:CO
ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA VOL.
I
48
co
o
Ijp
OWLEDGE AND THE SCIENCES IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY (S.I.E.P.M.)
VOL.1
Edited by
MONIKA ASZTALOS JOHN E. MURDOCH ILKKA NIINILUOTO
HELSINKI
1990
KNOWLEDGE AND THE SCIENCES IN
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY (S.I.E.P.M.)
Helsinki 24-29 August 1987
VOL.
I
Edited by
MONIKA ASZTALOS JOHN E. MURDOCH ILKKA NIINILUOTO
ACTA PIIILOSOPHICA FENNICA VOL. HELSINKI
1990
48
ISBN 951-9264-09-4 ISSN 0355-1792 Helsinki 1990
Yliopistopaino
PREFACE
The
Congress of Medieval Philosophy (Societe Internationale pour PEtude de la Philosophic Medievale) was held in 29 August 1987. The general theme of the congress Helsinki, Finland, 24 International
Eighth
was Knowledge and
the
The program
Sciences in Medieval Philosophy.
consisted of plenary sessions with invited papers, sections with contrib uted papers, and meetings of the commissions of the S.I.E.P.M. The titles of the sections were as follows: (1) The Origin of Medieval Notions of
Science
and the Divisions of the Sciences,
(2)
Basic
Epistemological
Issues as Related to Medieval Conceptions of Science, (3) Trivium and the
Sciences, (4)
The Nature and Methods
of Theoretical Sciences, (5)
Nature and Methods of Practical Sciences,
New
Conceptions of Science
in
(6)
Theology
The
as a Science, (7)
Late Medieval and Early Renaissance
Philosophy.
The
reports of the commissions have been published in the Bulletin de
Philosophic Medievale Invited papers
volume
29
(1987),
and 30 (1988), pp. 10-38.
12-70
pp.
and contributed papers are published
work, edited by the
members
in the present three
of the program committee
Asztalos, Sten Ebbesen, Dagfinn F^llesdal,
Simo
Knuuttila,
(Monika Anja Inker!
Lehtinen, John E. Murdoch, Ilkka Niiniluoto) in collaboration with Reijo
Toivo
Tyorinoja.
Holopainen
has
served
as
assistant
to
the
editors.
Volume I (Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 48) contains the invited papers. The contributed papers of the sections (l)-(3) are included in volume II (Publications of Luther-Agricola Society, B 19). Volume III (Annals of the Finnish Society for Missiology and Ecumenics, 55) contains the contrib
uted papers of the sections (4)-(7). All papers offered are published.
Every volume of names. Ancient
is
provided with an index of manuscripts and an index in a Latin form.
Greek and medieval Western names are
The congress was
financially supported
by the Ministry of Education
of Finland, the Finnish Cultural Foundation, the
UNESCO,
and the University of Helsinki.
Helsinki, 15
The Editors
August 1990
Academy
of Finland, the
CONTENTS
Preface
iii
v
Contents
Plenary Sessions
Georg Henrik
VON WRIGHT,
Dante Between Ulysses and Faust 1
(Opening address)
Forme di conoscenza e ideal! di sapere nella Tullio cultura medievale Jaakko HINTIKKA, Concepts of Scientific Method from Aristotle to
GREGORY,
Newton Michael E. MARMURA, The Fortuna of the Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages L.M. DE RIJK,, The Posterior Analytics in the Latin West Wfedystew STRO2EWSKI, Metaphysics as a Science Alain DE LIBERA. Le developpement de nouveaux instruments et leur utilisation dans la philosophie de la nature conceptuels e au XfV siecle Arthur Stephen McGRADE, Ethics and Politics as Practical
...
10
72 85 104 128
158 198
Sciences
Symposium on the Theoretical and Practical Autonomy of Philosophy as a Discipline in the Middle Ages Linos G. BENAKIS, Die theoretische und praktische Autonomie der Philosophie als Fachdisziplin in Byzanz Hans DAIBER, Die Autonomie der Philosophie im Islam Colette SIRAT, La philosophie et la science selon les philosophes .
juifs
John
.
.
.
250
du Moyen-Age
MARENBON,
The Theoretical and
as a Discipline Philosophy, 1250-1350
Philosophy
223 228
in
the
Practical
Middle
of Latin
Autonomy Ages:
262
Indices
Index of Manuscripts Index of
Names
.
277 278
PLENARY SESSIONS
GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT
Dante Between Ulysses and Faust (Opening address)
One
most moving and also most enigmatic passages Dante s encounter with Ulysses. It is described Comedy twentysixth Canto of the Inferno. We are now in the region 1.
of the
Divine
is
in
the
in the
called
Malebolgc, deep down on
the ladder of sin where treacherous councellors
suffer eternal punishment.
The
human being
is
place
Dante
enclosed.
is full
of flames and in each flame a
struck by one flame which
is
who
the top and asks his guide Virgil,
is
burning
in
cloven at
is
Virgil answers
it.
it is Ulysses together with his companion in the war against Troy, Diomedes. They suffer, we are told, for the stratagem with the wooden horse which deceived the Trojans and brought about the fall of the city. Dante in great excitement asks permission to speak to the flame.
that
grant him his request,
does not
Virgil -
"degna
himself.
di
molta
Virgil
loda"
now
-
asks
and
although he thinks
it
laudable
approaching flame him where he went to die.
agrees to address the to
Ulysses
tell
Ulysses from inside the flame tells his interlocutors the following story: After he had left Circe, who held him captive for more than a neither
year,
for
affection
his
son,
nor veneration for his old father,
nor love for his faithful Penelope could restrain his burning desire to get to
know
("divenir
set
del
the world and every vice and valour of which
mondo
esperto, e degli vizi
humani
e del
man
is
valore").
capable
Thus he
out on another voyage with the few surviving companions from his
They sailed westwards passing through the strait of had placed his pillars as a sign that man should where Hercules Gibraltar, proceed no farther ("accio che uom piu oltre non si metta"). Neglecting previous
travels.
I
the prohibition Ulysses urged his
where no human being had "that
and
men
to follow
as yet put his foot.
him
to explore a
"Consider",
world
he exclaimed,
you are not destined to live like brutes, but to aspire after virtue knowledge"
("Fatti
virtute e conoscenza").
their oars wings
on a
non
foste
a viver
come
bruti,
Ma
per
scguir
And
so they continued across the waters, making
flight
which no-one had dared to undertake before
von Wright
2
them.
months
after
Finally,
of
they
travel,
sighted
a
an
with
coast
A wind blew up from the land, hit the ship, whirled round three times, the vessel was sucked into the depths - "and over
enormous mountain. it
booming billows and his crew. Here the us the
moves away from
its
clos
Thus perished the horror-stricken Ulysses
d".
and with dignity the flame then
tale ends; upright
stupefied audience.
how
This version of
and may well be Dante
Ulysses ended
The
invention.
s
is
known from elsewhere
not
which Ulysses approached
cliff
before his shipwreck could have been the mountain of Purgatory; the description of
was
so,
location
its
inaccessibility
conception of geography.
s
over
may ponder
interpreters for
Dante
fits
the
the pagan adventurer.
I
If
this
symbolic significance of shall
its
theme
not develop this
here.
2.
Dante was obviously shaken by the
tale Ulysses
had told him. In the
Homeric adventurer he must have recognized if not himself, kindred soul. Dante was also in search af a world which no
at
least
a
man
living
Ulysses he was curious about the things he witnessed. The questions he constantly puts to his companion testifies to this. Therefore he was, so to speak, "doubly curious" about Ulysses whose
had
before.
visited
curiosity
had led him to
What place,
Like
new
is
he
that
Traditionally,
disaster.
Dante
with
adds
was
of Ulysses
conception
new dimension
a
Ulysses
s
censured
the
to
for
is,
in
the
Homeric hero
cunningness
and
s
first
guilt.
treacherous
behaviour. In the Latin tradition in particular, he was an evildoer as he
had brought about the survivor
the
among
"protofounder"
of
of Troy.
fall
Trojans, the
Rome,
We
should
remember
was
regarded
Aeneas, city
that the leading
as
a
sort
of
which was destined to become the
acknowledged capital of Western Christendom. That the author of the Aeneid should think Ulysses deserving of eternal punishment is not in the least surprising. The author of the Commedia does not, at least not in words, question the grounds of the verdict as presented to him by his
guide through Inferno. But whether or not Dante thought these grounds sufficient, he placed the unhappy sufferer in the fires of Hell in a new perspective by adding to his load of guilt unlimited curiosity, unrestrained pursuit of knowledge for
With
Homeric
this
change
its
own
of
sake, as an
perspective
end
in itself.
Dante
in
fact
transformed
the
figure completely and gave him a symbolic significance which he
Dante between Ulysses and Faust not
did
Greek
the
in
possess
which
but
tradition
3
has
been
since
Western poetry and thinking. This by itself is a major prominent achievement of Dante s. As one commentary on the Ulyssean tradition 1 Dante turned Ulysses, the centripetal, homeward bound observes, in
who
traveller
a
into
search,
settles
finally
centrifugal
down
peace after a life full of restless adventurer who never comes to rest but in
constantly moves on in search of the new and as spiritual kinsman of two other illfated fictional
Dutchman and Captain Ahab words a
in Melville s
yet untried.
seafarers,
He
the
is
Flying
immortal novel. In Tennyson to
in
follow
a
like
s
a
desire/ knowledge spirit yearning beyond the utmost bound of human thought". I am by no means the first to note that Dante, by making Ulysses a symbol of man s unquenchable thirst for knowledge, was in fact heralding the great changes in the spiritual climate of Europe which were "gray
sinking star/
and
to take place in the fourteenth it
has been said,
spirit
of the
"
-
-
Dante
as
fifteenth centuries.
gives
it
life
"Ulysses
voice",
speaks prophetically for the
Renaissance".
Not too long
Dante wrote,
after
his Ulysses
incarnation in flesh and blood in a figure
transformed found an
who was
then himself going to
be transformed into a symbol maybe even more congenial than the Greek hero to the spirit of our Western Civilization. This incarnation was an infamous German, Doctor Johann Faust, who lived decades of the Reformation. Dante of Faust
3.
The
-
not so
much
idea that
it
of the
man
s
is
centrifugal Ulysses
an anticipation
as of the symbol.
not befitting for
is
in the turbulent early
man
know
to
every truth and
knowledge may be sinful is deeply ingrained our Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Its earliest expression is the myth of the Tree of Knowledge with its Forbidden Fruit in the first book
that unrestricted pursuit of in
of
the
Bible.
curiositas
is
save us from
The should
it,
idea
not
W.B. 2
Ibid.
the
Stanford
Christian
moral
teaching
that
there to
are
get
revelation.
and
of
the
Middle Ages
a sinful disposition. Saint Augustine prays that
and Saint Thomas too condemns
aspire
authority and
1974, p. 189.
In
deemed
J.V.
to
One Luce,
truths
know
God
it.
beyond human grasp which man is
related
to
certain
ideas
about
could speak about the Authority of the
The
Quest
for
Ulysses,
Phaidon
Press,
London,
von Wright
4
- an idea which in its turn has (Revealed) Word view of the relation between language and reality.
meaning. To understand
this
understanding, however,
not given to
who
interpreters
is
meaning
is
to
its
roots in an archaic
Words have the
possess
common men
Such
is
mediated by
who
exercize the
but
are accepted as trustworthy by those
a natural
truth.
authority. In the orbit of Christian mediaeval culture this authority got
weight partly from the fact that
its
was
it
ancient,
handed down since
times immemorial, but partly also from the fact that,
could mobilize in
that
its
support the worldly
challenged,
it
It was this view of authority in matters of knowledge and truth was contested by awakening science during the Renaissance. Not
agreement with the the
if
power of the Church.
facts
contingent
umanisti
tradition
opinions as true, but agreement with
of a Nature which lay open to inspection by the
The challenge
inquiring mind.
Christian
Word marked
but
also
did not concern only the authority of the that
of
the
Ancient
writers
whom
the
time were busy reviving and trying to reconcile with
of the
their inherited creed.
The encounter in
conflict -
Florence
moons be
between the old and the new view
as told to us
who
-
is
epitomized
in the
between Galileo and the university professors
refused to look in the telescope and see the revolving
of Jupiter, on the ground that Aristotle had shown such bodies to
impossible,
"an
authority
whom
not
only
the
entire
Antiquity but also the venerable Fathers of the Church
This was three hundred years after Dante. authority unwittingly ridiculed their
own
science
of 3
acknowledge".
The learned men who bowed
to
party in a conflict which had by
then deteriorated into one between truth and naked power.
4.
Even though Dante
s
centrifugal Ulysses can truly be said to herald a
new in
spirit which eventually, after centuries of struggle, came to prevail our Western World, it would be a great mistake, I think, to regard
Dante himself
as an early partisan of this spirit.
Dante
is
firmly rooted in
the culture of the Christian Middle Ages. His work, one feels tempted to say,
is
the
consummation and crowning achievement of
moment when
this culture.
At a
the potentialities inherent in the seed had reached their
doubts and cleavage were already beginning to affect the plant, Dante s Commedia presented a vision of the supranatural realm climax and
Quoted from Brecht, Leben des
Galilei, pt. 4.
Dante between Ulysses and Faust has tried to fathom, more loaded with symbol, beautiful and profound than any ever attempted either before or
which Christian
more
spirituality
after.
No
reader of the
Commedia can
fail
with which Dante
condemns
and
the factionism which
wrath
his
at
town
practically every
an exile from
his
But as a
essentially
reflected
Dante is
is
a
be impressed by the violence and decay in the Church
was ravaging the political life of This factionism had made Dante himself
Italy.
beloved Florence. critic
This
reformation.
in
to
signs of corruption
plea
Dante
of his times true
is
for
not
of
least
an order
in
is
aiming his
at restoration
political
thinking.
not at It
is
which the Pope and the Emperor
two aspects of the same universal body political, a Civitas Dei. yearning for an ideal which was threatened with being lost; he
not looking forward to the
new world which
a reborn Ulysses might
yet discover.
With the
of science and the secularization of society it became part and parcel of intellectual morality that the search for knowledge
5.
rise
and truth should not be curtailed by prohibitions. It became conventional between the pursuit and possession of knowledge on
to distinguish sharply
the one
hand and
its
application and use
on the
other.
Many
philosophers
proclaimed knowledge an intrinsic good and something worth pursuing as an end in itself. Therefore one who pursues and finds it cannot be held responsible for the doubtful or even evil use which others might
make
of
his findings.
that
This moral position can be upheld as long as one is reasonably sure bad use of acquired knowledge does not constitute a potential
threat to the very basic conditions of
self-preservation
enlightenment
will
make men more
human
well-being or even to the
and as long as one retains a faith that also contribute to the moral progress of humanity,
of the
race,
-
as the revealing phrase goes. This faith and assurance was for a long time characteristic of the ethos of Western civilization. It had a decisive breakthrough at the time "humane"
of the French Revolution and
it
culminated in the century of European
world-domination which ended with the 1914-1918 war. reinforced
study
and
by it
19th-century
nourished
a
evolutionistic
widely
spread
ideas
in
optimistic
It
nearly belief
was greatly all
in
fields
of
progress
von Wright
6
science,
through
and
technology,
the
rational
human
of
organization
institutions.
This faith
s
no longer stands unchallenged, however. Doubts have come to loom heavily over cultural debate in this century.
pursuit
about
man
the basically blissful, beneficial consequences of
in
of knowledge it
They found an
expression, for example, in
Edmund
Husserl
s
last
work,
the posthumously published Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften.
It
was written before the apocalyptic prospects conjured up by the nuclear arms-race, genetic technology, and large-scale automation and robotization
work had become
Today, half a century later, Husserl s concerns have assumed immediate urgency. It can no longer be taken for of
reality for us.
who
new realms
lead us into
of scientific
granted that
"those
are
and trustworthy guides conducting us to higher levels of and not "false councellors, luring us on to atomic
"prudent
civilization" -
destruction"
knowledge"
words of W. B. Stanford 4 one of the leading
to quote the
on the Ulyssean theme. The question whether the unrestriced pursuit of knowledge is more good or for evil rests ultimately on value premisses the acceptance or
writers
for
rejection
of which
seems obvious
is
not
the
that
a
matter of truth or falsehood. But
optimistic
and
belief in
also
it
progress through scientific
has very little rational enlightenment technological foundation and should therefore rather be abandoned altogether. Nor have
we
innovation
when
the slightest reason to place our hopes in a return to a stage
the Authority of the
knowledge and been unknown they
be
will
Word
there
A is
again reign supreme Such retrograde moves, though abortive, have not our century. The possibility cannot be ruled out that
in
followed
culture a
may
living
nature. Such
matters relating to
truth.
by
successful ones than those
Russia.
in
will
was the case
to express only the
we witnessed
thrive
belief
more
others,
in
subtle
in Hitler s
and
Germany and
under the Authority of the divine
its
in the
inspiration
or
Middle Ages. But when
Word the
is
Stalin s
as long as
otherwise
whims and wishes of worldly power,
authority has no rational justification and
more
therefore
Word
sacred is
seen
clinging to
a regress into barbarism
its
and
the irrational.
What own 4
befits us to do,
capabilities
instead,
and doings. To
W.B. Stanford, The
Ulysses
Theme, 2nd.
is
this
to take a critical attitude to our
end we would be well advised
ed., Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, 1963,
p. 182.
to
Dante between Ulysses and Faust
wisdom embodied
reconsider the
human
in the great
1
works of reflection on the
Homer and Dante and
condition of such teachers of mankind as
Goethe.
So
us cast a brief glance at what guidance they
let
may be
able to
offer us.
6.
The
Ulysses
centrifugal
of
Dante
was
transgressed the limits set by divine authority
condemned
because
he
on the freedom of human
There can be no doubt but
that Faust, in Dante s would have been equally illfated, deserving to be the devil s booty, as indeed he was made to be in the first major work of literature dealing with the subject, Christopher Marlowe s drama "Doctor Faustus".
cognitive enterprise.
opinion,
Goethe
Faust
s
is
also a doubtful character
and a reader may well wonder
whether he deserved to be rescued and go to heaven after his anything but spotless earthly career had come to an end. At least one can reasonably doubt whether his unending striving and refusal content with his achievement by themselves justified his redemption.
Be
may, Goethe s Faust is saved said of the centripetal hero of the Homeric this as
it
to
rest
and the same may be epic. Not only Dante s -
from
ascent
Inferno through Purgatorio to Paradiso but also the of the knight errants of Homer and Goethe are dramas of
narratives
man s road to who had been
salvation.
The Ulysses of
the Odyssey
patiently awaiting his return
came home
to her
all
those years, never losing
trust in the traveller s final return to a life of
mutually shared love and
happiness. Dante
is
kept safe on his wanderings through the abyss by the
divine light of which he
first
saw a
reflection in the love of his youth
and which was eventually to take him, the restless on earth, to eternal beatitude in heaven. And Faust clutches
exile in
from
his
home
rescued from the
of the devil and lifted to heaven by the chorus of angels in whom he once loved but then deserted sings of "das Ewig-
which she
which
lifts
striking
that
Weibliche"
us above the inconstancies of fate to union with
the higher.
7.
It
is
wanderer from disaster Gretchen.
common
in is
all
three
incarnate in
cases
the
power which saves the
a female figure: Penelope, Beatrice,
We
need not overemphasize, however, the femininity of this element of the three tales. The three figures are first and
foremost symbols. The same holds true of their male counterparts. Yet
von Wright
8
what they symbolize as couples, Penelope and Ulysses, Beatrice and Dante, Gretchen and Faust, can naturally be related to those qualities which are traditionally held to be symbolic of womanhood and manhood not
in
only
Western
culture.
On
and an
intuitive
sense of the boundaries which one can
effacing love,
overstep
on
only
peril
of
one side protective
the
On
destruction.
other
the
self-
care,
side
lust
for
glory, untempered enterprize and an boundaries. The two are the Yin and
dominating power and self-centered indomitable will to transscend set the
Yang of ancient Chinese wisdom. Of our three heroes, Faust no doubt two,
external
he
to
is
itself.
symbol of the called
name
this is,
deviated most
Unlike the by convention and not striving for a goal. His enterprize has no telos In Faust s perpetual push forward Spenglcr saw a rule.
which has animated Western Culture.
spirit
culture
has
who
the one
men
widely from the paths set to other
is
Abendland
of our
become
fully
obvious only
He
therefore
How appropriate this our century when science-based
"Faustian".
in
technological developments in combination with the mechanized industrial
mode
of production has nourished a myth of perpetual economic growth and expansionism. The managerial type of rationality of which modern natural science is in origin the outflow has acquired a domination under
which other forms of human
spirituality
emotion.
In
artistic,
moral, religious
-
are
underground of irrational belief and
either thwarted or relegated to the
uncontrolled
-
no other
culture,
surely,
Yang come
has
to
dominate as completely over Yin as in our own in its later days. The cultures of which the other two heroes, Homer s Ulysses and Dante of the Commedia, are representatives, viz. the culture of Ancient
Greece and
that of the Christian
two
between
Middle Ages, struck a happier balance Greek mythology and philosophy
the opposing emphasizes throughout the necessity for man to stay with the melron befitting his capabilities and not lapse into hybris which is then corrected forces.
by nemesis, the goddess-guardian of equilibrium in the kosmos. Christian religion and philosophy is inherently ambiguous on man s freedom in relation to the created natural order of things. But
salvation
God
s
for
those
superior
There
is
who curb
wisdom and care no way back
their
selfish
will
it
paves a road to
and put
their
faith
in
for their well-being.
for us
moderns
either to Ancient belief in a
harmony or to Dante s dream Christian commonwealth. We must try
self-preserving cosmic
of the restoration
on a universal
to attain
our own
Dante between Ulysses and Faust
9
understanding of our situation. And I have wanted to say belongs to this achievement that we take warning of the fate
self-reflective
that
it
which the poet foresaw for the non-Homeric Ulysses who steered his vessel beyond the pillars of Hercules and thereby entered the road to self-annihilation.
Academy
of Finland
TULLIO GREGORY
Forme
conosccnra c
di
idcali di
sapcrc
nclla cullura mcdicvalc
una forcsta vicino a
In
c
triste
sorgente,
insegnate da alcuni alia teologia
assorto
e
affidate
filosofi
che e signora della
con stupore come Dio questo mondo,
in
che
aveva
Raimondo
Parigi,
desolate,
in
-
arrivo
un
mano un
libro
come
concordia che
la
che anche
disse
concordia.
ci
errori
sugli
si
Raimondo,
scritti,
-
Socrate
si
domandava
permetta
tanti errori
e,
alcuni
di
restituito
il
salutato
Raimondo
filosofi,
gli
chiese
saluto, rispose che
aspetta fra causa e effetto. Socrate di rimando
lui,
della
Raimondo
si
corresse
e theologia
philosophic!
polivalen/a
dci di
sccoli
il
significati
vengono assumendo
filosofo
emblematicamente
ritrovare
corso
del
risposta
quale, secondo prospettive diverse, nel
contraric
gli
1
di
-
dottrine
tutto
da molti anni, desiderava conoscerc quclla stessa
pcnsiero medievale, sc non termini
false
del
poter mettere d accordo teologia e filosofia secondo
problematicita
tentati
delle
Mentre Raimondo
nome
In questo immaginario incontro di nella
csame
loro
vcrita e sapienza
filosofo di
perche era cosi triste e assorto. stava cercando
ai
filosofia...
somma
Lullo se no stava prcsso una
nell
-
si
greco
riassunto il
Lullo con Socrate e
tutto
rischio di
potrebbe esser 1
itinerario
del
in
due
ipostati/./.are
un piu complesso discorso lungo il e venuto organi/./ando e sistemando
patrimonio delPesperienza cristiana. La stessa che dall cta patristica alia fine del Medioevo
termini philosophic! e theologia
i
si
(dalla philosophic!
Christi alia philosophic! Aristolelis, dalla theologia varroniana alia teologia
come
scienza) indica
come sarebbe
concordia o discordia attravcrso trattasse di categorie
i
fuorviante pretendere di seguire la loro secoli della cultura medievale, quasi
si
permanenti c intcmporali di cui fosse compito dello
storico individuarc la varia manifestazione nel tempo.
Dcclara;
:>
Raymundi per moduni
Raymundus Lullus und Gcschichte dcr Philosophic des
dialogi cdita, cd. O. Keichcr,
Stellung zur arabischen Philosophic Mittelalters, VII, 4-5) Miinster, 1909, p.95.
seine
(Bcitrage zur
Fomie
di
di significati
Analoga ampiezza
ideali di sapere
assumono
usati ora per distinte
forme
come sinonimi per
ora
di sapere,
latino biblico e dalle traduzioni medievali di
allineare testi che
facile
Dei
sapientia
di
d&WEcclesiastico
di scientia,
significati
dalla sua identificazione
inflat,
reriim;
ne
alia
con
la il
tutto
aristotelicum
il
non
di
un
sapere
agostiniana
fra
sapienlia
e
distinctio,
ut
ricerca
recta
scientiae
cognitio
intellectuals,
rationalis")
messa
e
in
ad
Anche
qui
polisemia di sapienlia
come -
di Aristotele
carisma
-
universalis
cosi
come
alia scientia
la
quae
metafisica alia scienlia lemporalium
concetto
effimero.
medievale
non
Anche ergo
("Si
scienlia
di
alia
a patto di rinserrare nel
itinerario
complesso scienlia
filosofiche.
sapienlia
causarum"
definizione degli Analitici di Aristotele se
nemus
la
dalla scientia
pud ricondursi
certo
opere
confermano
scientia "primorum principiorum et
varicta
indicare una
tutti
significati
dalla
scientia c sapienlia (di cui
esperienze vastissime, di ideali di conoscenza e di vita, con autorizzati tanto dalla tradizione classica, quanto dal
di
sarebbe
1 1
e thcologia pretendono cssere esprcssioni supreme), termini
philosophia
gamma
conoscenza e
la
di
una
cultura
classica
haec
est
alia
distinzionc
sapientiae
ct
ad sapientiam pertineat aeternarum rerum vero temporalium rerum cognitio
scientiam
discussione dallo stesso Agostino
("Nee
ista
duo
sic
accipiamus, quasi non liceat dicere vel istam sapientiam quae in rebus humanis est vel illam scientiam quae in divinis. Loquendi enim latiore
consuetudine oscillazione
medievale.
utraque di
utraque scientia variamente soggiace a
sapientia,
significati
dici
potest")
tutta
la
e
tale
tradizione
2
Osservazioni non diverse potrebbero
mente connessi a
quelli sin qui ricordati
farsi
come
su
altri
termini stretta-
ratio e intellcctus, visio e
Iheoria, doctrina e disciplina.
Cio non vuol dire che la storia di queste parole e dei significati che via via son venute assumendo non costituisca una trama utile al nostro
discorso
che dovra tuttavia puntare a individuare, se possibile,
quali contenuti essi veicolino, senza presumere di avere una preliminare
definizione di cos e scienlia o sapere e senza privilegiare la teorizzazione di
un metodo
scientia
e
in
cosa
rapporto
non
lo
al e:
quale
si
credesse possibile individuare cosa e
presupposto che talora soggiace
alle
sottili
Fr. Glorie, Agostino, De Trinitate, XII, xv, 25; XIII, xix, 24, ed. W.J. Mountain Turnholti, 1968, pp. 379, 417; "nomen sapientiae accipitur pro scientia et e converse, ut docet Augustinus..." annotera Roberto di Kilwardby riferendosi a questi luoghi (Roberti Kilwardby De natura theologiae, ed. Fr. Stegmiiller, Monasterii, 1935, p. 45).
12
Gregory sul
storiografiche
indagini
XIV
XIII e
teologici fra
scienza, ove
grande dibattito che dividera
vari
indirizzi
come
spesso misurata sul metro della logica
scientificita e stata
la
i
secolo attorno alia concezione dclla teologia
aristotelica.
cristianesimo e
"II
e
pratica, all ini/.io
del suo Trattato pratico
Se
teologia":
del
finire
sul
-
filosofia era acquisita
in
nostro salvatore, costituita di
dottrina del Cristo,
la
fisica
un testo ben noto, Evagrio Pontico
in
cosi,
o
monaco?
il
IV secolo
1
identificazione
e
cristianesimo
di
di
del resto Pevoluzione del termine stesso
seguendo
eta ellenistica da
in
risolta
tempo
eucre/3et,a
("nullum
post nos habiturum dilectum simplicem, qui est philosophiae, quae sola est 4 dovra qui in cognoscenda divinitate frcquens obtutus et sancta religio")
essere sottolineata
risoluzione nella
la
discipline
come momenti
tica al
dei
non solo
quem 13,
la
orientano
fede
alia
e
a yaxrLC,
I
aeterna ut cognoscant
Christum"
1
Asclepius,
12,
ed.
Ge0 e L insegnamento
e
il
il
la
regno
di
evangelico
solum verum
te,
ma
fede,
Deum
et
versetto paolino (/ Cor.,
enigmate, tune autem facie ad itinerario della speculazione cristiana come tensione
visione:
una
-
con
identificata
volta
conoscenza dei misteri e pratica della
eixre/Seta,
A.D. Nock,
in
filosofia
la
Evagre le Pontique, Traite pratique ou Guillaumont et Cl. Guillaumont, Paris, 1971, t. II, 1
-
(JoH., 17, 3)
nunc per speculum
"videmus
faciem",
vita
lesum
misisti
12)
dalla
autem
est
"haec
della
6/jocwcrcc,
l
"scienza
5
definitivamcnte
era
intelligenza
faccia a faccia dclla verita.
o
Dio"
delPintelletto".
greca
patristica all
di
"regno
sostanza
alia
prepara una tensione cscatologica ove
Dio, contcmplazione -
della
filosofia
la
-
OeoAo^CKT]
Trinita", "coestesa
cruciale
esperienza
realizza in
e la
cieli"
(yyoxTLC,) della santa
fissata:
tripartito),
i
"regno
Un
delle
intese
successivi momenti della ^ryctXTTtKT); che e presupposto per o "scienza (yi^xrcc,
passibilita la fisica
Cristo"
itinerario spirituale: la Tipa/crc/cY) realizza quell im-
un
di
(So^r/ia) di
"dottrina
(secondo un tradizionale schema
filosofiche
trad.
le
moine,
ed.,
trad.,
comm.
vita
par
A.
p. 499.
A.-J.
Festugiere,
in
Corpus Htrmeticum,
t.
II,
Paris, 1945, p. 311. 1
Evagre
le
significato della
Pontique,
op.
TTPOOCTCKT)
cit.,
in
pp.
Evagrio,
499, cfr.
1
501
e
introd.,
cfr. 1. 1,
p.
498
pp. 48 sgg.
n.
1;
per
il
particolare
Forme
di conoscenza e ideali di sapere
13
assume una densita nuova poichc conscguc, in forza dclla mediazione di Cristo, quclla picnczza di conoscenza vanamente cercata -
cristiana
dalla filosofia pagana.
In
questa
ove
prospettiva
conoscere
il
portante perche termine ultimo della -
verita
della
costituisce
struttura
la
del credente e la conoscenza
rivendicando
cristiana,
un sapere che trova
filosofia, realizza
di
riflessione
la
vita
titolo
il
vera
di
suo fondamento nella rivelazione
il
Dio, nella Bibbia parola di Dio, nella storia della salvczza al cui centre
evento unico e irripetibile che e 1 incarnazione del Verbo, ratio e sapientia di Dio: la fede nel Dio che ha rivelato agli uomini i disegni sta quell
della sua
economia
costituisce
orizzonte di una nuova esperienza dalla
1
quale trae alimento un sapere che trascende, poiche storicamente piu ricco, la cultura
Qui non
pagana:
non experietur;
crediderit,
et qui expertus
non
non
fuerit,
cognosce!.
Conoscere, sacramenti
e
cui
di
tessuta
ma
Bibbia
la
non
portatrice
e
misteri
i
solo
di
i
una
un sapere e di una scienza totale. Sarebbe escludere da una delineazione degli ideali medievali di
rivelazione salvifica,
quindi
sara quindi leggere e decifrare
intelligere
difficile
di
scienza e di conoscenza quella forma di sapere propria del cristianesimo
che nasce dal progressive approfondimento del testo sacro in tutta la sua rnira profunditas: quando i Padri greci riconducono tutte le arti e le filosofiche
discipline
all
(delta anche teologia), 1
non
ideale della paideia greca con filosofia
alia
("quel
che
alia
esegesi,
essi
il
filosofi
i
scienza
o
Scrittura
della
limitano a trasferire in
si
campo
di
Dio
cristiano
rapporto propedeutico delle arti rispetto dicono della geometria e della musica,
della grammatica, della retorica e delPastronomia, essere le ausiliarie della -
filosofia, noi al
scriveva Origene
cristianesimo"),
indicano
nella
integrita
e
-
Papplicheremo alia filosofia un operazione assai piu
ma compiono
Bibbia
le
delle
origini
purezza e rivendicano
la
arti
priorita
trovato nei sapienti greci imitatori e seguaci.
da Origene nel prologo del commento risale
I
inventio
Anselmi
Epistola
Edimburgi 1946, Philocalia, lettre
delle
vol.
13,
d Origene a
II,
in
de
discipline
incarnations
e
al
II
1,
di
rapporto
significativa:
filosofia
nella
loro
una tradizione che ha
tema
e chiaramente svolto
Cantico dei Cantici: a Salomone
filosofiche
Verbi,
della
in
ed.
("quas
F.S.
Graeci
Schmitt,
ethicam,
Opera
Ommia,
p. 9.
Gregoire
le
Thaumaturge, Remerciement a
Gregoire, par H. Crouzel, Paris, 1969, p. 189.
Origene
suivi
de
la
14
Gregory
aggiungc forse physicam, cnopticen appcllarunt, has diccrc possumus 8 ciascuna dcllc tre e a naturalcm moralem Rufino inspectivam")
parti/.ioni
corrisponde
moralem
docuit
tradidit...
in
libri
Secundum
locum...
cst
id
suoi
dci
Cantico
vero
naturalis
qui
da questi
canlicorum";
sapienza greca: sumpta a Salomone... sed haec Salomon ante
omnes
in
Provcrbiis appellatur,
hoc
libello
deriva tutta la
libri
ergo ut mihi videtur, sapientes
"haec
in
ergo
("primo
Inspectivum quoque locum
Ecclesiaste...
in
comprehendit
uno
quique Graecorum
invenit et docuit per
9 che sapientiam quam accepit a Deo"). Secondo un analoga prospettiva, riconduceva le discipline filosofiche alia Bibbia come al loro fonte,
Origene indicava
altrcsi
nei
tre
Abramo, Isacco
patriarch!
e
Giacobbe
morale, naturale e inspectiva.
maestri rispettivamente della filosofia
i
I
fortuna nel parallelism! e le genealogie poste da Origene avranno larga delle risolu/.ione della il variamente con essi Medioevo e articolato, tema, discipline
nella
filosofiche
Sapien/a ha costruito excidit
sette
columnas arti
la
propria dimora
septem",
liberal!
e
divina philosophia;
Prov., 9,
della
libri
i
le
colonne su cui
sette
("sapientia
acdificavit sibi
saranno presto identificate con
1)
la
domum le
Bibbia assegnati alle varie parti della
filosofia:
Inveniuntur omnes illae tres nhilosophiae Graecorum etiam in divina ante Scriptura. Et omnis etiam philosophia et omnes modi locutionum fuerunt in Scriptura divina, quam apud sophist as saeculares, quia si quid habuerunt, de Dei dono habuerunt, ipso largiente.
Tutto
conferma
trovava
questo
significativa
nelle
mitologiche
genealogie tese a dimostrare la dipenden/a storica della cultura greca dai in Abramo colui che avrebbe patriarch! e dai profeti ebrei, ora indicando insegnato attravcrso
scien/a
la I
agli
Egi/i
identifica/ione di
dai
quali
1
apprese
Mose con Museo,
Mose, ora invece
capostipite della filosofia
cd. W.A. Bachrcns, Ix;ip/.ig, Origcnis Commentariunt in Cant. Canticonim, Prologus, in luogo di cnopticen, G. Dahan ("Origene et Jean Cassicn dans un Liber de litterairc du et Moyen Age, LI I philosophia Salomonis", Archives d histoire doctrinate di leggcre epopticen come attestato da alcuni manoscritti. 137, n. 11) 1
1925, p. 75;
propone
(1985), p. Dello stcsso
Dahan,
cfr.
quidam dc philosophia
"L
et
nc introduction a la philosophic au XII Archives d hist. doctr. et eius",
partihus
la hibl. 155-193 (e (1982), pp. classifica/ioni delle scien/.c filosofiche).
9
Origene, 2,I\L.
prol.,
op. 15,
cit.,
Christiani
75-76;
cfr.
indicata
Ambrosius,
per
i
F^cpositio
siccle.
lilt,
cit.,
in
Matthaeum Evangelistam,
2,
Tractatus varie
problcmi
inercnti
Evangelii
secundum Lucam,
pp. 78-79.
Druthmari Ex.
Ix;
du M. A., XLIX
1608B-1609A.
1
Origene, op.
p.
ivi
C
P.L. 106, 1284-85.
le
Fonne o facendo
grcca,
di
conoscenza e ideali di sapere
Platonc un disccpolo dei profcti cbrci; 12 temi non
di
-
estranei alia cultura ellenistica
aveva
grcco",
"cos
Numcnio
scritto
orientale
sull originc
15
della
attinto per difendere la
che
e
filosofia
non un Mose che parla
e Platone se
-
supremazia della
rientrano alia
grcca
in
quclla
disputa
qualc gia Taziano aveva
"filosofia
altri
barbara";
invece,
una piu ampia visione dell economia della salvez/a, cercheranno, come Giustino e Clemente Alessandrino, nella comune ispirazione del logo in
la
pedagogo
giustificazione delle
tra
affinita
la
filosofia
dei greci e dei
cristiani.
Sarebbe qui
scarsa utilita soppesare quanto della cultura antica
di
perduri e sia utilizzato nell ambito della riflessione cristiana, quasi che
il
valore di questa possa dipendere dalla maggiore o minore misura di quella utilizzazione; cio che interessa sottolineare e
conoscenza e ogni
sapere che proprio per
di
e
arte
disciplina,
La forma
precristiano.
sostituendosi
definirsi
il
un ideale
di
di
suo essere totalizzante include
il
ideali
agli
del
culturali
piu alta di questa nuova conoscenza,
1
mondo
orizzonte
piu vasto di questo nuovo sapere e offerto dall esegesi, via di accesso alia scientia divina trasmessa dalla Bibbia:
sacra
Scriptura scientia
spiritualis
ac
divina
ex
II
metodo per
decifrare
scientia
condi
qua ipsa Scriptura multiplicari non desmit.
plena est; eademque augeri semper ac
coepit,
misteri riposti in questa spiritualis scientia
i
e costituito dalla dottrina dei sensi della Scrittura, sviluppo sistematico
secondo
della tensione dalla lettera allo spirito
le
suggestion! di Origene,
ovunque present! nel Medioevo. Precisa insistenza sull ordo, rationes e le consequentiae che debbono essere osservate nella 1
testo sacro: a questo sapere 12
de
Su tutto I
Ecriture,
il
I,
1,
tema,
cfr.
il
classico
ricordino
H. de
le discipline
Lubac, Exegese
inedic\>ale.
le
lettura del
poiche
"nulla
Lcs quatre sens
Paris, 1959, in partic. pp. 74-94.
Numcnius, Fragments, par Ed. des Si
coordinano tutte
si
le leges,
due temi
Places, Paris, 1973,
fr. 8,
p. 51.
donna schiava catturata
guerra che 21, 10 sgg.), e le ricchezze rubate agli Egizi dagli Ebrei al momento della fuga (Esodo, 3, 22 e utilizzazione della cultura pagana e il suo ruolo ancillare 12, 35), per giustificare rispetto aU esegesi e alia teologia: cfr. II. de Lubac, Exegese nicdie\>ale, cit., pp. 290 sgg. e J. de Ghellinck, Le mouvement thcologique du Xlf siecle, Bruxelles-Paris, 1948",
deve
avere
i
unghie
e
capelli
esegetici tagliati
la
classici,
prima
di
1
pp. 94-95. 15
Rabano Mauro,
In Ex.,
Ill, 10,
P.L. 108,
USA.
esser
presa
per
moglie
in
(Dent.,
16
Gregory
enim sacra scriptura Tanto piu feconda di
cst
que
frutti
summa
XII che e
di
il
Ugo
Didascalicon,
16
careat
disciplinarum".
sara la lettura del testo, quanto piu ricca la
scienza delPinterprete: in quella
alia lettura della Bibbia,
liberalium
regulis
esemplare della cultura del secolo
San Vittore, come necessaria premessa
rende paradigmatica
la
sua personale esperienza:
Ego affirmare audco nihil me unquam quod ad eruditionem pertineret contempsisse, sed multa saepe didicisse, quae aliis loco, aut deliramento similia viderentur... Omnia disce, videbis postea esse superfluum. Coartata scientia iucunda non est.
Anche
afferma,
all
che
filosofiche
alle
in
applica la classificazione delle discipline
si
esegesi quindi
essa rientrano tutte di pieno diritto.
soglie
una
del
patristica greca e latina in
autem
nihil
dottrina
E
Eucherio che
maturata
Medioevo, una pagina giustamente famosa:
nella
gia
mundi huius philosqphiam suam
in trcs partes logicam, id est naturalem, moralcm, rationalem. .. Quam tripartitam doctrinae disputationem non adeo abhorret ilia nostrorum in disputatione distinctio, qua docti quique hanc coelestem Scripturarum philosophiam secundum historiam, secundum tropologiam, secundum anagogen disserendam putarunt.
Sapientia divisit:
Non
diversamente indichera
giovanneo,
fra
intelligibilis,
il
Giovanni preciso
discipline
ermeneutici
strumenti vertex
ethicam,
physicam,
della
Eriugena, parallclismo
filosofiche "theoria"
e
che
nelPomelia
sensi
della vallis
prologo mundiis
e
scrittura
fra
dalla
sul
veri
Scrittura,
historiae
sale
al
mantis theologiae: Divina siquidem scriptura mundus quidam est intelligibilis, suis quattuor partibus, veluti quattuor dementis, constitutus. Cuius terra est
veluti
in
medio imoque,
instar
historia;
centri,
circa
quam,
abyssys circumfunditur moralis intelligentiae, quae a Graecis H8IKH solet appellari. Circa quas, historiam dico et ethicam, veluti duas praefati mundi inferiores partes, aer ille naturalis scientiae circumvolvitur: quam, naturalem dico scientiam, Gracci vocant <J>TCIKHN. Extra autem omnia et ultra, aethercus ille
aquarum
igneusque
1
Giovanni
1975, p. 16:
similitudine,
ardor
cmpyrii
cacli,
hoc
est,
superae
Eriugena, Expositiones in ierarchiam coelestem, cd. J. Barbel, Turnholt, enim multe aque ex diversis fontibus in unius fluminis alueum confluunt
"Ut
unam
atque dccurrunt, ita naturales et liberates discipline contemplationis significationem adunantur, qua summus
in
Christus, undique per diversas theologie speculationes scriptura est que regulis liberalium careat disciplinarum".
insinuatur...
17 18
Ugo
contemplationis
fons
totius
eandemque
interne
qui est enim sacra
sapientie,
Nulla
di S. Vittore, Didascalicon, VI, 3, P.L. 176, 799-801.
Eucherius, Formularum spiritalis intelligentiae ... liber units, Cassiani Conlatio xiv, 8, ed. E. Pichery, vol. II, Paris, 1958, pp. 189-192.
P.L.
50,
728;
cfr.
Forme
conoscenza e ideali di sapere
di
17
divinae naturae, quam gracci theologiani nominant, circumglobatur; quam nullus cgrcditur intellcctus.
ultra
Le testimonianze potrebbcro dcfmirsi sin dall eta patristica,
c
una
20
scripturarum
"vera
21
verborum
substructura".
volta
i
secondo
-
dialettica
tecniche
vera
della
ratio,
intellectus,
piu
scienze
delle
Agostino e
1
come
esempio
nell
lascera
spazio alle
dell
della
Opuscula
degli
utilizzera
Eriugena, e
6cacpeTLK77
e
discorso
del
ai>aAirr<,KT7
saporose medita-
piu
sapientia)
sempre come una forma fidem
intelligentia,
e al volatiis allegoriae, ma si porra conoscenza a fide incoans ad speciem tendens: speciem intellectum quern in hac vita capimus esse medium
(sapida
spirituali
"inter
quasi
definira di
sapere
termine greco), patristica esuberante conoscenza simbolica,
strumenti
della
ct
del
insegnamento o piu raramente,
-
et
il
di
si
di
Scrittura,
"rcrum
"subsellia
matrice
della
neoplatoniche
nelPesercizio
della la
Mediocvo,
il
ncll csegesi
sono
arti
di
1
Boezio
di
realizza
si
conoscenza e
di
(secondo
sottili
piu
le
scienza
procedimenti
i
applichera
zioni
come
o theologia
seguira
le
Qucsta forma
volta
in
theoria
sacra
22
cui
di
scientia",
tutto
in
permanerc chc
scientia"
chc interessa e
qucl
moltiplicarsi; il
et
di
23 intelligo".
Non
e
il
metodo
del
intellectualiter
teologico
dei
contemplazione
e il
il
-
restando
pur
religiosita monastica,
"in
Particolazione
dialettica
non direttamente
trattatistica
un
la rationes necessariae
di
Anselmo
fortemente
segna Pinizio di
Giovanni Eriugena, Homelie sur
Pevoluzione
intellectus
come
sacramenti della Scrittura a un piu
dei
L opera
costituito.
e
Pimportanza che nella divinis precetto boeziano
parallelo passaggio da
e
misteri
Pitinerario
nota
ancora
piu
impegno per enucleare
dogmatico ormai
19
assume
e
versari"
legata al testo biblico, con
sottolineato
qui
anselmiano che sottende una
dell intelligere
decisive
accennare
per
da Agostino a Anselmo:
dcll intelligere
storia
luogo
-
all
legata
un patrimonio
di
come
e stato piu volte
esperienza
e
alia
una costruzione sistematica e non
Prologue de Jean, ed. Ed. Jeauneau, Paris, 1969,
le
pp. 270-272.
Cassiani
Canticorum, 21
Conlatio 8, vers. 9,
10,
cit.,
195;
p.
cfr.
Alcuini
Compendium
Petrus eucharistie
Cantor, a
la
fin
De du
tropis
XII
e
loquendi, siecle",
cit.
in
Archives
Ed.
d hist.
Dumoutct, doctr.
et
"La
litt.
(1943-1945), p. 182.
93
in
Canticum
Walafridus Strabus, Liber ecclesiasticus, 34, P.L. 113, 1217.
99 1
xiv,
P.L. 100, 663.
Anselmi CurDeus homo, Commendatio
opcris, ed. Schmitt, vol.
II, p.
40.
theologie de A., XIV
du M.
18
Gregory riflessione
dclla
esegetica
come approfondimento
intesa
tcologica,
delle
strutture razionali e nccessarie dell oggetto di fede (ratio fidei), della sua
come
interna coerenza; cosi
suo
continue
riferimento
un
annunciava
1
la
De
il
forza
fondamento
di
24
fidei
("nostrae
summae
in quella ratio
ma
rationem
-
e
patristica
simboliche"
alia rivelazione,
pur nel
Ambrogio
tradizione
dalla
"inclusion!
-
del mistero
non solo
capacita stessa
la
trova
inquirere")
naturae che sola rende
suo
il
Puomo capace
ilia, de qua micat omne verum, quod rationali menti lucet". luce del Verbo - il maestro intcriore secondo rinsegnamento di
di verita:
E
e
Agostino
decisive distinzioni dialettichc. Tuttavia
di
la ratio fidei
indagare
di
distacco
perdita di tutte le
uso della ratio e sempre ancorato
di
sacra coena di Berengario
autorita
alle
progressive
agostiniana con eucaristico in
gia
la
"lux
che
-
Agostino
manifesta nella rivelazione e apre aWintelligere spazi
si
non deve sfuggire il valore essenziale, in tutta la tradizione agostiniana, della dottrina deH illuminazione che non e una metafora, ma indica lo statuto proprio della mente umana, la sua infiniti.
te
Intclligo
illuminante:
condizione e natura che
rende idonea a
la
verita di fede. Ratio veritatis
fondamento ontologico
dialettica;
un tempo
a
resi
anzitutto discipline
principio
in
state create,
-
-
Verbo, Ao^oc, e Patris
il
e logici.
filosofi
sacra pagina e
della
quell unica ratio
che illumina
non
costante
1
a
la
fonte
di
24
H.
mente umana
caso
esaltazione
e
Lubac,
Corpus
della
mysticum.
si
tradizione
nella
sacramentomm, mystcrionim
dc
25
II
ratio
ratio,
il
uso della
di
Clemente
summa
sophia,
in
la
coordinarsi di tutte
cui
ha
tutte
e
patristica
I
ai
eglise
ratio
au
le
suo
il
cose sono
economia
altomedievale mysteria
profonda
ratio facti,
et
le
e manifestata nell
piu
ci
primato della ratio e
che soggiace
L cucharistie
nell
all intellectus fidei,
verita
sacramenta della storia sacra e ne guida ratio
si
I
cristiani,
lettura
salvezza;
ritorna
deve riconoscere
ragione nella quale
primato del Verbo; Punita del sapere,
il
alia
della
il
della
Alessandrino, potra dire che
ha
nos docuit scriveva Ansclmo sottolineando
imago Dei ogni giorno riscoperta e Abelardo, riproponcndo un tema che fu gia
ricordava Berengario
delle
la necessitas
intelligere
e
ai
intelligentia:
allegoriae,
Moyen Age,
ratio
Paris,
1949-, p. 254.
25
Anselmi
Proslogion,
Cur Deus homo,
14,
4,
24. Berengario, Ilagae Comitis, 1941, p.
ed. F.S. Schmitt, vol. II, pp. 50, 130; 3; II, 19, I, Schmitt, vol. I, pp. 112, 104; Monologion, 9, ed. Schmitt, vol. I, De sacra coena adversus Lanfrancum, 23, ed. W.H. Beekenkamp,
ed.
p. 47; P.
Abaelardi Ep. XIII, P.L. 178, 355.
Forme historia
mystica,
conoscenza e ideali di sapere
di
habet
propriam
cuncta divinae rationis sunt plena
Un mutamento
radicalc
proponendo e forme
all
*
*
quando un diverse concetto
Occidente
di
esperienze
ratio,
inlelligentiae
,
avra
si
interioris
rationem,
26
*
verra
19
attraverso
latino
estranee
sapere
tradizione
alia
di ratio
si
conoscenza
la
di
e
patristica
altomedievale, con una concezione del mondo e dell uomo, con una fisica e una metafisica ignote all esile pedagogia delle sette arti liberali. E la scoperta di una cultura profana, 1 irruzione di autori pagani intonsi et illoti
21
nuovo ambiente
nel
scolastico
cittadino
lungo
XII
secolo
il
a
segnare una svolta profonda, a marcare una periodizzazione precisa, come rilevarono subito le prime storie della cultura medievale scritte in eta umanistica: in concreto sono le traduzioni di
nuova concezione da\\
ordo
e
dalla
di
di
scienza
dell esegesi.
Se gia
ratio
awiavano
a
sacramenta
di cui e tessuta la
nettamente
il
via
una
metteva
che
commenti
in
aveva
ma
biblici
creaturae
perdita
nuovo sapere
tradotti,
medievale
e
ragione
parola
i
le
crisi il
trattati
piu
dei
dalle
della
leggi,
dialettica
e
mysteria
la vita cristiana,
strutture
suo
rette
progress!
Dio e
e scientifici
natura e con essa una
non piu
filosofico e scientifico,
trovato nei
di
di
simbolico
valore
del
filosofici
testi
una nuova idea
greci e arabi che fanno scoprire
trasmesso dai
profonde
del
dei
ancor piu testi via
simbolismo
ampio spazio non solo
de natura remm, trasformando
nei liber
il
sistema di simboli, oggetto di una lettura non diversa da
in
quella praticata nell esegesi del testo sacro. essenziale
Componente conoscenza e
della
mentalita
modello
medievale,
sapere destinato a perdurare nei secoli successivi
di
come
Tractatus mysteriorum, I, 31, ed. J.-P. Brisson, Paris 1947, p. 126; Ambrosii I, 2, P.L. 16, 406; Ambrosii Enarrationes in XII Psalmos Da\>idicos, In Ps.
Hilarii
De
di
Mysteriis,
P.L.
Lanfranci
De
et sanguine Domini, 150, 425; 15, P.L. Glueck, Vindobonae-Lipsiae. 1936, p. 62; Cassiani Conlatio xiv, 8, cit. p. 191; Origenis In Leviticum, horn. IX, 9, P.G. 12, 521; Ruperti In Exodum comm. I, 28, P.L. 167, 596; ex Origene Selecta in Ezechielem, 28, P.G. 13, 821-22; In Genesim, horn. II, 2, P.G. 12, 167-68; Hilarii In Evangelium Matthad I,
41,
Gaudentii
14,
commentarius,
significativo
Abailardi di "philosophies
VIII,
6
14, 3, P.L. 9, 997;
L espressione
regis
987;
Tractatus,
-
che
contesto
si
della
(51),
corpore
ed.
Ruperti In
riferisce
all
Disputatio
Thomas Moreniensis
(ed.
A.
Exodum comm., episodio catholicorum
di
P.L. 167, 612. a
cui
patrum
n.
14
contra
N.M. Ha ring, Studi medievali, XXII
Platonem, Virgilium, Macrobium, intonsos
introduxit".
II, 5,
biblico
et
illotos,
-
ricorre
dogmata
nel Petri
(1981), p. 368):
ad convivium supcrni
20
Gregory vitale
patrimonio
dell esperienza
concezione
la
cristiana,
e
1
inter-
pretazione simbolica della natura rispondevano a una dottrina precisa: il mondo create un libro scriptus digito Dei, calamo Dei 1 essere
inscriptus^ attraverso il quale Dio si rivela e indica la via per risalire a lui: il liber creaturae sarebbe stato sufficiente all uomo se il peccato non avesse reso necessaria creata.
29
Sulla
anche per Pintelligenza della natura
Scrittura
la
natura
della
priorita
Scrittura
alia
rispetto
giovera
per meglio comprendcre che in questo contesto parlare della natura come libro scritto da Dio non e usare una metafora, ma designare
insistere
cio che la natura intelligibile.
biblica,
e
esegesi
1
videlicet
suo esser segno e tipo proprieta delle cose
le
un ordine
di
comporta quindi
aeterna 30
et
una
in
puntuale
mundo
e
concordia
divino arbitrio institutae
("natura
vcl
interrogata,
31
2
concordia"),
cosi nella natura
humano
814;
"singulae
placito inventae, sed
ad manifestandam invisibilium Dei
Vittorc, De tribus dicbus, 4, P.L. 176, T. Wright, London, 1863, p. 125.
San
di
naturis rerum,
quaedam
si
pari loquuntur
nella Scrittura res ipsae sunt figiirac?
sunt non
per scripturam richiamano e si
declarat,
Scrittura
unum eumdemque sensum
creaturae quasi figurae
Ugo
seipsam natura
creaturam"),
Scriptura consulta,
come
un testo sacro. Strumenti della rivelazione divina
di
lux
ergo
corrispondono
28
il
e,
nature e
il
("Duplicitcr
e
le
messaggio secondo quello stesso dinamismo che, ncll esegesi va dalla lettcra allo spirito, poiche anche il discorso de natura
decifrarne
renim
veramente
Conoscere
33 sapientiam".
Ncckam DC
Alexandri
prol., ed.
II,
II. de Lubac, Exegese medie\ ale, I, 1, pp. 121-125; cfr. il bcl tcsto di Cfr. Bonaventura, Coll. in Hex., XIII, 12, Opera, V, p. 390A: "Certum cst, quod homo stans habcbat cognitioncm rerum crcatarum et per illarum repraesentationem ferebatur in Deum... Cadente autem nomine, cum amisisset cognitionem, non erat qui reducerct eas
in
Deum. Unde
autem autem
alius
fuit
iste
liber,
liber,
per
mundus, quasi emortuus
scilicet
qucm
iste
ut
illuminaretur,
et
necessarius
deletus erat;
accipcret metaphoras rerum. Hie
Scripturae, qui ponit similitudines, proprietates et metaphoras rerum in scriptarum. Liber ergo Scripturae rcparativus est..." (ed. F. Delorme, Firenze-Quaracchi, 1934, p. 150).
libro
liber est
mundi
Giovanni Eriugena, Homclie sur Riccardo di Cosi
Ugo
Benjamin major, V,
7,
cit.
p. 254.
P.L. 196, 176.
de theologia ed. G.H. Tavard, "quaestio" Recherches de theologie ancienne theologia
De
tratta
di
San
"St.
et
",
di
Recherches Th. A. M., 33
Prophetam,
Prologue de Jean,
una
in
Questions 230 (si p.
S. Vittore,
le
un anonima
XIX
compilazione:
cfr.
II.
Fr.
Bonaventure medievale,
s
Disputed
XVII
Dondaine,
nelle
(1950), stesse
(1952), pp. 244-270).
Vittore,
De
tribus
diebus,
34, di scuola vittorina, P.L. 96, 723B.
P.L.
176,
814;
cfr.
Comm.
in
Nahum
Forme Di
conoscenza e
non
nesso,
il
qui
di
21
ideali di sapere
estrinseco
natura-Scrittura
parallclismo,
quae creatura probai)^ quindi identita di strumcnti che esegetici permettono di cogliere, anche nella creatura, inscgnamcnti religiosi e morali, realta rivclate da Dio, prcfigurazioni di eventi cruciali 1
explicat
(Scriptura
dclla storia sacra.
Non
sarebbe
simbolica
difficile
e
nell esegesi
sacramentale e
nei
liturgica,
vario
il
seguire
come
de natura rerum
trattati
suo esplodere nelle
il
della
articolarsi
arti
lettura
nella
vita
ma
figurative,
piu
non e uno sprofondare nel e deH immaginario, ne un semplice processo di
interessa sottolineare che la lettura simbolica
mondo
del
fantastico
interpretazione allegorica
come
quello applicato alle favole antiche: essa
rappresenta invece una forma di conoscenza, un modo per afferrare la che soggiace ai misteri e ai sacramenti di cui 6 tessuta la parola di una tecnica dimostrativa coerente alia struttura stessa della realta e Dio,
ratio
al
rapporto ontologico fra simbolo e significato, una via anagogica per
la
piu alta theoria. "Symbolum,
collatio
ad demostrationem nel suo
commento
-
orienta
il
35
-
medievale dando a esso un fondamento metafisico con discesa
e
del
che
1
manifestazione
della
ritorno,
Simbolo e
analitica.
intero
mondo
congiuntamente il simbolismo
forte
piu
di S. Vittore
Ugo
cosi
cui pensiero
senso
nel
formarum
coaptatio visibilium
est
Pseudo Dionigi
allo
eriugeniani
sviluppi
agli
id
videlicet,
rei invisibilis propositarum":
la dottrina
teofanica
e
della
reductio
della
delle teofanie intelligibili e sensibili
processo anagogico dissolve per risalire alPunita ineffabile; punto d incontro e di snodo del metodo dell affermazione e della negazione, il il
simbolo costituisce, nella tradizione dionisiana, tutto
il
discorso teologico, di
symbolorum
Dio e su Dio:
varietate irrationabiliter
struttura
portante di
"simplicitatem
divinam ex
la
36 cognosci".
Sullo sfondo di questa concezione della realta simboli, con
i
corrispondenti processi
tipologia, simiglianza e dissimiglianza, in
profondo 34
Miscellanea
Ugo Rochefort,
di
tutto
in
San
Sermo,
1
orizzonte
appendice
alle
operc in
Vittore, Expos, 23, P.L. 205, 730:
del
di
sapere
Ugo
Hier.
meglio
di
comprende
per
1
cael,
"symbolice
III,
P.L.
colligit
et
Ill,
175,
mutamento
il
irruzione
San Vittore, P.L.
di
secondo analogia e
"dimostrativi"
si
come complesso
nella
cultura
505A.
960;
coaptat
cfr.
formas
Gamier de visibiles
ad
invisibilium demonstrationem".
Wilhelmus
Lucensis,
Comentum
in
nominibus, ed. F. Gastaldelli, Firenze, 1983,
teriiam p. 54.
ierarchiam
Dionisii
que
est
De
divinis
22
Gregory
occidentalc dclla scienza grcca c araba chc fra
sacramentum
colloca
natura
e
Scrittura
salutaris
nesso di cause (causanim
una
series,
uomo
1
imponendo una divarica/ionc in un univcrso non piu conosccnza
di
oggetto
allcgoriae
-
machina} ove trova spazio
ordo,
nexiis,
ma
simbolica,
ratio naturalis lontana dall intellectus agostiniano.
delinea un nuovo ideale di sapere per
Si
1
uomo
che voglia essere
degno del mondo in cui vive: Dicis enim ut in domo habitans quilibet, si materiam eius el compositionem quantitatem et qualitatem sive discriptioncm ignoret, tali nospicio dignus non est, ita si qui in aula mundi natus atque educatus est tarn mirande pulcritudims rationcm scire negh gat, post discretionis annos indignus atque si fieri posset eicicndus est. Cosi Adelardo
Bath, uno dei promotori della nuova scienza del
di
XII secolo, traduttore
di
testi
arabi e autore di due
diverso e Naturales quaestiones che rispecchiano
nuovi tcsori 1 ansia per acquisire meridionale e dalla Spagna:
e
i
Quod enim Precisa 1
gallica studia nesciunt, transalpina reserabunt;
insegnamento studiorum
maestri contemporanei.
commento
coniugare
quod apud
delineazione dei nuovi compiti della ratio e del sapere
la
("Arabicorum
biblioteche
et
scienza che affiuivano dall Italia
di
Platone
"in
38
altomedievali
con
i
sensa")
testi
conscntire")
al
ma
Somnium
restati
scientifici
cha
il
Scipionis
sempre
effectibus
e degli Arabi
con
convergenza
significativa
La lettura del Timeo con
Macrobio
di
in
causarum
physicis
ethicisque etiam consultibus Platoni te penitus
e del
De eodem
non addisces, Graecia facunda docebit.
latinos
secondo
di
scritti
nuovo clima culturale
il
ai
commcnto -
testi
present! nelle
viene
si
margini
affiuivano
altri
di Calcidio
attravcrso
a
nuove
le
traduzioni, soprattutto di medicina, fisica, astronomia e alchimia,
nuovi
orizzonti
e
indicando
il
valore
di
aprendo una conoscenza della natura
fondata sulla ratio e non sulVaiictorilas:
De
animalibus
magistris
difficilis
arabicis
^
est
ratione
mea tecum duce
didici,
dissertio.
tu
vero
Ego enim aliud
Dalla prcfazione di un trattato sull astrolabio di Adelardo Haskins, Studies in the history of mediae\-al science, New York, 1960, p. 29.
38
di
aliud a auctoritatis
Bath,
in
Ch.H.
Adelardo di Bath, De eodem et diverso, ed. H. Willner (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittclalters, IV, 1), Miinstcr 1903, p. 32; Quaestiones naturales, 24, der Phil, und Theol. des Mittelalters, XXXI, 2) prol., ed. M. Muller (Beitrage zur Gesch. Miinster 1934, pp. 31, 20.
Fortne di conoscenza e ideali di sapere
pictura captus capistrum sequeris desideras, rationem refer et recipe.
Questa -
ratio
-
impegnata a cogliere
23
Si
quid amplius a
la
dinamica delle
me
vires
audirc
naturae
invade anche
il campo dell esegesi e impone un intcrpretazione secundum genesi physicam che riconduce tutto Vomatus al gioco
e dei cieli cui
-
"dei
(gli
anche
rientra
valore
il
respinto
azione del fuoco
all
elementi,
tipologici
-
storico della lettera,
creazionc di
la
esegetica
aveva
Adamo
caricato
di
e di
Eva
significali
rientra nel complesso ordinato delle cause naturali:
ex aqua effectu superiorum - scrive Guglielmo di ubi tenuior fuit aqua, ex calore et creatione praedictorum apparuerunt in terra quasi quaedam maculae, in quibus
creatis
sic
Istis
degli
causa")
dei"
una veneranda tradizione
che
est quasi artifex et efficiens
di del Timeo), secondo un ordo naturalis in formazione dei corpi della prima coppia umana;
figli
la
("ignis
della
Conches
-
desicata,
habitant homines et alia
quaedam
animalia...
Ex quadam vero
parte,
qua elementa aequaliter convenerunt, humanum corpus factum est et hoc est quod divina pagina dicit deum fecisse hominem ex limo terrae. ... ex vicino limo terrae corpus mulieris esse creatum verisimile est, et ideo nee penitus idem quod homo nee penitus diversa ab homine nee ita temperata ut homo, quia calidissima frigidior est frigidissimo viro, et hoc est quod divina pagina dicit, deum fecisse mulierem ex latere Adae. Non enim ad litteram credendum est deum excostasse primum hominem. in
L interpretazione una
ratio
del
racconto genesiaco
che intende spiegare
come Dio
in
termini
fisici,
secondo
operi per naturam, non risponde
ma presuppone un canone ermeneutico precise: Auctores veritatis philpsophiam rerum tacuerunt, non quia contra fidem, sed quia ad aedificationem fidei de qua laborant, non multum solo
alle
leggi
della
cosmologia
timaica,
pertinebat.
E
nota
la
reazione degli ambienti monastici per bocca di Guglielmo
di Saint-Thierry:
Homo
physicus
et
philosophus,
physice
de
Deo
philosophatur...
Deinde creationem primi hominis pnilosophice, seu magis physice describens, primo dicit corpus eius non a Deo factum, sed a natura, et animam ei datam a Deo, postmodum vero ipsum corpus factum a 39
Adelardo
40
di
172,
Ha ring,
6, ed. cit.,
pp. 11-12.
G. Maurach, Pretoria, 1980, p. 38 Conches, Philosophia, I, 42-43, Teodorico di Chartres, De sex dierutn operibus, 1, 14, 17. ed. N.M. Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his School, Toronto,
Guglielmo (P.L.
Bath, Quaestiones naturales, di
ed.
55-56);
1971, pp. 555, 561, 562.
Guglielmo di Conches, In Boethium, ed. P. Courcelle, "Etude critique Commentaires de la Consolation de Boece (IX e -XVe siecles", Archives d hist. IM. du M. A., XII (1939), p. 85.
sur doctr.
les et
24
Gregory et a stellis... In creatione vcro quos daemones appellat, mulieris palam omnibus Icgentibus est, quam stulte, quam superbe scilicet excostasse Deum divinae historiam irridct auctoritatis; primum hominem, ad faciendam de costa eius mulierem. Et physico mud sensu interpretans, nimis arroganter veritati historiae suum pracfert inventum.
spiritibus,
AlVinventum physico sensu del maestro enim ad litteram credendum ("non
lettera
est"),
densa
historiae
veritas
la
oppone
insegnava San Paolo (Eph., infatti
di
forma
della Chiesa.
la
futuri, "Hoc
si
prefigurazione
crederet non
La divaricazione verita
tra
dal
rappresentata
magnum sacramentum come creazione di Eva de costa Ade e
profetica
dell
unione
Cristo
di
e
42 irrideret".
auctoritas
1
Guglielmo
la
di Saint-Thierry
un
di
30-32): la
5,
Conches che annulla
tradizione
della
nuovo sapere
fisico
si
e
ecclesiastica
configura
la
come
subito
insanabile opposizione:
Sunt enim -
-
si
anonimo
legge in un
trattatellp sul compute del 1175 antiquitatis improbi calumpniatores Christiana locum ab auctoritate tamquam
novitatis yenatores et
quidam
qui etiam in doctrina inartificiosum superciliose repudiant et de suo confidentes ingenio aliter quam tota ecclesia soli sentire volunt ut soli scire videantur. Sed, quod deterius est, vidi equidem doluique videre scripto quoque commendatum quedam aliter se habere sccundum ecclesiam, aliter secundum veritatem. 3
Se
la
di
contrapposizione
due
verita
polazione polemica, che sara poi quella
sempre un esperienza finalizzato
alia
d indagine
e
inscitia
troncando
direttamente
Deum
priorita
a
forme
il
di
del
sapere
che
di
interlocutore
che
est").
opposizione fra una natura intesa come diretta volonta divina e una natura come ordo e nexus causarum: all
una
"Quoniam
Adelardo
intendeva
Dio ogni fenomeno naturale ("universorum 44 II tema torna con insistenza
magis referendus
nuovi campi
rivendicano
anche rispetto alia tradizione: rationem redeamus", scrive
suo
estra-
sapere unitario e
di
dischiudersi
ad
pallemus,
discorso
il
di
conoscenza,
autonomia e
propria
nondum
Bibbia per
della
un
considerarsi
puo
Stefano Tempier, registra pur
un ideale
precisa: la rottura di
lettura
di
di
riferire
effcctus
ad
e riconduce
espressione
della
ut ignorantiae suae omnes ipsi nesciunt vires naturae, habeant, nolunt aliquem eas inquirere, sed ut rusticos nos credere nee rationem quaerere, ut iam impleatur illud profeticum, "Erit sacerdos sicut populus"... Nos autem dicimus in omnibus
quqniam
socios
42
Guglielmo 1
di Saint-Thierry,
Ch.H. Haskins, Studies,
Adelardo
di Bath,
De
cit., p.
erroribus Guillelmi de Concliis, P.L. 180, 339-340.
87.
Quaestiones naturales,
4, p. 8.
Fornie di conoscenza e ideali di sapcre
25
csse quaerendam, si potest inveniri... Sed isti... malunt nescire quam ao alio quacrcrc, el si inquirentcm aliqucm sciant, ilium esse hacrcticum clamant plus de suo capucio pracsumcntes quam sapicntiac suae confidentcs.
rationcm
L allusionc
polcmica
tradizionale cultura monastica
alia
non potcva
essere piu chiara cd 6 subito sottolincata da Guglielmo di Saint-Thierry: "In
viros religiosos
invehitur". II
tema torna
costante:
Sensisti vero et tu nonnullos hiis in temporibus cause quam ignorant iudices audacissimos, qui ne minus scientes videantur, quecunque nesciunt inutilia predicant aut profana. luxta quod Arabes dicunt: Nullus maior artis inimicus quam qui eius expers est... Horum siquidem error sive coloratus honesto malicioso quoque predictorum testimonio fretus, apud imperitos quorum maxima est multitudo in bonarum neglectum arcium efficacissime peroravit, ut iam numerorum quidem mensurarumque scientia omnino superflua et inutilis, astrorum verum studium ydolatria estimetur... Super nubes eorum conversatio,
ipso summe desipiunt
in
atque
sinu sapientie sese requiescere gloriantur. sapientiam, eique vacantium deliramenta
Mundanam
subsannant.
Cosi
Hugo
nella
di
prefazione
una versione
siciliana
presentando una compilazione
Sanctallensis,
dell Almagesto;
fisico-astrologica
e di
origine araba, insiste nella polemica:
Nam
humani generis
edormit estimans
ut
error,
qui
inscientie
crapula
sui
oblitus
nubibus soporata iudicip philosopnantium sectam laciyienti verborum petulantia, sicut huius temporis sapere et honestos inconstantie ventatis ascribit, sapientes imperitos diiudicat, verecundos atque patientes stolidos
stulticie
negligit,
concives reputat.
A
questi
spregiatori
scienza orientale far
-
della
dei
"setta
filosofanti"
degli Arabi, degli Indi, degli Egizi
philosophic
ipsius
vernulas
arroganti
tamen quantulamcumque portionem
vix
che
supercilio
Mundana costituendosi
lungo
ricerca di cause
il
ama
cosi
sapientia:
secolo XII
("propius
intuere
definirsi
trovando -
45
Guglielmo
di
Conches, Philosophic! 44-45, ,
Ch.H. Haskins, Studies,
cit.,
pp. 192-193.
Ch.H. Haskins, Studies,
cit.,
p. 75.
Adelardo
di
p.
Bath, Quaestiones naturalcs, 64,
"ut
negligunt,
venerari".
saltern,
scientie
il
il
47
nuovo sapere che viene suo metodo nell ordinata
ammonisce Adelardo
adde, causas propone, et effectum non
la
egli intende
tandem adeptam minime depravari
contingat sed potius ab eius amicis et secretariis
47
-
conoscere per soddisfare Vinsatiata philosophandi aviditas
dum
46
Ugo contrappone
48 mirabere")
39 (RL. 172, 56).
p. 59.
e
il
-
circumstantias
suo fondamento
26
Gregory
nell universale
causalita
Dio stesso ha
dci cicli cui
affidato di
compicrc
Vopus naturae: universes philosophic professores ratum arbitror et constans Hugo Sanctallensis quicquid in hoc mundo conditum cst haud dissimile exemplar in superior! subsistendi vice
Apud
scrive
circulo possidere.
L
jprtitum
astrologia afferma cosi
il
suo primato come fondamento
di tutte le
scienze della natura:
Unde tam
Ypocrati ct Galeno quam ceteris fere omnibus philosophis astrologiam plane physice ducatuin obtinere, ut qui astrologiam damnet, phisicam necessario destruit.
compertum
E
un si
astrologia
astronomiaAlbumasar, assiduamente ripetuto: pone ormai come il principio e il vertice di tutto il sapere testo
di
1
filosofico: sic sciverunt sapicntes - si leggeva in un opuscolo di Alkindi tradotto nel XII secolo - quod homo non est imbutus in philosophia nisi scit earn usquequo dinumerare possit cum sciencia impressiones
Et
supcriores.
Proprio dispositio
perche,
come
modo non
sit
figuratum",
Alkindi
ribadisce
mundum elementorum
disponit"
DC
pone come
si
Pastrologia
nel
e nulla esiste
radiis, "quod
la
"stellarum
suo
in celo
scienza piu alta,
rispondente sancto sapientie desiderio; essa e scienza dell universalc c del particolare che procede sillogismo et probacione, capace di conoscere il corso
della
storia
(causa turn per causam}
penetrando
il
tessuto
della
celeste armonia:
enim alicui datum esset totam condicionem celestis armoniae comprehendere, mundum elementorum cum omnibus suis contentis in quocumque loco et quocumquc temporc plenc cognosceret tanquam causatum per causam. ... Unde qui totam condicionem celestis armonie notam haberet tam preterita quam presentia quam futura cognosceret. Vice quoque versa unius individui huius mundi cpndicio, plene cognita, tanquam per speculum celestis armonie condicionem totam presentaret, cum omnis res huius mundi sit exemplum Si
universalis armonie.
49
Ch.H. Haskins, Studies,
cit., p.
78.
Albumasar, Introductorium in astronomiatn, Liber Alkindi dc nnuacione
tcmpomm,
I,
4,
cit.,
Vcnetiis 1506, b in
Aristotclianism in the Melfth centuiy, Beirut 1962, p. 47
R.
Ir.
Lcmay, Abu
Ma shar and
latin
n. 2.
Alkindi, De radiis, ed. M.-T. d Alverny-F.Hudry, Archives d hist. doctr. et. M. A., XLI (1974), pp. 218, 217, 223; cfr. Liber Alkindi de mutacione temporum, 47 n. 1.
lilt,
cit.,
du p.
Fortne di conoscenza e ideali di sapcre
L
mondo all
neH
conosccn/a per causam, rcalizza il la sua necessita: non solo ogni
corrispondc c ciascuno divicnc un punto di vista dal ritcsscrc 1 ordinc dell intero univcrso, ma si dissolve
puo
si
ricondotta rifluisce
la
con tutta
aristotclico di scicn/a
parlc del
qualc
assicurando
astrologia,
modello
27
si
ignoran/a dcllc cause
-
ogni
pretesa contingen/a e tutto
inflessibile causalita celeste:
autem omnia scita essent ab aliquo, ipse rerum causalitatem ad invicem nqtam haberet. Sciret ergo quod omnia que Hunt el contingunt in mundo elementorum a celesti armonia sunt causata, et inde cognosceret quod res huius mundi ad illam relate ex necessitate proveniunt. ... Est ergo ignprantia hominis causa opinionis eyentuum
Si
Futurorum
et
per hoc
medium
causa desiderii et spei
est ignorantia
et timoris.
Pur senza giungere a questo esito estremo - contro cui polemizzera duramente 1 autore del DC erroribus philosophonun - tutta la scienza fisica
medievale accogliera
greca
e
araba,
il
nodo centrale
causa e causato e da questo punto classificazione
tradizione
della
necessario nesso fra cielo e terra
il
scienze
delle
di vista
fra
poteva proporre una nuova
due
secondo
filosofiche
astrologica
come rapporto
partizioni, come scrive Daniele di Morley: Maxima divisio scientiarum fit in scientiam de
fondamentali
celo et scientiam de
omni, quod continetur sub celo.
Non delle
un caso se
e
sette
arti
1
liberali,
astronomia, uscendo dall ambiguo statuto di una
non solo riassorbe
il
quadrivio,
ma
abbraccia
discipline che in altre classificazioni rientravano nella scientia naturalis e si propone come la scienza dei principi primi della natura da tutte
cui
le
dcriva
dalla
ogni
scientia
de
conoscenza e
altra
de
scientia
iudiciis
imaginibus.
tutte le tecniche che
della natura
("recipit
opera"),
di
medicina
dalla
de
conoscenza
Nella
fondamento
sua
arte,
scientia
alia
speculis,
dei all
moti
all
celesti
alia
trovano
uomo una
manipolazione permettono potentiam inducendi motus in competenti materia per piegare gli influssi celesti, di scendere nelle viscere della
terra con la forza delle voces e delle imagines, di decifrare
profetico che per influsso dei vita
agricoltura,
dall alchimia
cieli
si
rivela
nei
il
messaggio
sogni, di prolungare la
umana: Oui
enim
temporum 53 Alkindi,
De
Daniclc di
celescium principia corporum ignorat constat eum ignorare naturas temporalium.
et
Cum
qualitates speculari
radiis, pp. 226-227, 228.
Morley,
Natuiwissenschaftcn
De
und dcr
philosophia, cd. K. Sudhoff, Archiv fur die Technik, VIII (1917), p. 24.
Geschichtc der
28
Gregory
DC VI renim ergo nobUc ingenium vitac cursum Dene prorogare ct melius conservare intendit.
seu mederi incipit -
principiis
Ratio
legge ncllo pscudp ermetico
si
coelo
imperat
bcnc riassume
-
fallitur ct fallit..7Hinc
avertuntur flagitia:
et
detto
il
una zona del nuovo sapcre che
tutta
Albumasar
di
costituisce
una partc
per piu aspetti essen/iale della storia dclla scien/a mcdievale e che trova
piu
e in tuttc le scicn/e ad cssa coordinate
-
nclPastrologia
L
significativo.
coelestibus
"de
di credito nella Bibbia, nella Stella dei
come momento
proporsi
addentrarsi
in
dimostrare
uscra
deH incarna/.ione
come
essa tendeva a porsi
di
che
tonsurati i
suoi
titoli
vorra
Vacies
esercilare
delle
oroscopo
e
per
religioni
e indubbio che
tuttavia
Cristo;
mentis
una sapientia mundana del tutto la conoscenza
vcrtice di
il
dai
nell epistolario paolino,
per
dcll
suo culminc
il
cerchera
tractare",
Magi,
preliminare
theological verita
la
difendersi
per
astrologia,
denunciavano come empio
-
estranea alia trepida medita/.ione della sacra pagina, ove dc\\
ordo causanim costituisce Pideale
deH
uomo
un sapere che reali//a
di
la dignita
conferma signore del creato:
e lo
Viderit in lucem mersas caligine causas, / Ut natura nichil occoluisse queat / ... omnia subiicial, terras regal imperet orbi: / Primatem rebus pontificiemque dedi.
Anche
legga di
il
Diduscalicon di
Gundissalinus
Alfarabi
-
Ugo
e
San Vittore o
di
il
un articola/ione piu
di
disciplina
rapporto
il
significativi:
regole
ove primeggiano arti
la
e
filosofiche.
De
loro uso
230;
d hist.
1
Cfr.
il
testo
di
Raimondo
Silvestris,
l
a
araba, latina-
classifica/.ioni
Boe/.io, da Cassiodoro e
assidua ripresa di alcuni temi la il
necessita
valore della
legiitn,
la
insisten/.a
ciascuna
per civilis
scicntia
forte presenza delle
picno diritto tra
Liber Hcrmetis Mcrcurii
di
tradi/.ione
tradi/ione
sul
le
nesso
discipline
sapicntia-
c la difesa della cohaercntia artium:
Triplicis
dc VI renim principiis,
du M. A., XXII (1955), pp. 296,
291.
Marsiglia in R. Lxmay, op. cit., p. Ch.H. Haskins, Studies, pp. 192-193.
153
doctr. et
prcfazionc a una trad. dctt Almagesto
Bernardus
la scicntia
importante
p.
radiis,
dcfiniti,
collocate
civile,
Silverstein,/lrc7uVt>5-
Alkindi, cd. Th.
il
e
ingeniis
Soprattutto
eloquentia, per
1
logica-filosofia,
metodi ben
retliorica
meccaniche o de
con
ricca,
la
scarne
alle
rispetto
altomedievali derivate da Marciano Capella e -
un
divisione philosophiac alia
con
coniugati
subito,
De
riferimenti
di
Avicenna
rileva
di
nuovi modi e pratiche del sapere: chi
di
intessuto
tutto
soprattutto
tardoantica
Isidore
XII risentono
classifica/.ioni delle scien/.e nel secolo
le
nuovo clima e del delinearsi
lilt,
in
Cosmographia, cd.
P.
Dronkc, Leiden 1978,
p. 141.
n.
1,
e
la
Forme
conosccnza e ideali di sapcre
di
Verumtamcn in septem libcralibus Hac quidern ita sibi
29
fundamcntum
artibus
doctrinae...
cohaerent, rationibus indigent, ut si una defuerit, caeterae non possint. Undc mihi crrarc vidcntur qui non artibus cohacrcntiam, quasdam sibi c ipsis intactis, his so
Non XII
posse
ma
e un topos
da un
secolo,
fieri
lato
est omnis altcrnis vicissim
ut
philosophum facere attendentes talcm in et
eligunt,
cactcris
perfectos putant.
scgnale di una
il
il
per
rapido
crisi
aperta nella cultura del e
ampliarsi
che sollecitava verso alcune
di
attivita
specializzarsi
degli
una dinamica sociale
insegnamenti delle singole discipline, dall altro per
una chiara
piu sicuro successo:
testimonianza di tale situazione e offerta da Giovanni di Salisbury nelle pagine che dedica ai cosiddetti seguaci di Cornificio. Sono costoro i
una cultura estremamente sommaria
portatori di
senza
philosophi"),
alcun
historiograph!, habebantur
interesse
per
summi repente
lettere
("poetae,
eos qui artium venerantur
"insultans
infames";
("ficbant
buone
le
o per le scienze del quadrivio ("nominare... aliquid operum auctores") naturae instar criminis erat"), desiderosi di apparire non di esser sapienti inertes sint et ignavi, videri
("cum
discorsi
sono verbosi
sofismi,
la
("sufficiebat
modo
"non
hanno trovato
la
dei
corti
le
di Chartres,
Guglielmo sed
nostri
trivii
loro
sistemazione
foenebrem pecuniam...
et
di cultura.
Sarebbe "nos
auribus e dalla
facile
"fama"
60
meno
artis
("sine
quadrivii
contemptores",
lucrative
medici
di
o
nei
la loro invidiosa
di
("exercent
sapientiae"),
convent!
ove
polemica contro
59
fecerimus",
appellat");
loro
i
e pieni di
Conches, Bernardo
professioni
nell attivita
principi,
di
opes ducunt esse fructum
solas
raccogliere
in
autori
altri
testimonianze
analoghe:
multos palpemus et insidias relinquimur protesta Teodorico di Chartres attaccato dalla
in scholis soli
magistri
totius
in
continuano, coperti dall abito monastico,
uomini
appetunt"), clamor"
Questi awersari della cultura esemplarmente rappresentata da
come Teodorico
Chartres,
presso
esse sapientes
loro dialettica e misera, Veloquentia senza regole
beneficio").
maestri
quam
ad victoriam verbosus
nisi
"invidia"
("Theodoricum ubique accusat et ignominiosis nominibus
non diversamente Guglielmo
della studii libertas per
il
San Vittore, Didascalicon,
III,
di
Conches denuncia
il
venir
prevalere di studenti arrogant! e incolti
CO
Ugo 59
Giovanni
Dal Suringar pp.
di
Commento in
213-214;
Ciceron",
di Salisbury,
Historia ed.
P.
di
Mctalogicon,
Teodorico
critica
di
I,
4-5, P.L. 176, 769. 2-5, P.L. 199,
Chartres
scholiastarum
Thomas,
"Un
al
828-833 passim.
De
invcntione di Cicerone ed. W.II.D.
Lugduni Batavorum, 1854, pars. I, commentaire du Moyen Age sur la Rhetorique de latinoriim,
Melanges Granx, Paris 1884, pp. 41-42.
30
Gregory anni
("unius
vcro
cessisse
putantcs"),
ab
non
ecclesiis
spacio
negligcnter
protetti
da
cxcludunt...
suis
61
clericos
e
includunt"
prclati e vescovi che
insipicntes
Ugo
di
multos studentes, paucos sapientes
Siamo una
in
presen/a
in
societa
rapida
scolastici complessi:
et
in
nobiles
et
umbras clcricorum
"Scholastic!
autem
discendo servare,
nostri
et idcirco
invenimus".
un fenomeno che puo considerarsi espansione che non intende seguire
di
ha Pimpressione che, appcna delineato,
si
sibi
sapicntiam
"sapientes
ignobiles,
San Vittore:
modum congruum
aut nolunt aut nesciunt
totam
studcntcs
di
tipico
percorsi 1
ideale di
un sapere come cohacrentia artium sia gia entrato in crisi. Pur andra sottolincata I insisten/.a con la quale alcuni maestri tornano sul necessario nesso
fra
una
civilis
ratio)^
antichi
(termini
discorso c
del
un sapere
carattcristica di di
quadrivio
scien/e
fra
diverse),
e
trivio
scicn/e
alia societa civile
utile
rifcrimento
II
che coprono ormai realta cose come essen/iale
delle
a
un
(civilis scientia
luogo
del
De
nell
uso
inventions
ciceroniano e costante: ut
Qupniam,
cum
ahquid,
ait
nocet,
sapientia
proficiente et
Tullius
prologo Rhetoricprum, eloquentia sine vcro sine eloquentia etsi parum, tamcn
in
sapientia
eloquentia autem maxime prodest, errant qui postposita non nocente, adhaercnt nocenti et non proficienti,
Guglielmo di Conches Giovanni di Salisbury:
scrive
nella prefa/.ione della sua Philosophia,
M
e
enim eloquentia non modo temeraria est sed etiam caeca, ratio non illustrat; sic et sapientia, quae usu verbi non licet enim proficit, non modo dcbilis est sed quodam modo manca; quandoque aliquatenus sibi prodesse possit sapientia elinguis ad solatium conscicntiac, raro tamen et parum confert ad usum Haec autem est ilia dulcis et fructuosa societatis humanae coniugatio rationis et verbi, quae tot egregias genuit urbes, tot
Sicut
quam
...
foederavit regna. tot univit populos et charitate hostis omnium publicus merito censeatur quisquis hoc, quod aa utilitatem omnium Deus coniunxit, nititur scparare. Mercurio Philologiam invidet et ab amplexu Philologiae Mercurium avellit ...
conciuavit devinxiti
et
ut
Brutescent homines,
Guglielmo 62
Ugo
di
di
si
concessi dote priventur eloquii.
Conches, Dragmaticon, Argentorati 1567, pp.
San Vittore, Didascalicon,
III, 3,
2, 157.
P.L. 176, 768.
Gundissalinus, De divisionc philosop/iiac, ed. L. Baur (Beitrage zur Geschichtc der Philosophic des Mittclalters, IV, 2-3). Miinster 1903, p. 64: "civilis racio dicitur sciencia dicendi aliquid racionabiliter et facicndi, quod hec quidem racio sciencia civilis dicitur, cuius pars integralis et maior rcthorica est. nam sapiencia i. e. rerum concepcio secundum carum naturam et rethorica civilem scienciam componunt".
Dominicus
^
Guglielmo
di
Conches, Philosophia,
I,
prologus, ed.
cit.,
p.
17 (P.L. 172, 41-43).
Forme
conoscenza e
di
Non divcrsamente Tcodorico secundum
conccptio
31
ideali di sapcre
Chartrcs:
di
earum
naturam
notare
che
rcrum
idest
"sapicntia
rhctorica
et
scicntiam
civilcm
65 componunt".
Ne
sara
individuata
e
civile"
inutile
discipline
ncl
("dialectica,
est
una
aliarum
dialcttica
isolala
66
di
"sapcre
dalle
altre
destituatur,
vigore
un sapere puramente
di
fere"),
nomi che pretendono
formale, fatto di vuoti
idealc
disciplinarum
inutilis
et
qucsto
di
crisi
di
prcvalcre si
quodammodo manca
la
di sostituirsi alle res:
omnes
a dialectica et sophistica disputatione exterminaverunt, si legge nel Dragtnaticon - nomina tamen earum receperunt eaque sola esse universana vel singularia praedicaverunt. Deinde supervenit stultior aetas, quae et res et earum nomina exclusit, atque omnium disputationem ad quatuor fere nomina reduxit. res
Giovanni s
incammina
logica sola
Salisbury awerte
di
nuova logica
la
placet"),
con chiarezza
awentura verso
1
physica quaevis,
("Vilescit
che presto dara luogo
all
littera
cui
sordescit,
intricato sottobosco fatto di
voces, di suppositiones, di sophismata e di consequentiae: la sua polemica
batte
quam solam
ea,
("in
contro coloro che invecchiano nello studio della logica
insistente
consumpserunt
discutendo
aetatem")
scientiam pctvenientes
Non
non decennium aut vicennium, sed totam sillabe e vocali, numquam ad
profitentur,
diversa sara la
nella totale ignoranza delle cose di cui parlano.
,
polemica umanistica, e gia del Petrarca, contro
68 i
barbari britanni.
La
discussione
tutta
coinvolge
funzione della logica,
difesa della logica, ne celebra
parte
essenziale vice
spiritus
sapientia
della
discurrat"
il
filosofia -
struttura
ogni
logica
eis
e
logica
per
"ut
sicche
("qui
filosofia
individua, contro dialettica,
65
Giovanni
Comm. 66
come
al
di
sono
le
nozze
vero
sine
di
Salisbury, Metalogicon, I, 1, ed. Suringar, pp. 217-218.
si
-
la
di
eius
essa
logica
Giovanni
di Salisbury, Metalogicon,
Guglielmo Giovanni
di
II, 9,
Conches, Dragtnaticon,
in
quaedam toglie
alia
philosophiam
exterminet rationes,
questa
Mercuric e
una sinonimia prevalente disputandi sdentia che
su
insiste
scritto
e sdentia disserendi,
serve
si
la
fllosofia,
Metalogicon,
ratio
omnium rerum
Giovanni
della
connessione
filologia
-
e
fra
insieme
posizione peculiare della
colloca nella zona del discorso
P.L.
199,
827;
Teodorico
di
De inventione,
67 68
-
il
omnia membra
non
chi
razionale
presidet").
come
valore
doceri putat, idem a sapientie cultu
quia
concezione
la
valore della dialettica:
il
P.L. 199, 866.
p. 5.
di Salisbury, Entheticus, P.L. 199, 967; Metalogicon,
II, 7,
P.L. 199, 864.
Chartres,
32
Gregory vicino
probabilc,
alia
distinta
retorica,
propriamcnte dimostrativo/
9
La
tcoria
dalla
quindi
del
discorso
testimonian/.a di Giovanni di Salisbury e
particolarmcnte significativa del crcsccntc intcressc per la logica e per la sua defmizione (ora identica a dialettica ora distinta), per i problcmi del c della dimostra/.ione, per
dcll inventio
metodo,
loro impositio^ per
il
e
delle
res
le
oggetto
rapporto altre
testi logici
secolo e che e merito del
De
Ove andra
ricerche
sottolineato,
orizzonti
e
del
che
strumento di
Temistio
per
il
intensificano fra XII e XIII
si
vario
il
sapere,
definirsi
ripresentarsi
massima
nei
cspansione
zona
teologia. In questa
vocum
recta impositio
pensi poi
di
una problematica ben presente di origine
opcre decisamentc
piu
dimostrazione con
1
sino
alia
da tempo
regole definite nei classico prologo del Sic
Gilberto Porretano e
di
significandi,
prima nelFesame della proprietas c della
assunzionc degli schemi assiomatici alle
come
parte o
privilegiata del sapere la logica aveva
(le
sistemazione
DC modis
trattati
fatto valere la propria influenza,
la
della
problema
come sua
di
campi
grammatica, portata presto sulle stradc dcll analisi del speculative che trovcra nei secoli XIII e XIV
dalla
come grammatica
nell
nuovi
riprendendo un problema gia discusso da Boezio sulla scorta e la sua determinante influenza nello sviluppo dclle singole
linguaggio
non sono
di
del
-
discipline:
la
dclle voces e la
deH argomenta/ione problcmi tutti che
Rijk avere sistematicamente portato alia
collocazione della logica in rapporto alia filosofia, -
analisi
filosofiche:
discipline
puntualmente ritornano nei luce.
1
tra le strutture formali
alle
nelle scuole) e
boeziana e euclidea
Regidae
di
et
Alano
(si
di Lilla),
imponcndo una teoria della scienza e della awento della logica nova. Ma interessa notare come
suo porsi come scicntia scicntianun la dialettica venga proprio per subito a competere con il primato riconosciuto alia teologia: il
Dialetica est ars artium, scientia scicntiarum, que sola scit scire et nescientem manifestare. Contra. Theologia est scientia scientiarum; non ergo dialetica. Dialetica est, quia nulla scientia perfecte scitur sine II
ilia.
e
testo
Quaestiones
del
"utrum
Sarebbe
XIII
secolo
theologia
e
non
a
caso
corre
parallelo
alle
sit scicntia".
tuttavia fuorviantc legare lo sviluppo del
alia sola influenza della logica
nova nella struttura
metodo
scolastico
delle varie discipline e
1
Giovanni 85V 860; 70
II, 5,
L.M. DC
di
Salisbury, Metalogicon,
I,
10,
P.L.
199,
837;
II,
1,
col.
col. 861; II, 6, col. 862.
Rijk,
Logica modemorum,
vol.
II, 2,
p. 417; cfr.
II, 1,
pp. 428, 431.
857;
II,
3,
col.
Forme nclla
soprattutlo
e
chc
quasi
come
del sillogismo scientifico,
metafisico,
conoscenza e ideali di sapere
teologia:
dclla scicnza
tcoria
di
scire
non
per causas, con
dai
Topici,
al
di
la
sua
la
modi
definizione dei
la
non condizionasse Pevolu/.ione
questo
con
aristotclica
logica
fosse coerenle con tutto
medievalc, dal secolo XIII, moeto Analitici,
la
33
sistema fisico e
il
della
specula/ione
dell influenza escrcitata dagli
Che proprio
dagli Elenchi sofistici.
dibattito
il
sul
significato della filosofia della natura di Aristotele, sulla sua compatibility
con il
la
philosophia Christi e
dopo
XII,
cristiano.
punto cruciale
il
Duecento approfondiscono
di tante
polemiche che lungo
tensioni gia aperte nella cultura del secolo
le
primo ingresso di una philosophia mundana Ne sono testimonianza le condanne di Aristotele
nell orizzonte
il
Duecento quando
il
sistema aristotelico veniva a imporsi
agli
del
inizi
come
filosofia
naturale o semplicemente filosofia e trovava spazio nelle nuove strutture scolastiche, le facolta delle arti. -
1215 scritti
le
colpiscono e
logici,
a caso quelle
filosofia
di
opere
Non
condanne
naturale e la metafisica non
celebre lettera di Gregorio IX del
la
del 1210 e
-
1228
alia
gli
facolta
parigina di teologia, tutta tessuta dei riferimenti biblici tradizionalmente addotti per
ruolo ancillare delle
il
in atto nel
sapere teologico per
della
naturalium,
L opposizione e
il
della
vanita"
"profane
arti liberali,
naturalis
mundana
tema torna puntualmente
batte insistente sulla crisi
invasione nei confini della teologia delle
doctrina philosophica
ratio
fra la
1
seguita
delle
naturalium, dai
naturalium
scientiae sectatores.
scientia e la theologica puritas e nettissima
nei sermoni universitari degli anni trenta:
Quando sua,
tales veniunt ad theologiam, vix possunt separari a scientia sicut patet in quibusdam, qui ab Aristotele non possunt in
theologia separari.
