partir de noscere laquelle annonce ce que Ton vient apres a demontrer: le fait que la connaissance est une condition la
Vers
celui-la.
le vrai
role
la
,
de
implicite
sur
augustinienne
communication:
le
Cependant, des
langage
a
mots,
la
la
preoccupation la
correspond
plus
de
regie
la
le dialecticien ne songeraient a grammairien, mise en question tout a fait philosophique de intentionalite essentielle du langage humain. si
celle-ci, 1
nomination.
la
ni
ce n etait
des
Alors,
degager dans
que
De
le
ni
le
la
deux regies du langage, que 1 ont vient de Magistro de Saint Augustin, ont trait surtout a des les
propos philosophiques, la grammaire, qu elles inaugurent, est, elle-meme, de soi philosophique. Accorde cela, peut-on voir, dans la grammaire rationnelle du dialogue augustinien, une anticipation de la grammaire speculative toutes
les
du moyen age? Le rapprochement est possible du fait que deux ont essaye de depasser la grammaire constituee et
chez Saint Augustin, parce que la grammaire conventionnelle etait trop prise a la surface des mots, pour convenir a 1 etre authentique du langage; chez les modistes du XIII C siecle, parce qu il fallait retablir instituee:
un domaine propre a de Part premier du
la
grammaire, par
Triuium
par
la
de
suite
la
penetration progressive
dialectique.
En
semantique des deux regies augustiniennes annonce deja Toutefois,
significandi.
tandis
"Num adhuc dubitas demonstrauimus, nomina esse? De Mag. 5, 14.
Cf. Cratyle
42
Cf.
388
De Mag.
5,
a;
424 b
U.
-
alias -
Non
425 a (sur
que
quoque dubito,
la
la
grammaire
construction de
1
art
portee
theme des modi
speculative
orationis
partes
quandoquidem
la
outre, le
eodem
de
modo,
fateor ea significare
de nommer).
1
ere
quo
aliquid."
Lamas Do
544
engagee dans un
etait
scolastique
Oliveira Xavier
d autonomie,
effort
dialogue augustinien se voulait surtout rationnelle retrouver
a
tendait logique.
Mais
reduise
a
fondement
le
commun qu
la
grammaire du
par consequent, elle
et,
devait
elle
cela ne signifie pas necessairement que la
la
on
logique:
montrer
de
vient
les
que
avoir
avec
la
se
grammaire deux regies
grammaticales d Augustin dependent d une philosophie du langage plutot que de la logique. Ce qui parait s imposer, dans le dialogue augustinien, c est
grammaire dans epistemologique. DCS
souci de fonder la
le
la
raison,
en sorte qu
elle
lors, la grammaire, comme les son tant ne vaut mots, que par sa nature science, objet, par pas rationnelle, c est a dire, son fondement intelligible, a la fois interieur et
receive de la legitimite
superieur.
De
2.
la
de
psychologic
communication
la
a
la
philosophie
de
la
connaissance
les
Cependant, s
que
regie de
pose
le
vers
la
laquelle,
la
tour, les
experience.
decisif: banal,
II
s agit
de
effct
de produire
parce que
apparents
des
1
la s
ne
est vrai
La methode ce
d un
fait
commun, quoiqu inapercu dans
mots43
;
car
decisif,
tout empirique, que but,
connaissance doit
la
applique aussitot a prouver par
evidence
efficacite
dans
il
communication au moyen des
il
pedagogique du langage question connaissance du role de la communication. 1
suivre
Magistro,
une relation de connaissance, encore non
inclut
choses nominees. Par consequent,
une condition plutot qu un
effets
De
le
rationnelle. S
mots. Neanmoins, c est cela qu Augustin I
dans
langage,
la
son
a
discernce, avec ctre
du
decouverte d une grammaire communication suppose celle de la nomination, celle-ci probleme de la connaissance. En realite, la disposition des mots fin de la communication depend de leur essence nominative,
epuisent pas a la
analyses
est
fortement
1
nous et,
auteur du
aussi la
oblige
des
De
demonstrative
lors,
banal que
soudainete des a
mettre
a separer
en la
Magistro continue de
de
la
preference
autem homines, ut cos, qui non sunt, magistros uocent, quia plerumque tempus locutionis et tempus cognitionis nulla mora interponitur, et quoniam post admonitionem sermonicantis cito intus discunt, foris se ab eo qui admonuit didicisse 1
"Falluntur
inter
arbitrantur."
De Mag.
14, 45.
Trivium
d Augustin pour
que de 1
et
Philosophic:
la vie
Le De Magistro de
psychologique,
comme domaine
concretion de ses analyses sur
la
le
545
Saint Augustin
d experience, ainsi
oppose a
s
langage, laquelle
abstraction de Pobjet des sciences du Triuium.