Da un nella
lato
Bibbia,
sophonim.
la
philosophica sapientia,
dalPaltro
le
philosophicae
la
tutta
theologia
rationes,
la
dispiegata
lingua
philo-
11
Precisa altresi la nota testimonianza di Ruggero Bacone: principalis
occupacio
questiones,
et
theologorum
istius
temporis
est
circa
pars omnium questionum est in terminis Philosophic cum tota disputacione, et rehqua pars que est in terminis Theologie adhuc yentilatur per autoritates et argumenta et soluciones philosophic ... maior pars questionum in studio tneologorum cum tota disputacione et modi solvendi est in terminis philosophic, ut notum est omnibus theologis qui exercitati fuerunt ad plenum in philosophicis, antequam veniebant ad theologiam. Et alia pars
Cfr. t.
I,
pp.
H.
Denifle
114-116;
1931, pp. 85 n.
3,
-
maior
A. Chatelain, Chartularium
M.M. Davy, Les sermons
252, 292.
Universitatis Parisiensis,
universitaires parisiens
Parisiis
de 1230-1231,
1889, Paris
34
Gregory questionum in usu theologorum quo cst in tcrminis thcologic, ut de Beata Trinitate et lapsu primqrum parcntum, et do gloriosa Incarnatione, et dc peccatis, et virtutibus, ct donis, ct sacramentis et de desideriis ct pena, ventilatur principalitcr per autoritates et raciones et solutiones tractas ex phifosophicis consideracionibus: et ideo tota quasi occupacio questionum ziheologorum est iam philosophica tarn in substancia quam in modo.
Non
e solo la reazione di teologi conservatori: e lo scontro di ideal!
diversi di sapere, e in discussione
Scritture
73
sacra
una
vult
("qui
scientiam
quaerat
discere,
e a una metafisica che
suo fonte,
in
mondo
fronte a una conce/.ione del
di
Scriptura")
fisica
valore della sdentia trasmessa dalle
il
impongono come
si
scilicet
e dell
in
uomo,
a
totale
e
visione
coerente della realta, chiusa a ogni esito soprannaturale, priva
di
ogni
valore simbolico.
Noi sappiamo che quanti
"dicunt
fidem catholicam, quasi capitositas
come
-
ne
la
poteva
presso scguivano
1
nelle
trovarlo, -
ricerca
intento
filosofica: di
un
-
1
che scandiscono
Aristotele
dcfinirsi di
il
secolo XIII
il
modi
dei
di teologi
la
netta
diverse nei
indica
latini
posi/ioni
suoi fin
limiti,
su
della
suo primo
nel
e
polemicamente condanna del 1277 - con le altre
intelligibile
-
quanto e
quanto e insegnato dalla
pur
ai
artisti
quanti piu da
in
distinzione fra
delle
autonomia,
o
filosofi
modo estremo
di Aristotele e
sottolineata dagli agostiniani. Tuttavia la
ma
di
e frutto della
un gruppo
di
ben nota ad Alberto
divarica/.ione
rendere
-
opere
inconciliabilita
sottolineando
cruciali
problemi
e in
esegesi averroista
constatare
a
74 veritates"
contcmporaneo
dedotto dai principi della filosofia fino
Tempier (1277)
cosiddetta dottrina della doppia verita non trova
contemporanei; loro fu piuttosto
Chiesa,
del vescovo
duae contrariae
sint
dissc qualchc
conservatori e che riscontro,
famosa condanna
la
ea esse vera secundum philosophiam, sed non secundum
...
non solo
diversi di concepire
1
asprezza di un dissidio,
procedimenti e
i
i
limili della
conoscen/.a e della scienza, della filosofia e della sacra doctrina.
La delineazione Dacia
rappresenta
della vita philosophi nel
modo esemplare
in
DC summo bono
la
ripresa
di
Boezio
dell antico
di
ideale
del /Bcoc,
Rogcri Bacon
Compendium
studii thcologiae,
ed.
II.
Rashdall, Aberdoniae 1911, pp.
25,35.
Bonaventurae Collationcs
in
Hexacmeron,
ed.
F.
Delorme, Fircnze-Quaracchi 1934,
p.
215.
74
R. Hissette, Enauete Louvain-Paris 1977, p. 13.
sur
les
219
articles
condamncs a Paris
le
7
mars
1277,
Forme
di
summum bonum,
conoscenza e
homini possibile secundum intellectum
est
quod
35
ideali di sapere
spcculativum, cst cognitio veri in singulis et dclcctatio in eodcm. Item, summum bonum quod est homini possibile secundum intellectum practicum est operatic boni ct delectactio in eodem... Et quia summum bonum quod est homini possibile est eius beatitude, sequitur quod cognitio veri et operatio boni et delectatio in utroque sit beatitudo humana.
Questa beatitudine e realizzata esclusivamente nella nell assidua speculatio
che consiste
homo
innatus est vivere et
"Philosophia
aveva
cam
Alberico
scritto -
aggiungendo
"Ideo
secundum ordinem
humano
est
veritatis:
di
Reims,
sulla scorta di
Averroe
-
est
"non
Facolta
alia
homo
con una beatitudine itinerario
che ha
alia
filosofico
si
arti,
equivoce qui
non escluda
come proprio
aliud est
quam
hoc
fine (in
vita)
contemplazione delle sostanze - nihil Jacopo da Pistoia
la -
"felicitas
scrive
continue sicut possibile est homini intelligere substantias
separatas et precipue
Deum
qui peccato e quanto ostacola tale
ipsum";
contemplazione, bene quanto la promuove, sicche la del tutto estranea all economia della salvezza, senza dottrine
Ethica
felicitate
nella
che
-
e
ritornano volta
ogni
di Sigieri,
si
costantemente discuta
o delle virtu
Monarchia dantesca
-
della
vari
in
felicita
intellettuali e
non potevano
"vita
filosofica"
escatologia.
commenti
come
nel
est excellentior status
quam
resta
Queste
averroistici
perduto
De
che hanno una precisa eco sfuggire
alia
condanna dei
teologi che ne sottolineano con teologica consequenzialita tutti gli
Quod non
futura
la vita
quale il filosofo e piu di ogni altro vicino, tutto scandisce secondo una ratio e un ordo naturalis
separate e di Dio causa prima:
all
nisi
amanda"
delle
ignorat".
In questa prospettiva, per quanto Boezio
1
75
generi appetenda pre ceteris et
maestro
sicut
vivit
philosophus
naturalem".
filosofica
vita
esiti:
vacare philosophiae.
sapientes mundi sunt philosophi tantum. ... Quod sunt necessariae, praeter philosophicas disciplinas.
pmnes
Quod
...
scientiae
non
De summo
bono, in Opera, VI, 2, ed. N.G. Green-Pedersen, Hauniae, luogo citato piu avanti, p. 371. La Philosophia di Alberico di 1271-72; il breve scritto e forse del 1265) e stata pubblicata da R.A. Gauthier ("Notes sur Sigier de Brabant, II Siger en 1272-1275. Aubry de Reims et scission des Normands", Re\ ue des sciences philosophiqucs et theologiqucs, LXVIII la autore (1984), pp. 3-48; il testo alle pp. 29^48) che opportunamente sottolinea come riferisca alia "filosofia del filosofi" tutti gli appellativi che la Bibbia, esegesi e la Boethii Daci
1976, pp. 371, 375; per Reims (rettore a Parigi
il
1
1
Sapienza di Dio o alia Vergine Maria (per il passo cit., p. 31 e di Jacopo da Pistoia - dedicata a Guido Cavalcanti - e Kristeller in Medioevo e Rinascimcnto - Studi in onore di Bruno
liturgia attribuivano alia
33). stata
La Questio de edita da P.O.
felicitate
Nardi, Firenze 1955, vol. I, pp. 425^53 76 R. Hissette, op. cit., pp. 15, 18, 26.
(il
luogo
cit.
a p. 452).
36
Gregory
dell
imprcssione che proprio problema che implica tutta
ha
Si
uomo
-
della storia dall
e
si
coordina anche
si
alia dottrina del peccato, della
concluso
tutto
annotava Boezio
pace,
conce/ione della natura
umana
e
un piu precise distacco dalla teologia e dcfinisce un ideale di felicita (delectatio
senza riferimento
grazia,
questo fine la
cristiana:
antropologia
della
la
ultimo
fine
sul
filosofia accentui
la
intellectualis)
discussion!
nolle
1
-
Dacia,
contcmplantes verum
intellectualibus
dell attivita
redenzione
speculativa.
A
organizzazione politica che deve assicurare
1
di
nell esercizio
cives possint vacare virtutibus
"ut...
moralibus
virtutibus
et
operantes
insegnamento averroistico di cui si ricordcra Dante che proprio necessita di garantire una pace universale come condizione per
bonum":
sulla
attuare
la
potenzialita
dell intelletto
Monarchia,
organizzazione
dell universale
autonoma i
fine proprio dell
il
comprende facilmente
Si
secondo
tutto
della
errori
inevitabili
rivendicava
la
faceva
si
ragione
rivcndicazione di un sapere
la
naturale:
lasciata
ragione
filosofia
Aristotele.
di
vera filosofia cioe sapere totale
suo fondamento
Scripturam
("Qui
consulite") il
tipologica
uomo.
di
stessa
se
a
Era
la
qui
denuncia degli
esemplarmente
la
il
logica e la
ergo e
scicntia perfecta
librum
legere 77
XIII
che
est
Era
fronte
di
lettura
che ha nella Bibbia
simbolica, della
altissimorum
la risposta piu all
-
sacculares vultis intrarc, sacram
nell interpreta/ione
Philosophorum").
secolo
-
scientias
metodo che permette una
("Hunc
naturalium del
civilitas,
sapienza cristiana che suo primato come vera filosofia che trova in Cristo la ratiocinatio nostra, il maestro e il mediatore di ogni scienza; dalla
rappresentata
filosofi
Humana
ideale
razione di un Bonaventura, negli anni
la
quando piu prepotente
costituito
il
dell
politica
1
rispetto alia Chiesa perche pcrmette di realizzare in terra, con
documenta philosophica,
Settanta,
fondera
possibile,
esperienza
analogica,
natura preclusa
ai
non
contemplatorum, matura dell agostinismo
storica
di
una
filosofia
naturale dichiarava la propria sufficienza, anzi la capacita di superare lo
Bonavcnturae V,
Opera,
Collationes
210.
p.
1964, vol. universal! vel
Frankfurt/Main simili,
vel
in
R.
Cfr.
I,
in
Hcxacmcron, cit., pp. 144-145, Bre\ iloquium, I, 1, in Bacon, Opus mains, ed. J.H. Bridges rist. anastatica, p. 43: proptcr hoc omnis creatura in se vcl in suo particulari, a summis coelorum usque ad terminos eorum in
"lit
ut sicut Deus fecit creaturas et scripturam, sic voluit ipsas res scriptura ad intellectum ipsius tam scnsus literalis quam spiritualis. Sed tola philosophiae intentio non est nisi rcrum naturas et proprietates evolvere, quapropter totius philosophiae potestas in sacris literis continetur; et hoc maxime patet,
ponitur factas
quia
in
scriptura,
ponere
longe
in
certius
f hilosophicus sciat
ac
eruere".
melius
et
verius
accipit
scriptura
creaturas,
quam
labor
Forme
conoscenza e
di
37
idcali di sapere
stcsso antagonismo fra Platonc e Aristotclc attraverso 78
al
Agostino fede:
quale attinge
come
dalla fcde alia visionc,
insiste
sulle rationes
latentes
un
continua tcnsionc
nella
intclligibilis",
Anselmo
in
citando
proprio
significativamente
di
insegnamcnto
1
ideale di un conosccrc chc e espansionc dclla
rationem
in
transit
"crcdibile
1
Riccardo,
San Vittorc; Bonavcntura
modus
ratiocinativus
c in Riccardo di
testo
di
nella fides nostra
e
il
suo sostegno in una ratio per fidem et donum scientiae et intellectus che ha per oggetto un credibile "quod habet in se rationem pritnae veritatis" 79
sive inquisitivus della scienza teologica trova
il
"elevata"
.
Altra significativa testimonianza della
assumere
atteggiamenti diversi che poteva
del XIII secolo e degli
crisi
esperienza cristiana di fronte
1
ai
nuovi orizzonti aperti dalla scienza greca e araba e offerta dall opera
di
Ruggcro Bacone: qui
filosofia
se
"secundum
e piu ancora contro
nociva")
di
prevalere
uomini,
capace
respublica
tradizione medievale
hanno
cui
Cos!
Christiana. -
la
perfectam ostendere,
et
un piu ampio disegno patriarch!
e
ai
Patriarchis et
Deo "ideo
profeti
i
78 79
("volo...
literis
della
("philosophiae
e
compito
philosophia non est
del
politica
della
costante
nella
unam
sapientiam esse -
contineri")
sapienza perfectio
che, fuit
si
rivelata
articola in
da Dio
ai
primo data sanctis,
uno
et
eodem
lavoro filosofico riscoprire e restaurare:
nisi sapicntiae
divinae explicatio per doctrinam
.
La
perfecta sapientia posta a principle niundi diviene
cammina
cui
sacris
motive
conoscenze dalla Scrittura
di tutte le
greci
e
religiosa
un
di
Prophetis, quibus lex Dei similiter fuit ab
revelata"),
opus
filosofi
in
il
allc
la
ripresa
storia
di
on
et
ai
la
hanc
penitus
consapevolezza della dignita e segreti della natura e al mondo degli
dipendenza
anche
attinto
est
commenti
nei
filosofiche
promuovere una riforma
di
polemica contro una
infidelium
("philosophia
afferma con forza
si
la
prosegue
distacco della teologia dall esegesi per
il
un sapere volto
del valore di
lato
squisitamente
question!
Sentenze, dall altro
un
se da
considcrata"
la
storia
Bonaventurae Sermo
dell
in
umanita,
IV, Christus units
omnium
progresso
1
ideale verso
continue:
"semper
magistcr, 18-19, Opera, V, p. 572.
Bonaventurae /
Sent., Proemii q. I, Rcsp., Opera, I, p. 7; q. II ad 5, p. 11: credibile est supra rationem; verum est, supra rationem quantum ad scientiam acquisitam, sed non supra rationem ele\>atam per fidem et per donum scientiae et intellectus. Fides enim elevat ad assentiendum; scientia et intellectus elevant ad ae
quod
obicitur,
quae credita sunt 5-6, p. 8; q.
II,
"Et
quod
intelligendum";
sed contra
per
gli
altri
luoghi cui
si
facenno,
2, p. 10.
80
Roger Bacon, Opus mains,
ed. J.H. Bridges,
cit.
vol.
I,
pp. 33, 64, 65.
m, Proem,
q.
I,
ad
38
Gregory
cresccrc potest in hac vita studium sapicntiac, quia nihil est pcrfcctum in
humanis
cumulatio cui
filosofia
realizza
si
fra teologia e
loquuntur
ma vengono
nel
marginali
habeant
si
philosophantes,
elevare
ad theologiae veritatcm... Et sancti non solum
et
sed
introducunt"),
et
("additio
(imam
philosophiam ad divina theologice,
tempo
una nuova e feconda connessione
1
mircntur
igitur
("Non
ncl
cosi
enciclopedia del sapere
sapientiam) in
tutta
sapientiae")
non solo
ricostruiscc
Si
inventionibus".
philosophice, collocate
in
ordine
contcmporaneo
et
philosophica
preminente discipline
posizione degli
multipliciter
studi,
le
quali
la
lingue,
matematica, \ascientia experimentalist
Al centro
corretta
della
e
primi
deH cpistemologia
mundi
principio
metodo che
nuova enciclopcdia
della
la
in
dimostrazione,
aristotelica:
invenerunt",
et
"Porta
la
matematica, scienza dei principi luogo
matematica costituisce
il
e
metafisica
della
clavis scientiarum
quam
sancti a
fondamento e
unifica tutte le scienze, dalla teologia alia scientia
il
civilis:
debemus
venire in certitudinem sine patet quod dubitatione et ad veritatem sine errore, oportet ut fundamenta cognitionis in mathematica ponamus; quatenus per earn dispositi possumus pcrtingere ad certitudinem aliarum scientiarum, et ad infatti veritatem per exclusionem erroris": solo nella si
scientiis
matemajica -
necessariam".
Opus mains Baconc riprende puntualmente
Roberto Grossatcsta dislinte
aliis
demonstrationcs potissimae per causam
"sunt
Ncll
in
le
tecniche
commento
il
di
Sccondi Analitici, ove con molta chiarezza erano
ai
dimostrative
varic
delle
discipline
che
filosofiche
procedono tulte "magis probabiliter quam scientifice", mentre solo alia matematica veniva riconosciuto lo statuto di scienza propriissime dicta che procede dimostrativamente per causam propriam et necessariam, tale
metodo esemplare rispctto al quale tutte solis enim mathematicis est sono subordinate: sapere 83 demonstratio maximc et principaliter dicta". Appoggiandosi a
quindi da offire un modello e un le altre
forme
scientia et
di
"In
una metafisica della luce che permetteva una cosmologia fondata sulle leggi dcll ottica e della prospettiva, la matematica offre Tunica possibile struttura effetti
81
82
dimostrativa
natural!
Roger Bacon,
alia
debbono
op.
Roger Bacon, op.
cit., I,
scienza
darsi
della
secondo
natura:
linee,
cause
degli
figure. Aliter
enim
"tutte
angoli,
le
pp. 30, 57, 20, 63.
cit., I, p.
106; cfr. pp. 105, 108.
oo
Robertus
Grossetcste,
Commentarius
in
Postcrionim
Rossi, Firenzc 1981, pp. 178-179; cfr. pp. 189, 216-217, 256-257.
Analyticorum
Libros,
ed.
P.
Fortne di conoscenza e ideali di sapere
est
impossibile
trova
("reductio
nella
Grossatesta fra coloro 85
omnium il
explicate"
metodo
del
storia
scientifico.
"qui
sul
nesso
-
fra
matematica e
e
argiimentum
modum
svolto
ramo
se
experimentum: perche
argumcntum, non
cognoscendi per
detto
ha
scire
aristotelico
dunque
cui
per
valore
solo
conoscitivo legato alPcsperienza tutto
dcmonstratione");
sapientes
agli
assume un appena
gli
veritatem sine
per
experti,
experientiam":
Bacone aveva impend,
universalia".
De
lineis,
la
matematica
verifica,
sufficit,
sed e
sillogismo
lo
intende
si
si
("si
ma fra
,
realizza
certificazione
la
il
si
87 experientia".
demonstratio faciens
come
procedimento non de nuda
experientia comitetur, et della Metafisica
che antepone
i
scienza dei primi principi alle singole scienze,
intesi
come
diverso
coloro
i
e contrapposti a colui
questi solo e
insistito
maldestri
se
radicalmente
sono
causa"
il
scientia experimentalis
nella
famoso passo
il
la
significato experti
del sapere, fino 86
gia proposto da Grossatesta
-
realizza via experientiae: "argumentum II
falsifica/ionc
un posto di Bacone ricorda
est ut theologus sciat mathematicam".
"Necesse
ampiamente
o
vcrifica
per potestatem mathematicae sciverunt causas e accentua, nel suo piano di una nuova enciclopedia,
Giovera anche insistere qui piu
84
nella
e noto a Grossatcsta
valore fondamentale delle matematiche in ogni
alia teologia:
matcmatica-
nesso
II
iV/w".
tcrminalc
danno come
impossibilia")
rilicvo
particolarc
momento
suo
il
ad
84
in
quid
propter
tcoria del duplicc proccsso di risoluzionc e composi/.ionc
la
esperien/a,
che
sciri
39
sul
il
"solum
quali
"qui
rationem
vero sapiente.
primato
88
dell individuale
Non in
degli Analitici posteriori:
ripetitori
baconiana non
nell esegesi
noscunt
nudam
causam
et
novit
a caso del resto
polemica con gli adorant "impend
89
angulis
et
figuris,
ed.
L.
Baur
(Beitrage
zur
Gesch.
der
Philos.
dcs
Mittelaltcrs, IX) Miinster 1912, p. 60.
85
Roger Bacon, Opus maius, ed. cit., I, p. 108: "Inventi enim sunt viri famosissimi, ut Episcopus Robertas Lincolniensis, et Prater Adam de Marsico, et multi alii, qui per potestatem mathematicae sciverunt causas omnium explicare, et tam humana quam divina sufficienter
exponere".
o/r
p. 175.
Roger Bacon,
op.
cit., I,
Roger Bacon,
op.
cit., II,
R7 p. 168.
88
Roger Bacon, op. cit., II, p. 168; cfr. Opus Opus tertium of Roger Bacon, Aberdeen 1912, veritate, scd non certificat". 89
Roger Bacon, Liber I Communium
tcrtium, 43: p.
ed.
A.G.
Pan of the persuadet de
Little,
"argumentum
not., 8, ed. R. Steclc, Oxonii, 1909, p. 96.
40
Gregory
per
il
vulgo studentium poenitus
("a
ampiamente
le
matcmatica c
la
aristotelico,
forme
di
prerogativae insistendo soprattutto sulla sua finalita
intellectus
conoscenza
-
un vecchio
prolungare
di
ampiamente fide Hum
ai
congiunta
universitaria
e
puro contemplare, Bacone
sia
manuwn
industria
-
in
produrre da materie
di
secreta naturae
i
investigare
all
cultura
della
margin!
recuperando
practicus.
fit
un sapere che
di
umana o
vita
la
speculativus
respinte
insistendo sull inutilita esaltera la scienza
Bacone
essa
di
ignorata"):
pratica e operativa perche solo attraverso di essa, riprendendo
detto
come
nell illuminazione divina vicne a porsi
suo fondamento ultimo
scienza nuova illustra
con
scientia experimentalis nella sua conncssione
La
quanto capace di 91 1 oro e piu
vili
vantaggio della respublica
a
:
hacc enim praccipit ut fiant instrumenta mirabilia, et factis utitur, et etiam cogitat omnia secreta propter utilitatcs reipublicae et personarum; et imperat aliis scientiis, sicut ancillis suis, et ideo lota isti
sapientiae speculativae potestas
Non deve experimentalis realizza:
le
a
rispctto
tutte
altre
a
preparare
In
e
discipline
la
lo
la
offerta dall astrologia
tcmperamenti dei
(indicia
e
singoli
costumi, "propter
gloriosas utilitates
94 verae".
popoli,
cosi
("oportet
la
una
sotto
gli
tertium, cap.
I,
II,
ed. J.S. Brewer,
pp.
204
Little, cit., pp. 44-46.
92
221.
Roger Bacon, Opus maius,
II, p.
Roger Bacon, Opus maius,
I,
pp. 238-239.
Roger Bacon, Opus maius,
I,
p. 253.
Roger Bacon, Opus maius,
I,
p. 193.
94
1
contro vittorie
escatologismo
altra
necessaria utilitas}
efficacia delle medicine,
e i
successione delle leggi e dei si
fanno chiari
sgg.,
una
bene radices
auspici
on
Roger Bacon, Opus mains,
1
sociologia,
theologum... scire
costituendo
Roger Bacon, Opus
un
-
le
il
all
astronomo
quae possunt evenire ex judiciis mathematicae
un antropologia,
Tutta
un apologetica
vengono
astronomiae):^
dei
ove
-
matematica (mathematicae
destino dei regni e delle religion!
il
lotta
segni premonitori
questa prospettiva
dell utilita della
che essa
scopo ultimo di tutto
cristiano trova sostegno nella scientia experimentalis verifica (certificatio)
alia scientia
potestas
Chiesa alPultima
awento imminente sono
Musulmani.
sui
le
sembrano essere
Bacone teso
Anticristo del cui
dei Tartari
egemone assegnata
sfuggirc questa posizione
opera sapientiae di
messaggio 1
scientiae specialiter attribuitur.
storiografia
astronomiae")
dell astrologia
London 214-215;
c si
ulteriore
1859, p. 10. cfr.
Opus
tertium,
ed.
A.G.
Forme conferma
opcre mirabili con
di
capace
hanno ricevuto sovrana
al
dai
cieli;
sic
"et
dc
anima razionale divicnc
1
verba,
i
con
sapientia
statute
sullo
mcntrc
-
forza chc
la
la
corso degli eventi:
dibattito
II
mathematicae
dclla potestas
41
conoscenza e ideali di sapere
di
mundo
faciet
scicntifico
i
carmina,
i
sua potestas
la
characteres
impone
si
96
quod
desiderabit".
e
dell astrologia
la
sua
collocazione nella classificazione dcllc scicnze costituisce un capitolo di
estrema importanza nella delincazione dcgli ideali del sapere: abbiamo come gia nel XII secolo 1 astronomia, come scienza dei moti celesti
visto
e
loro
dei
mondo
sul
influssi
Dal secolo XIII
delle scienze della natura.
forme
tutte le di -
questo
-
Pastrologia trova
mutamento
di
nel
mondo
il
sublunare e ripercorre
sviluppi
gli
queH assioma Aristotele e universalmente acccttato
principle alia luce della scienza astrologica araba:
per tutto
cruciale
come fondamentale
il
sistema di
principio del divenire fisico anche dai teologi piu cauti -
insegnamento dello Stagirita
all
rispetto
ponesse quale fondamento ampliata la conoscenza della
si -
suo piu precise fondamento assioma aristotelico della dipendenza dai moti dei cieli di
cultura greca e araba scientifico nell
sublunare,
come
privilegiato
scienza
dei
primi
all
assegnava
principi
astrologia
un posto
e del divenire.
dell essere
L astronomia
o astrologia, scriveva Guido Bonatti, e quindi la scienza piu ogni altra capace di dare all uomo la verita che ardentemente ricerca
di
earn
potest
("nee
per
aliquam
indica
piu
via
sicura
la
per
quantumcumque mens humana
Con maggior
veraciter
et
e, gareggiando con conoscenza di Dio
apprehendere, la
ita
scientiam,
sicut per Astronomiam")
("et
plus possit
ita
plenarie
la metafisica,
de ipso
scire
altingere").
precisione Pietro d Abano,
congiungendo la dottrina con la metafisica,
aristotelica della scienza quale formulata dagli Analitici
Conciliator
nel
scientifico
extet
del
e
piu
sapere astrologico
scientia"):
scientia
nel
ampiamente ("an
admirabilis
et
Lucidator
discute
cum
astrologia,
hiis
quae
nobilissima
divina,
statute
lo
per
ipsius, il
suo
1
Roger Bacon, Opus maius,
I,
396-397,
399;
cfr.
Opus
tertium,
ed.
A.G.
Little
cit.,
pp. 52-53.
97 98
G. Bonatti, Pietro d
nella
De astronomia
Abano,
trascrizione
di
tractatus
decem, Basileae 1550,
c. 1.
Conciliator, Venetiis 1565, p. 17ra; ho G. Federici Vescovini che ne prepara
potuto leggere 1
il
Lucidator
edizione critica sulla base
la Sorbonne, lat. 581 Bibliotheque de (S), Parigi, 2598 (N), Citta del Vaticano, Pal. lat. 1171 (V): di tale generosita devo qui ringraziarla. Per luoghi citati piu sotto nel testo: S. f. 412 rb, N. f. 99 ra, V. f. 320 ra; S. f. 417 vab, N. f. 103 vb-104 ra, V. f. 323 vb-324 ra; S. f. 413 ra, N. f. 99 va, V. f. 320 ra; S. f. 417 vb, N. f. 104 ra, V. f. 324 ra; S. f. 420 rb, N. f. 106 rb, V. f. 325 vb; S. f. 416 ra, N. f. 102 rb, V. f. 322 vb; S. f. 419 ra, N. f. 105 vb,
dei
tre
manoscritti
Bibliotheque
Parigi,
Nationale,
lat.
i
42
Gregory
oggetto il
corporum nobilissimum, simplex et incorruptible") e per sumat demostrationes suas ex scientia numeri et ("cum
("omnium
suo metodo
arismetrice
est
id
mensure,
et
motorum
et
qualitatum
modo"),
eorum
caelestium in se ac
scienza a pieno titolo, certa
et
non
(de revolutionibus
pone
e
pratica,
dispositioni
et
subesse";
ordine
ut
ipsum".
contra
naturale
come
infatti
-
nel Conciliator
di
conoscen/.a e
a testi di
asserisce Pietro d
-
nos
"duck
Metafisica
Pietro
d
San Paolo e
Abano con potissimc
Abano
in
divine
una celebre pagina afferma autonomia 1
scientifica
non
1
astrologia
al
XII della
divinam".
chc
la
appoggiandosi
della Sapienza:
cognitionem
loquentes
(i
ad indicare
esita
significative riferimento
ha
sapcre:
satiativa".
essa subalternate, e difesa
Abano
naturae")
di
quelli di
frustrant
oggetto et
d
Pietro
gentiles,
desidcrio intellectus
sui
possibilc utili/za/ione apologetica della scienza dcgli astri, -
sua certitude
omnia immediatius
"volentes
con accent! analoghi a
corrumpunt
"ordinem
"Ita
umano
et
e deicole hypocrites
Swnma
della
1
omni parte perfecta demoniache ad pratiche magiche
nobilis
divini
i
("scientia
de nativitatibus, de interrogationibus, de electionibus), principio e fondamento di ogni altra conoscenza teorica
,
come
Distinta dalle
contro
astrologia
et
sue classiche distinzioni della parte excertitativa
le
pienamente adcguata a saziare
"scientia...
dcll
con
astrologia,
cosi
investigat
effectibus universaliter
conieclurativa:
superet valde negotium divinum seu metaphysicum
si
1
precede deduttivamente da principt universal! ed e quindi
considerata")
L
etiam
quae
geometrie,
considerat ea quae semper uno se habcnt
non
Tuttavia
1 esito impressione suo intercsse "teologico" primario, quanto piultosto la difesa di una scienza tutta mondana capace di leggere il corso della storia
dall
opera
di
dell astrologia
si
1
sia
il
e migliorare la vita degli uomini.
Abbiamo al
detto del fondamento che
piu saldo sapere astrologico;
storia,
1
era
astrologia
ermetici, inserendo
da forze che
mirabili
V.
99
f.
325
si
metafisica aristotelica offriva
andra dimenticato che, nella sua
assorbendo
motivi
un mondo
stoici,
neoplatonici,
tutto vivo, percorso
corrispondono da parte a parte ("quod est ad perpetranda miracula rei unius")
est inferius
quod uomo-microcosmo
rendendolo capace di operazioni potentiam inducendi motus in competenti materia per sua
nell
("recipit
ma non
causalita celeste in
richiamano e
si
superius, est sicut
raccogliendosi
la
venuta
la
e
ra.
Tabula smaragdina, ed.
J.
Ruska, Heidelberg 1926,
p. 182.
Forme
43
ideali di sapere
consequitur vim movendi res extra positas suis
opera...
magisterium
est ut superius fiat inferius et inferius
isolare
difficile
quindi
conoscenza e
di
magiche de
astrologia da tutto
1
100
Sarebbe
delle
scienze
superius").
complesso
il
"totum
radiis";
de experimentis, dalle tecniche degli incantesimi e "Radices magice sunt motus planetarum" aveva
secretis,
del magistero alchemico. scritto Picatrix
spiegando che
ripercorrere a ritroso
wide
per cogliere
venit)
omnium
momenti
i
huius mundi
effectus, et
la della metafisica,
"radix
"qualis
est
et
principium
mundus
Per questo
sit".
et eius
il
sapere
colloca al di sopra del trivio e del quadrivio, al di
come donum Dei
que homo operatur
Non
lui
per eius creatorem factus si
opere per omnes partes questo senso nigromantia
fra
Dio come
e conoscere in
hominibus huius mundi dederit ("omnia
ma
solo legare cielo e terra,
della produzione del molteplice (reverti
unita originaria,
rerum"
quomodo
che Picatrix propone
1
non e
scire
et
est
donum
("maius scire"),
et nobilius
ex quibus sensus et spiritus sequuntur
pro rebus mirabilibus quibus
et
quod Deus
scienza dei mutamenti radicali illo
e in
operantur")
10 .
diversa la struttura teorica della scienza alchemica che inizia
XII e XIII secolo
sua storia complessa, destinata a affascinare
la
cultura europea fino a tutto
demonstrationes
et
causas -
quartonun Platonis
Rinascimento. Scientia che precede
il
et
alchimia riprende
1
rationes"
syllogisticas i
moduli
-
il
precisa
risolutivi e
la
"per
Liber
anagogici
della dialettica neoplatonica nella ricerca, al di la delle mutevoli specie, di
un unita
radicem
originaria
("omnia
substantiam
et
103 coequans"),
ridiscendere
-
et
Videntitas di Platone,
ripercorrendo
unum
entia
materiam
invenies"; 1
uno
momenti
i
sunt
ex una
"natura
di Euclide:
perpetua ac
104
delYartificiutn
per produrre quelle operationes mirabiles che ampliano
radice";
"unam
omnia
di qui e possibile
summi la
Creatoris
-
conoscenza e
il
potere dell uomo: 100
Alkindi, De radiis, cit., IV, Argentorati 1659, p. 576. Picatrix,
London
ed.
D.
p.
Pingree
230;
Turba philosophorum,
(Picatrix,
The
latin
in
version
Theatrum chemicum,
of the
vol.
Ghayat Al-Hakim,
1986), pp. 32, 3-4, 32-33, 3-5.
Liber
quanorum
Platonis,
in
Theatrum
Chemicum,
vol.
V,
Argentorati
1660,
p.
157.
Liber quartonim Platonis, cit., p. 105; Morienus, Liber de compositione alchemiae, Mangeti Bibliotheca chemica curiosa, Coloniae Allobrogum 1702, vol. I, p. 513B; Turba philosophorum, in Theatrum chemicum, vol. V, p. 1.
in
104
Liber
quanorum
Platonis,
cit.,
p. 107.
44
Gregory Sic habebis gloriam totius mundi - promette la Tabula smaragdina -, id est hoc lapide sic composite, gloriam huius mundi possidebis. Idco fugiet a te omnis obscuntas. Id cst, omnis inopia et
aegritudo.
Esperienza
riflcssione
mistica,
metafisica,
tecniche
pratiche
convergono ncl delincare una "scientia nimis profunda et fortis intellectui" che colloca 1 uomo in una posizione privilegiata nella grande catena dclPessere,
vertice del creato:
al
sciencia est quid valde nobile et altum proclama qui studet in ea et per earn operatur suam recipit nobilitatem et altitudinem. ... Et ille est perfectus qui scienciae gradum attingit ultimum... et est separatus ab animaiibus in suis magistcriis et scienciis... Et est in eo virtus Dei et sciencia iusticie pro civitatibus gubernandis... Et invenit magisteria subtilia et eorum
Scias
quod -
Picatrix
-
et
miracula et ymagines mirabilcs, et scientiarum est separatus ab omnibus aliis animaiibus sensibilibus. Fecitque ipsum Deus compositorem et inventorem suarum sapientiarum et scientiarum et explanatorem suarum qualitatum et omnium rerum mundi receptorem spiritu prophetico sua sapiencieque thesaurum, intellectorem omnium rerum et coniunctionum in maiori mundo exsistencium. Et cciam ipse homo comprehendit omnes intelligencias et composiciones rerum huius mundi suo sensu et ipse non comprehendunt cum; et omnia serviunt ei, et ipse nulh eorum scrvit. Et sua voce assimilatur unicuique animali quando ei placet. subtilitates, et Tacit formas retinet. Et
z
Forse
nei
proprio
della cultura delle scuole,
teoria
coniuga con
si
la
testi
magici,
astrologici,
alchemici,
ai
margini
viene delineando una forma di scien/a ove
si
la
pratica aprendo nuovi ori/zonti alia creativita e
potenza del sapicnte. Come nci tcsti ermetici tardoantichi, anchc in questa letteratura, che spcsso si richiama al mitico Ermcte, la conoscenza alia
delle
forze vive che percorrono
diverse
strettamente
e
nature,
mondo
il
connessa
dei rcciproci influssi fra le
e alia
celebrazione
della
dignita
delPuomo. 107 Impossibile
seguire
tutle
le
varie
articolazioni
delle
scienze
hac sciencia se intromittere intendit scire oportet et quod propter opera experimenta que fiunt in hoc mundo scientiarum sperimentali
("qui
in
profunditates et secrcta sciuntur, et ex operibus et expcrimentis solvuntur
impegnate assiduamente a difcndere la propria dignita contro condanne teologiche attraverso la distinzione fra una magia che e conoscenza e utilizzazione delle forze della natura e una magia che dubia...") i
sospetti c
le
Tabula smaragdina, 106 ricatrix,
Cfr.
108
F..
Picairu
cit., p.
Garin, cit.,
cit.,
p. 182.
26.
Mediowo
p. 170.
e Rinascimento, Bari, 1954, p. 154.
Forme
di conoscenza e ideall di sapcrc
precede con 1 aiuto degli che di tuttc costituisce che
confronto
come
la
Non
a caso
fra
problema
scienze
cui
a
altre
le
I
cruciali
problemi
i
con
porsi si
la
teologia,
coordinano e che
suoi rapporti con Dio, la
i
coincidono con
dell astrologia
cominciare dalla conciliazione fra necessita e libero
quelli della teologia, a arbitrio,
veniva
posizione delPuomo nel mondo,
invenstono
sua
storia.
fondamento,
il
nccessariamente
affermandosi entrambe
Limitandoci qui all astrologia deve esscre sottolineato il
infernali.
spirit!
45
moto
inflessibile
dei
e
cieli
realta
la
contingente:
il
pone costantemente dallo Speculum astronomic a Guido Abano in riferimento alia discussione di Albumasar sul
si
Bonatti e Pietro d
concetto
di
Aristotele. 1
antico
un
secondo
possibilis,
10
Con molta
chiarezza
testo 1
De
del
autore
dello
di
interpretatione
richiama
Speculum
problema teologico:
Et fortassis attingentius intuenti, eadem aut saltern similis genere est ista dubitatio ei dubitationi, quae est de divina proyidentia; nam in his caelum, nihil aliud est caeli quae operatur dominus per
significatio quam divina providentia. ... potuit figurare, si voluit, .quod sciebat;
Unde
qupd
libro universitatis... tune eadem est
in
si
fecit,
liberi arbitrii cum divina providentia cum interrogation^ significatione. Si ergo divinam providentiam stare cum libero arbitrio annullari non possit, neque annullabitur quin stet magisterium interrogationum cum eo.
determinatio de comrjossibilitate
et
Del resto che
essa
tutti
i
teologi
rappresenta -
aristotelico
Aristotelem, universalis,
dei
causalita -
-
tutti
fare
conti con Pastrologia, posto
i
dopo
sed
cieli
Bacone
ricordava
particularis,
sul
mondo
del
acquisizione
1
coerente applicazione di una legge
la
la
accettata,
per
debbono
sublunare
sistema
universalmente
fisica
("cerium
quod coelum non solum omnium rerum inferiorum"): 111 -
est
di
per
causa
est
qui
le
discussioni sui condizionamenti fisiologici del libero arbitrio, la funzione degli angeli, motori dei fra
previsione
astrologica
domenicano Giovanni
109 Aristotele,
monde,
t.
II,
cieli,
De
Paris, 1974
e
profezia:
di Vercelli
interpretatione,
(nouveau
Speculum astronomiae,
nel corso della storia, la difficile distinzione
ed.
9,
a
quesiti
Roberto
18a28-19b4;
di
cfr.
del
generate dell ordine
Kilwardby e a
P.
Duhem,
Le
Tommaso
systeme
du
tirage), pp. 296-297; 374-375. S.
Caroti,
1977, p. 44.
Roger Bacon, Opus maius,
i
cit., I,
p. 379.
M.
Pereira,
S.
Zamponi,
P.
Zambelli,
Pisa,
46
Gregory
d Aquino sono un tipico esempio dei problcmi posti
teologo dalla
al
fisica
112
peripatctica.
Ne
andra
sottovalutata
utilizzazione
1
come ermeneutica scientifica della cum historica narratione, secondo d Ailly), sino a recuperare
nell astrologia
leggere
anche
Qui
dell Anticristo.
1
astri
scritto
segni
i
trovare
sua conferma, mentre
la
il
precorritori
sembra
cristiana
apocalittica
Pietro
di
per confermare
rcligioni
negli
suo complemento e
il
uno
di
titolo
il
dcll astrologia
(Concordia astronomiae
sacra
storia
oroscopo delle
e
cristianesimo
del
primato
1
apologetica
in
altri
contesti e proprio la scienza dci moti e degli influssi celesti a ridurre in
termini
naturali
-
scrive
homo
"licite
religiosa:
discorso teologico
i
Chenu che ha messo
in
Aquinate,
sullo
trasformazione del il
caso
e scritto, soprattutto rilevo
sfondo
modo
di
XIV
il
di
significato e
un
intendere
di ripercorrere qui le
opzione
naturaliter
inclinabitur
a
Odo
tappe
lento
1
il
classico
saggio di
originalita della posizione
ma
radicale
lavoro teologico.
il
di
dopo
un dibattito
114
processo
Non
di capitale
di
e quindi
importanza
Tommaso
d Aquino sino ai maestri sccolo. Andranno tuttavia ricordati alcuni problemi che tornano
da Remigio del
1
qua naturaliter inclinatur
in
quia
-,
persino
procedimenti della scienza dimostrativa teorizzata si
dell
Parma
da
e
leges
scienza, delle polemiche sulla possibilita di applicare
molto
negli Analitici,
delle
113
come
Della teologia al
storica
debet insequi septam
Pelacani
Biagio
constellationc".
successione
la
di
Auxerre a
Rigaldi e
Tommaso
d Aquino, Opusculum X: Responsio ad magistrum Joannem de Vcrccllis dc XLII, ed. Vives, t. XXVII, pp. 248-255; la risposta di Roberto di Kilwardby in M.-D. Chcnu, "I^s rcponses dc S. Thomas ct de Kilwardby a la consultation de Jean de Verceil (1271)", in Melanges Mandonnet, Paris 1930, t. I, pp. 191-222; ivi cfr. anche J. lettre de S. Thomas au lecteur de Vcnise", pp. 103-189 che corre in piu Destrez,
articulis
"La
punti parallela alia lettera a Giovanni da Vercelli. 113 Cfr. G. Fcderici Vescovini, Le Quaestiones de aninia di Biagio Pelacani da Parma, Firenze 1974, pp. 81-82; p. 142: "per coniunctiones astrorum varias diversae gentcs compelluntur insequi diversas septas". Per tutto il problema sia permesso rinviare al mio
saggio
"Temps
astrologique et
Moyen Age, llf-Xllf
temps
Chretien",
siecles, Paris, 1984, pp.
M.-D. Chenu, La theologie
comme
in
Le temps de
la fin
de
I
Antiquite au
557-573. science an
Xllf
siecle,
Paris
1957
(la
prima
redazione del volume comparve nelle Archives d hist. doctr. et lilt, du M. A., II (1927), pp. 31-71). I ben noti luoghi di Tommaso d Aquino cui si fara riferimento piu avanti sono: / Sent., prol. q. I, a. 3; Super libnim Boethii De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 2; Summa thcologica,
I,
q.
1,
a. 2, 7, 8.
47
Fornie di conoscenza e ideali di sapere
con
corso
nel
insistcnza
del modello
validita
di
mcttcndo
dibattito
quel
una volta trasposto
aristotelico,
in
discussione
nell orizzonte
la
dclla
della fede, e il presupposto parallclismo fra il discorso scientifico c muove da cui gli articulifidei. principia Gia nella prima meta del secolo, soprattutto nelle quaestiones degli anni Trenta e Quaranta, si vengono definendo alcuni nodi problematici
"de
subiecto
scientia trasmessa in
IV, D. 13),
Odo
i
torneranno
che
fondamentali qitaestio
misteri
sui
riflessione
poi
theologiae"
sempre a riproporsi: tralasciando la del ms. Douai 434 e quella De divina
due redazioni (Bib. -
Rigaldi
complessita
tema utrum theologia
rapporto fra
difficile
svolge in tutta la sua
mettendo
scientia,
modello epistemologico
il
-
(1245)
sit
782; Praga, Univ.
lat.
Sentenze e piu nettamente
alle
115
nella Dispiitatio de scientia theologiae il
Vat., Vat.
commento
nel
evidenza
in
il
aristotelico e la riflessione
teologica. Viene in primo piano Pambiguita del paragone tra i principi non dimostrati da cui muove il discorso scientifico (per se noti o dati da una
scienza superiore) e
messa
e quindi
gli
articuli fidei accolti in forza della rivelazione,
teoria della subalternazione che costituisce,
sur lequel est
bade
de
comme
la
theologie
et la
come notava Chenu,
alia
si
scienza di
Dio
et
habeant"),
("quod
la
pivot
structure
Odo
analogia fra
1
anonimo
di
la si
perspective
subalterna
Douai, discutendo del
linea visualis habeat se ut scientia subalternans
videtur
aveva notato:
articolato discorso
1
scienza teologica che
la
e dei beati, gia
ita
subalternata,
demontree
"le
science".
subalterna alia geometria e
medesimo problema
est
preuve par laquelle
Se PAquinate affermera con decisione che
ed
discussione la possibilita di applicare alia teologia la
in
"Nee
quod
de
scientia
est ratio
ea
Deo
univocans";
et
creaturis
se
con piu precise e
Rigaldi sottolineava una differenza radicale:
hoc est differentia, quia in aliis scientiis suppositiones sunt manifestae ipsi rationi sine adminiculo extrinseco... Sed in theologia indigent adminiculo gratiae fidei. in
theologiae di Odo Odo nel II vol., ove sono pubblicate fra altro la "quaestio" De subiecto theologiae del ms. Douai 434, 101 ra (pp. 115-16) e la Quaestio de divina scientia nelle due redazioni del ms. f. I, Praga, Univ. IV, D. 13, ff. 79rb-80vb e del ms. Bib. Vat., Vat. lat. 782, ff. 123ra124rb (pp. 131-148, 151-164): per la possibile datazione di questi testi, vol. I, pp. 71L.
Rigaldi e
Sileo,
altri
Teoria
testi
della
inediti
scienza
teologica.
(1230-1250), 2
voll.,
Quaestio
Roma,
de
1984.
scientia I
testi
di
1
E
merito del Sileo aver nel corso degli anni cospicui documenti. 76.
scienza
insistito
Trenta
suH importan/.a del dibattito sulla teologia come Quaranta del Duecento e averne pubblicato
e
48
Gregory Per questo propriamente
defmisce
sapienza
invece
puo
marum";
principiis
problema che ormai
commentando
preliminare
Lombardo
sino
le
"quantum
conclusiones
teorica
della
come
teologia
dal
assumcndo
formulazioni, al
tutta
in
nazione e fondando su
illis
scienza,
De
Trinilate
Tommaso
giovanile
Boezio e
di
sua valenza
la
di essa
il
carattere
scienza teologica: qucsta, traendo
la
d Aquino
commcnto
dottrina
all
della
al
Summa
alia
theologica] e determinante perche conduce qucll elaborazione radicale,
altissi-
ex
U(
Sentenze, la posizione di
commento
al
"cognitio
ad
Aristotele
causarum
maestri erano obbligati ad affrontare in via
i
ma omogenee
diverse
(nelle
tutti
quanto
sed fidei.
simpliciter,
Nella complessa elaborazione
come
e sapientia,
teologia in
scientia
dirsi
ma non
illatas",
la
metafisica
la
esito piu
subalter-
eminentemente speculativo
della
suoi principi (quae sunt articuli fidei}
i
procede discurrendo de principiis ad conclusiones e ricostruisce nei modi umani ordine della conoscenza e della realta sub dalla scienza di Dio,
1
ratione
Non
Dei.
meraviglia
applicare alia teologia
riferimento costante
di
validita
del
articuli
fidei
1
parallelismo
nome
in
quindi
metodo
il
che
dibattito
il
sulle
Aquinate, tornando a mettere fra
i
principi
una
di
come punto
discussione
in
una scienza subalterna e
di
rigorosa
di
possibilita
del discorso scientifico abbia
gli
teoria
della
interpetazione
la
aristotelica.
Non
videtur convenienter dictum scriye Gerardo da Bologna ricordando la tesi tomista - quod ad racionem scientie subalterne sufficiat scientcm credere habenti superiorem scienciam, sicut musicus credit principiis sibi traditis ab arismetrico, et perspectives principiis sibi traditis a gcometra; et eodem modo, ut dicunt, sacra
doctrina credit principia revelata a deo
da
cosi
estendere
che
sostenerc
concluduntur ex
perche dei
alia
articulis
"principia
teologia fidelis
"eciam
fidei".
fidei"
ed e quindi
affatto evidens
la
nozione
potest "Ista
stare
de
scienciam
non
possunt",
insiste
per
que
illis
Gerardo,
ha noticia enigmatica et obscura, niente "impossibile quod de conclusionibus habcatur si
sciencia sive noticia evidens, et hec ratio traditur a est id
subalterna
scienza
di
habere
quod assumitur, conclude contestando
teoria della subalternazione in
campo
il
Philosopho...";
falsum
valore epistemologico della
tcologico.
E
evidente
infatti,
aveva
sostenuto Goffredo di Fontaines, che
1
Odo
Rigaldi,
ms. Douai 434,
h>i,
Quaestio de scientia theologiae, cd. Sileo,
p. 116.
p.
13;
per
1
anonimo
del
Forme
di
conoscenza e ideali di sapere
49
creditis vel opinatis non acquiritur certa scicntia de conclusione. Nee est differentia in hoc inter principia quorum est habitus fidei et opinionis... Et idep sicut irrationale est dicere quod ex j>rincipiis solum opinatis acquiritur certa scientia cqnclusionum ex ipsis elicitarum, ita etiam in proposito ex principiis creditis.
ex principiis
Pretendere articuli
fidei
scientia
quod
di costruire
dicere
"est
una scienza
in
contradictoria...
subalternata
vere
sit
senso proprio nullus
scientia",
sanae
muovendo mentis
conclude,
dagli
intelligit
ricordando
a
proposito dal paragone di subalternazione fra perspectiva e geometria che "numquam
erit
perfectus
geometria per scientiam
Non
in
perspectiva
qui
non
fuerit
instructus
in
superiorem".
diversa la reazione di Pietro d Auriol:
falsum
est... quod articuli fidei sint principia in nostra theologia... non potest - insiste polemicamente contro Tommaso d Aquino quod dicit ad scientiam subalternam sufficere notitiam creditivam respectu principiorum, nee exigi respectu eorum alium habitum nisi fidem... impossibile est quod conclusio scientifice cognoscatur quocumque habitu scientiae etiam subalternae, et quod principium tantummodo credatur et teneatur habitu creditivo... noc est omnino
stare
falsum.
Se fosse vera Panalogia proposta dalPAquinate il perspectivus non potrebbe mai divenire geometra, cioe conoscere dimostrativamente i principi ricevuti dalla scienza subalternante,
mentre
il
teologo non potra mai avere
il
che e evidentemente
falso,
simile conoscenza degli articuli da
cui precede: fides esset habitus principiorum perspectivi, numquam aliquis simul esset geometra et perspectivus... ergo non est verum quod scientia siibalternata ex haoitu procedat principiis cognitis si
creditivo.
Le prime dodici questiones della Summa di Gcrardo da Bologna sono edite da P. de Vooght, Les sources de la doctrine chretienne, Bruges, 1954: per luoghi cit., pp. 309310; Petri Aureoli Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum, proem, sect. 1, ed. E.M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1952, vol. I, pp. 140-141; Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, par M. De Wulf-A. Pelzer, Louvain, 1904, Quod. IV, q. 10, pp. 261-263; cfr. anche Quod. IX, q. 20, ed. J. Hoffmans, Louvain 1928, pp. 188-189. Non diversamente Giovanni di Bassolis, discepolo di Duns Scoto, sottolineava i
che quocumque processu theologie que est circa mere theologica principium est creditum tantum... ergo impossibile est quod conclusio per istum habitum unquam sit scita...", per questo la teologia nostra "nee est scientia nee possibile est ipsam esse propriam scientiam sicut impossibile est hominem esse asinum"; parimenti categorico il "in
rifiuto
dell analogia
di
subalternazione:
habeat evidentiam principiorum vel principia
que omni
intellectui
"non potest aliquis scire perspectivam nisi ea reducere in sensum immediate vel in prima nota sunt ex terminis... Dico quod aliquem scire
sciat
stanti
perspectivam et non geometriam est unum nihil dictu et ignorare vocem propriam" (Opera Joannis de Bassolis... In quatuor Sententiarum libros, Parisiis 1517, Questio prol. 5, a. 3 e 4, f. 21vb-22ra; 22rb; si sono corretti alcuni evident! errori di stampa). Tommaso d Aquino collocava nella dinamica del passaggio dalla fede alia visione la
50
Gregory Dal
suo
canto
d Aquino e per
Unde
Occam
gli stessi
defmira pucrili
le
Tommaso
di
posizioni
argomenti:
quod ego scio conclusiones aliquas, quia tu quibus ego credo, quia tu dicis ea. Et eodem modo Deus puerile est dicere quod ego scio conclusiones theologiae, quia scit principia quibus ego credo, quia ipse revelat ea. dicere
est
nihil
scis principia
dimostrativo
discorso
del
una
che
ricordare
Inutile
fortemente sottolineata da
e
scientifico
metodo tcologico era
il
qui in
illi
scientia
autem
et
experiment!. Principia revelationem divinam.
Obiezioni che colpiscono tutta
scientia
divaricazione
e
fidei
stata
theologia quac demonstratiyo. via sensus, memoriae scicntiae nota sunt... per
ilia
procedere in omnibus Principia enim demonstrations dcbent esse riot a est sacra scriptura] volunt
la
metodo
il
Sigieri:
pessime volunt procedere
sottolineando
fra
separazione
precisa
fra
>
teoria tomista della subaltematio
secondo Aristotele
scienza
riscontro
di
imponendo
la la
illius
[scil.
modo
alia
uno
teologia
e
la
statuto
radicalmente diverso:
Nam
aveva scritto Gerardo da Bologna - qui ea que Philosophus subalternacionc scienciarum dicuntur vidctur quasi primus et solus tradidisse, nunquam posuit subalternacionem inter fidem vel 11 opinionem et scienciam, scd solum inter scienciam et scicnciam.
de
di
possibilita
future,
modo
sicut
conoscerc
principia
scientiae
principium credimus, sed finis sicut
modo
(sicut
si
demonstrationis"
fidei
sciens
inferior
est
proximum est
in
scita,
addiscat
2, a.
2 ad 7).
Guillclmi
dc
prol., q. VII, in S. Bonaventurae,
Ockham
supcrioris
Scriptum
ed.
G. Gal,
Quaestiones in Metaphysicam,
St. lib.
in ct
24,
I,
q.
scientis
credita"
librum
a.
2,
sol.
scientiam,
intcllectus
et
1,
ad
"in
fidei: et
noti, 2);
cura Y.,
comm.
I,
divinus,
tune fient
(Super libnim Boethii
visi,
"huius
De
cui
intellccta
ei
Trinitate,
q.
Sententiarum, Ordinatio, lib. I, Franciscani Universitatis
primum
theologica
1,
est
primum
Bonaventure, N. VI, q.
per se
nos perveniamus ad intelligendum quac credimus, sed
ut
nobis,
Opera philosophica
d.
articuli
gli
articuli
(/// Sent.,
fides,
quae prius erant tantummodo
vel
demonstrationist crunt ita
principia
quando Deus videbitur per essentiam,
Instituti
1967,
ed.
p.
199;
Sigier de
Brabant,
W. Dunphy, Louvain-la-Neuve,
1981, p. 361.
119
Gerardo da Bologna, Summa, ed. cit., p. 305; Tommaso sono costretti a difendere la
discepoli di distinzioni e
pp. 306, 309. Anche i piu fcdeli teoria della subaltematio con sottili
cfr.
uso: "Unde mihi vidctur - scrive Hervaeus Natalis nella restringendone quod, quando frater Thomas in aliquo loco dicit, Defensa doctrinae D. Thomae esse scientiam subalternam, quod non intcndit, quod theologia sic sit theologiam scientia subalterna, quantum ad hoc, quod scientia subalterna inventa ab homine habet (testo processum scientificum, sed quantum ad hoc, quod habet similitudinem cum edito dal Krebs, Wissenschaft nach der Lehre der Hochscholastik Thcologie und Bd. XI, 3-4), Munster i. W. (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, 1
ea"
1912, p. 37*,
cfr.
anche
p. 10*).
Forme
Ne meno mosse
di conoscenza e idea Ii di sapere
51
interessante sarcbbc ripcrcorrcre un altra serie di obiezioni,
dal rifiuto di chiudere nei procedimcnti universalizzanti del discorso
aristotelico
le
realta
e
cui
di
contingenti
tcssuta
storia
la
sacra.
Odo
Rigaldi nella sua Disputatio de scientia theologiae avcva insistentemcnte
riproposto
il
dilemma
fra
e
aristotclica
Pepistemologia
discorso
il
teologico:
Item,
de universalibus
scientia est
"omnis
et incorruptibilibus", sicut
Philosophus; sed theologia est de singularibus et corruptibilibus Quantum ad magnam sui partem (ut de historialibus quae sunt gesta circa singularia), ergo theologia non est scientia, - aut ilia non sunt de theologia, quod manifeste falsum est. dicit
La
ammesso che (sic
est
cognitio in
a
risposta la
certa",
non
theologia
ma
nomeri)
obiezione
questa
solo
se
era
-
individuality storica
ma
il
complessa e sfumata: termine e preso proprie
prende communiter come possono
non secondo
assunti
quanto vengono
se
sia scientia si
singularia, gli historialia
i
stata
lettera
la
ad sensum
"quantum
"intellectiva
rietrare nella teologia -
cioe
interiorem",
nella
come
loro
segni e
ratione illius habent universalitetem"). Sed esempi di valore universale non est sic in aliis scientiis, annota come insoddisfatto, proponendo ("et
un
altra
soluzione
con
la
e
si
quale
del
tutto
fuori
dalla
logica
del
procedono per humanam rationem non possono mai giungere a una conoscenza certa delle realta individuali ("circa singularia non potest ratio humana certa reperiri"); la discorso
scientifico:
le
scienze
infatti
che
teologia invece e scienza capace di conseguire, anche dei gesta singularia,
una conoscenza assolutamente certa per lumen fidei substratum: in hac scientia; non sic autem
La distanza sottolineata
Odo "scientia...
e
gli
pari in evidenza alia
conclude
"unde
in aliis
scientiis".
-
matematica
historica
intelligibilium;
cit.,
sono
pp.
6,
11,
-
possunt cadere singularia
120
fra scienza aristotelica e teologia viene cosi
Rigaldi, Quaestio, est
-
-
acquisiti
15-17.
relinquitur ergo
di
pieno
Non diversamente
diritto,
la
fortemente nella
Summa
quod doctrina Theologiae non
loro
Halesiana:
est scientia.
Item, sicut dicit Philosophus, in principio Metaphysicae: Experientia singularium est, ars vero universalium..."; sed doctrina Theologiae pro magna parte non est universalium, sed singularium, ut patet in narratione historica; relinquitur ergo quod non est ars vel e la risposta: "Introducitur ergo in historia sacrae Scripturae factum singularc ad significandum universale, et inde est quod eius est intellectus et scientia" (Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica, I, tract, intr., q. I, c. 1, ed. Studio et cura PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, t. I, Ad Claras Aquas, 1924, pp. 1-2; 3). Per il complesso problema dei scientia";
rapporti di priorita fra Odo Rigaldi e la compilazione della Summa, cfr. ed. cit., t. IV, Prolegomena, Ad Claras Aquas, 1948, pp. CXCIX sgg.; Sileo, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 76 sgg. (e la precedente bibliografia ivi citata). Ricorre insistente il richiamo ad Agostino: "Alia sunt quae semper creduntur, et numquam intelliguntur: sicut est omnis historia, temporalia et humana gesta percurrrens" (De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 48, P.L. 40, 31).
52
Gregory
singolarita, all interno di
una
scientia
cui statute e radicalmente diverse
il
da quello definite ncgliAnalitici. II
Tommaso
problema non sfugge a
restata
Odo
in
marginale
Rigaldi:
Sed sacra doctrina
singularibus.
abbassando Yhistoria a
livello di
d Aquino che sceglie
alPobiezione
dc
tractat
exemplum
soluzione
la
non
"scientia
risponde
egli
singularibus...",
de
est
:
singularia traduntur in sacra doctrina, non quia de eis principalitcr tractetur, sed intrpducuntur turn in exemplum vitae sicut in scientiis moralibus, turn etiam ad declarandum auctoritatem virorum per quos ad nos revelatio divina processit.
Quanto
piu rigoroso pretendera di essere
discorso teologico, tanto piu netto sara
il
metodo
il
scientifico nel
distacco dalle categoric storiche
della rivelazione, della teologia scienza dall esegesi: e la tendenza che
manifestera nel tomismo posteriore.
Ma
polemica con
il
("magna
Aquinate, denunciava
1
habitus
pars
thcologici
Pietro d Auriol,
gia
serrata
rischio di distruggerc la teologia
se
detruncaretur")
oggetto alle verita nccessarie e immutabili;
la
tutta tessuta di realta contingenti, di interventi di
clarum
in
si
si
riducesse
il
suo
thcologia noslra e infatti
Dio
nella storia:
quod theologia nostra tractantur multae veritates contingentcs, quod Christus fuit incarnatus et mundus creatus, et similia, quae pendent mere ex voluntate divina in
est
per questo non puo essere scienza. si
Tommaso
riferisce a II
-
"Relinquitur
ad
ut impossibilis
-
tcnendum".
problema e cruciale e torna insistente:
Particularia tota gesta, quibus dubitationem an theologia sit scientia
aveva annotate Ulrico di Strasburgo. sull
analogia fra
la
storicita
scientifico;
dalle
igitur praedicta positio 122
i
principia e
scriptura
Piu
plena
est,
faciunt
ancora che nella discussione
gli articuli fidci, si
pone qui
il
dilemma
fra
del intemporalita del discorso messaggio cristiano e un obiezione torna costante nel corso delle quaestiones, sin I
prime battute:
"scientia
intelligibilibus et universalibus".
non
est
de
singularibus",
"scientia
est
Se per questo molti maestri rifiutavano
de di
altri nel senso proprio del termine, teologia una scienza alia scienza anche sc davano teologica per rispondere alPobiezione fondamenti ed esiti non riducibili all epistemologia aristotelica, erano
considerare
la
condotti a risolvere
Tommaso
d Aquino,
la
singolarita dell evento, la temporalita della lettera,
Summa
Petri Aureoli Scriptum,
theologica,
proem,
sectio
1,
I,
q. 1, a. 2
ed.
cit.,
ad secundum.
pp. 144-145.
Forme
di
conoscenza e
53
ideali di sapere
entro paradigm! di valore universale, strumenti dell economia divina. Cosi
Ulrico di Strasburgo, pur assumendo
omni firma il
carattere
della
scientifico
cononoscenza teologica de
est
"communiter...
Gand che
ai
tcologia,
pur
invcstiti
pochi
riservando
di
1
evidenza
rebus
sua
in
certissimis
veritate
non rientrano come
gesta della storia sacra
nella
historica),
(sensibilia
dclla
una spccialc illuminazione ex
et
scienza
teologica,
scientis
parte
securissima et evidentissima viro spirituali lumine intellectual! le
pro
difendc
absolute dicendum quod ista est certissima scicntiarum,
et
("simplicitcr
quia
tcrmine scientia
il
apprehensione", e piu decisamcntc Enrico di
illustrate"):
nella loro singolarita
tali
ma
con
solo
funzione
pedagogica, esplicativa:
modo
historiae et gesta particularia et sensibilia in hac scientia non tarn propter necessitatem scientiae, quam propter declarationem eorum quae pertinent principaliter ad scientiam... Unde et ista sensibilia historica in hac scientia sunt quasi exempla in aliis.
hoc
introducuntur,
Ma
la
contingenza
che
radicale
salvezza torna insistente a negare
il
sottende
tutta
la
storia
della
carattere di scienza alia teologia: in
una quaestio dedicata all esame delle varie tesi sul metodo teologico, e in serrata polemica con la teoria del lumen supematiirale di Enrico di Gand,
Giacomo
di
Therines insisteva sul carattere peculiare degli oggetti propri
del discorso teologico,
necessitas et exigentia dependet ex divina ordinatione et libere yoluntatis, sicut quod mundus inceperit et quod tempore determinate Filius Dei sit incarnatus, et quod substantiapams convertatur in corpus Christi; et quia talia vera sunt de facto et in ordine ad Deum, poterunt aliter se
quarum arbitrio
proseguiva nabere, quia potuisset non incarnari; ideo de tahbus non est scientia aicta, quia scientia est eorum que impossibile est aliter se Eroprie abere et que sui impermutabilem substantiam sortiuntur.
Enrico di Gand, 1520 (reprint
Ascensii
Ulrico
di -
teologia est,
et
scientia
Strasburgo scientia
tamen
in
vocatur"),
strumenti
della
manuductiones
Summae
quaestionum ordinariarium, in aedibus lodoci Badii Bonaventure, N. Y., 1953), a. VI, q. 2, fo. XLIXv, XLIIIr. che aveva awertito in manicra pungente il problema, e della St.
o sapientia - sottolineava non general scientiam, sed
limite
affectiva
il
nobis
fidem...
non
rinunciava
pedagogia nostri
divina:
materialis
ad
assorbire
"Omnia
intellectus
i
gesta
in
noi
("in
se
scientia
que tamen fides etiam exempla unh-ersalia o in
negli particularia huius scientie vel sunt ut sunt aparitiones Dei et divina,
autem in
huiusmodi, vel sunt universalia exempla vivendi, ut gesta Patrum et ipsius christi" (Summa de bono, lib. I, tr. 2, 2, ed. J. Daguillon, Paris, 1930, p. 30). La quaestio di Giacomo di Therines e stata pubblicata da J. Leclercq, theologie comme science d apres la litterature quodlibetique", Recherches de theologie ancienne et medie\ ale, XI (1939), pp. 351-374 (il testo di Giacomo alle pp. 360-365, il luogo cit. a p. 361, corretto in un punto; cfr. la conclusione, p. 364: "quod theologia quam habent et habuerunt communiter Sancti et Doctores de Deo, secundum statum presentis vite, non "La
sit scientia").
54
Gregory
Come
salvare
il
contingente, che inerisce alia storia della salvezza,
nelle strutture del discorso teologico
non
uno
e peraltro che
degli aspetti
un piu ampio problema della fede cristiana, ove esperienza della esso ritorna in contingenza costituisce un elemento portante: per questo 1
di
tutte
zone delle
le
propria di Dio e si
primo obiecto conoscere
del
illud
de
Dio e
est,
pcrfectionis
necessario
Giovanni
di
Ripa,
condotto
a
I
porre
privilegiare
sit
haec
tutto
delle
(perfectior
condicio
riconducibile
creatura"
la
cosi
lieu
de
1
criterio
il
est)
("in
della
scientia
quod autem sit non cognitionis"),
agli
mcntre
Analitici,
negli
Scoti
Scotisticac...
rispondente "la
"cuilibet
contingence
dans
intelligible".
dibattito
"utrum
theologia
sit
scientia"
gioco un astratta possibilita di far rientrare
schemi del discorso
teologico
Duns
"in
della
125
discorso
Joannis
epistemologico
obiecti,
da introdurre
in
124
contingenti
dell oggetto
ratio contingens
awerte che non era solo
Commissionis
vcrita
statute
necessita
alia
est
Dio stesso
complesso
51
scienza
cognitio certa et evidens;
non
entedement archetype meme, In
la
discutendo della conoscenza dei futuri contigenti, e in
de
contingenti
allo
rapporto
rispetto
modello
un
vero
a
quod
obiecto,
proponendo
anzitutto
investe
e condotto a delineare le condizioni trascendentali
deU evidenza
e
certezza
in
theologico"
in
e
discutendo
Proprio
tempo.
Duns Scoto
scienza,
teologica
suo conoscere ab aetemo quello che contingcntemente
il
nel
realizza
riflessione
scientifico
teorizzato
si il
negli
omnia... studio et cura prol., pars 4, q. 1, Opera pracside C. Balic, Civitas Vaticana, vol. I, 1950, pp. 144-145;
Ordinatio,
est
de
est certa et evidens, et, quantum 145-146: igitur aliqua alia cognitio scientia quae rcquirit perpctua, ipsa vidctur in sc formaliter perfection quam necessitatem obiecti. Scd contingcntia ut pertinent ad theologiam nata sunt habere certam et cvidentem ct, quantum est ex parte evidentiae, perpetuam...
ivi,
pp.
"Si
se,
cognitionem
sunt habere nata ad ut pcrfectiorem theologiam pertinent contingentia Igitur cognitionem quam scientia de ncccssariis acquisita. Sed numquid cognitio eorum est scientia? Dico quod secundum illam rationem scientiae positam I Posteriomm, quae requirit necessitatem obiecti, non potest de eis non est cognosccre ut nccessarium, esse scientia, contingens cognoscerc quia scientiam in VI Ethicorum, ut contingens; tamen secundum quod Philosophus accipit dividitur contra opinionem et suspicionem, bene potest de eis esse scientia, quia et
habitus est
dici quod theologia quo determinate verum dicimus. Magis tamen proprie potest secundum se, quia de necessariis contentis in ea ipsa habet evidentiam et
sapientia
necessitatem et certitudinem, et obiectum perfect issimum et altissimum et nobilissimum. de contingentibus in se contingentia, habet evidentiam manifestam visis ut in obiecto theologico, et non habet evidentiam mendicatam ab aliis prioribus;
Quantum autcm ad unde
notitia
quam
scientiae conclusionum".
125
Jean
Vignaux,
contingentium
habetur
in
ea
magis assimilatur
intellectui
principiorum
Conclusions, ed. A. Combes, Paris 1957, pp. 229-230; cfr. P. de I Eglise, ora in De Saint Anselme a philosophic medievale dans le temps
de
La
ut
Ripa,
Luther, Paris 1976, p. 75.
Forme Analitici:
era
in
teologica
fra
la
conoscenza e
di
discussione
fede
e
la
c
possibilita
la
natura della riflcssionc
Dictro
visone bcatifica.
la
55
ideali di sapcre
contro
obiezioni
le
analogia fra gli articuli fidei e primi principi (con il rifiuto della subalternazione della teologia alia scienza di Dio), dietro 1 insistenza sul 1
contingente delle verita della storia sacra oggetto proprio del
carattere
sapere
e
teologico
modus
sul
quindi
dimensione temporale, -
il
awerte
si
historialis,
exemplificativus,
all
esegesi e alia sua
126
revelativus, sybmolicus della sacra doctrina
legata
preoccupazione che
la
la verita rivelata
evidenza per Dio e per i beati - perda nel discorso teologico suo carattere enigmatico e simbolico proprio dell oggetto di fede: di qui
di assoluta
e
scienza
della
evidencie
Gerardo da Bologna
sottolineata da
-
divaricazione
la
certitudo
la
o
veritatis
propria della teologia e della fede; scienza
la
-
fra la certitudo
adesionis
securitas
non
teologia
ma
e,
per
la
certezza che la caratterizza impegna assai piu di quella: nessuno infatti
morte per difendere una verita matematica, mentre ove e in gioco la salvezza - anche 1 eretico, che segue
andrebbe incontro -
alia
per la fede senza saperlo dottrine
ita sibi
exponit vitam, et
false, "ita 127
caput amputari
dimittit... sicut et catholicus".
Andrebbero anche approfonditi scientia
1
teologico:
intesa
viene
si
aliter
sacra
anche
dottrina,
in
scientia
o improprie per
la
secundum affectum
di
significati
Summa
Halesiana),
(onde
religiosi
tutti
M.-D. Chenu,
La
theologie
la
comme science,
Gerardo da Bologna, Summa, della
se
dibattito
e
scienza
sia
teologia
ed.
cit.,
adhaesionis
certitudo
p.
1?8
Per
theologiae,
le
espressioni
ed.
Fr.
cui
si
Stegmuller,
allude
nel
Monasterii
300.
Sulla
testo,
espressioni
proprie
"prima
sapientia",
notava
scienza pratica o scientia affectiva,
certitudo
della
1935,
("scientia
Aristotelem",
pp. 41, 43.
cit.,
(come theologia Goffredo di Fontaines, Quod. IX, q. 20, ed. Hoffmans, cit., pp. 287-288. la
la
a sapore affectionis
si
\
Cfr.
il
analogia,
delle
minus
ponga al di la di tali distinzioni come 128 segni di un problematico rapporto.
speculativa o
sono
sapere
suo coniugarsi costante con
o sapientia
pietatis
e
etici
teologia,
ricorrente
il
1
apud
philosophia, quae est theologia philosophorum... dicitur la
termine
il
dal
inve.ntione
aliter
et
apud theologos et sanctos, Roberto di Kilwardby), 1 uso
scientia large
sostiene
Humana
accipitur
carica
distinguersi
ne
chi
scienza divina inspiratione e
fra
sottolineava
la
per
cui
di
diversi
o
insistenza posta nel differenziare la scienza aristotelicamente
dalla
distinzione
caricando,
valori
i
identificarsi
cfr.
p.
Roberti
41-42;
il
evidentiae scientia
propria
fidei)
cfr.
Kilwardby De natura luogo citato prosegue:
56
Gregory
Ne andranno
dimenticati
modelli scientific! estranei il
all
modi
altri
dare
di
compito eminentemente apologetico e teologico
scientia
fondata
instabilis
sulla
metodo argomcntativo quindi Dio e le "dignita maniera
in
superiores}
combinatori, scientiarum"
in
ai
di
misteri.
alti
che
alia
um
sostituire
stessi della realta
principi
per dedurre da questi (per causas
129
omnium humanarum
"suprema
emergere Per molti
("ista
ars est et logica
1
aspetti
e
necessariae
che
arte di Lullo
pud
rationes
le
creazione
della
ratio
la
ripercorrere
facendo
fidei
piu
vuole
secondo precise simbologie e modelli
infallibile,
capace
ratio
la
soggiacciono
i
cui logica e metafisica coincidono
metaphysica"),
penetrare
siano
intera struttura del reale; arte
1
et
-
divine"
dell arte lulliana
tradizionale
logica
cui principi
i
discorso teologico
al
orizzonte aristotelico: basterebbe ricordare
considerarsi un tentativo di dare una struttura apodittica e un fondamento
metafisico
metodo teologico
al
autori ai quali costantemente
Ma
il
da
fuori
problema un diretto
si
Anselmo
di
riferisce.
metodo
della
riferimento
alia
del
San Vittore,
e di Riccardo di
scienza teologica
sacra
si
con
pagina,
pone anche significativo
recupero della dialettica neoplatonica riscoperta, al di la della tradizione dionisiana, nelle opere capital! di Proclo tradotte da Guglielmo di
Moerbeke.
Basta
Bertoldo
Moosburg
teologica della
di
del
iniziali
pagine
testo
"philosophia difficillima",
le
cui
Elementatio
"in
rationum
publicam coordinationem permette
uno
scientiarum
-
propone
si
procliano
"regulae"
quibus
est
seu
excellentissima
sono
sive
divinis
-
come et
praepositones
dc
Deo"
che
Scientia
luce
alia
divinissima
dalle
costituite
sermo de
di
di Proclo: qui la scienza
Elementatio thcologica nel
commento
grande
tradizione platonica e neoplatonica, ermetica e dionisiana
omnium
dc\\
alia
scandisce
si
quale
le
leggere
"extra
"secundum
precede dignissima disgregationem theorematum sive elementorum", essa ascensus per rationem indeatam ad rationem "scalaris viam".
et
Theologi enim et sancti scitum dicunt omne quod mcntc cognoscitur, sive credatur sive Sed Aristoteles nihil dicit scitum nisi conclusionem causaliter demonstratam... Unde iliac rationes de Aristotele sumptae non contingunt Sacram Scripturam, nee usquam locum hahent nisi in scientiis humana investigatione inventis" (pp. 42^3);
videatur.
Summa theologica, tr. Summa dc bono,
Alexandri de Hales di
Strasburgo,
Magno,
I Sent., d.
Raymundi Ill, p. 1.
I,
1,
tract, 2,
c.
intr.
IV,
q.
pp.
I,
c.
1,
ed.
36-37 (in
cit.,
t.
I,
p.
2;
Ulrico
dipendenza da Alberto
ad. 4, ed. Borgnet, p. 19a).
Lulli
Introductoria Artis
demonstrativae,
1,
in
Opera, Maguntiae
1722,
t.
Forme
divinam"
130
57
di conoscenza e ideali di sapere
collocandosi
come
sapientialis scientia al di la dclla mctafisica
pcrchd non e solo scicnza del primi principi di Aristotclc (principiorum ctiam principiorum, quac sunt super entia" ("sapientia non entiiim), "scd
131
solum entium sed
secundum
Questa
superentium").
modum
proprium
scientiae,
che procede
divinalis sapientia
trova
il
suo fondamento
in
quel
superiore principium cognitivum che Platone, Proclo e Dionigi chiamano
unum animae vel unitas, perche anima "efficiatur L irruzione deU esperienza neoplatonica 1
Analitici (validi solo
modello
di scientia
Deus".
spezza
schemi
gli
degli
propone un
cognitionem"),
con un itinerario diverso da quello della sacra
che, la
recupera
doctrina,
"usque
ad intellectualem
quasi
piu
alta
dialettica
-
platonica
scientia platonica
1 ^2
e con essa una tradizione piu antica e autorevole della stessa filosofia
-
peripatetica:
Plato autem et ante Platonem theologi laudant cognitionem supra quam divulgant esse divinam maniam, et dicunt ipsam talem cognitionem esse unum animae - in tali enim uno, quoc vocal Dionisius... "unitionem (vel secundum aliam translationem unitatem) intellectum,
superexaltatam supra mentis (seu intellectus) naturam", idem est cognitivum et cognitio... sed cognitivum huius nostrae divinalis theologiae est excedens non solum cognitiva omnium scientiarum, sed etiam excedit... ipsum intellectum, qui secundum auctorem ibi supra in nobis est melior omni scientia et est ipsius animae. II
presentarsi
Platone
di
venssime
eppure
supers apientia
convergono
un ideale
di
e
Proclo,
come
sapere
divinalis philosophia
...
.
i"Vl
propmssime scientia Ermete Trismegisto e
et
-
-
cui
in
Dionigi,
e
testimonianza significativa della molteplicita dei modelli conoscitivi che si delineano nella cultura medievale; e non e casuale se Giovanni da Ripa potra assimilare di
sapere
1
esperienza mistica, e
scientifico
la theologia mystica,
(notitia scientifica). In particolare
si
a
una forma
dovra insistere
resa piu importanza della tradizione neoplatonica critica filosofica orientare una traduzioni di Proclo dalle per precisa
sul
significato
e
1
della metafisica e della noetica di Aristotele finito:
"omne
esse
dicit
clausionem
come
finitatis
metafisica e noetica del
alicuius"
si
leggeva
nello
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elcincntationcm theologicam Prodi, M.R. Pagnoni Sturlese-L. Sturlese, Hamburg 1984, Exposilio tituli, pp. 47-49.
1
^9
134
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio,
cit.,
Praeamb., pp. 66-67.
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio,
cit.,
Praeamb., pp. 61, 65,
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio,
cit.,
Praeamb.,
p. 65.
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio,
cit.,
Praeamb.,
p. 69.
68.
ed.
58
Gregory
pseudo-ermetico Liber
rcrum creatarum
("prima
Verbum netta
est
tcsto
congiunge con
si
esse")
136
la
17/z
principle erat
svolta fondamentale, con la
-
del
ben noto a Eccart:
ove Vauctoritas del Liber de causis
-
segna una Vangelo giovanneo affermazione del primato in Dio
deU esse; esiti
XXIV philosophomm,
eccartiana dell ontoteologia
critica
fondamento
dcirintelligcre,
op/.ionc che orienta tutta la teoria della conoscenza sino agli
estremi della speculazione estatica. La ripresa di temi platonici porta circoscrivere la scien/.a aristotelica
a
sempre
sfera della terra alia intellectus,
veritas,
luna",
mentrc
"secundum
de
sunt
scientia
virtus,
all
mondo
umbratile
et
Augustinum
mundo
et
"dalla
Platonem
regione
super-
naturali".
Sul tutta la
conoscere
fatto
138 simplicibus"),
rispetto insiste
alia
indotti
agli
latuerunt
("quae
-
intrinseco
limite
anche
a Platone,
del
resto
I
i
nunc
et
philosophos
ma
insisteva
aristotelica
filosofia
non solo perche esperienza cristiana ha filosofi quello che non avevano compreso
tradizione agostiniana:
per
scclte
quindi prima
e
manifestae
Christianis
da
compiute
precise
fuori di
sunt
Aristotele
quella esperienza:
Bonavcntura poi costantemente riprcso
-
proprio
la
infatti
negazione
della dottrina dclle idee c dclPilluminazionc e stata la causa degli errori di Aristotele su 1
Dio, sulla Prowidcnza,
immortalita delPanima, mentre
sull
insegnamento platonico, integrato da Agostino con la dottrina del Verbo,
apriva la via a riconosccre in Cristo
fondamento quindi
come
"veritas",
di tutto
"principium
il
sapere filosofico
essendi et
omnium
"medium
il
in
quanto
scientiarum",
egli e
il
"medium"
cognosccndi":
exprimit Patrem et res... Hoc est medium mctaphysicum reducens, et haec est tota nostra metaphysical de emanatione, de exemplaritate, de consummatione, scilicet illuminari per radios spirituales et reduci ad summum.
Verbum ergo
1
Liber
XXIV
und Theol. dcs
philosophonim, ed.
Mittclalters,
XXV,
1-2)
Cl.
Bacumkcr
(Beitrage zur Gesch. dcr Philosophic
Munstcr Wcstf.
1927, p. 210.
B. Gcyer, Die lateinischen Wcrkc, Magistri Ik-hardi Quaestioncs Parisienscs, I, V, Stuttgart-Berlin 1936, pp. 4CM1; e cfr. il vol. collcttivo Maitre Eckhart a Paris, Une Paris 1984, che ne costituisce un commento critique mcdic\ alc de I onto-theologie, cd.
(pubblicando, con trad, francese, le Quacstiones). 1 37 P.O. ITiery, commcntaire dc Maitre "Le
Archives 1 vt
d hist.
doctr. et
Bonaventurae
lilt,
Sent.
du M.
///, d.
Delorme,
cit., p. 7.
IV
in
Lxkhart
sur
le
livre
de
la
Sagcsse",
(1929-30), pp. 361, 306.
24, a. 2, q. 3
Bonavcnturae Collationes ed. F.
A.,
ad
4,
Hexaemcron,
Opera, I,
11,
III, p.
13,
524. 17,
Opera, V, pp. 331-332;
cfr.
Forme nella
Prospettiva isolarc
una
filosofia
conoscenza e
di
qualc
59
ideali di sapere
sarcbbc
del
fuorviantc
tutto
tcntarc
di
indipcndcntc dalla riflessione tcologica, introducendo agostiniani. Si dovra
una distinzione rifmtata da Bonaventura e dagli
come proprio
piuttosto sottolincare
una teoria
costruisca
conoscenza"
se
140
patriarch! e
i
dei
esperienza cristiana
conoscenza e del sapere
della
philosophi
volta
si
della
"teologia
la filosofia
una
illuminati
pagana, anche con inseriti,
i
profeti, nella storia della salvezza; la filosofia di Aristotele
e in genere dei filosofi antichi rappresenta relicta",
dopo
peccato, mentre diverse sono
1
il
frutto della ragione
"iudicio
inconsapevole assolutizzazione della condizione dell
proprio il
dell
che dichiara chiusa e superata
-
temi
utilizza
luce
alia
dalla fede e dalla grazia:
Ruggero Marston
-
non
"Coacti
le possibilita della
-
sunt etiam philosophi confiteri
Deo
sine gratia, divinitus a
uomo
ragione illuminata
data, posse
scrive
ad veram
14
philosophiam Altre
pervenire".
limitazioni
significative
teoria
alia
aristotelica
scienza
della
erano peraltro dettate dalPesperienza della fede: di particolare rilievo, per la puntuale discussione di gli sviluppi che avra nella speculazione scotista,
Roberto
Grossatesta,
Secondi, sui
modi
e
gli
All affermazione
sensazione (An. Post.,
fortemente
limitative
nel
corso
del
commento
grande
Analilici
agli
strumenti della conoscenza.
che I,
18,
per
e
avere
impossibile
81a38
sgg.),
circoscrivere
scienza
dove manchi
la
Grossatesta premette un discorso la
teoria
aristotelica
allo
stato
uomo dopo il peccato e difende la priorita, in linea di principio, una conoscenza scientifica del tutto esente dal medio della sensibilila: dell
di
Dico tamen quod possibile est quamlibet scientiam esse absque sensus adminiculo. In mente enim divina sunt omnes scientie ab eterno et non solum est in ipsa cqgnitio universalium certa, sed etiam omnium singularium... Siminter intelligence recipientes irradiationem a lumine primo in ipso lumine primo vident omnes res scibiles universales et singulares... Est igitur in his que carent sensu scientia completissima. Et similiter si pars suprema anime humane, que vocatur intellectiva et que non est actus alicuius corporis neque egens in operatione sui propria instrumento cprporeo, non esset mole corporis corrupt! obnubilata et aggravata, ipsa per irradiationem acceptam a lumine superiori haberet cornpletarn scientiam absque sensus adminiculo, sicut habebit cum anima erit
Alludiamo saggi raccolti nel
alia
felice
formula piu volte suggerila da
volume De Saint Anselme a Luther,
Rogcri Marston Quaracchi 1932, p. 187;
Quaestiones cfr.
testo di
disputatae,
Bonaventura
cit.
P.
Vignaux:
cit.,
pp. 71, 202.
q.
2,
ed.
alia n. 145.
Coll.
S.
cfr.
per
Bonav.,
es.
fra
i
Firenze-
60
Gregory cxuta
a
amore
et
modo
II
anime
delle
corpore et sicut forte habent alioui penitus absoluti ab phantasmatibus rerum corporalium.
conoscere proprio di Dio, dclle intelligen/e separate e dal corpo mette in crisi la tcoria aristotelica e la
di
libere
riconduce in un ambito storico determinato, del tutto prowisorio: essa e relativa alPintelletto umano quails est adhuc in nobis non quails debct esse
secundum statum Se tutta
sui
optimum.
^~
tradi/ione francescana lungo
la
della conoscenza, species,
fino
conoscen/a
radicale
alia
delPOlivi
posizione
diretta
intellettiva
non
14
la
dottrina
forti limiti alia tcoria dell
imponendo
della
circa
individual
rcalta
obiecti individualis est terminatus in ipsum, in et
scconda meta del XIII
la
accoglieva con sempre maggiore cautela
secolo
quantum
aristotelica
astrazionc e delle
cognitivus
("actus
est
della
primato
il
hoc individuum
"
critica
la
aliud"),
del
Grossatesta
costituira
un
punto
di
riferimento importante per la forma/ione della dottrina scotista della conoscenza e della scienza: al commento del vescovo di Lincoln si riferira
direttamente la dottrina
dopo
il
propter
1
autore del
De anima
(forse lo stesso Scoto) nel delimitare
aristotelica e tomista della
peccato
("necessitas
-
problematica
peccato
/7/0,
dell intuizione
substantiae
142
Robcrtus
si
con
tutta
sua
la
e attenuto quiet nihil scivit
mentre ex natura potentiae senza
intellettuale
eadem
exsistens
umana
condizione
diviene la descrizione di uno stato di fatto prowisorio (dc
facto, pro statu isto} al quale Aristotele 145
alia
astrattivo
procedimento
il
peccatum"):
conoscenza
recurrendi ad phantasmata est nobis inflicta
potentia
immatcrialis",
Grossctcstc,
naturaliter,
Duns
scrive
Commentarius
si
ricorso
in
deve affermare
fantasma
al
la
de
priorita
("intellectus,
cognoscet per se quiditatem Scoto in diretta polemica con
Posteriorum
Anafyticorum
libros,
cit.,
pp.
212-213.
Robcrtus Grossctcste, Commentarius,
cit.,
p. 257.
144
Pctrus Johannis Olivi, Quacstiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, Jansen, vol. Ill, Ad Claras Aquas 1926, p. 37. 145
Scoto (o
q.
72,
ed.
B.
DC anima,
q. 18, 4, Opera omnia, Lugduni 1639, II, p. 554B Opera omnia, cd. cit., vol. I, Civitas Vaticana 1950, p. 152). Si ricordi Bonaventura, // Sent., d. 30, a. 1, q. 1 Resp. (Opera, II, p. 716A) per la denuncia del limite intrinseco dci philosophi antichi quali, seguendo una ratio "iudicio viam sensus et experientiae" hanno proprio relicta" e procedendo assolutizzato uno stato dell uomo corrotto dal peccato, ignorando la condi/ione nella
(per
1
di
attribuzionc,
scuola), cfr.
1
Intr.
alle
i
"per
quale era conditum;
stato
creato
cum tamen
("eis
videbatur
catholicis doctoribus
certitudinaliter eius contrarium appareat esse
esse
valde
non solum verum").
rationabile fide,
hominem
sic
fuisse
scd etiam rationum evidentia
Fonne 14 1
c
Aquinate)
(singiilare est
Tesi legate
per se
variamcntc
la
approfondendone
61
del
dirctta
particolarc
ma
e degli angeli, della scientia
dalle
assumono
che
orientano
perche
distanza
Dio
di
francescana
tradizione
nella
present!
beatifica
importanza
particolare
conoscen/.a
la
conoscenza
della
visione
della
ideali di sapcre
intelligibile}.
problema
e
Christi
anchc
quindi
queste
al
conosccnza e
di
tutta
tomiste.
posizioni
Scoto
in
sua
la
Si
una
spcculazione,
dovra
altresi
sottolineare che nella rigorosa costruzione metafisica e teologica di Scoto
delinea con forza un modello di conoscenza e di sapere per
si
determinante
filosofia
dottrina del peccato e della grazia, e una nozione di
la
che non puo
in
modo
alcun
aristotelica.
concluso
dall csperienza
cristiana
con sub
(Deus
Dio"
naturaliter distinta
nota"
dalla
"Haec
aliquam aliam
la
"teologia
ratione -
e
la
quale
offre
in
se"
deitatis)
un
ma
filosofia,
di
soli
"quae
assoluto, in
"Dio
intellectui
sapere
superato
sapere
che ha per oggetto
e
un
fallace
ideale
in
(theologia
noi"
quanto
divino
sunt
come dalla filosofia Nee etiam ipsa etiam sibi
nostra}
scientia nulli subalternatur...
subalternat".
La divaricazione
fra
una teologia
che scienza propriamente non al dibattito
non
intrinsecamente
e
scienza propria di Dio (theologia divina), abissalmente
"teologia
14
prima:
la
-
Dio
ricondursi nelPambito dclle strutture della
Quest ultima
storicamente
identificato
quale e
il
e,
in
se,
vera scienza, e una in noi
e per piu aspetti significativa e soggiace
teologico anche fuori della radicale teorizzazione di Scoto: era
la
contrapposizione fra due modelli di conoscenza, uno assoluto e proprio
di
Dio, Paltro relative allo stato dcll
homo
viator.
dico aliter scrive Guglielmo di Ware - quod accipiendo scientiam proprie et perfecte, haec scientia in se perfecta est, immo et hoc est ex eyidentia rei; homini tamen viatori, et perfectissima, hoc de lege communi, non est scientia.
Ideo
-
Non diversamente Gerardo da Bologna fede oggetto della teologia intellectui
divino vel beato
"in
affermera che
le
verita di
se sunt magis noscibilia, quia et cerciora
quam
ea que sunt aliarum
scienciarum",
ma
Joannis Duns Scoti Ordinatio, I, d. 3, q. 3, in Opera omnia, cit., vol. Ill, Civitas Vaticana 1954, p. 70. Per le citazioni che seguono, Ordinatio, prol. pars 3, q. 4; pars 4, q. 2, in Opera omnia, cit., vol. I, pp. 102-103, 146. 147 Sul tema ha insistito tutta la storiografia, ma si vedano le acute considcrazioni di P. Vignaux (op. cit., pp. 201-202) per situare Scoto nella storia della filosofia "par sa doctrine du savoir absolu identifie a la theologie". 148 nell
Guglielmo di Ware, / Sent., prol., q. 3 apparato di Occam, Ordinatio, cit., vol. I, p. 193.
(Cod.
Vindob.
1438,
f.
5va)
cit.
62
Gregory
non sono
tali
distinzione
fara
sulla
per
1
intelleUo
uomo
dell
in
ricorso
Roberto
di
della
teologia,
divenuta
scientificita
vita.
questa
149
Holkot per scartare tanto
Alia
la
tesi
autorevole
piu
stessa
tomista
per
la
santificazione dell Aquinate:
Quando autem
dicit
est
quod Theologia
esse scientia, potent r5i tantum. eis
tamen quod
et
est,
istae sint
Distinzione questa puntualmente connessa da obiezioni dei filosofi contro la teologia
come
non possono essere confutate
loro coerenza
dicere
vult
scientia,
hoc
veritates Theologicae sunt in se scibiles,
quod
verae quod de verae nos credimus ita
Occam
alle
opposte
scienza, obiezioni che per la
dal teologo se
non
in
base ad
auctoritates:
tencnt
Alii
partem tenent
philosophi,
hoc
Et
negativam.
omnem
ad
quod
Quidam,
dupliciter.
scientiam
nobis
sicut
possibilem
possumus naturaliter attingere, et ideo nihil est credibile, mere nisi quod potcst sciri cvidenter. Sed ista opinio non potest imprpbari per rationes naturales sed tantum per auctoritates... Alia est opinio quae ponit quod quamvis credibilia possint evidcnter sciri, non tamen a nobis pro statu isto de
communi
lege.
Giacomo
Nella quaestio del Natale 1306,
Therines aveva soslenuto:
di
nunquam enim aliquis usque ad ista tempora adducit aliquam rationem ad probandum aliquam conclusionem pure theologicam ratione cuius intellectus necessitetur
A
un
secolo
ad assentiendum. dell aristotclismo
dall ingresso
sembra avere esaurito
riflessionc cristiana
un pensiero ad essa estraneo senza
omnino II
nelle
universita,
la
tutte le possibilita di assimilare
riuscire
Aristotele haeretico facere
"de
catholicum".
fallimento di ogni tentativo concordislico e denunciato nei primi
decenni del
XIV
particolarmcnte
efficaci:
dici
potest
secolo dal domenicano Roberto di Holkot in termini
generaliter
quod non habemus ab aliquo philosopho aliquis angelus est, neque de deo,
demonstrative probatum quod neque de aliquo incorporeo.
La costruire
rigorose
le
Robert
Holcot,
cit., p.
Utrum thcologia
altri
quali
una teologia naturale non hanno alcun
Gerardo da Bologna, Summa,
XX
con
dimostrazioni
aveva
ritenuto
di
valore:
299. sit
scientia,
cd.
J.T.
Mucklc, Mediaeval Studies,
(1958), p. 147.
151 tesi
Guillelmi de Ockham, Ordinatio, condannate nel 1277: "Quod nihil
notis
possit
cfr. J.
Leclercq,
declarari"
(Hissette, 364.
art. cit., p.
op.
I,
est
cit.,
prol.,
q.
VII,
credendum, p.
21);
per
pp. il
192-193;
si
ricordi
una delle
per se notum, vel ex per se testo di Giacomo di Therines,
nisi
Forme
di
63
conoscenza e ideali di sapere
dico brevitcr quod nee Aristotcles nee aliquis homo umquam probavit hanc: deus est accipicndo propositioncm mcntalcm quam calholicus accipit.
Tutto
quanto
i
e
filosofi,
hanno detto su
Arislotclc,
soprattutto
realta immateriali c forsc solo un pallido rcsiduo di un sapcrc rivclato
primi parent!
("vestigium
umbrosum
cognitionis dei a primis
ai
parentibus"),
piu ancora un ibrida mescolanza di speculazione filosofica e tradizioni religiose, non diversa da quella tentata da piu recenti teologi:
Philosophi auterrij turn quia curiosi, quia etiam ambitiosi, volentes reddere causam in omnibus etiam in his quae vulgus opinabatur, miscuerunt Philosophiam suam cum dictis legislatorum et prophetia fidei... non quod ipsi per naturalem rationem aliquod incorporeum, ut deum, vel angelum, vel animam esse convincerent... .
I
percorsi diversi del pensiero medievale, le
per
istanze
della
teologia,
rendono a nostro awiso impossibile seguire di individuare una "metafisica nuova" creata del tempo, la cui
moment de
1
illustre
da
Gilson,
maestro nel tentativo
dalla teologia scolastica, fuori
de
"independente
sottolineate
1
etat
de
la
science en tout
histoire, reste aussi permanente que la lumiere de la foi dans 153 Puo darsi che questa metafisica nuova - libera est nee".
1
elle
laquelle
"verita",
critica assidua della filosofia
la
fortemcnte
cosi
da ogni condizionamento storico
-
possa costituire un
utile e pio
sostegno
philosophia perennis nel cielo dei purissimi enti di ragione chimera puo rivendicare un suo posto; ma lo storico dovra
ai fautori della
ove anche
la
piuttosto sottolineare come, pur partendo da riflessione
la
fede,
teologica venga
alle
volta le strutture e gli
Con grande fra
le
scuole
utilizzando
e
trasformando concetti
passato cosi
esiti.
acutezza
teologiche
Tommaso
d Aquino registrava come
passassero
attraverso
le
differenti
filosofiche dei maestri in sacra pagina, e dal canto suo
denunciava addolorato
1
52
il
rischio che tutto
Robert Holcot, Utrum theologia
1
Et.