On
se
cette
sert,
mots dans de differentes
de quelques
fois-ci,
circonstances psychologiques de reception par rapport a la connaissance
des choses et des mots eux-memes:
choses qu 44
L
ni la
memes, du
fait
qu
1
etat
mots ne
les
la
parce que
signes,
de connaissance
1
etat
d ignorance des choses signifiables, 1 etat de connaissance des
montrent pas; a connaissance de leurs les
signifiables
trouve deja
se
incluse dans la connaissance des signes respectifs45
et
acquise
etat ordinaire
originaire
sont des signes: a
ils
parce que
1
d ignorance des signes (exs. caput et verifie experience que les mots ne produisent pas, par euxconnaissance des choses qu ils signifient, ni la connaissance
des signes et a tegtnina).
de non connaissance des
a Petal
signifient (ex. sarabarae), a
ils
;
enfin,
a
etat d ignorance des signes, parce que les mots ne sont, dans ce cas, que des sonorites insignifiantes. De plus, attendu que la connaissance des signes ne se parfait que par la connaissance de leurs signifiables, il faut 1
reconnaitre que celle-ci est une condition plutot qu un effet de celle-la. 46
De
on a rendu manifeste que
cette facon,
soil,
1
efficacite
la
des mots:
connaissance, quelle qu elle la
connaissance n est point
communicable par des mots.
litteralement
De
le
Certes,
connaissance a mais,
a
exterieure
est
par
1
egard du langage, par
anteriorite
1
d Augustin
Magistro
tres
fragile
1
denonce
1
exteriorite
de
la
anteriorite de celle-la a celui-ci,
de
contingentes, c est a dire, qui peuvent etre
circonstances
ou ne pas
etre.
psychologiques
Au
surplus,
on
n a remarque, au sujet des signes donnes, que des connaissances sensibles, lesquelles sont, en elles-memes, aussi exterieures que contingentes. Or, 1
effectif
usage
des
mots,
qui
realise
une
intentionalite
plongee
a
de
nous-memes, ne peut pas dependre de circonstances comme de ses conditions de possibilite. Une connaissance contingentes, circonstancielle n est pas une condition de possibilite; celle-ci doit I
int6rieur
participer d 44
Cf.
De Mag.
"Cum
docere
une necessite indifferente a Pexperience.
me
enim
necessite de
10, 33.
mihi
signum datur, si nescientem me inuenit, cuius uero scientem, quid disco per signum?" De Mag. 10,
nihil potest; si
1
"Ita
D une
magis signum re cognita
quam
signo dato ipsa res
discitur."
De Mag.
rei
signum
33. 10, 33.
sit,
Lamas De
546
Oliveira Xavicr
est, toutefois, le genre de connaissances que Saint Augustin toute connaissance des signes, posterieurement, au De dans presuppose
cette sorte,
des signes,
connaissance
comme
connaisssances
les
Trinitate:
la
valeur de la communication entre les
connaissance tout
court.
47
a
des choses purement
sur
portent
necessaires
et
prealables
Ces donnees
hommes
de
la
anterieures
a
et la valeur
sont
intelligibles
quelque
intelligibles,
toute experience de communication et a toute acquisition de connaissance.
Le De Magistro en
ligibles,
c est
encore avec effet,
est
dans
qu elles etaient mais seulement a
a dire,
compte de connaissances
tenu
deja
tant
communication, sensiblcs,
avait
pour ressemblance
requises la
le
,
pas
primaute intellectuelle que leur donne le De Trinitate. En dialogue pedagogique d Augustin, la connaissance intelligible
pourvue
est
Pillumination
48 intelligibles
la
de
la
personnelle, qui est celle Christ
la
connaissances
des
au sujct des noms de choses
essentiellement une relation personnelle entre
intcrieur,
intel
de
effectivite
1
ici
fondue
49
la
propre
contingcnce
de
Christ et
le
toute
a
sujets intentionnels et libres.
avec
1
idee
de
sensible
metaphore
vcrite
relation
dans
usitee
homme inter-
La personne du
avec
et
l
1
agent
la
de
tradition
platonicicnne pour traduire la connaissance des intelligibles. Cependant, Pillumination, ainsi personnifiee, devient, a son tour, le modele de toute
de connaissance, sensible
relation
extrinseques de
possibilitc.
En
et
veritc,
intelligible, 1
quant a ses conditions
anti-formalisme du
De
Magistro
jusqu a pcrsonnifier toute relation de connaissance, laquelle est vraiment irreductible au rapport abstrait d un sujet avec un objet: un il ne connait sujet peut se rcpresenter un objet dans sa conscience, mais va
point par-la la realite. Pour connaitre la realite,
il
faut
qu
elle
nous
soit,
en quelque sorte, montrce, et c est cela-meme qui n est pas dans le 50 mais, par contre, opacite de ceux-ci pouvoir des mots, a cause de c est cela qui est le propre dc la lumicre. Celle-ci se distingue de tout 1
signe par la qualite de la transparence. 47 48
49 50
Cf.
De
Cf.
De Mag.
Trin.
X,
;
51
1, 2.
5, 14: ex. uirtus.
Cf.DeMag.
11, 38.
Cf.DeMag.
11, 36.
Caractere qui n appartient pas, par exemple, au geste du doigt tendu, lequel est un acte meme de montrer plutot qu un moyen de montrer quoi que ce soit: cf. signe de 1
Trivium
et
Philosophic:
Le De Magistro de
547
Saint Augustin
Toutefois, la lun-iere n est que le moyen, ou mieux, le milieu par
excellence de celle
action de montrer; elle ne suffit pas a la realisation de
une action d un
est
qui
1
ostensio
quelque
la
des qu
intentionnel. Alors,
sujet
faut
il
realite,
voir
y
il
d un
action
1
agent
est
toute realite connaissable soit aussitot ostensible, en d autres mots,
qu
elle soi