Gilson, "Les ratione
Scholastica
Internationalis,
di
da creare sistemi speculativi diversi in differenti opzioni filosofiche, che ne condizionano a loro
filosofici ereditati dal
rapporto
una comune esperienza
sit
scientia,
cit.,
1
edificio ecclesiastico crollasse
historico-critiqucs et historico-critica instauranda,
sancto
esperienze
Giovanni Peckham
pp. 144-145, 149.
recherches
Romae anno
le diversita
MCML celebrati,
1
avenir
Acta
Romae
de
la
scholastique",
Congressus
1951, p. 141.
in
Scholastic!
64
Gregory
una volta abbandonate relative dell
illuminazione
all
alle
anima,
mutamenti
e
divina
alle
nc
seminali:
ragioni
si
mcglio
di la delle
fra
constatare
i
la
le
di
pluralita
i
medievale non e una metafisica unificante fra
Parola
la
contesti
Dio
di
fede
e
conoscenze
ricerca
e
nella
dalla cultura
Non sua
di
vie
al
patrimonio
di
delle
consapevolezza
contenute nella rivela/ione rispetto
la
concettuali
delle
tensione
intelligibility
conoscenze trasmesse
di
dal
apocalittiche
una
fronte
tradi/ione
della
francescana
-
seconda meta del XIII secolo
della
tanto
radicale
dopo -
torna a
opposizione generoso Aquinate, quanto, c piu duramente, al simmctrico e ordinato aristotelico. Basta pensarc al rilievo che assume nel secolo XIV
Dei absoluta che mette
della potentia aristotelica
portando
affacciato
alle
nella
tradizione
storici
squisitamente teologico
le
crisi
che
contro
cristiana
umana
il
della Bibbia.
di
circoscrivere
tentano
conseguenze piu
Ehrle,
"John
III,
d Aquino,
Pecham
englischen Scholastik,
//
871-872,
pp.
iiber
Roma
Sent.,
901
d.
14,
(lettere
den Kampf des
q.
del
tcma
1,
a.
realta
a
chiudere
e inutile lo
un
ambito
2;
gcnn.
quella fede nella
richiamo
investe
tutto
Giovanni 1285
Augustinismus",
1970, pp. 70-71, 75-76.
Ed
si
radicali della fede cristiana nel
ma
1
di
tentativi
i
Dio
contingenza dell ordine creato,
Tommaso
il
slrutture della filosofia
le
Dio principio creatore assolutamente libero: in potentia Dei absoluta non costituisce solo un
Epistolarum,
mondo
estreme consegucnze un motivo che piu volte
entro orizzonti di razionalita quegli
in
le
concordismo
al
dell
radicale
novita
radical!
mentre dopo le condanne e la polemica dei corrcctoria d Aquino sembrava trovare un autorevole avallo nella
a caso,
esplodcre
di
dai
offerti
Tommaso
reviviscenze
sforzo
uomo
"profana".
canonizzazione,
era
1
speculativa
ma
diversi sistemi,
i
di cui
tradi/.ione
la
strumenti
gli
nella
cultural!, di
delPesperien/,a
duorum
doctrina
("cum
paene penitus hodie adversetur", variegate posizioni dei maestri, non potra non modi prospcttive metafisiche e, con essc,
capace. Quello che rendc omogenea
ritiene
opera
i
sibi
diversi di concepire e organizzare la sfera delle
1
potevano
due ordini mendicanti
omnibus dubitabilibus
aveva scritto Peckham) e
diversi
potenzc
constatare
soprattutto dalla fine del XIII secolo, al
lo sviluppo,
polemiche
in
continua
alle
actemae,
regiilae
contrasti irriducibili.
i
Chi ne segua
si
tradi/ione agostiniana
della
tcsi
profondi della cultura crisliana nel corso del secolo XIII, gli
esiti diversi,
ordinum
fondamentali
le
e in
costante
alia
Pambito delle
Peckham, Rcgistrum giungo 1285), cfr. F. Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur 1
Forme
di
conoscenza e
conoscenze umanc c divicne uno strumento
tcologia chc
le
Parisius,
piu 1
rifiuto
il
principle dell
il
omnipotentem")
-
ncll
1
(il
Lungo
la
scienze di
intellectus
la possibilita della il
approfondisce
nclla
maniera
che assume
applicazioni in
In
aristotclico"
"carcere
"credo
la
i
piu
della il
in
unum Deum patrem
riflessione
mondo
assoluta,
relazione
-
un
e
ponendo
conoscenza
di
oggetto a
filosofica
delle essenze
seconda
di
"nome
dalla teologia alia metafisica e alia
mette
abiti,
in
dissociando
conoscenza
secolo XIV, mentre
logici e analitici con
della potentia
e
della
categoria
et
rei
adequatio
il
-
Francisci".
Occam, esprime
di
orizzonte
individuale
scompone un aggregate
in
prospettando
si
tutto
le
imposizione",
fisica
onnipotenza divina
tutta
riduce
intuitiva,
c
che, strettamente connesso alle piu sottili analisi logico-
come
realta
la
ampiezza
1
15
Sancti
entro
Venerabilis inceptor frantuma
II
teologica.
nota
disarticola
linguistiche,
di
chiudcrc
di
e
esperienza cristiana:
Occam
ordinem
dcstruis
ipse
un franccscano, Guglielmo
radicale
verificazione
analisi,
aveva assuntc nell ambito della sacra doctrina.
"Parisius,
realta proprio
di
della filosofia aristotclica c dclla
delle piii sicure strutturc
falsificazione
65
ideali di sapcre
1
crisi
oggetto
intuitiva del
fiducia
ingenua
1
e
non
intuizione
1
e
esistente.
vengono costruendo nuovi modelli
si
arditi giochi dell ipotesi e dell
divaricazione tra
il
immaginazione, normale cursus naturae e 1 ordine
Dei absoluta (tema variamente utilizzato entro e fuori la fra Pambito della scientia aristotelica e la veritas
tradizione occamista), rei,
apud Deum (come
ed entra
in crisi
1
che Dio puo causare
una proposizione
sottolinea Enrico di Harklay discutendo delPinfinito)
idea di una scienza fondata sull evidentia simplex, posto la
conoscenza del non esistente e creare
1
assenso a
falsa:
potest causare propositionem falsam et ponere in intellectu, Posse etiam autem Deum precipere aliquod falsum credi, non est dubium dicitur quod Deus posset obligare ad credendum contradictor ia. e
Si
parlato
valenze
gravato
di
ragione
aristotelica
91,
di
scetticismo,
con
termine
equivoco
e
inutilmente
negative: meglio sara parlare di una critica della che puo orientarsi tanto nel senso di un ricorso a
Dicta Bead Aegidii Assisiensis, Ad Claras Aquas, 1905, p. 91; cfr. Jacopone, Laude "Mai vedemo Parisi, che ane destrutt Asisi" (Jacopone, Laude, ed. F. Mancini,
2:
Roma-Bari
1974, p. 293).
Sul problema, collettaneo Preuve
au XIV* siede, Genest,
"Pierre
sia et
permesso raisons
a
rinviare I
al
Univcrsite
mio saggio de
"La
tromperie
Paris.
ed. par Z. Katuza-P. Vignaux, Paris de Ceffons et hypothese du Dieu trompeur", pp. 197-214. 1
divine"
Logique, ontologie 1984, pp. 187-195 e,
et ivi,
nel
vol.
theologie cfr.
J.Fr.
66
Gregory principio fontale di verita, quanto verso un uso critico, limitato
Dio come dalla
soddisfatta
ragione
un
definizione di
mondo
solido
Del all
verso
e
quid,
evidenza non piu legato
principio di
la
adaequatio e al
all
delle essenze.
non
resto
un
e
caso
occamismo, mentre sempre
vie della scienza aristotelica
157
fra
proprio
-
si
modemi
i
vicini
ripercorrere le
il
dira al termine di
-
Aristotelis
("philosophia
attenzione
1
scientia"),
se
piu problematico diviene
una lunga tradizione Pietro d Ailly
quam
secundum
un evidentia
di
seu doctrina magis debet dici opinio ai
volge
mondo
del
problemi
del
contingente, della natura e degli uomini, delle rcalta individuali. res singularis se ipsa est
"Quaelibet
orienta tutta una nuova teoria della conoscenza
non solo del senso
della rcalta individuale,
ma
assioma occamista
1
singularis":
come
intuizione diretta
dcll intclletto:
intellectus est praccisc singulare... omne singulare notitia intuitiva, quantum est ex natura animac et intellectus nostri.
obiectum motivum potest
II
intelligi
paradiso
teoria della species ritrovato
il
"suppone"
sistema di fuori dell
universal!
degli
dell individuazione
e
come un
dilcgua
insieme
fie turn,
tramite la materia;
il
alia
concetto,
anima, e ricondotto a immagine che o a molti signum natural? che puo entrare in un meglio per proposizioni, oggetto di scienza, ma senza una propria realta suo esse obiectivum
anima ove
in
suo esse sta
il
assioma
scnsus
conosciuto (eorum esse
nell esser
eorum cognosci}.^ Giunge con Occam
a termine
un lento processo
est
di
erosione
dell
con
che esso presupponeva, mentre assume nuova soli realmente esistenti: "Omne ens mondo degli individui 15 particulare et si sic, ergo nullum univcrsale est verum ens".
tutta il
dignita
verum
est
la
est
intellectus
pariicularium,
universalium,
mctafisica
i
Senza
nei
inoltrarsi
pericolosi
sentieri
fra certe discussioni scientifiche del secolo
moderna, troppo tortuosi e ambigui
storiografici
XIV
sentieri
i
continuita
della
e le origini della scienza della
ragione,
e
senza
sedurre dal gioco dei precorrimenti e degli svolgimenti omogenei, troppo profonde sono le cesure e le svolte, non si puo non rilevare che nell orizzonte teologico e filosofico del suo tempo il rasoio semplificatore lasciarsi
Petri
Parisius
158
s. d.,
de ed.
Alliaco J.
Guillelmi de
Opera,
vol. II, ed. S.
Quaestiones
super
primum,
tcrtium
et
quartum
scntentiarum,
Petit, I Sent., q. 3, a. 3, p. 83va-b.
Ockham Brown,
Ordinatio,
St.
I,
d.
Quaestio de universali secundum viam
Grabmann, Monasterii
II,
q.
VI;
d.
Ill,
q.
VIII;
d.
II,
q.
VIII,
in
Bonaventure, N. Y., 1970, pp. 196, 540, 273.
1930, p. 27.
et
doctrinam Guilelmi de Ockham, ed. M.
Forme recidendo
Occam,
di
67
conoscenza e idcali di sapere
di
nesso
il
fra
cd
csistcnti
gli
un
eliminando
presupposto rcticolato di essenzc etcrnamcntc date, csaltando la priorita c fecondita dclla conoscenza intuitiva dell individuale, dischiudcva orizzonti e possibilita nuove. In ambicnti occamisti c sotto la potente spinta del
viene aprcndo un dibattito destinato a grandc fortuna su
si
mcrtoniani,
L
questioni cruciali, fuori dall orizzonte aristotclico. dell analisi 1
calculators
dci
impcgno
remissio fortnarutn in rapporto al
e allo spazio, lontana dai modelli
tempo
e
Aristotele
di
sostanzialistici
una
verso
orientata
geometrica quantitativa delle variazioni qualitative, definire
rappresentazione
con
delle
perfezioni
paziente rispetto
all
-
divine
analisi
le
agente,
discussion}
le
,
de
maximo
-
estesi
sulla
anche
le
ai
del
reactio
minimo,
et
un
esistenza degli indivisibili e sulla possibilita di
vari tentativi di
i
gradi delTintensio e della latitudo delle qualita
i
problemi
sull
applicazione rigorosa
problemi dclla filosofia e dclla teologia, per dare una descrizione doH intensio et
ai
logico-linguistica
ipotesi
infinite in atto, lo
sviluppo amplissimo dei problemi di dinamica e di cinematica a partire dal
de proportione di Thomas Bradwardine, sono strade anche quando si svolgono secundum imaginationem diverse che, articolandosi disputationis causa - senza pretendere di costruire nuove Tractatus
grande
concezioni della natura
-
convergono tuttavia
nell
elaborazione di nuovi
modelli mentali e di linguaggi analitici che investono settori non marginal! della scienza aristotelica
sapere, dalla logica alia
Parallelamente
la
con
inevitabili ripercussioni in tutte le
fisica, dalla
metafisica alia teologia.
sempre piu netta distinzione
filosofia naturale e quello della fede
occamismo
finivano
zone del
per convergere
-
fra
il
dominio della
per piu aspetti averroismo e insieme alia crisi di un universe
in cui
gerarchizzato secondo una scalarita di essenze, mettevano in discussione le
teocratiche
pretese
teologico-politica.
humano
notis"),
una
legum) derivano
eligendum
rigorosa
la
trascrizione
analisi
filosofica
e
legislator
arbitrio
humanae
questa
et
Marsilii de
quid
spernendum",
Padua Defensor Pads,
la
civium
Yuniversitas
"causa",
ex
viis
ingenio adinventis, constantibus ex proposicionibus per se
160 :
erano state
quell universo
Marsilio da Padova riconduce
sola
9, 63, 66.
di
Proprio muovendo da una
e della natura della societa civile ("demonstrabo intenta
dell origine certis
che
e
factor
mentis,
secondo
ed.
statuizione delle leggi est
(ipsius di
ad
tutti
essa
le varie
gli
auctoritas
umane
lacionis
ordinamenti
spetta
a
definire
che "quid
esigenze dei tempi e dei
R. Scholz, Hannoverae, 1932-1933, vol.
I,
pp.
68
Gregory
luoghi
161
intemporali modelli mctafisici o
demonstracionem deve garantire del
potere
1
inutile
ad
-
del secolo
le
pretesc
"corpo
suscitando
Nicola
ecclesiastica
dell autorita
di
atteggiamento
sermones
vita
per che
civile
affermazione dell autonomia
da
ridotto,
della
del
temporali
a corpus
mistico",
62
meta
alia
1
che
chiesa
hanno
sacerdoti
qui
-
individua/.ionc
I
e temporale
cittadini, e
alia
rispctto
et inutile^
Ouando
mondano
fine
di
religiosi;
bene vivere dei
il
dei
monstruosum condanna
del
politico
e
pontefice
-
sen/a rifcrimento a
ct locorum"),
tcmporum
exigentia
("secundum
di Aristotele e di
la
di
preferiscono
quanti
Averroe invece
violenta rea/.ione e la
Autrecourt
denuncera
invecchiare
sui
di rivolgersi
logici
ad naturam
16 ^
rci e
e quando affermera morales et curam boni communis, placeat non placeat - che Aristotele in tutta la sua filosofia non ebbe nolizia 164 indicava duabus conclusionibus et fortasse nee de evidente res
-
vel
"de
non solo
una",
una sua ricerca personale - extra gregem forse anche Pesaurimento di un epoca con il suo ideale di scienza: 1
Ex
csito
di
quod aliqua
eo,
evidentia
reducta
principii inferri,
Mentre con
in
quod
il
res
est
esse, vel
cpgnita
primum nrincipium alia res
mondo
non potest evidcnter in
certitudinem primi
sit.
e
causalita
di
principio
ma
-
\nilgi
messo
in
discussione
tutto
modesto complcsso di multo ("sicut tempore visa sunt csse nunc forsan diminuetur, sic Aristotelis quorum probabilitas probabilia dicta 1
ordinato e compatto
-
aristotelico
ridotto a
proposi/.ioni ormai ncppurc probabili
162
Marsilii dc
Padua Defensor Pads,
vol.
I,
pp. 62, 71, 64.
Marsilii dc
Padua Defensor Pads,
vol.
I,
p. 17; vol. II, p.
Nicola Autrecourt",
Satis Autrecourt, I Mediae\ al Studies,
revocandum",
"prcsumptuosum",
di
si
ordo,
cvigit
(1939),
Icggc
nclla
cd.
pp.
459. J.R.
O Donnell,
185:
181,
condanna
(J.
"falsum,
I^ppe, op.
"Nicholas
crroneum cit.,
alia
of ct
nota
segg., p. 37*).
Dai
testi
ed.
J.
I^ppc,
(Beitragc zur 1908, pp. 12*-13*, 17*, 25*.
seine
Schriftcn
J.
op. cit., p. 9*; cfr. pp. 15*-16*, 31*: tcsi condannata come "falsa e (pp. 31*, 37*); a essa andra collegata la tcsi condannata come "falsa, erctica e "hec consequentia non est evidcns: a est productum, igitur aliquis producens a
Lappe,
erronea" erronea":
est
Nicolaus von Autrecourt. Scin Lcbcn, seine Philosophic, Gcsch. dcr Philosophic dcs Mittelalters, VI, 2), Miinstcr
vel
fuit"
recita
la
come
"falsa,
tcsi
(p.
34*).
Con
il
principio
di
causalita
e
rifiutata
anche
la
finalita,
come
aliquis ncscit evidenter, quod una res sit finis alterius", condannata eretica e blasfcma" (p. 33*). Gli scritti di Nicola furono bruciati a Saint "quod
Germain-des-Pres
"tamquam
multa
et heretica continentes" (p. 43*).
falsa,
pcriculosa,
prcsumptuosa, suspccta
et
erronea
69
Fortne di conoscenza e ideali di sapere veniet unus qui toilet probabilitatem ab
certezza
e
di
cvidcnza
si
vicne
evidente dei primi principi e si
leva in
"de
dcfinendo:
actibus
un
istis")
e
nostris".
altro principio di
la
conoscenza chiara e
Un
affermazione solenne
Vico degli Strami:
Universaliter et conversive quicquid est clarum et evidens intellectui est verum... Deus non distinguitur ab homine in clarius cognoscere res.
Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, Universita di
Satis cit.,
exigit
ordo,
cit.,
p.
187:
"excusatio
Roma
vulpina",
recita
condanna (Lappe,
la
op.
p. 39*).
Satis
ricorrente
exigit
ordo,
negli
scritti
condannata come
"falsa"
cit.,
di (J.
pp.
235,
Nicola
I.appe, op.
239;
"quod
cit.,
J.
Lappe,
certitude
p. 32*).
op.
cit.,
evidentie
pp.
non
6*,
habet
8*;
la
gradus"
tesi
e
70
Gregory
ABSTRACT: Forms of Knowledge and
Ideals of
I
.earning in Medieval Culture
ideals of knowledge and science in the Middle Ages. method and then Beginning with a specific definition of science and scientific writers is a process which would proceeding to search for its application in medieval lead us astray. We must therefore attempt to determine just what these various models of knowledge and learning were, conscious of the fact that even basic terms like intcllectus take on meanings philosophy and theology, science and wisdom, ratio and and values which change drastically in various times and contexts. The identification of Christianity and philosophy which was asserted by Greek
There were various models and
to the early on, allows the reduction of philosophical disciplines which claims the title of true philosophy for Christian thought, philosophia whose foundations are to be found in itself, puts into practice a form of knowledge the revelation of God, in the Bible, word of God. Faith in God who revealed to men the designs of His economy forms the horizon of a new experience and this faith
patrology
quite
Christi.
nurtures a
learning which
transcends pagan culture because,
historically
speaking,
it
is
far richer.
and deciphering the mysteries and reading Knowing, intclligcrc thus means sacraments woven into that Bible which brings not only a revelation of salvation but a this learning can be found in learning and total science as well. ITie highest form of the Bible has transmitted. It should exegesis, the access to that scicnlia divina which also be pointed out that intelligence of the Scriptures, just as with intcllectus which is of deepening placed between faith and beatific vision, leads to the greatest possibility ratio comprehension of the mysteria and the ratio fidci in order to participate in the divina which manifests itself through revelation (ratio veritatis nos docet). A radical mutation in medieval culture, with the emergence of new methods and areas of knowledge, took place when a different conception of natura and ratio was and Arabic proposed to the I^itin West through the knowledge of new Greek 12th and 13th centuries. A sapicntia philosophical and scientific texts between the mundana arose outside of the symbolism of the High Middle Ages (which, in any case, had represented a precise model of interpretation and knowledge of natura rcrum). This found its tools in a ratio, separate from exegesis, which had the construction of knowledge as its goal. Nature, no longer sacramentum salutaris allegoric became and ordo causarum. Its enquiry reached its peak in astronomy/astrology, that new science which linked heaven and earth and which found its most valid bases in the in the syllogistic structure of physics and metaphysics of Aristotle and his method scientific discourse. For this reason the importance of astrology in medieval culture and the new ideals of science cannot be underestimated and the same is true of the value which "magical" sciences assumed. The constant comparison between astrology and scientific apologetics, for theology was quite important as was the use of astrology for natural
nexus
the demonstration of the truth of Christianity, for the hcrmcncutics of sacred history. Aside from a defense of the legitimacy of a knowledge whose object was the causa and the ratio of events, new models of knowledge and learning developed through the the debate over coerentia artium and the relations were philosophy. At the same time new methodologies sacred text. New tools adopted for theological discourse which was separated from the of logical-linguistic analysis or axiomatic procedures were adopted and exegesis was
12th
century
between
logic,
primarily
dialectics
come to terms The beginnings of
through
and
with the science of nature. Aristotclianism, especially after its insertion in university studies, discourse but with posed problems of relations not only with a new model of scientific a world system in which logic, physics and metaphysics were solid. There were various and options, from the revival of the Aristotelian-Averroistic ideal of positions to nature and reason, to the polemics against intelligere as the highest good according Aristotelianism in the name of a learning and reason whose basis was to be found in forced to
Forme
di
conoscenza e idea Ii di sapere
71
The theme of sapicntia Christiana was also the basis for models of knowledge such as that model proposed by Roger Bacon for the supremacy of mathematics and the accentuation of the cognitive value of experientia which was connected to the glorification of a form of learning capable of modifying reality to Christ s mediation.
scientific
humanity
s
advantage.
problems in the debate over theology as a science should be of Rigaud s prior position on the theme, the theory of subalternatio which was rigorously followed by St. Thomas Aquinas, the relationship between the singularity of those event which make up sacred history and the atemporal network of Certain
particular
underlined:
Odo
Aristotelian science.
While
it
transforms
comes from a common experience of philosophical
concepts
speculative systems. That which not a metaphysics which unifies
inherited
from
faith,
the
theological past
makes medieval speculative
reflection
uses and
creating
different
thus tradition
homogeneous
is
systems nor any identical scientific ideal, but rather the constant problematic reference to Christian experience. If, on one hand, this experience tends to absorb elements from ancient cultures and is itself ultimately modified, on the other hand it vindicates its own autonomy, professing ideals of knowledge and learning which cannot be traced back to the terms of profane philosophical traditions. We should keep in mind the importance which the theme the various
potentia Dei absoluta assumed in the 14th century and the turmoil it created for all the of Aristotelian philosophy, theme which was frequently structures taking a considered in Christian tradition to its logical conclusion. It is useless to attempt any limitation of the radical consequences of Christian faith in God as the absolutely free principal
creator to a purely theological sphere. It is actually that faith in potentia Dei down any attempt at necessitarianism and transforms the world
absoluta which breaks
fabric of divine initiative, of radical contingency. Scepticism has been spoken of term both equivocal and unnecessarily negative. It would be better to speak of a criticism of Aristotelian reason which may be oriented both in the sense of a recourse to God as the originating principle of all truth and towards a search for a principle of evidence no longer linked to the adequatio and the solidity of essence. On the other hand it is no accident that, while turning back to Aristotelian science becomes
into a
as a
increasingly problematic, the circles close to the contingent world, on nature and on
Ockhamism concentrated
their
attention
on
man. In Ockhamist circles, under the powerful influence of the Mertonians, a debate on crucial matters which lead outside the Aristotelian world was Political taking place. thought became a rigorous philosophical analysis of the origins of the nature of civil society with no reference to atemporal metaphysical or religious models. The criticism of Nicholas of Autrecourt not only denied the fundamental structures of Aristotelian metaphysics but formulated a new principle of evidence as well.
JAAKKO HINTIKKA
Concepts of Scientific Method from Aristotle to Newton
In
this
not
shall
I
paper,
to
try
any results concerning the
present
history of philosophers ideas concerning in middle the about the scientific method ages. Instead, I shall comment
history
of philosophy
the
or
on the conceptual frameworks which have been used, or can be used, in such historical studies. It seems to me that our understanding of what the
in
middle
actually
happened
suitable
conceptual framework
the
history
of
the
scientific
historical
problems
shall also suggest that in the study of
I
as
method,
philosophical scholarship, the best
be greatly enhanced by a
which the specific
in
can find their appropriate niche.
can
ages
so
in
walks
other
many
of
of finding the right framework (in
way
the sense of the historically relevant and useful framework)
is
go back
to
the main Greek philosophers, especially to Aristotle, and to try to reach a deeper understand of their ideas. Their philosophy was the most important backdrop of medieval thought, which often can be looked upon
to
as a gradual transition will
an appropriate
actual
historical
from Greek ideas to ours. In other respects, too,
map
of the conceptual situation help to
developments
as
together
pieces
of
a
different
fit
larger
overall
picture.
am
How
do we twentieth-century thinkers view the scientific process, and how do our ideas differ from Aristotle s ideas in this respect? This question might seem to be too In
this
spirit,
I
led
to
ask:
general and ambiguous to admit of a clear response, but in reality there and yet informative answer to it. A twentieth-century is a clear
philosopher
is
likely to think of scientific inquiry as consisting of
making
observations (and gathering other kinds of empirical evidence) and then of using step
them
as a stepping-stone to general explanatory theories.
form data to theories
is
sometimes called a (species that
this
inference.
It
deductive.
The main watershed between
science
the question whether there
is
is
generally agreed
is
so-called
of)
The
scientific
inference cannot be
different overall conceptions of
a nondeductive kind of inference,
usually called inductive inference, to mediate the step from observations
Concepts of Scientific Method
to
theories
general
whether
or
According to the
hypothesis.
this
step
in
is
73
a
principle
matter
of
we cannot infer theories or we can test them by comparing observations. Thus we obtain two of the
latter
idea,
other general truths from phenomena, but their deductive conclusions with
main types of modern models of
scientific inquiry:
the inductivist
model
and the hypothetico-deductive model. Although these two models do not quite enjoy any longer the monopoly they used to have among philo sophers of science, they are being widely used
tacitly
or
explicitly
by
1
historians of philosophy as a part of their conceptual framework.
The basic idea of the Aristotelian conception of scientific inquiry can also be indicated very simply. Aristotle conceives of scientific inquiry literally as inquiry, that is, a questioning procedure. This is shown amply by the Topics, among other things. One precedent for such a procedure were the Socratic questioning games practiced in the Academy. 2 Originally, even deductive inferences were simply special kinds of
moves
these
in
questioning
person would have to
given
give,
answers
viz.
games,
that
every
rational
admissions. Aristotle soon
earlier
his
realized the special role of such preordained answers or admissions tried to systematize
them
He
in his syllogistic logic.
and
even tried to make
syllogisms the only vehicle of putting the first principles of a science to use for the purpose of explaining various phenomena. But even then the road to these first principles remained a dialectical one.
The
interrogative
evidence
in
Aristotle.
called the dialectic
the long
way
or erotetic concept of inquiry In
a
method.
I
more
am
traditional
is
thus amply in
terminology,
it
would be
avoiding this label, however, because on
to twentieth-century philosophy
it
has acquired
all
sorts of
misleading associations. It
is
fairly
clear
that
something
like
the
interrogative
model of
science remained influential in the middle ages. For instance, the various
Their
restrictive
character
is
shown
by
the
difficulty
of
fitting
major
historical
figures into either pidgeonhole. Was Newton an inductivist or a hypothetico-deductivist? Neither shoe fits very well. And the same question can be raised about the medievals.
What
a wider and more realistic conceptual framework for understanding of philosophical, scientific, and theological thought. That is what I shall try to provide here for the history of the scientific method, just as I have (with several others) tried to provide a new framework for studying the history of the the
is
actual
needed
is
history
of being. That earlier attempt is documented in Simo Knuuttila and Jaakko Hintikka, editors, The Logic of Being: Historical Studies, Synthese Historical Library, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986. 2 See here my paper, "The Fallacy of Fallacies", Argumentation vol. 1 (1987), pp. 211238, and the literature referred to there.
concept
74
Hintikka
commentaries on Aristotle terminology of
new
light.
If
Aristotle s
loaded
interrogatively
by the learner", etc. one facet of medieval thought into a enough put there indeed was a relevant element of interrogative
"admissions",
This fact
use
freely
"acceptances
to
is
in
knowledge-seeking
medieval epistemology and philosophy of science,
it
be expected that the logic of such interrogative procedures should have been studied in so many words. This expectation is fulfilled by the 3 important but incompletely understood obligationes tradition. Whatever is
to
problems there is about the interpretation of these questionanswer dialogues, in their standard form (antiqua responsio) they were not, and could not have been, a form of counterfactual deductive detailed
them one was not examining what
reasoning, as has been claimed. For in follows logically from the
but
rather
positiim
plus
follows
from,
logically
the rcsponder
of interrogative or
teristic
in
what
positum or what
initial
inconsistent with
inconsistent
is
admissions. This
earlier
s
or
is
is
by some
logicians.
But
this
it,
the
charac
fact
knowledge-seeking. Admittedly, later
"erotctic"
the fourteenth century obligation-games were given a
twist
in
with,
merely
my
illustrates
more deductive
recommendation of
viewing medieval thought as a transition from the Greek to the modern viewpoint.
might not seem to have a great deal to do with conceptions of scientific method. However, their Admittedly,
at
sight the obligationes
first
close link with the sophismata provides a bridge, for problems concerning
knowledge-seeking and science were frequently dealt with sophismata in logic, theology, and natural philosophy, and the obligations terminology In
general,
rogative
was
We
seeking by means of what 4
inquiry.
This
codification
form of
in this context
largely employed.
obligation-games
knowledge-seeking.
in the
I
illustrate
can
have
of the
study called
dialectical
several this
the
features
kind
of
interrogative
conception
of
inter
knowledge-
model of
of knowledge-
Here the work of Simo Knuuttila and his associates promises to be decisive. I here relying on their results. See, e.g., Simo Knuuttila and Mikko Yrjonsuuri, "Norm and Action in Obligational Disputations" in O. Pluta, ed., Die Philosophic im 14. und 15.
am
Jahrhundert, B.R. Griiner,
The work on
this
Amsterdam
model
is
1988, pp. 191-202.
largely
still
in
progress. For interim expositions,
cf.,
e.g.,
Representation and the Interrogative Model of Inquiry", forthcoming in a volume of new papers on epistemology, edited by Keith Lehrer and Marjorie Clay, Jaakko Hintikka and Merrill B. Hintikka, "Sherlock Holmes Confronts Modern Logic", in
my
"Knowledge
E.M.
Barth and J.L. Martens, eds., Argumentation: Approaches to Theory Formation, Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1982, pp. 55-76; and "The Logic of Science as a Model-Oriented
Concepts of Scientific Method
main conceptual framework
the
is
seeking
historians of scientific
The In
model seems
interrogative
may
inquirer
am recommending
I
the
to
method.
an idealized inquirer
it,
75
at
first
to
sight
from a given
starts
be simplicity
initial
itself.
The
premise T.
on the put questions to a source of information. Depending oracle" we may call this source of information
intended application,
"the
or nature. The inquirer may draw deductive conclusions from T together with the answers. The aim of the game (or the inquirer s aim) is to
prove a given conclusion or answer a question
C
or
(in
the
Normally,
not-B?"
"B
to
another variant of the model) of
presupposition
a
be asked. question must have been established before the question may from the differ How does this model, applied to scientific inquiry,
models of science?
received
turns out
It
be more
to
flexible
than
its
rivals in several respects.
For one
some
most
the
of
the Oracle
thing,
s
answers need not be observations. In variants
interesting
of
the
model,
controlled
But the experiments are conceived of as a scientist s questions to nature. oracle s answers may instead be intuitions of innate ideas or, as in Aristotle, well-established general opinions, endoxa.
be
all true, just
then
is
as endoxa
They need not even
sometimes are deceptive. But
all
that
happens
the inquirer has to ask further questions to establish the
that
veracity of the oracle
One
5
s
particular answers.
of especially important corollary of this wider conception
nature can
tell
the following:
we can
us or what
what
otherwise establish interrogatively
An
in the interrogative
model
is
is
the
important parameter the oracle can provide to the logical complexity of the answers that models of In the received science, both in the inductivist and in inquirer. the hypothetico-deductive model,
game (i.e.,
In
is
assumed
that
nature (who in the
of science plays the role of the oracle) can only provide particular s questions. quantifier free) propositions as answers to the inquirer
the
wider
"Atomistic
is
it
model,
Postulate",
there as
I
is
no longer
have called
it.
any
And
if
reason
to
accept
this
the Atomistic Postulate
not assumed, the rationale of both of these models collapses. For then
in P. Asquith and P. Kitcher, eds., PSA 19S4, vol. 1, Philosophy of Science Logic", Association, East Lansing, 1984, pp. 177-185. See also the work referred to in other notes.
5
For the concept of endoxa and for their role in Aristotle s argumentation, see. G.E.L. Owen, Tithenai ta Phainomena", in S. Mansion, ed., Aristote et les problemes de methode, Louvain, 1961, and. cf. my "The Fallacy of Fallacies", op. cit.
76
Hintikka
there
is
no reason
to conclude that general theories could not
be arrived
deductively from
at
Newton
nature s answers to the inquirer s questions or, as could not be deduced from the phenomena. 6 there are at least two historically important ways in which a
puts
Now
it,
can be thought of as being able to obtain general truths as to his or her questions.
scientist
immediate (non-inferential) answers
The
way
first
is
For
experimentation.
the
outcome
typical
of
has
It
proposition.
quantifier-free
The other way
Aristotle
is
It
s.
form of X. This
external one.
And
X
be
also
will
between
forms
if
is
so,
X
be
the
in
Y
one
for
way.
in
his
s
quantifier 8
s
psychology
soul to take
on
form as any
of the
which necessarily accompanies
Thus any necessary connection
soul.
ascertained
is
no longer a
is
existential
realization
genuine any other form
present
can
"answer"
deeply rooted
a
as
controlled
Newton
essentially is
of thinking according to which to think of the
successful
variables, the controlled
one
least
at
controlled
way
a
experiment and the observed one. The codification of such an
dependent on a universal one. This was
of
the
is
dependence between two
to find a
is
It
post-medieval.
simply
by
about
thinking
them,
9 according to this Aristotelian psychology (and metaphysics) of thinking. This means that for Aristotle general truths can be seen immediately
in
one
s
own
interrogative
soul,
model,
of course after suitable preparation. In terms of the this
means
the
that
oracle
assumed
is
to
give an
Aristotelian scientist general answers, and not only particular ones. In the
of what was said earlier,
light
it
is
therefore small
wonder
that neither
the inductivist nor the hypothetico-deductive model of science played any
appreciable role
in
medieval philosophy.
This does not mean, however, that the Aristotelian idea of direct access to general truths was universally accepted in the middle ages.
soon as
1
As
inference was conceptualized as involving a step from
scientific
Cf. note 4 above.
See
here my paper, 74 (1988), pp. 173-190.
Is
"What
the
Logic
of
Experimental
Inquiry?",
Synthese
vol.
t>
See
here
Interrogative
Jaakko Logic
Hintikka of
symposium on Newton
in
and
Inquiry",
James
Garrison,
forthcoming
in
the
"Newton s
Methodology and
proceedings
of
the
April
the
1987
Jerusalem,
o
This pecularity Aristotelian psychology of thought is so striking that it is barely been acknowledge in its full strangeness (strangeness from our twentieth-century viewpoint, that is to say). For indications of Philosophical Re\ iew vol. 75 (1966), pp. 197-219.
it,
cf.
my paper
"Aristotelian
Infinity",
Concepts of Scientific Method
particulars to a general truth,
it
became
77
was not
clear that such a step
unproblematic, and could not be thought of as nature
direct
s
answer to a
middle ages, the rise of nominalism seems to mark an important watershed in this respect. This is only to be expected in view of Aristotle s idea of the realization of universal concepts in the scientist s question. In the
form of
"forms"
source
a
as
soul
background helps us
Aristotelian
this
Indeed,
human
the
in
of scientific
truths.
understand why the
to
rejection of universals was as crucial a development in medieval thought
as in
understand the impact of nominalism general. For instance, nominalism cannot be construed as a skeptical in fact was. This helps us to
it
philosophy, as several speakers at this very congress will emphasize. Its
seen by comparison with Aristotle
s
methodology which
impact
is
means
giving up, at least partly, the idea that
in effect
nature can give us general
answers to suitable questions by means of a realization of the relevant
forms
in
one
Did
s
mind.
this
mean
The
process?
idea of the scientific
a radical change in philosophers
interrogative
no. For the interrogative
model suggests an
model shows
that
interesting answer,
on the oracle
the effects of an additional restriction
which
is
you can often compensate for s
(nature
s)
answers
10
In fact, logicians by strengthening the initial theoretical assumption T. know that even if answers to questions are restricted to (negated or
unnegated) atomic propositions, there can be theories T which jointly with nature s answers to questions enable the inquirer to establish any true proposition. (These are the theories that are known as modelcomplete ones.) These observations throw highly interesting light on developments in the medieval period. The very same philosophers who began to think of inference as a passage from particular observations to general
scientific
were also among the first ones to evoke prior general propositions back them up. Duns Scotus is an especially interesting case in point.
truths to
He writes
as follows:
11
As
for what is known by experience, I have this to say. Even though a person does not experience every single individual, but
is
Cf. here my The Logic of Science as Model-Oriented Logic", op. cit. In general, the possibility of partial trade off between strong assumptions as to what answerable and strong a priori premises is an extremely interesting fact which can
throw
light
Duns
on
several other historical
Scotus,
Opus
phenomena.
Oxoniense,
Philosophical Writings, p. 109.
i,
d.3,
q.4,
translated
in
Wolter,
Duns
Scotus:
Hintikka
78
only a great many, nor does he experience them at all times, but on frequently, still he knows infallibly that it is always this way and holds ror all instances. He knows this in virtue of this proposition reposing in his soul: "Whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause that is not free, is the natural effect of that cause." This proposition is known to the intellect even if the terms are derived from erring senses, because a cause that does not act freely cannot in most instances produce an effect that is the very opposite of what it is ordained by its form to produce.
This quotation
interesting in that
is
Duns Scotus was
the
alternative
regularity
knows
intellect
with
of nature
a
idea
for a thinker like
nature
that
t
certainty
that
not
is
character
the
do so apud the
like
from sense-
derived of
answer
can
completely general truths
certain
They are therefore of
experience.
the
Even though nature doesn
questions concerning universals.
Scotum, the
what
illustrates
it
to
premises of
initial
the scientific enterprise rather than answers (new facts) contributed by nature.
What
important here
is
that
is
this
novelty docs
not
Scotus away from the interrogative conception of inquiry. is
to shift the focus
One symptom quoted
from nature
of this
passage,
viz.,
s
answers to
initial
turn
What
Duns does
it
theoretical premises.
what Duns Scotus says in so many words in the that the results based on the principle of the
is
regularity of nature are infallible, even though they are based only on a
sample of the individuals covered by the generalization. In can say, they are just like the results of an interrogative
Duns Scotus does the
Hume
not anticipate
twentieth-century conception
author
refers
in
this
context
s
inquiry.
I
Thus
doubts about induction nor even
even though one recent
of induction,
to
this respect,
Duns Scotus
s
12 "inductive
evidence".
Admittedly, soon afterwards Duns Scotus says that in this way we can But this very lowest degree of scientific knowledge". only reach inferior degree does not mean a lower level of certainty, for the principle "the
of
the
of
regularity
"uncertainty
Thus
and it
Duns Scotus
is
nature
is
said
to
remove
in
such
cases
all
infallibility".
in
principle misguided to see
anticipation of
Hume s
in
medieval thinkers
like
problems or even anticipations of the
hypothetico-deductive or the inductivist models of science. These models came about only when the skeptical ideas found two different inroads into 12
See N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge Later Medie\ al Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, p. 511. 13
Op.
cit.,
i,
d.3, q.5;
Wolter,
p. 119.
History
of
Concepts of Scientific Method
79
the interrogative conception of scientific inquiry. restrict
nature
like
why
was
is
all
nontrivial initial premises.
modern
crucially important for
Hume
Locke and
One
answers to negated or unnegated atomic ones.
s
has to eliminate in principle
reason
was not enough
It
It
is
to
also
for this
empiricist philosophers
to attack the doctrine of innate ideas.
The same observation
why Newton
explains
s
overall conception of
the structure of science bears striking resemblances to Aristotle in spite
of
mathematical character.
its
answers
general
a
to
14
For according to Newton nature can yield questions, of course not answers
scientist s
as in Aristotle but concerning necessary connections between answers taking the form of functional dependence between variables, "forms"
through a controlled experiment. No wonder Newton, too, believed that general truths can be deduced from phenomena. typically obtained
It
the
of interest to see a
is
abandonment of the
truths.
One
forms
Aristotelian
the
to
corollary
realization of
more
bit
little
of direct
idea
Aristotelian
in the soul is that
the nature of things in question, that
between
logical
and natural
involved in
is
access of
theory
to
general
thinking
as
a
whatever follows as a matter of is,
as a matter of their essential
forms, can be established in thought. There Aristotle
what
closely
therefore no distinction in
is
("formal")
necessity. This conclusion,
which has of course been misunderstood time and again, is shown to be a genuine Aristotelian doctrine in my monograph on Aristotle s theory of 15
Another corollary
modality. clearly
and
conclusion. rational
in
distinctly
Full-fledged
action
in
(i.e.,
a
her
or
akrasia
whoever does
that
is
his
mind,
as
is
syllogism).
avoid
drawing the
in
logic
as
All
these
Aristotelian
impossible 16
practical
realize the premises
cannot
it
is
in
views have their echoes in medieval thought. Of course, in order to be able to see what necessarily accompanies a
form one must
to
general
but
truths,
Accordingly, the
I.
realize
first
fully
an Aristotelian
crucial task for
the
the
form
in
one
s
mind. Hence the
scientist is not inference
formation
of
general
from particulars
concepts
("forms").
premises of an Aristotelian science are definitions,
first
See Hintikka and Garrison, op. cit. The view we reject is represented, e.g., by Bernard Cohen, The Newtonian Revolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980. Jaakko
Hintikka
and Determinism
(with
(Acta
Unto
Remes and Simo
Philosophica
Fennica,
vol.
Knuuttila), no. 1),
29,
Aristotle
on
Societas
Philosophica
Fennica, Helsinki, 1977.
See here
my
"Aristotle
s
Incontinent
Logician",
Ajatus
vol.
37 (1978), pp. 48-65.
Modality
80
Hintikka
and the way
them
to reach
definition of a concept
All
this
Aristotle
is
To
give
essential
its
and parcel of what
part
questions
answerable.
(i.e.,
the dialectial process which leads up to the
is
a full grasp of
concerning
up
this
general
17 "form").
meant by saying propositions were I
that
for
(directly)
answerability assumption can therefore take
the form of giving up the identification of logical (metaphysical) necessity
and natural
nomic
necessity. In so far as this natural necessity
necessity, the step
away from
is
construed as
Aristotle took the form of denying
the identification of unrestricted generality and metaphysical (conceptual)
As
necessity.
Knuuttila and others have spelled out, this step was taken
most resolutely by Duns Scotus. 18
Now we
can
see
scholastic philosophers
that
this
step
was not an
isolated
ideas about necessity and other
in
change
modal concepts.
It
affected their outlook on the entire structure of the scientific search of
knowledge.
These general observations can be illustrated by applying them to the history of one particular concept, that of induction. There exists a useful
study
of
the
of
history
this
assumes
he
concept
by Julius Weinberg,
but
his
unfortunately throughout essay something essentially tantamount to the twentieth-century notion of induction as an inference from particulars to general truths. 19
At
first
sight,
the
story
of
induction
within
an
interrogative
framework might look rather like the "curious incident of the dog in the in Sherlock Holmes: the dog didn do anything. Likewise, night-time" there does not seem to be any niche for the notion of induction in the t
interrogative conception of scientific investigation.
model and allow
Even
if
we
relax our
answers by nature that are true only with a certain probability (and hence can be false), the result is not the inductivist model of science but its mirror image. 20 In inductive logic, we study for
uncertain (nondeductive) inferences from data that are typically assumed to
17
be unproblematic. In the loosened interrogative model we are studying
Cf.
"The
Fallacy of
Fallacies",
op.
cit.
10 Cf.
Knuuttila
s
own
contribution
to
Simo
Knuuttila, ed., Reforging the Great Chain
of Being, Synthese Historical Library, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981. 19
Julius
Weinberg,
History of Thought,
See
here
Inference",
The
and Induction: Three Essays Relation, Abstraction, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison and Milwaukee, 1965.
my paper, "The Interrogative Erkenntnis vol. 26 (1987), pp. 429-442.
Approach
to
Inquiry
and
in
the
Probabilistic
Con cepts of Scien tific Meth od deductive
hence
(and
inferences
certain)
from
81
answers
uncertain
by
nature.
This negative finding
nevertheless
is
itself
quite remarkable, just as
counterpart was in Conan Doyle. It is indeed remarkable how little the medievals had to say about induction in anything like the twentiethits
century acceptance of the term.
There
is
more
be said of
to
this
twentieth-century notion of induction of interrogative inquiry, there that arises naturally
This general
can
they
as
can
scientific inquiry.
Even
follows:
be
Even
concept, however.
an uninvited guest
if
if
21
nature
For instance,
partial.
answers
s
in
can
B
13),
number of
directly find out only
cf.
An.
what characterizes each of a
Likewise, an experimental
scientist
can
what functional dependence obtains between the variables he or she
find is
we can
subclasses of pride.
be
an Aristotelian
search for a definition of pride or magnanimity (megalopsychia, Post.
the
house
in the
a historically important namesake notion
from the idea of
be seen
truths,
is
is
interested in over a
variable.
number of
The experimentally
intervals of values
of the controlled
established dependence can even be different
over the different intervals. Such general but restricted answers lead to the problem of reconciling these partial answers with each other.
Thus
Aristotle writes:
mean, e.g., if we were to seek what pride is we should inquire, in the case of some proud men we know, what one thing they all have as such. E.g. if Alcibiades is proud, and Achilles and Ajax, what one thing do they all [have]? Intolerance of insults; for one made war one waxed wroth, and the other killed himself. Again in the case of others, e.g. Lysander and Socrates. Well, if Tiere it is being indifferent to good and bad fortune, I take these two things and inquire what both indifference to fortune and not brooking dishonour have that is the same. And if there is nothing, then there will be two sorts of pride. I
This reconciliation procedure,
what Aristotle elsewhere
calls
know when
earlier
I
wrote
pretation of Aristotle
my s
subsequent Aristotelians.
See here
Model of
my
paper,
Inquiry",
I
have shown elsewhere,
epagoge
or induction.
paper was
that
concept of induction was
Thus Aquinas
"The
forthcoming
22
is
What
essentially fairly
I
precisely
did not
this
inter
common among
assimilates to each other induction
Concept of Induction in
in the Light of the Interrogative the proceedings of the Pittsburgh Colloquium in the
Philosophy of Science. In
422^39.
"Aristotelian
Induction",
Revue Internationale de Philosophic,
vol.
34 (1980), pp.
Hintikka
82
and the method of looking division. in
the
same
the
"...
method of the
obtaining
quod
in the
thing happens
induction."
23
quid of a
by means of the method of
definition
for
Here
the
thing".
method of
division as
method of
The
context
division
makes
is
happens "used
clear
it
in
that
Aquinas is thinking of an interrogative search for definitions. This is shown by statements like the following: 24 For one who induces through singulars to the universal does not demosntrate or syllogize from necessity. For when something is proved syllogistically. it is not necessary to make further inquiry concerning the conclusion or ask that the conclusion be conceded; is necessary is that the conclusion is true, if the premises
what laid
down
Aquinas mistakenly thinks that the search for definitions An. Post. B 13 (by means of magnanimity example) is by Aristotle to be a method different from division and
However, described
in
intended alternative
famous
are true. [Emphasis added.]
to
it.
nevertheless
is
It
in
that,
significant
the
discussing
chapter of An. Post. B, Aquinas assimilates induction and the
last
search for definitions along the lines of
B
13 to each other, and even
one of the examples employed there. There identity of the two apparently
refers to
definition-seeking (seeking for the
different
quod quid of
of
processes
a thing) and induction
throws some
light on the history of the notion of induction. For instance, we can see in what sense Aristotelian induction must be complete: the different kinds of megalopsychia whose definitions have to be reconciled
with each other must collectively exhaust the entire field of of
magnanimity.
different
subclasses
magnanimity. Of the
reconciliation
exhaustion of
means
This
at
one
and
of magnanimity
course, of the
and
in Aristotle
definitions
all
the the
all
same time particular
instances
exhaust
to
of the
subspecies,
of
instances
the real action in induction
lies
in
not just in the
instances.
all
This shows
how
thin the line
modern conception. This
line
is
from Aristotelian induction to the
was repeatedly transgressed
as early as in
the middle ages.
What question the
is
is
facilitated
extension
An
the inductive reconciliation process like?
and
loc. cit.
this
by a comparison with the quantitative version of
reconciliation
Thomas Aquinas, Commentary Books, Albany, N.Y., 1970, p. 177. Thomas Aquinas,
answer to
on
problem.
the
In
Posterior
this
problem,
Analytics
of
different
Aristotle,
Magi
Concepts of Scientific Method
83
of definition are to partial functions with exclusive ranges
be subsumed
under one single comprehensive functional dependence. I have shown elsewhere that this kind of reconciliation problem occurs often in the of
history science.
and
science
crucial
at
the
in
junctions
development
of
25
It
cannot be subject to simple
easily seen that the reconciliation
is
experimentation with the mathematical expressions of the different functions to be reconciled with each other, and hence has a rules.
involves
It
definite
It it. represents a type of use of mathematics in science, that
element of conceptual analysis to
scientific
including
reasoning,
the
much by philosophers. between the reconciliation problem
has not been discussed very
Here the science
and
megalopsychia to
definitions
similarity
induction
Aristotelian
is
close.
particularly
endoxa.
Here
One
is
One
is
reconciliation
qualitative forms.
some of
tempted to say that Aristotelian induction
modern
to
try
open both
Another problem
is
to systematic
understand what goes
to
both
process,
the is
reconciliation process.
a couple of challenging tasks
research.
inductive
the
example shows Aristotle understood inductive search of contain a heavy dose of conceptual analysis and even
merely a qualitative version of the
historical
as
For,
conceptual reorganization, including the partial rejection of relevant
modern
in
in
its
the
and
its
quantitative
to understand the
and to
into
development of
Aristotelian sense into an integral (though
the concept of induction in
its
not
methodology of modern the functional extrapolation and reconciliation
always
explicitly
recognized)
part
of the
I have argued that what Newton meant by induction. But where he got his ideas from and, more generally, what happened to the notion between Aristotle and Newton largely remains to be investigated.
science.
task
is
Certain things can nevertheless be said.
modern conception
of
induction
began
fourteenth century. Such writers as
to
It
is
rear
unmistakable that the its
ugly
Ockham, pseudo-Scotus
head etc.
in
the
discuss
induction unmistakably as a step from particular cases to a general law that
falls
short
pseudo-Scotus
See op.
cit.,
of
who
necessity.
says
note 21 above.
This
that
is
for
incomplete
instance
stated
induction
explicitly
cannot
by
provide
Hintikka
84
necessity, only evidence.
26
This
is
a far cry
from the Aristotelian idea of
induction sketched earlier. In a wider perspective, an especially interesting point
connection between the
this
of nominalism.
rise
change This
seeking.
A in
to
be a
philosophers concept of induction and connection is shown by the Aristotelian
background mentioned above, and nominalism meant such a break with
a form
seems
in
it
helps
us
to
earlier ideas of
understand
why human knowledge-
nominalist could not conceptualize thinking as a realization of
one
mind and therefore could not assume
s
that
necessary connections between forms could be seen simply by realizing them in
one
s
mind.
A
nominalist, in brief, could not
general questions,
at
least
assume
that nature
answered
not directly, only particular ones. This helps
us to appreciate the impact of nominalism in general.
This
proposed
is
an
here
instructive
can
throw
philosophical thought.
Florida State University
26
Super
Pr.
Anal.
II, 9, 8.
example of how observations of the kind on major issues in the history of light
MICHAEL E. MARMURA
The Fortuna of the Posterior Analytics
It
is
title,
in the
Arabic Middle Ages
perhaps risky to begin a paper by suggesting a possible change of if
particularly
original. This
the suggested change approximates a reversal of the
may seem
flippant.
The
risk,
however,
is
worth taking, the
purpose being to press home a point. When first asked to read a paper entitled, "The Fortuna of the Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle I
Ages,"
thought
the
title
could very well be changed to read,
"The
Fortuna of Arabic Philosophy after the Entry of the Posterior Analytics into Medieval Islam," for its influence on Arabic philosophy was powerful and pervasive. On further reflection, however, a change of title did not
seem necessary; exerted.
But
perhaps more
influential in the
hand
in
for part of the fortuna of this
way
it
to
the
point
is
work the
is
the influence
truism
that
it
it
was
was understood. Influence and interpretation go
hand.
I
In terms of the history of the transmission of Islam,
Greek thought
the Posterior Analytics was a relatively late arrival.
to medieval
A
complete
was made by the Nestorian scholar Ishaq Ibn Hunayn (d. and then, based on this Syriac version, another Nestorian scholar, 910) the logician Abu Bishr Malta (d. 940) made the Arabic translation that Syriac version
has survived. 1 The work became the object of intensive study by the
This is the translation mentioned in the medieval Arabic sources and which has been edited by A. Badawi and published (see n. 12 below). The research of L. MinioPaluello ["note sul Aristotile Latino medievale IV; La tradizione semitico-Latina del testo dei secondi Analytici," Ribista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, 42 (1951), Fasc. II, republished in L. Minio-Paluello, Opuscula: The Latin Aristotle (Amsterdam, 1972), 12754] indicates that Averroes used, in addition to the translation of Abu Bishr, another Arabic version by an unknown translator. R. Walzer has raised the possibility that this other translator may be the Maraya, twice mentioned in marginal comments in the Paris manuscript of Abu Bishr s translation. See R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic (Oxford, 1962),
Marmura
86
tenth-century Baghdad! school of logicians that included the philosopher Alfarabi (al-Farabi) (d. 950)
2
earlier philosophers as Kindi
Sarakhsi
(d.
speaking,
the
There are
.
(al-Kindi)
had some
899)
for
credit
indications, however, that such ca.
(d.
of
knowledge
870) and his student
the
work.
But,
development of Arabic philosophy. which philosophical and
within
the
It
point
in
the
provided the conceptual framework
scientific
operated.
investigations
Its
part of the texture of Arabic philosophical discourse, as
became
came
world
properly
introduction to the main stream of Arabic
its
philosophy belongs to the school of Baghdadi logicians. Its entry into medieval Islam marked a turning
precepts
al-
3
be
to
in
connections,
through the medium of logical language of middle terms. Its influence,
perceived the
expressed moreover, went beyond philosophy to reach Islamic speculative theology, hahm. Thus, in the eleventh century, as will be indicated more fully,
Ghazali (al-Ghazalf) of
school
Ash
the
kaCam,
Aristotelian
1111), a leading
(d.
c
of the then dominant
suggested ways demonstration within
arite,
for
requirements
member
for
a
retaining
the
non-Aristotelian
occasionalist view of the world.
But while the Posterior Analytics exerted an immense influence on medieval Arabic philosophy,
itself
it
was influenced by its new intellectual work and resolve some
environment. In their attempt to understand this of the difficulties inherent in
philosophers like Alfarabi and Avicenna
it,
99-100.
2
Alfarabi
that
states
he
the
studied
Posterior
earliest,
Greek thought
to
Islam,
Ibn
al-Nadlm
(d.
995),
with
Analytics
Yuhanna Ihn Haylan, but we have no though by no means infallible, sources for the
Nestorian scholar,
informs us
was made
his
teacher,
the
One
of our history of the transmission of details
in
about his
this.
Fihrist
_that
a
first
Ibn
Ishaq (d. 873), by Ilunayn partial translation of the Posterior Analytics and that his son Ishaq made a complete Syriac translation, on which Abu Bishr based his Arabic translation. He further informs us that Abu Bishr studied this work with his
teacher
al-Marwa/.I
who
taught
in
exposition of the Posterior Analytics. Bishr, Alfarabi, Thcmistius and John Arabic translation, but states that the
and also with Quwayri who wrote an al-Nadlm mentions commentaries by Abu Philoponus, the two latter presumably in their commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias was not
Syriac
Ibn
available. Ibn al-Nadlm, al-Fihrist (Tehran, 1971), 309, 321-22.
3 Fihrist,
316,
317,
where we are
told
that
these two philosophers wrote epitomes on
referring to it as Apodictica, in his short treatise content: al-Kindi, Raenumerating Aristotle s works, adding a few sentences about its sa il al-Kindi al-Falsafiyya, ed. M.A.A. Abu Rida (Cairo, 1950), 367, 368. See also N. this
work.
Kindi
lists
this
work,
Rescher, Studies in the History of Arabic Logic (Pittsburgh, 1963), 34, 36. Ibn al-Nad[m the physician-philosopher al-RazI (d. 926) wrote a work entitled, Kit ab al-Burhan (The Book of Demonstration), consisting of two chapters. Fihrist, 357. also states that
Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages
77i
Sma)
(Ibn
(d.
87
1037) offered interpretations and expansions on
it.
Some
of
these expansions reflect the influence of the epistemology of the katem.
Thus, before Ghazali
s
endorsement of Aristotelian demonstration,
it
had
already had some interaction with the kalam. In what follows we will attempt to convey an idea of how the Posterior Analytics fared in the Arabic middle ages. We will begin with three
We
of
illustrative
examples
different
ways
affected
it
philosophical
then indicate some of the ways it was interpreted and expanded on, concluding with a section devoted mainly to the Ghazalian thought.
will
attempt to accommodate Aristotelian demonstration within an atomist, occasionalist theological metaphysics.
II
For
our
first
of
example
the
the
way
Posterior
Analytics
affected
medieval Arabic philosophy, we will turn to Alfarabi s political theory. This theory offers, in effect, an interpretation of Islamic religious and institutions
political
terms
it,
"the
a
fulfills
society
leadership
in
virtuous
of
a
Platonic city,"
is
ideal
philosopher-ruler,
all
acting
a
or,
city,
hierarchically organized.
function,
special
The
terms.
Each
harmoniously also
philosopher
as
Alfarabi
level of its
under
the
endowed with
The law governing the city is an expression of philosophical truth, but in a language the non-philosopher can understand, that is, the language of the image and the symbol. It is within such a community that happiness exceptional practical ability and wisdom.
the revealed law. This law
is
in this life, leading to ultimate
To his
political
treatise,
are required: practical
of
"the
happiness in the hereafter,
Tfie
"theoretical
arts."
sciences
he offers a
He
then discusses the
"theoretical
whose ultimate purpose
brief,
4 certainty."
is
to
virtues"
make
which consist
the beings and what
Before discussing these sciences,
but interpretive digest of the Posterior Analytics.
Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, translated with an Introduction
1962), 13.
attainable.
the very beginning of Attainment of Happiness, four kinds of things virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues and
they contain intelligible with
Aristotle,
is
realize this happiness, Alfarabi states at
in
and
the
The Philosophy of Plato and by Muhsin Mahdi (New York,
trilogy,
Notes
He
Marmura
88
example, the division of knowledge into the primary, the
for
discusses,
and
self evident,
instruction
and
the
fact
yields
he
former,
that
which
He
study."
only and
explains,
is
acquired through
which gives the reasoned
that
the
"investigation,
principles
of
are
instruction
principles
with
of being
the
them on the second
discussing
23; also, II, 2,
89b
in
Then,
four
Aristotelian
that
With the
fact.
than
other
He
principles of being; with the latter, they are the same.
the
inference,
between the demonstration
differentiates
the
then identifies
causes,
part of the Posterior Analytics
drawing (II,
1,
in
89b
36).
terms of
this
digest,
Alfarabi
the
introduces
theoretical
sciences beginning with mathematics where, he explains, only the formal
cause
involved.
in
5
He
then introduces physics, metaphysics and, what
where the ideological cause, the 6 perfection of man, plays the dominant role. Political theory, one of the theoretical virtues the philosopher-ruler must have, is a demonstrative concerns us here most, political theory,
science.
7
Alfarabi
s
concept of the ideal
state,
which
is
basically Platonic,
through the dialectic of the Republic, but through Aristotelian demonstrative reasoning. Here, however, a qualification is needed. Alfarabi s epistemology has a Neoplatonic element, basic to his is
arrived
at,
not
explanation of prophetic revelation.
For the realization of the
ideal state,
the
first
be both a philosopher and a prophet receptive Revelation conjoins
takes
with
place
the
when
Active
the
ruler at least
of the
philosopher-prophet
Intellect,
the
last
of
a
s
revealed
rational
series
of
must law.
faculty celestial
becomes
emanating from God. The prophet-philosopher s rational soul inundated with the intelligibles proceeding from the Active
Intellect.
These,
intelligences
in
turn,
descend on the prophet
s
imaginative
faculty
which transforms them into particular images that symbolize them. These symbols are then expressed in the language which all people, non-
Ibid., 19. See also al-Farabi", Kitab al-Musiqa al-Kablr (The Great Book of Music), ed. A. Khashaba (Cairo, 1967), 90-91, where Alfarabi expands on this. The source of his discussion is Posterior Analytics, I, 13, 78b 35 - 79a 10.
Attainment of Happiness, 22-23. 7
Ibid., 23.
The Posterior Analytics and
philosophers
can
philosophers,
89
Arabic Middle Ages
in the
the
understand,
of
language
the
8
scriptures.
should be stressed, however, that the intellectual knowledge the differ in prophet-philosopher receives from the Active Intellect does not It
from
kind
the
other
in
Religion,
knowledge. Since Alfarabi philosophy
theorizing
s
much
very
model
his
Underlying
way."
Analytics that
Rushd)
intellectual
theory
knowledge
knowledge
some sense known
to
what
Islamic,
his political
becomes more
that
who
1198)
(d.
is
is
is
will turn to
God knows
that
theory
this
knowledge.
of demonstrative
his
in
explicitly
political
the disciple of Alfarabi.
For our next two examples, we and begin with
is
more
an accommodation between the Posterior
is
(Ibn
acquires
demonstrative
is
r Qur an, an accommodation
by Averroes is
It
symbolic expression
religious
provides in effect
Analytics and the
expressed
offers
words,
philosopher
ordinary
demonstration.
through
laboriously
the
knowledge
particulars
s
"in
metaphysics a universal
the epistemological ideal of the Posterior
of the universal.
The
Some
the universal.
God
Avicenna
individually.
object of
God
s eternal,
particulars, however, are in
These are the
particulars, entities
and events related to them, in the celestial world. In Avicenna s triadic emanative scheme, each celestial entity, whether intellect, soul or body, in
each of the triads proceeding from the
represents the only
member
of a species.
first
of the emanated intellects,
God knows
these species. But
knowledge of these universals does not entail the knowledge that each is confined to one member. God knows that they are so confined as a consequence of His causality, where in the celestial realm the principle that
from the one only one proceeds
the celestial species and (b) that
one
individual.
entities and,
relate to
It
is
in
this
its
is
operative.
Thus God knows
sense that
God knows
celestial
particular
by extension, particular celestial events such as eclipses that
them. 9
fuller discussion of prophetic revelation in Alfarabi, see the author s Philosopher s Conception of Islam," in Islam s Understanding of Itself, R.G. Hovannisian and S. Vryonis, Jr. (Malibu, California, 1981), 94-96.
For a
Islamic
Some medieval knows
(a)
universal qualities are confined to
each
and
"The
eds.
Islamic philosophers have interpreted Avicenna as holding that God every particular in both the celestial and terrestrial world by
intellectual, conceptual knowledge. Textual evidence showing that this cannot be Avicenna s view is overwhelming. For a detailed discussion of this question and of the Avicennan theory, see the author s, "Some Aspects of Avicenna s Theory of God s Knowledge of Particulars," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 82.3 (July-
Marmura
90
Included in the
this
of
Metaphysics
Avicenna
is
theory his
Shifa
conception does not disallow
definition of the universal in
s
as
namely
(Healing),
whose very
"that
being predicable of many." It may be he explains, of none, as with actually predicated of many, as with its
"man,"
a
"heptagonal
only one sun
house,"
and
That there
"sun."
is
"sun,"
Demonstration of 74a
"earth"
not included in the universal concept, extraneous cause. 10 This idea, however, is first
an
to
or of one, as with
s
given
is
is
due
in
the
an expansion on Posterior Analytics I, 5, ? expansion, however, that reflects the medieval Arabic
an
4-12,
translator
1
and
his Shifa
in
interpretation of this passage.
passage Aristotle states that we may inadvertently err in taking a conclusion to be universal in its primary, widest sense, when it is not. He then gives three reasons for this error. The first occurs when In
this
Oxford translation) subject is an individual or individuals above which there is no universal to be found." Abu Bishr Malta s (to use the
"the
of this
translation
one
passage gives a different interpretation of the error
prone to commit. According to this translation it consists of two which in fact is universal not to be so,
is
things: (a) mistaking a conclusion
that
thinking
is,
be a
to
it
particular;
and
the
(b)
thinking the particular conclusion to be a universal. gives
the
when
there
is
nothing
"higher
12
and
solitary
(wahlda}."
this,
translator then
of the reasons for error as applicable to (a).
first
of
opposite
The
It
occurs
other than the things that are particular
Both Avicenna and Averroes interpret this as which is the sole member of
referring to particulars like the sun, each of 13
its
species.
In
the
Demonstration,
between the universal sun and
September Ihn
Avicenna
the
stresses
particular only instance.
distinction
The
universal
1962), 299-312.
Sina
Dunya and in
its
S.
(Avicenna),
:
al-Shifa
Zayid (Cairo,
1960),
al-Ilahiyyat 195-96. This
ed. G.C. Anawati, S. be abbreviated, Metaphysics,
(Metaphysics},
work
will
the notes.
Ibn
A.A.
Sma
Affifi
(Avicenna), al-Shifa
(Cairo,
1956),
144-46.
:
al-Mantiq (Logic) V; al-Burhan (Demonstration), ed. This work will be abbreviated, Demonstration, in the
notes. Aristotle,
Badawi
in
Analutlqa al-Av,~akhir (Posterior Analytics),
Mantiq Aristu
(Aristotle s
Logic),
3 vols.
tr.
reissued
Abu
Bishr
(Beirut,
ed.
A.
1980),
II,
Malta,
Kuwait,
345-46.
13
Demonstration, Analytics, ed.
144;
Averroes
A.A. Haridi (Cairo, 1982), translation.
(Ibn
M.M. Kassem, completed, 53.
Rushd),
Middle Commentary and the Posterior
revised and annotated by C.E. Butterworth and
This strongly suggests that both were using
Abu
Bishr
s
Arabic Middle Ages
Tlie Posterior Analytics in the
sun does not include the information that there distinction
in
knowledge
we
as
Avicenna,
of
particulars
"in
our
final
God
contingency for that
it
operates
example, s
we
existence.
exclusively
I,
This
turn is
terms
in
way."
God
theory of
first
It
occurs
s
an
as
5.
shall
14
only one sun. This
is
of his
part
universal
interpretation of Posterior Analytics,
For
is
noted,
a
91
Avicenna
to
s
an a priori proof
or
rational
proof from sense
in the
that
concepts
are
independent of our perception of the observable world. Just as there are self-evident logical propositional truths, he argues, there are also primary, very
general,
necessary."
in
itself
such
concepts
as
"the
The impossible cannot
necessary or only possible.
If
and hence the it
necessary,
would be uncaused, necessarily one, simple. If in we suppose it to exist, then it can be shown that existence existence,
Once
the
existent
the
necessary in
must be an
there
existence
God
of
possible in itself, the world,
That
this
is
is
itself.
existent is
"the
existent,"
exist
:
"the
either
can be shown that
it
only possible and would require for its
it
in
itself.
since
This
then the existent that
proved,
is
itself
there is is
is
God. only
inferred from His existence.
the pattern of argument intended
Metaphysics of the Shifa
existent
In either case,
necessary
and
thing,"
Avicenna writes
is
indicated in the
15 :
become clear to you anon through an intimation that we have a way of proving the existence of the First Principle, not by the the method of evidential proof from the things perceived by senses, but by way of universal rational premises that render it It
will
necessary that there
is for existence a principle that is necessary in existence, that makes it impossible for this principle to be in anv way multiple, and makes it necessary that the whole is necessitated by Him according to the order possessed by the whole. Because of our incapacity, Tiqwever, we are unable to adopt this
its
demonstrative method which is the method of arriving at the secondary existents from the primary principles and the effect from the cause, except with some groupings of the ranks of existing things, not in detail.
These
"groupings
of the ranks of existing
are the celestial emanated triads in Avicenna
proceeding sequentially from
God
parallels
s
things"
mentioned above
emanative scheme. Their
the
demonstrative ideal of
In his writings Avicenna gives several (closely related) versions of this proof. The most comprehensive of these is in the Metaphysics where, however, it is scattered in different discussion and has to be reconstructed. See the author s, "Avicenna s Proof from Contingency for God s Existence in the Metaphvsics of the Shifa" Mcdiac\~al Studies, XLII (1980), 337-52. ,
15
Metaphysics, 21.
Marmura
92
arriving at the secondary existents
the cause. That Avicenna here
reasoned
fact
is
from the primary, at the effect from referring to the demonstration of the
not difficult to discern. Not that the
is
inferring the existence of the celestial triads
Gha/ali
as
devastating criticism
s
of
seriously flawed.
is
shows,
it
way he goes about
convincing. His argument,
is
16
But
the demonstrative ideal of inferring the effect from the cause, enunciated in
the Posterior Analytics,
is
very
much
there.
explains the fact of the world, not the other
It
God, the cause,
is
that
way around.
Ill
How
then did the Posterior Analytics fare
Islamic
was
It
interpreters?
at
the hands of
Book
"The
of
its
medieval
and
Demonstration"
demonstration meant to them the perfection of syllogistic reasoning, its ultimate goal. "Our primary and essential purpose in the art of logic,"
Avicenna that
writes, knowledge of syllogisms and that part of [the examines demonstrative syllogisms." "The use of this for "is
us,"
continues, after
"is
the
of
acquisition
he
17 sciences."
Again, chapter of the Demonstration of the Shifa this work should he entitled, the Book of
explaining in the
first
that properly speaking Demonstration and Definition, he writes 18
Once we mention
demonstrative
the
art]
the
book
:
purpose which
s
is
to
bestow the methods
of assent that is certain and conception that is true, the productive benefit of the book becomes clear. It is to arrive at the cognitions that are certain and conceptions that are true, nay necessary for us when we engage in using tnis instrument, that is logic, and begin to weigh with its scales the theoretical and practical sciences.
Whatever philosophers
-
else
the
Posterior Analytics
may have meant
Alfarabi, for example, emphasi/.es
its
al-Falusifa
(Incoherence
of the Philosophers),
Ihn Sina (Avicenna). al-Sliifa : al-Mantiq (Logic) IV; /ayid (Cairo, 1964), 3. This work will he abbreviated, Syllogism,
these
19 pedagogical intent
1
Al-Gha/ali, Talnifut (Beirut, 1929), 110-132.
for
al-Qiyas
cd.
M. Bouygcs
(Syllogism),
ed.
S.
in the notes.
IX
Demonstration,
18.
19
See D.L. Demonstrative
Black,
The Logical Dimension of Rhetorica and
in Reasoning (University of Toronto, 1987),
Theory of
New
York,
Medie\ al 116-21.
See
Arabic also
Philosophy, M. Galston,
Poetics: Aspects
Doctoral "Al-FarabF
of Non-
Dissertation
on Aristotle
s
Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. P. Morewedge (Delmar, 1981), 31. See, in particular, Alfarabi, Book of Letters (Kitab al-Humf), ed.
Demonstration,"
Arabic Middle Ages
Tfic Posterior Analytics in the
-
was
it
work
a
of
the true sense,
in
ascertaining knowledge
the
providing
logic,
criterion,
knowledge
"the
that
scales,"
certain.
is
It
Scientific
of
definition
for
knowledge. presented an exacting, demonstration, in the best sense, does not only ascertain the facts but is the demonstration of the gives the reason for them. The ideal hence ideal
also
reasoned
where both the middle term and
fact,
the cause of the conclusion and
its
referent in reality are
form for
scientific
argument
the
is
The premises of The ideal syllogistic
referent in reality.
its
demonstration are universal, necessary and eternal.
mood
first
of the
first figure.
This conception of scientific demonstration posed for the Islamic as
philosophers,
did
it
for
predecessors and successors,
their
many
a
for example, the relation of the universal to the particular, question the necessary to the contingent, the role of observation in all this. The Posterior Analytics, however, while enunciating stringent conditions for -
Science
flexibility.
fact.
knowledge, is not without statements suggestive of not confined to the demonstration of the reasoned
scientific
realizing
is
Demonstration establishing the
fact
of scientific knowledge, to be sure,
can
be
-
an
in
is
manner
accidental
Observation certainly plays a role in
sun
the
s
also acknowledged.
The
object
of
the
20
perishable
scientific investigation.
particular.
True, in one
we were on the moon and saw the earth we would experience the eclipse without
passage, Aristotle states that
obstructing
is
the universal. But demonstration
if
light,
for it. He immediately adds, however, that understanding of a fact enables us to grasp the universal and frequent observation
reason
the
attain demonstration.
related
21
and
points,
Islamic philosophers expanded on these and
The
extended
the
demonstration to include assertions of This discusses,
(burh an
can
be
seen
for example, 22
inna).
where there are
of
premises
admissable
in
particular experiential facts.
particularly
in
the
writings
of Aviccnna.
He
kinds of the demonstration of the fact
different
These include finite
range
for
him a type of inductive argument
instances, allowing the induction to be complete,
also (Beirut, 1970), 151-52. This does not contradict Alfarabi s view that it is_ for ascertaining what is certain and a means of arriving at it: Al-Farabi, Ihsa al- Ulum, ed. U. Amin (Cairo, 1949), 64.
M. Mahdi
a
20
criterion c
Posterior
Analytics,
I,
8,
75b
25-27;
172-73.
21
22
Posterior Analytics,
I,
Demonstration, 79-80.
33,
87b 39
-
88a
4.
Avicenna
reiterates
this
in
Demonstration,
Marmura
94
23 these instances expressed in a disjunctive premise.
against believing that this kind of argument also urges is
them not
confined
demonstration involves
of
the
is
there
is
not a demonstration.
is
He
fact,
which
he
terms
"evidential
daftl,
cause from the
of the
effect.
proof,"
one place he
In
of demonstration by using a conditional syllogism:
illustrates this type
there
his readers
pay any attention to the claim that demonstration attributive syllogism. The most common type of
inference
the
warns
to
the
to
He
a lunar eclipse, then the earth intervenes
If
between sun and moon;
a lunar eclipse; therefore the earth intervenes between sun and
moon. The repeated premise, "there is a lunar eclipse," he states, acts 24 The most general demonstration of the fact, however, a middle term.
as is
the one in which two effects are necessitated by one cause. In such a case, the existence of the
one
effect
inferrable from the existence of
is
membrane
the other. Al-sarsam, brain fever due to the swelling of the the
envelopping
and
brain,
viscous
white
urine, Avicenna
are
states,
concomitants, two effects of the same cause, namely the movement of the acrid humours towards the head.
Turning
to the modality of demonstrative syllogisms,
Avicenna urges
the reader to pay no attention to the contention that necessary premises
are
those
demonstrative,
equally
rhetorical,
possible,
26
impossible,
the
poetical.
least
In
Demonstration,
divided,"
instances
are
79,
Avicenna
al-muqassam expressed
in
most
possible,
part,
dialectical,
the
and
the
sophistical,
There can be demonstrations of the possible (of
whatever degree). His position, which
"the
the
for
possible
(possibly, a
refers "the
disjunctive
in
to
effect
this
dividing,"
premise.
The
as
a
includes the distinction
conditional
al-muqassim}, different
syllogism
called
these
that
stating
kinds of this syllogism,
including the inductive, are discussed in Syllogism, Bk. VI, Ch. 6, 349-59. For a translation and commentary on the different kinds of this syllogism, see N. Shehaby,
The Prepositional Logic of Avicenna (Dordrecht and Boston, 1973), 152-60, 262-65. Ibn Sina (Avicenna), al-IsHarat
wa
al-Tanbihat (Vol.
I:
Logic), ed. S.
Dunya
(Cairo,
which will be abbreviated, Isharat, includes the commentary For an English translation, see Ibn Sina, Remarks and Logic, tr. with an Introduction and Notes by S.C. Inati (Toronto,
1953), 536-37. This edition, of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi.
Admonitions: Part
I;
1964), 155.
25
Demonstration, 79-80.
Qiyas, 4; Isharat, 512. Avicenna in this criticism may well Alfarabi who adopts this position in his short treatise, Qawanin translated by A.J. Arberry: A.J. Arberry, "FarabF s Commentary on
have al-Sht
had r,
in
edited
mind and
Rivista delga Poetry," Studi Orientali, 267-78, 268. I owe this reference to D.L. Black. For a full discussion of this passage and the issues involved, see her doctoral dissertation, cited in note 19
above,
p. 142ff.
The Posterior Analytics
between modalities de dicto and de
in the
Arabic Middle Ages
re, is
scientist philosopher Nasir al-Din al-Tusi
summed up by
95
his follower, the
27
1274)
(d.
:
Demonstrative syllogisms consist of propositions whose acceptance is necessary. These are the ones to which assent is necessary, regardless of whether they are in themselves necessary or possible. then their conclusions are necessary If necessary in themselves, according to both circumstances, and if possible in themselves, In short, demonstrative syllogisms necessary in terms of acceptance. are certain, materially and formally. In the case of premises that are in themselves necessary, Avicenna
A
the question of the duration of their necessity. predicate, he if latter always a the to subject maintains, will always belong necessarily
raises
-
exists
for
statements
example,
about
the
in
corruptible
statement, things,
is
"God
a
however,
In
one."
universal
belonging
predicate
necessarily to a subject will always exist as long as the subject exists, as in
the
statement,
"all
men
are
animals."
The same
when
applies
A
description associated with a subject has a necessary predicate. object
has
a
necessary predicate,
its
being of a color distinguishable
(presumably as definitely white) to sight. the
predicate
necessarily
as
existing
seated
associated with
when he
is
seated).
a particular event
Then
the
as
long
at
a
white
a
there
predicate
is
there
Finally,
the necessity of
exists is
man
(a
the
is
necessity
specific time, such as a lunar
28
eclipse.
This existential
which includes questions regarding the meaning of (assertoric) premises and their relation to the modal, was
analysis,
severely criticized by Averroes
about corruptibles are
still
who
maintains that universal statements
universal.
necessarily an animal, the predication
or not
each
Averroes
man
observes,
exists
Hence when we is
necessarily and
apply
to
eternal, always."
not
particular,
state that
man
is
"regardless
of whether
Avicenna
conditions,
universal
s
statements.
Whatever the strengths or weaknesses of Avicenna s analysis, it should be remarked that it appears in several of his works, often in discussions of modality arising from the Prior Analytics. 27 28
One
of
its
fullest
expressions,
Isharat,5U. Qiyas, 53; Demonstration, 121. Cf. Posterior Analytics,
Arabic
text
I,
8,
published by Dunlop. See, D.M. Dunlop,
75b 33-36. "Averroes
(Ibn Rushd) on the
Modality of Propositions," Islamic Studies, Vol. I (1962), 33. For an English translation with an Introduction and comments, see N. Rescher, Studies in Arabic Logic, 91-105.
Marmura
96
however, occurs
I,
that
concerns us most here
work were The school of katam
divides
Ash c arite. According
the
is
into
and
"necessary"
to this school,
the
"reflective,"
latter
31 knowledge based on the former. Necessary knowledge
being inferential is
on
philosophical expansions of this
earlier,
by the epistemology of the katam.
human knowledge
as an expansion
6.
As mentioned also influenced
^
Demonstration of the Shifa
in the
Posterior Analytics,
created in us directly by God.
includes self-evident logical truths,
It
knowledge of our own existence and our psychological and physical states, knowledge of the world around us attained immediately in association with our senses and knowledge based on tawatur. This latter of individual
historical
is
knowledge
events and geographical places rendered certain
through innumerable individual corroborative reports, ultimately based on observation. Tawatur in Islamic theology and religious law is very significant. It gives certitude about events in the past, particularly veridical
religious events, the existence of the prophet
utterance of revelation,
Now
some
Avicenna includes
of demonstration.
He
of his actions and sayings. all
these cognitions as usable in the premises
judgement. either
beyond
true this
It
is
or
He
and
case of the former, sensation
in the
for example, his
32
thus includes particular empirical premises arrived at
through direct observation and tawatur. insist that
Muhammad,
is
his
followers,
however,
always accompanied by
only thus that utterances about particular observables are false,
certain
or
uncertain.
33
Avicenna,
moreover, goes
to include as premises of demonstration universal empirical
-
"Ul
Demonstration,
120-24.
See
also,
-
-
Isharat,
308-16;
Syllogism,
32-33 and
-
Ibn Sina, al-
Nafat (Cairo, 1938), 20-21.
For a discussion of the Ash c aritc theory, see my article, "Gha/.ali Ixtgic," Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, (Albany, New York, 1975), 104-105.
Secular Sciences and
See Ghazali,"
B. Weiss, "Knowledge of the Past: Studio Islamica, LXL (1985), 90-105.
s
Attitude to the
ed. G.F.
Hourani
The Theory of Tawatur According
to
Demonstration, 58, where Avicenna is reluctant to admit apprehension by the senses as constituting knowledge, but elsewhere he affirms that particular premises based on observation are admissible in demonstration: Isharat, 389ff. Al-TusI, in his Talkhls al-Muhassal (Tehran, 1980), 112-13 is very explicit in insisting that particular premises based on sense experience must include judgment, otherwise they would not constitute propositions that are cither true or false, certain or uncertain.
Tfie Posterior Analytics in the
A
statements of the form, whenever kinds, al-mujarrab~at,
A
"the
experienced,"
97
Arabic Middle Ages
then B. These consist of two related
and alhadsiyyat,
"the
intuited."
discussion of the experienced premises occurs in Alfarabi
Great
s
Book of Music
(Kitab al-Musiqa al-Kabir) devoted to both musical theory In this work he locates harmonics within the epistemological and practice.
confines of the Posterior Analytics and discusses aspects of the latter.
34
According to Alfarabi, the process of arriving at the certainty of these experienced premises begins with sensation and imagination, followed by the mind s activity of separating and combining images. Then the mind uses a special natural power for a specific action, enabling certain
it
to arrive at
knowledge from the recurrence of the events observed. is and of what
not indicate, however, what this natural power consists.
He
activity
and
does
hence
does
induction
that
states
only
not
provide
not
the
involve
He its
this
does
action
mental
required
certainty
in
35
demonstrative premises. In his treatment of both the experienced and intuited premises, Avicenna is more explicit about the role of the mind in arriving at their certainty.
Both these kinds of premises depend on the observation of in
regularities
In
nature.
case
the
regular association of events
is
of
the
premises,
the
as for example,
fire
experienced
directly perceived,
and the burning associated with it. With the intuited, the association is not directly perceived. Avicenna s example of this derives from Aristotle s definition
of
"quick
Avicenna puts it, the moon and that
"an
it
example of
its light is
The observation
The mind then
argues,
is
the
34 35
ii,
5,
34.
Thus,
as
for a person to observe
its
various shapes and from
seizes a middle term,
namely
that
sun."
always
is
a
not sufficient. In addition to
hidden
syllogism
was coincidental
From
to it
the
this,
effect
Avicenna
that
if
the
would not have continued
this argument, which has a background he concludes that the regularity derives 196b, 10-16,
always or for the most part. Physics,
1,
of regularities in arriving at both types of certain
regular association of events
in
would be
I,
36
premises, while necessary, there
this
Analytics,
gives light according to
the side facing the sun. the cause of
Posterior
in
wit"
Alfarabi, Kitab al-Musiqa al-Kablr, 92-98. Ibid., 97-98.
"Vi
Demonstration, 259.
Marmura
98
from the inherent causal properties Ghazali
see,
shortly
uses
37
natural
in
As we
things.
shall
same argument, but draws from
the
it
a
different conclusion.
IV
It
we must now
to Ghazali that
is
of
the
used
logic
by
turn.
their
He
it.
essentials
in
logic
wrote a number of expositions
only
argued that
in
did not differ
it
in
terminology,
fellow
his
urging
philosophers,
38
theologians and lawyers to adopt
from
He
Islamic
the
its
greater
refinement and more exhaustive treatment. Furthermore, he maintained, is
it
a neutral tool of knowledge, not committed to any one philosophy or
But
doctrine.
philosophers,
and
aim
the
perfection
demonstration.
is
hinges on the Aristotelian
four
of
to
according
logic,
in
the
demonstration
Explanatory reasoning causes. Is it not then committed to a
specific metaphysics of causality?
Of
Ash
difficulty for
cause,
Aristotelian
the
as
c
developed by Avicenna, to
According to
this
its
39
embodied
particular, logic.
a
This concept of
a necessitarianism, which
agency, was totally unacceptable to
divine
posed
Ash c arism.
concept, the proximate, essential, efficient cause and
direct effect coexist, the priority of cause to effect being ontological,
not temporal. the
in
efficient,
acceptance of demonstrative
arite
when applied
the
causes,
cause
When
the causal conditions obtain, barring impediments,
all
the
necessitates
between cause and
effect
is
extramcntal
In
effect.
irreversible, that
is,
reality,
the
relation
one can only remove the
by removing the cause. In the mind, however, the inferential relation between cause and effect is reciprocal. The connection between effect
the
efficient
proximate
disruption impossible.
cause
Hence
and
its
effect
is
a
necessary
one,
its
certain miracles reported in the scripture,
involving such a disruption, are impossible and the language reporting them must be read as metaphor. 37
Demonstration, 95, 96, 223-24; Isharat, 394-96.
38 See,
See Theology (Albany,
Attitude to the Secular Sciences and
"Ghazali s
the
and
author
s,
The
Philosophy:
New York,
Metaphysics
Studies
1984), 172-78.
in
of
Logic."
Honor of
Efficient
G.F.
Causality
Hourani, ed.
in
Avicenna,"
Islamic
Michael E. Marmura
Arabic Middle Ages
TJie Posterior Analytics in (He
Ghazali
a
himself,
Ash c arite
leading
99
criticized
theologian,
and
rejected this causal concept. His theological school was occasionalist. It denied secondary causes, conceiving the world to consist of transient
atoms and accidents inhering by the divine voluntary finite
temporally
them. These entities are created ex nihilo
related
act,
of
spans
between these created
in
There
existence.
events has no inherent necessity.
It
a habit,
is
decreed by God, but can be disrupted
To
see
how
this
answer
attempts
to
scheme
Fafasifa
(Tfie
it,
will
Incoherence
first
of the
he
argues
impossible by the miracles
either
both
Ash
c
that the connection
Philosophers),
own
and
its
effect
in
written
doctrine. In
of
how he
certain
to its
Tah afut
al-
refute
the
seventeenth
deemed
miracles
One can show the possibility of such Ash c arite causal theory or even an
modified. Ghazali expounds and defends
himself
arite theory,
then would the
writings and
s
modified Aristotelian
the
committing
explicitly
introducing the
the
of
when properly
Ash c arite and
the
without
terms
How
turn to his influential
possibility
philosophers.
in
Aristotelian theory
the
for
orderly flow of
or a custom, sunna,
~ada, will.
in
interaction
of things?
Islamic philosophers, not to affirm his discussion,
His
at
causal
The
c
question arises in Ghazali
we
no
is
only concomitance.
entities,
Posterior Analytics relate to this
form bodies40 and sustained
to
in
theory
work
this
to
as
possible,
either.
41
In
he begins with his well-known argument is habitually believed to be the cause
between what
observable things
is
not
logically
necessary and that
hence one can affirm either one and deny the other without contra diction. After giving examples of such habitual causes, he concludes :
The connection of who creates them
is due to the prior decree of God, by side, not to any inherent necessity in these things that would render their separation from each other
these things side
On
the contrary, it is within God s power to create satiety without eating, death without decapitation, to prolong life after decapitation and so on in the case of all concomitant things.
impossible.
Ghazali then continues with his argument that observation shows only concomitance, not necessary causal connection.
For the subtleties involved R.M. Frank, "Bodies and
rism, see
See the author Tahafut,"
Islamic
s,
in
"Al-Ghazali s
Philosophy
the
Atoms,"
and
Second Causal Theory Mysticism,
1981), 278-79.
42
question of what constitutes a body in Islamic Theology and Philosophy, 39-53.
Ghazali, Tahafut al-Falasifa, 278-79.
ed.
P.
in
Ash c a-
the 17th Discussion of the
Morewedge (Delmar, New York,
Marmura
100
In the above passage, however, special attention should be given to
the example 43
The
period.
of these
first
Belief), written
and
defends
his Iqtisad fi al-Ftiqad (Tfie
is
of
c
arite
the
and
criticism
44 it.
rejects
proclaiming
it
he
it
Mu c ta/,ilite
He to
In
theology.
rival
with the philosophers
identifies
Tah afut, a work
shortly after the
Ash
his
acts
generated
theory,
Tah afut and written
works associated with the
different
of
of decapitation, which recurs in two key passages in two
of
the
same
which he affirms
in
subjects
school
in
Golden Mean
the
kafam,
theory
of
which
he
theory of efficient natural causality, to
Ash c arite causal The example of
affirms unequivocally the
be
the
true
45
theory.
decapitation occurs in a discussion of al-ajal, the individual s predestined
time
of
death.
a
If
man
is
decapitated,
decapitation or his ajaH Ghazali writes
does
he
die
because
of
46 :
means
the cutting of the neck. This reduces to accidents of the hand of the striker with the sword, accidents that are separations in the parts of the neck of the one being struck, another accident being associated with these, namely, death. If there is no bond between the cutting and death, the denial of death would not follow necessarily from the denial of cutting. For these are created together, connectedly in accordance with habit c there being no bond of the one with the other. They are ( ada), similar to two separate things that are not habitually connected. Killing that are
After
motions
further
discussion,
including
an
explanation
of
the
philo
47
sophers causal position, he concludes It ought to be said that he died by his :
ajal, ajal meaning the time creates in him his death, regardless of whether this occurs with the cutting of a neck, the occurrence of a lunar eclipse, or the falling of rain. For all these things are for us not generated acts, except that with some their associations, connection is repeated according to habit, but with some they are not repeated.
in
which
God
In Posterior Analytics, I, 4, 73b 15-16, decapitation is given as an essential cause the killing of an animal. That a similar example (though with reference to people) occurs in Ghazali s discussion of causality may well be coincidental. in
^
Al-Ghazall, al-Iqtisad 95-99;
for an
philosopher 45
s
explicit
Ibid., 223-24.
47 Ibid.,225.
al-ftiqad, eds. of the
I.A.
(^ubukqu and H. Atay (Ankara, 1962), theory of generated acts and the
Mu c tazilite
theory of efficient causality, see Tahafut, 377.
Iqtisad, 224, line 8.
46
ft
identification
TJie Posterior Analytics in the
It
in
with this example as
is
mind
that
we
turn
shall
Tah afut,
it
Arabic Middle Ages
occurs in the Tah afut and the Iqtiiad
work, the logical treatise he
the
third
Micyar
al Ilm
to
101
(Tlie Standard of Kfiowledge). an of Avicenna s logic where the causal essentially exposition language in the discussion of demonstration is for the most part
appended
This
to the
his
is
There
Aristotelian.
discussion
of
the
is,
however, a reminder of
mujarrabat,
Avicenna, he argues that empirical
we
"the
arrive
through
generalizations
Ash c arism.
the
(a)
occurs in his
Following
premises.
experienced"
at
It
certain
knowledge of these
observation
of
the
regular
association of events, and (b) the hidden rational argument that regularity
was coincidental or accidental
always or for the most part. Avicenna, as
it
if
this
would not have continued
we have
seen, draws
from
this
the conclusion that this certainty derives from the causal, natural powers
of things, and the necessary causal connections between natural things.
Ghazali does not
make
this
conclusion.
objection to his analysis of these premises
How
Someone may
Instead,
he reports a possible
and answers
do you consider
it.
He writes48 certain
:
when
the say: theologians have doubted this, maintaining that it is not decapitation that causes death, nor eating satiation, nor fire, burning, but that it is God, the Exalted, who causes burning, death and satiation at the occurrence of their concomitant events, not through them. answer: have already directed attention to the depths and true nature of this problem in the book, The Incoherence of the Philosophers. It is sufficient here to say that when the theologian informs the questioner that his son been decapitated, the no rational man doubts this. theologian does not doubt his death The theologian admits the fact of death, but inquires about the manner of connection between decapitation and death. As for the inquiry as to whether this is a necessary consequence of the thing itself, impossible to change, or whether this in accordance with the passage of the custom (sunna) of God, the Exalter, due to the fulfillment of His will that can undergo neither substitution nor change, this is an inquiry into the mode of connection, not in the connection itself.
We
this
We
"has
If
God
we read Ghazali
aright,
nature proceeds in a uniform manner.
decrees the creation of regularly associated events
we
habitually
regard as causes and effects. But they are not true causes and effects, only concomitants. They have, however, an order in their relation to
each other that parallels that of the Avicennan essential efficient causes and their effects. Thus the habitual cause coexists with the habitual effect,
its
priority to
it
48 Al-Ghazall,
Mfyar afllm,
being ontological, not temporal. In extramental
ed. S.
Dunya
(Cairo, 1961), 190-91.
Marmura
102
reality the
order of the habitual cause and the habitual effect
irreversible, but
mind
the
in
their inferential relation
is
is
normally
reciprocal. This
on any necessary connection between them, but on a uniform pattern decreed arbitrarily by God. This order can thus be disrupted. God in His goodness, however, disrupts it only on the relation
inferential
when
rare occasion
God
Tah afut^
not based
is
a miracle
creates
when
in
us
As Ghazali
needed.
is
the
assurance
that
the
tells
it
in his
uniformity
will
miracle takes place, he refrains from creating in us knowledge of the uniformity, creating knowledge of the miracle instead. Under normal circumstances, however, we have the assurance from God
continue:
order of the world
the
that
scientific
On
continue.
will
we can have
basis
this
demonstrations about the natural order.
To be significant
and
a
sure, there are difficulties in this epistemology.
our purpose here
for
is
one of Islam
that
s
But what
is
most important
theologians did not discard demonstration, but sought to his religious metaphysics. Not that all Islamic religious
influential
adapt
to
it
thinkers looked kindly on demonstration.
A
Islamic lawyer Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), for
what
case in point
whom the
is
the
renowned
the object of knowledge
in its singularity. being is concerned with the Aristotelian which for the Demonstration, purists universal, cannot arrive at such knowledge. It thus does not arrive at the
is
exists
extramentally,
existence of the unique, one deity,
universal
a
therein."
He
writes
"whose
this
God, but only conception
docs
singular
at
the universal concept of
not
disallow
partnership
50 :
Universal, general propositions do not exist externally as universal and general. They are only universal in [our] minds, not in concrete existence. Regarding external existents, these are specific proper to it, differentiating it things, each existent having a
from what
As
is
such,
other, it
is
reality [the reality] with it. arrive at the particularity
no other sharing impossible
to
of
a
specific existent through the syllogism. [The logicians] acknowledge this, stating that the syllogism does not indicate a specific thing. They may express this by saying that it does not indicate a that particular, but only the universal, intending by the particular
whose conception prevents the occurrence of partnership in it. [Now] every existent has a reality proper to it whose conception prevents the occurrence of partnership in it. Hence the syllogism does not bestow knowledge of a specific existing thing. Every existent
is
a specific existent. [The syllogism] thus does not bestow realities of existing things, but only of universal,
knowledge of the 49 50
Tahafut, 286.
Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd
c
ala al-Mantiqiyyin, ed. S.
Nadawi (Bombay,
1949), 344.
Tfie Posterior Analytics in the
absolute
supposed
things,
in
the
Arabic Middle Ages
mind,
not
103
reali/ed
in
specific
existence.
We
have
mention
ticians
of this and other things at greater length was shown that none of the things the theore regarding the syllogistic arguments they term proving the existence of the Creator, may He be
spoken
elsewhere, where
demonstration for
it
praised and exalted, indicate anything about His specific existence, but only an absolute universal thing, whose conception does not disallow partnership therein.
The concluding remark with
God
is
Islam
s
a barbed insinuation, since associating a partner
is
cardinal sin.
All things considered, however, in Posterior Analytics,
Arabic ideas,
thought.
widening
Ghazali,
"the
fared
Its its
very
sponsors,
the
epistemological
proof of
Islam,"
within a non-Aristotelian view of
University of Toronto
well.
It
its
Islamic range,
sought
God and
medieval Islamic journey, the
exerted
to
enormous influence on
philosophers,
while
render
the world.
a
developed
leading its
its
theologian,
canons operative
L.M.
DE
RIJK
The Posterior Analytics
1.
It
in the Latin
West
Preliminary: Aristotle on True Knowledge
common knowledge
is
that Aristotle
had the conviction
that
all
reality
was to be found within our world of sensible experience and that Plato
s
assumption of another, Transcendent World of Perfect Being was merely empty talk and poetic mataphor (Metaph. A9, 991a20). Indeed, Aristotle took Plato s Forms to be quite useless for explaining the possibility of true knowledge about our world. However, like his master, Plato, Aristotle
stuck
the
to
Parmenidean
formal
unchanging
ff.
true
Aristotle,
immanent
To be
sure,
being.
all
As
the
existence
real
well-known,
is
immanent dynamic natures
knowledge
in things (see e.g.
ct alibi).
of
principles
principles are in things as their
For
about
conviction
concerns
his
of
formal
(eide).
the
essential
natures
Metaph., 991al2-3; 999a24-9; 1018b36; 1032M being is individual being and so Aristotle is
compelled to answer the quite intriguing question: if the proper object of true knowledge is universal nature and everything real is a particular, how, then, are we able to gain genuine knowledge about the things in their
own
right?
In
by
truly
understands
his
Posterior Analytics
knowing
Aristotle
things.
claims
Aristotle
Well, that
quite
explains
what he
in
with
line
his
scientific
knowledge is philosophical stand, concerned with discerning a universal nature as immanent in a particular. In 12, 72a25-7 e.g., it is explicitly said that the elements of the deduction are such and such in concreto in
fact
concerns
(cf.
all
73a29-31). For Aristotle, demonstration
some phenomenal
state
of
affairs
of
which
the
investigation aims to clarify the essential structures.
Let us
start,
now, with a sketch of the basic tenets of
proof according to Aristotle and
list
the key terms involved.
scientific
West
TJic Posterior Analytics in the Latin
2. Tlie
Nature of Scientific Attribution (Predication)
For there to be attributes are (14,
(1) i.e.
73a26
The
a
demonstration
true to
assigned
member
of the subject
hauto or per
should belong kath
it
universally
which
,
i.e.
holou,
S
entire nature:
s
is
P
Nota bene. This kath holou
se,
which
would
P in
to S in virtue of the nature
be said of the subject S
in virtue of the entire nature of
as katholou
commonly read
is
highly confusing. Rather
is
is
be said of the subject
i.e.
it
in virtue of .
and rendered
should be printed kath
commensurately applying The proper Latin trans de toto = de tola intentione or ratione, but all
holou and rendered lation
in
P
of S or in virtue of the nature of
the latter
Every S
s class:
P belongs
virtue of a thing s proper nature:
(3)
way
attribute should belong to the subject kata pantos (universaliter),
should belong kath
it
the
(apodeixis)
subjects has to meet special conditions.
their
ff.)
hold good for each
(2)
105
be:
.
noun
translations have quite unfortunately, the substantive
universale.
In fact, these requirements are cumulative such that the third one
kath
holou
comprises the
The
first
two and adds to them the notion of hei
holou requirement is intended to prevent the ). ( demonstrator from picking out an attribute which is per se but does not belong to the subject in virtue of the whole of its essential formal as such
auto
constituents. E.g.
kath
when seeking
the appropriate subject for the attribute
the kath holou requirement having angles equal to two right angles as the isosceles the triangle proper subject because that reject property is not related to its complete nature, but only to part of it, viz. ,
makes you its
being a triangle. In other words, the kath holou requirement does not the demonstrator to use the sentence: Every isosceles has its
allow
equal
angles
although
These
sciences.
See
Parisiis
illustrati,
holou.
See
metodo edition).
the
e.g.
-
I
Nuchelmans.
scientific
premiss,
play
an
they
important as
lex
role
veritatis,
in
lex
the
Ramistic
justitiae
and
philosophy lex
of
sapientiae
constitutive and discriminative of the diverse arts and Rami, Dialecticae libri duo, Audomari Talaci praelectionihus pp. 224-38. It is noteworthy that this edition prints kath
1566,
Vasoli, cultura del
La
XV
owe
an appropriate
as
criteria
Petri
Cesare
nella
ones
1
when
on
later
into
developed
right
also
requirements
and
science,
two
to
\sper se true.
it
this
e
dialettica
XVI
e
secolo,
la
retorica
dell
Umanesimo. Invenzione
e
Milan 1968, pp. 554 and 584 (for the 1592
information to the kindness of
my
colleague,
Professor Gabriel
De
106
Rijk
The question may arise, now, by what kind enquiry should commence. Aristotle lists four: the quid},
(propter
whether
the
(si
an
or
est
est)
of questions scientific that
(quid}, the
and
what
why It
(quid).
should be noted that quia and propter quid ask about some state of affairs (pragma) whereas the other two concern the subject involved in
A
that state of affairs.
crucial role
middle
middle term but rather
are quite right in speaking of
The
,
medium
played by the meson, which
sets out to analyze
the
appropriate
clouds into
is
causes
supposition
quenching of
So
the
E.g.
caused
thunder
>
.
thunder
that
fire in
is
presented Next, the
and attribute by
pragma
is
noise
The
now be
is
caused by the
clouds
them.
Aristotle views scientific enquiry as a
expresses
in this case
knowledge
the
in
,
and quenching of
fire
movement from
idea provided by sense-perception and experience to a of what
upon
thcre-being-a-quenching-of-fire
pre-existent
a
hitting
somc-noise-occurring-in-the-
quenching of
by>
The
described as
phenomenon (pragma).
medium
analy/ed, through the
the noise
fire is
the
is
meson.
not
is
into subject
it
may now be
sensation which, in turn,
to the intellect as an as yet unanalyzed intellect
is
The Medicvals
(not, terminus mediusl).
process of acquiring knowledge
initial
The senses produce some
follows:
is
or intermediate pragma.
some kind
of thing or type of event
is,
as
full
a rough
understanding
John Ackrill 2
aptly
it.
following
rules
of
thumb concerning
the
four
questions
may
described as follows: hoti esti (quia) introduces some state of affairs (pragma); even it should read: in the case of a simple term used, e.g. animal ,
some-x-being-an-f ei
esti
being
(si
in
existence
est) introduces some subject somehow qualified or a certain state; the formula does not ask for the of some unqualified hypokeimenon, as the latter is
already presented by sense-perception (quid est) asks for the correct categorization of the (subjectum) of the phenomenon; this question mainly concerns the subject s formal identification
ti
esti
hypokeimenon dioti
(propter quid) involved.
2
Aristotle, the Philosopher,
asks
Oxford 1981, 102
for
f.
the
why of the
state
of affairs
Definition
an important role
plays
in
this
107
West
TJic Posterior Analytics in the Latin
process.
(See
118,
e.g.
110, 93b29-94a7). Aristotle distinguishes four types of
93al6-33; 93M5-8; definition:
taken as a non-causal essential proper subject of the state of affairs involved
(1)
definition
(2)
definition taken state of affairs
causal
a
as
of the
categorization
(and essential)
the
of
categorization
definition as performed by the conclusion of the apodcictic syllogism which reveals the essential nature of the proper subject involved in the state of affairs under discussion
(3)
qua definition of the immediates (amesa) which indemonstrable assumption of their essential nature.
is
definition
(4)
In 1113 Aristotle offers
some
the
recipes for discovering useful defini
tions and what is called the hunting for essential attributes (96a22-3). This part of the scientific process amounts to correctly connecting the attribute and definiens. specific terms just mentioned, i.e. subject,
The and,
(and indeed the precise nature) of
role
speaking,
generally
Aristotle
s
essential
(118,
also
categorization
from
appear
discussion of the relationship between the quid est and 3
items
essential attribution
93a20-2S;
possible to seek x
93b34-5).
10,
Why
precede enquiry into
such a thing as (x)
must knowledge what
(x)
there
that
Would
it
is
not be
knowing whether or not
nature, quite apart from our
s
is?
est
si
x exists?
In
order
answer
to
this
question
empirical framework of what Aristotle Aristotle intends to
occurring
in
achieve, then,
thus grasp
its
the is
do
daily
is
world,
to define a
its
means by
scientific enquiry.
to seek the essential nature (cf.
above,
p.
However,
hypokeimenoti)
is
Aristotle
we should know
that
the demonstrator should be aware of what
subject
first
thing
categorizing
it
to
and
claim that the state
familiar to us does not imply
that
this
s
What
of particulars as
The
104)
phenomenon by properly
essential nature.
of affairs (including
one should be aware of the
as qualified such-and-such but I
rather
have called above
(p.
106) an as yet unanalyzed phenomenon. What he has to investigate, then, is whether the essential categorization he has in mind really obtains. In
my is
3
opinion that not
sufficient
is
to
what Aristotle means when remarking that it be familiar with some thing under a non-essential
precisely
Cf.Ackrillop.d/., 101-2.
DC
108 4
Rijk
For example, supposing there
categorization.
One may come up
some god
with
is
some
noise in the clouds.
order to explain
in
this
phenomenon
Zeus). However, a rational explanation requires the true definition or Moreover true categorization of the cause, namely quenching of fire (e.g.
.
essential categorization
of nominal definition;
pragma
it
is
at the level
still
should also reveal the why (propter quid) of the
it
involved (93b38-94a7).
now
Let us of
not sufficient as long as
is
necessity
scientific
Aristotle
.
knowledge
should
reader
of
cannot possibly be otherwise than
it
(16):
is
it
and
based on necessary premisses. However, what understand by necessity ? Well, it must strike the
we
Posterior
is
that
Analytics
and
first
foremost
demonstration and
the
for
property required
items. First Aristotle s notion
quite explicit about the nature of the object of
is
therefore demonstration exactly
some important
pick up
its
premisses,
things they are about. In other words, demonstration
is
necessity
a
of the
not
about necessary
is
connections between subjects and attributes. So Aristotle speaks of the principle that "demonstration implies necessity, that is: if something has
been proved, se
is
cannot be
it
not sufficient;
we
otherwise"
know
shall
it
as
74M3-5). Something
(16,
s
being per
aperse connection.
proved is not a thing but a state of affairs, as attribute (see signified by a necessary connection between subject and s that Aristotle even 75a28 being per se is something argues ff.). esp. 16,
what
Well,
is
not a sufficient explanation; se
between
connection
lexicon
(Book
D
we
rather have to
know
its
In
constituents.
essential
its
being as a per
his
philosophical
of Metaphysics, cap. 5) Aristotle confirms this once
more
(1015b6-9). In
Anal. Post.
18
author
the
claims
demonstration must be eternal and demonstration of knowledge the next lines
not the thing
itself
Besides, as
Men
in
must
hypothetical,
is
it
i.e.
it
conclusion
the
there
accordingly,
sense of what that
(or premiss)
is
is
of
a
can be no
corruptible. In
called corruptible,
about.
Physics
be
Democritus view
See
a proposition
it is
that,
in the strict
that
119
made
Aristotle
of
flesh,
clearly
blood
argues that etc.,
depends on whether they
that the expression
1110, 93529-37. H.g. calling
the
exist
means men of
thunder noise or Callias a white
in
expressions
necessity at
flesh
all.
He
is
only
rejects
and blood must
.
772t Posterior
be\
And
in
D5
Metaphysics
109
Analytics in the Latin West
just
mentioned the author concludes
his
discussion of necessary as follows (1015b9-15): things owe their necessity to something other than others do not, but are themselves the source of in the primary necessity in other things. Therefore the necessary and strict sense is the simple (to haplouri); for this does not admit of more states than one. ... If then, there are any things that are eternal and unmovable, nothing compulsory or against their nature attaches to them. (Oxford translation}
Now, some themselves;
To my mind,
Aristotle
Posterior Analytics
in
is
interested
not
in
the eternity of things but rather in the perpetuity of the truth of certain propositions (premisses and conclusions). For that reason, the quite 5
among modern
controversy
interesting
adherence to the
interpreters
conception of necessity
statistic
about
may be
Aristotle
left
s
aside for
moment.
the
I
conclude
shall
Analytics with
First Principles (or
Not 12
all
,
of Posterior Analytics to
of
stages
memory
cognition on the
or
possible
first
to
our
Well,
the
thanks
principles.
discussed at length in the famous final chapter
is
(II 19).
in
principles as proceeding
made
is
immediates
with
found
that
demonstrative, Aristotle argues as early as in
is
demonstration
rather
latter type of cognition
similar
of the apprehension of the so-called
immediates amesa kai archai).
acquaintance
previous
discussion
knowledge
(72bl9-22);
survey of important issues taken from Posterior
this
short
a
In this chapter Aristotle describes in a
Metaph. Al
the
apprehension
the
of
way first
from sense-perception through the intermediate
and
experience
,
or
the
basis of repeated memories.
framing
Such a
of
a
transition
universal is
possible
because sense-perception already has an element of universality in it (e.g. we perceive Callias as a man ). Starting from such rough universals
we
arrive
at
unanalyzables
higher ,
ones
and
finally
come
to
the
highest
ones,
the
or highest categories. This passage from particulars to the
inhering in them is called induction (epagoge). Incidentally, kind of induction should be well distinguished, I think, from the kind
universal this
See
esp.
Jaakko
Hintikka,
Time and
Necessity.
Studies
in
Aristotle s
Theory of
Oxford, etc. 1973 and Jeroen van Rijen, Aristotle s Logic of Necessity (diss. Leyden), Alblasserdam 1986 (forthcoming in Reidel s Series: Synthcsc Historical Library: Aspects of Aristotle s Modal Logic) esp. chs 8 and 9. Modality,
De
110
Rijk
of induction as found elsewhere in our treatise
(e.g.
72b9; 78a34; 81a38-
6
b9).
Aristotle
process
s
and
of induction
description
role
its
the
in
remarkably well with what he has earlier
in
fits
scientific
remarked about
the process of proper categorization. Referring to the well-known battle
how
-
simile
undifferentiated
the
comes
a general retreat
stand, and then another <
mind
universal in the
etc.
to an
-,
percepts
makes a
>
until the highest
...
end
one man makes a
after
the author argues that
there
stand,
genera
"as
soon as one of a
is
primitive
been reached
>"
(1119, 100al4-b4).
The
or
faculty,
familiar with the
scientific
principles
us
we become
or intellective apprehension.
principles (such as axioms etc.), in the
all
states
of
concludes (100bl6-17). the
in
now,
try,
Nous
knowledge covers the whole domain of
affairs (pragrnatd), Aristotle
Let
the
is
by which
attitude,
cognitive
Nous precedes
Well, just as the
same way
rather
first
next
Medievals
discover the
to
sections,
doctrinal reception of the Posterior Analytics by discussing their views of
some themes useful,
to
characteristic of Aristotle
that
end,
requirements for and,
necessity,
to
out
single
the
method.
scientific
following
items:
would be
It
Medievals
the
well-known four questions, their views of the three
of the
discussion
s
hunting essential attributes the
finally,
,
their
(different)
views of
Medieval conceptions of induction and our
knowledge of the First Principles.
3.
Hie Four Basic Questions Involved
One
in
Apodeixis
should clearly notice, at the outset, that the Medievals were in no preoccupied with epistemological problems. They did not ask
way
themselves whether
knowledge as such
rather started from
the firm conviction that knowing things
What
they were interested Plato
esp.
and
Aristotle,
knowledge about
things,
On
the
this
Analytics.
Cf.
footing
Fritz,
was
and
to
really
time,
question
determine the
at
all.
is
They
possible.
how
to
latter s in
arrive
at
true
nature or status.
Aristotle
s
Posterior
they were fully aware of our capacity of
Die Epagoge bei Aristoteles
der antiken Wissenschaft, Berlin-New
possible
the footsteps of the Ancient thinkers,
the
Medievals were interested
At the same
Kurt von
in
in,
is
York
in
Grundprobleme der Geschichte
1971, 623-76, esp. 655.
West
TJic Posterior Analytics in the Latin
1 1 1
knowing a great many of truths not attainable by scientific demon truths but also stration, among which not only all kinds of theological direct
about
experiences
our
sublunar
world.
They were particularly work intends
the Posterior Analytics precisely because this
interested
in
to afford
a rational foundation of strict knowledge and place
framework of human cognitive processes
the
in general.
within
it
7
To turn now to the specific items announced, quite naturally, every Medieval commentator extensively discusses the four questions that are so in their terminology: quia, propter indispensable for any scientific proof; si est, quid est. As we have seen before, the first two concern a
quid,
pragma or
of affairs
state
other pair are about the
the
,
appropriate
subject as involved in the state of affairs.
Robert Grosseteste (not
3.1.
me
Allow
after
1168
-
to start with a pertinent
1253)
Me
quotation from
Evoy s
excellent
8
study of the philosophy of Robert Grossesteste [1982:320]: While the modern preoccupation with epistemological problems should not be read back into the Schoolmen, there is a deal of interest to be found in inquiring how a theologian of the thirteenth reacted century, writing out of the background of Augustinian ideas, to the theory of knowledge created by Aristotle in his struggle to free himself from Platonism.
As that
a matter of
tension
Aristotelian really see
fact,
Me
Grosseteste
in
He
thought.
any harm
our transient world
is
right
in
Augustinian
concerned.
You might
think,
interested in logical matters.
towards Aristotle
West
s
with
However, Grosseteste
now,
way of thought but succeeded an
extensive
commentary,
is
and
(neo-Platonic)
in assenting to Aristotle s scientific is
to elucidate
arguing that Grosseteste
of the kind so generously given by people
global,
Latin
Evoy mainly confines himself between
method
did
not
as far as
that his assent
who
is
are not really
not only quite open
well in providing the
which
goes
into
many
For the reception of the Posterior Analytics in the Middle Ages, see also Eileen in The Cambridge History of Latin Medieval Philosophy (eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, associate editor Eleanore Stump), Cambridge
Serene, etc.
8
1982, 496-517.
James
Rossi
Me
edition
the Evoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, Oxford 1982. I used (Robertus Grosseteste, Commentarius in Posterionim Analyticorum libros.
Introduzione e testo critico
di Pietro Possi.
Firenze 1981).
112
DeRijk
interesting details,
profitable for
and more importantly, (I too. For
modern commentators
must say
really
that matter,
this)
a
many
quite
modern
interpreter could have saved himself the trouble of asking and answering
questions (rather unsuccessfully, at times) that had been solved with
due understanding as early as Grosseteste
is
quite
in the thirteenth century.
in
explicit
pairs of questions and points out that
what
about
he
the
calls
concern the complcxio
rei.
essentia
essential
the
distinguishing
two
different
(or: est) and quid est ask whereas quid and propter quid
an
si est
rei
However, unlike
questions concerning the subject: (a)
all
9
is
it
Aristotle,
really
he
given and
starts with the
what
(b)
is
its
next, the questions concerning the state of affairs in
nature?;
which the subject
involved
is
(
complexio
rei
),
come up
for
discussion
(290, 64-70 ed. Rossi). Robert is fully aware of the fact that for there to be a real apodeixis the occurrence of a complexio rei or state of affairs
must be our startingpoint rather than the question whether
this
or that
subject as such does exist.
What
is
under consideration
moon as such but an eclipse. And so, some
as
explains
rightly
the
four
the outset
at
is,
not, for example, the
their being involved in
sun or the
lines further in
questions
some condition such
on (292, 100-10), Robert quite the
correct
order,
and,
more
importantly, he describes the complexio rei as a product of sensation; he adds the gloss per sensum to Aristotle s lemma: Ut scicntes (III, 89b29).
Further, Grosseteste nicely explains the role of the for the correct
hunting
111
attribute (292,
Unlike
ff.).
medium and our many a modern
commentator he understood the true sense of medium very well, in not thinking of some terminus medius but precisely that causal or explicative state
of affairs responsible for what
we
are up to prove (see esp. 294,
145-6). Accordingly, Grosseteste formulates four theses (Conclusiones IIV) about the role of the medium, the fifth one explicitly stating quod
Thus Robert Barnes
finds
(Aristotle s
no
in
difficulty
Posterior Analytics,
the
phrase in with
translated
numerum notes,
ponentes, (89b25) where Oxford 1975) speaks of a
bizarre phrase (apparently ignoring that the Greek arithmos as the Latin nutnerns always stand for a plurality of things (terms), our number one being not a number to Ancient and Medieval mind, but the principium numerandi. For Robert s correct ,
interpretation of this phrase, sec 290,77-291,93.
Thus
the
including that (
S
est
P
).
phrase complcxio of the form: Sol
Incidentally,
important issue (Cf.
all
does
rei
not
only refer to any enuntiatio whatsoever
more precisely, to a three piece proposition iMedicval commentators had the right understanding of this est
Thomas Aquinas,
but,
407-11).
West
Tfie Posterior Analytics in the Latin
omnia que quenuitur sunt questiones medii
(
113
= Aristotle, Anal.Post.
112,
90a35).
3.2.
Tliomas Aquinas (1225- 74)
Thomas Aquinas, (who
doubt about that?)
could
gives
a
quite
clear
exposition about the four questions. He starts with clarifying the purport of Book II, taken as a whole (nr. 407 ed. Spiazzi). Next he deals with the
He
four questions (408-13).
409) and
is
quite explicit
some
questions ask about Next, St
Thomas
them
discusses
about the
clearly
medium
indeed,
order (see esp.
quid and propter quid
state of affairs.
shows that
quia est question ask whether there the
in the correct
fact that the
the
is
is
and the
si est
an appropriate medium, the
of
ratio
both the
in fact
of
state
affairs
since,
under
consideration.
The
words of the passage
final
but their meaning
given in the editions. the original question the
in
phenomenon
What Aquinas is concerning some light
of the
hunting for the appropriate
order to arrive
clouds fire,
some
as just
we
will
phenomenon
will
is
incorrect
sensation did not as yet put the
medium 11 and
precisely the
first
explanation of the
remember:
as long as
noise, rather than
never succeed in arriving
punctuation
quite right in pointing out, is that
appropriate
medium
the scientific
at
You
consideration.
(412, see our note 11) are important
somewhat confused by the
is
we
take
that
thing to
our
do
in
phenomenon under some noise in the
something caused by quenching of at the scientific
explanation of the
of thunder.
Thus the
role
pivotal
medium and our hunting
of the
for
it
is
explained by Aquinas. At the same
time, our author understands nicely remarkably well the semantic aspect of the procedure (which we have correct categorization ), where he remarks (415) labelled before: the that
Aristotle
above,
hoc
to
claim
that
the
108) of the attribute (passio)
So you should read: id quod (vel an simpliciter, ut infra
translate:
the
p.
seems
"that
predicative although not
which
is
the
est
medium.
definiens;
see
In this connection
est ratio eius de quo quacritur an hoc sit non tamen quaeritur sub ratione medii, and
is
the proper element
(
ratio
)
of that about which
(or else the simple one as will be said below) is asked, under the proper aspect ( ratio ) of the medium". (I have used the
question
the
(read:
medium
dicetur),
medium
is
definition
Leonina edition as printed by R.M. Spiazzi, Marietti).
De
114
Thomas
Rijk
points out that the definition of say whiteness in fact concerns
album or
a white subject. Thus,
Aquinas too
is
aware of the
becomes absolutely
it
somehow
always the particular as
clear,
again, that
the object of scientific proof
that
fact
qualified,
rather than
some
is
essential
nature taken as such.
William of Ockham
3.3.
A
To my
preliminary remark.
deals with
the
1285- 1347)
(c.
scientific
understanding, Aristotle
procedure
of apodeixis
in
s
Posterior Analytics
general
rather than
apodeictic syllogism in particular, the latter being merely the vehicle for scientific
proof.
For
that
to a set of propositions ordered in the
a
into
a
framing
correctly scientia
demonstratio
so-called
Aristotle
s
when reducing (most) appropriate way reason,
Ockham
potissima,
tends
This leads the Venerable Inceptor to deal with Aristotle scientific
Master
to
reduce
theory of scientific proof to a theory of apodeictic syllogism.
proof
a
in 12
somewhat
different
perspective
and
s
doctrine of
from that of the
interesting study of Father Ockham s theory of demonstration Webering fell victim, I am afraid, to similar optical errors as did indeed Gordon Leff as well (op.
himself.
13
300
cit.,
is
this
pioneering
Ockham
Nevertheless,
ff.).
Analytics
In
quite
important,
not
s
still
exposition
of
the
Posterior
only as a personal interpretation but
also as an elucidating
commentary. now to the famous four questions, unlike Aristotle, Ockham Turning does not see them as four elementary stages in any scientific procedure.
To he honest, the confusion is not quite alien to other Mcdicvals either. So the well-known three qualities which are characteristic of a per se proposition (viz. per se nota, self-evident and easily rccogni/.ed) are, in fact, for Aristotle not specific qualities of
the
per
se
but
proposition
rather
of
the
principles
of
scientific
knowledge,
as
argues (I). Webering, Theory of Demonstration according to William 1953 Institute St. Bonaventure, (Franciscan N.Y./Ixnivain/Padcrborn, Publications, Philosophy Series, 10), p. 42). On the other hand, like the Schoolmen Webering failed to recogni/.e that Aristotle discusses the terms of demonstrative proof,
Webering Ockham,
rather
rightly
than
of demonstrative
the propositions
syllogism,
so
that
Webering
s
opposing
rather unfortunate, in that it entirely obscures the main issue of the correct categori/.ation; for the latter, see above, p. 107 ff. the
two (21-31 and 32-57)
Gordon
I^ff,
Manchester 1975.
William
is
of
Ockham,
The
Metamorphosis
of Scholastic
Discourse,
Tiie Posterior Analytics in the Latin
Rather he considers tl-em as four different questions,
which lead to two different types of demonstration, posteriori
to the extent in fact that
demonstration,
115
West 14
the two pairs of
a priori and a uses a
viz.
Ockham even
and propter quid demonstration as equivalent expressions as well as a posteriori and quia demonstration. It is most significant, then, that
priori
Webering
felt
carefully,
this
is
interesting
compelled to remark [1953:11] that when we study identification
note
to
Thomas Aquinas has
In
justified."
TJieological
Summa
identification, but
Aquinas
his
in
same
the
not entirely
"is
that
this (I,
Ockham
respect
912
art.
it
2)
certainly did not
reduce the two pairs of questions to types of demonstration; and quite right
he was.
Another still
est
question
being,
quite
an
important
treatment of the questions
divergence
between Ockham
Aristotle s
thing
is
s si
real
and Aristotle
Indeed, with Aristotle the question merely concerns
of this
applicability
s
Once Ockham has made demonstrability of some
of the
question
in.
Ockham
to consider.
the
unavoidably comes the
of
characteristic
more worthwhile
or
that
categorization
to
the
subject
of the
pragma under consideration, whereas its real existence is quite out of the question (see above, p. 107). But to somebody who, as Ockham does,
makes the
si
real being,
the latter
More
est
importantly,
question concern the demonstrability of the subject s s actual existence is not a matter of fact as yet. it
is
as such
no guarantee
knowledge, since the actual existence of
all
for universal
and necessary
beings, except that of
God,
is
For that reason, Ockham is bound to give the contingent and si est question a wider range; indeed it covers, not only actual existence 15 but also the possibility of existence. By doing so, he reveals a concern individual.
quite different from what Aristotle
had
in
mind when
devising the
si est
question.
See
Webering
(op.cit.,
80-172)
who
Summa est
however, by Aristotle.
failed,
issues involved in the four questions put forward
logicae III-2, cap. 25, 550, 7-10: Est
terminatur per
hoc quod
evidenter
to
see
the
quite
different
autem primo sciendum quod quaestio si quod res est. Quod fit si sciatur
cognoscitur
propositio in qua esse existere per propositionem de inesse vel de possibili praedicatur de subiecto. See Webering, op.cit., 28-31 and 88-106; Leff, op.cit., 257.
De
116
4. Ttie Tiiree
In
Requirements for
Rijk
Scientific Predication
Aristotle s
requirements for understandably, taken by the
fact,
quite
essential
hunting
Medicvals
as
attributes
rules
for
Of
predication as accomplished in framing adequate premisses.
most interesting question here
whether the Medievals did
is
modern commentators, were not
translations
course, the
in fact
have
holou requirement (unlike quite a
the right understanding of the kath
of
were,
scientific
lot
for that matter). Admittedly, the different Latin
favour of the correct interpretation. James of
in
Anonymous named Johannes, Gerard of Cremona and William Moerbeke as well all render katholou (14, 73b25 ff.) by using the
Venice, the of
substantive
noun
A
univcrsale.
disadvantage was to affect their
similar
whole
passage anyway. However, as usual the understanding Medievals affinity with Ancient doctrine made them overcome many a of
difficulty
4.1.
the
and pick up other unequivocal hints from the
Tlwmas Aquinas
Robert Grosseteste and
Grosseteste gives three
fine
a
requirements.
exposition
of what
First,
(110,
35-116, 62 ed.
Aristotle
labels
requirement of universalitas tarn ex parte subiecti (110,
36).
et
subiecto primo.
Rossi)
kata pantos
of the or
the
ex parte temporis
quam
hauto and the kath
holou requirements are dicatur de subiecto per se et quod de quod predicatum
Then, the kath
described as
text.
An
excellent
interpretation,
first
and foremost,
in
that
Grosseteste rightly indicates that the three requirements merely concern
ways of attributing something to something. As to the per se requirement his Latin translation was bound to put him (as the other
three
Medievals) on the wrong track hyparchei
(at
73a35):
"per
Robert does not hesitate et dicitur
to
per se alterum dc
start
from the
from
his gloss (112, 79):
in
sunt".
"est
altero"
point.
He
liberty
of translating into de toto
apparently
105);
is
wise enough to
i.e.
the
quite clear
is
ergo Per se autem sunt, supple: altera de explanation of kath holou is quite to the
vel
p.
and he
"Dicit
Robert
alteris
above
(111, 51-2),
logical rather than the ontological sense as
dicuntur."
hauta d hosa
rendering the phrase kath
autem sunt quaecumque However, autem per se alterum de altero phrase:
se
s
this
interprets
special
requirement
(-de
attribute
tola is
as
what
intentione
appropriate
I
took
the
or ratione\ see to
the subject
s
TJic Posterior Analytics in the Latin
West
111
16 Of course, Robert avoids the whole intension, not merely to part of it. universaliter and speaks of did de subiecto primo rendition katholou --
(after picking
our author
up the useful clue found
73b34 and elsewhere).
at
And
so
mark.
exactly hits the
Thomas Aquinas also clearly sees that the three requirements are cumulative and that the third one, the katholou requirement comprises the
He
other two.
straight-forwardly explains katholou
(universale) as primo which and an interpretation closely fits in with gives praedicari) (sc. 17 He warns his readers that universale Aristotle s sayings on this score.
here
used
not
is
well-known
the
in
sense.
Porphyrian
viewpoint of modal logic
it
is
claim
is
only implied in the kath
that the
necessity
(i.e.
not in the de is
modality
4.2.
omni requirement)
involved.
From
the
Aquinas clearly sees holou requirement
so that no extensional conception of
19
William of Ockham
In his
Summa
ments,
de
Medieval
Ockham
omni, per se
pp.
q.4,
own
s
est
est
in
aliquid
extensively discusses
and what he vera
primo
(III-2;
and
144,17-145,2
labels,
quite
the three require in
line
with
the
capp. 6-8; 514-21; cf. Ordinatio, 20 In order to trace 152,6-17).
views of scientific proof and his personal interpretation of
Posterior Analytics
Nichil
Ockham
logicae
tradition,
prologue,
nee
also noteworthy that
18
we have
triangulo hahitu
in
to pay special attention to his definition of
quod non sit causa respectu habitus trium angulorum etc., trium angulorum etc., quod sit non causatum respectu
trianguli. (115,148-116,150); cf. 115,141
ff.
PostAnal. 78: enim in demonstrationis aliquid Oportet propositionibus [= kata pantos] praedicari (quod significat dici de omni); et per se [kath hauto]; et etiam primo (quod significat universale). Haec autem tria se habent ex additione Primo vero dicitur aliquid praedicari de altero per adinvicem (...). comparationem ad ea quae sunt priora subiecto et continentia ipsum. Nam habere tres angulos etc. non praedicatur primo de isoscele, quia prius praedicatur de priori, scilicet de triangulo; cf. 91-96. In
universaliter
1
18
Ibid., 91.
19 Ibid.,
93:
Manifestum
est
quod
universalia
praedicata,
prout
hie
view
of
sumuntur,
ex
necessitate insunt rebus de quibus praedicantur.
20 (
treatment Webering s commensurately universal
(op.cit., )
is
interpretation of the phrase, and vera is not free of confusion either.
his
of
50-3)
vitiated
by
Aristotle s
discussion
kath
holou
common the following (wrong) (53-7) of Ockham s propositio primo
his
De
118
the propositio primo vera (S.L.
Rijk
cap. 8, 519, 5-7):
III-2,
"that
proposition
which the predicate does not belong (primo vera) 21 earlier than to its own subject to any other subject which is more than the former, or to a subject which is not predicable of its general is
primarily true
own to
in
In that case the predicate
subject".
22
this
subject
predicate
least
at
,
predication",
,
the
if
is
Ockham
it
called
is
subject
with regard
of
subject
mode
the second
in
predicable
first
that
of essential
elucidates (ibid. 7-10).
second
the
Well,
and
universale
called
is
of
part
the
contains
definition
an
additional
be primo vera which is not mentioned requirement by the other Medieval commentators (and not found in Aristotle either) a proposition to
for
in
not
is
Ockham
the
that
requiring
which
requirement
of
predicable
make
to
is
do not belong
attribute
own
its
addition
this
subject.
worthwhile
is
predicable
of
(calidum),
since
heat
On
10-20) is
thing
All heat
the
is
footing
extra
its
abstract.
its
which
(calefactivurri),
of
is
hot
something something can become hot his earlier remark (cap. 4, the proposition:
in
expressed
presupposes as
(prius) to
predicable
heat
first
is
same
principle
heat-giving is
Every hot
further principle the proposition
hcatgiving.
cannot
It
the
that
there
if
is
it
before
(calor)
only
through calefaction. 510,
earlier
example, the property of heat-giving
for
forces
The
examine.
to
subject
intended to prevent misattributing to a concrete particular
a passio which, properly speaking, belongs
Take
earlier to some The reason that
be
denied
concerning the kath
requirement
meant
is
that
Ockham
holou requirement. to
prevent
us
has
thus It
a
problem
special
should be recalled that this
from
wrongly
categorizing
the
appropriate subject of a demonstration. Well, take the proposition (the
example
is
Ockham
Omne
s):
calidum
est calefactivum
Every hot thing
Ockham
to
isosceles triangle
in
or quality
21
22
heat-giving
.
R
has to recogni/e, now, that just as the 2
two angles equal
people
is
calor
Ockham
,
180 the
before
it
)
belongs
same way
to
triangle
property (=
before
it
having
belongs to
heat-giving belongs to the property
belongs to the concrete hot thing. So of
should be the one to set a thing
s
all
forma apart and give
it
earlier (prius) refers to logical priority.
Thomas Aquinas, 78: Primo vero dicitur aliquid comparationem ad ea quae sunt priora et continentia ipsum. Cf.
praedicari
de
altero
per
West
Tlie Posterior Analytics in the Latin
priority
logical
the
to
concretum
Ockham
surprised, then, that
counterfactual condition, etc.
24
However, most
informs.
it
23
One need
not
nothing were heat-giving other than heat
if
Ockham seems
fortunately, as
of a problem since
Ockham
hot thing
Ockham,
let
It
.
is
not
is
ontology does admit of them. But what
s
The
then to do about forms such as paternitasl raised by
...
to suggest, there are
true that as far as qualities of the calor type are concerned, there
much
be
to
exposition of the problem starts from the
s
heat-giving does primarily belong to
hot things, so that
119
latter
not
is
problem
alone solved.
However, returning
to the
calidum example,
this
view
still
seems
to
contradict the kath holou requirement since the complete ambitus of the concept hot thing contains definitely something more than merely the
forma heat (e.g. the forma, iron ). The same problem is found
in
the
Ordinatio,
there things are explained in greater detail, whereby
view inevitably comes to the
between the proposition defining
which
first
is
subject
its
of
first
due to which
>
:
can
"I
<
call
still
subject
can
possess
it,
it
has
is
through the
itself
been ruled
possess the attribute
still
ruled first
first
>^
has been ruled out and (2) which
when
personal
s
sets out to define the relation
attribute
subject
involved
attribute
subject
q.4,
primarily true (primo vera). This relation
notion
the
and
subject
Ockham
fore.
subject
out".
that
subject.
a
to
other
to no other belong In other words: the first
when every
Ockham adds an
(1)
belong when any
26
(relation)
stated through
is
>
other subject that
while every other subject can possess
out,
but
prologue,
Ockham
example:
E.g.
it
may only
capable of
Of course, the forma calor is nothing else but the particular heat inhering in this or that particular hot thing and an individual thing itself as well as the hot thing. But all the same, remarkable it is, if you think of formae (like fatherhood; e.g. in Every father has a child ) which, unlike calor etc., are not distinct from the particulars involved.
24
For a related question, see Ordinatio,
Both Webering
prol. q.4.
and Leff (op.cit., 288) failed to cap. (op.cit., notice the modus irrealis (For that matter, Leff used a bad text). For another counterfactual startingpoint, see S.L. III-2, cap. 7, 517, 75-83. S.L.
8,
520,
23.
See the adverb adhuc used Leffs excluded
translation
with
in the
55)
following example (144,20); see below.
everything
else
excluded
and
nothing
awkward and quite ungrammatical
of
the
attribute
being a dative). The difficulty lies in the fact that nulli (dative) does not correspond with omni (which here is an ablative case, not a dative) but with cut; further circumscribere has the cf. nomine destrncto in the example sense of to take away, rule out or destroy given at 145,3; finally, the adhuc found twice in the example, is pivotal for a correct understanding of the passage. (p.
288)
is
rather
;
(nulli
De
120
Rijk
has the intellective soul as
learning
every other
<
subject
of learning and
the other
same
"the
whole through one of
its
is
nothing
hand>
And
the intellective soul has gone. the author argues:
subject because, even
first
its
has been ruled out, the soul
>
the examples
still
(adhuc} capable capable of learning when
may
easily
of
the
subject
be multiplied,
applies to other accidents that
belong to a
parts."
Again, the author cannot help upgrading a subject cost
when
is
in
itself,
of
spite
the
property at the
s
the
that
fact
latter
is
subsistent and the property merely something inherent. However, such a view does not seem to fit in well with Ockham s basic philosophical doctrine, which is founded upon the ontological primacy of
something
the individual. Well, unlike in the
counterfactual
in
suppositions;
tackling of the problem
notion
of
subject:
is
it
logicae (where he took refuge in
above),
somewhat more
is
either
Summa
see
used
to
the
realistic.
stand
for
Ockham
Ordinatio
He
s
distinguishes the 27
only
one thing of
which something can be predicatd or for everything of which something can be predicated. Ockham instances this by opposing the definition (rather
the
triangle, that
definiens) is
of
triangle
(
which
something
to say, the property of having 2
R
has
R
2
which has
the
subject
subject
while in the latter sense
the figure taken as a whole which
first
is
the property
to
)
to a figure
2 R. In the former sense of it
28
is
first
is
,
the
subject. easily seen, Ockham s doctrine of the primacy of individual being is bound to meet with some difficulties in Aristotle s holou (primo vera) requirement for there to be a truly scientific
As
is
subsistent
kath
predication.
5.
Some
All
Important Divergencies about Necessity
Schoolmen follow
the
characteristic
The termino of tantummodo
rather
of
Aristotle unanimously in affirming that necessity a
the edition
(which
is
scientific
is
proof.
not correct,
I
paleographically
It
is
scientific
is
predication
presume and should be read: tantum or (tm for tmm) quite easy te explain);
aliquo uno tantum is opposed to omni illo. The edition s reading (termino) forces the reader so supply omni illo at 145,20 which gives a clumsy sentence. 28 has 2 R should read has its interior angles equal to two right angles .
TJie Posterior Analytics in the Latin
West
121
accomplished according to the three requirements, dc omni, per se and primo vera, that warrants the premisses and conclusions being necessary. It should be noted at the outset that for the greater bulk of
Medieval commentators, the problem of necessity goes beyond the limits of logic since it has great impact on the ontological status of the objects knowledge. Thus
of true
unlike Aristotle,
these
Medievals paid much
attention to the question of whether the objects of demonstration have to
be
However,
incorruptible.
if
they
really
are,
what,
about
then,
the
contingency of this sublunar world?
5.1.
Robert Grosseteste
Some
remarks,
29
and TTiomas Aquinas
about the incorruptibility of the proper objects of before (p. 108) Aristotle speaks of the
first,
knowledge. As we have noted phtharta
propositions,
nature.
definitely
not
of
states
when
that
ff.)
affairs
are
that
things
So he argues (75b24
frame a
you
as
(corruptibilia)
by
signified
themselves
certain
corruptible
by
trying (in vain, of course) to
demonstration of corruptibilia (corruptible states of affairs, our minor premiss must be non-universal and recall),
strict
should
(where the author
corruptible
incorruptible at
follows,
clearly
not
of propositions,
truth
75b28-30). Well,
in
referring to things,
as
the universal and
esse
universalem
et
concerning incorruptible
anticipates
(140-1)
Forms
77a5
(at
ff.;
corruptibilem
,
making and eternal things. Thomas even
remark about the superfluity of Platonic Thomas, nr 166). By this move, Robert and
Aristotle
see
ad locum
Aristotle discuss
as well as Grosseteste take the liberty of
propositions
from what
appears
spite of the Latin translation
propositionem
running
correctly
Thomas
is
s
Thomas (and others) in fact changed the Ockham felt no qualms about being strictly
subject.
Small wonder that
faithful to Aristotle s sayings,
this time!
it
Turning now to the issue of by asking himself (17, 139, 96
can
be
scientific
knowledge
corruptible.
29
given
incorruptible,
As
a
are
matter
Sec the fine exposition on
this
ff.)
the
in
fact
account
how that
fact
found of
incorruptibility, Grosseteste deals with
in
the
particulars
the
Me
the objects of demonstration
principle
Evoy, 327-9.
universals
which
are
according
featuring
in
themselves to
which a
De
122
known
is
particular
obtained
through
form and
substantial
its
is
the
Rijk
of
definition
the
scientific
and
genera
However, a mind not capable of knowing a thing
know
nature
can
nature.
Grosseteste
only
accidents
the
somewhat
is
form
is
another
world
in the
it is
Thomas Aquinas
ff.).
even though matter
itself,
His guess is,
that a
is
or else that the
some
preserved by the fact that at
is
substantial
its
accompanying its true essential on account of the incorrupti
of these principles of knowledge (141, 145
permanence of a species
species
after
is
involved.
hesitant
bility
not corruptible in
knowledge
place or
instantiated.
stand
well-known on
is
this
see
score;
In
e.g.
f.; Knowing things amounts to setting apart their universal form by means of the most characteristic operation of the human mind, abstraction. Even though material things are corruptible and
Anal.Post.
not
140
I
intelligible,
166.
marks
characteristic
made
are
they
of
intelligible
material
their
by
away
taking
constitution.
Sensation
the
and
human mind to grasp the material things In principle Thomas doctrine of scientific
abstraction together enable the
such as they essentially are.
proof
is
truly Aristotelian:
scientific
knowledge
is
substantially a set of
conclusions syllogistically deduced from principles and for
and attribute-hunting
definition
5.2.
is
its
procedure
pivotal.
William of Ockham
To
incorruptibles 512,
Ockham
with,
begin
19-34)
hard to swallow.
closely joins
the
not
did
On
text
find
Aristotle
s
sayings
the contrary, he (S.L.
of Posterior Analytics
III-2,
about cap. 5,
and explains
it
should be recalled) as referring to propositions. However, (correctly, his own, quite specific contribution to the discussion cannot wait for it
long.
For
to
his
mind, even speaking of necessary propositions sounds
imprudent, as only God is a necessary Being. For that reason, although Ockham s view of scientia as a set of propositions is as such not in opposition with the Aristotelian view, his notion of necessary proposition basically differs from that of Aristotle. The latter thinks in terms of propositional
content
(pragma), but
Ockham acknowledges
this
content
actually framed by somebody. So a proposition proposition is necessary and eternal and incorruptible when it is always true and never false // it is framed (si formetiir, S.L. 512, 30-2). That is
only as
long as
a
is
The Posterior Analytics to say: the prepositional content
in the
necessarily the case...
is
framed no prepositional content However, what are the conditions for
a proposition
Ockham
being the case)? Being (God) or existential
order
).
actual
s
subject
x
if
animal
,
knows
in
that
its
always being true (always
should be about eternal
it
a
is
when no man
rational
cf.
because they do not presuppose is not is a rational animal
Man
E.g.
false
is
animal
,
exists,
or
but
man
alternatives
its
can be a rational
Ord. prol. q.4, 157,1-16).
how do we know
answers (quite
one
possibili ones,
513,51-514,2;
(ibid.,
Finally,
it
man, x
a
is
but without
etc.
exists.
claims that either
being.
necessarily true, since are:
123
framed quite independently from actual being ( the Those of the latter sort are the negative ones, the
hypothetical and the de their
Latin West
a
proposition
is
necessary?
Ockham
line
with the Medieval tradition, for that matter):
its
contradictory
opposite
involves
a
if
contradiction
(Ordinatio, prol. q.2). (Of course, unlike other Medieval thinkers such as
Aquinas, for Ockham, the absence of contradiction implies possibility only, but the latter suffices for there to be a necessary proposition de possibili).
Thus
Aquinas, does not attribute necessity to mind, the things contingent nature should never out of consideration and does not need to be considered either
be
left
unlike
Ockham,
universal forms.
To
his
for the sake of demonstration.
It
simply suffices to use a
way
of logical
framing which takes ontological contingency into account, e.g. when you which can instead of homo est animal si est homo, est animal say: ,
only refer to
6. Tlie
All
some man
actually being an animal.
Apprehension of the
First Principles. Induction.
knowledge is ultimately based on self-evident first which are required as the foundation of every true proposition.
deductive
principles,
Quite naturally, the Schoolmen too are really interested in the question of how we obtain such principles, above all, that called universale .
DC
124
6.1.
and Tliomas Aquinas
Robert Grosseteste
sensation, which
Through only
212,
(114,
195),
in
(265, 135
How we
ff.).
As
is
never a cause of knowledge but
we
some
apprehend
space and time.
determinately
by Grosseteste
Rijk
It
its
determinate
occasio
particular
cannot grasp, therefore, the universal
do obtain knowledge of the universal is explained famous exposition in II 19.
in closely following Aristotle s
human
with Aristotle, the
abstracts the universal from the
intellect
data provided by the external and internal senses. It
striking that Grosseteste,
is
and
induction
does
abstraction,
anamnesis. The
intellect
who
not
describes
own
its
the process both as
any Platonic
accept
certainly has
31
innatism
specific role but
but start from sensory experience, from which
it
or
cannot
abstracts or induces the
it
universale incomplexiun (see 214, 250-2).
Thomas Aquinas intellectual
basically adheres to the Aristotelian conception of
word
1119 he uses the
Anal. Post.
abstraction.
through
cognition
32
In
induction
his
commentary
to describe the process
on by
which universals are generated. 33
6.2.
William of Ockham
The main
characteristic of
principles
is
that
Ockham
he takes the
opinion about the apprehension of
s
latter
as
propositions
(S.L.
522,
22-8),
rather than incomplex universals as Aristotle and most Medievals do. For that matter,
notions
Ockham does know
through
senses
the
of the simple apprehension of contingent
which
at
is
the
basis
of
an
intellectual
in
See
Me
Evoy,op.cit., 340-5.
212, 207-11. Cum inductio sit ex singularibus, deficicnte aliquo sensu deficict acccpta a singularibus ... et deficicnte inductione accepta ab illis singularibus deficit apud intellectum cognitio universalis eorum singularium, quia ipsum universale non est acceptum nisi per inductionem. For this important passage, see Me Evoy, 32935. See also 116 (ad Anal. Post. 1119) 406, 67-9: universalia prima, composita sicut et 114,
inductio
simplicia,
ex
abstraction
is
32
inductione
found
See esp. S.Th.
ad
I
a
sensibilibus
facta
nobis
sunt
manifcsta.
The
notion
of
at 214, 246-50.
85, qq.
1
and 2 and Contra gentes
144;
II,
77; 82.
Quia igitur universalium cognitionem accipimus ex singularibus, 595, fin.: concludit manifestum esse quod necesse est prima universalia principia cognoscere per inductionem. Sic enim, scilicet per viam inductionis, sensus facit universale intus in anima, inquantum considcrantur omnia singularia.
T)ic Posterior Analytics in the Latin
but
cognition, initial
to
his
understanding
West
125
apprehension acts only as an
this
stage of the inductive acquisition of prepositional principles.
need not be
at all surprised to find Post-Anal.
by Ockham on
the
same
footing since
II
34
One
19 constantly explained
the Venerable Inceptor
is
only
interested in induction inasmuch as questions about demonstrability and
immediateness of propositions are under consideration, just as for him the medium demonstrations is always associated with the middle term of the premisses of a scientific syllogism.
7.
Conclusion
Generally speaking the Medievals proved to be well acquainted with the basic tenets of the Posterior Analytics. (but quite a decisive one,
from Aristotle to
give
a
s
I
am
To my mind,
afraid) all
one respect only Medieval commentators deviated
basic purpose. While Aristotle
scientific
procedure
to
clear
up
discerning essential structures in them, his the Medievals,
all
seem
first
in
and foremost intended
phenomenal data by commentators, and not only diffuse
to take demonstration, ultimately, as a scientific
proof of certain well-formed theses at hand which are put forward as candidates for the warrant of verification. On the other hand, the
Medieval
interpreters
of
Posterior
Analytics
were
certainly
right
in
more than merely a logical treatise about argumentation. Rather they took it as dealing with the kind of knowledge we may obtain about things which is of a higher rank than considering this treatise as something
mere opinion about them. It
is
because of
its
epistemological impact (or rather philosophical
impact, in Medieval terminology) that Posterior Analytics was differently interpreted and assessed by diverse commentators, as according to their
own
diverse
philosophical
and theological stands. Let us
finally
take a
general look at the different interpretations.
34
and ff.
S.L. Leff,
cap. 10, 523, 9-14; cf. cap. 4, 511, 42-7. See also Webering, 70-9; 161 282-3. For Ockham s doctrine about the First Principles, see Webering, 58
III-2,
De
126
7.1.
Robert Grosseteste
For
Grossesteste,
Aristotle
on
valid
unrestrictedly
incorruptible
the
which
nature
in
soul,
its
present
unchanging
ephemeral
underly
is
knowledge
human knowledge
of
However, the highest part of the human have
scientific
scientifically inquiring into the
is
of
principles
of
theory
level
when man
limited condition
s
Rijk
things.
would
the intelligentia,
any help from the
without
complete knowledge by were it not encumbered and darkened by our present status of man. Accordingly, when set free from this earthly body after this illumination,
senses, fallen life,
it
knowledge attainable in this beatific
vision.
universal
life,
Aristotle
Truly,
he
principles
Principles,
The
enjoy that very knowledge (see 114, 213, 22S-214, 238).
will
was
however,
was
God
the Eternal Ideas in
aware
not
are
after
just a stage
is
Mind.
s
of
created
the
Me
the
on our way fact
products
Evoy
is
that
of
to
the
other
quite right in
saying that Grossetcste had no doubt whatsoever about the validity of the Aristotelian
methodology
comprehensiveness
Tfiomas Aquinas
St
Thomas
such
Posterior Analytics
a
faithful
adherent
Revelation.
as
Master. At the same time, there
limits
necessitarism
no
time,
illusions
about
its
of
the
Aristotelian
view
of
.
Especially
in
commenting upon
the
he proves to be a thinker congenial with the Greek
rather vindicates his
see the
same
the
knowledge, even when discussing various other roads to
demonstrative
knowledge,
at
(op.cit., 345).
7.2.
was
but,
own
is
nothing slavish
in
rights as a Christian thinker
his behaviour.
and never
fails
He to
imposed on thought by what Gilson has labelled Greek In a way similar to Grosseleste Thomas knows how to give
the Aristotelian theory of knowledge
its
proper place within philosophical
and theological thought.
7.3.
William of Ockham
Unlike Robert and Thomas, to Aristotle.
More
Ockham
importantly, he
could not help being rather unfaithful is
fully
aware of what he
is
doing,
Vie Posterior Analytics which
from
appears
the
in the Latin
occasions
many
he
127
West
opposes
Christian
faith
(secundum fidem catholicani) or rational truth (secundum veritatem) Aristotle
s
On
sayings (e.g. S.L.
1
to
112, cap. 5, 512, 34ff.).
when adhering to the general framework of the Posterior Analytics Ockham affords many refinements to the Master s theory of demonstration. Whereas Aristotle never explicitly differentiates degrees of demonstration, Ockham does and, accordingly, makes an the one hand,
important distinction between self-evident principles which are indemon strable and indemonstrable principles whichs are not self-evident and, thereby, not necessary.
On rather
other
the
Leff
as
stration,
hand,
from
different
Ockham
Aristotle
observed
rightly
starts
from a notion of his
Furthermore,
s.
273),
(op.cit.,
theory
"is
necessity,
of
demon
governed by
the
known self-evidently and made Ockham also give
epistemological scope and limits of what can be
by
absolutely
intuitive
cognition",
and
this
experience priority to demonstration, not only as its precondition but also as a higher form of cognition. Both his Christian belief in the radical of
contingency individual
make
creatural
all
was
the
authority,
Philosopher
most
that
To
Aristotelis.
s
and
for important divergencies
was deeply convinced intentio
being
the
as
so
reliable
University of Leiden
ontology
from
of
Aristotle.
the
Still,
strictly
Ockham
he himself was always on the safe track of the
him,
but,
his
Aristotle often,
spokesman.
of Posterior Analytics
Ockham
took
himself
really
as
the
WLADYSLAW STROZEWSKI
Metaphysics as a Science
The
topic of this paper
may be understood
in
many
different ways, yet
two of them appear to be the most promising: 1. to investigate the topic from the point of view of modern conceptions of science, 2.
to
investigate
it
from the point of view of science
in
mediaeval
its
sense. In the
first
case
we would be
asking whether metaphysics meets
the scientific criteria considered valid today.
It
is
obvious that
all
we would
then have to begin by specifying whether under the notion of "scientific" we understand some general idea of science, which constitutes a botium
commune
of the
contemporary philosophical thought, or a concept of
science proclaimed by
some
philosophical orientation.
In the second case the problem
with the concept of science as
it
would be
which we would
particularly in the period to
to confront metaphysics
was understood
question that should be posed would read:
is
in
the Middle Ages,
like to limit ourselves.
The
metaphysics a science under
the mediaeval understanding of the notion of scientia, which again may be an idea of "scientificity" common to a certain period or concepts of
science defined by various philosophers.
Yet both of these formulations of the subject appear
The
to
be wrong.
anachronistic.
Moreover, the investigations of the scientific character of metaphysics would have to be "intermediated" by an investigation of the notion of science itself and by the comparison of its first
is
mediaeval formulations with rather
modern understanding.
its
draw us away than bring us
All
this
would
closer to the essence of the matter.
The second formulation
is simply needless. The question whether metaphysics was considered to be a science in the Middle Ages has a
answer
positive
in all cases.
None
of the mediaeval philosophers doubted
that
metaphysics was a science, nor
that
it
was the most important of
intellect.
all
-
what may be more important sciences, cultivated
-
by the natural
129
Metaphysics as a Science
Thus we must rephrase the question posed the
questioning
answer
the
we
the
of
highest,
the
recall that
with
specificity
of
problem
especially as
sciences.
the
criteria its
at the
beginning. Without
is
of
would
I
metaphysics,
specificity
metaphysics
all
features of each science:
of
character
scientific
scientific
this
to
like
character,
treated as the most important,
answer the question of this commonly used to determine the essential subject, material and formal, and its relation shall
I
try
to
to other sciences. It
appears
"constants"
and
practically
all)
each
that
"variable";
of
in
mediaeval
those
bears
features
some,
so
other words: aspects characteristic of
philosophers
to
say
all
(or
and certain individual opinions
which often vary greatly from one thinker to the others. Let
me
accomplished
draw
also in
to
your
attention
the
considerable
the last years in the subject of our concern.
of excellent works, to
name
just those of Albert
progress
A
number
Zimmermann, Armand
Maurer, James Doig, John Wippel, Ralph Me Inerny, Zofia Wlodek and - on the base of detailed source answered a others, have investigations
number of questions and proposed
am
interesting interpretations of them.
1
I
deeply indebted to their achievements.
At the beginning
let
us recall the basic opinions about metaphysics
expressed by mediaeval philosophers, opinions in which they did not differ from one another: 1.
2.
Metaphysics is a science (scientia), As such it belongs to the category of habitus
-
i.e.
intellectual
disposition, 3.
one (prima 4.
5.
is
Metaphysics et
the highest science, the
first
and the most noble
nobilissima),
As such
it is
also considered to
Synonyms
with
-
some
be wisdom
(sapientia), -
limitations
of
"metaphysics"
are:
Zimmermann, Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion uber den Gegenstand 13. und 14. Ja/irhundert. Texte und Untersuchungen, Leiden - Koln 1965; A.A. Maurer, Unity of Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists", in: St. Thomas Aquinas 1274 - 1974. Commemorative Studies, Toronto 1974, vol. II, p. 269-291; A.A. Maurer, "Ockham s Conception of the Unity of Science", Mediae\ al Studies XX, [
A.
der Metaphysik im
"The
1958, p. 98-112; J.C. Doig, Aquinas on Metaphysics. A historico-doctrinal study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics, The Hague 1972; J.F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, Washington D.C. 1984; R. Me Inerny, Being and Predication. Thomistic Interpretations,
Washington
sredniowiecznej
w
Jana
Burydana",
D.C.
1986;
Wroctew
Z.
Wtodek,
Filozofia
1977; Z. Wtodek, Studio Warminskie IX, 1972, p. 215-230.
Polsce
t.III),
bytu
"Koncepcja
(Dzieje
filozofii
mctafizyki wedfug
130
Strozewski
theologia,
scientia
theosophia,
divina,
philosophia
prima,
transphysica,
sapientia, 6. Metaphysics has its own proper subject (or from subjects of other sciences, 7.
Metaphysics demands a specific way of procedure
scientific 8.
different
subjects),
has
(it
its
own
method),
Metaphysics
characterized by a specific unity
is
Metaphysics is a preparation, and being the 9.
difficult first
in
science,
(it is
one),
demands
it
the system of sciences
a
it
special
should be
the last in teaching,
Metaphysics belongs to a system of sciences, and
10. its
-
specificity
is
-
despite
interrelated with other sciences.
These cautiously formulated statements
as
I
have tried to present
them, have not been questioned. Yet each one of them was interpreted in many ways. And so, e.g., it has been agreed that metaphysics belongs to the category of habitus, but habitus:
an
also
metaphysics "accidental"
habitus.
was not
it
whether
clear
it
is
one or many
answer to the question concerning the character of St. Thomas and others; or (the "substantial" unity
"unity"
-
as in
Many
Ockham) depended on whether
notions
of metaphysics were
was one or many
it
used commonly, but their
sense was explained differently. It has been agreed that metaphysics has its own specific subject, but in answering the question what this subject is, we would probably come across a very grat range of answers. The same applies to the
methods of
analysis,
metaphysics.
Lastly,
or,
the
more
widely,
the
conditions
of metaphysics
relation
to
of procedure
in
other sciences was
also viewed in different ways.
I.
"Tfie
names"
of Metaphysics
Let us begin with a point which
which
may seem
to
be not very important, but
most general character of the various approaches to metaphysics, namely its names. All of them, except for the notion "metaphysics" itself, have common roots which go back to in
Aristotle.
Mediaeval
reality
He
designates
also
authors
gave
do
the
the not,
classical
for
the
interpretation
most
part
of
their
deviate
meaning. from his
Metaphysics as a Science
interpretations,
the
yet
attached
stresses
131
various
to
are
justifications
significant.
Various names attributed to metaphysics have usually been treated
in
three manners: 1) as thoroughly synonymous; thus the subject explanation of the character of metaphysics
various
name
preference of one
St.
Bacon,
(Roger
designations
not related closely to the meaning of
is
Albert
the
Great),
with
2)
with the omission or distinct secondary treatment
of others (Dominicus Gundissalinus), 3) with a distinct differentiation of
each designation, leading to the extraction of all aspects of metaphysics and its many-sided, but specific character (St. Thomas).
Scientia
(1)
divina. is
understanding
The name which appears most the
Latin
often and
equivalent
Yet already the translation of the logos of
"theology".
"theology"
translation
is
merely
a
it
course deeply
one.
linguistic
The notion
following way:
at
shall of
it
treatise
De
divisione philosophiae
is
tercia
"...
theologia siue scientia prima, siue
dicitur
2 metaphysica".
Yet when he turns to making
it
precise, he changes the notion theologia to scientia divina, defining once in three ways: "diuina sciencia est sciencia de rebus separatis a
materia
diffinicione". -
prima".
the
be
will
"theology"
describes the three parts of the latter in
theoretical,
philosophia prima, siue
it
It is
point of our deliberations, having divided philosophy into the
practical and the
more
was
differ.
Dominicus Gundissalinus, whose initial
s
has any essential meaning or whether the
shared with the revealed theology, sacra doctrina, from which
the
it
meaning and moved towards the Platonic-Aristotelian episteme.
hard to determine whether
the
most
is
of Aristotle
Replaced, but at the same time limited
scientia.
erroneously replaced by in its
-
divina
scientia
first
item:
one
-
"diuina
is,
in
item:
"diuina
sciencia est philosophia certissima et
sciencia est sapiencia reality,
a
definition,
assessments designating more specifically
3 certissima",
while
the
of which only
two
next
are
kind of knowledge. These
this
three definitions are the most general and apply to divine knowledge and its
synonyms. Thus the notion: scientia divina
always appears
first
-
is
-
and
justified by the fact that
it it
is
this
applies to
Dominicus Gundissalinus, DC divisione philosophiae. Herausgegeben Baur (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, B. IV, H.
...
1903, p.15.
3
Ibid., p. 35.
notion that
God:
it
von Ludwig 2-3),
Miinster
132
Str62ewski
He
enquires (inquirit} whether "ipsa
de deo
We
an
inquirit
similar
find
sit,
et
is
probat quod
definitions,
He
is:
more concise motivations
in
and demonstrates (probat)
that
4 sit".
but with
Michael Scot, except that the notion theology is not to be found in Scot s works; instead he constantly uses the name scientia divina or 5 simply divina.
This
name
is
applicaple
quia
"...
de rebus diuinis
et
6 tractat".
spiritualibus
Avicenna
common
a
undoubtedly
root
for
these
conceptions.
(although He with direct subject!), being which has the highest dignity as it
Metaphysics not
is
its
completely
separated
ab eo, quod
scientia
scientia
a divine science since
is
it
from the nature: cst
dignus
in
ea
God
deals with
is is
et
hunc nominabitur haec
scilicet
vocabitur haec scientia,
"...
7 divina".
Similar arguments are to be found in divina
scientia
applies
to
metaphysics since
Thomas. The notion of
St. it
deals with knowledge of
we
the being most separated from nature. Although
get to
know them
indirectly and only through the consequences of their acts, yet enough to designate them as the most divine, the more so since
prime cause
is
God. Thus:
"Dicitur
inquantum praedictas substantias
A
somewhat
different
enim
it
is
their
divina sive theologia,
scientia 8
considerat".
emphasis
is
found
in
St.
Albert the Great
s
works. Although he also maintains that the reason for calling metaphysics a
divine
science
are
the
causes with which
first
which, they in themselves, are
"divina
et
optima
et
it
is
concerned and 9
prima".
Yet, he adds,
that the notion divina applies to those aspects of created objects,
which
are the most evident (manifested), noble and the most fundamental in relation to others.
4
These aspects are connected with the main subject of
Ibid., p. 38.
Ibid., Anhang. Die bei Vinccntius Bcllouacensis im Speculum doctrinale erhaltenen Fragmente einer Einleitungsschrift des Michael Scotus, p. 399.
6
Ibid., p. 400.
1
Metaph.,
t. I,
c.4, fol. 71v. Cf. J.C.
Doig, op.
cit., p.
85.
Q
Duodecim
In
De
Trinitate, 5,
4
libros
Metaphysicorum
Aristotclis
expositio,
Proemium;
Cf.
In
Boethium
c.
n "Vocatur
aliis
in
autem
et
quia omnia talia sunt divina et optima et prima, omnibus complementum. Esse enim, quod haec scientia considerat, non
divina,
esse praebentia
contractum ad hoc vel illud, sed potius est prima effluxio dei et creatum primum, ante quod non est creatum aliud." Alberti Magni ... Metaphysica. Libros quinque priores. Ed. Bernhardus Geyer, Monasterium Westfalorum in Aedibus Aschendorff 1960, accipitur
p. 2-3.
Metaphysics as a Science
metaphysics: being, existence, esse.
133
denominatio ideo
"Nee
Omnia enim apud naturam omnium rerum
dicitur.
divinissima
et
priora
haec
et
omnibus,
ens
sunt
fit,
quod divina
manifestissima sunt entis
et
partes
et
1(
principia."
Philosophia prima. While the same arguments were usually used in
(2)
notion
the
defining
philosophy"
1) First it,
of
scientia
were often quite
seeking in
their final premises,
it
of
explanations
"first
such because, whereas other sciences refer to
is
philosophy
the
divina,
different.
does not appeal or base itself on which no other science poses
it
any other. First philosophy poses questions
same time, is the only science that testifies all its The priority of first philosophy is evidently methodological, in particular, it is established by its relation to other sciences. So, among others, St. Thomas views it when in his comments to the De Trinitate of the
at
and,
assessments.
Boethius he writes:
omnes
"Dicitur
enim philosophia prima,
in
dicitur
intellectualis consideratio est principium
it
philosophy owes
its
name
deals: spiritual substances and,
name
of the
rationalis,
scientiis,
is
to
the priority of beings with
above
God. The
all,
justification
not of a methodological, but of an ontological character;
appeals not to primary premises, but to the primary causes on the
existence and the functioning of which depends everything that exists. is
in
propter hoc
philosophia."
First
it
aliis
11
prima
2)
which
aliae
ab ea sua principia accipientes earn consequuntur. Et
scientiae
exinde etiam est quod ipsa largitur principia omnibus
quantum
quantum
due
to
primanim
this
that
Dominicus
causanim. 12
In
his
Gundissalinus
Proemium
to
defines
it
as
It
scientia
Commentary on the
his
Metaphysics St. Tfiomas also draws our attention to its relation to immaterial substances; his argumentation here differs from the earlier one
found that,
in the
Commentary
to Boethius
since philosophy treats of the
prime and also as sapientia and 10
Op.
Thomae de Aquino,
Decker, Leiden 1959, 12
Op.
Trinitate.
cause,
it
Avicenna maintained
has
scientia nobilissima.
itself to
appear as
The same thought
cit.,p. 5.
Sancti
13
De
first
dr., p.
p.
166 and 212.
38 and 268.
Cf. J.C. Doig, op.
cit.,
p. 85.
Expositio
super
librum
Boethii
de
Trinitate,
ed.
B.
134
Str6*ewski
was
beautifully formulated by St.
Thomas:
"Itaque
ordinatur ad Dei cognitionem sicut ad altimum
prima philosophia tota
fmem."
14
Albert the Great again enriches the ontological argumentation. philosophy applies to what is first, and what, at the same time, is the most divine and most connected with God of all things: in being St.
First
and
itself,
in
its
and
parts
15
principles.
whole universality and not only deserves the designation 3)
partly,
And from
as
it
this
considers being in point of view
it
its
also
16 "first".
Besides the methodological and the ontological argumentation, we could call pragmatic, appears. And so, in addition
another type, which to
the fact, or possibly because of the fact, that first
causes,
is
philosophy
first
in
the
it
applies to the
order of love
(if
I
may
first
say so
etiam prima philosophia quia primo ab homine desiderata, here): et etiam quia est secundum sui partem de primo principiorum omnium, et etiam de omnibus primis principiis...." 1 This formulation comes from "dicitur
Roger Bacon. (3) Metaphysica. Like philosophia at
least
three ways.
in
It
prima, metaphysica has been interpreted
depended on how was the
first
part
of this
name, namely meta, was understood: as supra, trans or post. 1) In the first case metaphysics was treated as a science dealing with
the
supra-physical,
beings: pure intelligences
immaterial,
existing
autonomically
and God. Argumentation
is
spiritual
similar to the case
ofscientia divina or philosophia prima (2). 2) In the second case, metaphysics
omitting the
moment
deals with abstracts which, of materiality and the quantitative determination,
make up a class of terms that, in respect of contents, is the most general and of the broadest range. The abstract with which metaphysics deals is, above all, the idea of being. Its separation from matter is double: as a 14
Summa
contra gentiles
III,
25.
"Omnia enim apud naturam omnium rcrum manifestissima sunt divinissima et nobilissima et priora omnibus, et haec sunt ens et entis partes ct principia Op. cit. ..."
p. 5. "Et
non
in
ideo et honorabilissimorum et mirabilissimorum et certissimorum per totum et sui parte cst scientia ista, quam ideo merito primam vocamus philo-
quadam
sophiam," ibid., p. 5.
Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, fasc. XI Questiones altere super prime philosophic Aristotelis, ed. R. Steele collaborante P.M. Delorme, Oxonii 1930, p. 30.
libros
135
Metaphysics as a Science
notion
belongs to intellectual beings, as an abstract (relative to
it
constitutes the highest genus.
it
contents)
Great metaphysics is called transphysica deals with the general principles that are fundamental for anything
According as
it
its
to St. Albert the
which belongs to nature: natura
quaedam esse
principia
vocatur,
transphysica
"...
quoniam quod
est
fundatur
per
determinata quantitate vel contrarietate,
omne
transcendunt
quae
simpliciter,
vocatum
sic
physicum.
Thomas
St.
resolutionis),
enim
"Haec
commuma
post minus commuma.
with
most
the
transcendentals
ilia
been,
its
expressis first
et
de
est
science
hanc scientiam vocamus et physis, scientia, 20
Thus
transcendentibus."
considered
verbis,
among
a
is
notion,
meta, quod est trans,
quia
the
is
magis
aliquam scientiam universalem,
transcendentia,
scientia,
have
sicut
resolutionis,
meaning of est esse
est dicitur a
metaphysics; as being
via
are worth special attention. Metaphysics, in
"Necesse
quae per se considcret
in
9
essential
treating transcendentals.
metaphysicam, quae quasi transcendens
n1
trans-
discovered after the less general:
is
inveniuntur
transphysica
or
of metaphysics,
holds in the process of analysis (via
it
where the more general
Duns Scotus arguments accord
name
the
similarly:
related to the place
is
physics,
thinks
the
them, metaphysics
subject is
of
a science
of being as transcendentale. 3)
In
the
third
The
when meta
case,
distinguish two orders:
is
understood as post,
we can
(a) of cognition or discovery, and (b) of teaching.
subject of metaphysics
discovered by us due to the investigations of, physics. From the point of view of
is
carried on before, and in the field
our cognition (quoad nos), metaphysics appears to be a science posterior to physics; yet, from the point of view of the objective theoretical order, it
is
prior.
was
Avicenna, 18
19
This
shared
Metaphysica, liber
I, c. 1,
very
likely
formulated
by
all
for
the
scholastics.
first
time
21
Similarly,
by the
p. 2.
Prooemium.
In Met.,
Duns
probably
opinion,
Scotus,
Philosophical Wolter, Edinburgh 1962, p. 2.
Writings.
A
selection
edited
and
translated
by Allan
ipsa est de eo quod est post naturam. principium motus et quietatis; ... quod vero est in respectu quantum ad nos ... unde quod meretur vocari haec scientia considerata in se haec est, ut dicatur quod est ante naturam. Ea enim de quibus inquiritur in hac scientia per eandem sunt ante naturam." "Nomen
vero
huius
scientiae
est,
Intelligitur autem natura virtus quae dicitur post naturam haec posteritas
quod
est
136
Strofcewski
was common concerning the second
conviction
posterior to physics (post physicam}
due to the
more
fact that
is
it
thus
the order of teaching. 22 This
in
seeks examples in physics, but also because
it
be
case: metaphysics could
studied only after becoming acquainted with natural science and
it
is is
than physics, and the way of teaching should lead from
difficult
easier through
more
(4) Sapientia.
This
difficult matters.
name appears
either as a
synonym of
"metaphysics"
or
as a narrower definition of this science.
wisdom are
All the essential features characteristic of
by
Wisdom
metaphysics.
is
the
of
knowledge
first
also fulfilled
the
is
principles,
cognition of greatest certainty, and, being the knowledge of the noblest objects,
is
also noble
ruler of
all
the sciences.
Due
itself.
to these three features,
According to Aviccnna, metaphysics nobilior
scientia
writes that et
practice",
omnia
est
"hec
universalia in
verissime
nobilius
nobilissima, quia
ipsa est
and adds:
particular!, 24
Thomas Aquinas:
ut
Most
cognoscit."
ut
universali,
"Omnes
23
in
Bacon
Roger
particular!,
scilicet,
ct
omnia
partes
entis,
universales et primas, et ita
known words
significant are the well
autem
also
regula scientie speculative
omnes
omnes causas
is
etiam sapientia quae est scitum".
habet cognoscere
"sapiens
in
particularia
est
"...
apprehenditur
qua
wisdom
scientiae et artes ordinantur in
of
St.
unum,
ad hominis perfectionem, quae est eius beatitudo. Unde necesse quod una earum sit aliarum omnium retrix, quae nomen sapientiae
scilicet est,
recte vindicat.
Nam
sapientis est alios
25 ordinare."
1, c. 4, fol. 71v. Cf. J.C. Doig, op. cit., p. 85; quae alio nomine metaphysicsa, id est trans physicam, quia post physicam dicenda occurit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia devenire," S. Thomas Aq., In Boet. De Trinitate, cd. Decker, p. 166, 2-4.
Aviccnna, Met., T.
"...
dicitur
Metaphysica enim nuncupatur quia quantum doctrina, post tamen in quantum Roger Bacon, op. cit., p. 30. "...
transcendit scientia,
physica,
vel
est
post
unde meiha trans
physica
vel post
in
latine;
..."
Avicenna, Met., T. Gundissalinus, op.
Roger Bacon, S.
Thomas,
cit., p.
op.
1,
c.
2,
fol.
71r HF;
cf.
J.C.
cit.,
fasc.
X,
cit.,
p.
85;
cf.
Dominicus
p. 11.
Prooemium; "Hie igitur de Met., illam scientiam vere esse sapientiam,
In
dicimus
Doig, op.
35-36.
sapiente
conceptionibus
sic
quae per se est scientia ista, quod sui ipsius ipsa causa est, hoc est, quam gratia sui ipsius quaerimus scire et volumus, et hoc est cuius finis, propter quem scire volumus, est in ipsamet ista scien suppositis,
tia."
Alberti
Magni Metaphysica, Tractatus
2, c. 1, p. 18.
137
Metaphysics as a Science
II.
Ttie subject
of Metaphysics
The problem
of the subject
crucial for our topic. Aristotle himself
is
was
the origin of the mediaeval controversies over this problem. In the his that science which he himself Metaphysics he defined the subject of or theology many times. Let us recall the first called
wisdom,
philosophy
most important of those definitions: and
principles
virtue of
own
its
"There
1-3);
being and the attributes which belong to
as
being
investigates
(A,l,982a
causes"
knowledge about certain is a science which
is
"Wisdom
in
this
are seeking the principles
"We
(r,l,1003a 16);
nature"
and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being" the two last quotations due to subsequent precising (E,l,1025b 1-2) statements which "...
make
things
more
us: precise are specially important for
the question which raised of old and
always the subject of doubt,
viz.
is
raised
what being
is
is,
now and
always,
and
just the question,
is
what
substance; for (Z,l,1028b 3-4); "The the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of substances" subject of our inquiry
is substance"
(L,l,1069a 18-19);
"There
mathematics, theology for
it
...
is
-
are three kinds of theoretical sciences
and of these themselves the
deals with the highest of existing
last
is
not
things"
contention.
harmoniously
impossible It
seems
that this
the appropriateness of
questioned
either
commentators. The
his
by latter
-
as
to
best;
(K,7,1064b 1-5).
them together
bring
was evident
numerous
is
26
Although the aforesaid formulations apply to a variety of it
physics,
named
subjects,
into
one
for Aristotle himself. Similarly,
definitions of metaphysics has not
or
direct
followers
we may
see from St.
by
his
been
mediaeval
Thomas Proemium to tried to demonstrate how
rather Commentary on the Metaphysics the a was variety of unity despite metaphysics
his
its
subjects
and to find
the basis that would motivate such a unity. Controversies arose largely
over the problem of what aspect to accent. There was no doubt as to the fact that the subject of metaphysics is being as being, yet whether it is
preoccupied with
all
being or only with substantial being were
among
the questions that were posed. Studies were undertaken to determine how one might understand first principles: are they concrete, non-material beings, 26
or
principles
of
demonstrations,
All quotations in translation by
W.D.
Ross.
or
both,
and
if
so,
do they
Stroewski
138
remain
in
any
a science which
is
metaphysics
mutual
specific
being) the subject of
This
last
is
point
is
especially
also
agreed that cause - God,
first
directly or indirectly (as the reason of
no
investigations found
its
was
It
has to deal with the
He
yet the problem of whether
relation?
relevant
common the
since
answer.
two greatest Arab
whose ideas were always respected by Christian thinkers, Avicenna and Averroes, had given contrary answers to the namely, question of the subject of metaphysics. According to Avicenna, the main philosophers,
is being as being and its ultimate causes: "Nulla de causis ultimis nisi ista scientia; si autem consideratio
subject of metaphysics
enim
alia inquirit
fuerit inquantum habent esse, et de omni eo, quod accidit eis sccundum hunc modum, oportebit tune ut ens inquantum est ens sit subiectum quod est convenientius". 27 At the same time metaphysics is the
dc causis
only science which seeks to find the existence of the -
God. But because God
He
sit,
cannot be
its
is
subject:
Metaphysics docs
existing.
the existence
of
God.
cause of being
first
for metaphysics the object of the question all
assume
sciences
their subjects as already
this in relation to being, but
"Dico
est
ergo impossibile
cannot assume
it
esse ut
ipse
subiectum huius scientiae, quoniam subiectum omnia scientiae conccditur
esse,
2*
The
subiecti."
autem
quo
fit
inquiruntur
an
non
phrase puts duobus modis: unus
eius
tune
sit,
enim scientiarum debet Avicenna
scientia
ipsa
following
inquisitio
scientia
et
s
nisi
inquirit
est
quo
Deus
est res,
quae eo
"Dc
explicitly:
inquiritur an
sit
illius
dispositiones
even more
it
an
alius est
sit,
autem
proprietates. Postquam inquiritur in hac non potest esse subiectum huius scientiae. Nulla
suum
stabilire
position
subiectum."
29
was countered by Averroes: God
is
the proper
Metaphysics may omit the question of the posed and answered in physics which prove the existence of the Prime Mover: "Substantia enim aeterna declarata est in of
subject
metaphysics.
existence of
God
naturalibus
in
undertake
as
fine
closer
a
it
is
octavi
Physicorum."-^
of
analysis
the
Philosophia prima sive scientia divina, Opera fol. 70v E, cf. J.C. Doig, op. cit., p. 24.
Unfortunately
argumentation
Philosophica
,
of
Venisc
we
cannot
these
1508,
two
Reimpr.
Ixmvain 1961,
28 Avicennae pcripatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi opera in ac nuper quantum ars niti potuit per canonicos emendanda, Venetiis 1508, A. Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 109. 29
Ibid.
C
70rb,
cf.
Zimmermann,
op.
cit.,
Averroes, Venetiis 1483,
II,
Aristotcles,
com
22.
Opera
redacta
70ra-b;
cf.
p. 110.
Jfl
in:
luce f.
latine
cum commento
Averrois,
ed.
Nic.
Varnia,
139
Metaphysics as a Science
Averroes accepts a merely notice the fact that a God of physics, is God his Avicenna: different conception of God than us
let
philosophers;
unmoved Mover
an
Avicenna
s
concepts of
the
explaining
movement, while contingent being. Those two of
phenomenon
God prime God assume two radically
of
cause
the
is
different conceptions of metaphysics
and lead to two divergent and far reaching consequences. In general mediaeval thinkers followed Avicenna with
difference
significant
in
detail.
Albert
s
conception, yet
who
Zimmermann
has
devoted an excellent and thoroughly documented work, Ontologie oder der Metaphysik im 13. Metaphysik? Die Diskussion iiber den Gegemtand 1
und
Jahrhundert?
14.
to
this
has
problem
distinguished
three
fundamental solutions: 1)
God
one of the main subjects of metaphysics. This concept was
is
among others, by Roger Bacon, William Ockham and John Buridan, shared,
God
2)
being);
is
among
Great and 3)
God
among
cause
the
St.
of the
subject
Giles of
Rome, Peter
of metaphysics,
the thinkers sharing this position
we
Aureoli,
of being
i.e.
(as
find St. Albert the
Thomas,
a part of the subject of metaphysics; this idea was proclaimed, but also by Augustine others, by Siger of Brabant, Henry of Ghent, is
of Ancona, Peter of Auvergne, Alexander of Alexandria and Joan
Duns
Scotus.
Each
texts
was shared by a number of unidentified have been published by Zimmermann in his
God
as a subject of metaphysics
of the above opinions
commentators, whose work.
The problem
of
is
crucial for
its
from the point of view of the further fate as a science, the development of metaphysics or possibly even its causes understood as the problem of its relevance to those prime
definition.
Yet
appears
it
To spheres was of a special importance. existence their of were to appear that the hypothesis
unmovable Movers of put
was
it
simply,
false,
if
it
at least
that,
celestial
one of the reasons
for the existence of metaphysics as
a science would have to be omitted. Should
reasons of a
31
Albert
crisis
we
not, then, see
within metaphysics in the late Middle
Zimmermann,
Ontologie
im
oder
und
Metaphysik? Jahrhundert.
Die
Ages
Diskussion
Texte
und
one of the in
uber
the
den
Untersuchungen Metaphysik Gegenstand des Mittelalters, hrsg. von Joseph Koch, Bd. (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte VIII), Leiden-Koln 1965. der
13.
14.
Stroewski
140
appearance of a spheres,
e.g.,
hypothesis explaining the
rival
of Buridan
movement
of the celestial
theory of impetus? Going further, was not the
s
substitution of the notion of metaphysics for ontology in the seventeenth
century significant testimony of a need for a new formulation of the subject of its investigations, especially in view of the fact that what had celestial movements formerly been considered supra-physical been included in the Newton s general laws of gravitation?
The order
Let us return to our main problem.
-
had then
of presentation shall
be governed by a single criterion, the criterion of the unity, or rather the
integrity,
of metaphysics. Metaphysics may, or even must, consider
various subjects, yet
of
how
I
would
like
to bring to
our attention the problem
these subjects were brought together so as to achieve the unity
of the fundamental subject of this science.
(1)
The view according
which the essential subject of metaphysics
to
exclusively being, has been expressed by Michael Scot:
"huius
is
scientiae
subiectum est ens, non Deus ucl quattuor causae, sicut quidam crediderunt. Teste cnim Aristotele nulla scientia subiectum suum inquirit. In 32 This autem queritur de Deo quid sit et similitcr de causis...." or to the Dominicus Gundissalinus: stated has been subject, by opinion
hac
use Dominicus "communius
et
terminology, the matter of metaphysics 33
euidencius omnibus
est".
is
being, which
This general being designates
which vary depending on whether they treat of beings completely isolated from matter, beings mixed with matter but not constituted by it, beings which can exist both with and without four
the
matter
parts
(e.g.
causality,
general aspects
view
of metaphysics,
(e.g.
metaphysics
and
unity),
in
movement be
may
or motionless).
divided
into
division of being itself into substance
what
is
particular, cause and
effect,
its
own
34
Ibid., p. 37.
op. op.
corresponding
subjects, since
subject, but only
59
Dominicus Gundissalinus,
species
point of to
the
and accident, what is universal and 34 Yet God does act and potency.
follows Avicenna in his argumentation.
Dominicus Gundissalinus,
From another
and
not enter into the range of metaphysics the existence of
material beings in their most
finally
tit.,
Anhang,
cit.,
p. 37.
p. 400.
assumes
it.
no science seeks
Dominicus
clearly
141
Metaphysics as a Science
Being
(2)
In
well.
is
main subject of metaphysics
the
Book
the
Albert the Great as
for
he presents three
chapter 2 of his Metaphysics
I,
and opinions as to the essential subject of this science: God, first causes, being as being. Rejecting two first while arguing similarly to Avicenna
autem
("Deus
divina
et
subiectum esse non
est,
omnibus
the correct one:
is
in
quaeruntur
"cum
possunt"),
that the third opinion
ens
separata
ista
scientia.
Peripateticis,"
est
"ens
Ergo
he insisted
subiectum inquantum
et ea, quae sequuntur ens inquantum est ens et non inquantum
hoc ens, sunt passiones
35 eius."
The
condition:
"non
inquantum hoc
ens"
kinds of specially important: metaphysics does not deal with specific of its entity. However, being, but with all being from the point of view is
meaning of
since the full it
substance
is
the
in
interest,
metaphysics
claim
this final
is
that
analysis
is
it
that
substance that the
is
main
is
being,
subject
of
and thus the metaphysical search for causes and 36 The unity of and principles of substance.
principles apply to the causes
is in any event guaranteed. In stressing the role of substance as the subject of metaphysics, St. Albert the Great is not alone; similar opinions are to be found in other
metaphysics
mention but only one, an anonymous Metaphysics used the same arguments to scientia est justify the dignity of metaphysics: "quia subiectum huius 37 Other thinkers from this circle, such as substantia vel ens universum". thirteenth
century
to
thinkers,
Oxonian commentator on the
Robert Kilwardby or
Adam
of Buckfield, have specified the subject of *\Q
metaphysics as ens inquantum ens.
(3) St.
followed the line favored by Aristotle, Avicenna and St. Great: Being as being is the subject of metaphysics, thus
Thomas
Albert the
defining both the material and formal subject of this science.
Metaphysica,
As
in all
p. 4.
*\\ "Oportet
non
habetur
pritnum philosophum nisi per causas et
principia substantiarum", op.
37
Daniel
A.
thirteenth-century
Callus,
Oxford
cit.,
"The
...
habere scientiam substantiarum; et quia scientia oportet philosophum habere causas et
principia,
p. 165; cf.
Zimmermann,
subject-matter
masters",
in:
of
op.
cit.,
metaphysics
Die Metaphysik
in
Ibid., p. 396-399.
according
Mittelalter.
Bedeutung... (Miscellanea Mcdiaevalia, Bd. 2), Berlin 1963, p. 394.
38
p. 156.
ffir
to
some
Ursprung und
Strozewski
142
knowledge, it is its formal subject that decides about its quality, and this is what is here expressed in the words being" inquantum ens? The notion of being taken in its whole range, but simultaneously in "as
its
could
immaterial,
the
what
infinite,
notion of being
and the
actual
in
is
We
any way.
is
is
contingent.
and what
finite
is
The most general
virtually transcendental, yet taken as
is
subject of metaphysics
essential
what
potential,
necessary and what
is
that
notion of being covers both the material and the
the
that
say
means everything
indefinableness
specific
denominating the as what metaphysics assumes - it
-
i.e.
which are presented to us directly. It is here that we should look for the reason why St. Thomas attachs such importance to limits itself to beings
the fact that being
formulated already
quae primo
quod
primo
conceptiones
is
the
first
DC
in His
datum of our
cntc
ct essential
in intellectu concipiuntur"
intellectus rcsolvit,
40
quasi
concipit 41
est
-
"...
ens",
"ens
autem
notissimum,
autem
quo omnes
in
et
aliquod primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, dico
"Illud
est
quidem operatione
prima
-
et essentia sunt
never change:
shall
in
This conviction
intellect.
scilicet
hoc quod
42 ens...."
We
cannot since
priority,
metaphysics
determining
emphasi/.e is
it
basically
in relation to its
too
is
cognitively first, direct,
The given
a us
to
appears
hori/on
priori
as
a
being,
which
other words:
has to be based on certain
what
this
this
fact
cognitive
assures
the
of being
autonomy
s
of
other sciences and guarantees the possibility of
In
subject.
strongly
metaphysics, as every science,
assumptions, yet what
initial
and not referring to anything of the
what
i.e.,
as having existence:
notion being
"ens
experienced and so defined, being
is
directly
simpliciter is
est
is
it
assumes
is
what
is
else.
infinite,
experienced,
quod habet
yet
cognitively -
essc".
So
the essential subject of metaphysics.
marks the ways of the investigation of being. The first way deals with its essence as a being: what does it mean, to exist, to be something? What is the relation between what a thing is (essentia}
At the same time
it
4c and commentary by Thomas Gilby O.P in: St. Cf. S. Thomas Aq., 5.7 1, I, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I,atin text and English translation, Introduction, .
Notes, Appendices and Glossaries, vol.
40
DC
ente et essentia,
41
De
veritate
42
In Met. IV,
Summa
Proocmium.
1, Ic.
1.6,
605.
theologiae
I-II,
26, 4c.
I,
Christian Theology, Blackfriars,
Cambridge
1964.
Metaphysics as a Science
and that
more of
is
it
Answers
(es.se)?
143
to these questions,
among
others, render
precise the essence of substance as a being par excellence, but also
its
and
parts
A
accidents.
its
second way of investigating being is exist, i.e., have essel
determined by the question: Why does something This determines the horizon of the search for the
whose
and essentia
esse
The
the same.
is
first
cause, for being
direction of the
way
first
is
horizontal, of the second, vertical.
Thomas
St.
metaphysical dictionary
rich in additional definitions
is
of being which were to raise controversies the
Ens quod
future.
its
range? Does
Thomas
St.
inquantum
are
among
not suggest
it
expressed assumption by
When
-
commentators
his
among
ens
ens,
simpliciter,
in
esse
most important of them.
the
was the notion of common being, ens commune. What
Especially troubling is
ens,
commune
ens
simpliciter,
ens
St.
its
Thomas
univocity, contrary to the explicitly
an analogical notion? commune, he doubtlessly does
that being
uses the formula ens
is
not mean any special species of being nor, even more so, the hypostasis which was directly created by God. It seems that ens commune is a being in its widest range, yet such as is accessible to our direct It
cognition.
since
per
is
due
or with
se,
to this that
its
it
is
the essential subject of metaphysics
assumed by other sciences dealing
the being
is
it
domains,
sciences do not investigate
its
them
Similar remarks
all.
into categories.
Common
by any of them. commune, ad quod
"Et
seem
to
scilicet
be
right: 45 I
Dei".
to
commune Him finds
a
notion
ens
correctly
is it
determinata 44 45
In Met. XI, 5.7.
MI
"ens
know
included its
may be made
1,
commune
ad
multiplicitas
range of ens
4.
it
is
entis
is
commune
est proprius effectus
not exhausted
habet
aliquid
causae altissimae,
Thomas would the name Qui est
its
"quanto
insist
that
attributed
absoluteness, and the less
more general and
referred to God:
to created being
St.
as well, although
magis communia
2197.
common
is
with regard to being as divided
of no text in which
God
subject in what
to all of them,
reason of existence also in
may be
66, 5
its
44
limit the
determined and
et
quod
patet
fit reductio."
Commentators who
or aspects, yet these other
variations
and analogical
sic
it
in the aspect of its beingness. Starting with
it
the totality of sciences, metaphysics finds to
with
either
aliqua
et absoluta, tanto
absolute,
the
more
nomina sunt minus
magis proprie dicuntur
Strozewski
144
Deo
de
46
a
nobis".
God has to commune limits
of being that could apply to
the range limitations (and
all
transgress
The notion
believe that ens
I
categorial being) and thus be considered as a transcendental designation. This, of course, also falls within the domain of metaphysics. to
itself
The problem
(4)
more
of the subject of metaphysics with John
He
complicated.
Avicenna
s
the term
that
proposition
God
being. But
is
"being",
also
Averroes
rejects
a
is
metaphysics
Duns Scotus and
opinions
science
is
accepts
about being qua
being as well and since Scotus assumes the univocity of nature should be easier to understand than with
God s
assumption of the analogy of being. Isn t God then the second and equivalent subject of metaphysics beside being or, according
Thomas
St.
to
Zimmermann,
cannot take up a discussion of this problem here (by the way: me, that the notice of a mediaeval scholiast: "Certe quae
I
seems hac
part of the subject?
to
questione
appears to be 1)
being
2)
the
is
tradit
still
valid!).
superare
Let us recall what remains beyond any doubt:
the subject of metaphysics,
notion of being that defines the subject of metaphysics should
cover virtually
all
other notions which are attributed to metaphysics,
3) the notion of being
only
humanum ingenium
Doctor videntur
it
in
coextensive
the
also
disjunctive
is
a transcendental notion, covering virtually not
transcendentals
entis
(passiones
such
transcendentals,
as
but
convertibiles),
finite-infinite,
necessary-
accidental, in potentia-in actu, causatum-causa, 4)
God
is
the
a being and thus
The
of being.
analysis
falls
within the range of the general notion
point of departure of metaphysics
of being
as
a
transcendental:
scientiam universalem, quae per se consideret
is
being and
"Necesse
ilia
est
its
esse
task
is
aliquam
transcendentia, et hanc
scientiam vocamus Metaphysicam, quae dicitur a meta, quod est trans, et physis scientia, quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcenden48 tibus."
But
this
analysis, as applying either to
transcendental qualities (passions) 46
47
S.T.
I,
Cf.
J.
being as being or to
its
or finally to disjunctive transcenden-
13, lie.
Scotus?" in:
Owens, "Up to What Point is Mediaeval Studies X, 1948, p. 163.
Duns Scotus, Quaestiones subtilissimae Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, op. cit., p.
God in 2.
Included
in
Metaphysicam
the
Metaphysics of Duns
Aristotelis,
Prol.,
n.
5;
cf.
145
Metaphysics as a Science
tals,
must lead on
show the prime
to
being, which
is
God. 49 In
God, not being the point of departure of metaphysics, becomes as
the
investigate
Him
subject
Him
of
God
of
No
arrival.
the
in
appearing
in
science
other
as Being, as physics reaches
treats
theology notion
point
of
Him is
metaphysics
rightful
would
that
exists
as the First
way
Mover, and
Although the general and not perfect
of His
respect
this
its
divinity.
the attribute of the subject of any science, (generality is, in any event, but only theology will speak of God ut hie), yet it is doubtlessly attributable to
God becomes
1.
God,
2.
God who
is
As such an
infinite.
the subject of metaphysics.
50
infinite being,
Averroes was not mistaken,
when he maintained that God is the subject of metaphysics, but he was as the wrong when he insisted that He was taken over by it from physics unmovable Mover. Metaphysics does not adopt the notion of God from comes to accept the necessity of His physics nor from theology: it existence when analyzing being as being, an analysis which, at the same time, enables us to display, not clearly, but certainly,
some
features of
His essence.
There
no doubt about unity of metaphysics. After
is
all,
it
is
being
determined by the wmvocity of the notion of being. God is part of the to whose discovery subject of metaphysics as He is the highest Being, led through the analysis of the transcendentals. And it is He is being investigated by metaphysics; from the which this aspect is investigated by theology, to which point of view of His divinity He
metaphysics
is
in
metaphysics as metaphysics has no access.
(5)
Where
the
unity
of the
subject
of metaphysics
position taken earlier by Siger of Brabant
is
the
concerned,
Being in general, limits we must its Within esse universal, is the subject of metaphysics. results and those which are causes. clearly distinguish beings which are which would apply and be true about theorems whether is The problem both exist (e.g., general phrases stating that every being as being (ens has its cause are false since beings having no cause secundum is
less clear.
ens)
49 "Unde
et
actu
et
finitate
potentia,
sunt
et
multitudine
infinitate,
et
passiones Metaphysicae talibus, quae proprietates Metaphysica Deum esse, sive primum ens esse." Rep. Par., Prologus
multis
op.
50
cit.,
Cf.
Szkota.
et
III,
et
ex
concludi
in
unitate,
potest 1.
Cf.
J.
Owens,
p. 170.
Owens, op. cit. passim; Jacek Widomski, "Przedmiot metafizyki u Jana Dunsa Proba rozgraniczenia zagadnien ontologicznych metafizycznych w obre>ie jego
J.
filozofii",
i
Studio Mediewistyczne 19,
2,
1978, p. 49-73.
Strozewski
146 51
Thus God
exist).
a being
is
among
beings,
cause of those that are results, yet no
would enable us
Him
to speak about
within a single subject of metaphysics.
seems
It
(6)
me
to
that the
it
is
a being that
common denominator
the
is
exists that
as well as about contingent beings
52
integrity of the subject of
problem of the
metaphysics has not been solved any more completely by Roger Bacon than by Siger. Analyzing Aristotle s Metaphysics, he arrived at the conviction that the Philosopher has passed through three topics connected with three subjects of metaphysics: being as being, substance and God.
We
should stress that these are the three equivalent subjects of this science or, put in another way, that its subject may be defined in three "subiectum
ways:
of reference being:
God
tamen
"ista
The first
is
tria
fact that
ad
unum
Bacon
reducuntur,
scilicet
ad causam
54 primam".
treats the range of the notion of being as the
primo modo dictum est ens") worthy of note. One of the questions from his Comments
of metaphysics
subject
very widely,
53 The common point metaphysica tripliciter dicitur". rather than being as being, God as the first cause of
in
is
("subiectum
on the Metaphysics reads: metaphysicus habeat considerare significationes nominum". The answer is positive. A metaphysician regards the "an
meaning of names beings:
et
"...
considerat
not
is
different
way sit
pars
in
grounded first
its
treating
logician,
them
as
diminuta, ideo metaphysicus
philosophy
knowledge, thus
justify the unity of
subject? Bacon
s
solution
metaphysics when of a pragmatic
is
the subject of prime desire for those
is
its
relation
to
the cognizance of details
although there are
of happiness to virtues:
that
from a
entis, licet
one
then, finally, should
character: desire
a
sermonem".
How it
in
cum sermo
many
is
who like
virtues, there
is
only one happiness (beatitudo).
"Tamen
entis,
Texte
inedit,
<52
"Cum
haec
entibus
Op.
55
Louvain 1948,
ens,
Graiff,
non Siger
est principium, quia
de Brabant,
tune
omne
ens haberet
Questions sur la Metaphysique
.
p. 5.
ens secundum quod ens non habeat causas et principia, quia non omne ens, ... non considerat nisi causas et principia, quae communia sunt omnibus
scientia
causatis."
53 54
secundum quod
Cornelio Andrea
principium",
cit.,
Op.
cit.,
p. 364.
vol. XI, p. 121.
Ibid., p. 21, 22. Ibid., p. 95.
147
Metaphysics as a Science
A
(7)
different solution
still
in
we must base our
works not devoted
this
problem.
The Physics Prologue to the Commentary on one subject
first
is
as regards
one
did not,
the Metaphysics so, for the
speculations on
to
directly
Ockham. He
given by William
commentary on
unfortunately, write a
of interest to us,
is
is
his opinions
A
problem
expressed
sentence from
significant:
sort of priority, while
the
"Sometimes
another
first
is
For metaphysics being regards another sort of priority. whereas is the first subject of all as regards priority of predication, (ens) instance in
as
The priority is God." subject as regards priority of perfection of a subject of a certain science depends on the point of view which 5<)
the
first
could be one of many, methodologically fact
that
the
undermine of science
any
its
plurality
of
subjects
all
for
a
being equally qualified. The specific
unity does not have any significance for
science
seems
Ockham: the
to
unity
view only something accidental and is not based on and science, being an aggregate of certain premises
in his
is,
principle:
to conclusions, does not have to be characterized by some essential unity its well since as equal subjects be a science. This applies to metaphysics
God; thus the following sentences are equally true: attributionis est metaphysica primum inter omnia subiecta primitate and primum (i.e. subiectum) primitate perfectionis metaphysica are being and
"in
ens"
...
"in
est
57 Deus".
The review presented above subject
of
metaphysics
not,
One thing appears to the assures which best the cement unity of metaphysics
entitle us to arrive at
be certain:
is
of the positions taken in regard to the of course, complete. It also does not
any
far reaching conclusions.
the notion of being, treated either univocally or analogically. as well, since Being assures the unity of the formal aspect of metaphysics on behalf it enables it to deal with everything that falls within its scope subject
is
of features that
tell
subject of metaphysics to cause, or even if
we assume
being as being. The reduction of the something other than being: substance, prime
us something
is
God, does not generate that
the
crucial
its
integrity. It
is
lost
even more,
notion of metaphysics, namely being,
is
equivocal.
56
William
Indianapolis
of -
Ockham,
New York
Philosophical
Writings.
1964, p. 11.
Expositio super libros Physicorum, Prol.;
cf.
supra.
A
Selection,
transl.
Ph.
Boehner,
148
III.
Strozewski
Metaphysics and other sciences
What
is
the
sciences?
We
attributed
place
must, above
all,
to
could
features
characteristic
the
in
metaphysics
system
of
the
state the fact that metaphysics, despite
been
have
(which examining the problem of its subject),
observed
even
its
when
an integral part of a system
is
constituted by the sciences. What is more, in the common opinion of all mediaeval philosophers, without it this system would have been impossible.
A
whole range of problems exist, which are common to all sciences, which each of them separately or together cannot cope with due to yet the limitations of their subjects. These are basically the problems of (1)
being, essence, and existence, but also problems of relations: whole-part, 58
The ens commune as defined by St. Thomas seems to be the being considered by metaphysics as the common subject of all sciences. Yet it does not exclude the problems of being as ens simpliciter, act-potency, etc.
which, being the subject of prime interest to metaphysics, is considered as a transcendental and allows analogous procedure also in regard to the
Prime Being.
The notion of being is assumed by all sciences. They receive it from metaphysics with the most general notion of which they make use, not caring to work out its fundamental contents. This is also a task for which,
metaphysics,
in
reality. In the
St.
to
he
development
it
more
the
in
precise
as
Middle Ages, examined
well
as
of referring
in physics or metaphysics.
Thomas, who maintained
A
different opinion
that the notion of being 59
to
is
was not
be obtained through abstraction, but through separation. Due to it did not mix immaterial abstractions with individual, concrete
immaterial beings such as pure forms (substantiae separatae).^ When it comes to the semantics of the notion of possibilities
that
maintained that 58
it
case the reference was to abstractions, yet different
first
from that abstractions expressed by
its
of making
various ways
Cf. S.T. I-II 66, 5
could "being"
ad
4;
take
place
applies univocally to
In Met. XI,
1.1,
being,
all
Duns Scotus designations, St. Thomas
have been exhausted. its
2146.
CO In Boeth.
60 "Et
tantum 2174.
De
6.
haec est, quia nihil est in rerum natura praeter singularia existens, sed consideratione intellectus abstrahentis communia a propriis." In Met. XI, 1.2,
veritas in
Trinitate, 5 and
149
Metaphysics as a Science
that
docs
it
equivocally.
It
so
analogically,
would be
and
Ockham
finally,
interesting to
that
it
applies
what extent these
investigate to
had influence on the character of metaphysics, and also on other sciences that drew their foundations from metaphysics. solutions
Each science assumes not only general notions, but specific principles well. It assumes them as being evident or justified in another science
(2)
as
which
responsible for their validity.
is
It
is
this
that metaphysics does;
it not only makes use of first principles, but analyzes them and defends ideo sapientia non solum their validity: It was St. Thomas who said: "Et
utitur principiis indemonstrabilibus, eis,
sicut aliae scientiae; sed
quorum
est intellectus,
etiam iudicando de
eis,
concludendo ex
disputando contra
et
61 negantes."
St.
physicist
Albert
the
Great
analyzes
this
problem
in
detail.
When
a
assumes the existence of moving bodies or a mathematician the assume them to be existing. Yet they cannot
existence of dimension, they
derive being as being from their theorems; this has to be demonstrated 62 This can be only on the basis of principles concerning being itself. foundations theoretical ultimate the which done by metaphysics provides for all sciences: "inter theoricas autem excellit haec divina, quam modo
eo quod fundat omnium aliorum subiecta et passiones et 63 sicut nulla St. Thomas confirms it: principia, non fundata ab scientia particularis determinat quod quid est, ita etiam nulla earum dicit tractamus,
"Et
aliis."
de genere subiecto, circa quod versatur, est aut non est. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit; quia eiusdem scientiae est determinare questionem an est, et
manifestare quid
Thomas
est.
fundamental question of metaphysics, namely the question about the essence and existence of being. They are fundamental and ultimate at the same time, since all questions about the St.
formulates the
causes rely upon them, propter quid est?.
If
exists
and
that
61
1-1166,5 ad
S. T.
Alberti
63 64
also
one could demonstrate what
4.
Ibid., p. 3. 1.1,
1151.
questions of the quid est?, quia e^t? and
one could not demonstrate that the cause
Magni Metaphysica,
In Met. VI,
i.e.,
p. 2.
it
is,
at
issue
posing
such
Strozewski
150
would be
questions
And
senseless.
add
us
let
no other science
that
analyzes questions about essence or the questions about existence.
The
(3)
and
third area of interest to both metaphysics
to other sciences
the problem of immaterial substances, pure forms, even when they are understood as unmovable movers. Metaphysics covers the problem of
is
unmovable movers question
them from on what
its
Thus
physics.
is
comes from
in
scope,
given
it
does
it
yet
accepts the
seek
not
existential
judgment about
appears that metaphysics bases
direct,
answer the
to
itself
of metaphysics and physics in this case
is
very peculiar.
proving the existence of unmovable Movers, at the
them
interprets
not only
everyday experience, but also on what
i.e.,
scientific experience.
The meeting Physics,
in
existence, but
of their
as
they had to be pure forms, that
if
same time had to be
is,
immaterial. But because of the methodological limitations of physics to the realm of material objects,
turns
them
it
were
causes
prima ubique et
non
metaphysics which,
et
sit
quomodo
intellectus
nostre
est
thus
(prima principia)
possibilities of physics, but of
quomodo
to
fit
ibi
not
transgress
metaphysics as well. virtutes
possibilitatis
only
their entitas.
the
cognitive
autem causa
"Quomodo
corporum celestium ubique
ubi est illud inlelligatur explanare"
...
it
turn, does not
in
them thoroughly, but only under the aspect of
investigate First
as
over,
cannot deal with them further. Thus
it
altioris est
sint et
negotii
wrote Robert Grosseteste
in
65 And we could think that Commentary on the Posterior Analytics. a view of of from the he wrote it physicist, were it not for the point
his
that
fact
this
phrase
is
a
part
of
a
larger
whole
of
a
typically
metaphysical character.
Thus we could ask why metaphysics deals with is
known
possibilities?
towards
from
the
There
reality,
is
the
beginning
that
but one answer:
taking into
they it
is
subjects of which its
transgress
it
cognitive
the postulate of faithfulness
consideration of everything, of what
is
it to given in any way, even indirectly through other sciences that causes deal with such subjects. If this were not done by metaphysics, it would
be
like the
metaphysics of modern science, which would,
Commcntarium Robert 128.
Grosseteste
in
and
Posteriorum Anafyticorum the
Origins
libros,
I.
18,
f.
19rb.
e.g.,
A.C. Crombie, Oxford 1953, p.
Cf.
of Experimental Science 1100-1700,
declare a
151
Metaphysics as a Science
holes"
of
regard
elementary
the
or
particles
"black
in the universe.
some
In any case,
interested principles
in
prime
more important reason them closely to the
thinkers had an even
causes.
related
They
to
be
first
of cognition on which the sense of the whole of knowledge
depends. Such the
in
disinterest
complete
ties
of
spirit
traced to Robert Grosseteste; his relation to
may be
is
philosophy
neoplatonic
not
without
here.
importance
Complete cognizance of prime beings, immaterial prime substances, would the
guarantee
our
of
certainty
not
is
it
Unfortunately
cognition.
present condition, and we have to be 66 satisfied with the certainty connected with mathematical subjects. Further, St. Albert the Great points to the fact that first causes are accessible
to
our
in
intellect
its
Although for the human intellect they are cognitively the most difficult due to their abstractness, they nevertheless guarantee the certainty of the cognizance which refers to them. Complete knowledge is
maxima
scibilia.
a knowledge based on the cognition of causes; thus metaphysics seeking the prime causes guarantees certainty both to
and
sciences
the
to
considered the
which
aim of
refer
to
sciences
all
67
and
own
its
cognitive results itself
Metaphysics
it.
own
its
cause:
scientiam vere esse sapientiam, quae per se est scientia ipsius
causa
...
volumus, ipsamet
(4)
hoc
est,
et
ista
hoc
est,
quam
est,
cuius
gratia
sui
quem
propter
finis,
scire
ista,
quod
et
est
in
volumus,
AC
scientia".
only first in the recalling
nobilissima,
sui
scire
All the arguments cited above demonstrate that metaphysics
Bacon,
illam
"dicimus
quaerimus
ipsius
may be
qui
system of sciences, but that Aristotle ipsa
habet potestatem supra
est
and
Avicenna,
regula
omnem
scientie
partem
writes that the task of metaphysics
is
it
is
the ruling one.
maintains
speculative
that:
et
is
Roger
"hec
practice
not
est
quare
In another place he
philosophic".
to determine the origin,
number,
Robertas Grossctcste, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum libros, Intro duzione e testo critico di Pictro Rossi, Firenze 1981, p. 255-256. Cf. De veritate, in: Die Philosophise he Wcrke dcs Robert Grosseteste Bischofs von Lincoln, Zum erstensmal in kritischer vollstandig Ausgahe besorgt von Dr. Ludwig Baur (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic dcs Mittelaltcrs, B. IX), Munster A.C. Crombie, op. cit., p. 52-53. Alberti
68
69
Magni Metaphysica,
ed.
cit.,
p. 21.
Ibid., p. 18.
Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi,
ed.
cit.,
fasc.
X,
p. 13.
i.
W.
1912;
p.
137-138;
cf.
Str62ewski
152
and order of the sciences, and even the explanation of their specific features, for which reason some investigators of Bacon s philosophy consider him to be a precursor in treating metaphysics as preceding the 70 methodology of other sciences.
Siger of Brabant, stressing that metaphysics deals with
what
theoretical sciences,
all
the other sciences: St.
sciences,
Albert
antiquior et
Great
the
omni
prior
est,
quod iustum
alio
quodam
et
alia
that
Let us end
dignum
this
list
metaphysics, all:
quae formulatur
scientia,
alias scientias speculativas,
...
ab ipsa accipientes sua principia tota
St.
et
sit
Cuius signum quod non ab
Thomas.
Summa
In his
se habet philosophia
omnes
ipsa
sapientia
alia."
autem modo
nam ab
other
among
is
"ista
72
omnia
of quotations with "Hoc
aliae
prima
dependent, utpote
directionem contra negantes principia: Dei cognitionem sicut ad
ordinatur ad
prima philosophia ultimum fincm, unde et scientia divina ipsaque
71 scientias".
esse dicimus officium sapicntis,
ordinetur, sed ipse ordinet
contra gentiles he writes:
ad
notices
and as wisdom orders
doctrinalis
aim of
"the
sees a leading role in relation to
God"
iterum, haec scientia ordinal alias
"et
maxime
is
nominatur."
73
IV. Dignity of Metaphysics
Several justifications of the its
We
dignity.
particular
metaphysics to the
first,
names of metaphysics can
see
this
especially
aim
at
showing where reference of
directly
immaterial causes and, most of
to
all,
God
is
emphasi/ed. Avicenna claimed that the dignity of the object gives dignity et tune nominabitur haec to the science which is subordinated to it; "...
et dare rationem Metaphysica, cujus proprium est distingucrc omncs scientias, universalem de omnibus, quia est communis omnibus rebus et scientiis specialibus et in omnes suam influit potestatem." Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, fasc. Ill, Liber "...
primus nobilis
Communium
distinctione
et
demonstrans"
d apres
naturalium Fratris Rogeri, ed. by R. Steele, Oxford 1911, cum sit communis omnibus scientiis, est de
dcs
numero
et
ordine
cf.
E.
Charles, Roger Paris 1861, p.
ibid.;
textes
inedits,
Rogera Bacona, Wroclaw 1969, 7*
C.A.
Graiff,
Louvain 1948,
Siger
de
scientiarum
Metaphysica,
I,
Contra gentiles
Brabant,
tract. 2, cap. 3, p. 20. III,
25.
omnium, ostendens propria
Bacon, 142;
sa
M.
vie,
ses
ouvrages,
Frankowska,
"Nam
et
cuilibet
et
ses
"Scientia"
9.
origine
doctrines
w ujfdu
p. 57.
p. 7-8.
72 73
p.
Metaphysica,
pars
Questions
sur
la
Metaphysique.
Texte
inedit,
153
Metaphysics as a Science
ab eo, quod cst clignus in ca 74 This view came to divina". scicntia
be
hacc
vocabitur
scilicet
scientia
shared
by
scicntia,
scholastic
all
commentators on the Metaphysics. knowledge which refers to the first causes, and of them, also deserves the name of especially to the most superior Et haec est philosophia prima, quia ipsa est scientia de prima wisdom. the
However,
"...
causa
esse
etiam
est
et
...
veritatis
nobilius scitum, quia est
et
75 Deus...."
of these statements in the definitions of
De
divisione
identified
precision:
what
with wisdom,
it
"...
find a distinct trace
knowledge"
Gundissalinus
reason for
this
hec autem tres proprietates sapiencie
most
is
the
states
We
"divine
Dominicus
of
philosophiae
highest
dignified,
qua
Nobilior vero scientia, quia est certitudo
scitum.
apprehenditur nobilius
scientia
nobilior
est
quae
sapientia
certainty,
and
included in
who,
having
identification with
of
cognition
[i.e.,
reference
to
the
first
est nobilior
ipsa est sapiencia,
que causes] conueniunt huic sciencie: ergo uero sciencia est, sciencia, qua comprehenditur nobilius scitum, nobilior
est deus et cause que quia est certitudo ueritatis, et nobilius scitum, quia
sunt
cum,
post
cognicio
et
et
del."
The problem consideration. first
eciam cognicio causarum ultimarum omnis esse the
of
Let us see
commentators on
certainty
how
this
of
metaphysics
certainty
is
deserves
Robert Grosseteste. In
Aristotle,
separate
by one of the
justified
his
Commentary more certain
on the Posterior Analytics, he states that that knowledge which is logically prior, i.e., relates to primary things (est de prioribus}. At this moment, however, he introduces a new, neoplatonic element: is
to the primary things are more certain because they are better adjusted mind. Thanks to it, knowledge about spiritual light which pervades our
immaterial
substances
Furthermore,
things.
accessible to us.
is it
more
certain
appears
The human
that
than knowledge about material this certainty is not presently
intellect in the state in
which
it
now
is
must
rose be content with the certainty of mathematical truths. If, however, to the state in which it should be, the divine things would become most certain for it: "Intellectui igitur humane, qualis est adhuc in nobis, sunt it
res
mathematice
74 Met.,
75
t.
I, c.
4, fol.
Ibid.,c. 2, fol.
De
certissime
71v C;
cf.
...;
J.C. Doig, p. 85.
71rE-F.
diuisione philosophiae,
sed
p. 36, 3-8.
intellectui
tali
qualis
debet
esse
154
Strozewski
sccundum statum
sunt res divinae certissime, et quanto res sunt priores et natura sublimiores tanto certiores." 77 sui
optimum
Argumentation of Thomas Aquinas is worth considering here. In the to his Commentary on Aristotle s Metaphysics, the methodo
Proemium
arguments he refers to are anchored in assumptions made even in politics. The goal to which all sciences and
logical
in ethics
and
arts
subordinated
autem
man
is
s
perfection as identified with his happiness:
scientiae et artes ordinantur in
tionem, quae est ejus
same
-in
happiness
unum,
a
as
belonging
most
the
sciences,
top
(who,
of
powers,
cognitive
We
all
most
must
Platonic: as
cognitive
other
will
efficient
objects which
cognitive
hierarchy of the social
of
reference
direct
to
most
cognitive
most
are
3)
are
satisfied
certainty,
supreme
is
which deals with objects
that
is
is
2)
by:
certainty,
2)
adequate
for
intelligibilia).
1)
that
They are
most
absolute
guarantee connected with
is
that,
God and
3)
Posterionim
Analvticorum
libros,
ed.
this
argumentation with Aristotle
s
as
pure intelligences whose
P.
Rossi,
257.
78
it
beings which are
is absolutely independent of material conditions and subordinated to intellectual powers only. 78
in
These
cognition.
cognition
Commcntarius
general
which
which
nothing more general than e.g.,
the
provide
intellectual
causes
first
Being and
completely separated from matter,
Compare
Aristotle s
satisfy (together or separately) the following conditions: 1)
being, for there
strictly
hierarchy.
one step more and we will be able to identify sages soon appear, are metaphysicians) with rulers. Among
guarantee
conditions
as
the
notice, however, that the spirit of this argumentation
powers the
information,
the
therefore
becomes
knowledge, just as those who are should rule and reign people of weaker
kinds
requiring the purest intellectual cognition (maxime
they
it
secondly,
and
is
allows us to treat
and
perfection
essence;
Here Thomas Aquinas makes
intellect.
clearly
s
it
domain of knowledge is parallel to hierarchy within the most intellectual knowledge, namely wisdom, is at the
rules
intellectually
Politics.
man
all,
compound analogy between
hierarchy
society:
and
to
human
of
of
first
-
the
in
Hierarchy
human
of the
point
starting
coefficient strictly
scilicet
resembling the teachings of Socrates
here a matter of the utmost importance:
knowledge
"Omnes
ad hominis perfecThis close connection of wisdom and
beatitudo."
respects
are
Metaphysics A, 2 982a.
is
therefore
Firenze
1981,
p.
155
Metaphysics as a Science
from these three objects and the manners of their cognition that knowledge which deals with them receives not only its supreme It
dignity,
is
but also
names:
its
first
philosophy, metaphysics, divine science,
or theology.
As
a conclusion for this chapter,
us quote an opinion which
let
is
collects all of the reasons to be obviously eclectic, but which perhaps found to prove the dignity of our science. In the Proemiwn to his
Commentary on philosopher
the
from
Metaphysics,
the
primae philosophiae
et
University praestantia
John of
of
claims:
Cracow,
ultra
a
Gtogow,
alias
XVth
century
"Dignitas
ut
disciplinas,
itaque
expositores
ex metaphysicac Aristotelis ostendunt, ex sex potest persuaderi: primo eius ex utilitate, eius perfectibilitate, secundo ex eius sublimitate, tertio sexto quarto ex eius iocunditate, quinto ex eius firmitate, eius necessitate.
accipitur perfectibilitate,
enim
Terficit
ultimo ex
(...)
primae philosophiae dignitas ex eius nostrum. ipsa enim perficit maxime intellectum
metaphysicae
"Primo
et
metaphysica
intellectum nostrum vel
vel
,
ut
dicit
Albertus
animam secundum
illud,
primo
quod
est
Metaphysicae divinum in ea
,
.
(...)
ex metaphysicae dignitas vel primae philosophiae accipitur eius sublimitate; est enim ipsa metaphysica secundum Aristotelem primo "Secundo
Metaphysicae
dea scientiarum
et
eius
ilia
possessio plus divina
quam
Ipsa enim habet firmare et dirigere alias scientias, regere autem et gubernare sublimium et magnorum est. Omnes etiam aliae scientiae metaphysicae subserviunt et famulantur, ipsa enim sola est libera
humana
et
est.
sui.
gratia
Versatur etiam circa substantias separatas divinas, quibus
nihil praestantius,
sublimius et dignius invenitur.
(...)
metaphysicae sive primae philosophiae accipitur dignitas ex eius utilitate, utile enim est homini cognoscere omnium causas, sine est maxima scibilia quibus nihil perfecte sciri potest. (...) Utile etiam "Tertio
cognoscere, ab
dependet.
eorum enim cognitione omnium aliorum
cognitio oritur et
(...)
metaphysicae vel primae philosophiae dignitas accipitur ex eius iocunditate. Delectabile enim est intellectui hominis ea noscere, quae et altissima sunt; metaphysica autem, ut dictum nobilissima, "Quarto
dignissima
est, circa
res divinas, altissimas ct nobilissimas est.
(...)
primae philosophiae dignitas accipitur ex metaphysicac eius firmitate. Ostendit enim Aristoteles primo De anima quod una "Quinto
vel
,
156
Strozewski
scientia
est
altera
dignior
sccundo ex eo quod quidem
autem
mcliorum
certissimorum principiorum
est
autem
Oportet
modo:
duplici et
divina
esse
et
et
rationc
primo
mirabiliorum est
ccrtitudinis,
Metaphysica
.
causarum primarum intransmutabilia
immortalia,
speculatrix.
omni
ab
et
corruptione aliena.
ultimo metaphysicae dignitas accipitur ex eius necessitate;
et
"Sexto
necessaria enim
Quod
est
disciplina
pulchre
omnes
huius scire ultra
deducit Alexander
in
prooemio
scripti
alias
sui
disciplinas.
super primo
Metaphysicae cum dixit in haec verba: metaphysica versatur circa ens inquantum ens et quae ens sequuntur; ens enim et ea quae sequuntur ens ,
communia Scientia
sunt omnibus, de quibus consideratur in scientiis particularibus.
autem propriorum
communium
quod
scientiae
Concludit
.
The aim that
Necessaria
of this paper was by no
I
specialis
scientia,
in
qua ens
."
to exhaust its subject, something any case; nor was it to propose new could not have aspired to do. If I have managed
way
would have been unrealisable which
una
est
communium, eo
cuiuslibet
omnium communium, quae sequuntur
ens; et haec est metaphysica
interpretations, to
et
sine scientia
cognitionem
ingreditur
Alexander:
determinatur de natura entis
inquantum
non potest
acquiri
virtus
in
and systematize some basic and very well known matters,
recall
I
myself satisfied with having accomplished my goal. In conclusion let me pose a question which might move us not as
shall find
historians
of
philosophy,
but
as
philosophers.
metaphysics nothing more than an
and
vivid
values
It
reads:
Is
monument today
historical
for
mediaeval or does
it
such", any important metaphysics metaphysics which, after a period of its detronization by positivism, today witnesses a calm, but unquestionable, renaissance?
carry
Instead of a direct answer,
let
me
refer to the thoughts of three
contemporary philosophers whose opinions value of at least
some
"as
I
see as confirmation of the
of the questions that are posed and answered by
metaphysics. First
is
Roman
phenomenology Jana Aristotelis),
in
his
Ingarden.
works,
Faithful
he posed
to
the
program
of
the essential question
z Gtogowa Komentarz do Metafizyki (Commentarius wydafRyszard Tatarzyriski, Warszawa 1984, fasc. 1, p. 19-21.
in
classical
of the
Metaphysicam
157
Metaphysics as a Science
quid
est
type, but also stressed the role of questions
about existence, an
about modes of being and of the existential moments that constitute them. According to Ingarden, the problem of real, individual essence
cst,
realized within the frame of real existence (being) 80
metaphysics.
Does
this
by the scholastics? The second thinker
differ
subject
I
would
essentially
is
the
from
main subject of that
like to refer to is Nikolai
formulated
Hartmann. In
metaphysics he saw a science which was the only one to take up the problem of mystery and to approach the areas which are wrapped in it
by necessity. In
this context
Hartmann speaks
neither of
God, nor about
the so-called prime causes, the adequate cognition of which, according to scholastics,
transgressed the cognitive possibilities of a human. Instead,
he spoke of the sense of mystery common to them. The more so, as it is related to what in reality is the most fundamental: existence through its subject. Lastly,
Martin Heidegger. His
efforts to restore the rightful position
and importance to the problem of being - Sein - are worth the highest respect, even though they were accompanied by a bitter conviction that European philosophy had long since forgotten about being. I believe that mediaeval
should
philosophy
be
excluded
from
this
indictment.
Its
metaphysical roots are active right now, enlivening our reflections about
by various trends of mediaeval metaphysics are indeed worthy of our attention and our following today.
being
and
Paths
existence.
indicated
Uniwersytet Jagielloriski
or\
R. Ingarden,
Der
Streit
um
die Existenz der Welt, B.
1,
Tubingen 1964,
5 and
6.
ALAIN DE LIBERA
Le developpement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels dans la philosophic de la nature au XIVe siecle
et leur utilisation
Tant dans la
la
tradition philosophique
perspective
specifique
de
1
proprement
dite (Heidegger)l
des sciences
histoire
(Koyre)
que dans
Petude des
jusque dans un passe recent, etc dominee par deux decisions theoriques: (1) les sciences de la nature sont reduites a la physique, (2) dans la physique est privilegie ce qui sciences et de
la
appartient a
mecanique
la
philosophic de
et
la
nature au
par consequent a
Moyen Age
theorie du
la
a,
mouvement
local.
Ces deux decisions cxpliquent que Ton considere la problematique medievale des sciences de la nature a partir d une comparaison retrospective entre la conception du mouvement elaboree par
les artisans
de
la
mecanique classique
Newton) et la conception "aristotelicienne" des medievaux plus ou moins identifiee a ce qu on appelle la conception "ordinaire". C est dans cetle perspective que Ton a pris habitude de Descartes,
(Galilee,
1
distinguer
XIV C
la
siecle
physique de Page classique les
par
Pevolution et de
la
"nominalistes
formation de
la
physique nouvelle forgee au
et la
parisiens",
en
pensee de Galilee
tableau synthetique de Pevolution de
la
physique
utilisant
Phistoire
comme
fournissant
pre-galilcenne":
de "le
physique
nominaliste de { physique (dile physique impetus), archimedienne, en meme temps que Pinstance critique et le terrain de tous aristotelicienne,
les cnjcux:
la "mathematisation".
etapes d une histoire en
archetypiques du
Avec Galilee on
meme
mouvement
et
temps que de Pespace:
physique aristotelicienne (qui implique
"la
se le
voit
done se scandcr
les
delimiter des conceptions
mouvement-processus de
la
neccssite de Paction continuelle de
cause-moteur contigue au mobile") et la conception "nominaliste" du s epuise en mouvement-effet de la force imprimee dans le mobile P"arret necessaire du mobile" son cffet" toutes deux produisant impliquant la
"qui
sont abandonnees au profit du mouvement-etat (ou "comme
cette
1
Cf.
tout ctat dure sans
pcrsistance";
M. Heidegger, Qu
la
est-ce
qu aucune cause
conception
qu une chose?,
"translation
soil necessaire
simple")
une transformation
de
Pespace
trad.
Reboul-Taminiaux, Paris 11971,
"subit
qui
pour expliquer
p. 92-106.
Le developpement dc noiiveaux instruments conccpluels
"a
analogue":
1
cspacc physique d
distincts, se substitue
1
ensemble de
Aristote",
espace abstrait, homogene, de
archimcdien), ce qui entraine
la
"disparition
159
lieux qualitativement la
geometric (espace
du cosmos de
la
physique
medievale" 2 . II
n
est
pas question de remettre
de Koyre dans pas lui
annees 1935:
les
le "prolongement
tourne
comme
le dos,
elle
des analyses
les resullats
que la dynamique de Galilee n physique de ^impetus et meme qu
est acquis
il
de
naturel"
en cause
ici
la
tourne
est
"elle
le
dos au sens
commun
et a
I
experience
non plus question de revenir sur les analyses de a la meme epoque3 dans un autre conlexte et scion Heidegger, formulccs commune".
II
n
est pas
,
d autres perspectives. Nous voudrions, au contraire, au seuil d aborder "une pensee qui n est plus la notre", suivre un des preceptes fondamentaux de la
methodologie d Alexandre Koyre: integrante de notre pensee" et
"oublier
les verites qui sont
"adopter"
les
"modes",
les
devenues partie "categories de
metaphysiques qui pour les gens d une epoque passee etaient d aussi valables et d aussi sures bases de raisonnement et de recherche que le sont pour nous les principes de la physique mathematique et raisonnement" et les "principes
les
donnees de
1
Envisager dans
"utilisation
au
XiVe
2 Sur
astronomie".
developpement d un nouvel "outillage conceptuel" et son domaine de la science" ou de la "philosophic de la nature"
le le
siecle
consiste
done,
dans
un premier temps,
a
oublier
la
developpement de ces themes chez A. Koyre, cf. entre autres, "Galilee et Platon", trad, un article "Galileo and Plato", paru dans le Journal of the History of Ideas, IV/4 (1943), p. 4CXM28, repris dans A. Koyre, Etudes d histoire de la pensee scientifique, Paris: 1966, p. e 166-195; "Galilee et la revolution scientifique du XVII siecle", trad, franchise de article paru dans la Philosophical Re\ iew (1943, p. 333-348), repris dans Etudes d histoire de la pensee etude sur Die Vorldufer Galileis im XIV. Jahrhundcrt, scientifique, p. 196-212. Voir egalcment in: Archives internationales d histoire des sciences, IV/16 (1951), p. 769-783, et la reponse d A. le
franchise d
1
1
"Die naturphilosophische Bedeutung der scholastischen Impetus-Thcoric" Scholastik, 30 (1955), p. 321-343. Sur revolution des perspectives historiques et methodologiques d A. Maier, E. Sylla, "Anneliese Maier and the History of Medieval Science", in: Studi sul cf. J. Murdoch
Maier,
,
&
XIV secolo
in
memoria
p.
&
Roma
Maieru A. Paravicini Bagliani (eds.), 7-23 [avec une bibliographic d A. Maier, p. 15-23].
di Anneliese Maier, A.
1981 (Storia e Letteratura, 151),
On sail que Die Frage nach dcm Ding. 7,u Kants Lehre von den Transzendentalcn Grundsdtzen, Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1962, reprcnd en fait le texte d un cours professe durant le scmcstre d hiver 1935-1936 a Universite de Fribourg-en-Brisgau. Les travaux de Koyre sur annees d apprentissage de Galilee", dont nous extrayons nos citations, sont exactement contemporains. Cf. "Resume de la Conference d Alexandre Koyre au Comite international d histoire des sciences, lors de sa Vile reunion annuelle. 26-27 juin 1935", Archeion, 17 (1935), p. 250 sq.\ "Proces-vcrbal de la seance de la section d histoire des sciences du Centre international dc synthese",/lrcto o/j, 18 (1936), p. 238 sqq.; documents repris dans A. Koyre, Dc la mystique a la science. Cours, conferences et documents, 1922-1962, P. Redondi (ed.), Paris: Fxiitions des Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales, 1986, p. 38^40. 3
1
"les
I
de Libera
160
problematique des "precurseurs" ou des "predecesseurs" de Galilee, la mise en parallele de la conception aristotelicienne avec la conception dite "ordinaire" du mouvement, la predominance du mouvement local sur les autres formes
de mouvement ou de changement etudiees par degager les determine
les
"modes",
la
"categories"
production
theologiques ou se
d un
et les
medievaux, a tenter de
les
"principes"
ensemble
qui ont effectivement
d enonces
philosophiques
et
une certaine conception de la nature caracteristique des du XIV e siecle.
dit
savoirs et des pratiques scientifiques
C est la
une donnee
aristotelicienne, constante depuis le
XHIe
philosophic naturelle ne se laisse pas uniformement reduire a
C est done
siecle,
que
physique*.
sur le fond traditionnel d une mise en ordre des ecrits naturels
aristoteliciens
(ou
determination des
d Ockham:
la
six parties
de
(1)
qu
pseudo-aristoteliciens)
de
philosophic naturelle
la
condicionibus
communibus
naturalium, (2) de corporibus coelestibus corporibus inanimatis
et
rationali et actibus eius
et
eonim passionibus, (5) de
faut
il
ceteris
et
eorum
comprendre la selon Guillaume
magis notis proprietatibus,
omnium (3)
de
de corpore animato anima
(4)
animalibus
et
eorum
proprietatibus, (6)
de plantis. Pour etre effectivement comprise, cette classification appelle, cependant, trois observations complementaires: -
Si la theorie des
mouvements
naturels est un element essentiel de la
du corpus mobile (ou de Vens mobile} ne se laisse pas ramencr a un domaine dc problemes homogenes a la stride problematique du mouvement local, qui seule autoriserait une evaluation retrospective de la "physique" du XIVe siecle a partir des visees et des enjeux
scientia naturalis, la science
epistemologiques de la "mecanique" classique; en d autres physique de V impetus ne peut a elle seulc constituer un terrain
philosophiques termes:
la
d observation conception de
physique
et
historico-philosophique la
suffisant
nature caracteristique du
nominaliste
nominaliste, physique
,
la
triade
classique"
XIVe
"physique
n offre pas une
pour
reconstruire
siecle sous les especes
"la"
d une
physique de lecture suffisamment
aristotelicienne, grille
4
Pour Roger Bacon la scientia naturalis comprend la perspective, Yastronomia iudiciaria et pondcrum, Valkimia, Vagricultura, la medicina, la scientia experimentalis Pour Albert le Grand les sciences naturelles se divisent en trois: la science du corps nature! mobile per se ou physique, la science du corps nature! mobile materiel et simple, qui comprend, par exemple, la theorie de la generation et de la corruption, du ciel et du monde, du lieu, des proprietes des elements, la science du corps nature! mobile materiel et mixte, englobant notamment les meteorologiques, la psychologic, les mouvements des aninvux, la botanique, la operativa, la scientia
zoologie.
.
161
Le dcveloppement dc nouveaux instruments conceptuels fine
phenomenes qui ont determine, des maitres du XlVe siecle.
pratique specifique -
de
les
pour apprecier
la
de
la scientia naturalis
d
"reception
la scolastique tardive est
Cette
Aristote".
elle
si
un moment
particulier
ne peut etre correctement "reception" delimitation de Pobjet de la philosophie
appreciee aux seuls niveaux de la naturelle (la delimitation de Pextension du domaine des naturalia) accointances supposees avec "representation habituelle"
differents
total
experience
XlVe
siecle
doctrine generate
la
d instrumentation
types
Pontologie ou de
ou
1
commune
conceptuelle
la
de ses
ni et
mesure des innovations, des continuites
la
auteurs du
les
ruptures apportees par
d un aristotelisme
:
donnees de
les
la
existe,
de et
des
consideration
suppose de la connaissance, et
les
la
les
de
propositions
philosophie premiere doivent necessairement aussi trouver
la
Autrement dit: on ne saurait a la fois reprocher aux medievaux d avoir elabore une physique qualitative proche des donnees de 1 experience une maniere purement dialectique tournant commune et d avoir precede leur place.
"d
en une
ou un
analyse"
conjonction de ces -
la
naturalis
"experimentation"
L essence du
mathematisation de
la
la
"sans
assise" 6
-
pourtant
la
dans Phistoriographie.
scolastique tardive est aussi, mais
particulier
"une
contredit la representation
intuitive".
de
moment
un
mathematique qui exige plus d
conceptuels
griefs est traditionnelle
scientia
exclusivement,
"poeme"5
dans
Phistoire
de
la
non
pensee
representation fondamentale des choses qui
habituelle" et,
effective
pour
de cefait meme, ne reclame pas non "offrir
corps a une representation
mathematique scolastique ne reside pas dans la physique mais dans un ensemble de procedures et de projet
methodes de calcul portant sur des determinations et des enonciations anticipantes, ou propositions, qui constituent autant de prises prealables et de variations sur la maniere dont se construisent des processus de changement.
Cette construction ne vise ni a decrire ni a reconstituer ce qui se passe en realite
mais a definir une verite normative pour le "savoir naturel" congu auto-enchainemcnt d enonces portant sur des objets, les mobiles,
comme
soumis par
En
la
pensee a des stipulations autonomes sinon arbitraires (casus).
ce sens Pobjet de \aphilosophia naturalis est moins la Nature, ou
meme
la
Nature scion Aristote, qu un ensemble d entites ou de processus physiques formule sur la base de la typologie "aristotelicienne" des mouvements et de Pontologie categorielle qui
la
supporte.
5
M. Heidegger, Qu
est-ce
qu une chosel,
p.
6
M. Heidegger, Qu
est-ce
qu une chose!
p. 93.
,
100
dc Libera
162
Cette derniere caracteristique est bien connue. Mais son sens reste
Vue dans
problematique.
nommalium ockhamiste objets
realium
via
et
la quantite, le
de
reference
mouvement,
opposition
entre
via
que dans 1 ontologie temps n ont d autres
et le
leurs
et
aurait
physiques"
1
fait
espace
1
substances
les
que
des realites
"meconnaissance
de
termes
les
correspond au
elle
meme
qualites:
cette
de degrader
effet
pour
la
en semio-physique, 1 analyse quantitative des processus reels en analyse logique d enonces quantificationnels portant sur les substances et les qualites impliquees dans les changements. A terme,
philosophic naturelle
"la
deviendrait
quantification"
science
d
Ockham
sont
se
"plus
ce qui expliquerait
physique",
"peut-etre
dans toutes
lances
bientot
de logique
affaire
pourquoi
successeurs
les
varietes
les
possibles
de
d interminables
a
attardant
de langage que de
et
subtilites logiques sophismala calculatoria, n ayant que peu de valeur quant a la mise en oeuvre d une veritable comprehension de la nature" 7 Cette appreciation negative a au moins un s
.
met clairement en lumiere
merite. Elle
caractcristique du
de
la
logique
et
XIVc
de
1
caractere philosophique du projet
le
que son
siecle ainsi
ontologie. Mais
elle
trait interne:
manque
1
entre-implication
le principal: les
auteurs de
les Calculators n ont pas un projet de comprehension de
sophismata et nature. Les techniques du
"calcul"
ne sont pas destinees a
1
la
investigation
systematique des phenomencs naturels. L accent principal est mis sur des "experiences de pensce", secundum irnaginationern, qui n ont aucun rapport avec une realisation concrete, et qui, pour une large part, ne sauraient meme trouvcr place dans
Les nouveaux
le
cadre de
"outils
la
conceptuels"
instruments destines a assurer
domaine de
la
logique,
"nature".
le
du XIVc
siecle
ne sont pas de simples
transfer! des raisons physiques dans le
ce sont des systemes conceptuels delimitant des
reseaux de relations organisees logicc ou sophistice loquendo sans reference ou plutot ces originaire au reel, naturaliter ou physice loquendo^. Ces "outils",
"langages"
intensione
analytiqucs et
-
De
remissione
incipit
et
desinit,
fonnamm,
De
De maximo
et
proportionibus
minimo, De ont deux
caracteristiques principals: (a) ce sont tous des langages mathematiques
au moins quantitatifs dont
7 W.A. Wallace, Causality 8
les interferences sont
and scientific
explanation
1
reconnues
(Ann Arbor
et
ou
explorees pour
1972), p. 54.
Sur le sens de ces expressions, cf. C. Wilson, William Heytesbury. Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics, (The University of Wisconsin. Publications in Medieval Science, 3), Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1956, p. 24-25.
Le developpement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels
commun
elles-memes, (b) leur terrain originaire sophismata, ou
s
exprime
que
plutot
disputatio,
commentaires de
la
genre, oriente vers le
le
est le
Physique
et
du De
litteraire
genre
un genre
pratique universitaire d
la
163
particulier
que constituent
"reel",
des
de les
caelo.
Pour comprendre le sens de introduction des langages "analytiques" au XlVe siecle on doit done s interroger autant sur les conditions effectives de 1
leur
et
apparition
que sur
scientifiques
alors
les
des
changements
des
et
modalites pratiques de leur application.
les
les "nouveaux outils conceptuels"
que
mentalites
des Calculators sont
paradigmes
On
constate
le fruit
d une
evolution dans la conception de la science et de la scientificite en general plutot
que d un changement dans la representation particuliere de la nature ou d une modification dans la perception de la rationalite naturelle. S il est vrai langages analytiques portent sur des objets non empiriques librement construits par 1 imagination sans pour autant cesser de produire du savoir, il les
que
un changement radical dans la perception des rapports entre le rationnel et le reel (au-dela ou en dec,a du clivage traditionnel entre Yens reale et Yens rationis, le verum et \&fictum) en meme temps qu une refonte et une faut postuler
redistribution des notions telles
contingent,
que
avait
les
propositions categoriques
du necessaire, de
"habituelles"
elaborees
la
impossible et du
1
doctrine de la matiere des
.
Nous tenterons de
decrire
cette
evolution en
analysant
les
points
suivants: le
(1)
changement des conceptions de
occasionne par
"certitude"
la
la
demonstration
resorption des topiques dans
la
et
de
la
theorie et la
pratique des consequentiae\
accroissement pratique de ces resultats dans
1
(2)
mental ouvert par (3) le
le
nouvel espace
le obligationes;
developpement de nouveaux modeles pour
les
modalites (possible,
impossible, necessaire, contingent) sur la base des acquis ou des problemes
de
theologie de potentia Dei absoluta;
la
(4)
1
aboutissement de ces convergences dans
le
"format"
theorique des
sophismata.
Avant d entamer
meme
d
"outil
domaine de sait,
et
le
cette analyse,
analytique".
portee
nous
faut,
La notion de
cependant, revenir sur
"langage
conceptuel"
la
notion
appliquee au
du Moyen Age tardif a, comme chacun Professeur John Murdoch. Afin d en saisir la nature
philosophic naturelle
ete introduite par le
la
il
effectives
il
convient
d en
rappeler
brievement
les
traits
de Libera
164
Dans "Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science in the Late J. Murdoch a defini un changement de perspective dans la
caracteristiques.
Middle
Ages",
tardive
scolastique
double
la
presentant
de
caracteristique
s
eloigner
d Aristote sans pour autant annoncer Galilee 9 Le facteur initial ou Pelement determinant de ce changement consiste dans le "developpement de nouveaux .
langages conceptuels permettant de trailer les problemes traditionnels de philosophic
en
tout
naturelle
inventant
en
et
de
resolvant
la
nouveaux
Ces nouveaux langages sont de deux types. Les deux premiers ou "quasi mathematiques", il s agit: (1) du langage de "mathematiques"
problemes".
sont 1
intension et de la remission des formes, avec les concepts solidaires de
degres
et
de latitudes;
(2)
de
celui des proportiones applique
Bradwardine aux variables du mouvement
mais
local,
notamment par
utilise
de maniere
tout accroissement arithmetique dans
beaucoup plus generate pour comparer un ensemble de choses donnees avec un accroissement geometrique dans autre ensemble.
Un
autre langage,
applications effectives, est logique:
autrement
la
de
epistcmologiques,
trailer
ontologiques,
tel
champ de ses
du langage des suppositiones, cadre de la theorie semantique
s agit (3)
il
le
Murdoch comme un
reference, langage caracterise par
permettant
analytique"
plus extensif quant au
du langage formule dans
dit
medievale de
le
"outil
de problemes logiques, toutes ou plus metaphysiques, physiques sortes
specifiquement de motu. Le langage des suppositiones n est evidemment pas une creation du XIVc siecle: on sail, grace aux travaux du Professeur L.M. De Rijk,
qu
il
a etc mis au point dans la seconde moitie du XII e siecle 10
Murdoch marque done
la specificite
du XlVe
siecle
dans
la
;
J.
combinaison de
ce langage ancien avec une ontologie nouvelle, le Nominalisme, ou plus
exactement ajouter:
(4)
1
ontologie
"particulariste"
une nouvelle
"prescription
langage analytique proprcmcnt
permet
de
"pousser
I
dit: le
comme
Enfin, on 1
recours a
la
ces trois langages, recherche"
licites
plutot
il
faut
qu un
potentia Dei absoluta, qui limites
des
a Pinterieur de la philosophic
plus large de ce qui est logiquement en compte (5) toute une "constellation de operativite se verifie" de maniere plus qu englobante, et que
naturelle et de s engager dans le
concepts dont
pour
A
la
examen d une question au-dela des
possibilites physiques recues
permissible".
d Ockham.
champ
doit prendre
9 Science in the Late Middle Ages", in: Cf. J. Murdoch, "Philosophy and the Enterprise of Interaction between Science and Philosophy, Y. Elkana (ed.), Humanities Press, 1974, p. 58. 10 Cf. essentiellement: L.M. De Rijk, Logica modernorum, II, Development of the Theory of Supposition, Assen: Van Gorcum, 1967.
1:
The
The Origin and Early
Le developpement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels on pcut rcgroupcr sou:: Ic litre dc "valcurs infmies", qu forces, de durees ou d intensites de toutes sortes. 1
Telle que la presente
place
prise
par
s
agissc dc poids, dc
and the Enterprise of
"Philosophy
langage des suppositiones dans
le
il
165
Science",
la
reformulation des
la
problemes traditionnels de la philosophic naturelle est double: reduction des termes connotatifs a une "une fonction" des termes absolus; elimination des representees par des termes
"fictions"
comme
"instant",
"point",
"ligne"
et
du role joue par ces termes a des propositions epurees dans lesquelles ils ne figurent plus. Dans un texte posterieur: "Prepositional
transfer!
Analysis in Fourteenth-Century Natural et
langage semantique
de pensee que s Symposium de BonnR
la
ontologie particulariste est definie
corps a une veritable methode, ligne
Philosophy"! 1,
inscrit
On
l
"analyse
"Scientia
propositionnelle".
mediantibus
parle desormais d une
des problemes de philosophic
naturelle",
comme donnant C est dans cette
vocibus",
"analyse
veritable
"outil
entre
solidarite
prononce au
metalinguistique methodologique"
completant ou encadrant 1 utilisation des autres "langages analytiques". Ce recours a la notion d analyse metalinguistique permet en outre de reclasser certains langages selon
C
intentionibus.
changement
est
une
distinction entre traitement de re et traitement de
ainsi
est
que le probleme assume de re au niveau du
langage analytique de primo dernier instant de
1
etre
et
aristotelicien
de
1
instant
du
le "langage objet" forme par ultimo instanti en termes de premier ou de
ou du non-etre d un
assume de intentionibus au niveau du
sujet
donne, alors qu
"metalangage"
offert
par
il
1
est
outil
metalinguistique que constitue analyse, l "expositio", d une proposition, en termes de commencer et de finir, de incipit et desinit^. 1
11
"Prepositional
40 (1979), 12 in:
Analysis in Fourteenth-Century Natural Philosophy:
A Case
Study",
Synthese,
p. 117-146.
Scientia mediantibus vocibus. Metalinguistic Analysis in Late Medieval Natural Philosophy", Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittclalter, (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 13/1), 1981, p. 73-106.
13
Sur la problematique de incipit/dcsinit et de primo/ultimo instanti, cf. A. Maier, Die Vorlaufcr Galilei im XIV. Jahrhundert (Storia e Letteratura, 22), Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura,1949, p. 9-25; Zwischcn Philosophic und Mechanik (Storia e I^etteratura, 69), Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1958, p. 3-59; N. Kretzmann, "Incipit/desinit", in: Motion and R. G. Turnbull (eds.), Columbus: Ohio University Time, Space and Matter, P. K. Machamcr
& & A.
I. Lehtinen, "Change and Contradiction: A Fourteenth-Century Controversy", Synthese, 40 (1979), p. 189-207; A. de Libera, "Apollinaire Offredi critique de Pierre de Mantoue: Le Tractatus de instanti et la logique du changement", in: English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries. Acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medie\ al Logic and Semantics. Rome 10-14 November 1980, A. Maieru (ed.), (History of Logic, 1), Naples: Bibliopolis, 1982, p. 253-291; R. Sorabji, "Stopping and Starting", in: Time, Creation and the Continuum. Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, Londres: Duckworth, 1983,
Press,
1976,
p.
101-136;
S.
Knuuttila
de Libera
166
developpcmcnt de langages
Si le
quantitatifs et de langages logiques
constitue le trait distinctif de la science naturelle 1
interaction de ces langages
ou de ces
du XlVe
siecle,
c est
permet de comprendre
outils qui
le
sens du projet mathematique specifique de la scolastique tardive. Cette interaction apparait a differents niveaux.
Tout d abord par la predominance d une problematique de la mesure et de la mensuration entendue comme probleme logique de denomination^ ,
essentiellement
a
appliquee
des
distances
spatiales,
ou
temporelles
continuums statiques dont les elements presentent une relation d ordre; aux diverses sortes de changements et de mouvements essentielles; a des
dans
par Aristote
distingues
les
et
Categories
la
temps au
point
triple
de vue de
(croissance, decroissance)
et
du
lieu
La seconde manifestation de mesure 1
et
1
memes qu le
(alteration),
(mouvement
intervalle
de
la
de
quantite
local).
interaction entre la problematique de la
regies de mensuration quant aux langages analytiques mettent en oeuvre: c est ainsi que, tout en etant formulee
des
ellcs
langage des proportiones
associant
qualite
un
analyse logique reside dans les croisements repctes qui marquent
application
dans
1
la
changement
Physique:
substantiel instantane, processus accidentels deployes sur
la
progression
la
"Regie
de
arithmctique
dynamique"
la
vitesse
de Bradwardine
d un
mobile
a
la
progression gcometrique du rapport de ses causes (forces/resistances) est egalement traduite dans le langage de intcnsion ct de la remission des 1
formes.
En
outre, et c est le troisiemc point,
par
"testee"
rapport
a
"toutes
les
chaque regie de mesure peut etre
variations
concevablcs"
secundwn
imaginationem d une qualite, d une puissance ou de quelque autre entite 15 n "mesurable" cngage aucune que ce soil. Cette "rule-testing activity" confrontation du calcul avec Pexperience ou
expcrimcntation active, son but n est pas la connaissance du reel commun ni la verification d une hypothese, mais la production de nouvellcs regies ou 1 engendrement de nouveaux 1
Remarks on the Background of the Fourteenth Century Limit Decision The Editing of Theological and Philosophical Texts from the Middle Ages, Acts of the Conference Arranged by the Department of Classical Languages, University of Stockholm, 29-31 August 1984, M. Asztalos (ed.), (Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Studia Latina Stockholmiensia, XXX), Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell International, 1986, p. 245-266. p.
403-421;
S.
Controversies,
14 les cf.
15
Knuuttila,
in:
entre Cf. J. Murdoch, "Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science...", p. 62. Sur interaction aspects logiques et les aspects physico-mathematiques de analyse medievale des mesures, C. Wilson, William Heytesbury..., p. 21-25. 1
1
Cf.
J.
Murdoch,
"Philosophy
and the Enterprise of
Science...",
p. 66.
Le developpement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels
"puzzles logiqucs",
fait
ici
sur
le
Ics
terrain
167
sophismata: comme le souligne Murdoch, le progres sc de { analyse logique non sur celui de induction a la 1
Duhem. Enfin, il est clair que la mesure envisagee par le philosophe naturel du Moyen Age tardif n a de valeur qu a Pinterieur de cet espace de jeu imaginaire du possible logique: lorsqu un Richard Swineshead se represente ou plutot se propose un corps dote d un degre de chaleur egal a premiere moitie, a 2 sur
le
1
sur sa
quart suivant, a 3 sur le huitieme suivant, a 4 sur le
Pinfini, et qu il demontre que ce un degre de chaleur 2, autrement dit un corps, pris fini chaleur comme meme si en lui la chaleur augmente a de tout, degre Pinfini, il n a en vue aucun corps concret donne dans une experience ou
seizieme suivant
de suite jusqu a
et ainsi
comme un
tout, est a
manipulable dans une experimentation^; pour autant, il ne se livre pas a une "experience de pensee" ou "experience imaginaire", telles que, apres Mach, ont pu les decrire ou les problematiser Koyre,
Pour comprendre ce point
Kuhn ou
Popperl?.
nous faut nous interroger sur le difficile, statut epistemologique et philosophique de la methode de raisonnement des scolastiques tardifs. De prime abord, la dimension de "imaginaire" il
imaginatio designe un domaine de speculation ouvert par
I
le
mode de
consideration specifique de lapotentia Dei absoluta. Pour determiner ce qu
en
est
de
la
mathesis ou du
"projet
mathematique de
la
nature"
il
au XlVe siecle
qu entretiennent ces deux notions. La demarche secundum imaginationem des medievaux n est pas ce que Koyre appelle, a propos des "experiences de pensee" de Galilee, une "realisation de
il
nous faut done analyser
Pideal",
avec des objets theoriquement parfaits, que
"operant
imaginaire"
en
"mettre
les relations
veritable "intermediate entre le jeu":
"veritablement"
surfaces planes
mathematique
"veritablement"
spheriques, corps
1
et le
experience vient
reel"
planes, surfaces spheriques
"parfaitement"
rigides
ou
"parfaitement"
elastiques qui n existent pas
et
16 Pour une analyse de ce cas,
Murdoch, "Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science...", p. in: The Cambridge History of Later Medical Philosophy,
67-68, n. 39;
"Infinity
Cambridge, 1982, 17
p.
and
cf. J.
ne peuvent d
ailleurs pas exister in
renim
continuity",
588-590.
Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York, 1959, App. XI, p. 442 sqq.; A. De motu gravium de Galilee. De experience imaginaire et de son ahus", Rwue Koyre, d histoire des sciences, 13 (1960), p. 197-245; Th. S. Kuhn, Function for Thought Experiments", in: Melanges Alexandre Koyre, Paris, 1964, vol. 2, p. 322 sqq. Sur le sens medieval de experience de pensee et pour une comparaison avec age classique, cf. A. Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Voir egalement, du meme auteur: "The Dialectical Cf. K.
"Le
1
"A
1
1
Preparation for Scientific
Berkeley
&
Revolutions",
Los Angeles, 1975,
in:
p. 163-203.
The Copemican
Achie\>ement,
R.
Westmann
(ed.),
dc Libcra
168
natura;
1
experience
non plus que
la 8
des mcdievaux ne va pas de
"imaginaire"
science medievale ne vise, de son cote, a
On
I
ideal
"expliquer
au
reel,
le reel
par
Murdoch, le role de que impossible"! secundum consiste a fournir un moyen de imaginationem argumentation analyse d un probleme "au-dela des limites des possibilites pousser 1
.
a
1
vu,
le
tel
defmit
J.
1
1
licites
physiques atteindre
autrement
Murdoch
a
interieur de la philosophic naturelle d
Aristote" jusqu a de "tout ce est qui logiquement acceptable", plus large ce qui ne comporte pas de contradiction interne. Pour 1
domaine
le
dit:
cette caracteristique
de
la
mcthode secundum imaginationem n
est
comprehensible qu a partir de la notion de potentia Dei absoluta puisqu elle ne
fait
qu exprimer au niveau de
niveau de
agir divin, selon lequel:
I
includit contradictionem".
la
pensee humaine
"Deus
Autrement
dit:
valable au
le principe,
potest facere
omne quod
on ne va pas
ici
fieri
non
de Pimpossible au
mais du possible reel au possible logique. La these de J. Murdoch se ramene done pour finir a deux affirmations essentielles: (a) 1 appel a la reel,
compte non seulement de la possibilite mais dufait procedures secundum imaginationem dans la philosophic naturelle du XIVc siecle; (b) parallelement le
potentia Dei absoluta rend
meme
de
1
theologie et
de
existence la
foisonncment de casus
ct
de rationes fondes sur Papplication des nouveau
langagcs analytiques rend compte du dcploiement effectif d un nombre traites de potentia Dei significatif d elemcnts secundum imaginationem absoluta. la
L entre-implication du
phenomene II
XIV e
saillant,
de leur
aborder
utilisation
dans
le
"nouveaux
domaine de
problemes distincts: (a) maniere dont ils sont appliques;
trois
analytiques; (b) la
permis ou rcndues possibles voire necessaires leur ces
que parmi
est
et
va de soi qu une etude complete des
siecle et
devrait
raisonncment de potentia Dei absoluta
de rationes secundum imaginationem presuppose dans tout ce qui suit.
mise en oeuvre dc casus
conditions
ccrtaines
tiennent
a
la 1
de
et
done
outils conceptuels
le
du
philosophic
naturelle",
des
langages
origine
(c) les conditions qui
ont
application: etant entendu la
prcssion
meme
des
problemes, par une sorte de necessite interne, tandis que d autres tiennent a evolution des mcntaliles concernant les normes de la scientificite en general 1
18
dans A. Koyre a propos de Galilee et de son concept du revolution scientifique", in: Etudes d histoire de la pensee d "idealement pariah", non celui scientifique, p. 199. II va de soi qu "impossible" a ici le sens d "impossible opinable" que nous alleguons plus bas (sections 2 et 3) avec Burleigh. Cette belle formule se
mouvement,
cf.
"Galilee
et
lit
la
Le developpement dc nouveaiix et
C est
activite
1
dans
philosophique
ou conceptuelle,
intellectuellc,
1.
dc
nature
la
consequences an debut du
et
La modification de demonstratif et
la
double
sa
dimension
et sociale, c est-a-dire institutionnelle.
ce dernier point que nous abordons
Topiques
169
instruments conceptuels
XIVs siecle
des
perception
ici.
rapports
entre
le
raisonnement
raisonnement dialectique est le premier element qui du complexe forme par les nouveaux langages
le
favorise la mise en place
analytiques, le raisonnement de potentia Dei absoluta et la
methode secundum
imaginationem.
Lorsque nous considerons un sophisma, ses stipulations fantaisistes, son architecture apparemment extravagante, nous eprouvons d emblee le d avoir
sentiment
un mode
a
affaire
particulier
de
demonstration
et
d enchainement propositionnel qui suppose une extraordinaire valorisation des relations topiques dans
representation generale de ce que peut etre
la
pertinence d un raisonnement et
la
nature de
affect spccifique
1
la
d assentiment
normalement, 1 accompagne. Prenons un exemple simple. Lorsque nous lisons chez Burleigh des inferences comme Sortes currit, igitur Deus est, ou Homo est asinus, igitur qui,
Sortes currit et que nous voyons valables, notre premier
qu
mouvement
il
est
les
considere
comme
parfaitement
de nous demander quel sorte de jeu
preside a des constructions de toute evidence aussi vaines qu absurdes.
pourtant
la
un
resultat notable
de
pensee logique du Moyen Age, en
la
II
y a
meme
temps qu une condition indispensable au fonctionnement des differents langages ou concepts analytiques caracterisant le projet logico-mathematique de
la scolastique tardive.
d autres termes:
1
univers technique mais aussi
conceptuel du sophisma ne saurait exister sans
mental
et
validite
de
De
En
quoi
s agit-il,
courantes au
XlVe
Xlle
ou
siecle,
Adamitonim,
en
siecle,
la
perception de
fait?
De
la
Papplication de deux regies absolument
premiere formulations remontent au designee sous le litre de consequentia
mais dont
premiere
est
les
e regies qui sont egalement bien attestees au XIII siecle,
impossibili quidlibet^
9
19 Cette regie est decrite
,
necessarium ex quolibet
comme la De Rijk,
i.e.:
ex
20, soil:
consequentia Adamitonim dans le Tractatus Emmeranus de in: "Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on the Game of Vivarium, 12 (1974), p. 118. Elle est egalement mentionnee - positivement - chez
impossibili positione, Obligation",
la
telles inferences.
ed.
de Libcra
170 -
nOp -i
O-iq
Dans
-
(p
(p
->
Ic
DC
q) ->
q)
puritatc arils logicac, Tractatus brevior, Burlcigh
admet ces
forme ex impossibili sequitur quodlibet, el necessarium sequitur ad quodlibet. Mais sur quoi fonde-t-il sa decision et son assentiment? Precisement sur une relation topique: le locus a minori, les deux deux regies qu
cite
il
sous
la
inferences argumentant per locum a minori affirmative^.
La
memc
analyse est
fournic dans le Tractatus longior^: Si impossibile sit verum, sequitur per locum a minori, quod quodcumquc aliud erit verum. Cctte relation topique s inscrit a Pintericur d un dispositif plus large consistant dans une distinction entre deux types dc
"consequences":
accidentelles23. Mais,
d inferences,
les
comme
relations
les
consequences naturelles et les consequences on le voit des la definition de ces deux sortes
comme
fonctionnent
topiques
cadre
general
consequence naturelle quand antcccdent inclut le veut dire que la validite dc la consequence cst determince ce qui consequent, d elucidation.
II
y a
1
Dc naturis rcrum, cd. T. Wright, Alexandri Neckham Dc naturis rcrum libri Poem of the Same Author Dc laudibus divinac sapicntiae, Ixindrcs, 1863, p. 288. On
Alexandra Ncckham,
duo
with
(lie
pcut done la fairc rcmonter avant les annees 1200, les Adamiti etant les clcvcs ou partisans d Adam du Pctit-Pont (Adam dc Balsam, Par\-ipontanus). Sur ce point, Cf. P.O. I^wry, O.P., "Robert Grossctcste s Question on Subsistence: An Ixho of the Adamites", Mcdiac\ al studies,
45 (1983),
rcmarqucs
p. 11-12.
Sur
critiques
la
signification precise
d H.
Stump,
du passage cdite
"William
of
ct
Sherwood
s
commente par Dc Treatise
on
Rijk,
cf.
les
Obligations",
Historiographia linguistica, 1 (1980), p. 263-264, n. 12. On notera aussi que la mcme regie cst attribucc aux Nominates dans les Communes obiectiones ct rcsponsioncs (ms. Vat. tat. 7678, f. 81rb) particllcmcnt cditc cs par II. A. G. Braakhuis, in: De 13de Eeuwse Tractaten over
Syncategorematische Tcrmcn, I, Inlcidcndc Studie, Diss. Ixiden, 1979, p. 63, les Reales soutenant au contrairc que ex impossibili nihil sequitur. Ix; point de vue "rcalistc" cst apparemment dcfcndu dans un autre tcxtc du XII e siecle: YArs Meliduna (voir extrait public par De Rijk, in: Logica Modernorum, II, 1, p. 389 ct les commcntaircs dc Braakhuis, Dc Llde Euwse Tractaten..., 1
p. 39).
20
vers 1230, Cf. par cxcmplc les Abstractioncs d llcrve le Breton, maitre es arts a Paris Abstractiones d Herve le Sophistc", sophismata n 110, 117 et 133, cd. A. dc Libcra, Archives d histoire doctrinalc ct litteraire du Moycn Age, (1986), p. 199, 201, 204. Ix recucil ^Abstractioncs oxonicn attribuc a Richard dc Cornouailles (Magistcr Abstractionum) est un dcuxiemc tcmoin dc ex impossibili sequitur quidlibct consequcntia accidcntali, dc meme que les Syncategorcmata d un autre contemporain d Hcrvc, Ic maitre parisien Jean Le Page (cf. Braakhuis, Dc 13de Euwse Tractaten..., p. 188). II n cst pas jusqu a Pierre dTuspagne qui, dans de la regie (cf. Braakhuis, scs Svncatcgorcmata, nc connaisse ct n acccpte une version "Ix;s
"realiste"
p. 282).
Cf. Gauthier Burlcigh, De Puritatc Artis Logicae. Tractatus (Franciscan Institute Publications. Text Series, 9) St. Bonaventure: 1955, p. 248,24 249,3.
21
22
cf.
Ph.
Bochner
The Franciscan
Institute,
bre\
cd.
Gauthier Burlcigh, Dc Puritatc Artis Logicac. Tractatus longior, cd. Boehner, 1955,
p. 61,
10.
23 Cette distinction cst attcstce des le XIII e siecle, cf., notamment, Guillaume de Sherwood, Syncatcgoremata, ed. J. R. O Donncll, Mediac\ al Studies, 3 ( 1941), p. 78-82.
171
Le devcloppement dc nouveaux instruments conceptuels par un
"lieu
n inclut pas
intrinseque",
le
homo
consequence accidenlelle, quand
"regie
est asinus, tu sedes.
C cst
cxtrinseque".
1
antecedcnt
la consequence tient par d une inference comme Si
consequent, ce qui veut dire que
application d une
1
y a
il
le cas
Cette consequence est bonne; elle est bonne de par
elle-meme sur
la regie ex impossibili sequitur quodlibet, laquelle repose locus a minori, c est-a-dire, en derniere analyse, sur le fait que
parait le
moins
moins
est vrai.
bona, in
vrai
que n importe quoi d autre
-
d ou resulte que
si
1
le
impossiblc
ce qui parait
que le moins vrai necessairement du type de: omnis consequential est Bref, les regies consequentielles qua consequens est necessarium ou omnis consequential est bona, in vrai est vrai, ce qui parait plus vrai
qua antecedens
est
impossibile reposent en fin de
compte sur des principes
topiqucs.
Cc que nous venons de de
1
intuition naturelle est
dite
"des
consequences"
phenomene general l
"absorption
qui
un exemple aussi eloigne que possible
voir sur
un
trait
universel et caracteristique de la theorie
son age d or au
connait
qui
supporte a ete decrit par E.
le
des topiques dans
les consequences" 24
elements: tout d abord, naturellement, le fait
termes
en
du
que
Stump comme
il
faut epeler tous les
arguments topiques sont
les
de consequences a partir du XIIIc litteraire
Le
siecle.
Cette formule designe un
.
changement d ensemble beaucoup plus complexe dont
designes
XIV e
des
siecle;
se
ensuite substitue
consequentiae genre apparition progressivement aux commentaires des Topiques; enfin la prise dc conscience la montce graduelle qu il y a une necessite des inferences topiques et 1
progressive de theses telles que
du par
syllogisme tient par la relation topique
maximes sont
tout quantitatif, dont les les principes
"tout
qui
du did de
otnni,
did de
constituees au niveau syllogistique nullo"
25
Ce
.
dernier
trait, le
plus
exprime de differentes manieres: dans raffirmation ockhamiste la syllogismes tiennent grace a des "moyens extrinseques", c est-a-dire
important, est
que
les
plupart du temps des selon
laquelle
les
maximes topiques 2 ^, ou dans
syllogismes de la
seconde
24
deploiement de la these de la troisieme figures
le
et
into Consequences", Cf. E. Stump, Topics: Their Development and Absorption Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambrige, 1982, p. 273-299.
in:
The
25 und Syllogistik im Mittelalter", in: Cf. E. Stump, Topics...", p. 289; J. Pinborg, Topik Hoffman et al. (eds.), (Erfurt Theologischc Sapienter ordinare. Festgabe fur Erich Kleincidarn, Studien, 24), St Benno Verlag, 1969, p. 166-167; cf. egalement S. Ebbesen (ed.), Incertonim Auctorum Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, 7), Gad, 1977, p. 34-35 !".
26
Summa
Cf. Guillaume d Ockham, Institute, 1974, p. 588, 23-35; E. Stump,
logicae,
Topics...",
ed.
p. 295.
Boehner-Gal-Brown, The Franciscan
de Libcra
172
de la premiere figure du syllogisme, c est-adid de omni/de nullo fonctionnant pour elle comme des maximes topiques. Bref, le phenomene d absorption des topiques dans les
dependent des
"consequences"
dire des principes
consequences peut-etre ultimement decrit par le consequences absorbe fmalement et la conversion et Cette evolution generate qu
il
fait
le
que
theorie des
la
27
syllogisme
.
n est pas question de suivre dans
le detail
de ses distinctions techniques ne nous interesse pas en tant que telle, mais dans les modifications qu elle apporte a la representation sociale de ce que peut etre un raisonnemcnt. La theorie des consequences n a de sens que dans la
mesure ou
elle
il
y a une pratique concrete du raisonnement consequentiel, ou
peut fonctionner
comme une
technologic de
1
imaginaire, une
methode
de manipulation du non-realise, du non-empirique, ou elle permet de trailer des relations entre propositions n ayant plus de lien direct avec le monde de 1
intuition immediate, ni avec les contraintes
Le benefice
de Pontologie.
plus immediat de la theorie des consequences est qu elle habitue le savant du XI Ve siecle a trailer les sequences d arguments deconcertants comme des enthymemes, a decouvrir une possibilite le
permancnte de validation du non-empirique dans ou a des regies additionnelles.
Encore validation.
faut-il
noter
le
Le sens commun ne
qu une mentalite strictement XIV e siecle, le philosophe de s
en satisfont pleinement
C est de
science de histoirc
la
en
particulier de ce type de
satisferait pas,
non plus probablement il me semble qu au
aristotclicienne. Pourtant,
pour une large part le theologien, ne demandent rien d autre a Voutil logique.
la nature, et
qu
ils
de
meme temps C cst en ce
nature. la
la vie sociale,
qu epistemologique au sens
il
strict
de
la
sens que cet episode hyper-technique de
logique formelle peut etre considere
factcur intellectuel, et qu
de
et
s
fait
recours a des premisses
done, je pense, a bon droit que Ton peut considerer le dcveloppement la theorie des consequences comme un vecteur epistemique,
psychologique, en
1
caractere tout a
le
comme un nouveau
trouve sa place dans une dynamique particuliere
dans un changement typique de mentalites.
27 Cf. Albert de Saxe, Penitilis logica 1522, fol. 26ra s. Sur interpretation particuliere du did de omni et de nullo chez Albert de Saxe, cf. A. Maieru, "Logique et theologie trinitaire dans le moyen-age tardif: deux solutions en presence", in: The Editing of Theological and Philosophical Texts from the Middle Ages, Acts of the Conference Arranged by the Department of Classical Languages, Unn ersity of Stockholm, 29-31 August 1984, M. Asztalos (ed.), (Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Studia Latina Stockholmiensia, XXX), Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell (
International, 1986, p. 186 et 194.
173
Le developpement de nouveaiix instruments conceptuels 2.
Les jeiix d obligations
L
histoire dcs
origincs du genre litteraire et de la pratique scolaire des
mal connue 28 Une chose
obligationes est encore
fccondite du
leur application a des questions scientifiques
el
XIVc
.
siecle
est certaine:
En temoignent
en ce domaine.
1
plusieurs editions de
notamment de Richard Lavenham, de Robert Fland
textes,
extraordinaire
de Roger n y a pas de consensus des et
29 Cependant, il Swineshead, dues a P. V. Spade meme des Obligationes: certains auteurs, la fonction historiens sur Pobjet et .
comme A.
methode
Perreiah, y voient une
d un etudiant a
in vivo les aptitudes
la
scolaire d
logique
30 ;
examen destinee
d autres,
comme
a tester
Spade, une
esquisse medievale de la logique des contrefactuels31.
Dans
ces conditions, en quoi les Obligationes regardent-elles
de \aphilosophia naturalist
du complexe forme par potentia Dei absoluta et
En
ce qu elles
s
les
methode secundum imaginationeml inscrivent dans le mouvement general de en ce qu
d absorption des topiques dans il
d y theoriser
s agit
historien
quoi jouent-elles un role dans la mise en place nouveaux langages analytiques, le raisonnement de
la
des relations topiqucs;
Stump,
1
En
les
les
evaluer certaines consequences du
elles
communiquent avec
consequences, puisque,
meme
le
processus
comme
1
ecrit E.
que on a pour du contexte disputationnel de
difficultes particulieres fait
la valorisation
1
Les premiers temoins connus, qui remontent au XIII e siecle, ont etc edites par L. M. De the Game of Obligation", Rijk dans une serie d articles: "Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on Vivarium, 12 (1974), p. 94-123; 13 (1975), p. 22-54; 14 (1976), p. 26-49.
28
29
comments", Obligationes: Cf. P.V. Spade, "Richard Lavenham storia delta filosofia, 33 (1978), p. 225-242; "Robert Hand s Obligationes: an edition",
studies,
42 (1980),
d histoire 30
edition and
s
Cf.
p.
doctrinale
41-60;
"Roger
et litteraire
A. Perreiah,
du Moyen
"Insolubilia
in
Obligationes: edition Age, 44 (1977), p. 243-285.
Swyneshed
s
the Logica parva of Paul of
Rivista critica di
and
Venice",
Mediaeval
comments",
Archives
Medioe\ o, 4 (1978),
p.
155.
Theories of Obligationes: Burley, Kilvington and Swyneshed on and Philosophy of Logic, 3 (1982), p. 1-32. Sur interpretation des Obligationes, cf. M.A. Brown, The role of the Tractatus de obligationibus in mediaeval Franciscan Studies, 26 (1966), p. 26-35; E. Stump, "Obligations: from the Beginnings to logic", the Early Fourteenth Century", in: The Cambridge History of Later Medie\>al Philosophy, 31
Cf.
P.V. Spade,
counterfactual
"Three
reasoning",
1
History
in the fourteenth p. 315-334; P.V. Spade, "Obligations: developments The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, p. 335-341; C.H. Kneepkens, Ob "The Mysterious Buser Again: William Buser of Heusden and the Obligationes Tract in: English Logic in Italy...., p. 147-166; E. J. Ashworth, "English Obligationes Texts rogatum", in: The Rise of British after Roger Swyneshed: llie Tracts beginning Obligatio est quaedam Semantics. Oxford 19-24 June Logic. Acts of the 6th European Symposium on Medie\>al Logic and 1983, P.O. Lewry (ed.), (Papers in Mediaeval Studies, 7), Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Cambridge, Century",
1982,
in:
r
ars",
Studies, 1985, p. 309-333.
174
Icur
dc Liber a
occurrence-^;
en
enfin,
ce
elles
qu
une
constituent
tentative
de
codification de la dispute.
Qu
qu une obligation Pour autant qu on puisse en juger, un jeu rassemblant deux joueurs ayant chacun un role a tenir le respondens qui est-ce
:
s
a maintenir
"oblige"
I
dispute, 1
une certaine vue ou une certaine attitude au cours de
opponens qui
efforce
maintenir
a
occurrence,
s
des
de
le
contraindre a
contradictoires.
II
la
a
y
la
redargntio^, en
differentes
sortes
d obligationes. Les especes d obligalions resultent d une combinaison entre ce a quoi est oblige le repondant (un acte ou une disposition) et ce que couvre son obligation (un complexe ou un non-complexe). Prenons un exemple, celui de \apositio, ou le repondant est oblige a une disposition et ou son obligation couvre un complexe, c est-a-dire une il doit done maintenir comme vraie tout au long de la dispute. d abord un ca.sus, c est-a-dire une stipulation concernant la nature
proposition qu
On de
a
la realite
exterieure a
la
dispute obligationnelle, par exemple: Socrate et
Platon sont noirs.
ou obligalum,
Suit \cpositum
qui,
en general,
est
en discordance avec
le
casus, par exemple: Socrate est blanc, puis le proposition, et la serie des
Le repondant doit repondre conformement a des regies, etant entcndu qu a un certain moment opposant lui fournira un proposition auquel il ne pourra pas repondre, car toute rcponse qu il ferait enfermerait dans une contradiction.
proposita.
1
1
Quelles sont ces regies? Dans la perspective traditionnellc au debut du XIVc siecle, celle de Burleigh, il y a trois regies 34 :
(1) ce qui suit de Yobligatum et d une proposition (ou des propositions)
accordee(s) ou
de
oppose (ou des opposes) d une proposition (ou de propositions) correctemcnt refusee(s), etant connu lei, doit etre accorde. (2) ce qui est incompatible avec V obligation et une proposition (ou des 1
propositions) accordee(s) ou
opposes) d une proposition (ou de propositions) correctement refusee(s), etant connu lei, doit etre refuse. 1
oppose (ou
les
(3) ce qui est irrelevant (impertinent) doit etre accorde, refuse
doute selon sa qualite epistcmique
32
Cf. E.
Stump,
"Obligations...",
p. 328.
33
Cf. E.
Stump,
"Obligations...",
p. 316.
34
Nous suivons
ici
Medioc\ o, 7(1981),
la
:
formulation de E. Stump,
p. 137.
si
nous savons que c
"Roger
Swyneshed
s
ou mis en
est vrai,
Theory of
nous
Obligations",
175
Le developpement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels nous savons quc c est faux, nous refusons, ou faux, nous meltons en doute. si
accordons, c est vrai
Est irrclevante unc proposition a laqucllc ne
s
si
applique
nous ignorons
si
ni la regie (1) ni
la regie (2).
E.
Stump
Obligationes au
a
XIVc des
celle
Burleigh,
donne une version siecle.
Selon
Calculatores
Ires convaincante
elle,
il
faut distinguer
Dans
.
1
etape
de
la
fonction des
deux phases: 1
burleyenne:
celle
objet
de des
paradoxes logiques ou semantiques Obligationes semble rcsider dans fondes sur une sorte de reflexivite qui ressemble aux paradoxes de la suireference ou insolubilia, tout en etant plus faibles dans la mesure ou leur "les
caractere
paradoxal
depend du
disputationnel contribuant, 1
utilisation
d indexicaux,
occasionnes par
les
En
1
un argument 36 Chez .
interet
cela
quoi
contexte
le
;
Obligationes portent sur les phenomenes des indexicaux par leurs referents relativement
pour les insolubles principalement mise sur la logique
bien que
disputationnel"
plus souvent, a la generation d un paradoxe par
la substitution
a la validite generale d
est
le
35
contexte
nous concerne
les Calculateurs,
en revanche,
et les indexicaux, persiste,
l
"insistance
epistemique". t-il
ici?
epistemique n a pas d interct pour la science de Pourtant, si nous supposons un savoir
De
prime abord,
la
logique
la nature.
"naturel"
qui se deploie dans la
la dispute, le sophisma, nous voyons qu une telle forme de des enonces scientifiques implique la construction d une theorie production des attitudes propositionnelles dans un contexte disputationnel. Or, il est clair
dimension de
que
les Obligationes
constituent, pour
trait a ce probleme, mais qu elles en mise en argument. Dans la mesure ou la mediantibus vocibus et, pour une large part, dans le
ont non seulement
ainsi dire,
scientia natiiralis se fait
la
sophismata calculatoria, on peut done considerer que les non seulement constituent une maniere de raisonner Obligationes
cadre
de
epistemiquement par rapport a un univers de discours assume dans une discussion, mais encore ouvrent la voie a une maniere de raisonner imaginairement sur des univers definis en termes de casus et dc positum: en cela elles preparent les sophismata physicalia et le raisonnement secundwn imaginationem.
35
Cf. E.
Stump,
"Roger
Swyneshed
s...",
p. 172-173.
36
Cf. E.
Stump,
"Roger
Swyneshed
s...",
p. 173.
dc Libera
176
Cette these peut etre defendue en examinant
Ockham
et
Burleigh
concu
ont
certains
meme
dont
fondamentaux
des
maniere
la
aspects
Obligationes.
Nous avons
insiste
comme
regie decrite
dans
la section
precedente sur
consequentia Adamitonim: ex
1
importance de
regie est la septieme regie generale des consequences selon
comme
la
impossibili quidlibet. Cette
Ockham. Or,
montre E. Stump, Ockham distingue soigneusement la position d une proposition impossible et la consequence formee de propositions a
1
impossibles
37
La consequence Dieu n
.
est pas trine, done Dieu n est pas Dieu une consequence materielle, fondee sur la regie des Adamiti. dans une obligation on prend comme positum 1 antecedent de
est valide, c est
En
si
revanche,
repondant devra refuser le consequent. Cette these est ou completee par deux decisions que Ton peut qualifier de a 1 egard de la pratique obligationnelle: (1) on ne peut prendre
cette consequence, le explicitee limitatives
comme
positum n importe quelle proposition impossible, mais seulement ne conticnnent pas une contradiction "manifestc"; (2) on ne peut
celles qui
cas ou le positum est cons6quences ut nunc ou comparable chez Burleigh,
appliquer toutes les regies des consequences dans impossible:
notamment on ne peut pas appliquer
matcriellcs 38
lorsqu
On
.
trouve
quelque
chose de
le
les
rapporte que certains soutiennent qu on ne peut prendre
il
comme
positum qu une proposition impossible "opinable" (opinabile), ou quand il affirme lui-meme qu on ne peut prendre qu un "impossible n incluant pas formellement d opposes" 39 DC meme, Burleigh refuse utilisation de la regie 1
.
de necessarium ex quolibet dans une positio on ct soutient ne peut y utiliser que des consequences impossibilis qu a vu, celles ou le cons6quent est inclus dans naturelles, c est-a-dire, on ex impossibili quidlibet
et
1
ou
antecedent ne peut etre vrai sans
1
antecedent
1
on derogeait a ces principcs
La
relevant"
Cf. E.
38
Cf. E.
le
raison de la reaction conjointe de Burleigh et
impossibles:
37
(et
1
(pertinens
Stump,
Stump,
Ockham
40
.
est claire: si
les disputes obligationnelles scraient triviales
repondant devrait tout accepter
le
consequent)
sequens)
ou tout refuser
ou
comme "sequentiellement comme "incompatiblement
332-333.
"Obligations...",
p.
"Obligations...",
p. 333.
39 Cite par P.V. Spade & E. Stump, "Walter Burley and the Obligationes Attributed to William of Sherwood", History and Philosophy of Logic, 4 (1983), p. 17.
40
Cf. P.V.
Spade
&
E. Stump,
"Walter
Burley...",
p. 18.
Le developpement de nouveaux instruments
177
conceptuels
n y aurait plus dc dispute. Selon Stump42 la restriction des consequences manipulates dans une positio impossibilis aux seules consequences formelles est done destinee ultimement a en preserver 1 interet relevant 41.
II
Reste
philosophique.
C est
a
entendre
s
ce
sur
est
qui
"philosophiquement
que nous rejoignons la scientia naturalis. On peut evidemment longuement reflechir sur ce qu est en soi 43 Ockham se impossible opinable" par rapport a un "impossible inopinable" interessant".
ici
"un
.
comme positum
contente de dire qu on peut prendre
on ne peut
une contradiction aux moyens de regies evidentes par soi, per de premisses dont aucun intellect ne saurait douter44. Dans son
tirer
se notae, et
de
article
toute proposition dont
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, E. Stump une amorce de logique
la
la reflexion sur Vimpossibilis positio est
suggere que des contrefactuels appliquee a une
"classe
restreinte de
propositions":
Pobjet
des disputes obligationnelles ex impossibilis positione serait de voir ce qui est
implique
si
1
on prend
comme
pas^. Nous y voyons, quant
une proposition
vraie
comme
Dieu n
existe
a nous, une autre utilite encore, qui regarde
precisement la philosophic naturelle. Se donner un corps dote d un degre de chaleur egal a un sur sa
premiere moitie, a deux sur pour positum un impossible: la
le
quart suivant, et ainsi de suite, c est prendre
la
proposition correspondant a une situation ou
chaleur d un corps augmente a
Nous disons qu
il
1
infmi.
De
quel type est cet impossible?
y a la impossibilite physique, mais y-a-t-il impossibilite
logique? Poser cette question, c est faire intervenir
la definition
du possible
n entrainant pas de contradiction, mais aussi, du meme coup logique le principe sous-tendant la theologie de potentia Dei absoluta, selon lequel Dieu peut faire tout ce qui n implique pas contradiction, et la definition de la
comme
methode de raisonnement secundum imaginationem accordant pour recevable tout cas, distinction ou probleme ne contenant pas de contradiction logique
41
Cf. P.V.
42
Cf. E.
Spade
Stump,
&
E. Stump,
"Walter
"Obligations...",
Burley...",
p. 18.
p. 333.
43 Dans ses Obligationes, Burleigh distingue precisement "Posito
impossibili opinabile,
E. Stump,
"Walter
Burley...",
non
est
Cf. Guillaume d Ockham, Summa logicae Spade & E. Stump, "Walter Burley...", p. 17.
Cf. E.
Stump,
revanche, E.
"Obligations...",
Stump
contrefactuels.
rejette
deux puisqu
il
donne en
inopinabile", cf.
regie que: P.V. Spade &
p. 18.
44
45
les
concedendum impossibile
p.
III-3, ch. 42, ed. cit., lignes 24-27, cite par.
333-334.
Dans
"Roger
Swyneshed
s...",
p.
P.V.
169 sqq., en
toute interpretation des Obligationes en termes de logique des
dc Libera
178
Ce
formclle.
sont
va-t-on dire des choses bien differences.
la
chaleur du corps
Demandons-
A
augmente a 1 infini" une contradiction au sens d ou si dans les termes de Ockham, implique Burleigh elle "inclut formellemcnt des opposes". Notre impression est qu il y a la le
meme
type
On
la
si
nous, pourtant,
de
["
proposition
impossible
"la
opinable".
peut refuser ces rapprochements. Niera-t-on, pour autant, qu une
pensee du degre de credibilite de impossible prepare non plus seulement psychologiquement mais bien aussi conceptuellcment un raisonnement 1
secundum imaginationeml L philosophic possible
et
naturelle
de
est
interet
qu
la
theorie des Obligationes pour la
travaille
elle
la
dimension epistemique du
Certes, ce n est pas dans le strict cadre de
impossible.
1
de
que Ton fait la science de la nature, fut-elle, scion la belle formule Murdoch, une "science de la nature sans la nature". Pourtant, il ne peut y
Yobligatio
de
J.
avoir de
logique et de
argumentee. fait
secundum imaginationem sans une logique du possible impossible credible, et de leur maniement dans la discussion
science 1
De
fait,
comment
pas partie du monde
conceptuellement avec
1
appliquer des langages de mesure a ce qui nc si
actuel,
1
on nc
sait
pas ce que c est que travailler
impossible?
La
partie porteuse de Yobligatio, la reflexion sur la positio impossibilis a etc esquissee au XII le siecle, de meme appareil formel de la theorie des 1
consequences, qui permet dc lamathesis du XI Vc siecle
1
articuler et d y legiferer,
on peut done dire que
tout cela en heritage. Notre these est
rcc,oit
qu
elle
transforme cct heritage en le faisant communiquer avec d autres notions. C est ce que nous allons examiner dans notre troisieme partie.
3.
Du
possible reel au possible logique: theorie modale,
puissance absolue
La place dans
la
et
theologie de
la
raisonnement imaginaire
prise par les concepts
modaux
et la theorie
constitution de la scientia naturalis du
XIVc
logique des modalites
siecle peut etre envisagee
d une multitude points dc vue. Pour 1 historien des sciences, cela veut dire que impact de la theorie des modalites sur la philosophic naturelle se situe aux 1
points de convergence ou de divergence de trois ensembles bien definis: la
theorie de \apotentia Dei absoluta et de lapotentia Dei ordinata\ la distinction
entre
possibilites
necessites
logiques
naturelles
et
et
possibilites
necessites
entrecroisement qui preside a
la
naturelles;
absolues.
la
C est
distinction
ce
entre
redoutable
caracterisation de Inexperience de
pensee"
179
Le developpemcnt dc nouveaux instalments conceptuels
Murdoch, que de potentia Dei absoluta, le licite, secundum imaginationem,
du physicicn medieval. Dire, avec
J.
savant medieval peut
de maniere
"considerer
avec pour seule limitation
toutes les possibilites
logiques",
contradiction46, c est
obliger a trailer d
ces
s
domaines
trois
une maniere
de
principe de
aussi synthetique
en
a
le
scruter
que
affmites
les
problemes, en en marquant les continuites et les discontinues sur ce terrain historiques effectives. Ce geste en implique d autres: prendrc, un theme 1277 de des condamnations effet precis, la mesure de
possible
tout
conceptuelles
1
A. Koyre, et plus vigoureusement debattu depuis Duhem, notamment chez la discussion de la a sa toute faire E. chez nous de Grant47; place pres conception dite
"statistique"
de
Thomas d Aquin et, modalite defendue par Duns
modalite de Boece a
la
correlativement, a la nouvelle conception de la
Scot en des termes evoquant la theorie dite des
"mondes possibles" 48 .
developper en detail chacune de ces questions, nous nous centrerons sur les correlations conceptuelles, laissant de cote le probleme de
Ne pouvant
la signification
La
historique des condamnations de 1277.
est
sans aucun doute
de
la nature.
46
47
Cf.
J.
Sa
Murdoch,
Cf. E.
Dei absoluta
distinction de la potentia
Grant,
the Late Middle
la
signification n
"Philosophy
"The
Ages",
et
de
la
potentia Dei ordinata
piece centrale du dispositif conceptuel de la science
en
est
49 pas moins problcmatique
and the Enterprise of
Condemnation of
1277,
Science",
.
C est
que
p. 68.
God s Absolute Power and
Physical
Thought
in
Viator, 10 (1979), p. 211-244.
theorie statistique des modalites, cf. J. Hintikka, "Gaps in the Great Chain of Being: An Exercise in the Methodology of the History of Ideas", in: Reforging the Great Chain of Being. Studies of the History of Modal Theories, (Synthese Historical Library, 21), S. Knuuttila (ed.),
48 Sur
la
on the Realization of Possibilities in Time", ibid., p. Thomas Interpretation of Modality in Averroes and of the "Statistical" Interpretation Ajatus, 37 (1978), p. 79-98; "Duns Scotus Criticism wui Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Acts of the Sixth International Congress of in:
Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981, 57-72;
S.
Aquinas",
of
Knuuttila,
Modality",
p.
"The
1-17;
"Aristotle
Statistical
Sprache
Medical
Philosophy, Bonn, 29 August-3 September 1977, (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 13/1), 1981, Berlin-New York: De Gruytcr, 1981, p. 441-450; "Time and Modality in Scholasticism", in:
Reforging the Great Chain...,
p.
163-257;
distinction, cf. P. Vignaux, "Nominalisme", in: Dictionnaire de Theologie Nominalisme au XIV? siecle, Paris, 1948, Catholique, XI-1, Paris: Beauchesne, 1930, col. 763-769; The Honest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval p. 22-24; II. A. Oberman, Nominalism, Grand Rapids (Michigan), ^1961; W. J. Courtenay, "Covenant and Causality in Pierre d Ailly", Speculum, 46 (1971), p. 94-119; "The King and the Leaden Coin: the Economic Non" of the "Sine Traditio, 28 (1972), p. 185-209; "John of
49
Sur cette
Background
qua
Causality",
Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God can Undo the Past", Recherches dc 40 (1973), p. 147-174; "The Dialectic of Theologie Ancienne et Medifralc, 39 (1972), p. 224-256; and Omnipotence in Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages", in: Divine Omniscience Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985, p. 243-270; repris dans Mcdiae\
de Libera
180
meme
d un devcloppcment continu et lineaire de la notion de puissance absolue est aujourd hui battue en breche. Au minimum, on doit dire qu il y a 1
idce
deux modeles, deux interpretations divergentes de la distinction, dont les figures paradigmatiques sont, au XlVe siecle, Ockham et Scot. Pour E. Randi, qui a clairement mis en evidence le phenomene, ces divergences sont puisqu elles concernent a la fois: (1) la dynamique
loin d etre mineures,
interne (pour Scot \apotentia absoluta excede en pouvoir \& potentia ordinata,
pour
Ockham
1
une
est
agent per voluntatem puissance ordonnee,
Dieu
et
la
"anterieure"
et intellectum
a
1
autre); (2) le sujet (pour Scot tout
dispose d une puissance absolue et d une
pour Ockham
la
distinction
Toute-Puissance divine); (3)
concerne exclusivement
les manifestations
(pour Scot
la
puissance absolue couvre 1 ensemble des choses possibles de facto aux agents doucs de volonte et d intellect, pour Ockham "Dieu maintient de iure sa
propre puissance absolue, mais de facto a agi, agit et agira de potentia un ordinata"); (4) les connotations (pour Scot la distinction est liee 1 vocabulaire et a des concepts cthico-juridiques", pour Ockham, analyse "a
"a
logico-philosophique")50.
Etant donnee
maniere uniforme
la
du recours a \apotentia Dei absoluta dans la e argumentative du philosophus naturalis du XIV
la signification
strategic conceptuelle
Autrement
divergence de ces modeles, on ne saurait considerer de
et
on ne peut, semble-t-il, eviter les questions suivantes: argumentation de potentia Dei absoluta a-t-elle le meme sens ou la meme fonction scion qu on se trouve en milieu ockhamiste ou en milieu scotiste; siecle.
dit:
1
peut-on determiner un usage methodologique ou epistemologique de la distinction qui, etant donnee la possible universalite d un meme modelc argumentatif, permettrait de laisser de cote son interpretation theologique, 35 (1974), p. 7-27; Oakley, "Medieval Theories of Natural Law: Ockham and the Significance of Voluntarist Tradition", Natural Law Forum, 6 (1961), p. 65-83; "Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of the Laws of Nature", Church History, 30 (1961), I".
p. 445 sqq.\ Omnipotence, Covenant and Order. An Excursion in the History of Ideals from Abaelard to Leibniz, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984; E. Randi, "Potentia Dei
conditionata.
Una
questione di
Ugo
di saint-Cher sulla
onnipotenza
divina",
Rh ista
di Storia
delta Filosofia, 39 (1984), p. 521-536; "La vergine e il papa. Potentia Dei absoluta e plenitude potestatis papale nel XIV sccolo", History of Political Thought, 5 (1984), p. 425-445; L. Bianchi,
d oro e pesci di piombo: Galileo Galilei e la Potentia Dei absoluta", in: Sopra la volta mondo. Onnipotenza e potenza assoluta di Dio tra medioevo e eta moderna, A. Vettese (ed.), Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina Editore, 1986, p. 139-146. Le meme volume contient une "Uccelli
del
Bibliografia essenziale preparee par E. Randi (p. 175-183).
50
// soprano e I orologiaio. Due immagini di Dio nel dibattito sulla "potentia fra XIII e XIV secolo, (Pubblicazioni della Facolta di Lettere et Filosofia dell Universita di Milano, CXXI. Sezione a cura del Dipartimento di Filosofia, 11) Firenze: La
Cf. E. Randi,
absoluta"
Nuova
Italia Editrice, 1987, p. 108.
Le developpement dc nouveaiix instruments conceptuels
181
ordinata
la distinction potentia simplement: un "outil consideree comme etre pcut-clle
methodologique" univcrscl,
fonctionnellement independant des significations
voire
metaphysiquc
absoluta/potentia
lui
qui
echoient en theologic systematique?
Ces
recemment rappele
a
1
d evenements
inscription
apparemment la
au
conduisent
de
probleme
S. Knuuttila, le
est
Nous en retiendrons
ici
qui
deux: (a) la theorie des
peuvent rester nature ne
"ne
aristotelicien scion lequel
"frequences
(ou
est toujours faux),
temporelles ou
Ce modele,
dit
"possible",
fait
rien en
"leur
appartenant
"actualisation
vain";
generiques": est
d exprimer
"n6cessaire",
a
la suite
de Hintikka, permet de distinguer
necessite simple et necessite conditionnelle: la necessite simple est
sur une periode de
Nous
ne
interpretation^,
51
Cf. S. Knuuttila,
contemporains.
Aux
d histoire de
necessite conditionnelle,
temporelles", la
temps
1
l
P"actualite
"invariabilite
donnee" 52 .
discuterons
comme
ce qui est
ce qui n est jamais le cas
ce qui est quelquefois le cas (ou quelquefois
"statistique",
uniforme sans limites
de
(b) la definition
permettant
"outils"
"impossible",
necessaires
"proprietes
en vertu du principe
irrealisees",
comme
modales
notions
des
"la
toujours le cas (ou est toujours vrai),
vrai).
cadre,
modalite5 !.
la
interpreters de maniere temporelle, comme aussi longtemps qu elles existent" et decrites en termes d
differentes
le
aborde, depuis Bo6ce, a partir d un ensemble
substances"
potentialites"
dans
deterministe, des theologies chretiennes de la Providence et de
"necessite providentielle",
parallele
conception
probleme metaphysique
contingents
singuliers
bien circonscrit de paradigmes de
des
la
de la modalite.
Comme 1
nous
questions
"statistique"
de
plus
ont
pas fait
ici
la
pertinence
generale
de
notamment Jacobi 54 Weidemann55 ,
cette et
Van
and necessity in Gilbert of Poitiers", in: Gilbert de Poitiers et ses e Logica modemorum. Actes du VII Symposium europeen de la semantique medievales, J. Jolivet & A. de Libera (eds.),
"Possibility
origincs de la
la logique et (History of Logic, 5), Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987,
p.
181 et 185.
52 Selon S. Knuuttila, une interpretation statistique de style boecien peut etre aussi fondee la maniere dont differentes qualifications sont realisees dans les membres d un groupe de reference": une propriete "instantice dans tous les membres" peut etre appellee necessaire, est impossible, et qu une tandis qu une propriete qui n est "instantiee en aucun membre" propriete "instantiee en quelques membres au moins", est possible.
"sur
53
Cf. a ce sujet
philosophiques
54
et
A. de Libera, "Bulletin d histoire de la logique theologiques, 69 (1985), p. 281-291.
Cf. K. Jacobi, "Statements
Vh arium, 21
(1983), p. 85-108.
medievale",
about Events. Modal and Tense Analysis
Revue des sciences
in
Medieval
Logic",
dc Libera
182
Rijen56, nous n en retiendrons quc la these centrale, scion laquelle, au
dans
la tradition
est plus
d une
boecienne,
l
"actualisation
dans
ou moins explicitement consideree
De
possibilitc".
comme
le critere le
d authenticite
problcme qui
oriente une partic essentielle des speculations theologiques du
D
une formulc:
ou a des
les
si
du monde actuel
font effectivement partie, quelle sera la nature
substances et
la
1
des
accomodata"
veulent rcstrcindre cctte
la
-,
perspective,
"prevalence"
conditionnce par "rcgularites"
ce
que
actucls",
La
en
les necessites
que
inscritcs
comme immuables au nom de cctte
"dcrivee
necessitas
neccssite
divine".
reponse apportce par Gilbert cst unc de certains des choix thcoriques du XIVc
soil
dans
hums mundi,
neccssite
la
la
ct
de
Xlle siecle
"certains
la
simpliciter
thcologie, tout particulicrcmcnt
tel
ou
le
"les
etats
de choscs qui sont
ou seulcment
tcl invariant dans
volonte divine. Les
la
le
-
conception scion laquelle sont nccessaires
conditions".
les
et
philosophic doit ctre corrigce par
toujours
du rapport entre
rappelle que la sapientia
il
Toutc-Puissancc
anticipation des discussions
la
les entiles qui
claircment formule des
cst
considcrees
naturellcs
rcgularites
siecle: la
dc toutes
Philosophic, opere avec unc notion de
dit: la
Dans
et
Toute-Puissance divine, supposee illimitee?
chez Gilbert de Poitiers, quand
consuetudini
siecle.
ordre d actualisation des proprietes intrinseques des
Scion Knuuttila, cc probleme
autremcnt
XlVe
notions modales renvoient a des proprietes structurelles
traits caracteristiqucs
naturellcs exprimant
moins
du monde
histoire actuclle
permet de poser
cette these
fait,
1
le
"sous
certaines
monde
actuel est
"necessites naturellcs",
autremcnt
dit
plan divin effectivement actualise sont et
restent en elles-memes "theologiquement
contingentcs",
d une part,
"parce
d autre part, parce qu il qu n est pas "evident a priori que les choscs qui existent soient comprises dans les autrcs programmes providenticls que Dicu aurait pu realiscr" a la place de il
cclui
n est pas necessaire quc quoi que ce soil
qu
il
a effectivement actualise57
existe",
.
contingence theologique, ou mieux thconomiquc, des necessites naturellcs, ne signifie pas pour autant qu il n y a pas de "limitation logique a la toute puissance divine". II y a des necessites Cette conception dc
55
cf.
II.
Wcidcmann,
"Zur
la
Scmantik dcr Modalbegriffe bei Peter
Abelard",
Mcdioe\ o, 1
(1981), p. 1-40.
56
Cf.
J.
Van
Rijen,
Development of Modal 57
Cf. S. Knuuttila,
Haring,
The
the Principle of Plenitude, the de omni-per se Distinction and Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophic, 66 (1984), p. 61-88.
Theory",
"Possibility
p. 164, 34-41;
and
necessity...",
CEut, ed. Haring,
p. 322,
p. 195,
39^9.
d apres Gilbert dc
Poitiers,
DTrin
I,
ed.
Le developpement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels conceptuelles dont la validite n est pas relative^. necessaires, fondee sur
de Pidentite
lois
Ics
"La
dc ccs principcs
verite
de
et
la
183
contradiction
est
independante du vouloir divin". Autrement dit, Gilbert de Poitiers formule a sa maniere la distinction, supposee typique du XlVe siecle, entre necessites logiques et necessites reelles ou physiques^.
Mieux
Gilbert
encore,
formulation precoce de
la
Duns
anticipe
en
Scot,
theorie scion laquelle
proposant
une
signification des notions
"la
modales ne peut etre epelee qu en considerant simultanement differents etats sont choisies pour etre en de choses alternatifs". Les lois de la nature "qui
vigueur dans
monde
le
actuel ne sont pas inevitablement comprises dans tous
ne sont done pas absolument necessaires; de meme, y a un nombre illimite de possibilia qui ne sont pas il le monde dans actuel"; en revanche, y a des "principes absolument compris les
programmes
providentiels
alternatifs",
elles
"il
necessaires qui ne sont enfreints dans aucun
Sans
prejuger
de
1
de
exactitude
monde
la
possible".
de
reconstruction
la
theorie
gilbertienne chez Knuuttila, nous pouvons retenir, au moins heuristiquement, un point fondamental pour 1 histoire de la scientia naturalis: dans les
theologies de la Providence fondces sur une conception non-statistique de la
modalite faisant appel a un concept plus ou moins inchoatif des "mondes et de la semantique particuliere qui en precede, nous retrouvons possibles" opposition entre des necessites naturelles ou reelles qui ne sont que des formes de regularites radicalement contingentes, suspendues a la Toute1
Puissance divine, et des necessites logiques, dont est la figure
eminente,
et peut-etre
le
principe de contradiction
unique, qui, semble-t-il s imposent a
Dieu
lui-meme. Quelles sont philosophia
les
consequences de cette observation pour
naturalist
II
peut
se
demander
si
la
1
historien de la
nouvelle
definition
intensionnelle du possible est compatible avec la delimitation traditionnelle
de
la
puissance absolue et de
la
puissance ordonnee.
II
peut ensuite tenter de
mettre en relation cctte definition synchronique avec Phypothese, solidement etayee, d une divergence entre le modele scotiste et le modele ockhamiste de la
potentia absoluta pour voir quelles en sont les consequences sur la notion
meme
de
modele
58
Cf.
CEut.
"Possibility
59
legalite naturelle. Enfin,
scotiste
and
p.
de
la
il
doit
probablement se demander
puissance absolue ne retentit pas sur
310, 56-63; 318, p. 194.
34-36; 337, 95-338,
necessity...",
Cf. S. Knuuttila,
"Possibility
and
necessity...",
p. 194.
2;
la
(a)
si le
conception que
353, 41-42; cites par S. Knuuttila,
184
dc Libera
Ton peut se
de
faire
rcdevable a
l
"impossible opinable",
ct (b) si la
notion scotiste dc programmes providentiels altcrnatifs, a sa
la
notion de potentia absoluta de facto, aux deux a
De
notion d imaginatio est
si
fait,
d une
Pimpossibilite
la fois
ou a aucune des deux.
realisation
simultanee
contradictoires est une maniere legitime d exprimer le contenu
contradiction au niveau de
la
nature,
il
est clair
que
les
d etats
du principe de
notions d impossible
inopinable peuvent avoir le meme statut epistemologique scion que le possible est ou non defini par rapport a la necessite d une actualisation a un moment donne de 1 histoire du monde
opinable
actuel
d impossible
et
ou bicn
defini
dans
ne
le
royaume des contrefactuels entendus comme ce
monde
qui tout en n etant pas actuellement le cas dans le
actuel aurait pu,
dans une histoire alternative, y trouvcr place, et trouve effectivement place dans un nombre indetermine pour rhomme de programmes providentiels alternatifs. Si
1
on en juge par
ockhamiste de 1
la
potentia absoluta,
commune du
semble que c est le modele notion statistique de la modalite et
travaux recents, la
il
Dcus potest facere quidquid de cadre predominant a la mise en methode de raisonnement naturel de potentia Dei absoluta. Je ne
interpretation
non contradictionem place de la
les
puis, sur ce point,
questions du
principe selon lequel
includit qui a servi
que renvoyer aux textcs eux-memes, par exemple aux Hugues de Neuchateau recemment editees par E.
scotiste
Randi^O, ou, a propos de
la
question traditionnelle
Utmm Deus
possit facere
multitudincm actu infmitam je lis cet axiome qui me paratt bloquer toute interpretation non-standard de la puissance absolue en domaine naturel: Dico
quod Deus eodem modo potest
quomodo
eas
intelligit
res facere
quo modo eas
intelligit factibiles,
non
ex partc sufi\.
demarche secundum imaginationem qui est d autant plus embarrassant que de potentia Dei absoluta et secundum imaginationem recouvrent ou non le meme ensemble: la sphere du nonReste
le
probleme de
la
contradictoire. II
est
evidemment
tentant
de
rapporter
1
imaginaire
casuel
des
une perception naissante de Pinfinite des possibilites divines, des possibles non actualiscs. Le casus imaginaire serait en quelque sorte la lai cisation d une infime partie des programmes providentiels alternatifs de la Calculators, a
theologie des
"mondes possibles".
60
Cf. E.
Randi,
II
soprano e
I
orologiaio..., p. 133-172.
61
Cf. E. Randi,
//
so\rano e
I
orologiaio..., p. 156, 158-160.
Le developpement de nouvcaiix instruments conceptuels
L
dcs casus
histoire
fait
partic
de
1
185
du genre
histoire
et
litteraire
pedagogique des sophismata. Cette histoire a commence au XIIc siecle sans rapport structurel a la problematique de la modalite. On peut done, dans un premier moment, etre tcnte d admettre que
XIV e
vers Pimpossible physique a etc au "mondes possibles"
comme qu
modele
le
par
non moins stimulee par
absolue et de J.
meme
scotiste
de
la
modele des
potentia absoluta
puissance de facto. Cependant, on pourrait aussi bien admettre
elle a ete
ce que
voire
marche constante du casus
la
siecle stimulee par le
la
conception ockhamiste de
puissance ordinaire, ou encore qu elle est
la
Murdoch
a appele la
la
le fruit
puissance
normal de
"rule-testing activity".
nous semble, quant a nous, vraisemblable de soutenir que 1 imaginaire casuel est une donnee transversale, qui n est liee a aucune ontologie, II
semantique ou metaphysique particuliere, et que la divergence des modeles ethico-juridique ou logico-philosophique de la puissance n y joue a 1 origine
aucun role fondateur. Cependant, dans la mesure ou Pimaginable scientifique recouvre la classe du possible logique et ou le possible logique peut recevoir deux interpretations,
1
une extensionnelle
synchronique, nous concedons que cette divergence a
une
et la
signification
diachronique,
1
autre intensionnelle et
question reste ouverte de savoir: (a)
pour
le
philosophe naturel,
et (b)
si
quel
modele a joue un role effectif dans le developpement de la scientia naturalis. Pour heure, il semble que ce soit la definition burleyenne du possible 1
comme
n incluant
pas
de
formelle
contradiction
qui
ait
joue un role
significatif.
Ceci, toutefois, ne clot pas Penquete.
Qu adviendrait-il,
en
effet, si
nous
champ de Pimaginable identifie a tout ce qui n implique pas contradiction, autrement dit au domaine du possible de potentia Dei absoluta, au sens logico-philosophique du terme, n epuisait pas le champ du constations que le
licitement
assumable
qu adviendrait-il
si le
On
par
le
philosophe
calculateur?
domaine de Pimaginable n
etait
Autrement
dit:
qu un sous-ensemble de
aurait, ce qui nous parait etre une caracteristique notable
Pargumentable? du Calcul, a savoir: Paffirmation d une
possibilite
de Pimaginable, gratia disputationis Ceci nous amene a notre dernier point. .
d argumenter au-dela
meme
de Libcra
186
4.
Au-dela de
I
I
imaginable:
d un
univers des Sophismata et la conception
argiunentable disputationis gratia
Les sophismata ne sont pas la scule source disponible pour 1 historien de la naturalis du XlVe siccle: les materiaux existent, en nombre
scientia
comme
surabondant, dans des oeuvres theologiques, Sentences, dont
puisque c est doctrines, la
1
la
que
que se noue
se trouvent les enjeux theoriques, la
point de vue de
strict
comme
telle,
niveau
theorique
cxiste toute
il
sophismata: c est ultimo
la
instantiQ
plus le
que de portce reellement generale 62
theoric logique et de
une
eleve
cas des monographics
De
.
De meme,
analyse propositionnelle
De
praedicamenlis,
De motu; mais
c est aussi le cas
et
intcnsione
scnsu composito
et
diviso
et
remissione
et
M
,
De
tribus
de copicuses portions des voire des Sommes de logique caelo,
du De
elles-memes ou des Commentaires
De primo
incipit et desinit,
minimo, De
ct
proportionibus,
Physique
1
les
des
de genres litteraires assumant a un ensemble des problemes traites dans les
DC maxima
la
meme
gamme
1
formamm, De
Commentaires de
que se definissent
se situent, sous la pression
objets, les principales innovations
au
dialogue effectif des disciplines et des
le
positiones et la surtout
grandes
Commentaires des
les
aucun doute plus grande
est sans
importance philosophique
issus
de
1
exposition ou de
monographies devcnues elles-memes standard dans
tel
ou
tel
la
lecture de
milieu, telle
ou
telle Universite.
L importance des sophismata dans le processus que nous avons essaye de decrire est neanmoins decisive 65 C est dans les sophismata que Ton essaye .
on
ou les propositions generates de que mesure, c est dans les sophismata que Ton pousse litteralement a bout le jeu complexe de ( argumentation de potentia absoluta et du raisonnement secundum imaginationcm, mais surtout, c est dans les sophismata que s est les positions et
1
formee concretement
62 Sur cc point, 63
cf.
S.
la
Knuuttila
teste les regies
mcntalite scientifique ouverte a une pratique des
&
A.
I.
Ixhtinen,
"Change
and
Contradiction...", p.
189 sqq.
problemes assumes dans ces traites, cf. N. Kretzmann, "Continuity, Contrariety, Contradiction and Change", in: Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medie\*al Thought, N. Kretzmann (cd.), Ithaca-I^ndres: Cornel! University Press, 1982, p. 270-284; P. V. Spade, Sur
les
"Quasi-Aristotelianism", ibid., p.
64
Sur ce genre,
Prepositional
65
Sur
le
et
son contcnu,
Attitudes",
genre
Sophismata", in:
297-307. cf.
N. Kretzmann,
"Scnsus
compositus, Sensus divisus, and
Medioe\-o, 1 (1981), p. 195-229.
littcraire
des Sophismata,
cf.
The Cambridge History of Later
N. Kretzmann, "Syncategoremata, Exponibilia, Medie\>al
Philosophy, p. 21 1-245.
developpement dc nouveaux instruments conceptuels
Lc.
"nouvcaux langagcs"
tant dans la scientia naturalis
du sophisma que
outre, c cst dans Ic format
que dans
la theologie66.
En
sc sont manifesles les cffcts des
changcmcnts dc paradigmcs ou dc modeles scicntifiqucs quc nous avons pu observer avcc la resorption des topiques dans les consequences, le developpement des theories de la modalite, et la place croissante prise par obligationes dans la reflexion sur la connaissance.
L
des sophismata est encore mal connuc
histoire
les
d une grande
et
complexite dans la mesure ou, plus que tout autre, elle joue au double niveau de la forme litteraire et de la pratique scolaire. On peut neanmoins en esquisser les grandes lignes grace aux travaux ou aux editions de N.
De
Kretzmann, L.M. Originellement,
comme
proposition, ou
Ebbesen68
Rijk, J. Pinborg67, S.
des
c est-a-dire 1
XIIc
le
siecle,
Kretzmann:
ecrit
"a
et
un
H.A.G. Braakhuis. est
une
puzzling in its
own
sophisma
sentence
to bring right or on the basis of a certain assumption, designed issue into sharper
focus"
donnee constante de on en trouve
L
.
la logica
la trace
analyse et
la
discussion de sophismata est une
modemomm,
dans toutes
les
abstract
tous genres litteraircs confondus:
Sommes
de logique du XHIe siecle et
consacres aux proprietes des termes syncatcgorematiques 1 analyse de syncategorematibus). Parallelement, tout indique que
dans tous
(De
les traites
a
sophismata indispensable
autonome. aux
69
some
En
XII e et
resoudre
de
et,
ce
considered
fait,
developpee
temoignent, principalement,
XIII e
sieclcs
pour
facilcment
plus
initialement
d emblee
etc
modeles sur
comme un excrcice scolaire comme pratique pedagogique les recueils
de regies composes
aider, semble-t-il, les mattres et les etudiants a
leurs
difficultes
Ces
specifiques.
les Distinctiones theologicae,
recueils,
ont pris la forme de
Summae
de sophismatibus et distinctionibus puis d abreges tcls que les Abstractions de Richard de Cornouailles particulieremcnt en faveur a 66 Sur cct Intellectual aspect de la littcrature sophismatique, cf. J. Murdoch, "From Social into Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of I^te Medieval Learning", in: The Cultural Context of Mediwal Learning, J. E. Murdoch & E. D. Sylla (eds.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975, p. 303-307; "Scientia mediantibus vocibus...", p. 100-104; "Mathematics and Sophisms in Late Medieval Natural Philosophy", in: Les genres litteraires dans les sources theologiques et International de philosophiqiies nicdie\ alcs, definition, critique et exploitation. Actes du Colloquc Institut d etudes I,ouvain-la-Neuve, 25-27 mai 1981, Louvain-la-iNeuve: Publications de 1
medicvales (2e
67
Cf.
J.
"Radulphus
68
Cf. S.
Dacia",
69
Cf.
serie, vol. 5), 1982, p. 85-100.
Pinhorg, "Die Ixigik der Modistae", Studio Mediewistyczne, 16 (1975), Brito s Sophism on Second Intentions", Vivarium, 13 (1975), p. 119-152.
Ebbesen
Cahiers de
1
&
J.
Pinborg,
Institut
N. Kretzmann,
"Studies
"Socrates is Whiter...",
et latin,
p. 6.
39-97;
Writings Attributed to Boethius de 3 (1970), p. 1-54.
in the logical
du Moyen Age grec
p.
dc Libcra
188
Oxford dans
premiere moitie du XHIe
Les Regiilae solvendi heritieres lointaines de ce genre litteraire.
la
siecle.
sophismata de Heytcsbury sont les A une epoque que on ne peut encore situer avec precision, la discussion de sophismata s est organisce a la fois formellement et institutionnellement sur 1
modele, plus ou moins fidelement respecte, des Quaestiones disputatae. On peut, a partir de la, considerer le sophisma comme une unite discursive autonome, possedant sa structure argumentative propre, refletant une
le
discussion complexe,
d un
solution
Maitre.
rassemblant plusieurs intervenants, terminee par la Les sophismata de Boece de Dacie, avec leur
architecture compliquee de probationes, d improbationes, de solutiones et de
responsiones, qu
s
il
agisse de la
"reponse
du
Bachelier"
ou de
bon exemple de cette configuration. meme donne au XI V c siecle: le sophisma
la
responsio
propria Magistri, sont un
On
une dispute effective organisee autour d une proposition particuliere, deja riche de toute une histoire argumentative. II y a cependant, apparemment, une difference fondamentale: les sophismata du XIIIc siecle n utilisent ni cas "imaginaire" ni retrouve
la
raisonnement sccundiun imaginationcm, langages mathematiques,
et surtout, ils
ils
est
n utilisent pas les outils ou les
semblent principalement destines a
elucider ou a manifester les proprietes des tcrmes syncategorematiques et les
phcnomcnes syntactico-semantiques determines par categoremes ainsi
syncategoremcs a
meme
que
scicntia
et
lorsque
le
comme
naturalis,
1
syncatcgorematibus
relations
entre
C est
sophisma semble porter sur une question de c est
le
incipit/dcsinit contenus tant dans les
De
les
intericur de la proposition discutee.
du XIIIc
siecle,
nombreux sophismata de de logique que dans les traites s agit toujours de determiner
des
cas
Sommes il
import des proprietes syntactico-semantiques des syncategoremes incipit et desinit plutot que d utiliser le sophisma comme pretexte a une analyse 1
metalinguistique des problemes ou des paradoxes du continu.
1
Ce changement
comprehension de la fonction epistemologique du sophisma exprime evolution d une conception de la theorie logique centree sur la semantique
dans
des
la
termcs
(dc
proprietatibus
tenninoruni)
categoreme-syncategorcme, a une utilisation de "passage
toutes
au niveau les
propositionncl"
possibilites
logiqucs
articulce
1
outil logique
le couple fondee sur un
pour explorer secundum imaginationem d une situation ou d un probleme
epistemologique,
physique,
ou
epistemique.
cette
evolution
en
comparant
caracterise
sur
et
le
J.
Murdoch
traitement
a
clairement
de sophismata
Le developpcment de nouveawc standard dans
1
unc
ct
1
189
instruments conceptuels
le
autrc tradition^: c esl ainsi, par excmplc, que
sophisma neiitrum oculwn habendo, a determiner la fonction de
tu
"neuter"
poles videre qui servait au
comme
XHIe son
signe distributif et
siecle
effet
de
composition et de division du sens propositionnel, devient chez Heytesbury un instrument d analyse de la virtus visus et des minima visibles, ou que Omne
Noe, naguere consacre aux proprietes syntacticosous semantiques de quodlibet est applique au probleme de maximo/minimo, une a-t-il italien: humaniste un ravi sans forme une y doute, qui aurait, une 1 ou minimum d eau "capable" de faire flotter arche quantite
animal
fuit
in
archa
quantite
maximum
incapable d en assurer
la flottaison?
Cela pose, nous voulons souligner un point qui nous parait essentiel: le sophisma est 1 unite de discours ou s organise Papplication des nouveaux langages et ou se deploie
methode, mais
1
analyse metalinguistique, le sophisma est une
c est aussi, et sans
doute d abord, un genre particulier de
dispute.
Les sophismata du XlVe des
Ce changement n est un changement de perspective, ce qui fait que meme des materiaux traditionnels, on les utilise differcmment. Bref,
"limit-decision sophisms".
est surtout
de contenu, c
lorsqu on utilise il
pour la plupart, comme pas un simple changement
siecle se presentent,
y a
une maniere
"moderne"
de
trailer les questions les plus classiques.
Albert de Saxe peut nous servir
du moins
Sophismata,
tels
les
que
de guide et de temoin. Dans ses transmet le ms. Lot. 16134 de la
ici
71 Albert examine 31 sophismes portant sur Bibliotheque Nationale de Paris 12 au moins relevent du Sur ces 31 le probleme de incipit/desinit. sophismes, ,
dit
genre
des Sophismata physicalia. Selon Albert, ces Sophismata sont
par certains
"traites
convient done, nous
modernes" 72 , dit-il,
"de
les
mais de maniere peu satisfaisante. II trailer de maniere plus penetrante", magis
usage des ecolicrs, afin qu ils exercent leur propre "pour scolariwn ad exercitum proprii intellectus utilitatem propter lucide,
7
1
Cf. J.
Murdoch,
"Scicntia
mediantibus
vocibus...",
intelligence", .
La
finalite
p. 100-101.
la version imprimee a Paris en 1502 les sophismata 123 a 133 compris ne Notamment, Hildesheim, Olms, 1975). (reproduite par Sortes incipit esse albior quam figurent pas dans le ms. 16134, qui, a la place, porte (fol. 45ra-vb):
7 1 Cette version manuscrite est sensihlement differente de
ipsemet incipit esse, Sortes incipiet esse ita albus sicut ipsemet Plato erit albus, Sortes erit albior quam Plato erit albus.
71
On
notera que
sqq.) et de
73
Cf.
le
ms. Nat.
lat.
16134 contient
Guillaume de Heytesbury
ms. Nat.
lat.
16134,
fol.
46va.
(fol.
les
81 sqq.).
erit,
Sortes incipiet esse ita albus sicut
Sophismata de Richard Kilvington
(fol.
56
190
dc Libcra
clu
pedagogique
sophisma determine, scmble-t-il, les choix theoriques dans sa grande Somme de logique, la Perutilis il
Comme
d Albert.
mentionne
logica,
divcrscs
de
"particulariste"
solutions?-*.
style
Id,
"ockhamiste"
toutefois,
qu
abandonne
il
these
la
y avail defendue, et tranche au
il
d une demarche secundum imaginationem, fortement apparentee dans ses resultats a une interpretation caracteristique de Burleigh75. A en croire profit
Albert, Panalyse de type
dans
la
littcrature
d assumer avec
imagine dans
le
de
Panalyse
est
et
"precision"
Dans
s ils
"burleyen"
illam
n existent pas dans a
est
compatible avec
secundum
indivisibilia in
meme
temps,
et
et, ceci expliquant cela, d etre incapable souhaitee ces "instants indivisibles que Ton
sophismatique
la
type
sophismatique
a le double inconvenient d etre inusitee
"ockhamiste"
la
precisius
demarche
sa bricvete
meme,
la
realite";
dans
utilisec
"imaginaire":
au contraire,
la
litterature
"[...]
ista usitata
possumus ymaginando veritate non sint76."
instantia
loqui
licet talia in rei
tempore
fois
la
ce texte nous permet, je pense, de
"fixer"
le
du sophisma et la methode de raisonnement caracteristique d un point de vue "moderne".
rapport existant entre la pratique "imaginaire"??
comme
La methode secundum imaginationem elle
ne
consiste
uniquement
pas
a
a
pour
mettre
lieu naturel le
en
scene
des
sophisma; situations
empiriquement non
attestees, voire bi/arres,
d introduire dans
discussion philosophique un ensemble d entites qui ne
font pas partie ccla,
ajoute
la
du monde
Albert,
le
un ensemble d
reel,
logicien
s
egale
a
elle
permet
entites fictives 1
astrologue
aussi et surtout
ou
qui
abstraites. "imagine
En une
Sur revolution d Alhcrt cf. A. dc I.ibera, "fcpositio et probatio per causas veritatis chcx. Albert dc Saxc ct Marsiic d lnghen", in: Prcuvcs ct raisons a I Unirersitc dc Paris. Logique, ontologic et theologie au XIV*- stcclc, /.. Kahj/.a & P. Vignaux (cds.), (Etudes dc Philosophic mcdievale), Paris, 1984, p. 127-147. Albert avail dc ja soutcnu ccttc interpretation dans son Kvpositio dcs Conscqucntiae dc Guillaume de Sutton (ou plutot d un commcntaire de ces Conscqucntiae), ms Nat lot 14715 fol.
76
77rb-77va. Cf. ms. Nat.
lat.
16134,
fol.
43va.
va de soi que nous n acccptons pas interpretation qu en donne C. Wilson, William Heytesbury..., p. 41, pour qui analysc a laquelle "revient" Albert est "celle du Dc exponibilibus des Summulae logica/cs de Pierre d accord avec lispagne", parce qu elle est II
1
I
"en
1
usage
presumably among Schoolmen. En effet, le De exponibilibus n est pas une ocuvre de Pierre d Espagne (Wilson a, sans doute suivi, sur ce point une indication fautivc dc Petrus e dition de Venisc, 1522, fol. 2213 de la Perutilis Sanitus, dans logica); d autre part, Pusage" dont il s agit ici n cst prcciscment pas usage commun des "Maitrcs" en tant que tels, mais bicn uniquement usage hautemcnt technique predominant dans le genre pedagogique et litteraire des Sophismata. commun",
I
1
1
Le developpement dc nouveaiix instruments conceptuels multitude de ccrclcs dans indivisibles",
alors
les
ni les
que
cicux"
uns
ct
191
au geometre qui "imagine dcs points n existent dans la realite.
ni les autres
Reste a indiquer ce qui justifie et finalise cette procedure. A lire Albert, on n y trouve qu une raison: utilite pedagogique, propter meliorem et 1
faciliorem traditionem scientianun Autrement .
pas de decouvrir de nouvelles verites
ni
dit: le
meme
but de
de tester
mcthode n
la
la validite
est
de regies
anciennes, mais purement et simplement de transmettre plus efficacement un savoir constitue en integrant 1 exercice actif de Pintelligence au processus
meme plus
de sa transmission. Hors du sophisma pedagogique, la methode n du moins par rapport aux prescriptions de Pontologie.
est
licite
Cette caracterisation de la fonction epistemologique du sophisma par la pedagogic demande, toutefois, une confirmation. De fait, Albert ne souscrit pas lui-meme a
pratique des
la
or, ce qui interesse
modemi;
sciences, ce sont precisement les sophismata tels
historien des
1
groupe de d Oxford on a les et philosophes que longtemps appeles Mertoniens, que Ton maintenant du titre moins specifique de Calculatores d Oxford. designe
que
les traite le
1
La question vise-t-elle
est
comme
done
la suivante:
la
chez Albert de Saxe
pratique oxonienne du sophisma le
seul
niveau de
1
exercice
de
Pintelligence?
L historiographie deux
general
sophismata
des sophismata calculatoria
caracteristiques:
en
fonction
de
(a)
elle
repartitions
distingue
d Oxford presente en differentes
disciplinaires:
les
sortes
de
sophismata
grammaticalia, les sophismata logicalia, les sophismata physicalia, (b) elle considere que les sophismata physicalia sont la maniere typiquement
de faire de la physique. Cette vue traditionnelle a ete recemment refutee par E. arguments tires de 1 etude des statuts universitaires d Oxford 78 "mertonienne"
On
et
Sylla,
avec des
.
les savants ulterieurs ont remarque peut resumer ainsi sa these: 1 oeuvre des calculateurs d Oxford apprecie pour son contenu physique et "Si
mathematique, neanmoins dans le contexte academique meme de Oxford du siecle, 1 oeuvre des Calculateurs n est pas apparue sous la forme de 1
XIV e
mathematiques ou de philosophic naturelle reconnues comme 1 interieur de la pratique standard de la dispute Iogique79."
78
Cf.
E. Sylla,
The
Oxford
Calculators",
in:
Philosophy, p. 540-563.
79
Cf. E. Sylla,
"The
Oxford
Calculators", p.
542.
telles,
mais a
The Cambridge History of Later Medical
de Libera
192
Sans entrcr dans 1
etudiant
d Oxford,
d informations "pedagogique"
qui
que nous avons
singulierement relativiser
complique des obligations statutaires de des analyses de Sylla un ensemble
detail
Ic
on peut semblent
la
tirer
tiree
dans
assez
aller
sens
le
d Albert de Saxe,
et
de
hypothese
1
done, par la-meme,
portee scientifique du sophisma.
Tout d abord, le sophisma concerne exclusivement les etudiants avances: apres deux annees d audition de cours magistraux (lecturae), les aspirants au un
d opponens puis de respondens dans des disputes de sophismatibus (statut de 1268) ou de parviso (aux alentours de 1350 et en 1409); apres quoi, ils sont admis a repondre de Baccalaureat es
arts,
doivent, pendant
questione puis, ensuite seulement, a celle
d un autre maitre (durant
fondamental
le
servir
an,
dans leur ecole ou dans
"determiner"
Ils
Careme).
sont alors bacheliers.
est ici la distinction entre les disputes ordinaires
Le
fait
des maitres ou
disputes in scolis, completant leurs lectures ordinaires, et determinees par eux, et les disputes destinees aux etudiants
ou
in parviso,
parvis"
c est-a-dire:
non
bacheliers, de sophismatibus
a Pexterieur de PecoleSO.
ont pour seule fonction
1
apprentissage de
la
Ces disputes
"sur
comme
logique,
le
en
temoigne entre autres le fait que les participants sont appcles sophistae. Les rccueils de Sophismata des Calculators sont composes par les maitres pour ne retracent pas des debats directs comme les disputes in sont concus comme des "munitions pour les etudiants, sans
les etudiants,
scolis,
ils
determination
ils
magistrale
Par
particuliere"81.
la
meme,
sens
le
de
la
distinction traditionnelle entre sophismata logicalia et sophismata physicalia,
perd toute pertinence institutionnelle, done conceptuelle. Pour E. Sylla, les sophismata physicalia ne font pas partie de
education
1
des etudiants dans le domaine de la philosophic de la nature. Ccci ne veut pas dire qu il n y a pas de philosophic naturelle ou de mathematique dans 1
oeuvre des Calculatores: ceci veut
social 1
de
leurs
productions
apprentissage de
80
la
in
scolis",
intellectuelles
logique. Autrement
E. Sylla tend a considcrcr
"disputes
dire, plus
d une part,
dit:
comme synonymes "disputes
de
les
contexte
simplement, que
le
est
logique
la
dispute
on ne peut sainement evaluer
expressions
sophismatibus"
et
"disputes
"disputes
in
de
questione"
parviso".
et la
et
Noter,
toutcfois cette precision, p. 545, n. 12: "One cannot claim an absolute identity between de disputations de sophismatibus and disputations in pan iso. There were certainly disputations sophismatibus not in pan iso for instance in the "determinations" of new bachelors in Lent and probably also in disputations connected with the ordinary lectures on logic. Later there may
have been disputations
in
pan iso not on logic. am arguing that in the period of pan iso would have been de sophismatibus and vice I
Calculators most disputations in 81
Cf. E. Sylla,
"The
Oxford
Calculators", p.
the Oxford
versa."
546.
Le developpement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels
193
la signification du sophisma comme instrument de savoir sans au distinguer prealablc disputes ordinaires et disputes in parviso. C est parce que les disputes de sophismatibus sont, contrairement aux disputes ordinaires, et
portee
detachees du contexte immediat de
qu
elles
la lecture
d un manuel scolaire de logique
etre le theatre d injections massives de materiaux non-
peuvent
logiques d origine physique ou mathematique.
Le
resultat
1
utilisation
comme
la
de
travaux
des
Sylla
est,
il
faut
1
avouer,
un
peu
porteuse de Panalyse propositionnelle et de des nouveaux langages conceptuels que nous voulions considerer
decourageant. Ainsi
la partie
plus novatrice dans la scientia naturalis du
XlVe
siecle serait
un
simple exercice scolaire destine aux non-bacheliers pour parfaire leur culture
On
logique...
intellectuelles
peut se consoler en songeant aux extraordinaires aptitudes dont devaient faire preuve les etudiants d Oxford. Mais on peut
aussi depasser cette premiere reaction.
Tout d abord, si les recueils de Sophismata composes par les maitres ont une destination principalement pedagogique, ils servent eventuellement de materiaux pour la confection de traites scientifiques de niveau superieur; d autre part, on ne peut detacher la science medievale de son contexte culturel: la dispute n est pas un trait exterieur, secondaire, du mode de production des enonces scientifiques, elle en est 1 un des organes essentiels; enfin, c est peut-etre parce que son point d application dans 1 institution trouve, comme on dit, in parviso, que la pratique de la oxonienne de sophismatibus permet une autonomisation de la disputatio scientia naturalis par rapport aux donnees contraignantes de la physique et de la cosmologie aristotelicienne - detachement assurement plus difficile a universitaire se
obtenir in scolis a fleur de commentaire.
doute
tirer
apparemment
de
argument disputes
innovations des calculationes
En
d autres termes,
pratique pedagogique
moyen
le
situation
la
dans
I
ecole,
De
ce point de vue, on peut sans
parisienne
semblent
ou
moins
les
sophismata, aux
permeables
.
la
reference aux statuts universitaires et
effective
de
1
plus economique d aborder
a la
Universite d Oxford est sans doute le
phenomene memc
de
le
la logicisation
du savoir naturel. Nous avons essaye de degager un certain nombre de facteurs conceptuels appelant une transformation des representations collectives
de
la scientificite,
serait sans objet
si
de ses
Ton ne pouvait
la
de ses methodes; cette tentative situer dans un cadre social defini. II n y a
criteres,
pas d histoire des mentalites, fussent-elles scientifiques, sans une histoire des facteurs sociaux et institutionnels ou elles prennent corps. Les debats sur ce
dc Libcra
194
Murdoch
ct E. Sylla ont appele Tlie cultural context of medieval ne peuvcnt pas ne pas integrer Ic phenomene meme dc Universite, learning idcntite ou dc sa physionomie propres. L histoirc dcs statuts son dc J.
quc
1
universitaircs
partic dc
fait
expression centralc du
1
histoirc
"caractere
de
science medievalc:
la
de
unitaire"
la
une
c est
science dcs scolastiques
tardifs.
Ccla pose, 1
ncgliger
XIV e
il
que 1 histoirc de la science ne saurait non plus ou dcs formes litteraires. Si les innovations du
cst clair
histoirc dcs genres
de ce point de vue, clles peuvent etre reconduitcs a organisation oxonicnne de la disputalio logique, lesdites innovations ont largcmcnt cssaime en dehors d Oxford, et on on rctrouve de siccle sont, avant tout, anglaises,
si,
1
1
multiples traces sur
d cxistencc
Ic
formcllc
Continent, quellcs qu institutionncllc
ct
Subtilitates anglicanae sont
pcnctrent largemcnt
omniprcscntes dans
La
On
XIVe
XVe
ct
XIVe
1
ct
Murdoch un
Sentences** 2
.
ou
Elles sont
manicrc dont
s est
comme
1
intcgration de
1
univcrs
instrumental du sophisma aux autres formes discursives: ce que appclle "sophismata -based reasoning" ou "sophismata without
Orcsme la
critique
scmblc
en
Aristotc,
doute prcsupposce par la manicrc sur unc ingenieuse s appuyant
theorie des conscqucntiae et de la theorie dcs possibilites
logiques, qu un recent article d H.
qu
cst
cllc
Hugonnard-Rochc a bicn misc en
aussi
dans
apparcntc
particuliercment
valeur&t.
Wirkungsgeschichtc des Rcgulae solvcndi sophismata de Heytesbury en
La en
ellcs
approchc mctalinguistiquc.
combinaison dc
me
siccle,
siecles italiens.
announcement"^. Cettc evolution est sans
II
genre
Paris du
univcrs des Commentaires de
pcut dccrire ccttc generalisation
theorique
dont
du le
situation italicnnc pcut scrvir de rcvclateur de la
gencralisec
J.
1
les
connues dans
formes particulieres sophismatique. Les
y soient les
la
cffet,
distinction
cntre
1
approche de
re
lice
a
Italic.
unc ccrtaine
interpretation du cadre et du langage aristoteliciens, d unc part, ct
mctalinguistiquc ou dc intcntionibus, d autre
la
1
approchc
part, tend a se rcsorbcr par
Punivcrsalisation dcs instruments d analyse et des principes argumentatifs du
sophisma de 82
& 83 84
J.
Cf.
Peter B.
style anglais.
Murdoch,
"Subtilitates
C cst
ainsi,
Anglicanae
in
pour prendre un seul exemplc, que
Fourteenth Century Paris: John of Mirecourt and
Machaut s World. Science and Art in the Fourteenth Century, M. Chandler (eds.), (Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 314), 1978. Ceffons", in:
Cf.
J.
Cf.
Murdoch, II.
"From
social into intellectual
Hugonnard-Roche,
d Aristote par Nicole
"Lx>gique
Orcsme", s.p.
et
les
factors...",
P.
Cosman
p. 306.
philosophic naturelle au
XIVe
siccle:
la critique
Le developpement de nouveaux de primo
traitcs
ultimo instanti d un Pierre de
et
195
instruments conceptuels
Mantoue ou d un Apollinaire
cas, regies et les arguments systematiqucment visee sophismatiques dans une strategic metalinguistique d ensemble, dont la n est plus pedagogique, au sens ou elle serait liee a un mode particulier
Offredi integrent
d institution de
les
les
la dispute,
mais
scientifique,
sophisma est un generates d analyse
au sens ou
le
pour la discussion de regies de problemes classes et ordonnes selon 1 ordre des matieres propositionnelle ou 1 ordre des raisons85. Les regies pour resoudre les sophismata de maximo
cadre
et
conccptuel
minima
sont desormais, avant tout, des regies pour trailer le probleme
metalinguistique du
sophisma devient
maximum format
le
et
meme
du minimum. Le format pedagogique du de
quelques-uns de ses
traits structurels:
le
d une
vericonditionnelle "experimental"
de
de
univers
casus,
1
comme
activite discursive.
reference
total
un
suppose
Panalyse
modele
un
desormais
univers explicitement centre sur
un univers
a
indispensable
designe
proposition,
variables detachees sur le fond d
petit
nombre de
invariant, grace a la
clause: ceteris paribus (toutes choses egales par ailleurs). Cette limitation 1
univers
casuel
fonctionne
On
du format sophismatique en notant
universalisation
peut
science
la
cette
decrire
comme un
principe
de
methodologique. Son nom de principes
application concrete peut, cependant, etre mise en cause au
par exemple, de montrer que la clause n est pas effectivement appliquee ou n est pas reellement applicable dans le casus delimite par un auteur. C est ainsi qu Hugues de Sienne objecte au cas (utilise scientifiques generaux.
II s agit,
par Pierre de Mantoue) d un patient soumis uniformement a 1 action d un il ne principe actif que "toutes choses ne sont pas egales par ailleurs", puisqu
peut y avoir action uniforme d un agent sur un patient
uniformement dispose, ce qu interdit 86 prochaines et de ses parties eloignees aussi
la difference
si
celui-ci
meme
n
est pas
de ses parties
.
-
L argumentation
definissant
1
ex suppositione
n
est
plus
limitee
aux seuls cas
univers de reference, elle s etend aussi bien aux propositions
C est
qu on peut accepter ou refuser: (a) la validite de certaines theses d ontologie presupposees dans un corpus, comme identite de la forme" ou "Pidentite du compose suffit a grandeur d une theoriques elles-memes.
ainsi
1
85
Pour tout
cela, cf.
A. de Libera,
"Apollinaire
"la
Offredi critique de Pierre de
Mantoue...", p.
266 sqq. 86 Sur ce de Pierre de Mantoue...", p. 267point, cf. A. de Libera, "Apollinaire Offredi critique mentionnee 268, note 26. La Quaestio de augmcntatione de Hugues de Sienne (Ugo Benzi) est par C. Wilson, Medical Logic..., p. 200, note 58.
de Libera
196
meme la
forme etendue pout varier selon la plus ou moins grande extension de matiere"; (b) celle de certaines suppositiones physiques telle que "tous les
mouvements uniformes,
a egalite de temps et de vitesse, produiront des effets
egaux, en quelque categoric que ce sont
associees
producendum
dans
erit,
telle
quod
ou
soit";
telle
(c) celle
des conclusiones qui leur
comme:
opinio,
successive
aliquid
in nullo instanti erit.
Enfin: la clause ceteris paribus peut etre legitimement appliquee a une
-
afm de reduire la portee de argument qu elle supporte. Ces remarques sur universalisation du format sophismatique nous amenent a notre conclusion. 1
suppositio
1
Le moment de comporte de decrire ou de
XlVe de
1
1
interne et d auto-limitation de
critique
universalisation
de souligner n
et
"non-realisme"
siecle.
du
"sophisrnata -based
est
pesant sur
1
la logicisation
-
enfin!
contraire, elle vient s auto-limiter dans le "imaginaire"
1
univers-test
dans
les
qu
qu a tous
elle sc
pas
devaluation,
les realites a
la
toute-puissance
au
-
reel;
moment
oil elle
Toute analyse peut, en principe, procede ex suppositione: dans
elle
les principes et les regies
qu
elle applique,
de ses hypotheses les plus generales. probleme de la decouverte des lois de
meme
ni
au
de son universalisation.
le
premier
validation sont compris lois
tire
pourquoi
nature n est
ici
meme
"irrealisme"
philosophia naturalis du
diraient certains
fait
niveaux
les
donne, dans
conclusions qu elle
On comprend
la
obtient son triomphe veritable au
revient sur elle-meme, rcditione completa. etre rectifiee, parce
imputation d
ce type de raisonnement,
imaginaire ne se heurte pas
La methode
de
1
imaginaire que
que nous venons
reasoning"
pas destine a lever
Dans extension de
1
ultime:
c est
que
les
la
procedures
evaluer et le niveau de pertinence des tests de
comme
essentiellement conventionnels. Les seules
general, mais bicn celles de la
non pas
de
pensee en pensee aux prises avec elle-meme, de la pensee
qui restent sont celles de la pensee,
celles
la
disputante plutot que ratiocinante.
C est
ce
mode de pensee
agonistique qu ont forge les reflexions sur le
possible logique et le possible naturel, sur le statut de la positio impossibilis
dans
de
les
jeux d obligations, sur
credibilite, sur le
1
impossible opinable et ses differents niveaux
fondement topique des raisonnements formels;
c est lui
profile dans Pemergence des formes nouvelles qui encadrent obligationes et consequentiae accompagnent la montee de 1 imaginaire
qui se
et -,
c est lui qui se cherche dans la redefinition des notions traditionnelles de la
Lc dcveloppement de nouveaux absoluc
puissance
et
do
la
197
instruments conceptuels
1
A
ordinaire.
puissance
agonistique fmit par rcsorbcr jusqu a
terme,
imaginaire lui-meme.
la
C est
pensee ce que
dit Heytesbury dans scs Sophismata: par la grace de la dispute, on peut admettre ce qui n est pas possible mais imaginable, autrement dit ce qui ne contient pas formellement de contradiction, mais on peut aussi admettre
nous
jusqu a Pimpossible que Ton ne
"saurait
disputationis potest admilti totus casus possibilis
Unde
[...]
bien
tamquam
breviter quilibet casus qui
formaliter sen tale impossibile
imaginer":
Et ideo gratia
imaginabilis, et
non
non tamquam
claudit contradictionem
quod non bene potest imaginari
[...],
satis potest
admitti gratia disputationis^.
C est
ce
mode de raisonnement
disputationis gratia qui constitue le
centre perspective des nouveaux langages et des nouveaux outils conceptuels
du XlVe
siecle,
un mode de pensee que, nous esperons
saurait ni trouver ni
comprendre a
1
1
avoir montre,
Ton ne
etat isole.
Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris
ABSTRACT: The Development of New Conceptual Tools and Their Use
in
the Philosophy of Nature in the 14*h Century
The paper
deals with the major conceptual tools that have been used in what could be termed
the dialectical preparation for the XlVth century natural science and/or natural philosophy. Conceptual tools are not considered as mere logical tools; one assumes that they also include the
methods of teaching as well as the literary genres. Thus, the paper builds on the recent work that has been done in the following fields: (1) the development of the topical tradition in the late XIII tn and early XlVth centuries and the conceptual, scientifical import of the so-called "absorption of the Topics into Consequences"; (2) the games of Obligations and the application of ideas related to them to questions of natural science; (3) the development of different models or interpretations for possibility and necessity, both real and logical, the theology of potentia Dei absoluta and the secundum imaginationem reasoning; (4) the social and cultural context of the sophismata-bascd teaching and scientifical inquiring at Oxford, the main stages in the evolution of the genre and its final achievement: the admission as a conceptual tool (disputationis gratia) of counterfactuals that cannot be fully "imagined" (impossibile quod non bene potest imaginari).
87
Sophismata,
fol.
161vb-162va, cite par C. Wilson,
p. 174,
note 65.
ARTHUR STEPHEN MCGRADE
Elhics and Politics as Practical Sciences
The proper
to
place
a
begin
of medieval
discussion
the context of the sciences
in
philosophy
political
Latin
and
ethics
with the progressive
is
recovery and development of Aristotelian moral philosophy starting in the 13th century, and that indeed
me
moment
a
the
chart
the
United
the
Hamilton
to
citizens
of
approaches, we
Constitution
where
s,
new
the
ratify
do
may
one of a
in
As
States.
well
series
constitution.
mankind
government understand
their
intended
political
will
you
permit
first like
to
on
good
destined 1
and
"accident
the
debate was
establishing
forever
of
fellow
his
Hamilton,
political
of
are
urging to
the
remark
a
ponder
not
of
bicentennial
of essays
or
choice"
institutions
the to
American or
capable
and
if
should
force".
As
to I
the constitution devised by Hamilton and his associates was
it,
to
really
reflection
"from
for
depend
are
I
According
central question in the post-Revolutionary
whether
but
will begin;
I
course of this talk by reference to
circuitous
chronologically
Constitution
Alexander
is
of philosophical patriotism beforehand,
be not only a product but a continuing embodiment of choice. Reflection and rather than the choice,
and
reflection
implementation of momentary popular impulse, or the preservation of a given social order, or the enforcement of given scientific or religious views,
were
process.
It
is
to
be,
this
so to speak, the essence of the American political
autonomy of
reflection
and choice and the autonomy of I want
the practical science which reflects on reflection and choice that
some
to use to give
and
challenging
consider practica
briefly
focus to an inevitably partial examination of a vast
literature.
the
which began
In
the
development in
the
13th
first
of an
section
of
implicitly
century.
My
the
paper
autonomous
thesis
here
will
I
shall
scicntia
be that
that Ockham s development continued well into the 14th century nominalism in particular represents an intensification of the pursuit of
this
-
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, introd. and commentary by Garry Wills (Toronto and New York: Bantam Books, 1982), numbers 1 (p. 2) and 9 (pp. 37-38).
Ethics
in
rationality
and
199
Politics as Practical Sciences
and moral philosophy, not an authoritarian or
morality
remaining sections of the paper shall be concerned with two sorts of doubts or difficulties regarding
In the positivist rejection of that project. I
this
two challenges to the autonomy of scientia practica. There the claims to priority that can be made on behalf of such
project,
are,
first,
In speculative sciences as natural theology or philosophical anthropology.
attempt to assess these claims,
my
I
shall
come back
Thomas
time to
in
Aquinas. The autonomy of practical science can be challenged, however, not only by other sciences, but also, and more profoundly, it seems to
me, by a wisdom transcending paper
1.
take up this challenge as
will
I
all
science.
it is
In the
final
St.
presented by
The Autonomy and Continuity of Scientia Practica
section of the
Augustine.
in the 13th
and
14th
Centuries
The 13th-century beginnings
of Latin Aristotelian moral philosophy and
maturation of that enterprise in
the
The work
studied.
serve
a
as
scholarship practica.
basis is
Thomas Aquinas have been
well
of such scholars as Lottin and Gauthier continues to for
research
in
this
exceptionally illuminating
Georg Wieland
s
Ethica
-
rich
field,
and recent German
on the very nature of
Scientia practica
2
is
further investigation of the early Latin commentaries
scientia
a guiding light for
on the Nicomachean
and Wolfgang Kluxen has admirably abstracted the principles of a genuinely philosophical ethics from the theological synthesis of St.
Ethics,
Thomas. 3 It
that
it
is
a special merit of Professor Kluxen
distinguishes
Thomas
s
somewhat the same fashion
in
s
philosophical ethics as
Aristotle
work,
from
marks
if
his
off
I
may
say so,
moral theology the
objects
of
mathematics from the objects of natural science - in thought, that is, not in being. There is no suggestion, in other words, that St. Thomas actually did ethics in a purely philosophical way.
2
The
idea
is,
rather, that
Scientia practica: Die Anfange der philosophischen Ethik im Jahrhundert, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge, Band 21 (Miinster: Aschendorff, 1981). And see now Anthony J. Celano, "Peter of Study Auvergne s Questions on Books I and II of the Ethica Nicomachea:
Georg Wieland, Ethica
13.
A
and
Critical
Edition,"
Mediaeval Studies, 48 (1986):1-110.
Wolfgang Kluxen, Philosophische Ethik bet Auflage (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980).
Thomas von Aquin,
Zweite,
erweiterte
McGrade
200
use of philosophy as a servant of theology required that the servant have some genuine abilities in order to be of use. It is thus not possible his
moral science of Thomas Aquinas by copying out Thomas s writings. Yet by a method of disciplined reflection on Thomas s Ethics commentary and his theological works it is possible to arrive at some definite results as to the character assemble
to
the
passages here and there from
and properly philosophical moral science would have. reading of St. Thomas, it is theology which provides the
a properly Thomistic
On
this
may be embedded.
systematic whole in which a philosophical ethics
A
purely philosophical Thomistic ethics would have access to objectively correct practical first principles. It would be able to develop a coherent
account of the moral and intellectual virtues. counterpart
-
to
although not identical with
It -
would be the a true and
scientific
truly
moral
prudence with regard to particular choices in the circumstances in which find ourselves. It would thus, in the terms of this paper, articulate
we
the essential characteristics of a
an
ethics,
and
life
of reflection and choice. Yet such
apart from the theological context of creation and providence
without
reference
ultimate
the
to
human good
of
supernatural
would necessarily have a certain incompleteness or openness to Far from being a defect, this openness would be a mark of scientific
beatitude, it.
adequacy.
From Thomas
in lacking a fulfilling
s
standpoint, Aristotle
is
a
more
scientific ethicist
doctrine of beatitude than were the Averroists in positing a
union with the Intelligences
in
the
conditions
of the
present
life.
to pursue the relationship of Thomistic moral science to other disciplines further in the next section of this paper, and theology I would like to persuade you, if I can, that the history of but first I
want
medieval scientia practica
is
on the whole a continuous one from the
13th well into the 14th century
-
a continuous history, not in the sense
were gradually accumulated and added to the conclusions already reached by Aristotle and St. Thomas, that universally agreed on moral
but
continuous
in
the
sense
facts
that
philosophically
trained
thinkers
continued to reflect upon the problems of personal and social morality on the assumption that rational analysis and reflection were relevant to such problems. the
A
leading
chief objection to this thesis of a continuous history
movement
nominalism, was scientia practica
in
14th-century
philosophy,
is
Ockhamism
that
or
opposed to the program of an autonomous rational and instead regarded morality as irrational, willful, or
and
Ethics
authoritarian. If this objection
science
we
as
find
in
this
main
the
correct, then such discussions of
is
including
period,
affirmation that there indeed
wait
Thomistic
the
Ockham
own
moral
quodlibetal to
and we should perhaps have
to
the
of
revival
s
would be contrary
a science of morals,
is
intellectual trend of the time,
for
201
Politics as Practical Sciences
16th
century
a
for
legitimate
continuation of the medieval Aristotelian project. I
would
not attempt to depict William of
will
to suggest,
like
-
maintain
to
if
rational reflection
Ockham
s
however,
to
indeed,
not,
and choice
persistent
impossible to overlook,
I
clarify
human
in
Ockham as a Thomist. Ockham s thought
I
the effect of
that
and strengthen
-
the
role
is
of
action.
emphasis on reason in ethics would be think, were it not for our fascination with his
command
moral omnipotence, God s authority to us to do things which apart from His command would be utterly
irrational.
This
occasional discussions of
God
s
not the place to assess the rational status of
is
Ockham
s
4
For present purposes two points version of divine-command morality. must suffice. First, Ockham himself held that loving God above all else
God
and making
the end of
all
one
actions did in fact accord with right
s
reason. Second, Ockham was by no means alone in holding that what would otherwise be murder, adultery, or theft - hence irrational and a violation of natural law - is not murder, adultery, or theft if done in is well known, the same position is Thomas. 5 Ockham, like Thomas, believed that it was rational obey divine commands. But he was like St. Thomas also in having much say about morality apart from such commands.
obedience to a divine command. As taken by to
to
we
If
and
St.
the
are prepared to recognize
analysis
Ockham. Thus,
reflection
of,
and
it,
we
choice
find that the
are
for example,in a substantial question
demand
recurrent
for,
themes
in
on the connection of
the virtues Ockham argues strenuously that an actual exercise of right reason is required for virtuous action and that right reason in some degree must indeed be included in the object willed in a virtuous act. To
f
For
this
Structure of
Freppert,
and
for
Ockham
The Basis
see Marilyn McCord Adams, The Franciscan Studies, forthcoming. Also see Lucan of Morality According to William Ockham, (Chigaco: Franciscan
much
s
Moral
further
illumination
Theory,"
Herald Press, 1988).
Summa 6
Theologiae, lallac, qu. 94,
Ockham,
Prindpium
Bibliae
art. 5, obj.
sive
2
and ad
Quaestio
Theologica, cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1967-1984), 8:393^02.
2.
de S.
Connexione Bonaventurae
Virtutum, (St.
Opera
Bonaventure,
McGrade
202
act virtuously,
I
I
do something which happens remember thinking was reasonable yesterday.
not enough
is
it
be reasonable and which
to
I
if
I
willingly
must be actually aware that what I am doing is reasonable, and further, must do it because it is reasonable. Yet more precisely, the right
reason because of which
I
less rational,
of
in
my
virtue
a
occasion, and
my
example, peace
and
this will
action
particular
between
connection
may be more
act
hence more or
my
and
both the grade or
also
the
strength
on one occasion, or one
on completely
acting well
may be
well
acting
or less a matter of principle,
affect
different occasions.
7
operating
because
right
a
and
principle will incline
when
of
my
me
virtue
if
I
in those will
be
courage precisely to be sought by habitual commitment to right reason as a
reason dictates that
being courageous,
of
the specific right reason for acting courageously
level
higher
the
sort
Thus, for
on certain occasions, and if I am brave for the sake of peace cases I will be acting virtuously, but on Ockham s analysis I at
level
of
practice
those cases peace
in
to act as right reason dictates
is
even on occasions
considerations of peace and courage are not directly relevant.
Such passages display both technical precision and moral sensitivity. The same can be said for Ockham s discussions of praxis and of the
between
distinction
must
and
practical
the
to
restrict
speculative
technical
science,
alone.
although
here
I
Duns Scotus had
myself aspect extended the notion of praxis or behaviour to include volitions as well as overt action.
Ockham
characteristically tries to
go Scotus one better by
arguing operations of the speculative intellect also count as praxes insofar as they are voluntary. This has the consequence, which Ockham is that
to
pleased
accept,
sciences,
that
these
since
grammar, and rhetoric become practical show us how to construct valid disciplines logic,
arguments, grammatical expressions, and persuasive speeches - and all of these constructions are praxes? It does not follow, however, that every
argument or expression every science a praxis
more
in
or
is
practical.
the sense that
less
is
7 Ibid., pp.
practical.
That
in
an act of
practical. This
is
is,
Every science
is
a praxis,
but not
every instance of scientific knowing
is
comes about because someone, with some
it
reasonable end
what one knows
knowing
is
in
view,
scientific
or engages in it. But determines whether the knowing
pursues
to say that practical
it
and speculative sciences
335-337 and 347-350.
c
Ockham, Scriptum l>280-285
and qu.
in
Librum Primum Sentcntiarum Ordinatio, Prologus, qu.
11, p. 316.
10,
OTh,
and
Ethics
are
known
those
in
accordance
in
distinguished
sciences.
is
knowledge
practical.
with
their
what we
If
are
objects
engaged
,
the in
propositions is
knowing
a
some operation within our power, then our what we are engaged in knowing is not a
of
directive
proposition
203
Politics as Practical Sciences
If
how
perform an operation or directly or indirectly dictates some operation, then, although our knowledge is a
proposition that either shows us
praxis,
it is
not practical.
9
moral import of these our day perhaps no argument is needed to show that
Time does not permit distinctions, but in
the
into
insight
to
that
fact
of the
discussion
we
are doing something
science must indeed have moral import.
when we engage
in
might add here that the micro
I
human action exhibited in these passages is also scopic approach characteristic of Ockham s political writings. In these, too, I would argue, to
the
result
Ockham
s
not
is
10
but
authoritarianism
irrational
a
rather
sober
would urge for present purposes is that at least in case the equation of nominalism with divine or human moral
reasonableness.
All
I
positivism overlooks a great deal ofscientiapractica.
But to
his
if
this is
great
so
-
Ockham does
if
13th-century predecessors
not provide an irrationalist
how
-
are
we then
to
foil
describe
moral philosophy produced in the period when he was a leading influence in logic and metaphysics? Ockham is, of course, not the only the
legitimate orientation point
moral philosophy, but he
if
is
we would
trace the shape of 14th-century
a useful one.
In
my
opinion, there
is
no
simple answer to questions about his influence, as the example of John
Buridan If
will attest.
what
metaphysical
I
have said about
and
logical
Ockham
right,
then the
fact
that
a
Buridan does not espouse an arbitrary divine commands no longer
nominalist
ethic of unreflective obedience to
is
like
shows that he was not influenced by Ockham
in
moral philosophy, but, of
9
to the Ibid., qu. 11, pp. 311-312 and 315. Besides qq. 10-12 of the prologue Ordinatio and the question De Connexione Virtutum, other Ockham texts on the nature of moral science include Opera Theologica, 4:507-522; 6:419^26; 8:143-149 and 281-284; and 9:176-178; on the grades of virtue also see Dialogus, part 1, bk. 6, chap. 77 in J. ed., Opera Plurima (I,yons: 1494-1496; reprint Farnborough, Hants., England: Va Ockham s reduction of final causes to objects Press, 1962), 1, fol. 90 -9Q loved and willed by conscious agents (Opera Theologica, 8:98-155) must be read with the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable volition (as in the first passage
Trechsel,
Gregg
.
cited in this note) clearly in mind.
Arthur Stephen McGrade, The Cambridge University Press, 1974).
Political
Thought of William of Ockham (Cambridge:
McGrade
204
does
neither
course,
he was
that
further complicated by Buridan
is
problem
show
this
by him. The
influenced
intimation at the beginning of
s
questions on the Ethics that he will in effect suppress some new however plausible they may appear in favour of older opinions, reasons 11 Whose reasons and opinions does he which have never led him astray. his
,
,
mean? Buridan always, by
my he
however,
cites
St.
Thomas
On some
questions,
Ockham would have found more and he concludes his defense of St. Thomas s Thomas,
takes
congenial than
frequently and explicitly in this work,
order to agree with him.
reckoning, in
St.
which
positions
position on the unity of speculative and practical intellect by invoking Ockham s ra/.or. I have found no sign of Buridan s having read Ockham on the connection of the virtues, even when it would have been helpful for
him
to have
done
On
so.
the other hand, his extensive discussion of
the beatific enjoyment of God, which has been cited as a
good example
of nominalist linguistic analysis, also shows an awareness of the central
Ockham
issues in
s
discussion of the
resolve the question as
Ockham where
s
solution.
Ockham
Could
this
a later position appears
With
one
striking
does.
same
topic
He seems
-
yet
Buridan does not
rather to back
away from
be a case of following older views even
more
plausible?
exception,
Buridan
s
on
questions
Ockham. Buridan
Politics are similarly mixed in relation to
Aristotle s is
generally
and here and there he takes positions which Ockham would have found especially congenial, but for the most part his political clear
and
thought is
analytic,
is
his fifth question
lohannis
on Book VIII of the
Buridani
...Quacstioncs
Nicomachum (Oxford: Hxcudcbat and
loh.
The one exception
neither markedly pro- nor anti-Ockhamist.
Wilmot,
1637),
pp.
L.L.,
1-2:
Politics,
in Decem Libras Impensis Hen. Cripps,
"...scntcntiis
&
where he asks whether
Ethicorum
Aristotelis
ad
Hen. Curtayne, auctoritatibus doctorum antiquorum, Fxl.
Forrest,
quam novis rationihus, ctiam quantumcunque mihi apparcntibus, adhaerebo. Pluries enim me invcni deccplum rationibus novitcr emergentibus, antiquorum autem sententiis magis
nunquam, Arts de Partie
I
specialiter in moralibus." Discussed by lidmond Faral, Jean Buridan, Maltre es Histoire Litteraire de la France, Tome 28, 2 Universitc de Paris, Fxtrait de
(Paris:
"Nominalism
1
Imprimerie Nationale, 1950), pp. 122-123. and the Ethics: Some Remarks on Buridan s
See
also
James
Commentary"
J. Walsh, Journal of the
of Philosophy, 4 (1966):1-13. I regret that the following came to my attention too late for consideration in this paper: James J. Walsh, "Buridan on the Connection of the Virtues," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 24 (1986): 453-482; Gerhard Krieger, Der Begriff der praktischen Vcrnunft nach Johannes Buridanus, Beitrage zur Geschichte
History
der Philosophic und Aschendorff, 1986).
Theologie
des
Mittelalters,
Neue
Folge,
Band
28
(Miinster:
and
Ethics
205
Politics as Practical Sciences
12
expedient for the whole world to be subject to one secular ruler. Here his arguments for and against world monarchy are taken wholesale it
is
from Ockham
s
treatment of the same question, and his resolution of the
Ockham
question substantially overlaps
Seven of the eight arguments
s.
Buridan advances on the affirmative side are
virtually
verbatim excerpts
from the rather down to earth reasoning deployed by Ockham for this position in the Third Part of his Dialogus^ and all four of Buridan s
Ockham. On
negative arguments are similarly drawn from
neither side of
all of Ockham s arguments, and he does not develop any of them as fully as Ockham does. Furthermore, although he agrees with Ockham that the expediency of secular world monarchy varies with times and circumstances, he is less willing than
the question, however, does Buridan use
Ockham
endorse
to
participating in the is
drawn from
St.
the
same
political
order
Christians -
community
non-Christians
his position
are not the 14th century.
underline
the
continuity
ophical reflection about reflection
and choice
in
and
on
this
matter
Thomas. 14
Ockham and Buridan them
of
legitimacy
to
I
have focussed on
and the variety of philos Ockham was
in this period.
no Thomist, but neither was he a moral positivist. Hence Buridan s rational approach to philosophical ethics was by no means inconsistent with
on speculative questions - but neither were his moral philosophy simple derivations from Ockham. Question by
nominalism
his
positions in
question comparisons suggest a
common commitment
to the analysis of a
wide range of positions and arguments and a basic consensus with regard to moral values, but little in the way of ideological allegiance to a single philosophical
analysis
wider survey would confirm in
moral
abstract
system
disappointing
Summa
if
of
It
was
morality
is
Johannes
Buridan,
Quaestiones
V
Summa
Octo
to
be found can
activity
not the case that a single up,
and
this
may be
the second part of the
is
Libras
this
a
it
can be argued that the
doctrine
Politicomm
owes
more
Aristotelis
to
(Paris:
Minerva G.M.B.H., 1969).
Dckharn, Dialoeus, Part I
super
is
activity
built
our model for moral science
believe that
I
and
mid-14th-century,
as scientia practica.
rational
Vigorous
As we have seen, however, character of St. Thomas s moral
1513; repr. Frankfurt:
230*-232
this account.
the
Tlieologiae.
systematic
13
in
philosophy
properly be described
of those values.
or justification
3,
Tract
Theologiae, Ilallae, qu. 10,
2,
bk.
art. 9.
1,
chaps.
1
and
2,
Opera Plurima,
1,
fols.
McGradc
206
theological context than philosophical method.
At any
rate,
if
we
think of
science as the rational investigation of inherently problematic questions,
then lack of consensus on a single moral-philosophical system may not seem troublesome, and the free pursuit of alternative lines of inquiry will
appear as an expression of autonomous scientific reason, not a collapse Mid- and late 14th-century anti-Pelagianism can certainly
into relativism.
be seen as a reaction against the self-confidence of human recta ratio, yet an appreciation of Aristotelian scicntia practica and an analytical
approach to the understanding of human action such doctores gratiae as Gregory of Rimini,
to
is
be found even
in
Thomas Bradwardine, and
John Wyclif, while the unparalleled involvement of philosophically trained thinkers
the
in
political
that a rational
assumption and could be practically section
of
my argument
controversies
approach effective.
to
a
together constitute a significant
autonomous
15 I
close,
unit
of the
or
rational
natural
was
in
common
logically possible
conclude, therefore, to draw this the
that
and 14th centuries
13th
the development of an implicitly
scicntia practica.
This conclusion occasions a doubt,
doubts
day indicates a
to such matters
difficulties
morality.
St.
I
want
Thomas
to
however, the
consider
regarding
first
the
of the two
autonomy of
discussed the virtues in the context of a
theology and philosophical
anthropology
in
which the existence
and many of the attributes of God, as well as the subsistent immateri ality, immortality, and metaphysical unity of the human soul, could be scientifically
demonstrated. While the conclusions of these demonstrations
continued to be held by faith in the 14th century, the demonstrations themselves came under heavy criticism. Does this not suggest that there Alan Gcwirth s exposition of the Dcfcnsor Pads as containing a substantially coherent political philosophy (Marsilius of Padua and Medical Political Philosophy, New York Columbia University Press, 1951) was greeted with some incredulity by scholars used to thinking of Marsilius s ferocious anti-papalism as an amalgam of any notions that
might
Marsilius
serve
a
actuali/.ed
ruling laicist passion, but it has subsequently been argued that the true secularist potentialities of Aristotle s Politics (Walter of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, I^ondon: Methuen
Ullmann, I*rinciples and Co., 1961). Marsilius s opposition to hicrocratic political ideas need not be taken as anti-Christian, but whether medieval peace was defended or in fact attacked by Marsilius, the use of Aristotelian ideas by such thinkers as Ockham and Oresme a represents noteworthy attempt to understand contemporary problems by the of scientia practica. Maistre Nicole Oresme, Le Livre de Politiques application d Aristote, ed. Albert Douglas Menut, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Vol. 60, Part 6 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1970). Susan M. Babbitt, Orcsme s "Livre de Politiques" and the France of Charles V. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Vol. 75, Part 1 (Philadelphia:
The American
Philosophical Society, 1985).
Ethics
and
207
Politics as Practical Sciences
in the history of scientia practical all, a radical interruption nominalist criticism did not involve a direct attack on the rationality
was, after If
of
morality,
may
not
it
be
still
case
the
morality of a necessary metaphysical basis for
its
rationality
deprived
by sapping
speculative foundations?
its
2.
nominalism
that
Practical Science
This suggestion
and Speculative Science
fits
well with a traditional view of Thomistic natural law
as a system of obligations deriving
content from our God-given
its
nature and having imperative force because of to the nature
He
has given
On
us.
God
s will
that
we
human live
up
which has been found
this view,
in
such leaders of the 16th-century Thomistic revival as Vitoria, Vazquez,
we might
expect that in a period critical of natural theology and philosophical anthropology, there should also be an ultimately corrosive lack of systematic order in moral philosophy, and, most mfluentially, Suarez,
stemming from a
lack of metaphysical foundations.
One
of the most interesting recent developments in Anglo-American this view of Thomistic moral philosophical ethics is the challenge to Finnis in their presentation and John Grisez Germain philosophy posed by of Thomistic natural law as an ethics of practical reason not resting on speculative principles concerning
God
Grisez
and
Like
Professor
Kluxcn,
or on facts about Finnis
place
human
great
nature.
emphasis
on
and appropriation of Aristotle s distinction between practical Humean with the concern their but Anglo-American speculative reason,
Thomas
s
and ought produces such sharp formulations of make some critics imagine that they have turned St.
philosophical topos of this distinction as to
Thomas
mere Kantian. What are we make of this debate, which relevant to the theme of an autonomous scientia practical
into a
so directly
16
is
Germain G.
Grisez,
"The
First
Principle of Practical
Reason,"
Natural
is
Law Forum,
A Reprinted in an abridged version in Anthony Kenny, ed., Aquinas: Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, Natural Law and Natural 1976; 1st ed. Doubleday Anchor Books, 1969). John Finnis, Press 1980, repr. with corrections Clarendon Series Law Clarendon (Oxford: Rights, 42-48 and 54-55. Ralph Mclnerny, The 1982); criticism of 16th century theories, pp. Journal of Jurisprudence, 25 (1980): 1-15. John Principles of Natural Law," American Finnis and Germain Grisez, "The Basic Principles of Natural Law. A Reply to Ralph 10 (1965):168-196.
Mclnerny,"
American Journal of Jurisprudence, 26 (1981):21-31.
McGrade
208
Thomas s conception of practical reason from the and theological anthropological context in which he actually presented it is a delicate operation. Thomistic moral philosophy as St. Thomas Enucleating
presented
human
it
a part not only of a theological
is
action
synthesis in which every
ordered to the attainment of eternal beatitude but also
is
of a metaphysical and natural-scientific synthesis which seems to
construed,
ideologically
ordered
divinely
human
nature
the
make
a
inevitable
presupposition even for an ethics of this present life. By the time we have reached the second part of the Summa Tfieologiae the conception of the good as fulfillment of inherent potentialities is well entrenched in an overall
a
that
and providence which suggests quite readily
of creation
vision
moral human
rational,
consists of satisfactorily performing a
life
naturally and divinely preordained
promulgated
a set of divine is
a
task.
Furthermore, in virtue of being Decalogue natural law does in fact have the status of
in the
commands
more than ample
Thomas.
for St.
It
would seem, then,
that there
basis for the Suare/.ian interpretation.
And yet the texts appealed to by the revisionists are also there before us in the same Sunimas. The first precept of natural law - good is to
the
be done and pursued and first,
contradiction
never
to
be avoided
-
really
presented as
is
underived, self-evident principle of practical reason, a governing for
principle
evil
reasoning on a
practical in
speculative
reasoning.
par with
the
principle
To my knowledge,
St.
of non
Thomas
pronounced upon the validity of natural law if, per there were no God. 17 Yet since he held that the existence of impossibile, God was not self-evident but must either be demonstrated (and that with formally
on
difficulty) or else held
faith,
it
seems clear
that
-
notwithstanding the
theological presentation and notwithstanding the positive confirmation of natural law in the Decalogue - Thomas would grant that
order of his
law does
natural
in
principle
have a standing independent
of theistic
assumptions.
The
possibility
determinate view of
of a
human
Thomistic scientia practica nature
is
considerably
independent of a
less obvious. St.
Thomas
Gregory of Rimini towards the middle of the 14th century addressed the matter briefly
in
something
explaining why he defined actual sin as voluntarily doing contra rectam rationem instead of contra rationcm divinam
or
omitting
si per deus ipse non esset aut ratio ilia esset errans ... adhuc, si impossibile quis ageret contra rectam rationem angelicam vel humanam aut aliam aliquam, si qua esset, peccaret," Gregorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura super Primum ct Sccundum Scntentiarum, 6, ed. A. Damasus Trapp OSA and Venicio Marcolino (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), p. 235, commenting on Bk. 2, dists. 34-37, qu. 1, art. 2. :
ratio divina
sive
"Nam,
and
Ethics
several
at
argues
certain
that
places
209
Politics as Practical Sciences
we have
connaturalis to us and that
ends are naturally conveniens or
a natural capacity for apprehending
we develop and
those ends. In acquiring the various moral virtues
refine
and
this natural
grasp of what
in
that practical reason gains a clearer view of the particular
this
goods
way it
human
do and pursue.
to
is
truly agreeable or suitable to us,
is
nature
is
it
is
seems, then, that a determinate view of
It
an integral part of Thomistic moral philosophy, not only
a background for the historical presentation of that philosophy but an essential foundation for
objected
distinguishes here
between
human good
human
ideal
as
aside,
s
to
medieval
philosophy,
Thomas and
very
difficult
this
has
recently
18
Gewirth
ground.
Aristotle. Aristotle, unlike St. it
to
is
an
reach
adequate
essential nature. Accordingly, Aristotle located the
in actions
and habits approved of by reason, rather than in tendencies and the curbing of unnatural or
of natural
fulfillment
perverse ones.
St.
how
recognized
definition of a thing
the
stranger
Thomistic natural law on precisely
to
Thomas,
it.
no
Alan Gewirth,
St.
Thomas, on the other hand, reasoned from a view of
nature which
is
human
unnatural,
debatable in
and
itself
tendencies which
are
leaves
arbitrarily
morally dubious but
arguably innate.
am
I
not
the
ideal
respondens for
St.
Thomas
to
reply to
Alan
Thomas s problematic view of human
am Gewirth as opponens, but moral philosophy essentially depends on a nature. To be sure, as a theologian and philosophical anthropologist Thomas holds views about the ontological status and ultimate possibilities I
of
human
reluctant to concede that St.
action which greatly affect his treatment of morality.
He
does
indeed think he knows what human beings at bottom are and what they may finally attain to, and he seeks to determine the significance of what
Yet there are passages which show a recognition on St. Thomas s part that from the viewpoint of a moral agent human nature is not a directly given norm for human action. These
we do
in the context of those views.
passages suggest that in the practice of morality and in the philosophical reflection on that practice with which we are concerned this morning, the discovery of our nature might
come
at a relatively late stage.
In article 1 of question 63 of the Prima Secundae
St.
Thomas
asks
whether we have any virtuous habits by nature. Following Aristotle, he 18
Alan
Gewirth,
Alternative,"
"The
Ontological
Basis
of
Natural
American Journal of Jurisprudence, 29 (1984):95-121.
I^w:
A
Critique
and
an
McGrade
210
holds
that,
Aristotle
strictly
we do
speaking,
but
not,
here,
he observes that individuals vary considerably
-
too, in
following
temperament
from birth virtues. 4,
obj.
in ways facilitating or impeding the acquisition of various seems evident from this discussion (and from lallae, q. 94, a. 3 and ad 3) that we cannot simply read off what is natural in It
own
the normative sense from our
More broadly
individual inclinations, however basic.
Thomas s discussion of sensuality in 91 of the Prima Secundae question (art. 6). His problem as a theologian at
this
is
point
irrational
passage he takes
is
understand
to
animals
relevant
how
human
a
propensity to behave like
an overall rational order of things. In this as given that we do in fact have an innate propensity
fits it
into
do not accord with
for being strongly attracted by objects or goals which
our best reflective judgments. While evil in our empirically encountered
Thomas s description human nature does
of the radical
accord in
not
detail with the nihilism of a Callicles or a Nietzsche, this passage leaves
room
much
in principle for as
human
congenital irrationality in
beings as
any opponent of natural law could desire. To be sure, as a Christian St.
theologian
Thomas
distinguish between a
we
all
has a doctrine of original pristine
human
sin,
ourselves born, but such a distinction
find
and thus he can
nature and the condition to which is
surely no part of
moral philosophy. In any case, just as an individual may come to realize that he or she has irrational innate impulses, so we as a species in history
may come
Such differs
to a similar recognition.
passages
from
traditional
the
understanding
interpretation
Thomas does
an
suggest
understanding
of
connaturality
which
the concept implicit both in the law and in Gewirth s criticism. St.
of
of natural
me, that we begin our moral deliberations with a direct intuition of our underlying or ideal essential not
assume,
it
seems
to
on the basis of which we can assess actions as agreeing or disagreeing with that nature. We do not start out by intuiting what our nature,
and
potentialities
to act
the
their fulfillments are
and then conclude
we ought
that
do and pursue the latter and avoid unfulfilling results. In order to rationally, we do indeed need to know what is possible for us, but judgment of
frustration
action
reading
is
St.
a
that
our
a
good one
Thomas
given
human for
possibility
nature,
us
to
as holding that
is
a
fulfillment
comes
after
perform.
In
rather
the judgment
other words,
we apprehend an
connatural and therefore to-be-pursued, connaturality
than that
instead
a
the
of
action or an end as is
better understood
and
Ethics
211
Politics as Practical Sciences
useful for describing after the fact what goes
as a mctacthical concept
on when we grasp something as a good, as an end suitable to serve as a starting point for practical reasoning.
Thomas
St.
and
goods
indeed committed to the view that judgments about are objectively true or false, and he carries this
is
evils
judgments about those ideal goods which, as Gewirth observes, are highly debatable. But while Thomas might well
commitment through even
to
concede that the dcbatability of a good is a reason for not prescribing it in our legal codes or demanding it as a categorical moral obligation, he 19 In summary, would not see this as a basis for dropping it from ethics. the doing and pursuing of good
then,
and rational human
valid
is
Thomas an
for St.
but one which need not
project,
inherently
from a
set out
given speculative framework (contra a traditional view of Thomism) and need not be limited in its rationality to ends which are so closely tied to the
conditions
necessary
undeniable by any agent
at
human
for
action
as
itself
to
be
logically
any time.
conclude, therefore, that the philosophical ethics contained as a in principle not potential part within the Thomistic synthesis is separable I
only from the supernatural context of Christian revelation but from the contexts of the speculative-scientific disciplines of natural theology and
anthropology.
philosophical
about
the
standpoint,
autonomy I do not at
human
about
disciplines.
more
On
fruitfully
nature the
In
of moral all
mean
and
contrary,
posed when
thus
can be met from
first
difficulty
a Thomistic
to advocate indifference to the questions
ultimate I
the
that
suggesting
science
discussed
reality
would suggest
that
in
those
other
those questions are
the openness or incompleteness of our
common
God, freedom, and immortality is best pursued when affirmative views on these subjects are neither required as a precondition for moral discourse nor spun out as moral
experience
is
respected.
The
about
truth
postulates of a supposedly purely rational morality.
But
this
brings us to the second and more fundamental difficulty - a difficulty, indeed, about the
about the autonomy of practical science
autonomy of science
Thomas
in
general.
If
there
not
is
a
sufficient
basis
in
himself for the Suarezian perception of natural law as essentially
known nature and paying there some other basis for
a matter of comparing possible actions with our
heed
to the
commands
of a divine superior,
is
19 As Grisez and Finnis emphasize, the scope of broader than the domain of strict legal or moral obligation.
Thomistic
practical
reason
is
McGradc
212
such a perception?
bounds
the
To answer
this
of scientia practica
we
question
consider
to
I
must, a
think,
go beyond tradition
philosophical
oriented not around science but towards wisdom.
3.
Wisdom
Science and
The
tradition
I
refer to
that of St. Augustine.
is
the level of broad generalities that
autonomous implicitly
autonomous science of
wisdom grounded
human
we have
scientia practica
nature which
practical reason,
the contemplation of eternal things in
the
Augustine champions a source
eternal
is
wisdom
wisdom can we have
of such
light
the
to itself just because of
lost
is
alternative to the
so far considered. Instead of an
humility before
in
enough on
clear
is
It
we have here an
in
a
its
of a
rational
autonomy. Only
account, and only
this
science
of rightly using
temporal things instead of a vain curiosity that inflates and degrades us.
The
alternatives
dominate however,
of the
page
every
virtually is
and humility
of pride
relation
in
to
God
our creator
of God. Equally important,
City
the alienation from self following the Fall, a derangement of
our very nature. The just punishment of rejecting free servitude to that we are no longer masters of ourselves.
God
is
should say
I
for
a
and
once that
conscious
direct,
Suarc/
at
others
as
I
am
acceptance a
basis
for
not primarily concerned to argue
of this their
Augustinian
version
framework by
of natural
law.
The
situation here is complicated. Although Suare/, for example, refers to Augustine do/ens of times in his discussion of natural law, he does not cite him on the question before us, and he was indeed opposed to sola gratia
and
predcstinarian
reformers derived
theological
from
in part
argue that a readiness to take
grounded
in
some
sort
unphilosophical basis
church political
in the units,
in
positions
which
their reading of Augustine. it
as axiomatic that
all
the
protestant
One
could also
obligation
must be
of relation of superior to inferior has a wholly this
period.
The
disintegration
of the western
16th century, combined with the strengthening of national
posed the question of
political
obedience
in
an especially
acute form. In these circumstances, the transformation of Thomistic moral
philosophy into a theory of sovereignty and obedience should be no more surprising than the emergence of such secular sovereignty theories as those of Bodin and Hobbes.
Ethics
On
and
213
Politics as Practical Sciences
the other hand, Augustine was increasingly in the air from the
mid-14th century onwards, not only residually, as a source of author itative citations to support positions arrived at by other means, but as a resurgent inspiration for personal spiritual quests and, more surprisingly, 20 as an inspiration for as W.J. Bouwsma has argued for the Renaissance, constructive efforts in politics. But whatever the situation
positive,
be with regard to conscious influence,
own
best
way
I
how
of understanding
would urge
that
may our
is
Augustine
these thinkers (or anyone else for
that matter) could take so completely for granted a hierarchical ordering
of the moral universe which would not have
seemed
Thomas and would seem As I have argued
that this
quite problematic to
do not think
I
above,
is
an appropriate
But what does follow
starting point for an Aristotelian practical science.
one
self-evident to St.
most philosophers today.
with
Augustine instead of simply reflecting on reflection and choice? What would an Augustinian political science or ethics look like, and how would such a derived political for
moral
science
or
science Aristotle
his
begins
comport with the autonomous moral philosophy of
ethics
and
if
medieval appropriators?
Augustine himself provides us with a formula for answering these questions in the distinction between wisdom and science in the De Trinitate
which
to
have already alluded. Wisdom, contra Cicero,
I
the science of things divine and
Temporal matters are
divine.
things
human to
be dealt with by science
how
science instrumentally conceived as knowledge of the
in
things
of wisdom.
light
21
we attempt
If
not
is
but only the contemplation of
to use
-
by
to use this
temporal formula to
derive Augustinian scientific prescriptions for the use of temporal things,
however, the result
at
is
first
quite baffling.
than the vanishing space of time remaining in
It
would take
this
far
longer
paper to sketch even views on the matters
major interpretations of Augustine s that concern us, but it will be useful to give a brief indication of the in outline the
William Renaissance Italicum:
J.
The
Transformation theoretically
Bouwsma,
Thought"
in
of
Profile
called
Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in ed., with Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Itinerarium Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Italian
the
E.J.
(Leiden:
Two
"The
Hciko A. Oberman, Brill.
dutiful
for
1975),
3-60;
pp.
involvement
in
a
pp.
12
public
and 51-52. While Stoicism order which, theoretically,
mirrored a rational cosmic order, it in fact encouraged contemplative withdrawal. By while Augustinianism recognized the patent unintelligibility (to us) and the
contrast,
pervasive sinfulness of
human
affairs,
yet pragmatic attention to secular needs
21
De
Trinitate, 12.14.22,
PL
its
and
profoundly social orientation demanded caring institutions.
42:1009; 12.15.25,
PL
42:1012; 14.1.3,
PL
42:1037.
McGradc
214
range
of
the
of
hope
you
will
recital.
It
does
I
interpretations.
character
following
the
forgive
do
not
kaleidoscopic
justice
cither
to
Augustine or to his interpreters, but it is important, I think, that we have clearly in mind the diversity of implications for practice which Augustine has seemed to
The a
offer.
thirteen relatively recent assessments which follow
sample of that diversity.
I
may
serve as
present these interpretations in the order of
constructive practical import which they find in Augustine, beginning with in
readings effects
on
provides
which he
and
found to have had quite considerable negative concluding with interpretations in which he
for
more
practice
inspiration
is
or
radical
less
efforts
to
transform the
world for the better. In the middle are studies which propose that
in
essence
Augustine correctly perceived the practical hopelessness of morally
legitimate constructive action in the conditions of this
To
at
begin
the
end
negative
contribution to the disgraceful
of
the
Rosemary doctrine
s
account,
of original
sin
to
22
be
and in
is
Elaine
affirmed
rather
autonomy this same doctrine of is
Blumenberg
the problem of
evil,
a solution
Augustine
s
nonetheless substantial in finds
Pagels
Augustine
s
and unfortunate contrast with
sharp
earlier patristic tradition (including especially
human
then,
range,
of Christian anti-scmitism, while
history
not as flagrant as that of John Chrysostom,
Ruether
life.
John Chrysostom), in which 23 diminished. For Hans
than
original sin
is
a mistaken solution to
from which humanity has freed
itself
only
modern age through the assertion of theoretical curiosity. 24 For Pagels the Augustinian move from autonomy to obedience as a spiritual ideal is part of an accommodation of the Church to its newfound legal in
the
Roman
Empire. The break with an earlier anti-statist tradition of the north African church which this accommodation involved domicile
is
22
in
signalled
the
by Augustine
s
Rosemary Radford Ructhcr, Faith and (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974),
Semitism
Elaine
Pagels,
versus that of John
The
Politics
Chrysostom,"
and
rejection
of
Hazard
eventual
Fratricide:
The
persecution
of the
Theological Roots of Anti-
pp. 173-174.
Augustine s Exegesis of Theological Rc\ iew, 78 (1985):67-99.
Paradise:
Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modem Age, trans. (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1983), pp. 127-136.
Genesis
1-3
Robert M. Wallace
and
Ethics
Donatist
an
church,
attention.
of
being
one can
call
it
about
negative
own
inclined to accept Augustine s life,
W.H.C.
which
on
episode
Frend
focussed
has
25
Instead
if
215
Politics as Practical Sciences
negativity about the present
which
that,
others
however,
Augustine,
with
testifies
its
life,
we
evils that
are this
mortals
26 have been damned from our origin. Augustine takes for granted as an 27 His bleak ordinary part of such a life the necessity of judicial torture.
view of what order
in
is
demanded
who would
him
be a mediator between Christ and
suits
life
public
of those to
Machiavelli, as in Giuseppe Prezzolini
the
of
City
God it
earthly politics,
reason in
this
enjoyment of Kamlah. 29
provides no will
God
positive
but
offer
e/o Machiavelli^ Or
Cristo
s
support little
for
the
encouragement
human and
if
darker side of for
practical
community in the interpreted purely eschatologically, as by Wilhelm
if
life
still
maintain some degree of
its
is
vision of
angelic
For such scholars as Joseph Ratzinger and R.A. Markus, the concepts of
the
sacramental
recognizing
while
the
or
of
holiness
the
of the
Augustinian
Church and
signum its
a
offer
mission in
this
avoiding the ideological delusion of secular utopianism.
ecclesial but similarly positive inspiration
Les metamorphoses de as the most relevant
is
30
way of world,
A
less
found by Eticnne Gilson
in
de Dieu, a work in which Augustine appears all of political thinkers for a world inevitably
la Cite
For a survey of research following Frend s The Donatist Church (Oxford, 1952), see R.A. Markus, "Christianity and Dissent in Roman North Africa: Changing Perspectives in Recent Work" in Derek Baker, ed., Studies in Church History, 9, Schmism, Heresy and 8 in R.A. Markus, Religious Protest (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 21-36, repr. as selection
From
Augustine to Gregory the (London: Variorum Reprints, 1983). 26
De
27
De Ch itate Dei,
History
and
Christianity
in
Late
Antiquity
Civitate Dei, Bk. 22, chap. 22.
Bk.
19,
Oft
Giuseppe Prezzolini, 29
Great:
chap.
6.
Cristo e/o Machiavelli (Milan: Rusconi Editore, 1971).
u. historische Christentum u. philosophise he Selbstbchauptung, Untersuchungen zur Entstehung dcs Christentums u. zu Augustins Burgcrschaft Cones Zweite, neubearbeitcte und erganzte Auflage (Stuttgart and Cologne: W. Kohlhammcr,
Wilhelm
Kamlah,
,
1951), p. 339.
Kirchenvdter Vision der Eine Nationen: Ratzinger distinguishes his sacramental view from Kamlah s eschatological interpretation in "Herkunft und Sinn der Civitas-Lchre Etudes Augustiniennes, [1954?]), 2:965-979. R.A. Augustins," Augustinus Magister (Paris: Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine (Cambridge:
Joseph
Ratzinger,
(Salzburg-Miinchen:
Cambridge University
Die
Anton
Einheit
Pustet,
der
1971).
Press, 1970), pp. 154-186.
McGrade
216
become
destined to
a global community.
concrete positive implications
for
31
The or
culture
discovery in Augustine of the present
in
civilization
sometimes emerges from a study of his radical break with classical culture, as in the work of Henri-Irenee Marrou, who found that Augustine was the first among the church fathers to recognize the full meaning of life
the decadence of his time. Accordingly, he devoted himself to the total
reconstruction of culture on a
and
philosophically
yet
new
A
plane.
acute
theologically
more
politically oriented
of
presentation
the
same
combination of clear perception of morbidity in the classical empire and the projection of a new order of human relationships based on adherence
God
to
be found
to
is
C.N.
in
Cochrane
s
and
Christianity
Culture.^ But one need not immerse oneself in the decline of find positive significance for
our time
in St.
Classical
Rome
has argued persuasively that the hollowness and inauthenticity of life
call
directly for the recovery of an interiority, dialogue,
of
and
truth
value
to
Augustine. Francesco Cavalla
modern
and genuine
which
to
Augustine preeminently Augustine has been pressed into the service of liberation theology by those who take his account of what human life might be like at its best as directly relevant to their revolutionary intersubjectivity
points the way.
34
Finally,
struggle against the imperialism of our time. It
seems
that,
hermeneutically speaking, Augustine brings not peace
but a sword. Given this range of interpretations,
him, and what
we
shall
how
shall
we understand
say about the challenge posed by Augustinian
autonomy of scicntia practical In the climate of modern philosophy, there is some temptation to reject any whole-hearted and
wisdom
to the
single-minded orientation to the transcendent, a temptation to argue that
contemplation
Augustinian
Etiennc
Ix>uvain/
Henri-Irence Boccard, 1937), 1
Charles
Lex
Gilson,
universitaires de
of eternal
metamorphoses Paris: Lihraire
Marrou, Saint Augustin
Norris
Cochrane,
Christianity*
to
Augustine, University Press, 1944), pp. 500-501. 1
Francesco S.
ct
la fin
J.
Cavalla,
come fondamento
Agostino: societd,
a
consistent
(Ix)uvain:
Publications
to
Vrin, 1952).
de la culture antique (Paris: H.
and rev.
Classical ed.
DC
A
Study
of Thought
Sapientia ed Esperienza Sociale, \:La ricerca della del pcnsiero giuridico-politico di S. Agostino, 2:Le due citta di
Scientia,
diritto e giustizia
Shaull,
Culture:
(Ixmdon-New York-Toronto: Oxford
(Padua: Cedam, 1974).
Heralds of a New Reformation: America (Maryknoll, New York: Orhis Books, 1985), p. 66.
Richard
Dicu
de
Cite
la
Philosophique
not
p. 356.
and Action from Augustus
Verita
de
leads
things
the
Poor
of North
and South
and
Ethics
217
Politics as Practical Sciences
moral science but to an unlimited clash of moral and
immoral opinions. That
is
not the conclusion
I
in
some
cases
would draw. 36
not provide an easy solution to our problem about Although live of the autonomy practical reason, I believe that it will help us to if we take with that problem and come to grips better with Augustine, will
it
seriously both parts of the philosophical identifying label
him:
to
applied
human
Christian
The
Platonist.
contrasting
most frequently
depictions
of the
condition, which are a major source of the divergences in inter
relative preting his writings, stem from a Platonic vision of pure Forms, In contradictions. a mass of to which historical reality is itself writing de
bononim
fmibus
malonim
et
on
the
of
limits
goods
and
evils
Augustine confronts a range of ideal human possibilities for good or evil which goes beyond the bounds of ordinary experience. At the same time
makes him see these
his faith in the Incarnation
eternal possibilities with
a vividness and a sense of direct relevance to present experience which
sharply separates him
Above
God
all,
human
every
s
from
personal
Platonic and Neoplatonic predecessors.
his
call for
relationship
a
total
potentially
devotion gives every action and infinite
weight
relation
in
to
eternity. If
brief
this
on Augustine s character as a Christian understand somewhat better the range of plausible
reflection
Platonist helps us to
interpretations
of his writings,
between
relationship
it
does not provide an easily negotiable
Augustinian
wisdom
and
a
single,
objective,
reasonable moral science. Augustine has been the inspiration for a whole host of more or less fully developed ethical and political theories, but no
one
specific interpretation of his thought
can reasonably claim to be the
uniquely derivable moral-scientific consequence of Augustinian contempla tion, for each such claimant is subject to objections from all the others.
Yet neither can we put all the interpretations together: any balanced or moderate interpretation of St. Augustine is false on the face of it, for Augustine for
Plato,
36
is
nothing
he
is
if
like
not radical. Plato
in
He
is
thus even
more
challenging than
eluding specific interpretation but
more
extraordinary overall unity of the De Civitate Dei is shown in Jean-Claude de Dieu" de saint Augustin study, Unite et structure logique de la "Cite the interlocking of Augustine s terminology in (Paris: Etudes Augustinienncs, 1961). For the crucial discussion of peace in Book 19 with that of his more technical works, see Joachim I^ufs, Der Friedensgcdanke bet Augustinus: Untersuchungen zum XIX. Buch des
The
Guy s
lucid
Werkes De Civitate Dei, Hermes, Zeitschrift fur Heft 27 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1973).
klassische
Philologie,
Einzelschriften-
McGrade
218
we make
insistent than Plato that
the attempt to interpret
him nonethe
less.
So
as the attempt to state a systematic relation of Augustinian
far
wisdom
to scientia practica
The contemplation
we
concerned,
is
are,
I
think, at
an impasse.
God do
of eternal things and the love of
not relieve
us of the responsibility of thinking for ourselves and acting accordingly. In this sense, practical reason,
who engage rational
in
it,
alternative.
does not
a at
we cannot
extent
There
principles.
16th-century
is
Thomism
no did
itself as
invalidate
in
in
account of the circumstances or
s
Augustine
we do
basic conditions in which
holds that
own
its
something received from above in the from a superior, I believe it was in error. Yet this
command all
the
to
Hence,
indeed regard natural law
manner of
whatever the personal inspiration of those
must proceed on
fact
exist,
live,
and
think.
Augustine
fact think for ourselves or rule ourselves except
by the grace of God. Acknowledgement of this situation is the beginning of wisdom. Rejection of whatever awareness we may have of this
So
can see, nothing in the principles or legitimate conclusions of practical reason counts against this position. situation
is
incapacitating.
far
as
I
Conclusion
My own moral difficult
to
get
both
is
is
therefore,
conclusion,
science
This conclusion
right.
audience as a pretty obvious one, yet large,
and hence
may
it
of
deserve
relevance.
contemporary thinkers were most
were able to think which they
the
that
some
Let
definitely
us
able
and
no doubt
will it
relationship
important
extraordinarily
is
of
strike
present
observe, to
think
then, for
that
late
themselves
-
medieval but they
because of the culture
in
up on liberating as well as repressive More recently, when Alexander Hamilton and his
a culture built
lived,
of
the
closing emphasis with a suggestion
associates proposed as an alternative to accident and force a
essence
to
not so obvious to the world at
for themselves in large part
Augustinian principles.
the
wisdom
extraordinarily
which
was
reflection
and
choice,
they
government an
recogni/ed
underlying religious consensus as an important factor favoring the success of their
proposal,
a
factor
no
less
important
for
not
being formally
and
Ethics
219
Politics as Practical Sciences
incorporated in the processes of secular
37 politics.
More
recently
still
-
and more philosophically - Wittgenstein held that Augustine was not in error when he invoked God on every page of the Confessions, "except 38
where he formulated a for in
theory."
We may
do well
to substitute
science
dictum and to say accordingly that Augustine was not theory error when he exploited the topos of pride and humility before God on in this
every page of the City of God, except when he attempted to derive from this relationship a science of living. Perhaps Augustine himself, despite to the contrary,
many appearances Perhaps
for
especially important
technocrat,
Augustinian
39
Augustinian principles. to apply the City of
morality, -
was not committed
whole tradition of augustinisme
the
and
it
is
this
congress
In any case,
rests
God
it
directly to the
especially perilous
-
politique,
which
in
it
is
include the great 13th-century
to
Roger Bacon,
to such derivations.
is
on a misunderstanding of
surely a perilous undertaking
problems of personal or
social
perilous to the point of fanaticism
make such
to
scientific
applications under the impression that one is being and perilous also to the doing so. Yet it is also perilous
in
suppose in the name of science that there is no point to the quest for wisdom. To bring back the Middle Ages, in the sense of making our morality and our legal institutions unfold as directly -
point of fanaticism
as possible
from an
think, a project
relegate
the
to
officially
endorsed code of
spiritual values, is not,
most medievalists would endorse.
On
I
the other hand, to
alternately imperceptible and overwhelming eternal things
contemplated in Augustinian wisdom to the realms of historical curiosity or personal fantasy, as most intellectuals do today,
The importance
of both
recognized by John Jay
in
material conditions and a
Federalist
makes no sense
common
at all.
religious tradition was ed. cit. in n.
Paper no. 2 (The Federalist Papers,
l.p.7).
38
From Wittgenstein
Herbert Spiegelberg, 17 (1979):319-327;
s
The
Golden "Bemerkungen iiber Frazer s in Wittgenstein," Journal of the
"Augustine
Bough
",
as quoted
by
History of Philosophy,
p. 323.
39
R.A. Markus has argued (Saeculum, pp. 152-153) that the sort of political Augustinianism implied in the notion of constraining public law and morality to unfold from theology shows a misunderstanding of the fundamental theological structures of Augustine s thought and (pp. 174-176 and 211-230) that it is rather the Christianized Aristotelianism of St. Thomas which provides a rationale for the deliberate religious of shaping of society. Professor Markus concedes, however, that his interpretation about the Augustine involves not remaining content with what Augustine actually said duties of Christian rulers and subjects.
McGrade
220
Augustine,
in
resource for us It
part all.
may be
just
because
he
is
so
disturbing,
remains
a
vital
40
that
one or another 13th- or 14th-century thinker
offers
us a correct and systematic statement of the relationship between science
and wisdom, but until that is demonstrated I would propose that the distinctive and great value of medieval moral philosophy lies not so
much
in
any achieved system as
immanent
scientia
Even
practica
combination of
in the uneasiness of its
an
with
authentic
response
to
the
two approaches in moral philosophy should remain forever incommensurable in theory, the medieval period at its best transcendent.
if
the
exhibits an exceptional vitality in practice
of
disciplined
reflection
and
argument.
and especially
-
In
their
own
in the practice
struggle
against
may show us, even if they cannot and choice may live with providence
accident and force, medieval thinkers fully
explain to us,
how
reflection
and grace.
The
University of Connecticut
Some recent studies which come to grips with difficult aspects of Augustine s thought: Margaret Ruth Miles, Augustine on the Body, American Academy of Religion Dissertation Series, ed. H. Ganse Little, Jr., No. 31 (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1979) and Peter Brown, Augustine and Sexuality (Berkeley, California: The Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture, 1983).
SYMPOSIUM ON THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL AUTONOMY OF PHILOSOPHY AS A DISCIPLINE IN THE MIDDLE AGES
LINOS
BENAKIS
G.
Die thcorctischc und praktischc Autonoraic dcr Philosophic als Fachdisxiplin in
Byzanz
Im Refcrat werden folgcndc Grundcinsichtcn zur Thematik gcstiitzt
auf
die
Ergebnisse
der
neueren
Forschung im
vertrctcn,
Bercich
der
1
Byzantinistik.
Literatur
zum Thcma: AT.
"
MTTCIXXJCTIC;,
1949-1971":
Zusammcnfassung:
Byzantinische
C
H crnovSri
TT]C,
Bv^avT LVTIC,
1 (1971) (Athen) Philosophic. Forschungsbericht
*tAo
I,cmerle, Le premier humanisme byzantin. Notes et e culture a Byzance des engines au Paris siecle,
X
remarques
<$>tAocro
390-433
(Deutsche -
1949-1971). sur enseignement
P. et
327 S. - G. Weiss, Die sogenannte Universita tsgriindung 1043 und die Ausbildung der Beamtenschaft: Ostromischc Beamte im Spiegel der Schriften des Michael Psellos, Mtinchen 1973, 65-76, 186192. - P. Speck, Die kaiserliche Universitdt von Konstantinopel Miinchen 1974, 120 S.R. Browning, "Enlightenment and Repression in Byzantium in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries": Past and Present No 69 (1975) 3-23. - W. Wolska-Conus, "Les ecolcs de Psellos et de Xiphilin sous Constantin IX Monomaque": Travaux et Memoires 6 (1976) 223-243. - J. Gouillard, G. Podskalsky, religion des philosophies": ibid. 305-324. "Zur Bedeutung des Methodenproblems fur die byzantinische Theologie": Zeitschrift fur kathol. G. Podskalsky, Theologie und Philosophic in Theologie 98 (1976) 385-399. Byzanz. Der Streit um die theologische Methodik in der spatbyzantinischcn Geistesges1971,
,
"La
Grundlagen und seine historische Entwickgouvernement des philosophes. Notes et les ecoles, la culture": Cinq etudes sur le Xf s. byzan II. Hunger, Philosophic, 3 Philosophic und Theologie: Die tin, Paris 1977, 195-248. profane hoclisprachliche Literatur der Byzantiner, Miinchen 1978, Bd. I, 42-53 (Neugriechische durchgesehene Ubersetzung, Athen 1987, Bd. A, 92-107). - I. Medvedev, "Neue philosophische Ansatze im spa ten Byzanz": Jahrbuch Ostencichischen Byzantinistik 31/2 G. Podskalsky, "Orthodoxe und westlichc Theologie": ibid. 513-527.(1981) 529-548. L. Clucas, The Trial of John Italos and the Crisis of Intellectual Values in Byzantium in the Eleventh Century, Miinchen 1981, 266 S. - A. Kazhdan-G. Constable, People and Power in Byzantium. An Introduction to Modern Byzantine Studies, Washington 1982, 218 S. - G. Podskalsky, "Die gricchisch-byzantinische Theologie und ihre Mcthode": A. ZLCCCTOC;, "SaAocrcxpocTJ O.UO&CLK.-CLK.T) K.O.L Theologie und Philosophic 58 (1983) 71-87. chichtc
(14. /15.
Jh.),
seine
systematischen P. Lemerle,
Miinchen 1977, 268 S. remarques sur enseignement,
lung,
"Le
1
OCVT LUpOK\C Ctt UpOLJ \iO.r CLO. TOU NtKOAttOU TTCOTT) Enci. ScoAor. Z^oAfjc; ITafCTr. 8e
/3lAtKTJ
Me#CJl>7Jc;":
<7T7)l>
Entcrc.
-
P.
1986,
G. Weiss, Byzanz. Kritischer I- orschungs- und Literaturbericru 1968-1985 (272Sonderheft 14 der Historischen Zeitschrift, 1986. L.G. Geistesgeschichte): Benakis, "Neues zur Proklos-Tradition in Byzanz": Proclus et son influence. Actes du
97-154.
-
301:
du Neuchatel 1985, Neuchatel 1987, 241-253. and Commentators on the Logical Works of Aristotle Gedankenzeichen. Festschrift fiir Klaus Oehler, Tubingen 1988, 3-12.
Colloque
intern,
"Commentaries
L.G. in
Benakis,
Byzantium":
224
Bcnakis
1.
Trotz der radikalcn Inbesitznahme des Begriffs
durch
den Sieges/ug dcs Christentums fiir christliche, asketische und monchische Weisheit, blicb Philosophic wahrend dcr ganzen byzantinischcn Zeit (9.-15. Jahrhundcrt) die Wisscnschaft von dcr Erkenntnis allcr fiir Mensch und Welt
Philosophie" als
man
Dinge. In der Regel e^cjtfey oder f) dvpot-dcv
wurde
grundlegenden der 2.
fj
cai? f)/iac,
Die
"Hellenische
bezeichnet, die
der Theologie, gegeniiberstellte.
der
aus
diese
Tradition
dcr
Theologcnschule
2
von Alexandreia
(Klemens, Origenes, Didymos) stammcndc, auf Philon zuriickgehende und in
Formel philosophia theologiae
der lateinischen
ancilla
gcpragte Ansicht
von dcr untcrlegcnen und dicnendcn Stcllung der Philosophie gegeniiber der Theologie wurde zwar von dcr gricchischen Vatern (die sich der antiken Philosophie hinfort
fiir
die Excgese zu bediencn
wuBten) bcgicrig
aufgcnommen, reprasentiert aber nicht die herrschende Position
wo
es
niemals
zu
einer
philosophischen Logik) In
der
in die
wegcn
Tat,
Integration
der
Philosophie
Theologie, wie im Westcn,
einer
ticf
vcrwurzeltcn
in
gekommen
und
Byzanz,
(insbes.
nic
der
ist.
aufgclosten
Uncntschlossenhcit hinsichtlich des Wertcs der philosophischen Dialektik
und Prazisicrung thcologischcr Fragen - ja sogar wcgcn cincs gewissen Horrors vor eincm erkenntnisthcoretischcn als
Mittel zur Untcrsuchung
Eindringcn heilige
mil
zwanglaufig
Mysterium
-
und
heidnischcn
intcllektucllen
trotz der eigentlich traditionellen
Mitteln
in
das
Verehrung dcr
gricchischen Philosophie blieb in Byzanz cine systematische theologischc
Methodc untcr in
freicr
Anwcndung
dcr Dialektik
zum groBten
Teil
immcr
den Ansatzen stcckcn. Weil also der Philosophic und Logik bcstenfalls
cin dcr Theologie vor- odcr untcrgeordncter Stcllenwcrt eingcraumt wird,
muB man
fiir Byzanz von einer und Theologie sprechen. 3
traditionellen
Trennung von Philosophic
So II. Hunger, Die profane hochsprachliche Litcratur der Ryzantincr, I 42. Vgl. den Ausdruck oL e^w TTJC, TjjaeTcpcu; in einem unedierten Traktat des "Fiirsten der Ilieodoros von Smyrna (12. Jh.), "Uber die Natur und die Prin/.ipien der Philosophen", Natur nach den antiken Philosophen". auA7)<;
i
Zum besseren Verstandnis dieser These konnte sicherlich cine Analyse des wahren Charakters der byzantinischen Philosophie beitragen. In diesem Zusammenhang werden meine eigencn Forschungsbeitrage (kommentierte Texteditionen und Studien, s. "Beitrage zur Erforschung der Byzantinischen Philosophie in Griechenland 1972-1985": Bulletin de Philosophie Medie\>ale 27 (1985) 197-201) der letzten 15 Jahre (in Ubereinstimmung mil Thesen von Kl. Oehlcr und Th. Nikolaou im selben Zeitraum) den Ausgleich der byzant. Philosophie zwischen Antike und Christentum, zu dem ein Universalismus tritt, in dem diese Philosophie eingebettct ist, herausarbeiten. So G. Weiss in seinem jiingsten Hier ware auch zu beachten, daB die Verehrung der Forschungsbericht (1986).
Die Autonomie der Philosophic
in
225
Byzanz
Zur Frage der praktischcn Autonomie der Philosophic als Fachdisziplin ist zunachst die Situation der Hoheren Schulen in Byzanz zu 3.
Nach
untersuchen.
in
"Universitaten"
ncueren erster
waren
Erkenntnissen
die
Funktionarsschulen
Linie
byzantinischen
allgemein
weltlicher
Bildung mil vorwiegendem Privatcharakter, stehen aber unter kaiserlicher Protektion und werden gelegentlich auch vom Patriarchen und der Synode unterstiitz.t
(solche Schulen
ohne
gebracht,
werden
"geistliche"
Theologen und Kleriker gab es
Wie
oft
Schulen in
im Bereich eines Klosters unterzu
Byzanz
sein.
Theologieschulen
fiir
nicht).
aus konkreten Fallen hervorgeht (Verurteilung von bedeutendcn
Philosophieprofessoren
"wegen
VerstoBe gegen die
Orthodoxie"),
spielen
vor allem politische Motive die Hauptrolle bei Prozessen, welche einen Eingriff
der
und kirchlichen Behorden
staatlichen
bedeuten. Dabei aber
ist
als
Schulwesen
Langzeitfaktor die gesellschaftlich schwache
immer nur
Stellung des Intellektuellen und Lehrers, der nicht
das
in
als
Privatmann,
im Rahmen eines von Kirche oder Staat organisierten Bildungs-
systems stellen.
das
philosophische
Und wo immer
philosophischen
ein
Bildungsgut
des
Aufschwung
zu vermerken
Studien
Rechnung zu Bildungswesens und der
vermittelte,
ist,
liegt
in
der eigentliche
dafiir
im auBerordentlichen Charakter der Personlichkeiten
gerade
in dieser Zeit wirken.
SchlieBlich aber gab es in Byzanz keine korporative
Philosophielehrer
gegeniiber
kirchlichen
und
staatlichen
Grund
selbst,
die
Autonomie der (kaiserlichcn)
Gewalten, im Gegensatz zum westlichen Mittelalter, wo die Entwicklung sehr viel anders verlief, unter anderem als Folge des Konkurrenzkampfes zwischen staatlichen und kirchlichen Machttragern, der fortschreitenden Urbanisierung, d.h. der politischen und sozialen Dezentralisierung. Eine
zunehmend eigenstandige nicht
erringen,
dcnn
Position konnte sich die Philosophic in Byzanz
oft
wurden
die
Versuche,
die
Stellung
der
Philosophic aufzuwerten und ihr aus der Antike ererbtes Instrumentarium auch auf theologische Fragen anzuwenden, von der der christlichPhilosophic eine nie geendete Tradition in Byzanz gehabt hat. Dabei muB mit der Logik sprechen (selbstverstandlich ist hier die aristotelische Logik gemeint), und zwar sowohl auf didaktischer Ebene (s. L.G. Benakis, "Grundbibliographie zum Aristoteles-Studium in Byzanz": Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung. Paul Moraux gen idmet, Bd. II, Berlin 1987, 352-379) wie auch auf der Ebene
griechischen
man insbesondere von der Beschaftigung
der Kommentierung und der Interpretation (s. jetzt L.G. Benakis, "Commentators and Commentaries 1988), aber auch, was die systematische Behandlung von erkenntnisProblemen angeht, so zum vieldiskutierten Problem der allgemeinen theoretischen Begriffe (s. meine Studie von 1978/79 iiber den Begriffsrealismus der Byzantiner). ...",
226
Bcnakis
orthodoxen
Tradition
vcrstandcn und
Die
4.
zum
verpflichteten
Fiihrungsschicht
als
Bcdrohung
Schcitcrn gcbracht. 4
der
Abgrcnzung
namlich
weitgchend
lehren,
was
die
ist
einer
wissenschaftlichen
Es sind
philosophischen
Disziplinen, vor allcm der Harmonielehre, der
der Harmonielehre z.B.
den
nicht sehr ausgepragt.
Lehrer der Philosophic, die diesc Disziplinen zu
zugleich
von
Philosophic
Disziplinen, vor allcm dcs Quadriviums,
ist
Einfarbung jener Astronomic u.a. fiihrte. In
es interessant, die theoretischen
Stromungen
zwischen Pythagoreismus und der Aristoxenos-Schule zu verfolgcn, wobei in Byzanz sich die Lehre von den Tonabstanden auf pythagoreische
Grundgedanken lehre
die
stiitzt
(arithmetischcs Vcrhaltnis), aber in der
aristoxenische
Methode
zu
Anwendung kommt.
Harmonie Fur
cine
Verbindung der Philosophic mit den wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen spricht auch
die
Tatsachc,
Philosophielchrer reprasentiert, schriftstcllcrisch
daB
in
Byzanz
hcrvorgctrctcncn
d.h.
des
die
Manner
vielscitigen
und
groBe Mehrheit der als den Typus des Polyhistors in
mehrercn
Disziplinen
und didaktisch tatigen Gelehrten. 5
Akadimia Athinon, Athinai
Diesc Ansicht ist chcnfalls der modcrncn Forschung y.u verdanken. DaB man bei der Erforschung geistcsgcschichtlicher Phanomcne auch die soziale, wirtschaftliche und Faktoren eben der modcrnen historischen soil, politische bcriicksichtigen gchort Betrachtungsmcthode an (s. z.B. A. Ka/.hdan-G. Constable, People and Power in - Was die Konfrontation der byzantinischen Philosophielehrer mit der Byzantium, 1982). der christlich-orthodoxen Tradition betrifft, sollte man - so geFiihrungsschicht nicht glaubcn, daB sic sich auf rechtfertigt die hier vertretcne Ansicht auch sein mag ofter vorgekommene Falle stiitzen kann. Inquisitionsahnliche Geschehnisse gab es in
Byzanz
nie.
Zur Bcurteilung der Verwandtschaft bzw. Abgrenzung der Philosophic hinsichtlich der wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen des Triviums und des Quadriviums sind hauptsa chlich die Inhalte des Studiums nach den reichlich vorhandenen Quellen, die uberlieferten didaktische Werke und das umfangreiche Schrifttum der bedeutendsten Vertreter der byzantinischen Gelehrsamkeit auszuwerten.
Die Autonomie der Philosophic
in
227
Byzanz
ABS I RACT: The Theoretical and
Practical
Autonomy of Philosophy
as a Discipline in Byzantium
The
findings
practical theses:
of
recent
research
autonomy of philosophy
in
Byzantine
as
a
regarding the theoretical and Byzantium support the following
studies
discipline
in
(a) Although the early Christian writers dealing with the ascetic theory of life had adopted the term philosophia, the record shows that philosophy as a discipline remained throughout the period from the ninth to the fifteenth century in Byzantium the science of the cognition of fundamental truths concerning man and the world. This science or "from without" dvpaticv) was contrasted as a matter of rule with the (e^oxtfev "philosophy from within", namely theology. (b) Theoretical autonomy: The view that philosophy is ancllla theologiae, one that the Greek Church fathers derived from Philo and the Alexandrian school of theology, does not represent the dominant position of Byzantium as is the case in the West. Philosophy, and logic in particular, never came under theology either as background or
as
a
basic
systematic
As
By the same token, theology in Byzantium did not become a for the dialectical elaboration of Christian truths, that is, a science.
instrument.
method
a result, the initial distinction (c) Practical autonomy: At
between philosophy and theology remained
intact.
of autonomy in institutional practice it should be noted that while theological schools and studies did not exist in Byzantium, the fact is that the purpose of higher studies was mainly to train state functionaries. On the whole, this instruction, based on philosophy and the Quadrivium, had a private character despite the support it received from the Emperor and the Church. We hear of the
level
occasional interference on the part of either secular or ecclesiastic authorities, which was possible due to the lack of professional organization of teachers of philosophy. Furthermore, Byzantium did not have independent universities in cities or ones that were instituted by monastic orders, as was the case in the West due to different social itself from and developments. Finally, philosophy protected possible political involvement in theological controversies arising from time to time. In general, philosophy has a different development from that of Western Scholasticism. (d) Autonomy vis-a-vis the other sciences: Regarding the autonomy of philosophy in relationship to the other sciences, it should be noted that the prevalent model of thinker in Byzantium was a type of encyclopaedic teacher of philosophy, a polyhistor, i.e. a erudite master of scholarship who maintained close touch with the other sciences that
comprised the Quadrivium
etc.
as
well
as
one who
set
the
the scientific subject-matters and of the problems under investigation.
philosophical tone of
HANS DAIBER
Die Autonomic dcr Philosophic im Islam
niemals Bestandtcil dcs islamischen Untcrrichtsbetriebes
ist
"Philosophic"
gcwesen. Sic ist cin Erbc dcr Gricchcn. Wcr sich damit beschaftigte, tat dies nebcn scincm Brotcrwcrb odcr konntc sich der Forderung durch den
Abbasidcn
Die
crfrcucn.
Kalifcn
fordcrtcn
zunachst
die
Ubersetzung
griechischer wisscnschaftlicher Tcxtc, wobei haufig praktische Interesscn (z.B.
Medizin, Astronomic, Mathcmatik) cine Rolle spicltcn.
und
keincswegs
ausschlicBlich
dcr
Schlcpptau
"im
1
Gleichzeitig 2
arztlichen
Kunst"
Intcrcssc an "Philosophic", par excellence wobei vor allcm Logik und Bcwcisfiihrung fur griechischer Philosophic, islamischc Thcologcn und Juristen wegweisend gewordcn ist. Philosophic
entwickelte
ist
cin
sich
hicr primar dcr
ticfcs
zur Erkcnntnis und Tcil der Wisscnschaften, die
Wcg
Endcs dem Nachwcis von Gottcs Wundertatigkeit in 4 Von theorctischer und praktischer Autonomie der Schopfung dientcn.
dem Muslim
letzten
Rede
schcint hicr kcinc
den Begriff
Der zunachst
"Autonomie"
Begriff
den
in 5
Philosophic.
zu konncn.
Rcchtswisscnschaftcn
und
Doch betrachtcn
wir zunachst
miher.
Autonomie gewinnt hinaus
Dariiber
gesetzlichkcit
scin
erst
entspringt
Eigenstandigkcit
in
der Ncuzcit an Bedcutung,
und dann das
dcr
-
Kant
scit
an
Interessc
-
der
wic
Philosophic
in
der
Eigcnandercr
Wisscnschaften moderncr Wissenschaftsthcorie, die sich mit Strukturen und
Methoden
bcschiiftigt.
II. Daihcr, "Anfange und Entstehung dcr Wisscnschaften im Freiburg/Miinchcn 1978 (S.356-366), S.363 untcn.
Vgl. 29,
Islam",
in:
Saeculum
Diese These hatte Rudi Paret, Der Islam und das griechische liildungsgut (Tubingen = Philosophic und Gcschichte 70), S.lSff. aufgestellt; vgl. dazu Daiber in: Gnomon
1950
42, 1970, S.540f.
3
Vgl.
George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges (Fxlinburgh
4
Reuben
Vgl.
Ixvy,
The
Social
Structure
1981), S.107.
of Islam
(Cambridge
1957;
repr.
1979),
S.458ff.
Art.
Vgl. Ritter.
I.
"Autonomic"
Darmstadt
1971.
in:
Historisches
Worterbuch der Philosophic.
Hrsg.v.
Joachim
Die Autonomie dcr Philosophic
Die
Ubcrtragung
modcrncr
islamischcn
klassischen
Gleichzeitig kniipft
sic
ist
229
Islam
Fragcstcllungen
Philosophic
Zusammenhange
ermoglicht uns,
irn
auf
durchaus
das
Icgitim.
Gcbiet
dcr
Dcnn
sic
bcsser zu erkennen und zu verstchcn.
an die im Mittelalter 6 vor allcm
scit
Thomas von
Aquin gestcllte Frage nach der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Theologic an. Die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Theologie ist von ihren islamischen Vertretern nicht bezweifclt worden; c ilm al-kalam in seiner klassischen
Auspragung bedient und der Ontologie erscheint theologiae.
wie
in
Doch
sich formal
bzw.
dcr
patristischcr
langst vor
und
inhaltlich der Philosophic, der
Dialcktik
und
und
Logik
Metaphysik. Philosophic Tradition als ancilla
mittelalterlicher
den Diskussionen
in
Mittelalter
und Neuzeit
war das ancilla-theologiae-Ri\d im Islam Anderungen unterworfen. Man hat im Rahmen des islamischen, von Koran und religioser Uberlieferung bestimmten Wcltbildes und unter dcm Eindruck griechischer Philosophien und Wissenschaften der Philosophic einen eigenen Stellenwert verliehen. Gleichzeitig
ist
dem
der Tenor uniibersehbar, in Ubereinstimmung mil
damaligen religiosen Weltbild nicht von der Symbiose von Religionen und Wissenschaften abzuweichen. Autonomie und Gebundenheit der Wissen schaften einschlieBlich dcr Philosophic stehen so in standigcm Ducll; dies
macht die islamische Szene zu einem interessanten Schauplatz Entwicklung
eines
Philosophiebegriffes,
der
sich
standig
fur
die
den
mit
7 Glaubensforderungen islamischcr Orthodoxie arrangieren muBtc. Bevor wir den islamischen Philosophiebegriff im Einzelncn erortern, sollten wir beachten, wic die den Arabern ja wohlbekannte gricchisch-
pythagoraische Etymologic von Philosophic
als
"Liebe
zur
8 Wcisheit"
mit
Vgl. Martin Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode.l.ll. Darmstadt 1956; Charles Lohr, Theologie und/als Wissenschaft im friihen 13. Jahrhundert", in: Internationale katholische Zeitschrift: Communio 10, 1981, S.316-330.
7 3 1971; George F. Hourani, Vgl. A.J. Arberry, Revelation and Reason in Islam, London Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy (London 1976), S.2ff. - Umgekehrt wenn man von Parallelentwicklungen absieht - philosophische Gedanken Eingang gefunden: vgl. R.M. Frank, "Reason and Revealed Law: a sample of parallels and divergences in kalam and falsafa", in: Recherches d Islamologie. Recueil d articles offert a Georges C. Anawati et Louis Gardet par leurs collegues et amis.
haben auch im kalam
Louvain 1977 (= Bibliotheque philosophique de Louvain
26), S.123-138.
o
Vgl.
Graeca al-asya
Ammonius,
In
ed.
A.
Busse im 9.
Porphyrii Isagogen Berolini 1891), S.9,7ff.; ubernommen z.B. wa-rusumiha ed. Abu Rlda (Rasa il al-Kindl
4,
(Commentaria in Aristotelem von Kind!, Risala fi hudud
Jh.
l-falsaflya,
Kairo
1950),
S.172
(Neuedition mit Ubersetzung und Kommentar: F. Klein-Franke, "Al-Kindi s On Defini of Things in: Le Museon 95, 1982, S.191-216) oder im 10. Jh. tions and Descriptions von Qosta Ibn Luqa in einer titellosen Abhandlung iiber die Einteilung der Wissenschaft, Hs. Aya Sofya 4855, fol.SOrSf. ",
Daiber
230
dcm
islamischen Traditionsliteratur bereits friih den Glaubigen Strcbcn nach Wissen 9 parallelisiert wcrdcn kann: Wissen und empfohlcncn
dcr
in
Handcln gehoren im islamischen Glaubensbegriff zusammen. 10 Das Wissen zunachst das umfaBt Wissen von Koran und religios-juristische
Im Zuge der Expansion des islamischen Imperiums seit dem der Muslim zunehmend mil zahlreichen Kulturen
Uberlieferung. Jh.
7.
sich
sieht
Wissen umfaBt mehr und mehr auch die fremden Wissen-
konfrontiert;
allem
vor
schaften,
die
Philosophic
und
Naturwissenschaften
die
der
Griechen. Die Philosophic, namlich Logik und Mctaphysik, lieferte das Riistzcug fur die Formulicrung und Abgrenzung des islamischen Dogmas nichtislamischcn
gegeniiber
11
ancilla
als
Thcologic,
Mu c tazila,
gnostisch-dualistischen
um
Philosophic erschcint hier als Wissen
Bewegungcn. dcr
und
Rcligionen
theologiae.
Ein
typisches
cine scholastische Bewegung, die sich im
entwickeln
und
begann
dcr
in
Formulicrung
Beispiel Jh.
8.
und
die Hilfsmittel ist
die
im Irak zu
Begriindung
der
uberlieferten Glaubcnslchrcn traditio durch ratio zu ersetzen suchte. Ihre Begriindung dcr Religion mil Argumcntcn des Verstandcs fiihrte teilwcisc unter griechisch-hellenistischcm EinfluB zu verfeincrtcn Tcchniken in
und dicntc
dcr islamischen theologischen Disputation (kafam) als
Rcchtfcrtigung fur die Beschaftigung mit den Wissenschaften. Allerdings
ist
man
schncll an die
Erkenncns gclangt. Bereits als
Begriindcr dcr c
Menschen"
(al- ~aliniiiti)
Fran/.
Vgl. ngc"
(wie
konncn
tazila gilt,
bzw.
Grenzcn mcnschlichcn Wissens und
Wasil Ibn cAta
"die
"die
(gest.
748 oder 749), dcr
mit Wissen ausgestattcten
mit Sprachc (odcr: Vernunft)
Begabtcn"
Gott nur schr unvollkommcn bcschrcibcn, namlich sowcit Gott
(an-n~atiqiui)
"Anfa
Mu
c
fiir
glcichzcitig 13
Roscnthal,
Anm.
1)
Knowledge
Triumphant
(I^idcn
1970),
S.70ff.;
Daiber,
S.358.
c c Abbad asVgl. Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Mu ammar Ibn Sularnl (gcst.830n.Chr.) (Beirut 1975 = Bciruter Texte und Studicn 19), S.143f., Anm. 7. 11
Vgl. Daiber (s.vor.Anm.) S.16ff.; 123ff.
Vgl. Josef Van Ess, Classical Islamic Culture,
islamischen
Theologie", in:
The
Structure
logical
Wiesbaden
1970,
findet
man
in
Islamic id.,
Theology",
in:
"Disputationspraxis
Logic in
in
der
Re\ ue des Etudes Islamiques 44, Paris 1976, S.23-60.
1-3
So
of
S.21-50;
der Tat
bci
den
Mu c taziliten
schon
friih
interessante
Erorte-
Daiber (s.Anm. 10) S.283ff. und id., Fragen; vgl. c In gleichem Sinne schreibt im 10. Jh. Abu 1-Hasan al- Amiri (s.Anm. 1). "Anfange" sein Buch iiber die Vorziigc des Islam (Kitab al-flam bi-manaqib al-Islam); vgl. G. Endress, "Grammatik und Logik" (in: Bocnumer Studien zur Philosophic 3, Amsterdam rungen
naturwissenschaftlicher
1986, S.163-299), S.216.
Die Autonomie dcr Philosophic im Islam im Koran
"sich
selbst
Seine Schopfung
fur
231
Schon hier
beschrieb".
...
bahnt sich das Problem der spateren islamischen Attributenlehre an. Fur c Wasils Schiiler Dirar Ibn Amr (gest. 796) sind Gottes Attribute nur in oder fur den Mu c ta/,iliten Negationen ihres Gegenteils beschreibbar; c Abbad Ibn Sulaiman (gest. 864) sind gottliche Attribute lediglich sprachliche Zeichen, "Benennungen", die nicht mil dem Be/eichneten identisch sind.
16
Hier
bereits koranische
17
klingt das Prin/ip der negativen
Unendlichkeit Gottes
Menschen nur unvollkommen
ist
fur
Thcologie an; die Sprache und Dcnken des
erfaBbar.
Diese rigorose Einstellung formt den Nahrboden fur die spiitere Adaption neuplatonischer Gedanken iiber die Unendlichkeit
islamische
Man
Gottes.
auch
sondern
Aristoteles"
die
Ungefahr
vorliegen. Institutio
fiir
fur
die
Plotins,
dieselbe Zeit erhielt
der
des
Bearbeitung
neuplatonischen Werke haben den
die
der
Logik einer
in
Arabern
den
Paraphrase
um in
Iheologica
nur
nicht
Enneaden
genannten
18
sich
interessiert
man
Griechen,
"Theologie
des
im
Jh.
bereits
9.
Kenntnis von Proclus
Liber de
Diese
causis.
der
Philosophiebegriff
islamischen
Philosophen von Beginn an gepragt.
Der Kindi
islamische Philosoph,
erste
nach
(gest.
definiert
866)
Anlehnung an Aristoteles
21
Abu
anderem
unter
und Platon
22
Yiisuf
als
Ya c qiib 20
"Wissen
die
um
Ibn Ishaq
al-
Philosophic
in
die
wahre Natur
14 c Hittbat Wasil ed. Daiber (Wa$il Ibn Ata als Prediger und Thtologe, Leiden 1988 Islamic Philosophy and Theology. Texts and Studies 2), fol.87v22ff.; vgl. Kommentar S.42. 15 c ammar (s.Anm. 10) S.136. Vgl. Daiber,
=
Mu
Vgl.
Daiber,
Mifammar
iibcr die gottlichen Attribute
(s.Anm.
10)
S.211C.
-
formen den Nahrboden
Solche fiir
theologischen
spatere, unter
dcm
Diskussionen EinfluB der
griechischen Logik weiterentwickelte Erorterungen iiber das Verhaltnis von Sprache und Denken; vgl. Endress (s.Anm. 13); Wilfried Kiihn, "Die Rehabilitierung der Sprache durch den arabischen Philologen As-Sirafi", in: Bochumer Studien zur Philosophic 3, 1986, S.301-402.
17 Vgl. 1965); 10
z.B.
Sure 3,174; Art.
Daiber, Mifammar
"Ghayb"
(s.Anm.
in:
Encyclopaedia of Islam
? I
(I^idcn,
London
10) S.117ff.
Vgl. den Sammelband Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages. Ed. by Ryan and C.B. Schmitt. Ixtndon 1986. Dazu die Besprechung v. Daiber
Jill
in:
Kraye, W.F. Dcr Islam 65,
1988, S.130-134. Jetzt
neu herausgegeben von Charles Taylor, Liber de causis (Kalam Toronto 1981.
ft
mahd
al-
khair). Diss. ?f)
Vgl. G.N. 1984), S.lSff. 21
Metaph.
II
Atiyeh, Al-Kindi,
the
1.993b20 (eirtcmi^T}
Philosopher of the Arabs
TTK
(Rawalpindi
1966;
repr.
Daiber
232
der
soweit
Dinge,
Metaphysik,
cs
erste
"die
23
Mcnschcn
den
fiir
Philosophic",
als
moglich
um
"Wissen
sowie
ist"
die
die Erste Wahrheit,
Hier wird der aristotelischen Ursache jeglicher Wahrheit Erklarung, daB "dasjenige, was abgeleitete Wahrheiten als wahr erweist,
die
die
am
wahrsten
ist".
24
koranischen
Anlehnung an
in
ist"
Begriff
haqq
Ursache
ist
Aussage
26
das
als
entscheidend gcwordcn
eine
"Gott"
Komponente gegeben.
vortrefflicher
ist
=
"Wahrheit"
Pointierung mit islamischer
und Proclus 25 sowie an den
Plotin
um
Wissen
die
neuplatonische
das Wissen
"Dcnn
27 Wirkung".
um
die
Diese
die Entwicklung des islamischcn
fiir
Philosophicbegriffes; Philosophic beschaftigt sich in crstcr Linie mit der gottlichen
Ursache
Wahrheit"
"ersten
den Erkenntnisscn
Scins
alien
und
nach der Erkenntnis dieser
strebt
(al-haqq al-auwal). Hierbei friiherer
soil
sie
Kind! zufolge auf
28 Generationen und andcrcr Volker aufbauen.
Diesem Grundsatz getrcu und untcr Beriicksichtigung koranisch-islamischer Theologie
von
der
creatio
ex nihilo
Kindi die
entwickelt
These,
daB
Universum, Korper, Bcwegung, Zeit und Anfang nicht ohne einander existieren und cine Ursache auBcrhalb haben, die absolute Einheit, das
wahre Eine. 29 Hicraus entstcht
Wahrnchmbaren
jedcs
in
Emanationcn In
(al-mafysus).
der
(faid) das Sein (tahawwi}
Emanation
werden
die
rationalen und mctaphysischcn Dinge zu etwas Wahrnehmbarem, zu etwas,
Thcaet. 176 A.B; darnach Ammonius (s.Anm. 8) 3,8f.; vgl. Alfred L. Metaphysics (Albany 1974), S.117F. 23 I d. Abu Rlda (s.Anm. 8) I 97,9/Ubers. Ivry (s.vor.Anm.) S.55. 24 Metaph. 993H27. "~
Vgl. S.152;
26
27
G.
Hndress, ftoclus
Ambus
(Beirut
1973
=
Ivry,
Al-Kindi s
Beiruter Texte und Studicn
10),
286.
Sure 10,32(33). Vgl. ed.
Abu Rlda
(s.Anm. 8)
I
101,1/Ubers. Ivry (s.Anm. 22) S.56.
28
Vgl. ed. Abu Rlda (s.Anm. 8) I 102/Ubcrs. Ivry (s.Anm. 22) S.57, Kommentar S.126 metodo de Al-KindF aristotelischen Inspirationsquellc) und A. Cortabarria, visto a travers de sus Risalas" (in: Orientalia Hispanica I, Leiden 1974, S.209-225),
(zur
"III
So tragen nicht nur die Vorlaufer aus der Antike, sondern alle Zeiten in Weise zum wisscnschaftlichen I ;ortschritt bei, wie im 12. Jh. der Astronom alAsturlabl und der Mathematiker as-Samau al folgerten; vgl. Franz Rosenthal, Asturlabi and as-Samaw al on Scientific Progress", in: Osiris 9, 1950, S.553-564. - Zum Fortschrittsgedanken im Islam vgl. Tarif Khalidi, "The Idea of Progress in Classical Islam", in: Journal of Near Eastern Studies 40, 1981, S.277-289.
S.210-212. gleicher
"Al-
Vgl.
zur Bewcisfiihrung Kindls
Mittelalters"
(in:
Michael
Marmura,
W.M. Watt/M. Marmura, Der
Islam,
"Die
II
islamische
Stuttgart,
1985 = Die Religionen der Menschheit 25,2), S.332ff.
30
Vgl. ed.
Abu Rida
(s.Anm. 8)
I
Philosophic des Koln, Mainz
Berlin,
162,2ff./Ubers. Ivry (s.Anm. 22) S.I 13.
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam
wovon
233
der menschlichcn Sccle sich ein Abbild (mital) formen kann; im
in
Untcrschied hicrzu existicrcn die Universalien, die Gattungen und Arten
im
nur
Geiste. 32
31
Hierbei
die
1st
erste
Wahrheit weder Genus noch
sondern formt die essentielle Einheit, was wir akzidentell
Spezies,
in
den Dingen finden. ist
Philosophic
zum Wissen um
hier
die gottliche
im menschlichen Geiste existierenden Universalien und
die nur
Seele in
um
Ursache sowie
der
die in
Form von Abbildern vorhandenen wahrnehmbaren
geworden. Dieses Wissen al-a^ya bi-haqa iqih~d)?^
ist "Wissen
fur Kind!
in
theoretisches
die
wahre
Das Streben des Philosophcn nach diesem Wissen
im AnschluB an
ist
um
Partikularien Natur der Dinge" ( c ilm
die aristotelische Einteilung der Philosophic
und praktisches Wissen mil den Zielen Wahrheit und 35 und auf die "erste Wahrheit, die Ursache jeder Wahrheit"
Handeln 34 "das
wahrheitsgetreue
bei
Kind! nicht
Handeln" (al-
6
c amal
37
bi-l-haqq)^ gerichtet.
Diese praktisch-ethische Komponente der Philosophie erscheint hier naher ausgefiihrt und beschrankt sich auf das aktive
um
Streben des Menschen nach Wissen
wahre Natur der Dinge; diese emanieren aus dem wahren Einen und sind eine creatio ex nihilo. Gctreu koranischer Vorstellung (Sure 55,6)
zu dienen und
ihn zu verehren.
38
ist
die
das Universum geschaffen,
Hier, aber auch
in
um
Gott
weiteren spezifischen
31
Ed. Abu Rlda (s.Anm. 8) I 107f./Ubers. Ivry (s.Anm. 22) S.61ff.; vgl. auch Kindls noch nicht herausgegebene Risala fi sarh ma li-n-nafs dikruhu minima kana laha fi c c c c alam al-hiss wa-m a laha dikruhu mimm a laha fi alam al~alam al- aql id_ s arat fi c c alam al- aql und dazu G. Endress, "Al-Kindi s Theory of Anamnesis", hiss in sarat fi in: Islao e Arabismo na peninsula iberica. Adas do XI congresso du uniao europeia de Arabista e islamologas (Evora-Faro-Silves, 29 set.-6 out. 1982). Ed. por Adel Sidarus. Evora 1986, S.393-402. 32
Vgl. ed. Abu Rlda (s.Anm. 8) dazu Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.334ff. 33 S.
oben zu Anm.
Vgl. Aristoteles, Metaph.
36
S.
oben zu
Vgl. ed.
^7
Anm.
Abu
113ff.;
123ff./Ubers. Ivry (s.Anm. 22) S.67ff.,
76ff.;
23.
34 35
I
II
1.993b20.
20.
Rlda (s.Anm. 8)
I
97,10/Ubers. Ivry (sAnm. 22) S.55. r
T
Vgl.
hierzu
Ivry (s.Anm.
22) S.117f.;
-
Kindis Philosophiedefinition hat bei Ibn Sina,
al-Mantiq, al-Mudhal ed. G.C. Anawati, Mahmud al-Hudain u. Ahmad Fu ad alas^Sifa Ahwani (Kairo 1952) S.12 nachgewirkt; vgl. dazu M. Marmura, "Avicenna on the Division in: Journal for the History of Arabic of the Sciences in the Isagoge of His Shifa ,
",
Sciences
Das
4,
Aleppo
zeigt
1980, S.239-251.
Kindls Schrift Fi l-Ibana
Abu Rlda (sAnm.
8)
I
S.238-261.
c
an sugud al-girm al-aqsa wa-ta
c
atihi
li-llah
ed.
234
Daibcr
Lehren 39
zcigt
der
sich
religios-islamische
Rahmen; Philosophic
steht
im Widcrspruch zur Offcnbarung.
nicht
Sie religioser
durch
aber nicht ancilla theologiae: philosophische Interprctationcn Sprache, wie sic Kindis Schrift iiber die Verehrung Gottcs
ist
Univcrsum
das
bictct
(s.o.),
weiscn
Icdiglich
auf die
Uberein-
stimmung von Philosophic und Qffcnbarung. Philosophic ist autonom und weist den Weg zum Wissen und zu aktivem Streben nach diescm Wisscn. Hierbei unterschcidct Kindl crkenntnisthcoretisch zwischen
und Abstraktioncn im Gciste
Die
Wahrnehmung
Offenbarung tritt in den zwar nicht im zur Hintcrgrund: Widcrspruch Philosophic, aber es wird ihr keine bcstimmtc Rolle im philosophischen ErkenntnisprozeB zugcwicscn. Sie stcht nicht im Widcrspruch zu dem, was Philosophcn sic
(s.o.).
religiose
ist
durch cigcne geistigc Anstrcngung bcweisen konnen - auch wcnn deren Erkenntnisse letzten Endcs nicht an die Offenbarung des Propheten heranreichen.
40
Kind! hat sich nicht
vicl
iibcr
die
spezifische
Rolle der religioscn
der
Philosophic gcauBcrt. Vielleicht hat dies zu ciner nachfolgende Philosophcn cindcutigeren Stellungnahme heraus-
Offcnbarung
gefordcrt.
gcgcniiber
Der Arzt und Philosoph Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Zakariya
ar-
Razi (Rhazcs im lat. Mittclalter; starb 925 odcr 932) hat mil Kindis These von der Autonomie der Philosophic Ernst gemacht. Seine Ablehnung der Notwendigkeit von Propheten und geoffenbartcn Religionen bcgriindet er mit der Unabhangigkeit des Denkens, mit der Philosophic. Alle Menschcn sind zu Philosophic fahig, es gibt keine Bcvorzugung - ebcnsowenig wie cin gerechtcr, barmhcrziger Gott seine Offcnbarung nur einem Einzelnen oder cinem bestimmtcn Volk zukommen laBt. Philosophic befahigt den
Menschcn
zur
Kontrollc
seiner
Lcidenschaften
durch
die
ratio,
zur
Erlosung der Seele von den korperlichen Trieben und zu ihrer Aufwartsbewegung (Seelcnwanderung) zu hoheren Lebensformcn nach dem Tode des 39 Vgl.
Marmura (s.Anm.
Averroes y
Kant",
in:
29) S.337;
al-Qantara
2,
Hmilio Tornero,
Madrid
"Religion
y filosofia en al-Kindi,
1981, S.89-128.
kannyat kutub Aristutalis ed. Abu Rlda (s.Anm. 8) I 372f.; Philosophers Conception of Islam", in: Islam s Under lid. by R.G. Hovannisian and Speros Vryonis. Malibu/Cal. 1983 standing of itself. (= Giorgio Ixvi della Vida Riennial Conference 8), S.87-102, hier S.91; R.Walzer, Greek 2 into Arabic (Oxford 1962, Im 11. Jh. folgt Kindls Anschauung der 1963) S.lSlff. spanische Philosoph Ibn Hazm, vgl. A.G. Chejne, Ibn Hazm (Chicago 1982) S.72ff., bes. 80. Ibn I.Iax.m erweist sich auch sonst als nicht unkritischer Kenner von Kindls Philosophie: vgl. Daiber, "Die Kritik des Ibn Ha/.m an KindFs Metaphysik", in: Der Islam 63, Vgl. Riialat al-Kindi
dazu M. Marmura,
1986, S.284-302.
The
ft
Islamic
235
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam
Menschen. 41 Die von Gott
Gnade den Menschen
seiner
in
verliehene
Vernunft, eine Emanation aus Seinem Wesen, befahigt den Menschen, seine Seele aus dem korperlichcn Schlummer zu wecken und in ihren urspriinglichen Zustand zurikkkehren zu lassen. Die universelle Secle bildet eins 42
der
ewigen Prin/ipien, neben Materie, Raum, Zeit und Schopfer. in einem demokritischen atomistischen Entwurf erscheinen
fiinf
Diese
platonischer Pragung, worin die koranische creatio ex nihilo keinen Platz
sondern die Schopfung
hat,
ewigen Atomen
praexistenten
Philosophic
erschcint
der (Neu-)Anordnung der bereits aktuell
in
besteht. hier
Menschen
alien
autonomes,
als
Volkern gerneinsames Denken mit ethischer Komponente. Die 44 Lebensweise"
sophische
ist
(as-sira l-falsafiya)
und
"philo-
mehr das
Vorbild, nicht
Leben des Propheten. Philosophische Erkenntnis befahigt den Einzelnen zu der Leidenschaften, zur Befreiung der Seele von wie es nach ihm Miskawaih (gest. 1030) unter EinfluB von oder, platonisch-aristotelischer Ethik und mit etwas abweichender, farabianiKontrolle
rationaler
diesen
-
scher Akzentuierung im Titel eines Buches formulierte
des Charakters (Tahdib al-ahlaq).
45
-
zur Verbessening
Sic bedarf dazu nicht der religiosen
46
Offenbarung. Hierin ist
ar-Razi ein zeitgenossischer Kontrahent,
der Ismailite
(gest.
dem Abu Bakn Abu Hatim ar-Razi
seinem Buch 41 Vgl.
42 Vgl.
iiber
um
933 oder 934) nicht gcfolgt. In
Die Beweise des Prophetentums (A c fam an-mibliwa)
Marmura (s.Anm.
41
29) S.344C.
Marmura (s.Anm.
29) S.339ff;
--,
"Islamic
Philosophers
(s.Anm. 40)
Conception"
S.92f.
4^
Vgl. im 1936) S.34ff.
Einzelnen
Shlomo
44
Vgl. die gleichnamige 1939), S.99-111.
Schrift
Pines,
ed.
Paul
Kraus
Atonicnlehre
islamischen
zur
Bcitrdgc
in:
ar-RazI,
Rasa
il
(Berlin
(Kairo
falsafiya
45
Miskawaihs Tahdib al-ahfaq wurde von C. Zurayk 1966 in Beirut herausgegehen und Rez. v. Daiber, Oricntalitiberset/.t (The Refinement of Character)-, vgl. dazu stische Literaturzeitung 67, 1972, Fine franz. Ubers. veroffentlichte Mohammed Arkoun 1968
(Miskawayh: Traite d ethiquc. Damas 1969). 46 Hierin ist ihm offcnbar der Dichter R.
Kevin
I^ccy,
Man and
1984) S.146ff. u. 160f., wo weitern Parallele s. S.273ff.).
Society
auf
Abu the
in
RazF
als
c l-
Ala
c
al-Ma arn (973-1057)
Luzumiyyat of al-Ma
mogliches
Vorbild
c
am
verwiesen
gefolgt:
(thesis
wird
vgl.
Harvard (zu
einer
c
47
Salah al-Sawy, Teheran 1977. Teilubersetzung v. F. Brion, Kit ab A fam alnubuwwat. Traduction el commentaire des pages relatives a la philosophic de la Universite Catholique de Louvain, memoire de licence dactylograph. 1985 (vgl. Hrsg.
v.
religion.
nachfolg.Anm.). Vgl. dazu meine Analyse
"Abu
Hatim ar-Razl (10th century
A.D.) on
236
Daiber
deren
nachzuweisen, daB auch die Vielzahl dcr Religionen nicht transzendcnte Einheit zerstoren konne. Ihre Unterschiedlichkcit
riihre
von der Verschicdcnhcit der Volker
versucht
er
her.
-
Philosophic
wie
ist
religiose Offenbarung gottlich und bedarf des Vermittlers, ebenso wie in der Vergangenheit Astronomic, Astrologie und Alchemic durch Idris bzw.
bei
den Griechen durch Hermes vcrmittelt werdcn muBte. Die
gottliche
Offenbarung des Korans spreche in Form von Bildern (amtal} und man musse nach dcr univcrscllcn Bedeutung (ma c n~a) diescr Bilder und ihrer auBeren Erscheinungsformen (zahir al-alfaz) fragen und forschen. 48 Abii Hatim ar-Razi hat cine Ehrcnrettung dcr These von
der
Offenbarung durch eincn Propheten gcsucht, indem er auf die universelle Wahrhcit dcr diese vcrwies; Religionen universcllc, religiosen
transzendente Wahrheit
sci
mil dcr Philosophic identisch und wie diesc
gottlichen Ursprungs. Sic bedarf eincs Vermittlers, eines Propheten. Die iibcrmittcltc (ta wll),
um
Botschaft,
die
Bilder ihrerseits bediirfcn dcr Interpretation
zu dcren univcrsellen Bedeutung gclangen zu konnen. Die c (kullu ma rifatin) habc ihren Ursprung in Gott, und
Wahrhcit
universelle
wcrdc durch den Propheten vermittclt, "dcm ersten Weisen" (al-hakim alauwal). Das Wisscn dcr Menschen hicrum bauc auf vorherigcs Wisscn auf.
Auch
diese Tatsache bcwcisc die Existenz cines vorhcrigen prophctischcn
Vermittlers.
49
Abu Hatim
ar-Razis Symbiose von Philosophic und rcligioscr Offen
barung durch die sich
als
Annahme
gcmcinsamen transzendenten Wahrheit Wcitercntwicklung von Gedanken seines Vorgangers cincr
entpuppt Kindi; das Wisscn des Philosophen hat letztlich scinen Ursprung in Gott und stimmt mit dcr religioscn, durch den Propheten ubermittcltcn Offen
barung ubercin; ihr Inhalt liegt den Menschen in Form von Bildern deren Bedeutung durch Interpretation verstandlich wird. Gleichzcitig
scheidung
erscheint
zwischcn
Bildern
hicr
des
Kindis
erkenntnistheorctische
Wahrnehmbaren
in
der
vor,
Untcr-
Seelc
und
Abstraktionen des Geistcs aufgcgcben; das Bild der religioscn Sprache
ist
the Unity and Diversity of Religions", in: Dialogue and Syncretism. An Interdisciplinary Approach. Currents of Encounter 1. Amsterdam 1989. 48 c Vgl. A lam an-nubuwa ed. al-Sawy (s.Anm. 47) S.104ff./franz. Ubers. F. Brion, c et revelation: traduction annotee de six extraits du Kitab A lam Al"Philosophie Nubuwwa d Abu Hatim AI-Razi", in: Bulletin de philosophic medievale 28, 1986 (S.134162), S.152ff.
49
Vgl. ed. al-Sawy (s.Anm. 47) S.314ff.
237
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam
konform mit dcm Gcdankcn. Religion hat eine symbolische Bcdcutung, zu dcrcn Verstandnis
man
Wir erkennen Razis
durch Interpretation kommen kann. im Ansat/, einen Gedanken, den
Zeitgenosse
jiingerer
Abu Hatim
hier
politischen Philosophic
950) zur Hauptthese seiner Fur Farabi sind Religionen - sic Hatim erinnernden Weise lediglich in
Farabi
gemacht
unterscheiden sich in einer an
ar-
hat.
Abu
(gest. 50
der Symbolik und nicht im Symbolisierten
51
philosophischcr Wahrheit,
der Philosophic. Dies begriindet
"Nachahmung"
-
die symbolische
Wiedergabe
Farabi mit der aristotelischen These von der Wechsclbeziehung zwischcn
Denken und Wahrnehmung; die Seele denkt in Wahrnehmungsbildern, indem ihre Vorstcllungskraft Wahrnehmbares "nachahmt". Im Gegensatz zu Kind!, der zwischen Wahrnehmungsbildern der Seele und gedanklichcn Abstraktionen unterschiedcn hatte, haben bei Farabi die Universalien der Philosophic ein bildliches Pendant in den Partikularien, in der Religion. In
Weise hat nun Farabi diese Konstellation
origineller
und von Kind! nur
aristotelischen
von Theorie und
Komponente,
gestreiften Zweiteilung der Philosophic
Wisscn und ethischem Handeln; die ethischc
Praxis,
die bereits
parallelisiert mit der
Abu Bakr Muhammad
ar-Razi als
Ibn Zakariya
Mittel zur Lautcrung der Seele durch die ratio miteinbezogen hatte, dient dazu, um in platonischem Kontext mit aristotelischem Vorzeichen die
Verwirklichung der wahren Philosophic in der ethischen Vervollkommnung des Einzelnen im Idealstaat moglich zu machen. Hierzu leitet die Religion mit ihren Vorschriften an.
Da
diesc gleichzeitig die einzig mogliche,
dem
Mcnschcn zugangliche Wiedergabe philosophischer Wahr heit, der Universalien in Form von Symbolen, Bildern und die einzig mogliche Verwirklichung der Philosophic durch das ethisch vollkommcne Erkennen
aller
Handeln des Einzelnen im Mustcrstaat
Autonomie der Philosophic
in einer
nicht nur ein erkcnntnistheoretischcr
unentbehrlichen
"Instrument"
ist,
schrankt
hicr
besonderen Weise
Religion
ein.
Religion
die ist
und ethischer Faktor, sondern zum
der Philosophic gewordcn.
52
Dariibcr hinaus
erweist sich religiose Offenbarung als unentbehrlich fur das philosophischc
Erkennen und 50 Vgl. in:
fur
den logischcn Nachweis der spezifischcn Natur der
zum Nachfolgenden
L homme
et
son
univers
Daiber,
au
und Ethik bei FarabT
"Prophetic
moyen
age.
Louvain-la-Neuve
1986
(gest.
(=
339/950)",
Philosophes
medievaux 26-27), S.729-753; --, The Ruler as Philosopher, Amsterdam/Oxford/New York 1986 = Mcdcdelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. c -i
Letterkunde,
n.r. d.49,
no.4 (= S.129-149).
W~
S.85C. Vgl. Farabi, as-Siyasa l-madaniya ed. P.M. Naggar (Beirut 1964)
52
Vgl. Naheres bei Daiber, Ruler (s.Anm. 50) S.14f.
238
Daibcr
Dingc bzw. dcr im Musterstaat nachzuahmenden Struktur des Universums durch die Mcnschen, den Prophct-Philosophen par excellence. Menschliches Erkcnncn ist unvollkommcn und bcdarf dcr Inspirationen des gottlichen aktiven
Alexander
Intellektes.
und
Aphrodisias
um
Aristoteles
Prophetic und der Philosophic zu vcrankern. Religion ist nicht
in
Offenbarung
religiose
von
Lehren dienen hier da/u,
psychologische
islamische
nur bildlichc, symbolische Wicdcrgabe philosophischer Wahrhcit fur den Nichtphilosophcn, fur die Masse, sondern auch Verwirklichung der wahren
indcm
Philosophic,
sic
das cthische Vcrhalten des Einzelnen im Muster
bestimmt sowic prophetische Inspirationsquelle dieser Philosophic ist daher Philosoph und Prophet.
staat
ist.
Der Regent des Mustcrstaates Mil
Lehren
scincn
hat
Farabi
den
Philosophiebegriff
der
nach-
folgenden Zcit maBgebend beeinfluBt, scheint es ihm doch gelungen zu Philosophic und religiose Offenbarung in philosophisch iiberzeugender
sein,
und
den muslimischen Glaubigcn akzeptabler und vcrstandlicher Weise
fiir
miteinander filosofiae
Religion.
zu
und
verbinden. andererseits
Dicse
Losung
gcnialc
erscheint
Religion
verwirklicht hat
sich
auf
eincrseits
ancilla
als
dcr
die
Philosophic
in
spatcre
Philosophcn
groBen
Eindruck gemacht, wobei es Modifikationen und Kritik gegebcn hat. Der bcruhmte Arzt und Philosoph Ibn Sina (gcst. 1037) hat Farabis Auffassung dcr Religion
als
Nachahmung der
Philosophic in
Form von
53 Symbolcn mit cinigen Andcrungcn iibcrnommcn. Philosophic ist nicht der ungebildcten Masse zugiinglich; daher muB dcr Prophet dicsc in Symbolcn
ansprcchcn, ohnc den Eindruck zu wcckcn, daB gewissc Kcnntnisse ihr Ermahnung Ibn Sinas implizicrt die Annahmc
vorcnthaltcn wcrdcn. Dicsc
philosophischen Wisscns, das nicht ist
Religion
wie
Farabi
mil
ausschlicBlich
"Islamic
Masse bestimmt
ist.
54
Denn
notwendige Verwirklichung wahrer Philosophic,
und
Argumentation
Bildcrsprache
Philosophers
Conception"
crklart
gcwordcn,
(s.Anm. 40)
die
hattc; iibcr
sic
ist
Gottcs
S.98C.
hierzu z.B. Ihn Sina, Ahw al an-nafs ed. Ahmad Fu ad al-Ahwam (Kairo 1952) Risalat al-qadar, wo/.u man G.F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic
Vgl. S.141F.;
Islam).
die
cpistemologischcr
Symbol-
Vgl. iMarmura,
Ethics
mehr
nicht
die
fiir
,
S.227-248, bes. 240ff. vergleiche (dazu Rez. Daiber in: Der hier von Farabis Ikschreibung der Methode des Aristoteles c vgl. Farabi, yanbagi an yuqaddam qabl ia allum falsafat Aristu ed. F. Leiden 1892, S.53f.)/Ubers. Dieterici (Alfarabls philosophische Abhandlungcn
(Cambridge -
angeregt: Dieterici
Ibn
1985)
Sma
ist
Ma
,
(Leiden 1892) S.89; Farabi seinerscits folgt hier alexandrinischer Tradition: vgl. Elias, In Porphyrii Isagogen ct Aristotelis Categorias commentaria ed. A. Bussc (Berlin 1900 = Commentaria in Aristotelem Gracca 18/1) S.124.25ff. und dazu E.K. Rowson, Al- cAmirt on the Afterlife (thesis Yale University 1892) S.341 (zu S.99f.).
239
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam
Majestat und Unvcrgleichlichkcit, liber Auferstehung, ewigc Gliickscligkeit und Verdammung spricht. 55 Folglich kann man bei Avicenna zwei Arten des Prophetcntums finden:
56
das imaginative Prophetentum, worin der
1)
Prophet von den himmlischen Seelen, "den wirkenden Engeln" sein Wissen in Form von Bildern und Symbolen des universellen Wissens empfangt; 2)
Prophetentum, worin der Prophet ohne Mithilfe der Seele durch Intuition (hads) die intelligiblen vom wirkenden Intellekt das intellektuelle
empfangt. Diese hohere Form der Erkenntnis laBt sich den Nichtphilosophen in der Sprache von Bildern und Symbolen iibermitteln, wobei wie ihnen einiges vorenthalten werden muB. Diese esoterische Einstellung, die FarabI
gesagt
fertigt
-
57
kritisiert
hatte,
recht-
Avicenna mit dem Eingestandnis, daB es neben den primaren, von
Menschen direkt rezipierbaren Intelligiblen auch solche gibt, die nur Propheten aufnehmen konnen, Menschen, die des demonstrativen und abstrakten Denkens fahig und zu logischen SchluBfolgerungen imstande 58 konnen den Nichtphilosophen nur in Diese sind. Intelligiblen alien
beschranktem
MaBe
sowie nur in Symbolen weitergegeben werden; die soil mit diesem Wissen - par excellence das
menschlische Vernunftseele geoffenbarte
Wahrheit
-
eine
Gesetz,
symbolische
Widerspiegelung philosophischer
lernen, die animalischen Leidenschaften zu beherrschen,
um
vom Korper befreit, in ewiger Seligkeit, in der Schau der himmlischen Wesen und von Gott zu verweilen. - Dieser Auffassung von
nach dem Tode,
der Symbolsprache
FarabI
beeinfluBte
gegeniiber stehen Avicennas
von
Auffassung
Gott
Wesenheit notwendig Seienden, worin die Kette ihrer koexistierender
55 Vgl.
Ibn
,
Uahiyat
X
ed.
in
seiner
essentieller
Wirkungen endet, welcher
Sma, as-^ifa
Beweise fur seine von
dem
als
sich
Muhammad Yusuf
eigenen
Ursachen und
selbst
erkennt und
Musa, Sulaiman Dunya,
S.443/engl. Ubers. Marmura in: Medie\>al Political Philosophy: sourcebook. Toronto, Ontario 1963, S.lOOf.; franz. Ubers. G.C. Anawati, Avicenne, la musulmanes 27), S.177. metaphysique du Shifa , livres de VI a X, Paris 1985 (= Etudes
SaId Zayid (Kairo 1960)
A
56
Ahwal an-nafs ed. Ahwam (s.Anm. 54) S.114ff.; Avicenna s De anima ed. F. Rahman (London being the psychological part of Kit ab Al-Shifa -an-nub uwat ed. M. Marmura (Beirut 1968) S.45ff./engl. Itb at 1959) S.173ff.; S.114ff. - Dazu Ubersetzung Marmura in Medieval Political Philosophy (s.Anm. 55) Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.363; Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal, "De la Multiplicite des modes de la sur Avicenna. Dirigees par Jean Jolh et et Roshdi prophetic chez Ibn Sma", in: Etudes Rashed. Paris 1984, S.125-142; J.R. Michot, La destinee de Vhomme selon Avicenne de Belgique - Fonds Rene Draguet. Classe des lettres 1986 = Academic Vgl. Ibn Sma,
(Arabic
Text)
,
Royale
(Louvain
V) 57
S.104ff., bes. 120ff.
S.17f. Vgl. Daiber, Ruler (s.Anm. 50)
58 Vgl.
Marmura (s.Anm.
29) S.361f.
240
Daibcr
wie die (lurch ihn notwendigc himmlische Intelligenz die Einzeldinge nur eine allgemeine
"auf
Weise"
kennt. 59
Religiose Symbolik und philosophische Wahrheit formen bei Ibn Sina nicht
mehr
Dies
hangt mit einer wichtigcn Neuerung /.usammen, die Ibn Sina unter dem Eindruck der Enzyklopadie der Ihwan as-Safa eine
die innige Verbindung, wic wir sic bci Farabi gefunden batten. -
vielleicht
,
vor 959/960 verfaBte philosophisch-naturwissenschaftliche Begriindung des Sufitums zur Lauterung der Seele 60 eingefiihrt hatte, namlich die nachdriickliche Einbeziehung der Mystik in die Philosophic. Fiir Ibn Sina
daher
ist
der
Verkiindung
Prophet
des
ein
gottlichen
Mystiker,
Gesetzes
der
die
auf den
Menschen durch mystischen
Pfad
seine fiihren
61
Der mystische Pfad ist der einzige Weg, der die Vernunftscele vom Korper und seinen Leidenschaften befreien und zur vollstandigen Schau
will.
62 Mit dieser mystischen Komponente steht (mutfahada) Gottes fiihren kann. Ibn Smas Philosophiebegriff in krassem Gegensatz zu Farabis Auffassung
von der Philosophic als Weg zur Gliickseligkeit im ethisch vollkommenen Vcrhalten des Einzelnen im Musterstaat. Er beriihrt sich mit dcm coipay/iwi/ -pLoc.-Ideal des Philosophen, der sich besser
neuplatonischen
aus der Gesellschaft zuriickzieht; vor Ibn Sina hatte der 1017 verstorbene ncstorianische
al-Hammar diesem Thema
Ibn
Christ
eine
Abhandlung Er hat eine poetische Wiedergabe erfahren in Ibn Smas M und in seinem Gcdicht iiber die Seele, 65 Allegoric Hayy Ibn Yaqz an 63
gewidmet.
Vgl.
Marmura (s.Anm.
Auf
die Bckanntschaft Ihn Sinas mit
29) S.359-361.
den Ihwan as-Safa wcist Susannc Diwald, "Die das islamischc Dcnkcn", in: Convegno sugli 1979), Roma 1981 (= Accademia Na/.ionale dci Fonda/.ione Ix;one Cactani), S.5-25. hcs. 23f. - Zum Philosophiehcgriff der Ihwan
Bcdcutung des Kitah Itiwan as-^afa Ik/wan as-Safa (Roma 25-26 ottobrc Lincei,
ed.
vgl.
fur
Hairaddm az-/irirkir III (Kairo 1928) S.325ff./0bers. S. Diwald, Arabische und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopadie (Wiesbaden 1975) S.427ff.
Philosophic
im
Vgl.
Ash c arite W.S.
Hinzclncn
"Aviccnna s Theory of Prophecy in the Light of The Seed of Wisdom. Essays in honour of T.J. Meek. Ed. by (Toronto 1964) S. 159-178; -, "Aviccnna s Psychological Proof of
Theology",
McCullough
Prophecy",
in:
Journal of Near Eastern Studies 22, 1963, S.49-56.
"
Vgl.
Marmura,
in:
Ix)uis
Gardet,
Marmura (s.Anm.
La pensec
rcligieuse
d Avicenne
Sina),
(Ibn
Paris
1951,
Kp.5;
29) S.363.
al-Hasan Ibn Suwar Ibn al-Hammar, Maqala fl sifat ar-ragul al-failasuf hrsg.u.ubcrs. ideal antique du philosophc dans la tradition arabe", in: Lychnos 1954-5 Lewin, (Uppsala 1955), S.267-284; vgl. dax.u Joel L. Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam (I^iden 1986) S.128. v.
64
B.
"L
-
-
-
Arab. Text ed. Ahmad Amin, Hayy Ibn Yaq^an li-bn Sina wa-bn Tufail wa-s-Suhrawardi (Kairo 1966) S.4CM9/Ubers. mit Kommentar in A.M. Goichon, Le recit de Hayy Ibn den Art. "Hayy B. Yakzan" in: Encyclopaedia of Yaqzan, Paris 1959. Vgl.
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam
241
symbolische Bcschreibungcn dcr Wegc der Scclc wcg von den Fesseln des Korpers, von dcr Dunkelheit der Materie und hin zum
bcides
himmlischen Licht des reinen
Intellekts, zur
Einswerdung mil Gott.
Ibn Smas mystische Orientierung des Philosophiebegriffes im Sinne eines intellektuellen Aufstieges zu hoheren Formen der Erkenntnis hat durchgesetzt und hat erst ein Jahrhundert spater, bei
sofort
nicht
sich
Ibn Bag^a ein Echo gcfunden. In der Zwischenzeit hat Ibn Smas Philo sophic einen Bewunderer, aber auch Kritiker in Abu Hamid al-Gazzall gefunden. Gazzali reduziert die Bedeutung der Philosophic auf
(gest. 1111)
Funktion
ihre
ancilla
als
weist
philosophorum)
(Destructio
in
theologiae; 66
er
seinem auf
Tah afut
al-falasifa
Unstimmigkeiten
der
Philosophen und auf Aussagcn, die im Widerspruch zu Theologen seiner Zeit, den As^ariten stehen; zu nennen ist hier vor allem der Widerspruch der Philosophen zur Lehre von Gottes ewigem Willen und schopferischem, in
der
Handeln. Gazzali lehnt die philosophischen 67 von Gottes Kenntnis der Vorewigkeit der Welt,
stattfindenden
Zeit
Theorien von
der
Einzeldinge in universeller Weise und von der individuellen Unsterblichkeit der Seele mit AusschluB des Leibes ab. Doch die Logik bleibt unein-
Instrument
geschrankt
der Erkenntnis
wissenschaft. Diese hat ihn
benutzt
um
er,
kritisieren.
68
inspiriertes fiihrte nicht
die
Gazzalfs
am
auch
fiir
Theologie und Recht-
meisten an Ibn Sina fasziniert und diese
und
zu
Philosophen,
namlich
as^aritisches
und von seinem Lehrer GuwainI69
Ibn
Sina
Farabi,
Konzept von Gottes allmachtigem Wissen, Willen und Handeln nur zur Leugnung der philosophischen Vorstellung, daB alles,
Ursache haben miisse; Gott habe die Dinge zunachst nebeneinander erschaffen und bestimme mit seinem Willen und
was verursacht
Islam
III
ist,
eine
(Leiden-London 1971)
u.
dort gegebene Literaturverweise.
Arab. T. mit Studie in: Fathallah Hulaif, Ibn Sina wa-madhabuhli fl n-nafs (Beirut 1974) S.129-131; franz. Ubers. H. Jahier, A. Noureddine, Anthologie de textes poetiques attribute
aAvicenne (Alger 1961)
66 Hrsg.
v.
S.30-36.
M. Bouyges, Beyrouth
1927.
Das Buch war dem
Mittelalter bekannt, auch in
lateinischen Ubersetzungen der Widerlegung des Averroes seit dem 14. Jh.; vgl. Beatrice H. Zedler (Hrsg.), Averrois Destructio destructionum philosophiae Algazels in the Latin
Version
ofCalo Calonymos, Wisconsin
1961.
67
Vgl. dazu M. Marmura, The Conflict over the World s Pre-Eternity ofAl-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd (thesis Michigan 1959).
68
69
Vgl. im Einzelnen Vgl. dazu
Marmura (s.Anm.
W.M. Watt
in:
Der Islam
II
29) S.366ff.
(s.Anm. 29) S.404ff.
in
the
Tahafuts
242
Daiber
seiner Allmacht den
Zusammenhang zwischen
diesen.
70
Gazzali leugnete
damit auch Ibn Smas neuplatonische Emanationslehren, folgt ihm aber in der Einbeziehung der Mystik in den Gottesglauben: In seinem Werk iiber Die Wiederbelebung der Religionswissenschaften (Iljyh c urum ad-dln) 71 sucht
cine
er
zwischen
Synthese
der
Sufi-Tugenden
koranischer Ethik und aristotelischer Lehre von der Tugend
Gottesliebe,
Goldene
als
72
Philosophic wird mehr zum logischen Werkzeug fur die geistige Beschaftigung mil der Religion, fur die Theologie. In der Theologie finden Mitte.
-
Mu ctaziliten
wie bereits vorher bei den
-
seit
Gazzali
zunehmend auch
philosophische Lehren Eingang.
Im Gegenzug mehr Nachdruck zu
hat Gazzali versucht, den Partikularien der Religion
Das Streben nach Vollkommenheit am islamischen Gesetz und an den koranisch-islamischen
sich
verleihen.
einer
des
orientiert
Jenseits-
einzelnen
erwartungen mystisch gcpragten Frommigkeit Glaubigen. Die menschliche Gesellschaft, Farabis Musterstaat als Rahmen fur die Verwirklichung der Philosophic im tugendhaften Handeln dcs
Menschen
tritt
den
in
Hintergrund;
ebenso der erkenntnistheoretische
Aspekt der Philosophic, den Gazzali von Ibn Sina nicht uncingeschrankt
ubernommen und
vielfach auf den Einsatz der Logik als Mittel der 73 durch die philosophische Elite reduziert hat. Beweisfiihrung Erst der spanische Philosoph Ibn Bag^a (gest. 1139) hat Ibn SInas
Begriff
der
Philosophic
im
Sinnc
cincs
zu
mystischcn Aufstiegs
stets
hohcrcn Formcn der Erkcnntnis wciter ausgcbaut. Ziel ist die Bcfreiung der Scele von der Materie und ihre Einswerdung mit dem aktiven Intellekt,
eincr
Emanation Gottes, wodurch
sie zu einem zunehmend Form zusammengesetzten sinnlich Hierbei hat Ibn Bag^a das Schlagwort vom
abstrakten Begriff des aus Materie und
Wahrnehmbaren kommt. 74 Vgl. im Einzelncn
of Philosophy gcgebcne Hinwcise.
History
Hrsg. Vgl.
in
4
dazu
1972) S.lOSff.;
Bandcn
Marmura, 3,
in
1965,
"Gha/.ali
S.
183-204
and Demonstrative Science", in: Journal of the und Daiber, Mifammar (s.Anm. 10) S.284f.
Kairo 1862; seithcrsind mehrere Nachdrucke crschicnen.
O.E. Chahine,
L originalite
creatrice c
ferner Gazzalis Schrift Mizan al-
/Obers. Hikmat Hachem, Critirc de
I
action, Paris 1945.
Vgl. dazu Gazzalis Ilgam al- awamm min rasa il al-Imam al-tiazzali, Kairo 1964. ~
74
w
de la philosophic musulmane (Paris ed. Sulaiman Dunya, Kairo 1964
amal
c
ilm al-kalam
in:
al-Qusur
c
al-
c
awati min
ed. M. Fakhry, Opera metaphysica lttis,al al- aql bi-l-insan c (Beirut 1968) S.155ff.; -, Tadb ir al-mutawahhid ed. Ma n Ziyadeh, Beirut 1978; dazu le Tadblr alMongi Chemli, La philosophic morale d Ibn Bajja (Avempace) a
Vgl.
Ibn
Bagga, Risalat
tra\<ers
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam
243
Philosopher, gcnannt al-mutawahhid, cntwickclt. Er gibt hier Aussage cine neue Pointierung, worin Farabi eingesteht, daB ein
"cinsamcn"
cincr
Mcnsch odcr Philosoph /.uweilen untcr nichttugendhafter muB und wie Fremder in der Welt" ist. Ibn Bagga
tugcndhaftcr
Hcrrschaft lebcn
"ein
beschrankt sich nicht auf Farabis Pessimismus, wonach fur den tugendhaften Mensch, der keinen tugendhaften Staat findet, als
das
fmdct,
Denn
Leben".
muB
Menschen abkapseln.
-
sich
der
"einsame"
Tod
"der
besser
ist
Philosoph, der nicht seinesgleichen
wie ein Sufi von der Gemeinschaft, von den anderen
unter denen er wie
Obzwar
"Unkraut"
nawabii)
(pi.
ubereinstimmend mil Aristoteles
-
Natur ein politisches Lebewesen ist, Umstanden akzidentell etwas Gutes. 76
Der Philosoph
in
der
-
der
leben
muB
-
Mensch von
Abkapselung unter diesen
sei diese
Abgeschiedenheit
von
der
Welt sowie
in
mystischer Kontemplation und intellektuellem Aufstieg entpuppt sich bei
Rechtfertigung fur autonomen Alleingang der Philosophie farabianisch formuliert - die Partikularia dieser Welt zu benotigen.
Ibn Bag^a
ohne
-
als
Diese These vom Alleingang des Philosophen hat ein jiingerer Zeitgenosse von Ibn Bag^a, der spanische Philosoph Ibn Tufail (gest. 1185 oder 1186) zum Thema seines philosophischen Romans Hayy Ibn Yaqzan gemacht und dabei Farabi, Gazzali und Ibn Bag^a Tufail als Schiiler des Ibn
Sma.
78
kritisiert.
77
Hierbei erweist sich Ibn
Er ubernimmt dessen These von der
Gottesschau durch mystische Kontemplation und von der Einheit
aller
Ursache habe. 79 Gleichzeitig ubernimmt er die farabianisch-avicennianische These von Religion als Dinge, die eine erste notwendige gottliche
symbolisches,
alien
Menschen
verstandliches
Spiegelbild
philosophischer
Mutawahhid, Tunis 1969; Georges Zainaty, La morale d Avempace, Paris 1979 = Etudes musulmans 22; Joel L. Kraemer, Bajja y Maimonides sobre la perfeccion humana", in: / congreso international "Encuentro de las culturas" (3-7 octubre 1982), Toledo "Ibn
1983, S.237-245.
75
c
Vgl. Farabi, al-Fus ul al-muntaza a, ed. P.M. Naggar (Beirut 1971) S.95; -, Kit ab alMilla ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut 1968) S.56f./0bers. Marmura (sAnm. 29) S.354 oben; dazu
Endress (s.Anm. 13)
S.233ff.
lf\
Vgl. Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.375f.; G. des islamischen Mittelalters", Philosophie
Endress, in:
"Wissen
und Gesellschaft
in
der
Handbuch
pragmatischcn Denkens. Hrsg. v. Herbert Stachowiak. I (Hamburg 1986, S.219-245), S.236.; vgl. dazu Oliver Leaman, "Ibn Bajja on Society and Philosophy", in: Der Islam 57, 1980, S.109119, bes.HSf. Vgl.
Arabic 78
79
Marmura (s.Anm.
Discussions", in:
Arab
Pragmatik.
29) S.377f.; -, The Philosopher and Society: Some Medieval Studies Quarterly 1, Detroit 1979 (S.309-323), S.318ff.
Vgl. dazu auch Z.A. Siddiqi, Philosophy of Ibn Tufayl (Aligarh 1965) S.133ff.
Vgl. oben zu
Anm.
59.
244
Daiber
Wahrheit, nicht aber Farabis Einschatzung der Religion als Vcrwirklichung der Philosophic im tugendhaften Vcrhalten des Einzelnen im Musterstaat:
Die Religion von Absal, der um die verborgene Wahrheit der Offenbarung sich im Unterschied zu Salaman nicht auf die a uBere Form, den
weiB und
Buchstaben sowie die vorgeschriebenen Rituale beschrankt, widerspricht nicht der philosophischen Erkenntnis, die
Abgeschiedenheit
Hayy Ibn Yaqzan
erworben
auf der Insel
hatte.
80
Da
in
mystischer
Philosophic den
Nichtphilosophen nur durch die Symbolik der Religion ubermittelt werden kann, bleibt Hayy Ibn Yaqzan gczwungenermaBen der "einsame" Philosoph, wie er es von Anfang war; Absal leistet ihm Gesellschaft, weil ihm seine Kenntnis um die symbolische Bedeutung der Religion den Zugang zur philosophischen Wahrheit vermittelt hat. Hierbei erscheint bei Ibn Tufail dieselbe esotcrische Einstellung, die wir bei Ibn Sina gefunden hatten: die
Mehrheit der Leute
ist
nicht
der
in
Lage,
die
tieferc
Bedeutung der
Religion zu verstehen, sollte daher nicht mit den Lehren der Philosophen
werden und
konfrontiert
-
eincr
as^aritischen
Maxime
folgend
weiteres Fragen (bi-la kaifa) die religiosen Vorschriften einhalten.
-
ohne
81
Die Einschatzung der Philosophic als tiefcre Bedeutung der Religion ubernimmt Ibn Tufails jiingerer Freund Ibn Rus d (gcst. 1198). Er bietet in scincm Fasl al-maq al (Die entscheidende Abhandlungf 2 cine juristische Verteidigung der Philosophic. Die Philosophic sei nach dem Gcsetz Pflicht, das logische Argumcntieren und die Erforschung von Gottes Schopfung zum Zwcckc der Gottesschau sei vom Koran (z.B. Sure 59,2) bcfohlen. 83
Doch wie ist
der farabianisch-aviccnnianischen Auffassung des Ibn Tufail nicht jedcr zu philosophischcr Erkenntnis in der Lagc; Ibn Ru^d in
untcrscheidet die philosophische Elite, die zu logischen Schliissen fa hig -
80
er nennt sic nach Sure 3,7 Leutc,
Im Unterschied
hicr/.u
kommt
1
"die
cin griindlichcs
spater bei
Jh.
Ibn
Wissen
an-Nafis der
ist
84 habcn"
Theologus auto-
AuBcnwelt zu dem SchluB, daB der Mensch die Gesell schaft ferner cntdcckt er durch notig hat; eigenes Nachdenken seine religiosen Pflichten, die Notwendigkeit eines Propheten und die Zeichen des kommenden Untergangs der Welt; s. Max Mcyerhof, Joseph Schacht, The Theologus Autodidactus (ed. with an introduction, translation and notes. Oxford 1968) S.30f. dictatus durch Kontakte mit der
01
Vgl Ibn Tufail, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan ed. Leon Gauthier (Beirut 1936) S.153f./0bers. Lenn Evan Goodman, Ibn Tufayl s Hayy Ibn Yaqzan (New York 1972) S.164f. 8^ Hrsg.
v.
George
F.
Hourani, Ix;iden 1959; engl. Ubers.
Harmony of Religion and Philosophy (s.Anm. 83 Vgl.
84
Marmura (s.Anm.
Vgl. dazu
I
v.
7).
29) S.381f.
lourani (s.Anm. 7) S.52,
Anm.
74
u. S.54,
Anm.
87.
Hourani, Averroes on the
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam
245
von denen, die sich mil rhctorischen Uberredungen bcgniigcn miissen; cr fiigt abcr zwischen bciden Klassen die Schicht der Theologen (mutakal-
-
ein, die nicht iiber
limun)
das dialektische Argumentieren hinaus
nur
zufolge
und beruht
scheinbar
kommen.
und Religion ist Ibn Rusd daB schwierige Texte der
Jeglicher Konflikt zwischen Philosophic darauf,
Offenbarung wortlich und nicht metaphorisch ausgelegt sowie von Leuten interpretiert werden, die nicht zur Beweisfiihrung fahig sind. religiosen
Doch im Unterschied zu
86 er in dessen Kritik an den Philosophen zuriickweist, ist Irrtum in der Einschatzung
(jazzali, 1
seinem Tah afut at-tah afuf* der Offenbarung
noch nicht iiber
die
als
wortlich oder allegorisch zu interpretierende Texte
"Unglaube"
Ein Beispiel
(kufr).
wo
Auferstehung,
es
ist
unsicher
die religiose Uberlieferung
sei,
ob
hinsichtlich
sie
der
Unsterblichkeit der Seele wortlich oder philosophisch interpretiert werden
Ru^d nimmt
Ibn
musse;
sowohl
sie
und betrachtet
wortlich
Bestatigung fur die individuelle Unsterblichkeit der Seele.
auch
eine
Form
des
wobei
Aber
sie
als
er bietet
gegen Gazzali zur Leugnung der individuellen Unsterblichkeit kommt: Dies begriindet Ibn Ru^d mit seiner Theorie vom aktiven ewigen Intellekt. 88 Dieser ist die
Verbindung
philosophische
Hyle-Intellektes, -
seinerseits
der Hyle-Intellekt, c
um
d~ad\
Interpretation,
welcher
Form
ewige
-
er
der
vergleichbar
der Seele
ist.
Somit
und
Potentialitat
ist
besitzt
die
Form-Materie-
Form
die
der Seele,
Disposition
(isti-
unter Einwirkung des aktiven Intellekts die Intelligiblen durch
aufzunehmen und das erworbene Wissen mit dem
die Vorstellungskraft
aktiven Intellekt zu verbinden. Diese Verbindung
(ittis al,
itlihad)
ist
die
vollkommenste Form menschlicher Erkenntnis, die der spekulative Intellekt des Menschen in standiger Beschaftigung mit den Wissenschaften erlangen 85
Vgl. im Einzelnen
86 Vgl.
87 Hrsg.
London
v.
1969,
repr.
in
(=
29) S.382-4.
29) S.384ff.
M. Bouyges, Beyrouth
1482), ad^Datura
1981 oo
Marmura (s.Anm.
Marmura (s.Anm.
1978).
-
Ubers.
1930/cngl.
v.
Simon Van Den Bergh
Tahafut al-falasifa)
(I-II,
c
Ala addm at-Tusi (gest. zu vermitteln. Das Werk ist von Rida Sa ada
Zwischen beiden Werken sucht
Beirut neu herausgegeben worden.
Vgl. A.L. Ivry, "Averroes on Intellection and Conjunction", in: Journal of the Towards a Unified View of Averroes American Oriental Society 86, 1966, S.76-85; The Philosophical Forum IV/1 (new series), Fall 1972 (Boston, Mass. Philosophy", in: 1973), S.87-113.; Marmura (sAnm. 29) S.385ff.; Kalman P. Bland, The Epistle on the Ibn Rusnd with the Commentary Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by of Moses Narboni (New York 1982), Einl. S.lff. und Text; Ovey N. Mohammed, ,
Averroes Doctrine of Immortality, Waterloo, Ontario 1984.
Daiber
246
Als Folge dicser Verbindung dcr Seele mil der ewigcn
kann.
Seele.
gibt
dcs
und den verganglichen imaginarcn Formcn des Hyle-
aktiven Intellcktes Intcllcktcs
Form
es
fur
Avcrrocs kcine individuelle Unstcrblichkeit der
90
Bedeutsam
in
ist
in
dieser
Stellungnahme zur
epistemologischen
Unsterblichkeit die Beziehung zwischen sinnlichen, verganglichen Einzel-
wahrnehmungen und
abstrahierten
ewigen Allgemeinbegriffen, zwischen
und Sinneswahrnehmung. Ibn Rus d fiihrt Gedanken des Farabi und des Ibn Bag^a
Intellekt
Form
Intellekt
ist
das
Bindeglied
zwischen
der
hier
in
modifizierter 91
weiter;
absoluten
der
aktive
Einfachheit
Ewigkeit von Gottes Wissen und dcr Vielheit des erworbenen Wissens die sichtbare, vcrgangliche Welt. Seine
Verbindung mil
und
um
dem erworbenen
Aufgabe der Philosophcn, welche hiermit ohne Zuhilfenahme der gottlichen Offenbarung zu jeder Zeit und an jedem Ort Gliickseligkeit, Wissen
ist
namlich Unsterblichkeit erlangen konnen. 92 Hiermit hat Ibn Rus d die farabianisch-avicennianische Auffassung von der gottlichen Offenbarung durch den Propheten als etwas fiir die mcnschliche Erkenntnis Unentbehrliches cingeschrankt. Ferner hat er Ibn
Bag^as und Ibn Tufails mystische Lehre vom "cinsamen" Philosophen nicht iibernommen und kniipft stattdessen an Farabis Lehre von der Gliickseligkeit
des Menschen
in
der Gemeinschaft an.
Konjunktion dcs erworbenen Wissens mit
93
dem
In
seiner
These von der
aktiven Intellekt hat Ibn
Rus d jcdoch abgesehen von Farabis Parallelisierung von aristotclischcr Abhangigkeit dcs Dcnkcns von der Wahrnehmung mit philosophischer Theorie und Praxis, Einsicht und Ethik. Denn die Gemeinschaft ist eher Hindernis philosophischer Erkenntnis. 94 Indessen weisen auch bei Ibn Ru^d die Partikularien auf Universalien,
auf allgemeine Begriffe, die durch die theoretische Fahigkcit des
Menschen
abstrahiert
werden konnen. Hier erscheint Farabis These von
Vgl. Cbcrs. Bland (s.vor.Anm.) S.36; 69 (wo Ibn Rusd sich damit ausdriicklich gcgen die Sufis wendet); 103ff.; Mahmoud Kassem, Theorie de la connaissance d apres Averroes et son interpretation chez Thomas d Aquin (Alger 1978) S.235ff. Vgl. zu weiteren S.386-388.
91
92 93
94
Argumcntcn gcgcn
Vgl. Bland (s.Anm. 88) S.4ff. Vgl. Bland (s.Anm. 88) S.6f. Vgl. Ubers. Bland (s.Anm. 88) S.108f.
Vgl. Bland
I.e.
dicse I^ehre des Gaz/ali
Marmura (s.Anm.
29)
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam dcr Religion
als Spicgclbild
247
und Instrument der Philosophie
durch
erset/.t
These vom philosophischen Wissen des Menschen um die Manifestation gottlichen Wisscns durch die Verbindung seiner Seele mil die kompliziertere
der ewigen
Form
des aktiven Intellektes und mit der verganglichen
Form
mehr der Philosoph, Prophet und Regent des nicht mehr der mystische und einsame Wahrheits-
des Hyle-Intellektes; nicht
Musterstaates (Farabl),
sucher (Ibn SIna, Ibn Bag^a, Ibn Tufail), sondern diese dem gesamten Menschengeschlecht zur Aufgabe gesetzte Verbindung fiihrt zur Gliick95
zur
ist
Philosophie
seligkeit.
Form
hochsten
universaler
mensch-
Kenntnis religioser Wahrheit geworden. Wie bei Farabl, Ibn Sina, Bag^a und Ibn Tufail ist sie nicht fur jeden begreiflich. Selbst
licher
Ibn
Philosophen konnen sich hierbei irren, da auch die theoretische Fahigkeit Menschen auf Bilder angewiesen ist. Somit muB es zuweilen unklar
der
bleiben,
ob ein Gedanke allegorisch auszulegen ist oder nicht. Auffassung formt den Endpunkt einer Entwicklung, die
Averroes
einen ersten Hohepunkt in Farabl erreicht hatte. Dieser hat mit seiner
Harmonisierung von Philosopie und Religion den Philosophiebegriff dcr nachfolgenden Zeit entscheidcnd gepragt. Philosophie wird zum autonomen Wissenszweig, dessen Inhalt sich sowohl an den griechischen Philosophen
von Platon und Aristoteles bis Proclus, religioser
Uberliefcrung
theoretischen
orientiert
Methoden zunehmend
als
und
auch
am
Koran und
Islam, an
Ideen
dessen
wie
erkenntnis-
die einzelnen Wissenschaften in ihren 96
formalen und inhaltlichen Pragungen und abgrenzenden Einteilungen, auch die islamische Theologie 97 gepragt haben. Wahrend ihres Duells mit
Vgl.
hier
Shlomo
une
Averrocs;
Pines, "La philosophic dans a al-Farabi?" In: Multiple
1
reponse
economie du genre humain scion Averrocs
1978)
(Paris
S.
189-207;
Endress (s.Anm. 76) S.239f. 96
Muslim Philosophers Classifications of the Sciences: alVgl. Ahmad A. al-Rahc, al-Farabi, al-Ghazali, Ibn Khaldun. Thesis Harvard (Cambridge, Mass.) 1984; G.
Kindl,
Endress (s.Anm. 76)
Genannt seien
S.219ff., bes. 223ff.
hier Ibn
Tumart
(gest.
at-TusI (13. Jh.), Ibn Tairmya (13./14. Jh.)
Georges Vajda, "Kanz
al-
c
ulum"
"Une
de
synthese
Muhammad
391/1001), as-Sahrastani (12. Jh.), Nasiraddin und Ibn Abl gumhiir al-Ahsa (15. Jh.): s. i
pcu connue de H.
C
A1I Ibn
la
revelation
Tumart
et
de
Le Melanges Louis
la
philosophic:
in: al-Andalusi", v y,
- W. Madelung, "As-Sahrastanis Strcitschrift gegcn Massignon 3, Damas 1957, S.359-374. Avicenna und ihre Widerlegung durch Naslraddln at-TusI", in: Akten des J.Kongrcsses fur Arabistik und Islamwissenschaft (= Abhandlungen der Akademie der v Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, philol.hist. KI., 3.F. Nr.98), Gottingen 1976, S.250-259; S ahrastanls Muc c sara at al-falasifa und Tusis Masarf al-mus.arf sind von Mahmud al-Mar asi u. Hasan c al-Mu izz! 1405/1984 in Qumm hcrausgegcben worden. - abih Ahmad Kamali, Types of
Islamic Thought (Aligarh 1963) S.53ff. (zu Ibn Taimiya); Thomas Michel, Critique of Falsafa", in: Hamdard Islamicus 6/1, Karachi 1983, S.3-14.
"Ibn
-
Taymiyya
s
W. Madelung,
Daibcr
248
Offcnbarung, das auf cine wechselhafte Gcschichte lebhaftcr, 98 hat sich zuriickblicken Diskussioncn kann, politisierter
religioser
tcilweise
Philosophic ebcnso profiliert wic die iibrigen Wissenschaften und das religiose Denken und Handeln des Islam. Sie hat das damalige islamische
BewuBtsein so sehr gepragt, daB der beriihmte islamische Historiker Ibn Zusammenschau von islamischer
Haldiin (gest. 1406) cine nicht unkritische Gesellschaft, religios-politischem Geset/
von
des
Einfliisse
Weltbildes
verrat"
Farabi
und Philosophic bieten kann, die
Averroes
bis
und nach Averroes
entwickelten philosophischen Vorbild die universalhistorische
100 Philosophie fur die Bcdeutung der auf richtige Weise gepflegten Menschheit unterstreicht. Seine Geschichtsdarstellung und seine philo-
Gegebenheiten und Erfordernissen gcpragte Schau der Geschichte hat er nicht nur fur cine Minderheit von 101 auch hier greift Ibn Haldun Gebildeten geschrieben, sondern fur alle; sophische, von
Einsichten in
so/.iale
auf Vorbilder der Vergangenheit zuriick.
Vrije Universiteit,
"Ibn
Abl
gumhur
Amsterdam
al-AhsaYs
Synthesis
of
kalam,
philosophy
and
Sufism",
in:
La
du bos moycn age dans I histoire et la culture du monde musulman. Actes du 8me congres de I Union Europeennc des Arabisants et Islamisants. Aix-en-Provence
signification
septembre
London 98
Muhsin
,
Religious
Schools
and
Sects
in
Medie\ al
Islam.
1971)
Khaldun",
in:
Theorie.
Jaldun
s
Ibn
Khaldun
s Philosophy of History (Ixmdon 1957; der islamischen politischen Philosophie bei Ibn Wissenschaftliche Politik. Eine Einfuhrung in Crundfragen ihrer Tradition Hrsg. v. Dieter Oberndorfcr. Frciburg/Br. 1%2, S.117-151; B.J. Rosenthal,
hierzu
Vgl.
^Chicago
"Ibn
(auch:
Vgl. Endress (s.Anm. 76) S.233f.
99
und
S.147-156
1976,
1985).
S.84ff.;
Attitude
Mahdi,
,
to
"Die
the
Kritik
Falasifa",
in:
-,
Studio
Semitica
II,
Cambridge
1971,
S.I 15-126.
100
Vgl. al-Rabe (s.Anm. 96) S.171C.; 187ff.
101
(s.Anm. 99) S.113ff.; Ferial Ghazoul, The Metaphors of Historio study of Ibn Khaldun s Historical Imagination", in: In Quest of an Islamic Humanism. Arabic and Islamic Studies in Memory of Mohammed al-Nowaihi. Cairo 1984, Vgl.
graphy:
S.48-61.
a
Mahdi
249
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam
ABSTRACT: The Autonomy of Philosophy in
Islam
The paper gives a survey of the concepts of philosophy hold by Islamic _philosophcrs Ibn Sma, al-Gazzali, Ibn Bagga, (Kindi, Abu Bakr ar-Razi, Abu Hatim ar-Raz[, FarabF, Ibn Tufail, Ibn Rusd, Ibn Haldiin). The dominant concept of philosophy as an to the knowledge of God started from epistemological instrument and as a way like the idea of a transcendent God, the emphasis of the Koranic-Islamic assumptions
first rational methods of arguing and thinking about_ God c and world as developed by the Mu tazilites of the 8th/9th century. For Kind! who followed Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas, philosophy is Jcnowledge of the divine cause and does not contradict religion and its revelation. Abu Bakr ar-Razi took over Kindi s conception of the autonomy of philosophy and even denied the necessity of criticized all by his revelation; people are able to philosophy. This was sharply
search after knowledge and
in a modified contemporary, the Ismaili scholar Abu Hatim ar-Razi whose ideas reappear Farabi: he declared manner in his younger contemporary, the famous philosopher of philosophy which is realized in an ethical religion as "imitation", as a "picture" each other as the of in the state; religion and philosophy need manner, perfect religion the regent of the state, the philosopher must be a prophet whose imperfect intellect intellects agens. Farabi paralleled this correlation gets its divine inspirations from the
between religion and philosophy with the Aristotelian correlation of praxis and theory and with Aristotle s thesis of the correlation between thought and sense-perception.
who
modified
Farabl s unique conception of philosophy influenced later philosophers which the According to Ibn Sma religion is solely a language of symbols and pictures and which not in every case can be "active the from received angels" prophet transmitted to the people. Ibn Sma classified the prophet as a mystic who wants_ to it.
reorientation is taken over in Gazzali s guide people to the mystic pad. This mystical the Aristotelian conception of ethics and synthesis between Sufi virtues, Koranic virtues as golden mean; philosophy is reduced mainly to a logic tool for argumentation state as a frame in favour of religion. - The neglect of the community^he perfect is continued in Ibn Bagga s concept of philosophy as for the realization of
philosophy
the soul to higher forms of cognition. His concept of the Tufail s philosophical novel Hayy Ibn philosopher played a central role in Ibn of religion as Yaqzan, where we can detect the Farabian-Avicennian conception truth which can be understood by nonsymbolical mirror image of philosophical This estimation of philosophy as deeper meaning of religion is taken philosophers. over in a specific manner by a younger friend of Ibn Tufail, the famous philosopher
ascension
mystical
of
"solitary"
to him every conflict between philosophy and religion is jurist Ibn Rusd; according caused by wrong interpretation of revelation. The philosopher must take care for more and more intensive connection between the divine active intellect and acquired exclusive task of a Farabian prophetknowledge. This conjunction is no more an of a solitary mystic as suggested by Ibn in the perfect state, philosopher and leader the Sma, Ibn Bagga and Ibn Tufail; on the contrary, it is an obligation of every man, whole mankind. Philosophy is the highest form of universal human knowledge about turns out to be the end of a development which religious truth. Ibn Rusd s conception with Farabi. - Philosophy had become an autonomous had reached its first
and
highlight
branch of science; it continues Greek philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, his commentators, Plotin and Proclus and keeps to Islamic religious traditions of Koran and Sunna. With branches its contents and epistemological methods it has shaped more and more single of sciences, including Islamic theology. The duel between philosophy and religious revelation has shaped Islamic philosophy and sciences as well as religious thought and acting.
Islamic
Therefore the famous historian Ibn Haldiin could present a critical synopsis of law and philosophy, in this he stressed by religious-political society, the model of Ibn Rusd - the universal importance of correctly understood
following
his description of discovery of permanent social philosophy to mankind. His history and factors and demands in history addresses all people and not only an educated minority. Here too Ibn Haldun appears to be inspired by Islamic philosophers.
COLETTE SIRAT
La philosophic les
Tout 1
long de
le
etude
de
I
histoirc
dc
Revelation
la
et la science scion
philosopher juifs du
la
ont
Moycn-Agc
philosophic juive, etc
appliquees
etude dcs sciences
1
a
resoudre
les
et
memes
problemes, a tenter de repondre aux memes questions, a expliquer Dieu et le monde. II n y a pas cu de partage entre les domaines auxquels seule la foi ou seule la raison pouvaient prctendre.
philosophic et II
1
done
celle
La
difference entre la
de definition, de methode de pensce.
eu
a
y
la foi est
quelques penseurs opposes a la philosophic ct a des sciences. Ainsi Salmon ben Yeruhim apprentissage (karaite, Palestine,
vers 910-970) affirme:
d autres [livres que les livres Pignorance [et s encombrer de] ce qui "Desirer
revcles]
ne
sagcsse...Celui qui porte interet a la sagcsse etrangers, devient un disciple des incroyants...
Ces deux themes eloignent d elle
-
-
les sciences
des
sont extcrieures a
seront rcpris et amplifies durant
c est
renferme
acquerir point la
"autres",
des
la religion et elles
querellc au sujet des etudes philosophiques, en France du en Sud, Espagne et en Italic durant le Xllleme siecle. la
Les premiers penseurs rationalistcs, partisans du Kalam, ont affirme cepcndant quc la raison est une manifestation de Dicu, ainsi Qirqisani et Yefet ben Eli parmi les Karaites, Saadia Gaon, parmi les Rabbanites (tous trois du Xeme siecle, Orient). Scion eux, la recherche et le raisonncment font partie de homme en tant qu il se distingue des animaux. Comme 1
eux,
qu
il
elle
a,
ccrtes,
est
une
unc ame vivante, mais
ame
la
sienne est diffcrente en ce
c est-a-dire
rationnclle grace a sa "parlante", son discernement comprehension qui incluent le langage. De plus, il y a une homogencitc du savoir qui, en elle-meme, est preuve de sa neccssite: prenons une connaissance acquise par 1 investigation rationnelle; elle est et
prouvee par une autre connaissance acquise egalement par
G. Vajda: Deux commentaires karaites sur I Ecclesiaste, Leyde, 1971,
p. 82.
1
investigation
La philosophic
et la
prouvec par la connaissancc base dc tout raisonncmcnt logiquc.
mais ccttc dcrniere
rationncllc,
qui se trouvc ainsi ctrc la
L amc
25 1
science scion les philosopher juifs
intuitive
cst
humainc, par sa disposition naturcllc,
tcllc
qu
cllc a etc
crece
et a le par Dieu, pense et comprend les definitions vraies des choses imagc et la ressemblance de Dieu", c est pouvoir de faire un choix. "L
cette capacite de discerner
evenements passes
le
et futurs;
bon du mauvais, de choisir, de percevoir les les animaux se contentent d acquerir ce qui
est necessaire a la survivance physique.
preuve a un processus et psychologique qui existe de toutes facons, car le besoin de connaitre on le n heureux et nul est hommes les tous dans de chercher existe lorsqu
La
traite
rationnelle
speculation
apporte
une
d ignorant.
La raison
est ce qui distingue
connaitre est naturel a
A
homogene.
la
nos
la religion?
multiple puisque
Seule
1
question: trois
rhomme
des animaux
homme. La science la
est
aussi,
chretiens,
la
musulmans ont chacun
s
besoin de
un corpus
deja,
speculation rationnelle doit-elle
auteurs repondent decidement oui:
juifs,
et le
appliquer a
revelation est
leur revelation.
raison permet de decider de Pauthenticite d une revelation.
la
II
done que le processus intellectuel, rationnel, precede justifie elle soil. Or, meme dans la Bible, d une quelle qu prophetic acceptation nous voyons qu il y cut des faux prophetes. Plus encore, avant mcme d accepter la prophetic, il faut etre convaincu qu un Dieu, bon et sage, et
faut 1
est
a
1
origine de cctte prophetic;
prouver, par
A
les
la raison,
1
il
convient done en premier lieu de
existence de Dieu.
seconde question: pourquoi la revelation ctait-clle necessaire? reponses different mais sont basees sur 1 utilite et la necessite la
politique.
Chez d appeler
les philosophies juifs les
neo-platoniciens,
philosophes grecs mais dire
ete
-
la
philosophie
brulant;
il
leur
le
ct la
la
definition
de
qu on a coutume
siccle la
raison
probleme des rapports entrc science
-
et la revelation
n y
la
est
celle
des
raison c est-a-
nc semble pas avoir
ni difference ni qu deux. Citons ici un texte de Joseph b. Jacob Ibn
scmblait
incompatibilite entre les
du Xeme-XIIeme
evident
il
avail
Tsaddiq (Espagne, vers 1110-1150): avons dit que le chemin de la connaissance du Tout est la "Nous car en connaissant son connaissance par 1 homme de son ame, connaissant son ame, il et en monde il le connait corporel corps,
homme attemt la le monde spirituel; par cette connaissance, connaissance de son Createur comme il est dit dans Job XIX, 26: a Dieu. Ne t imagines pas que cette partir de ma chair, je verrai connait
1
252
Sirat
connaissance puisse s accomplir sans etude ni recherche; Pabsurdite de cette idee est evidente puisque ce n est pas en vain que Dieu a donne a 1 homme Pintellect et la faculte de raisonnement mais justement pour cette raison; ensuite le Createur, beni soit-il, n est pas objet de sensation ni de comprehension (immediate) et Phomme ne peut le connaitre que par Pintellect apres des etudes et des recherches comme il est dit a propos d Abraham notre pere: qu ij chercha et pensa et reflechit et, lorsqu il cut compris, le Saint beni soit-il se revela a lui. Nous voyons bien que cette connaissance de Dieu attribuee a Abraham est consideree dans la Bible comme le plus eminent et le plus important de tous les dons que Dieu donnera a n auront plus a instruire chacun son prochain, chacun son Israel: frere en disant: Connaissez le seigneur car tous me connaitront, du plus petit au plus grand" (Jer. XXXI, 34) et la raison de cette connaissance est la prophetic selon le verset: Et alors, je repandrai mon esprit sur toute chair; vos fils et vos lilies prophetiseront" (Joel III, 1) et a ce sujet, les philosophes ont dit que ne peuvent servir la Cause des Causes qu un hornme prophete par nature dans sa generation ou un philosophe reconnu". "ils
Cette
identification
problemes, car
la
entre
prophetic
et
philosophic
nombre de
philosophic inclut
sciences qu
pose
des
est
bien
il
d attribucr au peuple juif recevant la Tora sur le Mont Sinai Ibn Tsaddiq resout la question en affirmant que lors du don de la Tora, difficile
;
Dieu a donne
prophetic a tout
la
le
peuple, car telle ctait sa volonte;
mais comme, actuellement, nul ne peut atteindre dire
la
prophetic,
si
ce
doivent gravir les degres de
Pour
les partisans
n est
par
du kalam
Xlleme suite
siecle)
meme
de
Pintermediaire
la
science,
tous
la science.
peut pas y avoir de conflit entre
deux rameaux d une
philosophic, c est-a-
la
comme la
philosophic
branche. Avcc
nous cntrons dans
la
pour
les neo-platoniciens, et
Abraham
la
il
ne
revelation: ce sont
Daoud (Espagne,
Ibn
periode aristotelicienne. Et tout de
on ressent Popposition entre philosophic et religion: Tora et la philosophic sont en contradiction flagrante lorsqu il s agit de decrire Pessence divine: pour les philosophes, Dieu, incorpprel, n est aucunement susceptible de changement; la Tora, au contraire, relate les deplaccments de Dieu, ses sentiments... Etant donne que la philosophic et la Tora sont a ce sujet en contradiction, nous sommes dans la situation d un homme ayant deux maitres, dont Pun est grand et Pautre n est pas petit; au premier il ne peut complaire qu en transgressant Popmion du second, en consequence, si nous trouvons un moyen de les mettre d accord, nous nous en "La
trouverons fort heureux.
Abraham Ibn Daoud
apportera dans son
livre
textes religicux et les preuves de la philosophic vraie. 2 5
Ha-Olam haqatan,
Emuna Rama,
ed. S. Horovitz, Breslau, 1903, p. 21.
ed. S. Weil, Francforts/Main, 1852, p. 82.
temoignagc des Ces preuves, que
le
La philosophic
s
enchainent
dcs
sont
ellcs
sont-elles?
aux
unes
les
253
science selon les philosophes juifs
ct la
et
premisses ainsi
autres,
il
raisonnements
des
d abord
faut
qui les
exposer
nous ameneront premisses de la physique et de la mctaphysique lesquelles necessairement a la connaissance des attributs divins et de ses actions, mais la verite de cette connaissance des attributs divins ne sera assuree
que son
si
Ton prouve d abord son existence ne
unite. ..celle-ci
d abord
preuve de
la
et
que Ton apporte
veritablement
sera
1
que
prouvee
existence des substances simples
preuve de
la
la
si
precede
etc...
la philosophic est un corpus de raisonnements qui uns aux autres et forment un tout englobant 1 ensemble couronne par la connaissance des attributs divins. Les
Pour Ibn Daoud, s
enchainent
les
des sciences et
des
temoignages
textes
viendront
religieux
ensuite
les
fortifier
conclusions.
Pour Maimonide: du
intellect
capable de distinguer le vrai perfection humaine et le but de son
humain,
de
est le stade ultime
il
faux;
1
la
est
existence.
Dans son genres de
introduction
comme
"parole"
Maimonide
logique,
definit
un des
1
trois
etant:
on 1 appelle Tintelligible lui-meme que 1 homme a deja intellige. aussi parole interieure...L art de la logique qu a fonde Aristote et qu il a complete en huit livres, montre a la faculte de raison les chemins intelligibles, c est-a-dire de la parole intericure; c est lui la voie juste et la fait qui la preserve de 1 erreur, lui montre les domaines ou la faculte humaine dans tous la verite a parvenir peut atteindre la verite. La philosophic theorique, qui se compose la des sciences physique et metaphysique a pour but
mathematiques, connaissance dps choses depourvues de matiere et elle recherche la verite. La logique, pour les philosophes, ne fait pas partie des outil des sciences et Ton ne peut ni enseigner ni sciences elle est si ce n est par Part de la logique: apprendre de maniere ordonnee 4 elle est 1 outil de toute chose et ne vient d aucune chose." 1
Ainsi,
la
boucle est bouclee
sciences et de la verite, la
du bien
et
Le
du mal
texte
et
non
et
celui
du
intellect,
la
des
est celui
vrai.
pas a premiere vue, c est que vulgaire. Le philosophe saura deceler
Mais
1
revele doit confirmer les conclusions vraics et
fait
exterieur.
dans ce tableau de
religion n intervient pas: son domaine
le
niveau exoterique
la verite
sous
science n a pas reponse a toutes
le
les
est
s
il
ne
le
destine au
manteau du langage questions ainsi elle
ne donne pas de reponse assuree quant a Peternite du monde ou a sa
4
Millot hahygayon, ed. L.
Roth
ct
D.H. Bancth, Jerusalem, 1965, chap. XIV,
p.
101 sqq.
254
Sirat
nouveautc. vicndrait
Si
clle
le
tcxtc
le
faisait,
convenablcmcnt expliquc,
biblique,
confirmcr.
le
Dans
Icurs grands traits,
Maimonidc concordcnt: c est-a-dire
-
science
la
attitudc d
1
Abraham
tradition
la
Ibn
Daoud
recherchee par
la verite doit etre
rcligicusc se
la
ct ccllc
dc
philosophic
-
pliera a la verite ainsi
obtenue.
Parmi
les
de
successeurs
Maimonidc,
Ics
caracteristiques
de
la
science se dessinent quelquefois avec plus de details:
D Italic
abord che/ Juda
Salomon ha-Cohen, espagnol
b.
a la cour dc Frederic
II
ct,
qui se rendit en
en 1245 traduisit lui-meme en hcbreu
en arabc:
expose sur la science". Les deux parties scientifiques: mathcmatique-astronomie et physique sont encadrees par des developpements relevant de la "science divine": 1
encyclopedic qu
il
avait redigee
chacunc des sciences le
monde
comme
des spheres,
appliquc a un le
leur
different
non-corporel
s
ct les
monde
divin.
d etude:
objet
"L
monde
different: le
monde
d ici-bas,
Les methodes des sciences different la
science
deux autres sciences decoulent d
divine,
seule,
attcint
le
elle:
auteur, Juda ha-Cohen b. Salomon ha-Cohen de Tolede dit: lorsque tu refiechis et occupes ta pensee de ces sciences afin d acquerir la connaissance de tout cc qui existe du debut a la fin, tu verras a la fin que tu nc connaitras que fort pcu de choses en ce qui concerne les deux mondes perc,us nar les sens: le monde des "L
de
et de la corruption. Quant au connaissais par cocur les trei/e livres d Aristote sur la science divine, tu n en tirerais pas plus que la connaissance du premier moteur, rqchcr, un vivant, qui n est ni corps, ni force dans un corps et qu il y a pour chaque sphere un intellect scpare, c est tout ce que tu apprendrais a propos de cc monde (spirituel) si tu occupes ta pensee de ces traites...Les se sont efforces a connaitre ces trois mondes, par philosophies { seulement. est science d unc (conjecture) laquelle opinion connaissance qui s enracine dans la sensation comme Aristote 1 a et
spheres
monde
celui
spirituel
mentionne
la
generation
meme
dans
"la
si
tu
demonstration"
\Analytiques]
et
Tame"
[Dc
Anirna]. Aussi, ce serait vraimcnt miraculeux de pouvoir, a nartir de la sensation, connaitre, comprendre et atteindre quelquc chose qui n est aucunement sensible; aussi, ce peu que (les philosophes) ont atteint, bien que ce soit comme unc goutte d eau dans la mer, n est a atteint par une opinion de l intellect dont n est aucunement sensible comme oeil humain n a vu Dieu" (Is. LXIV, 3) car nous ne
celui
qui pas peu pour la base est la sensation. il
est dit:
"Aucun
1
Or (Dieu)
que les corps. Puisqu il en est ainsi et que nous nc pouvons user de opimon, comment atteindrons-nous les details de percevons
1
cette science qui est la base, la cause et le debut des sciences des deux mondes (inferieurs)? Ne conyient-il pas de dire a propos de celui qui ne s est occupe que des sciences de ces deux mondes: "vous
ne trouverai pas un sage parmi que la sagesse "sagesse" certaine, celle qui est "spirituelle" et celui qui la connait est appele sage comme le dit Aristote dans le Livre III de la Metaphysique\ en tous,
vous"
venez done de nouveau (Job XVII, 10) car n
et je
est
appelee
La philosophic
et la
255
science selon les philosophes juifs
le mondc (spirituel) precede les autres par toutes sortes de precedences et celui qui connait cette sagesse n a pas besoin de fatiguer son esprit des deux sciences infeneures, car il les connait immediatement avec facilite, mais celui qui ne connait que ces deux sciences a encore besoin de connaitre la sagesse. Etant donne que nous ne pouvons atteindre cette sagesse par le seul raisonnement, nous avons besoin de la recevoir {le-qabbeia\ oralement, d homme a homme, a partir de la Puissance divine [Dieu].
cffct,
De meme
different entre elles les
deux sciences
inferieures:
genres de demonstration apportcs en physique sont le contraire de celles qu apportent les sciences matnematiques: dans ces anterieur au posterieur tandis qu en physique, dernieres, on ya de on va du posterieur a anterieur, et comme les choses connues par les sciences mathematiqucs le sont generalement par les sciences physiques, les demonstrations des sciences mathematiques sont absolues, tandis que celles de la physique ne sont pas completement connues, absolument et en soi, aussi les demonstrations qui sont faites dans cette science physique sont-elles appelees preuves. "Les
1
1
Cette comparaison entre les preuves apportees par la physique et les demonstrations apportees par les mathematiques commente le tout debut du Livre I de la Physique ou Aristote decrit le processus d analyse dans les
sciences de la nature sans reference aux mathematiques.
On
trouve
cette comparaison dans VEpitome d Averroes et, de maniere plus explicite et elaboree, dans le Commentaire moyen, source du Midrash ha-Hokhma.
Et
ici
Juda ajoute:
plus, toutes les choses dont on dit qu elles sont expliquees dans cette science (physique) ne le sont pas convenablement, meme "Bien
Sirat: Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen philosophe, astronome premiere moitie du XHIeme siecle, dans Italia, II, 1977, pp. 39-61.
traduit dans C.
Kabbaliste de
En
la
d autres
mots:
furniture
The In
propositions
and
observation
epistemological principle, they shoes and sealing wax, etc. To say as much is not in any the material world is full of wonderful and inspiring things. empirical
only:
statements
have
way
all
of to
et
peut-etre
science
have
do with
ships, to diminish science, for
Some
are
commonplace and
but among them perhaps raindrops, pebbles and water fleas ordinary, to be sure others are awe-inspiring or in the literal sense tremendous: the multitudinous seas round Cape Horn, where the Atlantic and Pacific oceans fight it out to see which is
the greatest; and the great dome of heaven, as we may become aware of it on a high plateau, for nowhere else does the world seem so large. All are part of the empirical mise -en-scene of the world. The law of Conservation of Information makes it clear that from observation statements or descriptive laws having only empirical furniture there is
no process of reasoning by which we may derive theorems having to do with first and last things; it is no more easily possible to derive such theorems from the hypotheses and observation statements with which science begins than it is possible to deduce from the axioms and postulates of liuclid a theorem to do with how to cook an omelet or bake a cake - accomplishments that would at once unseat the I,aw of Conservation of Information. I do not believe that revelation is a source of information, though I and that Coleridge judged theology acknowledge that it is widely believed to be so Queen of the Pure Sciences for that very reason." P. Medawar: The Limits of Science, Oxford, 1986, pp. 81-82.
256
Sirat
par ces demonstrations appelces "preuves" mais quelques unes d entre elles seulement. II en resulte que Pinferiorite de la physique est due a trois defauts hierarchiquement disposes: (1) Les premisses ne sont pas toutes basees sur les evidences premieres. II n y a pas de demonstration parfaite comme dans les (2) demonstrations mathematiques, mais seulement des preuves. (3) Nombre de fails ne sont pas expliques, meme par des preuves." (ibidem).
En
conclut Juda,
faudrait pouvoir apporter en physique des preuves manifestes au sens, des demonstrations experimentales qu on ne fait,
il
comme
puisse mettre en doute,
sont les experiences dans les sciences
le
mathematiques et astronomiques. En absence de ces demonstrations, on nc pcut choisir entrc les theories physiques opposees, et les debats entre 1
physiciens ne sont que discussions oiseuses.
Shemtob
b.
Joseph Falqera (Provence, 1225-1295) considere que le la philosophic et celui de la religion coincident:
domaine de recherche de cepcndant,
ni la
Deux
science ni
voies
scientifique.
a
offrent
s
Celui
sur
n ont
la religion
qui
1
s
homme:
epanchc
la la
prerogative de voie
de
Pinflux
la verite:
prophetique Pintellect
et
la
et
qui
voie est
prophete atteindra la verite sans recherche, aux autres hommes s ouvre seulement la voie scientifique, celle que Maimonide a decrite dans Le
Guide des Egares;
elle
consiste a examiner, a scruter et a
comprendre
tout ce qui existe, dans ses details et dans son ensemble, car
il
n y a de
prcuve de Pcxistence de Dieu que par cette realite existant devant nos existence yeux; mais, pour tirer de cette realite sensible la prcuve de 1
d un autre ctre, nous devons nous
la
representer intcllectuellement selon
sa nature et sa forme, et cela ne peut se faire que par Petude des livres
par
rediges
les
philosophes non-juifs car,
si
les juifs
ont
compose des
ouvrages de philosophic, ceux-ci se sont perdus au cours de Pexil. Dans cette recherche de la science vraie, tout ce qui a etc dcmontre veritablement et qui concorde avec la foi religieuse doit etre
admis par
le savant,
quelque
soit la
source de
la
demonstration. Et citant
la science et de la Falqera philosophic: on ne doit preter attention qu a ce qui est dit et non point a
reaffirme
Aristote,
celui
qui
le
dit;
Penonce, quelle que
L
si,
meme
les
de
reste la verite quelle
que
soit
la
bouche qui
de celui qui Penonce. habitudes de pensee prises des Penfance jouent ici est des verites evidentes que Phomme tend a rejeter,
soit la religion
education, les
un role important: sans
verite
la
Puniversalisme
il
examiner, car elles
lui
paraissent etranges et inhabituelles;
a premiere vue, ces idees lui paraissent le contraire de la verite, c est
La philosophic
et la
257
science selon les philosophes juifs
de ce qu il a appris. Et Falqera cite Porphyre pour dcmandcr instamment a ses lecteurs d cxaminer avec soin et sans prejuges toute idee nouvelle; il ne faut ni 1 adopter, ni la rejeter parce qu elles sont
mais
precipitamment est
douteuse,
comme
Toutes celles
les
explications
elle
si
de
c est le cas
la
soin
est
et
vraie
patience,
en
partie
la realite sensible et
aux
en
et
partie
plupart des idees.
du monde qui ont ete enoncees ou toutes
que
les autres, celle qui
intelligibles tires
dans cette explication du
idee
cette
si
qui pourraient Petre doivent etre patiemment etudiees et
choisir celle qui est meilleure
si
avec
rechercher,
ou non,
vraie
nouvelle
contraire
le
monde
il
de cette
repond
le
realite; et cela,
demeure des choses
faut
il
mieux a
meme
cachees...
Pour Falqera, cependant, la verite est une. Pour Isaac Albalag, son contemporain, il se peut qu
elle soil
double:
etre philosophe pour saisir Pintention du meme qu meme seul un prophete est a meme de saisir de philosophe, [ intention du prophete. Ceci parce que les modes flitteralement: faut
il
"de
de Papprehension philosophique et de 1 apprehension meme contraires: le philosophe apprehende prophetique sont divers et [ intelligible au mqyen du sensible, alors que le prophete apprehende II n est pas douteux le sensible que [le contenu par Pintelligible. respectif de] leurs apprehensions ne soil aussi divers que leurs modes d apprehension, si bien que Pun peut apprehender, en partant d en bas, le contraire de ce qu apprehende Pautre en partant d en haut. II ne faut done pas mettre en contradiction Pun avec Pautre mais le sage doit croire le philosophe lorsque celui-ci apporte une demonstration et recevoir Penseignement du prophete par mode de foi simple. Meme si les paroles oe Pun contredisent celles de Pautre, aucun [des deux] ne doit ceder |a place a Pautre, car c est une de la foi scripturaire que, dementie par la qualite specifique demonstration, elle peut rester vraie. En effet, ce qui est impossible sur le plan de Pordre de la nature, devant la recherche "voies"!
syllogistique
Papprehension prophetique peut le saisir comme necessaire sur le plan de la toute-puissance du Maitre [de la nature]. C est pourquoi il existe beaucoup de choses impossibles devant la doctrine speculative qui sont possibles devant la doctrine scripturaire. II advient aussi que, a la Taveur de sa recherche, le philosophe apprehende quelque cnose qui n est saisi par le prophete qu a la faveur de ce qu il possede de speculation [rationnelle], non a la faveur de la prophetic. Cela non pas a cause ae Pimperfection de la prpphetie. mais parce que son mode d apprehension est superieur a ce [lui du philosophe]".
Les philosophes du ont generalement
Les croyances
des
suivi
textes
G. Vajda: Isaac Albalag,
1960, pp. 154-155.
siecle,
en Provence
comme
en Espagne,
Averroes (Resume des Parva Naturalia, ed. H.
philosophes,
juive au Moyen-Age selon des
8
XlVeme
introduction,
imprimes
et
averroiste juif,
traduit
dans
C.
Sirat:
La
philosophic
manuscrits, Paris, 1983, pp. 284-285. traducteur
et
annotateur
d Al-Ghazali,
Paris,
258
Sirat
Blumbcrg, p. 58-59) et affirmcnt que la science est acquise par un enchainement de raisonnements, de syllogismes; on ne peut sauter les etapes. Ainsi Nissim de Marseille (debut du XlVeme siecle) ecrit: n
pas possible que les connaissances et les apprehensions que a la capacite d acquerir par la speculation et la reflexion puissent parvenir a rhomme dans une vision ou dans un reve car si cela etait possible, la speculation syllogistique et prophetique la connaissance du raisonnement seraient superflues. "II
est
homme
1
Trois consequences a cette affirmation: 1) le role du prophete n est a la science mais a la prevision de 1 avenir et la faculte
lie
pas
spccifiqucment prophetique est
la
science, les prophetes peuvent se le
faculte
tromper
imaginative, 2) en matiere de
de
et,
fait,
prophete peut aussi etre philosophe, auquel cas
dans
deux
les
facultcs:
imaginative
et
il
se sont trompes, 3) atteint la perfection
intellectuelle;
ce
fut
le
cas
de
Moi se. Nous trouvons ces Moi se de Narbonne 10
idees chc/ Nissim Isaac
de Marseille, Joseph Caspi,
ct a ce propos ils de Baba cvoquent adage talmudique (Talmud Batra, 12 a): Babylone, sage est superieur au prophete". Isaac Pulgar fait ressortir un autre trait ,
Pulgar
et
Gersonide,
1
de
"le
la science:
difference entre le sage (le savant) et le prophete tient au [domainej apprehende comme a la route qui mene a la perfection [en ce domainej: le savant atteint les chpses cachces et il comprend comment il les apprehende en verite et totalement- en effet, intellect est comme une recherche et une reflexion afin de faire sortir le cote cache de ce qui est connu; il fait ressortir le terme moyen [du syllogisme] et en 1 exprimant, il joint la mineure a la majeure et les lie, de sorte qu il pose la question recherchee comme conclusion du syllogisme et ote tout oostacle. Seul le prophete apprehendera un sujet sans savoir comment cette connaissance lui est venue ct pourquoi c est a lui qu elle s est revelee. Si un contradicteur eleve des objections, il ne pourra pas lui repondre car il ne connait pas le chemin [qui mene a cette connaissance]. En cffet, la prophetie repose sur la faculte imaginative (ne vas pas t imaginer autre chose!) et non pas sur la faculte discursive (tu te tromperais grandcment!) et lorsqu il a besqin de se representcr il manque jau prophete] la voie qui mene de 1 un a quelque chose, autre. Aussi un sage a-t-il eu raison de dire: sage est superieur au prophete" c est la une objection absolue et une preuve evidente "La
1
1
"le
o
Ma ase Nissim, ms. hehrcu 720, fol. 36b, lere colonne, cite dans Ch. Touati: Le probleme de inerrance prophetique dans la theologie juive du Moyen-Age, dans Revue de I Histoire des Religions, n 174, 1968, p. 178. 1
Cf.
le
Commentaire
sur
Les
Bibliotheque nationale, ms. hebr. 956,
fol.
Intentions
181 recto.
des
philosophes,
d Algazel,
Paris,
La philosophic que sa
le
et la
prqphete nc pcut pas enscigner a autrui quoi quo cc
evenements
les
prevoil
essentiellement liee a
est
prophetic
Moi se
soit
dc
prophetic".
Gersonide (1288-1344) partage avcc ses contcmporains la
259
science selon les philosophes juifs
furent aussi des
1
opinion que
imaginative et qu elle
propheles et, en particulier, des savants; mais tous ne le furent pas.
futurs.
"sages",
faculte
la
Certes,
les
ne peut etre interdit a la recherche du monde. scientifique, le probleme se posait a propos de la creation en faveur de decisive aucune ne trouvant Maimonide, preuve scientifique au de s en remettre conseille avait du Peternite ou de la creation monde,
Pour Gersonide, aucun
texte
revele,
etait
lequel
sujet
en faveur de
creation
la
decision de Maimonide, est due a Pincapacite ou fournir des preuves scientifiques;
non pas a
du monde.
Cette
se trouvait alors de
il
Pimpossibilile essentielle de
fournir ces preuves. Or, Gersonide peut prouver que la creation du
monde
a pris place dans le temps, a partir d une matiere premiere depourvue de
forme laquelle se trouve a Petal primitif entre les spheres celestes. En faveur de cette creation temporelle, Gersonide evoque d abord ce desir
profond
comprendre
et
les
naturel
de
Phomme,
sujets importants et nobles
ce
besoin
comme
de
celui
savoir
de
la
et
de
creation,
ensuite des fails historiques: 1)
il
y a un progres des sciences
el
loutes ne sont pas au
meme
niveau de perfeclion: onl p9ur chaque science apporle leur Iribut mais de ces sciences n a alleinl sa perfeclion qu apres un cerlain lemps ainsi la science [physique] n a alleinl sa perfeclion qu avec le philosophe [Arislole] el une aulre science [la medecine] n esl parvenue a complelude que lorsque vinl Galien; dans Paslronomie nous n avons pas Irouve qu elle ful parfaile chez aucun des anciens; celle science la a eu besoin d une periode de lemps plus longue pour se perfeclionner.
"les
anciens
chacune
En
lard. effel, ayanl besoin des sens, sa perfeclion esl venue plus Les sciences malhemaliques: geomelne et arilhmelique onl ele les premieres a se perfeclionner car les savanls qui ont precede Arislole onl ecril des livres parfails, selon ce qu on raconte a ce propos. En revanche, la physique avait besoin des sens plus qu elles, aussi eslelle venue a perfeclion plus lard; quanl a la medecine, elle avail besoin plus encore des sens el en parliculier de ce que Pon apprend des experiences el de ce qu on apprend de la chirurgie aussi eslelle parvenue a perfeclion plus lard encore. L aslronomie avail
11
"Sur quelques idees Levinger, Tel-Aviv, 1984, p. 88 et S. Pines: d Isaac Polgar et a Spinoza", dans Etudes de Kabbale, de occasion dc son offertes a I. Tishby a philosophic et de pensee juives (en hebreu) 75eme anniversaire, Jerusalem, 1986, p. 423.
Ezer Hadat, ed.
J.S.
communes au Ezer Hadat
1
260
Sirat
besoin de sens a
point qu il n etait pas possible qu elle vint a apres un temps d une longueur tres remarquable. Si cette perfection est venue si tard c est que ces sciences Jastronomiquesj elevent l homme au degre de la perfection: il les desire naturellement avec grande force. II n est done pas possible que 1 humanite soil eternelle et que ces sciences soient si
perfection
nouvelles..."
centre
n est
.
Le quinzieme lutte
tcl
ce
les
siecle
pour
fut,
persecutions.
qu auparavant, durent defendre de partisans d une attaques
les
Les
la
Juifs,
un
siecle
philosophes
judai sme et
de
nombreux
religion
moins
ouverte
aux
courants
nouveau, on rcprocha aux sciences d etre exterieures au de dctourner les fideles de leur religion.
la
dcfinit
les
sciences
une perfection proprement humaine a laquelle perfection du juif croyant.
introduisant
ajoutera
et
philosophie et les sciences contre les
Dans son Dcrekh Emouna, Abraham Bibago s
retrait
De
exterieurs.
comme
de
moins
a
science n est pas la science de "grecque" demonstrative dont nous parlons car cette science dc
recherche recherche est une science intellectuelle que Phomme acquiert en tant qu homme; elle est done science proprement humaine et non pas science "grecque"; la science grecque est celle qui est particuliere a la Grece et n est pas cejle des autres pcuples...ces sciences sont done des sciences humaines et non pas grecques, des sciences intellectuelles et intcrieurcs [a homme et au juif en tant qu homme] | L et non des sciences exterieures. "La
"
Centre National de
la
Recherche
Les guerres du Seigneur, ed. Riva ed. Constantinoble, 1522,
fol.
di
Scientifique, Paris
Trento, 1560,
46 verso.
fol.
48b,
2eme colonne.
la
la
La philosophic
et la
science selon les philosophes juifs
261
ARSTRACT: Science and Philosophy: the Jewish Philosophers in the Middle Ages
Middle Ages, Jews did not restrict the realm of philosophical investigation: all of knowledge, including religious ones, were subjected to philosophical inquiry. It was accepted by every one that human reason has the right to ask questions; however one of the most frequent criticisms was that philosophy was not the way Jews have to In
the
fields
ask these questions. Jewish philosophers never accepted these criticisms and tried to build systems where Science and Revelation were parallel or complementary. 1 For Jewish Mutakallimun (X century) as for those called neoplatonists (XII century), effort,
philosophy
contrary
to
is
a
corpus
prophecy which
which is homogenous and learnt with by God, however, they are two branches
of sciences, is
given
stemming from the same tree. With Abraham Ibn Daud and Maimonides, there are clearly felt the differences between the revealed God and Aristotle s First Mover. For them, as for the other Aristotelian philosophers, Truth is learnt by learning the sciences; from them onwards, the philosophers tried often, with help of arguments found in to define the field of the Sciences, their methods and the
the
Metaphysics,
Aristotle s
degree
of
perfection they are able to reach.
The most original opinions were those of two philosophers specialised in astronomy: b. Salomon ha-Cohen (Spain-Italy, 13 century) and Gersonides (Provence, 14
Juda
century).
For Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen, the demonstrations of the mathematical sciences are absolute while those of physics are not known completely, absolutely and in themselves; one should be able to adduce in physics proofs manifest to the senses - experimental demonstrations that one cannot question, like experiments carried out in the mathematical and astronomical sciences. In the absence of these demonstrations, one cannot choose between conflicting theories in physics. For Gersonides, the progress of the sciences is far from being complete and has not reached an equal level in the different branches of knowledge. Astronomy is a science where observation by the senses is so necessary that perfection came very late. At the end of the Middle Ages, Jewish Philosophers had to defend themselves against the critique that philosophy induced them to abandon their faith for an alien lore. The answer given by one of them - Abraham Bibago - was that "Greek Wisdom is not the demonstrative science of research; the science of research is an intellectual science, an attribute of man as a human being and, in consequence, it is a human science, not a
Greek
science".
J.
The Theoretical and
MARENBON
Practical
Autonomy of Philosophy
as a Discipline in the Middle Ages:
Latin Philosophy, 125(M350
I
Was
philosophy an autonomous discipline
the
Most
Middle Ages?
later
historians
West during
the Christian
in
of medieval
have
philosophy
chosen profession - a challenge too serious to be met without the assistance of a venerated figure, dominating the pages of their books and justifying their claims to this
regarded
a
as
question
challenge
to
their
be truly historians of philosophy. The identity of the figure varies. For some he is the Arts Master - a new, urban type of teacher with a conception of the scientific enterprise
unclerical
basically
questioning
of
authorities,
guaranteed only by reason.
1
seeking
and
critical
,
as unknown and yet Thomas Aquinas, Doctor of
truths
For others he
is
the distinction between faith and reason, creator of a
sound synthesis
between Aristotelianism and Christianity which preserved the rights of philosophy and theology." For yet others he is the Christian
both
Philosopher, whose treatment of the problems of philosophy less
philosophical,
faith.
but
all
more
the
C.H.
Ix>hr,
The Medieval
Interpretation of Aristotle
in
N. Krct/.mann, A. Kenny, J. pp. 81-98: see pp.
(eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medie\ al Philosophy, 90-1, 95. Behind Lohr s phrases are ideas of J. Le Goffs: cf.
moyen age his
La
Introduction
is
this,
Medical Philosophy
The notion of expounds
it
put
forward with
particular
clarity
by
F.
philosophic au XHIe siecle (Ix)uvain/Paris, 1966), esp. a I etude de la philosophic medie\ ale (Ix>uvain/Paris,
For a discussion of Later
Les
intellectuels
au
(Paris, 1969), esp. pp. 63-9.
This point of view see
made no
3
Pinhorg 86,
is
percipient by his adherence to the
in
Stecnherghen: 46-54 and his
1974), pp. 78-113. to medieval philosophy, see J. Marenbon, Introduction (Ix^ndon, 1987), pp. 83-90.
and other approaches (1150-1350).
Christian
many
van pp.
of his
An
philosophy earlier
is
associated
particularly with
works and, perhaps most
fully,
in
E.
Gilson,
L Esprit
who
de la keen
philosophic medie\ ale (Paris, 1944 ). In his late work, however, Gilson was less and more eager to see the Christian philosophy to stress the distinctiveness of a great scholastic thinkers as theologians: see esp. Les recherches historico-critiques et ,
Autonomy of Philosophy answer
shall
I
the
without the aid of these question raises
about
spectral
figures,
its
recognizing a
historian.
because
philosophers.
philosophia
The main
-
first,
its
Either
Middle Ages; or
the subject which, nowadays,
I
subject
autonomy
is
consider that the
one
real challenge:
an ambiguous word can mean the subjects
is
it
can
it
mean philosophy - that who call themselves
studied by those
of this paper will be the autonomy of in practice; then, its
end with a few remarks about the
shall
autonomy of philosophy
the
Philosophy
ambiguity.
medieval
called philosophia in the is,
263
interesting problems, but only
many
when used by
I
question
5
of
that
as a Discipline
relation
autonomy in theory. between philosophia
and philosophy.
II
Although the word philosophia itself had a number of different meanings 4 in the Middle Ages, there is one usage of it which predominates in thirteenth and fourteenth-century university texts (and which, alone, I be considering here). By this usage, philosophia by reason and observation, without the
will
is
discover
what men can
aid
of
revealed
knowledge.
The organization
studies
in
medieval
universities
autonomy of philosophia in this sense, because where students studied only
practical
were
of
faculties of philosophia,
to natural reason -
physics
using
-
such as grammar,
especially 5
the
logic,
works of
ensured
faculties of arts
the
open and meta
disciplines
biology, physics
Aristotle,
the
Philosophus,
as
sometimes give the impression that this was under attack from conservative theologians and autonomy constantly the Church authorities, who saw the freedom of rational speculation as a their
text-books.
Historians
avenir de la scolastique Antonianum 26 (1951), pp. 40-8 [reprinted in his Etudes medievales (Paris, 1986), pp. 9-17] and Introduction a la philosophic chreticnne (Paris, 1960). I
,
On im
the term
Mittelalter
,
philosophia
Romanische
see E.R. Curtius,
Forschungen
47
Zur Geschichte des Wortes Philosophic (1943),
pp.
290-300;
but
unfortunately,
Curtius ends his survey with the twelfth century. 1
On
the
in
the
Thirteenth
curriculum of the arts faculties, see G. Leff, Paris and Oxford Unh ersities and Fourteenth Centuries (New York/London/Sydney, 1968), chapters 1 and 2; P. Glorieux, La faculte des arts et ses maitres au XUIe siecle (Paris, 1971); J. Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Weisheipl,
Century Mediae\ al Studies 26 (1964), pp. 143-85. ,
Marenbon
264
threat to Christian doctrine.
6
They
the condemnations of 1277 and
cite
the cases of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. But such instances
much
of discord were very
the arts
no
posed
for
possibilities
the
to
challenge
and grammar
logic
even
and,
faith;
with
conflict
The foundation
the exception.
always remained
faculties
subjects which
other
the
in
doctrine
Christian
of teaching in
-
were
arts,
the
and were
few,
rarely taken.
The condemnations so
view,
two
as
long
of
1277 themselves provide evidence for
distinctions
autonomy and hegemony, and
carefully observed:
are
between theoretical
that
this
that
between
and
practical
decree against those engaged in the arts who autonomy. By 7 - indeed exceeded the limits of their faculty Bishop Tempier endorsed directing his
,
autonomy of the arts masters in the He went on, in a series of prohibitions,
-
required
the
disciplines.
8
-
be
in fact
And, by condemning absolutely
enquiry.
certain propositions, which might
reached as the result of natural reasoning,
For instance the
-
thirteenth
two recent discussions
take
to
its
prevent
being
Ix>hr
(op.
cit.,
p.
92) writes:
...in
newly translated philosophical and scientific sources simple concordances which the twelfth century had made to
the
literature
I^tin
ecclesiastical
tradition.
In
this
new
situation
attempted by ecclesiastical condemnations to Bonavcnture and Olivi, saw in Aristotle the
and
read; others, like the last days...
of
beast
apocalyptic
new
the
rejected
-
Tempier attacked the very
the
century
rendered questionable the between authorities limited
some
censure claims
have been made) for the hegemony of claims that philosophia could take the place of theological
(some of which may never philosophia
of their
practice to
;
whilst
M.
Haren
[Mediwal
(Ixmdon,
Thought
1250-77 was a period during which Aristotle was being studied in the major arts faculty of Hurope, in a formal, exegetical fashion, divorced from the wider theological considerations with which it was soon to be adds that ITiis confrontation with radical teaching in the arts faculty at confronted Paris was a dramatic manifestation of the intellectual tensions felt at the time. 1985),
p.
having explained
5],
that
,
Magnarum
et
gravium
quod nonnulli Parisius quosdam manifestos et
pcrsonarum
studentcs
in
crebra artibus
zeloque fidei acccnsa insinuavit relatio, propriae facultatis limites excedentes
exsecrabiles errores ... quasi dubitabiles ed. in R. Hissctte, Enquete sur les 219 disputare praesumunt Paris le 7 mars 1277 (Louvain/Paris, 1977), p. 13. 8
Articles
1
-
7
in
Hissette,
op.
cit.,
pp.
15-27:
scholis
in
:
Quod non
articles
est
tractare
et
condamnes a
excellentior
status
vacare philosophiae; Quod sapientes mundi sunt philosophi tantum; Quod ad hoc quod homo habeat aliquam certitudinem alicuius conclusionis, oportet quod sit fundatus no turn, vel ex per se super principia per se nota; Quod nihil est credendum, nisi per se
quam
notis
possit
certitudinem
declarari;
alicuius
Quod homo non Quod
quacstionis;
debet
esse
contentus
auctoritate
quaestio est disputabilis per rationem, determinare, quia rationes accipiuntur a considerare secundum diversas sui panes;
non debeat disputare et autem omnes res habet Quod omnes scientiae non sunt necessariae, praeter philosophicas non sunt necessariae, nisi propter consuetudinem hominum.
quam rebus.
philosophus Philosophia
ad habendum
nulla
disciplinas;
et
quod
Autonomy of Philosophy as a of the
basis
autonomy of philosophia, but imposed only
theoretical
slight reservation on the arts masters
The
important
only
came from
philosophia
autonomy on the
restrictions
Arts
within.
figure
when
was
began
autonomy
practical
masters were,
in
general,
of
young;
their studies in the arts
they were fourteen or fifteen; after about seven years (the
less fixed in Paris
them went on
of
a
in practice.
their pupils very young. Students usually faculties
265
Discipline
than
at
once
teaching arts
Oxford) they became masters. Few in their mid-twenties - they had
completed two years of obligatory teaching ( necessary regency ); and, even among the exceptional masters who remained in the faculty and
made
none before Buridan (1295/1300 compete with the theologians in depth of reading and is
after 1358) could
a career there,
skill.
analytical
It
not surprising, then, that they turned to theological writings for help their
in
of
pursuit
him 9 ). Nor
is
it
philosophia
Thomas should
differences with St
Siger
of
Brabant,
whose
surprising that they tended to concentrate on the literal
of Aristotelian texts
exegesis
(witness
not obscure the extent of his debt to
(even in quaestio-commcntaries), learning
the lessons of natural reason, not by reasoning but from authority.
What
of the theologians?
They read and used works of philosophia
(usually with greater comprehension than the arts masters). But, just as
was organized around the autonomous study of philo sophia, so the theology faculty was organized around the autonomous study of theology. The theologians set-texts were the Bible and the the
arts
faculty
Sentences of Peter the Lombard; the aim of their long studies was to increase their understanding of the faith.
None
the
less,
many
historians
claim that there are two important ways in which the theologians engaged in the
autonomous
practice of philosophia. First,
works
individual
entirely
Aquinas
s
De
Ockham
s
Summa
works which, detached from
imitate
it
intellectus
said,
and
to his
many
theologians wrote for
philosophia
commentaries on
instance,
Aristotle,
or
Second, there are
logicae.
is
dedicated
are
many passages in theological devoted to natural reasoning and can be
their theological context.
Both these claims
call for
serious
qualification.
9
Re\ ue des sur Siger de Brabant. I. Siger en 1265 theologiques 67 (1983), pp. 201-32, esp. pp. 212-32. Even Radulphus Brito, one of the most sophisticated arts masters, who spent about ten years teaching in the faculty (c. 1296-1306) before going on to study theology, draws heavily
See
sciences
R.A.
on Aquinas:
cf.
Notes
Gauthier,
philosophiques
,
et
Marenbon, op.
cit.,
pp. 140-1.
266
Marcnbon when
Even
he
out
sets
to
write
a
work on
whole
belonging to philosophic!, a theologian does not forget a theologian. For example, Aquinas status
his
in
this
revealed
using
about his
shapes
grasp
the
way he
letter
of the
in
text;
without
reasons,
De
in
intellect
potential
of Aristotle
subject
man and
Christian understanding of
the
scrutiny of the
close
his
despite
it
s
informs
implicitly
premisses,
and
intel/ectus,
life
a
what he knows as
his
imitate
commentaries,
whilst
for
Ockham,
theologian has an explicit role to play even in logic, where God s power to create and annihilate, and Christ s sinlessness, are used as the the
10 arguments in favour of an anti-realist theory of univcrsals. These considerations apply with yet greater force to the claim that
basis for
passages of philosophic! are detachable from their contexts works.
When
an historian
understand a
tries to
attempting to grasp the writer
s
text
as expressed
intention,
in
theological
from the
past,
he
is
the text. But
in
the character of an intention depends on the whole complex of intentions
which
to
it
cannot be isolated for close study, can study the individual atoms which
It
belongs.
that, say, natural science
molecule.
The
theological contexts
There
who
historian
are,
is
philosophic! was practised
By
theologians. organi/.ing
contrast,
principle
detaches passages of philosophic! from their
imposing autonomy, not discovering
then,
strong as an
arguments
arts
discipline
autonomy of
faculties,
although
it.
the
against
autonomous
the practical
of the
the way make up a
in
position
by
later
philosophic! it
was
that
medieval
was the
restricted
by
the age and inexperience of most masters there.
II!
I
come now
that
I
shall
to the theoretical restrict
autonomy of
philosophic!
-
a topic so large
myself to three, connected illustrations
-
from the
master Boethius of Dacia, and from the masters of theology Aquinas and Duns Scotus. I shall then suggest a few more general conclusions. arts
Summa 42-4.
Logicae
J.E.
[ed.
Murdoch
P.
Bochner, G. Gal and
From
Social
into
S.
Brown (New York, Factors:
An
1974)], p. 51:29-
Aspect of the Unitary Character of I^te Medieval learning in J.E. Murdoch and E. Sylla (eds.), The Cultural Context of Medical Learning (Dordrecht/Boston, 1975), pp. 271-348] provides many examples of how, in fourteenth-century thought, concepts derived from theology were used in mathematical and physics discussions. 37,
[
Intellectual
Autonomy of Philosophy as a
De
In his
aetemitate
11
mundi
267
Discipline
Boethius of Dacia discusses
(c.1271/2)
12 problem known to Christian thinkers for centuries. According to natural reason and to Aristotle, it seems that the world is eternal;
a
according to Christian doctrine, the world had a beginning. Can the two positions be reconciled? The main thread of Boethius s argument involves -
a peculiarly precise
and peculiarly narrow
-
statement of this familiar
problem. The natural scientist, says Boethius, is compelled to deny the statement that the world had a beginning. Influenced by the widelystudied Posterior Analytics,
philosophia has
based on them. 13
known from scientist
each
that
own
For instance, the natural
discipline.
natural science.
of a
14
discipline,
But
if
demon
a statement actually goes against
then the exponent of that discipline
compelled to deny it. For the natural scientist, this statement that the world had a beginning, since principle of his discipline that every motion
is
the case with the
is
goes against the caused by a preceding
is
it
15
The problem,
then, for Boethius
scientist denies that the
not
is
which are
truths
He
the principles of his
principles
one.
within
discipline
and contains only
can accept statements about geometry which he cannot
strate within
the
principles
holds
does not, however, believe that the exponent of one compelled to deny a statement, simply because it cannot be
is
discipline
own
its
Boethius
to
show
world had a beginning
the
contradicting
is
revealed
truth
-
the natural
which he must do world
the
that
when
that,
-
have
did
he a
beginning. Boethius solves the problem by arguing that, not only is each discipline based on its principles, but its conclusions must be qualified by these true
,
principles.
what he
according 11
to
is
Whenever a
natural scientist,
N.G. Green-Pedersen
(ed.), Boethii
Dad Opera Vl.ii
For a survey of the tradition, see R. (London, 1983), pp. 193-252. Ed.
cit.,
negare
nisi
example, says
really asserting, according to Boethius,
the principles of natural science
Sorabji,
.
And
it
is
that is
p
is
p
is
true
a matter
of
(Copenhagen, 1976), pp. 335-66.
12
vel
for
Time,
Creation
and
the
Continuum
347:335 - 348:336: ...nullus artifex potest aliquid causare, concedere ex principiis suae scientiae. pp.
... naturalis non potest causare ex suis veritates, quas quae tamen non contrariantur suis principiis nee destruunt suam scientiam, negare non debet. Ut quod "circa quemlibet punctum signatum in superficie
Ibid.,
principiis
p.
nee
351:438-444: scire,
sunt
quattuor recti anguli possibiles" habet veritatem, naturalis ex suis principiis causare non potest, nee tamen debet earn negare, quia non contrariatur suis principiis nee destruit suam scientiam. 15 Ibid.,
pp. 348:345-56; 350:394-8.
Marenbon
268
elementary
note
to
logic
the
that
statement
true
is
p
to
according
something (for instance, according to the principles of natural science ) 16 does not contradict the statement that The natural p is false is forced to The world had no but scientist, then, say beginning .
,
because
mouth
in his
this
sentence means
The world had no beginning
according to the principles of natural science revealed
the
contradict
-
truth
which,
says
he has not been forced to
,
is
Boethius,
truth
without
qualification (simpliciter).
Boethius
succeeds
thus
in the precise
problem
in
terms
providing
an
immediately raises awkward, wider questions. to have anticipated elsewhere in his work.
One If
solution
elegant
which he has stated
in
of
18 it.
to
the
But the solution
them Boethius seems
every statement within a
branch of philosophia is to be understood merely as a statement about the conclusions which follow from that discipline s principles, how is it possible to investigate the relation between the principles of the various is
disciplines? This, says Boethius,
But there
the special function of metaphysics.
another, related question: what
is
is
19
the relation between the
principles of the sciences and the truth of Christian faith ?
Boethius can provide no answer to does.
this question.
Aquinas can, and
Like Boethius, Aquinas analyses the disciplines of philosophia
Aristotelian terms: each has
are drawn.
its
own
Unlike Boethius, he
relation to revealed truth.
He
principles from which
feels
its
in
conclusions
able to order these disciplines in
can do so because,
in his view,
theology
is
a scientific discipline in the Aristotelian sense, like mathematics, physics
and metaphysics.
Ibid.,
eg.
p.
352:468-75:
Quicquid enim naturalis sccundum quod naturalis negat
conccdit, ex causis et principiis naturalibus hoc qua naturalis dicit mundum et primum motum
vel
negat vel concedit. Unde conclusio in esse novum accepta absolute falsa ex quibus ipse earn concludit, ex illis
<non>
est,
sed
si
rcferatur
rationes
in
et
principia
Scimus enim quod qui dicit Socratcm esse album, album secundum quaedam, uterque dicit verum. sequitur.
17 1
8 1
et
qui negat Socratem esse
Ibid. p. 351:422.
of Boethius s argument take his focus to have been Pinborg Zur Philosophic des Boethius de Dacia. Ein Uberblick Studia Mediewistyczne 15 (1974), pp. 165-85, esp. pp. 175-82 (reprinted in his Medie\>al Semantics (London, 1984)], with bibliography. See also P. Wilpert, Boethius von Dacien - Die Autonomie des Philosophen in P. Wilpert (ed.), Beitrdge BerufsbeH usstein des mittelalterlichen Menschen, Miscellanea Mediaevalia III, (Berlin, 1964),
Other
wider.
The
scholars
analyses
fullest
by
is
J.
[
,
mm
pp. 135-52.
See Pinborg, op.
cit.,
pp. 170-2 and the texts quoted by him in n. 12.
Autonomy of Philosophy as a
269
Discipline
This position requires some explanation. The principles of theology the articles of faith which, St Thomas recogni/es, are not self-
are
evident to earthly theologians, in the scientific
heaven.
self-evident,
that Aristotle
however,
some
that
to
are
requires of a the
blessed
in
subalternate
to
recognized disciplines such disciplines are based on principles which are self-evident
others: in
only
They are
discipline.
Aristotle
way
the
higher
instance, optics takes
discipline
which
to
are
they
subalternated.
For
principles from geometry; music from arithmetic.
its
Similarly, according to Aquinas, earthly theology
is
subalternated to the
theology of the blessed; and earthly theologians are enabled to accept the 20
principles of the subalternating discipline that there
Aquinas accepts every sort
by the light of faith a branch of philosophia dealing with
is
.
of being; but this does not mean, for him, that theology
superfluous (or, as
is
does for Boethius, that there
it
between the unqualified truth of
faith
is an inexplicable gap and the true statements made
which are true because they are statements not about the world, but about the disciplines to which they belong). Just as a natural scientist and an astronomer can reach the same within the disciplines of philosophia
-
correct conclusion that the earth
round, each in his different
is
way
-
the astronomer by abstract mathematical calculation, the natural scientist
by material measurement;
so, in general,
the exponents of philosophia and
theology discuss the same things, each of them within the framework of a scientific discipline, but in different
ways
-
the philosophi by the light of
natural reason, the theologians by the light of faith.
Aquinas does Like
value.
by
mankind
his nature
20
Sfumma] I,
q.l,
...
a whimsical
and which, using
Tfheologiae]
and see M.-D. Chenu,
ST
however, consider that these ways are of equal though for very different reasons, he finds the
not,
Hume,
condition of
a.l,
La ad
21
I,
22
The end which man seeks
his natural reason,
he can
attain,
is
not
cf. Commentary on De trinitate, q.2, a.2, ad 5 & comme science an Xllle siecle (Paris, 1957), pp. 64-100.
q.l, a. 2;
theologie 2:
one.
...diversa
ratio
cognoscibilis
diversitatem
scientiarum
1
inducit.
Eandem enim conclusionem demonstrat astrologus et naturalis, puta quod terra est rotunda: sed astrologus per medium mathematicum, idest a materia abstractum; naturalis autem per medium circa materiam consideratum. Unde nihil prohibet de eisdem rebus, de quibus philosophicae naturalis
rationis,
et
disciplinae
aliam
secundum quod sunt cognoscibilia lumine secundum quod cognoscuntur lumine
tractant
scientiam
tractare
divinae revelationis.
22
An
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, XII,2 [ed. L. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, ... the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and 160]: believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations... 1902
),
p.
.
Marcnbon
270
Although by nature he seeks to know God, he does so only created through things; but his true end (which he cannot attain in this his true end.
life)
to
is
enjoy
immediate vision of God. All the enquiries of
the
philosophia are based on an understanding only of of his true one.
23
As
St
Thomas
puts
man
s
natural end, not
it:
The
perfection of a rational creature consists not only in what is fitting for him by his nature t but also in what is attributed by a kind of supernatural participation in God s goodness. For this reason is said ... that the final happiness of man consists in a kind of it supernatural vision of God But man cannot attain this vision save in the manner of a pupil learning from God, his teacher...
Duns Scotus was and
a severe critic of
He
relation to philosophia.
its
Aquinas
s
conception of theology
view of earthly theology as 25 And he will
rejects the
to the theology of the blessed.
a subalternate discipline
not accept that the theologian knows the same things as the exponent of philosophia, but in a different and higher way.
Thomas
own example and
s
his
knows, by
turns
measurements,
back on
it
that the earth
need to know from the astronomer that earth to be round.
See
eg.
26
Commentary on humanac
fincm
posucrunt
Scotus
insists
is
his
that the
He itself.
refers directly to St
Once
the physicist
round, then he does not
show
calculations also
the
same piece of knowledge
Sentences, Prologue, q.l, a.l: ...omnes qui dci contcmplationcm. Contemplatio
vitac
rectc
is
senserunt
autem
del
est
in qua contcmplatione Philosophus una per crcaturas, quae impcrfccta est contcmplativam posuit, quac tamen est fclicitas viae; et ad hanc ordinatur tola cognitio philosophica, quac ex rationihus crcaturarum proccdit. Rst alia dei contemplatio, qua vidctur immediate per suam cssentiam; et haec perfecta est, quae erit in patria et est homini possibilis sccundum fidci suppositioncm. Undc oportet ut ca quae sunt ad fincm proportionentur fini, quatcnus homo manducatur ad illam contemplationcm in statu viae per cognitioncm non a creaturis sumptis, scd immediate ex divino lumine and ibid., Ill d.24, q.l. a.3a, ad 2: per inspiratatam; et hacc est doctrina theologiac rationem ergo naturalem potest cognosci summum bonum, secundum quod diffundit se communicatione natural!, non autem sccundum quod diffundit se communicationc supcrnaturali; et secundum hanc rationem summum bonum est finis nostrae vitae: de quo oportet haberi fidem, cum ratio in illud non possit. ...
dupliciter: felicitatem
;
24
ST, 75
For
11-2, q.2, a.3; cf.
De
veritate, q.14, a. 10.
(non-)scientific character of theology, see Ordinatio [in C. Balic (ed.), Scoti Opera Omnia I (Vatican, 1950)], Prologue, pars 4, q.1-2. Scotus rejects Aquinas s teachings on subaltcrnation at pp. 148:12-149:13. Cf. A.-M. Vellico, De charactero scientifico sacrae theologiae apud Doctorem Subtilem Antonianum 16
loannis
the
Duns
,
(1941), pp. 3-30.
Ordinatio,
ed.
cit.,
Prologue,
q.l.
Scotus
from Aquinas s ST which is reproduced in Contra: si de cognoscibilibus in theologia
n.
quotes (p. above, and then
the
explicitly
48:1-7)
21
comments
passage
(11.
9-14):
cognitio tradita vel possibilis tradi in neccssaria cognitio theologica de aliis licet in alio lumine, ergo non est scientiis, eisdem. Consequentia patet in excmplo eius, quia cognoscens terram esse rotundam per
medium physicum, non
indigct
est
cognitione per
medium mathematicum, tamquam
simpli-
Autonomy of Philosophy
as a Discipline
same piece of knowledge, whatever way
the
it
is
271
discovered.
He
therefore
would be superfluous, if philosophia could provide about knowledge every sort of thing. But, as he goes on to argue, it cannot: although philosophia considers every sort of thing that can be
believes that theology
speculated on,
them,
does not treat everything which can be known about properties about which the philosophi are
it
some have
because
27
inevitably ignorant.
For instance, the philosophi
assert that
God
causes
whatever he causes necessarily. Wrongly - because it is one of God s 28 But they cannot know this by properties to cause things contingently. natural reason.
IV Before trying to draw any conclusions about the theoretical autonomy of
from these three
philosophia like
that,
meaning.
29
philosophy
To
state
illustrations,
autonomy
,
that,
in
the
is
a
later
important to recognize term with more than one is
it
Middle Ages, philosophia was
theory might be to make any one of three, different claims. The weakest of these claims would be that it had autonomy of
autonomous
in
definition; a stronger claim
to
the
truth
of
its
autonomous with regard to Arts masters and granted
unhesitatingly
autonomy of
was autonomous with regard conclusions; strongest of all, that it was
would be
individual
that
it
truth about the subjects
theologians
philosophia
in
it
autonomy
considered.
medieval
the in
the
definition. Just as, in practice, philosophia
universities
weakest
sense:
was autonomous
citer necessaria. ...in illis scientiis speculativis etsi tractetur de omnibus speculap. 50:l^t: non tamen quantum ad omnia cognoscibilia de eis, quia non quantum ad propria eorum... Scotus then refers back to a passage earlier in the quaestio (pp. 22:15 ff.),
Ibid.,
bilibus,
.
which
...VI Metaphysicae: cognitio substantiarum separatarum est nobilissima, quia circa nobilissimum genus; igitur cognitio eorum quae sunt propria eis est maxime nobilis et necessaria, nam ilia propria eis sunt perfectiora cognoscibilia quam ilia in
begins:
quibus conveniunt naturalibus tantum
28
cum (my
sensibilibus.
Sed
ilia
propria non possumus cognoscere ex
puns
italics).
Ibid., p. 24:7-10: Troprietas etiam istius naturae ad extra est contingenter causare; ad oppositum huius magis effectus ducunt, in errorem, sicut patet per opinionem philosophorum, ponentium primum necessaria causare quidquid causal. 29 I am very grateful to Professor Amos Funkenstein for asking a question about autonomy when this paper was read, which has led me to clarify the different, potentially confusing meanings of this term.
et
Marenbon
272
in
the arts faculties, so
in
The
from theology was recognized theory. subjects belonging to philosophia were based on selfevident premisses, observation and reasoning, whereas theology also made distinctiveness
its
use of revealed knowledge.
The example arts
of Boethius of Dacia shows
how
masters to discuss the autonomy of philosophia
went beyond
weak one. They were
this
difficult
it
was
for
any sense which
in
ill-equipped to theorize about the
boundaries of philosophia, as opposed to discussing its internal divisions. scrutinize the boundaries of philosophia, they needed a discipline
To
which, unlike any of the
not
is
arts,
based on natural reason, but
itself
rather places and describes natural reason within a wider context.
The
from Aquinas and Duns Scotus show, by contrast, carefully theologians examined the claims of philosophia to a less weak form of autonomy. Their conclusions varied about its autonomy illustrations
how
with
to
regard
philosophia as reason
the
of
truth
individual
conclusions.
Aquinas
allowed
second, stronger autonomy. He considered that, so long was correctly used and began from self-evident premisses, no this
statement that
it
found true could be
false.
30
Philosophia could therefore
be relied upon, without external correction, to arrive
Duns Scotus
disagreed.
He
argued
that,
true conclusions.
at
without revelation to correct their
the
exponents of philosophia could not avoid concluding the truth of various statements which are, in fact false (for instance, that findings,
God
causes necessarily
Duns Scotus
,
whereas
refusal
s
to
in fact
he causes contingently).
form of autonomy, which Aquinas allows state
that
and
Thomas
St
Duns Scotus
theologian
-
second,
stronger
has often led historians to
it,
recognized the autonomy of philosophia, whereas
did not. But this assessment
Duns Scotus
this
grant philosophia
and,
were united
in
I
would
is
add,
denying the
misleading, for both Aquinas
almost
autonomy
medieval
later
every
of philosophia in the
and most important sense. Even if, as Aquinas (but not Scotus) thought, philosophia asserted no actual falsehoods, theologians were agreed that, nevertheless, it was radically deficient in its efforts to third, strongest,
find the truth. Natural reason could not but
capabilities.
Were
its
misjudge
30
These views are them more explicitly a.8, Summa contra
implied in
Gentiles
his I,
man
be ignorant of
man
s
end and
present position and cognitive conclusions to be considered as an autonomous
therefore could not but
by
the
s
illustrations
discussed
Commentary on Boethius
s
De
above.
trinitate
7 and at the end of De unitate intellectus.
Aquinas q.2,
a.3,
develops
ST
I,
q.l,
Autonomy of Philosophy
as a Discipline
273
body of knowledge, philosophia would therefore mislead. Its value theologians depended on their ability to gauge its limitations.
to the
By denying philosophia autonomy in the strongest sense, later medieval theologians therefore did much more than to insist that the truths of philosophia needed to be supplemented by the truths of They pointed out
theology.
-
offered by philosophia
the picture
that
of
man and
the
universe
account of topics as various as cognition, - was volition and virtue mistaken. It was for this reason that, causality, its
autonomous practice of philosophia in the arts a propaedeutic, the theologians did not themselves practise
whilst they accepted the as
faculties
philosophia autonomously. In their view, the great thinkers of antiquity had been forced, by the accident of their time of birth, to seek the invisible things of in
more
a
whether within
There
fortunate
only through what was made.
is
The
Christian
search
disciplined
was
For him, philosophia must be placed a scheme of a work, or in a single work
position.
institutionally, or in
the
guidance of
been
God
for
a
truth
not
without
attainable
-
-
the
faith.
a
saying.
more general There
conclusion to be drawn from
are, doubtless,
many
all
that
I
some of them
similarities,
have close,
between the problems and methods of medieval thinkers and those of modern philosophers. But, regarded as disciplines, philosophia and modern philosophy bear
Few
little
of the
philosophy,
resemblance.
many
although
of
many
them
are
still
studied,
Philosophia provided a general education, taken by studies
a
now
subjects included in philosophia are
basic
all
parts of
independently.
who pursued
their
by contrast, is a specialist was as a lower set of disciplines, from subject. Philosophia recognized which students could pass on to higher disciplines, such as theology.
Modern
beyond
philosophers
level;
take
a
philosophy,
less
modest view of
although some modern philosophers might claim mark of their discipline - like that of philosophia
their
studies.
-
is
its
basis in natural
reason, there are two ways in which this apparent similarity First, there are
many
And,
that the distinguishing
is
deceptive.
other subjects nowadays besides philosophy which
can equally well be said to be based on natural reason. The philosopher
Marenbon
274
some
therefore have to find
will
his pursuit.
contrast
-
Second,
in the
additional characteristic to distinguish
Middle Ages natural reason was understood by
with supernatural cognitive powers and with revelation. Outside
meaning of the term - if it retains any - is different. If, then, philosophia and modern philosophy are so unlike, study of the autonomy of philosophia in the Middle Ages cannot be used - as this context, the
many
historians of medieval thought have tried to use
the claim that their material historians
of philosophy
.
is
truly philosophy
Rather,
it
should
and
it
-
to establish
that they are truly
make them aware
of the
dangers of assuming that the organization of knowledge in past times will
conform
to
modern
expectations, and lead
them
to reflect
posed by the very notion of the history of philosophy
Trinity College,
1
A
on the problems
31 .
Cambridge
companion to such reflection is provided by the essays in R. Rorty, J.B. and Q. Skinner (eds.), Philosophy in History (Cambridge, 1984). This collection includes articles on ancient, early modern and more recent thought. But no period raises the problems its contributors explore more pointedly than the Middle and perhaps even Ages. Historians of medieval philosophy have much to learn from useful
Schneewind
more
to contribute to
-
such theoretical discussion.
INDICES
Index of Manuscripts
DOUAI Bibliotheque municipale 434
47. 48
ISTANBUL 229
Aya Sofya 4855
PARIS Bibliotheque Nationale hebr. 720 hebr. 956 lat. 2598 lat. 14715 lat. 16134 Bibliotheque de
la
258 258 41
190 189. 190
Sorbonne lat.
581
41
PRAHA Univerzitm Knihovna IV. D. 13
47
WIEN Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek VPL 1438
61
VATIC-\NO (CITTA DEL) Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana
47
782 7678
169
Pal. lat. 1171
41
lat. lat.
Index of
Abbad ibn Sulaiman 231 Abraham Bibago 260, 261
Asquith,
Abu Ma shar (sive Albumasar) 26, Abu Rkla, M.A.A. 86, 229, 232-234 Ackrill,
28.
45
Asztalos,
Parvipontanus 169 201
Adclardus dc Bath 22-25 Acgidius Assisicnsis 65 Acgidius Romanus 139 Affifi. A.A. 90 al-Ahsa Iibn AbF Djumhur 247 al-Ahwani, A.F. 233, 238, 239 Alanus dc Insulis 32 Albalag Isaac 257 Albcricus dc Rcmis 35 Albcrtus Colonicnsis (Magnus) 131,
134-136, 152, 155, 160 132,
Badawi, A. 85, 90 Bachrcns, W.A. 14 Bacumkcr, C. 58 Baker, D. 215 Balic, C. 54, 270
34,
149,
55, 151,
Bancth, D.H. 253 Barbel, J. 16 Barnes, J. 112 Barth, ILM. 74 Baur, L. 30,39, 131, 151
Albcrtus dc Saxonia 172, 189-192 Alcuinus 17 Alexander dc Alexandria 139, 156 Alexander Aphrodisicnsis 86, 238 Alexander dc Hales 51,55
IkrcngariusTuroncnsis 18 Bcrnardus Carnotcnsis 29 Bernard us Silvcstris 28
Alexander Neckham 20, 169 Ambrosius Mediolancnsis 14,
Bianchi, L.
Amm,A. A mm, U.
Beekenkamp. W.I I.
Bcrtoldus Mosburgcnsis 56, 57 18. 19
c
230, 238
Blasius Pelacani dc
Anawati, G. 90, 229, 233, 239
Ansclmus Cantuariensis
13,
17,
18,
37,
59 165, 195
32,
Arbcrry, A.J. 94, 229 Aristotclcs
66-68, 92,
10,
11,
47,
48,
50,
122,
124-127,
140,
141,
161,
164,
229,
231,
55,
101,
102,
151,
146,
166,
179,
168,
210,
233,
238,
33,
34,
57-60,
79-84,
130-132,
144,
209,
26,
72-77,
71,
97-99,
204-207,
171,
266
46,
48,
49,
132,
17,
133,
23,
135,
28,
148,
179, 181
4,
70.
93,
Parma 46
Blumbcrg, H. 258 Blumcnbcrg, II. 214 Boehner, Ph. 147, 170,
Ikx:thius (A.M.T. Severinus)
Apollinaris Offredi
45,
179
Black, D.L. 92, 94 Bland, K.P. 245, 246
al- Amin, Abu al-Hasan Ammonius 229, 231
41,
18
Bcnakis, L.G. 223, 224
240 92
54, 55,
37,
Babbit. S.M. 206
141,
139,
165, 172
3, 11, 17, 18, Augustinus (Aurclius) 51,58, 111, 139, 199,212-220 Augustinus Triumphus de Ancona 139
141
Adams, M. McCord
M.
Atay, H. 100 Atiych. G.N. 231
106, 107
J.
74
P.
al-Asturlabl 232
c
Adam Balsamiensis Adamdc Bockfeld
Names
36,
37,
62,
63,
85-88,
104-118,
90,
120-
137,
138,
153-156.
159,
134,
194,
198-201,
Boethius de Dacia 266-269, 272
Bonaventura 20, Borgnet, A. 55
34-36,
34, 36, 37, 58-60,
Bouyges, M. 92, 241, 245 Braakhuis, II.A.G. 169, 187 Brady, T.A. 213
213,
219.
223.
224,
Brecht, B. 4
243,
247,
249,
253-
Brewer,
J.S.
40
256, 259, 261, 262-269 Aristotcles (Pseudo-) 231
Bridges, J.H. 36.37 Brion, F. 235, 236
Aristoxenus 226
Brisson, J.-P.
Arkoun, M. 235 Ashworth, H.J. 173
Brown, M.A. 173 Brown, P. 220
19
187,
188,
264
264,
Index of Names
de
Brown, S.F. 66, 171, 266 Browning, R. 223 Busse, A. 229,238
279
L.M.
Rijk,
32,
104,
164,
169,
173,
187 Descartes, R. 158
Butterworth, C.E. 90
Destrez,
Buytaert, E.M. 49
de Vooght,
J.
46
P. 49 Wulf, M. 49 Didymus de Alexandria 224 Dieterici, F. 238
De Callus,
D.A. 141
Caroti, S. 45
Cassiodorus (Flavius Magnus Aurclius) 28 Cavalla, F. 216 Celano, A.J. 199 Chahine, O.E. 242 Chalcidius 22 Chandler, B. 194 Charles, E. 152 Chatelain, A. 33 Chejne.A.G. 234 Chemli, M. 242 Chenu, M.-D. 46, 47, 55, 269
Dionysius Areopagita (Pseudo-) 21, 57 c Dirar ibn Amr 231 S. 240 Diwald, al-Djuwaini 241
Christianus Druthmarus 14
Duhem,
Cicero (Marcus Tullius) 29, 30, 213 Clay, M. 74 Clemens Alexandrinus 15, 18, 224
Dumoutet, E. 17 Dunlop, D.M. 95 Dunphy, W. 50 Dunya, S. 90, 94,
Clucas, L. 223
Cochrane, C.N. 216 Cohen, I.E. 79 Coleridge, S.T. 255 Combes, A. 54 Constable, G. 223, 226 Constantinus IX 223 29 "Cornificius" Cortabarria, A. 232 Cosman, M.P. 194 Costa ben Luca vide Qusta Courcelle, P. 23 Courtenay, W.J. 179 Cripps, H. 204 Crombie, A.C. 150, 151 Crouzel, H. 13 Cubukc,u, I.A. 100 Curtayne, H. 204 Curtius, E.R. 263 Daguillon,
J.
b.
Gundissalinus
28,
136,
138,
30,
131,
133, 136, 140, 153
Dondaine, H.F. 20 Doyle, A.C. 81 Dronke, P. 28 45, 167
P.
101, 239, 242
Eucherius 16 Euclides 43, 255
Luqa
Fakhry,
M. 242
al-Farabl,
Abu Nasr
86-89,
28,
92,
94,
97, 237-244, 246-249
Faral, E. 204
Federici Vescovini, G. 41, 46 Festugiere, A.J. 12 Finnis,J. 207,211 Forrest, E. 204
Franciscus Petrarca 31 228,
230,
231,
234,
235, 237-
Daniel Morleius 27
Dante Alighieri
1-5, 7, 8,
36
Davy, M.M. 33 Decker, B. 133, 135 J.
Frank, R.M. 99, 229 Frankowska, M. 152 Frazer, J.G. 219
d Alverny, M.-Th. 26
Ghellinck,
135,
Elamrani-Jamal, A. 239 Elias 238 Elkana, Y. 164 Endress, G. 230-233, 243, 247, 248 Euagrius Ponticus 12
239, 242
De
Dominicus
133,
Ehrle, F. 64
53
II.
132,
129,
Ebbesen, S. 171, 187 Eckhardus de Iloheim 58
Dahan, G. 14 Daiber,
Doig, J.C. 153
15
de Lubac, H. 15, 18, 20 de Libera, A. 158, 165, 169, 181, 190, 195 Delorme, P.M. 20, 34, 58, 134 Denifle, H. 33
Frend, W.H.C. 215 Funkenstein, A. 167,271 Gabriel Bielus 179 Gal, G. 50, 171, 266
Galenus 26,259 Galilei,
G.
4,
168, 179
Galston,
M. 92
158-160,
164,
165,
167,
Index of Names
280
Gardet, L. 229,240 Garin, E. 44 Garnerius dc Rupeforti 21 Garrison, J. 76, 79
Hachem, H. 242
Gastaldelii, F. 21
Ha ring,
Gaudentius Brixiensis 19
Hamilton, A. 198,218 Haren, M. 264 Haridi, A.A. 90 Hartmann, N. 157 c al-Hasan al-Mu izz[ 247 Haskins, C.H. 22,24-26,28
Guillaumont, C. 12 Guy.J.C. 217
1
Gauthier, R.A. 35, 199, 265 Gauthier, L. 244 Genest, J.F. 65
Gerardus de Bononia 48-50, 55, Gerardus Cremonensis 116 Gersonides vide Levi b. Gerson Gewirth, A. 206,209-211
61,
62
Abu Hamid
86, 87, 92, 96, 98-
248
F.
Gilbertus Porretanus (sive Pictavicnsis) 32, 181-183
Hilarius Pictavicnsis 19
Hintikka, J. 72-77, 79-81, 109, 179, 181 Hintikka, M.B. 74 Hippocrates 26
Gilby.T. 142 Gilson, E. 63, 215, 216, 262 Glorie, F. 11 Glorieux, P. 263
Hissettc, R.
34,35,62,264 Hoffman, F. 171 Hoffmans, J. 49,55
Glueck, A. 19 Godefridus de Fontibus 48, 49, 55 Goethe, J. 7 Goichon, A.M. 240 Gouillard,
Homcrus I
J.
Graiff, C.A.
66,
229
146, 152
Grant, E. 179
Green-Pedersen, N.J.
35,
267
Gregorius I papa (Magnus) 215 Gregorius Ariminensis 179, 206, 208 Gregorius ITiaumaturgus 13 Gregory, T. 10 Grisez, G.G. 207,211 Gualterus Burlacus 168, 170, 173-178, 190 Guido Bonatus 41,45 Guido de Cavalcantibus 35 Guilclmus Buser 173 Guilclmus de Conchis 23-25,29-31 Guilelmus Hentisberius 162, 166, 188-190, 194, 197
Guilelmus Lucensis 21 Guilelmus de Moerbcka 56, 116 Guilelmus de Ockham 50, 61, 71,
147,
83,
114-115,
149,
160,
8
252
Hrabanus Maurus
223
Grabmann, M.
2, 7,
lorovit/., S.
Hourani, G. 96, 98, 229, 238, 244 Hovannisian, R.G. 89, 234
L.E. 244
Goodman,
Hermes Trismegist us 28,44,57 Hcrvaeus Brito 169 Hervaeus Natalis 50
103, 241-243, 245-247, 249, 257, 258
Ghazoul,
19,23, 182
Heidegger, M. 157, 158, 159, 161 Henricus de Gandavo 53, 139, 179 Henricus Harkelaeus (sive Harkeley) 65
Geycr, B. 58, 132 al-Ghazall,
N.
117-127, 162,
164,
129,
171,
65-67,
130,
139,
176-180,
Guilelmus de Sancto Theodorico 23-25 Guilelmus Shirovodus (sive de Shyreswood) 169, 170, 176
16,
20,
21,
28-
Husscrl, E. 6
lacobus de Bencdictis lacobus Foroliviensis
(si\
e
(sive
de Todi) 65 de Turre) 53,
62 lacobus Pistoricnsis 35 lacobus Venctus 116 Badjdja, Abu Bakr (sire Avcmpacc) 241-243, 246, 247, 249 Ibn Da ud, Ibrahim 252-254, 261
Ibn
62,
198, 200-206, 265, 266
Guilelmus de Sutton 190 Guilelmus de Ware 61 Guillaumont, A. 12
15
Hudry, V. 26 Hugo Bcnzi 195 Hugo de Novocastro 184 Hugo de Sancto Caro 179 Hugo dc Sancto Victore 30 Hugonnard-Roche, H. 194 Hume, D. 78,79,207,269 Ilunain ibn Ishaq 86 Hunger, H. 223,224
Ibn Ha/.m, Abu Muhammad Ibn al-Khammar 240
c
Ali 234
Ibn Khaldim, Wall al-Dm 247-249 C Ibn Miskawaih, Abu AH 235 Ibn al-Nadim. Abu al-Faradj 86 e Ibn al-Nafls, Ala al-Dm 244 Ibn Rushd, 35,
68,
Abu 70,
al-Walid (sive Averrocs)
85,
89,
90,
95,
138,
139,
Index of Names
144,
179,
145,
255,257 Ibn
c
Abu
Sina, 86,
87,
234,
229,
AIi
(sive
Avicenna)
89-98,
101,
132,
144,
151,
152,
138-141, 247, 249
244-249,
241,
133,
135,
28,
136,
238-244,
233,
Ibn Taimiyya 102, 247
Ibn Tufail, 247, 249
Abu
Inati, S.C.
240, 243, 244, 246,
78,
Klein-Franke, F. 229 Kleineidam, E. 171
Knuuttila,
Duns Scotus 139,
49, 144,
60,
54,
145,
61,
148,
77,
179,
Duns Scotus (Pseudo-) 83 de Glogovia 155, 156 Italus 223 de Mirecuria 179, 194
74,
79,
80,
165,
179,
J. 139 Koyre, A. 158, 159, 167, 168, 179 Kraemer, J.L. 240,242 Kraus, P. 235 Kraye,J. 231 Krebs, E. 50 Kretzmann, N. 78, 111, 165, 262 Krieger, G. 204 Kristeller, P.O. 35
186,
187,
Kuhn, W. 231
Pagus 169
Peckham
73,
Koch,
Buridanus 139, 140, 203-205, 265 Cassianus 14, 16, 17, 19 Chrysostomus 214 135,
S.
181-183, 186
180, 183, 202, 266, 270-272
loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes
Abu Yusuf 26-28, 43, 86, 229, 231-234, 236, 237, 247, 249
al-Kindl,
W. 199,207 Kneepkens, C.H. 173
94
80,
al-Khudain, M. 233 Khulaif, F. 240
Kluxen, Bishr Malta 85, 86, 90
Ingarden, R. 156, 157 loannes de Bassolis 49
loannes loannes loannes loannes
Khalidi,T. 232 Khashaba, A. 88
Kitcher, P. 74
Abu Bakr
Ibn Tumart 247 Ibn Yunus,
281
Kuhn.T. 167
63, 64
Philoponus 86 de Ripa 54, 57
Lacey, R.K. 235 Lanfrancus Cantuariensis 18, 19
Sarisberiensis 29-32
Scotus Eriugena
16, 17,
Lappe, 20
de Vercellis 45, 46 Wiclefus 206 Xiphilinus 223 Isaac Pulgar 258, 259 Ishaq ibn Hunain 85, 86 Isidorus Hispalensis 28
J.
68,
69
Laufs,J. 217
Leaman, O. 243
Jay.J. 198,219 Jeauneau, E. 17
J. 53, 62 G. 114, 115, 119, 125, 127, 263 LeGoff,J. 262 Lehrer, K. 74 Lehtinen, A.I. 165, 186 Leibniz, G.W. 179 Lemay, R. 26, 28 Lemerle, P. 223 Levib. Gerson 258,259,261 Levinger, J.S. 259 Levy, R. 228 Lewin, B. 240 Lewry, P.O. 169, 173
181,239 Joseph ibn Caspi 258 Joseph ben Jacob ibn Zaddlq 251, 252 Juda ben Salomon ha-Cohen 254-256, 261
Locke, J. 79 Lohr, C. 229,262,264 Lottin, O. 199
lustinus 15
Ivry,A. 231-233,245 Jacobi, K. 181 Jahier,
H. 240
Jansen, B. 60
Jolivet, J.
Kahaza, Z. 65, 190 Kamali, S.A. 247
Kamlah, W. 215 Kant, I. 159,207,228,234 Kassem, M. 90,246 Kazhdan.A. 223,226 Keicher, O. 10 Kenny, A. 78,111,207,262
Leclercq,
Leff,
Little,
A.G. 39-41
Luce,J.V. 3 Luther, Martin 54, 59 c
c
al-Ma arn, Abu al- Ala 235 McCullough, W.S. 240 McEvoy.J. 111,121,124,126 McGrade,A.S. 198,203
Machamer, P.K. 165 Mclnerny, R. 129, 207
Index of Names
282
Macrobius
19,
22
Nardi, B. 35
Madclung, W. 247 Madison,J. 198 Mahdi, M. 87, 92, 243, 248 Maier, A. 159, 165 Maieru, A. 159, 165, 172 Makdisi, G. 228
Newton,
Mancini, F. 65
Nikolaou, T. 224 Nissim de Massilia 258
Mandonnet,
46
P.
Numenius
15
262, 265
Markus, R.A. 215, 219 Marlowe, C. 7 Marmura, M.H. 85,
Oakley, F. 179 89,
91,
98,
99,
232-
Oberman, H.A. 179,213 Oberndorfer, D. 248
O
235, 238-246
Donnell, J.R. 68, 170
Marrone, J. 179 Marrou, H.-I. 216 Marsilius de Inghen 190
Odo
Marsilius Patavinus 67, 68, 206 Martens, J.L. 74
Owen, G.H.L. 75
Origenes 13-15,
Owens,
Minio-Paluello, L. 85 Mohammed, O.N. 245 b.
Maimon
Maimonides)
(sive
242,
253, 254, 256, 259, 261 Moises ibn Tibbon (sive Moises
al-Sulami 230
159,
187, 188, 189, 194,
266
Musa, M.Y. 239 Nadawi,
S.
102
Nadjdjar, P.M. 237, 243
Pagels, II 214 Pagnoni Sturlesc, M.R. 57 Paravicini Bagliani, A. 159 Paret, R. 228 Parmenides 104 Paulus Venetus 173 Pelzer, A. 49 Pereira, M. 45 Perreiah, A. 173 Petit, J. 66 Pctrus Abaelardus 18, 19, 179, 181 Petrus de Abano 41,42,45 Petrus de Alliaco 46, 66, 179 Petrus de Alvcrnia 139, 199 Petrus Aureoli 49,52, 139 Petrus Cantor 17 Petrus Ceffons 65, 194
Philo Alexandrinus 224, 227 Pichery, E. 16
Pinborg, J. 78, 111, 171, 187, 262, 268 Pines, S. 235,247,259
Muckle, J.T. 62 Miiiler, M. 22 J.B.
144, 145
Petrus Sanitus 190
Mountain, W.J. 11
Murdoch,
224
Pctrus Ix)mbardus 48, 265 Petrus Mantuanus 165, 195
92, 99
Mu c ammar ibn cAbbad
J.
19,
Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis 169, 190 Petrus loannes Olivi 60, 264
Narboncnsis) 245, 258
Moraux, P. 224 Morewedge, P. Morienus 43
Rigaldi 46-48, 51, 52, 71
Oehler, K. 223, 224
Martianus Capclla 28 al-Marwa/.i, Ibrahim 86 Massignon, I,. 247 Maurach, G. 23 Maurer, A. 129 Medawar, P. 255 Meek, T.J. 240 Melville, H. 3 Menut,A.D. 206 Mcyerhof, M. 244 Michael Scotus 132, 140 Michael Pscllus 223 Michel, T. 247 Michot, J.R. 239 Miles, M.R. 220
Moises
158
al-Nowaihl, M. 248 Nuchelmans, G. 105
Maraya 85 Marcolino, V. 208 J.
72, 73, 76, 79, 83, 140,
Nock, A.D. 12
Mansion, S. 75 c al-Mar ashF, Mahmud 247
Marcnbon,
I.
Nicolaus de Methone 223 Nicolaus Oresme 194, 206 Nicolaus de Ultricuria 68, 69, 71 Nicolettus Vcrnias 138 Nietzsche, F. 210
163-168,
178,
185,
Pingree, D. 43 Plato 15, 19, 22, 37, 43, 57, 58, 87, 88, 104,
110,
111,
121,
124,
217, 218, 231, 247, 249 Plotinus 231,232,249 Pluta, O. 74
Podskalsky, G. 223
131,
154,
159,
Index of Names
283
Gaon 250 c Sa ada, R. 245
Popper, K. 167 Porphyrius 117,229,238,257 Prezzolini, G. 215
Saadia
Proclus 56, 57, 223, 231, 232, 247, 249
al-Samau
Salmon ben Ycruhim 250 232
al
al-Sarakhs! 86
Qalonymos ben Qalonymos 241 al-Qirqisani, Abu Yusuf 250
al-Sawi, S. 235, 236
Luqa 229 Quwairi, Abu Ishaq 86
Schmitt, C. 231
al-Rabe, A.A. 247,248 Radulphus Brito 187, 265
Scholz, R. 67
Rahman, F. 239 Raimundus Lullus 10, 56 Raimundus Massilicnsis 28 Ramus, P. 105
Selby-Bigge, J. 269 Serene, II. Ill
Qusta
Schacht,
b.
J.
244
Schmitt, F.S. 13, 17, 18
Schneewind, J.B. 274 Schreiner, P. 223
al-Shahrastani 247 Shaull, R. 216
Shehaby, N. 94
Randi, E. 179, 180, 184 Rashdall, II. 34 Rashed, R. 239 Ratzinger,
J.
Siasos, L. 223 (sive
86, 234,
Rhazes)
235, 237, 249 al-Razi,
Abu Hatim
235-237, 249
Sidarus, A. 233 Siddiqi, S.A. 243
Sigerus
de Brabantia
Redondi, P. 159 Remes, U. 79
146, 152, 264, 265 Sileo, L. 47,48,51
Remigius Altissiodorensis 46
Silverstein, T.
Rescher, N. 86, 95
al-Slrafi,
Abu
Rhabanus Maurus vide Hrabanus Maurus
Sirat, C.
250,255,257
Ricardus Ricardus Ricardus Ricardus Ricardus
35,
Skinner, O. 274 Sorabji, R. 165, 267
Rufus Cornubicnsis 169, 187 de Sancto Victore 20, 37, 56
Spade, P.V. 173, 176, 177, 186 Speck, P. 223 Spengler, O. 8 Spiazzi, R.M. 113 Spiegelberg, H. 219 Spinoza, B. 259 Stachowiak, II. 243
Swyneshed 167
228 Robertus Fland 173 Robertus Grossatesta 116,
117,
151, 153, 169 Robertus I lolcot
121,
38,
122,
39, 59,
124,
60,
111,
126,
150,
11, 45, 46, 55,
34,
139,
Stanford, W.B. 3,6 Steele, R. 39, 134, 152
62,63
Robertus Kilwardby Rogerus Baco 33,
50,
28 c Sa ld 231
Kilvington 173, 189 de Lavenham 173
Ritter, J.
112,
256,
257
215
Abu Bakr
al-Razi,
Shem-tob ben Joseph ben Falaquera
141
36-41, 45, 71,
134, 136, 139, 146, 151, 152, 160, 219
131,
Stegmullcr, F. 11,55 Stephanus de Aurelianis (sive Tempier) 24, 34,
264
Rogerus Marston 59 Rogerus Swyneshed 173-175, 177
Strozewski, W. 128 Stump, E. Ill, 169, 171, 173-177
Rorty, R. 274 Rosenthal, E.J. 248
Sturlese, L. 57
Rosenthal, F. 230, 232 Ross, W.D. 137
Sudhoff, K. 27 Suringar, W.II.D. 29,31 Sylla,
E.D. 159, 187, 191-194, 266
Rossi, P. 38, 111, 112, 116, 151, 154
Roth.L. 253 Rowson, E.K. 238
Tatarzynski, R. 156
Rudavsky, T. 179 Ruether, R.R. 214 Rufinus 14
Tavard, G.H. 20 Taylor, C. 231 Tennyson, A. 3 Themistius 32, 86
Rupertus Tuitiensis 19 Ruska, J. 42 Ryan, W.F. 231
Tatianus 15
Theodoricus Carnotensis
23, 29, 31
Theodorus Smyrnaeus 224
145,
Index of Names
284
Thery, P.O. 58 Thomas de Aquino 81,
139,
45-50, 52,
121-124,
112-118,
82,
141-144,
199-201,
148,
204-213,
149,
218,
61-64,
129-137,
126,
152,
219,
71,
154,
179,
229,
246,
262, 265, 266, 268-270, 272 ITiomas Bradwardinus 67, 164, 166. 206 Thomas, P. 29 Tishby, I. 259
Walzer, R. 85, 134 c Wasil ibn Ata 230, 231
W.M. 232,241 Webering, D. 114, 115, Weidemann, H. 181 Weil, S. 252 Watt,
Weinberg,
J.
80
Weisheipl, Weiss, B.
J.
263
117, 119, 125
%
Tornero, E. 234 Touati, C. 258 Trapp, A.D. 208 Trechsel, J. 203 Turnbull, R.G. 165 c al-Tiisi, Ala al-Dm 96, 245 al-f iisl, Naslr al-Dm 94, 95, 247
Weiss, G. 223,224 Westmann, R. 167
Ullmann, W. 206
Wilson, C. 162, 166, 190, 195, 197 Wippcl, J. 129
Widomski.J. 145 Wieland, G. 199 Willner, H. 22 Wills, G. 198 Wilmot, I. 204 Wilpcrt, P. 268
Ulricus Argcntoratensis 52, 53, 55
Wittgenstein, L. 219 Wtodek, 7. 129
Vajda, G. 247,250,257 Van den Ikrgh, S. 245 Van Ess, J. 230
Wolska-Conus, W. 223 Wolter, A. 77, 78, 135
Van Rijcn,J. 109, 182 Van Stccnhcrghcn, F. 262
Wright, T. 20, 169
105
Yefct ben Eli 250 Yrjonsuuri, M. 74
Vasoli, C. Vcllico,
A.-M. 270
Vcrgilius (Puhlius V. Vettcse, A. 179
Maro)
1, 2,
19
Yuhanna
ibn Hailan 86
Vignaux, P. 54, 59, 61, 65, 179, 190 Vincentius Bcllovacensis 132
/ainaty, G. 242 Tambclli, P. 45
von Frit/., K. 110 von Wright, G.H. 1 Vryonis, S. Jr. 89,234
/amponi,
S.
45
Tayid, S. 90,92,239 /edler, B.H. 241
/immermann, A. Walafridus Strabo 17 Wallace, R.M. 214 Wallace, W.A. 162 Walsh, J.J. 204
H. 240 7iyadeh, M. 242 7uraiq, C. 235
al-7irikll,
A-,t:
/
11
/
129, 138, 139, 141, 144
B
720 C6 1987 V.I C.I
ROBA
ISBN 95 1-9264-09-4 ISSN 0355-1792 Helsinki 1990
Yliopistopaino